THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

JOHN IA. aILL 

Arrs-. ~EXAR 787ll 

*-- 0s August 16, 1973 

The Honorable Robert S. Calvert 

Comptroller of Public Accounts 

State Finance Building 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Mr. Calvert: 

Opinion No. H- 88 

Re: Exemptions from taxation 

of property owned by certain disabled veterans and 

their surviving spouses 

and children, and others 

In November, Section 2 of Article 8 of the Constitution of Texas was 

amended by adding Subsection (b) as follows: 

;‘The Legislature may, by general law, exempt 

property owned by a disabled veteran or by the surviving spouse and surviving minor children of a disabled veteran. A disabled veteran is a veteran of the 

armed services of the United States who is classified 

as disabled by the Veterans’ Administration or by a 

successor to that agency; or ~the military service in 

,which he served. A veterah who is ceitified as having 

a disability of less than 10 percent is not entitled to 

an exemption. A veteran having a disability rating of 

not less than 10 percent nor more than 30 percent may 

be granted an exemption from taxation for property 

valued at up to $1, 500. A veteran having a disability 

rating of more than 30 percents but not more than 50 

percent may be,granted’an‘exemp$ipn.fFom tax?ation. 

for property&oed kk tip-io’$2, OOQ. A vetkramhavirig 

a disdbilit$ rating of maze, than 50 percent. but’ not more 

th&x 70 p&icentmay be :granted.,+n exemption from taxation for-propert? vaiied tit up’& $2, 500. A veteran 

who has a disability Sating >of more than 70 percent, or 

a, veter&‘Sh6 has a di?$biii$y rating of note less than 10 

percent-and’had d?%ained the age of 65, or a disabled 

veteran whose &‘s;ibili’%y consists of the loss ‘or loss of 

use of-one or more limbs, total blindness in one or both 

eyes, or paraplegia, may be granted an exemption from 

p. 400 
The Honorable Robert S. Calvert, page 2 (H-88) 

taxation for property valued at up to $3,000. The 

spouse and children of any member of the United 

States Armed Forces who loses his life while on 

active duty will be granted an exemption from tax- 

- 

ation for property valued at up to $2,500. A deceased 

disabled veteran’s surviving spouse and children w 

be granted an exemption which in the aggregate is 

equal to the exemption to which the decedent was entitled’at the time he di’ed. ” (emphasis added) 

Pursuant to the authorization contained in this Amendment, the 

Legislature enacted House Bill 80 “relating to exemption from taxation 

of property owned by disabled veterans and surviving spouses and children of deceased veterans. ” Section 13 of House Bill 80 states that its 

purpsse “is to provide for exemptions under the authority of Article 

VU? 5 2(b) of the Texas Constitution. ” 

The constitutional language creates two separate categories of 

tax relief beneficiaries and treats them diffe&ntly: (1) those in the 

severely disabled veteran class (or their surviving wives and children) 

& be accorded certain exemptions from tax liability for their property; and (2) the survivors (wife and children) of on-,duty military personnel who die twill be granted “an exemption from taxation for property 

valued at up to $2,500. ” 

You have submitted four specific questions to us concerning the 

effect of House Bill 80. However, it is appropriate that we first determine whether any part of the constitutional provision is self-executing, 

and examine the constitutionality of the Act. If Article 8 6 2(b) of the 

Constitution is-in ‘no part self-executing and if House Bill 80 is unconstitutional, then answers to your questions would no longer be needed. 

Generally, a constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing 

if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected or the duty imposed map be enforced; and it is not selfexecuting when it merely indicates principles, 

._~ 

without layi,ng down rules by 

which these principles may be given ‘+e force of ii+. Mitchell County v. 

City National Bank, 43 S. W. 880, 883 (Tex. 1898); City of Corpus Christi 

v. City of Pleasanton, ,276 S. W. 2d 798 (Tex. 1955). 

p. 401 
The Honorable Robert S. Calvert, page 3 (H-88) 

Obviously, Article 8 6 2(b) of the Constitution is not self-executing 

with regard to exemptions for disabled veterans and their surviving spouses 

and surviving children. The Legislature has been given discretion where 

exemptions in their favor are concerned. The Constitution does not command 

that any relief be given such persons. We think it within the authority of the 

Legislature to attach reasonable limitations and conditions to the enjoyment 

of such relief as it gives, if any, and that no exemption for such persons can 

exist unless the Legislature has created it by valid statute. 

After careful study we have also concluded that the constitutional provision concerning exemptions for survivors of those “on-duty” military personnel who die is not self-executing in the “immediately operative” sense 

[Compare Strang v. Pray, 35 S. W. 1054 (Tex. 1896)], but rather contemplates 

and requires legislation on the subject. It speaks prospectively in that context 

(“will be granted . . . ‘I) (I’ . . . any member . . . who loses his life while on 

active duty. . . . “) and, in our opinion, is mandatory but not self-executing. 

The provision does more than simply state a principle, but it obviously 

looks to the intervention of another authority. It does not indicate when the 

right to an exemption will accrue. It shapes, but does not e~,the exemption; 

it specifies that the exemption “will be given”. We believe the passage places 

a mandatory duty upon the Legislature to enact a law specifying the effective 

date of the exemption for survivors of on-duty military personnel, but the 

exemption cannot be given effect until the Legislature acts. Duncan v. Gabler, 

215 S. W. 2d 155 (Tex. 1948). See 16 C. J.S. Constitutional Law $48, at p. 142; 

16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law 0 94, at p. 280. 

We are led to the foregoing conclusion by the manner in which the provisionis integrated with the remainder of the section clearly contemplating 

prerequisite legislative action; by the absence of words of present execution 

used in other sections, e.g., “shall be exempt” (Art. 8 5 5 1, l-b; Art. 11 s 9) ; 

by the absence of any language indicating self-execution such as. “This amendment is self-operative” (Article 1, 5 3a); “This amendment shall become effective 

upon its adoption” (Article 3 § 65) ; and by the fact that,the title of House Joint 

Resolution No. 35, Acts 1971, 62nd Legislature, R. S., pi 4136, proposing the 

amendment anticipates that the Legislature ,will be instrumental in providing 

all the contemplated exempti’ons, including those to be enjoyed by such survivors. 

Consequently, we are of the ,opinion that the effective date for any Article 8 

5,2(b) exemption applicable to survivors of on-duty military personnel is dependent upon valid legislation on the subject. 

p. 402 
The Honorable Robert S. Calvert, page 4 (H-88) 

Is H. B. 80 valid legislation? The Legislature has specifically 

provided that the provisions of the Act are non-severable and that the 

invalidity of any one of its provisions will render the whole Act void. 

Section 14 of H. B. 80 reads: 

“Sec. 14. The provisions of this Act are 

declared to be non-severable, and’if any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a final 

judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction 

as to any person, the Act is void. ” 

In our judgment the Courts will, if presented the question, declare 

some of its provisions invalid and the statute (because of its non-severable clause) : who Ily void. 

The Constitution says, in part: 

11 

. . . The spouse and children of any member of 

the.United States Armed Forces who loses his life 

while on active duty will be granted an exemption 

from taxation for property valued at up to $2, 500. ” 

Section 5 of House Bill 80, purportedly implementing this portion of 

Art.. 8, s 2(b), provides: 

“Sec. 5. The surviving spouse of a person who 

dies while on active duty in the armed services of 

the United States his entitled to an exemption of the 

first $2,500 of the assessed value of the spouse’s 

property during the period that the surviting spouse 

remains unmarried. ” 

Putting aside other questions about the statutory language, it is clear 

that-the Legislature is without power to place limitations upon an unlimited 

exemption commanded by the Constitution, in the absence of constitutional 

authority to do so. Strang v. Pray, 35 S. W. 1054 (Tex. 1896). The Constitution grants no such legislative discretion with regard to the ,exemptions 

that must be allowed survivors of on-duty military personnel. ‘~ The Constip. 403 
The Honorable Robert S. Calvert, page 5 (H-88) 

tution does not limit such an exemption to surviving spouses of such 

personnel only so long as they do not remarry, and in our opinion any 

attempted statutory limitation to that effect would be held inoperative. 

What is more, 5 8(b) of H. B. 80 purports to grant an exemption 

to the estate of a deceased veteran. We find no constitutional authority 

for such a provision. The exemptions permitted by the Constitution are, 

we think, personal to the natural individuals designated and there is no 

provision in Article 8 6 2(b) of the Constitution authorizing an exemption 

for an artificial person. Subsection 8(b) of H. B. 80 is therefore invalid, 

in our opinion. See Deason v. Orange- County Water Control and. Imp. 

