### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-06-00313 -CV

Te xa s D e par tm e nt of Ins ur anc e , A ppe lla nt

v. Rec onveyance Servic es, Inc. , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1-G N-06 -0000 34 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
Con c e rn e d th a t the Te xas De pa rtme nt of I ns ur anc e (“ TD I ” ), wi tho ut s tatut or y a uth or ity to do so , ha d

t a k e nr e g u l a t o r

y a c t i o n s t h a te f

f e c t i v e l y p r e v e n t e d

i tf r o m d o i n g b u s i n e s s i nT e xa s, Reconve y ance Service s, I nc. (“Reconve y ance ”) sought declaratory relief under the Uniform De clar atory J udg ments Act (“ UDJA”). See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (W est 1997 & Supp. 2006). TDI

challeng ed the district cour t’s subject -m at t er

j u ri s d i ct i o n , co n t en d i n g t h at s ep ar at i o n -o f- power s principles forba de the judicial branc h from g ranting Reconve y ance its re quested relief an d that Reconve y ance ’s claim is not justiciable. The district cour t den i ed TDI ’s plea to the jur isdiction. TDI appea ls the district court’s orde r. Se e id . § 51 .0 14 (a )( 8) (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) . We a ff

ir m.2 STA ND AR

D A ND SCO P E OF RE VI EW The su b j ect matter

jurisdiction of a trial cour t may be cha lleng ed throug h a plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex as Dep’t of Parks &W ildlif e v. M iranda, 13 3 S.W. 3d 21 7, 22 5- 26 (T e x. 20 04 ); Bland Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W .3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The determination of whether a tr ial court ha s subject matter jurisdiction beg ins with the pleading s. See M iranda, 133 S.W .3d at 226. The plea der ha s the initial burden of alleg ing fac ts that aff irmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the
cause . Id. (c i t i n g Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex as Air Contr ol Bd., 852 S.W .2d 440 , 4 4 6 (Tex. 1993)). Whether the plea der ha s met this burden is a question of law that w e revie w de novo. Id. We construe the pleading s liberally

and look to the pleade r’s intent. Id. I f the pleading s do not contain sufficient fac ts to affir matively demonstrate the trial court’ s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate inc urable defe cts in jurisdiction, the i s s ue is one of pleadingsufficie ncy

and the plaintiffs should be affor ded the oppor tunity to amend. Id. a t 22 6- 27 ; El gin Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. R.N., 1 9 1 S
. W
. 3 d 2 6 3 , 2 7 2 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n2 0 0 6 , n o p et
. )
. If t h e p l ea d i n gs aff irmatively neg ate the exis tence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be g ra n t ed wi t hout allowing the plaintiffs an oppor tunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W .3d at 227. A def endant may also challeng e the jurisdictional fac ts alleg ed by the plaintiff throug h the summary -judg ment-like proc esses de scribed i n Miranda
. He nd e e v . D e whu rst

, No. 03-06-00501- CV, ___ S.W .3d ___, ___ , 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 4149, at * 30, (Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 2007, pet. denied) ; see M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 2 2 7 (c i t i n g B l and, 34 S.W .3d at 555). “ When a plea to the jur isdiction challeng es the e x istence of fac ts alleg ed by

the pleade r to establish the trial cour t’s subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must c onsider re levant evide nce submitted by the par ties.” Hende e, ___ S.W .3d at ___, 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 4149, at * 24 (c i t i n g Miranda, 133 S.W .3d at 227). He re, TD Ihas notWe rely on Reconve y ance ’s Second Ame nded Petition. Although the live pe tition at the 1 time of the district court’s or der on a ppeal wa s Reconveyance ’s Fir st Amended Petition, TDIstates that the new ple ading “does not ra ise new substantive jurisdictional issues.” 3 challeng ed the jurisdictional fa cts alleg ed by Reconve y ance , nor did it introduce jurisdictional evidence
. I t disputes only

whether Reconve y ance ’s pleadi n gs ar e sufficient to aff irmatively

establish the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently , we assume the truth of the fa ctual alleg ations contained in Reconveyance ’s pleading s. Miranda, 133 S.W .3d at 226.

Additionally , beca

use Reconve yance i n t ro d

u ce d j u risdictional evidenc e in re sponse to TDI ’s plea to the jurisdiction, we may consider this evidenc e in resolving the j urisdictional challeng es TDIhas raised. Bland, 34 S.W. 3d

a t 55 5 ( “ [A] c ourt

de c idi nga

ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n is no t r e qu ir e d to loo k s ole ly to the pleading s but may

consider e vidence and must do so when n ec es s ary to resolve the jur isdictional issues raised.” ).
P LEADINGS AND JURISDICTIONAL EVIDENCE

Reconve y ance pleads that it is a Was hin g ton

c or po ra tio n th a t pr ov ide s w hat it te rm s “ po st- 1 closing mortg ag e re lease service s” in various states that , t o d at e, have not include d Texas. I t describe s the se se rv ic e s a s f

oll ow s:
When a re sidential proper ty buy er pur chase s a home with a n exis ting mortg ag e, the c urre nt le nd e r ha s no inc e nti ve to pr ov ide a re le a se of that mor tg a g e pr ior to c los ing
. To do so in a tra nsaction that does not ultimately close would cre ate sig nificant proble ms for the lende r. The ne w lender

is not willing to ac cept a title commitm ent that indicates it is in a sec ond lien position. Therefor e, the buy er a nd seller proce ed with the ir closing without the formal fi lin g of a re le a se . A ft e r t

he c los ingof

the tr ans a c tio n, the kn ow le dg e a ble buy e r m ay

e nli st the help of a

service provider like Re conveyance Service s, outside of closing the t ra n s ac t i o n , t o en s u re t h e t i m el y re l ea s e o f t h e p ri o r e x i s t i n g m o rt gage af t er cl o s i n g.Tex. I ns. Code Ann. §§ 2501.001-2704.104 (West 2006). 2 4 Reconve y ance desires to off er its servic es in Texas. “To inform the most buy ers of the nee d to have these rele ases filed,” Reconve y ance “planne d on having title insurance c ompanies list the service
as an optional se rvice with an optional char g e.” I n its jurisdi ctional evidenc e, Rec onvey ance introduced an af fidavit from Jan Hollenbeck in w hich she ela borate s that “[a]s i t does in other states, [Reconveyance ] plann ed i n T exas to have title insurance companies list its service a s an optional additional servic e for buy ers, f or which [Reconve y ance ] would charg e a $15 f ee.” To un de rs tand

Re c on ve y anc e ’s fu

rt he r a lle g a tio ns re g ard ingthe natur e of its dis pu te wi th T D I, i ti s h e l p f

u l t o n o t e s o m e b a s i c f

e a tu r e s o f t h e s t a tu t e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e T e x a s t i t l e i n s u r an c e i n d u s t r y. The legislature enac ted the Te x as Title I nsuranc e Ac t with the express intent “to completely regulate the 2 business of title insurance , i n cl u d i n g t h e direct issuance of policies and the reinsura nce of any assumed risks, to (1) protec t consumers a nd purcha sers of title insuranc e policies; and ( 2) provide a dequate and
rea sonable rates of re turn for title insuranc e compa nies and title insuranc e ag ents.” Te x . I ns. Code Ann. § 2501.002 (West 2006)
. To that end, the leg islature has de leg ated to the insura nce c ommissi oner pow er to “ fix and promulg ate the premium rate s to be char g ed by a title insura nce company

or by a title insurance ag ent for title insuranc e policies or for other forms pre scribed or

approve d by

the commissioner.” Id. § 2 70 3. 15 1( a ) ( Wes t 20 06 ); see ge nerally id. §§ 2703
. 1 5 2 -. 2 0 8 (West 2006) (proc edure s for setting premium rate s). “Premium,” in tur n, is de fined by the leg islature as “ the pre mium rates promulg ated by the commissioner . . . and includes a char g e for (A) title e x amination and closing the transa ction . . . ; and (B ) issuing the policy .” Id. § 2501.003(8) (West 2006) . Of pa rticular importa

nce he re is the “ closing the tr ans a c tio n” c omp on e nt o f t he “ pr e mium.” Th e Ac t de fi ne s “ c los ingthe tr ans a c tio n” a s f oll ow s:5

(a) For

purposes of this title, “closing the transa ction” desc ribes the investigation that is made: (1) on behalf

of a title insuranc e compa n y , t i t l e insuranc e ag ent, or dire ct operation before the title insurance policy is issued; and (2 ) to d e te rm ine pr op e r e xec uti on , a c kn ow le dg me nt, and de liv e ry of a ll c on ve y anc e s, mor

tg a g e pa pe rs , a nd oth e r t itl e ins trum e nts ne c e ssa ry to consummate a

transac tion. (b ) Clo sin g the tr ans a c tio n in c lud e s a de te rm inatio n th a t: (1) all delinquent taxes have be en paid; (2) in the case of an owner title insura nce policy , all curr ent taxes, ba sed on the lat es t available information, have been pr operly prorated betwe en the purcha ser a

nd seller; (3) the consider ation has bee n passed; (4) all proce eds have been pr operly disbursed; (5) a fina l searc h of the title has bee n made; and (6) all nece ssary

paper s have be en filed f

or re cord.
Id. § 2501.006 (West 2006).

Pursuant to t h es e statutory deleg ations, the insuranc e commissioner ha s established a schedule of “ba sic premium rate s” for title insura nce policies, which “include the char g e for title insuranc e, title ex amination, and closing the transa ction.” 2 8 T ex . Ad m i n . C o d e § 9
. 1 (2 0 0 7 ) ( ad o p t i n g Basic Manual of R ule s, Ra te s a nd Fo rm s fo r th e W

rit ing of TitleIn su ra nc e in t heSta te of T

e x as [hereinaf

ter Ba sic Manual ] as amended effec tive J anuar y 20, 2006, av ail

ab leat ww w. tdi .s tate .tx.u s/c omp any /ti tle man. htm lSee also Basic M anual Pr oc e dura l Rul e s P- 1( e ), (f ), (p ) ( de fi nin g “ tit le ins ur anc e ,” “ tit le 3 examination,” and “c losing the tra nsaction”)
. 6 Rul e R- 1) ; se e Ba sic Ma nu al Procedur al Rule P -1(w) (def ining “premium” as “including the cha rg es of title ex amination and for

closing the transa ction . . . and for issuance of

a policy”). 3 The g rava

men of Rec onvey ance ’s alleg ations is that nothin g i n t hese statutes a nd
re g ulatio ns g ive s T DI

the a uth or ity to p ro hib it t itl e ins ur e rs a

nd a g e nts fr om of

fe ri ngRe c on ve y anc e ’s po stclosing rele ase service s to c onsumers for a fe e in addition to premium, y et TDI is nonetheless purpor

ting to do so. Reconve y ance pleads that its “[p] ost closing mortg ag e release service s” are not cove red by the “pre mium” beca

use they “ar e clea

rly not titl e insuranc e,” “ title ex amination,” or “ closing the transa ction.”

“ ‘[C]l os inga

tr ans a c tio n, ’” it a sse rt s, is:
the investigation that is m ade . . . to de termine prope r execution, ac knowledg ment and de liv e ry of a ll c on ve y anc e s, mor

tg a g e pa pe rs , a nd oth e r t itl e ins tr

ume nts ne ces sa

ry to consummate a

transac tion, [ and it ] includes a deter mination that: (1) a ll delinquent tax es have be en paid; (2) in the ca se of a n owner title insurance policy , all curr ent taxes, based on the latest ava ilable information, have been pr operly prorated . . . ; (3) the c onsideration ha s be e n pa sse d; (4 ) a ll pr oc e e ds have be e n pr op e rl y dis burs e d; (5 ) a fi na l se arc h o f t he tit le has bee n made; and ( 6) all nec essar y paper s have be en filed f

or re cord.
See Te x. I ns . Co de Ann. § 2 50 1. 00 6; se e als o B as ic Ma nu al Procedural Rule P-1(f) . “Ac cording ly ,” Re c on ve y anc e a lle g e s, “ c los ingthe tr ans a c tio n d oe s no t c on te mpl a te a ff ir mativ e e ff

or ts to se c ur e a

re le a se from the pr ior exis ting mortg ag e,” as “[a] title insurance operations c losing duties ar e mer ely investigative and not correc tive in nature ” and “[t] he release of a pr ior exist ing mor tga g e is not a docume nt nece ssary to consummate the tra

nsact i o n .” I t adds that other pr ovisions of the insurance code a nd Ba sic Manual “conte mplate [that] the release of a prior exis ting mortg ag e may

never be filed of

rec ord and pr ovide for insuring a round the unre lease d lien of re cord.” Reconve y ance further alleg es that “[s]eparate char g es ca nReconve y ance also cites sec tion 550.001 of the insurance code for the pr oposition t hat 4 “ins u re rs an d

age n t s m ay

co l l ec ts erv i ce fe es as we l l as p re m i u m s , ” t h er eb y “e n co u rag [i ng ] i nsuranc e op e ratio ns to p ro vid e be ne fi c ia l ( y e t no n- re qu ir e d) se rv ic e s b y pe rm itt ingthe a sse ssm e nt o f f e e s in support of these se rvice s.” 7 be asse ssed for c erta in service s outside the basic duties associate d with titl e insuranc e, title examination,
and c los ing the tr ans a c tio n. ” “ On e e xamp le of su c h s e rv ic e fe e s, ” Re c on ve y anc e state s, “ are no tary fe e s, which the title insuranc e industry has long been pe rmitted to assess.” 4 R ec o n v ey an ce p l ea d s t h at , “T DI ha s t ak en t h e p o s i t i o nt h at t h es e p o s t -c l o s i n g m o r t g a ge rele ase se rvice s are cover ed by the title insu ra nce pr emium and may not be the basis for

a sepa rate fee ch ar gedt o t h e c o n s u m er . ” S p ec i fi ca l l y , R ec o n v ey an ce al l ege s , “T DI ma i n t ai n s t h at p o s t -c l o s i n g m o rt gage rele ase se rvice s are among the dut ies of a title ag ent that comprise ‘ closing the transa ction’ and the ref ore
are in clu ded in th e basic pr e mium r a te pr ov ide d b y Ra te R- 1 o f t

he B a sic Ma

nu a l.” I t a lle g e s th a t, a s a
re su lt, “ Ti tle ins ur anc e c omp anie s and a g e nts in T e xas h a ve inf

or me d Re c on ve y anc e Se rv ic e s th e y wo uld
us e the se rv ic e s o f R e c on ve y anc e Se rv ic e s if not fo r the po sit ion take n by TD I wh ic h p re c lud e s th e tit le
c omp anie s f

ro m c ha rg ingfo r t

ho se se rvi ces,” a

nd that “ [s]ome of

the same e nti tie s w hic h u se Reconve y ance Service s in other states would use the ser vices of Re conveyance Service s in Texas but for the a c tio ns of

TD I .” Re c on ve y anc e pr e se nte d ju ri sd ic tio na l e vid e nc e c on c e rn ingthe se a sse rt ion s. I n her a ffidavit, Hollenbe ck testified that “ [u] nder the threat of disciplinary action and a

fine from TDI , Texas titl e compa nies have not be en willing to of fer [R econve y ance ’s] services to re sidential pr op e rt y buy e rs . Se ve ra l ti tle c omp anie s, ho we ve r, have in dic a te d th e y wo uld of fe r [Re c on ve y anc e ’s ] service s if TDI did not prohibit c harg ing customers [R econve y ance ’s] $15 fee.” She attache d an ema il she had re ceive d from Robert Yor k, TDI ’s Dire ctor, Title Examinations, which appea rs to respond to a

n ear lier8

i n qu i ry fr o m Ho l l en b ec k
. Yo rks t at es , wi t h re fe re n ce t o R ec o n v ey an ce ’s p ro p o s al t o ch ar ge i t s fe e t h ro u gh tit le c omp anie s and

a g e nts :
Ihave alway s said that I believe the [t itle] ag ents should be paying for the se rvice and not the c on sume rs . . . . [W]he n we se e an a g e nt c ha rg e the fe e dir e c tly

to t he c on sume r w e c ite the ag ent for a

rule viol at i o n and tell them that a f ee is una uthorized. W e cur

rently have a pendingdisciplinary

action (w ith fines rec ommended) ag ainst an age nt for charg ing a fe e fo r r e le a se tr a c kin g se rv ic e s.
Yo rk la te r c on c lud e s, “ I f a

tit le a g e nt a sk s me a

bo ut a ser vi ce su c h a s th e on e y ou are pr ov idi ng , I

wi ll advise them of the points I mentioned above .”

Hollenbec k also attac hed corr espondenc e from repr esentatives of two title companies, one of which, she testified, alre ady offe red Rec onvey ance ’s servic es in Washington and O reg on. One state d, wi th r e g ard

to R e c on ve y anc e ’s se rv ic e s, “ Ithi nk it i s a g oo d p ro g ra

m a nd wo uld c e rt a inl y re c omm e nd

it to al l ou r a g e nts in T e xas a

nd oth e r s tate s, ” wh ile the oth e r s tate d “ the se rv ic e s o f R e c ov e y anc [e] Se rv ic e s, I nc ., wo uld

be su pp or te d a nd e nte rt a ine d b y

our c omp anie s if

the c ha rg e fo r s uc h s e rv ic e s w a s a pass throug h char g e with ac knowledg ment as such by the Texas Depa

rtment of Insuranc e.” Reconve y ance reque sted dec laratio n s “that post-closingmortg ag e re lease service s are not titl e insuranc e, title examination, nor ‘closing the t ra n s ac tion,’ and these se rvice s provided by Re c on ve y anc e Se rv ic e s may be of fe re d to c on sume rs fo r a fe e by tit le c omp anie s o r t itl e a g e nts in t he State of Texas.”
AN AL YSI S

I n t wo i s s ues, TDI

complains that the district court e rre d in deny ing its plea

to the jurisdiction because (1) se paration-of-powe rs principles pr event judicial “revie w” of its int erpr etation of9

“closingthe transa ction” under section 2501.006 of the insura nce c ode; (2) Re conveyance ’s suit does not prese nt a justiciable controve rsy but instead seeks a

n advisory

opinion. Our analy tical starting point in cases, such a s this one, involving disputes over w hether a trial court or

administrative ag ency has subject-matter jurisdiction ove r a dispute is a rticle V, section 8 of the Texas Constit ution. It pr ovides that a district c ourt’s jurisdiction “ consists of exclusive, a ppellate, a

nd orig inal jurisdiction of all actions, proce eding s, and re medies, except in ca ses wher e exclusive, appe llate,
or or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n ma

y be c on fe rr e d b y

thi s Co ns tit

uti on or oth e r law on so me oth e r c ourt , tr ibu na l,
or a dmi nis tr a tiv e bo dy .” Te x. Con st. art . V , § 8. Th e le g isl a tur e ha s p ro vid e d b y statut e tha

t di str ic t c ourt s possess “the jurisdiction provided by Article V , Section 8, of the Te x as Constitut ion,” and “ may hear and deter mine any cause that is cog nizable by courts of la

w or e q u i t y

and may g rant a ny relief that could be g ra nte d b y e ith e r c ourt s o f law or equ it y .” Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. §§ 24 .0 07 -. 00 8 ( Wes t 20 04 ). Thus ,

“ [c]o ur ts o f g e ne ra l juri sd ic tio n p re suma bly have su bje c t matt e r jur isd ic tio n unle ss a co ntr ary sh ow ingis made.” Subaru of Am., Inc. v . David Mc David Nissan, Inc
. , 84 S.W .3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002). Re c on ve y anc e br ing s it s su it und e r t he UD JA. Th e UD JA pr ov ide s th a t a c la ima nt “ wh os e rig hts, status, or other leg al rel at i o n s are aff ecte d by a statute . . . may

have de termined a

ny question of construction or va lidity

arising under [i t] and obtain a decla ration of rig hts, status, or othe r leg al re lations there under.” Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a ) (West 1997). The leg islature intended the UDJA to be remedial, to settle and af ford r elief f

rom unce rtainty

and insec urity

with respec t to rights, and to be li bera lly construed. Id. § 3 7. 00 2( b) (We st 1 99 7) ; Bonham State Bank v . Beadle, 907 S.W .2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995).

Th e UD JA do e s n ot c re a te or a ug me nt a tr ia l c ourt ’s su

bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n— it m e re ly provides a r emedy

wher e subjec t-matter jurisdiction alre ady exis ts. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.S ee a l s o B exar Metro. W

ater Dist. v. City of Bulverde, 156 S.W .3d 79, 90 5 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 04 , pe t. d e nie d) ; Juliff Gardens, L.L.C . v. Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 13 1 S. W.3 d 2 71 , 2 76 -7 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 04 , n o p e t.) ; City

of W ac o v. T exas N atu ra l R es. Conservation Comm’n, 83 S.W .3d 169, 175 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). Se e, e .g ., Te

x as De p’ t of In s. , D iv . o

f W or ker s’ Com p. v . Lu mb e rm e ns Mu t. C as . Co
. , 6 212 S.W
. 3d 870, 874-75 (Te x . App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (cla im that ag ency ’s issuance of advisories i n co n sistent with st atutory require ments was outside of a g ency ’s statutory authority ); S we e n e yv . J efferson, 2 12 S.W .3d 556, 564-65 (Te x . App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (w hether defe ndants remove d plaques without historical commission approv al and without statutory a uth or ity ); Texas Mun. Power Agenc y v. P ublic Util. Comm’n, 100 S.W .3d 510, 516 (T ex . App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (a U DJ A ac tion “to interpret the sc ope of a n ag ency ’s statutory authority . . . is sufficient to invoke the tria l court’s jurisdiction”). 10 § 37.003(a) (West 1997) (“A court of re cord withi n its juri sdiction has powe r to dec lare rig hts, status and oth e r l e g a l r e latio ns . . . . ” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); Che na ult v . Phil lip s, 914 S.W .2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996); Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W .2d at 444. B ut while the UDJA cannot conf er subjec t-matter jurisdiction in the absenc e of a

cause of ac tion within t he cour t’s jurisdiction, “[a] suit under the UDJA is not confined to case s in which the pa

rties have a ca

use of a ction apar

t from the Ac t itself.” Te

x as De p’ t ofPu b. Sa

fe ty v. Moore , 985 S.W .2d 149, 153 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). Th a t is , a UD JA a c tio n w ill lie wi thi n 5 the su bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n of th e distr ic t c ourt s w he n th e re is a (1 ) a jus tic ia ble c on tr ov e rs y

a s to the ri g hts and

status of pa rt ie s a c tua lly

be fo re the c ou rt fo r a dju dic a tio n; a nd (2 ) t hat w ill be a c tua lly resolved by

the dec laration sought. Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n , 141 S.W .3d 158, 163-6 4 (T ex . 2004); Beadle, 9 0 7 S
. W
. 2 d

at 4 6 7 (c i t i n g Texas Ass’n of Bus , 852 S.W .2d at 446). As thi s Court ha s re pe a te dly re c og nize d, a jus tic ia ble c on tr ov e rs y

re g ard ingwh e the r a

state ag ency or offi ce r h as acte d bey ond statutory authority provides a jur isdictional basis for a U DJ A ac tion
s e e k i n g s t a tu t o r

y c o n s t r u c t i o no f t h a ta u t h o r i t y. Thi s t y

p e of UDJA action, furthe rmore, doe s not 6 implicate sovere ign immunity
. Texas Highway Comm’n v . Texas Ass’n of Steel Imps., Inc., 372 S.W .2d 52 5, 53 0- 31 (T e x. 19 63 ); Cobb v. Harrington, 19 0 S. W.2 d 70 9, 71 2 ( Te x. 19 45 ); see also Texas NaturalThe c ourt went on to add that, “I t is the doctrine of absoluti sm, pure, simple, and na ked, 7 and of c ommunism , which is its twin—the double prog eny of the same evil birth.” Impe rial Sugar Co. v . Ca be ll, 179 S.W . 83, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1915, no writ). 11 Res. Conservation Comm’n v . IT-Davy , 74 S.W
. 3 d 8 4 9 , 8 5 5 (Tex. 2002) (“Private par ties may seek de c larator y re lie f a g a ins t st a te off

ici a ls w ho a lle g e dly

a c t w ith ou t le g a l or

statut or y a uth or ity .” ); c

f. Director of Dep’ t of

Agric. & Env’t v. Printing Indus. Ass’n, 600 S.W .2d 264, 265-66 (Tex. 1980) (if the complained- of ac ts of a state of ficial a re illega l o r outside his statutory authority , “an e ntity

or per son whose rig hts have be en violated
. . . may bring suit to reme dy the violation or preve nt its occurre nce, a nd
su c h s uit is n ot a su it a g a ins t th e State re qu ir in g l eg isl a tiv e or statut or y a uth or iza tio n” ). Th is p ri nc ipl e de ri ve s f ro m th e tr a dit ion a l d istinc tio n b e tw e e n la wf ul a c ts o f t

he state , to wh ic h s ov e re ig n im mun ity
a tta c he s, and

wr on g s c omm itt e d b y

ind ivi du a ls o ste ns ibl y in t he name of

the state —w hic h, in t

ur n, re fl e c ts ba sic c on sti tut ion a l and

de moc ratic pr inc ipl e s:
Th is d ist inc tio n is e sse nti a l to the ide a of c on sti tut ion a l g ov e rnme nt. To de ny it o r b lot it out obliterates the line of demar [c] ation that separ ates c onstitut ional g overnme nt from abs o luti s m, f

r e e s e lf

- g o v e r n me n t b a s e d o n th e s o v e r e ig n ty o f th e p e o p le f rom that despotism, whe ther of the one or the many , which ena bles, the ag ent of the state to declar e and dec ree that he is the state—to say , “L ’etat c’e st moi.” Of wh at avail are wr itten Constit utions, whose Bills of Right for the secur ity of individual liberty

have be en wr itten, too of te n, wi th t

he blo od of mart y rs sh e d u po n th e battl e fi e ld a

nd th e sca ff

old , if the ir limit ations and re straints upon power ma y be over passed with impunity

by the ver y ag encie s cre ated a

nd appointed to g uard, defe nd, and enf orce them; and that, too, with the sacr ed author ity of l aw, not only compelling obedienc e, but entitled to respec t? And how else c an these principles of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, w hen violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individu al o ffe nders, who a re the instruments of wrong, w heneve r they interpose the shie ld of the state? The doc trine is not t o b e t o l e r a t e d
. T h e w h o l e f r a m e an d s c h e m e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i tu t i o n s o f t h i s c o u n t r

y, state and fe de ra l, p ro te st a g a ins t it . T he ir c on tin ue d e xiste nc e is n ot c omp a tib le wi th i t. 7
Im pe ria l Su ga r Co . v . Ca be ll, 179 S.W . 83, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1915, no wr i t ) (citations omitted), cited in Cobb , 190 S.W .2d at 712.See , e.g ., Hon. J ohn E. Powers, Age nc yAd jud ic ati on s 5-6 (1990) (obser ving, w ith reg ard 8 to the conce rns t hat m otivated t he Admini strative Proce dure A ct, that “[a]dmini strative g overnme nt re qu ir e d a bure a

uc ra c y —a

n ap pa ratus that w a s a lw ay s e xpe ns ive and so me tim e s arr og ant, wa ste fu l, indiffer ent, intimidated, inflex ible, or obsessed w ith prerog ative and pow er . . . [ o r] s u b v er t ed or controlled by

the re g ulated intere sts i n o n e p ar ticular or a nother” ). Such ar e the ills tending from g ov e rnme nta l po we r un c he c ke d by law, re g ard le ss of the g oo d fa ithof ind ivi du a l pu

bli c se rv ants
. 12 These pr inciples apply

no less to the modern a dminist rative state
. I n fac t, administrative 8

a g e nc ie s p os se ss on ly

those powe rs t he leg islature has e x pressly g rante d them by

statute, tog ether with those nece ssarily

implied from the s tatutory authority confe rre d or dut ies imposed. Se e Pu bli c Ut il. Comm’n v. GTE -So u t h w es t , Inc ., 90 1 S. W.2 d 4 01 , 4 07 (T e x. 19 95 ); see also City of Houston v. Clark, 197 S.W .3d 314, 324 (Tex. 2006) (conf irming the conti n u ed v i abil ity of the de leg ation doctrine—the his t o ri ca l co n s t i tu t i o n al m o o ri n g o f t h e a dm i n i s t ra t i v e s t at e w i t h i na go v ern m en tfo u n d edon separ ation-ofpower s principles).

Ac co rd i ng ly , Texas courts have routinely permitted UDJA claims challeng ing a g ency actions as bey ond statutory authority and seeking a construc tion of that authority
. E.g., Cobb , 190 S.W .2d
a t 71 2 ( UD JA c la im s e e kin g de c laratio n th a t pl a int if fs we re no t “ mot or

c arr ie rs ” su

bje c t to ta x wa s n ot a
su it a g a ins t the state that im pli c a te d s ov e re ig n im mun ity ); Texas De

p’t of Ins., Div. of W

orkers’ Comp. v

. Lumbermens M

ut. Cas. Co., 21 2 S. W.3 d 8 70 , 8 74 -7 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 06 , pe t. de nie d) (U DJA c la im seekingdecla

ration that ag ency ’s issuance of advisorie s i n consistent with statutory require ments was bey ond ag ency ’s statutory authority ). Construing Reconve y ance ’s pleading s liberally and taking them as tr ue , a s we mus t, Re c on ve y anc e ha s ple d this ty pe of c la im: it all e g e s tha t TDI ha s n o s tatut or

y a uth or ity to regulate or pr ohib i t titl e ag ents and insure rs from c harg ing a separ ate f

ee to pr ovide Reconve y ance ’s service s, asserts that the a g ency is acting bey ond its statutory authority in purporting to do so, and seeks a dec laration construing the age ncy ’s s tatutory authority to commit these actions. Thus, Reconve y ance ’s13

c la im i s w ith in t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n if (1 ) R e c on ve y anc e ha s a lle g e d a jus tic ia ble c on tr ov e rs y reg ardingthe scope of TDI ’s statutory authority ; and (2) the d i s t ri ct court’s jurisdiction over Re c on ve y anc e ’s UD JA c la im h a s n ot b e en di ves ted by the le g isl a tur e ’s g ra

nt o f j ur isd ic tio n to TD Ito
r e g u l a t e t h e t i t l e i n s u r an c e i n d u s t r y. Agency j urisdi ction

I n its first i s s u e, TDI

attempts to invoke sever al re lated princ iples that apply when the leg islature has deleg ated jurisdiction to an ag ency to make an initial determination in a dispute. See Texas De p’t of Protective & Regulatory Serv s. v. Me ga Child C

are, Inc

. , 145 S.W .3d 170, 173 (Tex. 2004) (“In Texas, a per son may

obtain judicial revie w of a n administrative action only if a statute pr ovides a rig ht to j ud ic ia l r e vie w, or

the a c tio n a dv e rs e ly affe c ts a ve ste d p ro pe rt

y ri g ht o r o the rw ise vio late s a
co n s t i tu t i o n al ri gh t
. ”) (c i t i n g Continental C as. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W .3d 393, 397 (Tex. 2000); Firemen’ s & Policeme n’s Civil Serv. Comm’n v . Ken n ed y, 514 S.W .2d 237, 239 (T e x. 19 74 ); and City of

Amarillo v. Hanc ock, 23 9 S. W.2 d 7 88 , 7 90 (T e x. 19 51 )) ; W estheime r Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Brock

ette, 567 S.W .2d 780, 785 (Tex. 1978) (“Courts ge nera lly hold that administrative bodies are entitled to and should exercise the duties a nd functions conf

err ed b y statute without interfer ence by the courts. I t follows, however , that intervention by the cour t in administ ra t i v e p ro cee dings ma y be pe rm iss ibl e wh e n a

n a g e nc y is e xer c isi nga

uth or ity be y on d it s sta tut or ily

c on fe rr e d p ow e rs .” ); Texas Comm’n of Lice nsing & Regulation v. Model Search Am., Inc ., 95 3 S. W.2 d 2 89 , 2 91 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 1997, no writ) (“ The sepa ration of g overnme nt pow ers mandated in the State constitution forbids a court to reviewthe ac tions of an administrative age ncy unless the l eg islature has, in a proper statute, authorized
a cause of action for that purpose or the plaintiff complains the ag ency action is ultra v i re s or14

un c on sti tut ion a l in

its e ff e c t up on the pla int if

f o r h is p ro pe rt

y .” ). Th e a

pp lic a tio n of thes e pr inc ipl e s, h o w e v e r , tu r

n s o nt h e n a tu r e o f

j u r i s d i c t i o n , i f

an y, t h a tt h e l e g i s l a tu r e h a s d e l e g a t e d t o t h e a g e n c y. As noted, the leg islature ena cted the T exas Title Insuranc e Act “to completely regulate the business of title insurance , including the direc t issuance of policies and the r eins u ra n ce o f an y assumed risks, to (1) protec t consumers a nd purcha sers of title insuranc e policies; and ( 2) provide a dequate and
rea sonable rates of re turn for title insuranc e compa nies and title insuranc e ag ents.” Tex . I ns. Code Ann. § 2501.002. A per son eng ag es in the “business of title insurance” if the person “as insurer, guara ntor, or
sure ty , ma

ke s o r p ro po se s to make a c on tr a c t or

po lic y of tit le ins ur anc e or its e qu iva le nt, ” or “ tr ans a c ts or propose s to tra

nsact any phase of

title insurance,” including soliciting ; titl e examination other than a n examination conducted by an attorne y ; closing the transact ion other than a closing conducte d by

an attorney ; executing a

contra ct of title insurance ; insuring and t ransa cting matters ar ising out of the c ontrac t afte r the contra ct is e x ecute d, including reinsura nce; or making a g uara

nty or war

ranty of a title sea

rch or a title examination, or any component of a ti tle sear ch or title ex amination, if the per son is not the person who per forms the sea

rch or examination. Id. § 2501.005(a) (West 2006). Fur ther, a person e ng ag es in the

“ bu sin e ss o f t itl e ins uranc e ” if the pe rs on

e ng a g e s in

or pr op os e s to e ng a g e in a ny bu sin e ss “ that is substantially

equivalent to the business of title insurance as desc ribed by this section, reg ardle ss of whethe r that conduct is per formed in a manner desig ned to evade the provisions of this tit le.” Id. § 2501.005(b). TDI is char g ed gene rally with administering the Act. Id. § 31 .0 02 (1 ), (3 ) (We st 20 06 ) ( TD Ish a ll “ re g ulate the bus iness of i nsuranc e in t his state” and “ ensure that this code and othe r laws r eg ardinginsurance and insurance companies a

re executed”)
. I t ha s also been deleg ated specific power s that, in addition to i ts ratemaking power , include licensingand enf orce ment power s over title insurer s, titl e ag en t s , and other s15

eng ag ed in the “busine ss of title insurance .” Id. §§ 2551.101-.102, 2551.351-.354, 2552.101-.108, 2552.254, 2552.301-.302, 2651.001-.010, 2651.051- .055, 2651.157, 2651.301-.302 (West 2006).

I mpl ic it i n a re g ulator

y sc he me lik e the Ac t is the po we r o f T DI to i nte rp re t th e statut e s it is charg ed with administering and enf orcing
. Se e Be aco n Nat ’l In s. Co. v . M

on te ma y or , 86 S.W .3d 260, 266-67 (Te x . App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (TD Ihad author ity to state position reg ardingproper construction of policy

form bec ause it “is ex pressly authorized by the I nsuranc e C ode to regulate insuranc e po lic ie s a nd ins ur e r c la ims pr a c tic e s” ); see also Mode l Search , 953 S.W .2d at 290 (de partment of lice nsing and re g ulation staff “ had the undoubted authority to inter pret the Act’s provisions a nd to make a de cision” inf or ma lly a dv isi ngc orpor a tio n th a t it s a c tiv iti e s f e ll w ith in a g e nc y ’s re g ulator y a uth or ity ). Th is is the power on w hich TDI predic ates its jurisdictional arguments. TDI asser ts that the courts have no po we r t o “ int e rf

e re wi th” or

“ re vie w” its int e rp re tatio n o f “ ‘c los ingthe tr ans a c tio n’ in t he cou rse of

its regulatory

duties.” T D I ’ s c l a i m o f

j u r i s d i c t i o nf

a i l s f o r s e v e r a l r e a so ns . F ir st, T D Io v e r l o o k s t h a ta U D JA
c la im i s su i ge ne ris and

no t ne c e ssa

ri ly c on tr oll e d b y

wh e the r a

n a lte rn a tiv e a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me dy is o r i s
n o t ma d e a v ailable. Texas Liquor Cont rol Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W .2d 891, 895 (T e x. 19 70 ); Cobb, 190 S.W .2d at 713. More importa nt l y , TDI obscure s the fac t that it has not been g rante d jurisdiction to decide the di s p u t e p re s ented in Rec onvey ance ’s UDJA action. As TDI
a c kn ow le dg e s, Re c on ve y ance doe s n ot f a ll w ith in i ts r e g ulator

y jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he “ bu sin e ss o f t itl e insurance ” and T DI

has not, and c annot, initiate a proc eedingag ainst Reconveyance . Un lik e c ourt s, “ the re is n o p re sumpt ion that a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc ie s are aut ho ri zed to resolve disputes. Rathe r, they may exercise only

those power s the law , in clear and express statutory lang uag e, conf

ers upon them.” David Mc David Nissan, 84 S.W. 3d a t 22 0. “ Court s w ill no t im ply16

additional authority

to ag encie s, nor may age n ci es cre ate f or themselves a

ny excess power s.” Id. The
c ourt s are no t di ve ste d b y an a g e nc y

of the su bje c t- matte r j uri sd ictio n th e y wo uld oth e rw ise po sse ss t o adjudicate a dispute unless the leg islature has gr anted the ag ency exclusive jurisdiction, or the sole power to make the initial deter

mination in the disput e. Id. a t 22 1; Bex ar Metro. W ater Dist. v. City of Bulverde, 156 S.W .3d 79, 90 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, pet. denied)
. Whether an ag ency has exclusive jurisdiction is determined by

construction of the rele vant statutory scheme
. See Thomas v . Long , 207 S.W .3d 334, 340 (Tex. 2006). The legislature ’s i ntent to g rant an ag ency the s ole authority to make the initial deter

mination in a dispute may

be re flec ted in either e x press statutor y l an gu age t o that eff ect or the over all statutory scheme
. Id . at 340-42.

TD I ha s not sug g e ste d that it po sse sse s exc lusive jurisdiction—i.e., that the leg islature has d i v e s t e d t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rto f

t h e j u r i s d i c t i o ni tw o u l d o t h e rw ise po s s e s s o v e r

R e c o n v e y an c e ’ s U D JA claim—to decide the prop er construction of “ closing the transa ction” as it bea rs upon TDI ’s statutory p o w e r s . N o r

d o e s th e T e xa s T it le I n s u r an c e A c t g iv e T D I s u c h b r o a d p o w e r , a t l e a s t o u ts id e th e c o n te xt of the proc eeding s it can initiate ag ainst titl e insurer s and ag ents. TDI , ag ain, acknow ledg es that it ha s no power to initi ate suc h proce eding s ag ainst Reconveyance . TDI also does not a ssert that principles of primary jurisdiction would req u i re t h e dis trict
c o u rtt o d e f

e r t o T D I’ s p o w e r

t o c o n s t r u e “ c l o s i n g t h e t r an s a c t i o n ” i nt h e c o u r s e o f i t s l e g i s l a t i v e l yd e l e g at e d r e g u l a t o r

y d u t i e s . “ P r i m ar

y j u r i s d i c t i o n ” i s n o t t r

u l y a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n , b u ta j u d i c i a l l ycre ated c oncept of

prudential limitation. David McDavid Ni ssan, Inc., 84 S.W .3d at 220-21. The primary jurisdiction doctrine operate s to allocate power betwee n courts and ag encie s when bo th have the a uth or ity to make the initial deter

mination reg ardinga dispute or issue. Id. a t 22 1. I t ho lds that tr ia l c ourt s sh ou ld
a llo w a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e a gency to ini tia lly de c ide an is su e wh e n: ( 1) the a g e nc y is s ta ff e d w ithe xpe rt sThe sole pr ovision of the Act t h at wo u ld appea r potentially

to provide any

forum for 9 Re c on ve y anc e to s tate its vie ws is se c tio n 2 70 3. 20 3, wh ic h r e qu ir e s th e ins ur anc e c omm iss ion e r t o ho ld a bie nn ia l he ari ngc on c e rn ingru le makin g and rate makin g c on c e rn ingre g ulatio n o f t he bu sin e ss of title insurance . Tex. I ns. Code Ann. § 2703.203-.205 (West 2006). For example, while TDI

questions Reconveyance ’s re liance on se ct i o n 5 5 0 of the 10 insurance code, contending that the provision doe s not apply to the title insurance a ct, TDI has not a sse rt e d th a t th e c omm iss ion e r w ou ld have statut or y po we r to p ro hib it the a sse ssm e nt o f a se pa rate fee for post-c losing re lease service s if such ser vices a re not included i n t h e “premium,” nor sug g ested that the e x istence of any such powe r would be r eleva nt to our jurisdictional inquiry
. 17 trained in ha

ndling c omplex problems within the ag ency ’s purview , and (2) g reat benef it is derived from the ag ency ’s uniform interpre tation of laws within its purview and the a g ency ’s rules a nd regulations when courts and juries might reac h differ ing results under simi lar fa ct situations. In re So uth weste rn Be ll Te l. Co., 226 S.W .3d 400, 403 (Tex. 2007).

The primar

y jurisdiction doctrine does not apply for severa l rea sons. Most obviousl y , the leg islature has not provided Reconve y ance an administrative pr ocee ding thr oug h which it could obtain a de c isi on re g ard ing“ c los ingthe tr ans a c tio n” and TD I ’s statut or

y a uth or ity , to wh ic h the dis tr ic t c ourt c ou ld defe r. Moreove r, as the pa rties have fra

med the dispute, Reconve y ance ’s UDJA claim turns entirely on 9 a question of statutory

construction—the mea

ning of “closing the transac tion” under section 2501.006 of the insuranc e code . TDI h as not sug g ested that a ny other issue would be rele vant to Reconve y ance ’s
e nti tle me nt t o th e de c larator y re lie f i t se e ks
. A l o n gs t an ding c orollary or exception to the primary 10 jur isd ic tio n d oc tr ine re c og nize s that “ [w]he re the iss ue is o ne inh e re ntl y jud ic ia l in

natur e . . . th e c ourt s
are not ouste d from jurisdiction unless the L eg islature, by a valid statute, ha s expl icitly g rante d exclusive jurisdiction to the administ rative body .” Gregg v . Delhi-T a yl o r Oi l Corp., 344 S.W .2d 411, 415 (T e x. 19 61 ). Th is C ourt

ha s a pp lie d th is “ inh e re ntl y ju di cia l” con c e pt t o s tatut or y -c on str uc tio n is su e s, Bex ar Metro. W

ater Dist., 156 S.W .3d at 90 (“Construing a statute is a n inhere ntly

judicial function, and18

courts ar e n o t deprive d of their jurisdiction unless a statute e x plicitly g rants an a dminist rative a g ency
exc l u s i v e j u risdiction.”), re asoning that “[s] tatutory interpre tation or construc tion is not something that
ne e ds to be le ft to the [ag e nc y ] to de c ide
. Th e [ag e nc y ] ha s no expe rt ise that is g re a te r t ha n th e c ourt s in deter mining what a statute means.” Id. ; see also Juliff Gardens, L.L.C. v. Texas Comm’n on Env tl. Quality, 13 1 S. W.3 d 2 71 , 2 79 (T e x . App. —Aus tin 20 04 , n o p e t.) (a

pp ly ing “ inh e re ntl y

jud ic ia l” c on c e pt t o
c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s) . A lth ou g h w hat are te rm e d “ sta tut or y c on str uc tio n” iss ue s so me tim e s ma y e nta il embedde d fac t issues that counsel defer ence to ag ency proce eding s, see Tex as Ct. Reps. Certifi cation Bd. v. Esquire De

position Servs., No. 03-06-00002- CV, ___ S.W .3d ___, ___, 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 5701, at *3 (Te x . App.—Austin J uly 20, 2007, no pet. h.), that is not the ca se her e. The leg islature has de fined t h e t e r m “ c l o s i n g t h e t r an s a c t i o n ” u n d e r s e c t i o n2 5 0 1
. 0 0 6 o f

t h e i n s u r an c e c o d e w i t h c l ar i t y an d s p e c i f i c i t y, the par ties have joined issue on the question of whether Reconve y ance ’s service s fall within it, and there appea r to be no mate rial fa ct disputes conce rning t h e n at u re of Reconve y ance ’s servic es. See Te x. I ns . Code Ann. § 2501.006. In short, there is nothing about this di spute war rantinga depa

rture f rom the g ener al rule that statutory

construction is a que stion of law and f or t he courts to decide, Bex ar Metro. W ater Dist., 156 S.W .3d at 90, and ne ither par ty has sug g ested other

wise. We a lso ob se rv e tha

t th e un de rl yingpurp os e s o f t he pr ima ry jur isd ic tio n d oc tr ine argua bly have a lrea dy

been satisfied here . There is no di s p u t e t h at T DI has made a f orm of initial determination reg ardingthe prope r construc tion of “closing the transa ction.” I t conce des that the email from its Director of Title Examinations “ex presse d TDI’s position on the matter : that su c h a fe e may no t be pa sse d d ir e c tly on to the consumer a

nd if Reconve y ance ’s servic es ar e used, the cost should be paid by the title ag ent or company and should not be passe d on to the consumer.”The dissent urg es “[i] t is prec isely for this rea son that courts will traditionally defe r to an 11 ag ency ’s re asonable construction of the s tatute t he ag ency is charg ed with enf

orcing .” ___ S.W.3d at ___ n.5 (Patterson, J., dissenting). In fa ct , t h i s conce pt contemplates only that courts may
“ consider the a g e nc y ’s in ter pretati on of its ow n p ow e rs on ly

if that in te rp re tatio n is re a so na ble and not inconsistent with the statute.” Public Util. Comm’n v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53 S.W. 3d

31 0, 31 6 ( Te x. 20 01 ) (e mph a se s a dd e d) . “ We a re no t bo un d, ho we ve r, by the [ag e nc y ’s ] interpre tation.” Rylander v . Fisher Controls, Inc., 45 S.W .3d 291, 299 (Tex. App.–Aus tin 2001, no pet.). F urther, “ [c] ourts do not defe r to administrative interpr etation in reg ard to que stions which do not lie within administrative ex pertise, or deal with a nonte chnica l question of law.” Id. at 302 (quoting 2 B S i n ger, Sutherla nd Statutory

Construction § 49.04, at 23-24). Some statutory construction questions, this Court has held, may fall into that categ ory . Id . ( ho ldi ngthat “ the ta sk of statutory

construction does not he re involve a matter lying w ithin age ncy expertise. I t involves ins te a d a no n- te c hn ic a l qu e sti on

of law— le g isl a tiv e int e nt— de te rm ine d f ro m th e le g isl a tur e ’s us e of the te rm “ no t su

bje c t to t a xati on ” in c on te xt an d b a se d o n th e or din ary me anin g of

tho se wo rd s. Court s are a s c omp e te nt a s th e Com ptr oll e r i n ma

kin g that a sses smen t of

le g isl a tiv e int e nt. Th is reduc es consider ably

the deg ree of judicial def ere nce ow ed the Comptroller’s inter pretation.”). We ag ree with the dissent and Professor Be al that wher e an a g ency has exclusive 12 j u ri s d i ct i o n o v er a di s p u t e, t re at i n g e v e ry qu e sti on of statut or y c on str uc tio n im pli c a te d b y

the dis pu te as going to the ag ency ’s “statutory authority ” would ca

use the ultra vires exception to ex haustion-ofreme dies requir ements to swallow the r ule. ___ S.W.3d at ___ (Patterson , J
. , d i ssenting) (citing Ronald L . Be al, 2 Te

x as Ad mi nis tra tiv e Prac tic e an d P ro c e du re § 12 .2 , a t 12 -4 9 ( 20 06 )) ; se e als o Cobb , 190 S.W .2d at 714 (“ We do not hold that the declar atory judgme nt p ro ce d u re may be used 19 As TDI cannot de monstrate that it ha s been de leg ated e x clusive jurisdiction over the issues prese nted by Reconve y ance ’s UDJA c laim, the district c ourt possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over the
c l a i m i f i ti s j u s t i c i a

b l e . T e xa s C o n s t i tu t i o nart
. V , § 8 , T e x. G o v ’ tC o d e A n n . § § 2 4
. 00 7- .0 08 ; David McD avid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W .3d at 220. Nor doe s primary jurisdiction require the district court to defe r to T DI . T he di ss ent no ne the le ss s ug g e sts that be c a us e TD Iha s a

uth or ity to c on str ue the statut e s it administers (as a g encie s g ener ally do), TDI ’s asser

tions of authority

predic ated on the a g ency ’s alleg ed
m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f

t h e s e s t a tu t e s ar e i n s u l a t e d f r o m j u d i c i a l s c r

u t i n y. Although t h e conce pt that an 11

a g e nc y ’s “ de c idi ngwr on g ly ” re g ard ing an issu e is n ot ult ra v ire s may have a pplication wher e the leg islature has deleg ated the a g ency exclusive jurisdiction t o decide that issue, e.g ., North Alamo W ater Supply Corp. v. Texas De

p’t of Health, 839 S.W .2d 455, 458-59 (Tex
. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied) , 12when a

statute provides a

n administrative boar d or other spe cial tribunal or spe cial proc edure for the particula r ty pe of c ase in ha

nd as, for example, a workme n’s compensation case.” ). But a g ain, the leg islature has not de leg ated TD Isuch jurisdiction here
. 20 ag encie s do not ha

ve g ener al authority to misapply the law when a sserting their re g ulatory power s in other contexts. Aga in, it is well-e stablished that Texas courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to declare illega l
o r e n j o i nage n ci es ’ a c t s t h a t m i s i n t er p re tan d m i s ap p l y t h e l aw s t h ey

ar e c h ar gedwi t h ad m i n i s t er i n g. See Cobb , 1 90 S.W. 2d

a t 71 3 ( UD JA c la im se e kin g de c laratio n that pl a int if fs we re no t “ mot or

c arr ie rs ”
su bje c t to ta x und e r s tatut e ); see also Camacho v . Samaniego, 95 4 S. W.2 d 8 11 , 8 19 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 97 , p e t. d e nie d) (o bs e rv ingthat Cobb involved comptroller’ s illega l tax collection based on a mistaken interpre tation of law made within the scope of his statutory authority ). Under th e b e d r o c k ju r is p r u d e nti a l p r in c iple s ref

lected in Cobb , we c onclude that a ny power s g ra nte d to TD Iby

the le g isl a tur e do no t di ve st t he dis tr ic t c ourt

of its su bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n to adjudicate Reconve y ance ’s UDJA claim or re quire the c ourt to defe r i ts proce eding s. We overrule TDI ’s first issue.
Justiciabil ity I n it s se c on d is su e , T DI c on te nd s th a t Re c on ve y ance h as fai led to p le a d a jus tic ia ble controve rsy

that could support the distri ct court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over its UDJ A claim. “T o constitute a justiciable contr oversy , there must exis t a re al and substantial contr oversy involving g enuine conflict of ta

ng ible interests and not mer ely a theor etical dispute.” Be ad le , 907 S.W .2d at 467 (quoting Bex ar-Me dina-Atascosa Counties W ater Control & Improve ment Dist. No. 1 v. Me dina Lake Prot. Ass’n, 640 S.W .2d 778, 779-80 (Tex
. App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). In this reg ard, TD Iargues that21

(1) Rec onvey ance has suffe red no “conc rete injury ” on which to ba se its suit, (2) its sui t is not ripe, and (3 ) i tl ac k s s t an d i n g.

Ripeness and standingare related doctrine s of justiciability : eac h is a threshold question th a t im p li c a te s s u

b je c t matt e r ju

r is d ic ti o n an d e a c h e mp h a s iz e s th e n e c e s s it y o f a c o n c r e te in

ju r y f or a justiciab l e cl aim to be pre sented. W aco Inde p. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W .3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000) (c i t i n g Patterson v. Planned Pare nthood, 971 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)). Ripeness and st anding , like other justiciability

doctrines, de rive fr om the constitutional prohibition ag ainst advisory opinions, which in turn stems from separ ation-of- power s principles. Patterson, 971 S.W .2d at 442.

Ripeness co n ce rn s whether , at the time a law suit is brought, the fa cts have develope d sufficie ntly

such that an injury

has occur

red or is likely to oc cur, rathe r than being conting ent or re mote. Id
. A c a se is no t ri pe wh e n its re so lut ion de pe nd s up on c on tin g e nt or hy po the tic a l fa c ts or up on event s that have not y et come to pa ss. Gibson, 22 S.W .3d at 852. The c onstitut ional prohibition ag ainst issuing advisory opinions also has a pra g matic, prude ntial aspec t that aims to conserve “judicial time and r esourc es for r eal a nd curr ent controve rsies, rather than a bstract, hy

pothetical , o r re m o te disputes.” Patterson , 9 7 1 S. W. 2 d at 443 (quoting Mayhe w v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W .2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)). In the administrat i v e l aw c ontext , moreove r, avoidingpremature litigation over administrative de terminations pr e ve nts c ourt s f

ro m “ e nta ng lin g the mse lve s in a

bs tr a c t di sa g re e me nts ov e r a dmi nis tr a tiv e po lic ie s” wh ile simult aneously

allowing them to postpone interfe ring when ne cessa ry so that o th e r

b r a n c h e s o f g o v e r nme nt and g overnme ntal ag encie s may perf orm their func tions unim peded . Id
. T h ese f actua l and prude ntial
conce rns under lie the court’s deter mination of ripene ss, in which it c onsiders: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial r eview, a

nd (2) the ha

rdship occa sioned to a party by the court’s denying judicial revie w. Pe rry v. De l Rio, 6 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 3 9 , 2 5 0 (T ex . 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Ab bo tt La bs . v . G ar dn e r, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).22 Stand ing dif

fe rs fr om ri pe ne ss be c a

us e ri pe ne ss q

ue sti on s w he n a

n a c tio n ma

y be br ou g ht, while s tanding conce rns who may bring an ac tion. Patterson , 97 1 S.W. 2d a t 44 2. Stand ingis i mpl ic it i n the conc ept of subjec t matter jurisdiction. Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S
. W.2d at 443. The standing require ment stems from two limit ations on subject m atter jurisdiction: the s epar ation of powe rs doctrine and, in Tex as, the ope n courts provision. Id. T h e g e n e r a l te s t f o r s ta n d in g in T e xa s r equire s that there “(a ) shall be a

rea l controver sy

betwee n the par

ties, which (b) will be actua lly deter mined by the judicial decla ration sought.” Id . at 446 (c iting Board of W ater Eng’rs v. City of

San Antonio, 283 S.W .2d 722, 724 (Tex. 1955) ). An opinion issued in a case broug ht by a par ty without standing is advisory beca use rather t h anr e m e dyi n g ana c tu a l o r i m m i n e n t h ar m , t h e j u d g m e n ta d dr e s s e s o n l y a h yp o t h e t i c a l i n

j u r y. Id. at 444. I n many c a s e s , th e s ta

n d in g an d r ip e n e s s in qu ir ie s me r g e : a p arty ma y la c k s ta

n d in g b e c a

u se wha t happene d to him is not far en oug h develope d, but that lack of de velopment may also rende r the a ction unripe. Patterson, 971 S.W .2d at 442.

We f ur the r o bs e rv e tha

t w hil e the UD JA does not s up e rs e de the se jus tic ia bil ity require ments, a per son seekingdecla ratory relief need not have y et incurr ed ac tual injury of the sort for whic h conseque ntial relief mig ht be g rante d. Bex ar Metro. W ater Dist., 1 5 6 S
. W
. 3 d at 8 8 (c i t i n g City of W aco v. Tex as Natural

Res. Conservation Comm’n, 83 S.W .3d 1 6 9 , 1 7 5 (T ex. App.—Austin 2002, p et
. d en i ed) and Texas De p’t of Banking v. M

ount Olivet Ceme tery Ass’n, 27 S.W .3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)) . I nstead, the UDJA is intended to provide a means to dete rmine the rights of parties when a controve rsy

has ar isen, but befor e any wronghas ac tually

been c ommitt ed, and is preve ntative i n nature
. Id. For example, c ourts have issued de clar atory judgme nts construing statutes befor e the statutes a

re violate d. Id. at 88-89.23 I n c on te nd ingthat Re c on ve y anc e ha s f a ile d to ple a d a

c o nc re te inj ur

y , s tand ing , o r r ipe ne ss, TDI makes four primary

contentions: (1) Rec onvey ance ’s asser ted injury is premised on the “ hy

pothetical future e vents” that title insurers and ag ents will actua lly do business with Reconveyance if it obtains the de c lar a t i o n s i t s e e k s ; ( 2 ) R e c o n v e y an c e i s a “ f o r e i g n c o r

p o r a t i o n ” w i t h “ n o r i g h t t o c o n d u c t b u s i n e s s in Texas without comply ing w ith all statutory condi t i o ns,” and w ho cannot c laim injury from TDI ’s “[p] reve nting [i ts] future business plan from rea ching fruition”; (3) Re conveyance cannot show injury or hardship bec ause it is not regulated by TDI or subject to any

enfor ceme nt actions; and (4) Reconve y ance improperly

seeks “ revie w” of

an “inf ormal advisory

opinion.” I n support of its first contention, TDI equate s this case with Br ink le y v. T exas L otte ry Comm’n, 986 S.W .2d 764 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1999, no pe t.). Brinkley , l i k e t h i s c a s e , i n v o l v e d a U D JA claim broug ht by

a party who, while not dir ectly regulated by an ag ency , claimed injury from the a g ency ’s alleg edly unlawful a ctions that deterr ed its licensee s from doing business with the party . Br inkley owned

“ e ig ht- lin e r” g a min g ma c hin e s, le a sin g sp a c e to o pe rate su c h ma c hin e s in bi ng o p arl or s. B ing o p arl or s, but not Brinkley , wer e license d by the Texas L ottery

Commi ssion and reg ulated under the B ingo E nabling Ac t. T he Ac t pr oh ibi te d b ing o p arl or s f ro m a llo wi ng op e ratio n of “ g a mbl ingde vic e s” on

the ir pr e mis e s. Responding to inquiries, the c ommissi on sent its licensees a letter s et t i n g forth cr iteria by which the licensee s could deter

mine the leg ality of machines in the ir parlors and war ning of potential administrative and cr iminal penalties if they permitted oper ation of illeg al machine s. Id . at 766- 6 7. Br inkley sued the commission under the UDJA seekingthat eig ht-liners we re not “ g ambling de vices” under the pena l code and that the commi ssion’s interpre tation of t he code was unc onstitut ional. Id . at 767. He a lleg ed that he sustained “irrepar able injury to vested property rig hts with no adequate remedy at l aw” beca use hi s lessor,F ur the r, a s note d, Re c on ve y anc e int ro du c e d lette rs fr om t

wo tit le ins ur e rs statin g that it s 13 se rv i c e s w o u l d

“ c e rt a i n l y

[b e ] r e c o m m e n d [e d ]” t o “ a l l o f o u r a g e n t s i nT e xa s an d

i no t h e r s t a te s” and “ wo uld be su pp or te d a nd e nte rt a ine d b y our co mpa nie s if th e c ha

rg e fo r s uc h s e rv ic e s w a s a pa ss 24 “as a result” of the commission’s letters, demande d that he re move his machine, a nd that he wa s preve nted from oper ating his machines in other bing o parlors. Id. at 767-68.

This Court concluded, “ We believe B rinkley ’s ca use of action under the UDJA re quires an advisory opinion.” Id. at 768. I t observe d that Br inkley was not a li cense e subjec t to the commission’s regulation, and that no license es we re pa rties. Id. As fo r wh e the r B ri nk le y no ne the le ss ha d a jus tic ia ble int e r e s tar i s i n g f

r o m t h e a dv e r s e e c o n o m i c i mp a c to f t h e c o m m i s s i o n ’ s a c t i o n s , t h e C o u rts u m ma ri ly dis mis se d th a t po ssi bil ity . Witho ut e la bo ra tio n, it s tated th at, “B ri nk le y ne c e ssa ri ly sp e c ulate s th a t a decla ratory judgme nt, holding that eig ht-liners ar e not g ambling de vices, may induce his lessor or

other bin g o- pa rl or lic e ns e e s to a llo w him to op e ra te his ma c hin e s, ho we ve r c on fi g ur e d, in t he ir pa rl or s. Th is is a conting ency , an unce rtainty , a hy pothesis upon which a co urt may not decide the leg al issues raise d in Brinkley ’s petition.” Id
.

Brinkley d o e s n o tc o n t r o l t h i s c a s e . U n d e r o u r s t an d ar d o f r e v i e w , R e c o n v e y an c e ’ s U D JA claim ca nnot be dismiss ed as based on mere ly speculative or hy pothetical business loss. Reconveyance expli citly alleg es that: “Title insuranc e compa nies and a g ents in Texas hav e i n formed Re conveyance Se rv ic e s they would use the se rv ic e s o f R e c on ve y anc e Se rv ic e s if n ot f or the position taken by

TDI which prec ludes t h e t i t l e co m p anies fr om char g ing f or those ser

vices,” and that “[s]om e of the same e ntities

w h i c h u s e R e c o n v e y a

n c e S e r v i c e s i no t h e r

s ta te s w o u l d use the se rv ic e s o f R e c on ve y anc e Se rv ic e s in Te xas bu t fo r the ac tions of TDI .” (Empha sis added.) Simi larly , J an Hollenbe ck testified that, “ Severa l t i t l e c o mp an i e s . . . h a v e i n d i c a t e d t h e y wou ld o

ffe r [ Re con vey anc e ’s ] se rv ic e s if TD Idid no t pr oh ibi t char g ing c ustomers [R econve y ance ’s] $15 fee.” (Emphasis adde d.) TDI did not challeng e these fa ctual 13throug h char g e with ac knowledg ment as such by the T ex as De partment of I nsuranc e.” Reconve y ance alre ady has an ong oing business relationship wit h one of the se insurer s, which off ers Reconve y ance ’s servic es t o customers in Washington and Oreg on. Although the se statements a re n o tn e c e s s ar i l y conclusiveproof that the insure rs would do business wit h Re c o nv e y ance if it obtained its de sir e d d e c laratio n, the y are e vid e nc e c on sis te nt w ithRe c on ve y anc e ’s un c ha lle ng e d p le a din g s. TDI ’s arguments to this eff ect a ppear to rely on a misapplication of a

statement in Model 14 Search that “a f

oreig n corpor ation . . . po s s es s es n o ri g ht to transact business in Texas without complying w ith all statutory conditions that pertain to the matte r.” See M odel Searc h Am., Inc ., 95 3 S. W.2 d at 29 2. Th is s tate me nt r e fe rr e d to whe th e r a c or po ratio n p os se sse d a

ve ste d p ro pe rt

y inte r e s t s u c h th a t th e a g e n c y ’ s a c ti o n im p li c a te d d u e p r o c e s s an d g a v e r is e to an inh e rent rig ht of judicial revie w from a

n ag ency order
. Id. at 291-92. I t does not stand for the pr opositions t hat fore ign c orporations can neve r be injure d or “a ffe cted” under the UDJA by an ag ency ’s ac tions or that such entities a re without a leg al re medy if ag encie s exceed their de leg ated powe rs to a corpor ation’s detriment. See Tex as Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W .2d 89 1, 89 5 ( Te x. 19 70 ) ( UD JA a c tio n is su i ge ne ris ); Cobb, 190 S.W .2d at 713 (same ). 25 alleg ations or introduce contra ry jurisdictional e vidence
. Acc ording ly , we must take the se alleg ations as true, a nd construe the m liberally
. Miranda , 1 33 S.W. 3d a t 22 6; see also Swee ney v . Jefferson , 212 S.W .3d 556, 564-65 (Te x . App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). The se fa cts distinguish Reconve y ance ’s claim fr om that
o f B r i n k l e y. Th is ty

pe of a c tua l or thr e a te ne d bu sin e ss inj ur y fr om the e ff

e c ts of a g e nc y a c tio n g ive s r ise to a justiciable inter es t t h at ca n support Reconve y ance ’s UDJA claim. See also W al-Mart Stores, Inc.

v . S tur ge s, 52 S.W .3d 711, 721-27 (Te x . 2001) (discussing Texas’s longsta nding r ecog nition of commonlaw tort for

tortious interfer ence wi t h prospec tive business relations). TD I ’s contentions that Re c on ve y anc e c ann ot p os se ss s uc h a n in te re st b e c a

us e it i s a

“ fo re ig n c or

po ra tio n” or is se e kin g to imp le me nt a

“ futur e bu sin e ss p lan” are wi tho ut m e ri t. 14 N o r ar e w e p e r s u a d e d

t h a tR e c o n v e y an c e c an n o t b e i n j u r e d o r “ a f

f e c t e d ” u n d e r

t h e U D JA
mere ly beca use it is no t regulated by TDI or subject to its enfor ceme nt authority . As this Court has
rec og nized, a party not dir ectly regulated by

an ag ency

may nonetheless be “af

fec ted” a nd injured by

the26

ag ency ’s ac tions. I n City of W aco v. Tex as Natural

Res. Conservation Comm’n, 83 S.W .3d 169, 178-79 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) , the Court reve rsed the dismissal of a de clar atory judgme nt broug ht by the city who, while not direc tly

subject to the statutes the ag ency administered, wa s adver sely aff ecte d by the ag ency ’s actions in inter preting and enfor cing them. I t held that the city could see k a dec laration of the e ffe ct of a fede ral regulation—which had bee n incorpora ted into an ag ency

rule—on the TN RCC ’s statutory authority to issue new per

mits allowing dischar g e of a g ricultural wa ste from c onfined a nimal fee ding operations (CAFOs) into the B osque River. Id . at 178. Althoug h the city was not a pa

rty to the CA F O p e rm itt ingpr oc e ss o r d ir e c tly su bje c t to the TN RCC’ s statut or y a uth or ity , it s r ig hts we re a dv e rs e ly
a ff e c te d b y the a g e nc y ’s re fu sa l—u

nd e r i ts i nte rp re tatio n o f t he regul ati on

and its ow n r ule —to a do pt a plan deter mining the a

mount of pollutant that the river c ould rec eive a nd assimilate befor e is s u ing ne w p e r mi ts f o r p o ll u ta n ts. Id
. at 1 7 9
. I n this case Rec onvey ance , which is not subject to TDI ’s re g ulation, contends that it s rig hts, status or leg al re lations have be en adve rsely aff ecte d by TDI ’s re fusal—base d on its int erpr etation of th e ins uranc e code —to allow title companies to use Rec onvey ance ’s fe e-ba sed mortg ag e re lease service s in Texas. W e ar e not per suaded by TDI ’s ar g ument that Reconve y ance has not been injure d or “a ffe cted” within the meaning of the UD J A mere ly beca use it is not direc tly regulated by TDI
. See Ronald L . Be al, 2 Te x as Ad mi nis tra tiv e Prac tic e an d P ro c e du re § 12.1, at 12-46 to 12-47 (2006) (obser ving that standing to a ssert UDJA claim ag ainst ag encie s seeking construction of re g ulatory statutes is not li mited solely

to persons direc tly

regulated by

them, that “[t] here app ear s to be no rational ju st if ica ti on for

su c h a re a din g of

the UD JA,” and

tha t “ [t]o r e str ic t th e UD JA inthe a g e nc y c on te xt to
on ly tho se pe rs on s d ir e c tly

su bje c t to the pr ov isi on s o f t he re g ulator

y statut e in qu esti on

wi ll s e ve re ly restric t the efficac y of t he UDJ A cause of action of c larify ing bona fide disputes as to the mea ning of the rele vant statutes”)
.27 We a lso re

je c t T DI ’s a sse rt ion s that Re c on ve y anc e ’s UD JA c la im i s unr ipe be c a us e its on ly actions we re to provide what it terms an “ informal advisory o p i n ion” to title insurers and a g ents. TDI compar es this case to Model Se arch , which involved a UDJ A claim broug ht by an entity that attempted to c halleng e an informal oral opinion obtaine d from ag ency staff that it was a “ta lent ag ency” within the ag ency ’s re g ulatory

authority
. See Tex as Comm’n of Licensing & Regulation v. Mode l Search Am., I nc., 95 3 S. W.2 d 2 89 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 97 , no wr it)
. Th is Court he ld that the se a c tio ns did no t “ a ff e c t” Model Searc h’s rig hts, status, or other leg al re lations “with the immediacy and conc rete ness contemplate d by the Uniform De clar atory J udg ments Act.” 953 S.W.2d at 292. I t expl ained:
The trial c ourt had be fore it no final ag ency order ; indeed the c ourt had be fore it no order at all, but only

MSA’s alleg ation that t he ag ency ’s g ener al counse l and direc tor of enfor ceme nt told MSA that acc ording to their i nterpre tation of t he Act MSA was oblige d to obtain a certificate of re g istration. So far as the pleading s and evide nce indicate, no public office r or pr ivate per son has attempted to enf orce ag ainst MSA the civil or criminal conseque nces of operating a talent a g ency in the state without a ce rtificate of re g istration.
Id. Her e, by

contra st, th er e i s j u ri s d i ct i o n al ev i d en ce t h at T DI ha s ac tu al l y i n i t i ated enforc ement pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t ti tle a g e nts wh o atte mpt to c ha rg e fe e s f or po st- c los ingre le a se se rv ic e s— and wo uld continue to do so. More to the poi nt, there are , ag ain, uncha lleng ed plea ding a lleg ations that TDI ’s ac tions
ar e c au s i n g Rec onvey ance c on c re te inj ur y by pr e ve nti ng

it f ro m d oi ng bu sin e ss t

hr ou g h ti tle a g e nts and insurer s in Texas. TDI , ag ain, does n o t dispute these alleg ations or Reconve y ance ’s jurisdictional evidenc e. Th es e al l egations and evidence further point to the hardship Reconve y ance would incur from the de privation of its reque sted relief . Reconve y ance contends that TDI is acti n g wi thout lawfulThe sole “ reme dy ” provide d i n the Act is sec tion 2703.203, which, ag ain, re quires the 15 insurance commissione r t o h o l d a biennial he aringconce rning rulemakingand ratemaking conce rning regulation of the business of title insuranc e. Te x . I ns. Code Ann. §§ 2703.203-.205.

A lt e r n a ti v e ly , T D I ’ s s in g u la

r f o c u s o n th e “ c lo s in g th e tr an s a c ti o n ” c o n s tr u c ti o nissue 16 demonstrates that, at a minimum , resolution of this issue will se rve a useful purpose t o war d terminating the controve rsy . Beadle, 907 S.W .2d at 468 (“ A trial cour t h as d i scre tion to enter a de c larator y jud g me nt s o lo nga s it

wi ll s e rv e a

us e fu l pu

rp ose or wi ll t e rm inate the c on tr ov e rs y betwee n the par

ties.”). 28 authority in pr ohibiting title insure rs and ag ents from char g ing a fee for post-c losing re lease service s. TDI is threateningenfor ceme nt action ag ainst any title insurers or a g ents who mig ht char g e such f ees, a nd has
a c tua lly c ite d o ne a g e nt f

or do ingso . B e c a

us e Re c on vey ance’s se rv ic e s w ou ld b e of fe re d o n a

pa ssthroug h fee basis, it is doubtful that any title insure rs or ag ents would have an incentive to seek
a dju dic a tio n of Re c on ve y anc e ’s statut or y c on str uc tio n issu e in a TD I e nf

or c e me nt pr oc e e din g . The tit le i n s u r an c e a c t d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a m e an s b y w h i c h R e c o n v e y an c e c o u l d s e e k i t s r e l i e f f r o m T D I. Un le ss

15 and until Reconvey ance can obta in the decla rations it seeks, what it contends are TDI ’s unlawf ul actions wi ll c on tin

ue to p re ve nt i t f

ro m do ingbu sin e ss thr ou g h Te xas t itl e ins ur e rs and a g e nts . F ur

the r, on thi s
re c or d, thi s c on tr ov e rs y

wi ll b e “ a c tua lly

de te rm ine d” by

the de c lara

tio ns . 16 Finally , as discussed e arlier , Reconve y ance ’s UDJA c laim tur ns on a question of statutory construction—a que st i o n o f l aw that is fit for judicia l resolution. Compare City of W aco, 83 S.W .3d at 175-77 (holding that UDJ A claim t hat ag ency acte d beyond statutory

authority “pre sents a pure ly

leg al inq uir y ” that “ wi ll no t be ne fi t fr om the de ve lop me nt of a dd iti on a l fa c ts in c onne c tio n wi th a sp e c if ic pe rm it application”) , with Esqui re De pos i t i o n Servs., ___ S.W .3d at ___ (statutory authority issue require d consideration of specific fac ts within ag ency expertise and not y et pre sented) and Beac on Nat’l Ins. Co., 8 6 S
. W
. 3 d

at 2 6 8 (d i s t i n gu i s h i n g City of W aco and holding that UDJA claims there “ require [d] deter mination of sever al fa ctual matter s which have not been suff iciently develope d”).We simi larly reje ct TDI ’s view that we should not permit Reconve y ance ’s s uit based on 17 wh at t h ey ch ar ac t er i z e a s a m er e “ i n fo rm al ad v i s o ry o p i n i o n ” b ec au s e d o i n g s o wo u l d d i s co u ra ge a g e n c ie s f r o m g iv in g in f

o r ma l o p in io n s an d th a t w o u ld b e b a d p u b li c p o licy
. Mo del

Search Am ., Inc., 9 5 3 S
. W .2d at 292 (“ [T] o permit suits . . . upon mere informa l, advisory , administrative opinion s m i gh t well discoura g e the pr actice of g iving suc h opinions, with a net loss of far g reater proportions than any possible ga in.”). F irst, we have reje cted TD I ’s pre mise that its actions here a re simil ar to the informal ac tions in Model Se arch . We fu rt he r o bs e rv e tha

t th e pu bli c po lic y

be ne fi ts of c a te g or ic a lly

ba rr ingjud ic ia l sc rutiny

of a lle g e dly un lawf ul a g e nc y a c tio ns that, whil e os te ns ibl y “informa l,” nonethele ss have sig nificant impac t on regulate d entities and others a re not be y ond 29 We conclude that Reconveyance has alleg ed a justiciable controve rsy conce rning the scope of TDI ’s statutory

authority that is appropriate for relief under the UDJA. We a re not, of course , holding that “ e ve ry wo rd
. . . of an a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc y ” or its e mpl oye e s pr e se nts a jus tic ia bl e con tr ov ersy
su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a UD JA a c tio n, muc h le ss t hat c ourt s shou ld iss ue un c on sti tut ion a l a dv iso ry op ini on s. ___ S.W .3d at ___ (Patterson, J., dissenting). I f there is a constitutional conce rn here, it arises from the dissent’s “settled e x pectations in admini strative law” t hat would yield an administrative state untethere d from the e x press statutory deleg ations that cre ate a

nd define its li mited powers. We similarly reje ct the dissent’s notion that courts must condone e x tra-statutory ag ency actions that ca

use injury and har m and g ive rise to justiciable controve rsies whene ver an ag ency might labe l or posture such a ctions as “infor mal.” This Court has held that a ra ng e of a g ency

actions, while not fa lling within the proc edura l parameters of rules or c ontested-c ase or ders, none theless ca n g ive rise to justiciable controve rsies conc erningthe scope of ag ency authority
. E.g ., Texas De p’t of Ins., Div. of W

orke r s ’ Co mp. v. Lumberm ens Mut. Cas. Co., 212 S.W .3d 870, 874-75 (Te x . App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (UDJA claim that ag ency ’s issuance of
a dv iso ri es inc on sis te nt w ithstatut or y re qu ir e me nts wa s o uts ide a g e nc y ’s statut or y a uth or ity ); se e als o Texas Lottery Comm’n v . Scientific Game s Int’l, Inc., 99 S .W .3d 3 76 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 03 , p e t. denied ) (a d d re ssing UD J A and injunctive c laims challeng ing c ommissi on’s statutory authority to issue policy statement depa

rting from compe titive-bidding re quirements). Such is the c ase he re. 17question. Cf . Ron Bea l, A Miry Bog Part I I: UDJA and APA Dec laratory J udgment Ac t i o n s and Agenc y Stateme nts Made Outside a Contested Case He aring Regarding the Meaning of the Law , 59 B ay lor L . Re v. 26 7, 28 4- 85 (2 00 7) (a rguin g fo r c le are r jud ic ia l r e c og nit ion of “ int e rp re tiv e ru le s” su sc e pti ble to c ha lle ng e un de r se c tio n 200 1. 03 8 of the APA , urg ing that “ a ll p art ie s c on c e rn e d c ou ld obtain a def

inite ruling by

the judiciary

as to the mea

ning of the re lev an t law. I f the a g ency interpre tation is upheld, the ag ency may proce ed with enf

orce ment kno wi n g i t s actions fulfill the leg islative intent, a

nd all parties would be willing to a cce pt the cost of compliance knowi n g t he int e rp re ta tio n w ou ld b e up he ld b y c ourt s in

any su bs equ e nt e nf

or c e me nt o r c on te ste d c a se proce eding . L ikewise, if the a g ency l ea rn s its int erpr etation is invalid, vast resourc es will be pr e se rv e d b y

no t e nf or c ing the ill e g a l in te rp re tatio n a nd re g ulate d p art ie s w ill no t ha ve unne c e ssa

ri ly expended re source s to comply with the illega l interpreta tion and application of the law.”)
. 30 We overrule TDI ’s sec ond issue.
CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled TDI ’s issues, we a ffirm the or der of the di strict court overruling TDI ’s plea to the jurisdiction. We emphasize that “this is not a decision on the merits,” Texas Mun. Power Agenc y v. P ublic Util. Comm’n, 100 S.W .3d 510, 5 1 3 (T ex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied), and w e
e xpre ss n o o pin ion

on that su bje c t.

_______________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop; Dissenting O pinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med Filed: August 31, 2007