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0-1/1 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE t

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 15, 1961

(Open and Executive Sessions)

[No. I]

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66417 WASHINGTON: 1961

cRENCE cp

L I E.:)" RARY

DEPARTMENT

TAN,

4
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS

OVERTON BROOKS, Louisiana, Chairman

GEORGE P. MILLER, California

OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas

VICTOR L. ANFUSO, New York

JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota

KEN HECHLER, West Virginia

EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, Connecticut

WALTER H. MOELLER, Ohio

DAVID S. KING, Utah

THOMAS G. MORRIS, New Mexico

BOB CASEY, Texas

WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri

JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia

WILLIAM FITTS RYAN, New York

JAMES C. CORMAN, California

II

JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR., Massachusetts

JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania

J. EDGAR CHENOWETH, Colorado

WILLIAM K. VAN PELT, Wisconsin

PERKINS BASS, New Hampshire

R. WALTER RIEHLMAN, New York

JESSICA McC. WEIS, New York

CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio

RICHARD I. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana

ALPHDNZO E. BELL, JR., California

CHARLES F. DITCANDER, Executive Director and Chief Counsel

Dr. CHARLES S. SHELDON II, Technical Director

SPENCER M. BERESFORD, Special Counsel

PHILIP B. YEAGER, Special Consultant

JOHN A. CARSTARPHEN, Jr., Chief Clerk

FRAifl R. HAMMILL, Jr., Counsel

RAYMOND WILCOVE, Staff Consultant

RICHARD P. Hms, Staff Consultant

Capt. HOWARD J. SILBERSTEIN, USN, Staff Consultant
CONTENTS

Statement of—

Dryden, Dr. Hugh L., Deputy Administrator; accompanied by

Edward C. Buckley, Assistant Director of Space Flight Operations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Yates, Lt. Cen. Donald N., Deputy Director, Defenge Research And

Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Page

1

35

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DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1961

HOTITSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS,

ashington,D.0 D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, in room B-214, New House

Office Building, at 10:20 a.m., Hon. Overton Brooks (chairman of

the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The pictures

are over. I think everybody has what he wants.

We have on this committee some members who have rejected assignments on other major standing committees of the House of Representatives, either to come on this committee or to remain on this

committee.

So I think, whether they be Democrats or Republicans, we ought

later this year to honor those at a little party. When we do so, we

want Dr. Dryden to be present.

We have known Dr. Dryden a long time. He was formerly the

head of the NACA and is now Deputy Director of the NASA. In

my judgment, nobody has contributed more to the program of space

development than has Dr. Dryden.

This morning as our leadoff witness on this occasion, we have

Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy Director of NASA. Dr. Dryden.

STATEMENT OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,

ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD C. BUCKLEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

OF SPACE FLIGHT OPERATIONS, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND

SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Dr. DRYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have always found this a very

friendly group. We are arduous rooters for the home team, in all of

our problems together.

I would like to make a few preliminary remarks. I have no

prepared opening statement.

As many•of you know, it is impossible to reach Venus with any

boosters now available to us or the U.S.S.R. except in the neighborhood

of certain dates.

With respect to Venus, which is our subject this morning, the first

available date after NASA was formed on October 1, 1958, was an

approach, near approach of the Earth to Venus on June 8, 1959.

When NASA was formed, the Administrator was appointed. We

received a proposal from one of the very well qualified groups in our

country to make shots at Venus, in June of 1959, which was then about

8 or 9 months away.

1
2 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

As many of you know, we learned together, both the contractor and

ourselves, and you and the American public, that this was too tight a

schedule that with the equipment that we ha el available, even working

around Ale clock, it was not possible to get prepared with any assurance of success by June of 1959. And the vehicles for which we

originally contracted for that purpose were used for space probes,

one of them, Pioneer V, as you know, was launched in March of 1960,

in the general direction of the orbit of Venus but not at Venus. It did

not have the power .to get as close to the Sun as the orbit of Venus.

We did maintain communications with it for 22/12million miles. We

measured the same things which our Soviet friends say they are now

measuring with their probe—magnetic field, radiation, micrometeorites, and so on. We have those measurements out to that distance.

And there were some very remarkable things discovered which are a

matter of history.

The next date at which Venus could be approached was January of

1961. . January 13, is the distance of closest approach. It is not necessary to fire on the exact day but in this general vicinity. - This is the

day when the minimum energy is required. You have to shoot a

little faster if you don't shoot on that particular day.

It was clear to us, as we have told you very many times that the

United States does not have the booster capacity to do this type of

difficult mission. And we did, beginning in October of 1958, take

vigorous action to remedy this deficiency.

Now, the unfortunate part for us is that it takes something of the

order of 4 to 5 years to develop one of these new rocket engines.

I should make very clear that development of the Atlas—with all

of the pressure in effort and money required for an object of this priority—took that amount of time. A space vehicle begins with the

Atlas as the first-stage booster. To it you must add other stages and

more complex guidance equipment. So that no matter how much we

appropriate, it is unlikely we can buy a year or two in time.

We, your team, you and ourselves, are going to have to sweat out

another year or two.

Now, the first vehicle that really has promise of doing more or less

what the Russians have just done, with a payload of around 1,100

pounds as against their 1,400, is the Centaur, which we have discussed in this committee on many occasions.

• The first flight of this vehicle is scheduled sometime this year, and

we do have plans in the developmental flights of this vehicle to shoat

one with a scientific payload in the general direction of Venus

'

or fly

by, which is what the experiment is that is now beirt carried on 'by

the U.S.S.R. The 1962 date is in the neighborhood of August 1962.

A second, or the next try after that comes in March of 1Q.64, by which

time the Centaur should be a thoroughly tested vehicle. We should

be able to do a very sophisticated job in reconnaissance of that planet.

Now, in our 10-year plan, which many of you have seen, the 1962

shot is labeled—I don't remember the exact language, as the launching

of a planetary vehicle, and the word Venus does not appear. When we

test the vehicle, we might as well shoot it in the direction of Venus

as to just shoot it out in space.

And we do have plans. You have to remember that this will be one

of the early Centaur development vehicles. And we will undoubtedly

have two tries, as apparently our friends across the sea did. And
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 3

we hope that we have the same percentage of success at that time as

they did.

The favorable dates are 19 months apart. This is why the yearly

interval seems to fluctuate from 1 to 2 years.

By 1965, October 27, the Saturn vehicle would be available for a

try with a much heavier payload toward Venus. This in brief is

the present U.S. program in this regard.

The feat of the Russians is dependent primarily on the question of

booster capacity, which we have discussed very many times.

The guidance systems that we have available as I have gone into

with you before are to the best of our knowledge as good as the

Russians have. We just don't have the weight of booster to use these

guidance systems on missions of this kind.

Now, with respect to the Russian shot, as you know, the Russians

placed in orbit, or at least in part of an orbit, a 7-ton satellite,

which is launched to the best of our knowledge with the same ICBM

first-stage booster that they have had for a very long time. They seem

to have improved the upper stages, as we judge from the performance,

so that the payload in orbit is now 71/2tons, as compared with, I think

about 5 tons in some of the previous shots.

The business of hitting in the neighborhood of Venus is dependent

on starting a probe with a certain velocity in a certain direction.

If the microphone here is the Earth and Venus is where Mr. Brooks

is now sitting, we must get this probe started in that direction with

a velocity which depends on the time at which we fire it. If you notice

the last release from Moscow, they say it is going to get there a month

early. This means they seem to have gotten a little higher velocity

of launch than they programed. Or it may be a little slower. This

is a very peculiar business because we shoot backward from the direction in which the Earth is traveling in its orbit so as to get a slower

velocity in space relative to the Sun. In that way it begins to fall in

toward the Sun, toward the orbit of Venus.

The probe describes a path from Earth to Venus while both Venus

and the Earth are moving, With the probe going a little bit faster

than Venus. The two paths converge and the probe goes by when

they come near each other.

Apparently from the program which was used, advantage was

taken of the rotational velocity of the Earth. They chose a time of

day when the motion would be in the opposite direction to the direction of travel of the Earth around the Sun so as to get a greater reduction of the velogity with respect to the Sun.

This technique, as I have said to the press, has been described long

before there were any satellites or space vehicles, that is the necessity

of using a* so-called parking orbit so as to get started in the right

position.

You perhaps have got the vision of a rocket.going along and shooting off to one side. This is not the way it is done.

The propulsiOn for the space probe was like the top stage on any

of the space vehicles that we have fired. It is the object sitting on

top the final rocket. You fire the first stages to get into the satellite

orbit and then you have to, with, an orientation control out in space,

rotate the rocket until it is pointing in the direction you want to fire

the probe. You then fire the probe off the nose. There is another

•
4 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

technical detail, because the satellite is moving. You have to point it

in such a direction that the combination of the motion of the probe

along its axis with the motion of the satellite gives you the direction

that you want. It is the old problem of shooting from a moving

vehicle.

Anyway, the space vehicle looks like any space vehicle except that

the probe is located with its propulsion as the final stage.

In the use of the Centaur we plan a slightly different technique,

perhaps an improvement, in that the final stage, which we may or

may not use in a parking orbit depending on the circumstances, contains the Centaur engine which can be shut down, the rocket allowed

to coast, and then turned on again. So that you use a single rocket

engine in the last satellite stage for an additional impulse an order

to go toward Venus.

It is in this way that we can do more or less the same order of probe

weight with Centaur, which is a vehicle with an Atlas as the first

stage, as the Russians can do with a first stage which has the thrust

of twice that of the Atlas.

What we know, then

'

is that the 7-ton satellite was used. This satellite was put in orbit. The most recent numbers which were obtained

and released last night show that the period of this satellite is 89.66

minutes, that its lowest height or perigee is 125 statute miles, that its

apogee is 198 statute miles.

This satellite is being tracked by the United States.

The rocket body has reentered the atmosphere and burned up.

That is, the rocket which put it in orbit was separated from the

satellite.

A third object, believed to have been ejected or broken off from the

7-ton satellite, also is being tracked, but no precise orbital elements

are available at this time.

We are attempting to track 1961 Gamma I, the name given by scientists to the Russian space probe, launched from orbit toward the

planet Venus on February 12.

The rocket body of this probe is believed to have reentered the

atmosphere.

The satellite from which the probe was launched has broken into

two parts, which are being tracked. And the most recently computed

figures indicate the following elements: 89.79 minutes for the period

of one of these two, and 89.54 for the other.

The perigee is about the same for the two, 123 and 124 statute miles.

And the apogee of one is 186 and the other 2011/2.

The orbit inclination of the satellite itself was 64.9.

After this splitting into two pieces, it is about 65.01 degrees.

Now, I would like to explain that no one has yet, outside of Russia,

received signals from the probe, although they have announced the

frequency.

The reason for this is that the satellite is commanded—that is, the

transmitter is commanded on and off by the Russians. Their most

recent statement is that they will do this once every five days.

This suggests, of course, that .they have limited solar and battery

capacity and perhaps have put in a very high powered transmitter

which can be operated only for brief intervals.

We don't understand why they planned it this way.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 5

Now, in order to track this successfully we must not only know the

frequency but have some idea when it is radiating.

We have cranked up some of our stations to receive the frequency,

and we will make an attempt to track it.

Changing to this frequency is not a simple matter of turning a knob

on a set It is about 2 days' work to install new receivers in the right

frequency range and to do the tuning up and calibrations that are

necessary.

Trying to find this satellite as it gets farther and farther out with

some of our 85-foot antennas is really a difficult search job. The beam

from one of these antennas is very narrow. Unless you know where

to look and when the transmitter is turned on, you have almost a hopeless proposition.

We hope that in time the Russians will realize the advantage of

having some confirmation of the performance of this probe and they

will see that it is to their benefit to tell us the times when they turn

it on.

There is, however, another difficulty. Presumably the Russians

will turn this on when it is visible from Russia. At that time the

United States is in the shadow of the Earth and can't see the probe.

So it is very doubtful that our station at Goldstone, Calif., for example, will have very much luck in seeing this probe. In depends altogether on when it is turned on and off.

I think that is about the—oh, one more point.

The Russians have announced that they may get to Venus a month

earlier than they first predicted.

What this means in practice is merely a somewhat different miss

distance and it is not as big as you might think. I think I mentioned

before that you have Venus running along a track like this [indicating], and you have the probe overtaking it at a faster speed. If it

comes early it may go ahead of Venus, or if late, behind it, but the

amount of the miss changes and is not as great as you might think

from the distance that Venus travels in 1 month, because both the

probe and Venus are traveling in roughly the same general direction.

There has been some confusion in the press about the distances between the Earth and Venus at the time of closest approach. This I

think is a confusion between the distances between the Earth and.

Venus over which the information must be transmitted, and the distance between the orbits of the Earth and Venus.

I don't have the exact figures. It is between 25 and 30 million

miles.

This is the distance over which the information will have to be

transmitted if the Russians are to get any information at the time of

closest approach.

I think the shorter distances that have been mentioned are the

distances between the orbit of the Earth and the orbit of Venus, which

is kind of a perpendicular distance. That is, Venus is here and the

Earth is here [indicating], and the probe is near Venus. The perpendicular distance between the two orbits is shorter than the distance

between the Earth and Venus, and I believe this has given rise to some

confusion in the statements in the press about the distance.

I think this is about the sum total of my knowledge of the matter.

66417-61-2
6 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

• You will, in due course, get a more highly technical presentation

of our own program in connection with the authorization hearings

'that are to come and I personally am not really competent to give you

this detailed technical picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Doctor.

The arrangement this morning of the committee is that at 11 o'clock

Lt. Gen. Donald N. Yates, Deputy Director of Defense Research and

Engineering, will testify.

Now, we can go until about 11. Then We are going to ask General

Yates to testify. And later on, if we don't finish with Dr. Dryden and

Mr. Edward C. Buckley, who is here as Assistant Director of Space

Flight Operations for NASA—you gentlemen could come back,

couldn't you?

Dr. DRYDEN. We

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to heed you.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have an appearance before the deficiency committee of the House at 1 o'clock. So this afternoon we will be otherwise engaged.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the posture hearings we are going to need

you.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, may I ask you this, Doctor: What is the

most significant feature of this Venus probe? Is it the ability, of

the Russians to send up this space ship? Is it the ability to fire a

piggyback load from the space ship, that is, a rocket toward Venus?

Is it the apparent ability of the Russians to fire that rocket back to

the Earth? What would you say is the most significant?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, overall, we are seeing what a country can do

if it has 800,000 pounds thrust in the basic booster vehicle.

A country which has that capability can use it in a very great

many ways, and we have seen quite a number of them.

One is to put enough guidance on it to be able to hit the Moon, at

least they did this once.

The other is the ability to do a manned orbital flight.

The third is a mission of the present type to the planets. There

are other missions to the Moon which this capacity enables the Russians to do.

We have estimated from the very beginning that the Russians could

do any of these things which they elected to do.

Now, what they have elected to do, as you know, is to go to the

Moon with three shots, then shift to recovery of animals from space.

and presumably are engaged in the work leading up to manned orbital flight.

They have chosen now to go to Venus.

There was an opportunity at Mars on October 1, 1960. And you

recall that there was a disposition of ships in the Pacific at that time,

when Mr. Khrushchev was in this country, which suggested they

might have been looking for an operation. We do not know, of

course, how to interpret this.

The point is they can do any one of these things, but apparently

have not put the effort to do them all simultaneously.

What they will do next depends on decisions that have been made

in the Kremlin, to which we are not a party. This is a frank state-
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 7

ment. They could do a number of things. They could go back to

the Moon with a soft landing, for the next round. They could go

to Mars at the next opportunity, which is November of 1962. They

can drive more aggressively on the manned space flight program.

Apparently their resources are such that they do one thing at a

time for a certain period and have chosen the spectacular elements.

We are far ahead of them, in the opinion of everyone who has

examined the question objectively, in the amount of scientific data

that we have obtained from satellites and space probes and have made

it freely available to the world.

We have done the first experiments in the applications of Earth

satellites in the meteorological and the communications field. As far

as we know the Russians have done nothing of this kind. In other

words, what we have done is accept the hard fact that it will be about

4 or 5 years before we have the booster capacity to do their type of

operation. And with the tools and the things at hand, the abilities

at hand, we have put them into areas of possible accomplishment

and have pulled ahead in those areas.

The CHAIRMAN. One more question, Doctor: From what you say

we apparently are going to have difficulty in keeping in contact with

this operation.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have 110 contact as yet with the probe itself. The

satellite is being tracked.

The CHAIRMAN. You can contact the satellite?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But not the probe?

Dr. DRYDEN. Not the probe, because they turn it on and off.

Now, we in NASA have no facilities for tracking a satellite that

isn't transmitting.

This is a problem for which responsibility lies in the Department

of Defense and this is a problem I think you will be discussing with

General Yates.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. I am going to recognize Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Doctor, are we getting the same cooperation from the

Russians with respect to the release of scientific data that they have

gathered through their probes that we give the world and which

their scientific community picks up?

Dr. DRYDEN. It is difficult to distinguish between whether there

is a failure to release information or a failure to have the information

in the first place to release. I think we responded to a letter from

the chairman with, regard to a comparison of the number of scientific

papers published by our own scientists and by other scientists. This

is a very crude and rough measure of comparison.

As I say, when someone doesn't give you information, you don't

know whether it is because he won't give it to you or because he

doesn't have it.

Mr. MILLER. You feel that they have in a reasonable degree tried

to cooperate in this respect?

Dr. DRYDEN. They have supplied information usually by appearances at international meetings. The information is usually sketchy

and not in the detail that most of our scientists like to see.
8 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Many of us—I don't remember whether any members of the committee did—got from Mr. Sedov when he was in Washington in

October of 1959, I think, a book with pictures of the back side of the

Moon, for example. If you examine that—it is a nice booklet. We

see the overall results they obtained. And there is a picture made

from many observations and sort of giving their final results. There

is not too much technical material in the booklet.

Now, on the other hand, in some scientific journals in connection

with the sputniks, they have published results of scientific information

on magnetic fields, on the radiation and so on.

Mr. MILLER. Has that generally come after we have had that

information?

Dr. DRYDEN. No. We get very—I would say we get only spotty

and occasional advance copies through occasional personal contacts

with someone that a scientist knows and communicates with.

Mr. MILLER. In the instant case they tell us what the frequency is

going to be, but when they withhold information as to when the

probe is going to send out signals, they are meeting us only about halfway, aren't they?

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. MILLER. YOU know

Dr. DRYDEN. We feel so. It makes it impossible until we solve this

problem of verifying by independent means what the trajectory is.

You will recall the discussion we had with respect to the lunar

shot in this respect.

Mr. MILLER. We know when they are going to play a game and

the hour it is going to be played, but they don't tell us where it is going

to be played.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. MILLER. That is not very helpful.

Dr. DRYDEN. Neither the time nor the exact place is specified.

Mr. MILLER. I want to congratulate you, Doctor. I for one am

very happy to see you back here.

Dr. DRYDEN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MILLER. I think you are doing a great job at NASA.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fulton?

Mr. FULTON. Glad to have you here, Doctor.

I think we have to examine what is the area of reference in which

we are operating.

The question is this: Are we in a space race with the Russians?

Would you just say "Yes" or "No" on that.

Are we or are we not? How do you look at it in NASA?

Dr. DRYDEN. In my opinion, as a nation we are in competition

with the Russians. I don't see how anyone

Mr. FULTON. Are we recognizing the race, though? That is my

point.

You see, we are always talking about whether we are ahead of

them or behind them. But the question is, does your agency recognize it as a race, with some necessity for speeding up?

Dr. DRYDEN. I would say that we are working as hard as we know

how, with very much overtime, utilizing the resources that are provided to us to move ahead just as rapidly as possible.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 9

Mr. FULTON. If I could comment, I have never yet heard your

agency say it is a race. Is it a race?

- Dr. DRYDEN. I have just said we are in a competition with the

Russians, if you want to call the competition a race—a scientific and

technological competition with the Russians.

Mr. FULTON. You have said what the Russians will do in the future

depends on decisions made in the Kremlin to which we are not a

party.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. That would seem to me to have some political aspects

to it. Because the decisions then, to you, are not being made in the

Russian institutes of science. They are made in the Kremlin.

This question then comes up. Under the new administration, what

different, more emergency policies have been given to you since January 20, 1961? Have you been urged, as an administrative policy,

to speed up and overtake Russia, or are we just going to go by your

10-year calendar, where in March 1964 we have a fly-by of Venus?,

Dr. DRYDEN. The present situation is that the new Administrator

was recently appointed and took the oath of office at 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon.

As you know, I have been continued. I am not a good person to

tell you what the new administration will do so far as changes in

policy are concerned. I think I would just have to defer an answer

until we have gotten a little bit further along in the review that he

will make and the administration will make.

Mr. FULTON. Then to limit it, as Acting Administrator you have

received no instructions to speed up anything, other than what has

been done in setting out the 10-year schedule last year?

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

There has been a communication to the Administrator to review

all the programs of the agency and to make his recommendations.

Mr. Fuuroisr. Now, let us look at the two different kinds of flights

to Venus. You have said that our's will be a flight going backward

from the Earth's velocity.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. And using the gravitational influence of the Sun.

Isn't it a fact that that is exactly the opposite from What the

Russians have done, because theirs is a forward projection.

Dr. DRYDEN. No, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Using their velocity to overtake Venus.

Dr. DRYDEN. No, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Which is right.

Dr. DRYDEN. No, sir.

Mr. FuuroN. I had seen by the diagrams in the papers that it was

an overtaking flight.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is, but this is a very tricky subject. The speed

goes up because of the falling toward the Sun, and the increasing

speeds of a falling body compounded with a speed which initially

is slower than the speed of the Earth in its orbit.

Mr. FULTON. The Russians shot backward, too, didn't they?

Dr. DRYDEN. If you recall Pioneer V, there was quite a period of

months when it lagged behind the Earth. And then it overtook the

Earth and went out toward the Venus orbit. This is a somewhat
10 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

detailed technical point. It is the combination of the motion which

was less than the Earth's orbital velocity with the downward acceleration, continually increasing velocity of downward fall, which

in a few months caused this initially slower speed to increase beyond

the speed of the Earth and beyond the speed of Venus.

Mr. FULTON. You had said just previously that it will be 4 to 5

years before we in the United States have the booster capacity.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. To perform this type of operation.

Dr. DRYDEN. No, I tried to say in the fall of 1962, but with a developmental vehicle.

Mr. FULTON. But it will be by March 1964 before we can try it,

is that correct?

Dr. DRYDEN. It is the next opportunity for Venus we will be trying.

It will be with the Centaur vehicle. The payload will be of the order

of 1,000 pounds, rather than 1,400.

Mr. FULTON. Let's go back to the large satellite of the Russians.

That is the Gamma I you spoke of.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. On February 12, 1961.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. That is now in three pieces. And satellites don't go

into three pieces, unless 

Dr. DRYDEN. The satellite is in two pieces. The satellite, itself,

is in two pieces.

Mr. FULTON. But there were three pieces up there.

Dr. DRYDEN. The rocket with which they put it up has already

reentered and burned.

Mr. FULTON. That means there must have been some sort of an

explosion, a separation of that space platform or satellite, doesn't it?

Dr. DRYDEN. We always separate, of course, the satellite from the

rocket.

Mr. FULTON. I realize that.

Dr. DRYDEN. They have separated a cabin, or something, from the

satellite presumably.

Mr. FULTON. That is what I am getting at. -

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. Fuvrow. We are only talking of payload.

You said they have separated possibly a cabin.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is in two pieces, I should be accurate in my statement because that is all we know.

Mr. FuvroN. Right.

Dr. DRYDEN. The satellite separated from the launch rocket which

put it up.

The launch rocket has reentered the atmosphere and burned. The

satellite is now in two pieces. The probe had a rocket which propelled it. That rocket presumably has reentered and the probe is

on the way.

Mr. Fu-uroN. Now, we understand each other.

Dr. DRYDEN. There is another piece that we don't know what it is,

probably fairing-s or something of that kind.

Mr. Fuvrow. So there are really two pieces we know about, and the

third piece may be fairings or some equipment that has split off?
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. So on the payload there are three pieces remaining.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. FuvroN. And the two pieces of the launch vehicle and rocket

have gone away. _

Dr. DRYDEN. I 'suppose you are suggesting that there may have been

an attempt of recovery of one of the pieces. That is possible. We

just do not know. .

Mr. FuvroN. That is what I am getting at.

Now, the question is, do we know what occurred up there on our

tracking when this satellite divided into three pieces? Could it be

possible that they were going to outflank us on the Mercury program

and bring two men down in capsules with retrorockets?

