alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                             PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, George Moore hereby certifies as follows:

(a)  I am the Chief Executive Officer of Barrington Sciences Corporation (the
     "Company");

(b)  To the best of my knowledge, the Company's Annual Report on form 10K for
     the year ended September 30, 2005 (the "Report") complies in all material
     respects with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange
     Act of 1934, as amended; and

(c)  To the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the Report, the
     information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                        BARRINGTON SCIENCES CORPORATION

Date:   May 1, 2007                     /S/ George Moore
                                        --------------------------------
                                        George Moore
                                        Chief Executive Officer

     This certificate accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 or any other provision of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.

     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18of the United States Code

I, Thomas M. OFlynn, Chief Executive Officer of PSE&G Transition Funding II LLC, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of PSE&G Transition Funding II LLC on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2007 (the "Periodic Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of PSE&G Transition Funding II LLC.



/s/ Thomas M. OFlynnThomas M. OFlynnChief Executive OfficerDate: August 10, 2007




---
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA



### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT

PAUL ERDEK

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

.

No. 2D 20 2 3

- 1142

May 2 4 , 20 2 4

Appeal from the County Court for Sarasota County; Phyllis R. Galen,

Judge.

Paul Michael Erdek, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James A. Hellickson,

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT

, VILLANTI

, and ROTHSTEIN

- YOUAKIM

, JJ.

, Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
#### Ulises TAMAYO, a minor, By and Through his parents and next friends, Ulises TAMAYO and Rosario Estevez and Ulises Tamayo and Rosario Estevez, individually, Appellants, v. MIAMI CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, Appellee.

Nos. 86-877, 87-370.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 1, 1987.

*1092Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Arnold Ginsberg, J. Arthur Hawkesworth, Jr., Miami, for appellants.

Kubicki, Bradley, Draper, Gallagher *&*McGrane and Betsy E. Gallagher and Richard Hoffman, Miami, for appellee.

Before HUBBART, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a trial court order awarding them attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 768.56, Florida Statutes (1983) as the prevailing parties in a medical malpractice action. The trial court limited the attorney’s fees awarded to the amount of the contingent fee payable under the contract between the plaintiffs and their counsel, based on the authority of *Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe,*472 So.2d 1145, 1151 (Fla.1985) (“Further, in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee arrangement reached by the attorney and his client.”)

We reverse and remand for further proceedings based on the rule in this district that *Rowe*does not apply retroactively so as to restrict an attorney’s fee award to be no more than the fee set by the contingency fee agreement between the party seeking fees and his counsel, where, as here, the said attorney’s fee agreement was entered into prior to the effective date of the *Rowe*decision. *Tuerk v. Allstate Ins. Co.,*498 So.2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), *rev. denied,*506 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1987); *Levy v. Levy,*483 So.2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA), *rev. denied,*492 So.2d 1333 (Fla.1986). We nonetheless certify that our decision passes upon a question of great public importance, namely, whether the above-stated interpretation of *Rowe*is a proper and valid interpretation of the *Rowe*decision, so as to permit further review of this case by the Florida Supreme Court under Article V, Section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.

The attorney’s fee order under review is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an attorney’s fee award based on the standards established by *Rowe,*except that the court-awarded fee may exceed the fee set by the contingency fee agreement between the plaintiff and his counsel.

Reversed and remanded.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. James Delmar HUTCHESON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 86-1027.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Jan. 29, 1987.

*191Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Paula C. Coffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant/ cross-appellee.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Michael S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee/cross-appel-lant.

COBB, Judge.

The state timely appeals the sentence of seven years’ incarceration given appellee, James D. Hutcheson, for the crime of entering contraband (marijuana) into a correction facility in violation of section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1985). The state contends that the trial court erred in utilizing a category (7) “Drugs” scoresheet instead of a category (9) “All Other Felony Offenses” scoresheet, thus resulting in a lower presumptive guideline sentence.

Two sentencing scoresheets were initially prepared on the matter. One looked at the offense as a category (7) offense, “Drugs,” and gave a total score of 205 points, placing Hutcheson within the guideline range of seven to nine years’ incarceration. The second scoresheet scored Hutcheson under category (9), “All Other Felony Offenses.” This scoresheet gave Hutcheson a total score of 350 points and placed him in a guideline sentencing range of 15 to 22 years in prison. The lower court scored Hutcheson utilizing the category (7) score-sheet because the contraband involved in the present case was drugs, and sentenced Hutcheson to seven years’ incarceration.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(c) provides, in pertinent part:

> Offenses have been grouped into nine (9) offense categories encompassing the following statutes:

> * * * * * *

> Category (7): Drugs: Chapter 893.

> 5⁄8 # 3⁄8 5⁄8 jfe 3⁄8

> Category (9): All Other Felony Offenses.

The actual forms for categories (7) and (9) contained in the 1985 version of the rules (which were in effect at the time of this sentencing) provide the headings “Category (7): Drugs,” and “Category (9): All Other Felony Offenses.” From the above it is apparent that category' (7) offenses were only meant to include those offenses under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Thus, since the present felony was not contained in Chapter 893, it should properly have been scored on the category (9) scoresheet.1

As the lower court sentenced Hutcheson using an incorrect scoresheet, and since the utilization of the correct scoresheet would result in a higher sentencing guideline range, this case is remanded. On remand the trial court is instructed to sentence utilizing the category (9) scoresheet and either sentence within the guideline range or give appropriate reasons in writing to justify a departure from the guidelines.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

COWART, J., and DANIEL, C.W., Associate Judge, concur.

1

. The recent amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.988, effective July 1, 1986, is consistent with this position. This amendment adds to the title of the form for category (7) the words "Chapter 893.”
#### Kenneth E. CARPENTER, Sr. v. LAFAYETTE WOODWORKS, INC. and Monaco Motor Homes, Inc.

No. 87-245.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

March 16, 1987.

*180Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier & McElIigott, Philip A. Fontenot, Lafayette, for defendant-relator.

Dean, Lomenick, Seemann & Willis, Otis E. Lomenick, Jr., Opelousas, Joseph J. Pic-cione, Lafayette, for respondents.

Before DOUCET, LABORDE and YELVERTON, JJ.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY:

The trial court erred in holding Monaco Motor Homes, Inc. has no claim for contribution against Lafayette Woodworks, Inc., *LeFrance v. Abraham Lincoln Mercury, Inc.,*462 So.2d 1291 (La.App. 5 Cir.1985), *Lokey v. Dixie Buick, Inc.,*400 So.2d 322 (La.App. 4 Cir.1981), *Landry v. Nobility Homes, Inc.,*488 So.2d 726 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986), *Perrin v. Read Imports, Inc.,*359 So.2d 738 (La.App. 4 Cir.1978). The tolling of prescription on this claim for contribution does not begin to run until Monaco Motor Homes, Inc. has been cast in judgment, therefore, the trial court erred in holding Monaco Motor Homes, Inc.’s cross-claim for contribution had prescribed, since it was not filed within one year of the last act of negligence. *Smith v. Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co.,*399 So.2d 1193 (La.App. 3 Cir.1981), *McKneely v. Don Coleman Construction Co.,*441 So.2d 497 (La.App. 2 Cir.1983), *Matt v. Cox,*408 So.2d 389 (La.App. 1 Cir.1981). The trial court’s judgment is thus vacated in part, and it is now ordered that Monaco Motor Homes, Inc. be allowed to pursue its claim in contribution against Lafayette Woodworks, Inc. That part of the trial court’s judgment sustaining Lafayette Woodworks, Inc.’s exception of vagueness is not disturbed by this court’s ruling.
#### STATE ex rel. James C. BARNUM, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 89-KH-0916.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 21, 1989.

In re Barnum, James C. Jr.; — Plaintiff(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “E”, Nos. 332-509, 332-510.

Denied. Bills of information have been filed.
Exhibit
4.5


 


	
   

  	
  CIBER, Inc.

