PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________

No 10-3388

_________

COURTLAND C. PITTS, 

 Appellant

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE; RUTH ANN MINNER; 

RENEE HRIVNAK; STATE OF DELAWARE POLICE; 

LT. COL. AARON CHAFFINCH; LT. MARK DANIELS; 

GREGORY SPENCE; M. JANE BRADY

________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. No. 1-05-cv-00185)

District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.

_______

Argued April 25, 2011

Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

and POLLAK,* District Judge

(Filed June 17, 2011 )

______

 

* Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 

sitting by designation.
2

Karen E. Keller (Argued)

John W. Shaw

Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor

Wilmington, DE 19899

Attorneys for Appellant

Ralph K. Durstein, III (Argued)

Department of Justice

Wilmington, DE 19801

Attorney for Appellees

_____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

It is only on rare instances that a jury‟s verdict in a 

civil case should be overturned. This appeal presents the 

question whether this is such a case. 

Courtland Pitts filed a Complaint against Corporal 

Gregory Spence of the Delaware State Police, asserting 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. After a trial, a 

jury found in favor of Pitts on two of his four claims. The 

District Court granted Spence‟s subsequent motion for 

judgment as matter of law, made pursuant to Rule 50 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to Pitts, we conclude that the District 

Court erred.

I.

Pitts‟ Complaint against Spence alleged that Spence 

falsely arrested, illegally seized, and maliciously prosecuted 

him, as well as deprived him of equal protection under the 

law. At trial, Pitts testified that his claims arose out of events 

occurring when Pitts, who is African American, went to 
3

Mitchem‟s Auto Body Shop and conversed with its owner, 

James Mitchem, Jr., who is Caucasian, about Pitts‟ 

displeasure with work Mitchem had done on Pitts‟ car. A 

verbal dispute between the men arose, which quickly 

escalated into a physical altercation. At some point, Mitchem 

“promised” to “[o]pen up a can of whoop ass” on Pitts, which 

Mitchem conceded was intended to convey a physical threat. 

App. at 328-29. The men brawled and Pitts knocked 

Mitchem to the ground by punching him after Mitchem lost 

his balance. 

After Mitchem fell, Daniel Wykpisz, a shop employee 

who had witnessed the altercation and who is Caucasian, 

grabbed an aluminum baseball bat from the shop and chased 

Pitts from the area. During the chase, Pitts came across a 

board, which he picked up to defend himself. Wykpisz then 

stopped giving chase, turned around, and walked back to the 

shop.

Pitts testified that he walked back to his car, which he 

had parked in the common parking lot shared by the 

numerous industrial shops in the area, and discovered that his 

car windshield and hood had sustained fresh damage. 

Mitchem later admitted responsibility for causing the damage. 

While Pitts was near his car, Mitchem threatened him by 

saying “[y]ou better get the F out of here or I‟ll get my gun.” 

App. at 252. Pitts dialed 9-1-1 several times, conveying to 

the dispatcher that he had been chased with a baseball bat and 

that Mitchem had threatened him with a gun. Wykpisz and 

Mitchem testified they had also called 9-1-1. At least two 

officers responded to the calls, including Spence, who is 

Caucasian, and another officer, Corporal Helen Dane. 

Although the exact sequence of events is unclear, Pitts 

testified that when Pitts saw Spence‟s patrol car, he started 

waving his arms to identify himself as the person who called 

for assistance. Spence, who had received a report that there 

might be a gun at the scene, acknowledged Pitts by rolling 

down his window slightly and yelling, “[g]et back, get back.” 

App. at 255. Pitts accused Spence of treating him unfairly, 

exclaiming “[i]f I was a white guy, you would have been out 
4

of that car, and I would have been treated differently.” Id. 

According to Pitts, Spence then jumped out of his patrol car, 

got in Pitts‟ face, and when Pitts asked for Spence‟s badge 

number and supervisor‟s name, told Pitts to “[s]hut the fuck 

up.” App. at 256. 

Pitts and Spence hollered at each other and Spence 

eventually told Pitts that “[i]f you don‟t shut the fuck up, I‟m 

going to arrest you.” App. at 257. Pitts put his hands behind 

his back and told Spence that he was not going to resist. 

Spence handcuffed Pitts and placed him in the backseat of the 

patrol car, but did not read Pitts his rights under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

Pitts testified that he was unable to tell Spence about 

Mitchem‟s threats or that Wykpisz chased him with a bat

because Spence “never gave [Pitts] a chance” and “didn‟t 

want to hear anything [Pitts] had to say.” App. at 276. Pitts 

declined to give a statement but Spence continued his 

investigation by speaking with Mitchem and Wykpisz, who 

gave a narrative of the events and informed Spence that Pitts 

had made the gun threat. Pitts did not see Spence question 

any of the numerous witnesses who had gathered at the scene. 

After speaking with Mitchem and Wykpisz, Spence 

drove Pitts to the police station where Pitts‟ Miranda rights 

were read to him and he was informed of the charges against 

him. Spence charged Pitts with aggravated menacing, two 

counts of terroristic threatening, assault in the third degree, 

disorderly conduct, and criminal trespass. Spence charged 

Mitchem with disorderly conduct, offensive touching, and 

criminal mischief. Dane also arrested Mitchem and brought 

him to the station. 

Spence towed and conducted an inventory search of 

Pitts‟ car. The inventory search produced nothing 

incriminating. Spence did not report finding a weapon. 

The parties‟ briefs do not discuss the state court trial 

based on the charges against Pitts on one hand and Mitchem 

on the other. Pitts was acquitted of all the charges brought 
5

against him. Pitts asserts that Mitchem pled no contest to two 

of the charges against him, and that the third was dropped 

pursuant to a plea agreement. 

Following the state court proceedings, the District 

Court proceeded to hear the instant suit, which Pitts had filed 

against Spence. The jury returned a verdict, pursuant to a 

general verdict form, finding in favor of Pitts on his illegal 

seizure and equal protection claims, and in favor of Spence on 

Pitts‟ false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. The jury 

awarded Pitts $80,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 

in punitive damages. Spence filed a motion for judgment as 

matter of law, which the District Court granted. 

In granting the motion, the District Court noted that 

the parties‟ agreed-upon instructions presented the jury with 

two possible scenarios that could support Pitts‟ claim of 

illegal seizure: (1) when Spence handcuffed and placed Pitts 

in the back of the patrol car; and (2) when Spence towed and 

conducted an inventory search of Pitts‟ car.1 The District 

Court first considered whether there was sufficient evidence 

to support the jury‟s illegal seizure verdict insofar as it was 

based on Pitts‟ detention. Citing investigatory detention 

jurisprudence under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the 

Court concluded that “based on the facts available to Corporal 

Spence at the time he handcuffed Mr. Pitts, the detention of 

 

1

 The District Court held that the jury‟s verdict in favor 

of Spence on Pitts‟ false arrest claim was facially inconsistent 

with its verdict in favor of Pitts on his illegal seizure claim

insofar as the latter was based on Pitts‟ arrest, but that the 

verdicts may be reconcilable if Pitts‟ detention were viewed 

as separate and distinct from his arrest. The Court, however, 

declined to address whether the verdicts could be so 

harmonized because, as it stated, “regardless of whether the 

verdict is inconsistent or reconcilable, the Court concludes 

that Corporal Spence is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law because there is insufficient evidence to support the jury 

verdict that Mr. Pitts was subject to an illegal seizure based 

upon his handcuffing and placement in the patrol vehicle.” 

Pitts v. Spence, 722 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481 (D. Del. 2010).
6

Mr. Pitts was reasonable in that Corporal Spence had an 

articulable suspicion that Mr. Pitts had been involved in a 

fight at Mitchem‟s Auto Body Shop, and that Corporal 

Spence‟s personal safety or the safety of others at the scene 

could be in danger.” Pitts v. Spence, 722 F. Supp. 2d 476, 

483 (D. Del. 2010). The Court therefore held that Spence‟s 

detention of Pitts was reasonable as a matter of law and that 

there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‟s verdict to 

the extent it was based on this conduct. 

The Court next considered whether there was 

sufficient evidence to support the jury‟s illegal seizure verdict 

insofar as it was based on the search and seizure of Pitts‟ car. 

The Court concluded that Spence‟s testimony at trial 

established “that the towing of [Pitts‟] vehicle was required 

both to prevent harm to the vehicle and to prevent the 

possibility of another altercation.” Id. at 484. Based on this 

testimony, and Spence‟s assertion that he conducted the 

search in accordance with standard procedure, the Court held 

that the search and seizure was reasonable as a matter of law 

and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‟s 

verdict in Pitts‟ favor. The Court rejected Pitts‟ argument that 

the evidence suggested that the search of the car was 

pretextual. It also rejected Pitts‟ contention that Spence‟s 

admission that he lacked probable cause to search Pitts‟ car 

rendered the inventory search unreasonable. In finding this 

argument unpersuasive, the Court cited inventory search 

jurisprudence and reasoned that “the concept of probable 

cause is not implicated in an inventory search.” Id.

Turning to the jury‟s verdict in favor of Pitts on his 

equal protection claim, the Court was not persuaded that 

Spence‟s failure to properly document or investigate the 

incident could support the jury‟s verdict, reasoning that “any 

gaps in the police report concerning Mr. Pitts‟ point of view 

are attributable to [Pitts‟] own lack of cooperation” in 

declining to give a statement to Spence after Spence 

attempted to interview him. Id. at 487. The Court rejected 

Pitts‟ other arguments, concluding that there was “no 

evidence” that Spence acted with discriminatory purpose or 

that his actions were in any way motivated by racial animus. 
7

Id. at 486. The Court therefore granted Spence judgment as a 

matter of law on Pitts‟ equal protection claim.

Having overturned both of the jury‟s verdicts in favor 

of Pitts, the Court denied the motions of Pitts‟ current and 

former counsel made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for 

attorneys‟ fees and expenses, on the basis that Pitts was no 

longer a prevailing party. Pitts appeals.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 and this court has appellate jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over the District Court‟s decision to grant judgment as a 

matter of law, viewing the record evidence in the light most 

favorable to Pitts, as the verdict winner, and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in his favor. We have cautioned that a 

court should grant judgment as a matter of law “sparingly.” 

Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2003). A 

court must not weigh evidence, engage in credibility 

determinations, or substitute its version of the facts for the 

jury‟s. Only if the record is “critically deficient of the 

minimum quantum of evidence” upon which a jury could 

reasonably base its verdict will we affirm a court‟s grant of

judgment as a matter of law. Acumed LLC v. Advanced 

Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation omitted). 

III.

Pitts contends that the District Court erred in 

concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

jury‟s illegal seizure verdict in his favor. Pursuant to the 

parties‟ agreement, the Court instructed the jury that the 

Fourth Amendment “protects persons from being subjected to 

unreasonable searches and seizures by police.” App. at 520. 

The Court explained that Pitts was required to demonstrate by 

a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that Spence 

“intentionally handcuffed [Mr. Pitts], and placed him in the 

back seat of a patrol vehicle, and towed and impounded [his] 
8

vehicle[;]” (2) “that those acts subjected Mr. Pitts to a 

seizure[;]” and (3) that “the seizure was unreasonable.” App. 

at 520-21. With respect to reasonableness, the jury heard 

only that an arrest of a person constitutes an unreasonable 

seizure if not supported by probable cause. The jury was told 

to consider in its probable cause assessment “whether the 

facts and circumstances available to Corporal Spence would 

warrant a prudent police officer in believing that Mr. Pitts had 

committed or was committing a crime.” App. at 521.

We agree with Pitts that the evidence was sufficient to 

permit the jury to conclude that Spence subjected Pitts to an 

unlawful seizure.2 With regard to Pitts‟ detention, Spence 

testified that at the time that he detained Pitts, he had not 

finished his investigation and had not decided whether Pitts 

“should be arrested for anything at that point.” App. at 461. 

Additionally, Spence and Pitts both testified that Spence had 

not read Pitts his Miranda rights at that time. Spence testified 

only that he detained Pitts because Spence feared for his 

safety, an assertion the jury could have found not credible 

because Spence failed to include any mention of that fear in 

his contemporaneous crime report. It follows that the District 

Court necessarily weighed the evidence and did not view it in 

the light most favorable to Pitts when it concluded that Pitts‟ 

 

2

 With respect to the District Court‟s holding that the 

jury‟s verdict on the illegal seizure and false arrest claims 

were facially inconsistent, we conclude that the verdicts, to 

the extent they were inconsistent, were reconcilable. A court 

has a “„duty to attempt to read the verdict in a manner that 

will resolve inconsistencies.‟” Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 

85, 90 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 

796, 806 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Here, the verdicts 

were reconcilable on the basis that the instructions permitted 

the jury to conclude that Pitts‟ detention was an unlawful 

seizure, and there was sufficient evidence to support that 

determination. Moreover, the instructions permitted the jury 

to conclude that the search and seizure of Pitts‟ car was an 

unlawful seizure, and there was also sufficient evidence to 

support that determination.
9

detention was reasonable as a matter of law in light of 

Spence‟s asserted fear. 

Moreover, it was error for the Court to rely on Fourth 

Amendment principles regarding investigatory detentions 

because the jury was not instructed on that jurisprudence. 

Even if Spence had an articulable suspicion that Pitts had 

committed a crime, the jury was informed only of the law 

regarding probable cause. The jury could have concluded on 

the evidence that probable cause was lacking; and thus, based 

on the instructions given, the evidence was sufficient to 

support Pitts‟ claim that Pitts‟ detention was unlawful.

With regard to the towing and inventory search of 

Pitts‟ car, Spence conceded at trial that he lacked probable 

cause to conduct a search of Pitts‟ car. Spence testified that 

he considered the towing necessary to prevent the possibility 

of another altercation or further damage to Pitts‟ car, and 

conceded that he did not search the car for safety reasons or 

to look for a gun. The jury, however, could have found that 

Spence was not credible and could have concluded that 

Spence unlawfully searched the car in order to search for the 

gun that Mitchem had accused Pitts of threatening to use. 

The Court necessarily weighed the evidence and did not view 

it in the light most favorable to Pitts when it concluded that 

there was no evidence to support a suggestion of pretext and 

that Spence‟s asserted fear rendered the towing and inventory 

search reasonable as a matter of law. It was also error for the 

Court to consider inventory-search jurisprudence in its 

analysis because the jury was not given an instruction 

thereon. Based on the instructions given, the evidence was 

sufficient to support the jury‟s verdict, and the District Court 

erred in concluding otherwise. 

Pitts further asserts that the District Court erred in 

concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

jury‟s verdict in Pitts‟ favor on his equal protection claim. 

The Court informed the jury that “[t]he Equal Protection 

Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 

Constitution . . . guarantees each and every person that they 

will not be denied their fundamental rights in an arbitrary or 
10

discriminatory manner.” App. at 518. The Court explained 

that it was Pitts‟ burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of

the evidence that Spence was motivated by a discriminatory 

purpose, or “an intent or purpose to discriminate against 

[Pitts] . . . based upon [Pitts]‟ membership in a protected 

class.” App. at 519. It was also Pitts‟ burden to demonstrate 

that Spence‟s conduct had a discriminatory effect, which “is 

shown where the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, he 

is similarly situated to members of that class, and that he was 

treated differently than members of the unprotected class.” 

App. at 519-20. The jury was informed that it could consider 

direct or circumstantial evidence in its deliberations and that 

neither form of evidence was superior to the other. 

We agree with Pitts that the evidence circumstantially 

demonstrated that Spence violated Pitts‟ rights to equal 

protection. For example, the jury was entitled to consider 

Spence‟s admittedly inaccurate reporting of the incident. 

Spence acknowledged that he did not record that he spoke 

with Pitts first upon arriving at the scene, that Pitts accused 

Spence of being racist, that Spence handcuffed Pitts and 

placed him in his patrol car before interviewing Mitchem and 

Wykpisz, or that Spence did not try to interview Pitts after he 

concluded his investigation. Spence explained that he “didn‟t 

feel the need” to explain and that “there was no reason to say” 

that Pitts had accused Spence of being racist because that 

exchange was “irrelevant to the crimes that occurred between 

[Pitts] and Mr. Mitchem.” App. at 405-06. The jury, 

however, was entitled to disregard this testimony as 

incredible. The District Court‟s conclusion that Spence‟s 

inaccurate reporting was the fault of Pitts‟ decision to remain 

silent, a right that he was entitled to exercise under the Fifth 

Amendment, was not only in direct conflict with Spence‟s 

testimony, but also necessarily resulted from the Court‟s 

substitution of its view of the facts for the jury‟s. 

The jury was also entitled to consider Spence‟s 

testimony regarding his manner of investigating the incident. 

Spence admitted that he did not question Mitchem‟s 

statement that Pitts told Mitchem that he was going to get a 

gun. Indeed, Spence‟s crime report made no mention of 
11

Spence having interviewed anyone other than Wykpisz or 

Mitchem at the scene.

3

 And Spence admitted that he did not 

give Pitts an opportunity at the scene to rebut Mitchem‟s 

allegation. Spence agreed that because Mitchem reported that 

Pitts was the one who had threatened to retrieve a gun, “[t]hat 

was good enough for [him] to end that part of the 

investigation.” App. at 398. The jury could have deemed this 

testimony suggestive that Spence was motivated by 

discriminatory purpose and that his conduct had a 

discriminatory effect.

Similarly suggesting an equal protection violation was 

the testimony of Pauline Reid, a witness to the altercation and 

Pitts‟ confrontation with Spence. Reid testified that Spence 

was “agitated” and “elevated” when speaking with Pitts, and 

“was not listening to what [Pitts] was trying to explain.” 

App. at 304, 305, 309. Reid confirmed that she was so 

concerned for Pitts‟ wellbeing after watching Spence‟s 

demeanor towards him that she followed Pitts in Spence‟s 

patrol car back to the police station. She stated that she felt 

Pitts had been treated unfairly because the officers “bypassed

[Pitts] and went to the other person. They didn‟t really listen 

to [Pitts]. When they came back, no one was listening . . . .” 

App. at 309. This observation of unequal treatment supported 

Pitts‟ assertion that Spence treated him dismissively. The 

testimony circumstantially demonstrated that Spence acted 

with a discriminatory purpose and effect.

The jury could have also given weight to Spence‟s 

post-investigation conduct. Spence charged Pitts with 

aggravated menacing, a charge that requires that the

defendant place the victim in fear of imminent physical 

 

3

Spence testified that he attempted to interview the 

witnesses at the scene, but that they informed him that they 

did not see anything, and then dispersed. The jury was 

entitled to discredit this testimony on the basis of Spence‟s 

failure to include any mention of his interview attempts in his 

crime report, as well as the testimony of Wykpisz, who 

agreed that “there were several people watching the fight as it 

happened.” App. at 373.
12

injury, 11 Del. C. § 602(a), for having “CHASED VICTIM 

WYKPISZ WITH A LONG WOODEN POLE.” App. at 67. 

At trial, however, Wykpisz testified that he was not afraid 

that Pitts would strike him, and in fact turned his back to Pitts 

to walk back to the shop. The jury could have concluded that 

Spence was aware that Wykpisz did not feel threatened, and 

acted with discriminatory purpose and effect by bringing an 

improper charge against Pitts.4 Moreover, Spence 

acknowledged that he simultaneously sent the warrants for 

Mitchem and Pitts to the arraigning judge, but his warrant for 

Pitts was detailed, and his warrant for Mitchem was not. The 

warrant for Pitts emphasized in capital letters the alleged 

conduct supporting the basis of each charge. The warrant for 

Mitchem, on the other hand, capitalized names and locations. 

It also failed to include any description of Mitchem‟s alleged 

conduct that supported the charges against him. These 

unaccounted for differences provided support for the jury‟s 

verdict in favor of Pitts. 

The above sampling of evidence, much of which the 

District Court failed to mention, was sufficient to support the 

jury‟s verdict in favor of Pitts on his equal protection claim. 

In concluding that there was no evidence that Spence was 

motivated by a discriminatory purpose and engaged in 

conduct that had a discriminatory effect, the Court necessarily 

weighed the evidence, engaged in credibility determinations, 

and substituted its view of the facts for the jury‟s. This 

exceeded the Court‟s role and was therefore in error.5 

 

4

This conclusion would not have been impermissibly 

inconsistent with the jury‟s verdict in favor of Spence on 

Pitts‟ malicious prosecution claim. Neither the instructions 

nor the general verdict form required the jury to conclude that 

every charge Spence brought against Pitts was supported by 

probable cause. Thus, the jury could have concluded that any 

one of the six charges brought against Pitts was supported by 

probable cause to find in favor of Spence on Pitts‟ malicious 

prosecution claim.

5

 Because we conclude that the District Court erred in 

granting Spence‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law, we 
13

IV.

This case does not present one of those infrequent 

occasions in which the record evidence is so critically 

deficient that the jury‟s verdict should be overturned. To the 

contrary, when viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Pitts, as we must, we conclude that the evidence 

amply supported Pitts‟ claims. Accordingly, we will reverse 

the judgment of the District Court and reinstate the jury‟s 

verdict and damages award in Pitts‟ favor. We will also 

vacate the District Court‟s denial of the motions of Pitts‟ 

current and former counsel for attorneys‟ fees and expenses 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with instructions that the District 

Court consider those motions on the merits.

 

need not address Pitts‟ remaining contention that the District 

Court abused its discretion in partially denying his motion to 

compel the production of documents.