No. 01-14-00863-CV

IN THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

WEATHERFORD ARTIFICIAL LIFT SYSTEMS,INC.,

 Appellant,

V. 

A&E SYSTEMS SDN BHD, 

 Appellee.

On Appeal from the 295th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas

Cause No. 2012-62091 

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 

BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP

Brendan D. Cook

State Bar No. 04721700

Brendan.Cook@bakermckenzie.com

Chelsea M. Keeton

State Bar No. 24083296

Chelsea.Keeton@bakermckenzie.com

Brandon E. Caire

State Bar No. 24064991

Brandon.Caire@bakermckenzie.com

700 Louisiana, Suite 3000

Houston, Texas 77002-2716

(713) 427-5000

(713) 427-5099 (Fax)

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 

WEATHERFORD ARTIFICIAL LIFT 

SYSTEMS,INC.

ACCEPTED

01-14-00863-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

2/17/2015 5:49:15 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 2/17/2015 5:49:15 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary..................................................................................................................1

I. A&E Impermissibly Narrows the “Minimum Contacts” 

Analysis. ...............................................................................................3

II. A&E’s Purposeful Contacts.................................................................5

A. A&E Custom-Designed and Marketed its Products 

Directly to Texas-based Weatherford........................................7

B. A&E CEO Arthur Haycox Engaged in Numerous Email 

Communications With Weatherford From the Summer of 

2009 through 2010. ....................................................................8

C. Weatherford Purchased From A&E, and A&E Shipped to 

Weatherford, the Very Products at Issue in This Dispute. ........9

D. The Exit Agreement Creates an Ongoing Relationship 

with Texas Resident Weatherford and Establishes a 

Substantial and Continuing Relationship with the Forum 

State..........................................................................................11

III. The Operative Facts of Weatherford’s Claims are 

Substantially Connected, and Arise Out of, A&E’s 

Contacts with the Forum State. ..........................................................13

IV. Any Contacts that Weatherford had With A&E USA are 

Attributable to A&E, and the Fact That A&E USA Also 

Has Contacts With Texas Does Not Eviscerate A&E’s 

Many Direct Contacts With Texas.....................................................16

Conclusion & Prayer ............................................................................................21
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchund,

83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002).................................................................................16

Burger King v. Rudzewicz.

471 U.S. 462 (1985)..........................................................................................2, 3

Citrin Holdings L.L.C. v. Minnis,

305 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed)....11, 12, 15

Gonzalez v. AAG Las Vegas, LLC,

317 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. 

denied)...................................................................................................................6

Hoagland v. Butcher,

2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12979 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

Dec. 4, 2014, no pet.)........................................................................................5, 6

Information Services Group, Inc. v. Rawlinson,

302 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. 

denied)...............................................................................................................4, 6

IRA Res. v. Griego,

221 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................................7

Mikuni Corp. v. Foster,

2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 404 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 

19, 2012, no pet.) ................................................................................................17

Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg,

221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................................5

Morris Indus. v. Trident Steel Corp.,

2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9480 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 

1, 2011) .....................................................................................................1, 17, 18
iii

Schott Glas v. Adame,

178 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet 

dism’d)................................................................................................................18

Statutes

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 17.042(1)..................................................................12
1

SUMMARY

In its Brief of Appellee (the “Response” or “Response Brief”), A&E 

unilaterally and constrictively redraws the boundaries of minimum contacts 

analysis so as to include only a few carefully chosen contacts; in the process of 

doing so, A&E asks the Court to turn a blind eye to almost the entirety of the 

Parties’ year-long business relationship. All the while, A&E continues to realize a 

double profit by re-selling products that Weatherford purchased and then returned,

without refunding to Weatherford the purchase price of the products in question. 

A&E’s newly-fashioned test both defies controlling Texas law and mocks 

principles of fair play and substantial justice. In view of the many contacts A&E 

has made with Texas relating to this case, the Court must exercise jurisdiction and 

allow Weatherford to recover the funds that A&E rightfully owes it. 

Specific jurisdiction exists where: “(1) the non-resident purposefully 

directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the 

privileges of conducting activities there, and (2) the controversy arises out of or is 

related to the non-resident’s contacts with the forum state.” Morris Indus. v. 

Trident Steel Corp., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9480 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

Dec. 1, 2011) (emphasis added). The test for whether the controversy “arises out of 
2

or relates to” the non-residents contacts with the forum state is whether there is a 

“substantial connection” with the litigation’s operative facts and the non-resident.

In its Response, A&E selectively distills the “operative facts” of the lawsuit 

in an attempt to distract the Court from the true nature of the Parties relationship 

and the essence of this dispute. In doing so, it demands that the Court view the 

dispute between the Parties through a very different lens than the one that the law 

requires. At its core, the Parties’ dispute concerning minimum contacts may be 

condensed into one question: 

In weighing A&E’s Special Appearance, may the Court consider the 

collective import of the many contacts it made with Texas in the 

interest of using Weatherford to distribute its products, or is the Court 

limited to only two or three narrowly-drawn contacts occurring at the 

precise time and place that an agreement to return those products was 

finalized? 

While the parties no doubt have some other disagreements, the Court, were 

it to resolve this question, can fairly easily determine whether or not the A&E’s 

direct contacts with Texas should subject it to Texas courts’ jurisdiction.

Weatherford submits that in determining which contacts to analyze, the 

Court should include all contacts made in furtherance of the Parties’ relationship in 

accord with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Burger King v. 

Rudzewicz. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Burger King mandates that, in addition to a 

parties’ contract alone, “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, 

along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of 
3

dealing . . . must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant purposefully 

established minimum contacts within the forum.” Id. at 479. In making sustained 

and deliberate contact again and again with Texas in its attempt to induce 

Weatherford to distribute its products worldwide, there can be no doubt that A&E 

anticipated being haled into a Texas court should it refuse to refund Weatherford as 

agreed once those products were returned.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

I. A&E Impermissibly Narrows the “Minimum Contacts” Analysis.

A&E Malaysia contends that there is not a substantial connection between 

the operative facts of this litigation and A&E’s purposeful contacts with the forum 

state. According to A&E, the only “contacts” that bear any weight on the Court’s 

analysis are (1) the location where the final terms of the Exit Agreement between 

the Parties were negotiated (i.e., Malaysia), and (2) A&E’s refusal to remit 

payment from Malaysia.

Of course, the scope of “minimum contacts” is much broader than that, and 

the operative facts of this litigation relate to much more than simply where the Exit 

Agreement was negotiated or where the money that A&E owes Weatherford is 

located. In actuality, the “operative facts” that will be the focus at trial include 

A&E’s continued efforts to create and benefit from a business relationship with 

Weatherford that would largely be executed in Texas, the representations and 
4

communications exchanged between the Parties regarding what they each expected 

from each other with regard to that business relationship, A&E’s promises to 

refund the money that Weatherford paid for the Products, the “falling out” that 

eventually occurred between the Parties, the instructions given to Richard Hoyland 

from Arthur Haycox in Malaysia regarding the issuance of the Credit Notes, and

A&E’s inspection and re-sale, from Malaysia, of the Products first paid for by 

Weatherford. Information Services Group, Inc. v. Rawlinson, 302 S.W.3d 392, 398 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (stating that “to identify the 

operative facts of the litigation, we select those facts that would be the focus of the 

trial”). 

These facts comprise, surround, and bear heavily on the business 

relationship between the parties. Accordingly, neither that relationship, nor the 

numerous contacts A&E made with Texas in furtherance of it, can be disregarded. 

As is well known to the Parties and now to the Court, that business relationship 

eventually failed, and the circumstances surrounding that relationship’s unraveling 

form the subject of this dispute. However, in order to escape the jurisdiction of the 

Court and force Weatherford to litigate against a non-existent entity, A&E now

adopts the untenable position that the majority of its contacts with Weatherford in 

developing the failed business relationship are not substantially connected to 

Weatherford’s claims. That position is inapposite to Texas law. 
5

In deciding whether there is specific jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant where a contract, such as the Exit Agreement, is involved, Texas courts 

will consider the contract at issue “against a backdrop of ‘prior negotiations and 

contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and 

the parties' actual course of dealing.’” Hoagland v. Butcher, 2014 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 12979, *19–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 4, 2014, no pet.). 

A&E would rather the Court ignore this “backdrop” of prior negotiations, 

contemplated future consequences, and the terms of the parties course of dealing as 

considerations that are “irrelevant” to the Court’s analysis. (Response Brief 19)

They are not at all irrelevant. When properly considered, it is certain that A&E 

purposefully availed itself of the benefit of doing business in Texas and that 

Weatherford’s claims against A&E arise out of and relate to that purposeful 

availment.

II. A&E’s Purposeful Contacts

“Minimum contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction when the 

nonresident defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws.’” Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007). 

Texas courts consider “three factors to determine whether a nonresident purposely 

availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas: (1) the 
6

defendant's contacts with the forum, not the unilateral activity of another party; (2) 

whether the contacts were purposeful rather than random, isolated or fortuitous; 

and (3) whether the defendant has sought some benefit, advantage, or profit by 

availing himself of the jurisdiction.” Hoagland, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS at *11.

A&E’s contacts with the forum state were of its own intent, not merely 

reactions to the unilateral activity of a Weatherford. Those contacts were 

deliberate, not random, and were committed purely out of A&E’s desire to benefit

from doing business in Texas and with a Texas resident. In these ways, A&E’s 

contacts are far more purposeful than those of the nonresident defendants in either 

the Rawlinson or Gonzalez cases that it cites. (Response Brief 22–25 (citing

Information Services Group, Inc. v. Rawlinson, 302 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Gonzalez v. AAG Las Vegas, LLC, 317 

S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)) In each of those 

cases, the nonresident defendant’s actions were not committed for the purpose of

benefiting or with the intent to benefit from business in Texas.1 Each of those cases 

are very different from the one at bar, in which A&E has deliberately sought the 

benefits and advantages of doing business in a Texas forum and tirelessly pursued 

 1 In Gonzalez, the nonresident defendant worked for a car dealership in Nevada, was employed 

there, and the question of his breach of fiduciary duty arose from and related to his actions 

conducted in Nevada. Gonzalez, 317 S.W.3d at 284. In Rawlinson, the nonresident defendant’s

actions at issue were those conducted in the UK, and did not seek the benefit of the business of a 

Texas forum. Rawlinson, 302 S.W.3d at 397. 
7

that benefit through intentional and purposeful contacts aimed at Texas resident 

Weatherford and the forum state of Texas.

A. A&E Custom-Designed and Marketed its Products Directly to 

Texas-based Weatherford.

“Targeting marketing efforts in a state to generate business there suffices to 

justify jurisdiction in disputes arising from that business.” IRA Res. v. Griego, 221 

S.W.3d 592, 597 (Tex. 2007). A&E marketed its products specifically to 

Weatherford in multiple ways. First, A&E specially designed its products with 

Weatherford branding in an attempt to persuade Weatherford to serve as its global 

distributor, selling A&E products to end users around the world from its Texas 

headquarters. A&E USA has previously referred to the products sent to 

Weatherford as “special order goods to accommodate Weatherford’s specific 

needs.” (CR 107) These goods were not mere commodities but customized

products that were specifically branded for distribution by Texas-based 

Weatherford and shipped from A&E in Malaysia to Texas for Weatherford’s 

distribution to end users. 

A&E did not merely design and ship the “special order goods” to 

Weatherford in Texas. It also sent Simon Haycox, its technical expert, to Houston 

to perform complimentary demonstrations of the products to Weatherford 

representatives in Texas in an attempt to cement the Parties’ relationship and 

ensure Weatherford understood how to distribute and use the product. Notably, 
8

A&E freely admits in its Response that Simon Haycox was an employee of A&E 

and not A&E USA, despite previously misrepresenting to the trial court that “it has 

never had an employee or officer in Texas.” (CR 120, 130; Response Brief 7) 

Haycox’s visit to Houston and demonstrations of A&E’s products there are 

unquestionably part a purposeful marketing effort by A&E—not A&E USA—to 

secure Weatherford’s business in Texas. Another A&E employee, Tim Davison, 

specially tailored marketing tools such as presentations and brochures to those that 

A&E believed would best appeal to Weatherford’s clients in Texas and throughout 

the United States. (CR 258)

B. A&E CEO Arthur Haycox Engaged in Numerous Email 

Communications With Weatherford From the Summer of 2009 

through 2010.

Arthur Haycox, A&E’s CEO, and Weatherford engaged in regular 

conversations by e-mail regarding how the two parties would do business together 

globally, beginning in the summer of 2009 when Haycox first sent A&E marketing 

materials to Weatherford. (CR 189) While these email contacts with Texas 

resident Weatherford, were they standing alone, might not suffice to support 

jurisdiction, they are, contrary to A&E’s contentions, certainly Texas contacts. 

Furthermore, they are only one facet of A&E’s sustained and continuous 

purposeful contacts both in Texas and with Texas resident Weatherford. 
9

Despite Haycox’s alleged dual role as both CEO of A&E and Manager of 

A&E USA, these contacts are unquestionably contacts of A&E for multiple 

reasons, and any implied finding otherwise goes against overwhelming evidence to 

the contrary. In contrast to A&E’s submission, Weatherford representative Todd 

Travis noted that he always “understood [Haycox] to be the CEO of A&E 

Systems Sdn Bhd and the head of the A&E Group as a whole, which is how he 

always presented himself.” (CR 189) The emails found in the record 

emphatically confirm Travis’s statement. Throughout the Parties’ relationship, all 

email contacts from Haycox to Weatherford in Texas solely reflect Haycox’s CEO 

position at A&E. (CR 256, 258, 326, 341, 344) Furthermore, at the start of the 

Parties’ relationship, Haycox could not have been acting as a representative of 

A&E USA, because Defendant A&E USA did not even exist at the time.2

(Response Brief 3)

C. Weatherford Purchased From A&E, and A&E Shipped to 

Weatherford, the Very Products at Issue in This Dispute.

A&E, attempting to protect itself from Texas jurisdiction by using A&E 

USA as a commercial shield, characterized its relationship to A&E USA thusly: 

When A&E USA would receive a purchase order from a United 

States-based company, A&E USA would place an order with A&E 

Malaysia for the manufacture of the equipment or products specified. 

Upon A&E USA’s receipt of payment from the United States-based 

 2 A predecessor to A&E USA was in existence at that time, as A&E notes, but neither A&E nor 

Weatherford allege that predecessor entity to have had any contact with Weatherford.
10

customer, A&E USA would pay A&E Malaysia a portion of the 

payment received for the manufacture of the products, pursuant to the 

parties’ contractual agreement, which was cost plus 30%. (Response 

Brief 5) 

Weatherford agrees that the process described is a “common international 

transaction,” but the process A&E describes in its Response differs drastically 

from the process used in this dispute.

In actuality, A&E dealt directly with Weatherford in providing the products 

at issue in this case. Prior to the transaction, A&E confirmed that, rather than 

issuing purchase orders to A&E USA, “Purchase order[s] [were] to be made out 

to A&E Systems Sdn Bhd, No. 26, Jalan Pendafter U1/54, Seksyen U1, 

Glenmarie, 40150 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia.” (CR 341) 

While Weatherford did include A&E USA on its purchase order for the products, 

Haycox quickly caught Weatherford’s mistake, noting that the orders had to be 

made to A&E “to be of any use.” (CR 344) Weatherford did not formally issue 

new purchase orders directly to A&E, but there was no need to, as it was clear 

from the circumstances that A&E had received notice of the orders in question 

regardless of their original addressee. As A&E’s own CEO has observed, an order 

placed to A&E USA would have been useless, as the party Weatherford was doing 

business with was A&E. 

Nevertheless, Weatherford submitted payment for the products directly to 

A&E, who directly accepted the payment. (CR 236) A&E then directly shipped 
11

the product from its warehouses in Malaysia to Weatherford in Houston. (CR 

327–329) Furthermore, it is untrue that “Weatherford made a deliberate choice to

issue purchase orders to A&E USA and not A&E Malaysia.” (Reply Brief 5). In 

fact, the largest purchase order of $651,990.54 was issued to Pangtong Investment 

& Management, the Hong Kong intermediary (used for accounting purposes) who 

served as Weatherford’s direct line to A&E Malaysia. (CR 89) 

In summary, with respect to the very products for which Weatherford seeks 

compensation in this suit, those products were provided directly by A&E to 

Weatherford in Texas in exchange for payment to A&E from Weatherford in 

Texas without any substantive involvement by A&E USA at all.

D. The Exit Agreement Creates an Ongoing Relationship with Texas 

Resident Weatherford and Establishes a Substantial and 

Continuing Relationship with the Forum State.

Perhaps the most important signal of A&E’s intent to benefit from the forum 

state is that the terms of the Exit Agreement, even taken alone, support a finding of 

jurisdiction over A&E because they were, in part, “specifically designed to benefit 

from the skills of a Texas resident who performs contractual obligations in Texas.”

Citrin Holdings L.L.C. v. Minnis, 305 S.W.3d 269, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2013, pet. filed). For example, the Exit Agreement envisions that:

• “WFT and A&E remain connected via a normal vendor/client 

relationship.” (CR 82)
12

• “WFT will continue to offer Alocit and Enviropeel to its clients.” A&E 

has not disputed that Weatherford is a Texas company, and that the 

marketing of the Alocit and Enviropeel products to Weatherford clients 

would be conducted from Weatherford’s Texas offices and to Weatherford’s 

Texas clients. (CR 82)

• “A&E will support and have available management to demo and 

present to WFT clients on a global basis.” (CR 82) Again, it is obvious 

that at least some of these clients would be in Texas and/or would stem from 

Texas. Furthermore, the essential personnel needed for these demonstrations 

included A&E Malaysia employee Simon Haycox, who had previously 

traveled to Texas for the same purpose.

• “WFT to review a manager and ‘link’ between WFT and A&E.”

Importantly, each of the above terms specifically intend to benefit from the 

skills and services of Texas resident Weatherford that would be performed in 

Texas. Citrin, 305 S.W.3d at 280. The “place of performance” consideration is one 

mandated by the Texas long-arm statute itself, which finds that a party does 

business in Texas when it “contracts...with a Texas resident” (regardless of where 

the actual “contracting” took place) and “either party is to perform the contract in 

whole or in part in this state.” Id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 17.042(1)).

It is undisputed that Weatherford’s breach of contract claim “arises out of or 

relates to” the terms of the Exit Agreement entered into between A&E and 

Weatherford. Accordingly, that agreement and the interpretation of its terms are 

“operative facts” that are critical to the determination of this case. Furthermore, 

A&E USA’s counterclaim reveals that A&E itself envisioned the Exit Agreement 

as one that would establish “an ongoing business relationship with a Texas resident 
13

to be performed at least in part in Texas,” and that A&E hoped for a “substantial 

and continuing relationship” in Texas, prior to and in accordance with the Exit 

Agreement. (CR 110) Ironically, A&E points to the very same contacts—contacts 

that admittedly were made by A&E Malaysia, such as Simon Haycox’s October 

2009 training and testing visit—as Weatherford to support its own causes of action 

against Weatherford. (CR 107, 209)

Only now does A&E claim that “the so-called ‘Exit Agreement’ creates no 

‘substantial and continuing relationship with Texas,’” and that, in the context of 

determining whether the “operative facts of the litigation” are “substantially 

connected” to its contacts with Texas, that those very same contacts are now 

“irrelevant.” (Response Brief 21) A&E cannot use the very same contacts that 

establish jurisdiction over it as a sword to recover against Texas resident 

Weatherford, but as a shield to preclude Weatherford from its own recovery.

III. The Operative Facts of Weatherford’s Claims are Substantially 

Connected, and Arise Out of, A&E’s Contacts with the Forum State.

Moreover, as alleged in its Petition, Weatherford’s claims for breach of 

contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation all arise from a 

failed business relationship in which “[t]he parties originally envisioned that A&E 

would tender [certain coatings products] to Weatherford, and that eventually 

Weatherford would act as the exclusive distributor, seller, marketer, and servicer of 

the Products” globally. (CR 71) In connection with this relationship, Weatherford 
14

ordered and paid for certain products for distribution that A&E provided; 

Weatherford later determined not to use the products and returned them, expecting 

(as the parties had agreed) payment for the returned products. Instead of providing 

that payment, A&E has kept Weatherford’s money and realized a double profit on 

some of the product which it has sold. 

Despite the fact that the very goods for which Weatherford seeks 

compensation in this suit were provided by A&E in exchange for payment, A&E, 

in its myopic redrawing of boundaries for minimum contacts analysis,

disingenuously argues that the Exit Agreement is not related to the Parties’ 

contemplated business relationship. As A&E contends, all the actions it took in 

furtherance of its relationship with Weatherford, including its trip to Houston to 

demonstrate its products, its branding of its products for Weatherford customers, 

its demanded payment directly to the bank account of “A&E Systems Sdn Bhd,” 

and its request that Weatherford market its products to Weatherford customers, are 

conveniently “out of bounds” for the Court’s jurisdictional analysis. 

The Exit Agreement, and the liability of A&E for failing to follow that 

agreement’s terms, is unquestionably related to the Parties’ business relationship 

and the many contacts that A&E had with Texas in furtherance of that relationship. 

Any sober comparison of the Exit Agreement and the Parties’ relationship yields 

the inescapable conclusion that the two are inextricably intertwined. Not only is 
15

the Exit Agreement “related to” the parties’ business relationship, it was the 

ultimate agreement reached to consummate that relationship, albeit not in the way 

either party had originally intended. Indeed, the very term “Exit Agreement” 

indicates that the Parties necessarily had something to exit. The Exit Agreement 

was not an abrupt change of course, wholly unrelated to the Parties’ prior 

relationship. It was instead the culmination of a relationship that had steadily 

grown more uneasy, a relationship which had already become unstable by March 

2010. At that point, A&E CEO Arthur Haycox flew to Houston to meet with 

Weatherford representative David Colley, and Colley made clear at that meeting 

that the Parties’ relationship would have to change or end. 

A&E also places undue emphasis on the fact that the Parties never reached 

the point of executing a distributorship agreement. In doing so, A&E seems to 

posit that the only contacts which count in a relationship are ones culminating in 

the signing of a formal contract. However, contacts made in negotiating a contract 

are relevant to a jurisdictional analysis, even if one is not signed in the end, or if, as 

in this case, the parties instead sign an Exit Agreement in the end. Citrin 305 

S.W.3d at 281 (considering a prior contract between the parties that was alleged 

but not produced in evidence as a contact relevant to the jurisdictional analysis).
16

IV. Any Contacts that Weatherford had With A&E USA are Attributable 

to A&E, and the Fact That A&E USA Also Has Contacts With Texas 

Does Not Eviscerate A&E’s Many Direct Contacts With Texas.

Contrary to A&E’s assertion, Weatherford has not waived its claims of alter 

ego on appeal. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchund, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 

(Tex. 2002) (an appellate court reviews a trial courts grant or denial of a special 

appearance de novo). The facts before this Court, both as pled in Weatherford’s 

Petition and presented in its initial Brief, make obvious that A&E USA was 

nothing more than the alter ego through which A&E conducted its business with 

Texas resident Weatherford. 

“Personal jurisdiction may exist over a nonresident defendant if the 

relationship between the foreign corporation and its parent corporation that does 

business in Texas is one that would allow the court to impute the parent 

corporation’s ‘doing business’ to the subsidiary.” BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. 

Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tex. 2002). “To ‘fuse’ the parent company and its 

subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes, the plaintiffs must prove the parent controls 

the internal business operations and affairs of the subsidiary.” Id.

A&E holds itself out on its own website as a “group” that is headquartered 

in Malaysia, with the other locations of A&E being no more than mere “offices” or 

“regional centres.” (CR 198, 200) The existence of separate headquarters is a 

relevant consideration in determining whether a parent corporation is “separate” 
17

from its subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes. Mikuni Corp. v. Foster, 2012 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 404 *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 19, 2012, no pet.).

Additionally, when Weatherford inquired as to why certain discounts were 

applied to the Credit Notes allegedly issued by A&E USA, Mille Moreno, the 

administrator in A&E USA’s office, made clear that that information would have 

to come from A&E’s “headquarters in Malaysia” via Arthur Haycox:

At the very least, A&E USA was certainly A&E’s agent. “Texas contacts of 

an agent are attributable to the principal.” Morris Indus. v. Trident Steel Corp, 

2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9480 *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 1, 2011). 
18

“The defining feature of an agency relationship is the principal’s control over the 

agent.” Id. The right to control, analyzed in the agency context, “includes not only 

the right to assign tasks but the right to dictate the means and details of how the 

agent will complete the tasks.” Schott Glas v. Adame, 178 S.W.3d 307, 315 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet dism’d).

The overwhelming evidence shows that A&E controlled the vast majority, if 

not all, of the business operations and affairs of A&E USA, and particularly 

exercised that control with respect to any contact that A&E USA had with 

Weatherford. Both Arthur Haycox and Richard Hoyland testified that A&E 

explicitly controlled the means and details of how A&E USA was to conduct any 

business with Weatherford. (CR 282, 232, 204, 205, 341) Haycox stated that his 

job “as CEO” was to decide the terms of the business relationship with 

Weatherford. (CR 232, 204) Hoyland, in fact, testified that everyone reported to 

Haycox in his role as CEO, and that those above him in the A&E “hierarchy” were 

Simon Haycox3 and David Lee, each of whom are only employees of A&E 

Malaysia. (CR 205)

Furthermore, the issuance and terms of the credit notes were explicitly made 

at the instruction of Haycox in his capacity as A&E Group’s CEO and A&E 

 3 Tellingly, Hoyland refers to Simon Haycox as “Our Technical Director.” (CR 296) In that 

same email, he states that “Arthur has visited three times to ensure we were talking decision 

maker to decision maker.” Id.
19

Malaysia’s lead officer. (CR 216) A&E USA Manager Hoyland testified that he 

had “no independent thinking” when Haycox told him to issue the Credit Notes at 

a discounted price, and that his role was largely ministerial. (CR 216) All monetary 

benefit for the Products was received by A&E in its Malaysian bank account. (CR 

341) All the Products bought by Weatherford were manufactured by A&E in 

Malaysia. (CR 236) These facts and others in the record, taken together, show that 

A&E USA was nothing more than an alter-ego (or at least an agent) distributor to 

facilitate A&E’s US, and, specifically, Texas, business.

To veil itself in corporate separateness where none exists, A&E makes the 

conclusory statement that “Weatherford always knew it was dealing with A&E 

USA,” as if to imply that Weatherford could only do business with A&E or A&E 

USA, and not with both entities.4

 (Response Brief 2) However, A&E USA’s 

contacts with Weatherford occurred in addition to A&E’s direct contacts with 

Weatherford as the two entities were used interchangeably by A&E in fostering 

A&E’s relationship with Weatherford. Furthermore, Todd Travis makes clear that 

it was Weatherford’s understanding that all interactions with the A&E Group were 

led by, and actually with, A&E in Malaysia. (CR 190)

 4 A&E emphasizes that it and A&E USA are separate entities and contends that, despite A&E’s 

use of the two entities interchangeably, Weatherford has abandoned its alter ego argument. 

While Weatherford reserves all rights flowing from the fact that A&E and A&E USA utterly 

failed to observe any formal corporate distinctions, even if A&E and A&E USA were properly 

considered to be separate entities, their separateness does not provide A&E cover for its own 

direct contacts with Weatherford and with Texas.
20

A&E’s repeated A&E’s attempts to distinguish itself from A&E USA are 

distinctions that only come after A&E Malaysia already inserted itself into the 

litigation. As the litigation progressed, it became increasingly clear that A&E 

Malaysia was the actual party with whom Weatherford was involved, and that 

A&E USA was nothing more than a conduit through which A&E Malaysia

occasionally served Texas client Weatherford, interacting directly with 

Weatherford in most instances. Arthur Haycox refused to be deposed as a 

corporate representative of A&E USA, and Weatherford was forced to allow more 

time for discovery than that allowed for under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 

in order for documents and deponents to be provided from Malaysia and the UK. 

Furthermore, as mentioned above, A&E USA’s fraud claim against 

Weatherford relies heavily on contacts and actions that were made not by A&E 

USA, but rather by its Malaysian principal. Any recovery that A&E USA may 

receive in its suit against Weatherford will be one realized by A&E Malaysia, as 

A&E USA no longer operates in the US and is a nonexistent entity. It would be a 

vast inequity to allow A&E to attack Weatherford under the veil of a nonfunctioning subsidiary based on interactions that occurred between A&E Malaysia 

and Weatherford, but to also find that A&E does not have to defend itself against 

Weatherford’s own claims against it in this Court. 
21

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

A&E conducted over a year’s worth of purposeful contacts and enjoyed the 

privilege of doing business with Texas-resident Weatherford, interacting directly 

with the forum state of Texas in order to do so. It has benefited in amounts over 

$800,000.00 from this business. It has already participated in the litigation 

considerably, providing documents and witnesses to answer discovery that its shell 

company, A&E USA, is incapable of providing. Despite all this, A&E now 

attempts to hide behind jurisdictional arguments to avoid having to pay 

Weatherford the amounts that Weatherford is rightfully owed. To allow it to do so

would run afoul of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

For these reasons, Appellant Weatherford Artificial Lift Systems 

respectfully prays that this Court reverse the Order entered by the trial court 

granting Appellee’s special appearance and dismissing the action as to A&E for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, reinstate Appellant’s claims against A&E in their 

entirety, remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 

this Court’s holdings, and grant such other and further relief to which Appellant 

may be justly entitled.
22

Respectfully submitted,

BAKER & McKENZIE LLP

By: /s/ Brendan D. Cook

Brendan D. Cook

State Bar No. 04721700

Brendan.Cook@bakermckenzie.com

Chelsea M. Keeton

State Bar No. 24083296

Chelsea.Keeton@bakermckenzie.com

Brandon E. Caire

State Bar No. 24064991

Brandon.Caire@bakermckenzie.com

700 Louisiana, Suite 3000

Houston, Texas 77002-2716

(713) 427-5000

(713) 427-5099 (Fax)

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT WEATHERFORD 

ARTIFICIAL LIFT SYSTEMS,INC.
23

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(I)(3)

This brief complies with the length limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 

9.4(i)(2)(C) because it contains 4,909 words, as counted by the computer program 

used to prepare this brief, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by TEX. R.

APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Brendan D. Cook

Brendan D. Cook
24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.3 and 9.5(b), (d), (e), I 

certify that I have served this document on all other parties which are listed below 

on February 17, 2015 as follows:

Bruce Coplen

Guy Cooksey

Coplen & Banks, P.C.

12651 Briar Forest Dr., Suite 100

Houston, Texas 77077

Telephone: (713) 785-5595

Fax: (713) 785-8651

Counsel for Appellees

By:

___ personal delivery

 X mail

___ commercial delivery service

___ fax

 X email

/s/ Brendan D. Cook

Brendan D. Cook