1The Honorable Henry L. Jones, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 99-4187

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Almeter Overton, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of *

Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: November 3, 2000

 Filed: November 28, 2000

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Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Almeter Overton appeals the District Court’s1 order affirming the

Commissioner’s decision to deny her application for disability insurance benefits.
2Overton had applied for disability insurance benefits in August 1991, and was

granted a closed period of disability from May 1989 to June 1991.

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Overton alleged disability since October 19912 from a bad back, leg numbness, nerves,

and insomnia. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that she

had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the full range of light and

sedentary work, as she had no nonexertional impairments, and could thus perform her

past relevant work (PRW) as a sewing-machine operator (classified as light work in the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles); and alternatively, based on the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines, she was not disabled. In an attached psychiatric review technique form,

the ALJ found that her mental impairments were not severe.

On appeal, Overton argues that the ALJ erred in finding her capable of

performing her PRW or light work, as she consistently complained of back pain, her

MRI showed spinal-canal narrowing, and the opinion of her treating physician, Leon

Waddy, M.D., as to her RFC was given no weight. Overton also argues that the ALJ

improperly relied on the observations of the consulting psychologist, Dr. Charles

Spellman, and incorrectly concluded that her mental impairments were not severe.

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s findings are

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Cunningham v. Apfel,

222 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review). 

Overton’s characterization of her reports of back pain is not entirely accurate,

because, as the ALJ noted, there were significant periods of time—December 1991 to

July 1992, and July 1993 to October 1994—after the alleged onset date of October

1991 during which she sought no treatment for back pain. See Siemers v. Shalala, 47

F.3d 299, 301-02 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding substantial evidence, based in part on

claimant's failure to seek regular medical treatment, to support ALJ's decision to

discredit complaints of disabling pain). The April 1991 MRI report also supported the

ALJ’s determination that she was able to do light work, as it indicated no nerve-root
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compression; additionally, Dr. Collins’s later neurological findings were normal.

Although the ALJ did not reference Dr. Waddy’s July 1992 RFC opinion, it was

conclusory (as Overton admits) and it was based on an unexplained and unsupported

diagnosis of “lumbar disc syndrome.” See Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1494

(8th Cir. 1995) (affirming ALJ's assessment of treating physician’s opinion as

unsupported by objective medical tests or diagnostic data and not conclusive in

disability determination; weight given to treating physician’s opinion is limited if it is

only conclusory statement). Thus, we conclude that the ALJ’s RFC findings were

based on the medical records (which he summarized), observations of the treating and

consulting physicians and others, including Overton’s chiropractor, and Overton’s own

testimony, as required. See Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995).

Contrary to Overton’s assertion, the ALJ did not base his findings as to her

alleged depression and anxiety solely on Dr. Spellman’s observations; he also relied

on the minimal number of notations in her medical records related to mental problems,

the lack of abnormalities assessed by Dr. Collins in his mental-status examination, and

the absence of treatment by mental health professionals or prescriptions for psychiatric

medications. Accordingly, his conclusion that Overton’s depression and anxiety were

not severe is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Callahan, 122 F.3d 1148,

1153 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding substantial evidence supported ALJ's conclusion that

claimant did not have severe mental impairment, where claimant was not undergoing

regular mental-health treatment or regularly taking psychiatric medications, and where

his daily activities were not restricted from emotional causes). 

As to the IQ test results obtained during Dr. Spellman’s evaluation of Overton,

Dr. Spellman opined they were not indicative of her true level of intellectual functioning

based upon the way she handled herself and his suspicion that she deliberately gave

incorrect answers. Further, the scores were the product of a one-time assessment; her

medical records do not reflect a suspected intellectual impairment; and she at one time

drove, cooked, and performed household tasks. See Clark v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1253,
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1255-56 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing factors weighing against validity of IQ test scores).

Finally, Overton did not raise impaired intellectual functioning as a basis for disability

in her applications or at the hearing, see Sullins v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 601, 604 (8th Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1076 (1995), and she worked for a number of years with

the same cognitive abilities, see Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 468-69 (8th Cir. 2000)

(concluding ALJ properly supported his determination as to effect of claimant’s

borderline intellectual functioning and reading deficiency by noting, inter alia,

claimant’s ability to work for years with same cognitive abilities). 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.