If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 21, 2019

V No. 341321

Saginaw Circuit Court

TRAVONTE MARCEL BROWN, LC No. 17-043543-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V No. 341806

Saginaw Circuit Court

BRISCO DEQOUNTERRIO SUTTON, LC No. 17-043542-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SERVITTO and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated cases, defendants Travonte Brown and Brisco Sutton appeal as of 

right their convictions of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, conspiracy to commit 

assault with intent to do great bodily harm, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.84, and two counts each of 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. In 

Docket No. 341806, the trial court sentence Sutton to serve 141⁄2 to 30 years for the assault with 

intent to murder conviction, 5 to 10 years for the conspiracy conviction, and 2 years for the 

felony-firearm convictions. In Docket No. 341321, the trial court sentenced Brown to serve 12 

to 20 years for the assault with intent to murder conviction, 5 to 10 years for the conspiracy 

conviction, and 2 years for the felony-firearm convictions. For both defendants, the sentences 

for the assault and conspiracy convictions are concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the 

felony-firearm convictions. In Docket No. 341806, we affirm Sutton’s convictions and 
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sentences. In Docket No. 341321, we affirm Brown’s convictions, but we vacate his sentences 

and remand for resentencing.1

I. BASIC FACTS

This case arises out of a shooting. On February 18, 2017, Sutton and Brown travelled to 

the home of Everlena Huddleson. When they arrived, Sutton climbed onto the hood of the 

vehicle and, with a gun in his hand, yelled at the house’s occupants to come out and fight. 

Brown banged on the front door until Huddleson opened it. Huddleson testified that Brown 

asked where the “men were” and told her to tell them to “come out and fight.” Huddleson 

recounted that she told him to leave and that there were no “men” present. She stated that, at one 

point, Brown shoved the door open further, knocking her back against the couch. Around the 

same time, Antonio Buford, Huddleson’s son, entered the room and exchanged words with 

Brown, who told him to come outside. Huddleson testified that she saw Sutton come up the 

stairs, then she heard a gunshot and Buford bent down and held his abdomen. Buford made his 

way to the bathroom dripping blood, and Brown and Sutton left. At trial, Brown testified that he 

went to Huddleson’s house because he saw the light on and wanted to resolve a dispute with 

Alonzo Mallet. Brown explained that in the days leading up to the shooting, Mallet had come to 

Brown’s house drunk, waving a machete, and demanding that Brown come out and fight him. 

Brown stated that he did not intend to commit the crimes charged and had no knowledge of 

whether Sutton intended to commit the crimes. Sutton admitted that he shot Buford, but he 

claimed he acted in self-defense.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions. 

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo. People v Ericksen, 288 

Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). In reviewing whether a conviction is supported by 

sufficient evidence, this Court examines the evidence presented to the jury in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a jury could have found that the prosecution 

proved the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Gaines, 306 Mich App 

289, 296; 856 NW2d 222 (2014). The reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable 

inferences and resolve all credibility questions in support of the verdict. People v Nowack, 462 

Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).

 1 The jury acquitted both defendants of a number of additional charges, including first-degree 

home invasion, conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, a count of felony-firearm with 

home invasion as the predicate felony, and assault and battery. Additionally, the jury only 

convicted defendants of conspiracy to commit assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, 

which was a lesser included offense of a charge of conspiracy to commit assault with intent to 

murder.
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B. ANALYSIS

“The elements of assault with intent to commit murder are (1) an assault, (2) with an 

actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Brown, 

267 Mich App 141, 147; 703 NW2d 230 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Both 

defendants argue that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions 

of assault with intent to commit murder. We address each in turn.

Sutton argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because he did not have 

an actual intent to kill Buford when he shot him in the stomach. The jury may infer intent from 

“the nature of the defendant’s acts constituting the assault; the temper or disposition of mind 

with which they were apparently performed, whether the instrument and means used were 

naturally adapted to produce death, his conduct and declarations prior to, at the time, and after 

the assault, and all other circumstances calculated to throw light upon the intention with which 

the assault was made.” People v Taylor, 422 Mich 554, 568; 375 NW2d 1 (1985) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Additionally, intent to kill can be inferred from the use of a deadly 

weapon. People v Henderson, 306 Mich App 1, 11; 854 NW2d 234 (2014). Viewing the facts in 

the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, Sutton and Brown travelled to Huddleson’s house 

sometime between 4:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. When they arrived, Sutton climbed onto the hood of 

their vehicle, held his gun in his hand, and yelled for the occupants of the house to come out and 

fight, and Brown banged on the door until it was opened. When Buford appeared in the hallway, 

Sutton aimed his gun and pulled the trigger, striking Buford in the stomach. Therefore, we hold 

that the evidence was sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Sutton assaulted Buford with the intent to kill.

Sutton also contends that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution failed to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in lawful self-defense when he shot 

Buford. A person may use deadly force against another if he or she is not engaged in the 

commission of a crime at the time, has the legal right to be at the location, and “honestly and 

reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or 

imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual.” MCL 780.972(1)(a). 

Because self-defense is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the initial burden of 

producing some evidence of it. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 247-248; 562 NW2d 447 

(1997). “Once evidence of self-defense is introduced, the prosecutor bears the burden of 

disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 20; 507 NW2d 

763 (1993). In support of his self-defense claim, Sutton testified that before the shooting, Buford 

had threatened to kill him and had, on one occasion, shot at him while he was on the street. He 

stated that on the morning of the shooting, he observed Buford with a gun and, in light of his 

prior history with Buford, he fired a shot. Brown also testified that he saw Buford with a gun 

before the shooting. However, contrary to defendants’ testimony, Buford testified that he did not 

have a gun, and Buford’s mother testified that she did not see Buford with a gun. Therefore, 

although Brown and Sutton testified to a different sequence of events, it is not the role of this 

Court to interfere with a jury’s “determinations regarding the weight of the evidence or the 

credibility of witnesses.” People v Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 628; 858 NW2d 98 (2014). 

Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, there was sufficient 

evidence that Buford did not have a gun, which negates Sutton’s claim that he acted to prevent 
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imminent death or imminent great bodily harm from being inflicted on himself or Brown. 

Consequently, Sutton’s sufficiency of the evidence argument is without merit.

Brown was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder on an aiding-and-abetting 

theory. The elements of aiding and abetting are

(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) 

the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission 

of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had 

knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the 

defendant] gave aid and encouragement. [People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 6; 715 

NW2d 44 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Additionally, “[a] defendant is criminally liable for the offenses the defendant specifically 

intends to aid or abet, or has knowledge of, as well as those crimes that are the natural and 

probable consequences of the offense he intends to aid or abet.” Id. at 15. “Therefore, the 

prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant aided or abetted the 

commission of an offense and that the defendant intended to aid the charged offense, knew the 

principal intended to commit the charged offense, or, alternatively, that the charged offense was 

a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the intended offense.” Id.

As explained above, there is sufficient evidence to establish that Sutton committed the 

crime of assault with intent to murder. Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to establish that 

Brown performed acts that assisted the commission of the crime. The record reflects that he 

drove Sutton to the Huddleson’s residence, banged on the front door until it was opened, 

demanded that the “men” come out and fight, and shoved the door open wider. Buford was shot 

through the open doorway. The question on appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence that, at 

the time, he provided the above assistance he intended the commission of the crime or had 

knowledge that Sutton intended it when he gave aid and encouragement. Viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, Buford and Sutton had a hostile history that 

included attempts by Buford to kill, or at the least intimidate, Sutton, by shooting at him. There 

was also testimony that Mallet, a member of Buford’s household, was regularly visiting Brown’s 

house with a knife or a bottle and demanding that Brown or Sutton come out and fight him. 

With that history in mind, Brown testified that when he saw the lights on at the house, he decided 

to confront Mallet. By his own words, he wanted the “men” to come out and fight. At that time, 

Sutton was on the hood of the car, holding a gun and yelling for the occupants of the house to 

come out and fight. Brown had been asked to leave—several times—by Huddleson, but he 

refused to do so. Taking those facts into consideration, the jury could reasonably infer that 

Brown went to the house looking for a fight. He banged on the door knowing that Sutton had a 

gun in his hand. He refused to leave and repeatedly demanded that the men come out of the 

house and fight. Thus, at the time he provided aid to Sutton, the jury could infer that he knew 

Sutton intended the commission of the crime. Or, alternatively, he knew that the natural and 

probable consequences of the crime included that someone would be shot and could die. There 

was sufficient evidence to support Brown’s conviction of assault with intent to commit murder.
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Next, defendants both argue that there was insufficient evidence to support their 

convictions of conspiracy of assault with intent to do great bodily harm. The elements of assault 

with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder include the following: “(1) an attempt or 

threat with force or violence to do corporal harm to another (an assault), and (2) an intent to do 

great bodily harm less than murder.” People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 

(1997). “A criminal conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes, under which two or more 

individuals voluntarily agree to effectuate the commission of a criminal offense.” People v 

Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 588; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). Conspirators “must specifically 

intend to combine to pursue the criminal objective, and the offense is complete upon the 

formation of the agreement.” Id. Proof of a conspiracy may be in the form of circumstantial 

evidence. Id. Thus, the prosecution need not present direct proof of the conspiracy and can 

instead establish the conspiracy using the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties. People 

v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 317; 721 NW2d 815 (2006).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could 

infer that after being harassed by Mallet for a number of days and after being shot at by Buford, 

Brown and Sutton decided to take matters into their own hands. Brown woke Sutton sometime

between 4:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. and they went to Huddleson’s house. Once there, Sutton stood 

on the hood of the vehicle, yelling for a fight, and holding a gun in his hand. Brown went up the 

steps, opened the screen door, and banged on the inside door until Huddleson opened it. He then 

demanded, repeatedly, that the men in the house come out and fight. The record reflects that 

Brown and Sutton knew the occupants of the house included Buford and Mallet, so the demand 

that the “men” come out was a demand that both Buford and Mallet emerge. And both Brown 

and Sutton were yelling for the men to come out to fight. When issuing that challenge, Sutton 

had a gun in his hand. Although Brown claimed he did not know Sutton had a gun, the jury 

could reasonably infer that he saw Sutton on the hood of the vehicle with the gun in his hand. 

Moreover, Sutton testified that he carried a gun on a daily basis, and there was testimony that 

Sutton and Brown were “like brothers.” Based on that testimony, the jury could reasonably infer 

that Brown knew Sutton carried a gun on his person as a matter of course. Thus, a jury could 

infer, based on the actions and circumstances, that Brown and Sutton formed an agreement to 

travel to Huddleson’s residence and assault the men living there. Further, given that they 

brought a drawn gun into their challenge, the jury could also infer that they intended to inflict 

great bodily harm on Buford and Mallet should the circumstances permit. The jury’s verdict 

against both defendants is supported by the evidence.

Finally, both defendants argue that, because there was insufficient evidence to support 

their convictions for assault with intent to murder and conspiracy to commit assault with the 

intent to do great bodily harm, their convictions for felony-firearm are likewise supported by 

insufficient evidence. The elements of felony-firearm are “(1) the defendant attempted to 

commit a felony or committed a felony (2) while he or she had a firearm in her or her possession 

. . . .” See People v Bryant, 319 Mich App 207, 212; 900 NW2d 360 (2017). Given that there is 

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that each defendant committed two felonies 

while possessing a firearm, there is also sufficient evidence to support their convictions of 

felony-firearm.
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III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Brown argues that the prosecutor’s improper, sarcastic remarks during cross-examination 

denied him a fair trial. Unpreserved issues involving prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for 

plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 

755 NW2d 664 (2008). “Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction 

of an innocent defendant, or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

“The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and 

impartial trial.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Prosecutorial 

misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing court must examine the 

record and evaluate challenged remarks in context. People v Mann, 288 Mich App 114, 119 

(2010); 792 NW2d 53 (2010). Prosecutorial comments must be evaluated as a whole in the light 

of the relationship that they bear to the evidence admitted at trial as well as to the arguments 

from the defense. Brown, 279 Mich App at 135.

At trial, Brown testified that Sutton was “like a brother” to him. The prosecutor then 

used the descriptive phrase “like-a-brother” when asking Brown questions about Sutton. We 

discern no impropriety in the prosecutor’s remarks. They were based on Brown’s testimony and 

were used to undermine his theory of the case given that he denied knowing of Sutton’s firearm 

and denied conspiring with Sutton to assault anyone living at Huddleson’s house. The fact that 

the prosecutor did not advance his case using “the blandest possible terms,” does not constitute 

prosecutorial misconduct. Dobek, 274 Mich App at 66. Similarly, given that Brown testified 

that he asked his mother for help when confronting Mallet, the prosecutor’s comment on that 

evidence was not improper. Moreover, when viewed in context, the prosecutor was seeking to 

establish the sequence of events leading up to the shooting and bring to light inconsistencies 

between Brown’s testimony and his mother’s testimony. For instance, Brown’s mother testified 

that she was woken by Mallet, but Brown testified that he woke his mother so she would send 

Mallet away before Brown went out and “beat” him. There is no prosecutorial misconduct.2

 2 Given that there was no prosecutorial misconduct, Brown’s lawyer did not provide ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to it. See Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201 (stating that failing to 

raise a meritless or futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance).
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IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Sutton argues that his lawyers provided ineffective assistance. Because he did not

preserve his challenge to his lawyer’s effectiveness, our review is limited to errors apparent on 

the existing record. People Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).

B. ANALYSIS

“Both the Michigan and the United States Constitutions require that a criminal defendant 

enjoy the assistance of counsel for his or her defense.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 

826 NW2d 136 (2012), citing US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Effective assistance of 

a lawyer is presumed and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v 

Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 670; 821 NW2d 288 (2012). To establish ineffective assistance of a 

lawyer, a defendant must show (1) that his lawyer’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his lawyer’s

error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 

668, 691-692; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).

Sutton argues that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to introduce a video of Buford 

threatening to kill him. However, although a video was apparently available showing that 

Buford threatened Sutton, it appears that Sutton’s lawyer made a strategic decision to introduce 

evidence of the threats through testimony from Sutton and Sutton’s grandmother. See People v 

Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004) (opinion by COOPER, J.) (stating that 

what evidence to present, including whether to call or how to question witnesses, is presumed to 

be a matter of trial strategy which this Court will not second-guess with the benefit of hindsight). 

Moreover, even if Sutton’s lawyer’s performance was deficient on this basis, Sutton cannot 

establish prejudice. Evidence of the threats was already before the jury, and, given that it 

rejected the self-defense theory, cumulative evidence supporting the existence of threats was not 

outcome determinative.

Next, Sutton argues that his lawyer should have cross examined the prosecution’s 

witnesses differently with respect to whether Buford’s home was searched for a gun. Sutton 

does not specify which witness or witnesses his lawyer should have cross examined and exactly 

what additional questions should have been asked. Nor has Sutton made an offer of proof as to 

what the witnesses would have testified to had they been more thoroughly cross-examined on 

this point. The record does show, however, that a police detective testified he did not conduct a 

search of Buford’s premises to see whether the latter possessed a firearm, and Sutton’s lawyer 

used that fact during his closing argument. Given that the evidence on this point was used, and it 

is unclear what additional evidence may have been adduced, we conclude that Sutton has failed 

to establish his lawyer was ineffective on this basis.
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V. SENTENCING

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a brief filed by his appellate lawyer and in a supplemental brief filed by Brown on his 

own behalf, Brown argues that the trial court erred when it scored offense variables (OVs) 2, 3, 

5, and 9. We review for clear error a court’s factual findings related to the scoring of the 

sentencing guidelines. People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 439; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). The court’s 

application of the facts to the law is reviewed de novo. Id. “Clear error exists when the 

reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v 

Brooks, 304 Mich App 318, 319-320; 848 NW2d 161 (2014) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Unpreserved scoring issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. 

People v Chelmicki, 305 Mich App 58, 69; 850 NW2d 612 (2014). “To avoid forfeiture of the 

issue under the plain error rule, the defendant bears the burden to show that 1) the error . . . 

occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e. clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial 

rights. The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error 

affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted; 

alterations in original). For purposes of scoring the guidelines, a sentencing court’s factual 

determinations need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Hardy, 494 Mich at 

438.

B. ANALYSIS

OV 2 of the sentencing guidelines addresses the lethal potential of a weapon possessed or 

used during the commission of the offense. MCL 777.32(1). The court must assess 5 points if 

the offender possessed or used a pistol. MCL 777.32(1)(d). Brown, in his supplemental brief, 

argues that there was no evidence that he possessed a firearm during any part of the incident in 

question, and he also points out that he testified that he did not know that Sutton was armed. 

However, “[i]n multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for possessing a weapon, 

all offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.” MCL 777.32(2). The latter 

subsection shows no concern for whether those other offenders knew, or reasonably should have 

known, that the other was in possession of a weapon. Because Sutton admitted that he possessed 

a pistol when he shot Buford, and because Sutton was assessed 5 points for OV 2, the trial court 

properly scored 5 points for OV 2.

OV 3 addresses physical injury to the victim. MCL 777.33(1). The court must assess 25 

points if a “[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim.” MCL 

777.33(1)(c). Brown’s appellate lawyer argues that Buford’s gunshot wound could not be 

considered a life-threatening or permanent injury because the prosecution did not present 

evidence specifying the extent of his injuries. However, the prosecution need not present 

medical evidence to show that a victim suffered life-threatening injuries, and a court may rely on 

witness testimony to justify its OV scores. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 697 n 19; 739 

NW2d 563 (2007). Buford suffered a gunshot wound to the abdomen, which caused him to bend 

over and lose blood. He was transported to the hospital as a result of the shooting. The court 

also had before it video footage showing Buford’s condition when he was being interviewed by a 

detective while in the emergency room. Although medical documentation was not introduced to 

show what treatment Buford received at the hospital, the presentence investigative report (PSIR)
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indicates that the bullet that struck Brown did not exit his body. This evidence, considered along 

with the common knowledge that a gunshot wound to the abdomen may be fatal, supported the 

conclusion that a score of 25 points for OV 3 was appropriate in this instance.

OV 5 addresses psychological injury to a member of a victim’s family. MCL 777.35(1). 

A court must assess 15 points if a “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional 

treatment occurred to a victim’s family.” MCL 777.35(1)(a). The fact that professional 

treatment has not been sought is not conclusive. MCL 777.35(2). Here, the court awarded 15 

points after finding that Buford’s mother suffered serious psychological injury from seeing her 

son shot. However, there is no evidence that Huddleson sustained any psychological injury, and 

the prosecution concedes that OV 5 was scored incorrectly. Because correcting the scoring of 

OV 5 occasions a shift in the applicable guidelines range, we remand to the trial court for 

resentencing. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 92; 711 NW2d 44 (2006) (reliance on an 

incorrect guidelines range constitutes reliance on inaccurate information and requires 

resentencing).

Finally, Brown contends that the court erred by scoring OV 9 at 10 points. OV 9 

addresses the number of victims. MCL 777.39(1). Ten points must be assessed if “[t]here were 

2 to 9 victims who were placed in danger of physical injury or death . . . .” MCL 777.39(1)(c). 

Here, when the gun was fired, Buford and Buford’s mother were both standing in close 

proximity, as was Brown. A victim need not have actually suffered harm; proximity to a 

physically threatening situation may suffice. People v Gratsch, 299 Mich App 604, 624; 831 

NW2d 462 (2013), vacated in part on other grounds 495 Mich 876 (2013). Accordingly, there 

were at least two victims placed in danger of physical injury or death when Sutton fired his gun 

through the open doorway.3

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we vacate Brown’s sentence for his conviction of assault with 

intent to murder and conspiracy to commit assault with intent to do great bodily harm and 

remand his case to the trial court for resentencing. We affirm Brown’s convictions. We affirm 

Sutton’s convictions and sentences.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s Mark T. Boonstra

 3 Brown argues that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to object to the court’s scoring decision 

for several of the OVs. However, the court did not err by assessing points for OVs 2, 3, and 9. 

Accordingly, to the extent that Brown’s lawyer did not object to the scoring of those OVs, his 

performance was not deficient. See Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201. Moreover, although OV 5 

was scored incorrectly, we are remanding for correction of that error.