UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Tenth Circuit

Byron White United States Courthouse

1823 Stout Street

Denver, Colorado 80294

(303) 844-3157

Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk

June 21, 1996

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION

RE: 95-3259 Decker v. Chater

 April 15, 1996 by The Honorable Deanell R. Tacha

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision:

The file stamp date appearing on the published opinion is incorrect. The correct 

date is April 15, 1996.

Please make the appropriate correction to your copy.

Very truly yours,

Patrick Fisher, Clerk

Beth Morris

Deputy Clerk
* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human

Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of

Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services,

as the defendant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the

Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the

appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 4/15/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

DONALD D. DECKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of

Social Security,*

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-3259

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

(D.C. No. 94-CV-4247)

Submitted on the briefs:

Roger D. Fincher, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, Jackie A. Rapstine, Assistant United States

Attorney, Topeka, Kansas (Frank V. Smith III, Chief Counsel, Region VII, Social

Security Administration, Lisa A. Thomas, Assistant Regional Counsel, Kansas City,

Missouri, of Counsel), for Defendant-Appellee. 
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument.

(continued...)

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Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

TACHA, Circuit Judge.

Claimant Donald D. Decker appeals from the district court’s order affirming the

decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, denying in part his application

for social security disability benefits. The Secretary found a closed period of disability

from May 29, 1991, the date of Decker’s injury, through December 15, 1992. The

Secretary concluded, however, at step five of the five-step sequential evaluation process,

that as of December 16, 1992, Decker’s medical condition had improved to the point that

he was able to perform a significant number of occupations existing in the local and

national economies and was therefore no longer disabled.

Decker contends on appeal (1) that the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision

that he was not disabled after December of 1992 is not supported by substantial evidence,

and (2) that, in reaching that decision, the ALJ improperly relied on testimony from a

vocational expert that was solicited through an allegedly defective hypothetical question. 

We affirm.1
1

(...continued)

See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted

without oral argument. 

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Our review of the Secretary’s decision is limited to determining whether her

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the correct legal

standards were applied. Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d

1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). We may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our

judgment for that of the Secretary. Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.

1991).

Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

conclusion that Decker was no longer disabled after December 15, 1992. Decker’s

medical records indicate that, although he continued to complain of pain, his condition

had improved enough by December of 1992 to enable him to engage in sedentary work. 

See Appellant’s Supp. App. at 186, 239; 302 (out of order), 304 (out of order). Indeed,

Decker himself testified at the hearing that there had been enough improvement to enable

him to go back to work. Appellant’s App. at 19. See also Appellant’s Supp. App. at 137-

40 (“Reconsideration Disability Report,” signed by Decker, October 5, 1992) and at 143-

44 (“Claimant’s Statement When Request For Hearing Is Filed And The Issue Is

Disability,” signed by Decker, January 18, 1993). 

Decker complains that the ALJ’s determination was based on Decker’s condition

and limitations “as of and before December, 1992," Appellant’s Brief at 13, rather than as
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of June of 1993 “when his condition [had] deteriorated significantly after months of

attempting to return to gainful employment,” id. at 12. The record is clear, however, that

the ALJ did not ignore the post-1992 period. At the hearing, most of the ALJ’s questions

to Decker were either broad enough to encompass the entire period of alleged disability

up to the date of the hearing, see Appellant’s App. at 19-22, 26-27, or specifically

directed at the post-1992 period, see id. at 11-18, 19, 22, 23-26. The ALJ specifically

inquired about Decker’s alleged re-injury in June of 1993, id. at 14-15, 17, and about

Decker’s condition on the date of the hearing as compared to his condition in December

of 1992, id. at 21-22, 29. In addition, it was the ALJ who noted the absence of any

medical records related to the post-1992 period, and specifically asked for their

submission before he closed the record. Id. at 16-17.

The ALJ’s decision reflects not that he ignored the post-1992 period, but that he

did not accept as true the evidence that Decker’s condition had permanently and

significantly worsened between December of 1992, when he first returned to work, and

the date of the hearing. This conclusion enjoys substantial evidentiary support in the

record. See Appellant’s App. at 29 (Decker’s testimony that his functional capacity was

no different at the time of the hearing than in December of 1992), 27-28 (Decker’s

testimony concerning his willingness to try a job with exertional requirements applicable

to sedentary work), 21-23 (Decker’s testimony suggesting his pain situation was no worse

on date of hearing than in December of 1992), 52 (chiropractor’s letter noting Decker’s
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failure to follow work restrictions and stating that his condition “will definitely improve

with him off work again”).

Decker challenges the ALJ’s finding that his testimony was only partially credible, 

claiming that the ALJ based his credibility determination at least in part on an erroneous

conclusion that Decker attempted to conceal his post-December of 1992 employment. 

The plain language of the ALJ’s decision does not permit this interpretation. It clearly

reflects that, in assessing Decker’s credibility, the ALJ appropriately considered medical

evidence that was inconsistent with Decker’s claim of total disability up to and including

the date of the hearing. See Appellant’s App. at 59. Decker also claims that the ALJ’s

credibility determination was inappropriately influenced by the fact that Decker failed to

abide by the physical restrictions imposed by his doctor when he returned to work. We

disagree. The failure to follow prescribed treatment is a legitimate consideration in

evaluating the validity of an alleged impairment. See Diaz v. Secretary of Health &

Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990)(Secretary properly discounted

claimant’s alleged impairment due to poorly controlled seizures where claimant failed to

follow prescribed treatment regime). The fact that Decker regularly exceeded the work

restrictions recommended by his doctors was relevant to the credibility of his testimony

concerning disabling pain.

Finally, Decker challenges the ALJ’s reliance on the testimony of the vocational

expert, citing the ALJ’s failure to include in his hypothetical questions Decker’s
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purported ability to sit or stand for only fifteen minutes at a time and his purported need

to lie down twice a day for thirty to forty-five minutes. Decker is correct that hypothetical

questions in this context must reflect with precision all of his impairments, see Hargis,

945 F.2d at 1492, but they need only reflect impairments and limitations that are borne

out by the evidentiary record, Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995). Here,

we have already affirmed the ALJ’s findings with respect to Decker’s condition and his

partial credibility. Because these findings are accurately reflected in the ALJ’s

hypothetical inquiries, the vocational expert’s testimony provided substantial evidence

that, as of December of 1992, there were a significant number of unskilled sedentary jobs

in the local and national economies which Decker could perform.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is

AFFIRMED.