AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed May 27, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-00201-CV RICHARD RALEY AND RALEY HO LDINGS, LLC, Appellants V. DANIEL K. HAGOOD, P.C. AND FITZPATRICK HAGOOD SMITH & UHL, LLP, Appellees On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-00390-B MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burn s, Justice Partida-Kipness, and Justice Garcia Opinion by Justice Garcia This case involves a sanctions award fo r post-judgment discovery abuse. In two issues, Richard Raley argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the sanctions order after the judgment was supers eded and there is no legal basis for the award. As discussed below, we conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to sanction Raley for pre-supersedeas post-judgment discovery misconduct on which the court had expressly deferred a ruling. We affirm the trial court’s order.–2– I. B ACKGROUND The underlying lawsuit resulted from Rale y’s failure to pa y outstanding legal fees owed to Hagood. The dispute was subm itted to arbitration and the arbitrator awarded Hagood $376,313.97, plus post-award interest. Th e court entered a final judgment confirming the award on May 4, 2018. Raley moved to set aside the judgment. Following the entry of judgment, Hagood filed an application for a turnover order and served Raley w ith post-judgment written di scovery. Hagood also noticed Raley’s deposition to occur on May 14 and re quested that Raley provide alternative dates if the noticed date was not conve nient. Raley’s coun sel, Matthew Bobo, replied, “after written discovery is answer ed and if you are not satisfied with our responses or feel you need more informa tion, we can discu ss a deposition.” Raley then moved to quash the deposition w ithout providing alternate dates. Raley also attempted to conduct pos t-judgment discovery by serving production requests and interrogatories on Hagood and a subpoena duces tecum on JAMS, the dispute resolution company that conducted the arbitration. Hagood moved to quash and for a pr otective order and sanctions, arguing that Raley was not entitled to post-judgment discovery because he was not the prevailing party to whom a judgment was owed. On May 9, Hagood provided Raley with notice that a June 1 hearing had been set on Hagood’s motion to quash Raley’s post-judgment discovery, and on Raley’s–3– motion to quash the deposition and Hagood’s turnover order. Raley did not move for a continuance. Instead, on May 29, Raley sent a letter to the court requesting that the hearing not occur because of an a ttorney vacation letter Bobo had on file. Hagood’s counsel appeared for the June 1 hearing, but Bobo was not present. The court concluded that the attorney vaca tion letter did not com port with the Dallas County Local Rules but declined to proc eed on the turnover or der because Bobo was not present. Nonetheless, the court granted Haygood’s motion to quash Raley’s attempted post-judgment discovery, denied Raley’s motion to quash the deposition, and ordered that Raley’s deposition occur before July 15. 1 Hagood sent Bobo a letter about deposi tion dates, and after receiving no response, noticed Raley’s deposition for Ju ly 13. The notice included a duces tecum. The same day, Raley moved to quash the deposition, but pr ovided no alternate dates. Raley’s counsel also responded to all of Hagood’s interrogatories and production requests with the same statement: “Defe ndant has filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. If the Motion is denied, Defenda nt will pay the judgment, rendering this discovery moot.”

1 In a prior appeal, this court concluded, among othe r things, that the trial court did not err by denying Raley post-judgment discovery because Raley was not the prevailing party in the litigation. Raley v. Daniel K. Hagood, P.C., No. 05-18-00914-CV, 2019 WL 5781916, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 6, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).–4– Hagood filed a motion to compel reques ting that the court order Raley to respond to the interrogatories and produ ce the requested documents. That motion, and various other motions , was set for hearing. On the day of the hearing, Bobo sent a letter to the court stating he was unable to attend because of a cancelled flight. The judge asked Hagood’s counsel to stand by for a telephone hearing while the court tried to reach Bobo. Bobo could not be reached. The same day, Hagood filed a motion to show cause, arguing that Raley never intended to appear for various hearings or his deposition and did not intend to answer the post-judgment discovery, but instead, wa s attempting to stall collection of the judgment indefinitely. Hagood asked the cour t to impose monetary sanctions and to hold Raley in contempt. In a subsequent hearing, the court rep eatedly expressed c oncern and requested an explanation for Raley ignoring the court order to appear for his deposition. During that hearing, Bobo represente d to the court that if the court ruled against Raley on the motion to set aside the judgment, Ra ley would pay the j udgment. Bobo also stated that Raley understood that if the cas e goes forward then “[h]e’s going to be produced for deposition” and “[w]e’re goi ng to have to produce documents.” By order dated July 24, the court de nied Raley’s motion to set aside the judgment and ordered that Ral ey provide complete res ponses to written discovery and sit for his deposition within ten busin ess days. When Raley did not pay the–5– judgment after the court’s adverse ruling, Hagood moved for sanc tions and an order finding Raley and Bobo in contempt. Raley did not comply with the cour t order to respond to discovery. Accordingly, Hagood filed a motion to s how cause and for sanctions. The motion argued that sanctions should be imposed be cause Raley had not answered discovery, had ignored properly noticed hearings, an d had defied two court orders. The motion was initially set for hearing on Augus t 17 but was moved to August 21 to accommodate Bobo’s schedule. At the hearing, the court granted th e show cause motion and ordered Bobo and Raley to do the following on August 28: ( i ) appear before the court, (ii) provide Hagood with all documents responsive to th e post-judgment discovery requests, and (iii) amend and serve discovery responses. The court further or dered that Raley’s deposition would occur “immediately follo wing reporting to the court.” The judge specifically postponed her ruling on the sanctions motion, stating that “the Court is withholding ruling on sanctions sought by Plaintiffs to be determined in a later Order.” On August 28, Raley’s counsel provide d amended discovery responses that generally complied with the court’s order bu t continued to object to certain requests. The court overruled the objec tions and ordered Raley to supplement his responses. Raley also failed to provide documents responsive to twen ty-four requested–6– categories, including credit card statem ents, loan and lien documents, and investment documents. Two days later, Hagood file d a motion to compel, argui ng that Raley’s August 28 responses were incomple te and were not verified . Hagood requested fees from Bobo and Raley for the cost of filing the motion in additi on to sanctions previously requested. Although he previously informed the c ourt that he did not intend to appeal, Raley filed a notice of appeal on August 7. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Raley , 2019 WL 5781916, at *4. On September 19, Raley made a cash deposit in lieu of bond, filed a motion confirming the supersedeas deposit, and re quested a stay in enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. The court issued a writ of supersedeas on September 21,
2018. 2 On October 1, 2018, Hagood filed an am ended motion for sanctions, tied to the court’s August 21 order deferring the ruli ng on sanctions and attorney’s fees to a later date. The request for sanctions was premised on Raley’s and Bobo’s postjudgment discovery conduct occu rring and brought to the court’s attention prior to supersedeas. Specifically, Hagood argued th at Raley and Bobo defied three court

2 Raley also made a $50,000 deposit into the court’s registry on August 28, 2018.–7– orders, made false statements in discovery and showed no regard for the court or the judicial process. The motion also argued that Hagood had incurred $66,700 in attorney’s fees in its efforts to collect the judgment between May 4, 2018 a nd September 26, 2018, and that most of the fees would not have been incurred if Bobo and Raley had not improperly resisted discovery . Hagood attached billing records to substantiate its claim and requested a fees award pursuant to T EX

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. §
31.002 3 and as sanctions. On October 12, 2018, the court he ld a hearing on Hagood’s motion for sanctions. Bobo orally objected to the court’ s jurisdiction to award sanctions because supersedeas had issued. When the hearing concluded, the cour t orally pronounced that it would enter a sanctions order. Eleven days after th e hearing, Raley filed a moti on for leave to respond to the sanctions motion. The response did not argue that there was no legal basis for sanctions or attempt to justify Raley a nd Bobo’s conduct. Inst ead, Raley’s response sought to explain certain exhibits the cour t admitted into evidence at the hearing and to demonstrate the difficulty Raley had findi ng liquid assets to deposit in the court’s registry. A month and a half later, Ral ey sent a letter to the court seeking

