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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

CHRISTOPHER MORALES-FELICIANO, :

:

 Appellant : No. 1445 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 16, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004777-2018, CP-06-CR-0005097-2017, & 

CP-06-CR-0005962-2017

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MCLAUGHLIN, J. AND STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 04, 2021

Christopher Morales-Feliciano appeals from his May 16, 2019 

judgments of sentence for eight crimes across three dockets. After review, 

we affirm his May 16, 2019 judgments of sentence, deny his application for 

remand for clarification of amendments to his judgments of sentence, vacate 

the amended sentencing orders entered on September 26, 2019, and 

remand for imposition of recidivism risk reduction incentive (RRRI) minimum 

sentences consistent with this memorandum. 

Morales-Feliciano was involved with a drug-dealing operation that 

police targeted in an investigation known as Operation Shattered. After 

being charged with a variety of crimes related to the investigation, MoralesFeliciano entered into an open plea agreement with the Commonwealth 

wherein Morales-Feliciano agreed to admit to certain facts and plead guilty 
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to some of the charged crimes in exchange for the Commonwealth’s 

withdrawal of the remaining charges. 

On May 16, 2019, Morales-Feliciano pleaded guilty to eight crimes at 

three dockets. He was sentenced that same day. The trial court opted to 

run the sentences at each count consecutively to the others except for one,

which resulted in an aggregate sentence of 71⁄2 to 25 years of imprisonment

for the eight crimes. The trial court deemed him eligible for RRRI at each 

count. The facts to which Morales-Feliciano pleaded guilty and the individual 

sentences for each count follow.

Relative to docket number CP-06-CR-0005962-2017 (delivery docket), 

on September 14 and 24, 2017, undercover police officers requested to 

purchase drugs from Morales-Feliciano’s sister, Carmen Morales-Feliciano.

On both occasions, Morales-Feliciano delivered the heroin to the officers.

Morales-Feliciano was sentenced to one to four years of imprisonment, 

respectively, for two counts of delivery of heroin and one count of conspiracy 

to deliver heroin. Unlike Morales-Feliciano’s other sentences, which were 

run consecutively, the trial court opted to impose one delivery count and the 

conspiracy count concurrently to each other. The trial court gave him a 

RRRI sentence of nine months at each count.

Regarding docket number CP-06-CR-0004777-2018 (abuse docket), 

on October 6, 2017, Morales-Feliciano was present at a first-floor apartment 

on Franklin Street in Reading, Pennsylvania, for the purpose of selling drugs. 
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While he was at the apartment, between 1:30 and 5 a.m., Morales-Feliciano

wrapped the dead body of Madison Walb1in a rug. He then did the following 

with Walb’s carpet-wrapped body: shoved it out of the back window of the 

apartment; carried it to a car with the assistance of Christian CarmonaLlanos; dropped it multiple times while walking to the car to avoid detection 

of individuals in the area; rode in the car driven by his sister along with the 

body and Carmona-Llanos; and abandoned the body in a secluded wooded 

area with the intent to impair investigation into Walb’s death and in a 

manner that would outrage family sensibilities. Morales-Feliciano was 

sentenced to one to two years of imprisonment respectively for abuse of a 

corpse, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy to commit abuse of a 

corpse. The trial court gave him a RRRI sentence of nine months at each 

count.

Finally, relative to docket number CP-06-CR-0005097-2017

(possession docket), on October 11, 2017, Morales-Feliciano was present at

the Franklin Street apartment referenced supra when police executed a 

search warrant. At that time, Morales-Feliciano possessed drugs packaged 

for street sale or in bulk that he intended to sell. Specifically, he possessed

.82 grams of fentanyl and 8.72 grams of cocaine. Morales-Feliciano was 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 14 months to 5 years for possession

 

1 The Commonwealth alleged Morales-Feliciano’s sister shot Walb in the 

head while Walb was at the Franklin Street apartment purchasing drugs.
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with intent to deliver (PWID) fentanyl with a RRRI sentence of 10 months 

and 15 days. He also was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 16 

months to 5 years for PWID cocaine with a RRRI sentence of one year.

Morales-Feliciano filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court

denied. Morales-Feliciano then timely filed notices of appeal.

2 Both the trial 

court and Morales-Feliciano complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Morales-Feliciano presents two issues for our consideration. The first

is whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 

sentence upon Morales-Feliciano. Morales-Feliciano’s Brief at 4. The second

is whether we should remand this case to the trial court for clarification of 

Morales-Feliciano’s RRRI sentences. Id.

Morales-Feliciano’s first issue presents a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. 

An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an 

appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

 

2 On November 26, 2019, this Court issued an order directing MoralesFeliciano to show cause why his appeal should not be quashed pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018) (holding that notices 

of appeal filed after June 1, 2018 must be quashed if the Morales-Feliciano

fails to file separate notices of appeal from a single order resolving issues 

arising on more than one lower court docket). Morales-Feliciano’s response 

contended we should not quash his appeal because he filed a separate notice 

of appeal with all three docket numbers at each of the three dockets, but the

clerk of courts apparently transmitted only one notice of appeal to this 

Court. Upon receipt of this response, this Court discharged the rule to show 

cause and referred the issue to this panel. Because the record confirms that 

Morales-Feliciano filed three separate notices of appeal in compliance with 

Walker and Pa.R.A.P. 341, we need not quash Morales-Feliciano’s appeal.
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must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the 

appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the 

following four factors: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) 

whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) 

whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Morales-Feliciano timely filed a notice of appeal, preserved the issue in 

a post-sentence motion and arguments at his sentencing hearing, and 

included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. Therefore, we now 

consider whether Morales-Feliciano has raised a substantial question for our 

review.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 

825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exists only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Morales-Feliciano requests that this 

Court review his sentences because they are excessive and the trial court 

did not consider mitigating factors “in any way,” including his acceptance of 

responsibility for his actions, his age, his working under the direction of 

others in the organization, his fear of those individuals, and the small

amount of drugs he possessed with intent to deliver. Morales-Feliciano’s 

Brief at 9. This claim presents a substantial question. Commonwealth v. 

Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“[T]his Court has held that 

an excessive sentence claim - in conjunction with an assertion that the court 

failed to consider mitigating factors - raises a substantial question.”). 

Accordingly, we will proceed to review this challenge3to his sentence,

mindful of the following.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an 

abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

 

3

In his argument section, Morales-Feliciano presents additional questions he 

claims constitute substantial questions for our review that he did not present 

in his Rule 2119(f) statement. Morales-Feliciano’s Brief at 12. However, our 

case law is clear that “[w]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions 

presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a

substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 

123 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (some brackets altered). As such, we do 

not consider his claims that (1) the sentencing court placed insufficient 

reasons on the record for deviating from the sentencing guidelines and 

sentencing him to the statutory maximum on the charges at the abuse

docket, see Morales-Feliciano’s Brief at 13, 18; (2) the imposition of 

consecutive sentences instead of concurrent was harsh and excessive, id. at 

13, 19; and (3) his sentence is too harsh in comparison to other coconspirators who engaged in similar conduct. Id. at 13-20.
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Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the trial court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

* * *

When imposing [a] sentence, a court is required to 

consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the 

character of the defendant. In considering these factors, the 

court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age,

personal characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.

Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1074-75 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 

2014)); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).

Sentencing in Pennsylvania is individualized, and requires the 

trial court to fashion a sentence “that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b). The trial court must also consider the sentencing 

guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on 

Sentencing. Id.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 663-64 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Morales-Feliciano’s argument that the trial court failed to consider 

mitigating factors is intermingled with other arguments we are unable to 

consider, as discussed supra. From what we can discern of the argument

related to the substantial question he presents for our review, his argument 

is largely unsupported. He asserts his sentence is excessive because he 

took responsibility for his actions, he is 22 years old, he sold drugs to 

support his drug addiction, he worked at a low level under the direction of 
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others within the drug-dealing organization, he possessed small amounts of 

drugs (10 grams of cocaine and less than one gram of fentanyl), he was not 

involved in violence and did not kill Walb, and he is and was in fear of others 

in the drug-dealing organization. Morales-Feliciano’s Brief at 14-15.

His counsel made similar arguments at the sentencing hearing. N.T., 

6/4/2019, at 29-32. In response, the trial court noted that it “appreciate[d] 

all of the information provided” by defense counsel. Id. at 32. Nevertheless, 

the trial court found it significant that Morales-Feliciano chose to become 

part of the drug-dealing operation to support his drug habit. It emphasized 

that the operation sold drugs out of two locations “like candy stores for 

drugs” and killed Walb, which Morales-Feliciano helped cover up so that the 

organization could continue to sell drugs out of the apartment on Franklin 

Street. Id. at 32-34. The trial court noted on the record at sentencing that 

it read and considered a presentence report. N.T., 6/4/2019, at 11. “When 

a trial court has reviewed a presentence investigation report, we presume 

that the court properly considered and weighed all relevant factors in 

fashioning the defendant’s sentence.” Baker, 72 A.3d at 664; see also 

Trial Court Opinions, 1/3/2020, at 4-7 (emphasizing it considered the 

presentence investigation report, the factors set forth at subsection 9721(b),

and the sentencing guidelines).

Morales-Feliciano’s claim that the trial court did not consider mitigating 

factors in any way is belied by the record. The trial court was aware of, and 
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considered, the facts Morales-Feliciano highlights in his argument. It simply 

determined, in its discretion, that such facts did not compel a less significant 

sentence considering Morales-Feliciano’s participation in the activities of the 

drug-dealing operation, his drug dealing on multiple occasions over time, his 

cover-up of Walb’s murder, and his treatment of her dead body. Even if we

found the facts Morales-Feliciano emphasizes to be persuasive, “[w]e cannot 

re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the 

trial court.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 

2009). Accordingly, his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence merits no relief. 

We turn now to Morales-Feliciano’s second issue, which he also raised 

in an application to remand he filed with this Court on June 24, 2020. By

way of background, on September 26, 2019, after the instant appeal was 

filed, the trial court entered amended sentencing orders, increasing the RRRI 

sentence on five counts.4 The trial court did so sua sponte and without 

 

4 Specifically, the amended orders provided as follows.

 Count 1 of the PWID docket (PWID fentanyl): minimum sentence of 14 

months; amended RRRI sentence of 14 months.

 Count 2 of the PWID docket (PWID cocaine): minimum sentence of 16 

months; amended RRRI sentence of 14 months.

 Counts 1, 4, and 7 of delivery docket (delivery of heroin and 

conspiracy to deliver heroin): minimum sentences of one year;

amended RRRI sentences of 11 months and 20 days.
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explanation.5 Morales-Feliciano asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

to amend the orders while the orders were on appeal to this Court. MoralesFeliciano’s Brief at 21-26. He argues that while the trial court could have 

corrected an obvious clerical error, the changes to the orders appear to be 

substantive. Id. He requests a remand for the trial court to explain its 

amendment to the orders. Id.

“Trial courts have the power to alter or modify a criminal sentence 

within thirty days after entry, if no appeal is taken. Generally, once the 

thirty-day period is over, the trial court loses the power to alter its orders.” 

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 57 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5505) (“Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a

court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 

days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of 

court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.”).

Additionally, “when an appeal is taken, the trial court has no jurisdiction to 

modify its sentence.” Melvin, 103 A.3d at 57 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)

 

5 The parties contend the revised orders were prompted by the trial court’s 

receipt of a letter from the Department of Corrections, which pointed out an 

error in the trial court’s calculation of the RRRI sentences. Although the 

Commonwealth included the letter as an exhibit with its brief, the letter was 

not made part of the certified record and we may not consider it on appeal.

Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc)

(explaining that this Court may consider only the materials in the certified 

record when resolving an issue).
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(“Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken ... 

the trial court ... may no longer proceed further in the matter.”)).

However, there are exceptions to these rules. One exception is a trial 

court’s “inherent power” to correct “patent and obvious errors,” including 

illegal sentences if the illegality is obvious. Commonwealth v. Hoover, 

231 A.3d 785, 792 (Pa. 2020) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 67 (Pa. 2007)); see 

also Commonwealth v. Hansley, 47 A.3d 1180, 1189 (Pa. 2012) (“Thus,

under limited circumstances, even where the court would normally be 

divested of jurisdiction, a court may have the power to correct patent and 

obvious mistakes.”). This power can be exercised in limited circumstances 

even after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct “a patent defect or 

mistake in the record,” such as a miscalculation of time credit.

Commonwealth v. Klein, 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa. 2001).

6

Our Supreme Court has emphasized that “it is the obviousness of the 

illegality, rather than the illegality itself, that triggers the court’s inherent 

power. Not all illegal sentences will be amenable to correction as patent 

errors. Moreover, the inherent power to correct errors does not extend to 

 

6 Rule 1701 permits a trial court to “correct formal errors in papers relating 

to the matter” after an appeal has been filed. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1). Our 

Supreme Court declined to decide whether this would encompass a

miscalculation in time credit post-appeal because it determined it was 

already within the trial court’s inherent powers to correct such a patent 

error. Klein, 781 A.2d at 1135 n.2.
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reconsideration of a court’s exercise of sentencing discretion.” Holmes, 933 

A.2d at 66-67.

In the instant case, a comparison between the RRRI statute and the 

trial court’s original sentencing orders reveals a patent and obvious error in 

the trial court’s calculation of the RRRI minimum sentences. 

For any offender eligible for RRRI, subsection 4505(c)(2) requires the 

trial court to enter a sentencing order that includes a RRRI minimum 

sentence. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(c)(2). The statute does not afford discretion 

in the imposition of the RRRI sentence for eligible offenders or the 

calculation of the RRRI minimum sentence. See id. At the time of MoralesFeliciano’s sentencing, subsection 4505(c)(2) required the trial court to use 

the following calculation.

7

The [RRRI] minimum shall be equal to three-fourths of the 

minimum sentence imposed when the minimum sentence is 

three years or less. The [RRRI] minimum shall be equal to fivesixths of the minimum sentence if the minimum sentence is 

greater than three years. For purposes of these calculations, 

partial days shall be rounded to the nearest whole day. 

61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(c)(2). In other words, for shorter sentences (i.e., a 

minimum sentence of three years or less), the trial court must use a 

multiplier of three-fourths to calculate the RRRI sentence. For longer 

 

7 Section 4505 was amended effective December 18, 2019, and now 

provides that, once the trial court finds the defendant RRRI eligible, “[t]he 

court shall direct the department [of corrections] to calculate the length of 

the sentence. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(c)(2). This memorandum discusses the 

version in effect until December 17, 2019.
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sentences (i.e., more than three years), the multiplier is set at five-sixths of 

the minimum sentence. 

Subsection 4505(c)(2) also addresses how to calculate the RRRI 

minimum sentence when multiple consecutive sentences are imposed: “[i]n 

determining the [RRRI] minimum sentence, the aggregation provisions of 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9757 (relating to consecutive sentences of total confinement for 

multiple offenses) and 9762(f) (relating to sentencing proceeding; place of 

confinement) shall apply.” Id. Both sections of the Sentencing Code 

referenced in subsection 4505(c)(2) direct the court to consider multiple 

consecutive sentences in the aggregate.8

Accordingly, when sentences are imposed consecutively, subsection 

4505(c)(2) directs the court to calculate the RRRI minimum based on the

aggregate of the minimum sentences. This means that even if the 

individual minimum sentences are less than three years, the five-sixths 

 

8 Section 9757 provides in relevant part that “[w]henever the court 

determines that a sentence should be served consecutively to one being 

then imposed by the court, or to one previously imposed, the court shall 

indicate the minimum sentence to be served for the total of all offenses with 

respect to which sentence is imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9757. In other 

words, the trial court must specify a minimum aggregate sentence, which is

comprised of each of the individual minimum sentences added together. Id.

Subsection 9762(f) states that for the purpose of determining whether 

a sentence is to be served in a county or state correction institute—a 

determination that depends on the length of the sentence—“the entire 

continuous term of incarceration to which a person is subject” is to be used.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(f).
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multiplier must be used to calculate the RRRI minimum if the total 

continuous period of incarceration is longer than three years. 

Here, Morales-Feliciano was sentenced to consecutive terms of 

incarceration. Morales-Feliciano’s aggregate minimum sentence is seven

and one-half years, which obviously exceeds three years. To comply with 

subsection 4505(c)(2), the trial court should have imposed RRRI sentences 

that were five-sixths of the aggregate minimum sentence of seven and onehalf years, which results in an aggregate RRRI sentence of six years and 

three months. Subsection 4505(c)(2) affords no discretion in the calculation.

All but one of the RRRI minimum sentences imposed by the trial court equal 

three-fourths of the minimum sentence.

9

It is obvious that the trial court

erroneously selected the RRRI multiplier based on each individual minimum 

sentence, instead of the aggregate minimum sentence. As such, each RRRI 

sentence was erroneous in the original sentencing order. 

The error here was based on a non-discretionary statutory calculation, 

using the wrong multiplier to calculate RRRI minimum sentences. This falls 

into the category of patent and obvious errors that the trial court had the 

inherent jurisdiction to correct, even though more than 30 days had passed 

 

9 The only sentence that did not use three-fourths appears to be a 

typographical error. The original sentencing order imposed an RRRI sentence 

of 10 months and 15 days for both counts at the PWID docket, despite each 

count carrying a different minimum sentence (14 and 16 months, 

respectively). 
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since it had entered the sentencing orders and the sentencing orders were 

being reviewed by this Court on appeal. Accord Klein, 781 A.2d at 1135

(deeming miscalculation of time credit to be a patent and obvious error

amenable to correction); Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 97 A.3d 1255, 

1257 (Pa. Super. 2014) (same). Accordingly, we deny Morales-Feliciano’s 

petition to remand to the trial court for clarification of the orders.

This does not end our inquiry, however. While it may have had 

jurisdiction to correct the orders, the trial court once again made errors in its 

calculations. First, for the sentences it amended, the trial court did not use 

the five-sixths multiplier to calculate the RRRI minimum sentences. Second, 

the trial court failed to correct the errors in its original calculations at the 

abuse docket, leaving those RRRI minimum sentences incorrectly standing at 

three-fourths of the minimum sentence. Third, the aggregate RRRI 

minimum sentence in effect after the amended sentencing orders is seven 

and one-half years—the exact same as the aggregate minimum sentence, 

which is plainly in error. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to 

correct its errors. We direct the trial court to issue sentencing orders that 

conform to subsection 4505(c)(2). Each individual RRRI minimum sentence

at each of the three dockets should be five-sixths of the individual minimum 

sentence and add up to an aggregate RRRI minimum sentence of five-sixths 

of the seven and one-half year minimum aggregate sentence (i.e., six years 

and three months).
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May 16, 2019 judgments of sentence affirmed. September 26, 2019 

amended judgments of sentence vacated. Application for Remand denied. 

Remanded for entry of amended sentencing orders consistent with this 

memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision 

of this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/04/2021