No. 3--98--0998

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 20001

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 			)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS,					)	of the 12th Judicial Circuit,

							)	Will County, Illinois

	Plaintiff-Appellee,			)	

							)

	v.						)	No. 97--CF--4697

							)	

DERRICK J. WHEELER,				)	Honorable

                                )	Rodney Lechwar

	Defendant-Appellant.		)	Judge, Presiding

_________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:

_________________________________________________________________

	The defendant, Derrick J. Wheeler, was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 1996)) in the Will

County circuit court.  He claims that his convictions should be

reversed because (1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, and (2) the court erroneously admitted evidence from

"invisible blood" testing.  We remand for a Frye hearing on the "invisible blood" testing procedure.

	BACKGROUND

	Before the defendant’s trial, his attorney filed a motion in limine seeking, inter alia, to bar the State from presenting evidence from a Leuco-Malachite Green (LMG) test the police

performed on his car.  LMG is a chemical mixture used to detect

latent blood on a surface.  The defendant’s attorney argued that

the test results were highly prejudicial and lacked probative value.  The judge reserved his ruling on the LMG portion of the

motion.

	The case proceeded to trial on September 9, 1998.  The

State’s first witness was Jacques Buckley, who testified that he

was a lifelong friend of Monte Love, the victim.  Buckley said he

and the defendant were "riding around" in the defendant’s yellow

car in the early morning hours of June 18, 1997.  They eventually

picked up Love and drove to the defendant’s house, where Buckley

and Love entered and bagged some "fake dope."  They exited the

house after about 15 minutes, and the defendant said, "Let’s go." 

Karen Washington and another person were also outside the house

at that time.  The three men left in the defendant’s car with

Buckley driving, Love in the front passenger seat, and the

defendant in the back seat.

	According to Buckley, they drove around the neighborhood and

eventually detoured from Patterson Road because a train was

crossing in front of them.  Love then asked Buckley to stop the

car so he could get out and relieve himself.  Buckley said he

stopped under a noisy highway, and Love exited the car followed

by the defendant.  Buckley then heard two quick gunshots.  He

looked back and saw Love lying on the ground and the defendant

returning to the car.  He began pulling away, and the defendant

entered through the front passenger door with a gun in his hand. 

Buckley asked what happened, and the defendant told him not to

worry about it.  The defendant placed the gun in a bag and put it

under the seat.

	Buckley testified that he saw a white woman with a dog or a

cat as they left the scene.  He said they drove to a store, where

he used the bathroom and left in the car with another man named

Lamaris George.  The defendant was not with them at that time. 

Buckley said he told a man named Jermaine Holifield about the

shooting the day after it happened.  He acknowledged that he did

not speak to the police about the shooting until a detective

contacted him approximately 10 weeks later while he was in jail

for a pending drug case.  He testified that the defendant had

threatened to "do" him also if he told anyone about the shooting.

	In addition to this testimony, Buckley acknowledged that he

had been convicted of three felonies and a misdemeanor, all

involving acts of dishonesty.  He also acknowledged that he was

involved in a pending case for narcotics possession.  In that

case, in exchange for his testimony against the defendant, the

State agreed that he would receive 30 months of probation, 180

days in the county jail, and drug counseling.  The State also

granted him immunity from any murder charges stemming from Love’s

death.

	The parties stipulated that Karen Washington would offer the

following testimony if called as a witness.  She was at the

defendant’s house between 6:30 and 7 a.m. on the morning of the

shooting.  She observed Buckley, Love, and the defendant arrive

in a yellow Oldsmobile Delta 88.  The top of the Oldsmobile was

the same color as the bottom, and she believed it belonged to the

defendant.  The three men left in the Oldsmobile around 7 a.m., after the defendant mentioned having something important to do. 

Buckley was driving, the defendant was in the front passenger

seat, and Love was in the back seat.  Washington heard that Love

was dead about 30 to 45 minutes later.

	Reginald Pinnick, one of Love’s friends, testified that he

saw Love riding in the front passenger seat of a yellow car

around 7 a.m. on the day of the shooting.  He tried to stop the

vehicle to speak with Love, but Love raised one finger as if to

indicate he would be right back.  Pinnick saw two other persons

in the car whom he could not identify.  He said he could not

recall whether the car had a vinyl top and did not remember

telling police detectives it had a vinyl top.  He also said the

car resembled a yellow Oldsmobile Delta 88 depicted in People’s

Exhibit No.  6 (a photograph), but he could not definitely

identify it as the Delta 88.

	The parties next stipulated that a train crossed Patterson

Road at approximately 7:35 a.m. on the morning of the shooting.

	Camille Sharp testified that Interstate 80 is elevated "over

the top of [her] back yard."  She said on the morning of the

shooting, she went outside to get her dog and saw a man urinating

beside a car that was facing her house.  After unchaining her

dog, she looked up and saw a second man, with a gun, standing

behind the man who was urinating.  The second man initially made

an unsuccessful attempt to fire the gun.  However, he made

another attempt and shot the first man in the back of the head. 

Sharp saw "a big cloud of blood" followed by the victim falling backward to the ground.  She said the shooter’s arms were

outstretched in opposite directions, one reaching for the car

door and the other pointing the gun.  She further said the

distance between the victim and the car was a "little over" the

length of the shooter’s outstretched arms.

	According to Sharp, the shooter fired two additional shots

at the victim while attempting to enter the car.  He then entered

the car and it pulled away.  Sharp believed there were two

persons in the car at that time.  She described the car as a

large, white, four-door vehicle with chrome bumpers and a vinyl

top that was a shade darker than the body.

	Sharp called 911 after witnessing the shooting.  She

testified that she observed the shooter’s complexion and

described his clothing to a police detective.  When asked about

the information in the detective’s report, she remembered telling

him the shooter wore a sports jersey with black and blue

lettering on it and had a black "do-rag" on his head.  However,

she said she did not recall telling him the shooter’s complexion

resembled a dark Mexican or a light black man.  Instead, she

testified that she believed the shooter’s skin was darker than

the victim’s skin.

	Sharp viewed three or four cars at the police station and

identified the one that most resembled the car used in the

shooting.  However, she later called the police and directed them

to another car she had seen on her own.  She testified that she

directed them to the other car to show them what the car used in the shooting looked like.

	Police officer James Kren testified that he arrived at the

scene at approximately 7:30 a.m.  He found a dead black male

lying face-up under Interstate 80 with blood covering the right

side of his face.

	Louis Bolognani, a police evidence technician, testified

that he photographed the murder scene and collected evidence. 

Upon arriving at the scene, he found the victim lying face up

with the zipper of his trousers down.  Bolognani preserved casts

of tire impressions made by a vehicle that apparently left the

area at "an excessive rate of speed."  He discovered two small

plastic bags containing a white powdery substance, one on the

victim’s chest and another by his left hand.  Bolognani also took

tire impressions and lifted latent fingerprints from three

vehicles in police custody, including the yellow Oldsmobile

depicted in People’s Exhibit No. 6.  He did not testify regarding

any connection between the defendant and the impressions or the

fingerprints.  He said he found no evidence inside the yellow

Oldsmobile, describing its interior as "exceptionally clean."  He

also said the Oldsmobile did not have a vinyl top.

	The parties stipulated that neither of the plastic bags

recovered from the victim contained a controlled substance and

that the victim’s death resulted from gunshot wounds to the head.

	The State’s next witness was William Smith, an evidence

technician who performed an LMG test on the defendant’s car. 

Before Smith took the stand, the defendant’s attorney renewed his argument that the LMG evidence should be barred because it was

highly prejudicial and lacked probative value.  He further

stated:

	"I believe the State if they wanted to present

evidence of this, I think there is a Frye test.  We talked about this earlier, as to whether this is a test

that’s generally accepted by the scientific community

for the purposes of which it’s being used to show this

is an indicator of blood or not."

The judge subsequently denied the portion of the defendant’s

motion in limine relating to the LMG evidence.

	Smith then took the stand and testified that he had been a

police evidence technician for approximately nine years.  He had

received evidence training at Northwestern University, including

instruction on the use of LMG as a blood- enhancement technique. 

He explained that the LMG test involves spraying a chemical

mixture on a surface and watching for a color change to "dark

blue green."  Such a change, he stated, "will give you a

presumption to say that this is blood."  He acknowledged that

possibly as many as 50 other substances, including fresh potato

juice and certain metals, would cause the same reaction.  When

discussing that fact, he stated: "It’s presumed to be blood.  It

could be another substance, but it is presumed to be blood."

	Smith then testified that he performed an LMG test on the

defendant’s yellow Oldsmobile Delta 88 during the murder

investigation.  He did not see any blood on the car beforehand.  He said he sprayed the inside of the rear passenger-side door and

observed "a couple little dots" where the LMG exhibited the dark

blue color change.

	Detective Steve Bajt was the State’s final witness.  He

testified that he tried to speak with Lamarus George to verify

Buckley’s claim that they were together after the shooting. 

However, George’s parents would not let Bajt see him, stating

that he could not communicate because of a medical condition. 

Bajt never spoke with Jermaine Holifield.

	Bajt testified that he arrested the defendant and took the

Oldsmobile Delta 88 into custody.  The defendant waived his

Miranda rights and denied knowing Love or being involved with the shooting.  However, after looking at a photograph, he said he

recognized Love as "Demonstration Man" and acknowledged giving

him a ride to the projects on the day of the shooting.

	According to Bajt, the defendant gave a statement containing

the following facts: Love came to the defendant’s house on the

morning of the shooting wanting to buy some "weed."  Buckley was

outside at the time with some friends, including Karen

Washington.  The defendant advised that he did not have any

"weed," and Love asked for a ride to the projects.  Buckley and

the defendant took him to the projects in the defendant’s car. 

Buckley was driving, the defendant was in the front passenger

seat, and Love was in the back seat.  The defendant did not drive

because his license was suspended.  After dropping Love off at

the projects, Buckley and the defendant drove to see a girlfriend but discovered that she was not home.  The defendant’s car would

not start when they tried to leave, so Buckley got a ride with

another person to pick up a battery.

	Bajt testified that, while going over the statement a second

time, the defendant said he went with Buckley to pick up the

battery and they both returned and fixed the car.  He never

identified the person who took them to get the battery.  Bajt

also testified that the Oldsmobile Delta 88 he took into custody

did not have a vinyl roof.

	The State then rested, and the defendant recalled Bajt to

testify.  Bajt said he interviewed Buckley in jail and advised

that his name had surfaced during the investigation of Love’s

murder.  Buckley never mentioned seeing a white woman with a dog,

telling Jermaine Holifield about the shooting, or being

threatened by the defendant.  Bajt also interviewed Reginald

Pinnick, who described the car he saw as a beige or yellow four-

door vehicle with a vinyl top.  Additionally, Bajt interviewed

Camille Sharp at the scene of the shooting and at the police

station.  Sharp described the shooter as a male in his mid-

twenties, either a dark Mexican or a light- complected black man,

wearing a black sport jersey with blue lettering and a black "do-

rag" on his head.

	Three stipulations were presented after Bajt’s testimony. 

The first stipulation indicated that the tire impressions at the

scene of the shooting did not match the tires on the defendant’s

car or any other cars in police custody.  The second stipulation indicated that during his grand jury testimony, Buckley never

testified that he (1) saw a white woman with a dog, (2) told

Jermaine Holifield about the shooting, or (3) was threatened by

the defendant.  The third stipulation indicated that if Buckley

was recalled to testify, he would acknowledge being addicted to

drugs dating back to the day of the shooting.

	After hearing the evidence, the jury found the defendant

guilty of first degree murder.  He filed a motion for a new trial

claiming, inter alia, that the judge erred in admitting Smith’s testimony about the LMG test without conducting a Frye hearing.  The motion was denied, and the defendant was sentenced to 48

years in the Department of Corrections.  He now appeals.

	ANALYSIS

	I. Reasonable Doubt

	The defendant first claims that the State’s evidence was

insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

	It is well established that a jury’s role is to determine

the credibility of the witnesses, weigh their testimony, and draw

inferences from the evidence.  People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 535 N.E.2d 889 (1989).  An appellate court’s role, when

addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the State’s

evidence, is to determine whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.  People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985).  In making this determination, the court considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the State.  Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.  "Where evidence is conflicting,

it is the prerogative of the jury to ascertain the truth; a

reviewing court may not substitute a different conclusion on

questions regarding the credibility of witnesses."  People v. Gill, 169 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1053, 523 N.E.2d 1239, 1242 (1988).  A jury verdict should not be disturbed unless the evidence is so

improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that no rational

trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.  People v. Jarvis, 158 Ill. App. 3d 415, 511 N.E.2d 813 (1987).

	In light of these principles, we conclude that the State

presented sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s

conviction for first degree murder.  Jacques Buckley testified

that he witnessed the murder and that the defendant was the

shooter.  His testimony was corroborated in several respects by

other witnesses.  For example, Karen Washington confirmed that

the defendant left his house on the morning of the murder with

Buckley and the victim.  She also confirmed that they left in the

defendant’s car and that Buckley was driving.  Reginald Pinnick

testified that he saw the victim riding in the front passenger

seat of a yellow car with two other individuals that morning. 

The parties stipulated that a train crossed Patterson Road at the

time Buckley claimed to have been detoured by one.  Officer

Bolognani testified that the victim was found dead with his

trousers unzipped, corroborating Buckley’s statement that the

victim was shot after exiting the car to relieve himself.

	Additionally, Camille Sharp witnessed the shooting and

testified that she saw two men standing beside a car near an

elevated portion of Interstate 80.  She said one of the men was

urinating while another man shot him in the back of the head. 

She said the shooter then entered the car and it pulled away. 

She believed two persons were in the car at that time.  These

details corroborate Buckley’s description of the shooting.

	We acknowledge the defendant’s argument that Buckley was not

credible.  However, Buckley’s credibility was a matter for the

jury to determine.  After viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the State, we cannot say that no rational trier of

fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.

	II. "Invisible Blood" Evidence

	The defendant next claims that Smith’s testimony about the

LMG test should not have been admitted without a Frye hearing, and that the testimony was irrelevant.

	The State contends that the defendant has waived his Frye claim by failing to assert it in the trial court.  However, the

record shows that the defendant’s attorney mentioned the Frye test while arguing his motion in limine.  The attorney also alluded to previous discussions before the court regarding

application of the test.  Furthermore, the defendant’s motion for

a new trial contained a claim that the judge should have

conducted a Frye hearing.  We decline to apply the waiver doctrine under such circumstances.  See Harris v. Cropmate Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d 364, 706 N.E.2d 55 (1999) (declining to apply

the waiver doctrine even though the defendant failed to request a

Frye hearing in the trial court).

	When determining whether an expert witness can give an

opinion based on a scientific theory, Illinois courts follow the

test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  The Frye court explained the test as follows:

"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses

the line between the experimental and demonstrable

stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this

twilight zone the evidential force of the principle

must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way

in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-

recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently

established to have gained general acceptance in the

particular field in which it belongs."  (Emphasis added.)  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

Thus, expert testimony based on a scientific theory is not

admissible unless the theory has gained general acceptance in the

expert’s field.  People v. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1, 526 N.E.2d 525 (1988).  The determination of whether a theory has

gained such acceptance is made at a separate evidentiary hearing. 

See Harris, 302 Ill. App. 3d 364, 706 N.E.2d 55.

	These principles apply to determining the admissibility of Smith’s testimony.  The prosecutor argued otherwise in the trial court, asserting that Smith would not testify as a scientific

expert because he "would not *** give an opinion as to whether or

not the substance which was sprayed was actually blood."  Rather,

according to the prosecutor, Smith would simply "testify to the

test that he performed and what the results were."

	These statements understate what Smith did when he took the

stand.  He described the LMG test and the reaction he observed on

the door of the defendant’s car.  However, he further told the

jurors that a reaction with LMG raises a presumption that the

detected substance is blood, even though possibly as many as 50

other substances could cause the same reaction.  He gave this

testimony against the backdrop of his training at Northwestern

University and his years of experience as an evidence technician. 

His testimony amounted to an opinion that the reaction on the car

door was a basis for presuming the presence of blood over all the

other possible substances.  Such an opinion falls within the

realm of expert testimony.

	We are convinced that a remand for a Frye hearing is warranted.  The degree to which LMG testing is accepted in the

scientific community is unclear.  No reported cases in Illinois

address the admissibility of LMG evidence.  Additionally, the

trial judge’s comments on the record suggest that he was

unfamiliar with LMG.  The State cites People v. Henne, 165 Ill. App. 3d 315, 518 N.E.2d 1276 (1988), and People v. Hendricks, 145 Ill. App. 3d 71, 495 N.E.2d 85 (1986), for the proposition that Luminol testing, which is similar to LMG testing, involves a generally accepted procedure.  We note that Hendricks has been reversed (People v. Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31, 560 N.E.2d 611 (1990)).  In any event, neither case is helpful because they

merely mention the use of Luminol without addressing the

admissibility of the test results.

	We realize that the LMG testing procedure is taught at

Northwestern University.  However, we are not willing to assume

that the Frye standard is satisfied based solely on that fact.  Furthermore, the issue in the instant case involves more than

just the testing procedure.  In light of Smith’s testimony, the

relevant inquiry is whether LMG testing is generally accepted in

the scientific community as a means of raising a presumption

(rather than just a possibility) that blood is present.  That

inquiry should be addressed at the Frye hearing on remand.  Unless it is determined that Smith's testimony qualifies for

admission under the Frye standard, the defendant should receive a new trial, because we do not believe the resulting error would be

harmless.  See Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1, 526 N.E.2d 525 (noting that a retrial under such circumstances does not subject

a defendant to double jeopardy).

	The defendant also claims that Smith’s testimony should not

have been admitted because it was irrelevant.  Since that claim

would remain if the testimony passed the Frye standard on remand, we will address it now.  Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact in consequence to the determination of

the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.  People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 658 N.E.2d 391 (1995).  

	The State presented evidence that the defendant exited the

rear passenger-side door of the Delta 88 and shot the victim near

the car, causing a large cloud of blood.  Accordingly, the

existence of blood on the door was a fact of consequence to the

determination of the case.  Smith’s testimony made that fact more

probable and thus qualifies as relevant.  For these reasons, we

cannot conclude that the judge abused his discretion in admitting

Smith’s testimony as relevant.

   	CONCLUSION

	The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this order.  This court retains

jurisdiction of the appeal pending resolution of the Frye issue in the circuit court.

	Remanded with directions.

	SLATER and LYTTON, J.J., concurred.

_______________________________________________________________

      SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION     

   JUSTICE HOMER delivered the supplemental opinion of the court:

 ________________________________________________________________

	Defendant Derrick J. Wheeler was convicted of first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 1996)).  He appealed,

challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence and the admission of testimony of "invisible blood" testing.  As

previously set forth, this court found the State's evidence

sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, but we retained

jurisdiction and remanded the cause to the trial court for a

hearing to determine the degree to which Leuco-Malachite Green

(LMG) testing is accepted in the scientific community. 

	After a hearing on January 15, 2002, the trial court ruled

that LMG evidence was properly admitted.  We review Frye issues under an abuse of discretion standard.  Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Company, 199 Ill. 2d 63, 767 N.E.2d 314 (2002).  Based on our careful review of the record, as

supplemented by a transcript of the hearing and supplemental

briefs of the parties, we now reverse defendant's conviction and

remand the cause for a new trial.

	A detailed statement of the facts of the case is set forth

above.  We will include only those facts here which are relevant to the LMG testing procedure.  

	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to bar the State from presenting testimony by Officer William Smith

relating to LMG testing of the door of defendant's car. 

Defendant argued that the testimony was unduly prejudicial and

that the State had not established that the test was generally

accepted in the scientific community as an indicator of blood. 

Upon the prosecutor's assurance that Smith would not testify as

an expert witness, the trial court admitted the testimony.

	Smith then testified that prior to spraying a solution of LMG on the car door, he did not observe any spots or substances

resembling blood.  The spray revealed a "couple" of spots that

gave a positive reaction by turning dark blue-green.  Smith

stated that LMG is a "presumptive test" for the presence of blood

and that a positive LMG reaction "will give you a presumption to

say that this is blood."

	Because Smith's testimony amounted to an expert opinion,

this court remanded the cause for a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  We noted that no reported cases in Illinois had addressed the admissibility of LMG

evidence and that the issue in this case required more than

simply determining whether LMG was a testing procedure generally

accepted in the scientific community.  We directed the court to

determine specifically "whether LMG testing is generally accepted

in the scientific community as a means of raising a presumption

(rather than just a possibility) that blood is present."  Slip

op. at 18. 

	At the hearing on remand, two forensic scientists testified,

Dr. Robert Gaensslen for the State and Marc Scott Taylor for the

defense.  Dr. Gaensslen testified that LMG testing is generally

accepted in the scientific community as a "presumptive" or

"preliminary" test that produces a positive reaction to

substances containing a sufficient amount of peroxidase enzyme. 

He explained that approximately 50 different substances--

including, for example, copper and blood--contain peroxidase

enzyme and give a positive reaction to LMG.  On cross- examination, however, Gaensslen said that if a suspected

substance such as blood was not visible to the naked eye, a

positive LMG test indicated a "possibility" of its presence, but

a "confirmatory" test would have to be performed to determine

whether the substance was blood.

	Defendant's expert, Taylor, agreed with Dr. Gaensslen that a

positive LMG reaction on an invisible stain raised only a

possibility, but not a presumption, that blood was present.  He

said a stain was presumed to be blood when it was visible and

looked like blood and then produced a positive reaction to LMG.

	The Frye hearing established that a positive LMG reaction indicates a broad range of possible substances present on the

material tested, but it does not, without more, permit the tester

to "presume" the presence of any particular substance within the

category of matter containing peroxidase enzymes.  The experts

agreed that if a suspected substance is not visible, LMG testing

alone could only indicate the possible presence of blood.  In

other words, although LMG is generally accepted in the scientific

community as a preliminary test for the presence of blood, it is

not an accepted method for presuming the presence of blood as

Smith opined at trial.  

	Thus we conclude that, at least in the absence of visible

evidence of blood, LMG testing is not generally accepted in the scientific community as a means of raising a presumption (rather

than just a possibility) that blood is present.  

	Our conclusion today is generally consistent with decisions in sister jurisdictions where the use of "presumptive" tests has

been challenged.  See, e.g., Brenk v. Arkansas, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993) (presumptive test improperly admitted in absence

of confirmatory test to determine whether substance causing

reaction was blood); State v. Fukusaku, 85 Ha 462, 946 P.2d 32 (1997) (presumptive testing properly excluded because, without

confirmatory tests, prejudicial effect of evidence was not

outweighed by its probative value); State v. Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, 964 P.2d 681 (1998) (evidence of presumptive tests admitted

where confirmatory testing established that substance causing

reaction was blood); State v. Peterson, 242 Neb. 286, 494 N.W.2d 551 (1993) (LMG evidence properly admitted where visible dark

stains indicated presence of blood and confirmatory tests

established that substance was blood); cf. Commonwealth v. Duguay, 430 Mass. 397, 720 N.E.2d 458 (1999) (evidence properly admitted where expert testified that presumptive ortho-tolidine

test used to detect blood was a screening test capable of

producing false positives).

	In sum, we hold that the testing procedures utilized in the instant case did not give rise to a presumption as to the

presence of blood on the door of defendant's car.  Therefore, the

admission of Smith's expert opinion to the contrary resulted in

reversible error.  Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction

and remand the cause to the circuit court of Will County for a

new trial.

	Reversed and remanded.  

LYTTON, P.J., and SLATER, J., concurred.