J-S36013-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSEPH M. AMOOP, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 428 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order, January 6, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014293-2007, 

CP-51-CR-0014308-2007.

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

Joseph M. Amoop appeals from the order denying his first petition for 

relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court, which acted as the fact-finder during Amoop’s bench 

trial, summarized the pertinent facts as follows:

Desmond McMoore who participated in these crimes with 

[Amoop] testified pursuant to a plea agreement. McMoore, 

whom this Court found to be a credible witness, testified 

that at the time of the crimes [Amoop] and he had been 

friends for about one year. In the afternoon of June 4, 2007, 

they were drinking on Camac Street with others. They went 

to a number of bars and ended up at a bar called the Upper 

Deck near Germantown and Chelton Avenues in 

Philadelphia. At approximately 2AM they left in McMoore’s 

two door 1996 Chrysler [Sebring] looking to commit a 

robbery. They drove passed Baynton and Church [S]treets 

and saw a large group of people. After turning the corner 
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McMoore retrieved his gun, a .9 millimeter High Point, from 

the trunk. [Amoop’s] gun, a Tech 9, was under the 

passenger seat. They then drove back around with the 

intention to rob all the people on the corner. When the 

intended victims saw them, the women and two or three 

males immediately ran. They stopped the car and Eric 

Christmas, who remained was at the driver’s window. 

McMoore grabbed his shirt and Mr. Christmas threw all of 

his cash into McMoore’s lap. McMoore pulled out his victim’s 

pockets searching for his other items. He pointed his gun 

at the victim and demanded more. He then fired his gun 

intending to intimidate the victim. While this robbery was 

occurring, [Amoop] had left the car to rob the others. 

[Amoop], who was returning to the car as Mr. Christmas 

was attempting to run away, confronted the victim near the 

back of the car. As McMoore heard the victim say, “Ah shit,” 

[Amoop] repeatedly shot Mr. Christmas. [Amoop], who was 

carrying purses got back into the car and threw the purses

into the back seat. [Amoop] told McMoore that the victim 

tried to shoot him and McMoore then fired two shots at the 

victim as he lay on the ground. They then drove off.

A few minutes later they stopped at a traffic light at 

Broad and Lindley Streets. The second victim, Francisco 

Rodriguez was crossing the street and looking into the car. 

[Amoop] said to the victim, “What the F are you looking at?” 

As Mr. Rodriguez kept staring, [Amoop] pulled his gun, 

pointed it out of the sunroof and repeatedly shot it, striking 

the victim. They then fled to [Amoop’s] house where others 

eventually joined them, including a woman named [Sharita] 

Riley.

Eventually McMoore and Sharita left. They went to at 

least two gas stations to vacuum the broken glass from the 

shattered back windshield which had been shot out during 

the robbery. As they arrived at McMoore’s house, 

[McMoore] was stopped by the police and arrested. His gun 

was seized.

Substantial evidence was introduced corroborating 

McMoore’s version of the events. Other witnesses who were 

at [Baynton] and Church Streets, coincidently staging an 

auto accident for purposes of insurance fraud testified 

consistently with McMoore’s version of the incident. One of 

those witnesses, Amber Anderson identified [Amoop] in a 
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line-up. Ballistics evidence taken from the scene and from 

the decedents was consistent with McMoore’s testimony. 

The Medical Examiner’s testimony, which identified the 

causes of death to be gunshots, was consistent with 

McMoore’s testimony. Sharita Riley gave a statement to 

Detective Donald Marano which was consistent with 

McMoore’s testimony. [At trial Ms. Riley denied the 

substance of the statement. However, this Court as 

factfinder credited the detective’s testimony and found Ms. 

Riley’s prior statement to be truthful.] Both McMoore’s and 

[Amoop’s] fingerprints were found in the car. In addition 

the Commonwealth presented evidence that [Amoop] was 

not licensed to carry a firearm. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/17, 2-4 (citation and footnote omitted).

At the conclusion of his bench trial, the trial court convicted Amoop of 

two counts of first-degree murder and related charges. On June 28, 2010, 

the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life in prison. On August 

2, 2012, this Court affirmed Amoop’s judgment of sentence, and, on February 

13, 2013, our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Amoop, 60 A.3d 555 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished 

memorandum), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 772 Pa. 2013).

On April 9, 2014, Amoop filed a timely pro se PCRA petition in which he 

raised various trial court errors, after-discovered evidence, and multiple 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The PCRA court appointed 

counsel, and, on November 12, 2015, PCRA counsel filed an amended petition 

raising only Amoop’s claim of after-discovered evidence. Upon motion of both 

Amoop and PCRA counsel, the PCRA court held a Grazier1 hearing, and 

____________________________________________

1 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 
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determined that Amoop wished to proceed pro se. On June 6, 2016, the PCRA 

court granted Amoop $1000.00 to hire a private investigator.

On June 28, 2016, Amoop filed an amended pro se PCRA petition, in 

which he reiterated the claims raised in his first pro se petition. Thereafter, 

the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Amoop’s 

petition without a hearing. On October 21, 2016, Amoop filed a timely 

response. By order entered January 6, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed 

Amoop’s amended petition. This timely appeal follows. Both Amoop and the 

PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Amoop raises the following issues in his brief:

I) Did the PCRA Court commit an error of law and fact 

when it held that [Amoop’s amended PCRA petition

had] no merit?

II) Did the PCRA Court commit an error of law and fact 

when it held without [an] evidentiary hearing, [trial 

counsel] was [not] ineffective for not objecting to 

expert use and admission of Testimonial Hearsay 

(autopsy report) authored by another as [the] basis 

to form his opinion which violated [Amoop’s] Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendment right under the United 

States [C]onstitution and Article [I] §9 of [the] 

Pennsylvania [C]onstitution right to confront adverse 

witness?

III) Did the PCRA Court commit an error of law and fact 

when it held without [an] evidentiary hearing, [trial 

counsel] was not ineffective for failing to get [an] 

exculpatory statement admitted on the record at trial 

and was [Amoop] denied Due Process, Equal 

Protection and Fundamental Fairness where excluded 

evidence [proved] actual innocence and did [the] trial 

court apply Hearsay rule mechanistically to deny the 

[interests] of justice?
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IV) Did the PCRA court commit an error of law and fact 

when it held without holding [an] evidentiary hearing, 

[trial counsel] was not ineffective for failing to 

investigate forensic evidence by not properly cross 

examining [the] state expert witness and by not 

consulting and retaining his own ballistics expert that 

specialize[s] in [the] trajectory of bullet projectiles?

V) Did the PCRA Court commit an error of law and fact 

when it held without holding [an] evidentiary hearing, 

[after-discovered] evidence of actual innocence in the 

form of [an] affidavit of truth by Jose Lopez held no

merit, which stated that state witness [McMoore] 

admitted to him that his trial testimony was perjured 

and McMoore was the one who actually committed the 

murders?

Amoop’s Brief at 4-5.

Our scope and standard of review is well settled:

In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the 

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record 

of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party. Because most PCRA 

appeals involve questions of fact and law, we employ a 

mixed standard of review. We defer to the PCRA court's 

factual findings and credibility determinations supported by 

the record. In contrast, we review the PCRA court's legal 

conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citations omitted). In addition, A PCRA petitioner’s right to an evidentiary 

hearing is not absolute. Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81, 85 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). Rather, the PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition 

without a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues 

of material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, 

and no legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings. 
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Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014). To obtain a 

reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, a

petitioner must show that he has raised a genuine issue of material fact which, 

if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him or her to relief, or that the 

court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing. Id.

In his second, third and fourth issues, Amoop raises three separate 

challenges to trial counsel’s effectiveness. To obtain relief under the PCRA 

premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must establish, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's ineffectiveness so 

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of 

guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 

A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). “Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to 

be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon 

a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id. This requires the petitioner to

demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel 

had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) 

counsel’s act or omission prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 533.

As to the first prong, “[a] claim has arguable merit where the factual 

averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v. 

Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). “Whether the facts 

rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.’” Id. (citing 

Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 866 A.2d 292, 304 n.14 (Pa. 2005). 
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As to the second prong of this test, trial counsel's strategic decisions 

cannot be the subject of a finding of ineffectiveness if the decision to follow a 

particular course of action was reasonably based and was not the result of 

sloth or ignorance of available alternatives. Commonwealth v. Collins, 545 

A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1988). Counsel's approach must be "so unreasonable 

that no competent lawyer would have chosen it." Commonwealth v. Ervin, 

766 A.2d 859, 862-63 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). A petitioner 

asserting ineffectiveness based upon trial strategy must demonstrate that the 

“alternatives not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater 

than the tactics utilized.” Commonwealth v. Clark, 626 A.2d 154, 157 (Pa. 

1993). “We do not employ a hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel’s 

actions with other efforts he [or she] may have taken.” Stewart, 84 A.3d at 

707. A PCRA petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief simply because 

a chosen strategy was unsuccessful. Commonwealth v. Buksa, 655 A.2d 

576, 582 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

As to the third prong of the test for ineffectiveness, “[p]rejudice is 

established if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different." Stewart, 84 A.3d at 

707. “A reasonable probability ‘is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 

A.2d 365, 370 (Pa. Super. 2006). 
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Finally, when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

PCRA court “is not required to analyze these [prongs] in any particular order 

of priority; instead if a claim fails under any necessary [prong] of the 

ineffectiveness test, the court may proceed to that [prong] first.” 

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). 

In particular, when it is clear that the petitioner has failed to meet the 

prejudice prong, the court may dispose of the claim on that basis alone, 

without a determination of whether the first two prongs have been met. 

Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. 1995). Counsel 

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. 

Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).

Amoop first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 

to the admission of Dr. Gary Collins’ testimony regarding the victims’ manner 

and cause of death. According to Amoop, Dr. Collins based his conclusions, 

at least in part, on his review of the victims’ autopsy reports which were 

authored by another medical examiner who did not testify at trial. Relying on 

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 539 (Pa. Super. 2013), as well as 

the United States Supreme Court’s decisions discussed therein, Amoop argues 

that “the introduction of such a report at trial may occur only when the 

testifying witness is the person who prepared the report, observed the 

examination for which the report arose, actively supervised its preparation 

and completion and is subjected to cross-examination.” Amoop’s Brief at 11.
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Amoop then argues that “because the autopsy report and the toxicology 

report [sic] in this case at hand was introduced by a witness who met none of 

the [Yohe] criteria, its direct use at trial violated [his] confrontation 

guarantee.” Id. In addition, Amoop argues the “constitutional analysis is no 

different when an expert reads the report and makes it the basis for his new 

conclusion.” Id. According to Amoop, “[u]se of testimonial hearsay to 

establish a conclusion deprives an accused of the same confrontation 

guarantee.” Id. 

The PCRA court found no merit to Amoop’s claim:

Dr. Collins did not perform the actual autopsy. The 

autopsy was performed by Dr. Bennett Preston. 

Photographs were taken during the autopsy, samples were 

taken, tests were performed and reports were written. The 

record is clear that, prior to reaching his own conclusions, 

Dr. Collins reviewed all of the work previously performed. 

Dr. Collins’ conclusions as to the cause and manner of death, 

although consistent with those reached by Dr. Preston, were 

reached independently, after a thorough review of the 

evidence. Accordingly, there was no basis to object to this 

testimony. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 A.2d 

693 (Pa. 1971)[.]

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/17, at 6. We agree.

This Court confronted a similar factual circumstance in Commonwealth 

v. Brown, 139 A.3d 208 (Pa. Super. 2016). There, a panel of this Court first 

considered “whether an autopsy report is testimonial for purposes of the 

Confrontation Clause.” Brown, 139 A.3d at 210. “After careful 

consideration,” the panel held that “the autopsy report in this case was 

testimonial and the trial court erred in admitting the autopsy report.” Id. The 
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Brown panel further held that the “trial court also improperly admitted certain 

testimony relating to the opinions expressed in the autopsy report.” Brown, 

139 A3d at 210. Nevertheless, the Brown panel affirmed Brown’s judgment 

of sentence, because the “trial court properly admitted expert testimony 

expressing independent conclusions based on the autopsy report[,]” and 

concluded the improper admission of the improper evidence was harmless 

error. Id.

In reaching this conclusion, the Brown panel summarized:

We hold that an autopsy report is testimonial when the 

death was sudden, violent, or suspicious in nature, or was 

the result of other than natural causes. Because [the 

victim’s] death was sudden, violent, and the result of other 

than natural causes, the autopsy report in this case was 

testimonial and the trial court erred by admitting the 

autopsy report and Dr. Chu’s reference to the opinions 

expressed by Dr. Osborne in the autopsy report. 

Nonetheless, Dr. Chu’s independent expert testimony 

regarding the cause of [the victim’s] death was admissible 

and sufficient to prove [the victim’s] cause of death beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Confrontation Clause 

violation was harmless error. 

Brown, 139 A.2d at 220.

In affirming this Court’s decision, our Supreme Court unanimously 

agreed that autopsy report was testimonial, and that the admission of it 

without accompany testimony from its author violated Brown’s rights under 

the Confrontation Clause. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 185 A.3d 316, 

324-29 (Pa. 2018). 
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Further, all of the Justices agreed that its admission in Brown’s case was 

harmless error, albeit for different reasons. Justice Dougherty, joined by 

Justices Baer and Todd, agreed with the Brown panel that Dr. Chu’s 

independent expert testimony rendered the admission of the autopsy report 

harmless. In a Concurring Opinion, joined by Chief Justice Saylor and Justice 

Wecht, Justice Donahue disagreed; based on her review of the record, Dr. 

Chu’s testimony could not be separated from the conclusions reached by the 

autopsy’s author. She nevertheless found that any error was harmless 

because Pennsylvania precedent establishes that “medical testimony is not 

required to establish causation in a murder prosecution.” Brown, 185 A.3d 

at 340 (citation omitted) (Donohue, J., concurring). According to Justice 

Donahue, even in the absence of the autopsy report and Dr. Chu’s testimony, 

“there was competent evidence presented at trial to a jury to justifiably 

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim died as a result of the 

gunshot wounds.” Id. In a separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Mundy 

opined that any error that occurred was harmless “only because the autopsy 

report and its accompanying testimony did not affect the outcome of Brown’s 

trial in light of other non-expert witness testimony as to the cause and manner 

of [the victim’s] death.” Brown, 185 A.3d at 342 (Mundy, J., concurring).

Here, the PCRA court concluded that Dr. Collins reached his own 

independent conclusions about the cause and manner of the victim’s death. 

We agree. Moreover, even if this was incorrect, the admission of such expert 

medical testimony was nonetheless harmless. Our review of the record 
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establishes that the non-expert testimony of the various Commonwealth 

witnesses who saw the shooting and the condition of the victim immediately 

thereafter, gave the trial court, as fact-finder, sufficient evidence to determine 

the cause and manner of the victims’ death beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Amoop, supra, unpublished memorandum at 5-7. Thus, trial counsel cannot 

be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue this meritless claim. Loner, supra.

In his next claim, Amoop asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to ensure an alleged exculpatory statement by an eyewitness who died 

prior to trial was admitted into evidence. Amoop concedes that the trial court 

denied his counsel’s attempt to introduce the hearsay statement because it 

did not fit within the “excited utterance” exception. Amoop’s Brief at 27. 

Nevertheless, Amoop contends that trial counsel “abandoned him when he 

gave up on its admission after the denial by [the] trial court,” because “trial 

counsel never once argued that the evidence was exculpatory or that it 

showed that the crime was committed by someone else.” Id. at 30. 

It is well settled that the admissibility of evidence is a matter left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and may be reversed only upon a showing 

that the court abused that discretion. Commonwealth v. Shelton, 170 A.3d 

549, 552 (Pa. Super. 2017). Here, the trial court sustained the 

Commonwealth’s hearsay objection because it determined that the statement 

at issue lacked “the necessary indicia of reliability.” PCRA Court Opinion, 

8/11/17, at 6. Trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective because his attempt 
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to introduce the statement was unsuccessful. Buksa, supra. Further we 

note that, although Amoop takes issue with the trial court’s application of the 

“excited utterance” exception in his brief, he did not raise the issue in his 

direct appeal. Thus, this claim is waived and, therefore, does not entitle 

Amoop to relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). 

In his last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Amoop claims that 

trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to investigate the medical and forensic 

evidence, consult with and retain experts and present expert testimony or 

properly cross-examine the Commonwealth’s expert[.]” Amoop’s Brief at 16 

(excess capitalization omitted). 

Although Amoop raised this claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement, the 

PCRA Court did not address it in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. The Commonwealth 

contends that the issue is waived because Amoop failed to raise it in his 

original or amended pro se PCRA petitions. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 13 

n.2. Although our review of the record reveals that Amoop did make reference

to such claim in both of his petitions, the manner in which he did so renders 

the claim without merit. 

Before an evidentiary hearing will be granted, a PCRA petitioner “must 

set forth an offer to prove at an appropriate hearing sufficient facts upon which 

a reviewing court can conclude that trial counsel may have, in fact, been 

ineffective.” Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 635 (Pa. 2001) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Pettus, 424 A.2d 1332, 1335 (Pa. 1981). 
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Amoop made no such proffer. Although within his brief, he discusses his

disagreement with the ballistics and other evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth, he proffers no evidence that a different ballistics expert would 

support his conclusions.2 In the absence of a sufficient proffer, “a petitioner’s 

bare assertions would inappropriately convert an evidentiary hearing into a 

‘fishing expedition’ for possible exculpatory evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 94 (Pa. 2008). Thus, Amoop’s final claim of 

ineffectiveness fails. 

In his final issue, Amoop argues that the PCRA Court erred in denying 

his after-discovered evidence claim, in the form of an affidavit, from Jose 

Lopez, a fellow inmate. According to Mr. Lopez’s affidavit, McMoore told Lopez 

that he actually committed the murders, and that Amoop was not present. 

A petitioner is eligible for relief under the PCRA if he or she can establish 

the “unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has 

subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the 

trial if it had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). This Court has 

explained the test to be applied to such a claim as follows:

To obtain relief based on after-discovered evidence, an 

appellant must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) could 

____________________________________________

2

 As noted above, the PCRA court granted Amoop $1,000 dollars to hire a 

private investigator. There is no indication in the record that Amoop used 

these funds to hire his own expert.
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not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of trial by the 

exercise of reasonable due diligence; (2) is not merely 

corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to 

impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely 

result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted). “The test is conjunctive; the [petitioner] must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that each of these factors has been met in 

order for a new trial to be warranted.” Id. Moreover, “when reviewing the 

decision to grant or deny a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence, 

an appellate court is to determine whether the PCRA court committed an 

abuse of discretion or error of law that controlled the outcome of the case.” 

Id.

Here, the PCRA court explained why, having acted as fact-finder at 

Amoop’s bench trial, Amoop’s proffered affidavit “would not likely have 

resulted in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.” Foreman, supra. 

It stated:

In a brief affidavit Mr. Lopez stated that on November 18, 

2013, [McMoore] told Mr. Lopez McMoore committed the 

killings and gave [Amoop], “All the credit for it.” We 

emphasize that this Court sat as fact finder. As stated 

above, McMoore’s testimony was corroborated by the other 

evidence in the case, made sense and was credible. Even if 

this Court heard evidence of an alleged recantation, six 

years after the killing, the verdict would not have changed. 

Accordingly, this Claim, too is baseless.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/17, at 6.
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In essence, the PCRA court did not find Lopez’s proffered affidavit 

credible. When considering alleged after-discovered evidence, such credibility 

considerations are properly part of the determination of the integrity of the 

proffered evidence, and, therefore, whether the proposed evidence would 

have resulted in a different verdict. Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 

356, 363 (Pa. Super. 2010). Here, given that the PCRA court sat as the 

original fact finder, we cannot disturb this determination. See

Commonwealth v. Battle, 883 A.2d 641, 648 (Pa. Super. 2005) (explaining 

that credibility determinations are solely within the province of the PCRA 

court). Thus, Amoop’s claim is meritless.

In sum, because all of Amoop’s ineffectiveness claims are meritless, and 

the PCRA court properly rejected Amoop’s alleged after-discovered evidence, 

we affirm its order denying him post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/18