Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-60651

SPENCER BROWN; ARLENE BROWN; FLORENCE CLARKE; 

STEVEN CLUNIS; LESLIE DAVIS; MIRIAM DAVIS; OLIVER FERGUSON; 

ELAINE FORBES; ANNETTE GRANT; DELROY HINDS; BEVERLY

NELSON; VANICE PATRICK; RANDOLPH OWEN; MILEAN OWEN; 

DAVID ROWE; DOREEN SHAW; WYCLIFE WILLIAMS; TELKA GRANTWILLIAMS; JULLAINE WISDOM; MAXINE WILLIAMS

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

CURTIZE D. JOHNSON; GREYHOUND BUS COMPANY, doing business as

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.

Defendants- Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi 

No. 2:08VB4KS-MTP

Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The plaintiffs appeal the judgment of the district court enforcing releases

they signed in settlement of injuries sustained in a crash while they were

passengers on a chartered Greyhound bus. Based on our conclusion that

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 9, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-60651

 The short release read as follows: 1

GENERAL RELEASE

I/We, in consideration of the payment of __________ Dollars $________, hereby

release and forever discharge any and all claims whatsoever arising from an

accident, occurrence of loss on or about _____________ at or near

________________. 

It is expressly agreed that this release and payment of said sum is not to be

construed as an admission of liability. 

This is a full and final release and satisfaction of all claims. 

Each release was appropriately completed when finalized. 

2

genuine issues of fact exist regarding the enforceability of those releases

obtained shortly after the accident, we reverse and remand.

I. 

On March 14, 2007, a Greyhound charter carrying 30 Jamaican residents

to work as seasonal labor in Branson, Missouri was involved in an accident near

Wiggins, Mississippi. The accident occurred after the driver dropped his map

and bent down to retrieve it. The bus overturned on the highway median. 

Eleven passengers were transported by ambulance to three separate area

hospitals. Nineteen passengers (including all but four of the appellants) were

transported to hospitals by school bus because their injuries did not appear to

be significant, mainly contusions, sprains and strains. 

Greyhound dispatched adjusters from Frontier Adjusters to the scene and

to the various emergency rooms where the passengers had been transported.

The adjusters met the injured passengers at the hospitals and attempted to

reach settlements with them for their injuries. The passengers taken to one

hospital contacted their employer who advised that they should not sign any

release. Sixteen passengers (the “Releasors”) at the other two hospitals signed

releases in favor of Greyhound and received amounts ranging from $500 to

$1,500 each, in addition to payment of their medical expenses.1
No. 08-60651

3

The Releasors claim that the adjusters used a number of fraudulent,

unfair bargaining tactics to mislead them into signing the releases. They assert

that the adjusters directed them to go individually into a separate room at the

hospital. They were told that Greyhound would only pay their medical expenses

if they signed a release. The adjusters refused to allow the accident victims to

take the release from the interview room to discuss it among themselves.

Further no transportation was provided from the hospital until each of the

passengers met with the adjusters. Individual affidavits from the Releasors,

indicate that the adjusters described the payments received as an “incentive,”

and the “release” as a form that would release them from the hospital. Some

understood that the form was to allow the adjusters to pay for the meals they

had at the hospital or as authorization for the adjusters to pay their medical

bills. Some of the plaintiffs were told they could get additional money if their

injuries did not heal as quickly as expected. 

The Releasors also claim that they were at several disadvantages in this

process. They had just been involved in a traumatic bus accident, were far from

home and without resources either to pay the hospital or for transportation to

continue their trip. Some were still in pain and had been given pain medication

and/or muscle relaxants. Greyhound denies all allegations. 

The Releasors repudiated their settlements by letter dated April 3, 2007,

and together with all of the non-releasing passengers filed suit against

Greyhound and the driver. Four spouses added loss of consortium claims.

Greyhound filed a motion for summary judgment and motion to enforce

settlement, which the district court granted based on the unambiguous language

in the releases and the “more-than-nominal” consideration they received. After
No. 08-60651

4

the district court certified the judgment for appeal under Rule 54(b), the

Releasors and their spouses appealed.

II. 

