2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-10-2009

Frederick Hedgespeth v. Roy Hendricks

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-1314

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Recommended Citation

"Frederick Hedgespeth v. Roy Hendricks" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 839.

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CLD-261 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1314

___________

FREDERICK HEDGESPETH, 

Appellant

v.

ROY L. HENDRICKS, former administrator of New Jersey State Prison; RICHARD

RUNCIE, former chief of custody at New Jersey State Prison; LIEUTENANT

WASHINGTON, Lieutenant, New Jersey Department of Corrections; JOHN DOE#1,

Lieutenant, New Jersey Department of Corrections; JOHN DOE#3, Special Investigations

Division Officer, New Jersey Department of Corrections; JOHN DOE#4, Lieutenant,

New Jersey Department of Corrections; SERGEANT S. WILSON, SR., Sergeant, New

Jersey Department of Corrections; DAVE DOE#2, New Jersey Department of

Corrections; MAKARSKI, Disciplinary Hearing Officer, New Jersey State Department of

Corrections; MICHELLE RICCI, Assistant Administrator, New Jersey State Prison;

BRENDA O'GARA, Administrative Analyst II, Business Office and Inmate Trust Fund

Accounts, New Jersey State Prison

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-03883)

District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

July 23, 2009

Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 10, 2009)
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_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Frederick Hedgespeth, an inmate at New Jersey State Prison, appeals pro se from

an order by the District Court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For

the reasons provided by the District Court, we will summarily affirm.

On August 17, 2006, Hedgespeth filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging that defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments. In his 100-plus page complaint, Hedgespeth listed thirteen

causes of action, which stemmed from an incident on July 25, 2004, when he and other

inmates in his housing unit were subjected to a strip search and placed on “lockdown”

status. Hedgespeth states he complained about a prison cell condition during the

lockdown and that as a result, he was retaliated against, ordered out of his cell, and

subjected to additional strip searches over the next three hours. He was then transferred

to a detention housing unit to await a disciplinary hearing and deprived of privileges

afforded to general population prisoners. Hedgespeth subsequently received notice that

he was charged with attempted escape and again, claims he was subjected to further strip

searches. Hedgespeth received a disciplinary hearing, but claims that he was not

permitted the opportunity to confront witnesses. He was found not guilty of the attempted

escape charge and released from administrative segregation. Hedgespeth alleges,
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however, that he is entitled to work credits and back pay for his time spent in

administrative segregation and awaiting his hearing and requests declaratory, injunctive,

and monetary relief.

Defendants initially filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted in

part and denied in part. Hedgespeth’s surviving claims included: (1) his right to due

process in connection with the procedures that were supposed to be afforded to him at his

disciplinary hearing; (2) his right to due process in connection with the allegedly false

disciplinary charges brought against him; (3) his First Amendment rights when he was

falsely charged, strip searched, and placed in administrative detention in retaliation for

complaining about prison conditions; and (4) his liberty interest in receiving back pay.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which set forth six arguments,

including Hedgespeth’s failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Defendants also filed with the District Court a separate letter that

indicated that the New Jersey Department of Corrections reimbursed Hedgespeth $66.00,

the amount he requested in back pay. The District Court granted defendants’ motion for

summary judgment based on their exhaustion argument and found that Hedgespeth’s back

pay claim was moot. Hedgespeth timely appealed.

We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

exercise plenary review over a district court’s order of summary judgment. See Kaucher

v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper if
 As the District Court notes in its opinion, Hedgespeth contended that he filed forms 1

regarding his constitutional claims in addition to the two Inmate Request Forms that are

part of the record. Hedgespeth claimed that these forms were in his possession because

they were returned to him as improperly filed. Hedgespeth never provided these

documents to the court, and even if he had, exhaustion includes a procedural default

component. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). An “untimely or

otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” does not satisfy the

mandatory exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83

(2006); see also Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230. Accordingly, such documents would further

support defendants’ claim that Hedgespeth failed to properly exhaust his remedies. 

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there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The District Court properly found that Hedgespeth failed to exhaust administrative

remedies before filing his complaint. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),

prisoners must first properly exhaust their administrative remedies before filing an action

under section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006). 

Defendants demonstrated that Hedgespeth failed to properly exhaust his administrative

remedies based on an affidavit by a prison official involved in processing inmate

grievances and appeals, copies of the administrative grievance forms filed by Hedgespeth,

and his own testimony at his deposition. 

The record indicates that Hedgespeth filed two grievances: (1) to request

compensation for his improper detention and (2) to request back pay and work credits for

the time he was administratively detained and awaiting his disciplinary hearing.1

Although he argued that the proper grievance form was unavailable to him, presumably to
5

show that he was prevented when he tried to administratively exhaust his claims, this

argument lacks merit. Hedgespeth conceded that prison officials permitted him to use a

substitute form to exhaust his remedies. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3d

Cir. 2004).

When completing a grievance, the New Jersey State Prison Inmate Handbook

instructs inmates to be “as clear, complete and easy to read as possible, and be based on

the facts concerning the problem or question being presented.” However, even construing

Hedgespeth’s submitted grievances liberally, he failed to allege (1) that defendants

retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights; (2) that he was subjected

to retaliatory discipline strip searches; or (3) that he was denied due process with respect

to the disciplinary charges. Although Hedgespeth contended that his reference to

“compensation” broadly encompassed the constitutional claims set forth in his complaint,

he conceded in his deposition that “compensation” referred to “[m]y back pay and my

time credit.” Hedgespeth neither included any facts relevant to his constitutional claims

in his filed grievances nor named any of the individuals involved in the claims contained

in his complaint. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230 (an exhaustion rule can be fairly read to

include a procedural default component). In fact, the words “retaliation,” “false charges,”

or “strip search” do not appear at all. Thus, it is clear from the scope of his submitted

forms that he did not properly exhaust the constitutional claims alleged in his complaint.
6

In addition, Hedgespeth could have filed a grievance regarding the alleged due

process violations at his disciplinary hearing, which was a distinct and separate event

from his improper detention. Yet, as the record indicates, Hedgespeth did not submit

anything challenging the disciplinary decision. Hedgespeth argued that multiple

grievances on the same subject constitutes an abuse of the grievance procedure. 

However, submitting a grievance on his disciplinary hearing would not have been a

redundant claim. Accordingly, the District Court properly concluded that no genuine

issue of material fact exists as to whether Hedgespeth properly exhausted the available

administrative remedies with respect to his constitutional claims. Summary judgment was

proper.

With respect to the surviving claim involving Hedgespeth’s liberty interest in

receiving back pay, we agree with the District Court that this claim was rendered moot. 

The record indicates that the State provided Hedgespeth with the relief he requested,

namely $66.00 in back pay. See Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211,

216 (3d Cir. 2003) (“if developments occur during the course of adjudication that . . .

prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed

as moot”)(citations omitted). 

Finally, the District Court properly denied Hedgespeth’s Motion for Default

Judgment as to defendant Richard Runcie because Hedgespeth failed to effect service of

the complaint. A plaintiff is responsible for serving a complaint within 120 days after the
7

complaint is filed with the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1), (m). The District Court’s

docket indicates that Hedgespeth filed his action on August 17, 2006, and on November

13, 2006, the summons and complaint for defendant Runcie were returned to the Court as

unexecuted. The docket does not reflect that Runcie was ever served with the complaint

during the two-year span in which the parties continued to litigate the case. Thus, the

District Court properly denied Hedgespeth’s motion. 

As the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the

District Court judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.