If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re McGRATH/GROENINK, Minors. May 12, 2022

No. 358697

Kent Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 19-051471-NA;

19-051472-NA

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent1appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her 

two minor children after she released her rights to the children. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because the issue on appeal involves only the trial court’s decision to accept respondent’s 

release of her parental rights, we will only briefly summarize the facts of the underlying child 

protective proceeding.

In 2019, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), petitioned the 

trial court to remove the children from respondent’s care because the family home was dirty, the 

children were often unkempt, and the children were repeatedly found to have head lice. 

Additionally, petitioner alleged that respondent would allow her friends to stay in the family home, 

and they would assault each other in front of the children. Furthermore, respondent had some kind 

of “issues with intellectual functioning.” DHHS provided respondent with numerous services to 

help rectify her barriers to reunification with the children, including cleaning schedules and 

therapy sessions. Respondent was unable to rectify her barriers to reunification with the children, 

 

1 The children’s fathers were also respondents in the proceedings below, and their parental rights 

were terminated. Neither father is a party to this appeal, and this opinion’s use of “respondent” 

refers to the minor children’s mother.
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and a termination hearing was held in 2021. At the beginning of the termination hearing,

respondent released her parental rights to the children.

At the termination hearing, the trial court swore respondent in and asked her questions to 

“confirm that it’s [her] intention to execute what we call the loving and difficult release of rights.” 

The trial court asked respondent if anyone had threatened her, and she answered “no.” The trial 

court then asked respondent if anyone had offered her any money, special treatment, or anything 

that had not been placed on the record for her to sign a release of her parental rights, she answered 

“no.” The trial court then read into the record the exact language of the written release form being 

offered by respondent:

[Mother] respectfully acknowledges that she is unable to provide a safe, 

stable, nonneglectful home environment, though financially able to do so, and will 

be unable to do so within a reasonable amount of time. She has come to the difficult 

and loving conclusion after carefully considering all actions taken and exhibits 

entered, including those of today, that the best interests of her children . . . would 

be served by the termination of her parental rights. Therefore, she does not contest 

the termination of her parental rights.

The trial court asked respondent if the language of the release conformed to her understanding of 

the release she intended to sign, and she said “yes.” The trial court then asked respondent’s counsel 

if respondent was “signing the release knowingly and understandingly,” and her counsel answered:

I believe she is, your Honor. We’ve had discussions today. We previously 

had discussed some of these types of language. But we’ve discussed it at length 

today and I believe that she does understand it and that she is doing this knowingly, 

and most of all in the children’s best interest.

Respondent then signed the release. The trial court told respondent that it would issue an 

order terminating her parental rights, informed her of her appellate rights, and ensured that she had 

received an advice of rights form. The trial court subsequently issued an order terminating her 

parental rights. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent never raised before the trial court the issue of whether her release was 

knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made. “In general, issues raised, addressed, and 

decided by the trial court are preserved for appellate review.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 

859 NW2d 208 (2014). “Our review is therefore limited to plain error affecting substantial rights.” 

In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by accepting her release of her parental rights. 

We conclude that respondent has abandoned this argument.

“A release or consent is valid if executed in accordance with the law at the time of 

execution.” MCR 3.801(B). Additionally, the trial court “shall not accept a plea of admission or 
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of no contest without satisfying itself that the plea is knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily 

made.” MCR 3.971(D)(1); see also In re Burns, 236 Mich App 291, 292; 599 NW2d 783 (1999). 

A respondent’s “change of heart,” alone, is not enough to set aside a release that was knowingly 

and voluntarily made. In re Burns, 236 Mich App at 292-293. A voluntary relinquishment of 

rights means that the decision must be the “product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 

intimidation, coercion, or deception.” People v Garwood, 205 Mich App 553, 556; 517 NW2d 

843 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Respondent’s entire argument on appeal is that “there was, however, not a substantial 

inquiry over [sic] [respondent’s] present mental state” at the termination hearing. Respondent did 

not support this argument with any citation to legal authority, elaborate on it in any way, or direct 

this Court to portions of the record that provide factual support for her argument. “[W]hen a party 

merely announces his or her position and fails to cite any supporting legal authority, the issue is 

deemed abandoned.” Hooker v Moore, 326 Mich App 552, 557 n 2; 928 NW2d 287 (2018).

In any event, respondent’s appellate counsel asked us to review the record for ourselves to 

determine whether any colorable issue exists, and we have done so.2 Our review of the termination 

hearing transcript reveals that the trial court conducted a fair and reasonable inquiry into whether 

respondent’s release was made knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily. No evidence has 

been submitted to suggest that respondent’s release of her parental rights was not a product of her 

free and deliberate choice, rather than some undue intimidation, coercion, or deception. Indeed, 

the trial court, seemingly in recognition of respondent’s intellectual challenges, specifically 

inquired of her trial counsel whether she understood what she was doing. Furthermore, respondent 

 

2 Counsel essentially presented something partially akin to an incomplete Anders motion. Pursuant 

to the United States Supreme Court’s mandate in Anders v California, 386 US 738, 744; 87 S Ct 

1396, 1400; 19 L Ed 2d 493, 498 (1967), reh den 388 US 924; 87 S Ct 2094; 18 L Ed 2d 1377 

(1967), if appellate counsel appointed to represent a criminal defendant “finds [the] case wholly 

frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, [counsel] should so advise the court and request 

permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to 

anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” In Michigan, such motions must 

be made pursuant to MCR 7.211(C)(5), and they apply not only to appeals in criminal matters, but 

also appeals in termination of parental rights cases. See In re Kanjia, 308 Mich App 660, 662, 662 

n 1; 866 NW2d 862 (2014). Appellate counsel did not move to withdraw and did not provide a 

proper supporting brief, but appellate counsel may not have realized that doing so was an available 

option. Nevertheless, an Anders motion to withdraw is not appropriate where, as here, counsel 

also manifests an apparent belief—such as by making a substantive argument—that the appeal is 

not wholly frivolous. See Holt v Whelan, 388 Mich 50, 56; 199 NW2d 195 (1972). Although it 

is our practice to carefully review all records, it is nevertheless the responsibility of the parties to 

offer us guidance in conducting those reviews.
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has not demonstrated, or even argued, that she was prejudiced by the trial court’s alleged failure 

to inquire into her state of mind. Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8. Respondent has not demonstrated 

plain error. Id.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra