alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Patrick C. CHIODO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 85-1436.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 28, 1986.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

FRANK, Judge.

Patrick Chiodo, appealing from a sentence imposed after probation violations, maintains that the trial judge erred in sentencing him in excess of the guidelines’ recommended range. We agree, reverse and remand for resentencing.

*160Chiodo originally pleaded nolo conten-dere to resisting an officer with violence, to related charges of driving while intoxicated and the violation of a driver’s license restriction. Pursuant to the recommendation of the sentencing guidelines the trial court placed him on five years probation. Subsequently, however, Chiodo’s probation officer filed an affidavit of probation violation alleging that Chiodo had been twice convicted of DUI, had resisted arrest without violence, had used intoxicants to excess, and had failed to pay court costs. The court revoked probation and sentenced Chiodo to three years in prison. The score-sheet reflects a recommended range for the original offenses as “any non state prison sanction”; the next higher cell is “community control or 12-30 months incarceration.”

As is reflected in his written departure order, the trial judge was perturbed by the similarity of the offenses Chiodo committed while on probation to the offenses for which he was being sentenced. That reason, however, is not sufficiently clear and convincing to justify a sentence in excess of the recommended range. Although a sentence within the next higher cell is proper upon revocation of probation, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(14), and would have produced a maximum term only six months less than the sentence actually imposed, the trial judge apparently did not consider this alternative.

In our view, the significance of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(14) should not be overlooked; offenses committed while a defendant is on probation can be automatically factored into the guidelines structure with resultant enhancement but without deference to Rule 3.701(d)(11). Thus, use of the probation violations — without additional clear and convincing reasons — to impose a sentence beyond the one cell increase permitted by the guidelines is analogous to the *Hendrix*prohibition against using prior criminal convictions, without more, to depart from the presumptive sentence. *See Hendrix v. State,*475 So.2d 1218 (Fla.1985). Thus, only when the offenses committed on probation are quite egregious will further departure be warranted. *See Brown v. State,*488 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

Accordingly, the appellant’s sentence is reversed and this cause is remanded for resentencing.

RYDER, C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
#### FOREST HILL CENTER, INC., and Peachtree Plaza, etc., Appellants, v. DESIGNED STRUCTURES, INC., Appellee.

No. 85-1366.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 16, 1986.

Rehearing Denied June 25, 1986.

Andrew A. Ostrow, of English, McCau-ghan & O’Bryan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

Margaret A. Wharton, Oviedo, for appel-lee.

LETTS, Judge.

The appellant appeals a partial final judgment. Following our decision in *Stein v. Hospital Corporation of America,*481 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), this appeal is not reviewable since the counts pending in the trial court involve substantively the same transaction. Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED.

GLICKSTEIN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Edward CREAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 87-KH-0125.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 30, 1987.

In re Creaux, Edward; applying for remedial writ; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, Nos. 89-588, 78-254.

Denied. Relator must refile in trial court which does not have motion.
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 101 (Thursday, May 24, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31010-31011]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-12627]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-9677-5]

Proposed CERCLA Agreement for Recovery of Past Response Costs; 
Piqua Hospital Site

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency.

ACTION: Notice; request for public comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with Section 122(i) of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended 
(``CERCLA''), 42 U.S.C. 9622(i), notice is hereby given of a proposed 
administrative settlement for recovery of past response costs 
concerning the Piqua Hospital Site (Site ID Number B5RB) in Piqua, Ohio 
with the following settling parties: Hospdela LLC and Dr. Enrique De La 
Piedra. The settlement requires the settling parties to pay $20,000 to 
the Hazardous Substance Superfund. The settlement includes a covenant 
not to sue the settling parties pursuant to Sections 106 and 107(a) of 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9606 and 9607(a). For 30 days following the date of 
publication of this notice, the Agency will receive written comments 
relating to the settlement. The Agency will consider all comments 
received and may modify or withdraw its consent to

[[Page 31011]]

the settlement if comments received disclose facts or considerations 
which indicate that the settlement is inappropriate, improper or 
inadequate. The Agency's response to any comments received will be 
available for public inspection at 77 West Jackson Boulevard, 7th floor 
Superfund File Room, Chicago, Illinois.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before June 25, 2012.

ADDRESSES: The proposed settlement is available for public inspection 
at 77 West Jackson Boulevard, 7th floor Superfund File Room, Chicago, 
Illinois. A copy of the proposed settlement may be obtained from 
Deborah Carlson, Associate Regional Counsel, C-14J, 77 West Jackson 
Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 60604, telephone: 312-353-6121. Comments 
should reference the Piqua Hospital Site in Piqua, Ohio and EPA Docket 
No. V-W-09-C-922 and should be addressed to Deborah Carlson, Associate 
Regional Counsel, C-14J, 77 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 
60604.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Deborah Carlson, Associate Regional 
Counsel, C-14J, 77 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 60604, 
telephone 312-353-6121

    Authority:  The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 9601, 
et seq.

     Dated: May 11, 2012.
Richard C. Karl,
Director, Superfund Division, Region 5, United States Environmental 
Protection Agency.
[FR Doc. 2012-12627 Filed 5-23-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
```
#### The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven Dean LORENZO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80CA1053.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Nov. 19, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 1981.

Certiorari Denied March 22, 1982.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Laura E. Udis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, Colorado State Public Defender, Nicholas R. Massaro, Jr., Deputy State Public Defender, Littleton, for defendant-appellant.

COYTE, Judge.

Defendant appeals from the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence upon probation revocation. We affirm.

On September 15, 1978, after defendant pled guilty to first degree assault, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for two years. The court revoked defendant’s probation one year later for, among other violations, commission of a burglary in Wyoming while he was on probation. The trial court then sentenced defendant to imprisonment for five to six years which he was to begin serving after he had served his sentence in Wyoming. Defendant now appeals the imposition of a consecutive, rather than a concurrent, sentence.

Defendant contends that under § 16-11-206(5), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) the imposition of a consecutive sentence upon probation revocation is illegal, as the statute only authorizes the court to impose a sentence which could originally have been im*51posed. Defendant argues that as the Wyoming sentence did not exist at the time of the first trial, the court cannot now impose a sentence consecutive to that one because this would, in effect, amount to a greater sentence than he could have originally received. We disagree.

Section 16-11-205(5), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) provides:

> “[I]f the court determines that a violation of a condition of probation has been committed it shall ... either revoke or continue probation. If probation is revoked, the court may then impose any sentence or grant any probation pursuant to the provisions to this part 2 which might have originally been imposed or granted.”

In interpreting this language to require concurrent sentencing, defendant has misconstrued the language and meaning of the statute. The words “which might have originally been imposed or granted” mean that the later imposition of sentence shall be done in accordance with the law applicable at the time defendant was originally placed on probation, and they do not mandate concurrent rather than consecutive sentencing. *See State v. Monahan,*29 Or.App. 791, 564 P.2d 1374 (1977). Here, consecutive sentencing is an appropriate mechanism for imposing a distinct punishment for each of two criminal acts. *United States v. Lustig,*555 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied,*434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 889, 54 L.Ed.2d 796 (1978).

Thus, upon the revocation of probation following suspension of imposition of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, impose a consecutive sentence to a sentence received by the defendant for a subsequent intervening crime.

Sentence affirmed.

STERNBERG and KIRSHBAUM, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 14, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-20581 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus STEVEN WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:03-CR-285-9

-------------------- Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to represent Steven Willis has moved for leave to withdraw from this appeal and has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Willis has filed a response, raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Our independent review of the brief, the record, and Willis’s response discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. We decline to address Willis’s claims of ineffective assistance ofNo. 04-20581 -2- counsel on direct appeal, without prejudice to Willis’s right to assert such claims in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); see also United States v. Higdon , 832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
Record of Discussion 

Docket No. FAA- Directorate Identifier: -AD 

With whom outside the FAA has this action been discussed (i.e., Design Approval Holder, 

manufacturer, ATA, NBAA, RAA, AOPA, ALPA, GAMA, etc)? 

ORGANIZATION PERSON CONTACTED DATE TOPICS DISCUSSED 

A4A Bob Ireland l/12/15 No response. 

Boeing Barry Bannister l/12115 No response. 

Other/ Additional Information:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Alton Thomas Davis, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 9, 2010 

d0830 

Order 

 

September 9, 2010 

140156(32) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 140156 

 COA: 292664 

Wayne CC: 90-001754 

ROBERT LEE HARRINGTON, JR, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s May 25, 2010 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED SE PTEMBER 6, 2013

NO. 03

- 12

- 00082

- CV

Neil Gallagher; Ronald R. Coleman; Steve Feeken; Gallagher Financial Group, Inc.; Michael Castellano; Brian R. Cervanka; Global One Direct, LLC; David A. Shields; Marco Lopez; Estate Protection Planning Corp.;

and Salvatore Magaraci, Appellant s

v.

Eduardo Espinosa, Receiver of Retirement Value, LLC; and Donald R. Taylor, Receiver of Hill Country Funding, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company an d Hill Country Funding, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Appellee s

APPEAL FROM 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MBERTON, AND ROSE

DISMISSED ON APPELLANTS ’ MOTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSE

THIS DAY came to be submitted the appellants ’ motion to dismiss the appeal in the above

cause, and the Court having fully considered said motion is of the opinion that same should be

granted

. IT IS THEREFORE ordered that said motion is granted and that the appeal is

dismisse d. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellant s p ay all costs relating to this appeal, both

in this Court and the court below

, and that this decision be certified below for observance.
1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 24, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-40489

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SEBASTIAN MARTINEZ-CARRISALES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. L-02-CR-1445-ALL

--------------------

Before DUHE’, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:1

Sebastian Martinez-Carrisales appeals from his conviction of

being found in the United States after deportation following a

conviction of an aggravated felony. He contends that the district

court erred by adjusting his offense level by 16 levels for

commission of a crime of violence based on a 1999 Illinois

conviction of residential burglary. He argues that his burglary

conviction was not an aggravated felony for sentencing purposes

and, for the first time on appeal, that the Sentencing Commission
2

did not intend for the crime-of-violence adjustment to apply to

offenses that are not also aggravated felonies. He also contends

for the first time on appeal that the “felony” and “aggravated

felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional in

light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

The district court did not err by adhering to a literal

interpretation of the language of the U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A),

which provides for a 16-level adjustment for commission of a crime

of violence. Interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is

subject to ordinary rules of statutory construction, and if the

guideline’s language is unambiguous, our inquiry begins and ends

with an analysis of the plain meaning of that language. United

States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 934 (2002). The only exception to this rule is when a clear

contrary legislative intention is shown, an exception that applies

only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.” See Ardestani v.

INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1991). Martinez has not established

that the commentary to and history of the amended U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2

establish that the Commission did not intend that some offenses

that do not qualify as “aggravated felonies” within the meaning of

the guideline nonetheless warrant the guideline’s top offense-level

increase. 

Martinez’s Apprendi contention is foreclosed by the caselaw of

this court. See United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th
3

Cir. 2000). Martinez concedes that his contention is foreclosed,

but he raises it to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.
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Printed on 100% recycled/recyclable paper with 100% post-consumer fiber and process chlorine free.

Customer Service Hotline: 1-800-438-2474

2/10/14

Honorable E. Christopher Abruzzo, Secretary

Department of Environmental Protection

Rachel Carson State Office Building

P.O. Box 2063

Harrisburg, PA 17105-2063

Dear Secretary Abruzzo:

On January 15, 2014, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received a revision to 

the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan (SIP) from the Department of Environmental Protection 

(PADEP) pertaining to the adoption of Outdoor Wood-Fired Boiler regulations by the Allegheny County 

Health Department (ACHD). EPA has determined that the submittal is administratively and technically 

complete, and is reviewing it to prepare a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) action. 

If members of your staff have any questions, they may direct them to Ms. Ellen Schmitt, Office 

of Air Program Planning, at (215) 814-5787, or at schmitt.ellen@epa.gov. She is the principal contact 

for this rulemaking. 

Sincerely, 

/s/

Diana Esher, Director

Air Protection Division 

cc: Ms. Joyce Epps, PADEP

Ms. Jayme Graham, ACHD

Mr. James Thompson, ACHD
#### DUTTON & VAUGHAN, INC. v. Petr L. SPURNEY, et al.

No. 86-C-2520.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 30, 1987.

In re Dutton & Vaughan, Inc.; Barriere Construction Co. Inc.—Third Party; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-4389; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “A”, No. 84-16477.

Prior report: La.App., 496 So.2d 1126.

Denied. The result of the Court of Appeal judgment is correct.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.
No. 99-10686 -1-

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-10686 Conference Calendar

RACHEL LEE BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus MOLLY FRANCIS, Honorable, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:99-CV-521-L

-------------------- February 17, 2000 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Rachel Lee Brown, Texas prisoner # 511017, appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Judicial officers such as Judge Francis are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims under § 1983 arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Graves v. Hampton , 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1993). Brown argues only that Judge Francis’ actions were improper. Brown’sNo. 99-10686 -2- arguments do not show that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing her action for damages against Judge Francis as frivolous. See Siglar v. Hightower , 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). We hold that Brown’s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is
DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Brown is hereby informed that the dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), in addition to the strike for the district court’s dismissal. See Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[D]ismissals as frivolous in the district courts or the court of appeals count [as strikes] for the purposes of [§ 1915(g)]”.). We caution Brown that once she accumulates three strikes, she may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while she is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless she is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS.
# Appendix E

LandBros	Aerial	Photography,	L.L.C.

Phantom Pilot	Training	Guide
#### Charles L. MAJOR, Appellant, v. Mary C. MAJOR, Appellee.

No. 85-537.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 13, 1986.

H.T. Smith, Miami, for appellant.

Roger McClelland, Key West, for appel-lee.

Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Finding that the stipulation between parties renders the issue on appeal moot, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice to appellant’s seeking other appropriate relief.