Docket No. 103845.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JESSE

GALAN, Appellee.

Opinion filed July 24, 2008.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald and Karmeier

concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion.

Justices Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice

Kilbride.

OPINION

In November 2001, defendant, Jesse Galan, was indicted for

possession with intent to deliver 900 or more grams of cocaine and

more than 5000 grams of cannabis. The evidence against him was

suppressed by the circuit court of Cook County and the State filed a

“Certificate of Substantial Impairment” and brought an interlocutory

appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R.

604(a)(1)). The appellate court affirmed. 367 Ill. App. 3d 876. After

its petition for rehearing was denied, the State filed and was granted
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leave to appeal to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315

(210 Ill. 2d R. 315).

There are two issues in this case: first, whether Illinois courts must

inquire into extradition irregularities for crimes committed within

Illinois’ borders; and, second, whether exclusion is the appropriate

remedy when Illinois police violate a postarrest provision of another

state’s fresh pursuit statute. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

On October 11, 2001, defendant drove his truck onto the Chicago

Skyway, entering the Skyway from an Illinois on-ramp. After

continuing onto a tollbooth 0.8 miles into Indiana, defendant was

stopped by several Chicago police officers. Defendant’s vehicle was

searched, and police recovered two boxes filled with marijuana.

Defendant was arrested and taken to his mother’s house at 8521

South Burley Avenue in Chicago, where he sometimes resided. Police

conducted a search of the house in the presence of defendant and his

mother and stepfather, eventually recovering two pistols,

approximately $10,000 in cash, and cocaine. A probable cause hearing

was held and defendant was eventually indicted by a Cook County

grand jury, as indicated above.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress

evidence. The motion was filed on July 23, 2002, and requested the

trial court to “[q]uash [defendant’s] arrest, because of the absence of

authority of probable cause to effect it, and to suppress from

introduction into evidence in this cause, the following: (a) Physical

evidence discovered and as a result of arrest and detention; (b)

Statements, utterances, reports of gestures and responses by petitioner

during the detention following the arrest[ ] i.e. oral statements of

defendant[;] (c) All other knowledge and fruits thereof, witnesses

statements, whether written, or oral or gestural and products of the

arrest.” Defendant asserted that during his arrest and subsequent

detention, the State “became aware of the existence of physical

evidence all the direct and indirect fruits of the arrest and detention,

which connect petitioner with the instant offense.” The trial court

conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 17, 2003.
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Defendant testified that he was driving his truck toward Indiana

when he was stopped at the tollbooth, past the “mile 1” marker

located in Indiana. He stated that several men dressed in plain clothes,

who it soon became apparent were Chicago police officers,

approached him at the tollbooth with guns drawn and ordered him out

of his truck, placed him in handcuffs, and forced him onto the ground.

Defendant testified that he did not give the men permission to search

his truck. Defendant acknowledged that when the truck was searched,

police recovered two boxes of marijuana and told him he was under

arrest.

Defendant testified that the police then took him back to his

mother’s house in Illinois. He stated that he occasionally resided at his

mother’s house and had come from that address when he was stopped

at the tollbooth. Defendant testified that officers knocked on the door

of his mother’s house and asked him if they could search the house.

Defendant testified that he told the officers they could not search the

house. He also testified, though, that his mother eventually opened the

door and, upon learning that the police had “busted [defendant] with

some marijuana,” agreed, after being asked, to allow the officers to

search the home. Defendant maintained that while he later signed a

consent to search, he only did so after officers threatened to arrest his

mother and stepfather. Defendant acknowledged that in searching the

house, police found other contraband. He asserted, however, that this

contraband was found before he signed the consent to search.

On cross-examination, defendant testified that after he was

removed from his truck by the police, the officers moved him away

from traffic and told him he was under arrest. Defendant stated that

at this point officers began searching his truck and found the two

boxes containing marijuana in the truck’s backseat. Defendant testified

that the officers eventually informed him that he was in trouble and

they were planning to take him back to the house he had come from,

which he understood to be his mother’s house. Following this

testimony, defendant answered several more questions regarding the

circumstances surrounding the search of his mother’s home.

The State called Officer Brian Luce, one of the Chicago police

officers involved in arresting defendant. Luce testified that he was part

of the Chicago police department’s narcotics and gangs investigation

section. Luce stated that after obtaining information from a
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confidential informant, police became interested in defendant. This

informant indicated that defendant lived at 8521 South Burley Avenue

and 9735 Avenue M in Chicago. Moreover, the informant stated that

defendant was storing, selling, and manufacturing large quantities of

marijuana. Based on this information, the Chicago police department

began an investigation, in which Luce took part.

Luce testified that on October 11, 2001, he was conducting

surveillance on the Avenue M address as part of the ongoing

investigation. Luce indicated that other officers were conducting

surveillance on the Burley Avenue address. Luce observed defendant

and another individual, Jose Mojica, leave the Avenue M address and

drive to the Burley Avenue address in defendant’s truck. Luce saw

defendant and Mojica get out of the truck and enter the house at 8521

South Burley. At this point, Luce picked a surveillance spot around

the block while another officer set up surveillance on the front door.

Luce then received a radio communication from the other officer that

defendant and Mojica, who was carrying a white bag, left the house,

got back in the truck, and headed back to the Avenue M address.

Luce followed the men back to the Avenue M address and

observed Mojica, still carrying the white bag, exit the truck and get

into a Nissan Maxima by himself. At this point, part of the surveillance

team, including Luce, followed the Nissan, while another part of the

surveillance team remained at the Avenue M address. Eventually, a

marked police car pulled Mojica over and Luce was informed by radio

that Mojica did not have a valid driver’s license and was going to be

taken to a police station for a traffic violator bond. Luce further

testified that the beige Maxima was taken to the police station, where

a custodial search was performed and the white bag, the same bag that

was observed going into the car, was found to contain a large amount

of currency.

After being informed that Mojica was in custody and a large

amount of currency was found, Luce was told to go back to Avenue

M and continue surveillance. Luce observed defendant again leave the

Avenue M address and return to the Burley Avenue address. Luce

testified that another officer saw defendant enter the house and then

exit, carrying a brown box. Luce testified that the other officer told

him that while taking the box to his truck, defendant was looking up

and down the street. Defendant then repeated this action, entering the
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house, leaving with a second brown box, and taking it to his truck,

nervously looking up and down the street.

Luce stated that after defendant entered the truck he pulled away,

only to stop approximately 50 to 100 feet from the Burley Avenue

address and look up and down the street, watching the cars as they

passed. Luce, who was then following defendant, had to drive by in

his unmarked vehicle. In driving by, Luce observed defendant looking

out his driver’s side window in several different directions. Luce

testified that based upon his experience as a Chicago police officer,

defendant’s actions constituted countersurveillance or tactics used to

see if police are in the area.

After driving by defendant, Luce drove around the block and was

informed over the radio that defendant made an illegal U-turn,

crossing two lanes. Luce was eventually able to reposition himself

behind defendant’s truck. Luce testified that officers continued

“moving surveillance” and observed defendant travel from Burley

Avenue to Indianapolis Boulevard and then onto 106th Street, where

he veered from the far left to the far right lane, without signaling,

across three or four lanes of traffic, traveling to the Skyway on-ramp.

Luce stated that defendant’s “erratic move from the left [lane] all the

way to the right [lane]” led police to believe that their surveillance was

compromised. Again, Luce and other officers believed that

defendant’s conduct indicated that he was either trying to get away or

utilizing countersurveillance tactics to see if he was being followed. At

that point, Luce and the other officers agreed to stop defendant’s

vehicle to investigate.

Luce testified that officers stopped defendant’s truck “right at the

tollbooth” and quickly ran up to the car with guns drawn. Once it was

safe, the officers holstered their guns. Luce stated that when he

approached the vehicle and opened the passenger door, he smelled a

strong odor of cannabis. Luce testified that he had smelled this odor

before while carrying out his duties as a Chicago police officer and it

was not easily confused with any other smell. Luce testified that

officers asked defendant what was in the boxes and he answered that

it was “weed,” a street term for cannabis, and asked if he was in

trouble. Moreover, defendant stated that he believed there was 20

pounds of cannabis in the boxes. Luce stated that officers then took

defendant out of the truck, pulled it to the side of the highway, and
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began talking to defendant. During that conversation, officers told

defendant what they had seen that day, informed him that he was

under arrest, and advised him of his rights.

After reading defendant his rights, Luce continued speaking with

defendant, informing him of the ongoing investigation, noting that

they had found the cannabis and indicating that they wished to search

defendant’s home. Officers then brought defendant back to the Burley

Avenue address and, Luce testified, defendant agreed to sign a

consent-to-search form. Luce testified that he did not physically

threaten defendant or act abusive toward him and defendant simply

signed the form in the presence of another officer. Luce further

testified that he signed the consent-to-search form. Moreover, he

stated that the form was signed before the house was searched. Luce

testified that defendant was cooperative, appeared to be nervous, and

wanted to work with police.

Luce testified that officers then conducted a search of the

residence, in the presence of defendant’s mother and stepfather. As

already noted, they recovered two pistols, approximately $10,000 in

cash, and cocaine. Additionally, Luce testified that police found an

envelope addressed to defendant at 8521 South Burley Avenue.

Moreover, Luce stated that he did not make any threats to defendant

regarding his parents, nor did he threaten defendant’s parents with

arrest in order to gain more cooperation from defendant.

Before the State finished its questioning, Luce testified to one last

matter regarding Mojica. Luce testified that he was informed by other

officers that when Mojica was stopped and police found him in

possession of around $80,000, Mojica lied regarding its origins.

Mojica stated that the money was brought to him at a location that

officers, based upon their surveillance, knew not to be true. Luce

testified, as he had previously, that officers observed Mojica retrieve

a white bag from the Burley Avenue address, take that bag to the

Avenue M address, exit defendant’s truck with the bag, and then get

into the Nissan Maxima with the bag. Surveillance never lost sight of

the vehicle or Mojica, and when Mojica was stopped, the bag

containing the currency was recovered.

On cross-examination, Luce acknowledged that the informant

police relied upon in this case was unknown to him. Additionally,

Luce did not know and his report did not indicate that the informant
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ever saw narcotics inside 8521 South Burley Avenue. Moreover, Luce

did not know if the informant, described as a confidential informant,

had ever been used in prior cases and Luce’s report did not indicate

that the informant was reliable. Luce testified, though, that

surveillance was set up based upon the information from this

informant.

Luce acknowledged that no one saw where the bag containing

currency came from or who gave it to Mojica, merely that Mojica

came out of the South Burley Avenue address carrying it.

Additionally, Luce admitted that neither he nor any other officers

could see through the bag. Moreover, Luce testified that when Mojica

was stopped while driving the Nissan Maxima, he was stopped not for

any traffic violation or the commission of any crime, but because

officers believed that he had something to do with their narcotics

surveillance. Essentially, Mojica was stopped solely to see if there

were drugs in the bag. While money was eventually found, no

narcotics were found in the car, nor was it known, at the time of the

stop, that Mojica was operating the car without a valid driver’s

license. Additionally, Luce testified that Mojica never told officers that

there were narcotics inside the Burley Avenue address, never told

officers that he got the money from the Burley Avenue address or

from defendant, and never told officers that the money constituted the

proceeds of narcotics.

