J-S46044-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.W., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3375 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree October 13, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000610-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 25, 2016

B.W. (Father) appeals from the decree entered October 13, 2015, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which terminated 

involuntarily his parental rights to minor daughter, A.M.P., born in February 

of 2014 (Child), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b).1 We 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

matter as follows.

On March 17, 201[4], [the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS)] received a General Protective Services (GPS) 

[report] alleging that [M.F.], [M]other’s paramour, handled 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court entered a decree terminating voluntarily the parental rights 

of Child’s mother, T.A.P. (Mother), that same day. The disposition of 

Mother’s appeal is by separate memorandum. 
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[Child] inappropriately – dropping her roughly on the bed. 

Furthermore, the report alleged that [M]other has a history of 

drug use. DHS recommended that [M]other remove her 

paramour from the residence. [M]other failed to comply with the 

recommendation that she remove [C]hild from the environment. 

Moreover, the report alleged that [M]other is fearful in her home 

and is afraid to leave the home. The report was substantiated.

On March 18, 2014, DHS received a supplemental report alleging 

that [M]other transported [C]hild to St. Christopher’s Hospital for 

Children because [C]hild was continuously crying. The report 

alleged that [M]other stated that [C]hild would not drink her 

milk. The only food that the mother gave to [C]hild for the day 

was two bottles of water. Furthermore, [C]hild had severe 

diaper rash and was dehydrated. Moreover, [M]other stated that 

she leaves [C]hild in the care of her paramour who she stated 

previously slammed [C]hild on the bed. Lastly, [M]other stated 

that [C]hild did not have a primary care physician and lacked 

immunizations.

On March 21, 2014, DHS visited [C]hild at St. Christopher[’s] 

Hospital for Children. [M]other stated that she observed her 

paramour drop [C]hild on the bed. [M]other further stated that 

she was fearful to return home. Moreover, [M]other stated that 

she was unable to provide adequate care for [C]hild. 

On March 21, 2014, DHS obtained an [O]rder of Protective 

Custody (OPC) for [C]hild and placed her in a foster care home 

through Delta Community Services, where she currently 

remains. 

A shelter care hearing was held on March 24, 2014. Master 

Summers lifted the OPC and ordered the temporary commitment 

of [Child] to the care and custody of DHS.

On April 1, 2014, an adjudicatory hearing was held before the 

Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine adjudicated [C]hild 

dependent and committed her to the care and custody of DHS. 

On November 25, 2014, at a permanency hearing before Master 

Lynne Summers, [Father] presented himself as the putative 

father. The court ordered a paternity test.
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In January, 2015, the paternity test results confirmed [Father] 

as the biological father with the probability of paternity of 

99.9999%.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/2016, at 1-2 (unnumbered pages).

On September 21, 2015, DHS filed a petition to terminate involuntarily 

Father’s parental rights to Child. A hearing was held on October 13, 2015. 

Following the hearing, the trial court entered its decree terminating Father’s 

parental rights. Father timely filed a notice of appeal.2

Father presents the following questions to this Court, which we have 

renumbered for ease of disposition.

1. Did the trial court violate Father’s due process right and 

equal protection of law when it failed to appoint counsel for 

Father at the inception of the case? 

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and or commit an 

err[or of] law when it terminated Father’s parental rights without 

due process of law by not giving Father sufficient time to meet 

his objectives when additional objectives were added during the 

goal change hearing and Father was not told about th[e] new 

objectives?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it terminated 

[Father’s] parental rights and [F]ather had m[et] his initial 

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2 On January 15, 2016, Father’s trial counsel filed in this Court a motion to 

withdraw. In his motion, trial counsel indicated that Father was claiming 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and that continuing to represent Father 

would be a conflict of interest. On February 1, 2016, this Court entered an 

order granting trial counsel’s motion to withdraw. In addition, this Court’s 

order directed the trial court to ascertain whether Father was entitled to 

court-appointed counsel and, if so, to appoint counsel for Father. On 

February 16, 2016, this Court received an order from the trial court 

indicating that new counsel had been appointed to represent Father on 

appeal. Father’s appellate counsel has filed a brief on his behalf. 
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objectives but new objectives were added yet Father was not 

given a reasonable amount of time to complete those additional 

objectives but was willing to do so to be reunified with his 

child[?]

Father’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).

We consider Father’s questions mindful of the following.

In cases involving the termination of a parent’s rights, our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether the order of 

the trial court is supported by competent evidence, and whether 

the trial court gave adequate consideration to the effect of such 

a decree on the welfare of the child.

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the 

decree must stand.... We must employ a broad, comprehensive 

review of the record in order to determine whether the trial 

court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re C.W.U., Jr., 33 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted).

Our courts apply a two-part analysis in considering termination of 

parental rights. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. 

In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 850 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re L.M., 923 

A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007)).
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In this appeal, Father does not assert that DHS failed to offer sufficient 

evidence at the termination hearing to establish that his conduct warranted 

termination under subsections 2511(a)(1) and (2), or to prove that 

termination of Father’s rights best served the needs and welfare of Child 

under subsection 2511(b).3 Instead, Father claims that an attorney should 

have been appointed for him earlier in the process (before Father was 

identified as Child’s father) and that he was not given enough time to meet 

his FSP objectives. None of Father’s claims entitles him to relief from this 

Court.

Father first asserts that the trial court violated his rights by failing to 

provide him with court-appointed counsel at the inception of the case. 

Father’s Brief at 11. He states that DHS made no efforts to determine the 

identity of Child’s father before Father presented himself as the putative 

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3 Our review of the record confirms that any such challenge would not merit 

him relief, as the trial court committed no error of law or abuse of discretion 

and its relevant factual findings are supported by the record. See N.T., 

10/13/2015, at 19 (Father repeatedly refused domestic violence 

counseling); id. at 20 (Father declined employment assistance); id. at 59 

(Father lives in housing that does not allow children); id. at 72 (Father 

waited six months to even start the referred housing program). Further, 

while Father regularly attended his weekly supervised visitation with Child, 

he failed to progress past those limited interactions or to demonstrate 

proper parenting during the visitations. Id. at 44 (detailing how Father 

never changed Child’s diaper and had to be redirected to interact with Child 

rather than speak to the DHS worker about the case). Finally, the record 

shows that Child would not be harmed by having her ties with Father 

severed permanently, but is bonded with her foster parents, whom she calls 

“mom” and “dad.” Id. at 47, 50.
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father in November 2014. Id. at 12. In the meantime, Father complains, 

the trial court had held hearings at which Father was neither present nor 

represented. Id. at 13.

We are utterly unpersuaded that Father was denied his right to counsel 

or to be heard. Our review of the record reveals that counsel was appointed 

for Father on November 25, 2014, at or near the time that the trial court 

first became aware that Father may be Child’s father. See Exhibit DHS 1. 

In addition, the record shows that Father was provided with notice of all 

proceedings after November 25, 2014. Id. After Father’s paternity of Child

was confirmed, DHS immediately established family service plan (FSP) goals 

for Father and communicated those goals to Father. N.T., 10/13/2015, at 

13, 17. From February 2015 to the time DHS filed its petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights at the end of September 2015, DHS provided 

services to Father to help him obtain those goals. Id. at 18-22. 

Father points to no authority to support his argument that the trial 

court should have provided him with counsel before it was even suggested 

that he was Child’s father, or that it should have declined to hold any 

hearings concerning Child’s immediate need for protection from Mother until 

such time as Child’s father could be identified and located. Father has not 

established that he was due any more process than he received. Father’s 

first issue warrants no relief. See, e.g., In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 976 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (holding parent received due process rights where he was 
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represented by counsel and had the opportunity to attend hearings, crossexamine agency’s witnesses, and present evidence).

With his remaining issues, Father complains that he should have been 

given more time to meet his FSP goals. We disagree.

“A child’s life, happiness and vitality simply cannot be put on hold until 

the parent finds it convenient to perform parental duties.” In re Adoption 

of A.M.B., 812 A.2d 659, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002). Father’s FSP goals were 

established and communicated to him eight months before DHS filed the 

petition to terminate Father’s rights. N.T., 10/13/2015, at 13, 17. Father 

met some of those goals, such as completing a parenting class and attending 

the weekly visits with Child. However, as discussed above, Father did not 

even attempt to meet other goals. For example, he steadfastly refused

domestic abuse counseling until the termination hearing, at which time he 

testified that he would take such a class “if you were going to provide me 

with my daughter” as a result. Id. at 67. Father claims to want 

reunification with Child, yet he resided in no-children-allowed housing, 

waited at least six months after receiving his housing FSP goal4 before he 

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Father complains at one point in his brief that housing, employment, and 

parenting and domestic violence classes were new goals added to his FSP in 

May 2015. Father’s Brief at 16. However, at another time he acknowledges 

that he knew housing was a goal as of November 2014. Id. According to 

DHS, all of those goals were set as part of his initial FSP in February 2015. 

N.T., 10/13/2016, at 13-14, 41.
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even began looking into obtaining housing appropriate for Child, and still had 

no guarantee of suitable housing at the time of the termination hearing. Id.

at 60, 72. 

Father asserts that he was working to meet his income/employment 

goal at the time of the termination, and that, if given more time, he could 

have obtained suitable housing. Father’s Brief at 16. However, Father 

offered no explanation for his delay in initiating his work on those goals. 

Further, DHS witnesses testified5that Father showed a lack of 

comprehension and understanding regarding the instruction he was given, 

N.T., 10/13/2016, at 45, and that he has made no progress in learning to 

care for Child, id. at 55. Father was defiant with DHS service providers, and 

hung up the phone when they questioned him on his progress. Id. at 39-

40. 

Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe that Father 

would have made progress at a reasonable pace even if he had been given 

more time. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in 

declining to make Child wait in limbo to see if Father would follow through 

with his goals rather than be free to be adopted by the foster family with 

whom she is happy, healthy, and secure.

Decree affirmed.

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5 The trial court found the DHS witnesses credible. N.T., 10/13/2015, at 84. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2016