IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. No. 68828-6-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED CHRISTOPHER JON MOORE, Appellant. FILED: September 16. 2013
Cox, J. —Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable 

### because they violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution v and article I, section 7 ofthe Washington Constitution. But "'there are a fewy>

Here, the State relies on the emergency aid exception to support the o validity of a warrantless search of locked rooms in Christopher Moore's home. 

### During that search, police officers discovered illegaldrugs that served as the 

### 1State v.Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). 2State v. Schultz. 170 Wn.2d 746, 753-54, 248 P.3d 484 (2011) (quoting State v. Reichenbach. 153Wn.2d 126, 131, 101 P.3d 80 (2004)). 3 Id. at 754. m ^o 

### jealously and carefully drawn exceptions to thewarrant requirement.'"2 The^ ^>;r ~> ~r, -- 

### State bears the burden ofproving an exception applies. =r =§^T'
SONo. 68828-6-1/2 basis for his arrest, prosecution, and conviction. Because this record fails to show that the emergency aid exception applies to this case, we reverse. The unchallenged findings offact from the CrR 3.6 hearing provide
context. On December 9, 2010, police officers were dispatched to an address in Marysville in response to a 911 call reporting "a physical domestic." This report of a physical "domestic disturbance" identified Christopher Moore and S.B. as the persons involved. The 911 caller indicated he had received a call from "the victim, [S.B.]," but she "had been disconnected." The caller also explained that he was "unable to reach [S.B.] further." Upon arrival at the Marysville residence, two police officers spoke with Moore, who identified himself immediately when he answered the door. They 

### asked "ifthey could come inside and talk." "[Moore] responded 'Sure.'" Once inside, one ofthe two officers spoke with Moore "while [the other 

### officer] began a protective sweep of the residence." The officers noted that Moore "appeared calm, as did two children who were seated in an adjacent 

### family room watching TV." The officers also noted that "nothingappeared out of the ordinary inside the residence." 

### While speaking with Moore, the officer who remained with him nearthe residence's entrance learned additional information from dispatch. The 911 

### callertold dispatch that he "had received the call from [S.B.] that evening with [S.B.] crying and stating that 'Chris' had 'beat the s**** out of [her]." The 911 callerfurther reported that "he heard some yelling and a disturbance and the lineNo. 68828-6-1/3
went dead; he was unable to get [S.B.] back on the phone." As the officer near the entrance spoke with Moore, he "confirmed that his girlfriend was [S.B.] and they had an argument that evening but that she'd left some time earlier." During the "protective sweep," the other officerfound one marijuana plant in the bathroom and discovered three locked doors, which Moore declined to open when asked to do so. An officer kicked in two ofthe three locked doors, searching for S.B. Moore then provided a key to the third door. They did not find S.B. Rather, they discovered marijuana plants and a marijuana grow operation 

### inthe previously locked room. They arrested Moore and secured a search warrant. When executing the warrant, they discovered more than 100 marijuana 

### plants and equipment associated with a grow operation. The State charged Moore with manufacture of a controlled substance. After a bench trial on stipulated evidence, the court found Moore guilty as charged. Moore appeals. EMERGENCYAID EXCEPTION 

### Moore argues that the police violated article 1, section 7 of the state constitution by invading his home and searching a locked room without authority 

### oflaw.4 We agree.

4Appellant's Opening Briefat 8.No. 68828-6-1/4 "As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in violation ofthe Fourth Amendment to the United States 

### Constitution and article I, section 7 oftheWashington Constitution."5 Despite the protections against warrantless searches "'there are a few 

### jealously andcarefully drawn exceptions to thewarrantrequirement.'"6 The State bears theburden ofproving anexception applies.7 

### Theemergency aid exception is one oftheseexceptions.8 "This exception emerges from the police's 'community caretaking function' and 'allows for the limited invasion ofconstitutionally protected privacy rights when it is necessary 

### for police officers to renderaid orassistance.'"9 Such an invasion ispermitted only ifthe State can show that: "(1) the police officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed assistance for health or safety concerns; (2) a reasonable 

### person inthe same situation would similarly believe that there was need for assistance;
... (3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need for assistance with the place being searched.". 

### . . (4) there is an imminent threat ofsubstantial injury to persons or property; (5) state agents must believe a specific person or persons or property is in need ofimmediate help for health or safety reasons; and (6) the claimed emergency is not a mere pretext for 

### anevidentiary search.[10]
5Garvin. 166 Wn.2d at 249. 

### 6Schultz, 170 Wn.2d at 753-54 (quoting Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d at 131). 7id, at 754. 8]d 

### 9]g\ (quoting State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 802, 92 P.3d 228 (2004)). 10 Id. (quoting Thompson. 151 Wn.2d at 802) (citing State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373. 386-87. 5 P.3d 668 (2000): State v. Leffler. 142 Wn. App. 175, 181, 4No. 68828-6-1/5
"[T]he failure to meet any factor is fatal to the lawfulness of the State's 

### exercise ofauthority."11 For purposes of a suppression hearing, the question is whetherthe 

### findings offact supporttheconclusions oflaw.12 Unchallenged findings of fact are verities onappeal.13 Wereview de novo thetrial court's conclusions of law.14 

### The supreme court recently addressed the emergency aid exception in the 

### contextofa reported incidentofdomestic violence in Statev. Schultz.15 Here, the trial court that heard Moore's case cited Schultz in support of its decision. 

### In Schultz, Sequim police officers received a report "from a resident of an 

## apartmentcomplex" about aloud argumentbetween amale and female.16 When the officers arrived at the apartment, they heard a man and a woman yelling and 

### "specifically overheard the man say that he wanted to be left alone and needed 

### hisspace."17 When theofficers knocked on thedoor, thewoman, Patricia Sue
183, 178 P.3d 1042 (2007); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833 (1999)). 

### 11 Id at 760 n.5. 12 State v.Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 645-47, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). 13 State v. Acrev. 148 Wn.2d 738, 745, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). 14 Schultz. 170 Wn.2d at 753. 

### 15 170 Wn.2d 746, 248 P.3d 484 (2011). 

### 16Jd at 750. 17 Id at 750-51. 5No. 68828-6-1/6 

### Schultz, answered anddenied thatanyone else wasin theapartment.18 The officers thentold Schultz they heard a malevoice.19 She called for Sam Robertson, later identified as the male whose voice the police had previously 

### heard.20 He emergedfrom a nearby bedroom.21 Schultzthen stepped back and the officers followed her inside.22 After entering the apartment, the officers separated Schultz and 

### Robertson.23 Oneofficerspoke toSchultz inside the apartment andnoticed that her"neckwas red andblotchy."24 Both Schultz and Robertson independently 

### told theofficers that therehad beenno physical violence during their argument.25 While talking to one ofthe officers, Schultz began "acting 'fidgety' and 

### picking things up around thehouse."26 AsSchultzwaspicking things up, the 

### officer "noticed a handgun and amarijuana pipe on thetable."27 Hethen asked

18 Id at 751. 

### 19id 20id 21 Id 22 Id 

### 23 Id 24 Jd 25 id at 752. 

### 26 id 27 Id.No. 68828-6-1/7 Schultz ifhe could search the house for narcotics.28 She consented but later 

### revoked herconsent.29 Theofficers thenobtained a search warrantby telephone, and, afterconducting a search, discovered methamphetamine.30 Schultzwas chargedwith methamphetamine possession.31 In Schultz, the supreme court adopted six factors that the government 

### must showtojustify awarrantless intrusion undertheemergency aid exception.32 The court also recognized the unique challenges for law enforcement indomestic 

### violence situations, where theemergency aid exception may arise.33 As the
court observed: Domestic violence situations can be volatile and quickly escalate 

### into significant injury. Domestic violence often, if not usually, occurs within the privacy of a home. Our legislature has 

### recognized thatthe risk ofrepeated and escalating acts ofviolence is greater inthe domestic context. The legislature has sought to provide [the] "maximum protection" to victims ofdomestic violence 

### through apolicy ofearly intervention.1341 With the above and other points in mind, the court continued, stating that a survey of cases indicates that:



### 28 id 29 Id 

### 30 id 31 id 32 id at 754-55. 33 Id at 755. 

### 34 id (citing RCW 10.99.040(2)(a); RCW 10.99.010)No. 68828-6-1/8 the fact that police are responding to a situation that likely involves domestic violence may be an importantfactor in evaluating both the subjective beliefof the officerthat someone likely needs assistance and in assessing the reasonableness of the officer's beliefthat 

### there is an imminentthreat ofinjury.[35] Buttressing this latter point, the supreme court recognized that "the likelihood that
a situation involves domestic violence is an important consideration in evaluating the reasonableness ofan officer's subjective beliefthat someone needs safety assistance."36 

### The supreme court held that the State was required to show that all ofthe emergency aid exception elements were established before the police crossed 

### thethreshold of herapartment.37 Itthenexamined the facts mostfavorable to the State to decide whetherthe requirements weremet.38 Here, we do the same, starting withthe unchallenged findings of fact. They are verities on appeal. 

### Forpurposes of our analysis, we considerwhether in this case the written findings supportthe Schultz factors. In doing so, we note that the absence of any one factor is fatal to the State's burden to establish that the emergency aid exception applies inthis case.



### 35 JcL at 756. 36jd at 759. 37 Id at 750-60. 38 Id. at 760.

8No. 68828-6-1/9 Police Officers' Subjective BeliefofNeededAssistance 

### Moore concededbelow,39 as heultimately does onappeal,40 that the State showed that the police subjectively believed that an individual needed assistance at Moore's residence. That concession is proper. Atthe time the responding officers stood at the threshold of Moore's home, they had received a 911 call of a "physical domestic" disturbance at a specific Marysville address. The 911 caller indicated that he had received a call "from the victim, [S.B.], that the call had been disconnected, and he had been unable to reach herfurther." The other name provided by the 911 callerwas 

### Christopher Moore. When the officers arrived at the address that the 911 caller provided, they spoke with Moore, who immediately identified himselfwhen he answered the door. They asked "ifthey could come inside and talk." "[Moore] responded 'Sure.'" 

### The trial court made further unchallenged findings that these officers had extensive domestic violence training and responded to domestic violence calls on 

### a daily basis. The officers testified to their obligation to identifywhether a domestic violence victim is present at a location and is safe. They also stated 

### thatthey feltthey needed to verify forthemselves ifS.B. was present inside the house and safe.



### 39 Report of Proceedings at 34. 40Appellant's Reply Briefat 4.No. 68828-6-1/10 This information was sufficient to establish these officers' subjective belief that someone likely needed assistance for health and safety concerns. This satisfies the first Schultz factor. Reasonable BeliefofNeeded Assistance Moore contests the existence of the second Schultz criterion. His argument is not persuasive. This criterion requires that the officers' beliefofthe need for assistance is reasonable. The unchallenged findings that we discussed in connection with the first factor also serve to fulfill the second. Moore contends the evidence was insufficientto support this criterion. In 

### doing so, he purports to summarize what the evidence showed when the police

were at the threshold of Moore's house as follows: 

### (1) an anonymous (unverified as to veracity) report of a physical domestic violence incident; (2) the officers heard no raised voices outside 

### the house; (3) Mr. Moore answered the door and showed no signs of distress; (4) everything in the home appeared to be inorder and there were children watching television who appeared ingood 

### spirits; (5) Mr. Moore answered allquestions consistently with what officers observed; and (6) there was no history of domestic violence 

### of any kind associated withMr. Moore individually or Mr. Moore and 

### [S.B.] together. That isit.[41] IfMoore suggests by the first item of this summary that verification of eitherthe identity ofthe 911 caller or the reliability of the information he provided is required to establish this exception to the warrant requirement, he is mistaken. In Schultz, there was no identification ofthe caller who reported the disturbance



### 41 Appellant's Opening Briefat 15.

10No. 68828-6-1/11 

### to the police.42 The opinion only statesthatthecall came"from aresidentofan apartmentcomplex."43 And theopinion does not discussreliability ofeitherthe informant or the information provided as a requirement for this exception to the 

### general requirementfor awarrant.44 This case is no different from Schultz. Such situations as those here and in Schultz are distinct from ones where authorities must establish reliability of the 

### informant and the information provided toobtain awarrant.45 Likewise, the failure ofthe police to hear raised voices from within Moore's 

### home is not, by itself, dispositive to refute the officers' reasonable beliefthat
someone likely needed assistance for health and safety concerns. As for 

### Moore's allegedly calm demeanor, the officers only noted that after gaining admittance to the house. Itcannot be a factor for purposes of showing what the 

### officers knew when they were at the threshold, prior to entry. Stated otherwise, there is substantial evidence to support the unchallenged findings that support this conclusion. 42 Schultz. 170 Wn.2d at 760. 

### 43 Id 44 See id. 

### 45 See State v. Lyons. 174 Wn.2d 354, 359, 275 P.3d 314 (2012) (noting that an affidavit insupport of a warrant "may be based on an unidentified informant's tip, [but] the affidavit must contain some ofthe underlying circumstances that led to the informant to believe that evidence could be found at 

### the specified location. In particular, the affidavitmust setforth the underlying circumstances specifically enough thatthe magistrate can independentlyjudge 

### the validity of both the affiant's and informant's conclusions.") (citing Aguilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108,114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L Ed. 2d 723 (1964): Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969)).

11No. 68828-6-1/12 Moore's remaining three points do not concern what the officers knew 

### when they stood at the threshold, prior to entering the home. Thus, they neither support nor refute the showing required atthe threshold ofthe home. Underthe circumstances detailed in the unchallenged findings, the officers had a reasonable beliefthat there was a need for assistance. This satisfies the second Schultz factor. Reasonable Basis to Associate Needed Assistance With Place Searched While Moore appears to challenge this showing, it is unclear whatthat challenge is. Inany event, the findings support the existence ofthis factor. As we have already discussed, the information provided to police 

### indicated that S.B., the reported "victim," was involved in a "physical domestic" disturbance at a specific address. Christopher Moore's name was provided by the caller. Moore verified his identity when police asked when he answered the door on their arrival. This shows that there was a reasonable basis to associate a need for assistance with Moore's house. This satisfies the third Schultz factor. Imminent Threat ofSubstantial Injury to Person 

### Moore argues that the police officers had insufficient information about 

### S.B.'s situation when they were at the threshold of his home to satisfy this factor. We agree. Conclusion of Law 4 is at issue. That conclusion states: The information that the Officers received was that there was a 

### domestic violence hang up call and the victimwas no longer responding to attempts to get her on the phone. Further information was that the victim was crying, the reporting party heard

12No. 68828-6-1/13

a disturbance and yelling and the line went dead. The Courtfinds thatthere was a very real potential that the victim could have been subject to imminent harm and that the officers had a professional 

### responsibility torule out such athreat.[461 The focus ofour inquiry is to determine what the officers knew when they
were at the thresholdof Moore's residence. We have already detailed what they knew then, according to the trial court's findings offact. They knew of a "physical domestic" disturbance at a specific address. They also knew that the 911 caller identified Christopher Moore and S.B. as the persons involved. The callerfurther indicated that he had received a call from "the victim, [S.B.]," and she "had been disconnected and the [911] caller was unable to reach her 

### further." Upon the officers' arrival at the reported address, Moore identified himself when he came to the door. Significantly, this record lacks any information thatthere was any 

### "imminent threat ofsubstantial bodily injury" to S.B. when the police stood atthe threshold, as the fourth Schultz factor requires. The second sentence ofthe 

### above quotation, that "the victimwas crying, the reporting party heard a 

### disturbance and yellingand the line went dead," describes knowledge the officers acquired afterthey entered Moore's residence. 

### After entry into the house, the officer who remained with Moore nearthe entrance learned additional information from dispatch. Specifically, he learned that the 911 caller "had received the call from [S.B.] that evening with [S.B.] 

### crying and stating that 'Chris' had 'beatthe s**** out of [her]." The caller further


### 46 Clerk's Papers at 17.

13No. 68828-6-1/14 

### reported that "he heard some yelling and a disturbance and the linewent dead; he was unable to get S.B. back on the phone." And the officer also learned from Moore that "his girlfriend was [S.B.] and they had an argument that evening but that she'd left some time earlier." This additional information, received after police gained Moore's consent to enter his home to talk, goes beyond what they knew ofS.B.'s condition before they entered the premises. Thus, the second sentence ofthe trial court's Conclusion of Law 4, quoted above, merges what the officers knew about S.B.'s condition before and after entering the home. In short, itdoes not support a determination of an imminent threatofsubstantialinjury to S.B. priorto entering the home to justify the warrantless search ofthe locked room that followed. In reaching our conclusion, we stress that Moore gave the two officers consent to "come inside to talk" to him. There is nothing to indicate that the scope of his consent extended to the search that followed. Yet, once inside, one ofthe two officers immediately began a "protective sweep ofthe residence." This led to discovery of the locked doors, two ofwhich the police kicked in to determine whether S.B. was there. The State submitted a statement of additional authorities, citing State v. 

### Dancer47 to supporttheofficers' actions. That case isdistinguishable. There, Division Two ofthis court held that where police officers "obtain consent to enter andsearch a homefor a person after informing the home's occupant ofthe



### 47 174Wn. App. 666, 300P.3d475 (2013).

14No. 68828-6-1/15 

### purpose ofthe search[,]" the search islawful.48 Here, however, the police did not obtain Moore's consent to search his home for S.B. Thus, Dancer is not helpful. Police Officers' BeliefofImmediate Need ofHelp by Specific Person We do not address this factor because itunnecessary to do so. Our determination that the State failed in its burden to show the fourth Schultz 

### criterion makesdiscussion ofthisfifth factor unnecessary.49 No Pretext forEvidentiary Search We address this sixth Schultz factor because Moore raises, for the first 

### time on appeal, the argumentthat police were required to inform him of his right to refuse their entry when they asked whetherthey could come inside to talk. He 

### argues that the absence ofsuch warnings is an independent basis to invalidate the search thatfollowed the officers' entry into his home. We disagree. 

### The protection againstwarrantless searches may be waived by 

### meaningful, informed consent.50 But as thesupreme court held in Statev. Ferrier,51 when police officers knock on the door of a person's home in orderto

48 Id at 674-75. 

### 49 See Schultz, 170Wn.2d at 760 n.5 (noting that analysis of all factors is unnecessary because the failure of any one factor is fatal to the lawfulness of the State's exercise of authority without a warrant). 

### 50 State v. Ferrier. 136 Wn.2d 103, 118, 960 P.2d 927 (1998). 51 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).

15No. 68828-6-1/16 obtain consentto conduct a warrantless search, "they must, prior to entry, inform 

### theperson oftherighttorefuse orrevoke consent."52 The supreme court has limited the application of Ferrier and the 

### consequent use ofwhat courtsnow call Ferrierwarnings.53 It has noted that "there is a fundamental difference between requesting consent to search a home 

### and requesting consent to enter a home for other legitimate investigatory 

### purposes."54 Theconstitutional protections againstwarrantless searches are not 

### present"when thepolice seekconsensual entryto question aresident."55 Thus, "when police officers seek entry to question a resident, the home is merely 

### incidental to thepurpose" and no warnings arerequired.56 In State v. Khounvichai,57 the supreme courtheld that Ferrierwarnings were not required where officers sought entry into a residence for the legitimate



### 52 Schultz. 170 Wn.2d at 758-59 (citing Ferrier. 136 Wn.2d at 118); State v. Khounvichai. 149 Wn.2d 557, 563, 69 P.3d 862 (2003)) ("[T]he Ferrier 

### requirement is limited to situations where police requestentry into a home for the purpose ofobtaining consentto conduct a warrantless search and have declined to broaden the rule to apply outside the context of a request to search."). 53 See Khounvichai. 149 Wn.2d at 563; see also State v. Williams. 142 

### Wn.2d 17, 28, 11 P.3d 714 (2000) (noting that Ferrier warnings are not required where police request consentto enter a home to arrest a visitorpursuantto a valid arrest warrant). 54 Khounvichai. 149 Wn.2d at 564. 

### 55jd 56 Id 

### 57 149 Wn.2d 557, 69 P.3d 862 (2003).

16No. 68828-6-1/17 

### investigatory purpose ofquestioning an occupantabout an alleged offense.58 There, two officers were responding to a malicious mischiefreport, and knocked 

### on the doorofthe address provided bythecomplainant.59 When awoman answered, they asked herwhetherthe suspect was athome.60 She told the 

### officers that the suspect was hergrandson and was athome.61 Theofficers then askedifthey could enter totalktohim.62 Shethen replied "'oh, yes' andwaved thetwo officers inside."63 TheKhounvichai courtheld, "we do notfind itprudent
or necessary to require that police officers warn citizens of the right to refuse consentto search when they request entry into a home merely to question or 

### gain information from an occupant."64 Here, as in Khounvichai. when the officers were at the threshold and knocked on the door, Moore answered. The officers confirmed his identity. They 

### then asked if"they could come inside to talk." Moore responded "Sure." This agreement to entry contrasts with what the supreme court characterized as 

### acquiescence in Schultz, where "neitherofficerrequested permission to enter"

58 Ji at 565-66.
59 li at 559.
60 Ji
61 ii
62 ]d
63 Id,
64 Id. at 566.
17No. 68828-6-1/18 

### thehome and yetentered anyway.65 Thus, unlike in Schultz, theofficers' entry was notaccomplished through Moore's mere acquiescence.66 Rather, as in Khounvichai. he gave his express consent for the police to enter "to talk." As for pretext to search that concerned the Ferrier court, there was none here. The core ofthe trial court's determination that there was no pretextfor an evidentiary search is found in its unchallenged statement that there was "absolutely no hint of pretext in the Officers' search of [Moore's] home." This 

### determination underscores thatFerrierwarnings were notrequired onentry.67 The State argues that the officers' search of Moore's home was consensual and not an infringement of his privacy rights. This is incorrect. The record shows that, once the officers gained entry to talk, they obtained additional information from Moore and police dispatch. The State implicitly argues that this additional informationjustified the kicking in ofthe doors to the locked room that followed. We disagree. Here, it is undisputed that the scope of Moore's consentto the officers' entry was for the officers to talk to him. There was no consent then to search either the premises or the locked room. Nevertheless, immediately upon entering the home, one ofthe two officers began what the trial court characterized as a "protective sweep" ofthe home while the other officer continued speaking with Moore near the entry. 65 Schultz. 170Wn.2dat756. 66 See id. 67 Ferrier. 136 Wn.2d at 118-19: Khounvichai. 149 Wn.2d at 562-63.
18No. 68828-6-1/19 

### "Whilemaking a lawfularrest, officers may conduct a reasonable 

### 'protective sweep' ofthe premisesfor security purposes."68 Such a protective sweep is not a search in the conventional sense but rather an extension of a 

### Terry69 investigatoryfrisk or patdown.70 Aprotective sweep is limited to"a cursory visual inspection of places where a personmay be hiding."71 When the protective sweep extends beyond the immediate area adjoining the place of arrest, the police must have "'articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably and prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a 

### danger to those on the arrestscene.'"72 Here, this protective sweep was not done incident to any arrest. Rather, 

### the purpose stated by the trial courtwas to search for S.B. Nor has the State provided any authority to justify this sweep as supporting the kicking in of the two locked doors that led to the discovery ofthe illegal grow operation. 

### More importantly, there is nothing inthe findings or conclusions of the court to explain whetherthe police received the additional information regarding


### 68 State v. Hopkins. 113Wn. App. 954, 959, 55 P.3d691 (2002) (citing Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325. 334-35, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)). 

### 69 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 889 (1968). 

### 70 See Buie. 494 U.S. at 331-34(noting that the "ingredients toapplythe balance struck in Terry" are also present in consideration of allowing a protective sweep). 

### 71 Hopkins. 113 Wn.App. at 959 (citing Buie. 494 U.S. at 334-35). 

### 72 Id at 959-60(quoting Buje, 494 U.S. at 334). 19No. 68828-6-1/20 

### "an imminent threat ofsubstantial bodily injury" to S.B. before they kicked inthe locked doors to gain entry to the room housing the illegal drugs. This is critical. 

### Ifthey did not, there was an insufficient showing ofthe existence ofail ofthe Schultz factors to justifythe warrantless search ofthe locked room. In sum, the warrantless entry ofthe locked room was without the "authority of law"that the state constitution requires. For these reasons, the search ofthe locked room under this alternate 

### argument was not justified. The evidence must be suppressed. We reverse thejudgment and sentence. 

# j.

WE CONCUR:

20