INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON SIMON OROS and VIORICA OROS, husband and wife, Respondents,

PAULA G. ANDERSON and JOHN DOE ANDERSON, husband and wife, Appellants. No. 72238-7-1 DIVISION ONE — —lc^ en y>ZQ 

## UNPUBLISHED OPINIO^

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## FILED: August24, 2015 £ §< Appelwick, J. — A jury awarded the Oroses damages against Anderson, in her 

### personal capacity, forbreach ofcontract. Anderson argues thatthetrialcourterredwhen it excluded evidence relating to counterclaims by Anderson's corporation and when it 

### denied her request to add the affirmative defense of offset. She further asserts thatthe trialcourterredwhen itawarded the Oroses prejudgmentinterestand attorneyfees inthe amount requested by the Oroses. We affirm. FACTS 

### Paula Anderson is a licensed real estate agent. In 2009, Anderson worked for RE/Max Northwest Realtors and worked outof its office. Anderson worked primarily with 

### foreclosed properties. She was also one of two shareholders for Anderson Real Estate Group (ARE)—a closely held corporation. Anderson's husband was ARE's other shareholder. 

### In May 2009, Simon Oros began working with Anderson, because he needed a real estate agentto help him to invest. Anderson encouraged Oros to investinforeclosed properties, remodel those properties, and sell them for a profit.No. 72238-7-1/2 

### On June 1, 2009, Oros signed a "Buyer's Agency Agreement" with RE/Max to purchase houses at foreclosure auctions. The agreement was between RE/Max as the brokerand Oros as the buyer. Italso stated that Re/Max appointed ARE as the agentto represent Oros. Sometime during June 2009, Anderson gave Oros a document from ARE entitled "Buying Equity Property." The document outlined the foreclosure purchasing process: the timeline, the auction process, the down payment, and the financing options. Italso 

### stated in capital letters that there are no returns for auction properties. Oros signed the bottom ofeach page ofthe document. 

### To beginthe investmentprocess, a lender—inthis case Equity Partners Northwest 

### Funding LLC—would attendthe foreclosure auction and bid on the desired property. After the lenderpurchasedthe propertyat the auction, the borrower—inthis case Oros—would 

### pay a down payment and execute loan documents through the lender to finance the remaining price ofthe property. 

### On July 9, 2009, Anderson called Oros about a foreclosed property investment 

### opportunity in Renton. After speaking with Anderson, Oros orally agreed to buy the Renton property. Afterthe auction, Anderson contacted Oros and told himthata bidwas made on Oros's behalfand the propertywas his. The total purchaseprice ofthe property
was $340,100.00. Anderson instructed Orosto pay a down paymentof$85,025.00. Oros provided the $85,025.00 down payment as instructed laterthat day. 

### The next morning, Oros and his wife went to look at the property that had been purchased on his behalf at the foreclosure sale. After seeing the house, noticing that several other houses on the block were also for sale, and speaking with a real estateNo. 72238-7-1/3 

### agent who was selling one ofthe other houses on the block, Oros determined that the house he agreed to purchase was worth less than Anderson suggested. Oros called Anderson and told herthat he no longerwanted to purchase the Renton property. The following Monday, Dean Street, the representative for Equity Partners Northwest, the lender, found out that Oros no longer wanted to purchase the property. 

### Streetwas angry and told Anderson that because Oros was her client she was required to fix the problem. Overthe course ofseveral conversations, Streettold Anderson that if she did not fixthe problemwith Oros thatshewould neverwork intheforeclosure industry 

### again. Anderson feltthat Street "was really threatening" her. 

### Subsequently, Anderson agreed to buythe Renton property, remodel it, and resell 

### it herself. Anderson was already remodeling another house that summer and told Oros that she would need his help with the project. 

### On August 3, 2009, the Oroses, Anderson, and Equity Partners Northwestentered into a propertyagreement (Agreement). Under the Agreement, Anderson tooktitleto the Renton property and becamethe buyer, the Oroseswere the sellers, and Equity Partners Northwest remained the lender. The Agreement provides inpertinent part: 

### (b) Buyer shall execute a junior position deed of trust behind Lender in the amount of $85,025.00 in favor of Seller. In the event that Buyer is 

### able to sell the Property for a purchase price in the amount of$450,000 or more, Sellershall receive $2000.00 inadditionto the return oftheirprincipal. 

### In the event the Buyer sells the Property for a purchase price ofless than $450,000 Seller shall have $2000.00 deducted from the principal amount. No interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance and the principal shall be 

### due 180 days from the date of this Agreement. Seller's deed oftrust shall 

### be paid fromthe proceeds ofthe closing of the sale ofthe Property. Buyer agrees to use bestefforts to list, market and sell the Property. In other words, Anderson would purchase the Renton property utilizing the Oroses' 

### $85,025.00 down paymentand would reimburse them afterthe sale of the property. TheNo. 72238-7-1/4 Agreementalso stipulatedthata newdeed oftrustwould be issued as betweenAnderson and Equity Partners Northwest. That deed of trust was executed and recorded. There
was no evidence in the record before us of a junior position deed oftrust in favor ofthe Oroses. According to the Oroses, the deed of trust securing repayment of their down paymentwas never executed. Anderson worked to repair and upgrade the Renton property in order to successfully improve it and sell it for more money. According to Anderson, Oros orally agreed to help with the repairs, failed to do so, and did not contribute to any ofthe costs. 

### Anderson sold the Renton property in December 2009 for $414,800.00—less than the $450,000 benchmark outlined inthe Agreement. From the $414,800.00 sale price ofthe 

### property, Anderson paid taxes, fees, costs, and obligations on the property. She maintained thatafterthe property sold, therewere insufficientfunds to refund the Oroses' 

### down paymentand that shewanted to make iteven so thatboth she and the Oroses "lost the same amount." Anderson paid Oros $32,381. 

### On February 22, 2013, the Oroses sued Anderson forthe remainder of the down payment.1 The Oroses also requested interestand attorneyfees and costs. The Oroses sued based on breach ofcontract, conversion, and breach ofconstructive or implied trust. 

### The lawsuit proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, Anderson defended againstenforcementof the Agreement primarily based on duress—that Anderson felt her economic livelihood
was at stake because of Street's threats. After a jury rendered its verdict, on July 10, 

### 2014, the trialcourtenteredjudgmentin favor ofthe Orosesfor$106,831.52 ($50,644.00

1 The Oroses sued for $52,644.00 even though the property sold for less than $450,000.00.No. 72238-7-1/5 

### principal amount, $27,006.43 prejudgmentinterest, $3,183.09 incosts and expenses, and $25,998.00 inattorney fees). Anderson appeals. DISCUSSION Anderson contends that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence and testimony relating to ARE's claims. Anderson also argues thatthe trial court erred when it denied her request to amend the pleadings to add the affirmative defense of offset. Anderson further asserts thatthe trial court erred when itgranted the Oroses' motion for


### an award ofprejudgmentinterestand when itgranted the Oroses' an excessive award of attorney fees.
I. ARE's Claims On June 3, 2014, the Oroses moved in limine to exclude any argumentorevidence


### as to any claims and issues belonging to ARE. The Oroses asserted thatAnderson had
no standing to sue or assert claims on behalf of the corporation. On June 5, 2014, Anderson argued—for the first time in her response to the motion in limine—that ARE's claims passed to the Andersons personally when ARE was administratively dissolved in 2010, because the Andersons were the sole shareholders. 

### On June 9, 2014, the day before opening statements, the trial court held a hearing
on the motions in limine. The trial court granted the Oroses' motion in limine precluding 

### Anderson from offering evidence, asserting, or arguing any claims or defenses that belong to ARE. The trial court stated that ARE is not a party to the lawsuit and that Anderson had not previously alleged that she is a successor to the corporation or that shewas asserting a claim on behalfofthe corporation. Itstated, "I don'tthink it's fair now 

### to mush things together and allow [a] claim by a corporation or to allow [Anderson], whoNo. 72238-7-1/6


### has not alleged that she's a successorto the corporation, to assertthe claim on behalfof the corporation." 

### Anderson argues that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, because it wrongly concluded that the claims belonged to the corporation, rather than Anderson 

### personally.2 It did not err. The trial court properly excluded any claims and damages belonging to the corporation. More importantly, itconcluded thatAnderson was untimely in asserting the claims and alleging thatthey belonged to her. Ineffect, Anderson argues that when the trial court granted a motion in limine the day before trial, it improperly 

### refused to allow her to amend her answer and counterclaim to raise those arguments.3 The amendment of a party's pleadings is governed by CR 15. CR 15(a) provides 

### that a party may amend its pleadings only by leave ofthe court or by written consent of the adverse party. The purpose of CR 15 is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. Herron v. Tribune Publ'q Co.. 108 Wn.2d 162, 165, 736 P.2d 249 (1987). While leave is 

### to be freely given, leave should not be granted where prejudice to the opposing party would result. Caruso v. Local Union No. 690 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &Helpers ofAm.. 100Wn.2d 343, 349, 670 P.2d 240 (1983). The court considers factors such as undue delay and unfair surprise when determining prejudice. Herron. 108 Wn.2d at 165. A court may also consider whether the amendment to the 

### 2A trial court's decision to exclude evidence will be reversed only where it has abused its discretion. Kappelman v. Lutz, 167 Wn.2d 1, 6, 217 P.3d 286 (2009). Atrial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Ryan v. State, 112Wn. App. 896, 899, 51 P.3d 175 (2002). 3Anderson is ostensibly challenging this ruling so that she can assert evidence that the Oroses breached the buyer's agency agreement with RE/Max and ARE by 

### refusing to go through with the purchase of the Renton property and that the Oroses breached an oral agreementthatOros would provide laborfor the remodel. And, because she seeks to place ARE's damages before thejury.No. 72238-7-1/7 

### complaint islikelyto result injury confusion, the introduction of remote issues, or a lengthy trial, jd. at 165-66. The amendmentofpleadings is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will be overturned on review only for abuse ofsuch discretion. Walla v. Johnson, 50 Wn. App. 879, 882, 751 P.2d 334 (1988). 

### Here, the trial court provided five bases for its ruling: (1) Anderson did not allege that she was a successorto the corporation inthe pleadings, (2) Anderson did not allege that she was asserting a claim on behalf of the corporation, (3) lack of timeliness, (4) 

### confusion ofthejury, and (5) fairness to the Oroses.4 Itwas not until Anderson's response to the Oroses' motions in limine on June 5, 2014—a week before trial—thatAnderson first asserted thatARE's claims passed to her personally. When Anderson answered the complaint and presented counterclaims, she asserted thatARE entered into the relevant agreements and transactions, ratherthan her personally. Specifically she asserted thatthe Oroses breached two separate agreements with ARE. As a result of the alleged breaches, Anderson sought damages from the 

### Oroses including compensation for the labor and services ARE expended to remodel the property. Moreover, Anderson sought relief in her answer to have ARE added as a necessary party to the lawsuit based on her counterclaims. But, she did not disclose ARE's corporate dissolution, did not plead the transferofARE's claims to herpersonally, and did nottake the steps required to add ARE as a party. ARE did not intervene. Anderson waited until the eve of trial to present evidence that ARE was administratively dissolved, that ARE's claims belonged to her, and that she intended to


### 4 Itcould have added that Anderson never filed a proper written motion seeking leave to amend to add these claims as required by CR 15(a).No. 72238-7-1/8 

### personally assert those claims on behalfofthe corporation. Anderson claimed that the delay wasjustified, because she did not determine until less than two weeks before trial that the corporation had been administratively dissolved. But, Anderson did not mention this theory until she responded to the Oroses' motions in limine on June 9, 2014—less than one week before trial. And, even then, she had not added ARE as a necessary party. Allowing the amendment of the pleadings or a change in theory based upon different circumstances than those set forth in the original pleading, after undue delay, would have constituted unfair surprise and would have been prejudicial to the Oroses. See Wilson v. Horslev. 137 Wn.2d 500, 507, 974 P.2d 316 (1999) (raising new issues on 

### the eve of trial is considered unfair surprise); id. at 515 (Sanders, J., concurring in 

### part/dissenting in part) (stating that an amendment should be allowed when itseeks only to assert a new legal theory based upon the same circumstances setforth inthe original pleading); Herron, 108 Wn.2d at 165 ("The factors a court may consider in determining prejudice include undue delay and unfair surprise."). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when itgranted the Oroses' motion in 

### limine excluding these late claims.5

II. Offsetting Damages Anderson argues that the trial court erred in not allowing thejury to consider her personal damages as an offsetto the Oroses' claims. 

### 5 Accordingly, whether ARE was actually administratively dissolved or whether ARE's claims automaticallytransferred to theAndersons is immaterial. And, becausewe conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding ARE's claims and 

### damages, we concludethatthetrialcourtdid not errwhen itexcludedexhibit28—a ledger listing ARE's remodel expenses.
8No. 72238-7-1/9



### In her counterclaims, Anderson asserted that Oros orally agreed to provide substantial laborand services toward the rehabilitation, remodel, and sale ofthe property. She claimed thatbothARE and Oros would be paid an hourly ratefor any laborperformed 

### readying the property for sale and that such payment would come from the proceeds of the sale. The counterclaim stated thatthe agreementwas between ARE and Oros. 

### Responsive to this counterclaim, the Oroses moved in limine to exclude evidence 

### of an "alleged oral agreement" between the parties. The Oroses argued that Anderson had no standing to assertthe counterclaim belonging to ARE. And, they argued thateven 

### ifAnderson personallywas the contracting party in the alleged oral agreement instead of ARE, admission of the oral agreement was barred by the statute of limitations for oral 

### agreements. Despite the fact that Anderson's counterclaim specifically stated that the 

### agreement about the remodel expenses was betweenARE and Oros, at the motion in limine hearing, Anderson argued that the alleged oral agreement was between her 

### personallyand Oros. Because itcould notdeterminethe parties to orterms ofthealleged oralagreement, the trial court denied the motion in limineto exclude evidence of such an oral agreement. After Anderson rested at trial, the Oroses made a motion under CR 50 to dismiss 

### Anderson's counterclaim seeking damages based on the alleged oral agreement. This time, rather than emphasizing the expiration of the statute of limitations for oral agreements or the fact that ARE might have been the contracting party, the Oroses claimed thatAnderson was unableto identifyspecific damages personal to her underthe 

### alleged oral agreement. The Oroses argued that even if the oral agreement existedNo. 72238-7-1/10
between Anderson personally and Oros, and provided Anderson the potential to claim damages, she could not identify those specific, personal damages. The trial court ultimately concluded that the statute of limitations on the alleged oral agreement ran before the Oroses filed the complaint. Therefore, the trial court dismissed Anderson's counterclaim ofthe oral contractwith respectto the work thatwas to be done on the property. After the trial court ruled, Anderson argued in response that
even ifthe statute of limitations had already ran on the oral agreement, precluding her counterclaim, she was still able to request a setoffagainst any amount thejury awarded the Oroses. Atthis point—the third day of trial afterAnderson rested—Anderson moved 

### to amend the pleadings to include an affirmative defense for offset of damages. The 

### Oroses objected and the trial court stated that, "I am going to deny any motion to amend the pleadings atthis late stage. It'sjusttoo late." 

### Anderson nowarguesthatthebasis ofthetrialcourt's rulingwas incorrect because statute of limitations had not run against defenses arising out ofthe transactions sued 

### upon. But, she misrepresents the issue on appeal. The trial court relied on the statute of limitations to dismiss Anderson's counterclaim—not Anderson's request to add the affirmative defense ofoffset. Thetrial courtdeniedAnderson's requestto offsetdamages 

### under CR 15, because she sought leave to add the defense too late.6 Thus, the issue is

6It is worth noting thatduring the hearing on the motions in limine, counsel forthe Oroses and the trial court had a discussion about whetherAnderson would be precluded 

### from bringing offset as an affirmative defense even ifthe trialcourt granted the motion in limine limiting evidence of an oral agreement on statute of limitations grounds. Counsel for the Oroses conceded that had Anderson pleaded that affirmative defense, the statute of limitations would not preclude itas itwould for the counterclaim. The trial court stated that it did not think Anderson had pleaded offset as a defense. Anderson did not say 

### anything atthat point and waited untilafter she rested to move to amend.

10No. 72238-7-1/11

whether the trial court abused its discretion under CR 15 when it denied Anderson's request to amend the pleadings to add the affirmative defense. Anderson argues that the trial court's denial of her request was an abuse of discretion and manifestly unfair. Anderson cites to CR 15(b) and argues that courts are required to liberally construethe rule to allow amendmentwhen the issues are raised and adjudicated attrial. Anderson claims thateven though she did not directly raise the issue ofoffset in her pleadings, she was claiming throughout the proceedings that Oros should share inthe costs to renovate the property. CR 15(b) states that issues not raised by the pleadings will be treated as ifthey
were ifsuch issues are "tried by express or implied consent of the parties." (Emphasis 

### added.) Amendment under CR 15(b) cannotbe allowed ifactual notice ofthe unpleaded issue is not given, ifthere is no adequate opportunity to cure surprise that might result from the change inthe pleadings, or ifthe issues have not infact been litigated with the consent ofthe parties. Harding v. Will, 81 Wn.2d 132, 137, 500 P.2d 91 (1972). Here, the Oroses quite clearly did not consentto the admission ofevidence ofthe oral agreement for offset purposes, as is plainly evidenced by their motion in limine to exclude that evidence and their later CR 50 motion to dismiss the counterclaim related to the oral agreement. And, Anderson does not identify anything in the record indicating that the Oroses impliedly consented. Additionally, granting leave to amend to add the affirmative defense of offset for Anderson's personal damages would have been futile. Anderson was unable to identify any specific personal damages. Although the trial courtexcluded evidence ofthe alleged oral remodel labor agreement and any damages stemming therefrom, it had allowed

11No. 72238-7-1/12


### Anderson to testify as to any personal damages incurred as a result of the remodel. Specifically, the trial court stated that "I think it's appropriate to allow . . . evidence of damages suffered by the individual, not by the corporation." And, Anderson testified that
some ofthe money for the remodel came outofthe Andersons' personal credit line. But, when cross-examined by the Oroses' counsel, Anderson could not answer specifically how much she was asking thejury to award her indamages. Denying a motion for leave to amend is not an abuse ofdiscretion ifthe proposed amendment is futile. Rodriguez v. Loudeve Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 729, 189 P.3d 168 (2008). Because Anderson was unable to provide a specific amount ofpersonal damages based on the costs ofthe remodel that she wished to offset, the amendment would have 

### been futile.7 Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Anderson's late request to amend the pleadings to add the affirmative defense of offset.

III. Prejudgment Interest 

### Anderson also argues that the trial court erred in granting the Oroses' motion for
an award of prejudgment interest. The trial court granted the Oroses' motion for prejudgment interest inthe amount of$27,006.43. This interest constituted a littlemore 

### 7We similarlyconclude that the trial court did not err when itdenied Anderson's requestfor a jury instruction related to offset ofdamages. Moreover, in light of our conclusion, Anderson's parol evidence argument is withoutmerit. TheAgreementstatedthatthe Oroses wereto be paid outofthe "proceeds 

### of the closing of the sale of the Property." Anderson claims that the definition of "proceeds" included the deductionsforthe costs to renovate the propertyand thatthetrial 

### court improperly disallowed parol evidence with respect to the definition of the term "proceeds." But, because we conclude thatthe trial court properly excluded evidence of 

### ARE's claims and damages and because Anderson was unable to prove any personal damages when given the opportunity to do so, whetherthe renovation costs should have first been deducted from the Oroses' reimbursement is moot.

12No. 72238-7-1/13


### than 53 percent of the principal amount of the judgment awarded by the trial court ($50,644.00). RCW 4.56.110(1) limits the amount of interest a court may award in an action on
a breach ofcontract. Itprovides thatjudgments shall bear interest atthe rate specified in the contracts provided that the interest rate is set forth in the judgment. Id. 

### Notwithstanding RCW 4.56.110(1 )'s focus on judgments, Anderson relies on a provision 

### inthe Agreementwhich states that no interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance ofthe Oroses' down payment. The balance amount was due in full in 180 days. It is a fair 

### reading of the provision that the no interest clause applied only until the due date. And, consistentwiththatreading, thetrial court did not award interestfromthedate ofthedown 

### paymentto the date of sale. Moreover, the interest provision in the Agreement did not address default orjudgmentinterestunder RCW4.56.110(1). The principal amount due on the note was liquidated. The trial court applied the proper interest rate pursuant to RCW 4.56.110(4). 

### Next, Anderson notes that the trial court has discretion to disallow prejudgment 

### interest during periods ofunreasonable delay in completing litigation that is attributable to the claimants. She contends that the Oroses sat "on the claim for years, never once 

### requesting reimbursement and allowing the Andersons to negotiate a settlement or pay the amount." The trial court reasoned that by failing to pay the Oroses, Anderson 

### wrongfullyretained money she was obligated to pay them and deprived them of the use of those funds. And, it concluded that itwould be inappropriate to reduce the interest, 

### because the Oroses commenced the litigation within the applicable statute of limitations 

### period. Anderson fails to produce authority upon which we can conclude that an award

13No. 72238-7-1/14


### ofprejudgmentinterestunderthese circumstances—whenthe Oroses broughtsuitwithin the statute of limitations period—constitutes an abuse ofdiscretion.

IV. Attorney Fees Anderson argues that the trial court erred when it awarded "excessive" attorney fees to the Oroses. Specifically, she argues that the amount of fees awarded is unreasonable, because it is greaterthan the principaljudgment amount when combined 

### with the prejudgment interest. This court reviews an award ofattorney fees for abuse of discretion. Steele v. Lundgren, 96 Wn. App. 773, 780, 982 P.2d 619 (1999). 

### Here, the Agreement provides for attorney fees inparagraph 1(k). 

### If either party hereto breaches any provisions of this Agreement, the 

### breaching party shall pay to the non-breaching party allattorneys' fees and other costs and expenses incurred by the non-breaching party inenforcing 

### the Agreement or preparing for legal or other proceedings regardless of whether suit is instituted. If itbecomes necessary for eitherpartyto employ 

### legalcounsel or to bring an action at law or other proceeding to enforce any oftheterms, covenants, orconditions ofthisAgreement, the prevailing party 

### in any such action or proceeding shall be entitled to recover its costs and expenses incurred in such action from the other party, including, without limitation, expert witness fees and costs, consultant fees and costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, set by the Court and not a jury, at both trial and appellate levels. The trial court awarded the Oroses $25,998.00 inattorney fees. Anderson cites to Singelton v. Frost. 108 Wn.2d 723, 731-32, 742 P.2d 1224 (1987) and RPC 1.5 for the assertion that the trial court may reduce the award offees to that which is reasonable in 

### light ofthe amount recovered and fix a fee that is proportional to the recovery. This provides the trial court permissive authority to make a reduction—it does not require a reduction. Secondly, the amount of money involved in the controversy is only one of several factors to be considered in reducing a fee award. See Frost, 108 Wn.2d at 731.

14No. 72238-7-1/15 And, the trial court properly considered all the relevant factors and criteria when considering the reasonability ofthe fee award here. Moreover, the amount of money involved in the controversy, excluding costs and 

### fees, was $50,644.00 plus the prejudgment interest of $27,006.438—$77,650.43. The attorney fee award was $25,998.00. Anderson provides no authority for the assertion that an attorney fee award constituting roughly a third ofthe amount ofmoney claimed in
a lawsuit is excessive or per se unreasonable. Therefore, we concludethatthe trial court did not abuse its discretion when itawarded the Oroses attorney fees inthe amountthat it did. 

### Anderson also argues that the Oroses should not be allowed to recover attorney fees for unsuccessful motions, witness fees for a witness under subpoena, and fees that


### were under an increased rate midway through the case. But, Anderson has failed to 

### provide any authority upon which we can conclude that thetrial courtabused its discretion in awarding these fees.

V. Fees and Costs on Appeal 

### The Oroses argue that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1 and the terms ofthe Agreement. This court will award attorney fees to the prevailing party only on the basis of a private agreement, statute, or 

### a recognized ground of equity. Eguitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 52 Wn.

8Anderson excludes the prejudgmentinterestwhen considering the amountofthe Oroses' claim in the lawsuit and the comparative reasonability ofthe fee award. But, as 

### discussed above, the Oroses requested prejudgmentinterest intheirinitialcomplaintand the trial court's award ofthat prejudgment interestwas proper.
15No. 72238-7-1/16 

### App. 497, 506, 761 P.2d 77 (1988). Here, the Agreement provides for attorney fees and

costs. The Oroses prevailed on every issue in this appeal. We therefore award them attorney fees and costs subjectto their compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
We affirm.

WE CONCUR: 

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