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I (AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION WITH

ITALY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

GOVERNMEN1 

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON THE

PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON THE USES

OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

CARTA WASHINGTON: 1961
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

CHET HOLIFIELD, California, Chairman

JOHN 0. PASTORE, Rhode Island, Vice Chairman

MELVIN PRICE, Illinois

WAYNE N. ASPINALL, Colorado

ALBERT THOMAS, Texas

THOMAS G. MORRIS, New Mexico

JAMES E. VAN ZANDT, Pennsylvania

CRAIG HOSMER, California

WILLIAM H. BATES, Massachusetts

JACK WESTLAND, Washington

II

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia

CLINTON P. ANDERSON, New Mexico

ALBERT GORE, Tennessee

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington

BOURKE B. FIICKENLOOPER, Iowa

HENRY DWORSHAK, Idaho

GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont

WALLACE F. BENNETT, Utah

JAMES T. RAMEY, Executive Director

JOHN T. CONWAY, Assistant Director

GEORGE F. MURPHY, Jr., Professional Staff Member
CONTENTS

STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES

Page

Graham, Commissioner John S., Atomic Energy Commission 21 Kohler, Foy D., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 6

Loper, Herbert B., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic

Energy 16

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Press release No. 304 of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy dated March 3, 1961, relative to the bearing on the proposed agreement with

Italy 5

CORRESPONDENCE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Eisenhower, President Dwight D., to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the AEC, dated November 8, 1960, concerning the pro- posed agreement with Italy 3

Eisenhower, President Dwight D., to the Congress of the United States, dated January 17, 1961, concerning NATO's military defensive strength_ 2

Gates, Thomas S., Secretary of Defense, and John A. McCone, Chairman,

AEC, to the President, dated August 25, 1960, submitting a proposed

agreement with Italy for his approval 3

Jehle, Herbert, Physics Department, George Washington University, to Chet Holifield, Ohairman, JCAE, dated March 9, 1961, commenting

on the proposed agreement with Italy 23 Merchant, Livingston T., Acting Secretary of State, to the President, dated December 31, 1960, concerning the proposed agreement with Italy 5

APPENDIX

Text of agreement between the Government of the United States and the

Government of Italy 

III

25

PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON THE

USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE

PURPOSES WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1961

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room F-391 the Capitol, Hon. Chet HoHeld (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Holifield and Price; Senators Pastore, Gore, Hickenlooper, Dworshak, and Aiken.

Also present: James T. Ramey, executive director; John T. Conway, assistant director; and George F. Murphy, Jr., professional staff member.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. The committee will be in order. This is a

public hearing of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to receive testimony concerning a proposed agreement for cooperation for mutual defense purposes between the United States and the Government of Italy. The proposed agreement before us was submitted to the Congress on January 17, 1961, by President Eisenhower and referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The submission of this proposed agreement to the Congress and its referral to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is in compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 85-479.

Subsection 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires that the proposed agreement for cooperation together with the approval and determination of the President cannot become effective until it has been submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Com- mittee and a period of 60 days has elapsed while Congress is in session. Subsection 123d also stipulates that such proposed agree- ment for cooperation shall not become effective if during this 60-day period the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed agreement for cooperation.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on March 1, 1961, held

a hearing in executive session in which representatives of the Depart- ment of State, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission testified concerning this proposed agreement. The hearing was held in executive session in order that the committee might fully explore all details of the agreement, much of which in- cluded classified matters. The hearing this ,morning is being held in

open session in order that the public may have knowledge of this matter. The Joint Committee has always recognized its important duty to the Congress and to the people of the United States to review

1
2 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

these proposed agreements very thoroughly before making recommendations and to bring before the public as much information as

possible consistent with the need for protecting classified information.

I might mention that the Joint Committee normally would have

held hearings on this matter much sooner except that through no

fault of its members there was some delay in its organization at the

beginning of the session. A hearing could not be held prior to the

committee's organization in late February.

Senator Pastore, vice chairman of the Joint Committee, on March

7, 1961, inserted in the Congressional Record the text of the proposed

agreement for those who may wish to read it in detail. We will also—

if there is no objection—include it in the appendix of the printed

record of our hearing today. If there is no objection, I would like to

submit for the record at this point a copy of the following correspondence concerning this proposed agreement.

1. Message of January 17, 1961, to the Congress from President

Dwight Eisenhower.

2. Memorandum of November 8, 1960, to the Secretary of Defense

and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from President

Dwight D. Eisenhower.

3. Letter of August 28, 1960, to the President from Secretary of

Defense Thomas S. 'Gates and AEC Chairman John A. McCone.

4. Letter of December 31, 1960, to the President from the Acting

Secretary of State, Livingston T. Merchant.

Also, if there is no objection, at this point I wbuld like, to submit for

the record a copy of the joint statement by Senator Pastore and me

on March 3, 1961, announcing the hearing today.

(The correspondence and statement referred to above follow:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, January 17, 1961.

To the Congress of the United States:

In December 1957 the heads of government of the nations members of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization reached agreement in principle on the

desirability of achieving the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive

strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and

techniques. In enunciating this agreement in principle the heads of government

made it clear that this decision was the result of the fact that the Soviet leaders,

while preventing a general disarmament agreement, had left no doubt that the

most modern and destructive weapons of all kinds were being introduced into the

Soviet armed forces. The introduction of modern weapons into NATO forces

should be no cause for concern on the part of other countries, since NATO is

• purely a defensive alliance.

It is our conviction and the conviction of our NATO allies that the introduction into NATO defenses of the most modern weapons available is essential in

maintaining the strength necessary to the alliance. Any alliance depends in the

last analysis upon the sense of shared mutual interests among its members, and

by sharing with our allies certain training information we are demonstrating concretely our sense of partnership in NATO's defensive planning. Failure on our

part to contribute to the improvement of the state of operational readiness of

the forces of other members of NATO will only encourage the Soviet Union to

believe that it can eventually succeed in its goal of destroying NATO's

effectiveness.

To facilitate the necessary cooperation on our part legislation amending the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was enacted by the Congress in 1958. Pursuant to

that legislation agreements for cooperation were concluded with four of our

NATO partners in May and June 1959. A similar agreement was also recently

concluded with our NATO ally, the Republic of Italy. All of these agreements

are designed to implement in important respects the agreed NATO program.
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 3

This agreement with the Government of Italy will enable the United States to cooperate effectively in mutual defense planning with Italy and in the training of Italian NATO forces in order that, if an attack on NATO should occur, Italian forces could, under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, effectively use nuclear weapons in their defense.

These agreements previously concluded and this Italian agreement represent only a portion of the work necessary for complete implementation of the decision taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in December 1957. I anticipate the conclusion of similar agreements for cooperation with certain other NATO nations as the alliance's defensive planning continues.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, I am submitting to each House of the Congress an authoritative copy of the agreement with the Government of Italy. I am also transmitting a copy of the Secretary of State's letter accompanying an authoritative copy of the signed agreement, a copy of a

joint letter from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission recommending my approval of this document and a copy of my memorandum in reply thereto setting forth my approval.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, November 8, 1960.

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

In your joint letter to me of August 25, 1960, you recommended that I approve a proposed agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Italy for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes.

Italy is participating with the United States in an international arrangement pursuant to which it is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. The proposed agreement will permit cooperation necessary to improve the state of training and operational readiness of the armed forces of Italy, subject to provisions, conditions, guarantees, terms, and special determinations, which are most appropriate in this important area of mutual assistance, in accordance with the agreement in principle reached in December 1957.

Having considered your joint recommendations and the cooperation provided for in the agreement, including security safeguards and other terms and conditions of the agreement, I hereby—

(1) Approve the program for the transfer of nonnuclear parts of atomic weapon systems involving restricted data under the terms and conditions provided in your joint letter and the proposed agreement; however, types, quantities, and conditions of transfer of such parts are subject to my further approval;

(2) Determine that the performance of this agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States; and

(3) Approve the proposed agreement and authorize its execution for the Government of the United States in a manner designated by the Secretary of State.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

Washington, August 25, 1960. The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is hereby submitted for your consideration and approval a proposed agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Italy for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes.

The proposed agreement will permit, under the authority of sections 91c and 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the transfer of classified infor- mation and certain equipment necessary for the purposes of improving the state of training and operational readiness of the Armed forces of Italy. The December
4 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

1957 NATO heads of government meeting established the concept of a stockpile

of arms for the strengthening of NATO's defenses, and this present agreement is an

important part of the implementation of this concept. The carrying out of this

agreement should do much to advance our mutual defense interest, including the

vital cause of strengthening the NATO defensive alliance, and will thereby aid

materially in the defense of the United States.

Article II of the agreement provides for the transfer of classified information,

including "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data," necessary to the

development of defense plans; the training of personnel in the employment of and

the defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic

energy; the evaluation of the capability of potential enemies in the employment

of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and the

development of delivery systems capable of carrying atomic weapons.

Article III of the agreement provides that the United States will transfer nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving restricted data (other than

nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons) for the purpose of improving the state of

training and operational readiness of the armed forces of Italy. However, in

view of section 91c of the Atomic Energy Act, the applicability of which is reflected in article IV of the agreement, no transfer can be made if it would contribute significantly to the recipient nation's atomic weapon design

'

development,

or fabrication capability. It is not possible to determine at this time the types,

quantities

'

and conditions of transfer, whether by sale, lease, or loan, of those

parts which it will become necessary to transfer for our mutual defense during the

period of the agreement. Accordingly, under the terms and conditions of the

agreement, it will be necessary to determine from time to time the types, quantities, and conditions of transfer and such determination shall be submitted for

your approval.

The agreement would remain in force until terminated by agreement of both

parties, thus assuring continued protection for the information and equipment

transferred in accordance with the provision of the agreement. However, cooperation for the transfer of information and equipment under articles II and III

of the agreement may be discontinued by either party in the event of the termination of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In accordance with the provisions of sections 91c and 144b of the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, the agreement specifically provdes in article I that all cooperation

under the agreement will be undertaken only when the communicating or transferring party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security. Article I of the agreement

also provides, in accordance with the act, that all cooperation under the agreement will be undertaken only while the United States and Italy are participating

in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security and making

substantial and material contributions thereto. Cooperation under articles II

and III of the agreement would be undertaken only when these conditions prevail.

Article IV of the agreement stipulates that the cooperation under the agreement

will be carried out by each of the parties in accordance with its applicable laws.

Article IV also makes clear that there will be no transfer under the agreement of

atomic weapons, nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons or special nuclear material.

In addition to the foregoing provisions on the terms, conditions, duration,

nature, and scope of cooperation, the agreement provides that the parties will

maintain agreed security safeguards and standards. The agreement also contains

particular commitments that the recipient of any equipment or information that

is obtained pursuant to the agreement will not transfer it to unauthorized persons

and will not transfer it beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient party, except in

limited circumstances specifically provided in the agreement.

Italy is now participating with the United States in an international arrangement pursuant to which Italy is making substantial and material contributions

to the mutual defense and security. It is the view of the Department of Defense

and the Atomic Energy Commission that this agreement is entirely in accord with

the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. It is the considered

opinion of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission that

the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute

an unreasonable risk to the commion defense and security of the United States.

Accordingly, it is recommended that you—

(a) approve the program for the transfer of nonnuclear parts of atomic

weapon systems involving restricted data under the terms and conditions

provided in this letter and the proposed agreement; however, types, quantities, and conditions of transfer of such parts are subject to your later approval;
-AkiREEMENT FOR MTJTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 5

(b) determine that the performance of this agreement will promote and will

not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security

of the United States; and

(c) approve the proposed agreement and authorize its execution for the

Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of

State.

The Secretary of State concurs in the foregoing recommendations.

With great respect, we are,

Faithfully yours,

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

DEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: The undersigned, the Acting Secretary of State, has the

honor to lay before the President with a view to its transmission to the Congress,

pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, an authoritative copy

of an agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense

purposes between the Government of the United States and the Government of

Italy, signed at Rome on December 3, 1960.

This agreement was signed on behalf of the United States pursuant to the

authorization granted in the President's memorandum of November 8, 1960, to

the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

A copy of this memorandum was received by the Secretary of State from the

President.

Faithfully yours,

THOMAS S. GATES,

Secretary of Defense.

JOHN A. McCoNE,

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

DECEMBER 31, 1960.

From the office of the

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy will hold open hearings on a proposed

agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes with the Government of Italy, Thursday, March 9, 1961, at 10 a.m. in room

F-39, the Capitol, it was announced today by Congressman Chet Holifield and

Senator John 0. Pastore, respective chairman and vice chairman of the Joint

Committee.

The proposed agreement which is similar to agreements entered into in 1959

with Greece, Turkey, West Germany, and the Netherlands would authorize the

AEC and Defense Department to transfer to Italy nonnuclear parts of atomic

weapon systems and to exchange classified atomic energy information necessary

to—

(1) the development of defense plans;

(2) the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against

atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;

(3) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;

and

(4) the development of compatible delivery systems for atomic weapons.

By law, the transfer of the material and the communication of the information

will occur whenever the President determines that it will promote and will not

constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. We will begin our hearing this morning with

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Mr. Kohler, if you are ready, you may proceed.

/8/ LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT,

Acting Secretary.

66856-61----2

No. 304

For immediate release

March 3, 1961
6 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

STATEMENT OF FOY D. KOHLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

PI Mr. KOHLER. Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to appear

before the committee. I wish to speak in support of the proposed

agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual

defense purposes between the United States and Italy. The proposed

agreement with Italy, which we are discussing today, is one step in

the phased evolution of the necessary NATO atomic posture. We

believe delay in the activation of the agreement would retard growth

in Italian military capabilities to carry out NATO defense plans and

could raise doubts in NATO ccantries as to our attitude toward the

alliance.

The proposed agreement for atomic cooperation with Italy is

designed to serve the same objectives of improving the defense capabilities of the NATO alliance for which the United States has entered

into atomic cooperation agreements with other NATO countries. In

character, the agreement parallels agreements the United States has

concluded with Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey which

were previously discussed before this committee in 1959.

The need for expanded cooperation on uses of atomic energy for

mutual defense between the United States and Italy, and between

the United States and other NATO countries, stems from the problems

recognized by the NATO heads of government at their meeting in

Paris in December 1957. The communique issued at the close of that

meeting stated:

The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have

made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles

of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet

view, all European nations except the U.S.S.R. should, without waiting for

general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms

of the preatomic age.

As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative

but to remain vigilant and to look to our defenses. We are therefore resolved to

achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking

into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which

will be readily available for the defense of the alliance in case of need. In view

of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also

decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the

disposal of the supreme allied commander, Europe.

Senator GORE. Will have to be put at what?

Mr. KOHLER. Would have to be put at the disposal of the supreme

allied commander, Europe.

The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use

will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned.

Since the Soviet Union was already in 1957 introducing nuclearcapable weapons into their own armed forces, the NATO allies have

found it imperative to develop within the framework of the alliance

nuclear capabilities adequate to assure their effective mutual defense.

In accordance with the decisions at the December 1957 NATO

meeting, forces of our NATO allies have acquired nuclear-capable

weapons delivery systems, as distinguished from the weapons. These

systems have been obtained either by direct purchase of Allied governments or through the military assistance program. Also in accord
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 7

with December 1957 decisions, the United States has been establishing stocks of nuclear weapons readily available for the defense of the

alliance in case of need. Iti7-e have been keeping this committee

informed of U.S. measures to assist the development of nuclear capabilities required in allied fOrces to maintain our common defense.

Under this proposed agreement with Italy the United States will

be able, in accordance with section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act,

to exchange information with Italy which is jointly determined to be

necessary to the development of defense plans, the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and

in other military applications of atomic energy, the evaluation of the

capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons,

and the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic

weapons they carry. The United States will also be able, in accordance with section 91c of the act, to transfer to Italy nonnuclear parts

of atomic weapons systems (as opposed to parts of atomic weapons)

as jointly determined to be necessary for the purpose of improving

the state of training and operational readiness of Italian armed forces.

I want to emphasize at this point that the agreement does not

provide for exchange of information for the design, development, or

fabrication of atomic weapons. The agreement expressly states that

there will be no transfer under it of atomic weapons, parts of atomic

weapons, or special nuclear materials.

Cooperative arrangements, such as this proposed agreement, assure

that, if an attack on NATO should occur, Italian forces could, under

the direction of the supreme allied commander, Europe, effectively

operate in conjunction with other NATO forces in the use of nuclear

weapons if required. Cooperation under this agreement will enhance

the ability of these forces to maintain a high state of readiness. It

will enable Italy to contribute to cooperative arrangements for pro- duction of weapons delivery systems for the use by NATO forces.

This proposed agreement is based on the principle of mutual interest

which forms the foundation of NATO. Within NATO we see extensive evidence of how mutual interest has been translated into shared

effort and shared responsibility. Through our cooperation in the field

of atomic energy we make available some of our special capabilities in

this field to the benefit of our trusted NATO allies. For their part,

Italy and other alliance members are assuming their share of the responsibilities for providing forces, equipment, and facilities required

to implement the agreed NATO strategy which provides for our common defense.

Italy has consistently demonstrated stanch support for NATO.

The Italian Government and public are fully aware of the necessity

for maintaining a strong defense posture in NATO. There has been

a continuing increase in the Italian defense budget at the same time

that Italy is applying increased resources to economic development

needs. Italy has been exemplary in its efforts toward meeting its

NATO requirements. These tangible efforts reflect a firm Italian

political commitment to NATO. Similar concrete actions on our

part, such as implementation of this proposed agreement, will continue to build cohesion in the alliance by indicating our equally

sincere political commitment to NATO purposes.

This proposed agreement with Italy is designed to develop capabilities within Italian armed forces required to fulfill NATO-agreed
8 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

plans for mutual defense. Cooperation contemplated under the agreement will assure that the Italian armed forces keep pace with the

_phased evolution in overall NATO military capabilities. The effective deterrent to aggression against the NATO area which has been

maintained to date by NATO military posture cannot be expected to

prevail if NATO military capabilities suffer from hesitant or interrupted implementation of NATO plans.

The success of NATO military strategy to date should make clear

the need to maintain our guard while continuing our efforts to negotiate resolutions of political differences which give rise to the need for

strong military defenses. In the recent past we have experienced

developments which warned us against relaxing our military readiness during negotiations with the Soviet bloc. Determination in

maintaining our defense is an essential precondition to negotiations

which offer some hope of reaching agreements compatible with our

security.

The communique issued by the North Atlantic Council after its

meetings in Paris in December 1960 clearly expressed our current

task:

In order that the Atlantic alliance may pursue its constructive purposes in

peace and without fear, confronted as it is by the menace of growing Communist

military strength, the North Atlantic nations must be able to respond to any

attack with whatever force might be appropriate.

The Department of State fully concurs in the opinion of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission that the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable

risk to the common defense and security of the United States. I

strongly urge your favorable consideration of the proposed agreement.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Kohler.

Did you have a prepared statement, Mr. Farley?

Mr. FARLEY. I have no statement.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Are there any questions of Mr. Kohler at

this time?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, if nobody else has a question, I

might ask how much notice is required for a nation to withdraw from

NATO?

Mr. KOHLER. There is no provision for withdrawal from NATO.

The NATO agreement was an agreement for a 20-year period at which

time there would be a review, as I recall the agreement. I can't

cite it.

Senator AIKEN. I was just wondering how long the term that this

agreement with the NATO countries might run.

Mr. KOHLER. May I read the duration article:

After the treaty has been in force for 20 years, any party may cease to be a party

1 year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the

United States of America, which will inform the governments of the other parties

of the deposit of such notice of denunciation.

Senator AIKEN. That is 1 year.

Mr. KOHLER. After 20 years, notice may be given to take effect 1

year later.

Senator AIKEN. In the meantime the agreement made with Italy

or any other NATO country regarding the disposition of nuclear arms

in those countries remains in effect—"will remain in force until

terminated by agreement with both parties and either party may
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 9

terminate under articles 2 and 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty." That

means if you make a deal you are in it for along time.

Mr. KOHLER. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Regardless of whether the government of the other contracting country may change or not.

Mr. KOHLER. That is right. The government could change, sir. Senator AIKEN. It might even change the nature of the government, but we would still be under the agreement.

Mr. KOHLER. I think, Senator, my comment from the political point of view on that would be that we do not regard this as likely in the case of Italy. Italy has had a number of changes of government, but they are always based and have been based for many years now

on iyhe plurality position of the Christian Democrats in Italy, which have 273 seats out of the 569 in the Italian Parliament. This complex in the Italian political picture seems likely to prevail. The reasons that you have shifts of government usually reconstituted with very much the same people is that the 273 is not a majority and in itself sufficient to enable the Christian Democrats to form the Government by themselves. So they are always making alliances slightly to one side or the other of themselves with smaller parties, and this does shift. But the basic complex of the Italian Government has been very

constant and we consider that it will remain constant.

Senator AIKEN. This is the same type of contract as contemplated with other NATO countries, too?

Mr. KOHLER. Yes sir. These agreements are the same.

Senator AIKEN. Tiow many other countries have we reached these

agreements with?

Mr. KOHLER. We have them with four, sir. As I mentioned in my

statement, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Turkey.

Senator AIKEN. Belgium?

Mr. KOHLER. Not yet. •

Senator AIKEN. And France not yet?

Mr. KOHLER. NO, Sir.

Senator PASTORE. Will the Senator yield at this point?

Senator AIKEN. I yield at this point. I have had my questions answered.

Senator PASTORE. Just so the record will be clear, this is a bilateral

agreement between the United States Government and the Government of Italy, which is not a self-executing contract. This is to be implemented. To come back to the question that was raised by Mr. Aiken, should there be a situation either vis-a-vis with Italy or any of these governments with which we are executing these bilateral

agreements, we could unilaterally bring to a stop any passage of infor- mation that might be contemplated by this contract?

Mr. KOHLER. Yes, sir.

Senator PASTORE. In other words, the point I am meaning to make is that this is not an agreement to pass any nuclear arms. This is merely an agreement to pass some nonnuclear parts plus information

that has to do with atomic energy which has to be implemented as the U.S. Government feels that it should be implemented consistent with our own security and protection.

Mr. KOHLER. Yes, sir.

Senator PASTORE. I think the record ought to be clear on that, that

any change of government would imperil the position of America, not
10 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

with Italy or any other country with whom we are negotiating these

bilateral agreements. Am I right in that statement?

Mr. KOHLER. Senator, I thank you very much for making the point

I should have made myself in response to Senator Aiken, because

these agreements are permissive. They are subject in implementation

as you go along to determinations constantly as to the information

that needs to be passed or whether any needs to be passed.

Senator AIKEN. Do I understand these agreements do not require

the approval of the Senate?

Mr. KOHLER. Yes, sir; that is right. After the 60-day period they

come into effect unless there is an act of disapproval.

Senator AIKEN. Unless they are disapproved. Sixty days goes

pretty fast.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Senator Aiken, as you know, there are several ways of having international agreements. The treaty I guess we

would call the highest form of international agreement. That does

require the consent of the Senate, as you know. Under the Atomic

Energy Act these agreements would authorize, but Congress as a

whole is given a chance to act within 60 days. It has been the custom

to introduce the texts of the agreements in the Congressional Record

and to hold hearings on them within the .60-day period in order to

give Congress a chance to scrutinize them and have an opportunity

to report them if the Congress so elects. Is that not right, Senator

Pastore?

Senator PASTORE. Yes, sir.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Although the law does not require us to

introduce a resolution, if we are in favor of it, we have to introduce a

resolution against it if we are not in favor of it. Nevertheless, the

committee has always thought that it was fair and the wise thing to

do to not allow these agreements to go into effect, you might say,

by inaction, but to hold hearings and then issue a report to give the

Congress a chance to know how to act upon them. I assume that

this same course will be followed in this agreement.

Senator PASTORE. Yes. But the point which was made by Mr.

Aiken, which was a very good point, and inasmuch as this is a public

hearing the record should be very clear on the subject, that inasmuch

as these contracts are of long duration because of the very provision

in the charter of NATO and plus the fact that after a period of 20

years it still takes a year after denunciation notice is given, that we

were committing ourselves, that if there were a change in government

that might be prejudicial to the security of the world, that we would

be tied down to having imparted nuclear weapons, which is not the case.

Nor that we would be compelled to give strategic information beyond

that period. While I am trying to make the record clear, it is that

this is an agreement that has to be implemented. We can stop implementation any time. We will be prejudiced to whatever we released up to that moment.

Senator AIKEN. Implemented in what way?

Senator PASTORE. The information that we are to give. We are

to determine what information we will give to the Italian Government.

They can't compel us to give them any information. This is merely

an agreement that we can do this.

Senator AIKEN. It does not have to be implemented by the Congress.
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 11

Senator PASTORE. No, not by the U.S. Congress.

Senator AIKEN. The people who negotiated the treaty.

Senator PA-STORE. The President of the United States.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. The law says that any time there is transfer

of restricted data the President shall make a determination. This

is not just one determination at the beginning of this agreement, but

any time that there is a substantial or important transfer of restricted

data, the President must make that determination in each and every

instance. So we do have, as Senator Pastore so clearly explained,

continuous control over the transfer of classified information. It is

true that if a government would change, let us say, from a friendly

government to an unfriendly government, at that point the President

could control the transfer of any other restricted data, as the Senator

pointed out. However, we would be prejudiced to the extent of the

restricted data which had already been transferred if it got into the

hands of the new and unfriendly government.

Senator AIKEN. This agreement does not contemplate the physical

transfer of atomic weapons and their parts?

Chairman HOLIFIELD. No. The Senator again pointed out that

this contemplates the transfer of nonnuclear parts of weapons systems.

For instance, the transfer of an airplane to carry a nuclear weapon

might be part of the system. It is nonnuclear parts. This does not

contemplate the transfer of nuclear parts.

Senator AIKEN. It contemplates training the Italians in the use

of nuclear weapons?

Senator PASTORE. That is right.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Yes, training, and it also contemplates

explaining to them the effects of nuclear weapons if used against

them, or if used on behalf of NATO, so that they would be able to

protect themselves to the best of.their ability from the effects of

nuclear weapons in the hands of the enemy.

Senator AIKEN. We would transfer the weapon with the exception -

of the nuclear warhead.

Mr. CONWAY. No.

Senator AIKEN. Very well. I think that answers the question.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Mr. Gore.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, you say on page 2 that since the Soviet Union was already in 1957 introducing nuclear capable weapons

into their armed forces—would you enlighten us further on that?

Mr. KOHLER. I think that the Soviets have been at some pains to

make it clear to us that they have developed missiles and atomic

weapons and have even gone beyond that time and again indicating

a willingness to use them in certain situations. This has been repeatedly stated.

Senator GORE. I am aware of that. I will be more specific. What

interested me was that in 1957 they were already introducing them

into their armed forces. Having ICBM's is one thing. I wanted

to inquire about another. To what extent has the Soviet Union

introduced nuclear capable or nuclear weapons—nuclear capability

into their ground forces in Eastern Europe?

Mr. KOHLER. Senator, that is a technical question that perhaps

General Loper could go into further than I can. • To my knowledge,

and the intelligence that we have, they not only have missiles in

their own territory, but have them with their forces in Eastern

Europe.
12 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY,

Senator GORE. Are there nuclear weapons with the Soviet forces or

East German forces in East Germany?

Mr. KOHLER. It is my understanding that there are nuclear

capable weapons systems with the Soviet forces in East Germany.

Soviet forces, sir.

Senator GORE. Would you mind interrupting your testimony to let

General Loper say what he can say of an unclassified nature on this

subject?

Mr. KOHLER. None whatsoever.

General LOPER. The extent to which they have actually introduced

their weapons into various elements of their armed forces is not

completely known, certainly to me. We do know from the general

order of intelligence that they have stated a capability of utilizing

nuclear weapons throughout their armed forces. Physically where

they may be located is something that I don't know.

Senator GORE. Obviously somebody within this Government—

whether they want to say so, I don't know—knows whether or not

there is nuclear capacity now stationed in East Germany. Do you

say you do or do not know?

General LOPER. No, I don't know that, Senator.

Senator GORE. Do you know, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. KOHLER. It is my understanding that the Soviet forces in

East Germany have nuclear capable delivery systems. •

Senator GORE. Then why wouldn't you know that, General?

General LOPER. The question asked whether they had a nuclear

capability in East Germany, not a delivery system. They may not

have their weapons with them. This is the point I wanted to make.

I don't know whether their weapons are actually stocked with these

delivery systems in East Germany.

Senator GORE. But you are aware that the delivery systems are

present in the Armed Forces in East Germany?

General LOPER. That is right.

Senator GORE. You say this was being done as early as 1957, Mr.

Secretary.

Mr. KOHLER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. So the development of nuclear capability by NATO

forces was undertaken by the United States and by our NATO

allies in response to and only in responSe to such an undertaking

by the Soviet forces. Do you imply that or do you say that? What

is the situation?

Mr. KOHLER. I think the increasing intelligence—and I may say

that at all the NATO meetings there is an intelligence review of the

Soviet capability in all weapons fields—

Senator GORE. I wonder why the United States is 2 years late in

reaching such an agreement with Italy than with Greece, Turkey,

West Germany, and the Netherlands?

Mr. KOHLER. Senator, the answer to that is simply, I think, that

we went ahead in the first instance early in 1959 with the four countries

that were most immediately ready and where the military requirement

had been developed. So that we started negotiations in early 1959

with them and concluded in about May 1959, with these four countries

that I have mentioned, at which time we undertook in June 1959 the

Italian negotiations. The Italians were then ready. These negotiations, I think, proceeded very normally, but they were delayed
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 13

beyond what, the others had been by the fact that we had a change

in the Italian Government meanwhile, and a new team to restart the,

negotiations with, which always creates a certain delay. However,

these negotiations were then concluded in August of 1960, but just

before the Congress was adjourning last year, and so the agreement

could not be submitted until the resumed session in January. There.

was nothing abnormal about the negotiations, sir.

Senator GORE. From press accounts it would appear that the administration is reexamining the Nation's whole policy on nuclear

weapons—the role of nuclear weapons and the Nation's defense forces,

the degree of readiness for use and deployment, and weapons tests and

weapons development. Does this treaty or this agreement with Italy

prejudice in any way the possible conclusions of this reexamination?

Mr. KOHLER. In no way whatsoever. The examination now being

undertaken—there are several types of examinations, and they range

farther than just an examination of nuclear weapons as such, but of

the whole balance of weapons—with the advice of Mr. Dean Acheson,

the specific range of NATO military and political and other programs

are also being examined. I think that both the President and the

Secretary of State have made clear that we contemplate, while perhaps

a change in the balance of forces, that the nuclear deterrent continues

important, as does the buildup of conventional forces under that.

But in any event, this training agreement with the Italians certainly

would not prejudice any changes that might come out of such exercise.

Senator GORE. I will not pursue in public session the degree of

provocation created by cocked nuclear guns in Eastern Europe, nor

will I proceed to examine the advisability of creating such provocation either by us or the Russians or the danger it brings. For one I

welcome a thorough reexamination, but not a weakening of the U.S.

forces. Quite to the contrary, I want to see a stronger, a more flexible

and yet, if possible, a less provocative stance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Senator. I think it is pertinent

at this point to announce that last November and December an ad hoc

committee composed of Senator Bennett, of Utah, and Congressmen

Westland, Hosmer, Aspinall, and the present occupant of the chair

visited our military bases and our NATO countries in Europe, and

we had accompanying us on that trip Commissioner Graham and

part of the trip the former AEC Chairman, Mr. John McCone.

Upon the return from that trip we worked out a very comprehensive

report in which we analyzed the NATO nuclear weapon situation in

many ways. We transmitted to the President and the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense and other interested parties copies

of these classified reports. I am very happy to say that this report

has been receiving the closest attention by the people in the highest

positions of the Government. The President has read the complete

report. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State have

read the complete report. We made many suggestions in there along

the line of the Senator's remarks just made. We have criticized some

of the arrangements. We offered constructive suggestions. They

are being considered, and there is a complete reevaluation of the whole

NATO concept being undertaken by the respective executive branches

of Government that are involved in the NATO procedures.
14 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

We feel that as a result of the committee's study of this matter

that we are going to have a complete look at the NATO setup and

constructive approach to some of the problems which we found there.

Senator GORE. I have read the report. I think it is one of the finest

pieces of work that I have seen performed by a subcommittee. I

understand the report was made unanimously.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. That is right.

Senator GORE. It was entirely bipartisan in makeup.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Not only as far as the Congress was concerned but as far as the Commission and the committee were

concerned.

Mr. KOHLER. Mr. Chairman, if I may be permitted, I would just

like to confirm that we regard this as a very important contribution

which is indeed being very carefully studied and reviewed.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Getting back for a moment to this particular

agreement, Senator Pastore brought out the fact that we have similar

agreements with Turkey, Greece, West Germany, and the Netherlands.

While there are some minor details which have to do with peculiarities

of the different countries involved, in substance this agreement, we

might say, is practically the same.

Mr. KOHLER. Practically identical.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. There is no real substantial difference. The

text of the agreement has already been put into the Congressional

Record by Senator Pastore so that it is available for the public.

On page 4 of your prepared statement, you state:

Italy has been exemplary in its efforts toward meeting its NATO requirements,

and that there has been a continuing increase in the Italian budget.

Do you have the figures on how much the Italian Government is

spending per year for defense purposes in relation to their NATO

budget?

Mr. KOHLER. I do, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to develop

further this statement. The Italian defense expenditures at the

present time in 1960 were approximately $1.1 billion. The Italian

Government has laid on a forward plan to increase its defense budget

by at least 4 percent annually over a period of 5 years which would

give a 20 percent increase. In 1960 actual expenditures indeed were

about 5.5 percent over the previous year. In addition to this, the

Italians are participating to the extent of about 50 billion lira in a

NATO-wide production program of F-104 Starfighters.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Could you translate that into a rough

equivalent of dollars?

Mr. KOHLER. It runs about $90 million. We will check the figure,

Mr. Chairman.

Italy, as you know, still has some development problems of its own

and a rather low per capita income of $565 per annum. But despite

this, the Italian defense budget runs approximately 4 percent of gross

national product.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Has the Italian Government supplied its full

quota of manpower and equipment for NATO?

Mr. KOHLER. The Italians make to NATO one of the major contributions of manpower numerically. There are still, as of course in

practically all the NATO countries, some deficiencies. There is some

failure to meet the full force goals established by NATO. This is

true throughout the alliance. It is not a serious lag in the case of
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 15

Italy. The details of that I believe would have to be discussed in

executive session. But the general answer to the question is favorable. They have made a real effort and they are supplying the manpower and resources required for NATO purposes.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Under this proposed agreement in the event

that there are nonnuclear parts of weapons systems transferred to

Italy, who would pay for those?

Mr. KOHLER. That could be either by purchase or loan, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Has it been mostly through military assistance up to date, or have they paid for part of these pieces of equipment?

Mr. KOHLER. I believe most of the advance material to Italy has

been through military assistance.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. I am speaking of regular military equipment.

I am not speaking of the nonnuclear parts of weapons systems. I am speaking of the regular equipment.

Mr. KOHLER. They do a lot of their own production to start with,

but insofar as advanced items have been necessary that are beyond

their own production capacity, I think there has been a substantial

amount of MSP program. I believe for details I would have to refer

you to the Defense witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. At the top of page 3, you say, "We have

been keeping this committee informed of U.S. assistance to the development of nuclear capabilities to allow our allied forces to maintain

our common defense.' That "we", I suppose, refers to the State

Department?

Mr. KOHLER. I think we are speaking collectively there, Mr.

Chairman. The State Department, certainly, on the negotiating

side. We have worked very closely and you have had direct reports

to the committee.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. I am not going into detail at this time. It

has been a subject of discussion in executive hearings. I do want to

say this: As one member of this committee, I am not satisfied with

the rate at which information has been made available to us in the

past, nor have I been satisfied with the request for certain documents

which had to do with this NATO setup. These requests are belatedly

being met, I am happy to say, at this time. Some of the documents

which we have asked for in the past will be supplied to us, as I understand. I feel that under the Atomic Energy Act that there is a clear

mandate to the agencies and the departments of the executive branch

to cooperate with this committee in keeping us fully and currently

informed on matters pertaining to nuclear weapons and nuclear

matters. I just want to say at this time and have it on the record

that I have not been satisfied in the past with the cooperation that

we have received, and I am very hopeful that I won't have to make

the same statement a year from now.

Mr. KOHLER. Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that it is our intent

to have a close cooperative relationship with the committee, and to

make you satisfied that indeed we are supplying you with the information that is essential to the performance of your duties, too.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Are there any further questions on the part

of members or the staff? If not, are there any further witnesses, Mr.

Kohler?
16 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSa PURPOSES WITH ITALY

Mr. KOHLER. Not from the State Department, sir. General Loper

is here from the Department of Defense.

Chairman HoLIFIELD. General Loper, do you have a prepared

statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT B. LOPER, ASSISTANT TO THE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

General LOPER. I do.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Will you please come forward?

General LOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am appearing before

you on behalf of the Department of Defense in support of the agreement between the United States and the Government of. Italy in

accordance with the provisions of section 91c and 144b of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954. This agreement is essentially the same as the

agreements for cooperation our Government entered into with the

Netherlands, Turkey, Greece, and the Federal Republic of Germany

in the summer of 1959.

The implementation of the NATO stockpile concept other than the

actual stockpiling of the weapons requires three steps to insure the

attainment of a satisfactory atomic capability for the allied forces.

The first is the exchange of atomic information with NATO planners. This has in general been met by the atomic agreement with,

NATO authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This agreement was ratified by each of the member countries, and came into.

force in March 1956. It has permitted the NATO planners to develop

theater defense plans and the essential force goals to support these

plans.

The second is the identification of the force goals with the individual

member countries. This identification is contained in the current

NATO plans which give the overall force goals for the countries.

Those forces of all the countries which are earmarked for NATO are

integrated into the overall plans of SACEUR and SACLANT for the

defense of the alliance.

Now, the third step is the equipping and training of the non-U.S.

NATO country with the specific atomic delivery units. In the case

of Italy, the proposed atomic delivery units included in the Italian

goals are systems for land, air, and naval forces. A number of these

systems have been delivered under the military assistance program;

however, in the near future it is expected that Italy may build an

aircraft system of her own which may become capable of atomic

delivery.

The training requirement of this third step leads us to the agreement.

before the committee today. The Italian forces can conduct basic

training on the atomic weapons systems proposed and have done so

with those systems now in their hands. However, the final training

to insure that the Italian forces are capable of performing a satisfactory atomic mission with the aircraft delivery system, for example,

cannot be completed until we are authorized to transmit information

on loading, appropriate testing, including the post load test, inflight

monitoring and possibly information on ground handling.

Of course, the Italian military staff other than those assigned to

major NATO commands need the kind of information permitted in
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 17

the agreement in the development of their defense plans, training of

personnel, and the evaluation of the atomic capability of a potential

enemy. In this connection, the training of NATO earmarked forces

continues to be a national responsibility.

In addition, the basic weapon system as furnished by the military

assistance program may not in all cases include certain nonnuclear

parts of the system which are those necessary accessories for handling

the weapons, for attaching weapons to delivery vehicles, and for

monitoring and checkout of a weapon to insure that it is safe and in

proper operating condition prior to the mission. Nonnuclear parts

of a system may include the control mechanisms, which are parts of

aircraft or missile-launching devices associated with the bomb or warhead, lugs, pylons, and other devices for attaching the bomb to its

carrier and the like. Of course, these do not include any part of the

bomb or warhead itself, but may include training shapes or simulators

to assist in the attainment of an effective delivery capability. Since

these items are components of the delivery system rather than of the

warhead or bomb, it is desirable that arrangements be made for their

transfer by sale under the military assistance program, thus making

it unnecessary for Italy to establish special production facilities for

the limited quantities involved. No such transfers are envisaged at

this time but may be appropriate in future systems.

I would like to go over in some detail the agreement itself. The

agreement will permit under the authority of sections 91c and 14413

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the transfer of classified information and certain equipment necessary for the purpose of

improving the state of training and operational readiness of the Armed

Forces in Italy in the context which I have described above.

Article II of the agreement provides for the transfer of classified

information, including restricted data and formerly restricted data,

necessary to the development of defense plans; the training of personnel in the employment of and the defense against atomic weapons

and other military applications of atomic energy; the evaluation of

the capability of potential enemies in the employment of atomic

weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and the

development of delivery systems capable of carrying atomic weapons.

Article III of the agreement provides that the United States will

transfer nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving restricted data (other than nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons) for the

purpose of improving the state of training and operational readiness

of the Armed Forces in Italy. However, in view of section 91c of the

Atomic Energy Act, the applicability of which is reflected in article IV

of the agreement, no transfer can be made if it would contribute significantly to the recipient nation's atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability.

The agreement would remain in force until terminated by agreement

of both parties, thus assuring continued protection for the information and equipment transferred in accordance with the provision of

the agreement. However, cooperation for the transfer of information

and equipment under articles II and III of the agree e discontinued by either party in the event of the termi rth

Atlantic Treaty.
18 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

In accordance with the provisions of sections 91c and 144b of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the agreement ,specifically provides in

article I that all cooperation under the agreement will be undertaken

only when the communicating or transferring party determines that

such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable

risk to its defense and security. Article I of the agreement also provides, in accordance with the act, that all cooperation under the agreement will be undertaken only while the United States and Italy are

participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense

and security and making substantial and material contributions

thereto. Cooperation under articles II and III of the agreement

would be undertaken only when these conditions prevail.

Article IV of the agreement stipulates that the cooperation under

the agreement Will be carried out by each of the parties in accordance

with its applicable laws. Article IV also makes clear that there will

be no transfer under the agreement of atomic weapons, nonnuclear

parts of atomic weapons or special nuclear material.

In addition to the foregoing provisions on the terms, conditions,

duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, the agreement provides

that the parties will maintain agreed security safeguards and standards. Because of previously established relationships with Italy in

the area of mutual defense, it has been possible to develop these

mutually agreed security standards and practices. There are additional safeguards built into this 144b agreement with the Italians and

stringent controls are placed on information and materials made

available under the agreement. Specifically, these include personnel clearances, physical security of atomic information, special controls on atomic information, the requirements for written security

assurances on personnel participating in visits and conferences, and

the provision for continuing review of the security system of Italy.

It is the considered opinion of the Department of Defense that the

criteria, standards, practices, and procedures provided assure security

protection of the information governed by the agreement in the responsible and comprehensive manner which is dictated by considerations of our own common defense and security.

The agreement also contains particular commitments that the

recipient of any equipment or information that is obtained pursuant

to the agreement will not transfer it to unauthorized persons and will

not transfer it beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient party, except

in limited circumstances specifically provided in the agreement. I

want to make it clear that the agreement does not provide for—

(a) The transfer of special nuclear material;

(b) The transfer of nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons;

(e) The transmission of any information that would assist

Italy in the design, development, or fabrication of atomic

weapons.

Italy is now- participating with the United States in an international

arrangement pursuant to which Italy is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. It is the

view of the Department of Defense that this agreement is entirely in

accord with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended. It is the considered opinion of the Department of Defense

that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and

will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and

security of the United States. That ends my formal statement.
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 19

Chairman HOLIFIELD. General Loper, this is a very frank and

comprehensive statement on your part. There may be some questions which the members want to ask from the standpoint of emphasizing certain points.

Senator PASTORE. I think that the statement itself is explicit enough

and clear enough and succinct enough without any further comment

on my part.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. In order to emphasize one or two points

which are covered in your statement, where you point out the limits

of the agreement, and in order that there be no misinterpretation, I

ask you is it true that this agreement does not permit the communication Of classified information that would assist the Italian Government in the design, development, and manufacture of nuclear

weapons?

General LOPER. I think this is a firm statement, sir.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. This agreement also does not permit the

transfer of fissionable material.

General LOPER. That is right.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. On page 5 of your prepared statement, you

mentioned that the agreement would remain in force and would not

be terminated unless by agreement of both parties. Does this

mean that if the United States wishes to terminate the agreement and

the Italian Government wishes to continue, the agreement remains

in force?

General LOPER. I believe it does.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. In the event both parties agree to its

termination, or in the alternative, if NATO disbands, what procedure

would there be for the reclamation of the material and information

previously furnished by the United States?

General LOPER. Any material which previously was furnished by

sale naturally would belong to the Italians. I would see no way of

recovering that. Information is likewise unrecoverable. As has

been pointed out before, one discontinues the operation of the agreement, but has no basis for recovering that which has gone before.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. However, during the 20-year period of

NATO or any extension thereof, under the terms of this agreement

the United States has full control currently and continuously over the

release of restricted data.

General LOPER. That is correct.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. This agreement is permissive in nature only,

and the President by Executive order can at any time prohibit or

control the extent of the cooperation under this agreement.

General LOPER. Yes, sir.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. So the problem that was brought up by

Senator Aiken this morning of a change in government in any of

these countries—I address my remarks specifically to this agreement

because it is before us—at any time there should be a change in government which would not be deemed to be friendly and helpful to the

security of the United States, the transmission of restricted data to

Italy then could be terminated.

General LOPER. That is correct.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. And further cooperation under the agreement terminated.
20 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

General LOPER. That is correct, sir.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. By Presidential order.

General LOPER. Yes, sir. I might add in connection with a continuation of an agreement which we ourselves decided we would not

want to continue, the Italian Government would be still fully responsible for protecting the information it already received in the manner

prescribed by the agreement, because the agreement would still rbe in

force and they would hold that responsibility.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Of course, that would pertain then if the

government in power accepted the responsibilities of the prior government.

General LOPER. That is right.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. But it would not obtain if the government

did go completely against the free world.

General LOPER. That is correct, sir.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. General Loper, I just have one further thing

to say. You are aware of the dissatisfaction of the Chair and some

of the members of the committee with the way which information

has been furnished us on some of these arrangements. We have

•discussed this in some detail in executive session. I don't care to go

into it in any full detail now. But I want to say to you the same as

I said to the representative of the State Department, .that this committee is zealous of its responsibilities and its duties. Under the

.statute under which we operate we expect to guard those responsibilities and to fulfill those duties fully. It is my hope that information

will be given to us more promptly and more completely in the future

than it has in the past. It will not be necessary for the committee

to engage in controversy or extensive correspondence in order to

obtain information which we believe we are entitled to under the

statute.

General LOPER. I fully appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I think, as

we have frequently discussed this matter, there is a tremendous volume

of information relating to this subject and I am sure the committee

•does not want all of it. You would have no way of handling it. We

would have no way of getting it to you. Somewhere in the chain

we must have a means of assuring.that we select and give you automatically and promptly that information which you can use and not

burden you down with the great volume of information which you

can't use.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. I accept that.

General LOPER. We would like to cooperate.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. I accept that statement. I recognize that

there is an area of judgment that you must exercise and we must

exercise as to the important points of information. I believe through

our discussions with you in the past that you know the areas of interest

that we have, and you know that we are not referring to the voluminous detailed information. But we are referring to those areas where

important policy is being suggested or implemented which pertains

directly to the responsibilities of this committee in its surveillance of

nuclear information and nuclear materials.

General LOPER. I appreciate that, and I hope we can improve 100

-or 500 percent.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Thank you. Are there any further questions? If not, thank you, General Loper.

Commissioner Graham, will you come forward, please?
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES W.I.1.11. ITALY 21

STATEMENT OF JOHN S. GRAHAM, COMMISSIONER, ATOMIC

ENERGY COMMISSION

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have a statement

today in support of the agreement for cooperation for mutual defense

purposes with Italy which has recently been submitted to the Congress in accordance with section 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended.

Representatives of the Departments of State and Defense here

today have discussed with the committee the background, principal

provisions, and contemplated cooperation envisioned under the mutual

defense agreement with Italy. This agreement is similar in all of

its major provisions with the agreements entered into in 1959 with

the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, and Turkey, which were designed

to strengthen NATO by making restricted data available for use

with atomic capable weapons systems under the new authority

provided in the 1958 amendments to sections 91, 144, and 123 of the

Atomic Energy Act. This agreement covers the transmission of

information relating to defense plans, training of personnel, and so

forth, as provided for in section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act.

It also covers the transfer of nonnuclear parts for atomic weapons

systems necessary for improving the Italian state of training and

operational readiness. It does not cover the deployment of atomic

weapons.

As in the case of the agreements with the Netherlands, Germany,

Greece, and Turkey, the Commission's role in the conclusion of the

mutual defense agreement with Italy has been limited to assisting

the Department of Defense since this Department has primary

responsibility for agreements negotiated pursuant to section 144b of

the Atomic Energy Act.

The Commission does, however, support this agreement and

joined the Department of Defense in recommending to the President

that its execution will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. Before joining in this

recommendation, the Commission, together with the other agencies

involved, satisfied itself that the security procedures of the Italian

Government would be adequate to protect information of the kind

to be transmitted under the agreement. Members of the Commission staff are present and would, of course, be happy to answer any

questions the committee may have concerning the details of actions

which the Commission has taken with respect to this agreement.

That is the end of the statement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Graham.

Are there any questions of Commissioner Graham?

Senator GORE. I note on the bottom of page 1, Mr. Commissioner,

you say that the Atomic Energy Commission has recommended this

program to the President, and that its execution will promote the

defense and security of the country and will not constitute an

unreasonable risk.

I wish to inquire about your use of the term "unreasonable risk."

Do you refer by this to the risk of imparting secrets, or to some other

type of risk?
22 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WiTA ITALY

Mr. GRAHAM. Sir, in this agreement we are talking primarily about

the transmission of restricted data. We have analyzed the security

system of the Italian Government, and we were satisfied that such a

system would protect any restricted data which might be transferred

subsequent to the execution of this—if I may use the term—" umbrella"

agreement which is the particular matter under discussion today.

Senator GORE. I don't understand your use of the term "umbrella."

Mr. GRAHAM. I have used it in the sense that here you have a broad

agreement for cooperation first, but as was explained by Senator

Pastore and the chairman, there will be individual actions which will

follow in order to implement the agreement and those would be dealt

with on a case-by-case basis.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Graham.

Representative PRICE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Mr. Price.

Representative PRICE. Mr. Graham, why would the Commission

and the Defense Department want to recommend to the President the

execution of an agreement that would promote an unreasonable risk?

You want this corrected for the record?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.'

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Mr. Graham, thank you for this statement.

The Chair would like to say that for some time now we have had no

complaint toward the Commission in furnishing us with information

which we have requested and keeping us fully and currently informed.

We are looking forward to this type of an association during the present

term of Congress, and we hope in the future. We hope that under

your new chairman that the policies which have obtained in the last

few years will be continued of keeping this committee currently

informed. We do not do this from the standpoint of idle curiosity,

but a deep feeling of responsibility that the Congress has asked that

this committee be the watchdog on this program, particularly in this

military application and development, and we feel that we are entitled

to this information, and we feel that we can do our job better if the

information is furnished us as provided for in the statute, and that the

relations between the committee and the Commission can be amicable

and we can do constructive work together. Otherwise, it becomes

laborious and tedious and controversial, and this does not lend itself

toward efficiency of operation in either the executive or legislative

branch.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sure

that Dr. Seaborg will want to continue the practice of trying to keep

you currently and fully informed. Sometimes we are going to miss,

but I think you know that it is not a matter of intent to try to impede

the work of this committee. Sometimes we may fall over our own

feet in following administrative practices. If I may make one personal observation, Mr. Chairman, you were very kind to note in

answer to Senator Pastore that your committee had included me on

the trip to Europe and that • Mr. McCone was able to join us for

part way. I previously expressed to you and am pleased to repeat

1 The statute, sec. 144 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires that a determination be made that

the arrangement "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and

security * * * 9,

In my statement just concluded I have followed the wording of the act. We have always understood this

to mean that we must find that the arrangement will promote the common defense and security of the

United States and also find that it will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and

security of the United States.
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 23

here that we both were honored to have been included. It was most

helpful and instructive. As I have said before, we certainly compliment this committee on having arranged that the group was not

delayed by the weather but for 2 hours, and that was on a Sunday

afternoon. The committee deserves a high mark for all of their

arrangements as well as their hard work.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Thank you, sir.

We understand, of course, that the AEC has its statutory duties to

protect classified data. We expect that the AEC would continue in.

these responsibilities with the Defense Department to assure the procedures that are adopted in this bilateral agreement between the

United States and the Italian Government, that the procedures in

both Governments will be such as to protect classified information

which may be passed under this agreement.

Mr. GRAHAM. It will be our intention, sir, to continue the practice

we have had of carrying out our statutory responsibilities.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. Thank you.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOLIFIELD. I understand that there is no further request

for witnesses. Therefore, this meeting will stand adjourned. The

committee will meet again at 2 o'clock in executive session.

(The following letter Was submitted for the record:)

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT,

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

Washington, D.C., March 9, 1961.

Hon. CHET HOLIFIELD,

Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: May I comment on the proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States Government and the Government of Italy.

The transfer of "nuclear weapons systems" will mean the nuclearization of the

respective NATO armies. Nuclearized armies are useless without the possession

of nuclear warheads. The wholesale transfer of nuclear we,pons systems will

therefore soon put the United States into the predicament of being cornered into

surrendering nuclear warheads to these foreign military establishments, or seeing

them make an extra effort to produce weapons-grade plutonium themselves, or

even seeing them obtain it on a nuclear black market. •

The transfer agreements open the door to those who want to propagandize

that the United States is not seriously trying to preserve peace as a great many

more military establishments are given the chance to start World War III. In

fact, the transfer agreements play thus into the hands of the most suspicious and

irreconcilable men abroad.

These agreements actually amount to much more than a treaty. The fate of

the United States and of the world hinges upon whether an international accord

can be reached—under United Nations auspices and control—an accord which

has the effect of curbing the spread to more and more. countries of the possession

of nuclear weapons. The present transfers achieve the opposite.

Some Members of Congress have argued that failure of the United States to

enter such agreements would only enhance independent development of nuclear

weapons by these countries, in which case the United States would have no control over such emerging nuclear powers. It seems that the cardinal issue of the

nuclear age is the moral responsibility for the nuclear holocaust which threatens

us all. Every country preparing nuclear weapons and, still more so, every country which spreads these weapons over the globe shares the responsibility for the

eventual nuclear avalanche whose actual start will be more or less a matter of

accident—technical or diplomatic or by communication default.

We should see to it that the United States is not going to surrender in due time

nuclear weapons to complete the weapons systems. So we may, for quite some

time, be spared an irreversible conversion of NATO armies entirely dependent

on nuclear weapons systems—plus nuclear weapons.
24 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

It would be good if we would stop hanging our fate on straws of unrealistic

policies of shortsighted expediency. Rather we should remember that the United

States was founded by men whose conscience and concern for humanity gave new

life to the Western world.

Sincerely,

•

HERBERT JEHLE.

(Thereupon at 11:25 a.m., Thursday, March 9, 1961, the meeting

was concluded.)
APPENDIX

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY FOR COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC

ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Italy,

Considering that they have concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement'

pursuant to which each Government will make available to the other equipment

materials, services, or other military assistance in accordance with such terms and

conditions as may be agreed;

Considering that their mutual security and defense require that they be prepared

to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare;

Considering that they are participating together in an international arrangement

pursuant to which they are making substantial and material contributions to their

mutual defense and security;

Recognizing that their common defense and security will be advanced by the

exchange of information concerning atomic energy and by the transfer of certain

types of equipment;

Believing that such exchange and transfer can be undertaken without risk to

the defense and security of either country; and

Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended, and all the applicable Italian statutes;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

While the United States and Italy are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security and making substantial and material

contributions thereto, each Party will communicate to and exchange with the

other Party information and transfer non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons

systems involving Restricted Data to the other Party in accordance with the

provisions of this Agreement, provided that the communicating ar transferring

Party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an

unreasonable risk to its defense and security.

ARTICLE H. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Each Party will communicate to or exchange with the other Party such classified

information as is jointly determined to be necessary to:

A. the development of defense plans;

B. the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against

atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;

C. the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and

D. the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic

weapons which they carry. .

ARTICLE III. TRANSFER OF NON-NUCLEAR PARTS OF ATOMIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS

The Government of the United States will transfer to the Government of

Italy, subject to terms and conditions to be agreed, non-nuclear parts of atomic

weapons systems involving Restricted Data as such parts are jointly determined

to be necessary for the purpose of improving Italy's state of training and operational readiness.

ARTICLE IV. CONDITIONS

A. Cooperation under this Agreement will be carried out by each of the Parties

in accordance with its applicable laws.

25
26 AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY

B. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer by either Party of atomic

weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, or special nuclear materials.

C. The information communicated or exchanged, and non-nuclear parts of

atomic weapons systems transferred by either Party pursuant to this Agreement

shall be used by the recipient Party exclusively for the preparation or implementation of defense plans in the mutual interests of the two countries.

D. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the communication or exchange

of classified information which is transmissible under other arrangements between the Parties.

ARTICLE V. GUARANTEES

A. Classified information and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems.

communicated or transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded full

security protection under applicable security arrangements between the Parties

and applicable national legislation and regulations of the Parties. In no case

shall either Party maintain security standards for safeguarding classified information, and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems, made available

pursuant to this Agreement less restrictive than those set forth in the applicable

security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into force.

B. Classified information communicated or exchanged pursuant to this Agreement will be made available through channels existing or hereafter agreed for

the communication or exchange of such information between the Parties.

C. Classified information, communicated or exchanged, and any non-nuclear

parts of atomic weapons systems transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall

not be communicated, exchanged or transferred by the recipient Party or persons.

under its jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons or, except as provided in

Article VI of this Agreement, beyond the jurisdiction of that Party. Each

Party may stipulate the degree to which any of the information and non-nuclear

parts of atomic weapons systems communicated, exchanged .or transferred by

it or persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement may be disseminated or distributed; may specify the categories of persons who may have access

to such information or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems; and may

impose such other restrictions on the dissemination or distribution of such information or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems as it deems necessary.

ARTICLE VI. DISSEMINATION

Nothing in:this Agreement shall be interpreted or operate as a bar or restriction

to consultation or cooperation in any field of defense by either Party with other

nations or international organizations. Neither Party, however, shall so cornmunicate classified information or transfer or permit access to or use of nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems made available by the other Party pursuant to this Agreement unless:

A. It is notified by the originating Party that all appropriate provisions and

requirements of the originating Party's applicable laws, including authorization

by competent bodies of the originating Party, have been complied with which

would be necessary to authorize the originating Party directly so to communicate

to, transfer to, permit access to or use by such other nation or international organization; and further that the originating Party authorizes the recipient Party so

to communicate to, transfer to, permit access to or use by such other nation or

international organization; or

B. The originating Party has informed the recipient Party that the originating

Party has so communicated to, transferred to, permitted access to or use by such

other nation or international organization.

ARTICLE VII. CLASSIFICATION POLICIES

Agreed classification policies shall be maintained with respect to all classified

information and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems communicated,

exchanged or transferred under this Agreement.

ARTICLE, VIII. RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE OF INFORMATION AND NON-NUCLEAR PA,RTS

OF ATOMIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and

specifications) or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems communicated,

exchanged or transferred under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the

Party receiving it, and the other Party does not provide any indemnity or warranty with respect to such application or use.
AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES WITH ITALY 27

ARTICLE IX. PATENTS

The recipient Party shall use the classified information communicated, or revealed

by equipment transferred hereunder, for the purposes specified herein only. Any

inventions or discoveries resulting from possession of such information on the part

of the recipient Party or persons under its jurisdiction shall be made available to

the other Party for all purposes without charge in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of Article V of this Agreement.

ARTICLE X. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

A. "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of

the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use

as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

B. "Classified information" means information, data, materials, services, or

any other matter with the security designation of "Confidential" or higher applied

under the legislation or regulations of either the United States or Italy, including

that designated by the Government of the United States as "Restricted Data"

and "Formerly Restricted Data" and that designated by the Government of

Italy as "Atomic Restricted" and "Atomic Most Restricted".

C. "Non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons" means parts of atomic weapons

which are specially designed for them and are not in general use in other end

products and which are not made of, in whole or in part, special nuclear material;

and "non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data"

means parts of atomic weapons systems, other than non-nuclear parts of atomic

weapons, which contain or reveal atomic information and which are not made

of, in whole or in part, special nuclear material.

D. As used in this Agreement, the term "atomic information" means:

1. So far as concerns information provided by the Government of the

United States, information which is designated "Restricted Data" and

"Formerly Restricted Data".

2. So far as concerns information provided by the Government of Italy

information which is designated "Atomic Restricted" and "Atomic Most

Restricted".

ARTICLE XI. DURATION

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government

shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has

complied with all legal requirements for the entry into force of this Agreement,

and shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties except

that either Party may terminate its cooperation under Articles II or III upon

the expiration of the North Atlantic Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this

Agreement.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, in the English and Italian languages, both texts

being equally authentic, this 3rd day of December, 1960.