UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. BIRDIE JO HOAKS, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-6250 (D.C. No. 5:17- CR-00105-R-1) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , HARTZ , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Defendant Birdie Jo Hoaks appeals her 60-month sentence for con spiracy imposed by the United States Dis trict Court for the Western Dis trict of Oklahoma. Her sole issue on appeal is whet her the district court’s upward variance from the unchallenged sentencing guidelin e range of 24 to 30 months was procedurally and

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel h as determined unanimously that oral argument would not mat erially assist in the determina tion of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is th erefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive valu e consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 6, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 substantively unreasonable. Exe rcising jurisdict ion under 28 U .S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Following a spree of defrauding the Postal Service of almost $6 2,000 by purchasing stamps with bad checks , Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring with her twin sister. See 18 U.S.C. § 371. The presente nce investigation report (PSR) suggested a guideline range of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. But it noted the “seriousness and continuity” of Defendant’s criminal history—in cluding 18 convictions, 13 of whic h did not count toward her PSR criminal- history points for various reasons including their a ge— as a factor the sentencing court might consider as a basis for either an upward departure or variance from the guideline range. R., Vol. 2 at 36. In deciding upon the sentence th e district court considered the PSR, Defendant’s sentencing memorandum, and Defendant’s statement at her sentencing hearing in which she described th e abuse she suffered as a chil d, her close relationship with a son, and her admission of responsibility. At the hearin g the court acknowledged that Defendant “h ad a . . . very unfortunate child hood and society has got to do better.” R., Vol. 3 at 14. And it asked questions a bout her relationship with her son. But the co urt concluded: [I]n considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S. Co de 3553, I think my primary goal right now, and re sponsibility, is to protect so ciety. Unfortunately, at least by my count, in the presentence report you have 18 prior convictions, an addi tional 14 arrests. Tha t’s – that’s the tim es that you have gotten caught. With all this in mind, it’s my judgment that yo u need to be put3 away for as long as I can put you away so you won’t be doing th is to other people. R., Vol. 3 at 14. After imposing the sentence, the court completed a Statement of Reasons form in which it checked boxes indic ating it had exceeded the guidel ine range because of the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “to af ford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to pr otect the public from further c rimes of the defendant.” R., Vol. 2 at 41-42. Defendant’s only procedural chall enge to her sentence is that t he district court did not adequately explain its upward variance of her sentence at the sentencing hearing or in its Statement of Reasons. Ordinarily, we review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion stand ard. See United States v. Sanchez-Leon , 764 F.3d 1248, 1262 (10th Cir . 2014). But because Defendant did not object to the procedure belo w, we review only for plain err or. See United States v. Mendoza , 543 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008). 1 Under that standard we reverse only if the district court committed “(1) error, (2) that is pl ain, (3) which affects . . .

1 Defendant argues that she did not have the oppo rtunity to obj ect to the Statement of Reasons because it was issued a fter the conclusion of her sente ncing proceeding. But the proper way to object to a defec tive Statement of Reasons is to file a motion to correct the document. See Mendoza , 543 F.3d at 1195-96.4 substantial rights and (4) which seriously affects the fairness , integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id

. We see no error, much less error that is plain, in the district court’s explanation of its sentence at the sentencing hearing . The issue is why th e court imposed a sentence twice as severe as the u pper end of the guideline sent encing range. The explanation was clear and reason able: Defendant had not shown the ability to conform her behavior to the law , as established by a horrendous record of arrests and convictions. The court noted tha t it had considered all the st atutory factors. But none could outweigh the threat to society. As for Defendant’s challenge to the Statement of Reasons, she f ails on the third prong of plain-error review beca use she cannot show prejudice f rom any shortcoming in this postsentencing document. See United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro , 884 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e believe that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it filed a written statement of reasons form. ” (internal quotation marks omitted ))

. Defendant’s substantive-reasonableness challenge is that the se ntence is greater than necessary to comply with the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a). We review for abuse of discretion. See id. at 1265 (“A district cour t abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whims ical, or manifestly unreasonable.”).5 The district court did not abus e its discretion. A five-year s entence for Defendant’s offense, in light of her criminal history, was hard ly whimsical. At some point even sympathy for a defend ant’s traumatic childhood canno t override the need to protect society. And Defenda nt’s love for her son, which ap parently had not induced her, in the court’s words , to “get a job and take care of [him],” was not a compelling basis for le niency. R., Vol. 3 at 13.
I. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment below.
Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge