NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 07a0456n.06 Filed: June 28, 2007 No. 05-4653 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. DO NA Z E G AI

NE S, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO
OPI NI ON

Before: G ILMAN, G IBBO NS, and GR IF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges . RONALD LEE GILMAN, Cir cuit Judge
. I n 2002, a jury convicted Donaze Gaines on one count of possession wit h intent to distribute 9.55 g rams of cra ck cocaine and on one count of being
a fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm . T he dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc e d him to 327 mon ths of imp ri so nme nt. Gaines’ s conviction was a ffirme d on appea l, but his case was re manded f or re sentenc ing in lig ht of United St ates v. Book

er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The district cour t resente nced G aines to 300 months of imprisonment. He ha s appea led once ag ain. For the re asons discussed be low, we AF F IRM Gaines’ s sentence . I. BACKG ROUNDNo. 05-4653

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- 2 - Th e fa c ts of

t h i s c a s e ar e f

u l l y s e tf o rt hi nt h i s c o u rt ’ s d i s p o s i t i o no f G a i n e s ’ s f

i r s ta p p e a l, U n ite d States v. Gaines , 1 0 5 F
. A p p ’ x 6 8 2 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 4 ) , an d

w il l n o t b e r e p e a te d

h e r e . We aff irmed both his conviction and his sentenc e. The Supreme Court g rante d Gaines’ s petition for a writ of ce rtiorar i and re manded the c ase t o u s for reconsider ation in light of its holding in United States v. Booke r , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Gaines v. United States , 543 U.S. 1114 (2005). We in turn
rema nded the c ase to the district c ourt “for re- sentenc ing in c onformity with Booke r .” Upo n re m and, Gaines once ag ain cha lleng ed the district cour t’s finding s that (1) he was subject to an in cr ease d mandatory -minimum sentence unde r the Ar med Care er Criminal Ac t (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1), a nd (2) he fit the classification of a car eer offe nder unde r U.S.S.G. § 4 B 1. 1. At

the re se nte nc inghear in g, the dis tr ic t c ou rt no te d th at it

ha d a lr e a dy

ru le d o n th os e
argume nts a t Ga ine s’ s fi rs t se nte nc ing he ari ng , that tho se iss ue s we re no t r a ise d in his pr ior a pp e a l, and that they wer e not available to be reopene d. The dist rict court further stated that it would have
rea ffirme d its earlier

ruling s on those issues in any ev en t . Du ring the re sentenc ing he aring , the g o v e r n me n t r e a d

into th e r e c o r d

th e in d ic tm e n ts f

o r G a in e s ’ s p r io r

b u r g la r y c r im e s , w h ic hserve d
a s th e p r e d ic a te o f

f e n s e s f o r h is c la s s if

ic a ti o n s a s b o th

anar me d c ar e e r c r im in a l a

n d a car eer offe nder. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

the n c on sid e re d th e re ma ini ngse nte nc ingiss ue s r a ise d by Ga ine s, a s w e ll as the a pplication of the statutory sentenc ing fac tors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It addre ssed the disparity

in the Gu i delines betwe en cr ack c ocaine and powde r coc aine, c oncluding that the dis pa ri ty did no t dri ve th e re su lt i n G a ine s’ s c a se . T his c on c lus ion wa s b a se d o n th e fa c t th a t hi s status a s an a

rm e d c are e r c ri min a l, a s w e ll a s h is c la ssi fi c a tio n a s a c are e r of fe nd e r, c a us e d h isNo. 05-4653

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- 3 - G u id e li n e s r an g e to b e h ig h e r th anth e r an g e f

o r th e c r a c k c o c aine of

f e n s e it s e lf

. T h e c o u rt n e xt addre ssed Gaine s’s argument that his prior convictions took pla ce some time ag o. I t then considere d Gaines’ s traumatic c hildhood and his claims of reha bilitation. Finally , the cour t addre ssed Gaine s’s argument that his cooper ation with fede ral ag ents in an ongoing drug investigation called Ope ration Rol lin g Thun de r s ho uld

be take n into a c c ount. The d is tr ic t c o u rt r

u le d th a t t h e r e w a s n o b a s is f

o r a d o w n w ar d

d e p artu r e u n d e r U
. S.S.G. § 5K1.1 because the g overnme nt had not fil ed the r equire d motion in s upport of a de parture based on Gaines’ s cooper ation. I nstead, the court awa rded c redit for

Gaines’ s cooper ation outside of the Gu ide lin e s and

ult imate ly

imp os e d a

ne w s e nte nc e of

30 0 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt. Gaines has appea led once ag ain, contendingthat (1) the district c ourt err ed whe n it applied the law- of-the- ca s e d o ct ri ne to his rese ntencing , (2) he was de nied due pr ocess whe n the district
c ourt fo un d th a t he wa s b oth

an a rm e d c are e r c ri min a l and a c are e r of fe nd e r, (3 ) t

he dis tr ic t c ourt , prior to Gaine s’s initial conviction, should have gra nted hi s motion to suppress on the basis t hat the
sear ch wa rra nt was def

ective, a nd (4) he was de nied due pr ocess be cause of an a lleg ed depr ivation of his rig ht to a speedy

trial.
II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of review W e re v i ew t h e district cour t’s decision to apply

the law- of-the- case doctrine f or abuse of discretion. United States v. Todd , 9 2 0 F. 2 d 3 9 9 , 4 0 3 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 0 ). T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa c t with re sp e c t to th e Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s, on the oth e r h and , w ill no t be re ve rs e d b y us un le ssNo. 05-4653

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- 4 - they are clea rly err oneous. United States v. Dav idson , 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir. 2005). B ut we revie w de novo mixed questions of law and fa ct. Id . L ikewise, a co n s t i tutional challeng e to a sentenc e is revie wed de novo. United States v. Copeland , 321 F.3d 582, 601 ( 6th Cir. 2003). B. Law- of- th e -c as e doc tr ine The law -of- the-c ase doc trine provides that, absent extraordinar y circ umstances, we will not
rec onsider determinations made by us at a pr ior stag e of the same litigation. United States v. Tocco , 306 F.3d 279, 288 (6th Cir. 2002). This doctrine does not nec essar ily deprive a cour

t of discre tion to revisit an issue, so long as the c ase r emains within its jurisdi ction. Todd , 920 F.2d at 403. The Supreme Court has instru ct ed , h o we v er, that the doctrine should be a pplied in the absenc e of

“ e xtra or din ary

c ir c ums tanc e s su c h a s w he re the ini tia l de c isi on wa s c le arl y

e rr on e ou s and

wo uld work a manifest injustice.” Chr ist ian so n v . Col t In du s. Op e ra tin g Co rp ., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (citation and quotation marks omitted). I n his brief, Ga ines argues that we should make an e x ception to this doctrine bec ause “ the statuto ry l aw h adb ee nd ec l ar edu n co n s t i tu t i o n al ” b y i n t erv en i n g S u

p re m e C o u rt d ec i s i o n s . He re l i es
on Am e n v . Ci ty

of D e ar bo rn , 718 F.2d 78 9 , 7 9 3 -9 4 (6th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that “the doctrine must y ield to an interve ning c hang e of c ontrolling lawbetwee n the date of the first ruling
and the re tr ia l.” Al tho ug h Ga ine s do e s no t sp e c if y the statut or

y law at is su e , w e pr e sume tha t he is ref err ing to the Sente ncing Guidelines, which the Supreme Court in Booke r held ar e no long er mandatory
. 543 U.S. a

t 232- 33. We f

ind nothingin the Booke r ho ldi ng , h ow e ve r, no r a ny thi ngin its wake, that c onstitut es a “cha ng e in c ontrolling law” war ranting an exception to the law- of-thec a se do c tr ine wi th r e sp e c t to Ga ine s’ s F ourt h A me ndme nt o r s pe e dy -t ri a l c la ims
.No. 05-4653

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- 5 - Gaines r aised both the F ourth Amendment a nd the speedy -trial claims in his first appea l, and this court specific ally

held that his challeng es had no me rit. See G aines , 105 F. App’ x at 693-98. Mo re ov e r, he pr e se nts ne ith e r n e w c on tr oll inglaw n or e xtra or din ary

c ir c ums tances th at w ou ld
c omp e l us to re vis it the se argume nts . We the re fo re c on c lud e that a pp lic a tio n of

the law- of

-t he -c a se doctrine w as appr opriate in the pr esent c ase. C. Guidelines-based chall enges to t he sentence Gaines nex t argue s th a t he do e s n ot q ua lif y a s an a rm e d c are e r c ri min a l un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 924(e) or as a car eer offe nder under U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.1. Although G aines ra ised this argument at his init ial sentenc ing, he failed to pursue it on his first appea l. See G aines , 105 F. App’ x at 685. The district court conc luded at Ga ines’s re sentenc ing he aringthat he had waived a ny Guidelines-r elated arguments due to his failure to pr eviously raise the m. Gaines a

rgues on t his appea l that the waiver doctrine is inapplica

ble bec ause Bo ok

e r and Shepard v. U

nited States , 544 U.S. 13 (2005), c hang ed the law, thus allowinghim to reasser t all Guidelines-re lated cha lleng es. We find no nee d to resolve thi s p ro c e dura l qu e sti on , h ow e ve r, be c a us e we c on c lud e that Ga ine s’ s argume nts fa il on the ir me ri ts. First, Gaines contends that, under Sh e pa rd , his prior burg lary

convictions do not qualify as p r e d i c a t e o f

f e n s e s f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o nu n d e r t h e A C C A , 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 9 2 4 ( e )
. In Sh e pa rd , th e Sup re me Court a dd re sse d th e na

rr owiss ue of

wh e the r a

c ourt a pp lyingthe AC CA sentenc ing e nhance ment could look to police repor ts or complaint applications to deter mine whether
a pr ior g uil ty ple a su pp or te d a c on victio n f

or g e ne ri c burg lary . 5 44 U. S. at 17 . T his iss ue aro se beca use Massac husetts has two burg lary statutes, one of which expands the traditional def inition ofNo. 05-4653

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- 6 - burg lary that once a

pplied only

to buildings to cover

brea k-ins of boats and c ars a s well. Id . at 16-17. Shepard ha d previously

pled guilty

to offense s under this expanded statute. The Supreme Court he ld that a district court c ould not consider police r eports or c omplaint applications when making its de termination of whether a guilty plea to burg lary

under the broade r statute admitted the ele ments of g ener ic burg lary nece ssary

to qualify

as a pr edicate offe nse under the ACCA. Id . at 26. Instead, the district must look only to the char g ing doc ument, the terms of the ple a a g re e me nt, the tr ans c ri pt o f t he ple a c oll oq

uy be tw e e n th e jud g e and

the de fe nd ant, or

“ to s ome compar able r ecor d of this information” in establishing the fac tual basis of t he predicate offe nse. Id
. Gaines a rg ues that the Ohio burg lary statute is identical to the Massac husetts statute that was at issue in Sh e pa rd in t hat it e xpand s th e de fi nit ion

of burg lary to a pp ly to b oats a

nd c ars , a nd the re fo re his prior guilty

pleas c annot constitute predic ate of fense s under the A CCA. Gaines’ s argument fails bec ause, a s stated above , a sentencing court may look to the char g ing docum en t when de termining whether prior convic tions qualify as pre dicate of

fense s under the ACCA. Id . at 26. At Gaine s’s rese ntencing , the go vernme nt rea d the indictments in the prior burg lary case s into the recor d. These indictments c harg ed Ga ines with enteringthe “ha bitation” of the victims. This information is w hat led the district c ourt to c onclude that Gaines’ s prior burg lary convicti o n s q u alified a s predicate offe nses for pur poses of the A CCA. Moreover , the cour t
co n cl u d ed that Gaines w ould qualify under the ACCA on the basis of his other violent fe lony convictions for r obbery , felonious assault, and involuntar y manslaug hter even without consideration of the burg lary

of fe ns e s.No. 05-4653

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- 7 - Gaines further argues that, as a r esult of Booke r , the fi nd ing that he is a care e r o ff e nd e r m us t be mad e b y a j u ry

rathe r than the district c ourt. A def endant may

be desig nated a

car eer offe nder under the Guidelines if (1) he was at least 18 y ear s old at the time of the commission of the instant offe nse of c onviction, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a fe lony

that is either a violent or controlled-substanc e off

ense, a nd (3) the de fenda

nt has at lea st two prior felony convictions of either
a cr ime of violence or a c ontrolled-substance offe nse. U .S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The two pr ior felony convicti o n s m u st be “unre lated” unde r the Guide lines in order to qua lify . U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c ). Previous convictions are unrelated if they “we re for offe nses that wer e sepa rate d by an interve ning
arr est.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.3. Ga ines argues that his three 1988 convictions should have be en counted a s only

one convic tion because they wer e alleg edly

all part of the same pla

n or sche me. The Presentenc e Report, howeve r, confirms that all three of these convictions wer e in fa ct sepa rate d by interveningarr ests. But Ga ines contends that a jury must determine whe ther these pri o r co n v i cti ons were part of the same plan or scheme under the Supreme Court’s re asoning in Booke r , Sh e pa rd , and Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). This ar g ument fails bec ause Booke r does not confe r the rig ht to have the c are er- offe nder de termination submitted to a jury
. See U nited States v. Bradley , 400 F.3d 45 9, 46 2- 63 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) (“ F ro m Apprendito Blak e ly to Booke r , t h e [ S u p re me] Court has continued to except such fa ctfinding from the r equire ments of the Six th Amendment.”)
. Moreove r, in Un ite d S

tates v . A lfo rd , 4 36 F .3 d 6 77 , 6 80 -8 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) , this c ourt

he ld that the re latedness or separ atene ss of prior c onvictions under the Guide lines, like the question of whether the conviction wa s for a

crime of violence, is so intimately connec ted to the fa ct of a priorNo. 05-4653

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- 8 - conviction as to come within the “prior c onvictions” exception to Apprendi . I t fur the r he ld t hat “ thi s inquiry . . . does not perta in to the offense for which [t he def endant] was cha

rg ed,” but r ather

g oes to t h e q u es t i o n of re cidivism, which is properly a sente ncingconsideration. Id. a t 68 1. F or the se
re a so ns , w e c on c lud e that G a ine s’ s argume nt o n th is g ro un d is wi tho ut m e ri t. D. Reasonableness of the sente nce under Booker Gaines’ s ap p l i cable Guidelines ra ng e wa s from 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. The district court initially imposed a sentenc e of 327 months, at the top of the re commended Guidelines rang e. At the r esente ncing hear ing, the district court explicitl y considere d the following § 3553(a) fac tors: (1) the nature of the offe nse, i ncluding the disparity in sentencingrang es betwe en off enses involving cr ack c ocaine and those involving powder coca ine, (2) G aines’s his t ory of violence balanc ed ag ainst his c laims of childhood abuse, ( 3) his claims of re habilitation, (4) and his appa rent lack of remorse . Moreove r, the district cour t concluded that it could consider, as a re sult of Booke r , Gaines’ s less-than-f

ull c ooperation in the g overnme nt’s Oper ation Rolli ng Thunder inve stigation, even thoug h this im perf

ect c ooperation did not qu al i fy him for a downw ard de parture under the Guidelines. Takingall of these f actor s into a cc o u n t , t h e court im posed a ne w sentenc e of 300 months, which is be l o w Ga ines’s orig inal sentenc e and w ell within the rec ommended Guidelines rang e. Ga ine s of

fe rs no thi ng that wo uld re but the pr e sumpt ion of re a so na ble ne ss t hat w e a c c or d th is sentenc e. See R ita v. United States, — U.S. —, No. 06-5754, 2007 WL1772146, at *3 (June 21, 2007) (holdingthat “a court of a ppeals may

apply a pre sumption of reasona bleness to a district cour

t
se nte nc e that re fl e c ts a pr op e r ap pli c a tio n of the Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s” ); see also United States v

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- 9 - W illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 708 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (ac cordinga pre sumption of reasona bleness to a sentenc e imposed within the proper ly calc ulated Guidelines rang e). H e simply disag ree s with the
we ig ht t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

g ave to the a

bu se he e nd

ur e d a s a c hil d, a s w e ll a s th e larg e dis pa ri ty in sentence s involving cr ack c ocaine as opposed to thos e invol ving coca ine i n powder form. Given t h e cl ar ity

with which the district cour t expl ained how it bala

nced the se fa ctors ag ainst the other fac ts, we find no er

ror in t h e s en t en ce imposed. We ther efor e conc lude that the sente nce of 300 months’ imprisonment was rea sonable.
III . C ON CL USI ON For all of the re asons stated a bove, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt .