[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hauck, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7826.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-7826 

CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. HAUCK.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hauck, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-7826.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Twoyear suspension with second year stayed on conditions. 

(No. 2016-0260—Submitted May 3, 2016—Decided November 22, 2016.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2014-098. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, John Wesche Hauck of Milford, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0023153, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1978. On 

July 7, 2011, we suspended Hauck for 12 months with 6 months stayed on 

conditions for failing to maintain client funds in an interest-bearing trust account 

separate from his own funds, failing to maintain adequate records of client funds in 
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2

his possession, failing to notify his clients that he did not carry malpractice 

insurance, and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hauck, 129 Ohio St.3d 209, 2011-Ohio3281, 951 N.E.2d 83. After finding Hauck in contempt of our prior order on March 

5, 2012, we lifted the stay and required him to serve the full 12-month suspension. 

In re Hauck, 131 Ohio St.3d 1470, 2012-Ohio-849, 962 N.E.2d 801. We also 

suspended Hauck’s license on November 1, 2011, based on his failure to timely 

register for the 2011-2013 biennium. In re Attorney Registration Suspension of 

Hauck, 130 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2011-Ohio-5627, 956 N.E.2d 310. He was reinstated 

to the practice of law on November 15, 2012. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hauck, 133 

Ohio St.3d 1232, 2012-Ohio-5271, 979 N.E.2d 345. 

{¶ 2} In a December 15, 2014 complaint, relator, Cincinnati Bar 

Association, charged Hauck with violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 

for failing to provide competent representation to a client; practicing law in 

violation of the regulation of the legal profession in Ohio; committing an illegal act 

that reflects adversely on his honesty or trustworthiness; engaging in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and engaging in conduct 

that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 

{¶ 3} The charges relate to a letter that Hauck sent on behalf of an alleged 

client, Richard Ellison, to the client’s mother and stepfather (“parents”) in violation 

of a civil protection order (“CPO”). The CPO prohibited Ellison from having any 

contact with his parents—including contact through another person. As a result of 

Hauck’s conduct, Ellison was arrested, pleaded guilty to a second-degreemisdemeanor charge of attempting to violate the terms of the CPO, and was 

sentenced to 90 days in jail. 

{¶ 4} After a two-day hearing, a panel of the Board of Professional Conduct 

found that Hauck committed all the charged misconduct and recommended that he 

be suspended from the practice of law for 12 months and be required to submit to 
January Term, 2016 

3

an evaluation by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and comply with 

all OLAP recommendations. Additionally, the panel recommended that Hauck be 

required to petition this court for reinstatement to the practice of law pursuant to 

Gov.Bar R. V(25). The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, but believing that a longer period of actual suspension is necessary to protect 

the public from additional misconduct, the board recommends that Hauck be 

indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. 

{¶ 5} Hauck objects to the board’s findings that Ellison was his client and 

that he committed an illegal act by preparing the letter on Ellison’s behalf. He also 

objects to the panel’s denial of his pre- and posthearing motions to dismiss the 

complaint on constitutional grounds and to the board’s recommended sanction. 

{¶ 6} We overrule Hauck’s objections to the board’s findings of fact and 

misconduct and adopt those findings as our own. But we sustain Hauck’s objection 

to the board’s recommended sanction in part. Accordingly, we suspend Hauck 

from the practice of law in Ohio for two years with the second year stayed on 

conditions, and we require him to petition this court for reinstatement to the practice 

law and to serve a period of monitored probation upon reinstatement. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 7} In October 2004, Ellison entered his parents’ home through an 

unlocked garage, disconnected the phone, and waited three hours for them to return 

home. Although he claimed that he wanted to talk with them about longstanding 

family problems, he had duct tape, two pairs of handcuffs, a hammer, and a change 

of clothing in his possession when he confronted them. He thwarted his stepfather’s 

attempt to leave the house—injuring him in the process—and grabbed the phone 

from his mother as she attempted to dial 9-1-1. State v. Ellison, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-050553, 2006-Ohio-2620, ¶ 2-4. In 2005, Ellison pleaded guilty to charges 

of aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and abduction arising out of the incident and 

was sentenced to six years in prison. 
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{¶ 8} In anticipation of Ellison’s early release from prison, his mother 

obtained a CPO from the Hamilton County Domestic Relations Court on August 

11, 2010. The order—which was valid until August 10, 2015—prohibited Ellison 

from initiating any contact with his parents by “telephone, fax, e-mail, voice mail, 

delivery service, writings, or communications by any other means in person or 

through another person.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 9} Hauck met and befriended Ellison in September 2012. Shortly 

thereafter, they began to discuss a letter that Ellison wanted to send to his parents 

in an effort to reconcile with them. After months of discussion, Ellison began 

drafting the letter in late 2013 or early 2014. Hauck encouraged Ellison to complete 

the letter, offered advice about the content and wording of the letter, and suggested 

that he ask his parents to move the court to terminate the CPO. 

{¶ 10} Ellison was well aware that the CPO prohibited him from contacting 

his parents directly and believed that they would not open a letter that bore his 

return address. Consequently, he asked for permission to use Hauck’s letterhead 

and signature so that it would appear that the letter came directly from Hauck. 

Because Hauck was reluctant to use his normal office letterhead, Ellison designed 

special letterhead for the letter that bore Hauck’s name along with the title 

“ATTORNEY AT LAW.” Hauck agreed to edit Ellison’s letter, print it on the 

newly designed letterhead, and adopt the content of the letter as his own by signing 

it. Although the letterhead plainly identified Hauck as an attorney, he also inserted 

a disclaimer in the body of the letter, stating, “I should clarify that although I am 

an attorney, I’m not acting in that capacity here. I am writing strictly as a friend 

and a Christian who wants to help.” 

{¶ 11} Ellison mailed the letter to his parents in early March 2014, unaware 

that his stepfather had passed away in September 2010. Days after the mailing, 

Ellison was arrested and charged with a first-degree misdemeanor for violating the 
January Term, 2016 

5

CPO. Unable to make bond, which was set at $10,000, Ellison remained in jail 

pending trial. 

{¶ 12} Hauck used his attorney-identification card to visit Ellison in jail and 

spoke to him at least twice by telephone. Hauck testified that his purpose was to 

determine whether he could represent Ellison, and he claimed that he “stay[ed] on 

the sidelines” when he realized that the prosecution might call him as a witness in 

the case. During the trial-preparation phase of the case, however, Hauck wrote 

three letters to the arresting officer. While the letters were ostensibly written on 

Ellison’s behalf, Hauck did not obtain prior approval from him or his appointed 

counsel. 

{¶ 13} At the panel hearing, an assistant county prosecutor assigned to 

Ellison’s case testified that Hauck could have been charged with complicity for his 

role in violating the CPO. But after Hauck invoked his Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted 

him immunity from criminal prosecution so that he could be compelled to testify 

against Ellison. After the court granted Hauck immunity, Ellison agreed to plead 

guilty to the lesser charge of attempt to violate a CPO and served approximately 

two months in jail. 

{¶ 14} Hauck testified that he was aware that a CPO had been issued against 

Ellison while they were discussing and drafting the letter to Ellison’s parents, but 

Hauck claimed that he did not know—and made no effort to ascertain—the contents 

of that order. Although the board noted that Ellison’s testimony largely supported 

Hauck’s claims, it also found that their conversation during a recorded jailhouse 

telephone call contradicted their testimony. The transcript of that call documents 

the following exchange: 

 Mr. Ellison: Okay. Well, let me ask you something. Are 

you going to be willing to—I mean, you looked over the protection 
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6

order. You didn’t see any problem with it. Are you willing to, you 

know, let them know that basically you, as an attorney, had looked 

it over and didn’t see any reason why we couldn’t do what we did? 

 Mr. Hauck: Well, look, I don’t want to get in to the 

legalities. We [were] making a good faith, courteous attempt to 

communicate. It was me, not you, doing it, okay. When it comes to 

that time we can decide on what to say, but I’m willing to come in, 

[and] speak on your behalf. 

{¶ 15} The board found that conversation to be more credible than the 

testimony of Hauck and Ellison and therefore found that Hauck had reviewed the 

CPO and still believed that it was appropriate to send the letter. The board noted 

that the last paragraph of the letter, asking Ellison’s parents to “file a motion to 

cancel” the CPO, provided additional evidence that Hauck had reviewed the CPO 

prior to signing and transmitting the letter. 

{¶ 16} The board expressly rejected Hauck’s efforts to disclaim his role as 

a legal professional in this matter, because Hauck’s holding himself out as an 

attorney imparted an air of credibility to the letter to Ellison’s parents. 

Additionally, it found that Hauck acted as an attorney by providing Ellison with his 

time and advice, encouraging him to write the letter, editing the letter, signing the 

letter, and returning it to Ellison to send to his parents and also by calling and 

visiting Ellison in jail. Ellison admitted that he relied on Hauck’s knowledge and 

skills as an attorney and testified that if Hauck had advised him not to send the 

letter, he would have followed that advice. And the board found that Hauck’s 

conduct supported Ellison’s belief that Hauck served as his attorney. 

{¶ 17} Having found that Hauck had established an attorney-client 

relationship with Ellison, the board expressed shock at his poor advice and lack of 

good judgment. Because Hauck admitted that Ellison had not only fully briefed 
January Term, 2016 

7

him on the serious problems in his relationship with his mother but had also told 

him that she had obtained a CPO against him, the board concluded that the only 

reasonable course of action for Hauck was to (1) review the CPO, (2) conclude that 

the contact proposed by Ellison was prohibited, and (3) advise his client not to send 

the letter. 

{¶ 18} Therefore, the board found that Hauck violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 

(requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client) by failing to 

realize and advise Ellison that writing a letter to his parents would violate the CPO. 

Because Hauck’s assisting Ellison in violating the CPO was illegal, the board also 

found that Hauck violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from 

committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or 

trustworthiness). 

{¶ 19} Based on findings that Hauck and Ellison acted in complicity to 

circumvent the prohibitions of the CPO by attempting to deceive Ellison’s parents 

into believing that the letter drafted by Ellison was actually from Hauck, the board 

found that Hauck violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 

in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). And because 

Hauck disregarded the CPO and substituted his own judgment for that of the issuing 

court in the name of friendship, the board also found that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 

8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice). 

{¶ 20} In addition, Hauck was not registered as an attorney with this court 

from September 1, 2013, through April 13, 2014. Although Hauck was never 

summarily suspended for this violation, see Gov.Bar R. VI(6), the board concluded 

that he continued to practice law while his registration was not in good standing, in 

violation of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a 

jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession). Hauck admits to 

this violation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

Hauck’s Objections to the Board’s Findings of Misconduct 

Whether Hauck Served as Ellison’s Attorney 

{¶ 21} In his first objection, Hauck contends that there is insufficient 

evidence to support the board’s finding that he undertook Ellison’s legal 

representation, let alone that he failed to provide him with competent representation 

in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1. Hauck argues that he acted as Ellison’s friend, 

not his attorney, and that his chief role in editing Ellison’s letter was to encourage 

him to vent some of his anger before asking his parents for a fresh start. In addition 

to emphasizing his written disclaimer of any attorney-client relationship, Hauck 

contends that an effort to bar his testimony on the basis of attorney-client privilege 

was unsuccessful in Ellison’s criminal matter. But the docket in Ellison’s criminal 

case reflects that he entered a plea agreement before the court ruled on the issue of 

attorney-client privilege. 

{¶ 22} We acknowledge that the record contains conflicting evidence 

regarding Hauck’s role in drafting and sending the letter to Ellison’s parents. The 

panel and full board found, however, that the use of letterhead identifying Hauck 

as an attorney, his recorded telephone conversations with Ellison, and Ellison’s 

admission that he relied on Hauck’s knowledge and skills as an attorney to be more 

credible than the contrary testimony offered by Hauck and Ellison. In exercising 

our independent review in attorney-discipline cases, we defer to a panel’s 

credibility determination “unless the record weighs heavily against those 

determinations.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008-Ohio91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 

2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 23} The evidence in this case does not weigh heavily against the board’s 

determination that Ellison relied on Hauck’s knowledge and skills as an attorney, 

because Hauck encouraged him to draft and send the letter to his parents. Indeed, 

the record demonstrates that while Hauck paid Ellison $150 to design and build a 
January Term, 2016 

9

website for Hauck’s practice, Ellison returned the full amount to Hauck once he 

signed the letter in “gratitude” for the work Hauck had done on his behalf. The 

record also reflects Ellison’s unequivocal testimony that had Hauck told him not to 

send the letter, he would have followed that advice. Because “[a]n attorney-client 

relationship may be created by implication based upon the conduct of the parties 

and the reasonable expectations of the person seeking representation,” Cuyahoga 

Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hardiman, 100 Ohio St.3d 260, 2003-Ohio-5596, 798 N.E.2d 369, 

syllabus, we overrule Hauck’s objection to the board’s finding that he had an 

attorney-client relationship with Ellison. 

{¶ 24} Hauck’s argument that he did not provide any legal services to 

Ellison because his letter did not include legal analysis, skill, citation, or 

interpretation is likewise without merit. In Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Zubaidah, 140 

Ohio St.3d 495, 2014-Ohio-4060, 20 N.E.3d 687, ¶ 50, we acknowledged that 

“permissible conduct” that will not result in a finding of the unauthorized practice 

of law includes endorsing a person’s character, advocating a social issue generally, 

advancing personal interests, or providing nonlegal advice to a family member. But 

even if the actual content of Hauck’s letter had fallen within those categories, it is 

his counseling, aiding, and abetting Ellison in the drafting and mailing of the letter 

in knowing violation of the CPO and his visits to Ellison in jail that elevate his 

conduct to the practice of law in this matter. We therefore overrule his objection 

in this regard. 

Whether Hauck Committed an Illegal Act 

{¶ 25} In his second objection, Hauck argues that he did not commit any 

illegal act in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) because he did not know the specific 

prohibitions set forth in the CPO issued against Ellison. Therefore, he argues that 

he cannot be held responsible for aiding or abetting Ellison in his violation of the 

CPO, because “[a] court’s order is binding on a nonparty aider and abetter under 

Civ.R. 65(D) only to the extent the nonparty has actual notice of the terms of the 
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10 

order by personal service or otherwise,” Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Internatl. 

Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., Local 

486, 61 Ohio St.3d 121, 573 N.E.2d 98 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 26} Because we have already found that there was sufficient evidence to 

support the board’s finding that Hauck had reviewed the CPO and was aware of its 

prohibitions, we reject this argument and overrule Hauck’s second objection. 

Whether the Restrictions of the CPO Are Unconstitutional 

{¶ 27} In his third objection, Hauck argues that the board erred in overruling 

his motion to dismiss relator’s complaint on the ground that the CPO underlying 

the complaint violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 

{¶ 28} The general rule is that unless an order is void for lack of subjectmatter or personal jurisdiction, it must be obeyed until it is set aside by proper 

proceedings. State ex rel. Beil v. Dota, 168 Ohio St. 315, 321-322, 154 N.E.2d 634 

(1958), citing United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303, 67 

S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (“The interests of orderly government demand that 

respect and compliance be given to orders issued by courts possessed of jurisdiction 

of persons and subject matter. One who defies the public authority and willfully 

refuses his obedience, does so at his peril”). Unless a judgment was issued without 

jurisdiction or was procured by fraud, it is considered valid, and even though it may 

be flawed in its resolution of the merits, its integrity is generally not subject to 

collateral attack in a separate judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio 

Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 25. 

{¶ 29} Here, Hauck does not allege that the court that issued the CPO at 

issue in this case lacked personal jurisdiction over Ellison or subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the case. Instead, he raises the constitutional argument now to 

contend that he cannot be found to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct 

if the violation is based on an unconstitutional order. Hauck did not challenge the 
January Term, 2016 

11 

validity of the CPO at the time he assisted Ellison with violating the CPO. And we 

have already found that Hauck was aware of the CPO’s prohibitions but assisted 

Ellison anyway. Thus, the validity of the CPO does not affect whether Hauck’s 

actions constituted attorney misconduct. We therefore reject Hauck’s attempt to 

collaterally attack the constitutionality of the CPO in this disciplinary proceeding 

and overrule his third objection to the board’s report. 

{¶ 30} Having overruled each of Hauck’s objections with respect to the 

board’s findings of fact and misconduct and determining that those findings of fact 

and misconduct are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we adopt them in 

their entirety. 

Sanction

{¶ 31} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, 

relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the sanctions imposed in 

similar cases. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A). 

{¶ 32} Hauck did not suggest an appropriate sanction for his misconduct. 

Relator recommended that Hauck be suspended from the practice of law for 12 

months, that he be required to submit to counseling with a mental-health 

professional, that the mental-health professional be required to submit regular 

reports regarding Hauck’s progress, and that Hauck be required to petition this court 

for reinstatement to the practice of law. 

{¶ 33} In mitigation, the panel found that Hauck did not act with a dishonest 

or selfish motive, displayed a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 

proceedings and made full and free disclosure to the board and to relator, and 

presented evidence of his good character apart from the charged misconduct. See

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2), (4), and (5). And with respect to Hauck’s violation of 

Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a), the board also accorded some mitigating effect to the fact that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

the Office of Attorney Services had failed to provide him with notice either that his 

biennial registration was due or that it was past due. 

{¶ 34} As aggravating factors, the panel found that Hauck has been 

previously disciplined by this court, has committed multiple offenses, has refused 

to admit the wrongful nature of all of his misconduct, and has caused great harm to 

vulnerable people—including members of Ellison’s family and Ellison himself, 

who spent 90 days in jail as a direct result of Hauck’s misconduct. Gov.Bar R. 

V(13)(B)(1), (4), (7), and (8). 

{¶ 35} The panel was also troubled by the content of the letter Hauck sent 

to Ellison’s parents in a claimed effort to resolve a family rift. It described the letter 

as “offensive and accusatory” rather than conciliatory and expressed concern 

regarding Hauck’s failure to appreciate that the letter would have been 

inappropriate to send—even in the absence of a CPO. 

{¶ 36} While appreciating Hauck’s goal of reuniting Ellison with his 

mother, the panel believed that the letter they sent to his parents could be seen by a 

reasonable person only as making matters worse. And the panel expressed true 

dismay that Hauck could counsel his client to send that letter without any 

appreciation of how it would be perceived by the recipients. The panel noted that 

Dr. Douglas Beech, who conducted an independent psychiatric examination of 

Hauck, reported: “[Hauck’s] religious and personal ethics/beliefs have affected and 

overridden his professional judgment. While these ethics have guided much sincere 

and benevolent behavior throughout his life, they have also been an integral part of 

his misconduct.” Citing multiple instances in Hauck’s own testimony in which he 

claimed to be “in a different universe, a different plane” and having problems with 

“the moral and personal objectivities overcoming what is the rule of law in other 

ways,” the panel was convinced that his moral convictions will continue to override 

his professional judgment in the future. 
January Term, 2016 

13 

{¶ 37} The panel compared Hauck’s misconduct to the misconduct at issue 

in two cases cited by relator. See Akron Bar Assn. v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 

313, 2008-Ohio-862, 883 N.E.2d 1046 (imposing a one-year suspension with six 

months stayed on conditions, including an 18-month period of monitored probation, 

on an attorney who neglected one client’s legal matter and abandoned another, filed 

a misleading dismissal entry with a court, knowingly violated a CPO issued against 

a client, entered into a business transaction with a client without making required 

disclosures, commingled personal and client funds, and was found in contempt for 

failing to conduct himself in a professional manner during court proceedings); Stark 

Cty. Bar Assn. v. Osborne, 62 Ohio St.3d 77, 578 N.E.2d 455 (1991) (imposing a 

one-year suspension on an attorney with a prior disciplinary record who assisted 

his client in the deliberate violation of a temporary restraining order). Ultimately, 

the panel recommended that Hauck be suspended from the practice of law for 12 

months, that he be required to submit to an OLAP evaluation and fully comply with 

all OLAP recommendations, and that he be required to petition this court for 

reinstatement pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(25). 

{¶ 38} Citing Hauck’s prior disciplinary record, Dr. Beech’s report, and 

Hauck’s own testimony, the full board concluded that an indefinite suspension with 

reinstatement subject to the conditions recommended by the panel is necessary to 

protect the public from future misconduct. 

{¶ 39} Hauck objects to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing that an 

indefinite suspension is more punitive than it is protective of the public. He argues 

that he should be commended—not blamed—for following his Christian beliefs. 

And quoting scripture, he contends that he should not be condemned but directed 

to “ ‘go and sin no more.’ ” 

{¶ 40} We do not adopt Hauck’s view but agree with the board’s assessment 

that a period of actual suspension coupled with a petition for reinstatement is 

necessary to protect the public. We conclude, however, that a two-year suspension 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

with one year stayed on conditions, combined with certain conditions on Hauck’s 

reinstatement to the practice of law and a period of monitored probation, will better 

protect the public from future harm. Therefore, we sustain Hauck’s fourth 

objection, in part. 

{¶ 41} Accordingly, John Wesche Hauck is suspended from the practice of 

law in Ohio for two years with the second year stayed on the conditions that he 

submit to a mental-health evaluation conducted by OLAP, comply with any and all 

treatment recommendations resulting from that evaluation, serve a one-year period 

of monitored probation, make full restitution of $150 to Ellison, and engage in no 

further misconduct. If Hauck fails to comply with these conditions, the stay will 

be lifted and he will serve the entire two-year suspension. In addition, Hauck shall 

be required to petition for reinstatement to the practice of law pursuant to Gov.Bar 

R. V(25). Costs are taxed to Hauck. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and

O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 

_________________ 

Beth I. Silverman; Richard J. Goldberg; and Edwin W. Patterson III, for 

relator. 

John W. Hauck, pro se. 

_________________