alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JAMES E. CARLEY, M.D., P.A., and American States Insurance Company, both individually, and John Walker f/u/b/o American States Insurance Company, Appellants, v. SEIBELS, BRUCE & COMPANY and John Garber, Appellees.

No. 85-1131.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 8, 1986.

*141Bernard R. Zimmerman and Rex A. Hurley of Zimmerman, Shuffield, Kiser & Sut-cliffe, P.A., Orlando, for appellants.

Robert D. Keough of Woolfolk, Estes & Keough, P.A., Orlando, for appellee.

COWART, Judge.

An employee in the course and scope of his employment was injured by a tortfeasor with liability insurance. While receiving worker’s compensation benefits the injured employee settled with the tortfeasor’s insurer.1 The worker’s compensation carrier sued the tortfeasor’s liability carrier alleging that the settlement was in violation of the compensation carrier’s statutory subro-gation rights in that the liability carrier “had actual or constructive knowledge” that the injured employee was receiving compensation benefits when the settlement was made. Upon motion of the liability carrier, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action because it failed to allege that the compensation carrier had “given *written*notice of [its] right of subrogation to the third-party tortfeasor” as required by section 440.-39(3)(b), Florida Statutes. We affirm the dismissal.

The worker’s compensation carrier argues that it was the intent of the legislature to provide the compensation carrier a statutory right of subrogation; that it was wrong for the liability carrier to settle with the injured employee knowing the compensation carrier had subrogation rights in and to the settlement proceeds, and that, to effectuate the intent of the legislature and to remedy that wrong, this court should “interpret” or “construe” the word “written” out of the statute or read it to mean that “actual or constructive” notice or knowledge is sufficient. We decline this invitation to “do justice” in deference to our judicial duty to follow the statute as the legislature has clearly written it. The compensation carrier argues that the statute works an injustice by its formalistic requirement of “written notice.” That argument should be made to the legislature.

AFFIRMED.

COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.

1

. This factual sequence distinguishes *Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Russell,*137 So.2d 219 (Fla.1962), *A.S.J. Drugs, Inc. v. Berkowitz,*459 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and *Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,*281 So.2d 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
Exhibit 23.01

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We have issued our report dated June 3, 2011, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule included in the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of New Frontier Media, Inc. for the year ended March 31, 2011. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the
Registration Statements of New Frontier Media, Inc. on Forms S-8 (File No. 333-92081, effective December 3, 1999; File
No. 333-57554, effective March 23, 2001; File No. 333-102694, effective January 24, 2003; File No. 333-147314, effective
November 13, 2007; and File No. 333-170103, effective October 22, 2010).

/s/
GRANT THORNTON LLP
Denver, Colorado
June 3, 2011

---



QuickLinks
#### James MARTIN and Patricia Martin, his wife, Appellants, v. Joseph ROBERTSON and Margaret Robertson, his wife, Appellees.

No. 87-2238.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Nov. 23, 1988.

*944James M. Campbell of The Garland Fun, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia, for appellants.

Robert M. Morris, Sanford, for appellees.

EVANS, V.W., Jr., Associate Judge.

The trial court entered a summary final judgment on November 22, 1985. In the summary final judgment the parties were referred to as plaintiffs/counter-defendants and defendants/eounter-plaintiffs. The judgment found defendants/counter-plaintiffs, appellees here, to be the owners of certain horses at issue in the case. In the judgment the court mistakenly designated them as plaintiffs/counter-defendants, but this is of no significance inasmuch as in a subsequent proceeding enforcing the return of the horses it is clear that defendants/counter-plaintiffs, appellees here, were, indeed, found to.be the owners of the horses. The summary final judgment further found in favor of the plaintiffs/counter-defendants, appellants here, in both the complaint and counterclaim as to liability and that “ * * * defendants/counter-plaintiffs shall take nothing as to liability.” As indicated above, the defendants/counter-plaintiffs below are the appellees here. The judgment reserved jurisdiction only for the purpose of taxing costs and assessment of attorneys’ fees. This summary final judgment was entered by Circuit Judge Harold Vann.

On June 3, 1987, one year and seven months later, the appellees filed a motion to amend final judgment complaining of errors in the entry of the summary final judgment and sought a further evidentiary hearing on the issue of money damages. Circuit Judge C. Vernon Mize, as successor judge, held an evidentiary hearing, over objection of appellants, and entered a supplemental final judgment on September 21, 1987, in favor of the appellees and against appellants in the amount of $9,355.00.

The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the supplemental final judgment with award of money damages. The remedy of appellees, defendant/counter-plaintiffs below, was by way of appeal to this court from the summary final judgment entered by Judge Vann and not by way of motion to a successor trial judge.

Reversed and remanded for entry of appropriate orders consistent with this opinion.

ORFINGER and DANIEL, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Cord Blood America, Inc. (the Company) for the quarter ended June 30, 2008, for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Matthew L. Schissler, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company, as of, and for the periods presented in the Report.



|                       |              |                                                                                  
|---------------------- | ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                       |              |                                                                                  
|Date:  August 19, 2008 | By:          | /s/ Matthew L. Schissler                                                         
|                       | Name: Title: | Matthew L. Schissler
Principal Executive Officer
and Principal Accounting Officer
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas D. BAREFOOT.

No. 87-KH-1645.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 22, 1987.

In re Barefoot, Thomas D.; applying for writ of mandamus and remedial writ; Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “G”, No. 123102; City of St. Mary, No. C87-0925.

Denied. Moot. The district court acted on relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 8, 1987.
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATIONBY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

I, Steven Tanner, certify that:

1.             I havereviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Real Mex Restaurants, Inc.;

2.             Based onmy knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.             Based onmy knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

c)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

b) Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

Date: August 04,2006
|                         |
|-------------------------|
| /s/ Steven  Tanner      |   |
| Steven Tanner           |
|                    |
| Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19I0175. THE COLUMBUS CLINIC, P.C. v. REGINALD A. WILLIAMS.

Reginald A. Williams sued the Columbus Clinic, P. C. (“the Clinic”) for breach

of contract, claiming he was fired without cause. The parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment, and the trial court granted the Clinic’s motion and denied

Williams’ motion. Williams appealed, and we reversed. See Williams v. Columbus

Clinic, 332 Ga. App. 714 (773 SE2d 457) (2015). The trial court then conducted a

subsequent hearing, after which it entered an order granting Williams’ motion for

partialsummary judgment and denying the Clinic’s motion for summary judgment. The

Clinic seeks interlocutory review of this ruling.

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on

any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” Here, the Clinic

seeks to challenge that portion of the trial court’s order granting Williams’ motion for

partial summary judgment. “This Court will grant a timely application for interlocutory

review if the order complained of is subject to direct appeal and the applicants have

not otherwise filed a notice of appeal.” Spivey v. Hembree, 268 Ga. App. 485, 486 n.

1 (602 SE2d 246) (2004).

Accordingly, this interlocutory application is hereby GRANTED. The Clinic

shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal in the trial

court. If the Clinic has already filed a notice of appeal from the order at issue here,

February 25, 2019
it need not file a second notice. The clerk of the trial court is DIRECTED to include

a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

02/25/2019
#### In the Interest of C.B., S.B., and J.B., Jr., each a child, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-2037.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 16, 1988.

*1034Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Public Defender, for appellants.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Eric J. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order finding the children dependent pursuant to § 39.409, Florida Statutes (1985). Appellants have raised three points on appeal, the first of which challenges the trial court’s failure to include specific findings of fact in the disposition order.

Appellee has filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction so the trial court may enter an amended disposition order which briefly states the facts on which the dependency finding was made as required by § 39.409(3). Appellant objects to the relinquishment of jurisdiction because two additional points have been raised on appeal. Appellant contends that relinquishment of jurisdiction will merely delay disposition of those two additional points.

Because the motion to relinquish jurisdiction acknowledges that the appealed order is facially deficient, we find the appropriate disposition is to vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. *See Rivers v. State,*513 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In the event the additional errors raised by appellant are not cured in the proceedings on remand, appellant may seek review after entry of an appealable order under Chapter 39.

Accordingly, the appealed order is vacated and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.

SMITH, C.J., and JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
# United States Court of Appeals

f or the Fifth Circuit

No. 21

- 20571 Summary Calendar

United States of America,

Plaintiff

— Appellee ,

versus

Jonathan Keith Senteno,

Defendant

— Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:13

- CR

- 528

- 1

Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges

. Per Curiam : *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jonathan Keith
Senteno has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Senteno has not filed a response. We have reviewed

* Pursuant to 5th Cir cuit R ule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir cuit R ule 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 8, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 21-20571 Document: 00516423762 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/08/2022No. 21

- 20571

2 counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appell ate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to
withdraw is GRANTED , counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED

. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2

. Case: 21-20571 Document: 00516423762 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/08/2022
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Ella Ruth GARRETT.

No. 86-KK-2445.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 23, 1987.

In re Garrett, Ella Ruth; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of DeSoto, 11th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 53985; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 18215-KW.

Granted. The rulings of the lower courts are set aside. Since relator was admitted to post conviction bail, the execution of her sentence was suspended, La.C. Cr.P. art. 913 B. The trial court had jurisdiction to reduce a legal sentence, La.C. Cr.P. art. 916(3). Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court to consider and decide relator’s motion to reduce her sentence.
#### Charles A. RIVERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. BS-152.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 7, 1987.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Sharon Bradley, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Bradford Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges his sentence because it was entered without a guidelines score sheet and because the aggregate term of incarceration and probation exceeded the statutory maximum. After appellant’s initial brief was filed, appellee filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction so that the trial court could correct the errors raised in appellant’s brief. Thereafter, appellee was ordered to show cause why the motion to relinquish jurisdiction should not be construed as a confession of error, to which this court received no response. Although the procedure followed by this court in the case of obvious guidelines sentencing errors may vary from case to case, it is likely that the court will find it advisable to simply reverse and remand to the trial court for resentencing, thus eliminating the procedure of issuing a show cause order as was done here. *See Hope v. State,*513 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

Accordingly, appellant’s sentence is vacated and this cause is remanded for resen-tencing.

SMITH, C.J., and SHIVERS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Victor VARGAS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 87-KH-2658.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 8, 1988.

Writ Granted March 18, 1988.

In re Vargas, Victor; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, prohibition, mandamus and remedial writ; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 172813.

Denied. A motion to expunge must be filed in the parish where the arrests occurred. La.RS 44:9.
#### Cynthia Ledet RATCLIFF, Individually and as Tutrix of Her Minor Child’s Estate John Quitman Ratcliff, Jr. v. Earl M.J. BOYDELL, Jr. and Deonne DuBarry d/b/a DuBarry & Boydell, a Professional Law Corporation.

No. 87-CC-1045.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 12, 1987.

In re Ratcliff, Cynthia Ledet; Barrios, Dawn M.; Wool, Brandon M.; applying for writs of prohibition, certiorari *&*mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “A”, Nos. 86-11313, 86-15175 *68and 86-19056; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CW-7688.

Denied.

MARCUS, WATSON and COLE, JJ., would grant the writ.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-31184 

Conference Calendar

__________________

JOSE F. PUPO,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALLEN CARTER; DORA RABALAIS; BURL

CAIN, Acting Warden, Louisiana State

Penitentiary; RICHARD L. STALDER, 

Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CV-454

- - - - - - - - - -

April 18, 1996

Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal as

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) of appellant's civil

rights complaint. He contends that the district court erred by

dismissing his complaint as frivolous and by doing so when the

proceedings had been stayed previously by the magistrate judge. 

We have reviewed the record and the district court's order and 

find no reversible error. See Pupo v. Carter, et al., No. 95-CV454 (M.D. La. Oct. 18, 1995); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
No. 95-31184

-2-

AFFIRMED.
IIA

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 15

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to prohibit

retroactive increases in taxes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 18, 1999

Mr. COVERDELL introduced the following joint resolution; which was read

twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States to prohibit retroactive increases in taxes.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several

8 States within seven years after the date of its submission

9 by the Congress:
2

•SJ 15 IS

1 ‘‘ARTICLE—

2 ‘‘SECTION 1. No new Federal tax, and no increase

3 in a Federal tax, shall take effect before the date of enact4 ment of the new tax or increase.

5 ‘‘SECTION 2. This article takes effect on the date of

6 its ratification.’’.

Æ
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 62 (Friday, March 30, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 19179]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7598]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

 Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Docket T-1-2012]


Foreign-Trade Zone 267, Temporary/Interim Manufacturing 
Authority, CNH America, LLC, Agricultural and Construction Equipment; 
Notice of Approval

    On January 12, 2012, the Executive Secretary of the Foreign-Trade 
Zones (FTZ) Board filed an application submitted by the Fargo Municipal 
Airport Authority, grantee of FTZ 267, requesting to expand 
manufacturing under temporary/interim manufacturing (T/IM) authority to 
include subassemblies and parts of tractors, combines, and wheel 
loaders, on behalf of CNH America LLC, within FTZ 267--Site 2, in 
Fargo, North Dakota.
    The application was processed in accordance with T/IM procedures, 
as authorized by FTZ Board Orders 1347 (69 FR 52857, 8/30/04) and 1480 
(71 FR 55422, 9/22/06), including notice in the Federal Register 
inviting public comment (77 FR 2699, 1/19/2012). The FTZ staff examiner 
reviewed the application and determined that it meets the criteria for 
approval under T/IM procedures. Pursuant to the authority delegated to 
the FTZ Board Executive Secretary in the above-referenced Board Orders, 
the application is approved, effective this date, until March 22, 2012, 
subject to the FTZ Act and the Board's regulations, including Section 
400.28.

    Dated: March 23, 2012.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-7598 Filed 3-29-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-M