FILED

September 9, 1996

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

DECEMBER 1994 SESSION

D

5 

STATE OF TENNESSEE, 5

 Appellee 5 No. 03C01-9406-CR-00218

 5

 vs. K ANDERSON COUNTY

5

5 Hon. James B. Scott,Jr., Judge

HANS VINCENT MORRIS, 5

 Appellant 5 (State Appeal)

E

 

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: 

Tom Marshall Charles W. Burson

District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter

Katherine J. Kroeger Merrilyn Fierman 

Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General

101 South Main Street Criminal Justice Division

Clinton, TN 37716 450 James Robertson Parkway

 Nashville, TN 37243-0493

 John Maddox 

 Asst Dist. Attorney General

 Room 127, Courthouse

 Clinton, TN. 37716

OPINION FILED: _______________________

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Robert E. Burch

Special Judge
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OPINION

The State has appealed from a ruling of the Criminal Court

of Anderson County in which the trial court ruled that the

Juvenile Court of Anderson County did not have jurisdiction to

require a juvenile traffic offender to attend psychological

counseling.

FACTS

Although the transcript of the hearing contains no facts

concerning the traffic incident which precipitated this dispute,

we note from the record that the juvenile was observed by a

police officer to have been driving in a very erratic manner and

to have run two stop signs. When stopped, the juvenile appeared

to the officer to be “in a highly excited state”. The juvenile

was not licenced to operate a motor vehicle.

The juvenile and his mother were required to attend a

prehearing conference. At that conference it was learned that

the juvenile had previously received psychological counseling. 

The prehearing conference resulted in a determination that the

charges could not be informally adjusted. The Public Defender’s

Office was appointed to represent the juvenile and the matter set

for hearing.

At the hearing, the juvenile judge accepted a guilty plea

from the juvenile and held a disposition hearing. At said

hearing, Her Honor ordered the juvenile to enter and complete

psychological counseling/treatment.

The juvenile appealed this ruling to the Circuit Court. No

proof was introduced at the hearing of this appeal. Instead,

legal argument was heard concerning the authority of the Juvenile

Court to order psychological counseling for a traffic offender. 

The trial judge ruled that the juvenile judge did not have this

authority and vacated the Juvenile Court’s order requiring

psychological counseling.

The State appeals this ruling.
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If the Juvenile Court finds a juvenile to be a traffic

violator, the court has the authority to deal with the juvenile,

inter alia, in the same manner as a delinquent child. T.C.A.

§37-1-146(b).

T.C.A. §37-1-131 empowers the court to place a delinquent

child on probation “under conditions and limitations the court

prescribes...”.

Requiring psychological counseling as a condition of

probation is certainly within the power of the court, in proper

cases. See State v Kevin Yant (unreported) Tenn. Crim. App. at

Nashville. #01C01-9206-CR-00187 opinion filed 7/8/93 ; State v

Donald Mitchell Boshears and Ronald Dwayne Morris III

(unreported) Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville #01C01-9412-CR-00402

opinion filed 11/15/95.

It is clear, then, that the trial court was in error when it

ruled that the Juvenile Court did not have the authority to

require a juvenile to undergo psychological counseling incident

to a traffic conviction. Whether counseling was appropriate in

this case was not ruled upon by the trial judge since the court

ruled on this issue prior to a formal hearing. A de novo hearing

would be required for His Honor to determine whether or not

counseling was appropriate in this case.

Appellee submits that, since the juvenile’s history of

psychological counseling was divulged at the prehearing

conference, the evidence of same should not have been presented

to the juvenile court at the hearing since information gathered

at the prehearing conference cannot be used against the juvenile

at the hearing. Rule 14(c)(2)(v), Tenn. R. Juv. P. If this is

true, the remedy for same is a de novo hearing before the Circuit

Court. The evidence is inadmissible. See Rule 14(c)(2)(v),

Tenn. R. Juv. P.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is
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remanded for a de novo hearing as required by T.C.A. §37-1-159. 

 

 _________________________

Robert E. Burch,

Special Judge

CONCUR:

_________________________

 Gary R. Wade, Judge

_________________________

 Joseph M. Tipton, Judge