J-S06028-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

QUINTON BRIGHT

Appellant No. 484 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 17, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006516-2009

CP-51-CR-0012649-2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2015

Quinton Bright appeals from his judgment of sentence imposed in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on December 17, 2013, after 

the court found him to be in violation of his probation. Counsel has 

petitioned this Court to withdraw his representation of Bright pursuant to 

Anders, McClendon and Santiago.

1

 Upon review, we affirm Bright’s 

judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981); and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). 
J-S06028-15

- 2 -

In order to withdraw pursuant to Anders and McClendon, counsel 

must: 1) petition the Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a 

thorough review of the record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised 

are wholly frivolous; 2) file a brief referring to anything in the record that 

might arguably support an appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the 

appellant and advise him of his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se

brief to raise any additional points that the appellant deems worthy of 

review. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 783 A.2d 784, 786 (Pa. Super. 

2001). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, in order to withdraw under Anders, 

counsel must also state his reasons for concluding his client’s appeal is 

frivolous.

Instantly, counsel’s petition states that he has made an examination of 

the record and concluded the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel indicates 

that he supplied Bright with a copy of the brief and a letter explaining his 

right to proceed pro se,

2 or with newly-retained counsel, and to raise any 

other issues he believes might have merit. Counsel has also submitted a 

brief, setting out in neutral form three issues of arguable merit and, 

pursuant to the dictates of Santiago, explains why he believes the issues to 

____________________________________________

2 Bright has not submitted any additional or supplemental filings to this 

Court. 
J-S06028-15

- 3 -

be frivolous. Thus, counsel has substantially complied with the requirements 

for withdrawal. 

Counsel having satisfied the above requirements, this Court must 

conduct its own review of the proceedings and render an independent 

judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Bright raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the lower court err in finding that [Bright] violated his 

parole and probation, thereby justifying the imposition of a 

new sentence of incarceration?

2. Was [Bright’s] sentence legal?

3. Did the lower court err in not acting upon [Bright’s] postsentence motions?

Anders Brief, at 3. 

Bright first alleges that the trial court erred in finding that he violated 

his probation. This claim is meritless. On November 5, 2009, Bright pled 

guilty to multiple counts relating to the manufacture and delivery of 

controlled substances. The Honorable Rayford Means sentenced him to 

concurrent terms of 6 to 23 months’ incarceration,3followed by one year of 

probation. While under Judge Means’ supervision, on June 14, 2013, Bright 

was found guilty of persons not to possess firearms, theft by unlawful taking 

and firearms not to be carried without a license, charges stemming from an 

____________________________________________

3 Bright was granted immediate parole on both cases. 
J-S06028-15

- 4 -

incident that occurred on August 26, 2010. The Honorable Linda Carpenter 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of 10 to 24 years’ incarceration for 

these charges.

Conviction of a new crime is a sufficient basis for a court to revoke a 

sentence of probation. Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289 

(Pa. Super. 2008). Thus, by virtue of his conviction on the new charges 

before Judge Carpenter, Bright was in direct violation of his probation. 

Additionally, Bright committed technical violations of his probation involving 

drugs. See N.T. Violation Hearing, 12/17/13, at 3-4. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not err in finding Bright to be in violation of his probation. 

Bright next claims that his revocation sentence was illegal. This claim 

is without merit. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b), when a revocation 

occurs, the court has all the sentencing alternatives that were available at 

the time of initial sentencing. Commonwealth v. Mazzetti, 44 A.3d 58, 65 

(Pa. 2012). Upon resentencing, a term of total confinement may be 

imposed if one of the following conditions exists: (1) the defendant has 

been convicted of another crime; (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates 

that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or 

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). 

Here, Bright was convicted of additional crimes and, thus, was eligible 

for a term of total confinement under section 9771(c). Additionally, Bright 

pled guilty to one charge of possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”) –
J-S06028-15

- 5 -

cocaine, and one charge of PWID – marijuana and cocaine. The statutory 

maximum penalty for PWID – cocaine is ten years’ imprisonment. 35 P.S. § 

780-113(f)(1.1). Judge Means resentenced him to 4 to 8 years’ 

incarceration on each count. Thus, Bright’s revocation sentence was well 

within the statutory limit. As such, this claim is meritless.

Finally, Bright claims that the trial court erred by not acting upon his 

post-sentence motions, in which he attempted to challenge the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. Counsel e-filed post-sentence motions in each of 

Bright’s cases. However, incorrect documents – post-sentence motions from 

Bright’s case before Judge Carpenter – were erroneously submitted to the 

court, and the court did not consider them. Accordingly, Bright’s 

discretionary-aspect-of-sentencing claim was not preserved on appeal. 

Because he did not properly preserve this claim, it is waived and, therefore, 

frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 292 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (where issue has been waived, pursuing matter on direct 

appeal is frivolous in context of Anders). 

Even if Bright’s sentencing claim had not been waived, it would have 

garnered him no relief. In order to obtain review of a claim implicating the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing, an appellant must raise a substantial 

question as to whether the trial judge, in imposing sentence, violated a 

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contravened a “fundamental 

norm” of the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 

135, 142 (Pa. Super. 2011). Here, Bright does not allege a violation of a 
J-S06028-15

- 6 -

specific provision of the Sentencing Code, nor does he claim the court 

contravened a fundamental norm of the sentencing process. Rather, the 

sole basis for Bright’s claim is that he is remorseful for his crimes and seeks 

the court’s mercy. This does not raise a substantial question.4 See id. 

Accordingly, Bright’s claim is meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed; petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/2/2015

____________________________________________

4 Even if we were to interpret Bright’s claim as alleging the sentencing 

court’s failure to consider mitigating circumstances, he would still be entitled 

to no relief. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 567 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (“A claim that a sentencing court failed to consider certain mitigating 

factors does not raise a substantial question that the sentence is 

inappropriate.”).