  	
   

  
	
  Corporate Office

  	
  303-220-0100

  
	
  5251 DTC Parkway

  	
   

  
	
  Suite 1400

  	
  Fax: 303-220-7100

  
	
   

  	
  Greenwood Village, CO

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  80111

  	
  www.ciber.com

  



 


 


July 22,
2005


 


 


By Facsimile and Certified Mail


Wells
Fargo Bank Minnesota, National Association


213
Court Street, Suite 703


Middletown,
CT 06457


Facsimile:
(860) 704-6219


Attention:
Corporate Trust Services


 


	
  Re:

  	
   

  	
  Indenture dated December 2, 2003 of CIBER, Inc.
  for 2.875% Convertible

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Senior Subordinated Debentures Due 2023 (the “Indenture”)

  



 


 


Ladies
and Gentlemen:


 


Pursuant
to Section 16.02 of the Indenture, this letter shall serve as notice to
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, in its capacity as Trustee under the Indenture,
that CIBER, Inc. hereby irrevocably elects to settle any and all
Debentures surrendered for conversion in accordance with the terms of the
Indenture solely in cash. As stated in Section 16.02 of the Indenture,
following such notice from the Company, the Company shall deliver to the holder
surrendering any such Debenture for conversion the amount of cash per Debenture
equal to the Applicable Stock Price multiplied by the Conversion Rate in effect
with respect to such Conversion Date pursuant to Article 16 of the
Indenture and pursuant to the terms of the Debenture. Capitalized terms used in
this notice but not defined herein have the meaning given to them in the
Indenture.


 


 


CIBER, Inc.


 


 


	
  By:

  	
  /s/ David G. Durham

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  David G. Durham

  	
   

  
	
  Senior Vice President,
  Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
RE: ID: FAA-2015-2719-0001

10/2/2015 

I believe the approval of this request to be in the best interest of the public as a whole, as; 

Being an honorably discharged 8 year military veteran, with many years of recreational remote 

control aircraft operations, and years of membership in the Academy of Model Aeronautics 

(current membership expires 12/31/2018) I strive to be proficient in rules, regulations, and 

operations associated with remote control aircraft/drone flying standards. 

Considering the current atmosphere regarding drone operations approval of this application will give the 

public & my customer base a certain comfort level in the knowledge that I make every effort to be in 

compliance with all rules, regulations, and safety standards currently in place, and I take my business 

seriously, thus assuring my customers a professional, and conscientious representation of their business 

operations and requirements. 

Thank You for your consideration 

Robert Carroll – ID: FAA-2015-2719-0001
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James MONDS.

No. 88-KK-0004.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 12, 1988.

In re James Monds, applying for rehearing of this court’s order of January 20, *1391988, 517 So.2d 816; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 19491-KW; Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 62935.

Reconsideration granted. Hearing ordered on the motion to recuse the District Attorney prior to the hearing on motion for new trial, which should be postponed as necessary.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 4969

_____________________________
R AYMOND P ADILLA ,
Petitioner
,

v.

F LORIDA C OMMISSION ON O FFENDER R EVIEW , Respondent

.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

— Original Jurisdiction

.

July 10, 2018

P ER C URIAM

. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

R OBERTS , W ETHERELL , and O STERHAUS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Raymond Padilla, pro se
, Petitioner

. Rana Wallace, General Counsel, and Mark Hiers, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee
, for Respondent

.
From: Bob Kneisley [mailto:Bob.Kneisley@wnco.com] 

Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 10:13 AM 

To: Faulk, Scott (OST); Leslie Abbott 

Subject: RE: DOT Transfer Order 

Scott, we'd prefer the language read "and/or" as you suggested - good catch! If you know, can you tell 

me what your timetable is for issuing the final transfer order? 

Bob 

Robert W. Kneisley 

Associate Generai Counsel ^ . 

Southwest Airlines Co. 

1901 L Street, N.W. ?^ 5 i:: s 

Washington DC 20036 ^^ "*-^: S 

(202) 263-6284 " O^ g 

bob.kneislev@wnco.com n'lrriD"' 

• ^ : > g^ g 

• __ p^o Q 

From: Scott.Faulk@dot.gov (mailto:Scott.Faulk@dot.gov] ~~ -:^':s: '•' 

Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 9:21 AM J=- 25 

To: Bob Kneisley; Leslie Abbott ' ^ 

Subject: DOT Transfer Order 

Bob and Leslie, 

We're in the process of finalizing the transfer order, and I have one point of clarification. In your 

application, you requested the Department reissue the international route authorities in the name of 

"AirTran Ainways, Inc. or Southwest Airlines Co." Would you rather it read, "AirTran Airways, Inc., and/or 

Southwest Airlines Co."? The "and/or" might make it less difficult to integrate the various route segments 

once the two air carriers start to merge operations. We used the "and/or" on the American/TWA transfer 

order (see Order 2001-4-7, issued April 6, 2001), and I thought I would suggestion it in this case. It's 

completely up to you, just let me know. 

Regards, 

Scott Faulk 

Transportation Industry Analyst 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Office of Aviation Analysis 

Air Canrier Fitness Division 

1200 New Jersey Ave., SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

202-366-9721 

Chief, Air Carrier Fitness Division 

(office): 202.366.9721 

(fax): 202.366.7638 

laura.remo@dot.gov
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Earl SMITH.

No. 87-KK-0465.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 26, 1987.

In re Smith, Earl; Applying for Writ of Certiorari; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Number K-7044; Parish of St. Bernard 34th Judicial District Court Div. “C” Number 78-091.

Granted in part. The assistant district attorney, Glenn Diaz, is ordered recused from the case. Otherwise denied.

LEMMON, J.,

concurs. After a hearing on a pretrial motion for change of venue, the trial judge *must*decide whether to grant or deny the motion. *State v. Clark,*434 So.2d 404 (La.1983). When the trial judge refuses to change venue, the defendant has the right to reurge the motion during or upon completion of voir dire at trial if the answers of the prospective jurors indicate that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial in that parish. Because of this right to reurge the motion, it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeal in this case to vacate the denial and order deferral of the ruling.
This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3 v. No. 33,679 4 RONALD WIDMER, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Charles W. Brown, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellant 12 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 13 David Henderson, Assist ant Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION 172 HANISEE, Judge. 1 {1} The State appealed an order of the di strict court suppressing certain evidence 2 discovered during a pat-down of Defendant. We issued a notice proposing to reverse 3 the district court’s decision. After a several-month delay caused by the lack of a timely 4 appointment of appellate counsel for Defe ndant, Defendant file d a response to the 5 notice of proposed disposition. In that response Defendant included a motion to 6 remand the case for dismissal of the char ges brought against him, relying on a plea 7 agreement by the terms of which the State agreed not to pursue those charges should 8 the State’s appeal be successful. The State has responded to Defendant’s motion by 9 filing its own motion to dismiss this appeal , and requesting that the charges filed in 10 this case be dismissed after th e case is remanded from this C ourt. In essence, the State 11 appears to agree with Defendant’s contention that the plea agreement moots this 12 appeal and requires dismissal of th e charges brought against Defendant. 13 {2} Having reviewed Defendant’s submission and the State’s motion to dismiss its 14 own appeal, we see no reason not to grant the State’s motion. We therefore dismiss 15 the appeal and remand for dismissal of the charges filed below. 16 {3} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

18 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 193 WE CONCUR: 1

2 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 3

4 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 5
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       3,761,322
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   64,320
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,825,642
<PP&E>                                       1,877,294
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,670,057
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,032,879
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          321,481
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,711,398
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,032,879
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,155,996
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               580,828
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                575,168
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            575,168
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   575,168
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Robert LOERA.

No. 88-K-2522.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 27, 1989.

In re Loera, Robert; — Defendant(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 19746-KA; Parish of DeSoto, 11th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 59940.

Prior report: La.App., 530 So.2d 1271.

Denied.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 23.2

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in these Registration Statements
No. 33-48246, No. 33-87046, No. 333-24707, No. 333-37219 and No. 333-37305 of
FirstFederal Financial Services Corp on Form S-8 of our report dated January
26, 1996 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of FirstFederal Financial
Services Corp for the year ended December 31, 1997.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Columbus, Ohio
March 26, 1998