F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

E U G E N E S C A L I A , Secretary

of L abor, U.S. Department of L a

b or, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

.

E M P L O Y E R S O L

U T I O N S S T A F F I

N G G R O U P , L L C, a limited liability
company ; E M P L O Y E R S O L U T I O N S S T A F F I N G G R O U P I I
, L L C, a limited liability company ; E M P L O Y E R S O L U T I O N S S T A F F I

N G G R O U P I I I
, L L C, a limited liability company ; E M P L O Y E R S O L

U T I O N S S T A F F I

N G G R O U P I V
, L L C, a limited liability
company , Defendants-Appellants. N o. 18-16493

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02916- ROS

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Rosly n O. Silver, District J udg e, Presiding

A rg ued and Submitted F ebruary 3, 2020 Phoenix , Ariz o na

F iled March 2, 2020S C A L I A V

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B efore: Susan P. Graber, Andrew D. Hurwitz
,

and Eric D. Miller, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J udg e Graber

SUMMARY *

F air Labor Standards Act

The panel affirmed the d istrict court’s summary judg ment entered in favor of the Sec r et a ry o f L abor in an action challeng ing four companies’ f a i l ure to pay overtime to employ e es who worked more than 40 hours in a workweek in violation of the F air L abor Standards Act (“F L SA”).

Employ er Solu t ions Staffing Companies (“ESSG”)

co n tracts with other companies to recruit employ ees a nd place them at jobsites for which ESSG handled a dministrat ive tasks. ESSG c onceded that it qualified as an “empl oy er” o f the recruited employ ees under F L SA. ESSG contracted with Sy nc Staff ing
, which placed the recruited employ ees a t a jobsite run by TB G L og istic s

. One of ESSG’s employ ees, Michaela Haluptz ok, was responsible for processing the TB G L ogi s t i c s p ay

roll. A Sy

nc employ ee told Haluptz ok to pay overtime hours as “reg

ular” hours, which w a s a F L SA violation.

Consistent with the law of ag ency , the pane l imputed Haluptz o k ’s actions to ESSG. The panel held that because

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.S C A L I A V

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Haluptz ok admitted that she k new the recr

u i ted employ ees

were not being paid overtime owed to them, the district court correctly found no dispute of material fact as t o ESSG’s ultimate liability

under the F L SA.

O rdinarily
, a two-y ear statute of limitations applies to

c l aims under F L SA, but f or a “willful violation,” th e limitations period ex tends to three y ears. The panel held that throug h its ag ent, Haluptz ok
, E SSG recklessly disreg arded the possibility that it was violating F L SA. According ly
, t he three-y ear statute of limit a tions applied to the Secretary ’s claim, making the action timely

.

F L SA mand a t e s liquidated damag es in an amount equal
to the unpaid overtime compensation claims unless the employ e r acted in “g o od faith” and had “reasonable g rounds”
to believe it was not violating F L SA. Th e p a n el held that because ESSG’s violations were willfu l
, i t could not have acted in g ood faith. According ly
, the p a n e l affirmed the award of liquidated damag es.

The panel held that there was no indication that Cong ress intended to create a rig ht to contribution or indemnification for liable e mploy ers from a n other employ er under F L SA. The panel further h eld that no rig ht to contribution o r indemnification arose under federal common law.S C A L I A V

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COUNSEL

Michael R. Shebelskie ( a

r g u e d )
, H unton A ndrews Kurth L L P, Richmond, Virg inia; Rebecca J

. L evine, Rebecca L e vine L aw PL L C, Edina, Minnesota; for Defendants-Appellants.

Kately n J

. Poe (argu e d ), Attorney ; Paul L

. F rieden, Counsel for Appellate L itig ation ; J ennifer S. B rand, Associate Solicitor; Kate S. O’Scannlain, Solicitor of L abo r ; United States Department of L a

b or, W ashing ton, D.C.; for PlaintiffAppellee.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:
Employ er Solution s Staffing Group and three r elated companies (collectively
, “ESSG”) 1 appeal from the summary judg ment entered in favor of the Secretary of L abor in this action challeng ing E SSG’s failure to p ay overtime to employ e es who worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, in violati o n of the F air L abor Standards Act of 1938 (“F L SA”), 29 U.S.C. § § 2 0 1 –219. ESSG also disputes the dismissal of its cross-c l a i m s ag a inst other defendants below for indemnification or contribution. W e affirm.

B ACKGROUND

ESSG, a staffing company , contracts with other companies to recruit employ ees and place them at jobsites for

1 Fo u r related co m

p an ies w ith n early id en tical n am es are def en d an ts h ere; th ey u su ally ref er to th em selv es u sin g th e sin g u lar “ ESSG.”S C A L I A V

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which ESSG h andles administrative tasks, s u ch as pay roll processing

. ESSG concedes that it qualifies as an “employ e r” of the recruited employ e es under the F L SA, 2 9 U

. S .C. § 203(d).

I n 2012, ESSG contracted with Sy nc Staffin g, which placed the r ecrui t e d e mploy ees a t a jobsite run by TB G L og istics, where the employ ees unloaded deliveries for a g rocery store. TB G maintained a spreadsheet o f t he employ e es’ h ours. F or each pay p eriod in November 2 0 12

an d t h e r eafter, TB G sent the spreadsheet to Sy n c, which forwarded it to ESSG.

Only one o f E S S G ’ s e m

p l o y ees, Michaela Haluptz o k, was responsible for processing the TB G p a y r o ll. ESSG trained Haluptz ok on the F L SA’s r equirements. The f i r st time that Haluptz ok received one of the spreadsheets, she prepared a nd

s e n t to Sy

nc a report showing that e mploy ees who h ad worked more than 4 0 hours per w eek would receive overtime
pay for th ose hours. B ut when a Sy nc employ ee called Haluptz ok and told her—without ex plaining why this action would be a

ppropriate—to p a

y a ll o f the hours as “ r e gu lar hours” instead of overtime, Haluptz ok complied.

To follow the Sy

nc employ ee’s instructions, Haluptz ok had to dismiss numerou s e rror messag es from Defendant’s
pay roll software. Haluptz o k understood that n ot pay ing overtime for the qualify ing employ ees trig g ered the error messag es, but she disreg arded the messag es any wa y

. After processing h er first spreadsheet in this manner, Haluptz ok did the same thing f

or every future spreads heet. ESSG’s relationship with TB G and Sy nc ended o n J uly 27, 2014; by
t h a t date, more than 1,000 violations had occurred in which employ e es did not receive their earned overtime pay

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The Secretary sued ESSG, TB G, Sy nc, and an o ther
company in Aug ust 2016, more than two y ears after the final overtime violation o ccurred. ESSG b roug ht cross-claims for contribution or indemnification a g ainst the other d e fendants. The district court dismissed those c laims under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court als o denied Defendant’s motion to file a third-party complaint seeking contribution from a g rocery store where some recruited employ e es worked. The Secretary reached consent judg ments with the other companies, so only ESSG remained in the case when the Secretary moved for summary judg ment. The d istrict court g ra n ted the Secretary ’s motion, held that ESSG had violated the F L SA willfully
, and ordered ESSG to pay approx imately $78,500 in unpaid overtime wag es plus an equal amount in liquidated damag es.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

W e review de novo a g r ant of summary judg ment. F lores

v. City of San Gabriel
, 824 F .3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2016). W e also review de novo “the application of leg al principles to established f

acts.” Id. at 905. F i n ally
, w e review de n o vo a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). F ields v. Twitter, I

n c. , 881 F .3d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2018).

D I SCUSSI ON

W e first address ESSG’s arg uments that it cannot be liable fo r t h e actions of a low-level employ ee such a s Haluptz ok and that, reg ardless, any F L SA violations were not willful and instead occurred in g ood faith. W e t hen discuss whether the F L SA allows a lia b l e e m ploy er to seek indemnification or contribution from other employ ers.S C A L I A V

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A. Liability

Haluptz ok k

new that the relevant empl o y e e s were working more than 40 hour s p er w eek without r eceiving overtime pay

. ESSG chose Haluptz ok as its ag ent for pay roll processing
, so it cannot disavow her actions merely because she lacked a specific job title or a certain level of seniority in the company

. S

ee U nited States v. G raf

, 610 F .3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (“As an inanimate entity , a corporation must
act throug h ag ents.” (quoting C F TC v

. W eintraub
, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985))); see also Re s tatement (Third) o f Ag ency § 1.01 ( d efining “ag ent” as one who “ act[ s] on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control ” )

. A llowing ESSG to evad e liability simply because none of its “supervisors” or “mana gers” processed the pay roll would
create a loophole in the F L SA and run c o unter to the statute’s purpose of “protect [ i n g ] a ll covered w orkers from subs tandard wag es and oppressive working hours.” W illiamson v

. Gen. Dynamics Corp.
, 208 F .3d 114 4
, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the law of ag e n cy , we impute Haluptz o k’s actions to ESSG. B ecause H aluptz ok a dmitted that she knew the recruited employ ees w ere not b eing pai d o v e r time owed
to them, the district court correctly found n o d ispute o f material fact as to ESSG’s ultimate liability u nder the F L SA. See Forrester v. Roth’s I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc.
, 646 F

. 2d 413, 414 (9th Cir. 1 981) ( “[ A] n e mploy er who knows or should ha v e known that an employ ee is or was working overtime
must comply with the provisions of [ 29 U.S.C. § ] 207[ ( a)] .”).

B

. W illfulness

Ordinarily
, a two-y ear st a t ute o f limitations applies to claims under the F L SA. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Bu t f o r aS C A L I A V

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“willful violatio n ,” the limitations period ex tends to three
y ears. Id. B ecause the Secretary sued ESSG more than two
y ears after the last v iolation, ESSG must have acted willfully for this action to be timely

.

A violation is willful when “the employ er either k new o r showed reckless dis r e ga r d for

. . . whether its conduct was prohibited by the [ F L SA. ] ” M cLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.
, 486 U .S. 128
, 1 3 3 ( 1 988). F or more than a y ear, Haluptz ok dismissed the pay roll s o f t w a r e ’ s r e p e a t e d w a r ning s that e mploy ees mig ht not b e receiving earned ov e r t i m e pay

. Al t h o u gh she (at least initially ) a cted on Sy nc’s instructions
not to pay o vertime, she never r eceived any ex planation from Sy nc that justified dismissing the software’s error messag es. Thus, throug h its ag ent, ESSG recklessly “disreg arded the

v e r y p o ssibility that it was violating the statute.” Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.
, 339 F .3d 894, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 According ly
, the three-y e ar statute of limitations applies to the Secretary ’s claim, making this action timely

.

C. Liquidated Damages

The F L SA mandates liquidated damag es in a n amount

e q ual to the unpaid overtime compensation unless a n employ e r acted in “g ood f aith” and had “reasonable g rounds”

2 ESSG q u estio n s w

h eth er o u r d ecisio n in Alva rez co m p orts w ith th e

“ reck less d isreg ard ” stan d ard set f o rth in Ric h l a n d S

h o e

. S ee Flo res v. City o f S an Ga b riel
, 8 2 4 F.3 d 8 9 0
, 90 7– 0 8 (9 th

. Cir. 2 0 1 6 ) ( O w e n s, J
., co n cu rrin g ). Of co u

rse, w e are n o t f

ree to rev isit Alva rez

. S

ee Miller v. Ga mmie
, 3 3 5 F.3 d 88 9
, 89 2

– 9 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 03 ) (en b an c). In an y ev en t, b ased o n Halu

p tzo k ’ s ad m issio n s, w e h av e little tro u b le co n clu di n g t h at ESSG reck lessly d isreg ard ed its o b lig atio n s u n d er th e FSL A ev en u n der th e strictest read i n g o f Rich la n d S ho e

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to believe that it wa s not violating the F L SA. 29 U .S.C. §§ 216(b), 260. B ecause E SSG’s vi o l a t i o ns w ere willful, it could n ot have acted in g ood faith. See Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc. , 346 F .3d 908, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[ A] finding of g ood faith is plainly inconsistent with a finding o f willfulness.”).

ESSG insists that an employ er can act in g o od faith while willfully violating the F L SA. B u t, as a three-judg e panel we cannot overrule Chao in the absence of interveni n g e n b anc

or S u preme Court precedent. M iller v. Gammie
, 335 F .3d 889, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). I ndeed, Chao alig ns

w i t h p recedent in most other circuits that have reached the issue. See Alvarez Perez v. Sanf o r d

- Orlando Kennel Club, Inc.
, 515 F .3d 1150, 1166 ( 1 1th Ci r

. 2008) (ag reeing with Chao
, joining “ t h e majority side of the circuit split on this i s s u e ,” and collecting cases). Thus, we affirm the award o f liquidated damag es.

D. Indemnification/Contribution

The F L SA’s tex t does n ot ex p r e s s l y address whether an employ e r may seek ind e m n i fication or contribution from another employ e r, but E SSG contends that the statute implicitly permits those remedies. A lternatively
, ESSG a sks us to recog niz e those remedies under federal common law.

1. W h e t h e r t h e F

L S A I m p l i c i t l y A l l o w s Indemnification or Contribution

“I n determining whether a federal statute that d oes not

ex p ressly provide for a p a r ticular private rig ht of action nonetheless impli c i tly created that rig ht, our task is o ne o f statutory construction.” Nw. Airlines, I nc. v. Transp. W

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Union
, 4 51 U.S. 77, 91 (1981). W e must ascertain “whether Cong r ess intended to create the pr i v a t e r e m e dy

— for ex ample,

a rig ht to contribution—that the [ litig ant] s e eks to invoke.” Id. I n recent decades, the Supreme Court has adopted a “cautious c ourse before finding implied causes of action.” Ziglar v. A bbasi
, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 ( 2017). F our f actors g uide our inquiry : (1) the statute’s tex t; (2) “the underly ing
purpos e a

nd structure of the statutory scheme”; (3) “the likelihood that Cong ress intended to supersede or to supplement ex isting state remedies”; a nd ( 4) the s t a tute’s leg islative history

. Nw. Airlines
, 451 U.S. at 91; accord Tex. Indu s

. , Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.
, 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981).

ESSG larg ely ig nores the relevant f actors and arg ues that, be ca u s e employ ers face joint and several liability under the F L SA, they necessarily must have a r ig ht to seek contribution from one another. Defendant emphasiz e s 29 C.F .R. § 791.2 (2019), whi c h p r ovides that “all joint employ ers a re responsible, b oth individually and joi n t l y , for compliance with all of the applicable p rovisions o f t h e act.” A newer, not-y et-effective version of this r eg ulation refers ex pressly to joint and several liability : “[ A] joint e mploy er is jointly a nd severally liable with

. . . any other joint e m p l o y e rs for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the Act.” Id. (2020). 3 O f course, the reg ulation does not clarify w h at Cong r ess intended when it enacted the F L SA in 193 8 ; i t provides only t h e Secretary ’s c urrent interpretation of the F L SA.

B u t the Supreme Court has rejected the arg ument that joint a nd several liability alway s g oes hand-in-hand with

3 T h e n ew er v ersio n

tak es ef f ect o n March 1 6 , 2 0 2 0

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contribution. See Tex. I

ndus.
, 451 U.S. at 646 (“Nor does the judicial det e r mination that defendants should be jointly a nd severally liable su g g est that courts also may order contribution
, s ince joint and several liability simply ensures tha t the plaintiffs will be a ble to recover the full amount o f d a m a ge s from some, if not a ll, participants.”). And the common law “provided no rig h t to contribution among joint tortfeasors.” Id. at 6 34. ESSG does not merely o we a d e bt to its employ e es; it committed a wrong ag a inst them. Thus, we

r e main unpersuaded that Cong ress necessarily codified a r i g h t to contribution when it enacted the F L SA.

W e turn now to the four factors. The Second Circuit, apply ing the four-factor framework from Northwest Airlines
, has held that the F L SA does n o t p rovide a rig ht to contribution o r i n d e m n i f

i c a tion for liable employ ers. Herman

v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd.
, 172 F .3d 1 3 2, 14 4 ( 2 d C i r. 1999). W e ag r ee.

F irst, the F L SA’s tex t s a y s n othing about a rig ht to contribution or indemnification f or employ ers w ho have violated the statute. T hat silence “is not dispositive if, a mong other thing s,” the statute’s tex t sug g ests that it was “enacted for the spec i a l b en efit of a c lass of which [ESSG] is a member.” Nw. Airlines
, 451 U.S. at 9 1–92. B ut, the F L SA’s tex t sug g ests ex actly the opposite. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (noting the cong ressional policy b ehind the F L SA o f eliminating “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard o f living nec e s s a r y for health, efficiency
, and g eneral well-being of workers”).

Second, as its tex t sug g ests, the F L SA’s “central purpose” is to “enact minimum w a g e and max imum hour provisions desig ned to p rotect employ ees,” n ot e mploy ers. W illiamson
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208 F .3d at 1154; see also Herman
, 172 F .3d at 144 (stating that the F L SA “ was desig n ed to r eg ulate the c onduct o f employ e rs f

or the b enefit of employ ees”). I n other w or d s, ESSG belong s to the class w hose c onduct Cong r ess intended
to control “for the prot e ct i o n and benefit of an entirely distinct class .” Tex. Indus.
, 451 U.S. at 639 (quoting Piper v

. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
, 430 U.S. 1, 37 ( 1977)). The F L SA’s statutory scheme resembles those of the Equal Pay Act a nd Title VI I of the Civil Rig h ts A ct, for which Northwest Airlines found no implied rig h t to contribution f or employ ers. Similarly
, the F L SA “has a comprehensive remedial scheme

as shown by the ‘ex p ress provision for private e nforcement i n certain carefully defined circumstances,’” Herman
, 1 7 2 F. 3 d at 144 (quoting Nw. Airlines
, 451 U.S. at 93), a n d for enforcement by the federal g overnment in other circumstances, 29 U.S.C. § 217. I n d e e d
, “broader or more comprehensive coverag e of employ ees

. . . would be d ifficult to frame.” United States v. Rosenwasser
, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945).

Third, “[ t] he compr e hensive character of the remedial scheme ex pressly fashioned by Cong ress strong ly evidences an intent not to authoriz e additional remedies” bey ond those

ex p ressly allowed unde r the statute. Nw. Airlines
, 451 U.S.
at 93–94. The F L SA p rovides “comprehensive statutory remedies,” W

illiamson
, 208 F .3d at 1155, and it is “ not within

our c ompetence as federa l j u d g es to amend

. . . compre hensive e nforcement schemes” by adding private remedies that Cong r ess never intended to allow, Nw. Airlines
, 451 U.S. at 94.

F ourth, and finally
, the F L SA’ s leg islative history is “silent on a rig ht to c o n t r i b ution or indemnification” for employ e rs. Herman
, 172 F .3d at 144 ( collecting the relevantS C A L I A V

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leg islative history ). I n sum, we see no i n d i c ation that Cong r ess intended to c reate a rig h t to contribution o r indemnification for employ ers under the F L SA.

ESSG arg ues t h a t allowing it to seek contribution o r indemnific a t i o n from other employ ers would advance the F L S A ’ s purpose in various w ay s, including by encourag ing employ e rs to b e more proactive about compl y i n g w ith the
statute. May

b e so, but such policy questions belong to “Cong ress, not the courts, to resolve.” Tex. Indus.
, 451 U.S.
at 646. “I f the statute itself does n ot ‘display an intent’ to

crea t e ‘ a private remedy ,’ then ‘a cause of action d o es not

ex ist and courts may not create o ne, no matter how desirable that mig ht be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.’” Ziglar
, 137 S. Ct. a t 1 856 (brackets omitted) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval
, 5 3 2 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)). F ollowing the Supreme Court’s “ cautious course,” id. at 1855, we decline to find an implied cause of action for contribution or indemnification under the F L SA.

2. W h e t h e r a R i

g h t t o C o n t r i b u t i o n o r Indemnification Arises Under Federal Com m o n Law

F ederal courts have the authority to c raft f ederal common law in limited circum s t ances. F irst, we may undertake this ty pe of lawmaking “in those few instances where ‘a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect [ a] uniquely federal interest.’” Mortgs., I

nc. v. U.S. Dist. Cour t , 9 3 4 F .2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 19 9 1 ) ( per curiam) (quoting Tex. Indus.
, 451 U.S. at 640). “The r i g ht of recovery from another
wrong doer, however, does not implicate any such interests.” Id. Thus, this categ ory

does not help ESSG.S C A L I A V

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S i m i larly
, we may create federal common law “in tho s e

areas dominated by strong national o r federal concerns such

as controversies between states, admiralty matters, or foreig n relations.” Id. Plainly , this categ ory does not apply

here.

F inally , “Cong ress may

empower federal courts to make federal common law w hen a statute contains sweeping lang uag e and its leg islativ e history indicates Cong ress’s

ex p e c t a tion that the courts will ‘g ive shape to the statute’s broad mandat e b y d

rawing on common-law tradition.’” Id. (q uoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l E n g’rs v. United States
, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)). I n N a t i o n al Society of Professional E

ngineers
, for ex ample, the Court a ddressed the Sherman Act, for which “[ t] he leg islative hi s t o r y makes it perfectly clear that [ Cong ress] ex pected the courts to g ive shape” to the statute’s b road contours. 435 U.S. at 688. B y contras t , neither the F L SA’s tex t nor its leg islative history
sug g ests that Cong r ess ex pected the courts to g o bey o nd the “judicial interpretation of ambig u ous or incomplete provisions” that proves necessary for “almost a ny statutory scheme.” Nw. Airlines , 451 U.S. at 97.

W h en “Cong ress has enacted a comprehensive leg islative

s c h e m e ” t h a t i n c l u d e s “ i n t e g r a t e d p r o c e d u r e s f o r enforcement,” we p r esume that Cong ress did n ot intend for us “to s u p p lement the remedies enacted.” Mortgs.
, 934 F .2d
at 213. The F L SA i s j u s t such a comprehensive statute. I t includes procedures for both “private enforcement in c ertain carefully defined circumstances,” Herman
, 1 72 F

. 3 d at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted), and (as in th i s c ase) enforcement by the Secr e t ary , § 217. Thus, this final categ ory also does not help ESSG.S C A L I A V

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W e thus join the Second Circuit in holding that the F L SA does not imply

a rig ht to contribution or indemnification for liable employ ers. W e a lso decline to make n ew federal common law that recog

niz es those rig hts.

AF F IRMED.