Luce testified further on cross-examination that he could not see

what was in the boxes defendant brought from 8521 South Burley

Avenue to his truck. Moreover, Luce acknowledged that defendant’s

activity of pulling his truck over and looking in his mirrors could be

construed as normal activity. Regarding the eventual stop of defendant

at the tollbooth, Luce stated that while he believed it occurred in

Illinois, he was not certain and it could have been in Indiana. He also

stated that the stop was not carried out to give defendant a traffic

ticket but was actually carried out because of Luce’s belief that

surveillance was compromised and officers were conducting a drug

investigation.

Luce testified that while he could smell cannabis when he

approached defendant’s truck, he did not actually see the cannabis

until he opened the boxes inside the truck. Luce testified that the

boxes were opened without obtaining defendant’s consent. Moreover,
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Luce stated that before he opened the boxes, and even before he read

defendant his rights, he asked defendant what was inside. Luce also

testified, though, that before asking defendant what was in the boxes

he told defendant that the police were pulling him over because they

believed that a narcotics transaction occurred.

On cross-examination, the defense asked several questions and

Luce testified extensively regarding the eventual search of the Burley

Avenue address. This testimony was unaltered from Luce’s testimony

regarding the home search on direct examination. Luce stated that

officers brought defendant back to the Burley Avenue address,

explained the consent-to-search form to defendant, one of the officers

read the form to defendant, Officer Luce filled out the form, and then

defendant signed it. Luce testified that he and the officers did not

immediately knock on the front door of 8521 South Burley Avenue

upon arriving, instead waiting until after defendant had already signed

the consent-to-search form.

The parties stipulated to the testimony of another officer who took

part in the investigation. Detective Schnoor would have testified that

he saw the boxes that were eventually found to contain cannabis being

taken out of 8521 South Burley Avenue one at a time by defendant.

Moreover, he would have testified that in taking those boxes out

defendant looked up and down the street, conduct which he believed

indicative of people transporting narcotics. It was also stipulated,

however, that this type of behavior could be seen in law-abiding

citizens as well.

On October 1, 2003, the motion to quash and suppress came up

for argument. Before argument was heard, though, the parties

additionally stipulated that private investigator Joe Carone would

testify he photographed the tollbooth where defendant was arrested,

which was 0.8 miles from the Illinois border, inside Indiana. Defendant

argued not only that the arrest at the tollbooth was improper, but also

that defendant’s later consent to search was involuntarily given.

Defendant contended, while arguing before the trial court, that “[i]f

the initial stop is bad everything that happens after that stop is bad,

including the consent form, the alleged smell and the stop in the other

state, all of that falls.” The State, by contrast, argued that the

anonymous tip, the suspicious driving between two houses multiple

times in one day, the fact that $80,000 dollars was recovered from
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Mojica, and defendant’s conduct which officers believed to be

countersurveillance, taken together, amounted to probable cause.

Considering these arguments, and after making specific factual

findings, the trial court agreed with the State that officers had

probable cause to arrest defendant and denied defendant’s motion.

On October 28, 2003, defendant filed another motion to suppress,

this time specifically referring only to the evidence seized as a result

of the search at defendant’s residence at 8521 South Burley Avenue.

No hearing was held on this motion. The motion was again presented,

however, on March 8, 2004, in tandem with defendant’s motion to

vacate the trial court’s earlier denial of defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence. The March 8 motion, presented in a single document, asked

the trial court to enter orders: “A. Vacating the order entered October

01, 2003, denying the defendant’s motion to suppress; B. Holding an

evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the items

seized from his home on October 11; C. Granting the motion to

suppress the items seized from the defendant’s home at 8521 South

Burley, Chicago, Illinois on October 11, 2001.”

On June 8, 2004, the trial court heard argument regarding

defendant’s March 8 motion to vacate and motion to suppress.

Defendant asserted that the original motion to suppress, filed on July

23, 2002, and denied by the trial court on October 1, 2003,

“concerned itself only solely and exclusively with the search of the car

and [defendant’s] arrest and probable cause for his arrest. It did not

concern itself in any way with the search *** later that day of

defendant’s home.” Defendant contended that the issue of the search

at defendant’s home had never been litigated or ruled upon. Defendant

acknowledged, though, that the trial court previously denied the

motion to quash and suppress with respect to the search of

defendant’s car and his arrest.

Supporting the new motion, defendant asserted that the arrest was

illegal because it took place in Indiana. Defendant asserted that

pursuant to Indiana statutory law, after Chicago police officers

arrested defendant, they were required to take defendant before a

judge of the Indiana county in which the arrest was made for a bond

hearing. Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998). Because that

was not done in this case, defendant contended his arrest was invalid.

Based on this argument, defendant asked the trial court to vacate the
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original denial of the motion to suppress and grant the motion to

suppress.

In response, the State acknowledged that defendant should have

been brought before an Indiana judge for a bond hearing. The State

argued, though, that the failure to do so was harmless and for the trial

court “to suppress any evidence recovered by the police officers

including a consent to search, including all the cannabis that was

found in defendant’s vehicle, including all of the evidence that was

found at the address [in] Illinois is too harsh for the circumstances in

this case.” The State asserted that the trial court already heard all of

the arguments defendant made in this motion in the previous motion,

specifically noting that the trial court heard arguments about the

legality of defendant’s arrest in Indiana when it considered defendant’s

first motion to suppress. Accordingly, the State requested the trial

court to again deny defendant’s motion.

The trial court noted that it was undisputed that the arrest in this

case took place in Indiana. The court then pointed out that Indiana

was not afforded, as required by Indiana statute, the opportunity to

determine whether there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest.

Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998). Moreover, extradition

procedures required by Indiana statute were not followed. Ind. Code

Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998). In light of the above, the trial court

vacated its denial of the original motion to quash and suppress and

granted defendant’s new motion to quash and suppress the evidence

in Indiana. Having done this, the court set a future date for a hearing

on the motion regarding the search of the Burley Avenue address.

This hearing was never held, though, as the trial court went back on

the record the same day, June 8, 2004, and granted the motion to

suppress with regards to the evidence obtained at the Burley Avenue

address. The trial court noted that the information retrieved at 8521

South Burley Avenue resulted from the “wrongful detention in

bringing [defendant] back across the state line,” which was the same

basis the court utilized in granting defendant’s motion to vacate.

With this factual and procedural background in mind, we turn to

our analysis.

ANALYSIS
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In its petition for leave to appeal, the State presents two

arguments. First, the State asserts that an Illinois court need not

inquire into extradition irregularities for crimes committed within

Illinois’ borders, as such irregularities affect neither the guilt nor the

innocence of the accused, nor the jurisdiction of the Illinois court to

try a defendant. Second, the State contends that exclusion is not the

appropriate remedy in this case. As the facts are not in dispute and

these arguments present questions of law, review is de novo. People

v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 148 (2006).

A. Procedural Issues

Before addressing the State’s arguments, we first address several

procedural arguments. Defendant asserts that the State’s position is

essentially that an individual arrestee may not contest the validity of

the arrest and postarrest procedures visited upon him. Defendant

contends that this argument was not presented to the trial court by the

State and thus is forfeited. People v. O’Neal, 104 Ill. 2d 399, 407

(1984). In a similar vein, defendant argues that the State never

presented argument regarding the law of extradition in the trial court,

and thus any reliance on such law is also forfeited. Additionally,

defendant asserts that the State failed to argue the good-faith doctrine

before the trial court or the appellate court, and, accordingly,

argument on that point is forfeited as well.

The State asserts that it has sufficiently preserved its claims to

survive forfeiture. First, the State argues that defendant

mischaracterizes its argument. The State contends that its argument

is not premised upon standing, but on the position that irregularities

in extradition affect neither the guilt nor the innocence of a defendant,

nor the jurisdiction of the court to try him. Defendant, in arguing

before the trial court, specifically referenced the extradition clause of

the United States Constitution and asserted that in this case, Chicago

police officers essentially acted as “kidnappers when they took

[defendant] from Indiana back in Illinois.” The State also specifically

referred to the extradition clause before the trial court and argued that

the officers’ failure to adhere to Indiana’s postarrest statutory

procedures was harmless and did not deprive the trial court of

jurisdiction to consider the case. Like the parties, the trial court

referred to the extradition clause, noting that “what was skipped in
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this case was the fact that there was no extradition hearing *** we

have skipped the extradition proceedings in Indiana and I feel that that

is determinative in this case of the law that should be applied.”

Likewise, the State claims that defendant mischaracterizes its

argument regarding good faith. The State asserts that it is not arguing

for a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Instead, it is the

State’s position that the officers in this case did not intentionally

ignore Indiana’s statutory scheme and thus the exclusionary rule

should never even be invoked. According to the State, exclusion is

unwarranted in this case based upon the deterrent effect/detriment to

society considerations necessary to deciding if the rule should be

invoked in the first place. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.

586, 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56, 64, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006)

(explaining that the exclusionary rule should only be applied where its

deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs); People v.

Coleman, 227 Ill. 2d 426 (2008) (where this court noted that if the

main purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police

misconduct the interests of justice are not served by suppressing

electronic surveillance gathered pursuant to federal law in

contravention of state law, unless there is evidence of collusion to

avoid the state law requirements). The State points out that arguments

regarding good faith were presented in the trial court, the appellate

court, and in the petition for leave to appeal in this court. Indeed, both

the trial and appellate court referenced good faith in their decisions,

with the trial court making its decision “regardless of the good faith

of the officers” and the appellate court asserting that “Chicago police

officers blatantly disregarded” portions of Indiana’s fresh pursuit

statute. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 881.

This court has considered the purpose of the forfeiture rule

repeatedly, noting:

“ ‘ “Failure to raise issues in the trial court denies that court

the opportunity to grant a new trial, if warranted. This casts a

needless burden of preparing and processing appeals upon

appellate counsel for the defense, the prosecution, and upon

the court of review. Without a post-trial motion limiting the

consideration to errors considered significant, the appeal is

open-ended. Appellate counsel may comb the record for every

semblance of error and raise issues on appeal whether or not
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trial counsel considered them of any importance.” ’ ” People

v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 400 (2006), quoting People v.

Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988), quoting People v.

Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31-32 (1984).

It is apparent in this case that while the State’s arguments regarding

extradition and good faith were not as extensively made or fully

developed in the lower courts as they are before this court, they were

raised and considered. As such, it would not serve the purposes of the

forfeiture rule to apply it under these circumstances and we will not

do so.

Defendant also contends that this case involves two separate and

independent searches, one of defendant’s truck and one of the Burley

Avenue address. Defendant asserts that the State’s notice of appeal

was limited to the quashing of defendant’s arrest and the search of his

car, and thus this court lacks the jurisdiction to determine the validity

of the search of the Burley Avenue address. Defendant points out that

Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) provides that

the State has the right to appeal from the denial of a motion to

suppress and Supreme Court Rule 606 (210 Ill. 2d R. 606) provides

that the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.

This case does involve two separate searches. However, this does

not establish that the validity of the search at the Burley Avenue

address presents a question beyond this court’s jurisdiction. The

record establishes that the trial court was presented with extensive

evidence and testimony regarding the search at 8521 South Burley

Avenue. Both parties discussed the search of the home at the

evidentiary hearing and both parties referenced it in making

arguments. Defendant’s original motion to quash and suppress was

broadly written and specifically asked that all “knowledge and fruits

*** and products” of his arrest and detention be suppressed.

Moreover, defendant argued that during his arrest and subsequent

detention, the State “became aware of the existence of physical

evidence all the direct and indirect fruits of the arrest and detention,

which connect petitioner with the instant offense.” The evidence found

at the Burley Avenue address constitutes the fruits and products of

defendant’s arrest, just as it connects petitioner with the offenses

charged.
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The fact that defendant later filed a second motion to suppress,

this time only referencing the home search, does not alter that fact that

the home search was at issue and considered in the first motion to

suppress. Considering this, it is not surprising that the trial court did

not hold another evidentiary hearing and did not specifically consider

the second motion to suppress filed on October 28, 2003, as it seems

merely to constitute an attempt to revive a portion of the previously

ruled upon motion. The trial court’s discussion of defendant’s later

motion to vacate and motion to suppress, filed on March 8, 2004,

supports this position. After granting the motion to vacate on June 8,

2004, the trial court initially set a later date to argue the motion to

suppress. Instead of waiting until a later date, however, the trial court

went back on the record that same day and granted the motion to

suppress the evidence seized at 8521 South Burley Avenue. In so

doing, the trial court pointed out that the information retrieved at

8521 South Burley Avenue resulted from the “wrongful detention in

bringing [defendant] back across the state line,” which was the same

basis the court utilized in granting defendant’s motion to vacate.

Our conclusion that this court has jurisdiction to consider the

validity of the house search is further supported by the State’s notice

of appeal. The notice of appeal referenced two dates of judgment or

order: June 8, 2004, and July 21, 2004. As already discussed, the trial

court granted defendant’s motion to vacate, thus granting defendant’s

first filed motion to suppress (which we find included the evidence

seized at the house search), on June 8, 2004. On the same date, the

trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized at

8521 South Burley Avenue. The July 21, 2004, date references the

trial court’s denial of the State’s motion to reconsider the June 8

ruling. In its motion to reconsider, the State specifically asked the trial

court to “reconsider its rulings on June 8, 2004, to reinstate its

findings that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant and that the

cannabis from Defendant’s vehicle was properly seized, and to find

that the evidence seized from the Burley address resulted from a

voluntary and properly obtained consent to search.” Accordingly, the

State’s notice of appeal adequately referred to the home search.

In light of the above, we find that the State complied with this

court’s rules and we will consider the validity of the search of the

Burley Avenue address. As already noted, we do not find any of the
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State’s argument forfeited and will consider the State’s arguments

concerning extradition and good faith. Finding that the State has

adequately preserved its arguments, we turn to the merits.

B. Merits

The two Indiana statutory sections primarily at issue in this case

comprise portions of Indiana’s Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. The

first section (Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–1 (Michie 1998)), entitled

“Fresh pursuit–Peace officers of other states–Authority to arrest in

Indiana,” provides:

“Any member of a duly organized state, county, or

municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in

fresh pursuit, and continues within this state in such fresh

pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is

believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall

have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in

custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to

arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is

believed to have committed a felony in this state.”

The second section, Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (LexisNexis 1998),

entitled “Arrest–Hearing–Commitment or discharge,” provides:

“If an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another

state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this

chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person

arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was

made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of

determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge

determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the

person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of

an extradition warrant by the governor of this state. If the

judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall

discharge the person arrested.”

The trial and appellate courts found that because the Chicago police

officers did not comply with the second statutory section, Ind. Code

Ann. §35–33–3–2 (LexisNexis 1998), they were not authorized to

arrest defendant and thus the evidence against him must be

suppressed.
-16-

I. The State’s Position

The State points out that in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111,

43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 63, 95 S. Ct. 854, 861 (1975), the United States

Supreme Court found that “the standards and procedures for arrest

and detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its

common-law antecedents.” Moreover, this court has recognized that

at common law police officers had the authority to arrest a defendant

outside the territorial limits of the political entity which appointed

them to their office when the officers were in fresh pursuit of a felon

or a suspected felon fleeing that jurisdiction. People v. Lahr, 147 Ill.

2d 379, 382 (1992). According to the State, Indiana’s Uniform Act on

Fresh Pursuit merely codifies the common law principle authorizing

felony fresh pursuit extraterritorial arrest which has already been

codified in the fourth amendment.

The State asserts that it complied with the fourth amendment in

this case. The State points out that the trial court initially denied

defendant’s motion to quash and suppress after a full evidentiary

hearing, considering extensive testimony regarding defendant’s arrest,

the search of his car, and the search of the Burley Avenue address.

Upon reconsidering its rulings, the trial court never questioned the

court’s initial findings, this time only altering its ultimate legal

conclusion based upon defendant’s statutory argument. Likewise, the

appellate court limited its consideration to the legal questions

revolving around noncompliance with Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute

and whether the proper remedy is suppression. 367 Ill. App. 3d at

879. According to the State, then, while Chicago police may not have

complied with Indiana’s post-arrest statutory procedures, their actions

arresting defendant and seizing evidence against him clearly comport

with the fourth amendment and its common law antecedents.

The State further points out that the arrest was substantively

authorized by Indiana statute. In fact, the appellate court specifically

noted that “[t]he parties agree that, in compliance with section

35–33–3–1 of Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute, the Chicago police were

properly in fresh pursuit of defendant, whom the Chicago police

believed had committed a felony.” 367 Ill. App. 3d at 880. Even in his

brief before this court, defendant acknowledges the same, stating that

he agrees “Chicago police officers had the authority to follow the
-17-

defendant into the State of Indiana, and Indiana having adopted the

Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, arrest him.”

According to the State, only section 35–33–3–2 of Indiana’s fresh

pursuit statute was violated, and unless that provision is mandated by

a component of the federal Constitution, noncompliance with the

section has no bearing on the legitimacy of the arrest or the

subsequent actions of the Chicago police and State of Illinois. The

State asserts that because this is an Illinois prosecution, in an Illinois

court, for offenses committed wholly within Illinois’ borders, and

because the arrest complies with the fourth amendment, whether

Illinois evaluates the matter with respect to Indiana’s statutory scheme

presents a discretionary question premised upon principles of comity.

Put simply, the State asserts that the Chicago police officers’

noncompliance with Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (LexisNexis 1998)

did not make defendant’s arrest unlawful.

The State points out that section 35–33–3–2 of Indiana’s fresh

pursuit statute not only provides an arrestee with a probable cause

hearing, but also serves to set forth the initial step in the extradition

process which typically takes place in an interstate fresh pursuit

scenario. In this case, the State acknowledges that by summarily

removing defendant from Indiana and bringing him to Illinois to face

prosecution, the Chicago officers bypassed the procedural mechanisms

set forth in section 35–33–3–2, and indeed the entirety of the statute’s

extradition proceedings. Nevertheless, the State argues that this did

not offend the extradition clause or the prompt presentment

requirements of the federal Constitution.

The extradition clause provides that “[a] Person charged in any

State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from

Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the

executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up,

to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.” U.S.

Const., art. IV, §2. The State points out, though, that a long line of

United States Supreme Court precedent, known as the Ker-Frisbie

doctrine, has established that irregularities in the extradition of a

fugitive from justice for an otherwise constitutional prosecution

“affects neither the guilt nor innocence of the accused, nor the

jurisdiction of the court to try him.” Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627, 637

(1884), aff’d, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S. Ct. 225 (1886);
-18-

Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952);

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 119 L. Ed. 2d 441,

112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). In Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 712, 32

L. Ed. 283, 287, 8 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (1888), the Supreme Court held

that “the offender against the law of the State is not relieved from

liability *** because of indignities committed against another state.”

More recently, the Supreme Court, considering principles of

federalism, noted that “an accused ‘should not be permitted to use the

machinery of one sovereignty to obstruct his trial in the courts of the

other, unless the necessary operation of such machinery prevents his

having a fair trial.’ ” Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S 381, 385, 5 L. Ed.

2d 620, 624, 81 S. Ct. 632, 635 (1961), quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden,

258 U.S. 254, 260, 66 L. Ed. 607, 611, 42 S. Ct. 309, 310 (1922).

In the State’s view, the above makes clear that Illinois courts are

not required to measure defendant’s arrest by the statutory overlays

of Indiana’s postarrest procedural provision. The State asserts that if

there is any affront in this case, it is to Indiana and not to defendant.

Considering this, the State acknowledges that this court could elect to

decline to exercise jurisdiction as a discretionary matter premised

upon comity. The State argues, though, that this court should not do

so in view of its longstanding adherence to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,

as well as the Supreme Court of Indiana’s adherence to the same. Ker,

110 Ill. 627; People v. Klinger, 319 Ill. 275, 278 (1925); People ex

rel. Lehman v. Frye, 35 Ill. 2d 343 (1966); Massey v. State, 267 Ind.

504, 507, 371 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1978) (“A trial court’s jurisdiction

does not depend upon the legality of [defendant’s] arrest or return to

the wanting state”). Indeed, the State points out that the Supreme

Court of Indiana has recognized that comity, in certain circumstances,

should not be utilized so as to effect the release of a defendant based

upon mere technicalities. Cozart v. Wolf, 185 Ind. 505, 512-13, 112

N.E. 241, 243 (1916).

Corollary to the above, the State points out that while defendant

was not afforded a Gerstein hearing in Indiana as required by Ind.

Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (LexisNexis 1998), he was afforded a proper

Gerstein hearing in Illinois. Such a hearing, mandated by the fourth

amendment, affords a defendant arrested without a warrant prompt

“judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended

restraint of liberty following arrest.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 43 L.
-19-

Ed. 2d at 65, 95 S. Ct. at 863. Since a Gerstein hearing was held,

then, the State contends that the fact that the hearing did not take

place in Indiana should render defendant’s arrest unlawful only if this

court chooses to acknowledge and give effect to Ind. Code Ann.

§35–33–3–2 (LexisNexis 1998) based upon principles of comity. For

the reasons already discussed, the State argues against this. Moreover,

the State points out that courts in other states have held that as long

as a Gerstein hearing is properly held, what state it is held in is

constitutionally insignificant. See Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857,

862 (Wyo. 1980); Weaver v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 487, 513

S.E.2d 423 (1999).

In addition to the above arguments, the State asserts that the

exclusionary rule is inapplicable to the facts of this case. The State

notes that by its plain language, the fourth amendment “contains no

provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in

violation of its commands.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 131 L.

Ed. 2d 34, 43, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995). The Supreme Court

crafted the exclusionary rule as a “judicially created remedy” to

“safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent

effect.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d

561, 571, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974). The exclusionary rule is not

reflexively applied. The Supreme Court has even stated that

“[s]uppression of evidence *** has always been our last resort, not

our first impulse.” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126

S. Ct. at 2163. Indeed, the rule is only applied where its deterrence

benefits outweigh its substantial societal costs. Hudson, 547 U.S. at

591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.

The State asserts that the exclusionary rule was designed to police

federal constitutional violations rather than nonconstitutionally

compelled state statutory violations, particularly where the arrest itself

was constitutionally legitimate. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres,

440 U.S. 741, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979) (considering

a violation of IRS regulations which did not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation and noting that “our precedents enforcing the

exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations provide no support

for the rule’s application”). Additionally, the State points out that

outside the mandatory reach of the federal constitutional exclusionary

rule, the Supreme Court has found that “[t]he States are not
-20-

foreclosed by the Due Process Clause from using a similar

[cost/benefit] balancing approach to delineate the scope of their own

exclusionary rules.” California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 44-45,

100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39-40, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (1988). This court

has recognized this principle and utilized it in numerous instances.

See, e.g., People v. DeMorrow, 59 Ill. 2d 352, 354 (1974) (“whether

or not any given search and seizure is unconstitutional, as violative of

the fourth *** amendment[ ], as a matter of substantive law, is to be

decided by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court.

*** The decision of what State courts may deem to be admissible in

their systems according to their laws of evidence is an entirely

separate question”); People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 532 (2005)

(exclusionary rule not applied where detention ran afoul of Gerstein,

but confession voluntary); People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill. 2d 429 (1997)

(exclusionary rule not applied because of violation of clergy/penitent

evidentiary privilege); People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114 (1998)

(exclusionary rule not applied where defendant was transferred from

jail in violation of Illinois Habeas Corpus Act).

Considering the above, the State argues that not only is the

application of the exclusionary rule not compelled by the federal

Constitution, it is also not compelled by this state’s own exclusionary

principles. The State points out that this court has noted that “there is

no constitutional barrier, other than the fourth amendment, which

precludes one jurisdiction from refusing to honor the standards of

another relative to the validity of an arrest or search.” People v.

Saiken, 49 Ill. 2d 504, 510 (1971). Moreover, precedent establishes

a trend on the part of courts in other states not to invoke their

exclusionary rules as a per se remedy in situations involving a

constitutional extraterritorial arrest that also violated a statutory

provision of a nonconstitutional dimension. See, e.g., People v.

Porter, 742 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1987); State v. Pike, 642 A.2d 145 (Me.

1994); City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St. 2d 232, 416 N.E.2d

598 (1980); Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267

(1986); State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423 (2001).

Applying the deterrence benefits/societal costs analysis of the

exclusionary rule specifically, the State points out that the officers

involved in this case were not even aware that they were in Indiana

when they arrested defendant. Accordingly, the police officers did not
-21-

violate Indiana’s statutory procedure for extradition out of disrespect

for Indiana’s laws or territorial borders, but because defendant ran for

the border. The State notes that the exclusionary rule is “calculated to

prevent, not to repair.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 4

L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1444 (1960). As such, the State

argues that applying the exclusionary rule in this situation, involving

inadvertent police action, would not act as a deterrent, as the officers

would not even be aware of their error. Further, the State argues that

applying the exclusionary rule would have substantial societal cost.

II. Defendant’s Position

Defendant agrees that Chicago police had the authority to follow

defendant into Indiana and arrest him, citing Ind. Code Ann.

§35–33–3–1 (Michie 1998). However, defendant disagrees with the

State that officers were free to disregard Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2

(Michie 1998). Supporting his position, defendant notes that in United

States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589, 92 L. Ed. 210, 217, 68 S. Ct. 222,

226 (1948), the Supreme Court stated that “in the absence of an

applicable federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without

warrant takes place determines its validity.”

Defendant points out that inWyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,

299-300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 414, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999), the

Supreme Court stated that to determine whether a governmental

action violates the fourth amendment, courts must “inquire first

whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure

under the common law when the [fourth] Amendment was framed.”

Defendant argues that examining the common law of arrest as it

existed in Indiana before the adoption of the Uniform Act on Fresh

Pursuit, it is clear that Chicago police would not have been able even

to make an arrest pursuant to a lawful warrant in Indiana. Martin v.

Newland, 196 Ind. 58, 61, 147 N.E. 141, 142 (1925) (“a warrant

issued by a court in Illinois could not have any extraterritorial effect,

and conferred no authority to arrest and imprison the petitioner in

Indiana, without a warrant issued by a court or other proper officer of

the State of Indiana”).

Defendant further argues that this court has rejected the position

that Illinois police officers are free to disregard the statutes limiting
-22-

their jurisdiction. Defendant points to People v. Lahr, where this court

considered a situation where a defendant was arrested by a Sleepy

Hollow, Illinois, police officer outside of Sleepy Hollow’s boundaries

and held that the arrest powers of a law enforcement officer operating

“ ‘outside of the respective police authorities’ area of jurisdiction’ ”

are circumscribed and limited to those possessed by a citizen. Lahr,

147 Ill. 2d at 387.

Similarly, defendant points to People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1

(2002), where this court considered a situation where Chicago police

officers, after conducting surveillance, arrested a defendant in Franklin

Park, Illinois. The defendant in Carrera asserted that Chicago police

officers did not have the authority to arrest him outside the territorial

limits of the City of Chicago. This court agreed, holding that “Illinois

law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police

effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory

authority.” Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11.

According to defendant, Lahr and Carrera refute the State’s

argument that the existence of probable cause to arrest is the only

requirement for a valid arrest. In defendant’s view, it is illogical to

contend that a Sleepy Hollow, Illinois, police officer may not use his

police arrest powers to arrest outside Sleepy Hollow, Illinois, and that

a Chicago, Illinois, police officer may not make a valid arrest

supported by probable cause in Franklin Park, Illinois, absent statutory

authority, but that the same Chicago police officer has the authority

to enter and make an arrest in Indiana and remove the arrestee to

Illinois.

Considering the exclusionary rule and its application to the facts

of this case, defendant points to Commonwealth v. Sadvari, 561 Pa.

588, 752 A.2d 393 (2000). In Sadvari, Pennsylvania state troopers

stopped a speeding defendant less than a mile inside the State of

Delaware, performed sobriety tests on the defendant which he failed,

and then transported him back to Pennsylvania for chemical testing.

The defendant moved to suppress the results of the chemical test,

asserting that his arrest did not conform to the Delaware fresh pursuit

statute, as a Delaware magistrate was not afforded the opportunity to

consider the lawfulness of the arrest. The Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania held that because the Pennsylvania state troopers

ignored Delaware’s statutory requirement that the defendant be
-23-

brought before a Delaware court, “the arrest was illegal.” Sadvari,

561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. Additionally, in considering the

remedy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “application of the

exclusionary rule will serve primarily as a demonstration of comity to

vindicate Delaware’s sovereignty in light of Pennsylvania’s incursion

upon this important state interest. Suppression is also appropriate to

encourage future compliance with Delaware’s procedures and, in a

more general sense, to safeguard the individual right to be free from

unlawful seizures.” Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 399.

Additionally, defendant points to People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d

447 (1979), where our appellate court considered a situation where

Illinois police obtained a warrant for a defendant’s arrest, pursued him

into the State of Iowa, arrested him, and brought him back to Illinois,

where he was extensively interrogated and eventually confessed. The

Jacobs court held that the Illinois police officers had no authority to

arrest the defendant, except that granted them by the uniform fresh

pursuit law of the State of Iowa. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449. That

law, similar to Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998), required

out-of-state police officers, after effecting an arrest, to take the person

arrested before an in-state magistrate for a Gerstein hearing, among

other things. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449-50. The Jacobs court held

that because the mandates of Iowa’s fresh pursuit law were “blithely

and summarily ignored,” the defendant’s later confessions stemmed

from an illegal arrest and were inadmissible.

Further supporting his position, defendant cites United States v.

Holmes, 380 A.2d 598 (D.C. App. 1977), where the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals considered a situation where Maryland

police officers arrested a defendant in the District of Colombia as he

got off a bus from Maryland. While the defendant consented to return

to Maryland, the court held that the consent was illegally procured

and noted that “this court has heretofore made clear that such an

arrest is valid only under authority of the Uniform Act on Fresh

Pursuit.” (Emphasis in original.) Holmes, 380 A.2d at 600.

Substantively addressing the State’s argument concerning good

faith, defendant asserts that the good-faith doctrine is limited to

arrests and searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. Defendant’s

argument on this point is brief. Defendant points out that the Supreme

Court has stated that “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the
-24-

question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and

we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most

appropriately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a

magistrate’s determination.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,

914, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 693, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984). Moreover,

citing to People v. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d 299, 308 (1994), defendant

points out that this court has stated that “[t]he Leon Court was careful

to limit the contours of its ruling.” Additionally, defendant asserts that

the subjective beliefs of an arresting officer are irrelevant with regard

to establishing probable cause for a warrantless arrest. See Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98, 116 S. Ct.

1769, 1774 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”).

III. Extradition Irregularities, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Facts

of This Case

We agree with the State that defendant’s arrest should not be

quashed nor the evidence against him suppressed. The Supreme Court

has stated that to determine whether a governmental action violates

the fourth amendment, courts must “inquire first whether the action

was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law

when the [fourth] Amendment was framed.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at

299-300, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 414, 119 S. Ct. at 1300. This does not

mean, as defendant suggests, however, that we must examine the

common law of arrest as it existed in Indiana before the adoption of

the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. Instead, as the State suggests, it

means that we must examine the common law in place at the time of

the enactment of the fourth amendment. As noted above, this court

has already done this, stating, “[a]t common law, municipal and

county police officers had no authority to arrest a defendant outside

the territorial limits of the political entity which appointed them to

their office. The sole exception to this rule at common law was when

the officers were in ‘fresh pursuit’ of a suspected felon fleeing that

jurisdiction.” Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382.

Here, the evidence clearly indicates that the Chicago police

officers who eventually stopped defendant did so believing that he was

engaged in drug trafficking and was attempting to escape. The

Chicago police officers were thus in fresh pursuit of a person they
-25-

suspected to be a fleeing felon. Pursuant to our analysis in Lahr, then,

they had the commonlaw authority to effect an arrest of that person

outside the territorial limits of the political entity that appointed them.

Additionally, there is no question, and defendant has even agreed, that

the arrest that occurred in this case was substantively authorized by

Indiana statute. See Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–1 (Michie 1998).

It is also worth noting that defendant’s sole fourth amendment

argument before this court revolves around his contention that

Chicago police violated Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998).

This is not surprising considering the procedural posture of this case.

As already detailed, defendant’s first filed motion to suppress was

very broad, requesting the trial court quash his arrest and suppress,

among other things, the “[p]hysical evidence discovered and as a

result of arrest and detention” and “[a]ll other knowledge and fruits

*** and products of the arrest.” After holding a detailed evidentiary

hearing and considering extensive argument on this motion, including

evidence and argument regarding the home search, the trial court

denied the motion to quash and suppress. Before this court, defendant

advances no fourth amendment argument other than that based upon

Indiana statute. Accordingly, if we find no fourth amendment violation

based upon Indiana statute, there is no other basis argued for us to

find such a violation. Defendant already advanced a variety of other

fourth amendment based arguments in the trial court, lost those

arguments, and no longer advances them on appeal.

The Illinois cases defendant cites do not settle this case as a matter

of law. Lahr, Carrera, and Jacobs all involved situations

distinguishable from this case. In Lahr, the defendant was not a fleeing

felon and he was arrested by a police officer using his police authority

outside of the territorial limits of the political entity which appointed

him. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382, 386-87. This arrest was thus invalid.

Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 386-87. In Carrera, the defendant was arrested by

police officers utilizing a statute that was later declared void ab initio.

Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 14-15. Accordingly, this court held that the

defendant’s arrest was unlawful. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 17. In Jacobs,

it appears that police were not in fresh pursuit of the defendant, as he

was arrested in Iowa a day after police had already interrogated and

released him. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 448. Accordingly, the actual

arrest at issue in the Jacobs case may have been invalid even without
-26-

considering postarrest irregularities. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449.

Additionally, the appellate court in Jacobs noted that its decision in

that case may well have been based upon entirely different reasoning.

Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449 (“It may well be that in spite of having

received Miranda warnings the totality of the circumstances, to-wit,

the defendant’s age, I.Q., reading level, circumstances of his arrest,

the deprecatory advice as to need of counsel, the minimization as to

the seriousness of the crime of murder by a minor, and the police

officer’s offer to help the defendant in any way he could, when

considered in their entirety, might well require the suppression of all

statements made by the defendant during his interrogation session

with the law enforcement authorities of Rock Island County”). Unlike

the present case, then, Lahr, Carrera and Jacobs, all involved

situations where defendant’s arrest occurred under very different

circumstances than those present here.

Defendant’s citation to the Holmes decision is similarly

distinguishable. While the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

touched upon the magistrate provision of Maryland’s fresh pursuit

statute similar to the statutory provision at issue in this case, it was

also questionable whether the defendant’s arrest was valid. Holmes,

380 A.2d at 600 (noting that the trial court’s basis for suppressing

evidence included the fact that “Holmes was arrested without probable

cause ***. Police failed to present Holmes to a District of Columbia

court in accord with statutory provisions. There was ineffective

inquiry into Holmes’ understanding of his rights. Holmes was

intensively interrogated for some four hours in the middle of the night

***. In sum, the police created and exploited circumstances which

resulted in legally inadmissible statements”). Moreover, the court’s

ultimate conclusion in the case was based upon its finding that the trial

court properly found that the defendant’s consent to leave the District

without a hearing and extradition was involuntary. Holmes, 380 A.2d

at 602. As such, none of the cases defendant cites settle the question

at issue in this case, that being whether one state’s noncompliance

with another state’s postarrest procedural statute makes a defendant’s

arrest unlawful where it would otherwise be completely lawful.

While this court has held that “Illinois law is settled that the

exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an

extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority”
-27-

(Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11), it has never considered the situation

involved here, where Illinois authorities validly arrested a defendant

but failed to comply with another state’s statutory postarrest

procedural requirements by failing to present that defendant to a

magistrate in the other state for the determination of probable cause

and a formal beginning of the extradition process. Courts in other

states have considered this question and come to different

conclusions.

Some courts have considered situations involving constitutional

extraterritorial arrests that also violated a nonconstitutional statutory

provision of a foreign state and been unwilling to invoke the

exclusionary rule as a remedy. See State v. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d 84,

90 (Iowa 2007) (considering the magistrate provision of Missouri’s

version of the uniform fresh pursuit statute almost identical to that at

issue in this case and refusing to apply the exclusionary rule,

characterizing the violation as “a statutory violation that does not

involve fundamental rights, constitutional overtones, or false

representations of law or other similar police misconduct”); State v.

Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 468, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1984)

(considering the magistrate provision of Iowa’s version of the uniform

fresh pursuit statute almost identical to that at issue in this case and

refusing to apply the exclusionary rule finding that the statutory

violation did not affect the validity of the arrest or amount to a due

process violation); State v. Bond, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 653 P.2d 1024,

1032 (1982) (en banc) (refusing to exclude evidence in a situation

where a defendant was arrested by Washington officers in Oregon and

removed to Washington without presentation to an Oregon magistrate

as statutorily required and noting that “[t]he improper interstate

rendition was merely incidental to the arrest and represented no new

intrusion into defendant’s privacy. It represented more of an affront

to the rights of the State of Oregon than of the defendant”).

By contrast, as defendant describes in detail, other courts have

applied the exclusionary rule in situations involving constitutional

extraterritorial arrests that also violated a nonconstitutional statutory

provision of a foreign state. See Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 588, 752 A.2d

393; Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447; Holmes, 380 A.2d 598.

We find the analysis in Dentler, Ferrel, and Bond more persuasive

than that found in Sadvari, Jacobs, and Holmes. We find particularly
-28-

instructive the analysis utilized in Dentler, the most recent case to

address this particular issue. After discussing Sadvari and Jacobs, as

well as Ferrell and Bond, the Dentler court noted its commitment to

the exclusionary rule. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 87-88. Next, the

Dentler court considered the probable cause for the defendant’s arrest

and pointed out that while he was not brought before a Missouri

magistrate, he was promptly taken before an Iowa judge and thus

“afforded the opportunity to test the validity of his arrest before a

neutral magistrate promptly after his arrest.” Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at

89. Accordingly, the Dentler court found that the defendant’s due

process rights were not violated. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. The

court thus found that the main issue in the case was “whether a

violation of Missouri statutory law warrants exclusion of evidence” in

Iowa. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89.

Considering that issue, the Dentler court first asked whether the

Missouri statute specifically required the exclusion of evidence and

found that it did not. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. Next, the court

asked whether the Missouri statute involved a fundamental right of the

defendant. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. Likewise, the court found that

it did not, pointing out that the main purpose of the magistrate

provision was to vindicate the rights of Missouri not the rights of an

individual defendant. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89 (“To the extent an

ox is being gored in this case, it belongs to Missouri, not Dentler. ***

Ordinarily, a party seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule may not

vicariously assert the rights of another”). Following this, and perhaps

in a nod to principles of comity, the court noted that the defendant

made no argument that there existed a fundamental public policy

difference between Missouri and Iowa which militated in favor of

exclusion. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. Finally, the court considered

and rejected the concern that without applying the exclusionary rule

to the situation at issue there would be insufficient deterrence to avoid

future similar violations by Iowa police of Missouri statutory law.

Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 90. In so doing, the court stated:

“Because the benefits of violating the magistrate provision

are so small, however, the incentive for future violations is not

very high. If we are proven wrong in this assessment, the

Missouri legislature may withdraw its authorization of Iowa

peace officers to engage in fresh pursuit. Further, because this
-29-

opinion is narrowly based on the unique facts of this case, law

enforcement officials have no certainty that the exclusionary

rule will be held inapplicable under a different state of facts,

particularly where the record demonstrates willful misconduct.

Finally, in the unlikely event that such violations become a

recurrent problem, this court reserves the right to exercise its

supervisory powers to exclude the evidence in future cases.

[Citations.]” Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 90.

As in Dentler, aside from the fact that Chicago police failed to

comply with the magistrate provision of Indiana’s Fresh Pursuit

Statute, defendant’s arrest was valid. Defendant’s arrest complied

with the fourth amendment, its common law antecedents, and Indiana

statute. Likewise, while defendant was not brought before an Indiana

magistrate, he was promptly taken before an Illinois judge and thus

afforded the opportunity to promptly test the validity of his arrest

before a neutral magistrate. Accordingly, defendant’s due process

rights were not violated. See Six Feathers, 611 P.2d at 862; Weaver,

29 Va. App. 487, 513 S.E.2d 423. The main issue, then, is whether

the Chicago police officer’s noncompliance with Indiana’s postarrest

procedural statute makes defendant’s arrest unlawful when it would

otherwise be completely lawful. In other words, we must consider

whether a violation of Indiana statutory law, particularly Ind. Code

Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998), mandates the exclusion of evidence

in Illinois.

We do not believe that the violation of Ind. Code Ann.

§35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998) mandates the exclusion of the evidence

arrayed against defendant. First, the statutory language itself does not

mandate exclusion or even mention it. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d

569, 580-81 (2006) (“The fundamental rule of statutory construction

is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. [Citation.] ***

The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given

its plain and ordinary meaning”). Next, the Indiana statute, under the

facts of this case, does not involve a fundamental right of defendant.

Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998) appears to have two

main purposes. First, the statute provides an arrestee with a probable

cause hearing in Indiana. The fact that defendant had the hearing in

Illinois rather than Indiana does not constitute a constitutional

violation, however. See Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89; SixFeathers, 611
 

1

In discussing the exclusionary rule, we feel it worth mentioning that

apart from his reference to Sadvari, 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2d 393, defendant

advances little substantive argument regarding the application of the

exclusionary rule. Defendant does advance an argument concerning the goodfaith doctrine and its application in situations where police are operating

without a warrant. As we discussed when considering defendant’s procedural

arguments, however, the State is not advocating the application of the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule. Rather, the State merely discusses

the good faith of the Chicago police officers involved in this case in order to

show that the exclusionary rule should never even apply. Accordingly,

defendant’s argument on this point does not address the State’s position or

-30-

P.2d at 862; Weaver, 29 Va. App. 487, 513 S.E.2d 423. Second, the

statute sets forth the initial step in the extradition process. Again, that

Chicago police ignored the extradition process in this case does not

constitute a constitutional violation. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine has

established that irregularities in the extradition of a fugitive from

justice for an otherwise constitutional prosecution “affects neither the

guilt nor innocence of the accused, nor the jurisdiction of the court to

try him.” Ker, 110 Ill. at 637, aff’d, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S.

Ct. 225; Frisbie, 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509; MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (“For the

past 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the

manner in which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect the

ability of the government to try him”). In addition to the above, we

note that to the extent that any fundamental rights are implicated by

Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (LexisNexis 1998), they are not the

rights of defendant but the rights of Indiana. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at

89; Ferrell, 218 Neb. at 468, 356 N.W.2d at 872; see also Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 404, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433

(1978) (a party generally may not vicariously asserts the rights of

another when seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule); Alderman v.

United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176, 187, 89 S. Ct.

961, 966-67 (1969) (same).

Considering the exclusionary rule itself, we note that the Supreme

Court has stated that “[s]uppression of evidence *** has always been

our last resort, not our first impulse,” and applied the rule only where

its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial societal costs.1 Hudson,
affect our analysis.

-31-

547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. This court,

in discussing the rule, has stated:

“[T]he exclusionary rule that accompanies the fourth

amendment has no constitutional footing. Instead, it is a

judicially created, prudential remedy that prospectively

protects fourth amendment rights by deterring future police

misconduct [Citations.] Its application has been trimmed to

instances where its remedial objectives will be most effectively

served. [Citation.] That is, it applies only where its deterrent

benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” Willis, 215 Ill.

2d at 531-32.

Indeed, we have recognized that “[t]he State does not violate the

fourth amendment when it introduces evidence obtained in violation

of the fourth amendment. [Citation.] Rather, a fourth amendment

violation is ‘fully accomplished’ by the illegal search or seizure, and

excluding evidence cannot undo the invasion of the defendant’s

rights.” Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 531. As such, in Willis this court refused

to apply the exclusionary rule in a situation where the fourth

amendment was actually violated. See Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517. By

contrast, in this case, there was no constitutional violation and

exclusion is even less warranted. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548

U.S. 331, ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 577, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681 (2006)

(statutory violations only remotely related to the gathering of evidence

do not ordinarily trigger application of the exclusionary rule).

The deterrence benefits/societal costs analysis supports this

position. Here, the Chicago police officers involved were not even

aware that they were in Indiana when they arrested defendant.

Accordingly, the arrest did not involve any police misconduct, willful

disregard for the laws of Indiana or its territorial borders, or false

representations of law designed to improperly obtain evidence.

Additionally, as the Iowa Supreme Court recognized in Dentler, the

benefits of violating another state’s statutory magistrate provision are

so small, any incentive for future violations is low. Dentler, 742

N.W.2d at 90. While applying the exclusionary rule under the facts of

this case would thus have little deterrent effect, it would have
-32-

significant societal costs, as the State has already acknowledged that

without the evidence against defendant, its case against him would be

substantially impaired. As we have stated in the past, the exclusionary

rule laudably secures constitutional rights through its deterrent effect

but “also deflects criminal trials from their basic focus by erecting

barriers between the jury and truthful, probative evidence.” Willis, 215

Ill. 2d at 532. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized the same,

pointing out that its cases have “consistently recognized that

unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals

of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truthfinding functions of judge and jury.” United States v. Payner, 447

U.S. 727, 734, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468, 476, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2445 (1980).

While we choose not to apply the exclusionary rule in this case,

we could elect to utilize it based upon principles of comity. Sadvari,

561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 398-99 (“We find, however, that the

Delaware statute, with its directive that an out-of-state officer present

the arrestee to a Delaware judicial tribunal for review of the

lawfulness of an arrest conducted in Delaware, functions as more than

merely an extradition statute, and that a contrary interpretation would

render empty the mandate of the Delaware law. *** In this instance,

application of the exclusionary rule will serve primarily as a

demonstration of comity to vindicate Delaware’s sovereignty in light

of Pennsylvania’s incursion upon this important state interest”). Not

only has this court long adhered to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, however,

but so has the Indiana Supreme Court. In fact, in Massey v. Indiana,

the Indiana Supreme Court specifically cited both Ker and Frisbie and

stated that “[a] trial court’s jurisdiction does not depend upon the

legality of [defendant’s] arrest or return to the wanting state.” Massey,

267 Ind. at 507, 371 N.E.2d at 705. Accordingly, we do not believe

principles of comity require the application of the exclusionary rule in

this case. Moreover, in light of its long adherence to the Ker-Frisbie

doctrine, we believe it unlikely that the Indiana Supreme Court would

find any differently were it faced with this situation in reverse.

With this opinion, we reaffirm our adherence to the Ker-Frisbie

doctrine. Ker, 110 Ill. at 637, aff’d, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S.

Ct. 225; Frisbie, 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509. This is

not to say, however, that Illinois courts may completely ignore

another state’s statutory scheme providing postarrest procedures for
-33-

defendants who committed crimes within Illinois’ borders. To the

contrary, in such situations courts should inquire into the facts of each

case as well as the extraterritorial statutory provisions at issue.

Indeed, that is exactly what we have done in this case. Based upon the

particular facts and statutory provisions at issue in this case, then, we

will not apply the exclusionary rule. We feel it important to point out,

however, that law enforcement officials should not consider it a

certainty that we will find the exclusionary rule inappropriate under a

different set of facts, particularly in situations involving willful

misconduct. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 90.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the appellate court affirming the

decision of the trial court. We thus reinstate the trial court’s original

determination that defendant’s motion to quash and suppress be

denied and remand the cause to the circuit court for trial.

Reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring:

While the majority correctly reverses the judgment of the appellate

court, it omits any discussion of the appellate court’s reasoning and

fails to explain why that reasoning was in error. I write separately to

do so.

The appellate court provided a straightforward analysis in support

of its decision to affirm the circuit court’s granting of defendant’s

motion to suppress. At the outset, the appellate court noted that there

was no dispute in this case that the Chicago police officers who

arrested defendant in Indiana were in fresh pursuit when they crossed

the state line. The appellate court further noted that section

35–33–3–1 of Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute (Ind. Code Ann.

§35–33–3–1 (Michie 1998)) provides the statutory authority for an

out-of-state officer to effect an arrest in Indiana when the officer is in

fresh pursuit. Section 35–33–3–1 states:

“Any member of a duly organized state, county or

municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in
-34-

fresh pursuit, and continues within [Indiana] in such fresh

pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is

believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall

have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in

custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to

arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is

believed to have committed a felony in this state.” Ind. Code

Ann. §35–33–3–1 (Michie 1998).

The appellate court then observed, however, that the Chicago

officers, in violation of section 35–33–3–2 of the Indiana statute (Ind.

Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998)), failed to bring defendant

before an Indiana judge before returning him to Illinois. Section

35–33–3–2 provides:

“If an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another

state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this

chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person

arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was

made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of

determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge

determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the

person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of

an extradition warrant by the governor of this state. If the

judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall

discharge the person arrested.” Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2

(Michie 1998).

The appellate court concluded, as a matter of statutory interpretation,

that the police officers’ failure to comply with the presentment

requirements of section 35–33–3–2 rendered defendant’s arrest

statutorily invalid. The court explained:

“Chicago police officers had no inherent authority to effect an

arrest in Indiana; rather, the Chicago police officers’ authority

to make an arrest in Indiana was derived from Indiana’s fresh

pursuit statute and the authority provided by the Indiana

statute is conditioned by the requirement that an accused shall

be brought before an Indiana judge for a determination of the

lawfulness of the arrest. Accordingly, under the rationale of

People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447, which we endorse,
-35-

defendant’s arrest was unlawful.” (Emphasis added.) 367 Ill.

App. 3d at 881.

According to the appellate court, the presentment requirement in

section 35–33–3–2 was a condition precedent to the authority granted

in section 35–33–3–1. The failure to comply with the presentment

requirement meant that the officers had no statutory authority to

arrest defendant.

The appellate court then pointed to this court’s decision in People

v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2002), which holds that a police

officer’s right to arrest a person outside his jurisdiction is no greater

than that of a private citizen and “that the exclusionary rule is

applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without

appropriate statutory authority.” See also, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Savage, 430 Mass. 341, 719 N.E.2d 473 (1999) (invoking the

exclusionary rule when an out-of-state officer effected an

extraterritorial arrest without statutory or common law authority).

Because the appellate court had determined that defendant’s arrest

was made without statutory authority, the court applied the rule of

Carrera and affirmed the circuit court’s grant of defendant’s motion

to suppress.

In my view, the appellate court erred in its reading of the Indiana

fresh-pursuit statute and in its conclusion that defendant’s arrest was

statutorily unauthorized. It is a well-settled rule that we may not

depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it

exceptions, limitations, or conditions. People v. Martinez, 184 Ill. 2d

547, 550 (1998). Nothing in the Indiana fresh-pursuit statute states

that the presentment requirement of section 35–33–3–2 conditions the

authority to arrest provided in section 35–33–3–1. Nor does the

statute state that the failure to present a defendant before an Indiana

judge negates the authority to arrest a defendant in fresh pursuit. The

presentment requirement is a procedure to be followed after a

statutorily authorized arrest has been made. See, e.g., State v. Ferrell,

218 Neb. 463, 356 N.W.2d 868 (1984); see also People v. Junco, 70

Misc. 2d 73, 333 N.Y.S.2d 142 (NY. Sup. Ct. 1972) (describing the

condition-precedent argument as an “exotic assertion” that would

impose absolute liability on all inadvertent violations of the

presentment requirement), aff’d, People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419, 321

N.E.2d 875, 363 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1974).
-36-

Of course, having determined that the Chicago police officers

were authorized to arrest defendant, there still remains the entirely

separate question as to whether the exclusionary rule should be

applied when police officers inadvertently fail to comply with the

presentment requirement of section 35–33–3–2. For the reasons stated

by the majority (see slip op. at 27-32), I agree that it should not.

Accordingly, I join in the judgment of the majority.

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:

Unlike the majority, I believe that this case presents a

straightforward question of statutory construction. After examining

the plain language of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute, the comments

of the drafters, and the relevant precedent, I believe that the lower

courts correctly held that application of the exclusionary rule is

appropriate in the matter before us. I therefore dissent.

Indiana has enacted a statutory scheme that sets forth procedures

to be followed when out-of-state law enforcement officers, who are

in “fresh pursuit” of a suspect, arrest that person in Indiana. Ind. Code

Ann. §§35–33–3–1 through 35–33–3–5 (Michie 1998). As a prefatory

note, this statutory scheme abrogated the common law principles

relating to extraterritorial arrests. At common law, a limited exception

developed to the general rule confining the authority of an officer to

a geographic area which allowed an officer who is in “fresh pursuit”

of a suspected felon to make a legally binding arrest in a territorial

jurisdiction other than the one in which he has been appointed to act.

People v. Clark, 46 Ill. App. 3d 240, 242 (1977). The “critical

elements” that characterized a “fresh pursuit” under common law

were its “continuity and immediacy,” and the term “fresh pursuit”

connoted “something more than mere casual following.” 5 Am. Jur.

2d Arrest §72, at 720 (2001), see also N. Lopuszynski, Father

Constitution, Tell the Police to Stay on Their Own Side: Can Extrajurisdictional Arrests Made in Direct Violation of State Law Ever

Cross the Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness” Line?, 53 DePaul L.

Rev. 1347, 1358-59 (Spring 2004) (the focus is upon the “immediacy

and continuousness of the pursuit”). Given that the Indiana legislature

has enacted specific legislation to deal with extraterritorial fresh

pursuit arrests within its borders, the question presented is two-fold:

What does the Indiana statute require and what happens when those
-37-

requirements are not met? Accordingly, the analysis begins with an

examination of the language of the statute.

In construing the meaning of a statute, the court’s primary

objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters

(Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,

503-04 (2000)), the best indicator being the statute’s language (Yang

v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001)). The statutory

language must be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning (In re

Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002)), and, where the

language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without

resort to further aids of statutory construction (In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d

306, 313 (2005)). We will not depart from the plain language of a

statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that

conflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v. Wallach, 198

Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002). Moreover, this court is bound to give meaning

and effect to all the provisions of a statute, and the court must

construe a statute so that no word, clause or sentence, to the extent

that it is possible to do so, is rendered superfluous or meaningless.

Huskey v. Board of Managers of Condominiums of Edelweiss, Inc.,

297 Ill. App. 3d 292, 295 (1998); Walker v. Alton Memorial Hospital

Ass’n, 91 Ill. App. 3d 310 (1980). In construing a statute, we presume

that the enacting body did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or

injustice. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40

(2001). In addition, we view all provisions of an enactment as a

whole. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). Accordingly,

words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant

provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation.

Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504.

Section 35–33–3–1 of Indiana’s statute bestows limited authority

upon the police officer of another state to arrest an individual in

Indiana, and specifically sets forth the circumstances under which a

non-Indiana officer may enter that state and make an arrest:

“Any member of a duly organized state, county or

municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in

fresh pursuit, and continues within [Indiana] in such fresh

pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is

believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall

have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in
 

2

I note that in the circuit court, defendant raised in his motion to vacate

the denial of his motion to suppress the argument that, based upon the

testimony of Officer Luce, “prior to the defendant’s arrest at the [Indiana]

toll booth the police officers rejected multiple convenient opportunities to

arrest the defendant” while he was still in Illinois, and that the “officers

themselves chose both the time and place to arrest defendant.” The circuit

court, however, did not have occasion to address defendant’s contention that

the officers were not engaged in “fresh pursuit” of him in its factual findings,

as the State conceded in the trial court that the arrest took place in Indiana

and the Chicago officers did not follow the mandates of the Indiana statute.

Having prevailed on the suppression motion in the circuit court, defendant

has not pursued this argument on appeal. Although I do not express an

opinion as to the merits of defendant’s argument with respect to whether the

Chicago officers were actually in “fresh pursuit” of him at the time the arrest

was made, I do note that a review of Officer Luce’s testimony at the

suppression hearing indicates that the officers may have had ample

opportunity to stop defendant in Illinois, including when defendant parked for

a minute at the side of the road near the Burley Avenue address and also

after he made what Luce described as an “illegal” U-turn in that same area.

It would have been interesting to see how the Indiana court would have ruled

on this argument, had the officers complied with the statute and the Indiana

-38-

custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to

arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is

believed to have committed a felony in this state.” Ind. Code

Ann. §35–33–3–1 (Michie 1998).

The plain language of section 35–33–3–1 reveals that the Indiana

statute provides authority to an out-of-state law enforcement officer

to make an arrest in Indiana, so long as that officer enters Indiana in

“fresh pursuit” of that suspect. The statute defines “fresh pursuit” in

three ways: as it was “defined by the common law,” as “the pursuit of

a person who has committed a felony or who reasonably is suspected

of having committed a felony,” or “the pursuit of a person suspected

of having committed a supposed felony, though no felony actually has

been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a

felony has been committed.” Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–5 (Michie

1998). The statute further instructs that “[f]resh pursuit shall not

necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable

delay.”2 Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–5 (Michie 1998).
court had the opportunity to hear the case.

-39-

Thus, the Indiana law carves out a limited, statutory exception to

the common law general rule that a police officer acting within his

official capacity cannot make a warrantless arrest outside the

territorial limits of the jurisdiction from which his authority is derived.

See, e.g., Kindred v. Stitt, 51 Ill. 401, 409 (1869) (at common law,

municipal peace officers had no authority to make a warrantless arrest

outside of the political entity in which they held office); 2 W. La Fave,

J. Israel, N. King & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure §3.5, at 203 (3d ed.

2007), citing People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992). In other words,

the authority of an out-of-state officer to make an extraterritorial

arrest in Indiana is gained only through the grace of Indiana through

operation of its statute.

The Indiana statute additionally departs from common law by

setting forth with specificity not only the steps that must be taken by

an out-of-state police officer after he makes an arrest within Indiana,

but also those which must subsequently be taken by the Indiana court.

Section 35–33–3–2 provides:

“If an arrest is made in [Indiana] by an officer of another

state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this

chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person

arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was

made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of

determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge

determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the

person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of

an extradition warrant by the governor of [Indiana]. If the

judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall

discharge the person arrested.” (Emphasis added.) Ind. Code

Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998).

Thus, the Indiana legislature conditioned an out-of-state officer’s

authority to make an extraterritorial arrest in Indiana upon the

officer’s compliance with the dictate that the officer “shall, without

unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the

county in which the arrest was made.” (Emphasis added.) Ind. Code

Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998). The use of the word “shall”
-40-

generally indicates a mandatory requirement. See, e.g., Village of

Winfield v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 64

(1997). The Indiana statute in no uncertain terms requires the out-ofstate officer to take the arrestee before an Indiana judge as soon as

possible after the arrest. Once that person is brought before the judge,

the statute further requires the judge to conduct a hearing “for the

purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest.” Ind. Code Ann.

§35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998). The statute then specifies two subsequent

options, based upon the outcome of the judicial hearing. If the judge

determines that the arrest was lawful, the judge is required to “commit

the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an

extradition warrant by the governor of [Indiana].” Ind. Code Ann.

§35–33–3–2 (Michie 1998). If, however, the judge determines that the

extraterritorial arrest was unlawful, the statute requires that the judge

“shall discharge the person arrested.” Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2

(Michie 1998).

Under the plain language of the Indiana statute, the question of

whether the officer has made the arrest in fresh pursuit is only the

threshold inquiry. The arrest is dependent upon the subjective belief

of the arresting officer that there is probable cause that the person

committed a criminal offense. The officer’s subjective belief is then

tested when the facts and circumstances of the encounter are

presented to an objective, neutral magistrate. It is only when this

magistrate determines that the arrest is lawful that the extraterritorial

arrest is deemed complete. This “presentment requirement” is a

statutory procedure that did not exist at common law. The

requirement advances several important interests. It promotes comity

and ensures that the sovereignty of the state entered into by outside

officers is preserved; it protects the rights of a person who has been

subject to an extraterritorial arrest; and it encourages future

compliance with the statutory provisions. Thus, the presentment

requirement is an important component of a statutory scheme

designed to balance the interests of law enforcement with the rights of

the arrestee. It is only by giving meaning to all provisions of the fresh

pursuit statute that this balance can be achieved. This interpretation of

Indiana’s fresh pursuit statute ensures that no provision is rendered

superfluous.
 

3

I note that Illinois also has a “fresh pursuit” statute which is derived

from the Uniform Act and which, like Indiana’s statute, allows an out-ofstate law enforcement officer who is in fresh pursuit of a suspect to arrest

that person in Illinois as long as the officer “without unnecessary delay

takes[s] the person arrested before the circuit court of the county in which the

arrest was made” so that the court can “conduct a hearing for the purpose of

determining the lawfulness of the arrest.” 725 ILCS 5/107–4 (West 2006).

-41-

My reading of the Indiana statute is supported by an examination

of the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit of

Criminals Across State Lines (Uniform Act), from which the Indiana

statute was derived.3 The Uniform Act was drafted in the mid-1930s

by the Interstate Commission on Crime, with the purpose to “prevent

criminals from utilizing state lines to handicap police in their

apprehension.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on

Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978). In order to advance this goal,

the Uniform Act addressed the realities faced by law enforcement

officers engaging in the fresh pursuit of suspects across state lines:

“In the foreign state, the pursuing officer from the State where

the crime is committed is, in general, no longer an officer. This

*** is remedied in a simple manner by this act. Thereunder,

the moment an officer in fresh pursuit of a criminal crosses a

state line, the state he enters will authorize him to catch and

arrest such criminal within its bounds. The statute grants this

right only when the officer is in fresh pursuit of a criminal, that

is, pursuit without unreasonable delay, by a member of a duly

organized peace unit, and only in cases of felonies or supposed

felonies occurring outside the boundaries of the state adopting

the act. It is thus based upon the little-known common-law

doctrine of fresh pursuit, from which the statute has derived

its name.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on

Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978).

The drafters of the Uniform Act thus believed that the Act would be

of benefit to police officers, because although it was “declaratory of

the common law,” it also clearly informed the officers “of their right

to cross a state boundary and make an arrest in fresh pursuit.” Council

of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control

147 (1978).
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The Uniform Act, however, was also intended to be of similar

benefit to the person arrested under its provisions. The drafters noted

that the Act “protects the rights of the person taken into custody, by

providing that he shall without unnecessary delay be given a hearing

before a magistrate, and requires his extradition if the arrest was

lawful.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate

Crime Control 150 (1978). In other words, in the Uniform Act

“[s]imple provisions are made to safeguard the rights of the arrested

person and to provide for his return to the state where he committed

the crime.” Council of State Governments, The Handbook on

Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978). Thus, it is apparent that the

drafters of the Uniform Act intended to delicately balance the

competing interests of law enforcement in allowing extraterritorial

arrests with the rights of the state in which the arrest occurred and the

rights of the person taken into custody. Accordingly, based upon a

straightforward interpretation of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute, it is

my conclusion that because the Chicago officers failed to comply with

that statute’s provisions, defendant’s extraterritorial arrest was made

without statutory authorization.

The majority, however, not only fails to construe Indiana’s fresh

pursuit statute, but also fails to answer the question of whether

defendant’s arrest was unauthorized due to the Chicago officers’

noncompliance with the Indiana statute. Instead, the majority skips

over this necessary analysis and concludes that the exclusionary rule

is not an appropriate remedy for the officers’ noncompliance with the

fresh pursuit statute. The majority’s treatment of the issue renders the

presentment provisions of the Indiana statute superfluous and a

nullity. It is only when the Indiana statutory scheme is properly

understood that the importance of the need for the application of the

exclusionary rule for its violation becomes apparent.

Like the majority and the special concurrence, I acknowledge that

the Indiana statute on fresh pursuit is silent as to the remedy for its

violation. However, this question has been addressed by courts in

other jurisdictions. Some courts have been unwilling to invoke the

exclusionary rule as a remedy to an unlawful extraterritorial arrest.

See, e.g., State v. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 2007); State v.

Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 468, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1984). Other

courts, however, have found that the exclusionary rule is the
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appropriate remedy to apply. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 380

A.2d 598 (D.C. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Savage, 430 Mass.

341, 719 N.E.2d 473 (1999); Commonwealth v. Sadvari, 561 Pa. 588,

752 A.2d 393 (2000). The leading case adopting this latter position is

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Sadvari, which I find

to be persuasive.

In Sadvari, two Pennsylvania state troopers, while on patrol near

the Pennsylvania-Delaware border, observed a vehicle driven by the

defendant, a Delaware resident, which was speeding. The troopers

pursued the vehicle and, shortly after crossing into Delaware, they

activated their emergency lights and stopped the defendant

approximately four-tenths of a mile inside the State of Delaware.

Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 590, 752 A.2d at 394. Subsequently, the

defendant was asked to perform field sobriety tests, which he failed.

He was then arrested for drunk driving by the Pennsylvania officers

and was transported to a Pennsylvania hospital where blood samples

were drawn for chemical testing. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d

at 394.

Prior to trial, Sadvari moved to suppress evidence related to the

traffic stop as the product of an unlawful arrest. According to the

defendant, his arrest was unlawful because it was not conducted in

accordance with Delaware’s fresh pursuit statute. The trial court

found that the Pennsylvania officers had probable cause to stop

Sadvari and that the Delaware statute granted them authority to enter

Delaware while in fresh pursuit and conduct an arrest. Sadvari, 561

Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d at 395. While the trial court agreed that, under

the relevant provisions of the Delaware statute, the defendant should

have been taken before a Delaware judge, it viewed this requirement

simply as an extradition provision and denied Sadvari’s suppression

motion. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 593, 752 A.2d at 396. The Pennsylvania

appellate court affirmed. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 593, 752 A.2d at 396.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. That court first noted

that, as is the case with the Indiana statute in the instant appeal, the

Delaware statute also derived from the Uniform Act on the Fresh

Pursuit of Criminals Across State Lines. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752

A.2d at 398. The court held that the trial court’s conclusion that the

Delaware statute did not require a justice of the peace to determine

whether the arresting officer complied with the Delaware statute was
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in error. The Delaware statute–as does the Indiana statute in the case

before us–plainly required the justice of the peace to “determine the

lawfulness of the arrest,” and the court observed that there was no

authority for a uniformed Pennsylvania trooper in a marked police

cruiser to effectuate an extraterritorial arrest in Delaware other than

the Delaware fresh pursuit statute. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d

at 398. Accordingly, to comply with the mandate of the statute to

evaluate the lawfulness of an arrest, a Delaware tribunal was required

to assess the arresting officers’ compliance with the statute. However,

because the officers did not comply with the condition imposed upon

their authority under the Delaware statute–which required them to

bring Sadvari before a Delaware justice of the peace–the court found

the arrest to be illegal. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398.

