alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

RECEIVED 

1

JUN 2 4 2015 

National Business Aviation Association, Inc., et 

a!. PART 16 DOCKETS 

Complainants, 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-08 

v. 

Town of East Hampton, NY 

Respondent. 

RESPONDENT TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT 

Designation of persons to receive service for the Town of East Hampton, New York: 

Elizabeth Vail 

Town Attorney 

Town of East Hampton 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 1193 7 

EV ail@EHamptonNY. Gov 

W. Eric Pilsk 

Catherine van Heuven 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

epilsk@kaplankirsch.com 

cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com 

Telephone: (202) 955-5600 

Facsimile: (202) 955-5616 
The Town of East Hampton, New York (the "Town"), pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 16.26, 

hereby moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim that warrants 

investigation or further action by the FAA on two grounds: 

I. Complainants' claim that the Local Laws adopted on April 16, 2015, as 

amended on May 7, 2015, violate Assurance 23 must be dismissed 

because NBAA fails to allege that the Local Laws had an anti-competitive 

or monopolistic effect as required to state a violation of Assurance 23. 

2. Complainants' claim of revenue diversion must be dismissed because 

Assurance 25 does not prohibit an airport sponsor from using airport 

revenues to defend airport rules and regulations, including the payment of 

legal fees. 

Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in greater detail in the Memorandum of Points 

and Authorities filed herewith, the Complaint should be dismissed. 

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of June, 2015. 

Elizabeth Vail 

Town Attorney 

Town of East Hampton 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 1193 7 

EVaii@EHamptonNY.Gov 

~t:::~ 

W. Eric Pilsk 

Catherine van Heuven 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

epilsk@kaplankirsch.com 

cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com 

Telephone: (202) 955-5600 

Facsimile: (202) 955-5616 

2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I have this 24th day of June, 2015, served the foregoing Respondent 

Town of East Hampton, New York's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the following 

parties by hand delivery at the following addresses: 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

Attn: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, AGC-61 0 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Steve Brown 

Chief Operating Officer 

National Business Aviation Association, Inc. 

1200 G Street, NW 

Suite II 00 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

Dated this'24 dayofJv1,{'2015. 

W. Eric Pilsk 

3
#### Ferdinand Gombert, Appellant, *v.*Niagara Junction Railway Company, Respondent.

Negligence — when question of contributory negligence for jury.

Upon examination of the evidence in an action for personal injuries, *held,*that upon the facts proved the issue as to contributory negligence was for the jury.

*Gombert*v. *Niagara Junction Ry. Co,,*156 App. Div. 924, reversed.

(Argued January 19, 1916;

decided February 4, 1916.)

Appeal from a judgment, entered May 3, 1913, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict, and directing a dismissal of the complaint in an action to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff through his being struck by one of defendant’s trains while he was crossing its right of way.

*Eugene M. Ashley*and *Augustus Thibaudeau*for appellant.

S. *Wallace Dempsey*for respondent.

*636
      *Per Curiam.*

This is an action for damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff recovered a verdict upon which judgment was entered. Upon appeal the Appellate Division reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint “upon the merits,” and by a divided court held ‘ ‘ That the uncontradicted evidence shows that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.” It is not necessary to set forth the facts or to point out the inferences which a jury would have been justified in drawing from them. We think it is sufficient to announce the conclusion at which we have arrived, viz., that upon the facts proved the issue as to contributory negligence was for the jury.

The Appellate Division held the judgment erroneous as a matter of law, and have not yet passed upon the weight of the evidence. The case must, therefore, be remitted to the Appellate Division for its consideration of the facts. *(Junkermann*v. *Tilyou Realty Co.,*213 N. Y. 404, 410.)

The judgment should be reversed, with costs to the appellant in this .court, and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for its consideration of the facts.

Willard Bartlett, Ch. J., Hiscock, Collin, Cuddeback, Hogan, Seabury and Pound, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed, etc.
IV

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 105

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the Congress should have the

power to prohibit desecration of the flag of the United States.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 24, 2001

Mr. STEARNS submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the Congress

should have the power to prohibit desecration of the

flag of the United States.

Whereas from Valley Forge to Yugoslavia, in every battlefield

where American values have been attacked and American

lives sacrificed, the flag of the United States has been a

shining symbol of the Nation and of the indomitable and

eternal spirit of American liberty;

Whereas to desecrate such a symbol is to desecrate the memory of the thousands of Americans who have sacrificed

their lives to keep that banner flying, intact, and inviolate; and

Whereas, since Americans have fought and died to defend the

flag of the United States, any act of desecration of the
2

•HCON 105 IH

flag is profoundly offensive to Americans: Now, therefore,

be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

3 (1) as a symbol of our Nation, the flag of the

4 United States deserves to be treated with respect of

5 the highest order; and

6 (2) the Congress should have the power to pro7 hibit the desecration of the flag of the Unites States.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 69 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 69

   To prohibit the consideration of retroactive tax increases in the 
                                Senate.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 18, 1999

  Mr. Coverdell (for himself, Mr. Hagel, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Kyl, Mr. 
Inhofe, and Mr. Grassley) submitted the following resolution; which was 
         referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   To prohibit the consideration of retroactive tax increases in the 
                                Senate.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. RULE OF THE SENATE PROHIBITING CONSIDERATION OF RETROACTIVE 
              TAX INCREASES.

    (a) In General.--It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider 
any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report, 
that includes a retroactive Federal income tax rate increase.
    (b) Definition.--In this resolution--
            (1) the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any 
        amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 
        1, or to section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code 
        of 1986, that imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and 
        thereby increases the amount of tax imposed by any such 
        section; and
            (2) a Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it 
        applies to a period beginning prior to the enactment of the 
        provision.
    (c) Supermajority Waiver.--
            (1) Waiver.--The point of order in subsection (a) may be 
        waived or suspended only by the affirmative vote of three-
        fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn.
            (2) Appeals.--An affirmative vote of three-fifths of the 
        Members, duly chosen and sworn, shall be required to sustain an 
        appeal of the ruling of the Chair on a point of order raised 
        under subsection (a).
    (d) Effective Date.--This resolution takes effect on January 1, 
1999.
                                 <all>
```
#### Clinton Dale REASONER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80CA0912.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division II.

April 16, 1981.

No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellant.

*188KELLY, Judge.

The Department of Revenue appeals the judgment of the district court reversing the revocation of appellee’s driver’s license under § 42-2-122(l)(g), C.R.S.1973, for being twice convicted of driving while under the influence within a five-year period, as well as under the habitual traffic offender statute, §§ 42-2-202 and 42-2-203, C.R.S.1973. The Department argues that the district court should not have permitted appellee to attack the validity of the underlying traffic offense conviction. We agree and therefore reverse.

A driver may collaterally attack the constitutionality of an underlying conviction which forms the basis for the determination that he is an habitual traffic offender. *See People*v. *Roybal,*Colo., 618 P.2d 1121 (1980); *People v. Heinz,*197 Colo. 102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979).

> “In order to assert the constitutional invalidity of a traffic offense conviction, a defendant must make a prima facie showing of invalidity; the People must then prove the conviction was obtained in a manner consistent with the defendant’s constitutional rights.” *People v. DeLeon,*Colo., 625 P.2d 1010 (No. 80SA97, announced March 12, 1981).

Here, appellee did not make a prima facie showing of constitutional invalidity. At the administrative hearing, appellee testified that he had not been convicted of one offense which appeared on his driving history record, and that, as to another offense, he entered a guilty plea without having been advised as to the number of points to be assessed. *See People v. Heinz, supra.*This testimony is insufficient to bring into question the constitutionality of the underlying convictions.

In view of our conclusions, we need not address appellant’s other assignments of error.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate the revocation.

PIERCE and VAN CISE, JJ., concur.
1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-1454

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Kari Valles, also known as La Guera, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 22, 2008

