1 James Ne ely succ eed ed M ichae l M agill as C omm issioner of the T enne ssee D epa rtmen t of La bor and

W orkforce Development. Accordingl y, James Neely has been subst itu ted as the part

y defen dant purs uant t o Rule 19(c) Tenn. R. App. P. (when an of fice r of t he sta te ceas es to hold of fice , th e offi cer’s success or is automati call y subst itu ted as a p arty). 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on

Briefs N ovembe

r 7, 2003 ANTUAN J. FOXX v. JAMES NEELY, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 02-1743-1 Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor

No. M2003-01634-COA-R3-CV - Filed Nove mber 21, 2003

This is an appeal by a

former employee whose unemployment c ompensation benefits were denied on the basis of w ork-related misc onduct, sp ecifica lly for allegedly refusing to perform certain wor k as requested by a supervisor. The

claim for benefits was denied by the Employment

Security Division of the Tennessee Department of L abor and Workforce

Development. The employee filed a petition with the Ch ancery

Court for judicial r eview. T he Chanc ery

Court aff irmed. Th

e employ ee asse rts that the denial of his claim is not supported by substantial and material evidence. We find there is substantial and material evidence to support the denial of benefits and a ffirm the trial court. Tenn.R. App. P.3 Appeal as of right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed and Remanded
F RANK G. C LEMENT , J R ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W IL LI AM C. K OCH , J R ., P.J., M.S., and W IL LI AM B. C AIN , J., joined.
Fra nk J. Sc anlo n, Na shville, T enne ssee , for the a ppel lant, Antua

n J. Fo xx. Paul G. Summers , Attorne y General and Repor

ter; and Warren A . Jasper, A ssistant Attorney Genera l, for the appellee James Neely , C omm issioner, Tennessee Department of L abor and Workforce Develop ment. 12 Te nn. R. C t. App . 10 sta tes:
Th is Co urt, with the concur rence of al l ju dges parti cipat ing in t he cas e, mayaff

irm, reve rse or mod ify the action s of the trial c ourt b y memora ndum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedenti al val ue. When a case is deci de d by memora ndum opinion i t shal l be desi gnated “MEMORANDU M OP INI ON ,” shall no t be p ublishe d, and shall no t be cite d or relie d on for any reason i n any un relat ed case. -2- MEMORAN

DUM OP

INION 2 Antuan J. Foxx (Foxx) was employed by Char ging Sy stems Internationa l , Inc . (CSI ). CSI manufactures ba tt er y ch ar ge rs . F ox x’ s p ri ma ry f u nction wa s to mount tr

ansform ers on ci rcuit boa rds. Fox x was initially compensated on a n hourly basis; however , his compensation was changed to a piece-work

rate by whic

h he was paid by the number of transformers he

mounted to

circuit b oards. Neverth eless, CSI reserved the rig ht to assign different work to Fo xx with the understanding that Foxx may be paid by

different methods and amounts of compensation for the other work.
On November 14, 2001, Foxx’s super visor in structed Foxx to work a

t a diffe rent ar ea to perform a d if fe re nt fu nc ti on . S pe ci fi ca ll y, Foxx was asked to mounta transformer for a special orde r. The new assignment

required more time to assemble than the mounting process at F oxx’s primary work stati on. Realiz ing that the new assignment was more time consuming , Foxx requested a specific increa se in his piece-work rate of pay ment in order to not reduce the amount of money he wo uld mak e in a day. Thoug h company off

icials refused to give a specific incr ease, Foxx was assuredthey

would “f igure o ut” a rate of compensation later. Foxx refused to perform the new duties until he was assured of his exact pay . His supervisor admonished him and asked Foxx if he would be willing to sign a

statement confirming his refusal to accept the assignment. Foxx ultimately agreed to do the requested wor

k and repor ted to the appropriate area of the plant to do the work f or the special orde r. Upon arriving at the new work station, Foxx determined that there wa s insufficient work for him to

do, specifically tha

tth er e w as an in su ff

ic ie nt su pp ly o f t ra ns fo rm er s t o r em ai n b us y. Foxxunilaterally left the ne w assignment , returned to his normal work station, and did not subseque ntly inquire to see if his services were needed f or the special order. Later that evening the CSI producti on manag er disco vered th at not all o f the special order had been assembled and ascertained

that Foxx had

left his new as signment. The following day Foxx was terminated for insubordination for not assembling the special order as instructed.
Foxxapplied for unemployme nt compensation benefit s. His cla imwas deni ed on the b asis that Foxx was guilty of work-re lated misconduct.
The issue presented is whether there is substantial and material evidenc e to suppo rt th e decision of the Department of La bor an d Wor kforce Development that Foxx was guiltyof workrelated misconduct disqualify ing him for benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(a )(2).-3-

The standard for judicial review of decisions of the B oard of Review granting or deny ing unemployment

compensa

tion benefits is set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-304(I) (2) and (3). The pertine nt provisions are a s follows: (2) The chancellor may

affirm the decision of the [Board of Revi ew] or . . . may reverse, remand o

r modif ythe decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced

because the administrativefindings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (A) In vio lation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (B) I n excess of the statutory authority of the agency ; (C) Made upon unlawful procedure; (D) Arbitrary or capricious or char

acterized by

abuse of discr etion or c learly

unwarr anted exe rcise of discretion; or

(E) Unsupported by

evidencewhich is both substantial and material in light of the entire record. (3) In d et er mi ni ng th e s ub st an ti al it y o f eviden ce, the c hancell or shall ta

ke into account whatever in the record

fairly detrac ts from its w eight, but the ch ancello r shall no t subst itute the chancellor’s judgment for that of the boar d of review as to the weight of the ev idence on questions of fact

. No decision of the board shall be reversed, remanded or modif ied by the chancellor u

nless for errors which affect the merits of the final decision of the board. . . .
Wh en reviewing the decision of the Boar d of Review, the issue is not whether there i s evidencein the record that might contradict the decision of the Board of Review, but whether there is substantial evidence to support that decision. Jackson v. Bible , 611 S .W.2d 588, 5 90 (Tenn . Ct. App.1 980). So lo ng as th ere is any eviden ce that suppo rts t he agenc y’s factua l find ings , judicia l review is limited to questions of law. Id. at 590. It is genera lly held that courts must affirm the B oard of Review if

there is a ny e vid ence to supp ort the B oard’s d ecision, unless the

Board’ s decisio n is contrary to the law. Perryma

n v. Bible , 653 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983).
The Board of Review found that there was suff icient evidence of misconduct, that his failure to follow his supervisor’s instructions constituted work-rel ated misc onduct and that such conduct disqualified him from unemployment benef its as work-related misconduct under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(a)(2). The Chancellor affirmed the decision of the Board of Revie w, finding the decision was supported by substantial and mater ial evidence, and dismissed the Petition for Judicial Review. We also find that there is substantial and material evidence to support the decision.
Ac co rd in gl y, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are assessed agains t the Appellant , Antu an J. Foxx.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE