United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted October 20, 2011

Decided October 20, 2011

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 11‐1859

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL L. TRAPP,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 90‐cr‐200

Rudolph T. Randa,

Judge.

O R D E R

When Michael Trapp pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,

armed bank robbery, and attempted bank larceny, he resolved to start his life anew. But

while on supervised release, Trapp proved that old habits die hard when he robbed a car

rental dealership and fled the state. At his revocation hearing, Trapp did not contest any of

the charges but asked the court to impose his reimprisonment concurrently with his seven‐

year state sentence for armed robbery. The district court imposed the minimum 36 months’

imprisonment, but ran it consecutively to Trapp’s state‐court sentence. Trapp appeals, but

his attorney has determined that any appeal would be frivolous and moves to withdraw

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Trapp declined our invitation to respond to

his counsel’s motion. See Cir. R. 51(b). We limit our review to the potential issues identified

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 11‐1859 Page 2

in counsel’s facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973–74 (7th Cir.

2002).

Counsel first considers whether Trapp could challenge the revocation of his

supervised release. But Trapp has not indicated that he wants to challenge the revocation, so

counsel should have omitted this discussion. See United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390

(7th Cir. 2010).

Counsel next considers challenging Trapp’s reimprisonment term, but correctly

concludes such a challenge would be frivolous. The court followed the proper methodology

in deciding the length of imprisonment. See United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438–39 (7th

Cir. 2008). The court first assessed a guidelines range of 51‐63 months, driven primarily by

Trapp’s decades‐long history of violence (which equaled a criminal history category of VI),

his guilty plea to armed robbery (a Grade A violation of his release), and his guilty plea to

possession of a firearm after three convictions for violent felonies (a Class A felony). See

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The court next considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors,

particularly the need to protect the public in light of the violent nature of Trapp’s offenses

and his life‐long pattern of violent crime. At 57, Trapp was older than most violent

offenders, the court noted, and prison had not deterred him from his latest armed robbery.

The court considered Trapp’s mental illness and abandonment by his birth mother, but

found these could not excuse his continued violence. The court then sentenced Trapp to the

statutory minimum 36 months’ imprisonment, and we presume that a sentence within or

below a properly calculated guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Curtis, 645 F.3d

937, 943 (7th Cir. 2011). Counsel has not identified any argument to rebut that presumption,

nor have we.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.