`[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





          PORT SAFETY, SECURITY, AND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT

=======================================================================

             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
                           Serial No. 118-51

                     Committee on Homeland Security
                           Serial No. 118-58

                          JOINT FIELD HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION,

             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                                AND THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                 TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY,

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 5, 2024
                      (PortMiami, Miami, Florida)

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and 
         Infrastructure and the Committee on Homeland Security






    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]






     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                                   _______
                                   
                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
                 
57-417 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2024 









































             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                          Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
                      Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking Member

              


Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, Arkansas        Eleanor Holmes Norton,     
Daniel Webster, Florida                      District of Columbia  
Thomas Massie, Kentucky                    Grace F. Napolitano, California
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania                  Steve Cohen, Tennessee             
Babin, Texas                               John Garamendi, California
Garret Graves, Louisiana                   Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaian       
David Rouzer, North Carolina               Andre Carson, Indiana             
Mike Bost, Illinois                        Dina Titus, Nevada
Doug LaMalfa, California                   Jared Huffman, California
Bruce Westerman, Arkansas                  Julia Brownley, California
Brian J. Mast, Florida                     Frederica S. Wilson, Florida
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,                  Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey 
   Puerto Rico                             Mark DeSaulnier, California 
Pete Stauber, Minnesota                    Salud O. Carbajal, California 
Tim Burchett, Tennessee                    Greg Stanton, Arizona,
Dusty Johnson, South Dakota                   Vice Ranking Member
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,            Colin Z. Allred, Texas                         
   Vice Chairman                           Sharice Davids, Kansas                         
Troy E. Nehls, Texas                       Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois             
Tracey Mann, Kansas                        Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Burgess Owens, Utah                        Seth Moulton, Massachusetts
Rudy Yakym III, Indiana                    Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon                Marilyn Strickland, Washington
Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey            Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Anthony D'Esposito, New York               Patrick Ryan, New York 
Eric Burlison, Missouri                    Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
John James, Michigan                       Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin               Val T. Hoyle, Oregon
Brandon Williams, New York                 Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio         
Marcus J. Molinaro, New York               Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan 
Mike Collins, Georgia                      Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina                   
Mike Ezell, Mississippi                  
John S. Duarte, California                     
Aaron Bean, Florida                
Celeste Maloy, Utah                             
Vacancy                                          
                                     
                                ------                                
                                

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                   Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
             Salud O. Carbajal, California, Ranking Member
             
Brian Babin, Texas                              John Garamendi, California
Brian J. Mast, Florida                          Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,                       Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
  Puerto Rico                                   Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey                  Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice Chairman            Vice Ranking Member
Aaron Bean, Florida                             Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) 
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)




















                    COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                   Mark E. Green, M.D., Tennessee, Chairman
               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Ranking Member
 
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas  
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Eric Swalwell, California            
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           J. Luis Correa, California           
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            
August Pfluger, Texas                Shri Thanedar, Michigan              
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island         
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Glenn Ivey, Maryland                 
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Daniel S. Goldman, New York          
Nick LaLota, New York                Robert Garcia, California            
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois           
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Menendez, New Jersey                             
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Thomas R. Suozzi, New York                                     
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Yvette D. Clarke, New York           
Dale W. Strong, Alabama
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                                     
                                ------                                
                                

          Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security

                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
                Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking Member 
                
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                          Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Nick LaLota, New York                            Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida                           Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi  (Ex Officio)
Mark E. Green, M.D., Tennessee (Ex Officio)
    
    


























                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES

Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
  Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     4
Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast 
  Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation 
  and Infrastructure, opening statement..........................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     6
Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez of Florida, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 
  Security, opening statement....................................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     8
Hon. Shri Thanedar of Michigan, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 
  Security, opening statement....................................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    11

                               WITNESSES
                                Panel 1

Hon. Mario Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Florida, oral statement...............................    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    14

                                Panel 2

Rear Admiral John C. Vann, Commander, Coast Guard Cyber Command, 
  U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement...............................    18
Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant Commandant for Prevention 
  Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement.......................    19
    Joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Vann and Arguin....    21
William K. Paape, Associate Administrator for Ports and 
  Waterways, Maritime Administration, oral statement.............    25
    Prepared statement...........................................    26

                                Panel 3

James C. Fowler, Senior Vice President and General Manager, 
  Crowley Shipping, oral statement...............................    35
    Prepared statement...........................................    37
Frederick Wong, Jr., Deputy Port Director, PortMiami, on behalf 
  of the American Association of Port Authorities, oral statement    38
    Prepared statement...........................................    40
Brent D. Sadler, Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and Senior Research 
  Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, oral statement................    42
    Prepared statement...........................................    43
Ed McCarthy, Chief Operating Officer, Georgia Ports Authority, on 
  behalf of the National Association of Waterfront Employers, 
  oral statement.................................................    50
    Prepared statement...........................................    51
Dave Morgan, President and Chief Executive Officer, Cooper/Ports 
  America, on behalf of the National Maritime Safety Association, 
  oral statement.................................................    55
    Prepared statement...........................................    57

                                APPENDIX

Questions from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal to:
    William K. Paape, Associate Administrator for Ports and 
      Waterways, Maritime Administration.........................    69
    Frederick Wong, Jr., Deputy Port Director, PortMiami, on 
      behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities.....    69
    Ed McCarthy, Chief Operating Officer, Georgia Ports 
      Authority, on behalf of the National Association of 
      Waterfront Employers.......................................    70
    Dave Morgan, President and Chief Executive Officer, Cooper/
      Ports America, on behalf of the National Maritime Safety 
      Association................................................    70

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                             April 2, 2024

    JOINT SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation and Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime 
Security

    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation and Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime 
Security

    RE:      LSubcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation and Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime 
Security Hearing on ``Port Safety, Security, and Infrastructure 
Investment''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the 
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security of the 
Committee on Homeland Security will meet on Friday, April 5, 
2024, at 9:30 a.m. ET in Terminal E of PortMiami to receive 
testimony at a joint field hearing entitled, ``Port Safety, 
Security, and Infrastructure Investment.'' The joint field 
hearing will discuss emerging challenges to safety and security 
at United States ports as well as the state of port 
infrastructure and future investment needs. At the hearing, 
Members will receive testimony from three panels of witnesses. 
The first panel will include a Member from the United States 
House of Representatives. The second panel will include 
representatives from the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard 
or Service) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD). The third 
panel will include representatives from Crowley Shipping, 
PortMiami, the Heritage Foundation, Georgia Ports Authority, 
and Cooper/Ports America.

                             II. BACKGROUND

    The United States is a maritime Nation with 95 percent of 
all cargo entering through the Marine Transportation System 
(MTS).\1\ Cargo activity at United States ports accounts for 26 
percent of the United States' gross domestic product (GDP), 
generating nearly $5.4 trillion in total economic activity, and 
supporting 31 million direct and indirect jobs.\2\ The United 
States navigable transportation network includes 361 ports on 
more than 25,000 miles of waterways, including oceans, rivers, 
and lakes.\3\ The sheer size and complexity of port facilities, 
along with the volume of freight handled, can make them 
difficult to secure despite the critical importance of 
safeguarding our Nation's ports.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Fact Sheet, The White House, Biden-Harris Administration 
Announces Initiative to Bolster Cybersecurity of U.S. Ports (Feb. 21, 
2024), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2024/02/21/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-
announces-initiative-to-bolster-cybersecurity-of-u-s-ports/.
    \2\ Id.
    \3\ John Nemerofsky, Protecting our Ports, Security Magazine, (Jan. 
10, 2022), available at https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/
96867-protecting-our-ports.
    \4\ Interpol, Port Security Project, available at https://
www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Maritime-crime/Port-Security-Project.
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    To ensure the uninterrupted operation of the MTS, the Coast 
Guard is responsible for the development and implementation of 
policies and procedures to facilitate commerce and improve 
United States ports and waterways ensuring they are safe and 
operational.\5\ Additionally, the Coast Guard serves as the 
principal Federal agency charged with ensuring the security and 
safety of the waters under United States' jurisdiction.\6\ Its 
responsibilities include securing United States ports against 
any physical or cybersecurity threats seeking to disrupt 
operations. To this end, the Coast Guard is responsible for 
reviewing and approving port facility security plans, 
conducting site visits to ensure proper physical security 
measures are being taken, and taking steps to prevent and 
respond to malicious cyber activities.\7\ United States Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), complements the Coast Guard's 
maritime security efforts by identifying and screening high-
risk cargo before it enters the United States.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ U.S. Coast Guard, Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment 
(PAWSA), available at https://
www.dco.uscg.mil/PAWSA/
#::text=The%20United%20States%20Coast%20Guard,efficient
%2C%20and%20commercially%20viable%20as.
    \6\ U.S Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-20-33, Assessing Deployable 
Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce 
Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities, (2019), available at https:/
/www.gao.gov/assets/d2033.pdf.
    \7\ Evaluating High-Risk Security Vulnerabilities at Our Nation's 
Ports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Maritime Sec. of the 
H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 118th Cong. (May 10, 2023).
    \8\ CBP, CSI: Container Security Initiative, available at https://
www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MARAD, within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is 
responsible for fostering, promoting, and developing the United 
States maritime industry so it can meet the Nation's economic 
and security needs.\9\ MARAD serves as a resource to ports by 
providing financial assistance to help fund infrastructure 
improvements and facilitate a more efficient, reliable and 
operational MTS.\10\ The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) provides additional financial assistance for security-
focused projects at ports through its Port Security Grant 
Program.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ MARAD, About Us: MARAD at a Glance, available at https://
www.maritime.dot.gov/
about-
us#::text=Mission%3A%20To%20foster%2C%20promote%20and,nation's%20econom
ic
%20and%20security%20needs.
    \10\ MARAD, Ports, available at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/
ports.
    \11\ FEMA, Port Security Grant Program, available at https://
www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness/port-security.
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                     III. PORT SAFETY AND SECURITY

    Maritime ports, facilities, and infrastructure worldwide 
are vulnerable to physical and cybersecurity exposure through 
domestic and foreign adversarial access to everything from port 
equipment and infrastructure to supply chain information 
management systems.\12\ These threats pose a serious safety and 
security risk to our Nation's ports and vessels underway. 
Furthermore, they threaten to disrupt the supply chain. One of 
America's largest ports, the Port of Los Angeles, faces 
approximately 40 million cyber-attacks per month.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ MARAD, 2023-002-Worldwide Maritime Port Vulnerabilities--
Foreign Adversarial Technological, Physical, and Cyber Influence, 
available at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2023-002-worldwide-
maritime-port-vulnerabilities-foreign-adversarial-technological-
physical.
    \13\ Sam Fenwick, Cyber-attacks on Port of Los Angeles have doubled 
since pandemic, BBC (July 22, 2022), available at https://www.bbc.com/
news/business-62260272.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHYSICAL/KINETIC THREATS

    The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened 
awareness about the vulnerability of all modes of 
transportation, including the MTS, to terrorist attacks.\14\ A 
large fraction of maritime cargo is concentrated at a few major 
ports, making them highly susceptible to threats.\15\ Ports 
face physical security threats ranging from unauthorized access 
to smuggling to terrorism and beyond.\16\ The Coast Guard and 
its partners attempt to prioritize and assess these threats 
through a variety of tools, including Notices of Arrival, 
inspections, and specially trained teams.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Bart Elias et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46678, Transportation 
Security: Background and Issue for the 117th Congress, (Feb. 9, 2021), 
available at https://crs.gov/Reports/R46678?source=search.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ John Nemerofsky, Protecting our Ports, Security Magazine, 
(Jan. 10, 2022), available at https://www.securitymagazine.com/
articles/96867-protecting-our-ports.
    \17\ See supra note 14; see also supra note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, the Coast Guard tries to manage physical 
security concerns both at the port facility and over the 
vessels transiting in and around facilities. Under the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) (P.L. 107-295), port 
facilities must submit a facility security plan to the Coast 
Guard that outlines how they will implement required physical 
and cyber security measures.\18\ The Coast Guard conducts 
facility site visits to ensure each port is implementing the 
proper physical and cyber security measures.\19\ It evaluates a 
ship's country of registration, cargo, crew, vessel security 
history and last port of call to determine the risk an inbound 
vessel poses and conduct boardings accordingly.\20\ Depending 
on the risk, the Coast Guard may conduct a security boarding at 
sea prior to entry, provide the vessel an armed escort to 
protect it from external threats, or place a security team 
onboard to avoid hijacking or weaponizing the vessel.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Coast Guard, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., U.S. Coast Guard, 
ISPS / MTSA, History, available at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/ISPS-MTSA/.
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ Id.
    \21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Maritime Security Operations is one of the Coast Guard's 
major operational mission programs. It encompasses activities 
to detect, deter, prevent, and disrupt terrorist attacks, and 
other criminal acts in the United States maritime domain.\22\ 
It includes the execution of anti-terrorism, counterterrorism, 
response, and select recovery operations.\23\ This mission 
encompasses the operational element of the Coast Guard's Ports, 
Waterways, and Coastal Security mission and complements its 
Maritime Response and Prevention efforts.\24\ To help carry out 
this mission, the Coast Guard maintains Specialized Forces 
units, including the Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT) and 
Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST), who have the 
capabilities needed to handle high-risk law enforcement, drug 
interdiction, terrorism, and other threats to the U.S. maritime 
environment.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ U.S. Coast Guard, Missions, available at https://www.uscg.mil/
About/Missions/.
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ Id.
    \25\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the focus on ports has recently shifted to 
cyberattacks, the risk of physical attacks through illicit 
activity or terrorist actions remains very real and is an 
ongoing threat the Coast Guard continues to work to prevent.

CYBER THREATS

    Beginning in the mid-2000s, the Chinese government 
developed the National Transportation and Logistics Public 
Information Platform, known as LOGINK, which is a logistics 
management system that provides shipment tracking and other 
logistical services.\26\ The data collected by the system 
varies, but can include vessel and cargo locations, transit 
conditions, specific information on the type of cargo, customs 
information, and personal and financial data.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, LOGINK: 
Risks from China's Promotion of a Global Logistics Management Platform 
(September 2022), available at https://www.uscc.gov/research/logink-
risks-chinas-promotion-global-logistics-management-platform
    \27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chinese government is seeking to spur the adoption of 
LOGINK, along with its proprietary data standards, among global 
ports and transportation suppliers by providing the service 
free of charge. To date, LOGINK has received cooperation 
agreements with dozens of ports outside of China, including 
major logistical centers in Europe, Asia, and the Middle 
East.\28\ Given the sensitivity of the information collected by 
LOGINK, including property data on shipment and supply chains, 
the data could be misused by the Chinese Communist Party to 
gain access to sensitive business and foreign government data 
for malign purposes. The James M. Inhofe National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263), included 
provisions to protect against malicious Chinese software. Among 
its provisions is a prohibition on the use of LOGINK by 
recipients of Port Infrastructure Development Grants and 
directs the State Department to work with allies that use 
LOGINK to dissuade its use. Further, H.R. 1836, the Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 2023, which was approved by the United 
States House of Representatives on March 21, 2024, includes 
similar provisions.\29\ Similarly, Chinese-made port equipment, 
including cranes, presents vulnerability to the safe and 
efficient operation of ports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ Ocean Shipping Reform Implementation Act of 2023, H.R. 1836, 
118th Cong. (2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On February 21, 2024, President Biden issued an Executive 
Order to strengthen maritime cybersecurity.\30\ Among its 
provisions, the Executive Order enables the Coast Guard to 
establish safety zones to respond to malicious activity, 
control the movement of vessels that present a suspected or 
known cyberthreat, and require facilities to take action 
against cyberthreats that pose a danger to the safety of a 
vessel, shoreside facility or harbor.\31\ In concert with this 
Executive Order, the Coast Guard issued Maritime Security 
Directive 105-4 which requires owners and operators of People's 
Republic of China manufactured Ship-to-Shore Cranes to take a 
series of actions on these cranes and their systems and a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which establishes minimum 
cybersecurity requirements for United States flagged vessels, 
Outer Continental Shelf facilities, and United States 
facilities subject to the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
of 2002.\32\ The comment period ends on April 22, 2024.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Exec. Order. No. 14116, 89 Fed. Reg. 13971, (Feb. 21, 2024), 
available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-02-26/pdf/
2024-04012.pdf, see also Coast Guard, Executive Order Expands Coast 
Guard Authorities to Address Maritime Cyber Threats (Feb. 22, 2024) 
available at https://www.news.uscg.mil/maritime-commons/Article/
3683564/executive-order-expands-coast-guard-authorities-to-address-
maritime-cyber-threa/.
    \31\ Id.
    \32\ Id.
    \33\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Coast Guard's Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) help port 
stakeholders address specific cyber threats and vulnerabilities 
through consistent proactive engagement with public and private 
industry organizations.\34\ Port owners and operators can 
request CPTs to conduct cybersecurity assessments that include 
penetration testing and configuration review as well as 
assessing malware vulnerability.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Protection Team (CPT), 
available at https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/CPT%20One%20Pager.pdf.
    \35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given these threats, the Coast Guard needs to confront the 
possibility and even probability of kinetic and cyberattacks by 
improving its capability to protect ports against these rapidly 
evolving risks.

                  IV. PORT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS

    The surge of cargo brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic 
exposed vulnerabilities in our supply chain with ports and 
intermodal connections unable to efficiently handle the higher-
than-normal container shipping volumes. The resulting supply 
chain crisis brought greater focus to needs across our Nation's 
infrastructure. Federal funding opportunities to support 
landside investments at ports have expanded in recent years to 
try and address these identified shortfalls, and port and 
marine terminal operators plan to invest $163 billion for 
infrastructure improvements through 2025.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Jerry Haar, America's Air, Sea, and Land Ports Require 
Investment to be Globally Competitive, Wilson Center, (Mar. 2, 2023), 
available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/americas-air-sea-and-
land-ports-require-investment-be-globally-competitive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MARAD is responsible for the administration of the Port 
Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP), a discretionary 
grant program that provides awards on a competitive basis to 
projects at coastal seaports, inland river ports, and Great 
Lakes ports to improve the safety, efficiency, or reliability 
of the movement of goods into, out of, around, or within a 
port.\37\ Acting as the sole discretionary grant program 
dedicated to port infrastructure improvements, PIDP has grown 
exponentially over the last several years with the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) providing 
advanced appropriations of $450 million per year through fiscal 
year (FY) 2026, which is in addition to annual appropriations 
the program receives.\38\ Since its initial round of funding in 
FY 2019, PIDP has distributed over $9 billion in grant 
awards.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ MARAD, Port Infrastructure Development Program, available at 
https://www.maritime.dot.gov/PIDPgrants.
    \38\ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 
135 Stat. 429.
    \39\ MARAD, PIDP Applicant List, available at https://
www.maritime.dot.gov/grants-finances/federal-grant-assistance/pidp-
applicant-list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              V. WITNESSES

PANEL I:

     LHon. Mario Diaz-Balart, 26th District of Florida, 
Member of Congress

PANEL II:

     LRear Admiral John C. Vann, Commander, Coast Guard 
Cyber Command, United States Coast Guard
     LRear Admiral Wayne Arguin, Assistant Commandant 
for Prevention Policy, United States Coast Guard
     LMr. William Paape, Associate Administrator for 
Ports and Waterways, United States Maritime Administration, 
United States Department of Transportation

PANEL III:

     LMr. James Fowler, Senior Vice President and 
General Manager, Crowley Shipping
     LMr. Frederick Wong, Jr., Deputy Port Director, 
PortMiami, on behalf of the American Association of Port 
Authorities
     LMr. Brent D. Sadler, Senior Research Fellow, 
Heritage Foundation
     LMr. Ed McCarthy, Chief Operating Officer, Georgia 
Ports Authority, on behalf of the National Association of 
Waterfront Employers
     LMr. Dave Morgan, President and Chief Executive 
Officer, Cooper/Ports America, on behalf of the National 
Maritime Safety Association
 
          PORT SAFETY, SECURITY, AND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT

                              ----------                              


                         FRIDAY, APRIL 5, 2024

                  House of Representatives,
                    Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
                           Maritime Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                     joint with the
                 Subcommittee on Transportation and
                                 Maritime Security,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., at 
Terminal E, PortMiami, 1265 North Cruise Boulevard, Miami, 
Florida, Hon. Daniel Webster (Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation) presiding.
    Ms. Levine Cava, Mayor, Miami-Dade County. I think it would 
be wonderful if everyone could take their seats. And in advance 
of your session, I just wanted to offer some brief words of 
welcome. Thank you, everyone.
    Very good. Good morning. Good morning, everyone. I'm 
Daniella Levine Cava, your county mayor in Miami-Dade County. 
I'm thrilled that PortMiami is part of our great county 
government. So, we want to welcome you officially here.
    We're joined by our Chief Operating Officer Jimmy Morales, 
who has responsibility for the port, the airport, and other 
critical infrastructure, and of course, much of our leadership 
here at PortMiami. We're very grateful that you've chosen to do 
your field hearing here.
    So, thank you very much to Chairman Webster from the Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure. We think it's fitting and 
proper because we have such a great operation here, and we hope 
you'll have a chance to explore and tour and learn more about 
it.
    And, of course, to our local House Representative, Carlos 
Gimenez, who served in this role as mayor for 10 years and who 
serves as chairman of the Transportation and Maritime Security 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security. Thank you 
so much for being here with us today, Congressman. And we are 
also joined by our Congressman, Representative Diaz-Balart, who 
has played such a critical role in transportation as well. 
Thank you.
    All right. And to all of our visiting Members, thank you 
for choosing us for today's hearing. I want to welcome 
particularly our Ranking Member Carbajal and Ranking Member 
Thanedar and members of the subcommittees. Thank you.
    So, I think you've heard Miami-Dade County is the cruise 
capital of the world. We're very proud of that fact and fully 
restored post-pandemic. So, quite remarkable. Cruising has come 
back with a huge, huge force. People are just loving coming 
here, and we also have become a global commerce capital for 
trade, as well. And so, we really are doing very well here at 
PortMiami, and I believe that there is no better place in our 
Nation to address these critical topics in the maritime 
transportation system.
    We're the second most important economic engine in Miami-
Dade County after our airport. And we contribute $43 billion 
annually to the local economy. We support more than 334,000 
jobs. It's one of the fastest growing cargo gateways in the 
country. And last year, we welcomed over 7 million cruise 
passengers, more than any port in the world.
    So, again, we're growing. You can see there's construction 
for yet another terminal right beside us here, and it's quite a 
busy waterway when these cruise ships line up and take people 
on their wonderful vacations.
    So, we're a coastal metropolis. We're a growing one. We're 
always striving to be at the cutting edge of maritime safety 
and security while building for tomorrow's infrastructure needs 
and an economic engine. We did a study showing this is a $64 
billion impact right here from our bay and our port.
    So, welcome again, everyone. I hope you'll get a chance to 
tour, as I said, and also learn about our shore power 
installation. Very proud. That will be coming online in just a 
short couple of months, and three ships will be able to plug in 
simultaneously, reducing our fumes and carbon output and 
providing us a cleaner and safer future for our vessels as 
well. Thank you, everyone.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The joint subcommittee hearing 
between the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure and the Subcommittee on Transportation and 
Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security will 
come to order. We're in order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's joint hearing. 
Without objection, show that ordered.
    I ask unanimous consent that the Members not on the 
subcommittee, but on either committee's full committee, be 
permitted to sit with the subcommittee at today's joint hearing 
and ask questions. Without objection, show that ordered.
    As a reminder to Members, if you wish to insert a document 
into the record, please also email it to 
DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov. I now recognize myself for the 
purpose of an opening statement for 5 minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, 
   SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, 
         COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Before we begin, I want to mention 
the recent tragedy in the Port of Baltimore. First and 
foremost, our thoughts are with the victims and their families. 
We greatly appreciate the work of the Coast Guard and other 
first responders in their heroic efforts in response to this 
tragedy. As the work gets underway to reopen the channel, 
rebuild the bridge, and carry out an investigation, the 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will closely 
monitor developments and work with the families and 
stakeholders impacted.
    Turning to the agenda at hand, we meet today at PortMiami 
to examine port safety and security and infrastructure 
investments. I appreciate the mayor, the port's Director and 
Chief Executive Officer Hydi Webb, and the rest of the team at 
PortMiami for hosting us.
    I'd like to welcome our witnesses joining us today. We will 
be hearing testimony from three panels.
    On our first panel, we'll have Representative Mario Diaz-
Balart, who represents Florida's 26th Congressional District.
    On the second panel, we have Rear Admiral John Vann, 
Commander of Coast Guard Cyber Command; Rear Admiral Wayne 
Arguin, Jr., who is Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for 
Prevention Policy; and William Paape, Associate Administrator 
for Ports and Waterways for the Maritime Administration.
    On the third panel, we'll hear from James Fowler, senior 
vice president and general manager of Crowley Shipping; 
Frederick Wong, Jr., deputy port director of PortMiami; Brent 
Sadler, senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation; Ed 
McCarthy, chief operating officer of Georgia Ports Authority; 
and Dave Morgan, president and chief executive officer of 
Cooper/Ports America. Thank you all for being witnesses here 
and joining us today.
    Cargo activity in the United States ports is crucial to our 
Nation's commerce and accounts for 26 percent of our Nation's 
GDP, generating nearly $5.4 trillion in total economic activity 
and supporting 31 million direct and indirect jobs. To protect 
this crucial economic engine, we need to make the necessary 
investments and ensure our ports are effectively confronting 
the physical and cyber threats.
    The Maritime Transportation Security Act was passed in the 
wake of 9/11 and was originally envisioned to guard primarily 
against physical threats. However, as technology and automation 
become more engrained into the port's operations, the risk of 
cyber attacks grows. For example, we know from public reporting 
that one of America's largest ports, the Port of Los Angeles, 
faces approximately 40 million cyber attacks per month.
    At the same time, we must also confront the reality of 
China's influence in the maritime domain. And it's growing and, 
if left unchecked, threatens to throw up impediments to the 
maritime transportation sector. Major port equipment, such as 
terminal cranes, are purchased from China and could present 
serious vulnerabilities to the supply chain.
    LOGINK, a logistics management system developed by China, 
provides shipment tracking and other logistical services while 
collecting significant amounts of data that could be used for 
malign purposes or to gain unfair economic advantage. I'm 
pleased that the subcommittees were able to work together to 
include language in last year's NDAA that provides critical 
protections against this.
    In the wake of the global supply chain crisis that caused 
significant disruptions to commerce, it's critical that our 
ports and, just as importantly, the intermodal connections that 
connect our ports to inland cargo destinations, have learned 
from the experiences during the pandemic and are working to 
increase the resiliency of the supply chain. I look forward to 
hearing from our witnesses on how port infrastructure 
development grant funding is improving the efficient movement 
of goods through our ports. And I look forward to learning how 
operators within the supply chain are mitigating the risk of 
another supply chain crisis and making the maritime 
transportation system more resilient to future disruptions.
    [Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman, 
 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Before we begin, I want to mention the recent tragedy at the Port 
of Baltimore. First and foremost, our thoughts are with the victims and 
their families. We greatly appreciate the work of the Coast Guard and 
other first responders in their heroic response efforts. And as work 
gets underway to reopen the channel, rebuild the bridge, and carry out 
an investigation, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will 
closely monitor developments and work with the families and 
stakeholders impacted.
    Turning to the agenda at hand, we meet today at PortMiami to 
examine port safety, security, and infrastructure investment. I 
appreciate Mayor Cava, the Port's Director and Chief Executive Officer 
Hydi Webb, and the rest of the team at PortMiami for hosting us. And 
thank you to all the witnesses for joining us today.
    Cargo activity at United States ports is critical to our nation's 
commerce, and accounts for 26 percent of our nation's GDP, generating 
nearly $5.4 trillion in total economic activity, and supporting 31 
million direct and indirect jobs. To protect this crucial economic 
engine, we need to make the necessary investments and ensure our ports 
can effectively confront physical and cyber-threats.
    The Maritime Transportation Security Act was passed in the wake of 
9/11 and was originally envisioned to guard primarily against physical 
threats. However, as technology and automation become more ingrained in 
port operations, the risk of cyber-attacks grows. For example, we know 
from public reporting that one of America's largest ports, the Port of 
Los Angeles, faces approximately 40 million cyber-attacks per month.
    At the same time, we must also confront the reality that China's 
influence in the maritime domain is growing, and if left unchecked 
threatens to throw up major impediments to the maritime transportation 
sector. Major port equipment, such as terminal cranes, are purchased 
from China, and could present serious vulnerabilities to the supply 
chain. LOGINK, a logistics management system developed by China, 
provides shipment tracking and other logistical services, while 
collecting significant amounts of data that could be used for malign 
purposes or to gain unfair economic advantage. I am pleased our 
subcommittees were able to work together to include language in last 
year's NDAA that provides critical protections against LOGINK.
    In the wake of the global supply chain crisis that caused 
significant disruptions to commerce, it's critical that our ports, and 
just as importantly, the intermodal connections that connect our ports 
to inland cargo destinations have learned from the experiences during 
the pandemic and are working to increase the resiliency of the supply 
chain. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how Port 
Infrastructure Development Grant funding is improving the efficient 
movement of goods through ports. And I look forward to learning how 
operators within the supply chain are mitigating the risk of another 
supply chain crisis and making the maritime transportation system more 
resilient to future disruptions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. With that, I recognize our ranking 
member, Mr. Carbajal, for his opening statement for 5 minutes. 
You're recognized.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 
 TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Chair Webster and Chair 
Gimenez, for gathering us here today in this beautiful, 
beautiful place called Miami for this important bipartisan 
joint hearing focused on our ports. I also want to extend 
thanks to the mayor for coming out and welcoming us and to my 
other colleague who will be providing testimony, Representative 
Diaz-Balart. You certainly live in a great place, a wonderful 
piece of paradise in our country. I live in the other paradise, 
Santa Barbara, California.
    But I wanted to make one observation before I start my 
testimony. It seems that the Democrats are not wearing ties 
today, and all my Republican colleagues, especially from Miami, 
are wearing ties. I'm just wondering what is the best way to do 
Miami. You know, I'm a little confused.
    Last week, when a containership struck the Francis Scott 
Key Bridge in Baltimore, the world saw how easily a major port 
can come grinding to a stop. I express my sincere condolences 
to the families of the construction crew who lost their lives.
    The collapse of the Key Bridge exposed vulnerabilities and 
created an economic catastrophe for the country. When a major 
port shutters, shock waves are felt nationwide. Locally, 
thousands of individuals depend on a port for their livelihoods 
and will be out of work. Further away, farmers and miners are 
also affected as their product will not leave the docks. 
Baltimore is also the largest car port in the country, which 
will certainly affect the market for vehicles.
    The United States has more than 300 ports nationwide, and 
more than 95 percent of all cargo spends time on a ship. The 
U.S. economy depends on our ports. Ports are intermodal 
connectors integrating water, rail, road, and airborne modes of 
transportation. Over 11 million containers move through U.S. 
ports each year.
    Ports face both physical and cybersecurity threats on a 
daily basis. The Coast Guard holds the responsibility to review 
port security plans, respond to cyber attacks, and monitor 
daily traffic entering and exiting the ports. President Biden 
recently signed an Executive order strengthening the Coast 
Guard's authority to respond to cyber events at ports. This 
comes at an important time as ports are receiving thousands of 
cyber attacks each year. I'm interested in hearing from the 
Coast Guard how they plan to utilize this Executive order and 
strengthen cybersecurity.
    Our ports must be resilient to all threats. Climate change 
and sea level rise pose one of the largest threats of our 
generation and can cause an equally devastating disruption to 
the supply chain. That is why Congress worked together to 
include over $2.25 billion for the Port Infrastructure 
Development Program in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law aimed 
at decarbonizing and making ports more resilient. It's my 
understanding this port in Miami is moving towards having 
shoreside power in the very near future.
    Ports are vital to our economy and national security. I 
welcome today's conversation as to how to continue to support 
our ports and make them more resilient. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. I yield back.
    [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking 
   Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Webster and Chair Gimenez, for gathering us here 
today in beautiful Miami for this important joint hearing focused on 
our ports.
    Last week, when a container ship struck the Francis Scott Key 
Bridge in Baltimore, the world saw how easily a major port can come 
grinding to a stop. I express my sincere condolences to the families of 
the construction crew who lost their lives.
    The collapse of the Key Bridge exposed vulnerabilities and created 
an economic catastrophe for the country. When a major port shutters, 
shock waves are felt nationwide. Locally, thousands of individuals 
depend on a port for their livelihoods and will be out of work. Further 
away, farmers and miners are also affected as their product will not 
leave the docks. Baltimore is also the largest car port in the country, 
which will certainly affect the market for vehicles.
    The United States has more than 300 ports nationwide and more than 
95 percent of all cargo spends time on a ship--the U.S. economy depends 
on ports.
    Ports are intermodal connectors, integrating water, rail, road, and 
airborne modes of transportation. Over 11 million containers move 
through U.S. ports each year.
    Ports face both physical and cyber security threats on a daily 
basis. The Coast Guard holds the responsibility to review port security 
plans, respond to cyber attacks and monitor daily traffic entering and 
exiting the ports.
    President Biden recently signed an executive order strengthening 
the Coast Guard's authority to respond to cyber events at ports. This 
comes at an important time as ports are receiving thousands of cyber 
attacks each year. I am interested in hearing from the Coast Guard how 
they plan to utilize this executive order and strengthen cyber 
security.
    Our ports must be resilient to all threats. Climate change and sea 
level rise poses one of the largest threats of our generation and can 
cause an equally devastating disruption to the supply chain. That is 
why Congress worked together to include over $2.25 billion for the Port 
Infrastructure Development program in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law 
aimed at decarbonizing and making ports more resilient.
    Ports are vital to our economy and national security; I welcome 
today's conversation as to how to continue to support our ports and 
make them more resilient.
    Thank you, and I yield back.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Now I recognize the chairman of the 
Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee, Mr. Gimenez, 
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS A. GIMENEZ OF FLORIDA, 
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY, 
                 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And on behalf of my 
constituents in the 28th Congressional District of Florida, I 
would like to welcome my colleagues and our distinguished 
witnesses to Miami.
    I don't know, Mario, why are we wearing ties? I really 
don't get it. OK.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. I didn't know y'all had them.
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes. Well, we found a couple, I think, and so, 
we put it on just to impress you all. But normally here, 
especially in the summer, we don't go around--we have something 
called a guayabera, if you're Latin, that we use for formal 
things. But I'm with you, Ranking Member. It's a little too 
formal for me. All right. But anyway, I digress.
    Today, our guests will further learn what I have long 
known: that Miami is a unique, robust, beautiful city that has 
much to offer to both its residents and its visitors. This 
venue, PortMiami, is the busiest passenger cruise port in the 
entire world, not just in United States, but in the entire 
world. And it's one of the busiest cargo ports in the United 
States.
    I'm excited to use this hearing to further examine the 
integral role it plays in our city, and more broadly, our 
country. And the mayor has already touched on how important 
this port is to the economy of this city and south Florida in 
general. Over 300,000 jobs are either directly or indirectly 
related to this port. It's the second largest economic 
generator in this area. This and the airport combine for 
probably over 600,000 either direct or indirect jobs.
    First, I'd like to offer my sincere condolences to the 
families of the individuals who passed away or were negatively 
impacted by the tragic collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge 
in Baltimore last week and express my gratitude to the men and 
women of the United States Coast Guard and other Federal, 
State, and local authorities who responded to the incident. 
While we're not aware of any malicious responsibilities for the 
incident, the severity of the collapse of the bridge 
underscores the importance of what we're discussing today.
    Before I was elected to Congress, I had the distinct honor 
to serve 25 years as a firefighter with the city of Miami, 
later serving as its chief. I then had the privilege of being 
the city manager of the city of Miami, and then finally I 
served as the mayor of Miami-Dade County. It was during my time 
as mayor of Miami-Dade that I saw the critical impact that the 
PortMiami and maritime-borne trade has on Miami and the State 
of Florida.
    Our port here is not only of commerce, it's a gateway to 
the world. Major disruptions at the port operations, like what 
we're witnessing in Baltimore, would severely harm the local 
economy and hinder the region's connectivity to the rest of the 
United States and beyond. It is for that reason I worked hard 
during my tenure as mayor of Miami-Dade and will continue to do 
so in my current capacity to ensure PortMiami and the Nation's 
ports have what they need to operate safely, effectively, and 
securely.
    In my current role as chairman of the House Homeland 
Security Committee's Transportation and Maritime Security 
Subcommittee, I am continuously concerned by the security 
threats facing maritime ports across the country.
    I'm especially worried by the security vulnerabilities that 
exist with port equipment that is manufactured or installed in 
the People's Republic of China. The ship-to-shore cranes 
hovering over our docks, including the ones here, while 
instrumental to our port operations, are a focal point of that 
concern. Most of the U.S. port ship-to-shore cranes--nearly 80 
percent--are made by ZPMC, a Chinese state-owned enterprise 
under the direct control of the Chinese Communist Party.
    This near-monopoly allows for ZPMC to compromise U.S.-bound 
cranes that could cause malfunction or facilitate cyber 
espionage at U.S. ports. This situation not only presents 
cybersecurity threats, but also supply chain vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited by those who wish to inflict damage to 
our Nation and could have lasting impacts.
    Well, unfortunately, Communist China's influence in the 
supply chain extends beyond state enterprises like ZPMC. Third-
party companies often create the internal operational 
components for these ship-to-shore cranes.
    These components include programmable logic controllers 
which control many ship-to-shore crane systems as well as crane 
drives and motors. In most all cases, ZPMC requires, and I 
repeat, requires that these companies ship their components to 
the PRC where they can be installed by ZPMC engineers or 
technicians.
    As my subcommittee has discussed in previous hearings, the 
proliferation of port equipment and operational technology 
manufactured or installed by engineers in the PRC introduces 
significant supply chain vulnerabilities into our maritime 
transportation system. As a country, we must acknowledge and 
assess these risks, threats, and vulnerabilities and decide how 
to effectively respond.
    In February, the Biden administration signed an Executive 
order providing the U.S. Coast Guard with new authorities to 
respond to potential malicious actors targeting our maritime 
sector, and particularly those from the PRC. While I commend 
the administration on this initial action, I believe we need to 
continue examining this critical topic and ensure that our 
ports are protected from security threats.
    To do so, I have brought together a group of members from 
the China Select Committee and the Committee on Homeland 
Security to investigate some of the vulnerabilities associated 
with PRC-manufactured port cranes and the consequences of 
having a supply chain that is overly reliant upon equipment 
sourced from our greatest geopolitical opponent.
    Additionally, I have introduced legislative solutions such 
as my Port Crane Security and Inspection Act to ensure that the 
U.S. Coast Guard and other Federal agencies responsible for 
safeguarding maritime ports have the tools and authorities 
necessary to deter hostile actors from operating against our 
ports.
    I am glad to be participating in today's hearing which will 
allow us to continue to address this critical topic and deliver 
a strong message to our adversaries interested in meddling in 
our ports and in the United States, in general. Thank you. And 
I yield back.
    [Mr. Gimenez's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez of Florida, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on 
                           Homeland Security
    On behalf of my constituents in the 28th District of Florida, I 
would like to welcome my colleagues and our distinguished witnesses to 
Miami. Today, our guests will further learn what I have long known: 
that Miami is a unique, robust city that has much to offer to both its 
residents and its visitors. Our venue, PortMiami, is one of the busiest 
passenger and cargo ports in the United States. I am excited to use 
this hearing to further examine the integral role it plays in our city 
and more broadly our country.
    First, I would like to offer my sincere condolences to the families 
of the individuals that passed away or were negatively impacted by the 
tragic collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, Maryland 
last week and express my gratitude to the men and women of the United 
States Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local authorities who 
are responding to the incident.
    While we are not aware of any malicious actors responsible for the 
incident, the severity of the collapse of the bridge underscores the 
importance of what we are discussing today.
    Before I was elected to Congress, I served for 25 years as a fire 
fighter with the City of Miami Fire Department. I then had the 
privilege of serving as the Mayor of Miami-Dade County and City Manager 
for the City of Miami. It was during my time as Mayor of Miami Dade 
that I saw the critical impact that the PortMiami and maritime-born 
trade has on Miami and the state of Florida.
    Our port here is not only a hub of commerce--it is a gateway to the 
world. Major disruptions to the port's operations--like what we are 
witnessing in Baltimore--would severely harm the local economy and 
hinder the region's connectivity to the rest of the United States and 
beyond. It was for that reason I worked hard during my tenure as Mayor 
of Miami Dade, and will continue to do so in my current capacity, to 
ensure PortMiami has what it needs to operate safely, effectively, and 
securely.
    In my current role as Chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Committee's Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee, I am 
continuously concerned by the security threats facing maritime ports 
across the country.
    I am especially worried by the security vulnerabilities that exist 
with port equipment that is manufactured or installed in the People's 
Republic of China. The ship-to-shore cranes towering over our docks--
while instrumental to our port operations--are a focal point of that 
concern. Most of the U.S. port ship-to-shore cranes--nearly 80 
percent--are made by ZPMC, a Chinese state-owned enterprise under the 
direct control of the Chinese Communist Party. This near-monopoly 
allows for ZPMC to compromise U.S.-bound cranes that could cause 
malfunction or facilitate cyber espionage at U.S. ports. This situation 
not only presents cybersecurity threats but also supply chain 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by those who wish to inflict 
damage on our nation that could have lasting impacts.
    Unfortunately, Communist China's influence in the supply chain 
extends beyond state-owned enterprises like ZPMC. Third-party companies 
often create the internal operational components for these ship-to-
shore cranes.
    These components include programmable logic controllers which 
control many ship-to-shore crane systems, as well as crane drives and 
motors. In almost all cases, ZPMC requires that these companies ship 
their components to the PRC where they can be installed by ZPMC 
engineers or technicians.
    As my subcommittee has discussed in previous hearings, the 
proliferation of port equipment and operational technology manufactured 
or installed by engineers in the PRC introduces significant supply 
chain vulnerabilities into our Maritime Transportation System.
    As a country, we must acknowledge and assess these risks, threats, 
and vulnerabilities and decide how to effectively respond.
    In February, the Biden administration signed an executive order 
providing the U.S. Coast Guard with new authorities to respond to 
potential malicious actors targeting our maritime sector--and 
particularly those from the PRC. While I commend the administration on 
this initial action, I believe we need to continue examining this 
crucial topic and ensure that our ports are protected from security 
threats.
    To do so, I have brought together a group of members from the China 
Select Committee and the Committee on Homeland Security, to investigate 
some of the vulnerabilities associated with PRC-manufactured port 
cranes and the consequences of having a supply chain that is overly 
reliant upon equipment sourced from our greatest geopolitical 
competitor.
    Additionally, I have introduced legislative solutions--such as my 
Port Crane Security and Inspection Act--to ensure the U.S. Coast Guard 
and other federal agencies responsible for safeguarding maritime ports 
have the tools and authorities necessary to deter hostile actors from 
operating against our ports.
    I am glad to be participating in today's hearing which will allow 
us to continue to address this critical topic and deliver a strong 
message to our adversaries interested in meddling in our ports.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. I now recognize the ranking member 
of the Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee, Mr. 
Thanedar, for 5 minutes for your opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHRI THANEDAR OF MICHIGAN, RANKING 
 MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY, 
                 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning to 
all. I'm used to coming here, not only not in my tie, but also 
bringing my family, my children, who are excited to go on the 
cruise. This is the only time I'm here working in this 
beautiful building and this beautiful city.
    But before I begin my remarks, I would like to thank 
PortMiami for hosting us today. Thank you also to Chairman 
Gimenez for hosting us in your hometown. And thank you, 
Chairman Webster and Ranking Member Carbajal, for bringing our 
two subcommittees together for this important hearing. Finally, 
thank you, all of our witnesses today, for sharing your time 
and expertise with us.
    The past couple weeks have displayed the importance of the 
safe and secure functioning of our Nation's maritime ports and 
the Marine Transportation System. As we all are aware, on March 
26, a containership crashed into the Francis Scott Key Bridge 
in Baltimore, causing the bridge to collapse, claiming the 
lives of six men who were working on the bridge. My heart goes 
out to the friends and families of the victims of this tragic 
accident.
    In the aftermath of the bridge's collapse, the Port of 
Baltimore was forced to shut down all maritime traffic in and 
out of the port. The incident has demonstrated how critical a 
single port's operations can be to the whole economy, as 
industries and communities throughout the country have felt the 
impact of the port's closure, including the automotive industry 
in my hometown of Detroit.
    But while the incident has highlighted some of the 
vulnerabilities of our maritime sector, it has also displayed 
its tremendous resilience. The Coast Guard, along with a host 
of Federal, State, and local partners, has worked diligently 
around the clock to respond to the accident, carry out search 
and rescue missions, assess the damage, contain hazardous 
material, and begin to clear the waterways. Thanks to their 
hard work, a temporary channel has already been cleared, 
allowing the port to reopen to limited traffic. I'm grateful to 
all the first responders who have worked to save lives and 
limit the damage caused by the accident.
    Today, we will discuss what more can be done to ensure the 
safe and secure operation of our Nation's seaports and prevent 
further disruption to the Marine Transportation System. We must 
ensure that congested waterways can be navigated safely. And 
since accidents will happen regardless, we must develop better 
ways to protect infrastructure and prevent catastrophic damage. 
And while there is absolutely no evidence that the accident in 
Baltimore was caused by any kind of cyber or physical attack, 
threats to the maritime sector are very real, and we must 
ensure the Coast Guard and its partners have the resources and 
the tools needed to counter them.
    As computer systems and networks have grown increasingly 
prevalent within ports, addressing cyber threats has become 
especially critical. Cyber attacks on ports in the U.S. and 
overseas have already had drastic impacts, stalling the 
transport of cargo and costing hundreds of millions of dollars 
in economic damage.
    In February, the Biden administration announced a series of 
actions to greatly enhance port cybersecurity, including: an 
Executive order to address Coast Guard authorities and cyber 
incident reporting, proposed regulations to establish minimum 
port cybersecurity requirements, a security directive to 
address vulnerabilities posed by Chinese-manufactured cranes, 
and an investment of more than $20 billion to improve port 
infrastructure and initiate domestic manufacturing of cranes. 
These actions will significantly improve port cybersecurity.
    I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses on what 
support is needed to carry out these actions and on other 
efforts to ensure the safety and security of our Nation's 
seaports. Thank you again to our hosts, our witnesses; and 
Chairman, I yield back.
    [Mr. Thanedar's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Shri Thanedar of Michigan, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on 
                           Homeland Security
    The past couple weeks have displayed the importance of the safe and 
secure functioning of our Nation's maritime ports and the Marine 
Transportation System. As we all are aware, on March 26th, a container 
ship crashed into the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, causing 
the bridge to collapse and claiming the lives of six men who were 
working on the bridge. My heart goes out to the friends and family of 
the victims of this tragic accident.
    In the aftermath of the bridge's collapse, the Port of Baltimore 
was forced to shut down all maritime traffic in and out of the port. 
The incident has demonstrated how critical a single port's operations 
can be to the whole economy, as industries and communities throughout 
the country have felt the impact of the port's closure--including the 
automobile industry in my hometown of Detroit. But while this incident 
has highlighted some of the vulnerabilities of our maritime sector, it 
has also displayed its tremendous resilience.
    The Coast Guard, along with a host of Federal, State, and local 
partners, has worked diligently around the clock to respond to the 
accident, carry out search and rescue missions, assess the damage, 
contain hazardous materials, and begin to clear the waterways. Thanks 
to their hard work, a temporary channel has already been cleared, 
allowing the port to reopen to limited traffic. I am grateful to all 
the first responders who have worked to save lives and limit the damage 
caused by this accident.
    Today, we will discuss what more can be done to ensure the safe and 
secure operation of our Nation's seaports and prevent further 
disruptions to the Marine Transportation System. We must ensure that 
congested waterways can be navigated safely--and since accidents will 
happen regardless, we must develop better ways to protect 
infrastructure and prevent catastrophic damage. And while there is 
absolutely no evidence that the accident in Baltimore was caused by any 
kind of cyber or physical attack, threats to the maritime sector are 
very real, and we must ensure the Coast Guard and its partners have the 
resources and tools needed to counter them.
    As computer systems and networks have grown increasingly prevalent 
within ports, addressing cyber threats has become especially critical. 
Cyberattacks on ports in the U.S. and overseas have already had drastic 
impacts, stalling the transport of cargo and costing hundreds of 
millions of dollars in economic damages. In February, the Biden 
Administration announced a series of actions to greatly enhance port 
cybersecurity, including:
      an Executive Order to address Coast Guard authorities and 
cyber incident reporting.
      proposed regulations to establish minimum port 
cybersecurity requirements.
      a security directive to address vulnerabilities posed by 
Chinese-manufactured cranes.
      and an investment of more than $20 billion to improve 
port infrastructure and initiate domestic manufacturing of cranes.

    These actions will significantly improve port cybersecurity.
    I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses on what support 
is needed to carry out these actions and on other efforts to ensure the 
safety and security of our Nation's seaports.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Thank you. And we have, as 
we've said, three different panels. But before we begin those, 
I'd like to take a moment to explain our lighting system. Green 
means go, yellow means slow up, and red means stop, kind of 
like a stoplight.
    I'd like to ask unanimous consent that witnesses that have 
full testimonies and full statements be included in the record. 
Without objection, show that ordered.
    I ask for unanimous consent that the record of today's 
hearing remain open until such time as the witnesses on all 
panels have provided answers to any questions that may have 
been submitted in writing. Without objection, show that 
ordered.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 
days for additional comments and information submitted by the 
Members or the witnesses to be included in the record of 
today's hearing. Without objection, show that ordered.
    As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
we ask that you limit your remarks to 5 minutes.
    With that being said, we'll start with our first witness, 
which is Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, a good friend of 
mine. We served together in the State house, State senate, and 
now in Congress, and in Congress, he is recognized as probably 
one of the top Members of Congress.
    So, thank you. You're recognized for 5 minutes.

   TESTIMONY OF HON. MARIO DIAZ-BALART, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
               CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much, Mr. 
Chairman and Ranking Member. This is a very distinguished 
panel, and I am honored that you would all be here in south 
Florida.
    To you, Mr. Webster--Mr. Chairman, you and I have worked on 
issues dealing with infrastructure now going back to, well, 
we'd rather not talk about how long, but I will tell you that 
this State and the country is better off because of the 
service, Mr. Chairman, that you have provided. Your leadership 
on infrastructure issues and other issues, but in particular on 
infrastructure issues, has been frankly remarkable.
    And we are in this beautiful PortMiami, but I can't help to 
think of all you have done going back to the State legislative 
years, and you and I worked on those things together. But your 
leadership there and you continue your leadership on making 
sure that the ports of this State and now nationally are the 
best they can be. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 
invaluable service to this amazing country of ours.
    And I would be remiss, and I'm not--because I have a lot of 
friends on this panel--but I do want to mention Chairman 
Gimenez. Chairman Gimenez was obviously a distinguished member 
of the T&I Committee, is also of the Homeland Security and also 
of the China Select Committee.
    But as I'm sure you know, he's also a bit of an institution 
in our community here. A firefighter, career firefighter then 
fire chief and going all the way to mayor. And I will tell you, 
I don't mean this as disrespectful to any mayor before or after 
Mr. Gimenez, but this community and the infrastructure in this 
area has not been better than when Mr. Gimenez was mayor, and 
he continues to serve. And he's a valuable asset, I know, to 
your committee, Mr. Chairman, to your committee, Ranking 
Member. And again, it's a privilege, Mayor, Chief, and friend 
and colleague, to be here with you.
    I did, Mr. Chairman, submit a rather extensive statement, 
so, I just want to touch a couple of issues if I may. Again, I 
also thank all of you for mentioning the tragedy in Baltimore.
    We are in this beautiful place that all of you have talked 
about. The amazing thing about PortMiami is that it's a very 
small port. It's landlocked, and yet it does amazing things for 
this community, for the State, for the country, in a very small 
footprint. And every port in the country is different. And this 
is one of those examples of a port that is on the cutting edge.
    And without this port, frankly, this community would not be 
able to be this thriving community that we all see and that we 
all cherish and some of us are privileged to live in.
    I'm very proud that, as a former chairman of the THUD, 
Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development Subcommittee of 
the Appropriations Committee--I'm still on that--I was able to 
create and fund--actually probably more important, right, than 
creating--the Port Infrastructure Development Program, 
specifically for seaports.
    As you know, seaports have always had to compete for 
funding with everything else, and they still do in other areas, 
but at least we have this program. And I just want to emphasize 
that because all of us have to be very supportive of making 
sure that we continue to emphasize seaports because they are 
such a vital part of our community.
    Also, something a little bit unique about this port and, 
frankly, this community, is that we are affected greatly--other 
ports and other communities are as well--by what happens in 
this region and in this hemisphere. We've all seen the tragic 
situation taking place in Haiti, for example, right now, and it 
is tragic. And I will tell you that whatever happens in places 
like Haiti, or we're in a hurricane area, this whole hemisphere 
is, and when there's a hurricane, this seaport also becomes a 
hub for humanitarian relief around the entire hemisphere.
    But I also want to talk about another little issue that is 
a little unique for PortMiami and for this part of the State, 
this part of the country. We happen to be sitting 90 miles away 
from a state sponsor of terrorism. Think about that. Ninety 
miles away from us, there is a dictatorship, by the way, that 
has troops fighting along with the Russians in the Ukraine, 
that has what the OAS Secretary General has called an army of 
occupation, in Venezuela just 90 miles away from us.
    And so, when we're dealing with security and safety, which 
is an issue that I know that you all are looking at, one of the 
things to remember is that while every port has its challenges, 
this port and this community and this area has some unique 
challenges and that sometimes I think are either forgotten or 
ignored.
    I was outraged, by the way, when the U.S. Department of 
State--I deal with them all the time--in coordination with the 
Department of Homeland Security, recently approved a visit for 
members of that terrorist regime to go visit the Port of 
Wilmington in North Carolina. Don't take my word for it. The 
Representative who represents that area, Mr. Chairman Rouzer, 
was equally incensed.
    And furthermore, to just show you sometimes how folks can 
be totally tone deaf, one of the things that was mentioned by 
the Department of State during that so-called visit was that 
the delegation was meeting with the Cuban counterparts in the 
United States, the U.S. Coast Guard, the counterparts.
    With all due respect, the U.S. Coast Guard are heroes. They 
sacrifice. They risk their lives to protect commerce, to 
protect the environment, to protect the American people and, 
frankly, people from all over the world. And to say that the 
thugs of the Cuban regime are counterparts to the U.S. Coast 
Guard not only shows a lack of understanding of reality, but 
it's just an insult to the men and women, to the heroes of the 
United States Coast Guard.
    Just one example, the so-called counterparts, the Cuban 
regime's counterparts, remember, they were responsible for the 
horrific tugboat massacre where they on purpose sank and 
murdered and with hoses, actually hosed babies and kids, men 
and women into the ocean who drowned and they sank a tugboat on 
purpose. To call those folks the counterparts of the U.S. Coast 
Guard is not only insensitive and insulting, but it shows a 
lack of understanding of reality.
    So, I am so grateful for the fact that all of you are here. 
I'm grateful for your leadership. I'm grateful for what you do 
day in and day out, and I'm also incredibly privileged to have 
the opportunity to work with you all as my role as an 
appropriator, and I thank you all.
    And I know that I've gone way over my time, Mr. Chairman. I 
apologize for that. That's what happens when you wear a tie, 
you go over the line, you see. So, anyway, thank you for your 
kindness, for your indulgence.
    I yield back.
    [Mr. Diaz-Balart's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Mario Diaz-Balart, a Representative in 
                   Congress from the State of Florida
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, Chairman Gimenez, 
Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the Subcommittees:
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss port safety, security, and 
the future of infrastructure investment for our nation's seaports. 
Before I begin, I'd like to thank Chairman Daniel Webster, for his 
leadership and his staunch support of the U.S. Coast Guard and maritime 
transportation across our country. Many of you may or may not know, 
Chairman Webster served as Speaker and then Majority Leader in the 
Florida State Legislature and has nearly forty years of transportation 
experience, proving to be an invaluable asset to our Florida 
Congressional delegation and to the Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee. Thank you for always fighting for our mariners, and ensuring 
our waterways are safe for the American people. Additionally, I'd like 
to thank Chairman Carlos Gimenez with the Committee on Homeland 
Security for the kind invitation today as well. Chairman Gimenez has 
worn many hats over the years: firefighter, fire chief, and as Mayor of 
Miami-Dade County. Chairman Gimenez's extensive knowledge of 
transportation and maritime issues facing South Florida, specifically 
PortMiami as former Mayor, proves to be an invaluable asset to the 
United States Congress.
    Our nation's seaports are huge drivers of economic growth, 
supporting 31 million jobs, and generating nearly $5.4 trillion in 
economic activity. Here in Florida, we are lucky to have some of the 
best and busiest ports in the country. Our seaports support nearly 
900,000 jobs and contribute $117.6 billion in economic value to our 
state. For 2023, Florida's system of seaports handled 114.25 million 
tons of cargo, shattering the 2022 record-high 112.5 million tons of 
cargo moved \1\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Florida Seaports Set Back-to-Back Record-High Cargo Growth, 
Proving Florida Is America's Supply Chain Solution.'' Florida Ports 
Council, Florida Ports Council, 30 Jan. 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One such seaport is PortMiami, which contributes $43 billion 
annually to our local economy while supporting more than 334,000 jobs. 
Over a million containers of cargo come through PortMiami each year, 
much of it containing fruits, vegetables, and flowers from South 
America. Compared to most seaports on large plots of land, PortMiami is 
limited to a relatively small space, which creates some challenges. For 
example, the USDA charges a flat fee for fumigation of fruits and 
vegetables arriving from international destinations. In PortMiami, only 
a fraction of goods could be fumigated at the rate of larger seaports. 
This made imports to PortMiami more expensive, and therefore, PortMiami 
was less competitive compared to other seaports.
    This problem was only going to get worse as competition was 
increasing, and supply chain vulnerabilities were being exposed. I knew 
that there must be a better solution.
           Addressing Critical U.S. Port Infrastructure Needs
    For years I have worked to improve our states seaports, both during 
my time in the Florida State Legislature, and now as a Member of 
Congress. In the U.S. Congress, I had the privilege of serving as 
Chairman, Ranking Member, and now member of the Transportation, Housing 
and Urban Development Subcommittee of Appropriations. Our seaports must 
compete for funds under large, more visible infrastructure programs 
under the direction of the Department of Transportation. Seaports must 
compete among airport, road and bridge projects in major metropolitan 
areas, multimodal projects, and many other sectors of our national 
transportation system, making it challenging for seaports to obtain 
sufficient funding and receive the attention that they so desperately 
need.
    As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee when drafting the Fiscal Year 
2019 Appropriations bill, I created the first dedicated account 
specifically for our seaports, which totaled $293 million. The Port 
Infrastructure Development Program, also known as the PIDP, has aided 
in addressing critical infrastructure needs to ports across our 
country, as well as in my home state of Florida. As a result, PortMiami 
received $44 million to help construct a 100,000 square foot state-of-
the-art fumigation facility that will ensure the Port remains 
competitive and efficient, rivaling the ports in the Northeast. The 
PIDP program is critical for our seaports to have the ability to 
address necessary infrastructure needs and address supply chain 
vulnerabilities.
           Bolstering American Competitiveness and Readiness
    In addition to securing critical port funding, I was also able to 
solve a problem for our merchant shipping fleet. More than 70 percent 
of U.S. Coast Guard-licensed officers stem from one of six state 
maritime academies nationwide \2\. These state maritime academies rely 
on at-sea training in deck seamanship, navigation, and engineering. 
This training provides life-saving expertise in safe ship practices, 
operations, and maintenance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Alfultis, Michael A., et al. ``State Maritime Academies--
Educating the Future Maritime Workforce.'' The State of the Maritime 
Workforce, Jan. 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regrettably, our future merchant mariners have been training on 
outdated ships, some of which have obsolete steam-powered propulsion 
systems, that do not reflect the current world-class vessels in the 
national fleet. As a fiscal hawk, I have fought to reduce wasteful 
spending, cut wasteful bureaucracy, and bolster the safety and security 
of the American people. House Republican Appropriators have fiercely 
worked to spend less and change the trajectory of federal spending, 
without shortchanging critical investments to our national security 
interests at home and abroad. Improving our American competitiveness 
and readiness on the national stage begins by preparing our future 
mariners at home. With our national security interests in mind, I 
secured a total of $1.6 billion in funding for the replacement of the 
aging school fleet to the new National Security Multi-Mission Vessels 
(NSMV). These vessels serve a critical role in providing necessary 
hands-on training for those serving in the maritime industry that 
cannot be accomplished in a classroom. The next generation of domestic 
mariner training ships must be more cost effective while also utilizing 
creative solutions to generate the highly trained and capable mariners. 
It may be these very mariners who answer the call to serve future U.S. 
war efforts by transporting shipments of supplies to military bases 
around the world often being enlisted to transport vehicles, guns, 
bombs, gasoline, food, and medicine while fully supporting other U.S. 
logistical needs.
    This initiative alone has revitalized shipyards across our country 
supporting almost 1,200 shipyard jobs during construction and 
additional jobs at-sea and ashore once completed \3\. Just late last 
year, the first NSMV was delivered to SUNY Maritime College, named 
Empire State VII. These new vessels have state-of-the-art navigation 
equipment, which in turn will prepare the academies to have a 
standardized and purpose-built training platform for years ahead. The 
next training vessel is slated delivery to the Massachusetts Maritime 
Academy later this year. The National Security Multi-Mission Vessel 
program contributes to our national security interests at home and 
abroad as we increase the ranks of our well-trained maritime workforce 
and bolster critical American sectors of our economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ``MARAD National Security Multi-Mission Vessel Program.'' 
Maritime Administration, Department of Transportation--Maritime 
Administration, www.maritime.dot.gov/. Accessed 2 Apr. 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Confronting our National Security Threats and Guarding our U.S. Ports
    Any discussion of port and maritime safety in South Florida is 
incomplete unless we address a serious threat to our national security 
in our hemisphere, which are those in Communist Terrorist Regime in 
Cuba. I was outraged when I learned that the U.S. State Department, in 
coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, approved a visit 
for members of the Cuban regime's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of the Interior, which is currently under U.S. sanction for 
human rights abuses, to the Port of Wilmington in North Carolina. I 
also note that our colleague who represents the district that includes 
that port, Representative David Rouzer, roundly condemned on the House 
Floor the Biden Administration's decision to invite representatives of 
a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism to his district. To our 
distinguished members of the Coast Guard here and those working hard to 
keep Americans safe every day, you deserve better. I was further 
incensed by the State Department spokesperson's defense of the visit 
that, ``The Cuban delegation is meeting with [U.S. Coast Guard] 
counterparts and joining supervised tours of port facilities in North 
Carolina . . . The U.S. Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard have had a 
collaborative relationship for decades that focuses first and foremost 
on maritime safety.''
    First of all, the Cuban regime's operatives are not 
``counterparts'' to members of the U.S. Coast Guard. The members of the 
U.S. Coast Guard serve with honor to protect the American people and 
are charged to show compassion to all who they encounter. In sharp 
contrast, the Cuban regime's thugs who perpetrated the horrific Tugboat 
Massacre of 1994 that killed dozens of innocent people including 
children, the chaos of the Mariel boatlift of 1980, and the purposeful 
ramming of a boat off of Bahia Honda in October 2022 which killed five 
people, are not your ``counterparts.'' The regime's operatives which 
were caught smuggling cocaine in 2016, or who were caught smuggling 
weapons to North Korea, are not your ``counterparts.'' It is an insult 
to compare our honorable service members as though they are even in the 
same league as the murderers, weapons smugglers and narcotraffickers of 
the regime in Cuba. Second, it is patently absurd to engage in maritime 
safety and port security visits with a terrorist dictatorship that has 
no respect for human rights, and no respect for the human life. They 
are not our Coast Guard's ``counterparts,'' and they certainly do not 
prioritize maritime safety. It collaborates with the terrorist states 
of Iran and North Korea, as well as Communist China, provides thousands 
of intelligence agents to keep Maduro in power in Venezuela, sends 
soldiers to train in Belarus while other Cubans fight for Russia 
against Ukraine, and harbors terrorist individuals such as Joanne 
Chesimard and aids terrorist organizations such as the ELN. It is a 
dangerous mistake to assume that the anti-American, malign regime in 
Cuba shares our goals related to port security and maritime safety.
    These dangerous adversaries are seeking ways to harm Americans, and 
the threat from Communist China might be the most insidious. Whether 
through cyberattacks targeting our critical infrastructure, purchasing 
land near military bases, and stealing valuable technology, the threat 
from Communist China is the challenge of our time. Due to the Biden 
Administration inaction and weakness in confronting multiple foreign 
adversaries, the Republican Majority is acting. In the Homeland 
Security Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2024, I championed language 
prohibiting the Department of Homeland Security from entering into 
contracts or other agreements with entities connected to the Chinese 
military. This prohibition should not have been necessary, it is just 
plain common sense. But under the Biden Administration, we must 
prohibit even the absurd. This language also strengthens cybersecurity 
at ports by requiring the Departments of CISA, CBP, the Coast Guard, 
and other related agencies to submit risk assessment reports by the 
mandatory deadlines, and also to brief the Congress on risks to U.S. 
ports and the agency efforts to mitigate them. My colleagues and I will 
continue to remain firm in countering these national security threats.
                               Conclusion
    In closing, I'd like to thank Chairman Webster, Ranking Member 
Carbajal with the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and 
Chairman Carlos Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar with the Homeland 
Security Committee for the invitation to testify at today's joint field 
hearing on Port Safety, Security, and Infrastructure Investments. We 
have some difficult challenges ahead of us, due to the increasing 
technological capabilities of our adversaries, and their determination 
to circumvent our security strategies. I am grateful for the 
opportunity to speak to you today, and I look forward to working with 
my colleagues, and other authorizers, to ensure that the United States 
is able to counter these threats, strengthen vulnerable supply chains, 
expand the competitiveness of our farmers and other businesses, and 
protect the American people for generations to come.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Does anybody on the panel have 
a question for Representative Diaz-Balart? You're recognized, 
Mr. Cohen.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you. I am not a subcommittee chairman of 
the relevant committee, but I am the senior Member of this 
delegation, and I feel like Rodney Dangerfield.
    Moving right along with our bombastic review, I want to 
express my sincere care for our colleague, Representative Diaz-
Balart. He's a good guy. We've been on travels together and got 
to be friends and bonded and continue, and he does a great job.
    He brought up the issue about Ukraine. I hope we get a vote 
when we come back next week to support the Ukrainians, who are 
valiantly fighting to maintain democracy, to fight off an 
authoritarian attack by Russia, just as many in Cuba did when 
Castro came. And I hope we get that vote. And right now, the 
Cuban soldiers who are there are having a pretty free range in 
killing Ukrainians because they've got the bullets and the 
Ukrainians don t. So, I hope that happens.
    And then on a bit of personal privilege, my staff emailed 
me, and they didn't say anything about me not having a tie. 
They said, ``I like your shirt.'' Shirts are good.
    I'd also like to give note that I'm a 1967 graduate of 
Coral Gables High School. I probably may be the only, other 
than Mr. Gimenez, graduate of a Dade County high school in the 
Congress. And I was a Cavalier, and I went to Ponce Junior and 
loved Miami and still love Miami. It's changed a lot since I 
was here. I've visited many times, but from when I was here, 
growing up, it's changed a ton.
    And I've just learned that Mr. Gimenez and I have much in 
common, Sonny Liston, Cassius Clay, Joe Auer, and so much else. 
And we'll have lots of time to talk about George Meyer in the 
future.
    Thank you. And it's good to be back in Miami. And also from 
Mr. Carbajal's note, and he may not know this and it may be an 
old thing, C-A-L-I-F. That's, Mr. Carbajal, that's abbreviation 
for California, is it not?
    Mr. Carbajal. It could be.
    Mr. Cohen. When I was growing up, they told me that meant 
``come and live in Florida.'' I yield.
    Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Chair, now we know who to blame for the 
taste in shirt that Mr. Cohen is wearing.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Yes, for sure.
    Are there any questions for Representative Diaz-Balart from 
the panel here?
    OK. Well, that brings to the close the first panel.
    Thank you for appearing, Representative Diaz-Balart. Thank 
you for your insight. We really appreciate it. You are excused.
    So, our second panel today consists of the executive branch 
Government witnesses, which are Rear Admiral Vann. You are 
recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOHN C. VANN, COMMANDER, COAST GUARD 
CYBER COMMAND, U.S. COAST GUARD; REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE R. ARGUIN, 
 ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD; 
  AND WILLIAM K. PAAPE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR PORTS AND 
               WATERWAYS, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOHN C. VANN, COMMANDER, COAST GUARD 
                CYBER COMMAND, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Vann. Thank you so much.
    Good morning, Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking 
Member Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar, distinguished members 
of the subcommittees. I am honored to be here today to discuss 
the protection, defense, and resiliency of the Marine 
Transportation System, the MTS, from today's cyber threats. I 
ask that my written testimony be entered into the record.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So ordered.
    Admiral Vann. First and foremost, I would like to express 
my deepest sympathies to the six individuals who lost their 
lives in the terrible accident involving the Francis Scott Key 
Bridge. The Coast Guard's thoughts are with their loved ones 
during this difficult time. Furthermore, my thanks go out to 
the Coast Guard men and women and the many agencies and 
organizations that continue to heroically respond to that 
tragic accident.
    The Coast Guard is committed to addressing cybersecurity 
risks and responding to cyber incidents in the marine 
environment to ensure our Nation's economic and national 
security. The size, interdependence, complexity, and 
criticality of the MTS make it a prime target for criminals, 
activists, terrorists, state-sponsored actors, and adversarial 
nation states.
    The threat of disruptive cyber effects to our critical 
infrastructure, and specifically to the MTS, require us to be 
vigilant, proactive, collaborative, and resourceful. Cyber 
intrusions and attacks have a devastating impact on critical 
infrastructure. A successful cyber attack could impose 
unrecoverable losses to port operations and electronically 
stored information, hampering national economic activity and 
disrupting global supply chains.
    The increased use of automated systems in shipping, 
offshore platforms, and port and cargo facilities creates 
enormous efficiencies and introduces additional attack vectors 
for malicious cyber actors. With the support of Congress, the 
Coast Guard has invested in growing and maturing Coast Guard 
Cyber Command to assess, identify, and respond to cyber risks 
and threats. CG Cyber currently employs three Cyber Protection 
Teams, or CPTs, and a Maritime Cyber Readiness Branch.
    The CPTs work with local Coast Guard captains of the port 
to address cybersecurity risks and respond to cyber threats in 
the MTS. A Coast Guard CPT was the first Federal cyber response 
team in 2021 to identify probable port network intrusion by a 
People's Republic of China actor known now as Volt Typhoon. Our 
ability to share information and critical vulnerabilities with 
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, and 
law enforcement partners enabled a timely response and rapid 
mitigation with that port partner.
    The Maritime Cyber Readiness Branch employs subject matter 
experts in cybersecurity and marine safety. They regularly 
engage with industry support Area Maritime Security Committees 
for planning and execution of cyber exercises and work with MTS 
cybersecurity specialists at each Coast Guard area, district, 
and sector to improve cyber literacy and support Coast Guard 
captains of the port in measuring cyber risk.
    We will soon be releasing the third annual Cyber Trends and 
Insights in the Marine Environment report, which provides key 
insights and trends to aid industry and other stakeholders in 
identifying and addressing current and emerging cyber risks.
    Through consistent work in collaboration with other 
departments, agencies, and industry, CG Cyber shares critical 
vulnerability information, mitigation strategies, and threat 
intelligence. Our CPTs regularly deploy with Department of 
Defense and CISA teams to provide maritime and operational 
technology subject matter expertise around the globe. We are 
better and more resilient because we exercise and execute 
operations together.
    I look forward to continuing this conversation and 
answering your questions. Thank you.
    [The joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Vann and 
Arguin is on page 21.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Next we have Rear Admiral Arguin. You are recognized for 5 
minutes.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE R. ARGUIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 
            FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Arguin. Good morning, Chairman Webster, Chairman 
Gimenez, Ranking Member Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
Congressman Cohen. I'm honored to be here today to discuss a 
top priority for the United States Coast Guard: protecting the 
Marine Transportation System. I ask that my written testimony 
be entered into the record.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So ordered.
    Admiral Arguin. I'd like to offer my heartfelt condolences 
to the families and loved ones of the six individuals who lost 
their lives in the tragic incident involving the Francis Scott 
Key Bridge. Much like in south Florida, the Coast Guard has 
strong ties throughout Maryland and the Baltimore region, and 
our sympathies are with all those impacted by this horrible 
incident.
    Our national security and economic prosperity are 
inextricably linked to a safe, secure, and efficient Marine 
Transportation System, or MTS. The vast system of ports and 
waterways that make up the MTS supports $5.4 trillion of annual 
economic activity, accounts for the employment of more than 30 
million Americans, and enables critical sealift capabilities, 
allowing our Armed Forces to project power around the globe.
    Florida is a shining example of the benefits brought by a 
vibrant MTS, employing more than 65,000 men and women and 
contributing approximately $15 billion to the State's economy. 
The increasing connectedness and complexity of the Nation's MTS 
also brings new vulnerabilities and threats, including in the 
cyber domain.
    In response to dynamic threats, the United States Coast 
Guard has taken decisive action in our maritime critical 
infrastructure to harden and build resiliency against cyber 
attacks. On February 21, the President signed an Executive 
order which further enables our port security efforts by 
explicitly addressing cyber threats.
    It empowers the Coast Guard to prescribe conditions and 
restrictions for the safety of waterfront facilities and 
vessels in ports, including reporting requirements for actual 
or threatened cyber incidents. With this authority, the Coast 
Guard issued a directive requiring specific risk management 
actions for all owners and operators of cranes manufactured by 
companies from the People's Republic of China. While the 
specific requirements are deemed sensitive security information 
and cannot be shared publicly, our captains of the port around 
the country are working directly with crane owners and 
operators to ensure compliance.
    Also, on February 21, the Coast Guard released a proposed 
rulemaking to set baseline cybersecurity requirements for 
vessels, facilities, and Outer Continental Shelf facilities. 
The public comment period for the proposed rule is open, and 
the Service stresses the need for public participation in the 
proposed rulemaking. The diversity of the maritime industry and 
the dynamic nature of the cyber threat make public comment 
critical.
    While the Coast Guard is focused on implementing these new 
major efforts, work is far from done. The MTS is indeed a 
system where an attack on one segment has the potential to 
affect others. This demands collaboration across Government and 
industry to ensure unified and coordinated response to cyber 
challenges in the maritime domain. Like all other risks to the 
MTS, cyber risk is a shared responsibility.
    As such, the Coast Guard will continue its work across all 
levels of Government and engage with industry to assess 
security vulnerabilities, determine risk, and develop 
mitigation strategies. This layered approach from the local to 
international level is critical due to the size, diversity, and 
interconnectedness of the MTS.
    As the proven prevention and response framework is applied 
to prevent or minimize disruptions to the MTS and ports around 
the country, I'm grateful for the support of this committee to 
ensure the Coast Guard has the authorities and the resources we 
need to stay ahead of these threats.
    I look forward to your questions on the vital work the 
Coast Guard does every day to help safeguard America's ports. 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and 
for your continued support of the United States Coast Guard.
    [The joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Vann and 
Arguin follows:]

                                 
Joint Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral John C. Vann, Commander, Coast 
   Guard Cyber Command, U.S. Coast Guard, and Rear Admiral Wayne R. 
  Arguin, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard
                              Introduction
    Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar, and distinguished Members of the 
Subcommittees. We are honored to be here today to discuss a top 
priority for the U.S. Coast Guard: protecting the Marine Transportation 
System (MTS).
    The U.S. Coast Guard offers its heartfelt condolences to the 
families and loved ones of the six individuals who lost their lives in 
the tragic incident involving the Francis Scott Key Bridge. The U.S. 
Coast Guard has strong ties throughout Maryland and the Baltimore 
community, and our sympathies are with all those impacted by this 
horrible accident.
    At all times, the U.S. Coast Guard is a military service and branch 
of the U.S. Armed Forces, a Federal law enforcement agency, a 
regulatory body, a co-Sector Risk Management Agency, a first responder, 
and an element of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The Service is 
uniquely positioned to ensure the safety, security, and stewardship of 
the maritime domain.
    Since the early days of the Revenue Cutter Service, the Service has 
protected our Nation's waters, harbors, and ports. While much has 
changed over the centuries--with our missions expanding from sea, air, 
and land into cyberspace--our ethos and operational doctrine remain 
steadfast. Regardless of the threat, we leverage the full set of our 
authorities; the ingenuity and leadership of our workforce; and the 
breadth of our military, law enforcement, and civil partnerships to 
protect the Nation, its waterways, and all who operate on them.
          The Criticality of the Marine Transportation System
    Our national security and economic prosperity are inextricably 
linked to a safe and efficient MTS. It is difficult to overstate the 
complexity of the MTS and its consequence to the Nation. It is an 
integrated network that consists of 25,000 miles of coastal and inland 
waters and rivers serving 361 ports. However, it is more than ports and 
waterways. It is cargo and cruise ships, passenger ferries, waterfront 
terminals, offshore facilities, buoys and beacons, bridges, and more. 
The MTS supports $5.4 trillion of economic activity each year and 
supports the employment of more than 30 million Americans. It supports 
critical national security sealift capabilities, enabling U.S. Armed 
Forces to project power around the globe. The U.S. Coast Guard remains 
laser-focused on the safety and security of this system as an economic 
engine and strategic imperative.
      Port Security--A Shared Responsibility and Layered Approach
    The U.S. Coast Guard is the Nation's lead Federal agency for 
safeguarding the MTS. The Service applies a proven prevention and 
response framework to prevent or mitigate disruption to the MTS from 
the many risks it faces. U.S. Coast Guard authorities and capabilities 
cut across threat vectors, allowing operational commanders to quickly 
evaluate risks, apply resources, and lead a coordinated and effective 
response.
    The U.S. Coast Guard works across multiple levels of government and 
industry to assess security vulnerabilities, determine risk, and 
develop mitigation strategies. This layered approach--from the local to 
the international level--is critical due to the size and 
interconnectedness of the MTS.
                 Locally: Vessel and Facility Security
    Security in U.S. ports and waterways starts with individual 
vessels, port facilities, and outer continental shelf facilities. The 
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and its implementing 
regulations place specific requirements on regulated entities to 
conduct security assessments, analyze the results, and incorporate 
their findings in U.S. Coast Guard-approved security plans.
    These plans set baseline requirements that regulated U.S. vessels 
and facilities must follow to protect the MTS, including addressing 
access control, computer systems and networks, restricted area 
monitoring, communication, security systems, cargo handling, delivery 
of stores, personnel training, and drills and exercises. U.S. Coast 
Guard inspectors verify compliance with these plans during scheduled 
and unannounced inspections throughout a given year.
    For foreign-flagged vessels, the approach to security is very 
similar to that of MTSA-regulated domestic vessels. Per the 
International Maritime Organization's (IMO) International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code, each foreign vessel must conduct a Ship 
Security Assessment and develop a Ship Security Plan, which must be 
approved by the ship's Flag Administration prior to a vessel being 
certificated as compliant with the ISPS Code. This certification is 
verified by the U.S. Coast Guard during regular compliance examinations 
when the vessel arrives in a U.S. port.
    To enhance security, on February 22, 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard 
released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for new cyber risk management 
regulations appliable to all MTSA-regulated vessels, facilities, and 
Outer Continental Shelf facilities. The proposed regulations are 
primarily based on the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency's (CISA) Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals and follow 
the structure and format of existing security regulations in place 
since 2004. Proposed regulations would require several cybersecurity 
measures, including account security, device security, network 
segmentation, data security, training, incident response planning, and 
drills and exercises. Regulated entities would also be required to 
identify a Cybersecurity Officer responsible for developing a 
Cybersecurity Plan and overseeing implementation of new requirements.
            Regionally: Area Maritime Security Coordination
    At the regional level, Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) are 
required by MTSA and its implementing regulations to serve an essential 
coordinating function during normal operations and emergency response. 
Comprised of government and maritime industry leaders, an AMSC serves 
as the primary regional body to jointly share threat information, 
evaluate risks, and coordinate risk mitigation activities. As the 
Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC), U.S. Coast Guard Captains 
of the Port (COTP) direct their regional AMSC's activities.
    AMSC input is vital to the development and continuous review of the 
Area Maritime Security (AMS) Assessment and Area Maritime Security Plan 
(AMSP). The AMS Assessment must include the critical MTS infrastructure 
and operations in the port; a threat assessment that identifies and 
evaluates each potential threat; consequence and vulnerability 
assessments; and a determination of the required security measures for 
the three Maritime Security levels.
    These AMS assessments then lead to the collaborative development of 
AMSPs to ensure government and industry security measures are 
coordinated to deter, detect, disrupt, respond to, and recover from a 
threatened or actual Transportation Security Incident.
    The U.S. Coast Guard COTP and AMSCs are also required by 
regulations to conduct or participate in an exercise once each calendar 
year to collectively assess the effectiveness of the AMSP in today's 
dynamic operating environment.
                 Nationally: Interagency Collaboration
    The U.S. Coast Guard functions on behalf of the Department of 
Homeland Security as the co-Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA) for 
the Maritime Transportation Subsector along with the Department of 
Transportation. As an SRMA, the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for 
coordinating risk management efforts with CISA, other Federal 
departments and agencies, and MTS stakeholders.
    CISA is a key partner whose technical expertise supports the U.S. 
Coast Guard's ability to leverage our authorities and experience as the 
regulator and SRMA of the MTS. CISA integrates a whole-of-government 
response, analyzes broader immediate and long-term impacts, and 
facilitates information sharing across transportation sectors. Our 
relationship with CISA is strong and will continue to mature.
    As an element of the IC, the U.S. Coast Guard possesses unique 
authorities, and has opportunity and capability to collect, analyze, 
and share information from domestic, international, and non-government 
stakeholders which operate throughout the MTS. This ability allows the 
U.S. Coast Guard to gain a collective understanding of threats and 
vulnerabilities facing the maritime domain, including physical security 
and cybersecurity.
    Our enduring relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) is 
also crucial to safeguarding the MTS. In many cases, DoD's ability to 
surge forces from domestic to allied seaports depends on the same 
commercial maritime infrastructure as the MTS. The relationship between 
the U.S. Coast Guard and DoD ensures the Nation's surge capability and 
lines of communication will be secure and available during times of 
crisis. By sharing threat intelligence, developing interoperable 
capabilities, and leveraging DoD's expertise, the U.S. Coast Guard 
enables national security sealift capabilities and jointly supports our 
Nation's ability to project power around the globe.
    The U.S. Coast Guard also supports the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) in the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) by providing 
subject matter expertise in maritime security. The PSGP is designed to 
support and protect critical port infrastructure from terrorism. FEMA 
is responsible for the administration and management of the program, 
which has distributed more than $3.8 billion to MTS stakeholders since 
the program's inception in 2002.
          Internationally: International Port Security Program
    U.S. Coast Guard efforts to secure the MTS also extend overseas. By 
leveraging international partnerships, including through the U.S. Coast 
Guard International Port Security (IPS) program, the U.S. Coast Guard 
conducts in-country foreign port assessments to assess compliance with 
the ISPS Code and the effectiveness of security and anti-terrorism 
measures in foreign ports. In addition, the IPS program conducts 
capacity building engagements to assist foreign ports in implementing 
effective anti-terrorism measures, where possible.
    If the U.S. Coast Guard finds that a country's ports do not have 
effective security and anti-terrorism measures, the Service may impose 
additional security measures called Conditions of Entry (COE) on 
vessels arriving to the United States from those ports and may deny 
entry into the United States to any vessel that does not meet such 
conditions. Verification that a vessel took additional security 
measures when it was in foreign ports that lacked effective anti-
terrorism measures may be required before the vessel is permitted to 
enter the United States.
                        The Growing Cyber Risks
    Cyber-attacks can pose a significant threat to the economic 
prosperity and security of the MTS for which whole-of-government 
efforts are required. The MTS's complex, interconnected network of 
information, sensors, and infrastructure continually evolves to promote 
the efficient transport of goods and services around the world. The 
information technology and operational technology networks vital to 
increasing the efficiency and transparency of the MTS also create 
complicated interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and risks.
    The size, complexity, and importance of the MTS make it an 
attractive cyber target. Terrorists, criminals, activists, adversary 
nation states and state-sponsored actors may view a significant MTS 
disruption as favorable to their interests. Potential malicious actors 
and their increasing levels of sophistication present substantial 
challenges to government agencies and stakeholders focused on 
protecting the MTS from constantly evolving cyber threats.
    Cyber vulnerabilities pose a risk to the vast networks and system 
of the MTS. Increased use of automated systems in shipping, offshore 
platforms, and port and cargo facilities creates enormous efficiencies, 
but also introduce additional attack vectors for malicious cyber 
actors. A successful cyber-attack could disrupt global supply chains 
and impose unrecoverable losses to port operations, electronically 
stored information, and national economic activity.
    On February 21, 2024, the President signed an Executive Order (EO) 
that makes clear that U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port authorities 
apply to threats and incidents in the cyber domain and also requires 
reporting of actual or threatened cyber incidents to aid in detection 
and rapid deployment of an interagency response. With this authority 
clarified, the U.S. Coast Guard issued a Maritime Security Directive 
requiring specific cyber risk management actions for all owners or 
operators of cranes manufactured by companies from the People's 
Republic of China. Our Captains of the Port around the country are 
working directly with crane owners and operators to ensure compliance 
and further mitigate the threats posed by these cranes.
                    The U.S. Coast Guard's Approach
    In support of the whole-of-government effort, the U.S. Coast Guard 
applies a proven prevention and response framework to prevent or 
mitigate disruption to the MTS from the many risks it faces.
Prevention
    The Prevention Concept of Operations--Standards, Compliance, and 
Assessment--guides all prevention missions, including port security. It 
begins with establishing expectations in the MTS. Regulations and 
standards provide a set of baseline requirements and are critical to 
establishing effective and consistent governance regimes. With 
effective standards in place, vessel and facility inspectors verify 
systematic compliance activities to ensure the governance regime is 
working. This part of the system is vital in identifying and correcting 
potential risks before they advance further and negatively impact the 
MTS. Effective assessment is paramount to continuous improvement. It 
provides process feedback and facilitates the identification of system 
failures so that corrective actions can be taken to improve standards 
and compliance activities.
    In addition to vessel and facility inspectors, the U.S. Coast Guard 
also has Port Security Specialists and MTS Cybersecurity Specialists in 
each Captain of the Port Zone. These dedicated staffs build and 
maintain port level security-related relationships, facilitate 
information sharing across industry and government, advise U.S. Coast 
Guard and Unified Command decision-makers, and plan security exercises.
Response
    The U.S. Coast Guard has a proven, scalable response framework that 
can be tailored for all hazards. Whether a cyber or physical security 
incident, our operational commanders immediately assess the risk, 
consider their authorities, and deploy assets or issue operational 
controls to mitigate risks. Depending on the incident's size and 
severity, commanders set clear response priorities, request specialized 
resources to help mitigate risk, and notify interagency partners to 
help coordinate the response.
    For complex responses, the U.S. Coast Guard maintains deployable 
teams with specialized capabilities that can support operational 
commanders across a spectrum of needs and domains. These teams include 
specially trained law enforcement teams that can bolster physical 
security, and pollution response teams that can address significant oil 
spills or hazardous material releases.
    In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard established three Cyber 
Protection Teams as commands under U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command. 
Leveraging U.S. Coast Guard authorities and unique capabilities, these 
units assist Captains of the Port with measuring cyber risk and are 
poised to deploy in support of time-critical or nationally significant 
cyber activities.
                              Future Focus
    Given today's dynamic operational environment, the U.S. Coast Guard 
is ever vigilant and on watch to identify emerging threats, evaluate 
associated risk, and apply authorities and capabilities to protect the 
MTS. While the U.S. Coast Guard has a proven prevention and response 
framework that has been honed over many years, the Service is dedicated 
to continually assessing and enhancing the way we execute both enduring 
and emerging missions. The U.S. Coast Guard's commitment is to continue 
to lead with the same level of professionalism, efficiency, and 
effectiveness that the public has come to expect.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and thank you for 
your continued support of the U.S. Coast Guard. We look forward to 
answering your questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Now, Mr. Paape.

  TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. PAAPE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR 
          PORTS AND WATERWAYS, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Paape. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman Webster, 
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Carbajal, Ranking Member 
Thanedar, and distinguished members of the subcommittees. Thank 
you for your tremendous support for the Maritime 
Administration, and thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today regarding the Port Infrastructure Development Program, or 
PIDP, which is a discretionary grant program, in its role in 
bolstering the safety and security of our Nation's ports.
    Before I go further, allow me to express on behalf of the 
Department of Transportation our condolences to the families of 
those who lost their lives last week when the Francis Scott Key 
Bridge collapsed.
    I also want to express thanks to the United States Coast 
Guard for spearheading the Federal response at the Port of 
Baltimore and to all of our Federal partners, as well as 
Maryland State and local officials, for their ongoing response 
to the Baltimore bridge collapse. Times like this highlight how 
important our maritime transportation system is to our economic 
and national security.
    MARAD promotes the development and maintenance of a 
resilient maritime transportation system, including ports, by 
providing grants for infrastructure projects, technical 
assistance, and support for port security initiatives. The Port 
Infrastructure Development Program is MARAD's largest 
discretionary grant program.
    The primary objective of PIDP is to enhance the safety, the 
efficiency, or reliability of the movement of goods into, out 
of, around, or within a port. PIDP grants support efforts by 
ports and industry stakeholders to improve port and related 
freight infrastructure to meet the Nation's freight 
transportation needs and ensure our port infrastructure can 
meet the anticipated growth in freight volumes.
    In fiscal year 2023, MARAD received 153 eligible 
applications for PIDP from projects across 37 States and 4 U.S. 
Territories, with a combined funding request exceeding $2.8 
billion, with only $662 million available. MARAD awarded grants 
to fund 41 port infrastructure projects across the Nation, 
including several notable PIDP projects that focused on safety 
improvements across various ports. These numbers vividly 
demonstrate the oversubscription of this grant program and 
highlights the continued urgent need for measures to help 
continue strengthening the Nation's supply chains.
    On the technical assistance front, MARAD chairs the 
National Port Readiness Network to ensure readiness of 
commercial strategic seaports to support deployment of military 
forces and national contingencies. Together with eight other 
Federal agencies and military commands, this network supports 
the maintenance of port readiness committees. MARAD further 
facilitates the collaborative development of port readiness 
plans, which are voluntary planning documents focused on port 
facility readiness at commercial strategic seaports.
    As our current port security initiative, the FY24 PIDP 
Notice of Funding Opportunity included two critical provisions 
addressing cybersecurity and technology concerns. First, the 
Notice of Funding Opportunity prohibits the use or provision of 
LOGINK. This measure aims to safeguard against potential 
security risks associated with these platforms.
    The second provision seeks to ensure projects are 
consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience, in that each 
application selected for Federal funding must demonstrate 
consideration and mitigation of physical and cybersecurity 
risks relevant to their project. Projects failing to adequately 
address these risks will be required to do so before receiving 
funds.
    Finally, the FY23 NDAA directed MARAD, in consultation with 
our other Federal stakeholders, to conduct a study to assess 
whether there are cybersecurity or national security risks 
posed by foreign-manufactured cranes at United States ports. 
Our report will be delivered to Congress soon.
    In conclusion, PIDP plays a vital role in enhancing the 
safety, efficiency, reliability, and resilience of our Nation's 
ports. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this 
subcommittee and thank you for the support you have shown the 
Maritime Administration. I welcome any questions that you may 
have.
    [Mr. Paape's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of William K. Paape, Associate Administrator for 
              Ports and Waterways, Maritime Administration
    Good morning, Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar and Members of the Subcommittees. 
Thank you for your tremendous support for the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) and thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding 
the Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP), a discretionary 
grant program, and its role in bolstering the safety and security of 
our nation's ports.
    Before I go further, allow me to express on behalf of the 
Department of Transportation our condolences to the families of those 
who lost their lives last week when the Francis Scott Key Bridge 
collapsed. I also want to express thanks to the United States Coast 
Guard for spearheading the Federal response at the Port of Baltimore, 
and to all of our Federal Partners--especially my DOT colleagues at 
MARAD and FHWA--as well as Maryland state and local officials for their 
ongoing response to the Baltimore bridge collapse.
    Times like this highlight how important our maritime transportation 
system (MTS) is to our economic and national security. Our MTS, and for 
that matter, our entire national surface transportation system, is the 
best in the world. We have the greatest inherent flexibility and 
redundancy to support the transportation segments of our supply chain.
    The collapse of Key Bridge, the COVID surge, the attacks in the Red 
Sea, and Hurricanes Maria, Sandy, and Irene, to name a few, serve as 
notable reminders of how vital ports are to our Nation's economic 
vitality. Equally, our responses to these tragedies have demonstrated 
our great resolve and ability to respond as a Nation.
    Several agencies play key roles in overseeing port security in the 
United States. These agencies work collaboratively to ensure the safety 
and security of U.S. ports and the maritime transportation system.
    MARAD promotes the development and maintenance of a resilient 
maritime transportation system, including ports, by providing grants 
for infrastructure projects, technical assistance, and support for port 
security initiatives. MARAD's cooperative efforts include chairing the 
National Port Readiness Network (NPRN) to ensure readiness of 
Commercial Strategic Seaports to support the deployment of military 
forces and national contingencies. Together with eight other Federal 
agencies and military commands, this network supports the maintenance 
of Port Readiness Committees. MARAD further facilitates the 
collaborative development of Port Readiness Plans, voluntary planning 
documents focused on port facility readiness at Commercial Strategic 
Seaports.
    The primary statutory objective of the PIDP is to enhance the 
safety, efficiency, or reliability of the movement of goods into, out 
of, around, or within a port. Each project funded through the PIDP must 
address or advance at least one of these critical objectives. PIDP 
grants support efforts by ports and industry stakeholders to improve 
port and related freight infrastructure to meet the nation's freight 
transportation needs and ensure our port infrastructure can meet 
anticipated growth in freight volumes. The PIDP provides funding to 
ports in both urban and rural areas for planning and capital projects. 
It also includes a statutory set-aside for small ports to continue to 
improve and expand their capacity to move freight reliably and 
efficiently and support local and regional economies.
    In fiscal year (FY) 2023, MARAD received 153 eligible applications 
for the PIDP from projects across 37 states and 4 U.S. territories, 
with a combined funding request exceeding $2.8 billion with only $662 
million available funding for FY 2023. Similarly, in FY 2023, the 
United States Marine Highway Program, received 16 eligible applications 
from projects in 12 states and 2 territories, requesting a total of 
approximately $46.4 million in funding with only $12.123 million 
available funding for FY 2023. These numbers highlight the continued 
need for strengthening of the nation's supply chains.
    In FY 2023, MARAD awarded grants to fund 41 port improvement 
projects across the nation, including several notable PIDP projects 
that focused on safety improvements across various ports:
      Cold Bay, AK: Construction of a new dock with significant 
operational and safety benefits compared to the old dock.
      Kawaihae, HI: Access and lighting enhancements to improve 
safety.
      Astoria, OR: Major infrastructure upgrades, including 
fire protection measures.
      Freeport, TX: Site improvements facilitating safer cargo 
movement and dedicated truck lanes.
      San Diego, CA: Lighting enhancements to enhance safety.
      Red Wing, MN: Mooring improvements aimed at enhancing 
safety during barge operations.

    Another noteworthy FY 2023 PIDP project incorporating security 
enhancements is underway at the North Carolina State Port Authority in 
Wilmington, NC. This comprehensive project involves reconfiguring port 
access, relocating security checkpoints, installing a gate operating 
system, enhancing railroad crossings, constructing a truck queuing 
area, implementing new cybersecurity tools, and constructing guard and 
badging facilities.
    Addressing cybersecurity and technology concerns, the FY 2024 PIDP 
Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) included two critical provisions:
      LOGINK Prohibition: In compliance with Section 825 of the 
FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the FY 2024 PIDP 
NOFO prohibits the utilization or provision of certain Chinese 
transportation logistics platforms. This measure aims to safeguard 
against potential security risks associated with these platforms.

      Each applicant selected for federal funding must 
demonstrate consideration and mitigation of physical and cyber security 
risks relevant to their project. Projects failing to adequately address 
these risks will be required to do so before receiving funds. MARAD and 
the Office of the Secretary's Chief Information Officer will conduct 
risk assessments on all grant projects, with additional cyber risk 
mitigation activities mandated for moderate or higher risk projects.

    Section 3529 of the FY23 NDAA directed MARAD, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, to 
conduct a study to assess whether there are cybersecurity or National 
security threats posed by foreign manufactured cranes at United States 
ports. Our report will be delivered to Congress soon.
    In conclusion, PIDP plays a vital role in enhancing the safety, 
efficiency, reliability, and resilience of our nation's ports. The 
projects highlighted underscore our commitment to enhancing and 
modernizing the Maritime Transportation System which is vital to our 
national and economic security missions.
    I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee and 
thank you for the support that you have shown the Maritime 
Administration. I welcome any questions you may have.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you all for your testimony. 
And now we turn to members from the second panel and questions 
for them. And I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Rear Admiral Vann, the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
was approved by Congress in 2002. At the time, there were 
physical problems and those were looked into; now we have cyber 
problems. Do you think the Coast Guard has the right authority 
and is striking a balance between cyber and physical threats?
    Admiral Vann. Chairman Webster, I'll take an attempt to 
answer your question and then maybe ask my colleague here who's 
really--this is his area of expertise.
    But to your point, clearly, cyber threats and the risks of 
cyber attack have increased over time with the advance of 
technology, particularly in the port environment, with the 
implementation of automation and various software products, 
operational technology to increase the efficiency of our ports. 
What comes with that are increased vulnerabilities, and as I 
mentioned in my opening remarks, attack vectors.
    Our authorities, which will be bolstered by the current 
rulemaking effort, are currently adequate for our team's 
abilities to assist port partners in addressing risks and 
responding to attacks.
    I'll defer to Admiral Arguin to add to the answer.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Rear Admiral Arguin, do you have 
something to add to that?
    Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir. So, to answer your question 
directly, the Maritime Transportation Security Act did support 
or did solve a particular problem when initially enacted and 
focused primarily on physical security. However, the evolving 
threats that have been brought about with the cyber domain, we 
are evolving those same authorities. We can use that same 
structure.
    And our proposed rulemaking really does focus on evolving 
the requirements that we were putting in place through those 
baseline cybersecurity requirements to address the emerging 
threats that cyber places. So, I would say that we're good on 
the physical side with MTSA. Evolving to incorporate 
vulnerability closing actions underneath the MTSA is still 
appropriate; yes, sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, were there more that you might 
need for the cyber part of that as far as the Coast Guard 
needing more authority for port safety and so forth, do you 
think?
    Admiral Arguin. Mr. Chairman, I would say that the 
framework, the structural framework, that system that was put 
in place underneath the MTSA, is adequate. The authorities that 
we have underneath the captain of the port authorities to be 
able to address those emerging threats is adequate. We need to 
build out the specifics, which is where the notice to propose 
rulemaking really does focus on setting that baseline.
    But the cyber challenge really is an evolving challenge 
that we're going to have to be nimble and flexible as new 
vulnerabilities are identified. But I feel very confident that 
the structure and the system that's in place underneath MTSA is 
adequate for the purposes of addressing those vulnerabilities.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, Rear Admiral Vann, in February, 
the President signed an Executive order to strengthen 
cybersecurity in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard has 
historically been sometimes slow to respond to doing Executive 
orders and rulemaking and so forth. For example, we spent a 
decade trying to execute rules for the Atlantic coast port 
access routes.
    Cybersecurity is rapidly developing. Do you think that the 
Coast Guard will have the speed to put together what's needed 
in order to do that, or are you going to adopt a slower speed?
    Admiral Vann. Mr. Chairman, the Executive order clarified 
captain of the port authorities to respond to cyber threats and 
attacks immediately as soon as it was instituted. As you know, 
sir, that same day the Coast Guard released a maritime security 
directive that specifically addressed the assessment of 
vulnerabilities in foreign-made ship-to-shore cranes. So, 
again, that was an immediate response.
    And then that same week was the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, which to your point, sir, there is a process that 
plays out. We're in the public comment period, and the Coast 
Guard encourages industry and port partners to take advantage 
of the opportunity to provide feedback on the draft regulations 
that have been put forward through that rulemaking process. So, 
moving with haste, sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    OK. Mr. Carbajal, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Paape, as we so tragically witnessed in Baltimore, the 
continuous operation of our ports should not be taken for 
granted. What is MARAD doing to help ports become more 
resilient to rising oceans and extreme weather events?
    Mr. Paape. I thank you for that question. We are taking a 
number of actions, but I think I would like to take that 
question for the record.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Rear Admiral Vann, President Biden 
issued an Executive order granting the Coast Guard stronger 
authorities to address cybersecurity. So, building on what my 
colleague just asked, how is the Coast Guard using this new 
authority, and could you explain how this differs from the 
existing authority the Coast Guard already had?
    Admiral Vann. Thank you, Member, I appreciate that 
question. As I indicated before, the Executive order was a 
clarification of our Magnuson Act authorities where the captain 
of the port has the authority to respond to risks and threats 
and attacks, be they physical, be they any threat. This 
Executive order added cyber to clarify, to your point, existing 
authorities.
    So, the way we are using those authorities is continuing to 
do our mission in prevention. And then as cyber threats emerge 
or attacks occur, captains of the port could leverage that 
authority that comes with the Executive order to respond by 
directing the movement or the operations of port operations of 
vessels.
    As I mentioned in my previous answer, one of the first 
actions we took was a maritime security directive in 
association with the Executive order to direct the assessment 
of port cranes due to the criticality of that node of the 
system and the prevalence of foreign-manufactured cranes. So, 
these are actions that we've taken and that we are poised to 
take should there be a threat or an attack that occurs.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral Arguin, I'd like to take a 
moment to thank you for your commitment to addressing sexual 
assault and sexual harassment in the commercial maritime 
industry. Your efforts have not gone unnoticed among merchant 
mariners, the very people who need your help.
    How would you assess the state of change in the industry, 
and how far do we still have to go?
    Admiral Arguin. Ranking Member, thank you for the 
compliment, but it is a team sport. We have taken directed 
efforts to engage with maritime training providers, with 
industry representatives, seafarers around the Nation to ensure 
that everyone understands their responsibilities to change the 
culture associated with maritime.
    I think there's not a finish line associated with changing 
a culture. It is an expectation that there is a culture that is 
established to ensure that every single person feel safe coming 
to work and that they feel valued. And so, that's going to be a 
continuous assessment of culture, and we really get to the 
point where what happens between two individuals in the engine 
room or on the bridge and that interaction where both people 
feel valued, feel respected, that really is the standard. And 
when that fails or if that fails, that there's an expectation 
for accountability.
    And so, that's going to be a continuous effort. I don't 
think we get to snap the chalk line and say we're done. I think 
that's going to be a continuous shared responsibility not only 
just with industry to change that culture, but then to ensure 
that, if that culture does not stand forward, we are in a 
position to hold individuals accountable.
    Mr. Carbajal. With organizational leadership changes that 
occur, I would submit to you that real cultural change will be 
determined on the system's changes that occur within the 
organization. So, as leadership changes, those are sustainable. 
And so, I encourage you to look at it from that perspective. 
Getting achievements now is one thing, but making sure the 
culture is ever evolving to ensure that we don't have what 
we've had in the past continue. So, thank you very much,
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you. Chairman Gimenez, you're 
recognized for 5 minutes for questions.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And Mr. Paape, or anybody who can answer this, in light of 
what happened in Baltimore--and right now, it looks like every 
indication was, it was an accident--how many ports do we have 
in the United States that are vulnerable to either an accident 
or an attack that's actually not an accident? So, how many 
ports in the United States would be vulnerable to such a thing 
where a ship strikes a bridge, the bridge collapses, and then 
basically the port is out of commission? How many ports do we 
have like that?
    Admiral Arguin. Mr. Chairman, I'll take a first shot at 
that. I would say that every port is vulnerable. I think given 
the cyber challenges and the interconnectedness, the continued 
interconnectedness of the Marine Transportation System, and the 
inherent vulnerabilities with that interconnectedness, that we 
have to be ever vigilant to continuously evolve efforts to 
close those vulnerabilities.
    Specific to number of ports that may have infrastructure 
that could impact or cause the closure of a particular port, I 
don't have particular numbers, but I think anything that 
crosses a waterway poses a particular hazard or threat, and we 
need to be evaluating on a regular basis the--assessing those 
waterways. As more congestion comes into our ports, we need to 
understand that and be nimble and flexible to be able to put 
safeguards in place to ensure the safe and efficient movement 
of commerce.
    Mr. Gimenez. I think it'd be wise for the Coast Guard to do 
an inventory of those critical ports that are critical to the 
security of the United States and see, either by accident or by 
intentional act, how those ports can be affected.
    I mean, this accident in Baltimore is clear indication. One 
ship hits a bridge and the port is out of action for some time. 
A foreign adversary could, say, have a coordinated attack. This 
is not farfetched. I mean, this is what happened on 9/11, 
right? So, coordinated attack to affect our ability to respond 
around the world, especially our military around the world.
    Have we done such an analysis? And if we haven't, I think 
it should be done to say, OK, these ports are vulnerable in 
this fashion to being shut down and affecting our ability as a 
country to respond around the world.
    Admiral Arguin. Mr. Chairman, so, just to be clear, each of 
our sector commanders, our captains of port, have real-time 
information on ongoing threats and hazards within each of those 
ports, and they are regularly assessing risks on a daily basis 
to understand the impact to the Marine Transportation System.
    A consolidated list of single point failures within those 
ports, I'll bring that back to the staff to verify that we have 
done something like that. But on a daily basis, every one of 
our sector commanders is regularly assessing risks, whether 
that's weather, whether that's congestion, whether that's 
impacts to the waterway due to navigation challenges. They're 
regularly assessing those ports to ensure that we can continue 
to move cargo on a daily basis. We certainly understand the 
significance of the----
    Mr. Gimenez [interrupting]. Yes, but in Baltimore, did 
anybody assess the risk of a ship hitting that bridge and it 
causing it to collapse? Did anybody do that?
    So, I mean, you've got to think of the stuff that's never 
happened before. What if? The what if. And I guess because 
that's my firefighter in me. What if? All right. It's better to 
prevent something than to say, oh, gee, look, it collapsed. OK? 
Collapsed because it got struck by a ship.
    Was there anything you could have done to that bridge, 
fortified it, so that if it got struck by a ship, it would not 
have collapsed?
    Admiral Arguin. I'm not a bridge expert, sir, but I would 
certainly say that at the conclusion of the investigation, the 
causal factors and recommendations that will come through, 
we'll take those into account.
    Mr. Gimenez. That's what I'm calling for. So, those 
critical ports are critical to the security of the United 
States that if somehow knocked out of commission, what are the 
ways that you can knock it out of commission and what are the 
things we need to do to make sure it's not knocked out of 
commission before it actually happens?
    I believe in Murphy's law. All right. And it doesn't mean 
everything's bad, it just says anything that can happen will. 
And obviously, look, it happened in Baltimore. It could happen. 
A ship lost power, it hit the bridge, the bridge collapsed.
    Could we have done something to make sure that, even in the 
event of Murphy's law taking effect, that we had protection 
around the bridge structure so that it would not collapse? 
Because now the largest port for vehicles in the United States 
is knocked out of action and it's going to hurt the economy.
    I'm worried more also about our ability to respond around 
the world and an adversary taking certain actions to make sure 
that we don't respond around the world, because we do need 
maritime assets when we're responding around the world. That's 
my concern. That's all I'm putting on the table.
    Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you. Mr. Thanedar, you're 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman. Admiral Vann, and all of 
you, thank you for your testimony here today.
    In the aftermath of the Key Bridge accident, there has been 
a lot of conjecture about the cause of the accident, some of 
which has been widely irresponsible. I understand that the 
investigation is ongoing and you're limited in what you can 
share, but that said, can you say whether at this point there 
is any evidence at all that the accident was caused by a cyber 
attack?
    Admiral Vann. Ranking Member, as you know, we have 
representation from Coast Guard Cyber Command on the Coast 
Guard's Marine Board of Investigation, which is working in 
partnership with the National Transportation Safety Board's 
investigation. It is, as you said, sir, much too early in the 
process to know the causal factors. But the reason for that 
subject matter expertise is certainly to investigate the 
potential for that type of a causal factor, some sort of a 
cyber disruption. So, absolutely being considered and really 
too early, and I wouldn't be in a position to comment.
    Mr. Thanedar. All right. Thank you so much.
    And Admiral Arguin, the waterways near major ports are 
subject to significant congestion and obstacles that make safe 
navigation challenging. What are some of the initial lessons to 
be learned from the Key Bridge incident, both for vessel 
operators and for port operations?
    Admiral Arguin. Ranking Member, so, ships that are moving 
throughout our ports, there's a shared and a layered approach, 
and there are a variety of different ways that we attempt to 
prevent the bad thing from happening. And that involves skilled 
mariners at the helm. It involves pilots that are uniquely 
positioned and experienced in operating in those particular 
waters. It's the inspection and investigation of vessels, the 
oversight of vessels to ensure that the systems that have been 
designed to meet certain requirements are effectively operating 
in the way that they're supposed to. It is the aids to 
navigation to ensure that the channel is properly marked. It's 
the access to information. All of those pieces of information 
come together to ensure that commerce can operate safely.
    And when any one of those elements fails to meet the 
expectations, being able to understand why that failed and then 
build resiliency into that system is important. And we 
constantly are looking at those challenges on a regular daily 
basis at our captains of the port.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. And Admiral 
Arguin and Admiral Vann, I appreciate your testimony before our 
subcommittee on some of the same topics back in February. At 
that hearing, we discussed in detail the actions the 
administration announced in February to bolster cybersecurity 
at ports.
    These actions will require significant effort from the 
Coast Guard to implement. Since that hearing, Congress passed 
funding for the remainder of the current fiscal year, and the 
President submitted his budget request for next year.
    Yesterday, for the better part of the day, I had the 
pleasure of meeting the officers of the Coast Guard and being 
on the water with them, and I admire their dedication and their 
service to our Nation. But I kept seeing the strong need for 
resources, whether it was infrastructure needs, whether it's 
needs for personnel. As these challenges continue to grow, to 
have a well-funded, well-staffed Coast Guard is so important, 
and that became very apparent as I was traveling through and 
working with them.
    So, what resources does the Coast Guard require to advance 
and then implement the rulemaking, inspect for compliance, and 
otherwise ensure the recently announced efforts are carried out 
effectively? Does the Coast Guard's budget request include the 
necessary funding?
    Admiral Arguin. Ranking Member, so, we certainly appreciate 
the subcommittee's and committee's support, Congress' support 
for Coast Guard budgets. The Commandant's been very clear. For 
the Coast Guard to meet its current and future demands, we need 
to be a $20 billion organization by 2033 to meet all of those 
requirements. And I think it's important to recognize that a 
predictable level of funding gives us the opportunity to 
recapitalize our assets while also still meeting emerging 
demands. And so, the support of Congress to ensure that is 
paramount for us.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. 
Representative Cohen, would you like 5 minutes?
    Mr. Cohen. Seven.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. You can have 5.
    Mr. Cohen. I'll take 4. Thank you.
    I didn't really understand the answer to that question. How 
much more money does the Coast Guard need than what they were 
appropriated? You've been asked to do cybersecurity. You've got 
the awareness of bridges and other infrastructure vulnerable to 
massive ships and other forces. How much money do you need to 
protect the American maritime system beyond what you're 
getting?
    Admiral Vann. Congressman, as my colleague mentioned, the 
fiscal 2024 budget that was approved since we last appeared 
before the committee and then the President's budget that's 
been presented for next year and then looking ahead to 2033, 
Commandant Fagan has been clear about the current roughly $13 
billion Coast Guard being a $20 billion Coast Guard and looking 
at a 3- to 5-percent increase in operating and maintenance 
funds annually. We've said that publicly, in order to meet 
those requirements, all those requirements you listed, sir, and 
many others.
    To be specific about cyber, my area of responsibility, I 
would tell you that we are meeting the current demand signal, 
but there's no doubt I think anyone has that cyber threats are 
increasing. Our increasing use of automation is creating more 
vulnerability. And so, if we are asked to do more, if the 
required level of effort is going to go up, then the required 
level of resources would need to go up with it. So, we will be 
responsible in asking for what we need as those 
responsibilities increase.
    Mr. Cohen. Either of you all want to comment on this?
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman, the Commandant's been very 
clear that the status quo is a risk position that we're in 
right now. Staying steady state does not give the Coast Guard 
the readiness to be able to meet emerging demands and future 
demands. And so, the President's budget has a prioritized list 
of critical assets and critical funding support that will allow 
us to not only continue to restore readiness for our aging 
infrastructure and aging assets, but then also be able to meet 
future demands for service for the Coast Guard.
    Mr. Cohen. And I believe you need more money. I believe 
almost every element of American defense and the homeland 
security needs more money as we have more and more threats from 
overseas and from neighbors in Central America. But we have to 
realize as congresspeople that things cost money. And the 
continuing resolution hurt you when we had not approved the 
budget for next year, you all were operating with less funds, 
and it affected your abilities. We need to be willing to take 
the difficult votes to pass revenue measures to serve our 
defense teams, our homeland security teams, and protect our 
country.
    Just putting out jingoistic comments about America and 
protect us and close our border and build walls and all that 
kind of stuff doesn't get it. It takes yes, I vote for the 
budget or I will vote for additional funds. That's what we need 
in so many areas. And I'm going to be willing to do it. I know 
in cybersecurity, there's going to be a whole lot more, and 
you've got trouble dealing with Silicon Valley wanting to take 
a lot of people you probably want to serve in this important 
area. These ports are vulnerable, and cyber is a future 
warfare.
    So, I just hope you'll quietly let your voices be known to 
folks that they need to support funding and not just rhetoric. 
Thank you for your service. I know what happened in Baltimore 
is being dealt with, and I guess anything could happen. Mr. 
Gimenez mentioned that. I don't expect ISIS or somebody to get 
a gigantic car container, cargo container and have lots of 
containers on it and be able to bring down a bridge. But they 
could do something and you're responsible, so, we want to give 
you the funds to be able to do the job.
    Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. That 
concludes our second panel. And we thank the witnesses. Thank 
you for being here. Thank you for your testimony and the 
information you've given us, and you are excused.
    For our third panel, I'd like to welcome them and the 
witnesses and ask them to get prepared. You're next.
    Our third panel consists of industry experts operating in 
and around ports. As the primary users and operators of ports, 
they're aware of the safety, security, and infrastructure 
investment needs not only today, but for long-term 
sustainability and success.
    So, as noted earlier at the beginning of this hearing, your 
written testimony has been made a part of the record. 
Therefore, we'd ask you to limit your remarks to the time-
allotted 5 minutes.
    With that, Mr. Fowler, you are recognized for 5 minutes for 
your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES C. FOWLER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL 
  MANAGER, CROWLEY SHIPPING; FREDERICK WONG, Jr., DEPUTY PORT 
 DIRECTOR, PORTMIAMI, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
 PORT AUTHORITIES; BRENT D. SADLER, CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY (RET.), 
    AND SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION; ED 
McCARTHY, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY, ON 
BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WATERFRONT EMPLOYERS; AND 
  DAVE MORGAN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, COOPER/
   PORTS AMERICA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME SAFETY 
                          ASSOCIATION

TESTIMONY OF JAMES C. FOWLER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL 
                   MANAGER, CROWLEY SHIPPING

    Mr. Fowler. Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking 
Members Carbajal and Thanedar, members of the committee, I'm 
honored to appear here today to discuss critical issues 
concerning port safety, security, and infrastructure 
investment.
    I'm James Fowler, senior vice president and general manager 
of shipping at Crowley. We're a U.S. owned and operated 
maritime, energy, and logistics solutions company serving 
commercial and Government sectors with over 170 vessels, mostly 
in the Jones Act fleet, and approximately 7,000 employees 
around the world--employing more U.S. mariners than any other 
company. The Crowley enterprise has invested more than $3.2 
billion in maritime transport, which is the backbone of global 
trade in the global economy.
    As a ship owner-operator and transportation services 
provider with more than 130 years of innovation and a 
commitment to sustainability, Crowley serves customers in 36 
nations and island territories. We sincerely appreciate the 
committees' continued work towards making America's ports the 
most efficient, safe, and secure in the world.
    Crowley has operations in ports along the U.S. east coast 
and gulf coast, including Gulfport, Mississippi; Mobile, 
Alabama; Port Everglades and Jacksonville, Florida; Wilmington, 
North Carolina; and Eddystone, Pennsylvania. These facilities 
support our U.S. customers as well as customers in Mexico, the 
Caribbean, and Central America. We also have significant 
operations in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.
    While the investigation of the terrible and tragic collapse 
of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore continues, it 
reminds us all that safety is of critical importance to the 
maritime industry and all transportation modes. We also see 
that our Nation's intricate supply chain is vulnerable to 
disruption, and industry must continue to work collaboratively 
with Federal officials to address these issues.
    Post-9/11, our industry has made significant changes to 
operations and procedures to increase security at all of our 
ports. As a port stakeholder, we take our obligations in this 
area seriously, and we work closely with a number of Federal 
agencies, including CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard, and CISA. While 
the focus over the past 20 years has been on security physical 
threats, we've become increasingly prepared for cyber threats.
    Crowley works closely with both the CISA Maritime Modal 
Sector Coordinating Council and the Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism program to address industry cyber and supply 
chain concerns.
    We're also mindful of the concerns raised over the last 
year involving cranes manufactured by ZPMC. While Crowley does 
not own any ZPMC cranes, we know they're extensively used in 
U.S. ports, including some in which we operate. The recent 
Executive order on this and other cybersecurity matters brings 
further attention to the critical role that ports in the 
maritime sector have in our economy, and Crowley looks forward 
to working with our Government partners on proposals to 
strengthen the security and resiliency of our Marine 
Transportation System.
    An important part of maintaining resiliency in our supply 
chains is ensuring that our Nation's port infrastructure 
receives the investment necessary to accommodate the movement 
of trade both now and in the future. Crowley is investing in 
port electrification in coordination with local, State, and 
Federal partners, particularly MARAD. Port infrastructure 
development grants have been critical to expanding 
electrification efforts in ports like Jacksonville, where we're 
in the early stages of a project to build out electrical 
connections for hundreds of refrigerated containers. These 
improvements will decrease our diesel fuel usage and costs, 
reduce air and noise pollution, and increase equipment uptime 
and efficiency.
    We've also worked with our public-sector partners to 
utilize PIDP grant funding for desperately needed upgrades to 
the Crown Bay Terminal in St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands and 
to begin construction of New England's flagship offshore wind 
terminal in Salem, Massachusetts.
    PIDP grants should continue to be available and expanded to 
ensure that we don't lose momentum in addressing the needed 
port improvements across the U.S.
    In conclusion, while progress has been made in addressing 
various challenges facing the maritime industry, continued 
vigilance and investment are essential to ensure the safety, 
security, and resilience of our ports and supply chains. I 
commend the committees' further dedication to these critical 
issues and stand ready to collaborate in advancing solutions 
that strengthen our Nation's Marine Transportation System's 
infrastructure and competitiveness.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Fowler's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of James C. Fowler, Senior Vice President and 
                   General Manager, Crowley Shipping
    Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Members Carbajal and 
Thanedar, Members of the Committees, I am honored to appear here today 
to discuss critical issues concerning port safety, security, and 
infrastructure investment.
    I am James Fowler, Senior Vice President and General Manager of 
Shipping at Crowley. We are a U.S.-owned and -operated maritime, energy 
and logistics solutions company serving commercial and government 
sectors with over 170 vessels, mostly in the Jones Act fleet, and 
approximately 7,000 employees around the world--employing more U.S. 
mariners than any other company. The Crowley enterprise has invested 
more than $3.2 billion in maritime transport, which is the backbone of 
global trade and the global economy. As a ship owner-operator and 
transportation services provider with more than 130 years of innovation 
and a commitment to sustainability, Crowley serves customers in 36 
nations and island territories. We sincerely appreciate the Committees 
continued work toward making America's ports the most efficient, safe, 
and secure in the world.
                              Port Safety
    While Crowley is not primarily a port operator, we do have 
extensive operations in ports along the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts 
including in Gulfport, MS; Mobile, AL; Port Everglades and 
Jacksonville, FL; Wilmington, NC; and Eddystone, PA. These facilities 
support our U.S. customers as well as customers in Mexico, the 
Caribbean, and Central American. We also have significant operations in 
San Juan, Puerto Rico and in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
    At Crowley we have a company-wide safety culture that is imbedded 
in everything we do. Every employee has the authority and obligation to 
stop work if they believe it is not safe. Each Crowley meeting or shift 
change begins with a Safety Moment--a brief pause to share a safety tip 
or idea about how to improve our safety performance. This practice is 
part of our commitment to continual improvement when it comes to safety 
and helps us develop new ideas for safety procedures and reinforces the 
role that safety plays in our performance as a company.
    While the investigation of the terrible collapse of the Francis 
Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore continues, it reminds us all that safety 
is of critical importance to the maritime industry and all 
transportation modes. We also see that our Nation's intricate supply 
chain is vulnerable to disruption and industry must continue to work 
collaboratively with federal officials to address these issues.
                             Port Security
    Post 9/11 we as an industry have made significant changes to 
operations and procedures to increase security at all our ports. As a 
port stakeholder we take our obligations in this area seriously and we 
work closely with a number of federal agencies including CBP, the U.S. 
Coast Guard and CISA. While the focus over the past 20 years has been 
on physical security threats, we are becoming increasingly aware and 
prepared for cyber threats. Crowley works closely with both the CISA 
Maritime Modal Sector Coordinating Council and the Customs Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program to discuss and work to 
address industry cyber and supply chain concerns.
    We are also mindful of concerns raised over the last year involving 
cranes manufactured by ZPMC. While Crowley does not own any ZPMC cranes 
we know they are used extensively at U.S. ports, including some in 
which we operate. The recent Executive Order on this and other 
cybersecurity matters brings further attention to the critical role 
ports and the maritime sector have in our economy, and Crowley looks 
forward to working with our government partners on proposals to 
strengthen the security and resiliency of our marine transportation 
system.
                          Port Infrastructure
    An important part of maintaining resiliency in our supply chains is 
ensuring that our Nation's port infrastructure receives the investment 
necessary to accommodate the movement of trade both now and in the 
future. For Crowley looking toward the future we are investing in port 
electrification efforts in coordination with local, state, and federal 
partners, particularly MARAD. Port Infrastructure Development Grants 
(PIDP) have been critical to expanding electrification efforts in ports 
like Jacksonville, where we are in the early stages of a project to 
build out electrical connections for hundreds of refrigerated 
containers. These improvements will decrease our diesel fuel usage and 
costs, reduce air and noise pollution, and increase equipment up-time 
and efficiency.
    We have also worked with our public sector partners to utilize PIDP 
grant funding for desperately needed upgrades to the Crown Bay Terminal 
on St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands and to begin construction of 
New England's flagship offshore wind terminal in Salem, Massachusetts. 
We believe PIDP grants should continue to be available and expanded to 
ensure we do not lose momentum in addressing needed port improvements 
across the U.S.
                                Closing
    In conclusion, while progress has been made in addressing various 
challenges facing the maritime industry, continued vigilance and 
investment are essential to ensure the safety, security, and resilience 
of our ports and supply chains. I commend the committees for their 
dedication to these critical issues and stand ready to collaborate in 
advancing solutions that strengthen our nation's marine transportation 
system's infrastructure and competitiveness. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Wong, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

    TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK WONG, Jr., DEPUTY PORT DIRECTOR, 
   PORTMIAMI, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT 
                          AUTHORITIES

    Mr. Wong. Good morning, Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, 
Ranking Member Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
Congressman Cohen.
    My name is Fred Wong. I'm the deputy port director here at 
PortMiami. And Miami welcomes you all, and we appreciate you 
guys addressing critical topics in the maritime transportation 
system. I respectfully ask that my written testimony be read 
into the record, sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Without objection, duly done.
    Mr. Wong. Thank you. Before I begin, I want to extend my 
condolences to the families of those lost in the collapse of 
the Baltimore Key Bridge last week. Our Nation's port industry 
stands with Baltimore now.
    My testimony is given on behalf of the American Association 
of Port Authorities, AAPA. AAPA represents over 80 U.S. ports 
on urgent and pressing issues facing our industry, promoting 
common interests of the port community, and providing critical 
industry leadership on security, trade, port development, and 
other operational issues.
    According to Ernst & Young, ports moved $5.4 trillion in 
imports and exports, or roughly 20 percent of the U.S. economic 
activity, while supporting 2.5 million jobs.
    Ports need robust Federal funding and streamlined 
construction to expand capacity and reduce emissions at every 
point in our operations. We simply cannot do this without your 
Federal support. The ports are concerned because the annual 
appropriations in the President's budget request for the Port 
Infrastructure Development Program have all decreased. The 
President's budget request was lowered by $150 million, and the 
appropriations for PIDP was lowered from $212 million in FY 
2023 to only $50 million in FY 2024 for competitive grants.
    Although ports mainly operate independently, they are part 
of a larger system. A crisis at one port, such as Baltimore, 
means that all the other ports must absorb all the other cargo 
flow. The Committee on the Marine Transportation System 
estimates that every dollar spent on our maritime supply chain 
returns $3 of economic activity. We ask Congress to fund port 
infrastructure projects at a level on par with other modes of 
transportation across the globe.
    To significantly improve project delivery at all ports, the 
PORT Act has been referred to the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee. This bill will allow MARAD to expand 
the list of categorical exclusions and increase access to the 
Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council.
    We are partners with the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, and shortages of CBP officers and agriculture 
specialists are a chronic problem with most of our seaports. 
CBP's workload staffing model reveals a deficit of 1,750 
officers and 250 agriculture specialists nationally. This 
deficit significantly impacts processing time at our seaports.
    CBP also faces funding shortages for their Federal 
inspection facilities at our ports. In recent years, CBP has 
turned to our port authorities to pay for major upgrades and 
new facilities, which is unsustainable. We thank Congresswoman 
Lee for introducing the CBP SPACE Act, which will allow CBP to 
access existing user fees to fund their Federal facilities at 
seaports and sets guidelines around what ports are expected to 
provide.
    At all of our seaports, cybersecurity is our top priority. 
We thank Chairman Gimenez for his leadership on maritime 
security. As the U.S. Coast Guard sets MARSEC Directives, we're 
requiring certain cybersecurity standards for the maritime 
sector. AAPA members are weighing in on the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking to ensure regulations comport with facility 
operations while keeping our industry protected.
    Ports are cognizant of the increased use of connected 
equipment, including ship-to-shore gantry cranes. While our 
industry works on long-term solutions such as reshoring 
manufacturing of critical cargo handling equipment, ports and 
maritime terminals have taken steps to ensure the safety and 
security of our operations.
    Last year, after touring PortMiami with Chairman Gimenez, 
Congressman Gallagher, chairman of the Select Committee on the 
Chinese Communist Party, said that he felt that ports were 
doing what they needed to do to mitigate potential risk only in 
the short term. The Port Security Grant Program is the only 
program dedicated to port security improvements and upgrades, 
but funding has dropped significantly, and we ask Congress to 
increase the PSGP funding, as well.
    As hubs to commerce and trade, our U.S. seaports continue 
to contribute to the Nation's supply chain. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify on behalf of AAPA today, and I look 
forward to answering your questions, Mr. Chair.
    [Mr. Wong's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Frederick Wong, Jr., Deputy Port Director, 
  PortMiami, on behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities
    Good morning, Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar, and members of the Subcommittees.
    My name is Frederick Wong, and I serve as the Deputy Port Director 
for PortMiami. Thank you for coming to Miami to address critical topics 
in the maritime transportation system.
    Before I begin, I want to extend my condolences to the families of 
those lost in the collapse of the Baltimore Key Bridge last week. This 
tragedy highlights how fragile our supply chain is and how flexible and 
resilient our industry is. The nation's port industry is standing with 
Baltimore right now.
                          About Ports and AAPA
    My testimony is given on behalf of the American Association of Port 
Authorities (AAPA) from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, the 
Great Lakes, in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. Today, in our nation's capital, AAPA represents over 80 U.S. 
ports on urgent and pressing issues facing our industry, promoting 
common interests of the port community, and providing critical industry 
leadership on security, trade, transportation, infrastructure, 
environmental, and other port development, and operational issues.
    Our U.S. seaports deliver vital goods to consumers, facilitate the 
export of American made goods, create jobs, and support our local and 
national economic growth. Ports also have a crucial role in our 
national defense. This is evident by the designation of 18 ``strategic 
military seaports of significance'' by the Department of Defense.
    According to Ernst and Young, ports moved $5.1 trillion dollars in 
imports and exports in 2023, this represents roughly 20 percent of the 
U.S. economic activity. The port and maritime industry sustains 2.5 
million jobs and has an economic impact of $311 billion dollars to the 
U.S. economy.
                         Infrastructure Funding
    Ports need robust Federal funding to build and maintain their 
infrastructure. To remain competitive in a global market, we need to 
expand capacity, purchase more efficient equipment, improve roadways 
and rail, and reducing emissions at every point in our operations. We 
simply cannot do this without Federal support.
    Although ports are eligible for funding through the U.S. Department 
of Transportation's INFRA, RAISE, CRISI, and other grants, our 
signature funding source is the Port Infrastructure Development Program 
(PIDP), administered by the Maritime Administration (MARAD).
    The Ports are concerned because the annual appropriations, 
authorizations, and the President's Budget Request for PIDP have all 
decreased. Last year, MARAD lowered the PIDP authorization from $750 
million to $500 million. The President's Budget Request was lowered 
from $230 million to $80 million. And the appropriation for PIDP was 
lowered from $212 million in FY23 to only $50 million dollars in FY 24 
for competitive grants.
    Although ports mainly operate independently, they are part of a 
much larger system. A crisis at one port such as Baltimore, means that 
other ports across the country must absorb the cargo flow--as we are 
seeing right now up and down the East Coast. Ports are always planning 
for growth and for potential disruptions.
    Competitive grant funding for ports is an investment in the safety, 
security, and resilience of the American supply chain. The Committee on 
the Maritime Transportation System estimates that every dollar spent on 
our maritime supply chain returns three dollars in economic activity. 
We ask Congress to fund port infrastructure projects at a level on par 
with other modes of transportation across the globe.
    Infrastructure projects are not limited to land. Ports rely on the 
Army Corps of Engineers to deepen and maintain Federal navigation 
channels. We need to ensure the Army Corps has the resources required 
to deepen and widen our harbors and turning basins for safe navigation, 
and to conduct routine maintenance to allow commerce to flow year-
round.
                           Permitting Reform
    Federal funding is not only a must but the ability to spend those 
funds efficiently is critical. Unnecessary delays in project 
construction add significant costs to the port or local project 
sponsor. These additional costs compel ports to either delay or halt 
other projects preventing the port from growing.
    The PORT Act (H.R. 7587) is currently before the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee and was introduced by members of the 
Committee. This bill would allow MARAD to update its list of 
Categorical Exclusions, allow the use of other agencies' Categorical 
Exclusions, and expand access to the ``Federal Permitting Improvement 
Steering Council'', among other policies. This bill, along with the 
reforms in the ``Fiscal Responsibility Act'', will significantly 
improve project delivery at all ports.
                        Security Infrastructure
    Ports work hand-in-hand with the Federal Government to keep our 
country secure. Ports-of-entry are borders too. We are partners with 
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and they need the staff 
and resources to process the cargo and passengers at maritime 
facilities and port-of-entries into the United States.
    Shortages of CBP officers and agriculture specialists are a chronic 
problem at seaports. CBP's Workload Staffing Model reveals a deficit of 
1,750 officers and 250 agriculture specialists. This deficit 
significantly impacts processing times, adding an additional bottleneck 
to ports, and limiting our ability to keep up with long-term growth in 
trade and travel.
    CBP also faces funding shortages for their federal inspection 
facilities at ports. In recent years, CBP has turned to port 
authorities to pay for major upgrades and new facilities. This shifts 
the burden of financing their inspection mission from the Federal 
Government onto the ports. This is unsustainable.
    We thank Congresswoman Lee for introducing the CBP SPACE Act (H.R. 
6409) which will allow CBP to use existing user fees to fund their 
federal inspection operations at seaports and set guidelines around 
what ports are expected to provide.
                             Cybersecurity
    At all ports, cybersecurity is a top priority. A critical attack on 
any of these systems could have devastating economic consequences or 
even a loss of life. The Maritime Transportation System needs resources 
to continue to harden IT systems to prevent attacks and to respond 
appropriately when an attack does occur. We thank Chairman Gimenez for 
his leadership on maritime cybersecurity issues.
    Our industry works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard to mitigate 
and report all cyber threats. As the Coast Guard sets Marsec Directives 
requiring certain cybersecurity standards for the maritime sector, AAPA 
members are weighing in to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) to 
ensure regulations comport with facility operations while keeping our 
industry protected.
    Ports are cognizant about the increased use of connected 
equipment--including ship-to-shore gantry cranes. While our industry 
works on long-term solutions such as reshoring manufacturing of 
critical cargo handling equipment, ports and Marine Terminal Operators 
have taken steps to ensure the safety and security of their operations. 
This includes replacing stock IT and Operating Terminal systems on 
cranes; working with the U.S. Coast Guard, other federal authorities, 
and private companies to inspect crane systems; segmenting cranes from 
each other and from public networks; and limiting access to crane 
systems, both physically and virtually. Last year, after touring 
PortMiami, Congressman Mike Gallagher, Chairman of the Select Committee 
on the Chinese Communist Party, said he felt ports were doing what they 
needed to do to mitigate potential risks in the short-term.
    The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) is the main method by which 
ports and related groups can make large scale security upgrades to 
their facilities. The PSGP was created shortly after 9/11 as Congress 
realized that ports--as critical infrastructure--were vulnerable to 
threats. However, in the ensuing years, PSGP funding has dwindled to a 
fourth of its highest appropriated amount. We ask Congress to increase 
PSGP funding to cover more port projects and ensure that ports are the 
main recipient of PSGP awards.
                               Conclusion
    As hubs to commerce and trade, our U.S. seaports stand ready to 
continue to contribute to the nation's supply chain. Thank you for the 
opportunity of testifying on behalf of AAPA today. I look forward to 
answering any questions you may have.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Mr. Sadler, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF BRENT D. SADLER, CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY (RET.), AND 
        SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

    Mr. Sadler. Thank you very much. And, again, distinguished 
Members of Congress, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you in this great city and the Port of Miami. And as a 
sailor, I've got to say, thank you again for hosting next 
month's Fleet Week. And as a sailor, I certainly didn't need 
another excuse, a good excuse to come to Miami, which I will 
take advantage of.
    And the Port of Miami does stand out. I think it's worth 
kind of commenting a little bit. As it looks to grow its market 
presence and lead in smart port technology, it has welcomed the 
world's largest cruise ship, the Icon of the Seas. And it can 
service some of the largest containerships, the Neopanamax 
containerships.
    Sadly, however, the Nation's maritime sector is not as 
healthy as it needs to be. The American public has become 
increasingly aware that assumptions their store shelves and gas 
stations will be stocked can no longer be taken for granted. 
Since leaving COVID lockdowns, shipping backlogs have ensued, 
at times due to decisions in Beijing.
    In 2021, grounding of a containership shut down the Suez 
Canal, grain supply disruptions due to the war in Ukraine, 
Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and the incident last week, the 
very unfortunate sad incident last week in the Baltimore 
Harbor, are making the case that our prosperity, which relies 
to a great extent on maritime trade, is not as secure as it 
once was.
    No U.S. port ranks in the top 25 of nations in cargo 
handling. China holds eight of those spots. Asia has the most 
new commercial shipping entrants, led again by China. The point 
is not that our ports don't meet today's need in general, but a 
lack of competitiveness has not generated a vibrancy to 
modernize nor attract and recruit new mariners and shipyard 
workers as needed.
    One consequence of this malaise is on display in Baltimore 
Harbor where last week the containership Dali collided with the 
Key Bridge and the unfortunate killing of six people. While 
investigations and recovery operations are ongoing, and it will 
be some time before we know all the facts, it's clear our 
Nation's maritime industrial sector has not been treated as the 
strategic asset that it is. One only has to look at the limited 
salvage capacity on hand to reopen the Nation's ninth port.
    I go into greater detail about this in my statement. But in 
short, a national maritime initiative is needed to rectify our 
overreliance on nonfriendly nations to sustain our economy and 
ensure safe maritime operations. Such an act would, first, 
provide adequate American-flag commercial shipping; second, 
expand shipbuilding repair and salvage capacities and 
associated workforce; third, harden maritime infrastructure and 
shipping to cyber attack and material damages.
    On the first, existing approaches are inadequate. Change is 
needed, but only while taking a maritime Hippocratic Oath to do 
no harm to the legacy Jones Act domestic maritime industrial 
sector. At the same time, the March 12th petition against 
unfair Chinese trade practices in the maritime logistics and 
shipbuilding sectors is an opportunity--an opportunity to not 
only strengthen U.S. agencies like the Federal Maritime 
Commission to press America's case, but to rally international 
support.
    Delivering on the second, a stronger and global competitive 
maritime sector serves as a deterrent to Chinese economic 
coercion and military ventures. This can be done by fostering a 
revolution in shipping through a new multimodalism. Achieving 
this, American trade can proceed with greater confidence and 
resiliency and better sustain our military.
    Lastly, and perhaps most relevant, due to recent events, 
legal and regulatory frameworks of the post-9/11 era should be 
reviewed with an eye to adjusting to the new Cold War that we 
find ourselves in with China. To start with, the Maritime 
Security Act of 2002, the Container Security Initiative, and 
the Proliferation Security Initiatives should be updated with 
China in mind, while placing into law measures of both the 2020 
National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan and the recently enacted 
Executive order to ensure measures that are taken today are 
sustained which bolster our maritime sector's cyber defenses.
    Safeguarding the Nation's ports, economy, and defense 
requires a national maritime initiative, which begins with an 
update to the 1989 National Security Directive on Sealift and 
enabling legislation from Congress that hardens the Nation's 
maritime infrastructure, strengthens U.S. ability to combat 
unfair Chinese maritime practices and regain American maritime 
competitiveness, creates maritime prosperity zones, establishes 
a maritime innovation incubator, trains more mariners and 
incentivizes those mariners who maintain their certifications, 
and creates a naval guard for disaster response as well as 
crisis management.
    This is not easy nor cheap, but failing to address the 
Nation's sea blindness will further place our Nation's economic 
and national security in the hands of nonfriendly parties. 
Thank you again, and I look forward to the questions.
    [Mr. Sadler's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Brent D. Sadler, Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and 
            Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
Securing America's Maritime Security: A National Maritime Initiative to 
                Regain American Maritime Competitiveness
    Bottom Line Up Front: The nation has for too long relied on less 
than friendly nations to transport its trade and has failed to 
adequately invest in its maritime industrial sector--to include its 
ports. The costs of this neglect are plainly visible today, with the 
nation's security and continued prosperity at risk. The recent allision 
by container ship Dali into Baltimore's Francis Scott Key bridge and 
the subsequent loss of life is only the most recent symptom of this 
neglect.
    Today our nation's prosperity sails on others' ships, while our 
ports rely on suspect Chinese cranes, and potentially compromised 
logistic software that risks more than trade. From our ports sails the 
supplies needed to sustain military operations defending America's 
interests and citizens. Moreover, our ports and commercial ships serve 
a critical role in any disaster response, moving critical supplies to 
areas hit hard such as Puerto Rico by 2017's category five hurricane 
Maria.
    Our maritime situation is a strategic vulnerability, that China 
could use as leverage against us. In fact, a Chinese proverb says it 
best with a slight twist this time with the borrower (U.S.) 
disadvantaged:

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Key Vulnerabilities:
    Reliance on foreign shipping. Of the more than 80,000 ships 
arriving at American ports, fewer than 200 are U.S.-flagged, -owned, 
and -crewed.\1\ In a war, the Department of Defense concluded in a 2020 
Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study that there is insufficient US 
Flag tanker capacity to meet defense requirements, necessitating 
enduring need for foreign flag tankers. This shortfall was confirmed in 
April 2023 testimony by the current Commander of Transportation 
Command, and while the specific numbers are classified it has been 
reported that over 80 tankers would be needed--it is unlikely this 
number considers the upward demand on tankers from closure of Red Hill 
fuel depot in Hawaii.\2\ This says nothing of the need for sustaining a 
wartime national economy which would add considerably to the required 
number of tankers, as well as bulk carriers and container ships not 
accounted for. Making matters worse, a fractured domestic energy 
logistic network makes getting fuel to where it is needed tenuous. For 
instance, New England has almost no pipeline connectivity to domestic 
sources, and the existing pipelines are maxed out. These are also prone 
to cyber-attack as demonstrated by a successful May 2021 attack on the 
Colonial Pipeline. That incident stopped for six days critical energy 
flows from Gulf Coast refineries to New York City.\3\ This situation 
makes movement of fuel by ship critical for sustaining parts of the 
nation, which in wartime that shipping may not be readily available.
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    \1\ In 2015 the Maritime Administration stated there were 82,044 
port calls in U.S. ports, as of January 1, 2024 (last MARAD report) 
there are currently 185 U.S. flagged ships with 167 militarily useful. 
Brent Droste Sadler, U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century: A New 
Strategy for Facing the Chinese and Russian Threat (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2023), pp. 1-2 and 239-250.
    \2\ Caitlin M. Kenney, ``Tanker program adds 9 ships to fuel US 
military in a crisis,'' Defense One, July 27, 2023, https://
www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/07/tanker-program-adds-9-ships-fuel-us-
military-crisis/388924/ (accessed April 1, 2024). Hearing To Receive 
Testimony on the Posture of United States European Command and United 
States Transportation Command in Review of the Defense Authorization 
Request for Fiscal Year 2024 and the Future Years Defense Program, 
April 27, 2023, pg. 14-15, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/23-39_04-27-2023.pdf (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \3\ Kevin DeCorla-Souza, Matt Gilstrap, and CeCe Coffey, ``East 
Coast and Gulf Coast Transportation Fuels Markets,'' EIA, February 
2016, pg. 32, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/transportationfuels/padd1n3/
pdf/transportation_fuels_padd1n3.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023) and 
EIA, ``Planned shutdown of Philadelphia refinery will change gasoline 
and diesel supply patterns for the U.S. East Coast,'' This Week in 
Petroleum, July 3, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/weekly/archive/
2019/190703/includes/analysis_print.php (accessed January 31, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Limited U.S. port infrastructure. Ports in the U.S. able to service 
the large container ships (i.e. Panamax and bigger) and tankers is 
limited due to access to rail, water depth, piers, and crane services. 
This makes the loss of any one of these ports a significant disruption 
to the national economy and security. For example, the Port of Houston 
handles just over 70 percent of all maritime container trade in the 
gulf coast region.\4\ Such a disruption is playing out now with the 
closure of Baltimore harbor due to the March 26, 2024, allision already 
mentioned. Added to limited number of viable ports, specialization has 
also made the loss of some ports hard to make up in others--case in 
point, Baltimore is a major port for automotive exports and imports.\5\ 
Despite the importance of our waterways and ports to the nation's 
economic and security well-being, the much championed Build Back Better 
effort has only resulted in relative minuscule amounts of funding. For 
example, at the end of 2023, after two years and $400 billion dollars 
spent, ports and waterways accounted for 4.3% of total budget and 1.1% 
of the total projects supported.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ ``Trade Highlights and Performance Data,'' Port of Houston, 
2022, https://porthouston.com/about/our-port/statistics/ (accessed 
April 1, 2024).
    \5\ ``2023 Foreign Commerce Statistical Report,'' Port of 
Baltimore, 2023, pg. 1, 7 and 10, https://mpa.maryland.gov/Documents/
2023FCSR.pdf (accessed April 1, 2024). ``Top 14 Busiest Container Ports 
in the United States,'' GoComet, February 25, 2024, https://
www.gocomet.com/blog/top-container-ports-in-the-united-states/ 
(accessed April 1, 2024).
    \6\ ``Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Celebrates Historic 
Progress in Rebuilding America Ahead of Two-Year Anniversary of 
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,'' The White House, November 9, 2023, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/
09/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-celebrates-historic-progress-
in-rebuilding-america-ahead-of-two-year-anniversary-of-bipartisan-
infrastructure-law/ (accessed April 1, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Zero-day dangers in shipyard cranes. Recent reporting has exposed 
the potential cyber vulnerability built into Chinese sourced heavy lift 
cranes at U.S. ports. Chinese manufacturer, ZPMC, holds a dominant 
position in the global crane market, accounting for more than 70 
percent of all ship-to-shore container cranes at U.S. ports.\7\ While 
not uncommon for heavy equipment to have such features for predictive 
maintenance, the option for including these feature were not part of 
their purchase agreements. This raises serious concerns given recent 
reporting by U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command of long running, concerted 
Chinese effort to access critical U.S. infrastructure, most notably the 
recent Chinese cyber-attack known as Volt Typhoon.\8\ Recent efforts 
have done much to expose this vulnerability but compromised cranes are 
not the only vector available for cyber espionage and attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ ``Chinese-Built Port Cranes May Be Able to Call Home On Their 
Own,'' The Maritime Executive, March 7, 2024, https://maritime-
executive.com/article/chinese-built-port-cranes-may-be-able-to-call-
home-on-their-own (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \8\ Testimony of Rear Admiral John Vann, U.S. Coast Guard Cyber 
Command, ``Port Cybersecurity: The Insidious Threat U.S. Maritime 
Ports,'' Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, February 
29, 2024, 34min. 21sec., https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/
subcommittee-on-transportation-and-maritime-security-hearing/ (accessed 
April 1, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China's LOGINK digital logistics risk. Global transportation of 
goods occurs over various logistic functionalities; freight forwarding 
services, container/shipment tracking, and national customs data 
submissions via Port Single Windows. As a logistics management 
platform, LOGINK was designed to improve cost efficiency of shipping 
cargo by consolidating various data streams, including price and 
tracking information. From inception in 2007, LOGINK has been a product 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with stewardship since 2019 being 
the Ministry of Transportation's (MOT) China Transport 
Telecommunication & Information Center (CTTIC [Editor's note: pinyin 
omitted]). To encourage LOGINK adoption overseas, the CCP has offered 
LOGINK free of charge; since 2010 it has been adopted at over 20 ports 
in Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Portugal, Spain, United Arab Emirates, 
Ukraine, Israel, Latvia, Netherlands and Germany.\9\ Widespread 
adoption of LOGINK standards would provide the CCP a vector to access 
logistic and trade data, potentially even manipulating data or severing 
access. Similar non-Chinese logistic management platforms include: 
Flexport, FreightPOP, Shipwell, Freightview and DHL Salodoo. However, 
none of these approaches the scope of sources of LOGINK, but 
competitors like Gnosis Freight offer a compelling alternative as it 
grows its access to more data streams and customers. Should LOGINK be 
adopted in the U.S. it would be subject to the Ocean Shipping Reform 
Act of 2022.\10\ That Act, empowers the Federal Maritime Commission to 
regulate shipping exchanges beginning from 2025; as of April 1, 2024 
LOGINK is not registered.\11\ CCP control of LOGINK poses a national 
security risk and exposure to predatory market behavior. U.S. antitrust 
law has struggled to address China anti-competitive behavior, 
especially Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), which have claimed 
sovereign immunity pursuant to the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA).\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ ``LOGINK: Risks from China's Promotion of a Global Logistics 
Management Platform,'' U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, September 20, 2022, pg. 8-9, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/2022-09/LOGINK-Risks_from_Chinas_Promotion_of_
a_Global_Logistics_Management_Platform.pdf (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \10\ Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022, Public Law No: 117-146
    \11\ Federal Maritime Commission, April 1, 2024, https://
www2.fmc.gov/FMC1Users/scripts/ExtReportsTOC.asp (accessed April 1, 
2024).
    \12\ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act U.S. Code 28 Sec. Sec.  1603
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Navigational GPS spoofing. In 2019 Iran spoofed the navigation 
system of the British tanker Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz.\13\ 
The ship's crew thought they were in international waters when they 
were actually in Iranian territory. The ship and its crew were held for 
10 weeks by Iran. The same year, NATO military exercises in the Baltic 
Sea were disrupted by Russian GPS spoofing. Good navigational practices 
would dictate system redundancies and independent backup navigational 
positioning (e.g. radar fixes, visual fixes, running fixes) to prevent 
incidents such as the Stena Impero. That said, sophisticated GPS and 
other navigational spoofing is a risk that calls for enforcement of 
sound navigational practices and backup measures to ensure ships safely 
navigate U.S. restricted waters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ ``MARAD Warns of Iranian GPS Jamming in Strait of Hormuz,'' 
The Maritime Executive, August 9, 2019, https://maritime-executive.com/
article/marad-warns-of-iranian-gps-jamming-in-strait-of-hormuz 
(accessed April 1, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fuel tampering and contamination. The March 26, 2024, allision of 
container ship Dali into the Francis Scott Key bridge in Baltimore has 
raised the specter of tampered fuel. Speculation over fuel 
contamination on the Dali emerged after an exclusive report in The Wall 
Street Journal cited a U.S. Coast Guard briefing that talked of the 
engines sputtering and a smell of burned fuel in the engine room.\14\ 
While investigations are ongoing, it cannot be ruled out that improper 
fuel loading or handling could just as likely be to blame for the loss 
of ship's power. Typically, commercial ships use higher grade fuels in 
port to meet environmental requirements as well as for greater 
reliability, shifting to lower grade fuels once in the open ocean. If 
the fuels were switched while still navigating in port it would 
represent a procedural violation as well as an opportunity for human 
operational error at a critical navigational moment. Finally, improper 
maintenance or poor material conditions could also lead to the loss of 
propulsion and warrants further investigation. In this case, the 
consequence of the allision is the loss of six lives, billions of 
dollars in damages, and the shuttering of the ninth largest U.S. port.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ ``Investigators Check Dali's Fuel with Speculation of Possible 
Contamination,'' The Maritime Executive, March 28, 2024, https://
maritime-executive.com/article/investigators-check-dali-s-fuel-with-
speculation-of-possible-contamination (accessed April 1, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not Enough Mariners and Shipyard Workers. Too few mariners and 
shipyards workers has had a deleterious effect on attempts to grow the 
maritime industry. Moreover, too few American merchant mariners means 
the nation is too reliant on foreign sealift to meet military 
operational needs as well as sustain a wartime economy. A 2017 study 
released by the U.S. Maritime Administration pointed out that the 
nation had a deficit of 1,839 certified and fit-for-service mariners in 
case of war--the actual deficit is unknown and likely higher as the 
2017 estimate was to support military operations and not to sustain a 
wartime economy. As that merchant mariner population retires (in 2021 
the average American merchant mariner was 47 years old) as the nation's 
need for sealift grows proportional to a potential war with China, the 
mariner deficit today is likely much worse. Commercial shipyards and 
naval shipbuilders alike have faced endemic workforce shortages. This 
is driven by several factors: uncompetitive wages, too few young 
workers willing to work in the challenging conditions of America's 
antiquated waterfronts, and too few Americans with the requisite 
technical skills (e.g. naval architects, welders, pipe fitters, etc.). 
The effect has been to outsource American shipping and shipbuilding, 
and maintenance to Chinese ports. The most notable in the recent past 
has been U.S. company Matson retrofitting three of its container ships 
by China's COSCO.\15\ While doing repairs or procuring commercial ships 
from China may be cheaper, it poses a potential vector for material and 
cyber-attacks and furthers dependencies on a rival nation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ ``Matson Proceeding with Third LNG Conversion for its 
Containerships,'' The Maritime Executive, February 6, 2024, https://
maritime-executive.com/article/matson-proceeding-with-third-lng-
conversion-for-its-containerships (accessed April 1, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 A few port safety and security thoughts on the allision in Baltimore:
    While it has already been mentioned, the allision of the Dali in 
Baltimore harbor provides several key considerations for port safety 
and security. Reviewing these in brief:
    1.  Potential fuel contamination and/or improper handling remains a 
risk for large commercial ships losing power in constrained waterways. 
The consequence is collision with other vessels or damage to critical 
maritime infrastructure (e.g. bridge, gas pipelines).

    2.  Loss of power on today's very large container ships, represents 
a hazard that most U.S. infrastructure has not been designed to 
withstand--the 1977 build Francis Scott Key bridge is a case in point 
and had no barriers (i.e. dolphins) protecting the bridge's supports 
and contributed to its collapse. As such, critical ports must be ready 
to clear their restricted waterways of obstructions (e.g. collapsed 
bridges, sunk ship etc.) rapidly to resume port operations. In a 
conflict or natural disaster, delays to regaining operations could be 
fatal. An example of what is needed are the floating cranes that began 
arriving on scene several days after the Dali incident to remove bridge 
debris and free the Dali.\16\ Additionally, the opening of a temporary 
channel in Baltimore to resume limited harbor operations also points to 
the need to having dredging equipment nearby as well.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ ``Navy barges assist in removing collapsed Baltimore bridge 
from river,'' Stars and Stripes, March 31, 2024, https://
www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-03-31/navy-barges-baltimore-bridge-
collapse-13461242.html (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \17\ Alejandra Salgado, ``Baltimore preps small, temporary channel 
for essential vessel transit,'' SupplyChainDive, April 1, 2024, https:/
/www.supplychaindive.com/news/port-baltimore-alternate-shipping-
channel-reopen-operations-debris-cleanup/711863/ (accessed April 1, 
2024).

    3.  Cyber-attacks have not been adequately investigated in shipping 
incidents. The December 2020 National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan was 
intended to address these vulnerabilities in the maritime sector, and 
would have required forensic cyber-attack investigations.\18\ While 
terrorism was ruled out quickly in the Dali allision, due diligence 
investigating cyber-attacks are time consuming and require exquisite 
skills to detect and have until recently been resisted. A month before 
the Dali allision, the White House issued an executive order to bolster 
cybersecurity of U.S. ports that granted additional authorities to the 
U.S. Coast Guard.\19\ The day after this order was issued, the U.S. 
Coast Guard posted proposed cyber security regulation changes for 
public comment which will conclude on April 22, 2024.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Donald J. Trump, ``The National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan 
,'' The White House, December 2020, pg. 4-5, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/12.2.2020-
National-Maritime-Cybersecurity-Plan.pdf (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \19\ Joseph R. Biden, ``Executive Order on Amending Regulations 
Relating to the Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront 
Facilities of the United States,'' The White House, February 21, 2024, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/02/
21/executive-order-on-amending-regulations-relating-to-the-
safeguarding-of-vessels-harbors-ports-and-waterfront-facilities-of-the-
united-states/ (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \20\ ``Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System,'' U.S. 
Coast Guard, February 22, 2024, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2024/02/22/2024-03075/cybersecurity-in-the-marine-
transportation-system (accessed April 1, 2024).

    4.  China sourced parts and ship maintenance done in China provides 
a potential vector for material tampering that could enable future 
cyber-attack. The case of modems discovered on ZPMC cranes represents 
only the first of likely more cases. After a prolonged period of 
review, finally, on the same day the President signed the maritime 
cyber security executive order, a maritime advisory was issued on 
LOGINK and ZPMC cranes.\21\ Future advisories should be expected, with 
the Dali investigation serving as a potential benchmark.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ ``2024-002-Worldwide-Foreign Adversarial Technological, 
Physical, and Cyber Influence,'' Maritime Administration, February 21, 
2024, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2024-002-worldwide-foreign-
adversarial-technological-physical-and-cyber-influence (accessed April 
1, 2024).

    5.  After the Dali's allision, the bridge debris wedged the ship on 
the harbor bottom and against high pressure gas lines.\22\ This raises 
another port safety and security concern, and how to harden this 
submerged critical infrastructure to damage from today's larger vessels 
and potential attack. Finally, the mishap investigation should verify 
Baltimore Port executed effectively its security plans as mandated by 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, specifically 
regarding securing the gas pipeline after the allision, and assessments 
of the Francis Scott Key bridge to resist an allision from modern 
container ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Brandon M. Scott, ``March 31st Update from Key Bridge Response 
Unified Command,'' City of Baltimore, March 31, 2024, https://
mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2024-03-31-march-31st-
update-key-bridge-response-unified-command (accessed April 1, 2024).

    6.  In what is an unusual occurrence, the ship's Voyage Data 
Recorder (VDR)--otherwise known as the ship's black box--stopped 
recording sensor data at a key moment of the incident.\23\ While audio 
recording continued on backup power, the loss of sensor data should be 
investigated and remedies offered to prevent future occurrences that 
may hinder future mishap investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Gary Howard, ``What Dali's black box recorder tells us about 
Baltimore bridge allision,'' Seatrade Maritime, April 1, 2024, https://
www.seatrade-maritime.com/casualty/what-dalis-black-box-recorder-tells-
us-about-baltimore-bridge-allision (accessed April 1, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Actions to Date Not Enough--Time for a National Maritime Initiative
    Our ports are the gateway to the nation's prosperity and security 
and are an integral part of a strategically important maritime 
industrial sector. Safeguarding our ports necessarily means bolstering 
our maritime resiliency to attack as well as supply chain disruptions, 
man-made or by an act of God. Doing this will require a national 
maritime initiative that:
      Provides an adequate American flagged commercial shipping 
fleet to sustain the nation in a major war; augmented by treaty ally 
shipping as required.
      Expands shipbuilding and repair capacities and associated 
workforce to mitigate over-reliance on China or non-friendly nations.
      Hardens maritime infrastructure and shipping to cyber-
attack and material damage.

    On the first, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, known as the Jones 
Act, was intended to meet this objective.\24\ Sadly, it has proven 
inadequate to the task and has not addressed the needs of sustaining a 
wartime economy needed in a war with China. Case in point, the 2019 
Turbo Activation 19-Plus exercise demonstrated that only 64 percent of 
the Ready Reserve Fleet was able to deploy on time in support of 
national defense needs--vessels that are intended to be ready to 
support rapid deployment of military forces. Moreover, the average age 
of these merchant ships is 45 years, well over the industry end-of-life 
average of 20 years, and the DOD faces a gap of approximately 76 fuel 
tankers to meet surge sealift requirements.\25\ That said, a wholesale 
repudiation of the Jones Act without additional actions would be 
counter-productive and not deliver the shipping needed either. In the 
near term, fostering stronger cooperation with allies (such as Greece, 
Japan, and South Korea) can help to satisfy some clearly defined 
national shipping needs in wartime while working to regain American 
maritime competitiveness. In short, a Hippocratic oath should be taken 
to ``do no harm'' to the domestic maritime industrial sector in 
pursuing initiatives to strengthen the sector. The March 12, 2024 
petition to the U.S. Trade Representative to take action against unfair 
Chinese trade practices in the maritime, logistics and shipbuilding 
sectors is an opportunity to not only strengthen U.S. agencies like the 
Federal Maritime Commission to press our case, but to rally 
international support.\26\ After decades of neglect, the U.S. maritime 
sector alone cannot take on China's goliath state-controlled shipping 
and shipbuilding sectors, but a consortium of like-minded maritime 
nations could. Common interests regarding freedom of navigation, free 
trade, and a shared threat perception of China would bind the group 
together. This new grouping could together represent a formidable bloc 
critical for an American-led revolutionary transformation in shipping--
an informal Maritime Group of Nations not dissimilar to the current 
Group of Seven (G7).\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Merchant Marine Act of 1920, June 5, 1920, U.S. Code 46, ch. 
24, sec. 861, https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml;jsessionid=5142A83A2AAB12A25A2F9AB8A3949F92?req=granuleid
%3AUSC-2000-title46a-
chapter24&saved=%7CZ3JhbnVsZWlkOlVTQy0yMDAwLXRpdGxlND
ZhLWNoYXB0ZXIyNC1zZWN0aW9uODYx%7C%7C%7C0%7Cfalse%7C2000&edition=2000 
(accessed April 1, 2024).
    \25\ Bryan Clark, Timothy Walton, and Adam Lemon, ``Strengthening 
the U.S. Defense Maritime Industrial Base: A Plan to Improve Maritime 
Industry's Contribution to National Security,'' Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments, February 12, 2020, pp. 9-13 and 48, https://
csbaonline.org/research/publications/strengthening-the-u.s-defense-
maritime-industrial-base-a-plan-to-improve-maritime-industrys-
contribution-to-national-security/publication/1 (accessed April 1, 
2024).
    \26\ Petition for relief under section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974, ``China's Policies in the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding 
Sector,'' March 12, 2024, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/Section%20301%20Petition%20-
%20Maritime%20Logisitics%20and%20Shipbuilding
%20Sector.pdf (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \27\ Brent D. Sadler and Peter St. Onge, ``Rebuilding America's 
Maritime Strength: A Shipping Proof-of-Concept Demonstration,'' The 
Heritage Foundation, August 16, 2023, pg. 6-7, https://
www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2023-08/BG3782_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To deliver on the second, regaining America's maritime 
competitiveness is required. Fostering a revolution in American 
shipping can energize a lethargic industrial sector that is critical to 
the nation's defense and strengthen it so that it can sustain a wartime 
economy. This new inter-modalism would combine existing and emerging 
technologies into a new logistics paradigm comprised of small modular 
nuclear reactor powered container ships, unmanned drones (ship and 
vertical lift), smart port technologies, blockchain tracking of smart 
containers, and additive manufacturing.\28\ A stronger and globally 
competitive maritime sector serves as a deterrent to Chinese economic 
coercion and military adventures. With a more robust maritime sector, 
American trade could proceed with greater confidence that the U.S. 
military can sustain combat operations on U.S.-flagged vessels. In 
addition to serving U.S. security needs, this shipping revolution could 
mitigate the environmental impacts of shipping, promote domestic 
production, and expand American exports to global markets, which would 
spur wider job growth and advance technological innovation in the U.S. 
The primary task is to create a domestic landscape that can foster a 
sustainable competitive advantage in American shipbuilding, shipping, 
and multi-modal logistics. This will require a maritime legislative 
agenda that incentivizes entry in the maritime workforce, rewards 
mariners sustaining critical certifications, and establishing maritime 
development zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Brent D. Sadler and Peter St. Onge, ``Regaining U.S. Maritime 
Power Requires a Revolution in Shipping,'' The Heritage Foundation, May 
15, 2023, pg. 12-20, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/SR272.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the third point, the lessons of the Dali bear witness that the 
status quo is not tenable and new efforts are required. The current 
Maritime Security Act of 2002 was conceived for a different era where 
the principal threat was violent extremist and natural disasters. Today 
the nation confronts a China, which is able to conduct conventional 
attacks as well as highly advanced asymmetric attacks across the 
homeland. A new framework is needed that builds on the Maritime 
Security Act and incorporates and codifies in law the best elements of 
both the 2020 National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan and the recently 
enacted executive order (EO 14116). Likewise, two programs that were 
devised in a post-9/11 world are perhaps ready for an update and 
revitalization: the Container Security Initiative (CSI) \29\ and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) \30\. As of March 24, 2024, 
there are 112 countries supporting the PSI's effort to prevent the 
movement of weapons of mass destruction, while CSI is conducting 
screening of U.S. inbound cargo in 61 overseas ports to interdict 
terrorist movement of weapons via maritime containers. Moreover, to 
better respond locally to maritime disasters and provide maritime 
support to the Department of Defense, a naval component of the National 
Guard should be established in states with strategically important 
ports. Already such forces have proven their worth; New Jersey and New 
York naval militia provided critical support moving material and first 
responders into lower Manhattan following the September 11th 
attacks.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ ``CSI: Container Security Initiative,'' U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, March 6, 2024, https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/
ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \30\ ``About the Proliferation Security Initiative,'' U.S. 
Department of State, https://www.state.gov/proliferation-security-
initiative/ (accessed April 1, 2024).
    \31\ Brent D. Sadler, ``Rebuilding America's Military: The United 
States Navy,'' The Heritage Foundation, February 18, 2021, pg. 39, 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/SR242.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next Steps.
    Safeguarding the nation's strategically important maritime 
industrial sector will be a complex task, and it will only be sustained 
by regaining America's commercial maritime competitive edge. To do this 
requires a grand design--a National Maritime Initiative. A likely 
vehicle for this would be an update to the 1989 National Security 
Directive (NSD-28) with enabling legislation from Congress that:
    1.  Harden the nation's maritime infrastructure. Concerted efforts 
are needed to harden U.S. maritime infrastructure to cyber, kinetic, 
and acts of God--to include allision from today and future large 
commercial shipping. This must include adequate salvage and dredging 
capacity to rapidly restore harbor operations at critical ports.

    2.  Strengthen U.S. ability to combat unfair Chinese maritime 
business practices and incentivize U.S. shipping. Currently the 
principal agencies (i.e. U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Administration, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Federal Maritime 
Commission) responsible for the nation's non-defense maritime sector 
are scattered across several departments. Structurally this has not 
fostered coherent sustained nor well-resourced maritime initiatives, 
reorganizing for task as well as increased investment in the nation's 
maritime sector are past due.

    3.  Create Maritime Prosperity Zones. Incentivize investment in the 
maritime industry and waterfront communities, to include attracting 
treaty allies like Japan and South Korea in common cause.

    4.  Establish a Maritime Innovation Incubator. The incubator would 
function to mature future maritime capabilities and new concepts of 
operations (e.g. small modular nuclear reactors, robotic shipping, 
drones/dirigibles useful for moving cargo at-sea etc.), and to train 
the next generation of naval architects and shipyard workers to operate 
and maintain these new methods and technology.

    5.  Train More Mariners. Expand existing and establish new state 
merchant marine academies to educate and certify merchant mariners. And 
prioritize existing educational and technical training grants to 
specialties critical to shipbuilding, e.g. naval architects, welders, 
and pipefitters.

    6.  Incentivize Mariners Who Maintain Certification. Attract 
American merchant mariners with favorable tax incentives and personal 
subsidies, who remain in the maritime sector while sustaining USCG 
mariner certifications.

    7.  Create a Naval Guard. Expand select state National Guards to 
include a naval component.

    The United States has neglected a core element of its security and 
prosperity--its historic maritime strength. As a result, American 
shipping and shipbuilding has atrophied, yet domestic industry and 
capacity for innovation remain strong. This advantage needs to be 
pressed by restoring American maritime competitiveness in pursuit of a 
new multi-modalism. Doing this at the same time hardening our maritime 
infrastructure is an imperative to deter Chinese economic coercion and 
military adventurism.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Now, Mr. McCarthy, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

  TESTIMONY OF ED McCARTHY, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, GEORGIA 
   PORTS AUTHORITY, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
                      WATERFRONT EMPLOYERS

    Mr. McCarthy. Good morning, Chairman Webster and Ranking 
Members and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 
invitation to testify here at the field hearing today. I thank 
Chairman Graves' recent visit to us in Savannah and the 
committee's support of all the initiatives that you're 
endeavoring in.
    I'm the chief operating officer for the Georgia Ports 
Authority and a member of the National Association of 
Waterfront Employers. We are very appreciative of the Federal 
infrastructure grants that will help U.S. ports and marine 
terminal operators to become more resilient. Thank you for the 
opportunity to talk about U.S. ports and marine terminal 
operators on safety, security, and the infrastructure 
investments that are needed.
    The Georgia Ports Authority employs 1,700 direct employees 
and over 3,000 ILA employees. GPA has invested $3 billion since 
2012, mostly all of that self-financed Georgia Ports' revenues. 
Georgia Ports plans to spend another $4\1/2\ billion over the 
next 10 years to build more port infrastructure, which will 
primarily be financed by the Georgia Ports Authority.
    There are two pillars by the Georgia Ports Authority; one, 
containers which are done in Savannah, Georgia. This is the 
third ranking volume port in North America, behind L.A.-Long 
Beach and New York-New Jersey. The second is automobiles and 
machinery in Brunswick, the fastest growing roll-on/roll-off 
port and the second largest only behind Baltimore, who our 
hearts and prayers go out to all those in the Baltimore city 
region.
    Ports are an economic engine, creating jobs and keeping 
America competitive. According to a recent study by UGA, 
University of Georgia, Georgia's ports supported more than 
600,000 jobs indirectly in the State of Georgia, contributing 
$40 billion in income, $170 billion in revenue, and $5 billion 
in local taxes.
    The subcommittees' attendance here in the field today 
demonstrates the importance of ports and marine terminal 
operators as a foundation of the American economy. The Bureau 
of Transportation Statistics reports approximately 47.7 million 
TEUs of equipment of containers were handled by U.S. ports and 
marine terminal operators. This represents 41 percent of U.S.-
international trade value and almost $1.9 trillion.
    In addition, U.S. ports and MTOs directly support the 
development and sustainment of our U.S. military. Since 9/11, 
ports have a robust facility security plan, which is approved 
by the U.S. Coast Guard. Most ports voluntarily, with the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, are certified by a Customs Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism. And I concur with Mr. Wong's 
remarks with funding for CBP and headcount.
    Georgia Ports contracts on the ship-to-shore cranes are 
with a company called Konecranes in Finland. The cranes' 
technology is made in the U.S., Japan, and China. These ship-
to-shore cranes are more expensive, but we think that the 
higher quality delivers better uptime on the cranes and 
justifies a total lifetime cost of ownership.
    Turning to cybersecurity, this is our primary priority at a 
multitier level approach working with the U.S. Coast Guard 
Security Cyber Terrorism Unit and the FBI cyber team. We look 
forward to working with the U.S. Coast Guard and this 
subcommittee on these matters.
    We greatly appreciate the subcommittees' endeavor today and 
the important work you are doing for our country. We thank you 
for this invitation to the field hearing today. I'm truly 
grateful for the support U.S. ports and marine terminals are 
securing through the maritime supply chain and your efforts for 
the U.S. workforce and ports.
    I welcome your questions. Thank you.
    [Mr. McCarthy's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Ed McCarthy, Chief Operating Officer, Georgia 
 Ports Authority, on behalf of the National Association of Waterfront 
                               Employers
    Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
members of the Subcommittee.
    My name is Ed McCarthy, and I serve as Chief Operations Officer of 
the Georgia Ports Authority (GPA). Thank you for the invitation to join 
you for today's field hearing and site visits.
    Chairman Graves recently visited us in Savannah and we would like 
to thank him for his recent visit to the Port and his and the 
committee's continued support.
    I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the steps that United 
States ports and marine terminal operators are taking to address port 
safety and security, as well as federal infrastructure investment 
opportunities that exist to support such endeavors while enhancing the 
efficiency of the U.S. maritime supply chain.
    Georgia Ports Authority employs 1700 employees directly and 
approximately 3000 longshore labor employees.
    Investment-wise, Georgia Ports Authority has invested $3.27 billion 
since 2012 building new port and inland infrastructure.
    This amount has been mainly self-financed from Georgia Ports 
revenues--and has not cost Georgian taxpayers. (Aside from Federal 
grants).
    We're also planning on spending an additional $4.5 billion the next 
ten years to build more port infrastructure--which will again be 
primarily financed by ourselves.
    We operate two major ports:
    The Port of Savannah--which is one of the fastest growing container 
ports in the nation. We currently rank third in volumes behind LA/LGB 
and NY/NJ.
    The Port of Brunswick--which is the fastest growing Roll-On/Roll-
off port for cars and High and Heavy machinery like excavators and 
tractors and is ranked 2nd nationally behind Baltimore.
    We are investing $262 million in new improvements to expand 
capacity in Brunswick.
    We expect this year to become the largest automobile port in the 
nation in both cargo volume and actual physical space.
    Ports are economic engines, creating jobs and keeping American 
business competitive in world markets.
    Every country in the world wants access to a competitive port 
system.
    According to a study recently completed by the University of 
Georgia, in 2023, Georgia's ports and inland terminals supported more 
than 609,000 jobs throughout the state annually, contributing $40 
billion in income, $171 billion in revenue and $5.3 billion in state 
and local taxes to Georgia's economy.
    As part of GPA's community engagement efforts, $6 million will be 
donated to communities located near the Port of Savannah to support a 
multi-year, local workforce housing initiative.
    CNBC ranked Georgia #1 in the U.S. for infrastructure in America's 
Top States for Business in 2023.
    I am also here today on behalf of the National Association of 
Waterfront Employers (NAWE), of which the GPA is a proud member.
    NAWE is a non-profit trade association whose member companies are 
public operating port authorities, privately-owned stevedores, marine 
terminal operators (MTOs), and other U.S. waterfront employers.
    NAWE's member organizations and companies engage in business at all 
major U.S. ports on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, the Gulf of 
Mexico, the Great Lakes, and Puerto Rico.
    In that manner, NAWE, as the voice of operating ports and MTOs in 
Washington, DC, ensures that there are open lines of communication 
between Congress, regulatory agencies, and the gateways to our Nation's 
international commerce.
           Importance of Ports and Marine Terminal Operators
    The Subcommittee's attendance in the field today further evidences 
the fact that ports and MTOs are a foundational element of the American 
economy.
    Operating ports and MTOs employ and ensure the safety of hundreds 
of thousands of American waterfront workers, fund the purchase of cargo 
handling equipment and security infrastructure at U.S. ports, and 
connect the U.S. economy to the world.
    We serve the nation's agriculture, retail and manufacturing 
sectors--both large businesses and small rely on American ports to 
deliver their goods.
    Operating ports and MTOs transition cargo between various modes of 
transportation (ships, trucks, and rail cars), while managing the 
orderly, safe, and secure collection and distribution of cargo between 
countless transportation stakeholders.
    This dynamic environment--with the constant movement of 
containerized, bulk, rolling, and project cargo, intermodal equipment, 
and cargo handling machinery--creates endless safety risks to the 
waterfront workforce and stakeholders entering marine terminals that 
must be accounted for, and materially mitigated, by ports and MTOs.
    In addition, as the critical connection point of the U.S. 
international trade and projection of economic power, security risks 
are an ever-present reality of port and MTO operations that require 
constant diligence, oversight, and investment to identify and mitigate.
    The latest Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports that in 2021 
approximately 47.7 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) were 
handled by U.S. ports and MTOs, representing 41 percent of U.S.-
international trade value in 2021--almost $1.9 trillion.
    As the critical connection of the leading transportation mode for 
U.S.-international trade in goods, efficient port and MTO operations 
are foundational to the success of the U.S. economy.
    In addition, U.S. ports and MTOs directly support the deployment 
and sustainment of the American military, serving as the baseline point 
for the projection of U.S. power throughout international areas of 
operation.
    Correspondingly, U.S. ports and MTOs can become critical physical 
and cyber security targets for actors looking to negatively impact U.S. 
trade and military operations.
    As such, U.S. ports and MTOs must be ever-vigilant regarding such 
security threats, constantly identifying potential risks and developing 
best practices and procedures--while making the accordant 
infrastructure investments--to mitigate such risks.
    Working with our Government partners, including this Subcommittee, 
the U.S. Coast Guard, and Customs and Border Protection, is a key 
aspect of success in ensuring the security of the U.S. port 
environment.
    In addition, to meet the just-in-time delivery focus of the modern 
supply chain, U.S. ports and MTOs must leverage new technologies and 
advanced infrastructure to ensure that the skilled waterfront workforce 
can meet stakeholder needs in a safe operating environment that seeks 
to mitigate the risk of injury.
    Quite simply, there are no days off at U.S. ports, as evidenced by 
the fact that ports and MTOs maintained continuous operation during the 
entirety of the COVID-19 pandemic, working tirelessly to meet 
unprecedented consumer demand and mitigate the associated supply chain 
congestion effects.
    Accordingly, developing new safety procedures and investing in 
cleaner and safer cargo handling equipment is critical to ensuring the 
efficient operation of the maritime supply chain to meet consumer 
demand.
                 Port Security in a Unique Environment
    Security of the maritime supply chain and the safety of the 
waterfront workforce are of paramount importance to ports and MTOs.
    To address ever-present security risks, and in accordance with the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, GPA developed a robust 
and dynamic Facility Security Plan (FSP), which has been approved by 
the U.S. Coast Guard under applicable regulations at 33 CFR Part 105.
    The FSP addresses, among numerous other areas, screenings for 
dangerous devices and substances, restrictive access control measures, 
proactive patrols, monitoring of the facilities and surrounding areas 
for suspicious activity, training, information sharing and multilevel 
collaboration.
    GPA is also a certified partner of the Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (CTPAT), a voluntary program led by U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) focused on improving security from point of 
origination and throughout the global supply chain to point of 
distribution.
    In accordance with CTPAT, GPA has entered into an agreement that 
outlines GPA's commitments to protect the supply chain, identify 
security gaps, and implement specific security measures and best 
practices.
    GPA's Port Police force numbers approximately 180 sworn officers 
and 40 additional security personnel and are leaders in their field of 
practice.
    Many of our Police have joined from local police departments which 
means they bring local awareness of nearby towns and have strong 
working relationships with Law Enforcement at Federal, State and Local 
levels.
    Port Police are physically present and visible every time a ship 
enters the port. They observe the docking procedure and then also check 
gangway access and manning to ensure secure procedures and staffing is 
in place.
    Port Police also work closely with CBP and USCG to ensure every 
vessel entering the port has passed a security and safety check with 
both agencies.
    Port Police are also working in tandem with State of Georgia 
Officials to prevent Human Trafficking as part of a multi-level 
approach to this issue.
             Let's Talk About Ship-to-Shore Cranes at Ports
    Georgia Ports uses ship-to-shore cranes (STS) constructed by a 
Finland-based company called Konecranes.
    Finland is a recent and critical NATO partner to the United States.
      These cranes use technology made in the U.S., Japan and 
Taiwan.
      We're the only port in the U.S. that use these cranes.
      These cranes are more expensive than other crane brands 
on the market, but their higher quality delivers very high uptime usage 
which justifies their total cost of ownership over the lifetime of the 
cranes.
 Turning to Cybersecurity--This Topic Remains a Primary Concern of All 
                          U.S. Ports and MTOs
    Given the importance of the maritime supply chain to the overall 
U.S. economy, the risk of cyber-attacks upon U.S. ports and MTOs cannot 
be overstated.
    However, to address such risks, GPA has developed a sophisticated 
cybersecurity plan:
    Cybersecurity is the number one priority and is a multi-level 
approach to thwart this issue, working closely with the USCG Security 
Cyberterrorism unit and the FBI.
    We use best practices for industry hygiene which means we keep all 
systems up-to-date.
    We immediately install fixes and patches as driven by our IT 
software and hardware vendors--along with ethical testing of our 
employees to train and retrain them on phishing and other cyber 
tactics.
    We keep a constant dialogue with our IT vendors on the current 
cyber threats.
    GPA and NAWE are currently reviewing the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System 
published by the U.S. Coast Guard on February 22, 2024.
    Our primary concern is that any cybersecurity standards developed 
by the U.S. Coast Guard must be specific to U.S. ports and MTOs to 
address the unique threats and operating environment of our industry.
    Generic cybersecurity recommendations, even when developed in 
coordination with the U.S. Government's leading cybersecurity experts, 
can add unnecessary cost without appropriately mitigating cybersecurity 
threats faced by ports and MTOs on a daily basis.
    We look forward to working with both the U.S. Coast Guard and this 
Subcommittee to ensure that any ultimate regulations governing port and 
MTO cybersecurity measures will be consistent with industry threats and 
operational realities, and to identify and develop opportunities for 
federal support to implement any necessary infrastructure, network, 
training, and workforce enhancements.
       Port and MTO Investments in Safer Cargo Handling Equipment
    With a workforce exceeding 1,700 employees and numerous partners 
contributing to operations within GPA terminals, safety remains 
paramount in our daily activities.
    Annually, we facilitate the movement of over 5 million TEUs and 
600,000 vehicles through GPA terminals, underscoring the critical 
importance of maintaining a safe work environment.
    To further enhance the safety culture, the GPA has introduced the 
Safety NONSTOP program.
    This comprehensive initiative ensures that safety awareness remains 
a constant focus for all employees and partners, around the clock, 
seven days a week.
    Through Safety NONSTOP, we prioritize proactive measures like 
training, hazard reporting, and observations to safeguard the well-
being of everyone involved in our operations, reinforcing our 
commitment to a culture of safety excellence.
    Last fiscal year, we achieved significant improvements in our 
safety performance, being 37% below the recordable rate and 60% below 
the lost time rate compared to the most recent BLS Industry Average 
(2022).
    This positive trend continues into this fiscal year, with a 
continued decrease in injuries.
    This success is attributed to the unwavering safety commitment 
across all levels of our organization.
    Now let me touch on the future of biofuels . . .
    One key aspect of creating a safer, healthier, and a cleaner 
working environment for the waterfront workforce is transitioning from 
diesel-driven cargo handling equipment to lower emission alternatives.
    The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) appropriates $3 billion for 
maritime decarbonization to help ports and MTOs switch to zero- or 
near-zero emissions equipment to decarbonize port operations and 
improve air quality in port communities.
    NAWE are extremely grateful to Congress for its leadership in 
passing the IRA and supporting investment in next-generation cargo 
handling equipment.
    However, although U.S. ports and MTOs want cleaner, safer, and 
healthier ports, the IRA's timelines for getting new equipment are 
challenging for several reasons, including:
    1.  The much higher cost of electric equipment;
    2.  Lost value in replacing existing equipment before the end of 
its useful life;
    3.  The need for expensive electric or alternative fuel 
infrastructure; and
    4.  The availability of U.S.-manufactured zero- or near-zero 
emissions cargo handling equipment.

    NAWE and its members continue to investigate the anticipated costs 
and timelines of switching from existing cargo handling equipment to 
zero- or near-zero emissions equipment.
    However, given the above-listed challenges, we anticipate that the 
aggregate costs to bring U.S. ports into compliance with the IRA's 
decarbonization goals will be in the tens (and possibly hundreds) of 
billions of dollars and will far exceed the IRA's timelines, even if 
U.S. manufacturing of next-generation cargo handling equipment can be 
rapidly expanded.
    Given these challenges, GPA and NAWE will continue to engage with 
Congress to find flexibility in the IRA and other port investment 
opportunities--such as the Port Infrastructure Development Program and 
private investment supported by the Capital Construction Fund as 
proposed by H.R. 4993--to account for the realistic costs, timelines, 
and U.S. equipment availability to achieve port decarbonization.
    While the IRA is outside this Subcommittee's jurisdiction, we 
appreciate the members' support for our efforts, including with regard 
to programs within the Subcommittee's jurisdiction.
    I encourage your support for a study to deepen the Savannah harbor 
in the upcoming WRDA as requested by the entire GA delegation.
    While that legislation does not go through this subcommittee, it is 
the larger T&I Committee that puts it together.
      Georgia Ports is seeking authorization for a Savannah 
Harbor Improvement Project study in the 2024 Water Resources 
Development Act (WRDA).
      The study would define the optimal depth and width of the 
Savannah Harbor in a potential future improvement program, balancing 
cost-benefits for the nation and environmental impact.
      With greater channel depth, the Port of Savannah will 
reduce shipping costs and delays while maximizing access for the global 
fleet of container ships.
      Widening the river would allow more opportunities for 
two-way vessel traffic, improving safety and preventing delays for 
American commerce. Faster vessel service will enable the Port of 
Savannah to handle more ships each year.
      Savannah Harbor improvements will benefit the nation, not 
just Georgia, and keep pace with the global shipping industry's future 
ships.
      Enhancing the channel would not only allow larger, more 
cost-effective and sustainable vessels to call on Savannah. Addressing 
impediments to larger ships at the Port of Savannah will allow carriers 
to deploy 18,000- to 24,000-TEU vessels to the entire U.S. East Coast.
      Each ship could take on more cargo and transit the 
channel more quickly, getting U.S. exports to global markets with 
greater efficiency, lower cost and lower emissions.
      Modernizing the shipping channel will expedite the flow 
of cargo for mega-ships transiting the Savannah River. American 
exporters will have greater opportunity to move goods overseas, because 
ships will be able to take on more cargo.

    In closing, let me thank you all for the important work you do for 
our country. Thank you for inviting me to join you for this field 
hearing to share first-hand updates and concerns on the critical safety 
and security issues that impact our industry. I am truly grateful for 
your support of U.S. ports and marine terminal operators in ensuring a 
secure maritime supply chain and safe working environment for our 
waterfront workforce.
    And now, I welcome any questions you may have.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you so much for your 
testimony. Mr. Morgan, you're recognized.

    TESTIMONY OF DAVE MORGAN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
   OFFICER, COOPER/PORTS AMERICA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL 
                  MARITIME SAFETY ASSOCIATION

    Mr. Morgan. Good morning, Chairman Webster and Chairman 
Gimenez, Ranking Member Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
Congressman Cohen. It's a pleasure to be here.
    My name is Dave Morgan. I'm the president of Cooper/Ports 
America, and also I am the current president of the board of 
directors at the National Maritime Safety Association, better 
known as NMSA. And I can assure the committee that being from 
Texas, I never have a tie on, ever, ever, ever. However, today, 
it's an honor to wear a tie for the system, but it's also a 
Ports America Baltimore tie in honor of my colleagues and 
families up in the Baltimore area.
    By way of background, Cooper/Ports America is a joint 
venture between Cooper, the Cooper group of companies, and 
Ports America. C/PA operates in the Texas ports. We handle 
approximately 25 percent of the container volume handled in 
Houston and about 82 percent of the general cargo handled in 
the Port of Houston and outports in Texas. We employ over 3,300 
company and international longshoremen union labor and operate 
an average of about 1.65 million man-hours annually.
    On port safety, at C/PA, safety drives everything we do and 
is led by the participation of all personnel. A safe workplace 
will result from positive attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs of 
our C/PA team. We strive to create a healthy and injury-free 
environment for all employees and visitors to our facilities 
and operations. We measure our business success by safety 
excellence and will never waver in this commitment.
    Very similarly, in parallel, the focus and purpose of NMSA 
is marine cargo handling safety, which has been our mission 
since NMSA was formally established in 1972 through the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Prior to that 
formation, NMSA's predecessor was the Management Advisory Cargo 
Handling Safety Committee that was launched in 1956.
    NMSA is a diverse association focused on safety, and one of 
the main objectives of NMSA is to maintain a network of 
professionals capable of addressing the evolving safety issues 
of the cargo handling industry. NMSA members are all dedicated 
volunteers, and this collective of progressive expertise serves 
as a primary resource to the industry to keep workers healthy 
and injury-free.
    NMSA also has a Technical Committee that holds regular 
meetings at ports across North America and invites guests from 
port employers; local, State, and Federal agencies; and local 
union representatives to join our discussions to promote 
maritime safety. During these open meetings, ports are toured, 
safety management is discussed, accidents and injuries are 
examined for increased hazard recognition and new preventive 
methods, new safety training products are prepared, and experts 
are invited to present technical aspects of equipment, 
including technical engineering details. Importantly, 
professional networks are expanded through this collegial 
information sharing environment and continually drive a 
proactive approach for addressing safety at the workforce.
    Some of NMSA's current areas of focus are: the safety of 
alternative fuel sources for cargo handling equipment; anti-
collision technologies to detect people working around 
machines; fulfilling OSHA's new requirements for e-filing of 
injury and illness data; improving pre-shift safety talks; 
ensuring safety on elevated working surfaces when working on 
gondola railcars; recognizing and addressing drug and alcohol 
matters; heat illness prevention best practices; training 
workers on powered industrial trucks, PIT; mooring line 
snapback injury prevention; lockout tagout program best 
practices; and split rim wheel safety best practices.
    We are also very concerned on security. We and the MTOs 
follow the local and State and Federal guidelines on security, 
and we have our own internal systems on security--that's all 
part of my testimony.
    And in closing, I encourage both of your committees and 
your key staff to engage with NMSA and its Technical Committee 
to share information and any concerns about the maritime 
transportation system. I would also like to extend an 
invitation to committee members and your staff to come visit 
our terminals in Texas and meet the hard-working people that 
keep cargo moving and play an integral role in our supply 
chain. Our industry experts stand ready to answer any questions 
you may have, serve as a resource on any safety related 
matters, and assist you in any way we can.
    Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to be with 
you at today's field hearing and share my perspectives on 
critical safety and security issues. Again, I appreciate the 
attention of your two committees on ensuring the safety and 
security of U.S. ports, marine terminal operators, and all the 
workers we employ in our maritime supply chain.
    I welcome any questions. Thank you.
    [Mr. Morgan's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Dave Morgan, President and Chief Executive 
   Officer, Cooper/Ports America, on behalf of the National Maritime 
                           Safety Association
    Good morning, Chairman Webster, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, Ranking Member Thanedar, and members of the Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation and Transportation and Maritime Security 
Subcommittees. My name is Dave Morgan, and I am President and CEO of 
Cooper/Ports America.
    It is an honor to appear before you today. I applaud both of your 
committees' interest in port safety, security, and infrastructure 
investment and desire to better understand how the marine cargo 
handling industry works with the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support and secure 
our maritime supply chain. We are at a critical juncture for port 
safety and security and given the recent tragic incident in Baltimore 
this hearing could not be more timely.
    Cooper/Ports America, LLC (C/PA) is a joint venture operation that 
is the combined businesses of Ports America and The Cooper Group and 
integrated Shippers Stevedoring, Chapparal Stevedoring, and Integrated 
Marine Services (IMS). C/PA is the premier provider of full-service 
stevedoring, terminal operations, container stuffing and stripping, 
container yard depots, container and chassis maintenance and repair, 
and truck brokerage and logistics in the Texas markets. The Cooper 
Group and Ports America merged their breakbulk operations in the 
Houston and surrounding ports on October 1, 2016. C/PA currently 
operates at Houston City Docks, Barbours Cut, Bayport, Beaumont, Point 
Comfort, Corpus Christi, Freeport, Galveston and Brownsville. C/PA has 
a long-term contract with USTRANSCOM and handles 25,000 pieces of US 
Army assets via truck, rail, and vessels annually. C/PA has 
approximately 28% & 25% of the total market share of the BCT-BPT total 
TEU's respectively and 82% of the total tonnage in 2023 that moved 
across the City Dock Terminal. C/PA employs over 3,300 company and 
International Longshoremen's Association Union Labor & operates at an 
average of 1.65M labor hours annually.
    I also appear before you today as President of the Board of 
Directors of the National Maritime Safety Association (NMSA). NMSA is 
the forum for maritime industry leaders and Labor to gather and discuss 
proactive and preventive safety measures with the goal of protecting 
the health and safety of our dedicated waterfront workers at U.S. 
marine terminals. C/PA is a longtime member of NMSA, and we take great 
pride in not only C/PA's commitment to safety, but our industry's 
overall commitment to protecting the men and women that work at ports 
and terminals around the country day and night so they can return home 
safely to their loved ones when their shift is over.
    While intricately connected, consistent with the theme of the 
hearing title, I have divided my written testimony into three parts: 
the first part addressing ``port safety,'' second focusing on 
``security,'' and third addressing ``infrastructure investments.''
                              Port Safety
    At C/PA, safety drives everything we do, and is led by the 
participation of all personnel. A safe workplace will result from 
positive attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs of our C/PA team. We strive 
to create a healthy and injury-free environment for all our employees 
and visitors to our facilities and operations. We measure our business 
success by safety excellence and will never waver in this commitment.
    Similarly, the focus and purpose of NMSA is marine cargo handling 
safety which has been our mission since NMSA was formally established 
in 1972 through the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970. Prior to 
its formation, NMSA's predecessor was the Management Advisory Cargo 
Handling Safety Committee (MAXIE) that was launched in 1956.
    NMSA is a diverse association focused on safety, and one of the 
main objectives of NMSA is to maintain a network of professionals 
capable of addressing the evolving safety issues of the cargo handling 
industry. NMSA members are all dedicated volunteers, and this 
collective of progressive expertise serves as a primary resource to the 
industry to keep workers healthy and injury free.
    NMSA also has a Technical Committee (TC) that holds regular 
meetings at ports across North America and invites guests from port 
employers, Local, State and Federal Agencies, and local union 
representatives to join our discussions to promote maritime safety. 
During these open meetings, ports are toured; safety management is 
discussed; accidents and injuries are examined for increased hazard 
recognition and new prevention methods; new safety training products 
are prepared; and experts are invited to present technical aspects of 
equipment--including technical engineering details. Importantly, 
professional networks are expanded through this collegial information 
sharing environment and continually drive a proactive approach for 
addressing safety on the worksite.
    Some of NMSA's current areas of focus are:
      The safety of alternate fuel sources for cargo handling 
equipment
      Anti-collision technologies to detect people working 
around machines
      Fulfilling OSHA's new requirements for e-filing of injury 
and illness data
      Improving pre-shift safety talks
      Ensuring safety on elevated working surfaces when working 
on gondola rail cars
      Recognizing and addressing drug & alcohol matters
      Heat illness prevention best practices
      Training workers on Powered Industrial Trucks (PIT)
      Mooring line snapback injury prevention
      Lockout tagout program best practices
      Split rim wheel safety best practices
                                Security
    Cooper/Ports America and other stevedore companies and marine 
terminal operators (MTOs) are central pillars of the global intermodal 
marine transportation system. We have extensive systems, practices, and 
processes in place to address the full and evolving spectrum of 
threats--from those of a physical nature to those in the cyber realm. 
C/PA and other MTOs have a system of layered physical and cybersecurity 
countermeasures in accordance with the Marine Transportation Security 
Act (MTSA), the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Justice and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at the 
federal level and with support from appropriate state and local law 
enforcement agencies.
    Since the enactment of the MTSA in 2002 and its implementation by 
the United States Coast Guard, MTOs are required to have an approved 
Facility Security Plan (FSP) and a designated Facility Security Officer 
(FSO). C/PA's FSOs work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard within the 
MTSA framework to address the ever-evolving nature of threats we face 
at our facilities. In addition, C/PA is currently reviewing the Coast 
Guard's recently published Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System. C/PA and its team of 
security terminal operators will work with other MTO's to ensure that 
any ultimate regulations governing port and MTO cybersecurity measures 
will be consistent with industry threats and operational realities, and 
to identify and develop opportunities for federal support. We look 
forward to continue working with the U.S. Coast Guard on this endeavor. 
Of note, C/PA falls under the Port Authority's FSP in all ports in 
Texas.
    Regarding cyber threats, C/PA partners with government entities 
like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to 
replicate frameworks created by the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
protect critical infrastructure. In addition to government partnerships 
and programs, terminal operators have a high isolation level on crane 
control and auxiliary function systems, and monitoring access is 
strategically implemented to detect and capture threats. C/PA, like 
other MTO's, proactively engage with control system and auxiliary 
system providers regarding their latest offerings and demand the 
highest level of security.
    NMSA also is focused on security threats to marine terminal 
operations that could jeopardize the safety of our waterfront workers, 
and our association has been closely tracking such threats for some 
time. Through our Technical Committee, NMSA proactively engages experts 
from within and outside the industry to assess and understand potential 
risks, gather data, investigate and conduct fact-finding reports, 
review and evaluate best practices, and disseminate and encourage 
adoption of solutions to improve safety for waterfront workers.
    Protecting cargo handling equipment from cyber intrusions, damage, 
or sabotage--particularly systems where our workers are at risk of 
injury or potentially life threatening injury--is a significant concern 
for NMSA and C/PA, and we are work vigilantly to safeguard all of our 
systems and workers. This is why in February of 2023, NMSA's Technical 
Committee received a presentation from officials with the U.S. Coast 
Guard Sector's Jacksonville Cyber Division on cyber threats at U.S. 
ports and marine terminals. We plan to continue this discourse both 
internally and publicly to ensure comprehensive and protective measures 
are in place and that our workforce remains safe and secure in their 
operations.
                       Infrastructure Investments
    Forecasts projecting continued growth in international trade and E-
commerce are expected to drive a significant increase in the volumes of 
goods transported across the globe over the next few decades. The 
greatest volume of this cargo will be transported via shipping 
containers handled by our workforce. Congress and the Biden 
Administration's recent investments in port infrastructure through 
federal grant programs such as the Port Infrastructure Development 
Program (PIDP) and the new EPA Clean Ports program are very helpful and 
we thank you. Unfortunately, even if robustly funded for the next 
decade, these programs alone will not be sufficient to address the 
anticipated increase in cargo volumes.
    Other approaches to infrastructure development and transportation 
network expansion will be required to meet global demand in the 
maritime cargo and intermodal freight transportation systems. One such 
innovative approach would be the enactment of legislation to expand the 
Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Capital Construction Fund (CCF) 
program to allow MTOs to use a portion of their own revenues, on a tax-
deferred basis, to purchase new and replace aging cargo handling 
equipment with new, zero-emission equipment that has built-in state-of-
the-art safety features manufactured here in the U.S. as proposed in 
H.R. 4993. It has the added benefit of not requiring appropriated 
funding and is distinctly beneficial to U.S. taxpayers.
    H.R. 4993 is a bipartisan bill introduced by Congressmen Mike Ezell 
(R-MS) and Troy Carter (D-LA) and has 17 cosponsors so far. Chairman 
Webster, we are grateful that you are one of them. I respectfully urge 
all of you take a look at this bill and consider cosponsoring this 
important legislation.
    Another approach that should be considered is to increase cargo 
volumes at U.S. ports that currently have excess capacity for 
additional volume or have room to expand their terminal operations with 
additional investments. For instance, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
should be authorized and adequately funded to carry out additional 
projects to deepen and expand navigation channels and approaches to 
several ports--particularly in the Gulf of Mexico. Such investments 
will not only expand our port capacity to move higher freight volumes, 
they will also strengthen the resiliency of the entire U.S. Maritime 
Transportation System (MTS); a need made abundantly clear by the recent 
collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge and closure of the vessel 
traffic to the Port of Baltimore.
    In closing, I encourage both of your committees and your key staff 
to engage with NMSA and its Technical Committee to share information 
and any concerns about the marine transportation system. I would also 
like to extend an invitation to committee members and your staff to 
come visit our terminal in Houston and meet the hardworking people that 
keep cargo moving and play an integral role in our supply chain. Our 
industry experts stand ready to answer any questions you may have, 
serve as a resource on any safety related matters, and assist you in 
any way we can.
    Thank you for providing me the opportunity to be with you at 
today's field hearing and to share my perspectives on the critical 
safety and security issues that affect our industry. Again, I 
appreciate the attention of your two committees on ensuring the safety 
and security of U.S. ports, marine terminal operators and all the 
workers we employ, and our maritime supply chain. I welcome any of your 
questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you all for your testimony. 
We now turn to the questions for the third panel, and I 
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fowler, given the large range of vessels that Crowley 
operates, are there any categories on the shoreside part of 
this that are lacking and that don't quite meet the needs that 
are necessary?
    Mr. Fowler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 
question. I want to make sure I answer your question 
adequately. Specifically as it relates to the shoreside, how 
can I direct my response?
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, just from the--are there 
certain services that are lacking----
    Mr. Fowler [interposing]. Understood.
    Mr. Webster of Florida [continuing]. That need to be 
provided?
    Mr. Fowler. Thank you. I appreciate the question. So, 
Crowley operates many, many different types of vessels, right? 
We operate container vessels, we operate petroleum and chemical 
transportation vessels, we operate general cargo vessels, we 
operate Government vessels. So, as our vessels come in and out 
of the U.S. ports, the U.S. ports are adequate. They offer 
great service for us.
    The areas in which we operate when we talk about after--in 
the COVID and the congestion that occurred on the west coast, 
the areas that Crowley is operating, servicing the Caribbean, 
servicing the islands, servicing South America, really weren't 
met with those challenges. And so, we have a great system that 
operates well, and in conjunction with our partners and ports 
across the country, we've had great service here and in large 
part of the continued investment in those ports.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, from an operator's perspective, 
what are the most pressing immediate needs for our Nation's 
ports?
    Mr. Fowler. Thank you for your question. For us operating--
Mr. Chairman, I'll say that the greatest challenges that we as 
operators face right now relate to mariner shortage. And this 
is something that we can take action on. And it's something 
that's of critical importance to us in ensuring that our 
vessels maintain in operation.
    Today, we have vessels that at times are not operating 
because of inadequate mariner levels that we'd need to operate 
those vessels. And so, I would put that in two different 
categories. The first category would be in attracting new 
talent to our system and making aware our industry. And this is 
an industrywide problem. We need the support from MARAD and 
others to make aware and bring in more to our industry.
    The second I would say is that we have, as it relates to 
the mariner shortage, we have mariners who want to continue to 
progress through the system and upgrade their licensing and are 
struggling to do so. In some cases, it will take 100-plus days 
of classroom time and up to $80,000 of their personal funding 
to see those upgrades. And you can imagine that if you've been 
at sea for 120 days, to come back then on your off time, when 
you want to be with your family who you've been away from, to 
have to then go spend 100 days in a classroom and to invest 
significant dollars. There are ways for us to modernize that 
process, to reduce the financial burden, to have more internet 
delivery, e-delivery of that material that makes it easier for 
those mariners to upgrade their licensing.
    But if you're--from an operator standpoint, the critical 
need that we have now is ensuring that we have adequate 
mariners in our system. Today, we're in a mariner shortage, and 
it's a crisis across our industry, and we certainly need some 
support in ensuring that we can solve this together.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. It's kind of a crisis everywhere.
    Mr. Fowler. It is.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. For every kind of worker.
    Mr. Wong, during the pandemic, we saw substantial supply 
chain disruptions driven by numerous factors, all kinds of 
inability just to move cargo. Have you seen any improvement in 
the intermodal side of what's happening?
    Mr. Wong. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the question.
    Absolutely. Here at PortMiami and the majority of the 
Florida seaports, beneficially, we didn't really have as much 
of the stock hold of vessels out in anchorage. Be that as it 
may, the Florida seaports, they have efficient operations and 
sufficient equipment.
    As far as the challenges that I think the Nation ended up 
encountering was most definitely staffing, rotation of shifts, 
to make sure that everyone wasn't hit by COVID at the same 
time. There were a lot of mechanisms that ports had to take as 
an industry as a whole to be safe during COVID. But as far as 
the Florida seaports as a whole, we were blessed that we didn't 
have any of that congestion here in our Florida seaports.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Chairman Gimenez, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes. Or did I--no, I've got Carbajal, 
sorry.
    Mr. Carbajal. It's OK. I'm easy.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. You're recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wong and Mr. McCarthy, the Bipartisan Infrastructure 
Law provided $2.25 billion in advance appropriations for the 
Port Infrastructure Development Program. How important is that 
funding to your ports, and how will it help you lower emissions 
from your facilities? It's a softball for a good answer.
    Mr. Wong. All right. I'll take it first since it's a 
softball. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.
    As far as funding goes, one thing I would say about the 
maritime industry and infrastructure, nothing is cheap in the 
maritime industry. Infrastructure, such as specifically 
PortMiami, we have a lot of infrastructure that we're operating 
on, but it's towards the end of life.
    And as far as processes, funding that's available, let me 
tell you, our port will take any funding available. Our north 
bulkhead, for example, where almost all of our cruise vessels 
end up berthing at--we only have one cruise terminal on the 
south side specifically for smaller vessels--but our entire 
north side, our entire bulkhead needs to get replaced. And that 
infrastructure and that funding is essential for us to continue 
to grow and just to continue to operate on a daily basis.
    The phasing of construction is essential as well. And when 
you talk about aging infrastructure, we're talking about 
upwards of $500 million on estimates as far as our north 
bulkhead. So, it is expensive. It is a length of time for 
construction, especially during operations.
    Mr. Carbajal. Great.
    Mr. McCarthy. Thank you for the question.
    The infrastructure bill and the amount of funds is critical 
to the United States and to ports and the infrastructure. For 
Georgia Ports Authority, as you could see by what we submitted 
as our attachment, three pages of grants over the last 36 
months that we have been blessed to get from Congress and 
Federal grant programs. We are currently applying for a 
resilient grant to make our electric more robust so we can 
shift from rubber-tired gantry cranes to electric gantry cranes 
in our yard. So, the infrastructure bill is critical not only 
to Georgia, but to the entire Nation. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Fowler, first, I wanted to give you credit for Crowley 
stepping up to embrace the EMBARC program. There's still a lot 
of work that needs to be done. So, with that praise comes great 
responsibility. But I do want to recognize how your company 
stepped up and led on that issue.
    So, with that, domestic cabotage laws require vessels 
carrying cargo between two U.S. ports be built, owned, and 
crewed by Americans. Those vessels are also governed by 
stricter Coast Guard regulations. What role does the Jones Act 
have on economic security and port security?
    Mr. Fowler. Thank you, and thank you for your comments. I 
very much appreciate the recognition of our embrace of the 
EMBARC program.
    The Jones Act is critically important for our Nation's 
security. So, Jones Act, of course, we have U.S. mariners on 
these vessels. And I think with the conflict going on around 
the world, there's a heightened sense and awareness of the 
importance of having U.S. mariners that are not only coming in 
and out of our ports, but in our inland waterway system, that 
we have U.S. mariners where you don't have the robust security 
of a port, but in our inland waterway system along the coastal 
U.S. It's critically important to our Nation's security that 
those are American vessels owned by American companies and 
crewed by American mariners.
    So, in terms of the reliability, of course, you talked 
about the heightened regulations around U.S. vessels as it 
relates to vessel requirements, it relates to audits, as it 
relates to crew training, crew regulations. It gives us a, 
certainly, resiliency in having those Americans on those 
vessels, creates great economic impact for those families. Many 
of these jobs are six-figure jobs, well into six figures. These 
are high-paying jobs that support American families across the 
country, and they ensure at a greater level that our ports 
remain resilient and safe.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. This is to all the panel. I'm 
going to be out of time, so, I'm going to submit this question 
for the record and ask that you follow up with an answer, if 
you could, to all the witnesses. This question is for all the 
witnesses, as I mentioned.
    Every maritime port obviously happens to be on the water 
and is therefore subject to rising sea level and extreme 
weather events. What are you doing to prepare for the future, 
and how expensive is that preparation? I'll submit that for the 
record, if you could follow up, that would be great. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Gimenez, you are recognized, 
Chairman, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wong, are you familiar with all the cruise ships that 
dock here at Port of Miami? Home port here?
    Mr. Wong. Yes, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Gimenez. How many were built in the United States?
    Mr. Wong. From what I can recollect, none of the cruise 
vessels that are coming here right now.
    Mr. Gimenez. None of the cruise ships are----
    Mr. Wong [interposing]. That's correct, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Are you familiar with most of the cargo ships 
that dock here?
    Mr. Wong. Yes, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Gimenez. How many of those were built in the United 
States?
    Mr. Wong. From what I can recollect, none, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Sadler, that's a sad state of affairs, to 
say the least. What has caused this? I'm going to give a little 
bit of a brief history. During a World War II, for every 
aircraft carrier that the Japanese built, we built six. If we 
were to get into a conflict with China now, we would be Japan 
and they would be us, although much worse. How did we get to 
this, and how do we rectify it? How do we strengthen our 
shipbuilding capacity here in the United States? Also another 
little tidbit, the largest navy in the world now is the navy of 
the PRC.
    Mr. Sadler. No. I love this question, and I'll be very 
cognizant of the limited time that we have on this. Looking 
forward, I mean, we can go and look at the history, but looking 
forward, the way that we can best address this is focusing on 
our competitiveness. I mean, we have a legacy fleet and the 
Jones Act, which has been that way for 100 years.
    We have to get more competitive in the global marketplace. 
We have to change and reorganize for the task. Our maritime 
agencies are scattered about several different departments. We 
need to organize for task, we need to focus on competitive 
measures. Make it lucrative to be a merchant mariner, make it 
lucrative to be a shipyard worker, because those are high-
paying jobs. We just need more people there. We need to start 
building more competitively than we have been.
    Mr. Gimenez. Does the PRC--are they engaged in some unfair 
practices that give them an advantage?
    Mr. Sadler. Absolutely. It's a state-owned enterprise, and 
so, they benefit both from direct and also indirect subsidies. 
They also take their orders, most often, not from an economic 
perspective, but from a Communist Party's perspective. So, they 
are not a free market entity. And so, that allows them to put 
national assets behind whatever their strategic interests are. 
If it's buying access into a port, if it's designing ships at a 
lower cost so that they can elbow in or to take over market 
share, they'll do it.
    Now, there's still a lot of comparative advantages that our 
allies and that we have in this sector. We just have not taken 
full advantage of it, and that's probably where the solution 
lies where we are today.
    Mr. Gimenez. Is there legislation needed to accomplish 
this?
    Mr. Sadler. Absolutely. I think there's probably a family 
of legislation that can't come soon enough, quite frankly.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. Since this is an interesting or a great 
kind of melding of the three committees that I actually serve 
on--I serve on HASC, Armed Services; I serve on the Select 
Committee on China; and I obviously serve on Homeland 
Security--I would love to get all of your perspectives on the 
legislation that we need in order to keep America safe.
    I mean, we're talking about port security, but now we're 
really talking about the security of the United States. And it 
really concerns me that of all the ships that come here, none 
of them are built in the United States. Probably none of them 
either are staffed by American sailors. They're probably 
staffed by foreign sailors.
    So, final question, on the licensing, Mr. Fowler, which you 
talked about. Are the licensing requirements different for U.S. 
sailors versus maritime personnel from around the world?
    Mr. Fowler. Thank you for your question. And certainly 
there are differences. And so, for us, some of the challenges 
that we face in applying for those licenses today, to give you 
some perspective, we've got at Crowley 100 jobs today that, if 
we could work through a more efficient licensing process, could 
be immediately filled. Over 100 jobs that are waiting to be 
filled that mariner licensing, if we could expedite that 
process, would resolve. Today----
    Mr. Gimenez [interrupting]. All right. I need to cut you 
off because I've got one more thing that I want to follow. I 
only have 30 seconds.
    The ships that dock here that don't have American sailors, 
they have different licensing requirements, but yet we allow 
them to dock in American ports. Is that a disadvantage for 
American sailors also? I mean, why do we have these licensing 
requirements for our folks and yet we allow folks from other 
countries that aren't licensed the same way to operate on U.S. 
ports if, in fact, it's all about safety?
    Mr. Fowler. It should be about safety, Congressman, and I 
would ask that we defer to the Coast Guard to understand the 
differences and to provide that detail to make sure that that 
safety element is being satisfied.
    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you. Mr. Thanedar.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Webster. And again, thank 
you, Mr. Wong, for hosting us here today in this beautiful 
venue. The collapse of the Key Bridge impacted all of your 
organizations in one way or another. What lessons, if any, can 
we learn from this collapse and look from a point of safety?
    And my second question is, do we have the right perspective 
in terms of our spending, our budget, our spending on security, 
protecting our homeland in general? Are certain areas given a 
higher emphasis than other areas, and is that justified? Are we 
leaving some areas so vulnerable to the attacks because we are 
all focused on certain different areas?
    So, I just wanted to get a perspective from all of you on 
lessons learned and how do you see the budgets and how does 
that impact?
    Mr. Sadler. I'll take the first stab at it. Great question. 
And first up, on the bridge, I mean, we are still in the 
process of discovery, but there are clearly, clearly a few 
lessons that--right, first off, one, protective dolphins, which 
would have prevented or deflected the full force of the Dali 
from taking out the bridge, were not in place. This was based 
on a similar incident that happened in 1980, but yet in the 
intervening years, nothing was done.
    How many other bridges are likewise not hardened because 
shipping has changed dramatically in the intervening years? So, 
there's a task that doesn't take very long to figure out that 
needs to get done.
    When it comes to priorities, which is what I really think 
the issue is, on resourcing, it's been easier to focus on other 
areas. It's been easy to kick the can down the road because we 
had the best infrastructure, we had the best fleets, but now 
our competitors have caught up. And a lot of that 
infrastructure, the educational for merchant mariners, and the 
ability for us to have that present, the market share, has been 
eroded. So, it's time now to basically kind of get back to the 
gym and to get competitive again, in my mind.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Mr. Sadler.
    Mr. McCarthy. I'll take the next part of it. It really 
comes down to infrastructure, that it's not just the bridges 
that need to be resilient or tunnels that need to be 
constructed to remove those impediments. But it's also about 
the infrastructure of our waterways. Some of our waterways in 
the country are not deep enough or wide enough, and we need 
funding for that. I know the WRDA bill is being discussed at 
the T&I Committee and deepening harbors and widening them.
    I know Savannah is requesting a study being done for the 
Savannah River, and I know there are other regions of the 
country that need more infrastructure, as a lesson learned and 
what we need to do.
    As far as the cost and the funding goes, it's in the 
trillions of dollars, if you look at the whole country. And 
what you are doing with the Federal grants is very appreciated 
as a step for us to get moving in the right direction. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
    Mr. Sadler. Just one thing, to come back. One of the other 
lessons from the Baltimore issue is the salvage capacity that 
we have. I think that's something that needs to be looked at. 
The ability to dredge as well as to remove debris. We're 10 
days into it. It took less time to clear the Suez Canal. So, we 
need to do better. We do have vulnerable ports, based on that 
question in the last session.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you so much. Quick question. How should 
I say this? Are we more reactive to attacks and dangers as 
opposed to being proactive in anticipating what could happen?
    Mr. Sadler. I think we have been probably worse than 
reactive. We have been complacent for far too long. We need to 
get more proactive in the competitive spirit with our 
adversary, China, because we have a lot of vulnerabilities to 
their economic state craft that we need to get up to speed to.
    But when it comes to the threat, we were focused and 
fixated on a terrorist threat, a physical terrorist threat, and 
we need to update our framework and our approaches to look at a 
great power competitor. And it's not just China, it's also the 
Russians and the Iranians that are in this space that are 
harming us day to day.
    Mr. Thanedar. All right. Thank you so much. I'm out of 
time. So, Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. Mr. Cohen, 
you're recognized.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir.
    What is the liability of a shipping company? And maybe Mr. 
Fowler would be appropriate. I'm not sure who would be the 
right person. Right now, when there's a disaster like such has 
happened in Baltimore, are there limits on liability in 
statute?
    Mr. Fowler. Thank you for your question. I appreciate that. 
I'd like to follow up with you after about the specifics, and 
I'll get our staff involved to make sure that we're providing 
you the adequate results on that.
    Mr. Cohen. Well, my staff can do that for me afterwards, 
but for right now, tell me what your liability is.
    Mr. Fowler. So, our liability would be to respond. And so, 
we have contracts in place that would ensure that in the event 
that we would respond accordingly. Take, for example, in this 
particular instance you're referring to in Baltimore, they had 
salvage contracts and responding contracts already in place, so 
that immediately in hours after, those salvage responders were 
immediately responding to that incident. I know that because we 
were in communication with some of our services to offer our 
services and support to do that.
    So, what's going on in Baltimore is a joint effort. And 
beyond, the shipowner plays a part, but absolutely, we would 
have the responsibility to respond and would do that 
proactively.
    Mr. Cohen. How about--I mean, I thought I read there were 
damages and there was a limitation on damages because of some 
old statute. And if this shipping company was negligent, what's 
the liability?
    Mr. Fowler. Thank you again, Congressman. I'll come back 
with some more details, the specifics of that and----
    Mr. Cohen [interrupting]. All right. Well, I'll find out 
from my staff. But what I'm getting at is there could be 
liability on the companies, and there shouldn't be limitations 
that are on some ancient law. The limitations, if there any at 
all, they ought to be current.
    But we shouldn't give a free pass to the maritime industry 
if they are negligent in causing a damage to a bridge or other 
facility that causes an injury to a port, which causes an 
economic injury to the community. So, we'll look into that.
    Is there any particular port, Mr. Wong, in your opinion, 
that's more vulnerable than another right now?
    Mr. Wong. Thank you for your question, Congressman. I think 
as the Coast Guard alluded to this morning, they do risk 
assessments with ports every single day. Our port here in Miami 
is vulnerable as well. We continuously train, we drill for 
response in active mitigation for what we can control.
    But to answer your question more precisely, I do think 
every port has specific critical infrastructure that will 
hinder their operations. Here at PortMiami, we're a 522-acre 
island. We have two points of access through our bridge, which 
is critical, and through our tunnel, which is another critical 
infrastructure. But as far as our waterways, we have one single 
inbound and outbound channel. It is not a two-way channel. So, 
when a parade of vessels is going in, they're going in. When a 
parade of vessels is going out, it's single out.
    We recently, last November, had an issue where we had a 
down recreational vessel strike a barge. She did go down in the 
channel. There was one fatality in the channel. The response 
was we had five cruise vessels cutting water, standing by to 
come in. We had thousands of passengers coming inbound, 
thousands of passengers on hold on the outbound, and three 
container vessels as well. So, when you talk about planning, 
mitigation, Coast Guard, our local sheriffs, our community 
here, as port stakeholders, we drill, we take it very seriously 
to react as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Wong.
    Mr. Wong. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Cohen. Mr. McCarthy, you mentioned safety as being 
paramount to port operations, which, of course, they are. Based 
on what you know so far, could anything have been done 
differently with the Francis Scott Key Bridge? I read a lot 
about some kind of supports they could have put around the 
pylons and that would have diffused the impact. Could that have 
happened and----
    Mr. McCarthy [interrupting]. I'm not privy to the details 
of the Francis Scott Key Bridge. I can talk about what's going 
on in Georgia around the Sidney Lanier Bridge, which is down in 
Brunswick, Georgia. There are actually 2-acre rock walls around 
the abutment of the bridge to protect the stanchions of the 
bridge down in the Sidney Lanier Bridge down in Brunswick.
    Mr. Cohen. Were they constructed when the bridge was 
constructed, or were they added later?
    Mr. McCarthy. I'll have to get back to you on the details 
of that question.
    Mr. Cohen. Do you know how old that bridge is 
approximately?
    Mr. McCarthy. I do not. I'll have to get back to you on 
that as well.
    Mr. Cohen. Because that was an issue about--I think they 
said there had been--they could have gone back in Baltimore and 
reinforced those stanchions, but it hadn't been done. Do you 
know of situations, or anybody on the panel know of situations 
where folks have gone back and refortified the stanchions to 
guard against a potential strike?
    Mr. McCarthy. I do not.
    Mr. Sadler. I think Tampa, the incident in 1980, they 
actually did, but there are other cases, I'm sure, just not in 
the top of my mind right now.
    Mr. Cohen. There was something that happened in New Orleans 
some years ago. I'm not quite sure what it was. A friend of 
mine was in NTSB back in the nineties, and he said after that 
there was a need for a major study, and it was mandated by 
Congress, then it never took place. Can you edify us on that, 
Mr. Sadler?
    Mr. Sadler. I'm not familiar with the specifics of that, 
but I'm not surprised that other issues, other priorities at 
the time intervened to make it not possible, too expensive, not 
urgent.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank each of you for what you do. And thank 
you, Mr. Wong, for being the first person to recognize me 
today. I appreciate that very much. I yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. All right. So, that concludes the 
joint subcommittees' hearing today, and I'd like to thank each 
of the witnesses for coming and testifying and giving some 
insightful information about what's going on in the industry.
    So, the joint subcommittees, between Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure and the Subcommittee on Transportation and 
Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, stand 
adjourned. Thank you for coming.
    [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the subcommittees were 
adjourned.]



                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


  Question to William K. Paape, Associate Administrator for Ports and 
    Waterways, Maritime Administration, from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal

    Question 1. Mr. Paape, at the hearing I asked, ``what is MARAD 
doing to help ports become more resilient to rising oceans and extreme 
weather events?'' of which you requested to take it for the record. 
Please provide that answer.
    Answer. The Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP) 
authorized by Congress in 2009 and first funded in 2019, funds projects 
that address a number of factors, including resilience. As provided in 
46 U.S.C. 54301(a)(6)(B)(iii), the Secretary shall, in making grant 
awards, assesses whether, and how well, a proposed project improves a 
port's resilience as part of its review of PIDP funding requests.
    The Notice of Funding Opportunity for Fiscal Year 2024 PIDP grants 
defines port resilience as the ability to anticipate, prepare for, 
adapt to, withstand, respond to, and recover from operational 
disruptions and sustain critical operations at ports, including 
disruptions caused by natural or climate-related hazards (such as sea 
level change, flooding, and extreme storms) or human-made disruptions 
(such as terrorism and cyberattacks).
    In considering a project's role in improving a port's resilience to 
natural or climate-related hazards, reviewers consider how well the 
project incorporates evidence-based climate resilience and adaptation 
measures or features. Projects will score more highly on this element 
of the criterion if the narrative demonstrates that the project: uses 
best-available climate data sets, information resources, and decision-
support tools (including DOT and other federal resources) to assess the 
climate-related vulnerability and risk of the project; develops and 
deploys solutions that reduce climate change risks; is included in a 
Resilience Improvement Plan or similar plan incorporates nature-based 
solutions/natural infrastructure; advances objectives in the National 
Climate Resilience Framework; follows the Federal Flood Risk Management 
Standard, consistent with current law; and includes plans to monitor 
performance of climate resilience and adaptation measures.
    Many PIDP projects include elements that improve resilience by 
elevating, strengthening, or relocating critical port infrastructure or 
otherwise implementing systems and strategies to make port facilities 
better able to withstand rising sea levels and extreme weather events.

 Question to Frederick Wong, Jr., Deputy Port Director, PortMiami, on 
behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities, from Hon. Salud 
                              O. Carbajal

    Question 1. Mr. Wong, every maritime port is subject to rising sea 
level and extreme weather events. Following up from the hearing, what 
are you doing to prepare for the future, and how expensive is that 
preparation?
    Answer. Recognizing the potential impact of sea level rise, the 
Port understands that climate resilience must be integrated into future 
decision-making for operations, maintenance, and capital investments. 
Therefore, the Port proactively approached future flood resilience by 
developing an initial Sea Level Rise Vulnerability Assessment and 
Adaptation Guidance document. The document identified areas of the Port 
that are projected to be exposed to sea level rise hazards through the 
coming decades, provided an overview of the Port's asset 
vulnerabilities, presented a suite of strategies to adapt the Port over 
time and provided a framework to consider future sea level conditions 
in the Port's capital planning process. By preparing for future sea 
levels, the Port will become more resilient to future flood and storm 
events and remain a solid economic engine locally, regionally, and 
nationally.
    The costs of implementation vary. Grant funding is being pursued, 
with success, for projects that improve Port resilience. Other costs 
are associated with modifying projects to ensure the longevity and 
resilience of new construction in the coming years. The aforementioned 
study did include a range of anticipated construction costs for each 
strategy as well as the cost of inaction over the coming years.
    These efforts reflect PortMiami's commitment to building resilience 
against climate-related challenges, ensuring the Port's continued 
functionality and safety in the face of environmental changes.

    Question to Ed McCarthy, Chief Operating Officer, Georgia Ports 
    Authority, on behalf of the National Association of Waterfront 
                 Employers, from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal

    Question 1. Mr. McCarthy, every maritime port is subject to rising 
sea level and extreme weather events. Following up from the hearing, 
what are you doing to prepare for the future, and how expensive is that 
preparation?
    Answer. The Port of Savannah is located on the Savannah River 18 
nautical miles from the ocean which is a different environment than a 
seacoast port.
    Extreme weather events such as hurricanes are covered in our 
Georgia Ports Authority Hurricane Plan which is reviewed annually with 
the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port of Savannah.
    From an infrastructure standpoint, Georgia Ports (Port of Savannah, 
Port of Brunswick) are well-suited for any sea-level rise that may 
occur over the next century because our terminals in Savannah are built 
with the 7-foot tide differential of the Savannah River taken into 
account, eliminating any long-term flooding impacts.
    Our Port of Brunswick facilities are being raised with a 
combination of FEMA grants and Georgia Ports costs totaling $14.9 
million while any facilities built since 2016 have all been designed to 
be above the 100-year storm surge.
    In the last 8 years, Georgia has weathered six Tropical Force Storm 
winds in the region. Each storm was slightly different regarding storm 
track, wind force and water surge. No storm has impacted Georgia Ports 
in a significant manner and the highest storm surge was from Hurricane 
Matthew which was still below our Savannah berths.

Question to Dave Morgan, President and Chief Executive Officer, Cooper/
 Ports America, on behalf of the National Maritime Safety Association, 
                      from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal

    Question 1. Mr. Morgan, every maritime port is subject to rising 
sea level and extreme weather events. Following up from the hearing, 
what are you doing to prepare for the future, and how expensive is that 
preparation?
    Answer. All Marine Terminal Operators (MTOs) are governed by their 
respective US Coast Guard Captains of The Port (COTP) with regards to 
hurricane/weather preparations (copy of Houston/Galveston attached). 
The pre and post work for a hurricane is funded 100% by the MTO's with 
no external sources of revenue to offset the cost of this work. These 
preparations include directives from the US Coast Guard that warn MTOs 
to prepare for operational interruptions that could extend into 96 
hours both during and after storm passage, and may have a direct effect 
on public safety, energy, and transportation needs \1\.
    Nearly all MTO's employ Union Labor such as the International 
Longshoremen's Association (ILA), and the International Longshore and 
Warehouse Union (ILWU), and our pre and post work is paid at full wage 
and fringe benefit scales according to our Collective Bargaining 
Agreements. In the US Gulf Coast and US East Coast alone there are 
historically 12 or more hurricanes per season which require these pre 
and post preparations, and in polling Port Authorities and MTO's, most 
budget for these preparations, but can spend in excess of $100,000.00 
per hurricane season which is non-recoverable to the Ports and MTO's.
    Further to the point made in your question regarding sea level rise 
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has 
indicated that every 3-20 years we may expect a 100-year storm surge 
which has the potential to cost billions in direct damages resulting 
from only one foot of sea-level rise \2\. CISA further estimates that 
higher seas will cause increases in flooding in nearly all U.S. 
mainland and Pacific Island coastlines by the mid-2030s, and a third of 
coastal sites in the US will experience 100-year storm surges becoming 
10-year or more frequent events by 2050 \2\. It has been estimated that 
some of the world's largest Ports, including here in the U.S., may 
become unusable by 2050 due to rising sea levels \3\.
    The National Maritime Safety Association closely monitors and 
engages the work of industry stakeholders and Subject Matter Experts 
regarding this issue. As an example, the Southeast Florida Regional 
Climate Change Compact has reported that a NOAA assessment shows high-
tide flooding days has been increasing for locations along the U.S. 
East Coast, and offered Miami as an example in that it will likely 
suffer 60 days of high-tide flooding per year by 2050 with this number 
possibly exceeding 150 days per year (Figure A-7, personal 
communication, Sweet et al., 2018) (Sweet et al., 2018) \4\.
    It has been further reported that tropical cyclones have caused 
extensive damages that present crippling costs towards recovery 
including Category 5 Hurricane Katrina causing approximately $2.2B in 
damages to Category 1 Hurricane Sandy causing approximately $147M in 
damages \5\. As an example of costs related to guarding against sea 
level rise port elevation is a one accepted engineering control against 
this risk. However, a recent study approximated that raising port 
infrastructure could cost $71-101B to elevate all existing commercial 
coastal ports in the United States to address sea level rise by 2070 
\5\.
    NMSA and its maritime transportation stakeholders remain diligent 
to protect our vital supply chain in the face of these challenges, but 
any assistance is not only welcomed, it is critical to ensure the 
stability of our Nation's infrastructure. It is well noted that the 
Maritime Transportation System Emergency Relief Act (MTSERA), 
authorized in the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
would greatly assist our industry of ports, terminal operators and 
approximately 40 additional eligible maritime partners by providing 
relief to maritime industry entities from declared national and 
regional disasters and emergencies.
    The MTSERA program, administered by the U.S. Maritime 
Administration (MARAD), has yet to have appropriations provided by 
Congress. NMSA is ready to engage in further discussion how this 
program would directly protect, and affect, billions of dollars at risk 
by lack of protective actions and recovery operations resulting from 
extreme weather changes and sea level rise due to insufficient funding 
in these endeavors.
    It is our understanding that Congress has recognized and authorized 
an authority to allow financial assistance, and we encourage this 
Subcommittee to consider, and agree to support, funding this critical 
program through appropriations. MTSERA Grants would allow MARAD to 
provide financial assistance to stabilize our maritime industry when it 
suffers a national emergency or disaster \6\.
    A resilient and efficient maritime supply chain is fundamental to 
protecting American citizens and our economy. Congress has long 
recognized the critical importance of the maritime supply chain by 
virtue of establishing a permanent Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund to 
maintain and ensure the approaches, channels, and berthings in our 
ports so they remain open, safe, and of sufficient depth to ensure safe 
and reliable vessel traffic which in turn assures the movement of 
trade.
    In addition to the far-reaching benefits of MTSERA we also ask that 
this Subcommittee consider a smaller, but permanent fund, to provide an 
expeditious source of revenue that addresses the immediate needs of 
ports and MTOs damaged after natural disasters. NMSA feels it would 
benefit our industry, and the Nation's economic stability, for Congress 
to take this holistic approach to our supply chain by assigning a 
percentage of excise tax revenue to provide emergency response for 
ports and MTOs.
    We thank you for the opportunity to participate in this critical 
discussion, and look forward to further engagement with this 
Subcommittee.
References:
\1\ chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://
    www.maritime
    delriv2.com/storage/app/media/Agencies/USCG/USCG_Hurricane/2018_
    COTP_DelBay_Port_Hurricane_Contingency_Plan.pdf

\2\ https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-
    resilience/extreme-weather-and-climate-change/sea-level-rise

\3\ https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/top-global-ports-may-
    be-unusable-by-2050-without-more-climate-action-report-2023-09-07/

\4\ chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://
    southeastflorida
    climatecompact.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2019-sea-level-
    projections.pdf

\5\ chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://
    www.edf.org/
    sites/default/files/press-releases/RTI-EDF%20Act%20Now%20or
    %20Pay%20Later%20Climate%20Impact%20Shipping.pdf

\6\ https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/
    chairs-defazio-
    maloney-legislation-to-provide-relief-to-maritime-sector-amid-
    ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-passes-through-house

                                    
                            [all]`