Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE:

JOSEPH A. TAYLOR

Pendleton, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOSEPH A. TAYLOR, )

)

Appellant-Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A02-1110-PL-993

)

SGT. RINEHART, )

)

Appellee-Defendant. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Rudolph R. Pyle III, Judge

Cause No. 48C01-1110-PL-104

June 29, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1

Joseph Taylor, an inmate at the Pendleton Correction Facility (“the prison”),

appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to the screening procedure of 

Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-2. Taylor raises a single issue for our review, which we 

restate as whether the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 17, 2011, Taylor filed his complaint against “Sgt. Rinehart.”2 

Appellant’s App. at 4. In relevant part, Taylor alleged that the prison’s disciplinary 

procedures denied him certain statutory and constitutional rights. The trial court 

dismissed Taylor’s complaint pursuant to the screening procedure of Indiana Code 

Section 34-58-1-2 and Zimmerman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 2001). This appeal 

ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) subjects to dismissal complaints that “fail[] to state a 

claim up which relief can be granted.” It was on this basis that the trial court dismissed 

Taylor’s complaint and, on appeal, Taylor recites our standard of review under Rule 

12(B)(6). But this is not a Rule 12(B)(6) appeal. Rather, Taylor’s complaint calls into 

question the jurisdiction of Indiana’s courts to hear the subject matter of his claims. 

Blanck v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ind. 2005). “Resolution of the 

 

1

 The trial court dismissed Taylor’s complaint pursuant to the screening procedure of Indiana 

Code Section 34-58-1-2. Because the court dismissed Taylor’s complaint, there were no respondents and, 

as a result, no appellees. This fact is underscored by the Attorney General’s filing of its notice of noninvolvement.

2

 Sergeant Rinehart’s full name is not disclosed.
3

subject matter jurisdiction issue involves determining whether the claim advanced falls 

within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by constitution or statute.” 

Id. Where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, we review whether the trial court has 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Bellows v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cnty. of Elkhart, 

926 N.E.2d 96, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

In Zimmerman, relied upon by the trial court, our supreme court reaffirmed 

established Indiana law that there is no right to judicial review of prison disciplinary 

actions in an Indiana court. 750 N.E.2d at 338. Specifically, the court stated:

In Hasty [v. Broglin, 531 N.E.2d 200 (Ind. 1988)], this Court declared:

Neither Indiana statutes nor common law rules establish 

Hasty’s right to judicial review of prison disciplinary action. 

Absent statutory authorization, Indiana courts have declined 

to review a decision of a penal institution to take away an 

inmate’s good-time credit for a prison infraction. Riner [v. 

Raines], 274 Ind. [113], 115, 409 N.E.2d [575], 577 [(1980)]. 

The current system of administrative review by policy makers 

and executive officers within the correction department 

establishes a fair procedure to resolve disputes, one adequate 

under due process.

Hasty, 531 N.E.2d at 201. In Riner, we expressly held that there is “no 

constitutionally protected right to judicial review of the decisions of factfinding and appellate tribunals presently conducting disciplinary 

proceedings within the prison system.” 274 Ind. at 118-19, 409 N.E.2d at 

579.

In the eleven years since Hasty, the Indiana General Assembly has 

not enacted any statutory authorization providing for the judicial review of 

a disciplinary decision of a penal institution. Regardless of the procedural

vehicle employed—whether mandate to compel compliance with statute or 

direct judicial review of a prison disciplinary decision—Zimmerman is 

seeking judicial intervention in the disciplinary actions of the Department 

of Correction. We decline to retreat from the principles and policies 

reflected in Hasty and Riner. The relief sought is not available in Indiana 

courts.
4

Id. (some alterations original).

In Blanck, our supreme court went further, declaring that Indiana’s courts are 

without subject matter jurisdiction to review an offender’s complaint if that complaint is

based on Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-5, among other statutes. 829 N.E.2d at 509-10. 

Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-5(a) provides in relevant part:

Before imposing any disciplinary action, the department shall afford the 

person charged with misconduct a hearing to determine his guilt or 

innocence and, if guilty, the appropriate action. The charged person may 

waive his right to a hearing. . . . In connection with the hearing, the person 

is entitled to:

(1) have not less than twenty-four (24) hours advance written notice of the 

date, time, and place of the hearing, and of the alleged misconduct, and the 

rule the misconduct is alleged to have violated;

* * *

(8) have a written statement of the findings of fact, the evidence relied 

upon, and the reasons for the action taken;

* * *

Any finding of guilt must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence 

presented at the hearing.

In concluding that Section 11-11-5-5 does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on 

Indiana’s courts, our supreme court held that:

While each of these statutes imposes certain duties on the DOC and, we 

assume, confers substantive rights on inmates, none of them contains any 

provision suggesting that inmates have a right to enforce any such rights in 

court. . . .

* * *

We further conclude that whatever doubt the statutes may leave as to 

whether inmate discipline decisions are subject to judicial review is 
5

resolved in the negative because of the long period of legislative 

acquiescence to our decisions to that effect. As noted above, these 

decisions date back to Riner and Adams [v. Duckworth, 274 Ind. 503, 412 

N.E.2d 789 (1980)] in 1980. . . .

We hold that none of the prison discipline statutes cited confer 

subject matter jurisdiction over claims challenging judicial review of prison 

disciplinary decisions.

Blanck, 829 N.E.2d 509-10.

In his complaint, Taylor alleged that the following errors occurred during the 

course of the prison’s disciplinary process: he was not provided with timely written 

notice of the alleged misconduct or of the rule the misconduct was alleged to have 

violated; he was not provided with a written statement of the findings of fact, the 

evidence relied upon, and the reasons for the action taken; and the prison’s determination 

was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant’s App. at 12-15. 

Taylor’s allegations mirror and expressly rely on Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-5(a). As 

stated in Blanck, Indiana’s courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review such 

claims. 829 N.E.2d 509-10.

Nonetheless, in support of his appeal Taylor cites and relies on Smith v. Sgt. 

Thompson, 910 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In Smith, an inmate claimed that he 

had been denied his due process rights when he was excluded from his disciplinary 

hearing and when the hearing was conducted by a single member instead of three, in 

violation of the rules of the Department of Correction. We held that his complaint stated 

a claim upon which relief could be granted. Smith, 910 N.E.2d at 262.

Smith is inapposite here. Smith addresses only Rule 12(B)(6) and federal 

constitutional law. It does not discuss our subject matter jurisdiction, Indiana Code 11-
6

11-5-5 or Rule 12(B)(1). Accordingly, we decline Taylor’s invitation to follow Smith

and ignore Blanck. We hold that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction 

over Taylor’s complaint and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.