NUMBER 13-21-00466-CV 

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

NUECES COUNTY AND

NUECES COUNTY APPRAISAL

DISTRICT, Appellants, 

v.

SAN PATRICIO COUNTY, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 135th District Court

of Refugio County, Texas.

OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Peña 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

Appellants Nueces County and the Nueces County Appraisal District (NCAD) 

appeal a summary judgment entered in favor of appellee San Patricio County regarding
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a boundary dispute. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 72.009. The present suit involves

the interpretation of an earlier 2003 Judgment setting the boundary line between the two 

counties. In three issues, Nueces County and NCAD1 argue that the trial court erred in: 

(1) concluding that piers, wharfs, docks, and related facilities connected to the shoreline 

of San Patricio County are in San Patricio County; (2) concluding that certain categories 

of land within the bays are within San Patricio County; and (3) binding NCAD to the 2003 

Judgment when it was not a party to that litigation. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Boundary Dispute

“Counties are creatures of the Legislature.” In re Occidental Chem. Corp.

(Occidental), 561 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. CONST. art. 

IX, § 1 (“The Legislature shall have power to create counties for the convenience of the 

people[.]”), TEX. CONST. OF 1845, art. VII, § 34 (“The legislature shall, at the first session 

thereof, and may at any subsequent session, establish new counties for the convenience 

of the inhabitants of such new county or counties[.]”)). “The 1846 boundary between San 

Patricio County and Nueces County was described as ‘following the meanders’ of Corpus 

Christi Bay.” Id. (quoting Act approved April 18, 1846, 1st Leg., R.S., § 1, 1846 Tex. Gen. 

Laws 86, reprinted in 2 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 1392, 1392 

(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898)). “In 1897, the Legislature authorized counties to sue 

each other for the purpose of establishing the boundary line between them.” Id. (cleaned 

up). That statute currently provides that suit must be brought in the district court of the 

closest, adjoining county “whose boundaries are not affected by the suit.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T 

1 For ease of reference, Nueces County and NCAD will be referred to collectively as “Nueces 

County” throughout this opinion, except when necessary to refer to NCAD solely.
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CODE ANN. § 72.009(a). “The district court has jurisdiction to determine where the 

boundary line is located and may order the line to be re-marked and resurveyed.” Id. 

§ 72.009(b). “The line established by the district court shall be treated as the true 

boundary between the counties unless the court determines that the line in question was 

established under prior law.” Id.

B. The 1972 Suit

The Texas Supreme Court has summarized the initial boundary dispute between 

the counties as follows:

In 1972, San Patricio County sued Nueces County in the district court of 

neighboring Refugio County to determine the boundary between the two 

counties running along the Nueces River, and the Nueces, Corpus Christi, 

and Redfish Bays, and to recover taxes which it claimed that Nueces 

County wrongfully assessed on the San Patricio County side of the 

boundary. The counties disputed whether statutes then delineating their 

boundaries set the dividing line in the center of those waterways, as San 

Patricio County argued, or at the shoreline, as Nueces County argued. The 

case remained pending for 17 years. Finally, in 1989, the trial court granted 

summary judgment for Nueces County[, setting the boundary at the 

shoreline]. The court of appeals reversed because the judgment failed to 

dispose of San Patricio County’s claim that the shoreline had moved or 

been modified by natural processes, such as erosion, or by human 

intervention, such as dredging. The court remanded the case for trial of the 

issue of which county includes [modifications to the shoreline.]

Occidental, 561 S.W.3d at 151–52 (cleaned up).

C. 2003 Judgment Following Remand

Fourteen years later, in 2003, the trial court rendered a final judgment. The court 

“decreed that the common boundary line between San Patricio and Nueces Counties”

runs, in relevant part, “along the northerly shorelines of the Nueces Bay and Corpus 

Christi Bay” and that “San Patricio County shall lie northerly of that line” and “Nueces 

County shall lie southerly of that line.” The judgment defined “shoreline” as “the point at 
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which the waters of the bays meet the mainland at mean lower low tide.” The judgment 

stated that San Patricio County “shall include the parts of the Donnell and Ingleside Points 

detached from the mainland by the La Quinta ship channel and the waters of La Quinta 

ship channel intervening between the detached parts of Donnell and Ingleside Points and 

the mainland,” and “the part of Dagger Island detached from the mainland by the 

Intercoastal ship channel and the waters of the Intercoastal ship channel intervening 

between the detached part of Dagger Island and the mainland.” On the remanded issue, 

the judgment declared: “Past and future natural and artificial modifications to the shoreline 

of San Patricio County shall form a part of San Patricio County.” Both counties rely on the 

following demonstrative evidence in their appellate briefs to depict the detached 

properties referenced in the judgment:

After the 2003 Judgment became final, Nueces County filed a petition for bill of 

review alleging that it had not received notice of the judgment. San Patricio County v. 
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Nueces County, 214 S.W.3d 536, 543 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006), 

judgm’t vacated on other grounds, 246 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. 2008). The trial court set aside 

the 2003 Judgment, consolidated the boundary suit and the bill of review proceedings, 

and adopted the 2003 Judgment as its judgment on the merits. Id. at 544. On appeal to 

this Court, we reversed the trial court’s judgment granting the bill of review, and we 

affirmed the 2003 Judgment. Id. at 549. Nueces County did not seek further review of the 

2003 Judgment’s establishment of the boundary line between the two counties. See 

Nueces County v. San Patricio County, 246 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. 2008) (reviewing only the 

award of damages against Nueces County for taxes improperly levied on San Patricio 

County properties and holding that Nueces County was immune from such claims).

D. 2009 Suit

In 2009, San Patricio County filed a new § 72.009 suit in Refugio County district 

court to enjoin Nueces County from taxing certain properties that extend into the water of 

the Nueces County bays. San Patricio County claimed the properties were on its side of 

the boundary pursuant to the 2003 Judgment. San Patricio also sought a declaration that 

certain lands in the bays were a part of San Patricio County. 

Nueces County filed a cross-petition seeking a declaration that the 2003 Judgment 

awarded the entirety of the bays to Nueces County, including piers, docks, and wharfs. 

On Nueces County’s motion, venue was transferred to Nueces County, where the case 

sat inactive for years. In 2014, the Nueces County district court granted summary 

judgment for Nueces County, dismissing all of San Patricio County’s claims. However, 

this Court reversed, concluding that under § 72.009, the case should be heard in Refugio 

County. San Patricio County v. Nueces County, 492 S.W.3d 476, 488 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
6

Christi 2016, pet. denied). We remanded the case with instructions that the trial court 

vacate and set aside its judgment and transfer the case to the 135th District Court of 

Refugio County, Texas. Id. 

E. Tax Protest Suits

In the meantime, the Texas Supreme Court heard two cases pursuant to § 72.010 

of the local government code, which affords that court original jurisdiction to determine 

which county is owed taxes on the petition of a property owner that is subject to multiple 

taxation. See In re Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC (CCL), 588 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. 2019); 

Occidental, 561 S.W.3d 146. 

In Occidental, relators, which the court collectively referred to as Oxy, “own[ed] two 

massive commercial piers extending from the mainland of San Patricio County into the 

waters of Corpus Christi Bay that lie in Nueces County.” 561 S.W.3d. at 150. The court

held that “[t]he common law . . . supports treating docks, piers, and similar permanent 

facilities that are connected to the mainland of San Patricio County as a part of that 

county” and that the “taxes owed by Oxy on its Piers [were] due [to] San Patricio County, 

not Nueces County.” Id. at 165. The court “direct[ed] the Nueces County Appraisal District 

to withdraw and cease from issuing tax assessments to Oxy for its Piers and other 

facilities which [it] held to be part of San Patricio County.” Id.

The Texas Supreme Court heard another case pursuant to § 72.010 in CCL, 588 

S.W.3d at 275. CCL petitioned the court for the same relief that was previously granted 

to Oxy, contending that the operative facts were the same. Id. at 276. The court observed: 

The material facts are undisputed. In 2015, CCL began construction of a 

massive natural gas liquefaction and export facility on the northern shore of 

Corpus Christi Bay. The first phase of the project has been completed; a 

second phase remains under construction. The facility is built on land in San 
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Patricio County, with docks stretching out into the La Quinta Channel of the 

Bay, which is in Nueces County. 

Id. CCL asserted that it was being taxed in both Nueces County and San Patricio County 

on the same property, just as Oxy was. Id. at 277. After CCL filed its petition, Nueces 

County decided to refrain from taxing the facility and explained that some taxing entities 

would be issuing refunds for taxes paid in tax years 2018 and 2019. Id. As a result, 

Nueces County argued that “by zeroing out the 2018 and 2019 appraisal values for CCL’s 

facility, the Appraisal District has mooted the case.” Id. Nueces County also argued that 

“CCL’s massive plant and docks are so different from Oxy’s piers that Occidental’s

rationale and ruling do not apply.” Id.

In assessing whether it had jurisdiction to decide the matter, the court noted the 

following:

[T]he parties’ disputes over the nature of CCL’s facility in relation to the 

counties’ boundary are significant and require resolution. While Occidental

concluded that the common law treats docks, piers, and similar permanent 

facilities built both on the mainland and the submerged land as being part 

of the mainland, we did not hold that the rule applies to every such structure 

imaginable. On the contrary, we derived the rule from cases that involved 

structures similar to Oxy’s piers. The Nueces Parties argue that CCL’s 

facility is different in ways inconsistent with the rationale for the common 

law rule. CCL insists that there is no meaningful difference. That is, in part, 

a factual dispute. So is the nature of the services Nueces County will be 

obliged to provide CCL.

Id. at 278–79 (cleaned up). In reviewing whether there was a strong and special reason—

or an urgent necessity—for it to exercise original jurisdiction, the court distinguished 

Occidental as follows: “In the present proceeding, however, CCL has complained of 

double taxation for only three years, has paid little under protest, may have some of that 

refunded, and is not currently being assessed.” Id. at 279. Ultimately, the court 
8

determined “in the circumstances before us, we conclude that the Constitution does not 

permit us to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by [§] 72.010 at this time.” Id.

F. Summary Judgment

At the time the Texas Supreme Court issued the Occidental and CCL opinions, the 

trial court was considering competing motions for summary judgment in the 2009 suit. In 

its motion, San Patricio County argued that, as a matter of law, the following disputed 

lands are part of San Patricio County:

1. Lands that have been raised above the mean lower low tide line by 

the deposit of dredge spoil or other materials (“Raised Lands”);

2. Piers, wharfs, docks, and similar permanent facilities that are 

connected to the mainland of San Patricio County and that are 

suspended on pilings above the mean lower low tide line (“Piers and 

Wharfs”);

3. Submerged lands that are located in “the waters of La Quinta ship 

channel intervening between the detached portions of Donnell and 

Ingleside Points and the mainland” (“Intervening Submerged 

Lands”); and

4. Lands that were formerly connected to the mainland and above the 

mean lower low tide line, but that have become submerged, or 

detached from the mainland, because of the dredging of navigation 

channels or the removal of soil for the construction of ports, docks, 

piers or similar facilities (“Detached or Submerged Parts of the 

Mainland”).

San Patricio County argued that the properties are “a part of the mainland of San Patricio 

County and not a part of the waters of the bays.” It argued that artificial modifications of 

the shoreline include the raising of submerged lands and the construction of piers, wharfs, 

docks, and similar facilities. San Patricio reasoned that “[a]s a practical matter, only [it] 

can provide any meaningful governmental services to the docks, piers, and other facilities 

constructed along its shoreline.” San Patricio County attached evidence establishing that 
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it provides a variety of public services to the disputed properties that Nueces County does 

not.

In its motion, Nueces County argued that the disputed properties were located 

within Nueces County. It attached several exhibits to its motion, including affidavit 

testimony that Nueces County provides law enforcement, fire prevention, and emergency 

medical services by boat to the bays. It also produced evidence that Nueces County 

funded the development of the disputed property through bond initiatives. Nueces County 

argued that all piers, wharfs, and docks are located in Nueces County. It maintained in 

the alternative that certain structures should be treated differently than the Oxy piers 

because they are massive structures with concrete poured into the bay. Nueces County 

posited that these structures are more akin to the artificial fill that Texas courts have ruled 

cannot change a boundary.

After a hearing, the trial court signed an order granting San Patricio County’s 

motion for summary judgment and denying Nueces County’s motion for summary 

judgment. It later rendered a final judgment providing that: 

a) Nueces County and [NCAD] are bound by the terms of this Court’s 

April 11, 2003 Judgment and that judgment is valid and remains in 

full force and effect.

b) The following categories of property are a part of San Patricio

County:

1) Formerly submerged lands that have been raised above the

mean lower low tide line by the deposit of dredge spoil or other 

materials and that are connected to the San Patricio County 

shoreline.

2) Piers, wharfs, docks, and similar permanent facilities that are 

connected to the mainland of San Patricio County and that are 

suspended on pilings above the mean lower low tide line.
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3) Lands that were formerly a part of Donnell and Ingleside

Points but that were submerged by the dredging of the La

Quinta Channel and are now within “the waters of La Quinta 

ship channel intervening between the detached portions of 

Donnell and Ingleside Points and the mainland.”

4) Lands that were formerly connected to the San Patricio

County mainland and the surface of which was above the

mean lower low tide line, but that have become submerged,

or detached from the mainland of San Patricio County,

because of the dredging of navigation channels or the

construction of port or docking facilities.

c) The Alpha and Beta piers formerly owned by Occidental Petroleum

Company and its subsidiaries, and any similar structure built out from 

the San Patricio shoreline are not taxable by Nueces County.

d) All of the land that is connected to the detached portion of Ingleside 

Point and that is above the mean lower low tide line is in San Patricio 

County.

The judgment enjoined Nueces County and NCAD from taxing the identified properties. 

The trial court did not award attorney’s fees to any party. Nueces County’s motion to 

modify the judgment, or alternatively, for new trial was overruled by operation of law. This 

appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

“We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo.” KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. 

City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019). We consider the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the 

nonmovant and resolving any doubts against the movant. Id. A party moving for traditional 

summary judgment bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nassar 

v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017). Evidence is conclusive 
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only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 

S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). 

“If a movant initially establishes a right to summary judgment on the issues 

expressly presented in the motion, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present to 

the trial court any issues or evidence that would preclude summary judgment.” Bryant v. 

Baker, 580 S.W.3d 408, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (citing 

City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Tex. 1979)). The 

nonmovant can meet its burden if its evidence is more than a scintilla; i.e., it “rises to a 

level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.”

Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Merrell Dow 

Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). When both parties move for 

summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we 

determine all issues presented and render the judgment that the trial court should have 

rendered. Colorado County v. Staff, 510 S.W.3d 435, 444 (Tex. 2017) (citing Merriman v. 

XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)). “However, if resolution of the issues 

rests on disputed facts, summary judgment is inappropriate, and the reviewing court 

should reverse and remand for further proceedings.” Rancho Viejo Cattle Co., Ltd. v. ANB 

Cattle Co., 642 S.W.3d 850, 870 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, pet. denied) (quoting 

Gramercy Ins. Co. v. MRD Invs., Inc., 47 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).

“A county may bring suit against an adjacent county to establish the common 

boundary line.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 72.009(a). “The court shall try the suit in the 

same manner in which it tries other suits.” Id. “The district court has jurisdiction to 
12

determine where the boundary line is located and may order the line to be re-marked and 

resurveyed.” Id. § 72.009(b). “The line established by the district court shall be treated as 

the true boundary between the counties unless the court determines that the line in 

question was established under prior law.” Id. “If the district court determines that the 

boundary line has been established under prior law, the court shall declare that line to be

the true boundary between the counties and shall have that line resurveyed and 

established as the boundary.” Id.

“[T]he powers conferred on the district court are very general regarding the 

establishment of a common boundary line.” San Patricio County, 492 S.W.3d at 485. We 

have previously held that the statutory grant of authority “to determine where the 

boundary line is located necessarily embraces the power of that court to determine all 

necessary and incidental matters including what property is located within each county 

along that boundary line should such a question arise at a later date.” Id.

“Courts construe orders and judgments under the same rules of interpretation as 

those applied to other written instruments.” In re Estate of Renz, 662 S.W.3d 531, 537 

n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied) (quoting Azbill v. Dall. Cnty. Child Protective 

Servs. Unit of Tex. Dep’t of Hum. & Regul. Servs., 860 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1993, no writ)). “Judgments should be construed as a whole to harmonize and give 

effect to the entire [judgment].” Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003)

(citing Constance v. Constance, 544 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. 1976)). In interpreting a 

judgment, our goal is “to determine not what the trial court should have done but, if 

possible, what the court actually did.” Hampton v. Equity Tr. Co., 607 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied) (quoting Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 447). We begin with the 
13

“text of the judgment as written and, if it is unambiguous, we must give effect to the literal 

language used.” In re Piatt Servs., Inc., 493 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, 

orig. proceeding). For undefined terms, we must give the term its common and ordinary 

meaning, and we may resort to dictionary definitions. Anadarko Petrol. Corp. v. Hous.

Cas. Co., 573 S.W.3d 187, 192 (Tex. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Piers, Docks, Wharfs, and Similar Facilities

In its first issue, Nueces County argues that the trial court erred in concluding that

piers, docks, and similar facilities in the bays are a part of San Patricio County. Nueces 

County maintains that such facilities do not constitute artificial modifications to the 

shoreline of San Patricio County. Nueces County further argues that it provides services 

to the structures in the bays and invested in the development of certain structures. Nueces 

County urges in the alternative that this Court should conclude that structures similar to 

the piers identified in Occidental are in San Patricio County, while all other structures are 

subject to taxation in Nueces County. San Patricio County responds that this issue was 

decided against Nueces County in Occidental and that decision is final, binding, and not 

subject to further review. San Patricio County maintains that it is impractical for Nueces 

County to provide any meaningful public services to the disputed property.

As recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in Occidental, “docks, piers, and 

similar permanent facilities that are connected to the mainland of San Patricio County 

[are] a part of that county.” 561 S.W.3d at 165. In other words, such facilities, even though 

not an alteration of the shoreline, are considered part of the mainland to which they are 

connected. See id. The court explained “that piers, docks, and related facilities cannot 
14

fairly be said to alter a shoreline as dredging does[, and] . . . that private persons cannot 

alter county boundaries merely by constructing improvements across them.” Id. at 162. 

However, the court reasoned that:

Taxation is justified by the assumption that the government will render 

services of equivalent value in protecting one’s person and property, in 

adding to the value of one’s property, and in creating and maintaining public 

conveniences in which one shares, like roads, bridges, sidewalks, 

pavements, and schools for the education of children. Nueces County 

cannot practically render services such as fire and police protection to Oxy’s 

Piers, while San Patricio County can easily access the Piers from the land.

Id. at 163. The court observed that “Nueces County can do little, if anything, to improve 

the value of Oxy’s Piers, and nothing to provide public conveniences.” Id. The court fully 

adopted the following analysis by the Maryland Court of Appeals in determining the effect 

of piers on the boundary between the City of Baltimore and the County of Baltimore:

It would seem, therefore, to be perfectly clear that the Legislature never 

intended that such improvements as these should, for the purposes of 

taxation, be cut in two at the point of high-water mark on the bank of the 

river when they were made, and part be taxed by the city and the rest by 

the county. Without the right to use the land, which is in Baltimore city, the 

improvements would be useless, and, as they are incident to that land and 

dependent upon it for their existence, it would be an anomalous condition 

of affairs if they were to be thus divided. They are so situated as to be 

dependent upon the city for police and fire protection, and if the appellant’s 

theory be correct they would practically have neither, as this water is 

separated from Baltimore county and it would be impossible to furnish the 

appellant with proper fire or police protection on these piers, unless the 

county made special provision for them, which would practically be 

impossible without the assistance of the city.

Id. at 164 (quoting W. Md. Tidewater R.R. Co. v. City of Baltimore, 68 A. 6, 10 (Md. 1907)).

The court observed that “[t]he common law thus firmly recognizes that the right to 

construct docks, piers, and similar facilities from the shore into the water springs from the 

ownership of the upland property bordering the shore, rather than from the submerged 

lands on which portions of those facilities are constructed.” Id. at 165. Thus, the court
15

“direct[ed] the Nueces County Appraisal District to withdraw and cease from issuing tax 

assessments to Oxy for its Piers and other facilities which [it] held to be part of San 

Patricio County.” Id.

CCL did not retreat from this holding but recognized that there may be fact issues 

as to the nature of the structures at issue as well as the services provided by the 

respective counties to those structures. 588 S.W.3d at 278–79. The court thus declined 

to exercise jurisdiction under the unique statutory scheme at issue. Id. at 279.

Under the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, we must follow the precedent of the 

Texas Supreme Court. Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022); see 

Lubbock County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (“The 

court of appeals in this case followed established law. It is not the function of a court of 

appeals to abrogate or modify established precedent. That function lies solely with this 

Court.”) (internal citation omitted). This Court has recently recognized the binding nature 

of Occidental in resolving a boundary dispute among municipalities: 

This dispute is analogous to the dispute in [Occidental]. Here, the 

undisputed evidence shows that the structures located on the water are 

connected to the mainland located in Ingleside. Some are the very same 

structures that were the subject of the [Occidental] dispute. Therefore, for 

the reasons stated in [Occidental], we similarly conclude that the piers, 

docks, bulkheads, wharves, and similar facilities and structures that are 

constructed and attached to the [main]land are part of Ingleside’s 

jurisdiction as a matter of law.

City of Corpus Christi v. City of Ingleside, No. 13-20-00513-CV, 2022 WL 2163878, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op) (cleaned 

up). Further, we conclude that evidence that Nueces County provides boat services to 

the waters of the bay does not alter the common law justification for the taxation of piers 
16

and similar facilities.2 See Occidental, 561 S.W.3d at 163 (“Nueces County cannot 

practically render services such as fire and police protection to Oxy’s Piers, while San 

Patricio County can easily access the Piers from the land.”).

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that

the following property is located in San Patricio County: “Piers, wharfs, docks, and similar 

permanent facilities that are connected to the mainland of San Patricio County and that 

are suspended on pilings above the mean lower low tide line.” See City of Rowlett, 593 

S.W.3d at 181.

Nueces County argues in the alternative that we should conclude that only piers 

similar to the piers described in Occidental are subject to taxation by San Patricio County.

Nueces County maintains that “massive structures with concrete poured into the 

Bays . . . place a great burden on the Nueces County Bays.” In support of its argument, 

Nueces County references the CCL opinion, but it cites no summary judgment evidence 

demonstrating that a particular facility fails to meet the criteria set forth in the underlying 

judgment.3 Accordingly, we conclude that Nueces County failed to create a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether any specific facility attached to the mainland of San Patricio 

County was so dissimilar to the facilities in Occidental that it should be considered a part 

2 Nueces County also provided evidence demonstrating that separate governmental entities, 

located at least partially within San Patricio County, provide services to the facilities in question. We 

conclude that this evidence is immaterial to whether Nueces County maintains authority to tax the facilities.

See Janaki v. C.H. Wilkinson Physician Network, 624 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2021, no pet.) (“A fact is ‘material’ only if it affects the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law.” (quoting W. Trinity Props., Ltd. v. Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 92 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2002, no pet.))).

3 In its brief, Nueces County cites to a summary judgment exhibit which appears to contain aerial 

photographs of certain structures in the bay. We have reviewed this exhibit and the entirety of the summary 

judgment record, and we can find no corresponding evidence establishing what these photographs depict 

or demonstrating that the facilities constitute structures that are properly classified as being in Nueces 

County.
17

of Nueces County. See Rancho Viejo Cattle, 642 S.W.3d at 870. We overrule Nueces 

County’s first issue.

B. Lands Within the Bays

In its second issue, Nueces County argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded 

that certain categories of land in the bays are within and taxable by San Patricio County

because they do not constitute natural or artificial modifications to the shoreline as 

provided for by the 2003 Judgment. Specifically, Nueces County maintains that the 

following types of land were miscategorized: (1) formerly submerged lands that have been 

raised by the deposit of dredge connected to the mainland and the detached portion of 

Ingleside Point; and (2) lands formerly connected to San Patricio County that have 

become submerged or detached due to dredging.

1. Raised Lands Connected to San Patricio County Mainland and the 

Detached Portion of Ingleside Point

Nueces County argues that formerly submerged lands raised above the mean 

lower tide line by the deposit of dredge spoil or other materials and connected to San 

Patricio County’s shoreline are in Nueces County. Nueces County maintains that the 

creation of land by artificial fill does not alter a political boundary line. It argues that the 

land connected to the detached portion of Ingleside Point that has been raised above the 

mean lower tide line are in Nueces County for the same reason. Nueces County further 

maintains that the expansion of Ingleside Point is in the intervening waters and therefore 

the fill cannot be considered a modification of the shoreline. San Patricio County responds 

that the 2003 Judgment, which is final and unappealable, declares such lands to be a part 

of San Patricio County as a future artificial modification of the shoreline. It further 

maintains that the detached portion of Ingleside Point constitutes the shoreline of San 
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Patricio County and that artificial modifications to that shoreline are part of San Patricio 

County pursuant to the 2003 Judgment. 

The trial court in the prior litigation was empowered by statute to “determine where 

the boundary line is located.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 72.009(a). In making this 

determination, it concluded that the “common boundary line between San Patricio and 

Nueces Counties” runs “along the northerly shorelines of the Nueces Bay and Corpus 

Christi Bay” and that “San Patricio County shall lie northerly of that line” and “Nueces 

County shall lie southerly of that line.” The 2003 Judgment stated that San Patricio County 

“shall include the parts of the Donnell and Ingleside Points detached from the mainland 

by the La Quinta ship channel and the waters of La Quinta ship channel intervening 

between the detached parts of Donnell and Ingleside Points and the mainland.” It further 

stated that “[f]ormerly submerged lands that have been raised above the mean lower low 

tide line by the deposit of dredge spoil or other materials and that are connected to the 

San Patricio County shoreline” are part of San Patricio County.

The 2003 Judgment defines the shoreline as “the point at which the waters of the 

bays meet the mainland at mean lower low tide” and that “[p]ast and future natural and 

artificial modifications to the shoreline of San Patricio County shall form a part of San 

Patricio County.” “Natural” means “existing in nature; not made or caused by humans.”

Natural, OXFORD ADVANCED AMERICAN ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.

oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/natural_1 (last visited 

December 4, 2023). Contrariwise, “artificial” means “created by people; not happening 

naturally.” Artificial, OXFORD ADVANCED AMERICAN ONLINE DICTIONARY,
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https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/artificial?q=artificial (last 

visited December 4, 2023).

Interpreting the judgment as a whole to harmonize and give effect to its provisions,

see Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 447, we construe the definition of “shoreline” in the 2003 

Judgment to apply to the mainland of San Patricio County as well as the detached lands 

awarded in the 2003 Judgment. We further construe the judgment as providing that any 

modification to that shoreline whether created by people, or occurring as a result of 

nature, shall form a part of San Patricio County. Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of 

law that the trial court did not err in determining that those lands raised above the mean 

lower tide line that are connected to the mainland and the detached portion of Ingleside 

Point are a part of San Patricio County. See City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d at 181.

We do not address Nueces County’s argument that the creation of land by artificial 

fill does not alter a political boundary line according to common law principles4 because 

the argument is an impermissible collateral attack on the 2003 Judgment, which clearly 

states that artificial modifications to the shoreline shall form a part of San Patricio County.

Collateral attacks on final judgments are generally impermissible insofar as they run 

counter to Texas courts’ strong policy of finality and constitute an attempt to bypass the 

appellate process. In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020). The 2003 Judgment, 

even if erroneous, is not subject to collateral attack. See Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449 

4 The common law focuses on whether a change to a shoreline is gradual or sudden in determining 

whether a boundary changes. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998) (explaining that “a 

sudden shoreline change known as avulsion (as distinct from accretion, or gradual change in configuration) 

has no effect on boundary”) (cleaned up); Brainard v. State, 12 S.W.3d 6, 17 (Tex. 1999) (“Texas follows 

the general rule that when the location of the margin or bed of a body of water that constitutes the boundary 

of a tract of land is gradually and imperceptibly changed or shifted by accretion, reliction, or erosion, the 

margin or bed of the body of water, as so changed, remains the boundary line of the tract, which is extended 

or restricted accordingly.”). 
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(explaining that the “remedy for a substantive error of law by the trial court [is] by direct 

appeal” and not a collateral attack on the judgment).

2. Detached or Submerged Parts of the Mainland

Nueces County argues that lands that were formerly connected to the San Patricio 

County mainland that have become submerged or detached by dredging are in Nueces 

County because they are disconnected from the shoreline. San Patricio County responds 

that the 2003 Judgment declares that the detached parts of certain areas are a part of 

San Patricio County. It contends that the land that has since become detached or 

submerged by dredging or excavation remain part of San Patricio County. This includes 

lands that were formerly part of Donnell and Ingleside Points, which the 2003 Judgment 

declares to be a part of San Patricio County, but that have become submerged after the 

La Quinta ship channel was created and are now within the waters of the channel between 

the detached portions of Donnell and Ingleside Points and the mainland.

The 2003 Judgment states that San Patricio County “shall include the parts of the 

Donnell and Ingleside Points detached from the mainland by the La Quinta ship channel 

and the waters of La Quinta ship channel intervening between the detached parts of 

Donnell and Ingleside Points and the mainland,” and “the part of Dagger island detached 

from the mainland by the Intercoastal ship channel and the waters of the Intercoastal ship 

channel intervening between the detached part of Dagger Island and the mainland.” This 

language unambiguously awards the detached land caused by dredging, including the 

intervening submerged lands, to San Patricio County. We construe the 2003 Judgment’s 

award of detached and submerged land as fixing the county boundary line such that future 

detached and submerged lands that were previously determined to be a part of San 
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Patricio County would remain in San Patricio County. See Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 447. A 

contrary interpretation would result in ongoing uncertainty as to the true boundary line,

which is inconsistent with the intent of the 2003 Judgment when viewed in its entirety.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that these lands are 

a part of San Patricio County. See City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d at 181.

3. Summary

Having rejected each of Nueces County’s arguments, we overrule its second issue.

C. NCAD Bound by 2003 Judgment

In its third issue, Nueces County argues that the trial court erred in binding NCAD 

to the 2003 Judgment because it was not a party to that case. 

Nueces County appears to take issue with the following declaration of the trial 

court: “Nueces County and the Nueces County Appraisal District are bound by the terms 

of this Court’s April 11, 2003 Judgment and that judgment is valid and remains in full force 

and effect.” We observe that in a boundary dispute between counties, “[t]he line 

established by the district court shall be treated as the true boundary between the 

counties.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 72.009(b). The Texas Tax Code further provides 

that “[t]he appraisal district boundaries are the same as the county’s boundaries.” TEX.

TAX CODE ANN. § 6.02. Because NCAD’s boundary is statutorily fixed to the boundary of 

Nueces County, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that NCAD is 

bound by the 2003 Judgment’s establishment of the boundary line. See City of Rowlett, 

593 S.W.3d at 181.We overrule Nueces County’s third issue.
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IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

L. ARON PEÑA JR.

Justice

Delivered and filed on the 

28th day of December, 2023.