* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 97-50008

Conference Calendar 

__________________

KENNETH LEE JOHNSON,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DEBORAH PARKER, Captain, Disciplinary

Captain; CHARLES W. REDDEN; KENNETH 

GREEN; MARK SCOTT,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-95-CV-100

- - - - - - - - - -

June 18, 1997

Before SMITH, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kenneth Lee Johnson appeals from the district court’s denial

of his FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion. Review is for an abuse of

discretion. Midland West Corp. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 911

F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 1990). Johnson argues that the

district court abused its discretion (1) in allowing the

magistrate judge to enter a final judgment against him, (2) by
No. 97-50008

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allowing the magistrate judge to deny his IFP status, (3) by not

conducting a de novo review, and (4) by not reviewing the

magistrate judge's refusal to allow him to amend his complaint. 

Johnson consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Title

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), conferred on magistrate judges the authority

to conduct "any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil

matter and order the entry of judgment in the case." Johnson's

personally-executed written consent to trial before the

magistrate judge pursuant to § 636(c), on its face, evinces valid

consent, binding upon him. See Johnson v. Hines, No. 93-7076

slip op. at 11 (5th Cir. September 15, 1994) (unpublished); see

also 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3 (unpublished opinions issued before

January 1, 1996, are precedent). Because the denial of a motion

for IFP is not a matter excepted under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

the magistrate judge did not lack authority to enter such an

order. The record reveals no "good cause" or extraordinary

circumstances" that would have justified annulling the magistrate

judge's authority over the case. See Johnson, No. 93-7076 slip

op. at 11. 

The district court did not err in refusing to conduct de

novo review. Once valid consent is given pursuant to § 636(c),

a party has no absolute right to withdraw that consent and demand

his right to an Article III judge. Carter v. Sea Land Servs.,

Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Once a right, even a
No. 97-50008

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fundamental right, is knowingly and voluntarily waived, a party

has no constitutional right to recant at will .").

Citing to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974)

and TDCJ-ID rules, Johnson argues that the district court's

dismissal of his suit as frivolous was inappropriate because the

notice was not adequate to allow him to prepare a defense, that

he was denied his right to call witnesses and cross-examine, and

that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of a

violation. We have reviewed the findings in the court below and

Johnson's contentions and we discern no abuse of discretion. 

Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986)(citations

omitted); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567-69. 

Johnson’s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. 

See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR.

R. 42.2. Johnson's motion's objecting to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act and the court's reliance on it to deny in forma

pauperis status are DENIED. Carson v. Johnson, __ F.3d __, No.

96-41003, slip op. at 3164-66 (5th Cir. May 15, 1997). 

This is not the first suit and appeal filed by Johnson which

has been dismissed as frivolous. See Johnson v. David, No. 93-

8350, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. July 14, 1994) (dismissal, in part,

under § 1915 affirmed by this court) (unpublished); Johnson v.

Benner, No. 95-50608, slip op. at 1-2 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 1995)

(dismissal under § 1915(d) affirmed in part and vacated and
No. 97-50008

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remanded in part, but sanctions warning issued by this court)

(unpublished). A prisoner may not

bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in

a civil action or proceeding under this

section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more

prior occasions, while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, brought an action

or appeal in a court of the United States

that was dismissed on the grounds that it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted,

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Including the dismissal of this suit and

this appeal, Johnson has four "strikes." See Adepegba v.

Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 386-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Therefore, except

for cases involving an imminent danger of serious physical

injury, § 1915(g) bars Johnson from proceeding further under

§ 1915. He may proceed in subsequent civil cases under the fee

provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1911-14 applicable to everyone else.

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS DENIED; SANCTION IMPOSED.