alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50334

Summary Calendar

RENE D. MENDOZA

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(SA-97-CV-96)

October 23, 1998

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appellant, a former employee of the Texas Department of Human

Services (“TDHS”), appeals th e district court’s grant of summary

judgment in this employment discrimination case.

T DHS first sought summary judgment on Mendoza’s c laims

regarding harassment, failure to promote, and disability

discrimination. A district court may consider only those grounds

of a Title VII or ADA compla int that were raised in the

administrative process. S ee Anderson v. Lewis Rail Serv. Co.

, 868

F.2d 774, 775 (5th Cir. 1989). Mendoza did not properly raise2

these claims in the administrative process, so the claims could not

reasonably be expected to be within the scope of the EEOC’s

investigation. Thus, the district court did not err in rendering

summary judgment on these claims.

Mendoza also claimed that he was discharged bec ause of his

race and gender. However, Mendoza did not establish a p rima facie

case of either race-based or gender-based discrimination because he

failed to present proper summary judgment evidence that he was

replaced with a similarly qualified person outside the protected

class. S ee Ward v. Bechtel Corp.

, 102 F.3d 1 99, 202 (5th Cir.

1997).

Nevertheless, eve n assuming a p rima facie case, TDHS

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging

Mendoza, and Mendoza presents no evidence casting doubt on the

legitimacy of TDHS’s reasons for Mendoza’s discharge. S ee St.

Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 510-511 (1993).

For these reasons, the judgment of the district c ourt is

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.2
                           ============

        Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
----------------------------------------------------------------------

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Rotoblock
Corporation (Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Lance Waymen, Chief
Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer, hereby certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief:

   (1)  the quarterly report fully complies with the requirements
        of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
        1934; and

   (2)  the information contained in the quarterly report fairly
        presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
        results of operations of Registrant.



Date: March 15, 2006         /s/ Thomas M. Howard
                              -----------------------------------------
                              By: Thomas M. Howard, Chief Financial
                              Officer and Principal Accounting Officer












<PAGE>
#### James O. McGRIFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1499.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 8, 1988.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 1988.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Mark A. Jones, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Alfonso M. Saldana, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. The information charging the defendant with sexual battery and the evidence presented at trial do not support an instruction on lewd and lascivious conduct as a lesser included offense. There*996fore, the failure to give such an instruction was not error. *See State v. Hightower,*509 So.2d 1078, 1078 n. 2 (Fla.1987); *Walker v. State,*464 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); *Harrielson v. State,*441 So.2d 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).

DOWNEY, LETTS and STONE, JJ., concur.
#### Willie J. AWLS v. STATE of Alabama, ex rel. Wayne F. McCLOUD, a minor.

Civ. 6566.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 29, 1989.

Richard H. Ramsey IV, Dothan, for appellant.

William Prendergast and Lois Brasfield, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

J. ED TEASE, Retired Circuit Judge.

After jury verdict finding appellant to be the father of an illegitimate child, he files this appeal.

The record fails to disclose that a judgment of child support followed the jury’s determination of paternity. Consequently, the judgment is not final, and will not support an appeal.

The appeal is due to be, and is, dismissed under authority of *Hardy v. State ex rel. Chambers,*541 So.2d 566 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).

The foregoing opinion was prepared by Retired Circuit Judge J. ED TEASE while serving on active duty status as a judge of this court under the provisions of section 12-18-10(e), Code 1975, and this opinion is hereby adopted as that of the court.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

All the Judges concur.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIALREPORT**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

The undersigned officer of WII Components, Inc. (the “Company”)hereby certifies that the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for thequarterly period ended September 30, 2009 to which this certification is beingfurnished as an exhibit (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and that the information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company. This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350and Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K (“Item 601(b)(32)”) promulgated under theSecurities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the ExchangeAct.  In accordance with clause (ii) ofItem 601(b)(32), this certification (A) shall not be deemed “filed” forpurposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to theliability of that section, and (B) shall not be deemed to be incorporated byreference into any filing under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, exceptto the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.

 
| **Date:  November 12, 2009** | ** **                                               |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|                         | /s/ Dale B.  Herbst                                      |
|                         | Name: Dale B.  Herbst                                    |
|                         | Title: Chief  Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary |

 

1

----
## NUMBER 13 -23-00459-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE EUSTORGIO GUZMAN RESENDEZ

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

.


## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria 1 Proceeding pro se, relator Eustorgio Guzman Resendez filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate various orders and a judgment on grounds that the trial court “was without authority to preside over . . . this case .” Relator’s c ontentions concern

1 See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(d) ( “ When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case. ” ); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).2 matters related to his 1992 conviction for capital murder. 2 Relator has further filed a motion for leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus. In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish both that the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary or judicial decision and that there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged harm. See In re Meza , 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Harris , 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re McCann , 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be denied. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana , 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding ). The Court, having examined and fully consider ed the petition for writ of mandamus and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relator h as not met his burden to obtain relief. Accordingly, we d eny t he petition for writ of mandamus. Further, as previously noted, relator filed a motion for leave to file this original proceeding. Although a motion for leave is required to file original proceedings in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 72.1, a motion for leave is not required to file original proceedings in the intermediate appella te courts. See id. R. 52 & cmt.; In re Fields , 619 S.W.3d 394, 394 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2021, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) ; see also In re Simmons , No. 13

-

2 See Resendez v. State , 860 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg 1993, pet. ref'd) (affirming relator’s conviction on direct appeal) ; see also In re Resendez , No. 13

- 20

- 00433

- CR, 2020 WL 6278290, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg Oct. 27, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publ ication) (collecting related cases).3 23

- 00217

- CR, 2023 WL 3688028, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg May 26, 2023, orig. proceeding ) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We thus dismiss the motion for leave as moot.

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2 ( b ). Delivered and filed on the 30 th day of October, 2023.
#### STATE ex rel. Alvin BERTAUT v. CLERK OF COURT, 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 87-KH-2355.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Bertaut, Alvin; applying for remedial writ; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “M”, No. 85639; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 87-KH-0730.

Denied.
From: "Frey, Nathan J." <Nathan_J._Frey@omb.eop.gov>

To: Kevin Culligan/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Peter Tsirigotis/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, RobertJ

Wa yland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Joseph Goffman/DC/USEPA/US@EPA Cc: "Mancini, Dominic J." <Dominic_J._Mancini@omb.eop.gov>, "Higgi ns, Cortney"

<Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov> Date: 03/22/2012 07:14 PM Subject: Interagency Comments on latest draft of NSPS EGU preamble



### Attached are comments on the latest draft of the EGU NSPS preamble. Please call me if you have any questions. Rega rds, Nathan
#### George Washington MIMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 88-293.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 11, 1988.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Loren H. Cohen, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Michele L. Crawford, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *Phillips v. State,*360 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), *cert. denied,*368 So.2d 1372 (Fla.1979).
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 12

                       STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF RATIOS
                       -----------------------------------
                                 (In thousands)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                                          Years Ended December 31,
                                                                          ------------------------
                                                               1999      1998       1997         1996       1995
                                                             --------   --------   --------    --------   --------
<S>                                                          <C>        <C>        <C>         <C>        <C>
Fixed charges, as defined:
    Interest on long-term debt, amortization of
     debt discount, and interest component of
     rent expense                                            $ 11,019   $ 10,878   $  3,842    $    581   $    859
                                                             ========   ========   ========    ========   ========

Earnings, as defined:
    Income (loss) before income taxes                        $  3,522   $  4,336   $(15,208)   $  8,522   $ 16,112

     Total fixed charges (as shown above)                      11,019     10,878      3,842         581        859
                                                             --------   --------   --------    --------   --------

          Earnings available for fixed charges               $ 14,541   $ 15,214   $(11,366)   $  9,103   $ 16,971
                                                             --------   ========   ========    ========   ========
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges and
preferred dividend requirements
                                                                  1.3x       1.4x        --        15.7x      19.8x
                                                             ========   ========   ========    ========   ========

</TABLE>
#### Burton DENNIS et ux. v. Emmitt D. VANDERWATER et ux.

No. 86-C-2560.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 30, 1987.

In re Pico Credit Corp. — Third Party; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 85-1144; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 135602.

Prior report: La.App., 498 So.2d 1097.

Denied.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00795- CV
Mike Lucio, App ellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 98TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GV-1 3-0 0012 2, H ONO RAB LE TIM SULAK , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant filed his notice of ap p ea l in the trial court on November 16, 2013. The
rec ord was filed on Marc h 11, 2014, making appellant’ s brief due April 10. On April 28, we sent appellant n o t ice that his brief was overdue , asking for a response by May 8 and cautioning him that a fa ilure to respond could lead to the di smissal of hi s appea l. Appellant has not responde d to
our notice or filed a brief. We there fore d i s m i s s t h e appea l for want of prosec ution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Goodwin, and F ield Dismissed for Want of Prosecution Filed: June 9, 2014
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 59 (Tuesday, March 27, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 18258]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7326]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

[Docket No. FR-5625-N-01]

Notice of FHA Debenture Call

AGENCY: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Housing--Federal Housing 
Commissioner, HUD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This Notice announces a debenture call of certain Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) debentures in accordance with authority 
provided in the National Housing Act.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Yong Sun, FHA Financial Reporting 
Division, Office of Housing, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 451 Seventh Street SW., Room 5148, Washington, DC 20410, 
telephone 202-402-4778. This is not a toll-free number. Persons with 
hearing or speech impairments may access this number through TTY by 
calling the toll-free Federal Relay Service at 800-877-8339.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 207(j) of the National 
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 1713(j), and in accordance with HUD's regulation 
at 24 CFR 207.259(e)(3), the Assistant Secretary for Housing--Federal 
Housing Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, announces the call of all FHA debentures, with a coupon rate 
of 3.125 percent or above, that have been registered on the books of 
the Bureau of the Public Debt, Department of the Treasury, and are, 
therefore, ``outstanding'' as of March 31, 2012. The date of the call 
is July 1, 2012.
    The debentures will be redeemed at par plus accrued interest. 
Interest will cease to accrue on the debentures as of the call date. At 
redemption, final interest on any called debentures will be paid along 
with the principal. Payment of final principal and interest due on July 
1, 2012, will be made automatically to the registered holder.
    During the period from the date of this notice to the call date, 
debentures that are subject to the call may not be used by the 
mortgagee for a special redemption purchase in payment of a mortgage 
insurance premium.
    No transfer of debentures covered by the foregoing call will be 
made on the books maintained by the Treasury Department on or after 
June 11, 2012. This debenture call does not affect the right of the 
holder of a debenture to sell or assign the debenture on or after this 
date.

    Dated: February 17, 2012.
Carol J. Galante,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Housing--Federal Housing Commissioner.
[FR Doc. 2012-7326 Filed 3-26-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4210-67-P
```
**Exhibit 23**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

The Board of Directors and Shareholders 

Saflink Corporation: 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in theregistration statements (Nos. 333-92072, 333-74253, 033-668832, 333-118249 and 333-133016) on Form S-8, registration statements (Nos. 033-62430, 333-75789, 333-23467, 333-01510, 333-58575, 333-54084, 333-112287, 333-119778, 333-114594, 333-126185,333-135626 and 333-140723) on Form S-3, registration statement (No. 333-97221) on Form S-2 and registration statement (No. 333-68642) on Form S-1 of Saflink Corporation, of our report dated March 30, 2007, with respect to the consolidatedbalance sheets of Saflink Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2006 and 2005, and the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders’ equity (deficit) and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period endedDecember 31, 2006, which report appears in the December 31, 2006 annual report on Form 10-K of Saflink Corporation. 

Our report dated March 30, 2007contains an explanatory paragraph that states Saflink Corporation has suffered recurring losses from operations and has a net capital deficiency, which raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. The consolidatedfinancial statements do not include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of that uncertainty. 

Our report refers to SaflinkCorporation’s adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (revised 2004), *Share-Based Payment*, effective January 1, 2006. 

/s/ KPMG LLP 

Seattle, Washington 

March 30, 2007
#### Hubert FISCHER & Angeles de Fischer, Appellants, v. BARNETT BANK OF SOUTH FLORIDA, N.A., Appellee.

No. 87-113.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 1, 1987.

Steinberg & Merlin and Robert Merlin, Miami Beach, for appellants.

Sparber, Shevin, Shapo & Heilbronner and Jerome Shevin and Michael S. Perse and Marsha C. Rosen, Miami, for appellee.

Before HUBBART, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendants Hubert Fischer and Angeles de Fischer from a trial court order denying their motion to vacate an adverse final declaratory decree entered below on a default. We affirm the order under review for two reasons.

First, the defendants have failed to establish, as required by Florida law, that they did not timely respond to the petition for declaratory decree due to their excusable neglect. The defendants were properly served by publication and copies of the subject petition were mailed to them at their residence in Venezuela. The defendants, however, had just left Venezuela for *1088a two-month visit in Europe without leaving anyone to monitor their mail while they were gone — although they were fully aware of the pending controversy in the instant case and were represented thereon by counsel in Miami during part of the pre-litigation negotiations. In sum, the defendants’ failure to timely respond to the properly served petition herein was certainly due to their neglect, but their neglect was entirely inexcusable. Plainly, they should have had someone monitor their mail while they were away in Europe and left instructions as to how to respond to any lawsuit filed against them, in their absence, relating to the pending controversy in Miami. Their failure to do so was grossly negligent and inexcusable. *Winter Park Arms, Inc. v. Akerman,*199 So.2d 107, 108-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967); *Somerville v. Skidmore,*175 So.2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); *see Florida Investment Enters, v. Kentucky Co.,*160 So.2d 733, 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).

Second, the defendants have failed to establish, as required by Florida law, that they acted with due diligence in seeking to set aside the final declaratory decree. The defendants obtained the final judgment against them shortly after they returned to Venezuela from Europe; yet it inexplicably took them five weeks thereafter to contact their counsel in Miami to look into the matter. Although counsel promptly acted upon being so contacted and immediately filed a motion to vacate the final declaratory decree herein, the pri- or five-week delay by the defendants was entirely inexcusable. *See Bayview Tower Condominium Ass’n v. Schweizer,*475 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); *Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Steven Lake Masonry, Inc.,*356 So.2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); *Cal-U-Sonic v. Metric Sys. Corp.,*330 So.2d 63, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA), *cert. denied,*339 So.2d 1167 (Fla.1976). The order under review is, therefore, in all respects,

Affirmed.