### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 2, 200 7 S es sio n

ST A C EY D EW A Y N E RA M SE Y v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forCarr oll Coun ty No. 93CR561 Julian P. Gu inn , Judge

No. W2006-01827-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed September 3, 2008

Th e pe tit ion e r, Sta c y D e wayn e Ra mse y, wa s c on vic te d b y a jury in the Mo ntg ome ry Cou nty Cir c uit Court of first degr ee mur der, a nd he re ceive d a sente nce of life wi t h o ut the possibili ty of parole

. Th e re a ft e r, he fi le d a

pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, a lle gin g d ue pr oc e ss v iol a tio ns , n e wl y discovere d evidenc e, and nume rous claims of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. After a hea ring on the petition, the post-conviction court denied re lief, finding that the petitioner ha d failed to prove tha t any rel i ef was wa

rra nted. The pe titioner appea ls that ruling. Upon review of the re cord a nd the parties’ briefs, w e af

firm the judgment of the post-c onviction court.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s A ff

ir me d.

N OR MA M C G EE O GLE , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and A LA N E. G LE NN , JJ., joined.

Benjamin S. Dempsey, Huntingdon, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Stacy De wayne Ramsey.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E. W ill is, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; and Ha nsel Jay McCada ms, District Attorney Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

I. Fa c tu al B ac kgr ound

The pe titioner was indicted by the Carr oll Count y Gra nd Jury for the first degre e murde r of De nn is B r o o k s , J r

. A t t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s r e q u e s t , v e n u e w a s c h a n g e d
, a n d t h e tr i a l w a s h e ld i n Montgomery County. The proof at the petitioner’s trial reve aled that he, and c o-def endants W alter Stev e Smothe rs a ndTe re sa De ion Smith H arris p la nn e d to be a t H arris’ e x- bo yf ri e nd , D a vid Hampton. On the way to Hampt o n ’s re sidence , the petitioner’s truc k overhe ated. The ref ore, the petitioner, Smothers, and Ha rris dec ided to take t h e n ex t vehicle that passed them on the r oad, agre eing that they might ha ve to kill the driver of the vehicle. The pe titioner, Harris, and Smothers grabbe d the victim, the driver of t he vehicle t hat Harris flagge d down, and put him in his truck. The thr e e c o- de fe nd a nts go t in to the truc k a ndbe ga n d ri vin g. Th e y sh ot the vic tim in the le ft hip wi th-2-

a sh otg un , a nd the vic tim be ga n sc re a min g. Th e y tol d the vic tim to sto p sc re a min g a nd the y w ou ld take him to a h o s p i t al . The victim scre amed more , and Smothers used the shotgun to shoot the vic tim un de r the c hin , kil ling h im. Th e re a ft e r, the pe tit ion e r s ug ge ste d th a t th e y b ury th e vic tim

. The trio decide d to c ut of

f the victim’s le gs to ma

ke burial easie r. Further, the autopsy revea led that one of the victim’s arms and his penis wer e also amputated. At Har ris’ behe st, Sm others re moved the vic tim ’s he art , a nda ll thr e e he ld the vic tim ’s he art to the ir mou ths . A dd iti on a lly , th e y r e pe a te dly stabbed the vic tim post -mortem with a butche r knife. N ext, they poure d oil and gasol ine on the victim and his truc k and set both a blaze

. The pe titioner was later discovere d wea

ring the victim’s shoes and possessing the victim’s shaving kit containing tools. The petitioner was c onvicted of the first degre e murder of Brooks, and he rec eived a sente nce of life without the possibili ty of parole

. On appe al, this court af

firmed the pe titione r’ s co n v i ction and sente nce. State v. Stac y Dewayne Ramsey, No. 01C01-9412-CC-00408, 1998 WL 255576, at **1-4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 19, 1998).

S u b s eq u en t ly, the petitioner filed in the Montgomery County Circuit Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging numer ous claims of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel. The c ourt summari l y dismiss ed the pe tition. Thi s court re verse d the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition and re manded for further proceedings. S ee Stac y De wayn e Ra mse y v. Stat e , N o. M2 00 3- 02 96 9- CCA -R 3- PC, 2 00 5 W L 1 23 48 0, a t *2 (T e nn . Crim. App. at Na shville, Ja n. 21, 2005). On re mand, the Montgomery County Circuit Court transfer red the case to the Carroll County Circuit Court f or a post-conviction hearing be fore the original t ri al judge.

Prior to the hearing, the petitioner filed two a mended post-c onvictio n petitions, alleging numerous cla ims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. The petitioner conte nded that bec ause of the

e xte nt o f co un se l’ s er

ro rs , pre jud ic e sh ou ld be pr e su me d. He a lso c la ime d th a t hi s d ue pr oc e ss righ ts

wer e violated by va

rious jury instructions given by the trial cour t. He further a ll eg ed that he had

ne wl y d isc ov e re d e vid e nc e in the fo rm of a l e tt e r f ro m c o- de fe nd a nt S mothe rs to c o- de fe nd a nt H arris

re c a nti ng his tr ia l te sti mon y a nda sse rt ing that th e pe tit ion e r w a s in no c e nt.

Th e pe tit ion e r’ s p os t- c on vic tio n c ou ns e l f ile d n ume ro us re qu e sts fo r co nti nu a nc e s, contending that the trial court could not locate the entire original trial rec ord, and, the ref ore, he was
un able to s uf

fi c ie ntl y r e vie w the re c or d to de te rm ine the pe tit ion e r’ s po ssi ble po st- c on vic tio n is su e s. At a hearing on January 30, 2006, post-conviction counse l told the post-conviction court that “the re [have ] bee n some comments that a to rn ad o s t ruck thecourthouse in Clarksville a nd possibly the

rec ords wer e los t.” There fore , post-conviction counse l maintained that “we ’re here today for [ the pet i t i o n er ’s] claim that he’s being de nied postconviction relief beca use his rec ords ar e lost and destroyed.”

The post-c onviction co urt ac knowledged that the Montgomery County Courthouse was “destroye d by a tornado.

. . . And in terms of the r ecor ds, . . . whether they survived or

not, I don’t kn ow bu t th a t’ s r e a lly pr e tty re la tiv e ly i mmate ri a l. B e c a us e the origi na l tr a ns c ri pt s ho uldbe on fi le with the cler

k of t he court of criminal appeals or the cler k of the supre me court.” Post-conviction counsel stated that he had c hecke d with the trial court and with the cle rk of the Court of Criminal Appea ls, and he stated that “all of those pe ople tell me [the rec ord] is at a differ ent place .” He said,-3-

“I’ ve talked to the supreme court, and I’ve been to the court of appea ls here, I don’t think his records

are going to show back up. I c an’t find them a nywher e.”

The State then informed the court that the petitioner’s trial c ounsel had co p i es of the petitioner’s trial tra nscript. Trial counsel told the court that “w hat I ha ve is what wa s provided for me for the appea l of this case. I t is a certified copy direc tly f rom the court reporter.” Trial counse l noted that the copy he possessed had not be en stamped f iled. The post-conviction court said, “[W] e
are not about to get conce rned w ith that. You’ve got an attested copy, that’s good e nough.”

At the post-conviction hea ring on June 22, 2006, post- c o nviction counsel ca lled an employee of the Car

roll Coun t y C i rcuit C ourt Clerk’s Of fice who testified that she photoc opied all re cords pe rt a ini ng to the c a se that we re in the c le rk ’s of fi c e , c on sis tin g o f “ the tr a ns c ri pts a ndthe c ou rt fi le that’s on file that a

re ba sically the trial transcripts

. ” Wh en as k ed if the copies containe d the complete tra nscript of the tria l, the cler k testified, “That’s what [the petitioner’s trial c ounsel] gave me to copy.”

Regarding his cla im of newl y discovere d evidenc e, the pe titioner called c o-def endant Smothers to testify about a letter Smothers wr ote to Har ris rec anting his trial testimony. S mothers testified that the allegations i n h i s l etter w ere untrue. Smothers expla ined that he ha d written the letter mer ely to get out of prison for a trip to court. Smothers re fused to testify fur ther.

The pa rties stipulated that one of the petitioner’s trial counsel was dece ased at the time of the post-conviction hea

ring. Howe ver, the petitioner’s s econd trial counsel, who w as the son of dece ased c ounsel, testified at the post-c onviction hearing. Counsel state d that the goal at trial wa s to get a not guilty verdict or, in the alternative, a convic tion for a lesse r off ense. A fter the petitioner

wa s f ou ndgu ilt y o f f

ir st d e gr e e mur de r, c ou ns e l’ s o bj ect iv e wa s to sp are the pe tit ion e r the de a th penalty. Ultimately, the jury re jected the death pe nalty but imposed a sentenc e of life without the possibili ty of parole

.

On di rect e xa min a tio n, c ou ns e l st a te d th a t prior to t ri a l, the de fe ns e fi le d a

mot ion “ to

e xc lud e the po st- de a th f

a c ts. ” Ho we ve r, the tr ia l c ou rt ov e rr ule d th e mot ion . T he re a ft e r, the de fe ns e made a deliberate choice t o ref ere nce post-death facts i n front of the j ury as littl e as possible so as not to “draw more a ttention to them.”

Counsel acknowle dged that Smothers had r ecan t ed t h e testi mony he gave at the trials of Ha rr is an d th e p e t i t i o n e r

. H o w e v e r , c o u n s e l r e c a l l e d t h a tS m o t h e r s h a d l a t e r a s s e r t e d t h a th is

rec antation was f

alse a nd that his trial testimony was true.

Co u n s e l r e c a ll e d th a t at t r ia l, th e d e f

e n s e a tt e mp te d to p r e s e n t p r o o f o f th e p e ti tione r’s diminis hed ca

pacity; howeve r, “[ t]he jury did not agre e with our assessment.” Regardle ss, counsel believed that “we did the be st job we could do t hat anyone could ask.” Counsel acknowle dged that the petitioner’s c ase w as “diff icult.” Counsel asserted, “I don’t think we would do anything differ ent today than we would back the n.”-4-

Trial counse l said that he provided a copy of the petitioner’s trial tran s cr i p t t o t h e cle rk’s office , and he a s s u m ed t h at pos t-conviction counse l was provided a copy. Tria l counsel acknow ledged that he d i d n o t know wher e the physica l evidence and exhibits introduced at trial

wer e.
The pe titioner did not testify at the post-conviction hea ring.

Th e pe tit ion e r’ s p os t- c on vic tio n c ou ns e l a ga in t oldthe c ou rt that heha d been un able to obtain the original transcripts a nd exhibits of the petitioner’s tria l; however , he submitted an attested copy of the petitioner’s trial tra nscript that he ha d rec eived f rom trial counse l via the cler k’s offic e, and he a lso submit ted portions of Ha rris’ tria l transcript. Pos t-conviction counse l did not make any argume nt at the conc lusion of the post-conviction hea ring, opting to rest upon the pleadings.

After the conc lusion of the po s t -c o n viction hearing, the post-conviction court entere d an order finding that the allegations of ineffe ctive assist ance contained in the pos t-conviction petition

wer e either

previously determined, waived, u n fo u n ded, or me rely c hallenges to trial strategy. Regarding the pe titioner’s clai m s o f due proc ess violations, the post-conviction court f ound that “[t]he re is nothing to be found in these a llegations that amounts to a denial of due proce ss or eve n suggests the prese nce of such an err or or err ors.” Further, the court found that Smothers “af firmed his tr ia l te sti mon y” ; th e re fo re , th e pe tit ion e r’ s claim o f n e wl y d isc ov e re d e vid e nc e wa s b a se le ss. The pos t -c o n viction court conc luded, “Quite simply stated, ther e wa s no evidenc e of a ny sort adduce d at t he hea

ring of this matter that would in any way indicate that tria l counsel wa s ineffe ctive

or pe tit ion e r wa s de nie d d ue pr oc e ss. ” Fin a lly , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t “ the re is

. . . n o t h i ng whatsoeve r to be found in the e vidence produce d at this hearing or anywhe re in the

rec ord of this ca se that would suggest that the pe titioner was denie d any constitutional right.”

On appe al, the petitioner a rgues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial

c ou ns e l we re ine ff

e c tiv e , be c a us e of

the ne wl y d isc ov e re d e vid e nc e of Smo the r’ s r e c a ntatio n o f h is
tr ia l te sti mony, and “bec a us e of a tot a l de nia l of

du e pr oc e ss, be ing that po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f i s tot a lly un a va ila

ble , b e c a us e the c omp le te origi na l tria l r e c or d w a s lo st, de str oy e d o r o the rw ise

un a va ila ble fo r u se by po st c on vic tio n c ou ns e l.” Th e pe tit ion e r a lso raise s “ [g ]e ne ra l c la ims ”

re la tin g to the de nia l of

du e pr oc e ss at tria l.

II. Ana lys is

To be succe ssful in his claim for post-conviction relief
, the petitioner must prove all fa ctual alleg ations contained in his post-conviction petiti on by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) (2006). “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence means evidence in which there is no s er ious or substantial doubt about the corr ectne ss of the conc lusions drawn fr om the

e vid e nc e .’ ” State v. Ho lde r, 15 S.W. 3d 90 5, 91 1 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ) ( qu oti ngHo dg e s v . S. C. To of & Co. , 8 33 S.W. 2d

89 6, 90 1 n. 3 (T e nn

. 19 92 ))

. I ssu e s r e g ard ingthe c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value to be acc orded the ir testimony , and the factua l questions raised by the evidenc e adduce d at trial are to be resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fac t. S ee He n l ey v. S t at e, 9 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d

5 7 2
, 5 7 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ). T h er ef o re , we af fo rdth e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nco u rt ’s fi n d i n gs-5-

of fa ct the weig ht of

a jury verdic t, with such findings be ing c onclusive on appe al abse nt a showing that the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst those finding s. I d. at 578.

A c la im of ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l is a mixe d que sti on of law an d f a c t. S e e State v. Bur ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . We will review the post-c onviction court’s finding s of fac t de novo with a pre sumption t hat those finding s are corr ect. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 45 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . H ow e ve r, we wi ll r e vie w the po st- c on vic tio n co ur t’ s con c lus ion s o f l aw p ur e ly de novo. I d.

When a petitioner see ks post-conviction relief on the basis of inef

fe cti ve assistanc e of counsel, “ the petitioner bear s the burden of provingboth that counsel’s pe rfor mance was de ficient and that the de ficienc y

prejudice d the def

ense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (c iti ngStr ic kla

nd v. Was hin g ton , 466 U. S. 668 , 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2 05 2, 20 64 (1 98 4) ). To e sta bli sh d ef i ci en tp er fo rm an ce , t h e p et i t i o n er m u s ts h o w th at co u n s el ’s p er fo rm an ce wa s b el o w “ t h e r an ge
o f competence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s.” B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (T e nn . 1 97 5)

. To e sta

bli sh pr e jud ic e , the pe tit ion e r mus t sh ow that “ the re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, b ut fo r c ouns e l’ s un

pr of e ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt o f t he pr oc e e din g wo uld

have be e n d if

fe re nt. A re asonable probability is a probability

s u ff i ci ent to undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Moreover,

[b]e c a us e a pe tit ion e r m

us t e sta bli shbo th p ro ng s of the te st, a fa ilure to prove e ither def iciency or prejudice provides a suff icient b as is to deny

relief on the ineff

ective a ssistance c laim. I ndeed, a court ne ed not addre ss the components in any particula r orde r or e ven addre ss both if the [petit ioner] makes an insuff icient showing of one

c omp on e nt.
Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069).

In his brief, the petitioner ra ises at least eighty-three “er rors and omissions by trial counsel [that we re] defic ient and prejudicial” and argue s that the err ors should be “pr esumed pre judicial.” Th e c la ims are pr e se nte d in lis t f or m. T his c ou rt

ha s p re vio us ly o bs e rv e d:

There are two schools of t hought conce rning appellate prac tice. One is the “shotgun approa ch.” The other is the “rifle shot ap proac h.” Under the shotgun approa ch the a ppellate counsel raises a

multit ude of issues and f

ires them shotgun style at the appe llate court, with the hope that one of

the issues will find its m ark a nd reve rsal will be gr a nte d. Un de r the ri fl e sh ot a pp ro a c h co un se l c ho os e the ir be st issues and thoroughly brief them, also with t h e i ntent of getting the appellate court to re verse the conviction. Ne ither is nece ssarily the be st m e tho d, bu t the ri fl e sh ot app ro a c h is pr e fe rr e d b y mo st a pp e llate judges, since th ei r t ime and the time of the ir rese arc h assistants can be better spent in intensive rese arc h rega rding a few wel l craftedD u e t o the n at ur e of t he pet i t i oner ’ s br i ef
, w e f i nd no ne ed t o s et out i n de t ai l t he pet i t i oner ’ s num er ous 1

a lleg a tio n s.

-6-

issues rather

than spending their time studyin g a wide spe ctrum of issues with very fe w, if any, ha ving any merit.

Charles A. Butler v. State, No. 03C01-9207-CR-00250, 1995 WL 56357, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Feb. 13, 1995).

The instant ca se is a textbook example of an unsu cc es s fu l use of the “ shotgun approac h,” which wa s employed both in the lower c ourt and on appea l. Instead of fleshing out issues which 1

ma y h a ve ha d me ri t, the pe tit ion e r i ns te a d r a ise d a mul titud e of c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e in list form without citation t o supporting authority or any a rgument re gardi n g wh y t h e action or inaction of c ounsel was de ficient or how the alleged de ficienc y prejudice d the petitioner. More over, at the post-convic tion he aring the petitioner relied upon his summary allegations without prese nting any ar gument o r m ea n i n g fu l proof to support his claims. The pe titioner merely submitted to the post-conviction court his e xtensive list of issues a nd a voluminous recor d with the gener al ar gument that prejudice should be p re s u m ed. As the post-conviction court noted, most of the pe titioner’s iss ue s w e re pr e vio us ly d e te rm ine d o r wa ive d. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a ga ins t th e po stconviction court’s findings. There fore , the petitioner ha s failed to prove that his trial counsel we re ineffe ctive.

The pe titioner also alleges tha t he is entitled to a new tri al b as ed upon newly discove red evidenc e, name ly Smot hers’ rec antation of his trial t estimony in a letter he wr ote to Har

ris. Initially, we note that gener ally claims of newly discovere d evidenc e shoul d be addressed in a petition for a writ of er ror c oram nobis and a

re not prope rly the subject f or post-convic tion review. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0

- 2 6

- 1 0 5 ( 2 0 0 3 )

. M o r e o v e r , Sm o th e r s te s ti f ie d a t th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n h e ar in g that the

rec antation letter w as full of lies. This issue is without merit.

Additionally, the petitioner complains that he “ is entitled to post conviction relief and a new
tr ia l, b e c a us e of

a tot a l de nia l of

du e pr oc e ss, in that po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f i s tota lly un a va ila ble , in that th e c omp le te or igi na l tria l r e c or d w a s lo st, de str oy e d o r o the rw ise un a va ila ble fo r u se by po st

c on vic tio n c ou ns e l.” Th e pe tit ion e r re pe a te dly re qu e ste d c on tin ua nc e s in or de r t o atte mpt to o bta in the original re cord. W e note that while the p et i t i o n er claims his abilit y to pursue post-convic tion

re lie f w a s c ri pp le d d ue to h is i na bil ity to o btain the origi na l tria l re c or d an d a c omp le te tr a ns c ri pt, not only was a tra nscript ava ilable from this court, but also the pe tition er h ad a copy of the trial
transcript that he obtained fr om the petitioner’s trial c ounsel. Further, a s the post-conviction court aptly noted, the petitioner “fa il[ed] to ide ntify what he was unable to obta in, where it is l ocate d, and, if ind e e d, it e xis ts” a ndhe “ fa il[ e d] to spe c if y an y ex hib it or e xh ibi ts that cou ld ha ve a n ef fe c t in thi s pr oc e e din g. ” In de ed, the e nti re app e llate re c or d o f the pe tit ion e r’ s d ir e c t app e a l w a s r e a dil y
a va ila ble . I n sum, the po st- c on vic tio n co urt fou nd “ [t ]h e re is nothin g to be f ou ndin [ the pe tit ion e r’ s] allegations that amounts to a denial of due proce ss or even suggests the prese nce of such an e rror

or
err ors.” We agre e with the post-convic tion court. The pe titioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.-7-

Th e pe tit ion e r a lso u se s th e “ sh otg un app ro a c h” to r a ise iss ue s r e ga rd ing du e pr oc e ss vio la tio ns

. Th e pe tit ion e r c la ims that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in makin g c e rt a in e vid e nti ary ru lin gs , giving jury instructions, and sentencing the pe titioner. He also raises severa l claims rega rding the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e. Most of these issues wer e previously determined by this court on direc t appea l. See Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 30 -1 06 (h ); Col e v. State
, 79 8 S.W. 2d 26 1, 26 4- 65 (T e nn . Cr im. App. 1990). Moreove r, none of these issues are a prope r basis for post-conviction re lief. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 106(g); Forre st v. St ate, 535 S.W.2d 166, 167 ( Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).

III. Conclusi on
Based upon the f

oregoing, we aff

irm the judgment of the post-convic tion court.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, JUD GE