### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 266 -CR

F e r nando M uniz -L una , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 6322 0 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM BACH US JR. , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The State c harg ed F erna

ndo Muniz -L

una with a g g ravated sexual assault stemming from an a lleg ed incident of sexual c ontact with his twelve- y ear -old daug hter D.M. See Tex. P enal Co d e A n n . § 2 2
. 0 2 1 ( We s t Su p p . 2 0 0 9 )
. A f

te r a ju r y f o un d M u n iz

- Lu n a g u il ty , th e tr ial court assessed punishment at 20 y ear s’ im p ri s o n m en t
. In three points of error on appea l, Muniz -L

una argues that the trial co u rt er re d in (1) allowingthe outcry witness to describe in detail what the complainant had told her , (2) a llowing imprope r bolstering of D.M.’s testimony , and (3) admitting evidenc e of othe r cr imes, wrong s, or ac ts of the def endant a nd declining to give the jury a limiting instruction reg arding those extraneous acts at t he ti me of their admission. W e af firm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
.Th e fa c ts r e c ite d h e re in a re fr om t he te sti mony

and e xhibi ts a dmi tte d at tr ia l. 1 2 BACK GR OUND On May 27, 2008, Christin R og ers, a n office r with Killeen Police Depa rtment, was
c a lle d o ut t o L ibe rt

y Hi ll M idd le Sc ho ol t o inve sti g a te a po ssi ble se xua l a ssa

ult
. There , she 1 interview ed D. M., who had be en wr iting notes to her classmates that indicated that she ha d been sexually assaulted by

her f ather
. R o gers, who was desig nated a s an outcry witness by

the State, testified at trial that she spoke to D.M. at the school. Duringthe conve rsation, D.M. stated that she ha d b e e n h ome a lon e wi th h e r f a the r, Muniz- Lun a , o n th e pr e vio us da y . A ro un d 5 :30 p. m., D. M. ha d e nc ounte re d h e r fathe r watc hin g a po rn og ra ph ic mov ie in the fr on t ro om o f t he ir ho me . D .M
. s a t d o w no na

c o u c h in th e r o o m a

n d b e g anto p la

y a g a me o nane le c tr o n ic g a mi n g d e v ic e ; M u n iz

Luna continued to watch the video. Appr ox imately 90 minutes later, Muni z -Lun a t u rn ed off the video, and the two of

them ate dinner

and watched a

television prog ram tog ether befor e D.M. we nt upstairs to g o to bed.

Acc ording to Roge rs’s testimony , D.M. stated that as she was g etting r eady for be d, h e r f a th e r e n te r e d h e r r o o m a n d a s k e d h e r to r u b h is penis. Th o u g h s h e in it ia ll y r e s is te d , M u n iz

L u n a i n s i s t e d , an d D
. M
. e v e n tu a l l y c o mp l i e d , o n t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e w o u l d n o t a s k h e r t o d o s o ag ain. Muniz-L una then a sked D.M. to suck on his pe n i s , fi rs t for “just a second,” then for 30 seconds. Ag ain, af

ter initially

ref using, D .M. complied. D.M. then left the bedroom a nd went to t he bathr oo m to br

us h h er te e th. Muniz- Lun a fo llo we d h e r, a sk ingD. M. to c on tin ue to r ub his pe nis to “ he lp him g e t his sp e rm ou t.” She a g a in i nd ic a te d th a t sh e wo uld c omp ly if he did no t a sk he r t o d o s o a g a in i n th e futur e . Sh e c omp le te d th e a c t, a nd a ft e r h e r f

a the r e ja c ulate d into the toi le t, she ra n back to he r bedr oom and went to slee p.3 Th e da y a ft e r D .M
. sp ok e to Rog e rs —tw o da y s a ft e r the inc ide nt—De te c tiv e Ronnie Sup a k o f t

he Ki lle e n Po lic e De pa

rtme nt m on ito re d a

n in te rv ie w b e tw e e n D .M . a nd a fo re ns ic int e rv ie we r at the Childr e n’ s A dv oc a c y Ce nte r. Sup a k o bs e rv e d th e int e rv ie w v ia c los e d- c ir c uit
came ra. A t tr i al , S u p ak t estified over objection from the de fense that D.M.’s ac count of the May 26th incident during the interview was consistent with the statement she made to Roge rs and wi th t he re po rt of the inc ide nt c omp ile d b y the De pa rtme nt o f C hil d a

nd Pr ote c tiv e Se rv ic e s. D.M. also testified at tria l about the May 26th incident. She stated that her fathe r had
a sk e d he r fo r “s pe c ia l han d” on the nig ht in que sti on , an d sta te d that she un de rs too d the te rm a s a reque st that she rub his pe nis, a s he had used the same terminolog y befor e. When aske d whether he had pre vi o u s l y as k ed for “specia l hand” more than once , more than te n times, or more than 100 times, D.M. answer ed, “Mor e than onc e.” D
. M
. testified that her fathe r had a lso asked for “spec ial kiss” on the nig ht in question, which she under stood to indicate or al sex, though he ha d
never used the term befor e. D.M. further testified t hat her fathe r had on pr ior occ asions touched he r skin “on [her] boobs and under her pants” a nd “inside” he r under

her pa nties. At the conc lusion of trial, the jury found Muniz-Lu na guilty of ag g ravated sexual assault. S

ee Te x. Pe na l Co de § 2 2. 02 1. Th e tr ia l c ourt a sse sse d p un ish me nt at 20 y e ars ’ imprisonment, and this appeal followe d.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewa trial c ourt’s ruling under the rules of evide nce f or an a buse of discr etion. Pa gev . S tate , 213 S.W .3d 332, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We c onsider the ruling in light of what
wa s b e fo re the tr ia l c ourt

a t th e tim e the ru lin g wa s mad e and up ho ld t he tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt i f i tWhil e Muniz-Luna cites to a rticle 38.07 of the code of criminal pro cedur e for

the 2 proposition that a “cor

roborating state ment” was n o t re q u i red in this case , article 38.07 does not g overn the ad m i s s i b i l i ty of outcry

statements. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.07 (West 2005). 4 lies within the z one of reasona ble disag ree ment. Ro dge rs v . S tate , 20 5 S. W.3 d 5 25 , 5 29 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2006).
DI SCU SSIO N Out c ry Wit ne ss I n h is f ir st po int of e rr or on a pp e a l, M un iz- Lun a

argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in
a llo wi ngRog e rs , th e ou tc ry wi tne ss, to t esti fy

a s to the c on te nt o f D .M .’ s o utc ry state me nt. A rt i c l e 3 8
. 0 7 2 o f t h e c o d e o f c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e c r e a t e s an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e ar s ay r u l e f o r “ o u t c r y” statements made by

a child abuse victim describing t h e al leg ed off ense, if the witness is the first adult to whom the child made suc h statements. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.072 (We st Su pp . 2 00 9) ; Ga rc ia v . S

tate , 7 92 S.W. 2d

88 , 9 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ); Fl e mi ng v . S tate , 81 9 S. W.2 d 2 37 (Tex
. App.—Aus tin 19 91 , p e t. r e f’ d) . F or

an o utc ry

state me nt t o b e a dmi ssi ble
un de r a rt ic le 38 .0 72 , th e state me nt m us t de sc ri be the of

fe ns e in som e dis c e rn ibl e mann e r a nd mus t consist of more than a gener al allusion to a potential occ urre nce of sexual abuse. Se e Ga rc ia , 792 S.W .2d at 91.

I n this case, Roge rs testified re g ardingD.M.’s ac count of a n incident duringwhich Muniz -L una aske d D.M. t o rub and suc k on his penis. These state ments fall square ly within the hear say exception c arve d out by article 38.072, which applies to outcry statements that “de scribe the alleg ed off

ense.” See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.072. 2Muniz -L una does not ch al l eng e any of the other

require ments of ar

ticle 38.072, such a s 3 notice, the a g e of the child, whether the outcry

witness was the first person that the child spoke to, or the availability

of the c hild to testi fy
. See id. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 2009). 5 Muniz -L una conte nds that an out cry witness may

only testify that an outcr

y statement
was made and relate the basic nature of the complaint, and that any further testimony

reg ardingthe d e t a i l s o f t h e a l l e g e d

o f f e n s e c o n s t i tu t e s i n a dm i s s i b l e h e ar s ay. Ho we ve r, a s o utc ry state me nts mus t 3 rise above the level of g ener al allusions to sex ual abuse , se e Ga rc ia , 792 S.W .2d at 91, the inclusion of some deta il reg arding the alleg ed offe nse is not only permissible but require d for a dmissibi lity of th e o u tc r y s tate me n t. See Ca rty

v . S tate , 178 S.W .3d 297, 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2 0 0 5 , p e t
. r e f

’ d ) ( h o l d i n g o u t c r

y s t a t e m e n ta dm i s s i b l e b e c a u s e “ [i ]t w a s detailed and in a ‘d i s ce rn ab l e ma n n er d es cr i b es t h e al l ege d o ff en s e’ ”) (q u o t i n g Ga rc ia , 7 92 S.W. 2d a t 91 ) ( e mph a sis
a dd e d) ; Ma rq ue

z v . S tate , 165 S.W .3d 741, 747 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. ref ’d) ( holding th a t o u tc r y s tate me n t w a s a dmi s s ib l e b e c a u s e it d e s c r ib e d s p e c if ic s e xu a l a c ts )
. A c c o r d in g ly , M u n iz

Luna’s f irst point of error

is overrule d.
Bol ste ring I n his second point of err or on appea l, Muniz-Luna ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in overrulingthe def

ense’ s objection to bolstering of D.M.’s testim o n y . Muniz -L una’s a rg ument fo c us e s o n Su

pak’ s te sti mony

that D .M . w a s c on sis te nt i n d e sc ri bin g th e ev e nts of the nig ht i n question in eac h of three statements—her statement to R o g ers, he r statement to the inter viewer at the C hildre n ’ s A dv o c a c y Ce n te r , an d

h e r s tate me n t t o th e D e p artm e n t o f F a mi ly an d Pr o te c ti veTh e re is s ome que sti on a s to wh e the r a

“ bo lst e ri ng ” ob

je c tio n p re se rv e s e rr or . Wh ile 4 “bolstering ” wa s a prope r objec tion in Tex as cour ts prior to the adoption of the r ules of evide nce, the rules themse lves contain no spec ific provision reg ardingbolstering
. Coh n v . S tate , 849 S.W .2d 817, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Campbell, J ., concur ring ). Concurr ing in Cohn , Jud g e Campb e ll argue d th a t a

“ bo lst e ri ng ” ob

je c tio n s ho uld

no lon g e r b e re c og nize d, a s “ an o bje cti on th a t c e rt a in evidenc e is ‘b o l s t er i n g’ i n no way invokes the Rules or informs the tria l court of the ba sis for ex cl u s i o n under the Rules.” Id. ; se e als o R iv as v . S tate , 2 7 5 S. W. 3 d 8 8 0 , 8 8 7 ( T e x. Cr im . App. 2009) (noting that “[m] any appellate courts have cited the Cohn concur renc e as a uthority to abandon ‘bolstering ’ as a valid objection to prese rve e rror for r eview” ). Howe ver, g iven our disposition of thi s is su e , w e ne e d n ot a dd re ss t he c on tin uin g vit a lity

of a “ bo lst e ri ng ” ob

je c tio n in Te xas. T o th e e xte n t t

h a t t h e o b je c ti o nc anb e c o n s tr

u e d a s ano b je c ti o nto a

p r io r c o n s is te nt 5 statement under

Rule 613(c) of the rules of evidenc e, the same rea soning a pplies. Under Rule 613, “a bolster ing obje ction is appropriately made to a prior c onsistent statement introduced afte r the witness’s in-cour

t testimony .” W

est v . S tate , No. 03-05-00371- CR, 2008 Tex . App. L EXI S 8599, at *15 (Te x . App.—Austin Nov. 14, 2008, pet. re f’d) (op. on re h’g ) (e mphasis added)
. 6 S erv i ce s . At t ri al , M u n i z -Lun a’ s co u n s el o b j ec t edt o t h e a dm i s s i o no f t h i s t es t i m o n y , s t at i n g, “That’s an attempt to bolster the witness.” 4

Bolster ing occur s when one item of evidenc e is imprope rly used by a party to add
c r e d e n c e o r

w e i g h tt o s o m e e ar l i e r

u n i mp e a c h e d

p i e c e o f e v i d e n c e o f

f e r e d b y t h e s a m e p art y. Coh n v . S tate , 849 S.W .2d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Texa s courts have emphasized that bo lst e ri ngon ly

a pp lie s w he n e vid e nc e is i mpr op e rl y us e d b y a pa rt y to a dd c re de nc e or

we ig ht t o
some e ar lie r unimpeache d piece of evide nce. Va lc ar c e l v . S tate , 765 S.W. 2d

41 2, 41 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p . 1 9 8 9 ) ( ci t i n g Gu e rra v . S tate , 771 S.W .2d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). As Supak testified befor e D.M. did, his testimony could n o t h av e bolstered he rs. See id. ; Hy dev . S tate , 869 S.W .2d 660, 663 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 1994, no pet.) (“ [I ]m proper ‘bolstering ’ does not occ ur whe n the alleg ed ‘bolstering ’ takes place befor e the unimpeache d witness has had a chanc e to testify .”). 5 Acc ording ly , Muniz -L

una’s se cond point of er

ror is over

ruled.7

Ot he r Crimes

, W ro ngs , o r Ac ts I n h is thir d p oin t of

e rr or , M un iz- Lun a

argue s th a t th e tr ial cou rt imp e rm iss ibl y introduced e vidence of other c rimes, wrong s, or ac ts dur ing D.M.’s testimony , and fa iled to give the jury a limiting instruction at the time that the evide nce w as admitted.
Ad mi ssi bil ity Mun i z -Lun a contends that the tria l court er red in a dmitti ng D.M.’s testimony reg ardingprior occasions on which Muni z-Luna asked D.M. to rub hi s penis, watche d pornog raphy in D.M.’s prese nce, a

nd touched D.M.’ s brea sts and g enitals. Under rule 404(b) , evidenc e of othe r crimes, wr ong s, or bad a cts is inadmissibl e if it is offe red to pr ove the cha rac ter of a person in orde r to s ho w a c tio n in

c on fo rm ity

the re wi th, tho ug h it

may be a dmi ssi ble fo r o the r p ur po se s. Te x. R. Ev id. 40 4( b) . H ow e ve r, Ar tic le 38 .3 7 o f t

he c od e of cri mi na l pr oc e dure pr ov ide s th a t, notwithstanding rule 404, evidenc e of other crimes, wrong s, or bad acts c ommitt ed by a def endant ag ainst a child who is the victim of the a lleg ed sexual assault “shall be a dmitted for its bear ing on rele vant matters, including: (1) the state of mind of the defe ndant and the child; a nd (2) the pr evious and subseque nt relationship b et we en the def endant a nd the child.” Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art . 3 8. 37 (We st Su

pp . 2 00 9) ; Po olev . S

tate , 9 74 S.W. 2d

89 2, 89 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 98 , p e t.
re f’ d) ; se e als o E

rn st v . S tate , 9 7 1 S
. W
. 2 d 6 9 8 , 700 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (noting authority that observe s that wording of article 38.37 is “strong ly tipped in favor of admissibilit y ”). I n th is c a se , te sti mony

tha t Muniz- Lun a

ha d p re vio us ly

a sk e d D .M . to ru

b h is p e nis , watche d pornog raphy

in D.M.’s prese nce, a

nd touched D.M.’ s brea sts a nd g enitals all relate to the prior se x u al nature of their r elationship. Furthe r, the fa ct that Muniz-L una had pr eviously askedWhil e e vid e nc e a dmi ssi ble un de r a rt ic le 38 .3 7 ma

y be e xclu de d un der

ru le 40 3 if

its 6 probative va lue is substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, Muniz-Luna did not raise that issue at trial or on appea l. See Te x. R. E vid . 4 03 ; Sa nte lla n v . S tate , 939 S.W .2d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that appellant must make spec ific objec tion at t ri al to preser ve appellate issue based on ba lancingunder r ule 403). 8 D. M. fo r “ sp e c ia l ha

nd ” wh e n re qu e sti ng sh e ru b his pe nis is re le va

nt to his state of

min d o n th e date of the a lleg ed incident whe n h e again asked her for “ specia l hand.” See, e .g. , Al le n v . S tate , No. 03-05-00755- CR, 2007 Tex
. App. L EXI S 549, at *3 (Tex. A pp.—Austin Jan. 23, 2007, no pet.) (m e m. o p. , n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) (e vid e nc e of

pr ior a bu se and “ biza rr e punis hme nts ”
a dmi ssi ble un de r ar

tic le 38 .3 7 to show de fe nd ant’ s “in te nt an d ab ili ty to co mmi t the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e and to ex p l ai nt h e c o mp l ai n an t ’s ac qu i es ce n ce t o ap p el l an t ’s ab u s e” ). Ac co rd i n gl y , we conclude that the tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de te rm ini ngthe e vid e nc e wa s r e le va nt. 6 Contemporaneous Limiting Instruction

Muniz -L una also a rgu es that the trial cour t erre d in failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury

at the time the evide nce of extraneous offe nses was ad m i t t ed . Rule of evidenc e 105(a ) provides that “[w] hen evide nce which is admissible as to o n e p ar t y or for one purpos e b u t n o t ad missibl e as to a nother pa rty or for another purpose is admitted, the c ourt, upon
re qu e st, sh a ll restr ic t th e e vid e nc e to i ts p ro pe r s c op e and ins tr uc t th e jur

y a c c or din g ly .” Te x. R. Ev id. 10 5( a ). Whe n e vid e nc e is a dmi tte d fo r a lim ite d purp os e , the tr ia l c ourt mus t, up on re qu e st, pr ov ide a midtr ia l limiti ng ins tr uc tio n, a s fa ili ng to pr ov ide the ins tr uc tio n may imp ro pe rl y

re su lt i n the j ury forming a negative infere nce about the defendant. J ac k so n v . S tate , 992 S.W .2d 469, 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). This improper infe renc e, once formed, c annot ea sily be cur ed by

an instruction in the jury

char g e. Id.9 The burde n is on the defe nd an t al o n e to request a limiting instruction. W alker

v . S tat e , 3 00 S.W. 3d

83 6, 84 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 9, pe t. r e f’ d) . I f t

he de fe nd ant f

a ils to reque st a limit ing instruc tion at the introduction of the evidence, the defe ndant does not pre serve
err or and the trial court is not requir ed to provide a n in struction. Id. The re quest for a limit ing instruction mu s t b e s u ff

i ciently specific to “inform the tria l court as to what limi tation should be place d upon the evidenc e.” Pu e ntev . S tate , 888 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tex. App.—San Antoni o 1994,
n o p e t
. ) ( ci t i n g Bu rk

s v . S tate , 876 S.W .2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that to preser ve
err or, counse l must “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thi nks himself entitled to it, and [] do so clea

rly enoug h for the judg e to under stand him”)). I n this case , Muniz -L

una’s tria l counsel first discussed D .M.’s testimony reg arding extraneous offe nses with the court at a conf ere nce outside of

the pre sence of the jury . After trial counsel objec ted that the ac ts should not be admitted under r u l e 4 0 4(b) “ to show char acte r or char acte r conf

ormity or any thing other than c erta in limi ted purposes that the law provide s,” counse l and the c ourt eng ag ed in the followingexchang e:
CO UN SEL : I f t he Court a llo ws thi s tes tim ony , we wo uld a sk the Court to g ive a lim i t i n g i n struction as to the burde n of the a dmission o f t h i s t e s t i m o n y. TH E CO UR T: Al l r ig ht. CO UN SEL : B ut w e do ob je c t to it. TH E CO UR T: Sur e. I ’m goin g t o ove rr ule y our o bje c tio n. I ’m

g oin g to allow it in. But when we do the C harg e, I would g ive for [sic] a limiting instruction. COUNSEL : Your Honor , Iwould ask for one at the time of the evidenc e.Muniz -L una’s brief also indicates that the trial court e rre d in failing to give an instruction 7 on the burd e n o f p ro of

a t th e tim e tha

t the e vid e nc e of

the e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s w a s a dmi tte d. Whil e this issue is not properly

befor e us on appe al, see Te x. R. A pp . P. 38 (b ri e fi ngre qu ir e me nts ), we no te that the ana ly sis in Jack son serve s to overrule any challeng e re gar d i n g t he nec essity of a contempora

neous instruction on the burden of proof. 992 S.W .2d 469, 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining that burden of proof instructions may

be g iven for the first time in jury char g e as juror s do not encounter

burden of

proof que stions unti l all evidence has bee n taken)
.

10 TH E CO UR T: I ’m g oin g to d e ny

that.
When the evidenc e wa s offe red be fore the jury , counsel stated, “ Your Honor , I ’m g oing to objec t as we objec ted outside the pre sence of [the jury ] as this testimony will not be allowed.” After the trial court ove rruled the objection, counsel stated, “And, ag ain, we would ask for a limiti ng instruction at this tim e, Your

Honor.” This reque st was also denie d. Our r e vie w o f t

he tr ia l tr ans c ri pt ind ic a te s th a t Muniz- Lun a did no t pr op e rl y

re qu e st a limiting instruction re gar d i ng the purposes f or which the extraneous-off ense e vidence could be used. Out s i d e o f t he pre sence of the jury , trial counsel a sked for a “limiting instruction as to the burden of admission of t he testi mony .” Such an ins truction ref ers to the State’ s burden of proof, f or which a contempora

neous instruction is not re quired. See J ackson , 992 S.W .2d at 477 (stating that

“ th e r a ti o n a le f

o r g iv in g a c o n te mp o r an e o u s in s tr

u c ti o n[w h e na dmi tt in g e v id e n c e o f e xtr aneous offe nses] does not apply to bur den of pr oof issues”)
. Fur ther, whe n the jury

returne d, counsel stated 7 only that, “ag ain, we would a sk for a limit ing instruc tion at this t ime.” This statement re fer s back to t he pr ior re qu e st f or an in str uc tio n o n th e burd e n o f p ro of . E ve n if we we re to e va luate the re qu e st on its own, it i s not sufficiently specific to inform the trial court as what instruction the def endant soug ht. Se e Pu e nte , 8 88 S.W. 2d a t 52 8; se eals o E lli

s v . S tate , 2 4 1 S. W. 3 d 1 72, 179 (T e x.The State a lso argues that no limiti ng instruction was req u i re d b eca use the e x trane ous 8 offe nse evide nce w as used to prove a “ma in fac t” in the case . The trial court is not requir ed to g ive limit ing instruc tions on an extraneous offense which involves a main fac t and is acc ording ly “par t and p ar cel of and closely interwove n with the offe nse for which the a ccuse d is on trial.” Nav arro v . S

tate , 8 6 3 S
. W
. 2 d 1 9 1 , 1 9 9 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n 1 9 9 3 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Ar iv e ttev . S tate , 513 S.W .2d 857, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). Howe ver, be cause we c onclude that e rror was not pr op e rl y pr e se rv e d, we ne e d n ot a dd re ss t his argume nt. 11 App.—Eastland 2007, pe t. ref’ d) (“ A re quest for a limit ing instruc tion must inform the trial c ourt as to what limitations shoul d be plac ed upon the e vidence .”).

Fur ther, even taking the content of c ounsel’s objec tion into consideration, counsel objected to the a dmission of the evidence solely under r ule 404( b ). T h e evidenc e, howe ver, w as
a dm i s s i b l e u n d e r

art i c l e 3 8
. 3 7 , a s e x p l a i n e d b y t h e S t a t e o u t s i d e o f t h e p r e s e n c e o f

t h e j u r y. Although the defe ndant is entitled to a limit ing instruction r eg arding the purposes f or which 38.37 offe nses may

be conside red dur ing the g uilt/i nnocenc e phase of trial, see Gr aves v . S tate , 176 S.W .3d 422, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.), such a n instruction was neve r specific ally

reque sted in this case, a s defe nse counse l never disc u s s ed o r all uded to ar ticle 38.37 wh e n o bje c tin g . A c c or din g ly , th e re qu e st f or a c on te mpo ra

ne ou s in str

uc tio n wa s n ot p ro pe rl y prese rved. Se e Tor

re s v . S tate , N o s . 0 5
- 9 6
- 0 0 4 9 8
- C R & 0 5
- 9 6
- 0 0 4 9 9
- C R , 1 9 9 8 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 4635, at *7-8 (T ex. App.—Dallas J uly 30, 1998, no pet.) (me m. op., not designated for publication) (holding that appellant ha d not preser ved re quest for l i m i t i ng instruction when evide nce
was a dmissibl e u nder a

rticle 38.37 a

nd counsel ha d only

objected a

nd reque sted instruction under r ule 404(b))
. 8 Even if this issue had been prese rved for our re view, Muniz-Luna’s a rg ument does not survive har

m analy sis. A trial court’s f ailure to g ive a limiting ins t ru ct i o n as t o extraneous12

offe nse evidence does not constitute constitutional error. Se e J on es v . S tate , 944 S.W .2d 642, 653 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1996) (holdingharmless e rror analy sis is applicable to failure to give contempora

neous limiti ng instruction); Ra nk in v . S tate , 995 S.W .2d 210, 215 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pet. re f’d) (noting it wa s non-constitutional e rror when tria l court g ave limiting instruction to jury

when jury

was c harg ed and not whe n extraneous offe nse testimony was a dmitted). The rule s of appe llate proc edure provide that a ny err or other tha

n constitutional error “ that does not aff ect substantial rig hts must be disreg arde d.” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2( b). Substantial rights ar e not aff ecte d by the erroneous admissi on of evidence if, afte r examining the r ecor d as a w hole, we ha ve a fair assurance that the error did not influence the j ury , or had but a slight ef fec t. Mo til la v . S

tate , 78 S.W .3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t he fa ilure to g ive a

lim iti ngins tr

uc tio n r e g ardi ngart ic le 38.37 evidenc e wa s harmless, the c ourt of appe als in Ra nk in , dealing with the harm issue on re mand, noted that “the trial court submi tted a proper li miting i nstruction in the jury char g e, that the jury

had been instruc ted not to consider the evidenc e for purposes of char acte r conformity , and that ther e wa s no evidenc e to show the jury formed a n opinion prior to the time it bega n its deliberation” in finding the er ror ha rmless. Le mm on s v . S

tate , 7 5 S. W.3 d 5 13 , 5 25 (T e x. Ap p. —San Ant on io 2 00 2, pe t.
re f’ d ) ( s u m m ar i z i n g Ra nk in , 995 S.W .2d at 215). Othe r cour ts have a lso considere d the leng th of time be tween the failure to g ive the contempora neous instruction a

nd the rea ding of

the cha rg e. See id. (n oti ng

“ the sh or t amou nt o f t ime that pa sse d f

ro m th e int

ro du cti on of

the e xtra ne ou s- of fe ns e evidenc e to the trial c ourt’s re ading of the instruction to the jury” in concluding that tria l court’s e rror did not affe ct substantial rig ht).We note that this inst ruction u n d u l y l i m its consideration of e x trane ous acts involving 9 Muniz -L una’s pr ior sexual c ontact with D.M. and his watching of pornog raphy in her pre sence . As these a cts are admissible unde r article 38.37, they may also be considere d with r eg ard to the state of mind of the defe ndant and the c hild and the pre vious and subsequent relationship betwee n the d e f e n d an tan d

t h e c h i l d
. T e x. C o d e C r i m . P r o c . A n n . art
. 3 8
. 3 7 ( W e s tS u p p . 20 09 ); s ee B r a n tley v . S tat e , 48 S.W .3d 318, 323 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref ’d) (holding that limit ing instruc tion in char g e that did not include langua g e authoriz ing consideration of ac ts for purpose s enumerated in article 38.37 “ unduly

limit ed the use of the damag ing e vidence ”).

13 I n this case, the t ri al co u rt instructed the jury in the char g e that any

evidenc e of extraneous offe nses could only be conside red “ in determining the intent, knowled g e, plan, prepa ration, motive, absenc e of mistake or accident of the defendant, .
. . and for no other purpose .” 9 D. M. wa s the la st wi tne ss to te sti fy duri ng the State ’s c a se in c hie f, and the lim iti ngins tr

uc tio n in the cha rg e wa s re ad t o the jury

on the morning following D.M.’s testimony . Fur ther, the r ecor d prese nts no other indication sug g esting that the jury formed a n opinion reg ardingMuniz -Luna’ s
c ha ra c te r o r c on fo rm ity

pr ior to t he re a din g of

the jur y c ha rg e , and we no te that the State did no t r e ly he a vil y on the e xtra

ne ou s ac ts dur ing c los ing
. B a se d on our ana ly sis of the re c or d, we have a

fa ir
as s u ra n ce t h at the er

ror did not influenc e the jury or had but a

slight ef fec t, and ac cording ly

we conclude that any

err or by the trial cour

t in failing to g ive a c ontem porane ous limi ting instruction did no t a ff e c t Muniz- Lun a ’s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts
. Acc ording ly , Muniz -L

una’s third point of er

ror is over

ruled.14 CO NC LU SION F ind ingno re ve rs ibl e e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: September

30, 2010 Do No t Pu

bli sh