### FILED JANUARY 5, 2016 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt W A State Court ofAppeals, Division III

IN THECOURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISIONTHREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 32809-I-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) lC.,t ) ) Appellant. ) LAWRENCE-BERREY, 1. This case requires this courtto interpret and apply RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v), which concerns sealingjuvenilerecords. That subsection prohibits sealingwhen a person'sjuvenilecourtrecord contains an adjudication for indecent liberties thatwas "actually committed" with forcible compulsion. As ajuvenile, lC. pleaded guilty to an amended charge ofindecent liberties by forcible compulsion. As an adult, heunsuccessfully movedto seal hisjuvenileconviction file. Hecontends thetrial court erredbecausethe evidence shows thathe did not "actually" use forcible compulsion incommitting indecent liberties.

t Forpurposes ofthis opinion, the minor's initials are used in place ofhisname.No. 32809-1-III 

### State v. 

### J.C
We resolve two questions: (1) whetherRCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) required the trial court to determine whether lC. actually used forcible compulsion, and (2) whether it is appropriate for this court to render an ultimate decision at thisjuncture. We answer the first question yes, and the second question no. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's order, and remand for the trial court to conduct a hearing and enter findings offact and conclusions oflaw. FACTS! When J.C. was 13 years old he volunteered at a "Mothers ofPreschool Children" (MOPS) program. While the mothers met in a separatepart ofthe building, J.e. sat at a classroom table with M.B.C., a five-year-old girl, and W.A.B., a five-year-old boy, and exposed himselfto both ofthem. He asked M.B.C. and W.A.B. to do the same. M.B.C. '"toldhim no because Mom saidnot to,'" but J.C. said, '"show me anyway.'" Clerk's Papers at 1. Both M.B.C. and W.A.B. then exposed themselves to J.C. He then asked W.A.B. to touch his penis, and W.A.B. complied. J.C. told M.B.C. and W.A.B. not to tell anyone whatthey had done. When later questioned by Detective Kevin Bechtold, J.e.

I These facts come from the police reports that supported the initial probable cause determination. In the statement ofplea ofguilty form, lC. admitted to the facts in these reports. 2No. 32809-I-II1 State 

### v. 1.

### C.
admitted he had exposed himselfto W.A.B. on two prior occasions, and had asked W.A.B. to expose his penis once prior. The State charged lC. with child molestation inthe first degree and indecent exposure. A negotiated settlementresulted in the State amending the charge to indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, and lC. pleading guilty to the amended charge.2 The trial court ordered J.C. into the special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) program. J.C. completed the SSODAprogram and all other court-imposed requirements. The Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration released J.C. from supervision, and in 2012, he no longer was required to register as a sex offender. In August 2014, J.C. movedto seal hisjuvenile record under RCW 13.50.260(3). Dueto the legislature's reworking ofchapter 13.50 RCW in 2011,juvenilerecords containing sex offenses-includingclass A felony sex offenses-are requiredto be sealed ifsixconditions are met.3 The State agreed that J.C. met all conditions, exceptthe

2In what is commonlyreferred to as aBarrplea, a personpleads guilty to a substituted charge and a trial court can accept the plea even thoughthere is no factual basis for it, provided there is a factual basis for the original charge. In re Pers. Restraint a/Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265,684 P.2d 712 (1984). 3The full statute provides: (4)(a) The courtshallgrant anymotion to sealrecords for class A offenses made pursuant to subsection (3) ofthis section if: (i) Since the last date ofrelease from confinement, including fulltime residential treatment, ifany, or entry ofdisposition, the person has 3No. 32809-1-111 

### State 

### v. J. 

### C.
fifth: that he had "notbeen convicted of
... indecent liberties thatwas actually committed with forcible compulsion." RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v). The trial court agreed with the State and denied lC.'s motion to seal. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS 

### J.C. argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to seal. He argues that the statutoryprovision in question required the trial court to determine whether he actually used forcible compulsion, and because he did not use forcible compulsion, his motion to seal should have been granted.

spent five consecutive years in the community without committing any offense or crime that subsequently results in an adjudication orconviction; Oi) Noproceeding is pending against the movingparty seekingthe conviction ofajuvenileoffense or a criminal offense; (iii) No proceeding is pending seekingthe formation ofa diversion agreement with that person; (iv) The person is no longer required toregist.er as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.l30 or hasbeen relieved ofthe duty to register under RCW 9A.44.143 ifthe person was convicted ofa sexoffense; 

### (v) Theperson has not been convictedof rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, or 

### indecent liberties that was actually committed withforcible compulsion; and (vi) The person has paidthe full amount ofrestitution owingtothe individual victim named in therestitution order, excludingrestitution owed to any insurance provider authorized under Title 48 RCW. RCW 13.50.260 (emphasis added). 4No. 32809-1-III State v. J. C.
A. WhetherRCWJ3.50.260(4)(a)(v) requires the trial court to determine whetherJ. C. actually used forcible compulsion 1. Standard ofreview The legal standard for sealing orunsealing records is a question oflaw reviewed de novo. Rufer v. AbbottLabs., 154 Wn.2d 530,540, 114 P.3d 1182 (2005). RCW 13.50.260(3) permits a person who is the subject ofa filedjuvenile offender complaint and has nothadhis or herjuvenilecourtrecord sealedto movethe courtto vacate its order and findings and seal the officialjuvenile courtrecord, except
as to certainpersons and for certain purposes as set forth in RCW 13.50.050. In RCW 13.50.260(4)(a), the legislature removed trial court discretion and directed that trial courts "shall grant any motion to seal records for class 

### A offenses made pursuantto subsection (3)" ifsix conditions are met. Becausethe legislature removedtrial court discretion, the general abuse ofdiscretion standard otherwise applicable to a trial court's granting ordenying a motion to seal is not appropriate here. 2. Statutory background RCW 13.50.260 governs sealingjuvenilecriminal records.4 Washington has

4 RCW 13.50.050 governedjuvenilerecord sealinguntil June 2014. In June 2014, the sections ofRCW 13.50.050 addressing sealinghearings and sealingjuvenile offender records wererecodified in a new section, RCW 13.50.260. See LAWS OF 2014, ch. 175, §§ 3-4. 5No. 32809-1-111 State 

### v. J.

### C. historicallyprovided a mechanism forjuveniles convicted ofsex offenses to have their records sealed. See State v. Webster, 69 Wn. App. 376, 378, 848 P.2d 1300 (1993) (holdingtrial court was obligated to sealjuvenile'srecords once statutoryrequirements
were met, even if juvenile was convicted ofa sex offense). However, in July 1997, the legislature amended former RCW 13.50.050 and prohibited sealingjuvenilerecords containing sex offenses. See LAWS OF 1997, ch. 338, 

### §40(11) ("The court shall grantthe motion to seal records
... ifit finds that
... (d) The person has notbeen convicted ofa class A or sex offense."). In 2011, the Washington State Senate introduced S.B. 5204, which proposed reinstating the right for ex-juvenile offenders to have certainjuvenile sex offense records sealed. See S.B. 5204, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (deleting the condition, "[t]he person has not been convicted ofa sex offense" and replacing it with, "[t]heperson is no longer required to register as a sex offender"). S.B. 5204, as it was originally introduced, included a list offive conditions for an ex-juvenile offender to meet before that person's juvenilerecord containing a sex offense couldbe sealed: (1) five consecutive years in the community without acquiring a new adjudication or conviction, (2) no pendingjuvenile
or criminal offenses, (3) no pending diversionary agreements, (4) the person is no longer requiredto register as a sex offender, and (5) full restitution has been paid. Id.

6No. 32809-I-III State 

### v. 

### Je.
Afterthe original bill had been introduced, the Washington Association of ProsecutingAttorneys (WAPA) lobbied the sponsors ofthe bill to categoricallyprohibit sealingjuvenilerecords containing adjudications for three crimes: first degree rape, second degree rape, and forcible indecent liberties.5 In response, the legislature drafted RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v), inserted the newprovision into the Substitute Senate Bill, and includedtheprovision in the enacted law.6 See SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5204, at 14, 62d Leg.,

5WAPA's Tom McBride testifiedto the Senate Committee onHuman Services and Corrections: Here to request an amendment on this bill
...the second thing we did in the sealing statute is we gavethe court a specific list offactual findings and then you should seal the records. Well the problem is, Senator Hargrove, as you said, there's "sex offenders" and there's sex offenders, and there's three crimes thatwe don'tthink this is a sufficient amount oftime to keep track of, and there's apublic safety issue. Andthose are the crimes ofrape inthe first degree, rape in the second degree, and forcible indecent liberties. And the reason why, is these are as much crimes ofviolence as they are sex, and it'sthat intersection ofviolence and sex. These are crimes thatwe think are pretty serious, they needto be kept track of. Thankfully there's not very many ofthem. Most ofthe sex offenses inthejuvenile system are goingto be rape ofa child or child molestation-they'renot going tobe these violent sexual crimes. So we'd ask youto exemptthose three specific crimes, because we do think that there's a benefitto trackingthose crimes. Hr'g on S.B. 5204 Before the S. Comm. on Human Servo & Corr., 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 25, 2011), 1:30 p.m. (Wash. 2011), available at http://www.tvw.orgiindex.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2011011176 (statement ofTom McBride, Member, WAPA). 6 Unfortunately, the body oflegislativehistory for S.B. 5204 is devoid ofany indication why the legislature included the word, "actually." This is available at the Washington State Legislature's Internet site for "bill information." See Bill Information, 7No. 32809-1-III State 

### v. J. C. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011); LAWS OF 2011, ch. 338, 

### §4(12)(a)(v). 3. Legislative intent behind RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) The fundamental goal ofstatutory interpretation is to discern and implement the legislature's intent. State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444,450,69P.3d 318 (2003). When interpreting a statute, courts look first to the statute's plain meaning. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). "Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning ofthe language at issue, the context ofthe statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Christensen
v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). "Ifthe statutory language is susceptibleto more than one reasonable interpretation, then a court may resortto statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent." Id. Washington courts have established principles ofstatutory construction. '" [E]ach word ofa statute is to be accorded meaning.'" State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 624, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (quoting State ex reI. Schillbergv. Barnett, 79 Wn.2d 578,584, 488 P.2d 255 (1971)). '" [T]he drafters oflegislation
... are presumedtohave used no superfluous words,'" and courts must ascribe meaning to every word in a statute. Id. at

S.B. 5204-2011-12, http://apps.leg.wa.govlbillinfo/summary.aspx?bil1=5204&year=2011 8No. 32809-1-III State v. 

## Jc.
624-25 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingIn re Recallof Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wn.2d 756, 767, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000» ("Isolating 'reckless' from the phrase 'ina reckless manner,' as petitioners advocate, wouldrender the word 'manner' meaningless and superfluous."). Courts "may not delete language from an unambiguous statute: [s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portionrendered meaningless or superfluous." JP., 149 Wn.2d at 450 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingDavis v. Dep 't of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977P.2d 554 (1999». Finally, and importantly, "the legislature is deemed to intend a different meaning when it uses different terms." Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d at 625. First, RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v)'splain meaning is evidenced by the ordinary meaning ofthe language at issue: the word "actually." "Actually" is synonymous with "de facto, genuinely, really, truly, veritably." WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE THESAURUS 12 (1988). Thus, by using the word "actually" in RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v), the legislature signaled its intent for the trial court to consider what "genuinely, really, truly" happened infact when determining whether the underlying crime was committed with forcible compulsion.
(last visited September 18, 2015). 

### 9No. 32809-1-III State v. J.C.
In addition to the ordinary meaning ofthe word "actually," the context ofthe statute, its related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole all support interpreting RCW 13.S0.260(4)(a)(v) in a way thatrequires trial courts to lookpast the pleadings and considerthe specific facts ofthe person'sprior adjudication. In addition to RCW 13.S0.260(4)(a)(v) and the indecent liberties provision itself(RCW 9A.44.100), the crime of"indecent liberties by forcible compulsion" appears II times in the Revised Code ofWashington. 7 Every other statutory reference to this crime uses one ofthree

7 See RCW 9A.28.020(3)(a) (grading an attempt to commit "indecent liberties by forcible compulsion" as a class A felony); RCW 9.41.0I0(3)(a) (defining "crime of violence" under the firearms and dangerous weapons statute, which includes "indecent liberties ifcommitted by forcible compulsion"); former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b)(i) (2012) (defining the criteria for "persistentoffender" underthe Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, which can include a conviction for, among other offenses, "indecent liberties by forcible compulsion"); former RCW 9.94A.030(S4)(a)(v) (2012) (defining "violent offense" underthe SRA, which includes "[i]ndecent liberties if committed by forcible compulsion"); RCW 9.94A.S07(1)(a)(i) (providing a special sentencing scheme for persons convicted ofa number ofsex offenses, including "indecent liberties by forcible compulsion"); RCW 9.94A.S1S (assigning "Indecent Liberties (with forcible compulsion)" a seriousness level X, and "IndecentLiberties (without forcible compulsion)" seriousness level VII); RCW 9.94A.737(S) (requiring that offenders who violate a condition ofcommunity custody by committing a new crime "shall be held in total confinementpending a sanction hearing" ifthe underlying offense is enumerated in the provision, which includes "[i]ndecent liberties with forcible compulsion, as defined in RCW 9A.44.100(l)(a)"); RCW "9.94A.837(1) (authorizing the prosecutorto file a special aIiegation "[i]n a prosecution for
... indecent liberties by forcible compulsion" when the victim ofthe offense was under IS years ofage); RCW 9.94A.838(l) (authorizing the prosecutorto file a special allegation "[i]n a prosecution for
... indecent liberties with forcible compulsion" whenthe victim had diminished capacity); RCW 13.40.21O(3)(a) 10No. 32809-1-III State v. 

### 1.C. syntacticpermutations: "indecent liberties by forcible compulsion," "indecent liberties with forcible compulsion," or "indecent liberties ifcommitted by forcible compulsion." These other statutes all have straightforward applications. The fact that a person was convicted offorcible indecent liberties operates to categorically qualify ordisqualify that person in the pertinent statutory scheme, full stop-no individualized factual inquiry into the underlying conviction is needed. See, e.g., State v. Morin, 100 Wn. App. 25, 30, 995 P.2d 113 (2000) (conviction for indecent liberties by forcible compulsion was defendant's "second strike" and automatically qualified defendant as a "persistent offender." Ifthe legislature intended RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) to workthe same way as the 11 other "forcible indecent liberties" provisions in the Revised Code ofWashington, it wouldhave drafted RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) with the same language: "[t]heperson has not been convicted ofrape inthe first degree, rape in the second degree, or indecent liberties by forcible compUlsion." However, because the legislature chose to addthe word "actually," "wemust recognize that a different meaningwas intended." Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d at 626. Tohold otherwise would renderthe word "actually" meaningless and superfluous, in contradiction to well-establishedprinciples ofstatutory (increasing the length ofparole to 24 months forjuveniles "sentenced for
... indecent liberties with forcible compulsion"); RCW 71.09.020(17) (defining "sexually violent offense" underthe sexually violentpredators statute, which includes "indecent liberties 11No. 32809-1-III State 

### v. 

### J.C.
construction. Finally, the legislature's stated intent behind its 2014 chapter 13.50 RCW amendments supports interpreting RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) in a way that resolves ambiguities in favor ofthe person seeking to have his or herjuvenile record sealed: [I]t is the policy ofthe state ofWashington thatthe interest injuvenile rehabilitation and reintegration constitutes compelling circumstances that outweigh the public interest in continued availability of juvenile court records. LAWS OF 2014, ch. 175, 

### § 1(2). The legislature designed the mechanism for sealing juvenilerecords specifically so juveniles can overcome prejudice and reintegrate into society. 

### ld. at 

### § 1(1). Because Washington's goal for itsjuvenilejustice system is rehabilitation and reintegration ratherthan punishment, "[t]he legislature has always treatedjuvenile court records as distinctive and as deserving ofmore confidentialitythan other types ofrecords[,] and [Washington] court[s] halve] always given effectto the legislature'sjudgmentin the unique setting of juvenile courtrecords." State v. 

### s.J.c., 183 Wn.2d 408, 417,352 P.3d 749 (2015). These goals, in tandem with the ordinary meaning ofthe word "actually,"the context ofthe statute and its related provisions, the statutory scheme as a whole, and the legislature's stated intent behind the 2014 amendments to chapter 13.50 RCW, support by forcible compulsion"). 12No. 32809-I-III State v. 

### Jc. interpreting RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) as requiring trial courts to inquire whether actual force was used in the commission ofindecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Except in the instance ofaBarrplea, the inquiry will be conclusively answered by the findings of fact ifthe case was tried or in the plea statement ifdisposition was by aplea. B. Whether it is appropriate for this court to render an ultimate decision at thisjuncture or whether remand is appropriate lC.requests that this court direct the trial court to enter an order sealing his juvenile conviction file. An appellate court does notmake initial findings offact and, where the trial court failed to enter sufficient findings, remand is the properremedy. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335,342, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992). Because this court has clarified the meaning ofRCW l3.50.260(4)(a)(v), we remand the case to the trial court to determine whether lC. actually used forcible compUlsion in light ofthis court'sruling. The parties may stipulate to the police reports being the facts for the trial courtto apply to ourruling. Ifthe parties do not so stipulate, the trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve J.C.'s motion to seal. An evidentiary hearing is appropriate when there are questions offact. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56,98 S. Ct. 2674,57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); State v. Crockett, 118 Wn. App. 853, 857-58, 78 P.3d 658 (2003) (quoting former RCW

13No. 32809-1-111 

### State 

### v. 

## Jc. 9.94A.530(2) (2002)); 

### State v. 

### Zatkovich, 113 Wn. App. 70, 75-76, 52 P.3d 36 (2002); 

### State v. 

### Card, 48 Wn. App. 781, 786, 741 P.2d 65 (1987). Reversed and remanded.

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 1CONCUR:

Fearing, J.

1432809-I-II1 KORSMO, J. (concurring) - I agree thatthis matter should beremanded for a new hearing on the petition to seal the record ofthejuvenile adjudication. However, I disagree with the majority's construction ofthe statute and suggest a different basis for reaching the same result. The legislature has categorically excluded indecent liberties by forcible compulsion from thejuvenile sealing statute. My disagreement starts with the word "actually." While clarity ofintent would have been better served by using a different word, there is no significant issue presented in this circumstance by the novel word choice. As the majority notes, the legislature has varyingly described the crime ofindecent liberties "by/with/if**com~itted** by" forcible compulsion. For some reason, the majority has no difficulty determining that all three of those iterations mean the same thing, but finds that the language used in the sealing statute ("actually committed with forcible compulsion") must mean something different. I disagree. Ifthe use ofdifferent language means a different legislative intent, then all of those first three iterations must likewise mean something different. However, the majority correctly discernsthatthey mean the same thing. That should likewise be the
case for indecent liberties "actually committed by" forcible compulsion. It isjust another description for the one offense defined by the legislature. Indecent liberties can be committed in six different manners, five ofwhich are class B felonies. RCW 9A.44.100(l), (2)(a). Those five offenses all involve victim

### No. 32809-1-III State v. 

### Jc. vulnerability or a specified offender-victim relationship. RCW 

### 9AA4.100(1)(b)-(f). 

### The legislature has declared the crime ofindecent liberties "by forcible compulsion" to be a class A felony. RCW 9A.44.l00(1)(a); (2)(b). This is the one version ofindecent liberties focused solely on the offender's conduct. The majority duly notes that the legislature has defined "forcible compulsion" in terms of"physical force" orthreatened
use offorce. RCW 9A.44.010(6). As the majority's excellent exposition ofthe legislative history reveals, the legislature intended to exempt from the sealing statute the three necessarily violent sex offenses-first and second degree rape, and indecent liberties involving forcible compulsion. It

### did not intend for trial courts (or appellate courts) to attempt to reconstruct the factual basis for an old indecent liberties adjudication. The words "actually committed by" simply specified which ofthe six versions ofindecent liberties the legislature intended not be subject to a sealing order. Thephrase is not any different than the "ifcommitted by" language used in the definitional statutes cited by the majority. RCW 9.41.010(3)(a) (defining "crime of violence"); RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(v) (defining "violent offense" for the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1981). It 

### simply described which alternative method ofcommitting the crime was exempted from the sealing statute. Accordingly, J.C.'s argument fails on the language ofthe sealing statute. It also fails under the definition ofthe crime ofindent liberties "by" forcible compulsion. RCW 9A.44.l00(1)(a). By definition, it simply is not legally or logically possible to commit 2No. 32809-1-II1 State v. J. 

### C.
indent liberties by forcible compulsion without using forcible compulsion. Id.; RCW 9A.44.010(6). Thus, indecent liberties "actually committed by forcible compulsion" will always exist whenever a youth has been adjudicated to have committed indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. With the rare exception exemplified by this case, the majority approach dooms trialjudges to apointless review ofa record to confirm exactly what the original trial court had to consider in the first instance-whetherthere was a factual basis to find that the offender committed indecent liberties. Itis essentially an untimely collateral attack on the evidence supporting the original adjudication, even when, as here, the offender eschews such a challenge. There is absolutely nothing in the history to suggest that the legislature intended trialjudges engage in this wild goose chase. I Accordingly, I disagree with the majority's construction ofthe sealing statute. Itis a strained reading ofotherwise clear language. Nonetheless, I agree that, on these unusual facts, the matter should be remanded for another hearing. I would get there by focusing on the nature ofthe guilty plea itself. I agree with the majority that this case was treated as a Barrplea. In re Pers. Restraint of Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265, 684 P.2d 712 (1984). There was a factual basis for the charged greater offense offirst degree child molestation, thus providing a fictional basis for

I This approach also effectively reverses the burden ofproofin this motion. As a proponent ofsealing, 

### J.e. is required to establish that he acted without physical force, so he has no interest in setting forth any evidence contradicting that burden. The State would need to show use ofphysical force to defeat the motion. 3No. 32809-1-111 State 

### v. 1.C. accepting the pleato the somewhat2 lesser offense ofindecent liberties by forcible compulsion. The legislature intended that the sealing statute would apply tojuveniles who committed first degree child molestation. J.C. having committed this greater offense, rather than the fictional one to which he entered a guilty plea, 1 would allow the trial court to enter a sealing order because it was the legislature's intent that this fact pattern be subject to sealing. Thus, 1 would permitBarrpleas to be subject to sealing when the charged greater offense was subjectto sealing.3 Since 1 believe a new hearing is appropriate, 1 concur in the majority's disposition ofthe case despite my disagreement with the majority's construction ofthe statute.

Kor 0, J. 

### I 

# lifo

2 First degree child molestation is classified as an A- felony under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, while indecent liberties by forcible compulsion is classified as a B+ felony. For someone with no previous adjudications, as in lC. 's case, the difference had no sentencing consequences, although there would have been a difference in outcome if there had been prior offenses. See RCW 13.40.0357. 3 1would permitthis approach only when the Barrplea fiction was followed and would not allow sealingjustbecause the record would have permitted the filing ofa different charge subject to sealing. For example, an offender adjudicated to have committed first or second degree rape ofa youthful victim would notbe allowed to argue for sealing on the basis that the prosecutor could have instead charged first or second degree child rape, offenses for which sealing is possible. 4