Filed: January 12, 2009

___________

Before MURPHY, BYE, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Kari Valles challenges as unreasonable the 18-month prison sentence the

district court1

 imposed after revoking her supervised release. On appeal, she argues

that the district court failed to properly weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that

it was not enough for the court merely to list the factors. We affirm. 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court’s discussion of

the relevant sentencing factors was sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate
-2-

review, see United States v. Bear Robe, 521 F.3d 909, 910 (8th Cir. 2008) (district

court must adequately explain sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review), and

that the sentence is not unreasonable, see United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 922-

23 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing review of revocation sentences for unreasonableness).

Significantly, the district court was authorized to convert Valles’s unserved

home detention into an equivalent period of imprisonment, and add it to her Chapter

7 Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(d), p.s. (unserved home detention imposed

in connection with sentence for which revocation is ordered shall be ordered served

in addition to sanction determined under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, p.s., and may be converted

to equivalent period of imprisonment). Further, the court expressly stated that it had

considered relevant section 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Franklin, 397 F.3d

604, 606-07 (8th Cir. 2005) (evidence that district court was aware of § 3553(a)

factors is sufficient), and specifically mentioned the need to incarcerate Valles long

enough for her to participate in and benefit from anger-management training, see 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (court shall consider need for sentence imposed to provide

defendant with medical care or other correctional treatment in most effective manner).

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.

______________________________
#### STATE ex rel. Terry L. LOUIS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 88-KH-0177.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 12, 1988.

In re Louis, Terry L.; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “G”, No. 123097.

Denied. If petitioner is aggrieved by any ruling of the district court, he should seek review in the Court of Appeal, 1st Circuit, which has jurisdiction over his case.
III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 77

Commending and congratulating the University of Connecticut Huskies for

winning the 1999 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 14, 1999

Mr. DODD (for himself and Mr. LIEBERMAN) submitted the following

resolution; which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Commending and congratulating the University of Connecticut Huskies for winning the 1999 NCAA Men’s

Basketball Championship.

Whereas the University of Connecticut men’s basketball team

capped a remarkable season by defeating the top-ranked

Duke Blue Devils 77–74, on March 29, 1999, in St. Petersburg, Florida, to win its 1st national championship in

its 1st ‘‘Final Four’’ appearance;

Whereas the Huskies finished with a regular season record of

34–2, the best in the program’s proud 96 years of competition;

Whereas the Huskies firmly established themselves as the

dominant team of the decade in the storied Big East

Conference, winning their 6th regular season title and

their 4th tournament championship of the 1990s;
2

•SRES 77 ATS

Whereas UConn’s Richard ‘‘Rip’’ Hamilton distinguished

himself in the championship game and throughout the

season as one of the premier players in all of college basketball, winning his 2d Big East Player of the Year

award, earning 1st team All-America honors, and closing

out a spectacular offensive performance in the NCAA

tournament by being named the most valuable player of

the Final Four.

Whereas UConn’s senior co-captain Ricky Moore distinguished himself as one of the Nation’s top defensive players, personifying the grit, determination, and fierce will

to win that carried the Huskies throughout the year;

Whereas UConn coach Jim Calhoun instilled in his players an

unceasing ethic of dedication, sacrifice, and teamwork in

the pursuit of excellence, and instilled in the rest of us

a renewed appreciation of what it means to win with dignity, integrity, and true sportsmanship;

Whereas the Huskies’ thrilling victory in the NCAA championship game enraptured their loyal and loving fans

from Storrs to Stamford, taking ‘‘Huskymania’’ to new

heights and filling the State with an overwhelming sense

of pride, honor, and community; and

Whereas the UConn basketball team’s national championship

spotlighted one of the Nation’s premier State universities,

that is committed to academic as well as athletic excellence: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate commends and congratu2 lates the Huskies of the University of Connecticut for win3 ning the 1999 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship.
3

•SRES 77 ATS

1 SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit

2 a copy of this resolution to the president of the University

