alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Alison PETRY and Douglas Lee Brown, Petitioners-Appellants, v. The COUNTY COURT In and For the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER and Kenneth L. Goodman, Clerk of the County Court in and for the City and County of Denver, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 82CA0674.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

April 14, 1983.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1983.

Podoll and Podoll, P.C., Richard B. Podoll, Robert J. Cunningham, Denver, for petitioners-appellants.

Max P. Zall, Denver City Atty., Lee G. Rallis, Asst. City Atty., Howard E. Willner, Denver, for respondents-appellees.

TURSI, Judge.

Appellants, Alison Petry and Douglas Lee Brown, seek reversal of an order of dismissal granted by the district court in this C.R. C.P. 106 proceeding in favor of appellees, the Denver County Court and the Clerk of that Court (Clerk). We affirm.

Appellants were convicted of criminal charges in County Court. In their notice of appeal to the Superior Court, appellants *1126designated several portions of the record as necessary to a resolution of issues raised. The Clerk sent counsel a timely notice of lodging reporter’s transcript, to which no objection was raised. *See*Crim.P. 37(c).

Appellants brought this action in the nature of mandamus in the district court, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), claiming that the record as designated was not fully transmitted to the superior court by appel-lees. Finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed appellants’ petition.

We agree that the district court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the appeal process between the county and superior courts. *See*§ 13-6-311(6), C.R.S.1973, § 13-7-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973, Crim.P. 37(g) & (i). *See also Hawkins v. Superior Court,*196 Colo. 86, 580 P.2d 811 (1978).

Order affirmed.

PIERCE and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.58


 


EXHIBIT B (GAYLE GRAHAM)


 




	
  Age of Insured at the

  Time of Death

  	
   

  	
  Amount of Death Benefit, or 100%

  of the net-at-risk, whichever amount is less

  	
   

  
	
  65

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  97,190

  	
   

  
	
  66

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  93,150

  	
   

  
	
  67

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  91,476

  	
   

  
	
  68

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  89,393

  	
   

  
	
  69

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  86,803

  	
   

  
	
  70

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  83,541

  	
   

  
	
  71

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  79,638

  	
   

  
	
  72

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  75,016

  	
   

  
	
  73

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  69,592

  	
   

  
	
  74

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  63,271

  	
   

  
	
  75

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  55,890

  	
   

  
	
  76

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  47,460

  	
   

  
	
  77

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  37,755

  	
   

  
	
  78

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  26,730

  	
   

  
	
  79

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  14,198

  	
   

  
	
  80

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  2
III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 9

To make effective reappointment of Senate Legal Counsel.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 6, 1999

Mr. LOTT (for himself and Mr. DASCHLE) submitted the following resolution;

which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

To make effective reappointment of Senate Legal Counsel.

1 Resolved, That the reappointment of Thomas B. Grif2 fith to be Senate Legal Counsel made by the President

3 pro tempore this day is effective as of January 3, 1999,

4 and the term of service of the appointee shall expire at

5 the end of the One Hundred Seventh Congress.

Æ
1 1

. A l l p h o t o / v i d e o f l i g h t s w o u l d h a v e t h e d a t e

, t i m e

, G P S c o o r d i n a t e s a l o n g

w i t h t h e c a m e r a m e t a d a t a r e c o r d e d i n a n i n

- a p p f l i g h t l o g o n t h e m o b i l e

d e v i c e s e r v i n g a s t h e i n

- f l i g h t m o n i t o r

. T h i s f l i g h t l o g r e c o r d s f l i g h t p a t h

,

a l t i t u d e

, f l i g h t t i m e

, n u m b e r o f i m a g e s s h o t

, a m o u n t o f v i d e o s h o t

, d a t e

, t i m e

, a n d t o t a l f l i g h t d i s t a n c e

. E a c h i n d i v i d u a l f l i g h t h a s t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f

p l a y i n g b a c k ( i n

- a p p ) i n r e a l t i m e a n d i s s y n c e d a c r o s s d e v i c e s v i a D J I ’ s

i n

- a p p U s e r C e n t e r

. 1 2

. G i v e n t h e s m a l l s i z e o f t h e U A S a n d t h e r e s t r i c t e d s t e r i l e e n v i r o n m e n t

w i t h i n w h i c h i t w i l l o p e r a t e

, A e r i a l p x l

, L L C ’ s o p e r a t i o n s w i l l

a d h e r e t o t h e R e f o r m A c t ’ s s a f e t y r e q u i r e m e n t s

. 1 3

. T h e D J I I n s p i r e 1 w i l l n e v e r b e f l o w n i n t h e f l i g h t p a t h o f m a n n e d

a i r c r a f t

. w i t h t h e f i r s t c o n d i t i o n l i s t e d

, a l w a y s k e e p i n g a v i s u a l l i n e o f

s i g h t

, b e i n g o f u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e t o p r o v i d i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l o f

p u b l i c s a f e t y

.

I r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t e x e m p t i o n u n d e r S e c t i o n 3 3 3 t o e n a b l e A e r i a l p x l

, L L C

t o o p e r a t e e f f i c i e n t

, l i m i t e d

, l o w

- r i s k c o m m e r c i a l U A S

o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e a c t i v i t i e s s t a t e d r e s p e c t i n g a t a l l t i m e s t h e s p a c e a n d

p r i v a c y o f c i t i z e n s a n d p r o p e r t y w h i l e k e e p i n g a i r s p a c e s a f e

.

R e s p e c t f u l l y

,

A e r i a l p x l

, L L C

5 4 2 5 P e a c h t r e e P k w y S T E 2 5 7

N o r c r o s s G A 3 0 0 9 2

P h o n e : ( 4 0 4 ) 5 1 8

- 9 9 8 9

w w w

. a e r i a l p x

. c o m
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2253 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Permethrin. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Permethrin. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMETHRIN. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.10.80 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended 

6 by striking ‘‘12/31/2009’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

8 subsection (a) applies with respect to goods entered, or 

9 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

10 the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### DiGregorio Unemployment Compensation Case.

*563Argued March 20, 1962.

Before Rhodes, P. J., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.

*Abraham N. Bassman,*for appellant.

*Sydney Reuben,*Assistant Attorney General, with him *Raymond Kleiman,*Deputy Attorney General, and *David Stahl,*Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.

April 12, 1962:

Opinion by

Montgomery, J.,

This is an appeal from the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review which held the appellant to be ineligible for unemployment compensation under section 402(h) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. §802(h), because the appellant was self-employed at the time he filed his application for benefits, the application therefore being invalid within the meaning of section 401(c) as defined in section 4(w) (1) of the Law.

The facts in this case are similar to those in *Roccograndi Unemployment Compensation Case,*197 Pa. Superior Ct. 372, 178 A. 2d 786, and the law applicable *564thereto has been enunciated in *DePriest Unemployment Compensation Case,*196 Pa. Superior Ct. 612, 177 A. 2d 20, where it was held that the corporate entity may be ignored in determining whether the claimants, in fact, were “unemployed” under the act, or were self-employed persons whose business merely proved to be unremunerative during the period for which the claim for benefits was made. In the present case, the mere fact that the landscaping business was operated on a seasonal basis and consequently was unable to continue paying appellant’s wages during the claim weeks in question was not sufficient to remove appellant from the classification of a self-employed person, considering that he was and is president and part owner of the company from which he alleged he was laid off.

Order affirmed.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk March 29, 2011

0321 

# Order

March 29, 2011

142318

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 142318 COA: 293819 Wayne CC: 09-011120-FH MAURICE ANTHONY GRANBERRY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 9, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.

Z AHRA 

### , J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.
Flight Manual and Specifications VikingUAS FF-X4/X8 Multirotor Plat forms

VK-FF-X4 Aircraft SpecificationsVK-FF-X4/X8 Multirotor Assembly

# VK-FF X8 SpecificationsHardware assembly is the same as the VK-FF X4 other then the addition of 4 mot ors +

escs and longer landing gear.Radio Specifications

### Attaching the Mooring System

1. The VikingUAS Mooring tether line needs to be fastened as close to the center of

the aerial vehicles CG in order to keep the line from making contact with the

propellers of the multi-rotor if using a balloon place as close to the center at the

bottom of the balloon or blimp.

2. If you do not have pre-drilled 1/8” hole in your aircraft you will need to drill one

for the 4-40 screw attachment to anchor the aluminum stand-off.

3. Once tether is attached and line is spooled out we recommend you to practice at

low level to get a feel for the tether on your aircraft. Each platform reacts

differently with the line which can easily be dialed in through the gains in yo ur

flight control software you can do this manually through the Skylark Radio follow

the instructions on sub-trim adjustment. The key is that your’re comfortable with

the flight characteristics to safely operate the platform. If at any t ime you do not

feel comfortable disconnect tether and seize flight operations immediate ly.

4. Operation above 149 feet AGL must comply with CFR 14 Part 101.13 (a) (1) (3) (4) and

(b) Part 101

. 17 (a) & (b).

5. Operation will be conducted with a minimum 150 foot Safety Perimeter where

nonparticipating personnel and property will not be allowed in t o the operational area.
SCPW-20-0000085

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

 

JUDGES FOR JUSTICE, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE HENRY T. NAKAMOTO, Judge of the Circuit Court of

the Third Circuit, State of Hawai#i, Respondent Judge,

and

ALBERT IAN SCHWEITZER; STATE OF HAWAI#I, Respondents.

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

(S.P. NO. 07-1-0007)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

AND WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, and Wilson, JJ.,

and Circuit Judge Nakasone, assigned by reason of vacancy)

Upon consideration of petitioner Judges for Justice’s

petition for writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus, respondent

Albert Ian Schweitzer’s answering brief, respondent State of

Hawai#i’s answer, the respondent judge’s answer, the respective

supporting documents, and the record, it appears that petitioner

is currently seeking relief by way of an appeal in the

Intermediate Court of Appeals in CAAP-20-0000374. 

Extraordinary relief is therefore not warranted. See Gannett

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCPW-20-0000085

09-SEP-2020

08:53 AM
Pac. Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 226, 580 P.2d 49, 53

(1978) (a writ of prohibition is not meant to serve as a legal

remedy in lieu of normal appellate procedures); Kema v. Gaddis,

91 Hawai#i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (a writ of mandamus

is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the

petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief

and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged

wrong or obtain the requested action). Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of

prohibition and writ of mandamus is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, September 9, 2020.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Karen T. Nakasone

2
#### Abraham Troy BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. BO-129.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 16, 1987.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Norma J. Munge-nast, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.

NIMMONS, Judge.

The appellant was sentenced as an habitual offender under Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Whitehead v. State,*498 So.2d 863 (Fla.1986). Appellant was sentenced in excess of the sentencing guidelines on multiple third degree felonies. The only justification given for guidelines departure was the Court’s finding that the appellant satisfied the criteria as an habitual offender and that it was necessary for the protection of the public from further criminal activity by the appellant to impose an extended term under Section 775.084.

The sentences must be reversed under the holding of *Whitehead v. State, supra.*If, on remand, the trial court decides to depart from the guidelines, it may not use the appellant’s status as an habitual offender as a reason, but must state other clear and convincing reasons for departure. *See Avery v. State,*505 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

No issue has been raised by the appellant with respect to the validity of the *judgments.*

Judgments affirmed, sentences reversed and remanded for resentencing.

SHIVERS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Joseph ROBINSON v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 87-KH-0114.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 30, 1987.

In re Robinson, Joseph; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, prohibition and mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “I”, No. 285-111; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-5953.

Granted. Remanded to Court of Appeal to act.
Amendment No. 2 to the Prioritized Listings Syndication Agreement



  
 Exhibit 10.56

  
 SECOND AMENDMENT
TO THE PRIORITIZED LISTINGS SYNDICATION AGREEMENT 
 BETWEEN LOOKSMART, LTD. AND INTERCHANGE CORPORATION 
  
 This Second Amendment (the “Second Amendment”) to the Prioritized Listings Syndication Agreement dated as
of October 19, 2001 (as amended to date, the “Agreement”) is entered into as of July 19, 2005 by and between LookSmart, Ltd., a Delaware corporation, (“LookSmart”) and Interchange Corporation (formerly eLiberation
Inc.), a Delaware corporation (“Partner”). 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, the parties agree that during the term of this Second Amendment, the Agreement (as amended) shall be further amended as follows: 
  

	 	1.	Section 3 Cost per Click (CPC) is hereby deleted and replace with the following: 

  
 Subject to the terms and conditions hereof, for any given calendar month, LookSmart will pay Partner a share of revenues for
all valid Clicks generated by Partner, as recorded by LookSmart’s proprietary click tracking system. For each Click, the share of revenue paid to Partner will be equal to the cost-per-click (“CPC”) bid by LookSmart for the
corresponding search term, less a month-end adjustment for credit card fraud, advertising complaints or similar items. LookSmart will determine the CPC bid and include it in the live feed sent in response to such query. CPC bids may change
frequently, and LookSmart will have sole discretion to decide the CPC bid for each search term, provided however that (i) for high and medium value feeds (as determined by LookSmart) the CPC bid by LookSmart will be not less than forty five percent
(45%) of the amount LookSmart bills to the relevant advertiser for that click, and (ii) for any other feed the CPC bid by LookSmart will be not less than 39% of the amount LookSmart bills to the relevant advertiser for that click. Partner may use
the CPC bid included in the live feed for its internal purposes, but the parties agree that all CPC bid amounts submitted by LookSmart are confidential information for internal use only, and shall not be posted on Partner’s web pages or
disclosed to any third parties. LookSmart shall have no obligation to pay for clicks which are delivered in violation of the Agreement. 
  

	 	2.	All other terms of the Agreement not expressly modified herein shall remain in full force and effect. 

  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Second Amendment as of the date set forth above. In the event of any conflict
between the terms hereof and the terms of the Agreement, the terms hereof shall govern. This Second Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which may be an original or fax copy, and all of which together shall form one instrument.

  

									
	LookSmart Ltd.	 	 	 	Interchange Corporation
					
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Bryan Everett
	 	 	 	 By:
	 	 /s/ Douglas S. Norman

	 Name: Bryan Everett
	 	 	 	 Name: Douglas S. Norman
Order entered April 7, 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05 - 19 - 00963 - CR AURORA SONANO REYES, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 382 nd J udicial District Court

Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2 - 17 - 0510

O RDER Before the Court is the St ate ’ s April 3, 2020 second motion for extension of time to file its brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER the brief due on or before April 17 , 20 20

. /s/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 23-20011 

Summary Calendar 

____________ 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Martin Morin Nino, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:20-CR-330-1 

______________________________ 

Before Jones, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Martin Morin 

Nino has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 

229 (5th Cir. 2011). Morin Nino has not filed a response. We have reviewed 

counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

August 28, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

Case: 23-20011 Document: 00516874105 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/28/2023
No. 23-20011 

2 

concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous 

issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to 

withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities 

herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. 

Case: 23-20011 Document: 00516874105 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/28/2023
#### Ernest Lee KYLES v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 57192.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 9, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1987.

William 0. Townsend, Pearl, for appellant.

Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen., by Deirdre D. McCrory, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rankin County; R.L. Goza, Judge.

Before HAWKINS, P.J., and ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-6814
JIMMIE JOHNSON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus EARL BESHEARS, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge. (CA-94-39-JFM) Submitted: January 23, 1996 Decided: February 9, 1996 Before WIDENER, HALL, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jimmie Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Mary Jennifer Landis, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Johnson v. Beshears , No. CA-94-39-JFM (D. Md. Apr. 14, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



I, Paul Kim, Chief Financial Officer of Cogent, Inc. (the Registrant), do hereby certify in accordance with 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:



(1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the Report),
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Registrant.



This certification has not been, and shall
not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.



Dated: May 16, 2005



|                             
|-----------------------------
|/s/    PAUL KIM              
|Paul Kim                     
|Chief Financial Officer      
|(Principal Financial Officer)