alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of QC Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Douglas E. Nickerson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: August 5, 2010



| |  |                           |  | 
| |  | ------------------------- |  | 
| |  | /s/  Douglas E. Nickerson |  | 
| |  | Douglas E. Nickerson      |  | 
| |  | Chief Financial Officer   |  |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY BRAXTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-01004 (UNA)

)

 )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter, filed pro se, is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The Court will 

grant the application and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized 

by Constitution and statute,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). A party 

seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court’s 

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is based “on the actions and misconduct of the Superior Court of the 

District of Columbia” during multiple court proceedings. Compl. at 1; see id. at 2-4. This federal 

district court lacks jurisdiction to review another court’s decisions and order it to take any action. 

See Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents 

lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from 

a state court.”) (citing Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); 

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85
2

(D.D.C. 2011) (district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, 

and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts.”) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 

546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)). Plaintiff’s recourse lies, if at all, in the D.C. Court of Appeals and the 

U.S. Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest 

court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ 

of certiorari[.]”). Therefore, this case will be dismissed by separate order. 

 

_____________________

TREVOR N. McFADDEN

Date: June 12, 2023 United States District Judge
#### STATE ex rel. Jimmy C. WINGO v. Hilton BUTLER, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 87-KP-1397.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 13, 1987.

In re Wingo, Jimmy C.; applying for supervisory writ & writ of habeas corpus; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, No. 48202.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             JUN-30-1995
<PERIOD-END>                  JUN-30-1995
<CASH>                        50,436
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 4,023,496
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   93,599
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              15,000
<PP&E>                        1,150,160
<DEPRECIATION>                (804,556)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                12,940,698
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         6,106,495
<BONDS>                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   240,000
<COMMON>                      450,223
<OTHER-SE>                    5,718,653
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  12,940,698
<SALES>                       12,658,491
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              12,658,491
<CGS>                         838,453
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 838,453
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              19,295,323
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            309,757
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (7,721,708)
<INCOME-TAX>                  (997,932)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (8,719,640)
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  (8,719,640)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 (.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0
        


</TABLE>
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

November 23, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 00683

- CR

Daniel GUTIERREZ

- LOPEZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR7741

Honorable Jefferson Moore , Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED.

It is so ORDERED on November 23, 2016

.

_____________________________ Jason Pulliam , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 23rd day of November, 2016

.

_____________________________ Keith E. Hottle, Clerk
#### Bernard KENNEDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 6830.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

Feb. 10, 1983.

Mary E. Greene, Asst. Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Dana Fabe, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

George F. Schaefer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harry L. Davis, Dist. Atty., Fairbanks, and Wilson L. Condon, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

Before BRYNER, C.J., and COATS and SINGLETON, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Bernard Kennedy pled no contest to a charge of driving while intoxicated, AS 28.-35.030. He appeals his sentence of 120 days’ incarceration, three years’ license revocation, and a $1,000 fine as excessive. We disagree,1 and therefore AFFIRM the sentence.

1

. Kennedy’s vehicle struck the rear of a taxi stopped at a railroad crossing. The taxi driver walked back to Kennedy’s car and found Kennedy passed out on the seat. While the taxi driver was calling the police, Kennedy’s car began rolling backwards; the taxi driver was able to catch up with the car and turn off the engine. The trial court found it “remarkable” that no damage or injury had resulted from Kennedy’s actions.

Given the risks created by Kennedy’s offense, his extensive record of alcohol-related misdemeanor convictions, and the fact that at the time of this offense Kennedy’s license was suspended because of a previous DWI conviction, we cannot say the sentence was clearly mistaken. *McClain v. State,*519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).
#### Adam Troy SCIPPIO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 84-2315, 84-2324.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 13, 1986.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg and Thomas Murray, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Charles M. Fahlbusch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BASKIN, FERGUSON, and JOR-GENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the order revoking the appellant’s probation, Case No. 84-2324, and his conviction of the substantive offense of armed robbery, Case No. 84-2315. *See Christopher v. State,*407 So.2d 198 (Fla.1981), ce*rt. denied,*456 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1761, 72 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982); *Freiheit v. State,*458 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); *Ben-Hain v. Tacher,*418 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); *Strate v. Strate,*328 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA), *cert. denied,*336 So.2d 1184 (Fla.1976); *Gibbs v. State,*193 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).

We, nevertheless, vacate the sentences imposed and remand for re-sentencing based upon the state’s concession that the calculations in the guidelines score sheet were improper.

Convictions affirmed; sentences vacated; cause remanded for re-sentencing.
1.
    
    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A of NYMAGIC, INC.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered
by this report; and3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.
 August 12, 2009
    /s/ A. George KallopA. George KallopPresident and Chief Executive Officer
#### STATE of Louisiana v. An Ngoc DANG.

No. 88-KK-0322.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 11, 1988.

In re State of Louisiana; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “C”, No. 310-798; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. KW-0092.

Stay order denied. Writ denied.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 30, 2020

No. 04-20-00550-CV

CITY OF PREMONT, TEXAS,

Appellant

v.

Jose Richard GONZALEZ and Elda E. Gonzalez,

Appellees

From the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells County, Texas

Trial Court No. 20-09-60606-CV

Honorable Richard C. Terrell, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s second motion for an extension of time to file its brief is GRANTED.

Appellant’s brief is due on or before February 22, 2021.

_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 30th day of December, 2020.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
#### Hunt Unemployment Compensation Case.

Argued March. 21, 1962.

Before Rhodes, P. J., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.

*Jaclc G. Briscoe,*for appellant.

*Sydney*Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, Avith him *Raymond Kleiman,*Deputy Attorney General, and *David*Stahl, Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.

April 12, 1962:

Opinion by

Wright, J.,

James D. Hunt was last employed as a porter by Schlichter Jute Cordage Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His final day of Avork was May 26, 1961. His application for benefits was disallowed by the Bureau of Employment Security, the Referee, and the Board of RevieAV on the ground that his unemployment was due to his discharge for wilful misconduct connected with his work under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Act of December 5, 1936, *436P. L, (1937) 2897, 43 P.S. 802(e). This appeal followed.

The record discloses that claimant’s discharge arose out of a dispute with a foreman concerning the unauthorized use by claimant of a fork-lift tow truck. The ensuing argument became so heated that, according to the foreman, claimant “requested me to come out on the railroad and fight”. In his interview under date of June 13, 1961, claimant stated: “I did invite him outside as I did not want to fight on the premises”. The following findings of the Board of Review are fully supported by the evidence: “2. The claimant was told by a foreman from another department to return a forklift tow-motor and to stop using it because it was charged to the foreman. 3. The claimant refused to follow the instructions given to him by the foreman from the other department and made threatening remarks to the foreman. 4. The claimant was discharged for failing to follow instructions and making threatening remarks to the foreman”.

We are all of the opinion that the Board was justified in concluding that claimant’s conduct was in deliberate violation of the standards of behavior which the employer could rightfully expect, and was in disregard of the employer’s interests. Although not controlling, it is significant that claimant’s union did not protest the discharge. Insubordination, accompanied by threatening remarks, constitutes wilful misonduct: *Dati Unemployment Compensation Case,*184 Pa. Superior Ct. 292, 132 A. 2d 765. See also *Massano Unemployment Compensation Case,*197 Pa. Superior Ct. 115, 177 A. 2d 9.

Decision affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 11 , 2018 

# Order

Clerk October 11 , 2018

15 8078 ( 29 )

BRENDA R. WHITE,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

SC: 158078

v COA : 342657

MCAC: 17

- 000015

EDS CARE MANAGEMENT LLC, and

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,

Defendants

- Appellees

.

____________________________________ __/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff

- appellant to waive filing fees

is DENIED

. In accordance with this Court’s orders in No. 157197, White v Southeast MI

Surgical Hosp

, and No. 157199, White v OL Matthews, MD , the plaintiff

- appellant is not

entitled to a waiver of the filing fee. The plaintiff

- appellant m ust pay the filing fee within

28 days of the date of this order or the application for leave to appeal will be

administratively dismissed.
**EXHIBIT31.2**

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Danielle Imel, certify that: 

     1. I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of U.S. Premium Beef, LLC; 

     2. Basedon my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

     3. Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report; 

     4. Theregistrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

     a)designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared; 

     b)evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and 

     c)disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

     5. Theregistrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

     a)all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and 

     b)any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financialreporting. 

|     |  |                                                                       |
|-----|--|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| By: |  | /s/ Danielle Imel                                                     |
|     |  | Danielle Imel*Treasurer	(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)* |

Date: July 11, 2005
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2400 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2400

 To extend the temporary reduction of duty on staple fibers of viscose 
    rayon, not carded, combed, or otherwise processed for spinning.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

  Mrs. Hagan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To extend the temporary reduction of duty on staple fibers of viscose 
    rayon, not carded, combed, or otherwise processed for spinning.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. STAPLE FIBERS OF VISCOSE RAYON, NOT CARDED, COMBED, OR 
              OTHERWISE PROCESSED FOR SPINNING.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.25.59 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to staple fibers of viscose 
rayon, not carded, combed, or otherwise processed for spinning) is 
amended by striking ``12/31/2009'' and inserting ``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0165 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BRUCE SCHRODER,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including September 14, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 10 2022

08/10/2022
Case Number: DA 22-0165
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**Certifications**

 

I, J.A. Cardwell, Sr., certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Petro Distributing, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting. 

 

Date: November 4, 2004