J-S15001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PAUL DAVID WEIMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1461 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-02-CR-0011523-2010

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PAUL DAVID WEIMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1462 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-02-CR-0011522-2010

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PAUL DAVID WEIMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1463 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-02-CR-0011535-2010
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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 27, 2020

Appellant, Paul David Weimer, appeals from the judgment of sentence

of an aggregate term of 231⁄2 to 47 years’ incarceration, imposed in three

separate cases,1 after he was convicted by a jury of 21 criminal offenses

committed against three adolescent boys, including involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse (IDSI), statutory sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a child

(EWOC), and corruption of a minor (COM). On appeal, Weimer solely

challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we 

affirm.

In a prior appeal, we summarized the pertinent facts and procedural

history of Weimer’s cases, as follows:

Weimer, who was forty years old, was arrested on August

5, 2010[,] and eventually charged, regarding victim, J.D. at

11535–2010, with ... []IDSI[], unlawful contact with the

minor, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, furnishing

liquor to minors, and two counts of [COM]; he was charged

regarding victim, J.C. at 11524–2010, with unlawful contact

with a minor, [COM] and open lewdness; regarding victim,

R.Z., he was charged at 11522–2010 with two counts of

rape, IDSI, unlawful contact with a minor, two counts of

statutory sexual assault, [EWOC], [COM], and furnishing

liquor to minors; and regarding victim, M.G., he was

charged at 11523–2010 with IDSI, indecent assault,

[EWOC], and [COM].

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This Court sua sponte issued a per curiam order on July 22, 2019, 

consolidating Weimer’s three appeals.
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***

At the conclusion of the jury trial, Weimer was acquitted

of all charges regarding J.C.; regarding J.D., he was

convicted of furnishing liquor to minors, unlawful contact

with a minor and two counts of [COM], and acquitted of

IDSI, statutory sexual assault and indecent assault;

regarding R.Z., he was convicted of IDSI, unlawful contact

with a minor, two counts of statutory sexual assault,

[EWOC], [COM], furnishing alcohol to minors, and acquitted

of two counts of rape; regarding M.G., he was convicted of

IDSI, indecent assault, [EWOC], and [COM].

Commonwealth v. Weimer, [No.] 1331 WDA 2012, 

[unpublished memorandum at *1] (Pa. Super. ... filed [Aug. 1, 

2013]).

The Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to seek

imposition of the 10–year mandatory minimum sentence for the

IDSI convictions, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a). Prior to

sentencing, the court held a hearing where it determined that

Weimer met the criteria to be classified as a Sexually Violent

Predator (SVP) under this Commonwealth’s version of Megan's

Law.2 On March 13, 2012, Weimer was sentenced to an aggregate

term of imprisonment of 25–50 years. Specifically, the court

sentenced Weimer to: consecutive sentences of 10–20 years of

incarceration on each count of IDSI with regard to R.Z. and M.G.,

and a consecutive term of 5–10 years of incarceration for unlawful

contact with a minor with regard to J.D.3 Weimer filed post-trial

motions that were denied on August 2, 2012, save for the court

granting Weimer two days of credit. Weimer filed a timely direct

appeal; our Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on August 1,

2013. [See Weimer, No. 1331 WDA 2012.] On November 27,

2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Weimer’s petition

for allowance of appeal. [Commonwealth v. Weimer, 83 A.3d 

777 (Pa. 2013).]

2 See 42 Pa.C.S.[] §§ 9791–9799.9. On December 20,

2011, the legislature enacted the Sex Offender Registration

and Notification Act (SORNA), effective in one year, or

December 20, 2012. Thus, at the time Weimer was

sentenced, SORNA was not yet in effect. However, under

SORNA[,] he is now classified as a Tier III offender who will
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be a lifetime registrant. See 42 Pa.C.S.[] §§ 9799.14(d)(4),

9799.15(a)(3).[2]

3 No further penalty was imposed on the remaining charges 

for which Weimer was convicted.

On April 7, 2014, Weimer filed a pro se PCRA[3] petition. On April

14, 2014, the court appointed PCRA Counsel, Thomas Farrell,

Esquire. On May 28, 2014, the court granted counsel’s petition to

appoint an investigator. On February 25, 2015, the trial court

gave Weimer [a] Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

the petition without a hearing. On June 16, 2015, Attorney Farrell

filed an amended PCRA petition on behalf of Weimer. On July 12,

2016, the court dismissed Weimer’s petition.

Commonwealth v. Weimer, 167 A.3d 78, 80–81 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Weimer timely appealed the order dismissing his PCRA petition. On 

appeal, this Court concluded that Weimer’s mandatory-minimum sentences 

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In Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), our Supreme 

Court held that the registration requirements under SORNA are punitive, thus 

overturning prior decisions deeming those requirements civil in nature. Id.

at 1218. Thereafter, in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212, 1217-18 

(Pa. Super. 2017), this Court ruled that under Muniz, the registration, 

notification, and counseling requirements of SORNA’s SVP provision, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(e)(3), is also punitive and, consequently, the statutory 

requirements for designating an offender an SVP do not satisfy the dictates of 

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 106 (2013) (holding that “facts that 

increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury” and 

found beyond a reasonable doubt). Following Muniz and Butler, the 

Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted legislation to amend SORNA, see Act 

of Feb. 21 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”), and the Governor of Pennsylvania 

thereafter signed new legislation striking the Act 10 amendments and 

reenacting several SORNA provisions, effective June 12, 2018. See Act of 

June 12, 2018, P.L. 1952, No. 29. Additionally, our Supreme Court recently 

reversed this Court’s decision in Butler, holding that SORNA’s requirements 

for SVPs do not constitute criminal punishment and are not subject to the 

conditions set forth in Alleyne. Commonwealth v. Butler, ––– A.3d ––––,

2020 WL 1466299 (Pa. filed Mar. 26, 2020). 

3 Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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for IDSI were illegal under Alleyne, and his 5 to 10 year sentence for unlawful 

contact with a minor was also illegal because it exceeded the statutory 

maximum term permissible for that offense. See Weimer, supra. 

Accordingly, we vacated Weimer’s judgment of sentence in each of his three 

cases, and remanded for resentencing.

On April 3, 2018, the trial court conducted Weimer’s resentencing 

hearing. At the close thereof, the court imposed a term of 31⁄2 to 7 years’ 

incarceration for Weimer’s conviction of unlawful contact with a minor, and 

two, non-mandatory terms of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for both of his 

IDSI convictions. All sentences were ordered to run consecutively, totaling an 

aggregate term of 231⁄2 to 47 years’ incarceration. 

Weimer filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied by 

operation of law on September 27, 2018. He then filed timely notices of 

appeal in each case, and he complied with the trial court’s order to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The 

court thereafter filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Weimer states one issue for 

our review: “Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion when it sentenc[ed 

Weimer] to consecutive statutory maximum sentences in excess of the 

[a]ggravated [r]ange of the sentencing guidelines and without giving 

meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 

9721?” Weimer’s Brief at 5. 

Preliminarily, section 9721 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
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(b) General standards.--In selecting from the alternatives set 

forth in subsection (a), the court shall follow the general principle 

that the sentence imposed should call for total confinement that 

is consistent with section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and 

the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates 

to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall also 

consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted 

by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect 

under section 2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for 

sentencing, resentencing and parole, risk assessment instrument 

and recommitment ranges following revocation). In every case in 

which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, 

modifies a sentence, resentences a person following revocation of 

probation or resentences following remand, the court shall make 

as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of 

sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence 

imposed. In every case where the court imposes a sentence or 

resentence outside the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania 

Commission on Sentencing under sections 2154 (relating to 

adoption of guidelines for sentencing), 2154.1 (relating to 

adoption of guidelines for restrictive conditions), 2154.3 (relating 

to adoption of guidelines for fines), 2154.4 (relating to adoption 

of guidelines for resentencing) and 2154.5 (relating to adoption of 

guidelines for parole) and made effective under section 2155, the 

court shall provide a contemporaneous written statement of the 

reason or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines to the 

commission, as established under section 2153(a)(14) (relating to 

powers and duties). Failure to comply shall be grounds for 

vacating the sentence or resentence and resentencing the 

defendant.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Weimer contends that the trial court did not adhere to the requirements 

of section 9721, and imposed an excessive sentence, for the following 

reasons: (1) it failed to consider mitigating factors such as his minimal criminal 

history, ability to contribute to society if released, and good conduct in prison 

while incarcerated prior to the resentencing hearing; (2) it ignored the 
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sentencing guidelines; (3) it failed to provide reasons for sentencing him 

above the guideline ranges; (4) it did not consider Weimer’s rehabilitative 

needs; and (5) the court placed undue and improper weight on the “presentence report and sentence [Weimer] served in 1993 after a misdemeanor 

level conviction.” Weimer’s Brief at 26.

Weimer’s arguments challenge the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. 

Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke 

this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the] 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing

Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006), 

appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006). Objections to 

the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if 

they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to 

modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 

A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003)....

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must 

be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,

925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question 

exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument 

that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Sierra, supra at 912–13.
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Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

As stated supra, Weimer filed a timely notice of appeal. He also filed a 

timely post-sentence motion challenging his sentence. However, in that 

motion, Weimer did not assert that the court failed to consider his minimal 

criminal history, ability to contribute to society, or rehabilitative needs. 

Weimer also does not cite to where he raised these issues before the court at 

his resentencing hearing. Therefore, these claims are waived. See Griffin, 

65 A.3d at 936 (“[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the 

trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an 

objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.”) (citation 

omitted).

Additionally, Weimer did not raise, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, his 

contention that the court failed to consider the mitigating factor of his good 

conduct while incarcerated prior to the resentencing hearing. Notably, the 

court informed Weimer, in its order to file a concise statement, that any issue 

not set forth therein would be deemed waived. See Rule 1925(b) Order, 

10/17/18, at 1 (single page). Consequently, this claim is waived, as well. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or 

not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are 

waived.”).
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In regard to Weimer’s remaining arguments, the Commonwealth 

adamantly objects to the adequacy of his Rule 2119(f) statement. Therein, 

Weimer states, in total, the following:

Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. [] 

2000)[,] requires that the Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) Statement for 

purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b) must specify where the sentence 

falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines, what particular 

provision of the sentencing code the sentence violates, what 

fundamental norm the sentence violates, and the manner in which 

it violates that norm. 

Based on the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing

Guideline Sentence Forms used in this matter, the ranges of 

sentences are as follows - [a]t each count of IDSI[,] the offense 

gravity score is twelve. [Weimer’s] criminal history category is 

two. The sentencing guideline range is 48 months in the mitigated 

range, 60–78 months in the standard range and 90 months in the 

aggravated range. For Unlawful Contact With a Minor (F3)[,] the 

offense gravity score is five and the sentencing guideline range is 

non-confinement in the mitigated range, 3–14 months in the 

standard range and 17 months in the aggravated range.

[Weimer’s] sentence, considering the advisory guidelines 

range for each count of conviction to which Appellant was 

sentenced, is manifestly excessive.

Weimer’s Brief at 12.

Clearly, Weimer did not present in his Rule 2119(f) statement many of 

the discrete claims he raises in the Argument section of his brief, or explain 

how those claims constitute substantial questions for our review. Additionally, 

to the extent that he baldly states that his sentence is manifestly excessive 

considering the applicable guideline ranges, we agree with the 

Commonwealth’s lengthy argument that Weimer has not demonstrated a 

substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 6-16. In 
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Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 733 (Pa. Super. 2003), we held 

that bald allegations presented in a Rule 2119(f) statement do not present a 

substantial question. Additionally, we have explained that “this Court is not 

persuaded by bald assertions or the invocation of special words in a concise 

statement of reasons; [t]o the contrary, a concise statement must articulate 

the way in which the court’s conduct violated the sentencing code or 

process.” Commonwealth v. Cannon, 954 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (citation omitted).

A Rule 2119(f) statement that simply “contains incantations of 

statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions of law” is 

inadequate.

Rather, only where the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement 

sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence

violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme 

set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental 

norm underlying the sentencing process, will such a 

statement be deemed adequate to raise a substantial 

question so as to permit a grant of allowance of appeal of 

the discretionary aspects of the sentence.

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 529 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002)).

Here, as the Commonwealth observes, Weimer’s

[Rule] 2119(f) statement fails to provide even the most basic data 

that the Court needs to determine whether a “substantial 

question” exists. The statement does not even inform the Court 

of what sentence was imposed, much less where the sentence falls 

in relation to the Sentencing Guidelines. The statement does not 

articulate reasons why that sentence raises doubts as to whether 

the trial court properly considered the sentencing guidelines. It 

does not specify what particular provision of the Sentencing Code 

has been violated, what fundamental sentencing norm was 
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violated, or in what manner the sentence violated any norm or 

Code provision. The statement does not identify any alleged 

breach of legal principles or provisions by the sentencing court. 

As a result, this Court is placed in the position of having to 

speculate as to the nature of, or basis for, [Weimer’s] claim that 

a substantial question exists. In short, [Weimer’s] “mere 

assertion” that a substantial question exists does not prove that 

one does.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 14-15 (citations omitted). 

We are compelled to agree with the Commonwealth that the cursory, 

single-sentence claim by Weimer that, given the applicable guideline ranges,

his sentence is manifestly excessive is insufficient to demonstrate a 

substantial question warranting our review. Moreover, Weimer does not set 

forth in his Rule 2119(f) statement any of the other, more specific sentencing 

challenges that he presents in his Argument section. Accordingly, he has 

failed to establish that a substantial question exists for our review.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins this memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/27/2020