alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 12.1
 ALLIED WASTE INDUSTRIES, INC.
RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS
(in thousands)
 For the Year Ended December 31,2005
    
    
    2004
    
    
    2003
    
    
    2002
    
    
    2001Fixed Charges:Interest expenses
    
    $
    528,409
    
    
    $
    605,138
    
    
    $
    728,218
    
    
    $
    841,896
    
    
    $
    844,020Interest capitalized
    
    
    14,497
    
    
    
    12,958
    
    
    
    15,746
    
    
    
    20,622
    
    
    
    45,693Total interest
    
    
    542,906
    
    
    
    618,096
    
    
    
    743,964
    
    
    
    862,518
    
    
    
    889,713Interest component of rent expense
    
    
    6,360
    
    
    
    6,982
    
    
    
    8,169
    
    
    
    8,552
    
    
    
    7,917Non-cash conversion of Series A preferred stock
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    893,092
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    Dividend expense
    
    
    96,118
    
    
    
    48,458
    
    
    
    172,047
    
    
    
    142,888
    
    
    
    445,195Total fixed charges
    
    $
    645,384
    
    
    $
    673,536
    
    
    $
    1,817,272
    
    
    $
    1,013,958
    
    
    $
    1,342,825Earnings:Income from continuing operations
before income taxes
    
    $
    327,485
    
    
    $
    127,490
    
    
    $
    201,862
    
    
    $
    365,837
    
    
    $
    197,965Plus: fixed charges
    
    
    645,384
    
    
    
    673,536
    
    
    
    924,180
    
    
    
    1,013,958
    
    
    
    1,342,825Less: interest capitalized
    
    
    (14,497
    )
    
    
    (12,958
    )
    
    
    (15,746
    )
    
    
    (20,622
    )
    
    
    (45,693
    )Less: dividend expense
    
    
    (96,118
    )
    
    
    (48,458
    )
    
    
    (172,047
    )
    
    
    (142,888
    )
    
    
    (445,195
    )Total earnings
    
    $
    862,254
    
    
    $
    739,610
    
    
    $
    938,249
    
    
    $
    1,216,285
    
    
    $
    1,049,902Ratio of earnings to fixed charges and
preferred stock dividends (A)
    
    
    1.3
    
    
    
    1.1
    
    
    
    *
    
    
    
    1.2
    
    
    
    *Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
    
    
    1.6
    
    
    
    1.2
    
    
    
    1.2
    
    
    
    1.4
    
    
    
    1.2
 
 *
    
    Earnings were insufficient to cover fixed charges, preferred stock dividends and non-cash conversion of Series A preferred stock by $879.0 million and
$292.9 million in 2003 and 2001, respectively.(A)
    
    Dividend expense is grossed up for taxes based on the Companys effective tax rate. During 2001, the Companys effective tax rate was 83.6%, which deviates from the statutory
tax rate primarily due to non-deductible portion of goodwill amortization. Effective January 1, 2002, in accordance with SFAS 142, goodwill is no longer amortized. If goodwill
amortization had not been recorded,  earnings would have been insufficient to cover fixed charges and preferred stock dividends by $66.2 million in 2001.
From: Cogliano, Gerain
To: "Jones, Danielle"
Cc: Farber, Glenn ; Jennings, Kim ; Prins, Christopher
Bcc: Hoffman, Wendy Subject: EO 12866 RMP NPRM: SBA concern--3 sentences for a potential preamble insert
Date: Monday, February 22, 2016 10:29:00 AM Importance: High



### For our discussion at 10:30 today, see the red text suggestion to address SBA’s concern.

Proposed §§ 68.59(c)(2) and 68.80(c)(2), if finalized, would include requirements for the retention of reports and records by the third-party auditors. Proposed §§ 68.59(c)(3) and 68.80(c)(3), if finalized, would require the audit report to be submitted to the implementing agency at the same time, or before, it is provided it to the owner or operator. Finally, EPA is proposing in §§ 68.59(c)(4) and 68.80(c)(4) that the audit report and related records cannot be claimed as attorney-client communications or as attorney work products even if the auditors are themselves, or are managed by or report to, attorneys. With respect to the attorney work product privilege, the audit report and related records are produced to document compliance rather than in anticipation of litigation, just like a monitoring report required by an air emission rule would not be produced in anticipation of litigation. With respect to the attorney-client communication privilege, the third party auditor is arms-length and independent of the stationary source being audited. The auditor lacks an attorneyclient relationship with counsel for the audited entity. EPA seeks comment on these proposedrequirements including any legal concerns that may result from the provision that limits attorneyrelated privileges.
# Europeiska unionens C 123A/16 a

| | ISSN 1977-1061 |
| --- | --- |
| Europeiska unionens
  officiella tidning | C 123A |
| | |
| Svensk utgåva | Meddelanden och upplysningar | 63 årgången16 april 2020 |

ISSN 1977-1061

Europeiska unionens

officiella tidning

C 123A

Svensk utgåva

Meddelanden och upplysningar

63 årgången16 april 2020

---

| Innehållsförteckning | Sida |
| --- | --- |
| | Rättelser |
| 2020/C 123 A/01 | Rättelse till meddelande om allmänna uttagningsprov – Epso/AD/375/20 – Danskspråkiga (DA) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/376/20 – Grekiskspråkiga (EL) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/377/20 – Franskspråkiga (FR) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/378/20 – Kroatiskspråkiga (HR) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/379/20 – Polskspråkiga (PL) juristlingvister (AD 7) ( EUT C 72 A, 5.3.2020 ) | 1 |

Innehållsförteckning

Sida

Rättelser

2020/C 123 A/01

Rättelse till meddelande om allmänna uttagningsprov – Epso/AD/375/20 – Danskspråkiga (DA) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/376/20 – Grekiskspråkiga (EL) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/377/20 – Franskspråkiga (FR) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/378/20 – Kroatiskspråkiga (HR) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/379/20 – Polskspråkiga (PL) juristlingvister (AD 7) ( EUT C 72 A, 5.3.2020 )

( EUT C 72 A, 5.3.2020 )

1

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| SV | |
| --- | --- |

SV

---

Rättelser

| 16.4.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | CA 123/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.4.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

CA 123/1

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Rättelse till meddelande om allmänna uttagningsprov – Epso/AD/375/20 – Danskspråkiga (DA) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/376/20 – Grekiskspråkiga (EL) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/377/20 – Franskspråkiga (FR) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/378/20 – Kroatiskspråkiga (HR) juristlingvister (AD 7) – Epso/AD/379/20 – Polskspråkiga (PL) juristlingvister (AD 7)

(
  Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 72 A av den 5 mars 2020
  )

(2020/C 123 A/01)

Sidan 1

I stället för:

”Sista ansökningsdag: den 7 april 2020 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid).”

ska det stå:

ska det stå:

”Sista ansökningsdag: den 5 maj 2020 kl. 12.00 (lokal tid Bryssel).”

Sidan 6

I stället för:

I stället för:

”Gör en webbansökan via Epsos webbplats http://jobs.eu-careers.eu senast

den 7 april 2020 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid).”

ska det stå:

ska det stå:

”Gör en webbansökan via Epsos webbplats http://jobs.eu-careers.eu senast

den 5 maj 2020 kl. 12.00 (lokal tid Bryssel).”

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#### STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Harleston LINDEN, Jr., James Harleston Linden, Sr., and Marvin Victor Wardle, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 17761.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 23, 1983.

Robert Van Sciver, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Earl Dor-ius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant was charged with two counts of arson of a house, in violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-102(1). Two others were named as codefendants: James Harleston Linden, Jr., defendant’s son, and Martin Victor Wardle, defendant’s nephew by marriage. At a jury trial, defendant and his son were found guilty of both counts and Wardle was found not guilty. Defendant brings a separate appeal from that of his son.1

Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. In order to upset a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, a defendant must show that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt.2

Found at the scene of the fire were two black plastic gas cans, later traced as items sold by Checker Auto Parts. Kathy Lynn Ott testified that she worked at a nearby Checker and that on about the day of the fire she remembered selling two black plastic cans to two men, one younger and the other older. Ott later identified the younger man as codefendant Wardle. The state intimates that although not identified, the older man was defendant. Ott described the older man as being 5'8" tall, 160 to 180 pounds, with dark hair, in his late thirties. Defendant was 49 years old at the time, but otherwise roughly matched Ott’s description.

There was considerable circumstantial evidence adduced at trial. Although circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt,3 the circumstantial evidence in this case relates not to the burning of the house, but to the burning of a neighboring beauty salon.4 Since neither defendant nor anyone else was charged with arson in that separate incident, the circumstantial evidence is of minimal value.5

We do not believe that sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to tie this defendant to the crime. The guilt of defendant’s son cannot be attributed to the de*876fendant and Ott’s testimony is simply too equivocal to support the conviction. Having concluded that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, we need not address other points raised by defendant on appeal.

Reversed.

1

. For the companion case, see *State v. Linden, Jr.,*Utah, 657 P.2d 1364 (1983).

2

. See *State v. Howell,*Utah, 649 P.2d 91 (1982), and cases cited therein.

3

. *State*v. *Clayton,*Utah, 646 P.2d 723 (1982).

4

. The state contends that this evidence tends to show a modus operandi, to wit, recovery of insurance proceeds.

5

.We do not rule that it constituted an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit evidence as to the burning of the salon. However, whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect is certainly open to question. See Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 9, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-11183

Summary Calendar

BRUCE WAYNE HOUSER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:03-CV-239-R

--------------------

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bruce Wayne Houser, Texas prisoner 460890, filed the instant

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition to challenge a prison disciplinary

conviction. The district court dismissed the petition pursuant

to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) for want of prosecution. Houser now

appeals that decision in accordance with this court’s grant of a

certificate of appealability on the issue whether the district

court abused its discretion in dismissing his § 2254 petition. 

Houser contends that he did his best to comply with the district
No. 04-11183

-2-

court’s order directing him to fill out a questionnaire and that

the district court erred in dismissing his suit. 

We review the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(b)

for abuse of discretion. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,

633 (1962); McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 789-90 (5th Cir.

1988). When reviewing a dismissal with prejudice under Rule

41(b), we will find an abuse of discretion unless there is a

clear record of delay or “contumacious” conduct by the plaintiff

and the district court has expressly determined that lesser

sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution, or the record

shows that the district court employed lesser sanctions that

proved to be futile. Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188,

1191 (5th Cir. 1992). 

The district court abused its discretion in dismissing

Houser’s suit. There is no clear record of delay or contumacious

conduct in this case. See Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191 n.6; cf.

Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980);

see also Morris v. Ocean Systems, Inc., 730 F.2d 248, 252 (5th

Cir. 1984). The district court also erred by not considering

lesser sanctions before dismissing Houser’s suit. See Berry, 975

F.2d at 1191. Consequently, the judgment of the district court

is VACATED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
1 ... S eeTe x. R. App . P. 47. 4. 

## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICTOFTEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 2 - 08 - 32 9- CV BOB A ND J AN E DU RHA M APPE L L AN TS V . STEV E AN D CA TH Y S TRO U D A PPELL EES

----- ----- FR O M CO UN TY CO URT AT LAW OF CO O KE COU NTY

----- ----- 

### M E M ORANDU M OP I NI ON 1 

### AND J UDGME NT

----- ----- W e h ave co ns i der ed “App e l l ant s’ M ot i on To Di sm i ssA ppe al . ” I ti s t he cou rt ’ s opi ni o n t hatt he m ot i on s houl d be gr ant ed; t her ef or e, w e d i sm i ss t he a p p e a l . S eeT e x . R . A p p . P . 4 2 .1 (a )(1 ), 4 3 .2 (f). C os t s oft he app ea l s hal l be pa i d bya ppe l l ant s, f orw hi ch l etex ec ut i on i s s u e . S ee Tex. R. A pp. P. 43. 4.
P E R CU R I AM PA N EL: GA RD N ER, D A U PH I N O T, an d M EI ER, JJ. DEL I VERE D: J a nu a r y 8, 2009
EXHIBIT 32.1



CORD BLOOD AMERICA, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of Cord Blood America, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Matthew L. Schissler, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer), of the Company certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      |                                                                                                                  
|--------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                      |                                                                                                                  
|Date:    May 21, 2006 | By: /s/Matthew L. Schissler                                                                                      
|                      | Matthew L. Schissler,                                                                                            
|                      | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Exhibit 32.2





SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO\


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the annual report of ECCO Energy Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") I, N. Wilson Thomas, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: April 15, 2010








/s/ N. Wilson ThomasN. Wilson Thomas

Chief Financial Officer
1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

THAD WHITE,

Plaintiff and Appell ant

,

v.

MONTANA BOARD OF CRIME CONTROL,

Respondent and Appellee,
and

PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER
STANDARDS AND TRAINING COUNCIL,

Intervenor. No. DA

- 2 2

- 0 748

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO WITHDRAW

H aving considered the Motion to Withdraw as counsel for Appellant Thad

White , and good cause under Rule s of Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(5)

, (6) , and

(7) appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Jason T. Holden, Katie R. Ranta,

and Faure Holden Attorneys at Law, P.C. are withdraw n as attorneys of record for

Appellant Thad White

.

ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED AND DATED BELOW

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 10 2023

04/10/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0748
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MELVIN IRVIN DAVIS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 152 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 8th day of October, 2019

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL MASTERSON; BIJOU 

MASTERSON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP., 

formerly known as THE BANK OF NEW 

YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR CWALT, INC., 

ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2007-19, 

MORTGAGE PASS THROUGH 

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-19; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55277 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-08741-DDP-AJW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 8, 2017**

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. 

Daniel Masterson and Bijou Masterson appeal pro se from the district 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-55277

court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law claims. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have an independent duty to 

determine whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Wash. Envtl. 

Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any 

basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 

1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Dismissal of the Mastersons’ action was proper because the district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the Mastersons failed to allege an injury in 

fact to establish Article III standing. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 

Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (the alleged injury must be

“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” to establish Article III 

standing); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (elements 

of Article III standing). Because a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

should be without prejudice, see Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 

1036 (9th Cir. 2004), we vacate the judgment in part and remand for the district 

court to dismiss the Mastersons’ action without prejudice. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 3, 2007 Decided November 6, 2007 Before Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY , Circuit Judge Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge No. 06-4263 CHASE MARCONI, Plaintiff-Appellant ,

v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Defendant-Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division No. 05 C 3136 Michael T. Mason, Magistrate Judge

. O R D E R Chase Marconi applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), alleging that he suffers from a mental impairment that became disabling before June 30, 2002, the date his disability insurance lapsed. The issue on appeal is whether the Social Security Administration applied the law correctly and relied on substantial evidence in concluding that Marconi was not disabled as of the date he was last insured. Because the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) correctly applied the law in finding that Marconi did not have a severe impairment and substantial evidence supports this finding, we affirm. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
**EXHIBIT32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONSPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of U.S. Premium Beef, LLC (the Company) onForm 10-Q for the period ended November 25, 2006 as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Steven D. Hunt,Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

     (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

     (2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|     |  |                                         |
|-----|--|-----------------------------------------|
| By: |  | /s/ Steven D. Hunt                      |
|     |  | Steven D. Hunt*Chief Executive Officer* |

Date: January 5, 2007 

 

 

 

 

 

----
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Ming Hsieh, President and Chief Executive Officer of
Cogent, Inc. (the Registrant), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

(1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the Report),
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

This certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Dated: May 9, 2007



|                                      |  | 
|------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ MING HSIEH                        |  | 
|Ming Hsieh                            |  | 
|President and Chief Executive Officer |  | 
|(Principal Executive Officer)         |  |