United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

NEIL MINTZ AND 

JIF-PAK MANUFACTURING, INC., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

and 

MARCUS MINTZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DIETZ & WATSON, INC. AND 

PACKAGE CONCEPTS & MATERIALS, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

__________________________ 

2010-1341 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California in Case No. 05-CV-1470, 

Judge M. James Lorenz 

___________________________ 

Decided: May 30, 2012 

___________________________ 

ROBERT P. ANDRIS, II, Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley, of Redwood City, California, argued for plaintiffsappellants. With him on the brief was LAEL D. ANDARA. 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 2

JONATHAN HANGARTNER, X-Petents, APC, of La Jolla, 

California, argued for defendants-appellees. 

__________________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, AND DYK, Circuit 

Judges. 

RADER, Chief Judge. 

The United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California granted Package Concepts & Materials, Inc.’s (“PCM”) motion for summary judgment on 

invalidity and non-infringement against Neil Mintz, 

Marcus Mintz, and Jif-Pak Manufacturing, Inc. (collectively, “Mintz”). This court affirms the non-infringement 

determination and vacates the invalidity holding with a 

remand to the district court for further proceedings. 

I. 

Marcus and Neil Mintz appear as co-inventors on U.S. 

Patent No. 5,413,148 (filed Jan. 6, 1994) (“the ’148 patent”). The ’148 patent claims a casing structure for encasing meat products. Claim 1 recites: 

 1. An elongated tubular casing structure for encasing meat products, said elongated structure 

having a longitudinal direction and a transverse 

lateral direction, said casing structure comprising: 

a stockinette member comprising a closely 

knit tubular member formed of closely 

knit threads and having a first stretch 

capacity; 

a knitted netting arrangement having a 

second stretch capacity and comprising 

a first plurality of spaced strands extending in said longitudinal direction 
3 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

and a second plurality of spaced strands 

extending in said lateral direction; 

the longitudinal and lateral strands of 

said netting arrangement each intersecting in locking engagement with one 

another to form a grid-like pattern comprising a plurality of four-sided shapes; 

said strands of said netting arrangement 

being knit into the threads of said 

stockinette member, whereby said netting arrangement and said stockinette 

member are integrally formed so that 

said casing structure comprises an integrally formed structure; 

said first stretch capacity being greater 

than said second stretch capacity; 

whereby, when a meat product is stuffed into 

said casing structure under pressure, 

said meat product forms a bulge within 

each of said four-sided shapes to thereby 

define a checker-board pattern on the 

surface thereof, said stockinette member 

forming a shield to prevent the adherence of adjacent meat product bulges 

over said strands of said netting arrangement. 

’148 patent col.5 l.39 – col.6 l.18 (emphasis added to the 

disputed claim term). 

The ’148 specification describes prior art meat encasements, which use a netting that allows meat to bulge 

between the netting strands and produce a desirable 

checkerboard pattern on the meat’s surface. But, in the 

prior art encasements, the meat would bulge and cook 

around the netting strands, causing difficulty in peeling 

the netting off the cooked meat. The prior art tried to 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 4

solve this problem by using a separate layer of collagen 

film, or stockinette, underneath the netting. This solution, however, required a two-step stuffing process that 

was labor intensive and expensive. 

The ’148 patent integrates a stockinette into a netting 

to make a new kind of meat encasement. The integrated 

stockinette has more stretching ability than the netting. 

The patent therefore solves the adherence problem without the higher cost of the two-step stuffing process while 

still allowing some bulging to create the desirable checkerboard or grid-like pattern on the meat surface. 

Mintz designs and manufactures knitted meat encasements for processed meat manufacturers. Mintz 

asserts that the ’148 patent covers its Jif-Pak knitted 

meat encasement products. 

PCM, previously a distributor of Mintz’s Jif-Pak 

products, now sells products that directly compete with 

Mintz. After their distribution agreement ended, PCM 

began selling certain knitted meat encasement products 

that Mintz alleges infringe the ’148 patent. Mintz now 

accuses PCM’s bubble netting (BN), collagen replacement 

(CR), and cubic netting (CU) product lines of infringement. 

In 2005, PCM filed a declaratory judgment action 

against Mintz in the United States District Court for the 

District of South Carolina. Also in 2005, Mintz filed a 

patent infringement action against PCM in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. After consolidation of the separate suits, the California district court conducted a Markman hearing and 

issued a claim construction order. The district court 

construed “locking engagement” as “fixed at each intersection.” The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on validity and infringement. The district court 
5 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

granted PCM’s motion and denied Mintz’s. Mintz filed a 

motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The district court also denied Mintz’s motion to 

exclude the testimony of PCM’s expert in the knitting 

arts. 

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1295(a)(1). 

II. 

This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment without deference, ICU Med. v. Alaris Med. 

Sys., 558 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the decision to 

allow expert testimony for an abuse of discretion, FlexRest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 

2006), and determinations on the factual inquiries underlying the obviousness analysis for clear error, Eli Lilly & 

Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 2006). 

III. 

Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a patent claim is invalid as 

obvious “if the differences between the subject matter 

sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 

subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the 

time the invention was made to a person having ordinary 

skill in the art.” This statutory test requires factual 

inquiries: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the 

level of ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) 

objective evidence of nonobviousness. Eli Lilly & Co. v. 

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 619 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 

2010). 

As to the second factor, this court has held, “Factors 

that may be considered in determining level of skill 

include: type of problems encountered in art; prior art 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 6

solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and 

educational level of active workers in the field.” See 

Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allen Indus., Inc., 807 

F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 

In this case, the prior art, the problems giving rise to 

the invention, and the invention itself featured the meat 

encasement art. The district court, however, discounted 

the importance of familiarity or experience with meat 

products. Instead, the district court opined that the 

person of ordinary skill would have familiarity with the 

knitting art but no familiarity with the meat encasing art. 

Without some understanding of meat and meat encasement technology in various settings, the artisan of ordinary skill would not grasp many aspects of the invention. 

Therefore, entirely omitting the meat encasement art led 

the validity search astray. 

The ’148 patent specification repeatedly focuses on the 

meat encasement art. The patent’s Title, Field of the 

Invention, and Summary of the Invention all define the 

invention as a “casing structure for encasing meat products.” ’148 patent, at [54], col.1 ll.14-15, col.2 l.41. Similarly, claim 1 recites a “casing structure for encasing meat 

products” and further recites “a meat product is stuffed 

into said casing structure” and the stockinette is “to 

prevent the adherence of adjacent meat product.” Further, the prior art’s meat adherence problem solved by the 

claimed invention concerns meat encasement, not knitting. The first line in the ’148 patent’s Description of 

Prior Art states, “It is known in the meat encasing art ...” 

and goes on to discuss the prior art meat encasements 

and their problems. ’148 patent col.1 l.20. Accordingly, 

the level of ordinary skill in the art of the claimed invention includes the meat encasement art. 
7 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

As to the first factor, the district court’s obviousness 

ruling rests on U.S. Patent No. 698,499 (filed Mar. 28, 

1901) (“Hirner”), U.S. Patent No. 1,981,057 (filed Oct. 29, 

1931) (“Lombardi”), and U.S. Patent No. 9,001,395 (filed 

June 19, 1990) (“Henricus”). Hirner and Lombardi claim 

inventions related to knitted fabrics for products such as 

socks; Henricus, on the other hand, teaches various 

knitted encasements for meat. 

Hirner discloses a method of knitting where two horizontal lines connect vertically at spaced intervals. That 

connection is not created by a separate vertical thread but 

instead by a loop from the bottom horizontal line thread 

being looped with a loop from the top horizontal line 

thread. 

Lombardi discloses a method of knitting fabric using a 

series of drop stitches while preventing the problem of 

runs in the fabric. A “special yarn” is woven horizontally 

into the fabric. At the last loop in the regular fabric 

before beginning the drop stitch series, the special yarn 

forms a vertical, perpendicular long loop that hangs from 

the rear of the fabric and secures the regular fabric loop, 

as shown in Fig.1. Lombardi also discloses an embodiment in which the special yarn loops are not hanging but 

instead the top of the loop is “caught in the regular knitting,” as shown in Fig.4. The special yarn loop creates a 

visual vertical line perpendicular to the horizontal special 

yarn woven in the regular fabric. 

Henricus discloses a meat encasement using two 

separate layers: a netting with a fine mesh underneath a 

number of strengthening threads. The strengthening 

threads are not completely interwoven with the netting 

but instead are looped only at select points. 

An issued patent enjoys a presumption of validity, 

and prior art may have different probative weight for the 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 8

non-obviousness analysis for reasons including prior 

consideration before the PTO. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Am. Hoist 

& Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-

60 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 

S.Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011) (citing Am. Hoist). In this case, 

the examiner considered during prosecution all the prior 

art cited by PCM against the claimed invention. Thus, 

the examiner found that the prior art applied in this case 

had not precluded patentability even before the clear and 

convincing standard came into play. This court also 

observes that the inclusion of meat encasement art within 

the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in this art 

does not preclude the use of the knitting references as 

analogous to the claimed invention. 

As to the third factor, the district court correctly 

found all limitations of claim 1 in the prior art except the 

“intersecting in locking engagement” claim limitation. 

During prosecution, Mintz added that claim limitation to 

overcome the examiner’s obviousness rejection over Henricus in view of Lombardi. Contrary to Mintz’s assertions 

on appeal, the mere existence of different stretch capacities is not sufficient to distinguish the claimed invention 

from the prior art. The prior art is not limited to a uniform stretch capacity. The PTO specifically identified 

prior art references with two different stretch capacities. 

The district court made a clear error, however, in its 

unsubstantiated reliance on “a common sense view” or 

“common sense approach” to hold that it would have been 

“obvious to try” a locking engagement. The mere recitation of the words “common sense” without any support 

adds nothing to the obviousness equation. Within the 

statutory test to determine if a claimed invention has 

advanced its technical art field enough to warrant an 

exclusive right, “common sense” is a shorthand label for 

knowledge so basic that it certainly lies within the skill 
9 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

set of an ordinary artisan. With little more than an 

invocation of the words “common sense” (without any 

record support showing that this knowledge would reside 

in the ordinarily skilled artisan), the district court overreached in its determination of obviousness. 

At this juncture, the district court’s reliance on the 

perspective of an artisan in the knitting arts is especially 

problematic. The basic knowledge (common sense) of a 

knitting artisan is likely to be different from the basic 

knowledge in the possession of a meat encasement artisan. Moreover, the district court emphasized that the 

problem in the prior art was merely forming a checkerboard or grid-like pattern. To be specific, the district 

court erroneously phrased the issue as whether it would 

have been obvious to simply “fix each point of intersection” of each strand in order to solve that problem. 

This statement of the problem represents a form of 

prohibited reliance on hindsight. The district court has 

used the invention to define the problem that the invention solves. Often the inventive contribution lies in defining the problem in a new revelatory way. In other words, 

when someone is presented with the identical problem 

and told to make the patented invention, it often becomes 

virtually certain that the artisan will succeed in making 

the invention. Instead, PCM must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the 

meat encasement arts at the time of the invention would 

have recognized the adherence problem recognized by the 

inventors and found it obvious to produce the meat encasement structure disclosed in the ’148 patent to solve 

that problem. 

As to the fourth factor, the district court made a clear 

error in not considering or making any findings as to 

Mintz’s evidence showing objective indicia of non-
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 10

obviousness. This court has repeatedly emphasized that 

the objective indicia constitute “independent evidence of 

nonobviousness.” Pressure Prods. Med. Supplies, Inc. v. 

Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

Indeed, objective indicia “may often be the most probative 

and cogent evidence of nonobviousness in the record.” 

Ortho-McNeil Pharm. V. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 

1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. 

Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 306 (Fed. 

Cir. 1985) (Objective indicia “may be the most pertinent, 

probative, and revealing evidence available to the decision 

maker in reaching a conclusion on the obviousness/nonobviousness issue.”). Such evidence “may often 

establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Simmons Fastener 

Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 

(Fed. Cir. 1984). 

These objective guideposts are powerful tools for 

courts faced with the difficult task of avoiding subconscious reliance on hindsight. See Crocs, Inc. v. ITC, 598 

F.3d 1294, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Objective indicia “can be 

the most probative evidence of non-obviousness in the 

record, and enable the court to avert the trap of hindsight.”). These objective criteria help inoculate the obviousness analysis against hindsight. The objective indicia 

“guard against slipping into use of hindsight and to resist 

the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of 

the invention in issue.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 

U.S. 1, 36 (1966). This built-in protection can help to 

place a scientific advance in the proper temporal and 

technical perspective when tested years later for obviousness against charges of making only a minor incremental 

improvement. “That which may be made clear and thus 

‘obvious’ to a court, with the invention fully diagrammed 

and aided by experts in the field, may have been a break-
11 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

through of substantial dimension when first unveiled.” 

Uniroyal, Inc. v. Budkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051 

(Fed. Cir. 1988). 

These objective criteria thus help turn back the clock 

and place the claims in the context that led to their invention. Technical advance, like much of human endeavor, 

often occurs through incremental steps toward greater 

goals. These marginal advances in retrospect may seem 

deceptively simple, particularly when retracing the path 

already blazed by the inventor. For these reasons, this 

court requires consideration of these objective indicia 

because they “provide objective evidence of how the patented device is viewed in the marketplace, by those directly interested in the product.” Demaco Corp. v. F. Von 

Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 

1988); see also Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 

1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The objective considerations 

reflect the contemporary view of the invention by competitors and the marketplace.”); Continental Can Co. USA, 

Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 

(“The significance of a new structure is often better measured in the marketplace than in the courtroom.”); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1143 (Fed. 

Cir. 1985) (“Recognizing the difficulty of casting one's 

mind back to the state of technology at the time the 

invention was made, courts have long recognized the 

usefulness of evidence of the contemporaneous attitude 

toward the asserted invention. A retrospective view of the 

invention is best gleaned from those who were there at 

the time.”). Obviousness requires a court to walk a tightrope blindfolded (to avoid hindsight) — an enterprise best 

pursued with the safety net of objective evidence. 

Mintz presented considerable record evidence on objective indicia, including unexpected results, expert 

skepticism, copying, commercial success, praise by others 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 12

(even from the accused infringer PCM), failure by others, 

and long-felt need. Inexplicably, the district court erroneously stated, “Plaintiffs do not appear to offer any objective evidence of nonobviousness.” 

The record also shows that Mintz gave the district 

court an opportunity to correct this error by noting this 

oversight in its motion for reconsideration. In denying 

that motion, the district court acknowledged that Mintz 

did present such evidence in its opening summary judgment brief. Nonetheless, the district court dismissed 

without consideration that presentation as “scant.” To 

the contrary, the district court should have proceeded to 

analyze the evidence. 

The district court seemed to believe that it need not 

fully weigh objective indicia evidence. This court has 

consistently counseled otherwise. See, e.g., Transocean 

Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors 

USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We hold 

that the district court erred by failing to consider Transocean’s objective evidence of nonobviousness. ... To be 

clear, a district court must always consider any objective 

evidence of nonobviousness presented in a case.”); Custom 

Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 

955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“When present, such objective 

evidence must be considered. It can be the most probative 

evidence of nonobviousness in the record, and enables the 

district court to avert the trap of hindsight.”). This obligation is not waived, as the district court seemed to 

suggest, by some procedural requirement that ducks 

consideration of evidence presented in the opening brief 

but not pursued in a reply brief or in an oral argument 

that veers in a different direction. 

Indeed, where the invention is less technologically 

complex, the need for Graham findings can be important 
13 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

to ward against falling into the forbidden use of hindsight. 

Simply because the technology can be easily understood 

does not mean that it will satisfy the legal standard of 

obviousness. In fact, objective consideration of simple 

technology is often the most difficult because, once the 

problem and solution appear together in the patent disclosure, the advance seems self-evident. Instead, the 

proper analysis requires a form of amnesia that “forgets” 

the invention and analyzes the prior art and understanding of the problem at the date of invention. 

Here, Mintz presented substantial evidence of unexpected results, expert skepticism, copying, commercial 

success, praise by others (even from the accused infringer 

PCM), failure by others, and long-felt need. See PowerOne v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (“[P]raise from a competitor tends to indicate that 

the invention was not obvious.”); Gambro Lunda AB v. 

Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (Before the litigation, the accused infringer recognized the technology “as a significant advance” and 

“touted the advantages.” The accused infringer’s “recognition of the importance of this advance is relevant to a 

determination of nonobviousness.”); Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Commercial Prod., Inc., 21 

F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Indeed, the litigation 

argument that an innovation is really quite ordinary 

carries diminished weight when offered by those who had 

tried and failed to solve the same problem, and then 

promptly adopted the solution that they are now denigrating.”); Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 

948 F.2d 1264, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Thus when differences that may appear technologically minor nonetheless 

have a practical impact, particularly in a crowded field, 

the decision-maker must consider the obviousness of the 

new structure in this light. Such objective indicia as 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 14

commercial success, or filling an existing need, illuminate 

the technological and commercial environment of the 

inventor, and aid in understanding the state of the art at 

the time the invention was made.”). 

For example, when PCM was the distributor of JifPak products covered by the ’148 patent (for 8 years), 

PCM sent customers many letters and brochures praising 

the benefits of the Jif-Pak products. Once Mintz terminated the distribution agreement, PCM began selling the 

products accused of infringement in this case. Similarly, 

other companies have been accused of infringement by 

Mintz and either requested to license the ’148 patent or 

were found to infringe a related European patent. Mintz 

has been granted similar patents in other countries and 

has sold embodiments of the ’148 patent in 20 countries. 

Additionally, despite the old elastic netting having 

been sold on the market for over 30 years and the collagen 

film for over 10 years, before Mintz’s claimed invention, 

the prior art disclosed no solutions to the problem of meat 

adherence without the laborious two-step process or the 

higher expense. Mintz presented an example of a competitor who tried to solve the problem but failed. Since 

their introduction over 15 years ago, the Jif-Pak products 

have become the industry standard. Mintz has sold over 

$70 million of the Jif-Pak products in the United States 

alone. 

Having identified several errors in the district court’s 

obviousness analysis, this court vacates and remands to 

the district court. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. BarnesHind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 449 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 

(“This court, as an appellate court, may not make the 

required Graham factual findings, and must therefore 

remand that determination to the district court. The 

district court should not ignore the four-part analysis the 
15 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

authorities require.”). In light of the following section on 

the issue of infringement, however, this court leaves to 

the district court to decide whether any further proceedings are necessary. The district court may proceed if the 

parties are still contesting validity of the ’148 patent. 

IV. 

The district court correctly found the accused PCM 

products do not infringe the ’148 patent. The PCM products do not satisfy the “intersecting in locking engagement” claim limitation. The longitudinal strands in the 

PCM products are always separated by at least one row of 

regular loops. 

BN 

 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 16

CU 

 

CR 

 

As shown in the figures above, the longitudinal 

strands are represented vertically. Each longitudinal 

strand is made of long loops. The loops of the regular 

fabric are much smaller than the long loops that make up 
17 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

the longitudinal strand. In each figure, there are two 

longitudinal strands. For each longitudinal strand, 

starting from the bottom, the figure shows the top of one 

loop, then the entirety of another loop, and finally the 

bottom of another loop. Each longitudinal strand is 

separated from the one below and above by rows of regular loops (three rows in the BN netting, two rows in the 

CU netting, and one row in the CR netting). The gaps 

(made of regular loops) between the loops of the longitudinal strands preclude the longitudinal strands from 

“intersecting in locking engagement.” 

Indeed, the PCM products have the same gap (made 

of regular loops) between each longitudinal strand that 

Mintz argued the prior art Lombardi showed as distinct 

from the claimed invention: 

In the embodiment shown in Fig. 4 ... in 

Lombardi, each loop of special yarn extending in 

the longitudinal direction does not intersect in 

locking engagement with each special yarn extending in the lateral direction to form a grid-like 

pattern. This is also apparent from Fig. 6 of 

Lombardi, where the aligned long loops of special 

yarn are each separated from one another by a 

row of regular loops. 

Appendix at A2944. 
MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON 18

As shown in Fig.4, the top of the single loop in special 

yarn 40 and the two loops in special yarn 42 are looped 

with a regular fabric loop. There is a gap (made of regular fabric loops) between the top of the loop in special yarn 

40 and the horizontal line of special yarn 41. Similarly, 

there is a gap (made of regular fabric loops) between the 

top of the loops in special yarn 42 and the horizontal line 

of special yarn 43. 
19 MINTZ v. DIETZ & WATSON

As shown in Fig.6, the longitudinal strands are represented by short vertical darker lines. Each vertical line is 

separated from the one below and above by a gap of white 

space, representing the regular fabric loops. 

Mintz’s argument for why Lombardi lacks the “intersecting in locking engagement” claim limitation applies 

similarly to explain why PCM’s accused products also lack 

that claim limitation. This court affirms the district 

court’s holding of non-infringement. 

VACATED-IN-PART, AFFIRMED-IN-PART, 

AND REMANDED.