1 The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief J udge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 09-3134

___________ United States of America, *
* Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Eastern District of Arkansas.
* Alvin Clay, * [PUBLISHED]
* Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 16, 2010 Filed: August 27, 2010

___________ Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Alvin Clay of conspir acy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and four counts of mone y laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The district court 1 sentenced him to five months’ imprisonmen t and ordered him to pay $16,265.26 in restitution. Clay appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He also argues the district court erred: (1) by denying his motion for a new trial; (2) in its jury instructions; (3) in admitting2 “We recite the facts in th e light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts.” White v. McKinley , 605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Hayes , 574 F.3d 460, 465 (8th Cir. 2009)).
-2- evidence; (4) in excluding evidence; and (5 ) in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background 2

This case concerns a conspiracy to de fraud purchasers of five homes in Little Rock, Arkansas. The government charged three individuals for their roles in the conspiracy: Clay, Raymond Nealy, and D onny McCuien (collectively referred to as “the conspirators”). During the period of the conspiracy, Clay worked as a licensed attorney in the State of Arkansas and also held a real estate and contractor’s license. Nealy worked as a mortgage broker and owned a mortgage co mpany. McCuien managed a Burger King and owned a pr operty management and construction corporation.

Each of the five fraudulent home purch ases proceeded in a similar manner. Usually McCuien would find a purchaser for aninexpensive residential property. The purchaser would be promised a no-risk tran saction, wherein he or she would receive some cash from closing. Nealy would then obtain financing in an amount substantially greater than the asking price. Using fraudulent information and frequently forging signatures, he would arrange for appraisals of the homes and prepare contracts for sale. The contracts s howed a sale price gr eater than the asking price. The difference between the aski ng price and sale price would go to Clay Construction Company for the renovation of the property.

At closing, the conspirators would fax a Clay Construction invoice to the closing agent, even though the work clai med on the invoice had not been completed. The invoice showed a difference between th e amount loaned to the borrower and the3 The second superseding indictment only named Clay and Nealy as defendants. McCuien pled guilty before the return of the second superseding indictment.
-3- amount paid to the seller. The closing agent would send Clay Construction Company a check for the invoice amount. In total, the conspirators submitted five invoices to title companies, and title companies subs equently issued five checks to Clay Construction totaling $133,142.23. Clay r eceived the checks, deposited them into Clay Construction’s bank account, and divi ded the money among Nealy, McCuien, and himself. The conspirators did not complete any work on any of the homes.

The FBI learned of this scheme whenKenny Wright, a tax preparer, became concerned that he had unlawfully assistedthe conspirators with preparing false documents. Wright, accompanied by his attorney, approached the government, admitting that he had falsified tax documents and participated in the fraudulent scheme by preparing false construction invoi ces. Wright provided the FBI with the conspirators’ names, the names of the conspi rators’ businesses, Clay’s social security number, and documentation of the illegal activity.

FBI agents subsequently executed a sear ch warrant for Clay’s law office and Nealy’s mortgage company, seizing twenty boxes of documents and seven computers. As a result of the search, the government sought a federal grand jury indictment.

The grand jury returned an indictment in December 2004, a first superseding indictment in November 2005, and a sec ond superseding indictment in June 2007. The second superseding indictment alle ged that Nealy and McCuien solicited individuals to purchase five homes and used fraudulent documentation when applying for financing through Nealy’s mortgage comp any. According to the indictment, the conspirators caused false offers to purchase and false invoices to be delivered to the title companies. The invoices claimed thatwork had been completed on the homes, even though no work had been done. It al so alleged that Ne aly and Clay had defrauded the purchasers of the five homes. 3McCuien was named as a coconspirato r, along with other persons known and unknown to the grand jury.
-4- Before trial, Clay moved to suppress evid ence seized in the s earch of his office and to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it failed to state an offense and was the product of prosecutorial retaliation. In support of his retaliation claim, Clay alleged he had been involved in a contentious litigation with the same prosecutor who initiated the criminal investigation of Cl ay. After Clay filed these motions, the Western District of Arkansas assumed responsibility for the Eastern District of Arkansas’s case. Following a hearing, the district court denied Clay’s motions.

The government tried Clay se parately from Nealy. Morethan thirty witnesses testified during the seven-day trial. The court denied Clay’s motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief and at the close of the trial. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Clay moved for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The district court held a hearing on these motions. At the hearing, Clay argued that McCuien had perjured himself at trial. The district court denied both motions. Clay appeals his convictions.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Clay argues the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support the conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence de novo and reverses only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty. United States v. Elzahabi , 557 F.3d 879, 885 (8th Cir. 2009). “Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable to th e government, it offers substantial support for the verdict.” United States v. Slaughter , 128 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 1997). “It is axiomatic that we do not pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted).-5- To convict Clay of cons piracy to commit wire fraud, the government needed to prove: “(1) a conspiracy with an ille gal purpose existed; (2) [Clay] knew of the conspiracy; and (3) [Clay] knowingly joinedand participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Price , 542 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2008).

Clay raises two arguments. We address each in turn.

A.

Clay first argues he did not participat e in the delivery, nor did he know about the fraudulent documents Nealy and McCuie n sent to lenders and title companies. Clay maintains that he was only conn ected to the lenders through the Clay Construction invoices which he contends wereimmaterial to the lenders’ decisions to loan money to the purchasers. Theref ore, he argues, no loan proceeds were transmitted by wire communications as a result of his involvement.

We disagree with Clay th at he needed to be directly involved in the transmission of loan proceeds from the lenders to the title companie s. To be guilty of a conspiracy, he need not ha ve knowledge of every detail of the conspiracy. Rather, the government needed to estab lish that the participants ag reed to the essential nature of the conspiracy. See Slaughter , 128 F.3d at 628 (requiring that the government prove that the defendant knew the esse ntial object of the conspiracy).

The government introduced evidence that Clay received $27,500 as a result of his partnership with McCuien and Nealy, yet he did not complete any work on any of the homes. Clay admitted at trial that helisted himself as the “supervisor” of a construction project on one of the Clay C onstruction invoices that the conspirators sent to a title company even though he was not present on any job sites, nor did he supervise any subcontractors or workers. The evidence further established that the title companies relied on these invoices to se nd a check to Clay Construction for the-6- difference between the amount loaned to the borrower and the amount paid to the seller, and Clay admitted that he bore responsibility for the invoices. Clay then deposited the checks from the title companies into his Clay Construction Company checking account and immediately wrote check s to himself, Nealy, and McCuien.

Clay may not have known ev ery detail of the conspiracy. But the law does not require such knowledge. See Blumenthal v. United States , 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (“[T]he law rightly gives room for allo wing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of a ll its details or of the participation of others.”). The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that Clay intended to assist McCuien and Neal y with defrauding others out of money, he knew the essential object of the conspiracy, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used. See Slaughter , 128 F.3d at 627 (providing for the insufficiency of the evidence standard). We reject Clay’s sufficiency of th e evidence claim.

B.

Clay next argues that the government fa iled to prove he conspired to commit wire fraud because the government only prove d that he defrauded the purchasers. He asserts that the purchasers were not vic tims because they knowingly participated in the fraud by falsely representing their intention to live in the homes they were purchasing and provided false information about their finances.

But the purchasers’ testimony negates Clay ’s claim. The purchasers testified that they purchased the homes because M cCuien told them they could make money in real estate and that several of them were harmed by the conspiracy. Further, McCuien admitted that the purchasers werenever informed that the conspirators received money from the title companies and that they split the money amongst4 Clay argues in a footnote that this c ourt should set aside the money laundering convictions on insufficient evidence grounds, but he does not explain what elements the government failed to prove. We have carefully reviewed the record and are satisfied that the government proved that Clay knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary transaction in crimin ally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, and that the property was derived from unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
-7- themselves. McCuien testified that they did not tell the purchasers because they wanted to keep the money for themselves . We conclude that the testimony supports the jury’s verdict that McCuien, Nealy, a nd Clay engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the purchasers and that the purchaser s were harmed by the conspiracy.

Finally, Clay provides no authority for his proposition that the purchasers could not be the victim of a conspiracy to comm it wire fraud. The substantive statute for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, does not specify who must be the victim of the wire fraud. The statute states:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, ra dio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing su ch scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. The government charged Clay with conspir acy to commit wire fraud, and the second superseding indictment clearly states thatthe conspirators engaged in a scheme to defraud the purchasers of the homes. Because Clay has not established he must defraud a lender to be found guilty of th e conspiracy, and the evidence clearly establishes that purchasers suffered harm as a result of the conspiracy, we reject Clay’s argument and affirm the conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud. 4-8- III. Motion for a New Trial

Clay argues the district court erred indenying his motion for a new trial because McCuien testified against him and McCuien lacked credibility. At trial, McCuien testified he had no experience in construction. After trial, Clay presented the court evidence that McCuien actively particip ated in construction and home repair.

But Clay’s post-trial attack on M cCuien’s credibility merely amounts to impeachment evidence. “[N]ewly discove red evidence which is merely impeaching normally cannot form the basis for a new trial.” United States v. Bonadonna , 775 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir. 1985). Further, the districtcourt determined that a jury could infer that Clay participated in the conspiracy based on reasons unrelated to McCuien’s testimony: (1) Clay had complete control over the $133,142 he deposited into the Clay Construction account; (2) the manner in which the conspirators distributed the proceeds indicated that no work had been done on the five houses; and (3) none of the indicia of a legitimate construction project were present. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in de nying Clay’s motion for a new trial. See United States v. Huerta-Orozco , 272 F.3d 561, 566 (8th Cir. 2001).

IV. Jury Instruction

The district court instructed the jury on whether Clay acted knowingly:

You may find that Alvin Clay acted knowingly if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Alvin Clay was aware of a high probability that money or property was being obt ained under false or fraudulent pretenses and that he deliberately avoided learning the truth. The element of knowledge may be inferred if Alvin Clay deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise ha ve been obvious to him. You may not find Alvin Clay acted “knowingly” if you find he was merely negligent, careless, or mistaken as to whether money or property was being obtained under false or fraudulent pretenses.5 Clay also briefly argues this instructi on shifted the burden of proof. We find no merit to this argument.
-9- You may not find that Alvin Clay acted knowingly if you find that he actually believed that money or property was not being obtained under false or fraudulent purposes. Clay argues this instruction requires reversal for two reasons. 5

A. Reasonable Doubt

First, Clay contends the instruction undermined the reasonable doubt standard, because the use of the phrase “aware by a high probability” misled the jury on the definition of “reasonable doubt.”

The term reasonable doubt “defies easy explication.” Victor v. Nebraska , 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). The Supreme Court explained:

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court instruct s the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular fo rm of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof . Rather, “taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.”

Id. (citations omitted).

We conclude Clay failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury on the reasonable doubtstandard as it pertained to whether Clay acted knowingly. See United States v. Rehak , 589 F.3d 965, 972 (8th Cir. 2009) (providing for an abuse of disc retion standard of review). This instruction did not-10- merely require that the jury find a “high probability” that Clay committed the offenses. Rather, the instruction stated that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt “that Alvin Clay was aware of a high probability” that money was being fraudulently obtained.

Moreover, the district court instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard in Jury Instruction #5:

A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense, and not the mere possibility of innocence. A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonabl e person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt.
Clay does not argue the district court erred in its reasonable doubt instruction, nor can we discern any mistake in law on this instruction. Further, Clay has not established that there is a reasonable likelihood that the ju ry applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. See Victor , 511 U.S. at 6 (“The constitutional question . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on [insufficient proof].”). We conclude that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. See id. at 5.

B. Willful Blindness Instruction

Clay next argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that it could infer knowledge of the c onspiracy if it found Clay “d eliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.” He maintains this willful blindness instruction undermined the re quirement for knowledge and intent.-11- “A willful blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.” United States v. Gruenberg , 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotations omitted). “Ignorance is deliberate if the de fendants were presented with facts putting them on notice criminal activity was particul arly likely and yet in tentionally failed to investigate.” United States v. Whitehill , 532 F.3d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 2008). Evidence is sufficient to support such an instruc tion “if a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendants had eitheractual knowledge of the illegal activity or deliberately failed to inquire about it before taking action to support the activity.” Id. “If reasonable inferences support a finding the failure to investigate is equivalent to ‘burying one’s head in the sand,’ the jury may consider willful blindness as a basis for knowledge.” Id. (quoting Gruenberg , 989 F.2d at 974).

Here, the district court deemed such an instruction appropriate, reasoning:

There were at least two invoices thatwere shown to Mr. Clay where they said supervised by Alvin Clay, and he admitted he had those contemporaneously with getting paid and he knows that he didn’t supervise any work and did not inquireabout any of that. And so that’s evidence of some misrepresentation and deliberately looking away. The other thing that -- the other part of the evidence that bothered -- that made me think this might be an appropriate instruction had to do with the first transaction with Linda Jones in which Clay Construction Company got whatever the amount of the check was, I don’t remember, and then got three cashier’s checks for Ray Nealy’s mother and to have that request of a general contract or from a subcontractor, don’t pay me, don’t pay my materialmen, don’t pay my laborers, you know, write out three cashier’s checks for my mother, that’s the sort of thing that not inquiring about that seems to me evidence that would support giving that instruction.

Trial Tr. 1095-96.6 Clay also briefly argues that his c onvictions for money laundering should be set aside because the jury instructions mi sstated an element of the money laundering offense. He relies on United States v. Santos , 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008) (plurality opinion), which the Supreme Court decided on th e fifth day of his trial. The Court in Santos determined ambiguous the term “proceed s,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and that “proceeds” should be defined as “profits.” Id . at 2024-25. Clay asserts that the district court shoul d have instructed the jury that the term “proceeds” meant “profits.” Because Clay di d not request this in struction, we review his claim for plain error. See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Clay has not established that the error, if any, affected the outcome of the proceedings. It seems unlikely that this definition affectedthe verdict because Clay’s defense was not that he did not “profit” at least $10,000. Rather, Clay defende d the charges by arguing that he did not knowingly particip ate in the money laundering scheme.
-12- Based on these facts, we agree with th e district court that a jury could reasonably conclude that Clay either knew of the illegal activity or buried his head in the sand. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in providing a willful blindness instruction. 6

V. Admission of Evidence

Clay argues the district court erred by admitting evidence that he had engaged in fraud when securing his contractor’s license . He complains thatthe district court should not have permitted testimony from four witnesses who testified about the manner in which Clay obtained his contract or’s license because it violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Gregory Crow, the administrator of th e Arkansas Contractors Licensing Board, testified that Clay applied for a contractor’s license in 2001. Crow testified that the application required that Cl ay submit references from i ndividuals for whom he had completed work. Clay’s application listed Pat Joyner, Earl Jone s, and Allan Nelson as references and included each of their alle ged signatures. Crow testified that Clay swore on his application that his answers weretrue. Crow further testified that the-13- Licensing Board would not have issued Clay a contractor’s license if he included false information on his application.

Three other witnesses testified briefly th at they were listed as references for Clay’s application although Clay did not perform work on their homes. Pat Joyner testified that Clay never e ngaged in any contracting work for her, she did not fill out a reference form for him, and she did notremember signing a re ference form. Earl Jones testified that he did not sign Clay’s reference form, did not authorize anyone to submit the reference form on his behalf, and did not know of Clay’s experience in construction. Allan Ne lson similarly testified.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi des that evidence of crimes by the defendant which are not charged in the i ndictment are generally inadmissible. See United States v. Clemons , 503 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1974). “However, evidence of other crimes is admissible for the purpose of providing the context in which the crime occurred.” United States v. Forcelle , 86 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1996). As further explained in United States v. Bass , 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted):

We have held that where evidence of other crimes is “so blended or connected, with the one[s] on trial as that proof of one incidentally involves the other[s]; or explains th e circumstances; or tends logically to prove any element of the crime charged,” it is ad missible as an integral part of the immediate context of th e crime charged. When the other crimes evidence is so integrated, it is not extrinsic and therefore is not governed by Rule 404(b).
The government argues the district c ourt correctly admitted the evidence because the manner in which Clay obtained his contractor’s license was intrinsic evidence of the fraudulent scheme upon whic h the wire fraud charges were based. The government asserts that Clay held himself out to be a legitimate contractor and-14- allowed Nealy to use his contractor’s licen se to bill homeowners for repairs that were never completed.

We agree that the government’s eviden ce that Clay fraudul ently obtained his contractor’s license helped “complete the story” of how he a nd his co-defendants allegedly committed wire fraud. The district court had a reasonable basis to admit this intrinsic evidence because Clay held himself out to be a legitimate contractor and used the license as part of the conspiracy. Thus, this evidence provided context for the charged offenses. The district court di d not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. See United States v. Johnson , 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing a district court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion).

VI. Exclusion of Evidence

Clay argues the government sought an indictment against him for these offenses because of the original prosecutor’s animosity toward him, and that the district court should have allowed him to present evidence of this vindictive prosecution to the jury.

The Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness should be addressed at trial. Bu t other circuits have held that this issue should be addressed before trial. See United States v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied , 127 S. Ct. 446 (2006) (“[T]he district court’s motion in limine was correct because the defense of selectiv e prosecution is a matter that is independent of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, so it is not a matter for the jury.”); United States v. Berrigan , 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973) (“By both tradition and constitutional mandate the jury is given the respons ibility of determining guilt or innocence according to instructions of law delivered by the court. The question of discriminatory prosecution re lates not to the guilt or innocence of appellants, but rather addresses itself to a constitutional defect in the in stitution of the prosecution.”).-15- We agree that the selective pr osecution of a criminal defendant is not an issue for the jury to decide. Rather, the district cour t should consider the matter before trial.

We review the district court’s factual findings on a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness for clear error. See United States v. Leathers , 354 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2004). After holding a hearing on Clay’s selective prosecution claim, the district court concluded the government had not engaged in selective prosecution. In reaching this conclusion, the distri ct court relied heavily on the testimony of the original prosecutor and the prosecutor’s supervisor who both testified that they bore no animus toward Clay.

The district court also found that the manner in which this case began indicated that the prosecutor did not retaliate ag ainst Clay. This case began when Kenny Wright, a tax preparer, became concerned th at he might face criminal charges because of his work for the conspirators. As a re sult of his concerns, Wright approached the government to discuss the case and implicatedall three men. Th ese facts indicate that the prosecutor did not “drum up” these char ges against Clay; rather, a person involved in the offense came forward to admit his wrongdoing.

The district court further found that the progression of this case also illustrated that the prosecutor did not engage in vindi ctive prosecution. The FBI agent testified that for several months he contacted this prosecutor to have the warrant reviewed, and the prosecutor stated he did not have time to review it. The case was then reassigned to a different prosecutor who eventually approved the affidavit. We agree with the district court’s reasoning “[t]hat [the fact that the prosecutor] did not take the time to review the affidavit for the search warrant is wholly inconsistent with Clay’s theory that [the prosecutor] was hell-bent on revenge.”-16- Upon careful review, we are convinced that the district court adequately considered Clay’s claim of selective prosecution pre-trial and its factual findings are not clearly erroneous.

VII. Motion to Suppress

The search warrant for Clay’s offices relied on an FBI agent’s affidavit regarding statements made by tax prepar er, Kenny Wright. Clay argues that the affidavit in support of the search warrant lacked reliable and corroborated information. “We review the district court’s factual dete rminations in support of its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Alexander , 574 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 2009) ( quotations and citations omitted).

The district court concluded that the warrant affidavit demonstrated Wright’s veracity, and the magistrate judge correc tly relied on Wright’s information to find probable cause. The court found reliable Wri ght’s statements that Nealy and McCuien solicited individuals to purchase homes , fraudulent construction invoices were prepared for Clay Construction which claime d that the work had been performed, and, at closing, checks were issued to Clay Construction even though no work had been performed. The court found Wright sufficien tly reliable because he had met with FBI agents on three occasions, and he gave the ag ents Clay’s social security number, two pay stubs, and lists of information Nealy ha d given him to prepare the false returns. The court reasoned that the FBI agents ha d a sufficient opportunity to assess Wright’s credibility during the three meetings, and that the warrant demonstrated Wright’s knowledge.

The district court also found that the FBI agent corroborated Wright’s statements. The agent request ed Clay and Nealy’s tax retu rn records for the previous three years and learned through the Secretary of State’s webs ite that Clay’s corporate licenses had been revoked for failing to pay taxes. The agent then took an undercover-17- agent to Nealy’s office and recorded convers ations. Based on this information, the agent prepared an affidavit in support of the search warrant, and the magistrate judge issued the warrant.

The FBI agent’s investigation sufficien tly corroborated Wright’s information. See United States v. Williams , 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Clay’s motion to suppress because the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

VIII. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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