IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20659

INTEGRANET PHYSICIAN RESOURCE, INCORPORATED, doing business 

as IntegraNet Health, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant

v.

TEXAS INDEPENDENT PROVIDERS, L.L.C.; ROBERT VINCENT ROTH; 

CARLOS J. PALACIOS, Medical Doctor, 

 Defendants–Appellees

********************************************************

INTEGRANET PHYSICIAN RESOURCE, INCORPORATED,

 Plaintiff–Appellant

v.

ROBERT VINCENT ROTH,

 Defendant–Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before SOUTHWICK, WILLETT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges. 

DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:

IntegraNet sued a competitor and its two owners (one of whom was a 

former IntegraNet employee) in state court. They removed to federal court. 

Then IntegraNet sued the former-employee owner in state court for another 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 11, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 18-20659

2

claim. And the owner again removed. The district court consolidated the cases.

The so-called consolidation order sua sponte barred IntegraNet from filing 

another case against Appellees without the judge’s permission. On appeal, 

IntegraNet argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that 

consolidation was improper, as was the sua sponte pre-filing injunction.

We agree with IntegraNet. We reverse the consolidation order, vacate

the injunction, and remand both claims with instructions to the district court 

to remand the Texas state law claims to the Texas state court from which the 

cases were removed.

I. BACKGROUND

IntegraNet is a Texas independent physician association (IPA), a 

network of independent physicians who’ve banded together to reduce overhead 

costs and negotiate contracts with payers. IntegraNet employed Robert 

Vincent Roth as Vice President of Contracting and Director of Financial 

Analytics. A big part of Roth’s job was to collect money owed to IntegraNet 

from insurers. Roth allegedly dropped the ball. In 2014 he sought recovery of 

only $337,784 of roughly $4.3 million owed to IntegraNet by an insurer. 

IntegraNet asserts that Roth knew about the underreporting prior to the claim 

deadline and failed to correct it. Roth quit IntegraNet that same year. About 

three years later, IntegraNet supposedly caught the mistake, but managed to 

collect only around $550,000 of the roughly $4.3 million. So IntegraNet is 

coming after Roth for the rest.

After Roth quit IntegraNet in 2014, he started a competitor IPA called 

Texas Independent Providers (TIP). TIP serves patients through Medicare 

Advantage plans. Roth and his partner, Dr. Carlos Palacios, are the principal

owners. IntegraNet says that Roth, Palacios, and TIP conspired to harm 

IntegraNet’s business, improperly prying physicians and insurers away from 

IntegraNet. For example, IntegraNet points to the insurer WellCare (a now-
No. 18-20659

3

dismissed defendant). WellCare was an IntegraNet insurer, but withdrew in 

2018.1 WellCare notified its members of the termination with IntegraNet. The 

parties agree that federal regulations and the contract between IntegraNet 

and WellCare required IntegraNet to abstain from interfering with patient 

enrollment upon WellCare’s termination of the contract.2 Put differently, 

IntegraNet was not supposed to pressure WellCare enrollees to switch 

insurance plans. IntegraNet insists it didn’t. 

But in April 2018, WellCare sent cease-and-desist letters to IntegraNet 

and some of its providers. The letters state that WellCare received “a complaint 

relating to unsolicited contacts with one or more of [the doctors’] patients who 

are Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.” IntegraNet says these letters were 

“thinly-veiled threats” to its doctor-members motivated by the desire for them 

to leave IntegraNet for another IPA—like TIP—or to contract directly with 

WellCare. IntegraNet also alleges that, around the same time, many of its 

doctor-members received marketing materials from TIP touting the benefits of 

their membership. These materials supposedly contain mischaracterizations

about IntegraNet “that only Roth would have the knowledge to make.” 

Appellees Roth and Palacios co-own TIP. Palacios is also a Medical Director at 

WellCare. IntegraNet believes that WellCare acted in concert with TIP, Roth, 

and Palacios.

 

1 In this situation, if IntegraNet-affiliated doctors wanted the continued opportunity 

to treat their patients with WellCare insurance, they could (1) terminate their relationship 

with IntegraNet and join a different IPA that contracts with WellCare, or (2) contract directly 

with WellCare without the negotiating advantages of an IPA.

2 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2268(e), (j), and (k), 423.2268(e), (j), and (k). These regulations 

were updated effective June 15, 2018, but these citations refer to the previous version that 

was in effect during the time period at issue in this case. See also CTR. FOR MEDICARE &

MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE MKTG. GUIDELINES § 70.5.1 (2017), available at

https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/ManagedCareMarketing/Downloads/CY-2018-

Medicare-Marketing-Guidelines_Final072017.pdf (citing the previously listed federal 

regulations).
No. 18-20659

4

IntegraNet filed two suits in state court. Suit #1 was against TIP, Roth, 

Palacios, and WellCare for interfering with IntegraNet’s business (TIP 

lawsuit). Suit #2 was against Roth alone for breach of fiduciary duty and 

negligence (Roth lawsuit). But WellCare and Roth removed to federal court.

Here’s the timeline:

April 18, 2018—IntegraNet files TIP lawsuit in state court.

IntegraNet petitions for, and is granted, a temporary restraining 

order against defendants.

April 29, 2018—WellCare removes TIP lawsuit to federal court 

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 (removal), 1442 (federal officer), and 1446.

May 10, 2018—After WellCare had been dismissed from the TIP 

lawsuit, IntegraNet moves for remand.

June 18, 2018—IntegraNet files Roth lawsuit in state court.

August 30, 2018—Roth removes the Roth lawsuit to federal court 

based on supplemental jurisdiction and 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), and 

he moves to consolidate with the TIP lawsuit.

September 17, 2018—IntegraNet moves for remand of the Roth 

lawsuit.

September 18, 2018—The district court consolidates the TIP and 

Roth lawsuits. The consolidation order forbids IntegraNet from 

“fil[ing] another case against the defendants on the facts in this 

action without [the district] court’s permission.”

September 24, 2018—IntegraNet appeals the consolidation order 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.

June 5, 2019—The district court denies remand of the Roth 

lawsuit.

In this appeal, we review the interlocutory order consolidating the two cases

and the denial of the motions to remand.
No. 18-20659

5

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Statement of Jurisdiction

The preliminary issue is whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal 

of this interlocutory order consolidating the two cases. Appellees argue that we

lack jurisdiction. They are mistaken. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we may 

review interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or 

dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except 

where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court . . . .” The relevant 

question is whether the district court’s order amounted to an injunction. The 

order forbade IntegraNet from “fil[ing] another case against the defendants on 

the facts in this action without [the district] court’s permission.”

We have previously held that restrictions similar to those imposed by the 

district court’s order constitute an order granting an injunction under 

§ 1292(a)(1).3 Baum, for example, had to do with a similar command from the 

same district judge as here: The plaintiff couldn’t “fil[e] claims, directly or 

indirectly, in courts or with agencies in the state of Texas without the express 

written permission of Judge Lynn N. Hughes.”4 We determined that the 

command was an injunction, and thus jurisdiction existed under § 1292(a)(1).5

And in our 2010 Qureshi decision, we considered a similarly worded 

dismissal order from the same judge: “Because of his persistent abuse of the 

judicial process, [plaintiff] may not file papers in Texas federal courts without 

 

3 See, e.g., Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 2008) (appeal 

from Hughes, J.).

4 Id.

5 Id. at 186–87. Right after Baum, and in an unpublished opinion, we similarly 

characterized a “sanction barring further pleadings by [plaintiff] or any of his associates 

concerning various civil actions.” Nat’l Bus. Consultants, Inc. v. Lightfoot, 292 F. App’x 298, 

300–01 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Baum for the standard for reviewing an injunction, which the 

per curiam panel characterized as a sanction).
No. 18-20659

6

written permission of Judge Lynn N. Hughes.”6 We did not explain why the 

order constituted an injunction. But for taxonomical purposes, the bottom line 

is that the court cited Baum and called the order a “pre-filing injunction.”7

Returning to this case, the “Order of Consolidation” bars IntegraNet 

from filing “another case against the defendants on the facts in this action 

without [the district] court’s permission.” Under Baum, this command not to

sue qualifies as an injunction, which is immediately appealable. So we have 

jurisdiction to review the order.

Appellees contend the order isn’t an injunction because the district court

merely ordered the consolidation of two cases, as its title—“Order of 

Consolidation”—suggests. But the order’s title is not dispositive.8 Rather, “[i]n 

determining what is an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), courts 

look not to terminology, but to the substantial effect of the order made.”9 Here, 

like in Baum and Qureshi, the district court’s order prevents a party from filing 

future lawsuits without that judge’s permission—meaning it’s a pre-filing

injunction. Thus, we have jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) to review the order.

As such, we also have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of 

IntegraNet’s motion to remand to state court. An order denying a motion to 

remand standing alone would not be appealable.10 But, where there’s an 

independent basis for jurisdiction, we must review the district court’s subject-

 

6 Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 2010).

7 Id.

8 See McCoy v. La. State Bd. of Ed., 345 F.2d 720, 720 (5th Cir. 1954) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

9 Id. See also 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC.

CIV. § 2962 (3d ed. 2019) (“[T]he court will look at the actual effect of the order that is issued 

by the district court when determining whether an appeal should be allowed. . . .[A] district 

court may not avoid immediate review of its determination simply by failing to characterize 

or label its decision as one denying or granting injunctive relief.”).

10 Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 578 (1954).
No. 18-20659

7

matter jurisdiction over the lawsuits.11 Here, the district court’s pre-filing 

injunction provides the requisite, independent basis for review under 

§ 1292(a)(1).

B. Standard of Review

When a district court remands (or denies remand) based on 

supplemental jurisdiction, we review for abuse of discretion.12 And when a 

district court grants or denies an injunction, we review that for abuse of 

discretion too—though we review underlying questions of law de novo.13

III. DISCUSSION

A. Appellees Failed to Satisfy the Federal Officer Removal Statute.

A court must have jurisdiction to decide a case.14 So we turn to the 

threshold inquiry of whether the district court had jurisdiction over the TIP

and Roth lawsuits.15 By statute, federal courts have original jurisdiction over 

 

11 See id; Sykes v. Tex. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 492 n.16 (5th Cir. 1987) (“When the 

district court decides to retain a case in the face of arguments that it lacks jurisdiction, the 

decision itself is technically unreviewable; but of course the appellate court reviewing any 

other aspect of the case must remand for dismissal if the refusal to remand was wrong, i.e.,

if there is no federal jurisdiction over the case.”).

12 Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 2004); Sibley v. Lemaire, 

184 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A district court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had pendent 

jurisdiction. . . . We review such decisions for abuse of discretion.”).

13 Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Women’s Med. Ctr. 

of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2001)); Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 

224 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 

1997)).

14 Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) 

(“Subject-matter jurisdiction . . . is an Art. III as well as statutory requirement; it functions 

as a restriction on federal power[] and contributes to the characterization of the federal 

sovereign.”)

15 Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Courts are 

instructed to examine their jurisdiction at every stage of the litigation.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).
No. 18-20659

8

federal-question and diversity cases.16 They can also exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims within [federalquestion or diversity cases] that they form part of the same case or controversy 

under Article III of the United States Constitution.”17

By statute, federal courts also have removal jurisdiction in some cases

originally filed in state court. For example, the federal officer removal statute, 

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), allows a defendant to remove a state-court action 

against “any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United 

States.” We have held that to satisfy § 1442, a defendant must show “(1) that 

it is a person within the meaning of the statute, (2) that it has ‘a colorable 

federal defense,’ (3) that it ‘acted pursuant to a federal officer’s directions,’ and 

(4) ‘that a causal nexus exists between its actions under color of federal office 

and the plaintiff’s claims.’”18 Importantly, the defendant bears the burden of 

showing that it meets § 1442’s requirements.19

TIP asserts that WellCare satisfied the criteria for removal under 

§ 1442(a)(1),20 thus creating jurisdiction. We disagree. Appellees didn’t show 

 

16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1332 (diversity of citizenship).

17 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

18 Zeringue v. Crane Co., 846 F.3d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting 

Bartel v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 805 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 2015)). We are reviewing the fourth prong 

en banc in Latiolas v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 918 F.3d 406, 411 (2019), reh’g en banc 

granted, 923 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2019), but that prong is not outcome determinative in this 

case.

19 Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 885 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t remains 

the defendant’s burden to establish the existence of federal jurisdiction over the controversy.” 

(internal quotations omitted)).

20 Curiously, TIP asserts—in one paragraph only—that its claims (independent of 

WellCare being party to the suit) are federal. “[T]he primary if not sole existence of 

IntegraNet and TIP is concerned with marketing, sales and utilization of Medicare 

Advantage insurance plans through its physician members. . . . All of these involve federal 

rules and regulations . . . .” TIP thus concludes that “pendant jurisdiction is proper and 

appropriate.” This appears to be an unsupported argument for supplemental jurisdiction, not 

independent federal-question jurisdiction.
No. 18-20659

9

that WellCare acted under federal-officer directions. The Supreme Court has 

noted that the words “acting under” are “broad . . . but broad language is not 

limitless.”21 The Court’s 2007 Watson22 decision demonstrates one of those 

limits. The Watson plaintiffs sued cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris, 

alleging it manipulated test results to show lower nicotine and “tar” content in 

cigarettes marketed as “light.”23 The Eighth Circuit held that Philip Morris 

was “acting under” a federal officer and could remove pursuant to § 1442 

because the Federal Trade Commission mandated that Philip Morris adopt the 

specific testing method plaintiffs challenged and enforced that mandate with 

“ongoing monitoring,” laboratory inspections, independent verification of 

results, publication of nicotine ratings, and enforcement actions against 

manufacturers.24 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the fact that a 

federal regulatory agency directs, supervises, and monitors a company’s 

activities in considerable detail” is not sufficient to satisfy the “acting under” 

requirement.25 The Court further explained that:

[A] highly regulated firm cannot find a statutory basis 

for removal in the fact of federal regulation alone. A 

private firm’s compliance (or noncompliance) with 

federal laws, rules, and regulations does not by itself 

fall within the scope of the statutory phrase “acting 

under” a federal “official.” And that is so even if the 

regulation is highly detailed and even if the private 

 

21 Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007). In the context of the 

federal officer removal statute, “the word ‘under’ must refer to what has been described as a 

relationship that involves ‘acting in a certain capacity, considered in relation to one holding 

a superior position or office.’ 18 Oxford English Dictionary 948 (2d ed.1989). That relationship 

typically involves ‘subjection, guidance, or control.’ Webster’s New International Dictionary 

2765 (2d ed.1953).” Id. at 152. 

22 See id.

23 Id. at 146.

24 Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 420 F.3d 852, 858 (8th Cir. 2005).

25 Watson, 551 U.S. at 145.
No. 18-20659

10

firm’s activities are highly supervised and monitored. 

A contrary determination would expand the scope of 

the statute considerably, potentially bringing within 

its scope state-court actions filed against private firms 

in many highly regulated industries.26

Citing Watson, we recently addressed a similar issue in City of Walker.27

There, appellants asserted that a construction company was “acting under” a 

federal officer because its work—including the hydraulic design that allegedly 

exacerbated the flooding damage at issue—was “subject to inspection and 

approval by the federal government,” which “retained ‘oversight 

responsibility’” for and contributed funding to the contracting job.28 But we

said even if that were true, that didn’t amount to being a government 

contractor “acting under” a federal officer when it designed and built the 

project.29

 

26 Id. at 153. But the Court distinguished cases where a private contractor “help[s] the 

Government to produce an item that it needs”—like in Winters, where “Dow Chemical 

fulfilled the terms of a contractual agreement by providing the Government with a product 

that it used to help conduct a war.” Id. at 153–54 (citing Winters v. Diamond Shamrock 

Chemical Co., 149 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 1998)).

27 City of Walker v. Louisiana through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 877 F.3d 563, 570 (5th 

Cir. 2017).

28 Id. at 569, 571.

29 Id. at 570–71. Like the Supreme Court, the City of Walker court distinguished its 

case from previous Fifth Circuit cases where removal was granted under the federal officer 

removal statute: “This monitoring arrangement is not the procurement relationship that in 

previous cases has allowed a private firm to enjoy the benefit of federal officer removal.” Id.

at 571. Cf. Zeringue, 846 F.3d at 788 (finding that contractor’s “provision of parts in an effort 

to assist the Navy’s construction of vessels satisfies the ‘acting under’ requirement”); Savoie 

v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that strict liability 

claims qualify for federal officer removal where the federal government obligated a shipyard 

via a detailed contract and supervision to use asbestos to refurbish U.S. Navy and Coast 

Guard vessels, and a former shipyard worker on one such vessel subsequently developed 

mesothelioma); Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2001) (where 

the federal government contracted with chemical companies to create a specific mixture of 

chemicals (now known as Agent Orange) for use in the Vietnam War, we held that “the 

defendants produced Agent Orange at the behest of the federal government,” so they were 

“acting under color of federal authority”); Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 
No. 18-20659

11

Likewise, WellCare wasn’t acting pursuant to a federal officer’s 

directions. First, Appellees’ assertion that federal regulations required 

WellCare to notify its members of the termination with IntegraNet is simply 

beside the point.30 It’s a strawman argument. IntegraNet takes issue with the 

cease-and-desist letters, not the notification letters.

After the notification letters, WellCare sent cease-and-desist letters to 

IntegraNet and some of its providers. The letters state that WellCare received 

“a complaint relating to unsolicited contacts with one or more of [the doctors’] 

patients who are Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.” Appellees argue that 

WellCare acted “at the direction of [the federal government] when it sent 

letters to IntegraNet and its physicians demanding that they stop violating 

federal rules in their efforts to coerce their patients into switching Medicare 

Advantage plans.” The parties disagree about whether any such interference 

occurred. But that’s irrelevant to this jurisdictional question. What matters is 

that Appellees cite no evidence showing that the government told WellCare to

send those cease-and-desist letters. Appellees merely argue that WellCare’s

letters urged compliance with applicable regulations.31 But that’s not acting 

under officer direction.

 

387, 398–99 (5th Cir. 1998) (similar to Miller, where the government “contracted with 

chemical companies for a specific mixture of herbicides, which eventually became known as 

Agent Orange,” “compelled [the companies] to deliver Agent Orange . . . under threat of 

criminal sanctions,” and “maintained strict control over the development and subsequent 

production of Agent Orange,” we held that federal officer removal was proper. Here, WellCare 

was not “procur[ing]” or “producing an item that the government needs” like chemicals for 

warfare or Navy ships).

30 See 42 C.F.R. § 422.111(e).

31 The parties agree that, under federal regulations, IntegraNet was required not to 

interfere with any patient enrollment upon WellCare’s termination. See §§ 422.2268(e), (j), 

and (k), 423.2268(e), (j), and (k). See also MEDICARE MKTG. GUIDELINES § 70.5.1 (citing the 

previously listed federal regulations).
No. 18-20659

12

Appellees quote an unreported Western District of Texas case for their 

insistence that “Medicare insurance carriers act under federal direction for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).”32 That case cites a published Fifth Circuit 

opinion from 1975 called Peterson.33 Again, Appellees misapply caselaw. 

Peterson dealt with a doctor who sought damages for supposed “wrongful 

suspension under the Medicare program.”34 In Peterson, the federal 

government received a complaint that “questioned the payment to Dr. Peterson 

for physical therapy services not rendered by him.”35 The government 

investigated, and uncovered possible fraud.36 So the government “issued a 

letter to Blue Cross/Blue Shield ordering suspension of further payments to 

Dr. Peterson under the Medicare program.”37 Without analysis, the district 

court concluded that “it is indisputable” that the insurance carrier acted under 

federal direction.38

This case is different. The federal government did not order WellCare to 

send the cease-and-desist letters to IntegraNet and its providers. WellCare 

wasn’t acting under federal direction. So the district court should have 

remanded to state court.

 

32 Gen. Surgical Assocs., P.A. v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., No. SA-14-CA-31-

OLG HJB, 2014 WL 12496771, at*4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2014).

33 Peterson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tex., 508 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1975).

34 Id. at 56.

35 Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1975). We decided both Peterson

cases on the same day, with opinions written by the same judge. The cases include the same 

claims. Instead of reciting the facts again, the Peterson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas 

opinion refers readers to this case.

36 Id. at 49.

37 Id.

38 Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tex., 508 F.2d at 57.
No. 18-20659

13

B. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Exercising 

Jurisdiction.

Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that WellCare satisfied the 

federal officer removal statute.39 Even with that assumption, IntegraNet 

dismissed WellCare from the suit. Taking our cues from the Supreme Court, 

we have long applied the “general rule” that “a court should decline to exercise 

jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are 

eliminated before trial.”40 That said, district courts may decide remaining 

state-law claims if the relevant statutory and common-law factors favor

retaining jurisdiction.41

These statutory factors come from 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).42 As we stated in 

Enochs, the factors are: “(1) whether the state claims raise novel or complex 

issues of state law; (2) whether the state claims substantially predominate over

the federal claims; (3) whether the federal claims have been dismissed; and (4) 

whether there are exceptional circumstances or other compelling reasons for 

declining jurisdiction.”43 The Supreme Court articulated the common-law 

 

39 Contra discussion supra Section III.A.

40 Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 

2009). See also Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 

1992) (discussing and quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 

(1966)); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989) (also citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 

726).

41 E.g., Enochs, 641 F.3d at 158–59; Brookshire Bros., 554 F.3d at 602.

42 “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim 

under subsection (a) if—(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the 

claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has 

original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 

declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

43 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159.
No. 18-20659

14

factors—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—in its 1988 

Carnegie-Mellon University decision.44

We applied these factors in Enochs and held that the district court 

abused its discretion by refusing to remand the case to state court following 

the dismissal of all federal claims.45 Today’s case has numerous similarities 

with Enochs. And Enochs governs this appeal.46

Here, as in Enochs, the statutory and common-law factors weigh against 

supplemental jurisdiction. First, we analyze whether the state claims raise 

complex or novel state-law issues. No party has argued that the cases present 

novel state-law issues. But, we agree with IntegraNet that there are complex

state-law issues—particularly in the TIP lawsuit and considering Appellees’ 

desire to consolidate the Roth lawsuit, which involves different facts and 

subject matter than the TIP lawsuit. Together, these lawsuits involve claims 

for breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, theft of trade secrets (under 

the Texas trade secret statute), and negligence. There are also complex facts 

arising out of the relationship between myriad entities, including multiple 

IPAs, an insurance company, a doctor, and a former executive. This complexity 

weighs in favor of remand. A Texas state court is best positioned to address a 

 

44 See generally Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).

45 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 163.

46 The Fifth Circuit has already applied Enochs multiple times: Powers v. United 

States, 783 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2015) (“In determining the propriety of a district court’s 

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, ‘we look to the statutory factors set forth by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c), and to the common[-]law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity.’” (quoting Enochs, 641 F.3d at 158–59)); Wilson v. Tregre, 787 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Enochs like in Powers, and then balancing the factors); Heggemeier v. Caldwell 

County, 826 F.3d 861, 872−73 (5th Cir. 2016) (again quoting Enochs). See also Moon v. City 

of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 360–61 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Enochs for how it would review an 

appeal regarding whether the district court abused its discretion by exercising—or declining 

to exercise—supplemental jurisdiction).
No. 18-20659

15

complex array of issues relating to Texas law—especially under complex 

factual circumstances.

Regarding the second and third factors, IntegraNet never brought any 

federal claims. Plus, the party invoking federal jurisdiction was dismissed 

before filing its answer. This of course means that, as in Enochs, “the Texas 

state law claims predominate over the non-existent federal claims.”47 Again 

tracking Enochs, “[t]he fourth factor also favors remand, as the heavy balance 

of the common[-]law factors in favor of remand constitutes another compelling 

reason to decline jurisdiction.”48

Let’s turn to the common-law factors: judicial economy, convenience, 

fairness, and comity. The suits are in their infancy. No discovery. No Rule 26(f) 

conference. No scheduling order. Like Enochs, “hardly any federal judicial 

resources, let alone a significant amount of resources, ha[ve] been devoted to 

the district court’s consideration of the Texas state law claims.”49 So remand 

wouldn’t harm judicial economy. And remand would be convenient. The Enochs

 

47 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159.

48 Id.

49 Id. Compare Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 587, 590 (finding that the 

district court abused its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over state-law claims following 

the dismissal of all federal-law claims because—among other factors—the proceedings were 

at a relatively early stage when the district court opted to retain jurisdiction—the case had 

been pending for merely nine months, discovery was incomplete, and there was no indication 

that the district judge had appreciable familiarity with the merits of the case), with Powers 

v. United States, 783 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2015) (concluding that judicial economy and 

convenience favored exercising supplemental jurisdiction because the “district court had 

presided over the entry and implementation of the judicial settlement for more than a year” 

and had “substantial familiarity with the factual background”); Newport Ltd. v. Sears, 

Roebuck and Co., 941 F.2d 302, 307–8 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that “after four years of 

litigation produced 23 volumes and thousands of pages of record, the preparation of a pretrial 

order exceeding 200 pages, over a hundred depositions, and according to counsel nearly two 

hundred thousand pages of discovery production, the declining to hear this case on the eve of 

trial constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion” because—among other factors—

“judicial economy and convenience . . . counsel strongly in favor of the retention of 

jurisdiction.”).
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court’s reasoning applies here as well: There would be little—if any—need for 

any party to duplicate work.50 Plus, it would be convenient for the case to be 

heard in Harris County state court where the parties, witnesses, and evidence 

are located.51

Next, remand is fair. Again paralleling Enochs, this case deals with 

“purely Texas state law claims,” making it “certainly fair” to hear them in 

Texas state court.52 And nothing indicates that any party would be prejudiced 

by remanding to state court. 

Finally, comity favors remand here. Federal courts have limited 

jurisdiction and must respect the “important interests of federalism and 

comity.”53 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[n]eedless decisions of state 

law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice 

between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable 

law.”54 Federal courts are “not as well equipped for determinations of state law 

as are state courts.”55 As in Enochs, “Texas state courts have superior 

familiarity with, and heightened interests in developing, Texas state law” 

 

50 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159 (finding that remand would be convenient because there 

was “no need for either party to duplicate any research, discovery, briefing, hearings, or other 

trial preparation work.”). See also Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588, 590 

(finding that the district court abused its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over state-law 

claims following the dismissal of all federal-law claims because—among other factors—

parties would not be subjected to any notable, additional burdens like duplicating the 

discovery process).

51 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160 (finding that remand would be convenient because the 

parties are in the same county).

52 Id.

53 Id. (quoting Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588).

54 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 585 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).

55 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160 (quoting Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588–

89).
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related to these claims.56 Because all of the remaining claims concern only 

state law, comity weighs in favor of remand. In sum, statutory law and 

common-law interests suggest that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying IntegraNet’s motion to remand. 

Yet Appellees argue that federal jurisdiction is “proper and 

appropriate”—even after WellCare’s dismissal from the lawsuit. Appellees 

seem to rest their argument on the “purely discretionary” nature of a district 

court’s decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “after dismissing every 

claim over which it had original jurisdiction.”57 IntegraNet does not dispute 

that district courts have this discretion. They do.58 The question is whether the 

district court abused its discretion. 

Appellees appear to misunderstand the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Carlsbad. Despite Appellees’ representations, Carlsbad was about whether 

28 U.S.C. § 1447 bars appellate review when a district court declines 

 

56 Id. at 167 (Prado, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the common-law 

factors—including comity—favor remand). See also id. at 160 (finding that because federal 

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, comity favors remand).

57 Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).

58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a claim . . . if [any of the following four factors apply]”) (emphasis added). In 

some cases, we have weighed the factors and concluded that retaining jurisdiction over the 

remaining state law claims was not an abuse of discretion. See e.g., Wilson, 787 F.3d at 326 

(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining supplemental 

jurisdiction over former deputy’s state law claims following dismissal of his only federal 

claim, where deputy’s state-law claims were neither novel nor complex, the case had been 

pending in district court for a full year, discovery had closed, and the case was scheduled for 

trial less than one month after district court’s order); Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346–

47 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by retaining 

jurisdiction over a patient’s state law claims after it had dismissed the patient’s federal 

claims because the state law issues were neither novel nor complex, the case had been 

pending for well over a year when the court decided to maintain jurisdiction, the discovery 

deadline had passed, and the parties had fully briefed defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, making the claims ripe for disposition). But this is not one of those cases.
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supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.59 The Supreme Court 

considered “whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction” to review a 

district court’s remand.60 The remand “was not based on a jurisdictional defect 

but on [the district court’s] discretionary choice not to hear the claims.”61 Thus, 

the Court reasoned, appellate review was possible.62 But Carlsbad didn’t affect 

the standard by which appellate courts review remand decisions.

Appellees also cite our 2016 decision in Heggemeier to support their 

argument that “[d]istrict courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether 

to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal claims 

are dismissed.”63 Heggemeier does acknowledge a district court’s “wide 

discretion.”64 But that is not a blank check, as Appellees seem to suggest. 

Rather, we explained that this “wide discretion” required it to “review a district 

court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over remaining state law 

claims] . . . for abuse of discretion.”65 In fact, we quoted Enochs and applied the 

common-law factors (albeit briefly).66 Appellees failed to apply any of these 

factors. And nothing suggests that the district court considered them either.

 

59 Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 556 U.S. at 636; see also Big Country Vein Relief, L.P. v. 

Directory Assistants, Inc., 425 F. App’x 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2011).

60 Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 556 U.S. at 636 (“In this case, we decide whether a federal 

court of appeals has jurisdiction to review a district court’s order that remands a case to state 

court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c).”).

61 Id. at 640.

62 Id. at 641.

63 Heggemeier, 826 F.3d at 872.

64 Id.

65 Id.

66 Id.
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“[W]e are bound to consider and weigh all the factors.”67 As explained, 

the relevant statutory and common-law factors disfavor the district court’s 

maintaining jurisdiction over the state-law claims at issue in this case. The 

district court’s refusal to remand these claims was an abuse of discretion under 

Enochs. 

C. Consolidation was Inappropriate.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), courts may consolidate 

actions if they “involve a common question of law or fact.” According to the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Peacock, this language means that “[a]ncillary 

jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual and logical dependence on 

the primary lawsuit.”68 So long as “that primary lawsuit . . . contain[s] an 

independent basis for federal jurisdiction.”69 Generally, “[d]istrict courts enjoy 

substantial discretion in deciding whether and to what extent to consolidate 

cases.”70 But, because the primary lawsuit here lacks a basis for federal 

jurisdiction,71 consolidation was not appropriate.

D. The Pre-filing Injunction Was Improper.

Similarly, the lack of federal jurisdiction72 also renders the pre-filing 

injunction improper. Plus, in Baum, we held that “[n]otice and a hearing are 

required if the district court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction or sua 

sponte modifies an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings.”73 We 

 

67 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160.

68 Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) (internal quotations omitted).

69 Id. (emphasis added).

70 Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1131 (2018).

71 See supra Parts III.A and III.B.

72 Id.

73 Baum, 513 F.3d at 189.
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reaffirmed this holding two years later in Qureshi.74 Here, there was no basis 

for federal jurisdiction, no notice, and no hearing—any one of which is 

sufficient to make the district court’s injunction improper.

IV. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the district court’s denial of remand and hold that it 

abused its discretion when denying IntegraNet’s motion to remand. We 

REVERSE the Order of Consolidation and VACATE the district court’s prefiling injunction. Finally, we REMAND both cases with instructions to the 

district court to remand the Texas state law claims to the Texas state court 

from which the cases were removed.

 

74 Qureshi, 600 F.3d at 526.