Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1605-CR-1096 | February 24, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Alexander E. Budzenski

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Johiney Jesus Acuna-Hinojosa,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 24, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1605-CR-1096

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Linda E. Brown, 

Judge

The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49F10-0905-CM-47325

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Johiney Acuna-Hinojosa appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief (PCR Petition). He asserts that the post-conviction court erred 

in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On May 12, 2009, Acuna-Hinojosa was pulled over by Sergeant Allen Driver of 

the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department because the vehicle AcunaHinojosa was driving had a fake temporary license tag on the back. As soon as 

Acuna-Hinojosa stopped, Sergeant Driver noticed that he was moving around 

in the car and appeared to be reaching toward the passenger side. AcunaHinojosa then attempted to exit the vehicle. Sergeant Driver ordered him back 

inside the car, and Acuna-Hinojosa complied. 

[4] After Acuna-Hinojosa complied with orders to show his hands, Sergeant Driver 

approached the driver’s side door and immediately saw that there was a towel 

draped over the steering column, which he recognized from his experience as a 

sign that the car was potentially stolen. He also noted that Acuna-Hinojosa 

seemed “[v]ery nervous, very hyper” and that he was moving around while 

inside the vehicle. Exhibit 1 at 16. Sergeant Driver removed Acuna-Hinojosa 

from the car and immediately placed him in handcuffs at the rear of the vehicle. 

Upon returning to the driver’s door, Sergeant Driver removed the towel and 

observed that the steering column was broken. He also saw in plain view a 

black handgun sticking up between the armrests.
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[5] Sergeant Driver asked Acuna-Hinojosa for his identification and registration, 

and Acuna-Hinojosa handed him a Mexican identification card. Because 

Acuna-Hinojosa spoke minimal English, Sergeant Driver called an interpreter 

to the scene. Acuna-Hinojosa admitted that he did not have a valid driver’s 

license and Sergeant Driver determined that there was no permit on file for the 

handgun. Sergeant Driver then placed Acuna-Hinojosa under arrest, and 

during a search of his person, Sergeant Driver discovered other forms of 

identification bearing a different name. 

[6] The State charged Acuna-Hinojosa with Class A misdemeanor carrying a 

handgun without a license and Class C misdemeanor driving without a license. 

After his initial hearing, public defender Tom Lee was appointed to represent 

Acuna-Hinojosa. Lee represented Acuna-Hinojosa at a pre-trial hearing and 

was supervising counsel during trial. Angka Morris, a certified legal intern 

under Lee’s supervision represented Acuna-Hinojosa at the September 2, 2009

bench trial. The trial court found Acuna-Hinojosa guilty as charged and 

subsequently sentenced him to an aggregate term of 365 days, with credit for 

four days time served and 361 days suspended. 

[7] On December 5, 2014, Acuna-Hinojosa filed his PCR Petition. The postconviction court held a fact-finding hearing on February 12, 2016. The postconviction court entered its order denying Acuna-Hinojosa’s PCR petition on 

April 22, 2016. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion & Decision
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[8] In a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing 

grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Bethea v. State, 983 

N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2013). “When appealing the denial of post-conviction 

relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative 

judgment.” Id. (quoting Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004)). In 

order to prevail, the petitioner must demonstrate that the evidence as a whole 

leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite the post-conviction 

court’s conclusion. Id. Although we do not defer to a post-conviction court’s 

legal conclusions, we will reverse its findings and judgment only upon a 

showing of clear error, i.e., “that which leaves us with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 

N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000)).

[9] A petitioner will prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only 

upon a showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. 

Bethea, 983 N.E.2d at 1138. To satisfy the first element, the petitioner must 

demonstrate deficient performance, which is “representation that fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the 

defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. 

(quoting McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002)).

[10] To satisfy the second element, the petitioner must show prejudice, which is “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 1139. “A reasonable probability is one that 
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is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Kubsch v. State, 934 

N.E.2d 1138, 1147 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Because a petitioner must prove 

both deficient performance and prejudice in order to prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the failure to prove either element defeats such 

a claim. See Young v. State, 746 N.E.2d 920, 927 (Ind. 2001).

[11] There is a strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate service. 

Bethea, 983 N.E.2d at 1139. “We afford counsel considerable discretion in 

choosing strategy and tactics, and ‘[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, 

inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render 

representation ineffective,’” State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. 2012) 

(quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001)).

[12] Acuna-Hinojosa first argues that a Cronic violation occurred. See U.S. v. Cronic, 

466 U.S. 648 (1984). He did not, however, present a Cronic claim to the postconviction court and thus, the post-conviction court was not given the 

opportunity to rule on this independent ground. He has therefore waived this 

issue for our review. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8) (“All grounds for relief 

available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition”).

[13] Waiver notwithstanding, Acuna-Hinojosa’s claim fails. The Sixth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel at all 

critical stages of proceedings. Id. at 659; see also Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 

604 (Ind. 2009). The right to assistance of counsel is so essential that prejudice 
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is presumed when there is actual or constructive denial of the assistance of 

counsel. Hernandez v. State, 761 N.E.2d 845, 849 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 692). In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court created a narrow 

exception to the Strickland inquiry and held that in extreme cases “a 

presumption of ineffectiveness” may be justified as to obviate the need for 

inquiry into counsel’s actual performance. 466 U.S. at 662. There are only a 

few situations that justify such an extreme measure: (1) when counsel is 

completely denied; (2) when counsel wholly fails to subject the prosecution’s 

case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) when circumstances are such that 

“the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide 

effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate 

without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Conner v. State, 711 N.E.2d 

1238, 1254 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60). 

[14] Acuna-Hinojosa argues that he was completely denied the right to counsel prior 

to trial because he claims his appointed counsel met with him once on the day 

of trial and did not use an interpreter to aid in communication. Specifically, he 

maintains that his trial counsel failed to discharge his duty to make a reasonable 

investigation of his case, which he asserts should at least have included an 

effective pre-trial consultation with him. 

[15] Aside from his own self-serving assertions that he was deprived of counsel, 

Acuna-Hinojosa has failed to present any meaningful evidence in support of his 

claim. In fact, the record establishes that he was appointed a public defender 

and that the public defender appeared with Acuna-Hinojosa at a pre-trial 
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conference and again met with him prior to trial, albeit briefly. During the trial,

Acuna-Hinojosa was represented by a certified legal intern under the 

supervision of his public defender. The State’s case was subjected to adversarial 

testing in the form of a motion to suppress evidence and attempted refutation of 

Acuna-Hinojosa’s mens rea in committing the crimes. A relevance objection 

was also asserted with regard to introduction into evidence of pieces of 

identification belonging to someone other than Acuna-Hinojosa that were 

found on Acuna-Hinojosa’s person. Acuna-Hinojosa asserts no grounds that 

fall within the third situation presented in Cronic, and he has consequently failed 

to meet his heavy burden of establishing a Cronic violation.

[16] We turn now to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. 

We begin by noting that the gist of Acuna-Hinojosa’s claim is that his counsel 

did not meet with him prior to trial to discuss trial strategy or possible defenses. 

The only evidence in support of his claim is his own self-serving statements. 

Acuna-Hinojosa did not call or solicit evidence from his appointed counsel. 

When a petitioner does not present evidence from his trial counsel, it can be 

presumed that counsel’s testimony would not have been favorable. See 

Culvahouse v. State, 819 N.E.2d 857, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Acuna-Hinojosa 

has not shown that his allegations are true, and in fact, the post-conviction 

court found them factually lacking. Acuna-Hinojosa has failed to overcome the 

presumption that his counsel rendered effective representation.

[17] We further note that Acuna-Hinojosa failed to demonstrate how he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s performance. There was ample evidence of his guilt. 
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Indeed, Acuna-Hinojosa admitted that he did not have a driver’s license and 

Sergeant Driver testified that the handgun was in plain view as it was sticking 

out between the arm rests of the front seats. Acuna-Hinojosa was the only one 

in the car. His claim that the handgun was not his does not establish a defense 

to the crime of carrying a handgun without a license under these circumstances. 

Acuna-Hinojosa cannot show that counsel’s performance, even if deficient,

affected the outcome. 

[18] In sum, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in denying 

Acuna-Hinojosa’s petition for post-conviction relief.

[19] Judgment affirmed.

[20] Riley, J. and Crone, J., concur.