alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
 

REGION IX
 

75 Hawthorne Street
 

San Francisco, CA 94105·3901
 

OFFICE OF THE 

REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 

OCT 1 4 ?009 

The Honorable Ida Riggins 

Pit River Tribe 

36970 Park Avenue 

Burney, CA 96013 

Dear Chairperson Riggins: 

In December 2008, then EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson sent a letter 

informing you of the designations for the 2006 24-hour national ambient air quality 

standards (NAAQS) for fine particles (PM2.S). Your reservation was located in an area 

that was designated as attainment/unclassifiable for that standard. Those designation 

decisions were based on the 2005-2007 air quality monitoring data, which were the most 

current data at that time. 

However, these designations were never finalized because they were not 

published in the Federal Register. Current EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson has reviewed 

the December 2008 decisions and has decided to promulgate area designations based on 

consideration of new 2006-2008 air quality monitoring data, the most recent data 

available. I am writing to inform you that, based on consideration of 2006-2008 air 

quality monitoring data, two additional areas in California, Shasta County and Plumas 

County, appear to be violating the 2006 24-hour PM2.S NAAQS. 

Since your reservation is located within the boundaries of Shasta County, EPA is 

reviewing our initial recommendation for your reservation. EPA is deferring the area 

designation for Shasta County so that EPA and the tribes may collect sufficient 

information to assess these areas before promulgating designations. As a first step in this 

process, EPA will gather and evaluate information. Once an evaluation is completed, we 

will notify you of our intended designation for your reservation. Please note that EPA has 

received requests from the Air Resources Board to exclude certain monitored violations 

in Shasta County pursuant to our exceptional events rule. 

We plan to announce intended designations within the next several months and at
 

least 120 days prior to promulgating final designations. You will have an opportunity to
 

comment on EPA's intended designation once it is announced.
 

Printed on Recycled Paper 
We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff to develop 

designations for the 24-hour PM2.5 NAAQS in a timely manner. If you have any 

questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your air quality staff may wish to contact 

Colleen McKaughan, Associate Air Division Director at (520) 498-0118. 

Sincerely, 

L'!:::1~ Acting Regional Administrator 

cc: Sophia Villarruel, Environmental Coordinator
#### Manuel Angel LABRADA, Jr., Manuel Angel Labrada-Bello, Raul Julio Frias, Irene Williams Sander, and Magalis Camejo, Appellants, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1224.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 4, 1988.

Edward A. Carhart, Coral Gables, and Eric Dorsky, for appellants.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Richard L. Polin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Before BASKIN, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The five appellants in this case were charged with various violations of the lottery statutes and entered pleas of nolo contendere pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the state. The appellants specifically reserved their right to appeal the trial court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained from searches of two residences. The parties stipulated, and the trial court agreed, that the motions to suppress were dispositive of the case. The gravamen of the appeal concerns the alleged deficiency of the affidavits submitted by the investigating police officers m support of their application for search warrants. The appellants claim that the affidavits failed to provide the requisite probable cause to support the trial court’s issuance of the search warrants. Having carefully reviewed each of the lengthy, detailed affidavits, we conclude that they satisfy the standard established by this court in *Machado v. State,*363 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), *cert. denied,*373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motions to suppress and affirm the convictions and sentences entered upon the appellants’ pleas. Our finding that the trial court correctly denied the motions to suppress on the merits obviates the need for us to address appellants’ alternative argument that the good faith exception of *United States v. Leon,*468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), does not pertain to this case.

AFFIRMED.
#### Commonwealth ex rel., Appellant, *v.*Zalewski.

*Municipalities*— Counties—Boroughs—Councilmen, *Act of May U'h 1915, P. L. 812, Chapter 7, Article I, Section 2*— Quo *warranto.*

1. Section 2 of Article I, of Chapter VII of the Borough Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 312, designating a judge, justice of the peace of the county or burgess of the borough, when he is qualified, as the officer before whom a borough councilman’s oath of office “may be taken” is directory or permissive, not mandatory, and the oath may he taken before a notary public. •

2. Where a suggestion for. a writ of quo warranto to oust a borough councilman from office alleged that he had never been properly-qualified because he had taken the oath of office before a notary public, and hot before one of the officers designated by the said Act of 1915, a demurrer to the suggestion was properly sustained.

Submitted Feb. 26, 1918.

Appeal, No. 43, Jan. T., 1918, by relator, from judgment of C. P. Lackawanna Co., Jan. T., 1918, No. 320, refusing judgment of ouster in quo igarranto proceedings in case of Commonwealth ex rel. George W. Maxey, District Attorney, y. Joseph Zalewski.

Before Brown, C. J., Potter, Stewart, Moschzisker and Walling, JJ.

Affirmed.

Suggestion for writ of quo warranto-. Before Edwards, P. J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

The respondent demurred to suggestion for the writ. The court entered judgment for the respondent on the demurrer. Belator appealed.

*Error assigned*was the judgment of the court.

*A. A. Vosburg,*for appellant.

*M. J. Martm*and *Ralph W. Rymer,*for appellee.

June 3, 1918:

Opinion by

Mr. Chief Justice Brown,

This proceeding was instituted to oust the appellee *410from his office as councilman of Dickson City Borough, on the ground that he had taken his oath of office before a notary public. Section 2, Article I, Chapter VII, of the Act of May 14,1915, P. L. 312, provides that, “Before entering upon the duties of their office:, the councilmen shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and to perform the duties of their office with fidelity. The oath or affirmation may be taken before any judge or justice of the peace of the county, or before the burgess of the borough, when he is qualified, and shall be entered upon or filed among the records of the borough.” Before entering upon his duties the appellee took the oath so prescribed, and the notary public who administered it to him had power to administer an oath, “as fully, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as any judge of the Supreme Court, or president, or associate judge, of any of the Courts of Common Pleas, or any alderman, or justice of the peace, within this Commonwealth”: Act of August 10,1864, P. L. 962. The provision in the Act of 1915 that the councilmanic oath of office “may be taken” before a judge, justice of the peace or burgess, is merely directory or permissive, and not mandatory, as it would be if the word “shall” had been used instead of “may,” and the learned president judge of the court below correctly so held.

Judgment affirmed.
Exhibit 23.1

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S CONSENT


The Board of Directors
Main Street and Main Incorporated:

     We consent to  incorporation  by reference in the  registration  statements
filed on Form S-3 (File Nos.  333-71230,  333-28659,  333-78161,  333-42122  and
333-55108)  and  Form  S-8  (File  Nos.  333-43612,  333-78155,  333-89931,  and
333-55100)  of Main Street and Main  Incorporated  of our report  dated March 4,
2003,  relating  to the  consolidated  balance  sheets of Main  Street  and Main
Incorporated and subsidiaries as of December 30, 2002 and December 31, 2001, and
the related  consolidated  statements of  operations,  changes in  stockholders'
equity and comprehensive  income (loss) and cash flows for the years then ended,
which report appears in the December 30, 2002 annual report on Form 10-K of Main
Street and Main Incorporated.

     As  discussed  in  Note 2 to the  consolidated  financial  statements,  the
Company adopted the provisions of SFAS No. 142,  "Goodwill and Other  Intangible
Assets", which changed the Company's method of accounting for goodwill and other
intangible assets effective January 1, 2002.

/s/ KPMG LLP

Phoenix, Arizona
March 31, 2003
#### STATE of Louisiana v. David W. BOURGEOIS. In re David W. BOURGEOIS.

No. K89-194.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Feb. 28, 1989.

*927David Bourgeois, St. Gabriel, pro se.

William E. Tilley, Dist. Atty., Leesville, for respondents.

Before STOKER, DOUCET and YELVERTON, JJ.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY IN PART AND WRIT DENIED IN PART:

Assignment of Error No. 1:

Writ Granted and Made Peremptory: The record fails to reflect that the trial judge advised the relator of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the time relator waived his right to counsel and entered a guilty plea to the charge of simple burglary in docket #37,575 of the Thirtieth Judicial District Court. *State v. Washington,*421 So.2d 887 (La.1982). Without such advisement, relator’s waiver of counsel was not intelligently and voluntarily made. La.C.Cr.P. art. 514. Accordingly, relator’s conviction and sentence are vacated and set aside and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

*Assignment of Error Nos. 2 and 3:*Writ Denied: There is no error in the trial court’s ruling.
#### Anthony MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. Joaquin FUENMAYOR, M.D.; Harold Kushner, M.D., and Anthony Maniglia, M.D., Appellees.

No. 88-16.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 22, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 11, 1989.

Patricia Graham Williams, Miami, for appellant.

Parenti & Falk and Hayes G. Wood, Miami, for appellees.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., HUBBART and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The final orders dismissing the action below for lack of prosecution under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(e) are affirmed based on the following briefly stated legal analysis. *First,*there was no record activity in the instant action for one year prior to the filing of appellees’ motion to dismiss, save for a motion to strike sham pleadings and an affidavit in support thereof which was filed by a non-party who was mistakenly served as a defendant in this cause. The aforesaid motion and affidavit in no way advanced the cause to resolution and cannot, in our view, preclude a dismissal under the above rule. *See, e.g., Inman, Inc. v. Miami Dade Water & Sewer Auth.,*489 So.2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); *Overseas Dev., Inc. v. AmeriFirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*433 So.2d 587, 589 (Fla. 3d DCA), *pet. for rev. dismissed,*438 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1983). *Second,*there was no good cause shown in writing for the lack of record activity in this cause as required by Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.420(e). Indeed, appellant’s written response to the motion to dismiss made no effort to excuse the lack of record activity in this cause; appellant’s oral argument at the hearing on the said motion cannot cure this fatal defect. *Shields v. Moore,*352 So.2d 139, 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

Affirmed.
Motion Granted, Appeal Dismissed, and Memorandum Opinion filed October 

29, 2020.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-20-00560-CR

ROXANNE ANAYA PEYRANI, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1634413

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant was indicted for possession with intent to deliver at least 400 grams 

of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). The indictment contained an 

enhancement paragraph. Appellant entered into a charge bargain with the State. The 

State agreed to reduce the charged offense to possession with intent to deliver 200 

to 400 grams of a controlled substance, abandon the enhancement paragraph, and 

waive its right to a jury trial. The charge reduction and abandonment of the 

enhancement paragraph had the effect of reducing the minimum statutory sentence
2

from 15 years’ to 10 years’ imprisonment. Compare Tex. Health & Safety Code 

§ 481.112(f) with id. § 481.112(e). In exchange for that benefit, appellant agreed to 

plead guilty to the reduced charge, waive her right to a jury trial, and waive her right 

of appeal. The possibility of a lower sentence constitutes consideration for 

appellant’s waiver of her right to appeal. See Jones v. State, 488 S.W.3d 801, 807 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. She was appointed 

appellate counsel one week later.

Because this is a charge-bargain case, appellant has the right to appeal under 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) only: (A) those matters that were 

raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after receiving the 

trial court’s permission to appeal. Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 340–41 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009); see also Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 812–13 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003) (holding that charge-bargain case is governed by Rule 25.2(a)(2)). 

The amended certification of defendant’s right of appeal states this case “is a 

plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” That certification is 

supported by the record. The record does not reflect the trial court’s permission to 

appeal or any pretrial motions that could be appealed.

On October 15, 2020, we notified the parties that we would dismiss this appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction unless appellant demonstrated, within 21 days, that the court 

has jurisdiction. On October 16, 2020, appellant’s appointed counsel filed a motion 

to dismiss, agreeing appellant had no right to appeal.

We grant appellant’s motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jewell, and Zimmerer.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### STATE ex rel. Reginald E. ROME v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION “J”.

No. 89-KH-0414.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 21, 1989.

In re Rome, Reginald E.; — Plaintiff(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial *893writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “J”, No. 285-113.

Denied. No particularized need shown.
#### STATE ex rel. Carl BENION v. Hon. Rudolph F. BECKER, III.

No. 88-KH-0870.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 1988.

In re Benion, Carl; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “E”, No. 226712.

Denied. Repetitive. La.Code Criminal Procedure art. 930.4.
**EXHIBIT32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONSPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of U.S. Premium Beef, LLC (the Company) onForm 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Scott J. Miller, Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

     (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

     (2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

|   |   |                                                                                     |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| By:    |   | /s/ Scott J. Miller                                                                      |
|   |   |                                                                                     |
|   |   | Scott J. Miller*Chief Financial Officer*

*(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)* |

Date: August 9, 2012
#### THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Herbert P. SAPP, Jr., Respondent.

No. 70493.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 16, 1988.

*909John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John T. Berry, Staff Counsel and Susan V. Bloemendaal, Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, for complainant.

John A. Weiss, Tallahassee, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary proceeding is before the Court for consideration of the referee’s report. Neither party seeks review of the report.

The referee’s findings of misconduct are set forth in three counts. On count one, the referee found that respondent agreed to provide legal services to a client and was paid a retainer. Although respondent performed part of the work, he failed to clear a land title for the client and failed to communicate with the client. The respondent’s delay caused a land sale contract to be rescinded. The referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the former Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty) and 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal matter).

On count two, the referee found that respondent agreed to provide legal services to a client and was paid a retainer. Respondent was expected to clear the title to land held by an estate. The client made clear that there was a limited time in which the work had to be done. Respondent caused delays and later demanded an additional fee to complete the matter. The referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal matter).

On count three, the referee found that respondent, after being retained to provide legal services, failed to return telephone calls, failed to keep appointments, and failed to pursue the matter referred to him by the clients. The referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating Disciplinary Rules 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal matter) and 7-101(A)(2) (failure to carry out a contract of employment).

The Florida Bar and the respondent submitted to the referee a joint recommendation on discipline. The referee adopted it and accordingly recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for thirty days. We approve the referee’s report and order attorney Herbert P. Sapp, Jr., suspended from the practice of law for thirty days. Pursuant to rule 3-5.1(h), respondent must provide notice of this suspension “to all of his clients with matters pending” in his practice. As respondent has already been suspended in separate proceedings, this suspension shall take effect immediately and run concurrently with the other suspension.

The costs of this proceeding are taxed against the respondent. Judgment for costs in the amount of $1,537.22 is hereby entered against Herbert P. Sapp, Jr., for which sum let execution issue.

It is so ordered.

McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report of IdentiPHI, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K forthe period ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey T. Dick, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and 

(2) The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

Date: March 31, 2008
#### Jerry CUMPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 86-902.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 1, 1987.

Elizabeth G. Mansfield and Robert H. Dillinger of Dillinger & Swisher, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Robert S. Landry and Kim W. Munch, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for ap-pellee.

HALL, Judge.

Jerry Cumper appeals his judgment and sentence for sexual battery on a child under eleven years of age. Appellant was tried jointly with a codefendant, and the jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty as a principal in aiding and abetting a sexual battery on a child eleven years of age or younger. The codefendant was found guilty of sexual battery on a child eleven years of age or younger. Appellant and the codefendant were both sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence.

Appellant raised seven points on appeal. We find no merit to any of the points and, therefore, affirm his judgment and sentence.

We note, however, that appellant has raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. This issue cannot be sufficiently determined by us from the record as it now stands. We, therefore, decline to reach that point. The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel may be properly raised in a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. *90
      *Kelley v. State,*486 So.2d 578 (Fla.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986).

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
#### BYLES WELDING & TRACTOR CO., INC. v. BUTTS SALES & SERVICES, INC., Howard Butts and Gloria Butts.

No. 89-C-1327.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re Byles Welding & Tractor Co.;— Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA87-1351; Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 37937.

Prior report: La.App., 541 So.2d 992.

Denied.

LEMMON, J.,

concurs. The corporation appears to be liable, but the trial court impliedly denied plaintiff’s claim against the corporation, and plaintiff failed to appeal.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 20-14256

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:02-cr-00073-LSC-GMB-23

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CLARENCE GENE SHANKLIN, SR.,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(May 12, 2021)

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

USCA11 Case: 20-14256 Date Filed: 05/12/2021 Page: 1 of 2
2

W. Scott Brower, appointed counsel for Clarence Gene Shanklin, Sr., in this 

criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the 

appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of 

the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the 

entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is 

GRANTED, and Shanklin’s revocation of supervised release and sentence are 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 20-14256 Date Filed: 05/12/2021 Page: 2 of 2