alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 204 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 204

    Designating the week beginning November 21, 1999, and the week 
 beginning on November 19, 2000, as ``National Family Week'', and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 15, 1999

Mr. Hatch (for himself, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Bayh, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Burns, 
 Mr. Byrd, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Grams, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Hagel, Mr. 
  Helms, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Levin, Mr. Lugar, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Reid, Mr. 
  Smith of New Hampshire, Mr. Smith of Oregon, Mr. Thurmond, and Mr. 
 Wyden) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
    Designating the week beginning November 21, 1999, and the week 
 beginning on November 19, 2000, as ``National Family Week'', and for 
                            other purposes.

Whereas the family is the basic strength of any free and orderly society;
Whereas it is in the family that America's youth are nurtured and taught the 
        values vital to success and happiness in life: respect for others, 
        honesty, service, hard work, loyalty, love, and others;
Whereas the family provides the support necessary for people to pursue their 
        goals;
Whereas it is appropriate to honor the family unit as essential to the continued 
        well-being of the United States; and
Whereas it is fitting that official recognition be given to the importance of 
        family loyalties and ties: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate designates the week beginning on November 
21, 1999, and the week beginning on November 19, 2000, as ``National 
Family Week''. The Senate requests the President to issue a 
proclamation calling on the people of the United States to observe each 
week with appropriate ceremonies and activities.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.2: Certification of Principal Financial Officer pursuant to 18
U.S.C.ss.1850 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of  South  Texas  Oil  Company  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the  period  ending September 30, 2005 as filed
with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on  the  date  hereof  (the
"Report"), I,  Jason F. Griffith,  Chief  Financial Officer of  the  Company,
certify,  pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to
Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and that to the best  of  the
undersigned's knowledge and belief:

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)The information contained  in  the  Report  fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                         /s/ Jason F. Griffith, CPA
                         ------------------------------------------
                         JASON F. GRIFFITH, Chief Financial Officer

Dated: November 14, 2005
# RECEIVE[0 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERALAVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

## DEC 11 2013 OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

## HEARING 

## DOCKEr

WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN THE MATTER OF NORTHEASTERN AVIATION CORP. Case No. 2012EA110030 FDMS No. FAA-2012-1264 Judge J.E. Sullivan

NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL AND ENTRY OF APPEARANCE THE CLERK OF THE COURT will please enter the appearance ofEdward J. Longosz, II, Esquire and Evelyn D. Sahr, Esquire, from the law firm ofEckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC and withdraw the appearance ofJames G. Ehrig, Esquire as counsel for Respondent in the above-captioned matter. Respectfully submitted, By: ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC

Edward J. Longosz)I, Esquire EvelynD. Sahr, Esquire Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC 1717 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Suite 1200 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 659-6622 (202) 659-6699 (fax) elongosz@eckertseamans.com esahr@eckertseamans.com Attorneys forRespondent NortheasternAviation Corp.CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that onDecember 9, 2013 the foregoing Notice ofSubstitutionof Counsel and Entry ofAppearance has been served viaFederal Express and facsimile to the following: Mr. Alfred R. Johnson, Jr., Esq. Mr. ZacharyM. Berman, Esq. Federal Aviation Administration 1 AviationPlaza Jamaica, NY 11434 Telephone: 718-553-3258 Fax: 718-995-5699 Judge J.E. Sullivan U.S. Administrative Law Judge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, D.C. 20590 Fax: 202-366-7536 (Federal Express only) I hereby certify that onDecember 9, 2013 the foregoing Notice ofSubstitutionof Counsel and Entry ofAppearance has been served viaFederal Expressto the following: Federal Aviation Administration (Original and one copy) 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591 Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Room 2014

Paralegal
#### In the Matter of Edlu Custom Builders, Inc., Petitioner, against John C. Young et al., Constituting the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Hempstead, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County,

October 8, 1958.

*Nixon & Nixon*for petitioner.

*John A. Morhous, Town Attorney,*for respondents.

Howard T. Hogan, J.

Petitioner proceeds under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review the refusal of the respondent Board of Zoning Appeals to permit it to erect a one-family dwelling on a sub-standard plot having a frontage of 40 feet and a depth of 110 feet, designated on the Land and Tax Map of Nassau County as lots 51 and 52. The property lies in a Residence *“*B ” district of the Town of Hempstead. The minimum lot dimensions required in such a district prior to 1951 were a front width of 40 feet and an area of 4,000 square feet. The present requirements are a minimum front width of 60 feet and an area of not less than 6,000 square feet.

Petitioner is a contract vendee. The present owner is, together with his wife as tenants by the entirety, the owner of another parcel consisting of three lots designated as lots 53, 54 and 55, improved with a one-family dwelling, title to which they acquired in November, 1947. This parcel abuts the subject property, sole title to which the present owner acquired in August, 1948.

Petitioner applied for a building permit which was denied by the Building Inspector, apparently oh the ground that the plot upon which he proposed to erect his house was sub-standard, and that since it was under the same ownership as the adjoining parcel, it was not entitled to the exemption from the area *377provisions of the Zoning Ordinance enjoyed by parcels held in single, *separate*ownership from a date prior to the amendment which would otherwise make them sub-standard.

It then appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals from such ruling. Although it characterized its application as one for a variance, it appears rather to be an appeal from the Building Inspector’s interpretation of the ordinance and the applicable law of the State. The court will treat it as such, since the proof was not aimed at establishing the grounds for a variance. *(Matter of Flanagan*v. *Zoning Bd. of Appeals,*2 Misc 2d 922, affd. 1 A D 2d 979.)

Simply stated, the issue is: Does the owner of lots 51 and 52 become the ‘ ‘ common owner ’ ’ of lots 53, 54 and 55 by reason of the fact that he holds these latter three lots with his wife as tenants by the entirety? If he does not, then he is entitled to a building permit to erect a house on lots 51 and 52, absent other circumstances which are not advanced by the respondent *(Matter of Waldorf*v. *Coffey,*5 Misc 2d 80).

Mr. Justice Pittoni has recently passed upon this precise question in *Matter of Barbara Homes*v. *Michaelis*(14 Misc 2d 620, 622) holding that under such circumstances the properties are ‘ ‘ under different ownership. ’ ’ The court adopts that ruling. Accordingly, the petition is sustained and the respondent Building Inspector is directed to issue a building permit to the petitioner.

Order signed.
#### Sam BAKER, Jr., a/k/a Sam Winfield Baker, a/k/a Sammy Baker, a/k/a Same Castoe, a/k/a Sam Baker, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-81-598.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

April 19, 1982.

*111J. F. Wilson, Maud, for appellant.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Jimmy D. Givens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

While serving a life sentence in the state penitentiary in McAlester, the defendant escaped from the Seminole County Jail, where he had been temporarily transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. He was convicted of Escape from a Penal Institution, in violation of Laws 1976, ch. 175, § 1, now 21 O.S. Supp.1980, § 443, in Seminole County District Court, Case No. CRF-80-191, and from a sentence of two (2) years’ imprisonment, he has appealed.

As his sole assignment of error, the appellant argues that he should have been charged under 57 O.S.1971, § 56, Breaking Jail, and that he was thus improperly charged and convicted. This argument must fail. One remains an inmate of a state penal institution, albeit constructively, when he is temporarily absent therefrom, such as in the case before us. *Boone v. State,*642 P.2d 270 (Okl.Cr.1982); *Goodson v. State,*562 P.2d 521 (Okl.Cr.1977); *McCoy v. State,*536 P.2d 1309 (Okl.Cr.1975). The appellant was properly charged.

Accordingly, the judgment and sentence appealed from is AFFIRMED,

BRETT, P. J., and CORNISH, J., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Melvin ALLEN v. Criminal District Court Judge, Hon. Rudolph F. BECKER, III.

No. 87-KH-0115.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 30, 1987.

In re Allen, Melvin; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “E”.

Granted. Remanded to Court of Appeal to order furnishing of Boykin transcript to relator in accordance with long standing practice of this Court.
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 24

- 1466

___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Aaron Olson

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern

____________

Submitted: July 23 , 2024 Filed: July 26, 2024 [ Unpublished ]

____________

Before KELLY

, GRASZ , and STRAS , Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

When Aaron Olson pleaded guilty to child

- pornography charges, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), he expressly waived his right to receive a sentence
reduction

. See id. § 3582(c)(2). Several years later, the district court 1 raised the

1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.-2- issue on its own and denied relief. His counsel, who seeks to withdraw, suggests
that Olson was eligible for one

.

We conclude that the plea agreement forecloses the argument

. See United
States v. Scott , 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing the validity of a waiver de novo); United States v. Andis , 333 F.3d 886, 889 –90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that defendants can waive additional statutory rights when they plead guilty if “each term of [the] agreement” is “entered into knowingly and voluntarily” ). The district court could not have erred by denying a right that Olson had already “intentional[ly] relinquish[ed].” United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (citation omitted). W e accor dingly dismiss the appeal and grant counsel permission
to withdraw

.

______________________________
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**Certification pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**
I, Thomas A.N. Miller, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K of Ansoft Corporation, the registrant;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, resultsof operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report isbeing prepared;
b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and
c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of the annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors andthe audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control of financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: June 2, 2005      By:/s/ Thomas A.N. Miller      Thomas A.N. Miller  Chief Financial Officer
#### Simpson Factors Corporation, Plaintiff, *v.*Harold Lipman, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

November 25,1958.

*Martin N. Whyman*for plaintiff.

*Hirson é Bertini (David G. Haskins*of counsel), for defendant.

Jacob Markowitz, J.

Plaintiff sues for the reformation of a note in the sum of $10,000 claiming mutual mistake by reason of which the demand note provides for the payment of interest at the rate of 7.2% per annum instead of 6% per annum as agreed. At the same time the parties engaged in a factoring agreement and the plaintiff received as security 15 shares of stock. Defendant has interposed two defenses and a counterclaim. By motion made pursuant to rule 109 of the Rules of Civil Practice plaintiff seeks an order striking out the defense of usury and, by cross motion, defendant moves for temporary *746injunction restraining plaintiff from proceeding to dispose of the two certificates representing the 15 shares of stock pursuant to the Lien Law or otherwise. While plaintiff seeks to recover ■interest in accordance with the agreement as alleged, it contends that no usury is involved since section 379 of the General Business Law applies. *(Brumley*v. *Robinson,*120 Misc. 799; *Wright*v. *Toomey,*137 App. Div. 401, affd. 204 N. Y. 661.)

This contention is based upon that allegation of the complaint which discloses that the loan was secured by stock certificates. There are no facts pleaded in the defense which will take the case out of the application of section 379 of the General Business Law. Regardless of plaintiff’s willingness to accept *6%*interest if defendant wished to defend upon the basis of nullity for usury the allegations of the complaint required that the defense be so pleaded that it could survive the application of the statute. This it failed to do. Indeed, upon the application for injunction the facts appear which clearly demonstrate that the section is applicable. Since the note is due and by documentary proof it is shown to have been fully secured by the 15 shares of stock, no good reason appears to warrant temporary injunctive relief. The motion to strike out the defense of usury is granted and the motion for temporary injunctive relief is denied.
#### William JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-81-674.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Oct. 27, 1982.

David Miller, Asst. Public Defender, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Susan Talbot, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Appellate Crim. Div., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

On appeal from his conviction of Robbery with Firearms, in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CRF-81-705, the appellant, William Johnson, raises two assignments of error.

*220First, Johnson argues that the trial court erred in failing to give a precautionary eye-witness identification instruction. A review of the record reflects that the eye-witness, Cathy Singleton, was positive of her identification of the appellant from her prior association with him, and did not waiver from it; there was no need for such an instruction. *King v. State,*640 P.2d 983 (Okl.Cr.1982). Furthermore, the record is void of any objection by the appellant to the instructions given at trial, and of any request for instructions by him, nor were any complaints raised in his motion for new trial, nor in his petition in error; thus, this assignment of error has not been preserved for review on appeal. Moreover, the appellant specifically stated that he had no objection to the instructions, and has thus waived his right to allege error in them on appeal. *Butler v. State,*645 P.2d 1030 (Okl.Cr.1982).

As his final assignment of error, the appellant contends that his confession was coerced and given under duress, and therefore, it was improperly admitted into evidence. In the in-camera hearing held for the purpose of suppressing the confession, Officer Lawrence Johnson testified that he gave the appellant his *Miranda*warnings in the presence of a secretary, and that the appellant advised him that he understood those rights. The signed confession corroborates the testimony of Officer Johnson that the confession was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. We have previously held that this Court will not disturb the trial court’s ruling permitting the introduction of a confession when supported by sufficient evidence that the statement was voluntarily given. *Kelsey v. State,*569 P.2d 1028 (Okl.Cr.1977). We find that the trial court properly overruled the motion to suppress.

The judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED.

BRETT, P.J., and CORNISH, J., concur.
#### Judy KARST, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Helen W. PIERCE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-122.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Feb. 4, 1987.

Helen W. Pierce, in pro. per., Alexandria, for defendant-appellant.

Irving Ward-Steinman, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before FORET, STOKER and YELVERTON, JJ.

FORET, Judge.

This is a suit to enforce payment of the purchase price of an automobile. Judy Karst, plaintiff, sued defendant, Helen W. Pierce, for the $500 sale price of a 1972 Pontiac and $250 in attorney’s fees. After trial on the merits, the trial judge ruled in favor of plaintiff, but denied plaintiff the attorney’s fees prayed for. From this ruling, defendant has appealed. We affirm.

The trial judge has succinctly set forth the case and his findings in written reasons for judgment, which we approve and quote as follows:

> “Evidence showed that Defendant, Helen W. Pierce, purchased a Pontiac automobile from Plaintiff, Judy Karst on January 31, 1984 and promised to pay her $500.00 consideration. The debt was acknowledged by Defendant in a letter to Plaintiff, dated October 14, 1984 and admitted into evidence as Plaintiff’s Exhibit *164# 1. Defendant’s denial of the debt is based upon the allegation that she did not receive a marketable title and also pleads redhibition. This court finds that the title, attached to the Plaintiff’s petition and accepted as evidence by the court, is in fact marketable. Simply because the Plaintiff is listed as having a lien thereon, does not mean the title is unmarketable. The court also finds that the defense based upon redhibition is prescribed under Article 2534 of the Louisiana Civil Code, because the car was bought on January 31, 1984 and the answer alledging [sic] redhibition was filed on October 28, 1985, well over the one year prescriptive period. Article 1067 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure states that this incidental demand is barred by prescription.”

We conclude that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed, at appellant’s costs.

AFFIRMED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RONALD CASTANON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-16224 

D.C. Nos. 1:17-cv-00252-DAD 

 1:96-cr-05272-DAD-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 19, 2022**

Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Ronald Castanon appeals from the district court’s order 

denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C § 2253. Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Reves, 774 F.3d 

562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014), we affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 28 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-16224 

Castanon contends that the district court erred by denying his § 2255 motion 

as untimely. He asserts that his motion is timely because he filed it within one year 

of the Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). 

However, Castanon’s argument that Johnson applies to the mandatory career 

offender Guideline under which he was sentenced is foreclosed. See United States 

v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Johnson did not recognize a 

new right applicable to the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines on collateral 

review.”). Contrary to Castanon’s argument, our decision in Blackstone is not 

“clearly irreconcilable” with United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). See 

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Accordingly, the 

district court properly concluded that § 2255(f)(3) does not apply and Castanon’s 

motion is untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).

We treat Castanon’s additional arguments as a motion to expand the 

certificate of appealability. So treated, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-

1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999). 

AFFIRMED.