The Sadvari court then considered the appropriate remedy for the

statutory violation and concluded that suppression of the evidence

obtained as a result of the unlawful arrest was warranted. The court

conceded that not every violation of a statute or rule requires

suppression. On the one hand, the court observed that it could be

argued that the Delaware statute merely duplicated the framework

provided by Pennsylvania law and its procedural rules for safeguarding

a defendant’s constitutional rights; therefore, in individual cases a

remedy as exacting as suppression should not be deemed necessary.

The court found, however, that the Delaware statute, with its directive

that an out-of-state officer present the arrestee to a Delaware judicial

tribunal for review of the lawfulness of an arrest conducted in

Delaware, “functions as more than merely an extradition statute, and

that a contrary interpretation would render empty the mandate of the

Delaware law.” Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398-99. The

court noted that under its prior state jurisprudence, the exclusionary

rule had previously been employed to ensure the orderly

administration of justice where a police officer acted without

authority, even in cases in which constitutional rights were not at the

forefront. In this instance, the court determined that application of the

exclusionary rule served several different and important interests: “as

a demonstration of comity to vindicate Delaware’s sovereignty in light

of Pennsylvania’s incursion upon this important state interest,” as a

means “to encourage future compliance with Delaware’s procedures,”
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and also to “safeguard the individual right to be free of unlawful

seizures.” Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 399.

As stated, I find the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reasoning and

holding in Sadvari to be persuasive. Its analysis most closely mirrors

the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act and is true to the

language of the statute by giving each provision meaning. The Sadvari

decision also highlights the several important interests that are affected

by operation of the fresh pursuit statute: a demonstration of comity to

vindicate the sovereignty of the state that has experienced the

incursion of out-of-state officers; encouragement of future compliance

with the provisions of the statute; and the protection of a defendant’s

rights to due process and to be free from unlawful seizures. It is my

view that Sadvari appropriately balances these important interests

against the similarly important interest in furthering legitimate law

enforcement objectives in allowing extraterritorial arrests, and arrives

at the correct result.

However, although Sadvari is factually analogous to the matter

before us, and is relied upon by defendant in his arguments to this

court and by the appellate court in its opinion below, neither the

majority nor the special concurrence discuss why Sadvari is not

persuasive. Instead, the majority states that it finds the analysis in

Dentler “particularly instructive” (slip op. at 27), and the special

concurrence joins in this assessment. I note, however, that Dentler is

factually distinguishable from the matter at bar, and that this factual

difference played a significant role in that court’s analysis as to

whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. In Dentler, Iowa

police officers pursued the defendant into Missouri, but, while in

pursuit, also notified the Missouri authorities and requested their

assistance in apprehending the suspect. Two Missouri law

enforcement officers came to the scene of the arrest and engaged in a

discussion with the Iowa officers as to which jurisdiction would retain

the defendant. According to the court’s opinion, “The Missouri

deputies advised [the Iowa officers], ‘Well you can keep

[defendant].’ ” Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 86. In addition, the court

noted that it was undisputed that Dentler was thereafter promptly

taken before an Iowa judge. In holding that the exclusionary rule was

not an appropriate remedy under the facts presented, the Dentler

court noted that “it [was] undisputed that the Missouri officers on the
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scene acquiesced to the action. While such acquiescence by state law

enforcement officials may not give rise to waiver or estoppel as a

matter of law, it is a factor that militates against the need for

application of the exclusionary rule.” Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. The

facts in Dentler are inapposite to those at bar. In the matter before us,

the Chicago officers made no contact with Indiana law enforcement

officials during the arrest of defendant on Indiana soil. In addition, I

note that rather than taking defendant before an Indiana magistrate, as

required under the provisions of the statute, the Chicago officers

instead transported defendant back across the state line to Illinois, and

then took him to his mother’s residence on Burley Avenue. The

officers thereupon conducted–according to their testimony–a

“consent” search of the home in conjunction with their narcotics

investigation of defendant. It was only after the officers conducted a

systematic search of these premises and discovered additional

evidence to be used in their prosecution of defendant that they

transported defendant to the police station and he was brought before

an Illinois magistrate. Accordingly, I find Dentler to be unpersuasive

for a number of reasons: it is factually distinguishable from the matter

at bar, and it does not speak to the intent of the drafters of the

Uniform Act, from which the statute at issue in that case was derived.

Further, and perhaps more importantly, support for my position is

found in our own, well-settled, state jurisprudence. Almost 30 years

ago, our appellate court in People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447

(1979), addressed a situation factually similar to the matter now

before us. In Jacobs, Illinois police officers in fresh pursuit of the

defendant arrested him inside the State of Iowa for his alleged

commission of robbery and murder. As in the present matter, the

Illinois police officers failed to comply with the presentment

provisions of Iowa’s fresh pursuit law. Jacobs held that the

extraterritorial arrest of defendant was illegal because the Illinois

officers “had no authority to arrest him in the State of Iowa except for

that authority granted to them by the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of

the State of Iowa.” Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449. The court held the

arrest to be illegal, and the defendant’s statements were suppressed as

the fruits of an illegal arrest. The court reasoned:

“The defendant was indeed illegally arrested since the

Illinois police officers had no authority to arrest him in the
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State of Iowa except for that authority granted to them by the

Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of the State of Iowa. [Citations.]

***

***

*** [The statute] mandates that an out-of-State police

officer, after effecting an arrest, shall without unnecessary

delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the

county in which the arrest was made, who shall conduct a

hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the

arrest. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was lawful,

he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable

time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor.

[Citation.]

None of the mandates set forth in the Uniform Fresh

Pursuit Law of Iowa were complied with by the arresting

officers from Illinois. They were both blithely and summarily

ignored and the defendant immediately upon his return to

Illinois was subjected to intensive interrogation.” Jacobs, 67

Ill. App. 3d at 449-50.

I find the reasoning in Jacobs to be persuasive and note that this

case has been law in this state for nearly three decades. I also observe

that the failure of the officers in Jacobs to bring the defendant before

an Iowa magistrate immediately following his arrest allowed the

Illinois officers to return the defendant to Illinois and to conduct an

immediate and lengthy interrogation in which they were able to gather

additional evidence against the defendant prior to taking him before

an Illinois judge. This factual scenario mirrors that in the matter at bar,

where the officers returned defendant to Illinois and, rather than

taking him before an Illinois judge, first took a detour to the home of

defendant’s mother and engaged in a “consent” search of those

premises in an effort to gather additional evidence against defendant

prior to taking him before an Illinois judge.

I further note that the fact that it has been nearly three decades

since our courts have been presented with an issue similar to that in

Jacobs underscores that the reasoning and holding in that case offered

a workable and effective procedure to be followed by officers making

an extraterritorial, fresh pursuit arrest. To be blunt, to date, interstate
-48-

extraterritorial arrests have not been a problem in Illinois. Clearly,

then, Jacobs has been well understood by law enforcement officers,

who have been cognizant of the state boundaries of their authority and

of the consequences of attempting to exercise that authority outside

the Illinois state line without complying with a sister state’s statutory

provisions. One thus could argue that society has already benefitted

(see slip op. at 31) in Illinois from the uniform, 30-year application of

the exclusionary rule to cases such as this. The court does not explain

how its result today provides additional societal benefit.

I note that, although factually not directly on point, this court in

People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1 (2002), upheld the suppression of

evidence obtained by police during the course of an unlawful,

extraterritorial arrest. In Carrera, Chicago police officers arrested the

defendant in Franklin Park, Illinois, relying upon an Illinois statute that

permitted intrastate extraterritorial arrests but which was, subsequent

to the defendant’s arrest, held to be unconstitutional on the basis that

it was part of a public act that was passed in violation of the singlesubject rule. In holding that defendant’s suppression motion had been

properly granted, this court first looked to its prior decision in People

v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992), wherein the court suppressed

evidence obtained during the course of an extraterritorial arrest.

Carrera then held that the statute upon which the police relied to

effect the arrest was void ab initio due to its inclusion in a public act

that was found to violate the single-subject rule, and, therefore, the

police had no statutory authority to arrest the defendant. This court

concluded that “Illinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is

applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without

appropriate statutory authority.” Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11.

 In support of its holding that defendant’s arrest should not be

quashed nor the evidence against him suppressed, the majority

engages in a quick and summary disposal of defendant’s reliance upon

Jacobs, Lahr, and Carrera. The majority states that the “cases

defendant cites do not settle this case as a matter of law” (emphasis

added) (slip op. at 25), but then attempts to factually distinguish the

cases from that at bar. With respect to Carrera the opinion states:

“In Carrera, the defendant was arrested by police officers

utilizing a statute that was later declared void ab initio.
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[Citation.] Accordingly, this court held that the defendant’s

arrest was unlawful.” Slip op. at 25.

This is the sum and substance of the majority’s factual distinction of

Carrera from the matter at bar. I believe that this is a distinction

which fails. The fact that the statute at issue in Carrera was void ab

initio was not what animated this court to hold that “Illinois law is

settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police

effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory

authority.” Rather, this court relied on its prior decision in Lahr,

which had already established this proposition. In addition, it was the

fact that the officers were acting without legal authority–just as

alleged in the case at bar–that controlled the result in Carrera.

In sum, courts of this state have long used the exclusionary rule to

protect the rights of defendants outside of the constitutional context.

To hold as the majority does today renders the provisions of Indiana’s

fresh pursuit statute a nullity. The majority fails to adhere to the

familiar tenets of statutory construction: it fails to afford plain

meaning to the language of the Indiana statute; it fails to adhere to the

intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act; it fails to afford appropriate

recognition to the principles of comity to vindicate Indiana’s

sovereignty; it fails to safeguard the protections intended to be

afforded to defendants by the statute; and it fails to follow our own

precedent. In rendering the provisions of the Indiana fresh pursuit

statute superfluous, the majority leaves the distinct impression that

Illinois law enforcement officers may freely disregard statutory limits

on their jurisdiction with no adverse consequences. In light of the fact

that Illinois has enacted a similar fresh pursuit statute, I question

whether out-of-state officers who make an extraterritorial arrest on

our own soil would feel compelled to comply with the provisions of

the Illinois statute after today’s decision. More importantly, would an

Indiana court feel compelled to follow the dictates of the Illinois

General Assembly, when this court so freely ignores the will of the

Indiana legislature?

For all the foregoing reasons, I cannot join the opinion of the

majority.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.