UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) LUIS IVAN POBLETE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 16-1799 (ABJ) ) U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, et al. , ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Luis Ivan Poblete has filed this pro se action against the United States Marshals Service, Judges Michael L. Rankin and John M. Mott of the Distri ct of Columbia Superior Court, Chung Hui Lo, Mark B. Sandground, Sr., Robert E. Cappell, and C hanning D. Phillips, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Writ of M andamus/Prohibition [Dkt. # 1-1] (“Writ”). This case appears to arise out of a civil action fil ed by Lo against Poblete in Superior Court. Id. ¶ 3. In that action for breach of contract, Lo was represented by M ark Sandground, and Poblete was represented by R obert Cappell. Public Docket, Lo v. Poblete , No. 2013 CA 5697 (D.C. Sup. Ct.). Judges Mott and Rankin presided over the Superior Court matter at various stages, and it appears fro m the docket that judgment wa s entered for the plaintiff on November 19, 2015, after th e parties came to a mediated settleme nt. Id. Poblete initiated the present civil action on August 19, 2016 in Superior Court, suing Lo, the attorneys and judges involve d in the matter, and various other entities and individuals. See Writ. The Marshals Service and U.S. Attorney Phillips removed th e matter to this Court on September 8, 2016. Notice of Removal [Dkt. # 1].2 Poblete appears to be asserting that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over the contract action brought by Lo, and he seek s a “writ of mandamus/prohibit ion” “immediately arresting action of the inferior Court” “und er the authority of the Commo n Law of England.” Writ ¶¶ 2–3. He asserts that Sandground “ente red a Void Summons and Complain t” in the contract action, and he “demand[s] the involuntary dis missal and the quashing of sai d service of process of the said instant matter.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 10. He further alleges thatthe defendants have engaged i n fraud and that “[t]he Superior Court of the District of Columbia is a cri minal enterprise.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 16. Specifically, he claims that the Superior Court “is under the d irect supervision of a Judge known to have acted without jurisdiction” – Judge Lee F. Satterfield – and that “any and all Judges and state officers . . . [including] Judge John M. Mott and Judge M ichael L. Rankin who are under his authority are acting without jurisdiction, [and] are actingin conflict with the Federal Constitution.” Id. ¶ 17. Poblete also contends that “[t]he C ourt and the Court officers in cluding but not limited to [his] attorney has joined into the action that was conspired ag ainst [him] and [his] parents that deprived [them] of [their] citizenship by changing [their] citi zenship status from American State Citizens to a U.S. Citizenship,” which Poblete insists “is puni shable by death pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Convention, Article 3.” Writ ¶ 18. He further alleg es that “[t]he courts and its officers including but not limited to [his] attorney is involve d in the act of ‘inland piracy’ and ‘PRESS-GANGING’ which is a criminal offense pursuant to the 194 9 Geneva Convention, Article 3.” Id. ¶ 19. He supports his writ with an affidavit, in which he avers tha t “the flesh lives and the blood flows and nothing stands between the Affiant and the divine.” Aff. of Luis Ivan Poblete [Dkt. # 1-1] ¶ 5.3 Before this matter proceeds any further, the Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear it. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to b e expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisd iction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). In ad dition, “‘[i]t is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and that courts may raise the issue sua sponte .’” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC , 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008), quoting Athens Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker , 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Indeed, a federal court must raise the issue because it is “forbidden – as a c ourt of limited jurisdiction – fro m acting beyond [its] authority, and ‘no action of the parties canconfer subject-matter jurisdi ction upon a federal court.’” Id. , quoting Akinseye v. District of Columbia , 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Therefore, a district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) when it is evident that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Evans v. Suter , No. 09-5242, 2010 WL 1632902, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010), ci ting Hurt v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir ., No. 07-5019, 2008 WL 441786 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2008); Scholastic Entm’t, Inc. v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc. , 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003); Zernial v. United States , 714 F.2d 431, 433–34 (5th Cir. 1983). Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking where a complaint “is ‘p atently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano , 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009), quoting Best v. Kelly , 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A claim is “patently insubstantial” when it is “flimsier than doubtful or questionab le . . . [and] essentially fictitious.”
Best , 39 F.3d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hagans v. Lavine , 415 U.S.4 528, 536–37 (1974) (“[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous . . . .”) (interna l citations and quotation marks omitted); see , e.g ., Peters v. Obama , Misc. No. 10-0298 (CKK), 2010 WL 2541066 (D.D.C. June 21, 2010) ( sua sponte dismissing complaint alleging that President Obama had been served with and failed to respond to an “Imperial Writ of Habeas Corpus” by the “Imperial Dominion of Amexem,” requiring the plainti ff’s immediate release from a corr ectional institution). Although the Court is mindful that complaints filed by pro se litigants must be held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Haines v.
Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Brown v. District of Columbia , 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), plaintiff’s allegations in this case present “no fed eral question suitable for decision.”
Best , 39 F.3d at 330. Insofar as the complaint is even intelligible , it lacks a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to r elief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to challenge an y aspect of the civil action filed by Lo in the Superior Court, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to review the merits of the court’s decisions in that case. Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals , 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[F]ederal district courts lack jurisdiction to review j udicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts.”).5 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this case sua sponte pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. A separate order will issue.

AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge DATE: September 13, 2016