III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 175

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in light of the Alliance’s April

1999 Washington Summit and the conflict in Kosovo.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 5, 1999

Mr. ROTH (for himself and Mr. LUGAR) submitted the following resolution;

which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States

policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

in light of the Alliance’s April 1999 Washington Summit

and the conflict in Kosovo.

Whereas NATO, the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership, has

successfully defended the territory and interests of its

members over the last 50 years, prevailed in the Cold

War, and continues to make a vital contribution to the

promotion and protection of freedom, democracy, stability, and peace throughout, Europe;

Whereas NATO enhances the security of the United States

by embedding European states in a process of cooperative

security planning, by preventing the destabilizing re-
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nationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the

United States in European security affairs;

Whereas the March 12, 1999, accession of Poland, the Czech

Republic, and Hungary to NATO has strengthened the

Alliance, and is an important step toward a Europe that

is truly whole, undivided, free, and at peace;

Whereas extending NATO membership to other qualified European democracies will also strengthen NATO, enhance

security and stability, deter potential aggressors, and

thereby advance the interests of the United States and its

NATO allies;

Whereas the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance,

threatens no nation and reinforces peace and stability in

Europe, and provides benefits to all nations;

Whereas article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that

‘‘any other European state in a position to further the

principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security

of the North Atlantic area’’ is eligible to be granted

NATO membership;

Whereas Congress has repeatedly endorsed the enlargement

of NATO with bipartisan majorities;

Whereas the selection of new members should depend on

NATO’s strategic interests, potential threats to security

and stability, and actions taken by prospective members

to complete the transition to democracy and to harmonize

policies with the political, economic, and military guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;

Whereas the members of NATO face new threats, including

conflict in Europe stemming from historic, ethnic, and re-
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ligious enmities, the potential for the reemergence of a

hegemonic power confronting Europe, rogue states and

nonstate actors possessing weapons of mass destruction,

and threats to the wider interests of the NATO members

(including the disruption of the flow of vital resources);

Whereas NATO military force structure, defense planning,

command structures, and force goals must be sufficient

for the collective self-defense of its members, but also capable of projecting power when the security of a NATO

member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc

coalitions of willing partners among NATO members;

Whereas this will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over

long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of

time, and operate jointly with the United States in highintensity conflicts;

Whereas NATO’s military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999

highlighted the glaring short-comings of European allies

in command, control, communication, and intelligence resources; combat aircraft; and munitions, particularly precision-guided munitions; and the overall imbalance between United States and European defense capabilities;

Whereas this imbalance in United States and European defense capabilities undercuts the Alliance’s goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;

Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a

uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues

concerning the interests and security of North America

and Europe;
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Whereas NATO has undertaken great effort to facilitate the

emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity

within the Alliance, including the identification of

NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as the commander of operations led by the Western European

Union (WEU); the creation of a NATO Headquarters for

WEU-led operations; the establishment of close linkages

between NATO and the WEU, including planning, exercises, and regular consultations; and a framework for the

release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities;

Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course

of its Cologne Summit, agreed to absorb the functions

and structures of the Western European Union, including

its command structures and military forces, and established within it the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy;

Whereas the member States of the European Union at the

Cologne Summit pledged to reinforce their capabilities in

intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control; and

Whereas the European Union’s decisions at its June 3, 1999

Cologne summit indicate a new determination of European states to develop a European Security and Defense

Identity featuring strengthened defense capabilities to address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now,

therefore, be it

1 Resolved,

2 SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

3 (a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—The Senate—

4 (1) regards the political independence and terri5 torial integrity of the emerging democracies in Cen-
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1 tral and Eastern Europe as vital to European peace

2 and security and, thus, to the interests of the United

3 States;

4 (2) endorses the commitment of the North At5 lantic Council that NATO will remain open to the

6 accession of further members in accordance with Ar7 ticle 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

8 (3) endorses the Alliance’s decision to imple9 ment the Membership Action Plan as a means to

10 further enhance the readiness of those European de11 mocracies seeking NATO membership to bear the

12 responsibilities and burdens of membership;

13 (4) believes all NATO members should commit

14 to improving their respective defense capabilities so

15 that NATO can project power decisively within and

16 outside NATO borders in a manner that achieves

17 transatlantic parity in power projection capabilities

18 and facilitates equitable burdensharing among

19 NATO members; and

20 (5) endorses NATO’s decision to launch the De21 fense Capabilities Initiative, intended to improve the

22 defense capabilities of the European Allies, particu23 larly the deployability, mobility, sustainability, and

24 interoperability of these European forces.
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1 (b) FURTHER SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is further

2 the sense of the Senate that—

3 (1) the North Atlantic Council should pace, not

4 pause, the process of NATO enlargement by extend5 ing an invitation of membership to those states able

6 to meet the guidelines established by the 1995

7 NATO Study on Enlargement and should do so on

8 a country-by-country basis;

9 (2) the North Atlantic Council in the course of

10 its December 1999 Ministerial meeting should ini11 tiate a formal review of all pending applications for

12 NATO membership in order to establish the degree

13 to which such applications conform to the guidelines

14 for membership established by the 1995 NATO

15 Study on Enlargement;

16 (3) the results of this formal review should be

17 presented to the membership of the North Atlantic

18 Council in May 2000 with recommendations con19 cerning enlargement;

20 (4) NATO should assess potential applicants

21 for NATO membership on a continual basis;

22 (5) the President, the Secretary of State, and

23 the Secretary of Defense should fully use their of24 fices to encourage the NATO allies of the United

25 States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade
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1 their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long

2 distances, sustain operations for extended periods of

3 time, and operate jointly with the United States in

4 high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective

5 partners of the United States in supporting mutual

6 interests;

7 (6) improved European military capabilities,

8 not new institutions, are the key to a vibrant and

9 more influential European Security and Defense

10 Identity within NATO;

11 (7) NATO should be the primary institution

12 through which European and North American allies

13 address security issues of transatlantic concern;

14 (8) the European Union must implement its

15 Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common

16 Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will

17 ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Can18 ada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Ice19 land, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United

20 States, will not be discriminated against, but will be

21 fully involved when the European Union addresses

22 issues affecting their security interests;

23 (9) the European Union’s implementation of

24 the Cologne summit decisions should not promote a

25 strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues
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1 that conflicts with that promoted by the North At2 lantic Treaty Organization;

3 (10) the European Union’s implementation of

4 its Cologne summit decisions should not promote un5 necessary duplication of the resources and capabili6 ties provided by NATO; and

7 (11) the European Union’s implementation of

8 its Cologne summit decisions should not promote a

9 decline in the military resources that European allies

10 contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the

11 complete fulfillment of their respective force commit12 ments to the Alliance.

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