alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
March 5, 2015

	In accordance with the enclosed Memorandum Opinion, below is the judgment in the numbered cause set out herein to be entered in the Minutes of this Court as of the 5th day of March, 2015.

10-15-00063-CR	WILLIAM ARTHUR McINTOSH v. THE STATE OF TEXAS - ON APPEAL FROM THE 40TH DISTRICT COURT OF ELLIS COUNTY - TRIAL COURT NO.  20383CR - DISMISSED - Memorandum Opinion by Justice Scoggins:

“This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion that this Court lacks jurisdiction and that the appeal should be dismissed; it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the appeal be, and hereby is, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  It is further ordered that costs of appeal be, and hereby are, adjudged against Appellant and that this decision be certified below for observance.”

# image1.png
Exhibit 32




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Magnum Hunter Resources Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q filed on August 12, 2010 for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Gary C. Evans, chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:




(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





August 12, 2010
 /s/ Gary C. EvansGary C. Evans,Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Magnum Hunter Resources Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q filed on August 12, 2010 for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ronald D. Ormand, chief financial officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:




(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




August 12, 2010


/s/ Ronald D. OrmandRonald D. Ormand,Chief Financial Officer
----

**Exhibit 13.1**

      In connection with the Report  of Dynamic Oil & Gas, Inc. (the Company) on Form 20-F/A for the twelvemonth  period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission  on the date hereof (the Report), I, Wayne J. Babcock, President and Chief Executive  Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

      The Report fully complies with  the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of  1934; and 

      The information contained in  the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition  and results of operations of the Company. 

/s/ Wayne J. Babcock                                Wayne J. Babcock President and Chief Executive Officer 

 May 20, 2004 

      A signed original of this written  statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Dynamic Oil & Gas,  Inc. and will be retained by Dynamic Oil & Gas, Inc. and furnished to the  Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 

----
EXHIBIT 32.2: Certification of Principal Financial Officer pursuant to 18
U.S.C.ss.1850 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of  South  Texas  Oil  Company  (the
"Company") on Form  10-QSB  for  the  period  ending  March 31, 2005 as filed
with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on  the  date  hereof  (the
"Report"), I,  Jason F. Griffith,  Chief  Financial Officer of  the  Company,
certify,  pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to
Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and that to the best  of  the
undersigned's knowledge and belief:

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)The information contained  in  the  Report  fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                         /s/ Jason F. Griffith, CPA
                         ------------------------------------------
                         JASON F. GRIFFITH, Chief Financial Officer

Dated: May 15, 2005
#### Chris Allrick PICKETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1128.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Jan. 21, 1988.

*479James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Barbara L. Condon, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sean Daly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This case involves an appeal of an order imposing costs under sections 943.25(4), 943.25(8), 960.20, and 27.3455, Florida Statutes. The record does not indicate that the alleged error in the imposition of these costs was first submitted to the trial court for correction; therefore, we affirm. *Reynolds v. State,*516 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH, ORFINGER and COWART, JJ., concur.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A18A1816. MICHAEL DARNELL PARSON v. THE STATE.

A jury convicted Michael Darnell Parson of criminal attempt to commit

murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of aggravated battery,

three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and

possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. We affirmed his convictions on

direct appeal. See Case No. A16A0608 (decided June 21, 2016). In July 2017,

Parson filed a motion to vacate, seeking to vacate his conviction due to alleged

procedural errors in the composition of the jury pool. The trial court denied his

motion on November 13, 2017. Parson filed a notice of appeal on December 19,

2017, to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court transferred the case here. See

Case No. S18A0893 (transferred April 16, 2018). We, however, lack jurisdiction.

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable

order. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an

absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Rowland v. State, 264 Ga.

872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Here, Parson filed his notice of appeal 36 days

after the trial court denied his motion to vacate.

Additionally, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not

an appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686

SE2d 786) (2009). The Supreme Court has explained that such a motion “is not one

of the established procedures for challenging the validity of a judgment in a criminal

case.” Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 SE2d 150) (2010). Thus, any appeal

from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed. Id.; Harper,

286 Ga. at 218 (2).

July 18, 2018
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED

for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

07/18/2018
#### The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Mitchell RAY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83SA84.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 9, 1984.

Robert L. Russel, Dist. Atty., Daniel C. Zook, Deputy Dist. Atty., Robert B. Har-ward, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellant.

The Murphy Law Firm, John Patrick Michael Murphy, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), the People appeal the trial court’s decision that Colorado’s vehicular homicide statute, section 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1983 Supp.), and vehicular assault statute, section 18-3-205(1)(b)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1983 Supp.), are unconstitutional. We reverse.

The defendant was charged in El Paso County District Court with one count of vehicular homicide, two counts of vehicular assault, and two other related crimes not relevant here. The defendant moved to dismiss the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault charges on the grounds that the statutes upon which the charges are based are unconstitutionally vague and deny the defendant equal protection of the laws. The trial court held the statutes unconstitutional because it concluded that they do not require a culpable mental state. The court ruled that in the absence of a mental culpability component the statutes do not comport with due process requirements. The prosecution appealed.

We recently upheld the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes against equal protection and due process challenges in *People v. Rostad,*669 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1983). That opinion addresses the rationale upon which the trial court based its decision in the present case as well as the more extensive due process and equal protection challenges raised by the defendant in the trial court and again on this appeal. No useful purpose would be served by setting forth the defendant’s arguments in *1020detail. We conclude that *Eostad*is dispositive of the issues raised here.1

We reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings.

1

. *Rostad*held that the statutes are constitutionally sufficient under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. In the present case, neither the defendant nor the trial court explicitly designates whether state, federal, or both constitutional *1021standards are implicated in the challenges and the ruling.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6014

RONALD JERRY SAWYER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

G. D. JOHNSON, Major; B. F. FERGUSON, Captain;

OFFICER CATRON; J. RUSSELL, JR., Correctional

Officer; DAVID R. BOEHM, Program Director;

K. L. OSBORNE, Warden; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

STAMPER; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CONNORS; RON

ANGELONE; KENNETH MOORE, Internal Affairs;

R. A. YOUNG,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-95-395-R)

Submitted: July 23, 1996 Decided: July 30, 1996

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald Jerry Sawyer, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the magistrate judge's order denying his

motion to compel discovery. We dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may

exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291

(1988), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 (1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither

a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.

Further, Appellant noted this appeal outside the thirty-day

appeal period established by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), failed to

obtain an extension of the appeal period within the additional

thirty-day period provided by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), and is not

entitled to relief under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The time periods

established by Fed. R. App. P. 4 are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264

(1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229

(1960)). Appellant's failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an

extension of the appeal period deprives this court of jurisdiction

to consider this case. We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### ERA NEWMAN-GREENSTEIN REAL ESTATE COMPANY, INC. and the Babcock Company, et al., Appellants, v. Paul KAPELOW and Kendall Walk Townhomes, Inc., Appellees.

No. 87-1584.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 8, 1988.

Beth Tyler Vogelsang, Miami, for appellants.

Sandler & Sandler and Alan Sandler, Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, NESBITT, and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of Paul Kapelow and Kendall Walk Townhomes, Inc. which denied the appellants’ claim for a real estate brokerage commission. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the appellants procured a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase the property as required under the oral listing agreement with Kendall Walk Townhomes, Inc., we hold that summary judgment was improper. *Schmalzried v. Findley,*394 So.2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA), *review denied,*402 So.2d 609 (Fla.1981).

Accordingly, the order granting summary judgment is affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with our holding.
#### THE ONS GROUP, INC. v. Aaron MINTZ.

No. 87-C-0596.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 23, 1987.

In re Mintz, Aaron; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 86-CA-5471; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “C”, No. 85-02373.

Prior report: La.App., 501 So.2d 255.

Denied.

CALOGERO, MARCUS and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7290

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL DELANEY JOHNSON, a/k/a Jamil Abdul

Aziz,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.

(CR-93-390, CA-97-860-2-18)

Submitted: November 19, 1998 Decided: December 3, 1998

Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Delaney Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Bruce Howe Hendricks,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Michael Delaney Johnson seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994

& Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the

reasoning of the district court. United States v. Johnson, Nos. CR93-390; CA-97-860-2-18 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 1997). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### STATE ex rel. Tyrone TURNER v. STATE of Louisiana, Charles Foti.

No. 87-KH-1127.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 26, 1988.

In re Turner, Tyrone; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 305-387.

Denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual report of Omni U.S.A., Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ending June 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I (We), Jeffrey K.
Daniel of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ JEFFREY K. DANIEL     CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & PRESIDENT   OCTOBER 12, 2004
----------------------
JEFFREY K. DANIEL
EXHIBIT
32.2




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Chisen Electric Corporation (the “Company”) on Form
10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the
undersigned hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his
knowledge:




1.           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2.           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.




Date:
      February 11, 2010
                By:
                /s/He ZhiweiName:
                He
      ZhiweiTitle:
                Chief
      Financial Officer, Principal Financial andAccounting
      Officer




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to Chisen Electric Corporation will be
retained by Chisen Electric Corporation and furnished to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>   1





EXHIBIT 11

                              CONSULIER ENGINEERING, INC.

                            COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                    1996              1995
                                                 ----------        ----------
<S>                                              <C>               <C>
Primary and Fully Diluted:

   Net income                                    $1,210,841        $  942,403
                                                 ==========        ==========

  Shares used in computation:

    Weighted average number of
      common shares outstanding                   2,500,764         2,517,056

    Common stock equivalents
      from assumed issuances
      using treasury stock
      method -
        Stock options and
         warrants                                    17,946           147,375
                                                 ----------        ----------

    Total                                         2,518,710         2,664,431
                                                 ==========        ==========

Net income per share:

    Net income per share                         $      .48        $      .35
                                                 ==========        ==========
</TABLE>



                                      E-5
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James LEWIS.

No. 88-KH-1856.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 20, 1988.

In re Lewis, James; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “0”, No. 326-662.

Denied. A bill of information was filed against relator on May 16, 1988.
#### STATE ex rel. Troy D. COURVILLE, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 87-KH-2495.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 16, 1987.

In re Courville, Troy D.; applying for remedial writs; Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “I”, No. 41132.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for prompt consideration.
EXHIBIT
32.1


CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




The
undersigned, the Chairwoman and Chief Executive Officer of Universal Travel
Group (the "Company"), does hereby certify under the standards set forth and
solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




Dated:
      May 10, 2010
            
            
            
            /s/ Jiangping JiangJiangping
      Jiang
              Chairwoman
      and Chief Executive Officer