United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-2324

LISA GELABERT-LADENHEIM,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant, Appellee.

 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]

 

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, 

 and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

 

Raymond L. Sanchez Maceira, with whom Melba Rivera Camacho was

on brief, for appellant.

John F. Suhre, with whom Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General

Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Associate General Counsel, and Vincent J.

Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, were on brief, for Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae. 

Angel Castillo, Jr., with whom Kara S. Nickel and Morgan, Lewis,

& Bockius LLP were on brief, for appellee.
 

June 12. 2001

 
3

LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Unlike other areas of discrimination

law where the protected status of the plaintiff (e.g., race or gender)

is usually not at issue, the law of disability discrimination often

presents a threshold question of whether a plaintiff is in fact

disabled. This question frequently arises when the plaintiff is

suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome ("CTS"), an affliction that can

result from repetitive motion injury. Under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the term

"disability" has a specialized meaning, more restrictive at times than

the meaning in the common use of the term "disabled." Under the ADA a

person must not only have a disability in the sense of a physical or

mental "impairment," but, importantly, that impairment must also

"substantially limit" a "major life activity." 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)(A). The CTS cases often turn on these last two prongs, and

the results vary with the individualized facts of a given case. That

is particularly so when the "major life activity" claimed to be

impaired is that of "working."

The district court here entered summary judgment against

plaintiff Lisa Gelabert-Ladenheim's ADA employment claim, concluding

that because defendant American Airlines reasonably accommodated her

alleged disability, namely, CTS, it did not violate the Act. See

Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 225

(D.P.R. 2000). We affirm on the different ground that the plaintiff
4

has not produced sufficient evidence on summary judgment that her

impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and so she does

not meet the specialized definition of the term "disabled."

I.

Plaintiff Lisa Gelabert-Ladenheim has a B.S. degree in Mass

Communication from Emerson College in Boston, Massachusetts. She is

fully bilingual in English and Spanish. Gelabert can type and operate

a computer and various software programs. By her own admission she is

qualified for positions in the fields of advertising, public relations,

radio and television production, news writing and editing, and EnglishSpanish translation. Her past work experience is broad and includes

jobs working in retail sales, narrating a documentary, doing a voiceover for a Spanish language commercial, and translating wire-copy.

In 1986, Gelabert began working as a passenger services agent

for American Airlines at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in

San Juan, Puerto Rico. Gelabert worked as a gate agent for most of her

career with American, after starting at the ticket counter. As a gate

agent, Gelabert was required to use computers, prepare itineraries,

compute fares, prepare and issue tickets, check baggage, and assist

passengers who are elderly, traveling with small children, or in

wheelchairs. Gelabert was also required periodically to update her

training in ticketing. 
5

Gelabert always worked part-time for American (twenty hours

a week). Throughout her employment there, and afterwards, until four

months after she had started a full-time job at the Wyndham El San Juan

Hotel and Casino, Gelabert also worked another part-time job as a

production coordinator and administrative assistant for a concert

production company called Rocktropic.

In May 1993, Gelabert injured her left hand while on duty at

American. She took a ten-month medical leave of absence; during her

treatment she was diagnosed with CTS in both hands, worse in her left

hand. By June 1994, Gelabert had received the maximum benefit from

insurance treatment, and in August 1994, she was released from her

insurance treatment with a declared 5% incapacity in her left wrist.

Gelabert continued to receive treatment from a private physician. The

condition deteriorated and now imposes a permanent impairment of 20% on

both hands.

In February 1994, Gelabert returned to work at American.

American placed her on restricted duty and assigned her to a temporary

part-time position at a curbside station for American Eagle Airlines,

Inc., its regional affiliate. This curbside position required Gelabert

to direct passenger traffic and provide information, but not to lift

luggage. She maintained her status as an American employee as well as

her previous salary. 

After August 1994, American reviewed Gelabert's medical file
6

and adopted the permanent physical exertion restrictions proposed by

Gelabert's treating physician. On March 17, 1995, American informed

Gelabert of her permanent work restrictions: no lifting of more than

thirty pounds; no pushing or pulling of more than twenty pounds; no

sitting or standing longer than eight hours; and moderate repetitive

typing of no more than one to two hours at a time, followed by a

fifteen minute break. Because Gelabert was no longer eligible for a

restricted duty assignment and because she could not perform all her

previous duties as a gate agent, American placed Gelabert on unpaid

medical leave and authorized job search assistance to try to find her

an alternate position at American. Gelabert remained on unpaid medical

leave from March 19, 1995 until April 16, 2000, when she exhausted her

allotment of medical leave. Throughout, American has maintained that

Gelabert is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

Gelabert's main contact during the American Airlines job

search was María Ramos-Salgado, a human services representative in San

Juan. Gelabert and Ramos spoke approximately once a week, though

Gelabert always initiated the contact. Ramos advised Gelabert to apply

for several available positions at the San Juan airport, including ramp

customer service team leader, ramp support staff, cargo services

coordinator, and operations customer service team leader. Gelabert did

not apply for any of these positions because she did not feel she could

perform the duties they required. Gelabert neither requested any type
1 Special services representatives cater to American's "very

important person" and "very important traveler" customers, and the

airline wanted a candidate who could accommodate all of these

customers' needs without having to refer them to another part of the

airport for additional services like baggage handling. 

7

of accommodation nor consulted with her physician before choosing not

to apply. Gelabert also insisted that any position be part-time to

enable her to continue working her other part-time job at Rocktropic.

In addition, Gelabert told Ramos she needed to remain in the San Juan

area to be close to family members who had health problems. Gelabert

eventually applied and interviewed for other positions at American. In

May 1995, Gelabert applied for a vacant light-duty position as a

special services representative, but that position was given to another

American employee who had baggage handling experience Gelabert lacked.1

In February 1996, Gelabert applied for another vacant light-duty

position as a platinum desk agent, but that position was given to

another American employee who had more extensive and more recent

ticketing experience than Gelabert. In both instances, American

believed Gelabert, though qualified, was not the most qualified person

for the job. 

In May 1996, American contacted Gelabert for an interview for

a part-time, temporary position as a sales and service representative

in reservations. Gelabert was interviewed and was offered the job but

declined, without exploring it, telling American that because the

position involved heavy repetitive typing she could not perform its
8

essential functions. Gelabert says American never told her that all

sales and service representatives received a fifteen minute break from

typing every one to two hours -- a regimen that paralleled Gelabert's

own work restrictions. Ramos says Gelabert never asked whether

American could have accommodated her by allowing her to take such

breaks. Had Gelabert asked, Ramos says, she would have been told about

the fifteen minute breaks. Indeed, other employees with CTS, and with

restrictions similar to Gelabert's, worked as sales and service

representatives at American at the time.

In July 1996, Gelabert accepted a position outside American

as an administrative office manager at the Wyndham El San Juan Hotel

and Casino ("the Hotel"). There Gelabert is responsible for assisting

the president and managing director with the Hotel's day-to-day

operation. The position is full-time, and Gelabert currently earns

approximately $51,000 per year. Gelabert's highest salary at American

was approximately $15,000 per year (albeit for part-time work).

Gelabert also continued to work part-time for Rocktropic for

approximately four months after she had been hired by the Hotel.

Gelabert's decision to leave Rocktropic was not related to her CTS, but

rather was based on her desire for a "career change." Gelabert's CTS

has never significantly interfered with her job at the Hotel, nor did

it ever significantly interfere with her job at Rocktropic.

II.
2 The district court also dismissed Gelabert's claim for

retaliation under the ADA as well as her claim under Puerto Rican

law. See Gelabert-Ladenheim, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 233. Gelabert has

not appealed the court's dismissal of the retaliation claim, and so

any such appeal has been waived. The dismissal of Gelabert's pendant

local law claim was proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Figueroa-Ruiz

v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1990).

3 Gelabert argues that the district court erred in

concluding as a matter of law that American reasonably accommodated

9

On December 20, 1996, Gelabert filed a disability

discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

against American Airlines. On June 15, 1999, she commenced this

action. On August 28, 2000, the district court granted American's

motion for summary judgment. The court determined that there was a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gelabert was disabled

under the ADA. It cited the restrictions on Gelabert's ability to type

for more than forty-five minutes, to grasp, to push, to pull, and to

lift. See Gelabert-Ladenheim, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 230. The court

concluded, however, that Gelabert's ADA claim nonetheless failed on

summary judgment in that no reasonable jury could find that American

had failed in its duty to reasonably accommodate any such disability.

Id. at 232-33. Gelabert now appeals the district court's grant of

summary judgment.2

III.

The parties pose the case as presenting a number of issues

relating to the question of reasonable accommodation,3 but we need only
her disability. She argues, inter alia, that absent an undue

hardship, an employer must reassign an individual to a vacant

position for which the individual is qualified when the individual,

due to a disability, can no longer perform the essential functions of

her present job even with reasonable accommodation. The EEOC has

submitted a brief as amicus curiae in support of Gelabert on this

issue. In response, American argues that the ADA does not require it

to violate its legitimate, non-discriminatory policy of selecting the

most qualified candidate for an available position, even if the

disabled candidate is qualified to perform the essential functions of

that position. 

10

decide the initial question of disability. 

We conclude that Gelabert is not disabled under the Act

because, though physically impaired, she has not adduced sufficient

evidence that she is substantially limited in any major life activity

to create a material dispute of fact. We do not reach (and,

consequently, express no opinion on) any of the issues with respect to

whether American provided her with a reasonable accommodation or the

scope of the accommodation duty. 

Review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is

de novo. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 47 (1st

Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000). 

Gelabert must initially demonstrate that she has raised a

material issue of fact that she has "a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities."

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Her CTS constitutes a physical impairment.

See Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1999).

Gelabert does not claim she is substantially limited in any major life
4 There was evidence that Gelabert continues to carry out

her daily activities and household chores, though not without some

difficulty, such as problems vacuuming, cramps when using her hair

dryer, and occasional pain when lifting a bottle of shampoo in the

shower. Gelabert also experiences brief and sporadic periods of pain

about four times during the day and more prolonged periods of pain at

night (up to an hour at a time); the pain at night is caused by the

splint she has to wear when sleeping. Here, such evidence must be

viewed in the overall context of how her condition actually affects

her ability to work.

11

activity other than working.4

For present purposes, we accept arguendo that "working" is

a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); see also LebronTorres v. Whitehall Labs., __ F.3d __, No. 00-1724, 2001 WL 563801, at

*3 (1st Cir. May 30, 2001); Quint, 172 F.3d at 10. There is, however,

"some conceptual difficulty in defining 'major life activities' to

include work." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492

(1999). The EEOC has itself suggested that working be viewed as a

residual life activity, considered only as a last resort "[i]f an

individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major

life activity." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j); see also Lessard

v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 175 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) ("'Working'

itself is a somewhat elastic term . . . ."). When the major life

activity of working is at issue (as opposed to any other major life

activity), the plaintiff "assumes a more fact-specific burden of

proof." Quint, 172 F.3d at 11.

Also, when the question of whether someone is disabled turns
5 The statute and EEOC regulations set up another difficulty

as well. A person may be sufficiently restricted by a physical

impairment from doing her job that many would think the employer

should make reasonable accommodations to keep the plaintiff employed. 

Yet, if the impairment does not affect any major life activity other

than working, and the impairment does not prevent the plaintiff from

working in a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes,

then, under the regulations, the plaintiff does not meet the ADA

definition of disability and the employer has no duty to accommodate. 

See, e.g., Lebron-Torres, 2001 WL 563801, at *4-*5 (citing 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).

12

on the plaintiff's ability to work, the very existence of the

disability turns on factors beyond simply the physical characteristics

of the plaintiff. See Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

240 F.3d 1110, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Randolph, J.,

concurring). So, arguably, different results could be reached with

respect to plaintiffs who suffer from identical physical impairments

but who, due to a variety of factors like the economic health or

geographic location of an area, face dissimilar employment prospects.

These factors may be difficult for employees and employers to predict,

and so both may be left with uncertainty as to whether there is any

disability and thus any duty to provide a reasonable accommodation.

That lack of predictability is an unfortunate artifact of ADA law.5

The plaintiff must meet the fact-specific burden Quint

describes in the context of the ADA's mandated "individualized

inquiry." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; see Stephenson v. United Airlines,

Inc., No. 00-15386, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11400, at *9 (9th Cir. May 30,

2001) ("The ADA mandates an individualized inquiry to determine whether
13

an employee is disabled."); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916,

926 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[W]hether a person is disabled under the ADA is

an individualized inquiry based on the particular circumstances of each

case."); cf. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. __, No. 00-24, 2001 WL

567717, at *13 (U.S. May 29, 2001) ("[A]n individualized inquiry must

be made to determine whether a specific modification for a particular

person's disability would be reasonable under the circumstances . . .

."). The issue of whether the plaintiff's impairment substantially

limits the major life activity of working involves a multi-level

analysis, starting with the skills of the plaintiff herself and moving

to the nature of the jobs she was prevented from performing as well as

those she was not. The "individualized inquiry" mandates first a focus

on the characteristics of the plaintiff. The inquiry focuses on the

plaintiff's education level, training, job skills, expertise, and

knowledge. This, in turn, requires a review of the plaintiff’s

employment: the job plaintiff is restricted from doing and the

plaintiff’s work history. If there is post-impairment work history, as

here, that is also relevant. If the plaintiff worked part-time for the

employer while simultaneously working elsewhere, as here, that is

relevant too. Here, the question is what plaintiff's past and/or

present work experience tells us about her current skills and abilities

in the workplace, as compared with "the average person having

comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. §
6 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (defining "disability" under

the Social Security Act as an "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment").

7 As one commentator has noted:

In defining who is disabled, a "Catch 22" aspect

appears: plaintiffs first must show that they have

some impairment that substantially limits a major

life activity. But these same plaintiffs must also

show they are not so disabled as to be unable to

perform the job, which implies lack of impairment.

Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 1 Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook 80

(3d ed. 1997). We do not think this case fairly raises this problem.

14

1630.2(j)(3)(i).

The second focus is on jobs and the relevant job market: the

job plaintiff held, the jobs closed to plaintiff, and the jobs open to

plaintiff within the reasonably accessible geographic area (as to which

defendants may also produce evidence). The individualized

characteristics of the plaintiff are the bedrock on which this jobs

analysis must take place. As to the jobs themselves, there is no

requirement in the ADA that a person be totally disabled from working;6

indeed, a person cannot be totally disabled because she must be

otherwise qualified to work. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining

"qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a

disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

the essential functions of the employment position that such individual

holds or desires").7 The requirement is only that the otherwise

qualified plaintiff be "substantially limited" in the major life
8 So we assume in Gelabert's favor that even if she is not

significantly restricted as to a broad range of jobs in various

classes, she can still show she is disabled if she is significantly

restricted as to a class of jobs.

15

activity of working. The EEOC regulations illuminate this analysis:

(1) "[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job" does not

constitute the required substantial limitation, 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(3)(i); 

(2) the plaintiff must show that she is significantly restricted in her

ability to perform "a class of jobs" -- that is, the job from which she

is disqualified by reason of her impairment and those which utilize

similar knowledge, training, skills or abilities, id. §

1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B); and/or

(3) the plaintiff must show that she is significantly restricted in

her ability to perform "a broad range of jobs in various classes" --

that is, the job from which she is disqualified by reason of her

impairment and those which do not utilize similar knowledge, training,

skills or abilities, id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C).

We will assume a plaintiff must show significant restriction

as to either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various

classes.8 Although the EEOC regulations are silent as to consideration

of jobs that are actually available to plaintiff (as opposed only to

those jobs that are unavailable), we believe this consideration to be

implicit in the statute and the regulations. If there were any doubt
9 This language in Sutton seems to reject the position taken

by the EEOC in McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., 110 F.3d 369 (6th

Cir. 1997), that the sole focus must be on the jobs plaintiff could

not perform, rather than on the jobs plaintiff could perform. See

id. at 372. We think both are pertinent.

10 This case also does not raise the very different problem

of what would happen in the case of a plaintiff trained, for example,

as a doctor, who suffers from an impairment that precludes her from

practicing medicine but not from performing manual labor jobs

available to her. See Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1120 (Tatel, J.,

concurring).

16

as to this question, the Supreme Court apparently resolved it in

Sutton: "If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his

or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a

substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of

jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs."

527 U.S. at 492.9 Whether, on certain facts, these EEOC regulatory

definitions comport with congressional intent is a matter we need not

reach here.10 

In showing disqualification from a class of jobs or broad

range of jobs in various classes it is often helpful, but far from

required, for plaintiffs to produce evidence from a vocational expert.

In some cases, it will be obvious that a particular impairment is so

severe as to qualify as an ADA disability. EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l

Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J., dissenting).

In other cases, reference to publicly available labor market

statistics, such as simple government job statistics, may suffice. See
11 Such statistics are readily available on the Internet, at

sites like <www.occustats.com>, which provides at low cost a number

of different reports on job requirements in specific local labor

markets. Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1117 n.5. 

17

Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1117.11

Applying the framework established above, our view is that

no reasonable jury could conclude that Gelabert was disabled. Here,

there is not even a colorable claim that Gelabert is disqualified from

a broad range of jobs in various classes. She is plainly qualified for

a great variety of jobs, by her own admission.

We test Gelabert's claim that she is nonetheless disqualified

from a class of jobs "as compared to the average person having

comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 

U.S.C. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). The average college-educated bilingual woman

in the San Juan area with computer skills and experience in retail

sales, the entertainment industry, the news industry, and the

hospitality and transportation industries does not have limited job

prospects. Due to her impairment, plaintiff is unable to lift more

than thirty pounds, push or pull more than twenty pounds, sit or stand

longer than eight hours, or type more than one to two hours without a

break. Those facts do not, on the evidence presented, mean that she is

significantly restricted in her ability to perform a class of jobs.

Indeed, Sutton itself held the plaintiffs were not disabled where poor

eyesight prevented them from being commercial pilots because they still
12 See also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 524-

25 (1999) (plaintiff not disabled where he could not perform a

mechanic position that required that he drive a commercial motor

vehicle, but where he could still perform other types of mechanic

positions); Webb v. Clyde L. Choate Mental Health and Dev. Ctr., 230

F.3d 991, 998-99 (7th Cir. 2000) (psychologist not disabled where his

condition precluded him from working in specialized niche of

psychology, but where he could still work as a psychologist

generally); Santiago-Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d

25, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2000) (flight attendant with hearing loss in one

ear not disabled where she was potentially precluded from flying on

non-pressurized airplanes, but where, inter alia, she was still

qualified for various ground positions at the airline, including

receptionist, payroll clerk, and operational manager).

18

qualified for other types of pilot positions. 527 U.S. at 492-93.

12

Further, that Gelabert is now employed in the hospitality industry (at

a higher salary), and that she continued to work part-time in the

entertainment industry after going on medical leave from American and

for several months after she started working at the Hotel, are at odds

with her conclusory claim that she is substantially limited in her

ability to work. See Lebron-Torres, 2001 WL 563801, at *3 (plaintiff

started working nearly full-time at home as a hair stylist, a previous

occupation, after leaving job at pharmaceutical manufacturing company

because of back injury); Santiago-Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc.,

213 F.3d 25, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2000) (flight attendant suffering from

hearing loss successfully continued her employment at airline);

Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998) (computer service

technician suffering from CTS unable to perform previous job that

involved lifting and moving computers but was hired less than one month
19

later as a computer service technician by a company that did not

require him to lift or move computers).

Here, Gelabert supports her claim by presenting expert

testimony from two individuals. That testimony falls far short. One

of Gelabert's expert witnesses, Dr. Hector J. Guerra-Prado, a clinical

psychologist, opined that Gelabert was limited to a range of light

work. However, he identified only two types of positions Gelabert was

precluded from performing -- (1) working as sewing machine operator and

(2) doing secretarial and/or data entry work. As to the first,

operating a sewing machine is not a job suited to someone of Gelabert's

much broader (and different) job qualifications. As to the second,

while her passenger services agent position at American involved some

intense typing characteristic of secretarial and/or data entry work,

Gelabert's education, skills, and work experience in no way suggest

that intense typing, without breaks, is characteristic of jobs suitable

for persons of her background and qualifications. Dr. Guerra also

acknowledged that Gelabert could perform skilled tasks on a sustained

basis and that she was qualified for other jobs at American.

In addition, Gelabert presented the affidavit of Dr. Fausto

A. Boria, a psychiatrist. His affidavit simply parrots the language of

Quint and the EEOC regulations, states that Gelabert is significantly

limited in the major life activity of working, and concludes that the

two jobs Gelabert wanted at American were reasonable accommodations
20

under the ADA. Such affidavits, consisting largely of legal

conclusions, are not helpful. Moreover, Dr. Boria’s conclusions depend

on Dr. Guerra's findings, which, as we have concluded, do not show

Gelabert is precluded from performing a class of jobs or a broad range

of jobs in various classes. Indeed, Dr. Boria's affidavit falls short

even of the vocational expert affidavit the Ninth Circuit found

insufficient in Broussard v. University of California, 192 F.3d 1252,

1258-59 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Gelabert relies heavily on Quint, supra, interpreting that

case as holding that a restriction to light work is per se a

substantial limitation on the major life activity of working. Her

argument rests on a misinterpretation and is contrary to the

"individualized inquiry" requirement. In fact, Quint rejected a per se

rule that CTS was or was not an ADA disability. 172 F.3d at 13. The

individualized inquiry in Quint established that plaintiff's work

history consisted entirely of manual labor jobs, that such physically

demanding jobs were the economic mainstay of her geographic area, that

her education did not go beyond high school, and that she was

disqualified from a broad range of jobs. See id. at 11-12. Quint also

supported her claim with corroborative expert testimony. See id. at

12.

Here, by contrast, Gelabert has produced only generic

evidence of her work restrictions, e.g., no intense typing or heavy
21

lifting, without showing how these restrictions substantially limit her

ability to work in the San Juan area given her education, training,

skills, abilities, and employment history. While the burden of proof

on an ADA plaintiff as to the number and types of jobs she can or

cannot perform in the relevant labor market is not onerous, see id. at

12 (citing 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)); see also Rockwell

Int'l, 243 F.3d at 1017-18, Gelabert has offered no more than

conclusory statements whose evidentiary value is dwarfed by evidence of

the types of jobs she was still qualified to perform, including

evidence of the jobs she actually did perform. 

There is also no evidence American regarded Gelabert as

disabled. Indeed, American explicitly said it did not. American’s

efforts to find another job for Gelabert, even while taking the

position she was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, belie the

notion that American was motivated to discriminate based on stereotypes

about disability.

There is no question that CTS is a physical impairment that

has affected Gelabert's life. There is also no question that CTS can

in other circumstances substantially limit a person in the major life

activity of working. See, e.g., Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist.,

187 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1999); Quint, 172 F.3d at 13. But for

Gelabert to prevail on her ADA claim, she must show that this condition

substantially limits her in the major life activity of working. Even
22

viewing the facts of record in the light most favorable to Gelabert, it

plainly does not. To the contrary, Gelabert's educational background,

skills, abilities, and work experience have proven and continue to

prove attractive to various employers, her CTS notwithstanding. There

is no evidence of an ADA violation. 

III.

The judgment of the district court dismissing the action is

affirmed.

So ordered.