IIA

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 19

Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E.

Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as

Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and

to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list

of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian

Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in positions

of command during World War II, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 15, 1999

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. SPECTER,

Mr. THURMOND, Mr. ENZI, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr.

KERRY, Mr. KYL, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Ms.

COLLINS, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. VOINOVICH, and Mr. DEWINE) introduced

the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the

Committee on Armed Services

JOINT RESOLUTION

Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral

Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy

to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United

States Fleet, during World War II, and to advance the

late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list

of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding

General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II,

as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947
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for all other senior officers who served in positions of

command during World War II, and for other purposes.

Whereas Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, formerly the

Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the

Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, had an

excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in

the United States Navy prior to the December 7, 1941

attack on Pearl Harbor;

Whereas Major General Walter C. Short, formerly the Commander of the United States Army Hawaiian Department, had an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in the United States Army prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor;

Whereas numerous investigations following the attack on

Pearl Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and

Lieutenant General Short were not provided necessary

and critical intelligence that was available, that foretold

of war with Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and

that would have alerted them to prepare for the attack,

including such essential communiques as the Japanese

Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot message of September 24,

1941, and the message sent from the Imperial Japanese

Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador in the

United States from December 6–7, 1941, known as the

Fourteen-Part Message;

Whereas on December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were relieved of their commands

and returned to their permanent ranks of rear admiral

and major general;

Whereas Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as

a member of the investigating commission known as the
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Roberts Commission that accused Admiral Kimmel and

Lieutenant General Short of ‘‘dereliction of duty’’ only

six weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the report maintaining that ‘‘these two officers

were martyred’’ and ‘‘if they had been brought to trial,

both would have been cleared of the charge’’;

Whereas on October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel on the grounds that his military decisions and the disposition of his forces at the

time of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor

were proper ‘‘by virtue of the information that Admiral

Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor’’; criticized the higher command for not sharing with

Admiral Kimmel ‘‘during the very critical period of 26

November to 7 December 1941, important information . . .regarding the Japanese situation’’; and, concluded

that the Japanese attack and its outcome was attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone in the

naval service;

Whereas on June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by

Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of

the Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed,

that essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions

and war plans was available in Washington but was not

shared with Admiral Kimmel;

Whereas on October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board

of Investigation determined that Lieutenant General

Short had not been kept ‘‘fully advised of the growing

tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an

increasing necessity for better preparation for war’’; detailed information and intelligence about Japanese inten-
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tions and war plans were available in ‘‘abundance’’ but

were not shared with the General Short’s Hawaii command; and General Short was not provided ‘‘on the

evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost

immediate break with Japan, though there was ample

time to have accomplished this’’;

Whereas the reports by both the Naval Court of Inquiry and

the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation were kept

secret, and Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General

Short were denied their requests to defend themselves

through trial by court-martial;

Whereas the joint committee of Congress that was established

to investigate the conduct of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short completed, on May 31, 1946, a

1,075-page report which included the conclusions of the

committee that the two officers had not been guilty of

dereliction of duty;

Whereas the then Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral J. L.

Holloway, Jr., on April 27, 1954, recommended that Admiral Kimmel be advanced in rank in accordance with the

provisions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947;

Whereas on November 13, 1991, a majority of the members

of the Board for the Correction of Military Records of

the Department of the Army found that Lieutenant General Short ‘‘was unjustly held responsible for the Pearl

Harbor disaster’’ and that ‘‘it would be equitable and

just’’ to advance him to the rank of lieutenant general on

the retired list’’;

Whereas in October 1994, the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle Trost, withdrew his 1988 rec-
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ommendation against the advancement of Admiral Kimmel and recommended that the case of Admiral Kimmel

be reopened;

Whereas the Dorn Report, a report on the results of a Department of Defense study that was issued on December

15, 1995, did not provide support for an advancement of

Rear Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short in grade,

it did set forth as a conclusion of the study that ‘‘responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant

General Short, it should be broadly shared’’;

Whereas the Dorn Report found that ‘‘Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese

diplomatic communications... which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war’’; that ‘‘the evidence

of the handling of these messages in Washington reveals

some ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and

misestimations, limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of clarification and follow-up at higher

levels’’; and, that ‘‘together, these characteristics resulted

in failure . . . to appreciate fully and to convey to the commanders in Hawaii the sense of focus and urgency that

these intercepts should have engendered’’;

Whereas, on July 21, 1997, Vice Admiral David C. Richardson (United States Navy, retired) responded to the Dorn

Report with his own study which confirmed findings of

the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor

Board of Investigation and established, among other

facts, that the war effort in 1941 was undermined by a

restrictive intelligence distribution policy, and the degree

to which the commanders of the United States forces in

Hawaii were not alerted about the impending attack on
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Hawaii was directly attributable to the withholding of intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General

Short;

Whereas the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, in establishing

a promotion system for the Navy and the Army, provided

a legal basis for the President to honor any officer of the

Armed Forces of the United States who served his country as a senior commander during World War II with a

placement of that officer, with the advice and consent of

the Senate, on the retired list with the highest grade held

while on the active duty list;

Whereas Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short are

the only two eligible officers from World War II who were

excluded from the list of retired officers presented for advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime

ranks under the terms of the Officer Personnel Act of

1947;

Whereas this singular exclusion from advancement on the retired list serves only to perpetuate the myth that the senior commanders in Hawaii were derelict in their duty and

responsible for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor,

a distinct and unacceptable expression of dishonor toward

two of the finest officers who have served in the Armed

Forces of the United States;

Whereas Major General Walter Short died on September 23,

1949, and Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel died on May

14, 1968, without the honor of having been returned to

their wartime ranks as were their fellow veterans of

World War II; and

Whereas the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Pearl Harbor

Survivors Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation,
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the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Retired Officers Association, and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative

Committee, and other associations and numerous retired

military officers have called for the rehabilitation of the

reputations and honor of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short through their posthumous advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime grades:

Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL

4 AND MAJOR GENERAL SHORT ON RETIRED

5 LISTS.

6 (a) REQUEST.—The President is requested—

7 (1) to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband

8 E. Kimmel to the grade of admiral on the retired list

9 of the Navy; and

10 (2) to advance the late Major General Walter

11 C. Short to the grade of lieutenant general on the

12 retired list of the Army.

13 (b) ADDITIONAL BENEFITS NOT TO ACCRUE.—Any

14 advancement in grade on a retired list requested under

15 subsection (a) shall not increase or change the compensa16 tion or benefits from the United States to which any per17 son is now or may in the future be entitled based upon

18 the military service of the officer advanced.
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1 SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PROFES2 SIONAL PERFORMANCE OF ADMIRAL KIMMEL

3 AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHORT.

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel

6 performed his duties as Commander in Chief, United

7 States Pacific Fleet, competently and professionally,

8 and, therefore, the losses incurred by the United

9 States in the attacks on the naval base at Pearl

10 Harbor, Hawaii, and other targets on the island of

11 Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not a re12 sult of dereliction in the performance of those duties

13 by the then Admiral Kimmel; and

14 (2) the late Major General Walter C. Short per15 formed his duties as Commanding General, Hawai16 ian Department, competently and professionally,

17 and, therefore, the losses incurred by the United

18 States in the attacks on Hickam Army Air Field and

19 Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and other targets on the

20 island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were

21 not a result of dereliction in the performance of

22 those duties by the then Lieutenant General Short.

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