NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 9

- 1647

__________ SHAHEED WILLIAMS , Appellant

v. JAMIE FERDARKO; WILLIAM M. SUTHERLAND; DR. MAXA; KIMBERLY SMITH; GARY L. PRINKEY; LISA ZUPSIC

________ ____________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court f

or the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 17

- cv - 00313 ) District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter

____________________________________ Submitted Pu rs uant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) M a r c h 1 9 , 2 0 2 0 Before: A M B R O , G R E E N A W A Y , J r . , a n d P O R T E R , Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : April 9, 2020)

___________

OPINION *

___________ PER CURIAM Pro se appellant Shaheed Williams appeals the dismissal of his law s uit for failure

t o state a claim . For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Cour t’s judgment.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Williams , who is incarcerated at State Correctional Institution Forest, filed a civil rights complaint on November 16, 2017, claiming that various Department of Co rrections employees (“DOC defendants”) and medical contractors (“medical defend ants”) failed to provide him with adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and state tort law. Williams alleged that in January 2015 he recei ved surgery to re move a benign cyst from his chest that had been causing him pain

. After the su rgery , he continued to experience chest and back pai n and other symptoms , w hich he believe s to be the result of spinal compression from a mass that wa s mistaken ly n ot removed du ring the surgery

. He claimed that the medical defendants refused to order him an MRI a nd instead prescribed ineffective treatments that led to permanent damage to his spine. In addition to money damages, Williams sought a preliminary inj unction enjoini ng the defendants to order him an MRI and a neurological exam

. The DOC defendants moved to dismiss Williams’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that he had not alleged their personal involvement as required under 42 U.S.C

. § 1983. Adopting the report and recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the Dist rict Court granted the motion

. The medical contractor defendants also moved to dismiss , arguing that Williams ’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations or, alternativ el y, that Williams had failed to state a

c laim

. The District Court granted the m otion. Adopting a Magistrate Judge’s oral recommendation, the Di strict Court also denied Williams’ request for a preliminary3 injunction for failing to demonstr ate either a li ke lihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Williams timely appealed. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s judgment pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s grant of the motion s to dism iss pursuant to R ule 12(b)(6). See Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark , 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Ci r. 2018)

. To survive dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by including facts that “permit the court to infer mor e than the mere
p ossibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678

– 79 (2009) ; see also Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc. , 704 F.3d 239, 244

– 45 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that,

a lthough held to less stringent standards , pro se litigants are stil l required to a ss ert sufficient facts to support a claim )

. We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe those facts in the light mo st favorable to the plaintiff. Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co. , 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012)

. While we revie w a district court’ s ultimate denial of a preliminary inj unction for abuse of dis cretion, we review factual findings for clear error and lega l c onclusions de novo. See Brown v. City of Pittsburgh , 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009)

. We may a ffirm on any gr ou nd supported by the record. See Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist. , 805 F.3d 454 , 469 (3d Cir. 2015). We agree with the District Court that Wil liams failed to state that the DOC defendants were personally responsible for violating his Eight h Amendment rig ht s . See Rode v. Dellarciprete , 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3 d Cir. 1988) (explaining that a § 1983 action cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior)

. Williams’ complaint4 adm itted that the DOC defendants had no responsibilities other than administra t i ve oversight of inmates’ medical care. Rather, he alleged that because the DO C defendants processed his numerous grievances , they kn ew about the alleged ongoing constitutional violation . However, m erely responding to or reviewing an inma te grievance do e s not rise to the level of personal involvement necessary to allege a deliberat e indifference claim.
See id. at 1208. And although “ [a] high

- ranking prison official can expose an inmate to danger by failing to correct serious known defici encies in the p r o vision of medical care to the inmate population,” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc. , 766 F.3d 307, 324 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on oth er grounds by Taylor v. Barkes , 575 U.S. 822 (2015), Williams failed to identify a supervisory policy, pra ctice, or custo m that caused him harm , see Sample v. Diecks , 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)

. Will i ams also failed to state an Eighth Amendment cl aim against the medical defendants . To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege acts or omissions by p rison officials t hat indicate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v.
Ga mble , 429 U.S. 97, 104

– 05 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility , 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference by establ ishing that the d efendants “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care.” Estel le , 429 U.S. at 104

– 05. However, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute i s over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts a re generally

re l u ctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound5 in state tort law.” United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County , 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1 979) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Altho ugh Williams di d not receive the MRI he requested , by his own account he was not denied medical care. His complaint states that , between January 2015 and August 2017, he received medical attention at l east thirty

- five times , including having

numerous x - ra ys and an EKG t a k en, being prescribed pain medications , and attending physical therapy. He all eged that the medical defendants violated his rights in refus ing to order him an MRI before first attempting other treatments . However, “mere disagreement as to the proper med i c al treatment” is insufficient to demonstrate an adequacy of care claim.” Monm outh Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro , 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d. Cir. 1987); see also Durmer v. O’ Carroll , 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that delibe rate indifferen c e requires something “more than negligence”). Accordingly , Williams failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. To the extent that Williams raises his state tort claims on appea l, the District Court was correct to dismiss them. The Distric t Court dismiss e d Williams ’ medical negligence claim because he failed to file a certificate of merit as required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 despite receiving notice abou t the requirement

. The District Court correctly applied Rule 1 042.3 as substa n t ive state law

. See Liggon

- Redding v. Estate of Sugarman , 659 F.3d 258, 264

– 65 (3d Cir. 2011) ( determining that Rule 1042.3 is substantive under the choice of law doctrine from Erie R.R. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).6 In addition, Willi ams did not sta t e a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such a claim requi res a showing of “ intentional outrageous or extreme conduct by the defendant, which causes severe emoti onal distress to the plaintiff.” Swisher v. Pitz , 868 A.2 d 1228, 1230 (P a . Super. Ct. 2005)

. The alleged conduct must be “so outrageous in character, s o extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decenc y, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society.”
Reeves v. M iddletown Athle t i c Ass’n , 866 A.2d 1115, 1122 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (quoting Hoy v. Angelon e , 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998)). Williams made no such allegatio ns about the medical defendants’ conduct . While he may disagree with the treatment he was prov ided, this does n ot render the medical defendants’ conduct outrageous or extreme. For essential ly the same reasons as above , we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in denying Williams’ request for a preliminary
in

junction . To o b t ain this “extraordinary remedy,” the moving party must establish: “(1) a likel ihood of success on the merits; (2) that [he] will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in e ven grea ter har m to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp. , 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). The District Court addressed the first and second elements, that Williams failed to establis h a like lihood o f success on the merits or irreparable harm, which is sufficient. See Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc. , 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The failure to establish any7 element . . . renders a preliminary injunction inappropria te.”) (i nternal q uotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly , we will affirm the judgmen t of the District Court.