The Honor able Ann Aldrich, United States District J udg e for the Northern District of Ohio, * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0632n.06 Filed: Oc tober 20, 2008 Nos. 07-2139, 07-2324 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DTR I NDUSTRI ES, I

NC., P etitioner / Cross-R espond ent,
v. NATI ONAL

L AB OR REL ATI ONS BO ARD, Respondent/ Cross-P etitioner .

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON P ETIT ION FOR REVI EW AND CROSS-APP L I CATI ON FOR ENF ORCEMENT OF A N ORDER OF TH E NATI ONAL L AB OR RELAT I ON S B OA RD
O P I N I O N

Before: M OORE an d SUT TON, Circuit Judges; ALDRICH, District Judge. * KA RE N NELSON MOORE, Circuit Jud ge. The National L abor Relations Boar d (“N L RB”) conclude d that the Petitioner, DTR I ndustries, I nc. (“ DTR”), violate d the National L abor Relations Act (“ NL RA”) whe n attempting to dissuade its e mploy ees f rom unioniz ing. D TR seeks revie w of two pa

rts of t h e NLRB’ s order . First, DTR asse rts that Ex ecutive Coordinator Thomas Ki ng ’s (“ Ki ng ’s ” ) s ta te me nts to e mpl oy e e s we re ob je c tiv e pr e dic tio ns , no t thr e a ts of lay of fs sh ou ld emp lo y e e s u n io n iz e . Se c o n d , D T R a r g u e s th a t t

h e N L RB in c o r

r e c tl y c r e d it e d e mp lo y e e Daniel Gahman’ s (“Ga

hman’s”) testimony when concluding that DTR threatened to discipline Ga hman for his pro-union ac t ivities and g ave G ahman the impre ssion that DTR was surveilling his unionNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

2 acti v it ie s . T h e N L RB f

il e d a c r o s s - a p p li c a ti o nf

o r e n f o r c e me n t o f

th e o r d e r . F o r

th e f o ll o w ing
rea sons, we ENF ORCE the NL RB’s or der. I. BACKG ROUND A. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound DTR manufa cture s hose and r ub b er an t i -v ibration products for use in automobiles. DTR employ s approximately 800 individuals at its Bluff ton, O hio f

acility
. DTR is a “just in t i m e” operation, manufac turing only the quantity

purcha sed by

a buy er a nd not producing excess parts for inventory
. J oint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 508-09 (De c. 18, 2003, NL RB Hr ’g Tr., KingTest. at 467:4- 46 8:2 0) . A dd iti on a lly , D TR i s a so le -s ourc e su

pp lie r f or thr e e -f ourt hs of its c us tom e rs , w iththo se
c us tom e rs re lyinge nti re ly up on DT R f or the pr od uc tio n o f a

g ive n p ro du c t. I n summer 2002, some DTR employ ees be g an a union- org anizing ca mpaig n. Gahma n, a union supporter, wa s involved in that effor t to obtain union represe ntation. Shortly afte r the
or g anizi ngc a mpa ign beg an, DT R ma na g e me nt m a de its dis a

pp ro va l of

his a c tiv iti e s c le a r t o Gahman. I

n ear ly Aug us t , Gahman’s supervisor told Gahma n that he wa s require d to attend a
me e tin g wi th K ingand

se ve ra l ot

he r s up e rv iso rs . K ing , D TR’ s Ex e c uti ve Coo rd inator , r e po rt s direc tly to D T R ’s president, COO, Chairman, and CEO. K ing is re sponsible for DTR’s human
resour ces a

nd had bee n with DTR for over a dec ade a s of 2003. Acc ording to Gahman’ s testimony , at the mee ting Kinginformed Ga hman th at Ki ng was
awa re of Gahman’ s support o f

u n io n ization and knew Gahma n attended union mee tings. In addition, King made it clea

r that he kne w about seve ral thing s that Gahman ha d mentioned at a union meeting the nig ht before ; King ’s knowledge left Gahman fee ling spied upon and fe eling as thoug h he “w asNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

3 being betra

y ed by the UAW.” J.A. at 223 (Dec . 17, 2003, NL RB Hr’g Tr., Gahman Test. at 183:9). Specifica lly , King acc used Ga hman of shar

pening a knife for

an employ ee in e x chang e for the employ ee sig ning a

union car d. But Gahman ex plained that he sharpened the knife as a favor for the employ ee w hile explaining the bene fits of unioniz ation. Nex t , King said that he ha d hear d that Gahman r efuse d to install a fan for an employ ee w ho did not support the union. Gahman, howe ver, resp o n d e d b y s tati n g h e in s ta ll e d f an s w h e n e v e r th e r e w a s a w o r k o r d e r . G ah ma

n te s ti f ie d th a t a t the c on c lus ion

of the me e tin g Ki ngstate d that if he c on tin ue d to he ar a

bo ut G ahma

n’ s unio n s up po rt , Ki ngwo uld

dis c ipl ine Ga

hman fo r t he kn if e and fa n in c ide nts . G ahma

n s a id t hat he wo uld discontinue his union support and “that there won’t be no further problems.” J .A. at 223 (Gahman Test. at 183:22-23). After the meetingwith Gahman, D T R c o nti n u e d to ma ke its disapproval of unionization clear to its employ ees. K ing’ s public comments reg ardingthe ef fec ts of unioniz ation are the primary focus of this case
. DTR conducts monthly President Associate s (“PA”) meeting s where manag ement dis c us se s c omp any

iss ue s w ithits e mpl oy e e s. On Au g us t 29 , 2 00 2, Ki ngus e d o ne of tho se PA meeting s to address the possible e ffe cts of unionization. Although there is no transcript or r ecor ding of King ’s statements, the administ rative la w judg e (“ AL J ”) a

nd the NL RB cr edited the testimony of
sever a l e mp lo y e e s w h o h e ar d K in g ’ s c o mm e n ts
. D T R e mp lo y e e Ja me s L e h ma n( “ L e hman”) te sti fi e d th a t K ingstate d tha t the e mpl oy e e s “ha d the ri g ht to c ho os e wh e the r w e wa nt[e d] th ir d p a rt

y repr esentation or not but there wa s some fac ts he thoug ht we nee ded to know.” J.A. at 72 (De c. 16, 2003, NL RB Hr ’g Tr., L ehman Te st. at 33:8-10).Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

4 Rita McVetta ( “McV etta”) , ano th e r D T R e mp loy ee, te stified on direc t examination t hat King explained DTR’s status as a sole-sourc e suppl ier. Acc ording to McVe tta, King stated “that if we g ot [a] Union into the plant that they wouldn’t probably do business with us and we w ouldn’t have jobs.” J .A. at 54 (D ec. 16, 2003, N L RB Hr ’g Tr. , M cV etta Te st. at 15:22-24). On c ross examination, McVe tta stated that King made it clear at the PA meeting that “[i] f we had a U nion in there[,] customers would not wa

nt to deal with us beca

use of the U nion.” J .A. at 63 (McVe tta Test. at 24:13- 1 4 ). On cr o s s ex am i n a t i o n , L eh m an co rr o b o ra t edM cV et t a’ s re co l l ec t i o no f t h e P A m ee t i n g;
acc ording to L ehman, Kingstated “that if Honda or T oy ota or a ny other c ustomer bec ame c oncer ned about re liability

of DTR’s produc tion flow, . . . those customers would look for other sources.” J .A. at 76 (L ehman Test. at 37: 6-8). L ehman’ s impression was that King wa nted employ ees to know that unioniz ation might thre aten DT R’s reliability , lead to a loss of business, a nd ultimately

forc e job
c uts
. Gahman a lso testified about King ’s comments at t h e P A meeting . On direc t examination Ga hma n s umm ari zed

Ki ng ’s state me nts : [King] ex plained to us that we ha d a sole supplier de al g oing w ith some of our customers where we were the only company that made particular pa rts for them, a

nd said that if the UAW was to g et i nto DTR that we would lose that sole supplier status be -, be c a us e the c omp anie s wou ld no lon g e r fe e l con fi de nt wit h us bei ngthe ir

on ly supplier bec ause the UAW would make us more unr eliable. And so they

would allow other c ompanies, y ou know, to compete w ith us for so me of the pa rt s th a t w e we re makin g . An d h e state d th a t if that ha pp e ne d it wo uld result in lay offs a

nd DTR had neve r laid anyone off he said [] , in the time that they ’d be e n a c omp any , b ut i f t

he UA W c a me the re that that po lic y wo uld , wo uld have to chang e.Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

Am on g the oth e r i nc ide nts that pr ov ok e d th e un ion ’s a c tio ns , D TR ord ered Ga hma n to 1 remove a hat emblazoned wit h the UAW logo, claiming the hat was offe nsive. The NL RB found thi s to be a

vio la tio n o f 2 9 U .S. C. § 15 8( a )( 1) , a nd DT R do e s n ot c on te st that f ind ingon a pp e a l. 5 J .A. at 225 (G ahman Te st. at 185:3-15). On cross-e x amination, Gahman stated that King expressed his con cern “a

bout action the customer s might take ” should DTR bec ome unionized. J .A. at 275 (Ga hman Test. at 235:13-14)
. Subsequent to these eve nts, DTR terminated Ga hman for submitting a

false sa mple for a drug test. DTR conducts ra

ndom drug tests of its employ ees, a nd company

policy dictates that DTR terminate a

ny employ ee w ho returns a

fra udulent sample. In September 2002, G ahman wa s selecte d for dr ug testing; the first sample he provided was brown-c olored and undersized, so it wa s discarde d, and DTR re quested that Ga hman produc e anothe r. Ga hman’s sec ond sample wa s a brig ht color and was not wa

rm enoug h, but the lab sea led and ke pt the s ample. DTR reque sted that Gahman pr ovide a third sample be fore a witness at the hospital, a nd this sample tested positive f or marijuana . The second sample was tested a nd the lab conc lu d ed t hat the sample w as “not c onsistent with normal human urine.” J .A. at 6 (N L RB Or der at 6). B. P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound On the basis of the se and othe r incidents, the union filed char g es with the NL RB ag ainst DTR on September 30, 2002. After a thre e-da

y trial, on April 9, 2004, the AL J issued an opinion holding 1 that DTR violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) by cre ating the i mpression that its employ ees w ere under surveillance , threatening employ ees w ith discipli ne if they continued to support the union, andNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

6 threatening employ ees w ith lay offs if DTR unioniz ed. The AL J also conc luded that DTR violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) for imprope rly terminating Gahman. The NL RB af

firmed the AL J ’s conclusion that DTR had violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) by
c re a tin g the imp re ssi on that its e mpl oy e e s we re un de r surv e ill anc e , thr e a te nin g e mpl oy ees w ith discipline if they

continued to support the union, and thre ateningemploy ees w i t h l ay o ff s i f DTR unioniz ed. In rea chin g this conclusion, the NL RB distinguished the previous DTR ca se, DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB , 39 F.3d 106 ( 6th Cir. 1994), and conc luded th at King’s stateme nts were
no t pr ot ect e d s pe e c h. Ho we ve r, the NL RB re ve rs e d th e AL J’s f ind ingthat G ahma

n w a s w ro ng ly dis c h ar g e d
. B e c a

u s e G ah m an ’ s s e c o n d u r i n e s a mp l e w a s f o u n d t o b e f

r a u d u l e n t , the NL RB
c on c lud e d th a t D TR’ s d ism iss a l of Ga hma n w a s c on sis te nt w ithDT R’ s p oli c ie s. The NL RB issued its order on September 7, 2007, a

nd DTR timely

filed a pe tition for review
. On Octobe r 12, 2007, the NL RB filed a cross-a pplication for the e nforc ement of its orde r. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review Al tho ug h th e NL RB mus t ha ve “ mor e tha

n a me re sc int ill a

of e vid e nc e ” su

pp or tin g its decision, we revie w the NL RB’s de cision defe rentially ; “[t] his Court reviews the NL RB’s f actua l deter minations, and its application of the law to a particula r set of fa cts, for substantial e vidence .” ITT Auto. v. NLRB , 188 F.3d 375, 384 (6th Cir. 1999) . “[A]s long a s the rec ord as a whole conta ins substantial evidence supporting the NL RB’s f indings, this Court must sustain those finding s even if we mig ht have r eac hed a dif fer ent conc lusion upon de novo review .” Id. Substantial evidenceNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

7 “ me ans su c h r e le va

nt e vid e nc e a s a

re a so na ble mi nd mi gh t a c c e pt a s a de qu a te to s up po rt a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of New Y ork v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). B. King’s Statem ents The primar

y ques t i o n o n appea l is whether King ’s statements at the PA mee tings we re impermissibly coer cive in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) or whe ther the state ments constituted protec ted spee ch under

29 U.S.C. § 158(c)
. Section 158(a) (1) makes it “an unfa ir labor pr actice for
an e mpl oy e r . . . to int e rf

e re wi th, re str a in, or c oe rc e e mpl oy e e s in t he e xer c ise of

the ” e mpl oy e e s’ ri g hts to s e lf

-o rg anizatio n a

nd c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini ng . 29 U.S. C. § 158( a ). Se c tio n 1 58 (c ) p ro te c ts “[t] he expressing of any

views, ar g ument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof ,” but only

if the “expression contains no threat of reprisal or forc e or promise of benefit.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) . The NL RB conc luded that King ’s stat em en t s “threatene d employ ees w ith job los s in violation of” § 158(a) (1), a

nd we a g ree . J A. at 1 (N L RB Or der at 1). DTR asser

ts that King’ s statements wer e not t h re at s but were instead simply objective predic tions of what would happen should DTR e mploy ees suc cee d in unioniz ing. A lthough the Supreme Court has made it clear that § 1 5 8 (c ) p ro t ec ts objective pre dictions, the Court also has stressed that a

ny such pre dict i o n s must be car efully phrase d lest they

erode into unsubstantiated thr e a ts: Thus, an employ er is f ree to c ommunicate to his employ ees a ny of his g ener al views about unionism or any of his spe cific views about a par ticular union, so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of repr isal or forc e or pr omise of bene fit.’ He may e ve n ma ke a pr e dic tio n a s to the pr e c ise e ff e c ts h e be lie ve s unio nizatio n w ill have on his c omp any . I n such a c ase, how ever , thepr e dic tio n m us t bec ar e ful ly phrased o n t h e basis of objective fact to c on ve y

an e mpl oy e r’ s b e lie f a s to demonstrably probable conseque nces bey ond his c ontrol or to c onvey a mana g ementNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

8 decision alre ady

arr ived at to close the plant in case of unionization. I f there is any implication that an employ er ma y or may not take action solely on his own initi ative for r easons unr elated to e conomic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longe r a rea sonable predic tion ba sed on available fac ts but a threat of reta liation based on misre prese ntation and coerc ion, and as suc h without the protection of the F ir st A me ndme nt. NLRB v . Gissel Pack

ing Co. , 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (citation omitted) (emphasis adde d). Section 15 8( c ) w a s in te nd e d to a llo w f re e de bate a

bo ut u nio nizatio n in the w or

kp la c e , b ut i t is no t so permissive as to allow coe rcive , threatening speec h. Cha mb e r of Com me rc e v . B ro wn , ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct . 2408, 2413-14 (2008)
. Be cause of the unique r elationship betwee n empl o y er, e mploy ee, a nd union, the scope of protec ted employ er spe ech in the la bor setting is lim ited: “Thus, an e mploy er’ s rig hts cannot outweig h the equal rig hts of the employ ees to a ssociate fre ely , as those rig hts a re e mbodied in § 7 and prote cted by

§ 8(a) (1) a

nd the proviso to § 8(c) .” Gissel Pack ing , 395 U. S
. at 6 17. As the Supreme Court has e x p l ai n ed , in assessingthe scope of per missibl e employ er e x pression, “a ny ba lanc ingof

tho se ri g hts mus t tak e int o a c c ount t he e c on omi c de pe nd e nc e of the e mpl oy e e s o n th e ir employ ers, a

nd the nec essar

y tendenc y of the for

mer, be cause of that re lat i o n s h i p , t o pick up intended implications of the latter that might be mor e readily dismiss ed by a more disinterested e ar.” Id . This balancingmust “rec og niz[ e] that what is basically at s t ake is the e stablishment of a nonper m an ent, limited relationship betwee n the employ er, his ec onomically depende nt employ ee
an d his union ag ent,” a s opposed to “the e lection of leg islators or the ena ctment of leg islation wh e re by that rel a tio ns hip is u lti ma te ly de fi ne d a

nd wh e re the ind e pe nd e nt v ote r m ay be fr e e r t o listen more objectively

and employ ers a s a cla ss free r to t al k .” Id . at 61 7- 18 . T he re fo re , w hil eNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

The dissent attem p t s t o s et up a false dichotomy , asser ting that “ [w] hen the e mploy er’ s 2 pr e dic tio n c on c e rn s a

c on se qu e nc e ov e r w hic h h e ha s no con tr ol, that by de fi nit ion

c ann ot c on sti tut e a ‘thre at of re prisal.’” Dissenting O p. at 4. This ignor es the c omplex ities and nuanc es of the ty pe of state me nts a t issu e in § 158( a )( 1) c a se s. As c on te mpl a te d b y § 1 58 (c ), a

state me nt m ay

c on ta in both predictive a

nd coer cive e lements
. For example, an employ er ma y make a predic tion that unioniz ation will cause a

customer to decre ase its business while also thre ateningthat the employ er will c h o o s e to d e a l w it

h th a t lo s s o f b u s in e s s thr o u g h la y o f f s . I f th e s tate me n t th a t la y offs, ra ther than alter native mea sures, will be employ ed is not “car efully phrase d on the basis of objec tive fac t,” it may rea sonably be viewed by employ ees as containing a thre at of re prisal, losing the protec tions of § 158(c ). Gissel Pack

ing , 395 U.S. at 618. 9 c e rt a in state me nts may be inn oc uo us in many se tti ng s, wh e n mad e duri ngan e ff or t to un ion ize tho se same stateme nts may

take on a nother chara cter entirely . “In revie wing Company statements made in the emotion of a union drive, the Boa rd re asonably

considers the eff

ect of the re marks fr om the point of view of those whose li velihood may depend on them.” Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc. v . NLRB , 863 F .2 d 1 29 2, 12 99 (6 th C ir . 198 8). State me nts thr e a te nin g pla nt c los ur e or

lay of fs are pa rt ic ula rl y suspect bec ause “ threats of plant closu re ar e ‘a m o n g the most flag rant’ of unfair la bor pra ctices.” Id. at 1 3 0 1 (q u o t i n g Gissel Pack ing , 395 U.S. at 611 n.31). Apply ing the Gissel Pack ing standard, we must c onsider whether King ’s statements, take n
as a w hole, wer e ca

ref ully phrase d predic tions on the basis of obj ective fac t, or contained “a threat of retaliation based on misrepre sentation and c oerc ion.” Gissel Pack ing , 3 9 5 U. S
. at 6 1 8
. Al t h o u gh 2

some of King ’s statements contained predic tions of what DTR’s customers woul d d o i f DTR unioniz ed, these predic tions were not “ car efully phrase d o n the basis of objec tive fac t.” Gissel P a ck ing , 3 9 5 U
. S. a t 6 1 8
. Co n s id e r e d in c o n te xt, an d

g iv e nK in g ’ s e xp li c it

s tate me n ts th a t D TR would have to c hang e its no-lay off policy and that DTR empl o y ee s wo u l d lose their jobs, the statements as a

whole had a “re asonable tendenc y ” to be “coe rcive in e ffe ct.” NLRB v. Pentre Elec .,Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

10 Inc. , 9 9 8 F. 2 d 3 6 3 , 3 6 9 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Peabody Coal v. NLRB , 725 F.2d 357, 363 ( 6th Cir. 1984)), overruled on othe r grounds by Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB , 517 U.S. 392 (1996). Ac c or din g to D TR, Ki ng ’s state me nts we re ob je c tiv e pr e di c t i o n s b e c a

us e we pr e vio us ly

he ld that simil ar state ments m ad e b y DTR’s pre sident were objective pr edictions not containing imp e rm iss ibl e thr e a ts. I n 1 98 9, duri ng a pr ior un ion iza tio n pus h at DT R, co mpa ny pr e sid e nt Y uji Kobay ashi (“K obay ashi”) se nt a four- pag e letter to emplo y ees e x plaining his view s reg ardingthe
e ff e c ts o f u nio nizatio n. Hi s le tte r i nc lud e d th e fo llo wi ngstate me nt: Our business would automatically be reduce d if the union wins the elec tion and our customers took aw ay

50 perc ent of our sole source business. They could, of cour se, take it a ll a

wa y and so le so ur c e wi th s ome no n- un ion c omp any . T he y do no t ha ve to g ive any bu sin e ss t o D TR. F ur the rm or e , mo st l a

bo r c on tr a c ts a

re fo r t hr e e y e ar t erm s. Th e U. S. a uto companies f

orce their unionized suppliers to build a 90-day inventory of par ts before any labor c ontrac t te rmination. I f the supplier f ails to do so, it us ually

loses its order. Th a t me ans tha

t un ion ize d su

pp lie rs , s uc h a s o ur

a sso c ia te No rb a lt, are re qu ir e d to wo rk ov e rt ime be fo re the e nd of e ve ry la bo r c on tr a c t and

the n, if the c on tr act

is neg otiated without a strike, employ ees a re la id off while the inve ntory is used. Point 3 really

comes down to this. Br inging a union would l ose business for DTR . . . . DTR Indus., Inc. , 311 NL RB 833, 833 (1993) (quot ing le tter fr om Kobay ashi to DTR employ ees (Nov. 10, 1989)) . The letter went on to conc lude: Ha vin g a un io n will hur

t ou r b us ine ss a

nd our c ha nc e s f or su c c e ss. We w ill los e some or all of our

sole source business and cr eate the dang er of losing the c onfidenc e of our c ustomers. L et us show what DT R and its associates c an do tog ether as a te am without the union. You have our attention and our c ommitm ent. We will lis ten and we will re spond and we will have a mutual c ommitm ent to eac h other. DTR In du s. , 39 F.3d at 109 (quoting le tter fr om Kobay ashi). Koba y ashi’s letter to DT R employ ees
c e rt a inl y be a rs so me sim ila

ri ty to K ing ’s state me nts a t th e PA m e e tin g s.Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

The re cord be fo re u s does not contain the e ntirety of Koba y ashi’s letter. H oweve r, whe n 3 the NL RB conside red the eff ect of the letter, it conc luded that the letter was threa t en i n g and c o erc ive, DT

R Industries , 311 NL RB at 833; thus, presuma bly the NL RB would have quoted the most damning sec tions of the letter. To the e x tent that we r ely upon Kobay ashi’s letter in making our dec ision, we rely

upon the langua ge that the NL RB used in de termining that the letter w as 11 When we pre viously

considere d the ef

fec t of Kobay ashi’s letter, w e conc luded that the letter
wa s an o bje c tiv e pr e dic tio n. We f ir st o bs e rv e d th a t “ the re is a dis tin c tio n b e tween

‘t hr e a ts’ motivated by

un i o n animus and ‘pr edictions’ about the pr obable e conomic conse quence s of unioniz ation; the former

clea rly violates section 8(a )(1) , while the latter may be prote cted by

section 8(c) .” Id. at 1 1 3 (f

o o t n o t e o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Pentre Ele c. , 998 F.2d at 369). We then conc luded: [T] he Koba

y as h i l et t er, taken in context, is an objective pre diction of what the pe tit i o n e r ’ s c u s t o m e r s w o u l d d o i n t h e e v e n t t h e u n i o n p r e v a i l e d , an d t hu s is protec ted spee ch. Koba

y ashi explained in the communication that companies that sole-sourc ed with the petitioner w ere likely to split their business in or der to have a n a lte rn a tiv e su

pp ly so ur c e in the e ve nt of a str ike . A s Pe ntr e El e c tri c demonstrated, Kobay ashi was e ntitled to make this statement base d on his industry experience and his knowledg e of the petitioner’s c ustomer base , at which point it was incumbent on t h e B o ar d t o p r o v e i t s f

a l s i t y. DTR Indus ., 39 F.3d at 114. Although w e dete rmined that Koba y ashi’s letter w as protec ted spee ch, that conclusion does not compe l us to find that King’ s distinct st atement is also prote cted. Kobay ashi and King , despite the vag ue simil arities betwee n what they said, did not m ake identical stateme nts, and their stateme nts were made in diffe rent c ontext s. Altho u g h both Kobay ashi and Kingexplained the n at u re o f DTR’s sole-source -supply business and expressed the vie w that DTR’s customers mig ht not be happy with a unionized DT R, the simil arities end ther e. Not once did Kobay ashi’s letter state that lay o ff s or plant closure s were an inevitable outc ome of unioniz ation. Ex plaining the importance of sole-sour ce c ustomers to DTR’s business, Kobay ashi

3Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

co er ci v e a n d

t h re at en i n g. 12 made the ta

utologica l point that “[ o]ur business would automatically be re duced if

the union wins the elec tion and

our customer s took away 50 perc ent of our sole source business.” DTR In du s. , 311 NL RB at 833 ( emphasis adde d). I t i s n o t ab l e that Koba y ashi did not follow this by saying that lay offs would ensue. Even if lay offs we re the eventua l by product of unionization, Kobay ashi’s letter was predicate d upon the necessar y condition of customers taking awa y 50 perc ent of the sole-source business, something th at Ko b ay ashi did not gua rante e. When discussing how automake rs have
re qu ir e d unio nize d s up pli e rs su c h a s N or ba lt t o bu ild up su

pp ly pr ior to t he e nd of la bo r c on tr a c ts, Ko ba y a sh i st a te d

that other companies ha

ve ty pically laid off e mploy ees w hile the excess supply was de ple te d. Ho we ve r, thi s w a s a fa c tua l sta te me nt an d not a thr e a t; as the dis se nt a c kn ow le dg e s, thi s experience would lead to layoffs only “if other companies’ experience was a ny g uide.” Dissenting Op . at 8. Ko ba

y a sh i di d n ot g o s o f

ar a s to sa

y that D TR w ou ld l ay

of f e mpl oy e e s. I n f

a c t, Kobay ashi closed his letter by expressing his desire for “DTR and it s associate s” to work “ toge ther as a te am” a

nd descr ibing the “ mutual commitmen t to eac h other.” DTR In du s. , 39 F.3d at 109 (quoting letter fr om Kobayashi). Ko ba y a sh i’ s le tte r, by

no t pr omi sin g lay of

fs a t D TR, is dif

fe re nt tha n Ki ng ’s state me nts to employ ees at the PA meeting s. McVetta, L ehman, a nd Gahman a ll ag ree d that the import of King ’s statement wa s that unioniz ation would lead to job lay offs. Contrary to the di ssent’s assertion that Ki ng“ did no t guarantee that lay offs wo u l d re s u lt from unioniz ation,” Dissenting Op. at 9, King sp e c if ic a lly state d th a t in c re a se d c omp e tit ion “ wo uld re su lt i n layof

fs ” and that, “i f the UA W ca meNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

The dissent cites the e mp lo ye e s ’ a gr e e me nt w ith statements by DTR’s trial counse l that King 4 was discussing customer r eac tion to a union win. Dissenting Op. at 6. Whi le King may have ma de so me su c h ob

je c tiv e state me nts , thi s do e s no t ov e rc ome Ki ng ’s e xplic it state me nts that D TR w ou ld c ho os e to d e a l w ithun ion iza tio n thro ug h la y of fs
. 13 there [DTR’s no-lay off] policy would, would have to c hang e,” J.A. at 225 (Ga hman Test. at 185:12- 15). McVe tta also rec alled King ’s statement “ that if we g ot [ a] Un i o n i nto the plant that they wouldn’t proba b l y d o business with us and we wouldn’ t have jobs.” J.A. at 54 (McVe tta Test. at 15 :22 -2 4)
. Thus , the te no r of Ki ng ’s state me nts wa s dif fe re nt tha n Ko ba y a sh i’ s. Un lik e Ko ba

y a sh i, Ki nge xplic itl y

state d th a t a decr ease in b us ine ss a s a re su lt o f u

nio nizatio n w ou ld b e de a lt w ith thr ou g h la

y of fs a t D TR. 4 I n addition to the fac t that K ing expli citly raised the spectre of DTR lay offs while Kobayashi did not, another ke y

distinguishing f

eatur e is the conte x t of these state ments. First, Koba y ashi was president of DTR, while King was a n Ex ecutive Coordinator, DTR’s chie f human-r esourc es off icer
. Al tho ug h E xec uti ve Coo rd inator may in f a c t be an im

po rt ant po si ti on at D TR, the NL RB distinguished Kingand Koba y ashi by noting t h at Kobay ashi’s privileg ed position at the company g ave him “industry

experience and knowledg e of [DTR’s] customer base,” while King ’s statement l a c k e d s u c h c o n t e x t
. J
. A
. a t2 ( N LR B O r d e r a t2 )
. Ino t h e r

w o r d s , K i n g ’ s t e n u r e a tD T R s a ys
n o t h i n g t o e mp l o ye e s a

b o u th i s a b i l i t y t o k n o w w h e t h e r

l ayo f f s w o u l d b e ane c o n o m i c n e c e s s i t y. As one NL RB Chairman note d, “ther e ar e wa y s, other than layoffs, to dea l wi t h d ro p -o ff s of business,” J.A. at 2 (NL RB Or der at 2 n.1 4 ), b u t t h e re cord doe s not sugg est that King was in a position t o assess the viability of alter native mea sures. As ch i ef h u m an-resourc es off icer , King ’s state me nts c ou ld re a so na

bly have be e n vie we d by e mpl oy e e s a s in dic a tin g that D TR w ou ld d e a l w ithNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

14 a de c lin e in b us ine ss t

hr ou g h layof

fs or oth e r l a bo r- re la te d o pti on s, inc re a sin g the thr e a te nin g qu a lity of the stateme nts. Although Kingmay have known ab o u t Kobay ashi’s prior state ments and the ensuing NL RB l i t igation, there is no indication that any of this knowledg e wa s expressed to the employ e e s . A s th e Su

p r e me Co u rt h a s s tate d , “ th e B o ar d c o u ld r e a s o n a b ly c o n c lu d e th a t t

he in t e n d e d an d u n d e r s t o o d i mp o rt o f t h a t m e s s a g e w a s n o t t o p r e d i c t t h a t u n i o n i z a t i o n w ou ld inevitably cause the pl ant t o close but to threaten to throw employ ees out of w ork regardless of the

econom ic realities .” Gissel Pack ing , 395 U.S. a

t 619 (empha sis a dded). I f the pe rson making the statements threatening lay offs is not seen as in a position to know the economic re al i t i es o f t he company , then the thre at is made re g ardle ss of the compa ny ’s ec onomic rea lities. Whil e it is true, as the dissent obse rves, that we f ound statements of lowe r-leve l supervisors to be prote cted in the
e arl ie r D TR c a se , we e mph a size d tha t the se state me nts “ me re ly re pe a te d the ob se rv a tio ns ma de in Kobay ashi’s letter,” DTR In du s. , 39 F.3d at 114 , and ther efor e we re taken in the conte x t of the ob je c tiv e fa c ts a

nd pr e dic tio ns a lr e a dy

pr ov ide d b y

DT R’ s p re sid e nt. Whil e Koba

y ashi no doubt knew the e conomic condition at D T R, K in g ’ s s ta

te me nt was made “without objective f

acts for actua lly believing [] that plants might close if employ ee s voted in the union.” IT

T Au to ., 188 F.3d at 386. “In the present case , no objective e vidence was pre sented by the Company

supporting a

statement that unionization would result or eve n co u l d result in an
o b j e c t i v e l y r e qu i r e d e c o n o m i c c l o s i n g o f t h e p l an t
. In d e e d , t h e C o mp an y f a i l e d b e f o r e b o t h t h e A LJ and the B oard to support such a statement as based i n fac t.” In dia na Cal-Pro , 863 F.2d at 1298-99 (holding that the NL RB possessed substantial evidenc e supporting the conc lusion that a supervisor vio la te d § 15 8( a )( 1) wh e n he tol d emp loy e e s tha t he h e ard fr om o wn e rs hip that un ion iza tio n w ou ldNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

The re quirement of obje ctive support does not mean that employ ers must provide e mpirical 5 evidenc e: Althoug h “an e mploy er is not re quired to ‘pr oduce evidenc e to c orrobor ate pr edictions about the ef

fec t of unioniz ation,’” our decisions “sti ll require [] an employ er’ s statements to have the support of pre cise objec tive fac ts.” ITT Auto. , 188 F.3d at 386 n.8. 15 le a d to the ow ne rs shutt ingdo wn the pla nt) . F ur the r, Ki ngpr ov id ed no ob je c tiv e fa c ts t o e xpla in wh y lay of fs , r a the r t

ha n a lte rn a tiv e me a sures , wo uld be a ne c e ssa ry c on se qu e nc e of

a de c re a se in business. Wi thout this objective support, employ ees could rea sonably view this choice as a thre at of re pr isa l. Com

bin e d wi th Ki ng ’s low e r po sit ion a t DT R, his fa ilure to pr ov ide ob je c tiv e fa c ts t o
su pp ort hi s st a te me nts le a ds to t he c on c lus ion

that “ the ir

. . . r e a so na

ble te nd e nc y

is c oe rc ive in eff ect.” Pentre Ele c. , 9 9 8 F. 2 d at 3 6 9 ( a l t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Peabody Coal , 725 F.2d at 363). 5 I n addition to asserting that our prior holding in the ear lier DT R case protec ts King’ s
s t a t e m e n t s , D T R e n c o u r a g e s u s t o a p p l y Pe ntr e El e c tri c to c onclude that King ’s statement was not imp e rm iss ibl y

c oe rc ive . We ho ld t

hat Pe ntr e El e c tri c is i na pp os ite
. I n th at case we a pp ro vin g ly cited the f ollowing summary

of the law : “While coer cive speech and conduct by an employ er a

re p r o h ib it e d b y th e N L RA , th e e xp r e s s io n o f n o n c o e r c iv e v ie w s , ar g u me n ts , an d o p in io n s f or and ag ainst unioniz ation cannot b e held unlawf ul.” Rebec ca H anner

Whit e, The Statutory and Constit utional L imits of Using Prot ecte d Sp e e c h a s E v id e n c eo f U nlawful Motive U nder the National Labor Relations Act , 53 O HI O S T . L .J . 1, 3 (1992 ) (footnote omitted), qu ote d in NLR B v . P e ntr e Elec., I nc. , 998 F.2d 363, 368 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Although it is true that nonc oerc ive ar g uments are not unlawful, in Pe ntr e El e c tri c we he ld m e re ly that th e re wa s n o v iol a tio n of § 15 8( a )( 1) be c a us e “[t] he re cord is s i m p l y devoid of a ny evidenc e that [the supervisors] sugg ested that Pentre mightNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

16 close its doors, much less that they would close Pentre as a mea ns to punish the employ ees if the y voted in favor

of the union.” Pentre Ele c. , 998 F.2d at 370. Thus, contra ry to t h e d i s s en t ’s
asser tions, Pe ntr e El e c tri c is fa c tua lly ve ry dif fe re nt tha n the c a se a t ha

nd ; K ingdid

thr e a te n la

y of fs , and we believe that the Boa rd’s de cision that his statements were coer cive is supported by substantial evidenc e. We rec og nize that this case is not easy g iven t he si milarities betwee n King ’s statements and Kobay ashi’s letter. I

n rea ching our conc lusion, howeve r, we bear in mind our defer ential standar d of re view and the Supreme Court’s admoniti on that “a r eviewingcourt must rec og nize the Boa rd’s competenc e in the first instance to judge the impact of utter ance s made in the c ontext of the
em p l o y er-employ ee r elationship.” Gissel Pack ing , 3 9 5 U
. S. a t 6 2 0
. D T R h a s n o t c h a ll e n g ed the NL RB’s conclusion that DTR did c ommit some violations; thus, it is clear that the D TR unioniz ation
e ff or t le d t o a t e n s e a t m o s p h e r e . G i v e nt h a ta t m o s p h e r e , K i n g ’ s s t a t e m e n t s w e r e n o tc ar e f ull y phrase d to avoid implied threats of re prisal. For these re asons, we uphold the N L RB’s c onclusion that King ’s statements we re c oerc ive and thre ateningin violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). C. G ahm an’s Credibility The sec ond issue on appea l is whether the NL RB err ed in concluding that DTR threatened to puni s h Ga h m an fo r hi s union activities and g ave G ahman the impre ssion that he was unde r
surv eillance . DTR argues that the NL RB er red be cause it based its decision solely on Gahman’ s testimony —the uncor

roborated, biased te stimony of a discredited employ ee. We conclude that the NL RB had substantial e vidence in support of its decision. “[T] his C o urt g ener ally defe rs to the
cre dibilit y

deter minations of the NL RB, par ticularly wher e the ‘ rec ord is fra

ugh t wi t h conflictingNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

17 t es t i m o n y

and esse ntial cre dibilit y

deter minations have bee n made.’ ” ITT Auto. , 1 8 8 F
. 3 d a t 3 84 (q u o t i n g Tony Scott Trucking, Inc. v . NLRB , 821 F.2d 312, 315 ( 6th Cir.1987)). The AL J did not rely

solely upon Gahman’ s testimony in determining that DTR threatened Gahman with punishment for his union activities and g ave G ahman the impre ssion that his activiti es
wer e under

surveillance . The AL J believed that Gahman’ s testimony was c orrobor ated by

King ’s own notes fr om the meeting with Gahman. Accor ding to the AL J ’s dec ision, King’s note s show that the meeting“wa s about Gahma n’s union activity
. . . cre ating the impression of surve illance.” J .A. at 27 (AL J Dec . at 27). F urthermor e, the AL J observed t h at t h ere wer e other supervisors at the
me e tin g be tw e e n G ahma

n an d Ki ng , y e t “ [n]on e of the se oth e r s up e rv iso rs we re c a lle d b y [DT R] to corrobor ate King ’s testimony .” Id. Thus, there was substantial evide nce suppor ting the A L J and NL RB’s c onclusion. The fa ct that Gahma

n was sepa

rate ly found to have submitt ed a fra udulent drug sample does not mean that the AL J and NL RB ca nnot find him cre dible as to other issues. The AL J has the
a b i l i t y t o c r e d i tp art s o f a w i t n e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y, e v e n w h e n d i s c r e d i t i n g o t h e r p art s o f t h e t e s t i m o n y. Carrier Corp. v. NL RB , 7 6 8 F
. 2 d 7 7 8 , 7 8 2 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 8 5 )
. G i v e no u r l e v e l o f d e f e r e n c e f o rA LJ and NL RB cr edibility

deter minations, we conc lude that there was substantial evide nce suppor ting the AL J and NL RB’s c onclusion that DTR threatened to punish Gahman for his union ac tiviti es and g ave G ahman the impre ssion that he was unde r surve illance. III . C ON CL USI ON I n the sensitive labor relations setting, e mploy ers’ predic tions of plant closures a nd job losses
are rea dily

perc eived a s coer cive a

nd threatening by

employ ees, who are depende nt on the employ erNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

18 for their livelihood. See G issel Packing , 395 U.S. at 617. Given the stronginterest in protec ting the rig hts of employ ees to a ssociate f ree ly , it is t here fore not enoug h for an employ er simply to prefa ce
a thr e a t of lay of

fs wi th a pr e dic tio n a

bo ut c us tom e r re sp on se to un ion iza tio n: Any “ pr e dic tio n mu st be car efully

phrase d on the basis of objec tive fac t.” Id . at 618
. With ou t suc h obje c tiv e c on te xt, it is all too easy

for vulner able e mploy ees to pe rce ive their e mploy er a s intending to punish union supporters by

laying the m off if business drops. The law d o es n o t require much of a n employ er, wh o, a s th e pa

rt y in c on tr ol o f the e mpl oy e r- e mpl oy e e re la tio ns hip , is in the be st p os iti on to “ a vo id
coer cive spe ech simply

by avoiding conscious overstatements he ha s rea son to believe will mislead his employ ees.” Id . at 620. Requiring any less would allow employ ers to consistently circ umvent the prohibitions of § 158(a) (1) by simply assuring that their threats a re acc ompanied by

v ag ue pr e dic tio ns of

the e ff e c t of un ion iza tio n o n th e fi rm ’s bu sin e ss. For these re asons, we be lieve that ther e wa s substa n t i al ev i dence supporting the NL RB’s
c on c lus ion s th a t K ing ’s state me nts vio la te d 2 9 U .S. C. § 15 8( a )( 1) and that D TR t hr e a te ne d to punis h Gahman for his u n io na c ti v it ie s an d g a v e G ah ma

nth e im p r e s s io nth a t h e w a s u n d e r s u r v e il la n c e. There fore , we DENY the petition for re view, and w e ENF ORCE the NL RB’s or der.Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

19 SUTTON, J., concurringin part and dissenting in part. I ag ree with the m ajority that Thomas King ’s re marks to Danie l Gahman amounted t o an unfa ir labor pr actice . But I respe ctfully

disag ree wi th i ts c on c lus ion

that K ing ’s sp e e c he s at th e pr e -e le c tio n e mpl oy ee mee tin g s d id n ot c on sti tut e protec ted employ er spe ech unde r § 8(c ) of the N L RA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Section 8(a) (1) of

the NL RA bars e mplo ye r s f r o m taking a ctions that “interf ere with, restra in,
or coe rce employ ees in the e x er ci s e o f” an employ ee’ s rig ht to org anize and par ticipate in union repr esentation. 29 U.S.C . § 158(a) (1). I n the statute’s e arly y ear s, the Boa

rd interpr eted § 8( a)( 1) expansively , “conde mn[ ing] almost any anti-union expression by

an employ er.” Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. NLRB , 36 F.3d 1130, 1138 (D.C. C ir. 1994) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Concer ned that the B oard’ s “ag g ressive enfor ceme nt of § 8(a) (1) had made it ex cessively difficult for e mploy ers to e ng ag e in a

ny form of non-coe rcive communications with e mploy ees reg ardingt h e m er i t s of uni o n ization,” Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NL RB , 104 F.3d 1354, 1361 ( D.C. Cir. 1997), and
conce rned a

bout the infring ement of the emplo y er ’s fre e-spe ech r ights, cf. Hec la Mining Co. v. NLRB , 564 F .2 d 309 , 313 & n. 6 (9t h Cir. 19 77 ), Con g re ss i n 1 94 7 a dd e d a ne w p ro vis ion

to l imi t § 8’s scope —§ 8(c) , L abor- Manag ement Relations Act, c h. 120, sec. 101, § 8( c), 61 Stat. 136, 142 (1 94 7) (c od if

ie d at 29 U. S.C. § 1 58 (c )) . U nd e r t he ne w p ro vis ion , “ [t]he e xpre ssi ngof any vie ws , argument, or opinion shall not constitut e or be evidenc e of a n unfair labor prac tice
. . . if it contains no threat of repr isal or forc e or pr omise of bene fit.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Section 8(c) not only

levels the fie ld betwee n advoca cy for union org anization and advoca cy ag ainst it, but the provisi on also “implements the First Amendment.” NLRB v

. Gissel Pack ing Co. , 39 5 U .S. 57 5, 61 7 ( 19 69 ); see also United Food &Commercial W orkers Union Local 204 v. NL RB ,Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

20 506 F.3d 1078, 1081 ( D.C. Cir. 20 0 7 ). Bo t h o b jectives fur

ther the e nd of making “[c]oll ective ba rg a ini ng. . . w or

k” by a llo wi ng“ la

bo r a nd mana g e me nt .
. . to e xer c ise the ir ri g ht to e ng a g e in uninhibited, robust, and wide- open debate,” Ste am Pr ess H old ing s, In c . v . H

awa ii Te am ste rs , 302 F .3 d 9 98 , 1 00 9 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 2) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; s e e a l

s o H e a l th c a r e A s s ’ n o

f N

. Y. State, Inc.v . Pataki , 471 F.3d 87, 98–99 (2d C ir. 2006), and by encour ag ing “fre ewhe eling use of the written and spoken word,” Cha mb e r o f Co mm e rc e v . B ro wn , __ U.S. __, 128 S. C t. 2408, 2413–14 (2008). By ensuringthat unioniz ation campa igns involve a neutr al dialog ue rather than a one-sided monologue , § 8(c) “ser

ves a labor law function of allowing e mploy ers to pre sent an a lternative vie w and information that a union would not present.” Healthcare Ass’n , 471 F.3d at 98. Openinglines of c omm un ic a tio n “ a ids the wo rk e rs by a llo wi ng the m to make inf or me d de c isi on s” ba se d no t on ly on the union’s own asse rtions but also on “a re asoned critique of their unions’ pe rfor mance .” Id. at 99 (interna l quotation marks omitted). And uninhibit ed d i s course levels the play ing f ield for the employ er, whose “only eff ective way of ar g uing a g ainst the union is . . . to point out to the worker s the adve rse c onsequenc es of unionization.” NLRB v. Pentre Elec ., Inc. , 998 F.2d 363, 369 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB , 5 17 U. S. 3 92 , 4 09 (1 99 6) ; cf. Boaz Spinning Co. v. NL RB , 439 F.2d 876, 878 ( 6th Cir. 1971). C onsistent with the free -spee ch princ iples underlying § 8( c), w e have applied this rule in favor of speec h by manag ement, se e Pe ntr e , 9 98 F .2 d at 36 8– 71 , a nd in f a vo r o f spe e c h b y

a un ion pr e sid e nt,
see NLRB v . Constr. & Gen. Laborers’ Union Local No. 534 , 778 F.2d 284, 290–91 ( 6th Cir. 1985) (re versingBoa

rd’s de cision that a union preside nt’s speec h amounted to a n unfair la bor pra ctice a

ndNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

21 holding it was pr otected where the pre sident “did not expl icitly threaten that [the union] would take
some ac tion ag ainst persons who file unfair la bor pra ctice c harg es” but instead “ the ac tion threatene d
was a ction that would have be en taken by an indepe ndent third party with no insti g ation or assistance from the Union,” his statements did not contain “some implied thre at that the Union or its member s
wo uld take so me a c tio n a g a ins t pe rs on s w ho fi le c ha rg e s” and the B oa

rd did no t fin d h is s ta te me nts
wer e “f alse” ). Section 8(c) thus confirms that “an employ er is f ree to communicate to his employ ees a ny of hi s g ener al views a

bout unionism or any

of his specific views about a particula r union.” Gissel , 395 U.S. at 618. And an employ er “may even make a predic tion a s to the prec ise eff ects he believes unioniz ation will have on his company” if it is “ca ref ully phrase d on the basis of objec tive fac t” and is de sig ne d “ to c on ve y an e mpl oy e r’ s be lie f a s to de mon str a bly pr ob a ble c on se qu e nc e s be

y on d h is control .” Id. (empha sis added). Threats of repr isal by

an employ er, by

contra st, serve none of these obje ctives and inde ed add nothing of

value to the dialogue Congr ess soug ht to foster. That is w hy § 8(c) offe rs no safe harbor to statements that “could easily and understandably be per ceive d as veiled thre ats of re taliation,” and
an e mpl oy e r “ c ann ot o bta in t he pr ote c tio n o f s e c tio n 8 (c ) s imp ly by la be lin g [suc h] st a te me nts ‘opinion.’” Peabody

Coal v. NLRB , 7 25 F .2 d 3 57 , 3 63 (6t h Ci r. 19 84 ); se e als o NLRB v. Price’s Pi c -P ac Su

pe rm ar k e ts , Inc. , 707 F.2d 236, 240 ( 6th Cir. 1983). But that doe s not mean eve ry employ er’ s prediction of ha rd times (and potentially

lost work for e mploy ees) flowing from unionization amounts t o an impermissible threat of repr isal or reta liation. There is a differ ence betwee n a predic tion that unioniz ation will h u rt t h e c ompany ’sNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

22 business and a thre at to reta liate ag ainst employ ees if they unioniz e. When the employ er’ s prediction
conce rns a c onsequenc e over which he has no control, that by definition cannot c onstitut e a “ threat of re prisal,” na

mely a threat of reta liation. “ [E] mploy ees ma y not rea sonably

conclude that they

are being coer ced w here the [employ er’ s] op i n ions refe r to matters ove r which the speake r has no control.” Pe ntr e , 998 F.2d at 369. What divi des protec ted pre dictions from prohibited threats of rep r is a l, th e n , is w h e th e r

th e e mp lo y e r ’ s s p e e c h c o n ta in s an“ im p li c a ti o nth a t [ th e ] e mp lo y e r may or may not take ac tion solely on hi s own init iative for rea sons unr elated to e conomic nec essities and known onl y to him.” Gissel , 39 5 U. S. a t 61 8 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also id. at 619. Only a stateme nt that “conve y s that the employ er will act on its own init iative to punish its employ ees a s the result of anti-union animus” fa lls outsi de § 8(c )’s prote cti v e s cope. Pe ntre , 9 9 8 F. 2 d at 3 7 1
. As J u d ge F ri e nd ly and “ the dic tio na

ri e s te ll u s, a ‘t

hr e a t of re pr isa l’ me ans a ‘t hr e a t of re ta liatio n’ and

thi s in turn means not a pr ediction that adve rse c onsequenc es wil l develop but a thre at that they will be deliberately

inflicted in retur

n for a n injury —‘to retur

n evil for e vil.’” NLRB v. Golub Corp. , 388 F.2d 921, 928 (2d C ir. 1967). The burden rests on the Board to pr ove that § 8(c) does not protec t a par ticular stateme nt, not

on the employ er to prove the opposite. Se e Pe ntr e , 998 F.2d at 371. Our c ases co n s istently

have stood by

this rule. On the one side of the line, whe re a n employ er te ll s em p l oy ees that the company will terminate them if they unioniz e, the state ment
rec eives no prote ction. See, e .g. , Dayton Newspapers, Inc . v. NLRB , 402 F.3 d 6 5 1 , 6 6 0 (6th Cir. 2005); Ind. Cal-Pro, Inc. v . NLRB , 863 F.2d 1292, 1298–99 (6th Cir. 1988). On the other side of the li ne , w he re a n e mpl oy e r e xpre sse s h is v ie w t hat un ion izin g a

c omp any or pla nt w ill le a d toNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

23 c on se qu e nc e s be y on d the e mpl oy e r’ s c on tr ol— su c h a s c ur re nt or pr os pe c tiv e c us tom e rs ’ l ik ely response s to dealing with a unionized suppli er—his stateme nts fall within § 8(c)’ s safe harbor
. P e ntre s h arpens the distinction. Company officia ls ga

ve spee ches to the e ffe ct that unioniz ation would sever ely underc ut the company ’s customer ba se. See id. at 3 6 9

– 7 0
. Al t h o u gh the company ’s leade rs neve r promised plant c losure or la y offs, th ey said that they wer e “‘ not prepa red’ to endure the har dships of rebuilding a customer base,” strong ly

sug g esting that the worke rs’ t en u re wo u ld be short-lived if the union won. Id. Pe ntr e he ld t hat th e state me nts sti ll
rec eived pr otection bec ause the speake rs neve r said the c ompany would retaliate fo r e mploy e e s’ exercise of

their statutory

rig hts. “Not a shre d of evide nce indicates that [the spe ak ers] predicte d the se c on se qu e nc e s b a se d on ma tte rs wi thi n [the ir ] o wn vo lit ion or c on tr ol, ” and the “ re c or d [w a s] simply devoid of a

ny evidenc e that [the speake rs] sugg ested . . . they would close [t he company ] as
a means to punish employ ees if they voted in favor

of the union.” Id. a t 37 0. “ No e mpl oy e e ,” a s a
re su lt, “ c ou ld re a so na

bly have c ome awa

y fr om [the e mpl oy e rs ’ spe e c he s] withthe be lie f t hat anti

union se ntiment on the part of the company could lead to c losure if the employ ees vote d in favor of the union.” Id. ; see also NLRB v. Vem co , 989 F. 2 d 1 4 6 8 , 1 4 8 9 (6t h Cir. 1993) (holding that an employ er’ s statement t hat uni onization would result i n a work shortag e re sulting in reduc ed hours or lay offs wa s a per

missibl e, objec tive predic tion, and thus protected sp ee ch u n d er § 8(c) , wher e nothing sug g ested that the expected work shorta g e “w as within [t he employ er’ s] control” or that the employ er “ would implement a cutbac k in hour s or a layoff solely on its own init iative for r easons
un re la te d to the e c on omi c ne c e ssi ty of a dju sti ngto a

sh or ta g e of work” ); ac c or

d Be-Lo Stores v. NLRB , 1 26 F .3 d 2 68 , 2 85 –8 6 ( 4th Cir . 1 99 7) ; Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB , 117 F.3d 627, 633 ( D.C. Cir.Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

24 19 97 ); NLRB v. Vill. IX

, 723 F .2 d 136 0, 13 68 –6 9 (7t h Cir. 19 83 ); Patsy Bee

, Inc. v . NLRB , 654 F.2d 51 5, 51 8 ( 8th

Cir . 1 98 1) ; c

f. C ro wn C or k , 36 F.3 d at 1 138–39, 1144–46 (collec ting c ases a nd cata loguingstatements that fe dera l courts have held protec ted by § 8(c) ). This principle, it seems t o m e, shoul d make short wor k of this case . As rec ounted by the employ ees w hose testimony the AL J cre dited, King told the employ ees at the mee tings that it was their own c h o ic e wh ether

to unioniz e, explained the compa ny ’s sole-sourc e re lationships and just-inti m e m an u fa cturing model, expressed his “expectation” that if DTR beca me unionized, the company ’s sole-sourc e, just-in-time customers would se ek o t h er supplier s to prevent pr oductionflow interr

uptions in t he eve nt of a strike, JA 275, and pre dicted that this would result in less work to g o around at DTR and thus lead to lay offs, see J A 7 6

– 7 7 (e mp l o y ee agr ee i n g t h at Ki n g’s m es s age was that “ customers would have to evaluate whethe r to kee p DTR as the sole sourc e supplier” based
on re lia bil ity c on c e rn s, and

“ if the c us tom e rs pu lle d s ome bu sin e ss a wa y fr om D TR b e c a

us e of thi s f e ar o f r e li a b il it y , th a t w o u ld

me anth e r e w o u ld

b e le s s w o r

k an d f e w e r jo b s a t D T R” ) ; JA2 75 (employ ee a g ree ing that “the conc ern [King ] expressed was a bout actions the customer s might take ”
and “ wh e n . . . [Kin g ] m e nti on e d lay of fs , the lay of

fs wo uld be be c a us e c us tom e rs pu lle d p art or a ll of their business out of DT R and there wasn’t e noug h work to g o around” ). No thi ngin K ing ’s re mark s amou nte d to a “ thr e a t of re pr isa l,” a s thi s c ourt and oth e r c ourt s have c onstrued the phr ase. The whole point of his statements was that other fa ctors—the de cisions of clients—would ca

use a slowdown in business a nd ev entually

job lay offs, not that the c ompany vin dic tiv e ly

pla nn e d to lay

of f w or ke rs , w he the r b us ine ss s low e d d own af te r u nio nizatio n o r n ot. The pre dicted e c o n o mi c c o n s e q u e n c e s
— a

s ever e re duction in the company ’s business leadingin turnNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

25 to la y offs—simply did not encompa ss a ny thing within DTR’s control. Cf. Vemco , 989 F.2d at 1489. That a c ompany

may be for ced by

a loss of bu s i n es s t o lay

off wor kers doe s not make its action a
vo lun tary on e in t he se ns e that Gissel

descr ibed. Se e Cro wn C or k , 36 F.3d at 1137 (“The fac t that an identifiable manag er, a nd not an invisible hand, makes these decisions (subject to sanction by the
mark e t if he or sh e make s th e m in c omp e te ntl y ), do e s n ot m e an th at th ey are an y le ss ‘ e c on omi c
n e c e s s i t i e s ’ o r

‘ b e yo n d h i s c o n t r o l ’ i nt h e s e n s e t h o s e p h r a s e s ar e u s e d b y Gissel .”). But e ven if ther e we re unc erta inty about the gu i d an ce these ca ses offe r, our a pplication of the se pr inc ipl e s to t he same e mpl oy e r, the same un ion and str iki ng ly

sim ila r s ta te me nts ou g ht t o
su ff ic e to r e so lve thi s c a se . Four teen y ear s ag o, we de cided DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB ( DTR I ), 3 9 F
. 3 d 1 0 6 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 9 4 ) , w h ic h inv o lv e d ana tt e mp t b y

th e s a me u n io n , th e U A W, to u n io n iz e the same D TR plant, see id. a t 10 9. A w e e k b e fo re the e le c tio n, the c omp any ’s the n- pr e sid e nt, Yu ji Ko ba y a sh i, s e nt a

le tte r t o th e pla

nt’ s e mpl oy e e s arguin g that be c a us e the c omp any ’s succ e ss d e p e n d e d h e a v il y o nit s s o le

- s o u r c e r e lati o n s h ip s w it h ju s t- in

- ti me ma

n u f a c tu r e r s , u n io n iz a tion would seriously harm it s business, possibly requiringlay offs. Id. Kobay ashi told the employ ees that DTR’s “business would a utomatically be reduce d if the union wins the elec tion and our customer s took away

50 perc ent of our sole source business.” Id. (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) . T ho se customers, he added, who did not turn to other suppli ers would likely require DTR to produce and
ma int a in a

90 -day inv e nto ry

wh e n e a c h c oll e c tiv e -b arg a ini nga g re e me nt a pp ro a c he d it s
e xpir a tio n— an e xpe ri e nc e tha t, if oth e r c omp anie s’ e xpe ri e nc e wa s any g uid e , wo uld le a d to lay of

fs
. See id.Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

26 Th e un ion

a lle g e d, and

the B oa rd fo un d, that Kob ay a sh i’ s le tte r a nd the oth e r s up e rv iso rs ’ statements amounted to unlawf ul threats of r eprisal and thus constituted an unfair la bor pra ctice. Id. at 110. We disa g ree d. “Koba y ashi[’s] letter,” we explained, “ taken in c ontext , is a n objective pr e dic tio n o f w hat the pe tit ion e r’ s c us tom e rs wo uld do in t he e ve nt t he un ion pr e va ile d, and

thu s is protec ted spee ch.” Id. at 114. The le tter set for th the basis for Koba

y ashi’s predic tion, ex plaining the company ’s sole-sourc e bu s i n es s an d the re asons customers w ould diversify their portfolios of suppliers, and we noted that Kobay ashi “wa s entitled to make this statement base d on his industry experience and his knowledg e of [DTR’s] customer ba se.” Id. The B oard of fer ed nothing to show that Kobay ashi’s statements we re e ither untruthful or “subjec tive” as w e def ined that term in Pe ntr e , see id. —i. e ., tha

t th e state me nt “ c on ve y s th a t th e e mpl oye r wi ll a c t on its ow n in iti a tiv e to p un ish employ ees a s the result of a nti-union animus,” Pe ntr e , 998 F.2d at 371. Our d e c isi on

inDTR I fu lly ans we rs the qu e sti on s r a ise d b y thi s c a se . K ing , li ke Ko ba y a sh i,
e xpla ine d th e natur e of

the c omp any ’s so le -s ourc e bu sin e ss, his e xp e c t a t i o n s t h a t un ion iza tio n w ou ld le a d th e c omp any ’s c us tom e rs to r e dir e c t busine ss t o o the r s up pli e rs and his vie w t

hat th is w ou ld lead to layoffs. Cf. 39 F .3 d at 10 9; DTR Industries, Inc. , 311 N.L .R.B. 833, 833 (1993) (re printing portions of Kobay ashi’s letter) . J ust as we he ld Kobay as h i ’s s tatements entitled to § 8(c) ’s protec tion, so too we should hold King’s state ments entitled to protection. I n rea ching the oppos ite conclusion, the majority attempts to disti ng uish King’ s and Kobay ashi’s statements. The lang uag e of Kobay ashi’s l etter, it say s, “did not g uara ntee” that DTR’s custo m er s wo u l d “t ak [e] awa y 50 perc ent of the sole- source business.” Maj. Op. at 12. But of
c ours e Ko ba

y a sh i did no t g ua

ra nte e that un ion iza tio n wo uld c a us e the c omp any to lo se a s pecif icNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

27 perc entag e of business. How could he do that, or

for that matter how could any one do that? What
m at t er s i s t h at h e p l ai n l y p ro m i s ed t h at u n i o n i z at i o n wo u l d d ec re as e DT R ’s b u s i n es s . “B ri n gi n g a
u nion,” he sa id, “would lose business for D TR.” DTR In du s. , 311 N.L .R.B. at 83 3
. “H av i n g a union,” he added, “will hurt our business and our chanc es for succe ss. We will l ose some or a ll of our sole sourc e business . . . .” DTR I , 39 F.3d at 1 0 9
. T h e 5 0 % loss was one w ay of estimating what would happe n and o n e wa y of illustrating w hy

jobs would be lost. Kobay ashi, indeed, w as hardly fix ated on a

50% estimate, a s he ra ised more ominous possibili ties later, sa y ing that DTR’s
c u s to me rs m igh t “ ta

k e [th e c o mp an y ’ s b u s in e s s ] all awa y and sole sourc e with some non-union company .” DTR In du s. , 3 11 N. L .R. B . at 83 3. Vi e we d fr om the pe rs pe c tiv e of e mpl oy e e s p ro ne “ to pick up intended implications . . . that might be more re adily dismiss ed by

a more disintere sted ea

r,” Gissel , 3 95 U. S. at 61 7, his wo rd s lef t no doub t tha t unio nizatio n wou ld c a us e the c omp any

to l os e a substantial amount of, if not all of, its sole-sourc e business. I na s im il ar v e in , th e ma

jo r it y in s is ts th a t K o b ay a s h i, u n li k e K in g , n e v e r “ e xp li c it ly

r a is ed t h e s p e c t r e o f D T R l ayo f

f s . ” M a j
. O p . a t1 3
. Y e tK o b aya s h i ’ s l e t t e r e x p l i c i t l y did me nti on

lay of fs
. Se e DTR In du s. , 3 11 N. L .R. B . at 83 3. To be sure , h e did no t guarantee that la

y of fs wo uld re su lt from unionization, but neither d i d King ; they both made pre dictions about the eff ect unionization
w o u l d h a v e o n b u s i n e s s an d , i n tu r n , j o b s . T h e k e y p o i n t i s thi s: Gi ssel tells us to st and in the employ ees’ shoes when g aug ing the ef fec t of Kobay ashi’s and K ing’ s words, and both pe rmitted an
e mpl oy e e to i nf

e r t hat un ion iza tio n w ou ld c a us e a dr op -o ff in b us ine ss, wh ic h wou ld le a d to lay of fs
. Be y ond the words Kingand Koba y ashi used, the major ity

argues that diffe renc es i n the contexts of t heir statements sets them apar t. See Maj. Op. at 13–14. Context no doubt can be cruc ialNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

28 to understandingthe meaningthat an employ er’ s statement ca rries. Se e In d. Cal-Pro , 863 F.2d at 1299. But as the Board bears the burden of proving a st atement unpr otected by § 8(c) , Pe ntr e , 998
a t 37 1, it mus t de mon str a te wh y the c on te xt o f Ki ng ’s state me nts ma de the m th re a ts o f r e pr isa l w hil e Kobay ashi’s letter ( and other supervisor’ s statements) in a nearly identical scenario did not. I n trying to meet this burden, the B o ard noted that Kobay ashi’s “le tter explained that [his ] perspective w as based u p o nh is in d

u s tr y e xp e r ie n c e an d

k n o w le d g e o f

[D T R’ s ] c u s to me r

b a s e , ” w h il e King ’s speec hes did not. J A 2. But that purported distinction misrea ds our decision in DTR I : Whi le we po int e d o ut t

hat K ob ay a sh i’ s e xpe ri e nc e and kn ow le dg e “ e nti tle d” him to m a ke the state me nts in h is le tte r, we ne ve r m e nti on e d ( muc h le ss r e st ed our d e c isi on up on ) t he le tte r’ s r e c itatio n o f h is qualifications. See DTR I , 39 F.3d at 114. And althoug h we de fer to the Boa

rd’s interpr etations of t h e s t at u t es i tad m i n i s t er s , we d o n o t gi v e i t t h e b en ef i t o f t h e d o u

b ti ni n t er p re t i n g our

pr e c e de nts
. See A lbertson’s, Inc. v . NLRB , 301 F.3d 441, 448 ( 6th Cir. 2002). B ut, the ma

jor ity a dd s, Ko ba

y a sh i w a s th e c omp any

pr e sid e nt w he n h e wr ote his le tte r, Ma j. Op . at 13 , w hil e Ki ngse rv e d a s th e c omp any ’s c hie f h uma n- re so ur c e s o ff

ic e r. Thus , it

c on tin ue s,
w h il e K o b ay a s h i “ n o d o u b t k n e w th e e c o n o mi c c o n d it io na t D TR,” id. at 15, as his “pr ivilege d position at the company

g ave him industry experience and knowledge of [DTR’s] customer ba se,” id. at 13 (interna l quotation mar ks omitted), there is no rea son to believe that Kinghad any simil ar knowledg e, and thus his “state ment was m ad e wi t h o ut objective fa cts for a ctually believing that plants might close if employ ees voted in the union,” id. at 15 (interna l quotation mar ks and alter ation omi tte d) . Y e t § 8 (c ) p ro te c ts “ the e xpre ssi ngof any vie ws , a rgume nt, o r op ini on ,” 29 U. S.C. § 158(c) , and we have never sug g ested that these words re quire e mploy ers to exerc ise their fr eedomNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

29 of spee c h o n ly

thr o u g h p r e - v e tt e d

e c o n o mi c e xp e rts o r

th a t § 8 ( c ) ’ s p r o te c ti o no th e r w is e d e p e n ds
on the s tatus of t he speaker. To the contra ry , we he ld in DTR I

that § 8 (c ) p ro te c te d th e state me nts of thr e e low -l e v e l su

pe rv iso rs who told e mploy ees that unioniz ation would lead to a dr astic loss of business from two of the c ompany ’s three l ar ges t sole-source customers. See 39 F.3d at 109, 114–15. Even thoug h King was not the pre sident of the compa ny , Ifail to understa

nd why he lac ked a suff i ci en t b as is to make his observations for an indepe ndent re ason. He attended K obay ashi’s prese ntations during the 1989 union campaig n, which may explain why

he spoke this time around. He observe d the ensuing proce eding s that culminated in DTR I. And he had served as the company ’s top human-re source s office r for over a deca de. Fa

r from being in the dark a bout the labor-r elated options at DTR’s disposal “to deal with drop- offs in bus i ness,” Kingwould have be en in an idea l position t o understand and “asse ss the viability of alterna tive measure s” to la

y offs. Maj. Op. at 14 (interna l quotation marks omitted). I n cond e mn in g

K in g ’ s s ta

te me nts beca

use he pr esente d “no objec tive evidenc e . . . supporting [hi s] s tatement that unionization would result o r even could re sult in an objectively require d economic c losing of the plant,” id. at 15 (interna l quotation marks omitted), the majority asks more
o f D T R t h an o u r c as es
— i n cl u d i n g DTR I —demand. J ust as King did not accompa ny his remar ks with e mpirical evide nce suppor ting his per sonal views and pr edictions, neither did Koba y ashi. To construe § 8( c) a s i m p o s i n g o n em ploy ers the bur den of pr oving obje ctively the truth of eve ry
asser tion they make would c ontrave ne both the lang uag e of the statute—which e ncompasses “ any views, ar g ument, or opinion , ” 29 U.S.C . § 158(c) —and its purpose, se e Pe ntr e , 998 F.2d at 371Nos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

30 (“ Re qu ir ingan e mpl oy e r t o p re se nt, in a dv anc e and wi tho ut a re qu e st f ro m th e B oa

rd , e vid e nc e to
corr oborate its predictions would, in our m ind, defe at t he int eg ral purpose of sec tion 8(c).” ). I f, as the Supreme Court ha s sai d , t h e p u rp ose of the statute is to foster “uninhibited, robust, and wide

open deba te in labor disputes” throug h “fr eew heelinguse of the w ritten and spoken w ord,” Chamber of Commerce , 128 S. Ct . at 2414 (interna l quotation marks omitted), Iam har d-pre ssed to understand how this objective-e vidence require ment is consistent with that goa l. At the end of

the day , Kobay ashi’s and King ’s statements must stand or fall tog ether . Either bo th c ro sse d th e lin e fr om p ro te c te d s pe e c h to pr oh ibi te d thr e a ts of re pr isa l, or bo th s tay e d w ith in § 8(c) ’s shield. Absent a meaning ful distinction betwee n the t wo s tatements, t he answer to the two
case s must be the same. Ne ither the stateme nts of Ko b ay as h i , nor of his under lings nor of King
a m o u n t e d t o “ t h r e at s o f

r e p r i s a l , ” an d

a c c o r d i n g l y DTR II sh ou ld co me ou t the same wa y a s DTR I
. Pe ntr e , 998 F.2d at 371. Wh a t u lt im a te ly

s e p ar a te s u s in

th is c a s e is th e me an in g o f thr e a ts o f

“ r e p r is a l. ” A s Ir e ad Gissel , Pe ntr e and DTR I

, they define the term just the way the dictionarie s do—as re quiring a thre at to pu nis h employ ees or

to re tal iat e a g a ins t th e m f or vo tin g fo r u

nio nizatio n, so me thi ngthat si mpl y is n ot c ov e re d wh e n the e mpl oy e r wa rn s that un ion iza tio n w ill c a us e a dr op of f i n b us ine ss a

nd wi ll lead to layoffs. When an e mploy er thre atens punishment or re taliation i f employ ees vote for unioniz ation, by co n t ra s t , he communicates that lay offs will result no matter w hat happe ns to the business—that lay offs will follow in spite of, not be cause of, potential declines in business. All of this , t h e m aj o ri t y

say s, is a “fa lse dichotomy .” Maj. Op. a t 9 n.2. But why

that is so is never explained, much less supported by the case l aw. Consist ent with the ca se law a nd the plain meaningNos. 07-2139/2324

DTR Industries, Inc. v . NLRB

31 o f “ r e p r is a l, ” th e d ic h o to my is th e f u lc r u m u p o nw h ic h th e c a s e turns a n d w h ic h th e s tatute ’ s te xt and contr oll i n g p re ce d en tp u tfr o n t -a n d -c en t er : W h at m at t er s i s wh et h er Ki n g’s s t at ements conve yed a promise or even the possibili ty that DTR would “punish” its employ ees f or unionizi ng—by

laying of f w or ke rs ir re sp e c tiv e of

, o r be y on d the e xten t of, the un c on tr oll a ble imp a c t un ion iza tio n w ou ld have on D TR’s business. Cf. Gissel , 395 U. S. at 618 (h old ing state me nts un pr ote c te d “[i]f

the re is any implication that an employ er ma y or may not take action solely on his ow n initiative for re asons
un re la te d to e c on omi c ne c e ssi tie s and kn ow n o nly

to h im” ); Pe ntr e , 998 F.2d at 369, 371 (explaining that a “statement i s an u n l aw fu l threat” if it “is subjectively phrase d in that it convey s that the employ er w ill act on its own init iative to punish its employ ees a s the result of anti-union animus”)
. Ki ng ’s wo rd s, lik e Ko ba y a sh i’ s w or ds be fo re him , d id n o s uch th in g, and the e mpl oy e e s in attendanc e did not sug g est otherwise . Whatever e lse ca n be said a

bout King’ s remar

ks, they cannot be c ha ra c te ri zed a s “ thr e a t[s] of

re pr isa l,” 29 U. S.C. § 1 58 (c ); Gissel 39 5 U .S. a t 61 8. Th e ma jor ity
se e ingthe se iss ue s d if

fe re ntl y , I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.