This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0382

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Jason Cole Hence, 

Appellant.

Filed February 5, 2024

Affirmed

Segal, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-22-11154

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

∗

 

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SEGAL, Chief Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by 

an ineligible person, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

his motion for a downward dispositional sentencing departure because the district court 

failed to meaningfully consider whether appellant’s youth justified such a departure. We 

affirm. 

FACTS

In June 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jason Cole Hence 

with being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm, possession of a dangerous 

weapon on school property, and possession of a firearm with no serial number. The 

complaint alleged as follows. On June 8, 2022, law enforcement received reports of a fight 

on the property of a school, including multiple reports that an individual involved in the 

fight had a firearm. The fight broke up before the officers arrived, but the officers were 

informed that three males, including an individual believed to have a firearm, were being 

escorted off the property by school staff. Officers approached and detained the three males. 

Hence was one of the males and was found to be in possession of a firearm with no 

serial number. Hence is ineligible to possess a firearm due to a prior adjudication for a 

crime of violence. Hence gave a statement to law enforcement, explaining that he was just 

trying to break up the fight. 

The parties reached a plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Hence pleaded 

guilty to being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm and the state dismissed the 
3

two remaining charges. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor explained that the parties had 

been through “several rounds of negotiations” and that defense counsel was requesting a 

“dispositional departure with a significant Workhouse sanction,” but the state was “on the 

fence about making that an official offer.” The state indicated it was waiting for more 

information from staff who worked with Hence during his time at a juvenile-detention 

facility and while on juvenile probation. The prosecutor stated that, depending on the 

information received, the state “may still end up making it an official offer or supporting a 

dispositional departure . . . but at this point it’s a straight plea.” 

Prior to sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report 

(PSI). As part of the PSI, Hence provided his version of the offense. Hence shared that on 

the date of the offense he was attending a graduation ceremony at the school when his 

brother and his brother’s friend tried to get involved in the fight on school property. Hence 

told his brother they should leave. Hence then saw another individual drop a bag that 

Hence believed may have a firearm in it, so he picked up the bag because he “didn’t want 

the dude to start shooting.” He didn’t intend to keep the gun but was arrested as he was 

leaving the school property. The PSI ultimately recommended that the district court 

sentence Hence to the presumptive sentence of 60 months in prison. 

At the sentencing hearing, the state requested that Hence be given a presumptive 

sentence in accordance with the recommendation from the PSI. Defense counsel asked the 

district court “to consider using all th[e] tools [it has] to depart from the presumptive 

sentence of—of prison and to give [Hence] an opportunity with appropriate punishment 
4

here to move forward still in a positive direction before he has to take that trip out to—to 

prison.” In support of the request for a downward departure, defense counsel argued:

I keep coming back to two things, Your Honor: Number

one, he’s 18. He was incarcerated at Red Wing for a substantial

period of time. To send him off and have him waste the next

three years staring at the walls before he’s had an opportunity

to try to get this going in the right direction just doesn’t make 

a lot of sense. This Court has ample tools available to it to, sort 

of, rein him in and focus him on what needs to be focused on, 

whether that be [electronic home monitoring], whether that be 

a huge chunk of Workhouse time. There are options. We have 

an entire, you know, division of probation that’s designed 

and—and—as a program to work with young folks like him as 

an adult. The options are there.

And what—the second thing I keep coming back to is

the facts in the case. As both the prosecutor and I told you in

October, he’s not the person seen with the firearm. It’s the guy

in the teal that the police are looking for that the administ[rator]

or teacher, whoever it was from the school, said she saw that. 

His involvement is going away from the school, getting the 

people and the firearm out of there, and they’re crossing the 

street and moving away from the school when this is—when 

this is over with. It’s consistent with what he said, and 

there’s—there’s nothing else to—there’s nothing else about 

this that—that we even have in our—in our collective 

knowledge here.

The district court sentenced Hence to 48 months in prison. The district court 

“note[d] that this is a durational departure” and explained that it was imposing a downward 

durational departure “in part based on [Hence’s] acceptance of responsibility and the fact 

that this [involved] less onerous facts than that which is normally seen by the Court.” But 

the district court further explained: “What concerns me is you just got out of Red Wing.

And it doesn’t matter whether or not they give you good services; you’re an adult, you’ve 

got [to] make choices. The last choice you want to make is picking up a gun.” 
5

DECISION

Minnesota law recognizes two kinds of sentencing departures: durational and 

dispositional. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2021). The district court imposes a 

downward durational departure when it pronounces a shorter sentence than prescribed by 

the presumptive sentencing range established in the sentencing guidelines. State v. 

Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623-24 (Minn. 2016). The district court imposes a downward 

dispositional departure when the sentencing guidelines call for an executed prison term, 

but the district court instead stays a prison sentence and places an offender on probation. 

State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 30-31 (Minn. 1982). 

Here, the presumptive sentence for being an ineligible person in possession of a 

firearm was an executed sentence of 60 months in prison. See Minn. Stat. § 609.11, 

subd. 5(b) (2020); Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.E.2.b (Supp. 2021). The district court 

imposed a sentence of 48 months in prison. The district court therefore sentenced Hence 

to the presumptive disposition—an executed prison term—but imposed a downward 

durational departure. Hence now challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a 

downward dispositional departure.

The district court must impose the presumptive sentence unless “identifiable, 

substantial, and compelling circumstances” justify a downward departure. State v. 

Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. 

Sept. 17, 2013). The district court has “broad discretion” in sentencing, and an appellate 

court will only reverse a district court’s refusal to depart in a “rare case.” State v. Kindem,

313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). This court generally will not disturb a district court’s denial 
6

of a motion for a downward dispositional departure when “the record shows that the 

sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented” before 

imposing a sentence. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925 (quotation omitted). 

Hence argues that his youth is a substantial and compelling reason to support a 

dispositional departure because he “was just barely a legal adult when he committed the 

offense at issue.” As Hence notes, the sentencing guidelines provide “a nonexclusive list 

of factors that may be used as reasons for departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3 

(Supp. 2021). The mitigating factors include, as relevant here, that “[t]he offender is 

particularly amenable to probation” and “[o]ther substantial grounds exist that tend to 

excuse or mitigate the offender’s culpability, although not amounting to a defense.” Minn. 

Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(5), (7). Minnesota courts have explicitly recognized that age is 

a relevant factor when considering whether an offender is particularly amenable to 

probation, Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31, and have considered an offender’s youth as a mitigating 

factor when evaluating whether a sentence is commensurate with the offender’s culpability, 

State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 715-16 (Minn. 2007). We also acknowledge the 

social-science studies and cases from foreign jurisdictions cited by Hence in his appellate 

brief about brain development in young adults. But Hence’s arguments nevertheless fall 

short of establishing an abuse of discretion by the district court.

The record here supports that the district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony 

and information presented” before imposing a sentence. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925 

(quotation omitted). Moreover, the record does not support a determination that this is one 

of those “rare case[s]” where a reversal of the district court’s denial of a dispositional 
7

departure can be justified. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. The PSI, which the district court 

reviewed prior to imposing a sentence, stated that “[a]menability to probation appears 

poor.” The PSI noted that during the pendency of this matter Hence was placed on 

electronic-home monitoring, but cut his bracelet and was eventually arrested with his codefendant—with whom he was not supposed to have contact—after the two were 

discovered in possession of a vehicle that was stolen during an armed carjacking. The PSI 

detailed Hence’s history of involvement with juvenile court, including his recent placement 

at Red Wing, and opined that Hence’s “juvenile history suggests he is not deterred by the 

idea of jail time or other court sanctions.” The PSI noted Hence’s “young age,” but 

ultimately recommended the imposition of a presumptive sentence. 

The district court provided only a brief explanation of its decision to impose a 

presumptive disposition, but did note that its primary concern was that Hence had just 

gotten out of his juvenile placement at Red Wing and, nevertheless, made the choice to 

“pick[] up a gun.” The district court thus considered Hence’s amenability to probation, 

one of the key factors in considering a dispositional departure. See Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 

at 623 (“A dispositional departure typically focuses on characteristics of the defendant that 

show whether the defendant is particularly suitable for individualized treatment in a 

probationary setting.” (quotation omitted)). In addition, the district court imposed a 

downward durational departure based on the determination that the offense involved “less 

onerous facts” and Hence’s acceptance of responsibility, which further indicates that the 

district court thoroughly considered the arguments advanced in support of a more lenient 

sentence than the presumptive 60-month executed sentence. 
8

Based on this record, where the district court considered the evidence and arguments 

presented, the district court’s disposition was consistent with the PSI recommendation, and 

the evidence does not compel a determination that Hence is particularly amenable to 

probation, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Hence’s motion 

for a downward dispositional departure. 

Affirmed.