1 Petitioner Natalia B. Romalis-Reytblatt did not appear or

in any way participate in these proceedings. With regard to her,

we dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. See Rule 123(b). 

The decision, when entered, will be in the same amount as

determined by the Court against petitioner Zinovy V. Reytblatt. 

Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and Rule

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

T.C. Memo. 2001-209

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ZINOVY V. REYTBLATT AND NATALIA B. ROMALIS-REYTBLATT, 

Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 6493-00. Filed August 8, 2001.

Zinovy V. Reytblatt, pro se.1

Michael P. Breton, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

POWELL, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a

deficiency in petitioners’ 1996 Federal income tax of $2,460. 
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The issues raised by the notice of deficiency are (1) whether

petitioners had unreported income from various sources and (2)

whether petitioners are entitled to a loss claimed on Schedule C,

Profit or Loss From Business. Petitioners resided in Bridgeport,

Connecticut, at the time the petition was filed.

We have combined to a great extent our findings of fact and

conclusions of law because of the confused state of the record. 

This case was calendared for trial on March 5, 2001, in

Hartford, Connecticut, and was recalled on March 7, 2001. At the

recall, Michelle B. O’Connor, Esq. (Ms. O’Connor), from the

Quinnipiac University School of Law Tax Clinic entered an

appearance on behalf of petitioners, and a stipulation of facts

was executed by Ms. O’Connor and petitioner Zinovy V. Reytblatt

(hereafter petitioner). The stipulation of facts provided, inter

alia, that with respect to the 1996 tax return (1) petitioner

Natalia B. Romalis-Reytblatt received nonemployee compensation of

$1,200 that was not reported; (2) petitioners erroneously

reported an additional $1,200 in wage income; (3) petitioner

received nonemployee compensation of $1,300 that was not

reported; (4) petitioners received dividend income of $62 and

interest income of $334 that were not reported; (5) petitioners

received $57 from an annuity that was not reported; (6)

petitioners were not entitled to a Schedule C loss of $11,833;
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2 It is unclear whether the payment was made in September

or November, but the exact date does not appear to be material.

3 Some of the documents received from petitioner have not

been filed and will be placed in the Court’s correspondence file.

and (7) petitioners were entitled to a deduction of $3,000 for a

long-term capital loss.

At the initial hearing petitioner contended that a payment

to the Internal Revenue Service in November2 1996 of $2,524 had

been made by his wife for the taxable year 1994 and that that

amount should have been credited to the 1996 liability. It

appears that changes were made to petitioners’ 1994 tax liability

resulting in an underpayment against which a $2,524 payment was

made in 1996 and applied to the 1994 liability. The Court

explained at that time that the taxable year 1994 was not before

the Court. When petitioner later renewed this issue, the Court

pointed out that the 1996 taxable year had not closed at the time

of the payment and a liability for that year had not even been

determined.

The case was continued for trial to the Special Session of

the Court commencing May 17, 2001, in Hartford, Connecticut. On

March 23, 2001, Ms. O’Connor filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel. That motion was granted on March 30, 2001.

Subsequently, petitioner, proceeding pro se, sent various

documents3 to the Court:
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(1) On April 11, 2001, an Application for Order To Take

Deposition of George Evans was received from petitioner. 

Petitioner did not attach a copy of the notice of deposition to

the application as required by Rule 75(d), and the application

was untimely. See Rule 70(a)(2). Respondent objected to the

deposition.

(2) Petitioner served a subpoena duces tecum on George Evans

(Mr. Evans) to appear for the purpose of taking the deposition. 

On April 24, 2001, respondent timely filed a Motion to Quash

Subpoena Duces Tecum, which the Court granted. 

(3) On April 11, 2001, petitioner’s “Motion for the

Protective Order” was received, the gravamen of which is totally

unclear except that the motion refers to the deposition of the

“sole witness”. The granting of respondent’s motion to quash

disposed of all questions dealing with the deposition.

(4) On April 26, 2001, petitioner filed a “Motion for

Sanctions on Respondent” relating to the deposition of Mr. Evans. 

That motion was denied at the hearing held on May 17, 2001.

(5) On May 9, 2001, the Court received from petitioner a

“Pre-Trial Order” that contained various attachments–-a Motion

for Continuation, a proposed Stipulation for Facts, and a

“Request to Admit to Respondent”. Respondent treated the latter

document as a request for admissions and filed a response on May

14, 2001.
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(6) Lastly, on June 18, 2001, petitioner filed a “Motion for

Reconsideration of Court Ruling Granting Respondent’s Motion to

Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum” and “Motion for Reconsideration of

Denial of Sanctions on Respondent”.

When this case was called, petitioner accused both Ms.

O’Connor and respondent’s counsel of some form of chicanery, the

details of which are, at best, confusing. Petitioner seems to

indicate that the stipulation of facts he executed is not the

same stipulation that was filed with the Court. But at the

initial hearing on March 7, 2001, the Court went over the

stipulation of facts, paragraph by paragraph, with petitioner,

and that is the stipulation of facts filed with the Court. Thus,

we hold petitioner to the stipulation of facts as filed. 

Furthermore, we note that from what we have observed, Ms.

O’Connor and respondent’s counsel performed in a completely

ethical and professional manner. It is unseemly that petitioner

would besmirch the character of both counsel in this fashion.

It subsequently became somewhat clear that petitioner

contends that, while conceding that his wife and he had omitted

the nonemployee compensation from the 1996 tax return, they both

had travel expenses that should reduce the amount of taxable

income. Petitioner, however, presented no records or other

corroborating evidence to document the alleged travel expenses.
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4 We also note that there is a problem of hearsay with

respect to the expenses of petitioner’s wife.

In certain circumstance the Court may estimate various

expenses. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d

Cir. 1930). Section 274(d), however, imposes strict

substantiation requirements for expenses relating to travel and

in this regard supersedes the Cohan doctrine. See Sanford v.

Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. 412 F.2d 201 (2d

Cir. 1969). To obtain a deduction for travel, a taxpayer must

substantiate “by adequate records or by sufficient evidence

corroborating * * * [his] own statement” the amount of the

expense and the time and place of the travel. Sec. 274(d). 

Petitioner, as noted, presented no evidence to satisfy section

274(d).4 Accordingly, as to this issue, we hold for respondent.

With respect to the Schedule C loss, petitioner conceded

that issue in the stipulation of facts.

In closing, we observe that to the end petitioner has sought

to depose Mr. Evans, an Appeals officer with whom he met in

attempts to settle this matter. Putting aside the untimeliness

and other deficiencies with respect to petitioner’s application,

we cannot fathom what information Mr. Evans could have possessed

that would have shed any material light on the issues properly

before this Court. The evidence concerning substantiation under

section 274(d) is under petitioner’s control. Furthermore, any
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statement made in settlement negotiations by Mr. Evans would be

inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 408. Our deposition process

should not be used as a harassment device. Accordingly, we deny

petitioner’s motions for reconsideration of our order quashing

the subpoena and the denial of petitioner’s motion for sanctions. 

It appears that our ruling with respect to the alleged

travel expenses and the stipulation of facts resolves all the

issues properly before this Court in favor of respondent.

An appropriate order and order

of dismissal and decision will be

entered.