Filed 5/26/22 Mejia v. Bank of America Corp. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MARIA J. MEJIA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, 

et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B302602

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC503092)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed.

Maria Mejia, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

McGuireWoods, Tanya L. Greene and E. Christine Hehir

for Defendants and Respondents.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳
2

Plaintiff Maria Mejia (Mejia) sued defendants Bank of 

America, N.A. (Bank of America) and ReconTrust Company, N.A. 

(ReconTrust) (collectively, defendants) for a variety of claims 

arising out of the foreclosure and sale of Mejia’s residential 

property. The trial court granted summary judgment for 

defendants, concluding that Mejia’s earlier chapter 7 bankruptcy 

proceeding transferred the claims from Mejia to her bankruptcy 

estate by operation of law, and thus Mejia lacked standing to 

pursue the claims. On appeal, Mejia contends she had standing 

to sue defendants, the trial court was precluded by our opinion in 

Mejia’s prior appeal from granting summary judgment for 

defendants, and she should have been permitted to amend her 

complaint. We conclude summary judgment was properly 

granted and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

leave to amend the complaint. We therefore will affirm the 

judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background.

Mejia was the owner of residential real property located at 

9951 Wheatland Avenue, Shadow Hills, California (the property). 

In September 2003, Mejia obtained a mortgage loan from HSBC 

Mortgage Corporation (HSBC) and executed a promissory note 

secured by a deed of trust on the property. Mejia obtained an 

additional loan from LaSalle Bank Midwest, N.A. (LaSalle), 

which also was secured by a deed of trust. LaSalle subsequently 

assigned its right in this loan to Bank of America.

Mejia became delinquent on the mortgage loans in 

March 2010, and ReconTrust recorded a notice of default on or 

about June 11, 2010.
3

Mejia began the process of seeking a loan modification from 

Bank of America in August 2010. In December 2010, a Notice of 

Trustee’s Sale was recorded on the property, and on or about 

December 20, 2010, a Substitution of Trustee and Assignment of 

Deed of Trust was recorded, reflecting an assignment of the deed 

of trust from HSBC to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP. Bank of 

America purchased the property at a foreclosure sale in March 

2011, and Mejia vacated the property sometime in April 2011.1

II. Mejia’s bankruptcy action.

Mejia filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in June 2012. 

(11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.) Mejia’s bankruptcy schedules disclosed

the mortgages and foreclosure of the property, but the schedules

do not identify any disputes or contingent/unliquidated claims 

against Bank of America or ReconTrust. Mejia’s Statement of 

Financial Affairs identifies five pending lawsuits, but none are 

claims against Bank of America or ReconTrust relating to the 

foreclosure. 

Mejia was discharged from bankruptcy on February 4, 

2013. Her bankruptcy case was closed on February 22, 2013. 

III. The present action.

Mejia filed the present action in March 2013, and she filed 

the operative third amended complaint (TAC) in April 2017

1 We are puzzled by Mejia’s assertion in her appellant’s reply 

brief that she “disputes that a foreclosure sale took place.” 

Mejia’s operative complaint affirmatively alleges that a 

foreclosure sale took place in March 2011, and many of Mejia’s 

claimed damages are alleged to result from the foreclosure and 

sale.
4

against Bank of America Corporation, Bank of America, 

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, and ReconTrust. The TAC 

alleged as follows:

Beginning in 2009, the City of Los Angeles (City) and the 

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) shut off 

water to the property at the direction of developers Patrick 

Wizmann (Wizmann) and California Home Development, LLC

(CHD), who owned adjacent properties. Thereafter, Mejia was 

involved in litigation against the City, LADWP, Wizmann, and 

CHD. 

In June 2010, Bank of America informed Mejia that she 

was in default on her loan, and on June 15, 2010, ReconTrust 

recorded a “Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of 

Trust.” Mejia contacted Bank of America about the notice of 

default in August 2010, and in September 2010, a Bank of 

America employee told Mejia that her foreclosure had been put 

on hold and no foreclosure sale was pending. In December 2010, 

the same employee told Mejia that no foreclosure sale date had 

been set and a loan modification would be completed in three to 

four months. The same day, however, ReconTrust executed a 

notice of trustee’s sale.

On January 10, 2011, a Bank of America employee told 

Mejia it was too late to apply for a loan modification, and on 

March 17, 2011, Bank of America proceeded with the foreclosure 

sale. Mejia moved out of the property in April 2011. In June 

2012, Mejia saw Wizmann occupying the property and inquired 

whether Bank of America had sold the property to Wizmann, but 

she did not receive a response.

Mejia “relied on Bank of America’s representations and 

promises . . . that there would be a loan modification in three to 
5

four months. . . . In reliance on Bank of America’s promises, 

Mejia gave up the opportunity to obtain other alternatives such 

as selling [the property], seeking a buyer for the property, raising 

or borrowing funds from a third party, or taking other steps to 

secure the [property], among other things.” 

Based on the foregoing allegations, Mejia alleged four 

causes of action:

(1) Negligence (first cause of action): Defendants owed 

Mejia a duty to exercise reasonable care in reviewing and 

processing her loan modification application. Defendants 

breached that duty of care by advising her that her loan would be 

modified and her property would not be foreclosed on, but then 

proceeding to foreclose on the property. In breach of their duty of 

care, defendants either never reviewed Mejia’s request for loan 

modification, foreclosed on the property while reviewing her 

request, or mishandled her request for a loan modification.

(2) Intentional fraud and negligent misrepresentation

(second and third causes of action): Between August 2010 and 

January 2011, Bank of America made false and misleading 

representations to Mejia, including that defendants did not 

intend to foreclose on the property and would provide Mejia a 

loan modification within a few months. At the time these 

representations were made, defendants intended to foreclose on 

the property and did not intend to provide Mejia a loan 

modification. “In fact, Defendants had no intention to provide 

Mejia a loan modification or to refrain from foreclosure at the 

time they promised her otherwise between August 2010 and 

January 2011.” Defendants subsequently foreclosed on the 

property, contrary to their representations in December 2010.
6

(3) Unfair business practices (fourth cause of action): 

The practices described above constitute unlawful, unfair, and 

fraudulent conduct. 

IV. Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment.

Bank of America and ReconTrust moved for summary 

judgment in June 2019.2 Among other things, defendants 

asserted that the commencement of a chapter 7 bankruptcy 

extinguishes a debtor’s legal rights and interests in litigation and 

transfers those rights to the bankruptcy trustee. When a 

bankruptcy case is closed, any property identified on the 

bankruptcy schedules but not distributed by the bankruptcy 

trustee is abandoned to the debtor, but property that is not 

identified on the bankruptcy schedules remains the property of 

the bankruptcy estate. In the present case, Mejia’s bankruptcy 

schedules did not identify her claims against defendants, and 

thus those claims belonged to the bankruptcy estate, not to Mejia. 

Mejia therefore lacked standing to assert her claims.

Mejia opposed defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

She asserted that her causes of action against defendants did not 

accrue until after her bankruptcy action was closed, and 

therefore those claims belonged to her, not to the bankruptcy 

estate. Mejia further contended her causes of action were not 

assignable in bankruptcy, and Bank of America was not a proper 

party to raise the lack-of-standing argument.

2 Bank of America purported to file its motion for summary 

judgment (and to appear in this appeal) “for itself and as 

successor by July 1, 2011 de jure merger to BAC Home Loans 

Servicing, L.P. (erroneously sued as Bank of America 

Corporation).”
7

The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on September 24, 2019. It explained that as a general 

matter, upon the filing of a petition for bankruptcy, the debtor’s 

interests in property become the property of the bankruptcy 

estate. This includes all kinds of property, including causes of 

action. Thus, “ ‘any causes of action which accrue to a debtor who 

has filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Act before the filing of 

the bankruptcy petition becomes the property of the bankruptcy 

estate and may thereafter be prosecuted only by the trustee or a 

duly appointed representative of the estate.’ ” If a debtor fails to 

schedule an asset, including a cause of action, that asset belongs 

to the bankruptcy estate and does not revert to the debtor upon 

the closing of the bankruptcy case.

The court found that in the present case, Mejia’s claims 

against defendants accrued prior to June 2012, and thus they 

were part of her bankruptcy estate. The court noted that under 

California law, a cause of action generally accrues “ ‘on the date 

of injury.’ ” Here, Mejia alleged that defendants’ conduct caused 

her injury when the property was foreclosed on and sold. 

Because the foreclosure occurred prior to the filing of Mejia’s 

bankruptcy petition, her claims relating to the foreclosure were 

part of her bankruptcy estate. Mejia therefore lacked standing to 

assert these claims, and summary judgment was proper.

Judgment was entered on October 28, 2019, and notice of 

entry of judgment was served on November 4, 2019. Mejia timely 

appealed.

DISCUSSION

Mejia contends the trial court erred in granting the motion 

for summary judgment because there were triable issues as to 

when her causes of action against defendants accrued and, 
8

therefore, whether she had standing to pursue her claims. Mejia 

further contends she was not judicially estopped from pursuing 

her claims against defendants, law of the case precluded 

summary judgment, and leave to amend should have been 

granted. For the reasons that follow, Mejia’s contentions lack 

merit.

A. Standard of review.

“ ‘A defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be 

granted if no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the 

defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)’ (Kahn v. East Side Union High 

School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002–1003 (Kahn).) A

defendant meets ‘his or her burden of showing that a cause of 

action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more 

elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that 

there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the 

defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material 

facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.’ (Code

Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see Szarowicz v. Birenbaum (2020) 

58 Cal.App.5th 146, 162 (Szarowicz).)

“ ‘On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review 

the determination of the trial court de novo.’ (Szarowicz, supra, 

58 Cal.App.5th at p. 162; Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1002–

1003.)” (Mubanda v. City of Santa Barbara (2022) 

74 Cal.App.5th 256, 261–261.) We review a trial court’s decision 

to deny leave to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. 

(Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 

242; Levy v. Skywalker Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 753, 770.) 
9

B. Mejia lacks standing to pursue her claims. 

1. Bankruptcy principles.

“The filing of a petition in bankruptcy commences the case 

and creates a bankruptcy estate. (11 U.S.C. § 541(a).) The 

bankruptcy estate includes all of the debtor’s legal and equitable 

interests in property as of the commencement of the case. 

(11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).)” (Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc. (1999) 

72 Cal.App.4th 497, 503–504 (Haley).) Thus, “[w]hen a debtor 

files a chapter 7 petition, two estates are created, a bankruptcy 

estate and a postpetition estate belonging to the debtor.” (Id. at 

p. 504.) The bankruptcy estate contains the debtor’s property 

that existed when the petition was filed, and the postpetition 

estate contains any property deemed exempt from the chapter 7 

estate, postpetition earnings, and property acquired after filing. 

(Ibid.)

“The bankruptcy code . . . places an affirmative duty on 

debtors to schedule their assets and liabilities with the 

bankruptcy court.” (Yack v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 

2008) 389 B.R. 91, 95–96, citing 11 U.S.C. § 521(1); Gottlieb v. 

Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 133 [same].) This includes 

“ ‘contingent and unliquidated claims’ ” as well as “ ‘ “all potential 

causes of action.” ’ ” (Gottlieb, at p. 133, italics omitted.) “[T]he 

integrity of the bankruptcy system depends on full and honest 

disclosure by debtors of all of their assets’ ” (Hamilton v. State 

Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (9th Cir. 2001) 270 F.3d 778, 785, italics 

omitted) and “the importance of full disclosure in bankruptcy 

proceedings ‘cannot be overemphasized’ ” (Ah Quin v. County of 

Kauai Dept. of Transportation (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 267, 273).

The bankruptcy schedule governing personal property 

“requires a debtor to list ‘all personal property of the debtor of 
10

whatever kind,’ including ‘contingent and unliquidated claims of 

every nature [and] . . . counterclaims.’ [Citation.] ‘Property’ of a 

bankruptcy estate includes ‘all legal or equitable interests of the 

debtor in property as of the commencement of the case’ and “[a]ny 

interest in property that the estate acquires after the 

commencement of the case.’ (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (7).) ‘Claim’

means a ‘right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced 

to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 

unsecured. . . .’ (Id., § 101(5)(A).)” (Gottlieb, supra, 

141 Cal.App.4th 110, 133.)

“ ‘[A]ny causes of action which accrue to a debtor who has 

filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Act before the filing of the 

bankruptcy petition become the property of the bankruptcy estate 

and may thereafter be prosecuted only by the trustee or a duly 

appointed representative of the estate. [Citations.]’ (Chrysler 

Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc. (E.D.Pa. 1993) 834 F.Supp. 813, 

839.)” (Haley, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 504; see also M&M 

Foods, Inc. v. Pacific American Fish Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 

554, 561–562 (M&M Foods) [commencement of bankruptcy case 

creates an estate composed of all equitable interests of the debtor, 

including causes of action; thus, bankruptcy trustee is the only 

party with standing to prosecute causes of action belonging to the 

estate].) In contrast, “[w]here events that give rise to a cause of 

action occur following the filing of the chapter 7 petition, that 

cause of action is not property of the bankruptcy estate.” (Haley, 

at p. 504.)3 

3 Defendants contend on appeal that claims may become part 

of the bankruptcy estate even before they accrue under the “fair 
11

As a general rule, “ ‘[a]n outstanding legal claim that is 

abandoned by the trustee reverts back to the original debtorplaintiff. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (directing that “[a]fter notice and 

a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate 

that is burdensome . . . or that is of inconsequential value and 

benefit to the estate”); id. § 554(c) (directing that “any property 

scheduled . . . [but] not otherwise administered at the time of the 

closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor and [considered] 

administered”). “ ‘[U]pon abandonment . . . the trustee is . . . 

divested of control of the property because it is no longer part of 

the estate. . . . Property abandoned under [§] 554 reverts to the 

debtor.’ ” ’ ” (M&M Foods, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 563.) 

However, “ ‘[i]f [the debtor] fail[s] properly to schedule an asset

. . . that asset continues to belong to the bankruptcy estate and 

[does] not revert to [the debtor]. See Stein v. United Artists Corp., 

691 F.2d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that only property 

“administered or listed in the bankruptcy proceedings” reverts to 

the bankrupt); accord Hutchins v. IRS, 67 F.3d 40, 43 (3d Cir.

1995); Vreugdenhill v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. 950 F.2d 

[524], 526 [(8th Cir. 1991)] (holding that property is not 

abandoned by operation of law unless the debtor “formally 

schedule[s] the property before the close of the case”).’ ” (M&M 

Foods, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 563–564, italics added.)

The court applied these principles in M&M Foods, supra, 

196 Cal.App.4th 554, where the plaintiff sued the defendants for 

conversion of approximately $700,000 in accounts receivable and 

contemplation” test, a claim that Mejia disputes. Because we 

conclude that Mejia’s claims accrued before she filed for 

bankruptcy, we need not address this issue. 
12

unspecified breaches of an asset purchase agreement. Prior to 

filing the conversion action, the plaintiff had filed for voluntary 

chapter 7 bankruptcy, from which it had been discharged. The 

bankruptcy petition had identified “ ‘[d]ebtor’s interest in 

collections obtained on outstanding accounts receivable from 

former business activities,’ ” but had not listed any contingent 

claims against the defendants. (Id. at pp. 557–558.) Under these 

circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff 

lacked standing to assert its claims against the defendants 

relating to the accounts receivable and other breaches. The court

noted that the plaintiff and the defendants ceased doing business 

in 2004––well prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition in 

2005—and thus whatever interest the plaintiff had in the 

accounts receivable passed to and became the property of the 

bankruptcy estate. (Id. at p. 562.) Because the plaintiff had not 

identified those accounts receivable on its bankruptcy schedules, 

the right to pursue the accounts receivable remained with the 

bankruptcy trustee. (Id. at p. 564.)

In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiff’s 

assertion that it had scheduled the receivables by identifying its

“ ‘interest in collections from accounts receivable from former 

business activities.’ ” (M&M Foods, Inc., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 563.) The court explained that one purpose of the 

bankruptcy schedules is to provide the trustee and creditors with 

a description of personal assets sufficient to allow a 

determination as to whether and to what extent a given asset has 

potential value and benefit to the estate. In the case before it, 

“[t]he listing as phrased by [the plaintiff] provides no indication 

as to the party responsible for collecting on the accounts or to 

which ‘business activities’ the accounts relate.” (Id. at p. 564.) 
13

The accounts receivable therefore were not adequately scheduled 

and, as such, did not revert to the debtor at the conclusion of the 

bankruptcy proceeding. (Ibid.)

2. Accrual.

A cause of action accrues “at the moment when the party 

alleging injury is entitled to ‘ “ ‘begin and prosecute an action 

thereon.’ ” ’ ” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. 

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 930–931.) “The general rule for defining 

the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time ‘when, 

under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’ or the 

wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises.’ 

[Citation.] In other words, it sets the date as the time when the 

cause of action is complete with all of its elements [citations]—

the elements being generically referred to by sets of terms such 

as ‘wrongdoing’ or ‘wrongful conduct,’ ‘cause’ or ‘causation,’ and 

‘harm’ or ‘injury.’ ” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 

397.)

3. Analysis.

In the present case, Mejia’s first cause of action for 

negligence is alleged to arise out of Bank of America’s processing 

of Mejia’s loan modification application between September 2010 

and March 2011; the second and third causes of action for 

intentional fraud and negligent misrepresentation are alleged to

arise from representations defendants’ employees made to Mejia

between September 2010 and December 2010; and the fourth 

cause of action for unfair business practices is alleged to arise out 

of the conduct “alleged in this Third Amended Complaint.” Each 

cause of action alleges Mejia suffered damages resulting from the 

loss of the property––i.e., from the sale of the property in March 
14

2011, and from being forced to vacate the property in April 2011. 

Thus, each of Mejia’s claims appears to have accrued no later 

than April 2011, by which time the wrongful conduct allegedly

occurred and caused Mejia harm.

Mejia filed for bankruptcy in June 2012. When she did so, 

each of the accrued claims against defendants passed to and 

became the property of the bankruptcy estate as a matter of law. 

(M&M Foods, Inc., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 563.) Because 

Mejia failed to include these claims on her bankruptcy schedules, 

they were not abandoned by the trustee and did not revert to 

Mejia when the bankruptcy case closed in February 2013. 

Instead, the claims remained the property of the bankruptcy 

estate, and as a matter of law Mejia lacks standing to pursue 

them.

Mejia contends that her causes of action did not accrue 

until after she filed for bankruptcy protection because Bank of 

America “concealed the fact that it deeded title to her property to 

[Wizmann/California Home Development] until 3 years after 

[Bank of America] stated it foreclosed.” But the wrongful conduct

alleged in the TAC is not the transfer of the property to 

Wizmann––it is, instead, Bank of America’s alleged failure to use 

due care in processing Mejia’s loan application and its allegedly 

false representations that Mejia’s loan would be modified. Bank 

of America’s alleged concealment of its transfer of Mejia’s 

property to Wizmann, therefore, appears wholly irrelevant to the 

accrual of the causes of action pled in the TAC.

Mejia further contends that her causes of action did not 

accrue until after she filed for bankruptcy protection because 

“[d]eciding to file a lawsuit involves a tremendous amount of 

time, energy, and money, and is not an easy decision to make, 
15

particularly in light of the vast litigation with Wizmann and 

California Home Development LLC.” However, Mejia cites no 

authority––and we are aware of none––for the proposition that a 

cause of action does not accrue until a party decides to file suit. 

Indeed, were that the case, no claim could ever be time-barred. 

That patently is not the law. 

Next, Mejia contends that she has standing to pursue this 

case because she suffered actual harm when she lost title to her 

home. Her contention misconceives the standing problem present 

in this case. There is no doubt that Mejia had standing to sue 

when her claims first accrued in March or April 2011––but as we 

have said, when plaintiff filed her bankruptcy petition, standing 

to pursue those claims was transferred to the bankruptcy estate 

by operation of law. (E.g., M&M Foods, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 562 [“ ‘In the context of bankruptcy proceedings, it is well 

understood that “a trustee, as the representative of the 

bankruptcy estate, is the real party in interest, and is the only 

party with standing to prosecute causes of action belonging to the 

estate once the bankruptcy petition has been filed,” ’ ” italics 

added]; Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. (5th Cir. 2008) 535 F.3d 

380, 385 [same].) And, because Mejia did not properly schedule 

her claims, the right to pursue the claims remained with the 

bankruptcy estate even after the bankruptcy case closed.

Finally, Mejia appears to assert that she was not required 

to schedule her claims against defendants because the 

bankruptcy “Statement of Financial Affairs” required only that 

she “[l]ist all suits and administrative proceedings to which the 

debtor is or was a party within one year immediately preceding 

the filing of this bankruptcy case.” Mejia urges that at the time 

she filed for bankruptcy, she was not (and had not been) a party 
16

to a lawsuit with Bank of America, and thus her potential claim 

against defendants was not relevant to her bankruptcy action. 

Not so. Although Mejia was not required to identify her claims 

against defendants on her Statement of Financial Affairs, she 

was required to identify those claims on her asset disclosure

schedules. (See, e.g., M&M Foods, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 561–562.) Her failure to have done so is fatal to her right to 

pursue these claims.4

C. The law of the case doctrine did not preclude 

the trial court from granting summary 

judgment.

Mejia asserts that because this court previously found that 

the first amended complaint adequately alleged the existence of a 

duty, the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded the trial court from 

granting summary judgment on the allegations of the TAC that 

“are consistent with the [first amended complaint].” The claim is 

without merit. A demurrer and motion for summary judgment 

are entirely different motions subject to different legal standards, 

and thus the conclusion in our prior opinion that plaintiff had 

adequately pled a duty could have no bearing on the trial court’s 

subsequent consideration of the presence or absence of triable 

issues of material facts. In any event, the trial court’s order 

granting summary judgment was based solely on its conclusion 

that Mejia lacked standing to bring her claims––an issue not 

addressed in the prior appeal. Our prior opinion, therefore, was 

irrelevant to the issues before the court on summary judgment. 

4 Because we have concluded that plaintiff lacked standing to 

pursue her claims, we do not address the parties’ contentions 

regarding judicial estoppel and unclean hands. 
17

(See, e.g., People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1161 [law of 

the case applies only to conclusions by Court of Appeal that are 

necessary to the decision]; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & 

Constr. Trades Council (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 36 [law of the case 

applies only when the precise question before the court has been 

actually decided in the same case in a former appeal].)

D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying leave to amend the complaint.

Mejia contends, finally, that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying her request to amend the complaint. 

Again, the claims lack merit.

“A trial court has wide discretion to allow the amendment 

of pleadings, and generally courts will liberally allow 

amendments at any stage of the proceeding. (Atkinson v. Elk 

Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.) On a motion for 

summary judgment ‘ “[w]here the complaint is challenged and 

the facts indicate that a plaintiff has a good cause of action which 

is imperfectly pleaded, the trial court should give the plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend.” ’ (Soderberg v. McKinney (1996) 

44 Cal.App.4th 1760, 1773.) But if the proposed amendment fails 

to state a cause of action, it is proper to deny leave to amend. 

(Oakland Raiders v. National Football League [(2005)]

131 Cal.App.4th [621,] 652.) [¶] Further, unwarranted delay in 

seeking leave to amend may be considered by the trial court 

when ruling on a motion for leave to amend (Huff v. Wilkins

(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 746), and appellate courts are less 

likely to find an abuse of discretion where, for example, the 

proposed amendment is ‘ “offered after long unexplained delay 

. . . or where there is a lack of diligence” ’ (Hulsey v. Koehler

(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1159). Thus, when a plaintiff seeks 
18

leave to amend his or her complaint only after the defendant has 

mounted a summary judgment motion directed at the allegations 

of the unamended complaint, even though the plaintiff has been 

aware of the facts upon which the amendment is based, ‘[i]t 

would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [the] 

summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a 

“moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.’ (Melican v. 

Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 

176.)” (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 

224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.)

In the present case, Mejia suggests that she should have 

been permitted to amend her complaint because “there is a 

genuine issue of material fact whether [Bank of America] 

intended to defraud [Mejia] of title to her home by acting in 

concert with Wizmann and California Home Development LLC.” 

Even were we to agree that Mejia’s evidence gave rise to a 

disputed issue––a conclusion we do not reach––Mejia has not 

demonstrated either how this issue is relevant to any of the 

causes of action already pled or how she could amend her 

complaint to state a valid claim for relief that would survive 

summary judgment. 

Further, Mejia’s request to amend her complaint is 

manifestly untimely. Mejia appears to concede that she knew or 

could have known the property had been transferred to Wizmann 

as early as October 2014, when the deed memorializing the 

transfer was recorded. She nonetheless did not seek to amend 

her complaint to allege transfer of title to Wizmann until 2019––

and only then in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying Mejia leave to amend.
19

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their 

appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

KIM, J.*

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California

Constitution.