United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-1876

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Micah B. Riggs

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Robert Gibbs, in his official capacity as a Kansas City, Missouri Police 

Department Officer, and, as an individual

 Defendant - Appellee

David Barbour, in his official capacity as a Kansas City, Missouri Police 

Department Officer, and, as an individual; Michael Feagans, in his official capacity 

as a Kansas City, Missouri Police Department Officer, and, as an individual; Alan 

Whaley, in his official capacity as a Kansas City, Missouri Police Department 

Officer, and, as an individual; Brad Dumit, in his official capacity as a Kansas 

City, Missouri Police Department Officer, and, as an individual

 Defendants 

Chris Onik, in his official capacity as a Kansas City, Missouri Police Department 

Officer, and, as an individual; Teddy Taylor, in his official capacity as a Kansas 

City, Missouri Police Department Officer, and, as an individual; Christopher 

Toigo, in his official capacity as a Kansas City, Missouri Police Department 

Officer, and, as an individual

 Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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Submitted: January 12, 2023

Filed: April 26, 2023

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Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

On October 3, 2012, law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless search 

at Micah Riggs’ business, Coffee Wonk, seizing $460 in cash and what officers

believed to be “K2”—synthetic marijuana. According to Riggs’ amended 

complaint, he was charged in state court on three counts: (1) intent to create a 

controlled substance; (2) possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute; 

and (3) possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The drug 

paraphernalia count was dismissed before trial, Riggs was acquitted on the 

possession with intent to distribute count, and the jury deadlocked on the intent to 

create a controlled substance count. The state re-indicted Riggs, charging him with 

selling XLR-11, which Riggs asserted was not at the time a controlled substance. 

After Riggs filed a motion to dismiss, the state dropped all charges. Riggs then

commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the legality of the search 

and alleging several federal and state claims against various individuals pertaining 

to the “repeated, intentional harassment by officers of the Kansas City Missouri 

Police Department (“KCPD”) over the course of more than three years.” 

The defendants previously appealed the district court’s order denying 

qualified immunity. Because material disputes of fact were at the heart of the 

officers’ appeal, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Riggs v. Gibbs, 

923 F.3d 518 (8th Cir. 2019). The district court1 set the case back on for trial, but 

trial was delayed due to COVID-19. The case eventually proceeded to trial on March 

21, 2022, on Riggs’ claim that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Missouri.
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unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. On the second day of trial, the 

district court granted, in part, the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law 

on Riggs’ conspiracy claim and dismissed as defendants Michael Feagans, David 

Barbour, Brad Dumit, and Alan Whaley. 

The jury was asked to decide liability for the alleged constitutional violation 

as to four defendants—Teddy Taylor, Christopher Toigo, Robert Gibbs, and Chris 

Onik. The jury returned verdicts in favor of defendants Taylor, Toigo, and Onik. 

The jury found in favor of Riggs on his claim against KCPD Detective Robert Gibbs. 

If the jury decided in favor of Riggs, the jury verdict instructions directed the jury to 

write the amount of damages it found on a designated line or, if none, write the word 

“none.” The jury was further instructed to state either the amount of damages it 

found, or if the jurors found the damages had no monetary value to “state the nominal 

amount of $1.00.” The jury wrote $1.00 on the damages line of the verdict form. 

After the jury returned its verdicts, Riggs’ counsel requested that the jurors be polled. 

The court polled the jury, accepted the verdicts, read the verdicts into the record, and 

then discharged the jury. When Riggs’ counsel was asked if there was anything 

further, counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” Even though the jury returned a 

verdict in Riggs’ favor against Gibbs, Riggs did not request that the court submit the 

issue of punitive damages to the jury. 

 

The issue of punitive damages had been raised earlier in the proceedings. 

During the instructions conference, Riggs objected to the district court’s failure to 

submit instructions on punitive damages, asserting the evidence established the 

defendants acted with reckless indifference to his constitutional rights. Defense 

counsel responded by concurring in the court’s decision not to include instructions 

on punitive damages, arguing the evidence did not show sufficiently egregious

behavior for punitive damages. The court made no comment on the merits of the 

punitive damages claim, nor did it make a ruling dismissing Riggs’ claim. Instead, 

in response to the arguments, the court stated: “My thought on this is I hear you, 

[plaintiff’s counsel], and if indeed the jury does come back with a finding in favor 

of the plaintiff, I will reconsider that at that time. Okay.” Riggs did not object to 
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this proposed course of action, which effectively bifurcated the trial, such that 

liability would be decided first, and if a verdict was returned in his favor, Riggs 

could renew his request that the jury be allowed to consider punitive damages.

2

 

 

On appeal, Riggs contends the district court erred by failing to instruct the 

jury on punitive damages. He suggests that we should review his alleged error de 

novo. Without specifying a review standard, Gibbs argues the merits of Riggs’ 

punitive damages claim. 

While we typically review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a punitive 

damages claim, Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith, Ark., 3 F.4th 1017, 1025-26 (8th 

Cir. 2021), the district court did not rule on the merits of Riggs’ request for punitive 

damages. After the verdicts were returned by the jury and accepted by the court, 

Riggs neither requested to proceed on the issue of punitive damages, nor did the 

court issue a decision dismissing his punitive damages claim. Under these 

circumstances, Riggs has not convinced us that de novo review is appropriate.

So long as a party preserves the issue for appeal, a district court’s refusal to 

give a jury instruction is reviewed by us under the deferential abuse of discretion 

standard. Id. at 1026 (quoting Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 416 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th 

Cir. 2005)). “If a party does not properly object to preserve the issue for appeal, 

objections to jury instructions are waived, absent a showing of plain error.” Bauer 

v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 680 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d). Rule 51(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure delineates 

different categories of error: 

2

While we recognize that Missouri law is not controlling, counsel should not 

have been surprised by a bifurcated trial. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 510.263 (stating 

“[a]ll actions tried before a jury involving punitive damages . . . shall be conducted

in a bifurcated trial before the same jury if requested by any party.”). 
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(1) Assigning error. A party may assign as error:

(A) an error in an instruction actually given, if that party 

properly objected; or

(B) a failure to give an instruction, if that party properly 

requested it and—unless the court rejected the 

request in a definitive ruling on the record—also 

properly objected.

(2) Plain Error. A court may consider a plain error in the 

instructions that has not been preserved as required by rule 

51(d)(1) if the error affects substantial rights.

 

Here, the district court declined to include instructions on punitive damages 

when the case was submitted to the jury but indicated it was open to reconsidering 

the request if the jury found in favor of Riggs. After liability was determined, Riggs 

never asked the court to consider the issue of punitive damages at trial or in a motion 

for a new trial. Rule 51 “helps to prevent litigants from ensuring a new trial in the 

event of an adverse verdict by covertly relying on the error.” May v. Nationstar 

Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 806, 819 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Star 

City Gravel Co., 592 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1979)). The record demonstrates the

district court did not address the merits of Riggs’ punitive damages claim because it

did not issue a definitive ruling on his request for the jury to consider punitive 

damages. The district court, in effect, deferred final ruling on the issue of punitive 

damages until liability was resolved. Because Riggs did not object to the process in 

which the court indicated it would rule on his request for jury instructions on punitive 

damages, nor did he renew his request for the jury to consider punitive damages after 

the favorable verdict was returned, we review his claim for plain error. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 51(d)(2); cf. Westcott v. Crinklaw, 133 F.3d 658, 662-64 (8th Cir. 1998) 

(holding that if a party fails to object to the “adequacy of a [nominal] jury verdict” 

when there was “proof of actual injury,” we will not correct the verdict absent “plain 

injustice” or a “shocking” result). 
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“Plain error is a stringently limited standard of review, especially in the civil 

context, and must result in a miscarriage of justice in order to compel reversal.” 

Bady v. Murphy-Kjos, 628 F.3d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). We 

have recognized the untenable position we face when a substantive objection is 

raised for the first time on appeal:

To correct the error, we would have to [hold] . . . the district court did 

not act sua sponte to provide a jury instruction that a party should have 

provided, and then we would have to remedy the problem in the face of 

the complaining party’s relative indifference to it. 

May, 852 F.3d at 820 (cleaned up).

A finding that an officer violated Riggs’ constitutional rights establishes 

liability under § 1983, but it “does not necessitate a finding of callous indifference 

warranting punitive damages.” Thurairajah, 3 F.4th at 1026 (quoting Coleman v. 

Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 787 (8th Cir. 1997)). Riggs’ Fourth Amendment claim against 

Gibbs was not supported by proof of actual damages caused by Gibbs’ conduct. In 

closing argument, Riggs told the jury that he was not asking for any economic 

damages against Gibbs “but we’re once again asking for the events that occurred on 

October 3rd, 2012, for $3 million in emotional damages.” We can only speculate as 

to the reason for the jury’s verdict on damages. On this record, Riggs has failed to 

convince us that the district court’s failure to sua sponte raise the issue of punitive 

damages after the verdict was received “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of the judicial proceedings” such that there would be “a 

miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected.” Slidell, Inc. v. Millennium Inorganic 

Chems., Inc., 460 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006) (reciting standard to warrant 

reversal for plain error). 

We affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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