The Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the *

Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 10-1484

DOWNING/SALT POND PARTNERS, L.P.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Chief Judge,

Souter, Associate Justice,*

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

William R. Landry, with whom Karen Pelczarski and Blish &

Cavanagh LLP were on brief, for appellant.

Michael Rubin, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Patrick

C. Lynch, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellees.

Brian A. Goldman on brief for appellee Coastal Resources

Management Council.

J. David Breemer on brief for amicus curiae Pacific Legal

Foundation.

May 23, 2011
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LYNCH, Chief Judge. Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P.,

frustrated by two state agencies' restrictions on its development

of a coastal residential subdivision in Narragansett, Rhode Island,

appeals the district court's dismissal of its federal takings

claims under the Supreme Court's ripeness requirements for such

claims, set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission

v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).

Downing argues that it is excused from one Williamson

County requirement, that it pursue any "adequate procedure for

seeking just compensation" that state law provides, id. at 195,

under a decision of this court. It argues it is excused from the

other Williamson County ripeness requirement, that the relevant

government agency has reached a "final decision regarding the

application of the regulations to the property at issue," id. at

186, because the state agency has not yet entered a final decision

despite Downing's repeated requests that it do so. We affirm the

dismissal of the complaint, reaching only the first issue. We hold

again that Rhode Island's inverse condemnation procedure satisfies

the Williamson County requirements and must be followed. See

Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 93 (1st

Cir. 2003).

I. Standard of Review

We review de novo the legal question of whether the

district court properly dismissed Downing's complaint as unripe for
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 144 (1st Cir.

2002). We accept the well-plead factual allegations in the

complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff. Id. In resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, we may

also consider other materials in the district court record,

including where those materials contradict the allegations in the

complaint. Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 510

F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007); Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281,

288 (1st Cir. 2002).

II. Factual Background

A. Facts as Alleged in the Complaint

In 1992, Downing secured a land use permit, called an

Assent, from the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council

(CRMC), in order to develop a residential community on a tract of

land it owns in Narragansett. Between 1992 and 2007 Downing built

homes on twenty-six of the planned seventy-nine lots in the

subdivision, installed community infrastructure such as roads and

a sewer line, and began infrastructure improvements necessary to

build on the remaining lots. While Downing failed to attach a copy

of the Assent to its complaint, Downing alleged that none of the

Assent's thirty-four stipulations and conditions required it to

perform any archaeological or historical surveys on the tract of

land.
The Complaint does not state whether the memorandum was 1

addressed to the CRMC or to Downing.

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In 2007, a second state agency, the Rhode Island Historic

Preservation and Heritage Commission (HPHC) "became keenly

interested in the site of the Salt Pond Residences project from a

cultural and archaeological perspective." This was because many

artifacts had been found in the course of the Salt Pond development

project indicating that the land was likely a former Narragansett

Indian settlement. These artifacts included digging and grinding

tools, fragments of ceramic and stone vessels and a pipe, and

projectile points. Downing alleges the HPHC then "concluded that

[the land] should be preserved for the benefit of the public at

large and not developed at all," and encouraged the CRMC to

withdraw the project's CRMC Assent. A July 11, 2007 letter from

the HPHC Executive Director to the CRMC, Downing alleges, stated

that HPHC "was resolved 'to acquire title to the [site] in order to

assure its preservation'" (alteration in Complaint).

The CRMC sent Downing a letter dated August 22, 2007

stating that the Assent "is still valid and remains valid pending

a determination by the [CRMC] on the issues raised by the Historic

Preservation And Heritage Commission" (alteration in Complaint).

In a June 2008 HPHC memorandum, Downing alleges, the HPHC 1

confirmed that it had recommended to the CRMC that either

construction be prohibited or a "complete archaeological data
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recovery" project be required as a condition of further

construction. Downing estimates that such a data recovery project

would cost six million dollars. 

Downing alleges that a year after the initial CRMC

letter, on August 21, 2008, following a series of informal

discussions with the HPHC that did not resolve the dispute, it

formally requested that the CRMC submit the matter for hearing. On

December 17, 2008 it submitted to the CRMC a legal opinion

memorandum and supporting materials from its lawyers arguing that

the CRMC and HPHC were violating the United States and Rhode Island

Constitutions' takings clauses.

On February 23, 2009, Downing formally notified the HPHC

that it would resume construction under its permits absent some

response from the agencies. There is no evidence in the record as

to whether further communications took place during the months

after this February 23 notice. 

Downing alleges that neither agency ever responded to any

of these communications. The defendants deny that they were

nonresponsive, asserting to us as they did to the district court

that during the two-year period at issue, informal negotiations

were ongoing between the parties to try to resolve the issue.

On June 27, 2009, Downing resumed construction. The same

day, the CRMC issued a cease and desist order. Downing did not

place the order into the district court record, and has not
Downing also alleged under federal law that the agencies 2

had conspired to violate Downing's civil rights. Under Rhode

Island law, Downing also alleged that the agencies had

intentionally interfered with its advantageous business relations.

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described its contents except to claim that the order did not

specify how Downing's conduct violated its permits. On July 15,

2009, Downing formally requested a hearing before the CRMC in order

to contest the cease and desist order. Downing alleges that it had

heard no response by the CRMC to this request by August 6, 2009.

On this day, Downing says, it then sent a "final notice" to the

CRMC warning that if the CRMC did not promptly respond, Downing

would conclude that its pursuit of administrative remedies was

futile and would "proceed accordingly."

Downing alleges that the CRMC did not respond to this

final notice, though Downing did not wait long for it to do so.

Less than three weeks later, on August 24, 2009, Downing filed its

complaint in federal court alleging, inter alia, that the state, 2

CRMC, and HPHC had taken its property for public purposes without

just compensation, and denied it substantive and procedural due

process and equal protection under the law. Downing sought damages

and prospective injunctive relief.

On December 30, 2009, the CRMC issued to Downing a notice

of hearing on the issues surrounding Downing's Assent. The

district court noted in its March 26, 2010 opinion that in February

2010 the parties had "agreed that the matter would be referred to
According to Downing's counsel, the CRMC subcommittee had 3

conducted four or five hearings over several months. That stage of

the process had concluded. The parties had still to submit closing

written submissions, after which the subcommittee would make a

recommendation to the full CRMC.

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a CRMC subcommittee for an expedited hearing." Downing/Salt Pond

Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island, 698 F. Supp. 2d 278, 279 & n.1

(D.R.I. 2010). At oral argument in this court, counsel for Downing

explained that this hearing process was ongoing.3

B. Motion to Dismiss in the District Court

Rhode Island moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, arguing that Downing had failed to meet either of the

Williamson County ripeness requirements for federal Takings Clause

claims, and that its other claims were coextensive with the takings

claims and should be subject to the same requirements. Downing

responded that it was excused from both requirements. As to the

requirement that it seek compensation in state court, Downing

argued that Rhode Island provided no "reasonable, certain and

adequate" procedures "for obtaining compensation." Williamson

County, 473 U.S. at 194 (quoting Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419

U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

argument was based on language in an opinion in a case under Puerto

Rico law that distinguished between "general remedial cause[s] of

action under state law" and "procedures specifically designed by

the state" to provide compensation for takings. Asociación De

Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Resonsabilidad Obligatorio v.
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Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2007). Downing argued

this language overruled an earlier decision of this court, Pascoag,

which affirmed a dismissal under Williamson County for failure to

use Rhode Island's inverse condemnation procedure. See Pascoag,

337 F.3d at 92-93. Downing also argued that the finality

requirement was inapplicable to "direct or physical takings such as

are alleged here," and in the alternative that further

administrative proceedings would be futile. Downing did not

respond to Rhode Island's argument that its non-takings claims

should be dismissed along with its takings claims and did not

assert that those claims were not also subject to the ripeness

constraints.

The district court, in a thoughtful and well-reasoned

opinion, granted the motion to dismiss all of Downing's state and

federal claims. Downing/Salt Pond Partners, 698 F. Supp. 2d 278.

The court found Downing's argument that it was excused from the

state litigation requirement to be foreclosed by binding First

Circuit precedent holding that Rhode Island's procedures were

available and adequate under the Williamson County ripeness test.

Downing, 698 F.Supp.2d at 284 (citing Pascoag). The court rejected

Downing's argument that Flores Galarza implicitly overruled

Pascoag. Id. As to Downing's remaining claims, including its

federal due process claims, the court found that "Downing has

merely '[d]ress[ed] a takings claim' in several other costumes,"
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and concluded that all of the claims failed on ripeness grounds

under Williamson County as well. Id. at 290 (quoting Deniz, 285

F.3d at 149) (alteration in original). Downing appeals the

dismissal of its claims. 

III. Analysis of the Williamson County Ripeness Prongs

A. Takings Claim Ripeness Requirements

In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that the

nature of a federal regulatory takings claim gives rise to two

ripeness requirements which plaintiffs bear the burden of proving

they have met before a federal court has jurisdiction over a

takings claim. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186; García-Rubiera

v. Calderón, 570 F.3d 443, 521 (1st Cir. 2009) ("Plaintiffs have

the burden of demonstrating ripeness."). These two requirements

arise because "there is no uncompensated taking," and therefore

nothing to litigate in federal court, "until the state has

established (a) what it has taken, and (b) its refusal to pay 'just

compensation.'" Pascoag, 337 F.3d at 91 (quoting SGB Fin. Servs.,

Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis-Marion Cnty., Inc., 235 F.3d

1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 2000)). Downing argues it is exempt from both

requirements. We discuss each in turn.

First, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe until the

relevant government entity has "reached a final decision regarding

the application of the regulations to the property at issue."

Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186. Determining whether regulatory
In adopting this "state litigation" terminology we do not 4

mean to suggest that the requirement would not encompass a nonjudicial state procedure that was otherwise adequate and available

under Williamson County.

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action has resulted in a taking involves a complex inquiry into

facts that "simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative

agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding" its

application of the law to the land in question. Id. at 191; see

also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001).

Generally plaintiffs must complete ordinary administrative

processes before the impact of regulatory restrictions can be

determined with reasonable certainty. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 621.

The second ripeness requirement, which is the focus of

our analysis, arises because the Fifth Amendment "does not

proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just

compensation." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. As a result,

"if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just

compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the

Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been

denied just compensation." Id. at 195. This is sometimes referred

to as a "state litigation" requirement. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. 4

v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 349 (2005)

(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Further, the compensation need not

be paid in advance or at the time of the taking, as long as there

is a procedure in place at the time of the taking that is
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"reasonable, certain and adequate . . . for obtaining

compensation." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 (quoting Reg'l

Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 124-25) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In Williamson County itself, at the time of the

alleged taking an inverse condemnation cause of action was

available under state law, and the state courts had permitted its

invocation in cases of regulatory takings as well as physical

takings. Id. at 196. Because the plaintiff in Williamson had

neither pursued an inverse condemnation proceeding nor shown that

it was "unavailable or inadequate," its claim was unripe. Id. at

196-97.

Under the Williamson County ripeness rules a plaintiff

might be precluded from ever bringing a takings claim in federal

court if the substance of the federal claim is litigated in state

court. The Supreme Court squarely confronted this situation in San

Remo Hotel, in which it acknowledged this implication of Williamson

County and refused to create an exception from ordinary preclusion

rules and the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,

whenever "a case is forced into state court by the ripeness rule of

Williamson County." San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 342. The Court

held that there was no absolute "right to vindicate . . . federal

claims in a federal forum . . . . even when the plaintiff would

have preferred not to litigate in state court, but was required to
As a practical matter, the Court emphasized, because the 5

finality requirement was actually "settled well before Williamson

County," regulatory takings were already rarely litigated in

federal court. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 346-47 (2005). This was not concerning:

"State courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional

challenges to local land-use decisions" and "undoubtedly have more

experience than federal courts do in resolving the complex factual,

technical, and legal questions" they raise. Id. at 347.

Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that since joining the 6

Williamson County majority, he had come to think that "the

justifications for [the] state-litigation requirement are suspect,

while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic" in that they

are often entirely precluded from a federal forum for their federal

takings claims. Id. at 352. He acknowledged that no party or

court had addressed the requirement's validity in San Remo Hotel,

but he invited the Court to reconsider in an appropriate case in

the future. Id.

See also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. 7

of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2618 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing

that "[u]ntil Williamson County is reconsidered, litigants will

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do so by statute or prudential rules" like the Williamson County

requirements. Id. 5

The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the

Williamson County state litigation rule, despite Chief Justice

Rehnquists's concurrence in San Remo Hotel encouraging the Court to

reconsider the rule. In San Remo Hotel itself, twenty years after 6

Williamson County, the Court expressly refused to soften the

effects of the rule on takings plaintiffs' access to the federal

courts. See id. at 341-42. Since San Remo Hotel, the Court has

repeatedly denied petitions for a writ of certiorari that asked the

Court to abrogate the Williamson County state litigation rule.7
have to press most of their judicial takings claims before state

courts, which are 'presumptively competent . . . to adjudicate

claims arising under the laws of the United States'" (quoting

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990))).

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See, e.g., Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 129 S. Ct. 1668

(2009); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Agripost, LLC, No.

08-567 (Oct. 27, 2008), 2008 WL 4757424; Howard v. City of Marion,

Ind., 547 U.S. 1179 (2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,

Howard, No. 05-1274 (Mar. 31, 2006), 2006 WL 895847. Williamson

County, then, governs our analysis.

This court has held, under Williamson County, that a

takings claim against the state of Rhode Island was unripe where,

as here, the plaintiff had failed to pursue the state's inverse

condemnation cause of action. Pascoag, 337 F.3d 87. In Pascoag,

the plaintiff owned a lake abutted by state-owned land. In 1964,

the state built a public boat ramp jutting into the lake, which the

public used as a point of access to the lake until at least 1997,

when Pascoag put up a "NO TRESPASSING" sign. Id. at 90. Rhode

Island won a judgment in the Rhode Island Supreme Court that it had

"acquired by adverse possession a small portion of the Lake bottom

(occupied by the boat ramp) and had acquired, on the public's

behalf, a prescriptive easement to use the boat ramp to access the

entire Lake for recreational purposes." Id. Pascoag then brought

an inverse condemnation action against Rhode Island in federal

court. Id. at 89. 
The majority did cite Pascoag for the proposition that 8

the finality requirement does not apply to physical takings claims,

but otherwise did not discuss Pascoag. See Asociación De

Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Resonsabilidad Obligatorio v.

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Without deciding "whether compensation is due when the

state acquires land by adverse possession or prescription," id. at

90, this court held that Pascoag had failed to show that Rhode

Island state remedies are "unavailable" or "inadequate," Williamson

County, 473 U.S. at 196-97, the "narrow" exceptions to the state

litigation requirement, Pascoag, 337 F.3d at 92. Those exceptions,

we held, encompass cases where state law "did not recognize the

taking that occurred, or did not permit the relief required to make

the plaintiff whole," for instance, where state law did not permit

an inverse condemnation cause of action for regulatory takings, or

where such actions were limited to monetary damages and the

plaintiff's damages were not quantifiable. Id. (citing cases).

Our opinion in Pascoag concluded:

Pascoag cannot show that Rhode Island's remedies were

inadequate or unavailable. The Rhode Island Constitution

prohibits the taking of private property for public use

without just compensation and Rhode Island state courts

have long allowed recovery through suits for inverse

condemnation. Thus, Rhode Island has an adequate process

available to address Pascoag's suit for just

compensation.

Id. at 93 (citations omitted).

Downing's arguments to the contrary rely on its reading

of Flores Galarza, which itself did not purport to overrule the

holding in Pascoag. In Flores Galarza, a divided panel held under 8
Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2007).

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Puerto Rico law that an unusual type of takings claim was ripe

because the plaintiffs were excused from fulfilling the Williamson

County requirements. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d at 13-20. The

plaintiffs, a group of automobile insurers in Puerto Rico, sued the

Puerto Rico Secretary of the Treasury for withholding from the

insurers insurance premiums generated by Puerto Rico's new

compulsory liability insurance program. Id. at 6. Under the

statutory scheme, the Commonwealth was to transfer to the insurers

insurance premiums paid when drivers renewed their licenses, but

the Commonwealth temporarily stopped doing so as a result of its

own cash-flow problems. Id. at 8-9. The insurers sought

compensation for this temporary taking, including for the foregone

interest on the premiums and the amounts they were forced to pay

from their own funds for reimbursements to drivers that were

intended to be paid from the amounts retained by the Commonwealth.

Id. at 11. They also sought compensation for the permanent taking

they alleged resulted from a change in the law that appropriated to

the Commonwealth certain reserve funds accumulated under the

insurance scheme. Id.

The majority opinion reasoned that the withholding of

funds amounted to a physical taking, not a regulatory one, id. at

15, and that because it involved "the direct appropriation of

funds," the Williamson County requirements were wholly
As we explain below, Downing argues that Rhode Island's 9

judicially created inverse condemnation cause of action is

actually, under the framework of Flores Galarza, merely a

"generally available state procedure" rather than one "particularly

aimed" at addressing its specific type of claim. See Flores

Galarza, 484 F.3d at 16-17.

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inapplicable, id. at 19. The majority nonetheless discussed the

nature of the state litigation requirement, in language that

Downing reads as reframing the Williamson County state litigation

requirement:

The key component of this prong of Williamson County is

the availability of a [state] process that is

particularly aimed at providing compensation when

government action effects a taking. In our view, such

procedures do not include litigation of a state takings

claim or any general remedial cause of action under state

law. Rather, the Supreme Court must have had in mind

only those procedures specifically designed by the state

to avoid constitutional injury in the first instance by

providing a means for a plaintiff to obtain compensation

for the government's taking of property.

Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Downing relies

on this language to argue that if this is the standard, then

Pascoag must be reconsidered.

Downing also relies on other language in the majority

opinion that attempts to contrast inverse condemnation proceedings

with "any generally available state procedure that might provide a

remedy for an uncompensated taking." Id. at 17. The majority

concluded that if only the latter was available, a plaintiff need

not pursue it to satisfy Williamson County. Id. at 17. This 9

purported distinction was driven in part by reliance on the
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concerns in Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in San Remo Hotel

and the panel majority's consideration that the full Supreme Court

might respond to those concerns by narrowing or overruling the

state litigation requirement in the near future. See id. at 17-18.

As we have said, the Supreme Court has since refused to alter the

Williamson County state litigation requirement, and so that basis

has disappeared.

One judge concurred in the judgment, disagreeing strongly

with the majority's conclusion and analysis on the state litigation

rule. The concurring opinion argued, "There is no support in

Supreme Court precedent for the conclusion that claimants are

relieved of the litigation requirement unless the state has adopted

specific processes . . . through which such compensation may be

recovered." Id. at 38 (Howard, J., concurring in the judgment).

"It is not enough to show only that the adequacy of state process

remains unsure and undeveloped"; it must be affirmatively shown to

be unavailable or inadequate. Id. at 40.

The majority's analysis was, as the district court in

this case recognized, called into question by the en banc court.

Three judges (a clear majority of the court's five active judges at

the time, four of whom participated in the matter) wrote in a

statement accompanying an order denying en banc review, "It appears

to us that the panel majority decision likely conflicts directly

with binding Supreme Court authority and prior decisions in this
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court, as well as the law in other circuits." Id. at 40 (statement

accompanying denial of reh'g en banc) (footnotes omitted). The

three judges emphasized, as had the concurrence, that plaintiffs

must carry "the burden of demonstrating the absolute lack of . . .

a state proceeding" in which compensation could be available, and

that the court's precedent had previously determined that "such a

proceeding and a remedy may very well exist under the Puerto Rico

Constitution." Id. at 41 (citing Deniz, 285 F.3d at 146-47).

Nonetheless, the court denied rehearing en banc because the case

had arisen on interlocutory appeal and error correction would be

available if necessary on appeal from final judgment. Id.

Moreover, the statement concluded, to the extent the majority

opinion had reached a result contrary to Supreme Court and First

Circuit precedent, it was without authority to do so. Id. at 40.

As we explain below, we too now reject application of the language

and reasoning in the Flores Galarza majority opinion that

purportedly reworked the Williamson County state litigation test as

contrary to Supreme Court and circuit precedent.

B. Downing Is Not Excused from Meeting the State Litigation Prong

Downing acknowledges that it never initiated an inverse

condemnation proceeding in Rhode Island state court, but went

instead directly to federal court. Downing argues that it was

excused from Williamson County's state litigation requirement

because Rhode Island's state law remedies are "unavailable" or
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"inadequate." See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 196-97; Pascoag,

337 F.3d at 92. But we concluded in Pascoag that the Rhode Island

courts "have long allowed recovery through suits for inverse

condemnation. Thus, Rhode Island has an adequate process

available" to takings plaintiffs, and plaintiffs must resort to it

before their federal takings claims will ripen. Pascoag, 337 F.3d

at 93. As the district court aptly stated, Pascoag "looks like a

trapdoor straight to state court for Downing." Downing, 698

F. Supp. 2d at 282.

Downing has two arguments in reply. First, it argues

that Flores Galarza overruled Pascoag as to Rhode Island's inverse

condemnation cause of action and set forth a higher standard for

state remedies that Rhode Island's inverse condemnation cause of

action does not meet. Second, it argues that all the Pascoag court

held was that the plaintiff in that case had not proven the

inadequacy or unavailability of the Rhode Island inverse

condemnation procedure, and that the state procedure suffers from

defects not considered in Pascoag that make it not a "reasonable,

certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation."

Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 (quoting Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act

Cases, 419 U.S. at 124-25) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1. We Reject Downing's Arguments that We May Alter the 

Williamson County Test Based on Flores Galarza

We turn first to Downing's arguments relating to Flores

Galarza. Downing argues that Rhode Island's inverse condemnation

proceeding falls on the wrong side of the line drawn in Flores

Galarza between "a process that is particularly aimed," Flores

Galarza, 484 F.3d at 16, at compensating property owners to prevent

constitutional injury and a "general remedial cause of action" such

as a state takings claim that provides damages for a constitutional

injury, id. at 17. Downing argues that because in Annicelli v.

Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983), the case in

which the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized an inverse

condemnation cause of action for regulatory takings, the state

court "did not develop any particularized procedure for obtaining

compensation for a taking," as Downing puts it, the cause of action

is insufficient under the rule in Flores Galarza. Downing argues

that it would be bound to bring a state inverse condemnation claim

only if the Rhode Island Supreme Court or legislature had crafted

an inverse condemnation scheme as "particularly aimed," Flores

Galarza, 484 F.3d at 16, and as detailed as the statutory

compensation schemes the state has legislatively created for

wetland owners denied permission to alter their land, R.I. Gen.

Laws § 2-1-21(b), and property owners whose land the state takes

for public use through condemnation, see, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws
The plaintiffs in Gilbert petitioned for a writ of 10

certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to reconsider the Williamson

County state litigation rule. See Opposition to Petition for Writ

of Certiorari at i, Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, No. 91-209 (U.S.

Aug. 30, 1991), 1991 WL 11178604. The Supreme Court denied the

petition. Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 502 U.S. 866 (1991).

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§ 42-64-9 (land condemned by state Economic Development

Corporation).

Downing's argument depends on the proposition that Flores

Galarza narrowed Williamson County generally by heightening the

standard for adequate state procedures. If that proposition were

correct, Downing might have an argument. But Flores Galarza could

not overrule prior circuit law. See Pascoag, 337 F.3d at 93;

Deniz, 285 F.3d at 147; Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51,

65 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding plaintiffs had not satisfied burden of

proving Massachusetts inverse condemnation proceeding could not

apply to the type of taking they alleged). Nor could the panel 10

majority revise a test created by the Supreme Court. See

Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195-97. The en banc statement of

this court made that point, and we elaborate.

To the extent that language in the Flores Galarza

majority opinion can be read to say the plaintiffs do not bear the

burden of proving the inadequacy or unavailability of state

procedures for seeking compensation, that language cannot be

squared with either Supreme Court or First Circuit precedent. The

Flores Galarza majority expressly refused to "requir[e] plaintiffs
-22-

to invoke any generally available state procedure that might

provide a remedy for an uncompensated taking." Flores Galarza, 484

F.3d at 17 (emphasis added). But in Williamson County the Supreme

Court clearly placed the burden of proving the inadequacy of state

law remedies on the plaintiff. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197

(finding that plaintiff "has not shown that the [state's] inverse

condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate . . . .").

In the First Circuit, "It is well settled that the burden

of demonstrating the absolute lack of [an adequate] state

proceeding is on the plaintiff." Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d at 41

(statement accompanying denial of reh'g en banc) (citing Deniz, 285

F.3d at 146); see also Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d

155, 165 (1st Cir. 2008). Even where "the most that can be said is

that it remains unclear whether the inverse condemnation remedy

applies" to the type of taking alleged by the plaintiff, the state

litigation requirement is not excused. Deniz, 285 F.3d at 147; see

also Gilbert, 932 F.2d at 65; Culebras Enters. Corp. v. Rivera

Rios, 813 F.2d 506, 514-15 (1st Cir. 1987). To be excused, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that the state law "expressly precludes

use of the inverse condemnation remedy" in the plaintiff's case.

Deniz, 285 F.3d at 147. We have relied on this allocation of the

burden of proof since Flores Galarza as well. See García-Rubiera,

570 F.3d at 451.
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Our sister circuits agree that the burden is on the

plaintiff to prove the absolute unavailability or inadequacy of

potential state remedies in order to be excused from the state

litigation requirement. See, e.g., Island Park, LLC v. CSX

Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (plaintiff must pursue

even unsure and undeveloped possibilities for relief); Rockstead v.

City of Crystal Lake, 486 F.3d 963, 965-66 (7th Cir. 2007)

(plaintiff must challenge out-of-date state common law precedent

denying validity of particular type of inverse condemnation claim);

Urban Developers LLC v. City of Jackson, Miss., 468 F.3d 281, 295

(5th Cir. 2006); Austin v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678,

680 (9th Cir. 1988).

Other language in Flores Galarza, if read a certain

way, would also conflict with Supreme Court precedent. The

majority held that a plaintiff is excused from the state litigation

requirement if the only remedy available under state law is a

general state takings claim. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d at 17-18.

But the Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel, decided two years before

Flores Galarza, abrogated a Second Circuit case holding "that

parties 'who litigate state-law takings claims in state court

involuntarily' pursuant to Williamson County cannot be precluded

from having those claims resolved 'by a federal court,'" San Remo

Hotel, 545 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added) (quoting Santini v.

Connecticut Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir.
There is also reason to think that, despite its broad 11

language, Flores Galarza did not intend to alter the rule in

Pascoag. The Flores Galarza majority repeatedly referred to

inverse condemnation proceedings, whether created by statute or

judicial recognition, as being appropriate state procedures under

Williamson County. See Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d at 16-18 & n.21.

-24-

2003)). The Court thereby expressly recognized that to satisfy the

Williamson County state litigation requirement, plaintiffs must

bring state taking claims in state court where they are available.11

Indeed, other circuits to face the question have held

that plaintiffs must pursue claims under the takings clause of a

state constitution even when there is no judicial or legislative

inverse condemnation procedure already definitively established.

See, e.g., Island Park, 559 F.3d at 110 (Second Circuit);

Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co., Inc. v. Harris Cnty., Ga., 89 F.3d

1481, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff must bring suit under

eminent domain provision of Georgia Constitution to determine

whether state law compensates temporary takings); Bateman v. City

of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 708-09 (10th Cir. 1996); Austin,

840 F.2d at 681 (Ninth Circuit); cf. Peters v. Vill. of Clifton,

498 F.3d 727, 733-34 & n.6 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding Illinois courts

had developed adequate remedy, but adding that in other circuits

where the issue was raised, courts have found adequate the "selfexecuting [takings] provision of a state's constitution").
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2. Downing's Other Attacks on Pascoag Also Fail

Downing also argues that the holding in Pascoag, that

Rhode Island has made available an adequate state-law remedy that

plaintiffs must pursue before their federal takings claims will

ripen, has no binding force in its case, even if Pascoag is binding

precedent. However, the main thrust of even these arguments is

that Pascoag insufficiently considered whether Rhode Island's

inverse condemnation proceedings met the adequacy standards set

forth in Flores Galarza, and so the arguments are disposed of under

our rejection of a reading of Flores Galarza as narrowing the state

litigation requirement.

Downing also attempts to distinguish its case from

Pascoag on the facts, arguing that Pascoag is inapposite because it

involved a different type of alleged taking, arising from the

state's acquisition of the plaintiff's land by adverse possession

and prescriptive easement, rather than from the actions of state

regulatory agencies as in Downing's case. The specific mechanism

of the alleged taking had no bearing on our consideration of the

Williamson County ripeness requirements in Pascoag. See Pascoag,

337 F.3d at 90. Because Downing bears the absolute burden of

proving Rhode Island's inverse condemnation proceeding is

unavailable or inadequate in its particular case, it is

insufficient to argue only that the alleged taking in its case is

different from the alleged taking in Pascoag.
-26-

Downing further argues that deficiencies in the remedies

available to it in state court render those remedies inadequate

under Williamson County. Rhode Island, Downing argues, has no

statute comparable to federal statutes permitting recovery of

attorneys' fees or pre-judgment statutory interest on awarded

compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (interest); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)

(fees); Andrade v. State, 448 A.2d 1293, 1295 (R.I. 1982) (holding

Rhode Island did not waive sovereign immunity as to pre-judgment

interest). Exact equivalence of damages is not required; just

compensation is. Culebras, 813 F.2d at 514 (holding that potential

differences between Puerto Rico and federal remedies did not render

potential Puerto Rico inverse condemnation remedy inadequate, "[s]o

long as just compensation is provided").

Finally, Downing argues that because Rhode Island has not

statutorily waived sovereign immunity for inverse condemnation

claims as it has for statutory condemnation procedures, the remedy

is uncertain. This allegation cannot satisfy Downing's burden to

show absolute unavailability in light of the Rhode Island Supreme

Court's decisions repeatedly reaching the merits in inverse

condemnation cases. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 611, 616

(reviewing, and partially reversing, Rhode Island Supreme Court's

decision that CRMC's denial of a plaintiff's development permit did

not constitute a regulatory taking); Woodland Manor III Assocs. v.

Keeney, 713 A.2d 806, 811-12, 814 (R.I. 1998) (remanding for trial
-27-

on plaintiff's claim of temporary regulatory taking); Annicelli,

463 A.2d at 141 (remanding for determination of property's fair

market value for purposes of compensation).

IV. Remaining Arguments

Because Downing must show it has fulfilled or is excused

from both prongs of the Williamson ripeness requirements, and we

have found that Downing has failed to make this showing as to the

state litigation requirement, we need not address the other prong,

the finality requirement.

As to Downing's other federal claims, Downing argues

strenuously in its reply brief that it has not waived its due

process claims, because it has argued that the entire district

court decision was erroneous. Downing's opening brief makes

frequent passing reference to Downing's due process claims, but

provides no argument explaining why those claims should survive in

federal court even if its takings claims are found to be unripe,

the issue of primary relevance as to these claims at this stage in

the proceedings. Nor did Downing make any such argument in the

district court. The argument is doubly waived. Cortes-Rivera v.

Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 626 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) ("We

decline to address the issue both because it was neither preserved

nor adequately presented in the district court and because it is

not adequately presented on appeal."); id. at 26 (holding that an

argument raised in a perfunctory manner is deemed waived).
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We decline to address the issues raised for the first

time by amicus in its brief, which argues that Williamson County's

ripeness rules apply only to Takings Clause claims, leaving

plaintiffs free to pursue in federal court Due Process Clause and

Equal Protection Clause claims that arise from the same allegedly

illegal state conduct. "[A]mici may not make up for waiver by a

party," Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 17 n.23

(1st Cir. 2010), and may not introduce a new argument into a case,

Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 74 n.5

(1st Cir. 1996). We note only that we have previously held that

plaintiffs cannot, merely by recasting its takings claim "in the

raiment of a due process violation," evade the Williamson County

ripeness requirements. Deniz, 285 F.3d at 149.

While the two agencies strenuously deny that they have

been unresponsive or have unreasonably delayed their decisions on

Downing's project, we express the hope that the parties will

promptly attempt to resolve any remaining disagreements.

Affirmed.