IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIE DOCKINS Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 97-00159 Joseph B. Brown, Judge

No. W1998-00354-CCA-R3-CD - Decided June 8, 2000

Defe ndan tWillie Dockins wa s convicted of fir

st degree murder

by a jury in the Shelb

y County Criminal Court. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to life impr isonment in the Tennessee Department

of Correction. Defendant challenges his conviction, raising the fo llow ing issues: (1) whether the trial court

properly determined that he was competent to stand trial; (2) whether the trial court should have declared that he was insane at the time the offense was committed; (3) whether the trial court erre

d when it admitted a

gun intoevidence after a security latch had been removed; and (4) whether the

evidence was suf

ficient to support h

is conviction. After

a review of the record, we affirm the jud

gment of the trial c

ourt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Criminal C

ourt Affirmed

W OODALL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W ADE , P. J. and W ITT , J. joined. Arch B. Boyd, III,

Memphis, Tennesse

e, for the appell

ant, Willie Dockin

s.
Paul G. Summers, Attorn ey General and Reporter, Kim R. Helper, Assista

nt Attorney Gener

al, William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General, Janet Shipman, Assistant District AttorneyGeneral, and Paul Goodman, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
I. FACTS

Jewell Rogers testified that

on January 26, 1996, she was living in a house on Leath Street withher granddaught

er Jewell Jones,

the victim in this

case. That same

date, Rogers took t

he victim to a dance at school. The victim subsequently returned to the home on Leath Street, where Rogers
saw her talking to two young men outside. The victim then came into the house and stated that she had been shot. Shortly thereafter, the victim fell into Rogers’ arms and Rogers could see that she had blood coming out of her mouth. The victim died a short time later.-2-

Matoya Perry testified that she was a friend of the victim. While Perry was at a school dance
on January 26, 1996, she observed an altercation between her cousin and the co-def endant, Je

rry Jones. When Perry subsequently went outside, the co-defendant took his shirt off and approached her “like he w as ready to fight. ” At this point Perry put her coat down a

nd she was immediat

ely stabbedby the co-defendant’s sister. Perry then began fighting with the co-defendant’s sister. After the fight ended and Pe

rry attempted to le

ave the school parking lot , the co-defendant approached Perry with a gun. Perry and a nearby group of individuals ran away and Perry eventually reported the incident to the police.

Travis D avidson , the victim’s cousin, testified that after the school dance on January 26, 1996, he observed two crowds in an area where some individuals were “thro wing blows,” b ut he could not identify the individuals. Davidson also observed the co-defendant run up the street and yell that he was going to get a gun. Davidson could also see that the co-defendant was not wearing
a shirt and his face was bleeding. At this point, Davidson and the victim ran to their grandmother’s house.

Davidson testified that a group consisting of Defend ant Willie Dockins, the co-defendant, and some other individu als s ubsequ ently came to his grandmother’s house and began asking questions about somebody with whom they had been fighting. The group left, but Defendant and the co-defendant s

ubsequently retur

ned to the house. Davidso n eventually went

in the house while the victim remained outside with Defendant and the co-defendant. Davidson then heard a boom and when he looked outside, he saw Defendant and the co-defendant running away.

DaRobert Jones, Davidson’s brot her, testified that after the dance at the school, he was involved in a fight between the Leath Street group and the Scutter Field group. Jones observed that while he was fighting on behalf of the Leath Street group, the co-defendant was fighting on beh

alf of the Scutter

Field group. Jones subsequently left the fight when “[s]omebody screamed out in the crowd that they were going to get a gun.”

Jones testified that after the fight, he went to his grandmother’s house. Jones subsequently observed the victim outside ta

lking to the co-defendant a nd an individual who

was wearing a sk

ull cap. Shortlythereafter, Jones heard a “pow” and when he looked outside, he saw the “guy with the skull cap running with a

gun in his hand” alo

ng side the co-de

fendant. Jones noticed that the gun was a chrome revolver.

Marcus Pearson testifiedthat he observed the fight after th

e school dance a

nd he saw “some boys off Leath Str

eet” jump on the co

-defendant and

injure him. Pearso

n subsequently wen

t with Defendant,

the co-defendant, and two other individuals to Leath Street in order to obtain the names of the people who had injured the co-defendant. The group eventually ended up at the residence of the victim on Leath Street wherethey had a conversation with Davidson. During the conversation, the group questioned Davidson about the names of the individuals who had been in the fight and they asked Davidson where his brother was. The reafter , Pearson and the t wo other individua

ls partedcompany with Defendant and the co-defendant. When Pearsonleft, he heard Defendant say that he was “going to do something bad.”-3-

Pearson testified that late

r that same

day, he played basketball with Defendant. At that time, Defendant

told Pearson that he had shot

the victim after s

he said something to

him. Defendant a

lso told Pearson that immediately before he shot the victi m, he told her “it ain’t going to be nothing, Bitch.” Pearson also saw Defendant with a revolver that had a purple handle.

Michael Tart testifi ed that he as sisted the co-defendant in the fight after the school dance. After the fight, T

art accompanie

d the co-defend

ant to his house, where theco-defendant retrieved
a silver gun with a purple handle. Tart then saw Pearson approach t he resi dence and he heard Pearson say, “let’s go get them.” The co-defendant and Pearson then attempted to leave, but they were stopped by the co-defendant’s mother.

Tart testified that after the co-defendant’s mother left, a group consisting of Defendant, the co-defendant,

Tart, Pearson, a

nd another individu

al formed and eve

ntually left the residence. When Tart began walking away from the group, Defendant stated, “if you ain’t with us, you without us.” Tart then rejoined the group and the group went to the home of the victim’s grandmother. When the group arrived, they asked for Davidson to come outside and when he refused, Defendant “got mad” and stated, “we need to quit bull-shitting around.” Tart then became confused because he believed that the group’s purpose was to “fight and get some names.”

Tart testified that at this point, the group started to walk away. Defendant then told t hree members of the group to leave, and he asked the co-defendant fo r a gun. The co-defendant then reached into his pocket and shortly thereafter, Tart saw Defendant holdin

g a silver gun with a

purple handle. As Tart and the others left, he saw Defendant and the co-def endant walk

ing back in the direction of the v

ictim’s residenc

e. Tart subseque

ntly heard a gunsh

ot.

Tart testified that Defendant had repeatedly asked the co-defendant for the gun befo re the shooting. Tart was not sure why Defendant had joined the group, o

ther than “[Def

endant] just came by to be nosey and to start something at the time.”

Roosevelt Taylor testified that he was with the group that w ent to the residen

ce of the victim
on Ja nuar y 26, 1996. Before they got to the house on Leath Street, Taylor observed that the codefendant was holding a chro

me gun. Taylor left

the group after they arrived at the house, but he encountered

Defendant a shor

t time later. At tha

t time, Defendant

gave Taylor the g

un and told Taylor to “get rid of it.” Defendant stated that he had shot the victim in the chest. Defenda nt also told Taylor that “he was trying to get the boy to come out the house, and the boy wouldn’t come out the house. So he shot the girl in the chest.” Taylor testified that after Defendant gave h im the gu n, he colored the handle blue and hi

d it in his sister’s residence. Taylor’s sister subsequently gave the gun to the police.

Officer Cham Payne of the Memphis Police Department testified that he recovered

the gun in this case. All parties stipulated that the bullet recovered from the body of the victim was fired from the gun.-4-

Dr. W end y Gunther testifie d that she perfor

med an autopsy on th

e body of Jewell Jo

nes. During the autopsy, Dr. Gunther observed that there was one bullet wound on the left breast and Dr. Gunther recovered one bullet from the body. Dr. Gunth

er opined that the

victim died from a

gunshot wound through the hear

t. Dr. Gunther als

o opined that the bu

llet’s path was consistent

with a gun pointed at the che

st. Sergeant Ottis Stewart of the Memphis Police Department testified that he interviewed the co-defendant

as part of his investigation of this case. During the interview, the co-defendant stated that he was with Defendant

when Defendant shot

the victim with a ch

rome revolver th

at had a purple handle. The co-defendant also stated that before Defendant shot the victim, he heard Defendant say, “There ain’t no love lost.”

Lieutenant

A.M. DeWitt of the

Memphis Police Dep

artment testifie

d that h e interviewed Defendant

as part of his investigation of this case. During the interview, Defendant stated that when he learned that

the co-defendant had been in a fight and Tart had fai

led to assist the co-

defendant, he became angry and stated, “Man, I’ll help you fight. I’ll come

up there everyday after school and help you fight.” De

fendant also

stated that Taylor and Pearson then said, “We need to get clicked up, to get some more N-----s, and fall on Leath Street and take care of our busines s.” Defendant stated that

in response, he told the co-defendant that he would go with him. Defendant admitted in his statement t

hat the reason he

and the other memb

ers of the group w

ent to Leath Stree

t was to “fight the boys who jumped on [the co-defendant] because they all lived on Le ath Street.” Defendant

also stated that when the group arrived at Leath Street, Pearson

said, “One of the dudes live right here and his name is Travis.” Defendant stated that the group then questioned Davidson about the fight, and Davidson denied fighting the co-defendant. Defendant also told the police that after Davidson went back in the house and came back out , D efendant told him “ You-all need to quash this shit,” and he to

ld Davidson to shake the co-defendant’s hand. Defendant stated that when Davidson refused to shakethe co-defendant’s hand, Defendant “told that little dude Travis that he making it seem like it ain’t through with the situation.”

Defendant

testified that while he and the co -defend ant were walking to the home of the victim on Leath Street, he confiscated the gun from

the co-defenda

nt in order to avoid

getting into trouble. Defendant also t estified that while

he was talking to

the victim, he accidently dropped the gun. When the victim questioned Defendant about the gun, Defendant picked up the gun and pulled the trigger in order t o show the victim that the gun was not loaded, which caused the gun to fire accidentally. Defendant and the co-defendant then ran away from the sce ne.
Defendant

testified that

even though the victim screamed when the gun was fired, he was not
awarethat he had shot

her. Defendan

t admitted that afte

r he ran from the

scene, he gave t

he gun to Taylor because he “didn’t want to get caught with the weapon.”

Defendant

admitted that when he gave his statement to the police after the shooting, he lied to them when he stated that the co-defendant was the one who shot the victim. Defendant testified that he lied to the police “so it make [him]self look innocent.”-5- II. COMPETENCY

Defendant

contends that the trial court erre d when it found that

he was competent

to stand trial. We disagree. Initially, we note

that Defendant

has cited absolute

ly no authority in sup

port of his argume

nt. Thus, this issue is waived. Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). Notwithstanding waiver, we conclude that Defendant is

not entitled to reli

ef on the merits.

Dr. Samuel Craddock, a clinical psychologist from the Middle Tennessee Mental He alt h Institute, testified during the competenc y hearin g that he evaluated Defendant during the period from April21 to May 14, 1998. After e val uating Defendant, Dr. Craddock formed the opinion that Defendant

was competent to assist couns e l and further, there would be no basis for asserting an insanity defense at trial. Dr. Craddock also evaluated Defendant on the morning of the competency hearing and Dr. Craddock found no substantial change in Defendant’s condition.

On cross-examinat

ion, Dr. Craddock

acknowledged th

at Dr. Wyatt

Nichols hadconcluded that Defendant’s competency and sanity were “questionable.” However, Dr. Craddock also noted that D efend ant had been uncooperative at the time of Dr. Nichols’ evaluation and as a result, the assessment

could not be completed. Dr. Craddock also testified that even if Defendant was hearing voices as he claimed, that would not interfere wi

th his ability to conc

entrate, functi

on, or participat

e at trial.

Defendant

testified that

he had been hearing the voice of the victim and the victim had even visited him in his cell. Defendant also testified that he had attempted to commit suicide. A letter submitted to the trial court from Larry Southard, Director of Forensic Services for the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, states that after completing an evaluation, the clinical staff was of the opinion that Defendant is able to “adequa

tely assist in his defense in a court of law.” The staff based this determination on findings that Defendant

“does understand the charges pending against him and the consequences which may follow and he i

s able to advise

counsel and part

icipate in his own defense.” In addition, the staff concluded that a defense of insanity could not be supported in this case.

At the conclusi on of the competency hearing, the trial court found that Defendant was competent

to stand trial. The trial court stated that it appeared from Defendant’s testimony that he
was “competent and knowledgeable of his circumstances and the background of the case and his situation.” The trial court also noted that it was apparent that Defendant understood that he had not actually heard t

he voice of the vic

tim and instead, suc

h occurrences

were simply nightma

res. The standard for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is set forth in Dusky v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 ( 1960):-6-

[T]he “test must be whether [the defendant]has sufficient pr esent ability to con

sult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. , 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 789. This standard has been adopted in Tennessee. See State v. Black , 815 S.W.2d 166, 174 ( Tenn. 1991); State v. Lem ing , 3 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “Th e burden is on the defendant to establish his incompetency to stand trial by a preponderance

of the evidence.” Leming , 3 S.W.3d at 14. “On appeal, the trial court’s findings are conclusive unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” Id.

The evidence in

this case does not p

reponderate a

gainst the trial court’s determination that Defendant

was compete

nt to stan d trial. Indeed, w e can find nothing

in the record whi

ch would reasonably

lead the trial court to questionDefendant’s competence. Quite simply, there is nothing in the reco rd that c ontradicts the co nclusion of the sta

ff at the Middle Te

nnessee Mental H

ealth In stitute that Defendant “does understand the charges pending against him and the conseque nce s which may follow and he is able to advise counsel and participate in his own defense.” Under these circumstan ces, we conclu de that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
III. INSANITY

Defendant contends that the trial court should have declared

that he was insane

at the time of the commission of the offense. We disagree.

We note that as with the previous issue, De

fendant has cite

d absolutely

no au thority in support of his argument. Thus, this issue is waived. Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b).

In addition, Rule 12.2(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly states that
a defendant must give written noticeof an intent t o rely upon the insanity defense and if the defendant fails to do so, “insanity may not be raised as a

defense.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a). No such notice appears in the record and in fact, Defendant’s trial counsel admitted during th e competency hearing thathe had not filed any notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense. Therefore, the defense of insanity was not available to Defendant in this case.
Further, insanity is an affirmative defense which a defe ndant mus t prove by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (1997). The determination of a defendant’s sanityat the time of the crime is a question of fact for the jury upon consideration of all the evidence. See State v. Sparks , 891 S .W.2d 607, 616 (Tenn. 1995). Thus, even if Defendant had filed the required notice, Defenda

nt’s sanity at the ti

me of the commission

of the offense

would have been
a question for the jury andit would have clearly been improper for the trial court to resolve this issue before trial. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
IV. INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE-7-

Defendant

contends that

the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the gun to be introduced into

evid ence after its

appearance was altered by the removal of a security latch. We disagree.

Once again, Defenda

nt has failed to cit

e any authority wh

atsoever in

support of his

argument. Thus, this issue is waived. Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10( b). Moreover , the record indicates that Defendant

failed to make any objection when the gun was introduced into evidence during the direct examination of Taylor. By failing to make a c

ontemporaneous o

bjection, Defen

dant has waived th

is issue. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a).
In addition, Defe

ndant has failed t

o identify any part of

the record which indicates that the gun was in fact altered in any manner before it was introduced into evidence. Thus, it is unclear whether the alleged alteration actually occurred. Nevertheless, we conclude that even if the gun was altered in the man

ner Defendant c

laims, Defendan

t is not entitled to re

lief on the merits. Although Defendant’s argument for this issue is far from clear, it appears that he contends that the removal of the security latch hampered his ability to support his theory of defense that the gun disc harged when he accidentally dropped it. However, Defendant has failed to offer any explanation for how his ability to advanc e this theor y was affected. Moreover, contrary to what Defendant

claims in his brief, he did not testify at trial that the gun discharge

d when he dropped

it. Rather, Defendant testified that the gun discharged after he picked it up and “pulled the trigger click, click, click.” We can see no wa y in which the presence of the security latch would have discredited the State’s theory tha

t Defendant fire

d the gun intentiona

lly and would have supported Defendant’s theory that he fired the

gun only because

he was unaware that it was loaded. In addition, we not e the jury was shown two photographs of the gun as it appeared when it was discovered by the police.

In short, Defendan

t has f ailed to demonstrate any prejudice from the manner in which the trial court admitted the gun into evidence. Thus, any error wasclearly harmless. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a). Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In five separate i

ssues that are es sentially id entical, Def

endant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree. Initially, we note that Defendant has failed to support h is contention with a

ny citation to

the record and further, he has f

ailed to support his contention with any argument other than four conclusory sentences which simply state

that the evidence

in this case was ins

ufficient. Thus,

this issue is waived. Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). Notwithstanding waive r, we conclude that Defendant is not e

ntitled to relief e

ven on the merits. Where the sufficiency

of the evidence is contested on appeal, the relevant question for the reviewing court is whether a ny rati onal trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virgini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99

S.Ct.-8-

2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) . In determining the sufficiencyof the evidence , this Court does not reweigh or re

evaluate the evidence. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Nor may this Court substitu

te its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence. Liakas v. State , 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956). To the contrary, this Court is required t

o afford the State

the strongest legit

imate view of the evidence contained in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn fr om the evidence. Statev. Tuttle , 914 S.W.2d 926, 932 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995). Since a verdict of guilt

removes the presumption of

a defendant’s innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the defendant has the burden of proof on the sufficiency of the evidence at

the appellate level. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Under Tennessee law, first deg ree murder is “[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(a)(1) (199

7). A person acts

intentionally “when it is the per son’s conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(18) (1997). “‘[P]remeditation’ is an act done after exercise of reflection and judgment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d) (1997). Although premeditation require s that “the intentto kill must have been formed prior to the

act itself[,] [i] t is not necessary tha t the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d) (1997). The element of premeditation is a questionfor the jury which may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing. State v. Gentry , 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Tennessee courts ha ve deline ated several circumstances that may be indicative of premeditation, including the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim, State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997), facts from which mo tive may be inferred, State v. Bordis , 905 S.W.2d 214, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), and calmness immediately after the killing, Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 660.

We conclude that

when the evidence in this case is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, as it must be, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant killed Jewell Jones intentionally and with premeditation.
First, the State introducedevidence from which a motive may be inferred. Several witnesses testified that the co-defendant was involved in a fight after the school dance and DaR obert Jones testified that the co-defe

ndant was fighting

on behalf of the Sc

utter Field group a

gainst the Leath Street group. Defenda

nt told the police in

his statement that when he learned that the co-defendant had been in a fight, he became angry and stated, “Man, I’ll help you fight. I’ll come up there everyday after school and help you fight.” Defendant also told the po lice that when Taylor and Pearson said, “We need to get clicked up, to get some more N- ----s, and fall o n Leath Street and take
care of our business,” he told the co-defendant that he would go with him. Defendant admitted in his statement to the police that the reason he and the other members of the group went to Leath Street was to “fight the bo

ys who jumped on [the

co-defendant] because

they all lived on Leath Street.”

Defendant

told the police that when the group arrived at Leath Street, Pearson said, “One of the dudes live right here and his name is Travis.” Pearson testified that the group then questioned Da vid son about the fight and all of the members of the group except for Defendant and the co--9-

defendant eventually left. In addition, Pearson testified that when he left, he heard Defendant say that he was “going to do something bad.” Tart testified that when Davidson refused to come outside, Defendant

“got mad” and stated “we need to quit bull-shitting around.” Tart also testified that when Defendant

told the other members of the group to leave, Defendant asked the co-defendant for a gun. Defendant

told the police tha

t when Davidson re

fused to shake the co-defendant’s hand, Defendant “told that little dude Travis that he making it seem like it ain’t through with the situation.”

Pearson testified that when he saw Defendant after the shooting, Defendant stated that he shotthe victim after s

he said something to

him and he told her “it ain’t going to be nothing, Bitch.” In addition, the co-defendant told the police that before Defendant shot

the victim, Defendant said, “Thereain’t

no love lost.” Taylor testified that Defendant told him that “he was trying to get the boy to come out the house, and the boy wouldn’t come out the house. So he shot the girl in the chest.”
Second, the evidence clearly established that Defendant used a deadly weapon to kill an unarmed victim. There is no dispute that the victim was unarmed when Defendant killed her.
Third, there was evide

nce that Defend

ant was calm im

mediat ely after the killing. Indeed, Pearson testified that he played basketball with Defendant after the shooting. Further, the evidence established that Defendant had the presence of mind to have Taylor hide the murder weap

on because he “didn’t want to get caught with the weapon.” In addition, Defendant sub sequently lied to the p olice and told them that the co-defendant w

as the one who shot t

he victim “so it m

ake [him]sel f look innocent.”

We conclude that a rational jury could infer from the above evidence that De fendant became angry when he learned that the co-defendant had been injured by a group from Le ath Street, Defendant

decided to go to Leath Street to seek revenge, Defendant was displeased when Davidson refused to shake the co-defendant’s hand, Defendant was displeased again when Davidson refused to come out of the house, Defendant di rected his displeasure toward the victim when Davidson remained inside the house, Defendant exchanged words with the victim, Defendant decided to direct his desire for revenge at the victim, and Defendant decided to kill the victim at least a short period before he s hot her in the chest. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jur

y to find beyond a r

easonable doubt t

hat D efenda nt killed Jewell Jones intentionally and with premeditation. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.