1

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3134

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Eastern District of Arkansas.

*

Alvin Clay, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 16, 2010

Filed: August 27, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Alvin Clay of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 371, and four counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1957. The district court1

 sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment and ordered

him to pay $16,265.26 in restitution. Clay appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his convictions. He also argues the district court erred: (1) by

denying his motion for a new trial; (2) in its jury instructions; (3) in admitting
2

“We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts.” White

v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 574

F.3d 460, 465 (8th Cir. 2009)).

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evidence; (4) in excluding evidence; and (5) in denying his motion to suppress. We

affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background2

This case concerns a conspiracy to defraud purchasers of five homes in Little

Rock, Arkansas. The government charged three individuals for their roles in the

conspiracy: Clay, Raymond Nealy, and Donny McCuien (collectively referred to as

“the conspirators”). During the period of the conspiracy, Clay worked as a licensed

attorney in the State of Arkansas and also held a real estate and contractor’s license.

Nealy worked as a mortgage broker and owned a mortgage company. McCuien

managed a Burger King and owned a property management and construction

corporation. 

Each of the five fraudulent home purchases proceeded in a similar manner.

Usually McCuien would find a purchaser for an inexpensive residential property. The

purchaser would be promised a no-risk transaction, wherein he or she would receive

some cash from closing. Nealy would then obtain financing in an amount

substantially greater than the asking price. Using fraudulent information and

frequently forging signatures, he would arrange for appraisals of the homes and

prepare contracts for sale. The contracts showed a sale price greater than the asking

price. The difference between the asking price and sale price would go to Clay

Construction Company for the renovation of the property. 

At closing, the conspirators would fax a Clay Construction invoice to the

closing agent, even though the work claimed on the invoice had not been completed.

The invoice showed a difference between the amount loaned to the borrower and the
3

The second superseding indictment only named Clay and Nealy as defendants.

McCuien pled guilty before the return of the second superseding indictment. 

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amount paid to the seller. The closing agent would send Clay Construction Company

a check for the invoice amount. In total, the conspirators submitted five invoices to

title companies, and title companies subsequently issued five checks to Clay

Construction totaling $133,142.23. Clay received the checks, deposited them into

Clay Construction’s bank account, and divided the money among Nealy, McCuien,

and himself. The conspirators did not complete any work on any of the homes.

The FBI learned of this scheme when Kenny Wright, a tax preparer, became

concerned that he had unlawfully assisted the conspirators with preparing false

documents. Wright, accompanied by his attorney, approached the government,

admitting that he had falsified tax documents and participated in the fraudulent

scheme by preparing false construction invoices. Wright provided the FBI with the

conspirators’ names, the names of the conspirators’ businesses, Clay’s social security

number, and documentation of the illegal activity. 

FBI agents subsequently executed a search warrant for Clay’s law office and

Nealy’s mortgage company, seizing twenty boxes of documents and seven computers.

As a result of the search, the government sought a federal grand jury indictment.

The grand jury returned an indictment in December 2004, a first superseding

indictment in November 2005, and a second superseding indictment in June 2007.

The second superseding indictment alleged that Nealy and McCuien solicited

individuals to purchase five homes and used fraudulent documentation when applying

for financing through Nealy’s mortgage company. According to the indictment, the

conspirators caused false offers to purchase and false invoices to be delivered to the

title companies. The invoices claimed that work had been completed on the homes,

even though no work had been done. It also alleged that Nealy and Clay had

defrauded the purchasers of the five homes.3
McCuien was named as a coconspirator, along with other persons known and

unknown to the grand jury.

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Before trial, Clay moved to suppress evidence seized in the search of his office

and to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it failed to state an offense and was

the product of prosecutorial retaliation. In support of his retaliation claim, Clay

alleged he had been involved in a contentious litigation with the same prosecutor who

initiated the criminal investigation of Clay. After Clay filed these motions, the

Western District of Arkansas assumed responsibility for the Eastern District of

Arkansas’s case. Following a hearing, the district court denied Clay’s motions. 

The government tried Clay separately from Nealy. More than thirty witnesses

testified during the seven-day trial. The court denied Clay’s motions for judgment of

acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief and at the close of the trial.

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Clay moved for a judgment of acquittal and

for a new trial. The district court held a hearing on these motions. At the hearing,

Clay argued that McCuien had perjured himself at trial. The district court denied both

motions. Clay appeals his convictions. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Clay argues the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support

the conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence de novo and reverses only if no

reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty. United States v. Elzahabi, 557

F.3d 879, 885 (8th Cir. 2009). “Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the government, it offers substantial support for

the verdict.” United States v. Slaughter, 128 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 1997). “It is

axiomatic that we do not pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be

given their testimony.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
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To convict Clay of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government needed

to prove: “(1) a conspiracy with an illegal purpose existed; (2) [Clay] knew of the

conspiracy; and (3) [Clay] knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy.”

United States v. Price, 542 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2008). 

Clay raises two arguments. We address each in turn.

A.

Clay first argues he did not participate in the delivery, nor did he know about

the fraudulent documents Nealy and McCuien sent to lenders and title companies.

Clay maintains that he was only connected to the lenders through the Clay

Construction invoices which he contends were immaterial to the lenders’ decisions to

loan money to the purchasers. Therefore, he argues, no loan proceeds were

transmitted by wire communications as a result of his involvement.

We disagree with Clay that he needed to be directly involved in the

transmission of loan proceeds from the lenders to the title companies. To be guilty of

a conspiracy, he need not have knowledge of every detail of the conspiracy. Rather,

the government needed to establish that the participants agreed to the essential nature

of the conspiracy. See Slaughter, 128 F.3d at 628 (requiring that the government

prove that the defendant knew the essential object of the conspiracy). 

The government introduced evidence that Clay received $27,500 as a result of

his partnership with McCuien and Nealy, yet he did not complete any work on any of

the homes. Clay admitted at trial that he listed himself as the “supervisor” of a

construction project on one of the Clay Construction invoices that the conspirators

sent to a title company even though he was not present on any job sites, nor did he

supervise any subcontractors or workers. The evidence further established that the

title companies relied on these invoices to send a check to Clay Construction for the
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difference between the amount loaned to the borrower and the amount paid to the

seller, and Clay admitted that he bore responsibility for the invoices. Clay then

deposited the checks from the title companies into his Clay Construction Company

checking account and immediately wrote checks to himself, Nealy, and McCuien. 

Clay may not have known every detail of the conspiracy. But the law does not

require such knowledge. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947)

(“[T]he law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon

showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it,

without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of

others.”). The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that

Clay intended to assist McCuien and Nealy with defrauding others out of money, he

knew the essential object of the conspiracy, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that

interstate wire communications would be used. See Slaughter, 128 F.3d at 627

(providing for the insufficiency of the evidence standard). We reject Clay’s

sufficiency of the evidence claim.

B.

Clay next argues that the government failed to prove he conspired to commit

wire fraud because the government only proved that he defrauded the purchasers. He

asserts that the purchasers were not victims because they knowingly participated in

the fraud by falsely representing their intention to live in the homes they were

purchasing and provided false information about their finances.

But the purchasers’ testimony negates Clay’s claim. The purchasers testified

that they purchased the homes because McCuien told them they could make money

in real estate and that several of them were harmed by the conspiracy. Further,

McCuien admitted that the purchasers were never informed that the conspirators

received money from the title companies and that they split the money amongst
4

Clay argues in a footnote that this court should set aside the money laundering

convictions on insufficient evidence grounds, but he does not explain what elements

the government failed to prove. We have carefully reviewed the record and are

satisfied that the government proved that Clay knowingly engaged or attempted to

engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than

$10,000, and that the property was derived from unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. §

1957. 

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themselves. McCuien testified that they did not tell the purchasers because they

wanted to keep the money for themselves. We conclude that the testimony supports

the jury’s verdict that McCuien, Nealy, and Clay engaged in a conspiracy to defraud

the purchasers and that the purchasers were harmed by the conspiracy.

Finally, Clay provides no authority for his proposition that the purchasers could

not be the victim of a conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The substantive statute for

wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, does not specify who must be the victim of the wire

fraud. The statute states:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice

to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to

be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in

interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or

sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

The government charged Clay with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and the second

superseding indictment clearly states that the conspirators engaged in a scheme to

defraud the purchasers of the homes. Because Clay has not established he must

defraud a lender to be found guilty of the conspiracy, and the evidence clearly

establishes that purchasers suffered harm as a result of the conspiracy, we reject

Clay’s argument and affirm the conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.4
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III. Motion for a New Trial

Clay argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because

McCuien testified against him and McCuien lacked credibility. At trial, McCuien

testified he had no experience in construction. After trial, Clay presented the court

evidence that McCuien actively participated in construction and home repair.

But Clay’s post-trial attack on McCuien’s credibility merely amounts to

impeachment evidence. “[N]ewly discovered evidence which is merely impeaching

normally cannot form the basis for a new trial.” United States v. Bonadonna, 775 F.2d

949, 957 (8th Cir. 1985). Further, the district court determined that a jury could infer

that Clay participated in the conspiracy based on reasons unrelated to McCuien’s

testimony: (1) Clay had complete control over the $133,142 he deposited into the

Clay Construction account; (2) the manner in which the conspirators distributed the

proceeds indicated that no work had been done on the five houses; and (3) none of the

indicia of a legitimate construction project were present. We conclude the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clay’s motion for a new trial. See United

States v. Huerta-Orozco, 272 F.3d 561, 566 (8th Cir. 2001). 

IV. Jury Instruction

The district court instructed the jury on whether Clay acted knowingly:

You may find that Alvin Clay acted knowingly if you find beyond

a reasonable doubt that Alvin Clay was aware of a high probability that

money or property was being obtained under false or fraudulent

pretenses and that he deliberately avoided learning the truth. The

element of knowledge may be inferred if Alvin Clay deliberately closed

his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. You may

not find Alvin Clay acted “knowingly” if you find he was merely

negligent, careless, or mistaken as to whether money or property was

being obtained under false or fraudulent pretenses. 
5

Clay also briefly argues this instruction shifted the burden of proof. We find

no merit to this argument.

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You may not find that Alvin Clay acted knowingly if you find that

he actually believed that money or property was not being obtained

under false or fraudulent purposes.

Clay argues this instruction requires reversal for two reasons.5

 

A. Reasonable Doubt

First, Clay contends the instruction undermined the reasonable doubt standard,

because the use of the phrase “aware by a high probability” misled the jury on the

definition of “reasonable doubt.” 

The term reasonable doubt “defies easy explication.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511

U.S. 1, 5 (1994). The Supreme Court explained:

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due

process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining

reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.

Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the

defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution

does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the

jury of the government’s burden of proof. Rather, “taken as a whole, the

instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt

to the jury.”

Id. (citations omitted).

We conclude Clay failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion

in instructing the jury on the reasonable doubt standard as it pertained to whether Clay

acted knowingly. See United States v. Rehak, 589 F.3d 965, 972 (8th Cir. 2009)

(providing for an abuse of discretion standard of review). This instruction did not
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merely require that the jury find a “high probability” that Clay committed the

offenses. Rather, the instruction stated that the jury must find beyond a reasonable

doubt “that Alvin Clay was aware of a high probability” that money was being

fraudulently obtained. 

Moreover, the district court instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard

in Jury Instruction #5:

A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common

sense, and not the mere possibility of innocence. A reasonable doubt is

the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a

convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely

and act upon it. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not

mean proof beyond all possible doubt.

Clay does not argue the district court erred in its reasonable doubt instruction,

nor can we discern any mistake in law on this instruction. Further, Clay has not

established that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in

an unconstitutional manner. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 (“The constitutional question

. . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions

to allow conviction based on [insufficient proof].”). We conclude that the jury

instructions, taken as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to

the jury. See id. at 5.

B. Willful Blindness Instruction

Clay next argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that it

could infer knowledge of the conspiracy if it found Clay “deliberately closed his eyes

to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.” He maintains this willful

blindness instruction undermined the requirement for knowledge and intent.
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“A willful blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack

of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.”

United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotations

omitted). “Ignorance is deliberate if the defendants were presented with facts putting

them on notice criminal activity was particularly likely and yet intentionally failed to

investigate.” United States v. Whitehill, 532 F.3d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 2008). Evidence

is sufficient to support such an instruction “if a jury could find beyond a reasonable

doubt the defendants had either actual knowledge of the illegal activity or deliberately

failed to inquire about it before taking action to support the activity.” Id. “If

reasonable inferences support a finding the failure to investigate is equivalent to

‘burying one’s head in the sand,’ the jury may consider willful blindness as a basis for

knowledge.” Id. (quoting Gruenberg, 989 F.2d at 974).

Here, the district court deemed such an instruction appropriate, reasoning: 

There were at least two invoices that were shown to Mr. Clay where they

said supervised by Alvin Clay, and he admitted he had those

contemporaneously with getting paid and he knows that he didn’t

supervise any work and did not inquire about any of that. And so that’s

evidence of some misrepresentation and deliberately looking away. 

The other thing that -- the other part of the evidence that bothered

-- that made me think this might be an appropriate instruction had to do

with the first transaction with Linda Jones in which Clay Construction

Company got whatever the amount of the check was, I don’t remember,

and then got three cashier’s checks for Ray Nealy’s mother and to have

that request of a general contractor from a subcontractor, don’t pay me,

don’t pay my materialmen, don’t pay my laborers, you know, write out

three cashier’s checks for my mother, that’s the sort of thing that not

inquiring about that seems to me evidence that would support giving that

instruction.

Trial Tr. 1095-96.
6

Clay also briefly argues that his convictions for money laundering should be

set aside because the jury instructions misstated an element of the money laundering

offense. He relies on United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008) (plurality

opinion), which the Supreme Court decided on the fifth day of his trial. The Court in

Santos determined ambiguous the term “proceeds,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and

that “proceeds” should be defined as “profits.” Id. at 2024-25. 

Clay asserts that the district court should have instructed the jury that the term

“proceeds” meant “profits.” Because Clay did not request this instruction, we review

his claim for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Clay

has not established that the error, if any, affected the outcome of the proceedings. It

seems unlikely that this definition affected the verdict because Clay’s defense was not

that he did not “profit” at least $10,000. Rather, Clay defended the charges by arguing

that he did not knowingly participate in the money laundering scheme.

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Based on these facts, we agree with the district court that a jury could

reasonably conclude that Clay either knew of the illegal activity or buried his head in

the sand. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in providing a willful

blindness instruction.6

V. Admission of Evidence

Clay argues the district court erred by admitting evidence that he had engaged

in fraud when securing his contractor’s license. He complains that the district court

should not have permitted testimony from four witnesses who testified about the

manner in which Clay obtained his contractor’s license because it violated Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Gregory Crow, the administrator of the Arkansas Contractors Licensing Board,

testified that Clay applied for a contractor’s license in 2001. Crow testified that the

application required that Clay submit references from individuals for whom he had

completed work. Clay’s application listed Pat Joyner, Earl Jones, and Allan Nelson

as references and included each of their alleged signatures. Crow testified that Clay

swore on his application that his answers were true. Crow further testified that the
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Licensing Board would not have issued Clay a contractor’s license if he included false

information on his application.

Three other witnesses testified briefly that they were listed as references for

Clay’s application although Clay did not perform work on their homes. Pat Joyner

testified that Clay never engaged in any contracting work for her, she did not fill out

a reference form for him, and she did not remember signing a reference form. Earl

Jones testified that he did not sign Clay’s reference form, did not authorize anyone to

submit the reference form on his behalf, and did not know of Clay’s experience in

construction. Allan Nelson similarly testified.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of crimes by the

defendant which are not charged in the indictment are generally inadmissible. See

United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1974). “However, evidence of

other crimes is admissible for the purpose of providing the context in which the crime

occurred.” United States v. Forcelle, 86 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1996). As further

explained in United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986) (citations

omitted):

We have held that where evidence of other crimes is “so blended

or connected, with the one[s] on trial as that proof of one incidentally

involves the other[s]; or explains the circumstances; or tends logically to

prove any element of the crime charged,” it is admissible as an integral

part of the immediate context of the crime charged. When the other

crimes evidence is so integrated, it is not extrinsic and therefore is not

governed by Rule 404(b).

The government argues the district court correctly admitted the evidence

because the manner in which Clay obtained his contractor’s license was intrinsic

evidence of the fraudulent scheme upon which the wire fraud charges were based. 

The government asserts that Clay held himself out to be a legitimate contractor and
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allowed Nealy to use his contractor’s license to bill homeowners for repairs that were

never completed.

We agree that the government’s evidence that Clay fraudulently obtained his

contractor’s license helped “complete the story” of how he and his co-defendants

allegedly committed wire fraud. The district court had a reasonable basis to admit this

intrinsic evidence because Clay held himself out to be a legitimate contractor and used

the license as part of the conspiracy. Thus, this evidence provided context for the

charged offenses. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this

testimony. See United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2006)

(reviewing a district court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion).

VI. Exclusion of Evidence

Clay argues the government sought an indictment against him for these offenses

because of the original prosecutor’s animosity toward him, and that the district court

should have allowed him to present evidence of this vindictive prosecution to the jury.

The Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether claims of prosecutorial

vindictiveness should be addressed at trial. But other circuits have held that this issue

should be addressed before trial. See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 579 (6th

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 446 (2006) (“[T]he district court’s motion in limine

was correct because the defense of selective prosecution is a matter that is independent

of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, so it is not a matter for the jury.”); United States

v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973) (“By both tradition and constitutional

mandate the jury is given the responsibility of determining guilt or innocence

according to instructions of law delivered by the court. The question of

discriminatory prosecution relates not to the guilt or innocence of appellants, but

rather addresses itself to a constitutional defect in the institution of the prosecution.”).
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We agree that the selective prosecution of a criminal defendant is not an issue for the

jury to decide. Rather, the district court should consider the matter before trial. 

We review the district court’s factual findings on a claim of prosecutorial

vindictiveness for clear error. See United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955, 962 (8th

Cir. 2004). After holding a hearing on Clay’s selective prosecution claim, the district

court concluded the government had not engaged in selective prosecution. In reaching

this conclusion, the district court relied heavily on the testimony of the original

prosecutor and the prosecutor’s supervisor who both testified that they bore no animus

toward Clay. 

The district court also found that the manner in which this case began indicated

that the prosecutor did not retaliate against Clay. This case began when Kenny

Wright, a tax preparer, became concerned that he might face criminal charges because

of his work for the conspirators. As a result of his concerns, Wright approached the

government to discuss the case and implicated all three men. These facts indicate that

the prosecutor did not “drum up” these charges against Clay; rather, a person involved

in the offense came forward to admit his wrongdoing. 

The district court further found that the progression of this case also illustrated

that the prosecutor did not engage in vindictive prosecution. The FBI agent testified

that for several months he contacted this prosecutor to have the warrant reviewed, and

the prosecutor stated he did not have time to review it. The case was then reassigned

to a different prosecutor who eventually approved the affidavit. We agree with the

district court’s reasoning “[t]hat [the fact that the prosecutor] did not take the time to

review the affidavit for the search warrant is wholly inconsistent with Clay’s theory

that [the prosecutor] was hell-bent on revenge.” 
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Upon careful review, we are convinced that the district court adequately

considered Clay’s claim of selective prosecution pre-trial and its factual findings are

not clearly erroneous.

VII. Motion to Suppress

The search warrant for Clay’s offices relied on an FBI agent’s affidavit

regarding statements made by tax preparer, Kenny Wright. Clay argues that the

affidavit in support of the search warrant lacked reliable and corroborated information.

“We review the district court’s factual determinations in support of its denial of a

motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States

v. Alexander, 574 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted). 

The district court concluded that the warrant affidavit demonstrated Wright’s

veracity, and the magistrate judge correctly relied on Wright’s information to find

probable cause. The court found reliable Wright’s statements that Nealy and McCuien

solicited individuals to purchase homes, fraudulent construction invoices were

prepared for Clay Construction which claimed that the work had been performed, and,

at closing, checks were issued to Clay Construction even though no work had been

performed. The court found Wright sufficiently reliable because he had met with FBI

agents on three occasions, and he gave the agents Clay’s social security number, two

pay stubs, and lists of information Nealy had given him to prepare the false returns.

The court reasoned that the FBI agents had a sufficient opportunity to assess Wright’s

credibility during the three meetings, and that the warrant demonstrated Wright’s

knowledge. 

The district court also found that the FBI agent corroborated Wright’s

statements. The agent requested Clay and Nealy’s tax return records for the previous

three years and learned through the Secretary of State’s website that Clay’s corporate

licenses had been revoked for failing to pay taxes. The agent then took an undercover
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agent to Nealy’s office and recorded conversations. Based on this information, the

agent prepared an affidavit in support of the search warrant, and the magistrate judge

issued the warrant. 

The FBI agent’s investigation sufficiently corroborated Wright’s information.

See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the district

court did not err in denying Clay’s motion to suppress because the issuing judge had

a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

VIII. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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