Filed 3/6/13 Almeida v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

YOLANDA ALMEIDA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ANTELOPE VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B240712
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS133582)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County. Ann Jones, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Diane Goldman and Diane Goldman for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sylvester, Oppenheim & Linde and Alan Varner for Defendants and Respondents.2 Yolanda Almeida (Almeida) appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition for writ of mandate. Through the writ petition, Almeida sought to set aside a decision of the Board of Trustees of the Antelope Valle y Union High School District (District) demoting Almeida and an order directing the District to re instate her to her previous position with back pay and dama ges. We find that the District proceeded in a manner
consistent with the law and therefor e affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CONTENTION Almeida’s sole contention on appeal is that the District failed to proceed in a manner required by law because it did not rest rict its review of the hearing officer’s findings, conclusions and recommendation to th e grounds enumerated in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, as set forth in E ducation Code section 4 5113, subdivision (e).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Almeida was employed by the District in the position of community attendance worker. In that position, sh e worked with students, pare nts, and school district employees in cases where students were truant or had other attendance issues. Almeida also worked with security personnel at her assigned school, Lancaste r High School. This included personnel employed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. One such individual, Deputy Canela, was assigned to Lancaster High School and worked in
the same office with Almeida. On October 6, 2010, Deputy Canela was observed by his sergea nt off-campus at
lunch in a car with three female Lancaste r High School students. Deputy Canela had taken the three girls to a Jack-i n-the-Box restaurant. Later th at day, Deputy Canela told his sergeant that Almeida was one of the fema les in the car, though Almeida was not in the car. Instead she was off campus at a student attendance review board (SARB) meeting. On October 7, 2010, Deputy Canela asked Almeida to “cover” for him by confirming that she was in the patrol car with him and the three female students. Almeida responded, “ok.” Thereafter, Deputy Canela called Almeida and told her that the District was getting involved in the Jack-in-the-Box incide nt, and again asked that she3 lie and tell them she was in the car with him and the three female students. At that point,
Almeida became concerned that Deputy Canela may also ha ve contacted the female students to persuade them to lie as well.
After that conversation with Deputy Canela, Almeida left her office and contacted one of the female students (A.D.) who had gone with Deputy Canela, in her English class. Almeida asked A.D. what happened with Deputy Canela and told A.D. that Deputy Canela had asked Almeida to report that Almeida was in the car. While there
was some difference between the accounts of what was said during the conversation between A.D. and Almeida, the administ rative hearing officer found that “the conversation was very brief and that [A lmeida] told A.D. to tell the truth.” Prior to talking with Alme ida., A.D. had received a call on her cell phone from Deputy Canela, who told A.D. that he had lied to his serg eant and stated that Almeida was in the car with them. Deputy Canela told A.D. that she might be questioned later in the day, and if so, that A.D. should say that Almeida was in the car with them. Approximately five minutes later A.D. was called in for an inte rview with Lancaster High School’s Human Resource Director, Jan Medema (Medema). Du ring the interview,
A.D. informed Medema that Al meida was in the car with them on the tr ip to the Jack-inthe-Box. However, after talking with Almeida, A.D. went back to Medema and told her
the truth -- that Almeida was not in the patrol car when they went to lunch.
Student B.L. was also interviewed. B. L. acknowledged that while she was in Deputy Canela’s patrol car on the day in qu estion, Almeida was not in the patrol car.
One of the interviewers asked B.L. if she ha d spoken to anyone prio r to the interview. B.L. responded that she had spoken to Alme ida. Almeida had stopped B.L. in the hallway, and asked B.L. if she had a hall pass. After seeing the hall pass, Almeida told
B.L. that if she was called for an interview about the lunch incident with Deputy Canela,
she should te ll the truth.
Almeida was also interviewed about the incident. Almeida denied that she was in the patrol car, and informed the interview panel that she was off campus conducting a hearing during lunch on October 6, 2010. Almeida was also asked if she was friends with4 any of the female students. Almeida denied any personal friendships . At the conclusion of the interview, Almeida wa s told that she was being placed on administrative leave pending the outcome of the investigation. Medema also informed Almeida that she was concerned that it appeared Almeida had attemp ted to interfere with the investigation in that she had spoken to both A.D. and B.L. The day after appellant’s interview, Medema verified Almeida’s statement that she was off campus during the lunch hour on Oct ober 6, 2010. Medema then concluded that Almeida was not in Deputy Canela’s car during the lunch hour on that date. Almeida was interviewed again at a later date. The individual s involved in the interview were Medema, Sherif f’s Department Lieutenants Th omas and Downton. They informed Almeida that they we re interested in Deputy Canela’s involvement with other students. Almeida responded that she did not know anything about Deputy Canela’s involvement with other students, other than the one incident at the Jack-in-the-Box.
Medema indicated that she did not believe Almeida because Almeida had contacted A.D. and B.L. to tell them what to say. Mede ma also indicated that another teacher had reported that certain students knew Almeida we ll, that they brought food for Almeida, left notes for her and called her by her firs t name. Medema did not believe Almeida’s statements that she did not have an unp rofessional friendship with these students.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY The discipline of Almeida began on Decemb er 17, 2010, when the District sent
her a notice that it intended to terminate her from the community attendance worker position. Almeida contested the termination in a Skelly hearing ( Skelly v. State Personnel
Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 ( Skelly ).) Almeida attended the Skelly hearing with a union representative. Followi ng the January 10, 2011 Skelly hearing, the District sent Almeida
a notice that she would be terminated from her employment with the District effective January 19, 2011. Almeida filed a timely request for a post- Skelly hearing before the5 District’s Board of Trustees regarding her te rmination. Pursuant to article 22.5 of the relevant collective bargaining agreement, Almeida was entitled to such a hearing. 1 On February 4, 2011, the Di strict notified Almeida that it is the practice of the
District “to conduct such h earings with an impartial he aring officer.” As Almeida conceded in her petition for writ of admini strative mandamus, although Almeida was entitled to a hearing, the Distri ct retained the auth ority to “accept, modify or reject” the hearing officer’s recommendations and to impo se a measure of discipline different from what the hearing officer advised. On February 10, 2011, the Di strict modified its previous decision to terminate, and
instead indicated its intention to demote Al meida to a position of b ilingual instructional aide. According to Medema, this reco mmendation was based on the fact that the bilingual aide position requires less trust and is more closel y supervised than the position of community attendance worker. At the hear ing that followed, Alme ida claimed that she never received notice of the revised charges a nd was never informed that the termination
had been reduced to a demotion. The hearing was held on Febr uary 17, 2011 before duly appointed hearing officer, Louis M. Zigman. At the commencement of the hearing, Hearing Officer Zigman confirmed: “And my function as the hear ing officer is to make a recommendation, I guess, findings of fact and a recommendation to the Board of Education. Correct?” Almeida’s counsel responded, “That’s my understanding.” After conducting the hearing and review ing written arguments from the parties, Hearing Officer Zigman issued a detailed wr itten report wherein he concluded that the District did not have just cause for the impos ition of any disciplinary action. The hearing
officer’s recommendation was that Almeida be reinstated to her former position as a community attendance worker and that she be reimbursed all lost wages and benefits that she lost as a result of the disciplinary action.

1 Almeida declined to request a post- Skelly arbitration, to which she was entitled under article 22.6 of the relevant collective bargaining agreement.6 The District met on June 15, 2011 to review the hearing officer’s
recommendations. The District chose to re ject the recommendations and imposed the revised discipline of demotion. On August 31, 2011, Al meida filed her petition for writ of administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Proce dure section 1094.5 Almeida argued that
under Education Code section 4 5113, subdivision (e), the Distri ct’s authority to accept or reject the hearing officer’s decision was limit ed to the grounds enum erated in Code of
Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a). 2 The trial court rejected this argument, stating: “As acknowledged by [Alm eida], the District has the discretion to reject the hearing officer’s determ inations and recommendations and to impose a measure of discipline different than the Hearing Officer advised. [Citation.] [Almeida’s] legal argument s to the contrary rest on statutory provisions that pertain to arbitrations , not hearings. See Opening Brief at 9 (citing Educ. Code § 45113(e); [Code Ci v. Proc. §] 1286 .2 (grounds for vacating arbitration awards.) See, e.g., California School Employees Association v. Bonita Unified School District , 163 Cal.App.4th 387, 403 (2008).”

The trial court also found that the weight of the evidence supported the District’s findings and conclusions. For these reas ons, Almeida’s petition for writ of mandamus
was denied. The trial court’s judgment was filed on March 20, 2012. On April 19, 2012, Almeida filed her notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 “structures the procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions rendere d by administrative agencies.” ( Topanga Assn.

2 Code of Civil Procedure section 1286 .2, subdivision (a), is found in title 9 of part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, captio ned “Arbitration.” The specific provision is found under chapter 4 of title 9, “Enforcement of the Award. ” Thus it is clear from the statutory scheme as a whole that the provisi on applies only to arbitration awards. It discusses the limited grounds for va cation of an arbitration award.7 for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514.) In a proceeding inquiring into the validity of a fina l administrative order, a trial court’s review is limited to the question of whether the administrative agency proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. A prejudi cial abuse of discretion is es tablished if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner re quired by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not support ed by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)
Almeida does not contend that the ev idence did not support the trial court’s decision. Her sole contention on appeal is that the District acted in excess of its authority by declining to limit its review of the hearing officer’s findings to the factors set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, as set forth in Education Code section 45113, subdivision (e). Thus, our review is limited to a determination as to whether the District proceeded in a manner consistent with the law. Because this task involves the interpretation of a statute, we independen tly review the trial court’s decision. ( California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698-699).
II. Education Code section 45113 The resolution of this appeal begins with an analysis of Ed ucation Code section 45113 (section 45113) which pr ovides, in pertinent part: “(a) The governing board of a school district shall prescribe written rules and regulations, governing the pers onnel management of the classified service . . . .
“(b) Any employee designated as a permanent employee shall be subject to disciplinary action only fo r cause as prescribed by rule or regulation of the governing board, but the governing board’s determination of the sufficiency of the cause for di sciplinary action shall be conclusive.
“(c) The governing board shall adopt rules of procedure for disciplinary proceedings wh ich shall contain a prov ision for informing the employee by written notice of the speci fic charges against him or her, a statement of the employee’s right to a hearing on those charges, and the time within which the hearing may be requested . . . and a card or paper, the8 signing and filing of which shall c onstitute a demand for hearing, and a denial of all charges. . . . .
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“(e) Nothing in this section sh all be construed to prohibit the governing board, pursuant to the terms of an agreement w ith an employee organization under Chapter 10.7 (co mmencing with Section 3540) of Division 4 of Title 1 of the Governme nt Code, from delegating its authority to determine whether sufficient cause exists for disciplinary action against classified employees, excluding peace o fficers as defined in Section 830.32 of the Penal Code, to an impartial th ird party hearing officer. However, the governing board shall retain authority to review the determination under the standards set forth in Section 1286.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

In California School Employees A ssn. v. Bonita School Dist. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 387 ( Bonita ), the Court of Appeal analyzed section 45113. After reviewing legislative history surrounding the passing of section 45113, subdivision (e) in 2001, the
court stated: “As we read subdivisions (b) and (e), respectively, of . . . section 45113, they authorize two distinct methods of challenging disciplinary action, the former under the auspices and regulations of the board, the latter by an arbitrator under the rules of th e [American Arbitration Association] and the provisions of the [co llective bargaining agreement].”
( Bonita, supra , at p. 403.)

We agree with the analysis in Bonita. As set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c), the employee is entitled to a hearing when disciplin ary action is instituted against him or her. This type of hearing is governed by th e regulations promulgated by the District. (§ 45113, subd. (c).) The District may appoint an impartial hearing officer to conduct the hearing and make recommendations. Howe ver, as Almeida has acknowledged, the District retains the authority to reject the hearing officer’s recommendations and to impose a measure of disciple different from wh at the hearing officer advised. Under the procedures described in section 45113, su bdivisions (b) and (c), the District’s9 “determination of the sufficiency of the cause for disciplinary action shall be conclusive.” (§ 45113, subd. (b).) Section 45113, subdivision (e), as enacted in 2001, “permits cl assified employees to submit certain disciplinary di sputes to arbitration pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. (See Stat s. 2001, ch. 844, § 3; Stats. 2001, ch. 839, § 1; Amends., Deering’s Ann. Ed. Code (2008 supp .) foll. § 45113, p. 296.)” ( Bonita, supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) Where the em ployee chooses to pr oceed under a post- Skelly arbitration, the District delegates its authority to determine whether sufficient cause exists for the discipline. (§ 45113, subd. (e).) When the District reviews an arbitration award,
its review is thus limited to a determinati on of whether the arbitrator’s determination complied with the Arbitration Act. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2.) III. Section 45113, subdiv ision (e) is inapplicab le to this proceeding Almeida argues that the District wa s prohibited from rejecting the hearing officer’s findings and recommendations by th e standards set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. Almeida’s position is based on a misapplication of section 45113, subdivision (e). As set forth above, secti on 45113, subdivision (e) is only applicable where an employee chooses to submit an employm ent dispute to arbitration. ( Bonita, supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) The subdivisi on provides that where a post-disciplinary arbitration hearing has been held, the District ’s review of the arbitrator’s decision is
limited to those factors set forth in section 1286.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (§ 45113, subd. (e).) Here, as Almeida admits, she did not request a post- Skelly arbitration. Instead, she filed a timely request for a post- Skelly hearing before the Distri ct’s Board of Trustees regarding her termination. Because Almeid a did not request an arbitration, section 45113, subdivision (e) and Code of Civil Pr ocedure section 1286.2 are inapplicable. Instead, the provisions of sec tion 45113, subdivisions (b) and (c) are controlling. Neither
of those subdivisions limits the District’s review to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. Instead, section 45 113, subdivisions (b) and (c) make it clear10 that the District’s “determination of the su fficiency of the cause for disciplinary action
shall be conclusive.” (§ 45113, subd. (b).) Almeida argues that the provisions of sec tion 45113, subdivision (e) are applicable even when the employee has requested a post- Skelly hearing, instead of an arbitration. She argues that section 45113, subdivision (e ) is not expressly limited to arbitrations. However, to the extent that there is any ambi guity in the plain language of section 45113, subdivision (e), the legislativ e history of the statute provi des clarification. When subdivision (e) of section 45113 was introduced as Assembly Bill No. 128 in 2001, it was described as a bill which “specifies that not hing prohibits school district and community colleges . . . to submit employee disciplinary ca ses to third party arbitration, except for peace officers.” (Sen. Rules Co m., Off. Of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 128 (2000-2001 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 13, 2001.) The citation to Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, provi des further support for a conclusion that the Legislature intended the subdivision’s applicab ility to be limited to situations where arbitration has been selected as the proced ure for a determination of the propriety of proposed employee discipline.
In Bonita , the Court of Appeal also analyzed the legislative history of section 45113, subdivision (e), and rationally concluded that this subdivision is only relevant to a situation where the employee el ects to proceed with a post- Skelly arbitration. ( Bonita,

supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) Almeida atte mpts to distinguish Bonita . She argues
that the court in Bonita took pains to menti on that the collective bargaining agreement between the school district and the employee uni on also provided that any award made by
an arbitrator would be fina l and binding, and that this provision was approved by the
school district. The terms of the applicable colle ctive bargaining agreement in Bonita have no relevance to our interpretation of the meaning of section 45113. Regardless of the terms of any collective bargaining agreement, section 45113, subdivis ion (e) can only be interpreted to mean that “[i]n reviewing an arbitration award, the board is required to apply the same standards as the courts. [Citations.]” ( Bonita, supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at11 p. 406.) Almeida has offered no cogent lega l argument to support her position that this subdivision should be expans ively applied to situations where the employee has not requested an arbitration. As set forth above, the language and the legislative history of
section 45113 do not support her position.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

.

__________ ___________________, J. CHAVEZ

We concur:

_____________ _______________, P. J. BOREN

___________________ _________, J. ASHMANN-GERST