United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-3702

___________

Julie A. McCormick; John F. *

Minnichoffer; Thomas D. O'Connor; *

Duane A. Opitz; Barbara C. Sjostrom; *

James A. Soshnik; Debra C. Stangler; *

Jacqueline J. Statz; Tami K. *

Williamson; Timothy C. Wise, *

*

Appellants, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal *

Association; Aircraft Mechanics *

Fraternal Association Local 33; *

Northwest Airlines Corporation, also *

known as Northwest Airlines, Inc., *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: June 13, 2003

Filed: August 22, 2003

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Before BOWMAN, MURPHY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

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BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
1

The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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Ten former employees (hereinafter "the Plaintiffs") of Northwest Airlines sued

Northwest as well as their former union, the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association

(AMFA), in an effort to reclaim their jobs. The District Court1

 granted motions by

Northwest and AMFA to dismiss the claims. We affirm.

The Plaintiffs were at one time employed by Northwest as custodians, and, in

that capacity, were members of AMFA. The Plaintiffs then switched jobs at

Northwest and became stock clerks. With the change in position came a change in

union membership: the International Association of Machinists (IAM) represented

Northwest stock clerks. In September 2001, Northwest furloughed the Plaintiffs, who

now seek to return to their jobs as custodians and point to the most recent collective

bargaining agreement between AMFA and Northwest—an agreement signed in May

2001, after the Plaintiffs had left AMFA and become stock clerks—as giving them

the right to do so. Specifically, the Plaintiffs believe a provision in this agreement

affords each the right to a job as a custodian, even it means displacing an AMFA

member with less seniority from his or her job. The Plaintiffs asserted these rights,

commonly called "bumping rights," but AMFA and Northwest disagreed with the

Plaintiffs' interpretation of this provision in the agreement and refused to hire them

as custodians. The Plaintiffs filed a grievance with AMFA, but AMFA did not pursue

it because they did not read the provision to afford the Plaintiffs any bumping rights.

The Plaintiffs then initiated this lawsuit, alleging that AMFA breached its duty of fair

representation and that Northwest and AMFA breached the collective bargaining

agreement. Both AMFA and Northwest filed motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs'

claims. AMFA's motion contended AMFA did not owe the Plaintiffs a duty of fair

representation, leaving the Plaintiffs without a claim upon which relief could be

granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Northwest's motion was premised on the
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breach-of-contract claims being preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45

U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2000). The District Court granted both motions.

"We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss, applying the

same standards as were employed by the district court." Ballinger v. Culotta, 322

F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003). We accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and

"will dismiss the case only when 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Casazza v.

Kiser, 313 F.3d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45–46 (1957)).

Generally, the RLA would preempt our consideration of the claims arising from

the May 2001 collective bargaining agreement. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,

512 U.S. 246, 262–63 (1994) (stating that state-law claim is preempted if it depends

on interpretation of collective bargaining agreement); see also Consol. Rail Corp. v.

Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302–03 (1989) (explaining that disputes

concerning collective bargaining agreements are subject either to a mediation process

or to arbitration). RLA preemption, however, has an exception: the RLA does not

preempt "hybrid actions," which are suits that allege both a breach of the collective

bargaining agreement by the employer and a breach of the duty of fair representation

by the union. Evans v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 439 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994).

The Plaintiffs argued that this exception applies. 

Where a bargaining agent has "statutory authority to represent all members of

a designated unit," it is statutorily obliged "to serve the interests of all members

without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with

complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386

U.S. 171, 177 (1967). This obligation is the duty of fair representation, and it applies

when a union negotiates, administers, and enforces a collective bargaining agreement.

See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991). As AMFA and
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Northwest have pointed out, "exclusive representation is a necessary prerequisite to

a statutory duty to represent fairly." Kuhn v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch

5, 528 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1976). The principle underlying this rule is conflict

avoidance: because the interests of union members will often diverge from those of

non-members, a union cannot owe a duty of fair representation to both classes

without creating "the potential for severe internal conflicts." Allied Chem. & Alkali

Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157,

173 (1971) (holding that union owes no fair duty of representation to former workers

who are retirees).

The Plaintiffs allege AMFA breached its duty by failing to enforce the May

2001 agreement and by unfairly handling their grievances. As AMFA and Northwest

correctly argue, these claims are foreclosed. The Plaintiffs were stock clerks

represented by IAM when these alleged breaches occurred, so AMFA, no longer the

Plaintiffs' exclusive bargaining agent, owed them no duty. See Kuhn, 528 F.2d at 770

(concluding that a union representing letter carriers owed no duty to a postal

employee who served as a janitor). This result comports with the conflict-avoidance

rationale discussed above. The interests of a former union member claiming seniority

or bumping rights will be opposed to those of a current union member who wishes

to keep his job and not be moved down the seniority ladder. AMFA owes only its

current members a duty of fair representation. As the Supreme Court explained,

"[F]ormer members . . . may suffer from discrimination in collective-bargaining

agreements because the union need not 'affirmatively . . . represent [them] or . . . take

into account their interests in making bona fide economic decisions in behalf of those

whom it does represent.'" United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Ret. Funds v.

Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1982) (quoting Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.

at 181 n.20).

The Plaintiffs also contend that AMFA breached its duty of fair representation

by ineffectively representing their seniority and bumping rights. According to the
2

Also inapplicable is a second exception to RLA preemption, which occurs

where a plaintiff can show that the union and the employer colluded to behave in a

manner that violates the duty of fair representation. See Raus v. Bhd. Ry. Carmen,

663 F.2d 791, 798 (8th Cir. 1981). The Plaintiffs argued this exception applied, but

AMFA could not have colluded with Northwest to breach a non-existent duty.

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Plaintiffs, AMFA acquired a duty to represent their seniority and bumping rights

because these rights were established by a prior collective bargaining agreement

between AMFA and Northwest that was put into effect when the Plaintiffs were

AMFA members. Even though the Plaintiffs have since left AMFA and this

agreement is no longer in effect (the May 2001 agreement is now in effect), they

believe AMFA continues to owe them a duty in representing these rights. This

argument fails to recognize that seniority and bumping rights are contractual terms

whose power does not extend beyond the life of the contract. See Cooper v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 651 F.2d 249, 250–51 (5th Cir. 1981). These rights are not vested

rights, and they do not give rise to a duty of fair representation. Id. As explained

above, that duty is a statutory obligation that attaches when a union becomes the

exclusive bargaining agent of an employee and ends when the exclusive

representation ends. As AMFA is no longer the Plaintiffs' exclusive representative

for bargaining with Northwest, it owes no duty to them. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs'

duty of fair representation claim cannot stand, and the hybrid exception is

inapplicable.2

In sum, the Plaintiffs are without recourse in federal court. They cannot

maintain a duty of fair representation suit against AMFA because AMFA owed no

such duty to the Plaintiffs once the Plaintiffs became members of IAM. They cannot

maintain a breach-of-contract claim against Northwest because the RLA preempts

that claim. No exception to RLA preemption applies, for these exceptions both

require a breach of the duty of fair representation, which AMFA does not owe. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.