UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GARY A. LOWE, JR., 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-3209

(D.C. No. 6:20-CR-10066-JWB-2)

(D. Kan.)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________

Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Gary A. Lowe, Jr., pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to 

distribute heroin and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Before 

sentencing, Mr. Lowe moved to recuse the judge, who denied the motion and 

imposed a 210-month prison sentence. Mr. Lowe appeals the calculation of his 

sentence and the denial of his recusal motion.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may 

be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 

10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

November 30, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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The Government argues we should dismiss based on the appeal waiver in 

Mr. Lowe’s plea agreement. It also argues Mr. Lowe’s appeal fails on the merits.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss Mr. Lowe’s appeal 

of his sentence by enforcing the appeal waiver. We affirm the denial of his recusal 

motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Indictment

A grand jury indicted Mr. Lowe on five drug- and gun-related charges. He pled 

guilty to possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a 

detectable amount of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Count 2), and to 

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(Count 5). The Government dismissed the remaining counts. 

B. Changes of Counsel

A succession of five attorneys represented Mr. Lowe. Even while represented, 

he routinely attempted to proceed pro se.

His second attorney moved to withdraw. At a hearing on that motion, the district 

court1 permitted Mr. Lowe to speak for himself. He argued the indictment was unfair 

and flawed. The judge told him twice not to argue and denied the motion to 

withdraw. 

1 We refer to the district court and the district judge interchangeably.

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Several weeks later, a third attorney entered an appearance. Within a few

months, the third attorney moved to withdraw. At a hearing on that withdrawal 

motion, Mr. Lowe repeatedly interrupted the judge, who told him to stop and to sit 

down. The judge then granted the motion to withdraw. The court later granted a 

motion for the second attorney to withdraw and appointed a fourth attorney. 

Five months after appointment of the fourth attorney, Mr. Lowe filed a motion 

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The fourth attorney moved to withdraw. 

At the hearing on these motions, the judge noted, “Mr. Lowe, you and I have had a 

couple of hearings together,” and after Mr. Lowe attempted to interrupt, the judge 

continued, “I’m going to start this one off by making sure you understand the ground 

rules . . . . You and I are going to address one another respectfully,” and “[a]t the 

appropriate times I’m going to give you an opportunity to speak and explain your 

position,” but “we’re not going to talk over one another.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 128. The 

judge added, “Ultimately, however, this is my courtroom and so when I talk, 

everyone else stops talking. Somebody’s got to be in charge and around here, that’s 

me; just one of the perks of the job.” Id.

Later at the hearing, when Mr. Lowe spoke out of turn, the judge told him to 

stop until after his counsel had been heard. The judge let Mr. Lowe present his 

argument and then denied both Mr. Lowe’s motion for a new attorney and the fourth 

attorney’s motion to withdraw. 

A few months later at another hearing, Mr. Lowe “made an oral motion to 

appear pro se,” and his fourth attorney “made a[] [renewed] oral motion to 

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withdraw.” Id. at 12-13. Mr. Lowe later withdrew his motion, and the court denied 

the attorney’s motion. Mr. Lowe then “informed the court he would like an 

opportunity to retain a[] [fifth] attorney and requested a continuance of the [] trial 

date.” Id. at 13. The judge then contacted Mr. Lowe’s proposed fifth attorney, who 

confirmed he was willing to represent Mr. Lowe. The judge appointed the fifth 

attorney to the Criminal Justice Act panel and substituted him for the fourth attorney. 

The judge also permitted the fifth attorney to refile several stricken motions that

Mr. Lowe had filed pro se.

C. Guilty Plea and Motion to Withdraw

While represented by the fifth attorney, Mr. Lowe pled guilty to Counts 2 and 

5 under a written plea agreement. The agreement included an appeal waiver that 

prevented Mr. Lowe from challenging “any matter in connection with th[e]

prosecution, his conviction, or the components of the sentence.” Id. at 345-46.

Before sentencing, Mr. Lowe moved pro se to withdraw his plea based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel. At a September 15, 2022 hearing to consider the 

matter, Mr. Lowe’s fifth attorney told the court that “Mr. Lowe ha[d] not authorized 

[him] to do anything at this stage.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 34. The court permitted 

Mr. Lowe to present his motion. When Mr. Lowe challenged the judge’s “failure to 

[] advise” him about the plea, the judge read “a rough transcript of the plea hearing.” 

Id. at 38. During this reading, Mr. Lowe repeatedly interrupted the judge, who told 

him, “Don’t interrupt me,” id., and, “Will you quit interrupting me? When I talk you 

stop talking,” id. at 39. The judge and Mr. Lowe then had the following exchange:

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THE COURT: Don’t talk to [the prosecutor].

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I’m talking to the Court. 

THE COURT: Well, then don’t look at [the prosecutor]. 

THE DEFENDANT: I can’t look around?

THE COURT: Don’t you get smart with me. I haven’t 

finished sentencing you yet. I will be the one who will be 

sentencing you. You want to sit here and poke me in the 

eye, see what happens.

THE DEFENDANT: I already know what’s going to 

happen.

THE COURT: You don’t know anything that is going to 

happen, Mr. -- listen to me. I have no desire to grind you 

up. I’m not going to give you 30 years. I know that right 

here and now. I am going to give you a reasonable and 

just sentence once I review the presentence report and go 

through the sentencing process. I have got nothing against 

you, but I’m telling you you’re quite foolish to come in 

here antagonizing the person who is going to sentence you. 

That’s not a very wise litigation strategy. Now, what else 

do you have to say?

Id. at 45. Later in the hearing, the colloquy escalated:

THE DEFENDANT: It doesn’t matter what you 

explained, once this man told me that --

THE COURT: Quit interrupting me.

THE DEFENDANT: -- it didn’t --

THE COURT: This hearing is over.

THE DEFENDANT: All right, this man does this, I told 

you, I knew this.

THE COURT: Get this man out of here.

THE DEFENDANT: I told you --

THE COURT: You’ll get a written order; we’re done. 

This hearing is over.

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THE DEFENDANT: . . . You didn’t do nothing but be 

bias [sic] to [sic] me through this whole proceeding.

Id. at 58.

The court denied Mr. Lowe’s motion to withdraw his plea. 

D. Motion to Recuse

After the district court denied Mr. Lowe’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 

he filed a pro se motion to recuse the judge. In the motion, Mr. Lowe argued he was 

not receiving “fair and impartial hearings,” ROA, Vol. 1 at 399, and that the judge 

was biased against him and was “hostile and harbor[ed] an aversion” toward him, id.

at 406. Mr. Lowe cited 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Tenth Circuit case law regarding 

judicial recusal. Id. at 398-99; id. at 408 (citing United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 

1243 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2005)). He

also filed a pro se affidavit in support of his motion to recuse. 

At a hearing on the motion, Mr. Lowe’s counsel said he could not argue on 

Mr. Lowe’s behalf because he was not authorized to do so. ROA, Vol. 3 at 67 (“I 

don’t feel like I can argue this motion, Your Honor. But I think Mr. Lowe . . . would 

like to argue [it] . . . .”). The judge did not permit Mr. Lowe to argue the motion 

himself. Without hearing argument, the judge rejected Mr. Lowe’s motion, stating:

I went through that process [hearing the pro se guilty plea 

withdrawal motion] until Mr. Lowe he became so 

disruptive that I had him remove[d] from the Court and 

ultimately issued a written ruling on that matter [the guilty 

plea withdrawal]. . . . I think overall any objective person 

looking at that record would conclude that I have bent over 

backwards to accommodate this defendant who has been 

undoubtedly the most obstructive and difficult defendant to 

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deal with in any criminal case that I have had since coming 

on the bench. . . . There is just no basis whatsoever for any 

objective person to believe that I am biased, prejudiced, or 

have any sort of favoritism toward the Government. I 

reject that and I have made my record on it. So that 

motion is denied.

Id. at 77.

E. Sentencing

The district court proceeded to sentencing. When Mr. Lowe was arrested, 

police had found drugs and currency at his home. The Presentence Investigation 

Report (“PSR”) had converted the amount of currency found at Mr. Lowe’s residence 

to drug weight based on a dollars per pound ratio and added that calculated drug 

weight to the weight of actual drugs found at his residence. Mr. Lowe objected, 

arguing the drug quantity in the report differed from the “factual basis in the plea 

agreement.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 418. The court rejected Mr. Lowe’s argument, noting 

that calculating drug weight based on the factual basis in the plea is “not what is 

contemplated under the [U.S. Sentencing] [G]uidelines and the plea specifically 

contemplates relevant conduct” like related currency. ROA, Vol. 3 at 125.

The court sentenced Mr. Lowe to 210 months in prison on Count 2 and 

120 months on Count 5, to run concurrently. He also received three years of 

supervised release for each count, to run concurrently. 

F. Appeal and Motion to Enforce Appeal Waiver

Mr. Lowe timely appealed. The Government moved to enforce Mr. Lowe’s 

appeal waiver and to dismiss the appeal. Following briefing on the issue, we denied 

the motion without prejudice to the Government’s raising the issue in its brief. 

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Although Mr. Lowe’s docketing statement expressed his intent to raise four 

issues on appeal, he has only raised two in his opening brief: (1) whether the district 

judge abused his discretion in declining to recuse, and (2) whether the district court

erred in determining the converted drug quantity based on the PSR. Aplt. Br. 

at 14, 25. 

The Government raised the appeal waiver issue in its response brief, arguing 

we should enforce the waiver as to both issues and dismiss the appeal. Aplee. Br. 

at 20. It alternatively argued we should affirm on the merits. Mr. Lowe did not file a 

reply.

II. DISCUSSION

We enforce the appeal waiver on Mr. Lowe’s sentencing claim but exercise 

our discretion to address the recusal issue on the merits.

A. Legal Background

“We review de novo the enforceability of a defendant’s appeal waiver in a plea 

agreement.” United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1301 (10th Cir. 2022).

In deciding whether to enforce the waiver, we ask: “(1) whether the disputed 

appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether 

enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Hahn, 

359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).

We determine whether the appeal waiver bars each argument presented on 

appeal. See, e.g., Gross, 44 F.4th at 1302-03 (holding two issues fell within appeal 

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waiver and “dismiss[ing] [the defendant’s] appeal insofar as [his] arguments” bore on 

those issues); United States v. Novosel, 481 F.3d 1288, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2007)

(analyzing separately whether the appeal waiver covered ineffective assistance of 

counsel and factual basis for guilty plea).

Because appeal waivers do not affect our jurisdiction, Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1324, 

we may “bypass resolution” of an appeal waiver issue and reach the merits, United 

States v. Garcia-Ramirez, 778 F.3d 856, 857 (10th Cir. 2015). We do so here on the 

recusal issue because: “(1) the waiver issue [i]s relatively complex, (2) the 

government ha[s] briefed the merits, and (3) [Mr. Lowe’s] appellate argument clearly 

fail[s].” Id. (citing United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113, 1115 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014)).

B. Application

Sentencing

Mr. Lowe alleges procedural error in the district court’s drug-quantity 

calculation used for sentencing. See United States v. Williams, 48 F.4th 1125, 1128 

(10th Cir. 2022) (explaining that a challenge to a drug-quantity calculation is 

procedural). Analyzing the three Hahn factors, we enforce Mr. Lowe’s appeal waiver 

on his sentencing challenge.

a. Scope

Even “strictly constru[ing]” the language of Mr. Lowe’s appeal waiver, United 

States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted), his 

procedural reasonableness challenge falls within the waiver’s scope. His appeal 

waiver reads:

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The defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right 

to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection 

with this prosecution, his conviction, or the components of 

the sentence . . . . The defendant also waives any right to 

challenge his sentence, or the manner in which it was 

determined, or otherwise attempt to modify or change his 

sentence, in any collateral attack, including, but not limited 

to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (except as 

limited by United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 

1187 (10th Cir. 2001)), or a motion brought under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In other words, the 

defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed 

in this case, except to the extent, if any, the Court departs 

or varies upwards from the sentencing Guideline range that 

the Court determines to be applicable. . . . 

Notwithstanding the forgoing [sic] waivers, the parties 

understand that the defendant in no way waives any 

subsequent claims with regards to ineffective assistance of 

counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.

ROA, Vol. 1 at 345-46. Mr. Lowe thus waived the “right to appeal . . . the 

components of his sentence,” “any right to challenge his sentence, or the manner in 

which it was determined,” and “the right to appeal the sentence imposed,” except in a 

situation not relevant here (upward departure or variance from the Guidelines range). 

Id. In Gross, we enforced an appeal waiver under nearly identical language: the 

defendant “waived the right to appeal his ‘sentence as imposed by the Court, 

including . . . the manner in which the sentence is determined.’” 44 F.4th at 1301

(alterations in original). Mr. Lowe’s sentence challenge falls within the scope of his 

appeal waiver.

b. Knowing and voluntary

Mr. Lowe has not argued his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. 

In his response to the Government’s motion to enforce the plea waiver, he argued 

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only that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his “constitutional right to an 

unbiased judge” or “his right to assert ineffective assistance of counsel.” See 

Doc. 10977154 at 13-14. As noted, Mr. Lowe has not replied to the Government’s 

renewed motion to enforce the appeal waiver. He thus has not shown the appeal 

waiver was not knowing and voluntary. See Anderson, 374 F.3d at 958-59.

c. Miscarriage of justice 

Enforcement of the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. A 

defendant may show a miscarriage of justice “[1] where the district court relied on an 

impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in 

connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where 

the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise 

unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (alterations in original) (quotations omitted). 

Mr. Lowe has not done so.

First, no evidence shows that Mr. Lowe’s race or a similar impermissible

factor affected his sentence.

Second, Mr. Lowe argued in his response to the motion to enforce the appeal 

waiver that he could claim ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the 

negotiation of his plea agreement. See Doc. 10977154 at 15-17. But the record

shows otherwise. 

In one of his pro se motions in district court, Mr. Lowe argued ineffective 

assistance because he entered into the plea agreement “pur[e]ly based on the stern 

advice of [his] attorney.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 349. He claimed that “[t]he plea was given 

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to [him] the morning of [his] trial, and in the course of 10 minutes [his] attorn[e]y 

briefly tried to explain it to [him],” and that “[n]ever, not once did [the attorney] tell 

[Mr. Lowe] . . . about the maximum sentence that [he] could receive.” Id. at 349-50. 

But the district court found Mr. Lowe’s claims to be “contradicted by the record.” 

Id. at 390.

The Government offered the plea to Mr. Lowe more than six months before his 

trial date, amended it once, and then re-extended it to him four months before the 

trial. Id. at 292-93. The Government also told the court that Mr. Lowe’s fourth and 

fifth attorneys had both reviewed the plea agreement with him. Id. at 293. Mr. Lowe 

admitted to the court that he understood the appeal waiver would “generally giv[e] up 

[his] right to challenge th[e] prosecution, [his] conviction, or [his] sentence in this 

case.” Id. at 314-15. And he admitted that the plea agreement was “read by [him] or 

at least read to [him] word for word” and that he and his fifth attorney “had time to 

review and discuss all the documents or other evidence produced by the 

Government.” Id. at 307. 

In this court, Mr. Lowe argued in his response to the Government’s motion to 

enforce the appeal waiver that “a full record was not developed” on this issue. 

Doc. 10977154 at 16. But given the record before us, nothing indicates Mr. Lowe 

received ineffective assistance in the negotiation of the waiver.

Third, Mr. Lowe’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. The 

statutory maximum for his drug offense alone without enhancements for prior 

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offenses was 20 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Mr. Lowe was sentenced to 

210 months (17.5 years) in prison. ROA, Vol. 1 at 442. 

Fourth, we see no reason, and Mr. Lowe has not provided one, why the waiver 

would be otherwise unlawful.

* * * * 

We enforce Mr. Lowe’s appeal waiver and dismiss his appeal on the 

sentencing issue.

Recusal 

Rather than address whether Mr. Lowe’s motion to recuse is within the scope 

of his appeal waiver, we exercise our discretion to address it on the merits. See 

Garcia-Ramirez, 778 F.3d at 857.

Mr. Lowe contends the district court judge erred in denying his motion to 

recuse because (1) based on the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, “a 

reasonable person would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality,” requiring 

recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455; and (2) the judge was required to ask another judge to 

decide the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Aplt. Br. at 16. 

a. Partiality 

We review the “denial of a motion to disqualify a judge for abuse of 

discretion.” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1052 (10th Cir. 2019). “Under this 

standard, we will not reverse unless the [judge] has made an arbitrary, capricious,

whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted).

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“Section 455(a) requires disqualification for the appearance of impartiality, 

§ 455(b)(1) for actual partiality.” Id. at 1053; see also Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 552-53 & n.2 (1994). Section 455(a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or 

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” And § 455(b) lists specific 

grounds for disqualification, including “[w]here [the judge] has a personal bias or 

prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Mr. Lowe invokes both 

§ 455(a) and § 455(b)(1). Aplt. Br. at 13.2

Both arguments fail. Mr. Lowe has not shown any judicial bias or partiality. 

The Supreme Court has held that “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, 

annoyance, and even anger,” do “[n]ot establish[] bias or partiality.” Liteky, 510 U.S. 

at 555-56. “A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and 

short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain 

immune” from challenge under § 455. Id. at 556.

At the September 15 hearing, the judge employed “ordinary efforts at 

courtroom administration,” id., particularly in light of Mr. Lowe’s lack of decorum 

throughout the proceedings and his self-described “impulsive[ness],” ROA, Vol. 3 at 

2 The Government appears to assert that Mr. Lowe made only a § 455(a) 

argument and not one under § 455(b)(1). See Aplee. Br. at 39-40. We think 

arguments under both are preserved. Although Mr. Lowe’s motion concerned a 

“violation of 28 U.S.C. [§] 455(a),” ROA, Vol. 1 at 398, the judge also addressed

whether he should recuse under (b)(1), ROA, Vol. 3 at 68. We may “reach issues 

that were either pressed by the appellant before, or passed upon by, the lower court.” 

Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotations 

omitted).

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43. Mr. Lowe argues the statement “Don’t you get smart with me. I haven’t finished 

sentencing you yet,” is “objectively, [] a threat.” Aplt. Br. at 21. We disagree, 

especially in light of the judge’s immediate statement to the contrary: “I have no 

desire to grind you up. I’m not going to give you 30 years. I know that right here 

and now. I am going to give you a reasonable and just sentence once I review the 

presentence report and go through the sentencing process.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 45.

Mr. Lowe also takes issue with the district judge’s statements at earlier 

hearings. See Aplt. Br. at 16-18. Those statements—such as, “Somebody’s got to be

in charge and around here, that’s me; just one of the perks of the job,” ROA Vol. 1 at 

128, and, “Quit interrupting me,” ROA, Vol. 3 at 58—are at most “expressions of 

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” made while attempting to

maintain decorum in the courtroom, Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56. Even though the 

judge said Mr. Lowe was “undoubtedly the most obstructive and difficult defendant 

to deal with in any criminal case that [he] ha[d] had since coming on the bench,” 

ROA, Vol. 3 at 77, the judge showed no bias against Mr. Lowe nor partiality toward 

the Government.

We see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s denial of Mr. Lowe’s motion.

b. Decision by another judge

Mr. Lowe argues on appeal that another judge should have decided his recusal 

motion. Aplt. Br. at 15, 16. But he did not raise this issue in district court, nor did

the judge address it. Mr. Lowe thus forfeited this argument, and he has not argued 

plain error on appeal. “When an appellant fails to preserve an issue and also fails to 

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make a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather 

than merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all . . . .” United States v. 

Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019). We will not review the issue in these 

circumstances.

III. CONCLUSION

We dismiss the appeal as to Mr. Lowe’s sentencing issue and affirm the 

district court’s denial of his motion to recuse the district judge.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr.

Circuit Judge

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