United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-2862

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Kelsey Weyer

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: May 8, 2024

Filed: July 30, 2024

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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company appeals the district court’s1 order 

granting judgment on the administrative record to Kelsey Weyer on her claim that 

Reliance Standard’s denial of long-term disability benefits violated the Employee 

1

The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the 

District of Minnesota, now retired.
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Having jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. 

Weyer applied for long-term disability benefits under a policy issued to her 

by Reliance Standard through her employer. Weyer has a host of medical conditions, 

including chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis, Lyme disease, 

migraine headaches, neurocognitive disorder, brain fog, clostridium difficile colitis, 

irritable bowel syndrome, HHV-6, and malnourishment. She also has a history of 

anxiety and depression.

Reliance Standard’s policy provides that an individual is entitled to benefits 

if she is “Totally Disabled.” The policy defines “Totally Disabled” in one of two 

ways, depending on the applicable time period. For the first twenty-four months of 

benefits, an individual is “Totally Disabled” if she “cannot perform the material 

duties of [her] Regular Occupation.” After twenty-four months, that individual 

remains “Totally Disabled” if she “cannot perform the material duties of Any 

Occupation,” which is defined as “an occupation normally performed in the national 

economy for which [the individual] is reasonably suited based upon [her] education, 

training or experience.” The policy also contains another provision relevant to this 

appeal, which limits payable benefits to “an aggregate lifetime maximum duration 

of twenty-four (24) months” if the individual’s “Total Disability [is] caused by or 

contributed to by mental or nervous disorders.” (MND Clause).

Reliance Standard approved Weyer’s claim, finding her “Totally Disabled,” 

and paid benefits for twenty-four months. After twenty-four months, Reliance 

Standard terminated those benefits, finding that Weyer did not satisfy the more 

stringent “Any Occupation” standard because Weyer could perform various 

sedentary jobs. It also found that her anxiety and depression contributed to her 

disability. Weyer filed an administrative appeal, submitting additional evidence 

from several doctors and clinicians. Reliance Standard sought independent review 
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of Weyer’s medical records and her additional evidence and ultimately upheld its 

decision. Weyer then commenced this lawsuit, arguing that the denial of continued 

benefits violated ERISA. 

The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record, and 

the district court ruled in Weyer’s favor. The district court found that the record 

evidence did not “suggest that Weyer’s depression and anxiety caused or 

contributed to her inability to work,” rejecting Reliance Standard’s contention that 

the MND Clause in the policy applied. Moreover, the district court held that Weyer 

was totally disabled under the policy’s applicable “Any Occupation” standard, citing 

evidence in the record from both Weyer’s physicians and the physicians who 

performed the independent review. Reliance Standard now appeals, arguing that 

(A) Weyer was not totally disabled and (B) even if Weyer was totally disabled, her 

mental health disorders caused or contributed to her total disability such that the 

MND Clause should have applied. We address each contention in turn.

II. 

The parties agree that the district court had authority to review Reliance 

Standard’s denial of ERISA benefits de novo because Reliance Standard lacked 

discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the plan’s 

terms. See Johnson v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 775 F.3d 983, 986-87 (8th 

Cir. 2014). “When the district court has conducted a de novo review of an ERISA 

fiduciary’s denial of benefits, we review the [district] court’s findings of fact under 

our customary clearly erroneous standard.” Id. at 987 (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted); see also Sloan v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 475 F.3d 999, 

1005 (8th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for clear error district court’s determination that 

plaintiff qualified for long-term disability benefits because he lacked work capacity). 

We review any legal conclusions de novo. See Avenoso v. Reliance Standard Life 

Ins. Co., 19 F.4th 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2021). “Clear error exists where, viewing the 

record as a whole, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
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has been committed.” Oden v. Shane Smith Enters., Inc., 27 F.4th 631, 633 (8th Cir. 

2022) (citation omitted). 

A.

Reliance Standard first argues that the district court clearly erred in finding 

Weyer was totally disabled. We disagree. After twenty-four months of benefits, 

Weyer was entitled to continued benefits if she was unable to perform the material 

duties of any occupation. Reliance Standard identifies evidence in the record 

suggesting that Weyer at least possessed the capacity to perform sedentary work. 

However, as the district court noted, there was also overwhelming evidence in the 

record that Weyer lacked sedentary-work capacity. And it is well established that 

“the court of appeals may not reverse [on clear-error review] even though convinced 

that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 

differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s 

choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Avenoso, 19 F.4th at 1028

(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (finding no clear error in district court’s 

conclusion that plaintiff lacked sedentary-work capacity where there was both 

evidence suggesting and tending to negate that plaintiff lacked sedentary-work 

capacity). 

The evidence relied on by the district court in finding Weyer lacked any work 

capacity is not unlike the evidence the district courts in Avenoso and Sloan relied on 

in reaching the same conclusion—decisions which this Court affirmed. In each of 

those cases, the district court “found that the plaintiff was totally disabled based on 

a ‘finding of disability under the rigorous social security standard,’ ‘subjective 

complaints of disabling pain,’ and some favorable ‘medical evidence.’” Id. (quoting

Sloan, 475 F.3d at 1005-06). Here, the district court identified evidence from five

doctors who either treated Weyer or reviewed her medical records that supported its 
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conclusion that, because Weyer was unable to work in any capacity, Weyer was 

totally disabled.2

 For example, one of Weyer’s treating physicians noted: 

The medical restrictions that have been placed on Mrs. Weyer by 

myself are direction not to engage in any physical or mental activities 

that result in post-exertional fatigue, malaise and pain. Currently[,] that 

translates into being sedentary, couch or bed-bound the majority of 

days. Her activity limit is currently approximately 45 minutes of a 

gentle stroll several days per week. She is largely prohibited from any 

mental exertion[,] whether it involves reading, computer time, or 

interacting with others after approximately noon each day due to the 

encephalopathy symptoms. She is incapable of the majority of 

activities of daily living and maintaining a household. . . . She cannot 

drive more than five minutes in her local neighborhood and is under 

medical direction not to drive at all. She cannot maintain any social 

relationships outside of her nuclear family due to the prevalence of 

symptoms. Any attempts to force activity[,] whether it be mental, 

physical or emotional simply result in being bedbound for hours to days 

afterward. 

Another physician explained that:

2

While the district court’s order purported to rely on several physicians’ 

determinations that Weyer was totally disabled and unable to regain any work 

capacity, we note that: first, the district court’s order was not a full recitation of the 

physicians’ opinions but a summary of the voluminous record that included the 

extensive functional limitations placed on Weyer by these physicians; and second, 

to the extent these opinions include inappropriate legal conclusions to which we need 

not give controlling weight, cf. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 

2004) (remarking, in the social security context, that doctors’ comments that patient 

was totally disabled and that patient’s disability would make it difficult to work were 

inappropriate legal conclusions entitled to little weight), we may affirm the judgment 

of the district court on any basis in the record, Adam & Eve Jonesboro, LLC v. 

Perrin, 933 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 2019). Here, the record is replete with evidence 

supporting the district court’s conclusion that Weyer is totally disabled because of 

various functional limitations placed on her by her physicians.
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Ms. Weyer continues to present with chronic migraines almost daily 

despite ongoing treatment. Ms. Weyer can easily experience headaches 

and/or migraines 5 out of 7 days a week. Common triggers for her 

migraines are screentime[,] such as looking at a computer screen or 

technology, reading and/or writing, cognitive effort, and 

driving. . . . Ms. Weyer also experiences poor concentration and focus, 

brain fog and visual distortions[,] all of which make it difficult for Ms. 

Weyer to drive a car, follow a conversation, follow instruction, use a 

computer, or stay on task. . . . Ms. Weyer’s fatigue is also chronic and 

debilitating. Even if Ms. Weyer is sitting, she still requires sleep and/or

rest throughout the day.

In addition, the district court considered Weyer’s favorable Social Security 

Administration disability determination, which it noted supported Weyer’s position, 

see Avenoso, 19 F.4th at 1027 (“[T]he Social Security Administration’s 

determination . . . is admissible evidence to support an ERISA claim for long-term 

disability benefits.” (citation omitted)), and discredited a thirteen-minute video 

Reliance Standard submitted purporting to show Weyer mowing the lawn because 

“[n]othing in the record identifie[d] [Weyer as] the individual mowing the lawn.” 

The district court also acknowledged that even if Weyer was the individual in the 

video, this evidence was not conclusive that Weyer was able to work, as “the video 

[was] only a 13-minute video of the individual mowing the lawn,” which was 

consistent with one physician’s opinion that Weyer could “occasionally on a good 

day be able to push a lawnmower over a small yard.” 

On the other hand, the district court also acknowledged evidence from another 

doctor that supported Reliance Standard’s position that Weyer possessed 

sedentary-work capacity and therefore was not totally disabled. However, this 

evidence, and Reliance Standard’s identification of other evidence supporting its 

position that Weyer could perform certain types of work, convinces this Court that, 

at best, “there are two permissible views of the evidence,” id. at 1028, a 

determination which “is not enough for us to conclude the district court clearly 

erred,” Sloan, 475 F.3d at 1006. Reliance Standard has not pointed to any evidence 

in the record “leav[ing] us with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been 
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made.” Buchl v. Gascoyne Materials Handling & Recycling, L.L.C., 100 F.4th 950, 

962 (8th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that 

Weyer lacked the ability to perform any occupation. And because Weyer was unable 

to perform any occupation, she was “Totally Disabled” under the terms of her policy. 

See Avenoso, 19 F.4th at 1027 (“[W]hether the district court’s decision survives de 

novo review of its legal determinations . . . turns on whether [it] clearly erred in 

finding that [the policyholder] lacks sedentary work capacity.”). 

B.

 

Reliance Standard alternatively asserts that, even if Weyer is totally disabled, 

her mental health disorders caused or contributed to her total disability, so the MND 

Clause should have applied. Recall that the MND Clause provides that “Monthly 

Benefits for Total Disability caused by or contributed to by mental or nervous 

disorders will not be payable beyond an aggregate lifetime maximum duration of 

twenty-four (24) months.” Reliance Standard argues—and Weyer agrees—that 

under the policy’s “caused by or contributed to by” language, the appropriate 

standard is “but-for” causation; that is, Weyer’s anxiety and depression caused or 

contributed to her total disability (and thus, the MND Clause limits benefits to 

twenty-four months) if, but for her anxiety and depression, she would not be totally 

disabled. Put differently, this means that if her “physical disability were 

independently sufficient to render [her] totally disabled, [her] eligibility for benefits 

would not terminate after twenty-four months because [she] also suffered from a 

mental condition.” Michaels v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S. Emps., 

Managers & Agents Long-Term Disability Plan, 305 F. App’x 896, 904 (3d Cir. 

2009) (interpreting a similarly worded mental illness limitation).

 

We agree that the MND Clause would limit Weyer’s benefits to twenty-four 

months if, but for her anxiety and depression, she would not be totally disabled, as

her physical conditions must independently render her unable to work. This but-for 

approach accords with the opinions of our sister circuits addressing this “caused by 

or contributed to by” plan language in similar mental-illness limitations in long-term 
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disability policies. See id.; George v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 776 F.3d 349, 

355-56 (5th Cir. 2015) (adopting the holdings of each federal circuit court to have 

addressed the meaning of “caused by or contributed to by” in similar exclusion 

clauses as “exclud[ing] coverage only when the claimant’s physical disability was 

insufficient to render him totally disabled. In other words, those courts have asked 

whether the mental disability is a but-for cause of the total disability.”); Okuno v. 

Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 836 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2016) (“We follow the 

analyses of our sister circuits [interpreting the meaning of “caused by or contributed 

to by”] and apply the but-for inquiry to the Mental and Nervous Disorders 

Limitation . . . .”); cf. Gunn v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 399 F. App’x 147, 

153 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming plan administrator’s denial of benefits because it “was 

grounded on a reasonable factual basis for concluding that [claimant’s physical 

impairment] alone was not disabling, and that, but for his psychiatric mental and 

nervous disorders, he would be able to work”).

Reliance Standard contends that the district court failed to adequately consider 

whether Weyer’s anxiety and depression were but-for causes of her inability to work 

because it placed too much emphasis on one physician’s opinion that Weyer’s 

anxiety and depression were simply “downstream effects” of her physical illness and 

ignored myriad evidence that Weyer’s mental illnesses “have, at the very least, 

contributed to her disability.” We disagree. 

 

Sitting as factfinder, the district court was permitted to weigh the evidence. 

See Avenoso, 19 F.4th at 1026. The district court cited several opinions in the record 

as examples that supported its conclusion that Weyer’s physical conditions 

independently rendered her unable to work. Based on the entirety of the record, we 

find no clear error in this conclusion. For example, one physician placed several 

restrictions on Weyer, including severely limiting her physical activity and “largely 

prohibit[ing] [her] from any mental exertion,” including reading and computer time, 

because of her encephalopathy. The physician noted Weyer’s inability to perform 

daily activities, maintain her household, drive longer than five minutes, or maintain 

social relationships because of her physical symptoms. Because there is evidence in 
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the record that Weyer’s myriad physical conditions independently rendered her 

totally disabled, Reliance Standard’s identification of competing evidence 

suggesting Weyer’s anxiety and depression impacted her ability to work does not 

compel a conclusion that the district court clearly erred. See Avenoso, 19 F.4th at 

1028. 

 

III.

Finding no clear error in the district court’s de novo review of Reliance 

Standard’s denial of long-term disability benefits, we affirm.

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