Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A05-1611-CR-2714 | April 28, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Weineke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dacia N. Ward,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

84A05-1611-CR-2714

Appeal from the Vigo Superior 

Court

The Honorable David R. Bolk, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

84D03-1606-F5-1587

84D03-1502-F6-475

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Dacia N. Ward (“Ward”) appeals his sentence for his conviction of Level 6 

felony failure to return to lawful detention1 and his sentence enhancement for 

his adjudication as an habitual offender.2 He argues that his sentence was 

inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. Because we 

conclude that his sentence was not inappropriate, we affirm the trial court’s 

sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether Ward’s sentence was inappropriate under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B).

Facts

[3] Following convictions for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and 

Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia in Cause Number 84D03-

1502-F6-475 (“Cause 475”), Ward was placed in a Vigo County Work Release 

Program on June 8, 2016. He was advised of the rules and procedures for work 

release, and he signed the work release center’s “Resident Rules and 

Regulations” form. He also initialed the following rule:

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-44.1-3-4(c).

2

I.C. § 35-50-2-8. This statute has since been amended, but we will apply the statute that was in effect at the 

time of Ward’s offense.
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7. ESCAPE: If Resident leaves the facility without being 

scheduled out or released by a VCCC staff member, fails to 

return to the facility at scheduled return time, or if a Resident is 

somewhere outside the facility without prior approval he/she will 

be charged with the crime of escape.

(State’s Ex. 2 at 2). 

[4] Two days after his entry into the program, Ward was authorized to leave work 

release at 8:00 a.m. to search for a job. He was required to return to work 

release at noon that day but failed to return as required. He never contacted 

work release to explain his whereabouts and never returned to the work release

center.

[5] As a result of Ward’s failure to return to the work release center, the State 

charged him with Level 5 felony escape and Level 6 felony failure to return to 

lawful detention and alleged that Ward was an habitual offender. Additionally, 

the Probation Department alleged that he had violated his probation in Cause 

475. 

[6] At a jury trial on the charges, the State presented evidence of the above facts. A 

case manager with work release testified that individuals in the work release 

program were instructed to call “immediately” if circumstances arose while 

they were away from work release and they were unable to return by the 

expected time. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 32). The jury found Ward not guilty of his escape 

charge but guilty of Level 6 felony failure to return to lawful detention. 
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[7] Next, the jury heard evidence on Ward’s habitual offender allegation. The 

State presented evidence that Ward had prior unrelated convictions for Class C 

felony burglary in 2012 and Class B felony burglary in 2004, in addition to his 

conviction for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine for which he had 

been placed in work release. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found 

that Ward was an habitual offender. 

[8] Thereafter, at a separate hearing, Ward admitted to violating his probation for 

his Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine conviction in Cause 475 

when he failed to return to work release. 

[9] The trial court held a hearing on Ward’s probation revocation sanction and his 

sentence in the instant cause. At the hearing, the State requested that Ward 

receive the maximum sentence, noting that Ward had been convicted of five 

prior misdemeanors, five prior felonies, and had violated probation multiple 

times. Ward’s counsel proffered the mitigating factors that Ward had a teenage 

daughter and elderly father that needed him, that Ward had not received the 

addiction counseling he needed, and that Ward suffered from mental illness. In 

response, the State noted that even though Ward continued to have substance 

addiction problems, he had been through several treatment programs for his 

addictions. Specifically, he had “received plenty of options and opportunities at 

treatment” and yet “continue[d] to reoffend.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 13). Ward testified 

that he was remorseful for his actions and said that he had not known “what to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A05-1611-CR-2714 | April 28, 2017 Page 5 of 8

do at the time” of his offense because his brother had killed himself.

3

 (Tr. Vol. 4 

at 15).

[10] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Ward’s probation 

violation, the violation of his pre-trial release, and criminal history at the time 

he committed his offense were aggravating factors. The trial court noted that 

the significance of Ward’s criminal history was “over and above” that which 

was required to adjudicate Ward an habitual offender. (Tr. 18). Specifically, 

Ward had “essentially been on probation, parole, [or] had a case pending[] 

since [1990] or [1992].” (Tr. 18). Based on these factors, the trial court ordered 

Ward to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence in Cause 

475. It also sentenced Ward to two and one half (21⁄2) years for his failure to 

return to lawful detention conviction in the instant case and ordered it to be 

enhanced by five (5) years for his adjudication as an habitual offender. Ward 

now appeals. 

Decision

[11] On appeal, Ward argues that his aggregate sentence of seven and one half (71⁄2) 

years was inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.4 

While sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, a 

reviewing court may revise a sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) if, “after 

 

3 Ward did not testify to the date or circumstances of his brother’s death other than to say that his brother

killed himself. 

4 Ward does not appeal the trial court’s order in Cause 475 that he serve his previously suspended sentence. 
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due consideration of the trial court’s decision,” it finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 493 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g,

875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007); Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1079-80 (Ind. 

2006) (quoting Ind. App. R. 7(B)). This Court is not required to use “great 

restraint,” but we nevertheless exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing 

decision, both because Appellate Rule 7(B) requires that we give “due 

consideration” to that decision and because we recognize the unique 

perspective a trial court has when making decisions. Stewart v. State, 866 

N.E.2d 858, 865-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The “principal role of appellate 

review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers and identify some guiding 

principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing 

statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).

[12] The sentencing range for Ward’s Level 6 felony conviction was six (6) months 

to two and one half (21⁄2) years, with an advisory sentence of one (1) year. I.C. 

§ 35-50-2-7. The sentencing range for his habitual offender enhancement was 

two (2) to six (6) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-8. Accordingly, Ward’s aggregate 

sentence was one (1) year less than the maximum sentence he could have 

received.

[13] Ward argues that this sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of his 

offense because the offense neither caused nor threatened serious harm to 
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people or property. He also claims that he failed to return to work release 

because his brother killed himself. 

[14] While Ward did not threaten serious harm to people or property, it is notable 

that Ward failed to return to work release merely two days after he signed the 

work release center’s rules and regulations, which provided that he was 

required to return to the center at a designated time. He also failed to call the 

center and report his whereabouts or his reasons for failing to return to the 

center. 

[15] As for his character, Ward argues that much of his criminal history was related 

to his severe drug addiction and mental illness. He also notes that he had a 

difficult childhood and that he was sincerely remorseful for the “damage he had 

caused to his family and to the court by failing to return to work release.” 

(Ward’s Br. 8).

[16] We, however, do not find that the trial court’s sentence was inappropriate. 

Ward had a significant criminal history at the time of the current offense, 

including five prior felony convictions and five prior misdemeanor convictions. 

He had been offered leniency several times in the past through probation and 

parole and had violated the conditions of his probation multiple times. As the 

trial court noted, Ward has “essentially been on probation, parole, [or] had a 

case pending[] since [1990] or [1992].” (Tr. 18). Also, with respect to Ward’s 

drug addictions, the trial court addressed his arguments and told him: “after 

twenty-three (23) years, you know, you’ve got to figure out a way, or to find a 
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way to deal with it outside the criminal justice system, and you’ve been—for 

whatever reason, you’ve been unable or unwilling [] to do that . . . .” (Tr. Vol. 

4 at 19). We agree with the trial court’s evaluation. While Ward has struggled 

with drugs for a significant portion of his life and had a difficult childhood, at 

some point he has to find a way to deal with those factors outside of the 

criminal justice system. His extensive criminal history and his violations of 

probation—including the probation he was on when he committed the instant 

offense—indicate that he has not done so. Moreover, they demonstrate his 

blatant disregard for the law and the past leniency he has been granted. 

Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s sentence was not inappropriate.

[17] Affirmed. 

[18] May, J., and Brown, J., concur.