UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CARLOS L. DIAZ, pro se, in his personal capacity and in and for the estate of Edmundo B. Diaz as brother and personal representative of the estate, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. GARY KING, New Mexico Attorney General; HONORABLE JAMES LAWRENCE SANCHEZ; HONORABLE ALLEN SMITH; HONORABLE VIOLET OTERO; CHARLES SANCHEZ, Hearing Officer; HONORABLE WILLIAM SANCHEZ, all acting in a capacity as officers of the court in and for the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Valencia County, all acting under color of law and performing duties as officers of the court, in their judicial capacity, official capacity, personal capacity; ELIAS BARELA, Attorney; LAW OFFI CE OF BARELA, Defendants - Appellees, and JEFF SESSIONS * , United States Attorney General; HONORABLE JAMIE BACA, Probate Judge, Defendants. No. 16-2227 (D.C. No. 1:14-CV-01086-KG-SCY) (D.N.M.)

* In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Jeff Sessions is substituted for Loretta E. Lync h as the respondent in this action FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 27, 2017 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 .

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , MATHESON , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Carlos L. Diaz got into a dispute with hi s late brother’s part ner, Nancy Barela, during the probate action following his brother’s death. Ms. Barela accused Mr. Diaz of fathering her son, and sued him in New Mexico state court for a paternity test and child support. Dissatisfied with both the probate and paternity proceedings, Mr. Diaz filed this lawsuit against se veral judges involved in the act ions, as well as a hearing officer, Ms. Barela’s attorney , and others. The district court ultimately dismissed Mr. Diaz’s claims agai nst all defendants. Liberally construing Mr. Diaz ’s pro se opening brief, see Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), it appears he makes three arguments. First, he argues the dist rict court erred by dismissing his claims against two state judges, James Sanchez and Allen Smith, and a hearing officer, Charles Sanchez, on judicial immunity groun ds. Second, he argues the district court erred by quashing service on Ms . Barela’s attorney , Elias Barela, and his law office,

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.3 and by subsequently dismissing Mr. Diaz’s claims against th em. And third, he argues the district court erred by denying his motion to recuse. We reje ct these arguments and affirm. I. Judicial Immunity According to the amended complaint, James Sanchez and Allen Smith are New Mexico district court judges who presided over various aspects of the paternity suit. Charles Sanchez is a New Mexico heari ng officer who conducted a hearing and recommended a paternity test. Mr. Diaz sued them for da mages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico law claiming, among other things, that they violated his constitutional rights. The di strict court found th ey were entitled to judicial immunity, so it granted their mo tion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We review the district court’s ruling de novo. See Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts Co ., 820 F.3d 381, 386 (10th Cir. 2016). We assume the facts alleged in the complaint are true and make all reasona ble inferences in Mr. Diaz’s favor. See id

. “To survive a motion to dismis s, a complaint must contai n sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (200 9) (internal quotati on marks omitted). As the district court explained, a judge is immune from damage suits unless (1) he did not act in his judi cial capacity or (2) he acted “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Stein v. Disciplinary Bd . of Sup. Ct. of N.M. , 520 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “unless a declaratory4 decree was violated or declaratory reli ef was unavailable,” § 1983 does not allow injunctive relief against a j udge acting in his judicial cap acity. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This immunity extends to “o thers who perform functions cl osely associated with the judicial process.” Dahl v. Charles F. Dahl, M.D., P.C. Defined Benefit Pension Tr. , 744 F.3d 623, 630 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation mark s omitted). New Mexico law offers similar protection. See Edwards v. Wiley , 374 P.2d 284, 285 (N.M. 1962) (“[J]udicial officers are not li able for the erroneous exerci se of the judicial powers vested in them, . . . [unles s] they act wholly in exces s of their jurisdiction.”); Hunnicutt v. Sewell , 219 P.3d 529, 532 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (“[J]udicial immunity has been extended to various persons whose adjudicatory functions or other involvement with the judicial process have been thought to warrant protection . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We agree with the district court th at James Sanchez and Allen Smith are entitled to judicial immun ity. The amended complaint acknowledges they acted in their judicial capacities, see R. Vol. 1 at 73, and in cludes no facts suggesting “a complete absence of all jurisdiction,” Stein , 520 F.3d at 1195 (i nternal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, none of Mr. Diaz’s claims relate to declaratory relief. See § 1983. This immunity extends to Charles Sanc hez, who performed well-established judicial functions lik e holding hearings and making recommendations, see Butz v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978). Mr. Di az admits Charles Sanchez acted in5 his capacity as a hearing officer, see R. Vol. 1 at 73, and does not dispute the district court’s finding that he did not exceed his jurisdiction. Mr. Diaz’s only argument on this issue is the conclusory assertion that the district court erred, and he cites no legal authority suppor ting his position. This is not enough to prevail on appeal. See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc. , 458 F.3d 1073, 1092 (10th Cir. 2006). We agree with the district court that these defendants are entitled to judicial immun ity and affirm its or der of dismissal. II. Service of Process Mr. Diaz next challenges the distri ct court order quashing service on Mr. Barela and his law office, as well as its subsequent order dismissing his claims against them without prejudice. Mr. Diaz accused Mr. Barela of conspiring with other defendants to violate his constituti onal rights, but he had trouble serving Mr. Barela. It appears Mr. Diaz mail ed a copy of the summons and amended complaint to Mr. Barela’s la w office by certified mail, but the envelope was returned marked “refused unable to forw ard.” R. Vol. 1 at 223. A process server then went to the building where the office was located a nd served a woman who worked there, but the woman did not work for Mr. Barela an d was not authorized to accept service on his behalf. The district c ourt found these efforts did not satisfy the requirements for serving an individual or busin ess under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and (h). It therefore quashed service and gave Mr. Diaz 30 days to re-serve Mr. Barela and his law office. When Mr. Diaz made no effort to do so, the district court dismissed his claims for untimely service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).6 We review de novo whether Mr. Diaz’s ef forts to serve Mr. Barela and his law office satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Ci v. P. 4(e) and (h). See Espinoza v. United States , 52 F.3d 838, 840 (10th Cir. 1995). But we re view the dismissal of Mr. Diaz’s claims for abuse of discretion. See id

. Mr. Diaz did not deliver copies of th e summons and complaint to Mr. Barela, leave copies at his dwelling, deliver copies to an authori zed agent, or properly serve Mr. Barela under New Mexico law. And Mr . Diaz does not argue he complied with New Mexico law for serving a business or th at he delivered copies of the summons and complaint to an authorized agent of Mr. Barela’s law office. So we agree with the district court that Mr. Diaz failed to satisfy the requirements for serving an individual or business. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (h)(1). Likewise, we see no error in the district court’s subsequent order dismissing Mr. Diaz’s claims against thes e defendants. If a defendant is not timely served, the district court “must dismis s the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. Bu t if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the c ourt must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Mr. Diaz did not timely serve Mr. Barela or his law office, † and did not attempt to re -serve them after the dist rict court gave him more

† Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) now requires serv ice within 90 days af ter a complaint is filed, but prior to December 1, 2015, the time limit was 120 days. Mr. Diaz filed his amended complaint on December 29, 2014. The district court quashed service on August 4, 2015, and dismis sed Mr. Diaz’s claims agai nst Mr. Barela and his law office on January 21, 2016—more than a year after the complaint was filed and more than 120 days after advising Mr. Diaz why his initial attempts at service failed.7 time and thoroughly explained why his initial efforts were unsuccessful. Mr. Diaz does not argue he established good cause for failing to serve these defendants within the time limit. Under the circumstances, the district court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Diaz’s claims was entirely reasonable. See Front Range Equine Rescue v. Vilsack , 844 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2017) (A district court abuses its discretion when it “enters an ar bitrary, capricious, whimsical , or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). III. Motion to Recuse Lastly, Mr. Diaz challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to recuse. According to his motion, the distri ct court judge had a duty to recuse because his prior position as the United States Atto rney for the Distri ct of New Mexico somehow rendered him biased in favor of the New Mexico Attorney General, who was a named defendant. The district cour t rejected this argument, finding that no reasonable person who unde rstood the circumstances would doubt the judge’s impartiality. We review the denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mendoza , 468 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006). A judge must “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). This is true when “a reasonable pers on, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts a bout the judge’s impartiality.” Mendoza , 468 F.3d at 1262 (internal quota tion marks omitted). It ta kes more than speculation or suspicion of bias to require recusal. See United States v. Cooley , 1 F.3d 985, 9938 (10th Cir. 1993). And prio r adverse rulings or the j udge’s familiarity with a defendant are not enough. See id . at 994. Mr. Diaz cites no facts supporting his ar gument, and he does not explain why the judge’s prior position as a United St ates Attorney would cause a reasonable person to doubt his impartiality in a ca se involving the New Mexico Attorney General. To the extent Mr. Diaz’s accusations are ba sed on the judge’s rulings against him, this is not e nough to warrant recusal. U nder the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its disc retion by denying Mr. Diaz’s motion. IV. Conclusion We affirm.

Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge