III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 220

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the February 2000 deployment

of the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit to an area of potential hostilities and the essential requirements that the battle group and expeditionary unit have received the

essential training needed to certify the warfighting proficiency of the

forces comprising the battle group and expeditionary unit.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 4, 1999

Mr. INHOFE (for himself, Mr. WARNER, Mr. ROBERTS, and Mr. LOTT) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on

Armed Services

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the February

2000 deployment of the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group

and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit to an area

of potential hostilities and the essential requirements

that the battle group and expeditionary unit have received the essential training needed to certify the

warfighting proficiency of the forces comprising the battle group and expeditionary unit.

Whereas the President, as Commander-in-Chief of all of the

Armed Forces of the United States, makes the final decision to order a deployment of those forces into harm’s

way;
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•SRES 220 IS

Whereas the President, in making that decision, relies upon

the recommendations of the civilian and military leaders

tasked by law with the responsibility of training those

forces, including the Commander of the Second Fleet of

the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in

the Atlantic;

Whereas the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility has

been since World War II, and continues to be, an essential part of the training infrastructure that is necessary

to ensure that maritime forces deploying from the east

coast of the United States are prepared and ready to execute their assigned missions;

Whereas, according to the testimony of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Island of

Vieques is a vital part of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons

Training Facility and makes an essential contribution to

the national security of the United States by providing

integrated live-fire combined arms training opportunities

to Navy and Marine Corps forces deploying from the east

coast of the United States;

Whereas, according to testimony before the Committee on

Armed Services of the Senate and the report of the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques, a suitable

alternative to Vieques cannot now be identified;

Whereas, during the course of its hearings on September 22

and October 19, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services

of the Senate acknowledged and expressed its sympathy

for the tragic death and injuries that resulted from the

training accident that occurred at Vieques in April 1999;
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Whereas the Navy has failed to take those actions necessary

to develop sound relations with the people of Puerto Rico;

Whereas the Navy should implement fully the terms of the

1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy

and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico regarding Vieques

and work to increase its efforts to improve the economic

conditions for and the safety of the people on Vieques;

Whereas in February 2000, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle

Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are

scheduled to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea and the

Persian Gulf where the battle group and expeditionary

unit will face the possibility of combat, as experienced by

predecessor deploying units, during operations over Iraq

and during other unexpected contingencies;

Whereas in a September 22, 1999, letter to the Committee

on Armed Services of the Senate, the President stated

that the rigorous, realistic training undergone by military

forces ‘‘is essential for success in combat and for protecting our national security’’;

Whereas in that letter the President also stated that he

would not permit Navy or Marine Corps forces to deploy

‘‘unless they are at a satisfactory level of combat readiness’’;

Whereas Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, recently

testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the

Senate that ‘‘only by providing this preparation can we

fairly ask our service members to put their lives at risk’’;

Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vieques provides

integrated live-fire training ‘‘critical to our readiness’’,
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and the failure to provide for adequate live-fire training

for our naval forces before deployment will place those

forces at unacceptably high risk during deployment;

Whereas Admiral Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations,

and General Jones, the Commandant of the Marine

Corps, recently testified before the Committee on Armed

Services of the Senate that without the ability to train on

Vieques, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit scheduled for deployment in February 2000 would not be ready for such deployment ‘‘without greatly increasing the risk to those

men and women who we ask to go in harm’s way’’;

Whereas Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth

Fleet of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee

on Armed Services of the Senate that the loss of training

on Vieques would ‘‘cost American lives’’;

Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of

unrestrained civil disobedience from using the training

facilities on Vieques which are required to accomplish the

training necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of combat readiness; and

Whereas while the Department of Defense is trying to work

with the Government of Puerto Rico on a permanent solution to resolve the current training crisis, the Department of the Navy has an immediate requirement to gain

access to these facilities for 13 days in December to accomplish the critical integrated training necessary to

achieve a satisfactory level of combat readiness for the

U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine

Expeditionary Unit: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that—
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1 (1) the Secretary of the Navy should conduct

2 the 13 days of pre-deployment training which is re3 quired to be performed on the Island of Vieques to

4 ensure the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the

5 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are free of serious

6 deficiencies in major warfare areas, thereby reducing

7 the risk to those men and women who we ask to go

8 in harm’s way; and

9 (2) the President should not deploy the U.S.S.

10 Eisenhower Battle Group or the 24th Marine Expe11 ditionary Unit until—

12 (A) the President, in consultation with the

13 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the

14 Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the

15 Commandant of the Marine Corps, reviews the

16 certifications regarding the readiness of the bat17 tle group and the expeditionary unit made by

18 the Commander of the Second Fleet of the

19 Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces

20 in the Atlantic, as the case may be; and

21 (B) the President determines and so noti22 fies Congress that the battle group and the ex23 peditionary unit are free of serious deficiencies

24 in major warfare areas.

Æ