### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O n- Br ie fs O ct obe r 31, 200 6 TRAVIS JO NES v . STATE O F TENNESSE E, EX REL. KE VA COLEMAN

A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Juvenile Court for Shelb y County No. R-2556 The Honorable Ge orge E. Blancett , Special Jud ge

No. W2006-00540-C OA-R3-JV - F iled Dece m ber 12, 2006
This is an appe al fr o m t h e ruling of the Juvenile Court of Shelby Countyoverr

uling the juvenile Refe ree ’s finding that Appellant’s v o l untary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity should be set aside un d e r

T

. C. A

. § 2 4

- 7

- 1 1 3

. F in d in g th a t th e e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t th e tria l c o u rt’s finding conce rning fraudulent procur ement, we vacate t h e Or d er o f t he trial c ourt and re mand for re ins ta te me nt o f the pr e vio us Judg me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt a ff ir min g the Re fe re e ’s Judg me nt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t V ac at e d, Rem anded an d Rendered
W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
J ames Sande rs of Memphis, Tenne ssee f or Appe llant, Travis Jones Michae l E. Moore, Ac ting Attorne y Gene ral and Reporter ; L aure n S. L amberth, Assistant Attorney Gene ral for

Appellee , State of Tenne ssee e x rel., Ke va Coleman OP IN ION Travis J ones (“A ppellant”) and Keva Coleman beg an dating in 1998. Sometim e in late 1998, the y se pa rate d. Du ri ng the se pa

ratio n, Ms. Col e ma n h a d a n a ff a ir wi th D arn e ll King . A bo ut a mon th later, Ms. Coleman informed Mr. Jones that she was pre g nant, and that she believed that Mr. J ones was the f ather . There afte r, Mr. Jones and Ms. Coleman rene wed their relationship. Khiara was born on A pril 22, 1999. At the hospital, Mr. J ones wa s li sted as the f ather on Khiara ’s birth ce rtificate and alleg edly executed a voluntary acknow ledg ment of paternity (“V AP”). Af te r the c hil d w a s b orn, Mr . Jon e s and Ms

. Cole ma n li ve d to g e the r f or abo ut s e ve n mo nth s. There afte r, Mr. Jones moved out but maintaine d contac t with Khiara by exercising visitation every other we ekend.-2-

Fr om J anuary

to J une of 2001, Mr . J ones wa s away at military

tr ai n i ng . Upon re turn, Mr. Jone s trie d to vis it Khia

ra bu t w a s u na

ble to loc a te Ms. Col e ma n. Mr . Jon e s w a s th e n d e plo y e d to a c tiv e du ty

fr om M arc h to No ve mbe r 2 00 3. Up on his re turn, Mr . Jon e s a g a in s ou g ht v isi ta tio n w ith Khiara but was unable to locate Ms. Coleman.
I n late 2004, Mr. J ones happened to see Ms. Coleman out and, although he did not renew the relationship wit h Ms. Coleman, Mr. J ones immediately beg an to v is it

w it hK h iara . Sometime around M ar c h o f 2 0 0 5 , M r . J o n e s b e g a n t o s u s p e c tt h a t h e w a s n o tKh i ar a ’ s b i o l o g i c a l f a t h e r . C o n s e q u e n t l y, he ob ta ine d a n in de pe nd e nt D NAte st. On Ap ri l 28 , 2 00 5, Mr . Jones f ile d a “ Pe tit ionto [Dis ]Est abli sh Pa te rn ity ,” in the J uve nil e Cou rt of She lby Cou nty se e kin g to d ise sta

bli sh his paternity of Khiar a. In his pe tition, Mr. J ones alleg es fraud in the procur ement of the VAP. The trial court orde red the parties to submit to DNA testing. T he DNAtest results excluded Mr. J ones as the biologica l father . On S eptember 12, 2005, afte r a he aring befor e the Ref ere e, the c ourt g rante d Mr. J ones’s p et i t i o n and disestablished paternity . The State of T ennesse e ex re l . Keva Coleman (“State,” or “Appe llee”) timely reque sted a de novo he ari ng be fo re the Spe c ia l Judg e , w hic h r e qu e st was g rante d by

Orde r of Septembe r 19, 2005.
At the re he ari ng , M r. Jone s mo ve d f or c on tin ua nc e on the g ro un d th a t he was un abl e to adequately

prepa re be cause he wa s alleg edly serve d with notice of the date of the re hearing only the day befor e. The trial co u rt d en ied the continuanc e, noting that Mr. J ones only had to re -prove e ve rythi ng he ha d p ro ve d at th e ini tia l he ari ng . In a dd iti on , th e c ou rt a lso de nie d Mr. Jone s’ s r e qu e st to admit the DNA test re sults made pursuant to the court order. By Orde r of F ebrua

ry 9, 2005, the trial court dismi ssed Mr. J o n es ’s petition without prejudice . Mr. J ones appe als and raises four issues for revie w as stated in his brief : 1. Whether the Rehe aring J udg e er red in dismissing the tria l judge ’s Finding s that fraud had occur red; that Petitioner had bee n ex cluded by DN A T e st andwa s, the re fo re , n ot the nat ural fa the r o f the c hil d named in the Petition; that there ha d been minimal contac ts betwee n the Peti t ioner a nd the minor child in the ca se at ba r; and that the re qu ir e me nts of

TCA§6 8- 3- 31 1 h a d b e e n me t? 2. Whether the Rehe aring J udge er re d in finding that fraud c an not be ma de ou t f

ro m th e fa c t of

a wo ma n’ s a dmi ssi on in o pe n co urt to having had a se x ual af

fair at or around the time of conc eption with a man not a party

to the action at ba

r; later w ithholding the fac t of the sexual affa ir from the other party to the action, while convincing that other pa rty to execute a voluntary acknow ledg ment of paternity of the wo ma n’ s c hil d b y

statin g to the oth e r p arty that he wa s in fa c t said child’s father, even t houg h the woman a dmitted in open Court to not being sure of

said child’s pate rnity

at the ti me of the declaration to the o t h e r p ar t y?-3- 3. Whe the r the Re he ari ng Judg e ’s de nia l of Ap pe lla nt’ s r e a so na ble reque st for a c ontinuance w as abuse of di s cr etion, in that Appellant was served with notice of the re h ea ri ng and an A nswer to the Ap p el l an t ’s P et i t i o n t h e p re v i o u s d ayt o t h e h ea ri n g? 4. Whether the Rehe aring J u d ge’s Order dismissing A ppellant’s Pet i t i o n wi t h no specific finding s of fa ct or law was a n abuse of dis c re tio n in

tha t Reh eari ng J ud ge’s Or der o verr ul ed p revi ou s sp e c if ic finding s of fa ct and law ?
T. C.A . § 24 -7 -1 13 (2 00 0) pr ov ide s f or re lie f f ro m vo lun tary a c kn ow le dg me nts of pate rn ity if c e rt a in r e qu ir e me nts are me t, t o w it:

(a) A voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pate rn i t y whi ch is completed under the provisions of § 68-3-203( g ), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305( b) or un de r s imi lar pr ovisi on s o f ano the r s ta te or g ov e rn me nt s ha ll constitute a leg al finding of pate rnity on the individual named as the fathe r of the chi l d i n the ac knowledg ment, subject to resc ission as provided in subsec tion (c). The acknow ledg ment, unless resc inded p u rs u an tt o s u b s ec t i o n (c ), s h al l b e c o n c l u s i v e o f t h atfa t h er 's pate rn ity wi tho ut f urthe r o rd e r o f the c ou rt

. * * * (c ) Asig natory

to a vol un tary a c kn ow le dg me nt s ha ll b e pe rm itt e d to resc ind the voluntary

acknow ledg ment at the ea rlier of : * * * (2) Wi th in th e s ixty - d a y p e r io d f o ll o w in g c o mp le ti o n o f the acknow ledg ment, at any judicial or administrative proc eeding during that perio d at which the signatory is a party

and which pr ocee ding re la te s to the c hil d, by c omp leti on of the fo rm de sc ri be d in subdivision (c)(1) or

by the entry of an order by

the administrative or judicial tri b u n a l w h ich direc ts the resc ission of such a c kn ow le dg me nt. * * * (e) (1) I f the voluntary

acknow ledg ment has n ot been r escinde d pursuant to subsection (c ), the a cknowledg ment may only be c ha lle ng e d o n th eb a sis of

fr aud , w he the r e xtri ns ic or int ri ns ic , d ur e ss, or ma te ri a l mi sta

ke of fa c t.-4- (2) The challeng er must i n s t i t ute the proc eeding upon notice to the other sig natory

and other nece ssary parties including the Title I V-D a g e nc y wi thi n fi ve (5 ) y e ars of the e xec uti on of the a c kn ow le dg me nt, and if the c ourt finds based upon the evidenc e p rese nted at the hearing that there is substantial likelihood that fraud, dur ess, or a materia l mist ake of

fa ct exis ted in the execution of the a c kn owl edg me nt o f p a te rn ity , th e n, a ndon ly the n, the c ou rt

sh a ll order pare ntag e tests. Such action shall not be barred by the five ( 5) y e ar sta tute of

limita tio ns whe re fr

aud in th e proc ure ment o

f t he ac kno wle dgment b

y the mothe r o

f t he c hild is all

e ge d a nd wh e re the requested relief

will not affect the interests of the child, th e state, or any Title IV

-D age ncy . Nothing he rein shall pre clude the c halleng er from p rese nting a ny

other form of evidenc e as a substitut e for

the pa re nta g e te sts if

it i s n ot p os sib le to c on du c t su c h te sts

. Emphasis added. We f ir st n ote that t he VAP is n ot i nc lud e d inthi s r e c or d. Ho we ve r, ne ith e r p arty c on te sts the va lid ity of thi s doc ume nt. Con se qu e ntl y , a ndfo r p ur po se s o f this app e a l on ly , w e wi ll a ssu me that th e VA P wa s e xec ute d ina c c or da nc e wi th the statut ory ma nd a te s. Be cause this c ase was tried by the court sitti ng without a jury , we r eview the case de novo up on the re c or d w itha

pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss o f the fi nd ing s o f f a c t by the tr ia l c ou rt . U nle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the finding s, we must af fi rm ab s ent er

ror of law. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d).
Mr. J ones cha lleng es the VA P on the basis of fraud i n the procurement. The law on fraud is w e ll e sta

bli sh e d in Te nn e sse e a nd , in or de r to state a c la im fo r fr aud , thefo llo wi ng e le me nts mus t be established: (1) an intentional misreprese ntation with reg ard to a materia l fac t; (2) knowledg e of the represe n t at i o n [ 's ] fa l s i t y -t h att h e r ep re s en t at i o n wa s m ad e k n o wi n gl y o r w i t h o u tb el i ef in it s truth, or re cklessly

without reg ard to its truth or fa lsity ; (3) that the plaintiff r eason ab l y re l ied on the misrepre sentation and suff ere d damag e; and ( 4) that the misrepre sentation relates to an existi ng or p a s tf a c t , o r , i f t h e c l a i mi s b a s e d o n p r o m i s s o r y f r au d , t h e n t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m u s t“ e m b o d y a promise of future action wit hout the present intention to carry out the promise.” Shah rdar v . Global Hous., In c. , 9 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d 2 3 0 , 2 3 7 (T en n . C t

. Ap p . 1 9 9 8 ) ( q u o t i n g Sta c ks v . Sa unde rs , 812 S.W .2d 587, 592 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990))

. I n her te stimony , Ms. Coleman admits to having a sexual relations h i p wi th Darne ll King du ri ng the mon th the c hil d w a s c on c e ive d, to w it:

Q. So when y ou [Ms . Coleman] broke up with Mr. J ones, y ou immediately

started dating other

men?-5- A. Well, we broke up a few months–a month–like a month, and then I fo un d o ut I

wa s pre g na nt, a nd I c a lle d him [Mr. Jone s] a ndtol d h im I wa s p re g na nt. Q. No w, h ad y o u h ad an af fa i r w i t h t h e– Da rn el l Ki n g?
A. Ye s. Despite the f

act that Ms. Coleman ha d eng ag ed in ac tiviti es with Mr. King t hat could have produc ed a child, she a dmits t hat she did not inform Mr. Jones that there wa s a possibilit y that he wa s not Kh iara ’s fathe r, to w it:

Q. Okay . At any

time did y ou let–or vol unteer to Mr. J ones that y ou had had an aff

air with Da

rnell King afte r y ou two broke up be fore y ou tol d h im y ou we re pr e g na nt? A. No, bec ause w e we re br oke up. Q. B ut w hen y ou called him [ Mr. J ones] and told him t hat y ou wer e pr e g na nt, y ou did n’ t te ll h im that y ou ha d h a d a n aff a ir wi th s o me b o d y

e ls e [d u r in g th e ti me o f

c o n c e p ti o n ]?
* * *
A. I don’t reme mber ex actly

what date s and months I

dated him [Mr. King ], but me and Tr avis broke u p fo r a month. W e had a disag ree ment, and I

sl ep t wi th Darne ll, and I found out I

was pr e g na nt. An d I

–I tho ug ht it wa s Tr a vis ’ daug hte r, too , b e c aus e –w e ll, I thought I was pre g nant by

him [ Mr. J ones].... Ms. Coleman’s testimony supports a finding that she was at least rec kless with r eg ard to the truthof the state me nt t o M r. Jone s th a t he wa s Khia ra’s fat her. From the re c or d, it i s c le ar that, beca use of her affair with Mr. King near t he ti me of conce ption, Ms. Coleman had re ason to believe that Mr. King was the f

ather of the c hild. Even wi t h this information, she proce eded to tell Mr. J ones t h at he wa s the fathe r. B y Ms. Coleman’s own statements, Mr. Jones had no knowledg e of he r a ff a ir wi th M r. Ki ng a nd

ha d no re a so n no t to re ly up on Ms. Col e ma n’ s state me nt, wh ic h h e did to h is d e tr ime nt. F ro m th e re c or d a s a wh ole , w e c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n g co n ce rn i n g fr au d i n t h e p ro cu re m en to f t h e VA P

. Ba s ed u p o n t h e f o re go i n g, we f ind that Mr. J ones has met his burde n to es t ab l i s h the exist ence of fr aud in this case. C o n s eq u en t l y , u n d erT

. C

. A. § 2 4 -7 -1 1 3 (e )( 2 ), t h e t ri al co u rt s h o u l d h a v e a l l o we d DN A t es t i n g. B e c aus e the Re fe re e ha d p re vio us ly or de re d D NAte sti ng , it

wo uldbe re du nd a nt t o re ma nd thi s c a se for the trial court to orde r anothe r test. I n the intere st of judicial economy , we hold that the DN A test order ed by

the Refe ree is admitted.-6-

I n addition to a showing of fr aud, a pa rty seeking relief under T.C.A. § 24-7-113 outside the fi ve y e ar s ta tut e of

lim itatio ns , mus t a lso sh ow that th e re qu e ste d r e lie f w ill no t a ff e c t th e int e re sts of t he child, the s tate, or any Title I V-D ag ency . I n this case, the trial court spec ifically found that thi s r e qu ir e me nt i s me t, t o w it:

Th e re ha s n ot b e e n a

sh owi ng to the satis fa c tio n o f the Cou rt that it would be adve rse to the inter est of the c hild to t erminate pare ntag e, nor has it bee n shown to the satisfac tion of the Court that it would be a dv e rs e to the Ti tle I V- D A g e nc y to t e rm inate the pa

re ntal r ig hts

. Fr om our revie w of the r ecor d, we c annot conc lude that the evidence preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s holding on this criterion.
For the fore g oing r easons, we vacate the Or der of the trial court a nd rema nd for r einstatement of the pre vious J udg ment of the c ourt which aff irmed disestablishing paternity . Costs of this appea l are assessed to Appe llee, State of Te nnessee ex re l. Ke va Jone s.

__________________________________________ W. F RANK CR A WF O R D , PR E S I D I N G JUDG E, W.S.