Dist. No. 1, 244 S. W. 2d 981 (Tex. 1952); City of Amarillo v. Amarillo 

Lodge No. 731, A.F. & A.M., 488 S. W. 2d 69 (Tex. 1973). 

The Constitution does not specify the kind of property owned by disabled veterans or their survivors for which no taxes need,be Raid, nor 

which taxes they may escape. It only indicates~ the value of property for 

which tax liability might be abrogated by legislative action. ,Notwithstanding 

an ambiguity caused by the first sentence of Article 8 § 2(b); (‘I . . . may. . . 

exempt property . . . ‘I). we think it contemplates a personal status ,entitling 

one to be exempt from paying taxes for property valued below a certain 

figure. This is made clear by the language used to ~establish ~exemption 

maximums for veterans with variously classified disabilities, (,I’ Y . . . an 

exemption from taxation for property valued at up to . . . ..‘I), 

- 

The constitutional amendment here ,was submitted to the people in the 

form of a “for or against” proposition reading: 

“The constitutional amendment allowing certain 

tax exemptions to disabled veterans, their surviving 

spouses and surviving minor children, and the surviving spouse and. s‘urvi,ting minor children of members 

of the, armed forces who lose their life while on active 

duty. ” Acts 1971, 62nd Legislature, Regular Session, 

p. 4136. (emphasis added) 

p. 404 
The Honorable Robert S. Calvert, page 6 (H-88) 

It did not mention the exemption of property; it specified the people to 

whom tax advantages were to-be allowed. 

If there is any ambiguity in the constitutional provision itself, 

it must be presumed that the ballot title fairly represented totie people 

the character and purpose of the proposed change. See R.R. Comm. 

v. Sterling Gil & Refining Co. 218 S. W. 2d 415 (Tex. 1949); g. 

Evans, 414 S. W. 2d 684 (Tex. Civ.App., Austin,l967.,writ. ref. ,n. r: e.); 

Whiteside v. Brown, 214 S. W. 2d 844 (Tex. Civ.App.,Austin,l948,writd.ism, 

W. o. j.); 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 5 36, at p. 208; 16 C. J. S., 

Constitutional Law, §9(3), at p. 56. 

The purpose of the constitutional provision, we think, is similar 

to the purpose of the “over 65 homestead exemption” also added in 1972 

(Article 8, $1-b(b) ; see Att&ney General Opinion H-9 (1973)], i. e., to 

allow the benefited class to acquire and hold property of a limited value 

~wlthout assuming a tax burden therefor. We think the provision is intended to afford relief to those severely disabled veterans and to those 

surviving spouses and child~ren (of deceased disabled veterans or of deceased persons on active military duty) in less fortunate circumstances 

who might bbsent such relief) become public charges. 

‘. 

It is our conclusion, then, that none of the exemptions contemplated 

by Article 8s 2(b) of the Texas Constitution can become effective until there 

is further legislation on the subject, and that no purpose would be served 

by detailing the intended operation of H. B. 80. We will therefore defer 

your specific questions. Moreover, because we feel the invalidity of $8(b) 

of H.B. 80 will cause the entire Act to fall, we need not discuss other aspects of the statute which might also cause it to be unconstitutional. 

SUMMARY 

1. The constitutional exemption commanded by 

Article 8 $ 2(b) of the Texas Constitution for 

survivors of military ~personnel who die while 

on active duty is mandatory but not self-executing and its effective date depends on legislation. Exemptions ,for disabled veterans and 

their survivors are dependent upon legislative 

discretion. 

p. 405 
The Honorable Robert S. Calvert, page 7 (H-88) 

2. The exemptions from tax liability accorded or 

authorized by Article 8, 5 2(b) of the Constitution 

are personal to the natural beneficiaries named 

and may not be accorded artificial persons as 

H. B. 80, 63rd Leg., R.S., attempts to do. 

3. The Legislature is not empowered to attach conditions to the enjoyment of the constitutionally 

shaped exemption for surviving spouses of on-duty 

military personnel: 

4. The “non-severable” clause contained in H. B. 

80 will cause the statute enacted to be declared 

void in its entirety. 

5. None of the exemptions contemplated by Article 

8 § 2(b) of the Constitution will become effective 

until there is further legislation on the subject. 

Very ~truly yours, 

Attorney General of Texas 

ROVED: 

nn 

E&-?x 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 406