Although Mississippi law generally adheres to the principle that a party

is charged with knowledge of the terms of a contract that he signed, see, e.g. , MS

Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So.2d 167, 177 (Miss. 2006), the state’s courts

have recognized exceptions for releases procured under circumstances

evidencing bad faith, disparity in bargaining power, coercion, duress, or other

inequities. For example, in Willis v. Marlar, 458 So.2d 722 (Miss. 1984), the

plaintiffs were involved in an automobile collision with the defendant. The

defendant’s insurer issued plaintiffs a check payable to them and their motor

credit company. Later the insurer’s agent met with the plaintiffs at a hurried

meeting during their lunch break at work at which time they signed an

“agreement and release.” Mrs. Willis stated that the agent asked her to sign a

document expressing her satisfaction with the used car she and her husband

bought to replace their wrecked vehicle. When she asked about blank spaces in

the document, the agent said he would fill them in. She signed the release

without reading it. Mr. Willis arrived next. He believed that the release form

was a statement that the insurer would pay “up to date” all medical bills and

signed it, also without reading it. He explained that it was a hurried meeting,

that the blanks were not filled in and that the title “Agreement and Release” was

concealed by the clip of a clipboard. The only payment the plaintiffs received,

other than the amount for their damaged car, was $424.00. The plaintiffs

argued that there was an absence of good faith and full understanding of legal

rights, that the nature and effect of the instrument was misrepresented, that

there was a failure of consideration and that Mrs. Willis was induced not to read

the instrument. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the district court’s

order directing verdict for the defendant on the release, finding that there was
No. 08-60651

5

an issue of fact for the jury on the releases. See also Alexander v. Myers, 219

So.2d 160, 160-63 (Miss. 1969)(decision to submit issue to jury was affirmed

where release obtained from person with sixth grade education and his 19-year

old wife was procured by fraud and misrepresentation. Adjuster told plaintiff

that the release was an authorization to thereafter consummate a settlement

and advance funds to appellee. Plaintiff could not read very well, could not read

the release and it was not read to him.); Tate v. Robinson, 78 So.2d 461 (Miss.

1955)(Issue of release’s enforceability should have been submitted to the jury

when injured party received a nominal sum in relation to her injuries, did not

know her rights and relied entirely on the representations of the adjuster who

induced her to sign the release without disclosing its terms.) These cases were

reaffirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Royer Homes of Mississippi, Inc.

v. Chandeleur Homes, Inc., 857 So.2d 748, 757 (Miss. 2003), in which the

Supreme Court stated “What all the cases make clear is that where there are

allegations made as to the validity of a release due to fraud, misrepresentation,

adhesion or other inequities then the case properly goes to the jury or

factfinder,” after citing Tate, Alexander and Willis. 

The issue in this case then is whether the plaintiffs’ affidavits are

sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to “to fraud, misrepresentation,

adhesion or other inequities” in the execution of the releases. We conclude that

they do. The plaintiffs were slightly educated foreigners, although they do speak

and read English. They were without resources to pay the medical bills they

incurred as a result of the bus accident and dependent on Greyhound for

transportation to continue their journey to their jobs Missouri. The releases

were obtained shortly after the accident, when the plaintiffs described

themselves as nervous and shaky. Some were in pain and under the influence

of medication they had been given. The affidavits also reveal that the plaintiffs

were misled about the nature of the document they were asked to sign. Some
No. 08-60651

6

were told that they had to sign a form to receive an “incentive.” Others were told

that the release had to be signed so their medical bills could be paid. 

Based on the affidavits discussed above and Mississippi case law, issues

of fact are present on the enforceability of the releases and the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants must be reversed.

III. 

The district court dismissed the loss of consortium claims brought by

spouses of the Releasors on the basis that “loss of consortium claims are

derivative claims under state law, [accordingly] this Court’s enforcement of the

releases bars the signatories’ spouses claims as well,” citing J&J Timber Co. v.

Broome, 932 So.2d 1, 6 (Miss. 2006). Based on our disposition of the main claims

in this case, we need not consider whether the loss of consortium claims were

properly dismissed. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court

dismissing plaintiffs’ personal injury and loss of consortium claims and remand

this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.