[Cite as Riley v. Parker, 2021-Ohio-1726.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

MICHELLE RILEY, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 109600 

 v. : 

 

NATASHA PARKER, ET AL., : 

 

 Defendants-Appellants. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: VACATED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 20, 2021

 

Civil Appeal from the Bedford Municipal Court 

Case No. 19CVG05987 

 

Appearances: 

Kaufman, Drozdowski & Grendell, L.L.C., and Evan T. 

Byron, for appellee. 

John T. Forristal, for appellants. 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.: 

Defendant-appellant Natasha Parker (“Parker”) appeals the trial 

court’s eviction order and writ of restitution in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Michelle 

Riley (“Riley”). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the court’s judgment and 

order that Riley’s complaint be dismissed. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Parker and her husband, Shannon Parker, were residing at the 

premises located at 20611 Ridgewood Road, Warrensville Heights, Ohio, pursuant 

to a month-to-month lease signed on August 12, 2010. The home was owned by 

Sheila M. Barnes (“Barnes”), the mother of Riley, and the aunt of Parker. Barnes 

had been subject to a guardianship, and Kathryn Joseph was appointed her legal 

guardian. 

On February 21, 2019, Barnes’s guardian sent Parker a 30-day 

termination letter for nonpayment of rent, pursuant to the lease agreement, 

terminating the month-to-month tenancy as of March 31, 2019. Barnes, however, 

passed away on March 25, 2019, and her will was filed with the probate court the 

same day by Riley, who was appointed fiduciary of Barnes’s estate on March 26, 

2019. 

On August 14, 2019, Parker received a three-day notice requesting her 

to vacate the premises. The notice was signed by Zachary Burkons (“Burkons”). 

Parker alleges Burkons was a court-appointed receiver in an unrelated probate case 

involving one of Barnes’s properties. Riley argues that the three-day notice, like the 

thirty-day notice, was signed by Barnes’s fiduciary. However, there is no evidence 

in the record of the relationship between Burkons and the Barnes’s estate. 

On October 31, 2019, in her capacity as executor of Barnes’s estate, 

Riley filed a complaint for eviction and a writ of restitution against Parker and her 

husband in the Bedford Municipal Court. After several continuances and hearings, 
the trial judge issued an eviction order and writ of restitution on March 6, 2020, 

giving the Parkers until March 16, 2020, to move out. The court takes judicial notice 

that this move-out date was on the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted 

in a temporary moratorium on evictions. Parker timely filed a notice of appeal on 

March 16, 2020. 

This appeal follows. Parker raises the following four assignments of 

error: 

I. The trial court committed reversible error in granting the judgment 

in forcible entry and detainer for the Plaintiff because it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to serve a notice to vacate 

to Defendant Natasha Parker that complies with R.C. 5321.17 and R.C. 

1923.04. 

II. The trial court committed reversible error in granting the judgment 

in forcible entry and detainer for the Plaintiff because it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction due to the affidavit of disqualification filed with the 

Supreme Court of Ohio. 

III. The trial court committed reversible error in granting the judgment 

in forcible entry and detainer for the Plaintiff because it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction due to plaintiff accepting future rent payments. 

IV. The trial court committed reversible error in granting the judgment 

in forcible entry and detainer for Plaintiff because it relied on 

Defendant Parker not filing an answer or other responsive pleading and 

granting an eviction based on default is impermissible under Ohio law. 

LAW AND ANALYSIS 

Parker’s first assignment of error alleges the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear this eviction case because Riley failed to comply with R.C. 

5321.17 and 1923.04. 
We apply a de novo standard of review to questions of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Evans, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

96120, 2011-Ohio-5654, ¶ 5. ““Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power conferred 

on a court to decide a particular matter on its merits and render an enforceable 

judgment over the action.”” Pivonka v. Sears, 2018-Ohio-4866, 125 N.E.3d 343, ¶ 

36 (8th Dist.), quoting ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Evans at ¶ 5, quoting 

Udelson v. Udelson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92717, 2009-Ohio-6262. “If a trial 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot act or rule upon the issues 

presented.” Pivonka at ¶ 36. 

R.C. 1923.04 governs the content and timing of the notice a landlord 

is required to provide a tenant before bringing a forcible entry and detainer in court. 

It states that 

(A) Except as provided in division (B) or (C) of this section, a party 

desiring to commence an action under this chapter shall notify the 

adverse party to leave the premises, for the possession of which the 

action is about to be brought, three or more days before beginning the 

action, by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by handing a 

written copy of the notice to the defendant in person, or by leaving it at 

the defendant’s usual place of abode or at the premises from which the 

defendant is sought to be evicted. 

“Compliance with the notice provisions of R.C. 1923.04 is a 

precondition to invoking a court’s jurisdiction in an eviction action.” UMH OH 

Buckeye II, L.L.C. v. DeCarlo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108912, 2019-Ohio-4986, ¶ 

6, citing Homeowners Assn. at Arrowhead Bay v. Fidoe, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 

MA 136, 2014-Ohio-1469, ¶ 13 (eviction action dismissed because statute requiring 
action to be brought in the name of the unit owner was violated). See also Chillicothe 

Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Anderson, 4th Dist. Ross No. 1406, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 

2552, 14 (June 28, 1988) (“In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, full 

compliance with R.C. 1923.04 is a mandatory requirement, and the notice therein 

required cannot be waived.”), citing Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Russell, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. CA 6396, LEXIS 13590 94, 95-96 (Jan. 3, 1980); Mularcik v. 

Adams, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 03JE17, 2004-Ohio-1383, ¶ 21, 24-25 (notice with 

language that inadequately tracks statutorily required language deprives trial court 

of subject-matter jurisdiction). This is because ‘“[p]roper service of the three-day 

notice is a condition precedent to the commencement of an eviction action, and it is 

a separate jurisdictional step that must be completed before [a forcible entry and 

detainer] action is filed.”’ DeCarlo at ¶ 6, quoting Ebbing v. Mathis, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2012-10-201, 2013-Ohio-2273, ¶ 11. 

“R.C. 1923.04(A) mandates as a prerequisite to a forcible entry and 

detainer action, that a tenant be served with a three-day notice to leave the premises 

that contains certain mandatory language.” DeCarlo at ¶ 5. In DeCarlo, this court 

found that a three-day notice that failed to identify the party, which ultimately 

commenced the eviction action against the tenant, did not comply with the notice 

requirements of R.C. 1923.04(A). Id. at ¶ 7. Because the landlord failed to comply 

with the notice requirements of the statute, we held “the trial court did not have 

jurisdiction over the action including entering a judgment against DeCarlo.” Id. 
In this case, the three-day notice to leave the premises was signed by 

Burkons and the eviction action was ultimately filed by Riley in her capacity as 

executor of Barnes’s estate. There is no evidence in the record of any connection 

between Burkons and the Barnes’s estate. The three-day notice does not contain 

Riley’s name or any reference to the estate and therefore does not comply with the 

notice requirements of R.C. 1923.04(A). Because Riley did not comply with the 

notice requirements of R.C. 1923.04(A), the trial court did not have subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the action and, therefore, was without jurisdiction to enter a 

judgment against Parker and her husband. Id. For these reasons, Parker’s first 

assignment of error is sustained.

Because we find merit to Parker’s first assignment of error, which is 

dispositive of this appeal, the remaining assignments of error are rendered moot 

pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

Judgment vacated; Riley’s complaint is dismissed. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Bedford Municipal Court to 

carry this judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR