NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 14-4165

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

BENISAIDA MENO-BRUNO, 

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00230-002)

District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 18, 2015

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 9, 2015)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.
2

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Benisaida Meno-Bruno challenges the reasonableness of her within-guidelines 

range sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.1

I.

Meno-Bruno, along with her husband and two stepsons, was involved in a largescale cocaine and heroin distribution ring. For her part, Meno-Bruno was observed on 

multiple occasions handing drugs to her codefendants during pre-arranged drug deals 

with confidential informants. The police arrested her in a vacant building used to store 

drugs, weapons, and large amounts of money. Meno-Bruno was indicted on a four-count 

indictment charging various drug offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and possess 

with the intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and heroin. In January 2014, she was 

convicted on three counts by a jury. 

The sentencing hearing took place in October 2014. At the hearing, but prior to 

imposition of the sentence, Meno-Bruno’s counsel raised an objection to the PreSentence Report arguing that the drug offense levels overstated the seriousness of the 

offense in light of the pending applicability of Amendment 782. The United States 

Sentencing Commission passed this Amendment in July 2014, which was to take effect in 

 

1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
3

November 2014.2 The Amendment “reduces by two levels the offense levels assigned to 

the quantities that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum penalties, resulting in 

corresponding guideline ranges that include the mandatory minimum penalties.”3 The 

District Court rejected Meno-Bruno’s argument, explaining that “[it did not] know what 

[the factors] w[ould] be. I have to say that at this juncture, I would have a hard time 

saying the words that I find the offense level overstates the seriousness of the offense 

here. I clearly don’t think it does. I think what we have here is a lack of proof. . . . I 

think that Ms. Benisaida Meno-Bruno, her involvement was much greater than what she 

is being held responsible for.”4 After consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, the District 

Court found that Meno-Bruno and her husband were operating drug premises, but it did 

not hold her responsible for the full amount of the drugs because Meno-Bruno’s level of 

involvement was unclear. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced her to 21-months’

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

 

2 The Amendment further provided that “[t]he court shall not order a reduced term of 

imprisonment based on Amendment 782 unless the effective date of the court’s order is 

November 1, 2015, or later.” U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(e). The Sentencing Commission’s 

reasons for the one year delay included alleviating overcrowded prisons, accommodating 

the sheer number of prisoners affected, allowing courts time to prepare for the influx of 

cases, and accounting for the public safety interest involved with offenders’ reentry into 

society. 79 Fed. Reg. 44973-01.

3 79 Fed. Reg. 25996-02.

4 App. 44.
4

II.

On appeal, Meno-Bruno argues that the District Court’s sentence was 

unreasonable because it failed to consider the applicability of Amendment 782. We 

review sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.5 First, we begin 

with procedural error, determining whether the District Court erred, for example, by 

“failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—

including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”6 Absent 

procedural error, we then review for substantive reasonableness. “We will affirm a 

procedurally sound sentence as substantively reasonable ‘unless no reasonable sentencing 

court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 

the district court provided.’”7

The thrust of Meno-Bruno’s argument is that the District Court erred in failing to 

consider and then to apply the two-level downward variance permitted by Amendment 

 

5 See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).

6 United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 196 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

7 United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 599 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Tomko, 526 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
5

782.8 The Amendment, however, went into effect on November 1, 2014, one month after 

Meno-Bruno was sentenced. While we appreciate Meno-Bruno’s argument regarding 

proximity in time, the District Court properly applied the Guidelines in effect at the time 

of sentencing, and we may not apply the amendment retroactively on appeal.9 Moreover, 

we also reject Meno-Bruno’s argument that the District Court failed to consider 

application of the Amendment. The District Court considered the Amendment, but held 

that application in this case was not warranted because the sentence did not overstate the 

seriousness of the crime. Instead, the District Court found that, if anything, it likely 

understated Meno-Bruno’s involvement in the scheme.

Thus, we conclude that the District Court properly calculated the advisory 

Guidelines range, gave thorough consideration to the appropriate § 3553(a) factors, and 

adequately explained the reasoning for rejecting Meno-Bruno’s request for a downward 

variance. Because Meno-Bruno fails to prove that “no reasonable sentencing court would 

 

8 While Meno-Bruno characterizes this as a substantive unreasonableness argument, in 

truth it is an argument of procedural unreasonableness—i.e., “the form that the 

sentencing procedure has taken, e.g., a court’s failure to give meaningful review to a 

defendant’s substantive arguments.” United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256-57

(3d Cir. 2014). Because Meno-Bruno failed to object on the record to any misapplication 

of the § 3553(a) factors after his sentencing, our review is for plain error. Id. at 258.

9 United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 220 (“[W]e have previously ruled that a postsentencing amendment reducing the base offense level applicable to a particular offense 

is a substantive change and is therefore not applied retroactively to cases on appeal.”).
6

have imposed the same sentence,” we find neither procedural nor substantive 

unreasonableness.10 

III.

Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s 

sentence. We note, however, that Meno-Bruno may file a motion with the District Court 

seeking a reduction in his term of imprisonment.11 The District Court may reduce his 

sentence, if appropriate, provided that the effective date of the order is November 1, 

2015, or later.12

 

10 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.

11 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); Wise, 515 F.3d at 220-21.

12 See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a), (d), (e)(1), cmt. 6.