Present: All the Justices 

FREDDIE B. LEXIE, JR., ET AL. 

v. Record No. 950227 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY 

OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

 April 19, 1996 

FREDDIE B. LEXIE, JR., EXECUTOR, 

ETC. 

v. Record No. 950455 

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Donald H. Kent, Judge 

BRIAN M. SKATES 

v. Record No. 950791 

COLONIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 

OF CALIFORNIA 

ARNITA M. GOODE 

v. Record No. 951049 

COLONIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 

OF CALIFORNIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPOMATTOX COUNTY 

John R. Snoddy, Jr., Judge 

 These four consolidated appeals arise from two so-called 

"drive-by shootings" involving the operation of motor vehicles. 

One incident occurred in the District of Columbia and the other 

in the Commonwealth in Prince Edward County. 

 Each case presents a question of motor vehicle insurance 

coverage. The dispositive issue in each is whether an 

intentional shooting by a person occupying an uninsured vehicle 
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constitutes "use" of the vehicle for purposes of uninsured 

motorist coverage. In one of the appeals, North Carolina law 

applies; in the other three, Virginia law is applicable. 

The Lexie Incident

 In November 1991, Patricia Dian Bigby Lexie was fatally 

injured in the District of Columbia in an unprovoked shooting by 

an occupant of an uninsured motor vehicle. At the time, she was 

a passenger in a vehicle operated on Interstate 295 by her 

husband, Freddie B. Lexie, Jr., who was also injured in the 

incident. The Lexies resided in the City of Alexandria; Mrs. 

Lexie maintained a separate residence in North Carolina. 

 The vehicle operated by Lexie was insured by an automobile 

liability policy containing uninsured motorist coverage issued in 

Virginia by appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Company. At the time of the incident, another automobile 

liability policy with uninsured motorist coverage issued in North 

Carolina by appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance Company to Mrs. 

Lexie was in effect. As pertinent to the issue to be decided in 

these appeals, the respective policies obligated the insurer to 

pay all sums the insured was legally entitled to recover as 

damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle 

arising "out of the ownership, maintenance or use of" the 

uninsured motor vehicle. 

 Subsequently, appellant Lexie, individually and as executor 

of his wife's estate (collectively, Lexie), made demand upon the 
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insurers for payment of benefits under the respective policies. 

He also filed an action for damages in federal court against the 

owner and operator of the vehicle in which the gunman was riding. 

 Later, the insurers separately filed the present actions 

seeking declaratory judgments that Lexie is not entitled to 

coverage under the respective policies. The parties agreed there 

were no material facts in dispute, and the insurers sought pretrial summary judgment. 

 The trial court, upon consideration of the pleadings and 

argument of counsel, ruled in favor of State Farm, applying 

Virginia law, and ruled in favor of Liberty Mutual, applying 

North Carolina law. 

 Lexie appeals the November 1994 State Farm judgment 

individually and as executor. He appeals the December 1994 

Liberty Mutual judgment in his representative capacity only. 

This dichotomy is irrelevant, however, because of the dispositive 

issue in the appeals. 

The Skates and Goode Incident

 In August 1991, appellant Brian M. Skates was operating a 

motor vehicle in Prince Edward County. Appellant Arnita M. Goode 

was among the passengers in the vehicle, which was owned by her 

mother. The group had been to a night club in Farmville where 

one Darrell Lee had been involved in an altercation with Skates. 

 Later, Lee was riding in an uninsured motor vehicle driven by 

another person pursuing the Goode vehicle. As the vehicles were 
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abreast, Lee leaned from an open window and shot both Skates and 

Goode, injuring them. 

 At the time, the Goode vehicle was insured by an automobile 

liability policy containing uninsured motorist coverage issued in 

Virginia by appellee Colonial Insurance Company of California. 

As pertinent to the issue to be decided in these appeals, the 

policy obligated the insurer to pay Skates and Goode all sums 

they were legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner 

or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle "arising out of the 

ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor vehicle." 

 Subsequently, the insurer denied uninsured motorist claims 

submitted by Skates and Goode. They sought payment for their 

injuries based upon the conduct of the operator of the vehicle in 

which the assailant was riding. Later, the insurer filed the 

present action against Skates and Goode seeking a declaratory 

judgment that the claimants are not entitled to coverage under 

the policy. 

 The trial court granted the insurer's pre-trial motion for 

summary judgment, declaring inter alia that the injuries did not 

arise out of the "use" of the uninsured motor vehicle. We 

awarded Skates and Goode separate appeals from the March 1995 

judgment order. 

 First, we shall address the Lexie-Liberty Mutual appeal. 

Generally, the nature, validity, and interpretation of automobile 

insurance policies, like other contracts, are governed by the law 
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of the place where made. Woodson v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 211 

Va. 423, 426, 177 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1970); Lackey v. Virginia Sur. 

Co., 209 Va. 713, 715, 167 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1969). The Liberty 

Mutual policy was made in North Carolina, issued and delivered 

there to Mrs. Lexie covering a vehicle principally garaged in 

North Carolina. Thus, the trial court properly applied North 

Carolina law, which we shall examine to determine whether the 

court correctly ruled "that the firing of gunshots from one 

vehicle into another does not arise out of the . . . use of the 

vehicle." 

 The law of North Carolina is consistent with the law of 

Virginia on this subject. In North Carolina, coverage for 

injuries arising from the "use" of a motor vehicle requires "a 

causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury." 

Scales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 460 S.E.2d 201, 203 

(N.C. App. 1995). "This connection is shown if the injury is the 

natural and reasonable consequence of the vehicle's use." Id. 

However, there is no coverage if the injury results from 

something wholly disassociated from, independent of, and remote 

from the vehicle's normal employment. Id. "Clearly, an 

automobile chase with guns blazing is not a regular and normal 

use of a vehicle." Id. 

 In sum, North Carolina law provides that injuries and death 

resulting from gunshots fired from a moving automobile do not 

constitute an accident arising from the "use" of such vehicle, 
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Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Knight, 237 S.E.2d 341, 344 

(N.C. App.), disc. review denied, 239 S.E.2d 263 (N.C. 1977), and 

the trial court in the present case correctly so ruled. 

 Parenthetically, it should be noted that Lexie dwells on the 

effect upon the contract issues in this appeal of the default 

judgment he obtained against the operator of the assailant's 

vehicle in the federal tort action, to which Liberty Mutual was 

not a party. The findings of the federal court were not before 

the trial court when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment, 

and there was no motion filed by Lexie in the trial court based 

on the preclusive effect, if any, of the federal judgment. Thus, 

we will not entertain these questions for the first time on 

appeal. Rule 5:25.*

 Next, we shall turn to the remaining three appeals, applying 

Virginia law. These cases are controlled by our recent decision 

in Travelers Insurance Co. v. LaClair, 250 Va. 368, 463 S.E.2d 

461 (1995). There, the issue was precisely the same as in the 

present cases. 

 In LaClair, a deputy sheriff was injured, while standing on 

a public highway, by gunshots intentionally fired by the operator 

of an uninsured motor vehicle, who had stopped in front of the 

officer's police car. The assailant, partially inside his car at 

the time, fired as the officer approached him. 

 

 *Additionally, there is no merit to Lexie's contention that 

he is entitled to the benefit of the minimum coverage 

requirements of the District of Columbia insurance laws. 
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 Reversing a trial court's judgment in favor of the officer, 

we analyzed our recent insurance coverage cases to address the 

question whether the injury arose from the "use" of the uninsured 

motor vehicle. We noted "certain basic concepts" that are 

uniformly applied to the question, including the rule that 

consideration must be given to the intention of the parties to 

the insurance contract in determining the scope of the coverage 

afforded. Id. at 371, 463 S.E.2d at 463. Importantly, we 

emphasized that there must be a causal relationship between the 

incident and the employment of the motor vehicle as a vehicle. 

Id. at 372, 463 S.E.2d at 463. 

 In LaClair, we held that the employment of the assailant's 

vehicle did not amount to "use" of that vehicle within the 

meaning of the policy provisions at issue. We said that even 

though the assailant may have utilized the vehicle to lure the 

officer into stopping behind him, even though the assailant was 

partially inside the car when firing the shots, even though the 

assailant employed the car as a shield, even though the vehicle 

was employed to facilitate the act producing the injury, and even 

though the assailant's vehicle may have been an accessory to the 

shooting, none of those acts or circumstances involved the use of 

the assailant's vehicle as a vehicle. 

 Thus, we concluded that the "requisite causal relationship 

between the incident and employment of the automobile as a 

vehicle does not exist." Id. at 373, 463 S.E.2d at 464. See
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United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Parker, 250 Va. 374, 377-78, 463 

S.E.2d 464, 466-67 (1995) (applying the same test in construing 

the "ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle" language 

of Code § 38.2-2206, the uninsured motorist statute). 

 Finally, in LaClair, we observed that "the natural and 

ordinary meaning of `use' of a private, passenger motor vehicle 

does not contemplate its utilization as a mobile or stationary 

pillbox or fortress, or as a shield, or as an outpost from which 

an assailant may inflict intentional injury with a firearm." 

LaClair, 250 Va. at 373, 463 S.E.2d at 464. 

 The foregoing statements from LaClair apply with equal force 

to these appeals controlled by Virginia law. The several 

claimants seek to distinguish the present cases from LaClair upon 

the basis that in these cases the vehicles were moving at the 

time of the assaults and passengers in the uninsured vehicles, 

not the operators, were the assailants. 

 These are distinctions without any difference, given the 

facts of these particular cases. The principal focus is upon the 

manner in which the vehicle, whether moving or stationary, is 

being employed, not upon the activity or role of any assailant 

who may be in, upon, or around the uninsured vehicle. 

 Consequently, the respective trial courts correctly ruled 

that the intentional shootings by persons occupying the uninsured 

vehicles did not constitute "use" of the vehicles for purposes of 

uninsured motorist coverage, and the judgments below in favor of 
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the respective insurers will be 

Affirmed.