Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Richardson, 2018 IL App (2d) 150737

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

JARON R. RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-15-0737

Filed

Rehearing denied

April 6, 2018

September 26, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 10-CF-4037; the 

Hon. Theodore S. Potkonjak, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Chan Woo Yoon, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Michael G. Nerheim, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, 

Lawrence M. Bauer, and Aline Dias, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Zenoff and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Jaron Richardson, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his postconviction 

petition. He contends that the trial court erred by allowing appointed postconviction counsel to 

withdraw without stating why each of the contentions in defendant’s petition lacked merit. 

Alternatively, defendant contends that counsel’s assistance was unreasonable where he failed 

to amend the petition to add a viable claim. We affirm. 

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon 

while in possession of body armor (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), (e) (West 2010)). One of the issues 

at trial was whether the vest defendant was wearing was in fact body armor. Waukegan police 

detective Francisco Cancino testified that the vest was similar to one he wore daily as a police 

officer. He described how the vest’s inserts protected the wearer’s vital organs. He 

demonstrated how the inserts functioned. 

¶ 3 In response to defense counsel’s objection that the State was trying to qualify Cancino as 

an expert on body armor without having previously disclosed him as such, the court stated that 

qualifying him was not necessary. It nevertheless allowed the prosecutor to do so. Defense 

counsel again objected. In a sidebar, the court stated that it was returning to its “original ruling” 

that the State did not need to qualify Cancino as an expert and that the State should not be 

“wasting a lot of time” doing so.

¶ 4 The jury found defendant guilty. Defense counsel filed a posttrial motion arguing, 

inter alia, that the trial court erred by first advising the jury that Cancino had been qualified as 

an expert on body armor and then, after changing its ruling, failing to advise the jury that 

Cancino was not testifying as an expert. Defendant also filed a pro se posttrial motion alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel. After counsel explained her strategy, the court denied both 

motions without appointing new counsel. The court sentenced defendant to 17 years’ 

imprisonment. 

¶ 5 On direct appeal, we held that expert testimony was not needed to prove that the vest in 

question was body armor. We noted that generally lay witnesses may testify about the nature of 

a substance they observe and with which they are familiar and that their testimony may even 

take the form of a conclusion as to what the substance is. People v. Richardson, 2013 IL App 

(2d) 120119, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we affirmed defendant’s conviction. Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 6 Defendant then filed a pro se postconviction petition and requested appointed counsel. The 

trial court, finding that at least some claims were not frivolous, advanced the petition to the 

second stage of postconviction proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2014). The 

court appointed Ian Kasper to represent defendant. 

¶ 7 At the next status date, Kasper sought leave to file a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and to withdraw as counsel. He said that he had spoken 

with trial counsel, appellate counsel, and defendant about the petition and had found nothing 

“that is justiciable or would be an appropriate motion as a post conviction petition that wasn’t 

either litigated by the Second Circuit [sic] or resolved earlier by this court.” The court allowed 

him to file the certificate but did not allow him to withdraw. 

¶ 8 The State moved to dismiss the petition. At a hearing on the motion, Kasper informed the 

court that defendant wished to personally argue his petition. Kasper stated that he had filed a 

Rule 651(c) certificate and had explained to defendant why he “agreed or disagreed” with his 
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claims. Defendant confirmed that he wished to represent himself. The following colloquy then 

occurred: 

“THE DEFENDANT: The reason why I want to argue the petition, Your Honor, is 

because when I filed this petition, I filed it as a pro se petition post-conviction [sic].

 THE COURT: Right. 

 THE DEFENDANT: Meaning that I had the intentions from the beginning to argue 

this throughout the whole proceeding myself, and I am under the understanding that 

counsel was appointed as stand-by counsel only, not the lead. 

 THE COURT: No. 

 THE DEFENDANT: I was not aware that counsel was supposed to take the lead in 

this. I’ve had one conversation with Mr. Kasper and that was over the phone and that 

was not enough time for me to go through all the ins and outs of my motions and issues 

and all the case laws that I have been researching for the past two years in a 30-minute 

conversation.”

¶ 9 Later, the court questioned defendant further about his decision: 

“THE COURT: ***

So if you don’t wish to have [Kasper] be your attorney, that’s fine. I’ll release him 

from the case, and you can proceed pro se if you wish to. 

THE DEFENDANT: It is my wish, Your Honor.”

¶ 10 In response to the court’s queries, defendant said that he had some credits toward a 

postgraduate degree and felt capable of representing himself. The court then discharged 

Kasper, and defendant proceeded to argue in opposition to the State’s motion to dismiss. Later 

in the hearing, defendant said that he hoped that he would not be held to the same standards as 

a lawyer. The court explained that he would, given that he had made the decision to represent 

himself. Defendant responded that “counsel came and showed up today and proved to me I 

wouldn’t have been represented by him in that same manner ***. So that’s why I pretty much 

was boxed in.”

¶ 11 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the 

petition. Defendant timely appeals. 

¶ 12 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing Kasper to withdraw without 

explaining specifically why each of defendant’s contentions in his pro se petition lacked merit. 

Defendant contends that, despite asserting generally that none of his claims were “justiciable,” 

Kasper never explained why his specific claims were frivolous. See People v. Kuehner, 2015 

IL 117695, ¶¶ 9-10. 

¶ 13 In response, the State points out that Kasper’s motion to withdraw was denied and that 

Kasper did not leave the case until defendant elected to proceed pro se. Thus, the State 

contends, defendant waived the right to postconviction counsel. 

¶ 14 Kuehner and People v. Komes, 2011 IL App (2d) 100014, both held that it was error to 

allow appointed postconviction counsel to withdraw without addressing specifically each of 

the defendant’s claims and stating why they lacked merit. Here, however, we agree with the 

State that defendant clearly stated his intention to represent himself and thus waived his 

statutory right to the assistance of counsel. 
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¶ 15 Defendant insists that he was “forced to proceed pro se due to counsel’s hostility to his 

claims.” He cites his later remarks to the effect that he felt “boxed in.” However, the record 

clearly refutes this contention. Defendant’s earlier remarks quoted above show that he always 

intended to represent himself on the petition. 

¶ 16 To be sure, defendant voiced concerns about the thoroughness of Kasper’s consultation 

with him. However, he had already made clear that his “intentions from the beginning” were to 

represent himself and that he would accept Kasper—or any attorney—only as stand-by 

counsel. Thus, defendant freely chose to argue the petition himself. 

¶ 17 A similar analysis disposes of defendant’s second contention, that Kasper provided 

unreasonable assistance by failing to amend the pro se petition to include the additional claim 

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury that Cancino was not testifying as an expert. A postconviction petitioner’s 

right to counsel is statutory, not constitutional (People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007)), and 

a postconviction petitioner is entitled only to a reasonable level of assistance (People v. 

Patterson, 2012 IL App (4th) 090656, ¶ 23). Rule 651(c) ensures such reasonable assistance 

by requiring that postconviction counsel consult with the defendant to ascertain his contentions 

of deprivation of his constitutional rights, examine the record of the trial court proceedings, 

and make any amendments to the defendant’s pro se petition that are necessary for an adequate 

presentation of his contentions. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 42 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 

2013)). 

¶ 18 We note that generally postconviction counsel need amend the petition only to present the 

defendant’s contentions, not to add new claims. People v. Peoples, 346 Ill. App. 3d 258, 262 

(2004). In any event, though, defendant represented himself at the hearing on the petition, thus 

waiving the right to counsel. Defendant’s remarks show that he carefully considered the issues 

he wanted to present, and nothing in the record suggests that he sought Kasper’s assistance in 

amending the petition. In People v. French, 210 Ill. App. 3d 681, 690 (1991), we held that a 

defendant who discharged his postconviction counsel and elected to proceed pro se could not 

later complain about counsel’s representation. So too here.

¶ 19 The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed. As part of our judgment, we 

grant the State’s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 

5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see also People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1978). 

¶ 20 Affirmed.