## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . V elez , 2012 IL App (1st) 101325

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. SAMUELVEL EZ , Def

endant- Appellant.

District & N o. First District, F ourth Division Docke t No. 1-10-1325

Filed Rehea ringdenied Marc h 22, 2012

April 16, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) On appea l from defe ndant’s conviction for child abduction, the appellate
court reje cted defe ndant’s contentions that he was d en i ed due proce ss when the trial court g ave the pattern instruction on t h e p ermissive
pres umption that defe ndant acte d with an unlawful purpose when he attempted to lure the victim into his va n, that the “luring ” section of the child abduction sta tu t e was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and that the trial court err ed in denying defe ndant a bill of particula rs, in ref using to allow the cross-e x amination of an office r about the sear ch of defe ndant’s van, in finding de fenda nt’s offe nse was sexually motivated for purposes of sentenc ing, and in requiring defe ndant to reg ister as a sex offe nder.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 08-CR-50 4 3 ; t he Hon. Colleen McSwee ney-Moore , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg
, and Sarah C urry , all of State Appellate D efe nder’ s Offic e, of Chica g o, for a ppellant.

Anita M. Alvare z, State’s Attorney
, of Chicag o (Alan J

. Spellberg
, Mary L

. Bola nd, and Tasha- Marie Kelly
, Assistant State’s At t orney s, of counsel), f

or the People.

Panel J USTI CE FI TZ GERAL D SMI TH delivere d t h e judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice L avin and J ustice Sterba concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 After a jury trial, defe ndant Samuel Velez was co n v i ct ed o f ch i l d ab du ct i o nand
sentenc ed to two year s’ incar cer ation. On appea l, defe ndant contends: (1) he was denied his due proce ss rights due to a permissive presumption contained in a jury instruction g iven to the jury ; (2) the child abduction statute under which defe nd an t was convicted is unconstitutionally v ague as applied to defe ndant; (3) the trial court err ed in denying his motion for a bill of particula rs; (4) the trial court e rre d in prec luding de fense counsel fr om

cross-e x amining a police office r reg arding what he found when sear ching defe ndant’s van; (5) the trial court erre d in findingthat defe ndant’s off ense of child abduction wa s sexually motivated wher e that infere nce was not supported by the underly ing fac ts of the offe nse; and (6 ) h e wa s denied his due process rights wher e, because there wer e inadequate procedur al safe guards during his hearing on sexual motivation, the trial court arbitra rily found the offe nse to be sexually

motivated. For

the followingrea sons, we af firm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Def

endant was charg ed via indictment w ith one count of child abduction. Prior to tr ial, defe ndant filed a motion for a bill of particula rs, reque sting that the State define the “exact statement(s) or action(s) ” which form the “other than a lawful p u rp o s e. ” T he State filed a response in which it stated that it would “re ly on the statements and actions of the defe ndant when he confr onted [ J .H.] on Februa ry 20, 2008 at appr ox imately 3:15 P.M. i n the ar ea of 9500 S. Oak Park Av en u e, Oak L awn, I llinois as summarized in the Oak L awn Police Depa rtment repor

ts that wer e previously tender ed to defe nse counsel.” The court denied the motion. ¶ 4 The following evidenc e was adduce d at trial. On Fe bruar y 20, 2008, 14-year -old J .H. was

-2-an eighth-grade student at Simm ons Middle School located on 95th Street in Oak L awn,

I llinois

. When school ended that day at 3 p

. m

. , J .H. walked down 95th Street to meet her mother. J.H. was wea

ringa hooded w inter coa

t and had a

school bagon her shoulder

. ¶ 5 J .H. normally met her mother near the Car Max on 95th St re et afte r school. That day
, howeve r, J .H. arrived at Car Max and saw that her mother was not there

. As was prea rra ng ed for occa sions when her mother could not g et to their meetin g p l ac e on time, J .H. beg an walking down 95th Street, westbound to Oak Park Avenue

. Per the plan, she would continue headingwestwa

rd until she would meet up with her mother. ¶ 6 As J .H. walked down 95th Street, a man in a white van slowed down, look ed at h er , smiled, and beepe d his horn. J .H. testified at trial that the man did a “double take.” J .H. tried
to ignor e him, put her head down and kept walking

. J .H. identified defe ndant as this man in
court. ¶ 7 J .H. continued walking
, and eventually tu rn ed right ont o Oak Park Avenue

. When she turned, she noticed the same white van parke d on Oak Park Avenue with the passeng er side window rolled down and the eng ine still running

. J .H. put the hood on her coat up and kept walking
, trying to ignor e the man even though her path took her right by the passeng er window. As she walked past the van, the man said, “He y baby g irl, ho w y o u doing?” The

man was sitti ng in the driver’ s seat, leaning toward the open window, and motioning for her to approa ch the va

n. ¶ 8 J .H. felt scar ed an d b ega n wa l k i n g fa s ter in an attempt to g et awa y from def

endant. Def endant asked her if she neede d a ride home. J .H. continued walking quickly

. Def endant beg an driving slowly along side J .H. and asked her if she had just g otten out of school. J .H. did not respond. Def

endant continued driving along side J .H. and ag ain asked her if she neede d a ride home. At that point, J.H. sa w her mother down the street and told de fenda nt, “No, my mom’s rig ht there.” J .H. ra n to her mother’ s car

and def endant dr ove aw ay

. ¶ 9 Meanwhile, Kathlee n H., J .H.’s mother, had driven to Oak Park Avenue to look for J .H. As she sat in her car , she s aw J

. H. wa l k i n g toward her. As Kathlee n H. waited, she saw a white van pull a

round the corne r, park on the side of the road, a nd roll down the passe ng er side window. Kathleen H. then sa w J .H. turn the corner a

nd pull her hood up. She thought something did not fee l right beca use she could see J .H. “tensi ng up” near the van. As she watched, she saw defe ndant lean over and talk to J .H., and saw J .H. walk faster in her attempt to esca

pe def endant. De fenda

nt kept pace with J .H. in his van. ¶ 10 J .H. rea ched Kathlee n’s car and told her mother what had happene d. Kathlee n called the police and beg an following defendant’ s van. S he provided the police with a de scription of the van and the license plate number. The police instructed her to stop following the van and
to meet them in a n ea rb y p arking lot. At the parking lot, Kathlee n and J .H. spoke with various office rs, including Chicag o police office r Brian Wil liams. J .H. told Offic er Wil liams that the man who ha d been f ollowing he r had a

g oatee

. ¶ 11 After speaking with Kathlee n an d J

. H., Offic er Wil liams and his field trainingoffice r Thomas Cul h an e returne d to the Oak L awn police station to continue their investigation. They had the license plate number as well as information that the van had the word “Integra” written on the side. They contac ted Integr a Hea lthcare Sy stems, a medical equipment

-3-delivery service

. Offic er Wil liams spoke with Ba rbar a Ander son, the direc tor of operations, and informe d her of

the situation. ¶ 12 Ander son contac ted her driver supervisor, Michae l Volare vic, and asked him to look up the vehicle plate number to see which driver was assigned to that van. Volare vic did so and saw that it was assigne d to defe ndant. He th en called defe ndant on his cell phone and was unable to rea ch him. About 20 minutes later, defe ndant called Volare vic. Def endant was schedule d to be at 119th Street and Halsted, but he infor med Volar evic that he was in Oak L awn havi n g l u n ch. Volare vic instructed defe ndant to g o to the Oak L awn police station, explaining that the police had g otten a complaint. He asked de fenda nt what had ha

ppened. Volare vic testified that defe ndant then told him he did not know what he was talking about. He explained he had just e aten lunch, jumped in his van, and “saw just a g ood-looking g irl

on the street, and just whistled at her. I didn’t g et out of my car or any thing.” Volare vic also noted that, when he saw defe ndant the morning of Fe bruar y 20, 2008, defe ndant had a “ver y short clea n-cut g oatee .” ¶ 13 On cross-e x amination, Volare vic denied having spoken to police in F ebrua ry 2008. He testified that he f

irst talked with the police a year and a ha lf afte r the incide nt. ¶ 14 Ander son informe d t h e p o l i ce that defe ndant was the driver of the van in question. Around 6 p.m., defe ndant arrived at the police station, and Offic er Wil liams noticed that he looked as though he had rec ently shaved with a dry ra z o r. He d i d not have a goatee

. After beinginformed of

his Miranda rights, defenda nt agree d to talk with the police. ¶ 15 Def

endant told the office rs that he had been in the are a of 95th and Natoma at 3 p.m. that day placing a to-g o order at the Lucky Bur rito restaur ant. Def

endant said he then proce eded to the 9400 block of Oa

k Park Ave nue, par

ked his van, a

nd ate his burrito. Defenda nt said he was parke d there for about 10 minutes and, during that time, he did not speak to any body

or see any body

. ¶ 16 Of

fi ce r W illiams testified that he then went to the Lucky Bur rito and verified t h at defe ndant had place d a to-g o order that afte rnoon. T h e restaurant’s video surveillance

rec ording showed defe ndant entering the restaur ant and placing his order, and also showed the van with “I

ntegra”written on it parke d outside. ¶ 17 L ater that evening
, J .H. and Kathlee n identified defe ndant in a photo arr ay at the police station. They

also identified def

endant’ s van in the par

king lot as the one they

saw e arlier

. ¶ 18 On Februar

y 21, J .H. and her parents returned to the police station to speak w ith Cook County Assistant State’s Att orne y (A S A) Nicholle Hempel. ASA Hempel testified at t rial that J .H. seeme d to be a “ty pical grammar ag e school student” who “looked young .” J .H. and Kathlee n identified def

endant in a lineup. ¶ 19 ASA He mp el then spoke with defe ndant, who ag ain waived his Miranda rights. ASA He mp el testified that defe ndant g ave her an acc ount of the day simil ar to that he h ad previously g iven Offic er Wil liams. Specifica lly
, defe ndant said he was working on Fe bruar y 20, and that, around 3:00 p.m., he purcha sed a burrito at the Lucky Bur rito and parke d at 95th Street and Oak Park to eat in his van. Def endant claimed that he rema ined in his van and did
not talk to or see any

body else. Def

endant told ASA Hempel that he had worn a g oatee in the past, but that he shave d it off two or thre e day s prior.

-4-¶ 20 The jury found defe ndant guilty of child abduction. Def endant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The court sentenced defe ndant t o two year s’ i ncarce ra t i o n. It also found that the offe nse in this case was sexually motivated, explaining that it c ould think of situations wher e an individual attempts to lure a child into a vehicle wher e it might not be sexually motivated, such as wher e the individual holds the child for ransom. Howeve r, in this

case , it believed the c rime wa s sexually motivated. ¶ 21 Def

endant a ppeals.

¶ 22 ANALYSI S ¶ 23 I . J ury Instruction I ssue ¶ 24 Def

endant first contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury . Specifica lly
, def e n d a nt a rg u e s th a t a jury instruction g iven, I llinois Pattern J ury Instructions, Criminal, No. 8.11A (4th ed. 2000) (her einaf ter I PI Criminal 4th No. 8.11A), was improper as a matter of law beca use the permissive presumption within deprive d defe ndant of due proce ss wher e (1) there is no rational connec tion betwee n the fac t that defe ndant attempted to lure a child into his van and the re sulting pre sumption that he did so with an unlawful purpose; and (2) the State failed to introduce corr oborating evidenc e of defe ndant’s guilt, and the presumed fac t that defe ndant acte d with an unlawful purpose “does not flow beyond a rea sonable doubt from the pr oven fa cts.” We disagree

. ¶ 25 First, the State urg es this court to revie w this issue for plain err or, arg uing that defe ndant forf eited this issue on appea l by failing to properly prese rve it. See People v. Chapman
, 194 I ll. 2d 186, 225 (2000) (fa ilure to properly prese rve an alleg ed err or by both an objection at trial and a written posttrial motion constitutes a proce dural defa ult of that err or on revie w). Specifica lly
, the State argues that
, while defe ndant argued to the trial court that the jury instruction was impermissible beca use it “esse ntially shifted the burden to him and indicated
to the jury that he nee d ed to prese nt some evidenc e in order to rebut the infere nce” and included the same issue in his posttrial motion, that issue differ s from the issue befor e us on ap p eal. Def

endant responds that he did, in fac t, properly prese rve this issue for ap p ea l beca use his arg

ument on appea l, that the instruction cre ated an u n l aw ful permissive presumption, is the same as that made below, that is, t h at t h e instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proo f t o d ef endant. We disagree with the State that the argument on appea l prese nts a “wholly differ ent issue” than that prese nted below and find that defe ndant
properly prese rved this issue for a ppeal. ¶ 26 T h e purpose of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the corr ect pri n ci p l es o f l aw applicable to the evidenc e submitt ed to it so that the jury may rea ch a corr ect conclusion

acc ording to th e l aw and the evidenc e. People v. Hopp
, 209 I ll. 2d 1, 8 (2004). Whil e the
g iving of jury instructions is g ener ally within the discretion of the trial court, we revie w de

novo the question of whether the jury instructions acc urate ly conveyed the applicable law to the jury

. People v. Parker
, 223 I ll. 2d 494, 501 (2006). Rather th an co n s i dering a jury instruction in isol ation, we review whether the instructions g iven t he jury “ ‘considere d as

a whole, fully and fairly announce the law applicable to the respe ctive theories of the People and the defe nse.’ ” People v. Terry
, 99 I ll. 2d 508, 516 (1984) (quoting People v. Kolep
, 29

-5-I ll. 2d 116, 125 (1963)).

¶ 27 The jury

instruction in question reads:
“I f y ou find that the defendant lured, or attempted to lure a child under 16 yea rs of
age i n t o a m otor vehicle, and that he did so without the consent of a pare nt or law fu l custodian of the c hild, you may infer it wa s for other

than a law ful purpose.
You are never require d to make this infere nce. It is for the jury to deter mine whether the i n fe re n ce should be made. You should consider all of the evidenc e in deter mining whether to make this infere nce.” I llinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 8.11A (4th ed. 2000) ( here inafter I PICriminal 4th No. 8.11A). ¶ 28 A person acc used of a crime may only be convicted of a criminal offe nse upon proof that establishes guilt bey o n d a rea sonable doubt. People v. Hester
, 131 I ll. 2d 91, 98 (1989). Nonethele ss, the S t at e m ay be entitl ed to rely upon presumptions or i nfer ence s in order to establish a defe ndant’s guilt. Hester
, 131 I ll. 2d at 98. “A presumption is a leg al device that either permits or requires the trier of fac t to assume the exis tence of an ultimate fac t , af t er establishing cer

tain predic ate fac ts.” People v. W oodrum
, 223 I ll. 2d 286, 308 (2006) (citing People v. Pomyk

ala
, 203 I ll. 2d 198, 203 (2003), citing People v. W atts , 181 I ll. 2d 133, 141 (1998))

. “An infere nce is a fac tual conclusion that can rationally be drawn by considering other fac ts. Thus, an infere nce is mere ly a deduction that the fac t finder may draw in its discretion, but is not require d to draw as a matter of law.” People v. Funche s , 212 I ll. 2d 334, 340 (2004) (citing Michae l H. Gra ham, Cleary & Gra

ham’s Handbook of I llinois Evidence § 302.2, at 81 (8th ed. 2004), and 1 Clifford S. Fishman, J ones on Evidence § 4:1, at 299-300 (7th ed. 1992)); W

oodrum
, 2 23 I ll. 2d at 308 (“The fac t finder is fre e to acc ept or reje ct a permissive pre sumption.”). ¶ 29 Her e, the instruction at issue contains an infere nce. An infere nce may also be ref err ed to

as a permissive presumption. People v. F r az ier
, 123 I ll. App. 3d 563, 572 (1984) (“An infere nce, occa sionally ref err ed to as a ‘per

missiv e p re s u mption,’ permits but does not require a jury to find that one fac t is proved by the exis tence of another fac t.”). An infere nce does not violate due proce ss wher e: (1) there is a rational connec tion betwee n the basic fac t and the presumed fac t; (2) the presumed fac t must be more likely than not to flow from the basic fact; and (3) the infere nce is supported by corr oborating evidenc e o f gu i l t

. P eople v. Housby
, 84 I ll. 2d 415, 424 (1981). “I f there is no corroborating evidenc e, the leap from the basic fac t to the presumed element must still be proved bey o n d a rea sonable doubt.” F u n ch es , 2 1 2 I l l. 2d at 343 (citing Hester
, 131 I ll. 2d at 100); Housby
, 84 I ll. 2d at 4 2 1 (citing County Court v. Allen , 442 U.S. 140, 165-67 (1979))

. ¶ 30 A person commits child abduction by
, in rele vant part, intentionally luring or attempting to lur e a child under 16 year s of ag e into a motor vehicle without the consent of a pare nt or lawful custodian for other than a lawful purpose. 720 I L CS 5/10-5(b)( 10) (West 2008). The phrase “other than a lawful purpose” in the child ab du cti on statute implies actions which violate the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 I L CS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2008)). People v. W illiams
, 133 I ll. 2d 449, 453-54 (1990). “The require d showing *** [of] ‘other than a lawful purpose’ is essentially a statement of the crimi n al i n t ent, or mens rea

. Criminal intent is a state of mind that is usually inferr ed from the surrounding circ umstances.” W oodrum
, 223 I ll. 2d at

-6-316 (citingPeople v . Maggette , 195 I ll. 2d 336, 354 (2001)).

¶ 31 The State prese nted sufficie nt evidenc e to satisfy the three elements set forth in Housby

as to whether the act proved, i.e.
, that defe ndant attempted to lure J .H. into his vehicle, was committed for “other than a lawful purpose.” See 720 I L CS 5/10-5(b)( 10) (West 2008). The evidenc e adduce d at trial showed that J .H. was a 14-year -old g irl who was walking along a sidewalk afte r school, car

rying a bookbag

. Def

endant, a 41-year -old man whom J .H. did not know, saw her. He smiled at her, honked his horn, and slowed his van in order to talk to her. J .H. tried to ignor e him, put her head down, and walked faster

. J .H. turned a corne r and saw defe ndant parke d in his van up the street. When she near ed the van, defe ndant asked J .H. if

s h e wa n ted a ride home. J .H. continued to ignor e him. She put up her hood and wa l k ed faster

. De s p i t e al l o f this, defe ndant continued to pursue J .H. He pace d her with his van, driving along side her as she continued walking down the sidewalk. He called her “baby g irl” and ag ain asked her of s h e wanted a ride home. He leane d from the driver’ s seat to the
passeng er seat, motioning through the window for her to approa ch the van. Def endant only left J .H. alone when J .H. told him she saw her mother and beg an to run toward her mother’s

car

. ¶ 32 We find a rational connec tion betwee n the fac t proved, i.e.
, that defe ndant attempted to lure a child under 16 into his vehicle, and the fac t presumed, i.e.
, that defe ndant did so with other than a

lawful purpose . The jury acc epted J.H.’s testimony that defe ndant used wor ds and g estures designed to direc t her to enter his car

. She felt fea rful, tried to ignor e him, and then incre ased her pace in order to esca pe from defe ndant. Def

endant called her “baby g irl” and drove along side her, beckoning her toward his vehicle. When viewed in connec tion with all of the other evidenc e adduced at trial, includingdefe ndant l eaving the s cene when J .H. told him s he saw her mother, his attempt to chang e his appe ara nce that day , and his denial
to police that he had even seen J .H., the rational infere nce to be drawn is that defe ndant had an unlawf ul intent when he attempted to lure J.H. int o his van. ¶ 33 We are not persua ded by defe ndant’s arg ument that, beca

use he did not touch, harm, or threaten J .H., there is no rational connec tion betwee n the fac t proved and the fac t presumed. Specifica lly , defe ndant ar gues: “The re is no substantial assura nce that just beca

use [defendant] honked at J .H., asked her how she was doing, an d o ff ered her a ride home without her parent’ s consent, that he more likely than not did so for an unlawful purpose. *** [Defenda nt] spoke to a young g irl in the m iddle of the a fternoon on a busy street f rom his work van. [ Def

endant] did
not touch or harm J .H. He did not threaten her. He did not g et out of his van. As soon as J .H. said she did not need a ride, [defendant] drove away

. The fac t that [defendant] offe red J.H. a ride home without the consent of her pare nts does notrationally support the pre sumption that he did so without a lawf ul purpose.” ¶ 34 In People v. Patten
, 230 I ll. App. 3d 922 (1992), this court addre ssed the fac t t h at t he child abduction statute treats an attempted abduction and a completed abduction as the same crime:
“De fenda

nt next asser

ts that punishing unsucce ssful abductions as sever ely as

s u cc essful abductions is an unrea sonable method of acc omplishi ng the objective of

-7-protec ting children; there fore
, it is in violation of due proce ss. More or differ ent people

are not aff

ecte d, he argues; only the p u n i s h m ent is incre ased for attempt, which is inconsistent w ith the ide a of punishingattempt acts less seriously than completed a cts. I ll. Rev. St at. 1989, ch. 38, pa r. 8-4( c). The leg i s l at i ve history of section 10-5(b) (10) reve als the conce rn that attempted luring of a child is as serious a threat to the s afe ty of a c hild as a succ essful abduction. (See People v. W

illiams [,133 I ll. 2d 449, 457 (1990)].) In W illiams
, the supreme court observe d that ‘[o] nce a child is taken into a vehicle an d whisked awa y by a person harboring a criminal motive, it become s exceeding ly difficult, if not impossibl e, for law enfor ceme nt pe rsonnel to intervene for the protec tion of the child.’ (133 I ll. 2d at 457.) Her e, the incre ased penalty may have a deter rent eff ect on would-be v i o l at o rs by decla ringthat an attempt will be tre ated a s harshly as a c rime ac complished.
Acc ording ly
, we find that section 10-5(b) (10) is not in violation of the proportionate penalties or due proce ss clauses.” Patten , 230 I ll. App. 3d at 931. The child abduction statute criminalizes t h e act of luring a child, whether or not the act is

succe ssful, in order to protec t children from further acts of violence. Under the statute, there is no require ment that a defe ndant must actua lly touch or harm the child in order to be guilty of the crime of child ab duction. There fore
, defe ndant’s argument that, beca use he did not actua lly phy sically harm J .H., his attempted luring of J .H. into his vehicle does not rationally support the pre sumption that he did so with other than a lawful purpose is unpersuasive. ¶ 35 Nor do we find support for defe ndant’s argument that he was denied due proce ss unde r Housby beca

use the State failed to introduce corr oborating evidenc e of defe ndant’s guilt in order to allow the jury to make the infere nce in I PI Criminal 4th No. 8.11A. Rather, the State i n t roduce d evidenc e at trial that, afte r defe ndant attempted to lure J .H. into his v an an d befor e he went to the police station later that s am e d ay , he chang ed his appea ranc e by shaving off the g oatee he had worn for at least six months prior. Had defe ndant been innocently offe ring J .H. a ride home, as he argues, there would be no rea son for him to alter his appea ranc e in an a

ppare nt attempt not to be identified by J .H. ¶ 36 M o re o v er , t h e fa ct t h at defe ndant fled when he saw J .H.’s mother near by sho ws a

consc i o u s n ess of guilt which raises a rational infere nce of unlawful intent. See People v. McD onald
, 168 I ll. 2d 420, 448 (1995) (“While evidenc e of flig ht by itself is not sufficie nt to e stablish guilt, it is a circ umstance from which a trier of fac t ma y infer consciousness of
guilt. (See People v. Harris (1972), 52 I ll. 2d 558, 561.) C onsequently
, a trier of fac t may

co n s i d er a defe ndant’s flight with other fac tors tending to establish guilt. ([ People v. ] Campbell , 146 I ll. 2d [ 363,] 388 [ (1992)]; People v . Brown (1963), 27 I ll. 2d 23, 26.)”). ¶ 37 Finally
, defe ndant’s statement at the police station to police office rs and to ASA Hempel also supports the inf

er en ce t h at he acte d for other than a lawful purpose. When defe ndant spoke with both the police and the ASA, he denied talking to or even seeing J .H. in the are a of 95th and Oa

k Park. I f he ha d an innoce nt intent in talking with J .H. to mere ly offe r J.H.

a ride home, as he posits on appea l, then he likely would have said as much to the authorities. Instead, defe ndant tried to concea l h i s i ntera ction with J .H., which could be considere d evidenc e of his guilt, corrobora ting the te stimony

of J.H. and her mother.

-8-¶ 38 Def endant was not d ep ri v ed o f his due process rights by the presumption contained in I PI Criminal 4th No. 8.11A wher e the evidenc e at trial clea rly showed a rational connec tion betwee n the inferr ed fac t and the proved fac t, i.e.
, betwee n the fac t that defe ndant attempted
to lure J .H. into his van and the presumption that he did so for an unlawful purp o se; the inferr ed fact was more likely than not to flow from the proved fact, i.e.
, it was more likely than not that defe ndant lured J .H. for an unlawful purpose; and the infere nce was supported by corr oborating evidenc e of guilt, i.e.
, that defe ndant fled the scene , altere d his appea ranc e, and denied having any interac tion with J .H.. S ee Housby
, 84 I ll. 2d at 424. The jury was instructed that it c ould inf er–but was not require d to do so–that defe ndant’s attempt to lur e J .H. into his van was for other than a lawful purpose. This is prec isely what the law require s. The jury inferr ed an unla

wful purpose and found de fenda nt guilty of child abduc tion. ¶ 39 In addition, along with the “you may infer” languag e, the jury wa s also instructed that defe ndant is presumed innocent at ever y st age , a presumption that is not overc ome unless from all the evidenc e it is convince d beyond a rea sonable doubt that defe ndant is guilty
, and that the burden to prove defe ndant guilty beyond a rea sonable doubt rema ins with the State throughout the case . “When examining instructions in a ca se, no sing le instruction is to be judge d in artificia l isolation. It must be viewed in the context of the entire charg e.” Housby
, 84 I ll. 2d at 433-34. In the case at b ar , each instruction g iven the jury was taken from the I llinois Pattern J ury Instructions, and eac h ac cu ra t el y stated the law. Acc ording ly
, the instructions comported with I llinois S up re m e C o urt Rule 451(a) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (ef f. J uly 1, 1997)), which require s that, wher e a court in a criminal case deter mines that the jury sh ould be instructed on a subject, and the I llinois Pattern J ury Instructions contains an applicable instruction, then the I PI “shall be g iven unless the court determ ines it does not

acc urate ly state the law.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) People v. Durr
, 215 I ll. 2d 283, 300-01 (2005). W e fi n d here in that defe ndant was not denied due proce ss wher e the trial
court instructed the jury with I PI Criminal 4th No. 8.11A. Acc ording ly
, the trial court did not

err in instructing the jur

y with I PICriminal 4th No. 8.11A.

¶ 40 I I . As-Applied Challeng e to Child Abduction St atute ¶ 41 De fe n d an t n ext contends that the “luring ” section of the child abduction statute (7 2 0 I L CS 5/10-5(b)( 10) (West 2008)) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, as the statute d i d not provide him adequate notice of the conduct that would subject him to cr i m i n al penalties. Specifica lly
, defe ndant ar gu es t h at the failure “to define the unlawful act or purpose alleg ed” subjected him to the “ar bitrary whims of the jury” as to whether the State proved this element of the offe nse and failed to g ive him “ade quate notice as to what actions or conduc t subjected [him] to criminal pena lties.” We disagree

. ¶ 42 A statute is presumed to be constitutional and, thus
, th e party challeng ing it bear s the burden of clea

rly demonstrating its invalidity

. See People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d 264, 290 (2003); acc ord People v. Bailey
, 167 I ll. 2d 210, 225 (1995); People v. Zapata
, 347 I ll. App. 3d 956, 966 (2004). We a re duty -bound to c onstrue a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality , if this can rea sonably be done. See Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d at 290-91; acc ord In re C.E.
, 161 I ll. 2d 200, 227 (1994); People v. Cosby
, 305 I ll. App.

-9-3 d 2 1 1, 224 (1999) (we must aff irm statute’s constitutionality and validity whene ver possible). In examining a statute’s constitutionality , we employ a de novo standard of revie w. See Zapata , 347 I ll. App. 3d at 967. ¶ 43 For a st atute to comply with due process, it must meet two require ments. First, it must g i v e a p er son of ordinary intelligenc e a rea sonable opportunity to know what conduct is lawful and what conduct is unlawful so that he may act acc ording ly

. See Bailey
, 167 I ll. 2d
at 228. Howeve r, a statute need not define the proscribed co n du ct with “mathematical
prec ision” or g ive letter-pe rfe ct notice of this conduct to avoid invalidation o n v agu en ess grounds. See People v. Holt
, 271 I ll. Ap p. 3d 1016, 1026 (1995). Rather, as long as the
statute clea

rly applies to the defe ndant’s conduct in light of the fac ts of the case , a challeng e to the statute’s constitutionality based upon vagueness will not succe ed. See Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d at 291-92; see Holt
, 271 I ll. App. 3d at 1026 (whe re statute prohibits conduct knowing ly done to acc omplish that which is prohibited, acc used cannot claim he suffe red from lack of

war ning or knowledg e that his conduc t violated the law)

. ¶ 44 The second require ment of due proce ss is that the statute must provide expli cit standards
to police office rs, judge s and juries who apply the statute in order to preve nt its arbitra ry and discriminatory enforceme nt. See In re C.E.
, 161 I ll. 2d at 227. Howeve r, the statute will not be decla red vague if a mere hy

pothetical situation involving disputed meaning s of some of its terms is prese nted. See People v. Grec o , 204 I ll. 2d 400, 416 (2003); see also In re C.E.
, 161 I ll. 2d at 211 (“ ‘[t] he fac t that the [st atute] might operate unconstitutionally under some

conce ivable set of circ umstances is insufficient to rende r it wholly invalid’ ” (quoting United States v. Salerno
, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) ); Holt
, 271 I ll. App. 3d at 1027 (“statute is not unconsti tu tionally vague si mply beca use i t allows some room for judicial interpre tation”). Rather, wher e judicial construction of the statute may be employed to r ender it suff iciently definite so as to prec lude arbitra ry or discriminatory application, a challeng e to the statute’s constitutionality

based upon vagueness will not succe ed. See In re C.E. , 161 I ll. 2d at 228. In sum, a statute violates due proce ss on vagueness grounds “ ‘ “only if its ter ms a re so illdefine d that the ultimate decision as to its meaningrests on the opini ons and whims of the trier of fac t rathe r than any objective criteria or fac ts.” ’ ” Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d at 291 (quoting Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc.
, 179 I ll. 2d 160, 168 (1997), quoting People v. Burpo
, 164 I ll. 2d 261, 266 (1995)). ¶ 45 Applyi n g t h e t wo -p art due proce ss analy sis outlined earlier, it is clea r that the child abduction st atute is indeed constitut ional, not void for vagueness, and should be affirmed. The statute both sets forth what conduct is unlawful and provides sufficie ntly d ef inite standards to guide triers of fac t so that its application does not depend mere ly on their private

conception s

. T h ere is no doubt that defe ndant’s conduct in the instant case clea rly falls within the statutory proscription. The rele vant portion of the child abduction statute rea ds as follows: “(b) A person commits child abduction when he or she does any one of the following : * * * (10) Intentionally lures or attempts to lure a child under the ag e of 16 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer
, or dwelling place without the consent of the pare nt or

-10-lawful custodian of the ch i l d fo r other than a lawful purpose.” 720 I L CS 5/10- 5(b)( 10) (West 2008).
It is evident from the plain languag e of the statute that the luri n g o r at t empted luring of a child into a vehicle or dwelling place without the consent of a pare nt or custodian is illeg al when the individual committing the luring ha s any underly ing c riminal intent or mens rea

. See W oodrum
, 223 I ll. 2d at 316 (“The require d showing *** [of] ‘other than a lawful
p urpose’ is essentially a statement of the criminal intent, or mens rea

. Criminal intent is a state of mind that is usually inferr ed from the surrounding circ umstances.” (citing Maggette
, 195 I ll. 2d at 354)). There fore
, defe ndant had sufficie nt notice reg arding prec isely when his actions beca

me criminal. See Bailey
, 167 I ll. 2d at 228 (to comport with due p ro ce s s require ments, a statute “must g ive a person of ordinary intelligenc e a rea sonable opportunity
to know what conduct is lawful and what conduct is unlawful so that he may act acc ording ly” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 46 W e s p ec i fi ca l l y d i s agr ee wi t h d ef en d an t ’s assessment that, “[w]i tho u t fu rt h er

ex p l an at i o n, the statute as applied proscribed [defendant] from action; for ‘other than a lawful purpose.’ This broad term provided virtually no guidance as to the statute’s rea ch as applied to [defendant]. Be cause this term was left undefine d and unexplained, the statute did
not provide adequate notice of what conduc t was proscribed, and there fore the s tatute was unconstitutionally vague as applied.” Rather, the statute clea rly informed defe ndant that, if he attempted to lure J .H. in order to commit actions which would violate the Criminal Code, he would be guilty

of child abduc tion. ¶ 47 Our supreme court considere d an as-a pplied vagueness challeng e to this same statute in W oodrum

. Simi lar to the case at bar, the W oodrum defe ndant arg

ued that, beca

use he was not provided notice of the unlaw ful purpose, he lacke d adequa te notice to prepare his defense

. W oodrum
, 223 I ll. 2d at 303. The court, rely ing on W illiams
, noted that it had previously held that the phrase “other th an a l aw ful purpose” was not unconstitutionally vague on its fac e beca use, g iven its ordinary meaning
, it implied “ac tions that violate the Criminal Code.” W oodrum
, 223 I ll. 2d at 303 (citing W illiams
, 133 I ll. 2d at 453-54). The court then rea soned that the phrase alone “g ives adequate notice of the conduct that will subj ec t a person to criminal penalties.” W

oodrum
, 223 I ll. 2d at 303. After finding that the phrase g ives adequate notice, the court noted that, in that particula r case , the defe ndant’s unlawful purpose or intent

was clea r from the detailed statement he provided to police. W oodrum
, 22 3 I l l

. 2 d at 303. Def endant urg es us to f

ind this small por

tion of the cour t’s opinion to be disposit ive of the

case befor e us, as he did not make such an incriminating st atement to the pol ice reg arding his criminal intent, or lack the reof . Howeve r, i n W

oodrum , the cour

t did not st ate or

imply
t h at, short of a clea

r statement of unlawful intent, its decision would have been differ ent. W oodrum , 223 I ll. 2d at 303. We decline to extend W oodrum in such a manne r. ¶ 48 Moreove r, beca use law enforceme nt, judge s, and juries have clea r guidelines as to what conduct is criminal, there is no dang er of arbitra ry and discriminatory enfor ce ment in this

case

. See C.E.
, 161 I ll. 2d at 227 (the sec ond require ment of due pr ocess is that the statute
must provide expli cit standards to police office rs, judge s and juries who apply the statute in order to preve n t i t s arb itrary and discriminatory enfor ceme nt). The phrase “other than a lawful purpose” in the child abduction statute implies actio n s wh i ch violate the Criminal

-11-Code. W illiams
, 133 I ll. 2d at 453-54. As such, t h e s t atut e provided sufficie nt guidance to law enfor ceme nt, judg es, and the jury as to what conduct is criminal. In addition, while the jurors wer e not prese nted wi th a specific underly ing offe nse which was alleg ed to have motivated defe ndant’s actions, they wer e prese nted with clea r para meters defining the boundarie s of the offe nse, that is, whether defe ndant attempted to lure J .H. into his vehicle in order to c ommit actions which would violate the Criminal Code. ¶ 49 The phrase “for other than a lawful purpose” informed defe ndant that if his act of luring

was committed with a criminal intent
, h e wa s gu ilty of the offe nse of child abduction. Acc ording ly
, beca

use the child abduction statute is not ill-defined or lacking al l o b j ec tive criteria, we will not decla

re it to be unconstitutionally vague so as to violate defe ndant’s due
proce ss rig hts.

¶ 50 I I I . The B ill of Particulars ¶ 51 Next, defe ndant contends that the trial court err ed wh en it denied defe ndant a bill of particula rs. Specifica lly
, defe ndant argues that, beca use the indictment failed to all ege the specific unlawful p u rpose which defe ndant possessed, he was deprive d of his ability to prepa re and prese nt an adequa te defe nse when the cou rt d enied his motion for a bill of particula rs. We disagree

. ¶ 52 The trial c ourt may requirethe State to furnish a bill of par ticulars whe n an indictment fails to sufficie ntly specify the particula rs of the charg ed offe nse in order to enable a defe ndant to prepa

re a defe nse. 725 I L CS 5/111-6 (West 2008). “The purp o s e o f a bill of particula rs i s to g ive t he defenda

nt notice of the ch arge and to inform the defenda nt of t he particula r transac tions in question, thus enablingprepa ration of a defe nse.” W

oodrum
, 223 I ll. 2d at 301-02. “ ‘[W ]here an indictment sufficie ntly informs the defe ndant of the offe nse charg ed ag ainst him there is no need for a bill of particula rs ***.’ ” People v. Lego
, 116 I ll. 2d 323, 337 (1987) (quoting People v. Tsukas
, 406 I ll. 613, 616-17 (1950))

. We revie w the trial court’s decision on a motion for a bill of particula rs for abuse of discretion. Lego
, 116 I ll. 2d at 336-37. An abuse of discretion is wher e the trial court’s ruling is “ar bitrary
, fanc iful, [or] unrea sonable,” or wher e no rea sonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court. People v . Hall , 195 I ll. 2d 1, 20 (2000). ¶ 53 A person commits child abduction by
, in rele vant part, intentionally luring or attempting
to lure a child under 16 year s of ag e into a motor vehicle without the consent of a pare nt or lawful c ustodian for other than a law ful purpose. 720 IL CS 5/ 10-5(b) (10) ( West 2008). ¶ 54 Her e, the indictment charg ing defe ndant wi th ch i l d ab duction sufficie ntly informed defe ndant of the nature and elements of the charg ed offe nse. It prec isely trac ked the statutory languag e of the child abduction statute by alleg ing that defe ndant committed the offe nse of child abduction in that:
“He
, intentionally attempted to lure [J .H.], a child under the ag e of 16, into a motor vehicle without the consent of her pare nt, or lawful custodian, for other than a lawful purpose, in violation of [the child abduction statute].” ¶ 55 Prior to trial, defe ndant filed a motion for a bill of particu l ar s , reque sting the court to order the State to produce a bill of particula rs statingthe following :

-12-“1. The exact statement(s) or action(s)
, whether verba l or not, which form the indicate [ sic ] the ‘othe r than a lawful purpose ;’ 2. The unlaw ful purpose the Def endant wa s g oing to c ommit upon t he minor; 3. The name and address of ever y person relied on by the prosecution whom hear d [ sic ] the communication describingor statingthe unlawf ul purpose ***.” ¶ 56 The State filed a responseto this m otion, stating:
“1. The People will rely on the statements an d actions of the defe ndant when he confr onted [J .H.] on Februa ry 20, 2008 at approximately 3:15 P.M. in the are a of 9500 S. Oak P ark Avenue
, Oak L awn, I llinois as summarized in the Oak L awn Police Depa rtment repor

ts that were previously

tender ed to def

ense c ounsel. 2. The People obje ct. See People v . Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d 1059, 569 N.E.2d 1189 (2nd Dist. 1991).
3. The People will provide a list of all witnesses and their addr es s es i n a formal

answe r to discover

y .” ¶ 57 In Joyc e , the defe ndant was convicted of child abduction. Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1065. Def endant’ s indictment alleg ed: “[T] he defe ndant intentionally attempted to lure M.W., a child under ag e 16, into a motor vehicle for other than a lawful purpose and without the consent of a pare nt.” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1062. ¶ 58 Prior to trial, the defe ndant soug ht a motion for a bill of particula rs seeking
, in pe rtinent part, information as to “th e u n l aw fu l purpose that the defe ndant alleg edly harbor ed at the time.” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1062. The trial court order ed the St at e to amend its indictment to include the possible unlawful purposes h arb o re d by the defe ndant, and the State responde d by ad d i n g a list of 29 possible unlawful purposes. Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d
at 1062. T h i s list included homicide, kidnapping
, sexual assault, tattooing the body of a mino r, an d violation of bail bond. Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1062. On appea l, defe ndant
argued, in pertinent part, that the cou rt erre d i n failing to dismiss the indictment beca use, “although the indictment trac ks the languag e of section 10-5(b) (10), the offe nse is one which require s greater specific ity in the charg e.” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1066. Initially
, the appellate co u rt admonished the S tate for its “ca valier” response to the defendant’s moti on for a bill of particula

rs. Joyc e , 210 I ll. App

. 3 d at 1 0 6 7

. Then, the court noted that “[the] indictment here initially

trac ked the statutory

languag e of section 10-5(b) (10).” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1067. The court considere d the fac ts of W illiams
, wher ein the defe ndant’s indictment, like the one at question in Joyc e , “tra cked the languag e of section 10-5(b) (10).” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1067. Specifica lly
, the W illiam s i n d i ctment charg ed that “ ‘the defe ndant attempted to lure a child under the ag e of 16 into his car without the consent of her
pare nt or leg al guardia

n ‘for other than a lawful purpose.’ ” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1067 (citing W illiams
, 133 I ll. 2d 451). “The i ndictment did not specify any part i cu l ar unlawful purpose ha

rbore d by the def endant at the t ime he allege dly attempted to lure the child into his car

. ([ W

illiams ,] 133 I ll. 2d 451.)” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1067. Ultimately
, the Joyc e court found “the indictment that the supreme court ap p ro v ed in W illiams was no more specific than the one here

. We there fore find that the defe ndant was sufficie ntly apprised of

-13-both the nature and the elements of the offe nse. See W illiams
, 133 I ll. 2d at 454.” Joyc e , 210 I ll. App. 3d at 1067. ¶ 59 Whil e we are mindful that the prec ise issue in Joyc e was whether the indictment should have been dism issed, which differs from the i ssue at bar r eg ardingwhether the m otion for the bill of particula

rs rega rd i n g the indictment should have been allowed, we find the

rea soning in Joyc e instructive. The core of the issue here is whether defe ndant was sufficie ntly informed of the nature and elements of the charg ed offe nse. We, like the Joyc e court, are prese nted with a situation in which the indictment for the crime of child abduction
prec isely mirrors the statute for c hild abduction. The indictment in the ca se at ba r contains the same amount of specific ity as that i n Jo yc e and, like the Joyc e court, we believe it informed defe ndant of the nature and elements of the charg ed offe nse. Acc ording ly
, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defe ndant’s motion for a bill of particula rs wher e defe ndant was f

airly apprised of

the nature of the c harg es ag ainst him.

¶ 60 IV. Cross-Examination of Office r Will iams ¶ 61 Next, defe ndant contends that the trial court err ed wher e it did not allow defe n dant to

cross-ex am i ne Offic er Wil liams reg arding his sear ch of defe ndant’s van. Specifica lly
, defe ndant argues that the trial court violated h i s s i x th amendment right to confr ontation when, afte r having testified that he sear ched defe ndant’s van, the trial court did not allow defe ndant to cross-e x amine Offic er Wil liams reg arding what he found inside the van. We disagree

. ¶ 62 Both the fede ral an d s t at e co nstitut ions protec t a defe ndant’s right to cross-e x amine a witness. People v. Ramey
, 152 I ll. 2d 41, 67 (1992); People v. Nutall
, 312 I ll. App. 3d 620, 626 (2000); U.S. Const., amends. VI
, XIV; I ll. Const. 1970, art. I
, § 8. Howeve r, a trial court may impose rea sonable limit s on cross-e x amination “base d on conce rns about, among other things, *** interrogation[ s] that [are] *** only marg inally rele vant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall
, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Cross-examination is g ener all y l i mited in scope to the subject matter of the direc t examination of the witness and to matters aff ecting the cre dibilit y of the witness. People v. Terrell
, 185 I ll. 2d 467, 498 (1 9 9 8 ). Although a defe ndant is aff orded wide latitude when conducting cross-e x amination, “thi s important principle is subject t o limit ations wher e the evidenc e soug ht provides an insufficient nexus to the proposition it supposedly supports.” Nutall
, 312 I ll. App. 3d at 628. “It is not err or for a trial
court to ref

use to permit a cross-e x aminer to g o beyond the scope of the direc t examination in an eff ort to prese nt his theory of the case .” People v. Hosty
, 146 I ll. App. 3d 876, 882-83 (1986). The scope of cross-e x amination is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will onl y disturb its ruling wher e there has been a clear abuse of discr etion resultingin manifest prejudice to the defe ndant. People v. Kliner
, 185 I ll. 2d 81, 130 (1998). Wit h these principles in mind, we determine that the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion in li miting the cr oss-examination of Office r Will iams. ¶ 63 Her e, Offic er Culhane testified that when J .H. and her mother ca m e to the Oak L awn police station, he took them to the parking lot wher e they identified defe ndant’s van as that which defe ndant had been driving when he spoke to J .H. earlier in the day

. Offic er Wil liams

-14-t es tified that he sear ched the van. The portion of trial testimony that is the sub j ec t o f defe ndant’s complaint is as follows: “Q. So did you sear ch that van? A. [OFF I CER W I L L IAMS:] Yes, I did. Q. And in that van did you find any knives? STATE’S ATTORNEY: Obje ction, rele vance

. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. [DEFENSE ATTO RNEY:] Did y ou find any wea pons? STATE’S ATTORNEY: Obje ction, rele vance

. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. [DEFENSE ATTO RNEY:] Did y ou find any condoms? STATE’S ATTORNEY: Obje ction, rele vance

. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. [DEFENSE ATTO RNEY:] Did y ou find any pornography? STATE’S ATTORNEY: Obje ction, rele vance

. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. [DEFENSE ATTO RNEY:] Did y ou find any duct tape? STATE’S ATTORNEY: Obje ction, rele vance

. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. [DEFENSE ATTO RNEY:] Did y ou find any thing unusua l in that van? STATE’S ATTORNEY: Obje ction, rele vance

. THE COURT: Over

ruled. [OFFI CER WI L L IAMS:] There is a lot of things in the van. I don’t know what a lot of them were, so it depends on what your term f or unusual for

the van is. I

don’t know what is unusual for that van to have in it. Q. [DEFENSE ATTO RNEY:] Did y ou find any thing da ng erous in that van? STATE’S ATTORNEY: Obje ction, rele vance

. THE COURT: Sustained.” ¶ 64 The court ruled corr ectly wh er e t h e line of inquiry eng ag ed in by defe ndant on crossexamination went beyond the scope of the orig inal direc t e x amination in a n eff ort to inject def en d an t ’s theory of the case into cross-e x amination. The State’s direc t examination of Offic er Wil liams was limit ed and took the jury through the steps Offic er Wil li am s we nt through in his attempts to locate defe ndant, his conver sation with defe ndant about the events

on Fe bruar

y 20, his attempts to rec over the video surveillance tapes from the Lucky Bur rito, and J

. H. ’s identification of defe ndant. On cross-e x amination, howeve r, defe nse counsel questioned Offic er Wil liams about the sear ch of the van itself, a subject which had not been addre ssed or mentioned during dir ect e x amination. ¶ 65 Def

endant argues on appea l that its questioning reg ardin g wh at Of fi cer Wil liams may

-15-have f ound in the van wa s an “attempt to show a lack of a n unlawful purpose.” He a rgues: “Certa inly if Wil liams had found a knife, a wea pon of any kind, condoms, pornography
, duct tape, or any

thing at all dang erous in the van, these items would have been rele vant to show that [defendant] acte d for an unlawful purpose in attempting to lur e J .H. to the

van. As such, the lac k of abse nce of any of these items in the van was rele vant to show that [defendant] had no unlawf ul purpose in attemptingto lure J.H. to t he van.”
We disagree

. It is clea

r that the additional questions defe ndant wished t o ask Offic er Wil liams on cross-e x amination wer e not designed to “explain, qualify
, discredit, or destroy his direc t testimony .” People v. Jones
, 174 I ll. App. 3d 737, 748 (1988) (cr oss-examination should be limit ed to “the subject m at ter inquired into on direc t examination,” and “those circ umstances within the knowledg e of t h e wi t n ess which explain, qualify
, discredit, or destroy his direc t testimony although they may incidentally constitute new matter which aids the cross-e x aminer’ s case ” (interna l quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v. W illiams
, 66 I ll. 2d 478, 486 (1977))). Rather, the line of questioningat issue was de signe d solely to prese nt defe ndant’s theory of the case

. See Hosty
, 146 I ll. App. 3d at 882-83 (“It is not err or for a trial court to ref

use to permit a cross-examiner to g o beyond the scope of the direc t examination in an effor

t to present his theory

of the c ase.” ). ¶ 66 Moreove r, d ef en d an t wa s gi ven an opportunity to cross-e x amine Offic er Williams. Def endant did so at leng th, asking Offic er Wil liams questions reg arding his interac tions with J .H. and he r m other in the parking lot afte r J.H. and her mother ha d followed de fenda nt in the van, questions a

bout ste ps taken to locate the van, about defe ndant’s eventua l arrival at the police station, about the specific ities of the lineup in which J .H. identified defe ndant, and about defe ndant’s appea

ranc e when he arrived at the police station. We find no abuse of discretion whe re the trial court properly limit ed cr oss-examination to the subjec t matter of the direc t examination.

¶ 67 V. Sexually Motivated Crime ¶ 68 Next, defe ndant contends that the trial court err ed at sentenc ing in its deter mination that defe ndant’s offe nse of child abduction was sexually m otivated. Specifica lly
, defe ndant
argues that none of the fac ts of the underly ing offe nse indicated that he acte d with the intent
to eng ag e in behavior of a sexual nature

. He points out t h at , b eca use of the trial court’s deter mination that his offe n s e was sexual in nature , he is require d to reg ister as a sex offe nder. Def

endant asks this court to reve rse the trial court’s finding in this reg ard and order that defe ndant is not require d to reg ister as a sex offender

. ¶ 69 The Sex Offe nder Reg istration Act (Reg istra ti o n Act) require s persons convicted of child abduction under section 10-5(b) (1) of the Criminal Code to reg ister as sex offe nders “provide d the offe nse was sexually motivated.” 730 I L CS 150/2(B) (1.9) (West 2008). “Sexually motivated” means that one or more of the “fa cts of the u n d erlying offe nse indicates conduct that is of a sexual nature or that shows an intent to eng ag e in be havior of

a sexual nature .” 20 I L CS 4026/10(e) (West 2008). Be fore requiring a defe ndant to reg ister

as a sex offe nder, a trial court must make a specific deter mination regard ing whether the crime w as sexually

motivated. People v . Black, 394 I ll. App. 3d 935, 940 (2009).

-16-¶ 70 At t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri ng in the case at bar, the trial court informed defe ndant that

reg istering as a sex offe nder was a collater al sentenc ing conseque nce of the crime he committed. The court explained that it was require d to make a specif i c d et er mination
reg ardingwhether

defe ndant’s crime was sexually motivated. It noted: “[THE COURT]: And I can cer tainly think of offe nses, for example, perhap s a kidnaping of a child, wher e an offe nder attempts to lure or does, in fac t, lure a child into

a vehicle and then takes that child to a nother place for ransom. In that fac tual situation, I would be willing to say that offe nse was not sexually motivated. Howeve r, in this case , I ’m not. Ibelieve this off ense w as solely

sexually motivated; and that, Mr. Velez, you, there fore , will be require d to reg ister as a sex offender .” ¶ 71 The trial court did not err wher e the statutory test that “one o r m ore of the fac ts of the underlying offe nse indicates conduct that is of a sexual natu re o r t h at shows an intent to eng ag e in behavior of a sexual nature ” is met. 20 I L CS 4026/10(e) (West 2008); Black
, 394 I ll. App. 3d at 940. J .H. testified that she saw defe ndant do a “double take” and look at he r

as she walked down the street. He followed J .H. in his van, motioning for her to come toward the van. Twice he offe red her a ride home, even though she attempted to ignor e him by not verba lly responding to him, putting up her hood, and walking faster

. J .H. was a 14-year -old child who had just g otten out of school and was car rying her bookbag

. Def

endant, a complete strang er to her, sug g estively ref err ed to her as “baby g irl” and dog g edly pursued her in order
to convince her to g et into his van. We think the l ow t hreshold is met, that is, one or more

o f t h e fa ct s of the underlying offe nse indicates conduct that is of a sexual nature or th at shows an intent to eng ag e in behavior of a sexual nature

. See 20 I L CS 4026/10( e) (West 2008). ¶ 72 Def

endant’ s arg

ument that, beca

use there wer e no “sexual innuendos” or touching
, this offe nse should not be char acte rized as sexually motivated, is unpersua sive. The purpose of the Reg istration Act is to protec t children from sex crimes and to aid law enfor ceme nt by letting them know wher e sexual offe nders live. In re Phillip C.
, 364 I ll. App. 3d 822, 827-28 (2006). The Reg istration Act d o es not require there to be actual s exual contac t or an overt sexual act. Rather, the Reg istration Act specifie s that conduct which “show s an intent to eng ag e in beha v i o r o f a sexual nature ” is sufficie nt to require reg istration under the Reg istration Act. ¶ 73 Def

enda n t al s o u rge s us to consider that the court’s comments reg arding defe ndant’s prior acts wer e improper and tend to show that the trial court relied on improper evidenc e in its deter mination that defe ndant’s crime was sexually motivated. We disagree , as nothing in the rec ord indicates that the sentenc ing court considere d any thing aside from the fac ts of the offe nse itself in makingits finding that the of fense was sexually

motivated. ¶ 74 I n d et ermining whether an offe nse is sexually motivated, a trial court i s d i re ct ed t o

exa m i n e t h e “facts of the underlying offe nse.” 20 I L CS 4026/10(e) (West 2008). At
sentenc ing, the State prese nted evidenc e that, six year s prior to his arr est in this case , defe ndant was arr ested for solicitation of a prostitute. That case was later dismiss ed. Def endant takes issue with the fol l o wi n g comment the court made when sentenc ing defe ndant:

-17-“[ T HE COURT]: [W ]hat is signific ant about the prosti tution cape r i s that he has a dark, se cre t predator side to him that appar ently he does not show to those around him in my opinion.” Def endant urg es us to find that this comment shows the court considere d more than just the fac ts of the underly

ing offe nse in its deter

mination that the offe nse was sexually motivated. We find no err or, howeve r, wher e the court made this statement during the earlier part of the hearing when it was fashioning defe ndant’s overa ll sentenc e, not wh en it was making the
separ ate de termination reg ardingdefe ndant’s sexual motivation.

¶ 75 VI . Def endant’ s Procedur al Due Proc ess Rights ¶ 76 Finally
, defe ndant contends he was deprive d of his right to due proce ss wher e inadequate proce dural safeguards were in place duringhis hearingon sexual mot ivation, allowing the
court to arbitra

rily find his offe nse to be sexually motivated pursuant to the Reg istration Act. 730 I L CS 150/2(B) (1.9) (West 2008). Specifica lly
, defe ndant argues that the “lac k of evidentiar y standards and the absenc e of a stand ar d of proof failed to adequately protec t ag ainst the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [hi s] rights.” We disagree , as defe ndant cannot make the requisite showing that the reg istration require m en t s d eprive him of a protec ted liberty interest. ¶ 77 A statute is presumed to b e co n stitut ional, and, thus, the party challeng ing it bear s the burden of clea

rly demonstrating its invalidity

. See Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d at 290; a ccor d Bailey
, 167 I ll. 2d at 225; Zapata
, 347 I ll. App. 3d at 966. We a re duty -bound to c onstrue a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality , if this can rea sonably be done. See Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d at 290-91; acc ord In re C.E.
, 161 I ll. 2d at 227; Cosby
, 305 I ll. App. 3d at 224 (we must aff

irm statute’s constitutionality and val idit y wh e n e v er possible). In examining

a s tatute’s constitutionality
, we employ a de novo standard of revie w. S ee Zapata
, 34 7 I l l

. App. 3d at 967. ¶ 78 An at t ac k on proce dural due proce ss focuse s on the statute’s specific proce dures a n d whether the statute p rovi des an “opportunity to be hear d at a meaning ful time and in a meaning ful manner .” In re Phillip C.
, 364 I ll. App. 3d at 831; acc ord In re P.H.
, 145 I ll. 2d 209, 235 (1991). Procedur al due proce ss “re quires that a person in dang er of serious loss of life, liberty or proper

ty be g iven notice of the c ase a g ainst him a nd opportunity to me et it.” (Interna l quotation marks o m i tted.) People v. Stanley
, 369 I ll. App. 3d 441, 448 (2006). “Challeng es based on proce dural due proce ss focus on the proce dures employed by a statute and whether the statute p ro v i d es an opportunity to be hear d at a meaning ful time and in a meaning ful manner .” Stanley
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 448. A proc edura l due proc ess cha lleng e has two steps: ( 1) deter

mine whether an individual has bee n deprive d of life or a prote cted liberty or proper

ty interest; and (2) deter

mine what proce ss is due befor e such a deprivation
may occur

. Stanley , 369 I ll. App. 3d at 448. ¶ 79 Acc ording ly
, our first step in defe ndant’s due proce ss challeng e is to deter mine whether defe ndant has be en deprived of a protected li berty or prope rty

interest by

the re quirements imposed pursuant to the Reg istration Act. We find that he has not. Def endant argues that he will be stigmatized by having to reg ister as a sex offe nder and, in addition to this stigma, the

-18-actua l reg istration require ments themselves deprive him of both liberty and proper ty interests. See In re J.R.
, 341 I ll. App. 3d 784, 799 (2003) (reputation alone is neither liberty

nor proper

ty interest sufficie nt to invoke the proce dural protec tion of the due proce ss clause

. Rather, a defe ndant must show both (1) the utteranc e of a statement that is sufficie ntly derog atory

to injure his reputation that is capa ble of be ing pr oved fa lse, and that he claims is false; and (2) some tang ible and materia l state-imposed burden or alteration of his status or of a right i n addition to the s tigmatizing statement. (citing Paul v. Davis , 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)) ). ¶ 80 The reg istration require ments he mentions are as follows: An individual must reg ister in
person with the State and local police within 10 day s of the start of his probation or discharg e from the I llinois Depa

rtment of Correc tions. 730 I L CS 150/3, 4, 5 (West 2008). Reg istrants
must provide identification, proof of residenc e, tender a written statement that he is a sex offe nder, provide fing erprints, submit a curr ent photogr aph, and pay a fee

. 730 I L CS 150/3, 8 (West 2008). Reg is t rants must also complete an annual addre ss verific ation, repor t in
person annually
, repor

t a chang e of addre ss within 10 day s, and repor t out-of-state schooling or employ

ment. 730 I L CS 150/5-10, 6, 6-5, 8- 5 (W es t 2008). The duty to reg ister l asts 10
year s after p ar o l e, discharg e, or rele ase, or in the case of a sexual predator or a sexually dang erous person, for life. 730 I L CS 150/7 (West 2008). Any failure to comply with any of the reg istration require ments, or with any of the time limit ations, is a Class 4 felony
, car rying

a sentenc e of one to three year s’ i mp ri s onment. 730 I L CS 150/10 (West 2008); 730 I L CS 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (West 2008). ¶ 81 I llinois courts have held that reg istration pursuant to the Reg istration Act does not affe ct

a protec ted liberty or proper ty interest. In re J.R.
, 341 I ll. App. 3d at 799; In re T.C.
, 384 I ll. App. 3d 870 (2008) (juvenile offe nder not deprive d of liberty interest by require ment that he
reg ister as a sex offe nder for the rema inder of his natura l life); People v. Stork
, 305 I ll. App. 3d 714 (1999) (finding require ments under the Reg istration Act did not implicate any protec ted liberty interests); Stanley
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 449-50 (finding lifetime reg istration did not aff

ect a proper

ty interest); In re J. W

. , 2 0 4 I ll. 2d 50, 67 (2003) (finding that the
reg istration require ments of the Reg istration Act do not aff ect a fundame ntal right). We find

no rea son to depart f

rom this line of prec edent. ¶ 82 Def

endant specific ally acknow ledg es the holding in In re J.R.
, wher e this court found a

sex offe nder is not “stig matized” by the publication of truthful and accurate information about the offe nder to the public. In re J.R.
, 341 I ll. App. 3d at 798-99. Def endant, howeve r, believes this rationale does not apply in his situation beca use, unlike J .R., who was convicted of sexual abuse, he was not convicted of a sex offe nse. Def endant fails to rec ognize that he
was, in fac t, convicted of an offe nse that is statutorily char acte rized as a sexual offe nse. See 730 I L CS 150/2(B) (1.9) (West 2008); see also Stanley
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 450 (re jecting the defe ndant’s cl ai m that he should not be cate g orized as a sexual preda tor wher e “sexual predator” is def

ined by statute, and is a de finition he meets). ¶ 83 Howeve r, even if we wer e to find that def en d an t i d en t i fi ed a valid protec ted liberty interest, we woul d never

theless reje ct defe ndant’s arg ument that the sex offe nder reg istration require ments are so burdensome that they deprive him of a protec ted liberty interest. This court ha s rejec ted this precise argument in In re T.C. , wher e the c ourt noted:

-19-“A liberty interest m ea n s ‘n o t only the right of [ a] citizen to be free from t he mere phy sical restraint of his person, a s by incar cer ation, but the term is deeme d to embrac e the right of the citizen to be fre e in the enjoy m en t o f all his fac ulties; to be fre e to use them in all lawful way s; to live and work wher e he will; to ear n his livelihood by any lawful c alling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contra cts which may be proper , nece ssary , and essential to his ca rry i n g out to a

succe ssful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.’ [C itation.] We do not believe that defe ndant has met his burden o f s h o wi n g that the reg istration require ments imposed under [the Reg istration Act] deprive him of a pr otected liber ty interest. [ He] has fa iled
to show, beyond mere ly stating that being require d to reg ister as a sex offe nder for t he
rest of his natura l life place s substantial limit ations on his liberty by periodica lly having
to repor t his addre ss, school, and place of employ ment to authorities [citation]
, how such
reg istration require ments deprive d him of his right to be fre e from phy sical restra ints, to be fre e in the enjoy

ment of his fac ulties, and to live and work wher e he will.” In re T.C.
, 384 I ll. App. 3d at 874. ¶ 84 Simi larly here
, d ef en d an t l i s t s t h e re gi s t ra t ion require ments and argues that such require ments “deprive [hi m ] o f both proper ty and liberty in their most basic forms.” He explains this deprivation only by saying that, if disreg arde d, the require ments “would subject [hi m] to f elony prosec ution” and thus a lter his leg al rights a nd status. L ike the argument in In re T.C. , this is clearly

not a violation of defe ndant’s due pr ocess rights. ¶ 85 Even if we wer e to find that defe ndant identified a valid deprivation of a protec ted liberty interest, we would never

theless find that he rec eived all the proce ss he was due. This c ourt addre ssed a simil ar issue in In re Phillip C.
, 364 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d at 831. In that case , the defe ndant argued, in pertinent part, that the Reg istration Act violated his proce dural due
proce ss rights be cause the reg istration r equire ment is a utomatic under the Reg istration Act and there is no opportunity to challeng e that re quirement. In re Phillip C. , 364 I ll. App. 3d
at 831. The court disagree d, howeve r, beca use “def endant had a meaning ful opportunity to be heard at trial,” and to challeng e, at trial, whether he committed ag gravated kidnaping
, the crime which subjecte d him to reg istration under the Reg istration Act. In re Phillip C. , 364 I ll. App. 3d at 831. L ike In re Phillip C.
, defe ndant here had a jury trial and h ad am p l e opportunity to c halleng e whe ther he committed child abduction. As one of the elements of the crime of child abduction is a demonstration that the luring of the child was d one “for other than a lawful purpose,” defe ndant had opportunity at trial to challeng e the “other than

a lawful purpose,” as well as opportunity to show that he was not se x ually motivated when luring J .H. Acc ording ly
, we find no violation of defe ndant’s proce dural due proce ss guara ntees.

¶ 86 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 87 For the fore g oing rea sons, w e aff irm the judgme nt of the circ uit c ourt of Cook County

.

¶ 88 Affir

med.

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