Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 30, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00410-CV

EUGENE L. BUTLER, ROBERT E. CHAMBERLAIN, RONALD E. SMITH 

AND SHIP AND SAIL, INC., Appellants

V.

AMEGY BANK, N.A., SUCCESSOR TO MAXIMBANK, Appellee

On Appeal from the 125th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-62225

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellee Amegy Bank, N.A. sued appellants Ship and Sail, Inc. and 

individual guarantors—Eugene Butler, Robert Chamberlain, and Ronald Smith—

for breach of contract and attorney’s fees based on a loan agreement. Appellants 

contend the trial court reversibly erred by signing an agreed judgment without 

adequate time for appellants to respond under a local rule requiring motions to be 

set at least ten days after filing. Amegy contends this court lacks jurisdiction 
2

because appellants filed a late notice of appeal. We conclude that we have 

jurisdiction, but any error below is harmless. Thus, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In its live petition, Amegy sought recovery of damages for breach of 

contract and attorney’s fees under Section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code. The guarantors answered the suit. The record does not contain an 

answer for Ship and Sail.

On the day set for trial in January 2014, all parties except Ship and Sail 

appeared.1 The trial court orally rendered an agreed judgment based on a 

settlement between Amegy and the guarantors. According to the agreement, 

Amegy would recover $550,000 from the guarantors, plus interest and costs. The 

parties also agreed that the trial court would not sign a written judgment against the 

guarantors, however, until Amegy made a “demand” for the trial court to sign it. 

In the meantime, the guarantors would make payments to Amegy and attempt to 

sell off some stock to pay the judgment by December 31, 2014.2

In May 2014, the trial court signed a judgment titled “partial agreed 

judgment.” The judgment states that Ship and Sail “has not appeared or answered 

 

1 Appellee notes in its brief, “Ship and Sail did not appear and did not answer.”

2

The trial court’s oral rendition of judgment appears in part as follows: 

The Court therefore renders judgment based on the settlement agreement that has 

been arrived at between the parties and upon demand of counsel pursuant to the 

agreement of parties will memorialize the judgment at such time as it becomes 

necessary. . . . Just for purposes of the record, the case is called to trial. The 

Court has rendered judgment on the settlement of the parties. . . . The Court 

renders judgment on the settlement, awaits instructions from counsel pursuant to 

the agreements of the parties. . . . We will go ahead and put this down for entry of 

judgment deadline of one—the first week of January of 2015. I think that 

resolves everything, correct?

Attorneys for Amegy and several guarantors agreed the trial court’s judgment resolved 

everything.
3

herein and has wholly made default.”3 The judgment further states, “The parties 

announced that they had agreed to the entry of a judgment in favor of Amegy Bank 

N.A. against Ship and Sail, Inc.” for $550,000 in actual damages, pre- and postjudgment interest, and costs. The judgment concludes with a Mother Hubbard 

clause: “All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.” The document is signed 

by the attorney for Amegy and an attorney for the guarantors.4

On January 5, 2015, Amegy made its demand for the signed judgment 

against the guarantors by filing a “motion for entry of agreed judgment.” Amegy 

set the motion for submission on January 12. On January 7, the trial court signed 

an agreed judgment against the guarantors for $550,000 in actual damages and preand post-judgment interest. The judgment states that all costs are adjudged against 

Ship and Sail. The judgment concludes with a Mother Hubbard clause.

On January 12, appellants filed a “motion to temporarily vacate agreed 

judgment.” In the motion, appellants complained that the trial court violated Local 

Rule 3.3.3, which requires motions to be set for written submission “at least 10 

days from filing, except on leave of court.” Harris Cty. (Tex.) Civ. Trial Div. Dist. 

Ct. Loc. R. 3.3.3. Appellants complained that they were not afforded an 

opportunity to respond to Amegy’s motion. Appellants asked the court to vacate 

the agreed judgment and “extend the submission period for 30-days to allow the 

parties to respond.”

 

3 On appeal, Amegy sometimes refers to this judgment as an “agreed default judgment.” 

Amegy also refers to it simply as a “default judgment,” which Ship and Sail failed to adequately 

challenge under Craddock. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 

1939). See generally, e.g., Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307, 

309–10 (Tex. 2012). The docket sheet refers to the judgment as an “interlocutory default 

judgment.”

4

It appears from the Clerk’s Record that Amegy also filed a motion to sever the case 

against Ship and Sail from the case against the guarantors. The motion is not in the Clerk’s 

Record, but the trial court signed an order denying the motion on July 14.
4

One hundred five days after January 7, appellants filed their notice of 

appeal. This court granted appellants’ motion to extend time for the filing of the 

notice of appeal.5

On appeal, appellants contend the trial court erred by violating Local Rule 

3.3.3. Amegy challenges this court’s jurisdiction. We address the jurisdictional 

arguments first and then turn to appellants’ complaint. See, e.g., SJ Med. Ctr., 

L.L.C. v. Estahbanati, 418 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2013, no pet.) (“Because a question has been raised as to whether this court has 

appellate jurisdiction, we must address that threshold issue before considering the 

merits of this appeal.”).

II. JURISDICTION

A timely filed notice of appeal invokes this court’s jurisdiction. See In re 

J.M., 396 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tex. 2013). Amegy contends that appellants did not 

timely file a notice of appeal to confer this court with jurisdiction because (1) the 

May 2014 written judgment against Ship and Sail was the final judgment as it 

disposed of all the remaining claims and parties; or (2) if the January 2015 

judgment was the final judgment, then the guarantors’ “motion to temporarily 

vacate agreed judgment” did not extend the appellate timetable.

We hold that the May 2014 judgment was not final, the January 2015 

judgment was final, and the guarantors’ postjudgment motion extended the 

appellate timetable.

 

5

See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within ninety days after the 

judgment is signed if a party timely files a motion for new trial or motion to modify the 

judgment); Tex. R. App. P. 26.3 (appellate court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if 

the party files its notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time within fifteen days after the 

deadline for filing the notice of appeal).
5

A. The May 2014 Judgment Was Not Final.

Amegy contends the May 2014 written judgment was final because the 

January 2014 oral judgment rendered against the guarantors merged with the May 

2014 judgment signed against Ship and Sail, so the May 2014 signed judgment 

disposed of the only remaining claim and was the final judgment. And thus, 

appellants’ notice of appeal filed in April 2015 was late. See Tex. R. App. P. 

26.1(a).

Generally, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. See 

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). In most cases, such 

as this one, there can be only one final judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. 301. 

As authority for its position that the May judgment is the final judgment 

because it merged with a prior oral rendition, Amegy cites Parking Co. v. Wilson, 

58 S.W.3d 742, 742 (Tex. 2001). But Parking Co. had nothing to do with the 

merger of judgments or, in particular, oral judgments. See id. (holding that the 

partial summary judgment was interlocutory even though it contained a Mother 

Hubbard clause). Parking Co. is inapposite.

Amegy contends that the May 2014 judgment disposed of the sole remaining 

claim in the suit, so the May 2014 judgment was final. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 

204 (“Thus, an order that grants a motion for partial summary judgment is final if 

in fact it disposes of the only remaining issue and party in the case, even if the 

order does not say that it is final, indeed even if it says it is not final.”). The 

referenced Lehmann analysis occurs when a judgment is signed without a 

conventional trial on the merits. See id. at 205. However, because this case was 
6

regularly set for a conventional trial on the merits before the trial court signed the

judgment, we look to the Aldridge presumption.6

The Aldridge presumption is: “When a judgment, not intrinsically

interlocutory in character, is rendered and entered in a case regularly set for 

conventional trial on the merits, no order for separate trial of issues having been 

entered . . . , it will be presumed for appeal purposes that the Court intended to, and 

did, dispose of all parties legally before it and of all issues made by the pleadings 

between such parties.” N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897–

98 (Tex. 1966), quoted in Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 198.

In Aldridge, the trial court had granted a partial summary judgment in favor 

of the plaintiff on liability. Id. at 895. The case was set for trial in October 1964, 

and on October 5 the parties “entered into a written stipulation” about the amount 

of damages. Id. “Thereupon, the court rendered judgment that [the plaintiff] 

 

6

If there was no trial on the merits here, the judgment would be interlocutory under 

Lehmann regardless. The May 2014 judgment—titled “partial agreed judgment”—did not 

expressly dispose of Amegy’s request for attorney’s fees from Ship and Sail or any of the claims 

against the guarantors. See Youngblood & Assocs., P.L.L.C. v. Duhon, 57 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (judgment not final even though it was labeled “final 

summary judgment,” included a Mother Hubbard clause, and awarded pre- and post-judgment 

interest, because the plaintiff requested attorney’s fees and the judgment contained no award of 

attorney’s fees). The Mother Hubbard clause would provide no indicia of finality under these 

circumstances, so we cannot assume the trial court intended to deny relief on the remaining 

claims based on the Mother Hubbard clause. See, e.g., Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204 (“[D]enying 

the standard Mother Hubbard clause of any indicia of finality in any order not issued after a 

conventional trial . . . .”); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 

167 S.W.3d 827, 828–29 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the default judgment was 

not final even though it contained a Mother Hubbard clause because the plaintiff sought to 

recover actual and exemplary damages, but the default judgment was silent about exemplary 

damages); Flores v. Sandoval, No. 01-02-01197-CV, 2004 WL 966328, at *1–2 & n.3 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that an agreed judgment 

was not final even though it contained finality language and a Mother Hubbard clause because 

the judgment did not dispose of one party; expressly denying any indicia of finality based on the 

Mother Hubbard clause). Therefore, if there was no trial on the merits here, the May 2014 

judgment did not dispose of every claim in the case.
7

recover of and from [the defendant] the sum of $30,000.00 with interest and costs.” 

Id. And, the judgment was approved as to form by the parties. Id. The judgment 

did not specifically address the plaintiff’s claim against a third-party defendant. Id. 

Aldridge held that the judgment was final because it was rendered after the case 

was “regularly set for conventional trial on the merits.” Id. at 897–98.

Amegy and the guarantors appeared for trial in January 2014. The parties 

reached a settlement. The trial court left no doubt about what happened next: “Just 

for purposes of the record, the case is called to trial. The Court has rendered 

judgment on the settlement of the parties.” As in Aldridge, when the parties appear 

for trial and reach a settlement, and thereupon the court renders judgment, there 

has been a conventional trial on the merits. See id. at 895, 898; see also In re 

M.G.F., No. 04-15-00591-CV, 2016 WL 519650, at *1–2 ((Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Feb. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying Aldridge and its progeny 

when, on the date of trial, the parties filed a Rule 11 agreement and the trial court 

signed an order that “wholly incorporated” the Rule 11 agreement). Even the May 

2014 judgment itself states, “Came on for trial the above entitled and numbered 

cause.”

Thus, the May 2014 judgment is presumptively final for purposes of starting 

the appellate timetable because the trial court signed it after a trial on the merits. 

See Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Com’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2002) (citing 

Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995)) (holding that the 

“appellate timetable runs from the date the district court signs the judgment, rather 

than from the date the judgment is rendered”); see also Alcantar v. Okla. Nat’l 

Bank, 47 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (noting that the 

date the trial court signs the judgment determines when a notice of appeal must be 

filed).
8

But the Texas Supreme Court “does not disagree” with the notion that this 

presumption “should not be rigidly applied to make judgments final contrary to the 

litigants’ reasonable expectations.” John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 58 

S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. 2001). Accordingly, the presumption is rebuttable; it 

applies “in the absence of a contrary showing in the record.” Aldridge, 400 

S.W.2d at 898; see Vaughn v. Drennon, 324 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tex. 2010) 

(reviewing the record to determine if the Aldridge presumption was warranted).7

“If there is any doubt as to the judgment’s finality, then finality must be resolved 

by a determination of the intention of the court as gathered from the language of 

the decree and the record as a whole, aided on occasion by the conduct of the 

parties.” Vaughn, 324 S.W.3d at 563 (quotation and alterations omitted).

This record rebuts the presumption of finality for the May 2014 judgment. 

At the January 2014 trial, the court expressly incorporated the settling parties’

agreement in its oral rendition of judgment against the guarantors. The court said 

it would “not memorialize that judgment until such time as counsel brings it to the 

Court’s attention . . . on your demand.” The court said it would “await[] 

instructions from counsel pursuant to the agreement of the parties.” And the court 

“put this down for entry of judgment deadline of one—the first week of January of 

2015.” The trial court’s May 2014 judgment is against Ship and Sail and is titled 

“partial”—in fact, “partial” is handwritten. And of course, the trial court actually 

signed another judgment in January 2015 against the guarantors. After the 

guarantors filed their motion to vacate, the trial court signed an order denying the 

 

7

See also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 219 (Baker, J., concurring) (“This presumption can be 

rebutted by a contrary showing in the record.”); 1 Adele Hedges & Lynne Liberato, Texas 

Practice Guide: Civil Appeals § 6:82 (2012) (“It would appear that the presumption may be 

rebutted by a contrary showing in the record.”); Elaine A. Carlson & Karlene S. Dunn, 

Navigating Procedural Minefields: Nuances in Determining Finality of Judgments, Plenary 

Power, and Appealability, 41 S. Tex. L. Rev. 953, 965 (2000) (“[T]he Aldridge presumption can 

always be rebutted by contrary evidence in the record.”).
9

motion, stating that the court’s plenary power expired in February 2015. Thus, it 

appears from this record that the trial court did not intend the May 2014 judgment 

to be final.

The same can be said for the parties. After the trial court signed the May 

2014 judgment, Amegy filed a motion to sever the cause against Ship and Sail, 

indicating a belief that the May 2014 judgment against Ship and Sail was not final. 

Amegy waited until January 2015—long after Amegy now contends the trial court 

lost plenary power—to file its “motion for entry of agreed judgment.” Amegy 

moved for entry of judgment because the guarantors allegedly had failed to pay the 

total amount of the judgment by December 31, 2014. And, the guarantors alleged 

in their motion to vacate that they had made monthly $10,000 payments totaling 

$130,000. None of this conduct of the parties would have been necessary if they 

had reasonably expected the May 2014 judgment to be final.

This case is similar to the San Antonio Court of Appeals case cited above. 

See In re M.G.F., 2016 WL 519650, at *1–2. On the day of trial, the parties filed a 

Rule 11 agreement, and the trial court wholly incorporated the agreement in its 

parental-termination order from the same day. Id. at *1. The court of appeals 

looked to the terms of the Rule 11 agreement, where the parties agreed to “push” 

the issue of a party’s intervention “to a later date.” See id. at *1–2. This part of 

the record alone justified rebuttal of the Aldridge presumption. See id. at *2. The 

judgment was not final. Id. at *2.

Like in In re M.G.F., the trial court here incorporated the agreement between 

Amegy and the guarantors in its orally rendered judgment. The trial court said it 

would sign the agreed judgment against the guarantors “on demand” of Amegy, 

with an “entry of judgment deadline” during the first week of January 2015. Thus, 

the trial court specifically reserved signing and entry of a judgment against the 
10

guarantors until a later time even though the trial court had orally rendered a 

judgment against the guarantors. See Richey v. Bolerjack, 598 S.W.2d 957, 959 

(Tex. 1979) (noting that the Aldridge presumption would not apply if the trial court 

specifically reserved judgment on part of the case until a later time). The fact that 

the trial court signed a partial judgment against Ship and Sail in May 2014 that, if 

treated as final, would be contrary to the trial court’s oral rendition suggests that 

the May 2014 judgment was not the final judgment. See Exxon Corp. v. Garza, 

981 S.W.2d 415, 419–20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (refusing to 

indulge the Aldridge presumption for the first of two judgments signed after a jury 

trial when the first judgment—which was labeled “final” and contained a Mother

Hubbard clause—rendered a take-nothing judgment against a settling defendant, 

and the second judgment was consistent with the jury’s verdict against defendant 

Exxon; the first judgment “contained no indication that the trial court intended to 

disregard the jury’s verdict”).

We hold that the Aldridge presumption is rebutted for the May 2014 

judgment. The May 2014 judgment was not final.

B. The January 2015 Judgment Was Final.

For the reasons above, the Aldridge presumption applies to the January 2015 

judgment. Nothing in the record rebuts this presumption. The trial court and 

parties did not address the matter of attorney’s fees at trial and did not reserve or 

“push” the issue to a later date. See Richey, 589 S.W.2d at 959; In re M.G.F., 2016 

WL 519650, at *1–2. Accordingly, the January 2015 judgment implicitly denied 

relief on the attorney’s fees claims and was the final judgment for purposes of 

beginning the appellate timetable.
11

C. The Guarantors’ Motion Extended the Appellate Timetable.

The deadline for filing a notice of appeal is extended to ninety days by the 

filing of certain postjudgment motions—such as a motion for new trial or a motion 

to modify the judgment—during the thirty days following the day the trial court 

signed a final judgment. See Brighton v. Koss, 415 S.W.3d 864, 866 (Tex. 2013); 

see also Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a); Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(g). Amegy contends that 

the guarantors’ motion did not extend the appellate timetable because it sought 

only to change the date of the trial court’s judgment nunc pro tunc and not to 

substantively alter the judgment. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith So. Equip., 

Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. 2000) (noting that “only a motion seeking a 

substantive change will extend the appellate deadlines,” and distinguishing a 

motion for judgment nunc pro tunc seeking a clerical change from a motion to 

modify or correct a judgment).

Amegy relies on Claxton v. (Upper) Lake Fork Water Control & 

Improvement District No. 1, 220 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no 

pet.) (op. on reh’g), to argue that a motion seeking to change the date of a 

judgment is a mere clerical change that would not extend appellate deadlines. See 

id. at 543 (noting that a judgment nunc pro tunc may be used to correct the recited 

signing date of an order if the original recited date is incorrect, but nunc pro tunc is 

not used to backdate the signing of a written order). In Claxton, the judgment nunc 

pro tunc corrected the signing date of an order because the record indicated that the 

date recited on the earlier judgment was incorrect. See id. at 542. Nunc pro tunc

proceedings are appropriate to “make the court’s records speak the truth.” Stuart v. 

City of Houston, 419 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, 

writ ref’d n.r.e.).
12

That is not the case here. The guarantors did not merely ask the court to 

make the judgment reflect what the trial court actually rendered, i.e. to speak the 

truth. Although the guarantors asked the court several times to “temporarily 

vacate” the judgment, the guarantors also asked the court to simply “vacate” the 

judgment. The guarantors sought a thirty-day extension of the submission date for 

entry of the judgment because the guarantors “did not even have an opportunity . . . 

to file a response two business days before a properly submitted motion.” It is 

evident from the motion that the guarantors sought to vacate the judgment so they 

could have an opportunity to be heard before the judgment was entered. This is 

not a mere clerical change to the judgment. Cf. Aero at Sp. Z.O.O. v. Gartman, 

469 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (holding that a 

special appearance filed after the judgment “implicitly requests that the trial court 

vacate” the judgment because “any timely-filed motion seeking to vacate the trial 

court’s judgment, even a motion asserting meritless grounds for vacating the 

judgment, constitutes a motion for new trial that will extend the appellate 

timetable”).

Accordingly, the guarantors’ motion extended the appellate deadlines. 

Appellants’ notice of appeal was timely filed. This court has appellate jurisdiction.

III. NO REVERSIBLE ERROR

Appellants contend the trial court erred by violating Local Rule 3.3.3. 

Appellants contend the trial court’s error resulted in the trial court rendering an 

agreed judgment without appellants’ consent. In particular, “Appellants did not 

have occasion to inform the court of the revocation of the judgment prior to its 

entry.” (emphasis added).

For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the trial court 

erred. Yet, we may not reverse a trial court’s judgment unless the error 
13

“(1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably 

prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals.” 

Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. We hold that Rule 44.1 has not been satisfied because 

appellants had no right to revoke consent to the orally rendered judgment.

“A judgment routinely goes through three states: (1) rendition, (2) signing, 

and (3) entry.” Gana v. Gana, No. 14-05-00601-CV, 2007 WL 1191904, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 24, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial 

court’s judgment is rendered when it is announced orally in open court. Id. “In the 

case of an oral rendition, the judgment is effective immediately, and the signing 

and entry of the judgment are only ministerial acts.” In re E.G., No. 14-14-00967-

CV, 2016 WL 1128137, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 22, 2016, no 

pet. h.) (mem. op.). Although the date of the signing of a judgment is material to

calculating appellate timetables, as discussed above, the date of the signing of a 

judgment “does not affect or change the date of the rendition of the judgment.” 

Alcantar, 47 S.W.3d at 821.

Here, appellants conflate the signing of a judgment with the rendition of a 

judgment. Appellants are correct that “a court cannot render a valid agreed 

judgment absent consent at the time it is rendered.” Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 

S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added). But a party may not revoke 

consent to an agreed judgment after it has been orally rendered. See Samples 

Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the 

complaining party could not revoke consent when, “after the parties voiced their 

approval of the settlement dictated in open court, the trial court rendered judgment 

by ordering them to sign and follow the agreement”); Galerie D’Tile, Inc. v. Shinn, 

792 S.W.2d 792, 792, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) 

(holding that the complaining party could not revoke consent to an oral agreed 
14

judgment when “the parties voiced their approval of the settlement dictated in open 

court, [and] the trial court rendered judgment by announcing ‘signed and entered 

this, the 19th day of October, 1987,’” even though the trial court did not sign or 

enter a judgment before one party attempted to revoke consent).

For a trial court’s oral rendition to be adequate to prevent a later revocation, 

“[t]he words used by the trial court must clearly indicate the intent to render 

judgment at the time the words are expressed.” S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 

S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995). “[I]t would always be preferable for the trial judge 

to use the specific word ‘render’ and to say unequivocally that he ‘does now render 

judgment’ in the case.” Galerie D’Tile, 792 S.W.2d at 794.

We must therefore determine whether the trial court indicated a clear intent 

to render judgment by “present act” in open court in January 2014 or to postpone 

rendering judgment until January 2015. See Genesis Producing Co., L.P. v. Smith 

Big Oil Corp., 454 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no 

pet.). We conclude the trial judge could not have been clearer. The judge said, 

“The Court has rendered judgment on the settlement of the parties.” The trial court 

not only used the specific word “render” to describe the present act, but also used 

the word “memorialize” to refer to the setting in January 2015.

Appellants claim, for the first time on appeal, that they wanted to revoke 

their consent to the judgment. But they could not do so because the trial court had 

already rendered judgment on the agreement. See Samples Exterminators, 640 

S.W.2d at 875; Galerie D’Tile, 792 S.W.2d at 792, 794. Thus, any failure of the 

trial court to allow more time between Amegy’s motion for entry of the judgment 

and the signing and entry of the judgment could not have caused the rendition of an 

improper judgment or prevented the proper presentation of the case to this court. 

Appellants’ issues are overruled.
15

IV. CONCLUSION

We have jurisdiction over this appeal, but any error in the trial court is not 

reversible. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Sharon McCally

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, McCally, and Busby.