2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-24-2002

Brown v. Phila Mun Ct

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 01-3837

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Recommended Citation

"Brown v. Phila Mun Ct" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 608.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

 No. 01-3837 

 

 

 RICHARD T. BROWN, JR., 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 PHILADELPHIA MUNICIPAL COURT; 

 KATHLEEN RAPONE; 

 VIVIAN T. MILLER, CLERK; 

 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 

 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-01317) 

 District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam 

 

 

 Argued June 28, 2002 

 Before: AMBRO, STAPLETON, and CUDAHY*, Circuit Judges 

 (Filed: September 24, 2002) 

 

 * The Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior United States Circuit Judge 

for the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 

 

 

 Richard T. Brown, Jr., Esquire (Argued) 

 1528 John F. Kennedy Bou

 Two Penn Center Plaza, Suite 1204 

 Philadelphia, PA 19102 

 Attorney for Appell

 Richard A. Sprague, Esqu

 Thomas A. Sprague, Esquire (Argued) 

 Geoffrey R. Johnson, Esquire 

 Sprague & Sprague 

 Suite 400, Wellington Bu

 135 South 19th Street 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 

 Nelson A. Diaz, City Solicitor 

 Elise M. Bruhl, Esquire (Argued) 

 Assistant City Solicitor, Appeals 

 City of Philadelphia 
 Law Department 

 1515 Arch Street 

 One Parkway 

 Philadelphia, PA 19102 

 Attorneys for Appel

 

 

 OPINION 

 

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge: 

 Richard Brown brought this action against the Municipal Court of Philadelphia 

(MCP), the City of Philadelphia and various of their employees (MCP defendants) under 42 

U.S.C. 1983 and the First Amendment right to access judicial records. Since Brown 

eventually obtained most of the requested documents, the MCP defendants filed a motion 

to dismiss Brown’s complaint. The district court dismissed this case for mootness, though 

the court also issued a short memorandum opinion suggesting that Brown’s allegations did 

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Brown now appeals. For the following 

reasons, we vacate and remand. 

 I. 

 This case arises out of the MCP’s failure promptly to deliver a list of all parties 

arrested during a Mardi Gras celebration and related judicial documents to Brown, an 

attorney. Brown initially requested the documents on March 2, 2001 and continued to do 

so thereafter, but still had not received the documents by March 20, 2001. The period to 

appeal the Mardi Gras arrests was scheduled to expire on March 29, 2001 and March 30, 

2001. 

 On March 20, 2001, Brown filed a pro se complaint against the MCP defendants 

in district court. In his complaint, he asserted a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim alleging a 

violation of his First Amendment right of access to judicial records and sought injunctive 

relief. He also sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 and compensatory 

damages, including interest, costs and attorney’s fees. After a preliminary hearing using 

a list of names of arrested parties obtained from a police department website, Brown 

received the requested documents. The MCP defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 

various grounds, including mootness. The district court granted the motion on mootness 

grounds. Brown now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. 

 II. 

 This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We review de novo whether 

Brown’s First Amendment claim is moot. United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 146 (3d 

Cir. 1997) (holding that an appellate court applies de novo review to a plaintiff’s First 

Amendment claim, including issues of mootness). 

 Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to 

actual "cases and controversies." The mootness doctrine defines constitutionally 

minimal conditions for the invocation of federal judicial power. A case is moot when 

"the issues presented are no longer ’live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest 

in the outcome." City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (quotation 

omitted). 

 Brown argues that his claim falls into the "capable of repetition, yet evading 

review" exception to the mootness doctrine. This exception is "narrow and available 

only in exceptional situations." County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 

527, 534 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Further, the exception is limited to cases 

where two elements are present: "’(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short 

to be fully litigated to its cessation or expiration and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood 

that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’" Doe v. 

Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 

206 (3d Cir. 1993)). Even if we were to assume, given the length of time it took Brown 

to reach this stage of the litigation, that the first element is satisfied, we cannot conclude 

that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would be subjected to the same conduct 

again. The district court specifically held that "the facts established at the hearing, 

viewed in their entirety, rule out any realistic likelihood of future recurrence of the 
problems initially encountered by plaintiff." There can be no "reasonable likelihood" of 

repetition when Brown himself documents his subsequent success in obtaining 

equivalent records for the February 2002 Mardi Gras arrests. Reply Br. at 2 n. 1. 

 However, even though Brown’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief may 

be moot, we must still consider the viability of his request for compensatory damages, 

interest, costs and attorney’s fees. The availability of damages or other monetary relief 

normally precludes a finding of mootness. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. State of 

New Jersey, 772 F.2d 35, 41 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that "[d]amages should be denied 

on the merits, not on the grounds of mootness"). Since the district court did not rule on 

Brown’s possible claim for damages, even if nominal, we vacate and remand this case for 

a decision on the merits. 

 III. 

 The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case REMANDED to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion regarding Brown’s 

claim for damages, including, if necessary, attorney’s fees and costs. 

 

 

 By the Court, 

 /s/ Richard D. Cudahy 

 Circuit Judg