UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4466

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GUILLERMO ALFONSON SALAZAR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior 

District Judge. (2:09-cr-00727-PMD-1)

Submitted: September 30, 2010 Decided: October 20, 2010

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ann Briks Walsh, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Alston Calhoun Badger, Jr., 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,

William Walter Wilkins, III, United States Attorney, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Guillermo Alfonson Salazar appeals the district 

court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing 

him to sixty months’ imprisonment. Salazar’s attorney has filed 

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

raising the issue of whether the district court’s revocation 

sentence is plainly unreasonable. Salazar was notified of his 

right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. 

We affirm.

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory 

range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 

461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether 

the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.

at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential 

posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion 

than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences. United 

States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if 

we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable 

must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.

While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven 

policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to 

revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006), 
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the court need not robotically tick through every subsection, 

and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the 

previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the 

statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district 

court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the 

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence. 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that 

Salazar’s sentence is within the prescribed statutory range and 

not plainly unreasonable. At his revocation hearing, Salazar 

admitted the violation alleged by the probation officer, and the 

court properly considered the guidelines and applicable 

statutory factors in imposing its sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, 

of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States 

for further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. Finally, we dispense 
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with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED