* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-60734

Summary Calendar

DEBORAH STUART; DELLA MOORE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants,

INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Mississippi

(1:95-CV-156-GR)

November 17, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Chief Judge: *

Deborah Stuart and Della Moore appeal an adverse summary judgment and the

district court’s denial of their motion for class certification. For the reasons assigned,

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs brought this action against their employer, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.,

alleging sexual discrimination in the promotion of female employees to advanced and1 Plaintiffs have only appealed the portions of the district court’s order dealing with their

Title VII claims.

2 supervisory positions, sexual harassment, retaliation, and various constitutional and

state law c laims. 1 They also sought to certify a class consisting of all women who

have been employed at Ingalls since December 25, 1992, or who may in the future be

employ ed at Ingalls, and who would be discriminated against on the basis of sex or

who would suffer from sexual harassment.

The district court granted summary judgment against both Stuart and Moore on

their individual claims for several reasons, initially finding that their claims were timebarred because they failed to demonstrate any specific instance of discrimination within

the preceding 180-day period. The court also held that plaintiffs did not establish a

prima facie case of discriminatory denial of promotion because they c ould not

demonstrate that they were qualified for or applied for a promotion. As the court noted,

the plaintiffs’ statistical and deposition testim ony also failed to indicate that Ingalls

intended to discriminate against them. The same findings were made as to plaintiffs’

claims for discrimination in technician pay, depar tment transfers, and assignment of

overtime.

The district court also granted summary judgment on Stuart’s and Moore’s claim

of hostile work environment sexual har assment, finding that the plaintiffs did not

subjectively feel harassed and that there was no evidence of knowledge of the

employer. The retaliation claim failed for lack of causal connection and failure of proof

of any retaliatory act concerning ultimate employment decisions.

The distri c t court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, holding that2 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 92 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1996).

3 Gutierrez v. Excel Corp. , 106 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 1997).

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc. , 148 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 1998).

5 Gutierrez , 106 F.3d at 686.

3 there was not sufficient statistical evidence to support a finding of discrimination in the

workplace, specifica lly rejecting the statistics produced by plaintiffs’ expert as

unreliable. The requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 also were not

satisfied because of the individual nature of the claims of the putative class and because

of the lack of employer knowledge concerning the alleged incidents of harassment. The

class certification order also denied the request for conditional certification and refused

to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Stuart and Moore timely appealed both the district

court’s grant of summary judgment and the denial of class certification.

ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 2 viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 3 Summary judgment is

appropriate when the record discloses “that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 4 We will

affirm the grant of summary judgment if the facts and inferences in fa vor of the

prevailing party are so strong that no reasonable juror could arrive at a verdict contrary

to the district court’s decision and we will reverse if there is substantial evidence upon

which reasonable jurors could differ. 5

Our review of the record and briefs discloses no reversible error and,6 J .R . Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chem ical Co. , 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996)

(stating that the trial court has “wide discret ion” in deciding whether to certify a class);

Shipes v. Trinity Indus. , 987 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1993).

7 See, e.g., Trevino v. Holly Sugar Corp. , 811 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1987).

4 accordingly, on the facts as found, the authorities cited, an d analysis made by the

district court in its Memorandum Opinion filed September 30, 1997, we affirm the grant

of summary judgment in favor of Ingalls on plaintiffs’ individual claims.

Pl a intiffs also appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for class

certification. We review a district court’s denial of class certification for an abuse of

discretion. 6 If summary judgment on the claims of the individual plaintiffs is upheld,

the court need not address the issue of class certificatio n because the proposed

representatives would not be able to repres ent the putative class adequately. 7 Our

affirmance of the grant of summary judgment obviates the need to reach this question.

Were we to do so, we would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of

that motion. Accordingly, the judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.