This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,390 4 MIKE BACA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Benjamin Chavez, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 Vicki W. Zelle, Assistant Appellate Defender 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 GARCIA, Judge. 18 {1} Defendant, Mike Baca, appeals his c onviction for driving while under the 192 influence of an intoxicating liquor. Weissued a notice of proposed summary 1 disposition proposing to affirm on April 21, 2015. Defendant filed a timely 2 memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered. We remain unpersuaded 3 that our initial proposed disposition was incorrect, and we therefore affirm. 4 DISCUSSION 5 {2} In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant continues to argue that the State 6 failed to show that reasonable suspicion ex isted to stop him for a violation of NMSA 7 1978, Section 66-7-349(A) (1999). [MIO 12-16] Section 66-7-349(A) provides: 8 Upon any highway outside of a busine ss or residence district, no person 9 shall stop, park or leave standi ng a vehicle, whether attended or 10 unattended, upon the paved or main-traveled part of the highway when 11 it is practicable to stop, park or l eave the vehicle off such part of the 12 highway, but in every event an unobstructed width of the highway 13 opposite a standing vehicle shall be le ft for the free passage of other 14 vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicles sh all be available 15 from a distance of two hundred feet in each direction upon the highway. 16 The district court entered a memorandum opinion in Defendant’s on-record appeal 17 addressing this same issue. [RP 95-102] In our notice of proposed summary 18 disposition, we proposed to agree with the district court’s analysis and its 19 determination that reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant for a violation of Section 20 66-7-349(A) was established by the officer’s testimony that Defendant was parked on 21 a well traveled highway, it was practicable for him to pull off the entire highway, the 22 area was outside of a business or residential district, and the officer believed that other 233 cars would have to travel into the westbound lane to avoid colliding with Defendant’s 1 vehicle. [RP 101] 2 {3} We understand Defendant to make tw o arguments in his memorandum in 3 opposition. First, Defendant argues that th e officer made a mi stake of law as to 4 whether the statute applied to the area where Defendantwas stopped, and such of 5 mistake of law cannot serve as the basi s for reasonable suspicion. [MIO 11-19] 6 Specifically, Defendant argues that the ro ad on which Defendant was parked was a 7 city street, and, therefore, Defendant’s car was not on a “portion of highway outside 8 a business or residence district.” [MIO 14-15] We reject this argument, however, 9 because the trial court made a factual finding that the area where Defendant was 10 stopped was outside of a busine ss or residential district. [RP 101] This appears to have 11 been adequately supported by the testimony of the arresting officer, Deputy Perez, 12 describing the area. [RP 96] We note thatDefendant cites to other evidence that 13 suggests the area in question was in fact a residential and/or bus iness area. [MIO 14- 14 15] However, we review the district court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. 15 See State v. Aguilar , 2007-NMCA-040, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 364, 155 P.3d 769 (stating that 16 on appellate review of the metropolitan court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we give 17 deference to the metropolitan court’s factual findings and review the determination 18 of reasonable suspicion de novo); see also State v. Williams , 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 6, 194 139 N.M. 578, 136 P.3d 579 (stating that on appellate review of a denial of a motion 1 to suppress we review the facts under a substantial evidence standard in a manner 2 most favorable to the prevailing party). The question is whether the trial court’s 3 “decision is supported by substantial evidence, not whether the [trial] court could have 4 reached a different conclusion.” In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 15, 121 5 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318. 6 {4} We also understand Defendant to argue that he was only slightly parked in the 7 traffic lane, and the legislature did not intend to criminalize such a minimal intrusion 8 into the traffic lane. [MIO 15-16] Defendant therefore argues that Deputy Perez made 9 a mistake of law as to whether Section 66- 7-349(A) applied to hi s parking. [MIO 15- 10 16] Defendant made this same argument indistrict court, and in our notice of 11 proposed summary disposition, we proposed to adopt that portion of the district 12 court’s opinion analyzing this issue. De fendant has not pers uaded us in his 13 memorandum in opposition that the district court’s analysis of this issue was incorrect, 14 and we therefore affirm. Since we hold th at reasonable suspicion existed to stop 15 Defendant for a violation of Section 66-7-349(A), we do not reach Defendant’s 16 argument that Deputy Perez was not acting as a community caretaker when he stopped 17 Defendant. [MIO19-20] 18 {5} Finally, Defendant continues to argue th at he was subjected to a pretextual 195 traffic stop. [MIO 20-22] Again, the di strict court entered a memorandum opinion 1 addressing this same issue. [RP 102-106] In our notice of proposed summary 2 disposition we proposed to agree with its conclusion that Defendant failed to show 3 under the totality of the circumstan ces that the stop was pretextual. See State v. Ochoa , 4 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 40, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143 (holding that, where reasonable 5 suspicion exists to support a stop, to establish that the stop was pretextual the 6 defendant has the burden to show that, under the totality of the circumstances, there 7 was an unrelated motive for the stop that was not supported by reasonable suspicion). 8 Nothing in Defendant’s memorandum in opposition persuades us that the district 9 court’s analysis of this issue was incorrect. We therefore adopt that portion of its 10 opinion addressing this issue. 11 {6} For these reasons, we affirm the metropolitan court’s sentencing order. 12 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

__________________ ______________ 14 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16

_______________________________ 17 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 18

_______________________________ 19 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 20