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[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 249 (Friday, December 27, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78890-78898]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-30977]

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Comparability Determination for Japan: Certain Transaction-Level 
Requirements

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Comparability Determination for Certain Requirements 
under the Japanese Laws and Regulations.

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SUMMARY: The following is the analysis and determination of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'') regarding certain 
parts of a request by the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd (``BTMU'') 
that the Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in 
the Japan provide a sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of 
comparability with respect to the following regulatory obligations 
applicable to swap dealers (``SDs'') and major swap participants 
(``MSPs'') registered with the Commission: (i) Swap trading 
relationship documentation and (ii) daily trading records 
(collectively, the ``Business Conduct Requirements'').

DATES: 
    Effective Date: This determination will become effective 
immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Barnett, Director, 202-418-5977, 
gbarnett@cftc.gov, Frank Fisanich, Chief Counsel, 202-418-5949, 
ffisanich@cftc.gov, and Jason Shafer, Special Counsel, 202-418-5097, 
jshafer@cftc.gov, Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction

    On July 26, 2013, the Commission published in the Federal Register 
its ``Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations'' (``Guidance'').\1\ In the Guidance, the 
Commission set forth its interpretation of the manner in which it 
believes that section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') 
applies Title VII's swap provisions to activities outside the U.S. and 
informed the public of some of the policies that it expects to follow, 
generally speaking, in applying Title VII and certain Commission 
regulations in contexts covered by section 2(i). Among other matters, 
the Guidance generally described the policy and procedural framework 
under which the Commission would consider a substituted compliance 
program with respect to Commission regulations applicable to entities 
located outside the U.S. Specifically, the Commission addressed a 
recognition program where compliance with a comparable regulatory 
requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve as a reasonable 
substitute for compliance with the attendant requirements of the CEA 
and the Commission's regulations promulgated thereunder.
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    \1\ 78 FR 45292 (July 26, 2013). The Commission originally 
published proposed and further proposed guidance on July 12, 2012 
and January 7, 2013, respectively. See Cross-Border Application of 
Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 FR 41214 
(July 12, 2012) and Further Proposed Guidance Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations,78 FR 909 (Jan. 7, 2013).
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    In addition to the Guidance, on July 22, 2013, the Commission 
issued the Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap 
Regulations (the ``Exemptive Order'').\2\ Among other things, the 
Exemptive Order provided time for the Commission to consider 
substituted compliance with respect to six jurisdictions where non-U.S. 
SDs are currently organized. In this regard, the Exemptive Order 
generally provided non-U.S. SDs and MSPs (and foreign branches of U.S. 
SDs and MSPs) in the six jurisdictions with conditional relief from 
certain requirements of Commission regulations (those referred to as 
``Transaction-Level Requirements'' in the Guidance) until the earlier 
of December 21, 2013, or 30 days following the issuance of a 
substituted compliance determination.\3\ However, the Commission 
provided only transitional relief from the real-time public reporting 
requirements under part 43 of the Commission's regulations until

[[Page 78891]]

September 30, 2013, stating that ``it would not be in the public 
interest to further delay reporting under part 43 . . . .'' \4\ 
Similarly, the Commission provided transitional relief only until 
October 10, 2013, from the clearing and swap processing requirements 
(as described in the Guidance), stating that, ``[b]ecause SDs and MSPs 
have been committed to clearing their [credit default swaps] and 
interest rate swaps for many years, and indeed have been voluntarily 
clearing for many years, any further delay of the Commission's clearing 
requirement is unwarranted.'' \5\ The Commission did not make any 
comparability determination with respect to clearing and swap 
processing prior to October 10, 2013, or real-time public reporting 
prior to September 30, 2013.
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    \2\ 78 FR 43785 (July 22, 2013).
    \3\ The Transaction-Level Requirements under the Exemptive Order 
consist of 17 CFR 37.12, 38.11, 23.202, 23.205, 23.400-451, 23.501, 
23.502, 23.503, 23.504, 23.505, 23.506, 23.610, and parts 43 and 50 
of the Commission's regulations.
    \4\ See id. at 43789.
    \5\ See id. at 43790.
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    On September 20, 2013, BTMU submitted a request that the Commission 
determine that laws and regulations applicable in Japan provide a 
sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of comparability with 
respect to certain Transaction-Level Requirements, including the 
Business Conduct Requirements.\6\ (BTMU is referred to herein as the 
``applicant''). On December 16, 2013, the application was further 
supplemented with corrections and additional materials. The following 
is the Commission's analysis and determination regarding the Business 
Conduct Requirements, as detailed below.
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    \6\ For purposes of this notice, the Business Conduct 
Requirements consist of 17 CFR 23.202 and 23.504.
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    In addition to the Business Conduct Requirements described below, 
the applicant also requested a comparability determination with respect 
to law and regulations applicable in Japan governing trade execution, 
real-time public reporting, clearing, and swap processing.
    With respect to trade execution and real-time reporting, the 
Commission has not made a comparability determination at this time due 
to the Commission's view that although a legislative framework for such 
requirements exists in Japan, detailed regulations with which to 
compare the requirements of the Commission's regulations on trade 
execution and real-time public reporting under such framework are still 
under consideration in Japan. The Commission may address these requests 
in a separate notice at a later date, taking into account further 
developments in the U.S. and Japan.
    With respect to clearing and swap processing, this notice does not 
address Sec.  50.2 (Treatment of swaps subject to a clearing 
requirement), Sec.  50.4 (Classes of swaps required to be cleared), 
Sec.  23.506 (Swap processing and clearing), or Sec.  23.610 (Clearing 
member acceptance for clearing).
    The mandatory clearing requirement in Japan, which is consistent 
with the G20 commitments \7\ and objectives, was implemented in 
November 2012, ahead of other G20 jurisdictions. Japan's clearing 
requirement, at its initial stage, is applied to transactions between 
large domestic financial institutions registered under the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act, No. 25 of 1948 (``FIEA''), who are 
members of licensed clearing organizations \8\, for (i) certain credit 
default swaps (i.e., those referencing iTraxx Japan--an investment-
grade index CDS from 50 Japanese firms); and (ii) certain interest rate 
swaps (i.e., three month or six month Japanese yen LIBOR interest rate 
swaps). According to Japanese authorities, the scope of entities and 
products subject to the clearing requirement in Japan will be expanded 
over the next two years in a phased manner.
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    \7\ In 2009, leaders of the Group of 20 (``G20'')--whose 
membership includes Japan, the United States, and 18 other 
countries--agreed that: (i) OTC derivatives contracts should be 
reported to trade repositories; (ii) all standardized OTC 
derivatives contracts should be cleared through central 
counterparties and traded on exchanges or electronic trading 
platforms, where appropriate, by the end of 2012; and (iii) non-
centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital 
requirements.
    \8\ Japan Securities Clearing Corporation (``JSCC'') is 
currently the only licensed clearing organization under the FIEA in 
Japan.
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    While the Commission considers that the legal framework in respect 
of clearing and swap processing in Japan is comparable to the U.S 
framework, it also recognizes that there are differences in the scope 
of entities and products between its clearing requirement under section 
2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA and Sec.  50.2 (``the CEA clearing requirement'') 
and the Japanese FIEA clearing requirement, due to differences in 
market structures and conditions. Due to such differences, the 
Commission has not made a comparability determination with respect to 
Sec. Sec.  50.2, 50.4, 23.506, or 23.610 at this time. The Commission 
may address these requests in a separate notice at a later date, taking 
into account further developments in the U.S. and Japan.
    The Commission notes that its Division of Clearing and Risk has 
granted certain no-action relief from the CEA clearing requirement to 
qualified clearing participants of JSCC. Pursuant to such no-action 
relief, clearing participants of JSCC that are subject to Commission 
regulation 50.2, as well as parents and affiliates of such 
participants, may continue clearing yen-denominated interest rate swaps 
at JSCC instead of at a Commission-registered derivatives clearing 
organization (``DCO''). Further, JSCC is in the process of registering 
with the Commission as a DCO. Upon JSCC's registration, a Japanese SD 
could comply with both the CEA and FIEA clearing requirements by 
clearing relevant swaps at JSCC.

