alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
     906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In   connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Aearo Company I (the  'Company'),
     on Form  10-Q  for the  period  ended  June 30,  2005,  as  filed  with
     theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the 'Report'), I,
     Jeffrey S. Kulka, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
     to 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
     Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                                     /s/ Jeffrey S. Kulka
                                                     Jeffrey S. Kulka
                                                     Senior Vice President,
                                                     Chief Financial Officer
                                                     and Secretary
August 15, 2005

A signed written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Aearo
Company I and will be retained by Aearo Company I and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and its staff upon request.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-31474

Summary Calendar

 

WILLIE MARTIN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana

State Penitentiary

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(99-CV-3233)

--------------------

June 18, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, AND BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Petitioner Willie Martin, Louisiana prisoner # 111528, appeals

the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. He argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair

trial by being compelled to appear at his jury trial wearing

identifiable prison clothing, and that his trial attorney was

ineffective for failing to make a timely objection to such attire.

Martin first argues that both the state habeas court and the

district court denied relief under an improper application of

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), because they failed to
2

consider testimony presented at an evidentiary hearing before the

trial court in 1997. We reject this argument. An evidentiary

hearing was ordered by the Louisiana Supreme Court to determine

issues pertaining to Martin’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. See State ex rel. Martin v. State, 679 So. 2d 414, 414 (La.

1996). The evidence adduced at the hearing had no bearing on

Martin’s other claims for post-conviction relief. The state habeas

court proceedings did not involve an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law and did not result in a decision

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Moreover, considering the overwhelming evidence in the

record that supports the jury verdict, error at the trial level

would have been harmless. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

637-38 (1993). The district court did not clearly err in not

considering testimony from the evidentiary hearing on the fair

trial issue. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir.

2001). 

We next address Martin’s argument that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to make a

timely objection to Martin’s prison garb. Again, when considered

in the light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury

verdict, Martin cannot show prejudice even if we assume arguendo

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         686,655
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,412,182
<ALLOWANCES>                               (1,558,838)
<INVENTORY>                                    549,497
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,403,876
<PP&E>                                       3,583,801
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,259,896
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,187,713
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,256,787
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                       158,240
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,051,332
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,187,713
<SALES>                                     21,110,944
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            21,900,349
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               19,356,381
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,503,214
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             1,066,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             350,595
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,365,841)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   408,620
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,957,221)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,957,221)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.125)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (.125)
        

</TABLE>
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-18-0000766

09-NOV-2018

09:14 AM
#### Donna S. PARKER, Appellant, v. Donald D. PARKER, Appellee.

No. 88-2148.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 25, 1989.

Jennifer Byrom Sparr, Milton, for appellant.

O.E. Adams, Sr., Pensacola, for appellee.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Appellant appeals a summary final judgment refusing to modify the parties’ separation agreement. We reverse.

Relying on *Pusey v. Pusey,*386 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), the trial court construed paragraph 13(d) of the separation agreement as precluding the wife from seeking modification of another provision in paragraph 5 of the agreement. Paragraph 13(d) provides in pertinent part:

> Each understands and agrees that this agreement constitutes the entire contract of the parties.... No modifications of any of the terms shall be valid unless in writing and executed by the same formality as this agreement.

Upon consideration, we find the language in paragraph 13(d) above materially distinguishable from the language of the property settlement agreement in *Pusey.*In *Pusey,*the agreement provided that it could not be modified without the written consent of each of the parties. In addition, the court found that the agreement was in the nature of a final property settlement. Thus, it was improper to grant the wife's petition for modification of alimony without the husband’s consent. In contrast, giving the language of paragraph 13(d) its plain meaning, and absent any evidence that the parties intended to give it any special meaning, we agree with appellant that this language requiring modifications to be in writing was inserted simply to prevent the parties from orally modifying the agreement. It does not require the parties to consent to modification in writing before a modification could be ordered, unlike the agreement in the *Pusey*case.

Because the trial court entered summary judgment based upon an erroneous reading of paragraph 13(d), the court has yet to address the question whether the provision in paragraph 5 of this separation agreement, requiring appellee to pay $750 monthly to appellant for a period of twelve months, is part of a true property settlement agreement, which the court may not modify, or whether it was alimony or support which the court may modify. In making this determination, the trial court must *1299examine the plain language of the agreement, its surrounding circumstances and the parties’ apparent purpose in entering into the agreement. *Kirchen v. Kirchen,*484 So.2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). As this is a decision primarily for the trial court, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See *Fort v. Fort,*90 So.2d 313 (Fla.1956).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Michael L. Wilfley, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Grande Communications Holdings, Inc.

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                           |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ------------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: November 13, 2006 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/    MICHAEL L.
WILFLEY
|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                           |  | Michael L. Wilfley     
|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                           |  | Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of HMP Equity Holdings Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended
September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, J. Kimo Esplin, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C., Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

| |  | /s/J. KIMO ESPLINJ. Kimo Esplin Chief Financial OfficerNovember 19, 2004
| |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------

This
certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

---



QuickLinks
U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation

Administration Flight Standards Service Civil Aviation Registry, AFS-700 P.O. Box 25504 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125-0504 (405) 954-3116 WEB Address: http://registry.faa.gov

AFS-700-LTR-1 (01/14) May 5, 2014

Mr. Hans-Gunter Vosseler Blackbird Aviation, LLC 8600 Airport Blvd. Leesburg, Fl. 34788

Dear Mr. Vosseler:

This is in response to your letter received January 24, 2014, sent to the public docket (No. FAA-2014-0044) petitioning the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Blackbird Aviation LLC (Blackbird) for an exemption from Subpart C §47.65 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). That exemption, if granted, would allow

Blackbird to obtain a Dealer’s Aircraft Registration Certificate (dealer’s certificate) without meeting the U.S. citizenship definiti on of Title 49 United States Code (49 USC) 40102(a)(15) and 14 CFR §47.2.

As stated in 14 CFR §47.61(b), “A Dealer’s Aircraft Registration Certificate is an

alternative for the Certificate of Aircraft Registration issued under Subpart B (part 47).” Historically, the Civil Aviati on Registry, Aircraft Registra tion Branch (Registry), has interpreted this language to mean that in ma king the decision whether to issue a dealer’s certificate, a favorable determination must be made that finds the applicant is also eligible

for a Certificate of Aircraft Re gistration (aircraft cer tificate) under Subpart B of part 47. The Registry has consistently applied th e same alternative form of registration requirement, under Subpart B, when consider ing petitions for exemption from the U.S. citizenship requirement of 14 CFR §47.65.

Based on Blackbird’s petition for exempti on, it appears you are aware that non-citizen limited liability companies are not eligible for a Certificate of Aircraft Registration or a Dealer’s Aircraft Registration Certificate, absent the FAA granting an exemption to the U.S. citizenship requirement of 14 CFR §47.65.

With respect to petitions for exemption of the U.S. citizenship requirement of §47.65, it has been the historical practice of the Regist ry to only grant such exemptions when the petitioner is a non-citizen co rporation. The Registry has granted exemptions to noncitizen corporations because non-citizen cor porations are alternatively eligible for registration under 14 CFR §47.3(a). Unlike non-ci tizen corporations, Blackbird is a noncitizen LLC that is not alternatively e ligible for registration under 14 CFR §47.3(a).2

AFS-14-134-E Based on our review of your petition for ex emption, and the applicable statutes and regulations, the issuance of an exemption from the U.S. citizenship requirement of 14 CFR §47.65, to a non-citizen LLC, would be in consistent with the Federal Aviation Regulations, statutes, and prio r practices of the Registry.

In light of the foregoing, no further action will be taken on your request.

Sincerely,

/s/

John G. Bent Manager, Civil Aviation Registry
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 22.1


SUBSIDIARIES OF ENTERASYS NETWORKS, INC.

Bit Management Inc. (Canada)
C.S. Capital Corp. (Delaware)
Enterasys Holdings Limited (Mauritius)
Enterasys India Pvt. Ltd. (India)
Enterasys Insurance Company (Vermont)
Enterasys Networks Distribution Limited (Ireland)
Enterasys Networks Chile (Chile)
Enterasys Networks de Argentina (Argentina)
Enterasys Networks de Colombia Ltda (Colombia)
Enterasys Networks de Venezuela, C.A.(Venezuela)
Enterasys Networks, A.B. (Sweden)
Cabletron Systems, Ltd. (Hong Kong)
Enterasys Networks, Inc. of USA (China)
Enterasys Networks, Pte Ltd (Korea)
Enterasys Networks, S.A. (France)
Enterasys Networks, Sdn Bhd. (Malaysia)
Enterasys Networks A.G. (Switzerland)
Enterasys Networks Acquisition, Inc. (Delaware)
Enterasys Networks do Brasil (Brazil)
Enterasys Networks Government Sales, Inc. (Delaware)
Enterasys Networks Handels GmbH (Austria)
Enterasys Networks Investments S.a.r.l. (Luxembourg)
Enterasys Networks Limited (Bermuda)
Enterasys Networks N.V. (Belguim)
Enterasys Networks Netherlands, B.V. (Netherlands)
Enterasys Networks of Canada Limited/Reseaux
Enterasys du Canada Limitee (Canada)
Enterasys Networks Sales & Service Inc. (Delaware)
Enterasys Networks U.K., Ltd. (UK)
Enterasys Networks, GmbH (Germany)
Enterasys Networks, K.K. (Japan)
Enterasys Networks, Pty. Limited (Australia)
Enterasys Networks, S.A. (Spain)
Enterasys Networks S.a.r.l. (Luxembourg)
Enterasys Networks Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
Cabletron Systems de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
Enterasys Networks, S.r.l. (Italy)
Enterasys Networks, Singapore Pte Ltd. (Singapore)
Enterasys Services, Inc. (Delaware)
Enterasys Solutions, Inc. (Delaware)
Enterasys Sub Co., Inc. (Delaware)
Fivemere Asia-Pacific Singapore Limited  (Singapore)
Fivemere Developments Limited  (UK)
Fivemere Ltd (UK)
GlobalNetwork Technology Services Pty Ltd (Australia)
GlobalNetwork Technology Services U.K. Limited (UK)
GlobalNetwork Technology Services, Inc. (Delaware)
GNTS (Canada) Inc. (Canada)
NetVantage, Inc. (Delaware)
Network Express GmbH (Germany)
Network Express K.K. (Japan)
Network Express, Inc. (Michigan)
Aprisma Holding, Inc. (Delaware)
Aprisma Management Technologies Pty. Ltd. (Australia)
Aprisma Management Technologies UK (UK)
Aprisma Management Technologies, Inc. (Delaware)
#### Marilyn H. ABEL v. Roy Lamar ABEL, Betty Elaine Abel, et al.

No. 56581.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 16, 1987.

Robert S. Murphree, Jackson, for appellant.

Sam E. Scott, Sam S. Thomas, Heidelberg, Woodliff & Franks, Jackson, for ap-pellees.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hinds County; Joe G. Moss, Judge.

Before WALKER, C.J., and ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.1


 


Description of Changes to Non-Employee Director
Compensation


 


On August 8, 2005, the 3M Company (the “Company”) Board of Directors,
on the recommendation of the Nominating and Governance Committee, approved
changes in the non-employees directors’ compensation effective July 1, 2005.
The changes provide that the cash portion of the annual retainer increases from
$55,000 to $75,000 and the additional annual retainer paid to committee chairs
increases from $7,000 to 15,000. The portion of the annual retainer payable
only in the Company’s common stock remains at $95,000. These changes are
intended to keep the directors’ compensation competitive. Other elements of
directors’ compensation remain unchanged.


 


The following table shows compensation payable to non-employee
directors before and after this increase:


 


	
   

  	
   

  	
  Before

  Increase

  	
   

  	
  After

  Increase

  	
   

  
	
  Portion of the Annual
  Retainer Payable in Cash

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  55,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  75,000

  	
   

  
	
  Portion of the Annual
  Retainer Payable Only in Common Stock

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  95,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  95,000

  	
   

  
	
  Total Annual Retainer

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  150,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  170,000

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Additional Annual Retainer
  for Committee Chairs

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  7,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  15,000
#### Troy SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 85-83.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 13, 1987.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Susan Odzer Hugentugler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HENDRY, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was charged with kidnapping, sexual battery, robbery and first-degree murder, and pled not guilty. Upon trial before a jury, he was found guilty as to all counts. The trial court entered judgment pursuant to the jury verdicts, except as to the robbery count, which the court reduced to petit theft. A life sentence was imposed on the murder conviction, with concurrent terms of 12 years, life, and 60 days on the remaining counts.

In this appeal from his convictions and sentences the defendant urges reversal on the grounds that the trial court erred, first, in denying his motion to suppress post-arrest statements and, second, in denying his motions for mistrial based upon two comments by the prosecutor in closing argument.

We have considered the grounds relied on by the defendant for reversal in the light of the record, briefs and arguments of counsel. We find that the record shows the case was fully and fairly tried, the verdicts are supported by the evidence and the several rulings of the trial court challenged by the defendant did not, on the *788record and under the law, constitute reversible error.

Therefore the judgments and sentences appealed are affirmed.

Affirmed.