FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT OCT 12 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1344 7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D.C. Dock et No. 0 4- 00 07 6 C R-FTM -3 3- DNF UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us RAY MON D P AU L M AT TH EW S, D ef en da nt- A ppe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ (O ct ob er 12, 200 6) Be fo re MA RC U S, W IL SO N a nd C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. COX , C ircuit Judg e: W e de ci de in thi s a

ppe al w he the r a Fl or ida

c onvi ct ionf

or bur glary

of the curtilage of a structure is a conviction for a violent felonyfor purposes of the Ar m ed Care er Cr im ina l A ct , 18 U
. S. C. § 92 4(e) (the A CC A ). P re te rm itt ing c onsi de ra tio n2

of w he the r

s u c h ab u r g l a ry

i s “ g e n e r i c b u r g l a ry , ” w e c o n c l u d e t h a ti ti s av i o l en t fe lon y a s de fi ne d by

the A CC A be ca

use it “ inv olv es co nduc t tha t pr es en ts a se ri ous potenti al risk of phy sical injury to another[.] ” 18 U. S. C. § 924 (e)( 2)(B) (ii). I. BACKG ROUND Raym ond Pa

ul M at the w s w as c onvi ct ed by a j ur y of be ing ac onvi ct ed

f el on in p o s s e s s i o n o f a f

i r e a rm , i n v i o l a t i o n o f 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 9 2 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) , a n d p o s s e s sio n of
an unregistered short-barreled shotg un, in violation of 26 U .S .C. § 586 1(d). Prev io us ly, Mat th ews ha d bee n con vi ct ed of m ul ti pl e fel on ie s un de r Fl o r i d a l a w, inc lud ing: ( 1) thi rd -d eg re e bur glary in 1985 ; ( 2) se co nd- de gr ee bur glary a nd aggravated battery ar ising out of the sam e fa cts, a lso in 1 985; (3) third-degree burglary in 1989 ; and (4) aggravated assault in 2001
. He wa s sentenced as an arm ed
care er c ri m ina l, de fi ne d by

the A CC A a s ape rs on w ho “ ha s th re e pr ev iou s
co nvi ct ion s . . . f

or avio le nt f

el ony or a se ri ous dr

ug of fe nse , or bot h, co m

m itt ed on occasions different fr o m o n e an o ther.” 18 U. S. C. § 924 (e)( 1). The m andatory
m ini m um se nte nc e fo r an ar

m ed care er cr im ina l is f

if te eny ea rs ’ im pr iso nm en t. Id

. Matthews ar gued at sentencing that he wa s not an arm ed car eer crim inal be ca use his tw o thi rd -d eg re e bur glary co nvi ct ion s shou ld not be c onsi de re d vi ole nt fe l o n i es . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt h ea rd ar g u m en to n t h e qu es t i o n an dru l ed t h at Ma t t h ew s ’s ag gr av at ed

ba tte ry c onvi ct ionin 1985 , a ggr av at ed a ssa ult c onvi ct ionin 2001 , thi rd

-Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t f ind that th e 19 85 se c on d- de g re e burg lary c on vic tion wa s a 1 qualifying c onviction under the A CCA because that conviction arose out of the same fac ts and circ umstances a s the ag g ravated batter y conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 924( e) (1 ) (r eq uiring that qualifying violent f

elonies be “ committed on occa sions differe nt from one a nother.” ) Matthews also argues that his Six th A mendment rig ht to trial by jury was violated w hen the 2 district court judg e dete rmined that his previous convic tions were f o r v iolent felonies rather than requiringa jury

verdic t so finding. That a rg ument has been reje cted by this c ourt as for eclose d by Supreme Cour t p re cede nt. See U nited States v. Gree r , 440 F.3d 1267, 1273- 74 (11th Cir. 2006) (r e c og nizi ngthat Almendarez- Torres v. United States , 5 23 U. S. 2 24 , 1 1 8 S
. C t
. 1 2 1 9 (1 99 8) , c on tr ols and instructs that the de termination may be made by

a judg e). And, Matthews a

ppeals his conviction for being a felon in posse ssion of a fire arm, ba sed on his argume nts (whic h h e did no t r a ise in t

he dist ri ct cou rt ) that : ( 1) 18 U. S.C. § 9 22 is f a c ia lly unconstitutional because it is an ex er ci s e of Cong ressional powe r beyond the authorization of the Commer c e Cl a

u s e , an d ( 2 ) th e s tatute is u n c o n s ti tuti o n a l a s a p p li e d to h im b e c a

u s e th e r e was no 3 de gr ee bur glary

c onvi ct ionin 1 98 5, an d th ir d- de gr ee bur glary c onvi ct ionin 1989
we re a ll convictio ns for violent felonies as defined bythe AC CA. T he district court 1 fo und tha t t he thi rd -d eg re e bur glari es “ inv olv e[ d] co nduc t tha t pr es en t[ ed ] ase ri ous potenti al risk of phy sical injury to another.” (R. 10 at 7 5.) Ther efore, the court sentenced Matthews to 280 m onth s’ im prisonm ent and five y ears’ supervised release. II. ISS UES ON AP PE AL AN D C ONT ENT IONS OF THE P AR TIES Matthews appeals his sentence, arguing ( as he did in the trial court) that neither of his third-degree burglary con v i ct ions s houl d be consid ered violent crim es under the A CC A. Ma tth ew s c ont en ds tha t, be ca use , und er

the F lor ida

sta tut e, tho se
c on vi c t i on s w e r e f

or b ur gl a ry o f as t r uc tur e or the c urt ilage the re of , the y a re not
co nvi ct ion s f

or “ ge ne ri c bur glary . ” Bu rg la ry of a c ur t i l ag e, Ma tth ew s c ont en ds, is not g e n e r i c b u r g l a ry. 2evid en ce t h at hi s conduct substantially aff ecte d interstate c ommerce . These a rg uments are fore closed by circ uit pr ece dent. S ee United States v. Mc

Allister , 77 F.3d 387, 389- 90 (11th Cir. 1996). 4 T he G ove rn m en t ar gue s tha t bur glary of the c urtil ag e of

astr uc tur e is “ ge ne ri c b u rg l ar y.” I tfu rt h erar g u es t h at t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt c o r r e c t l y fo u n dt h at Ma t t h ew s ’s thi rd -d eg ree bu rg lary

c onvi ct ion s a re vio le nt f el oni es be ca

use , e ve n if

the y a re not
co nvi ct ion s f

or “ ge ne ri c bur glary , ” the y ar e co nvi ct ion s fo r fe lon ie s th at “ oth er w ise inv olv e[ ] c ondu ct

tha t pr es en ts a

se ri ous pot en tia l r isk

of phy sical inj ur

y to another[.] ” 18 U. S. C. § 924 (e)( 2)(B) (ii).

III. STA ND AR

D O F REVIE W T his c ourt c onsi de rs de nov o w he the r a pa rt ic ular c on victi on i s a“ vio le nt fel on y ” fo r pu rp os es of th e ACCA. U nit ed Sta tes v . W

ilk er son , 286 F
. 3d 1 324, 132 5 (11th Cir. 2002). IV. D ISCU SSION T he A CC A de fi ne s avio le nt f el ony a s: [A ] ny cri m e punish able by

im prisonm ent for a te rm exceeding one y ear, or any act of j uvenile deli n quency inv olv ing the use or

c ar ry ing of a f ir earm , kni fe , or destr uc tiv e de vic e tha t w oul d be pun ish ab le by im pr iso nm en t f

or suc h ter m if co m m itt ed by ana dul t, tha t– (i ) ha s a s a n e le m en t t he use , a tte m pte d us e, or thr ea te ne d us e of

phy sic al f

orce a ga ins t t he pe rs on o f an oth er ; or5 (i i) is bur glary , a rs on, o r ex tortio n, inv olv es use of ex p l o s i v e s , o r o t h e rw i s e i n v o l v e s c o n du c t t h a t p r e s en ts a se rio us po te nt ia l ri sk of p hysic al in jury to an ot he r[.] 18 U.S.C. § 9 24 (e)( 2) (B). In Taylor v. United States , 4 9 5 U
. S
. 5 7 5 , 1 1 0 S
. C t
. 2 1 4 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , t h e S up r e me Court held “ an offense constitutes ‘ burglary ’ for purpose s o f a § 9 24(e) sentence enhancem ent if either its statutory definitio n subs tantially

corre spon ds to ‘gener ic’ bur glary , or the c ha rg ing pa pe r an d j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns a ct

ua lly r equir ed the j ur y to fi nd all the elem ents of g eneric burglary in order to convict the defendant.” 495 U.S . a t 602, 110 S
. Ct
. a t 21 60. T he co urt de fi ne d “ ge ne ri c bur glary ” as a n of fe nse “ ha vin g the ba sic e le m en ts o f unl aw fu l or unpr ivi le ge d en tr y int o, or r em ai nin g in , abui ldi ng
orst ru ct ur e, wit h i nt en t t o c omm it a cri m e.” 4 95 U.S. at 5 99 , 11 0 S . Ct. at 21 58
. At the r elev an t t im es, F lorida law def ined third-degree felony

burglary as an unpr ivi le ge d e ntr

y int o a n un oc cu

pie d stru ct

ur e or a n un oc cu

pie d c onve y an ce w ith int en t t o c om

m it anof fe nse the re in. F la
. St at
. § 810. 02. A str uc tur e w as de fi ne d to i nclude the curtilage of the structure. Fla. Stat. § 810.011 (1). Florida ca se law
co ns tru es cu rti la ge na rro wl y, to inc lud e onl y a n e nc los ed

a re a sur ro undi ng a st ru ct ur e. Se e Sta te v . H

am ilt on , 660 S o. 2d 1 038, 104 4 ( Fl a. 199 5) ; H en ryv . Sta te , 707 So
. 2d 3 70, 372 ( Fl a. App. 1 D ist
. 199 8)6

Co nsi ste nt w ith the f

ac t t ha t F lor ida

doe s no t c onsi de r bur glary of the c urtil ag e of a st ru ct ur e to be a cri m e d is ti nc t fro m bu rg la ry of t ha t s tru ct ur e, H

en ry , 707 S o. 2d at 372 , the j udgm en ts o f co nvi ctio n fo r Ma tth ew s’ s th ir d- de gr ee bur glari es li st h is crim es only

as “ Burglary ” and “ Burglary (Structure ). ” The conviction s do no t specify whe th er he ent ered th e ro of edpo rti on of a st ru ct ur e o r on ly its cu rti la ge . (R
. 10- 88, E x. 1 a t 1, E x. 3 a t 1. ) T he ch argi ng d oc um en ts are a lso a m big uous in tha t r eg ar d. ( Id

. , E x. 1 at 3 (c ha rg ing en tr y int o “ a str

uc tur e or the c urtil ag e the re of

”) , E x. 3 a t 3 (sam e). ) A nd, the district court wa s not presented with any other j udicial record that pr ovi de s th at

inf orm at ion
. Matthews ar gues that because th e Florida crim e o f bu rglary includes bo th entry i n t o t h e r o o f

e d a r e a o f a s t r

u c tu r e a n d e n t ry i n t o t h e c u rt i l a g e o f a s truc tur e an d because the j udicial record does not dem onstrate that he was c onvi ct ed o f bu rglary of the r oof ed a re as of str uc tur es , his c onvi ct ion s m ay ha ve be enf

or b ur glary

of the curtilages of the structures. He further c ontend s that burgla ry o f t h e cu rtilage of a str uc tur e is not

“ ge ne ri c bur glary , ” as de fi ne d by the S upr em e Co urt i n Ta

yl or . T hus, he c onc lud es tha t be ca

use the se co nvi ct ion s a re not “ ge ne ri c bur glary ” co nvi ct ion s, th ey are n ot co nv ic ti on s fo r vi ol en t fe lo ni es as d efi ne d b y th e ACCA. W e agree with Matthews that, on this record, one cannot determ i n e w hether either of his two t h i rd -degree burglary conviction s was f

or burglary

of the roofedThe Gove rnment cites law enfor ceme nt offic ers’ probable c ause a ffidavits and othe r 3 documents outside the judicial r ecord to demonstrate that Matthews enter ed the struc tures. ( See Ap pe lle e ’ s B r i e f a t 3 , 4
. ) T o t h e e xt e n t t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n v i t e s u s t o r e l y o n t h o s e d o c ume nts to deter mine that Matthews ente red the structure s, we decline to do so. See She pard v. United States , 54 4 U. S. 13 , 12 5 S. Ct. 12 54 (2 00 5) (r e str ic tin g the kin d of e vid e nc e that a jud g e may

c on sid e r i n making a findingthat a prior c onviction qualifies under the ACCA to judicial rec ords). 7 portio n of astr uc tur e. It m ay be tha t Ma tth ew s w as c onvi ct ed of the se bur glari es f

or 3
en te ri ng the c urtil ag es of

the str uc tur es . Eve n so, Ma tth ew s’ s logic f ai ls; it dis co unt s
ana lte rn at ive pr ong of

the sta tut or

y te st f or avio le nt fe lon y , tha t the cr im e “ oth er w ise i n v o l v es co n du ct t h at p re s en t s a s er i o u s p o t en t i al ri s ko f p h ysi ca l i n ju ry t o an o t h er [. ]” 18 U. S. C. § 924 (e)( 2)(B) (ii). W e hold that, even if Matthews’ s third-degree burglary
co nvi ct ion s a re not

c onvi ct ion s f

or “ ge ne ri c bur glary , ” the y a re c onvi ct ion s f

or vi ol en t cr im es un de r th e ACCA b ecau se th ey sat is fy th is alt ern at iv e d efi ni ti on . As w e have explained above, Florid a n ar ro wly defines the curtilage of a structure to include on ly

an enclosed area surround ing a structure. W e ar e satisfied tha t a bur glary of thi s c ir cu m sc ri bed ar ea

is ind ee d ac ri m e tha t “pr es en ts a se ri ous potenti al ri s k of phy sical injury to another[.] ” I

d. Regar dless of whether a burglar breaches the r oofed portion of a structure, his un licensed entry into th e enclosed are a
s u rr o u n d i n g t h a t s t r

u c tu r e ma y b r i n g h i m i n t o c l o s e p h ys i c a l p r o x i mi t y w i t h t h e s a me persons he m ight encou nter w ere he to enter the structure. He m ay com e into contact
w ith the pr ope rty ’ s own er s, oc cu pa nts , or care ta ke rs . H is cl ose phy sic al pr es en ce to the str uc tur e co uld

le ad a n in noc en t pe rs on t o in ve sti ga te w hy he is the re , a nd h is8

pr es en ce a lon e co uld re as ona bly be pe rc ei ve d by an y of the se pe rs ons as thr ea te nin g. Ei t h ert h e i n n o ce n to r t h e b u rg l arm i g h tre ac tv i o l en t l y. In s h o rt , t h e b u rg l ar ’s presence in the curtilage of the structure presents a serious potenti al risk that violence
w ill e nsue a nd s om eo ne w ill be inj ur ed
. O ur de ci sio n is c onsi ste nt w iththe S upr em e Co urt’ s op ini on i n Ta yl or which spe ci fi ca lly

a cknow le dge s th at

som e bur glary -like o ff

en se s th at

a re not “ ge ne ri c bu rg la rie s” m ay

be vi ol en t fel on ie s no ne th el es s. Se e Ta yl or , 495 U
. S. a t 60 0 n. 9, 110 S. Ct. at 2159 n.9 (“ The G overnm ent rem ain s free to argue that any offense – inc lud ing of

fe nse s sim ilar to gen er ic bur glary – should c ount tow ar ds e nha nc em en t
as one tha t ‘ oth er

w ise inv olv es c ondu ct

tha t pr es en ts a se rio us poten tia l r isk of phy sic al inj ur

y to an oth er ’ und er

§ 92 4( e) (2 )( B) (i i)
. ”)
. A nd, it is co nsi ste nt w ithour pr ec ed en t. R ec en tly , w e he ld tha t “ ana tte m pt t o c om m it bur glary

. . . pr es en ts the pot en tia l r isk

of phy sic al inj ur

y to ano the r suf

fi ci en t t o sa tis fy

the A CC A ’ s de fi nit ion of a ‘ violent felony .’ ” United States v. J ames , 430 F. 3d 11 50, 1157 (11t h Cir. 2005 ), cert. gran ted , 126 S. Ct. 2860 (U .S . June 12, 2 006) (N o. 05 -9264). In d eciding that conspiracy

to com m it robbery

is a violent felony , w e sa i d , “ When o ne rea ches an ag re em en t w ithac o- co nspi ra tor to co m m it a ro bbe ry , a nd f

orm ula te s th e int en t t o
com m it the robbery , his c o n d u ct p resents at least a potenti al risk of phy sical injury within the m eaning of § 924 (e)( 2)(B) (ii). ” U nit ed Sta tes v . W

ilk er son , 286 F
. 3d 1 324,9

1325 -2 6 ( 11t h C ir
. 200 2)
. A nd, w e ha ve c onstru ed the sa m e la ngua ge in se ct ion 4B1.2 of the U nited States Sentencing Guidelines to ho ld that the c rim es of attem pted bur glary , f

el ony D U I, c ar ry ing a con ce al ed w ea

pon, an d using anI nte rn et f ac ili ty to
en tic e a m ino r to e nga ge in se xual ac tiv ity a ll pr es en t “ a se ri ous pot en tia l r isk of phy sical injury

to another.” Se e U

nit ed Sta tes v . M

cG ill , 450 F. 3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006 ); United States v. Searcy , 418 F
. 3d 11 93 (1 1th Ci r. 200 5) ; United States v. G unn , 369 F
. 3d 1 229 (1 1th Ci r. 200 4) ; U nit ed Sta tes v . G ilb er t , 138 F
. 3d 1371 ( 11t h Ci r. 19 98 ). The district court did not decide whether burglary of the curtilage of a

structure is a “ ge ne ri c bur glary ” as dis cu sse d in Ta yl or . G i v e n o u r h o l d i n g t h a t b u r g l a ry of the curtilage of a structure (as def ined by Florida law ) “ otherwise involves cond uct tha t pr es en ts a

se ri ous pot en tia l r isk

of phy sic al inj ur

y to an ot he r,” w e ne ed

not
ex pr es s a n opi nio n onw he the r the of fe nse s inque sti on h er e ar e “ ge ne ri c bur glari es ”
as dis cu sse d in Ta

yl or . V. C ONC LUS ION Beca use we find no m erit in Matthews’ s constitu tional argum ents and hold that
a Fl or ida c onvi ct ionf

or bur glary of a str uc tur e’ s curtil ag e is a conv ic tio n f or avio le nt crim e because it “ invo lves condu ct that presents a serious potenti al risk of phy sical10

inj ur y to ano the r[ , ] ” w e af

fi rm Ma tth ew s’ s conv ic tio n and sen te nc e pur suant to the ACCA. AFFIR MED.