2 This memorandum opinion was not selected fo r publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that th is electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not in clude the filing date.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 SILVER GARDENS II, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-35650 4 KENNETH P. MONTOYA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Victor S. Lopez, District Judge 8 Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC 9 Claud Eugene Vance 10 Albuquerque, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Kenneth Montoya 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 Pro Se Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 HANISEE, Judge. 17

{1}Defendant Kenneth P. Mont oya, appearing pro se, app eals the district court’s 18 order affirming the metropolitan court’s j udgment for restitution, which terminated 19the rental agreement betwee n Defendant and Silver Gard ens II (Plaintiff). For the 1 following reasons, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal. 2 DISCUSSION 3

{2} In addition to failing to comply withthe formalistic requirements of New 4 Mexico’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, see, e.g. , Rule 12-318(A)(1),(2) NMRA 5 (requiring the appellant’s brief in chief to c ontain a table of contents and a table of 6 authorities), Defendant’s brief in chief c ontains no summary of the proceedings or 7 facts relevant to the issues presented fo r review, no citations to the record, and, 8 critically, no discernible legal arguments. Thus and more importantly, Defendant’s 9 brief in chief fails to comply with the substantive requirements of Rule 12- 10 318(A)(3),(4). We acknowledge that Defendant has chosen to represent himself in 11 this appeal. However, pro se litigants must comply with court rules and will not be 12 treated differently from litigants with counsel. See Bruce v. Lester , 1999-NMCA13 051, ¶ 4, 127 N.M. 301, 980 P.2d 84; see also Newsome v. Farer , 1985-NMSC14 096, ¶ 18, 103 N.M. 415, 708 P. 2d 327 (holding that pro se litigants are “held to 15 the same standard of conduct and complian ce with court rules, procedures, and 16 orders as are members of the bar”). On Defendant’s failure to comply with our 17 briefing rule, alone, we may dismiss his appeal. See Rule 12-312(D) NMRA 18 (providing that “[f]or any failure to comp ly with these rules . . . , the appellate 19 court may, . . . on its own initiative, take such action as it deems appropriate . . . , 20 including . . . dismissal”); Rule, 12- 401(B)(4) NMRA (providing that “[a]n 21appeal . . . may be dismissed by an appellate court for failure to comply with rules 1 under Rule 12-312”). We dismiss Defendant ’s appeal, not because of technical 2 noncompliance with our rules but because th e substantive deficiency of his appeal 3 leaves us unable to meaningf ully address any le gal error that may have occurred in 4 this case. We briefly explain. 5

{3} Defendant’s docketing statement iden tified the following three “issues 6 presented” on appeal: (1) “The [metropolitancourt] should have continued the trial 7 so [Defendant] could testif y[;]” (2) “Any other argumen ts made by [Defendant’s] 8 attorney a[t] trial[;]” and (3) “As a r easonable accom[mo]da tion[,] [Defendant] 9 should not have been evicted.” However, none of those issues was developed in 10 Defendant’s briefs, meaning we consider them abandoned. See State v. Ramming , 11 1987-NMCA-067, ¶ 15, 106 N.M. 42, 738 P.2d 914 (stating that issues “listed in 12 the docketing statement but not briefed[] are abandoned”). Defe ndant’s brief in 13 chief contains only: (1) descriptions of post-judgment occurrences, such as an 14 inspection of his apartment that occurred after restitution was or dered; (2) general 15 allegations, including that Defendant (a ) “was not given a window of time to 16 remedy the situation[,]” (b ) “was never given a twen ty-four hour notice[,]” (c) 17 “had no access to [his] mail[]box[,]” and (d) had “not been allowed in [his] 18 apartment” since May 31, 2016; and (3) pleas for leniency “in regard to filing [his] 19 brief as [he] was not allo wed access to [his] mailbox by manag[e]ment.” His reply 20 brief contains only additional descrip tions of contemporaneous events in 21Defendant’s life. Critically, neither brief at any point refers to the proceedings 1 below, either generally or specifically, nor does either brief contain a single 2 citation to the record or any authority re lated to any of the “issues” identified in 3 Defendant’s docketing statement. 4

{4} The rule regarding issue abandonment is consistent with well-established 5 rules that counsel appellate courts ag ainst reaching and attempting to resolve 6 unclear, undeveloped arguments. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock , 2013- 7 NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (explaining th at appellate courts “will not review 8 unclear arguments[] or guess at what a pa rty’s arguments might be” (alteration, 9 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Santa Fe Expl. Co. v. Oil 10 Conservation Comm’n , 1992-NMSC-044, ¶ 11, 114 N.M. 103, 835 P.2d 819 11 (explaining that where a party fails to cite any portion of the record to support its 12 factual allegations, the reviewing court need not consider the arguments on 13 appeal); Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 14 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to entertain a cursory argument that included no 15 explanation of the party’s argument and no facts that would allow the appellate 16 court to evaluate the claim); Clayton v. Trotter , 1990-NMCA-078, ¶¶ 12-17, 110 17 N.M. 369, 796 P.2d 262 (explaining that we w ill review pro se arguments to the 18 best of our ability but cannot respond to unintelligible arguments). The reason for 19 these rules is that “[t]o rule on an inadequately briefed issue, [the reviewing court] 20 would have to develop the arguments itsel f, effectively performing the parties’ 21work for them.” Elane Photography, LLC , 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70. As our 1 Supreme Court has explained, “This creates a strain on judicial resources and a 2 substantial risk of error. It is of no benef it either to the parties or to future litigants 3 for [appellate courts] to pr omulgate case law based on our own speculation rather 4 than the parties’ carefully considered arguments.” Id. Here, because Defendant’s 5 briefs contain no semblance of legal argumentation or ev en an articulation of any 6 error committed by either the me tropolitan or district court, we are left to speculate 7 as to what basis exists for possible reversal in this case, something we will not do. 8

{5} Despite our dismissal of this pro se appeal, we have nonetheless reviewed 9 the record of proceedings be low and are satisfied that the decisions reached by the 10 metropolitan and district courts fall within the range of discretion afforded to those 11 courts and are not clearly erroneous as a matter of law. See generally In re Estate 12 of Heeter , 1992-NMCA-032, ¶ 23, 113 N.M. 691, 831 P.2d 990 (“On appeal, error 13 will not be corrected if it will not change the result.”). As such , it appears that the 14 rulings by those courts w ould be affirmed on the me rits. We briefly explain. 15

{6} First, there exists in the record substantial evidence of Defendant’s 16 numerous material violations of his leas e agreement that formed the basis of 17 Plaintiff’s eviction proceeding against De fendant. There also exists substantial 18 evidence that Plaintiff rep eatedly attempted to work with Defendant to allow him 19 to cure those violations in an effort to avoid eviction proceedings. Thus, we will 20 not disturb the metropolitan court’s judgme nt for restitution, which rested on the 21court’s findings that “Defendant committ ed material violations of the lease 1 between Plaintiff and Defendant beginning in May 2015[,] continuing to as recent 2 as December 3, 2015” and that “Plaintif f made . . . repeated attempts to 3 accommodate Defendant’s special needs.” See Weststar Mortg. Corp. v. Jackson , 4 2003-NMSC-002, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 114, 61 P.3d 823 (“If the verdict . . . is supported 5 by substantial evidence, whic h we have defined as suchrelevant evidence that a 6 reasonable mind would find adequate to s upport a conclusion, we will affirm the 7 result.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 8

{7} Second, we cannot say on the record be fore us that the metropolitan court 9 abused its discretion when it denied defe nse counsel’s motion for a continuance at 10 the close of Plaintiff’s case when (1) th e only basis identified for the continuance 11 was to allow Defendant, who was inexplicably absent from trial, to testify, and (2) 12 the metropolitan court noted that it was not the first continua nce Defendant had 13 requested. See Paragon Found., Inc. v. N.M. Livestock Bd. , 2006-NMCA-004, 14 ¶ 31, 138 N.M. 761, 126 P.3d 577 (explaining that“we review the district court’s 15 denial of [a] motion for a continua nce for an abuse of discretion”); El Paso Elec. v. 16 Real Estate Mart, Inc. , 1982-NMCA-101, ¶ 45, 98 N.M. 490, 650 P.2d 12 17 (explaining that the denial of a motion to continue “will be reviewed only when 18 palpable abuse of discretion is demonstrated”). 19

{8} Finally, to the extent Defendant soug ht to avoid eviction based on a claim 20 that Plaintiff’s refusal to continue to forego eviction cons tituted a failure to 21reasonably accommodate his disability a nd, thus, unlawful discrimination in 1 violation of the federal Fair Housi ng Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. 2 §§ 3601-3619 (2012), Defendant bore the burden of proving that claim. See Dubois 3 v. Ass’n. of Apartmen t Owners of 2987 Kalakaua , 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 4 2006) (identifying the elements of a failure-to-reasonably-accommodate claim 5 under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) that a tenant“must prove”). Specifically, Defendant 6 had to prove that Plaintiff refused to make an accommodation that was both 7 “necessary and seems reasonable on its face.” Kuhn ex rel. Kuhn v. McNary 8 Estates Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. , 228 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1147 (D. Or. 2017) 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant develops no argument 10 nor cites any authority to support his appare nt contention that Plaintiff’s refusal to 11 further and indefinitely forestall evicti on to allow Defendant to “obtain support 12 services” and “stabilize [his] medications” was a failure to reasonably 13 accommodate his disability and, thus, constituted unlawful discrimination in 14 violation of the FHAA. Thus, we cannotsay that the lower courts erred by 15 rejecting Defendant’s claim thatPlaintiff violated the FHAA. 16 CONCLUSION 17

{9} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the district court and 18 dismiss the appeal. 19

{10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 20

_________________________________ 21J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 1

WE CONCUR: 2

_________________________________ 3 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 4

_________________________________ 5 EMIL J. KIEHNE, Judge 6