United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2006-3260 

PHYLLIS M. VANIEKEN-RYALS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 

Respondent. 

John S. Grady, Grady & Hampton LLC, of Dover, Delware, argued for petitioner. 

Michael S. Dufault, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With 

him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Acting Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, 

Director, and Bryant G. Snee, Assistant Director. Of counsel was Tara K. Hogan, Trial 

Attorney. 

Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2006-3260 

PHYLLIS M. VANIEKEN-RYALS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 

Respondent. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: November 26, 2007 

__________________________ 

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, LOURIE and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

MICHEL, Chief Judge. 

Phyllis M. Vanieken-Ryals appeals from a final decision of the Merit Systems 

Protection Board ("MSPB") sustaining the denial of her application for disability 

retirement benefits by the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"). Vanieken-Ryals 

v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. PH-831E-05-0450-I-1 (M.S.P.B. May 15, 2006). Because 

OPM applied an erroneous legal standard in its assessment of evidence offered to 

support Vanieken-Ryals' application, and the MSPB repeated that error, we vacate and 

remand. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Vanieken-Ryals has been an employee of the Veterans Administration ("VA") for 

nearly thirty years. In the several years prior to February 2004, she experienced 
increasing discomfort and difficulties at her workplace and particularly with her 

immediate supervisor, Barry Emerson. On February 23, 2004, Emerson instructed her 

to switch offices to one near his. This prompted her to immediately apply for voluntary 

early retirement. Emerson informed her the next day, February 24, 2004, that he was 

recommending her application be denied. She did not return to work the next day, and 

she has been absent from work ever since. The VA formally denied her early retirement 

application on March 3, 2004. On June 25, 2004, she filed the application for disability 

retirement at issue in this appeal. OPM denied that application on January 12, 2005. 

After permitting Vanieken-Ryals to submit additional evidence, OPM reconsidered and 

sustained its decision on May 9, 2005. Vanieken-Ryals appealed to the MSPB, and the 

administrative judge ("AJ") sustained OPM's reconsideration decision. Vanieken-Ryals 

v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. PH-831E-05-0450-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 14, 2005) ("AJ 

Decision"). The MSPB denied Vanieken-Ryals' petition for rehearing on May 15, 2006, 

thereby making the AJ's decision its final decision, which Vanieken-Ryals then timely 

appealed to this court. 

Vanieken-Ryals claims complete disability due to several alleged psychological 

disorders, including major depression and anxiety disorder. The evidence she 

submitted to OPM to support her claim consisted of her own statements in addition to 

several letters, medical reports, and related documentation from her treating 

psychologist, Dr. Nichols, and treating psychiatrist, Dr. Rummler. Before the MSPB, 

Vanieken-Ryals additionally submitted testimony from herself and her husband, as well 

as testimony from Dr. Nichols. OPM offered no medical evidence countering Dr. 

Nichols' and Dr. Rummler's documents or testimony. 

2006-3260 2
In her statements to OPM, Vanieken-Ryals alleged that the stresses of her job in 

the months leading up to January 2004 resulted in, among other things, severe anxiety 

and panic attacks, vomiting, and nausea. Pet. App. at 167-68. She also indicated that, 

by January 2004, she "could no longer manage to drive [her]self to work," and that she 

would experience "sheer panic when forced to leave the house." Id. She further 

indicated that, after her meeting with her superior on February 24, 2004, she "suffered a 

total mental meltdown." Id. at 169. She also described the symptoms she has 

experienced since she stopped attending her job, such as "chest pains, heart 

palpitations," nausea, irritability, inability to drive, "deep depressive moods," difficulty 

with "simple basic hygiene" and "routine household chores" like laundry or cooking, and 

general and severe fear and anxiety in dealings with people and/or places at all 

connected or related to the VA. Id. at 169-71. 

Her testimony before the MSPB was consistent with her statements to OPM; she 

testified that the act of being driven to work by her husband would cause nausea and 

vomiting, that leaving her house would trigger panic attacks, that she suffered from 

depression, and that she had been prescribed multiple medications for her mental 

conditions. Id. at 54, 59-61, 65, 73. Her husband, James Ryals, also testified before 

the MSPB, corroborating his wife's testimony on her symptoms. Id. at 76-77, 79-81. 

Dr. Nichols submitted a number of letters and medical reports dated from May 

12, 2004, to February 8, 2005. She also submitted progress notes dated from as early 

as March 15, 2004. In these documents, she consistently diagnosed Vanieken-Ryals 

with generalized anxiety disorder, panic attack disorder without agoraphobia, and major 

2006-3260 3
depression, all "Axis I" psychological disorders.1

 Id. at 149-50, 152-58. She described 

in detail the symptoms reported by Vanieken-Ryals and her husband as well as those 

she herself observed during treatment. Id. at 149, 152, 154. She indicated her opinion 

that Vanieken-Ryals "is a reliable reporter of her situation." Id. at 152. She described 

particular aspects of Vanieken-Ryals' condition that reflected specifically on her 

capability to accomplish the tasks of her position; for example, Dr. Nichols wrote on 

February 8, 2005, that Vanieken-Ryals "is unable to drive or be driven north or to set 

foot in the VA building" and that merely receiving correspondence from the VA rendered 

her "extremely anxious and depressed and unable to leave the couch for days." Id. at 

149. Dr. Nichols also opined on Vanieken-Ryals' prognosis, reporting that aside from 

small improvements in personal hygiene and like tasks, "her date of recovery, if she has 

to return to work, is far in the future, if ever." Id. at 156. In mid-2004, Dr. Nichols did 

indicate, without specifying, that "[p]rognosis is good" and that Vanieken-Ryals "is 

making progress in therapy," but emphasized that she remained unfit to return to work. 

Id. at 157-58. And Dr. Nichols' final report in February 2005 indicated that VaniekenRyals "most likely will be unable to return to work at all" and that Dr. Nichols "does not 

believe an accommodation is feasible." Id. at 149. 

Dr. Nichols also gave oral testimony before the MSPB. She testified that she "did 

see that [Vanieken-Ryals] had anxiety and depression," and that she directly observed 

signs of mental illness such as having a "flat" affect and being "very fidgety." Id. at 30, 

32, 36. She described particular episodes and manifestations of Vanieken-Ryals' panic 

 1

 Dr. Nichols applied the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV"), a widely-accepted tool for psychological 

diagnosis published by the American Psychiatric Association. "Axis I" disorders are 

among the most severe of the disorders for which DSM-IV is used. 

2006-3260 4
attacks and depression, and discussed the limited progress achieved by VaniekenRyals' treatment, such as an improved ability to maintain personal hygiene. Id. at 30, 

33-36. Dr. Nichols testified several times that she at no time felt that Vanieken-Ryals 

was fit for work, and that Vanieken-Ryals "will not ever be able to return to the VA" and 

likely "will never be able to return to [any] work, full time." Id. at 30, 34, 38. She also 

testified that the standard diagnostic tool in the mental health field is DSM-IV, and that 

she had used DSM-IV to diagnose Vanieken-Ryals. Id. at 36. 

Dr. Rummler, whom Dr. Nichols indicated was prescribing Xanax and other 

psychiatric medication, id. at 152-54, provided a brief letter dated March 25, 2005, 

indicating that he had been treating Vanieken-Ryals since April 2004 and that he had 

diagnosed her with major depression and anxiety disorder. Id. at 151. He further 

indicated his opinion that "[d]ue to the intensity of symptoms attributable to work related 

stress, it can also be stated with reasonable medical certainty that Mrs. Vanieken-Ryals 

will be unable to return to her previous work at any time in the future." Id. He also 

submitted notes of his treatment of Vanieken-Ryals from April 2004 through June 2005. 

Id. at 135-42. 

Both OPM and the MSPB gave no weight at all to Vanieken-Ryals' medical 

evidence and then found that she had failed to prove her disability. The MSPB also 

held that she had not "definitively exhausted" the possibility that the agency could 

accommodate her alleged disability. AJ Decision at 16. This holding was largely based 

on the MSPB's rejection of her medical evidence and its view that she had failed to 

2006-3260 5
prove any disability beyond an inability to work with her particular supervisor.2

 The 

record shows that Vanieken-Ryals was offered "temporary duty away from work area 

and supervisor," which she turned down due to her medical condition. Id. at 9-10. 

However, the record also indicates that the VA determined: "Reassignment is not 

possible. There are no vacant positions at this agency, at the same grade or pay level 

and tenure within the same commuting area, for which the employee meets minimum 

qualification standards." Id. at 10. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction 

As a threshold issue, we first address whether this court has jurisdiction to hear 

Vanieken-Ryals' appeal due to 5 U.S.C. § 8347. While we have exclusive jurisdiction 

over appeals from a final decision of the MSPB under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9), the scope 

of review available regarding OPM disability determinations is restricted by § 8347 and 

by the Supreme Court's decision in Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768 

(1985). Under that statute as interpreted in Lindahl, factual determinations on 

"questions of disability and dependency" are unreviewable by this or any other court. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 8347; Lindahl, 470 U.S. at 779-80; Anthony v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 58 

F.3d 620, 625-26 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

The Court made clear, however, that issues of law regarding decisions on 

disability applications are reviewable: "[Judicial] review is available to determine 

whether there has been a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a 

 2

 The AJ, however, noted in his decision that he was "aware that the 

continuing position of both [Vanieken-Ryals] and Dr. Nichols is that [Vanieken-Ryals] 

can not work again at all" and that were Dr. Nichols' conclusions correct, "a 

reassignment could prove fruitless." AJ Decision at 16. 

2006-3260 6
misconstruction of the governing legislation, or some like error going to the heart of the 

administrative determination." Lindahl, 470 U.S. at 791 (quoting Scroggins v. United 

States, 397 F.2d 295, 297 (Ct. Cl. 1968)) (internal quotations omitted). Thus we may 

only address the critical legal errors, if any, committed by the MSPB in reviewing OPM's 

decision. Vanieken-Ryals contends that both the MSPB and OPM committed an error 

of law by entirely rejecting all of her medical evidence simply due to the absence of socalled "objective" medical evidence, arguing that such a requirement is unlawful and not 

supported by any statute, regulation, or precedent. The government argues that no 

such requirement was imposed and that the MSPB (and OPM) simply found the medical 

evidence insufficient to establish disability as a factual matter. 

We conclude, however, that the MSPB's decision was indeed predicated on its 

view that "objective" medical evidence is required to prove disability and that VaniekenRyals had failed to meet this requirement, affirming and expressly approving of OPM's 

holding to this effect. This is evident upon close examination of all three written 

decisions in this case. In OPM's initial decision of January 12, 2005, the agency 

criticized the evidence submitted by Vanieken-Ryals because "[a]part from [VaniekenRyals'] subjective narrative, no other objective medical documentation was provided 

supporting a history that may have contributed to [her] sudden mental demise." App. to 

Resp. Br. at 31 (emphasis added). OPM then elaborated, criticizing the lack of 

"documentation such as emergency room reports showing incidents of panic attack" 

and "relevant psychiatric studies or test results." Id.

In its later May 9, 2005 reconsideration decision, OPM further expressed its view 

that the critical defect in Vanieken-Ryals' evidence was the lack of so-called objective 

2006-3260 7
medical documentation. OPM indicated it was giving no weight to Dr. Nichols' several 

reports because "she provided no details concerning any mental status evaluation," and 

"she does not provide copies of any formal cognitive testing." Pet. App. at 145. OPM 

later repeated that the case file "contains no evidence of any formal cognitive or 

neuropsychological testing," and also cited the lack of "any comprehensive physical 

examinations" and "any current comprehensive mental status evaluations." Id. at 146. 

The MSPB in turn enforced OPM's "objective" medical evidence requirement. In 

his opinion, the AJ pointed to OPM's finding that Vanieken-Ryals had provided "little 

objective medical evidence . . . to demonstrate that [she] is disabled." AJ Decision at 13 

(emphasis added). He further noted that "OPM also points out that the bulk of the 

evidence presented by [Vanieken-Ryals] is Dr. Nichol's [sic] reports of what [VaniekenRyals] told her." Id. This latter point was relied on by the AJ in his own analysis, and he 

remarked that "the evidence presented by Dr. Nichols is only as good as the information 

given to her by [Vanieken-Ryals]." Id. Thus the AJ also concluded that Dr. Nichols' 

reports were necessarily immaterial since they were "subjective" in that they were 

primarily based on Dr. Nichols' assessment of Vanieken-Ryals' own account of her 

symptoms and experiences. The AJ made this apparent when he declared that "[t]he 

only evidence which supports [Vanieken-Ryals'] claim of disability is her protracted 

absence form [sic] work," and emphasized that "the necessity of the absences is based 

on purely subjective medical evidence, which are not supported by an [sic] objective 

medical evidence." Id. at 17 (emphases added). Clearly, the AJ totally discounted any 

probative value that Vanieken-Ryals' medical evidence might have to support her claim 

of disability since the only evidence he credited was her attendance record (which he 

2006-3260 8
then also rejected for being based on "purely subjective medical evidence"). His 

treatment of the medical evidence was thus tantamount to exclusion; he "considered" 

Dr. Nichols' and Dr. Rummler's evidence but only so far as deciding to disregard it as 

not at all probative as to her disability.3

The Supreme Court in Lindahl, by expressly rejecting that the MSPB and OPM 

are not subject to any judicial review on any issue, indicated that the courts have a 

limited but important role to play. Both to guard against the substantial errors of law and 

resulting miscarriage of justice described in Scroggins, and to properly respect our 

jurisdictional limitations on truly factual determinations, we must be discerning and 

cannot be satisfied by opinions that invoke the trappings of factual analysis—e.g., by 

vaguely describing broad swaths of evidence as "insufficient" or as failing to carry the 

claimant's burden, or simply asserting that all record evidence was considered, all of 

which the AJ and OPM did here—but, when read closely and carefully, reveal that 

absolutely no weight was given to certain evidence solely because it can generally be 

classified as "subjective" and not because of any specific identifiable defect. Giving little 

weight to specific evidence because of its individual failings, such as the lack of 

qualifications of the author of a particular medical report, is a factual analysis over which 

we have no jurisdiction to review. Disqualification of evidence because of its type is an 

 3

 Thus the AJ's conclusion that Vanieken-Ryals had failed to "adduce 

sufficient probative medical evidence that the medical conditions from which she suffers 

disables her from performing the duties of her position" does not truly evidence a factual 

analysis since it is predicated on the view that none of Vanieken-Ryals' medical 

evidence warranted any probative weight. See AJ Decision at 17. With this evidence 

essentially excluded, she of course had not adduced sufficient, or indeed any, probative 

medical evidence. OPM's conclusion, that the record "contains insufficient medical 

documentation regarding the level of any medical impairment in context to [VaniekenRyals'] ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of [her] job," is based on the 

same premise and is similarly unconvincing. See Pet. App. at 147. 

2006-3260 9
imposition of a legal standard because it inherently imposes a categorical requirement. 

When the use of such a standard is dispositive of disability retirement claims, they go to 

the heart of the administrative determination, and we are charged with resolving 

whether the imposed standard and its inherent evidentiary requirement are lawful. 

Therefore, we hold that our jurisdiction is established as to the issue of whether 

the imposition of an objective medical evidence requirement by the MSPB (or OPM) in 

disability retirement cases is lawful or "a substantial departure from important 

procedural rights, a misconstruction of the governing legislation, or some like error 

going to the heart of the administrative determination."4

 Scroggins, 397 F.2d at 297. 

We now turn to this issue of law, which we review de novo, keeping in mind that the 

MSPB decision sustaining OPM's actions may only be reversed if it is arbitrary or 

capricious, or if it is contrary to law.5 See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). 

B. Objective Medical Evidence Requirement 

It is telling that no authority whatsoever is cited by the MSPB or OPM, in any of 

the three written decisions in this case, for the proposition that objective medical 

evidence is required to prove disability. No statute or applicable regulation of which we 

are aware imposes such a requirement. In fact, applicable law suggests the opposite 

rule. OPM's regulations define the type of "medical documentation" required to 

establish disability. Such evidence must come from "a licensed physician or other 

 4

 We do not, however, review the MSPB's treatment of the non-medical 

evidence, such as her performance evaluations and the testimony of her supervisor. 

Both the MSPB and OPM seem to have considered and weighed this evidence. But 

this does not bear on whether the MSPB or OPM effectively imposed an objective 

medical evidence requirement. 

5

 While we may also reverse an MSPB decision if it is unsupported by 

substantial evidence, our limited review of legal issues only in OPM disability cases 

does not implicate the substantial evidence standard. 

2006-3260 10
appropriate practitioner," it must "be justified according to established diagnostic 

criteria," and it must "not be inconsistent with generally accepted professional 

standards." 5 C.F.R. § 339.104; see 5 C.F.R. § 831.1202 (requiring medical evidence 

submitted to support an application for disability retirement to conform to the 

requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 339.104). There is no hint of any objective/subjective 

distinction, and the regulation clearly indicates that any evidence—"subjective" or 

otherwise—utilizing "established diagnostic criteria" and consistent with "generally 

accepted professional standards" is eligible for consideration. 

Moreover, the MSPB has even precedentially ruled squarely against an objective 

evidence requirement. Chavez v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 6 M.S.P.R. 404, 418-23 (1981) 

("[The AJ] erred in assuming that appellant's claim for disability retirement benefits 

could not be granted if it was not proven by objective medical evidence.").6 While we 

are not bound by the MSPB's precedent, we agree with and accept the Chavez holding 

on this issue. OPM must consider all of an applicant's competent medical evidence, 

and an applicant may prevail based on medical evidence that, as here, consists of a 

medical professional's conclusive diagnosis, even if based primarily on his/her analysis 

of the applicant's own descriptions of symptoms and other indicia of disability. See id.

at 423 ("Objective medical evidence, then, is but one of the elements of proof to be 

considered, along with expert opinion evidence and subjective evidence of pain and 

inability to work . . . ."). 

 6

 We note that the AJ cited and quoted from Chavez at the beginning of his 

opinion, and thus his later disregard for one of its central holdings is very puzzling. An 

AJ is, of course, bound by all precedents of the MSPB. 

2006-3260 11
For example, in Craig v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 92 M.S.P.R. 449, 454-55 (2002), 

the MSPB held that the applicant satisfied her burden of proving her disability solely 

with medical evidence from a psychiatric social worker along with her own testimony. 

The social worker, a licensed mental health specialist, diagnosed her patient with 

multiple mental disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder and panic disorder. 

Id. at 452. Much like in the instant case, the social worker's reports were solely based 

on information she heard or observed during therapy sessions after the applicant had 

already left the job that had precipitated her conditions. See id. Also like Dr. Nichols, 

the social worker in Craig based her diagnosis on the guidelines in DSM-IV. Id. at 455. 

There is no mention of any "objective" tests in Craig; rather, the medical evidence there 

deemed highly probative was very similar to the medical evidence petitioner submitted 

here. The MSPB's total disregard of this evidence due to a lack of "objective" tests thus 

ignores its own precedents. 

In addition, subjective evidence—i.e., testimony or written statements—regarding 

symptoms that is submitted by the applicant "may be entitled to great weight on the 

matter of disability, especially where such evidence is uncontradicted in the record." 

Chavez, 6 M.S.P.R. at 418-422; see also Biscaha v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 51 M.S.P.R. 

304, 309 (1991) ("An appellant's subjective evidence of pain must be considered 

seriously, where it is supported by competent medical evidence."). It stands to reason 

that qualified medical opinions based on the same types of information must therefore 

also be afforded at least comparable, if not greater, probative weight. While the ultimate 

determination of whether the evidence has satisfied the applicant's burden of proof rests 

first with OPM and then with the MSPB, we hold that it is legal error for either agency to 

2006-3260 12
reject submitted medical evidence as entitled to no probative weight at all solely 

because it lacks so-called "objective" measures such as laboratory tests. 

The problem with a requirement of "objective" tests is particularly pronounced 

when, as here, the alleged disability arises from purely psychological, as opposed to 

physical, disorders. No laboratory tests or physical examinations exist, or are even 

known to be possible, to diagnose some psychological disorders. See Chavez, 6 

M.S.P.R. at 418. And the practice of psychologists often consists entirely of 

professional assessment of patient-reported symptoms and experiences. Thus, 

requiring objective medical evidence would often discriminate against those civil 

servants who suffer from legitimate, disabling psychological disorders. 

Here, Dr. Nichols submitted several reports in which she diagnosed VaniekenRyals with severe psychiatric conditions, recounting the symptoms and experiences 

reported by Vanieken-Ryals that formed the basis of her diagnosis. Inherent in these 

reports is her professional opinion that Vanieken-Ryals' account of these symptoms is 

credible, and that the symptoms reported are serious. Indeed, she stated explicitly that, 

in her professional opinion, Vanieken-Ryals was a "reliable reporter of her situation." 

Pet. App. at 152. And her professional opinion was supplemented and supported by the 

opinion of a second medical professional, psychiatrist Dr. Rummler, who concurred with 

Dr. Nichols' diagnosis and went further to prescribe medications, evidence of which was 

submitted to OPM. In cases involving psychological disability, such evidence is typically 

probative (though not necessarily dispositive). See, e.g., Craig, 92 M.S.P.R. at 454-55 

(crediting similar medical opinion testimony from a psychiatric social worker). 

2006-3260 13
While OPM and the MSPB may give only limited weight to seemingly strong 

medical evidence such as this, it typically does so only in the face of factors such as 

doubts about professional competence, contrary medical evidence, failure of the 

professional to consider relevant factors, lack of particularity in relating diagnosis to 

nature and extent of disability, etc.7 See Thomas v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 54 M.S.P.R. 

686, 689-90 (1992) (comparing and weighing conflicting medical opinions on the basis 

of qualifications and competence); Bridges v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 21 M.S.P.R. 716, 

719 (1984) (holding that the lack of contrary medical evidence lends weight to 

applicant's evidence); see also Chavez, 6 M.S.P.R. at 423 (noting that "the 

qualifications of the expert" and "the extent and duration of the expert's familiarity with 

or treatment of the applicant's condition," among others, are important factors). 

But here, OPM did not express any doubt as to the credentials or veracity of Dr. 

Nichols or Dr. Rummler, and the only medical evidence as to whether Vanieken-Ryals 

suffered from disabling psychological disorders were their reports and documentation.8 

 7

 Our decision in Trevan v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 69 F.3d 520, 526-27 (Fed. 

Cir. 1995), is inapposite because in that case, we held that the MSPB and OPM did not 

err by relying on a lack of objective medical evidence supporting a claim of disability 

when "OPM has produced [objective] medical evidence [such as X-rays] that is 

inconsistent with subjective claims of disability." There, the MSPB essentially held that 

the applicant's lack of supporting objective medical evidence rendered his subjective 

evidence less probative than the contrary objective evidence submitted by OPM. Such 

a comparison, when subjective evidence is deemed to be less probative than contrary 

objective evidence, is certainly factual in nature, but that is not the situation here where 

the only medical evidence is the so-called "subjective" evidence submitted by VaniekenRyals. And in Trevan, we acknowledged that "objective medical evidence is not the 

only factor to be assessed in determining disability." Id. (citing Chavez, 6 M.S.P.R. at 

419, 422). 

8

 Vanieken-Ryals also submitted written statements in which she described 

her own symptoms and experiences such as, for example, her inability to maintain basic 

hygiene and panic attacks preventing her leaving her home. Pet. App. at 171. She also 

ultimately testified before the AJ on appeal to the MSPB, as did her husband who gave 

2006-3260 14
OPM also did not make any findings that Dr. Nichols' or Dr. Rummler's reports did not 

utilize "established diagnostic criteria" or were "inconsistent with generally accepted 

professional standards." See 5 C.F.R. § 339.104. Nor were any such concerns raised 

by the MSPB in its review. And when, as here, the medical evidence indicates physical 

or mental incapacity so severe as to clearly establish an inability to perform the tasks of 

any job—such as inability to leave home, drive, or accomplish even basic life tasks—the 

medical evidence need not enumerate what specific job tasks are rendered unfeasible 

by the disability. Mullins-Howard v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 71 M.S.P.R. 619, 627 (1996) 

(holding that a psychiatrist's assessment that his patient "was unable to leave her home, 

see visitors, drive, and had great difficulty managing ordinary household tasks such as 

cooking and doing laundry" was sufficient to establish an incapacity to perform the 

duties of her job regardless of the specific tasks required). When weighing the 

probative value of medical evidence involves such a comprehensive and fact-intensive 

process, flatly refusing to consider such medical evidence simply for being "purely 

subjective" is a critical legal error and, at least in a case like this, clearly prejudicial. 

Here, it is clear that both OPM and the MSPB committed this legal error. As 

already discussed, the decisions of both agencies included numerous statements 

evidencing a belief that Vanieken-Ryals' medical evidence should be afforded no 

 

supporting testimony. Neither OPM nor the MSPB gave any indication that she or her 

husband was not a credible witness, and certainly no Hillen analysis was conducted. 

See Hillen v. Dep't of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). Nevertheless, OPM and 

the MSPB dismissed Vanieken-Ryals' symptoms and psychological reactions to her job 

as "situational," thus not serious or enduring enough to be disabling. While we have 

grave doubts about this characterization of her experiences given that her testimony 

was seemingly considered credible, we need not and do not address here whether 

OPM committed an error of law "going to the heart of the administrative determination" 

in its consideration of Vanieken-Ryals' own statements. 

2006-3260 15
2006-3260 16

probative weight at all due to the lack of "objective" evidence such as "formal cognitive 

testing." See, e.g., Pet. App. at 146. In addition, neither the MSPB nor OPM discussed 

the content of Dr. Nichols' or Dr. Rummler's evidence in any meaningful way, which 

further demonstrates that it was not properly considered. OPM, for example, resorted to 

a laundry list of "objective" tests and documents that the medical evidence did not

contain rather than examining the evidence and evaluating what it did contain. See id. 

This is precisely the type of "error going to the heart of the administrative 

determination," if not a "substantial departure from important procedural rights," that the 

Supreme Court charged this court to guard against. See Lindahl, 470 U.S. at 791. 

Therefore, we hold that OPM's and the MSPB's adherence to such a rule, 

unsupported in the law, was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law; thus this case 

must be remanded for proper consideration of Vanieken-Ryals' medical and other 

evidence. Further, since the MSPB's finding that reassignment possibilities had not 

been "definitively exhausted" was based in large part on its rejection of this evidence, 

that issue must also be revisited on remand. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the MSPB is vacated, and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the MSPB is instructed to properly 

consider Vanieken-Ryals' already-submitted medical and other evidence consistent with 

this opinion and other applicable precedent. 

VACATED and REMANDED.