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[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 175 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 175

   Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy 
    toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in light of the 
  Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the conflict in Kosovo.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 5, 1999

     Mr. Roth (for himself and Mr. Lugar) submitted the following 
  resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy 
    toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in light of the 
  Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the conflict in Kosovo.

Whereas NATO, the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and 
        a transatlantic membership, has successfully defended the territory and 
        interests of its members over the last 50 years, prevailed in the Cold 
        War, and continues to make a vital contribution to the promotion and 
        protection of freedom, democracy, stability, and peace throughout, 
        Europe;
Whereas NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European 
        states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the 
        destabilizing renationalization of European military policies, and by 
        ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in 
        European security affairs;
Whereas the March 12, 1999, accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
        to NATO has strengthened the Alliance, and is an important step toward a 
        Europe that is truly whole, undivided, free, and at peace;
Whereas extending NATO membership to other qualified European democracies will 
        also strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability, deter potential 
        aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and 
        its NATO allies;
Whereas the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance, threatens no nation and 
        reinforces peace and stability in Europe, and provides benefits to all 
        nations;
Whereas article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that ``any other European 
        state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to 
        contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area'' is eligible to 
        be granted NATO membership;
Whereas Congress has repeatedly endorsed the enlargement of NATO with bipartisan 
        majorities;
Whereas the selection of new members should depend on NATO's strategic 
        interests, potential threats to security and stability, and actions 
        taken by prospective members to complete the transition to democracy and 
        to harmonize policies with the political, economic, and military 
        guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;
Whereas the members of NATO face new threats, including conflict in Europe 
        stemming from historic, ethnic, and religious enmities, the potential 
        for the reemergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe, rogue 
        states and nonstate actors possessing weapons of mass destruction, and 
        threats to the wider interests of the NATO members (including the 
        disruption of the flow of vital resources);
Whereas NATO military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and 
        force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its 
        members, but also capable of projecting power when the security of a 
        NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of 
        willing partners among NATO members;
Whereas this will require that NATO members possess national military 
        capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain 
        operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the 
        United States in high-intensity conflicts;
Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
        (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 highlighted the glaring short-comings of 
        European allies in command, control, communication, and intelligence 
        resources; combat aircraft; and munitions, particularly precision-guided 
        munitions; and the overall imbalance between United States and European 
        defense capabilities;
Whereas this imbalance in United States and European defense capabilities 
        undercuts the Alliance's goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;
Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic 
        perspective and approach to issues concerning the interests and security 
        of North America and Europe;
Whereas NATO has undertaken great effort to facilitate the emergence of a 
        European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, including 
        the identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as the 
        commander of operations led by the Western European Union (WEU); the 
        creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations; the 
        establishment of close linkages between NATO and the WEU, including 
        planning, exercises, and regular consultations; and a framework for the 
        release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities;
Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course of its Cologne 
        Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and structures of the Western 
        European Union, including its command structures and military forces, 
        and established within it the post of High Representative for Common 
        Foreign and Security Policy;
Whereas the member States of the European Union at the Cologne Summit pledged to 
        reinforce their capabilities in intelligence, strategic transport, and 
        command and control; and
Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 Cologne summit 
        indicate a new determination of European states to develop a European 
        Security and Defense Identity featuring strengthened defense 
        capabilities to address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved,

SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

    (a) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate--
            (1) regards the political independence and territorial 
        integrity of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern 
        Europe as vital to European peace and security and, thus, to 
the interests of the United States;
            (2) endorses the commitment of the North Atlantic Council 
        that NATO will remain open to the accession of further members 
        in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
            (3) endorses the Alliance's decision to implement the 
        Membership Action Plan as a means to further enhance the 
        readiness of those European democracies seeking NATO membership 
        to bear the responsibilities and burdens of membership;
            (4) believes all NATO members should commit to improving 
        their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can project 
        power decisively within and outside NATO borders in a manner 
        that achieves transatlantic parity in power projection 
        capabilities and facilitates equitable burdensharing among NATO 
        members; and
            (5) endorses NATO's decision to launch the Defense 
        Capabilities Initiative, intended to improve the defense 
        capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the 
        deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability 
        of these European forces.
    (b) Further Sense of the Senate.--It is further the sense of the 
Senate that--
            (1) the North Atlantic Council should pace, not pause, the 
        process of NATO enlargement by extending an invitation of 
        membership to those states able to meet the guidelines 
        established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement and should do 
        so on a country-by-country basis;
            (2) the North Atlantic Council in the course of its 
        December 1999 Ministerial meeting should initiate a formal 
        review of all pending applications for NATO membership in order 
        to establish the degree to which such applications conform to 
        the guidelines for membership established by the 1995 NATO 
        Study on Enlargement;
            (3) the results of this formal review should be presented 
        to the membership of the North Atlantic Council in May 2000 
        with recommendations concerning enlargement;
            (4) NATO should assess potential applicants for NATO 
        membership on a continual basis;
            (5) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
        Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to 
        encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the 
        resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly 
        deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for 
        extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United 
        States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective 
        partners of the United States in supporting mutual interests;
            (6) improved European military capabilities, not new 
        institutions, are the key to a vibrant and more influential 
        European Security and Defense Identity within NATO;
            (7) NATO should be the primary institution through which 
        European and North American allies address security issues of 
        transatlantic concern;
            (8) the European Union must implement its Cologne Summit 
        decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in 
        a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including 
        Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, 
        Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will not be 
        discriminated against, but will be fully involved when the 
        European Union addresses issues affecting their security 
        interests;
            (9) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne 
        summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on 
        transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted 
        by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
            (10) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne 
        summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication of 
        the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and
            (11) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne 
        summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military 
        resources that European allies contribute to NATO, but should 
        instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective 
        force commitments to the Alliance.
                                 <all>
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