alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       5,937,686
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             7,000,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 42,474,916
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      42,210,875
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        42,474,916
<LOANS>                                    111,445,793
<ALLOWANCE>                                  2,023,752
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             181,861,275
<DEPOSITS>                                 164,639,201
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,419,094
<LONG-TERM>                                    874,574
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        6,147,995
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,780,411
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             181,861,275
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             10,167,293
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            2,595,576
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            12,762,869
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           6,067,043
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           6,152,538
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        6,610,331
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  620,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              8,104,425
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,724,361
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,724,361
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,388,733
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.07
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.52
<LOANS-NON>                                    202,434
<LOANS-PAST>                                     3,815
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                549,076
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             1,740,065
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  355,637
<RECOVERIES>                                    19,324
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            2,023,752
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         2,023,752
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### Thomas R. PACKARD, Appellant, v. David W. RIPPLE, Appellee.

No. 87-2159.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 13, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 1988.

Ezell, Menendez, Patterson, Claussen & Daniel, William D. Matthewman, Miami, for appellant.

William J. Brown, Miami, for appellee.

Before HUBBART, NESBITT, and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

*992PER CURIAM.

Packard’s original complaint stating a cause of action for fraud in the inducement contained conclusory allegations of mental condition and failed to allege sufficient facts to maintain that claim. *See Arnold, v. Week,*388 So.2d 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), *review denied,*399 So.2d 1140 (Fla.1981), citing *American Int’l Land Corp. v. Hanna,*323 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1975). The phraseology used in the arbitration clause was not ambiguous, and the matter was properly referred to arbitration. *See Larry Kent Homes, Inc. v. Empire of America FSA,*474 So.2d 868 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable and public policy favors arbitration as an alternative to litigation), *review denied,*484 So.2d 7 (Fla.1986). *See also Physician’s Weight Loss Centers of America, Inc. v. Payne,*461 So.2d 977, 978, n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). An arbitration award may not be vacated upon mistake of fact or law but only upon statutory grounds. *McDonald v. Hardy County School Board,*448 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA), *review denied,*456 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1984); *see also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hudnall,*279 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONSPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of U.S. Premium Beef, LLC (the Company) onForm 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Steven D. Hunt, ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that: 

     (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

     (2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

|   |   |                                    |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------|
| By:    |   | /s/ Steven D. Hunt                      |
|   |   |                                    |
|   |   | Steven D. Hunt*Chief Executive Officer* |

Date: August 9, 2012
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         579,488
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,882
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    282,904
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,030,080
<PP&E>                                       9,710,672
<DEPRECIATION>                               (423,674)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,050,695
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,765,829
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  1,024,997
<COMMON>                                        18,795
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,050,695
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,354,447
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               146,902
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             238,851
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,631,905)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,631,905)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,631,905)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### BROWN AND ROOT, INC. and Highlands Insurance Co. v. Joseph L. MALLON.

No. 58133.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 9, 1989.

William D. Blakeslee, Bryant, Stennis & Colingo, Gulfport, for appellants.

Rex Gordon, Sr., Gordon, Myers & Frazier, Pascagoula, for appellee.

Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Darwin M. Maples, Judge.

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 21.1**

 

DQE has the following direct subsidiaries,all of which are wholly or majority owned: 

 

Duquesne Light Company, a Pennsylvania corporation 

AquaSource, Inc., a Delaware corporation

DQE Energy Services, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company 

DQE Financial Corp., a Delaware corporation 

DQE Enterprises, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation 

DQE Systems, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation 

Duquesne Power Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation 

DQE Capital Corporation, a Delaware corporation 

Cherrington Insurance Ltd., a Bermuda corporation
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-4414

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KENNETH WAYNE ODOM, a/k/a Kenny,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(CR-04-559)

Submitted: December 14, 2006 Decided: December 18, 2006

Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henry M. Anderson, Jr., ANDERSON LAW FIRM, PA, Florence, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United States

Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Kenneth Wayne Odom appeals his conviction and 120-month

sentence pursuant to his guilty pleas to one count of conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute marijuana and five grams or more

of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A) (2000), and one count of using a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).

Counsel for Odom has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (2000), in which he states there are no

meritorious issues for appeal, but presenting one issue for our

review. Counsel suggests the district court erred in denying

Odom’s motion for a downward departure due to Odom’s extraordinary

physical condition. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.4

(2003).

A district court’s decision not to depart from the

sentencing guidelines is not subject to appellate review unless the

refusal to depart is based on the mistaken belief that the court

lacked jurisdiction to depart. United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d

666, 682 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d

28, 30-31 (4th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Cooper, 437

F.3d 324, 333 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases adopting this rule

after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). Here, the

district court recognized its authority to depart but found, under
- 3 -

the circumstances of Odom’s case, that departure was not warranted.

Thus, this claim is not subject to appellate review. Quinn, 359

F.3d at 682.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record for any meritorious issues and have found none.

Accordingly, we affirm Odom’s conviction and sentence. This court

requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but his

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 59 (Tuesday, March 27, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 18268]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7293]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Notice of Permit Modification Issued Under the Antarctic 
Conservation Act of 1978

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of permit modification issued under the Antarctic 
Conservation of 1978, Public Law 95-541.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Science Foundation (NSF) is required to publish 
notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. 
This is the required notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nadene G. Kennedy, Permit Officer, 
Office of Polar Programs, Rm. 755, National Science Foundation, 4201 
Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 12, 2012, notice was published in 
the Federal Register of a request for modification to permit 2010 WM-04 
(RPSC) for waste management activities at all U.S. Antarctic Program 
facilities in Antarctica. The requested modification transfers 
responsibility for waste management activities from the incumbent 
support contractor, Raytheon Polar Services Company, to Lockheed Martin 
Corporation. The transfer modified the permit to change the permit 
holder from Raytheon Polar Services Company to Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, who is the sole holder of the permit. All special 
conditions of the original permit remain the same except for the change 
in name of the permit holder. All references to Raytheon Polar Services 
Company now apply to Lockheed Martine Corporation.

Nadene G. Kennedy,
Permit Officer.
[FR Doc. 2012-7293 Filed 3-26-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Main Street and Main
Incorporated (the "Company") for the year ended December 30, 2002, as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Michael Garnreiter, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

MAIN STREET AND MAIN INCORPORATED

/s/ Michael Garnreiter
Michael Garnreiter
Chief Financial Officer

Date:  May 6, 2003








A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided  to Main  Street and Main  Incorporated  and will be  retained  by Main
Street and Main  Incorporated  and  furnished  to the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission and its staff upon request.
#### Joseph L. RIVERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-0602.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 1, 1988.

Rehearing Denied July 13, 1988.

*984Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tanja Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Alfonso M. Saldana, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Although we reject appellant’s contention that the state's proof was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction for first degree murder, we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial on the authority of *Richardson v. State,*246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971).

The state presented testimony at trial of a witness to whom the appellant made a specific threat to kill the victim. The victim was killed later on the same night and the time, place and manner of killing were chillingly similar to the threat made by the appellant to the witness. Other persons also testified to threats against the victim made by the appellant. We believe this evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue as to appellant’s guilt or innocence.

We reverse for a new trial in accord with *Richardson*because we find that the state failed to disclose the results of tests done on the appellant’s clothing that possibly linked the appellant to the crime, until midway in the trial. *Richardson*absolutely mandates a determination by the trial court as to whether the failure to disclose such evidence prejudiced the appellant’s ability to prepare for trial and defend against such evidence. The record reflects no such determination by the trial court despite the appellant’s objection to the evidence and the critical nature of the evidence. This evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the state, was the only physical evidence linking the appellant to the crime. In addition, the test results and testimony of the state’s expert indicated an uncertainty as to whether the evidence was reliable in linking the appellant to the crime. While the appellant seeks a ruling that the evidence should not be admitted in a retrial, we stop short of such a ruling but caution that the evidence should be closely scrutinized if offered again at trial.

We also agree with appellant that no reference to appellant’s photograph coming from prior police records should be allowed upon retrial. We reject appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying a proposed instruction on circumstantial evidence. That will be a matter to be decided in the trial court’s discretion on retrial. *See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases,*431 So.2d 594 (Fla.1981).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial in accord with the above.

ANSTEAD and DELL, JJ., and WARNER, MARTHA C., Associate Judge, concur.
Exhibit 32


      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT FOF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Group, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, Michael H. Lee,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Francis M. Colalucci,
Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
and 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and


            (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





/s/  Michael H. Lee
---------------------------------------------------------
Michael H. Lee
President and Chief Executive Officer

May 4, 2007



/s/  Francis M. Colalucci
----------------------------------------------------------
Francis M. Colalucci
Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

May 4, 2007

                                       25
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

MANUEL MORALES, 

Defendant Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Plaintiff Below, 

Appellee. 

§ 

§ 

§ No. 565, 2014 

§ 

§ 

§ Court Below—Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware, 

§ in and for New Castle County 

§ Cr. No. 1309012678 

§ 

§ 

 Submitted: October 10, 2014

 Decided: October 20, 2014 

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices. 

ORDER

This 20th day of October 2014, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On October 2, 2014, the appellant, Manuel Morales, filed a notice of 

appeal from his conviction on criminal charges in the Superior Court on May 20, 

2014. The appellant has not yet been sentenced. The Senior Court Clerk issued a 

notice to the appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for 

this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to consider an appeal in a criminal matter in the 

Superior Court where the defendant has yet to be sentenced. 

(2) The appellant filed a response to the notice to show cause on October 

10, 2014. In his response, the appellant states that he is scheduled to be sentenced 

on October 31, 2014. The response addresses the merits of the appellant’s appeal, 
2

but does not respond to the jurisdictional limitation raised in the notice to show 

cause. 

(3) This Court’s jurisdiction in criminal cases is limited to the review of 

final judgments.1

 A criminal conviction does not become final until the sentence is 

imposed.2 The appellant has not yet been sentenced in this case. Accordingly, the 

appellant’s conviction is not final and the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 29(b), 

that this appeal is DISMISSED. 

BY THE COURT: 

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice 

 

1

 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1)(b). 

2 Hunter v. State, 209 A.2d 469, 470 (Del. 1965).
#### SOUTHERN STATES MASONRY, INC. v. J.A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland.

No. 86-C-2443.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 23, 1987.

In re Southern States Masonry, Inc.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. CA-296; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 317-388.

Prior report: La.App., 498 So.2d 151.

Granted. Consolidated for argument with 86-C-2544.