### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J anu ary 14, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1551 7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ D. C. Docket N o. 02-00012 CV- 3- L AC/MC R SEAY OUTDO OR ADVERTISING, INC., Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant,
ve rs us CITY OF MARY ESTHER, FLORIDA, JO H N L U L U E , a s a n in div idu al a nd i n hi s cap aci ty as Ci ty Mana ge r, et al., D ef en da nts -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f or the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ (J an ua ry 14, 200 5) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, P RY O R and F A Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. FA Y, Circuit Judge:2

In this sig n ordinance case, P l aintiff-Appellant Seay Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (“ Seay ”) f iled a com

plaint challenging as u nconsti tutio nal the repeale d version of an
re vis ed loc al or din an ce gov er

nin g th e er ec tio n a nd m ai nte na nc e of sig ns i n th e Ci ty of Mary E sth er , Fl or ida (“ Mary E sth er ”)
. Se ay ’ s Co m pla int sou ght to pe rm an en tly
en j oine nf or ce m en t of

the r ep ea le d or din an ce , to c om pe l M ar y E sth er to gr an t pe rm its which would allow S eay

to erec t seven billb oards within the city lim its, and requested dam ages, c osts, and attorney s’ fee s. D espite the fact that Mary Esther had repealed t h e c o m p l ai n ed o f o rd i n an ce t wo m o n t h s p ri o r t o t h e i n s t i tu t i o n o f t h e s u i t , S ea y’ s Co m pla int did not c ha lle nge the ne w ve rs ionof the sig n or din an ce . O n c ro ss- m oti ons for sum m ary j udgm ent, the district court found cert ai n portion s of the challenged
or din an ce unc onst itu tio na l bu t he ld those portio ns s ev er ab le f ro m the re m ai nde r of the or din an ce. Inso d oin g, the dis tr ic t c ourt f urthe r uphe ld M ar

y E sth er ’ s ban on bil lbo ar ds. T he c ourt a lso de nie d S eay ’ s r eque st f or da m ag es a nd m oti on f or at tor ne y s’ f ee s a nd c ost s. S eay

now ap pe al s. A ft er tho ro ugh re vie w , w e bel ie ve the case is m oot and, therefore , nonj usticiable. A ccordingly , w e r everse the district court’ s grant of summ ary j udgm ent and rem and with instruction s to dis m iss for lack of su bjec t m at te r juri sd ic ti on . BACKGRO UND T he f ac ts i n th is c as e ar e no t in di spute
. S eay is anout door

a dve rt isi ng3

co rp or at iontha t bu y s or le as es land t o c onstru ct sig ns fo r co m

m er ci al a nd
no nc omm erci al sp eech . Mary Est he r is a sm al l mu ni ci pa li ty, ap pr ox im at el y two square m ile s ina re a w ith a popu la tio n of appr oxi m at el y 4, 055. Se ay c ontra ct ed

w ith pr op ert y own ers in Mary Esth er t o c on st ru ct sev en bi ll bo ard s t hr ou gh ou t t he cit y . To tha t end, on June 7, 2001 , Se ay subm itt ed se ve n appl ic at ion s for pe rm its to post the signs
. T he e r e c t i on of si gn s i n M a ry E sthe r w a s go ve rne d by A rt i c l e 16 of Mary Esther’ s Land Developm ent Code (the “ Repealed S ign Ordinance”). O n that very da y , a ll se ve n a

ppl ic at ion s w er e de nie d sol el y on the ba sis of S ec tio n 16
. 00. 01( G ) of the Re pe al ed

S ignOrdi nanc e, w hic h e xpl ic itl y dis al low ed

bil lbo ar ds. S eay

did not ap pe al the se r ej ect ions. I nst ea d, S eay e nga ge d th e Mary

E sth er Ci ty A tto rn ey in
co m m uni ca tio ns i n a n e ff

ort t o resolve the m at te r. I n th e int er im , on N ove m be r 5, 2001 , Mary Esther adopt ed Or dinance 2001 -12 (the “ Ne w S ign Ordinance”), which
re pe al ed a nd r ep la ce d th e Re pe al ed Si gn Or din an ce , how ev er , the ba n on bil lbo ar ds
re m ai ne d in ta ct
. B ec au se the ba n onbil lbo ar ds r em ai ne d, Se ay did not r es ubm it its ap pli ca tio ns. Se ay f ile d su it ag ai nst

Mary E sth er on J anua ry

17, 200 2, tw o m onths f

oll ow ing the e na ctm en t of the N ew Si gn O rd inanc e. I nte re sti ngl y , the Co m pla int c la im s on ly tha t the Re pe al ed

S ignO rd inanc e is u nc onstituti ona l, a nd d oe s no t r ef er en ce or challenge the Ne w Sign Or dinance. More over, a lthou gh Seay ’ s perm its wer e denied4

because of the particular provisi on banning billboards, Seay does not claim that that pa rt ic ular pr ovi sio n is unc onst itu tio na l. Ra the r, Se ay cl ai m s th at the Re pe al ed

S ign O rd inanc e is u nc onst itu tio na l i n it s e nti re ty be ca use it viol at es the F ir st A m en dm en t to, and the Equal Protection Clause o f, the United States Constitu tion and has resulted in an un co nst itu tiona l t ak ing
. S eay sou ght ape rm an en t i nj unc tio n pr ec lud ing
en fo rc em en t of

the Re pe al ed

S ignO rd inanc e, a s w el l a s da m ag es p ur su an t to 4 2 U
. S. C. § 19 83, a nd c ost s a nd a tto rn ey s’ f ee s pu rs ua nt t o 42 U
. S. C. § 19 88. Mary E sth er m ove d to dis m iss the co m pla int on, am ong oth er

thi ngs, m ootne ss ground s. T he di s t rict cou rt denied Mary Esther’ s m otion , f

indin g that the case had not been rendered m oot by the Ne w Sign Or dinance. In so hold ing, the district court applied the vo luntary

cessation doctrine and stated as its re asoning that Mary Esther ha d no t e sta

bli she d th at

the li ke lih ood of

f urthe r vio la tio ns w as suf fi ci en tly r em ote t o d i s m i s s Se ay’s c o mp l a i n tas m o o t . In ad d i t i o n , t h e C o u rt s t at ed t h at Se ay’s potenti al vested right to th e perm its m ay have also been sufficient to defeat Mary E sth er ’ s m ootne ss arg um en t. T he pa rt ie s la te r fi le d c ro ss- m oti ons fo r sum m ar y j udgm en t, an d alt houg h th e district court found several provisions of the Repea led Sign Ordinance
unc onst itu tio na l, it de te rm ine d that the se inv al id pro vis ion s we re se ve ra ble f ro m the
r e mai n d ero f t h e R ep ea l ed Si g n Or d i n an ce . Ac co rd i n g l y, th e c o u rt d en i ed Se ay’s5

m otion and granted summ ary j ud g m en t i n favo r of Mary Esther. T he district court fu rthe r co nc lud ed

tha t S eay w as not e nti tle d to a ny

da m ag es , c ost s, or

a tto rn ey s’ f

ee s. Se ay nowappe al s. DISC US SION Moo tne ss i s th e thr es hol d is sue i n th is c as e. Whil e ne ith er pa rty r ai se s th is iss ue on a ppe al , m ootne ss i s aj ur isd ic tio na l qu es tio n un de r A rt ic le I II , w hic h m ust be r ai se d by

the c ourt. S ee , e . g. , C & C P ro ds. , I nc . v. Me ss ic k, 700 F
. 2d 6 35, 636 (11 Cir. 1983 ). The Article III requirem ent of a ca se or controversy is a fundam ental th
as pe ct of our j ur isd ic tion. I f a sui t i s m oot , it c an not pr es en t an A rt ic le I II c as e or
co ntr ove rs y

a nd the f

ed er al c ourts l ac k su bj ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n to e nte rt ai n it
. Coral Springs Stree t Sy stem s, I nc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F. 3d 13 20, 1328 (11 Cir. th 2004 ) (c iti ng A l N aj

j ar v. A shc ro ft , 273 F. 3d 1330, 1336 (1 1 Ci r. 2001 ))
. Mo otn es s th
can oc cu r due to a ch an ge in ci rc um stanc es , or , as he re, a ch an ge in the law . I d.

“ When a subs equent law brings the existing controversy to an end the case becom es
m oot a nd shou ld be tr ea te d a cc or din gly
. ” Co al iti on f or the A bol iti on o f Mari

j ua na Pr ohi bit ion v. Ci ty

of A tlanta , 219 F
. 3d 1 301, 131 0 ( 11 Ci r. 200 0) ( ci ta tio ns th
om itted). T hus, before w e decide the legal questions p osed bySeay, w e ra ise sua spon te t h e qu es t i o n wh et h er t h e New Si g n Or d i n an ce re n d er s m o o t S ea y’ s
co nst itu tio na l c ha lle nge to the Re pe al ed S ign Ordinanc e. I n f

ind ing thi s c as e6

j usticiable, the district c ourt state d that Mary Esther wa s conceivably fre e to re- enact the offending prov ision s of the Repeale d Sign Ordinance at any tim e and that Seay
m ay have acquired vested rights und er the f orm er ver sion o f the N ew Sign Ordinance. W e disagree. I. Be ca use of the pos sib ili ty th at the de fe ndant c oul d si m ply r et ur n to his old
way s, “ [i] t has long been the rule that volu ntary cessation of allegedly illegal condu ct doe s no t de pr ive the tr ibu na l of pow er to he ar a nd d et er m ine the ca se , i. e. , doe s no t
m ak e the ca se m oot
. ” S ec ’ y of L ab or v. Bu rg er

K ing Co rp . , 955 F
. 2d 6 81, 684 ( 11 th Ci r. 199 2) ( int er

na l qu ota tio ns o m itt ed ). A c as e m ay ne ve rthe le ss b e m oot if the defendant can dem onstrate that (1) "there is n o r e asonable expectation th at the alleged vi o l a t i o n w i l l r e c u r , " a n d( 2 ) " i n t e r i m r e l i e f o r e v e n t s h a v e c o m

p l e t e l y a nd irrevocably

era dicated the eff

ects of the alleged violation ." C ount y of L os Angeles
v. D av is, 440 U
. S. 625 , 631 , 99 S
. Ct
. 137 9, 138 3, 59 L
. E d. 2d 6 42 ( 1979 ) (c ita tio ns
an d in te rn al quo ta tio ns o m itt ed ). “ H ow ev er , gov er nm en ta l e nti tie s a nd o ff

ic ia ls h av e been given cons iderably

m ore leew ay

than private parties in the p resum ption that they
are unlik ely to r esum e illegal activities.” City of Sunrise, 371 F. 3d at 132 8-29. Se e al so H ar ri son & B ur

ro w es Br idg e Co nstru ct or s, In c. v. Cu om o, 981 F
. 2d 5 0, 59 ( 2d Ci r. 199 2) ( “ So m e de fe re nc e m ust be a cc or de d to a[ le gis la tiv e body ’ s]See, e.g ., City of Mesquite v. Ala ddin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 102 S.C t. 1070, 71 1 L .E d. 2d 15 2 ( 19 82 ) ( de c lin ingto f ind moo t w he n th e City

e xpre ssl y ann ounc e d a

n inte nti on

to ree nact the old languag e of a challeng ed law if

the appe llate cour

t vacated the district cour t’s holding that the la

ng uag e of the statute was unc onstitut ionally vague); Nor

theaster n Florida Chapter of

Associated G ener al Contractor s of Amer ica v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 113 S.Ct . 2297, 124 L .Ed.2d 586 (1993) ( decliningto find moot when law that re place d repe aled law still potentially

disadvantag ed the plaintiff)
. See, e.g ., Christian Coaliti on of Alaba ma v. Cole, 355 F.3d 1288 ( 11 Cir. 2004) th 2 (findingcase moot where defe ndants submitted to the court a re prese ntation that the wrong ful conduct would not be r epeated); Jews for Jesus v. Hill sboroug h County Aviation Authority , 162 F.3d 627 ( 11 Cir.1998) (findingcase moot where the cha ng ed policy

was the r esult of th 7 re pr es en ta tio ns tha t c er

ta in con duc t has be endis co nti nue d. ”) ; R ag sda le v. T ur noc k, 841 F. 2d 1 358, 136 5 ( 7 Ci r. 198 8) ( “ [C ] es sa tio n of the a lle ge dly ill eg al c ondu ct by th governm ent officials h as b een treated with m ore so licitude by the courts than sim ilar action by private parties. ”). Co nst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s to sta tut es a re r out ine ly f ound m oot w he n asta tut e is am en de d or

r ep ea le d. See , e. g. , Ma ssa ch use tts v. O ak es , 491 U
. S. 576, 582, 109 S. Ct
. 263 3, 105 L
. E d. 2d 4 93 ( 1989 ); Ci ty of Su nr ise , 371 F. 3d at 1329 ; H ar ri son & Bu rr ow es , 981 F
. 2d a t 59
. T he S upr em e Co urt c au tio ns a ga ins t ho ldi ng a c ha lle nge to a r ep ea le d law m oo t if th e la w is re as ona bly li ke ly to be r ee na ct ed

or w he n it is replace d by

another constitu tionallysuspect l aw . “ Likew ise, this Court has 1 repeate dly

held that the doctrine of volu ntary cessation does not apply in c ases wher e ch al le nge d law s ha ve be enr ep ea le d un le ss the re is som e re as on t o be lie ve tha t the la w m ay be r ee na ct ed

a ft er dis m iss al of

the sui t. ” Ci ty

of Su nr ise , 371 F. 3d a t 13 29. 2“ su

bs tanti a l and

c on sc ie nti ou s d e lib e ra

tio n, ” and ha d b e e n “ c on sis te ntl y

a pp lie d” sin c e its enac tment). 8 In Ci ty of Su nr ise , thi s Co urt re ce ntl y ad dr es se d sim ilar iss ue s un de r ne ar ly identical circum stances. In that case, as here, an outd oor advertising com pany sued
a ci ty cl ai m ing tha t the sig n c ode w as unc onst itu tio na l. P ri or to the f ili ng o f the sui t,
as h er e, the old sig n code was r eplaced by the city with an am ended sign code that el im ina te d m ost

of the c onst itu tio na lly

inf irm pr ovi sio ns w hil e co nti nui ng t o pr ohi bit bil lbo ar ds. T he Co urt he ld tha t the doc tr ine of vol unt ar y c es sa tio n di d no t save the
ac tio n f ro m be ing r en de re d m oot by the ci ty ’ s am en dm en t of the co de
. Inso h old ing , the Court wa s persuaded that the city would not re -enact the old sign code by counsel fo r the c ity ’ s e xpr es s di sa vow m en t a t or al a rg um en t of a ny int en tio n of

de fe ndi ng the old sig n c ode , a nd b y

the c ity ’ s pr om

pt am en dm en t of

the sig n code in re spon se to a le tte r fr om

the pla int if

f, be fo re the c ity

w as e ve r sued. T he Co urt f ound absol ute ly no i ndi ca tio n th at

the c ity r ep ea le d it s ol d si gn c ode in ba d f ai th. Sim ilarly , in the ca se at h an d , en actm ent of the Ne w S ign Ordinance w as pr om pte d by c om m uni ca tio ns f

