Filed 2/17/23 Stabb v. County of Kern CA5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

VINDA STAAB et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN,

Defendant and Respondent.

F083508

(Super. Ct. No. BCV-20-101981)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. 

Lampe, Judge.

Law Offices of Ralph B. Wegis, Ralph B. Wegis and Edward Gordon for Plaintiffs 

and Appellants.

Ericksen Arbuthnot and Michael Lehman; Andrew Hamilton, County Counsel, for 

Defendant and Respondent.

-ooOooJohn Dominic Staab (Staab) was tragically killed when he was hit by a truck while 

bicycling on a public highway. His surviving wife and daughter, Vinda Staab and Shelby 

Staab (collectively, plaintiffs), filed a lawsuit against the County of Kern (County) and 

two other public entities seeking damages for his wrongful death based on the highway’s 
2.

allegedly dangerous condition. Before the suit was filed, the “Estate of John Dominic 

Staab” (the Estate) presented a claim for wrongful death to the County pursuant to the 

Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) (the Act),1 which the County 

rejected. The trial court granted the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on 

the ground plaintiffs had not presented a claim to the County in their own names before 

filing the lawsuit.

On appeal from the resulting judgment in the County’s favor, plaintiffs argue they 

may rely on the Estate’s claim to satisfy their obligation to present a claim to the County 

and, in any event, the claim substantially complied with the Act and the County should be 

estopped from arguing their failure to comply with the claim presentation requirements. 

Based on established law, we find no merit to plaintiffs’ arguments, and we must affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Government Claim and the County’s Rejection

On February 27, 2020, the Estate presented a claim to the County through its 

attorney, Ralph B. Wegis. The claim stated: “This is a claim being presented by the 

Estate of John Dominic Staab for his wrongful death arising out of a bicycle crash on 

Alfred Harrell Highway in an unincorporated area of Kern County on August 31, 2019.” 

The claim further stated “[a]ny communication to the Estate of John Dominic Staab or 

their attorneys, can be achieved by contacting” the Law Offices of Ralph B. Wegis. 

The claim contained a detailed statement of the accident alleged to have caused 

Staab’s death and the purported dangerous condition of the intersection where the 

accident occurred. The claim did not describe the claimed damages or list their amount, 

but stated that “[g]iven Staab’s death, any action in the Kern County Superior Court 

would be an unlimited civil case.” Wegis signed the claim, stating he is “the person 

presenting this claim on behalf of Claimant, Estate of John Dominic Staab.” The claim

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
3.

does not name any party other than the Estate, does not mention Vinda Staab or Shelby 

Staab, either by name or description, and does not state whether Staab was married or had 

children. 

The County rejected the claim on its merits on March 13, 2020. The County’s 

notice, which was addressed to Wegis, stated the claimant was “Estate of John Dominic 

Staab.” The County asserted it was not the entity against whom the claim should be 

addressed as it “does not own, operate, control, supervise or maintain or have jurisdiction 

over the intersection,” and it was informed and believed the City of Bakersfield was the 

correct entity. The County advised “[y]ou should investigate the identity of the proper 

entity or other potential defendants promptly, to protect your rights.” 

The Complaint

On August 25, 2020, plaintiffs filed a complaint naming the State of California, 

the City of Bakersfield, and the County as defendants, asserting causes of action for 

negligence, premises liability, and dangerous condition of public property. The 

complaint identifies Vinda Staab as Staab’s wife and Shelby Staab as his daughter. The 

complaint alleges compliance with the Act, stating with respect to the County that 

“plaintiffs, as the Estate of John Dominic Staab,” filed a claim against the County 

“arising out of the County’s failure to properly maintain the roadways and bicycle paths 

in the area where the wrongful death of decedent John Dominic Staab occurred,” and the 

County “rejected plaintiffs’ Claim” on March 13, 2020. 

The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The County answered the complaint, but then later filed a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings on the following pertinent grounds: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

hear plaintiffs’ claims because they failed to comply with the Act’s claims presentation 

requirement and the time to do so had passed; and (2) plaintiffs failed to state a claim as 

to any cause of action because they did not adequately allege compliance with the claims 

presentation requirement. 
4.

The County argued plaintiffs could not rely on the claim the Estate presented to 

satisfy the claims presentation requirement but rather were required to submit their own 

claims, and their failure to do so barred their suit against the County. The County further 

argued plaintiffs’ allegations they complied with the Act were contradicted by the 

judicially noticeable fact they did not comply with the Act. The County asked the trial 

court to take judicial notice of the following: (1) plaintiffs’ complaint; (2) that the 

County “is a ‘public entity’ within the meaning of the Government Claims Act”; (3) that 

the “Estate of John Dominic Staab” filed a claim under the Act; and (4) that plaintiffs did 

not file a claim under the Act. 

In opposing the motion, plaintiffs asserted the reference to the Estate in the claim 

without listing Vinda Staab and Shelby Staab as claimants was due to a “scrivener’s error 

of omission in typing out their names.” Plaintiffs asserted they substantially complied 

with the Act’s claims presentation requirement. Plaintiffs argued that because only 

Staab’s survivors could bring a wrongful death cause of action and the claim states it is 

for wrongful death, the face of the claim should have raised questions about the 

claimant’s identity; therefore, the County was required to provide notice of the defect to 

the Estate. Plaintiffs asserted the County waived the issue by failing to raise it when the 

claim was filed. Plaintiffs further argued because the County rejected the claim based on 

lack of control or jurisdiction over the accident site, it was estopped from asserting 

noncompliance with the claims presentation requirement since its rejection induced 

plaintiffs “from rectifying any error in the caption of the claim.” 

In reply, the County argued: it did not have a duty to identify and seek out other 

possible claimants who had potential claims against it; it was not obligated to give the 

claimant notice to correct any deficiency; the claim did not provide it with all required 

information as to plaintiffs; plaintiffs failed to address the elements of estoppel or 

identify any facts the County concealed from them; and the doctrine of substantial 

compliance does not apply because plaintiffs did not file claims. 
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Following oral argument on the motion, the trial court took the matter under 

submission. The trial court subsequently issued a written ruling granting the motion 

without leave to amend. The trial court noted the only claim filed in conjunction with 

Staab’s death was filed by his Estate and explained that while plaintiffs argued the claim 

should be read to include them because it included the phrase “wrongful death,” the 

argument went against well-settled authority holding each claimant must file his or her 

own claim and one claimant may not rely on a claim presented by another. 

The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ substantial compliance argument, finding they 

misapplied the doctrine as it only applies when the statutory requirements have been met 

but there is a defect in form. The trial court found plaintiffs’ alternative contention that 

the County is estopped from asserting failure to comply with the claim filing 

requirements was meritless. The trial court determined plaintiffs failed to properly 

address the elements of estoppel and, in any event, they did not offer any reasonable basis 

to show the County knew of plaintiffs’ existence and should have investigated the 

identities of potential claimants, as nothing in the claim could be perceived as notifying 

the County of plaintiffs or their connection to the claim since the claim does not reference 

them or assert their existence. The trial court granted the County’s request for judicial 

notice of its status as a public entity, that the Estate filed a claim pursuant to the Act, and 

that plaintiffs did not file a claim, and granted judicial notice of the complaint. 

Judgment was entered in favor of the County on October 8, 2021. 

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

“ ‘ “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same 

as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material 

facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law 

contained therein.... We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges 

facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any theory.” ’ ” (Tarin v. Lind (2020) 
6.

47 Cal.App.5th 395, 403–404.) “[W]e independently determine whether, on the state of 

the pleadings and any matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears the [County] was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Ventura Coastal, LLC v. Occupational Safety 

& Health Appeals Bd. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) “We may rely on any applicable 

legal theory in affirming or reversing because we ‘ “review the trial court’s disposition of 

the matter, not its reasons for the disposition.” ’ ” (Sanchez v. City of Modesto (2006) 

145 Cal.App.4th 660, 671.)

Plaintiffs Failed to Submit a Claim

As a prerequisite to any action for money or damages against a local public entity, 

the Act requires the timely presentation of a written claim to the public entity. (§§ 905, 

945.4; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 454 [failure to comply 

with this requirement is fatal to the cause of action].) “The failure to timely present a 

claim for money or damages to a public entity bars the plaintiff from bringing suit against 

that entity.” (Sparks v. Kern County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 794, 

798.)

The purpose of the claims presentation requirement is to “provide the public entity 

sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if 

appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court,

supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 455.) “The purpose is not to prevent surprise. [Citation.] Rather, 

claims statutes must be satisfied even in the face of the public entity’s actual knowledge 

of the circumstances surrounding the claim.” (Sparks v. Kern County Bd. of Supervisors,

supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) It is plaintiffs’ burden to allege facts demonstrating or 

excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (State of California v. 

Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1241.)

Here, plaintiffs alleged they complied with the Act by filing a claim with the 

County “as the Estate of John Dominic Staab.” Plaintiffs concede the only claim filed in 

conjunction with Staab’s death was the one that named his Estate as the claimant and that 
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their names are not included in the claim, which they assert was due to “a scrivener’s 

error.” The issue is whether plaintiffs may rely on the Estate’s claim to satisfy their own 

obligation to present claims in their own names. 

It is well settled that each claimant must file his or her own tort claim, and 

“[w]hen people suffer separate and distinct injuries from the same act or omission, they 

must each submit a claim,” and “[o]ne claimant cannot rely on a claim presented by 

another.” (Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 

212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1062‒1063 (Castaneda) [separate tort claims required for 

decedent’s predeath survival causes of action and daughter’s wrongful death claim]; 

accord, Nelson v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 796‒797; Nguyen 

v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 729, 733‒

734 [claim filed for injured child does not permit parents to sue for negligent infliction of 

emotional distress].)

This principle applies in wrongful death actions when one heir attempts to rely on 

a claim filed by another heir. In Petersen v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 757

(Petersen), a daughter who was the administratrix of her father’s estate never filed a 

claim in either her individual or representative capacity against the government 

tortfeasors she alleged were responsible for her father’s death. (Id. at pp. 764‒765.) Her 

mother, however, who was a co-plaintiff in the wrongful death action, filed a claim, and 

while the text of the claim was not in the record, it was presumed to include damages for 

her own injuries, as well as damages for the loss of her husband. (Id. at p. 765.) The 

appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of the governmental entities’ summary 

judgment motions with respect to the daughter’s wrongful death cause of action based on 

her failure to file a claim. (Ibid.) 

The daughter attempted to rely on her mother’s claim to satisfy the claim 

presentation requirement. First, she argued her mother’s claim was implicitly filed on 

behalf of all heirs who might be entitled to a share in any eventual recovery in the 
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wrongful death action and that claim was sufficient to allow the governmental entities to 

investigate and settle the claim. (Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at p. 766.) The 

appellate court rejected this argument, as it is generally recognized a claimant’s failure to 

file a timely claim is not excused by the mere fact the governmental entity has some 

notice or knowledge of the accident and possible claim. (Ibid.) Moreover, there was 

nothing in the record to suggest the mother was acting as an agent on her daughter’s 

behalf, that the daughter was named as a claimant, or that any sum was claimed on the 

daughter’s behalf. (Ibid.)

The appellate court also rejected the daughter’s contention she was entitled to rely 

on her mother’s claim “on the theory that there can be only one action, and therefore one 

claim for wrongful death.” (Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at p. 765.) The appellate 

court relied on Cross v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 690, 692, which it 

quoted for “the following principles: ‘[The wrongful death statute] is a procedural statute 

establishing compulsory joinder and not a statute creating a joint cause of action. 

Otherwise, its provisions could not be waived. [Citations.] Although recovery under [the 

statute] is in the form of a “lump sum,” the amount is determined in accordance with the 

various heirs’ separate interests in the deceased’s life and the loss suffered by each by 

reason of the death, and no recovery can be had by an heir who did not sustain a loss. 

[Citation.] Accordingly, each heir should be regarded as having a personal and separate 

cause of action.’ ” (Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at pp. 766‒767.)

Finally, the daughter contended one of the governmental entities was estopped or 

had waived the right to assert she failed to file a claim because the entity did not raise the 

issue until it moved for summary judgment. (Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at p. 767.) 

The appellate court recognized another case found an estoppel where the public entity 

filed an answer that failed to raise the issue of noncompliance with the claim presentation 

requirement when there was ample time remaining to comply with the claim statute, but 
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the court found that case distinguishable, as the time for the daughter to apply to file a 

late claim expired long before the wrongful death action was filed. (Ibid.) 

The rationale of the Petersen decision applies equally here. The claim presented 

to the County named only the “Estate of John Dominic Staab” as the claimant and did not 

identify plaintiffs by name or description. That the County had notice or knowledge of 

Staab’s accident and that a wrongful death action may result does not excuse plaintiffs’ 

failure to file a timely claim in their own names as required by the Act. There is nothing 

to indicate the Estate filed the claim on plaintiffs’ behalf as their agent or that any sum 

was claimed on their behalf. Since plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims are personal to them 

and each is only entitled to recover damages for their own pecuniary loss, they were 

required to submit their own claims to the County and their failure to do so precludes 

their wrongful death actions against the County.

Plaintiffs argue they may rely on the Estate’s claim because it specifically stated it 

was for wrongful death and a wrongful death claim can only be made on behalf of 

Staab’s survivors, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60.2 But this argument was 

rejected in Petersen, as in a wrongful death action, each surviving heir has their own 

claim for their own injuries, and we cannot imply they were included in the Estate’s 

claim solely because the Estate was the claimant. Plaintiffs assert that because the Estate 

could not assert a wrongful death claim in its own name, the onus was on the County to 

investigate the identity of the potential claimants. The County, however, was not 

obligated to determine who the potential claimants were, as the failure to file a claim is 

2 Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 provides in pertinent part: “A cause of 

action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be 

asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent’s personal representative on 

their behalf: [¶] (a) The decedents’ surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and 

issue of deceased children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, 

including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property 

of the decedent by intestate succession....”
10.

not excused by the County’s notice or knowledge of the accident and the possibility of a 

claim. (Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at p. 766.) Instead, the onus was on plaintiffs to 

provide their identities to the County so it could investigate and evaluate their claims, 

which were unique to each plaintiff.

Plaintiffs assert Petersen is distinguishable because it was not clear in Petersen 

whether the mother asserted her husband’s wrongful death in her claim, and here, the 

Estate, not one of the heirs, submitted the claim, which specifically stated it was for 

wrongful death. The appellate court in Petersen, however, presumed the mother sought 

damages for her husband’s wrongful death in her claim and based on that presumption, 

concluded the daughter could not rely on her mother’s claim to excuse her failure to file a 

timely claim. (Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at pp. 765‒766.) This applies equally 

here, where the Estate filed the only claim, as there is nothing to indicate the Estate filed 

the claim on plaintiffs’ behalf, and the claim did not name either plaintiff as a claimant or 

claim damages on their behalf. (Id. at p. 766.)

Substantial Compliance

Plaintiffs next contend the Estate’s claim should be read to include them because it 

substantially complies with the Act’s claims presentation requirements. “Where a 

claimant has attempted to comply with the claim requirements but the claim is deficient 

in some way, the doctrine of substantial compliance may validate the claim ‘if it 

substantially complies with all of the statutory requirements ... even though it is 

technically deficient in one or more particulars.’ ” (Connelly v. County of Fresno (2006) 

146 Cal.App.4th 29, 38.) The doctrine, however, “ ‘cannot cure total omission of an 

essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully 

with the statute.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Thus, the substantial compliance doctrine cannot apply when a person has not 

filed a claim: “[T]he statutory requirements [for filing a claim] have not been met by the 

person who has not filed a claim, and the doctrine of substantial compliance (which 
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applies only when there is a defect in form but the statutory requirements have otherwise 

been met) does not apply.” (Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 797.) Since plaintiffs did not present a claim in their names, they cannot rely on the 

substantial compliance doctrine.

Plaintiffs compare their circumstances to Lacy v. City of Monrovia (1974) 

44 Cal.App.3d 152 (Lacy). There, a husband, wife, and their three minor children filed a 

lawsuit against a city alleging police officers illegally entered their home and terrorized 

them. (Id. at p. 154.) The husband had submitted a claim for damages to the city, 

describing the injuries to himself, his wife, and their children. (Id. at pp. 153‒154.) The 

city moved for summary judgment on the wife’s and children’s causes of action, 

contending only the husband properly presented a claim. (Id. at p. 154.) The trial court 

determined the claim was sufficient to support the causes of action by the husband and 

children, but not the wife. (Ibid.) The sole issue on appeal was whether the husband’s 

claim was sufficient to support the wife’s cause of action. (Ibid.) 

The appellate court concluded that based on the wording of the husband’s claim, it 

was clear the claim was presented to the city “on his own behalf and on the behalf of his 

wife and children.” (Lacy, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 155.) The claim essentially listed 

the wife’s claim as one of the items of damages, by stating it sought $10,000 in damages 

“for detention, humiliation and embarrassment and threat to my wife’s life.” (Id. at 

pp. 155‒156.) The court concluded the husband’s claim accomplished the principal 

purposes of the claims statute, namely, to give the public entity the opportunity to 

investigate the claim and avoid unnecessary litigation by settling meritorious claims, as 

the claim’s contents gave the city all the notice and knowledge it needed concerning the 

wife’s claim. (Id. at p. 155.) Since a bona fide attempt was made to comply with the 

claims statute and the city had notice of the incident giving rise to the claim, as well as 

the names of all persons seeking damages and the amount of damages claimed, the 
12.

appellate court reversed the judgment in the city’s favor on the wife’s cause of action. 

(Id. at p. 157.) 

Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, this decision does not assist them. While 

plaintiffs assert the wording of the Estate’s claim gave the County all the notice and 

knowledge it needed concerning their claims, the claim did not identify plaintiffs by 

name or description or describe the damages they suffered. For that reason, Lacy is 

distinguishable, as there the husband’s claim identified his wife and described her 

injuries.3 Had the Estate’s claim contained similar information, such as identifying 

Staab’s wife and daughter and describing their injuries, the claim would be sufficient to 

allow plaintiffs to proceed. The claim, however, does not mention either plaintiff or 

describe their injuries; therefore, it did not provide the County with notice or knowledge 

of their claims.

Plaintiffs contend if the County was confused about who the claimants were or 

what the claim was, it was required to provide notice that the claim was deficient. A 

public entity that believes the claim as presented fails to comply substantially with the 

requirements of sections 910 and 910.24 may give written notice of any defects or 

omissions as provided in section 910.8, and its failure to give such notice results in a 

3 Plaintiffs are under the misapprehension that Lacy involved an omitted child who 

was not named in the husband’s claim. But a careful reading of the decision shows the 

issue was whether the husband’s claim was sufficient to support the wife’s cause of 

action, where the wife was identified in the claim and her damages, and their amount, 

were described in the claim. (Lacy, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at pp. 154‒156.)

4 Section 910 provides that a claim must be presented by the claimant or someone 

acting on the claimant’s behalf and sets forth the information that must be included in the 

claim: (1) the claimant’s name and address; (2) the address to which notices should be 

sent; (3) the date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence giving rise to the 

claim; (4) a general description of the “injury, damage or loss incurred”; and (5) if the 

amount claimed exceeds $10,000, indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil 

case. Section 910.2 provides that the claim must be signed by the claimant or someone 

acting on the claimant’s behalf.
13.

waiver of any defense as to the sufficiency of the claim based on a defect or omission in 

the claim as presented. (Connelly v. County of Fresno, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 38.) 

But without filing a claim indicating their intent to sue, plaintiffs have not presented a 

claim that would trigger the Act’s notice and defense-waiver provisions. (Castaneda,

supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1068‒1069.) Plaintiffs do not cite any authority that a 

claim that fails to identify certain claimants is deficient, thereby requiring the public 

entity to give notice of the failure to identify those claimants or waive the defense of a 

plaintiff’s complete failure to present a claim. 

Estoppel

Finally, plaintiffs contend the County is estopped from asserting their 

noncompliance with the Act because the County rejected the Estate’s claim on the basis 

that it did not control the accident site. Plaintiffs argue the County prevented or deterred 

them from filing their own claims when it denied the Estate’s claim on the ground it was 

not responsible for the accident site and did not point out the clear “scrivener’s error 

contained within the Claim.” 

“ ‘A public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the tort claims 

statutes where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely 

claim by some affirmative act. The required elements for an equitable estoppel are: 

(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) the party to be estopped 

must intend his or her conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting 

the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant 

of the true state of facts; and (4) the other party must rely upon the conduct to his or her 

injury.’ ” (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064.)

As the trial court found, plaintiffs failed to offer any reasonable basis to argue the 

County was apprised of the facts—that it knew of plaintiffs’ existence and should have 

investigated the identities of potential claimants. Nothing in the Estate’s claim could be 

perceived as notifying the County of plaintiffs or their connection to the claim, as the 
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claim does not reference them or assert their existence. Even if the County had actual 

knowledge of plaintiffs’ existence, “ ‘ “[i]t is well-settled that claims statutes must be 

satisfied even in [the] face of the public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances 

surrounding the claim. Such knowledge—standing alone—constitutes neither substantial 

compliance nor basis for estoppel.” ’ ” (Nguyen v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA 

Medical Center, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 734.) 

While plaintiffs claim they were misled by the County rejecting the claim on the 

merits, they do not cite any authority requiring the County to advise them that any heirs 

needed to file their own claims. Denying the Estate’s claim on the merits is not a 

misleading statement about the need for any heirs to file their own claims. (Castaneda, 

supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064 [“ ‘[e]stoppel most commonly results from misleading 

statements about the need for or advisability of a claim’ ”].) The County did not 

affirmatively tell plaintiffs they were entitled to rely on the Estate’s claim to satisfy their 

own claim presentation requirements or there was no need for them to file their own 

claims. 

Essentially, plaintiffs are contending the County was obligated to inform them of 

their attorney’s failure to include their names in the Estate’s claim, which plaintiffs 

concede were omitted due to a mistake in drafting the claim. But because plaintiffs were 

represented by counsel, they could not reasonably rely on the County’s conduct to decide 

not to file their own claims or to correct the Estate’s claim. (Castaneda, supra,

212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1066‒1067 [the law “ ‘disfavors estoppels “where the party 

attempting to raise the estoppel is represented by an attorney at law,” ’ ” as attorneys are 

charged with knowledge of California law].) Plaintiffs’ counsel should know the 

requirements of the Act and is not entitled to rely on the County to inform him of the law. 

In sum, plaintiffs were required to present a claim in their own names. The 

Estate’s claim does not satisfy this requirement because it does not mention plaintiffs 

either by name or designation or describe their injuries. Because plaintiffs did not file 
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their own claim, they cannot rely on the doctrine of substantial compliance. Finally, 

estoppel cannot apply because the County did not know their identities and was not 

required to investigate the identities of potential claimants, and plaintiffs could not 

reasonably rely on the County’s denial of the Estate’s claim to decide not to file their own 

claims. As plaintiffs did not timely present a claim and their failure was not excused, the 

trial court did not err in granting the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to the County.

 DE SANTOS, J.

WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.