II. Background

    On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act \9\ (``Dodd-Frank Act'' or ``Dodd-
Frank''), which, in Title VII, established a new regulatory framework 
for swaps.
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    \9\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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    Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA by adding 
section 2(i), which provides that the swap provisions of the CEA 
(including any CEA rules or regulations) apply to cross-border 
activities when certain conditions are met, namely, when such 
activities have a ``direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States'' or when they 
contravene Commission rules or regulations as are necessary or 
appropriate to prevent evasion of the swap provisions of the CEA 
enacted under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.\10\
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    \10\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
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    In the three years since its enactment, the Commission has 
finalized 68 rules and orders to implement Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. The finalized rules include those promulgated under section 4s of 
the CEA, which address registration of SDs and MSPs and other 
substantive requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs. With few 
exceptions, the delayed compliance dates for the Commission's 
regulations implementing such section 4s requirements applicable to SDs 
and MSPs have passed and new SDs and MSPs are now required to be in 
full compliance with such regulations upon registration with the 
Commission.\11\ Notably, the requirements under Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act related to SDs and MSPs by their terms apply to all 
registered SDs and MSPs, irrespective of where they are located, albeit 
subject to the limitations of CEA section 2(i).
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    \11\ The compliance dates are summarized on the Compliance Dates 
page of the Commission's Web site. (http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ComplianceDates/index.htm.)
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    To provide guidance as to the Commission's views regarding the 
scope

[[Page 78892]]

of the cross-border application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
Commission set forth in the Guidance its interpretation of the manner 
in which it believes that Title VII's swap provisions apply to 
activities outside the U.S. pursuant to section 2(i) of the CEA. Among 
other matters, the Guidance generally describes the policy and 
procedural framework under which the Commission would consider a 
substituted compliance program with respect to Commission regulations 
applicable to entities located outside the U.S. Specifically, the 
Commission established a recognition program where compliance with a 
comparable regulatory requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve 
as a reasonable substitute for compliance with the attendant 
requirements of the CEA and the Commission's regulations. With respect 
to the standards forming the basis for any determination of 
comparability (``comparability determination'' or ``comparability 
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finding''), the Commission stated:

    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign 
regulatory requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the 
applicable requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, 
the Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors, 
including but not limited to, the comprehensiveness of those 
requirement(s), the scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s), the comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program, as well as the home jurisdiction's 
authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant. In 
this context, comparable does not necessarily mean identical. 
Rather, the Commission would evaluate whether the home 
jurisdiction's regulatory requirement is comparable to and as 
comprehensive as the corresponding U.S. regulatory 
requirement(s).\12\
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    \12\ 78 FR 45342-45345.

    Upon a comparability finding, consistent with CEA section 2(i) and 
comity principles, the Commission's policy generally is that eligible 
entities may comply with a substituted compliance regime, subject to 
any conditions the Commission places on its finding, and subject to the 
Commission's retention of its examination authority and its enforcement 
authority.\13\
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    \13\ See the Guidance, 78 FR 45342-44.
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    In this regard, the Commission notes that a comparability 
determination cannot be premised on whether an SD or MSP must disclose 
comprehensive information to its regulator in its home jurisdiction, 
but rather on whether information relevant to the Commission's 
oversight of an SD or MSP would be directly available to the Commission 
and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP.\14\ The 
Commission's direct access to the books and records required to be 
maintained by SD or MSP registered with the Commission is a core 
requirement of the CEA \15\ and the Commission's regulations,\16\ and 
is a condition to registration.\17\
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    \14\ Under Sec. Sec.  23.203 and 23.606, all records required by 
the CEA and the Commission's regulations to be maintained by a 
registered SD or MSP shall be maintained in accordance with 
Commission regulation 1.31 and shall be open for inspection by 
representatives of the Commission, the United States Department of 
Justice, or any applicable prudential regulator.
    In its Final Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 FR 858 (Jan. 7, 2013), the Commission noted 
that an applicant for registration as a SD or MSP must file a Form 
7-R with the National Futures Association and that Form 7-R was 
being modified at that time to address existing blocking, privacy, 
or secrecy laws of foreign jurisdictions that applied to the books 
and records of SDs and MSPs acting in those jurisdictions. See id. 
at 871-72 n. 107. The modifications to Form 7-R were a temporary 
measure intended to allow SDs and MSPs to apply for registration in 
a timely manner in recognition of the existence of the blocking, 
privacy, and secrecy laws. In the Guidance, the Commission clarified 
that the change to Form 7-R impacts the registration application 
only and does not modify the Commission's authority under the CEA 
and its regulations to access records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs. Commission access to a registrant's books and records is a 
fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly monitor and 
examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and the 
regulations adopted pursuant thereto. The Commission has maintained 
an ongoing dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral basis with 
foreign regulators and with registrants to address books and records 
access issues and may consider appropriate measures where requested 
to do so.
    \15\ See e.g., sections 4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the 
CEA.
    \16\ See e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.203(b) and 23.606.
    \17\ See supra note 13.
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III. Regulation of SDs and MSPs in Japan

