1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 10 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s J. D. B. v . NOR T H CAROLINA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COUR T OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 09–1 11 21. Ar g u ed M a rc h23, 2011— Dec i ded Ju n e 16, 201 1 Polic e stoppe d an d qu es tio n ed petition erJ. D. B., a 13-y e ar -old, se v enth-grade student, upon seeing hi m neart h e site of two home br eak

ins. Fiv eday s later , aftera digi tal c a mer amatc hingone of the stolen items w a s fou n dat J. D

. B. ’s sc h ool an d s eeninh i s possess ion , In v e s tigator DiCostanzo went to th e school. A uniformed pol i ce officer on detail to the school took J. D. B. from hisclassroom to a closed-door confere n ce roo m , where poli ce and school administrator s questione d him foratlea s t 30 minutes. Befor ebegi n n ing , theydidnot giv ehim Miran d awa rn ings or the opportunity to ca ll his gra n dmother, his le

gal guardian, nor tell him h ewas free to l e ave the room. He first de

nied his inv o lv ement, but laterc o nfessed afteroffic i als ur g e d him to tell the tr uth and told him about the prospect of juvenile detention. DiCostanzo on lythen told him thathe could refuse to answer ques tions andwas free to le ave. Askedwhether he unde r stood, J. D. B. nodded and provided furthe r detail, including the lo cation of the sto

len items. He also wrote a statemen t, at DiCos t anzo’s reques t. When the school day ended, he was perm it te d to leav e to c a tc h the bus home. T w o j u venile petitions werefiled agains t J. D. B., chargi ng him with b r ea king a n d ent e ring a n d with larceny. H i s public de

fen d ermov e d to su ppr ess h i s sta t ements and the evidence derived ther efr o m, ar guingthat J. D. B. ha d b een int e rroga t e d in acus t odia l settingwitho u t beingaffo r d ed Miranda war n in g s an d th at h i s statements w e re involuntary. Th e tr ialc o ur t denied the motion. J. D. B. en ter e d a tr an sc r i pt of admis s iont oth e c h ar g e s, bu t r e n e wed his obj e ction to the denia lof his mo tionto su ppr ess. Thecourt adju

dicated him de linquent, and the No r t hCar o lin a Cou r t of Appeal s an d State Supreme Court affirmed. Th e latterc o ur t declined to find J. D. B.’ s ag e r e lev a nt to th e dete rminat i o n whether hewas in police custody.2 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Sy llabu s Held: A child’s age properly informs Miran d a ’s cus t ody analys is

. Pp. 5–

18.

(a) Custodi a l police interrogation entail s “inherently compelling pr essu r e s, ” Mirandav. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436, 46 7, th a t“c anin du c e a frighteningl y high perce ntage of peop le to confess to crimes they
nev e r c o mmitt ed,” Corleyv. United S t ates , 556 U. S. ___, ___. Rece nt stu d ies su g g e st th at r i sk i s allth e more acute when the subject of custodial inte rrogation is ajuven ile. Wh eth e ra su sp ec t is “inc u s tody” for Miranda purposes is an o bjecti v e determinat ion involving t w o dis cret einq u ires : “f irs t , wha twere t h e circum s t a nces s u rround

ingthe inter r o g a tion; and se c o nd, giv e n those c i r c u msta nc es, would a
r e ason able pe r s onh av efelt h eorsh e was at l iber t yto te r m in ate th e inter r o g a tion and leav e.” Thompsonv. Keohane , 516 U. S. 99, 112 (footnote omi t ted). The pol i c eand c o ur ts must“ex a m i ne all of the circum s t a nces s u rrou n ding t h e int e rroga t i on,” Stansburyv. Califor

nia , 511 U. S. 318, 322, in c l u d in gth ose th at “wou ld hav eaffec t ed h o w a r e ason able per s on” i nth e su spect’ s position “would perceive his or he r f r ee dom to leave,” id. , at 325. Howev e r, th e test in v o lv es no c o nsider ation of the par t ic ularsuspec t’ s “ac t ua l min d set.” Yar

boro u ghv. Al varado , 541 U. S. 652, 667. Bylimitin gan aly s is to ob

jective circum s tances, the te st avoi ds burdening police with the task of anticipating each suspect’s idio s y ncra s i es a n d divining how thos e par t ic ulartr aits affec tthat s u spec t’ s subje c tiv estate of mind. Berk e me rv. Mc Car t y , 468 U. S. 42 0, 430– 43 1. Pp. 5–8. (b) Insome c i rc u m stan c e s, a c h ild’ s ag e “wou ld h av eaffected h o w a reasonable pe rson” in th e s u spec t’ s posi ti on“w ould perceive his or her freedom to leave.” Sta n sbury , 511 U

. S., at 32 5. Cou r ts c a nac countfo r t h a trea lit y wit h o u tdoin g any damage to the objective na

t u re of t h e cus t ody a n a l ys is

. A child’s a g e is fa r “ m o re t h a nachrono

logical fact.” Eddingsv. Ok lahoma , 455 U. S. 104, 115

. It i s afac t th at “g en er ate s c o mmon s en s ec o n c lu sion s abou tbeh av i o ran d per c e p tion,” Alvarado , 541 U. S., a t674, th at ap plybr oadlyto c h ildr e n as a class. Childr e n “generally are le s s mat u r ean d r e spon sible th an adu l ts,” Eddings , 455 U. S. , at 11 5; th ey“oftenlac kt h e ex per i enc e , pers pect ive, a n d j u dgm e ntto recognize a n d av oid choices t h atcould be detr iment a l to them,” Bellottiv. Baird , 443 U. S. 6 2 2 , 635; an d they “are more vulnerable or suscep tible to .

. . outs ide pres s u res” th anadu l ts, Roperv. Sim m ons , 543 U. S. 55 1, 56 9. Inth e spec ific context of police interrogation, even ts that “would leav e a man c o ld and unimpressed can overa w e and ove r whelm a” teen. Haleyv. Oh io , 332 U. S. 5 96, 59 9. Th e la w h a s h i s t or ic allyr e flec ted th e sa me as s u m p t i on t h a tchildren cha r a c t e ris t ica l ly la ck t h e ca pa cit yt o exercis e matur ejudg ment and posse ss only an inc o mplete ab ili tyto under

stand the world around the m
. Lega l disq ualifications o nchildren a s3 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Sy llabu s

a c l ass—e.g. , limit ations on their abili tyt omar r ywithout par e ntal
c o nsent—ex hibit the sett le d under standingthat the di ffer e ntiating
c h ar ac ter i stic s of y o uth are universal.

Giv e n a histor y“r eplete wi th laws a n d j u dicia lrecog n it ion” t h at children ca nn ot b eviewed s i mply a s minia t ure a d ults , Eddings , 455 U. S., at 115 –11 6, th er e i s n o ju stific ationfortakinga differ e n t cours e here. S olong a s the c h ild’s age was known to the officer at the time of the in terv iew, orwould hav ebeen objectively apparent to a rea s onab l e officer, includin ga g e a s pa rtof t h e cus t ody a n a l ys is re

q u ires officers neit her t oc o ns id er circu ms ta nces “unknowab l e” to them, Berk em er , 468 U. S., at 43 0, n o rto“ ‘ “anticip at[e] the frailties or idiosyncrasies” of the p a rtic ular suspect being questi oned.” ’ ” Al

varado , 541 U

. S., at 662. Pr ec iselybec a u s e c h ildh ood y i elds objec

tive conclusio n s, considering age inthe custody analysi s does not in

volve a determination of how yo uthaffec t s a par t ic u l arc h ild’ s subjective state of mind. In fact , were the court precl u ded from tak

ing J

. D. B. ’s youth into a ccount, it would b eforced to eva l ua te th e circum s t a nces heret h rou gh t h e e y es of a r e ason able adu l t, wh en s o m e obj e ct ive circum s t a nces s u rroundinga nint e rroga tion a ts c hool are specific to children. The s e co nclus i ons a r e not under mined b yth e Cou r t’ s observ ationin Alvara do th at ac c o u n t in gfora ju v e n ile’ s ag e in the Mir a nda cus t ody a n a l ys is “ c ould b e viewed as cre a ting a sub

jec t iv e in qu ir y , ” 541 U. S., at 668. Th e Cou r t saidn o th in gabou t whet her s u chaview wouldb ecorre ctun der t h e la w o rwhet he r it simply mer i te d defer e nc e underthe Antiter r o r i sm and Effec t iv e DeathPen a ltyAc t of 1996, 110 St at. 121 4. So lon gas th e c h ild’ s ag e was known to the officer, or would havebeen objectively apparent to a r e ason able offic e r , inc l u d i n gag e i nth e c u stodyan aly s is i s c o n s is

tent with the Miran d a test’ s objec t iv e na tur e
. This do es not mean that a child’s age will be a determinat ive, or eve na si gni f icant, factor inev ery c a se, bu t it is a r e al ityth at c o u r ts c a n n o t ign o r e
. Pp. 8–14.

(c ) Additional ar g u ments that the S t a t e a n d its amicio ffer for ex

c l u d in gag e from th e c u stodyin qu ir y ar e u n p er su asiv e. Pp. 14–18.

(d) On r e mand, the state c o ur ts ar e to addr ess the question whether J. D. B. was in cus t ody wh en he was inter r o g a ted, takingac count of all of the releva ntcircum s t a nces of t h e int e rroga t i on, includ

in gJ. D. B.’ s ag e at th e time. P. 18. 363 N. C. 664, 686 S. E. 2d 1 35, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

S OTOMAYOR , J., delivered theopinion of the Cour t, i nwhic h K ENNEDY , G IN SB U R G , B RE Y E R , an d K AGAN , JJ., joined. ALITO , J., file d a di ssentin g opinion, in which R OBERTS , C. J., an d S CALI A an d T HOMA S , JJ., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s
. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 11 21
J. D. B., PETITIONER v. N O RTH C AR O L INA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COUR T OF NORTH CAR OLINA [Ju n e16, 2011 ] J USTICE S OTOMAYORd e livered theopinion of t h e Court. This case presents the question whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody an alysis of Mirandav. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966). It is beyond dispute that children wi ll often feel bound to submit to police questioning when anadult in the same circumstances would feel fr ee to l e ave. Seeing no reason for police officers or co urts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a chil d’s age prop

erly informs the Miranda custody analysis. I A Petitioner J. D. B. wa s a 13-year-old, seventh-grade student attending class at Smith Middle Sch ool in Chapel Hill, North Carolina when he was removed from his class

room by a uniformed police officer, escorted to a closed

door conference room, and questioned by police for at least half an hou r
. This was th e second time that pol i ce question e d J. D. B. in the spanof a week

. Five days earlier, two home brea k

ins occurre d, and va rious items were sto l en. Police stopped an d questioned J. D. B. after he was s een behind a2 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt residence in the neighborhood where the cri mes occurr ed. That same day, police also spoke to J. D. B.’s grand

mother—his legal guardian—as well as his au nt. Police laterlearned that a digital camera matching the description of oneof t h e stole nit ems had be en found a t J. D. B.’s m i ddle schooland seen i nJ. D. B.’s possessi on. Investigator DiCostanzo, the juvenile inves t igator with the local police force w h o had been assigned to the case, went to th e school to question J. D. B. Upon arrival , DiCostanzo informed the uniformed police officer on detail to the school (a so-called school resource officer), the assis

tant principal, and anadministrative intern that he wa s there to question J. D. B. about the break-ins. Although DiCostanzo asked the school administrators to verif y J. D. B.’s date of birth, address, and paren tcontact in

formation from school records, neither the police offi

cers nor t h e school administrat o rs contact e d J. D. B.’s grandmoth er. The uniformed officer interrupte dJ. D. B. ’s afternoon social studi e s class, removed J. D. B. from the classroom , and escorted him to aschool conference room. 1 There, J. D. B. wa s met by DiCostanzo, the assista n t principa l, and the ad ministrativ e intern. T h e door to t h e conference room was closed. With the two police officers and the two administrators present, J. D. B. was questioned for t h e next 30 to 45 minute s
. Prior to the comm encement of questioning , J. D. B. was given neither Miran d awarning s nor the opportunity to speak to his grandmoth er. Nor was he informedthat he was free to leav e the room. Questioning began with small tal k—discussion of sports and J. D. B.’s family life. DiCostanzo asked, and J. D. B.

——————

1 Althoughthe Sta t e sug g e st s that th e “record is unclea ras to who brought J. D. B. to the conference r oom, and the tr i a l c o ur t made n o factual findin gs on this spe c ific poin t,” Br ief forRespon dent 3, n. 1, the S t at e a g reed a t t h e cert iora ri s t a g e t h at “ t h e S R O [school res o urce officer] esco rted petitioner” to the room, Brief in Oppositi on 3.3 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt agreed, to discuss the e v ents of theprior week end. Deny

ing any wrongdoing, J. D. B. explai ned that he had been in the neighborhood where the crimes occurred because he was seeking wor kmo wing lawns

. DiCosta n zo pressed J. D. B. for additional detail about his efforts to obta in work; aske d J. D. B. to explain a prior incident, when one of the victi ms returned home to find J. D. B. behind her house; and confronted J. D. B. with the sto l en camera. The assist ant principal urged J. D. B. to “do the right thing,” war n ing J. D. B. that “th e truth always comes out in the end.” App. 99a, 112a. Eventually, J. D. B. asked whethe r he would “still be in trouble” if he returned the “stuf f.” Ibid

. In response, DiCostanzo explained that return of the stolen item s would be helpful, but “this th ing i s going to c o urt” rega r d

less. Id. , a t112a; ibid

. (“[W]hat’s done is done[;] now yo u n e e dt o h e l p y o u r s e l f b ym a k i n gi tr i gh t” ) ; s e e a l s o id. , at 99a. DiCostanzo then warned tha the may n eed to seek a secure custody order if he be liev e d that J. D. B. would continue to break into other hom e s. Wh en J. D. B. asked what a secure custody order was, DiCostanzo explained that “it’s where you g e t sent to j u venile det e ntion bef o re court.” Id. , at 112a. After learn i ng of the prospect of juvenile detention, J. D. B. con f essed that he and a friend were re sponsible for the break

- ins. DiCostanzo only then infor m ed J. D. B. that he coul d refuse to answe r the investigator’s questions and that he was free to leave. 2 Asked whether he under

-

——————

2 The Nor t h Ca r o lina Supr eme Cour t noted that the tr ialc o ur t’ s fac

tual finding s wer e “unc ontested an d therefore . . . bindi n g” on it. Inre J. D

. B. , 363 N. C. 664, 66 8, 686 S. E. 2d 135, 1 37 ( 2 009). Th e c o u r t described the sequence of events set forth in the text. See id., at 670– 671, 6 86 S. E. 2d, at 13 9. (“Immed i ate l yfollowin gJ. D. B.’ s in itia l confes s i on, Inves t igator DiCos t anzo informed J. D. B. that he did not hav eto speak with him and that hewas fr ee to leave” (i nternal quota

tion mar k s a n d alter a tion s omit ted) )

. T h o u ghl e s s t h a np e r f e c t l y4 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt stood, J. D. B. nodded and provide dfurther detail, inclu d

ing information aboutthe locati on of the stolen item s. Eventually J. D. B. wrote a statement, at DiCostanzo’s request. When the bell rang indicating t h e end of the schoolday, J. D. B. wa s allowed t o leave to c a tch the bus home. B Two juvenile petitions were filed against J. D. B., each alleging on e count of b r eaking and entering and one cou n t of larceny. J. D. B.’s public defender moved to suppress his statements and the evidence derived therefrom, argu

ing that su ppression was necessary becaus e J. D. B. had been “interrogated b y police in a custodial setting witho u t being afforded Miran d a warnin g[s],” App. 89a, and be

cause his statements were involuntary un der the totali ty of the circu mstances t e st, id. , at 142a; see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U. S. 218, 226 ( 1973) (due process pre cludes admi ssion of a c o nfessi on where “a defe ndant’s will was overbo rne” bythe circumstan ces of the interrogatio n). After a su ppression hearing at which Di Costanzo and J. D. B. test ified, the tr ial court de nied the motion, decid

ing that J. D. B. was not in custody at the time of the schoolhous e interrogati on and tha this state m ents were voluntary. As a resu lt, J. D. B. entered a transcript of admission to all four counts, renewing his objection to the denial of his motion to suppress, and the cour t adjudica ted J. D. B. delinquent.

—————— explicit, the tr ial court’s ord e r indica tes a finding that J. D. B. initially
c o n f essed pr iorto DiCostan z o ’ s war n ing s
. See App. 99a. Non e th eless, bothpar t ies’ su bmi ssion s t oth is Cou r t su g g e st th a t t h e wa rnings ca m ea f t e r DiCos t a n zo ra ised t h e poss ib ilit y of as e cure cus t ody order b u tb e fore J

. D. B. confes s e d for t h e first t i m e
. S e e Brief for Pet i t i oner 5 ; Brief for Res p ondent5

. Beca us e we rem a nd for a determinationwhetherJ. D

. B. was in custody under the proper analy

sis, the st ate c o ur ts r e main fr ee to r e v i sit whetherthe trial c o ur t made
aconclus ive fi nding of fact in this respect.5 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt A divided p anel of the North Ca rolina Court of Appeal s affirmed. In re J. D. B. , 196 N. C. App. 234, 674 S. E. 2 d 795 (2009). The North Carolina Su preme Court held, over two dissents, that J. D. B. was not in custody when he confessed, “declin[ing] to extend the test for custody to include consideration of the age .

. . of an individual sub

jected to questioning by police.” In re J. D. B. , 363 N. C. 664, 672, 68 6 S. E. 2d 1 35, 140 (2009). 3 We grante dcertiora r i to dete rmine wh ether the Miranda custody ana lysis includes consideration of a juvenile sus p ect’s age. 562 U. S. ___ (2010). II A Any police interview of an individual suspected of a crime has “coercive a s pects to it .” Or egonv. Mathiason , 429 U. S. 4 92, 495 (1977) (percur i am)

. Onl ythose inter

rogations that occur while a suspect is in police custody, however, “ h eighte[n] the risk” t hat statem ents obtained are not the product of the suspect’s free choice. Dicke rso n v. United States , 530 U. S. 428, 435 (2000). By its very nature, custodial polic e interrogation entails “inherently compelling pressures.” Miranda , 384 U. S., a t 467. Evenfor an adult, the ph ysical and psychological isolation of custodial interrogation can “undermine the individual’s will to resist and .

. . compel hi m to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Ibid

. Indeed, the pressur e of custodial interroga tion is so immense that it “can indu ce a frighte n ingly highpercentage of people t o confess to crimes they never committed.” Corleyv. United Sta t es , 556 U. S. __, __ (2009) (slip op., at 16) (c iting Drizi n

——————

3 J. D. B.’s challenge in the No rt h Carolina Supreme Court focused on t h e lower cour t s ’ conclus i on t h a the was not in custody f o r purposes of Miran d av. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (196 6 )

. Th e Nor t h Car o lin a Su

pr eme Cour t did not addr e ss the tr ia l c o ur t’ s holding that the st ate

men t s wer ev o lu n t ar y , an d th at qu estioni s n o t befor eu s
.6 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Re v. 891, 906–907 (2004)); see als o Miranda , 3 84 U. S., a t455, n. 23. That ri sk is all the more troubling—and re cent studie s suggest, all the more acute—whe nthe subj ect of cust odial interrogation is a juvenile. See Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae21– 22 (collecting empirical studies that “illustrate the heightened risk of false confes

sions from youth”). Recognizing that the inherently coercive nature of cus

todial interrogation “blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements,” Di ckers o n , 530 U. S., at 435 , this Court in Miranda adopted a set of prophylactic mea

sures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarante e against self -incrimination. Prior to question i ng, a suspect “must be warned that he has a righ t to remain silent, tha t any statem ent he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that h e has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retain ed or appointed.” 384 U. S., at 44 4; see also Floridav. Po well , 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 8) (“The four warnings Miranda requires are in

variable, but this Co urt has not dicta ted the words in which the essential inf o rmation m u st be conv eyed”). And, if a suspect makes a statement during custodia l interroga

tion, the burden is on the Govern ment to show, as a “pre

requisit[e]” to the statement’s adm i ssibility as evidence in the Govern ment’s case in chief, th at the defendant “v olun

tarily, knowingly and intelligently” waived his rights

. 4 Miranda , 3 84 U. S., at 444, 475–4 76; Dickers o n , 530 U. S., at 443–444.

——————

4 Am icion behalf of J. D. B. questionwhet her children of a ll a g es ca n com p rehend Miran d a war n in g s an d su g g est th at addi ti on al pr oc edu r al safeg u ar ds ma ybe nec e ssar yto pr otec t their Mira nda ri ghts. Brief for Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae13– 14, n

. 7. Wh atev erth e merit of tha tcontention, it ha s no releva nce here, whe r e no Mira nda warnings wereadminis t ered at all.7 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt Because these measur es protect the individual against the coerciv e nature of custodial interrogati on, they are required “ ‘o nly where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” ’ ” St a n s buryv. Cal ifornia , 511 U. S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam ) (quoting Or egonv. Mathiason , 42 9 U. S. 492, 495 (1977 ) (per curi a m )). As we have repeatedly emphasized, whether a suspect is “in custody” i s an objective inquiry. “Two discre te inquiries are essential to the determina

tion: first, what were the circums tances surr ounding the interrogation; and second, given those circum

stances, would a reasonable person have felt he or sh e was at lib erty to ter m inate the interrogat i on and leave. Once the scene is set and t h e players’ lines and actions are reconstruct ed, the cour t must a p pl y an ob

jective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal ar rest or rest raint on fre e dom of movement of the degr ee associated withform al arrest.” Thomp

sonv. Keohane , 516 U. S. 99, 112 ( 1995) (internal quo

tation marks, alteration, and footnote omitted). See also Yarboroughv. Alvarado , 541 U. S. 652, 662–663 (2004); Stansbury , 511 U. S., at 32 3; Berkem erv. McCarty , 468 U. S. 4 20, 442, and n. 35 (19 84). Rathe rthan dem a r cate a limited set of relevant ci rcumstance s , we have required police officers and courts to “examine all of the circumstan ces surrounding the in terrogation,” Stansbury , 511 U. S., a t322, inclu d ing any ci rcumstance that “woul d have affected how a reasonable person” in the suspect’s position “would perceive his or her freedom to leave,” id. , at 325. On the other h and, the “subjective views harbored by either t h e interrog a ting officers or the p e rson being questioned” are irrelevant. Id. , at 323. The test, in other words, involves no cons ideration of the “actual mindset” of the particu lar suspect subje cted to police questioning

. Alvarado , 5 41 U. S., at 667; see also Californiav. Behel e r ,8 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt 463 U. S. 1121, 1125, n. 3 (1983) (per cu riam)

. The benefitof the objective custody analysis is that it i s “designed to give clear guidance to the police.” Alvarado , 541 U. S., at 668. But see Ber k emer , 468 U. S., a t4 4 1 (recognizing the “occas i ona[l] .

. . di fficulty” th at police and courts nonetheless have in “deciding exactl y when a sus

pect has been taken into custody”)

. Police must make in

the-momen tjudgments as to whe nto administer Miran d a warnings. By limiting analysis to the objective circu m stances of t h e interrogation, and asking how a reasonab le person in the suspect’s position would understand his freedom to terminate questioning and leave, the objective test avoids burdening police wi th the task of anticipatin g the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect and divining how those particular t r aits affe ct each person’s subjectiv e state of mind. See id., at 430–431 (officers are not re

quired to “make guesses” as to circumstan c es “unknow

able” to them at the time); Alvarado , 541 U. S., at 668 (officers are under no duty “to consider .

. . contingent psychologic a l factors when deciding when sus p ects should be advised of their Miranda rights ”). B The State and its amicicontend that a child’s age has no place in th e custody a nalysis, no matter ho w youn g th e child subjected to police question i ng. We cannot agree. In some circumstances, a child’s age “would have affected how a reasonable pers on” in the suspect’s pos i tion “would perceive his or her freedom to l e ave.” Stansbury , 511 U. S., at 3 25. That i s , a reasonable child subjected to police quest ioning will sometimes f eel pressur e d to submi t when a reasonable ad ult would feel free to go. We think it clear tha tcourts ca n account f o r that reality withou t doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis. A child’s age is far “more than a chronological fact. ”9 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt Eddingsv. Oklahoma , 455 U. S. 104, 115 (19 82); accord, Gall v. Un ited Sta t es , 552 U. S. 38, 58 (2007); Roper v. Simmons , 543 U. S. 551, 569 (200 5); Johnsonv. Texas , 50 9 U. S. 350, 3 67 (1993). It is a fact that “genera t es common sense conclusions about behavior and perce ption.” A l v a rado , 541 U. S., at 6 74 (B REYE R , J., dissenting). Su ch conclusions apply broadly to children as a class. And, the y are self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge. Time and a g ain, this Court has drawnthese common

sense concl u sions for i t self. We have observ ed that chil

dren “generally are less mature and responsible tha n adults,” Ed dings , 455 U. S., at 11 5–116; that they “ofte n lack the experience, perspecti ve, and judgm e nt to recog

nize and avoid choices that co uld be detrimental to them,” Bellottiv. Bair d , 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opin

ion); that they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to .

. . outside pressures” than adults, Roper , 543 U. S., at 56 9; and so on

. See Graham v. Florida , 560 U. S. ___,

___ (2010) (slip op., at 17) (finding n o reason to “reconsider” these obs e rvations about the common “nature of juve

niles”). Addressing the specif ic context of police interroga

tion, we have observed that events that “would leave a man cold a n d unimpre ssed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.” Haleyv. Ohio , 332 U. S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion); see a l s o Gallegosv. Colorado , 370 U. S. 4 9 , 54 (1962) (“[N]o matter how sophisticated,” a juvenile subject of police interrogation “cannot be com

pared” to an adult subject). Describing no one child in particular, these observations restate what “any paren t knows”—in d eed, what any pe rson knows—ab out children generally. Roper , 543 U. S., at 56 9. 5

——————

5 Althoughc i tation to soc i al sc ienc e and cognitive science authorities is unneces s a ry to es tab l ish thes e com m ons e ns e propos itions , th e literature confirms what expe rience bears out. See, e. g. , Graham v.10 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt Our variou s statements to this effect are far from unique. The law has historically reflected the same as

sumption that children character i stically lack the capac i ty to exercise mature judgment and possess on l yan incom

plete ability to understand the world around them. See, e.g. , 1 W. Black s tone, Commentaries on the Laws of Eng

land *464–*465 (hereinafter Blac kstone) (explaining th at limits on children’s legal capacity under the common law “secure the m from hurting themselves by their own im

provident a cts”). Like this Court ’ s own generalizations, the legal disqualifications placed on childrenas a clas s— e.g. , limitations on thei r ability to alienate pr operty, enter a binding contract enforceable against them, and marry without parental consent—exhibit the settled understand

ing that the differentiating chara cteristics of youth are universal. 6 Indeed, ev en where a “reasonab le person” standard

—————— Florida , 560 U. S. ___, ___ (201 0) (slip op ., at 17) (“[D]evelopments i n ps ychology a n d b r a i n s c ience continue to show funda m enta l differences betweenju v e nile an d adu l t min d s”).

6 See, e.g
. , 1 E. Far n swor th , Con t r a c t s §4. 4 , p. 379, an dn
. 1 (1990 ) (“Common la w courts early announ cedthe prevailing view that a
m i nor’s cont ra ctis ‘voidab l e’ a tt h e ins t a n ce of t h e m i no r” (cit ing 8W. Holdsworth, History of English La w 51 (1926))); 1 D. Kramer, Legal Righ ts of Ch ildr e n§8.1, p. 66 3 (r ev . 2ded. 20 05) (“[ W]h ile min o r children havet h e rightt o a c q u ire and o w n property, they are consid

ered incapable of property m a nageme nt” (footnote omitte d)); 2 J. Kent, Commen t ar ie s onAmer ic anLaw *78–* 79, *90 (G. Coms toc ked., 11th ed. 1867); see g e n e r a lly id

. , at *23 3 (ex p la iningthat, underthe c o mmon law , “[t]h en e c e ssityof g u ar dian s r e su lt s f r om th e in abil i tyof in fan t s t o take care of t h emselves . . . and th i s inab ility continues , in contempla

tion of law, until the infant has a tta in ed t h e ag e of [21] ” ) ; 1 Bl ac kston e *465 (“I tis g e n e r a llytr u e , th at anin fan tc a nn e ith e ral ien eh i s lan d s , nor do a n y le ga l a c t, nor ma ke adeed, nor indeed a n y ma nner of contract, that will bind hi m”); Roperv. Simmons , 543 U. S. 551, 5 6 9 (200 5) (“Inr e c o g n itionof th e c o mpar ativ e imma tu r i tyan d ir r e spon si

bili ty of juveniles, almo st e v ery State pr ohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on ju ries , or m a rrying wi t h outpa rent al
c o nsent”).11 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt otherwise applies, the common law has refle cted the real

ity that chi l dren are not adults

. In negligen ce suits, for instance, where liability turns on what an objectively reasonable person would do inthe circumstances, “[a]ll American j u risdictions accept th e idea that a person’s childhood is a releva nt circumstance” to be considered. Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 0, Commen t b , p. 11 7 (2005); see also id. , Reporters’ No te, pp. 121 –122 (collect

ing cases); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A, Com

ment b , p. 15 (1963–1964) (“[T]here is a wide basis of community experience upon which it is possible, as a practical m a tter, to de termine what is to be expected of [children]”).

As this dis c ussion est ablishes, “[o]ur history is replete with laws a n d judicial recognition” that children cannot b e viewed simply as miniature adults. Eddings , 455 U. S., at 115–116. We see no justification for ta king a differe n t course here. So long as the child’s age was known to th e officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reas onable offic e r, includin g age as part of the cus t ody analysis requires officers nei

ther to consider circ umstances “unkno wa ble” to the m , Berkem er , 468 U. S., a t430, nor to “anticipat[e] the frail

ties or idiosyncrasies” of the partic u lar suspect whom the y question, Alvarado , 54 1 U. S., at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same “wide basis of community experience” that ma kes it possible, as an objective matter, “to determine what is to be expec t ed” of children in othe r contexts, Restatement (Second) of Torts §283A, at 15; se e supra , at 10, and n. 6, likewise m a kes it poss ible to know what to exp e ct of children subjected to police questioning. In other words, a child’s age differ s from other personal characteristics that, even when known to police, have n o objectively discernible relati onship to a rea s onable per

son’s understanding of his freedom of action. Alvarado , holds, for instance, that a suspect’s p r ior interrogatio n12 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt history with law enforcement ha s no role to play in the custody an alysis because such experience could just a s easily lead a reasonable person to feel free to walk away as to feel compelled to stay in pl ace. 541 U. S., at 66 8. Because th e effect in a n y give nca se would be “contingen t [on the] psycholog[y]” of the individual suspect, the Cou r t explained, such experi ence cannot be considered witho u t compromising the objective nature of the custo d y analysis. Ibid. A child’s age, however, is different. Precisely be

cause childhood yields objective conclusions l i k e those we have drawn ourselves

— among others, that children are “most susceptible to influence,” Eddings , 455 U. S., at 11 5, and “outside pressures,” Roper , 543 U. S., at 569— considering age in th e custody analysis in no way involves a determination of how youth “s ubjectively affect[s] th e mindset” of any particu lar child, Br ief for Respondent 14. 7 In fact, in many cases involving juvenile sus p ects, the custody an alysis would be nonsensical absent some con

sideration of the suspect’s age. This case is a prime exam

ple. Werethe court precluded from tak i ng J. D. B.’s youth into account, it would be forced to evaluate the circu m stances present here through the eyes of a reasonable person of av erage years. In oth e r words, how would a reasonable adult understand his situation, after being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a uniformed school resource offi cer; being encou r aged by hi s assistant principal to “do the r i ght thing” ; and bein g warned by a police investigator of the prospe ct of juvenil e detention a n d separation from his guardian and primary caretaker? To describe suchan inquiry is to demonstrate

——————

7 Thus , contra r yto the dis s e nt’s prot esta tio n s, today ’ s hol d ingneither invites cons idera t ion of whether apa rticula rs u s p ect is “unus ua lly meek orc o mpl i ant,” post , at 9 (opinion of ALITO , J.), nor“ex p an[ds]” the Miran d a c u stodyan aly s is, po st , at 8, into a tes ttha tr e q u ir es offic e r s to an tic i pate an dac c o un t for a su spec t’ s ev eryper s on al ch ar ac ter i stic , see post , at 11–12.13 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt its absurdity. Neither office rs nor courts ca n reasonably evaluate th e effect of o bjective cir c u mstances that, bythe i r nature, are specific to children without accounting for the age of the child subjected to those circumstan c es. Indeed, alt h ough the dissent s u ggests th at concerns “regardin g the application of the Miranda cu stody rule t o minors can be accom m odated by considering the uniq u e circumstances present when minors are questioned i n school,” post , at 17 (opi nion of ALITO , J.), the effect of the schoolhous e setting cannot be disentangled from the iden

tity of the p e rson quest ioned. A st udent—who s e presence at school is compulsory and whose disobedi e n ce at school is cause for disciplinary action—is in a far di fferent posi

tion than, say, a pare nt volunteer on school grounds to chaperone an event, or an adult from the co mmunity on school grounds to attend a basketball game. Withou t asking whe t her the person “questioned in school” is a “minor,” ibi d ., the coercive effect of the schoolhouse setting is unknowable. Our prior decision in Alvarado in no way undermines these conclusions. In that case, we held that a state-court decision that failed to mention a 17-year-old’s age as pa rt of the Miranda custody analysis was not objectively un

reasonable under the deferential standard of review set forth by th e Antiterro rism and Effective Death Penalt y Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Sta t

. 1214. Li ke the North Carolina Supreme Court here, see 363 N. C., at 672, 68 6 S. E. 2d, at 140, we o b served tha taccountin g for a juve

nile’s age in the Miranda custody analysis “could be viewed as creating a s ubjective in quiry,” 541 U. S., at 66 8. We said nothing, however, of whether such a view woul d be correct u n der the law. Cf. Renico v. Lett , 559 U. S. ___,

____, n. 3 ( 2010) (slip op., at 11 , n. 3) (“[W]hether the [state court ] was ri ght or wrongis not the per t inent ques

tion under AEDPA”). To the contrary, Justic e O’Connor’s concurring opinion ex plained that a suspect’s a g e m a y14 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt indeed “be relevant to the ‘custo dy’ inquiry. ” Alvarad o , 541 U. S., at 669. Reviewing the question de novo t o day, we hold that so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the tim e of police qu estioning, o rwould have been obj e ctively ap

parent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion inthe custody analysis is consistentwith the objective nature of th at test. 8This is not to say that a child’s age will be a deter

minative, o reven a s i gnificant, factor in every case. Cf. ibid. (O’Co nnor, J., concurring) (explaining that a state

court decisi on omitting any mention of the defendant’s age was not unreasonable under AEDPA’s deferential st an dard of review where the defenda n t “was almost 18 years old at the time of his interview”); post , at 17 (suggesting that “teenagers nearing the age of majority” are likely to react to an interrogation as would a “typical18-year-old in similar c i rcumstanc es”). It is, however, a reality that courts cann ot simply ignore. III The State and its am icioffer nu merous reasons that courts must blind themselves to a juvenile defendant’s age. None is persuasive. To start, th e State contends that a child’s age must b e

——————

8 This a pproa chdoes not unde r mine th e basi cpr inc i ple th at anin ter

roga t i ng office r’s una rt ic ula t ed, int e rna lt h ought s a r e ne ver—in a n d of themselves—o bjective circumstanc es of an interrogation. See supra , at 7; Stansburyv. California , 511 U. S. 3 1 8 , 32 3 (1 994) (per cu riam )

. Unlike a child’s youth, an officer’s pur e l yinter n al though ts hav eno conceivable eff e ct on ho w a reasonableperson in the suspect’s position would understand his freedo mof action. See id. , at 3 2 3

– 325; Berk em er v. McCarty , 4 68 U. S. 420, 442 (1 984). Rath erth an“ov e r t u r [n ]” tha t settle dprinci ple, post , at 13, th e limita t ionth at a c h ild’ s ag e may inform the custody analysis onlywhen known or k n owable si mp ly reflects our unwillingness t orequire officers to “make guesses” as to c i r c u mstanc es “unknowable” to th e mi nd e c i d i n gw h e nt o giv e Mira nda warnings , Berk em er , 468 U. S., at 430 –43 1

.15 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt excluded from the cus t ody inquiry because age is a pe r sonal characteristic sp ecific to the suspect hi mself rather than an “external” circumstance of the interrogatio n
. Brief for Respondent 21; see a l s o id. , at 1 8–19 (distin

guishing “personal ch aracterist ic s” from “objective fact s related to t h e interrogation itse lf” such as the location and duration of the interrogation). Despite the supposed significance of this distinction, however, at o r al argume nt counsel for the State s u ggested wi thout hesitation that at least some undeniably perso nal characteri stics—for in

stance, whether the individual being question e d is blind— are circums tances relevant to the custody a nalysis. See Tr. of OralArg. 41. Thus, the State’s quarrel cannot be that age is a personal characteristi c , without more. 9 The State further argues that age is irrelev ant to the custody an alysis because it “go[es] to how asuspect m a y internalize and perceiv e the circu mstances of an interro

gation.” Brief for Respondent 12; see also Brief for Unite d States as Amicus Curiae 21 (hereinafter U. S. Brief) (argu

ing that a child’s age h a s no place in the custody analysis because it goes to whether a suspect is “par ticularly su s ceptible” to the external circu msta n ces of the interrogatio n (some inter nal quotation marks omitted)). But the same can be said of every objective circumstance that the Sta t e agrees is r e levant to the custody analysis: Each circu m stance goes to how areasonable person would “internalize and perceive” every other. See, e. g. , Stansbu r y , 511 U. S., at 325. Indeed, this is the very reason that we as k whether th e objective circumstan c es “add up to custody,”

——————

9 The State’s purported disti n ctio n between blindness and age—that takingac c o unt of a suspec t ’ s y o uth r e quir es a c o ur t “t o g e t into the mind” of the child, wher eas takinga c c o u n t of a su spec t’ s blin dn ess doe s n o t, Tr . of Oral Ar g
. 41 –4 2

—is m i st aken. In either case, the questio n b e com e s how area s onab l e pers on wo uld u n ders t a nd t h e cir c um s t a n ces , either from the perspective of a blin d per s on or, as here, a 13-year-old child.16 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt Keohane , 5 16 U. S., a t113, instead of evalu a ting the cir

cumstances one by one. In the sam e vein, the State and its amiciprotest that the “effect of .

. . age on [the] perception of custody is internal,” Brief for Res p ondent 20, or “psychological,” U. S. Brief 21. But the whol e point of the custody analysis is to determine whether, given the circumstances, “a reason

able person[would] have felt he or she was .

. . at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Keohane , 516 U. S., at 11 2. Because the Miran d a custody inquiry turns on the min d set of a reasonable person in the suspect’s position, it cannot be the case that a circums tance is sub

jective simply because it has an “i nternal” or “psychologi

cal” impact on perception. Were t hat so, there would be no objective cir c umstances to consider at all. Relying on our state m ents that the objective custody test is “designed to give clear guidance t o the police,” Alvarado , 541 U. S., at 668, the S t ate next argues that a child’s age must be excluded from the analysis in order to preserve cl arity. Sim ilarly, the dissent insi sts that the clarity of the custody analysis will be destroyed unless a “one-size-fit s -all reasonable-person test” ap plies. Post , a t 13. Inrea lity, however, ignoring a juvenile defendant’s age will oft e n make th e inquiry m o re artificial, see supra , at 12–13, and thus only add confu s ion. And in any event, a child’s age, when kn own or apparent, is hardly an ob

scure factor to assess

. Though the State and the dissen t worry abou tgrada t ions among children of different ages, that concern cannot justify ig no ring a chil d’s age alto

gether. Just as police officers are competent to account for other object ive circums tances t hat are a ma tter of degre e such as the length of questioning or the number of officers present, so too are they competent to evaluate the effect of relative age. Inde ed, they are competent to do soeve n though an i n terrogatio nroom lac k s the “refl ective atmo s phere of a [j ury] deliberation room, ” post , at 15

. The same17 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt is true of j u dges, including those whose chil dhoods have long since passed, see post , at 14

. In short, officers and judges need no imaginative powers, k n owledge of devel

opmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultur al anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need the common senseto know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult. There is, however, an e v en more fundamental flaw with the State’s plea for clarity and the dissent’s singular focu s on simplifying the analysis: Not once have we excluded from the custody anal ysis a circu m stance th at we deter

mined was relevant and objective, simply t o make the fault line between custodial and noncustodial “brighter.” Indeed, were the guiding concern clarity and nothing else, the custody test would presumably ask only whether th e suspect had been placed under formal arrest. Berkeme r , 468 U. S., at 441; see ibid. (ac k nowledgin gthe “occ a siona[l] .

. . difficulty” p o lice officer s confront in determin

ing when asuspect has been taken into custody). But we have rejected that “more easily administered line, ” recognizing that it would simply “enable the police to circumventthe const r aints on custodial interrogatio n s established by Miranda .” Ibid.; see also ibid., n. 33. 10 Finally, the State and the di ssent s u ggest that excludin g

——————

10 Contr a r yto the dissent’ s i n timat i on, see post , at 8, M i randa does not answer the question whether a ch ild’s age is an obj e ctive circum

s t a n ce releva ntt ot h e cus t ody a n a l ys is

. Miranda simply holds that
wa rnings m u s tb e given onc ea s u s p ec t is i nc u stody , without “paus[ing] to in qu ir e ini n div i du al c a se s wh eth e rth e defen d an t wa s awar e of h i s r i gh ts with ou ta war n ingbein g giv e n.” 384 U. S., at 468 ; see also id. , at 468–4 69 (“As sess men t s of th e kn ow ledg e th e defendan t posse sse d, based on information a s to a g e, educ ation, intelligence, o rprior contact withau th or ities, c a nn e v e r be mor e th anspec u l ation ; a war n in gis a
c l ear c u t fac t” (footnote omit ted)). Th at c o n c lu sionsay s n o th in gabou t whether age p r operly inform s whether a child is in cust ody in the first place.18 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA Opinion of theCourt age from the custody analysis comes at no cost to juve

niles’ constitutional rights becausethe due pr ocess volun

tariness test independently acco unts for a child’s yout h. To be sure, that test permits consideration of a child’s age, and it erects its own b a rrier to admission of a defendant’s inculpatory statements at trial. See Gallegos , 370 U. S., a t 53–55; Hal e y , 332 U. S., at 599–601; see a l s o post , at 17– 18 (“[C]ourts shouldbe instru cted to take particular care to ensure t hat [young children’s] incriminating statements were not obtained involuntarily”). But Miranda ’s proce

dural safeguards exist precis ely because the v o luntarines s test is an inadequate barrier whe ncustodial interrogation is at stake. See 384 U. S ., at 45 8 (“Unless adequate pro

tective dev i ces are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice”); Dickerson , 53 0 U. S., at 442 (“[R]eliance on th e traditional totality-of-t he-circu mstances test raise[s] a ris k of overlook i n g an invo luntary custodial confession”); see also supra , at 5–6. To hold, as the State requ ests, that a child’s age i s never relevant to whe t her a suspect has been taken into custody—a n d thus to ignore the very real dif

ferences between children and adults—would be to deny children the full scopeof the procedural safeguards that Mirandagu arantees to adults. * * * The question remains whether J. D. B. was i ncustody when police interroga ted him. We remand for the sta t e courts to a d dress thatquestion, this time taking ac count of all of the relevant circumstan c es of the i n terrogatio n , including J. D. B.’s age at the tim e
. The jud g ment of the North Ca rolina Supreme Court i s reversed, and the cas e is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with thi s opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J., dis s e nting 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 11 21
J. D. B., PETITIONER v. N O RTH C AR O L INA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COUR T OF NORTH CAR OLINA [Ju n e16, 2011 ] J USTICE ALI T O , with whom T HE C HIEF J USTI CE , J US T I C E S CALI A , and J USTICE T HOMASjoin, dissenting. The Court’s decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest andsensible, but in truthit is neither. It is fundamentally inconsistent with one of the main justifications for the Miran d a 1 rule: th e perceived need for a clear rule th at can be ea sily applied in all cases. And today’s holding is not need ed to protect the constitutional rights of minors who are questioned by the police. Miranda ’s prophylacti c regime places a high value on clarity an dcertaint y . Dissatisfied withthe highly fac t

specific constitutional rule against the admission of involuntary confessions, the Mirand aC o ur t set dow n r i gi d standards that often require courts to ignore personal characteristics that ma y be hi ghlyrelevant to a particula r suspect’s actual susceptibility to police pressure. Thi s rigidity, ho wever, has brought with it one of Miranda ’s principal strengths—“the ease a n d clarity of its application” by law enforcement o fficials and courts. See Moran
v. Burbin e , 475 U. S. 4 12, 425–426 (1986). A key contributor to this clarity, at least up until n o w, has been Miranda ’s objective reasonable-pe rson test for determining custody. Miranda ’s custody requirement is based on the proposi­

——————

1 See Miran d av. Arizona , 38 4 U. S. 436 (19 66).2 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting tion that the riskof unconst itutional coercion is heightened whena suspect is placed u n der formal arrest or is subjected to some functionallyequivalent limitation on freedom of movement. When this custodial threshold is reached, Miranda warnings must precede police questioning. But inthe interest of simplicity, the cus t ody analysis considers only whethe r, under th e circumsta nces, a hyp o thetical reasonable p e rson would consider himself to b e confined.Many suspects, of course, will differ from this hypothetical reasonable person. Some, in cluding tho s e who have been hardened by past interro gati ons, may have no need for Mirandawarnings at all. An d for other suspects

— those who are unusually sensitive to the pressures of police questioning— Miranda war n ings may come too late to be of any use. That is a necessary consequence of Miranda ’s rigid standards, but it does not mean that the constitutional rights of these especially sensi t ive suspects are left unprotected. A vulnerable defendant can still turn to the con s titutional rule against actual coercion and contend tha tthat his confession was extracted against h i s will. Today’s decision shifts the Mirandacustody d e termination from a one-size-fit s -all reason able-persontest into an inquiry tha tmust a cco unt for a tl e ast one individualized characterist ic—age—th a t is though t to cor r elate with su sceptibility to coercive pressures. Age, however, is in n o way the only personal charac teristic that m a y correlat e with pliability, and in future cases the Court will be forced to choose between two unpalat able alternatives. It may choose to limit today ’ s decision by arbitrarily distinguishing a suspect’s age from othe r personal characteristics

— such as intelligence, education, occupation, or prior experience with law enf o rceme nt—that maya l so correlate with susceptibility to coercive pressures. Or, if the Cour t is unwilling to draw these arbitrary lines, it will be forced3 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J., dis s e nting to effect afundamen tal transformation of the Mirand a custody test—from a clear, easily applied prophylacti c rule into a highly fact-intensive st andard resembling the voluntariness test that the MirandaCourt found to be unsatisfactory. For at least three reasons, there is no need to go down this road. First, manyminors subjected to police interr ogation are near the age of majority, and for these suspects the one-siz e -fits-all M i randacust ody rule may not be a bad fit. Second, many of the difficulties in a p plying the Mirandacustody rule to min o rs arise b e cause of t h e unique circumstances present when the police conduct interrogations at school. The Mirandacusto d y rule has always ta ken into account the setting inwh ich questioning occurs, and accounting for the school setting in such cases will address many of thes e problems. Third, in cas e s lik e the on enow beforeus, where t h e suspect i s especial ly young, cou rts appl ying the cons titutional voluntarines s standard ca n take s p ec ial care to ensure thatincriminat

ing statements were not obtained through coercion. Safeguardi ng the constitutional rights of minors does not require the extreme makeover of Mirandathat today’s decision may portend. I In the days before Mira nda , this Court’s sole metric for evaluating the admissibility of confessions was a voluntariness standard rooted in both the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bram v. U n ited S t a t es , 168 U. S. 532, 542 ( 1897) (Self-Incrimination Clause); Brownv. Missis s ippi , 297 U. S. 278 (1936) (due process). The question in these voluntarines s cases was whether th e particular “defendant’s will” had been “overborne.” Lynumnv. Illinois , 372 U. S. 528, 534 (1963). Courts took into account both “the details of the interrogation” and4 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting “the charac teristics of the accused,” Schneckl o thv. Busta

monte , 412 U. S. 218, 2 26 (1973), a n d then “weigh[ed] .

. . the circums tances of p r essure aga i nst the po wer of resistance of the person confessing.” Steinv. New York , 3 46 U. S. 156, 185 (1953). All manner of individualized, personal characteristics were relevant in this voluntariness inquiry. Among th e most frequently mentioned fa ctors were the defendant’s education, physical co ndition, in telligence, and mental health. Wi throw v. Williams , 50 7 U. S. 680 , 693 (1993);
see Clewisv. Texas , 3 86 U. S. 707, 712 (196 7) (“only a fifth-grade education”); Gr eenwaldv. Wisconsi n , 390 U. S. 519, 520–521 (1968) ( p er curiam )(had not taken bloodpressure medication); Paynev. A rkansas , 356 U. S. 560, 562, n. 4, 567 (1958) (“mentally dull” and “ ‘slow to learn’ ”); Fikesv. Alabama , 352 U. S. 191, 193, 196, 198(1957) (“low mentality, if not mentally ill” ). The suspect’s age also received prominent attention in several cases, e.g. , Gallegosv. Colorado , 370 U. S. 49, 54 (1962 ), especially when the suspect was a “mere child.” Ha leyv. Ohio , 332 U. S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion). The weight assigned to any one consideration varied from case to case. But all of these factors, along with any th ing else that might have affected t h e “individual’s . . . capacity fo r effective ch oice,” were rele vant in determining whethe r the confess i on was coerced or compelled. See Mirand a v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 506– 507 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).The all-encompassing nature of the voluntariness inquiry had its benefits. It allowed c o urts to accommodate a “complex of values,” Sc hneckloth , supra , at 2 23, 224, and to make a careful, highly individualized determination as to whether the police had wrung “a confessio nout of [the] accused against his will.” Blackburnv. Alabama , 361 U. S. 199, 206–207 (1960). But with this flexibility came a decrease in both certainty and predictability, and the5 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J., dis s e ntingvoluntariness standard proved difficult “for law enforcement officers to confor m to, and f o r courts to apply in a consistent manner.” Dicke rson v. United S t ates , 530 U. S. 428, 444 (2000). In Miranda , the Court supplemented the voluntariness inquiry with a “set of prophylacti c measures” designed to ward off th e “ ‘inherently compelling pressure s’ of custodi a l interrogation.” See Ma rylandv. Shatzer , 559 U. S. __, __ (2010) (slip op., at 4) (q uoting Miranda , 384 U. S., at 467). Mirandag r eatly simplified matters by requiring police to give suspects standard warnings before com m encing any custodial interrogation. See id., at479. Its requirements are no doubt “rigid,” see Farev. Michael C. , 439 U. S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers), and th e y often require courts to su ppress “trustwo rthyand highly probative” statements that may be perfectly “volunta r y under [a] traditional Fifth Amendment analysis.” Farev. Michael C. , 442 U. S. 7 07, 718 (1979). But with this rigi dity comes i n creased cl arity. Mirandaprovides “a workable rule to guide police officers,” New Yorkv. Quarl e s , 467 U. S. 649, 658 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitte d), and an administrable standard for the courts. As has often been recognized, this gain inclarityandadministra

bility is on e of Miranda ’s “princi p al advantages.” Ber k e mer v. McCarty , 468 U. S. 420, 430 (1984); see also Mis

souriv. Seibert , 542 U

. S

. 60 0, 6 22 (2 004) (KENN E DY , J ., c o ncurring in j u dgment). No less than other facets of Miranda , the threshold requirement that the suspect be in “custody” is “designed to give clear guidance to the police.” Yarboroughv. Alva

rado , 541 U. S. 652, 668, 669 (2004). Cu stody unde r Mirandaat taches where there is a “formal arrest” or a “restraint o nfreedom of moveme nt” akin to formal arrest

. California v. Behel e r , 463 U. S. 1121, 112 5 (1983) (per curiam)(in t ernal quotation marks omitted)

. T h i s s t a n dard is “objective” and turn s on h o w a hypothetical “rea­6 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting sonable person in the position of the individual bein g questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action.” Stan sburyv. California , 511 U. S. 318, 32 2– 323, 325 (1994) (per curiam) (in t ernal quotation marks omitted). Until today , the Cour t ’ s cases ap plying this test hav e focused solely on the “objective cir c u mstances of the inter

rogation,” id. , at 323, not the personal characteristics of the interrog a ted. E. g. , Berkem er , supra , a t44 2, and n. 35 ; but cf. Sc h n eckloth , 4 12 U. S., a t226 (voluntariness inquiry requires consideration of “the details of the interrogation” and“the cha r ac teristics of t h e accused” ). Relevant factors hav e included such things as where the questioning occur r e d, 2 how l o ng it lasted, 3what was said, 4 any ph ysical restraints placed on t h e suspect’s movement, 5 and wheth e r the suspect was allowed to leave when the questioning was through. 6 The totality of t h e se circumstan ces—the external circu mstances, that is, of the interrogation itself—is what has mattered in this Court’s
cases. Personal characteristics of suspects have consistently been rejected or ignored as irrelevant under a on esize-fits-all reasonable- person standard. Stansbury, supra, at 323 (“[C]ustody depe nds on the objective circumstance s of the interrogation, not on the subjective vi ews harbored by either t h e interrog a ting officers or the p e rson being questioned” ). For example, in Berkemer v. Mc C a rt y, s u p ra , police officers con d ucting a traffic stop questioned a man who had been drinking and smoking marijuana before he was pulled over. Id., at 423. Although the suspect’s inebria­

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2 Maryla nd v. Sh atzer, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., a t13– 16). 3 Berk em er v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 437 –43 8 (19 84). 4 Oregonv. Mat h iason , 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1 977) (per curia m )

. 5 New Yorkv. Qu ar les , 467 U. S. 649, 65 5 (19 84). 6 Californiav. Beheler , 463 U. S. 1121, 1 122 –1 123 (1 9 83) (per cu

riam )

.7 Cite as: 56 4 U

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ALITO , J., dis s e nting tion was readily appar e nt to the officers at the scene, ibid. , the Court’s analysis did not advert to this or any other individualized consideration. Instead, the Co urt focused only on the external circumstan c es of the interrogation itself. The opinion concluded that a typical “tr affic stop” is akin to a “ Ter r y stop” 7 and does not qualify as the equivalent of “formal arrest.” Id. , at 439. Californiav. Beh e ler , supra , is a n other useful example. There, the circumsta n ces of the interrogati on were “r emarkably s i milar” to the facts of the Court’s earlier dec i

sion in Oregonv. Mathiason , 429 U. S. 492 (1977) (per curiam)—the suspect was “not placed under arrest,” he “voluntarily [came] to the police station,” and he wa s “allowed to leave unhin d ered by po lice after a brief interview.” 463 U. S., at 1123, 1121. A Californ i a court in Behel e r ha d nonetheles s distinguished Mathiasonbecause the police knew that Beheler “had been drinking earlier in the day” an d was “emo tionally distraught. ” 4 63 U. S., at 1124–1125. In a summary reversal, this Court explain e d that the fa c t“[t]ha t th e police knew more” personal information about Beheler than they did about Mathiason was “irrelevant. ” Id. , at 1 125. Neither one of them was in custody un der the objective reasonable-pers on standard. Ibid

. ; see a l so Alvarado , supra, a t668, 669 (experience with law enforcement irrelevan tto Mirandacustod y analysis “as a de novo matter”). 8 The glaring absence of reliance on personal characteris­

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7 See Ter r yv. Oh io , 392 U. S. 1 (196 8). 8 The Cour t c l aims tha t“[n]o tonc e ” have a n y of ou r ca s e s “ e xcluded fr om the c u stodyanaly s is a c i r c u mstanc e that we de ter m ined was releva nta n d obj e ct ive, s i m p ly t o make the fault line be tween custodial
a n d noncus todia l‘b righter.’ ” Ante , a t1 7

. S u rely t h is is incorre ct

. The
v e r yac t of ad optin ga r e as on able-pe rs on t e stneces s a r ily excludes all sorts of “relevant and objective” circumstances—for example, all the objective circumstances of a suspect’ s life history—that might otherwise bearona c u st odydeter m in ation

.8 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting tics in these and other custody cases sh ouldcome as n o surprise. To accountfor such i n dividualized considerations would be to cont radict Miranda ’s central premise. The Miran d aCourt’s decision to adopt its inflexible prophylactic re quirements was expr essly based o nthe notio n that “[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant pos

sessed, bas ed on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior co ntact wi th authorities, can never be more than speculation.” 384 U. S., at 468–469. II In light of t h is establis hed practice, there is no denyin g that, by incorporating age into it s analysis, the Court is embarking on a new expansion of the established custody standard. And since Mirandais this Court’s rule, “nota constitutional command,” it is up to the Cour t “to jus t ify its expansion.” Cf. Arizonav. Robe rson , 486 U. S. 675, 68 8 (1988) (K E NNEDY , J., dissenting). This the Court fails to do. In its present form, Miranda ’s prophylactic regime already imposes “high cost[s]” by requiring suppression of confessions that are o f ten “highly probative ” and “voluntary” by an y tra ditional standard. Or egonv. Elstad , 4 70 U. S. 298, 312 (1985); see Dickerson, 530 U

. S., at 444 (under Miranda“sta tements which may be b yno means involuntary, made by a defendan t who is a w are of his ‘rights, ’ ma y nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defe ndant go free as a result”). No netheless, a “core virtue” of Mirandaha s been the clarity and precision of its guidance to “police and courts.” With row v. William s , 507 U. S. 680, 694 (1993) (i nternal qu otation marks omitted); see Mo ran, 475 U. S., at 425 (“[O]ne of the principal advantages of Mirandais the ease a n d clarity o fits application” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This increased clarity “h as been thought to outweigh the burdens” that Mirand a imposes. Fare , 442 U. S., at 718. The Court has, however,9 Cite as: 56 4 U

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ALITO , J., dis s e ntingrepeatedly cautioned against upsetting the careful “balance” that Mirandast ruck, Moran, supra, at 424, and it has “refused to sanction attempts to expand [t he] Miranda holding” in ways that would reduce its “cl arity.” Se e Quarl e s , 467 U. S., at 658 (citing cases). Given this pra c tice, there should be a “strong presumption” against the Court’s new departu r e from th e establishedcustody test. See UnitedStatesv. Patan e , 54 2 U. S. 630 , 640 (2004 ) (plurality opinion). In my judgment, that presumpti o n cannot be overcome here. A The Court’s rationale for importing age into the custody standard is that mino rs tend to l a ck adul ts’ “capa city t o exercise ma ture judgment” and that failing to account for that “reality” will leave so me mi nors unprotected under Miranda in situations where they perceive themselves t o be confined. See an te , at 10, 8. I do not dispute that man y suspects who are und er 18 will be more su sceptible to police pressure than the average adult. As the Co urt notes, our pre- Miranda cases were particularl y attuned t o this “reality” in applying the constitutional requirement of voluntariness in fact. Ante, at 9 (relying o n Hal e y , 3 32 U. S., at 599 (plurality opinion), a n d Gall egos , 370 U. S., at 54). It i s no less a “reality,” h o wever, tha tmany persons overthe age of 18 are also more susceptible to police pressure than the hypothetical reasonable p e rson. See Payne, 356 U. S., at 567 (fact that defendant was a “mentally dull 19-year-old youth” relevant in voluntariness inquiry). Yet the Miranda custody standa r d has never accounted f o r the personal characteristics of these or any other individual defendants. Indeed, it h a s always been the cas e under Mirandatha t the unusua lly meek orcompliant are subject to the same fixed rules, including the same c u stody requirement, as those who are unus ually resis t ant to police pressu re.10 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting Berkem er , 468 U. S., at 442, an d n. 35 (“[O]nly relevant inquiry is h o w a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation”). Miranda ’s ri gid standards are both overincl usive and underinclusive. They are overinclusive to the extent that they provide a windfall to the most hardened and savvy of s u spects, wh o often have no need for Miranda ’s protections. Compare Miranda , supra , at 471–472 (“[N]o amount of circumsta ntial evidence that the person may have been aware of ” his rights can o v ercome Miranda ’s req u irements), with Orozc o v. Texas , 3 94 U. S. 32 4, 329 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (“Where the defendant himself [w]as a lawyer, policeman , professionalcriminal, or othe rwise has become aware of what his right to silence is, it is s h eer fancy to assert that his answer to every question a s ked him is compelled unless he is advised of those rights with which he is already intimately familiar”). And Miranda ’s requirement s are underinclusive to t h e extentthat they fail to account for “frailties,” “idiosyn crasies,” and other i n dividualized considerations that m i ght cause a person to bend mor e easily during a confro ntation with the police. See Alva

rado , 541 U. S., at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted). Members of this Court have seen this rigidity as a major weakness in Miranda ’s “code of r u les for confessions.” See 384 U. S., at 504 (Harl an, J., diss enting); Fa re, 439 U. S., at 1314 (Rehnquist, J ., in chambers) (“[T]h e rigidity o f [Miranda ’s] prophylactic rules was a principal weakness in the view of dissenters and criti cs outside t h e Court”). But if it is, then the weakness is an inescapable consequence of the MirandaCourt’s dec i sion to supplement the more holist i c voluntariness requirement with a one-sizefits-all prophylactic rul e
. That is undoubtedly why this Court’s Miranda case s have never before mentioned “th e suspect’s age” or a n y other individualized consideration in applyin gthe cus t ody standard. See Alvarado , supra, at 666. An d unless the11 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J., dis s e nting Miranda cu stody rule i s now to be radically t r ansformed into one that takes int o account the wide range of individual characteristics that are relevant in determinin g whether a confession is voluntary, the Court must shoulder the burden of explaining why age is different from these other personal characteristic s. Why, for e x ample, is age different from i n telligence? Suppose that an officer, upon going to a school to question a student, is told by th e principal that the student has an I. Q. of 75 and is in a special-education class. Cf. In re J. D. B. , 363 N. C. 664, 666, 686S. E. 2d 135, 136–13 7 (2009). Are those facts more or less importa nt than the student’s age in determining whether he or s h e “felt .

. . at liberty to t e rminate the interrog a tion and leave”? See Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U. S. 99, 112 (1995). An I. Q. score, like age, is more than just a number. Ante , at 8 (“[A]ge is f a r ‘more th an a chron o logical fact’ ”). An d a n individual’s intelligence can also yield “concl u sions” sim i

lar to those “we ha ve d r awn ourse l ves” in cas e s far afield of Miranda

. Ante, at 12. Compa r e ibid. (relying on Ed

dingsv. Oklahoma , 455 U. S. 104 (1982), a n d Roper v. Simmons , 543 U. S. 55 1 (2005)), with Smithv. Texas , 543 U. S. 37, 44–45 (2004) (per cu riam)

. How about the suspect’s cultural b a ckground? Suppose the police learn (or should have learned, see ante , a t11 ) that a suspect they wis hto question is a recen timmigran t from a country in which dire consequences oft e n befall an y person who dares to att e mpt to cu t short any m eeting wit h the police. 9Is this really less relev ant than the fact that a suspect is a month or so away fro m his 18th birthday? The defendant’s educa t ion is another person al charac­

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9 Cf. United St atesv. Chalan , 812 F. 2d 1 3 02, 1 307 (CA 1 0 1 987) (r ej e ct ing cla i m t h a tNat ive Am erica nsus p ectwa s “in cus t ody” for Miran d a purp oses because, by custom, ob edienc e to tr i bal author itie s was “ex p ec ted of all tr ibal me mber s”).12 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting teristic tha tmay generate “conclus i ons about behavior and perception.” An te , a t 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under today’s d e cision, why should police officers and courts “blind themselves,” ante , at 1, to t h e fact that a suspect has “only a fifth-grade education”? See Clewis , 386 U. S., at 712 (volun tariness case). Alterna t ively, what if the police know or should know that the suspect is “a college-educated man with law school training”? See Crookerv. California , 357 U. S. 433, 440 (19 58), overruled by Mirand a , supra, a t479, and n. 48. How are these individual considerations meaningfully different from age in their “rel a tionship to a reasonable person’s understanding of his freedom of action”? An t e , at 11. The Court proclaims that “[a] child’s age . . . is different,” ante , at 12 , but the basis for this ipse dixitis dubious. I have little doubt that today’s decision will soon be cited by defendants—and perhaps byprosecutors as well—f o rthe proposition that all manner of other individual characteristics should be treated like ag e and takeninto account in the Miranda custo d y calculus. Indeed, there are already lowercourt decisions that take this app r oach. See UnitedStatesv. B erau n -Panez , 81 2 F. 2d 578 , 581, modified 830 F. 2d 127 (CA9 1987) (“reasonable person who was an alien”); In re Jorge D. , 202 Ariz. 277, 280, 43 P. 3d 605, 6 08 (App. 20 02) (age, m a turity, and experience); Sta t ev. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 818, 948 P. 2d 166, 173 (1997) (same); In re Joshua DavidC., 116 M d . App. 580, 594, 698 A

. 2d 1155, 1162 (1997 ) (“education, age, an d intelligence”). In time, the Court wil lhave to confront these issues, and it will be faced with a difficult choice. Itmay choos e to distinguish today’s decision and adhere to the arbitrary proclamation that “age . . . is different.” Ante , at 12. Or it may choose to extendtoday’s ho lding and, in doing so, further un dermine the very rati onale for t h e Miranda regime.13 Cite as: 56 4 U

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ALITO , J., dis s e nting B If the Court chooses the latter course, then a core virtu e of Miranda—the “ease and clarity of its application”—wi ll be lost. Mora n , 475 U. S., at 42 5; see Fare , 442 U. S., at 718 (noting that the clarity of Miranda ’s requirement s “has been thought to outweigh th e burdens that the dec i

sion . . . imposes”). However, e v en today’s more limited departure from Miranda ’s one-size-fits-all reasonableperson test will pro d uce the very consequences that prompted the MirandaCourt to abandon exclusive reliance on the voluntariness test i nthe first place: The Court’s test will be hard for the police to follow, and i twi ll be hard for judges to apply. See Dickerso n v. Uni t ed Sta t es , 530 U. S. 428, 444 (2000). The Court holds that age must be taken into account when it “was knownt o the officerat the time of the inte rview,” or when it “would hav e been objectively apparent” to a reasonable officer. Ante , a t1 1

. The first half of this test overtu rns the rul e that the “initial determination of custody” do es not dep e nd onthe “subjective views harbored by . . . interrogat i ng officers.” Stansbu r y, 511 U. S., at 323. The second half will generate ti me-consumi ng satellite l i ti gation over a reasonab le officer’s perceptions. When, as here, the interrogation t a kes place in school, the inquiry may be relatively simple. But not all police ques

tioning of minors takes place in schools. Inmany cases, courts will presumably have to make findings as to whether a particular suspect ha d a sufficie n tly youthf ul look to alert a reasonable offi cer to the possib ility that the suspect wa s under 18 , or whether a reasonable off i cer would have recognized that asus p ect’s I. D. was a fa ke. The inquiry will b e both “time -consuming and disrupti ve” for the police and the courts. See Berk emer , 468 U. S., a t 432 (refusing to modify the custo d y test bas ed on similar considerations). It will also be m a de all the more complicated by the fact that a suspect’s dress and manner will14 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting often be different whe nthe issue is litigated in court tha n it was at th e time of the interrogation. Even after courts clear this initial hurdle, fur t her prob

lems will li kely emerge as judges attempt to put themselves in th e shoes of t h e av erage 16-year-old, or 15-yearold, or 13- year-old, as the case may be. Consider, for example, a 60-year-old judge attempting to make acu stody determination through the eyes of a hypothetical, average 15-year-old. Forty-five ye ars of personal experience and societal change separate this judge from the days when he or she was 15 years old. And this judge may or may not have been an average 15-year-old. The Court’s answer to these difficulties is to st ate that “no imaginative powers, knowledge of develop m ental psychology, [or] training in cognitive science” will be necessary. An te , a t 17. Judges “simply need the common sense, ” the Court assures, “to know that a 7-year-old is not a13-year-old and neither is an adult.” An te, a t 1 7

. I ti s o b vi o u s , h o w ever, that application of the Court’s new rule deman d s much more than this. Take a fai r ly typical case in which today’s holding may make a difference. A 161⁄2-y ear- old moves to suppres s incriminating statements made prior to the administration of Mira ndawarni n gs. The circumstanc es are such that, if the defendant were at lea s t 18, the court would n o t find that he or sh e was in custody, but the defendant argues tha ta reasonable 161⁄2-year-old would view the situation differently. The judge wi ll not have the luxury of merely saying: “It is co mmon sens e that a 161⁄2-year-old is not an 18-year-old. Motion granted.” Rather, the judge will be req u ired to determine whether the differences between a typical 161⁄2-year-old and a typical 18-year-old with respect to susceptibility to the pressures of interrogation are su fficient to change the outcome of the custody determination. Today’s opinion c o ntains nota word of actual guidance as to h o w judges a r e supposed to go about15 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J., dis s e nting making tha tdetermination. C Petitioner and the Court attemp t to show that this tas k is not unma nageable bypointing ou t that age is taken into account in other legal contexts. In particular, the Court relies on th e fact that the age of a defendant is a relevant factor unde rthe reasonable-person standard applicable in negligence suits. Ante , at 11 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts §10 , Comment b , p. 117 (2 005)). But negligence is generally a question for the jury, the members of which can draw on their varied experiences with persons of different ages. It also involves a post hocde termination, in the reflective atmosphere of a deliberationroom, abou t whether th e defendan t conformed to a standard of care. The Mirandacustody determination, by contrast, must be made in the first instance by police officers in t h e course of an investigation that may require quick decisionmakin g
. See Quarle s , 467 U. S., at 658 (noting “the importance” under Miranda of providing “a work able rule ‘to guide police office rs, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individu al interests involved inthe specif ic circumst ances they confront’ ”) ; Alvarado , 5 41 U. S., at 668, 669 ( “ [T]he custody inquiry states an objective rul e design ed to give clear guidance to the police”). Equally inapposite are the Eighth Amendment cases the Court cites in supportof its new rule. Ante , at 9, 11, 1 2 (citing Edd i ngs, 455 U. S. 104, Roper, 543 U. S. 551, an d Graham v. Florida , 560 U. S. ___ (2010)). Those decisi on s involve the “judicial exercise of independent judgment” about the constitutionality of certain punishments. E.g. , id. , at ___ (slip op., at 16). Li k e the negligence standard, they do not require on-the-spot judgments by the police. Nor do stat e laws affording extra protection for juveniles during custodial interrogation pr ovide any support fo r16 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting petitioner’s arguments

. See Brief for Petiti oner 16–17. States are free to enact additional restrictions on t h e police over and above t h ose deman d ed by the Constitution
or Miranda

. In addition, these state statutes generally create clear, workable rules to guide police conduct. See Brief for Petitioner 16– 17 (citing statutes tha trequire or permit parents to be presen t during custodial interrogation of a minor, that require minors to be advised of a statutory ri ght to communicate with a parent or guardian, and that require parental consent to custodi a l interrogation). Today’s decision, by contrast, injects a new, complicating fac t or into wha thad been a clear, easily applied prophylacti c rule. See Alvarado , supra, at 66 8–669. 10 III The Court’s decision greatly diminishes the clarity and administrability that have long b een recogni z ed as “principal advan t ages” of Miranda ’s pro p hylactic requirements. See, e.g. , Mora n, 475 U. S., at 425. But what i s worse, the Court ta ke s this step unnecessarily, as the r e are other, less disruptive tools av ailable to ensure that minors are not coerced into confessing. As an initi a l matter, the difficulties that t h e Court’s standard introduces will likely yi eld little adde d protection

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10 Th e Cou r t als or e lies onNo r t hCar o lin a’ s c o n c essionator al ar g u ment that a c o ur t c o uld take into ac c o un t a su spec t’ s blin dn ess as a fa ct or releva n tt ot h e Miran d acus t ody det e rm ina t ion. An t e , at 15, an d
n. 9

. This is afa r-fetched hypo thetical, and neither the parties no r their amicicit e a n y ca s e in which s u ch a problem has a c tually arisen. Pr esu m ably s u c ha c a se w o u l d in v o lv e a s i tu at ioninwh ic ha bl in d defendant was giv e n “a ty ped doc u ment adv i singhim that he [was] fr ee to leave.” See Brief for Ju ven ile Law Centeras Am icusCuriae23. In
s u ch aca s e , furnis hing t h is a dvice in a form ca lcula t ed to b eunintelligible to the s u spect would be t a nta m ount to fa iling to provide th e adv i c eat all. An d adv i c ebyth e polic e that a suspect is or is not free to leave at will h a s alw a ys bee nregard ed as a circumstance regarding the
c o nditions of the inter r o g a tion thatmus tbe taken in to ac c o unt in makingthe M i randacus t ody det e rm ina t ion.17 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J., dis s e nting for most juvenile def e ndants. Most juveniles who a r e subjected to police inter r ogation are teenagers nearing the age of majority. 11 These defendants’ reactions to police pressure are unlikely to be much different fr om the reaction of a ty pical 18-year-old in similar circu mstances. A one-size-fits-all Mirandacustody rule thus provides a roughly rea s onable fit f o r these def e ndants. In addition, many of th e concerns that petitio n er raises regarding the application of the Mirandacu stody rule t o minors can be accom m odated by considering the uniq u e circumstances present when minors are questioned i n school. See Brief for Petitioner 10–11 (reciting at length the factors petitioner believes to be relevant t o the custod y determination here, including the fact that pet i tioner was removed fr om class by a police officer, that t h e interview tookplace in a school conf erence room, and that auni

formed officer anda vice princi pal were p r esent). T h e Mirandacu stody rule has always taken into account th e setting in which questioning occurs, restric t ions on a suspect’s freedom of m o vement, a n d the presence of po li ce officers or other authority figures. See Alvarado , supra, at 665; Marylandv. Sha tzer , 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (sl i p op., at 14). It can do so here as well. 12 Finally, in cases lik e the one nowbefore us, where the suspect is much youn ger thanth e typical ju venile defendant, courts should be instructe d t o take parti cular care t o

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11 See Dept of Justice, Fe deral Bu r e auof In v e stig a t ion , 20 08 Crime in the United States (Sept. 2009), online at http://www2.fbi.gov/
u c r/c i u s 2008/d a ta/t able_ 38.h tml ( a llIn ter n et m a ter i al s a s v i si ted Ju n e 8, 2011, an d a v ailab l e inCler k of Cou r t’ s case file) (in d ic atin gth at less th an30% of j u v e n ile ar r e st s inth e United States are o f suspects who
ar e u n d er 15).

12 The Cour t thinks it would b e“ab s ur [d]” to c o nsiderthe sc hool settingwithout ac c o untingfor ag e, ante , at 12, bu t th e r e al absu r dityis f o r the Cour t to r e quir e polic e offic e r s to get i n side the headof a reasonabl e minorwhile makingthe quic k, on -the-spot deter m inations th a t Miran d a demands.18 J. D. B. v. NORTH CAROLI NA
ALITO , J., dis s e nting ensure that incriminating statements were not obtained involuntarily. The voluntariness inquiry is flexible and accommodating by nature, see Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at 224, and the Court’s precedents already make clear that “special care” must be exerci sed inapplying the voluntariness test where the co nfession of a “mere child” is at issue. Haley , 332 U. S., at 59 9 (plurality opinion). If Miranda ’s rigid, one-s i ze-fits-all standards fail to acc o unt for the unique n e eds of juveniles, the response should be to rigorously apply the constitutionalrule against coercion to ensure that the rights of minors are protected. There is no need to run Mirandaoff the rails. * * * The Courtr e sts its deci sion to inject personal c haracteristics into t h e Mirandacustody inquiry on the principle that judges applying M i randa cannot “blind themselves to

. . . commonsense reality.” An te , at 1, 8, 10– 11, 14. Bu t the Court ’ s shift is fu ndamentally atodds with the cl ear prophylacti c rules th at Mirand ahas long enforced. Mirandafrequently requires judges to blind t h emselves t o the reality that many un-Mirandized custodial confessions are “by no means involuntary” or coerced. Dickerson, 5 30 U. S., at 4 44. It also requires police to provide a rote recitation of Miranda warnings that many suspects already know and could like ly recite from memory. 13U n d e r today’s ne w, “reality” -based approach to the doctrin e , perhaps these and oth e r principles of our Mirandaju risprudence will, like the custody standard, now be ripe for

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13 Su rv ey s h av esh ownth at “[l] ar g em a j o ri ti e s” of th e publ i c ar e aw ar e tha t“in dividu al sarr e st ed fo r a c ri me” h av e a r i gh t to “r em ai [n] si len t (8 1%), ” a ri gh t to “ al awy er(95 %), ” and ari gh t to hav ea lawy er“ a ppoin te d”if the arre stee “cann o t aff o rd on e ( 8 8%). ” Se e Beld en, Ru ssone llo & S t ew art, De v e lo pin g aN a t i on alM e ss ag e forIn dig e n tD e fen s e: An a ly sis of Nation al S u rvey 4 (Oct. 2001), online at http:/ /www.nlada.or g / DMS/Docu m e nt s/ 121 1996 548 .5 3/ Poll i n g%20 res u lts % 20 report .pdf.19 Cite as: 56 4 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J., dis s e nting modification. Then, bit by bit, Mi randa will lose the clarity and ease of application that h a s long been viewed a s one of its ch ief justifications. I respectfully dissent.