UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-4375

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TASKEEN LAWRENCE TYLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:19-cr-00071-TDS-1)

Submitted: June 22, 2021 Decided: August 23, 2021

Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, 

Greensboro, North Carolina for Appellant. Matthew G.T. Martin, United States Attorney, 

Jacob D. Pryor, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Following a bench trial, the district court convicted Taskeen Lawrence Tyler of

escape, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (Count 1); bank robbery, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Count 2); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (Count 3). The court sentenced Tyler to 150 months’ 

imprisonment, at the top of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Tyler 

argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting his convictions on Counts 2 and 3 and 

that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” United States 

v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the convictions when viewed 

in the light most favorable to the Government. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that 

a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion 

of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Rodriguez-Soriano, 

931 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). In making this determination, we may not 

resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate witness credibility. Savage, 885 F.3d at 219. 

“A defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy burden, as appellate 

reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s 

failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) for bank robbery, the Government 

must prove that “(1) the defendant took, or attempted to take, money belonging to, or in 

the custody, care, or possession of, a bank, credit union, or saving and loan association; (2) 
3

the money was taken by force and violence, or by intimidation; [and] (3) the deposits of 

the institution were federally insured.” United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 152 (4th 

Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Tyler only challenges the second element.

The intimidation element is satisfied if “an ordinary person in the teller’s position 

reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm from the defendant’s acts,” whether or not 

the defendant actually intended the intimidation. United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 

363-64 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this test, the subjective 

courageousness or timidity of the victim is irrelevant.” United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 

363, 367 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[P]roof of express threats of 

bodily harm, threatening body motions, or the physical possibility of a concealed weapon” 

are not required to establish the intimidation element. Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Notably, the intimidation element “generally may be established based on 

nothing more than a defendant’s written or verbal demands to a teller.” Id.

While Tyler argues that his note to the teller merely asked for money, as opposed to 

demanding it, this an immaterial distinction. Not only did Tyler hand the teller a note, he 

also warned her not to activate an alarm because he would be watching her. Moreover, 

when the teller attempted to persuade Tyler not to proceed with the robbery, he became 

antsy and irate, stating, “I need it now. You need to give it to me now.” Additionally, 

Tyler interrupted the teller when she attempted to count out the money to him, demanding 

that she “[j]ust give it to” him. Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of 

intimidation.
4

As for Count 3, to establish a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the Government is 

required to show: “(i) that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense; 

(ii) that he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (iii) that the firearm 

traveled in interstate commerce at some point.”1

 United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 

183 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Tyler only challenges the 

possession element of this offense.

A person has constructive possession over a firearm if he “intentionally exercised 

dominion and control over the firearm, or had the power and the intention to exercise 

dominion and control over the firearm.” United States v. Al Sabahi, 719 F.3d 305, 311 (4th 

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Constructive possession may be proven by 

either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. A jury may infer that a defendant 

constructively possessed firearms that were found within his residence if the residence is 

“not so large, and the weapons were not so well hidden, as to prohibit a reasonable fact 

finder from concluding that [the defendant] was aware of their presence.” United States v. 

Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2003).

Here, Tyler was the only occupant of the motel room when law enforcement arrived. 

He immediately alerted the officers to the presence of the firearm in the bathroom. He 

stated that he then passed the firearm to law enforcement, contradicting his current 

argument that he lacked the ability to control the firearm. Moreover, Tyler described the 

1 The Government must also show that the defendant “knew he had [a prohibited] 

status when he possessed” the firearm. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 

(2019).
5

firearm in detail to law enforcement in his statement. Thus, there was sufficient evidence 

to establish Tyler’s possession of the firearm. We therefore affirm his convictions.

Finally, Tyler contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review 

a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under the Gall standard, a sentence is reviewed for both 

procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. If a sentence is free of “significant 

procedural error,”2 then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account 

the totality of the circumstances.” Id. We apply “a presumption of reasonableness to a 

sentence within or below a properly calculated guidelines range.” United States v. Vinson, 

852 F.3d 333, 357 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “presumption 

can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 357-58 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Tyler cannot overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded his withinGuidelines sentence. The district court considered counsel’s arguments, credited some of 

the points that he made, but found that the § 3553(a) factors called for a sentence at the 

high end of the Guidelines range. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 

conclusion.

2 Although Tyler does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, 

we must “review the sentence for procedural reasonableness before addressing whether it 

is substantively reasonable,” even if the parties do not address it in their opening briefs. 

United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). We have reviewed the 

record and found no procedural error in this case.
6

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED