COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA115 

Court of Appeals No. 14CA0586 

Boulder County District Court No. 13CR1092 

Honorable Patrick D. Butler, Judge 

Honorable Thomas F. Mulvahill, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

Michael A. Camarigg, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED 

Division IV 

Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM 

J. Jones and Welling, JJ., concur 

Announced September 7, 2017 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Karen Mahlman Gerash, 

Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant 
1 

¶ 1 Defendant, Michael A. Camarigg, appeals the judgment of 

conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of driving 

under the influence of alcohol (DUI); careless driving; and 

possessing chemicals, supplies, or equipment with intent to 

manufacture methamphetamine. We affirm. 

I. Background 

¶ 2 After defendant was arrested for DUI, officers decided to 

impound his Jeep because it was parked in front of a gas pump at a 

gas station. The officers conducted an inventory search of the 

vehicle and discovered a sealed box containing items commonly 

used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on those 

items, they obtained a warrant to search the Jeep and found 

additional items used to manufacture meth. 

¶ 3 The People charged defendant with DUI; careless driving; and 

possession of chemicals, supplies, or equipment with intent to 

manufacture methamphetamine. A jury convicted him of all 

charges. 
2 

II. Motion to Suppress 

¶ 4 Defendant first argues that the trial court should have 

excluded evidence discovered in the inventory search of his Jeep 

and under the subsequently issued warrant. We disagree. 

A. Additional Facts 

¶ 5 After stopping defendant on suspicion of DUI, Corporal 

Jonathan Bomba of the Lafayette Police Department called a DUI 

officer to complete the DUI investigation and arrest. Once 

defendant was placed under arrest, Corporal Bomba began an 

inventory search of the Jeep so it could be impounded. Corporal 

Alex Grotzky later arrived and assisted with the inventory search. 

¶ 6 In the cargo area, Corporal Grotzky found a gasoline canister 

and a transmission fluid container with tubes coming out of them. 

These items “kind of piqued [his] attention as possibly something 

that could be used in meth manufacturing.” He also found a United 

States Postal Service (U.S.P.S.) box addressed to “Jayne McCoy” in 

Idaho Springs, from a return address in Arizona without a name. 

Corporal Grotzky cut the box open and discovered drain cleaner, 

leaking hydrochloric acid, a glass beaker, and pH testing strips. 

Recognizing these items as consistent with methamphetamine 
3 

manufacturing, Corporal Grotzky called a hazardous materials team 

to determine if the Jeep was an active meth lab. The hazmat team 

determined it was not an active lab, and the Jeep was impounded. 

A search warrant was later issued, and officers discovered 

additional items consistent with the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. 

¶ 7 Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from the 

inventory search and under the warrant. He argued that the 

officers had options other than impounding his Jeep and that the 

inventory search was not conducted according to a policy that 

sufficiently curtailed police discretion, but, instead, permitted 

general rummaging. He also asserted that the evidence obtained 

under the warrant was tainted because the warrant was based on 

evidence found in the allegedly unconstitutional inventory search. 

¶ 8 The prosecution argued that the officers acted reasonably in 

impounding defendant’s Jeep because other options were 

impractical under the circumstances. The prosecutor also argued 

that the inventory search was valid because department policy 

required officers to open sealed containers found in an inventory 

search. 
4 

¶ 9 The Lafayette Police Department manual provided that 

[a]ll property in a stored or impounded vehicle 

shall be inventoried and listed on the vehicle 

storage form. This includes the trunk and any 

compartments or containers, even if they are 

closed and/or locked. Members conducting 

inventory searches should be as thorough and 

accurate as practicable in preparing an 

itemized inventory. . . . 

If the apparent potential for damage to a 

locked container reasonably appears to 

outweigh the protection of the items inside, 

other options to consider regarding locked 

containers include, but are not limited to, 

obtaining access to the locked container from 

the owner, placing the locked container into 

safekeeping or obtaining a written waiver of 

responsibility for the contents of the locked 

container. 

¶ 10 Corporal Grotzky testified at the suppression hearing that he 

did not make the decision to impound defendant’s Jeep, but factors 

likely informing that decision included the following: 

 Impounding a vehicle “is common practice with a DUI 

where you don’t want the person to get booked and 

released and go out and drive the vehicle.” 

 The officers “[did not] have permission from [the gas 

station] owner to leave the car there.” 
5 

 The Jeep “was parked kind of in a unique position in 

front of a gas pump where it would have been a 

nuisance.” 

 Defendant’s passenger “had admitted to Corporal Bomba 

that she had consumed alcohol” and had left the scene 

by the time Corporal Grotzky arrived. 

¶ 11 Corporal Grotzky further explained that he elected to open the 

sealed U.S.P.S. box because, while “[t]here’s some discretion within 

our policy” whether to open closed containers, he “wanted to make 

sure that there were no . . . valuable items that [he] . . . [or] the tow 

truck driver would be responsible for, [and] that the defendant 

could [not] come back and claim that [he] . . . [or] the tow truck 

driver [had] damaged or broken [defendant’s property].” Corporal 

Grotzky believed cutting the tape on the box would not damage it, 

and he “figured if . . . they needed to put a new piece of tape on it 

afterwards it wouldn’t be a big issue.” 

¶ 12 The trial court concluded that the Jeep was lawfully 

impounded and the inventory search was conducted according to 

standard policy. The court found no evidence of pretext because 

while officers had some discretion in whether to impound a vehicle, 
6 

there were “some coherent and reasonable reasons” why other 

options were impractical. The court also found that “the 

determination to do an inventory search [was made] . . . before 

there was any evidence or even suspicion by the officer that there 

would be some sort of illegal items found inside.” Thus, the court 

denied defendant’s motion to suppress. 

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

¶ 13 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress as a 

mixed question of fact and law. People v. Parks, 2015 COA 158, 

¶ 7. We defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by 

the record, but we review its conclusions of law de novo. Id. 

¶ 14 Unreasonable searches violate the United States and Colorado 

Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. 

Warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional unless an 

exception to the warrant requirement applies. Parks, ¶ 10. 

Inventory searches are one exception. Id. Inventory searches “are 

designed to protect the owner’s property while it is in police 

custody, to insure against claims concerning lost or damaged 

property, and to protect the police from any danger posed by the 

contents of the vehicle.” Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181, 1185 
7 

(Colo. 2010), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Vaughn, 

2014 CO 71.

¶ 15 Inventory searches are reasonable if (1) the vehicle was 

lawfully taken into custody, id.; (2) the search was conducted 

according to “an established, standardized policy,” Vaughn, ¶ 14; 

and (3) there is no showing police acted in bad faith or for the sole 

purpose of investigation, Pineda, 230 P.3d at 1185. 

¶ 16 A vehicle is lawfully taken into custody if the seizure is 

authorized by law and department regulations and is reasonable. 

People v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, ¶¶ 14-15 (cert. granted July 3, 

2017); People v. Gee, 33 P.3d 1252, 1255-57 (Colo. App. 2001). 

¶ 17 The inventory search must then be conducted according to a 

standardized procedure so as not to become “a ruse for a general 

rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. 

Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). Police discretion is permitted in 

conducting the search “so long as that discretion is exercised 

according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other 

than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Id. at 3-4 (quoting 

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987)). “The policy or 

practice governing inventory searches should be designed to 
8 

produce an inventory,” id. at 4, not as “a purposeful and general 

means of discovering evidence of crime,” id. (quoting Bertine, 479 

U.S. at 376 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The policy need not be in 

writing, so long as it is routinely used by officers. Brown, ¶ 16. 

¶ 18 Finally, when assessing whether an inventory search was 

pretextual, the officer’s subjective motives are irrelevant. Vaughn, 

¶ 11 n.7. Instead, we ask whether the officer’s actions were 

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Pineda, 230 P.3d 

at 1185. 

C. Decision to Impound 

¶ 19 Defendant does not challenge the officers’ legal authority to 

impound his Jeep after his DUI arrest but instead argues that they 

had options other than impounding the vehicle, such as allowing a 

third party to take custody or leaving the Jeep where it was. We are 

not persuaded that the decision was unreasonable. 

¶ 20 First, whether the officers had other options besides 

impounding defendant’s Jeep is not controlling; the question is 

whether the decision was objectively reasonable. See Vaughn, ¶ 15 

(“That [the officer] was not required to arrest [the defendant] for 

driving with a suspended license — and could have issued a 
9 

summons instead — is irrelevant, as [the defendant’s] arrest was 

both permissible and objectively reasonable.”). 

¶ 21 Second, evidence adduced at the suppression hearing 

indicates that the decision to impound was reasonable. 

Defendant’s passenger admitted she had been drinking, so officers 

could have reasonably decided she was incapable of safely operating 

the Jeep. She also left the scene before Corporal Grotzky arrived, 

indicating that she had determined not to stay with defendant and 

that she may not have been willing to take custody of the vehicle 

anyway. The officers lacked permission to leave the Jeep parked on 

the private property of the gas station owner, where it was blocking 

a gas pump and likely to be a nuisance. And department policy 

prohibited officers from moving a vehicle unless it was “an 

imminent danger to the safety of other motorists.” Defendant, 

having been arrested for DUI, certainly could not have moved the 

Jeep himself. Each of these considerations was appropriately based 

on public safety rather than a desire to investigate. See Brown, 

¶¶ 13-14 (stating that police may impound vehicles at their 

discretion “in furtherance of ‘public safety’” but “not to obtain 

evidence”) (citation omitted). 
10 

¶ 22 Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the officers 

properly took custody of defendant’s Jeep. 

D. Department Procedure 

¶ 23 Defendant also argues that the inventory search was not 

conducted according to standard department procedures that 

sufficiently curtailed officer discretion. Again, we disagree. 

¶ 24 First, whether Corporal Grotzky was motivated by some 

investigative curiosity is not controlling. See Gee, 33 P.3d at 1255. 

The question is whether his actions were objectively reasonable. Id. 

¶ 25 Department policy instructed officers to open all containers 

unless the potential for damage was significant. Having determined 

that the potential for damage was minimal, Corporal Grotzky acted 

according to policy when he opened the U.S.P.S. box in defendant’s 

Jeep. 

¶ 26 The discretion granted to Corporal Grotzky in making that 

decision was appropriate because it tailored his discretion 

according to standard criteria unrelated to criminal suspicion. 

Instead, the criteria were designed to further the purposes of an 

inventory search — protecting property while in police custody. 
11 

¶ 27 Thus, we agree with the trial court that Corporal Grotzky’s 

decision to open the box was reasonable. 

E. Pretext 

¶ 28 Finally, to the extent defendant suggests that the officers 

impounded his Jeep and conducted an inventory search as pretext 

for criminal investigation, we disagree. 

¶ 29 The only evidence defendant points to that would suggest 

pretext was Corporal Grotzky’s testimony that his curiosity was 

“piqued” by items consistent with the manufacture of 

methamphetamine before he opened the U.S.P.S. box. However, as 

the trial court noted, the decision to impound defendant’s Jeep was 

made before there was any suspicion of illegal items inside. And 

since department policy instructed officers to open all containers 

found during an inventory search unless the potential for damage 

was too great, a reasonable officer in Corporal Grotzky’s position 

would have made the same decision, his individual curiosity 

notwithstanding. See Pineda, 230 P.3d at 1185. 

¶ 30 Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the search was 

not pretextual. 
12 

F. The Counterman Case 

¶ 31 Finally, we reject defendant’s suggestion that under People v. 

Counterman, 192 Colo. 152, 556 P.2d 481 (1976), the search was 

improper because the purposes of the inventory search could have 

been accomplished without opening the box. First, Counterman is 

no longer good law.1 Second, the question is not whether the 

purposes of the inventory search could be satisfied by a narrower 

search, see Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (“The reasonableness of any 

particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably 

turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” (quoting 

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983))), but whether the 

search was reasonable. Third, the purposes of an inventory search 

would not have been satisfied by merely noting the existence of the 

 

1 People v. Counterman held that the inventory search of a knapsack 

found in an impounded vehicle was unconstitutional under the 

United States and Colorado Constitutions. 192 Colo. 152, 157-58, 

556 P.2d 481, 485 (1976). However, “under federal constitutional 

standards Counterman is no longer valid.” People v. Parks, 2015 

COA 158, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Inman, 765 P.2d 577, 579 n.4 

(Colo. 1988)). And subsequent decisions of our supreme court have 

made clear that the Colorado and United States Constitutions offer 

coextensive protections in the context of inventory searches. See id.

at ¶ 22. Hence, Counterman is no longer valid under either 

constitution. 
13 

sealed box in this case because it contained hazardous chemicals, 

which could have threatened police or public safety. See South 

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976) (“It would be 

unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in 

their custody . . . , had no right, even for their own protection, to 

search it.” (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967))). 

¶ 32 Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the inventory 

search was constitutional. 

G. Taint 

¶ 33 Because we conclude that the inventory search was 

constitutional, evidence obtained under the subsequently issued 

warrant could not have been tainted. 

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

¶ 34 Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly 

quantified the concept of reasonable doubt and lowered the burden 

of proof by using a puzzle analogy during closing argument. We are 

not convinced this was prosecutorial misconduct, but even if it was, 

it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
14 

A. Additional Facts 

¶ 35 In closing, the prosecutor argued that the circumstantial 

evidence showed that defendant knew what was inside the U.S.P.S. 

box in his Jeep and that he possessed those items with the intent to 

manufacture methamphetamine. Defense counsel asserted in 

closing that defendant did not know what was in the box, defendant 

did not know how to manufacture methamphetamine, and all of the 

items in the box had innocent uses. Thus, defense counsel argued, 

evidence of defendant’s guilt was merely speculative and the 

prosecution had not proven the possession with intent to 

manufacture meth charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 36 In rebuttal, the prosecutor used a puzzle analogy to explain 

how the circumstantial evidence was sufficient proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt: 

[W]hen you look at this case, think about 

reasonable doubt like it’s a puzzle, and that 

the pieces of this case are a puzzle that you 

are putting together. 

And when you look at a puzzle you’ve got — 

you start to put together your pieces. So first 

of all, you’ve got a piece here, which is this was 

the defendant’s car. He was driving it. He 

owned it. You saw some insurance paperwork 

in his — in his car. 
15 

So we know that the car belonged to him, that 

he drives this car, that it’s his. It isn’t like he 

was driving a friend’s car or something like. 

This is his own property. 

You keep adding up the pieces of the puzzle; 

that he’s driving drunk and he admits to that, 

but he does everything that he can to steer the 

cops away from the car. 

You put in some other pieces of a puzzle. And 

you have another one that we know that 

there’s nothing in the car that was necessarily 

or obviously illegal. Had some of these officers 

not had the training that they had, somebody 

might have overlooked this and said hey, this 

isn’t something that’s illegal. 

So he was trying to steer the cops away from 

something that he knew in his mind was 

illegal. But there wasn’t anything else that 

they found because we have talked about 

drugs or things like that. 

And again, you put together the pieces of the 

puzzle, there were items not just inside that 

box, but outside the box. Some of the tubing 

and the containers and the gas can were found 

outside the box. 

Keep adding the pieces of the puzzle, and you 

look at the proximity. Everything was in the 

trunk, and a lot of the items were together in 

that box. 

So again, if you have some pH papers in a 

drawer in your desk and you have some drain 

cleaner under your bathroom sink, the two 

aren’t probably mixing, right. 
16 

But when you’ve got all of those items in a box 

together and there’s no other reason to have 

those items in a box together, it’s probably 

there because you’re making 

methamphetamine. 

Keep adding the piecing [sic] of the puzzle. 

And again, look at why is this stuff mailed in 

the first place, right. If you could just go to 

Home Depot or McGuckin’s [Hardware] and 

buy it, why does somebody in Nevada have to 

ship that to somebody in Idaho Springs; some 

filter papers, some pH papers. So kind of look 

at just the suspicious circumstances of that. 

Remember what Detective Holdstock told you 

yesterday, that with his training and his 

experience dealing with people shipping drugs 

and things like that over the mail that maybe 

they’re sending it to a fake name, fake address. 

Maybe they’re sending it to somebody who 

doesn’t know what’s coming and somebody is 

going to intercept it. 

So just look at the suspicious nature of that 

package in and of itself. There’s a name and 

an address of the sender — or excuse me, the 

receiver. But the sender didn’t even put their 

name on there, just an address in Arizona. 

And then lastly you put the pieces together 

and let’s use our common sense in this 

case. . . . 

Common sense, if somebody who is driving a 

car, it’s their own car, people know what’s in 

your car, people know what’s in the packages 

in their car. So use your common sense when 

you think about the evidence that you heard in 

this case. 
17 

So reasonable doubt is a puzzle. We have a 

puzzle up here, and we filled in the pieces. 

And each of you might have other pieces of the 

puzzle that you would fill in. But you look at 

this puzzle, and [there are] a couple of items 

that are still missing or a couple of pieces of 

the puzzle that haven’t been filled in. 

When you look at this puzzle and you see what 

it is, it’s a tiger; right? No doubt, proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt that that is a tiger that 

you’re looking at. 

¶ 37 Defense counsel objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s 

analogy was “inaccurate as to reasonable doubt.” The court 

overruled the objection but instructed the jury that “the law that 

applies to this case is in the instructions that I’ve read to you and 

that each of you have.” 

¶ 38 The prosecutor then concluded: 

And my purpose in putting this up is what I 

talked about, right. Reasonable doubt is not 

all doubt. It’s not beyond a shadow of a doubt. 

It’s a doubt that would cause reasonable 

people to hesitate to act in matters of 

importance to them. 

Are you going to hesitate to say that that’s a 

tiger even though all the pieces aren’t filled in? 

No. 

So . . . look at the evidence, look at what you 

heard yesterday, the photographs that you 

saw. 
18 

And when you look at everything, it tells you 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

is guilty of the charges. 

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

¶ 39 We review a trial court’s ruling on prosecutorial misconduct 

for “a gross abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice and a denial 

of justice.” People v. Garner, 2015 COA 175, ¶ 26 (quoting People v. 

Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 42) (cert. granted Oct. 17, 2016). 

¶ 40 A prosecutor may not “misstate the evidence or the law, 

attempt to inflame the jurors’ passions or prejudices, or offer a 

personal opinion as to the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Krueger, 

2012 COA 80, ¶ 50. 

¶ 41 Only one published case in Colorado has addressed the 

analogy of the reasonable doubt standard to a puzzle. See People v. 

Carter, 2015 COA 24M-2, ¶¶ 50-61. In that case, the trial court 

told jurors during voir dire that if they had a jigsaw puzzle with 

some pieces missing, which showed 

a white building with a part of a red roof and 

the rest of the roof structure is not there . . . 

part of a fence that goes around but then part 

of that’s missing . . . [and] half of, what looks 

like . . . a house . . . [,] I suspect that . . . you 

might be able to figure out that there’s a barn 

and a corral and a house there, even if you 
19 

can’t see it all, that might be enough proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at ¶ 54. The prosecutor later referred to that analogy during 

closing arguments, telling the jurors that “you consider everything 

together. It’s a puzzle.” Id. at ¶ 56. The prosecutor went on to 

recite certain pieces of evidence and told the jury to put those 

pieces together. Id. Because the Carter defendant did not object, a 

division of this court reviewed the comments for plain error. Id. at 

¶ 51. The division assumed without deciding that the comments 

were erroneous, but it concluded that they were not plain error. Id.

at ¶ 58. 

¶ 42 Here, defendant did object, so we review for reversible error, 

not plain error. Because the Carter division assumed error and 

applied the plain error standard of reversal, and because other 

Colorado cases involving the dilution of the burden of proof have 

also applied a plain error standard, Colorado law provides little 

insight on when a prosecutor’s burden of proof analogy constitutes 

reversible error. See People v. Baca, 2015 COA 153, ¶¶ 9-16 

(reviewing trial court’s analogy of reasonable doubt standard to 

driving a car for plain error); People v. Boyd, 2015 COA 109, ¶¶ 7-
20 

13 (reviewing trial court’s comments on reasonable doubt and 

presumption of innocence for plain error); People v. Hill, slip op. at 

12-16 (Colo. App. No. 14CA0585, Sept. 1, 2016) (not published 

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (reviewing prosecutor’s analogy of 

reasonable doubt to a puzzle for plain error); People v. Opana, slip 

op. at 9-12 (Colo. App. No. 10CA1987, May 29, 2014) (not 

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (same) 

¶ 43 However, courts in other jurisdictions have provided guidance. 

Analogizing reasonable doubt to an incomplete puzzle may be 

permissible when used to explain the difference between proof 

beyond all doubt and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see Adcock 

v. State, 933 N.E.2d 21, 27-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 

analogy to a puzzle missing pieces “was used to highlight the 

difference between ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and ‘beyond all 

possible doubt’” and did not violate the defendant’s due process 

rights); State v. Jackson, 305 P.3d 685, 692 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) 

(finding that analogy of the presumption of innocence to a blank 

canvas and the state’s burden to put enough paint on the canvas 

that the jury could recognize the picture beyond a reasonable 

doubt, even if painting was not complete, was within the wide 
21 

latitude afforded prosecutors), or when used to explain how the 

evidence at trial will come together, State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 

412 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (“The puzzle analogy is an apt 

description of a trial, given that evidence is heard not in logical or 

chronological order but in order of witness knowledge.”). 

¶ 44 Even so, puzzle analogies can be problematic in several ways. 

First, they can be improper if they quantify the concept of 

reasonable doubt. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 

1128 (3d Cir. 1990) (The prosecution’s analogy of its case to a fivehundred-piece puzzle with eight pieces missing “improperly 

suggested a quantitative measure of reasonable doubt.”); People v. 

Katzenberger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) 

(stating that the prosecutor’s use of an image depicting an eightpiece puzzle with six pieces in place inappropriately suggested the 

reasonable doubt standard could be quantified); Lord v. State, 806 

P.2d 548, 552 (Nev. 1991) (suggesting argument that having ninety 

to ninety-five percent of the pieces of a puzzle was sufficient proof of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt “improperly quantified the 

concept”); State v. Lindsay, 326 P.3d 125, 131-32 (Wash. 2014) 

(finding the prosecutor’s argument that “[y]ou could have 50 
22 

percent of those puzzle pieces missing and . . . know [a puzzle 

depicts] Seattle” improperly quantified reasonable doubt). 

¶ 45 Second, puzzle analogies can inappropriately trivialize the 

state’s burden. See Berube, 286 P.3d at 412 (“The problem arises 

when the analogy is used to trivialize the State’s burden under the 

reasonable doubt standard.”). 

¶ 46 Third, using a puzzle analogy to equate the burden of proof to 

an everyday choice can be improper. See State v. Curtiss, 250 P.3d 

496, 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (“[C]losing arguments comparing 

‘the certainty people often require when they make everyday 

decisions . . . trivialize[] and ultimately fail[] to convey the gravity of 

the State’s burden and the jury’s role in assessing its case against 

[the defendant].’” (quoting State v. Anderson, 220 P.3d 1273, 1281 

(Wash. Ct. App. 2009))); cf. State v. Fuller, 282 P.3d 126, 142 (Wash. 

Ct. App. 2012) (deciding that puzzle analogy was not reversible 

error where the prosecution did not “equat[e] its burden of proof to 

making an everyday choice”). 

¶ 47 And finally, puzzle analogies are problematic if they use iconic 

images, which invite the jury to jump to a conclusion about a 

defendant’s guilt. See Katzenberger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 127 
23 

(deciding that the prosecutor’s use of a partially completed puzzle 

depicting the Statue of Liberty “invite[d] the jury to guess or jump to 

a conclusion, a process completely at odds with the jury’s serious 

task of assessing whether the prosecution has submitted proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt,” because “most jurors would recognize 

the image well before” the image was complete and “might guess the 

picture is of the Statue of Liberty when the first or second piece[s]” 

were in place); People v. Wilds, 529 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. App. 

Div. 1988) (The trial court’s analogy to a puzzle depicting Abraham 

Lincoln diminished the prosecution’s burden of proof because “the 

average American juror would recognize a jigsaw puzzle of Abraham 

Lincoln, long before all of the pieces are in place. Obviously, this is 

not the quantum of proof required in a criminal case.”). 

¶ 48 The parties disagree whether the prosecutor’s analogy should 

be reviewed for harmless error or constitutional harmless error. 

See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶¶ 9-12 (stating that preserved 

errors that affect a defendant’s constitutional rights are subject to 

constitutional harmless error review, while trial errors that do not 

directly affect a defendant’s constitutional rights are subject to 

harmless error analysis). We need not resolve that question. 
24 

Although we are not persuaded that the prosecutor’s argument 

specifically and directly offended defendant’s constitutional due 

process rights, see People v. Flockhart, 2013 CO 42, ¶ 20 (“Only 

those errors ‘that specifically and directly offend a defendant’s 

constitutional rights are “constitutional” in nature.’”) (citation 

omitted), we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility the 

prosecutor’s analogy contributed to defendant’s conviction, see 

Hagos, ¶ 11 (stating that under constitutional harmless error 

review, a reviewing court must reverse if there is a reasonable 

possibility that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction). 

C. Analysis 

¶ 49 The prosecutor used a puzzle analogy for purposes that other 

courts have found permissible: to convey the difference between 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond all doubt, and to 

explain how the circumstantial evidence fit together to support the 

prosecution’s case. See Adcock, 933 N.E.2d at 27-28; Jackson, 305 

P.3d at 692; Berube, 286 P.3d at 412. The prosecutor used the 

verbal imagery to emphasize that while the jury might want 

additional information, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to 

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 305 P.3d at 693 
25 

(deciding that the prosecutor did not act improperly in analogizing 

case to an incomplete painting to explain “that the prosecutor’s 

burden was not one to show proof beyond all doubt” and did not 

“attempt to diminish the State’s burden”). 

¶ 50 Furthermore, the prosecutor did not use the analogy to 

improperly quantify or trivialize the State’s burden. The prosecutor 

did not suggest the People had provided some specific portion of a 

puzzle or that the reasonable doubt standard would be satisfied 

when a certain percentage of the puzzle was provided. Cf.

Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084; Katzenberger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 127; 

Lord, 806 P.2d 548; Lindsay, 326 P.3d at 134-36. Instead, the 

prosecutor used the analogy to rebut the defense argument that 

evidence of defendant’s guilt was speculative. See People v. 

Santana, 255 P.3d 1126, 1132 (Colo. 2011) (“[T]he more a 

prosecutor is legitimately responding to questions and arguments 

raised by defense counsel, the less likely it is the prosecutor 

intended to shift the burden of proof.”). 

¶ 51 While the comparison was potentially problematic because the 

image of a tiger might be recognizable “long before all of the pieces 

are in place,” Wilds, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 327, we nevertheless conclude 
26 

that there is no reasonable possibility the metaphor contributed to 

defendant’s conviction. First, a tiger is not so iconic as to be 

immediately recognizable, in contrast to images of the Statue of 

Liberty, Katzenberger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 127, the State of 

California, People v. Otero, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 816-18 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2012), or Abraham Lincoln, Wilds, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 327, of 

which courts have disapproved. Second, in contrast to more 

problematic cases, the prosecutor did not display a partial image of 

a tiger. Cf. Otero, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 816-18 (prosecutor displayed 

image of California and asked what state it was); Katzenberger, 101 

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 127 (prosecutor displayed image of partially 

completed puzzle depicting Statute of Liberty). The generic verbal 

comparison was not so specific that the jury could have 

immediately conjured an image of a tiger and thus been encouraged 

to jump to conclusions about defendant’s guilt. Cf. Katzenberger, 

101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 127 (finding that image of puzzle depicting 

Statute of Liberty “le[ft] the distinct impression that the reasonable 

doubt standard may be met by a few pieces of evidence” and thus 

“invite[d] the jury to guess or jump to a conclusion”). Instead, the 

prosecutor merely recited a long list of circumstantial evidence, 
27 

analogous to putting the pieces of a puzzle together, in direct 

rebuttal to defense counsel’s argument that the evidence against 

defendant was speculative and did not prove his guilt. See People v. 

Gibson, 203 P.3d 571, 578 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[I]t was permissible 

for the prosecutor to argue that the sum of the circumstances was 

more than mere coincidence.”). 

¶ 52 Finally, the jury was properly instructed on the reasonable 

doubt standard and the State’s burden to prove each element of the 

charges beyond a reasonable doubt; the court reminded the jurors 

of these standards when defense counsel objected to the 

prosecutor’s analogy; and, after the objection, the prosecutor 

repeated the correct formulation of reasonable doubt to the jury. 

See People v. Bowring, 902 P.2d 911, 921 (Colo. App. 1995) 

(deciding that the prosecutor’s statements did not deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial where the jury was properly instructed on 

the law and reminded by the court of those instructions during the 

prosecutor’s objectionable comments). 

¶ 53 Under these circumstances, any impropriety in the 

prosecutor’s analogy was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
28 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 54 Lastly, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence he 

intended to manufacture methamphetamine. We disagree. 

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

¶ 55 We review the record de novo to determine if there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain a defendant’s conviction. People v. Leverton, 

2017 COA 34, ¶ 56. We ask “whether the relevant evidence, both 

direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to 

support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant is 

guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 53. 

B. Analysis 

¶ 56 Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence he 

intended to manufacture methamphetamine because (1) the items 

he possessed were legal and had legitimate uses; (2) there was no 

evidence he knew how to manufacture meth; (3) he did not possess 

items “essential” to manufacturing meth; and (4) there was no 

evidence he knew what was in the U.S.P.S. box. 

¶ 57 However, defendant disregards rational inferences a juror 

could make in favor of the prosecution from the circumstantial 
29 

evidence. For example, a juror could conclude defendant knew 

what was in the U.S.P.S. box because most people know what items 

are in their vehicles. Likewise, a juror could conclude defendant 

knew how to and intended to manufacture methamphetamine 

based on the close proximity of the supplies, the containers with 

tubes coming out of them (which an officer testified could be used 

in the production of the drug), the suspicious circumstances of 

having legal items shipped from an anonymous out-of-state 

address, and defendant’s attempts to keep the officers away from 

his vehicle. 

¶ 58 That the record contains other evidence that could support a 

contrary conclusion does not change the fact that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion. See People v. 

Thornton, 251 P.3d 1147, 1149 (Colo. App. 2010) (“The prosecution 

is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference that may 

fairly be drawn from the evidence, even if the record also contains 

evidence to the contrary.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); 

People v. Carlson, 72 P.3d 411, 416 (Colo. App. 2003) (“Where 

reasonable minds could differ, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a 

conviction.”). 
30 

¶ 59 It was the jury’s role to determine what weight and 

significance to attribute to the evidence, see Leverton, ¶¶ 62-63, 

and, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there 

was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended 

to manufacture methamphetamine. 

V. Conclusion 

¶ 60 The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE WELLING concur.