IIA

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 25

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the court-martial conviction

of the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay, III, and calling upon

the President to award a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew

of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 25, 1999

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire (for himself, Mr. FRIST, Mr. BOND, Ms.

LANDRIEU, Mr. ROBB, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr.

HELMS, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. DURBIN, and Mr. EDWARDS) introduced the

following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

JOINT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the courtmartial conviction of the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay, III, and calling upon the President to award

a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew of the

U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.

Whereas shortly after midnight on the night of July 30,

1945, during the closing days of World War II, the

United States Navy heavy cruiser U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA–35) was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese

submarine;

Whereas of the 1,196 crew members, only 316 survived the

attack and subsequent five-day ordeal adrift at sea, the
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rest dying from battle wounds, drowning, shark attacks,

exposure, or lack of food and water, making the sinking

of the INDIANAPOLIS the worst sea disaster in United

States naval history;

Whereas following the rescue of the surviving crew members,

the commanding officer of the INDIANAPOLIS, Captain

Charles Butler McVay III, who survived the sinking and

the ordeal at sea, was charged with ‘‘suffering a vessel

to be hazarded through negligence’’ and was convicted by

a court-martial of that charge, notwithstanding a great

many extenuating circumstances, some of which were not

presented at the court-martial trial;

Whereas Captain McVay had an excellent record throughout

his naval career before the sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS, beginning with his graduation from the United

States Naval Academy in 1919 and including an excellent

combat record that included participation in the landings

in North Africa and award of the Silver Star for courage

under fire earned during the Solomon Islands campaign;

Whereas after assuming command of the INDIANAPOLIS

on November 18, 1944, Captain McVay led the ship during her participation in the assaults on Iwo Jima and

Okinawa;

Whereas during the latter assault, the INDIANAPOLIS suffered a damaging kamikaza attack which penetrated the

ship’s hull, but the ship was made seaworthy and skillfully returned by Captain McVay and her crew to San

Francisco for repairs;

Whereas following completion of those repairs, the INDIANAPOLIS was given the mission of transporting to the island of Tinian vital parts of the atomic bomb which was
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dropped on Hiroshima, a mission which was completed

successfully on July 26, 1945, at a record average speed

of 29 knots;

Whereas following the accomplishment of that mission, the

INDIANAPOLIS sailed from Tinian to Guam and from

there embarked for Leyte Gulf in the Philippines to join

training with the fleet assembling for the final assault on

the Japanese mainland;

Whereas as the INDIANAPOLIS began its trip across the

Philippine Sea on July 28, 1945, the war was virtually

over in that area of the South Pacific, with hostilities

having moved 1,000 miles to the north, the Japanese

Navy’s surface fleet was nonexistent, and United States

naval intelligence reported only four operational Japanese

submarines in the entire Pacific theater of war, all of

which resulted in the state of alert among shore-based

personnel routing and tracking the INDIANAPOLIS

across the Philippine Sea being affected accordingly;

Whereas before departure from Guam Captain McVay requested a destroyer escort because his ship was not

equipped with antisubmarine detection devices, but, despite the fact that no capital ship such as the INDIANAPOLIS had made the transit between Guam and the

Philippines without escort during World War II, that request was denied, and a 1996 report by the Navy’s Judge

Advocate General’s office concedes that ‘‘Captain McVay

and the routing officer did not discuss the availability of

an escort after the operations officer for

COMMARIANNAS confirmed that an escort was not

necessary’’;

Whereas although Captain McVay was informed of ‘‘submarine sightings’’ in the Philippine Sea, such sightings
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were commonplace, and none of those reported to Captain McVay had been confirmed, and at the same time

there was a failure to inform him that a submarine within range of his path had sunk the U.S.S. UNDERHILL

four days before his departure from Guam;

Whereas United States military intelligence activities,

through a code-breaking system called ULTRA, had

learned that the Japanese submarine I–58 was operating

in the Philippine Sea area, but Captain McVay was not

told of this intelligence, which remained classified as Top

Secret until the early 1990’s, and this intelligence (and

the fact that it was withheld from Captain McVay when

he sailed from Guam) was not brought to light at his

court-martial;

Whereas the INDIANAPOLIS was sunk by this same submarine;

Whereas the commander of that submarine, Mochitsura

Hashimoto, testified at the court-martial that once he

had detected the ship, he would have been able to make

a successful torpedo attack whether or not the ship was

zigzagging;

Whereas with visibility severely limited by a heavy overcast

at approximately 11 p.m. on the night of July 29, 1945,

Captain McVay gave the order to cease zigzagging and

retired to his cabin and shortly after midnight the INDIANAPOLIS was struck by two torpedoes and sunk within 12 minutes;

Whereas the formal charge upon which Captain McVay was

convicted for ‘‘suffering a vessel to be hazarded through

negligence’’ contained the phrase ‘‘in good visibility’’ in

reference to the weather conditions on that night, which
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is contrary to the recollection of all survivors, who recall

that the visibility was very poor;

Whereas after the INDIANAPOLIS was sunk, various Navy

shore offices compounded the previous errors which had

led to the ship being placed in jeopardy by failing to report the ship’s overdue arrival, thus leaving the approximately 950 members of the crew who survived the sinking of the ship adrift for four days and five nights until

by chance the survivors were spotted by a routine air patrol;

Whereas a court of inquiry to investigate the sinking was

convened in Guam on August 13, 1945, just two weeks

after the sinking and nine days after the survivors were

rescued (a date so soon after the sinking that Captain

William Hillbert, the Navy judge advocate for the inquiry, admitted that the inquiry was so rushed that they

were ‘‘. . . starting the proceedings without having available all the necessary data’’) and recommended that Captain McVay be issued a Letter of Reprimand and that he

be court-martialed;

Whereas the headquarters staff of CINCPAC (commanded by

Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz) disagreed with the recommendation of the court inquiry, stating that in not

maintaining a zigzag course Captain McVay at worst was

guilty only of an error in judgment and not gross negligence and concluded that the rule requiring zigzagging

would not have applied in any event since Captain

McVay’s orders gave him discretion on that matter and

took precedence over all other orders (a point that was

never made by Captain McVay’s attorney during the

court-martial);
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Whereas the Department of the Navy delayed the announcement of the sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS for almost

two weeks to coincide with the announcement of the surrender of Japan, thus diverting attention from the magnitude of the disaster and lessening its public impact,

and then, despite opposition by Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Raymond Spruance (for whom the INDIANAPOLIS had served as flagship), it brought court-martial

charges against Captain McVay in a rare instance when

a commanding officer’s recommendations are contravened;

Whereas Captain McVay thus became the first United States

Navy commanding officer brought to trial for losing his

ship in combat during World War II, despite the fact

that over 700 ships were lost during World War II, including some under questionable circumstances;

Whereas Captain McVay was convicted on February 23,

1946, on the charge of ‘‘suffering a vessel to be hazarded

through negligence’’, thus permanently damaging his career as a naval officer, although when Admiral Nimitz

was advanced to the position of Chief of Naval Operations later that same year, he remitted Captain McVay’s

sentence and restored him to active duty;

Whereas following his court-martial conviction, Captain

McVay remained on active duty until retiring in 1949

upon completion of 30 years of active naval service, with

a final promotion, in accordance with then-applicable law,

to the grade of rear admiral, effective upon the date of

his retirement;

Whereas Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay III (retired),

died on November 6, 1968, without having been exoner-
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ated from responsibility for the loss of his ship and the

lives of 880 members of her crew;

Whereas the survivors of the INDIANAPOLIS still living

have remained steadfast in their support of the exoneration of Captain McVay;

Whereas in 1993, Congress, in section 1165 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public

Law 103–160; 107 Stat. 1765; 16 U.S.C. 431 note), recognized the memorial to the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS

(CA–35) in Indianapolis, Indiana, as the national memorial to that historic warship and to her final crew; and

Whereas in 1994, Congress, in section 1052 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public

Law 103–337; 108 Stat. 2844), stating that it was acting on behalf of the grateful people of the United States

(1) recognized the invaluable contributions of the U.S.S.

INDIANAPOLIS to the ending of World War II, and (2)

on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of her tragic

sinking, and the dedication of the national memorial in

Indianapolis on July 30, 1995, commended that ship and

her crew for selfless and heroic service to the United

States: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE

4 COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTION OF CHARLES

5 BUTLER MCVAY, III.

6 It is the sense of Congress that—

7 (1) the court-martial charges against then-Cap8 tain Charles Butler McVay III, United States Navy,
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1 arising from the sinking of the U.S.S. INDIANAP2 OLIS (CA–35) on July 30, 1945, while under his

3 command were not morally sustainable;

4 (2) Captain McVay’s conviction was a mis5 carriage of justice that led to his unjust humiliation

6 and damage to his naval career; and

7 (3) the American people should not recognize

8 Captain McVay’s lack of culpability for the tragic

9 loss of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS and the lives of

10 the men who died as a result of her sinking.

11 SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL

12 UNIT CITATION FOR FINAL CREW OF THE

13 U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con15 gress that the President should award a Presidential Unit

16 Citation to the final crew of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS

17 (CA–35) in recognition of the courage and fortitude dis18 played by the members of that crew in the face of tremen19 dous hardship and adversity after their ship was torpedoed

20 and sunk on July 30, 1945.

21 (b) WAIVER OF TIME LIMITATION.—A citation de22 scribed in subsection (a) may be awarded without regard

23 to any provision of law or regulation prescribing a time
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1 limitation that is otherwise applicable with respect to rec2 ommendation for, or the award of, such a citation.

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