### IN THE SUPREME COU RT OF TEN NESSEE AT KNOX VILLE May 27, 2 00 9 S es si on Heard in Co ok ev il le 1



### STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JERRY LE E HANNI NG

Appeal by Per m ission from the Court of Crim inal Ap peals

Crim inal Cou rt for Loudon County No. 10914 E. Eugene Eb len, Jud ge

No. E2006-02196-SC-R11- CD - F iled October 20, 2009

This a ppeal involves the detention and questioning of the driver of a truck trac tor and trailer based
upon an anony

mous tip of rec kless driving from a citizen. A police office r rec eived a dispatch that

a caller had repor

t ed a b l ac k “18-w heele r” bear ing a “Smith Br others” logo was being driven

rec klessly in a northbound dire ction on the i nterstate and had just exit ed at the Highway 72 ramp. The poli ce office r was in a parking lot very close to the ex it ramp at the t ime he rece ived t he call. He responde d immediately and observe d a black “semi-truc k” parke d in the emer g ency lane of the northbound exit ramp. T h e o ff i ce r t u rned his blue lights on, drove down the ramp, and pulled in front of the truck. After observing a Smit h Transpor t logo on the door o f t he truck trac tor, questioning the driver, and administering fi el d sobriety tests, the office r arr ested the driver for driving under the influence

. The dri v er enter ed a conditional g uilty plea to driving under the influence and re serve d the cer tified question of whether the war rantless de tention and questioning of the driver violated the Four th Amendment to the United States Constit ution and Article I
, Section 7 of the Co n s t i t u t ion of the State of Tenne ssee. We hold that in this case the anony mous tip
repor ting rec kless driving indicated a sufficie ntly high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to war

rant immediate intervention by law enfor ceme nt officia ls and justified the brief investiga tory stop beca

use t h e offe nse was repor ted at or near the time of its occur renc e, and the
repor t indicated that the caller was witnessing an o n go i n g offe nse; the repor t provided a detailed descr iption of the truck, its direc tion of trave l and location; and t h e investiga ting office r verifie d these de tails within m oments of the dispatch r eporting the tip.

Tenn. R. App . P . 11 Appeal by Per m ission ; Judgme nt of th e Court of Crim inal Ap peals Aff irm ed

S H A R O N G. L E E , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A N I C E M. H O L D E R , C.J
., C O R N E L I A A. C L A R K , and W I L L I A M C. K O C H , J R ., J J
., joined. G A R Y R. W A D E , J

. filed a separ ate concurr ing opinion.

O r a l a r g u m e n t w a s h e a r d i n t h i s c a s e o n M a y 2 7
, 2 0 0 9
, i n C o o k e v i l l e , P u t n a m C o u n t y , T e n n e s s e e , a s p a r t o f 1

t h i s C o u r t ’ s S

. C

. A

. L

. E

. S

. ( S u p r e m e C o u r t A d v a n c i n g L e g a l E d u c a t i o n f o r S t u d e n t s ) p r o j e c t

.Wade V. Davies, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J err

y L ee H anning

.

Robert E. Cooper, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; Gordon W. Smit h, Associate Solicitor Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP INION

F acts and P roce dural B ackground

On Novembe r 15, 2003, at approxi mately 9:30 p.m., Serg eant Ke nt Russell of the L oudon Police Depa

rtment rec eived a radio dispatch that an anon y m o us caller had repor

ted a rec klessly driven truck heade d north on I nterstate 75. The caller identified the vehicle as a black “18-w heele r” 2 with “1-800- GoSmith” or “Go Smith Brother s” on the ba ck and sta ted that the truck had ex ited at the Hig hway

72 exit ramp.

W h en S er geant Russell rec eived the dispatch, he was in the parking lot of a McDona ld’s
restaur ant located about one hundred and fifty y ards from the top of the Hig hway 72 exit ramp. He i m m ed i at el y d rove to the exit ramp wher e he observe d a black truck trac tor and trailer with it s park i n g l i gh t s on parke d in the emer g ency lane, fac ing the top of the ramp. Serg eant Russell activate d his e merg ency blue lights, drove his pa trol car down the ramp ag ainst the flow of traff ic, and parke d with the front of his vehicle very close to the front of the truck. Serg eant Russell walked
up to the truck’s doo r, wh i ch wa s embl azoned with an eag le imag e and the words “Smith” and “tra nsport,” and reque sted the truck’s driver, J err y L ee Hanning
, to step out of the truck. After Mr. Hanning complied with Serg eant R u s s el l ’s request, Serg eant Russell asked him if he had been drinking
, administered various field sobriety tests, arr ested him for driving under the influence
, and transporte d him to a hospital for a blood alc ohol test.

I n October of 2004, the L oudon County g rand jury returne d an in d i ct m ent char g ing Mr. Hanning with driving under the influence (“D UI ”) in violation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-10-401 and with possession of an open container o f an al co holic bever ag e in violation of

3 Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-10-416. Mr. Hanning filed a motion to suppress all evidenc e 4 obtained as a result of the detention of himself and his vehicle upon the g round that Serg eant Russell

W e t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e t h a t “ 1 8

- w h e e l e r ” a n d “ s e m i

- t r u c k ” a r e c o l l o q u i a l e x p r e s s i o n s f o r a t r u c k t r a c t o r a n d 2

t r a i l e r

.

“ I t i s u n l a w f u l f o r a n y p e r s o n t o d r i v e o r t o b e i n p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o f a n y a u t o m o b i l e o r o t h e r m o t o r d r i v e n 3

v e h i c l e o n a n y o f t h e p u b l i c r o a d s a n d h i g h w a y s o f t h e s t a t e

. . . , w h i l e : ( 1 ) U n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a n y i n t o x i c a n t

. . . ; o r ( 2 ) T h e a l c o h o l c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t h e p e r s o n ’ s b l o o d o r b r e a t h i s e i g h t

- h u n d r e d t h s o f o n e p e r c e n t (

. 0 8 % ) o r m o r e

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 )

- ( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 8 )

.

“ N o d r i v e r s h a l l c o n s u m e a n y a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e o r b e e r o r p o s s e s s a n o p e n c o n t a i n e r o f a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e 4

o r b e e r w h i l e o p e r a t i n g a m o t o r v e h i c l e i n t h i s s t a t e

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 1 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 8 )

.
2lacke d rea sonable sus p i cion or probable cause and there fore violated the sear ch and seizure

provisions of the state a

nd fede ral c onstitut ions. The trial cour t denied the motion to suppress.

After the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Hanning enter ed into a conditional p l ea ag ree ment with the State. I n exchang e for a conditional plea of g uilty to the DUI char g e, the open container char g e was dismiss ed, and he was sentenc ed to ele v en months, twenty -nine day s incar cer ation, suspended upon his service of three day s in jail and pay ment of fines and costs. This plea rese rved and cer

tified for appea l the question prese nted in the motion to suppress of “whe ther the warrantless questioning and detention of Mr. Hanning violated the Four th Amendment to the United S tates C onstitut ion and Article I
, Section 7 of t he C onstitut ion of t he S t ate of Tennessee.” This question was cer

tified for appea l pursuant to Rule 37(b)( 2) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedur e by

order of the trial c ourt. 5

The Court of Criminal Appea ls aff irmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and found that Serg eant Russell had rea sonable suspicion that the truck was the same one that the caller had identified as being driven rec klessly
, based upon the fac ts that when Serg eant Russell rec eived the dispatch he was in c lose proxi mity to the specifie d exit ramp, he immediately proce eded to the
ramp, and found a black truck trac tor and trailer sitti ng as if it had exit ed I -75, as stated by the caller

. The Court of Criminal Appea ls further found that, based upon Serg eant Russell’s rea sonable suspicion that Mr. Hanning had been driving reckle ssly
, he p ro p er ly questioned Mr. Hanning and adminis t er ed fi el d sobriety tests. Ba sed on the results of these actions, the Court of Criminal Appea ls a lso f

ound that the office r had probable cause to a rre st Mr. Hanning for driving under the influence . We gr anted Mr. H anning ’s applica tion for per mission t o appea l.

Analysis

As noted, the cer

tified question rese rved for appea l was “whe ther the war rantless que s ti o n ing and detention of Mr. Hanning violated the Four th Amendment to the United States Constit ution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Constit ution of the State of Tenne ssee.” We deter mine that under the fac ts of this case , the war

rantless de tention was valid bec ause it wa s supported by rea sonable suspi cion that Mr. Hanning had committed a c rime.

Although this case comes to us on appea l as a cer tified question of law under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2), w e re view it under the same standa rd as a n appea l from a judg ment deny ing a motion
to suppress. See State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W .3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2006). The “trial court’s finding s of fac t in a suppression hear ing will be upheld unless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise.” State

v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Fur thermore
, althoug h “[t] he party preva iling in the trial
court is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e adduce d at the suppression hear ing

T e n n

. R

. C r i m

. P

. 3 7 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( i ) p r o v i d e s t h a t a d e f e n d a n t i n a c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g m a y a p p e a l f r o m a n y 5 j u d g m e n t o f c o n v i c t i o n “ o n a p l e a o f g u i l t y

. . . i f

. . . t h e j u d g m e n t o f c o n v i c t i o n o r o t h e r d o c u m e n t t o w h i c h s u c h j u d g m e n t r e f

e r s t h a t i s f

i l e d b e f o r e t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l
, c o n t a i n s a s t a t e m e n t o f t h e c e r t i f i e d q u e s t i o n o f l a w t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t r e s e r v e d f

o r a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w

. ”

3as well as all reasonable and leg itimate infere nces tha t may be dra wn from that e vidence ,” id., the burden rema ins on the State to prove that a war rantless sear ch was const itutionally permissible. Nicholson, 188 S.W .3d at 656-57; State v. Henning
, 975 S.W .2d 290, 298 (Tenn. 1998). We revie w questions of law de novo. State v. Day , 263 S.W .3d 891, 900 (Tenn. 2008)

.

The Four th Amendment to the Constit ution of the United States, applicable to the states throug h the Four

teenth Amendment as rec og nize d i n Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961), provides:

The rig ht of the people to be secu re in their persons, houses, paper s, and eff ects, ag ainst unrea sonable sear ches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war rants shall issue, but upon probable cause , suppo rt ed by oath or aff irmation, and particula rly descr ibing the place to be sear ched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Simi larly , Article I , Section 7 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provides:

That the people shall be secur e in their persons, houses, paper s and possessions, from

unrea sonable sear ches and seizures; and that g ener al war rants, wher eby an office r may be commanded to sear ch suspected place s, without evidenc e of the fac t committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offe nces are not particula rly descr ibed and supported by evidenc e, are dang erous to liberty and oug ht not to be g rante d.

Three cate g ories of police-c itiz en interac tion have been judicially desig nated: (1) full-sca le

arr est, which must be supported by probable cause , see Br own v. I llinois
, 422 U.S. 590, 598 (1975); State v. Fe rra

nte, 269 S.W .3d 908, 913 (Tenn. 2008); (2) brief investiga tory detention, which must be supported by rea sonable suspicion of criminal activity
, see Terr y v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); State v. Wil liams, 185 S.W .3d 311, 315 (Tenn. 2006); and (3) brief police-c itiz en encoun t er that require s no objective justification, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W .3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). The case befor e us involves a brief investiga tory detention, and

acc ording ly
, we must deter mine whether at the time Mr. Hanning was detained, Serg eant Russell had

a re asonable suspicion that Mr. Hanning had committed a c rime.

We have previously noted that a seizure or detention occur s when “‘ i n view of all of the circ umstan ce s s u rrounding the i ncident, a rea sonable person would have believed that he was not fre e to leave .’” Wil liams, 185 S.W .3d at 316 (quoting United States v. Mendenha ll, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980))

. Ordinar ily
, when an office r turns on his blue lights, the office r has initiated a detention. See State v. Pulley
, 863 S.W .2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1 9 9 3 ). Howeve r, in some instances, an office r’s activation of his or her emer g ency blue lights will not constitute a detention, such as when the office r turns on the emerg ency lights for rea sons of safety

. See W illiams, 185 S.W .3d at 318. W hile it is
arg uable that Serg eant Russ ell initially activate d his blue l ights as a s af et y m ea s ure, give n that he

was driving down the exit ramp ag ainst the flow of traff ic, the parties have ag ree d that Mr. Hanning

4and his truck wer e detained when, with its blue lights flashing
, Serg eant Russell pulled his patrol car

very close to the front of Mr. Hanning ’s truck. A rea sonable person in Mr. Hanning ’s place would have believed he was not fre e to leave when the patrol car was parke d in front of the truck, blocking its ex it.

Having established the moment of detention, we must next deter mine whether the detention

was justified by rea sonable suspicion of criminal activity

. I n deter mining whether an investiga tory detention is based upon rea sonable suspicion, we eng ag e in a “fa ct-intensive and objective analy sis,” revie wing the rec ord for “spec ific and articula ble fac ts, that the defe ndant had committed, or was about to commit, a criminal offe nse.” See id. at 318-19. Rea sonable suspicion must be supported by something more t han the office r’s “inchoate and unparticula rized suspici o n o r ‘h u nch.’” Day
, 263 S.W .3d at 902 (quoting Terr y , 392 U.S. at 27). Howeve r, “‘r easona ble suspicion can be established with information that is differ ent in quantity or content than that requir ed t o establish probable cause ’” an d “c an ar i se from information that is less reliable than that require d to show probable cause .” I d. at 903 (quoting Pulley , 863 S.W .2d at 32).

When information is rec eived from an ano ny mous informant, as occur red in the instant matter, there is an enhanc ed conce rn as to whether the information is reliable or whether it was fabr icated. State v. Wil hoit, 962 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 2, 487 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Thus, in order to

ensure reliability
, befor e a motor ve hicle ca n be validly

detained ba sed upon informa tion rece ived from an anony

mous informant, there must be a showing of both 1) the basis of the informant’s knowledg e of the convey ed information and 2) the informant’s cre dibilit y

. Day
, 263 S.W .3d at 903 (citing Pul l ey , 8 6 3 S.W .2d at 31). The difficulty in utiliz ing this two-prong test to assess the reliability of a tip rec eived from an informant whose identit y i s u n k n own is rea dily appar ent. Ho we ver, any defic iencies in demonstrating reliability based upon this test can be cur ed b y an in v e s ti g a ti n g o f f ic e r ’ s in d e p e n dent corr oboration of the anony mously provided informati o n

. Wi lh o it
, 962 S.W .2d at 487.

I n the ca se befor e us, we first consider whether the basis of the c aller’ s knowledg e and the caller ’s cre dibilit y wer e established in acc ord with the two-pron g t es t for reliability

. Whil e the

re co rd does not show the caller ’s basis of knowledg e, we have noted that “[w]hen an informant
repor ts an incident at or ne ar the time of its occurr ence , a cour t can often assume that the re port is first-hand, and hence reliable

. ” Pulley
, 863 S.W .2d at 32. We have further held that this contempora

neity of the caller ’s observa ti on and the call, coupled with an office r’s verific ation of details of the caller ’s observa tions shortly afte r rec eiving the call, can be sufficie nt to satisfy the basis of knowled ge p ro n g o f o ur i nquiry

. Wil hoit, 962 S.W .2d at 487-88. I n this case , the anony mous caller repor

ted that a black “18-w heele r” was being driven rec klessly on the interstate and had taken the Hig hway 72 exit

. The call sug ges t ed that the caller was repor ting the rec kless driving as it

occur red. Wit hin mere minutes of rec eiving the dispatch, Serg eant Russell confirme d that there was a truc k matching the g ener al desc ription give n by the caller at the loca tion described by the ca ller. The confirma tion of this information in close proxi mity to its rec eipt was sufficie nt to demonstrate the ca ller’s ba sis of knowledg e. See id. a t 488.

5Whil e the anony mity of the calle r prec luded direc t verific ation of the caller ’s cre dibilit y , Serg eant Russell’s inde pendent corr oboration of cer tain details provided by the caller
, specific ally the ty pe of vehicle (truck trac tor and trailer)
, its color (blac k), its location (Hig hway 72 exit ramp), and its direc tion of trave l ( n orthbound), was sufficie nt to satisfy the cre dibilit y prong of the reliability inquiry

. See id. Fur

thermore
, when Serg eant Russell ob s er v ed the truck, it was parke d in the 6

emer g ency lane of the exit ramp. Whil e this was not a statutory offe nse at the t i m e, i t was a 7 sufficie ntly unusual circ umstance to arouse Serg eant Russell’s suspicion that the truck was the one repor ted by the ca ller as ha

ving be en drive n rec klessly

.

Mr. Hanning asser

ts that Serg eant Russell did not persona lly observe the truck being driven

rec klessly and, cit ing Florida v. J .L
., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), arg ues that Serg eant Russell’s

corr oboration of details observa ble or available to any one did not establish rea sonable suspicion. I n Florida v. J .L
., the United States Supreme Court held that an anony mous caller ’s repor

t that a suspect at a specific bus stop was car ry ing a conce aled g un did not cre ate rea sonable suspicion sufficie nt to justify the suspect being stopped and frisked by law enfor ceme nt office rs. The Court indicated that the anony

mous caller ’s failure to provide predic tive informatio n about the subject’s future movements left the police without any means to confirm that the i nformant had inside knowledg e about the subject that would have lent cr ed i b i lity to the caller ’s char g e that the defe ndant was eng ag ed in c riminal activity

. 529 U.S. a t 272. We f

ind the circ umstances of

the instant case to be distinguishable f

rom the fa cts in Florida v. J.L . in severa l way s.

First, a repor

t of readily observa

ble evidence of rec kless driving car ries a higher deg ree of inhere nt r eliability than does a repor t of a conce aled wea

pon. The basis of the tipster’s knowledg e is appar ent when the repor ted criminal activity is open to observa tion by the g ener al public, wher eas the basis of the tipster’s knowledg e of a conce aled crime is unknown, absent pro o f of inside information supporting the alleg ation. See Blooming dale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1219 (De l. 2004). Fur thermore
, when a tipster seeks to repor t the location of a rec kless driver at the time the rec kless driving is observe d or shortly there af ter, the tipster has a very brief amount of time to contac t the police, and the likelihood that the alleg ation is f abric ated is pr oportionately diminis hed. See id. at

A s n o t e d
, t h e c a l l e r a l s o d e s c r i b e d t h e t r u c k a s h a v i n g “ 1

- 8 0 0

- G o S m i t h ” o r “ G o S m i t h B r o t h e r s ” o n t h e b a c k

. 6
W h i l e S e r g e a n t R u s s e l l o b s e r v e d t h e w o r d s “ S m i t h ” a n d “ t r a n s p o r t ” o n t h e d o o r o f M r

. H a n n i n g ’ s t r u c k
, h e d i d n o t m a k e t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e d e t e n t i o n w a s c o m p l e t e , a n d t h e r e f o r e c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h i s a s p e c t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y t h e c a l l e r c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e f u r t h e r j u s t i f

i c a t i o n f o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p

.

E f f e c t i v e A p r i l 7
, 2 0 0 8
, s u b s e c t i o n ( c ) w a s a d d e d t o T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 5 5

- 8

- 1 5 8 a n d p r o v i d e s 7 i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t a s f

o l l o w s :

[ N ] o p e r s o n s h a l l s t o p , p a r k o r l e a v e a n y m o t o r v e h i c l e , w h e t h e r a t t e n d e d o r

u n a t t e n d e d
, u p o n t h e p a v e d o r u n p a v e d p o r t i o n s o f a n y e n t r a n c e o r e x i t r a m p o f a n y h i g h w a y ; p r o v i d e d
, t h a t a d r i v e r o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e t h a t h a s b e c o m e d i s a b l e d m a y l e a v e t h e v e h i c l e o n a n e n t r a n c e o r e x i t r a m p u n t i l s u c h t i m e a s t h e d i s a b l e d m o t o r

v e h i c l e c a n b e r e p a i r e d o r t o w e d
, a s l o n g a s t h e v e h i c l e i s n o t o b s t r u c t i n g t h e p a s s a g e o f o t h e r m o t o r v e h i c l e s

. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e d e p a r t m e n t m a y t a k e i n t o

c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n e m e r g e n c y s i t u a t i o n o r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h f e d e r a l l a w s

. T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 5

- 8

- 1 5 8 ( c ) ( 2 0 0 8 )

.
61 2 2 0. By contra st, a ti pster reporting a concea led weapon i s not subject t o such t ime restric t i o n s

.

And finally
, the rela tively limit ed amount of time available to repor t the location of a moving vehicle also diminis hes the possibili ty that the tip mere ly constitutes an attempt by the tipster to employ law enfor ceme nt officia ls for the purpose of hara ssment. See id. L og istically
, but for the corr oboration require ments imposed by the Court in Florida v. J .L
., it would be a simple matter to fabr icate a repor t of a conce aled wea

pon that would expose an individual to a stop and frisk. Howeve r, in order to use the p o l i ce fo r hara ssment by falsely repor ting that an individual is driving rec klessly
, the tipster would be require d to know not only that the person he seeks to hara ss is driving a particula r vehicle
at a specific time and location, but also that at the time the repor t is made, an office r will be in close
enoug h proxi mity to the subject to promptly execute a stop of the vehicle. Given the intricac ies and improbabilities that would be involved in seeking to hara ss another by a repor t of rec kless or err atic driving
, it se ems hig hly

unlikely that such a r eport will ha ve been fabr icated for that purpose. See Blooming dale, 842 A.2d at 1220 (conc luding that, beca use repor ting err atic driv ing “is such an intricate, improbable, and imprecise method of harassing another ,” the r isk of a tip being falsified by an informa

nt is “signific antly

reduc ed”)

.
Second, the level of intrusion prese nted by the actions of law enfor ceme nt officia ls in the two

case s is differe nt. I n Florida v.J .L
., the stop a

nd frisk conducte d by the office rs in the fede ral c ase entailed phy sical contac t betwee n the office rs and the suspect, wher eas the intervention in this case initially amounted to a brief detention and did not entail phy sical contac t betwee n Serg eant Russell and Mr. Ha n n i n g

. See S tate v. Boy ea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000) (re cog nizi ng that the l iberty interest at stake in a brief motor vehicle stop does not rise to the level that confr onted the Court in Florida v. J .L .); see also United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 737 (8 t h Cir. 2001) (stating that investi gat ory stop of motor vehicle is “conside rably less invasive, both phy sically and
psy cholog ically , than the fr isk on a public corne r that wa s at issue in [Florida v.] J .L .”).

Finally
, and mos t importantly
, the degr ee of dang er a nd urg ency for imm ediate action t hat confr onted the office rs in Florida v. J .L

. was much lower than that confr onting Serg eant Russell in this case

. A repor

t that a vehicle is being driven rec klessly or err atically sug g ests that the driver may be under the influence of alcohol or drug s, see State v. Rutz inski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 526 (Wis. 2001) (“Er ratic driving is one possible sign of intox icated use of a motor vehicle.” ), fatig ued, or in phy sical distress and ther efor e incapa ble of c ontrolling his or he r vehic le. While a conce aled we apon does
not of itself prese nt an imminent dang er of harm to the public, a truck driven rec klessly does prese nt such a dang er. Although the truck was parke d at the moment it was located by Serg eant Russell, it could have been moving and back on the interstate in a matter of seconds, and we do not believe that Serg eant Russell was obliga ted to wait until the truck was back on the interstate and moving to confirm the repor

t of rec kless driving

. Had he done so, the first indication that the caller ’s repor t of

rec kless driving was corr ect might well have been a collision betwee n the truck and another vehicle, resulting in injury or death to Mr. Ha nning a nd/or other membe rs of the public. I n Florida v. J .L
., the Court acknow ledg ed that under some circ umstances, such as wher e a person is repor ted to be

car ry ing a bomb, the dang er alleg ed by an anony mous caller might b e s o gre at that some lesser indicia of reliability would be suff icient to justify

a fr isk. 529 U.S. at 273-74. A truck trac tor and trailer being driven rec klessly on the interstate is sufficie ntly analog ous to a bomb to war rant prompt

7intervention and investiga tion by law enfor ceme nt officia ls. See Boy ea, 765 A.2d at 867 (stating that

“a drunk driver is not at all unlike a ‘bomb,’ and a mo b i l e o n e at t h at.”); acc ord Rutz inski, 623 N.W.2d at 526.

Mr. Hanning also relies on State v. Coleman, 791 S.W .2d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989), in support of his arg ument that Serg eant Russell lacke d rea sonable suspicion to justify a detention. I n Coleman, an informant advised law enfor cemen t o fficials that at a specifie d time, the s ubject in a

car of a particula

r color, model, and make would be t ra n s p o rt i n g m arijuana on Hig hway 431 to a location on Washington Road in Robertson County

. At t h e t i m e specifie d by the caller
, a deputy located a car matching the descr iption trave ling on Hig hway 431 toward Robertson County

. After following the vehicle for a b ri ef time, the deputy initiated a stop, sear ched the vehicle with the driver’ s consent, and discovere d sever al pounds of marijuana

. The Court of Criminal Appea ls held that the stop was invalid beca use the informant’s cre dibilit y and basis of knowledg e wer e not sufficie ntly established by the deputy ’s independe nt corr oboration of the information provided. I n

so h o l d i n g, t h e Court noted that law enfor ceme nt officia ls failed to make any inquiry as to the driver’ s identity or her reputa tion with respe ct to the use or sale of illega l drug s. Coleman, 791 S.W .2d at 506. We find Coleman to be distinguishable from the prese nt case

. I n Coleman, althoug h the informant’s identity was appar ently known, law enfor ceme nt officia ls failed to make any attempt to verify the informant’s cre dibilit y

. Coleman is also distinguishable from the matter now befor e us in that the criminal activity repor ted by the caller in that case (transpor tation of drug s) did not prese nt an imminent threat of ha

rm to the public.

I n the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. J .L

. and consistent with our above analy sis differ enti ating that case from the prese nt one, one United States Circuit Court of Appea ls and a multit ude of state jurisdictions have ruled that an investiga tory stop may be initiated on the basis of an anony mous repor

t of err atic, rec kless or drunk d ri ving, even without

corr oboration of any criminal activity by law enfor ceme nt officia ls. See Cottrell v. State, 971 So.2d 735, 745-46 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2006); People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 8 1 5 -1 6 (Cal. 2006); Blooming dale, 842 A.2d at 1219-20; State v. Prend er gas t, 83 P.3d 714 (Ha w. 2004); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 630 (I owa 2001); State v. Crawf ord, 67 P.3d 115, 119-20 (Ka n. 2003); S t at e v

. Ba rr as , No. 2009 KA 0014, 2009 WL 1717166, at *4-5 (L a. App. 1. Cir. J une 19, 2009); State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004); State v. Contrera s, 79 P.3d 1111, 1117-18 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003); People v. J eff ery , 2 A.D.3d 1271, 1 2 7 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Boy ea, 765 A.2d
at 868; Wheat, 278 F.3d at 729. We find g uidance in all of these case s in rea ching a conclusion in the prese nt matter. We are also g uided in our decision by specific fac tors rec og nized by this Court in State v. Pull ey , 863 S.W .2d 29, 33 (Tenn. 1993)

.

I n Pulley
, the police rec eived two anony mous repor

ts indicating that a man driving a y ellow For d L .T.D. in a specifie d trailer park was arm ed with a shotgun and was “supposed to shoot someone.” 863 S.W .2d at 29. The police found the subjec t in a vehicle matching the descr iption,
not a t the named trailer park, but pa rked at a near

by g as station. The investiga ting office r testified that when he arr ived at the g as station, he turned on his blue lights, approa ched the subject’s car , and asked him to step out, at which time he saw a shotgun on the car ’s floorboar d. He arr ested the

8subject on sever al char g es that included possessing various wea pons with the intent to g o arme d and driving under the influence

. Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appea ls ag ree d that the

wea pons and the results of a blood alcohol test should be suppressed, presumably upon g rounds that the investiga ting office r did not have rea sonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. We

reve rsed upon consideration of the following three fac tors: “‘( i) t h e p u b l i c i ntere st serve d by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the o b jective fac ts upon which the law enfor ceme nt office r relied in light of his knowledg e and experience .’” Pulley
, 863 S

. W

. 2 d at 3 4 (quoting Mendenha ll, 446 U.S. at 561). We deter mined that 1) the stop serve d the public’s interest in the preve ntion of violent crime; 2) the scope of what was intended to be a temporar y stop was minor; 3) the timely nature of the anony mous repor

t i n d i ca t i n g t h at the caller was an ey ewitness verifie d the caller’s basis of knowledge ; and 4) the corrobora tion of many of the de tails descr ibed by the caller “provide d some basis to believe the informant was cre dible.” I d. at 34. We conclude d that “g iven the threa t of violence, the police had ‘spec ific and ar t i cu lable fac ts’ to war rant the investiga tory stop,” id., and we rec og nized “t he need for immediate police action in response to serious threa ts of harm,” stating that the “re liability of the informant’s tip is not the only deter minant of the rea sonablene ss of the stop. The content of the tip is also a cruc ial fac tor and, in particula r, the level of da

ng er tha t the tip revea ls,” id. at 32.

Although Pulley did not involve a repor t of rec kless driving
, we believe that a re port of a truck trac tor and trailer being driven rec klessly on the interstate poses a sufficie ntly high deg ree of threa t of imminent hazard to wa rr ant prompt investiga tion by law enfor ceme nt officia ls. Wit h

s p ecif ic ref ere nce to the three fac tors desig nated in Pulley
, we conclude that Serg eant R u s s el l ’s detention of Mr. Hanning serve d the public’s interest in the preve ntion of rec kless driving ; the scope of what was intended to be a temporar y stop was minor; and in light of th ese considerations, the caller ’s basis of knowledg e and cre dibilit y wer e suffi ciently corr oborate d by Serg eant Russell to establish reliability

. Taking into acc ount these three fac tors and bear ing in mind the high deg ree of dang er prese nted by the anony mous tip, we hold that the war rantless detention of Mr. Hanning and his truck wer e justified upon re asonable suspicion of criminal ac tivity

.

As we indicated in Pulley
, an office r’s action should be evalua ted “in light of one’s rea ction had [t he office r] failed to act.” I d. at 33. I n this case , had Serg eant Russell ref raine d from detaining Mr. Ha nning and allowed him to resume driving
, either Mr. Hanning or another member of the public may well have been killed or injured. We emphasize the importance of this consideration in

our decision here in. As we have noted above, rec kless or err atic driving indicates that the driver may be impaired as the result of an intox icant. Rece nt statistics of the National Hig hway Transpor tation Safety Administration show that in 2007 approximately 13,000 people wer e killed by drunk drivers nationally
, and the citizens of Tenne ssee are not exempt from this ong oing trag edy

. The imminent

8 dang er prese nted by drunk driving and the public’s interest in eliminating this problem are obvious and indisputable.

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9I n holding that detention was justified in the prese nt case , we do not intend to imply that the

extent of corr oboration provided by Serg eant Russell will, as a g eneral matter, be sufficie nt to establish reliab il it

y o f a n ony mously provided information, but only that such deg ree of corr oboration

c a n b e s u f f ic ie n t to e stablish such reliability when independe nt corr oboration of the repor ted criminal activity is not fea sible beca use there is a high risk of imminent injury or death equivalent to the risk posed by a truck trac tor and trailer being rec klessly driven on the interstate. Fur t h ermore , we are comp el led to emphasize that the content of the tip is of critica l signific ance

. Thus, the deg ree of

corr oboration that was sufficie nt to establish reliability in this case may not be sufficie nt wher e the
nature of the activity repor ted and any associate d imminent dang er cannot be rea sonably inferr ed from the infor

mation convey ed by the informant. See State v. Day
, 263 S.W .3d 891 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that office r lacke d rea sonable suspicion to stop suspect wher e sto p wa s b as ed solely on anony mous driver fla shing he r lig hts, waving her a rms, and pointing a

t suspect’s vehic le).

Having justifiably detained Mr. Hanning based upon rea sonab l e s u s p icion of criminal activity , Serg eant Russell approa ched the door of the truck where he obs erve d the Smith l og o and
proper ly asked Mr. Hanning to step from the truck. See State v. Be rrios, 235 S.W .3d 99, 106 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Pennsy lvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977) (holding that once a vehicle has been lawfully detained, an office r may , as a matter of course , order t h e d ri v er t o step out of the vehicle) ). There afte r, S er geant Russell proper ly administered field sobriety tests, establishing probable cause to arre st Mr. Hanningfor dr iving unde r the influenc e.

I n summary , we hold that in this case the anony mous tip repor

ting rec kless driving sug g ested

a sufficie ntly high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to w arr ant immediate intervention by law enfor ceme nt officia ls and justified the brief investi gat o ry stop by Serg eant R u ssell beca

use the offe nse was repor ted at or near the time of its occur renc e, and t h e re p o rt indicated that the cal le r w a s w it n essing an ong oing offe nse; the repor t provided a detailed descr iption

o f M r. Hanning ’s truck, its direc tion of trave l and location; and Serg eant Russell verifie d thes e details within moments of the dispatch re porting the tip.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing rea sons, on the cer tified question prese nted, we h o l d t h at Serg eant Russell’s war

rantless detention of Mr. Hanning and his truck was valid beca use it was supported by

rea sonable suspicion that Mr. Hanning had committed or was about to commit a crime. Acc ording ly
, we aff irm the judgme nt of the Court of Criminal Appe als. The costs of this a ppeal are assessed to J err y L ee H anning , and his surety , for whic h execution may issue if nec essar

y

.

_________________________________________ SHARON G. L EE, J USTI CE

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