*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 10/4/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD L. CORNFORTH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

DONALD L. HOWARD,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-6206

(D.C. No. CIV-96-179-T)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered

submitted without oral argument.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Richard L. Cornforth appeals from the district

court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Donald L. Howard, a special judge

for Oklahoma County District Court. We affirm.

Cornforth was the defendant in a civil action heard by Judge Howard. Judge
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Howard awarded the plaintiff in that case attorney fees, including fees related to an

appeal taken by Cornforth in which the plaintiff prevailed. Cornforth appealed the

attorney fee award to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals and the court found Judge Howard

had exceeded his authority in including fees related to the prior appeal (Westlake

Presbyterian Church v. Cornforth, (No. 83,228, February 28, 1995)). See Chamberlin v.

Chamberlin, 720 P.2d 721, 727-28 (Okla. 1986) (trial court cannot award appeal-related

fees after appeal unless award is authorized by appellate court). The Oklahoma Court of

Appeals modified the attorney fee award and affirmed the judgment as modified.

In the present action, Cornforth maintains Judge Howard's award of appeal-related

attorney fees deprived Cornforth of a constitutional right to be free of "arbitrary

adjudication." He alleges Judge Howard acted maliciously and in bad faith. In granting

Judge Howard's motion for summary judgment, the district court found Judge Howard

was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal where, taking the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547,

1551-52 (10th Cir. 1995).

Generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. Immunity can be

overcome only where the challenged actions are nonjudicial, or are "taken in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Cornforth does not

argue that Judge Howard's award of attorney fees was a nonjudicial action, but contends

Judge Howard lacked jurisdiction to make the award. The question of judicial immunity

does not turn on the judge's authority to perform the specific act being challenged, but on
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the scope of the judge's jurisdiction in a broad sense. "A judge will not be deprived of

immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess

of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear

absence of all jurisdiction.'" Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citation

omitted).

Judge Howard had jurisdiction over the civil case and over the question of the

proper calculation of attorney fees to be awarded. Although he exercised that jurisdiction

erroneously and because of the error Cornforth was entitled to have the calculation

corrected on appeal, Cornforth was not entitled to claim compensation for damages

caused by the error. Nor do Cornforth's allegations regarding Judge Howard's motives

remove the protection of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit,

not just damages. Therefore, allegations of malice, bad faith, or corruption do not

overcome a proper claim of immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge