UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. AARON NEAL SAFFORD, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-8029 (D.C. No. 1:16- CV-00154-SWS) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE, HARTZ , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Defendant Aaron Neal Safford seeks a cer tificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the dismissal by the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring COA to appeal denial of relief un der § 2255). We grant a COA but affirm the dismissal on the merits. Although Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015), held that the residual clause of the Ar med Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18

* After examining the briefs and appellate re cord, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34. 1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judg ment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 27, 2017 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 U.S.C. § 924(e), 1 violates due process b ecause it is unconstitutionally vague, Defendant was not sentenced under that clause. In February 2010, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm . See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 92 4(a)(2). The presentence report, without objection from Defendant, determined that Defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum 15-year sentence impos ed by the ACCA because he had three predicate convictions: namely, two convictio ns for serious drug offenses (unlawful distribution of a controlled s ubstance) and one conviction fo r a violent felony (burglary under Wyoming law). On May 14, 2010, Defendant was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal. A year later, Defendant moved for relief under § 2255, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for failure to advise him of the consequences of his guilty plea. The district court set an evidentiary hearing an d appointed counsel to represent Defendant, instructing counsel to pay particular atte ntion to (1) whether Defendant’s attorney advised him of the 15-year mandatory mi nimum, (2) whether Defendant had a full understanding of his potentia l sentence, and (3) whether Defendant would still have pleaded guilty had he known he faced a potential 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.

1 The ACCA defines a violent felony as any offense that (1) “h as as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the elements clause); (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] invol ves use of explosives” (the enumerated-offenses clause); or (3) “o therwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (the invalid ated residual clause). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The statute imposes enhanced sentences on certain defendants with three previous convictions for violen t felonies or serious drug offenses. See id. at § 924(e)(1).3 Before the scheduled hearing, Defendant ’s newly appointed attorney and the government filed with the district cour t a “Stipulated Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice.” Although the motion said that defense counsel had determined that Defendant had not been adequa tely advised by his counsel regarding the ACCA sentence, it further stated that Defendant was eligible to be senten ced under the ACCA, in part because his prior conviction fo r burglary was a conviction fo r generic burglar y, which is an enumerated offense under the ACCA; and, most notably, it said that Defendant now believed that, even had he been properly advised, he would still have pleaded guilty. The court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice on February 19, 2013. In June 2015 the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson held that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutional. After Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016), held that Johnson is to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, Defendant obtained authorizati on from this court to file a second-or-successive motion under § 2255 to argue that Johnson invalidated his ACCA sentence enhancement. Upon consideration of the motion, however, the district court dismissed it because the sentencing court had not relied upon the now-invalid residual clause. After Defendant filed his initial pro se brief, we granted hi s motion to appoint counsel. Counsel’s brief sharpens and expands the arguments in the pro se brief. It relies

on Johnson , but only indirectly. The central poi nt of the brief is that Defendant’s Wyoming burglary conviction can not serve as an ACCA pred icate under the enumeratedoffenses clause if the cour t applies the approach of Mathis v. United States , 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), which abrogated Tenth Circu it precedent holding that Wyoming burglary4 could be a violent fe lony under that clause. He argues that Johnson is relevant because
pre- Johnson it would have been futile to challe nge Wyoming burglary as not coming under the enumerated-offenses clause. Until Johnson , he argues, the application of the residual clause would have de feated any claim that the burglary conviction was not a predicate offense under the ACCA. In other word s, he contends that he is truly raising a Johnson claim because his Mathis claim did not become ripe until Johnson , even though he is not raising a due-process vagueness cl aim. Further, Defendant contends that his sentence violates due process because he is st atutorily ineligible fo r that sentence. We are not persuaded. We re jected the same arguments in United States v. Westover , No. 17-8013, 2017 WL 4900449 (10th Cir. Oct. 31, 2017)

. As we stated there, our opinion in United States v. Snyder , 871 F.3d 1122, 1128–29 ( 10th Cir. 2017), requires us to evaluate Johnson claims by examining the record to determine whether the ACCA sentence enhancement was in fact based on th e residual clause. The “mere ‘option’ of applying the ACCA’s residual cl ause [does not] constitute[] a Johnson error.” Id. at *3. What Defendant is attempting is to leverage the irrelevant Johnson decision to enable him to apply Mathis retroactively. We can admire the effort, but we cannot permit such a circumvention of habeas law.5 We AFFIRM the denial of Defendant’s motion. We DENY defendant’s Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis as moot. Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge