1

Jo Anne B. Barnhart is substituted for former Commissioner of Social Security

Larry G. Massanari as appellee in this action pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c).

2

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-2460

___________

Patti M. Willard, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner *

of Social Security,1 * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: November 16, 2001

 Filed: December 6, 2001 

___________

Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Patti M. Willard appeals the District Court’s2

 order affirming the

Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income. In her January 1997 applications, Willard alleged disability since March

1993 from dysthymic (depressed mood) and personality disorders, and epilepsy. At
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an administrative hearing, a vocational expert (VE) testified in response to a

hypothetical posed by the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found Willard

not disabled based on the VE’s identification of certain jobs the hypothetical claimant

could perform. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. 

Willard first argues that the ALJ improperly discredited her subjective mental

complaints, pointing to evidence showing that she had problems even in a sheltered

work environment, her minimal daily activities did not suggest she was able to work,

and she did not have contact even with her family. We disagree. After properly

citing the factors in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), the ALJ

noted multiple inconsistencies in the record, including Willard’s ability to live

independently and the lack of physicians’ opinions that Willard was totally disabled.

See Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that if ALJ

discredits claimant and gives good reason, this court will defer to ALJ's judgment

even if every Polaski factor is not discussed in depth). We find reasonable the ALJ’s

conclusion that Willard’s alleged inability to work with others was not disabling. She

held her last rehabilitation-program job, which required handling phone calls, for ten

months, and the program coordinator indicated that Willard could likely succeed in

a job requiring less public contact. Cf. Gowell v. Apfel, 242 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir.

2001) (holding substantial evidence supported rejecting subjective complaints of pain

where evidence indicated pain was not severe enough to be considered disabling).

Similarly, neither her lack of contact with her family (and alleged lack of friends), nor

her daily activities of caring for her personal needs, using the bus to get around,

volunteering at church, and engaging in hobbies at home, support a finding of a

totally disabling mental impairment. Cf. Hutton v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 651, 654-55 (8th

Cir. 1999) (holding ALJ's rejection of claimant's application supported by substantial

evidence where daily activities—making breakfast, washing dishes and clothes,

visiting friends, watching television, and driving—were inconsistent with claim of

total disability). Willard’s contention that the ALJ failed to consider and discuss the

testimony of her caseworker is belied by the record.
3

See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). 

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In her remaining arguments, Willard essentially challenges the ALJ’s mental

residual functional capacity (RFC) findings, and contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical

to the VE was incomplete. However, the ALJ’s RFC findings not only included

limitations specifically addressing Willard’s problems in relating to others, but they

actually were more restrictive than the RFC findings of the Social Security

Administration psychologist upon whose opinion Willard relies except, unlike the

psychologist, the ALJ found no deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace—a

finding that is supported by the record. Willard contends that the ALJ’s mental RFC

findings (and thus his hypothetical) should have included certain added limitations,

but she bases this contention on the opinions of certain evaluators whose opinions are

either conclusory or internally inconsistent. Cf. Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015,

1018 (8th Cir. 1996) (according less deference where treating physician’s opinion is

itself inconsistent); Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1494 (8th Cir. 1995)

(giving limited weight to treating physician’s conclusory opinion). Willard also

points to two global-assessment-of-functioning3

 ratings of 50, but the professionals

issuing those findings also concluded that Willard’s ratings for the previous year were

higher. One evaluator, who had both interviewed and tested Willard, assessed a

rating of 65. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909 (2001) (impairment must last for

continuous period of at least twelve months). While we recognize, as Willard points

out, that she was terminated from a rehabilitation-program job, her inability to

perform that job does not demonstrate her inability to perform a job based on the

ALJ’s RFC findings. Thus, we find that the ALJ’s mental RFC findings were proper,

see Dunahoo, 241 F.3d at 1039 (explaining that RFC must be based on "all relevant

evidence, including medical records, physician’s opinions, and claimant’s description

of her limitations"), and that the hypothetical was sufficient, see Roberts v. Apfel, 222

F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2000).
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Although there is evidence in the record supporting Willard’s allegedly

disabling mental impairments, we review to determine whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See id. at 468

(substantial evidence "is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s conclusion"). We also note that the Commissioner

properly obtained psychological consultations due to the absence of mental-health

treatment records, cf. Freeman v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 687, 692 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting

that it is reversible error to fail to order consultative examination when it is necessary

for informed decision); and properly followed the special procedures for evaluating

mental impairments, see Russell v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1991)

(upholding ALJ's conclusion that impairment was not disabling where ALJ analyzed

claimant’s mental impairment under regulations’ special procedure and ample

evidence supported ALJ’s findings).

Accordingly, we affirm. 

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

Upon examination of the record, I am convinced that Ms. Willard is entitled to

benefits. Ms. Willard previously qualified for benefits from 1986-1993. She

apparently lost benefits when she failed to respond to Social Security Administration

inquiries.

In her present request for benefits, the administrative law judge determined that

Ms. Willard had the residual functional capacity to perform light duty jobs including

jobs such as a bench assembler, hand packager, or a laundry folder. However, there

is no evidence in the record that Ms. Willard ever held such positions, or for that

matter, has ever held any position in the workforce other than in a sheltered workshop
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or a special employment program. For these reasons, I believe Ms. Willard is entitled

to benefits.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.