3 of Connecticut.

Æ
#### Antonina Kubiak, Respondent, *v.*Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant.

*Kubiak*v. *Metropolitan Life Ins.*Co., 161 App. Div. 942, affirmed.

(Argued March 7, 1916;

decided March 21, 1916.)

Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered February 25, 1914, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict in an action to recover upon a policy of life insurance. The defenses which the insurance company pleaded in its answer were: *First,*that at the time of its medical examination the applicant substituted some other person in his place and that that person was examined by the company’s medical examiner, and, *secondly,*that the applicant in his application falsely *699stated that he had not been under the care of a physician for two years prior to the company’s medical examination, whereas, in truth and fact he had been under the care of a physician within two years previous to the said examination.

*Paul Grout, F. Sidney Williams*and *Gardiner Conroy*for appellant.

*Adolph Ruger*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Willard Bartlett, Ch. J., Hiscock, Chase, Cuddeback, Hogan, Cardozo and Pound, JJ.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The certification set forth below is being submittedin connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of MuellerGroup, LLC (the “Report”) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) orRule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “ExchangeAct”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United StatesCode.

I, Dale B. Smith, the Chief Executive Officer ofMueller Group, LLC, certify that, to the best of my knowledge:

1.                the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theExchange Act; and

2.                theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of Mueller Group, LLC.

| Date: March 30, 2006 | By:    | /S/  DALE B. SMITH         |
|---------------------------|--------|----------------------------|
|                      |   | Dale B. Smith              |
|                      |   | *Chief  Executive Officer* |

 

----
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Creative Supply of New
Jersey Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the six months
ending June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Carmine Catizone,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:
            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

/s/Carmine Catizone
-----------------------------
Carmine Catizone
Chief Executive Officer

August 8, 2006


        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Creative Supply of New
Jersey Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the six months
ending June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Daniel Generelli,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:
            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

/s/Daniel Generelli
-----------------------------
Daniel Generelli
Chief Financial Officer

August 8, 2006
#### STATE ex rel. Ray Henry STEVENS v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 86-KH-2238.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 19, 1987.

In re Ray Henry Stevens; applying for reconsideration of writ denied November 13, 1986, Parish of Calcasieu, Fourteenth Judicial District Court.

Reconsideration granted. Writ denied.
From: "Ricardo Rossello" <rossello@batteryrec.com> 

To: Chuck French/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA 

Date: 09/06/2011 06:59 PM Subject: 

FW: borrador de email 

Dear Mr. French: 

We continue working on the response to your request for information. Enclosed are the PDF copies of 

all tests conducted in the last five years, except for a test conducted on October 31, 2006 which was 

invalidated by a malfunction event and therefore was deemed to be non representative and invalid. The 

following is a summary of the test attached to this email and separate emails due to the size of the 

attachments. 

|------------+-------------+--------------+---------------| 

| Testing | Date of | Date of | Pollutant | 

| Company | Test | Test | or | 

| | | Report | Parameters | 

 | | | | Tested | 

|------------+-------------+--------------+---------------| 

| Pace | August 8,| August 28,| Lead | 

| | 2007 | 2007 | | 

|------------+-------------+--------------+---------------| 

| URS | December | December, | Lead | 

| | 3, 2007 | 2007 | | 

|------------+-------------+--------------+---------------| 

| URS | December | January, | PM | 

| | 16 to 17,| 2009 | Opacity | 

| | 2008 | | Face | 

| | | | Velocity | 

| | | | SO2 | 

|------------+-------------+--------------+---------------| 

| URS | February | March, | PM | 

| | 17, 2010 | 2010 | Opacity | 

| | | | Face | 

| | | | Velocity | 

| | | | Lead | 

|------------+-------------+--------------+---------------| 

| URS | June 28, | June 2010 | PM | 

 | | 2010 | | Opacity | 

 | | | | Face | 

| | | | Velocity | 

 | | | | Lead | 

| | | | Sulfur | 

|------------+-------------+--------------+---------------| 

 Enclosed also find a PDF copy of the Fugitive Dust SOP. We expect to be able to email you the formal 

response in the next 2 days. On behalf of The Battery Recycling Company, Inc., I apologize for the delay. 

We have been extremely busy handling several other important matters to EPA. Cordially,