J-S37027-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

YOLANDA M. WATSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2825 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 27, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0005833-2010

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 8, 2020

Appellant Yolanda M. Watson appeals from the order dismissing her 

first Post Collateral Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant contends the PCRA 

court erred by dismissing her petition without an evidentiary hearing 

because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether her trial

counsel was ineffective by failing to call character witnesses on her behalf. 

We affirm.

We state the facts as set forth by this Court in resolving Appellant’s 

direct appeal:

[Appellant] was present in courtroom 802 of the Criminal Justice 

Center throughout the attempted murder trial of her former 

fiancé, Rico Lofton (Lofton). Lofton’s first trial having ended with 

a hung jury, he was being retried on charges that he opened fire 

from a vehicle into a crowd of people gathered on the sidewalk, 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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in the street, and on the porch of his target’s home. Lofton’s 

bullets struck the intended target, as well as a two (2) year old 

child, and narrowly missed the head of the child’s grandmother. 

As a result of her fear of Lofton, the child’s grandmother 

returned to Portugal and had to be flown back to Philadelphia to 

testify against Lofton at his retrial. Throughout his retrial, 

[Appellant] was seated behind Lofton’s table every day. As was 

later developed, [Appellant], who has a prior felony conviction 

for aggravated assault, repeatedly glared at the prosecutor, 

Assistant District Attorney Lorraine Donnelly (Ms. Donnelly) 

throughout the trial. On March 4, 2010, before the deliberating 

jurors were dismissed for the day, and pursuant to a request by 

the prosecutor, this court gave specific instructions to the jurors 

that they were not to discuss the case with anyone.

After the jurors were dismissed, [Appellant] gathered with Lofton 

and his family at 13th and Filbert Streets outside the Criminal 

Justice Center. A juror in Lofton’s case, [C]omplainant Vladimir 

Gulko, was walking down Filbert Street, and had just ended a 

cell phone conversation when he was approached by [Appellant]. 

Complainant recognized [Appellant] as the woman who had just 

been talking to Lofton and who had been present in the 

courtroom the preceding days. [Appellant] approached 

[C]omplainant, telling him she needed to talk to him about a few 

things. Complainant told [Appellant] that he was a juror and 

could not talk to her because of the judge’s instructions. Despite 

being rebuffed by [C]omplainant, [Appellant] continued talking 

to [C]omplainant as he proceeded down Filbert Street to the 

Market East train station located approximately one (1) block 

away. Complainant repeatedly told [Appellant] that he could not 

and would not talk to her, but [Appellant] continued her 

explanation of matters otherwise unknown to the jury.

During the one block walk, [Appellant] told [C]omplainant that 

Lofton’s victim and his family were heavily involved in drug 

dealing and gang-related activities in their neighborhood. 

[Appellant] further stated that she wanted to testify in Lofton’s 

trial but was prohibited from doing so by his attorney. 

[Appellant] informed [C]omplainant that the prosecution of 

Lofton had gone on over the past four (4) years, and she 

attempted to have [C]omplainant read a document but he 

refused. Complainant attempted to ignore [Appellant] by putting 

in headphones, but she continued to talk to him about matters 

regarding Lofton’s case. At some point during this one-sided 
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conversation [Appellant] mentioned the sum of $38,000 in an 

attempt to influence [C]omplainant’s deliberations. Complainant 

continued to ignore [Appellant], who followed him until he 

entered the train station. 

When [C]omplainant returned to the courthouse the next 

morning to resume deliberations he immediately alerted 

courtroom staff that he had been inappropriately contacted the 

previous evening. This court then conducted a colloquy on the 

record with [C]omplainant, in the presence of counsel but 

outside the hearing of other jurors, and questioned him about 

what happened, whether he shared this information with other 

jurors and whether he could continue to deliberate without bias 

toward either the Commonwealth or Lofton. Satisfied that he 

had not shared the foregoing encounter with the other jurors, 

and with his unequivocal ability to resume unbiased 

deliberations, this court reintegrated [C]omplainant into the 

deliberating jury. Following [C]omplainant’s disclosure, this 

court made an on the record request for the name of every 

person seated in the courtroom, and his or her relationship to 

Lofton, including [Appellant]. Additionally, following the 

foregoing disclosures, this court prohibited members of Lofton’s 

family from the courtroom during times when the jury was 

present, with the exception of the pronouncement of the verdict. 

However, although permitted to return to the courtroom, 

[Appellant] remained outside in the hallway. Thereafter, the 

jury returned a partial verdict of guilty against Lofton and the 

Commonwealth began its investigation into the specific 

allegations against [Appellant].

Assistant District Attorney Donnelly approached [C]omplainant 

after the jurors were discharged and requested an interview with 

him at a later time. Simultaneously, [Appellant] was briefly 

detained by sheriff’s deputies outside of the courtroom but was 

quickly released because her contact information had already 

been obtained by the court on the record. Approximately one 

week later, on March 12, 2010, [C]omplainant was interviewed 

by Detective Tollier of the Philadelphia Police Department in the 

presence of Ms. Donnelly. Complainant explained that the 

woman who approached him was with Lofton and present in the 

courtroom during the trial. Accordingly, [C]omplainant was 

shown pictures of [Appellant] and Lofton’s mother, the only two 

(2) women present in the courtroom from Lofton’s family 

throughout the trial. From those pictures, [C]omplainant 
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identified [Appellant] as the woman who approached him on the 

street the week before.

Commonwealth v. Watson, 2013 WL 11299440, at *1-*2 (Pa. Super. filed 

Jan. 8, 2013) (unpublished mem.) (citations omitted and formatting 

altered), appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1091 (Pa. 2013).

The police arrested Appellant. Id. at *2. A jury convicted Appellant of 

aggravated jury tampering, obstructing the administration of law, and 

tampering with jurors. Id. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate sentence of seven-and-one-half to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 

Id. Appellant appealed, this Court affirmed on January 8, 2013, and our 

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on 

October 29, 2013. Id. at *5; see Order, 10/29/13.

The PCRA court docketed Appellant’s first pro se PCRA petition on 

October 24, 2014. The PCRA court docketed Appellant’s amended PCRA 

petition on February 5, 2015. The subsequent procedural history is 

extensive, but essentially, the PCRA court eventually appointed PCRA 

counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on July 2, 2018. The amended 

PCRA petition claimed that Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing 

to ask Appellant “to obtain character witnesses as to [Appellant’s] reputation 

for honesty and truthfulness.” Am. PCRA Pet., 7/2/18, at 4 (unpaginated). 

The amended petition included a witness certification signed by PCRA 

counsel, which identified Julie Dotson as a character witness who was 

available and willing to testify at Appellant’s trial as to Appellant’s reputation 
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for honesty and truthfulness. Witness Cert. The witness certification also 

listed Dotson’s address, which was in North Chesterfield, Virginia.2 Id.

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on December 21, 2018, 

claiming that Appellant failed to fulfill her burden of proof by providing “an 

affidavit from [Dotson] demonstrating that [she] existed and [was] ready, 

willing, and able to testify on her behalf at trial. She also provides no proof 

that she informed trial counsel of this alleged character witness.” Cmwlth.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss, 12/21/18, at 6. The Commonwealth argued that because 

Appellant’s claim was “unsupported by any relevant proof,” the PCRA court 

should deny relief. Id. The Commonwealth also asserted that Appellant 

failed “to meet the reasonable basis prong of the ineffectiveness test 

because she has not produced either a certification or affidavit from trial 

counsel discussing their trial strategy, [or] in the alternative, provided an 

explanation as to why she was not able to obtain such a certification or

affidavit.” Id. at 7.

On April 25, 2019, Appellant filed a supplement to her amended PCRA 

petition, which attached a signed affidavit from Dotson. Suppl. to Am. PCRA 

Pet., 4/25/19. Dotson averred that she was available and willing to appear 

at Appellant’s trial to testify as to Appellant’s “reputation for honesty and 

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2 The certification did not aver that Dotson was aware of Appellant’s 

reputation in the community.
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truthfulness.” Id. The affidavit did not include any reference to 

“community” or “community opinion.” 

The Commonwealth filed a response, in which it quoted an exchange 

between the trial court and Appellant. Cmwlth.’s Resp., 5/14/19, at 2-3. 

Specifically, the trial court asked Appellant directly as to whether she wished 

to call any other witnesses besides herself, and Appellant responded in the 

negative. Id. at 3. The Commonwealth also argued that Dotson’s 

certification was insufficient because it did not “explain how long she has 

known [Appellant], in what community and context she knows [Appellant], 

and whether she has ever spoken to others in the community about 

[Appellant’s] reputation for truthfulness or honesty.” Id. at 5. The 

Commonwealth further asserted that Appellant failed to establish prejudice 

because Appellant’s own testimony corroborated the Commonwealth’s case 

against her. Id. (summarizing Appellant’s inculpating testimony).

On May 24, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition without 

issuing a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. Order, 5/24/19. On June 5, 2019, the 

PCRA court vacated its May 24, 2019 order and also issued a Rule 907 notice 

stating that the issues raised in Appellant’s petition lack merit. Order, 

6/5/19; Rule 907 Notice, 6/5/19. Appellant did not file a response. On July 

10, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

On August 12, 2019, Appellant filed a petition to reinstate her 

appellate rights nunc pro tunc, which the PCRA court granted on September 
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27, 2019. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 1, 2019. The 

PCRA court did not order Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and did 

not prepare a Rule 1925(a) opinion.3

Appellant raises one issue:

Whether the PCRA court violated paragraph (1) of Rule 907 of 

Pa.R.Crim.P. by summarily dismissing [A]ppellant’s PCRA 

petition without [an] evidentiary hearing, where there was a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether [A]ppellant was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel, when her counsel 

failed to call [a] character witness on [A]ppellant’s behalf at 

trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

After stating the applicable law, Appellant summarily argues that “she 

was denied the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed under the 

United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, when counsel failed to direct 

[her] to obtain character witnesses to testify as to her reputation for honesty 

and truthfulness.” Id. at 11. Appellant asserts that not only did trial 

counsel fail “to call any character witnesses, but he did not even discuss the 

option with his client.” Id. at 13. In Appellant’s view, the Commonwealth’s 

evidence was “far from overwhelming, [and so] the presentation of character 

evidence would” have supported her case. Id. Appellant also contends that 

trial counsel did not have any reasonable basis for failing to present 

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3 The PCRA judge retired and did not prepare a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
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character witnesses on her behalf. Id. at 14. With respect to prejudice, 

Appellant argues as follows:

There is a reasonable probability that had trial counsel presented 

testimony of [A]ppellant’s honesty and truthfulness reputation, 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. In 

this case, the jury was precluded from hearing positive and 

substantial character evidence which may have been sufficient to 

raise a reasonable doubt and produce an acquittal.

Id. at 16-17.

We set forth the applicable standard of review in Commonwealth v. 

Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019):

Initially, we note that our standard of review from the denial of a 

PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the evidence of record and 

whether it is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on 

this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to 

the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.

Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the 

defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the 

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and 

(3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings 

would have been different.

We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the 

factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief. 

Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal 

determination.
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The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for 

his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would 

have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not 

chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of 

success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if 

they effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a 

hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other 

efforts he may have taken.

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to 

prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy 

any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the 

claim of ineffectiveness.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44 (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

“With respect to the PCRA court’s decision to deny a request for an 

evidentiary hearing . . . such a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA 

court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Initially, we note that the “failure to call character witnesses does not 

constitute per se ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 

435, 463 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). An appellant must show that

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify 

for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, 

the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to 

testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of 

the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a 

fair trial.

Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
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Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(a) addresses the use of such 

character evidence:

(a) Character Evidence.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or 

character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or 

trait.

(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The 

following exceptions apply in a criminal case:

(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant’s 

pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor 

may offer evidence to rebut it . . . .

Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1)-(2)(A).4 Relatedly, Rule of Evidence 405(a) addresses 

methods of proving character:

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4

In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 27 A.3d 244 (Pa. Super. 2011), the 

Court explained the reasoning for Rule 404(a):

It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that an individual on 

trial for an offense against the criminal law is permitted to 

introduce evidence of his good reputation in any respect which 

has “proper relation to the subject matter” of the charge at 

issue. Such evidence has been allowed on a theory that general 

reputation reflects the character of the individual and a 

defendant in a criminal case is permitted to prove his good 

character in order to negate his participation in the offense 

charged. The rationale for the admission of character testimony 

is that an accused may not be able to produce any other 

evidence to exculpate himself from the charge he faces except 

his own oath and evidence of good character.

It is clearly established that evidence of good character is to be 

regarded as evidence of substantive fact just as any other 

evidence tending to establish innocence and may be considered 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(a) By Reputation. When evidence of a person’s character or 

character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony 

about the person’s reputation. Testimony about the witness’s 

opinion as to the character or character trait of the person is not 

admissible.

Pa.R.E. 405(a).

Recently, this Court reinforced that character evidence must be 

established with testimony on the community opinion of the defendant: 

[e]vidence of good character offered by a defendant in a criminal 

prosecution must be limited to his general reputation for the 

particular trait or traits of character involved in the commission 

of the crime charged. Such evidence must relate to a period at 

or about the time the offense was committed . . . and must be 

established by testimony of witnesses as to the community 

opinion of the individual in question, not through specific acts or 

mere rumor.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

by the jury in connection with all of the evidence presented in 

the case on the general issue of guilt or innocence. Evidence of 

good character is substantive and positive evidence, not a mere 

make weight to be considered in a doubtful case, and, . . . is an 

independent factor which may of itself engender reasonable 

doubt or produce a conclusion of innocence. Evidence of good 

character offered by a defendant in a criminal prosecution 

must be limited to his general reputation for the particular 

trait or traits of character involved in the commission of 

the crime charged. The cross-examination of such witnesses 

by the Commonwealth must be limited to the same traits. Such 

evidence must relate to a period at or about the time the offense 

was committed, and must be established by testimony of 

witnesses as to the community opinion of the individual in 

question, not through specific acts or mere rumor.

Johnson, 27 A.3d at 248 (citation omitted and emphases in original).
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Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 453-54 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citation omitted and emphasis added); see also Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2).

For example, in Commonwealth v. Medina, 209 A.3d 992 (Pa. 

Super. 2019), the defendant contended the PCRA court erred by denying 

him an evidentiary hearing. Medina, 209 A.3d at 997. The defendant 

further claimed his trial counsel was ineffective by not notifying him of his 

right to call character witnesses who could testify as to his non-violent 

reputation. Id. In support of his contention, the defendant’s PCRA petition 

attached affidavits from four alleged character witnesses, only one of which 

was located in Philadelphia.

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 Id. at 995, 997. 

The Medina Court explained that only the Philadelphia affiant could 

testify as to the defendant’s reputation in the community but that person 

would not have been able to testify because the affidavit failed to list the 

character trait the witness would be testifying about. Id. at 997-98. 

Regardless, the Medina Court reasoned, even if the witnesses at issue could 

have testified about the defendant’s non-violent reputation in the 

community, the defendant failed to establish prejudice given the facts of the 

case. Id. at 999. For those reasons, among others, the Medina Court 

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5 The other three lived in New York City, Maryland, and Florida. Medina, 

209 A.3d at 995. 
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affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of relief on the defendant’s claim that his 

trial counsel was ineffective. Id. at 999-1000.

Instantly, as noted above, Appellant included an affidavit from Dotson, 

who lives in Virginia, and not in Appellant’s Philadelphia community. See 

Suppl. to Am. PCRA Pet. Dotson, unlike the Philadelphia witness in Medina, 

averred she could testify as to Appellant’s reputation for honesty and 

truthfulness. Cf. id. at 997-98. But Dotson, like the three out-of-state 

character witnesses in Medina, lives in Virginia and did not aver to any 

knowledge of Appellant’s reputation in her community. See generally 

Johnson, 27 A.3d at 248. Cf. Medina, 209 A.3d at 999. Identical to the 

Medina Court’s reasoning with respect to out-of-state witnesses, we agree 

with the Commonwealth6that Appellant failed to establish that Dotson could 

present admissible testimony on her community reputation. See Medina, 

209 A.3d at 998. 

Regardless, even assuming Appellant established her claim had 

arguable merit, Appellant’s prejudice argument spans two sentences, and 

such a “boilerplate allegation[] and bald assertion[] of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to prove that 

counsel was ineffective.” See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44; see also 

Treiber, 121 A.3d at 464. Because Appellant is not entitled to relief, she is 

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6 As noted above, the PCRA judge retired and did not prepare an opinion.
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also not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Medina, 209 A.3d at 999-

1000; see also Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 327. For these reasons, we affirm 

the order below. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/08/2020