3 T EX

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. § 31.002 provides court aid to a judgment creditor attempting to collect on a judgment and allows the judgment credito r to recover costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.–8– consideration of two additiona l documents that had never been produced or admitted into evidence. Like the re sponse, the letter did not object to court’s oral pronouncement that Raley and Bobo would be sanctioned or the legal basis for such sanctions. The court signed an order granting the motion and amended motion for sanctions on January 14, 2019, awardi ng Hagood $25,000, of wh ich $20,000 was to be paid by Raley and $5,000 to be paid by Bobo. The or der specified that sanctions were awarded for “bad faith actions,” violating rule of civil procedure 13 and Chapter 10 of the civil practice and re medies code by fili ng “groundless and bad faith discovery responses,” violating T EX

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. P. 215 for improperly resisting discovery and the court’s order granting th e motion to compel, violating the court’s June 1, July 18, and August 21 orders, and for misrepresent ations made to the court. Neither Raley nor Bobo objected after the or der was entered, a nd Raley now appeals from that order. 4
II. A NALYSIS Raley’s first issue argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award sanctions for post-judgment discovery abuse because its plenary power expired on September 6, 2018, 5 and the court’s Rule 621a power to enforce the judgment expired when the

4 Bobo is not a party to this appeal. 5 Thirty days after Raley filed a notice of appeal.–9– September 21 supersedeas issued. Raley’s second issue challenges the legal basis for a sanctions award.
Jurisdiction We begin with Raley’s argument concer ning the trial court’s plenary power. Raley correctly notes that the court’s plen ary power had expired when the sanctions order was entered in January 2019. But while the trial court’s power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform a judgment ceas es on the expiration of its plenary power under Texas Rule of Civil Pro cedure 329b, the court’s power to enforce its judgment is not so limited. Arndt v. Farris , 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1982 ). Rule 621a is an aid to enforcement of the court’s judg ment and the trial court has continuing jurisdiction over post-judgment disc overy as set forth in the rule. Id. Accordingly, the trial court has the power to supervis e post-judgment discovery conducted to aid in the enforcement of the judgment. See T EX

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. P 621a; Raley , 2019 WL 5781916, at *2. That supervisor y power aligns with the rule that a court always has inherent power to enforce its own judgments. Arndt , 633 S.W.2d at 500. Thus, while the court could not vacate or modify the judgment once its plenary power expired, it had jurisdiction to oversee the Rule 621a post-judgment discovery. Likewise, the court also retained jurisdiction over post-judgment discovery abuse. See Faherty v. Knize, 764 S.W.2d 922, 922–23 (Tex. App. —Waco 1989, no writ) (court lost authority to sanction for pre-judgment di scovery abuse after pl enary power expired but could sanction for Rule 621a post-judgment discovery abuse).–10– Raley also argues that after enforcemen t of the judgment was suspended, the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction was lim ited to the amount and type of security required to continue suspension of the judgment’s execution. See T EX

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. P. 24.3(a); T EX

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. P 621(a). Therefore, because the judgment was superseded on September 21, 2018 Raley contends the court had no jurisdiction to enter the January 14, 2019 sanctions order. Raley’s argument is unpersuasive. Cour ts have awarded post-supersedeas sanctions for similar discove ry abuse occurring before enforcement of the judgment was suspended. See Corey v. Rankin , No. 14-18-00111-CV, 2019 WL 2589857, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Farkas v. Second Congress. Ltd ., No.03-11-00807-CV, 2014 WL 1691645, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 25, 2014) (mem. op.), judgment withdrawn pursuant to settlement , No. 03-11-00807-CV, 2015 WL 1967990, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 29, 2015). For example, in Farkas , the court rejected the sanctioned party’s argument that the court lacked authority to enter an order compelling discovery and awarding sanctions after supe rsedeas was filed. Farkas , 2014 WL 1691645, at *6–7. The court noted that discovery requests had been pending for severa l months before supersedeas and the sanctions were dir ectly related to expenses the judgment creditor incurred seeking compliance with those requests. Id. Accordingly, the court–11– concluded that the sanctions award wa s an appropriate remedy for the presupersedeas misconduct. See id . at *7.
In Corey , the sanctioned partie s suspended enforcement of the judgment the day before a sche duled deposition. Corey , 2019 2589857, at *1. The judgment creditor moved to compel the deposition and for sanctions. The trial court declined to compel the deposition but awarde d attorney’s fees as sanctions. Id . On appeal, the court concluded that the sanctions aw ard was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at *3. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the judgment creditor’s evidence that the sanctioned parties resist ed discovery and delayed in cancelling the deposition was undisputed. Therefore, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the sanctioned parties were abusing the disc overy process and resisting discovery. Id .; see also In re Smith , 192 S.W.3d 564, 569 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (trial court could reasonably have concluded that sanc tioned parties were attempting to avoid post-judgment discovery by filing supersedeas). Moreover, “a sanctions orde r is tied to the portion of the proceeding in which the sanctionable conduct occurred.” Kenseth v. Dallas Cty ., 126 S.W.3d 584, 600 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). The misconduct he re began in May when post-judgment discovery commenced a nd was ongoing when the judgment was superseded. Raley repeated ly refused to answer pr operly propounded discovery requests or appear for his deposition, a nd then disobeyed the court’s orders to comply. As a result, Hagood incurred signi ficant unnecessary expense seeking court–12– enforcement of the post-judgment discove ry to which it was entitled. The court considered Raley’s conduct and reserved her ruling before the supersedeas was filed. Moreover, the court did not order anything inconsistent with the suspension of the judgment. Instead, the sanctions were lim ited to partial reimbursement of fees incurred because of Raley’s disregard for and violation of post-judgment discovery obligations arising prior to supersedeas. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to enter the sanctions award. See Corey, 2019 2589857, at *3; Farkas , 2014 WL 1691645, at *7. Raley’s first issue is overruled. Legal Basis for Sanctions Raley also argues that the court had no legal basis for the sanctions under Rule 215, Rule 13, Chapter 10, or its inhe rent power. As acknowledged during oral argument, however, Raley did not raise this issue in his response to the sanctions motion, or otherwise object to the basis of the award in the court below. Instead, Raley argued only that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make the award because the judgment had been superseded. Conseque ntly, Raley has faile d to preserve any alleged error concerning the basis for sanctions. See T EX

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. P. 33.1; Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc ., 10 S.W.3d 34, 41 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (party that fails to complain of sanctions imposed a nd fails to ask trial court to reconsider its actions waives complaint); Valdez v. Valdez , 930 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (appellant waives objections to sanctions raised for first time on appeal ). Raley’s second issue is overruled.–13– III. C ONCLUSION Having resolved all of Raley’s issues ag ainst him, we affirm the trial court’s order.

190201F.P05 /Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE–14– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

RICHARD RALEY AND RALEY HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellants
No. 05-19-00201-CV V. DANIEL K. HAGOOD, P.C. AND FITZPATRICK HAGOOD SMITH & UHL, LLP, Appellees On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-00390- B. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Chief Justice Burns and Justice Partida-Kipness participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee DANIEL K. HAGOOD, P.C. AND FITZPATRICK HAGOOD SMITH & UHL, LLP recover its costs of this appeal from appellant RICHARD RALEY AND RALEY HOLDINGS, LLC.
Judgment entered May 27, 2021