### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 08
- 00041
- CV
IN THE INTEREST OF H .W., MINOR CHILD ,

From the 413th District Court Johnson County, Texas Trial Court No. D200605788

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant J.W. appeals from a final order terminating his parental rights to his daughter , H.W. In doing so, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the st atutory grounds for termination, but he does not contest the
decision that termination was in the best interest of the chil d . H e also argues that the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. We will affirm the order
of the trial court. Procedural Background The petition of the Texas Department of Family and Prot ective Services (Department) allege d that J.W . committed several predicate acts for termination underIn t he Interest of H.W. Page 2

Texas Family Code section 161.001(1), and that termination was in the best interest of
H.W. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN . § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2007). The Department first removed H.W. from J.W.’s care on July 25, 2006. The court appointed the Department temporary managing c onservator and approved a family service plan outlining the Department’s requirements for reunification of J.W. and H.W. After several permanency hearings in which J.W. s howed no progress on his family service plan , the trial court ordered J.W. to mediation so that he and H.W.’s mother, L.F., could arrange for adoption of H.W. by L.F.’s husband. J.W. failed to attend.
A non - jury trial to involuntarily terminate J.W.’s par ental rights was held on January 18, 2008. J.W. failed to attend but was represented by counsel. At that trial , the court appointed L.F. as sole permanent managing conservator and terminated J .W.’s parental rights

. Standard of Review Termination of pa rental rights is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the petitioner to justify termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” Spangler v. Texas Dept. of Prot. & Reg. Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. App.

— Waco 199 8, no pet.). This standard is defined as “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. In a proceeding to terminate the parent

- child relationship brought under section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the movant must establish by clear and convincing evidence two elements: (1) one or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsectionIn t he Interest of H.W. Page 3

(1) of section 161.001 (termed a predi cate violation); and (2) that termination is in the
best interest of the child. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN
. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 200 7 ); Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2002, pet. denied). The factfinder must
find that both elements are esta blished by clear and convincing evidence, and proof of one element does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976); Swate, 72 S.W.3d at 766. Both legal and factual sufficiency reviews in termination cases must take into consideration whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the petitioner bears the burden of proof. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264

- 68 (Tex. 2002) (discussing legal sufficiency review); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (discussing factual sufficiency review).

In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding t o determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. This does not mean that a court must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not s upport the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence. If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the record evidence, a court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or convictio n that the matter that must be proven is true, then that court must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.In t he Interest of H.W. Page 4

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due consideration to
evidence that the factfi nder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id. [T]he inquiry must be “whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” A court of appeals shoul d consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. A court of appeals should detail in its opinion why it has concluded that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited disputed evidence in favor of the finding.
Id. at 266

- 67 (footnotes and citations omitted). We view the evidence in a neutral light when reviewing for factual sufficiency. Only one predicate act under section 161.001(1 ) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's
best interest . In re A.V. , 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
Grounds for Termination The petition for termination alleged and the cour t found that J.W. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed H.W. to remain in conditions or su rroundings that endangered her physical or emotional well

- being and that he engaged in conduct or knowingly placed H.W. with persons who engaged in conduct that endan gered her phys ical or emotional well

- being. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN . § 161.001(1)(D) (Vernon Supp.
2007 ).In t he Interest of H.W., Minor Child Page 5

Section 161.001(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code states that the court may order termination of the parent

- child relationship if the court finds by clear an d convincing evidence that the parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well

being of the child. Id

. § 161.001(1)(D). “Endanger” means to expose to loss or injury or to jeopardize. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). However, it is not necessary that the child actually suffer injury. Id. Although this provision addresses the child’s surroundings rather than the parent’s conduct, conduct by a parent or other resident of a child’s home can produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well

- being of a child. In re C.L.C. , 119 S.W.3d 382, 392 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2003, no pet.).
Ninfa Torres , a Department super visor, testified that she became involved with
H.W.’ s case when the Department received allega tions of neglectful supervision and drug use. The Department sought emergency removal of H.W. , who had a history of being in foster care, when a domestic violenc e incident over drugs occurred at J.W.’s
home. During that incident, J.W

. got high on cocaine and chased his wife ( H.W.’s stepmother ) around with a stick.
When J.W. was interviewed about the allegations , he tested positive for cocaine
and admitted that he frequently left H.W. with his wif e, who used methamphetamines and had issues with depr ession. Torres testified that this was particularly dangerous
because H.W. was also dia gnosed with clinical depression and self

- harm behavior,
which causes her to pull out her hair and pick at the skin on her stomach and arms. SheIn t he Interest of H.W., Minor Child Page 6

also testified that H.W. has a hear t condition, due to her dependency on cocaine at birth , and that J.W. was not seeking appropriate medical attention for her. Torres reported
that on visitat ion to H.W. ’s home , which did not have electricity, H.W.’s appearance was dirty, her hair was unkempt, and the home did not have a place for her to sleep. Dianne Ames, H.W.’s caseworker, outlined the family service plan created for J.W. to regain custody o f H.W. For a year, the Department asked J.W. to demonstrat e an ability to maintain a drug

- free lifesty le, which included finding drug

- free housing and taking random drug tests. J.W. was also asked to provide payment stubs indicating steady employment, ut ility receipts, and an updated address within 72 hours of any relocation. Finally, he was asked to participate in individual counseling, anger management, parent ing skills classes, and to refrain from criminal behavior. Ames
testified that at the time of trial, J.W. had not provided the Department with proof of completion of any of the Department ’ s requests. Ames tried to get in contact with J.W. by telephone and with letters on numerous occasions , but he never responded. She also
testified that of the eight court proceedings involving J.W.’s parental rights, he ha d only attended two. J.W. did not attend trial, and his counsel did not present any evidence
contradict ing the Department’s evidence. Using the appropriate standards of review for legal and f actual sufficiency , we conclude that "the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction" that J.W. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed H.W. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical or emo tional well

- being and
that J.W. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed H.W. with persons who engaged inIn t he Interest of H.W., Minor Child Page 7

conduct that endangered her physical or emotional well

- being. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
The evidence is thus legally and factually sufficient to suppo rt the trial court’s f indings
on the endangerment grounds. W e overrule J.W.’s first issue. Remaining Grounds for Termination The trial court’s findings of fact contain affirmative findings on four predicate
g rounds for termination of J.W. ’s parental rights. Because we have found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that J.W. engaged in conduct that endangered H.W.’s physical and emotional well

- being, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the o ther three predicate grounds. See In re
T.N.F. , 205 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. App.

— Waco 20 06, pet. denied). For termination of the parent

- child relationship, the factfinder must make an affirmative finding: (1) on at least one predicate ground for terminatio n; and (2) that
termination is in the best interest of the child. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN
. § 161.001

. Because J.W. does not challenge the trial court’s best interest finding in his appellant’s brief, we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence to su pport the court’s best

interest finding

. See In re D.M. , 244 S.W.3d 397, 403 (Tex. App.

— Waco 20 07, no pet.) (Reyna, J., concurring) (“ It is well

- settled that this Court cannot address an issue in a civil appeal which has not been raised as an issue or poi nt of error in the appealing party ’s brief.”). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law In his second issue, J.W. complains that the trial court failed to file findings of
fact and conclusions of law. He claims that he timely requested findings of fact an dIn t he Interest of H.W., Minor Child Page 8

conclusions of law under Civil Procedure rules 296 and 297. Under Rule 296, a party may request the court to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law within twenty days after the judgment is signed. T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 296. However, the record reflects that J.W. filed a Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 27, 2008, forty

- one days after the termination order was signed

. The clerk’s record does not reflect that J.W. ever filed an initial request for findings of fact and conclusions of law

. Because J.W. failed to formally request findings of fact and conclusions of law within twenty days of the trial court’s judgment, his
notice of p ast d ue findings of fact and c onclusions of l a w is untimely, and he has failed

to preserve his claim regarding lack of such findings for appellate review. Strangel v.
Perkins , 87 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2002, no pet.) ; DeMello v. NBC Bank

Perrin Beitel , 762 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1988, no pet.) . W e overrule J.W.’s second issue.
Conclusion Because we have found the evidence sufficient to support at least one predicate act under section 161.001(1) and J.W. failed to challenge the court ’ s best interest finding
and make a time ly request for findings of fact and c onclusions of law , the trial court’s
order is affirmed.

BILL VANCE JusticeIn t he Interest of H.W., Minor Child Page 9

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Vance, and Justice Reyna A ffirmed Opinion delivered and filed October 29 , 2008 [ CV06 ]