Filed 7/2/13 Kiet v. Litton Loan Servicing CA4/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

TANG KIET, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP, et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

 G047505 

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2010-00432088) 

 O P I N I O N 

 Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Karen J. 

Bravata, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. 

 Law Office of Quyen Kiet and Quyen Kiet for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 Houser & Allison, Eric D. Houser and M. Benjamin Susman for 

Defendants and Respondents. 
2

 The first deed of trust on residential real property was foreclosed upon and 

bought by the lender at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale for a full credit bid, leaving 

appellant Tang Kiet as a sold-out junior lien holder. Kiet did not appear at or bid at the 

trustee’s sale, nor did he otherwise attempt to cure the default on the senior lien. Instead, 

he filed the instant action against the lenders, Bank of America (as successor to 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide)) and the Bank of New York as Trustee for 

the Certificate Holders CWL, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-03 (BNY), the 

loan servicer, Litton Loan Servicing, LP (Litton), and Mortgage Electronic Registration 

Systems, Inc. (MERS) (hereafter collectively referred to as the Defendants unless the 

context indicates otherwise), seeking to recover from them the amount of his 

extinguished junior lien. 

 Kiet appeals from the judgment in favor of the Defendants that followed 

their successful summary judgment motion. He primarily contends the lender’s full 

credit bid included amounts the lender was not entitled to add to the secured debt 

(specifically property taxes and hazard insurance premiums paid by the lender), and 

included inflated amounts of principal and interest. Kiet urges the amounts improperly 

included in the lender’s full credit bid constitute surplus sales proceeds that should have 

been made available to satisfy his junior lien. We reject Kiet’s contentions and affirm the 

judgment. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURE 

The Complaint 

 In April 2002, Countrywide made an adjustable rate real estate loan of 

$437,750 to Lan Anh Truong (Borrower), evidenced by a promissory note (the Note) and 

secured by a recorded first deed of trust on residential property located in 

Fountain Valley. By the time of the foreclosure, BNY was the lender’s assignee via 
3

MERS,1 and Litton was the loan servicer. In December 2003, Kiet, who is an attorney, 

was named beneficiary of a second deed of trust on the property securing a $75,000 note. 

 Kiet alleged that when he learned of Borrower’s March 2006 default on the 

payments on the loan secured by the first deed of trust, he contacted Litton in August 

2006 to advise it of his secured interest in the property. The trustee’s sale was set for 

December 19, 2008, and the notice of the trustee’s sale set the minimum bid at $559,806, 

which Kiet alleged was enough to cover both liens. The property was purchased by 

lender BNY at the trustee’s sale for a full credit bid of $622,136. Kiet’s post-sale 

requests that his junior lien be satisfied went unanswered by Litton. Kiet alleged 

Defendants “inflated” the amount of the bid on the property by including amounts to 

which they were not entitled. He alleged the difference between the amounts Borrower 

really owed on the Note and BNY’s bid was at least $75,182—an amount that should 

have been available to pay off the second deed of trust. Based on the foregoing 

allegations, Kiet’s complaint contained causes of action against all the Defendants for 

equitable estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, enforcement of lien, breach of implied in 

fact contract, common counts, and unjust enrichment. 

Summary Judgment Motion 

 The Defendants moved for summary judgment. Before setting forth the 

facts contained in the separate statements, we describe the trust deeds in more detail. 

 

1 “MERS is a private corporation that administers a national registry of real 

estate debt interest transactions. Members of the MERS System assign limited interests 

in the real property to MERS, which is listed as a grantee in the official records of local 

governments, but the members retain the promissory notes and mortgage servicing rights. 

The notes may thereafter be transferred among members without requiring recordation in 

the public records. [Citation.] [¶] Ordinarily, the owner of a promissory note secured by 

a deed of trust is designated as the beneficiary of the deed of trust. [Citation.] Under the 

MERS System, however, MERS is designated as the beneficiary in deeds of trust, acting 

as ‘nominee’ for the lender, and granted the authority to exercise legal rights of the 

lender.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 

(Fontenot).) 
4

The First Deed of Trust and the Note 

 The April 2002 loan to Borrower was an adjustable rate loan based on the 

LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) plus six percent. The Note specifically referred 

to and was incorporated into the first deed of trust. As relevant to the issues raised in this 

appeal, the first deed of trust defined the secured loan as including “the debt evidenced by 

the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges due under the Note, and 

all sums due under this [first deed of trust] plus interest.” The first deed of trust provided 

Borrower “shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions attributable to 

the [secured property] which can attain priority over this [first deed of trust.]” If 

Borrower failed to pay property taxes, the lender could do so in order to protect its 

security interest in the property, and any amounts so expended would become additional 

debt secured by the first deed of trust bearing interest at the same rate as the Note from 

the date of disbursement. The first deed of trust further provided Borrower must 

maintain hazard insurance on the property and if Borrower failed to do so, the lender 

could obtain the insurance and any amounts expended by the lender in maintaining 

hazard insurance coverage “shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this 

[first deed of trust]” bearing interest at the rate provided for in the Note. 

The Second Deed of Trust 

 On December 8, 2003, without obtaining the required approval from the 

lender, Borrower executed a grant deed transferring title of the property to St. Thomas 

Corp., and a few days later Phan Anh Do as president of St. Thomas Corp. executed a 

promissory note for $75,000 payable to Kiet secured by a second deed of trust recorded 

against the property with Kiet as beneficiary. The reasons for this transaction are not 

entirely clear. At his deposition, Kiet testified he was the attorney for St. Thomas and the 

$75,000 note was for attorney fees related to a bankruptcy proceeding, but he could not 

explain why the property had been transferred to St. Thomas or what Borrower’s 

relationship was with St. Thomas. 
5

Defendants’ Separate Statement 

 Borrower stopped paying on the loan secured by the first deed of trust in 

March 2006 and a notice of default was recorded on March 31, 2008. On October 28, 

2008, the foreclosure trustee executed a notice of trustee’s sale to take place on 

November 26, 2008, which set a minimum bid of $559,806. The notice of the trustee’s 

sale was recorded on November 7, 2008. On December 19, 2008, the property was sold 

at public auction for a full credit bid by BNY. The full credit bid amount of $622,136, 

included, among other amounts, unpaid principal and interest of $560,910, property taxes 

of $42,002, hazard insurance premiums of $13,812, attorney fees of $1,770, and statutory 

disbursements of $1,983. 

 Defendants put forth the following as undisputed facts: The first deed of 

trust was senior to the second deed of trust. It was foreclosed by a trustee’s sale on 

December 19, 2008, for a full credit bid representing the amount of unpaid debt and costs 

owed by Borrower. Kiet did not attend the foreclosure sale, cure the default on the first 

deed of trust prior to foreclosure, or redeem the property at the foreclosure sale. Kiet did 

not communicate with MERS, Bank of America, or BNY. Litton did not promise Kiet it 

would pay him surplus funds from the foreclosure sale. Kiet was aware of the 

foreclosure on the first deed of trust since 2006, and he testified at his deposition that 

when he contacted Litton he was told Litton could not discuss the first deed of trust with 

him because he was not the borrower. Kiet did not record a request for special notice of 

the trustee’s sale until December 16, 2008. Kiet testified he made no attempts to collect 

on the promissory note from St. Thomas. 

Kiet’s Opposition 

 Kiet’s opposition included his declaration in which he attempted to dispute 

many of Defendants’ undisputed facts. Kiet’s declaration attached as exhibits many of 

the same documents included in Defendants’ moving papers. Kiet declared he contacted 

Litton after the trustee’s sale to ask for payment of his second deed of trust, was told they 
6

were reviewing the matter, and “promised that I would be paid if there was a surplus of 

funds.” In his declaration, Kiet stated he was “led by Litton[]” to believe the sales price 

obtained was sufficient to cover the first deed of trust and the second deed of trust. Kiet 

attached as exhibit M what appears to be an Internet printout from Zillow, dated 

December 26, 2008 (i.e., after the trustee’s sale) listing the two liens on the property (the 

$437,750 first deed of trust and the $75,000 second deed of trust), which showed the 

minimum foreclosure bid price of $559,806. He attached as exhibit H, a letter dated 

January 2, 2009 (i.e., after the trustee’s sale), he sent to Litton asking for payment of the 

debt secured by the second deed of trust. Kiet also included a declaration from Borrower 

in which she stated she had never “acknowledged” the amounts expended to pay property 

taxes or hazard insurance premiums, to be part of the amount she owed under the Note. 

 Kiet also included with his opposition a document designated exhibit F, of 

which he asked the court to take judicial notice. Exhibit F was a printout of what Kiet 

described as “a true and correct copy of table of historical 6-month LIBOR rates” from 

January 2002 to July 2012, published “on-line” at a website found at the Internet address 

“www.moneycafe.com.” He also included exhibit G, which was “a true and correct copy 

of Lender’s Officer’s Certificate produced by [d]efendant L[itton] in discovery.” The 

document has Borrower’s name and address at the top, and three columns comprised of a 

list of dates followed by the amount of principal and interest due on each date, beginning 

March 2006 and ending May 2009. Defendants objected to both exhibits as inadmissible 

hearsay and lacking relevance. 

Ruling 

 The trial court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion. As 

relevant to the issues Kiet raises in his appeal, the court found he could not prevail on his 

cause of action for enforcement of lien because his junior lien was extinguished by the 

foreclosure of the senior lien by the lender’s full credit bid at the trustee sale, which left 

no surplus as a matter of law. The court rejected Kiet’s argument inclusion of property 
7

taxes and insurance advances in the full credit bid was improper—it was undisputed 

Borrower did not make all of her property tax and insurance payments and the first deed 

of trust specifically provided property taxes and insurance advanced by the lender 

became part of the total debt owed under the first deed of trust. Additionally, Kiet had no 

standing to enforce the terms of the Note or the first deed of trust as he was not a party to, 

or third party beneficiary of, either. The court found there were no triable issues of fact 

as to Kiet’s common counts and unjust enrichment causes of action. The court sustained 

Defendants’ objections to exhibits F and G, and declined to take judicial notice of either 

document. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review 

 “Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no triable issue of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. 

[Citation.] . . . A defendant moving for summary judgment . . . must show that one or 

more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established or that there is a 

complete defense. [Citation.] The defendant can satisfy its burden by presenting 

evidence that negates an element of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does 

not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to support an 

element of the cause of action. [Citation.] If the defendant meets this burden, the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff to set forth ‘specific facts’ showing that a triable issue of material 

fact exists. [Citation.] [¶] We review the trial court’s ruling de novo, liberally construe 

the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning 

the evidence in favor of the opposing party. [Citation.] We will affirm an order granting 

summary judgment . . . if it is correct on any ground that the parties had an adequate 

opportunity to address in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons. 

[Citations.]” (Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 

197 Cal.App.4th 115, 119-120.) 
8

 “‘A different analysis is required for our review of the trial 

court’s . . . rulings on evidentiary objections. Although it is often said that an appellate 

court reviews a summary judgment motion ‘de novo,’ the weight of authority holds that 

an appellate court reviews a court’s final rulings on evidentiary objections by applying an 

abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Miranda v. Bomel Construction 

Co., Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1335.) 

B. Evidentiary Rulings 

 Kiet contends the trial court erred by not admitting into evidence his 

exhibit F, a printout of LIBOR rates from January 2002 to July 2012, he found “on-line,” 

and exhibit G, a document titled “Lender’s Officer’s Certificate,” which he states was 

produced by Litton in discovery. The trial court sustained Defendants’ relevance and 

hearsay objections to both documents. 

 “‘On appeals challenging discretionary trial court rulings, it is appellant’s

burden to establish an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ramos v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 624 (Ramos).) Kiet has 

failed to establish an abuse of discretion here. 

 The trial court did not err by declining to take judicial notice of exhibit F, 

the printout of the website found at the Internet address “www.moneycare.com” listing 

historical LIBOR rates. Judicial notice is a court’s recognition of the existence of a 

matter of law or fact relevant to an issue as a substitute for formal proof of that matter. 

(Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 264; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland 

Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117.) “‘Taking judicial notice of a 

document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular 

interpretation of its meaning.’ [Citation.] While courts take judicial notice of public 

records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein. [Citation.] ‘When 

judicial notice is taken of a document, . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the 

document are disputable.’ [Citation.]” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
9

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375, italics added; see also In re Christian P. (2012) 

207 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275, fn. 4 [judicial “notice [of court record] is limited to the 

existence of the documents and is not the same as taking notice of the truth of any matters 

or facts stated therein”].) Although the printout might be an accurate representation of 

the website Kiet found at “www.moneycare.com,” that does not allow the trial court to 

take judicial notice of the facts that were asserted on that webpage. Accordingly, the trial 

court correctly ruled the document inadmissible. 

 Nor has Kiet demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion by excluding 

his exhibit G. Kiet contends the one-page document, titled “Lender’s Officer’s 

Certificate” was admissible because it was produced by Litton in discovery, and relevant 

because it has Borrower’s name and loan number on it. Kiet offers no reasoned legal 

analysis of the issues to which the document pertains or how its exclusion prejudiced 

him. The document is a list of payment dates beginning in March 2006 and ending May 

2009, followed by amounts of principal and interest due on each date. In his opposition 

to the summary judgment motion, Kiet asserted it showed the “lender” charged interest 

after the foreclosure. But there is nothing explaining who created the document, when it 

was prepared, what it was for, or how it relates to the amounts calculated for BNY’s full 

credit bid. Kiet has failed to demonstrate the document’s relevance and has failed to 

meet his appellate burden. (Ramos, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.) 

C. Enforcement of Lien Cause of Action 

 As to the enforcement of lien cause of action, Kiet claimed there were 

“surplus funds” from the trustee’s sale that should have been made available to pay his 

junior lien on the property in accordance with the priorities set forth in Civil Code 

section 2924k, subdivision (a). Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds 

lender BNY’s full credit bid extinguished the junior lien, which left no surplus sale 

proceeds as a matter of law, and Kiet took no steps to protect his junior lien prior to its 

extinguishment. Defendants are correct. 
10

 Civil Code section 2924k, subdivision (a), requires the foreclosure trustee 

to distribute the proceeds of the trustee’s sale in the following order of priority: (1) the 

allowable costs and expenses associated with exercising the power of sale; (2) payment 

of the obligations secured by the deed of trust being foreclosed upon (e.g., the senior 

lien); (3) satisfying junior liens and encumbrances; and then (4) to the trustor. 

 The holder of a subordinate deed of trust will recover all or a portion of the 

debt secured by the subordinate deed of trust only if the successful trustee’s sale bidder 

pays enough to pay off all of senior and all or a portion of the junior indebtedness. 

(South Bay Building Enterprises, Inc. v. Riviera Lend-Lease, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 

1111, 1120-1121; FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Investments, Ltd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 

1018, 1023 (FPCI RE-HAB 01); Civ. Code, § 2924k, subd. (a).) If the successful bidder 

purchases at a price insufficient to pay off any of the junior indebtedness after the 

proceeds of the sale are applied to the senior indebtedness (and other statutory costs and 

expenses attributable to the sale see Civil Code, § 2924k, subd. (a)), then the holder of the 

junior deed of trust is out of luck. Kiet is out of luck. 

 In this case, the lender BNY was the only bidder at the trustee’s sale, and it 

made a full credit bid. A “full credit bid” is described as follows: “At a nonjudicial 

foreclosure sale, if the lender chooses to bid, it does so in the capacity of a purchaser. 

[Citation.] The only distinction between the lender and any other bidder is that the lender 

is not required to pay cash, but is entitled to make a credit bid up to the amount of the 

outstanding indebtedness. [Citations.] The purpose of this entitlement is to avoid the 

inefficiency of requiring the lender to tender cash which would only be immediately 

returned to it. [Citation.] A ‘full credit bid’ is a bid ‘in an amount equal to the unpaid 

principal and interest of the mortgage debt, together with the costs, fees and other 

expenses of the foreclosure.’ [Citation.] If the full credit bid is successful, i.e., results in 

the acquisition of the property, the lender pays the full outstanding balance of the debt 

and costs of foreclosure to itself and takes title to the security property, releasing the 
11

borrower from further obligations under the defaulted note. [Citation.]” (Alliance 

Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1238.) 

 In other words, when the foreclosing lender makes a full credit bid on the 

property, by its very nature, no money changes hands. The full credit bid conclusively 

establishes the value of the property. (Bank of America v. Quackenbush (1997) 

56 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1171). There is no “surplus” to distribute. The lender’s debt is 

extinguished, and it gets title to the property. “If a junior lienor does not cure the default 

in the senior obligation or redeem at the senior foreclosure, its lien will be extinguished at 

the foreclosure sale . . . .” (FPCI RE-HAB 01, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1023.) 

 We reject Kiet’s argument the lender’s full credit bid improperly included 

amounts not included in the debt secured by the first deed of trust, somehow requiring the 

lender (or one of the other defendants) to now pay those overbid amounts to Kiet—the 

sold-out junior. Kiet primarily argues the lender’s payment of $42,002 in delinquent 

property taxes and $13,812 in hazard insurance premiums was voluntary and those 

amounts cannot be considered part of the debt secured by the first deed of trust. 

Nonsense. 

 The first deed of trust specifically requires Borrower to pay property taxes 

and maintain insurance, and provides if Borrower defaults in those obligations, the lender 

may advance those costs and add them to the debt secured by the first deed of trust. Kiet 

provides no authority supporting his contention the absence of provisions concerning the 

lender’s payment of taxes and insurance in the Note controls; it is well established that a 

promissory note and deed of trust are part of a single transaction and are read together. 

(See Huckell v. Matranga (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 471, 481.) 

 Moreover, numerous statutes and cases specifically validate the lender’s 

rights in this regard so as to protect its security interest in the property. For example, by 

statute liens for real property taxes have priority over all private liens, regardless of the 

time of their creation. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 2192.1, 3712; Gov. Code, § 53935.) 
12

And when the trustor on a deed of trust fails to pay property taxes when due, the 

lender/beneficiary may make the payments, add the amount paid to the principal 

indebtedness and foreclose the security if those amounts are not reimbursed. 

(Security-First Nat. Bank v. Lamb (1931) 212 Cal. 64, 68-69.) Indeed Civil Code 

section 2876 specifically provides that when a lien holder “is compelled to satisfy a prior 

lien for his own protection, he may enforce payment of the amount so paid by him, as a 

part of the claim for which his own lien exists.” 

 Similarly, case law has acknowledged that both the borrower/trustor and 

the lender/beneficiary have separate insurable interests in the property (Mosee v. 

Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark (1927) 87 Cal.App. 473, 475; Loring v. Dutchess Ins. Co. 

(1905) 1 Cal.App. 186, 188), and if the borrower/trustor defaults on the obligations set 

forth in the deed of trust to keep the property adequately insured for the benefit of both, 

the lender beneficiary is entitled to insure or pay the premium and add that amount to the 

secured debt. (See Campbell v. Realty Title Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 195; 27 Cal.Jur. 3d 

(2013) Deed of Trust, § 99; Bernhardt, Cal. Mortgages, Deeds of Trust, and Foreclosure 

Litigation (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2012) Trustor’s Failure to Insure, § 8.58, p. 683; see also 

Fin. Code, §§ 1487 & 7461 [allow enforcement of provisions in mortgages and deed of 

trusts accelerating the debt and foreclosing for nonpayment of taxes and insurance 

whether or not lender’s security interest in the property has been impaired].) 

 We are similarly unimpressed by Kiet’s argument the lender’s full credit 

bid was based on incorrect calculations of the principal remaining due and inflated 

interest charges, and therefore either the lender (or one of the other defendants) must pay 

those amounts to Kiet. Even if the amounts of principal and accrued interest owed by 

Borrower on the Note were miscalculated, Kiet suggests no basis on which he can assert 

Borrower’s rights. It is undisputed Kiet made no attempt to cure Borrower’s default on 

the first deed of trust so as to protect his junior lien, did not bid on the property at the 

foreclosure sale, or redeem the property. And there is no evidence of any irregularities in 
13

the trustee’s sale that precluded Kiet from curing the default on the first deed of trust or 

prevented a bid by a higher bidder.2 Furthermore, “In order to prove [he] was damaged 

by [any] irregularities in the foreclosure sale which dissuaded or prevented a higher bid, 

the junior lienor would have to produce a ready, willing and able buyer who would have 

paid the higher price but for the wrongful conduct. Otherwise, damages alleged would be 

speculative.” (FPCI RE-HAB 01, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1023; see also Park v. 

First American Title Co. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1424.) Kiet presented no 

evidence he or anyone else was ready, willing, and able to bid on the property at the 

trustee’s sale. In short, there was no material issue of fact as to whether there was any 

“surplus” of funds from the trustee’s sale, and the trial court correctly granted summary 

judgment. 

 D. Common Counts and Unjust Enrichment Causes of Action 

 Kiet contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on his 

common counts and unjust enrichment causes of action. He engages in absolutely no 

reasoned legal analysis of either cause of action. He provides no citation to authority, or 

any discussion of the requisites for those claims. While we perform a de novo review of 

summary adjudications, it is always the appellant’s burden on appeal to demonstrate the 

trial court erred. (Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 649-650, 

 

2 Kiet makes a passing reference to the trustee’s sale date being “changed 

without giving notice to Borrower and other interested parties,” but he offers no facts

indicating an irregularity in the trustee’s sale. The record shows the trustee’s sale was 

properly noticed to take place on November 26, 2008. The trustee’s sale actually 

occurred on December 19, 2008. Civil Code section 2924g requires only that a 

postponement of the trustee’s sale (for less than 365 days) be orally announced, i.e., “by 

public declaration by the trustee at the time and place last appointed for sale. . . . No 

other notice of postponement need be given.” (Civ. Code, § 2924g, subds. (a) & (d).) 

The trustee’s deed states all legal notice requirements were complied with creating a 

presumption the sale was conducted regularly and properly. (Civ. Code, § 2924, 

subd. (c); Residential Capital v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. (2003) 

108 Cal.App.4th 807, 823, fn. 4.) Kiet presented no evidence rebutting the presumption 

notice of any postponement was properly given. 
14

[“party asserting trial court error may not . . . rest on the bare assertion of error but must 

present argument and legal authority on each point raised”].) Accordingly, we deem the 

contentions waived. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 

[when appellant raises issue “but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations 

to authority, we treat the point as waived”]; see also Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 

17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.) 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. 

 

 O’LEARY, P. J. 

WE CONCUR: 

BEDSWORTH, J. 

IKOLA, J.