*

The Honorable Michael H. Watson, United States District Judge for the Southern District of

Ohio, sitting by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 13a0190p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CEDRIC MARKEITH ADAMS,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 12-6400

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.

No. 2:12-cr-20172-1—S. Thomas Anderson, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: July 23, 2013 

Before: KEITH and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; WATSON, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Needum L. Germany, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Frederick H. Godwin, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Defendant appeals the district court’s

judgment revoking supervised release and imposing a thirteen-month sentence based on

Defendant’s guilty plea to four violations of his supervised release conditions.

The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. In 2009, the District Court for

the Northern District of Mississippi sentenced Defendant to a period of incarceration to

be followed by two years of supervised release for the sale of counterfeit obligations.

1
No. 12-6400 United States v. Adams Page 2

Defendant’s term of supervised release began on November 2, 2010. On June 6, 2012,

the district court for the Northern District of Mississippi entered an order transferring

jurisdiction of Defendant’s supervised release to the Western District of Tennessee. On

July 13, 2012, the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee consented to

jurisdiction. However, the Clerk of the Court for the Northern District of Mississippi did

not enter the order accepting jurisdiction from the District Court for the Western District

of Tennessee until August 23, 2012.

Before jurisdiction was transferred, Defendant left the judicial district without

permission from a probation officer on four occasions. Also before jurisdiction was

transferred, Defendant was arrested twice for promoting prostitution. On August 21,

2012, a probation officer filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under

Supervision in the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee alleging two

supervised release violations against Defendant. The first violation alleged that

Defendant was arrested in Nashville for promoting prostitution on January 6, 2012 and

again June 27, 2012. The second violation alleged that Defendant violated his

supervised release by leaving the judicial district without permission from a probation

officer on January 6, 2012; April 12, 2012; June 27, 2012; and August 10, 2012.

At a hearing held on October 24, 2012, in the District Court for the Western

District of Tennessee, Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11 to a supervised release violation. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the

second violation—involving leaving the judicial district without permission four times

during supervised release. In exchange, the Government agreed to drop the first

violation—involving the two arrests for promoting prostitution during supervised

release. The Government recommended a thirteen-month sentence. Defendant waived

his right to appeal if the district court accepted the Government’s sentencing

recommendation. At the hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to thirteen

months of incarceration. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.

On appeal, Defendant argues that his guilty plea is invalid because the violations

upon which it was based occurred before jurisdiction of his supervised release had been
No. 12-6400 United States v. Adams Page 3

transferred to the Western District of Tennessee. Alternatively, Defendant argues that

his guilty plea is invalid because he was unaware of the potential issues with the district

court’s jurisdiction at the time he pleaded guilty. The Government argues that we should

enforce Defendant’s appellate waiver and dismiss this case. Because we hold that the

district court had jurisdiction to revoke release and that Defendant’s guilty plea was

valid, we do not address the enforceability of the waiver.

We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction.

United States v. Slone, 411 F.3d 643, 646 (6th Cir. 2005). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3605

governs jurisdiction over releasees under supervision and states:

A court, after imposing a sentence, may transfer jurisdiction over a

probationer or person on supervised release to the district court for any

other district to which the person is required to proceed as a condition of

his probation or release, or is permitted to proceed, with the concurrence

of such court. A later transfer of jurisdiction may be made in the same

manner. A court to which jurisdiction is transferred under this section is

authorized to exercise all powers over the probationer or releasee that are

permitted by this subchapter or subchapter B or D of chapter 227.

18 U.S.C. § 3605 (emphasis added). Subchapter D of chapter 227 confers on courts the

power to “revoke a term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised

release . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Under § 3605, “the transferee court steps into the

shoes of the transferor court.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.

2010). “[S]ection 3605 expand[s] the power of the transferee court over the supervised

offender” as it “was intended to permit the transferee court ‘to exercise all the powers

over the . . . releasee that are permitted’ by the statutes dealing with supervised

releasees.” United States v. Fernandez, 379 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting S.

REP. NO. 98-225, at 132 (1984)).

We adopt the approach used by the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits

in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3605 authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a

defendant’s supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of

jurisdiction. See Fernandez, 379 F.3d at 275; United States v. Clark, 405 F. App’x 89,
No. 12-6400 United States v. Adams Page 4

92 (8th Cir. 2010); King, 608 F.3d at 1128; United States v. Bailey, 257 F. App’x 210,

212 (11th Cir. 2007). Analogously, the precedent we announce today gives transferee

courts equal power to terminate or reduce the conditions of supervised release. See

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). This approach avoids creating the “twilight zone” described by

the Ninth Circuit whereby supervisees would obtain immunity for violations

committed—but not discovered—before transfer. King, 608 F.3d at 1127.

Here, Defendant pleaded guilty to leaving the judicial district on four occasions

without permission in violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Defendant

does not dispute that he left the judicial district without permission on the four dates

indicated in his plea. The district court properly exercised its jurisdiction when it found

by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had violated a condition of his

supervised release and revoked release.

Defendant alternatively argues that his guilty plea is invalid because he did not

knowingly waive his jurisdictional objection. Technical errors in Rule 11 pleas are

harmless unless they affect substantial rights. FED.R.CRIM. P. 11(h). Because we have

affirmed a transferee court’s jurisdiction to revoke release based on pre-transfer

violations, Defendant’s jurisdictional concern is revealed to be meritless and does not

undermine the validity of his plea.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.