Filed 10/26/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

TAK CHUN GAMING 

PROMOTION COMPANY 

LIMITED,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

KEVIN C.S. LONG,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B317918

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 21BBCV00094)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, John J. Kralik, Judge. Affirmed.

Greenan, Peffer, Sallander & Lally, John P. Makin, Nelson 

S. Hsieh, and Helen H. Chen for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg 

& Rhow, Thomas R. Freeman, Ekwan E. Rhow, and Kimmy Yu 

for Defendant and Respondent. 
2

* * * * * *

During our state’s infancy, our Legislature declared “[t]he 

common law of England” to be “the [default] rule of decision in all 

the courts of this State.” (Civ. Code, § 22.2; see also former Pol. 

Code, § 4468; Merritt v. Hill (1894) 104 Cal.184, 185.) In so 

doing, our state imported the English common law rule that 

prohibits resort to the courts to enforce gambling debts. (E.g., 

Bryant v. Mead (1851) 1 Cal. 441, 442-443 (Bryant).) In the 

intervening 173 years, our state has legalized many discrete 

types of gambling. Does this shift to a selective and partial 

legalization of gambling warrant the abandonment of the 

common law rule shuttering the California courts to lawsuits 

seeking to enforce gambling debts? We hold that it does not. The 

public policy basis for not legalizing gambling and the public 

policy basis for not providing a judicial forum to enforce gambling 

debts are distinct; erosion of the former does not call the latter 

into question. We consequently agree with the trial court that 

the lawsuit in this case seeking to enforce a gambling debt was 

properly dismissed. Thus, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Kevin C.S. Long (Long) resides in Arcadia, California, and 

holds a Chinese resident identification card. In 2019, Long made 

several trips to Macau, which is an autonomous region on the 

south coast of China.

1 Gambling is legal in Macau.

While in Macau, Long entered into seven loan agreements

with Tak Chun Gaming Promotion Company Limited (Tak 

Chun)—one in January 2019, five in September 2019, and one in 

1 Macau is officially known as the Macao Special 

Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
3

November 2019. Tak Chun is a licensed junket operator that 

owns and operates gaming clubs inside Macanese casinos; among 

other things, Tak Chun loans funds to gamblers. The agreements 

obligated Long to repay the loaned amounts within 30 or 45 days, 

or face an interest rate at “five times the amount stipulated by 

law” in Macau. The agreements did not contain a forum selection 

clause. 

Tak Chun loaned Long “casino tokens” worth a total of $88 

million in Hong Kong currency (that is, over US$11 million); 

Long repaid only HK$13,668,680 (that is, around US$1.7 

million).

II. Procedural Background

On February 1, 2021, Tak Chun sued Long in a California 

state court seeking HK$74,331,320 (that is, US$9,904,787) under 

causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum meruit, 

and (3) common counts.

Long moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 

the lawsuit was barred by California’s public policy against

allowing the California courts to be used as a forum for enforcing

gambling debts, even when the gambling giving rise to those 

debts was lawful where it occurred.

2 Tak Chun opposed, urging

that this public policy was now outdated. After further briefing 

and a hearing, the trial court granted Long’s motion.

The court acknowledged that California’s legalization of 

certain pockets of gambling had “undoubtedly reduced the 

integrity and moral force” of California’s public policy against 

gambling, but ruled that the prohibition on using California’s 

2 Prior to Long’s filing of this motion, the parties litigated 

Tak Chun’s application for a writ of attachment against Long’s

assets, which the trial court denied.
4

courts as a forum to collect gambling debts had been a “clear[] 

and consistent[]” policy for “hundreds of years.” As for Long

specifically, the court noted that he was “headed down the road to 

perdition,” yet Tak Chun continued “giving him more help along 

the way again and again and again.” The court concluded that 

“California[’s] public policy” “strongly disfavor[ing]” the 

“enforcement of gambling debts” barred Tak Chun’s claims. 

Following the entry of judgment for Long, Tak Chun filed 

this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Tak Chun argues that the trial court erred in granting 

judgment on the pleadings. 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate 

when the operative complaint “does not state facts sufficient to 

constitute a cause of action . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds. 

(c)(1)(B)(ii) & (c)(3)(B)(ii).) A motion brought on this basis is 

equivalent to a demurrer (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor 

Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777), such that our 

task is to examine the complaint’s allegations and any judicially 

noticed documents in order to assess whether the pled causes of 

action are legally viable (ibid.; Barajas v. Sativa L.A. County

Water Dist. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1224 (Barajas)). A cause 

of action is not viable if, as pertinent here, it offends public policy. 

(Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U.S. 498, 506 [“It is ‘rudimentary’ 

that a state ‘will not lend the aid of its courts to enforce a 

contract founded upon a foreign law where to do so would be 

repugnant to good morals . . . or . . . violate the public policy of 

the State where the enforcement of the foreign contract is 

sought’”].) As to contract claims specifically, although public 

policy encourages the making of contracts, the courts will decline 
5

to enforce a contract if it violates “‘“‘sound public policy.’”’” 

(Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 171, 184.) 

We independently evaluate whether the trial court properly 

granted judgment on the pleadings.3 (Barajas, supra, 91 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1224.) We also independently review any 

subsidiary questions of law, including whether enforcement of a 

contract in the California courts is contrary to public policy. 

(Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 201 

Cal.App.3d 832, 838.)

I. California’s Public Policy Against the Enforcement 

of Gambling Debts

Although Tak Chun’s complaint alleges three causes of 

action, all seek to enforce the gambling debts Long incurred in 

Macau. Thus, the legal viability of Tak Chun’s claims turns on 

whether California provides a judicial forum for their 

adjudication. 

It does not.

In 1850, our Legislature enacted a statute declaring that 

“[t]he common law of England . . . is the rule of decision in all the

3 Our review of a judgment on the pleadings ordinarily 

includes a second step—that is, whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying leave to amend. (Starlight Cinemas, Inc. v. 

Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 24, 31-32.) We 

need not reach that issue because Tak Chun conceded in the trial 

court that any amendment “would not be useful” to this “issue of 

law” and because Tak Chun has not asked this court to grant 

leave to amend. (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 

62 Cal.4th 919, 924 [leave to amend properly denied where cause 

of action is legally invalid and cannot be cured by additional 

allegations]; Starlight Cinemas, at p. 32 [appellant has burden of 

proving an amendment would cure legal defect].)
6

courts of this State” unless “repugnant to or inconsistent with” 

federal or state constitutional law or state statutes. (Civ. Code, § 

22.2; former Pol. Code, § 4468; Tufeld Corp. v. Beverly Hills 

Gateway, L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 12, 21 [“Since the beginning 

of California’s statehood, the common law of England has been 

the law of the state except where it conflicts with the United 

States Constitution or other California law”].) Through this 

statute, California imported not only the “whole” “‘body of judgemade,’” decisional law of the English courts, but also “the written 

statutes enacted by Parliament.” (Martin v. Superior Court

(1917) 176 Cal. 289, 292-293 (Martin); People v. Williams (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 776, 782; Moore v. Purse Seine Net (1941) 18 Cal.2d 

835, 838-839; Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home (1914) 

167 Cal. 570, 573-574; but see In re Estate of Fair (1901) 132 Cal. 

523, 534 [excluding “‘English statutes’” from definition of 

“‘common law’”], overruled by Martin, at pp. 292-293.) Among 

the enactments of Parliament adopted as California common law 

was the Statute of Anne, which declared all gambling debts 

“utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect, to all intents and 

purposes whatsoever.” (9 Anne, ch. 14, § 1.) 

On this basis, our Supreme Court has issued a long line of 

unbroken decisions “traced back virtually to the inception of 

statehood,” declaring the California courts off limits when it 

comes to enforcing gambling debts. (Kelly v. First Astri Corp. 

(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 462, 477 (Kelly); Bryant, supra, 1 Cal. at 

pp. 442-443; Carrier v. Brannan (1853) 3 Cal. 328, 329 (Carrier).) 

With one exception, the intermediate appellate courts have all 

uniformly toed that line. (Lane & Pyron, Inc. v. Gibbs (1968) 266 

Cal.App.2d 61, 64-65; Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri

(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1821, 1824 (Metropolitan); Kelly, at p. 477; 
7

Kyablue v. Watkins (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1294 (Kyablue); 

but see Crockford’s Club Ltd. v. Si-Ahmed (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 

1402, 1406 (Crockford’s Club).)

Adhering to this line of precedent, the trial court properly 

dismissed Tak Chun’s complaint because it seeks to use the 

California courts to enforce Long’s gambling debts.

II. Tak Chun’s Arguments

Tak Chun offers what boil down to three reasons why we 

should take the common law of our state in a new direction and 

depart from this precedent.

A. The “loosening morality” argument

First and chiefly, Tak Chun makes a “times have changed” 

argument. It observes that, over the last several decades, 

California has legalized gambling in four discrete areas—namely, 

(1) pari-mutuel horse racing (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19400 et seq.); 

(2) the California State Lottery (Cal. Const., art IV, § 19, subd. 

(d); Gov. Code, § 8880 et seq.); (3) draw poker clubs and similar 

card games (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19800 et seq.); and, although it 

springs from a federal mandate, (4) gambling on tribal land

pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 

(25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721). From this receptivity to legalize 

gambling in certain circumstances, Tak Chun extrapolates that it 

“defies facts and logic” to believe that there remains any “moral” 

justification for shuttering the California courts to claims seeking 

to collect gambling debts.

To be sure, California’s public policy against gambling has 

“wan[ed]” and “eroded” somewhat as our state’s initial and more 

sweeping prohibition against gambling—as embodied in prior 

iterations of the California Constitution and Penal Code section 

330—has given way to the legalization of discrete types of 
8

gambling. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19 [authorizing certain types of 

gambling but prohibiting Legislature from “authoriz[ing] . . . 

casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New 

Jersey”]; Pen. Code, § 330 [enumerating gambling in many 

instances as a misdemeanor]; see Kyablue, supra, 210 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 [noting “waning public policy against 

gambling in general”]; Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1828 [noting how “California’s historical public policy against 

gambling has been substantially eroded”]; Crockford’s Club,

supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1406 [noting “expanded acceptance of 

gambling in this state”]; Nevcal Enterprises, Inc. v. Cal-Neva 

Lodge, Inc. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 177, 180 (Nevcal) [noting how 

“modern day[] Californians” are no longer “too pious” about 

“gambling”].) What was once a mostly impermeable wall against

gambling is undoubtedly more porous.

But there are three reasons why this shift in public 

attitude toward some types of gambling does not erode the public 

policy against opening the California courts to the litigation of 

gambling debts.

First, the public policy that justifies keeping litigation over 

gambling debts out of the California courts is independent of—

and hence not inextricably dependent upon—the public policy 

prohibiting gambling. (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1828 [noting the “critical distinction” between those two 

policies].) 

Originally, the public policy against litigating gambling 

debts in the California courts was grounded in two rationales—

namely, (1) that gambling itself was immoral and unlawful, such 

that the courts should not open their doors to vindicate rights 

grounded in immoral or unlawful contracts (Bryant, supra, 1 Cal. 
9

at pp. 442-443; Carrier, supra, 3 Cal. at p. 329; Union Collection 

Co. v. Buckman (1907) 150 Cal. 159, 162, 164; Wong v. Tenneco, 

Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 126, 135 (Wong); Lee On v. Long (1951) 37 

Cal.2d 499, 502; Braverman v. Horn (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 379, 

381; Lavick v. Nitzberg (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 381, 383; Fong v. 

Miller (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 411, 413 (Fong); Tokar v. Redman 

(1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 350, 353; Homami v. Iranzadi (1989) 211 

Cal.App.3d 1104, 1109-1110; Kyablue, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1292; see generally, Civ. Code, §§ 1667 [contract is “not lawful” 

if it is “contrary to good morals”], 1607 [“consideration of a 

contract must be lawful”]); and (2) that closing the courts to 

litigation over gambling debts “discourage[s]” the creation of such

debts, which is good for public policy because gambling—whether 

unlawful or lawful—leads to the “ruin of [the gamblers’] 

families,” and courts should not “‘become a handmaid of [such] 

iniquity,’” for doing so would be “humiliating to the Courts”

(Takeuchi v. Schmuck (1929) 206 Cal. 782, 786-787; Bryant, at p. 

442; Wallace v. Opinham (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 25, 28; Carrier, at 

p. 329; Homami, at pp. 1111-1113; Metropolitan, supra, 15 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1829). 

Critically, however, either of these two rationales is 

sufficient on its own to support the public policy of denying a 

judicial forum in California for adjudicating gambling debts. 

This is why, from the very beginning, “California’s public policy 

against judicial resolution of civil claims arising out of gambling 

contracts or transactions” has “applie[d] to all forms of gambling, 

whether legal or illegal.” (Kelly, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 490, 

480, italics added; Bryant, supra, 1 Cal. at p. 444 [noting that 

legality of gambling by holding a license would not “confer[] a 

right to sue for a gaming debt”]; Hamilton v. Abadjian (1947) 30 
10

Cal.2d 49, 51-52 (Hamilton) [refusing to adjudicate gambling debt 

incurred in Nevada, where gambling is legal].) And it is why the 

“substantial[] ero[sion]” of the “public policy against” gambling 

has not eroded “California’s deep-rooted policy against [the] 

enforcement of gambling debts.” (Metropolitan, supra, 15 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1828.) Other jurisdictions have reached similar 

conclusions. (Accord, King International Corp. v. Voloshin

(Conn.Super.Ct. 1976) 366 A.2d 1172, 1174-1175; Carnival 

Leisure Indus. v. Aubin (5th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 624, 626; Cie v. 

Comdata Network (Ill.App.Ct. 1995) 656 N.E.2d 123, 128.)

The only California case to disagree with this otherwise 

unbroken line of precedent is Crockford’s Club, supra, 203

Cal.App.3d 1402. Crockford’s Club held that the “expanded 

acceptance of gambling” in California justified opening the 

California courts for adjudicating a claim to enforce an English 

default judgment based on a casino gambling debt incurred in 

England, where the gambling was legal. (Id. at p. 1406.) 

Crockford’s Club is an outlier in that it is the only decision to 

conflate the public policy against gambling with the public policy 

against using the California courts as a forum for enforcing 

gambling debts; tellingly, its three-paragraph analysis of this 

issue did not cite—let alone distinguish—Hamilton or any of its 

progeny (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1828 [so 

observing]), choosing instead to cite a single out-of-state case 

applying that state’s different public policy. Not surprisingly, 

every court to subsequently consider the issue has rejected 

Crockford’s Club. (Ibid.; Kelly, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 485-

488.) We join that chorus.

Second, the premise of Tak Chun’s argument—that 

California has legalized gambling—is overstated. California did 
11

not flip a switch from “all gambling is illegal” to “all gambling is 

legal.” Instead, California has maintained its longstanding 

presumptive constitutional and statutory rules against gambling, 

but has expanded the types of gambling for which that 

presumption has been rebutted. But California has not fully 

embraced the legalization of all gambling. Just last year, for 

instance, the California voters rejected two ballot propositions 

that would have legalized in-person gambling on tribal lands and 

online sports betting. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Election 

(Nov. 8, 2022), text of Prop. 26, archived at 

<https://perma.cc/RB66-XEQY> [as of Oct. 23, 2023]; Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Election (Nov. 8, 2022), text of Prop. 27, 

archived at <https://perma.cc/69PA-3ZDG> [as of Oct. 23, 2023].) 

Contrary to what Tak Chun implies, California has not become

Sodom and Gomorrah.4

Third, our Legislature has at no point expressed an intent 

to deviate from the common law rule barring resort to the 

California courts to enforce gambling debts. To be sure, our 

Legislature has the power to alter the common law. (People v. 

Hickman (1928) 204 Cal. 470, 479; Lowman v. Stafford (1964) 

226 Cal.App.2d 31, 39.) But it must exercise that power—either 

by an express repeal of the common law or by a “plain[] 

declaration of legislative intent” that necessarily (but implicitly) 

repeals the common law. (Saala v. McFarland (1965) 63 Cal.2d 

4 Tak Chun’s comparison to our Supreme Court’s decision in 

In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 is ill conceived, for 

this decision was an acknowledgment that persons of different 

sexual orientations are entitled to the equal protection of the law 

authorizing marriage rather than, as Tak Chun distastefully 

implies, an illustration of a “substantial shift of public acceptance 

or morality” in California.
12

124, 130 [“‘“Statutes are not presumed to alter the common law 

otherwise than the act expressly provides”’”]; Martin, supra, 176 

Cal. at pp. 296-297; Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 

Cal.App.5th 245, 258.) Absent such an exercise,

5 we must 

presume our Legislature and the voters were aware of the 

preexisting common law rule against use of the courts to 

adjudicate gambling debts at the time they added new islands of 

legalized gambling amid an ocean of its presumptive illegality, 

and by not countermanding that rule—either expressly or 

implicitly—they thereby opted to leave the common law rule in 

place. (Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 503; People v. Giordano (2007) 42 

Cal.4th 644, 659.) Tak Chun’s subsidiary argument that we must 

infer an intent to alter the common law rule from legislative or 

voter silence accordingly has it backwards. Indeed, Nevada’s 

common law rule against resort to its courts to enforce gambling 

debts persisted despite that state’s legalization of gambling until 

the Nevada Legislature enacted a statute that expressly 

overturned its common law rule. (Compare West Indies, Inc. v. 

First Nat. Bank of Nevada (Nev. 1950) 214 P.2d 144 [adopting 

Statute of Anne into Nevada’s common law] with Nev. Rev. Stat. 

5 At oral argument, Tak Chun pointed us to a regulation 

authorizing “cardroom business[es]” to “extend credit” to their 

patrons. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 4, § 12388, subd. (a).) But this 

regulation does not purport to authorize enforcement in court of 

any resulting debts. Indeed, the regulation’s very existence—and 

its self-imposed limitation that it does not apply if extending 

credit is otherwise “prohibited by any statute, law, regulation, or 

local ordinance” (ibid.)—reaffirms that our Legislature has not

overturned the longstanding common law rule against the 

enforcement of gambling debts in California courts.
13

Ann. § 463.368 (1983) [statute altering common law rule and 

allowing for the enforcement of gambling debts in Nevada 

courts].) California has yet to do that. (Kelly, supra, 72 

Cal.App.4th at p. 489 [“The Legislature has not enacted a statute 

permitting the use of the process of the courts in California to 

resolve” gambling-related claims].)

B. The “weighing” argument

Second, Tak Chun argues that the common law rule 

declaring the California courts off limits to disputes over 

gambling debts does not erect an absolute barrier; rather, it 

obligates courts to make a case-by-case determination of whether 

to grant access to the courts after weighing a variety of factors, 

including (1) the “relative moral fault of the plaintiff and the 

defendant,” (2) “whether refusing a remedy can protect the 

public,” (3) “the degree of moral turpitude involved,” and (4) 

“whether application of the [common law] rule will result in the 

unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the 

plaintiff.” (Kyablue, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293.) For 

support, Tak Chun cites Kyablue as well as Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi 

Corp. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 199, 218-219, Kelton v. Stravinski (2006) 

138 Cal.App.4th 941, 949, and Southfield v. Barrett (1970) 13 

Cal.App.3d 290, 294. (See also Fong, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d at p. 

413.)

This argument mixes apples and oranges. The cases Tak 

Chun cites all address whether a court, after invalidating a 

contract on public policy grounds, should nonetheless grant some 

type of equitable relief despite the absence of a contract. This is 

irrelevant to this case, as the invocation of California’s public 

policy against enforcing gambling debts does not invalidate any of 

the loan agreements between Tak Chun and Long; instead, we 
14

hold that those contracts may not be enforced in this forum. Tak 

Chun remains free to attempt to enforce them in a different 

forum, and Tak Chun’s decision not to have insisted that Long 

agree in those contracts to litigate disputes arising therefrom in a 

particular forum lies with Tak Chun and Tak Chun alone. There 

is no support in the case law to let California courts decide—on a 

case-by-case basis—whether to lift the denial of access after 

weighing various factors. Indeed, such a case-by-case weighing 

process would significantly undercut the efficacy of the acrossthe-board ban California has adopted by leaving it to individual 

judges to decide whether to apply the ban; the exception would 

swallow the rule, and quite likely force our courts into the role of 

“handmaid[s] to iniquity.”

C. The “change the common law” argument

Third and lastly, Tak Chun urges us to exercise our 

authority as a common law court, and reject the common law rule 

in favor of the outlier decision in Crockford’s Club, supra, 203 

Cal.App.3d 1402.

To be sure, the common law of California is meant to be 

“‘flexib[le].’” (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 

382, 393-394.) Thus, we as a court have the ability to “modify[] . . 

. the common law” (Schmier v. Supreme Court (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 703, 709), and even have a duty to modify the 

common law “‘[w]henever an old rule is found unsuited to present 

conditions or unsound’” (Rodriguez, at p. 394). We accordingly 

reject Long’s contention that our Legislature’s use of a statute in 

1850 to cut and paste English common law into California 

somehow transmogrified and elevated that decisional law into 

something statutory in nature, and hence beyond the power of 

the courts to modify. (Cf. People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 
15

935, 950 [courts lack the authority to modify statutes when they 

disagree with “the wisdom of the Legislature’s chosen” rule].)

However, for the reasons articulated above, we conclude 

that the common law rule barring resort to the California courts 

to collect gambling debts rests on a rationale with continued 

vitality—namely, a policy of discouraging the creation of those 

debts and the financially ruinous consequences that often flow 

from them, regardless of whether those debts were lawfully 

incurred. 

Tak Chun resists this conclusion with what boil down to 

four arguments.

First, Tak Chun asserts that a common law doctrine may 

be upheld only if the rationale originally articulated to support it 

remains viable, such that the concern articulated by recent 

decisions that gambling is an addiction (and even a mental 

illness) cannot support adherence to the common law rule barring 

use of the California courts to enforce gambling debts. (See 

Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1830 [citing the 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders].) This 

assertion ignores that the common law rule barring use of the 

California courts to collect gambling debts has—since its 

inception—relied on two rationales, one tied to the underlying 

illegality of most gambling at that time and the other aimed at

discouraging judicial enforcement of gambling debts and their 

ruinous consequences even when those debts were incurred 

lawfully. Modern innovations in the diagnosis of mental health 

conditions may better explain the second rationale by expanding 

on why certain gamblers incur debts that lead to ruinous 

consequences—but they do not somehow erase that these 
16

consequences have been a justification for California’s public 

policy from the very beginning.

Second, Tak Chun contends that the common law rule 

reaches beyond its current rationale. Specifically, it argues that 

(1) the sole rationale for barring the enforcement of gambling 

debts in the California courts is to protect gambling addicts, (2) 

gambling addicts comprise only a subset of all gamblers, and (3) 

the bar against enforcing all gambling debts is overbroad because 

it bars litigation to enforce the debts of gamblers who are not 

addicts. Although the second step of Tak Chun’s argument may 

be correct (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1830), the 

first and third steps are most certainly not. The first step is 

wrong because, as explained above, the common law rule barring 

litigation of gambling debts in the California courts is not based 

solely on a need to protect gambling addicts against ruin; 

instead, it is meant to protect all gamblers against such ruin. 

And the third step is wrong because—even if the sole justification

for the common law rule was to protect addicts—the right to 

enforce a gambling debt is not a “fundamental right” triggering 

strict scrutiny (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288), 

such that the “fit” between the “ends” (of protecting gambling 

addicts) and the “means” (by not allowing for enforcement of any 

gambling debt in California courts) need not be “[]perfect” (Heller 

v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321); it need only be rational, and 

here it is because closing off California courts as a forum is one 

step toward protecting those addicts (Kaanaana v. Barrett 

Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 180 [“[t]he 

Legislature is permitted to attack problems one step at a time”]), 

even if it additionally protects non-addicts. 
17

Third, Tak Chun urges that the common law rule is riddled 

with so many “exceptions” that it should be abandoned, and 

points to three such “exceptions.” Yet the “exceptions” Tak Chun 

identifies do not undermine the rule so much as they reasonably 

define its contours. To begin, California courts may enforce outof-state judgments regarding gambling debts, but this does no 

more than reflect the deference accorded to a sister state’s

judgments under principles of full faith and credit. (Kelly, supra, 

72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 476-477; Metropolitan, supra, 15 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1824.) Where, as in this case, a gambling debt 

has yet to be reduced to a judgment and is merely a cause of 

action, full faith and credit considerations do not trump, and the 

common law embodying California’s public policy against using 

the California courts to facilitate collection of those debts applies. 

(Kelly, at pp. 476-477; Metropolitan, at p. 1824.)6 Next, 

California courts may ostensibly entertain a lawsuit by a credit 

card company to enforce its unpaid debts, even if its customer has 

used the card to purchase one or more lottery tickets, but in such 

a situation, the credit card company would have no 

foreknowledge that the card would be used to purchase lottery 

6 Similar concerns provide one potential way to harmonize

Crockford’s Club, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1402, with the bulk of 

other precedent. The plaintiff in that case sought to enforce a 

foreign country’s judgment. Because full faith and credit only 

applies to the judgments of other states and not other countries, 

full faith and credit considerations did not trump. (Wong, supra,

39 Cal.3d at p. 135; Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1828.) That being said, the fact that the plaintiff was seeking to 

enforce a judgment makes that case different from the typical 

case where, as here, the plaintiff is seeking to litigate their claim 

in the first instance. 
18

tickets. (See Rose v. Nelson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 751, 751-752 

[recognizing “exception[]” to the “general rule” barring access to 

the courts “when there is no evidence that the lender knew that 

the loan was intended to be used for gambling purposes”].) 

Where, as in this case, the lender knows that the money will be 

used for gambling (as Tak Chun knew because it tendered Long 

casino tokens), the common law rule applies. Lastly, California 

courts will entertain a lawsuit seeking an accounting following a 

transaction to sell a casino (Nevcal, supra, 194 Cal.App.2d at pp.

180-182), but such a lawsuit does not directly involve any 

gamblers and hence does not hasten any gambler’s financial ruin; 

while such a lawsuit involves the gambling industry in general, it 

does not implicate the rationale underlying the common law rule. 

Fourth and finally, Tak Chun argues that tradition alone is 

not sufficient to sustain this public policy-based common law 

prohibition against the enforcement of gambling debts in the 

California courts. As we have explained, this prohibition has a 

still-viable and still-vital rationale that goes far beyond 

upholding “tradition for tradition’s sake.” 
19

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Long is entitled to his costs on 

appeal. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.

CHAVEZ

_________________________, J.*

KWAN

* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.