If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 30, 2023

v No. 360675

Livingston Circuit Court

EVAN ANDREW OSLUND, LC No. 22-027137-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

HOOD, P.J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. This case exposes a potential loophole in the automatic waiver 

statute, MCL 764.1f. By affirming, we allow the prosecution to elevate an otherwise juvenile 

charge to an automatic waiver charge by alleging use of a dangerous weapon, when the weapon at 

issue is an article of clothing. By affirming, we also absolve the district court of its responsibility 

to make findings and conclusions that there was sufficient evidence that the juvenile defendant 

used the items—in this case, a flip flop and a tennis shoe—as weapons, as opposed to an article of 

clothing worn during a serious but unarmed assault. Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority 

holding would allow the prosecution to charge as an adult any juvenile that is involved in a fight—

so long as the fight is bad and someone involved was wearing clothes or shoes. It would also strip 

the family division of its jurisdiction over traditional waiver proceedings and deprive juveniles of 

the protections associated with those proceedings in a way not contemplated by the statute.

Instead, I would reverse the circuit court’s decision on the motion to quash and remand for 

the trial court to transfer defendant EO’s case to the family division for further proceedings as a 

traditional waiver case. Here, the district court did not make findings or legal conclusions about 

whether and how the flip flop and tennis shoe functioned as a dangerous weapon as it relates to 

EO. See People v Buford, 69 Mich App 27, 32; 244 NW2d 351 (1976) (analyzing whether a boot 
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was used as a weapon, not just whether it was used dangerously).1 To the extent that the trial court 

found sufficient evidence that the flip flop and tennis shoes were weapons, which is to say 

instruments of armed combat, it failed to make findings that EO was the juvenile who was armed

during the assault as required by MCL 764.1f(2)(b). Either of these errors provide a basis for 

reversal.

I. BACKGROUND

The assaults at issue in this case are two kicks during a 12-second attack.

2

 Though the trial 

court referred to it as a shoe, there were two dangerous weapons at issue in this case: a tennis shoe 

and a flip flop or athletic slide. 

The majority opinion accurately describes the evidence presented at the preliminary 

examination regarding the precursor to the attack. Codefendant TI lured the complainant, QD, to 

a skate park and assaulted him.

The alleged assault was recorded, and the prosecution published the video at the 

preliminary examination. While at or leaving the skate park, codefendants TI and CB began 

punching the complainant. As documented on the video, TI and CB punched the complainant for 

two or three seconds before they all fell. They continued to punch the complainant when he was 

on the ground. At approximately five seconds into the 12-second video, one of the codefendants 

kicked the complainant while wearing a black tennis shoe. Three seconds later, the other 

codefendant kicked the complainant while wearing a white flip flop. The flip flop flew off after 

the kick. Eleven seconds into the video, we can see one codefendant carrying both of his flip flops 

while walking away from the complainant who was still on the ground. Both of the kicks appeared 

to be blows to the complainant’s back or torso. 

The prosecution alleges that EO, who was not otherwise involved with the attack, agreed 

to film the attack. The prosecution presented evidence that he confessed to his involvement to his 

assistant principal.

The prosecution charged EO, CB, and TI, by filing a criminal complaint instead of a 

juvenile petition. Critically, EO was not charged with conspiracy to commit assault with intent to 

do great bodily harm. At the preliminary examination, the prosecution acknowledged that it did 

not have evidence of a conspiracy. Instead, the prosecution charged EO with aiding and abetting 

assault with intent to do great bodily harm. The prosecution’s theory is that EO encouraged CB 

 

1 Although Buford is not strictly binding pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1) because it was issued before 

November 1, 1990, as a published opinion, it nevertheless “has precedential effect under the rule 

of stare decisis” pursuant to MCR 7.215(C)(2). This rule applies to other pre-November 1, 1990 

cases of this Court referenced in this opinion.

2 The alleged assault was recorded, and the prosecution published the video at the preliminary 

exam. The majority described the assault as involving repeated kicking. There are only two kicks

that are clearly visible five seconds and eight seconds into the video. The first kick involved a 

tennis shoe, and the second kick involved a flip flop or athletic slide. 
-3-

and TI by agreeing to film the assault. There was no evidence or allegation that EO was ever 

armed.

Following the preliminary examination, the district court granted the motion to bind over. 

After considering arguments regarding automatic waiver under MCL 764.1f(2)(b), the district 

court announced its decision:

I think the video speaks for itself. I think the Court is bound by the case law on 

this. And I think that, again, I think there’s a catch-all provision. I think the 

legislature didn’t specifically exclude shoes or anything like that. They’re pretty 

clear on everything else, but again, they had that sub three in there—an object that 

is likely to cause death or bodily injury when used, when used as a weapon. And I 

do guess you can make the argument, based on whoever was doing the kicking, the 

guy I guess was, you know, he had the white shoes that, you know, maybe came 

off. I don’t know if he kicked them off or, you know, wanted them off or you argue 

one kick might have been to the head, but the rest were to the body that was after 

the shoes came off. I don’t know if that was luck. I don’t know where he was 

aiming. You know, those are all questions of fact for somebody else to decide. But 

when things started, he got kicked when the shoe was on. And I think that the 

catch-all catches it.

So based upon the case law that we’ve cited in this motion and the previous 

motion hearing, uh, and I think I’m bound by, you know, People versus Hale[3]and 

the subsequent decisions after that. The Goolsby[4]case, as counsel has indicated. 

So it falls under the catch-all and object is likely to cause death or bodily injury 

when used as a weapon.

The district court bound over EO on the prosecution’s aiding-and-abetting theory. 

The majority opinion otherwise accurately describes the factual background. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The majority opinion states the correct standard of review. In short, we stand in the same 

shoes as the circuit court when reviewing the motion to quash. People v Anderson, 501 Mich 175, 

189; 912 NW2d 503 (2018). 

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

The trial court should have granted the motion to quash for two reasons. First, a flip flop 

or tennis shoe does not satisfy the statutory definition for dangerous weapon under the automatic 

waiver statute. See MCL 764.1f(2)(b). See also Buford, 69 Mich App at 31-32 (analyzing whether 

 

3 People v Hale, 96 Mich App 343, 345; 292 NW2d 204 (1980), vacated on other grounds 409 

Mich 937 (1980).

4 People v Goolsby, 284 Mich 375; 279 NW 867 (1938).
-4-

a boot was used as a weapon, not just whether it was used dangerously). Second, even if the Court 

were somehow to conclude that the flip flop and tennis shoe in this case were dangerous weapons, 

the prosecution did not present evidence that EO was a juvenile who was armed—even with a flip 

flop—during the assault as required by MCL 764.1f(2)(b). 

A. AUTOMATIC WAIVER STATUTE AND MCL 764.1f(2)(b)

At the outset, this case requires an understanding of the automatic waiver statute, MCL 

764.1f, a law that requires the courts to treat, try, and sentence juveniles over the age of 14 as

adults when they are accused of certain serious—and usually capital—offenses like murder, firstdegree criminal sexual conduct, and first-degree arson. See MCL 764.1f(2)(a).

As the majority correctly observes, with limited exception, the family division of the circuit 

court has exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles that are accused of a crime. People v Conat, 238 

Mich App 134, 139; 605 NW2d 49 (1999), citing MCL 712A.1(1)(c) and MCL 712A.2(a)(1). This 

includesjurisdiction over juveniles who are accused of the serious crimes included in the automatic 

waiver statute when the prosecutor chooses to charge them as juveniles. See MCL 712A.2(a)(1) 

(“The court has jurisdiction over a juvenile 14 years of age or older who is charged with a specified 

juvenile violation only if the prosecuting attorney files a petition in the court instead of authorizing 

a complaint and warrant.”).

In the family court, when a juvenile is accused of a crime, the juvenile is entitled to certain 

special procedures. See, e.g., MCL 712A.2 (granting jurisdiction to the family division); MCL 

712A.2b (providing procedural safeguards); MCL 712A.2d (providing procedure for prosecution 

to petition to try a juvenile as an adult within the family division); MCL 712A.4 (providing 

requirements for traditional waiver). See also MCR 3.950(D) (providing procedures for traditional 

waiver). One such procedure is known as “waiver.” See MCL 712A.4. When a juvenile 14 years 

of age or older is accused of an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the family 

division of the circuit court may waive jurisdiction upon the prosecution’s motion. See MCL 

712A.4(1). See also MCR 3.950(C) (providing the procedure and requirements for traditional 

waiver based on a prosecutor’s motion). Among other requirements, before the family division 

waives jurisdiction, the court must “conduct a hearing to determine if the best interests of the 

juvenile and public would be served by granting a waiver of jurisdiction to the court of general 

criminal jurisdiction.” MCL 712A.4(4) (providing a nonexhaustive list of factors for the court to 

consider when deciding whether to waive jurisdiction). 

These procedures do not apply to a handful of “specified juvenile violations.” See MCL 

764.1f (authorizing the prosecution to file a complaint and warrant for juveniles 14 years of age or 

older but less than 18 years of age who have committed a specified juvenile violation); MCL 

600.606 (providing the circuit court has jurisdiction over “specified juvenile violations”). Instead, 

these violations are automatically waived into the criminal division of the circuit court when the 

prosecution files a complaint and warrant against a juvenile instead of a petition. See MCL 764.1f; 

see also Conat, 238 Mich App at 140. “The effect of these automatic waiver provisions is that the 

prosecutor has discretion whether to charge a juvenile at least fourteen years of age who commits 

specified serious felonies as an adult or as a juvenile.” Conat, 238 Mich App at 141-142. MCL 

764.1f(1) provides:
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If the prosecuting attorney has reason to believe that a juvenile 14 years of 

age or older but less than 18 years of age has committed a specified juvenile 

violation, the prosecuting attorney may authorize the filing of a complaint and 

warrant on the charge with a magistrate concerning the juvenile.

For the most part, the term “specified juvenile violation” includes only the most serious felonies:

for example, first-degree arson, MCL 750.72; assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; 

assault with intent to maim, MCL 750.86; assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; 

attempted murder (by poisoning, drowning, or strangling), MCL 750.91; first-degree murder, 

MCL 750.316; second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; kidnapping, MCL 750.349; first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; armed robbery, MCL 750.529; carjacking, MCL 

750.529a; and robbery of a bank, safe, or vault, MCL 750.531. See MCL 712A.2(a)(1)(A) through 

(I); MCL 600.606(2)(a) through (i). 

It also includes first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a, and assault with intent to do 

great bodily harm, MCL 750.84, but only “if the juvenile is armed with a dangerous weapon.” 

MCL 764.1f(2)(b). The statute describes dangerous weapon as one or more of the following:

(i) A loaded or unloaded firearm, whether operable or inoperable.

(ii) A knife, stabbing instrument, brass knuckles, blackjack, club, or other 

object specifically designed or customarily carried or possessed for use as a 

weapon.

(iii) An object that is likely to cause death or bodily injury when used as a 

weapon and that is used as a weapon or carried or possessed for use as a weapon.

(iv) An object or device that is used or fashioned in a manner to lead a person 

to believe the object or device is an object or device described in subparagraphs (i) 

to (iii). [MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(i) through (iv).]

Here, the prosecution charged EO with assault with intent to do great bodily harm, MCL 

750.84. The prosecution alleges that one codefendant’s flip flop, and the other codefendant’s 

tennis shoe satisfy the definition of “dangerous weapon” under MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(iii) (“An object 

that is likely to cause death or bodily injury when used as a weapon and that is used as a weapon 

or carried or possessed for use as a weapon.”). 

The automatic waiver statute includes conspiracy to commit a “specified juvenile 

violation.” See MCL 764.1f(2)(f). The statute is silent on aiding-and-abetting theories, 

particularly as it relates to the explicit possession requirements of MCL 764.1f(2)(b). 

B. A FLIP FLOP IS NOT A DANGEROUS WEAPON FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE

AUTOMATIC WAIVER STATUTE

The trial court should have granted EO’s motion to quash because a flip flop is not a 

dangerous weapon under MCL 764.1f(2)(b). 
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As the majority correctly observes, our primary goal in construing a statute is “to determine 

and give effect to the intent of the Legislature, turning first to the statutory language to ascertain 

that intent.” People v Campbell, 329 Mich App 185, 193-194; 942 NW2d 51 (2019). To that end, 

before applying judicial canons of statutory construction or looking to statutory analogues, first, 

“we interpret defined terms in accordance with their statutory definitions and undefined terms in 

accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings.” Id.

Instead of beginning with the statutory definition of “dangerous weapon” or plain meaning 

of the words contained within that section, the majority appears to begin with discussion of caselaw 

interpreting “dangerous weapon” under the felonious assault statute, MCL 750.82. 

This is incorrect, because unlike MCL 750.82, MCL 764.1f(2)(b) explicitly defines 

“dangerous weapon” for the purpose of the statute. Compare MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(i) through (iv) 

with MCL 750.82(1) (“Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who assaults another person 

with a gun, revolver, pistol, knife, iron bar, club, brass knuckles, or other dangerous weapon ...”). 

As stated above, it explicitly defines the term as including “[a] loaded or unloaded firearm,” “[a] 

knife, stabbing instrument, brass knuckles, blackjack, club,” “[a]n object or device that is used or 

fashioned in a manner to lead a person to believe the object or device is an object described in 

[MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(i) through (iii)].” MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv). This definition subsection 

does not include tennis shoes, flip flops, athletic slides, or socks. See id. But it includes a 

subsection defining dangerous weapon as “[a]n object that is likely to cause death or bodily injury 

when used as a weapon and that is used as a weapon or carried or possessed for use as a weapon.” 

MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(iii). This is the subsection that the prosecution has applied to EO’s case.

Although the statute defines “dangerous weapon,” it does not define “weapon” or “use as 

a weapon” in subsection (2)(b)(iii), so we look to the ordinary definition. See People v Thomas, 

263 Mich App 70, 73; 687 NW2d 598 (2004) (“When terms are not expressly defined by statute, 

a court may consult dictionary definitions.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, a 

“weapon” is defined as an instrument of armed combat. See American Heritage Dictionary: 

Second College Edition (defining “weapon” as “an instrument used in offensive or defensive 

combat”); Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997) (defining “weapon” in part as “any 

instrument or device used for attack or defense in a fight or in combat”); West Publishing Co,

Words and Phrases Volume 44A – Vote-Weapon (St. Paul: West Publishing Co, 1962), pp 764-

766 (compiling cases in different contexts (i.e., firearms, knives, axes, razors, etc.) and stating 

“Webster defines a ‘weapon’ as ‘an instrument of offensive or defensive combat; anything used or 

designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy, as a gun or sword.”). In sum, 

a weapon is something that changes unarmed combat to armed combat, or an unarmed assault to 

armed assault. It must be something that elevates the harm beyond what can be accomplished 

through unarmed combat. Cf. Buford, 69 Mich App at 31-32. Our Court has applied this 

distinction in the very cases on which the district court purported to rely. See id. (distinguishing 

People v Goolsby, 284 Mich 375; 279 NW 867 (1938), and holding that a court must determine 

whether an article of clothing was merely apparel or used as an instrument of combat). 

Here, the statutory definition of “dangerous weapon” and ordinary definition of “weapon” 

would require the district court to determine whether the flip flop or tennis shoe was in fact an 

instrument of armed combat. It was not. Unlike a boot or stiletto, they did nothing to amplify the 

harm that could be accomplished through armed combat. This was evidenced by the fact that 
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admittedly serious physical injury was largely accomplished through punches, as CB and TI 

appeared to kick the complainant once each. The analysis could—and should—stop here. 

But if we were to look beyond the plain language of the statute and ordinary dictionary 

definitions of these words in the statute and apply canons of statutory construction usually reserved 

for ambiguous statutes, the canon of ejusdem generis (of the same kind, class, or nature) provides 

more illumination than in pari materia. See Zug Island Fuels Co, LLC v Dep’t of Treasury, ___ 

Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 356419); slip op at 4 (noting that we 

reserve canons of statutory construction for ambiguous statutes). See also SBC Health Midwest, 

Inc v Kentwood, 500 Mich 65, 73 n 26; 894 NW2d 535 (2017) (Stating that the application of in 

pari materia is not necessarily conditioned on a finding of ambiguity, but can also be used to 

resolve conflicts between two statutes). Again, the statute is unambiguous, so applying a canon 

should be unnecessary. Nonetheless, before applying in pari materia and looking to other parts of 

the penal code, the canon of ejusdim generis directs us to look within this section of the statute at 

the other words in MCL 764.1f(2)(b) defining “dangerous weapon.” This includes “[a] loaded or 

unloaded firearm,” “[a] knife, stabbing instrument, brass knuckles, blackjack, club, or other object 

specifically designed or customarily carried or possessed for use as a weapon.” MCL 

764.1f(2)(b)(i) and (ii). The statute does not explicitly include “flip flops,” “athletic slides,” or 

“tennis shoes.” See id. A commonsense reading of the phrase “[a]n object that is likely to cause 

death or bodily injury when used as a weapon and that is used as a weapon or carried or possessed 

for use as a weapon,” in light of the preceding phrases which include guns, knives, brass knuckles, 

and blackjacks, should lead us to conclude that MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(iii) requires something more or 

different than a flip flop, tennis shoe, or other article of clothing. While it would certainly include 

a sock filled with pennies, it does not include a sock filled with a foot. Applying this canon of 

construction, our analysis could remain within the operative statute. 

Instead, the majority opinion, like the district court, relied on People v Buford, 69 Mich 

App 27, 32; 244 NW2d 351 (1976), and People v Hale, 96 Mich App 343, 345; 292 NW2d 204 

(1980), vacated on other grounds 409 Mich 937 (1980), cases interpreting MCL 750.82 and 

respectively holding that a boot can be a dangerous weapon and that a shoe can be a dangerous 

weapon when used to kick in the groin repeatedly. See Buford, 69 Mich App at 31-32 (boots can 

be a dangerous weapon); Hale, 96 Mich App at 345 (relying on Buford and Goolsby to hold that 

shoes may be a dangerous weapon when used in a dangerous manner, such as repeated kicks to 

the groin). And like the district court, the majority opinion broadens the holdings from both Buford 

and Hale.

Buford should not apply to this case because Buford’s holding was limited to “boots,” not 

all footwear. See Buford, 69 Mich App at 31-32 (relating to boots). Likewise, the cases on which 

Buford relied exclusively involved “boots.” See id., citing Berfield v State, 458 P2d 1008, 1009 

(Alas, 1969) (“heavy black boots” used to kick the victim in the ribs and head were dangerous 

weapons “because they were used as something to fight with-as instruments of offensive combat”); 

People v Rumaner, 45 AD2d 290, 292; 357 NYS2d 735 (NY App 1974) (“heavy leather boots” 

used to kick the victim in the face 10 or 12 times were “dangerous instruments” under New York’s 

penal law because the “boots were used to inflict serious physical injury upon the complainant and 

therefore could be found to be a dangerous instrument”); Orrill v State, 509 P2d 930, 931-932 

(Okla Crim App, 1973) (acknowledging that shoes can be a deadly weapon under the facts of the 

case because the victim was 73 years old when kicked in the head, noting “[a]dditionally, since 
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cowboy boots were used rather than shoes, the probability of them being a dangerous weapon is 

enhanced.”). They did not involve flip flops or tennis shoes. See Buford, 69 Mich App at 31-32 

(collecting cases). See also Stroman v United States, 878 A2d 1241 (DC, 2005) (holding that a 

flip flop sandal, which the defendant used to strike the victim on the forehead and cause a cut that 

required 15 stictches, was not a dangerous weapon, as was required for a conviction for attempted 

possession of a prohibited weapon).5 

In People v Hale, on which the district court and the majority also rely, this Court expanded 

the holding from Buford to apply to shoes. See Hale, 96 Mich App at 345. With limited 

explanation or analysis, this Court announced that “a shoe as well as a boot may be considered a 

dangerous weapon under the statute since it is an object that may be used in a dangerous manner.” 

Id. This Court failed to engage in any of Buford’s analysis, assessing whether the defendant used 

an item of apparel as an instrument of armed combat, not just whether it was dangerous. Compare 

Hale, 96 Mich App at 345, with Buford, 69 Mich App at 31-32 (stating that ordinary items that 

may be used as dangerous weapons, such as an automobile, see Goolsby, 275 Mich at 278-279, 

broomstick, People v Knapp, 34 Mich App 325, 333-334; 191 NW2d 155 (1971), flashlights, 

People v Ragland, 14 Mich App 425, 426-427, 165 NW2d 639 (1968), and lighter fluid, People v 

Morgan, 50 Mich App 288, 292-293; 213 NW2d 276 (1973), “bear a totally different relationship 

to a person than does a boot. A boot is an item of wearing apparel and, as such, is more of an 

extension of, or part of, a person’s body than for example, a broomstick.”). In short, Hale took the 

basic conclusions from Buford and jettisoned the analysis and reasoning.

The through line from Buford, which distinguished itself from Goolsby, is that apparel, like

boots, can be a dangerous weapon, but only when it is used or carried as a weapon, not just when 

it is used dangerously. See Buford, 69 Mich App at 31-32. That is to say footwear can be weaponry 

when it is used as an instrument of armed combat. See id. Essentially, the nature of the boot 

combined with its use elevated the conduct from unarmed combat to armed combat. See id. The 

same could be said for other types of footwear, like cleats, ice skates, hiking treads, crampons, and 

stiletto heels in certain circumstances. It is difficult to say that a rubber soled tennis shoe, let alone

a flip flop, is an instrument of offensive combat even when it is covering a foot that is kicking.

But extending the holding of Buford and Hale opens the door to overreach, particularly as 

it relates to juveniles. If a defendant stomps or kicks a victim while wearing pantyhose or 

stockings, are we prepared to say that person has assaulted with a dangerous weapon? What if 

they are wearing a house shoe? By extension, if a defendant elbows a victim while the defendant 

is wearing a windbreaker, is the windbreaker now a dangerous weapon? If someone wearing latex 

gloves punches a person in the throat, is the latex glove a dangerous weapon simply because it was 

covering a hand that did grievous harm? The answer to these questions is obviously no. Although 

the district court addressed dangerousness, it did not engage with the question of whether the flip 

flop and tennis shoe were weapons.

 

5

“Caselaw from sister states and federal courts is not binding precedent but may be relied on for 

its persuasive value.” People v DeRousse, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket 

No. 358358); slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Here, the jury is not responsible for answering these questions. Instead, the question of 

whether the prosecution’s theory of the tennis shoe and flip flop were used as weapons—separate 

from the issue of their dangerousness—was for the district court to vet when determining probable 

cause and personal jurisdiction for automatic waiver. If the prosecution can use a flip flop as a 

jurisdictional hook for automatic waiver, then anytime a juvenile defendant fights another minor 

while wearing clothes there is a risk they are sacrificing the procedural safeguards that the 

Legislature explicitly provided for juvenile defendants. See MCL 764.27. This is unacceptable. 

The district court should have found that it lacked personal jurisdiction. The circuit court should 

have granted the motion to quash. And we should remand to the family division for further 

proceedings because the apparel in this case was not used as a weapon.

C. DEFENDANT WAS NOT ARMED WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON AS REQUIRED 

FOR AUTOMATIC WAIVER UNDER MCL 764.1f(2)(b)

Even if we were to accept that a tennis shoe or flip flop is a weapon instead of merely an 

article of clothing worn during unarmed combat, the circuit court still should have granted the 

motion to quash because there was no evidence that EO was “armed with a dangerous weapon” 

during the assault as required under MCL 764.1f(2)(b).

Unlike the other “specified juvenile violations” such as first-degree murder, first-degree 

arson, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, that subject a juvenile to automatic waiver purely 

based on the elements of the charge, assault with a dangerous weapon is only a specified juvenile 

violation “if the juvenile is armed with a dangerous weapon” when he commits the crime. See 

MCL 764.1f(2)(b). Here, even if we accept the prosecution’s argument that a tennis shoe or flip 

flop is a dangerous weapon, EO was not armed with the tennis shoe or flip flop during this assault. 

He was filming it on a camera or cell phone. And while the automatic waiver statute includes 

conspiracy to commit a “specified juvenile violation,” see MCL 764.1f(2)(d), EO was not charged 

with conspiracy. He was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm under an aidingand-abetting theory. Based on the evidence and the charging document, the district court should 

never have found probable cause that EO was “armed with a dangerous weapon.” A plain reading 

of the statute leads me to conclude that automatic waiver only applies to juveniles charged with 

assault with intent to do great bodily harm “if the juvenile is armed with a dangerous weapon.” 

MCL 764.1f(2)(b). The prosecution has never alleged that EO was armed with a dangerous 

weapon. This is a sufficient basis to grant the motion to quash or alternatively transfer to the 

family division.

IV. CONCLUSION

A granular review of the record before us indicates that the alleged conduct was an unarmed 

attack. The prosecution presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause of assault with 

intent to do great bodily harm. The prosecution also presented evidence that one of EO’s 

codefendants used the flip flop he was wearing dangerously, while the other codefendant did the 

same with a tennis shoe. But it did not present evidence that either used or carried these items as 

weapons, which is to say as instruments of armed combat. The prosecution also did not present 

any evidence that EO was ever armed—with a flip flop or with anything else. The district court 

did not analyze whether the flip flop or tennis shoe was used as a weapon, or if EO was armed 

during the attack. These errors required the circuit court to grant the motion to quash and transfer 
-10-

the case to the family division to proceed as a traditional waiver, if at all. For these reasons, I 

respectfully dissent.

/s/ Noah P. Hood