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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA KAREN VATEL, Plaintiff,


### v. ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS and DAVID K. McCURDY, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Case No. 08cv467 (RJL) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

## --------------)~ MEMORANDUM OPINION

(January 

## 1£ ,2010) [# 25] Plaintiffhas brought suit against defendants alleging sex and race discrimination underthe District ofColumbiaHuman Rights Act. The case was removed from the Superior Court for the District ofColumbia and is now before this Court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. After careful consideration ofthe parties' pleadings, applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion. BACKGROUND This case arises out ofKaren Vatel's briefperiod ofwork as an executive assistant to David McCurdy, the ChiefExecutive Officer ofthe Alliance ofAutomobile Manufacturers ("Alliance"). Vatel claims she was fired from that position because

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McCurdy, a white male, "wasuncomfortable working with an African American female
as his executive assistant." (PI.'s Opp'n at 2.) Vatel began working for Alliance before McCurdy took over as CEO. (Def.'s Statement ofUndisputed Facts ("Def.'s Facts")**~~** 1,5.) She was hired in June 2006 by Fred Webber, the then-interim CEO. (Id.**~** 1.) Fromthe outset, Vatel understood that shewas assisting an interim CEO and that she may bereplacedwheneverAlliance found
a new chiefexecutive. (Vatel Dep. at 149.) McCurdy was offered that chiefrole nearthe end of2006 and quickly scheduled a lunch with Vatel to discuss whether she would remain employed as his executive assistant. (McCurdy Dep. at 11-12.) When McCurdy asked Vatel ifshe wantedto continue, she said she did and suggested she couldhelp McCurdy transition into his newposition. (Id.) McCurdy formally assumed duties as the CEO ofAlliance in February 2007. (Def.'s Facts**~** 5.) Itbecame clearto Vatel during the transition that herwork for McCurdy would be much more difficult than it was for Webber. (Vatel Dep. at 81.) According to Vatel, McCurdy's schedule was "muchmore full" than Webber's and working for him required
a lot more "focus," "forecasting," "troubleshooting," and "planning." (Id.) Nevertheless, Vatel believed she would be able to handle her newresponsibilities because she "already knew [her]job" from herpriorwork with Webber. (Id.) Three months later, however, Vatel began attending monthly meetings with a human resources officerto address McCurdy's frustration with her'job performance. (Id. at 124.)

-2-On November 1,2007, after nine months ofworking for McCurdy, and six months ofmeetings to address herjobperformance issues, Vatel was fired from Alliance. (Jd. at 134-35.) In response, Vatel filed this suit in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia claiming that hertermination was discriminatory. (FirstAm. CompI.**~** 18.) Defendants removed the case to this Court and moved for summaryjudgmenton the grounds that Vatel was not fired for discriminatory reasons, butrather for poor performance. Vatel, ofcourse, opposes the motion. For the following reasons, Vatel has failed to produce sufficient evidence ofdiscrimination to avoid summaryjudgment, and therefore, defendant's motion must be GRANTED. 

### LEGAL STANDARD Summaryjudgmentis appropriate "ifthe pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits showthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled tojudgmentas a matter oflaw."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summaryjudgmentbears the initial burden ofdemonstratingthe absence ofa genuine issue ofmaterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party opposing a motion for summaryjudgmentmust "notrely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must '" set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). To determine whether there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact, the Court must draw alljustifiable inferences in favor ofthe non-moving party.Anderson v. Liberty

-3-Lobby,Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The non-moving party must produce more than the "mere existence ofa scintilla ofevidence" to demonstrate triable issues offact, however. Id. at 252. "Ifthe evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summaryjudgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). In sum, the non-movant must offer "evidence on which thejury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Id. at 252. ANALYSIS Vatel has alleged one sole count ofdiscriminatory termination underthe District ofColumbiaHuman Rights Act ("DCHRA"). (FAC**~** 19-23.) TheDCHRA makes it unlawful for employers to discharge an individual "wholly orpartially for a discriminatory reason." D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (emphasis added). According to Vatel, McCurdy violated the DCHRA when he fired her discriminatorily based on his discomfort working with an African-American woman. (PI.'s Opp'n at 2.) To the contrary, defendants argue that Vatel was fired because ofher poor performance, not race. (Def.'s Mot. at 8-9.) Specifically, defendants claim that Vatel not only had trouble adjusting from Webber's easy style to the increased demands of assisting McCurdy, but that she actually refused to adjust because, in her own estimation, she felt she was doingjustfine. (Def.'s Reply at 4.) Given the intensely interpersonal nature ofthe president-executive assistantrelationship, for which Vatel herself acknowledged chemistry was essential, Alliance contends that Vatel'sreluctance to adapt

-4-to McCurdy's work style, even when told an adjustment was necessary, was a legitimate performance-basedreason for her firing. 

### (Id. at 5.) I agree. Ruling on defendants' motion essentially boils down to answering one question: has Vatel produced sufficient evidence for a reasonablejuryto disbelieve defendants' stated reason for hertermination, and to find instead that defendants' intentionally discriminated against her based on herrace or sex? See Hamilton v. Howard Univ., 960 A.2d 308,314-16 (D.C. 2008); cfBradyv. Office of the Sergeant atArms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (clarifying legal standard for summaryjudgmentunder Title VII). Unfortunately for Vatel, the answer is no because she has offered virtually no evidence to support her contention that she was fired because ofher race. Indeed, to date, the only probative piece ofevidence Vatel has offered is the fact that McCurdy replaced her with a white male. While this fact may permit an inference of discrimination, it is insufficient, without more, to establish discrimination. See Lewis v. NVTTechnologies, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 n.3 (D.D.C. 2000) (citingNieto v. L & H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997)). Indeed, the insufficiency ofthe inference drawn from this fact becomes even more apparent when viewed alongside the rest ofthe record. For example, any such inference ofdiscrimination is substantially offsetby the inference ofnondiscrimination that can be drawn from the fact that McCurdy himselfhired Vatelless than a year earlier. See Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2000), abrogatedon othergrounds byMastro

-5-V. Potomac Electric Power Corp., 447 F.3d 843,851 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Moreover, the record corroborates defendants' stated performance-based reasons for Vatel's termination. Vatel herselfeven admits that for six months priorto her termination, she had monthly meetings with a human resources director at which she was told she needed to improve her work. (Vatel Dep. at 124.) Movingpast the racial background ofher replacement, Vatel's opposition to defendants' motion rests on mere argument and conjecture. Forinstance, Vatel characterizes the performance meetings she attended as a sham, orchestrated over a six month period to cover up McCurdy's ultimate plan to discriminatorily fire her. She offers no evidence ofthis, however. Instead, she points to her own testimony in which she speculates that the meetings must have been a sham because she was not given specifics concerning McCurdy's general frustration with her work, and because the meetings were conducted by a human resources directorratherthan McCurdy himself. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 9-10.) Putting aside the self-serving nature ofthese allegations, Vatel's testimony does not actually contradict defendants' stated reason for her firing. Itmerely seeks to create inferences ofillegitimacy based on the fact that McCurdy did not address Vatel's poorperformance in the way she thought best. More to the point, Vatel's arguments are simply that; they are not evidence and do not help her carry her burden on summaryjudgment.) Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

I Ifanything, plaintiffs argument in this regard might actually corroborate defendants' stated reason for her firing. Vatel's insistence to this day that McCurdy "fail[ed]"to address her -6-Finally, Vatel purports to offerone last piece ofevidence intended to show that hertermination was discriminatory. She claims thatMcCurdy filled three vacant vice presidentpositions with white males, in one instance passing over a qualified AfricanAmerican female. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 10.) Unfortunately for Vatel, this claim does not make up for her evidentiary shortcomings in this case. First, there is doubtful probative value to such a small sample size. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. EducationalEqualityLeague, 415 U.S. 605, 620-21 (1974). Second, any probative value that might otherwise attach to this piece ofevidence is diminished by Vatel's admission that it is an incomplete snapshot. Indeed, she testified at her deposition and suggested in herpleadingthat there
were African-Americans working at Alliance in management and vice president positions. (Vatel Dep. at 102-104; Pl.'s Opp'n at 10.) Thus, Vatel's attempt to show a pattern ofdiscriminatory animus at Alliance

-- one likely to have played a role in her firing

-- has little to no probative value and thus cannot help her avoid defendants' summaryjudgmentmotion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

perfonnance issues himself, and thus that her firing was illegitimate, is quite telling. (PI.'s Opp'n at 4.) McCurdy, ofcourse, may have had a host oflegitimate reasons for employing a human resources professional to deal with VateI. Furthennore, as CEO ofAlliance and Vatel's boss, it was McCurdy'sprerogative to address Vatel'sperfonnance issues in the manner he felt most appropriate. That Vatel continues to believe otherwise underscores defendants' argument that she was unwilling to adapt to McCurdy's style and to accept her role as his assistant. -7-· 

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CONCLUSION For all these reasons, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED andplaintiffs case is dismissed. An appropriate Order will issue with this memorandum.

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# Z-i**rucH~** United States District Judge