ro m P la int if f’ s c ouns el a nd p re ce de d th e fi lin g of thi s sui t by tw o m onths. I n a ddi tio n, c ounsel fo r Ma ry E sth er , li ke w ise , e xpr es sly dis av ow ed

a t or al a rg um en t any

int en tio n of

r e- en ac tin g th e Rep ea le d S ign O rd inance. Accord ing ly , the vol unt ar y c es sa tio n do ctri ne is ina

ppl ic ab le , a nd w illI n City of Sunrise, the Court conte mplated that “if the City of Sunrise did nurture the 3 intention of reinstating the old, purportedly unconstitutional S ign Code , and ac tually adopted the Amended Sig n Code as a te mporary measure whene ver a

nother law suit appear ed on the hor izon, [t he Court] would plainly forbid it from doingso.” 371 F .3d at 1320. We adopt this warningand caution, her e, ag ainst such “f lip-flopping.” 9 not sa ve thi s c as e fr om

am ootne ss d et er

m ina tio n. 3 II. W e m ust ne xt e xa m ine w he the r Se ay pos se sse d ave ste d ri gh t to the sig n perm its at the tim e of application. State l aw dictates whether a vested right has been
crea te d, an d a ga in , we are g ui de d b y ou r rece nt de ci si on in Cit y of S un ris e, whe re we engaged in a thorou gh and extens ive analy sis of applicable F lorida law. As discussed in C ity of S unr ise , in or de r to c la im a ve st ed rig ht, S eay m ust sho w one of

the fo llo w ing c ir cu m stanc es : ( 1) tha t i t ha s r ea sona bly a nd d etri m en ta lly

r el ie d on existing law(equitable estoppel); or (2) that Mary Esther has acted in a clear display of bad faith. 371 F.3d at 1334
. Ne ither circum stance is present in this case. A. Equitable Estoppel Inor de r to i nvok e the doc tr ine of e qui ta ble e sto ppe l, S eay

m ust sho w tha t “ it ha s in cu rr ed

sub stanti al e xpe nse in re as ona ble r el ia nc e on ex ist ing la w . ” Id
. at 133 8. Sim ilar to the sign com

pany in City of Su nrise, ther e is no evidence that Seay has inc ur re d a ny sig nif ic an t e xpe nse in re lianc e on the Re pe al ed Si gn O rd inanc e. I nde ed ,10

the Re pe al ed

S ignO rd inanc e, on i ts f

ac e, pr ec lud ed

the c onstru ct ionof

bil lbo ar ds, the very signs contem

plated by Seay
. Ther efore, there is no basis to fin d t h at Seay

“ reas on ab ly reli ed ” o n t he pro vi si on s o f th e Rep eal edSig n Ord in an ce. Moreover, Seay ’ s standardized written lea se agree m ents provid e for no m oney to b e pa id t o th e la ndow ne rs unt il the da te of co ns truc tio n of the bil lbo ar ds. T he billb oards wer e never c onstructed. Seay has not paid any m oney to the lando wner s with w hom

it entered into contracts. Ther e w as no final lease agre em ent betwee n Se ay a nd the landow ne rs f

or a t l ea st tw o of

the sig n pe rm it ap pli ca tio ns s ubm itt ed to Mary E sth er . I t do es not

e ve n a ppe ar tha t S eay inc ur re d a ny e xpe nse in pr ep ar ing the perm it applications , as the construction plans f or the billb oards wer e not site specific. G ive n all of thi s evid en ce , it is cl ear tha t the re w as no e qui ta ble e sto ppe l tha t c oul d
co nc ei vably

r ise to a ve ste d r igh t i n th e sig n pe rm its
. B. B ad F

ait h In the absence of equitable e stopp el, in order to obtain a vested r i g h t , S eay
m ust sho w tha t M ar

y E sth er a ct ed in ba d f ai th i n de ny ing the sig n pe rm its
. C ity of Sunrise, 371 F. 3d a t 1336
. As explained in City of Sunrise, the Fl o ri d a c as es that ha ve f ound ba d f ai th h av e done so i n in stance s wher e it w as obv iou s th at the
m uni ci pa lity

w as pur pose ly a tte m pti ng to avoi d gra nti ng the pe rm it or li ce nse to the11

plaintiff. Id. Exam

ples of such situ ations in clude “ an ‘ em ergency ordinance’ passed while the application was p en d i ng,” “ selective and err oneous enforce m ent of an arguably unconst itutio nal provisi on of the law, ” and “ deliberate delay of the issuance of ape rm it unt il af

te r a bui ldi ng m or at or ium w en t i nto e ff

ec t. ” I d. a t 13 37- 38. N one
o f t h e s e s c e n a r i o s , o r

a n yt h i n g a k i n t o t h e m , i s p r e s e n ti n t h i s c a s e . F i r s t , b e c ause there ar e no off-site bil lboards in Mary Esther, Seay

cannot claim

that Mary

Esther
se le ct ive ly

e nf or ce d it s R ep eal ed S ignO rd inanc e ag ai nst S ea y . S ec ond, the ci r c u m s t a n c e s s u rr o u n d i n g M a ry E s t h e r ’ s a m e n d m e n tt o t h e a l le ge dly
unc onst itu tio na l R ep ea le d S ignO rd inanc e ar e virtua lly ide nti ca l t o th ose in Ci ty of Su nr ise , w he re no e vid en ce of ba d f ai th w as f ound
. I n Cit y of Su nr ise , not onl y did the c ity am en d its sig n co de to el im ina te the c onst itu tio na lly que sti ona

ble pr ovi sio ns before the sig n com

pany filed s uit, b ut also left in tact th ose provisi ons un der w hich the sign com

pany ’ s perm it was denied. Id. at 1339
. Sim ilarly , Mary Esther r epealed and replaced its allegedly unconst itutio nal sign o rdinance two m onth s before S eay in it ia te d liti ga tio n, a nd the N ewS ignO rd inanc e re ta ine d th e pr ovi sio n pu rs ua nt t o
w hic h S eay ’ s pe rm its w er e de nie d, na m el y , the pr ovi sio n pr ohi bit ing the e re ct ionof bil lbo ar ds. Ind eed , a s w e se e it, the a lle ge dly unc onst itu tio na l a spe ct s of the Re p ea l ed Si g n Or d i n an ce h ad n o t h i n g wh at s o ev ert o d o wi t h t h e r ej ec t i o n o f S ea y’ s pe rm it ap pl ic at io ns .Ordinanc e 2001-12 r epea led the orig inal Sign Or dinance in its entirety and ena cted a 4 completely

revised Sig n Ordinanc e, which se eming ly remove d all of the languag e objec ted to by Se ay and c ur e d a ny oth e r c ha lle ng e d d e fe c ts. 12 A cc or din gly , in thi s ca se , w e can fi nd ne ith er equit ab le es top pe l nor ba d f ai th,
an d a cco rd in gl y , Seay do es no t p os se ss a ve st edrig ht to an y si gn pe rm it s. III . Ha ving found that Mary

Esther has no in tention of ree nacting the Repealed Sign O rdinance and that Seay poss esses no vested righ t in a sign perm it, the ca se m ay sti ll be j ust ic ia

ble if the N ew Si gn O rd inanc e co nta ins the sa m e co nst itu tio na l de fe ct s
as it s pr ed ec essor. “ [A ] sup er se din g st at ute or r eg ula tio n m oot s ac as e onl y to the extent that it rem oves the challenged fe at u re s o f the prior law. T o the extent that tho se fe at ur es re m ai n in pla ce , an d ch an ge s in the la w ha ve not so fun da m en tall y altered the statutory

fra m ew ork as to render the original con t ro versy a m ere ab str ac tio n, the c as e is n ot m oot
. ” Ci ty of S unr ise , 371 F
. 3d a t 13 42- 43 ( quot ing Natu ris t So c’y , Inc . v. Fi ll y aw, 95 8 F .2d 15 15 , 15 20 (11 Cir . 19 92 )). th Upon re vie w of

the N ewS ignO rd inanc e, w e be lie ve tha t Se ay ’ s ch al le nge s to the Re pe al ed

S ignO rd inanc e ar e m oot be ca use the y se em to ha ve be enr em ed ie d by the N ewS ignO rd inanc e. H ow ev er , if the c ha lle nge d pr ovisi on s of the N ewS ign 4 Or dinance are sev er ab le from those portio ns of the Repealed Sign O rdinance that13

ac tua lly c au se d th e de nia l of

the pe rm it ap pli ca tio n, the re is no p oin t i n e va lua tin g Se ay ’ s a rg um en ts a s to tho se pr ovi sio ns. C ity of S unr ise , 371 F
. 3d a t 13 47.

“ Se ve ra bil ity of aloc al or din an ce is a que sti on o f sta te la w . ” Id
. ( ci tin g C ity of L ak ew ood v. P la in D ea le r Pu b. Co
. , 486 U
. S. 750 , 772 , 108 S
. Ct
. 2138 , 215 2, 100 L
. E d. 2d 7 71 ( 1988 ))
. U nde r Fl or ida law , the te st f

or se ve ra bil ity is as f oll ow s: Whe n part

of a st atute is de cl ar ed unc onst itu tio na l the re m ai nde r of

the a ct wi ll be pe rm itt ed to stand p ri ovi de d: (1 ) the unc onst itu tio na l pr ovi sio ns c anbe se pa rat ed f ro m the re m ai nin g va lid pr ovi sio ns, (2 ) the le gis la tiv e pur pose expressed in the valid p rovisio ns can be ac co m plish ed ind ep en de ntl y of tho se w hic h ar e void , (3 ) the goo d a nd the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be sa id tha t the L eg isl at ur e w oul d ha ve pa sse d th e one w ith out the oth er a nd, ( 4) a n act co m

ple te in i tse lf

r em ai ns af te r the inv al id p ro vis ion s a re str ic ke n. Id. a t 1 3 4 8 (citing Sm ith v. De partm ent of Insurance, 507 So.2d 108 9 (Fla. 1987 )).

“ A cc or din g to F lor ida

law , the n, th e un const itu tio na l part of ac ha lle nge d st at

ute shou ld be excised, leaving the rest intact and in force, when doing so d oes not defeat th e p ur po se of t he st at ut e an d l eav es in pl ace a law t ha t i s co m pl et e.” Id
. Fu rt h erb o l s t er i n g t h e s ev er ab i l i t y o f t h e N ew Si g n Or d i n an ce i s Ma ry Es t h er ’s express, c odified legisl ative desire to keep as m uch of its Sign Ordinance a s poss ible: Se ve ra bil ity : If an y se ct ion , subs ec tio n, p aragr ap h, subp aragra

ph, divisio n, subdivi sion, clause, sentence, w or d, or p ro vis ionof

thi s or din an ce sha ll be a dj udge d by a co urt of

c om pe te nt j ur is di ct ionto be inv al id o rFor example, Cit y

Ordinanc e 2001-12, e nactingthe New Sign Or dinance , states that “the 5 City Council of the City

of Mar y Esther finds a

nd deter mines that the regulation of billboards as se t f or th h e re in w ill imp ro ve the be a uty of the City of Ma ry Es the r, fo ste r o ve ra ll i mpr ov e me nt t o the ae sthetic and visual appe ara nce of the city , prese rve a

nd open up ar eas f

or bea utification on public proper

ty adjoining the public roadw ay s, increa se the visibility , rea dability and/or e ff e c tiv e ne ss o f o n- sit e sig ns by re du c ingand

/or dim ini sh ingthe vis ua l c lutte r o f o ff -s ite sig ns , enhanc e the City

of Mar y Esther a s an attra ctive plac e to live and wor k, reduc e blig hting 14 constitu tional, such portio n shall be deem ed a separa te, dis ta nt, a nd i nde p e n d e nt p ro vis iona nd s uc h j udgm en t sh al l no t a ff ec t, im pa ir , inv al ida te , or

nul lif y the r em ai nde r of th is ord in an ce. N ewS ignO rd inanc e, S ec tio n T w o. Mo re ove r, F lor ida l aw st at es tha t “ [a ] lbe it not bin din g, ale gis la tiv el y

e xpr es se d pr ef

er en ce fo r the se ve ra

bil ity of voi de d pr ovi sio ns is p er sua siv e. ” Ci ty

of S unr ise , 371 F
. 3d at 1349 ( ci tin g M or ea u v. L ew is, 648 S o. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 1995) (citation om itted)). To rule that the challenged prov ision s wer e not se ve ra ble f ro m th e rem ai nde r of

the N ewS ignO rd inanc e “ w oul d se ri ousl y inf ri nge on the not ionof

le gis la tiv e au ton om

y an d ignor e Fl or ida ’ s do ctri ne of
se ve rab il it y .” Id
. T he de nia l of

S eay ’ s pe rm it ap pli ca tio ns w as ba se d so le ly on the pr ovi sio n of the Re pe al ed

S ignO rd inanc e pr ohi bit ing bil lbo ar ds. T o th e exte nt th at a ny purportedl y

unc on st i t ut i on a l p r ov i si on s of

the R e pe a l e d S i gn Ordinance w ere retained in the NewSign Ordinance, we find tha t the ban on bi llboards, which is never ch al le nge d by

S eay , c ont inu es to fur

the r the pur

pose of the N ewS ignO rd inanc e in the absence of the challenged pr ovisi ons. The regulatory purpos e of the undi sputed 5influence s, and improve tra ffic sa fety by reduc ing dr iver distrac tions.” 15 se ct ion s of the Re pe al ed Si gn Or din an ce – a voi din g e y es or es a nd tra ff ic dis ru pti on
– w oul d no t be de str oy ed by the e lim ina tio n of

the sus pe ct

c ont en t r eg ula tio ns. Ther efore, we find that any portions of the Repealed Sign Ordinance r etained by the N ewS ignO rd inanc e tha t arg uably m ay be unc onst itu tio na l are f ull y se ve ra ble fr om the r es t of the la w , pa rt ic ularl y the ba n on bil lbo ar ds, w hic h w as the pr ovi sio n tha t lea d to the re

j ec tio n of Se ay ’ s perm it ap pli ca tio ns. T he re fo re , w e ne ed not – and do n ot – e va lua te w he the r oth er port io ns of

the N ewS ignO rd inanc e m ay be
unc onst itu tio na l be ca

use a ny de ci sio n on the m er its can ha ve no b eari ng o n th e ca se be fo re us. Se e id. “ In de ed , if w e w er e to eva lua te the va lid ity of c er ta in p ro vis ion s of th e [N ewS ignO rd inanc e] , kno w ing tha t the r es ult of thi s in qui ry

c oul d ha ve no ef fe ct on the r es ult

in thi s c as e, our

pr onou nc em en ts w oul d be e sse nti al ly a dvi sor y in
na tu re.” Id
. A cc o r d i n g l y , w e h o l dt h a tt h e c h a l l e n g e t o t h e R e p e a l e dS i g n O r d i n a n c e is
m oot , a nd this Co urt, the re fo re la ck s su bj ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n. RE V E RS E D a nd R E MA N D E D , w ithins tr

uc tio ns t o DISMI SS f

or la ck of subj ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n.16

E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, c onc ur s inthe r es ult
.