IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0981

Filed July 27, 2016

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

ATELLIA J. KINZENBAW, Deceased.

DOYLE KINZENBAW,

Intervenor-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Paul D. Miller, Judge.

Doyle Kinzenbaw appeals the enforcement of a settlement agreement. 

AFFIRMED. 

Peter C. Riley of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

John C. Wagner of John C. Wagner Law Offices, P.C., Amana, for 

appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

Doyle Kinzenbaw appeals the district court’s order enforcing a settlement 

agreement between the beneficiaries of the Estate of Atellia J. Kinzenbaw (The 

Estate). Doyle claims his attorney did not have authority to accept the settlement 

agreement. We affirm the district court’s ruling. 

We adopt the district court’s findings of fact:

Atellia Kinzenbaw died testate leaving one-sixth shares of 

the family farm to six of her children. Doyle was one of the six 

children receiving a share of the family farm. The Final Report was 

approved and the Estate closed on August 4, 2014. There appears 

to be a history of bad blood/bad relationship between Doyle and his

other five siblings. This included some litigation in the estate file 

and also a [forced entry and detainer] action to remove Doyle from 

the family farm. . . .

During some of the intra-family disputes, Doyle was 

represented by attorney Eric Tindal. At some point there was 

discussion between Doyle and his other five siblings about the five 

siblings purchasing (through an LLC) Doyle’s one-sixth interest in 

the farm. Attorney John Wagner represented the other five siblings 

in this process/negotiation. 

A series of emails between attorneys Wagner and Tindal . . . 

establish the following:

a. August 14, 2014, email from Tindal (Doyle’s attorney) to Wagner 

indicating that Doyle is perfectly willing to have his interest in the 

farm bought out;

b. August 15, 2014, email from Wagner to Tindal indicating that the 

siblings are going to meet to discuss whether interest exists to buy 

Doyle out;

c. November 7, 2014, email from Wagner to Tindal indicating that 

Wagner had attached a proposed Settlement Agreement based on

Doyle’s acceptance of the siblings $233,000 settlement offer;

d. November 7, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner indicating he 

(Tindal) would take a look at it and get back to Wagner;

e. November 9, 2014, email from Wagner to Tindal asking for 

progress update;

f. November 9, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner indicating that 

he (Tindal) had made two minor changes on the Settlement 

Agreement;

g. November 9, 2014, email response from Wagner indicating the 

changes are agreeable;
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h.November 9, 2014, email from Tindal indicating that “Doyle’s 

coming in to sign in the next hour”;

i. November 9, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner that starts “This 

is the damnedest thing John” and continues to state that Doyle 

wants to participate in the LLC as a minor member and subject to 

its direction and decision as a minor member;

j. November 9, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner indicating that 

Tindal would accept service if Wagner elects to attempt enforcing 

the settlement.

In May 2014, the Estate filed an application to enforce the agreement 

claiming the parties had reached a final and complete settlement. It also claimed 

the parties’ attorneys had the authority to enter into a settlement agreement on 

behalf of the parties. Doyle resisted the Estate’s application. 

The district court held a hearing on the Estate’s application in March 2015. 

Concerning the parties, the court made the following observations:

Attorney Tindal testified at the hearing that:

a. Doyle never had the opportunity to read the settlement 

agreement.

b. The content of [Tindal’s] emails. . . were accurate at the time 

Tindal authored those emails.

c. In response to a question from Wagner concerning the content of 

the emails—“And you believe that you were authorized to make 

those offers on behalf of your client, do you not?” Tindal responded 

“I would generally agree that I would not make an offer without 

having authorization.”

d. During this relevant time frame, Tindal and Wagner had 

numerous phone calls, some of which were probably about the 

subject of Doyle’s buyout.

e. Tindal had a phone conversation with Doyle concerning the 

$233,000 buyout offer from the siblings. Doyle had concerns that 

that figure was not fair market value. Tindal explained to him about 

the length of time litigation could go on and some of the potential 

problems (attorney fees, length of litigation, cost of partitioning the 

real estate) including the fact that farmland values were starting to 

drop and could continue to drop if the litigation dragged on.

f. At the end of the phone conversation, Tindal felt that Doyle had 

authorized him to accept the $233,000 offer, and Tindal then 

conveyed this to Wagner.
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g. Under cross-examination, Tindal felt it was his general practice, 

and also the case in this situation, that any final acceptance was 

subject to Doyle’s approval of a definitive document.

Doyle testified at the hearing that:

a. He has extensive hearing loss and is hard of hearing. He does 

not have a computer and does not email and, therefore, never 

received any of the emails between Tindal and Wagner.

b. He gave Tindal authorization to try and negotiate a buyout of his 

interest in the family farm but never gave him authorization to settle 

or accept an offer.

c. He would never agree to the $233,000 buyout price since he felt 

under current farmland values that his portion of the family farm is 

worth at least $750,000 to $1,000,000.

Executor Denise Kaestner credibly testified to the dollar 

amount reductions the siblings took into account in formulating their 

buyout offer to Doyle as follows:

a. $155,000 mortgage against the farm (one-sixth share equals 

approximately $26,000).

b. Possible environmental clean-up problems and expense caused 

by Doyle. (Doyle disputes this allegation). Estimated clean-up cost 

was $40,000.

c. Doyle lived on the farm property for approximately seven years 

without paying rent and also had livestock and horses there. Rent 

at $1000 per month equals $84,000 in unpaid rent.

d. $70,000 spent in legal fees by Atellia when she was sued over a 

motor vehicle accident caused by Doyle.

e. These amounts (including one-sixth share of the mortgage) total 

$220,000.

The court found the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement and 

the parties’ attorneys had authority to enter into the agreement. Doyle filed a 

motion to enlarge the findings claiming enforcement of the settlement agreement 

is prohibited by the statute of frauds provision in Iowa Code section 622.32(2)

(2013). The Estate resisted. The district court denied the motion finding Doyle 

had not preserved error on his statute of frauds claim. Doyle now appeals. 

“[T]he decision of the trial court has the effect of a jury verdict, and our 

review is limited to claims of error. The findings made by the trial court are 

binding [on appeal] if supported by substantial evidence.” Wende v. Orv Rocker 
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Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citations 

omitted). 

Doyle claims the district court’s finding his attorney had authority to accept 

the settlement agreement was not supported by substantial evidence and, thus, 

the court improperly enforced the settlement agreement. 

An attorney has the authority to “[b]ind a client to any agreement, in 

respect to any proceeding within the scope of the attorney’s or counselor’s 

proper duties and powers.” Iowa Code § 602.10114(2). 

An attorney’s offer of settlement is generally within the scope 

of the attorney’s litigation duties. See Strong v. Rothamel, 523 

N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); Starlin v. State, 450 N.W.2d 

257, 258 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). However, an attorney cannot settle 

or compromise a case without authority. Dillon v. City of 

Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Iowa 1985). If a settlement is 

made with authority, that settlement is binding on the client. Id.; 

see Iowa Code § 602.10114(2).

An attorney is presumed to act with authority. Dillon, 366 

N.W.2d at 923. The presumption, however, is not conclusive and 

may be rebutted. Id. The presumption is overcome only by clear 

and satisfactory proof. Lonning v. Lonning, 199 N.W.2d 60, 62 

(Iowa 1972).

Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Iowa 2000).

In finding Doyle’s attorney had the authority to accept the settlement 

agreement, the court noted:

The evidence clearly establishes that: Tindal initiated and 

undertook discussions/negotiations with Wagner concerning the 

siblings buying out Doyle’s interest in the farm and was authorized 

to do so by Doyle. Tindal was retained as an attorney by Doyle to 

engage in such negotiations. Tindal felt that Doyle had authorized 

him to accept the $233,000 offer and that Tindal conveyed this 

acceptance to Wagner. 

As stated in my Conclusions of Law, an attorney is 

presumed to act with authority. Based on the evidence presented 

and my Findings of Fact, buttressed by the presumption of

authority, I FIND that attorney Tindal was authorized to accept the 
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sum of $233,000 from Wagner for the buyout of Doyle’s interest in 

the family farm. Although Doyle now appears to have buyer’s (or in 

this case seller’s) remorse, he is unable to rebut the presumption of 

authority by clear and satisfactory evidence.

We agree with the district court and find Doyle has not proven, by clear 

and satisfactory evidence; he did not consent to the settlement agreement. We 

find substantial evidence supports the court’s finding Doyle’s attorney had 

consent to accept the settlement agreement, and we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.