alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         186,350
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  643,705
<ALLOWANCES>                                    90,305
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               782,229
<PP&E>                                          13,545
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (9,836)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 798,683
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          769,553  
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       177,901
<OTHER-SE>                                   (148,771)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   798,683
<SALES>                                        181,093
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               194,284
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   85,295
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                61,176
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                56,790
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              38,593
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (47,570)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (53,570)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (53,570)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.31)
        

</TABLE>
#### Aaron W. TREADWAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 85-2337.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 30, 1986.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and William H. Pasch, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Gary O. Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellant appeals from the imposition of costs following his entry of a plea of nolo contendere and adjudication of guilt for murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, robbery *309with a deadly weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon.

Appellant first contends, and the state concedes, that the imposition of costs pursuant to sections 943.25(4), 943.25(8) and 960.20, Florida Statutes (1985), was erroneous because the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard had not been complied with. We agree and strike the imposition of costs without prejudice to the state filing a new motion. *See Jenkins v. State,*444 So.2d 947 (Fla.1984); *Adams v. State,*497 So.2d 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

Appellant next raises the issue that section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985) violates ex post facto restrictions of the United States and Florida Constitutions as applied to him. The crime to which he pled nolo contendere occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. Ch. 85-213, §§ 2, 3, Laws of Fla. Ex post facto issues are generally not fundamental error and, therefore, must be raised at trial to be properly preserved for direct appeal. *Johnson v. State,*495 So.2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); *Springfield v. State,*443 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

A review of the record indicates that appellant did not raise this contention at trial. Accordingly, we refuse to rule on this issue at this time. Our holding is without prejudice to appellant to seek relief in the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. *Johnson; Springfield*at 485.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
#### David Lee WILLIAMS v. STATE.

1 Div. 631.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 24, 1987.

On Return to Remand June 30, 1987.

Arthur J. Madden III, Mobile, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Bernard B. Carr, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

PATTERSON, Judge.

Pursuant to the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in *Ex parte Williams,*510 So.2d 135 (Ala.1987), this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, with directions to vacate the sentencing order of May 24, 1983, in which a sentence of fifteen years was imposed pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act, and reinstate the original January 28, 1982, sentence imposing a two-year term of imprisonment. Upon compliance with these directions, the circuit court is to make due return to this court.

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

All Judges concur.

ON RETURN TO REMAND

PATTERSON, Judge.

It appears from the return to remand that the trial court has complied with our instructions by vacating its sentencing order of May 24, 1983, and reinstating its original order of January 28, 1982, imposing a two-year term of imprisonment. The trial court ordered that the sentence run concurrently with the sentence David Lee Williams is presently serving in the penitentiary in the State of Mississippi, and further ordered Williams to pay the costs of court in this case.

The judgment of sentence, as well as the judgment of conviction, is now affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

All Judges concur.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 40883 Summary Calendar

KELVIN ANDRE SPOTTS ,
P etitioner

- Appellant

v.
U.S. PENITENTIARY WARDEN FRANK LARA , Respondent

- Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:17

- CV

- 207

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and ELROD and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Kelvin Andre Spotts, federal prisoner # 05613

- 088, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana, cocaine, and cocaine base; using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime; and con spiracy to launder monetary instruments. He now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED June 27, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-40883 Document: 00514530817 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/27/2018No. 17

- 40883

2 whe rein he argued that in light of Mathis v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), United States v. Tanksley , 848 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.), supplemented by 854 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Hinkle , 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016), his prior Georgia drug conviction no longer qualified as a predicate felony offense for purposes of a sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851. Spo tts contends that the district court erred in determining that he failed to satisfy the requirements of the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
Our review is de novo. Padilla v. United States , 416 F.3d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Spotts challeng es the legality of his sentence, rather than the manner in which it is being executed, his claim is properly construed as arising under § 2255. See i d. at 425

- 26. Nevertheless, under the savings clause of § 2255(e), a § 2241 petition may be considered if Spotts shows that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” § 2255(e). To satisfy § 2255(e)’s saving clause, Spotts must establish that (1) his claim is “based on a retroa ctively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense,” and (2) his claim was “foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in [his] trial, appeal, o r first § 2255 motion.” Reyes

- Requena v. United States , 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). As the district court correctly determined, Spotts has failed to make such a showing. See id. at 904. We have repeatedly held that challenges to the validity of a sentencing enhancement do not satisfy the savings clause of § 2255(e). See, e.g., In re Bradford , 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011); Padilla , 416 F.3d at 426

- 27. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 17-40883 Document: 00514530817 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/27/2018
Exhibit
      32.2




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO




18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,




AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906




OF
      THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002









In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Global Services Partners Acquisition
      Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending April 30, 2007 (the
‘‘Report’’), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
      hereof, I Avinash Vashistha, Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice
      President of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1.
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2.
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




Dated:
      June 14, 2007




By: /s/
      Avinash
      Vashistha


Avinash
      Vashistha


Chief
      Financial Officer and Executive Vice President


(Principal
      Accounting and Financial Officer)
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of SAFLINK Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jon C. Engman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date: March 30, 2005
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIALREPORT**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

The undersigned officer of WII Components, Inc.(the “Company”) hereby certifies that the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Qfor the quarterly period ended March 31, 2010 to which this certificationis being furnished as an exhibit (the “Report”), as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and that the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.  This certification is provided solely pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K (“Item601(b)(32)”) promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “SecuritiesAct”), and the Exchange Act.  Inaccordance with clause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), this certification (A) shallnot be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act, orotherwise subject to the liability of that section, and (B) shall not bedeemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Actor the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specificallyincorporates it by reference.

 
| **Date:  May 13, 2010** |                            |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                         | /s/ John  Fitzpatrick           |
|                         | Name: John  Fitzpatrick         |
|                         | Title: Chief  Executive Officer |

 

1

----
**EXHIBIT32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONSPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of U.S. Premium Beef, LLC (the Company) onForm 10-Q for the period ended November 29, 2008 as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Scott J. Miller, ChiefReporting and Compliance Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

     (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

     (2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

|   |   |                                                                                                    |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| By:    |   | /s/ Scott J. Miller                                                                                     |
|   |   |                                                                                                    |
|   |   | Scott J. Miller*Chief Reporting and Compliance Officer*

*(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)* |

Date: January 13, 2009
**Exhibit
      32.2**









**INDEX
      OIL AND GAS, INC.**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Index Oil and Gas, Inc. on Form 10-QSB
      for the period ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
      Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Andrew Boetius, Chief Financial
      Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement req uired
      by
      Sect ion
      906
      has bee  n
      provided to Index Oil and Gas, Inc. and will be retained by Index Oil and Gas,
      Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.











/s/
      Andrew Boetius





Andrew
      Boetius


Chief
      Financial Officer


February
      14, 2007
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 14

- 00337

- CV In the Matter of J.M. From the 289th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2005JUV01800 The Honorable Carmen Kelsey, Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Delivered and Filed: June 25, 2014
DIS MISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Appell ant is attempting to appeal an adjudication order or a dispos ition order in a juvenile

case. Both orders were signed by the juvenile court on December 7, 2005. Juvenile appeals proceed under the rules governing civil cases. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN
. § 56.01(a) (West 2014); In the Matter of G.C.F. , 42 S.W.3d 194, 195 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); In the Matter of J.C.H., Jr. , 12 S.W.3d 561, 562 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1999, no pet.). In this case, appellant’s notice of appeal was due within thirty days from the signing of these orders, or by January 6, 2006.
See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.1 (providing that the notice of appeal in a civil case must generally be filed within 30 days after the judgment is signed)

. A ppellant filed his notice of appeal on May 1, 2014, which is untimely and fails to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. We ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A ppellant filed a written04

- 14

- 00337

- CV

response to our order; however, nothing in t his response shows that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. This appea l is therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See G.C.F. , 42 S.W.3d at 19 6 (dismissing juvenile appeal for lack of jurisdiction when the notice of appeal was untimely) ; J.C.H. , 12 S.W.3d at 562 (same)

. PER CURIAM

- 2

-
III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 137

To congratulate the United States Women’s Soccer Team on winning the

1999 Women’s World Cup Championship.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 12, 1999

Mr. REID (for himself and Mr. DASCHLE) submitted the following resolution;

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

To congratulate the United States Women’s Soccer Team

on winning the 1999 Women’s World Cup Championship.

Whereas the Americans blanked Germany in the second half

of the quarter finals, before winning 3 to 2, shut out

Brazil in the semifinals, 2 to 0, and then stymied China

for 120 minutes Saturday, July 10, 1999;

Whereas the Americans outshot China 5–4 on penalty kicks

after 120 minutes of regulation and overtime play ended

in a 0–0 tie;

Whereas the United States team played the final match

through heat, exhaustion and tension for 120 minutes,

including two sudden-death 15-minute overtime periods;

Whereas the United States team played before a crowd of

90,185, the largest to witness a women’s athletic event;
2

SRES 137 IS

Whereas title IX has created the opportunity for millions of

American girls and women to compete in sports;

Whereas the United States becomes the first women’s team

to simultaneously reign as both Olympic and World Cup

champions;

Whereas five Americans, forward Mia Hamm, midfielder

Michelle Akers, goalkeeper Briana Scurry and defenders

Brandi Chastain and Carla Overbeck, were chosen for the

elite 1999 Women’s World Cup All-Star team;

Whereas all the members of the 1999 U.S. women’s World

Cup team—defenders Brandi Chastain, Christie Pearce,

Lorrie Fair, Joy Fawcett, Carla Overbeck, and Kate

Sobrero; forwards Danielle Fotopoulos, Mia Hamm,

Shannon MacMillan, Cindy Parlow, Kristine Lilly, and

Tiffeny Milbrett; goalkeepers Tracy Ducar, Briana Scurry, and Saskia Webber; and midfielders Michelle Akers,

Julie Foudy, Tiffany Roberts, Tisha Venturini, and Sara

Whalen—both on the playing field and on the practice

field, demonstrated their devotion to the team and played

an important part in the team’s success; and

Whereas the Americans will now set their sights on defending

their Olympic title in Sydney 2000: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate congratulates the United

2 States Women’s Soccer Team on winning the 1999 Wom3 en’s World Cup Championship.

Æ
#### Beverly Ann COBY v. Henry Clay COBY.

Civ. 6242.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 16, 1988.

T.J. Carnes of Carnes & Carnes, Albert-ville, for appellant.

Louis B. Lusk of Lusk & Lusk, Gunters-ville, for appellee.

BRADLEY, Presiding Judge.

This appeal results from the denial of the wife’s petition for modification of a divorce *1071decree. The original decree denied the wife alimony, but the court retained jurisdiction to grant periodic alimony in the future.

Beverly Ann Coby and Henry Clay Coby were divorced in August 1985. The wife appealed to this court, asserting that the trial court erred by not awarding her alimony. *See, Coby v. Coby,*489 So.2d 597 (Ala.Civ.App.1986). This court affirmed the trial court’s denial of alimony but reversed on the ground that it had not retained jurisdiction to award alimony in the future. *Coby.*

Upon remand the trial court amended its divorce decree by retaining jurisdiction to award the wife alimony in the future. Subsequently, the wife filed a petition in the trial court asking it to modify the divorce decree by awarding her alimony. After a hearing the trial court denied her request.

A decision to modify alimony based upon a change in circumstances is discretionary with the trial court, and we will not reverse unless the court’s decision is plainly and palpably wrong. *Murphy v. Murphy,*470 So.2d 1297 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). Additionally, a presumption of correctness attaches to the trial court’s judgment following the presentation of evidence ore ten-us. *Murphy.*

Evidence was presented at trial that the wife, subsequent to the divorce, completed training to become a laboratory technician and was board certified. However, she has been unsuccessful in numerous attempts to secure employment in this field. As a result the wife has worked in jobs that pay minimum wage or slightly above minimum wage. Because her expenses have usually exceeded her income, the wife has had to rely on help from her family. The wife has also encountered some health problems which have contributed to her depressed financial situation.

The evidence shows that the husband, an experienced plumber and pipe fitter, earns very good wages when he is employed. However, at the time of trial the husband was unemployed. For about one year prior to trial the husband had been employed at temporary jobs that lasted for only a few weeks at the time. During the time that the husband has been unemployed, he has received unemployment compensation. The husband has health problems that could interfere with full-time employment in the future. The husband is presently required to pay the mortgage and insurance on the family home and maintain it. He is also required to pay child support. The husband testified that his liquid assets consisted of $200 in cash.

Based on the evidence before us, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision not to award alimony to the wife at this time is plainly and palpably wrong. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The wife’s request for an attorney’s fee on appeal is denied.

AFFIRMED.

HOLMES and INGRAM, JJ., concur.