2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-4-2002

Vipond v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket No. 01-3484

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Recommended Citation

"Vipond v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 243.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 01-3484 

 ___________ 

 JOHN R. VIPOND, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 

 LARRY G. MASSANARI, 

 ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 _______________________________________________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

 D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-00254J 

 (Honorable D. Brooks Smith) 

 ___________________ 

 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 March 4, 2002 

 Before: SCIRICA and ROSENN, Circuit Judges, 

 and WARD, District Judge* 

 (Filed April 3, 2002) 

 

 *The Honorable Robert J. Ward , United States District Judge for the Southern 

District of New York, sitting by designation. 

 __________________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 __________________ 

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 

 This is an appeal of a denial of social security disabled status and benefits. We 

will affirm. 

 I. 

 John Vipond suffers from heart and breathing trouble and obesity. He was fortyeight years old as of his date last insured for social security disability. Vipond has past 

work experience as a dump truck driver, night maintenance man and as a clerk. He was 

laid off from his last job in 1991. After developing chest pains in July 1995, Vipond was 

diagnosed with an acute myocardial infarction. On July 13, 1995, Dr. Mario Poon 

performed a balloon angioplasty on Vipond’s left anterior descending coronary artery. 

Vipond was released from the hospital on July 14, 1995. In August 1995, Dr. Poon 

found Vipond was "doing very well" - displaying no symptoms of angina or congestive 
heart failure. In February 1996, Dr. Poon told Vipond’s family physician, Dr. John 

Meloy, that from a cardiac standpoint Vipond was doing very well. 

 In 1997, two doctors made functional capacity assessments for the state agency in 

charge of determining disability. Dr. Sharon Wander reviewed Vipond’s medical records 

and performed a residual functional capacity assessment, finding Vipond could perform 

medium work. Dr. Rita Aneja reviewed the medical evidence and also found Vipond 

could perform medium work. 

 For some time, Vipond complained of shortness of breath and pain to Dr. Meloy. 

In February and March 1998, Dr. Meloy opined that Vipond was totally and permanently 

disabled from gainful employment. But over the course of his treatment, Dr. Meloy’s 

notes reflect that Vipond was generally normal. Dr. Meloy did specifically find Vipond 

suffered from shortness of breath. 

 Vipond filed an application for disability benefits in September 1997 alleging an 

onset date of October 18, 1991. The Administrative Law Judge found Vipond is limited 

to exertionally light jobs with a sit/stand option. A vocational expert testified that 

approximately five million such jobs exist in the national economy with limited climbing, 

balancing or stooping; no concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, chemicals or high 

humidity; no concentrated exposure to heights or dangerous machinery, that a person 

with Vipond’s age, education and work experience could do. Therefore, the ALJ found 

Vipond is not disabled under 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f) (1985). The District Court 

affirmed the ALJ, finding that substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s 

decision. Vipond appeals. 

 II. 

 We review the Commissioner’s final decision to deny disability on a substantial 

evidence basis. 42 U.S.C. 405(g) (1991). Substantial evidence has been defined as 

"more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate." Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations 

omitted). 

Vipond claims the ALJ erred in denying disability despite Dr. Meloy’s opinion. 

But an ALJ is bound to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight only when 

it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record." 20 

C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(2) (1991). The ALJ found Dr. Meloy’s opinion contrary to the 

great weight of the evidence, including the doctor’s own treatment notes. Substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. 

Vipond claims the ALJ erred by not giving sufficient weight to his subjective 

complaints. The ALJ properly weighed the evidence in the record under 20 C.F.R. 

404.1529 (1991) and found Vipond not fully credible. There is substantial evidence in 

the record to support the ALJ’s finding. 

Finally, Vipond claims the ALJ erred by finding he could do light work. But the 

ALJ in fact found Vipond could do only limited light work, as illustrated in the 

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. Substantial evidence exists to 

support the ALJ’s finding Vipond can do limited light work. 

 III. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

 

 /s/ Anthony J. Scirica 

 Circuit Judge