, Dr. DRYDEN. This is pure speculation. What we know is that it is

now in two pieces.

Mr. FULTON. Do we know anything about those pieces?

Dr. DRYDEN. No. It is not under continuous observation.

You observe it from a number of stations. One time it goes by

it is one piece, and the next time it goes around it is in two pieces.

Mr. FULTON. Is that space platform big enough to have had two

men in it?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, it was a 7-ton satellite.

Mr. FULTON. Is the Gamma I Russian performance of having a

space platform or spaceship from which action can be taken in space

a tremendous advance forward, would you say?

Dr. DRYDEN. Large size and booster capacity is advantageous.

You can do much more difficult things.

Mr. FULTON. But 

Dr. DRYDEN. All we know about the man in space program—to go

back—is that there were three tries of recovering from orbit, one of

which was successful.

, Now, whether on the basis of that experience they are prepared to

go ahead with man, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interject something at this time.

Mr. FtruroN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. General Yates is here. He said he will ,be able to

come back this afternoon.

What is the pleasure of the committee? Would you rather finish

with these witnesses now and meet at 2 o'clock this afternoon for

General Yates?

Mr. ANFUSO. That sounds all right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. If there is no objection, then, we will

proceed with these witnesses.

Could you notify General Yates? If it is all right, let us know.

Mr. FINCH. Yes, sir.

Mi FULTON. I have one more question.

- The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

- Mr. FULTON. We-have been hearing a good bit about a thing called

.4, missile gap.

Now that the political atmosphere has cleared, with regard to

Russia, would you say that based on U.S. performance there is a missile gap or there is not?
12 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Dr. DRYDEN. The question of a missile gap is a matter for Defense

to answer.

By missile I assume you mean ballistic missiles, which are not within

our province.

Mr. FULTON. Then let us take

Dr. DRYDEN. The space gap, if you want to call it a gap, is that in

booster capacity which we have repeatedly discussed?

The CHAIRMAN. We have all known that.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have all known this.

Mr. FuriroN. But how long is that gap?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, the Centaur vehicle will get to about 4 tons in

orbit as compared with the Russians' 71/2tons.

The first firing of Centaur will be this year. Certainly sometime

next year if we have that kind of a mission, we can put 4 tons in

Earth orbit.

The real step forward comes with Saturn, as, again, you know.

This I think is 1964.

Mr. FULTON. But if there is a gap, then, and you say Centaur will

fill it and there will be a firing this year—and I believe you said it is

in August—then you would say at this point that sort of a space gap

is to be filled by Saturn between March, April, May, June, July,

August-6 months.

Dr. DRYDEN. It depends on how much significance you attribute

to the difference between 4 tons and 71/2tons in carrying out missions.

Mr. FULTON. Does this Gamma I satellite of the Russians, or the

previous large satellite we will call it, have any effect on our security

posture in the United States? Will they be able perhaps to send

down a hydrogen or atomic weapon and possibly destroy us or any

of our cities?

Dr. DRYDEN. This is a matter for the Defense experts. As one

sitting on the outside, it looks so much more efficient and easier to

do it with an ICBM that I don't see why you adopt an extremely

complex and expensive way of doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask at this time: Does anyone else in the

committee have any questions?

Mr. ANFUSO. I certainly do.

Mr. FtruroN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. You are through, then, Mr. Fulton?

Mr. FULTON. I am through.

Mr. ANFUSO. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Anfuso.

Mr. ANFUSO. Dr. Dryden, I want to congratulate you for staying on

the job.

Dr. DRYDEN. Thank you sir.

Mr. ANFUSO. I have worked with you on international cooperation

and traveled with you. And you have done an excellent job.

Speaking about international cooperation, when I was in Russia, in

the latter part of 1958, I spoke to the Russian scientists Sedov, Topchiev, and all those scientists. That was the time when they hit the

moon, September 14,1959.

They said they were willing to cooperate on the peaceful exploration of outer space. Is that correct? They have said that many

times.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 13

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir; I have had many conversations myself with

these men.

Mr. ANFUSO. Now, we first had an ad hoc committee on space in

the United Nations, which later became a permanent committee, and

you and I sat on that, together with Mr. Fulton. Last year we did

not even have one meeting. We could not get together on a meeting.

I am going to ask you, Dr. Dryden, are you going to push, as r

will, with the State Department, that we do meet on this permanent

committee to try to solve some of these problems of international

cooperation?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, we have been consulted by the State Department

and have urged such steps as can be taken. We have been asked for

advice on specific points. I am not prepared to discuss the details of

that here, sir.

Mr. ANITTSO. Since the U.S.S.R. and the United States are the two

prime countries that have done the most in this field of space exploration, would you favor a joint conference between an American team

and a Russian team to discuss the peaceful uses and exploration of

outer space?

Dr. DRYDEN. I have on every occasion discussed with the Russians

this matter of cooperation. They generally talk about exchange of

information as a first step.

We find it very difficult to get them to speak of a specific field of

substantive cooperation. It usually winds up by saying there are

political problems which must be solved first.

Now, I am in this position at the present time. The state of the

Union message was sent to the Congress, in which Mr. Kennedy said

he was interested in international cooperation in the space field. And

there are discussions going on within NASA with respect to ideas for

some implementation of this. I can't discuss them at this time.

Mr. ANFITSO. Let me further add to that statement.

We all recognize that the future of the world or the destruction of

the world lies in what can be done in outer space. Would you again—

I repeat, would you as an individual—

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. ANFITSO. In the position which you hold, would you favor the

United States taking the initiative,—

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. ANFITSO. In asking the Russians to meet with us on the question

of deciding how these probes be conducted for the benefit of all mankind.

Dr. DRYDEN. You are touching on a question which has been of

very great interest to me.

I think, in this session, it is appropriate to say only one thing. As

you know, we have said so far as NASA is concerned, considering

only technical problems, we will cooperate bilaterally with individual

nations, we will cooperate with the group of nations in Europe who

form themselves into associations. When we say bilateral we include

the Russians as well as any other nation.

There is a certain problem. We prefer projects in which all nations can cooperate, or many nations can cooperate; for obvious reasons. And we have had very good response to this. We have tried

to tailor our program to the individual nations.

66417-61 3
14 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

As you know, the very first launching in this program was in Italy,

in Sardinia, when very fortunately two launching rockets carrying

sodium flares were successful. That is better luck than we have, all

the time.

Mr. ANFUSO. Dr. Dryden, there is no man more in favor of getting

all nations together on this subject that I am. But you can never get

a meeting in the United Nations with the Russians objecting.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. ANFUSO. Without the Russians in it, it is meaningless.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have 

Mr. ANFUSO. Are you in favor, Doctor, as an individual now 

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, I am in favor of talking .to the Russians and encouraging cooperation on every occasion. We met with them when

they were here in October of 1959 in Washington, at the meeting of

the American Rocket Society 

Mr. ANFUSO. Are you willing to—

Dr. DRYDEN. And I expect to meet with them again and discuss this

problem.

Mr. ANFUSO. And this committee wants to cooperate in that effort?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANFUSO. Because that is our job. Now, Dr. Dryden when

we had Secretary of Defense Gates before this committee, he testified

that in 1953, after a question I asked him, that our Government had

the choice whether to develop a large booster, such as the Russians

have concentrated on, or to develop the miniaturization and technical

efficiency of our satellites. He said the Government decided to develop the latter, the miniaturization and the perfection—

Has our policy changed in that respect? Is NASA prepared now

to concentrate in placing more emphasis on our large boosters?

Dr. DRYDEN. We are spending, in the 1962 budget, that will come to

you, $375 million in the vehicle area, in remedying this deficiency,

which is roughly one-third of the total budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that enough money, Doctor?

Dr. DRYDEN. Is that enough emphasis in one area or not?

You see, if you put all your money in that area, nothing happens.

In Saturn—nothing happens that the public is conscious of.

In Saturn we have already put, I think it is two hundred and some

million dollars, and so far as the public is concerned there are a few

pictures of an enormous vehicle and an enormous launch stand, and

some noises that have shaken up the vicinity of Huntsville.

If this was the only space activity of the United States, I think

you gentlemen would be the first to complain. [Laughter.]

ANFUSO. Would you need, Dr. Dryden, an additional appropriation in order to lay more ,emphasis on a larger booster?

Dr. DRYDEN. This is a matter which we are reviewing and certainly will be discussing with the committee when the

Mr. ANFUSO. And if you find more money is needed to develop a

larger booster, then you will ask for it? Is that correct, sir?

Dr. DRYDEN. We will ask for it. Whether we ask the Congress for

it, of course, depends on the administration position as you well

understand.

Mr. ANFUSO. In that connection there has been a great deal of talk

of late about the efficacy of a solid fuel propulsion.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 15

Mr. ANFUSO. I know that your agency has met with various agencies and various private enterprises which are doing this kind of work.

Do you see a great future for solid fuels in getting bigger payloads

into the air?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, the choice of adjective, of course whether it is

a great future—I think that is probably a good adjective.

If I may review the history of solid fuels for just a moment?

The problem of large solid propellant vehicles has been one that

up until a few years ago you had to transport the case with its fuel

in it. With liquid propellant fuel, you ship the fuel separately and

you bring it together with the vehicle at the launch site.

If you had to transport an Atlas completely filled with its fuel

across the continent, you would have a weight, you see, of 350,000 or

whatever it is—three hundred and some thousand pounds.

The first suggestion that was made to remedy this problem was to

build a fuel manufacturing plant at Cape Canaveral, and fuel the

vehicle on the launch stand. Many people did not think that this

could be a very successful technical proposition because of the requirements for control of the temperatures and curing.

Within the past year or two, as you may perhaps know, there has

been developed the concept of a segmented or Tinker Toy, or whatever

you want to call it, a building block type of construction of solid

propellant rockets. And we are supporting experiments in this area.

There was a successful—or three successful firings I recall a month or

two ago. We are proceeding with that project to larger diameters,

that is a few segments of larger diameters.

I think in time we will be entering into a solid propellant vehicle

development.

This is something which has to be coordinated with the Department

of Defense.

We do have a national vehicle program which has recently been

reviewed and the approval machinery is in process on it and it will

come before your committee.

Mr. ANFUSO. Now 

Dr. DRYDEN. Now,let me make it very clear. We will not jump

to a solid propellent rocket the size of Saturn as a first step. You

don't proceed along such a path.

Mr. ANFUSO. But I am told 

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. ANFUSO. But I was told, Dr. Dryden—and this is my final

question—by some experts and at a plant which I visited, that by

1965, about the time that we expect to bring out Saturn, if we concentrate on solid fuels we can get a thrust of something like 6 million

pounds.

Dr. DRYDEN. There is no problem in thrust with solid fuels. The

problem is the total impulse. You can get any thrust you want very

easily, but you have a short burning time.

Mr. ANFUSO. And with 6 million pounds—By the way, this solid

fuel, I understand, can be divided into sections.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. AN-Fuso. You can break if up.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. ANFITSO. You can transport it easily and all that, isn't that

correct?
16 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Dr. DRYDEN. That is what I have said.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANFUSO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar, I am sure, with the recent test

of the Air Force in using a very large thrust with solid propellant.

I think it was successful.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think you are referring to tests under our contract

with the United Technology Corp.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the Air Force?

Dr. DRYDEN. No, this is one of our contracts. The Air Force has

other contracts in which they are investigating this area. And our

vehicle programs must be coordinated. We are now using Air Force

vehicles and they are using our vehicles. We don't want a duplication in this area.

Mr. ANYOSO. Finally 

Dr. DRYDEN. May I mention one more thing in solid propellant?

Mr. ANFITSO. Yes.

Dr. DRYDEN. We see some problems in the man rating of solid propellants. When you have trouble with a liquid fuel system—as you

know, in Mercury we don't depend on 100 percent reliability in the

rocket. It gives notice by decreased chamber pressure or other means

of impending failure, which leaves time to send the signal to an escape

system and get the man out.

At least at the present time, when a solid propellant blows, it blows

in such a time scale that we see it as very difficult to use that technique. This means that we must attain a much better standard of

reliability in solid propellants, as we see it now with our admittedly

limited knowledge, than you can with liquid fuels.

Mr. ANFuso. Finally, Dr. Dryden, with a 6-million-pound thrust

you can easily get a 7-ton satellite into the air, couldn't you?

Dr. DRYDEN. The thrust—I have to emphasize that the thrust

alone won't do it. You must have that thrust for about 100 seconds

or more. It is difficult to design a solid propellent engine to have

that much burning time. This is one of these little technical matters

that causes great confusion to the public.

The successs of the mission depends on total impulse. And total

impulse can be done with a low thrust for a long period, or a higher

thrust for a very short period. Higher thrust for the short period

gives you much higher accelerations on everything that you put in it.

This however,. is a matter of design. I am myself an optimist on

the future of sold propellant. It is going

in

to grow at a normal rate.

It is not going to replace Saturn, in my opinion, n 1965.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, I want to say that General Yates

will be here at 2:15 this afternoon. The general just says he has no

information that he can give in an open session, so it will be in executive session.

Now. Mr. Karth, you had a question?

Mr. KARTH. Doctor, I am still somewhat confused as to the status

our country has today as compared to the Russian state of the art

in this whole field of thrust.

Dr. DRYDEN. The Russians have about 800,000 pounds at the present

time. Atlas, 350,000. About half of the thrust, roughly.

Mr. KARTH. How many pounds of thrust would you say it took to

boost this 71/2-ton satellite?
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 17

Dr. DRYDEN. About 800,000 pounds, with improvement in upper

stages.

The Russians started, as we did, with a sounding rocket stage perhaps, and continually improved the upper stages. They got to 5

tons in orbit, then to 71/2 tons. As we estimate it, this is within the

capability of the same booster, base booster which has been used

throughout their program.

Mr. KARTH. What booster propellant did they use in your opinion,

liquid or solid?

Dr. DRYDEN. It can—here again I have no positive definite information, but it can be done with the liquid oxygen, JP-type fuels that

we use. There is no necessity for liquid hydrogen, or anything of

the kind in the feats so far undertaken.

Mr. KARTH. One other thing confused me a bit, Doctor, on the

basis of what you said prior to the question and answer period.

Up to this point, all the testimony that I have heard at least has

pretty much regarded the Russian capability in the field of guidance

and control, as being rather big, bulky, unrefined, crude, so on and so

forth. You said 

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't think we know this at all.

Mr. KARTH. Well, this has been the testimony from all of the

people.

Dr. DRYDEN. No; the testimony is we have guidance equipment

which to the best of our knowledge is as accurate as the Russians.

Because of the limits on the weight of vehicles we can launch we have

not been able to use it.

Mr. KARTH. I will have to go back and check the testimony of last

year and the year before.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. KARTH. But it seemed to me that we had always maintained that

the Russians, while being ahead in booster power, were behind us in

guidance and control. And today for the first time I heard someone,

who is in a highly respected position such as you, say that it might be

that our guidance is as good as the Russians. Now, I am just wondering if we had a change of heart in this or if this is the fact as it is.

Dr. DRYDEN. No. I think the performance of our guidance systems is as good as those of the Russians.

I think—I don't want to be misunderstood on the other matter.

In the cases where the Russians have exhibited instrumentation and

equipment to us, it has not been highly miniaturized. And they don't

need to, with the weights that they have available.

I have no doubt about the ability of the Russians to miniaturize

equipment if they want to. They just haven't had to. They have had

so much surplus weight that they just didn't have to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KARTH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed in the press the other day that reports

from Moscow refer to the Russians having clustered boosters. Are

they using clustered boosters?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not know. All we know—we work backward

from the weights in orbit and so on to what thrust it takes to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—
18 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Dr. DRYDEN. Let me say this: Many of our stages have two engines,

four engines, Saturn has eight, and some of the upper stages have four

and two, which we call clustered engines.

The CHAIRMAN. They use the word "clustered."

Dr. DRYDEN. Atlas has three engines, for example. So almost every

rocket that we use has more than one engine, other than the very

simplest ones.

Mr. MILLER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KARTH. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mnr,LER; Doctor

'

did we get off on the wrong track when we

started from hindsight?

Dr. DRYDEN. No, sir.

Mr. MILLER. Instead of sticking on rather heavy 

Dr. DRYDEN. This comes back to my reply before.

If you had waited for the heavy booster, you would be appropriating a quarter of a billion dollars a year for 3 or 4 years with no

visible result to the public paying the bills.

Mr. MILLER. But if we hadn't gone into this finesse, would we have

a heavy booster today that the Russians have?

Dr. DRYDEN. No, there is no connection between the miniaturization

work of the electronics industry and the size of boosters developed

in the rocket industry.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Chairman_ , one final question, please.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karth.

Mr. KARTH. Doctor I heard you say that we have been the good

soldiers in this whole field of gathering scientific data.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. KARTH. And this I certainly concur with you on.

How much of this data have we turned over to the Russians, for

example?

Dr. DRYDEN. We have not turned it over specifically to them. We

have made this generally available.

Mr. KARTH. How much was made available so that anyone could

draw his own conclusions?

Dr. DRYDEN. I suggest you get this letter that we wrote to Mr.

Brooks, which dealt more specifically with this question.

The CHAIRMAN. We will put the letter in the record here.

(The letter of Chairman Brooks to Dr. Glennan, and Dr. Glennan's

reply follow:)

JANUARY 5, 1961.

Dr. T. KEITH GLENNAN,

Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington,

D.C.

DEAR DR. GLENNAN : As you know, the Committee on Science and Astronautics

has been continually interested in reviewing the comparative progress of the

Nation's space program and that of the Soviet Union. At this time, after an

interval of several years during which both the United States and the Soviet

have conducted numerous space experiments, we should be able to evaluate the

scientific results of both programs with more precision.

Accordingly, I would like to request a nonclassified report from NASA to be

furnished to the committee, which will give an evaluation of the U.S.S.R. versus

the United States output in this area.

With best personal regards, I am.

Sincerely,

OVERTON BROOKS, Chairman.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 19

JANUARY 19, 1961.

Hon. OVERTON BROOKS,

Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives,

Washington D.C.

DEAR Mn. CHAIRMAN: On January 5, in behalf of the Committee on Science

and Astronautics, you requested a report of the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration evaluating the progress made by this Nation in space science in

comparison with the program of the Soviet Union. Based on the information

available to NASA, this report has now been compiled and is being furnished

to the committee pursuant to your request.

With kindest regards. •

Sincerely yours,

T. KEITH GLENNAN, Administrator.

EVALUATION OF U.S.S.R. VERSUS U.S. OUTPUT IN SPACE SCIENCE

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

The average quality of Soviet scientific research is the same as that of the

United States. This conclusion is based on perusal of their literature and on

personal contacts between scientists of both countries in conferences held between 1956 and 1960, both in nuclear physics and in areas related to space

research.

The range of ability of Soviet scientists is also approximately the same as

that of U.S. scientists. A few are brilliant, as good as this Nation's best physicists, and the majority do conventional but necessary research.

It is a striking fact that in spite of equality of talent in U.S. and U.S.S.R.

science, nearly all the highly original work in space research has come out

of the U.S. program. The first two sputniks had little or no scientific apparatus,

apart from a biological experiment; and while the third sputnik had a great

deal of interesting geophysical apparatus, this flight was never followed up by

the second generation of experiments with which the Russians could have

capitalized on their experience with Sputnik III. However, these references

relate only to basic scientific investigations and not to technology. The U.S.S.R.

has achieved a number of successes, such as the Lunik III moon shot and the

recent space cabin launchings, which were great achievements in space

technology.

The United States, on the other hand, has been responsible for1. first detection of trapped energetic particles (Van Allen belts) ;

2. launch of Explorer VI and Explorer VII energetic particle satellites;

measurement of energy distribution and time variation of radiation in the

Van Allen belts; coordinated observations of radiation belt and red auroral

arc over Colorado;

3. launch of Pioneer V space probe; communication with earth out to

distance of 23 million miles; study of properties of interplanetary space;

detection of cloud of energetic particles sweeping over Pioneer V en route

from sun to earth at the time of a solar storm; correlation between groundbased atmospheric data and data received simultaneously from Pioneer V

in deep space and from Explorer VII near to earth;

4. correlation between solar weather activity and atmospheric density,

via satellite drag measurements; first measurement of air density at an

altitude of 1,000 miles, using drag data from the Echo satellite;

5. launch of the ionosphere satellite; measurement of density and temperature of electrons and ions in the upper atmosphere; measurement of

ionospheric disturbances during the solar storm of November 1960;

6. satellite contributions to geodesy and celestial mechanics: precise

measurement of variations in sea level, gravitational perturbations by sun

and moon, effect of solar radiation pressure;

7. Tiros cloud-cover photographs; and

8. Echo passive communications experiment.

Another significant fact appears in the comparison of United States and

U.S.S.R. papers published in the periodical literature or presented at international conferences: The United States and U.S.S.R. papers are of comparable

quality_ but the number of U.S. papers greatly exceeds the U.S.S.R. contribution. This very sizable discrepancy in the level of effort constitutes the most

significant difference between the United States and U.S.S.R. space research
20 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

programs. The U.S.S.R. has capitalized skillfully on the advantage in payload capability which it acquired from its early successes in missile development. It has concentrated on a small number of flights, and has chosen its

missions for these flights with close attention to their impact on world opinion

and their effectiveness in reinforcing the public image of U.S.S.R. strength in

science and technology. Yet the U.S.S.R. has done relatively little in space

science, considering the resources at its command and payload capability. It

is very difficult, for example, to understand why the U.S.S.R. failed to follow

up the remarkable flight of Sputnik III with further geophysical satellite

experiments.

Perhaps the explanation is that Soviet scientists are not in close contact

with their "gram planning authorities, and have not been able to participate

effectively in the formulation of their space program. The gathering momentum in the U.S. space science program, and the remarkable variety of

fields in which highly original results are being obtained, must be credited,

in part, to the insistence of U.S. authorities on the development of a sound

and broadly based program in space science, and to their continuing efforts to

enlist in the program an increasing fraction of the country's scientific community.

There is another circumstance which has probably had a major effect in

determining the relative levels of effort in the United States and U.S.S.R. space

research. This is the fact that the United States has had a tradition of strong

support for research over the last several decades, and has developed a powerful base for scientific operations in this country, including many large laboratories with highly trained staffs. This is true in nuclear physics and solid

state physics, as well as in the earth sciences and other disciplines from which

space research draws its problems and techniques. The base of research in the

U.S.S.R., on the other hand, is not as deep as in the United States. It is new

and relatively thin. For this reason the U.S.S.R. scientific effort is spotty, with

excellent work in certain fields on which Soviet interest has been concentrated

for one reason or another, whereas work in other fields of equal scientific interest is poor or entirely missing. Because the United States has tremendous

scientific resources at its command it has been able to develop a vigorous program in atmospheric physics, auroral phenomena. geophysics, sun-earth relationships, •and trapped particle research without appreciably reducing its level

of effort in other fields of research. We have in fact developed an entirely new

field to a very high level of activity in the short space of 2 years. The Russians

may not have the reserve strength in laboratory facilities and trained talent

to do this without disrupting established areas of research, and perhaps this

is the primary reason for the paucity of their achievements in space science

thus far.

It is important to note that this reflects the situation at the present moment.

In making an assessment of the Soviet position it is also important to look at

the rate of change of their effort, in addition to the current level. The U.S.S.R.

is believed to be training its scientists at a rate several times greater than the

rate of training in the United States, and it is entirely possible that the U.S.S.R.

may strengthen the weak spots in its scientific structure and move ahead in

an effort to overtake us in every important area of research, in the course of

the next several years or perhaps the next decade. It may be noted again that

the intrinsic ability of the Russian scientific community is in no way inferior

to that of our own; and that, therefore, there is no reason why they cannot overtake us in this period if we do not continue to develop and to strengthen our

program.

Figures on the number of papers presented at international meetings suggest

that the Russian level of effort in space science has not increased appreciably

between the Moscow CSAGI meeting in 1958 and the Nice COSPAR meeting

in 1960 in spite of the greater rate of training of scientists in the U.S.S.R. It

is possible that the talent being trained in this area is still at the graduate

student level and has not yet reached the level of responsibility at which this

effect can be felt in Soviet contributions to conferences. It is the impression of

a U.S. authority on upper atmosphere theory that this is the case in atmospheric

physics and in sun-earth relationships. In any case, the contrast between the

output of the U.S.S.R. space research program and our own cannot have failed

to impress the Soviet scientific community itself, and some elements of the

U.S.S.R. Government. U.S.S.R. scientists may succeed soon in persuading their

Government to initiate a more vigorous program in space physics under the

stimulus of our own successes in this field.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 21

In summary, the U.S.S.R. space science program has dissipated some of its

momentum after the initial successes of the sputnik launchings; while the U.S.

program has picked up momentum from a standing start, and now surpasses

the U.S.S.R. effort in its breadth of interest, originality of concept, and volume

of research. However, we should anticipate that the Russians will respond

to this challenge with a more vigorous space science program of their own in

the future.

SPECIFIC IMPRESSIONS

Quality of presentations

U.S.S.R. papers cover the same range as those in the United States. The

top stratum of individual talents in the U.S.S.R. scientific community is also

comparable to ours, according to impressions gained in meetings and by an

examination of the translated literature. The Russians have very capable people working in some fields, such as cosmic radiation and energetic particle

measurements and are also strong in mathematics, celestial mechanics, astrophysics, seismology, and observational aspects of oceanography. In certain other

areas of the earth sciences and astronomy, either directly or indirectly related

to the space program, the U.S.S.R. makes a less favorable showing in comparison

with the work in the United States.

For example, the U.S.S.R. has published little on the geodetic applications of

satellites, a most fruitful field of endeavor in the United States, and a major

source of important developments in geophysics. The analysis of satellite orbits

to obtain density data also has been carried out at a high level of activity by

several groups in the United States. In particular, the discovery of a correlation

between satellite drag and solar activity, one of the most significant developments in this field, was made by L. G. Jacchia at the Smithsonian Astrophysical

Observatory, and his work has since been refined and extended to reveal important diurnal variations. There has been relatively little U.S.S.R. work published on this important and interesting problem.

It is possible that this particular field of geodesy is considered sensitive by

the Russians, and that for this reason a substantial amount of U.S.S.R. material

has been held back from publication.

Quantity of presentations

The United States stands strongly to the fore in the quantity of work, in its

volume, and in the number and variety of fields in which we have been doing

original work. The contrast between the level of our effort and that of the

U.S.S.R. appears both in the comparison of presentations at international meetings, and in the survey of United States and U.S.S.R. scientific periodicals.

Presentations at international meetings.—Two major international conferences

in space research have been held in the last few years. The first of these was the

CSAGI conference in Moscow, in July 1958. The United States sent a large

delegation to this conference. U.S. contributions to the program were varied

and extensive, and gave an impression of strength in our incipient space science

effort, in spite of the weakness of our vehicle capability at that time. The next

international meeting in the field was arranged by COSPAR, and convened in

Nice in January 1960. The number of United States and U.S.S.R. contributions

to these meetings is listed below:

United

States

U.S.S.R.

CSAGI (1958) 

COSPAR (1960) 

39

40

15

10

The United States and U.S.S.R numbers are about the same for the two

meetings. It might be noted that the Goddard Theoretical Division alone read

five papers to the COSPAR meeting, half as many as the entire U.S.S.R

contribution, and ranging over the fields of celestial mechanics, geodesy, the

moon and planets, meteorites, and trapped particles. A perusal of the table

of contents of the recently published "Proceedings of the COSPAR Conference"

drives home the point that the United States program constrasts very favorably

with the U.S.S.R. effort in its breadth and in the fullness of participation

of the American scientific community.

66417-61-----4
22 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Volume of publication.—A bibliography has been compiled of U.S.S.R. periodical literature in space physics, appearing in reputable Soviet publications

(Proceedings of the Soviet Academy, Geophysics Bulletin of the Soviet Academy,

Soviet Astronomy, Soviet Jetp, Soviet Physics Express) and also the (British)

Journal of Planetary and Space Science.

For comparison, NASA has examined the contents of the Journal of Geophysical Research for the years 1958-60. The Journal of Geophysical Research is

the principal medium for the publication of space physics in the United States,

and contains approximately half of all papers on this subject and related,

topics in the earth sciences.

The Soviet series, Artificial Earth Satellites, has not been included in the

U.S.S.R. lists because it does not constitute a part of the periodical literature

on current research to be compared with the Journal of Geophysical Research.

The table below lists United States and U.S.S.R. contributions gathered from

these sources for the years 1958-60. The 1960 figures are extrapolated from

the volume of publications for the first 6 months of 1960.

1958 1959 1960

U.S.S.R 5 8 17

United States (Journal of Geophysical Research) 5 64 111

We see that the United States and U.S.S.R. efforts started at comparable

levels, that the U.S.S.R. effort has shown a moderate increase in the last 3

years, and that the U.S. effort has shown a greater increase. It appears from

these figures that the United States has reacted vigorously to the challenge of the

first Russian successes in space rocket technology. Our space program has been

able to draw on the resources of U.S. research, and has greatly exceeded the

modest increase in the Russian effort over this period.

The contrast in the level of United States and U.S.S.R. efforts in space

physics is, in fact, so great that we may expect a counter-reaction from the

U.S.S.R., in the form of a greater emphasis on scientific effort in their space

program. There may, in fact, be a hint of this development in a recent unusual

display of initiative on the part of the U.S.S.R., through its proposal for the

organization of a conference on problems of lunar research to be held in

Leningrad in December of this year under the joint auspices of the U.S.S.R.

Academy and the IAU.

Detail of publication; openness of meetings.—In the first postsputnik period,

U.S.S.R. reports on satellite experiments and calculations were sketchy, both

at meetings and in the periodical literature. The papers lacked the details

needed for the formation of an independent judgment regarding the validity of

results presented. It should be noted that this secretiveness was confined to

the rocket and satellite area; in other fields of physics and the earth sciences,

U.S.S.R. publications and presentations have been relatively open and detailed.

Another factor may contribute to the sketchiness of some of the Russian

presentations. It appears to be the practice of the U.S.S.R. to send a relatively

small delegation of leading Soviet scientists to these meetings, who then read

review papers on the work of a large number of their colleagues. For this

reason some of the areas of research covered in their papers may lack the

intimate understanding of the subject which is required to answer pertinent

questions.

Since 1958 U.S.S.R. publication policy seems to have relaxed to some degree,

although U.S.S.R. publications on orbit data and tracking systems are still

virtually nonexistent.

Timeliness.—Originally the U.S.S.R. appeared to favor newspaper releases

over publication in the professional literature for early reports on their satellite results. After the Moscow CSAGI meeting, this situation improved considerably. Preliminary notes on U.S.S.R. results have been appearing as

promptly as in the United States, about 6 to 8 weeks after launch for the

most interesting results. For example, Lunik I was launched on January 2,

1959, and the Vernov note describing cosmic ray and trapped particle measurements was submmited for publication in the U.S.S.R. Academy Proceedings

on February 25, 1959. Lunik III was launched early in September of 1959,

and the paper describing the photographs of the hidden face of the moon
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 23

was received for publication in the U.S.S.R. Academy Proceedings on

November 14, 1959.

These examples refer to the publication of preliminary notes, equivalent to

our letters to the editor. The detailed papers appear somewhat more slowly

than in the United States, typically after a delay of 12 months against 6

months in the United States.

Channels of communication.—As noted above, in the first period of the

U.S.S.R. space program the Russians appeared to prefer qualitative newspaper

accounts for the layman to quantitative publication in serious scientific journals. An examination of the literature suggests that this is no longer the

case. As in the United States, newspaper articles on achievements of exceptional interest appear in the Russian press or public media at approximately

the same time their preliminary scientific reports are published. The impression of this earlier, but no longer valid, circumstance has persisted because

the newspaper stories are picked up immediately and translated quickly by.

the Department of Commerce and other agencies for distribution to Government personnel, whereas the Academy proceedings and scientific literature

do not appear in translated form until a much later time. For this reason

U.S. scientists often obtain their first reports on interesting results through

a Pravda translation.

It appears that the Moscow CSAGI meeting was responsible for the change

toward normal channels of scientific communication and away from the public

press. The detail presented in the U.S. papers at the Moscow meeting, and

the strongly critical attitude of the U.S. delegation regarding Soviet suppression

of detail, seemed to have had a beneficial effect. The dates of publication

quoted above for the Lunik I and Lunik III experiments demonstrate this

clearly. It seems reasonable to say that Soviet officials and scientists have

shown a positive response to U.S. criticism in these matters and can no longer

be censured as severely on this basis as in 1958. An exception is the area of

tracking systems and orbit information, in which U.S.S.R. disclosures are still

inadequate.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Chairman, the only point I make is that if we

made available, to anyone who wanted to apprise themselves of this,

scientific data, then, of course, it seems to me that it wasn't necessary

for Russia to go into all of this soldierly work, so to speak. They

could concentrate instead on this big booster system and on these

spectacular shots that they have been making.

Dr. DRYDEN. I would say that while the scientific information is

a part of the information useful in design of vehicles and other missions, that its primary purpose is more knowledge about the Earth

and its atmosphere, and its value is enhanced by getting a lot of

people making simultaneous ground observations with the satellite

observations.

I attended a symposium in Buenos Aires, and we were astonished

to find that all over South America there were people who had measurements at the time of a certain solar flare, on the ground—cosmic

rays, magnetic disturbances, and so forth. And, of course, we had

made measurements in the satellite.

When you put all of this together, you get a picture of the solar

flare and its effect on the Earth which is more valuable than we got

just from the observations of the satellite.

So this is a part of the process of pooling the scientific talents of

all groups in making the knowledge we get more valuable to everybody. •

It, however, is not the type of thing that enables you to do a. new

military weapons system. If we get that kind of information, it will

be classified.
24 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Mr. KARTH. No. But my point was: Because we have done the

exploratory work and made available information of the magnetic

field, and so forth, and so forth, they don't have to do this. They

can gain this information and then charge ahead in making a Venus

shot or something of that nature.

Dr. DRYDEN. They have chosen a certain course of action as we

chose a certain course of action, which was dependent on the tools and

skills and where we stood in various fields of technology.

I don't believe that they get any great advantage in the space field

or in possible applications from this scientific data.

Now, we are, of course, going to bring to your attention a cooperative project in the field of active communication satellites. In this

instance

'

we are going to meet some of the problems which I think

troubled you.

That is, will we give to other nations the complete technology?

I think we will have some policy questions to decide in this kind of

area.

General scientific knowledge is in a different category, I think, than

specific technological developments in equipment and apparatus.

That is what I am trying to say.

Mr. KARTH. Thank you, Doctor.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bass?

Mr. BASS. Doctor I believe you stated earlier that August of 1962

was the next feasible date at which a shot of Venus would be made.

Dr. DRYDEN. August 16, 1962; yes. •

Mr. BASS. Now, then, as I understand it, that would be the next

possible date for us to make a Venus shot, because the Centaur presumably would be operational at that time.

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, it won't be operational. You will be in an

early number of vehicles. And I want to bring that out because

this is the reason that we have not labeled it in our long-range plan

as a specific Venus shot. We don't want to build up, very frankly,

an atmosphere that this is our great try for Venus.

We are going to test this interplanetary vehicle by firing it at that

time and in that direction.

And we are going to make more than one try.

Now, if we had two failures, then I wouldn't like the world to say,

"Well:this is something they said was bound to be successful," because it is only the fourth, fifth, or sixth vehicle.

Mr. BASS. Doctor, you gave us a schedule on Venus shot dates.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. BASS. Is there a similar one for Mars?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. The Mars dates are October 1, 1960, which has

passed; November 16, 1962; December 23, 1964; January 26, 1967;

February 28, 1969. They are about 25 months apart, as compared

with 19 months apart for Venus.

Mr. BASS. What thrust will the Centaur develop?

Dr. DRYDEN. The Centaur has as its first stage the Atlas, or it is

the same number as the Atlas thrust. I will give you the official

figure on this.

I think [referring to pamphlet] 360,000 pounds.

M. BASS. What would be the payload that a Centaur could send

up as a atellite ?
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 25

Dr. DRYDEN. As a satellite, about 41/4 tons-8,500 pounds.

Mr. BASS. What can the Atlas do now? What can we do now?

What is our maximum payload?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, we have at the present time the vehicle which

is being used by the Defense Department to launch Midas and Samos,

which is a vehicle that we are also using.

As I mentioned, we have a national program. So we are both

using the same vehicle. That has had a relatively small number of

shots so far. But that will put 5,000 pounds in a 300-nautical-mile

orbit and about 700 pounds to escape speed.

Mr. BASS. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about 21/2tons.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MILLER. For the escape.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. For the man in space program the Atlas

is -really a marginal vehicle, isn't it?

Dr. DRYDEN. We do not think so. We are having the usual development problems.

As I mentioned earlier, in the 2 years we have learned that you

do not take two existing pieces of equipment and stack one on the

other and get away without having some problems.

There is nothing in anything which has occurred which reflects in

any way on the Atlas for what it was built for, in its normal ICBM

mission. But when you put a long object up above and you have to

attach this securely, we are running into a few development problems.

The CHAIRMAN. The Atlas is primarily a military vehicle.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is a military intercontinental ballistic missile.

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to use the Atlas, a military booster,

for peaceful space programs.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. It is the only large rocket that we have.

The CHAIRMAN. And to that extent it is a marginal vehicle, there.

To carry our payload, it doesn't have

Dr. DRYDEN. I would not call it marginal.

Just as every new airplane has to work out the bugs of it, we have

to work the bugs out of this as a space vehicle.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not condemning it by calling it marginal.

Dr. DRYDEN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. But I meant in carrying capacity it is marginal.

Dr. DRYDEN. We can carry one man.

We would be happier, of course, with a lot more weight. Because

in Mercury—I have talked about miniaturization—we had to do a

lot of miniaturization of special equipment, because you couldn't stand

the weight and the standard equipment which was already available.

Mr. MILLER. Dr. Dryden, following Mr. Brooks' statement, you

could use the same heavy truck chassis—

Dr. DRYDEN. To do anything.

Mr. MILLER. Put a tank truck on to deliver gasoline, or you could

use the same truck chassis in time of war.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. But the chassis would be the same.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. And after all, that is what the Atlas is.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.
26 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Mr. MILLER. The Atlas we use in the chassis for the vehicle.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I recognize that is made in California. [Laughter.]

Mr. MILLER. Let's don't bring that in, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. But coming back to that program.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't attempt to put a 5-ton weight on a

slip-on body truck surely.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is not a question of weight. We are putting on a

stage which is a rather long cylinder. You are getting a more—

you have seen these space vehicles. They are very much higher than

the Atlas. You get into various problems of vibration and details of

connection between the pieces; the stresses due to use in the upper air

that you must take into account, and make the structure so that it

performs.

But the problem is no different than in every military weapons system that I have ever heard of, or anything of that type of technology.

Mr. MILLER. Occasionally, a sticky valve.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think the difference is that for the first time the

American public is looking through the window at the trials and

tribulations of people engaged in development.

You see every sticky valve every time we postpone a flight, and the

whole process is visible. Now, heretofore and now, our military

weapons development are carried out in security. A space program is

an open program and you become acquainted with the very hard road

of developing new vehicles.

The simplest ones of all have taken from 11/2 to 2 years from the

time you decide you are going to do something, using existing hardware components, until you fly a flight mission. And in the case

of a new booster, it takes 4 to 5 years. There is not much you can' do

to shorten it very much.

The CHAIRMAN. No additional money would help you much;

would it?

Dr. DRYDEN. This becomes a matter of balance.

Somebody said: "Why don't you have another booster program?"

Well, if you have a program—as I have mentioned, Saturn alone

is a quarter of a billion dollars. How many quarter of a billion dollar programs can we afford as alternates?

The CHAIRMAN. I have been impressed with this. I would think

that the best we have in scientists should go and contribute to the

building as speedily as reasonably possible of 

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. A huge booster. That is where we are suffering

and hurting. Isn't that right?

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you go for that?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you get contributions from the military and

from the Aviation Agency or other agencies, why it would go toward

that one thing.

Dr. DRYDEN. If you visit Huntsville or any of our industrial contractors you will find them on a three-shift basis, working every day

in the week to try to get you Saturn just as early as we know how to

get it.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 27

The CHAIRMAN. MT. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Can you please, on the man in space Mercury program, calendar for us shortly and give us any possible delays you

look ahead to now?

Dr. DRYDEN. I would prefer to wait until our regular appearance.

We are reviewing, of course, the past few flights, both Atlas-Mercury

and Redstone-Mercury.

Mr. FULTON. How are you living up to your program? Just

briefly. I think the committee would like to know that.

Dr. DRYDEN. There have been some difficulties encountered which

you have read about in the newspapers. That is to say, failure of

vehicles, and failure of components.

The schedule now, of course, is somewhat different than it was a

year or two ago.

May I tell you the philosophy of scheduling? If you want to have

people to do a job hurriedly, you don't pad the schedule with allowances for troubles. If you do, you get a lackadaisical attitude toward

the pressures. What you do is to figure out a schedule which assumes

that everything will work, that you will have no trouble, this is the

quickest time you can get an Atlas from California to Canaveral, it

takes so many days on the pad, etc. This is the way we set what

you call our schedule.

We prefer to think of them as target dates. Now, as time goes

on we run into troubles.

Mr. FULTON. Yes, but 

Dr. DRYDEN. As we run into troubles we have to slip those target

dates. And this is the way you keep the heat on people, to try to

make these target dates.

Mr. FtruroN. With this success of the Russians, aren't you going

to try to move your schedule up? That is the reason I am asking.

Aren't you going to try to get first in space, with man in space?

Dr. DRYDEN. How are you going to move up a schedule when you

are working 3 shifts a day, 7 days a week?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Riehlman ?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. This is the point I want to get to, Dr. Dryden.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. There has been a great deal of discussion about trying to telescope the schedules on our booster thrust program. I think

it is time that we in committee and the people in the country understand whether money can buy time and telescope this program and

whether we have the people, that is the scientists and the engineers,

to really step it up to any degree?

Dr. DRYDEN. The Mercury program is being done on a time scale

which is—I think it is almost one-half of that of the X-15, for example. It is not quite as complicated as the X-15, but it is more complicated than many people realize. Seven and a half miles of wiring. It has many systems within it. It has some of the complications of a fighter airplane, in this internal gear. It has had the problem, as I mentioned, that you couldn't use the standard stuff because

it is too heavy for the booster capacity you have.

You can buy time only to a certain limit. Look back at your time

scale on Atlas and Jupiter. And this is a more complicated job.

Much more to it.
28 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Mr. RIEHLMAN. This is absolutely true—am I not correct in it, that

in the Centaur and the Saturn we face the very same problem?

Dr. DRYDEN. Which problem—of time?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Yes.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. And do you feel that if more funds were provided,

that you could telescope this time table appreciably?

Dr. DRYDEN. You can't telescope it very much. We are reviewing

this question now in connection with this review of our programs.

But I say, I think if you visit Huntsville you will find that everybody is working just as hard as anybody knows how to work. Von

Braun is a very thorough man and a very competent engineer.

Mr. MOELLER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moeller.

Mr. MOELLER. This is a rather sobering thought, these repeated

statements made by you and others, that we can't use more money.

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't think I have said quite that. I said more

money

The CHAIRMAN. I pushed you, but you haven't said one way or the

other.

Mr. MOELLER. Have we come, then, Doctor, to this wretched impasse that with all our wealth, with all our technological abilities,

the -United States must admit we can't catch up with what the Soviets

are doing?

Dr. DRYDEN Not at all.

I am saying you can't buy back 4 years when you didn't. start 1

years earlier.

Mr. MOELLER. All right.

May I ask this second question, then? Is there any possibility that

we could advance a program of this sort, of searching for additional

talent? And if so, what could be done? Do we need to emphasize

education, for example, to bring more people into the field? Do,

we need possibly to have additional scouting work for us in other

parts of the world, outside of the Soviet Union, to see if we can't

bring people into our picture to—I can't say speed up, but to improve our program?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think the United States has the greatest collection

of talent in the world.

As you know, 85 percent of the work we do is not done by Government personnel, but it is in industry. I think our industry, is beyond a doubt the best in the world.

In every single job that we put out, we find 10, 15, 20 firms with

very excellent people and making very excellent proposals. Our country is saturated with the opportunity to do more.

Now, this is a different question that you have raised, you see. If

you really think you want to be sure that we get ahead, you do what

was done in the ballistic missile program, where you started Thor

and Jupiter, and Atlas and Titan. You can bring a new group in

to start a new development. This, of. course, is a different question

than the one that you asked.

Mr. BASS. Would you yield, Mr. Moeller?

Mr. MOELLER. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. We get back to Mr. Riehlman.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 29

Mr. MOELLER. Mr. Riehlman has the floor.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I yield.

Mr. BASS. You mentioned earlier you can't buy back 4 years. What

particular years were you referring to?

Dr. DRYDEN. The years between the time the Russians decided to

go ahead with a large booster and the time that we did.

Mr. BASS. What were those years? Could you pinpoint them?

Dr. DRYDEN. I can't pinpoint them exactly.

I can state it a different way. The Russians in 1954 set up a governmental agency to explore space, and began to put their resources

and funds into it. The United States set up NASA in 1958. That

is the 4 years, if you want to talk about it.

Mr. FULTON. And another 4 years is when Forrestal in 1947 recommended it, and it wasn't done for quite a while after. Isn't that

right?.

Dr. DRYDEN. You can point your finger to all sorts of things.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

I want to ask the doctor this. The Russian space establishment—

is it a peacetime establishment or is it a military establishment?

Dr. DRYDEN. It was in their Academy of Sciences, a commission on

interplanetary scientific communication, they called it, and it is

headed by Mr. Sedov, whose name has been mentioned here several

times.

The CHAIRMAN. IS that peaceful?

Dr. DRYDEN. They have always talked about peaceful purposes, although we know very well that the rockets are fired by their military.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Chairman—will the gentleman yield for one

question?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Yes.

Mr. KARTH. Doctor, you are saying we can't buy back 4 years of

time. Then we can't catch up.

Dr. DRYDEN. I am talking about the current years.

Mr. KARTH. You said in answer to the question by the gentleman

from Ohio—

Dr. DRYDEN. In 1965 or 1966 I think we will be caught up; 1966

might be a better date. You are in a stern chase.

Mr. KARTH. You are saying we can buy back 4 years; aren't you?

Dr. DRYDEN. Oh, absolutely. We think we have the programs

going to do it.

Mr. KARTH. I misunderstood.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is the old tortoise-hare race. You start with 4

years. Now, obviously if we were not putting a third of our budget

into repairing this booster gap and so on, we would never catch up.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the tortoise and who is the hare

[Laughter.]

Dr. DRYDEN. We think we are the hare. We hope we are, anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Riehlman ?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I yield back my time.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Daddario.
30 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

Mr. DADDARIO. Doctor, you have said the Russians apparently made

two attempts at Venus. Can you elaborate.on that?

'• Dr. DRYDEN. There was the experimetit that you know of, which

was to the external world.practically identical with this a- few weeks

before and never any real explanation of the purpose of it. The

whole proceedings looked very similar. There was a delay of quite

a long time before anything was said about it, and then it was passed

off as a vehicle experiment.

I don't think anyone would make a simple vehicle experiment prior

• to making a shot at Venus. If you are going to make the experiment, you put the payload on it. And our interpretation is that they

had two rockets ready to go, that one of them failed and one was

successful.

Mr. DADDARIO. Your explanation then is that the first one was not

just to judge the orbit?

• Dr. DRYDEN. No. •

Mr. DADDARIO. But that it actually was an. attempt which did not

carry out.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. This is a personal opinion of mine, based on—

again I emphasize—the nature of the orbit, the weights that were

stated, and the statements that the Russians made later.

Mr. DADDARIO. Doctor, there is one other point I would like you to

cover. Encompassed in the chairman's first question was one involving the possible military implications of a vehicle which can be put

into orbit around the Earth, having a parking vehicle in it which it

can launch in one direction or another. Now, what are the military

implications of such a vehicle and the capacity of such a nation which

has this ability within its hands?

Dr. DRYDEN. I really can't pc4int to anything specific'. And I think

you might find that the military would give you some specific military

application of this. I don't think anybody has a doubt that in the

future

'

ability in space will be translated into military power.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, let's follow that through. You gave quite an

elaborate, and I think understandable explanation as to just what they

had to do in order to, at the right time, release the parking vehicle so

that it can head off in the Venus direction.

Could they at the right time release a parking vehicle toward us?

Dr. DRYDEN. Certainly.

Mr. DADDARIO. It is within that capacity?

Dr. DRYDEN. Certainly.

What I said about that was that this is a complicated and expensive

way of getting a payload from one point on the Earth's surface to

' another point on the Earth's surface.

Mr. DADDARIO. Now, one other point and then I will quit. You said

the Russians don't get any great advantage in the space field following

the program they now have?

Dr. DRYDEN. No • I don't think I said that.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, I took it down exactly this way. You said,

"They don't get great advantage in the space field."

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't recall saying that. I said that in the areas that

we had worked, we had gotten advantages in area where they have. 

done nothing, especially in the scientific field and in the applications

field.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 31

(Dr. Dryden subsequently submitted the following statement to the

Committee:)

The record shows that Mr. Daddario was correct in quoting my statement.

The context, however, shows that I was referring to advantages in the space field

from our release of scientific data.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, do you believe that their program is one which

does give them an advantage over ours in the achievement of certain

scientific goals and objectives?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think it is primarily the psychological advantage

that we have been confronted with from the very start. A misinterpretation is often placed on its significance with respect to total

strength of the United States.

Mr. DADDARIO. Isn't this, however, an important goal which should

be built into our space program?

Dr. DRYDEN. I agree with you.

Mr. DADDARIO. That we should have psychological goals, taking

into consideration the effect of the spectacular?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. While we are waiting for the reporter to change

paper, do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Buckley?

- Mr. BUCKLEY. No, sir.

(Further discussion off the record.)

Dr. DRYDEN. I was just saying I think there were psychological

effects and values attributed to Echo, to Pioneer V, to Tiros, which

have been exploited to some extent.

I notice in the New York Times the other day there was a story of

the enthusiasm of the Australians, about weather pictures from

Tiros—because on New Year's Day, their great holiday, the weather

was very important, and they had been in an extremely hot spell,

this being their summertime. And the pictures from Tiros showed a

cold front moving in, which they did not detect from the few ships

that were around. They made the prediction that New Year's Day

was going to be 20 degrees cooler, or whatever it was. The celebration went off fine. And they were enthusiastic about a meteorological

• satellite. So were the Japanese, especially with reference to knowledge of typhoons in that area.

The information from a meteorological satellite is of great value,

• and I think this is a psychological victory for the United States,

if you like. It is not the same kind as the Russian one, I will admit.

The CHAIRMAN. It is of tremendous importance, though?

• Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. Could I have one more question?

' The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. You had spoken—are you through, Mr. Daddario?

• The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Mr. DADDARIO. Not quite.

Mr. FULTON. Go ahead.

Mr. DADDARIO. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FULTON. My question is short.

Mr. DADDARIO. .Go'right ahead.

Mr. FULTON. You spoke of the possibility of tracking the current

Russian Venus shot and you have been talking of Goldstone, being

on the opposite side, where Russia would probably have the messages
32 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

sent. But aren't we getting cooperation, for example, from 'Jodrell

Bank, at the University of Manchester, in England?

So really we do have a chance of tracking, and from one of the

best places.

Dr. DRYDEN. You want to answer the Jodrell Bank question?

Mr. BUCKLEY. The Jodrell Bank has not received the information

as to when the signal is commanded.

Mr. FurfroN. I am talking of the position or the inclination that

Jodrell Bank would be in respect to Russia. Even though it is not

possible from Goldstone—

Mr. BUCKLEY. They would be in a far better position

Mr. FULTON. Being in the dark of the earth.

Mr. BUCKLEY. To—

Mr. FULTON. Nevertheless, Jodrell Bank in Manchester, being on

hand, could do it, couldn't it?

Mr. BUCKLEY. It would be possible for the Russians probably to

command it on so that Jodrell Bank could not see it, either.

Dr. Lovell has given it some thought. On the other hand, it is in

a far better position than Goldstone.

Mr. FULTON. Well, aren't they going to try to do it? That is what

I am trying to put into the picture, that we have other tracking

stations that we do have and can use.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have not a definite answer to that question from

Lovell yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Do you know whether Jodrell Bank has been able to help you?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Jodrell Bank is on the frequency and listening.

Jodrell Bank has not received any information from the Russians

yet, either.

Mr. FULTON. So the Russians aren't cooperating with the British

yet?

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let us come back to Mr. Daddario.

Mr. DADDARIO. Doctor, in our effort to telescope the program, to

accomplish things earlier, we do have, do we not, within these talents

and skills which you have stated—and which I also concur are the

greatest anywhere in the world—the ability to transfer requirements

and assignments in the space field to industry and which could help

all of this program together.

Dr. DRYDEN. 85 percent of this $1 billion budget goes to industry.

About 18 percent of that goes via the military—in other words, we

buy a booster and we transfer the money to BMD and they place it

with Douglas. And we are doing this with our programs.

Mr. DADDARIO. But my question is this: We are not in fact using

our full national talents toward 

Dr. DRYDEN. I agree.

Mr. DADDARIO. Toward the accomplishment of greater goals in

space?

Dr. DRYDEN. I agree. There is lots of capacity in industry and in

university laboratories not being applied to space.

As far as I know, there are many plants which are not running at

full capacity.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 33

Mr. DADDARIO. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ryan.

Mr. RYAN. Doctor, I am a new member. I enjoyed your testimony.

I believe you testified that the space gap is really in booster capacity.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. RYAN. And then you said that whether a space gap would

exist after we launched a 41/2-ton vehicle should depend upon the

significance which one attached to the difference between 4/12and

7/12tons.

Dr. DRYDEN. Right.

Mr. RYAN. Now, what significance does your agency attach to that

difference?

Dr. DRYDEN. Let me say that one of the real problems is what

specifically is the 8,500—well, 4/12tons, or later when we get to Saturn

C-2, or 25 tons, what does that look like?

There is no use putting up lead there, you see. We want to do

something with that weight.

Now, on the Saturn C-2, the obvious application is to manned space

stations and things of this sort.

In the case of 11/2 tons there are certain types of unmanned scientific loads which can be conceived, principally relating to astronomy.

There is some question whether you need that big a capacity for some

types of communications gear.

But whether the difference between 4/12and 7/12is significant depends on what you want to do at the time. In this particular case,

of course, the Russians have wanted to put 1,400 pounds in the neighborhood of Venus. We think that particular job could be idone with

less than the 800,000 pounds thrust. But just as we do, they use the

vehicles that are available.

If you have a ton to transport and you own a 10-ton truck and don't

have a 1-ton truck, you would use that.

I would think if they really wanted to they could have made a

probe of greater weight, possibly.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, we want to thank

Dr. Dryden. We want also to thank Mr. Buckley for supporting Dr.

Dryden.

The committee will recess until 2:15 this afternoon when it will

meet in executive session.

(Whereupon, at 11 :52 a.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at

2 :15 p.m., in executive session.)
EXECUTIVE SESSION

DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY, 15, 1961

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS.

TV ash,ington, D.C.

The committee met at 2:15 p.m., Hon. Overton Brooks (chairman)

presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Members of the committee, this afternoon we are privileged to have

a very able officer in our Military Establishment, who has come here

from his command to testify for us. We called Lt. Gen. Donald N.

Yates, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in the

Department of Defense, some time back to come and talk to us about

the difficulties that we are having in our satellite tracking system.

You have seen something in the press about it.

I don't believe there is any greater authority in the United States,

and that covers the whole world, than General Yates on that subject.

I had hoped that he would have been able to testify in open committee meeting, but I can understand why what he has to tell the

committee has to be in executive session.

Now, General, before I recognize you, has everybody here been

screened?

General, I told them to allow no one in here that you would not

approve of yourself for secrecy, and if you are satisfied—plus the.

staff members who are all cleared for secrecy.

Mr. ANruso. I better leave, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think you can remain.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, may I welcome General Yates, too,

on our side. I think he is a fine individual. He is aggressive, and

he certainly is competent.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, he is a great officer.

Now, General, if you want to proceed, then, in your own individual

way, to tell the committee what our problems are, and what our hopes

may be in reference to successfully tracking these Russian satellites

and spaceships.

General YATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and Mr.

Fulton, for the complimentary comments.

I am very sorry that I had to request that the hearing be held in

executive session.

34
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 35

And as a part of this, I am wondering whether the recorder is

going to place on the record everything that I say on the basis that

it may be declassified, or if he is recording simply for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. We will follow your views, General. If you wish,

we will not use the recorder.

However, customarily, what we have done—because Sam is cleared

for top secrecy, too—is for him to take down what you say, we turn

over the transcript to you to edit, and you leave in there whatever you

want to, and then turn it bacl to us and we will then release what

is left.

If that can't be done, what we could do would be to ask you to

compile a statement of generally what you say this afternoon, and

we could release that to the press and give them something about your

appearance here.

General YATES. Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly have no objection

to having a recorder take down what I say.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General YATES. The only thing that worries me about it: That

in an effort to explain clearly what I feel is an evaluation of our

space detection tracking, and surveillance capability, I will have to

do it in a mixture of mostly classified information, along with some

unclassified information, and there is some question in my mind as

to whether we could get anything sensible out of an edited transcript.

I am perfectly willing to have it and make an effort to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not do this: Just motion to Sam whenever it

is unclassified, and he can take that down. Otherwise, there will not

be any record.

Mr. FULTON. Could I make a suggestion ?

Mr. ANFUSO. Mr. Chairman, can I make a suggestion? Perhaps

the general can re-edit.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I suggested just a moment ago.

Mr. ANFuso. I think it will stop your continuity of thought if you

have to be stopped.

General YATES. Then, if it is agreeable, we will make an effort to

edit whatever comes out, recognizing that it may come out in a pretty

emasculated condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Sam, there, will act as your man in handling the

transcript, up to the time that you edit it. Then it becomes our

transcript, after your edition of it.

General YATES. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD N. YATES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,

RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE

General YATES. There has been in the press recently sufficient to

raise quite a lot of question in the minds of the population of this

country as to where we actually do stand in the business of space

surveillance.

I think that to clarify the situation, I should try to divide it down

into a simple segment, or segments, as I can, and discuss each segment

a little bit.
36 DISCUSSION OF -U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

In my view there are three important divisions in the space surveillance capabilities or functions or responsibilities of the country.

The first is our scientific interest in the items that are in orbit or

interplanetary.

The CHAIRMAN. General, may I interrupt there?

We have several members of our staff back there. This is very

important to them, too.

Would you there want to come forward?

Spence, you are the captain. Phil. You can take one of these

empty seats here.

Just proceed, General.

General YATES. The second item is that of intelligence. In the

intelligence area we are interested in, of course, Soviet capabilities

and intentions.

And the third element is strictly an element of defense, wherein

we in the military business are interested at some time in the future

when and if space objects could do harm to the United States, to be

able to detect and neutralize these objects.

Now, with respect to the detection of satellites—orbiting or space

vehicles, as opposed to 'ballistic missiles, scientifically we and the

Soviets have both been interested in getting information from outer

space to advance our frontier of knowledge. NASA has the responsibility, the primary responsibility, for scientific work in this area. The

National Aeronautics and Space Administration has a tracking network and a readout network, whch works with our U.S. satellites, in

attempting to read out information, transmitted by them on the

various parameters that they are measuring, track them, predicting

their course, and what have you, and also has a network which is

capable of reading out information and working with deeper space

probes which leaves the immediate orbital vicinity of the Earth.

This is on a scientific basis. And this depends largely on cooperation from the satellite, on active transmission of information from

the satellites.

In addition to that, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has a capability for tracking optically with the use of BakerNunn cameras which can, with very high accuracy, track visually

whenever we can see, in the proper light conditions, a satellite orbiting

within range of these cameras and give us extremely accurate positions

of the satellites in orbit, to begin knowledge on behavior of satellites

in orbit, to help us get information on drag, on orbital prediction, and

on the shape of the Earth. " *

Now, all of these are tracking devices, but aimed primarily toward

the scientific side of this exercise.

From the intelligence point of view we, of course, are interested in

knowing what are the Soviet capabilities, what are their intentions,

and we then get into an area which is very difficult to discuss. * * *

Then to get down to the military business of detection—establishment of a track and identification of a satellite in time that we should

be able to determine where it is going, what it is doing, and then lock

on a counterweapon and neutralize it if necessary. It gets down to

really the basic military part of this whole proposition.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 37

This means that theoretically our requirement for detection and

tracking of satellites, is essentially the same over a long period of time

as it is for the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles which might

be launched against us.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, coming back to the Venus shot, will you be

able to follow the Venus shot?

General YATES. We can follow it if they will tell us when it is

transmitting and what frequencies it is transmitting on, and where

it is that it is transmitting. We must know all three.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with the information they have thus far

given you, can you follow the Venus shot?

General YATES. No, sir; we cannot follow it at the present time.

First, we did not know the velocity of that vehicle when it left the

satellite. Were we to know that velocity and then were we given any

one position at any given time, we could start from that velocity and

that position and work out a period of days, and theA start looking,

and chances are we might pick it up.

But the best way to get that vehicle and track it is to get advice

from the Soviet Union through the scientific channels and tell them

that we will provide information when it is on their black side and

give it to them. And we can track it and we can pick up information.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they don't want us to do it, we have no

alternative?

General YATES. If they don't want us to do it, we would have at

the present time no basic capability. It would be luck if we were to

pick it up.

The CHAIRMAN. That would cover even the use of Jodrell Bank

in England?

General YATES. Yes, sir. Jordell Bank is in the same position as

we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General YATES. They must know which way to look, because of

high-gain antenna you have to focus in a small beam in a small direction, and we have to know where to look.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, then, we are going to have to depend

on them for any information about it, and accept their statement as

to its accuracy?

General YATES. Yes, sir.

You see, previously they have sent out space vehicles, but they have

transmitted and we were able to track them. This one they have

shut off and they are only getting it to transmit on call.

It would be interesting to us, and we would like to participate in

their tracking exercise. We " * have equipment here which could

track it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not so academic for the future though. Because while this one may be getting farther and farther away, they
38 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

have got the capability of sending another one up. And we might

be in the same shape with it..

General YATES. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. How do you feel about the Nike-Zeus

'

General?

General YATES. Sir, the subject of this was space track and I am

not 

[Laughter.]

General YATES. If I may, I would like not to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. I will withdraw the question. [Laughter.]

Mr. Fur,ToN. You will have to make time with the opposition, to

putting Nike-Zeus into operation.

The CHAIRMAN. We have no opposition. It is all for the defense

of the country.

General YATES. I am not in the weapons system evaluation business at the present time. My business actually has been ranges and

space ground environment, and our capability against satellites, and

trying to give Nike-Zeus a capability to develop. And that is it.

I have no comment.

Mr. FULTON. On a humorous vein, without disclosing the source,

the suggestion is that Nike-Zeus be the first step in the U.S. disarmament with Russia to be voluntarily offered. [Laughter.]

If there are any _Army men here 

[Further laughter.]

Mr. MILLER. (presiding). Are there any other questions?

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fulton brought one question to mind, General, that he explored

last year. It was rather fantastic, to be sure, but this whole space

program is rather fantastic. He suggested at that time whether or

not any thought had been given to an energizing system of sorts, that

if something, some enemy missile or satellite were coming in that

there was any way or any principle that had yet been thought 

in,

or any research work done on it, where it might be energized and

boosted out over, off from the United States?

General YATES. To divert a missile which had been committed?

Mr. KARTH. To divert.

General YATES. I am sure it has been thought about, but I haven't

seen a good solution to that problem.

Mr. KARTH. You are not familiar with anything that is going on in

that field?

General YATES. No, sir.

Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Bass.

Mr. BASS. General, you mentioned a little while ago the Russian

shot No. 4, I think. it was, where they claim they had been able to

recover ironi space several dogs and animals.

General YATES. (Nods.)

Mr. BASS. How do we know that is true? Did we have any way,

do you know, of proving that out?

Genera YATES. We have no evidence to indicate that it isn't true,

nor reason to believe that it isn't true, and the fact it disappeared at
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 39

the time they said they recovered it makes it perfectly logical that

they recovered it. I am sure they recovered it. You see, we were

tracking it, and all of a sudden they pulled it down and we didn't

catch it at the next time around. So—there is only one other place

it could have gone and that is out, and that would have been rather

weird for this thing to do. And I think probably we would have

picked out something out there. No, I am sure they recovered it.

Mr. BASS. Well, they might have, I can see where they might

have—or it might have dropped out of space. But I understand there

are great technical difficulties in recovering an object unharmed with-

-out burning up. How do we know they did that, accomplished that

feat?

General YATES. I think that I—the only answer that I can give you

to that is that all the evidence we have at hand indicates that they

-did not make up that story, that they actually recovered it.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MILLER. Are you through, Mr. Bass ?

Mr. F-u-uroisr. On this point, I would like to be heard.

Mr. BASS. I yield. But I have some questions.

Mr. FULTON. We do know, General, when they did try retrorockets to bring the satellite down, that one went out, one went down,

and -43ne camein all right. So there is the chance it could have gone

,out.

General YATES. I think this is where we need to clear up the

record.

The satellites you referred to was Sputnik V, which was the one

they successfully recovered. Sputnik IV 

Mr. FULTON. One went out.

General YATES. Was the one that went in the wrong direction. In

fact, the evidence—they admitted what happened. And we confirmed that, because it had changed its track. It went into eight

pieces, which we had tracked, all of them.

Mr. BASS. General, " * my question was directed at that point;

namely, whether they had licked the problem.

And I have often wondered whether it was true that they were able

to recover this satellite intact.

General YATES. My answer would be that they have not necessarily

licked the problem, but that they did recover this one satisfactorily.

In other words, one success doesn't mean that you are operational.

We have been through that in our own missiles. We have hit a

target and then we have had several failures. To lick the problem

you must be able to consistently do it, and I have no reason to believe

that the Soviets can do it any better than we can, as far as licking the

problem on a consistent basis is concerned.

They have successfully overcome the technical difficulties on at

least one—on one test that we know about, I believe. That is the

Sputik V, and Sputnik IV indicated a failure.

And the next one they attempt might well be a failure, because

you don't do these things and solve all the problems and then have

them just go away by one success. So they are fraught with exactly

the same kind of engineering and test difficulties that we have.

* *
40 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, have you any way of telling, or do

you have any information as to whether or not in this space ship up

there now there is any human beings?

General YATES. No, sir; I have no information on that—no information at all. But I—and I don't know, but certainly the indications

from the way it is behaving, and lack of communications, let us

say, and a few other things, would indicate that there is no reason to

believe there is a human on board. Normally, with a human on board,

you would think they would want to be in almost constant contact with

the Earth.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in charge of that contact. Have you any

information about previous launchings, whether or not the Russians

have launched with a human being aboard?

General YAMS. No, sir; I have no information that would indicate

that they have launched any human beings.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing has come to your command to show that

there was a human being aboard?

General YATES. Not specifically; no, sir.

Mr. ANFUSO. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go down the bench.

Mr. ANEITSO. Yes.

General YATES. That is right, so—I would like to confine my answers to the subject. First, I speculate they have had their proper

percentage of failures, just on general principles, to clear the record,

because I know there is no way to do this job without having failures.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Daddario.

Mr. DADDARIO. General, several months ago there was a newspaper

report that a rising moon had been reported by BMEWS as a missile

launching and it was also reported that this alerted the Strategic Air

Command and a few other of our military establishments.

Now, was that a correct report? If so, how did it happen, and if

it did happen, what has been done to correct it so that such things, such

natural phenomena can be distinguished from the real thing?

General YATES. Well, I think—I don't know. I think some such

ghost appeared on their scope. During the development of any of

the new devices, we are bound to get this kind of false indication.

This is a very difficult problem, to clear out the noise and determine

with the noise what specifically is a missile or a satellite.

I understand that this has been corrected. But I do not know the

accuracy of the report that was in the paper. Whether this is accurate or what it was, I don't know.

But I understand that during the development and test program

of the Thule radar, BMEWS, they have had various kinds of false

indications which are screened out bit by bit as they work the thing

into operation and check it out. And at the present time I am advised

that it is doing very well. * * *

Mr. MOELLER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hechler asked me a little while ago.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 41

Mr. HECHLER. How would you summarize, General, the factual

accuracy of Soviet public pronouncements on their performance? I

don't mean how many failures they have actually had, but relating

their actual performance to their public pronouncements. From what

you know, could you give us any general statement to where there have

been wide variance between what they said publicly?

General YATES. I have never read a Soviet announcement which

indicated a failure. Maybe there have been some.

With respect to their statements I don't recall having read any

which didn't appear to be accurate Z.° the best of our knowledge.

Can you correct this, Curtis?

Dr. CURTIS. This is correct. Absolutely true.

General YATES. I really believe this. I know that they are

questioned.

But really there is no basis for question that I can see, since they

have the technical capability to do what they have said they have

done, and everything they have said, in general., to my knowledge, has

been consistent with the facts as we know them.

Mr. HECHLER. You would summarize by saying, then, that when

they are successful they tell the complete truth?

General YATES. They most certainly have not advertised their failures. I have never seen one advertised. And I am sure they have

had them.

Mr. HECHLER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moeller.

Mr. MOELLER. General, when Mr. Khrushchev was here for the

U.N. meeting, there seems to have been some indication that they

wanted to do something big. And also I think at the time we read

certain statements that alluded to the fact that they had had a failure

and a number of their prominent scientists were killed. Are you

aware of that?

General YATES. I have heard rumors that some of their scientists

were killed, but I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. MOELLER. You don't know.

General YATES. No, sir.

Mr. MOELLER. They apparently were attempting something of that

kind which also failed?

General YATES. Knowing the wartime attitude of the Soviets concerning safety, and our own, I would say that they have—that they

shouldn't have been anywhere near as lucky as we have been, and

we're lucky that we have had no serious incidents.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the general a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Riehlman.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Do we have any information of the tracking equipment that Russia has to follow our satellites or missiles?

General YATES. To follow our satellites?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Yes.

General YATES. We have not been secretive with respect to the

azimuth, inclinations and courses of our satellites. The problem that

they have would be considerably less than our problem, starting

from the assumption they give us no information on theirs. I do not

have specific information on what they would be using to track our
42 DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM

satellites, but let us say that they could do it as long as we are cooperating with them, and with * * * simple type equipment. For

example

'

most of our satellites are transmitting and give a continuous

signal. NASA has no reason to conceal the transmission of its satellites. And NASA uses very—for normal tracking purposes, doesn't

have to use high gain dishes or other sophisticated equipment. It has

its minitrack stations which can pick up within certain frequency

ranges and track from a fixed position any satellites on the proper

frequency. The Soviets could have this same type of equipment or

similar equipment and track our satellites. They would have no

trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. General, one more question. Did we, or were we

able to detect the 7-ton Sputnik before the Russians announced it?

General YATES. This is the last Sputnik?

The CHAIRMAN. No, the one before the last. Then I will ask you

about—

* *

General YATES. All right. That is No. 7.

It was announced, as I understand it, by the Soviets at 11:46 on

the 4th. We were tracking it for " * 14, or 16 hours before they

announced it.

The CHAIRMAN. That was good work.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the last one?

General YATES. The same thing applies.

* *

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moeller.

Mr. MOELLER. General, do we have any knowledge that the Soviets

have a tracking network of any sort, other than what is located in,

say, Russia, Siberia, or ships at sea?

General YATES. No, sir.

Mr. MOELLER. They wouldn't have any other spot?

General YATES. In other countries, you mean?

Mr. MOELLER. Yes.

General YATES. Not sir there is no information on any outside of

the Soviet sphere of influence. I think—I don't know, but I think

all of their stations are under or within the bloc and ships at sea.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we want to thank you very much for I

think what has been a brilliant dissertation on the subject that, you

have got so complete a command over.

Now, you have a supporting officer with you. Does he have a statement he would like to make?

Dr. CuRns. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in accord with what the general has had

to say?

Dr. CuRris. Completely. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. He merits a promotion, General.

Mr. FuuroN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a calendar question?
DISCUSSION OF U.S. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEM 43

When will our worldwide tracking installations be really in order? I mean, what are your calendar dates on your worldwide tracking system?

General YATES. Target dates for our worldwide--

Mr. FULTON. Yes when will it be in operation worldwide? General YATES. 

Yes,

tracking system right now is essentially world- wide, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. SO it is completed?

General YATES. Yes, sir. We are tied together, in the Pacific range and the Atlantic range, * * *.

There are several other projects that we are tied together. So it is complete as a worldwide system. It will continue to grow and be improved as the requirements demand.

Mr. FULTON. So that you are complete now?

General YATES. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. So there are no gaps. And so that 

General YATES. There are no gaps for programs or requirements that exist today.

Mr. FULTON. All right.

General YATES. And there will be no gaps in the future, for our future requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we certainly thank you, General, for coming here and helping the committee. We appreciate it very much. And

we-wish you good luck and Godspeed out there.

General YATES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FULTON. We will make him an honorary member of this committee.

(Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

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