alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.55

SECOND AMENDMENT

This Second Amendment (the "Second Amendment") is made and entered into as of this 1st day of April, 2011 (the
"Second Amendment Effective Date") and amends the Amended and Restated Employment Agreement dated as of September 29, 2008 as further amended by the First Amendment dated August 31, 2009
(collectively, the "Employment Agreement"), by and between NEW FRONTIER MEDIA, INC. ("NFM") and SCOTT PIPER ("Executive"). Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used shall have
the meaning ascribed to them in the Employment Agreement.

In
consideration of the foregoing, and other good and valuable consideration, including Executive's continued employment with NFM, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, Executive and NFM hereby agree as follows:

I.     AMENDMENTS TO AGREEMENT

Section 1 "Term" is hereby amended by deleting such section in its entirety and replacing the same with the
following:



II.    GENERAL PROVISIONS

All other terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement that have not been specifically amended herein shall remain in full force and effect. This Second
Amendment, together with the Employment Agreement, contains all of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties hereto regarding the subject matter hereof. All prior agreements, promises,
negotiations and representations, either oral or written, relating to the subject matter of this Second Amendment or the Employment Agreement not expressly set forth in this Second Amendment or the
Employment Agreement are of no force or effect. Any waiver, alteration or modification of any of the terms of this Second Amendment shall be valid only if made in writing and signed by both parties
hereto. This Second Amendment may be executed in up to two counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original but together shall constitute one and the same instrument.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first set forth above.

NEW FRONTIER MEDIA, INC.

EXECUTIVEBy:

/s/ MICHAEL WEINER

By:

/s/ SCOTT PIPERName: Michael Weiner

Name: Scott PiperTitle: Chief Executive Officer


---



QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of NYMAGIC, INC. (the "Company") on Form
10-K for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas J. Iacopelli,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

1.      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
        Company.


/s/ Thomas J. Iacopelli
-----------------------
Thomas J. Iacopelli
Chief Financial Officer
March 15, 2004
U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration February 20,2015 Mr. Daniel Rogers 245 Industrial Park Road Franklin, NC 28734 Office ofthe Chief Counsel 800 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591

Re: Rogers v. Macon CountyAirport; FAADocketNo. 16-15-04
Dear Mr. Rogers: We have determined the above-captioned complaint, filed byyou against the respondent, the Macon CountyAirport, to be incomplete under 14 C.F.R. part 16. Under 14 C.F.R. § 16.23(b), complainants must (1) state "the specific provisions ofeachAct thatthe complainantbelieves were violated"; (2) provide "aconcise but complete statement ofthe facts relied upon to substantiate each allegation"; (3) provide "all documents then available in the exercise ofreasonable diligence
... in support ofthe complaint"; and (4) describe "howthe complainant was directly and substantially affected by the things done or omittedto be done by the respondents." You submitted a complaintthat lists various inoperative systems atthe Macon County Airport and includes a statementthat these conditions have been reported onNOTAMs for the airport. However, you do not state whichprovisionhas been violated or provide sufficient detail or documentation in support ofan allegation ofviolation. Aside from a statementthat you have landed at this airport, your complaint contains no discussion as to howyou are directly and substantially affected by alleged noncompliance. Furthermore, under 14 C.F.R. § 16.21, prior to filing a part 16 complaint, a person directly and substantially affected by the alleged noncompliance must engage in good faith efforts to resolve the disputed matter informally with those individuals or entities believedresponsible for the noncompliance. The FAA will not consider a complaint underpart 16 unless it certifies that: (1) The complainanthas made substantial and reasonable good faith efforts to resolve the disputed matter informally prior to filing the complaint; and (2) There is no reasonable prospect for practical and timely resolution ofthe dispute.Efforts to resolve informally should be relatively recent and be demonstrated by pertinent documentation. 2

Your complaint does not include the express certificationrequired under§ 16.21. Your complaint also does not include any records offormal or informal correspondence, records of meetings, or email messages demonstrating your efforts to resolve the disputed matter. Again, under § 16.23, the complaint must include all documents then available inthe exercise ofreasonable diligence necessaryto support the complaint. Your complaint is dismissed without prejudice as incomplete under 14 C.P.R. § 16.27. You may file a new complaint that corrects the deficiencies noted above. Part 16 docket number 16-15-04 is hereby closed. Should youhave any questions onthis matter, please contact me at (202) 267-3199 orthe Office ofAirports at (202) 267-3085. Sincerely,

obert A. Hawks Attorney, Airport LawBranch Office ofthe ChiefCounsel

cc: Macon County Airport Authority Miles Gregory, Chairman 325 Westgate Plaza Franldin, NC 28734 Part 16 Proceedings Docket
#### Jerry L. STURDIVANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1085.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 16, 1988.

Jerry L. Sturdivant, pro se.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Sturdivant appeals the denial of his rule 3.850 motion as untimely filed. This rule allows any person whose judgment and sentence became final prior to January 1, 1985, until January 1,1987, to file a motion in accordance with the rule. Appellant’s judgment and sentences became final in November 1976, so he had until January 1, 1987, to file his 3.850 motion. Because appellant did not file this motion until July 20,1987, the trial court properly denied the motion as untimely. *Grooms v. State,*522 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); *see also Demps v. State,*515 So.2d 196 (Fla.1987) (post-conviction relief procedurally barred unless appellant alleged facts previously unknown and not discoverable, or raises a newly established fundamental constitutional right). Appellant has not alleged that the facts upon which his claim is predicated have just become known or that his claim is based on a newly established fundamental constitutional right. *Cf. Paez v. State,*512 So.2d 263 (Fla.3d DCA 1987).

AFFIRMED.

SMITH, C.J., and JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE I-LINK
INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS
COMPANY'S FORM 10-K FOR THEYEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  4618207
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (1385000)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               6827000
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          9782180
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<PREFERRED>                                    1199260
<COMMON>                                        112251
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  24252876
<SALES>                                       14065213
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              14065213
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 39926275
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             3022619
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (28667692)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (28667692)
<DISCONTINUED>                               (1191009)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (29858701)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (10.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (10.17)
        

</TABLE>
#### Steven MILLER v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 58066.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 11, 1989.

T. Victor Bishop, Brown & Bishop, Fulton, for appellant.

Mike Moore, Atty. Gen. by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lee County; Frank A. Russell, Judge.

En Banc.

AFFIRMED.

ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.

PRATHER, ROBERTSON and ZUCCARO, JJ., Would Reverse and Render; No Written Opinion.

PITTMAN, J., not participating.
### -78 -77 -76 -75

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### 500 1000 1500 1000 18 12 06 00 08/30 

## NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL 

# Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 30 Aug 07

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 39.41 N 76.30 WMeters AGL
#### Nance Unemployment Compensation Case.

*609Argued March 22, 1962.

Before Rhodes, P. J., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.

*Taitón H.*Nance, appellant, in propria persona, submitted a brief.

*Sydney*Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him *Raymond*Kleiman, Deputy Attorney General, and *David*Stahl, Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.

April 12, 1962:

Opinion by

Ervin, J.,

In this unemployment compensation case the appellant was refused compensation by the board under §402(b) (1), 43 PS §802(b) (1), of the Unemployment Compensation Law. The board found that the appellant terminated his employment voluntarily without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.

The appellant was last employed as a bosun aboard the S.S. Murfreesboro and on January 4, 1961 claimed that he was ill. His ship was then located in Houston, Texas. He obtained a master’s certificate for medical care at the Public Health Service. He also obtained $109.62, transportation money to his port of origin in California. On January 6, 1961 he reported to the Public Health Service Clinic in San Pedro, Cal. On January 10, 1961 the Public Health Service of San Pedro, Cal. proclaimed Nance fit for duty. He had an *610upper respiratory infection. The employer received a wire from the master of the S.S. Murfreesboro advising that the claimant quit his employment to take a vacation. Under the terms of the union contract covering appellant’s employment it was provided that a crew member was not entitled to transportation money to his port of origin if he continued employment on the vessel. The board found that by accepting the transportation money the claimant voluntarily terminated his employment. We cannot find any error in the board’s so concluding. While appellant complained of illness, he did not report to the Public Health Service in San Pedro, California, until two days after leaving the ship. He could have reported immediately to the Public Health Service in Houston, Texas. It is also important to remember that four days following his first visit to the Public Health Service in San Pedro he was declared fit for duty. It is also significant that appellant filed his application for benefits in California on January 29, 1961 and two days later, on January 31, 1961, obtained his doctor’s certificate to the effect that he should not ship in northern waters because of recurrent episodes of pleurisy. The employer also testified that the vessel from which appellant disembarked for some time thereafter traded in southern waters.

All of these matters were for the consideration of the board. There was ample credible evidence to justify its denial of benefits to the appellant. The credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it are for the board and its findings, when supported by credible evidence, are conclusive; *Progress Manufacturing Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,*406 Pa. 163, 176 A. 2d 632.

Decision affirmed.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### APPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA 

### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT
ANDREW BARRY DENNIS,

Appellant,
v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 2D21-2497
September 20, 2023 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Michael F. Andrews, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender and Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee and William C. Shelhart, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. SILBERMAN, KELLY, and SMITH, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
Exhibit 31.1

302(a) CERTIFICATIONS

I, Edward Wong Wah On, certify that:



1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of APD Antiquities, Inc.;



2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.  The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and we have:



a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness  of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation.



5.  The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent function):



a)  all significant deficiencies and material weakness in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: December 6, 2006

/s/ Edward Wong

Secretary, Director
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

NICHOLAS CIRIO
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 19

- 1140

[ March 5, 2020 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Cheryl Caracuzzo , Judge; L.T. Case No.

502017CF001898C

.

Jack A. Fleischman of Fleischman & Fleischman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lindsay A. Warner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

G ROSS

, M AY and D AMOORGIAN

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4974

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

WARDELL RODNEY JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (CR-04-19)

Submitted: March 23, 2005 Decided: April 7, 2005

Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.

Robert Leonard Flax, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul

Joseph McNulty, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia;

Gurney Wingate Grant, II, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Wardell Rodney Jones seeks to appeal his conviction and

sentence. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as

untimely. In criminal cases, the defendant must file his notice of

appeal within ten days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.

4(b)(1)(A). With or without a motion, the district court may grant

an extension of time to file of up to thirty days upon a showing of

excusable neglect or good cause. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4); United

States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1985).

The district court entered its judgment in May 2004; the

notice of appeal was not filed until October 2004. Because Jones

failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension

or reopening of the appeal period, we grant the Government’s motion

and dismiss the appeal from Jones’ conviction and sentence. 

Further, Jones seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion for an extension of time to file a notice of

appeal. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend

the appeal period, we affirm that order. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 43

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives

2 concurring), That when the Senate recesses or adjourns

3 at the close of business on Thursday, July 1, 1999, Fri4 day, July 2, 1999, or Saturday, July 3, 1999, on a motion

5 offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Ma6 jority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed or ad7 journed until noon on Monday, July 12, 1999, or until

8 such time on that day as may be specified by its Majority

9 Leader or his designee in the motion to recess or adjourn,

10 or until noon on the second day after Members are notified

11 to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent res12 olution, whichever occurs first; and that when the House

13 adjourns on the legislative day of Thursday, July 1, 1999,

14 or Friday, July 2, 1999, on a motion offered pursuant

15 to this concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader or his

16 designee, it stand adjourned until 12:30 p.m. on Monday,

17 July 12, 1999, for morning-hour debate, or until noon on

18 the second day after Members are notified to reassemble
2

SCON 43 ES

1 pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, which2 ever occurs first.

3 SEC. 2. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the

4 Speaker of the House, acting jointly after consultation

5 with the Minority Leader of the Senate and the Minority

6 Leader of the House, shall notify the Members of the Sen7 ate and House, respectively, to reassemble whenever, in

8 their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

Passed the Senate July 1, 1999.

Attest:

Secretary.
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 43

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess

the House of Representatives.of the Senate and a conditional adjournment of
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Wilton GOYNES.

No. 88-KK-1349.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 27, 1988.

In re Goynes, Wilton; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of *1066Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 323-961; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 88KW-0856.

Denied.
III

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. RES. 326

Designating the Cowboy Poetry Gathering in Elko, Nevada, as the ‘‘National

Cowboy Poetry Gathering’’.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 22, 2000

Mr. BRYAN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

OCTOBER 5 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 22), 2000

Committee discharged; considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Designating the Cowboy Poetry Gathering in Elko, Nevada,

as the ‘‘National Cowboy Poetry Gathering’’.

Whereas working cowboys and the ranching community have

contributed greatly to the establishment and perpetuation

of western life in the United States;

Whereas the practice of composing verses about life and work

on the range dates back to at least the trail drive era of

the late 19th century;

Whereas the Cowboy Poetry Gathering has revived and continues to preserve the art of cowboy poetry by increasing

awareness and appreciation of this tradition-based art

form;
2

SRES 326 ATS

Whereas the reemergence of cowboy poetry both highlights

recitation traditions that are a central form of artistry in

communities throughout the West and promotes popular

poetry and literature to the general public;

Whereas the Cowboy Poetry Gathering serves as a bridge between urban and rural people by creating a forum for the

presentation of art and for the discussion of cultural

issues in a humane and non-political manner;

Whereas the Western Folklife Center in Reno, Nevada, established and hosted the inaugural Cowboy Poetry Gathering

in January of 1985;

Whereas since its inception 16 years ago, some 200 similar

local spin-off events are now held in communities

throughout the West; and

Whereas it is proper and desirable to recognize Elko, Nevada,

as the original home of the Cowboy Poetry Gathering:

Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate designates the Cowboy Po2 etry Gathering in Elko, Nevada, as the ‘‘National Cowboy

3 Poetry Gathering’’.

Æ