UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ALEX COLEMAN, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 20-1403 (D.C. No. 1:18- CV-01965-KMT) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, BRISCOE and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Alex Coleman, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims alle ging medical negligence in violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and §§ 2671–80. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Coleman proceeds pro se, we construe his arguments liberally, but we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (1 0th Cir. 2005). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 8, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 BACKGROUND During the incident that gave rise to his lawsuit, Mr. Coleman was incarcerated at the Federal Correctiona l Institution in E nglewood, Colorado (FCI-Englewood). 2 Mr. Coleman alleged that, wh ile exercising in his cell one morning, he passed out on the floor and rega ined consciousness a few minutes later.
See R. at 42. After a shower, he reported dizziness and shortness of breath to a correctional officer. A prison nurse did not examine Mr. Coleman personally, but instructed the correctional o fficer to have Mr. Coleman lie down and drink water. Mr. Coleman vomited and passed out again. Prison officials took Mr. Coleman to a holding cell in the health serv ices unit, but he “was again returned to his unit without any medical treatment and told to drink wa ter and get some rest before coming to sick call the following morning.” Id. at 43. Mr. Coleman had a seizure later that evening, so prison officials transported hi m to Denver Health Medical Center, where an examination revealed three blood clots. See id. at 44. Mr. Coleman sued the United States unde r the FTCA, alleging “the deliberate and wanton disregard of his medical needs by the listed medical staff at [FCI-Englewood] rises to the level of a tortable [sic] cl aim as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protections agains t cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. The district court dismissed the claim becau se Mr. Coleman did not timely file a certificate of review, and Mr . Coleman appealed. In Coleman v. United States ,

2 Coleman is now incarcerated at th e Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, Alabama.3 803 F. App’x 209, 212–15 (10th Cir. 2020), a pa nel of this court vacated the district court’s dismissal order and remanded for furt her consideration of (1) whether expert testimony was required for Mr. Coleman to es tablish a prima facie case, (2) whether dismissal, if warranted, shoul d be for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (3) whether dismissal, if warran ted, should be with or without prejudice. On remand, the government moved for an order requiring Mr. Coleman to show cause why his claim should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to file a certificate of re view. R. at 88. The government argued Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) “is the best mechanism under the Federal Ru les of Civil Procedure to address the certificate of review requirement” in part be cause “it avoids Rule 12 as a procedural mechanism, and avoiding Rule 12 is consiste nt with the Tenth Ci rcuit’s order, state court decisions, and the operation of [C olo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602].” Id. at 89–90. Mr. Coleman then filed a “Request fo r a Court Order Requiring a Physician to Provide an Affidavit or Answer In terrogatories on Matters Relevant to Mr. Coleman’s Initial Diagnos is[,] Injury, and Treatment,” in which he stated he “now underst[ood] the significance of filing a certificate of review ,” Supp. R. Vol. 1 at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted), reque sted that the court appoint a medical expert on his behalf, see id. at 8, and argued the allegations in his complaint, taken as true and construed liberally in his favor, plausibly stated a cl aim for negligence, see id. at 8–11. He also moved fo r appointment of counsel, which the district court denied.4 The district court reviewed Mr. Colema n’s amended complaint, determined he needed to file a certificate of review, and c oncluded his “failure to file a certificate of review bars him from proceeding with his clai ms.” R. at 115. The court then ordered that “Plaintiff’s claims . . . ar e dismissed without prejudice.” Id. Initially, the final judgment issued by the district court cl erk stated: “this case is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro cedure 41(b) for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and to obey or ders of the Court.” Id. at 117 (emphasis added). The clerk later issued an amended final judgment th at correctly indicated the dismissal was without prejudice.
DISCUSSION “This Court reviews for an abuse of di scretion a district court’s decision to dismiss an action for fa ilure to prosecute.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co. , 497 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007) . Such abuse can occur “when a district court relies upon an erroneous conclusion of la w or upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Id. Mr. Coleman argues the distri ct court should not have dismissed his complaint because (1) given th e nature of his allegations, he did not need expert testimony to establish a prima facie case and therefore did not need to file a certificat e of review, 3 (2) he did not “fail to pros ecute” his claims, and (3) the

3 Coleman’s fourth and fifth issues for review substantially restate the arguments he presents in his first issue for review, so th e same analysis applies to each of those issues.5 district court should have granted his motions for a ppointment of counsel and appointment of an expert. Regarding Mr. Coleman’s first argument, his negligence claims against the United States are subject to the FTCA, which “provides th at the United States shall be liable under state tort law only ‘in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. United
States , 3 F.3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoti ng 28 U.S.C. § 2674). We have held the FTCA incorporates the requirements of Colorado’s certificate of review statute for claims against professionals “reg arding whom expert testimony would be necessary to establish a prima facie cas e.” Colo. Rev. St at. § 13-20-601. See Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. , 393 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004). Under the certificate of review statute, [i]n every action for damages or indemnity based upon the alleged professional neglig ence of . . . a licensed professional, the plaintiff’s or complainant’s attorney shall file with the court a certific ate of review for each . . . licensed professional named as a party . . . within sixty days after the service of the complaint . . . against such person unless the court determin es that a longer period is necessary for good cause shown. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602(1)(a). “[T]he requirements of the certificate of review statute are applicable to ci vil actions alleging negligence of licensed professionals filed by nonattorney pro se plaintiffs.” Yadon v. Southward , 64 P.3d 909, 912 (Colo. App. 2002). And, “[t]he failure to file a certificate of review in accordance with [§ 602] shall result in the di smissal of the comp laint . . . .”6 Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-20-602(4). Because Mr . Coleman did not file a certificate of review, the district court appropr iately dismissed his claims. Seeking to avoid application of the certificate of review requirement, Mr. Coleman argues the court misconstrued the nature of his claims. He asserts the cause of his injuries was not merely substandard care, but a total lack of medical care despite his worsening sympto ms. He therefore contends his claims should have proceeded under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under Colorado law, “[i]t is only in unusual circumstances that a medical malpractice claim can be proven without th e presentation of e xpert medical opinion to establish the proper standard of care agai nst which the professi onal’s conduct is to be measured. However, some claims of professional negligence do not require expert testimony.” Shelton v. Penrose/St. Francis Healthcare Sys. , 984 P.2d 623, 627 (Colo. 1999). For example, “[i]n some in stances, a claim relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not require a certific ate of review because the facts create a presumption of negligence and, therefore, expert testimony is not necessary.” Williams v. Boyle , 72 P.3d 392, 397 (Col o. App. 2003). Here, however, we agree with the district court that Mr. Co leman’s allegations did not depict such a situa tion. His complaint alleged that, during the span of one day, he went from exercising alone in his cell to being transpor ted to a hospital and receiving treatment for blood clots. Mr . Coleman does not deny receiving medical care altogether—to the contrary, he allege s prison officials tran sferred him to the health services unit of FCI-Englewood—but he alleges prison medical staff should7 have identified his condition an d treated him more quickly. But it is unclear from the allegations in the amended complaint precisel y what (if any) type of examination or treatment, administered at what point in the day, woul d have made a difference in Mr. Coleman’s overall outcome. For inst ance, it is unclear whether the seizure Mr. Coleman suffered was preventable or an inevitable result of the later-discovered blood clots. These are the t ypes of issues which, as th e district court concluded, would require expert test imony to substantiate. See id. (concluding expert testimony was required where plaintiff al leged “that defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff, which he breached by not giving appropria te diagnosis, treatment, and follow up of plaintiff’s health problems.”). Mr. Coleman also argues dismissa l for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) was inappropriate because he “did not fail to prosecute [or] obey orders of the court,” Opening Br. at 3, and that “the dist rict court is being confusing” because its order dismissing his claims specifies the dismissal is without prejudice but the final judgment stated the dismissal was with prejudice, see id. ; R. at 116 (order), id. at 117 (final judgment). But Rule 41 was simply the procedural vehicle the court used to enforce the cert ificate of review requirement. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude it was correct to do so. And the court corrected any confusion regarding its dismissal by issuing an amended final judgment clarifying the dismissal was without prejudice. See Supp. R. Vol. 2 at 3. Mr. Coleman last argues the district c ourt should have granted his motion for the court to appoint an expert to assist him in meeting the cer tificate of review8 requirement and his motion fo r appointment of counsel. “We review a district court’s denial of a motion to appoint an expert for abuse of discretion.” Duckett v. Mullin , 306 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir. 2002). We likewise “review a district court’s refusal to appoint co unsel for an indigent prisoner in a civil case for an abuse of discretion.” Hill , 393 F.3d at 1115. “Only in those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in fundament al unfairness will the dist rict court’s decision be overturned.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is not enough that having counsel appointed would have assisted th e prisoner in presen ting his strongest possible case, as the same c ould be said in any case.” Steffey v. Orman , 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 ( 10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks a nd alterations omitted). Although he emphasizes his indigency, Mr . Coleman offers no basis for us to conclude the district court a bused its discretion in declini ng to appoint counsel or an expert for him, or that failu re to appoint counsel resulte d in fundamental unfairness, so we do not consider th is argument further.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We grant Mr. Coleman’s request fo r leave to proceed without pr epayment of costs or fees on appeal.

Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich Chief Judge