Docket No . 103845.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE OF IL LINOIS, A

ppel l ant, v. J ESSE GALA N, Appel lee.
Opinion filed July 24, 2008.

JUSTICE GARMA

N del iv ered t he j udg m

en t of th e c our t, w ith op inion. Chi ef Justice Thomas and Jus tices F

itzgeral d and K armei er co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Jus t ice Bu rk e sp ecially conc ur re d, wit h op inion. Jus t ic es Freem

an di ssen ted, with opin

ion, j oined by

Justice Ki lb ride.

OPINION

In Novem be r 20 01, de f

en da nt, Je ss e G al

an , wa s i nd i cte d f or pos se ss i on

wi th i nten t to deli ve r 900 or m

o r e g r ams of c oc aine and
m ore than 5000 grams of cannab is. The evi

dence agai

nst hi m wa s su pp re ss ed b y th e c i rc ui t cou rt of Coo k C oun

ty an d th e S tate fi led a

“ Ce rti f i ca te of Su bs tantial Im pai rm en t” and br ought a n i nterl ocutory appeal pursuant t o Sup reme Court Ru le 604(a)( 1) (210 Ill . 2d R. 604(a )(1)). The appell ate court

aff irm ed. 367 Ill . App. 3d 876. Af ter its peti tion f or rehearin

g was deni

ed, the Stat e fi

led and was gran

ted-2- leave to appe al

to this court pursuant to S upreme C ourt Rule 315 (210 Il l . 2d R. 3 15). The re ar e t wo iss ue s in t his ca se : fir st , wh et he rI llino is cour ts must inqu i re into extr ad it io n ir r eg ula r it ies fo rcr imes co mmit t ed wit hin Ill in ois’ b ord er s;an

d, s ec on d, w

h eth er ex cl us i on i s th e a pp rop riate remedy when Ill in ois pol ic e vi olate a postarrest provisi

on of another state’s fresh

pursuit statute. We reverse.

BACK GROUND On October 11, 200 1, defend ant dr ove hi s truck onto the Chi cago S kyw ay, enteri

ng the Sk y way from an Il li nois on-ramp. Af

ter co nt inuing onto a to ll

boot h 0.8 mi

les i nto Indi ana, def

endan t was stopped by

several Chi cago police off

ic ers. Defen

dant’s vehi

cle was searched, and pol

ic e re covered two boxes fi ll ed wi th mari jua na. Defend ant was arr este d and t aken t o his mother’s hous e at 8521 South Bu r ley Av en ue in

Ch i cago, where h

e someti me s resi ded. Police conducted a s ea

rch of the hou se in th e p res en ce of de fen da nt an d h is mother and stepf

ather, eventual

ly reco ve r in g two pistols, ap pr o ximat ely $10 ,0 00 in ca sh, a nd co caine. A pr oba ble cau se he ar ing
was he l d a nd de f en da nt w as even

tua ll y ind i cte d by a C ook C ou nt y grand j ury, as i

ndi cated above. Pri orto trial , defen

dant fi led a m otion to quash arrest a nd suppress evi dence. T h e mot ion wa s filed on J uly 23, 200 2, and r equ est ed t he trial cou rt to “[q ]u ash [ defend ant ’s] ar re st , be cau se o f the ab senc e of
auth ori ty of probabl

e cause t o eff

ect it, an

d to s upp

res s f rom in tro duc ti o n

in to evi dence i n thi s cause, the f

oll owing: (a) Ph

ysic al
e vi dence d isco ver ed a nd as a r esu lt o f arr est and d et ent ion; ( b) Stat emen ts, utterances , reports of

ges tures a

nd r e s ponses by pe

titioner dur ing t he de t en t io n f

oll owi ng the arr es t[ ] i .e. oral

sta tem en ts of defendant [;] (c) A

ll other k no wle dge and f

ruits thereof, wi

tnesses s t at eme nts, whet her wr itt en, or or al or ges t ur al and p ro duc t s o f the
ar rest.” Defend ant asse rt ed t hat dur ing his arr est and s ubs equen t det ent ion, the Stat e “b ecam e aware of the ex

istence of ph

ysic al evi dence all the d irect and indir ect fruit s o f the ar re st and d et ent ion, whi ch connec t pe ti ti oner with the ins tant of

f en se.”The

tria l court conducted an evi

dentia ry h earin g on Septembe

r 17, 2003.-3- Defend ant te st ifi

ed t hat he wa s dr iving his tr uck t ow ar d I ndiana when he was sto pped at the to ll boot h, pa st t he “m il

e 1” m arker locatedin Indi ana. He stated that se ve r al me n d r es se d in pla in clothes, who it soon became apparent were Chicago po li ce offi cers, approachedhi

m a t the tollboot h wi

th guns drawn

and ordered hi

m out of hi s truck, pla

ced hi m i n ha ndcuf fs , and f orced him onto the ground. Defend ant testifi

ed that he did not give the me n perm is sion to search his t ru ck. Defend ant acknowl edged that when the truck was search

ed, poli ce recovered two boxes o f mar ijua na an d t o ldhi m h e was unde

r ar re st. Defend ant t es t ified t ha t t he po lice t he n t o o k h im b ac k to h is mother ’s house i

n Il li nois . He stated t hat

he o cc as io na lly

r es ide d a t his mother ’s house and had come f rom that address when

he was sto pped at the tollboot h. Def

endan t t estif ied that off

i cersknock

ed on th e d oor of hi s m ot her’s h ouse and asked h

im if they could search

the house. Defend ant testifi

edthat he t old t he o ffi

cer s t hey co uld no t sea rc h t he house. He also t es t ified , t ho ug h, t ha t his mo t he rev en t ua lly op ened t he door and, up on

lea rn in g that th

e p ol i ce h ad “ b us ted [d ef en da n t] w ith
so me mar ijua na , ” a gr ee d, aft er be ing as ke d, t o allo w t he o ffic ers t o search t he ho me. D efenda nt maintained t hat while he la ter signed a
co nsent t o s ear ch, he onl

y did so af ter off i cerst hr ea t en ed t o ar r es t his mother and s t epfat her . D efenda nt acknowl edged that in sear ching t he house, poli

ce found other

contraband. He asse

rted, ho we ve r , t ha t t his
co nt ra band w as fo und be for e he s igned t he co nsent t o s ear ch. On c ross-exam

in ation, def

endan t t estif ied that after he wa s re move d fr o m his t r uc k b y t he po lice , t he o ffice r s mo ve d h im awa y fr o m traffi c and told h

im he was un

der arrest. Defendan

t stat ed that at t his poi

n t o ff ic ers began

searchi ng hi s truck and found the

two box es contain in g ma rij uana i n the truck’s ba

ckseat. Defen

dant testif ied that t he o ffice r s e ve nt ua lly info r med him t h at he wa s in tr ou ble and they were pla nni ng to t ake him ba ck t o t he ho us e h e h ad co me fr o m, whi ch he un de r st o o d t o be his mo t he r ’s ho us e. Fo llo win g t his t es t imo ny, defen

dant answered s everal

mor e qu est ions re gar ding t he ci rcums tances surroundi

ng the search

of his m ot her’s h ome. The State cal

l ed Of f i cer B ri an Luc e, o ne

of the Chi cago police off i cersin v ol v ed in ar re sti n g d ef en da n t. Luce testif

ied that he waspart of the Chi cago police departmen

t’s narcotics an

d gangs inv

es ti ga ti on sec t ion. Luce s ta t ed t ha t aft er o bt ain ing info r mat io n fr o m a-4- confi dentia l inf orma nt, p o lice be ca me int er es t ed in d efe nd an t

. T his informant in

dic ated that defenda

nt li ved at 8521 So uth Burley

Avenue and 9735 Avenue M

in C hi cago. Moreover, t he i

nf ormant stated that defen dant was storing, sel

li ng, an d m an uf ac turi ng l arg e q ua nti ti es of
ma rij uana. Based

on t his informat ion, t he Chicag o p olice d epa rt ment b eg an an in v es ti ga ti on , i n wh i ch Lu ce took p ar t. Lucet es t ifiedth at on O ct obe r 1 1, 200 1, he wa s co nduc t ing survei ll ance on th e A v en ue M a dd re ss aspa rt o f the o ngo ing invest igat ion. Luce i ndicat ed t hat ot her officer s we re co nduc t ing survei ll ance on t he Bu rley Avenue add re ss. Luc e o bser ved d efenda nt and another

in div idua l, Jose Moj ic a, leav

e the Avenue M

add re ss and dr ive to the Burle

y A ven ue address i

n def endan t’s truck. Luce saw defend ant and Moj ic a get out of the truck and enter the house at 8521 So uth Burle y. A t t hi s poin t, Luce picked a survei

ll ance spot aroun d t he bloc k while ano t her officer set up s ur veillance o n t he f ront door. Lucethen recei

ved a rad i o com m un i ca ti on f rom the other o ff

ic er that defen dant and Moj ic a, who was carry in g a whit e ba g, left the house, got back in

the tr uck, and headed back to the Avenue M address. Lucefollow ed t he men b ac k to t he Avenu e M a ddr ess a nd observed Moji ca, stil l c arryi ng t he white bag, exi

t t he truck and get into a Ni ssan

Maxi ma by hi ms el f. A t t hi s poin t, part of the survei

ll ance tea m , i ncl udi ng Lu ce , f oll owe d the Ni ss an , wh

ile a noth er p art of t he survei ll ance team

rem ai ne d at the Av en ue M addre ss. Ev

en tual l y , a ma rked poli ce car pu lled Mojica o ve ran d L uc e w as info r med by r ad io that Mojica

did not have a valid dr iver’s license and was go ing t o be taken to a poli

ce s tation f or a traf f ic vi ola tor bond. Luc e further testifi edthat t he b ei ge Ma

x ima w astak

en to the p oli

ce s tation , where a custodial search was

performed and the wh

ite ba g, the sam e bag that
was o bse r ve d g o ing int o t he ca r , wa s fo un d t o co nt ain a larg e amo unt o f c ur r en cy. Af ter being in form

ed that Mojica was i

n custody an

d a l arge amou nt of currency

was f ound, Luce was told to go back to Aven ue M and conti

nue surveill

ance. Luce obs erved

de fen da nt ag ain leave t he Avenue M address an

d return to the Burle

y Av enue address. Luce testifi edthat another offi

cer saw defendant enter t he house and then
ex it, carryi ng a b rown box. Luce testif

ied that th e other o ffice rt o ld him that while ta king t he bo x t o his truck, defendan t was lookin

g up and down the street. Defendan t t hen r ep ea t ed t his act ion, ent er ing t he-5- house, le avi

ng wi th a sec ond b rown box, and taki ng i t t o his truck,
n er v ous l y l ooki n g up a n d d own th e s tre et. Lucest at ed t hat aft er defend ant ent er ed t he t r uc k h e p ul led aw ay, o nly t o sto p approxim

ately 50 to 100 feet f

rom the Burl

ey Avenue address and l

ook up and down t he st reet, wat chi ng the cars as

they passed. Luc e, who wa s t he n fo llo win g d efe nd an t , ha d t o dr ive by in his unmar ked vehicle. In d riving by, Luc e o bser ved d efenda nt loo king out his driv

er’s si de wi ndow in several dif feren t directions . Luce testifi edthat b ase d upon

his ex peri ence a s a Chi

cago pol i ce of f i cer, defendant’s act ions constituted countersurveil la nce or ta cti csus ed to see i f pol ic e are i n the area. Af ter dr iving

by defenda nt , Lu ce d ro ve ar ou nd t he bloc k and was in form edove r t he r adio t hat defend ant made a n ill ega l U-t ur n, cr os sing t wo lan es
. Lu ce wa s e ve nt ua lly able t o r ep o sit io n hims elf behinddef

endan t’s truck. Lu ce testif

ied that offi

cers contin

ued “moving su r ve illanc e” an d o bse r ve d d efe nd an t t r av el f ro m B urley Avenue to Indian apol

i s Boul ev ard and then onto 106th

Street, wh

ere he veered f

rom the f ar lef t t o t he f ar righ t lane , wit hou t signa li

ng, across three or four lane s of traff ic , traveli ng to t he Sky

way on-ramp. Lucest at ed t hat de fend ant ’s “ er ra t ic mo ve fr o m t he le ft [ lan e] all t he way t o t he r ight [lane] ” led p olice t o be lieve that t hei r survei ll ance was compromised. Again, Lu ce a nd other offi cers bel ie ved that defendant’s conduct in

dic ated that he was ei

ther tryi ng to get aw ay

or ut ili zing co un t er su r ve illanc e t ac t ics t o se e if he wasbeing fo llowed . At that poi nt, L uc e a n d th e oth er o ffic ers agr eed t o st op d efendant’s veh ic le to in vestigate. Lucetestifi

ed that off ic ers stopped defenda

nt’s truck “right at t he t ollbo ot h” and q uickly ra n up t o t he ca r w ith guns drawn . Once i

t was saf e, the off ic ers hol stered their guns . Luce stated t hat whe n he app ro ache d t he vehicle a nd opened the pas sen ger door, he sm

el led a strong odo r of cann

abi s. Luce testif

ied that he had sm

el led this od or bef ore wh ile c ar r ying o ut his d ut ies as a C hic ag o po lice o ffice ran d it
was not eas ily

co nfused wit h a ny ot her sm el l. Luc e testif

ied that off i cersask ed d efenda nt what was i n the b oxes and h

e answe red that it was “weed,” a s treet t er m fo rca nna bis, an d a sk ed if he wa s in tro ubl e. Moreover, d efen

dant stated t hat he b el

ie ved there was 20 pounds of cann

abi s i n the b oxes. Luce stated that o ff ic ers then took def enda nt ou t of t he t ru ck, pulled it t o t he side of t he highwa y, and-6- began talki ng to defenda

nt. Duri ng t ha t co nve r sa t io n, o ffice r s t o ld defend ant what t hey ha d se en t ha t day, i nf ormed hi m that he was under arrest , and advised h im of hi s rights. Af ter readin g defen dant hi s righ

ts, Luce continued sp ea

ki n g w ith de f en da nt, info r ming him

of the ongoing i

nve stigati on, noting that they had f ound the cannabi s and i

ndi catin g that t hey

wished to search defendant’s home. Officers t hen br ou ght defen dant back to the Burle

y Avenue ad dr es s a nd , Lu ce t es t ifie d , d efenda nt agr eed t o s ign a consent-to-search fo rm. Lu ce t es t ified t ha t he did no t ph ysic ally threaten defen

dan t o rac t ab us ive t o wa r d h im and de fen da nt simp ly signed the form

in the presence of

another off

ic er. Luce further te st ifi edt hat he signe d t he co nsent -t o- sea rc h for m. Mo re ove r, he stated that t he form

was si gned b efore the house was searched. Luc e testifi edthat defen

dant was co op er at ive, a ppe ar ed t o be ner vou s, a nd wanted to wo rk with pol

ic e. L uce tes tif

i ed th at of f i ce rs th en con du cte d a se arch of th e resi dence, in

the presence of

defen dant’s m ot her and s te pfat her . As al ready n ot ed, they recovered

two pistols, ap pr o ximat ely $ 10 , 00 0 in
cas h, and cocain

e. Addi tional ly, Luce testif

ied that police

found an
envel ope addres se d to defendant at 8521 Sout h Burl ey Avenue. Moreov er, Lucest at ed t hat he did no t make a ny thr eat s t o d efenda nt re gar ding h i s p aren

ts, n or di d h

e th re aten de f en da n t’s pa re n ts with
ar re st i n ord er to ga in m ore coop er ati

on f rom de f en da n t. Bef ore t he St at e finished its que st ioning, Luc e t est ifi ed t o o ne last
ma tt erregardin

g Moji ca. Luce testif

ied that he was i

nf ormed by ot her off i cerstha t wh en Moj i ca wa s s topped a

nd pol ic e fo un d h im in pos se ss i on

of around $80,000, Moji ca l ied regardi ng i

ts o rigi ns. Moji ca sta ted th at the mone

y w as brought to him

at a location that offi cers, ba s ed upon thei

r survei ll ance, kn ew not to be true. Luce testifi ed, as he ha d p r ev io us ly, that offi cers observed Moji

ca re t rieve
a whi te bag from

the B ur ley Ave nue a ddr ess, t ake t hat bag t o t he Aven ue M address, exit d efenda nt ’s t ru ck w ith t he bag , a nd then get into the Ni ssan

Maxi ma with the b ag. Su rve ill

ance never lost sight of t he ve hic le or Moji

ca, and wh

en Moj ic a was stopped, t he b ag contain in g the currency

was recovered. On cr o ss
- ex amina t io n, Luc e ac kno wledg ed t hat t he infor mant poli ce rel i ed upon i n th is c as e w as un kn o wn t o him. Ad di t io na lly, Lu ce di d not know and his rep or t did no t indicat e t hat t he infor mant-7- ever saw na rcoti cs i ns i de 85 21 South

Burl ey Av en ue. M oreover , Luce did n ot know if

the in form ant, describ

edas a con f i den ti al in f orm an t, had ever been usedin pr i or c as esan

d L uc e’ s r ep ort d i d n ot i n di ca te that the in

form ant was rel

ia bl e. Luce testif

ied, thoug h, that survei ll ance was s et up ba se d u po n t he info r mat io n fr o m t his in f orm an t. Luceacknowl

edg ed t hat no o ne sa w whe re t he bag co nt aining currency came from

or who gave it to Mojica, merel y tha t Mojica ca me o ut o f th e S outh Bu rl ey A v en ue addres s c ar

ry in g i t. Ad di t io na lly, Lu ce

ad m itted th at n ei th er h e n or a n y oth er of f i cers co uld see through the bag. Moreover, Luce testif ied that when

Moji ca was stopped whil

e driv in g the Ni ssan

Maxi ma , he wasstop pe d not f

or any tr aff ic vi olation or the comm

is sion of any

crim e, but bec aus e off i cersbel ie ved that he had s omethi

ng to do with thei

r narcotics survei ll ance. Ess en

ti al l y , Moj i ca wa s stopped sol el y to see i f there
were drugs in the bag. Wh

il e m oney was eve ntua l l yf ou nd, no na r co t ics we r e fo un d in t he ca r , no rwa s it kno wn, at t he t ime of t he stop, th at Moj i ca was opera tin g the car w ithout a v al

i d dri ve r’ s li cense. Ad di t io na lly, Luce testif ied that Mojica nev

erto ld of fi cers that there we r e n ar co t ic s in sid e t he Bu r ley Av en ue ad dr es s, ne ve rt o ld off i cerst ha t he go t t he mo ne y fr o m t he Bu r ley A ve nue addr es s or f rom def endan t, and neve r told of f i cerst hat t he money co nst itu t ed t he pro ceeds of narcot ics. Luce testif

ied further

on cross-exam

in ation that he could not see what was in the bo xes d efenda nt bro ught fro m 852 1 S ou t h Bu r le y Avenue to hi s truck. Moreover, Luce acknowledged that defendant’s
ac tiv i ty of p ulling his tr uck ove r a nd lo ok ing in his mi rr or s co uld be construed as nor mal act ivity. Re gar ding t he eve nt ual st op of d efenda nt at the to ll boot h, Luce st ate d t ha t wh ile he be lieve d it o cc ur r ed in Ill in ois, he was n

ot certain a

nd i t could have been

in Indiana. He also stated that the

stop was not carr i ed o ut t o giv e d efe nd an t a t r affic ticket bu t wa s a ct ua lly carried out because of Luce’ s bel

ie f that
su rvei ll ance was comprom

is ed and off

ic ers were conductin

g a drug invest igat ion. Luc e test ifi

ed t hat while he co uld smell canna bis when he approacheddefen

dant’s truck, h e d id n o t ac t ua lly se e t he ca nna bis
un t il he opened the b oxes

ins i de the tru ck . Lu ce t est ifi ed t hat t he boxes were

op ened wit hou t obt aining def en dan t’s c onse nt. More over,-8- Lucestated t hat bef

ore he openedt he boxes, an d even bef ore he read defend ant his r ig hts, he asked defen dant what was insi

de. Luce also testifi ed, t hou gh, t hat befo re ask ing defend ant what was i n the b oxes he told def

endan t t hat the poli

ce were pul

li ng hi m ove rbecausethey bel ie ved that a narcotics trans action occurred. On c ro ss- examinat ion, t he de fense a ske d se ver al que st ions a nd Lucetestifi

ed extensi vel y regardi ng the eventual

search of the Burle y Avenue address. This test im

ony was unaltere d from Luce’s t est imony
re gar ding the home

s ear ch on di

rect exam in ation. Luce stated that off i cersbrought defen

dant back to the Burley Avenue add ress, expl ai ned th e c on se nt-to- se arch

f orm to defend ant , o ne of th

e of f i cers readth e f orm to def en da n t, Off ic erLuce f

il led out the form , and then defend ant signed i

t. Luce test if

ied that he and the

of f i ce rs di d not immed iat ely knock on the front door o f 8521 Sout h Bu rley Avenue upon ar r iving , inst ea d w ait ing un t il after def endan t had al ready signed t he co nse nt

- t o
- se ar ch fo r m. The pa rti essti pu l ate d to t he tes tim

ony of an othe r of f i ce r wh o took part in the inves t igat ion. Det ect ive Schnoor would hav

e testif ied that he saw the boxes

that wer e eve nt ually found t o c ont ain canna bis being taken out of 8521 Sou th

Bu rl ey A v en ue on e a t a ti m e b y de f en da n t. Moreo ve r, he would have testif

ied that in taki

ng those boxesou t defend ant lookedup a nd do wn t he st re et , c ond uct which he bel ie ved indicat ive of p eopl e tran sporti

ng n arc o tics. It was al so stipulated, howeve r, that t hi s type of

behavi or co uld b

e see n in law-abid ing cit ize ns a s w ell. On Octo ber 1, 2003, the motion to quashand suppress cam e up f orargumen

t. Before argume nt was heard, though, the parties ad dit io na lly

st ipu lat ed t ha t pr iva t e in ve st iga t o rJo e C ar o ne wo uld t es t ify he ph ot ographed the tollboot h wh ere defe ndan t was arrested, whi ch was 0.8 m

il es fro m the Illinois bo rd er , inside I ndiana. Defend ant arguednot only t hat t he ar re st at t he toll booth wa s i

m proper, but also that defendan

t’s later co nsent to se a rc h was involunt ar ily given. Defend ant co nt en de d, wh ile a r gu ing be fo r e t he t r ial c ourt , that “ [i ]f t he in itial stop is bad e

v e rythi ng that happen s af

ter t hat stop is bad, including t he co nse nt fo r m, t he alle ge d s mell and t he st op in the ot her state, al l of th at f

al l s.” Th e Stat e, by cont ra st , a rg ued t hat t he
an o nym ous ti p, t he su sp icio us dr iving be t we en t wo ho us es mult iple t imes in one da y, the

f ac t tha t $80 ,00 0 dol

l ars wa s rec ove

red f rom-9- Moji ca, and d efenda nt ’s co nduc t which o ffi cer s believed t o be
coun te rsurvei

ll ance, taken toget her, am ounted to probabl

e cause. Co nsider ing th es e a

rg um en ts, an d a f te r mak in g speci fi c factual fi ndi ngs, t he t rial co ur t agr eed wit h t he State that offi cers had pr oba ble cau se t o a rr est defend ant and d enied d efenda nt ’s mot ion. On Oc tobe r 28 , 20 03, de f

en da nt f iled anothe r m oti onto suppress, t his t ime spec ifi

cally refer ring o nly to t he evidence seized as ar es ult of t he search

at defen dant’s resi

dence at 8521 South Burley Avenue. No hear ing was held o n t his mot ion. The motion was agai n presen ted, h owev er, on

Ma rc h 8, 2 00 4, i

n tan dem wi th de f en da n t’s m oti on to v ac ate the t rial court ’s earlier denial of defendant’s m

oti on to suppress evi dence. The March

8 mo t ion, pr ese nt ed in a si ngl e documen

t, asked t he trial court to enter orders: “A. Vacati ng the order entered October 01, 200 3, denying t he de f

en da nt’ s m oti on to suppress; B. Holdi

ng an evi den tia ry hearin g on t he defen

dant’s motion to suppress th e it ems seizedf rom h i s h om e on Oc tob er 11 ; C. Gr an

tin g th e m oti on to suppress the item

s sei zed from the de fe n da

n t’s h om e a t 85 21 Sou th Burl ey , Ch i cago, Il l inoi s on O ctober 1 1, 2001 .” On June 8, 2004, t he t rial co ur t hear d ar gument re gar ding defendant’s March 8 m

ot ion t o vacate a nd m

ot ion to suppr ess. Defend ant asse rt ed t hat t he o r igin al mo t io n t o su pp r es s, filed o n Ju ly 23, 2002, and deni

ed by the trial court on October 1, 2003, “concern edit se lf o nly

sol el y an d e xcl us ive l y wi th th e s ea rch of the car and [def en da nt’ s] arr es t and pr oba bl e c au se f or h i s a rre st. It di

d not conc ern itself in a ny wa y wi th th e s ea rch *** l ate r th at d ay

of defendant’s home .” Defen dant contended

that t he i ssue

of the search at defen dant’s h ome hadneverbeen litiga t ed o r r uled u po n. D efenda nt acknowl edged, t hou gh, t ha t t he t rial co ur t pr eviou sly denied t he
m oti on to qua sh

an d s upp res s w ith r

es pe ct to t he s ea

rch of de f en da nt’s ca r a n d h i s a rre st. Su ppo rt ing t he new mot ion, defend ant asserted that the arrest was il legal beca use it t oo k plac e in Ind ia na. Def endan t asserted t hat pur sua nt to I ndi

an a statutory

l aw, af ter Ch i cago pol i ce of f i cers arrested defen

dant, they were requi

red to take defen

dant bef ore a judg e o f the Ind iana co unt y in which the a rr est was made fo r a bond heari ng. Ind. Code Ann . §35–33–3–2 (Mich ie 1998). Because that
was not done i n thi s case, def

endan t contended hi s arrest was i nva li d. Based on t his arg ument , d efenda nt asked the trial co ur t t o va cat e t he-10- origi nal denial of the m ot ion to suppress an

d grant the m

oti o n to suppress. In r esp ons e, t he Sta

te ack now ledge d t hat defend ant sho uld have been brought bef

ore an Indi ana judg e f

or a b on d h ea ri n g. T h e S tate argued, though, that th e f

ai l ure to do so was harml

ess an d for the trial court“to sup

pres s an y evi den ce re cove red b y the p oli ce of f i cers including a c on sent to search, in cl udin g al l the c annabi s that was fou nd in defenda nt ’s vehi cl e, in cl udin g al l of the evi dence that was fou nd at t he ad dr es s [ in] I llino is is too harsh fo rt he cir cu mst an ce s in this case.” The State asserted that t he trial co ur t alr ea dy h ea r d a ll

of t he argu m en ts defend ant made in t his mot ion in t he pr eviou s mot ion, sp ec ifica lly

n oti n g that th

e tr i al cou rt heard ar gument s abo ut t he l eg al ity of defendan

t’s arrest in I nd ian a w he n it considered defendant’s fi rst m otion to suppre ss. A

ccordi ngl y , the Stat e requested the trial
co ur t t o a gain de ny defenda nt ’s mot ion. The trial court noted that it was un dis pu t ed t ha t t he ar r es t in t his
case to ok place i

n Indi ana. The court then poin

ted out th at Ind iana
was not aff

orde d, as re qu i

re d by Indi ana s tatu te, th e oppor

tun ity to dete r mi ne wh

eth er th ere w aspr ob able c au se f or d ef en da n t’s ar re st. Ind. Code An

n. §35 –33 –3–

2 (M i ch i e 1 998 ). M oreov

er, ex trad iti on procedures requi

red b y Ind i an a statute w ere

not foll owed. Ind. Code Ann. §35 –33 –3– 2 ( Michie 19 98) . I n lightof th e ab ove, th

e tri al court v ac ate d its denial of t he o riginal mot ion t o q uas h and s upp re ss and granted defen

dant’s n ew m ot ion to quash an

d suppress the ev

ide nce in Indi ana. Ha

vi ng done th i s, th e c ourt s et a

f utur e d ate f ora hea ring
on t he mot ion r ega rd ing t he se ar ch of th e Burley

Aven ue address. Thi s heari ng wasnever held, t hou gh, asthe tri al court we nt b ac k on t he record th

e sa m e day, Jun e 8, 20 04 , a

n d gra n ted th e m oti on to suppress with regardst o t he evi dence obtai

ned at the Burl

ey Avenue add re ss. The tri al

court n oted

tha t the inf orm ati on retrieved at 8521 South Burl ey Av en ue r es ult ed fr o m t he “w r o ng ful d et en t io n in bringing [defendant] back across t he st at e line,” which wa s t he sa me basis the court ut il

iz ed i n granti ng def endan t’s motion to vacate. Wi th this f actual an d proced

ural ba ckgroun d i n m ind, w e turn

to our anal ysi s.

AN

AL YSIS-11- In its peti tion f or leave to appeal , the Stat e presents two arguments. Fi

rs t, th e Sta

te a ss erts tha t an Il l inoi s c ourt n ee d not inqu i re into e xt r ad it io n ir r eg ula r it ies fo rcr imes co mmit t ed wit hin Ill in ois’ borders, as such i

rregulari ties aff ect nei thert he gu ilt no r t he innoce nce o f the acc use d, nor t he jur isdict ion o f the Il l in oi s c our t to try a def endan t. Seco nd, the State co ntends tha t excl us i on i s n ot t he appr opr i ate re medy in t hi s case . As t he fact s ar e no t in disput e and these ar gument s pr ese nt questions of law, revi ew is de novo

. People v. McCar ty , 223 Il l . 2d 109 , 148 (2 006).

A. Procedural Issues Bef ore addr essing the St ate ’s argumen ts, we fi rst address several proc edur al

ar gu men t s. De fen da nt as se r t s t ha t t he St at e’ s p o sit io n is
es se nt iallytha

t an ind ivi dua l arr es tee may not c onte st th

e v al i di ty of t he arrest and post arrest pro cedures v i site d up on him. D efenda nt contends that thi s a

rg um en t wa s n ot pr es en ted to t he t rial co ur t by the S tate an d thus i s f orfe ited. People v. O’Neal , 104 Ill . 2d 399, 40 7 (1984 ). In a simi

lar ve in , defen

dant argues that the Stat e nev er presented argumen t regarding the l

aw of ex tradi ti on in th e tr i al cou rt, and thus an yre lian ce o n s uc h la w is als o fo r fe it ed

. Ad di t io na lly, defend ant asserts that th e S tate f ai led to ar gu e th e g ood- f ai th do ct rine bef or e t he t r ial c o ur t o rt he ap pe llat e c o ur t , an d, ac co r di ng ly,
ar gu men t o n t ha t po int is fo r feit ed as we ll. The Stat e asserts that it has suff icie ntly preserved i

ts cl aims to sur vive forfe i t ur e. First , t he St at e ar gue s t hat defend ant mischa r acterizesits a rg ument . T he St at e co nt ends t hat its a rg ument is not premi sed upon standi ng, but on th e p osi ti on that irregul ariti

es in ex trad i ti onaf f ec t ne ithe r the g ui l t nor the inn ocenc e of a def en da n t, nor the jurisdiction of the court to try hi m. Def en da nt , in ar guing bef ore the trial

court, s pe ci

f i ca ll y ref ere nc ed the ex trad iti on cl au se of t he Uni ted St ates Co nst itu t ion and asserted that in this case, Ch ic ago poli ce o ffic ers ess en

ti al l y ac ted as“ ki dn ap pers wh

en the y took [d ef en da nt] from Indiana back i

n Ill in ois.” The Stat e also sp ec ifica lly referred to the ex tradi tion claus e b ef

ore the tri al courtand argued that t he off ic ers’ f ailure to adher e to In di an a’s postarrest statutory procedures was har mless and d id no t dep rive t he tri al court of j uri sdi cti on to consi der the ca se. L

i ke the parti

es, th e tri al court re ferred to the extraditi

on cl ause, noting that “what was ski pp ed i n-12- t his ca se wa s th e f ac t th at ther e was no ex

tradition h

earin g *** we have ski ppedt he extradition proceedings i n Indi ana an d I feel that t hat i s determ ina tiv e i n th i s ca se of the l aw th at shoul d be

appl i ed.” Li kewi se, t he St at e c laims t ha t de fen da nt mis c h ar ac ter i ze s i ts ar gument re gar ding g oo d fait h. T he St at e as ser t s t hat it is no t ar guing f ora good-f

ai th ex cepti on to the exc l

usi onary rul e. I ns t ead , it is the St ate ’s po sit ion thatt he o ffice r s in t his c as e d id n o t int en t io na lly i gnore Indi ana’s

statut ory sch

em e and thus the ex

clusio na r y ru le sho uld ne ve rev en be invo ke d. Ac co r din g t o t he St at e, ex clu sio n i s unwarranted

in t his case base d up on t he deter re n t ef f ec t/detr im en t to soci ety co nsid er at io ns ne ce ss ar y t o de cid ing if the rul e sho uld be in vokedin the fi rst pl ace . See, e.g. , Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56, 64, 126 S . Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006) (e xplaining t ha t t he ex clu sio na r y ru le s ho uld only be appl i ed wh ere i ts de terr ence

benefits o ut weigh its su bsta ntial soc ial cost s); People v. Coleman , 227 Ill. 2d 426 (2 008 ) ( wher e t his co ur t not ed t hat if the main purpose of the excl usionary rul

e i s to d eter future police misconductthe in

terests o f j us tice a

re not ser ved by su ppr essing ele ct r o nic su

rv ei ll an ce ga the red pur su an t to f ede r al la w in
con trav en ti on of state law, unl

ess there i s evi

dence of co ll

us i on to av o idth e s tate

l aw re qu i re m en ts) . Th e S tate points out th at a

rg um en ts r eg ar ding good

f ai th we re pres en ted in th e tr i al cou rt, th e a pp el l ate cou rt, and in the petition f

or leave to appeal in thi s c our t. In de ed , b oth t he trial and appel

late court referenced goo d fai th in thei r decisi ons, wi th t he t rial co ur t making it s de cisi on “ re ga rd les s of th e g ood f

ai th of t he o ffi cer s” a nd t he appel

la te court assertin

g that “Chi

cago police off i cersblatantly

dis regarde d” po r t io ns o f I nd ian a’ s fr es h p ur su it statut e. 367 Ill . App. 3d at 881. T his cou rt h as co nsid er ed t he pu r po se o f t he fo r feit ur e r ule repeatedly , noting:

“‘ “F ailu r e t o r ais e is su es in t he t r ial cou rt den i es th at court t he oppor tunity

to grant a new trial, if

warranted. T his casts a needles s burden of

preparin g and p rocess ing

ap pe al s u

pon appe ll ate co un se l fo rt he de fen se , t he pr o se cu t io n, an d up on t he cou rt of re v i ew . W

ith out a pos t-tr i al m otion l im itin g th e con si derati on t o er r o r s c o nsid er ed sig nific an t , t he ap pe al is open-ended. Appel

la te counsel may com b the rec ord f

or eve ry sem blance of error and raise issues on

ap pe al wh eth er or not-13- trial counsel considered them of

any im port ance.” ’ ” People
v. Lew is , 22 3 I ll. 2d 393, 400 (2006), quo ting People v. Enoch , 122

Il l . 2d 176 , 18 6 (1 988 ), q

uot in g People v. Caballero , 102 Il

l . 2d 23, 3 1-32 (1 984). It is app ar ent in this ca se t hat while the St at e’s a rg ument s re gar ding ext rad iti on an d good f

ai th we re not as ex

tens ivel y made or full y devel oped in the l

ower courts as th

ey are bef ore thi s court, they

were rais edand c ons ider ed. As suc h, it wo uld no t ser ve t he pur po ses o f the f orfe i ture rul e to a ppl y it under thes e c i

rcum sta nc es an d w e w ill not do s o. Defend ant also co nt ends t hat t his case involves t wo sep ar at e and indepe ndent sea rc hes, one of d efenda nt ’s t ru ck a nd o ne o f the Burle y Avenue address. Def

en da n t a sserts that the St ate’s notice of appeal
was lim ited t o t he qua sh

ing of de f en da nt’ s a rre st a nd the se arch of his car, and t hus t his co ur t lacks t he jur isdict ion t o d et er mine t he v al i di ty of the se arch of the Burley A

venue address. Defe

ndan t po in ts out that Su pr eme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill . 2d R. 604(a)(1)) provides that t he Stat e h as th e ri gh

t to ap pe al f rom th e den i al of a m oti on to su pp r es s a nd Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 606 (210 Ill . 2d R. 606) pro vi des t ha t t he filing o f a n o t ice o f ap pe al is jur isd ict io na l. T his ca se do es invo lve t wo se pa r at e s ea r ch es
. Ho we ve r , t his does not es t ab lish t ha t t he va lid it y o f t he se ar ch at t he Bu r ley A venu e address pres en

ts a qu es ti o n be yo nd t his co ur t ’s jur isdict ion. The record es tab l i sh esth at th e tr i al cou rt w as prese nt ed w ith ext ensive evi dence and testim

ony regardi

ng the search

at 8521 So ut h Burle

y Avenue. Both parties di scus s ed t he se ar ch o f the home a t t he
evi den tia ry hear ing and bo th par t ies re fere nced it in making arguments. De fen da nt ’s o r igin al mo t io n to quash an d suppress was br o ad ly writtenan d s pe cific ally as ke d that a ll “ kn owl ed ge an d f ru its *** and p ro duc t s” o f hi s arre st and detention be suppressed. Moreov er, defen

dant ar gue d t hat dur ing his arr est and s ubse que nt det ent ion, the Stat e “b ecam e aware of the ex

istence of ph

ysic al evi dence al l the di rect an d i n di re ct f ru its of t he ar re st and d et ent ion, whi ch connect petitioner wi

th the in stant offense.” The ev ide nce fou nd at the Burle

y A ven ue address consti

tut es the f

ruits and produ cts of d efe ndant’s arrest, just as i t connects petitioner wi

th the off enses charged.-14- The f ac t th at defendan

t later fil ed a second motion t o suppr ess, t his t ime only refer encing t he ho me search, does not alter that fact that t he home search was at issue and co ns i de re d i n th e f i rs t m oti on to suppress. Consi

derin g this , it i s not surprisi

ng that the trial

courtdid not ho ldan o t he rev ide nt iar y hea r ing an d d id n o t sp ec ifica lly consider t he se con d m oti on to supp

res s f iled on Oc t o be r28 , 20 03 , as it se ems mer ely to constitute an attemptt o r evive a p or t ion o f the pr ev io us ly ruled upon m ot i on. The trial

court ’s di scussi

on of def endan t’s la ter m oti on to vacate and motion to su ppr ess, f il ed on March 8, 2004,
su pp ortst his po sitio n. Aft er gr ant ing t he mot ion t o va cat e o n June 8, 2004, the trial

court in iti al ly set a later date to ar gu e t he mo ti on to suppress. Instead of wai

ting un til a l ater date, h

owev er, the trial

court went back on t he r eco rd t hat same d ay and gr an te d th e m oti on to suppress the evi

dence se iz ed at 8521 Sou th Burley Aven ue. In so doing, the trial

co urt po in

ted out that t he i

nf ormation retriev

ed at 8521 Sout h Burl

ey Avenue re sult ed fr om t he “w r o ng ful d et en t io n in b ri n gi n g [ de f en da nt] b ack a cross th e s tate line, ” w hic h w as t he sa me basis the court ut il

iz ed i n granti ng def endan t’s motion to vacate. Ourcon cl us i on th at th i s c ou rt has j ur isdict ion t o c ons ider t he
v al i di ty of the house sea

rch i s f urther support edby the Stat e’s n ot ic e of ap pe al. The noti ce

of ap pe al ref ere nc ed two da tes of j udgm en t or order: June 8, 2004, and Jul y 21, 2004. As al

ready di scussed, the trial courtgranted defen

dant’s m ot ion to vacate, thus grant ing defendant’s fi rst fi led motion to suppress (whi ch we f in d in cl ude d th e evi

dence seizedat the house search), on Jun e 8, 2004. On

th e sa me dat e, t he trial court gr an

ted de f en da nt’ s m oti on to suppress ev

ide nce sei zed at 8521 S o ut h B ur ley Av enue . T he Ju ly 21, 2 004 , d at e r efer ence s t he trial co ur t ’s de nia l o f t he State’s m ot ion to reconsi der the June 8 ruli ng. In its m oti on to re con si

de r, th e S tate spe cifically

ask ed t he trial courtto “reconsi

der its rul

in gs on June

8, 200 4, to rei n sta

te i ts fi ndi ngs that the

re was pro babl

e cause to arrest Defend ant and t hat t he
ca nna bis fr o m De fen da nt ’s ve hic le was p ro per ly seized, and t o find that the evi

dence se iz ed from the Burle

y a ddress res ulted f

r o m a vol unta ry and p ro per ly obt ained c ons ent t o se ar ch

. ” A cc o r di ng ly, t he St at e’s no t ice o f app eal ad equ at ely refer re d t o t he ho me sear ch. In l i gh t of the ab ove , we

f ind tha t the State com pl i edwi th t his
cou rt ’s r ul es an d w e w ill c o ns id er t he va lid it y of the sea rc h of t he Bur ley Avenue a ddr ess. As al rea dy noted, w e d o not

find any of t he-15- St ate ’s argument forfei

ted and will

consi der t he Sta

te’ s a rg um en ts co ncer ning extradition and good fai th. Fi ndi ng that t he State has adequat ely

preserved its arguments, we t urn to the merits.

B. Me ri ts The t wo Ind iana st at ut or y sect ions prim aril y a t issue in this case comprise por ti on s o f Indiana ’s Unifo rm Act on F re sh Pu rsu it. The fi rst section (Ind. Code A

nn. §35–33–3–1 (Mi

chi e 1 9 98)), entitled “Fresh purs ui t–Peac e of

f i cersof othe

r s ta t es –A ut ho r it y t o ar r es t in Indiana,” pro vi

des: “Any me mb er of a du ly

orga ni ze d s tate , county, or m un i ci pa l pe ac e u ni

t of an oth er sta te wh o en t er s t his s t at e in fresh pur suit, an

d c on ti n ues withi

n this stat e in

such fresh pu r su it of a person in order t o arr est hi m on ground that

he is bel ie ved to h av e c om m itted a f el ony in th e oth er st at e, sha ll have t he sa me auth ori t y t o ar r es t an d h o ld s uc h p er so n in custody ash asan

y l aw en f orc em en t of f i ce r of thi s s tate to arrest and h

old i n c us t o dy a p er so n o n t he gr o un d t ha t he is bel i ev ed to ha

ve com m itted a f el ony in th i s state .” The second section, Ind. Code An n. §3 5–33–3–2 (L

exi sNexi s 199 8), entitled “A

rrest –Hearing–Comm

itmen t o r discharge,” pro vi

des: “If an ar r es t is mad e in t his state by an off ic er of another sta te in a cc o r da nc e w it h t he pr o vis io ns o f se ct io n 1 o f t his ch ap t er , he sha ll, withoutun nece ss ary de l ay , tak

e th e p ers on arrested bef

ore a judge of the c ounty i n wh ic h the arrest was
ma de. The j udg e s ha

ll con duct a h ea ri ng f or the p urp ose

of det er mini ng the l awf ul ne ss of the a rrest. I f the judge determi nes th at the ar re st was lawful, he shall co mmi t t he pers on ar re sted to awai

t for a reasonabl

e tim e the i ssuan

ce of
an ex tradi ti on wa rra n t b y th e gov ern or of t his st at e. If t he judge d et er min es t ha t t he ar r es t wa s u nla wfu l, he sha ll di sch arge th e pers on arre sted.” The trial and appel

late court s found that because the Chi cago poli ce officer s did no t co mply with t he se co nd statutory section, Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3– 2 (LexisN ex is 19 98 ), th

ey we re n ot au th ori ze d to
ar rest defen

dant and thus the ev

ide nce agai nst hi m m us t b e suppressed.-16- I. Th e Sta te’ s P osi ti on The St at e po ints o ut t hat in Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 111, 43 L. E d. 2d 54 , 63 , 95 S. Ct

. 85 4, 86 1 ( 19 75 ) , t he Un it edState s Su pr eme Court found that “the standards and procedu res for arr est and detention h ave b een deri ved fro m the F ou rt h Amendment and it s comm on-law an t ec ed en t s. ” M o r eo ve r , t his court has recogni zed that at com m on l aw pol i ce of f i ce rs h ad th e a uth ori ty to ar re st a defend ant out side t he t er rit or ial li

mits o f the po litical ent it y whi ch appoi nted them to thei r off i ce wh en the of f i cerswere

in fre sh p ur su it o f a

f el on ora suspected f

el on fl eei ng that j uri sdi cti on. People v. Lahr , 14 7 I ll. 2d 379 , 3 82 ( 199 2) . Ac co rd ing to the S tat e, I ndiana’sUn if orm A ct on Fresh Pu rsu it mer ely cod ifi

es t he co mmon law pr inciple aut hor izing felony fresh

pursuit ex

trat erritorial

arrest whic

h ha s al ready b een cod if i ed in th e f our th am en dm en t. The St at e as ser t s t hat it co mplied wit h t he fo ur t h amend m en t in t his c ase. The State points out t hat the trial court in itial ly deni ed defendant’s motion to quash an d suppress af

ter a full evi den

tia ry heari ng, co nsider ing ext ensive t est imony reg ar ding defendant’s ar re st, t he sea rc h of his ca r, and t he se ar ch of the Burley Aven ue address. Up on reconsiderin

g its rul in gs, the trial

court never questioned th e cou rt ’s in

itial fi ndi ngs, thi s tim

e onl y a lteri ng i ts ultim ate legal
con cl us i on ba se d up on

defend ant ’s st at ut or y arg ument . Like wise, t he appe ll ate court li mi ted its consi

deration to t he l

egal qu est ions
re v ol v in g a rou n d n on com pl i an ce wi th Indi ana’ s f re sh purs ui t sta tute a nd whether the proper remedy is suppressi

on. 367 Ill . App. 3d at 879. Accordin

g to the Stat e, then, whi

le Chi cago police m

ay not have compl ied wi th Ind i ana’ s p os t- ar re st st at ut or y pro ced ur es, t heir ac t ions
ar re st ing defend ant and sei zi ng ev ide nce agai ns t hi m cl earl y com port with the fourth amendm

ent and its comm

on law antecedents. The St at e fur t her po ints o ut t hat t he ar re st was subs tan t ive ly auth orized by

Ind i an a statute. In

fac t , t he ap pe llat e c o ur t sp ec ifica lly noted t hat “[t ]he part i es ag ree tha t, i n c om pl i an ce wi th s ec ti on 35–33–3–1 of In

di an a’s f resh purs ui t statute, the C

hi cago pol i ce we re p r o pe r ly in fresh pursuit of def

endan t, whom the Chi

cag o po lic e bel ie ved had com mi tt ed a fel ony.” 367 I ll. A pp
. 3d at 88 0. E ve n in h is bri ef bef ore t hi s court, defen

dant acknowl

edges the sam

e, stating that he ag ree s “Ch

i cago pol ic e o ffi cer s had t he au t hor ity t o fo llow t he-17- defend ant in

to the Stat e of Indi ana, and I ndiana ha ving ado pt ed t he Un if orm A ct on F resh Pursu it, arrest h

im .” Acco rd ing to the St ate, only section 35–33–3– 2 of Indiana’s fresh pu r su it stat ute was violated, and unlesstha t prov i si on is mandat ed by
a co mpo nen t o f t he fe deralCo nst itu t ion, nonc omp liance wit h t he
se cti on ha s no bear ing o n t he legit imacy of t he ar re st or t he subs equ ent ac t io ns o f t he C hica go po lice a nd S t at e o f I llino is . T he Stat e asserts t hat because this is an I llino is p r o se cu t io n, in a n I llino is
cou rt, for offenses

commi tt ed wholl

y wi thin Il li nois’ bord ers, and becausethe arrest compl ie s wit h t he f

ourt h am endm ent, whether I llino is ev al

ua testh e m atte r w ith re sp ec t to Ind

i an a’s statutory sc he me pres en ts a di scre tionary que sti on p rem i se d up on pr inc ip les o f c o mit y. Put sim ply , t he Stat e asserts t hat the Chicago police off icers’
noncom pli ance with In d. Code Ann

. §3 5– 33 –3 –2 ( Le xisN ex is 1998) did no t mak e d efe nd an t ’s ar r es t un law ful. The Sta te p oi nts o ut th at section 35–33–3– 2 of Indiana’s fresh pu r su it statut e not only

provides an arrestee wi

th a p ro babl e cause he ar in g , bu

t al so s erv

es to set f orth the ini ti al ste p i n th e e xtraditi on proc ess wh ich t ypic ally t ak es pla ce in a n int er st at e fr es h p ur su it
s cenar io

. I n t his c as e, t he St at e a ck no wle dg es t ha t by su mmar ily
re moving de fen da nt fr o m In dia na an d b r ing ing him to Ill in ois to face pr os ecu t ion, the Chi

cago offi cers by passed the procedu

ra l mec ha nisms setfor t h in sect ion 3 5–3 3–3 –2, and inde ed t he en ti rety of the st atu te’s
ex trad iti on pr oceed in gs . N ev er th el es s, th e S tate

argu esth at t

hi s did noto ff end the ex

tradition cl

ause or the prompt presentmen t re quir ement s o f the feder al Co nst itu t ion. The extradition cl au se p ro vides t hat “[a] Per so n char ged in any Sta te with Treas o n, Fe lo ny, or oth er C ri m e, who sha

ll f lee f rom Ju sti ce, and b e found i

n anot her State, shall

on Dem and of th e exec ut ive Authori ty of the State f rom which he fl

ed, be del iv ered up, to be rem oved to t he State havi

ng Juri sdiction of the C

rim e.” U. S

. Const., art. IV, §2. Th e Sta te p oints out, th ough , th at a

l ong l ine of Un ited Stat es Suprem

e Court pr ecedent, known as the Ker-Fri sbi e doctr in e, h ases tab

l i sh ed th at i rre gu l ar iti es in t he e xt ra dit io n o f a fugit ive from j ust ic e f

or an othe rwise con sti tuti ona l pros ec uti

on “af fec ts neither th

e gui l t nor i nn ocence of

the a ccus ed, nor th e j uri sdi cti on of the c ourt to t ry

hi m .” Ker v. People , 110 Ill . 627, 637 (1884 ), aff’d , 119 U. S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S . Ct . 225 ( 1886) ;-18- Frisbie v. Collins , 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. Ed. 541, 7 2 S. Ct. 509(1952 ); United States v. Alvarez -Machain , 504 U.S. 655, 119 L. Ed. 2d 441, 112 S. Ct . 2 188 (1 992 ). In Mahon v. Justice , 127 U.S. 700, 712, 32 L. Ed. 283, 2 87, 8 S. Ct

. 12 04 , 12 11 ( 18 88 ) , t he Su pr eme Co ur t he ld that “the offend er aga inst t he law o f the State i s n ot rel i eved f rom l i ab il ity * ** b eca

use of i ndi gni tie s com m itted agai ns t anothe

r state.” Morerecentl

y , the Su

prem e Court, c o nsi deri

ng pri nci pl es of fed er alis m, noted that “anacc use d ‘sho uld no t be per mitt ed t o u se t he
mach ine ry o f o ne so ve r eig nt y t o o bst r uc t his t r ial in t he co ur t s o f the other, unl ess th e n ec es sa ry ope ra ti on of su ch mac h in er y prev en ts his having a fai

r trial .’ ” Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U .S 381, 3 85, 5 L. Ed. 2d 620, 624, 81 S. Ct . 632, 635 (1961), quo ting Ponzi v. Fessenden , 258 U .S. 254, 2 60, 66 L . Ed. 607, 6 11, 42 S . Ct. 309, 3 10 (19 22). In the S tat e’s view, t he abo ve makes cl ear th at Il l inoi s courts are not re quir ed t o mea sur e de fendant ’s ar re st by the s tatutoryo ve r lays of Ind iana’s p os t ar re st pr oc edu ra l pro vision. The S tate as se rts t ha t if t he r e is an y affr o nt in t his c as e, it is to Indi ana a n d n ot to de f en da n t. Co nsider ing thi s, th e S tate ackn owl ed ge s th at th i s c our t coul d e lec t to dec line to exercise j urisdic t ion a s a di scretionary ma tt er premised upon co mit y. T he St at e a r gu es , t ho ug h, t ha t t his co ur t sho uld not do
so in view of it s long st anding adhe re nce t o t he Ker-F risbie doctr in e, as we ll asthe Sup rem e C ourt of Indiana’s adh

eren ce to the s am

e. Ker , 110 Ill. 627 ; People v. Kl inger , 319 Ill. 275 , 27 8 (1 925 ); People ex rel. Lehman v. Frye , 35 Il l . 2d 343 (1966 ); Massey

v. State , 267 Ind. 504, 50 7, 37 1 N

. E

. 2d 70 3, 70 5 ( 19 78 ) ( “A t r ia lcourt ’s j urisd i cti on does not dep end u po n t he l eg al ity of [def en da nt’ s] arr es t orre tur

n to th e wan t ing st at e” )

. I nd ee d, t he St at e p o int s o ut t ha t t he Su pr eme Courtof Ind iana has recognized that co mi

ty, in certain

circumstances, sho uld not

be util ized so as to effect the release of a defe ndan t based upon m ere techn i cal itie s. Cozart

v. Wolf , 185 Ind. 505, 512-13, 112 N.E. 241 , 243 (1 916). Coroll ary to t he ab o ve , t he St at e p o int s o ut t ha t wh ile defend ant was not aff

orded a Gers tein he ar ing in Indi ana as requi red by Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Lexi sNexis 1998), he was af forded a proper Gerstei n heari

ng i n Il li nois . Such a hea

rin g, man dated by the fourt h
am en dm en t, af f ord s a de f en da n t ar re sted w ith out a

w arrant prompt “j udicia l de term ina ti on of probable cause

as a prerequi si

te to extended
re st ra intof libert y following arrest.” Gers tein , 420 U. S. at 114, 43 L.-19- Ed. 2d at 65, 95 S. Ct. at 863. Sin ce a G erste in he arin

g was hel d, t he n, the Stat e contends that the fact t hat the heari ng di d not t ake pla ce in Indiana should rende r defendant ’s ar r es t un law ful o nly if t his courtchooses to acknowledge an d g ive e ffe ct t o I nd. Co de Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Lexi sNexis 1998) based upon pri nci ple s of com ity . F or t he reasons al

ready di scussed, the State argues against t hi s. Moreov er, t he St at e po ints o ut t hat co ur t s in ot her st at es ha ve held t hat as lo ng as a Gers tein hear ing is pr op er ly he l d, w ha t st at e it is he ld in is
co nst it ut io na lly

insigni fi cant. See Six

Feathe rs v. Sta te , 611 P.2d 857, 862 (Wyo. 198 0); Weave r v. Com monw ealth , 29 Va. App. 487, 513 S.E.2d 42 3 (199 9). In addi tion to t he ab o ve ar gument s, t he St at e as ser t s t hat t he
ex cl usi onary rule is i nappl ic abl e to t he f acts of thi s case. The S ta te not es that by i

ts plain lan guage, t he f

our th amendm

ent “contains no prov i si on expr es sly p r ec lud ing t he us e o f ev ide nc e o bt ain ed in vi ol ati on of it s comm ands.” Arizona v. Evans , 514 U.S . 1, 10, 1 31 L. Ed. 2d 34, 43 , 115 S. Ct. 1185, 11 91 (19 95). Th e Supr em e Court crafted the excl usionary rul

e a s a “ j udi ci al l y crea ted re m ed y ” to “s af egua rdFo ur th Amendment right s ge ner ally thro ugh it s de t er re nt eff ect.” United Sta tes v. Caland ra , 414 U.S. 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (19 74) . Th

e e xcl us i ona ry rul e i s n ot r efle xive ly

app lied. T he Su pr eme Co ur t has e ve n sta ted that

“ [s ]uppre ss i on

of ev i de nc e * ** h

as al wa y s b een ou

r las t res or t, not our fi rst im puls e.” Hudson , 547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct

. at 21 63

. I nd ee d, t he r ule is o nly appl ie d wh ere its deterrence b en ef its outweigh i

ts sub stan tia l soci etal costs. Hudson , 547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. The Sta te a ss er ts that the excl

usionary rul

e was desi gned to polic e federal cons tituti

onal vi ola tion s rath

er t han no nc o nst it ut io na lly compel led st at e s t at ut o r y vio lat io ns, pa r t icu lar ly where the arrest it se lf
was cons tituti

onal l y legi tim ate. See , e.g. , United Stat es v
. Cacere s , 440 U.S. 741, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 99 S . Ct. 1465 (1 979 ) ( co nsider ing
a vio la tion of IRS regul

ations wh ic h di d not rise to t he l

ev el o f a constitutional

violat ion and not ing th at “our prec eden ts enfo rc ing t he
ex cl usi onary rule to deter co nsti

tut iona l v iolations provi

de no su pport f orthe rul e’s app li

cation”). Addi

tional ly, the Stat e poin

ts out that out side the ma

ndatory reach

of the f edera l cons tituti onal ex cl usi onary rul e, the Su pre

m e C ourt h

as f ound th at “ [t]h

e Sta tes are not-20- forecl osed by the Due Process Cla use f rom usi ng a si mi la r [c ost /b en ef it] b al an ci n g a pp roach to del in ea te t he scope of thei

r own ex cl usi onary rules .” California v. Greenw ood , 486 U. S. 35, 44-45, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39-40, 108 S. Ct. 162 5, 1631 (1 988). Th i s court has recogniz ed this

prin ci ple and util iz e d it in num

erou s in stances. See, e.g. , People

v. DeMorrow , 59 I ll. 2d 352, 354 (1974) (“whether
ornot any giv en sea rc h and s eizur e is unc ons t itu t ional, as vio lative of the fourth *** am

en dm en t[ ], a s a matter of subs t ant ive law, is to be decidedb y

th e pronoun

cem en ts o f th e Un ited

Sta tesSuprem

e C our t. *** The deci sion of what State cour ts may deem to be ad miss ible in t he irsyst ems acc or ding to t he ir la ws o f ev ide nc e is an en t ire ly
se pa ra te ques tio n”); People v. Willis , 215 Ill . 2d 517, 532 (2005) (ex cl usi onary rul e not ap pl i ed wh ere de ten ti on ran afo ul o f Gers tein , butco nfession volunt ary); People v. Burnidge , 178 Ill . 2d 429 (1997) (ex cl usi onary ru le not app lied beca use of vio latio n of c lerg y/penit ent evi den tia ry privilege); People

v. Harr is , 182 Ill . 2d 114 (1998) ( ex clu sio na r y ru le not appli ed where def

endan t was tran sf

err ed f rom j ai l in v i ola tion of Il l inoi s Ha be as C orpus A

ct). Co nsid er in g t he abo ve, t he St at e ar gue s t hat not only is the ap pl i ca ti on of the excl

usi onary rul

e not compel

led by the fede ral Co nst itu t ion, it is al so no t co mpell ed by this stat e’s own exc l usi onary princi ples. The S tate

points out th at thi s court

ha s no t ed t ha t “t he r e is
n o co nsti tut iona l b arrier, other than the f ourt h am endm ent, whi ch preclude s one j urisdi

ct ion f rom ref us ing to hon or the s tanda

rds of another relati ve to the val

idi ty of an arrest or search.” People v. Saiken , 49 I ll. 2d 5 04, 510 (1 971 ). Mo re ove r, pr ece dent establ ishes
a tre n d on th e p ar t of cou rts in oth er sta tes no t t o invo ke t he ir
ex cl usi onary rules as a per se re medy in situa t ions inv o lv in g a co nsti tut iona l extraterri

toria l arres t that al so vi

ola ted a s tatutory pro v i si on of a noncons tituti

onal di m en si on. See , e.g. , People v. Porter, 742 P. 2d 9 22 ( Co lo. 1 987 ); State v. Pike , 642 A.2d145 (Me. 1994) ; City of Kettering v. Hollen , 64 Ohi o St . 2d 232, 416 N.E.2d 598 (19 80) ; Fr

ye v. Com

monw ealth , 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E .2d 267 (19 86) ; State v. Barker , 143 W ash . 2d 915 , 25 P.3d

423 (2 001). Applying the deterrence ben efi ts/societ al co st s ana lysi s o f the
ex cl usi onary ru le spe cifically, t he Stat e points out th at the of f i cers in volv edin this case were not even

aw ar e t hat t hey wer e in Ind iana when they arres ted def

en dan t. Acc ordingl

y , the p oli ce of f i cersdi d not-21- v i ol ate Indiana’s statut ory procedure for extradition out of di srespect f orIndi ana’s

la ws or t erritorial

borders, but beca

us e d ef en da nt ran f or t he border. The Stat e notes that t he ex clu sio na r y ru le i s “ ca lcu l ate d to prev en t, n ot to repair.” Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206 , 217, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 167 7, 80 S . C t . 1 437 , 1 444 (1 960 ). As suc h, t he Sta te ar gu es t ha t ap plying t he ex clu sio na r y ru le in t his situ at ion, involving inadver t ent poli

ce action, would not act as a deterr ent, as t he off i cers wo uld not even b e aware of thei r error . Further, the Stat e argues that appl yin g th e ex cl us i on ar y ru le w oul

d hav e s ub sta n ti al soci eta l cos t.

II. D ef en da nt’ s P osi ti on Defend ant agrees thatCh

i ca go p ol i ce h ad th e a uth ori ty to f oll ow defend ant into Ind

i an a an d arre st hi

m , c it i ng I nd. Co de Ann. §35–3 3–3–1 (Mi

ch i e 199 8). Ho weve r, defend ant disag re es w ith t he Sta te that of f i cerswere free to disregard In

d. Code An

n. §35–33–3–2 ( Mic hie 1998)

. Su pp o r t ing his po sitio n, d efenda nt not es t hat in United States v. Di Re , 332 U.S. 581, 589, 92 L. Ed. 210, 217, 68 S. Ct. 222, 226 (1 948 ), t he Su pr eme Co ur t st at ed t hat “in the a bsenc e of an ap plic ab le f

ed era l sta tute th e l awof the state where an arrest wi thout
warra nt take s pl

ace determ ine s i ts va l i di ty.” Defend ant points out t ha t in Wyoming v. Houghton , 526 U.S. 295, 299-300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 , 4 14, 119 S. Ct . 1 297 , 1 300 (1 999 ), t he Su pr eme C ourt stated t hat to det ermi ne wh ether a governm

ental
ac t io n vio lates the fourt h am endm ent, co urt s must “i

nquire f irst whether the a cti on wa s reg arded

as a n un l awf ul sea rch or sei zure under the comm

on la w when the [f ourth] A m en dm en t was f ram ed.” Defend ant ar gue s t ha t ex aminin g t he co mmo n la w o f ar r es t as it exi sted in Indi ana b efore the a do ption of the Unif orm Act on Fresh Purs ui t, it i s cl ear that Chicago poli

ce would n

ot have been

abl e even to mak e a n a r r es t pu r su an t t o a la wfu l wa r r an t in Ind i an a. Martinv. New lan d , 196 Ind . 5 8, 61, 147 N. E. 141 , 1 42 ( 192 5) (“a w ar ra nt i ssued by a court in Illi nois c ou ld no t have a ny

ex tra ter ri tori al ef f ec t, and con f err ed no auth ori t y t o ar r es t an d imp r iso n t he pe t it io ne rin Indi ana, wi

thout a wa

rran t is sue d by

a court or o therprop er of

f i ce r of the State of In di an a”). Defend ant further argues that this court has rej ected the

pos iti on that I llino is p o lice o ffice r s a r e fr ee t o dis r eg ar d t he st at ut es limit in g-22- t he irj urisd

i cti on. De f en da nt p oints to People v. Lahr , where th i s court considereda si

tuation where a def

endan t was arrested by a

Slee py Holl ow, Ill in ois, police offi

cer o ut side of Sleepy Holl ow’s boundari

es and hel d that t he ar re st po wer s o f a law enfo rc ement officer op er at ing

“‘out side of the re spect ive poli ce aut horities’ are a of jurisdiction’ ”
are ci rc um sc ri b ed an d l im ited to th ose pos ses sed

by a ci tiz en
. Lahr , 147 Ill . 2d at 387. Simila r ly , defenda nt p oints to People v. Carrera , 203 Ill . 2d 1 (2002 ), where thi s court co nsi dered a si tuati on wh

ere Chi cago police offi cers, after conductin

g survei ll ance, arrested a

de fen da nt in

Fr an klin Park, Illinois. T he de fendant in Carrera asserted that Chicago police off i cersdid no t have t he au t ho r it y t o ar r es t him out side the territorial limit s of t he Cit y of Chicag o. This co ur t agr eed , ho lding t ha t “I llino is la w i s se ttled that the ex cl usi onary rul e i s appl i cable wh ere the poli ce ef f ec tua te an ex trat erritorial

arrest without appro priate st atutory authority.” Carrera , 203 Ill . 2d at 11. Ac cord ing to def

en dan t, Lahr and Carrera refute the State’ s ar gument that t he ex

istence of probabl

e cause to a r r es t is t he o nly
re quir ement for a val

id a rrest. In defenda

nt’s vi ew, it i s i ll ogi ca l to co nt end th at a

Slee py Holl ow, Illi nois , police off

ic er may no t us e h is poli ce arrest powers t o arrest o utside Sl eepy Holl ow, Illi nois , and that
a Chi cago, Ill in ois, poli ce o ffi cer may

not make a vali

d arrest supported by

probabl e cause i n Fran kli n Park, Il l inoi s, ab sen

t statutory au t ho r it y, b ut th

at th e s am e Ch i ca go p ol i ce of f i ce r h asth e a

uth ori ty t o ent er and mak

e a n ar re st i n Indi ana a n d rem ov e th e a rre stee to Ill in ois. Cons i deri ng th e ex cl usi onary ru le a n d i ts a pp l i ca ti on to th e f ac ts of thi s c as e, de f

en da nt poi n ts to Commonwealth v. Sadvari , 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2 d 39 3 ( 200 0) . I n Sadvari , Pe n n sy lv an i a s tate troo pers stopped a s pe ed ing de fen da nt les s t ha n a mile in sid e th e Sta te of Del aware, perf

orm ed sob ri ety tes ts on t he de fendant which he fai led, and then tran sp ort ed hi

m b ack to Pennsy

lvania for chem

ic al testing. The defen

dant moved to suppres s the res ul ts o f th e c h em

i ca l tes t, asse rt ing t hat his arr est did no t co nfor m to t he Delaware fresh pu r su it statut e, as a D el

aw are mag i stra te w as not affor ded t he opp ortu n ity

to considerthe

l aw f ul ne ssof the arr es t. Th e Su pre m e C ourt of Pe nns ylvan ia

hel d that because the Penns ylva ni a state troopers ign ored De law ar e’ s s t at ut o r y r equ irement t hat t he de fendant be-23- bro ught bef

ore a Del awar

e cou rt, “the arrest was il legal .” Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598 , 7 52 A. 2d a t 398 . Ad dit ionally, in c ons ider ing t he
r eme dy, the

Pen nsylva ni a Su pre m e C ourt h el d th at “ ap pl

i ca ti on of t he
ex cl usi onary r ule will s er ve pr imar ily

as a dem on strati on of com ity to v in di ca te De law ar e’ s s o ve r eig nt y in l i gh t of Pen nsylva ni a’ s i nc urs i on up o n t his imp o r t an t st at e in t er es t

. Su pp r es sio n is also a pp rop riate

to encourage futur e co mpl

iance with Delaware’s pr oc edu re s and , in a
m ore gen er al se n se , to safeg uar d t he individual r ight to be f ree f rom unlawful seizures.” Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598- 99, 752 A.2d at 399. Ad di t io na lly, de f

en da n t poi n ts to People v. Jacobs , 67 Ill . App. 3d 447 (1979), where our appellate court considered a s ituati on wh ere I llino is police obt ained a warra nt for a defendant’s ar r es t , pu r su ed him into the Stat e of Iowa, ar re st ed him, a nd brought hi m b ack to Ill

in ois, where he wasex t en sive ly

inter ro gat ed a nd eve nt ually confes sed . T he Jacobs co ur t held t hat t he I lli nois p olice o ffi

cer s had no auth ori

ty to arrest t he de fe nd an t , ex ce pt t ha t gr an t ed t he m by the u ni form f resh pu r su it l aw of

the State of Iowa

. Jacobs , 67 Ill . App. 3d at 449. That law, simi lar t o I nd. Co de Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Mic hi e 1998), required out- of -s tate pol i ce of f i ce rs , af ter ef f ec tin g a n ar re st, to tak

e th e p ers on arrested b ef

ore an in -s tate magi strate f

or a Gerstein hear ing, a mong ot her thi ngs
. Jacobs , 67 Ill . App. 3d at 449-50. The Jacobsco ur t he ld t ha t be ca us e t he man da t es o f I o wa ’s fr es h p ur su it law we r e “ blit he ly
a n d sum ma ril y i gnored,” the defen

dant’s l ater confessi

ons stemm

ed from an i ll egal arrest and were i

nadm is si bl e. Fur thersuppor ting his position, defendant ci tes United States v. Holmes , 380 A .2 d 598 (D. C. A pp. 197 7), wh

ere the Di stri ct of Co lumb ia Court of Ap pea ls co nsider ed a situ at ion whe re Mar yland po lice officer s ar re st ed a defend ant in the D istr ict o f Colo mbia as he gotoff a bus f rom M ary l an d. W hi le the def en dan t conse nted to return to Mary la nd, the c ourt hel

d that t he consen

t was il legal ly procured and noted that “this court has h eretofore made cl ear that such an
arres t i s val

id onlyunder autho rity of the Uni form Act on Fresh Pursu it.” (Em pha si s i n ori gi na l .) Holmes , 380 A.2d at 600. Su bst an t ive ly

addressi ng the State ’s

argum en t con ce rn ing good faith, de fen da nt as se r t s t ha t t he go o d- fait h d o ct r ine is l im ited to ar re sts and search es co nduct ed pur suant t o a w arra nt. Defendant’s
ar gument on this

point i s bri

ef. Def endan t po in ts out t ha t t he Su pr eme Courthas stated t hat “[r]easonable mi nds freq uent ly m

ay differ o n t he-24- que sti on whether a pa rt icular affidavit e st ablishes pr oba ble cau se, and
we have thus concl

uded that t he preference f or war rants is m

ost ap pr o pr iat ely ef

f ec tua ted by ac cord ing ‘grea t de f ere nc e’ to a magistrat e’s determi

nation.” United Sta t es v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 914, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 693, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984 ). Moreov er, citing to People v. Turnage , 162 Il l . 2d 299 , 308 (1 994), d efenda nt poi nts out that t hi s court has stated t hat “[t]he Leon Courtwas careful to li mi t t he contours of its rul

in g.” Addi tional ly, defen dant asserts that t he subjec t ive beliefs of an a rr est ing of f i ce r a re i rre lev an t wi th regar d to establ ishi ng probabl

e cause f or a warrantless arrest. See Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. E d. 2 d 8 9, 9 8, 1 16S. Ct. 1769 , 1774 ( 19 96 ) ( “S ub jec t ive int en t io ns pl ay n o r o le in o r di na r y, proba bl e-ca use Fourth Am en dm en t ana l y si s”).

III . Ex tradi ti on Irr eg ul ar iti es , the E x cl

us i on ar y Rule, an d th e Fac ts of This C ase We agr ee w ith t he St at e t hat defend ant ’s ar re st sho uld no t be quashed nor t he ev ide nc e a ga inst him su pp r es se d. T he Su pr eme Court has sta ted th at to d ete rm in e wh eth er a g ov er n m en ta l a ction vi

olates t he f ourth am endm en t, courts m

ust “inqu i re f i rs t wh eth er th e a cti on was regarded as an

unl awf ul sea rch or sei zure under the comm

on la w when the [fourth] Am

endm ent was fram

ed.” Houghton , 526 U.S. at 299-300, 143 L. E d. 2 d a t 414 , 11 9 S. Ct. a

t 130 0. Th

i s d oesnot mean, as defend ant sug ges t s, ho weve r, t hat we mus t examine t he
comm on la w of arrest as it ex

i ste d i n Ind i an a b ef ore th e adopti on of t he Uni form Act on Fres h Pu r su it

. I nst ea d, as t he St at e s ug ge st s, it
me ans that

we mus t examine the

com m on l awin p l ac e a

t the tim e of t he e nactment of the fourt h am endm ent. As not ed above, t hi s cour t has alr ea dy d one t his, st at ing, “[ a] t co mmon law, municipal and county poli

ce off ic ers had n o auth ori

ty to ar re st a defen dant outside t he territor ia

l l im its of the po l iti ca

l en ti ty wh i ch appoi n ted th em to t he iro ffice

. T he so le exce pti on to th i s r ul e a t com m on la w was whe

n t he off ic e r s were i

n ‘f resh pursui

t’ of a suspected f

el on fl eei ng that jurisdiction.” Lahr , 147 Ill . 2d at 382. Here, the evi

dence cl early in dic ates that t he Ch

ic ago polic e off i cerswho even

tuall y sto pped defe

ndan t did so bel

ie vi ng that he was engaged in drug traffi

cki ng an d was atte mpt ing t o e sca pe. The Chi cago po lice officer s we re t hus in fre sh p u rsuit of a person the y-25- suspectedto be a

fleeing felon. Pu rsu ant t o o ur analysis in Lahr , t hen, they had the com m onl awau thor ity to ef f ec t an arr es t of tha t pers on out side t he t er rit or ial li

mits o f the poli

tical entity that ap po int ed t he m. Ad di t io na lly, t her e is no que st ion, and d efenda nt has ev en agreed, that t he arres t that occurr

ed i n t his case was subs t ant ively autho rized by Ind i an a statute. See Ind. Code A nn . §35–3 3–3–1 (Mi

ch i e 199 8). It is al so wort h notin

g that defenda

nt ’s so le fou rt h amendment
ar gument bef

ore t hi s court r evol

ves around h

is contention that Chi cago poli ce vi olated Ind. Code Ann. §35–3 3–3–2 (Mi ch i e 199 8). T his is not surprisi

ng consi derin g the proceduralpo st ur e o f t his case. As al ready de tail ed, de f endan t’s fi rst fi led motion to suppress was
ve ry broad, request in

g the t rial cour t quash his arrest and suppress, among ot her thi

ngs, the “[p] hy sical

evidence discovered and as a
r es ult of ar

re st a n d d ete n ti on ” a n d “ [a ]l l oth er kn owl ed ge an d f ru its *** and p ro duc t s o f the arrest.” After holdin g a detai led ev i den tia ry hear ing and c ons ider ing ext ensive ar gument on t his mot ion, including
ev id encea nd a

rgum en t regard ing th e h ome sea rch , the trial

court deni edt he mot ion t o q uas h and s upp re ss. Befo re t his co ur t , d efenda nt advan ces no fou rt h amendment argum en t othe r th an tha t ba se d up on Ind iana statut e. Acco rd ingly, if we find no f ourth am en dm en t vi ol ati on based upo n Ind iana st at ut e, t her e is no ot he r basi s a rg ue d f or u s to find such a v iolation. Def

endan t already advan ced a vari ety of other f our th amend ment based arguments i n the trial court , lost t hose
ar gu men t s, an d n o lo ng er ad va nc es t he m o n a pp ea l. The Illinois cas es d efenda nt ci tes do not settle thi s case as a m atter of l aw. Lahr , Carrera , and Jacobsall involved sit uat ions dis t ing uis ha ble from

this case. In Lahr , th e d ef

en da nt w as not a fleeing f el on and he wa s a r r es t ed by a p o lice o ffice rus ing his pol i ce auth ori ty ou t side o f the territor ia

l l im its of the pol

iti cal entity whi ch appoi nted him. Lahr , 14 7 I ll. 2 d a t 38 2, 38 6- 87

. T his arrest was thus in val id. Lahr , 147 Ill . 2d at 386 -8 7. In Carrera , the defen dant was ar re st ed by poli ce off i cersutil izin g a statut e that was la

ter declared v oid ab initio

. Carrera , 20 3 I ll

. 2d a t 14- 15. Acco rd ingly, this c ou rt held t hat t he defendant’s arres t was unl awf ul

. Carrera , 20 3 I ll. 2d at 17. In Jacobs , it appears thatpo lice we r e n o t in fresh p ur suit of t he de fendant , a s he was arrested in

Iowa a day af

ter po lice had a lread y inter ro gat ed a nd relea sed hi m
. Jacobs , 67 I ll. App. 3d a t 448 . Ac co rd ingly, the actual arrest at iss ue in

the Jacobscase m

ay have been

in val id e ven without-26- co nsider ing postarrest irr egul ari tie s. Jacobs , 67 Ill . App. 3d at 449. Ad di t io na lly, t he ap pe llat e c o ur t in Jaco bs no t ed t ha t it s d ec isio n in that cas e may well have been based upon en

tirel y di ff erent reasoni

ng. Jacobs , 67 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 449(“ It m

ay we ll be tha t in s pi te of having received Miranda wa

rn ing s th e tota l ity of the circumstances, to-w it, t he de f en da nt’s ag e, I.Q ., rea

di n g l ev el , c i rc um sta n ce s of h i s a rre st, t he deprecatory advi

ce as to needof counsel , the mi ni mi zation asto t he seriousness o f the crim e of m urder by a m in or, and the police o ffi cer’s o ffer t o he lp t he de fen da nt in a ny w ay he co uld , w he n con si dered in th ei r en ti rety, m i gh t we ll req ui re th e s upp res si on of all sta te m en ts made by

the defendant during hi

s in terr ogat ion sess io n wi th the l aw en f orcem en t authori tie s of Rock Is l an d Coun

ty” ). Unl ike t he pre se n t c ase , then , Lahr , Carrera and Jacobs , all in volv ed situ at ions where def

endan t’s arrest occurr edun der ver y diff er ent ci rcums tances than those prese nt here. Defendant’s ci

tation to the Holme s de cis io n is s imilar ly disting uishable

. While t he Dis t r ict o f Co lumb ia C o ur t o f Ap pe als to uched upon th e m agi strate pro vis io n o f Ma r yland ’s fr es h p ur su it sta tute si mi la r to the statut ory provi sion at issue in this case, i t was also quest ionable whether t he defendant’s arrest wasva l i d. Holmes , 380 A.2 d at 600

(noti ng that the tri

al court ’s ba sis for sup pr essing evi dence in cl uded the fa

ct that “Holm

es was arrested wit ho ut pr o ba ble
ca us e * **. Pol

i ce f ai l ed to pre sent H ol

m es to aDistrict o f Co lumb ia courtin accord with statuto ry pro vis ions. The re was ineffect ive in qu i ryin to Holm

es’ un derstandi ng of h is righ ts. Holmes

was int en sive ly

int er r o ga t ed fo rso me fo ur ho ur s in t he midd le of t he night ***. In sum , th e p ol

i ce cre ate d a nd ex pl oited ci rc umstances whi

ch resul ted in legal ly in admi ssib le statements”). Mo reo ver, t he cou rt ’s ul timate co nclusio n in the c ase was base d up on it s finding t hat t he trial courtpr op er ly f

ou nd t hat t he de fendant ’s co nsent t o lea ve t he District withouta heari

ng an d extradition was involu

ntary

. Holmes , 380 A.2d at 602 . A s s uc h, non

e of the cases def

endan t cites settl e th

e q ue sti on at issue i n this cas e, t hat bein

g whether o ne st a te’s noncom pli ance wi th an oth er sta te’ s p ost ar

re st p roc ed ur al sta tute makes a defendant’s
ar r es t un law ful w he r e it wo uld o t he r wis e b e c o mple t ely la wfu l. While this court has hel

d that “Ill

in ois l aw is s ettled t hat t he
ex cl usi onary r ule is ap plic abl

e where the pol

ic e eff ectuate an extraterritor ia

l arrest without appro pr ia t e s t at ut o r y au t ho r it y”-27- ( Carrera , 20 3 I ll . 2d

at 11 ) , it ha s n

ever c onsi dered

the si tua ti on in volv edhe re, wh ere Il l inoi s a uthor it ies validly arre st ed a defend ant butf ai l ed to co m pl y wi th an oth er sta te’s stat uto ry postar rest proceduralreq

ui rem en ts b y f ai l ing to p rese nt th

at d ef en da nt to a ma gistrat e i n the othersta

te f or the d ete

rm ina ti on of pro babl e cause and a fo rmal

begi nni ng of the ex

tradition process. Courts in ot her
s tate s have c ons ider ed t his que st ion and co me to different conclusi ons. So me c ourt s hav

e consi dered si tuations i nvol vi ng consti tut iona l extraterritor ia

l arres ts that al

so vi ola ted a n oncon sti tutional statutory prov i si on of a f orei gn sta te a nd been un wi ll ing to in voke t he
ex cl usi onary r ul e a s a r eme dy. See State v. Dentler , 742 N.W.2d 84, 90 ( I o wa 20 07 ) ( co nsid er ing t he ma gi stra te p ro visi on o f Mi ssou ri’s
ve rs i on o f t he un ifo r m fre sh p ur su it statut e al most i dentic al

to that at is suein this ca se a nd r efusing t o a pply t he ex clu sionary rul e, char act er izing the

vi ol ati on a s “ a s tatutor

y vi ol ati on th at d oesnot involve fundam

ental righ

ts, co nstitutional overto nes, or false
re pr ese nt at ions of l

aw or other

si m il ar p o li ce miscondu ct ”); State v. Ferr ell , 2 18 Neb . 463, 468, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1984) (c ons ider ing the

mag i stra te p rovi si on of Iowa ’s ve rs i on of th e un if orm fresh pursuit statute alm

ost identical

to that at issue in t his case and
re fusing to appl

y the exc l usi onary rul e f indi ng that the s tatutory vi ol ati on di d n ot af f ec t t he va lidit y of

the arrest or am

ount t o a due pro cess violatio n); State v. Bond , 98 Wash . 2d 1, 14, 653 P.2d 1024, 1032 (1982 ) ( en banc ) (r ef us ing to excl ude ev i de nc e i n a si tua ti on where a defe ndan t was ar re st ed by Washingt on o ffi cer s in Ore go n and removed to W as hi ngton without presentation to an Oreg on mag i strate as statut oril

y requi red and notin

g that “[t]he im

proper inter stat e ren di ti on wa s m erel y in ci den tal to the arrest and represented no new intr us i on int o de fend ant ’s p riva cy. It re pr es ent ed mo re o f a n affro nt to the rightsof th

e State of Oregon than of th e def en dan t”). By co ntras t, as d efenda nt des cr ibes in det ail, o t her co ur t s have appl ied the excl

us i on ary rul

e i n si tuations i nvol vi ng consti tut iona l extraterritor ia

l arres ts that al

so vi ola ted a n oncon sti tutional statutory prov i si on of a f oreign s tate. See Sadvari , 5 61 Pa . a t 5 88, 752 A.2d 393 ; Jacobs , 67 Ill. App. 3d 4 47; Holmes , 380 A.2d 598. We find the analysis in Dentler , Ferrel , and Bond mor e pe rsu asive than t hat fou nd in Sadvari , Jacobs , and Holmes

. We find pa r t icu lar ly-28- i nst ru ct ive

t he ana lysi s ut ili

zed in Dentler , th

e m ost re cen t case t o address this

particular is sue. Af

ter discuss in

g Sadvari and Jacobs , as we ll as Ferr ell and Bond , t he Dentler cou rt noted its c om m itm en t to t he ex cl usi onary rul e. Dentler , 7 42 N .W. 2d a t 87- 88. Next , t he Dentler courtcon si

dered the prob able c au se

f or the defendant’s arrest and po in ted o ut that wh

ile he was

not broug

ht b ef ore a Mi ssouri
ma gist rate, he was prom ptly taken bef

ore an Iowa judge an

d thus “af forded th e oppor

tun ity to test th e v al

i di ty of h i s a rre st bef ore a neutral ma gistrat e promptly

after his arrest.” Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 89. Ac cord in

gly, the Dentler court found that the def endan t’s due pro cess ri ghtswere

not vi ola ted. Dentler , 7 42 N .W. 2d a t 89. The courtthus found tha

t t he m ai n i ssue i n the c ase was“whe

ther a vi ol ati on of Miss our i sta tutor y l aw wa rra n ts ex clu sio n o f ev ide nc e” in Iowa. Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 89. Co nsider ing that issue, the Dentler court fi rst asked whether

t he Mi ssouri st at ut e sp ecifically requ ired t he exc lusion o f evidence and fou nd that i

t di d not. Dentler , 742 N .W .2d at 89 . Nex t, the court asked whet her t he Misso ur i sta t ut e involved a fund ament al right of t he de f en da nt. Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 89. Likewi se, the court found that it did no t , p oint ing o ut t hat t he main pur po se o f the m ag i strate provisi on was to vin

dic ate the rights of M

is souri not the righ

ts of an in div idua l def endan t. Dentler , 742 N. W .2d at 89 (“To t he ex tent an oxis b ei n g g ore d i n thi s c as e, it b el

on gsto Mi ssouri, not Dentle r. *** Or di na r ily, a party seeki

ng to inv oke the excl

usionar y rul

e m ay not vic ar io us ly

as se rt th e ri gh ts of an other”)

. Foll

owing this, and perha

ps in a no d to prin

ci ple s of com

ity , the court noted that t he def endan t made no argumen

t t hat there exi sted a fun dam ental publ ic po lic y dif feren ce be t we en

Mi ss ouri an d Iow a w hi

ch m il itate d i n f av or of exclus ion. De nt ler , 742 N.W.2d at 89. Fin al ly, the court considered and r eject ed t he co ncer n t hat wit hou t app lyi ng t he ex clu sio na r y ru le to t he sit ua t io n a t iss ue t he r e w o uld be insu fficie nt de t er r en ce t o av o id f uturesi m il ar v i ol ati on s b y Iow a p ol

i ce of Miss our i sta tuto ry l aw. Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 90. In so do in g, the court stated: “Because t he benefit s o f violat ing the mag i stra te p rovi si on are so small, ho weve r, t he i

nc en ti ve f or f utur e v i ol ati ons i s n ot ve ry high. I f we ar e pr ove n w r ong in this as sess ment, t he Mi ssouri legis la ture may withdraw i ts authorization of Iowa peaceof f i ce rs to en gage in f re sh purs ui t. Further, becauset his-29- opi ni on i s narr owl y ba se d on the uni que facts of this

case, la w enfo rc ement off

icia ls have no ce

rtai nty that the ex cl usi onary r ule will be held ina

ppli cab le un der a diff erent st ate o f f

acts, par t icu lar ly where the record demonstrat es wi ll ful misconduc t

. Fin ally, in the u nlikely event t hat suc h vi o la tions b ecome a re cur re nt probl

em, thi s court

re ser ves t he r ight to ex

erci se its su pe r vis ory pow ers to excl ude the evidence i

n f utur e cases. [Citations .]” Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 90. As in Dentler , as ide fr o m t he fac t t ha t Ch ic ago po l i ce f ai led to c om ply wit h t he mag ist r at e p r o visio n o f I nd ian a’ s F r es h P ur su it Stat ute, defend ant ’s ar re st was valid. D efenda nt ’s arrest compli ed wi th th e f our th am en dm en t, its c ommo n law ant ece dent s, a nd I ndiana statut e. Li kewise, whi

l e def en dan t was n ot brough t bef ore an I ndiana
ma gistrat e, he wa s pr omp t ly take n befo re an I lli nois jud ge a nd t hu s aff orded the oppor tunity

to pr om p tly test the vali

dity of h is arrest bef ore a neutral

magi strate. A

ccordi ngl y , d efenda nt’s due pro cess ri gh ts were not violated. See Six Feathers , 611 P.2d at 862; Weaver , 29 Va. App. 487, 513 S.E.2d 423 . The ma in is sue, then, i s whether t he Ch i ca go p ol i ce of f i ce r’ s n on com pl i an ce wi th Indiana’s post arrest proceduralstat ut e makes defendant’s arrest unla wful wh en it wo uld ot herwise be com pl etel y l awf ul . In othe

r words, we mu st conside r whether a vi olation of Indi ana stat utor y l

aw, particularly

Ind. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Mic

hi e 1998), man

dates the excl us i on of evi dence in Ill in ois. We do not believe t hat t he violat ion o f Ind. Co de An n
. §35–33–3–2 ( Mi chi

e 1998) man

dates the excl

usion of the evi

dence arrayed ag ai n st d ef en da n t. F i rs t, the statut ory language i tself does not man da te excl usi on or even

m en tion it. People v. Jones , 223 Ill . 2d 569, 580-81 (2006) (“The f undam ental r ule of sta tutory con structi

on is t o a sce rt ain and g ive

eff ect to the legis la

ture’s in tent. [Citation.] *** The best indicat ion o f legislative int ent is the statut ory language, gi ven it s plain and ordinary

me ani ng”). Next, the Indi ana statute, under t he f ac ts of this c as e, does not

in volv e a f un da m en tal ri gh t of de f en da n t. Ind. Code An

n. §3 5–33–3–2 (M

i ch i e 199 8) app earsto have two main pu rp ose s. Fi rs t, th e s tatu te pr ov i de s a

n ar re stee w ith

a p r o ba ble
c ause he aring in I nd ian a. T he fac t t ha t de fen da nt ha d t he he ar ing in Illino i s rather than Indi

ana does not constitute a constitutional violat ion, however. See Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 89; Six Fea ther s, 6111 In di scu ssing the excl usi on ary rule , w e fe

el it wo rth m en tio ni ng th at apa rt fr om his referen

ce to Sadvari , 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2d 3 93, defendant ad va nces little subs tant ive argument regarding the app licatio n of the
e xc lu si on ary rule. Defen

dant doe s advance an argumen t conce rning the goodfa ith doctr ine and its ap plica tion in sit ua tions wher e police ar e opera ting wi tho uta warrant. As w e di scu sse d w he n c on sid eri ng de fe nd ant ’s proc ed

ural argum en ts, however, the S ta te is not a dvocat ing the app licat ionof the goodfa ith excep tio n to the ex clu sio na ry ru le. Rathe r, the State merely dis cu ss es the good faith of the Chicago police office rs involved in

thi s case in ord er to show tha t t he exc lus iona ry ru le should never even apply. Accordingly, de fen dant’s ar gument

on this point does not addr ess t he St at e’s pos ition or
-30- P.2d at 862 ; Weaver

, 2 9 Va . Ap p. 487 , 5 13 S .E .2 d 42 3. Sec ond , t he sta tute se ts forth t he i

ni tial step in the extradition pro cess. Agai n, that Chi cago police i

gnored t he extradition process in thi s case do es not c o nst it ute a constitutional

vi olation. The Ker-F

risbie doctr in e has establ ished that irreg u l ari

ti es in th e e xtraditi on of

a f ugi ti ve f rom justice for an otherwi se consti

tut iona l pr os ecu t ion “affect s neit her t he gu ilt nor innoce nce o f the acc use d, nor th e j uri sdi cti on of the c ourt to try hi m.” Ker , 110 Ill . at 637, aff’d , 119 U .S. 436, 3 0 L. Ed . 421, 7 S. Ct. 225; Frisbie , 342 U.S. 519 , 96 L. E d. 5 41, 72 S . Ct . 50 9; MattaBallesterosv. Henman , 896 F.2d 255 , 2 60 ( 7t h Cir. 199 0) (“Fo r t he past 100 ye ars, the Sup reme Co ur t has c ons iste nt ly held that t he
mann er in w hich a de fendant is bro ught t o t rial do es no t affect t he ab il ity o f t he go ve r nme nt t o t r y him” ). In addi tion to t he ab ove, we n ote th at to the extent that any fundament al right s ar e implicate d by Ind. Co de Ann

. §3 5– 33 –3 –2 ( Le xis N exis 19 98) , t hey are not t he ri gh ts of d efenda nt butthe ri

ghtsof In di an a. Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 89; Ferr ell , 21 8 N eb . at 4 68, 356 N.W .2d at 8 72;se e a

l so Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 148, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 404, 99 S . Ct. 421, 433 (1978) (a pa rty general l y may not v i ca rious l y as se rts th e ri gh ts of another when s eek ing to in

voke the exclusionar y rule); Alderman v. United States , 394 U.S. 165, 174, 22 L . Ed . 2d 17 6, 1 87 , 89S. Ct. 961, 96 6-67 (1 969) (s am

e). Co nsider ing t he ex clu sio na r y ru le itse lf, we no t e t hat t he Su pr eme Courtha s s tate d th at “ [s ]uppre ss i on of evi dence *** h

as alway s been
our la st resort , not o urf

i rst i m pul se,”and app l

i ed the rul e onl y where it s deter rence benef

its out weigh i

ts substant ial

societal costs. 1 Hudson ,affect our analysi s. -31- 547 U. S. a

t 59 1, 1 65 L. Ed. 2d

at 6 4, 1 26S. Ct. a

t 21 63 . Th

i s c our t, in dis cussi ng the rul e, has stated: “[T ]he ex

cl us i on ar y ru le th at acco m

pa n i esth e f

our th amendment has no const itutional f oo ting. Instead, it is a jud icia lly cr ea t ed , pr ud en t ial r eme dy t ha t pr o sp ec t ive ly pr otects fo ur t h a me n dme nt righ ts by deterring f

uture po li ce misconduct[ Cit at io ns .] Its appl ica ti on h asb een tri m m ed to instances where i

ts remedi al objectives wil

l be most effe ct ive ly served. [Ci

tation.] That is, it ap plie s o nlywher e its det er re nt b en ef its out wei gh

its sub stan

tia l social costs.” Willis , 21 5 I ll. 2d at 531-32. Indeed, we ha ve r eco gnized t hat “[t ]he St at e do es no t violat e t he fourth am endm ent when it i ntroduces ev

i de nc e obtai

ned i n v i ol ati on of the fourth am

endm ent. [Citation.] Rather, a f ourt h am endm e nt vi ol ati on is ‘ fully a cc o mplis he d’ by t he illegal sear ch o r se izur e, and exclud ing evi

dence ca n n ot u ndo t he in

vasion of the defendant ’s ri ghts .” Willis , 2 15 I ll. 2d a t 531 . As s uch, in Willis thi s court refused to appl y the ex clusion ar

y ru le i n a s itua ti on wh ere th e f our th
am endm ent was actuall

y v iolated. See Willis , 215 I ll . 2d 517. By
con tra st, in this case, there w as no co nst itu t ional vio latio n and
excl us i on is even le ss warranted

. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon , 548 U.S. 331, ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 577, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681 (2006) (statutory violat ions only re mot ely relat ed t o t he gatherin g of evi dence do not ordi

na ril y trig ger ap

pl i cation of the exc l usi onary rul e). The de t er r en ce be ne fit s/ so cie t al c o st s a na lysis sup po r t s t his po sitio n. Here, the Chi

cago police off

ic ers i nvol ved were n

ot even awar e t ha t t he y we r e in I nd ian a w he n t he y arr es ted de f en da n t. Ac co r di ng ly, the arrest did not in volv e any poli ce m i sc on du ct, wil

lf ul di sreg ard fo rt he law s o f I nd ian a o rit s t er r it o r ial b o rders, o r fal se re pr ese nt at ions of law des igned t o impr op er ly obt ain ev ide nce. Ad dit io na lly, a s t he I o wa Su pr eme Co ur t r ec o gn ize d in Dentler , t he b en ef its of violating another stat e’s statutory magi strate prov

i si on are so smal l, any in centive f or futu re viol ations is l

ow. Den tler , 742 N.W.2dat 90. While applying the ex cl us i on ar y ru le u n de r th e f ac ts of this cas e wo uld t hus ha ve litt le det er re nt effect , it wo uld have-32- significant societal

costs, as the Stat e hasal

ready a cknowledgedthat withoutthe evi

dence against defendant, its case aga inst him wo uld be
su bst an t iallyim

pai red. As we have stated in

the p ast, the

ex cl usi onary r ule la udabl y s ecures constitutional

righ ts thro ugh i

ts deterrent effect but“a l so def l ects c ri mi nal tr ials fro m their basic fo cus by erec t ing ba rriers be tween the j ury and t ru t hful, pr oba t ive

evi dence.” Willis , 215 I ll. 2d at 532. Mor eover, the Supreme Court has re co gnized t he sam e, po inting out that its cases h ave “consi stently

recogniz ed that unbe n d ing ap plic at io n o f t he ex clu sio na r y sa nc t io n t o en fo r ce ide als of go ve r nme nt al rect itu de w ou ld impede u nacc ept ably the t ru t hfindingf unction s of

j udge an d j ury .” United

States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468, 476, 100 S. Ct. 2439 , 2445 ( 1980)

. While we ch oose not to a pp ly t he ex

cl usionary rul

e i n thi s case, we co uld ele ct t o ut ilize it based upon p ri nc i pl es of com ity. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 398 -9 9 ( “We find, ho weve r, t hat t he Del awar e sta tute , w ith its dire ct ive

t hat an o ut -o f-st at e o ffi

cer pr ese nt t he arre ste e t o a Delaw ar e judicial t ribuna l for r eview o f the lawf uln ess of an arrest conducted in

Del aware, fun

ctions as more than
mer ely an extradi tion statute, an

d tha t a contrar y int er pr et at io n w o uld render em pty the m andate of the Del

aware l aw. ** * I n t his in stance, ap pl i ca ti on o f t he ex clu sio na r y ru le w ill se r ve pr imar il y a s a de m onstrati on of com ity to vin dicate De laware’s so ver eignt y in l ight of Pe n n sy lv an i a’ s i n cu rs i on up on thi s i m por tan t sta te inte res t”). Not
o nly has this court long adhered to the Ker-F

risbie doctri ne , howeve

r, butso has t he I ndiana Su pr eme Co ur t . I n fact , in Massey v. Indiana , t he Ind i an a Supr em e Court sp ec ifica lly

cite d bo t h Ker

and Frisbie and stated that “[a] trial

court ’s j urisdi

ction does not depen d u pon th e l eg al ity of [defendant’s] arrest or ret urn to t he wan ting s tate. ” Massey , 267 Ind. at 507, 371 N. E. 2d a t 705 . Ac co rd ingly, we d o no t believe prin ci ple s of com ity req ui re th e a ppl i ca ti on o f t he ex clu sio na r y ru le in t his cas e. Moreov

er, in li ght of it s long adheren

ce to t he Ker-F

risbie doctr in e, we be lieve it unlikely t hat t he I ndiana Su pr eme Co ur t wo uld fi nd an y di ff erently were it f aced wi th this si tuation in reverse. With t his op inion, w e r eaffirm ou r a dher enc e to the Ker-F risbie doctr in e. Ker , 110 Il

l . at 637, aff’d , 119 U.S. 436, 30 L . Ed. 421, 7 S. Ct . 22 5; Frisbie , 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. E d. 54 1, 72 S. Ct

. 50 9. T his is not to say , howeve

r, that Il l inoi s courts may

com pl etel y i gnore another sta te’ s s tatutor

y sc he m e p rovi di ng pos tarr es t proc ed

ure s f or-33- defend ant s who co mmi

t t ed c rimes wit hin Illi

nois’ bo rd er s. T o t he
co nt r ar y, in

su ch si tua ti on s c our ts sh oul d i n qu i re in to the f ac ts of each
case as wel

l a s the extraterritorial

statut ory provi sions at issue. Indeed, that is exactly

what we have d one in this ca se. Base d up on t he particularf

ac ts and statut ory provi sions at issue i n thi s case, then , we will not apply

the excl usionary rul

e. W e f eel it i m por tan t to poi n t out, howeve r, th at l aw en f orc em en t of f i ci als sh oul d n ot co n si de r i t a ce rta inty th at w e w ill

f in d th e ex cl us i on ar y ru le i n appr opr i ate und er a different set of facts, part ic ula rly in si tuations i nvol vi ng wi ll ful
m i scon duct. Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 90.

CONCLUSION We re v er se

th e j ud gm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cour t affirming the de ci si on of th e tr i al cou rt. W e th usre in sta te t he trial

court ’s origi

nal de term ina ti on t ha t de fen da nt ’s mo t io n to qua sh and sup pr ess be de nie d a nd r ema nd t he ca us e t o t he cir cu it co ur t fo rt r ial.

Reversed and remanded

. JUSTICE BURKE, speci al ly concurrin

g: While the ma

jori ty correctly

reversest he j ud gm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt, it o mit s an y discuss ion o f the app ellate co ur t ’s r eas oning and fails to explain why t hat re aso ning wa s in er ror. I w ri te s ep ar atel

y to do s o. The appell ate court

provided a

strai ghtf orward a na l y si s i n support of its decision to aff

irm the ci rcuit court’s granting of

defendant’s
m oti on to suppre ss. A

t the outset, the app el

l ate court noted that there
was no dis

pute in this case that the Chi cag o po lice officer s who arrested def

endan t in Ind i an a wer e in fr es h p ur su it when

they crossed th e st at e line

. T he ap pe llat e c o ur t fur t he rno t ed t ha t se ct io n 35–33–3–1 of Indi

ana’s fresh pur su i t st at ut e ( Ind . C od e Ann. §35–33–3–1 (Michi

e 1998)) pro vi

des the st at uto ry authori

ty f or an out- of -s tate o ffice rt o effe ct an ar r es t in I nd ian a w he n t he o ffice ris in fresh pursui

t. Section 35–33– 3–1 stat es: “Any me m be r of a d ul y orga ni ze d s tate , county

or mun icipa l peaceun it of an oth er sta te wh o en ter s th i s s tate in-34- fresh pu rs ui t, and continues wi

thin [Indiana] in

such fresh pu r su it of a p er son in ord er to ar re st him on gr ou nd t ha t he is bel ie ved t o ha ve co mmit ted a fe lo ny in t he o t he rst at e, sha ll have th e sa me aut hor ity t o a rr est and ho ld suc h per so n in custody ash asan

y l aw en f orc em en t of f i ce r of thi s s tate to arrest and ho ld in cust od y a per so n on t he gr oun d th at he is bel ie ved to have com

mi tt ed a fe lony in this state.” Ind. Co de An n. §3 5–33–3–1 (Mi ch

i e 199 8). The appe ll ate

cou rt th en observ

ed, however, that the Chi cago offi cers, in v i ol ati on of secti on 35 –3 3– 3–2 of

th e I n di ana s tatu te (Ind. Code Ann . §35–33 –3–2 (Mi c hie 199 8) ), failed t o br ing defend ant be f ore an In diana j udg e b ef ore r eturn ing hi m to Il l inoi s. S ec ti on 35–33–3–2 pro vi

des: “I f an ar r es t is ma

de i n thi s state by

an off ic er of another sta te in ac co rd anc e w it h t he p ro visio ns o f se ct io n 1 o f t hi s chapter, he shal

l, wi thout unn ece ssa ry de l ay , tak

e th e p ers on arrested bef

ore a judge of the c ounty i n wh ic h the arrest was
ma de. The j udg e s ha

ll con duct a h ea ri ng f or the p urp ose

of de t er minin g t he la

wful ness of the arrest. If the j udge determi nes th at the a rr est was lawful, he shall co mmi t t he pers on ar r es t ed t o aw ait f

or a r ea sonable ti

m e th e i ss ua nc e of
an extradition warrant by

the go vernor o f thi s st at e. If t he judge deter mi nes that t he arrest was u nl awful , he sha ll di scha rge the pers on arrested.” Ind. Code Ann . §35–33–3–2 (Mi ch i e 199 8). The appell ate court

concl uded, as a m

atter of st at ut or y inter pr et at ion, that the poli

ce off ic ers’ f ailure to compl

y w i t h t he pr ese nt ment re qu i re m en ts of s ection 35–33–3–

2 ren dere d de fen

dant’s arrest statut oril y i nva li d. The court explai

ned: “Ch ic ago poli ce off ic ers had n

o inh erent authority to eff

ect an arrest in Indiana ; ra t her , t he Ch i ca go p ol i ce of f i ce rs ’ a uth ori ty to make an arrestin

Indi ana was

deriv edfrom Indiana’s f

resh pu r su it st at ut e a nd t he au t ho r it y pr o vid ed by t he I ndiana sta tute is conditioned by t he r equ irement t ha t an ac cu se d s ha ll be bro ught befo re an I ndiana judg e fo r a det er minatio n of t he la wf ulne ss of the arr es t. A cc ordi

ng l y , un der the ra ti ona le of Pe op le v. Jacobs , 67 Ill . App. 3d 447, whi ch we en dorse,-35- defendan t’s arrest was un law ful. ” ( E mph as is a dd ed

. ) 36 7 I ll. App. 3d at 881. Acco rd ing t o t he ap pe llat e c o ur t , t he pr es en t men t r eq uir eme nt in
se cti on 35–33–3–2

wa s a con di ti on pr ece dent t o t he authority gran ted in se ct ion 3 5–3 3–3 –1. The failure t o c omp ly with t he pr ese nt ment re quir ement m

ea nt th at th e of f i ce rs h ad n o st atutory

auth ori ty to ar re st d ef en da nt. The appel la te court then

poi nted to th i s c ourt’ s dec i si

on in People
v. Carre ra , 203 Ill . 2d 1, 11-12 (2002), whi ch h olds that a poli

ce officer ’s r ight to arrest a person out side hi s j urisdi ction i s no greater than t hat of a pr iva

t e c it ize n a nd “t ha t t he ex clu sio na r y ru le is ap plic ab le where

the po li ce eff ectuat e an extrater ritor ial

arrest without appropri at e statutory

auth ority .” See

al so, e.g. , Commonw

ealth v. Savage , 430 M ass . 341, 71 9 N.E. 2d 473 (1 999 ) ( invok ing t he
ex cl usi onary rul e w he n a n ou t-of -s tateoff

ic er eff ected an extraterritor ia

l arr es t wi thou t sta tutory or com m on l awau thor

i ty). Because t he ap pe ll ate c our t had det ermi ned that defendant’s arrest
was ma de wi thout statut ory authority , the cour t ap plie d th e rule of Carrera an d a ffir med t he cir cu it cou rt ’s grant of defendant’s m oti on to suppress. In my vi ew, t he ap pellat e co ur t er re d in its r ead ing o f the Ind iana fr es h- pu r su it sta

tute an d i n its concl usion that defen

dant’s arrest was st at ut o r ily unauth orized . It i s a

we ll -s ettl

ed rul e th at w e m

ay not depa rt fr om th e p lain la ng ua ge o f a s t at ut e b y re ad ing int o it exceptions, li

mi tat ions, or condi

tion s. People v. Martinez , 18 4 I ll. 2d 547, 55 0 ( 19 98 )

. No t hin g i n the Indi ana f resh-pursui

t stat ute stat es that t he pr ese nt ment req

ui rem en t of se cti on 35– 33– 3–2 co ndit ions t he
auth ori ty to arr est pro vided in se ct ion 3 5–3 3–3 –1. No r d oe s t he st at ut e st at e t hat t he failure t o p re sent a de fendant befo re an I ndiana judge n eg ate s th

e a uth ori ty to arrest a de fendant in fresh p ur suit . T he pr ese nt ment requirem

ent is a proced ureto b e f

oll owed af ter a st at ut o r ily authorized

arres t hasbe en

made. S ee, e.g. , State v. Ferr ell , 218 Neb. 463, 35 6 N.W.2d 868 (1984) ; see al so People v. Junco , 70 Mi sc. 2d 73, 333 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N Y. Su p. Ct . 1 972 ) ( des cr ibing t he
co nd it io n-p re ced ent ar gu men t as an “e xo t ic a ss er t io n” t ha t wo uld im pose abso lut e liabili

t y on all inadver t ent violat ions o f the pr ese nt ment requi

rem en t), aff’d , People

v. Walls , 35 N.Y.2d 419, 321 N.E.2d 8 75, 363 N.Y.S.2d 82 (19 74).-36- Of course , ha

vi ng d eterm ine d tha t the Ch i cago pol i ce of f i cers were authorized to arrest defendan t, t here sti

ll remains t he en t ire ly
se pa ra te que st ion as to w het her t he exc lusiona ry ru le sho uld be appl ied when poli ce of ficers inad ver t ent ly f

ail to co mply with t he pr ese nt ment requirem

ent of section 35–33– 3–2 . For t he reasons stated by the ma jori ty (see sl ip op. at 27-32 ), I agre e th at i t sh oul d n ot. Ac co r di ng ly, I jo in in t he ju dg men t o f t he majo r it y.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, di ssen ting: Unl ike t he major ity, I believe t hat t hi s case presents a strai ghtf orward question of

statut ory construct i on. Afte r e xamining t he pla in lan guage o f the Indi ana fresh purs ui t sta tute , the c om

m en ts of the d raf ters, an d the rel ev an t prece den

t, I be li eve that the lower cou rts co r r ec t ly held t ha t ap plic at io n o f t he ex clu s io na r y ru le is appr opr i ate in th e m atte r b ef ore us . I th eref ore di ss en t. Ind iana has en acted a statut ory sch

em e that sets forth procedures to be fo llowed when o ut -o f-st at e law e nfor cement officer s, w ho are in “f resh pursui

t” of a suspect, arrest t hat

person i n Indi ana. Ind. Code Ann. §§35–33–3– 1 through 35–33 –3–5 (Mi

ch i e 199 8). As a pref

atory n ote , t his s t at ut o r y sc he me a br o ga t ed t he co mmo n la w p r inc ip le s re lating to extraterritor ia

l arrests. At common l

aw, a li mi ted exce pti on de v el ope d to th

e g en er al ru le c on f in in g th e a uth ori ty of an of f i ce r to a geographic

area whi ch al l owe d a n of f i ce r w h o i s i n “ f re sh purs ui t” of a su spe cted f

el on to make a

legal l y bi ndi ng a rre st in a territorial j urisd i cti on ot her t han t he o ne in which he h asb een appoi n ted to act. People v. Clark , 46 Ill . App. 3d 240 , 24 2 (1977). The “cri tical elem ents” that characterized a “ fresh pursuit” under comm

on la w were it s “co nt inui

ty an d i m m ed i ac y ,” an d th e te rm “ f re sh purs ui t” connoted “so met hing mo re t han mer e c as ua l fo l l owing.” 5 A m . Jur. 2d Arrest §72, a t 720 (200 1), se e also N. L opuszyns ki , Father Constitution, Tell the P

olice to S tay on The ir

Ow n Side: Can Extrajurisdictional

Arrests Made in Direct V iolation o f State Law Ever Cross the Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness” Line? , 53 D ePaul L. Rev. 1347, 135 8-5 9 (S pri ng 200 4) ( the f ocu s i s u pon the “i mm edi acy and conti nuousne ss of

the pursuit”). Gi

ven th at the In

di an a l egi slature has enacted s pe cifi c legi slation to deal wi th extrat errito rial

fresh purs ui t ar re sts wi thi n i ts b orde rs , th e q ue sti on presented i s two-fold: What does t he Indi ana statu te req uire and what happens wh en those-37- re qu i re m en ts are n ot m et? A cc ordin gl

y , th e a na lys is begi ns wi th an
exam in ation of the l

anguage of

the statut e. In construing the me ani

ng of a s tatut e, the co u rt’s pri mary ob j ec tive is to as certai

n a nd give ef f ect to the i

nten t of the draf ters ( Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook , 191 Ill . 2d 493, 503-04 (2 000 )) , t he best i ndi cator being the

statut e’s l

anguage ( Yang
v. City of Chicago , 195 Il l . 2d 96, 1 03 (20 01)). Th e statutory la nguage must be aff

orded its pla

in and ordin

ary m eani ng (In re Detention of Lieberman , 201 Ill . 2d 300, 308 (2 002 )) , a nd, wher e t he la nguage is clear and u nambiguo us, we mus t app ly the sta tute without resort to further ai ds of sta tutory con structi

on ( In re D.S. , 217 Ill . 2d 30 6, 313 (2 00 5) ). We w ill not de pa rt fro m t he p lain lan gu ag e o f a sta tute by read ing int o i t exceptions, l im itations or co ndi tions that confl ict with the express leg i sl ati v e i n ten t. Petersen v. Wallach , 198 I ll. 2d 439, 446 (2 002). M oreover , t his co ur t is bou nd t o g ive meaning and ef f ec t to al l th e prov i si on s of a s tatu te, an d th e cour t must construe a statut e so that no wo rd, clause or sentence, t o t he ext ent that it i s possi

bl e to do so, is ren

dered s uperfluous or meani ngl ess. Huskey v. Board of

Managers of Condominiums of Edelweiss, Inc. , 297 Ill. App. 3d 2 92, 295 (19 98) ; Walker v. Alton Memorial Hospital Ass’ n , 91 Il

l . App. 3d 31 0 (198 0). In

co nst ru ing a s t at ut e, we pr es ume that th e enac ting

bod y di d not inte

nd ab su rdi ty , i nc onv en i en ce or in justice. Burger v. Lutheran Gener al Hospital , 198 Ill . 2d 21, 40 (2001 ). I n a dd it io n, we vie w a ll pr ovisi ons of an enactmen

t as a whole

. In re Donald A.G. , 221 I ll. 2d 23 4, 24 6 ( 20 06 )

. Ac co r di ng ly, words an d p h ra se s m us t be inter pr et ed in light of o t her re levant pr ovisio ns of the statute and must not be c ons t ru ed in iso latio n. Michigan Avenue National Bank , 191 Ill . 2d at 504. Secti on 35–33–3–1 of Indi

ana’s statut e bestows l

im ited auth ori ty upon the poli ce o f f i ce r of an o t he rst at e t o ar r es t an ind ivid ua l in Indi ana, an

d s pe ci f i ca ll y sets f or t h t he circ umst ance s und er which a
n on -In di ana of f i ce r m ay en ter th at s tate an d m ak e a n ar re st:

“ Any member o f a du ly org anized st at e, co unt y o r mun icipa l peaceun it of an oth er sta te wh o en ter s th i s s tate in fresh pursuit, and conti

nues wi thin [Indi an a] in such fresh pu r su it of a p er son in ord er to ar re st him on gr ou nd t ha t he is bel ie ved to have comm

itted a felony

in the ot her st ate , sha ll have the same authority to arrest and hold su ch perso n in2 I note tha t in the cir cuit cour t, defendant r ais ed in his motion to v acate the denial of his motion to s upp ress the ar gu m ent tha t, ba sed upon t he test imony of Off ic er Luc e, “pri or t

o t he de fe nd ant ’s arrest at t

he [Ind ian a] toll boot h th e poli ce officer s r eject ed m ulti ple conv en ie nt o ppo rtuni tie s to arrestthe defenda n t” wh

il e he w as s ti ll in Il li no is , and t ha t th e “o ff ic e rs thems elves chose

both the tim

e and place to arr est defe

ndant.” The cir cuit
court, however, did not ha ve occas ion to addr ess defendant ’s cont entionth at the of fice rs we re no t e ng age d i n “f resh pursui t” of h im in its factual

fin ding s, as the State con cede d i n th e tri al co urt that the

arrest took pla ce in Indiana and the Chica go officers did not follow the mandat es of the India na st at ut e. Ha vingpr evailed on the sup pr ession motion in the cir cuit cour t, defendant has no t pu rs ued t hi s argum en t o n ap pe al. A lth ou gh I d o n ot expre ss an opinion as to the me

rits of defe

ndant’s argument wi

th respect towhether the Chica go officer s were a ctu ally in “ fres h pur suit ” of him at the t ime the

arrest wasmade, I do note tha t a review of Officer Luce’s test imony at the sup pr ession heari ng indi cat es that t he officers may have had ample opp ortun ity to s top de fe nd ant i n I ll in oi s, in cludi ng wh en de fe nd ant p ar ked for
a mi nute at the sid e o f the road n ear the Burle y A ve nue addre ss and

also after he mad e w ha t Lu ce de sc rib e d a s an

“i ll e ga l” U -tu rn in th at sam e are a. Itw ould ha ve be en i nt e re sti ng to se e ho w the In dian a co urt would have ru led
on this a rgu ment, had t he officers complied with the sta tut e and the India na -38- custody ash asan

y l aw en f orc em en t of f i ce r of thi s s tate to arrest and hol

d i n custody a pers on on th

e gro un d th at he is bel ie ved to have com

mi tt ed a fe lony in this state.” Ind. Co de An n. §3 5–33–3–1 (Mi ch

i e 199 8). The plain langua ge o f sect ion 3 5–3 3–3 –1 r evea ls tha t t he I ndiana sta tute pr ov i de s a

uth ori ty to an out- of -s tate la w enf orcemen t o ff ic er to make an arrest in In

diana, so long a s t ha t o ffice ren t er s I nd ian a in

“ f re sh purs ui t” of thatsu sp ec t

. T he st at ut e d efin es “fr es h p ur su it ” in three ways: as it was “defined by t he co mmo n la w, ” a s “t he pu r su it of
a per so n who has c ommitt ed a felony o r w ho reasonabl y i s suspected of having com

m itted a f el ony ,” or “the pursuit of a person suspected of hav in g comm itted a su ppo sed felony, t hou gh no fel ony a ctuall y h as been com m itted, if the re is rea sona b le grou n d f or b el i ev in g that a felony has been com

mi tt ed.” Ind. Code Ann . §3 5–33– 3– 5 ( Mic hie 1998)

. The st at ut e fur t her ins tru cts tha t “ [f ]re sh pur suit shal

l not ne ce ss ar ily

imply ins t an t pu r su it , bu t pu r su it wit h out un r ea so na ble del ay .” 2 Ind . Code A

nn . §35–3 3–3–5 (Mi

ch i e 199 8).cou rt ha d th e opp or tu nit y to hear the c as e. -39- Thus, the Indi ana l

aw carves out a li

mi ted, sta tutor y ex ce pti on to t he comm on la w ge ne r al r ule t ha t a p o lice o ffice rac t ing wit hin h is off icia l cap acit y canno t make a war ra nt less ar re st ou t side t he territor ia l l im its of the j urisd i cti on fr o m wh ich his a ut ho r it y is deriv ed. See, e.g. , Kindred v. Stitt , 51 Ill . 401, 409 (186 9) (at co mm on la w, mun icipa l peac e of f i cershad no autho rity to make a warrantless arrest out side o f t he po lit ica l en t it y in wh ich t he y held office); 2 W. La Fave, J. I sr ae l, N. Ki

ng & O. K err, Criminal Procedure §3.5, at 203 ( 3d ed. 2007) , ci ting People v. Lahr , 147 Ill . 2d 379 (1992 ). In ot her word s, t he authority of

an out-o f-state off

ic er to ma

ke an ex trat erritorial arrest in In

dia na i s gai ned o nly through the grace of Indi ana through operation of i

ts stat ute. The Ind iana st at ut e ad dit ionally depa rt s fro m commo n law by
se tti n g f orth wi th sp ec if i ci ty not o nl y the steps that must be t ake n by
an out -of-state po li

ce off ic er after he m

akes an a rrest withi

n Indi ana, butalso those which must subs equ ent ly be tak en b y th e I n di ana c our t. Section 35–33– 3–2 pro vi des: “If an ar r es t is ma de in

[Indi ana] by

an off ic er of another
s tate in acco rd ance wit h t he pr ovisio ns o f sect ion 1 of t hi s chap t er , he shall, wit hou t unnec essa ry de lay, t ake t he pers on arrested bef

ore a judge of the c ounty i n wh ic h the arrest was
ma de. The j udg e s ha

ll con duct a h ea ri ng f or the p urp ose

of det er mini ng t he la wfu lnes s o f the a rrest. If the judge determi nes th at t he arres t was lawful, he shall co mmi t t he pers on ar r es t ed t o aw ait fo ra r ea so na ble tim e the i ssuan

ce of
an ext ra dit ion wa rr ant by the g ove rno r o f [Ind iana]. If t he judge determi

nes that the arrest was unl awful, he shal

l dis charge the person arrested.” (Emphas is added.) Ind. Code An n. §3 5–33–3–2 (Mi ch

i e 199 8). Thus, t he Ind iana

legisl atu re co nditioned an ou t- of-st ate offi cer’s
auth ori ty t o mak e an e xt ra t er rit or ial arr est in Indiana upo n t he offi cer’s compl

ia nce w ith the

dictate tha

t the of f i cer “ shall, w ithout unnecessary delay , take t he pe rsonarr est ed be for e a jud ge o f the county i n wh ic h the arrest was m

ade.” (Emphasi s added.) Ind. Code Ann. § 35–33– 3– 2 ( Mic hie 19 98 )

. T he us e o f t he wo r d “ sha ll”-40- ge ne r ally ind ica t es a ma nd at o r y re qu ire me nt. See , e.g. , Village of Winfield v. Ill inois Stat e Labor Rel ations Bo ard , 176 Ill . 2d 54, 64 (1997 ). The Ind iana st at ut e in no uncertain terms requi

res t he o ut -o fsta te offi cer to take t he arrest ee bef ore an Indi ana j udge as soon as po ss ible aft er t he ar r es t

. On ce t ha t pe r so n is brought bef ore t he j udge, t he st at ut e fur t her re quir es t he judge t o c ond uct a hea ring “fo r t he purpo se of

det er mini ng t he lawfulness of t he ar re st .” Ind . C od e Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Mic

hi e 1998). The statut e then

speci fi es t wo subs equ ent opt ions , based upon the outcome of the j udicia l heari ng. If the j udge determi nes t hat t he ar r es t wa s la wfu l, t he jud ge is r eq uir ed t o “c o mmit t he pe r so n a r r es t ed t o aw ait fo ra r ea so na ble tim e th e i ss ua nc e of an ex trad iti on warra nt by the g overn

or of [In di an a].” In

d. Code Ann. §35–33–3–2 (Mi

ch i e 199 8). If, how ever , t he judg e de t er mines tha t t he extraterritor ia

l arrest was unl

awful, the statut e requires that t he j udge “shall d is charge the person arrested.” Ind. Code An n. §35–33–3–2 (Mi ch i e 199 8). Unde r th e p l ai n l an gua ge of the In dian a s tatute , th e q

ue sti on of whe ther t he o ffi

cer has mad e t he ar re st in fresh p ur suit is only the t hr es ho ldin

quiry . The arrest is depen dent upon the subj ective bel ie f of the arr es ting of f i ce r th at th ere i s prob able c au se

tha t the pers on comm itted a cr imin al off ense. The off ic er’s sub jective bel ie f is then tested wh en

the f acts a nd ci rcum stan cesof th

e en coun ter are presented t o an o bje ct ive , ne ut r al ma gis t r at e. I t is o nly wh en t his
mag i strate

deter mi nes that t he arrest is lawful tha t t he extraterritor ia l arrest is dee med co mplet e. This “pr ese nt ment requi rement” is a statutory procedur e t hat did no t exist at co mmon law. The
re quir ement adva nces seve ra l im po rt ant in terest s. It p rom

otes com ity and en sure s that t he soverei gnty of the state entered into by

out side off i cersi s pres erv

ed ; i t prote cts the

righ ts of a p ers on who has been subj ect to an

ex tra ter ri tori al ar re st;an d i t e ncourag es f

uture compl ia nce wi th the statutory

provisi ons. T h us, t he pr ese nt ment re quir ement i s a

n im por tan t com pon en t of a s ta tut o r y sc he me designed to b al an ce th e i n ter es ts of l awen f orce m en t wi th th e ri gh ts of t he ar r es t ee
. I t is o nly by g iving mea ning t o all pro vi sions of the f resh pu r su it sta

tute th at th i s b al an ce ca n b e a ch i eved . Th i s i nte rpr eta ti on of I ndiana’sf

resh purs ui t statute en sure s tha

t no provi

si on i s ren dere d superfl uous.3 I no te th at Ill inoi s also has a “ fres h pu rs uit ” s ta tu te whi ch is der ived from the Unifor m Act a nd which, like India na’ s s ta tu te, allo ws a n out-ofstate law enforc emen

t offic er who is in fr esh pur suit of a s usp ect to arre st th atpe rso n i n I ll in oi s as lo ng as th e of fi ce r “wi th ou t un ne ce ssary de lay take s[s] the pers on ar rest ed before the cir cuit cour t of the cou nty in which the arrestwas ma de” so tha t the court c an “cond uct a he aring for th e purpo se of determining the

lawf uln ess of the arrest.” 725 ILCS 5/107–4 (West 2006).
-41- My readin g of the Indi

ana statute is supported by an ex am ina ti on of th e i nte nt of the dra f ters of the Un if orm A ct on Fr es h P urs ui t of Cr iminals Acro ss S t at e Lines ( Unifor m Act) , fr om which t he Ind iana statut e was deri

ved. 3 The Un if orm Act was draf

ted in the mi d-1930s by the In ters tate Com m i ss i on on Cr im e, wi th t he pu rp os e t o “p re vent cr iminals from

util izin g state li

nes to handi

cap po li ce in t he ir ap pr eh en sio n. ” Cou ncil

of State Govern m en ts, T he Ha nd book on In ter sta te Cri m e Con trol 14 7 (197 8). In orde rt o ad va nc e t his g o al, t he Unifor m Act a ddr esse d t he r ealities faced by law enfor cement offi cers engaging i

n the fresh pursui

t o f suspects across st ate lin es: “In t he fo re ign st at e, t he pu rsu ing o ffi cer fro m the Sta

te where t he crim e i s comm itted is, in g en er al, no lo ng er an o ffice r
. T his *** i s rem

edi ed i n a si m pl e m an ne r by thi s ac t. There

und er, t he moment an off

ic erin fresh pursui

t o f a cri mi nal crosses a sta te lin e, t he st at e he e nt er s will aut hor ize him to cat ch and arrest such

crim in al wi thin i ts bounds. T he st at ut e g r an t s t his right o nly wh en t he o ffice ris in fresh pursuit of a cri

mi nal , that is, pu r su it wi

thou t un rea sonable d el

ay , b y a m em be r of a d uly organized pe ac e u nit , an d o nly in cases of fel onie s or supposed fel onie s oc cur ring o ut side t he b oun da ri esof th e s tate ado pt ing th e act . It is thus bas ed upon the l ittle-kn own comm

on-law do ct rine of f

resh pursui

t, from whi

ch the statute has derive d its n am e. ” C oun ci l of Sta te Governments, The H an db ook on Interstate Cri

m e Con trol 14 7 (197 8). The draf ters of the U ni f orm Act t hus be lieved t hat t he Act wo uld be of be ne fit to police off

icers, because

al thou gh it wa s “de cl

ara tory of t he co mmo n la w, ” it also clear ly i nfor med t he o ffi

cer s “o f the ir right to cross a state bounda

ry an d m ake a n a rrest i n f resh purs ui t.” Co un cil of State Gov ern

m en ts, The Han dbook on Interstat e C ri

m e C ontr ol 147 (1 978).-42- The Un if orm A ct, howe ve r, was al so in tended to be of si

mi la r be ne fit to th e p er son

ar re sted u n de

r i ts provisi ons. The draf

ters noted th at th e A ct “ pr otects the

righ ts of the pers on t ake n into cus t od y, by providi ng that he sh

al l wi thout unnecessary

del ay be given a hear ing b ef ore a m agi strate, an

d requi res h i s ex tradi tion if the a rr est wa s l awf ul .” Cou ncil

of Sta te Gov er n m en ts, The H an

db ook on In ter sta te Cr ime Con

tr ol 150 (1978). In ot her words, in the Uni form Act “[s]i mpl e provis ions

are ma de to safeguard the ri ghts of the arrested pers on an d t o pr o vid e fo rhis re tur n to the s tate

where h e comm itted t he cri m e.”Cou ncil

of State Gove rn m en ts, T he Ha nd book on In ter sta te Cri m e Con trol 14 7 (197 8). Thus , i t is app ar ent t hat t he draf ters o f the Un

iform Act intend ed t o d elicat ely balance t he
co mpet ing inter

es ts o f l aw en f orc em en t i n al l owi n g e x tra ter ri to ri al
ar re sts wit h t he r ight s o f the sta

te in which the ar re st oc cur re d and t he ri gh ts of t he pe rso n t ake n into cus t od y. Acco rd ingly, based upo n a strai ghtf orward inte rpr eta ti on of t he I ndiana fr es h p ur su it st at ut e, it is my con cl us i on t ha t be ca us e t he Ch ica go o ffice r s fa iled t o co mply wi th that statut e’s provi sions, defen dant’s ex trat erritorial

arrest was ma

de wit hou t st at ut or y aut hor izat ion. The m aj ori ty , howev er , n ot onl

y f ai l s to construe Indiana’s fresh pu r su it sta

tu te , but also f

ails to answer the question of wh ether defendant’s arr

es t wa s una

uthorize d due to t he Chi cago o ff icers’
noncom pli ance wi th th e I n di ana s tatu te. In ste ad , the m

aj ori ty s kips
overt his ne ces sary

an al y si s an d concl udes that the ex cl usi onary r ule is not an appropriate remedy f or th e of f i ce rs ’ n on com pl i an ce wi th t he fresh pur suit st at ut e. The major ity’s t re at ment of t he issue re nder s t he pr ese nt ment provisi

ons of the Indi

ana statute superfl

uous and a
nu llit y. It is only when t he I ndiana s t at ut o r y sc he me is pr o pe r ly
unders tood t hat t he impor t ance of t he nee d fo r t he ap pl ica ti on of t he
ex cl us i on ar y ru l e f or i ts v i ol ati on b ec om esappa re n t. Li ke t he ma jori ty and the special

concurrence, I acknowledge that t he Indi ana s tatu te on f re sh purs ui t i s si len t asto the rem

ed y f or i ts violat ion. However , t hi s q ue st io n ha s be en ad dr es se d b y co ur t s in ot her j uri sdi cti ons. S ome

court s have be en unw ill

ing t o invo ke t he
ex cl usi onary rule as a r em

ed y to an un l aw f ul ex tra ter ri tori al ar re st. See, e.g. , State v. Dentler , 742 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 2007 ); State v. Ferr ell , 21 8 Ne b. 463, 468, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1984). Ot her
cour ts, h owev er, have fo und t hat t he exc lusiona ry ru le is the-43- appr opr i ate r eme dy t o ap pl y. See, e.g. , United States v. Holmes , 380 A.2d 598 (D .C. A

pp. 197 7); Commonw

ealth v. Savage , 430 Mass. 341, 719 N.E.2d 473 (19 99) ; Commonw ealthv. Sadvari , 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2 d 39 3 ( 200 0) . T he lead ing case adopting thi s l atter po sit io n is t he Penns ylva

nia Su pr eme Co ur t ’s de cision in Sadvari , w hich I find to be persuas iv

e. In Sadvari , two P en

n sy lv an i a s tate tro opers, whil

e on patrol near t he Penns ylvania-Delaw ar e bo rd er , o bser ved a vehicle dr iven by the de f en da nt, a Delaware residen

t, whi ch was sp e edi

ng. Th e troopers pursuedth e v

eh i cl e a n d, sh ortl y after crossi

ng i nto Delaware, they activ ated thei

r emer genc y li

ght s and st op ped t he de fendant ap pro ximat ely four-tenths of a m il e i nsi de the State o f Del

aware. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 590 , 7 52 A. 2d a t 394 . S ubs equ ent ly, the de fen da nt wa s a sk ed t o pe r fo r m field so briet y tes t s, w hich he fai led. He wa s t he n a r r es t ed fo rdr un k d r iving by t he Pe nns ylvan ia o ffic ers and was tran sp orted

to aPennsyl

van ia hospi tal wh ere bl ood sampl

es were drawn f or che m i cal testi ng. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d at 394. Pr io rt o t r ial, Sadv ar

i m ov ed to s up pres s ev i den ce

re l ate d to t he t r affic stopasthe

prod uc t of an un lawf

ul ar re st . Ac co rd ing t o t he de f en da nt, hi s arrest was unl

awful because it was n ot co n du ct ed in accordancewith De

l aware’ s f

resh purs ui t statute. The

tria l court fou nd t hat t he Pe nnsylva nia o ffi ce

rs ha d pr oba bl e c au se to stop Sadv ari an d that th e D el aw are s tatu

te granted them

authority to enter Del awar e wh il e i n f resh purs ui t and cond uct an arrest. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d at 395. Whi le the trial court agreed that, under t he rel ev an t prov i si ons of t he De lawar e st at ut e, t he de fendant sho uld ha ve be en taken bef ore a De lawar e judg e, it viewe d t his req uire ment simp ly as a n ext ra dit ion pr ovi si

on a nd de ni ed Sad va ri ’s su ppr es si on m oti on. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 59 3, 75 2 A

. 2d at 39 6. T he Pe nns ylvan ia appell ate court af

f i rm ed. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 593, 752 A.2d at 396. The Pe nns ylvan ia

Supreme Court reversed. T hat cou rt firstnoted t h at, as is t he ca se wit h t he I nd ian a s t at ut e in t he inst an t ap pe al, th e Del awar e st at ut e also der ived fro m the U niform Act on t he Fres h Pu r su it of Crim

in als A cross State Li

ne s. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A. 2d at 39 8. T he co ur t he ldt hat t he t rial co ur t ’s co nclusio n t hat t he Del awar e sta tute d i d not req ui re a j us ti ce of the pe ac e to d et er mi ne whether the arresting of

fi cer compl ied with the D el aware statut e was-44- in er ro r. The Delaw ar e st at ut e–a s do es t he Indi ana s tatu te in the case bef ore us–pl ai

nl y requi red the jus tice

of t he pea ce t o “d et er mine the lawf uln ess of t he ar re st ,” and t he co ur t obs er ved t hat t her e wa s no auth ori ty for a uni form ed Penn sy

lvania tro ope r in

a m arked poli

ce cr ui se r to eff ectuat e an extrater ritor ial arrest in Del aware other than t he Del awar e f resh purs ui t statute. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. A ccordi ngl y , to co m

pl y wi th th e m an da te of th e s tatu te to ev al ua te the l awf ul ne ss of an arres t, a Del

awar e tribunal was requi

red to asse ss t he ar re st ing officer s’ co mpliance wit h t he statute. Howeve r, becauset he o ffice r s d id n o t co mply wi th th e c ond iti on im pos ed upon t he irauthority un

der the Del aware statut e–whi ch requi red them t o bring Sadvari

bef ore a De l aw are

j us ti ce of t he pe ace –t he co ur t fou nd the a rrest to be

ill egal

. Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. The Sadvari court then

con si dered the ap propri ate

rem ed y f ort he statutory violat ion and co ncl

uded that suppressi on of the evi dence obtained as a

resul t o f the un

la wful arrest was warranted. The court conceded tha t not e ve ry vi ol ati on of a s ta tut e or rule requi res sup pr essio n. On

the on e h an d, t h e co ur t obs er ved t hat it co uld be arguedthat the

Del awar e statute m

erel y dupl i cated th e f ra me w ork provided by Pennsylvania law and its procedural ru les for safeg uar ding
a defend ant ’s co nstitutional rights; therefore, in in div idual cases a remedy asex ac ting

assu ppr es si on shoul d not be de eme d n ec es sa r y. The co ur t fou nd, how ever , t hat t he De lawar e st at ut e, wit h its d irect ive that an out-o f-state off

ic er present the arrestee to a Del aware j udicia l t r ib unal f or r ev iew o f t he law fuln es s o f an ar r es t co nd uc t ed in Del aware, “funct ions as mo re t han mere ly an extr adit ion st at ut e, and that a con trary inter pr et at ion wo uld r ende r e mpt y the mandat e o f the Del awar e la w.” Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398 -99. Th e cou rt noted th at un de r i ts p ri or s tate jurisp ru denc e, t he ex cl

usi onary r ule had p re vi o us lybe en emp lo yed t o en su r e t he o r de r ly adm ini stra ti on of j ustice wh ere a poli ce off ic er acted without
au t ho r it y, even

in cases in which co nst itu t ional r ight s we re not at t he f ore f ron t. I n t his instance, the court det ermi ned t hat app licatio n of t he
ex cl usi onary rule served several

dif ferent and i

mportant in

terest s: “as
a demo nst ra t ion o f co mity to vindicat e De lawar e’s s ove re ignt y in l ight
o f Pennsy lvani a’s i ncursion upon this i

mportant stat e in

terest ,” as a means “to encourage future compl ia nce wi th Del awar e’s procedu res,”-45- and als o t o “sa feg ua r d t he ind ivid ua l rig h t t o be free of unlawful seizures.” Sadvari , 561 Pa. at 598- 99, 752 A.2d at 399. As stated, I find the Penns ylvania Supr eme Co ur t ’s r eas oning and hold ing in Sadvari to be persuas iv e. Its an al y si s m ost closel y m i rrors t he intent of t he dr aft er s o f the Unifor m Act a nd is t ru e t o t he la nguage of th e s tatu te by giv in g each provi sion me ani

ng. The Sadvari de ci si on also h i gh l i gh ts the several

im port ant in terests t hat are aff

ected by op er at ion o f the fresh

pursuit statute: a dem

on strati on of com ity to vi ndi cate t he so ver eignt y of t he st at e t hat has e xper ienced t he inc urs i on o f o ut -o f-s t at e o ff

ic ers; en couragemen

t o f f uture compli

ance wi th the prov i si ons of t he stat ut e; and the p ro tec tion o f a defendant’s ri gh ts to due pr o ce ss an d t o be fr ee fr o m un law ful s eiz ur es
. I t is my vi ew th at Sadvari app ro pr iate ly ba la n ce s th es e i m por tan t in ter es ts against the simil arly

im port ant in terest in f urtherin g legiti ma te law enfo rc ement o bje ct ive s in allowing e xt ra t er rit or ial arr est s, a nd arrives at th e c orrect r

es ul t. However, altho ugh S advari is factual ly anal ogous t o t he m

atter bef ore us, and is r elied up on by de fendant in hi s a r gu men t s t o t his
cour t a nd by t he ap pellat e co ur t in its o pinion belo w, neithe r t he
maj ori ty nor the speci al

concurrence

discuss wh y Sadvari i s n ot persuasi ve. Instead, the ma

jori ty states that it fi

nds the a nalysi s in Dentler “particul arly in structive” (sl

ip op. at 27 ), and the speci al
concurrence

joins in this assess me nt. I note, however, that Dentler is fac t ua lly dis t ing uis ha ble fr o m t he mat t er at ba r , an d t ha t t his fa ctual dif feren ce pla yed a signi

fi cant role i

n that court ’s anal

ys is as to whether t he exc lusiona ry ru le sho uld be a pplied. In Dentler , Io wa poli ce off ic er s pursu ed t he de fen da nt int o Mis so ur i, bu t , wh ile in purs ui t, al so n oti f i ed the Mi ss ou r i a ut ho r it ies an d r eq ue st ed t he ir assi stancein

apprehen

din g t he sus pect. Two Mi ssouri l aw enfo rc ement officer s ca me to t he sc ene o f the ar re st and en ga ge d in a di scus si on with the Iowa off

ic ers as to which

jur isd ict io n w o uld r et ain t he de f en da nt. A cc ordi

ng to the court’s o pi

ni on, “The Mi ssouri deputies advised [t he Io wa o ff icers], ‘W el

ly ou can keep [def endan t]. ’ ” Dentler , 742 N .W.2 d at 86. In addi tion , the c ourt noted t ha t it wa s u nd isp ut ed t ha t De nt ler wa s t he r ea ft er pr o mpt ly taken befo re an I ow a judg e. In ho lding that the excl usionary rul

e was not an appropriate rem

edy under the f

acts pr e sented, the Dentler courtnoted that “it [w as] undisp ut ed t hat t he Misso ur i officers on t he-46- sce ne acq uiesc ed t o t he action. Wh il e such ac quie scence

by state law enfo rc ement officials may not give rise to waiv er or esto ppel as a
ma tt erof law, i

t is a factor t hat mi

li tat es ag ai

n st the need f or ap pl i ca ti on of th e ex cl usi onary rul e.” Dentler , 742 N.W.2d at 89. The f ac ts in Dentler

are i n appos ite to those at bar. In the matt er before us, t he Chicag o o ffi

cer s made no c ont act wit h Ind iana law e nfor cement o fficia ls dur ing t he ar re st of d efenda nt on I ndiana s oil. I n add itio n, I
n ote that rat her than taki

ng def endan t before an In

dia na m agi strate, as required under the provi sions of the statute, t he C hi cago off i cers instead tra

n sp orte d d ef

en da n t b ack a cross th e s tate l in e to Ill in ois, and then to ok him

to hi s m ot her’s res ide

nce on Burle yAvenue . T he off i cersthereupon conducted–according to their testim ony–a

“ con se nt” sea rc h o f the h

ome i n conj unction with thei

r narcotics in vestigation of def

endan t. It was only

after the off ic ers conducted a sys t ema t ic se ar ch o f t he se pr emi ses a nd di scovered addi tional evi dence to be us ed i

n thei r pro se cution of def

endan t t hat they transport eddefend ant to the p oli ce s tation an d he wasbrought b ef

ore an I llino is ma gi st r at e. Ac co r di ng ly, I fi nd Dentler

t o be unpe rsu asive f ora n um be r of rea son s: it i s f

ac tua ll y di sti ng ui shable f rom the ma tt er at bar , a nd it do es no t spe ak t o t he int en t o f the dr aft er s o f the Un if orm Act, from wh

ic h the statute at is sue i

n that case was deri

ved. Furth er, and pe r ha ps mo r e imp o r t an t ly, s up po r t fo rmy po sit io n is fou nd in o ur ow n, wel

l-se tt led, state jurispruden

ce. Al m ost 30 y ears ag o, ou r a ppe llate c ou rt in People v. Jacobs , 67 Il l . App. 3 d 44 7 (1979 ), add re ssed a sit uat ion fact ually sim ilar t o t he m atter n ow bef ore us. In Jacobs , I llino is p o lice o ffice r s in fr es h p ur su it of t he defend ant ar r es t ed him ins ide t he St at e o f I o wa fo rhis a lleg ed
c om m i ss i on of robbery

and m urder. As i

n the presen

t mat ter , th e I llino is poli

ce off ic ers fa il ed t o c omp ly with t he pr ese nt ment provisions of Iowa ’s f

resh purs ui t la w. Jacobsh el

d that th

e extraterritor ia

l ar r es t o f de fen da nt wa s ille ga l bec au se t he I llino is off i cers“ h ad n o auth ori

ty to arrest him

in the Stat e of Iowa except

f or that authority gran

ted to them

by the Un if orm Fr es h P urs ui t La w of t he Sta te of Iowa .” Jacobs , 6 7 I ll. App. 3d a t 449 . T he co ur t held t he arrest t o be ill

ega l, and the defe

ndan t’s statements were suppress ed as the frui ts of an i ll egal arrest. The court reasoned: “The defend ant was indeed ill ega lly ar re st ed s ince t he I llino is po lice o ffic er s h ad no au t ho r it y t o arre st him i n t he-47- Sta te of Iowa exce pt f orthat author ity

granted to them

by the Uni form Fresh

Pur suit La

w of the State of Iowa. [Ci

tation s.] ***
***
*** [T he statut e] man

dates that an out -of-Stat e poli ce off i cer, after ef

fecti ng an arrest, shal

l w ithout un

ne ces sary del ay take t he person arrest ed be for e a mag istr at e o f the
cou n tyin wh

i ch th e a rre st w asmade, wh

o sh al l con du ct a he ar ing for t he pu rp os e o f det er mini ng t he lawfulnes s o f the
ar re st. If t he mag ist r at e d et er mines t ha t t he ar r es t wa s la wfu l, he shal l c omm it the person arrestedt o aw ait fo ra r ea so na ble t ime the i ss ua nc e of an ex trad iti on w arran

t by the govern or
. [Ci tation .] No ne of the ma

nda tes set forth in the Uni form Fresh Pu r su it La

w of Iow a w er e co mplied wit h by the a rr est ing officer s fro m Illi

nois. The y were bot h blithely and su mmar ily ign ored an d th e def en da n t i m m ed i atel y up on h i s r etu rn to Il l in oi s w assu

b j ec ted to in tensi ve i nterrogat ion.” Jacobs , 67 Ill . App. 3d at 449-50. I find t he r eas oning in Jacobst o be per sua sive and note that t his
case has been

law i n this stat e for nearly

three decades. I also obs er ve that t he failure of t he o ffi

cer s in Jacobst o br ing t he de fendant bef ore an Iowa m agi strate i

m m ediatel y f oll owing h i s arr est allowe d t he I llino is off

ic er s to r eturn the defen

dant to I ll in ois an d to conduct an im m ed i ate an d le ng t hy int er r o ga t io n in w hic h t he y we r e a ble to gather addi tional evi dence agai

nst the def

en dan t pri or to takin

g hi m bef ore an Ill in ois j udge. Thi s f

actual sce na ri o mi rrors tha t in the m atter at ba r, where the off ic ers returned defen

dant to I ll

in ois an d, rather than t aking him

bef ore an Ill in ois j udge, f

i rs t took a d

etour to th e h

om e of defendant’s mother and en gaged i n a “consent” sea

rc h of those premises i n an eff ort to gather additi

onal evi dence against defend ant prior to t aki

ng hi m b efore an Il

li nois judge

. I f ur th er note that t he f

act that it has bee

n ne arly three decades si nce our co urts have b een presen ted with an

is sue si mi la r to that i n Jacobs underscores t hat t he reasoni ng an d holdi ng i n that case off

ered
a wo rk able and effect ive pr oc edu re t o be follow ed by officer s making
an extrat errito rial , fresh

pursuit arrest. To be bl

unt, to date, in ter sta

te-48- extraterritor ia

l ar r es t s ha ve no t be en a p r o ble m in I ll ino is. Cle ar ly, t hen, Jacobshas been

well underst o od by law enforcemen t o ff icers, who have be en co gnizant of t he sta te b ounda ri es of t heir au t hor ity and of the consequen

ces of atte m pti n g to exerci se that authority outside t he Illinois st at e line

without compl

yi ng wi th a si ster state’ s statutory pro vi sions. One thus coul d argue t hat society

has al ready b enef itted (see slip op. a

t 31) in Ill inoi s f rom the un if orm , 30 -y ea r ap pl i ca ti on of t he excl usionary rul

e to cases such as

this . The court do es no t ex pla in h ow i ts r es ul t toda y pr ov i de s a

dditi on al soci eta l b en ef it. I no t e t ha t , alt ho ug h fa ct ua lly no t dir ec t ly o n p o int , t his co ur t in People v. Carrera , 203 Ill . 2d 1 (2002), upheld the sup pre ss i on of evi dence o bt aine d by p o lice d ur ing t he c o ur se o f an un la wfu l, extraterritor ia

l ar re st. In Carrera , C hicago po lice officer s ar re st ed t he defend ant in

Frankli n Park, Illi nois, re lyi ng upon an Il

li nois statut e that permi tt edin trastat e extraterritorial

arrests but which

was , su bseq uent to the de fendant’s arrest, held to be unconstitutional on the basis that it was part of a publ

ic act that was passed i

n vi olation of the si nglesubj ect ru le. I n hold ing that defendant’s suppressi on motion h

ad been pr o pe r ly gr an t ed , t his courtfirst loo ked t o it s pr ior dec ision in People
v. Lahr , 147 Il

l . 2d 379(1992 ), whe rein the court suppressed evi dence obtained durin

g the course of an ex

trat er ri tori al ar re st. Carrera then h

eld that t he statute up on wh i ch th e p ol i ce re l i ed to eff ect the arrest was void ab initiodue t o it s inclusio n in a publ ic act that was fou nd t o vio late t he single- subjec t ru le, a nd, t her efo re , t he poli ce ha d no s tatutory a

uthori ty to arr es t the def

en dan t. Thi s court concl udedthat “Ill

in ois l aw i s s et t led t ha t t he ex clu sio na r y ru le is ap plic ab le wher e t he poli

ce ef fectuate an ex

trat erritorial

arrest without appropriate statut ory authority .” Carrera , 203 Ill . 2d at 11. In suppor t o f i

ts h o lding t hat defend ant ’s ar re st sho uld no t be quashed nor the evi

dence aga in st h

im su pp re ss ed , th

e m aj ori ty engagesin a

qui ck an d s um mary di sp osa l of de f en da nt’ s rel i an ce upon Jacobs , Lahr , and Carrera. T he majo r it y states t hat the “cas es defend ant ci

tes do not settle thi s case as a matter of law ” ( emp ha sis added) (s l i p op. at 2 5), bu

t the n a ttem pts to factu ally disti nguish t he
ca se s f rom tha t at b ar. With r

es pe ct to Carrera the op in ion states: “In Carrera , the def

en dan t was a rrested by pol i ce of f i cers ut ili zing a statut e that was later decl aredvoid ab initio

.-49- [Ci tation .] A cc ordin gl

y , th is cou rt held that t he defendant’s arrest was unlawful .” Sli

p op. at 25. Thi s i s the sum

and sub stanceof the m

aj ority’ s f actual di sti ncti on of Carrera from the m

att er at bar. I beli

eve that t hi s is a dist inc ti on which fails. T he fact t hat t he statut e at iss ue in Carrera was voi d ab initio was not what ani mated this co ur t t o ho ld t ha t “I llino is la w is settled that the ex cl usi onary ru le i s appl ic abl e where the pol

ic e ef f ec tua te an ex tra ter ri tori al ar re st with out a

pp ropri ate statutory auth ority .” Ra

th er, t his co ur t re lied on it s pr ior dec ision in Lahr , whi ch had a lread y est ablished t his pro po sitio n. I n add itio n, it was t he fact that t he off

ic ers were actin

g w ithout legalauthori ty –just as alleged in the c ase at bar –t hat co nt ro lled t he r esu lt in Carrera. In su m, co ur t s o f t his state have l ong used th e ex cl us i on ar y ru le to prot ect the

righ ts of de f en da nts outs i de of th e c on sti

tuti on al con tex t. To hold a s the m

aj ority does toda

y ren ders the prov i si ons of Indiana’s fresh purs ui t statute a n

ul l ity. T he majo rit y fail

s t o a dher e t o t he fam il ia rten etsof sta tutor y con str uc ti on : i t f ai l s to aff ord pla in meaning to the

l an gua ge of t he Ind iana st at ut e; it fails to adhe re t o t he intent o f t he dr aft er s o f t he Un ifo r m Act ; it f ai l s to af f ord appr opr i ate re cog n iti o n

to the pr inci

ples of comity to vindicate Indiana’s
so ve r eig nt y; it f

ai l s to saf egu ar d t he pr ot ect ions int ende d t o be aff orded to d efendan ts by

the statut e; an

d it f ails to fol low our own preced en t. I n r en de r ing t he pr o visio ns o f t he I nd ian a fr es h p ur su it sta tute superfl uous, the maj ority leav

es the distin

ct impressi

on t ha t I llino is law en fo r ce men t o ffice r s ma y fre ely di sr eg ard s tatu

tory l im its on the i r j urisd i cti on with n o adve rs e c ons eq

ue nc es . In l i gh t of t he fact that I llino is ha s e na ct ed a s imi l ar f resh p urs ui t sta tute, I qu es ti on whether out -of-state o ff

ic ers who m

ake an ex trat erritorial

arr es t on our o wn so il wo uld fee l co mpe lled t o co mply wi th th e p rovi si ons of t he Ill in ois statute after to day ’s deci sion. More im port antly, would an Ind iana c ourt fee l co mpe lled t o fo llo w t he dic t at es o f t he I llino is G eneral As sembly, when t his co ur t so free ly i gno re s t he will of t he Indi ana l egi sl ature? For all t he fo r eg o ing r ea so ns, I ca nno t jo in t he o pin io n of th e majo r it y.

JU STI CE K ILBR ID E j oi n s i n thi s d i ss en t.