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*Ret ired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. : : CHRISTOPHER MORALES

- FELICIANO , : : Appellant : No. 1445 M DA 201 9 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 16, 2019 i n the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 0 6

- CR

- 000 4777

- 201 8 , CP

- 0 6

- CR

- 000 5097

- 201 7 , &

C P

- 0 6

- CR

- 0005962

- 20 17 BEFORE: KUNSE LMAN, J., MCL AUGHLIN, J. AND STRASSB URGER, J. * MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN , J.: FILED MAY 04, 2021 Christopher Morales

- Feliciano a ppeals from his May 16, 2019 judgment s of sentence for eight crimes across three dockets. Afte r r evi ew, we affirm his May 16, 2019 judgments of sentence , den y his application fo r remand for cl arific ation o f amendments to his judgments of sentence , v acate the amended sentencing orders entered on September 26, 2019 , and

reman d for imposition of recidivi sm risk r e d uc tion incentive (RRRI) minimum
sentence s c onsist ent with this m emorandum

. Morales

- Feliciano was involved with a drug

- dealing operation that police targeted in an investigation known as Operat ion Shattered. After being charged with a variety of cri mes re lated to the investigation , Morales

Feliciano e n tered into an open plea agreement with th e Commonwealth wherein Morales

- Feliciano agreed to admit to certain facts and plead guiltyJ

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to some of t he charged crimes in exchange for the Commonwealth ’ s withdrawal of the remain in g c harges

. On May 16, 2019, Mora les

- Feliciano pleaded gu ilty to eight crimes at three dockets

. He was sentenced that same day. The trial c ourt opted to

run the sentences at each count consecutively to t he others except for one , which resulted in a n aggregate se nte nce of 7 1⁄2 to 25 yea rs of i mprisonment for the eight crimes

. The trial court deemed him eligible for RRR I at each
count
. The facts to which Morales

- Feliciano plead ed guilty and the individual
sentences for each count follow

. Re lative to d ocket number CP

- 06

- CR

- 00 059 62

- 2017 (del ivery docket),

o n September 14 and 24 , 2017, undercover police officer s req u es ted to purchase drugs from Morales

- Feliciano ’ s sister , Carmen Morales

- Feliciano

. On both occasi ons, Morales

- Feliciano delivered the heroin to th e officer s . Morales

- Feliciano wa s sentenced to one to four years of imprison ment , respectively, for two counts of d elivery of heroin and one count o f c onspi racy to deliver heroin

. Unlik e Morales

- Feliciano ’ s other sentences, which were run consecutively, the trial court opted to impose o ne delivery count an d t he conspiracy count concurrently to eac h other. The trial court gave him a
RRRI sentence of nine months at e ach count
. Regarding docket n umber CP

- 06

- CR

- 0004777

- 2018 (abu se docket) ,
o n October 6 , 20 17, Morales

- Feliciano was present a t a first

- floor apartment

on Fr a nklin Street in Reading , P ennsylvania, for the purpose of s elling drugs

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While he was at the apartment , b etween 1:30 and 5 a.m. , Morales

- Feliciano wrapped the dead bod y of Madison Walb 1 in a rug

. H e then did the following with Walb ’ s carpet
- wrapped body: shoved it o ut of the back window of the
ap artment ; carried it to a car with the assistance of Christi an Ca rmona Llanos ; dropped it multiple times w hile walk ing to the car to avoid detection of individuals in the area; ro de in the car driv en by his sister along w ith the body and Carmona

- L lanos ; and abandoned the body i n a secluded wo oded

area with the intent to imp air investigation into Walb ’ s death and in a

manner that would outrage family sensibilities. Morales

- Feliciano w as sentenced t o on e to two years of i mp risonment re spectively for abuse of a
corp s e, tamperin g with evidence, and conspiracy to commit abuse of a
corp se . The trial court gave him a RR RI sentence of nine m onths at each
count. Fi nall y, relative to docket nu mber CP

- 06

- CR

- 0005097

- 2017 (possession docket) , on O ctober 11, 2017, Morales

- Feliciano was presen t at the Franklin Street apar tment referenced supra when police execut ed a search warrant. At that time, Morales

- Feliciano possessed drugs packaged for street sale or in bulk that he intended to sell

. Specifically, he posse ssed .82 grams of fent anyl and 8.72 grams of cocaine

. Morales

- Feliciano was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 14 months to 5 years for possession

1 The Commonwealth alleged Morales

- Feliciano ’ s sister shot Walb in the head while Walb was at the Franklin Street apartment purchasing drugs.J

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with in tent to deliver ( PWID ) f enta nyl with a RRRI sentence of 10 mont hs and 15 days. He also was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 16 months to 5 years for PWID cocaine with a RRRI sentence of one y ea r . Morales

- Feliciano filed a po st
- sentence motion, which the trial court den ied. Morale s - Feliciano then timely filed n otice s o f appeal

. 2 Both the trial
court and Morales

- Feliciano complie d wi th Pa.R.A .P. 1925. Morales

- Feliciano presents two issues for our consideration

. The first is whether th e trial court abused its discretion by imposin g a n exc essive sentence upon Morales

- Feliciano

. Morales

- Feliciano ’ s Brief at 4. T he secon d is whether we should remand this cas e to the trial court for clar ification of Morales

- Feliciano ’ s RRRI sentences. I d. Morales

- Feliciano ’ s first issue presents a ch allenge to the discretionary aspects of his s entence. An appellant is not ent itled to the review of challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sen tence as of rig ht. Rather, an appellant challenging the discretion ary aspects of his sentence

2 On November 2 6 , 2019 , this Court issued an order direct ing M orale s Feliciano to s how cause why his appeal shou ld not be quashed pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walke r , 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018 ) ( holding that notices of appe al filed after June 1, 2018 must be quashed if the Morales

- Feliciano fails to file separ ate no tice s of a ppeal from a si n gle order resolving issues arisi ng on more than one lower court docket )

. Morales

- Feliciano ’ s res ponse contended we should not quash his appeal because h e filed a sepa rate notice of appeal with all three docket nu m bers at ea c h of t he th ree d oc kets, but the clerk of courts apparently transmitted o nly o ne notice of appeal to this Court

. U pon receipt of this response, t his Court di scharged the rule to show cause and referr ed the issue to this panel. Because the record confirms th at Mor ales

- Felic iano filed thre e separate notices of appeal in compliance with W alker and Pa.R.A .P. 34 1, we need not quash Morales

- Feliciano ’s a ppeal.J

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must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whet her the appellant has invoked our juri sdiction by considering the following four factors: (1) whet her appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 an d 903; (2) whether the issue was properly pr eserved at sentencing or in a motion to r econsider and modify sentence, se e Pa. R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant ’ s bri ef has a fatal defec t, P a.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question t hat the sentence appealed from is not approp riate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C. S. A § 97 81(b). Commonwealth v. Samue l , 102 A.3d 1001, 1006

- 07 (Pa. Super. 2014)

. Morales

- Feliciano timel y fi led a notice of appeal, preserv ed the issue in

a post
- sentence motion and a rguments at his sentencing he aring , and included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) stat ement in his br i ef. Therefore, we now consider wh ether Morales

- Feliciano has raised a substantial ques tion for o ur

r eview. The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

eva luated on a case

- by

- case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul , 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question e xists only when the appellant advances a colorable argu ment that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a speci fic provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamen tal norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Com monwealth v. Griffin , 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. S uper. 201 3) (citation and quotation marks omitted).J

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In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Morales

- Feliciano re quests that this Court review his sentence s be cause they are excessive and the trial c ourt did not consider mi tigat ing fact or s “ in any way , ” including his acceptance of responsibility for h is actions, his age, his working under the direct ion of others in t he organization, his fear of t hose in dividuals, and the small amount of drugs he posse ssed with intent to deli ver. Morales

- Feliciano ’ s Brief at 9. This claim presents a sub stan tial question. Commonwealth v.
Raven , 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) ( “ [ T] his Co urt has held that an excessive sentence claim

- in conjunction with an assertion that t he court failed to consi der m itigating factors

- raises a substantial question

. ” ). Accordingly, we will proceed to review this challenge 3 to his sentence , mindf ul of the following

.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discre tion of the sentencing jud ge, and a sentence will not b e disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of d iscr etion. In this context, an a buse of discretion is not shown merely by an err or in jud gment.

3 In his argument section, Morales

- Feliciano prese nts additional questions he claims constitute substanti al que stion s for our review tha t he did not present in his Rule 2119(f) statement. Mor ales

- Feliciano ’s Brief at 12. However, our case law is clear that “[w ] e cannot look beyond the state ment of questions presented and th e prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to de termi ne wh ether a substan t ial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Barnes , 167 A.3d 110, 123 (Pa. Super

. 2017) ( en banc ) (some brackets altered). As such, we do not consider his claims that (1) the sentencing court placed insufficient reasons on the r ecord for d eviat ing from the se n tencing guidelines and sentencing him to the statutory maximum on the charge s at the abuse docket , see Morales

- Feliciano ’s Bri ef at 13, 18 ; (2) the imposition of cons ecutive sentences instead of concurrent was harsh and exce ssive , id. at 13 , 19 ; and (3) h i s sentence is too harsh in comparison to other co

conspirators w ho engaged in simila r conduct. Id . at 13

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Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the trial court ignored or misap plied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of pa rtia lity, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable de cisi on. * * * When imposing [a] sentence, a court is require d t o consider the particular circumstances of the of fense and the character of the defendant. In considering the se f actors, the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, per sonal charac teristics and potential for rehabilitation. Com monwealth v. DiClaudio , 21 0 A.3d 1070, 1074

- 75 (P a. Sup er. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Antidormi , 84 A.3d 7 36, 7 60

- 61 (Pa. Super. 2014)) ; see also 42 Pa.C.S. A. § 9781(d )

. Sentencing in Penn sy l vania is individualized, and requires the trial court to fash ion a sentence “that is co nsistent with the prote ction of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, a nd the rehabilitat iv e needs of the defendant[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. A. § 9721(b). The trial court must also consider the sentencing guidelin es ado pted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. Id. Common wealth v. Baker , 72 A.3d 652, 663

- 64 (Pa. Super. 2013)

. Morales

- Feliciano ’ s argument that the tr ial court failed to consider mitigating factors i s intermingled with o ther arguments we are unable to

co nsider , as discussed supra . Fr om what we can d iscern of the arg ument relat ed to the substantial question he p resents for our revi ew , his arg ument is largely unsupported

. He asserts his sentence is exce ssive because he took resp onsibility for his acti ons, h e is 22 years old, he sold drugs to support his drug ad diction, he worked at a low level under the direction ofJ

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others w ithin th e drug

- deali ng organization, he possessed small amounts of drugs (10 gr am s of cocaine and less than one gram of fentanyl ), he wa s not involved in violence and did not kill Walb, and h e is and was in fear of others in the drug

- dealing or ganization. Morales

- F eliciano ’ s Brief at 14

- 15

. H i s counsel made similar arguments at the sentenc ing hearing . N.T., 6/4 /2019 , at 29

- 32. In resp onse, the trial court noted that it “ appreciate [ d ] all of the infor mation pr ovided ” by defense counsel. Id. at 32. Nevertheless,
t he trial court found it significan t that Morales

- Feliciano chose to become
par t of the drug

- dealing operation to suppo rt his drug habit

. It emphasized that t he operation sold drugs out of two locations “like ca ndy stores for drugs ” and killed Walb , which Mo rales

- Feliciano helped cove r up so that the organiz ation could continue to sell dru gs out of the apartment on Fran klin Street

. Id. at 32

- 34. The trial court noted on the record a t sentencin g that it read and consider ed a presentence report. N.T., 6/4/ 20 19, at 11

. “ W hen

a trial court has reviewed a presentence investigation report, we presume that the court properly considered an d wei ghed a ll relevant fact ors in fashioning the defendant’ s sentence. ” Baker , 72 A.3d at 6 6 4 ; see also Trial C ourt Opinion s , 1 /3/2020 , at 4

- 7 (emp hasizing it considered the present ence investiga tion report, the factors set forth at subsection 9721(b) , and th e sent encing gui delines )

. Morales

- Feliciano ’ s claim that the trial court did not consid er mitiga ting fact or s in any way is b elied by the record. The trial court was a ware of, andJ

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consid ered , th e fact s Morales

- Feliciano highlight s in his argument. I t simp ly dete rmined , in its discreti on, that such fact s did not compel a less significant
sentence co ns idering Morales

- Feliciano ’ s participati on in the activities of the drug

- de aling operation, his drug dealing on mul tiple occasions over time, his

cover - up of Walb ’ s m ur der , an d his treatment of her dead body

. Even if we found the facts Morales

- Feliciano emphasizes to be pe rsuasive , “ [w] e cannot

re - weigh the sentencing factors and impose o ur judgment in the place of the trial court

. ” Commonwealth v. Ma cias , 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. S uper. 2009). Accordingly, his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence merits no relief

. W e turn now to Mo rales

- Feliciano ’ s second issue, which he als o raised in a n application to remand he filed with this Court on June 24, 2020. By way of ba ckgroun d, on September 26, 2019 , after the in stant appeal was filed , the trial court entered amende d s e ntencing orders , i ncreas ing the RRRI
sentence o n five co unts. 4 The trial court did so sua sponte and without

4 Specifically , the amended orders provided as follows.

 C ount 1 of the PWID docket ( PWID fe nta nyl) : minimum sente nce of 14 m onths ; amended RRRI s entence of 14 months.

 Count 2 of th e PWID docket ( PWID cocaine): minimum sentence o f 1 6 months; amended RRRI sentence of 14 months.

 Count s 1, 4, and 7 of delivery do c ke t (delivery of heroin and conspira cy to deliver heroin ) : minim um se ntenc es of one year ; amended RRRI sentences of 11 months and 20 days.J

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explanation. 5 Morales

- Feliciano asserts t hat the trial court lacked jurisdiction
t o amend the orders while the orders were on appeal to this Cour t. Morales

Feliciano ’ s Bri e f at 21

- 26

. He argues that while the trial court co uld have corrected an obvious cle rical er ror, the change s to the orders appear to be substantive. Id. He request s a remand for the trial court to explain its amend ment to the o rders. Id.

“ Trial c ourts hav e the power to alter or modify a criminal sentence within thirty day s after entry, if no appeal is taken. Generally, once the thirty

- day period is over, the tr ial cour t loses the power to alter its orders. ” Commonwealth v. Mel vin , 103 A.3d 1, 57 ( Pa. Super . 2014) (citing 42 Pa.C.S

. A. § 5505) ( “ Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order with in 30 da ys after its entry, notwithstanding th e prior termi nation o f any term of court, if no app eal from such order has been taken or allowed. ” ). Additionally , “ whe n an appeal is taken, the trial court has no jurisdiction to modify its sentence. ” Me lvin , 103 A.3d at 57 (citing Pa. R.A.P. 1701(a)

5 Th e parties contend t he revised order s w ere pr ompted by the trial court ’ s receipt of a letter from the Department of Corrections , whi ch pointed out an e rror in the tri al co urt ’ s c alcu latio n of the RRRI s e nten ces. Althoug h the Commonwealth included the letter a s an exhibit with its brief, the letter wa s not made part of the cer tified record and we may n ot consider it o n appeal. Commonwealth v. Preston , 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Su per. 2 006) ( en b anc ) (explainin g that this Court may consider only the materials in the ce r tified record when resolving an issue )

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( “ Ex cept as other wise p re scribed by these rule s , after a n appeal is taken

... the trial court

... may no longer proceed further in the matter. ”) )

. However, there are exceptions to these rules. One exception is a tria l
court ’ s “inherent power ” to correct “pat ent and obvious erro rs , ” including illegal sen t ence s if the illegality is obvious. Commonwealth v. Hoover , 231 A.3d 785, 79 2 (Pa. 2020) (O pinion A nnouncing J udgment of the Court ) (quoting Comm onwealth v. Hol mes , 9 33 A.2d 57, 67 (Pa. 2007 )) ; see also Commonwea lth v. Hansl ey , 47 A .3d 1180, 1189 (Pa. 201 2 ) ( “ Thus, under limited circumstance s, even where the court would normally be divested of jurisd iction, a court may have the power to correct patent and obvious mista kes. ”). This power can be exercised in limited circumstan ces

ev en after a notice of appea l has been filed to correct “ a patent defect or mis take in the record , ” such as a miscalculatio n of time credit

. Commonwealth v. Klein , 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa. 2001)

. 6
Our Su preme Court has emphasized th at “ i t is the obv i ousness o f the illegality, rather t han the i llegality itself, that triggers the court ’ s inherent
power. N ot all illegal sentences will be amen able to correction as patent

er rors. Mo reover, the inherent power to correct er rors does not extend to

6 Rule 1701 permits a trial court to “correct formal errors in papers relating to the matter ” after an appe al has been fil ed. Pa.R. A.P. 1701( b) (1). Our Sup r e me Court declined to decide whether this would enc ompass a mi scalculation in time credi t post
- appeal because it determined it was already within the tri al court ’ s inher ent powers to correct such a pat ent er ror. Klein , 781 A.2d a t 113 5 n.2

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reconsid e ration of a court ’ s exercise of sent e ncing dis cretion

. ” Hol mes , 933 A.2d at 66

- 67.
In the instant case, a comparison between the RRRI statute and the trial court ’ s or iginal sen tencing order s reveals a patent and obvious erro r in the trial co urt ’ s calcula t ion of th e RRRI minimum sentences

. F or any off ender eligible for RRRI, sub s ection 4505 (c) ( 2 ) requires the trial court to enter a sentencing order that inc ludes a RR RI minim u m sentence
. 61 Pa.C.S. A. § 4505 (c) (2)

. The statute does not afford discreti on i n th e im po sition of the RRRI sentence for el ig ible o ffenders or the calculation of the RRRI minimum sentence. See i d. At the time of Morales

Feliciano ’s sentencing, su bsection 450 5( c )( 2 ) required the trial court to use th e follo w ing calculation

. 7 The [RRR I] mi ni mum shall be equal to three

- f ourths o f the minimum sentence imposed when the m inimu m sentence is three years or less. The [RRRI] minimum shall be equal to five

sixths of the minimum sentence if th e minimum sentence is grea t er than three years. For p urpos es of these calculations, parti al days shall be round ed to the nearest whole da y . 6 1 Pa.C.S. A. § 4505( c )( 2 )

. In other words, for shorter sentences ( i.e. , a minimum sentence of three years or less ) , th e trial c ourt must us e a multiplier of three

- fou rths to calculate the RRRI s entence. For l onger

7 S ection 450 5 w as amended effective December 18, 2019 , and now pr ovides t hat , once the t r ial court finds the defen dant RRRI eligible, “ [t]he court shall direct the department [of corrections] to calculate the le ngth of the sentence. 61 Pa.C.S .A. § 4 5 05 (c) (2) . This mem orandum dis cusses the version in effect until Decemb er 17, 2019.J

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sentences ( i.e. , mor e than t hree years ), the multiplier is set at five

- s ixths of the minimum sentence
. S u bsection 4505( c )(2) also addresses how to calculate the RRRI
min imum sent e nce wh en multiple consecut ive sentences are imposed: “ [i] n determining the [RRRI] minimum sente nce, th e aggregation provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. A. § 9757 (relating to con secutiv e sentences of tota l confinement for multiple offenses) and 9762(f) (rela ting to s e ntenc i ng proce eding; place of confinement) shall apply

. ” Id. Both secti ons of the Sentencing C o d e refer enced in subsection 4505( c )(2) direct the court to consider multiple consecutive sentences in the aggregate. 8 Accordingly, when sentences are i mposed c onsecut ively, subsection
4 505( c )(2) directs the court to calculate the RR RI minimum based on the aggregat e of the minimum sentences
. This means that even if the individual minimum sentences are less than three years, the five

- sixths

8 Section 9757 provides in relevant part that “[w] henev er the court determines that a s entence should be served consecutivel y to one being the n imposed by the court, or t o one previously im po sed, the court shall indicate the minim um sentence to be served for the total of all offe nses with respect to which sent ence is imposed. ” 4 2 Pa.C.S. A. § 9 757

. In other words, the trial court must specify a min i mum aggregat e sent ence , which is c omprised o f each of the indi vidual minimum sentences added together

. Id. Subsection 9762(f) states that for the purpose of determi ning whether a sentence is to be served in a county or state correcti on institute

— a d e termination tha t depe nds o n the length of the s entence

— “ the entire continuous term of incarceration to whic h a person is subject ” is to be used. 42 Pa.C.S. A. § 9762(f)

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multiplier must be us e d to ca l culate the RRRI mi nimum if the total continu ous period of incarcer ation is longer than three years . Here , Morales

- Feliciano was sentenced to consec utive terms of incarceration. Morales

- Feliciano ’ s aggregate minimum sentence is seven and one - half y ears , wh ich obviously exc eeds three y ears . To comply with subsection 4505( c )(2) , the trial court should have imposed RRRI sentences that were fiv e - sixt hs of the aggregat e minimum sentenc e of seven and one

half years , which results in a n aggregate RR RI s e ntence of six years and th re e months

. Subsection 450 5(c ) (2) affords no discretion in the cal culation

. All but one o f the RRRI minimum sentences imposed by the trial court equal th re e - fo urt hs of the minimum sentence
. 9 I t is obvious that the trial court

e r roneously s e lected the RRR I multip lier based on each individual mini mum sentence , in stead of th e aggregate mi ni mum sen tence
. As such, e ach RRRI

se ntence was erroneo us in the original sentenc i ng order

. T he error here was based on a non - discr etionary st a tu tory c alcu l a tion ,
us ing th e wro ng multiplier to calculate RRRI minimum sentences . This falls into th e category of patent and obviou s errors that the trial court had the
in herent jurisdicti on t o co rrect , even though more than 30 days had passed

9 The only se ntence that did n ot us e three

- fourths appears to be a typographical erro r . The orig inal sen te ncing order imposed an RRR I sentence of 10 months and 15 days for bo th counts at the PWID docket, des pite each c ount carrying a different mini mum se ntence (14 and 16 months, respec tive l y ).J

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since it ha d e n t ered the sente ncing o rders a nd the sentencing orders we re being reviewed by this Court on appeal

. Accord Klein , 781 A.2d a t 1135 (deeming miscalculation of time cred it to be a patent a nd obvio us error amenable to correction ) ; C ommonwealth v. Ellswort h , 9 7 A.3d 1255, 125 7 (Pa. Super. 2014) ( same ). Accordingly, we deny Morales

- Feliciano ’ s petition to remand to the trial cou rt for clari fication of the orders

. This does not end o ur inquiry, however

. W hile it may have had jurisdiction to c o rrect the orde rs, t he trial court on ce a gain made err or s in its calculations

. F irst, for the sentences it amend ed , the trial c ourt did not u se the five

- sixths mul tiplier to calculate the RRRI minimum senten ce s . Second, the trial court failed to correct the error s in i ts or igin al ca lculations a t the abuse docket , leaving those RRRI minimum sentences incorrectly standing at three

- f o urths of the minimum sentence

. Th ird , t he aggregate RRRI mini mum sentence in e ffect after the a mended sen tencing orders i s seven and one

- hal f yea rs — the exact same as the aggregate minimum sentence , which is plainly in error

. Accordingly, we remand for t he trial c ourt to

c orrect its er ro rs. We direct the trial court to issue sentencing orders that conform to subsection 4505 (c ) ( 2 )

. Each indiv idual RRRI minimum sentenc e at e ach of the three dockets should be five

- sixths of th e in dividual minimum
sentence an d add u p to an a ggregate RRRI minimum sentence of five

- sixt hs

o f the seven and one

- half yea r minimum aggregate s entence ( i.e. , six years and thre e mont hs ).J

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May 16, 20 19 j udgment s of sentence affir med. September 26, 2019 amended judgments of sentence vacate d. Application for Re mand denied.
Rema n ded for entry of a mended sentencing orders consistent with this

mem orandum. Jurisdi ction relinquished. Judge Strassburger did not pa rtici pate in the consider a tion or decision of this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 05/04/2021