SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2627-17T2

MORTON L. GINSBERG, GRACE 

LA CILENTO WILLIAMS, 

THEODORE BOTTER, RUTH 

GLANZ, and MAURICE H. 

GREENFIELD, individually and as 

limited partners in various limited

partnerships, for themselves, and as 

representatives of all limited partners,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DAVID BISTRICER, MORIC 

BISTRICER, ALEX BISTRICER, 

ELSA BISTRICER, MORGAN 

CAPITAL, LLC, B.T. HOLDING, 

LLC, NORTHSTAR CAPITAL 

PARTNERS, LLC, EDWARD 

SHEETZ, EMMESS MANAGEMENT 

CORP., ANDREW DAVIDOFF, 

LGSB, LLC, ROBERT LAWRENCE, 

RLP HOLDINGS, LLC, GRAND CRU 

ASSETS THREE, LLC, GRAND CRU 

ASSETS ONE, LLC, GRAND CRU

G.P. EQUITY CORP., GRAND CRU 

PARTNERS, LLC, EILAT 

MANAGEMENT CORP., ZAKA, 

LLC, ARBOR NATIONAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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MORTGAGE, LLC, IVAN 

KAUFMAN, JOSEPH TABACK,

BERKSHIRE CAPITAL, LLC, and 

TOTOWA ASSOCIATES, LLC,

Defendants.

_______________________________

LAMPF, LIPKIND, PRUPIS 

& PETIGROW, P.A.,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

MORTON L. GINSBERG,

Respondent-Appellant.

_______________________________

Argued May 8, 2019 – Decided June 11, 2019

Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer

(Judge Koblitz concurring).

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. C000113-98.

William Goldberg argued the cause for appellant.

Andrew M. Epstein argued the cause for respondent 

(Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 

attorneys; Andrew M. Epstein, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
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Appellant1 Morton L. Ginsberg appeals from a January 5, 2018 order 

denying his motion to impose liability for payment of a judgment against the 

former shareholders of respondent Lampf, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow, P.A.

(Firm).2 We affirm.

We provide some background to give context to the matter on appeal. 

Ginsberg retained the Firm to represent him in a real estate dispute against

Bistricer and others (Bistricer litigation). Ginsberg signed a retainer agreement 

with the Firm, memorializing the Firm's legal services and billing for those 

services. Ginsberg prevailed in the Bistricer litigation and was awarded 

approximately $3.5 million. This amount was held in an escrow account by the 

Firm (Account), pending resolution of the appeals in the Bistricer litigation. 

When all appeals in that litigation were exhausted, the Firm sought to 

withdraw its legal fees from the Account. On May 21, 2007, the Firm sent a 

letter to Ginsberg, requesting permission to withdraw legal fees of 

 

1

 Because this appeal arises from a petition to enforce an attorney lien, we refer 

to the parties by their designation on appeal. 

2 The Firm, which dissolved in or around December 2015, was incorporated in 

accordance with The Professional Service Corporation Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 

14A:17-1 to -17. Under the Act, a shareholder of a professional corporation is 

liable for his or her own negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct. See N.J.S.A. 

14A:17-8.
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approximately $1.2 million, "plus twenty percent (20%) of [the] amount 

transferred from the escrow account to our trust account."3 Ginsberg consented 

to the Firm's withdrawal of legal fees by countersigning the May 21, 2007 letter, 

but wrote, "I reserve the right to review all aspects of the retainer agreements, 

invoices and credits and settle the same without prejudice . . . ." 

Thereafter, the parties disputed the fee amount Ginsberg owed to the Firm. 

In May 2009, the Firm filed a petition to enforce an attorney's lien against 

Ginsberg. Ginsberg filed a counterclaim against the Firm, alleging legal 

malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing. He did not name the Firm's individual shareholders in the 

counterclaim. 

On October 15, 2010, a judgment was entered in favor of Ginsberg. The 

Firm was ordered to return the amount of the success premium, approximately 

$1.3 million, to Ginsberg. 

Subsequent to the entry of the judgment, the parties executed several 

consent orders. With each signed consent order, Ginsberg agreed to postpone 

 

3

 The additional twenty percent was a "success premium" based on the amount 

awarded to Ginsberg in the Bistricer litigation. In accordance with the Firm's 

retainer agreement, the Firm was entitled to a twenty percent bonus of any 

amount in excess of $4,000,000 recovered in the Bistricer litigation, inclusive 

of cash, cash flow, and property.
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collecting on the judgment for a period of time conditioned upon the Firm's 

partial payment of $100,000 by an agreed upon date. The Firm also agreed to 

provide quarterly financial reports to Ginsberg regarding its fiscal status. The 

Firm contends it provided the financial information because Ginsberg knew of 

the Firm's precarious financial condition.

Ginsberg's counsel learned of the Firm's dissolution in late December 

2015 or early January 2016. In March 2016, Ginsberg filed a motion to compel 

the Firm's payment of the judgment from the proceeds of a contingency fee the 

Firm anticipated in an action entitled Nacchio and Esker v. United States. 

Because the contingency fee in that case was the only likely source of money 

available to satisfy the judgment, the court granted Ginsberg's motion. 

The Firm was unsuccessful on appeal in the Nacchio litigation. In June 

2017, Ginsberg learned all appeals in that case were exhausted, and there was

no money available for him to collect the judgment against the Firm. 

Four months later, in October 2017, Ginsberg filed a motion to hold the 

Firm's former shareholders liable for payment of the judgment. However, 

Ginsberg never filed a pleading to reopen the judgment or otherwise assert 

claims against the Firm's former shareholders.
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On January 5, 2018, the motion judge denied the motion. The judge 

concluded Ginsberg consented to the withdrawal of fees from the Firm's 

account, the Firm's former shareholders were not liable for the judgment because 

Ginsberg never filed a pleading to assert claims against the shareholders, and 

the claims against the Firm's former shareholders were barred by the six-year 

statute of limitations governing contract actions.

On appeal, Ginsberg argues the judge erred in denying his motion to hold 

the Firm's former shareholder's liable for payment of the judgment. Ginsberg 

contends the Firm owed a fiduciary duty to repay the funds withdrawn from the 

Account based on the attorney-client relationship notwithstanding the Firm's 

dissolution. He also asserts the Firm's former shareholders became liable for 

payment of the unsatisfied judgment when the Firm ceased operations.

The issues raised in Ginsberg's appeal involve questions of law. We 

review questions of law de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of 

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). 

We first examine Ginsberg's request to hold the Firm's former

shareholders liable for payment of the judgment. In other words, Ginsberg asked

the court to reach beyond the Firm's structure and compel the former 

shareholders to pay the judgment. However, Ginsberg requested that the court 
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pierce the corporate veil without filing any pleading against the Firm's former 

shareholders. 

"[A] corporation is 'an entity wholly separate and distinct from the 

individuals who compose and control it.'" N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant, 

418 N.J. Super. 530, 546 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. 

Super. 351, 356 (Ch. Div. 1970)). "[A] primary reason for incorporation is the 

insulation of shareholders from the liabilities of the corporate enterprise." 

Richard A. Pulaski Constr. Co. v. Air Frame Hangers, Inc., 195 N.J. 457, 472 

(2008) (quoting N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 

(1983)). "Where the corporate form is used by individuals for the purpose of 

evading the law, or for the perpetuation of fraud, the courts will not permit the 

legal entity to be interposed so as to defeat justice." Karo Mktg. Corp., Inc. v. 

Playdrome Am., 331 N.J. Super. 430, 442 (2000) (quoting Trachman v. 

Trugman, 117 N.J. Eq. 167, 170 (Ch. Div. 1934)).

To justify holding a corporate shareholder personally liable, it is not 

enough to allege that a judgment against the corporation is uncollectible because 

"insulation of shareholders from the liabilities of the corporate enterprise" is the 

fundamental reason for incorporation. Pulaski, 195 N.J. at 472 (quoting 

Ventron, 94 N.J. at 50). To pierce the corporate veil and hold an individual 
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liable in his or her personal capacity requires misuse of the corporation or the 

failure to observe the corporate formality. See Marascio v. Campanella, 298 

N.J. Super. 491, 502 (App. Div. 1997) (holding a shareholder who allegedly paid 

some corporate obligations from a personal checking account did not provide a 

basis for piercing the corporate veil to impose personally liability on the

shareholder); Arrow Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Levinson, 231 N.J. Super. 527, 533-34 

(App. Div. 1989) (setting aside a judgment because there was insufficient 

evidence to pierce the corporate veil and hold the individual personally liable 

for the corporate debt). 

Ginsberg did not allege any facts that fit the limited circumstances under 

which a court might impose personal liability on a corporation's shareholders. 

His counterclaim was directed to the Firm. He did not assert any claims against 

the Firm's former shareholders. Therefore, the liability of the Firm's former 

shareholders for payment of the judgment was not litigated. The counterclaim 

also failed to plead the requisite elements to pierce the corporate veil. Thus,

Ginsberg's October 2017 motion was procedurally flawed, supporting the 

Chancery judge's denial of the request to compel payment of the judgment 

against the Firm's former shareholders. 
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We next consider whether Ginsberg's claim against the Firm's former 

shareholders is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. In accordance with 

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, any action for "recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, 

express or implied," must be commenced within six years. The applicable 

period of limitations runs when a plaintiff "knows or should know the facts 

underlying" the elements of a cause of action, rather than "when a plaintiff learns 

the legal effect of those facts." Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 493 (1993) 

(citing Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291–92 (1978)). 

In asserting a malpractice claim against a lawyer, the cause of action 

begins to run "when the client suffers actual damage and discovers, or through 

the use of reasonable diligence should discover, the facts essential to the 

malpractice claim." Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 494. Actual damages are damages

that are "real and substantial as opposed to speculative[,]" and may exist in the 

form of an adverse judgment. Ibid. 

Here, Ginsberg knew the facts leading to his claim against the Firm on

October 15, 2007. On that date, Ginsberg sent a letter to the Firm, demanding 

return of the success premium withdrawn by the Firm. Thus, Ginsberg suffered 

"actual damage" as of October 2007.
10 A-2627-17T2

Even if we were to consider that Ginsberg could not have reasonably 

known of a cause of action in October 2007, Ginsberg obtained a judgment in 

October 2010, ordering the Firm to return the success premium. The October 

2010 judgment constitutes "real and substantial" damages sufficient for 

commencing the statute of limitations. Giving Ginsberg every favorable 

inference, assuming Ginsberg did not suffer actual damage until the entry of the 

judgment against the Firm in October 2010, Ginsberg's motion directed to the 

Firm's former shareholders was not filed until October 2017, beyond the sixyear statute of limitations. 

We acknowledge it is unfortunate that no remedy may be available to 

Ginsberg under these particular circumstances. We find it problematic that the 

Firm, aware of its former client's substantial judgment, ceased operations as of 

December 2015 and, lacking any assets after closing its doors, knew it was 

unlikely Ginsberg would ever collect on the judgment. However, the Firm's 

withdrawal of the success premium from the Account did not constitute a 

wrongful act, fraud, negligence, or misconduct.

4

 See N.J.S.A. 14A:17-8.

 

4

 There was no finding by the trial court that the Firm committed negligence,

fraud, misconduct, or other wrongful act. Rather, in entering the judgment 

against the Firm, the trial court held the Firm misinterpreted the retainer 

agreement related to the payment of the success premium. 
11 A-2627-17T2

We do not sanction a firm closing its doors to avoid paying a judgment to 

a client. However, in this specific situation, Ginsberg lacks a remedy to recover 

his judgment from the Firm's former shareholders. Absent a finding of 

negligence, misconduct, fraud, or other wrongful act, the Firm's former 

shareholders are not liable to pay the judgment. Based on the written retainer 

agreement, Ginsberg consented to the Firm's withdrawal of fees from the 

Account. Even after Ginsberg knew he was owed monies, he failed to institute 

suit against the Firm's former shareholders in a timely manner. Under the 

circumstances here, Ginsberg has not presented any evidence to pierce the 

corporate veil. Therefore, based on the corporate structure of the Firm, Ginsberg 

cannot penetrate the corporate entity and collect the judgment from the Firm's 

former shareholders. 

Affirmed.
______________________________

KOBLITZ, P.J.A.D., concurring.

I write to emphasize my concern with the result of this affirmance. In my 

view, it is deeply concerning for a corporate law firm to dissolve without a plan 

to repay a former client for fees mistakenly taken by the firm. N.J.S.A. 

14A:17-8 states in pertinent part:

Any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a 

professional corporation or a foreign professional legal 

corporation shall remain personally and fully liable and 

accountable for any negligent or wrongful acts or 

misconduct committed by him, or by any person under 

his direct supervision and control, while rendering 

professional service on behalf of the corporation in this 

State to the person for whom such professional service 

was being rendered . . . .

[(Emphasis added).]

The Firm was found to have misinterpreted its own retainer agreement to 

obtain a $1.3 million overpayment. Such a misinterpretation may well constitute 

negligence. It is my view that those members of a law firm who obtain excessive 

payments from a client through negligence remain personally liable to repay that 

debt regardless of the initial qualified consent of the client to take the funds,1 or 

the dissolution of the corporate firm. The statute ensures the particular members 

 

1

 It is not clear that plaintiff, himself an attorney, was represented by his own 

independent counsel when he consented. The consent was also subject to his 

review of the bills and retainer agreement.
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of the firm who dealt with plaintiff remain personally liable, and all members of 

the firm were likely beneficiaries of the proceeds of the mistakenly-obtained 

payment.

That being said, plaintiff did not sue his former attorneys individually, 

even after the Firm dissolved without a repayment plan. Plaintiff, like all 

litigants, must fit his demands within the procedural requirements of the law. 

He cannot successfully collect from members of the professional corporation on 

a debt owed by the corporate firm without litigating the liability of the individual 

members.