UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4160

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KENNETH LAMONT BARNES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:13-cr-00138-FL-1)

Submitted: December 31, 2015 Decided: March 2, 2016

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per 

curiam opinion.

Paul K. Sun, Jr., Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. 

May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Kenneth Lamont Barnes appeals his jury conviction and 

sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012). Having reviewed 

the record, we affirm Barnes’ conviction but vacate his sentence 

and remand for resentencing.

Barnes first challenges the district court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress evidence stemming from an investigatory stop of 

a stationary vehicle that he and an acquaintance occupied. We 

review factual findings underlying a district court’s denial of a 

motion to suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.

United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2015). In a 

case involving a brief investigatory stop short of an arrest, “the 

Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported 

by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be 

afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

30 (1968). “[R]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 

than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than 

preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

119, 123 (2000). “[M]ultiple factors may be taken together to 

create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor, taken alone, 
3

would be insufficient.” United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 

300 (4th Cir. 2013).

Our de novo review of the record confirms that the district 

court did not err in finding that, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, the officers had a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that Barnes and the vehicle’s other occupant were engaged 

in criminal activity. We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying Barnes’ motion to suppress.

Barnes also challenges the district court’s admission into 

evidence of expert testimony concerning the firearm’s movement in 

interstate and foreign commerce, and statements that Barnes made 

to police concerning his acquisition of the firearm. Upon careful 

review of the record, we find that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in admitting either type of evidence. See United 

States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating 

standard of review).

Finally, Barnes argues that the district court erred in 

sentencing him as an armed career criminal. In light of the 

Government’s concession that Barnes was not an armed career 

criminal, although we affirm Barnes’ conviction, we vacate his 

sentence and remand this case for resentencing. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 
4

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.