Vol. 80 Thursday, 

No. 5 January 8, 2015 

Part V 

Department of Transportation 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 93 

Slot Management and Transparency for LaGuardia Airport, John F. 

Kennedy International Airport, and Newark Liberty International Airport; 

Proposed Rule 


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1See 49 U.S.C. 102 and 106. 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 93 

[Docket No.: FAA–2014–1073; Notice No. 

14–11] 

RIN 2120–AJ89 

Slot Management and Transparency 

for LaGuardia Airport, John F. 

Kennedy International Airport, and 

Newark Liberty International Airport 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to replace 

the Orders limiting scheduled 

operations at John F. Kennedy 

International Airport (JFK), limiting 

scheduled operations at Newark Liberty 

International Airport (EWR), and 

limiting scheduled and unscheduled 

operations at LaGuardia Airport (LGA). 

The Orders are scheduled to expire 

when this proposed rule becomes 

effective but not later than October 29, 

2016. This proposal is intended to 

provide a longer-term and 

comprehensive approach to slot 

management at JFK, EWR, and LGA. 

The FAA proposes to maintain the 

limits on scheduled and unscheduled 

operations in place under the Orders, 

limit unscheduled operations at JFK and 

EWR, and require use of an allocated 

slot 80% of the time for the same flight 

or series of flights to retain historic 

precedence. The FAA also proposes five 

alternatives for a secondary market that 

would allow carriers to buy, sell, lease, 

and trade slots. The DOT proposes to 

review certain slot transfer transactions 

for significant anti-competitive effects 

and harms to the public interest. 

Finally, the FAA proposes minor 

miscellaneous amendments to remove 

inapplicable references in the High 

Density Rule. 

DATES: Send comments on or before 

April 8, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number FAA–2014–1073 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

553(c), DOT solicits comments from the 

public to better inform its rulemaking 

process. DOT posts these comments, 

without edit, including any personal 

information the commenter provides, to 

www.regulations.gov, as described in 

the system of records notice (DOT/ALL– 

14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 

www.dot.gov/privacy. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

action, contact Molly Smith, Office of 

Aviation Policy and Plans, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3274; email molly.w.smith@faa.gov; 

Susan Pfingstler, System Operations 

Services, Air Traffic Organization, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 600 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–6462; email susan.pfingstler@

faa.gov; or Peter Irvine, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, Office of Aviation 

Analysis, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590; telephone (202) 

366–3156; email: peter.irvine@dot.gov. 

For legal questions concerning this 

action, contact Robert Hawks, Office of 

the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–7143; email rob.hawks@faa.gov; or 

Cindy Baraban, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Office of the General 

Counsel, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590; telephone (202) 

366–9159; email cindy.baraban@

dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: See the 

‘‘Additional Information’’ section for 

information on how to comment on this 

proposal and how the FAA will handle 

comments received. The ‘‘Additional 

Information’’ section also contains 

related information about the docket, 

privacy, the handling of proprietary or 

confidential business information. In 

addition, there is information on 

obtaining copies of related rulemaking 

documents. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in Title 

49 of the United States Code, Subtitle 

VII, Part A, Subpart I, Sections 40101, 

40103, 40105, and 41712 

The Secretary of Transportation 

(Secretary) is the head of the DOT and 

has broad oversight of significant FAA 

decisions.1 In addition, under 49 U.S.C. 

41712, the Secretary has the authority to 

investigate and prohibit unfair and 

deceptive practices and unfair methods 

of competition in air transportation or 

the sale of air transportation. The 

Secretary is required to consider several 

objectives as being in the public 

interest, including, without limitation, 

the following: Keeping available a 

variety of adequate, economic, efficient, 

and low-priced air services; placing 

maximum reliance on competitive 

market forces and on actual and 

potential competition; avoiding airline 

industry conditions that would tend to 

allow at least one air carrier 

unreasonably to increase prices, reduce 

services, or exclude competition in air 

transportation; encouraging, developing, 

and maintaining an air transportation 

system relying on actual and potential 

competition; encouraging entry into air 

transportation markets by new and 

existing air carriers and the continued 

strengthening of small air carriers to 

ensure a more effective and competitive 

airline industry; and ensuring that 

consumers in all regions of the United 

States, including those in small 

communities and rural and remote 

areas, have access to affordable, 

regularly-scheduled air service. 

The FAA has broad authority under 

49 U.S.C. 40103 to regulate the use of 

the navigable airspace of the United 

States. This section authorizes the FAA 

to develop plans and policy for the use 

of navigable airspace and to assign the 

use the FAA deems necessary for safe 

and efficient utilization. It further 

directs the FAA to prescribe air traffic 

rules and regulations governing the 

efficient utilization of navigable 

airspace. The FAA should ensure 

efficient use of navigable airspace in a 

manner that does not effectively shut 

out potential operators at the airport and 

in a manner that takes account of 

competitive market forces. The FAA 

should take steps to ensure the 

operational limits imposed and the rules 


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governing their allocation and transfer 

do not inefficiently constrain 

competitive market forces. Competition 

at an airport benefits the flying public 

by providing price competition and 

expanded service. The ability of carriers 

to initiate or expand service at the 

airport is hindered, in large part, by the 

imposition of operations limits. 

Accordingly, the FAA believes it must 

strike a balance between (1) promoting 

competition and permitting access to 

new entrants and (2) recognizing 

historical investments in the airport and 

the need to provide continuity. 

These authorities empower the DOT 

to ensure the efficient utilization of 

airspace by limiting the number of 

scheduled and unscheduled aircraft 

operations at JFK, EWR, and LGA, while 

balancing between promoting 

competition and recognizing historical 

investments in the airport and the need 

to provide continuity. They also 

authorize the DOT to review proposed 

transfers of slots and to limit or prohibit 

transfers where they present a potential 

for significant anticompetitive effects or 

adverse effects on the public interest. 

Table of Contents 

I. Overview of Proposed Rule 

II. Background 

A. High Density Rule and AIR–21 

B. LaGuardia Airport After AIR–21 

C. John F. Kennedy International Airport 

After AIR–21 

D. Congestion at Newark Liberty 

International Airport 

E. Exploration of Long-Term Congestion 

Management 

F. Congestion Management Rules of 2008 

G. Current Slot Management at LGA, JFK, 

and EWR 

III. Discussion of the Proposal 

A. Hourly and Daily Slot Limits 

B. Allocation of Slots 

C. Usage Requirement 

D. Transfer of Slots 

E. Oversight of Competitive and Public 

Interest Issues 

F. Retiming, Suspension, and Withdrawal 

of Slots for Operational Reasons 

G. Unscheduled Operations 

H. Miscellaneous Amendments 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

C. International Trade Impact Assessment 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

G. Environmental Analysis 

V. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

VI. Additional Information 

A. Comments Invited 

B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

VII. The Proposed Amendment 

I. Executive Summary 

This proposed rule would replace the 

Orders limiting scheduled operations at 

JFK and EWR and the Order limiting 

scheduled and unscheduled operations 

at LGA. Those Orders remain effective 

until this proposed rule becomes 

effective but not later than October 29, 

2016. If adopted, this proposed rule 

would apply to all scheduled and 

unscheduled operations every day at 

JFK and EWR between the hours of 0600 

and 2259, local time. This proposed rule 

would apply to all scheduled and 

unscheduled operations at LGA Monday 

through Friday between the hours of 

0600 and 2159, local time, and Sunday 

between the hours of 1200 and 2159, 

local time. This proposed rule would 

apply, in large part, the International 

Air Transport Association (IATA) 

Worldwide Slot Guidelines (WSG) to 

administering slots at each airport. 

The following tables provide a 

comparison between requirements 

under the current Orders and under this 

proposal. The first table summarizes 

existing requirements for each airport 

under the Orders. The second table 

summarizes this proposal’s 

establishment of an initial slot base 

based on carrier holdings under the 

Orders, the slot-controlled periods, 

hourly and daily limits for scheduled 

operations, hourly limits for 

unscheduled operations, and the general 

processes that would be used to allocate 

slots or reservations for scheduled and 

unscheduled flights. It also identifies 

differences between the five potential 

alternatives for a secondary market to 

buy, sell, lease, or otherwise transfer 

slots between carriers and introduces a 

review of slot transfer transactions for 

significant anti-competitive effect. 

CURRENT ORDERS FOR JFK, EWR, AND LGA 

Feature JFK EWR LGA 

Slot Base ......................................... Seasonal slot holdings, as approved by the FAA.Seasonal slot holdings, as approved by the FAA.Slot holdings, as approved by the 

FAA. 

Slot (called Operating Authorization 

under the Orders).

Operational authority to conduct 

an arrival or departure operation on a particular day of the 

week during a specific 30- 

minute period.

Operational authority to conduct 

an arrival or departure operation on a particular day of the 

week during a specific 30- 

minute period.

Operational authority to conduct 

an arrival or departure operation during a specific 30- 

minute period. 

Slot-controlled hours ....................... Daily: 0600 to 2259, Eastern time Daily: 0600 to 2259, Eastern time M–F: 0600 to 2159, Eastern time 

Su: 1200 to 2159, Eastern time. 

Hourly slot limits .............................. 81 per hour or in any 60-minute 

period.

81 per hour or in any 60-minute 

period.

71 per hour or in any 60-minute 

period. 

Daily slot limits ................................ Not formally set but based on accepted schedules and modeled delay when Orders adopted. 

Hourly unscheduled operations limits.None ............................................. None ............................................. 3. 

Unscheduled operations reservation 

system.

None ............................................. None ............................................. Reservations available through 

the Enhanced Computer Voice 

Reservation System (e-CVRS) 

72 hours in advance; reservations for certain public charter 

operations available through 

the Slot Administration Office 6 

months in advance. 

Allocation of slots ............................ Adapted from IATA WSG ............. Adapted from IATA WSG ............. Lottery. 

Scheduling season .......................... IATA WSG .................................... IATA WSG .................................... Slot usage reporting on bimonthly 

basis. 


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CURRENT ORDERS FOR JFK, EWR, AND LGA—Continued 

Feature JFK EWR LGA 

Use-or-lose ...................................... Must use allocated slot 80% of the time throughout the previous corresponding season; waiver for highly 

unusual and unpredictable condition lasting 5 or more consecutive days; waiver for Thanksgiving, the Friday after Thanksgiving, and the period from December 24 through the first Sunday of January. 

Secondary market ........................... Privately-negotiated lease and trade that extend no longer than terms of Order; request for FAA approval. 

Logistical slot swaps ....................... Permitted. 

Competitive review .......................... None. 

PROPOSED REGULATION FOR JFK, EWR, AND LGA 

Feature JFK EWR LGA 

Slot Base ......................................... Seasonal slot holdings, as approved by the FAA. 

Slot .................................................. Operational authority to conduct an arrival or departure operation on a particular day of the week during a 

specific 30-minute period. 

Slot-controlled hours ....................... Daily: 0600 to 2259, Eastern time Daily: 0600 to 2259, Eastern time M–F: 0600 to 2159, Eastern time 

Su: 1200 to 2159, Eastern time. 

Hourly slot limits .............................. 81 per hour or in any 60-minute 

period and 44 in any 30-minute 

period.

81 per hour or in any 60-minute 

period and 44 in any 30-minute 

period.

71 per hour or in any 60-minute 

period and 38 in any 30-minute 

period. 

Daily slot limits ................................ 1205 for hours 0600 to 2159 ....... 1205 for hours 0600 to 2159 ....... 1136. 

Hourly unscheduled operations limits.2 ................................................... 1 ................................................... 3. 

Unscheduled operations reservation 

system.

Reservations available through the e-CVRS 72 hours in advance; reservations for certain public charter 

operations available through Slot Administration Office 6 months in advance. 

Allocation of slots ............................ Adapted from IATA WSG. 

Scheduling season .......................... IATA WSG. 

Use-or-lose ...................................... Must use allocated slot 80% of the time for the same flight or series of flights throughout the previous corresponding season; waiver for strike; waiver for highly unusual and unpredictable condition lasting 5 or 

more consecutive days; waiver for slot allocation or acquisition by new entrant carrier. 

Secondary market (Alternative 1) ... Privately-negotiated buy, sell, lease, and trade without prior public notice; request for FAA approval must 

include terms of transaction; terms of final transaction posted on the FAA Web site. 

Secondary market (Alternative 2) ... FAA publishes a bulletin board notice of buy, sell, lease, and trade; bidding and negotiation between seller 

and bidders after public notice; request for FAA approval must include terms of transaction; terms of final 

transaction posted on the FAA Web site. 

Secondary market (Alternative 3) ... FAA publishes a bulletin board notice of buy, sell, lease, and trade; negotiations prior to public notice permitted; bidding and negotiation between seller and bidders; request for FAA approval must include terms 

of transaction; terms of final transaction posted on the FAA Web site. 

Secondary market (Alternative 4) ... FAA publishes a bulletin board notice of buy, sell, lease, and trade; bids posted on bulletin board; request 

for FAA approval must include terms of transaction; terms of final transaction posted on the FAA Web site. 

Secondary market (Alternative 5) ... FAA publishes a bulletin board notice of buy, sell, and lease without identifying poster; cash-only bids 

posted on bulletin board without identifying bidders; seller must accept highest bid; request for FAA approval must include terms of transaction; terms of final transaction posted on the FAA Web site. 

Logistical slot swaps ....................... Permitted. 

Competitive/Public Interest review .. Performed by DOT based on submitted transaction terms; DOT has 14 days to decide whether to review 

transaction; DOT approval or non-objection required for FAA approval of transfer. 

The FAA developed this analysis 

using 2009 data to model the behaviors 

of carriers based on meeting the 

minimum requirement of the proposed 

rule. Under this assumption, carriers 

would incrementally increase actual 

operations in year one to meet the new 

usage requirement, and this new 

operating level would grow by the 

FAA’s Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) 

until it reached the daily limits. The 

analysis period is the first year because 

compliance cost is the highest in that 

year, and if benefits exceed the cost in 

the first year, this relationship will 

continue until passenger demand forces 

operations up to 100% of the available 

slots. In the first year, carrier utilization 

of slots will be at least 80%. Thereafter, 

increases in operations and slot 

utilization are a result of an increase in 

forecasted demand. Assuming the 

highest cost secondary market 

alternative (either alternative four or 

five) is adopted, the total benefits and 

costs are estimated at $74,696,596 

($65,242,900 Present Value at 7%) for 

benefits and $53,056,768 ($46,341,836 

Present Value at 7%) for costs. These 

costs and benefits result from the 

changed behavior concerning use-orlose, secondary market, and reporting 

requirements under this proposal as 

compared to current behavior under the 

existing Orders for each airport. 

Moreover, the FAA believes that this 

rule would improve utilization of 

existing slots, possibly increase a 

carrier’s penalty for retaining slots of 

limited value and thus result in the 

return of some slots, and would result 

in net benefits. 


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2 33 FR 17896 (Dec. 3, 1968) (codified at 14 CFR 

part 93 subpart K). 

3 35 FR 16591 (Oct. 24, 1970). 

4 33 FR 17896 (Dec. 3, 1968). 

5SFAR 43, 45 FR 72637 (Nov. 3, 1980). 

6Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 

F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1981). 

7See SFAR 44, 46 FR 39606 (Aug. 4, 1981); SFAR 

44–1, 46 FR 44424 (Sept. 4, 1981); SFAR 44–2, 46 

FR 48906 (Oct. 5, 1981). Those were then William 

B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport, Boston’s 

Logan International Airport, ORD, Cleveland 

Hopkins International Airport, then Dallas/Fort 

Worth Regional Airport, Denver’s Stapleton 

International Airport, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 

County Airport, Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood 

International Airport, then Houston 

Intercontinental Airport, Kansas City International 

Airport, JFK, LGA, Las Vegas’ McCarran 

International Airport, Los Angeles International 

Airport, Miami International Airport, Minneapolis/ 

St. Paul International Airport, EWR, Philadelphia 

International Airport, Pittsburgh International 

Airport, San Francisco International Airport, 

Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, and DCA. 

SFAR 44–3, 47 FR 7816 (Feb. 22, 1982). 

8SFAR 44–3, 47 FR 7816 (Feb. 22, 1982). 

9 47 FR 19989 (May 10, 1982). 

10 47 FR 29814 (Jul. 8, 1982). 

11 Id. at 29815. 

12 50 FR 52195 (Dec. 20, 1985). 

13SFAR 88, 51 FR 8630 (Mar. 12, 1986). 

14The term ‘‘new entrant carrier’’ was defined as 

‘‘an air carrier that does not hold a slot at the airport 

concerned and has never sold or given up a slot at 

that airport after December 16, 1985, and a limited 

incumbent carrier.’’ 49 U.S.C. 41714(h)(3). 

15Pub. L. 103–305 § 206(a)(1) (Jan. 25, 1994) 

(codified at 49 U.S.C. 41714). 

16Application of New Air Corporation for 

Exemption from 14 CFR part 93, subparts K and S 

Continued 

TOTAL COST AND BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVES FOUR OR FIVE OF THE PROPOSED RULE

First year Benefits Present value 

(7%) Costs Present value (7%) Net benefits 

Regulatory Case .................................................................. $74,696,596 $65,242,900 $53,056,768 $46,341,836 $18,901,064 

II. Background 

A. The High Density Rule and AIR–21 

To manage airspace congestion, in 

1968, the FAA adopted the High Density 

Rule (HDR), which limited take-offs and 

landings at JFK, EWR, LGA, Washington 

National Airport (DCA), and Chicago 

O’Hare International Airport (ORD).2 In 

1970, the FAA suspended the HDR’s 

application at EWR because airport 

capacity could meet demand.3 To 

operate during the slot-controlled hours, 

a flight needed a reservation, commonly 

known as a ‘‘slot.’’ The HDR divided the 

allowable slots by categories of users 

(i.e., air carriers other than air taxis, 

scheduled air taxis, and others).4 These 

reservations applied to both scheduled 

and unscheduled (i.e., ‘‘Other’’) 

operations. While LGA, DCA, and ORD 

were constrained throughout much of 

the day, JFK was constrained for only 5 

hours from 1500 through 1959, Eastern 

Time. 

Under the HDR, air carrier slots were 

allocated through airline scheduling 

committees, operating under thenauthorized antitrust immunity, and the 

airlines would agree to the allocation. 

The FAA’s role was limited to 

determining how many operations air 

traffic control (ATC) could reasonably 

handle during congested periods and 

enforcing operator compliance with the 

rules. After the Airline Deregulation Act 

in 1978, new entrant airlines sought 

access to, and legacy carriers sought 

expansion at, slot-controlled airports. 

This increased competition made it 

more difficult for airlines to reach 

agreement on slot allocation, and the 

scheduling committees began to 

deadlock. The Civil Aeronautics Board 

or DOT periodically stepped in to 

resolve the deadlocks. In resolving a 

1980 deadlock at DCA, the DOT 

divested a small percentage of slots from 

incumbent airlines and reallocated them 

to a requesting new entrant. The DOT 

noted that additional reduced fare 

service was likely to increase 

competition and thus be consistent with 

the general pro-competitive policy of 

the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.5

The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the 

DOT’s action on review following an 

airline challenge.6

In 1981, the FAA responded to a 

nationwide shortage of air traffic 

controllers by reducing the level of air 

traffic operations and imposing slot 

controls on the nation’s 22 busiest 

airports.7 Through that experience, the 

FAA implemented new allocation and 

slot management methods. In 1982, the 

FAA utilized a lottery allocation and 

imposed a minimum usage requirement 

for the first time.8 Also in 1982, the FAA 

implemented an experimental ‘‘Buy/

Sell’’ program, permitting transfers of 

slots in any number and for any 

consideration, to provide for 

‘‘adjustments in slot assignments that 

may be occasioned by seasonal variation 

in demand, competitive pressures, or 

economic decisions of the carriers’’ and 

to increase flexibility of the slot 

allocation system.9 For the 6 weeks the 

‘‘Buy/Sell’’ program was in place, 

approximately 190 slots were 

transferred by sale among carriers.10

Thereafter, the FAA no longer permitted 

slot sales (though trades continued to be 

permitted) because the necessity for 

slots was diminishing as the ATC 

system was being restored.11

The FAA established more permanent 

allocation procedures for slots under the 

HDR in 1985 when it adopted the Buy/ 

Sell Rule, which allowed carriers to 

buy, sell, lease, and trade most slots.12

In a companion rulemaking to the Buy/ 

Sell Rule, the FAA provided for the 

withdrawal of up to five percent of slots 

at slot-controlled airports through a 

reverse lottery to provide a pool of slots 

for new entrants and limited 

incumbents.13 The Buy/Sell Rule 

included use-or-lose provisions and 

explicitly stated slots were an operating 

privilege and not the carriers’ property. 

For the next 15 years the agency 

relied primarily on the secondary 

market authorized by the Buy/Sell Rule 

to address access issues at HDR airports, 

particularly for domestic operations. 

However, carriers without a substantial 

presence at HDR airports increasingly 

criticized the Buy/Sell Rule because 

their access to slot-controlled airports 

was severely limited. Those carriers 

complained to the FAA that 

grandfathering 95 percent of slots at 

slot-controlled airports to incumbent 

carriers left insufficient capacity 

available for reallocation. Carriers 

further criticized the Buy/Sell Rule for 

failing to foster a robust secondary 

market and complained about a lack of 

transparency that permitted private 

transactions arranged to reduce 

competition. Some carriers also 

complained they were unaware of slots 

potentially available for sale or lease 

even when they were seeking to initiate 

or expand service. Finally, a small 

number of carriers contended they were 

effectively denied access to the airports 

because their competitors refused to sell 

slots or provide meaningful lease terms. 

In 1994, Congress began to relax the 

HDR by authorizing the Secretary, upon 

making a public interest finding, to 

grant exemptions from the HDR to 

enable new entrant carriers 14 to provide 

air transportation at certain slotcontrolled airports, including JFK and 

LGA.15 At JFK, the DOT granted 75 slot 

exemptions to new entrant carrier 

JetBlue Airways (JetBlue) under this 

authority in 1999, which were phased in 

over a 5-year period.16 The order stated 


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of 49 U.S.C. 41714(c), Order 99–9–11 (Sep. 16, 

1999). 

17Pub. L. 106–181. 

18Congress directed the HDR phase-out for JFK 

and LGA by January 1, 2007. 49 U.S.C. 41715(a)(2). 

Congress directed the HDR phase-out for ORD by 

July 1, 2002. 49 U.S.C. 41715(a)(1). AIR–21 did not 

phase out the HDR at DCA, and it remains the only 

HDR airport. 

19AIR–21 also granted authority for this type of 

exemption at DCA and ORD. 

20AIR–21 also granted authority for this type of 

exemption at ORD. 

21 49 U.S.C. 41715(b). 

22The Port Authority of New York and New 

Jersey limits the distance to which commercial 

flights may operate on a nonstop basis. 

23FAA Aviation System Performance Metrics 

(ASPM). 

24Calculated from the FAA’s Air Traffic 

Operations Network Database (OPSNET). 

25 65 FR 69126 (Nov. 15, 2000). 

26 65 FR 75765 (Dec. 4, 2000). 

27 71 FR 51360 (Aug. 29, 2006). 

28 71 FR 77854 (Dec. 27, 2006). The LGA Order 

was amended on November 8, 2007 (72 FR 63224), 

on August 19, 2008 (73 FR 48428), on January 15, 

2009 (74 FR 2646), on October 7, 2009 (74 FR 

51653), on April 4, 2011 (76 FR 18616), on May 14, 

2013 (78 FR 28278), and on March 27, 2014 (79 FR 

17222). 

that JetBlue would operate the majority 

of its flights outside the 5 HDR slotcontrolled hours. The Secretary also 

granted 30 slot exemptions at LGA to 

new entrant carriers. 

On April 5, 2000, Congress enacted 

the Wendell H. Ford Aviation and 

Investment Reform Act of the 21st 

Century (AIR–21).17 AIR–21 phased out 

and terminated the HDR at JFK, LGA, 

and ORD.18 In phasing out the HDR, 

AIR–21 directed the Secretary to grant 

two types of exemptions from the HDR’s 

flight restrictions at LGA and JFK. The 

first type of exemption was designed to 

promote more competition at slotcontrolled airports and required the 

Secretary to grant exemptions to a new 

entrant or limited incumbent, defined as 

a carrier holding fewer than 20 slots or 

slot exemptions.19 The second type of 

exemption was aimed at improving 

service to small communities and 

required the Secretary to grant 

exemptions to a carrier operating an 

aircraft with less than 71 seats to smallhub or non-hub airports for an 

unrestricted number of flights.20 AIR–21 

also preserved the FAA’s authority to 

impose flight restrictions by stating that 

‘‘[n]othing in this section . . . shall be 

construed . . . as affecting the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s authority for 

safety and the movement of air 

traffic.’’ 21

B. LaGuardia Airport After AIR–21 

LGA, which provides almost 

exclusively domestic service,22

consistently has been one of the most 

congested airports in the nation. Its 

proximity to midtown Manhattan makes 

it a desirable airport for many travelers, 

and airlines attempt to meet that 

demand by operating many flights to 

LGA. Physical constraints of the airfield 

limit the ability to expand capacity. 

The slot exemptions mandated by 

Congress under AIR–21 facilitated 

access for new entrants and small 

community service at LGA, but the 

trade-off for this service was increased 

airport congestion and delays. By fall 

2000, carriers had added over 300 new 

scheduled flights at LGA and had plans 

to operate even more, resulting from 

more than 600 exemption requests. 

While the number of allowable 

scheduled operations under the HDR 

remained constant at 62 per hour, the 

actual number of scheduled operations 

rose to over 100 in several hours with 

the additional AIR–21 slot exemptions. 

With no new airport infrastructure, 

overall airport capacity remained the 

same while the number of aircraft 

operations and delays soared. 

Additional operations following AIR–21 

resulted in significantly higher delays at 

LGA than existed before 2000. The 

average minutes of delay for all arriving 

flights at LGA increased 144% from 

15.52 minutes in March 2000 (the 

month before AIR–21 was enacted) to 

37.86 minutes in September 2000.23 The 

increase in delay as a result of AIR–21 

was not limited to delays at LGA. 

Flights that arrived and departed late at 

LGA affected flights at other airports 

and in the national airspace system 

(NAS). By September 2000, flight delays 

at LGA accounted for 25 percent of the 

nation’s delays, compared to 10 percent 

for the previous year.24

Using its authority under 49 U.S.C. 

40103, and pending the development of 

a long-term solution, the FAA published 

a Notice of Intent in the Federal 

Register on November 15, 2000, 

announcing its intent to temporarily 

limit AIR–21 slot exemptions at LGA 

and to allocate them via a lottery.25 The 

lottery, which was conducted on 

December 4, 2000, was premised on the 

imposition of an airfield and airspace 

capacity management limit of 75 

scheduled operations per hour (plus six 

unscheduled operations primarily used 

by the general aviation community) 

beginning January 31, 2001.26 This limit 

still allowed a significant increase in 

operations at the airport above the 

HDR’s regulatory limits, thus serving 

Congressional objectives while 

stretching capacity to its practical 

limits. The number of AIR–21 slot 

exemptions at LGA was restricted to a 

total of 159 a day between the hours of 

0700 and 2159. As a result of the hourly 

restrictions, the average number of 

aircraft delays at LGA fell from 330 per 

day in October 2000 to 98 per day in 

April 2001. 

Under AIR–21, slots allocated under 

the HDR at LGA were scheduled to 

expire on January 1, 2007. Based on its 

experience in 2000, the FAA 

determined that simply lifting the HDR 

at LGA would result in a significant 

increase in delays and adversely impact 

the airspace around New York City and 

the NAS as a whole. 

In August 2006, the FAA published a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (LGA 

NPRM) proposing a continuation of the 

existing cap of 75 scheduled and six 

unscheduled hourly operations as well 

as a new method of allocating 

capacity.27 In addition to retaining the 

existing cap, the FAA proposed to 

impose an average minimum aircraft 

size requirement for much of the fleet 

serving the airport. By incentivizing 

carriers to use larger aircraft, the 

proposal was designed to maximize 

passenger throughput consistent with 

the airport’s physical constraints. The 

FAA also proposed to implement a limit 

on the duration of slots that would 

assure 10 percent of the capacity at the 

airport would be available annually for 

reallocation by the FAA. 

The FAA recognized that it would be 

unable to complete its rulemaking by 

January 1, 2007, when the HDR was 

scheduled to expire. After providing for 

notice and comment, the agency 

published an FAA Order Operating 

Limitations at New York LaGuardia 

Airport (LGA Order).28 The LGA Order 

retained the existing limit of 75 

scheduled operations and a reservation 

system for unscheduled operations that 

permitted six unscheduled operations 

per hour. The LGA Order did not 

distinguish between operations 

conducted pursuant to HDR slots and 

AIR–21 slot exemptions; rather, flights 

conducted pursuant to exemptions were 

included in the hourly cap without 

restriction. The slots and exemptions 

were grandfathered to the then-current 

holder as ‘‘Operating Authorizations.’’ 

The LGA Order also explicitly linked its 

duration to the publication of a final 

rule and noted that no rights to 

Operating Authorizations allocated 

under the Order would survive beyond 

the Order. No one challenged the terms 

of the LGA Order or the FAA’s authority 

to re-impose caps at the airport 

following the expiration of the HDR. 

In August 2008, the FAA reduced the 

number of reservations available for 

unscheduled operations at LGA from six 


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29 73 FR 48428 (Aug. 19, 2008). 

30 74 FR 2646 (Jan. 15, 2009). 

31An airport is designated an IATA Level 2 

Schedules Facilitated Airport when demand is 

approaching capacity, and a more formal level of 

cooperation is required to avoid the circumstances 

of over-capacity. At a Level 2-designated airport, a 

schedules facilitator seeks the cooperation and 

voluntary agreement of carriers serving the airport 

to avoid congestion. 

32 72 FR 54317 (Sept. 24, 2007). 

33Under 49 U.S.C. 41722, the Secretary may 

request a delay reduction meeting if ‘‘(1) the 

Administrator determines that it is necessary to 

convene such a meeting; and (2) the Secretary 

determines that the meeting is necessary to meet a 

serious transportation need or achieve an important 

public benefit.’’ 

34 72 FR 59579 (Oct. 22, 2007). 

35 72 FR 60710 (Oct. 25, 2007). When demand for 

an airport exceeds capacity, voluntary cooperation 

is unlikely to resolve the problem, and short-term 

capacity enhancements are not available, an airport 

may be designated as an IATA Level 3 to inform 

airlines that scheduling increases may be 

disallowed. 

36 73 FR 3519 (Jan. 18, 2008), as amended by 73 

FR 8737 (Feb. 14, 2008), 74 FR 51650 (Oct. 7, 2009), 

76 FR 18620 (Apr. 4, 2011), 78 FR 28276 (May 14, 

2013), and 79 FR 16854 (Mar. 26, 2014). 

37 73 FR 8737. 

38 73 FR 41156 (Jul. 17, 2008). 

to three.29 In January 2009, the FAA 

reduced the limits on scheduled 

operations to 71 per hour.30 Although 

the FAA did not withdraw Operating 

Authorizations to reach 71 operations, it 

stated it would retire any returned 

Operating Authorizations to reach that 

limit. These two actions were intended 

to further reduce congestion and delays 

at LGA. 

C. John F. Kennedy International 

Airport After AIR–21 

Until recently, most operations at JFK 

took place during relatively pronounced 

arrival and departure banks 

corresponding to the operating windows 

of transatlantic flights. The FAA 

accommodated those banks and 

achieved maximum efficiency by using 

either two arrival runways and one 

departure runway, or two departure 

runways and one arrival runway. Air 

traffic controllers have employed that 

configuration to facilitate the historical 

transatlantic traffic flows. 

Beginning in the spring of 2006, U.S. 

air carriers serving JFK significantly 

increased their domestic scheduled 

operations throughout the day, changing 

the historical arrival and departure 

patterns. For example, the traditional 

transatlantic arrival and departure 

periods now have significant levels of 

departing and arriving flights, 

respectively. While demand is 

somewhat more balanced, some loss of 

efficiency associated with a two-arrival 

or two-departure runway configuration 

has resulted. 

While operations at LGA remained 

capped throughout 2007, caps on 

afternoon operations at JFK were lifted 

on January 1, 2007, when the HDR 

expired at that airport. Operations at 

JFK already had begun to increase 

during the morning hours, but the 

increase in operations in the afternoon 

hours soon led to long delays, especially 

for departing flights during the evening 

transatlantic departure bank. 

During fiscal year 2007, the average 

daily operations at JFK increased 21 

percent over fiscal year 2006. At the 

same time, on-time performance and 

other delay metrics declined year over 

year. The on-time performance at JFK, 

which is defined as the arrival at the 

gate within 15 minutes of the scheduled 

time, declined from 68.5 percent in 

fiscal year 2006 to 62.19 percent in 

fiscal year 2007. On-time arrivals during 

the peak travel months of June, July, and 

August declined from 63.37 percent in 

2006 to 58.89 percent in 2007, while ontime departures declined from 67.49 

percent to 59.89 percent during that 

period. For fiscal year 2007, the average 

daily arrival delays exceeding 1 hour 

increased by 87 percent over fiscal year 

2006 levels. Additionally, taxi-out 

delays, which measure the time that 

aircraft wait prior to departing the 

runway, increased by 15 percent. Taxiout delays in the evening departure 

periods frequently exceeded 1 hour in 

duration. 

In September 2007, the FAA redesignated JFK as a Level 2 Schedules 

Facilitated Airport 31 for the summer 

2008 scheduling season in accordance 

with the WSG.32 Under the WSG, 

carriers must inform the schedules 

facilitator of projected operations at a 

Level 2 airport for the next scheduling 

season. When submitting the required 

information, the airlines expressed their 

intent to add new flights at JFK during 

peak and off-peak hours for summer 

2008. 

Also in September 2007, the Secretary 

and the Administrator determined that 

a delay reduction meeting was 

necessary to discuss flight reductions 

with U.S. air carriers to reduce overscheduling and flight delays at JFK 

during peak operating hours.33 On 

October 22, 2007, the FAA opened a 

docket for information on the 

establishment of flight reduction targets 

at JFK during peak hours.34 To address 

increases in demand by U.S. and foreign 

air carriers and to provide a process for 

schedule actions, the FAA designated 

JFK a Level 3 Coordinated Airport.35

To address the projected increased 

demand for summer 2008 and the 

previous over-scheduling in summer 

2007 when the airport lacked 

scheduling limits, the FAA convened a 

scheduling reduction meeting on 

October 23–24, 2007. The FAA’s goal 

was to obtain voluntary schedule 

reductions from historically operated 

and planned flights. Subsequent inperson and telephonic meetings took 

place as well. American Airlines, Delta 

Air Lines, and JetBlue, which together 

accounted for three-quarters of the total 

JFK operations, withdrew the schedule 

increases each had proposed for 

summer 2008 during the airport’s 1500 

to 1959 peak hours. They also adjusted 

the timing of operations throughout the 

day to smooth out peaks. Other airlines 

agreed to retime peak operations. 

Consequently, the FAA was able to offer 

additional operations during non-peak 

hours, which increased the daily total of 

operations while decreasing delays over 

the previous summer season. As a result 

of the agreements reached at that 

meeting and other discussions held with 

carriers regarding their planned summer 

2008 schedules, the FAA issued a 

temporary Order limiting scheduled 

operations at JFK to 81 per hour from 

0600 to 2259 (JFK Order).36 That 

temporary Order allocated slots to 

carriers operating at the airport based on 

the number and timing of operations 

negotiated during the schedule 

reduction meetings. Because the 

schedule reductions were voluntary, 

slot allocations in some hours exceeded 

81. The Order permits the FAA to retire 

slots that exceed the hourly limit if 

those slots are returned to the FAA until 

the slot limit is reached. On February 

14, 2008, the FAA amended the JFK 

Order to modify the use-or-lose 

provisions so that they would 

correspond to the WSG.37 The JFK 

Order temporarily responds to the 

carriers’ desire to schedule operations 

above the airport’s capacity during peak 

operating hours, relieves the substantial 

inconvenience to the traveling public 

caused by excessive congestion-related 

flight delays at the airport (which 

rippled through the NAS), reduces the 

average length of delays, improves 

carriers’ ability to plan operations and 

network connections, and provides for 

more efficient use of airspace. 

In July 2008, the FAA proposed to 

limit unscheduled operations at JFK to 

two hourly reservations from 0600 

through 1359, to one hourly reservation 

from 1400 through 2159, and to two 

from 2200 through 2259 at JFK.38 The 

FAA never adopted that proposed 

Order, but the unscheduled limits were 

incorporated in the 2008 Congestion 

Management Rule for JFK and EWR, 

which is discussed later. 


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39 72 FR 54317 (Sept. 24, 2007). 

40 Id. 

41 72 FR 73418 (Dec. 27, 2007). 

42 73 FR 29550 (May 21, 2008), as amended by 74 

FR 51648 (Oct. 7, 2009), 76 FR 18618 (Apr. 4, 2011), 

and 78 FR 28280 (May 14, 2013), and 79 FR 16857 

(Mar. 26, 2014). 

43The appendix to the Order included a few 

operations for summer 2008 above the 81 per hour 

limit. 

44 73 FR 41156 (Jul. 17, 2008). 

45 66 FR 31731 (Jun. 12, 2001). 46A copy of the ARC Report may be found at 

http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/

rulemaking/committees/documents/media/

NY.ARC.Final.Report.20071213.pdf. The report 

contained recommendations for operational 

improvements for the airports and associated 

airspace; discussed the use of market-based systems 

to allocate airport capacity at the airports; explored 

a gate utilization system at LGA proposed by the 

Port Authority; explored a US Airways proposal to 

relax the LGA perimeter rule; examined priority air 

traffic preferences; and considered the adoption of 

IATA WSG at the airports. 

47See http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas_

redesign/regional_guidance/eastern_reg/nynjphl_

redesign/documentation/. 

D. Congestion at Newark Liberty 

International Airport 

EWR has grown to be one of the most 

delay-prone airports in the country. In 

2007, demand during peak hours 

approached or exceeded the average 

runway capacity, resulting in significant 

volume-related delays. These delays 

were aggravated by weather or other 

adverse operating conditions. 

Comparing fiscal year 2007 to fiscal 

year 2000, the percent of on-time gate 

arrivals decreased from 70.66 percent to 

61.71 percent, and arrival delays greater 

than one hour increased, on average, 

from 54 to 93 per day. EWR’s on-time 

arrival performance of 61.8 percent was 

the second worst among the 35 busiest 

airports. Based on ‘‘the airport’s 

performance metrics and imbalance 

between ATC capacity and demand that 

is expected to continue in the near 

term,’’ the FAA designated EWR a Level 

2 IATA Schedules Facilitated Airport 

for the summer 2008 scheduling 

season.39 The FAA explained that 

‘‘increased levels of air traffic 

operations, congestion and delay at 

[both JFK and EWR] and a tangible 

decrease in operational performance’’ 

warranted this designation.40 The FAA 

found the peak morning and afternoon 

hours were particularly congested, but 

that capacity otherwise was available for 

retiming of flights or new operations. 

The information provided by carriers 

for the summer 2008 scheduling season 

reflected a projected increase in flight 

schedules, especially during the peak 

hours. U.S. and foreign carriers had 

planned about 100 new operations per 

day at EWR, many during the afternoon 

and early evening hours. For several 

consecutive hours, the number of hourly 

arrivals and departures would have 

reached between the upper 80s and 

mid-90s. These operations would have 

significantly exceeded the airport’s 

average of 83 total operations per hour 

over the 12-month period ending 

August 2007. These additional flights 

would have caused a spike in 

congestion and delays at EWR and also 

would have adversely affected other 

airports in the New York-New Jersey 

region and the NAS. 

In the autumn of 2007, the FAA found 

it necessary to informally discuss 

summer 2008 schedules with carriers 

operating at EWR because it was 

concerned proposed operations would 

cause excessive congestion-related 

delays. Modeling indicated a potential 

delay increase of almost 50 percent if 

the scheduled flights were operated as 

planned. The FAA asked carriers to 

consider scheduling flights at times 

when there was available capacity. 

However, the FAA realized some 

carriers intended to proceed with their 

plans to begin operating their proposed 

schedules during the busiest hours, 

regardless of the potential impact on 

delay. The FAA also believed limiting 

operations at JFK would create a 

spillover effect at EWR, thus 

exacerbating historical and projected 

delays. To prevent carriers from adding 

flights to already oversubscribed hours 

at EWR and from shifting flights from 

JFK to EWR, the FAA designated EWR 

as a Level 3 Coordinated Airport 

effective for summer 2008.41 After the 

designation, a series of discussions with 

the FAA led some carriers to move a few 

of their historical flights from the most 

oversubscribed hours. The movement of 

these flights permitted addition of a few 

new entrant operations without a net 

increase in delays. 

In May 2008, the FAA placed 

temporary limits on peak hour 

operations at EWR to mitigate persistent 

congestion and delays at the airport 

(EWR Order).42 The EWR Order limited 

scheduled operations during 

constrained hours to an average of 81 

per hour.43 That temporary Order 

allocated slots to carriers operating at 

the airport based on the number and 

timing of operations negotiated during 

the schedule discussions. Because the 

schedule reductions and retimings were 

voluntary, slot allocations in some 

hours exceeded 81. The Order permits 

the FAA to retire slots that exceed the 

hourly limit if those slots are returned 

to the FAA until the slot limit is 

reached. The provisions regarding the 

use of the WSG for use-or-lose mirrored 

those in place for JFK. In July 2008, the 

FAA proposed to limit unscheduled 

operations at EWR to two hourly 

reservations from 0600 through 1159, to 

one hourly reservation from 1200 

through 2159, and two from 2200 

through 2259.44 The FAA never adopted 

that proposed Order, but the 

unscheduled limits were incorporated 

in the 2008 Congestion Management 

Rule for JFK and EWR, which is 

discussed later. 

E. Exploration of Long-Term Congestion 

Management 

Following the enactment of AIR–21, 

the FAA and the DOT began 

investigating a long-term congestion 

management plan for the New York City 

area airports. In June 2001, the FAA 

published a variety of congestion 

management alternatives for public 

comment, including the use of auctions, 

congestion pricing, and administrative 

alternatives.45 Additionally, the FAA 

and the DOT, in conjunction with the 

National Center of Excellence for 

Aviation Operations Research 

(NEXTOR), conducted research 

initiatives of these alternatives. 

The level of interest in a long-term 

plan increased as the sunset of the HDR 

neared and following the experience of 

increased operations at the airports. 

Nationally, the summer of 2007 was the 

second worst on record for flight delays. 

Delays impacted all three New York 

City area airports and cascaded 

throughout the NAS. On September 27, 

2007, the Secretary announced the 

formation of the New York Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee (NYARC) to 

help the DOT and FAA explore 

available options for congestion 

management and how changes to 

current policy for JFK, EWR, and LGA 

would affect the airline access and 

utilization of the airports. 

The NYARC was designed to provide 

opportunity for extensive input by all 

stakeholders, having members from 

every major U.S. air carrier, several 

foreign carriers, associations 

representing different aviation interests, 

and the Port Authority of New York and 

New Jersey (Port Authority). The 

NYARC submitted a report of its 

findings and recommendations to the 

Secretary, dated December 13, 2007.46

The increased congestion and 

associated delays at JFK, EWR, and LGA 

impact each other and the NAS. The 

airspace redesign for the New York/New 

Jersey/Philadelphia metropolitan area, 

approved in 2007, documents the costs 

and far-reaching impacts of delays that 

originate from this area.47 Implementing 


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48 73 FR 20846 (Apr. 17, 2008). 

49 73 FR 29626 (May 21, 2008). 

50 73 FR 60544 (Oct. 10, 2008), amended by 73 

FR 66516 (Nov. 10, 2008). 

51 73 FR at 60574 (Oct. 10, 2008), amended by 73 

FR 66517 (Nov. 10, 2008). 

52 74 FR 52132 (Oct. 9, 2009) (JFK and EWR); 74 

FR 52134 (Oct. 9, 2009) (LGA). 

53 74 FR 52132 (Oct. 9, 2009) (JFK and EWR); 74 

FR 52134 (Oct. 9, 2009) (LGA). The FAA rescinded 

the rules because of the uncertainty caused by an 

Omnibus Appropriations Act provision prohibiting 

the agency from conducting slot auctions and the 

possible impact of the significantly changed 

economic circumstances on the slot auction 

program. Id.; see also Division I, section 115 of the 

Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111– 

8, 123 Stat. 115 (Feb. 17, 2009). 

54 79 FR 16854 (Mar. 26, 2014) (JFK); 79 FR 16857 

(Mar. 26, 2014) (EWR). 

55 79 FR 17222 (Mar. 27, 2014). 

56Allocated slots represent slot allocations for 

Thursdays during August 2012 as reflected in slot 

records maintained by the FAA’s Slot 

Administration Office. For actual operations, an 

average was calculated from Aviation System 

Performance Metrics (ASPM) data for each 

Thursday during August 2012. The ASPM data used 

for this comparison reflects runway arrival or 

departure time and may vary from a flight’s 

scheduled arrival or departure (slot) time due to 

taxi time or other operational reasons. 

airspace redesign will provide increased 

efficiency and congestion relief by, 

among other things, opening additional 

arrival and departure routes in the New 

York City area, and the FAA has begun 

that process. 

Further, the FAA continues to work 

with stakeholders to implement shortterm initiatives to improve the 

efficiency of airport operations and air 

traffic control, particularly during 

severe weather. Additionally, the FAA 

has increased the use of a second 

departure runway at JFK when 

conditions permit. However, none of 

these initiatives offer an immediate or 

complete solution. 

F. Congestion Management Rules of 

2008 

With the three temporary Orders 

limiting operations in place, the FAA 

determined to pursue a long-term 

solution for limiting operations and 

allocating slots for all three airports. 

After evaluating comments to the LGA 

NPRM and input from the NYARC, the 

FAA decided not to adopt its earlier 

proposal to require upgauging aircraft 

size and to reallocate 10 percent of the 

existing capacity each year. Instead, the 

FAA published a supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (LGA SNPRM) in 

April 2008.48 The LGA SNPRM 

proposed to allocate the majority of slots 

to historical operators. The agency also 

proposed to develop a robust market 

and encourage competition by 

withdrawing some slots and auctioning 

them during the first 5 years of the rule. 

The LGA SNPRM would have allocated 

any new or returned capacity via 

auctions. Finally, the FAA proposed to 

sunset the rule in 10 years. 

In conjunction with the LGA SNPRM, 

the FAA published an NPRM for JFK 

and EWR that sought to provide a 

longer-term solution and address a 

number of congestion-related issues 

(JFK/EWR NPRM).49 Similar to the LGA 

SNPRM, the FAA proposed to continue 

the hourly limits on flight operations at 

JFK and EWR, and to allocate the 

majority of slots at each airport to the 

historical operators. Similar to the 

proposal in the LGA SNPRM, the agency 

proposed to develop a robust market 

and induce competition by annually 

auctioning a limited number of slots 

during the first 5 years of the rule. Given 

the significant international presence at 

both airports, the JFK/EWR NPRM 

proposed to use WSG procedures 

instead of auctions to allocate new or 

returned capacity. Additionally, the 

JFK/EWR NPRM contained provisions 

for adoption of the WSG for use-or-lose, 

historic precedence, unscheduled 

operations, and slot withdrawal for 

operational needs. The FAA proposed to 

sunset the rule in 10 years. 

The FAA issued a final rule for JFK 

and EWR, which was consistent with 

the JFK/EWR NPRM, in October 2008 

with a published effective date of 

December 9, 2008.50 The FAA issued a 

final rule for LGA, which was consistent 

with the LGA SNPRM, in October 2008 

with an effective date of December 9, 

2008.51 Multiple parties challenged 

these final rules under the 

Administrative Procedure Act, and the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit stayed their 

effectiveness pending litigation.52 The 

FAA rescinded both final rules on 

October 9, 2009.53

G. Current Slot Management at LGA, 

JFK, and EWR 

Currently, the JFK and EWR Orders 

remain in effect, limiting scheduled 

operations to 81 per hour at each 

airport, until this proposed rule 

becomes effective.54 The LGA Order 

remains in effect, limiting scheduled 

operations to 71 per hour and 

unscheduled operations to three per 

hour, until this proposed rule becomes 

effective.55 The following tables show a 

comparison of allocated slots and 

average actual operations for each 

airport for August 2012.56


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a_ a_ a_ a_ a_ a_ 
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57This modeling used an aircraft queuing model 

produced for the FAA by the MITRE Corporation’s 

Center for Advanced Aviation System Development 

(CAASD). When determining airport capacity, delay 

targets, and slot limits, the FAA relies on modeled 

delay data because it establishes the peak of 

congestion and delays. Modeled delay and actual 

delay may differ because a variety of things occur 

on the day of operation that a model cannot 

consider (such as not scheduled or cancelled 

operations). Actual delay statistics for airports are 

published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

for Research and Technology Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics and can be found at 

http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/data_and_statistics/by_

mode/airline_and_airports/index.html. 

58These hourly limits were adopted in the LGA 

Order. 

59 In early 2009, the FAA sought voluntary 

schedule reductions from carriers to reduce LGA 

delays. American Airlines voluntarily returned 13 

Operating Authorizations in February 2009. 

60The FAA reviewed JFK’s hourly operations 

over a 2-year period, from July 2005 through July 

2007. Over the entire period, the average adjusted 

capacity was 77 hourly operations. During the first 

year, from July 2005 through June 2006, the airport 

had an average adjusted capacity of 74 hourly 

operations. Over the final 6 months of the period 

(February 2007 through July 2007), the average 

adjusted capacity increased to 81 hourly operations. 

Changes in capacity can result from a number of 

factors, and it often is difficult to determine the 

specific cause of the capacity change. These factors 

can include changes in runway configurations, 

taxiway configurations, ground movement 

procedures, airspace procedures, and the interplay 

of regional demand. The FAA strives to increase 

efficiency of operations at all airports with a 

specific focus on safely and efficiently meeting the 

daily operational demand. 

61Schedules initially submitted by carriers for 

summer 2008 would have increased the evening 

departure delays to more than 120 minutes per 

flight. 

62The Order also adopted an Appendix that 

contained the actual schedules then existing at the 

airport. In some hours, scheduled operations 

exceeded the limit of 81 scheduled operations. 

63The Order also adopted an Appendix that 

contained the actual schedules then existing at the 

airport. In some hours, scheduled operations 

exceeded the limit of 81 scheduled operations. 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–C 

JFK and EWR currently have similar 

demand profiles, with an early morning 

peak followed by lower demand in the 

mid-morning. Demand then approaches 

the average runway capacity in the early 

afternoon and typically continues until 

about 2200. LGA, on the other hand, has 

consistently high demand at or above 

the average runway capacity throughout 

the entire day. 

To determine the scheduling limits 

and associated delay mitigation goals 

under the Orders, the FAA modeled 

congestion and delays for each airport.57

To determine the average adjusted 

capacity for an airport, the FAA 

considered the airport’s capacity to be 

the higher value of either the aircraft 

throughput at the airport in a given hour 

or the number of arrivals and departures 

that ATC personnel identified as 

achievable in that hour. As a result, the 

FAA accepted the higher number when 

the airport’s performance exceeded 

expectations, as well as when the 

airport’s potential capacity exceeded 

demand. This measurement reflects the 

airport’s demonstrated and potential 

performance over time under actual 

meteorological and operational 

conditions. The FAA reviewed weekday 

operations over a two-year period to 

capture the variables in daily ATC 

operations. Delay and congestion 

modeling used by the FAA assumes that 

all flights operate as scheduled. Average 

unscheduled demand is randomized 

within the hour. These assumptions 

ensure the modeling reflects full 

utilization of the airport under various 

limits and allows the modeled queuing 

delay to be measured consistently as the 

scheduling limits are varied against 

demand. The model calculates arrival 

delay and departure delay relative to 

schedule, mean delay, and delay greater 

than 0, 15, 60 and 120 minutes. The 

model shows delay by time of day to 

ensure consideration of peak period 

delays. 

When developing the scheduled and 

unscheduled limits (of 71 and 3, 

respectively) for LGA, modeling showed 

a reduction in the scheduled limit from 

75 to 71 could generate a 41% decrease 

in mean delays. As discussed earlier, 

the FAA established a limit of 75 in 

December 2000 to reduce delays 

associated with new flights operating 

under AIR–21 slot exemptions.58

Subsequently the FAA reduced the 

hourly scheduled limit from 75 to 71 to 

provide an opportunity for delay 

reduction at LGA from voluntary returns 

or slots failing to meet the minimum 

usage rules.59 The FAA did not 

withdraw operating authority to achieve 

the lower limit, but reserved the 

authority to retire returned slots 

exceeding the limit. 

When developing the scheduled 

limits for JFK, operational analysis 

showed that the average adjusted 

capacity was steadily increasing over 

time.60 Additionally, a procedural 

change in early 2007 allowed departures 

on Runway 31L beginning at Taxiway 

KK, thereby providing increased runway 

capacity and reduced departure delays. 

Modeling for JFK used the higher 

adjusted airport capacity numbers since 

early 2007, rather than over the two-year 

historical period initially reviewed to 

capture that increased capacity. The 

FAA conducted discussions with 

carriers to seek voluntary agreement to 

retime flights at JFK from the busiest 

hours to less congested times when they 

could be accommodated with a lower 

delay impact. The FAA also restricted 

carriers from adding flights in the peak 

periods. The FAA’s goal was to reduce 

the peak evening departure delays from 

the summer 2007 average of about 80 

minutes.61 The limit of 81 scheduled 

operations per hour in the JFK Order 

reflected that goal and permitted a 

margin for unscheduled operations.62

As a result, modeled peak departure 

delays decreased to about 50 minutes, or 

by 30 minutes per flight when compared 

to summer 2007. As part of the schedule 

discussions for JFK, the FAA accepted 

some flights that exceeded the 

scheduling limits but reserved the 

authority to retire returned slots 

exceeding the limits and work with 

carriers to continue to further depeak 

their schedules. 

When developing the scheduled 

limits for EWR, modeling showed an 

average adjusted capacity of 83 total 

operations per hour with high sustained 

delays throughout the day. 

Additionally, the FAA modeled the 

proposed 2008 schedules and projected 

an even higher level of congestion and 

delays from those proposed schedules 

with EWR already one of the most 

delay-prone airports in the system. The 

FAA established a goal of no increase in 

delays at EWR while permitting 

additional operations to the extent 

practicable. The limit of 81 scheduled 

operations per hour reflected that goal 

and permitted a margin for unscheduled 

operations.63 Although the FAA 

accepted some flights above the hourly 

limits, it reserved the authority to retire 

returned slots exceeding the limits and 

work with carriers to depeak their 

schedules. 

The FAA has continued to monitor 

the three New York City area airports 

since the Orders were put in place to 

determine whether the limits continue 

to be appropriate. Actual performance 

in summer 2008 through 2012 was 

compared to the modeled projections to 

ensure that the model results were 

consistent with actual experience. 

Adjusted airport capacity information 

for 2008 through 2012 was updated. 

This information includes hourly arrival 

and departure rates based on runway 

configuration, demand, operating 

conditions, and actual hourly runway 

operations. Peak summer unscheduled 

demand for each hour between 0600 

and 2259, Eastern time, was reviewed 

for 2008 through 2011. 

Performance at JFK and EWR has 

improved in each year when compared 

to summer 2007. In some cases, actual 

operations were below allocated slot 

levels, and this contributed to delay 

reduction. However, as discussed later 

in this proposal, underutilization of 


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64This information is current as of August 2014 

as reflected in slot records maintained by the FAA’s 

Slot Administration Office. 

65This information is current as of August 2014 

as reflected in slot records maintained by the FAA’s 

Slot Administration Office. Not all indicated 

carriers may be currently operating at the airports. 

slots at a carrier’s discretion also has 

potential competitive and service 

consequences that must be considered 

along with delay mitigation goals. The 

2012 analyses indicated that daily 

unscheduled flights have decreased 

slightly compared to 2008 while peak 

morning and afternoon demand are 

similar to 2007. The adjusted airport 

capacity analysis indicated modest 

changes at EWR and JFK, but the FAA 

is not proposing to change the current 

scheduling limits. The FAA will 

continue to monitor whether changes in 

adjusted airport capacity are long-term 

trends that warrant adjustment of the 

scheduling limits at one or more 

airports. 

During summer 2010, one of the main 

runways at JFK was closed or partially 

closed so a valid comparison to earlier 

periods is not practical. Carriers 

voluntarily reduced scheduled 

operations, and the FAA waived the 

usage requirements to mitigate delay 

impacts from the construction and 

reduced airport capacity. The FAA used 

non-preferred runway configurations 

and waived slot usage requirements to 

facilitate temporary carrier schedule 

reductions to mitigate delays. In 

addition, the Port Authority has adopted 

an automated departure queuing 

program at JFK to manage when aircraft 

are released from the gate. This program 

reduces taxi-out delays for aircraft 

waiting to depart. Many of these 

procedural changes, including the 

departure queuing program, have been 

permanently implemented. 

As stated earlier, delay modeling for 

EWR and JFK analyzed the effects of 

both scheduled and unscheduled 

operations. Although not adopted, the 

FAA had proposed limits on 

unscheduled operations at the airports, 

while accommodating existing 

scheduled operations without creating 

high levels of congestion and delays. 

For 2007, unscheduled operations at the 

two airports averaged two per hour with 

several hours exceeding that average. 

The FAA had proposed limits for each 

airport of one and two operations per 

hour depending on the time of day. For 

summer 2010, actual operations were 

down at JFK and EWR to an hourly 

average of roughly one unscheduled 

operation. Unscheduled operations 

averaged just less than two per hour at 

both airports during the afternoon 

hours. 

The current Orders limit a carrier’s 

ability to transfer a slot (either by trade, 

lease, or sale) beyond the duration of the 

Orders. The Orders were intended as a 

short-term measure to allow time for 

development of a long-term, 

comprehensive rule that included a 

secondary market mechanism. The 

transfer mechanisms in place under the 

Orders differ significantly from those 

permitted under the HDR, currently in 

place only at DCA, which allow slots to 

be bought, sold, leased, or otherwise 

transferred for any duration and to any 

person. 

The following tables show the 

approximate percentage of slots held at 

each airport by carriers holding more 

than one percent of total slots.64 Since 

2008, numerous carriers have obtained 

slots at EWR, JFK, and LGA through 

either FAA allocations or slot 

transactions with incumbent airlines.65

At EWR, new carriers include: Austrian 

Airlines, Avianca Airlines, Cathay 

Pacific Airways, Icelandair, Iceland 

Express Airlines, La Compagnie, 

Southwest Airlines, Virgin America, 

and Vision Airlines. At JFK, new 

carriers include: Arik Air, Brussels 

Airlines, Fly Jamaica Airways, Hawaiian 

Airlines, Hellenic Imperial Airways, 

Interjet, LAN Peru, Nippon Cargo 

Airlines, Nordic Global Airlines, 

Norwegian Air Shuttle, Qatar Airways, 

Transaero Airlines, Virgin America, 

WestJet, and XL Airways France. At 

LGA, new carriers include: Southwest 

Airlines, Virgin America, and WestJet. 

EWR 

Percent 

United Airlines ...................... 73 

American Airlines .................. 7 

Delta Air Lines ...................... 5 

JetBlue .................................. 2 

FedEx ................................... 2 

Air Canada ............................ 2 

Porter Airlines ....................... 2 

Southwest Airlines ................ 1 

JFK 

Percent 

Delta Air Lines ...................... 31 

JetBlue .................................. 26 

American Airlines .................. 17 

United Airlines ...................... 4 

British Airways ...................... 2 

Virgin America ...................... 2 

LGA 

Percent 

Delta Air Lines ...................... 45 

American Airlines .................. 29 

LGA—Continued 

Percent 

United Airlines ...................... 8 

Southwest Airlines ................ 5 

Air Canada ............................ 4 

JetBlue .................................. 3 

Spirit Airlines ......................... 2 

WestJet ................................. 1 

Republic Airline ..................... 1 

Virgin America ...................... 12 

III. Discussion of the Proposal 

Because of the combination of high 

demand and limited ability to increase 

capacity at JFK, EWR, and LGA, the 

FAA must address a dilemma: How can 

the agency manage delays while 

promoting access to carriers wishing to 

operate at the airport, thus encouraging 

competition? This proposed rule 

attempts to address that dilemma. 

Ongoing implementation of the New 

York/New Jersey/Philadelphia 

Metropolitan Area Airspace Redesign 

project and Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen) 

technologies are expected to increase 

the efficiency and reliability of the 

airspace structure and ATC system and 

reduce delays within the next 10 years. 

Although the FAA continues to develop 

and implement these improvements, 

which it believes over time will reduce 

congestion and delays at the New York 

City area airports, it does not anticipate 

these airspace improvements will 

provide significant benefits at JFK, 

EWR, and LGA in the immediate future. 

Letting the Orders expire without 

replacing them with a more permanent 

solution likely would result in a growth 

in operations and consequently high 

levels of congestion and delays, as was 

experienced following AIR–21. 

Rather than take repeated and 

piecemeal approaches to manage slots 

and efficient use of airspace at JFK, 

EWR, and LGA, the FAA believes a 

longer-term and comprehensive rule is 

prudent. The FAA’s longstanding 

preference for addressing capacity 

limitations is to expand airport 

infrastructure, increase airport 

throughput, and improve airspace and 

airport surface efficiency. The FAA 

currently is implementing ways to 

utilize the airspace in the New York 

City area more efficiently and to 

decrease delays, but there are physical 

limitations to expanding these airports 

in the foreseeable future. This proposed 

rule would complement planned 

airspace and airport capacity 

improvements by encouraging more 

efficient use of existing capacity. 

This proposed rule would treat all 

three New York City area airports 


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similarly. To achieve the goal of delay 

management, it would limit scheduled 

and unscheduled operations. To achieve 

the goals of promoting market access 

and competition, it would permit 

transfer of slots between carriers in a 

secondary market that encourages 

transparency. Proposed changes to the 

usage requirement also could improve 

competition and market access at the 

airports by increasing the number of 

scheduled operations that are actually 

operated. Under the current Orders, 

some slots are allocated but not 

scheduled and operated. The FAA 

believes it is necessary to address 

allocation and distribution of slots at 

JFK, EWR, and LGA in a coordinated 

manner because traffic at each of these 

airports affect each other and the NAS 

as a whole. The airports are located 

close to each other and consistently 

have been among the most delay-prone 

airports. This proposal presents five 

different alternatives the FAA is 

considering for how slot transfers would 

operate in a secondary market, and 

these alternatives are discussed in detail 

later in the preamble. The FAA intends 

that any final rule would become 

effective at the beginning of a 

scheduling season to facilitate the 

transition from the Orders to a final 

rule. 

Currently, hourly scheduled 

operations are limited under the Orders 

to 81 at JFK, 81 at EWR, and 71 at LGA, 

and hourly unscheduled operations at 

LGA are limited to three under the LGA 

Order. This proposal, if adopted, would 

replace those Orders. It would adopt the 

current limits on operations, limit 

hourly unscheduled operations to two at 

JFK and one at EWR, and establish daily 

limits on scheduled operations at all 

three airports. 

For seasonal allocations of available 

slots, the FAA proposes to substantially 

follow the WSG at each airport. The 

WSG generally provides a consistent, 

transparent, and fair method of slot 

allocation. This proposed rule 

specifically addresses the WSG 

processes being applied. For WSG 

processes not specifically addressed in 

this proposal or for future changes to the 

WSG, the FAA would consider whether 

they are consistent with this proposed 

rule or other U.S. statutes or regulations. 

The current allocation mechanisms at 

JFK and EWR generally are consistent 

with the WSG. The FAA proposes to 

extend this allocation approach to LGA, 

even though it is an overwhelmingly 

domestic airport, because these 

international guidelines are widely 

understood by carriers. One allocation 

mechanism for all airports also 

maintains consistency and reduces the 

opportunity for confusion on how slot 

management applies at an individual 

airport. The allocation mechanism is 

discussed later and any significant 

deviations from the WSG are noted. 

The FAA also proposes to retain the 

80 percent usage requirement, which is 

consistent with the WSG, at each of the 

airports. The usage requirement would 

be applied to slots on an individual dayof-week basis over the entire season at 

each of the airports, similar to the 

method currently used at JFK and EWR. 

However, the FAA proposes a change in 

the way the utilization rules were 

applied under the Orders and under the 

HDR. The FAA proposes a specific flight 

or series of flights be identified for each 

requested slot throughout the entire 

season. Because each slot has a 

corresponding series of flights, a flight 

associated with one slot in the same 30- 

minute slot time period could not be 

used to help another slot meet the 

minimum usage rules. 

A. Hourly and Daily Slot Limits 

Based on modeling of airport capacity 

and demand at each of the airports, the 

FAA has determined that limits should 

apply throughout most of the day. As 

discussed in the Background section, 

operational demand is steady and 

approaches airport capacity throughout 

the day. The FAA proposes to retain the 

slot-controlled hours as they exist under 

the Orders. Accordingly, the FAA 

proposes the following slot-controlled 

hours: for JFK, daily from 0600 through 

2259; for EWR, daily from 0600 through 

2259; and for LGA, Monday through 

Friday from 0600 through 2159 and 

Sunday from 1200 through 2159. All 

times are expressed in Eastern time, 

which is the local time for all three 

airports. The FAA would use the 24- 

hour clock because carriers currently 

submit schedules using that 

international standard in local time or 

Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). 

Although not proposed, the FAA is 

considering changing the slot-controlled 

hours to daily from 0600 to 2259 for 

LGA to maintain consistency across all 

airports. The FAA believes a consistent 

approach across the three airports 

would reduce confusion for carriers as 

to when slots are required for an 

operation and reduce the carriers’ 

burden when submitting slot requests. If 

the FAA changed the slot-controlled 

hours at LGA, it would have to allocate 

slots in those new hours. The FAA 

tentatively is considering allocating 

daily slots to each carrier for the 

summer and winter scheduling seasons 

that correspond to the maximum 

number of flights that actually were 

operated by the carrier in that hour from 

the last Sunday in March 2014 through 

the first Saturday in September 2014. 

Carriers would be afforded an 

opportunity to return unneeded slots to 

the FAA. Any modifications to 

allocations in those hours due to 

operational changes between the 

publication of the NPRM and effective 

date of any final rule would be handled 

on an individual basis and could be 

temporarily allocated until a permanent 

(historic precedence) allocation is made 

for the subsequent corresponding 

season. The FAA requests comments, 

including specific benefits and 

drawbacks, on whether it should adopt 

a common definition of ‘‘slot-controlled 

hours’’ across the three airports. 

The FAA proposes to limit scheduled 

operations to no more than 81 per hour 

(or any 60-minute period) at JFK, 81 per 

hour at EWR, and 71 per hour at LGA. 

The FAA also proposes to assign slots 

specifically as an arrival or departure in 

30-minute windows, a practice already 

in place under the Orders, to manage 

peaking of operations within the hour. 

These proposed schedule limits would 

be 44 in any 30-minute period at JFK, 

44 in any 30-minute period at EWR, and 

38 in any 30-minute period at LGA. 

While the FAA does not propose to 

change the limits from those currently 

in effect, it may change them in the 

future. Enhanced capacity or delay 

reduction resulting from technological 

advances or procedural changes (e.g., 

NextGen or wake turbulence 

recategorization) may result in future 

increases in slot limits at the airports. 

The FAA will continue to review each 

airport’s capacity and operations before 

each scheduling season when 

determining whether to change slot 

limits. 

The FAA acknowledges that allocated 

slots exceed these schedule limits in 

several hours at each airport, but the 

FAA does not propose to withdraw any 

allocated slots. As applies under the 

Orders, the FAA would reserve 

authority to retire any returned slots 

until allocations in an hour no longer 

exceed the limits. The FAA would 

continue to work with carriers and 

encourage retiming of operations to 

depeak individual time periods, as 

necessary to mitigate congestion and 

delays. 

The nature of operations at JFK, and 

to a lesser extent at EWR, is such that 

demand has historically been less in 

mid-morning and very early afternoon. 

Therefore, many of those lower demand 

hours have allocations below the hourly 

limits of 81. These low demand hours 

currently provide a recovery period that 

reduces delays and prevents them from 

continuing into the peak afternoon 


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hours. The FAA has determined that 

allowing allocations in these hours to 

grow to the limit would result in higher 

and sustained delays throughout the 

entire day because total operations 

would exceed the airport’s actual 

capacity. To mitigate increasing delays 

while preserving historic allocations, 

the FAA proposes a daily slot limit. 

This daily limit would apply to the slotcontrolled hours at LGA and from hours 

0600 to 2159 at JFK and EWR. The FAA 

believes applying the daily limit to the 

2200 hour at JFK and EWR is 

unnecessary because operations in that 

hour contribute little to cumulative 

daily delays. The daily limit would not 

affect operations outside of those hours. 

A daily limit would provide flexibility 

to carriers scheduling flights because 

the FAA could approve new flights or 

retime existing flights to less congested 

hours while preventing a build-up of the 

schedule across the day that would 

result in significant increases in delays. 

The FAA acknowledges the benefits 

of a daily limit at LGA are not as 

significant as at JFK and EWR because 

allocations in most hours at LGA 

currently are at or above the hourly 

limit. A daily LGA limit would limit 

additional allocations in hours that may 

be below 71 scheduled operations, now 

or in the future, providing modest 

delay-management benefits. 

Nevertheless, the FAA proposes a daily 

limit at LGA for consistency purposes 

and to ensure the operational impacts of 

additional flights are considered. 

The FAA considered actual 

allocations accepted in 2008 and what 

was currently operating at each airport 

to determine this daily limit. These 

2008 allocations, and subsequent slot 

allocation decisions made with respect 

to the Orders, establish the upper bound 

of allocations at the airport to meet the 

established delay goals. The FAA 

proposes a daily slot limit of 1,205 at 

both JFK and EWR and 1,136 at LGA. 

This proposed limit would not result in 

any withdrawal of slots. Based on 

current allocations at JFK, there would 

be roughly 20 slots in low demand 

hours available for allocation. At EWR 

or LGA, there would be no slots 

available for allocation. Additionally, 

like the hourly limit at LGA, actual 

allocations currently exceed the LGA 

daily limit. Because slot allocation and 

usage are dynamic, this number of 

available slots is likely to change prior 

to the FAA issuing a final rule. 

B. Allocation of Slots 

The FAA proposes to grandfather all 

existing slot allocations made under the 

Orders for both the summer and winter 

scheduling seasons. This grandfathering 

recognizes that carriers have made 

investment, marketing, operating, and 

business decisions based on the 

assignment of Operating Authorizations 

under the Orders and the expectation 

that those slots would continue to be 

available in future seasons subject to the 

usage and other general Order 

provisions. On the proposed rule’s 

effective date, at JFK and EWR, the FAA 

would assign, according to its records, 

each carrier all slots for the summer 

scheduling season that had been 

approved for the previous summer 

scheduling season as amended through 

the slot allocation process. Similarly, 

the FAA would assign, according to its 

records, each carrier all slots for the 

winter scheduling season that had been 

approved for the previous winter season 

as amended through the slot allocation 

process. At LGA, for the hours of 0600 

through 2159 or 1200 through 2159 on 

Sunday, the FAA would assign each 

carrier all slots held as of the effective 

date for both the summer and winter 

scheduling seasons and for each day-ofweek. 

Temporary, one season-only, and 

other contingent allocations would not 

automatically receive historic 

precedence at the same times. For all 

other slots allocated under this 

transitional mechanism, carriers would 

have historic precedence, provided all 

other proposed conditions are met, for 

the subsequent corresponding 

scheduling season. The FAA tentatively 

has determined this is the most efficient 

method of transitioning from the 

temporary Orders to a more permanent 

regime. These allocated slots, however, 

would be subject to reversion to the 

FAA under the proposal’s minimum 

usage requirements and could be 

withdrawn for operational reasons. 

When making decisions regarding the 

allocation of available slots, the FAA 

would seek to allocate in a manner that 

ensures efficient use of a scarce resource 

and maximizes the benefits to both 

airport users and the traveling public. 

Except as indicated in the following 

discussion, the proposed allocation 

priorities mirror current WSG priorities. 

The FAA believes the WSG approach is 

well-understood and is an 

internationally-recognized system of 

slot allocation at airports. These 

allocation procedures would apply to 

JFK, EWR, and LGA. A WSG-like 

allocation process already applies under 

the JFK and EWR Orders because those 

airports have a significant international 

presence, and the WSG is commonly 

applied to international slot-controlled 

airports and understood by carriers with 

international service. Although a WSG 

procedure previously has not applied to 

LGA, the FAA proposes to do so to 

maintain consistency between the 

airports. A common approach to 

allocating slots reduces the 

administrative burden of multiple 

procedures for both the FAA and 

carriers. A common approach also 

reduces confusion with respect to the 

rules for each airport. The FAA 

understands that carriers with only 

domestic service would have some 

adjustment to the new rules at LGA, but 

most of these carriers already operate at 

JFK or EWR (and would have familiarity 

with the WSG at those airports). The 

FAA does not anticipate changing the 

allocation and usage mechanisms at 

LGA would be overly burdensome. 

Like the WSG, the FAA proposes to 

afford priority treatment for slot 

requests by new entrants. The FAA 

proposes to define a ‘‘new entrant’’ as a 

U.S. or foreign air carrier that holds or 

operates fewer than 20 slots on any day 

of the week, in any combination during 

the slot-controlled hours, at the 

respective airport. That number would 

include any slots that had been returned 

to FAA after the slot return deadline, or 

that had been revoked by the FAA for 

insufficient use, during the two 

corresponding scheduling seasons 

immediately preceding the scheduling 

season for which a slot allocation is 

being conducted. A carrier would not be 

eligible for slot allocation as a new 

entrant if it had returned slots to the 

FAA after the slot return deadline, or 

had slots revoked by the FAA for 

insufficient use, during the two 

corresponding scheduling seasons 

immediately preceding the scheduling 

season for which a slot allocation is 

being conducted. 

The proposed ‘‘new entrant’’ 

definition differs from the definition 

contemplated under the WSG, which 

sets a threshold of five slots, because the 

lower threshold would provide little 

opportunity for a new entrant to 

establish its operations before losing 

new entrant status and thereafter being 

able to expand in those markets only 

through slots obtained in the secondary 

market. With up to 20 slots, a carrier 

would have sufficient flexibility to 

establish a competitive presence at a 

large metropolitan airport such as LGA, 

JFK, or EWR, giving the carrier not only 

a basic foothold but also a critical mass 

of frequencies that would allow it to 

compete effectively. The FAA also 

proposes the definition be applicable at 

each airport, thus establishing a uniform 

definition that is easily understood by 

all stakeholders. 

For purposes of slot allocation, the 

FAA historically has treated U.S. air 

carriers conducting operations solely 


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under another carrier’s marketing 

control with unified inventory control 

as a single carrier. Also, U.S. carriers 

having more than 50 percent common 

ownership have been treated as a single 

carrier for slot allocation purposes; 

however, individual foreign carriers, 

regardless of their ownership, have been 

treated as separate carriers. Under 

international obligations, Canadian 

carriers are treated the same as U.S. 

carriers for slot purposes at U.S. highdensity airports. The FAA does not 

propose to change this approach. 

Prior to the start of the scheduling 

season, and according to the schedule 

published by IATA, the FAA would 

publish a notice in the Federal Register 

announcing the deadline for submitting 

schedule requests for the upcoming 

season. Prior to announcing the 

submission deadline, the FAA would 

conduct an informal airport capacity 

review for each airport, which is 

consistent with its historical practice at 

JFK and EWR and with the WSG. The 

FAA also would provide each carrier 

with a listing of its historic slots. The 

method for calculating historic 

precedence is discussed in more detail 

later in this document. By the deadline 

stated in the Federal Register notice, 

each carrier would submit its proposed 

requests for each airport noting which 

requests are in addition to, or changes 

from, the previous corresponding 

season. If a carrier wishes to make a 

change from an historic slot, it should 

submit a request to retain that slot and 

indicate that it also is requesting the 

change to avoid losing the historic slot 

if the FAA could not confirm the 

change. Based on the FAA experience 

with carriers’ slot trading when 

developing domestic schedules, the 

FAA believes that many carriers would 

not be ready to submit their schedules 

for LGA according to the IATA 

schedule, which requires slot request 

decisions several months before the start 

of the scheduling season. The FAA 

requests comment on whether the FAA 

should set a later submission deadline 

for LGA and what any later deadline 

should be. 

The FAA is not proposing a particular 

format for the submission of schedule 

requests because it wants to avoid an 

unnecessary burden, especially for 

carriers that operate a large number of 

slots at the airports, and wants to 

maximize carrier flexibility. However, 

each slot request would be required to 

indicate the effective dates of the 

request, proposed days of operation, 

proposed time of operation (indicated as 

either UTC or local time), whether the 

operation is an arrival or departure, 

flight number, and aircraft type. 

Although not required under this 

proposal, the FAA would accept 

schedule submissions in IATA Standard 

Schedules Information Manual (SSIM) 

format or another similar format. 

The FAA would accommodate these 

requests by allocating available slots 

according to the priorities set forth in 

proposed § 93.41. First, the FAA would 

confirm any requests for historic slots, 

including those that have adjustments 

within the same 30-minute period or 

other minor changes that do not affect 

operations, prior to the IATA Slot 

Conference. The FAA then would split 

the remaining available slots into two 

pools: One pool for new entrants as 

defined in proposed § 93.36 and another 

pool for all carrier requests. The FAA 

acknowledges this method of 

establishing two pools prior to 

accommodating retimings differs from 

the WSG, but the FAA believes that it 

provides new entrants with a better 

opportunity to access desirable slot 

times. The FAA would allocate any 

available slots according to these 

priorities until there were no available 

slots remaining in each pool. 

Within each pool, the FAA first 

would accommodate carrier requests to 

retime slots for operational reasons. The 

FAA recognizes that a carrier may 

request a retiming of a slot in a 

particular time period that the FAA 

cannot accommodate, and the FAA may 

offer a slot in a different time period. 

The carrier may then trade the slot with 

another carrier to conduct its desired 

operation or may operate in the 

allocated time period. A carrier in this 

situation that makes a request for a 

retiming to its desired slot time for a 

subsequent corresponding season will 

receive priority treatment within the set 

of requests for retimings. The FAA 

would use the carrier’s previous 

requests and slot transfer records to 

make this determination of priority. 

After addressing requests for 

retimings within each pool, the FAA 

then would accommodate requests by 

carriers to extend an allocated seasonal 

slot to year-round service. Consistent 

with the WSG, the FAA gives priority to 

requests for year-round service because 

that service most efficiently uses the 

scarce resource of available slots. 

Finally, the FAA would accommodate 

any remaining requests. The FAA would 

consider the extent and regularity of the 

intended slot use by giving priority to 

intended year-round service and greater 

weight to requests for daily service. The 

FAA would consider the effective 

period of operation by giving greater 

weight to intended use throughout the 

entire season. The FAA also would 

consider schedule constraints of the 

carriers requesting slots, especially if 

the carrier is operating to or from 

another slot-controlled airport. Finally, 

the FAA would consider the overall 

operational impacts of schedule 

requests, including the distribution of 

flights and mix of arrivals and 

departures. This holistic approach 

allows the FAA to best manage airport 

and airspace congestion. 

Because the FAA expects that 

requests for slots would exceed the 

number of slots available in most 

seasons, the FAA proposes to include 

some tie-breaker factors to aid in 

allocation decision-making. Although 

the FAA does not intend these factors to 

be determinative, it could consider 

airport facilities constraints (such as 

constraints on gates, terminals, aircraft 

parking, customs and immigration, and 

curfews) and impacts to competition 

and markets served when weighing 

which request to accommodate. 

C. Usage Requirement 

The FAA proposes to retain the 

current 80% usage requirement for 

historic precedence, but the 

methodology for calculating usage 

would change. The proposed 

calculation method would be used to 

determine historic precedence only for 

slots allocated for summer and winter 

scheduling seasons after this proposed 

rule becomes effective. Determining 

historic precedence for the first summer 

and winter scheduling seasons after this 

proposed rule becomes effective would 

use the calculation method under the 

rules in effect when the slots were 

allocated and operated. 

The 80% usage requirement provides 

a reasonable allowance for planned and 

unplanned cancellations. The usage 

calculation would be applied on an 

individual day-of-week basis. This 

method currently is used for JFK and 

EWR slots, and using this method for 

LGA slots would ensure consistency 

among the airports and afford carriers 

greater flexibility for slot allocations. 

A carrier must use the allocated slot 

at least 80% of the time for the same 

flight or series of flights throughout the 

period for which it is allocated during 

the scheduling season. The same series 

of flights would be at least five flights 

at approximately the same time on the 

same day-of-week, generally with the 

same flight number, generally serving 

the same market, and distributed 

regularly in the same season (for 

example, a 1035 JFK–LAX flight on 

every Monday of the summer season). 

This definition of same series of flights 

allows the FAA to see the intent to 

operate a series of flights but is not 

intended to preclude a carrier from 


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changing the flight number, origin/

destination, or flight time (within the 

same 30-minute slot time period) during 

the scheduling season. The requirement 

to identify markets served with a 

particular slot is not intended to restrict 

a carrier’s service in a particular market; 

it is simply a tool to assist the FAA in 

tracking the use of a specific slot. The 

FAA recognizes tying a slot to a series 

of flights for usage calculation is a 

departure from how it has historically 

applied usage rules. This change, 

however, is consistent with the WSG in 

that a carrier should hold only slots it 

plans to operate. This change is 

intended to address actions by some 

carriers that report a series of flights in 

different slots on various days during 

the reporting period to record usage on 

multiple slots with a single flight. 

Although those actions are not 

prohibited by the current Orders, they 

artificially allow carriers to meet the 

minimum usage rules without 

scheduling a flight for each slot. 

The FAA has found that the practice 

of spreading individual flights over a set 

of slots to achieve 80% usage 

potentially underutilizes slots because 

the full allocation of slots is not being 

scheduled and operated. Theoretically, 

operating four flights 100% of the time 

could meet the 80% usage requirement 

for five slots, which could result in nonutilization of 20% of the allocated slots 

(thereby limiting market access). While 

the FAA acknowledges scheduling 

realities make underutilization to this 

extent impractical, the FAA has 

observed some underutilization 

behavior at JFK, EWR, and LGA. The 

FAA believes this behavior could 

adversely affect the opportunities for 

new entrants to begin service at a 

particular airport or could reduce the 

choices available to consumers. 

This proposal would better ensure 

that the scarce resource of slots is used 

optimally. The FAA acknowledges that 

requiring carriers to operate their full 

allocation of slots could increase the 

number of operations. However, any 

increase in delays over current levels 

should remain within the accepted 

delay levels that were modeled at the 

time the current Orders, and 

corresponding hourly slot limits, were 

implemented. This model assumed full 

slot usage. It is likely that any increase 

in flights also would increase the 

number of flight choices available to 

consumers. The FAA believes another 

result of the changed usage calculation 

could be that a carrier that operates 

fewer flights than its slot holdings could 

dispose of the excess slots on the 

secondary market. The exchange of 

these slots could increase competition at 

the airport and provide consumer 

benefits, especially if the slots were 

acquired by a new entrant. Although the 

FAA believes it unlikely, especially in 

the peak demand hours, a carrier with 

excess slots could return those slots to 

the FAA, and they could be retired in 

hours exceeding the slot limits 

(providing delay-reduction benefits) or 

could be allocated to other carriers 

(providing consumer and economic 

benefits). 

The FAA requests comment on 

whether the proposed usage rate is 

appropriate. Additionally, in theory, it 

is possible that usage requirements may 

encourage carriers to fly smaller-thanoptimal aircraft or to fly less-than-full 

aircraft. The FAA requests comment on 

how the proposed usage requirement 

might impact utilization of slots. Please 

provide data supporting the comments. 

The FAA would have discretion to 

waive the usage requirements when a 

carrier ceases operation at an airport 

due to a strike. The FAA also would 

retain discretion to waive the usage 

requirements in the event of a highly 

unusual and unpredictable condition 

beyond the carrier’s control and 

affecting operations for 5 or more 

consecutive days. These exceptions 

allow carriers and the FAA flexibility to 

adapt to unusual and unexpected 

cancellations in contrast to the usual 

localized weather and mechanical 

cancellations the 80-percent usage rule 

permits. These usage waivers are similar 

to those under the WSG, and they 

previously have been successfully 

applied at U.S. slot-controlled airports. 

In certain circumstances, the FAA also 

could waive the usage requirements for 

a period up to 180 days for a new 

entrant acquiring slots at an airport 

either through FAA allocation or the 

secondary market. 

Under the HDR and the Orders 

limiting operations, slots held by a 

carrier were treated as used on 

Thanksgiving Day, the Friday following 

Thanksgiving Day, and the period from 

December 24 through the first Sunday of 

January. Under those rules, a carrier was 

allocated slots for the entire season 

rather than according to the schedule 

submitted by the carrier. Under this 

proposed rule, a carrier may give back 

a slot to the FAA for short periods of 

time (e.g., the week between Christmas 

and New Year’s Day) when the slot 

would not be scheduled. These periods 

of time are not included in the usage 

calculation. The carrier also would not 

receive historic precedence for the 

periods of time when the slot is given 

back to the FAA. However, because of 

the anticipated limited duration of these 

returns, the FAA believes it is unlikely 

the carrier would be prohibited from 

scheduling during that period in the 

subsequent corresponding season. 

Accordingly, the FAA proposes to 

eliminate general waivers for holiday 

periods. The FAA requests comment on 

whether the elimination of these general 

waivers would create a hardship on 

carriers that the FAA has not 

considered. Comments should be 

supported by specific data 

demonstrating a hardship. 

To aid in the usage calculation, the 

FAA proposes to require carriers to 

submit an interim and final usage report 

to the FAA, as is required under the JFK 

and EWR Orders. The interim report 

would be due by September 1 for the 

summer scheduling season and 

February 1 for the winter scheduling 

season. The final report would be due 

no later than 30 days after the end of the 

respective scheduling season. The 

interim and final reports should detail 

slot usage for each day of the respective 

scheduling season and report the 

following information for each slot held: 

The slot number, airport code, time, and 

arrival or departure designation; the 

operating carrier; the date and 

scheduled time of the actual operation, 

the flight number, origin and 

destination, and aircraft type identifier; 

and whether the flight was actually 

conducted. These reporting 

requirements are similar to those under 

the HDR and Orders. In addition to 

analyzing slot usage reports, the FAA 

would monitor slot usage throughout 

the scheduling season. 

D. Transfer of Slots 

When the FAA adopted the Buy/Sell 

Rule, it recognized slots have value in 

the secondary market. The FAA believes 

the development of a robust secondary 

market ultimately is the best way to 

maximize competition. Over the years, 

the FAA has received complaints that 

carriers were unaware of possible 

opportunities to buy or lease slots, that 

incumbent carriers were colluding to 

constrain new entrant carriers’ market 

access to an airport, and that there was 

uncertainty about the value of slots. The 

DOT and FAA believe increased 

transparency in the secondary market 

would address these concerns as well as 

allow interested parties to better 

understand the nature of slot 

transactions. For these reasons, the FAA 

proposes a secondary market and offers 

five alternatives for proposed § 93.45. 

The FAA requests comments on each of 

these alternatives and assumptions 

associated with these alternatives. The 

most helpful comments would include 

a weighing of the benefits and 

drawbacks of how each alternative 


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addresses transparency of the market, 

efficiency of the transfer process, and 

carrier flexibility in transferring slots to 

meet operational or business goals. 

Under the first alternative, the FAA 

would permit a carrier to buy, sell, or 

lease a slot to another carrier or to trade 

a slot with another carrier for a slot at 

any U.S. or foreign slot-controlled 

airport. This alternative is similar to 

what was permitted under the Buy/Sell 

Rule and would permit privatelynegotiated transactions between 

carriers. The FAA believes this 

alternative creates the least 

administrative burden on carriers, but it 

does not address previously-voiced 

concerns about lack of knowledge of 

opportunities to acquire slots. 

Transparency benefits would be realized 

largely through the transaction approval 

process, which is discussed later. 

Under the second alternative, a carrier 

seeking to sell, lease, or trade a slot with 

another carrier would be required to 

follow a formal process to negotiate the 

terms of the transaction. This alternative 

would require a public notice on an 

FAA-managed bulletin board system. 

The carrier would have to submit a 

notice to the FAA that it intended to 

engage in a slot transaction, and the 

notice would include the carrier’s 

intended terms. These terms would 

include the slots available for transfer 

(slot time and slot number), the type of 

transfer intended (trade, sale, lease), the 

proposed duration of a lease if 

applicable, and the intended effective 

date. The FAA requests comments on 

any additional information that the 

transferring carrier should provide. 

The carrier would make its request to 

the FAA at least 4 months in advance 

of its intended effective date. The FAA 

would post a notice of the offer to 

transfer and relevant details on the FAA 

Web site. The FAA would post that 

notice at least 3 weeks in advance of the 

opening date for bidding, and the notice 

would state the opening and closing 

dates for bidding and the contact 

information for submitting bids. The 

bidding period would last 2 weeks 

unless the transferring carrier requested 

a longer period of time. Carriers (and 

other interested parties) would be able 

to register to receive automatic notices 

when a new posting is published on the 

FAA bulletin board. The transferring 

carrier would not be permitted to 

negotiate terms prior to the start of the 

bidding period. The FAA intends all 

bids would be submitted directly to the 

transferring carrier. The transferring 

carrier could conduct negotiations 

during the bidding period to clarify and 

refine the bid. The transferring carrier, 

however, would be able to consider and 

negotiate only bids submitted during the 

bidding period, but that carrier could 

request an extension of the bidding 

period. Once the bidding period closes, 

the transferring carrier could select its 

preferred offer and negotiate the final 

terms of the transaction. 

The proposed rule would allow the 

transferring carrier flexibility in 

determining the best offer. The FAA 

would not require the carrier to select 

the highest-dollar offer because a carrier 

could place a higher value on non-cash 

assets and on the overall impact of the 

proposed transaction on its operations. 

The FAA requests comments on the 

timeframes being proposed. Is a 4- 

month advance notice to the FAA 

enough time to complete the proposed 

process for completing a transfer 

transaction? Is this advance notice 

period too long to be practical in light 

of operational necessity? Does a 3-week 

public notice provide sufficient time for 

a carrier to obtain necessary approvals 

to bid on a slot? With a system where 

bids are submitted directly to the 

transferring carrier for review and 

further negotiation, would a 1-week 

bidding period be sufficient? 

The third alternative is similar to the 

second alternative, except that carriers 

would be permitted to privately 

negotiate tentative terms of a transaction 

before publishing its intent to transfer 

slots on the bulletin board. Carriers 

could approach any prospective 

transferor or transferee to evaluate the 

market or assess how to package the 

slots for transfer. Those tentative terms 

would be submitted to the FAA and 

posted on the bulletin board, and other 

carriers would be permitted to submit 

counter-offers. The transferring carrier 

could then select its preferred offer and 

privately negotiate the final transaction 

terms. Like the second alternative, the 

transferring carrier would be able to 

consider only counter-offer bids 

submitted during the bidding period. 

Under this alternative, a carrier would 

be able to submit a notice of intent to 

engage in a slot transaction, as under 

Alternative 2, without prior private 

negotiation. 

The fourth alternative attempts to 

encourage the greatest transparency by 

requiring bidders to post their bids on 

the bulletin board during the bidding 

period. A carrier would submit a notice 

to the FAA that it intended to engage in 

a slot transaction, and the bidding time 

frames would be the same as under the 

second alternative. Bidding carriers 

would post their bids, and any 

counterbids, on the bulletin board. 

Therefore, negotiations in the form of 

iterative bids would be available to all 

registered interested parties. Because 

this alternative may require posting of 

proprietary or confidential business 

information, a bidding carrier would 

have the option of posting a summary 

bid with more detailed information 

submitted directly to the transferring 

carrier. The FAA requests comment on 

whether the option for submitting both 

a publicly-available summary bid and 

private detailed bid adequately ensures 

protection of proprietary or confidential 

business information. What level of 

detail for the publicly-available 

summary bid is adequate to inform 

other potential bidders of the 

transaction value? 

The fifth alternative is similar to the 

fourth alternative, but the identities of 

the offering carrier and bidders would 

not be revealed. Bids under this 

alternative would be cash only because 

non-monetary assets could reveal the 

identity of the parties. Under this 

alternative, the offering carrier would be 

required to accept the highest bid 

posted. This alternative would mitigate 

the possibility of any collusion between 

carriers (e.g., by a carrier signaling the 

precise value of its bid to the selling 

carrier). It would also ensure that the 

winning carrier is the carrier that places 

the greatest economic value on the slots, 

leading to more efficient use of slots. 

The FAA requests comment on whether 

a blind bidding process would facilitate 

a more robust secondary market. 

Under the bulletin board alternatives, 

the FAA anticipates the transferring 

carrier would structure its notice in a 

way that permits a transaction involving 

multiple slots in any desirable 

combination. For example, the 

transferring carrier could require 

multiple slots be transferred as a set or 

it would consider bids for smaller 

groupings of slots. The FAA intends to 

allow maximum flexibility for 

transferring slots provided prospective 

bidders have adequate information on 

which to act. The FAA expects that if 

the material terms of the transaction 

change during or after the bidding 

period, the transferring carrier would 

repost the notice of intent to transfer for 

a new bidding period. The FAA requests 

comment on whether it should 

implement additional procedures for a 

subsequent bidding period that 

included shorter notice and bidding 

time frames. Does allowing the 

transferring carrier to craft a notice in a 

way to allow transfer of multiple 

combinations of slots ensure both that 

the transferring carrier would have 

sufficient flexibility in transferring the 

slots, and that bidding carriers would 

have an adequate opportunity to acquire 

the slots? 


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66Because the DOT would be able to review the 

terms of the transaction under this proposal, the 

FAA would strictly enforce the prohibition against 

using transferred slots prior to approval of the 

transfer transaction. 

Under alternatives one through four, 

transactions could include both cash 

and non-cash consideration, and the 

transactions via the bulletin board 

would not have to be blind. A carrier 

also would need to know the identity of 

a bidder offering non-cash assets to 

accurately value those assets. The FAA 

requests comment on whether non-cash 

bids promote competition by enlarging 

the pool of potential bidders, which 

could result in more bidders and more 

valuable bids. 

Do the bulletin board processes 

adequately accommodate complex 

transactions involving consideration 

other than cash? Do the bulletin board 

processes adequately accommodate 

transactions that are initiated by the 

transferee? The FAA also is willing to 

consider additional proposals for, and 

comments on, alternative secondary 

market mechanisms. These additional 

proposals should encourage the efficient 

transfer and use of slots in a transparent 

environment that permits meaningful 

opportunities for all carriers to 

participate. 

Under each of these alternatives, the 

transferee would not be able to use the 

slot until the FAA approved the 

transaction.66 Each party to the 

negotiated transaction would submit a 

request for approval to the FAA along 

with the final terms of the transaction 

including the names of all parties, the 

consideration offered by each party, the 

effective date of the transfer, and, if 

appropriate, the length of the lease. This 

information would be publicly available 

to provide the market with information 

to better value slots as well as provide 

information to the DOT for determining 

any anti-competitive effect of the 

transaction, which is discussed later in 

more detail. The FAA believes this 

knowledge would help establish a more 

robust secondary market and reduce the 

likelihood of collusive or anticompetitive behavior. 

The FAA acknowledges submitting 

detailed terms of a transaction could in 

rare circumstances involve legitimate 

proprietary or confidential business 

information. A carrier may request 

confidential treatment of the request for 

approval while it is under review. The 

FAA’s general practice has been to not 

make this type of information public 

until after approval is granted, 

consistent with the Freedom of 

Information Act. In addition to 

confidential treatment while the request 

is under review, the FAA requests 

comment on whether it should develop 

a process for confidential treatment of 

certain information after the transaction 

is approved. If so, under what limited 

circumstances should this confidential 

treatment be granted to ensure a 

transparent secondary market? The FAA 

also requests comment on whether the 

transaction terms should not be made 

publicly available for a period of time 

after the transaction is approved. If so, 

what is a reasonable period of time? 

Under alternatives two, three, four, 

and five, the FAA proposes some 

limited exceptions to using the bulletin 

board system. The FAA proposes these 

exceptions because it believes they 

would facilitate transfers made for 

operational reasons, or as part of a 

transaction that does not raise concerns 

about a transparent secondary market. A 

carrier may trade a slot on a one-for-one 

basis with another carrier without 

submitting a bulletin board notice, but 

no consideration or promise of 

consideration may be offered for these 

trades. A carrier also may lease a slot to 

another carrier for a period of time no 

longer than two scheduling seasons. The 

FAA would review a series of short-term 

leases to determine whether a carrier is 

effectively engaging in a longer-term 

transaction. For example, a one-season 

transfer that is executed for multiple 

seasons would be construed as a longerterm transfer. In this situation, the FAA 

may disapprove the transaction. Carriers 

would have the option of posting a 

notice on the bulletin board and 

negotiating a new transaction. Trades 

among carriers with unified marketing 

control are permitted without using the 

bulletin board, thus effectively allowing 

those carriers to treat slots as one 

inventory because these transactions do 

not have the characteristics of a normal 

arms-length transaction. Finally, slot 

transfers that take place as a result of a 

carrier merger or acquisition would not 

be subject to the bulletin board 

requirements. These transactions are 

subject to Federal agency review under 

antitrust and other authorities. While 

the bulletin board process would be 

suitable for purposes of transparency 

and competitive opportunity for 

standalone slot transactions, the 

proposed process is not designed for 

slot transfers that result from a carrier 

merger or acquisition. 

Under these alternatives, it may be 

necessary for the DOT to conduct a 

public interest or competitive review of 

a transaction for anti-competitive effect, 

which is discussed later in this 

document. The FAA would not approve 

any transaction until it had received an 

approval or non-objection from the 

Secretary or the initial 14-day review 

period had elapsed. To be clear, the 

FAA would monitor compliance with 

any required bid procedures. 

The FAA requests comments on 

whether variations to the five 

alternatives presented would better 

achieve the stated goals of the 

rulemaking, including creating a vibrant 

secondary market. For example, under 

each alternative, the FAA would post 

the final terms of the transaction. Please 

comment on whether the availability of 

this information facilitates transactions 

in the secondary market. 

While the FAA seeks comment on the 

proposed secondary market alternatives 

noted above, the FAA also is open to 

other mechanisms to more efficiently 

allocate slots in the secondary market. 

For this reason, the FAA requests 

comments regarding lessons learned 

from the use of secondary markets in 

other regulated industries (such as 

market for pollution permits, CAFE 

credits, or wireless spectrum). This 

information may assist the FAA in 

designing a more robust, flexible, and 

efficient secondary market for slots. 

Additionally, the FAA requests 

comments regarding lessons learned 

from historical secondary market 

mechanisms implemented by the FAA 

(such as the HDR or 2006 Chicago 

O’Hare final rule). 

The FAA acknowledges that many 

carriers have engaged in short-term 

trades and leases at JFK, EWR, and LGA 

that extend until the termination date of 

the Orders. Carriers may intend these 

transactions be permanent rather than 

temporary, if permitted by FAA rules. In 

many cases a permanent transaction has 

operational or competition-enhancing 

benefits, but the Orders prohibit a 

transaction lasting beyond their 

effective dates. To facilitate the 

transition of these transactions from the 

Orders to this proposed rule, the FAA 

proposes to waive any bulletin board 

requirements, if adopted, for 90 days 

after the effective date of the final rule 

to allow carriers to negotiate and 

execute these transfers. These 

transactions still would be subject to the 

FAA approval process and DOT review. 

Under the Orders, carriers must 

transfer slots among various carriers 

operating on behalf of the marketing 

carrier. Some of these carriers are 

commonly owned while others are 

contracted service providers. Because 

the carriers operate under their own 

DOT and FAA operating authorities and 

communicate with ATC using their 

discrete call signs, the FAA has a valid 

interest in ensuring that carriers 

operating at a slot-controlled airport 

have the proper slot authorizations. The 

FAA proposes a simplified process in 


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67A standalone slot transaction is a slot transfer 

by one carrier to another carrier (whether by sale, 

purchase, lease, or trade), akin to monetizing a slot. 

The Delta/US Airways slot swap described below 

would be an example of a standalone slot 

transaction, for purposes of this NPRM. A 

standalone slot transaction would occur 

independently of any slot transfers that would 

result from a carrier merger or acquisition, defined 

as a transaction that combines the ownership/

operation/control of two (or possibly more) carriers 

into a single entity. The term ‘‘carrier merger or 

acquisition’’ is drawn from the statutory provision 

governing transfers of HDR slot exemptions, 

prohibiting their purchase, sale, lease, or other 

transfers, but permitting such transfers ‘‘through an 

air carrier merger or acquisition.’’ See 49 U.S.C. 

41714(j). Slot divestitures undertaken in response to 

a DOJ investigation of an airline merger or 

acquisition under the Hart Scott Rodino Antitrust 

Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. 18a, would 

not be considered standalone slot transactions, and 

thus, would be exempt from the secondary 

marketplace alternatives proposed in this rule, 

unless otherwise directed by DOJ. 

68See 49 U.S.C. 41712, authorizing the DOT to 

investigate and prohibit any unfair or deceptive 

practice or an unfair method of competition of an 

air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent. 

69See 49 U.S.C. 40101(a)(9), (10), (12), (13), and 

(16). 

70See 49 U.S.C. 40101(a), which directs the 

Secretary to consider identified matters, ‘‘among 

others,’’ as being in the public interest. 

71 49 U.S.C. 40101(a)(8), (11), (16). 

72Section 40109(b) authorizes the FAA to grant 

an exemption from Section 40103(b)(1), the FAA’s 

authority over use of navigable airspace, ‘‘when the 

Administrator decides the exemption is in the 

public interest.’’ 

73See Notice of a Petition for Waiver of the Terms 

of the Order Limited Scheduled Operations at 

LaGuardia Airport, 75 FR 7306 (Feb. 18, 2010); 

Notice on Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the 

Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia 

Airport, 75 FR 26322 (May 11, 2010); Petition for 

Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limited 

Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia Airport, 76 FR 

63702 (Oct. 13, 2011). 

74 75 FR at 26324 (May 11, 2010); 76 FR 63702 

(Oct. 13, 2011). In reaching these conclusions, the 

DOT calculated each airline’s share of slots and 

Continued 

§ 93.46 for managing the slot holdings of 

carriers with unified inventory and 

marketing control. The FAA believes 

this process would reduce the 

administrative burden on both the FAA 

and on carriers and their regional 

partners. The marketing and operating 

carriers would provide advance 

information to the FAA including the 

planned airport(s), the flight number 

ranges that would be used for marketing 

and ATC purposes, statements by the 

carriers as to which carrier would be 

responsible for ensuring that a slot is 

available, and reporting after the fact 

which carrier(s) operated the slots. Only 

flights meeting the proposed criteria 

would be permitted an exception to the 

advance transfer requirements. Carriers 

would retain the option to transfer slots 

to carriers under their marketing 

control. The FAA requests comments on 

whether this simplified process would 

reduce the administrative burden. 

E. Oversight of Competitive and Public 

Interest Issues 

Over the course of the last several 

years, the DOT has heard many airlines, 

communities, and airports express 

concerns that incumbent slot holders 

have acted to limit competitors’ access 

to slots. Arguments have been made that 

incumbent carriers have chosen not to 

transact with low-cost carriers or new 

entrants, preferring instead to deal with 

other incumbent carriers that hold a 

large portfolio of slots in order to 

preserve a competitive position in the 

market and forestall more rigorous 

competition. Similarly, there have been 

complaints that incumbent slot holders 

transfer slots for short periods to avoid 

losing slots under the application of the 

usage requirement. Consequently, some 

have sought more rigorous oversight and 

transparency of slot transactions. 

This section describes the DOT’s 

proposal to draw upon existing 

authority to review certain slot 

transactions at the New York City area 

airports that may raise potential 

competitive or public interest issues. 

First, this section will explain the DOT’s 

authorities that allow for review of 

standalone transactions.67 In addition, 

this section will provide a summary of 

how DOT has previously exercised 

these authorities. Next, this section will 

set forth the DOT’s proposal for 

reviewing standalone slot transactions 

for competition and public interest 

impacts. Finally, this section will 

explain the DOT’s proposed processes 

for engaging with the public regarding 

tentative determinations and protecting 

confidential information submitted in 

the course of such reviews. Through this 

proposal, the DOT would establish a 

more consistent, transparent, and 

predictable procedure for all 

stakeholders. 

1. Legal Authorities for Reviewing 

Standalone Slot Transactions 

The DOT’s authority to review slot 

transfers resulting from standalone slot 

transactions derives from several 

statutory provisions. The DOT has 

authority under 49 U.S.C. 41712 to 

prohibit airline conduct comparable to 

antitrust violations. Section 41712 

authorizes the DOT to prohibit conduct 

that it determines is an ‘‘unfair method 

of competition.’’ 68 Although the DOT 

has not, in the past, relied on Section 

41712 to take enforcement action in the 

context of airline slot transactions, the 

DOT nonetheless will consider 

exercising this enforcement authority as 

appropriate. 

In addition, the DOT is directed by 

statute, under 49 U.S.C. 40101(a), to 

carry out the pro-competitive aspects of 

the Airline Deregulation Act, in the 

course of carrying out the agency’s 

duties and responsibilities. These procompetitive objectives include 

maintaining the availability of a variety 

of adequate, economic, efficient, and 

low-priced air services; placing 

maximum reliance on competitive 

market forces and on actual and 

potential competition; avoiding airline 

industry conditions that would tend to 

allow at least one air carrier 

unreasonably to increase prices, reduce 

services, or exclude competition in air 

transportation; encouraging, developing, 

and maintaining an air transportation 

system relying on actual and potential 

competition; encouraging entry into air 

transportation markets by new and 

existing air carriers and the continued 

strengthening of small air carriers to 

ensure a more effective and competitive 

airline industry.69

Furthermore, the DOT also is directed 

by statute, under 49 U.S.C. 40101(a), to 

consider certain factors as being in the 

public interest, in the course of carrying 

out the agency’s duties and 

responsibilities. Many of these public 

interest considerations are enumerated 

in the statute, while others are left to the 

Secretary’s discretion.70 Enumerated 

considerations include, among others, 

maintaining and enhancing service to 

small communities and encouraging 

transportation through secondary or 

satellite airports.71

2. Historical Application of Authorities 

Recently, the DOT/FAA has had 

occasion to apply the Section 40101(a) 

pro-competitive policy considerations 

in responding to joint requests of two 

carriers with large slot holdings to 

waive, under 49 U.S.C. 40109,72 the 

prohibition on purchasing LGA slots.73

In that proceeding, Delta Air Lines and 

US Airways sought to exchange slot 

interests at LGA and DCA. The DOT 

evaluated the competitive impact of the 

transaction because of its unique scope 

and scale: the transaction would have 

dramatically enhanced the respective 

market positions of Delta at LGA and US 

Airways at DCA. The combination of an 

increased concentration of slot holdings 

at both airports, an increase in the 

number of monopoly or dominant 

markets in which increased pricing 

power could be exercised, and the 

potential for use of the transferred slot 

interests in an anti-competitive manner, 

led the DOT to seek remedy of the 

potential anti-competitive effects by 

requiring a divestiture of slot interest at 

LGA and DCA.74


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departures, finding that Delta’s share of slot 

interests at LGA would increase substantially, while 

US Airways’ share of slot interests at DCA would 

also increase substantially. The DOT noted that 

low-cost airlines have a limited presence at both 

airports, and the DOT determined that the 

transaction would further inhibit new entry because 

the airlines would have a greater interest in 

maintaining price premiums by forestalling new 

entry. See 75 FR at 7309–7310 (Feb. 18, 2010); 75 

FR at 26329–26330 (May 11, 2010). 

75See 15 U.S.C. 18a. 

76See 75 FR at 26327. 77See 49 U.S.C. 40101(a). 

In the course of that process, the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 

DOT informally agreed that the DOT 

would have primary responsibility to 

consider the carriers’ waiver request and 

DOJ would consider the carriers’ HartScott-Rodino Act (HSR) notification and 

report.75 Under that arrangement, the 

DOT obtained waivers from the parties 

to the transaction and thereby gained 

access to the documents submitted to 

DOJ pursuant to the HSR process. Using 

the documents and its expertise in the 

airline industry, the DOT assisted DOJ 

in that agency’s analysis of the 

transaction. DOJ also participated in the 

DOT’s independent determination of the 

joint waiver request by submitting 

comments, as a party, to the DOT 

docket. In its 2010 grant of waiver with 

conditions, the DOT explained that its 

analysis was complementary to that of 

DOJ. Rather than attempting to enforce 

antitrust laws, the DOT explained that 

it was invoking its authority to protect 

the traveling public by fostering 

competition in the context of the 

requested waiver. Further, the DOT 

clarified that DOJ’s authority under 

Section 7 of the Clayton Act to reject 

anticompetitive transactions ‘‘did not 

remove the DOT’s responsibility to carry 

out its programs consistently with the 

public interest criteria’’ under the procompetitive considerations in Section 

40101.76 DOJ’s submissions and 

analyses of the effects of the requested 

waiver on the availability of slots, 

competition between US Airways and 

Delta, low-cost carrier competition, 

fares, and mitigations of the 

anticompetitive effects were helpful to 

the DOT’s decision-making process. 

3. Review of Standalone Slot 

Transactions for Competitive and/or 

Public Interest Factors 

With respect to standalone slot 

transactions between or among carriers, 

the DOT proposes to conduct reviews 

for purposes of evaluating the effects of 

the transaction based on competitive, or 

other public interest, factors. For 

purposes of the DOT’s review based on 

competitive factors, the DOT proposes 

to limit its review to circumstances 

where the standalone slot transaction 

has the potential to substantially reduce 

competition or create unreasonable 

concentration. For purposes of the 

DOT’s review based on public interest 

factors, the review may examine the 

adverse effects of the slot transfers on 

service to small communities, the 

traveling public, or other statutory 

public interest objectives.77 The DOT, 

however, would not review, on either 

competitive or public interest factors, 

certain routine types of actions 

involving small numbers of slots or a 

lease of slots to new entrants or limited 

incumbents, as explained further below. 

The FAA would forward each request 

for a standalone slot transaction 

approval and the final terms of the 

transaction, required under proposed 

§ 93.45, to the Office of the Secretary. 

The DOT would determine, within 14 

days of receiving the request for 

approval, whether it needed to request 

and evaluate additional information for 

either competitive or public interest 

concerns, or both. As part of the 

Secretary’s determination of those slot 

transactions for which additional review 

is necessary, the Secretary would 

specifically identify the additional 

information required. If the DOT 

requests additional information, the 

FAA would not approve the transaction, 

and any slots involved could not be 

operated by the transferee until the DOT 

notifies the parties and the FAA of its 

approval or non-objection. If the 

Secretary did not notify the parties and 

the FAA within 14 days of the DOT’s 

receipt of the request for approval, the 

FAA could approve the transaction. 

The DOT would review the additional 

information as expeditiously as 

possible. The DOT’s review process 

would be facilitated by the parties’ 

timely information responses provided 

in a readable and workable format. For 

standalone slot transactions reviewed 

due to competition concerns, because 

the competitive factors would take 

antitrust law standards and policies into 

consideration, the DOT intends to 

coordinate and cooperate with DOJ to 

avoid unnecessary duplication of effort 

and burden by agencies and the parties 

concerned. If, after reviewing the 

additional information, the DOT 

determines the slot transaction raises no 

concerns, the Secretary would notify the 

parties and the FAA that the transaction 

may proceed. If the transaction raises 

concerns, the DOT would notify the 

parties of its concerns, propose 

remedies or other actions, and set 

appropriate procedures and timelines 

for review. 

For standalone slot transactions that 

raise competitive issues, the DOT would 

coordinate and consult with DOJ 

throughout the review process, to 

minimize the burden on the affected 

parties and to utilize Government 

resources efficiently. With respect to 

standalone slot transactions, the DOT 

would conduct a separate review under 

49 U.S.C. 40101, and may consider 

using its Section 41712 enforcement 

authority, as appropriate. The DOT 

requests comments and suggestions as 

to how best to minimize the burden on 

parties that may be subject to these 

reviews. The process that the DOT 

would use to conduct these reviews is 

proposed in § 93.47 and further 

explained below. 

The DOT proposes to review 

competitive issues arising from 

standalone slot transactions having the 

potential for significant anti-competitive 

effects, such as those that would 

significantly change the market 

structure at one of the slot-controlled 

airports, allow unreasonable industry 

concentration, permit one or two 

airlines to excessively dominate a 

market, or create an environment that 

would facilitate monopoly powers or 

practices that would tend to cause a 

carrier to unreasonably raise fares, 

reduce services, or exclude competition. 

Such transactions raise concerns 

because they may impede the procompetitive goals of the Airline 

Deregulation Act. 

Among the issues that the DOT may 

consider in determining whether a 

particular standalone slot transaction 

merits further competitive review are 

those analyzed in connection with the 

Delta-US Airways slots swap, including 

whether: 

• The transaction would increase the 

airline’s already dominant position in a 

significant manner, or place the airline 

in a significantly dominant position; 

• the transaction would significantly 

enhance an airline’s ability to 

unreasonably increase its airfares in a 

manner unconstrained by competitors; 

or 

• the transaction would enable slot 

interests to be used in an anticompetitive manner, such as by 

targeting smaller competitors. 

The DOT requests comments on the use 

of these and other criteria to address 

competitive concerns. 

The DOT believes that the 

transparency of the transfer mechanisms 

proposed in some of the secondary 

market alternatives discussed earlier 

would allow a better understanding of 

the dynamics behind slot transactions. 

That additional transparency may 

protect against the kind of behavior 


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78A fleet mix change could affect throughput in 

several ways. Introduction of larger aircraft with 

greater separation standards could reduce the 

number of aircraft that could use a runway. A fleet 

mix change also could change the runways 

available for use, which could affect the 

throughput. 

complained of by some. If the proposed 

transparent system to implement slot 

transfers reveals standalone slot 

transactions that have the potential to 

substantially reduce competition or 

create unreasonable industry 

concentration, the DOT has authority to 

investigate further and disapprove or 

approve with remedies that address the 

potential harm. The DOT also may 

monitor bulletin board postings, if that 

option is adopted in a final rule, to 

determine whether it suspects anticompetitive behavior. These procedures 

for reviewing slot transfer transactions 

do not limit the Secretary’s authority 

under 49 U.S.C. 41712 to investigate 

and prohibit unfair or deceptive 

practices or unfair methods of 

competition. 

To prevent harm to the public interest 

pertaining to factors other than 

competition, the DOT is proposing to 

review standalone slot transactions for 

purposes of analyzing effects that may 

be inconsistent with the public interest 

objectives. The DOT’s public interest 

review could consider adverse effects on 

the traveling public, service to small 

communities, service through secondary 

or satellite airports, or other areas 

covered by the public interest. The DOT 

requests comments on the use of these 

and other criteria to address public 

interest concerns. 

4. Exceptions to Reviews of Standalone 

Slot Transactions 

The DOT expects very few proposed 

standalone transactions would raise 

significant competitive or public 

interest concerns. Accordingly, the DOT 

proposes to exempt from its review the 

more routine types of transactions 

involving small numbers of slots (such 

as those consisting of fewer than eight 

slots in total), involving limited terms 

(such as those extending over two or 

fewer scheduling seasons), involving 

one-for-one trades among incumbents at 

any of the three airports, or involving a 

sale or lease entirely to a new entrant or 

incumbent that holds or operates a 

relatively small proportion of the slots 

at an airport. However, the DOT would 

consider multiple transactions within a 

period of a few years, including slot 

transfers to multiple carriers under the 

marketing or operational control of a 

single entity, as constituting a single 

aggregate transaction that could be 

subject to review. As with HSR filing 

guidance published by DOJ and the 

Federal Trade Commission, the DOT 

would seek to ensure that carriers not 

enter into multiple small transactions 

with the purpose of evading the review 

process; multiple transactions within a 

three-year period could be reviewed if 

they constituted a pattern and raised 

competitive or public interest issues. 

The DOT does not intend to review 

transactions that would be excepted 

from the bulletin board process. 

Nevertheless, it may conduct such 

reviews if it believes carriers have 

engaged in multiple transactions or have 

structured transactions to circumvent 

the competitive or public interest 

review process. 

The DOT requests comments on 

whether the exceptions described above 

create a sufficient safe harbor so that 

transactions enhancing competition and 

providing public benefits are 

encouraged, while still providing the 

DOT with an opportunity to review 

transactions that could impede 

competition, promote monopoly 

markets, unreasonably raise fares, 

reduce service, cause undue harm to 

small communities or service to 

secondary or satellite airports, or 

otherwise adversely impact the public 

interest. Are there alternative ways to 

describe the sorts of slot transfers that 

may be excluded from the review (that 

is, measured by the percentage gain in 

market share by an acquiring carrier)? 

Do the proposed timeframes for 

additional review permit carriers to plan 

slot transfers without discouraging those 

transactions? 

5. Process 

With respect to the proposals outlined 

above regarding reviews of standalone 

transactions for competitive or public 

interest factors, if upon first 

examination, the DOT determines that 

review is necessary, the DOT anticipates 

using expedited procedures to conduct 

that review. The procedures may 

include an opportunity for public 

comment as in the Delta/US Airways 

slot swap proceeding, or, for example, 

as in a potential proceeding involving a 

tentative DOT decision that seeks public 

comment. The DOT intends to 

harmonize such proceedings with DOJ. 

The DOT requests comments on 

appropriate procedures to synchronize 

the process with DOJ and to avoid 

undue burden and duplication on the 

parties. 

With respect to information submitted 

by the parties to a transaction, the DOT 

proposes that parties could request that 

any information submitted to the DOT 

for review and designated as 

confidential not be disclosed to the 

public. The DOT, subject to the 

procedures at 49 CFR part 7, would 

keep such designated information 

confidential and not include it in any 

public proceeding. The DOT would treat 

a request to examine or copy this 

information as any other request under 

the Freedom of Information Act, 5 

U.S.C. 552, and process the request 

under the DOT’s procedures at 49 CFR 

part 7. The DOT would use the 

procedures described in proposed 

§ 93.47(e) for receiving, handling, and 

disclosing such confidential 

information. The procedures at 14 CFR 

302.12 (commonly known as Rule 12) 

would not apply. The DOT requests 

comments on these proposed 

procedures, including the handling of 

confidential documents or alternative 

procedures, to ensure that decisions are 

made in a timely, effective, and 

transparent manner. 

F. Retiming, Suspension, and 

Withdrawal of Slots for Operational 

Reasons 

The FAA proposes to reserve the 

authority to retime or temporarily 

suspend a slot if a reduction in 

operations during a particular time 

period is required. Events such as a 

runway or taxiway closure, a change in 

separation standards, or fleet mix 

change that could impact throughput 78

at the airport may reduce the airport’s 

capacity on a short-term basis. As it has 

done in the past, the FAA would first 

seek voluntary cooperation to retime or 

reduce operations at the airport through 

waivers of the usage requirements and 

temporary schedule reductions. If these 

voluntary measures were insufficient, 

the FAA would temporarily suspend 

slots until reaching the desired 

operational level. The FAA would 

conduct a lottery of slot holdings in the 

particular time period to determine 

which slot to suspend, and credit would 

be given for any voluntarily suspended 

slot. The FAA also would not suspend 

a slot held by a carrier that holds fewer 

than 20 slots on any day of the week at 

the airport. The FAA would provide 

notice 45 days in advance of its 

intention to temporarily suspend a slot, 

unless the operational circumstances 

necessitate a shorter notice period. Once 

the situation requiring a reduction in 

operations ceases, any temporarily 

suspended slots would be returned to 

the carrier that held them provided that 

carrier still is operating at the airport. 

The FAA also reserves the authority 

to permanently withdraw slots at an 

airport. The FAA first would make a 

determination of decreased airport 

capacity that it does not expect to 

increase for an indefinite period of time. 


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79The FAA also reviewed unscheduled 

operations in summer 2009, 2010 and 2012 and 

found slightly fewer unscheduled operations in 

those years. Therefore, the higher 2008 traffic is 

used for this analysis. 

The FAA expects to use a permanent 

withdrawal only in the most unusual 

circumstances when voluntary 

cooperation and a temporary suspension 

of slots is determined insufficient to 

address capacity constraints. The FAA 

would conduct a lottery of slot holdings 

in the particular time period to 

determine which slots to withdraw. The 

FAA would not withdraw a slot held by 

a carrier that holds fewer than 20 slots 

on any day of the week at the airport. 

The FAA would provide notice 45 days 

in advance of its intention to 

permanently withdraw a slot, unless the 

operational circumstances necessitate a 

shorter notice period. Following 

withdrawal, the slot would cease to 

exist. 

The FAA believes that a carrier that 

ceases all operations at an airport 

should not continue to hold a slot and 

earn rental income from it, just as it 

believes that non-carriers should not be 

permitted to hold slots. The FAA 

believes slots held in these ways 

undermine the FAA’s promotion of 

efficient use of a scarce resource 

controlled by the U.S. Government. The 

FAA proposes to allow a carrier that 

ceases all operations to hold the slot at 

that airport for no longer than 2 years 

after the end of the season in which it 

ceased operations. The carrier could 

lease the slot during this period so that 

it does not permanently lose it. This 2- 

year period provides adequate time for 

the carrier to determine its long-term 

plans for operating at the airport and 

either resume operations at the airport, 

return the slot to the FAA, or sell the 

slot to another carrier. After the 2 years 

elapse, the slot would revert to the FAA, 

and any carrier operating the slot would 

have to cease that operation. Similarly, 

if a carrier’s DOT economic authority or 

FAA operating certificate is suspended, 

surrendered, or revoked, any slots held 

by that carrier would revert to the FAA. 

The FAA has determined only operating 

carriers may hold slots. If that carrier 

had an existing agreement under which 

another carrier were operating the slots, 

the FAA could allocate the slots on a 

temporary, non-historical basis for the 

remainder of the scheduling season or 

up to the duration of the agreement to 

avoid disrupting operations or 

expectations of the operating carrier. 

G. Unscheduled Operations 

The FAA proposes to limit 

unscheduled operations into and out of 

JFK, EWR, and LGA during the slotcontrolled hours. Unscheduled 

operations already are limited at LGA by 

Order, and the FAA previously had 

proposed limits on unscheduled 

operations at JFK and EWR. Although 

unscheduled operations (including 

general aviation, passenger and cargo 

charter, ferry, and other ad hoc 

operations) are typically a small 

percentage of overall traffic, the FAA 

has determined these limits are 

necessary because any airport operation 

affects congestion and delays. Even a 

few additional operations during peak 

hours could result in significant 

additional delay, thus eroding the 

effectiveness of the slot limits. 

Accordingly, limitations on 

unscheduled operations should be part 

of any comprehensive plan to manage 

congestion and delays and ensure the 

effectiveness of limits on scheduled 

operations. A comprehensive plan 

should seek to balance airport access to 

all potential operators without 

permitting unreasonably increased 

congestion and delays in the absence of 

FAA oversight. 

The FAA believes most unscheduled 

operations can be accommodated under 

this proposed rule if operators are 

flexible in their arrival and departure 

times. Moreover, the FAA believes that 

general aviation demand and a segment 

of flights conducted as business and 

private charters can be accommodated 

within regional capacity, including 

operating at Westchester County 

Airport, Islip MacArthur Airport, 

Republic Airport, Stewart International 

Airport, Morristown Municipal Airport, 

and Teterboro Airport. Based on data 

from the FAA’s Enhanced Traffic 

Management System (ETMS) for the 

year ended May 31, 2008,79 most 

unscheduled flights can be 

accommodated in the actual requested 

hour or through capacity in an adjacent 

hour (1 hour on either side of the actual 

hour of operation in the data), or 

through additional reservations 

available in visual meteorological 

conditions. If an operator cannot obtain 

a reservation for its preferred time, its 

planned flight times may need to be 

revised because of the limited available 

reservations. 

Unscheduled operations at JFK would 

be limited to two per hour, at EWR to 

one per hour, and at LGA to three per 

hour. The proposed LGA limits are 

consistent with the limit that has been 

in place since 2009. Although the limits 

for JFK and EWR are lower than that for 

LGA, these limits generally correlate to 

actual hourly unscheduled operations at 

the airports in summer 2008. To the 

extent possible, ATC would permit 

additional operations (for example, in 

favorable weather conditions or if 

unallocated slots exist in a particular 

time period). Also, a secondary market 

alternative for unscheduled operations, 

in addition to the existing reservation 

system, could allow slot holders to 

exchange slots that they are not able to 

use on a particular day. The FAA 

requests comments on whether allowing 

slots to be exchanged in the secondary 

market to unscheduled operators would 

lead to a more efficient use of limited 

operational capacity. 

Reservations obtained through the 

FAA’s Airport Reservation Office (ARO) 

would be required prior to conducting 

the operation (except in the case of 

emergency operations) and could be 

obtained up to 72 hours in advance. 

These reservations would allow an 

unscheduled operation (either arrival or 

departure) during a 60-minute period. 

The reservations would be allocated on 

a first-come, first-served basis, 

determined by the time the request is 

received by the ARO. When the ARO 

allocates a reservation, it would assign 

a unique reservation number. Operators 

would primarily obtain reservations 

through the ARO’s interactive computer 

system accessed via the Internet or 

touch-tone telephone system. This 

system is known as the e-CVRS. 

Operators would provide the date and 

time of the proposed operation along 

with other identifying information 

concerning the aircraft and the intended 

flight. Additional reservations would be 

available in the e-CVRS system, but 

these reservations may not appear until 

close to the reservation time. 

All operations at the airport other 

than declared emergencies, whether 

under instrument flight rules (IFR) or 

visual flight rules (VFR), would require 

a reservation. However, non-emergency 

national security, law enforcement, 

military, public aircraft, or other similar 

mission-critical operations may be 

accommodated above the limits with 

prior FAA approval. In the case of 

diplomatic or other flights in direct 

support of foreign governments, the 

FAA would permit additional 

reservations, if necessary, to 

accommodate these flights but may 

approve an operation at a time other 

than the one initially requested. 

The filing of a request for reservation 

would not constitute the filing of an IFR 

flight plan as required under other rules. 

However, an IFR flight plan could not 

be filed until the reservation is obtained. 

The operator would include the 

reservation number in the ‘‘Remarks’’ 

section of the flight plan to indicate that 

it has a reservation for the operation. 

The FAA recognizes the needs of 

public charter operators to confirm 


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airport access for commercial planning 

and 14 CFR part 380 compliance 

purposes. Accordingly, the FAA 

proposes to allow public charter 

operators to obtain a reservation up to 

6 months in advance for a planned 

individual operation or a series of 

operations occurring fewer than three 

times per month. Public charter 

operators planning to conduct a series of 

operations more than three times per 

month would need a slot for those 

operations. 

Public charter operations that seek a 

reservation more than 72 hours and up 

to 6 months in advance of the planned 

operation, would submit their request to 

the FAA’s Slot Administration Office. A 

public charter operator would be 

required to provide the Slot 

Administration Office with a 

certification that any required 

prospectus has been submitted to the 

DOT in accordance with 14 CFR part 

380; the call sign/flight number to be 

used for ATC communication by the 

direct air carrier conducting the 

operation; the date and time of the 

proposed arrival or departure; and the 

origin airport immediately prior to JFK, 

EWR, or LGA, or the destination airport 

immediately following JFK, EWR, or 

LGA; and aircraft type. A public charter 

operator also would be required to 

notify the Slot Administration Office of 

any changes to the above information 

after the reservation has been allocated. 

The number of reservations available 

in advance for public charter operations 

would be limited to one per hour at 

LGA and two per day at JFK and EWR. 

If a public charter operator were unable 

to obtain an advance reservation, it 

could attempt to obtain a reservation 

within the 3-day window that is open to 

all unscheduled operations. A public 

charter operator also could attempt to 

obtain a slot from another carrier in the 

secondary market under proposed 

§ 93.45. 

H. Miscellaneous Amendments 

Because the HDR no longer is in effect 

for JFK, EWR, LGA, and ORD, the FAA 

proposes to remove references to these 

airports in part 93, subparts K and S. 

These out-of-date references have 

caused confusion for the public, and 

these amendments would reduce that 

confusion. Accordingly, the FAA 

proposes to remove references to these 

airports in §§ 93.123 (including the table 

in § 93.123(a)), 93.211, 93.223, 93.226. 

The FAA also proposes to remove 

§§ 93.133, 93.215, 93.217, 93.218, and 

93.221(e) because they do not apply to 

DCA, which is the only airport for 

which the HDR applies. None of these 

amendments would substantively 

change how the HDR applies to DCA. 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

direct that each Federal agency shall 

propose or adopt a regulation only upon 

a reasoned determination that the 

benefits of the intended regulation 

justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) 

requires agencies to analyze the 

economic impact of regulatory changes 

on small entities. Third, the Trade 

Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96–39) 

prohibits agencies from setting 

standards that create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States. In developing U.S. 

standards, this Trade Act requires 

agencies to consider international 

standards and, where appropriate, that 

they be the basis of U.S. standards. 

Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform 

Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) requires 

agencies to prepare a written assessment 

of the costs, benefits, and other effects 

of proposed or final rules that include 

a Federal mandate likely to result in the 

expenditure by State, local, or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation with 

base year of 1995). This portion of the 

preamble summarizes the FAA’s 

analysis of the economic impacts of this 

proposed rule. We suggest readers 

seeking greater detail read the full 

regulatory evaluation, a copy of which 

we have placed in the docket for this 

rulemaking. 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined this proposed rule has 

benefits that justify its costs, and is a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as 

defined in section 3(f) of Executive 

Order 12866 because it raises novel 

policy issues contemplated under that 

executive order. The rule is also 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in the DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The 

proposed rule, if adopted, would not 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities, 

would not create unnecessary obstacles 

to international trade and would not 

impose an unfunded mandate on state, 

local, or tribal governments, or on the 

private sector. 

Total Benefits and Costs of This Rule 

The FAA developed this analysis 

using 2009 data to model the behaviors 

of carriers based on meeting the 

minimum requirement of the proposed 

rule. Under this assumption, carriers 

would incrementally increase actual 

operations in year one to meet the new 

use-or-lose requirement and this new 

operating level would grow by the 

FAA’s Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) 

until it reached the daily limits. In the 

first year carrier utilization of slots will 

be at least 80%. After this year, any 

increase in operations and slot 

utilization is due to an increase in 

forecasted demand. Total benefits and 

costs for the regulatory case are 

estimated at $74,696,596 ($65,242,900 

Present Value at 7%) for benefits and 

$53,056,768 ($46,341,836 Present Value 

at 7%) for costs, assuming the highest 

cost secondary market alternative (either 

alternative four or five) is adopted. 

Moreover, the FAA believes that this 

rule would improve utilization of 

existing slots, possibly increase a 

carrier’s penalty for retaining slots of 

limited value and thus result in the 

return of some slots, and would result 

in net benefits over one year. 

TOTAL COST AND BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVES FOUR OR FIVE OF THE PROPOSED RULE

Year 2012 Benefits Present value 

(7%) Costs Present value (7%) Net benefits 

Regulatory Case .................................................................. $74,696,596 $65,242,900 $53,056,768 $46,341,836 $18,901,064 

Who is potentially affected by this rule? 

• Operators of scheduled and nonscheduled, domestic and international 

flights, and new entrants who do not yet 

operate at JFK, LGA, and EWR. 

• All communities with air service to 

JFK, LGA, and EWR. 

• Passengers of scheduled flights to 

JFK, LGA, and EWR. 

• The Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey, which operates the 

airports. 

• FAA Air Traffic Control. 


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80http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes532011.htm; 

Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational 

Employment and Wages Statistics; Lawyer (May 

2009); In May 2009, the Employee Benefit Research 

Institute, using a Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey 

of employee benefits estimated the total 2009 

benefit as a percentage of payroll at 30.2 percent. 

81http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151041.htm, 

Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2009; 

(15–1041 Computer Support Specialists). 

82http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes532011.htm; 

Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational 

Employment and Wages Statistics; Lawyer (May 

2009); In May 2009, the Employee Benefit Research 

Institute, using a Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey 

of employee benefits estimated the total 2009 

benefit as a percentage of payroll at 30.2 percent. 

Assumptions 

• All costs and benefits are in 2010 

dollars. 

• Costs and benefits estimated for the 

first year. 

• Additional flights added to meet 

new usage requirement excludes 

weekends (Saturday and Sunday). 

• Assume some flights rescheduled to 

meet new usage requirement. 

• Present value discount rate of 

7 percent is applied. 

• Some unscheduled flights would be 

redirected. 

• Carriers that would need to add a 

large number of flights in less desirable 

hours (hours 0600 and 2100) would 

return or sell those slots. 

The majority of the costs and benefits 

from this proposed rule are from 

changes to the usage requirement. The 

secondary market and new 

administrative and reporting 

requirements result in minor benefits 

and costs. Benefits include consumer 

benefits (measured as consumer 

surplus) from additional flights at JFK, 

EWR, and LGA. Costs are attributed to 

the additional operating costs carriers 

incur for these added flights to meet the 

proposed usage requirement, the 

additional minutes of delay and any 

administrative and reporting costs. 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a 

principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ The RFA 

covers a wide-range of small entities, 

including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. If 

the agency determines that it will, the 

agency must prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis as described in the 

RFA. 

The initial regulatory flexibility 

analysis addresses: 

• Description of reasons the agency is 

considering the action; 

The purpose of this rulemaking is to 

replace the current temporary Orders 

limiting operations at LGA, JFK, and 

EWR with a permanent rule. Under the 

existing Orders the hourly scheduled 

operations are limited to 81 at JFK, 81 

at EWR, and 71 at LGA, and 

unscheduled operations are limited to 3 

at LGA. This proposal, if adopted, 

would replace those Orders and 

continue the existing limits on 

scheduled operations in addition to 

limiting unscheduled operations to 2 

per hour at JFK and 1 at EWR and 

establishing daily scheduled operations 

limits. The FAA also intends to increase 

the use of slots through a revised usage 

requirement and secondary market. 

• Statement of the legal basis and 

objectives of the proposed rule; 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in Title 

49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart 

I, Sections 40101, 40103, 40105, and 

41712 and in Title 15 U.S.C. Section 21. 

The FAA has broad authority under 49 

U.S.C. 40103 to regulate the use of the 

navigable airspace of the United States. 

This section authorizes the FAA to 

develop plans and policy for the use of 

navigable airspace and to assign the use 

the FAA deems necessary for safe and 

efficient utilization. 

• Identification, to the extent 

practicable, of all relevant Federal rules 

which may duplicate, overlap or 

conflict with the proposed rule; 

This rule would replace existing FAA 

Orders and does not duplicate, overlap, 

or conflict with other federal rules. 

• Description of the recordkeeping 

and other compliance requirements. 

The FAA proposes a secondary market 

and offers five alternatives. The 

secondary market would permit a 

carrier to buy, sell, or lease a slot to 

another carrier or to trade a slot with 

another carrier. For all five alternatives, 

each carrier party to the negotiated 

transaction would be required to submit 

a request for approval to the FAA along 

with the final terms of the transaction 

including the names of all parties to the 

transaction, the consideration offered by 

each party, the effective date of the 

transfer, and, if appropriate, the length 

of the lease. For four of the alternatives, 

carriers would also submit information 

that would be submitted to the bulletin 

board through either the carrier or the 

FAA. 

The scheduled carrier would incur 

reporting costs for buying, selling, 

leasing or trading a slot. While these 

costs for an operator are minimal, 

largely voluntary, and can provide 

revenue opportunities for small 

operators, a full discussion of these 

costs now follows. For all five 

alternatives, each carrier party to the 

negotiated transaction would be 

required to submit a request for 

approval to the FAA along with the final 

terms of the transaction including the 

names of all parties to the transaction, 

the consideration offered by each party, 

the effective date of the transfer, and, if 

appropriate, the length of the lease. 

Each respondent would require 30 

minutes, that includes 30 minutes for 

the transferring carrier and 30 minutes 

for the receiving carrier. Given the legal 

nature of the agreement a lawyer would 

be retained with an hourly burden labor 

rate 80 of $89.89. 

For alternatives that require the 

bulletin board the FAA estimates that 

carriers would need at least one hour to 

report the buying, selling, or trading of 

a slot. As mentioned above the FAA 

estimates that carriers would post up to 

25 trades. To estimate the annual 

reporting costs to carriers for buying, 

selling, or trading on the bulletin board, 

the FAA multiplied the estimated 

number of annual reports by the number 

of hours needed per report and the 

wage. The hourly burden labor rate was 

for a computer support specialist 81 at 

$30.74. Total yearly cost to carriers, at 

all three airports, is estimated to be 

between $461 and $2,305. For 

alternative 4, there is also the added 

cost to carriers of submitting bids on the 

bulletin board. The bidding period 

would last 14 days, and the FAA 

estimates that bidders would spend 

approximately 2 hours dealing with the 

bid over the course of 14 days. Given 

the public nature of the bid, carriers 

would seek legal review before postings 

bids for an hourly burden labor rate for 

a lawyer 82 of $89.89. The rate 

multiplied by 2 hours per bid sums to 

$179.78. Again, the FAA estimated that 

there would be roughly 25 notices per 

airport a year with approximately 5 bids 

per notice for a total of bids a year. 

• A description and estimated 

number of small entities to which the 

rule would apply. 

Any scheduled carrier, employing less 

than 1,500 employees, with existing 

slots or wanting a slot today would be 

affected by this rule. There are two 


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carriers operating scheduled service 

with less than 1,500 employees and one 

carrier with scheduled service that has 

slightly more than 1,500 employees. 

Also, unscheduled operators that 

employ less than 1,500 employees 

would be considered small entities. 

The delay costs for the small entities 

at the New York City area airports 

would not result in a significant 

economic impact. The annual delay cost 

equals the average of delay per flight, 

multiplied by the total number of 

flights, then by 50 percent attributed to 

ground delay, and then multiplied by 

the average airplane operating cost. 

When this total delay cost is divided by 

annual revenue the result is less than 2 

percent for the small entity scheduled 

operators. The FAA believes that 

compliance cost less than two percent of 

annual revenue is not a significant 

economic impact. 

A small number of unscheduled 

passenger flights planning to operate at 

EWR or JFK may have to operate at 

another New York City area airport, 

such as Teterboro, if they are unable to 

obtain a reservation. This change in 

plans may result in an additional 

ground transportation cost to or from 

the alternative airport. However, when 

considering the cost of travel by private 

jet compared to commercial passenger 

service, any additional ground 

transportation cost is not significant. 

The FAA believes the nonscheduled 

cargo carriers would not have a 

significant economic impact, as their 

flights would continue and most of their 

flights occur at night and would not 

incur delay costs. 

The FAA considered two alternatives 

to the proposed rule. The first 

alternative was to simply extend the 

existing Orders. This alternative was 

rejected because the FAA wanted to 

increase competition by making slots 

available to more operators. The FAA 

believes these operators are likely to be 

small entities. The second alternative 

was to remove the existing Orders. This 

alternative would result in unacceptable 

delay costs from the increase in 

operations. 

Thus, the FAA certifies that this 

proposed rule would not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

C. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such the 

protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed 

the potential effect of this proposed rule 

and determined that it would impose 

the same costs on domestic and 

international entities and thus has a 

neutral trade impact. 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$143.1 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This proposed rule does not contain 

such a mandate; therefore, the 

requirements of Title II of the Act do not 

apply. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the 

FAA consider the impact of paperwork 

and other information collection 

burdens imposed on the public. 

According to the 1995 amendments to 

the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 

1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not 

collect or sponsor the collection of 

information, nor may it impose an 

information collection requirement 

unless it displays a currently valid OMB 

control number. 

This action contains the following 

proposed information collection 

requirements. As required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted 

these proposed information collection 

amendments to OMB for its review. 

Title: Slot Management and 

Transparency for LaGuardia Airport, 

John F. Kennedy International Airport, 

and Newark Liberty International 

Airport. 

Summary: The FAA proposes to 

replace the current temporary Orders 

limiting operations with a permanent 

rule to address the issues of slot 

management at JFK, EWR, and LGA 

airports. The rule would limit 

scheduled and unscheduled operations. 

The FAA also proposes to adjust the 

usage requirements at the New York 

City area airports, establish a cap on 

unscheduled operations at JFK and 

EWR, and develop a secondary market 

for the exchange of slots. More 

information on the proposed 

requirements is detailed elsewhere in 

today’s notice. 

Use of: The information is reported to 

the FAA by carriers holding slots at JFK, 

EWR, or LGA. This information is used 

to allocate, track usage, withdraw, and 

confirm transfers of slots among the 

operators and facilitates the transfer of 

slots in the secondary market. The FAA 

uses this information in order to 

maintain an accurate accounting of 

operations to ensure compliance with 

the operations permitted under the rule 

and those actually conducted at the 

airports. 

The FAA also uses this information to 

help provide access to unscheduled 

operators seeking access to these 

airports. 

The slot exchange information posted 

on the FAA’s electronic bulletin board 

is designed to enhance competition by 

making the availability of slots known 

to new entrant and incumbent carriers 

seeking to serve these markets. 

Respondents: Respondents would be 

carriers with existing service at JFK, 

EWR, and LGA and new carriers 

initiating service at those airports in the 

future (by acquiring slots through slot 

allocation or the secondary market). 

Various carriers included in these totals 

have service at all three airports. There 

are 26 operating carriers at LGA, 46 at 

EWR, and 75 at JFK. 

Respondents also would be 

unscheduled operators seeking to 

operate at LGA, JFK, or EWR. For the 

period from May through August 2010, 

there were approximately 50 

unscheduled operators at LGA, 25 at 

JFK, and 30 at EWR that used the 

respective airports for more than five 

operations. 

Frequency: The information collection 

requirements of the rule involve carriers 

notifying the FAA of their use of slots. 

Each carrier must notify the FAA of its: 

(1) Slot requests for the upcoming 

season; (2) slot usage (operations); (3) 

requests for approval of one-for-one slot 

trades; (4) requests for approval of slots 

transferred between carriers under the 

same marketing control; and (5) 

submissions of bulletin board notices of 

intent to transfer slots and requests for 

approval of secondary market 

transactions. The information collection 


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83This analysis does not assume that a carrier 

operating at more than one of the affected airports 

would recognize an economy of scale, thus 

reducing the estimated amount of time required to 

comply with the proposed requirements. 

requirements also include reservation 

requests from unscheduled operators 

seeking access to the three airports 

during the slot-controlled hours. 

Slot requests for the upcoming 

scheduling season would take place 

twice per year, before the winter and 

summer IATA scheduling seasons. Slot 

usage reporting would occur four times 

per year, with interim and final usage 

reports for each scheduling season. 

Requests for approval of one-for-one 

trades, request for approvals for slots 

transferred between carriers under the 

same marketing control, and submission 

of bulletin board notices regarding the 

intent to transfer slots would all be 

event-driven and would occur as 

frequently as secondary market 

transactions warrant. The FAA 

estimates there would be approximately 

2,700 secondary market transactions per 

year for all three airports. Similarly, 

reservation requests by unscheduled 

operators would also be event-driven 

and could occur as frequently as the 

hourly limit at the respective airport, 

Annual Burden Estimate: The annual 

reporting burden for each subsection of 

the rule is presented below. These 

burden estimates consist of costs that 

would result from the imposition of this 

proposed rule. These include: A 

reservation system for unscheduled 

operations at JFK, EWR, and LGA, 

schedule requests for the upcoming 

season, reporting and monitoring of the 

usage requirement, and the 

documentation required for the 

secondary market bulletin board at all 

three airports. 

Reservation system: 51 unscheduled 

operations per day (34 at JFK, 17 at 

EWR). From prior experience with the 

reservation system at LGA the reporting 

time per reservation is two minutes. 

LGA would continue to have up to 48 

unscheduled operations per day. 

JFK: 

• (34 reservations per day) * (2 minutes 

per reservation) * (365 days per 

year) = Total Annual Hourly 

Burden = 414 hours 

EWR: 

• (17 reservations per day) * (2 minutes 

per reservation) * (365 days per 

year)—Total Annual Hourly Burden 

= 207 hours 

LGA: 

• Monday–Fridays: (48 reservations per 

day) * (2 minutes per reservation) * 

(5 days per week) * (52 weeks per 

year) = Total Annual Hourly 

Burden = 416 hours 

• Sundays: (30 reservations per day) * 

(2 minutes per reservation) * (1 day 

per week) * (52 weeks per year) = 

Total Annual Hourly Burden = 52 

hours 

• Total burden (Mon–Fri, Sunday): = 

Total Annual Hourly Burden = 468 

hours 

Schedule Requests for Upcoming 

Season: The FAA estimates it would 

take each carrier approximately two 

hours per scheduling season to submit 

the required schedule request reports. 

These reports would be submitted to the 

FAA on a semiannual basis, 

corresponding with the winter and 

summer IATA scheduling seasons. 

There are 26 operating carriers at LGA, 

46 at EWR and 75 at JFK for a total of 

147 operating carriers at the three NY 

airports. 

(147 carriers) * (2 hours per report) * 

(2 scheduling seasons) = Total Annual 

Hourly Burden = 588 hours 83

Usage requirement: To confirm 

adherence to the usage requirement, the 

FAA proposes to require carriers to 

submit an interim and final usage report 

to the FAA, for each scheduling season. 

The interim report would be due by 

September 1 for the summer scheduling 

season and February 1 for the winter 

scheduling season. The final report 

would be due no later than 30 days after 

the end of the respective scheduling 

season. The interim and final reports 

should detail slot usage for each day of 

the respective scheduling season and 

report the following information for 

each slot held: the slot number, airport 

code, time, and arrival or departure 

designation; the operating carrier; the 

date and scheduled time of the actual 

operation, the flight number, origin and 

destination, and aircraft type identifier; 

and whether the flight was actually 

conducted. 

(147 carriers) * (1.5 hours per 

submittal) * (4 occurrences per year) = 

Total Annual Hourly Burden = 882 

Hours 

Secondary market transactions: 

Reporting costs for the secondary 

market would vary according to which 

of the five alternatives the FAA chooses. 

Alternative 1 is the least costly. This 

alternative is very similar to current 

practices for lease agreements. This 

alternative does not include the costs for 

a bulletin board, rather carriers would 

privately-negotiate buy, sell, lease, and 

trade transactions. Alternatives 2, 3, 4, 

and 5 alternatively propose a bulletin 

board to post information on buy, sell, 

trade, and lease transactions. Costs 

include the reporting by carriers to the 

FAA. 

From prior experience, the FAA 

estimates that there would be 

approximately 2,700 slot transfer 

transactions yearly for all three airports. 

This amounts to roughly 575 

transactions for EWR, 1480 for LGA, and 

645 for JFK. Many transactions include 

trades among carriers with unified 

marketing control, and those carriers 

could use the simplified process under 

proposed § 93.46 to reduce the reporting 

burden. The proposed oversight of 

secondary market competition may 

require submission of additional 

information, but the DOT expects few 

transactions would be reviewed. 

Secondary Market Trades (not via 

Bulletin Board): 

• 2,700 (total transactions) ¥ 75 

(bulletin board transactions) = 2,625 

secondary market trades 

2,625 (secondary market trades) * 1 

hour per transaction (or 30 minutes 

per party) = 2,625 hours 

The FAA estimates that there would 

be roughly 25 notices per airport per 

year that would be posted to a bulletin 

board under alternatives 2, 3, and 4. The 

FAA estimates carriers would spend 2 

hours preparing and submitting those 

notices. For alternative 4, the FAA 

estimates approximately 5 bids per 

notice for a total of 375 bids at the three 

airports per year. The FAA estimates 

that bidders would spend 

approximately 2 hours dealing with 

each bid. 

Secondary Market Bulletin Board 

Transactions: 

(125 bids per airport) * (2 hours to 

respond to bids) * (3 airports) = 

Total Annual Hourly Burden = 750 

hours 

Summary 

The agency requests comments to— 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

information requirements are necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the agency’s estimate of 

the burden; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology. 

Individuals and organizations may 

submit comments on the information 

collection requirement by March 9, 

2015, and should direct them to the 

address listed in the ADDRESSES section 

of this document. Comments also 

should be submitted to the Office of 


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Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

OMB, via facsimile at (202) 395–6974, 

Attention: Desk Officer for FAA. 

According to the 1995 amendments to 

the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 

1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not 

collect or sponsor the collection of 

information, nor may it impose an 

information collection requirement 

unless it displays a currently valid OMB 

control number. The OMB control 

number for this information collection 

will be published in the Federal 

Register, after the Office of Management 

and Budget approves it. 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these proposed 

regulations. 

Executive Order 13609, Promoting 

International Regulatory Cooperation, 

promotes international regulatory 

cooperation to meet shared challenges 

involving health, safety, labor, security, 

environmental, and other issues and to 

reduce, eliminate, or prevent 

unnecessary differences in regulatory 

requirements. The FAA has analyzed 

this action under the policies and 

agency responsibilities of Executive 

Order 13609, and has determined that 

this action would have no effect on 

international regulatory cooperation. 

G. Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E, Environmental 

Impacts: Policies and Procedures, 

identifies FAA actions that are 

categorically excluded from preparation 

of an environmental assessment or 

environmental impact statement under 

the National Environmental Policy Act 

in the absence of extraordinary 

circumstances. The FAA has 

determined this rulemaking action 

qualifies for the categorical exclusion 

identified in paragraph 312d ‘‘Issuance 

of regulatory documents (e.g., Notices of 

Proposed Rulemaking and issuance of 

Final Rules) covering administration or 

procedural requirements (Does not 

include Air Traffic procedures; specific 

Air Traffic procedures that are 

categorically excluded are identified 

under paragraph 311 of this Order.)’’. It 

has been determined that no 

extraordinary circumstances exist that 

may cause a significant impact and 

therefore no further environmental 

review is required. A documented 

categorical exclusion has been filed in 

the docket. 

V. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

See the ‘‘Regulatory Evaluation’’ 

discussion in the ‘‘Regulatory Notices 

and Analyses’’ section elsewhere in this 

preamble. 

B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this proposed 

rule under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency has determined that this action 

would not have a substantial direct 

effect on the States, or the relationship 

between the Federal Government and 

the States, or on the distribution of 

power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government, and, 

therefore, would not have Federalism 

implications. 

C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

The FAA analyzed this proposed rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

agency has determined that it would not 

be a ‘‘significant energy action’’ under 

the executive order and would not be 

likely to have a significant adverse effect 

on the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. 

VI. Additional Information 

A. Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. The agency also invites 

comments relating to the economic, 

environmental, energy, or federalism 

impacts that might result from adopting 

the proposals in this document. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the proposal, explain 

the reason for any recommended 

change, and include supporting data. To 

ensure the docket does not contain 

duplicate comments, commenters 

should send only one copy of written 

comments, or if comments are filed 

electronically, commenters should 

submit only one time. 

The FAA will file in the docket all 

comments it receives, as well as a report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

this proposed rulemaking. Before acting 

on this proposal, the FAA will consider 

all comments it receives on or before the 

closing date for comments. The FAA 

will consider comments filed after the 

comment period has closed if it is 

possible to do so without incurring 

expense or delay. The agency may 

change this proposal in light of the 

comments it receives. 

Proprietary or Confidential Business 

Information: Commenters should not 

file proprietary or confidential business 

information in the docket. Such 

information must be sent or delivered 

directly to the person identified in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section of this document, and marked as 

proprietary or confidential. If submitting 

information on a disk or CD–ROM, mark 

the outside of the disk or CD–ROM, and 

identify electronically within the disk or 

CD–ROM the specific information that 

is proprietary or confidential. 

Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is 

aware of proprietary information filed 

with a comment, the agency does not 

place it in the docket. It is held in a 

separate file to which the public does 

not have access, and the FAA places a 

note in the docket that it has received 

it. If the FAA receives a request to 

examine or copy this information, it 

treats it as any other request under the 

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 

552). The FAA processes such a request 

under Department of Transportation 

procedures found in 49 CFR part 7. 

B. Availability of Rulemaking 

Documents 

An electronic copy of rulemaking 

documents may be obtained from the 

Internet by— 

1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or 

3. Accessing the Government Printing 

Office’s Web page at http://

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 

Copies may also be obtained by 

sending a request to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, Office of 

Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or 

by calling (202) 267–9680. Commenters 

must identify the docket or notice 

number of this rulemaking. 

All documents the FAA considered in 

developing this proposed rule, 

including economic analyses and 

technical reports, may be accessed from 

the Internet through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal referenced in item 

(1) above. 

VII. The Proposed Amendment 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 93 

Air traffic control, Airports, 

Navigation (air). 


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1300 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 5 / Thursday, January 8, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 93—SPECIAL AIR TRAFFIC 

RULES 

■ 1. Revise the authority citation for part 

93 to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101, 

40103, 40105, 40106, 40109, 40113, 41712, 

44502, 44514, 44701, 44715, 44719, 46301; 

15 U.S.C. 21. 

■ 2. Amend part 93 by adding subpart 

C to read as follows: 

Subpart C—LaGuardia Airport, John F. 

Kennedy International Airport, and Newark 

Liberty International Airport Slot 

Management Rules 

Sec. 

93.35 Applicability. 

93.36 Definitions. 

93.37 Slots for scheduled arrivals and 

departures. 

93.39 Determination of historic precedence. 

93.41 Allocation of slots. 

93.43 Reversion, suspension, and 

withdrawal of slots. 

93.44 Reporting requirements. 

93.45 Transfer of slots. 

93.46 Operation of slots by carriers under 

common marketing control. 

93.47 Oversight of competitive issues. 

93.49 Unscheduled operations. 

Subpart C—John F. Kennedy 

International Airport, Newark Liberty 

International Airport, LaGuardia 

Airport Slot Management Rules 

§ 93.35 Applicability. 

(a) This subpart prescribes the air 

traffic rules for the arrival and departure 

of aircraft used for scheduled and 

unscheduled service, other than 

helicopters, at John F. Kennedy 

International Airport (JFK), Newark 

Liberty International Airport (EWR), and 

LaGuardia Airport (LGA). 

(b) This subpart prescribes procedures 

for the assignment, transfer, lease, and 

withdrawal of slots issued by the FAA 

for scheduled operations at JFK, EWR, 

and LGA. 

(c) This subpart applies to operations 

at: 

(1) JFK, daily from 0600 through 2259, 

Eastern time; 

(2) EWR, daily from 0600 through 

2259, Eastern time; and 

(3) LGA, Monday through Friday from 

0600 through 2159, Eastern time, and 

Sunday from 1200 through 2159, 

Eastern time. 

(d) A U.S. or, to the extent provided 

for by international agreements, foreign 

air carrier conducting operations solely 

under another carrier’s marketing 

control with unified inventory control is 

not considered a separate carrier under 

this subpart. 

§ 93.36 Definitions. 

For purposes of this subpart: 

Airport Reservation Office (ARO) is an 

operational unit of the FAA’s David J. 

Hurley Air Traffic Control System 

Command Center. Its responsibilities 

include the administration of 

reservations for unscheduled operations 

at JFK, EWR, and LGA (excluding 

reservations for public charter 

operations allocated under § 93.49(d)). 

Carrier is a U.S. or foreign air carrier 

with authority to conduct scheduled 

service or regularly conducted 

commercial service under parts 121, 

129, or 135 of this chapter and the 

appropriate economic authority under 

14 CFR chapter II and 49 U.S.C. chapter 

401, 411, and 413. 

Enhanced Computer Voice 

Reservation System (e-CVRS) is the FAA 

system used to make an arrival or 

departure reservation at JFK, EWR, or 

LGA. Reservations are made through a 

touch-tone telephone interface, an 

Internet Web interface, or directly 

through the ARO. 

New entrant is a U.S. or foreign air 

carrier that holds or operates fewer than 

20 slots on any day of the week, in any 

combination during the slot-controlled 

hours, at the respective airport, with 

that number including any slots that 

have been returned to the FAA after the 

slot return deadline or had slots revoked 

by the FAA for insufficient use, during 

the two corresponding scheduling 

seasons immediately preceding the 

scheduling season for which a slot 

allocation is conducted. 

Public charter is defined in 14 CFR 

380.2 as a one-way or roundtrip charter 

flight to be performed by one or more 

direct carriers that is arranged and 

sponsored by a charter operator. 

Public charter operator is defined in 

14 CFR 380.2 as a U.S. or foreign public 

charter operator. 

Reservation is an authorization 

received from the FAA to operate an 

unscheduled arrival to or departure 

from JFK, EWR, or LGA for a specific 

60-minute period during the slotcontrolled hours. 

Scheduled operation is the arrival or 

departure segment of any operation 

regularly conducted by a carrier 

between JFK, EWR, or LGA and another 

airport regularly served by the carrier. 

Scheduled series of flights is at least 

5 operations on the same day-of-week 

that represent substantially the same 

scheduled service. These operations 

generally would be at the same time 

within a specific 30-minute period, have 

the same flight number, serve the same 

market, and be distributed regularly 

throughout the season. 

Slot is the operational authority 

assigned by the FAA to a carrier to 

conduct one scheduled operation or a 

series of scheduled operations, or a 

series of public charter operations that 

are operated more than three times per 

month, at JFK, EWR, or LGA on a 

particular day(s) of the week during a 

specific 30-minute period. 

Slot-controlled hours are: 

(1) For JFK, daily from 0600 through 

2259, Eastern time; 

(2) For EWR, daily from 0600 through 

2259, Eastern time; 

(3) For LGA, Monday through Friday 

from 0600 through 2159, Eastern time, 

and Sunday from 1200 through 2159, 

Eastern time. 

Slot return deadline is the date by 

which a carrier must return a slot that 

it does not intend to operate. For the 

summer season, the deadline is January 

15. For the winter season, the deadline 

is August 15. 

Standalone slot transaction is a slot 

transfer by one carrier to another carrier 

(whether by sale, purchase, lease, or 

trade), akin to monetizing a slot. A 

standalone slot transaction would occur 

independently of any slot transfers that 

would result from a carrier merger or 

acquisition, defined as a transaction that 

combines the ownership/operation/

control of two (or possibly more) 

carriers into a single entity. Specifically, 

slot divestitures undertaken in response 

to a DOJ investigation of an airline 

merger or acquisition under the Hart 

Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements 

Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. 18a, would not 

be considered standalone slot 

transactions. 

Summer scheduling season begins on 

the last Sunday of March. 

Unscheduled operation is an arrival 

or departure segment of any operation 

that is not regularly conducted by an air 

carrier, foreign air carrier, or other 

operator of an aircraft, excluding 

helicopters, between JFK, EWR, or LGA 

and another service point. Certain types 

of air carrier and foreign air carrier 

operations are considered unscheduled 

operations under this subpart including: 

on demand, public and other charter 

flights; hired aircraft services; extra 

sections of scheduled flights; ferry 

flights; and other non-passenger flights. 

Winter scheduling season begins on 

the last Sunday of October. 

§ 93.37 Slots for scheduled arrivals and 

departures. 

(a) No person may operate certain 

public charters or any scheduled arrival 

into or departure out of JFK, EWR, or 

LGA during the slot-controlled hours 


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without first obtaining a slot under this 

subpart. 

(b) Except as otherwise approved by 

the Administrator, the number of slots 

are limited to no more than 81 per hour 

at JFK, 81 per hour at EWR, and 71 per 

hour at LGA. 

(1) At JFK, the number of slots may 

not exceed 44 in any 30-minute period, 

81 in any 60-minute period, or a total 

of 1,205 between the slot-controlled 

hours of 0600 and 2159. 

(2) At EWR, the number of slots may 

not exceed 44 in any 30-minute period, 

81 in any 60-minute period, or a total 

of 1,205 between the slot-controlled 

hours of 0600 and 2159. 

(3) At LGA, the number of slots may 

not exceed 38 in any 30-minute period, 

71 in any 60-minute period, or a total 

of 1,136 during the slot-controlled 

hours. 

(4) The FAA may adjust the number 

of arrival and departure slots in any 

period as necessary based on the actual 

or potential delays created by such 

number or other considerations relating 

to congestion, airfield capacity, and the 

air traffic control system. 

§ 93.39 Determination of historic 

precedence. 

(a) Any carrier holding operating 

authorizations (except for temporary, 

one-season-only, or other contingent 

operating authorizations) allocated 

under the Order limiting operations at 

JFK, the Order limiting operations at 

EWR, or the Order limiting operations at 

LGA, as evidenced by the FAA’s 

records, will be assigned corresponding 

slots in 30-minute periods consistent 

with the limits under § 93.37(b) and the 

carrier’s summer and winter season 

schedules as approved by the FAA. The 

carrier will have historic precedence, 

subject to the requirements of this 

section, for these slots for the 

subsequent corresponding season. 

(b) To be eligible for historic 

precedence, an allocated slot must be 

used at least 80% of the time for which 

it is allocated during the scheduling 

period, subject to the following: 

(1) Absent approval by the FAA, the 

same flight or series of flights must be 

reported as used for an allocated slot 

throughout the summer or winter 

season. 

(2) For a series of flights operated on 

more than one day-of-week, each day-ofweek is considered a separate series of 

flights. 

(3) The FAA will treat as used a slot 

held by a carrier that ceases operations 

using that slot due to a strike. 

(4) The FAA may waive these usage 

requirements in the event of a highly 

unusual and unpredictable condition 

which is beyond the carrier’s control 

and which affects carrier operations for 

a period of five or more consecutive 

days. 

(5) The FAA may waive these usage 

requirements for a period of up to 180 

days if a slot is allocated to or otherwise 

acquired by a new entrant carrier. 

(c) A slot allocated by the FAA under 

§ 93.41(i) does not have historic 

precedence for the subsequent 

corresponding season. 

§ 93.41 Allocation of slots. 

(a) Requests for slots must be 

submitted to the FAA Slot 

Administration Office at the address 

and by the deadline published by the 

FAA in a Federal Register notice for 

each summer and winter scheduling 

season. The request must include the 

following minimum information: 

(1) The requesting carrier must submit 

its entire schedule at JFK, EWR, and 

LGA, as appropriate, for the particular 

season, noting which requests, if any, 

are in addition to, or changes from, the 

previous corresponding season at the 

respective airport. 

(2) Each slot request must indicate the 

effective dates of the request, proposed 

days of operation, proposed time of 

operation (indicated as either UTC or 

local time), whether the operation is for 

an arrival or departure, flight number, 

and aircraft type. 

(b) The FAA first will accommodate 

requests for slots for which the carrier 

has historic precedence and are for the 

same time period as the previous 

corresponding season. 

(c) After accommodating historic 

precedence slots, the remaining slots 

available for allocation will be divided 

into two pools: 

(1) Not less than 50% of the available 

slots will be for new entrants that have 

not returned slots to the FAA after the 

slot return deadline, or had slots 

revoked by the FAA for insufficient use, 

during the two corresponding 

scheduling seasons immediately 

preceding the scheduling season for 

which a slot allocation is being 

conducted; and 

(2) The remainder will be for any 

carrier. 

(d) Within each pool, the FAA first 

will accommodate carrier requests to 

retime slots for operational reasons. 

(e) Within each pool, the FAA next 

will accommodate carrier requests to 

extend an allocated seasonal slot to 

year-round service. 

(f) Within each pool, the FAA then 

will accommodate any remaining carrier 

requests. If all requests cannot be 

accommodated, the FAA will consider 

the following factors: 

(1) The effective period of operation; 

(2) The extent and regularity of 

intended slot use with priority given to 

year-round service; 

(3) Schedule constraints of carriers 

requesting slots; and 

(4) The operational impacts of 

scheduled demand, including the 

distribution of flights and the mix of 

arrivals and departures. 

(g) If an available slot cannot be 

allocated according to the factors in 

paragraph (f) of this section, the FAA 

may consider the following factors: 

(1) Airport facilities constraints 

including gates, terminals, parking, 

customs and immigration, and curfews; 

and 

(2) Competition and impacts to 

markets served. 

(h) A carrier allocated a slot under 

paragraph (f) of this section must 

operate that slot and may not transfer it 

for two corresponding seasons, except 

that carrier may engage in a one-for-one 

trade for operational reasons. 

(i) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) 

through (g) of this section, the FAA may 

assign an available slot to a carrier on 

a non-permanent, first-come, firstserved basis subject to permanent 

assignment under this subpart. Any 

remaining unassigned slots may be 

made available to unscheduled 

operations on a non-permanent basis 

according to the procedures in § 93.49. 

(j) The FAA will assign each slot a 

designation that consists of the airport 

code, slot number, 30-minute time 

period, frequency, summer or winter 

season, and arrival or departure 

designation. 

(k) If directed by the Office of the 

Secretary of Transportation, the FAA 

will not apply the provisions of this 

section to any foreign air carrier or 

commuter operator of a country that 

provides slots to U.S. air carriers and 

commuter operators on a basis more 

restrictive than provided under this 

subpart. 

§ 93.43 Reversion, suspension, and 

withdrawal of slots. 

(a) Absent prior approval by the FAA 

and except as otherwise provided in this 

subpart, a carrier that ceases all 

operations at an airport may transfer, 

sell, or lease any slots to another carrier 

as provided in § 93.45, but the carrier 

may not hold any slots for a period 

exceeding 2 years after the season in 

which it ceases all operations at the 

respective airport. 

(b) If a carrier’s DOT economic 

authority or FAA operating certificate is 

suspended, surrendered, or revoked, 

any slots held by that carrier revert to 

the FAA. If another carrier is operating 


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the slots under an agreement with the 

holding carrier, the FAA may allocate 

those slots on a temporary basis not 

exceeding the duration of the 

agreement. 

(c) The FAA may retime or 

temporarily suspend slots at any time to 

fulfill operational needs. The FAA will 

provide a 45-day notice, unless shorter 

notice is required for operational needs, 

to an affected carrier prior to 

temporarily suspending a slot that 

specifies the date by which operations 

using that slot must cease. The FAA will 

determine the suspended slots by lottery 

of slot holdings in the particular time 

period during which slots are being 

suspended. The FAA will reassign a 

suspended slot, if at all, only to the 

carrier from which it was suspended, 

provided the carrier continues to 

conduct scheduled operations at the 

respective airport. 

(d) If the FAA determines to reduce 

the number of allocated slots following 

a determination of decreased airport 

capacity, it may permanently withdraw 

slots to reach the accepted limit. The 

FAA will determine the withdrawn slots 

by lottery of slot holdings in the 

particular time period during which 

slots are being withdrawn. Following 

withdrawal, those slots would cease to 

exist. 

(e) The FAA will not retime, suspend, 

or withdraw slots, under this section, of 

a carrier that holds fewer than 20 slots 

on any day of the week at the respective 

airport. 

§ 93.44 Reporting requirements. 

(a)(1) No later than September 1 for 

the summer scheduling season and 

February 1 for the winter scheduling 

season, each carrier holding a slot must 

submit an interim report of slot usage 

for each day of the applicable 

scheduling season. 

(2) No later than 30 days after the last 

day of the applicable scheduling season, 

each carrier must submit a final report 

of the completed operations for each 

day of the entire scheduling season. 

(b) The report required under 

paragraph (a) this section must contain, 

in a format acceptable to the FAA, the 

following information for each slot: 

(1) The slot number, airport code, 

time, and arrival or departure 

designation; 

(2) The operating carrier; 

(3) The date and scheduled time of 

each of the operations conducted with 

the slot, including the flight number, 

origin and destination, and aircraft type 

identifier; and 

(4) Whether the flight was actually 

conducted. 

(c) The FAA may withdraw the slots 

of any carrier that does not meet the 

reporting requirements of paragraph (a) 

of this section. 

§ 93.45 Transfer of slots. [ALTERNATIVE 

ONE] 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in 

this subpart, a carrier may buy, sell, or 

lease a slot to another carrier for any 

consideration and for any time period, 

and a carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier for a slot at any U.S. or 

foreign slot-controlled airport. 

(b) Requests for FAA approval of 

transfers under this section must be 

submitted in writing by all parties to the 

transaction to the FAA Slot 

Administration Office in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator. 

Requests must provide the names of the 

transferor and recipient; business 

address and telephone number of the 

person representing the transferor and 

recipient; whether the slot is to be used 

for an arrival or departure; and the slot 

designation of the slot as described in 

§ 93.41(j). 

(c) The request for FAA approval also 

must include the final terms of the 

transaction including: 

(1) The names of all parties to the 

transaction; 

(2) The consideration offered by each 

party; 

(3) The effective date of the transfer; 

and 

(4) The length of the lease, if 

applicable. 

(d) Prior to approving the transfer, the 

FAA will confirm the transferred slots 

come from the transferor’s FAAapproved slot holdings and that no 

transfer limitations apply. 

(e) The Secretary may review the final 

terms of the transaction for any anticompetitive effects or adverse public 

interest effects under § 93.47. The FAA 

may not approve the transfer until the 

Secretary notifies the FAA of the 

Secretary’s approval or non-objection or 

the 14-day notice period under 

§ 93.47(b) elapses. 

(f) The slot may not be used by the 

transferee until the conditions of this 

section have been met, and the FAA 

provides notice of its approval of the 

transfer. 

§ 93.45 Transfer of slots. [ALTERNATIVE 

TWO] 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in 

this subpart, a carrier may buy, sell, or 

lease a slot to another carrier for any 

consideration and for any time period, 

and a carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier for a slot at any U.S. or 

foreign slot-controlled airport. 

(b) Except as permitted under 

paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of this 

section, a carrier must provide notice to 

the FAA four months before its intended 

transaction date of its intent to transfer 

a slot prior to negotiating with another 

carrier. The notice of intent to transfer 

must include the slot number and time, 

effective date of the transfer, and, if 

applicable, the duration of the lease. 

The FAA will post a notice of the offer 

to transfer the slot and relevant details 

on the FAA Web site at http://

www.faa.gov. The notice will state the 

opening and closing dates for bids and 

the contact information of the 

transferring carrier for bid submission. 

The offering carrier may accept any bid 

and negotiate the final terms of the 

transfer, but it may consider only bids 

submitted during the bidding period. 

(c) A carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier on a one-for-one basis 

without providing notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification by both 

carriers that no consideration or 

promise of consideration was provided 

by either party to the trade. 

(d) A carrier may lease a slot to 

another carrier without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the lease is effective for no 

longer than two scheduling seasons. 

(e) Carriers with agreements where 

one carrier operates solely under the 

other’s marketing control may transfer a 

slot with another party subject to that 

agreement without notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification of that 

agreement by both carriers. 

(f) Prior to [90 DAYS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE], a carrier may buy, 

sell, or trade with another carrier a slot 

that was subject to a lease or short-term 

trade under the Order limiting 

operations at JFK, Order limiting 

operations at EWR, or Order limiting 

operations at LGA without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section. 

(g) Requests for FAA approval for 

transfers under this section must be 

submitted in writing by all parties to the 

transaction to the FAA Slot 

Administration Office in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator. 

Requests must provide the names of the 

transferor and recipient; business 

address and telephone number of the 

person representing the transferor and 

recipient; whether the slot is to be used 

for an arrival or departure; and the slot 

designation of the slot as described in 

§ 93.41(j). 

(h) The request for FAA approval also 

must include the final terms of the 

transaction including, as applicable: 


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(1) The names of all parties to the 

transaction; 

(2) A description of the transaction; 

(3) The consideration offered by each 

party; 

(4) The names of all bidders and 

consideration offered by each bidder; 

(5) The effective date of the transfer; 

and 

(6) The length of the lease. 

(i) Prior to approving the transfer, the 

FAA will confirm the relevant slots are 

part of the carrier’s FAA-approved slot 

holdings and that no transfer limitations 

apply. 

(j) The Secretary may review the final 

terms of the transaction for any anticompetitive effects or adverse public 

interest effects under § 93.47. The FAA 

may not approve the transfer until the 

Secretary notifies the FAA of the 

Secretary’s approval or non-objection or 

the 14-day notice period under 

§ 93.47(b) elapses. 

(k) The slot may not be used by the 

transferee until the conditions of this 

section have been met, and the FAA 

provides notice of its approval of the 

transfer. 

§ 93.45 Transfer of slots. [ALTERNATIVE 

THREE] 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in 

this subpart, a carrier may buy, sell, or 

lease a slot to another carrier for any 

consideration and for any time period, 

and a carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier for a slot at any U.S. or 

foreign slot-controlled airport. 

(b) Except as permitted under 

paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (f) of this 

section, a carrier may negotiate tentative 

terms of a transfer without providing 

advance notice to the FAA. A carrier 

must provide notice to the FAA four 

months before its intended transaction 

date of these tentative transfer terms 

that includes the slot number and time, 

effective date of the transfer, 

consideration offered, and, if applicable, 

the duration of the lease. The FAA will 

post a notice of the relevant details of 

the transfer on the FAA Web site at 

http://www.faa.gov. The notice will 

state the opening and closing dates for 

bids and the contact information of the 

transferring carrier(s) for bid 

submission. The offering carrier may 

accept the tentative transaction or any 

counterbid and then negotiate the final 

terms of the transfer, but it may consider 

only bids submitted during the bidding 

period. 

(c) A carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier on a one-for-one basis 

without providing notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification by both 

carriers that no consideration or 

promise of consideration was provided 

by either party to the trade. 

(d) A carrier may lease a slot to 

another carrier without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the lease is effective for no 

longer than two scheduling seasons. 

(e) Carriers with agreements where 

one carrier operates solely under the 

other’s marketing control may transfer a 

slot with another party subject to that 

agreement without notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification of that 

agreement by both carriers. 

(f) Prior to [90 DAYS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE], a carrier may buy, 

sell, or trade with another carrier a slot 

that was subject to a lease or short-term 

trade under the Order limiting 

operations at JFK, Order limiting 

operations at EWR, or Order limiting 

operations at LGA without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section. 

(g) Requests for FAA approval for 

transfers under this section must be 

submitted in writing by all parties to the 

transaction to the FAA Slot 

Administration Office in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator. 

Requests must provide the names of the 

transferor and recipient; business 

address and telephone number of the 

person representing the transferor and 

recipient; whether the slot is to be used 

for an arrival or departure; and the slot 

designation of the slot as described in 

§ 93.41(j). 

(h) The request for FAA approval also 

must include the final terms of the 

transaction including: 

(1) The names of all parties to the 

transaction; 

(2) The consideration offered by each 

party; 

(3) The names of all bidders and 

consideration offered by each bidder, if 

applicable; 

(4) The effective date of the transfer; 

and 

(5) The length of the lease, if 

applicable. 

(i) Prior to approving the transfer, the 

FAA will confirm the transferred slots 

come from the transferor’s FAAapproved slot holdings and that no 

transfer limitations apply. 

(j) The Secretary may review the final 

terms of the transaction for any anticompetitive effects or adverse public 

interest effects under § 93.47. The FAA 

may not approve the transfer until the 

Secretary notifies the FAA of the 

Secretary’s approval or non-objection or 

the 14-day notice period under 

§ 93.47(b) elapses. 

(k) The slot may not be used by the 

transferee until the conditions of this 

section have been met, and the FAA 

provides notice of its approval of the 

transfer. 

§ 93.45 Transfer of slots. [ALTERNATIVE 

FOUR] 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in 

this subpart, a carrier may buy, sell, or 

lease a slot to another carrier for any 

consideration and for any time period, 

and a carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier for a slot at any U.S. or 

foreign slot-controlled airport. 

(b) Except as permitted under 

paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (f) of this 

section, a carrier must provide notice to 

the FAA four months before its intended 

transaction date of its intent to transfer 

a slot prior to negotiating with another 

carrier. The notice of intent to transfer 

must include the slot number and time, 

effective date of the transfer, and, if 

applicable, the duration of the lease. 

The FAA will post a notice of the offer 

to transfer the slot and relevant details 

on the FAA Web site at http://

www.faa.gov. The notice will state the 

opening and closing dates for bids and 

the contact information of the 

transferring carrier. Bids must be 

submitted through the bulletin board for 

public posting. The offering carrier may 

accept any bid and negotiate the final 

terms of the transfer, but it may consider 

only bids submitted during the bidding 

period. 

(c) A carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier on a one-for-one basis 

without providing notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification by both 

carriers that no consideration or 

promise of consideration was provided 

by either party to the trade. 

(d) A carrier may lease a slot to 

another carrier without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the lease is effective for no 

longer than two scheduling seasons. 

(e) Carriers with agreements where 

one carrier operates solely under the 

other’s marketing control may transfer a 

slot with another party subject to that 

agreement without notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification of that 

agreement by both carriers. 

(f) Prior to [90 DAYS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE], a carrier may buy, 

sell, or trade with another carrier a slot 

that was subject to a lease or short-term 

trade under the Order limiting 

operations at JFK, Order limiting 

operations at EWR, or Order limiting 


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operations at LGA without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section. 

(g) Requests for FAA approval for 

transfers under this section must be 

submitted in writing by all parties to the 

transaction to the FAA Slot 

Administration Office in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator. 

Requests must provide the names of the 

transferor and recipient; business 

address and telephone number of the 

person representing the transferor and 

recipient; whether the slot is to be used 

for an arrival or departure; and the slot 

designation of the slot as described in 

§ 93.41(j). 

(h) The request for FAA approval also 

must include the final terms of the 

transaction including: 

(1) The names of all parties to the 

transaction; 

(2) The consideration offered by each 

party; 

(3) The names of all bidders and 

consideration offered by each bidder, if 

applicable; 

(4) The effective date of the transfer; 

and 

(5) The length of the lease, if 

applicable. 

(i) Prior to approving the transfer, the 

FAA will confirm the transferred slots 

come from the transferor’s FAAapproved slot holdings and that no 

transfer limitations apply. 

(j) The Secretary may review the final 

terms of the transaction for any anticompetitive effects or adverse public 

interest effects under § 93.47. The FAA 

may not approve the transfer until the 

Secretary notifies the FAA of the 

Secretary’s approval or non-objection or 

the 14-day notice period under 

§ 93.47(b) elapses. 

(k) The slot may not be used by the 

transferee until the conditions of this 

section have been met, and the FAA 

provides notice of its approval of the 

transfer. 

§ 93.45 Transfer of slots. [ALTERNATIVE 

FIVE] 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in 

this subpart, a carrier may buy, sell, or 

lease a slot to another carrier for 

currency only and for any time period, 

and a carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier for a slot at any U.S. or 

foreign slot-controlled airport. 

(b) Except as permitted under 

paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (f) of this 

section, a carrier must provide notice to 

the FAA four months before its intended 

transaction date of its intent to transfer 

a slot. The notice of intent to transfer 

must include the slot number and time, 

effective date of the transfer, and, if 

applicable, the duration of the lease. 

The FAA will post a notice of the offer 

to transfer the slot and relevant details 

on the FAA Web site at http://

www.faa.gov. The notice will state the 

opening and closing dates for bids but 

not the identity of the transferring 

carrier. Bids must be submitted through 

the bulletin board for public posting. 

The identity of the bidders may not be 

disclosed during the bidding period. 

The offering carrier must accept the 

highest bid submitted during the 

bidding period. 

(c) A carrier may trade a slot with 

another carrier on a one-for-one basis 

without providing notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification by both 

carriers that no consideration or 

promise of consideration was provided 

by either party to the trade. 

(d) A carrier may lease a slot to 

another carrier without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the lease is effective for no 

longer than two scheduling seasons. 

(e) Carriers with agreements where 

one carrier operates solely under the 

other’s marketing control may transfer a 

slot with another party subject to that 

agreement without notice to the FAA 

under paragraph (b) of this section 

provided the request for FAA approval 

also includes a certification of that 

agreement by both carriers. 

(f) Prior to [90 DAYS AFTER 

EFFECTIVE DATE], a carrier may buy, 

sell, or trade with another carrier a slot 

that was subject to a lease or short-term 

trade under the Order limiting 

operations at JFK, Order limiting 

operations at EWR, or Order limiting 

operations at LGA without notice to the 

FAA under paragraph (b) of this section. 

(g) Requests for FAA approval for 

transfers under this section must be 

submitted in writing by all parties to the 

transaction to the FAA Slot 

Administration Office in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator. 

Requests must provide the names of the 

transferor and recipient; business 

address and telephone number of the 

person representing the transferor and 

recipient; whether the slot is to be used 

for an arrival or departure; and the slot 

designation of the slot as described in 

§ 93.41(j). 

(h) The request for FAA approval also 

must include the final terms of the 

transaction including: 

(1) The names of all parties to the 

transaction; 

(2) The price offered by each bidder; 

(3) The effective date of the transfer; 

and 

(4) The length of the lease, if 

applicable. 

(i) Prior to approving the transfer, the 

FAA will confirm the transferred slots 

come from the transferor’s FAAapproved slot holdings and that no 

transfer limitations apply. 

(j) The Secretary may review the final 

terms of the transaction for any anticompetitive effects or public interest 

effects under § 93.47. The FAA may not 

approve the transfer until the Secretary 

notifies the FAA of the Secretary’s 

approval or non-objection or the 14-day 

notice period under § 93.47(b) elapses. 

(k) The slot may not be used by the 

transferee until the conditions of this 

section have been met, and the FAA 

provides notice of its approval of the 

transfer. 

§ 93.46 Operation of slots by carriers 

under common marketing control. 

A carrier that operates solely under 

the marketing control of another carrier 

may operate the other carrier’s slots 

without transferring the slots provided 

that: 

(a) The marketing carrier is 

responsible for ensuring that there are 

slots assigned for the planned 

operations of the carrier under its 

marketing control. The marketing carrier 

must submit information in advance to 

the FAA Slot Administration Office, at 

least on a seasonal basis, detailing the 

airport, carrier, marketed and 

operational flight number ranges, and 

effective dates. 

(b) The marketing carrier must submit 

changes throughout the reporting 

period. 

(c) The marketing carrier is 

responsible for submitting the usage 

reports required under § 93.44. 

§ 93.47 Oversight of public interest and 

competitive issues. 

(a) The Secretary may review a 

standalone slot transfer transaction 

conducted under § 93.45, to determine 

adverse public interest and/or anticompetitive effects, as described in 49 

U.S.C. 40101(a). Small transactions of 

fewer than 8 slots in total or transfers 

extending for 2 or fewer seasons) would 

not be subject to review under this 

section. However, the Secretary may 

consider multiple transactions within a 

three-year period as constituting a single 

aggregate transaction, including 

transactions that involve the transfer of 

slots to carriers under the marketing or 

operational control of a single entity. 

(b) The following procedures are used 

when conducting a review for public 

interest or competitive factors under 

paragraph (a) of this section. 

(1) Within 14 days of receiving from 

the FAA the final terms of a transaction 

under § 93.45, the Secretary will notify 


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the parties of the Secretary’s 

determination of whether to request and 

evaluate additional information. If the 

Secretary decides to request and 

evaluate additional information, the 

DOT will request the additional 

information. 

(2) After receiving notice of a slot 

transfer under § 93.45, the FAA may not 

approve the transaction without further 

notice from the Secretary. 

(3) If the Secretary does not notify the 

parties and the FAA within 14 days of 

the intent to request and evaluate 

additional information, the FAA may 

approve the transaction. 

(c) The procedures for objections to 

public disclosure of information at 14 

CFR 302.12 do not apply to information 

submitted to the DOT under paragraphs 

(a) or (b) of this section. Any person 

seeking confidential treatment for 

information submitted to the DOT under 

paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section must 

clearly designate the information for 

which confidential treatment is sought 

by including appropriate markings on 

each page of the submission. The DOT 

will not disclose such designated 

information to the public, except as 

required under the Freedom of 

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, and 

pursuant to the procedures in 49 CFR 

part 7. 

(d) Nothing in this section limits the 

authority of the Secretary to investigate 

and prohibit any unfair or deceptive 

practice or an unfair method of 

competition, as provided by 49 U.S.C. 

41712. 

§ 93.49 Unscheduled operations. 

(a) During the slot-controlled hours, 

no person may operate an aircraft other 

than a helicopter to or from JFK, EWR, 

or LGA unless he or she has received, 

for that unscheduled operation, a 

reservation that is assigned by the ARO 

or, in the case of certain public charters, 

in accordance with the procedures in 

paragraph (d) of this section. The FAA 

will accept requests for reservations 

through the e-CVRS beginning 72 hours 

prior to the proposed time of arrival to 

or departure from the respective airport. 

Additional information on procedures 

for obtaining a reservation is available 

on the Internet at http://

www.fly.faa.gov/ecvrs. 

(b) Reservations, including those 

assigned to certain public charter 

operations under paragraph (d) of this 

section, will be available to be assigned 

by the ARO on a 60-minute basis as 

follows: 

(1) At JFK, two reservations per hour 

during the slot-controlled hours. 

(2) At EWR, one reservation per hour 

during the slot-controlled hours. 

(3) At LGA, three reservations per 

hour during the slot-controlled hours. 

(c) The ARO will receive and process 

all reservation requests for unscheduled 

arrivals and departures and assign 

reservations on a first-come, first-served 

basis determined by the time the request 

is received by the ARO. 

(d) One reservation per hour at LGA 

and two reservations per day at JFK and 

EWR will be available for assignment to 

certain public charter operations prior 

to the 72-hour reservation window in 

paragraph (a) of this section. 

(1) A public charter operator may 

request a reservation up to six months 

in advance of the date of the flight 

operation for a planned individual 

operation or a series of operations 

occurring fewer than 3 times per month. 

Reservation requests must be submitted 

to the Federal Aviation Administration, 

Slot Administration Office, AGC–200, 

800 Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591. Requests may be 

made via facsimile at (202) 267–7277 or 

by email at 7-awa-slotadmin@faa.gov. 

(2) The public charter operator must 

certify that its prospectus has been 

accepted by the Department of 

Transportation in accordance with 14 

CFR part 380. 

(3) The public charter operator must 

identify the call sign/flight number or 

aircraft registration number of the direct 

air carrier; the date and time of the 

proposed operation; the airport served 

immediately prior to or after JFK, EWR, 

or LGA; aircraft type; and the nature of 

the operation (e.g., ferry or passenger). 

Any changes to an approved reservation 

must be approved in advance by the 

Slot Administration Office. 

(4) A series of operations occurring 

more than 3 times per month is required 

to have a slot allocated by the FAA as 

provided in § 93.37. 

(5) If all reservations available under 

paragraph (d)(1) of this section have 

been assigned, the public charter 

operator may request a reservation 

under paragraph (a) of this section. 

(e) The filing of a request for a 

reservation does not constitute the filing 

of an IFR flight plan as required by 

regulation. The IFR flight plan may be 

filed only after the reservation is 

obtained, must include the reservation 

number in the ‘‘Remarks’’ section, and 

must be filed in accordance with FAA 

regulations and procedures. 

(f) Air Traffic Control will 

accommodate declared emergencies 

without regard to reservations. Nonemergency national security, law 

enforcement, military, public aircraft, or 

other similar mission-critical operations 

may be accommodated above the 

reservation limits with the prior 

approval of the Vice President, System 

Operations Services, Air Traffic 

Organization. Procedures for obtaining 

the appropriate waiver will be available 

on the Internet at http://

www.fly.faa.gov/ecvrs. 

(g) Notwithstanding the limits in 

paragraph (b) of this section, if 

conditions are favorable, and significant 

delay is unlikely, the FAA may 

determine that additional reservations 

may be accommodated for a specific 

time period. Unused slots also may be 

made available temporarily for 

unscheduled operations. Reservations 

for additional operations must be 

obtained through the ARO. 

(h) No reservations may be bought, 

sold, or leased. 

(i) A Reservation must be canceled if 

it will not be used as assigned. 

■ 3. Amend § 93.123 to revise 

paragraphs (a), (b)(4) to read as follows: 

§ 93.123 High density traffic airports. 

(a) Each of the following airports is 

designated as a high density traffic 

airport and, except as provided in 

§ 93.129 and paragraph (b) of this 

section, or unless otherwise authorized 

by ATC, is limited to the hourly number 

of allocated IFR operations (takeoffs and 

landings) that may be reserved for the 

specified classes of users for that 

airport: 

IFR OPERATIONS PER HOUR

Class of user 

Ronald 

Reagan 

Washington 

National 

Airport 

Air carriers ............................ 37 

Commuters ........................... 11 

Other ..................................... 12 

(b) * * * 

(4) The allocation of IFR reservations 

for air carriers except commuters at 

Ronald Reagan Washington National 

Airport does not include extra sections 

of scheduled flights. The allocation of 

IFR reservations for scheduled 

commuters at Ronald Reagan 

Washington National Airport does not 

include extra sections of scheduled 

flights. These flights may be conducted 

without regard to the limitation upon 

the hourly IFR reservations at those 

airports. 

* * * * * 

§ 93.133 [Removed and Reserved] 

■ 4. Remove and reserve § 93.133. 

■ 5. Amend § 93.211 to revise paragraph 

(a) to read as follows: 


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§ 93.211 Applicability. 

(a) This subpart prescribes rules 

applicable to the allocation and 

withdrawal of IFR operational authority 

(takeoffs and landings) to individual air 

carriers and commuter operators at the 

High Density Traffic Airports identified 

in subpart K of this part. 

* * * * * 

§ 93.215, 93.217 and 93.218 [Removed and 

Reserved] 

■ 6. Remove and reserve §§ 93.215, 

93.217, and 93.218. 

■ 7. Amend § 93.221 to remove 

paragraph (e). 

■ 8. Amend § 93.223 to revise paragraph 

(b) to read as follows: 

§ 93.223 Slot withdrawal. 

(b) Separate slot pools shall be 

established for air carriers and 

commuter operators at each airport. The 

FAA shall assign, by random lottery, 

withdrawal priority numbers for the 

recall priority of slots at each airport. 

Each additional permanent slot, if any, 

will be assigned the next higher number 

for air carrier or commuter slots, as 

appropriate, at each airport. Each slot 

shall be assigned a designation 

consisting of the applicable withdrawal 

priority number; the airport code; a code 

indicating whether the slot is an air 

carrier or commuter operator slot; and 

the time period of the slot. The 

designation shall also indicate, as 

appropriate, if the slot is daily or for 

certain days of the week only; is limited 

to arrivals or departures; and is 

allocated for international operations or 

for EAS purposes. 

* * * * * 

■ 9. Amend § 93.226 to revise paragraph 

(a)(3) introductory text to read as 

follows: 

§ 93.226 Allocation of slots in low-demand 

periods. 

(a) * * * 

(3) For Ronald Reagan Washington 

National Airport: 

* * * * * 

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 

19, 2014. 

Susan L. Kurland, 

Assistant Secretary for Aviation and 

International Affairs. 

Richard M. Swayze, 

Assistant Administrator for Policy, 

International Affairs, and Environment. 

[FR Doc. 2014–30378 Filed 1–6–15; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


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