Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 57 / Friday, March 23, 2012 / Notices 17119 

consecutive years of data, comparing the 

experiences of drivers in the first 2 years 

with their experiences in the final year. 

Applying principles from these 

studies to the past 3-year record of the 

twelve applicants, two of the drivers 

were involved in crashes and none were 

convicted of moving violations in a 

CMV. All the applicants achieved a 

record of safety while driving with their 

vision impairment, demonstrating the 

likelihood that they have adapted their 

driving skills to accommodate their 

condition. As the applicants’ ample 

driving histories with their vision 

deficiencies are good predictors of 

future performance, FMCSA concludes 

their ability to drive safely can be 

projected into the future. 

We believe that the applicants’ 

intrastate driving experience and history 

provide an adequate basis for predicting 

their ability to drive safely in interstate 

commerce. Intrastate driving, like 

interstate operations, involves 

substantial driving on highways on the 

interstate system and on other roads 

built to interstate standards. Moreover, 

driving in congested urban areas 

exposes the driver to more pedestrian 

and vehicular traffic than exists on 

interstate highways. Faster reaction to 

traffic and traffic signals is generally 

required because distances between 

them are more compact. These 

conditions tax visual capacity and 

driver response just as intensely as 

interstate driving conditions. The 

veteran drivers in this proceeding have 

operated CMVs safely under those 

conditions for at least 3 years, most for 

much longer. Their experience and 

driving records lead us to believe that 

each applicant is capable of operating in 

interstate commerce as safely as he/she 

has been performing in intrastate 

commerce. Consequently, FMCSA finds 

that exempting these applicants from 

the vision requirement in 49 CFR 

391.41(b)(10) is likely to achieve a level 

of safety equal to that existing without 

the exemption. For this reason, the 

Agency is granting the exemptions for 

the 2-year period allowed by 49 U.S.C. 

31136(e) and 31315 to the twelve 

applicants listed in the notice of 

February 6, 2012 (77 FR 5874). 

We recognize that the vision of an 

applicant may change and affect his/her 

ability to operate a CMV as safely as in 

the past. As a condition of the 

exemption, therefore, FMCSA will 

impose requirements on the twelve 

individuals consistent with the 

grandfathering provisions applied to 

drivers who participated in the 

Agency’s vision waiver program. 

Those requirements are found at 49 

CFR 391.64(b) and include the 

following: (1) That each individual be 

physically examined every year (a) by 

an ophthalmologist or optometrist who 

attests that the vision in the better eye 

continues to meet the requirement in 49 

CFR 391.41(b)(10) and (b) by a medical 

examiner who attests that the individual 

is otherwise physically qualified under 

49 CFR 391.41; (2) that each individual 

provide a copy of the ophthalmologist’s 

or optometrist’s report to the medical 

examiner at the time of the annual 

medical examination; and (3) that each 

individual provide a copy of the annual 

medical certification to the employer for 

retention in the driver’s qualification 

file, or keep a copy in his/her driver’s 

qualification file if he/she is selfemployed. The driver must have a copy 

of the certification when driving, for 

presentation to a duly authorized 

Federal, State, or local enforcement 

official. 

Discussion of Comments 

FMCSA received no comments in this 

proceeding. 

Conclusion 

Based upon its evaluation of the 

twelve exemption applications, FMCSA 

exempts Eugenio V. Bermudez (MA), 

John A. Carroll, Jr. (AL), Mark W. 

Crocker (TN), Johnny Dillard (SC), Keith 

J. Haaf (VA), Edward M. Jurek (NY), 

Allen J. Kunze (ND), Jack W. Murphy, 

Jr. (OH), Mark A. Smalls (GA), Glenn R. 

Theis (MN), Peter A. Troyan (MI) and 

Gary Vines (AL) from the vision 

requirement in 49 CFR 391.41(b)(10), 

subject to the requirements cited above 

(49 CFR 391.64(b)). 

In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) 

and 31315, each exemption will be valid 

for 2 years unless revoked earlier by 

FMCSA. The exemption will be revoked 

if: (1) The person fails to comply with 

the terms and conditions of the 

exemption; (2) the exemption has 

resulted in a lower level of safety than 

was maintained before it was granted; or 

(3) continuation of the exemption would 

not be consistent with the goals and 

objectives of 49 U.S.C. 31136 and 31315. 

