96-597

 No. 96-597

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

CLARA LIEDLE,

 Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent,

 v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation,

 Defendant, Respondent, and Cross-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Gallatin,

 The Honorable Thomas A. Olson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Bruce E. Lee, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Lyman H. Bennett, III; Sedivy, Bennett & White;

 Bozeman, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: May 15, 1997

 Decided: June 11, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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 On October 25, 1994, Clara Liedle filed a claim against State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company upon her automobile insurance contract with State Farm

for underinsured motorist coverage with regard to injuries sustained by her in an

automobile accident. A jury trial was held on January 16, 1996. The jury returned 

its

Special Verdict finding Liedle's damages in the sum of $83,359. The Eighteenth 

Judicial

District Court, Gallatin County, reduced this verdict by $25,000 in insurance 

proceeds

which Liedle had received from the tort-feasor's liability insurer, and $50,000 

already

paid by State Farm pursuant to a separate policy of underinsured motorist coverage 

in that

amount. The District Court then reduced the jury's award by medical pay benefits 

which

Liedle had received from State Farm pursuant to the collateral source reduction 

statute,

 27-1-308, MCA. Liedle's net jury award was thus reduced to zero. Liedle appeals 

the

reduction of the jury award by the medical pay insurance benefits received. State 

Farm

cross-appeals the District Court's award of costs to Liedle for the deposition of Dr.

Kurtz. We affirm.

 The issues on appeal are:

 1. Did the District Court err by applying the collateral source reduction 

statute,

 27-1-308, MCA, to reduce the jury's verdict by benefits paid to Liedle pursuant to

medical pay coverage?

 2. Did the District Court err in permitting, as an allowable cost to Liedle, 

the

cost of a copy of the deposition transcript of Dr. Kurtz, recognizing that the cost 

of the

original transcript of the deposition was paid by State Farm?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On May 22, 1992, Clara Liedle was injured in an automobile accident when her

automobile was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Kennan Skeen. The Skeen vehicle was

insured by State Farm with a policy having a liability limit of $25,000. State Farm 

also

insured the Liedle automobile involved in the accident and another automobile owned 

by

Liedle and her husband. The Liedles' two State Farm insurance policies contained

underinsured motorist coverage with liability limits of $50,000 each. 

 Prior to Liedle filing her suit, State Farm paid to her the $25,000 limit on the

Skeen policy, and the $50,000 limit on one policy of underinsured motorist coverage. 

No payment was made by State Farm on the second underinsured motorist policy. State

Farm also paid to Liedle the sum of $10,000, which represented medical expenses

incurred as a result of the accident under the medical pay coverage of Liedle's 

policy

with State Farm.

 Liedle sought to recover damages over the $75,000 already paid by State Farm and

upon the second policy of underinsured motorist coverage. The case was tried before 

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a

jury which returned a Special Verdict on January 19, 1996, finding that Liedle's 

total

damages arising out of the automobile accident were in the amount of $83,359.

 The District Court reduced the verdict by $75,000, representing the insurance

proceeds received by Liedle under Skeen's liability policy and under her own

underinsured motorist coverage. The court next reduced the jury's award by the 

medical

pay benefits received, pursuant to the collateral source reduction statute, 27-1-

308,

MCA. The $10,000 medical pay set-off was itself reduced by the sum of $200.57, which

represented the premiums paid by Liedle for the medical pay coverage from the date of

inception of the policy through July 1, 1996, for a total net offset in the sum of

$9,799.43. The District Court therefore reduced the verdict to zero and entered 

judgment

in favor of Liedle for the sum of zero dollars along with costs and disbursements in 

favor

of Liedle. 

 Included in the award of costs was the cost of a copy of the deposition 

transcript

of Dr. Kurtz. The District Court, in response to objections to Liedle's memorandum 

of

costs, entered an order on June 7, 1996, stating that Liedle may recover the costs 

of her

copy of Dr. Kurtz's deposition which was read at trial. 

 Liedle appeals the reduction of the jury award by the medical pay insurance

benefits received. State Farm cross-appeals the District Court's award of costs for 

the

deposition of Dr. Kurtz to Liedle.

ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err by applying the collateral source reduction statute,

 27-1-308, MCA, to reduce the jury's verdict by benefits paid to Liedle pursuant to

medical pay coverage?

 We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are

correct. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898

P.2d 680, 686.

 Liedle asserts that the District Court erred in applying the collateral source

reduction or offset statute because it does not apply to contract actions. Liedle 

argues

that this action is not a tort claim against the tort-feasor, but rather a breach of 

contract

action against State Farm on a policy of underinsured motorist coverage. State Farm

counters that Liedle's argument is incorrect, as the language of 27-1-308, MCA, is 

not

confined to actions arising in tort. State Farm contends that the District Court 

did not

err when it applied the collateral source offset statute to Liedle's recovery as 

against her

insured.

 The collateral source reduction statute, 27-1-308, MCA, provides:

Collateral source reductions in actions arising from bodily injury or

death -- subrogation rights. (1) In an action arising from bodily injury or

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death when the total award against all defendants is in excess of $50,000

and the plaintiff will be fully compensated for his damages, exclusive of

court costs and attorney fees, a plaintiff's recovery must be reduced by any

amount paid or payable from a collateral source that does not have a

subrogation right.

 (2) Before an insurance policy payment is used to reduce an

award under subsection (1), the following amounts must be deducted from

the amount of the insurance policy payment:

 (a) the amount the plaintiff paid for the 5 years prior to the date

of injury;

 (b) the amount the plaintiff paid from date of injury to date of

judgment; and

 (c) the present value of the amount the plaintiff is thereafter

obligated to pay to keep the policy in force for the period for which any

reduction of an award is made pursuant to subsection (3).

 (3) The jury shall determine its award without consideration of

any collateral sources. After the jury determines its award, reduction of the

award must be made by the trial judge at a hearing and upon a separate

submission of evidence relevant to the existence and amount of collateral

sources. Evidence is admissible at the hearing to show that the plaintiff has

been or may be reimbursed from a collateral source that does not have a

subrogation right. If the trial judge finds that, at the time of hearing, it is

not reasonably determinable whether or in what amount a benefit from such

a collateral source will be payable, he shall:

 (a) order any person against whom an award was rendered and

who claims a deduction under this section to make a deposit into court of

the disputed amount, at interest; and

 (b) reduce the award by the amount deposited. The amount

deposited and any interest thereon are subject to the further order of the

court, pursuant to the requirements of this section.

 (4) Except for subrogation rights specifically granted by state or

federal law, there is no right to subrogation for any amount paid or payable

to a plaintiff from a collateral source if an award is reduced by that amount

under subsection (1). 

 Liedle argues that the language of this statute, in particular the phrase "[i]n 

an

action arising from bodily injury or death," limits the collateral source reduction 

law to

tort actions, but acknowledges that Montana has not ruled upon the issue of whether 

27-1-308, MCA, is limited to tort actions. She then attempts to argue by analogy 

that

because the application of the collateral source statute is similar to the effect of

subrogation, the distinction between tort and contract actions which courts apply in

subrogation matters should also apply to the collateral source reduction statute. 

Liedle

makes this analogy based on the maxim of jurisprudence that where the reason is the

same, the rule should be the same. Section 1-3-202, MCA. In addition she contends 

that

allowing a collateral source reduction as against a party's own insurer is the 

equivalent

of allowing an insurance company to subrogate against its own insured, which is

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prohibited in the State of Montana. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Transport Indem. Co. (1979),

180 Mont. 419, 591 P.2d 188.

 First, it is clear that State Farm is not asserting a right of subrogation and 

is not

seeking to be substituted and succeed to the rights of Liedle under 27-1-308, MCA. 

State Farm is only claiming the benefits of the collateral source reduction statute 

as set

forth in 27-1-308, MCA. In fact, 27-1-308(1), MCA, is only applicable when there

is no subrogation right. Regardless, it is not necessary to reach Liedle's argument 

by

analogy, as the language of the statute itself does not confine its applicability to 

actions

only arising in tort.

 The language of 27-1-308, MCA, applies to actions arising from "bodily injury

or death." The policy of insurance upon which Liedle was seeking recovery is the

underinsurance policy issued to her by State Farm. This policy states that the 

insurer

will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect

from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily

injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance

or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.

 (Emphasis added.) Liedle's claim made pursuant to this underinsured motor vehicle

policy is an action arising from bodily injury as contemplated by 27-1-308, MCA.

 Liedle argues that the collateral source reduction statute impairs her right to

contract as provided by Article II, Section 31, of the Montana Constitution. She 

asserts

that to allow a collateral offset by one's own insurer violates the substantive rule 

that an

insurance company not be allowed to subrogate its own insured who purchased the 

policy. 

In addition, Liedle asserts that she has paid the premiums for her underinsured 

motorist

coverage and that the collateral source rule confiscates the benefit of that 

insurance

coverage by not affording any adjustment for the premiums she paid.

 The collateral source reduction rule does not reduce the amount of available

underinsured motorist coverage for which Liedle paid premiums, it only reduces the

amount of damages recoverable in an underinsured motorist claim. The statute does 

not

authorize collateral source payments to be deducted from the claimant's available

underinsured motorist coverage, but authorizes that such payments be entered into the

calculation of the claimant's compensable injuries and losses. Liedle does receive 

the

benefit of the insurance policy she has purchased, and her contractual rights under 

this

policy are not impaired. Liedle's policy provides that State Farm is required to 

pay only

those damages to which "an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or 

driver

of an underinsured motor vehicle." Liedle received exactly those amounts of damages,

less the collateral source offset as provided for by 27-1-308, MCA.

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 We hold therefore that the District Court did properly apply the collateral 

source

offset statute, 27-1-308, MCA, to Liedle's recovery as against her insured.

ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err in permitting, as an allowable cost to Liedle, the 

cost

of a copy of the deposition transcript of Dr. Kurtz, recognizing that the cost of the

original transcript of the deposition was paid by State Farm?

 As we previously stated, the standard of review of a district court's 

conclusions

of law is whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Carbon County, 

898

P.2d at 686. This Court has previously held that the trial court has broad 

authority to tax

costs. Fisher v. State Farm Ins. Cos. (Mont. 1997), 934 P.2d 163, 164, 54 St. Rep. 

151,

152; Baeta v. Don Tripp Trucking (1992), 254 Mont. 487, 839 P.2d 566.

 State Farm contends that the District Court erred in awarding Liedle the expense

incurred by her in purchasing a copy of Dr. Kurtz's deposition. State Farm argues 

that

the cost of the copy of Dr. Kurtz's deposition was solely for her benefit and was 

not an

appropriate cost to be awarded against State Farm. Liedle counters that the copy of 

the

deposition was not merely for her convenience and because the deposition was read at

trial it is a recoverable cost.

 This Court has previously held that depositions used at trial are a recoverable 

cost. 

Semenza v. Leitzke (1988), 232 Mont. 15, 754 P.2d 509. We have further held that 

when

the purpose of the deposition is merely to assist the requesting party in compiling 

its case

and is taken only for the convenience of counsel, the cost of that deposition is not

allowable. Fisher, 934 P.2d 163; McGinley v. Ole's Country Stores, Inc. (1990), 241

Mont. 248, 786 P.2d 1156; Semenza, 754 P.2d 509.

 The copy of Dr. Kurtz's deposition obtained by Liedle's counsel was not obtained

for the sole convenience of counsel or solely for Liedle's benefit. The copy of the

deposition was a practical necessity to allow counsel to be fully prepared for 

trial. As

the deposition was read at trial, the District Court did not err in awarding as a 

cost the

expense of the deposition copy.

 We hereby affirm the District Court.

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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