alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SHARON KELLER

 PRESIDING JUDGE

BARBARA P. HERVEY

BERT RICHARDSON

KEVIN P. YEARY

DAVID NEWELL

MARY LOU KEEL

SCOTT WALKER

MICHELLE M. SLAUGHTER

JESSE F. MCCLURE, III

 JUDGES

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

DEANA WILLIAMSON

CLERK

(512) 463-1551

SIAN SCHILHAB

GENERAL COUNSEL

(512) 463-1597

SUPREME COURT BUILDING, 201 WEST 14TH STREET, ROOM 106, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701

WEBSITE WWW.TXCOURTS.GOV/CCA

February 14, 2024

12TH Court Of Appeals Clerk

1517 W. Front, Room 354

Tyler, TX 75701

* Delivered Via E-Mail *

District Clerk Smith County

100 N. Broadway, Ste. 204

Tyler, TX 75702

* Delivered Via E-Mail *

Re: Moffitt, Jeremy Christian

CCA No. WR-95,135-01 

Trial Court Case No. 114-0071-21-A

The court has issued an opinion on the above referenced cause number.

Sincerely,

Deana Williamson, Clerk

cc: Presiding Judge 114th District Court (Delivered Via E-Mail)

District Attorney Smith County (Delivered Via E-Mail)

James W. Huggler Jr. (Delivered Via E-Mail)

Jeremy Christian Moffitt

Brittney Losack (Delivered Via E-Mail)

Kristen Worman (Delivered Via E-Mail)

Bettie Louise Wells (Delivered Via E-Mail)

Timothy Fitzpatrick (Delivered Via E-Mail)

FILE COPY
#### Johnny L. HADLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. BE-475.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 15, 1986.

Michael Allen, Public Defender, Larry G. Bryant, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Kurt L. Barch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

MILLS, Judge.

Hadley appeals from a sentence imposed pursuant to the sentencing guidelines following his conviction for aggravated battery and trespass on property. We affirm.

Hadley was positively identified by his elderly victim as the person who violently assaulted her in the yard of her home, resulting in injury requiring surgery. The physical attack was accompanied by verbal abuse calculated to place the woman in fear of her life. He was sentenced pursuant to the guidelines, which reflected a recommended sentence range of three and one-half to four and one-half years incarceration.

The trial judge departed from the guidelines to impose 15 years incarceration. He listed six reasons as justification therefor: 1) invasion of the privacy of the victim’s property; 2) intentional creation of terror by his actions and threats during the extended attack; 3) the age and vulnerability of the victim (she is 60 years old and lives alone); 4) the fact that Hadley “laid in wait” to make the attack; 5) that he informed the victim during the attack that he had placed a contract out on her life; and 6) the psychological trauma suffered by the victim.

Hadley concedes the propriety of reasons two and six. The age and vulnerability of the victim are acceptable reasons for departure, *Von Carter v. State,*468 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), as are reasons four and five as circumstances of the crimes. *See Manning v. State,*452 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

With regard to reason one, we recognize that the phrasing is somewhat ambiguous, so that it might seem that the court was improperly relying on an element of the crime charged (trespass), which under current authority would seem to require reversal of the sentence regardless of the propriety of the remaining reasons. *See State v. Mischler,*488 So.2d 523*163(Fla.1986); *but see Albritton v. State,*476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985). However, it is our belief that the trial court intended to rely on the invasion of the victim’s privacy, not her property. Therefore, reason one is valid as a circumstance of the crime.

Affirmed.

SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
#### Linda Marie Hatfield PETERS, etc., et al. v. PUMPKIN AIR, INC., et al.

No. 87-CC-1206.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 4, 1987.

In re Pumpkin Air, Inc., applying for rehearing of a writ granted with order on July 1, 1987, 508 So.2d 809; to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CW87 0365; 21st Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Helena, No. 11317, Div. A.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the rehearing.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Treasury

###### Internal Revenue Service

# AGENCY:

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Treasury.

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting.

# SUMMARY:

An open meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Toll-Free Project Committee will be conducted. The Taxpayer Advocacy Panel is soliciting public comments, ideas and suggestions on improving customer service at the Internal Revenue Service.

# DATES:

The meeting will be held Tuesday, February 7, 2012.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Marianne Dominguez at 1-(888) 912-1227 or (954) 423-7978.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    Notice is hereby given pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988) that an open meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Toll-Free Project Committee will be held Tuesday, February 7, 2012, at 11 a.m. Eastern Time via telephone conference. The public is invited to make oral comments or submit written statements for consideration. Due to limited conference lines, notification of intent to participate must be made with Marianne Dominguez. For more information please contact Ms.                           ( print page 2611)                        Dominguez at 1-(888) 912-1227 or (954) 423-7978, or write TAP Office, 1000 South Pine Island Road, Suite 340, Plantation, FL 33324, or contact us at the Web site:                     *http://www.improveirs.org*.                

The agenda will include various IRS issues.

Dated: January 10, 2012.

Shawn Collins,

Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.

[FR Doc. 2012-763 Filed 1-17-12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 18 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 18

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That when the House adjourns on the legislative day of Wednesday, 
January 31, 2001, it stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on Tuesday, February 
6, 2001.

            Passed the House of Representatives January 31, 2001.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
107th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                            H. CON. RES. 18

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

     Providing for an adjournment of the House of Representatives.
```
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 January 3, 2018

t1218

Order 

Clerk

January 3, 2018

156206 & (58)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 156206

COA: 330429 

Oakland CC: 2015-253328-FH

KENNETH JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion to supplement the application for leave to appeal 

is GRANTED in part and the transcript excerpts attached to the motion are accepted for 

filing. To the extent that the motion requests an abeyance and remand, it is DENIED. 

The application for leave to appeal the June 22, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is 

considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented 

should be reviewed by this Court.
#### Melvin T. WILKINSON, Petitioner/Claimant, v. H. R. McGEHEE, Respondent, Own Risk, Insurance Carrier.

No. 56851.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 18, 1982.

As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 28, 1982.

*672MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Melvin T. Wilkinson, claimant, filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment. A Judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court found, *inter alia,*the alleged injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment, and this finding was affirmed by a three judge panel.

The Court of Appeals, Division II, reversed and remanded with directions by a memorandum decision which found in favor of claimant because of a preponderance of evidence. Certiorari has previously been granted. We now vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and Affirm the Workers’ Compensation Court.

On review of Workers’ Compensation Court orders or awards, the reviewing court does not weigh evidence to determine preponderance thereof, but examine the record only to ascertain whether the order reviewed is supported by any competent evidence. *Loggins v. Wetumka General Hospital,*Okl., 587 P.2d 455 (1978); *Sooner Const. Co. v. Brown,*Okl., 544 P.2d 500 (1975). We have examined the record in this case and find the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Court is supported by competent evidence.

OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. FINDING OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT THAT CLAIM SHOULD BE DENIED IS AFFIRMED.

All the Justices concur.
#### Clifton SIMONEAUX, III v. SUN ERECTION COMPANY, et al.

No. 88-CA-0139.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Sept. 16, 1988.

*1137Darleen M. Jacobs, Brian Beckwith, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

James L. Donovan, Kevin K. Gipson, Donovan *&*Lawler, Metairie, for intervenor Associated and Indem. Corp.

Charles L. Chassaignac, Carmelite M. Bertaut, Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler & Sarpy, New Orleans, for defendant-appel-lee Standard Roofing Co. of New Orleans, Inc.

Before BARRY, CIACCIO and WARD, JJ.

CIACCIO, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendants. A procedual complication, however, prevents us from considering the merits of plaintiffs appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, without prejudice, and remand the matter to the district court.

Plaintiff filed this action in 1980. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, but before a hearing was held plaintiff died. Apparently unaware of plaintiffs death, counsel and the court conducted a hearing, and on February 2, 1987, the district court rendered judgment against plaintiff. On February 17, 1987, plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for appeal, which the court granted on March 10, 1987. On March 4, 1987, however, plaintiffs counsel had filed a supplemental and amending petition to substitute plaintiffs wife and son as parties plaintiff. And on March 6,1987, the court had ordered the supplemental and amending petition filed.

Despite the later substitution of parties plaintiff, the judgment appealed is against a plaintiff who was dead when the judgment was rendered. Although the proceedings in the district court were valid up to the moment of plaintiffs death, at that instant the action abated as to him, and the substitution of parties plaintiff did not cure the nullity. For it is well settled that a judgment for or against a deceased person is an absolute nullity. *Navarro v. Derbes,*211 La. 384, 30 So.2d 126 (1947); *White v. Givens,*491 So.2d 63 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986); *Smith v. Burden Construction Company,*379 So.2d 1133 (La.App. 2d Cir.1979); *Gulfco Finance of Livingston, Inc. v. Lee,*224 So.2d 524 (La.App. 1st Cir.1969); *Fountain v. American Employers Insurance Company,*161 So.2d 120 (La.App. 3d Cir.1964); *Hughes v. Furlow,*83 So.2d 144 (La.App. Orleans 1955), writ denied 1956. Any interested party may have declared null a judgment against a deceased person. *Sanders & Son v. Schilling,*123 La. 1009, 49 So. 689 (1909); *Hughes v. Furlow,*above. An appeal from such a judgment is improvidently granted and without effect. *Navarro v. Derbes,*above.

Because the judgment appealed is an absolute .nullity, we dismiss the appeal, without prejudice. We remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings with proper parties substituted for the deceased plaintiff.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED.
Amendment to Employment Agreement between Allin Corporation and Dean C. Praskach



 Exhibit 10.3 
  
 AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
  
 This amendment is made and entered into as of this 7th day of July 2005 by and between Allin Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“Employer”) and Dean C. Praskach (“Employee”), a resident of
Pennsylvania. 
  
 WHEREAS, Employer and Employee entered into an
employment agreement (the “Agreement”) as of June 23, 2000 and as amended on February 13, 2001 and December 8, 2004 and now desire to amend that Agreement by mutual consent. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein contained and intending to be legally bound
hereby the parties do hereby agree as follows: 
  
 Section 3(e)
of the Agreement is hereby amended and restated as follows: 
  
 (e) Stock Options. Employee acknowledges receipt of options to purchase stock of Employer under Employer’s Stock Plans. The options vest ratably at 20% per year on the anniversary of issuance; however, all
options granted to Employee that have not previously expired or been terminated will become fully vested on the date on which (i) Employer sells all or substantially all of its assets, (ii) Employer merges with another entity in a transaction in
which Employer is not the surviving corporation, or (iii) any person or group of affiliated persons other than the shareholders of Employer as of January 1, 2001 owns or controls 40% or more of Employer. Any or all of these occurrences are deemed to
be a “Change of Control.” At the sole discretion of Employer’s Board of Directors, additional options may be issued to Employee; however, Employer’s Board of Directors is under no obligation to grant to Employee additional
options, and any such options granted will be governed by the terms of the option award agreement to be entered into between Employer and Employee at or about the time of any such future option grant. 
  
 In all other respects, the terms and conditions of the Agreement are ratified
and confirmed. 
  

					
	 	 	ALLIN CORPORATION
			
	 	 	 	 	 /s/ Richard Talarico


	 	 	By:	 	Richard Talarico, Chairman
			
	WITNESS:	 	 	 	 
			
	 /s/ Robert V. Fulton

	 	 	 	 /s/ Dean Praskach


	Robert V. Fulton	 	 	 	Dean Praskach
#### Murray GALIN, Appellant, v. ROYAL SAMPLE SERVICE CORPORATION, et al., Appellees.

No. 4-86-2228.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 9, 1987.

Clarification Denied Jan. 25, 1988.

Michael E. Rehr of the Law Office of Michael E. Rehr, Coral Gables, and Jeffrey R. Eisensmith, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Gary Brookmyer of Broad and Cassel, Miami, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The summary judgment in favor of ap-pellee Harry Eichler is reversed on authority of *Nu-Way Plumbing, Inc. v. Superior Mechanical, Inc.,*315 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).

Appellees correctly point out that paragraph seven of the second amended complaint, wherein appellant seeks to recover salary and insurance coverage benefits, incorrectly alleges that such benefits flow from the agreement between Martin Pasti-na and appellee Eichler rather than from the stock purchase agreement. The summary judgment in favor of appellee Royal Sample Service Corporation is therefore affirmed. Upon motion, appellant should be permitted to amend his complaint.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

DOWNEY and LETTS, JJ., and LINDSEY, HUBERT R., Associate Judge, concur.
**Exhibit 10.1**

 

**SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE GFI GROUP INC.2008 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN**

 

ThisSecond Amendment (this “Second Amendment”) to the 2008 Equity Incentive Plan(the “Plan”) of GFI Group Inc. (the “Company”) has been deemed advisable andhas been adopted pursuant to the terms of Section 10.1 of the Plan by theCompany’s Board of Directors and is effective as of March 21, 2010,subject to stockholder approval.  Termsused herein but not otherwise defined shall have the meanings given to suchterms in the Plan.

 

**1.****             *****Amendments to the Plan*****.**  The first sentence of Article 4.1 of thePlan, as amended by the First Amendment to the GFI Group Inc. 2008 EquityIncentive Plan, is hereby further amended by deleting “14,900,000” andsubstituting “21,900,000” therefor.”

 

**2.****             *****The Plan****.*  In all other respects the Planis ratified and shall, as so changed by this Second Amendment, continue in fullforce and effect.

 

* * * * *

* * * * *

 

----
# ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 24-0010
JAMES G. ARCHER, DENISE F. ARCHER, ROGER WAGNER, ANTOINETTE WAGNER, RUTGERNIERS, LAURA NIERS, GREGORY CHAPMAN, GREGORY SMITH, and LISA BRYANT, Plaintiffs and Appellants, O RD E R
v. GORDON TAIT and MICHELLE JANZ,

Defendants and Appellees. 

### 1:

- r JAN 0 9 2724 Bowen Greenwood urt lt Counsel for Plaintiffs and Appellants James G. Archer, et al., have filed a notice of appeal fromtheDecember 5,2023OrderandRationaleonMotionsfor SummaryJudgment entered in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, in its Cause No. DV-23-640E. In their Notice ofAppeal, they assert that the appeal is taken from an order certified as final under M. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Pursuant to M. R. App. P. 4(4)(b), ifan appeal is taken after a district court issues certification under M. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the notice ofappeal shall state that fact and a copy of the certification order shall be attached to the notice. This Court then reviews the certification order for compliance with M. R. App. P. 6(6). Ifa court abuses its discretion in certifying an order as final under Rule 54(b), we are withoutjurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Kohler v. Croonenberghs, 2003 MT 260, 317 Mont. 413. 77 P.3d 531. Thus, even if not raised by a party, we will sua sponte determine if the court's certification order meets the criteria we have set forth in Roy v. Neibauer, 188 Mont. 81, 610 P.2d 1185 (1980), and Weinstein v. University ofMontana, 271 Mont. 435, 898 P.2d 101 (1995). Kohler,

### Til 8-9. 01/09/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0010In this case, Appellants failed to attach a copy of the certification order to their

Notice ofAppeal as required under Rule 4(4)(b). We therefore cannot determine ifthe court's certification order is in substantial compliance with the requirements ofRule 6(6) and our case law interpreting certification orders under Rule 54(b) and this matter cannot proceed on appeal. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to provide copies ofthis Order to all counsel ofrecord. Dated this cl

—

day ofJanuary, 2024.

2 ChiefJustice



# tt ioaishas

.Justices
#### Edward Benjamin WILSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Bert J. JOHNSON and The People of the State of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 81SA155.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

May 10, 1982.

Richard M. Borchers, Samuel R. Escamil-la, Westminster, for petitioner-appellant.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Clement P. Engle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents-appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Edward Benjamin Wilson, appeals the discharge of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He challenges the validity of the extradition documents submitted by the state of Arizona pursuant to section 16-19-104, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We affirm the judgment.

Wilson was arrested by Colorado authorities as a fugitive from justice on December 2, 1980. Thereafter, the state of Arizona initiated the extradition process when it submitted a requisition request issued by that state’s governor along with supporting documents. Wilson’s sole claim on appeal is that inconsistencies between the extradition request and the supporting documents as to the number of offenses pending against him in Arizona and the dates on which the alleged criminal acts occurred, render the extradition documents fatally defective.1 We disagree.

It is clear that the inconsistencies complained of in the extradition documents resulted from a clerical error committed in the course of transposing the numerous allegations contained in the charging documents to the extradition demand. *See*
      *22
      *Richardson v. Cronin,*Colo., 621 P.2d 949 (1980). When read as a whole, the documents substantially charge the appellant with having committed a crime under the laws of Arizona. Accordingly, these inconsistencies do not render the extradition documents invalid or prevent extradition. *Johnson v. Kiefer,*Colo., 624 P.2d 894 (1981); *Martello v. Baker,*189 Colo. 195, 539 P.2d 1280 (1975); *Bryan v. Conn,*187 Colo. 275, 530 P.2d 1274 (1975).

Judgment affirmed.

. Specifically, the governor’s request stated that the appellant’s return was sought for trial on six counts of forgery which allegedly occurred in February and March, 1978. Accompanying the request was a Pima County, Arizona grand jury indictment and a separate criminal complaint filed in that same county. Taken together, these supporting documents establish that there are ten forgery counts pending against the appellant. Further, as evidenced by these documents, the criminal acts occurred on the dates specified in the governor’s warrant as well as in January, 1978.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certificationof Chief Executive Officer**

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created bySection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer ofHyperSpace Communications, Inc. (the “*Company*”)hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:

 

(i) theaccompanying Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the quarterended March 31, 2005 (the “*Report*”)fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) orSection 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended; and

 

(ii) theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|         | /s/  Mark Endry          |
|--------------|--------------------------|
| May 12, 2005 | Mark  Endry              |
|         | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

----
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin Bernie SMITH.

No. 86-KO-2220.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 23, 1987.

In re Smith, Calvin Bernie; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 86-KA-60; Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 132-F.

Prior report: La.App., 496 So.2d 1221.

Denied.