If the exemption is still effective at the 

end of the 2-year period, the person may 

apply to FMCSA for a renewal under 

procedures in effect at that time. 

Issued on: March 9, 2012. 

Larry W. Minor, 

Associate Administration for Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2012–7084 Filed 3–22–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket No. PHMSA–2012–0039] 

Pipeline Safety: Cast Iron Pipe 

(Supplementary Advisory Bulletin) 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory 

Bulletin. 

SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an advisory 

bulletin to owners and operators of 

natural gas cast iron distribution 

pipelines and state pipeline safety 

representatives. Recent deadly 

explosions in Philadelphia and 

Allentown, Pennsylvania involving cast 

iron pipelines installed in 1942 and 

1928, respectively, gained national 

attention and highlight the need for 

continued safety improvements to aging 

gas pipeline systems. This bulletin is an 

update of two prior Alert Notices (ALN– 

91–02; October 11, 1991 and ALN–92– 

02; June 26, 1992) covering the 

continued use of cast iron pipe in 

natural gas distribution pipeline 

systems. This advisory bulletin 

reiterates two prior Alert Notices which 

remain relevant, urges owners and 

operators to conduct a comprehensive 

review of their cast iron distribution 

pipelines and replacement programs 

and accelerate pipeline repair, 

rehabilitation and replacement of highrisk pipelines, requests state agencies to 

consider enhancements to cast iron 

replacement plans and programs, and 

alerts owners and operators of the 

pipeline safety requirements for the 

investigation of failures. In addition, the 

latest survey and reporting requirements 

of cast iron pipelines required by the 

Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, 

and Job Creation Act of 2011 are 

included for information. 

ADDRESSES: This document can be 

viewed on the Office of Pipeline Safety 

home page at: http://ops.dot.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff 

Gilliam, Director, Engineering and 

Research, 202–366–0568 or by email at 

Jeffery.Gilliam@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

On January 18, 2011, an explosion 

and fire caused the death of one gas 

utility employee and injuries to several 

other people while gas utility crews 

were responding to a natural gas leak in 

Philadelphia, PA. A preliminary 

investigation found a circumferential 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
17120 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 57 / Friday, March 23, 2012 / Notices 

break on a 12-inch cast iron distribution 

main that was installed in 1942, and 

was operating at 17 pounds per square 

inch gauge (psig) pressure at the time of 

incident. An investigation continues 

toward finding the cause. 

On February 9, 2011, five people lost 

their lives and a number of homes were 

destroyed and other properties impacted 

by an explosion and subsequent fire in 

Allentown, PA. A preliminary 

investigation found a crack in a 12-inch 

cast iron natural gas distribution main 

that was installed in 1928, and was 

operating at less than 1 psig at the time 

of incident. The crack was located 

below grade near the destroyed homes. 

An investigation continues toward 

finding the cause. 

Alert Notice (ALN–91–02) 

On October 11, 1991, PHMSA’s 

predecessor agency, the Research and 

Special Programs Administration 

(RSPA), issued Pipeline Safety Alert 

Notice (ALN–91–02) alerting pipeline 

operators of National Transportation 

Safety Board recommendation P–91–12 

in response to the August 1990 

explosion and fire in Allentown, PA, 

caused by a crack in a 4-inch cast iron 

gas main. The recommendation stated: 

‘‘Require each gas operator to implement a 

program, based on factors such as age, pipe 

diameter, operating pressure, soil 

corrosiveness, existing graphitic damage, leak 

history, burial depth, and external loading, to 

identify and replace in a planned, timely 

manner cast iron piping systems that may 

threaten public safety.’’ 

The Alert Notice informed 

distribution pipeline operators with cast 

iron pipe of the following: 

—The Gas Piping Technology 

Committee developed guide material 

to assist them in developing 

procedures for determining the 

serviceability of the cast iron pipe and 

to identify the cast iron pipe segments 

that may need replacement. 

—Computer programs are commercially 

available that can be used to develop 

a systematic replacement program for 

cast iron pipe. 

—Pipeline safety regulations require 

that cast iron pipe on which general 

graphitization is found to a degree 

where a fracture might result must be 

replaced. In addition, the regulations 

require that cast iron pipe that is 

excavated must be protected against 

damage. An operator’s compliance 

with the above guidelines and code 

requirements can be enhanced by 

incorporating all of the operator’s cast 

iron responsibilities in an effective 

cast iron management program that is 

designed to identify and replace or 

remove from service cast iron pipe 

that may threaten the public. 

Alert Notice (ALN–92–02) 

On June 26, 1992, RSPA issued a 

Pipeline Safety Alert Notice (ALN–92– 

02) as a Supplementary Alert Notice to 

the 1991 Alert Notice. The 

Supplementary Alert Notice reminded 

pipeline operators of the requirement at 

49 CFR 192.613 that each operator have 

a procedure for continuing surveillance 

of its pipeline facilities to identify 

problems and take appropriate action 

concerning failures, leakage, history, 

corrosion, and other unusual operating 

and maintenance conditions. This 

procedure should also include 

surveillance of cast iron to identify 

problems and to take appropriate action 

concerning graphitization. 

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2012–05) 

To: Each Owner and Operator of a Natural 

Gas Cast Iron Distribution Pipeline Facility 

and State Pipeline Safety Representatives. 

Subject: Cast Iron Pipe (Supplementary 

Advisory Bulletin). 

Purpose: To Address Continued Concerns 

Rising Out of Recent Cast Iron Incidents. 

Advisory: 

On October 11, 1991, Alert Notice (ALN– 

91–02) was issued reminding all operators of 

natural gas distribution systems to have a 

program to identify and replace cast iron 

piping systems that may threaten public 

safety. RSPA also informed operators of 

guidelines and computer programs that were 

available to help operators determine the 

serviceability of cast iron pipe and schedule 

its replacement or retirement. On June 26, 

1992, Alert Notice (ALN–92–02) was issued 

informing pipeline operators that § 192.613 

required each operator to have a procedure 

for continuing surveillance of its pipeline 

facilities to identify problems and take 

appropriate action concerning failures, 

leakage, history, corrosion, and other unusual 

operating and maintenance conditions. This 

procedure should also include surveillance 

of cast iron to identify problems and to take 

appropriate action concerning graphitization. 

The two Alert Notices remain relevant, and 

reaffirm the need for operators of gas cast 

iron distribution systems to maintain an 

effective cast iron management program. 

PHMSA urges owners and operators to 

conduct a comprehensive review of their cast 

iron distribution pipeline systems and 

replacement programs and to accelerate 

pipeline repair, rehabilitation, and 

replacement of aging and high-risk pipe. 

Recent incidents, such as the deadly 

explosions in Philadelphia and Allentown, 

Pennsylvania involving cast iron pipe 

failures, have focused attention on our 

Nation’s aging pipeline infrastructure and 

underline the importance of having valid 

methods for evaluating the integrity of 

pipelines to better ensure public safety. 

PHMSA recommends owners and operators 

of natural gas cast iron pipelines assure their 

replacement program models are based on 

relevant risk factors. 

In addition, PHMSA reminds owners and 

operators of cast iron distribution pipelines 

of their responsibility for the investigation of 

all failures and that each operator must 

establish procedures for analyzing incidents 

and failures, including laboratory 

examination of failed pipe segments and 

equipment, where appropriate, for the 

purpose of determining the causes of the 

failure and minimizing the possibility of a 

recurrence [192.617]. Owners and operators 

are required to review pipeline records, 

validate safe pipeline operating pressure 

levels and accelerate repairs and replacement 

where improvements in safety are necessary. 

The Distribution Integrity Management 

Program (DIMP) requires natural gas 

distribution companies to develop and 

implement DIMP for the pipelines they own, 

operate or maintain. 

PHMSA is asking owners and operators of 

cast iron distribution pipelines and state 

pipeline safety representatives to consider 

the following where improvements in safety 

are necessary: 

—Request, review and monitor operator cast 

iron replacement plans and programs, 

actively encourage operators to develop 

and continually update and follow their 

plans, and consider establishment of 

mandated replacement programs. 

—Establish accelerated leakage survey 

frequencies or leak testing considering 

results from failure investigations and 

environmental risk factors. 

—Focus pipeline safety efforts on identifying 

the highest risk pipe. 

—Use rate adjustments and flexible rate 

recovery mechanisms to incentivize 

pipeline rehabilitation, repair and 

replacement programs. 

—Strengthen pipeline safety inspections, 

accident investigations and enforcement 

actions. 

—Install interior/home methane gas alarms. 

The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, 

and Job Creation Act of 2011, was signed into 

law (Pub. L. 112–90) on January 3, 2012. 

Section 7 of the new law requires the U.S. 

Department of Transportation to measure 

every two years the progress that owners and 

operators of pipeline facilities have made in 

adopting and implementing their plans for 

the safe management and replacement of cast 

iron gas pipelines. Additionally, not later 

than December 31, 2013, the Secretary of 

Transportation must submit to Congress a 

report that — (1) Identifies the total mileage 

of cast iron gas pipelines in the United 

States; and (2) evaluates the progress that 

owners and operators of pipeline facilities 

have made in implementing their plans for 

the safe management and replacement of cast 

iron gas pipelines. 

PHMSA is committed to working with 

owners and operators of natural gas cast iron 

distribution pipelines and state pipeline 

safety representatives to ensure our Nation’s 

pipeline infrastructure is safe and wellmaintained. 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 57 / Friday, March 23, 2012 / Notices 17121 

1Wellsboro & Corning R.R.—Acquis. & Operation 

Exemption—Wellsboro & Corning R.R., FD 35595 

(STB served Feb. 22, 2012). 

2On February 3, 2012, in Docket No. FD 35592, 

RailAmerica et al. filed a petition for exemption 

from the prior approval requirements of 49 U.S.C. 

11323–25 to acquire control of Marquette Rail, LLC, 

a Class III rail carrier. The Board issued a notice on 

February 28, 2012, instituting an exemption 

proceeding pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 10502(b). 

Issued in Washington, DC, on March 20, 

2012. 

Jeffrey D. Wiese, 

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. 

[FR Doc. 2012–7080 Filed 3–22–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Surface Transportation Board 

[Docket No. FD 35605] 

RailAmerica, Inc., Palm Beach Rail 

Holding, Inc., RailAmerica 

Transportation Corp., RailTex, Inc., 

Fortress Investment Group, LLC, and 

RR Acquisition Holding, LLC—Control 

Exemption—Wellsboro & Corning 

Railroad, LLC 

RailAmerica, Inc. (RailAmerica), Palm 

Beach Rail Holding, Inc. (Palm Beach), 

RailAmerica Transportation Corp. 

(RTC), RailTex, Inc. (RailTex), Fortress 

Investment Group, LLC (Fortress), and 

RR Acquisition Holding, LLC (RR 

Acquisition) (collectively, RailAmerica 

et al.), have filed a verified notice of 

exemption to acquire indirect control of 

the Wellsboro & Corning Railroad, LLC 

(W&C), a Class III rail carrier, through 

the acquisition of control of TransRail 

Holdings, LLC (TransRail), the parent of 

W&C, by RailTex. 

The proposed transaction is 

scheduled to be consummated on or 

after April 7, 2012 (30 days after the 

notice of exemption was filed). 

W&C acquired the assets of the 

Wellsboro & Corning Railroad Co.1 W&C 

owns and operates 35.5 miles of track 

between Wellsboro, PA., milepost 

109.90, and Erwin, N.Y., milepost 74.70, 

in Tioga County, PA., and Steuben 

County, N.Y. W&C interchanges traffic 

with the Norfolk Southern Railway 

Company and the Canadian Pacific 

Railway Company. 

According to the verified notice of 

exemption, RailTex entered a Unit 

Purchase Agreement dated January 31, 

2012 (the Agreement), with (1) 

TransRail, (2) Industrial Waste Group, 

LLC (IWG), (3) Wellsboro & Corning 

Railroad Co., and (4) A. Thomas Myles 

III, A. Thomas Myles IV, and William 

Myles (the MG Principals). The MG 

Principals own TransRail, and TransRail 

owns W&C and the successor to IWG. 

Under the Agreement, RailTex will 

acquire 100% of the Class A Common 

Units of TransRail, giving RailTex a 

70% ownership interest in TransRail 

and control of W&C through TransRail. 

The MG Principals will retain the Class 

B Common Units of TransRail, thereby 

retaining a 30% interest in TransRail, 

though they will not retain control or 

the power to control W&C. 

Fortress’ noncarrier affiliate, RR 

Acquisition, currently owns about 60% 

of the publicly traded shares and 

controls the noncarrier RailAmerica, 

which directly controls the noncarrier 

Palm Beach, which directly controls the 

noncarrier RTC. 

RailAmerica states that it controls the 

following Class III rail carriers: (1) 

Alabama & Gulf Coast Railway LLC; (2) 

Arizona & California Railroad Company; 

(3) Bauxite & Northern Railway 

Company; (4) California Northern 

Railroad Company; (5) Cascade and 

Columbia River Railroad Company; (6) 

Central Oregon & Pacific Railroad, Inc.; 

(7) The Central Railroad Company of 

Indiana; (8) Central Railroad Company 

of Indianapolis; (9) Connecticut 

Southern Railroad, Inc.; (10) Conecuh 

Valley Railway, LLC; (11) Dallas, 

Garland & Northeastern Railroad, Inc.; 

(12) Delphos Terminal Railroad 

Company, Inc.; (13) Eastern Alabama 

Railway, LLC; (14) Huron & Eastern 

Railway Company, Inc.; (15) Indiana & 

Ohio Railway Company; (16) Indiana 

Southern Railroad, LLC; (17) Kiamichi 

Railroad Company, LLC; (18) Kyle 

Railroad Company; (19) The Massena 

Terminal Railroad Company; (20) MidMichigan Railroad, Inc.; (21) Missouri & 

Northern Arkansas Railroad Company, 

Inc.; (22) New England Central Railroad, 

Inc.; (23) North Carolina & Virginia 

Railroad Company, LLC; (24) Otter Tail 

Valley Railroad Company, Inc.; (25) 

Point Comfort & Northern Railway 

Company; (26) Puget Sound & Pacific 

Railroad; (27) Rockdale, Sandow & 

Southern Railroad Company; (28) San 

Diego & Imperial Valley Railroad 

Company, Inc.; (29) San Joaquin Valley 

Railroad Company; (30) South Carolina 

Central Railroad Company, LLC; (31) 

Three Notch Railway, LLC; (32) Toledo, 

Peoria & Western Railway Corporation; 

(33) Ventura County Railroad Corp.; and 

(34) Wiregrass Central Railway, LLC.2

Further, Fortress, on behalf of other 

equity funds managed by it and its 

affiliates, directly controls the 

noncarrier FECR Rail LLC, which 

directly controls FEC Rail Corp., which 

directly controls Florida East Coast 

Railway, LLC, a Class II rail carrier. 

RailAmerica et al. states that: (1) W&C 

does not connect with any of 

RailAmerica’s subsidiary railroads; (2) 

the proposed transaction is not part of 

a series of anticipated transactions to 

connect W&C and any of RailAmerica’s 

subsidiary railroads; and (3) the 

proposed transaction does not involve a 

Class I rail carrier. The proposed 

transaction is therefore exempt from the 

prior approval requirements of 49 U.S.C. 

11323 pursuant to 49 CFR 1180.2(d)(2). 

Under 49 U.S.C. 10502(g), the Board 

may not use its exemption authority to 

relieve a rail carrier of its statutory 

obligation to protect the interests of its 

employees. Because the transaction 

involves the control of one or more 

Class III rail carriers and one Class II rail 

carrier, the transaction is subject to the 

labor protective requirements of 49 

U.S.C. 11326(b) and Wisconsin Central 

Ltd.—Acquisition Exemption—Lines of 

Union Pacific Railroad, 2 S.T.B. 218 

(1997). 

If the verified notice contains false or 

misleading information, the exemption 

is void ab initio. Petitions to revoke the 

exemption under 49 U.S.C. 10502(d) 

may be filed at any time. The filing of 

a petition to revoke will not 

automatically stay the effectiveness of 

the exemption. Petitions to stay must be 

filed by March 30, 2012 (at least seven 

days before the exemption becomes 

effective). 

An original and ten copies of all 

pleadings, referring to Docket No. FD 

35605 must be filed with the Surface 

Transportation Board, 395 E Street SW., 

Washington, DC 20423–0001. In 

addition, a copy of each pleading must 

be served on: Louis E. Gitomer, 600 

Baltimore Avenue, Suite 301, Towson, 

MD 21204. 

Board decisions and notices are 

available on our Web site at 

www.stb.dot.gov. 

Decided: March 20, 2012. 

By the Board, Rachel D. Campbell, 

Director, Office of Proceedings. 

Raina S. White, 

Clearance Clerk. 

[FR Doc. 2012–7054 Filed 3–22–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4915–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Surface Transportation Board 

[Docket No. EP 290 (Sub-No. 5) (2012–2)] 

Quarterly Rail Cost Adjustment Factor 

AGENCY: Surface Transportation Board, 

Department of Transportation. 

ACTION: Approval of rail cost adjustment 

factor. 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES