*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
HIGHLAND STREET ASSOCIATES

ET AL. v. COMMISSIONER OF

TRANSPORTATION ET AL.

(AC 44330)

Bright, C. J., and Cradle and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, two entities that, respectively, owned a parcel of real property

and a billboard located on that property, sought a declaratory ruling

from the trial court pursuant to statute (§ 4-175) following the failure

of the defendant Department of Transportation to act on their petition

for a declaratory ruling that they could replace the billboard’s existing

support structure. The billboard, which was located in a residential zone

within 660 feet of a federal highway and had been erected prior to

1968, was a nonconforming grandfathered sign pursuant to the federal

Highway Beautification Act of 1965 (23 U.S.C. § 131 et seq.) and related

state statute (§ 13a-123). In order to replace the billboard’s support

structure, the plaintiffs acknowledged that they would need to remove

the existing billboard for a short period of time. The department denied

the plaintiff’s application for a permit to replace the support structure,

as a new sign was not permitted pursuant to 23 U.S.C. §131 et seq. and

§ 13a-123. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, holding

that the proposed replacement of the billboard’s existing support system

constituted permissible maintenance and repair. The court further held

that, pursuant to a zoning statute (§ 8-2), the sign’s preexisting nonconforming use was a vested right with which the department and the

defendant Commissioner of Transportation could not interfere. On the

defendants’ appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in holding

that replacing the billboard’s existing support structure constituted

maintenance and repair pursuant to federal and state law: although, as

a grandfathered nonconforming sign, the billboard could continue to

exist, even though it did not comply with state regulations, and it could

be maintained and repaired without losing its grandfathered status,

replacing the billboard’s existing support system was not customary

maintenance and repair because such construction would substantially

change the billboard and constitute the erection of a new billboard, and

all other jurisdictions confronted with similar facts have held that such

structural replacement constitutes the erection of a new sign and, thus,

the termination of the preexisting sign’s nonconforming usage; moreover, this court’s determination that reconstructing a billboard with a

new support structure did not constitute customary repair and maintenance was consistent with the purpose of 23 U.S.C. § 131 et seq., as the

policy behind the act was for billboards located in certain zones along

federal highways to cease to exist after they had reached the natural

end of their lives; furthermore, the court’s reliance on § 8-2, which

restricts municipal zoning authorities from interfering with nonconforming uses, was misplaced, as that statute applies only in a zoning context

and this case was governed by federal and state law and regulations,

and, contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim, there was no taking of a vested

property right, as the defendants did not direct the plaintiffs to remove

the billboard.

Argued January 11—officially released June 21, 2022

Procedural History

Action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the

plaintiffs may replace the existing support structure

for a certain nonconforming outdoor advertising sign,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Fairfield and tried to the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe,

judge trial referee; judgment for the plaintiffs, from

which the defendants appealed to this court. Reversed;
judgment directed.

Anthony C. Famiglietti, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney

general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the

appellants (defendants).

Joel Z. Green, with whom was Linda Pesce Laske,

for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. In this declaratory judgment action,

the defendants, the Commissioner of Transportation

(commissioner) and the Department of Transportation

(department), appeal from the judgment of the trial

court rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Highland Street

Associates (Highland Street) and Barrett Outdoor Communications, Inc. (Barret Outdoor). On appeal, the

defendants claim that the court erred in concluding that

the replacement of a billboard’s existing trestle support

structure with a monopole1 constituted maintenance

and repair under the Highway Beautification Act of 1965

(act), 23 U.S.C. § 131 et seq., and General Statutes § 13a123. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts, which are undisputed, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this

appeal. Highland Street owns a parcel of real property

located at 215 Webster Street in Bridgeport. Barrett

Outdoor owns and operates a billboard that is located

on the Webster Street property. The billboard consists

of two sign faces that sit atop a trestle support structure

that is affixed to the ground. Advertising messages are

displayed on the sign faces and are changed frequently.

The billboard is located in a residential zone and is also

within 660 feet of Interstate 95, a federal highway. A

permit for the billboard was issued by the department

on May 9, 1966.2 Although a new billboard would not

be a permitted use at this location, because the billboard

at issue was erected prior to 1968, it is undisputed that

it is a nonconforming grandfathered sign under the act

and § 13a-123.

Recently, Barrett Outdoor decided that it wanted to

replace the billboard’s existing trestle support structure

with a new monopole. To that end, in November, 2017,

Barrett Outdoor submitted an ‘‘Application for Outdoor

Advertising Permit’’ to the department.3 The application

identified the billboard as a ‘‘[p]re-existing structure’’

and stated that ‘‘[t]he pole of the structure needs to be

replaced.’’ Dennis Buckley, a Bridgeport zoning official,

signed off on the plaintiffs’ application, attesting that

‘‘the structure described [in the application] is in accordance with all local zoning regulations and ordinances

concerning off-premise advertising.’’

On January 5, 2018, the department denied the plaintiffs’ request for a new permit, stating: ‘‘The existing

sign . . . does have nonconforming status and will be

allowed to be maintained and continued pursuant to

[§] 13a-123-12 of the Regulations of Connecticut State

Agencies and 23 C.F.R. § 750.707. However, to maintain

nonconforming status, a billboard structure must

remain ‘substantially the same.’ Anything beyond customary maintenance and repair, such as the replacement of the sign with a new structure, is not permissi-
ble under [f]ederal and [s]tate law.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Thereafter, the plaintiffs sent a letter to the department asking it to reconsider the denial of their application because ‘‘the present use of the premises at 215

Webster Street . . . for an outdoor advertising structure while nonconforming to the Zoning Regulations of

the City of Bridgeport, is a legally and permitted use

of the premises at 215 Webster Street . . . [and] there

is no contemplated change in the use of the property

by virtue of the application including the replacement

of the structure supporting the existing outdoor advertising sign which, once again, is specifically permitted

under Connecticut law.’’ The department denied that

request, stating that the plaintiffs’ application did not

‘‘request customary maintenance and repair’’ of the billboard because ‘‘[the plaintiffs are] seeking to remove

the existing sign structure and replace it with an entirely

new structure.’’ In denying the plaintiffs’ request for

reconsideration, the department specifically relied on

this court’s decision in Billboards Divinity, LLC v.

Commissioner of Transportation, 133 Conn. App. 405,

35 A.3d 395, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 916, 40 A.3d 783

(2012), wherein, according to the department’s summary of the case, this court defined the phrase ‘‘ ‘maintenance and repair’ to mean ‘actions taken to perpetuate

or to restore a presently existing sign.’ ’’ (Emphasis in

original.)

Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176,4

the plaintiffs

then petitioned the department for a declaratory ruling

that they could replace the billboard’s existing trestle

support structure with a new monopole. After the

department failed to act on the plaintiffs’ petition, the

plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action in the

Superior Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-175,5

seeking a declaratory ruling that they could replace the

billboard’s existing support structure.

A one day court trial was held on March 10, 2020.6

At the trial, Bruce Barrett, the president of Barrett Outdoor, testified on direct examination that Barrett Outdoor submitted an application for a new permit because

‘‘[w]e were being very protective, we wanted to make

sure if we disassembled this sign and replaced it that

midstream the [department] wouldn’t tell us that we

needed a permit.’’ Barrett also testified on direct examination that, in order to replace the billboard’s existing

trestle support structure with a new monopole, the

existing sign would need to come down for ‘‘a week

or two weeks whatever time.’’ On cross-examination,

Barrett stated that, once the existing support structure

had been replaced with the monopole, ‘‘[t]he [billboard’s] support structure will look different.’’

Matthew Geanacopoulos, a department employee,

testified that an application for a permit was required

only when a sign owner was ‘‘erecting a new structure,’’

and that, if a sign owner simply wanted to perform
maintenance or repair on a billboard, the owner did

not need to submit anything to the department. Geanacopoulos also testified that the department had denied

the plaintiffs’ application because the plaintiffs had

‘‘applied for a new permit, and their application said

they were going to replace their existing sign,’’ a request

that the department ‘‘interpret[ed] . . . as a new structure, new sign’’ which was not allowed under state and

federal law.

In a decision dated September 8, 2020, the court,

Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, rendered

judgment for the plaintiffs. The court held that (1) the

construction of a monopole in place of the billboard’s

existing trestle support system constituted maintenance and repair because ‘‘the outdoor advertising sign

is slated to remain in the same location, will contain

the same dimensions, and will be adjacent to the same

interstate highway,’’ and (2) pursuant to General Statutes § 8-2, the billboard’s preexisting nonconforming

use was a vested right with which the department could

not interfere. The court also held that this court’s decision in Billboards Divinity, LLC v. Commissioner of

Transportation, supra, 133 Conn. App. 418–19, was distinguishable from the plaintiff’s case because the property owners in Billboards Divinity, LLC, ‘‘desired to

erect two new billboards, after two nonconforming billboards were removed from the site,’’ whereas in the

present case, ‘‘the issue involves an existing outdoor

advertising sign, which has not been discontinued, or

abandoned.’’ The defendants then appealed.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review and principles of law that guide our analysis.

Resolving the defendants’ appeal requires us to interpret and apply the provisions of the act and § 13a-123.

‘‘With respect to the construction and application of

federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency

require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule

of construction utilized by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit. . . . If the meaning of

the text is not plain, however, we must look to the

statute as a whole and construct an interpretation that

comports with its primary purpose and does not lead to

anomalous or unreasonable results.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning

Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 400–401, 941 A.2d 868

(2008); see also O’Toole v. Eyelets for Industry, Inc.,

148 Conn. App. 367, 373, 86 A.3d 475 (2014) (plain meaning rule, as set forth in General Statutes § 1-2z, does

not apply when interpreting federal statutes).

Similarly, as to the construction and application of

state statutes, ‘‘[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a
reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language

as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . .

In seeking to determine that meaning . . . § 1-2z

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered. . . . Furthermore, [t]he legislature is

always presumed to have created a harmonious and

consistent body of law . . . [so that] [i]n determining

the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the

provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory

scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.

. . . Because issues of statutory construction raise

questions of law, they are subject to plenary review on

appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson

v. Tindill, 208 Conn. App. 255, 264, 264 A.2d 1063, cert.

denied, 340 Conn. 917, 265 A.3d 926 (2021).

‘‘The [act] . . . was enacted to exert federal control

over the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays and devices located within 660 feet

of the nearest edge of the right-of-way and visible from

the traveled portion of interstate and federal-aid primary highways. . . . The act requires states to enter

into agreements with the federal government to carry

out the provisions and the goals of the act or else risk the

loss of a portion of their federal highway funding. . . .

‘‘Section (d) of the act provides [in relevant part]: In

order to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective

display of outdoor advertising while remaining consistent with the purposes of this section, signs, displays,

and devices whose size, lighting and spacing, consistent

with customary use [as] is to be determined by agreement between the several [s]tates and the Secretary [of

Transportation], may be erected and maintained within

six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the

right-of-way within areas adjacent to the Interstate and

primary systems which are zoned industrial or commercial under authority of [s]tate law, or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas as may be determined by

agreement between the several [s]tates and the Secretary [of Transportation]. The [s]tates shall have full

authority under their own zoning laws to zone areas

for commercial or industrial purposes, and the actions

of the States in this regard will be accepted for the

purposes of this [a]ct. Whenever a bona fide [s]tate,

county, or local zoning authority has made a determination of customary use, such determination will be

accepted in lieu of controls by agreement in the zoned

commercial and industrial areas within the geographical jurisdiction of such authority. . . . Section (d),

therefore, clearly limits the erection of signs falling

within the provisions of the act solely to areas that are
zoned by state or local authorities for commercial or

industrial purposes . . . .

‘‘The federal regulations promulgated in support of

the act contain a provision addressing the issue of nonconforming signs, which it defines as a sign which was

lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of [s]tate law or [s]tate regulations passed at a

later date or later fails to comply with [s]tate law or

[s]tate regulations due to changed conditions. . . . The

regulation authorizes each state to include in its agreement with the federal government a so-called grandfather clause to allow for the continuation of nonconforming signs. . . . The clause only provides for the

continuance of a sign at its particular location for the

duration of its normal life subject to customary maintenance. . . .

‘‘The federal regulations also set forth criteria necessary to maintain and continue a nonconforming sign.

For example, the sign must remain substantially the

same as it was on the effective date of the [s]tate law

or regulations. . . . The regulation authorizes each

state to develop its own criteria to determine when

customary maintenance ceases and a substantial

change has occurred which would terminate nonconforming rights. . . . Further, a nonconforming sign can

only continue as long as it is not destroyed, abandoned,

or discontinued. . . .

‘‘Connecticut entered into an agreement with the federal government pursuant to the act, which led to the

enactment of . . . § 13a-123. Section 13a-123 (a) provides in relevant part: The erection of outdoor advertising structures, signs, displays or devices within six hundred sixty feet of the edge of the right-of-way, the

advertising message of which is visible from the main

traveled way of any portion of the National System of

Interstate and Defense Highways, hereinafter referred

to as interstate highways, the primary system of federalaid highways or other limited access state highways, is

prohibited except as otherwise provided in or pursuant

to this section . . . . Section 13a-123 (c) authorizes

the commissioner . . . to promulgate regulations for

the control of outdoor advertising structures, signs, displays and devices along interstate highways, the primary system of federal-aid highways and other limited

access state highways. Such regulations shall be as, but

not more, restrictive than the controls required by Title

I of the [act] and any amendments thereto with respect

to the interstate and primary systems of federal-aid

highways . . . . Section 13a-123 (e) provides in relevant part: Subject to regulations adopted by the commissioner and except as prohibited by state statute,

local ordinance or zoning regulation signs, displays and

devices may be erected and maintained within six hundred sixty feet of primary and other limited access state

highways in areas which are zoned for industrial or
commercial use under authority of law . . . .

‘‘Among the regulations promulgated by the commissioner in accordance with § 13a-123 (d), is a grandfather

clause of the type authorized by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707 (c).

. . . The regulation[s] [also define] erect to mean to

construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix, attach,

create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being

or establish, but it shall not include any of the foregoing

activities when performed as an incident to the change

of advertising message or customary maintenance or

repair of a sign or sign structure.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Billboards Divinity, LLC v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 133 Conn. App. 414–

17.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the court erred

when it concluded that replacing the billboard’s existing

support structure with a new monopole constituted

customary repair and maintenance. We agree.

It is undisputed that the billboard in question is a

grandfathered nonconforming sign, given that, although

it is located in an area zoned for residential use, it

existed prior to the enactment of the applicable state

regulations. As a grandfathered nonconforming sign,

the billboard is allowed to continue to exist even though

it does not comply with state regulations. 23 C.F.R.

§ 750.707 (d); Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 13a-123-

12. The billboard also can be maintained and repaired

without losing its grandfathered status. 23 C.F.R.

§ 750.707 (d) (5); Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 13a-123-

2 (b). Any alteration beyond maintenance and repair,

however, terminates the continuation of the billboard’s

grandfathered status and transforms the billboard into

a new sign that must comply with the state regulations.

See Billboards Divinity, LLC v. Commissioner of

Transportation, supra, 133 Conn. App. 416. Specifically,

although § 13a-123-4 of the Regulations of Connecticut

State Agencies prohibits the erection of new signs in

protected areas, § 13a-123-12 permits signs erected

prior to March 19, 1968, to remain in place as nonconforming uses, and § 13a-123-2 excludes from the definition of ‘‘ ‘erect,’ ’’ ‘‘activities when performed as an incident to the change of advertising message or customary

maintenance or repair of a sign or sign structure.’’ Consequently, consistent with federal law, the plaintiffs’

billboard maintains its grandfathered status so long as

the plaintiffs’ activities related to it are limited to customary maintenance and repair of the sign or the sign

structure.

In Billboards Divinity, LLC v. Commissioner of

Transportation, supra, 133 Conn. App. 418, this court

specifically addressed the meaning of ‘‘ ‘customary

maintenance and repair’ ’’ as used in the federal and

state regulations. In Billboards Divinity, LLC, the

plaintiff filed an application with the department for a
permit to reconstruct two grandfathered nonconforming billboards as to which its tenant had cancelled the

permits and removed from the property. Id., 408. The

department denied the plaintiff’s application because

the property where the billboards were to be rebuilt

was a residential zone and, thus, a prohibited area. Id.,

408–409. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that it had a

right to continue with a nonconforming use of its property and that the tenant’s removal of the previous billboards had not extinguished that use. Id., 410.

This court determined that, ‘‘[p]ursuant to the statutory and regulatory scheme set forth [in the act and

state law] . . . the plaintiff’s argument has merit only

if its erection of new billboards qualifies as ‘customary

maintenance or repair’ of the prior nonconforming

signs.’’ Id., 418. Noting that ‘‘ ‘[c]ustomary maintenance

and repair’ is not defined in the regulations [and] therefore, the term must be construed according to its commonly approved usage,’’ the court held that ‘‘[t]he term

‘maintenance and repair’ as used in reference to nonconforming signs logically refers to actions taken to

perpetuate or to restore a presently existing sign.’’

(Emphasis added.) Id. Given that interpretation, the

court held that the plaintiff’s proposed construction

of new billboards to replace the previously existing

billboards was not maintenance and repair because,

‘‘rather than seeking to make repairs to or to maintain

an existing, nonconforming billboard, the plaintiff’s

application sought a permit to erect two wholly new

signs.’’ Id., 418–19.

The plaintiffs argue, as the trial court held, that Billboards Divinity, LLC, is distinguishable from the present case because, in Billboards Divinity, LLC, the billboards had been removed and the permits cancelled,

whereas here, the billboard is still standing and the

permit remains valid. We conclude that any factual differences between the present case and Billboards

Divinity, LLC, are not material to our analysis. It is

undisputed in the present case that the existing billboard and support structure must be taken down in

order to replace the billboard’s existing trestle support

structure with the new monopole. When the billboard

is put back up, now supported by the new monopole,

the billboard is a new sign. See id. The erection of a new

sign, even when that construction is done to replace a

previously existing billboard and even though the owner

has never stated an intention to abandon the permit to

use a sign at that location, is not maintenance and repair

because such construction is not an action taken to

‘‘perpetuate or to restore a presently existing sign,’’

given that the ‘‘presently existing sign’’ no longer exists.

Id. Thus, as was the case in Billboards Divinity, LLC,

‘‘rather than seeking to make repairs to or to maintain

an existing, nonconforming billboard, the plaintiff’s

application sought a permit to erect [a] wholly new

[billboard].’’ Id., 419. Such construction is not mainte-
nance and repair according to that term’s commonly

understood usage, and the trial court therefore erred

in holding that replacing the billboard’s existing support

structure with a new monopole was maintenance and

repair under the act and § 13a-123.

Moreover, replacing the billboard’s existing support

system with a new monopole is not customary maintenance and repair because such construction would substantially change the billboard. Under the federal regulations, a billboard can be maintained and repaired only

to the extent that the sign remains substantially the

same as it was when the sign was grandfathered in as

a nonconforming sign. See 23 C.F.R. § 750.707 (d) (‘‘[i]n

order to maintain and continue a nonconforming sign

. . . (5) [t]he sign must remain substantially the same

as it was on the effective date of the State law or regulations’’). Reconstructing the billboard in the present case

with a monopole in place of its existing support structure would result in a billboard that is substantially

different in how it is constructed from the grandfathered nonconforming billboard. Indeed, the president of

Barrett Outdoor testified at trial that replacing the trestle support structure with a monopole involved disassembling the sign, with the end result being that the

billboard’s support structure would look different after

the trestle structure was replaced with a monopole.

Thus, because replacing the billboard’s existing support

system with a monopole would result in a substantially

different sign, such construction is not customary maintenance and repair.

We also are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument

that the billboard will be substantially the same after the

trestle support structure is replaced with a monopole

because the dimensions, location, and positioning of

the sign portion of the billboard structure will be

unchanged. The plaintiffs have not cited, nor have we

found, any cases from Connecticut or any other jurisdictions in which a property owner was permitted to maintain their nonconforming use by replacing a billboard’s

existing support structure with a new and different

support structure.7 To the contrary, our research has

revealed that all of the other jurisdictions that have

been confronted with facts similar to those here have

held that replacing a billboard’s existing support structure with a new support structure goes beyond maintenance and repair and instead constitutes the erection

of a new sign, at which point the preexisting sign’s

nonconforming use is terminated and the relevant state

regulations relating to the construction of the sign

apply. See, e.g., Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., 194

Ariz. 390, 397–98, 983 P.2d 759 (App. 1999) (replacement

of billboard’s existing twin I beam support structure

with new unipole structure was not reasonable repair);

U.S. Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indiana Dept. of

Transportation, 714 N.E.2d 1244, 1255 (Ind. App. 1999)

(reconstructing billboard’s existing support system by
removing wooden supports and replacing them with

steel supports was not maintenance and repair); Meredith Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Transportation, 648 N.W.2d 109, 118 (Iowa 2002) (increase

in billboard’s size and number of posts supporting sign

was ‘‘too extensive to constitute de minimis changes

or a mere continuation of the existing sign’’); Zanghi

v. State, 204 App. Div. 2d 313, 314, 611 N.Y.S.2d 263

(1994) (reerecting billboard that tenant had removed

constituted ‘‘change in existing use’’ and terminated

sign’s nonconforming use); Park Outdoor Advertising

Co. v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transportation, 86 Pa.

Commw. 506, 508, 510, 485 A.2d 864 (1984) (new billboard was erected when wooden frame and two support

posts were changed to metal frame and one support

post); cf. State Dept. of Roads v. World Diversified, Inc.,

254 Neb. 307, 315, 576 N.W.2d 198 (1998) (converting

existing billboard into electronic billboard constituted

maintenance and repair when ‘‘updates occurred upon

the original frame of the sign [and] the sign remained in

the same location on the same support posts’’ (emphasis

added)). Significantly, we have located no cases that

have held to the contrary since this court noted in

Billboards Divinity, LLC, that ‘‘other jurisdictions have

found that once nonconforming signs are removed completely, or they have been repaired substantially or

altered in some way, any right to the continuation of

the nonconformity terminates.’’ (Emphasis added.)Billboards Divinity, LLC v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 133 Conn. App. 419. Consistent with the

holdings in other jurisdictions and our decision in Billboards Divinity, LLC, we conclude that replacing the

billboard’s preexisting support structure and then

installing the newly built structure constitutes both a

substantial repair or alteration of the billboard and the

erection of a new billboard, all of which is well beyond

the customary maintenance and repair permitted by the

act, § 13-123, and the corresponding regulations.8

Our conclusion that reconstructing a billboard with

a new support structure does not constitute customary

maintenance and repair is also consistent with the purpose of the act. The policy behind the act was for billboards located in certain zones along our nation’s federal highways to cease to exist after those billboards

had reached the natural end of their lives. In fact, 23

C.F.R. § 750.707 (c), the provision of the Code of Federal

Regulations that provides for the grandfathering of nonconforming signs, explicitly provides: ‘‘This clause only

allows an individual sign at its particular location for

the duration of its normal life subject to customary

maintenance.’’ See Billboards Divinity, LLC v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 133 Conn. App.

415–16; see also Redpath v. Missouri Highway &

Transportation Commission, 14 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Mo.

App. 1999) (act was ‘‘intended to reduce the number

of signboards crowding the highways’’); National
Advertising Co. v. Bradshaw, 48 N.C. App. 10, 19–20,

268 S.E.2d 816 (‘‘obvious purpose of the [act was] to

gradually phase out signs . . . which existed at the

time of enactment but which tended to harm the public

interest and welfare by causing ugliness, distraction,

and safety hazards’’), appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 400,

273 S.E.2d. 446 (1980). Accepting the plaintiffs’ argument would mean that a sign owner could circumvent

that purpose and extend forever the nonconforming

use by essentially rebuilding a nonconforming sign

more than fifty years after it was built and then replacing

various parts of the sign as needed until the sign bears

no resemblance to its original structure, save for its

size and dimensions. We will not interpret the statutes

and regulations to reach such an anomalous and unreasonable result, and thus decline to interpret the act and

§ 13a-123 as permitting the reconstruction of billboards

with wholly new support structures. See Cambodian

Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning &

Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 400–401; see

also Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 703, 12 A.3d

783 (2011) (‘‘We often have stated that it is axiomatic

that those who promulgate statutes . . . do not intend

to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results. . . . Accordingly, [w]e construe a statute in a manner that will not . . . lead to

absurd results.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.)).

We further conclude that the court’s reliance on § 8-

2 to hold that the plaintiff could replace the billboard’s

existing support structure with a new monopole without the billboard losing its nonconforming status is

misplaced. The court reasoned: ‘‘It is well settled in

this jurisdiction that preexisting nonconforming uses

of land involve vested rights. Section 8-2 of the General

Statutes restricts municipal zoning authorities from

interfering with nonconforming uses.’’ After discussing

several of our Supreme Court’s cases applying § 8-2 and

the restrictions on a municipality’s ability to eliminate

a nonconforming use, the court concluded: ‘‘It cannot

be found, based on the evidence adduced at trial, and

applicable Connecticut case law, that the proposed

change in the support structure forfeits the right of the

property owner to continue the lawful nonconforming

use of 215 Webster Street.’’ Relying on this same analysis, the plaintiffs argue that ‘‘[t]he policies of the [act]

and [§ 13a-123], and the regulations promulgated pursuant to those statutes, provide protections to sign owners

that are consistent with the constitutional protections

that apply in the zoning context.’’ We fail to see how

§ 8-2 or the cases cited by the court are relevant to the

legal issues involved in this case.

Section 8-2 provides in relevant part that municipal

zoning regulations shall not ‘‘[p]rohibit the continuance

of any nonconforming use, building or structure

existing at the time of the adoption of such regulations.’’
There are no municipal zoning regulations at issue in

the present case. This case is governed by state and

federal law, specifically the act, § 13a-123, and the

appropriate state and federal regulations, not by municipal zoning law. Accordingly, § 8-2, which only applies

in the zoning context, does not apply here.

Given that § 8-2 has no application in the present

case, the court’s reliance on cases that have applied § 8-

2 to municipal actions directed toward nonconforming

uses is misplaced. Indeed, none of the cases relied on

by the court involved billboards, the act, § 13a-123, or

any of the applicable regulations.

Finally, we are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ claim

that the defendants’ denial of their request to replace

the sign’s existing support structure with a monopole

constituted ‘‘a taking of a vested property right’’ without

just compensation. Section 13a-123 (g) (2) provides in

relevant part that the commissioner may ‘‘acquire by

purchase, gift or condemnation, and shall pay just compensation upon the removal of [grandfathered] outdoor

advertising structures, signs, displays.’’ (Emphasis

added.) In the present case, the defendants have not

directed the plaintiffs to remove their sign. In fact, to

the contrary, the defendants have recognized the sign’s

grandfathered status and have made it clear that the

sign does not need to be taken down and that the plaintiffs can continue to operate and maintain it, albeit

within the confines of § 13a-123-12 of the regulations.

There can be no regulatory taking when a sign owner

has not been told to take down a sign and, conversely,

is explicitly allowed to continue operating the existing

sign. See Lamar Co., LLC v. Arkansas State Highway &

Transportation Dept., 386 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Ark. App.

2011) (plaintiff’s takings claim was premature when

defendant had not ordered plaintiff to remove billboards); U.S. Outdoor Advertising Co. v.Indiana Dept.

of Transportation, supra, 714 N.E.2d 1264 (‘‘[t]he question of taking and compensation is not properly before

this [c]ourt because the signs have not yet been

removed’’; additionally, no authority exists to support

assertion that denial of permit amounts to order for

removal of sign). Accordingly, we conclude that the

plaintiffs’ takings claim misses the point, given that the

defendants have not directed the plaintiffs to take down

their sign and have instead said only that the plaintiffs

may not remove the sign to reconstruct it with a new

and different support structure.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to render judgment for the defendants.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 A monopole is a singular pole that is used to support a billboard or other

advertising structure.

2 This permit has been in effect since its issuance in 1966 and was still

in effect at the time of this appeal.

3 Highland Street also signed the application.

4 General Statutes § 4-176 provides in relevant part:
‘‘(a) Any person may petition an agency, or an agency may on its own

motion initiate a proceeding, for a declaratory ruling as to the validity of

any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision

of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within

the jurisdiction of the agency. . . .

‘‘(e) Within sixty days after receipt of a petition for a declaratory ruling,

an agency in writing shall: (1) Issue a ruling declaring the validity of a

regulation or the applicability of the provision of the general statutes, the

regulation, or the final decision in question to the specified circumstances,

(2) order the matter set for specified proceedings, (3) agree to issue a

declaratory ruling by a specified date, (4) decide not to issue a declaratory

ruling and initiate regulation-making proceedings, under section 4-168, on

the subject, or (5) decide not to issue a declaratory ruling, stating the reasons

for its action. . . .

‘‘(i) If an agency does not issue a declaratory ruling within one hundred

eighty days after the filing of a petition therefor, or within such longer period

as may be agreed by the parties, the agency shall be deemed to have decided

not to issue such ruling. . . .’’

5 General Statutes § 4-175 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘If a provision

of the general statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened

application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or

impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff and if an agency . . .

is deemed to have decided not to issue a declaratory ruling under subsection

(i) of said section 4-176, the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a

declaratory judgment as to the validity of the regulation in question or the

applicability of the provision of the general statutes, the regulation or the

final decision in question to specified circumstances. . . .’’

6 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, but the court, Hon.

Alfred J. Jennings, judge trial referee, denied the motions.

7 We note, as this court did in Billboards Divinity, LLC, that we ‘‘need

not decide at this time whether the complete replacement of a nonconforming sign that was destroyed by accident, natural disaster, or foul play would

constitute customary maintenance and repair of the destroyed sign so as

to permit the continuation of the nonconforming use.’’ Billboards Divinity,

LLC v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 133 Conn. App. 419 n.5.

8 At oral argument before this court, the plaintiffs’ counsel argued that

the department has the authority to regulate only the sign face itself and

that the department cannot regulate a sign’s support structure. Section 13a123 (c) is directly to the contrary and makes clear that the department has

the authority to regulate both the sign face and the sign’s support structure

as they are, essentially, one and the same. See General Statutes § 13a-123

(c) (‘‘[t]he commissioner may promulgate regulations for the control of

outdoor advertising structures, signs, displays and devices along interstate

highways’’ (emphasis added)).