CAUSE NO. 01-14-00571-CV

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOUSTON, TEXAS

 

TED KALDIS AKA TED LEFTERIS KALDIS,

Appellant,

VS.

CREST FINANCE,

Appellee.

 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 281 DISTRICT COURT

OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

The Honorable Sylvia Matthews, Presiding

Cause No. 2012-71189

 

THE APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

 

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Gus E. Pappas

State Bar No. 15454850

Nicole M. Hilburn

State Bar No. 24055663 

DABNEY & PAPPAS

1776 Yorktown, Suite 425

Houston, Texas 77056

(713) 621-2678 Telephone

(713) 621-0074 Facsimile

gus@dabneypappas.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

January 9, 2015

ACCEPTED

01-14-00571-cv

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

1/9/2015 5:57:48 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/9/2015 5:57:48 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents. ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... . i

Index of Authorities........ ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ...... iii

Objection to Regulated Lending Portion of Appellee’s Brief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Argument. ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... . 2

I. APPELLEE’S CLAIM AGAINST APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.. ....... ....... ....... ....... ...... 2

Conclusion and Prayer . ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... .... 5

Certificate of Service........ ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ...... 7

Certificate of Compliance ........ ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... . . 7
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASES

Barker v. Eckman, 213 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2006). ....... ....... ....... ..... 3

APPELLATE COURT CASES

Bicknell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-08-00203-CV, 2010 WL 1635832

(Tex. App.-Beaumont Apr. 22, 2010, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Colvin v. Tex. Dow Emps. Credit Union, No. 01-11-00342-CV, 

2012 WL 5544950 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726

(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATUTES

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.004(a)(3). ....... ....... ....... ..... 3, 4

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.004(c). ....... ....... ....... ....... . . 4

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(k)(1)(c)........ ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 2
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CAUSE NO. 01-14-00571-CV

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOUSTON, TEXAS

 

TED KALDIS AKA TED LEFTERIS KALDIS,

Appellant,

VS.

CREST FINANCE,

Appellee.

 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 281 DISTRICT COURT

OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

The Honorable Sylvia Matthews, Presiding

Cause No. 2012-71189

 

THE APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

 

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW, TED KALDIS AKA TED LEFTERIS KALDIS, Appellant

herein, and files this his brief in support of his prayer that this Court reverse the trial

court’s entry of its May 22, 2014 Final Judgment and render a take nothing judgment

in its place, and for such other and further relief, at law and in equity, to which the

Appellant is entitled.
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OBJECTION TO REGULATED LENDING PORTION OF APPELLEE’S BRIEF

Appellant objects to the regulated lending section of Appellee’s Brief, which

begins on page 13, as it contains no cites to case law or other legal authority other

than The Truth and Lending Act, and even then, only general cites are included.

Additionally, the Appellee failed to include the Truth and Lending Act in its

Appendix, as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(k)(1)(c). By

failing to include the Truth and Lending Act in its Appendix and only citing the same

generally, Appellant is unable to properly address the Truth and Lending Act’s

applicability to Appellee’s arguments as to the same. Accordingly, the Court should

disregard the regulated lending arguments by Appellee beginning on page 13 of

Appellee’s Brief.

ARGUMENT

I. APPELLEE’S CLAIM AGAINST APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Appellee asserts that Appellant has not objected to any specific finding of fact

or conclusion of law. However, it is clear from Appellant’s Brief, Appellant clearly

takes issue and objects to Conclusions of Law 2,3,4, 5, and 6. 

In that regard, now that Appellee is changing its position in that it is no longer

claiming its lawsuit was filed on a suit on sworn account, it is clear that the trial

court’s May 22, 2014 Final Judgment should be reversed and a take nothing judgment
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §16.004(a)(3).

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3

rendered by this Court. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law,

which resulted in a judgment favorable to the Appellee, were based on law applicable

to suits on sworn account, and not suits such as this one, which are based on the nonpayment of a debt.

A suit on a debt must be brought "not later than four years after the day the

cause of action accrues," and regardless of whether a debt results from credit card 1

agreement or a line of credit, as is the case here, in a suit for the non-payment of debt,

the cause of action accrues from the date of default based on the general rule that a

breach of contract action accrues immediately upon a breach. See Colvin v. Tex. Dow

Emps. Credit Union, No. 01-11-00342-CV, 2012 WL 5544950, at *9 (Tex.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Bicknell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.

11-08-00203-CV, 2010 WL 1635832, at *2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Apr. 22, 2010, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (holding, in an action by Wells Fargo Bank to recover debt on two

lines of credit, Wells Fargo's cause of action accrued when the default occurred.) 

See Barker v. Eckman, 213 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2006). Accordingly, to the well

established law cited herein above and in Appellant’s Brief, Appellee’s claims against

Appellant accrue from Appellant’s alleged default on or about September 6, 2008.

Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726 at 730 (breach of contract occurred thirty
R. R. Vol. 2, p. 53. 2

C.R. Vol. 1, p. 4-27. 3

C.R. p. 4-6; R.R. Vol. 1 p. 8, line 23 and 24; Vol. 1 p. 20, line 12 4

4

days after last minimum monthly payment was made.) Here, the last minimum

monthly payment was made on August 7, 2008, with the next payment being due on

or before September 5, 2008 under the Agreement. The Appellee waited to file the 2

suit until December 3, 2012, three (3) months late given its September 4-5, 2012

3

deadline to do so based on the applicable four year statute of limitations. Therefore,

Appellant’s debt collection/breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of

limitations under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.004(a)(3), as the cause

of action accrued more than four years prior to the Appellee filing suit.

In Appellee’s Brief, the Appellee cites to Section 16.004(c) of the Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code for the proposition that the Appellee’s cause of action

against the Appellant accrued on the day the dealings between the parties ceased.

However, based on the facts of this case and the Appellee’s representations to the

Court, both in its pleadings and at trial, the basis of this lawsuit was Appellant’s nonpayment of debt, and, therefore, this case falls under Texas Civil Practice & 4

Remedies Code §16.004(a)(3), not Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code

§16.004(c), and pursuant to §16.004(a)(3), Appellee’s December 3, 2012 petition was

filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations.
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Based on the above and foregoing, the Court should reverse the trial court’s

final judgment in this case and render a take nothing judgment in its place.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

The trial court erroneously entered judgment in favor the Appellee in light of

the statute oflimitations barring theAppellee’s claim against the Appellant, requiring

reversal as requested herein. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that upon a

hearing of this appeal, the Court reverses the trial court’s entry of its May 22, 2014

Final Judgment and render a take nothing judgment in its place, and for such other

and further relief, at law and in equity, to which the Appellant is entitled. 
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Respectfully submitted,

DABNEY & PAPPAS

By: /s/ Gus E. Pappas 

 Gus E. Pappas 

 State Bar No. 15454850

 Nicole M. Hilburn

 State Bar No. 24055663

 1776 Yorktown, Suite 425

 Houston, Texas 77056

 713-621-2678 Telephone

 713-621-0074 Facsimile 

gus@dabneypappas.com

 nicole@dabneypappas.com

 

 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a, I, Gus E. Pappas, counsel for the

Appellants, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s

Reply Brief was served on the Appellee, by and through its attorney of record,

Andrew Olivo, 1622 E. Beltline Rd, Suite 100, Carrollton, Texas 75006, via

facsimile, on this the 9th day of January, 2015.

/s/ Gus E. Pappas 

Gus E. Pappas

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 

 

1. This reply brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Tex. R. App. P.

9.4(i)(2)(c), because this reply brief contains 936 words. 

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e)

and the type style requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e), because this Reply

Brief has been prepared in proportionally space typeface using WordPerfect 12

in 14 point font size in Times New Roman typeface. 

Dated: January 9, 2015

/s/ Gus E. Pappas 

Gus E. Pappas