    As represented to the Commission by the applicant, swap activities 
in Japan may be governed by the Banking Act of Japan, No. 59 of 1981 
(``Banking Act''), covering banks and bank holding companies, and the 
FIEA, covering, among others, Financial Instrument Business Operators 
(``FIBOs'') and Registered Financial Institutions (``RFIs''). The 
Japanese Prime Minister delegated broad authority to implement these 
laws to the Japanese Financial Services Agency (``JFSA''). Pursuant to 
this authority, the JFSA has promulgated the Order for Enforcement,\18\ 
Cabinet Office Ordinance,\19\ Supervisory Guidelines \20\ and 
Inspection Manuals.\21\ The Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission (``SESC'') is within the JFSA and has promulgated, among 
other things, the Inspection Manual for FIBOs.
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    \18\ Order for Enforcement of the Banking Act and Order for 
Enforcement of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.
    \19\ Cabinet Office Ordinance on Financial Instruments Business 
(``FIB Ordinance'') and Cabinet Office Ordinance on Regulation of 
OTC Derivatives Transaction.
    \20\ Comprehensive Guideline for Supervision of Major Banks, 
etc.(``Supervisory Guideline for banks'') and Comprehensive 
Guideline for Supervision of Financial Instruments Business 
Operators, etc.(``Supervisory Guideline for FIBOs'').
    \21\ Inspection Manual for Deposit Taking Institutions 
(``Inspection Manual for banks''), consisting of the Checklist for 
Business Management (Governance), Checklist for Legal Compliance, 
Checklist for Customer Protection Management, Checklist for Credit 
Risk Management, Checklist for Market Risk Management, Checklist for 
Liquidity Risk Management, Checklist for Operational Risk 
Management, etc.
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    These requirements supplement the requirements of the Banking Act 
and FIEA with a more proscriptive direction as to the particular 
structural features or responsibilities that internal compliance 
functions must maintain.
    In general, banks are subject to the Banking Act, relevant laws and 
regulations for banks, the Supervisory Guideline for banks, and the 
Inspection Manual for banks, while FIBOs are subject to the FIEA, 
relevant laws and regulations for FIBOs, Supervisory Guideline for 
FIBOs, and Inspection Manual for FIBOs.
    Pursuant to Article 29 of the FIEA, any person that engages in 
trade activities that constitute ``Financial Instruments Business''--
which, among other things, includes over-the-counter transactions in 
derivatives (``OTC derivatives'') or intermediary, brokerage (excluding 
brokerage for clearing of securities) or agency services therefor 
\22\--must register under the FIEA as a FIBO. Banks that conduct 
specified activities in the course of trade, including OTC derivatives, 
must register under the FIEA as RFIs pursuant to Article 33-2 of the 
FIEA. Banks registered as RFIs are required to comply with relevant 
laws and regulations for FIBOs regarding specified activities. Failure 
to comply with any relevant laws and regulations, Supervisory 
Guidelines or Inspection Manuals would subject the applicant to 
potential sanctions or corrective measures.
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    \22\ See Article 2(8)(iv) of the FIEA.
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    The applicant is a licensed bank in Japan that is also registered 
as an RFI under the supervision of the JFSA. In addition, the applicant 
is a member of several self-regulatory organizations, including the 
Japanese Securities

[[Page 78893]]

Dealers Association (``JSDA''). The JSDA is a ``Financial Instruments 
Firms Association'' authorized under FIEA by the Prime Minister of 
Japan.\23\
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    \23\ Because the applicant's request and the Commission's 
determinations herein are based on the comparability of Japanese 
requirements applicable to banks, FIBOs, and RFIs, an SD or MSP that 
is not a bank, FIBO, or RFI, or is otherwise not subject to the 
requirements applicable to banks, FIBOs, and RFIs upon which the 
Commission bases its determinations, may not be able to rely on the 
Commission's comparability determinations herein.
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IV. Comparable and Comprehensiveness Standard

    The Commission's comparability analysis will be based on a 
comparison of specific foreign requirements against the specific 
related CEA provisions and Commission regulations as categorized and 
described in the Guidance. As explained in the Guidance, within the 
framework of CEA section 2(i) and principles of international comity, 
the Commission may make a comparability determination on a requirement-
by-requirement basis, rather than on the basis of the foreign regime as 
a whole.\24\ In making its comparability determinations, the Commission 
may include conditions that take into account timing and other issues 
related to coordinating the implementation of reform efforts across 
jurisdictions.\25\
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    \24\ 78 FR 45343.
    \25\ 78 FR 45343.
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    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign regulatory 
requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the corollary 
requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission 
will take into consideration all relevant factors, including, but not 
limited to:
     The comprehensiveness of those requirement(s),
     The scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s),
     The comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program, and
     The home jurisdiction's authority to support and enforce 
its oversight of the registrant.\26\
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    \26\ 78 FR 45343.
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    In making a comparability determination, the Commission takes an 
``outcome-based'' approach. An ``outcome-based'' approach means that 
when evaluating whether a foreign jurisdiction's regulatory 
requirements are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, the corollary 
areas of the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission ultimately 
focuses on regulatory outcomes (i.e., the home jurisdiction's 
requirements do not have to be identical).\27\ This approach recognizes 
that foreign regulatory systems differ and their approaches vary and 
may differ from how the Commission chose to address an issue, but that 
the foreign jurisdiction's regulatory requirements nonetheless achieve 
the regulatory outcome sought to be achieved by a certain provision of 
the CEA or Commission regulation.
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    \27\ 78 FR 45343.
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    In doing its comparability analysis the Commission may determine 
that no comparability determination can be made \28\ and that the non-
U.S. SD or non-U.S. MSP, U.S. bank that is a SD or MSP with respect to 
its foreign branches, or non-registrant, to the extent applicable under 
the Guidance, may be required to comply with the CEA and Commission 
regulations.
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    \28\ A finding of comparability may not be possible for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that the foreign jurisdiction has not 
yet implemented or finalized particular requirements.
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    The starting point in the Commission's analysis is a consideration 
of the regulatory objectives of the foreign jurisdiction's regulation 
of swaps and swap market participants. As stated in the Guidance, 
jurisdictions may not have swap specific regulations in some areas, and 
instead have regulatory or supervisory regimes that achieve comparable 
and comprehensive regulation to the Dodd-Frank Act requirements, but on 
a more general, entity-wide, or prudential, basis.\29\ In addition, 
portions of a foreign regulatory regime may have similar regulatory 
objectives, but the means by which these objectives are achieved with 
respect to swap market activities may not be clearly defined, or may 
not expressly include specific regulatory elements that the Commission 
concludes are critical to achieving the regulatory objectives or 
outcomes required under the CEA and the Commission's regulations. In 
these circumstances, the Commission will work with the regulators and 
registrants in these jurisdictions to consider alternative approaches 
that may result in a determination that substituted compliance 
applies.\30\
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    \29\ 78 FR 45343.
    \30\ As explained in the Guidance, such ``approaches used will 
vary depending on the circumstances relevant to each jurisdiction. 
One example would include coordinating with the foreign regulators 
in developing appropriate regulatory changes or new regulations, 
particularly where changes or new regulations already are being 
considered or proposed by the foreign regulators or legislative 
bodies. As another example, the Commission may, after consultation 
with the appropriate regulators and market participants, include in 
its substituted compliance determination a description of the means 
by which certain swaps market participants can achieve substituted 
compliance within the construct of the foreign regulatory regime. 
The identification of the means by which substituted compliance is 
achieved would be designed to address the regulatory objectives and 
outcomes of the relevant Dodd-Frank Act requirements in a manner 
that does not conflict with a foreign regulatory regime and reduces 
the likelihood of inconsistent regulatory obligations. For example, 
the Commission may specify that [SDs] and MSPs in the jurisdiction 
undertake certain recordkeeping and documentation for swap 
activities that otherwise is only addressed by the foreign 
regulatory regime with respect to financial activities generally. In 
addition, the substituted compliance determination may include 
provisions for summary compliance and risk reporting to the 
Commission to allow the Commission to monitor whether the regulatory 
outcomes are being achieved. By using these approaches, in the 
interest of comity, the Commission would seek to achieve its 
regulatory objectives with respect to the Commission's registrants 
that are operating in foreign jurisdictions in a manner that works 
in harmony with the regulatory interests of those jurisdictions.'' 
78 FR 45343-44.
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    Finally, the Commission generally will rely on an applicant's 
description of the laws and regulations of the foreign jurisdiction in 
making its comparability determination. The Commission considers an 
application to be a representation by the applicant that the laws and 
regulations submitted are in full force and effect, that the 
description of such laws and regulations is accurate and complete, and 
that, unless otherwise noted, the scope of such laws and regulations 
encompasses the swaps activities \31\ of SDs and MSPs \32\ in the 
relevant jurisdictions.\33\ Further, as stated in the Guidance, the 
Commission expects that an applicant would notify the Commission of any

[[Page 78894]]

material changes to information submitted in support of a comparability 
determination (including, but not limited to, changes in the relevant 
supervisory or regulatory regime) as, depending on the nature of the 
change, the Commission's comparability determination may no longer be 
valid.\34\
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    \31\ ``Swaps activities'' is defined in Commission regulation 
23.600(a)(7) to mean, ``with respect to a registrant, such 
registrant's activities related to swaps and any product used to 
hedge such swaps, including, but not limited to, futures, options, 
other swaps or security-based swaps, debt or equity securities, 
foreign currency, physical commodities, and other derivatives.'' The 
Commission's regulations under Part 23 (17 CFR Part 23) are limited 
in scope to the swaps activities of SDs and MSPs.
    \32\ No SD or MSP that is not legally required to comply with a 
law or regulation determined to be comparable may voluntarily comply 
with such law or regulation in lieu of compliance with the CEA and 
the relevant Commission regulation. Each SD or MSP that seeks to 
rely on a comparability determination is solely responsible for 
determining whether it is legally required to comply with the laws 
and regulations found comparable. Currently, there are no MSPs 
organized outside the U.S. and the Commission therefore cautions any 
non-financial entity organized outside the U.S. and applying for 
registration as an MSP to carefully consider whether the laws and 
regulations determined to be comparable herein are applicable to 
such entity.
    \33\ The Commission has provided the relevant foreign 
regulator(s) with opportunities to review and correct the 
applicant's description of such laws and regulations on which the 
Commission will base its comparability determination. The Commission 
relies on the accuracy and completeness of such review and any 
corrections received in making its comparability determinations. A 
comparability determination based on an inaccurate description of 
foreign laws and regulations may not be valid.
    \34\ 78 FR 45345.
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    The Guidance provided a detailed discussion of the Commission's 
policy regarding the availability of substituted compliance \35\ for 
the Business Conduct Requirements.
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    \35\ See 78 FR 45348-50. The Commission notes that registrants 
and other market participants are responsible for determining 
whether substituted compliance is available pursuant to the Guidance 
based on the comparability determination contained herein (including 
any conditions or exceptions), and its particular status and 
circumstances.
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V. Supervisory Arrangement

    In the Guidance, the Commission stated that, in connection with a 
determination that substituted compliance is appropriate, it would 
expect to enter into an appropriate memorandum of understanding 
(``MOU'') or similar arrangement \36\ with the relevant foreign 
regulator(s). Although existing arrangements would indicate a foreign 
regulator's ability to cooperate and share information, ``going 
forward, the Commission and relevant foreign supervisor(s) would need 
to establish supervisory MOUs or other arrangements that provide for 
information sharing and cooperation in the context of supervising SDs 
and MSPs.''\37\
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    \36\ An MOU is one type of arrangement between or among 
regulators. Supervisory arrangements could include, as appropriate, 
cooperative arrangements that are memorialized and executed as 
addenda to existing MOUs or, for example, as independent bilateral 
arrangements, statements of intent, declarations, or letters.
    \37\ 78 FR 45344.
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    The Commission is in the process of developing its registration and 
supervision regime for provisionally-registered SDs and MSPs. This new 
initiative includes setting forth supervisory arrangements with 
authorities that have joint jurisdiction over SDs and MSPs that are 
registered with the Commission and subject to U.S. law. Given the 
developing nature of the Commission's regime and the fact that the 
Commission has not negotiated prior supervisory arrangements with 
certain authorities, the negotiation of supervisory arrangements 
presents a unique opportunity to develop close working relationships 
between and among authorities, as well as highlight any potential 
issues related to cooperation and information sharing.
    Accordingly, the Commission is negotiating such a supervisory 
arrangement with each applicable foreign regulator of an SD or MSP. The 
Commission expects that the arrangement will establish expectations for 
ongoing cooperation, address direct access to information,\38\ provide 
for notification upon the occurrence of specified events, memorialize 
understandings related to on-site visits,\39\ and include protections 
related to the use and confidentiality of non-public information shared 
pursuant to the arrangement.
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    \38\ Section 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.606 require a registered SD or MSP to make all records 
required to be maintained in accordance with Commission regulation 
1.31 available promptly upon request to, among others, 
representatives of the Commission. See also 7 U.S.C. Sec.  6s(f); 17 
CFR 23.203. In the Guidance, the Commission states that it 
``reserves this right to access records held by registered [SDs] and 
MSPs, including those that are non-U.S. persons who may comply with 
the Dodd-Frank recordkeeping requirement through substituted 
compliance.'' 78 FR 45345 n. 472; see also id. at 45342 n. 461 
(affirming the Commission's authority under the CEA and its 
regulations to access books and records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs as ``a fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly 
monitor and examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and 
the regulations adopted pursuant thereto'').
    \39\ The Commission retains its examination authority, both 
during the application process as well as upon and after 
registration of an SD or MSP. See 78 FR 45342 (stating Commission 
policy that ``eligible entities may comply with a substituted 
compliance regime under certain circumstances, subject, however, to 
the Commission's retention of its examination authority'') and 45344 
n. 471 (stating that the ``Commission may, as it deems appropriate 
and necessary, conduct an on-site examination of the applicant'').
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    These arrangements will establish a roadmap for how authorities 
will consult, cooperate, and share information. As with any such 
arrangement, however, nothing in these arrangements will supersede 
domestic laws or resolve potential conflicts of law, such as the 
application of domestic secrecy or blocking laws to regulated entities.

VI. Comparability Determination and Analysis

    The following section describes the requirements imposed by 
specific sections of the CEA and the Commission's regulations for the 
Business Conduct Requirements in the ``risk mitigation and 
transparency'' category that are the subject of this comparability 
determination and the Commission's regulatory objectives with respect 
to such requirements. Immediately following a description of the 
requirement(s) and regulatory objective(s) of the specific Business 
Conduct Requirements that the applicant submitted for a comparability 
determination, the Commission provides a description of the foreign 
jurisdiction's comparable laws, regulations, or rules and whether such 
laws, regulations, or rules meet the applicable regulatory objective.
    The Commission's determinations in this regard and the discussion 
in this section are intended to inform the public of the Commission's 
views regarding whether the foreign jurisdiction's laws, regulations, 
or rules may be comparable to and as comprehensive as those 
requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act (and Commission regulations 
promulgated thereunder) and therefore, may form the basis of 
substituted compliance. In turn, the public (in the foreign 
jurisdiction, in the United States, and elsewhere) retains its ability 
to present facts and circumstances that would inform the determinations 
set forth in this release.
    As was stated in the Guidance, the Commission understands the 
complex and dynamic nature of the global swap market and the need to 
take an adaptable approach to cross-border issues, particularly as it 
continues to work closely with foreign regulators to address potential 
conflicts with respect to each country's respective regulatory regime. 
In this regard, the Commission may review, modify, or expand the 
determinations herein in light of comments received and future 
developments.

A. Swap Trading Relationship Documentation (Sec.  23.504)

    Commission Requirement: Section 4s(i) of the CEA requires each SD 
and MSP to conform to Commission standards for the timely and accurate 
confirmation, processing, netting, documentation, and valuation of 
swaps.\40\ Pursuant to this requirement, the Commission adopted Sec.  
23.504.
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    \40\ See 7 U.S.C. Sec.  6s(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to Sec.  23.504(a), SDs and MSPs must have policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the SD or MSP enters into 
swap trading relationship documentation with each counterparty prior to 
executing any swap with such counterparty. Such requirement does not 
apply to cleared swaps.
    Pursuant to Sec.  23.504(b), SDs and MSPs must, at a minimum, 
document terms relating to:
     Payment obligations;
     Netting of payments;
     Events of default or other termination events;
     Netting of obligations upon termination;
     Transfer of rights/obligations;

[[Page 78895]]

     Governing law;
     Valuation--must be able to value swaps in a predictable 
and objective manner--complete and independently verifiable methodology 
for valuation;
     Dispute resolution procedures; and
     Credit support arrangements with initial/variation margin 
at least as high as set for SD/MSPs or prudential regulator 
(identifying haircuts and class of eligible assets).
    Regulatory Objective: Through Commission regulation 23.504, the 
Commission seeks to reduce the legal, operational, counterparty credit, 
and market risk that can arise from undocumented swaps or undocumented 
terms of swaps. Inadequate documentation of swap transactions is more 
likely to result in collateral and legal disputes, thereby exposing 
counterparties to significant counterparty credit risk.
    In particular, documenting agreements regarding valuation is 
critical because, as the Commission has noted, the ability to determine 
definitively the value of a swap at any given time lies at the center 
of many of the OTC derivatives market reforms contained in the Dodd-
Frank Act and is a cornerstone of risk management. With respect to 
other SDs/MSPs and financial entities, or upon request of any other 
counterparty, the regulation requires agreement on the process 
(including alternatives and dispute resolution procedures) for 
determining the value of each swap for the duration of such swap for 
purposes of complying with the Commission's margin and risk management 
requirements, with such valuations based on objective criteria to the 
extent practicable.
    Comparable Japanese Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Japan are in full force and effect in Japan, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(i) of the CEA and 
Commission regulation 23.504.
    Article 37-3 of the FIEA and Article 99 of the FIB Ordinance 
requires RFIs/FIBOs that intend to conclude a swap transaction to 
deliver to their customer documentation that outlines all relevant 
terms of the swap transaction. Such documentation must be delivered 
prior to execution in order to ``ensure that the customer can make a 
decision on whether to conclude the contract with a full understanding 
on the content[hellip]of the contract.'' In addition to describing all 
relevant terms of the transactions, the pre-execution documentation 
must identify:
     How the obligations arising from the swap transactions 
will be performed;
     Settlement terms;
     Events on default or termination;
     The name or trade name of the designated dispute 
resolution organization (if any), or the details of the grievances 
settlement procedures and dispute resolution measures; and
     The types of and computation method of the amount of 
customer margins or other guarantee money which a customer is required 
to deposit regarding the swap transactions, the types of an prices 
applicable to properties, etc. which may be deposited as customer 
margins or other guarantee money and matters equivalent thereto, and 
how customer margins or other guarantee money will be deposited by or 
returned to the customer.
    II-1-2.1(5)(i) and (ii) of the Inspection Manual for FIBOs requires 
RFIs/FIBOs to develop internal controls to verify compliance with these 
documentation requirements, including a system to verify that the 
written documents were issued before the agreements were concluded. 
Such internal controls must be approved by the RFI's/FIBO's board of 
directors. In addition, pursuant to IV(1) of the Checklist for Business 
Risk Management (Governance) of the Inspection Manual for banks, banks 
are required to develop an external audit system to review the 
effectiveness of these internal controls on at least an annual basis. 
II-1-1.4(1) of the Inspection Manual for FIBOs requires a RFI/FIBO's 
board of directors to establish an internal audit system to verify the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of these internal controls by setting 
up a highly independent internal audit division.
    Commission Determination: The Japanese standards specified above 
require OTC derivative contracts entered into between RFIs/FIBOs and 
their customers to be confirmed in writing, which corresponds to the 
requirements of Commission regulation 23.504(b)(2).
    Pursuant to the FIEA, RFIs and FIBOs are required to document the 
computation method of the customer margins or other guarantee money 
that the customer is required to deposit regarding the swap 
transactions. This corresponds with Commission regulation 23.504(b)(3) 
and (b)(4)(i), which requires SDs and MSPs to engage in daily valuation 
with other SDs and MSPs, and financial entities.
    Under the Japanese standards, when concluding OTC derivative 
contracts with each other, counterparties must have agreed detailed 
procedures and processes in relation to: (a) identification, recording, 
and monitoring of disputes relating to the recognition or valuation of 
the contracts and to the exchange of collateral between counterparties, 
and (b) the resolution of disputes in a timely manner. These aspects of 
the Japanese standards correspond to the valuation documentation 
requirements under Commission regulation 23.504(b)(4), which also 
require use of market transactions for valuations to the extent 
practicable, or other objective criteria, and an agreement on detailed 
processes for valuation dispute resolution for purposes of complying 
with margin requirements.
    Generally identical in intent to Sec.  23.504(b)(2), (3), and (4), 
the Japanese confirmation and valuation documentation requirements are 
designed to reduce the legal, operational, counterparty credit, and 
market risk that can arise from undocumented transactions or terms, 
reducing the risk of collateral and legal disputes, and exposure of 
counterparties to significant counterparty credit risk.
    Moreover, generally identical in intent to Sec.  23.504(a)(2), 
(b)(1), (c), and (d), the Japanese standards require that SDs and MSPs 
establish policies and procedures, including audit procedures, approved 
in writing by senior management of the SD or MSP, reasonably designed 
to ensure that they have entered into swap trading relationship 
documentation in compliance with appropriate standards with each 
counterparty prior to or contemporaneously with entering into a swap 
transaction with such counterparty.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission finds the confirmation and valuation documentation 
requirements of the Japanese standards specified above are comparable 
to and as comprehensive as the swap trading relationship documentation 
requirements of Commission regulations 23.504(a)(2), (b)(1), (2), (3), 
and (4), (c), and (d).
    The foregoing comparability determination does not extend to the 
requirement that such documentation include notice of the status of the 
counterparty under the orderly liquidation procedures of Title II of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, and the effect of clearing on swaps executed 
bilaterally.\41\
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    \41\ See Sec.  23.504(b)(5) and (6).

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[[Page 78896]]

B. Daily Trading Records (Sec.  23.202)

    Commission Requirement: Section 4s(g)(1) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.202 generally require that SDs and MSPs retain daily 
trading records for swaps and related cash and forward transactions, 
including:
     Documents on which transaction information is originally 
recorded;
     All information necessary to conduct a comprehensive and 
accurate trade reconstruction;
     Pre-execution trade information including records of all 
oral and written communications concerning quotes, solicitations, bids, 
offers, instructions, trading, and prices that lead to the execution of 
a swap or related cash and forward transactions, whether communicated 
by phone, fax, instant messaging, chat rooms, email, mobile device, or 
other digital or electronic media;
     Reliable timing date for the initiation of a trade;
     A record of the time, to the nearest minute using 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), of each quotation provided or 
received prior to trade execution;
     Execution trade information including the terms of each 
swap and related cash or forward transaction, terms regarding payment 
or settlement, initial and variation margin requirements, option 
premiums, and other cash flows;
     The trade ticket for each swap and related cash or forward 
transaction;
     The date and time of execution of each swap and related 
cash or forward transaction to the nearest minute using UTC;
     The identity of the counterparty and the date and title of 
the agreement to which each swap is subject, including any swap trading 
relationship documentation and credit support arrangements;
     The product name and identifier, the price at which the 
swap was executed, and the fees, commissions and other expenses 
applicable;
     Post-execution trade information including records of 
confirmation, termination, novation, amendment, assignment, netting, 
compression, reconciliation, valuation, margining, collateralization, 
and central clearing;
     The time of confirmation to the nearest minute using UTC;
     Ledgers of payments and interest received, moneys borrowed 
and loaned, daily swap valuations, and daily calculation of current and 
potential future exposure for each counterparty;
     Daily calculation of initial and variation margin 
requirements;
     Daily calculation of the value of collateral, including 
haircuts;
     Transfers of collateral, including substitutions, and the 
types of collateral transferred; and
     Credits and debits for each counterparty's account.
    Daily trading records must be maintained in a form and manner 
identifiable and searchable by transaction and counterparty, and 
records of swaps must be maintained for the duration of the swap plus 
five years, and voice recordings for one year. Records must be 
``readily accessible'' for the first two years of the five year 
retention period (consistent with Sec.  1.31).
    Regulatory Objective: Through Sec.  23.202, the Commission seeks to 
ensure that an SD's or MSP's records include all information necessary 
to conduct a comprehensive and accurate trade reconstruction for each 
swap, which necessarily requires the records to be identifiable by 
transaction and counterparty. Complete and accurate trade 
reconstruction is critical for both regulatory oversight and 
investigations of illegal activity pursuant to the Commission's 
enforcement authority. The Commission believes that a comprehensive and 
accurate trade reconstruction requires records of pre-execution, 
execution, and post-execution trade information.
    Comparable Japanese Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Japan are in full force and effect in Japan, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(g) of the CEA and 
Commission regulation 23.202.
    Article 156-64(1) and (2) of the FIEA, II-2-1 2.(1)(iv) of the FIBO 
Inspection Manual, and II.1.1(3)(iii) of the Checklist for Customer 
Protection Management, requires a RFI/FIBO to retain records for swaps 
and related cash and forward transactions, including:
     Documents prior to the conclusion of a contract that 
outline the terms of a swap transaction;
     24-hour audio recordings of trading by dealers;
     Order tickets for each swap and related cash or forward 
transactions;
     The date and time the order was accepted and the date and 
time the order was filled, both of which must be recorded by time of 
day, of each swap and related cash or forward transaction;
     Product name (items to be listed in the books and 
documents may be entered using codes, brevity codes or any other 
symbols that have been standardized by the relevant RFI/FIBO);
     Price at which the swap was executed, and the fees, 
commissions and other expenses applicable;
     Documents upon conclusion of a contract that contain an 
outline of swap transactions, the name of the customer, as well as 
trading daily books and customer account ledgers that contain 
transaction histories;
     Ledgers of the customer fees, margin transaction payment 
interest, margin transactions receipt interest, security borrowing fee 
or security lending fee;
     Guarantee money on deposit, customer margin, trade margin 
or other matters regarding collateral property (the distinction between 
cash or security, etc. deposited as margin, date of receipt or date of 
return, issue name, volume or amount of money); and
     Debit or credit of money and balances of all accounts.
    Pursuant to the OTC Derivative Ordinance, FIEA Enforcement Order, 
FIB Ordinance, and the Supervisory Guideline for FIBOs, records of 
swaps of RFIs/FIBOs must be in writing and maintained for a period from 
5 to 10 years, depending on the specific record at issue. III-16(iv) of 
the Checklist for Market Risk Management of the Inspection Manual for 
banks assesses whether voice recordings are maintained for all traders 
on a 24-hour basis, recorded tapes are stored for a prescribed period 
of time, and retained ``under the control of an organization segregated 
from the market and back-office divisions.''.
    III-2-(1)(viii) in Exhibit 1 of the Checklist for Operational Risk 
Management of the Inspection Manual for banks and II-2-1.2(1) of the 
Inspection Manual for FIBOs assesses whether documentary evidence such 
as transaction data are stored for a period specified by the internal 
rules and operational procedures, etc., but at least one year.
    In addition, III-3-10-2(3) (iv) of Supervisory Guideline for banks 
specifically requires banks to have the personnel and systems to 
respond in a timely and appropriate manner to inspections and 
supervision provided by overseas regulatory authorities. In view of 
maintaining direct dialog and smooth communications with the relevant 
overseas regulatory authorities, this provision ensures the 
establishment of a reporting system which enables timely and 
appropriate reporting.
    Similarly, IV-5-2(i) of Supervisory Guideline for FIBOs would 
ensure the availability of information to a regulator promptly upon 
request. Under this provision, the JFSA assesses whether a designated 
parent company of a FIBO

[[Page 78897]]

ensures group-wide compliance with the relevant laws, regulations and 
rules of each country in which it does business by establishing an 
appropriate control environment for legal compliance in accordance with 
the size of its overseas bases and the characteristics of its business 
operations.
    The JFSA has informed the Commission that, in the process of its 
oversight and enforcement of the foregoing Japanese standards for FIBOs 
and RFIs, any SD or MSP would be subject to such standards and required 
to record pre-execution trade information, communicated by not only 
telephone but also other forms of communication comparable to those 
listed in Sec.  23.202(a)(1) and (b)(1).
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that compliance with 
Japanese standards would enable the relevant competent authority to 
conduct a comprehensive and accurate trade reconstruction for each 
swap, which the Commission finds generally meets the regulatory 
objective of Sec.  23.202.
    In addition, the Commission finds that the Japanese standards 
specified above would ensure Commission access to the required books 
and records of SDs and MSPs by requiring personnel and systems 
necessary to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to inspections 
and supervision provided by overseas regulatory authorities.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the daily trading records 
requirements of Japan's standards are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.202.

    Issued in Washington, DC on December 20, 2013, by the 
Commission.
Melissa D. Jurgens,
Secretary of the Commission.

Appendices to Comparability Determination for Japan: Certain 
Transaction-Level Requirements

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Chilton and 
Wetjen voted in the affirmative. Commissioner O'Malia voted in the 
negative.

Appendix 2--Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler and Commissioners 
Chilton and Wetjen

    We support the Commission's approval of broad comparability 
determinations that will be used for substituted compliance 
purposes. For each of the six jurisdictions that has registered swap 
dealers, we carefully reviewed each regulatory provision of the 
foreign jurisdictions submitted to us and compared the provision's 
intended outcome to the Commission's own regulatory objectives. The 
resulting comparability determinations for entity-level requirements 
permit non-U.S. swap dealers to comply with regulations in their 
home jurisdiction as a substitute for compliance with the relevant 
Commission regulations.
    These determinations reflect the Commission's commitment to 
coordinating our efforts to bring transparency to the swaps market 
and reduce its risks to the public. The comparability findings for 
the entity-level requirements are a testament to the comparability 
of these regulatory systems as we work together in building a strong 
international regulatory framework.
    In addition, we are pleased that the Commission was able to find 
comparability with respect to swap-specific transaction-level 
requirements in the European Union and Japan.
    The Commission attained this benchmark by working cooperatively 
with authorities in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Switzerland to reach mutual agreement. The 
Commission looks forward to continuing to collaborate with both 
foreign authorities and market participants to build on this 
progress in the months and years ahead.

Appendix 3--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia

    I respectfully dissent from the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission's (``Commission'') approval of the Notices of 
Comparability Determinations for Certain Requirements under the laws 
of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Switzerland (collectively, ``Notices''). While I support the narrow 
comparability determinations that the Commission has made, moving 
forward, the Commission must collaborate with foreign regulators to 
harmonize our respective regimes consistent with the G-20 reforms.
    However, I cannot support the Notices because they: (1) Are 
based on the legally unsound cross-border guidance 
(``Guidance'');\1\ (2) are the result of a flawed substituted 
compliance process; and (3) fail to provide a clear path moving 
forward. If the Commission's objective for substituted compliance is 
to develop a narrow rule-by-rule approach that leaves unanswered 
major regulatory gaps between our regulatory framework and foreign 
jurisdictions, then I believe that the Commission has successfully 
achieved its goal today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 26, 
2013).
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Determinations Based on Legally Unsound Guidance

    As I previously stated in my dissent, the Guidance fails to 
articulate a valid statutory foundation for its overbroad scope and 
inconsistently applies the statute to different activities.\2\ Section 
2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') states that the Commission 
does not have jurisdiction over foreign activities unless ``those 
activities have a direct and significant connection with activities in, 
or effect on, commerce of the United States . . .'' \3\ However, the 
Commission never properly articulated how and when this limiting 
standard on the Commission's extraterritorial reach is met, which would 
trigger the application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act\4\ and any 
Commission regulations promulgated thereunder to swap activities that 
are outside of the United States. Given this statutorily unsound 
interpretation of the Commission's extraterritorial authority, the 
Commission often applies CEA section 2(i) inconsistently and 
arbitrarily to foreign activities.
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    \2\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
    \3\ CEA section 2(i); 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
    \4\ Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, because the Commission is relying on the legally 
deficient Guidance to make its substituted compliance determinations, 
and for the reasons discussed below, I cannot support the Notices. The 
Commission should have collaborated with foreign regulators to agree on 
and implement a workable regime of substituted compliance, and then 
should have made determinations pursuant to that regime.

Flawed Substituted Compliance Process

    Substituted compliance should not be a case of picking a set of 
foreign rules identical to our rules, determining them to be 
``comparable,'' but then making no determination regarding rules that 
require extensive gap analysis to assess to what extent each 
jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable based on overall outcomes of the 
regulatory regimes. While I support the narrow comparability 
determinations that the Commission has made, I am concerned that in a 
rush to provide some relief, the Commission has made substituted 
compliance determinations that only afford narrow relief and fail to 
address major regulatory gaps between our domestic regulatory framework 
and foreign jurisdictions. I will address a few examples below.
    First, earlier this year, the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group 
(``ODRG'') agreed to a number of substantive understandings to improve 
the cross-border implementation of over-the-counter derivatives 
reforms.\5\ The ODRG specifically agreed that a flexible, outcomes-
based approach, based on a broad category-by-category basis, should

[[Page 78898]]

form the basis of comparability determinations.\6\
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    \5\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6678-13.
    \6\ http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/odrgreport.pdf. The ODRG agreed to six understandings. 
Understanding number 2 states that ``[a] flexible, outcomes-based 
approach should form the basis of final assessments regarding 
equivalence or substituted compliance.''
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    However, instead of following this approach, the Commission has 
made its comparability determinations on a rule-by-rule basis. For 
example, in Japan's Comparability Determination for Transaction-Level 
Requirements, the Commission has made a positive comparability 
determination for some of the detailed requirements under the swap 
trading relationship documentation provisions, but not for other 
requirements.\7\ This detailed approach clearly contravenes the ODRG's 
understanding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The Commission made a positive comparability determination 
for Commission regulations 23.504(a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), 
(b)(4), (c), and (d), but not for Commission regulations 
23.504(b)(5) and (b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, in several areas, the Commission has declined to consider a 
request for a comparability determination, and has also failed to 
provide an analysis regarding the extent to which the other 
jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable. For example, the Commission has 
declined to address or provide any clarity regarding the European 
Union's regulatory data reporting determination, even though the 
European Union's reporting regime is set to begin on February 12, 2014. 
Although the Commission has provided some limited relief with respect 
to regulatory data reporting, the lack of clarity creates unnecessary 
uncertainty, especially when the European Union's reporting regime is 
set to begin in less than two months.
    Similarly, Japan receives no consideration for its mandatory 
clearing requirement, even though the Commission considers Japan's 
legal framework to be comparable to the U.S. framework. While the 
Commission has declined to provide even a partial comparability 
determination, at least in this instance the Commission has provided a 
reason: the differences in the scope of entities and products subject 
to the clearing requirement.\8\ Such treatment creates uncertainty and 
is contrary to increased global harmonization efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Yen-denominated interest rate swaps are subject to the 
mandatory clearing requirement in both the U.S. and Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, in the Commission's rush to meet the artificial deadline of 
December 21, 2013, as established in the Exemptive Order Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (``Exemptive Order''),\9\ the 
Commission failed to complete an important piece of the cross-border 
regime, namely, supervisory memoranda of understanding (``MOUs'') 
between the Commission and fellow regulators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap 
Regulations, 78 FR 43785 (Jul. 22, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I have previously stated that these MOUs, if done right, can be a 
key part of the global harmonization effort because they provide 
mutually agreed-upon solutions for differences in regulatory 
regimes.\10\ Accordingly, I stated that the Commission should be able 
to review MOUs alongside the respective comparability determinations 
and vote on them at the same time. Without these MOUs, our fellow 
regulators are left wondering whether and how any differences, such as 
direct access to books and records, will be resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, as I have consistently maintained, the substituted 
compliance process should allow other regulatory bodies to engage with 
the full Commission.\11\ While I am pleased that the Notices are being 
voted on by the Commission, the full Commission only gained access to 
the comment letters from foreign regulators on the Commission's 
comparability determination draft proposals a few days ago. This is 
hardly a transparent process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unclear Path Forward

    Looking forward to next steps, the Commission must provide answers 
to several outstanding questions regarding these comparability 
determinations. In doing so, the Commission must collaborate with 
foreign regulators to increase global harmonization.
    First, there is uncertainty surrounding the timing and outcome of 
the MOUs. Critical questions regarding information sharing, 
cooperation, supervision, and enforcement will remain unanswered until 
the Commission and our fellow regulators execute these MOUs.
    Second, the Commission has issued time-limited no-action relief for 
the swap data repository reporting requirements. These comparability 
determinations will be done as separate notices. However, the timing 
and process for these determinations remain uncertain.
    Third, the Commission has failed to provide clarity on the process 
for addressing the comparability determinations that it declined to 
undertake at this time. The Notices only state that the Commission may 
address these requests in a separate notice at a later date given 
further developments in the law and regulations of other jurisdictions. 
To promote certainty in the financial markets, the Commission must 
provide a clear path forward for market participants and foreign 
regulators.
    The following steps would be a better approach: (1) The Commission 
should extend the Exemptive Order to allow foreign regulators to 
further implement their regulatory regimes and coordinate with them to 
implement a harmonized substituted compliance process; (2) the 
Commission should implement a flexible, outcomes-based approach to the 
substituted compliance process and apply it similarly to all 
jurisdictions; and (3) the Commission should work closely with our 
fellow regulators to expeditiously implement MOUs that resolve 
regulatory differences and address regulatory oversight issues.

Conclusion

    While I support the narrow comparability determinations that the 
Commission has made, it was my hope that the Commission would work with 
foreign regulators to implement a substituted compliance process that 
would increase the global harmonization effort. I am disappointed that 
the Commission has failed to implement such a process.
    I do believe that in the longer term, the swaps regulations of the 
major jurisdictions will converge. At this time, however, the 
Commission's comparability determinations have done little to alleviate 
the burden of regulatory uncertainty and duplicative compliance with 
both U.S. and foreign regulations.
    The G-20 process delineated and put in place the swaps market 
reforms in G-20 member nations. It is then no surprise that the 
Commission must learn to coordinate with foreign regulators to minimize 
confusion and disruption in bringing much needed clarity to the swaps 
market. For all these shortcomings, I respectfully dissent from the 
Commission's approval of the Notices.
[FR Doc. 2013-30977 Filed 12-26-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```