UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DARRELL LAMONT BAILEY,

Petitioner ,

v. JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS, Respondent. Civil Action No. 18-848 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Petitioner is a federal prisone r who is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Color ado. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Bailey alleges that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 21 13(d) is invalid and that th e sentencing court had no jurisdiction over his case. D kt. 1 at 2–3. He also alleges th at he was improperly sentenced for having violated 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) because, in his view, that section requires that the defendant have been convicted of violating both 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), yet he was

convicted for a violati on of only 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Id. Finally, although diffi cult to follow, he also appears to allege that “ clerks” unlawfully served as “d e facto judges” in handling various aspects of his case. Id. at 4 (“Clerks did paperwork,” “ch ambers of Judges sent” or “[r] eturned . . . filings”). Bailey’s legal theories are not pellucid. It is clear, however , that he seeks the invalidation of his previous convictions. Id. at 5. Such a challenge, how ever, must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court tha t imposed the sentence. Day v. Trump , 860 F.3d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing § 2255 as “ord inarily the sole remedy fo r a federal prisoner challenging the legality of his conviction or sentence”); see also 28 U.S.C. §2255(a) (“A prisoner in custody2 under sentence of a court estab lished by Act of Congress claimi ng the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Co nstitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was w ithout jurisdiction to impose su ch sentence . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to va cate, set aside or correct the sentence.”). Although courts often transfer ha beas petitions that have been filed in the wrong district, doing so here would serve no purpose , because Bailey cannot fil e another petition under § 2255 without appellate c ourt authorization. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (“A second or successive motion must be certified as provid ed by in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before a second or succe ssive application permitted by this

section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall mov e in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the di strict court to consider the app lication.”); Burton v. Stewart , 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007) (holding that di strict courts lack jurisdi ction to consider “second or successive” petitions under § 2244 when petitioners have not fi rst obtained aut horization from the relevant court of appeals); United States v. Bailey , No. 94 C 6832, 1995 WL 302441, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 1995) (denying a previous petition brought u nder § 2255 challenging Bailey’s original conviction and sentence). The Court will, accordingly, DENY Bailey’s petition for a wr it of habeas corpus, Dkt. 1. A separate order will issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: April 18, 2018