In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-2316 

DONNELL D. WILSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

RON NEAL, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. 

No. 3:22-cv-00205-JD-MGG — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 10, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2024 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Donnell Wilson is 

serving an Indiana prison sentence of 100 years for 

committing two murders when he was sixteen years old. 

Wilson petitioned a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. 

He asserts that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment

as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Miller held that a person 

may not be sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison 
2 No. 23-2316 

without parole for a homicide committed while under the age 

of eighteen. Wilson contends the reasoning of Miller extends 

to a sentence like his: a sentence for a term of years that is so 

long that it amounts to a de facto life sentence.

We address two principal issues. First, the State contends 

Wilson’s federal habeas petition is time-barred under 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The district court found his petition 

timely, and so do we. To decide that issue, we must consider 

in some detail Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 7(B), a 

unique rule that the Indiana Supreme Court invoked to 

reduce Wilson’s sentence from 181 years to 100 years. Second, 

the district court denied relief on the merits, finding that the 

state-court decision rejected Wilson’s Eighth Amendment 

claim under Miller on the merits and that the rejection was 

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court precedent. We agree and, on that basis, affirm 

the denial of Wilson’s petition on the merits. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Convictions

We presume the facts set forth by the state court are correct 

unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We reproduce the facts of the murders 

from the Indiana Supreme Court’s summary of the evidence 

presented at Wilson’s trial:

In March 2013, sixteen-year-old Donnell Wilson, his then-girlfriend, her brother Jonte Crawford, and another of the Crawfords’ relatives 

were all walking home from playing basketball 

in their hometown of Gary, Indiana. When the 

group encountered fifteen-year-old Derrick 
No. 23-2316 3

Thompson, Wilson and Jonte flashed the handguns they were carrying and began harassing 

and intimidating Thompson, making references 

to the local Tre 7 gang. The pair then took 

Thompson’s smartphone and headphones and 

walked away.

A short time later, the group happened upon 

brothers Shaqwone Ham and Charles Wood. 

Wilson and Jonte were members of several 

interrelated gangs, including the Get Fresh 

Boys, Tre 7, and Glen Park Affiliated, which 

were all at odds with the Bottom Side gang, to 

which Ham and Wood belonged. Wilson had 

previously argued in person with the brothers 

and their disputes had continued online with 

the brothers threatening to fight Wilson. The 

groups initially exchanged greetings, but 

Wilson and Jonte soon began to argue with the 

brothers. Wilson exclaimed, “Oh, y’all looking 

for me? I’m in your hood.” Seconds later, he 

fatally shot Wood in the head. When Ham tried 

to run, Jonte shot him several times, killing him 

too. It is unclear from the record if Wilson also 

shot at Ham. The brothers were unarmed.

Three hours before the murders, Wilson—who 

had previously made several gang-related posts 

on Twitter—sent out a new tweet declaring 

“Glen Park or get shot,” referring to the Gary 

neighborhood where he lived. An hour after the 

murder, he tweeted “Chillen wit my bros #[GetFreshBoys].” Jonte and Wilson were quickly 
4 No. 23-2316 

arrested, and police found Thompson’s possessions on Jonte. Wilson was charged with two 

counts of murder, Class B felony armed robbery, and a Class D felony conspiracy to commit 

criminal gang activity. The State also sought a 

criminal gang enhancement.

While Wilson was lodged in the Lake County 

Jail awaiting trial, he told his cellmate he killed 

Ham and Wood because they were affiliated 

with the rival Bottom Side gang. He also 

explained how his gang affiliation had led to 

Twitter disputes with members of the Bottom 

Side gang. Wilson, along with some fellow 

inmates, later jumped this cellmate because he 

was from the “other side of the bridge” dividing 

Gary. During this period, Wilson was also 

recorded on a jailhouse video conference stating 

he wanted to “smash” a member of a rival gang 

incarcerated in the same facility and indicated a 

desire to continue participating in gang activity.

After a four-day trial beginning in June 2014, a 

jury found Wilson guilty on all counts. The trial 

court sentenced Wilson to a term of sixty years 

for the first murder conviction, fifty-five 

consecutive years for the second murder 

conviction, six consecutive years for armed 

robbery, and two years for criminal gang 

activity, with an additional sixty consecutive 

years added under the criminal gang 

enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of 183 

years. Wilson’s trial counsel did not retain any 
No. 23-2316 5

experts in preparation for the sentencing 

hearing and did not present any witnesses at 

sentencing. When handing down the sentence, 

the court cited several aggravating factors, but 

found Wilson’s youth to be a mitigating factor.

Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1167–68 (Ind. 2020) (internal 

record citations and footnotes omitted).

B. Procedural History

Wilson’s case has an unusual procedural history resulting 

from the operation of Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), discussed 

below. The exact dates of various state-court events are vital 

in determining whether Wilson’s petition is timely.

On August 5, 2014, a state trial court formally issued its 

judgment sentencing Wilson to 183 years in prison. Wilson 

appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals. That court 

affirmed, except for finding that the two-year sentence for 

criminal gang activity duplicated the 60-year criminal gang 

sentencing enhancement. The appellate court vacated the 

gang activity conviction and reduced the total sentence to 181 

years. Wilson’s direct appeal ended with the Indiana Supreme 

Court denying a transfer petition (Indiana’s form of 

discretionary review). After that, the Indiana appellate 

opinion was certified and became final on August 19, 2015.

Next, on August 11, 2016, Wilson filed his petition for postconviction relief in a state trial court. The trial court denied 

relief on November 21, 2018, after an evidentiary hearing. 

Wilson appealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed that 

denial on June 27, 2019, finding that Wilson’s trial counsel had 

been ineffective by failing “to present any evidence related to 

youth and its attendant characteristics or to Wilson’s own 
6 No. 23-2316 

youth, environment, mental health, good character, or 

prospects of rehabilitation.” Wilson v. State, 128 N.E.3d 492, 

502 (Ind. App. 2019). The state appellate court ordered a new 

sentencing hearing. Id. at 503. The State then petitioned the 

Indiana Supreme Court for transfer.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted the transfer petition, 

thus vacating the appellate opinion, and issued its own 

opinion on November 17, 2020. 157 N.E.3d 1163 (Ind. 2020). 

Wilson argued to the Indiana Supreme Court that his 181-year 

cumulative sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth 

Amendment based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller 

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation 

evidence at his sentencing hearing. Wilson also argued that 

his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 

the appropriateness of his sentence under Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B) on direct appeal. 

The Indiana Supreme Court rejected Wilson’s argument 

that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court 

explained its view that, first, Miller did not apply to sentences 

for terms of years, even if they amount to de facto life 

sentences like Wilson’s, and second, that even if Miller

applied, the sentencing court’s consideration of Wilson’s 

youth and background would suffice to satisfy this expanded 

application of Miller. Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1184. The Indiana 

Supreme Court also found that Wilson’s trial counsel 

sufficiently investigated Wilson’s background and potential 

mitigation arguments. Id. at 1177–78. The court found, 

however, that Wilson’s appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to challenge the sentence under Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B). Id. at 1180–81. 
No. 23-2316 7

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) authorizes an unusual degree 

of appellate review of criminal sentences: “The Court may 

revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that 

the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.” On direct appeal, 

Wilson’s appellate counsel did not argue that his sentence 

should be revised under this rule. The Indiana Supreme Court 

explained: “The correct remedy for this failure, in this 

instance, is to give Wilson a new chance to present an 

Appellate Rule 7(B) claim. But rather than remand for 

consideration, in the interest of judicial economy, we choose 

to now conduct a review of the sentence under Appellate Rule 

7(B).” 157 N.E.3d at 1181. 

Taking into account the evidence available during the direct appeal of Wilson’s original conviction and sentence, the 

Indiana Supreme Court explained that a downward adjustment to his sentence was appropriate. Id. The court reduced 

Wilson’s sentence from 181 years to 100 years, finding that his 

youth at the time of conviction was “the main factor weighing 

in favor of a shorter sentence.” Id. at 1184. 

Wilson sought rehearing, arguing that the 100-year 

reduced sentence also violated the Eighth Amendment. The 

Indiana Supreme Court denied Wilson’s petition for 

rehearing in an order without an opinion on January 22, 2021. 

Wilson’s new 100-year sentence was entered by the state trial 

court on February 12, 2021. Wilson tried to appeal the new, 

reduced sentence on February 22, 2021, but the Indiana Court 

of Appeals dismissed the appeal just two days later, on 

February 24, 2021, explaining that it did not have authority to 

review decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court. 
8 No. 23-2316 

On March 15, 2022, Wilson filed a federal habeas corpus 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Wilson asserted that he was a 

juvenile at the time of his offense and that his new 100-year 

sentence amounts to a mandatory, de facto life sentence without parole that violates the Eighth Amendment as construed 

in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In opposition, the 

State argued that Wilson’s petition was filed too late and that 

relief was not justified on the merits.

The federal district court denied the petition, finding that 

Wilson’s petition was timely but that no clearly established 

law extended the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller to de 

facto life sentences. Wilson v. Neal, No. 3:22-cv-00205-JDMGG, 2023 WL 3750544, at *5, 8–9 (N.D. Ind. May 31, 2023). 

The district court issued a certificate of appealability on the 

question whether the Indiana Supreme Court ruling on the 

Eighth Amendment challenge contradicted or unreasonably 

applied clearly established law. Id. at *10, applying Rule 11 of 

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts.

II. Timeliness

The State argues first that we should not reach the merits 

of Wilson’s claim because he filed his federal petition too late 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). No facts material to the issue are in 

dispute, and we review this question de novo. See Arnold v. 

Richardson, 14 F.4th 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2021). The statute of limitations for a habeas petition is one year from (for purposes of 

this case) the date upon which the judgment against Wilson 

became final either by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of time for seeking direct review. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The statute of limitations is tolled, however, 

during the time in which a properly filed petition for state 
No. 23-2316 9

post-conviction collateral review is pending in the state 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

The district court and parties agree on these general rules 

but disagree on how to apply them to Wilson’s petition. The 

parties put forth several theories on timeliness. To avoid 

undue confusion, we will not recount and refute all the 

theories they suggest. Instead, we agree with the district 

court’s bottom line that Wilson’s petition was timely, and we 

explain only our route to this conclusion.

A. Competing Timelines

The dispute boils down to whether the Indiana Supreme 

Court’s decision to reduce Wilson’s original sentence should 

be deemed to have caused entry of a new, intervening judgment that reset to zero the one-year clock in section 2244(d). 

If so, then his petition was timely, and if not, then it was indeed untimely. 

To unpack this a bit further, recall that direct review of 

Wilson’s original sentence concluded on August 19, 2015, 

when the Indiana appellate court’s opinion reducing the 

sentence to 181 years was certified. The section 2244(d) oneyear statute of limitations clock began to run 90 days later, on 

November 17, 2015. (The extra 90 days come from the 90-day 

deadline to file a petition for certiorari. See Supreme Court 

Rule 13; Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119–20 (2009) 

(petitioner’s conviction becomes final for purposes of 

section 2244(d)(1)(A) when time for seeking certiorari review 

by Supreme Court expires if no petition is filed).) 

Wilson filed his state petition for post-conviction relief on 

August 11, 2016, tolling the limitations period, effectively 

stopping the clock with 98 days left in the one-year limitations 
10 No. 23-2316 

period for filing a federal petition. Wilson’s state postconviction proceedings concluded on January 22, 2021, when 

the Indiana Supreme Court denied his petition for rehearing. 

At that time, the federal statute of limitations clock began to 

run again. The question, though, is whether the new 100-year 

sentence ordered by the Indiana Supreme Court reset the 

clock to zero, giving him one year plus 90 days to file, or 

whether he had only 98 days left to file his federal petition. 

Wilson filed his federal petition on March 15, 2022. It was 

timely if the new sentence reset the clock at zero but late if it 

did not.

B. New Judgment

We agree with Wilson and the district court that Wilson’s 

reduced 100-year sentence constituted a new, intervening 

state-court judgment that started a new statute of limitations 

clock for federal habeas relief. We draw from the Supreme 

Court’s reasoning in Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010). 

In Magwood, the Supreme Court analyzed section 2244(b)’s 

bar on “second or successive habeas corpus application[s].” 

Id. at 330–36, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) & (2). The 

petitioner in Magwood had been sentenced to death, and the 

state courts had upheld the sentence on direct appeal and in 

state post-conviction proceedings. A federal district court 

then set aside the death sentence and ordered a new 

sentencing proceeding in state court. After a new sentencing 

hearing in the state trial court, the petitioner was again 

sentenced to death. He then challenged the new death 

sentence in another federal habeas petition. The federal 

district court granted relief, once again finding the sentence 

constitutionally defective. The federal appeals court reversed, 
No. 23-2316 11

holding that the petition was barred as a “second or 

successive” challenge.

The question for the Supreme Court was whether the new 

federal petition constituted a “second or successive” 

application under section 2244(b). Id. at 330. The Court held 

that it was not, and its reasoning applies to the mirror-image 

question here. The Court looked to section 2254 to determine 

the meaning of “second or successive.” Id. at 331–34. 

Section 2254 specifies that a petition sought under that 

statutory provision is an “application for a writ of habeas 

corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (emphasis 

added). A federal habeas petition thus “seeks invalidation (in 

whole or in part) of the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s 

confinement.” Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332 (emphasis in 

original), quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 83 (2005). 

As the Supreme Court explained: “Custody is crucial for 

§ 2254 purposes, but it is inextricable from the judgment that 

authorizes it.” Id. at 333. This means “a prisoner is entitled to 

one free-standing collateral attack per judgment, rather than 

one attack per stretch of imprisonment.” Id. at 334 (alteration 

omitted), quoting Beyer v. Litscher, 306 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 

2002). This meant for the petitioner in Magwood that his 

second death sentence was imposed by a new judgment. His 

second federal habeas petition was his first to challenge that 

judgment, so it was not “second or successive” for purposes 

of section 2244(b). Id. at 342. Implicit in that reasoning is the 

conclusion that the new judgment also started a new clock 

under section 2244(d) for the petitioner in Magwood. 

In this case we address a different subsection of 

section 2244—subsection (d) regarding the statute of 
12 No. 23-2316 

limitations—but the same language and logic apply. Section 

2244(d) itself specifies that the one-year statute of limitations 

applies to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 

That’s the same language the Supreme Court drew from 

section 2254 and relied upon in Magwood. The judgment that 

now authorizes Wilson’s confinement is the judgment to 

which the statute of limitation applies. See Magwood, 561 U.S. 

at 332; Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (“Final 

judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is 

the judgment.” (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 

212 (1937)).

C. Distinguishing White

The State argues that, pursuant to our decision in White v. 

United States, 745 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2014), Wilson’s new 100-

year sentence was a simple reduction in his original sentence, 

not a resentencing, and therefore not a new judgment. Based 

on this logic, the State contends, Wilson is not in the same 

position as the petitioner in Magwood, who had a full 

resentencing.

We do not think this case should be decided based on 

labels and a court’s choice to say that a sentence was reduced 

rather than that the defendant was resentenced. Instead, we 

look to what the courts actually did in Magwood and White and 

compare that to what the Indiana Supreme Court did in 

determining that Wilson should have been sentenced to 100 

years in prison.

In White, a federal prisoner moved to reduce his sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) after the United States Sentencing 

Commission adopted a guideline amendment that applied 
No. 23-2316 13

retroactively to his original sentence. 745 F.3d at 835. The 

judge granted relief under section 3582(c) and reduced the 

sentence by 68 months. Nine months later, the prisoner filed 

a section 2255 motion. The district court denied the motion, 

finding it was both untimely and barred as a “second or successive” petition. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255(f) & (h). 

We dismissed the appeal, explaining that a sentence reduction 

under section 3582(c) is distinct from resentencing. 745 F.3d 

at 836–37. We relied on Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 

(2010), where the Supreme Court explained: “Section 

3582(c)(2)’s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that 

Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to 

an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing 

proceeding.” 560 U.S. at 826. 

We also explained in White the notable procedural 

differences between a resentencing and a sentence reduction 

under section 3582(c). 745 F.3d at 836. For example, a district 

judge considering a petition under section 3582(c) is not 

required to receive evidence or to reopen any issue decided in 

the original sentence. Id. To the contrary, U.S. Sentencing 

Guideline § 1B1.10(b)(1) specifies that courts making 

retroactive adjustments to a sentence “shall leave all other 

guideline application decisions unaffected.” Thus, a judge 

acting under section 3582(c) is circumscribed to reducing a 

sentence in accordance with the retroactive U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines amendment. Further, section 3582(c) does not 

entitle a prisoner to this retroactive sentence reduction. If a

court grants such a discretionary reduction, it is not a 

resentencing that constitutes a new judgment and does not 

“reset the clock or the count, for purposes of § 2244 and 

§ 2255.” White, 745 F.3d at 836–37.
14 No. 23-2316 

By contrast, in Magwood the petitioner’s second death 

sentence was “the result of a complete and new assessment of 

all the evidence, arguments of counsel, and law.” 561 U.S. at 

326 (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court 

explained: “An error made a second time is still a new error. 

That is especially clear here, where the state court conducted 

a full resentencing and reviewed the aggravating evidence 

afresh.” Id. at 339.

We now return to the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis 

under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We may frame our issue 

as whether that court’s reduction of Wilson’s 181-year 

sentence to 100 years was more akin to the new sentence in 

Magwood or the reduced sentence in White. Rule 7(B) permits 

an appellate court to modify a sentence where “the sentence 

is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender.” The Indiana Supreme Court has 

explained that the rule authorizes a comprehensive look at the 

offense and the offender: “Whether a sentence should be 

deemed inappropriate ‘turns on our sense of the culpability 

of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done 

to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a 

given case.’” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020), 

quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). 

In Wilson’s case, that’s exactly what the Indiana Supreme 

Court did. It analyzed the nature of his offenses and 

compared them to other cases to determine, for example, if 

the murder victims were “tortured, beaten, or lingered in 

pain.” 157 N.E.3d at 1181–82 (internal quotations omitted). 

The court also explained that the crime’s gang connections 

warranted an enhanced sentence. Next, the court considered 

Wilson’s character, including his prior misdemeanor and his 
No. 23-2316 15

continued expression of pro-gang sentiments while 

incarcerated, balanced against his status as a minor when he 

committed the murders. In particular, the court compared 

Wilson’s situation—“a sixteen-year-old who committed 

robbery and a double murder”—to factually analogous cases 

to determine an appropriate sentence. Id. at 1183–84. 

While the Indiana Supreme Court did not consider new 

evidence, it did consider new arguments, and it 

independently reviewed sentencing factors, all after full 

briefing and oral argument. If the Indiana Supreme Court had 

remanded for the trial court to reweigh the sentence, the 

result would have been a new judgment indistinguishable 

from the new judgment ordered on collateral review in 

Magwood. We see no reason that the state court’s choice on 

collateral review, “in the interest of judicial economy,” 157 

N.E.3d at 1181, to take the shortcut by conducting the review 

itself rather than remanding for a new trial-court decision 

should produce a different result for purposes of the section 

2244(d) federal statute of limitations.

The Indiana Supreme Court’s application of Rule 7(B) was 

much closer to the new sentencing hearing in Magwood than 

the limited sentence reduction procedure in White under 

section 3582(c). The Indiana Supreme Court itself has 

explained that review and revision of sentences under Rule 

7(B) is “an exercise of judgment that is unlike the usual 

appellate process, and is very similar to the trial court’s 

function” when weighing various sentencing factors. 

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1223. We thus find that the Indiana 

Supreme Court’s decision to reduce Wilson’s sentence to 100 

years, and the resulting Indiana trial court order entering that 

sentence, constituted a new judgment that reset the clock on 
16 No. 23-2316 

the section 2244(d) statute of limitations for federal habeas 

relief.

Wilson’s 100-year sentence was entered by the trial court 

on February 12, 2021. That was the new judgment ordering 

the custody that he challenges in this habeas proceeding. See, 

e.g., Jensen v. Pollard, 924 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting 

that petitioner was challenging custody imposed by new 

judgment). Wilson tried to appeal that sentence through 

direct review in the state courts, but no such further review 

was available. The Indiana Court of Appeals found it did not 

have jurisdiction to hear what was in effect a request to review 

a decision by the Indiana Supreme Court, so it dismissed 

Wilson’s appeal with prejudice. See Dkt. No. 7-21 at 2; see also 

Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. App. 2002) (“We are 

bound by the decisions of our supreme court. Supreme court 

precedent is binding upon us until it is changed either by that 

court or by legislative enactment,” and “it is not this court’s 

role to ‘reconsider’ supreme court decisions.” (internal 

citations omitted)), transfer granted, 783 N.E.3d 702 (2002), 

transfer vacated, 783 N.E.2d 687 (2003). The new federal 

habeas clock started running no earlier than February 12, 

2021, when the new judgment imposing custody was entered, 

though perhaps it might not have started until twelve days 

later on February 24, 2021, when the Indiana Court of Appeals 

dismissed Wilson’s attempt to appeal. That difference does 

not matter here. 

Wilson could have petitioned the Supreme Court of the 

United States for certiorari review. See, e.g., Wallace v. 

Mississippi, 43 F.4th 482, 498 (5th Cir. 2022) (explaining that 

review on petition for certiorari is available when highest 

state court in which review may be had is the trial court). 
No. 23-2316 17

Thus, Wilson had one year and ninety days running at least 

from February 12, 2021 to file his federal petition. His federal 

petition filed on March 15, 2022 was timely.

III. The Merits

A. Review under AEDPA

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(AEDPA) amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a habeas petitioner 

faces steep obstacles to prevail on a claim the state courts have 

rejected on the merits. To obtain federal relief, the state court’s 

decision must have been “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or 

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2). Federal courts review “the specific 

reasons given by the state court and defer[] to those reasons if 

they are reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. 

Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). A state-court decision is contrary to 

clearly established law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or 

“confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable 

from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different 

result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). In this 

context, an “unreasonable” application of clearly established 

law means “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; 

even clear error will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 

415, 419 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). A petitioner 

must show “the state court’s ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 
18 No. 23-2316 

These deferential approaches to state-court decisions apply, however, only if the petitioner’s claims were adjudicated 

on the merits by a state court. “If no state court has squarely 

addressed the merits of a habeas claim, we review the claim 

de novo under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243, 

but still with deference to the state court.” Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 

F.3d 1083, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). Wilson contends here that the 

state courts did not adjudicate the merits of his federal Eighth 

Amendment challenge under Miller, which would leave us 

free to decide the Eighth Amendment issue de novo, “to dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2243; Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(ordering habeas relief).

B. Adjudicated on the Merits

We find that the Indiana Supreme Court did adjudicate 

Wilson’s Eighth Amendment claim on the merits. The 

standard of review under section 2254(d) therefore applies 

and defeats Wilson’s claim. 

Wilson points out correctly that the state trial court’s order 

entering his 100-year sentence did not contain any reasons explaining the sentence. A federal court must, however, “‘look 

through’ the unexplained decision to the last related statecourt decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should 

then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the 

same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 

1192. That reasoning applies with even more force when the 

unexplained order comes from a lower court that is required 

to follow the instructions of the higher court, here the Indiana 

Supreme Court. 
No. 23-2316 19

Wilson argues, though, that his arguments in his federal 

habeas petition are different than his original arguments to 

the Indiana Supreme Court because of the state trial court’s 

issuance of his new sentence. Wilson’s habeas petition makes 

two primary arguments: (1) that Miller extends to de facto life 

sentences for minors; and (2) his 100-year sentence qualifies 

as a de facto life sentence and therefore is unconstitutional 

under Miller and the Eighth Amendment. Before the Indiana 

Supreme Court, Wilson’s arguments were aimed at a 181-year 

sentence but were otherwise identical: (1) Miller extends to de 

facto life sentences; and (2) his 181-year sentence qualified as 

a de facto life sentence. We do not require that the state court 

have considered a federal claim in exactly the same format as 

it is presented in a federal habeas petition to find the claim 

was adjudicated on the merits. See Flint v. Carr, 10 F.4th 786, 

796–97 (7th Cir. 2021) (state-court determination on 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on failure to 

object on double jeopardy grounds was enough to find 

petitioner’s double jeopardy claim was adjudicated on the 

merits); Murdock v. Dorethy, 846 F.3d 203, 208–09 (7th Cir. 

2017) (state court determination affirming denial of 

suppression of pretrial statements was enough to find 

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a 

failure to file a motion to suppress pretrial statements was 

adjudicated on the merits); Sturgeon v. Chandler, 552 F.3d 604, 

611–12 (7th Cir. 2009) (state court considering argument of 

need for a competency hearing in resolving ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claim was enough to find 

petitioner’s due process claim of a right to a competency 

hearing was adjudicated on the merits).

The Indiana Supreme Court found that “Miller’s enhanced 

protections do not currently apply to Wilson’s 181-year term 
20 No. 23-2316 

of years sentence” and that Miller applies “only to life-without-parole sentences.” 157 N.E.3d at 1176. This reasoning 

would apply to Wilson’s reduced 100-year sentence just as it 

did to his 181-year sentence. We are confident that when the 

Indiana Supreme Court reduced Wilson’s sentence under 

Rule 7(B), it had not forgotten his Eighth Amendment arguments it had rejected earlier in the same opinion. Because the 

state court “could not have decided the same ... question any 

differently ... the merits were effectively reached.” Sturgeon, 

552 F.3d at 612. A state court adjudicated Wilson’s federal habeas petition claim on the merits, so we apply the section 

2254(d) standard of review.

C. Miller and Clearly Established Law

Both sides agreed correctly at oral argument that if typical 

section 2254(d) review applies to Wilson’s claim, it must 

ultimately fail on the merits. The Supreme Court of the United 

States has not established the view Wilson presses, 

specifically, that Miller applies to de facto life sentences. The 

Supreme Court held in Miller that “mandatory life without 

parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes 

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and 

unusual punishments.’” 567 U.S. at 465. According to the 

Miller Court, “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the 

penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences 

on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible 

crimes,” id. at 472, but “mandatory penalty schemes ... 

prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central 

considerations,” id. at 474. Critical for Wilson’s case, the 

Supreme Court did not bar courts, in their discretion, from 

imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile 

convicted of murder. Instead, the Court required sentencing 
No. 23-2316 21

courts “to take into account how children are different, and 

how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing 

them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480. Therefore, under 

Miller, there is no categorical bar against sentencing juveniles 

convicted of murder to life without parole.

Miller framed its holding in terms of mandatory sentences 

of life without parole. The Court did not specify how its 

reasoning might or might not apply (a) to sentences of life 

without parole imposed by exercise of judicial discretion or 

(b) to sentences imposing terms of years that may or will 

amount, in effect, to life sentences. Nor did the Court reach 

the question (c) of how courts might determine reliably when 

a long sentence of years should be deemed a de facto life 

sentence, if indeed its reasoning extends to such sentences.1

1 The parties dispute whether Wilson’s sentence amounted to a mandatory de facto life sentence or whether it was discretionary. Under Indiana law in effect when Wilson committed his crimes, the murder convictions came with a mandatory sentence within the range of 45 to 65 years, 

with an advisory sentence of 55 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2013). The 

criminal gang enhancement carries with it a mandatory, consecutive sentence equal to the longest sentence imposed for one of the underlying felonies. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-15 (2013). That means Wilson was required to be 

sentenced to at least 90 years in prison. That is clearly a mandatory, de 

facto life sentence—Wilson was sixteen at the time of his crimes, so he 

would be in prison until at least the age of 106.

The State has two counterarguments, however. First, under Indiana 

law that applied at the time, Wilson is eligible for day-for-day good-time 

credit. This credit offers the possibility of reducing his original mandatory 

sentence by half, so that he could be released within 45 years. While that 

sentence would still be severe, the mandatory sentence would not necessarily amount to a de facto life sentence for an offender who was 16 years 

old. Second, the State argues that the existence of Rule 7(B) itself means 

that Wilson’s sentence was not mandatory. As explained above, the rule 
22 No. 23-2316 

In McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016), this 

court concluded that the reasoning of Miller should extend to 

discretionary life sentences and to de facto life sentences. But 

see id. at 914–16 (Ripple, J., dissenting), citing Croft v. Williams, 

773 F.3d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 2014) (denying permission to file 

successive collateral attack because Miller does not apply to 

discretionary life sentences). Our decision in McKinley does 

not help Wilson satisfy the section 2254(d) standard of review. 

See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 505 (2012) (explaining 

“clearly established law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s decisions). Whether this court agrees with 

the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Miller does not 

apply to Wilson’s de facto life sentence does not matter. The 

state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established law set forth in precedents 

of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The district court’s denial of Wilson’s petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 

allows appellate courts, in their discretion, to reduce an otherwise lawful 

sentence, meaning no sentence is truly mandatory. Or at least, so the State 

argues. At oral argument, Wilson pointed out the Indiana Supreme Court 

has never upheld the use of Rule 7(B) to reduce a sentence below a statutory minimum. We need not resolve the merits of these arguments here. 

The Supreme Court of the United States has never extended Miller to a 

sentence to a term of years, so it does not matter to our decision whether 

Wilson’s sentence is deemed discretionary or mandatory.