2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-18-2002

Pinnix v. Fielding Inst

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 01-2961

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Recommended Citation

"Pinnix v. Fielding Inst" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 747.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 ____________ 

 No: 01-2961 

 _____________ 

 

 ROGER PINNIX, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 THE FIELDING INSTITUTE; 

 WILLIAM J. FRIEDMAN 

 

 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the District of New Jersey 

 (D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-03384) 

 District Judge: Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky 

 

 ____________________ 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 on October 16, 2002 

 

 Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ROTH 

 and ROSENN Circuit Judges 

 

 (Opinion filed: November 18, 2002) 

 

 O P I N I O N 

 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

 Roger Pinnix appeals a final order of judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey, granting The Fielding Institute’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

1332. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. We exercise plenary 

review over a grant of a motion for summary judgment. See Metro Transp. Co. v. North 

Star Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672, 678 (3d Cir. 1990). In our review, we view all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

 Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F. 3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). Summary judgment may be 

granted where there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 

 Pinnix contends that the District Court made two errors in granting summary 
judgment: 1) it failed to recognize the existence of a contract based on the previous 

course of conduct between the parties under the original enrollment agreement, and 2) it 

applied an improper standard to Pinnix’s breach of implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing claim. 

 We will not recount the facts relating to the prior negotiations and relationship of 

the parties because they are known to them. 

 Pinnix argues that the District Court was incorrect in analyzing his overall breach 

of contract claim. The District Court found that, based on negotiations between the 

parties during 1996 and 1997, The Fielding Institute presented a firm offer which Pinnix 

never accepted. Because there was no contract, Pinnix has no basis for his challenge of 

its interpretation. See Beukas v. Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 605 A 2d 

776, 783 and fn 4 (N.J. Law Div. 1991); ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communs., 155 F. 

3d 659, 666 (3d Cir. 1998), citing 1 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 

 23, at 51 (Walter H.E. Jaeger, ed., 3d ed. 1957). 

 Pinnix, however, suggests that the previous course of conduct between the parties 

relating to "the entirety of the parties’ long relationship" dating back to the original 

enrollment agreement in 1993 supports his interpretation of the contract terms. Pinnix 

argues that during previous negotiations, The Fielding Institute never required a lump 

sum payment or any formal performance on his behalf as it required in its 1997 offer. 

Pinnix goes on to contend that he had substantially performed over the years by paying 

nearly $100,000 in tuition payments. However, the District Court pointed out that the 

negotiations between the parties up until the 1997 negotiations had resulted in separate 

contracts, each terminated at the initiation of new negotiations. 

 We conclude that in 1997 there were valid negotiations between the parties and 

The Fielding Institute made an offer to Pinnix. Pinnix, however, never accepted the 1997 

offer and he never made a counteroffer. There can be no breach of a contract if none 

existed. 

 Pinnix argues nevertheless that The Fielding Institute breached an implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealings and that the District Court applied an improper 

standard to this claim. The District Court held that since no contract existed there can be 

no breach of an implied covenant of that contract. We conclude that this was the proper 

standard. See Beukas, 605 A 2d at 783 and fn 4. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

 

 By the Court, 

 /s/ Jane R. Roth 

 Circuit Judge