UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5249

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JOEL CHAPARRO, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, 

Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00012-JPB-DJJ-2) 

Submitted: June 1, 2009 Decided: June 29, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Sherman L. Lambert, Sr., SHERMAN L. LAMBERT, SR., PLLC, 

Shepherdstown, West Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, 

United States Attorney, Thomas O. Mucklow, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Joel Chaparro appeals his conviction and thirty-three 

month sentence for aiding and abetting the distribution of 

cocaine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) and 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2006). Chaparro’s attorney has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

concluding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

challenging the district court’s refusal to provide a jury 

instruction on entrapment. Although informed of his right to do 

so, Chaparro has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We 

affirm. 

 We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny 

a defendant’s requested instruction on entrapment. United 

States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2006). “An 

entrapment defense has two elements: (1) government inducement 

of the crime and (2) the defendant’s lack of predisposition to 

engage in the criminal conduct.” Id. Before giving an 

entrapment instruction, the district court must make a threshold 

inquiry as to whether sufficient evidence exists for a 

reasonable jury to determine there was entrapment. See id. 

Mere solicitation of a crime is insufficient to merit an 

entrapment instruction, as solicitation alone would not persuade 

an otherwise innocent person to commit a criminal act. See id. 

“When government agents merely offer an opportunity to commit 

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the crime and the defendant promptly avails himself of that 

opportunity, an entrapment instruction is not warranted.” Id.

at 335 (internal quotation marks, citation and alteration 

omitted). 

 In this instance, it is clear that any inducement by 

the Government’s confidential informant was mere solicitation, 

and did not rise to the level of entrapment. The record shows 

that, at the informant’s request, Chaparro immediately sought to 

aid an undercover agent, whom Chaparro believed to be the 

informant’s brother, in the procurement of cocaine. Though the 

informant was undoubtedly friendly toward Chaparro, this fact 

had no bearing on Chaparro’s willingness to aid in the 

distribution of cocaine. This conclusion is underscored by the 

fact that, even without the informant’s involvement, Chaparro 

repeatedly organized deals between the undercover agent and a 

local drug dealer. Indeed, there was no evidence presented that 

could lead a reasonable jury to determine that Chaparro was 

anything other than a ready and willing participant in the 

crime, and that the informant and the undercover agent merely 

offered him the opportunity to engage in criminal conduct. 

Accordingly, as Chaparro failed to demonstrate any “lack of 

predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct,” Ramos, 462 

F.3d at 334, we find that the district court did not err in 

refusing to give an entrapment instruction to the jury. 

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 In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire 

record in this case and found no meritorious issues for review. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED