# Publicatieblad C 40/2020

| | ISSN 1977-0995 |
| --- | --- |
| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | C 40 |
| | |
| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Mededelingen en bekendmakingen | 63e jaargang6 februari 2020 |

ISSN 1977-0995

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

C 40

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Mededelingen en bekendmakingen

63e jaargang6 februari 2020

---

| Inhoud | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Informatie |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2020/C 40/01 | Wisselkoersen van de euro — 5 februari 2020 | 1 |
| | INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE |
| | Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA |
| 2020/C 40/02 | Besluit nr. 085/19/COL van 4 december 2019 tot inleiding van de formele onderzoeksprocedure ten aanzien van mogelijke staatssteun aan Remiks Group met betrekking tot afvalverwerkingsdiensten (zaak 84370) Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken | 2 |
| 2020/C 40/03 | Besluit nr. 86/19/COL van 5 december 2019 tot inleiding van de formele onderzoeksprocedure ten aanzien van vermeende staatssteun van Ganaveita Reykjavíkur Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken | 16 |

Inhoud

Bladzijde

IV   Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

2020/C 40/01

Wisselkoersen van de euro — 5 februari 2020

1

INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

2020/C 40/02

Besluit nr. 085/19/COL van 4 december 2019 tot inleiding van de formele onderzoeksprocedure ten aanzien van mogelijke staatssteun aan Remiks Group met betrekking tot afvalverwerkingsdiensten (zaak 84370) Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken

2

2020/C 40/03

Besluit nr. 86/19/COL van 5 december 2019 tot inleiding van de formele onderzoeksprocedure ten aanzien van vermeende staatssteun van Ganaveita Reykjavíkur Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken

16

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| | V   Bekendmakingen |
| --- | --- |
| | GERECHTELIJKE PROCEDURES |
| | EVA-Hof |
| 2020/C 40/04 | Eva-Hof Arrest van Het Hof van 13 november 2019 in zaak E-2/19 | 33 |
| | PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN DE GEMEENSCHAPPELIJKE HANDELSPOLITIEK |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2020/C 40/05 | Bericht van het naderend vervallen van bepaalde antidumpingmaatregelen | 34 |
| | PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2020/C 40/06 | Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie (Zaak M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax) Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak (
  1
  ) | 35 |
| 2020/C 40/07 | Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie (Zaak M.9719 — Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited/OMERS Administration Corporation/Riverstone Barbados Limited) Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak (
  1
  ) | 37 |
| | ANDERE HANDELINGEN |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2020/C 40/08 | Bekendmaking van een mededeling van de goedkeuring van een standaardwijziging van een productdossier voor een naam in de wijnsector als bedoeld in artikel 17, leden 2 en 3, van Gedelegeerde Verordening (EU) 2019/33 van de Commissie | 38 |
| 2020/C 40/09 | Bericht aan ondernemingen die in 2021 fluorkoolwaterstoffen in bulk in de Europese Unie in de handel willen brengen | 47 |

V   Bekendmakingen

GERECHTELIJKE PROCEDURES

EVA-Hof

2020/C 40/04

Eva-Hof Arrest van Het Hof van 13 november 2019 in zaak E-2/19

33

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN DE GEMEENSCHAPPELIJKE HANDELSPOLITIEK

Europese Commissie

2020/C 40/05

Bericht van het naderend vervallen van bepaalde antidumpingmaatregelen

34

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

2020/C 40/06

Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie (Zaak M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax) Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak (
  1
  )

1

35

2020/C 40/07

Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie (Zaak M.9719 — Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited/OMERS Administration Corporation/Riverstone Barbados Limited) Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak (
  1
  )

1

37

ANDERE HANDELINGEN

Europese Commissie

2020/C 40/08

Bekendmaking van een mededeling van de goedkeuring van een standaardwijziging van een productdossier voor een naam in de wijnsector als bedoeld in artikel 17, leden 2 en 3, van Gedelegeerde Verordening (EU) 2019/33 van de Commissie

38

2020/C 40/09

Bericht aan ondernemingen die in 2021 fluorkoolwaterstoffen in bulk in de Europese Unie in de handel willen brengen

47

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst. |

---

(1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst.

1

| NL | |
| --- | --- |

NL

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IV Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/1

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Wisselkoersen van de euro (1)

5 februari 2020

(2020/C 40/01)

1 euro =

| | Munteenheid | Koers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,1023 |
| JPY | Japanse yen | 120,94 |
| DKK | Deense kroon | 7,4728 |
| GBP | Pond sterling | 0,84444 |
| SEK | Zweedse kroon | 10,5450 |
| CHF | Zwitserse frank | 1,0717 |
| ISK | IJslandse kroon | 138,10 |
| NOK | Noorse kroon | 10,1173 |
| BGN | Bulgaarse lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tsjechische koruna | 25,055 |
| HUF | Hongaarse forint | 335,76 |
| PLN | Poolse zloty | 4,2491 |
| RON | Roemeense leu | 4,7734 |
| TRY | Turkse lira | 6,5975 |
| AUD | Australische dollar | 1,6299 |
| CAD | Canadese dollar | 1,4644 |
| HKD | Hongkongse dollar | 8,5572 |
| NZD | Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar | 1,7006 |
| SGD | Singaporese dollar | 1,5202 |
| KRW | Zuid-Koreaanse won | 1 302,97 |
| ZAR | Zuid-Afrikaanse rand | 16,2246 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,6858 |
| HRK | Kroatische kuna | 7,4568 |
| IDR | Indonesische roepia | 15 036,47 |
| MYR | Maleisische ringgit | 4,5382 |
| PHP | Filipijnse peso | 55,961 |
| RUB | Russische roebel | 69,0320 |
| THB | Thaise baht | 34,133 |
| BRL | Braziliaanse real | 4,6614 |
| MXN | Mexicaanse peso | 20,4923 |
| INR | Indiase roepie | 78,4330 |

Munteenheid

Koers

USD

US-dollar

1,1023

JPY

Japanse yen

120,94

DKK

Deense kroon

7,4728

GBP

Pond sterling

0,84444

SEK

Zweedse kroon

10,5450

CHF

Zwitserse frank

1,0717

ISK

IJslandse kroon

138,10

NOK

Noorse kroon

10,1173

BGN

Bulgaarse lev

1,9558

CZK

Tsjechische koruna

25,055

HUF

Hongaarse forint

335,76

PLN

Poolse zloty

4,2491

RON

Roemeense leu

4,7734

TRY

Turkse lira

6,5975

AUD

Australische dollar

1,6299

CAD

Canadese dollar

1,4644

HKD

Hongkongse dollar

8,5572

NZD

Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar

1,7006

SGD

Singaporese dollar

1,5202

KRW

Zuid-Koreaanse won

1 302,97

ZAR

Zuid-Afrikaanse rand

16,2246

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,6858

HRK

Kroatische kuna

7,4568

IDR

Indonesische roepia

15 036,47

MYR

Maleisische ringgit

4,5382

PHP

Filipijnse peso

55,961

RUB

Russische roebel

69,0320

THB

Thaise baht

34,133

BRL

Braziliaanse real

4,6614

MXN

Mexicaanse peso

20,4923

INR

Indiase roepie

78,4330

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(1)  Bron: door de Europese Centrale Bank gepubliceerde referentiekoers.

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INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/2

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Besluit nr. 085/19/COL van 4 december 2019 tot inleiding van de formele onderzoeksprocedure ten aanzien van mogelijke staatssteun aan Remiks Group met betrekking tot afvalverwerkingsdiensten (zaak 84370)

Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken

(2020/C 40/02)

Door middel van het bovengenoemde besluit, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, heeft de Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA de Noorse autoriteiten in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot inleiding van de procedure van artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie ten aanzien van de bovengenoemde steunmaatregel.

| Toezichthoudende autoriteit van de EVA |
| --- |
| Register |
| Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| registry@eftasurv.int |

Toezichthoudende autoriteit van de EVA

Register

Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

registry@eftasurv.int

De opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van de Noorse autoriteiten worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

Samenvatting

Procedure

| (1) | De Autoriteit heeft op 16 augustus 2016 een klacht ontvangen van de handelsorganisatie Norsk Industri. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | In reactie op haar verzoeken heeft de Autoriteit informatie van de Noorse autoriteiten ontvangen bij brieven van 5 oktober 2016, 28 februari, 20 maart, 22 augustus, 31 oktober en 20 november 2017 en 5 maart 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Beschrijving van de maatregelen

| (3) | De vermeende begunstigden van de steun zijn Remiks Miljøpark AS, Remiks Næring AS en Remiks Produksjon AS. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

| (4) | Remiks Miljøpark AS is voor 99,99 % in eigendom van de gemeente Tromsø. Remiks Næring AS en Remiks Produksjon AS zijn voor 100 % in eigendom van Remiks Miljøpark AS. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | Remiks Miljøpark AS is ook voor 100 % eigenaar van Remiks Huholdning AS. Dit bedrijf verricht echter uitsluitend diensten voor de gemeente Tromsø en is niet actief op de markt. Aankopen van Remiks Husholdning AS worden toegerekend aan de gemeente. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | Vanaf begin 2010 tot en met 1 februari 2017 heeft de gemeente Tromsø bij Remiks Næring AS afvalinzamelingsdiensten aangekocht voor haar eigen industrieel afval. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | Vanaf begin 2010 tot op heden heeft de gemeente Tromsø op basis van haar indirecte zeggenschap Remiks Husholdning AS opgedragen het huishoudelijk afval in de gemeente Tromsø in te zamelen. Vanaf 1 februari tot op heden heeft de gemeente Tromsø Remiks Husholdning AS ook opgedragen het industriële afval van de gemeente Tromsø op te halen. Remiks Husholdning AS verricht deze diensten namens de gemeente op basis van eigen kosten, wat betekent dat het wordt gecompenseerd op basis van de volledige kosten, winst niet inbegrepen. Remiks Husholdning AS zorgt voor de inzameling van afval, maar koopt de nodige afvalverwerkingsdiensten aan bij haar zustermaatschappij Remiks Produksjon AS. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | In verband met de oprichting van de Remiks Group heeft de gemeente Tromsø in 2010 en 2012 kapitaal, schulden, roerende goederen en onroerend goed overgedragen aan de moedermaatschappij Remiks Miljøpark AS. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

| (9) | Het besluit heeft betrekking op drie maatregelen: (i) de aankoop van afvalinzamelingsdiensten van Remiks Næring AS door de gemeente Tromsø, (ii) de aankoop van afvalverwerkingsdiensten van Remiks Produksjon AS door Remiks Husholdning AS en (iii) transacties van de gemeente Tromsø aan de Remiks Group in 2010 en 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Beoordeling van de maatregelen

| (10) | Wat maatregelen (i) en (ii) betreft, betwijfelt de Autoriteit of respectievelijk de gemeente Tromsø en Remiks Husholdning AS een marktconforme prijs hebben betaald voor de aangekochte diensten. Wat maatregel (iii) betreft, betwijfelt de Autoriteit of de transacties van de gemeente Tromsø aan de Remiks Group onder marktvoorwaarden, in overeenstemming met het beginsel van de marktdeelnemer in een markteconomie (“MEOP”), hebben plaatsgevonden. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

| (11) | Als de maatregelen staatssteun vormen, is de verplichting van artikel 1, lid 3, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie om de steun bij de Autoriteit aan te melden alvorens deze te implementeren niet in acht genomen. De staatssteun zou derhalve illegaal zijn. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

| (12) | De Noorse autoriteiten hebben geen argumenten aangevoerd om de maatregelen, voor zover zij staatssteun vormen, als verenigbaar met de werking van de EER-Overeenkomst te kunnen beschouwen. De Autoriteit heeft derhalve twijfels ten aanzien van de verenigbaarheid van alle drie de maatregelen. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Decision No 085/19/COL of 4 December 2019 to open a formal investigation into potential state aid granted to the Remiks Group related to waste handling services

1.   Summary

| (1) | The EFTA Surveillance Authority (the “Authority”) wishes to inform Norway that, having assessed a complaint relating to (i) Tromsø municipality’s purchase of waste collection services from Remiks Næring AS, (ii) Remiks Husholdning AS’ purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon AS, and (iii) transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012 (the “measures”), the Authority has doubts as to whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, and as to the compatibility of the measures with the EEA Agreement. Therefore, the Authority is required to open a formal investigation procedure (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | The complainant has also submitted a separate complaint about alleged violations of the public procurement rules. This decision, however, concerns the state aid complaint only, and remains without prejudice to the ongoing investigation concerning public procurement handled by the Authority’s Internal Market Affairs Directorate (2). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

| (3) | The Authority has based its decision on the following considerations. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

2.   Procedure

| (4) | By letter dated 16 August 2016, Norsk Industri, the Federation of Norwegian Industries, (the “complainant”) lodged a complaint against the measures (3). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | The Norwegian authorities submitted comments to the complaint on 5 October 2016 (4). The Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities on 18 January 2017 (5), which was provided by letters dated 28 February (6) and 20 March 2017 (7). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | The Authority provided the complainant with a preliminary view on the complaint by letter dated 24 May 2017 (8). The Authority received further information from the complainant on 22 June 2017 (9), and from the Norwegian Authorities on 22 August 2017 (10). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | By letter dated 31 August 2017, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (11). By letters dated 31 October and 20 November 2017, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request (12). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | By letter dated 16 January 2018, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (13), and the Norwegian authorities provided information by letter dated 5 March 2018 (14). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

| (9) | The complainant sent additional information by emails of 14 December 2016; 15 September and 13 November 2017; and 12 January, 31 January and 22 May 2018 (15). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

3.   Background

3.1   
  Historical development

| (10) | In Norway, waste handling services are regulated by the Pollution Control Act (16). The Act makes a distinction between household waste, which is all waste from the municipalities’ households, and industrial waste, which is the waste from public and private enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

| (11) | Up until 2009, Tromsø municipality organised its waste management services in-house through municipal units and enterprises. In 2009, the municipal council decided to organise the municipality’s waste management in a group of limited liability companies (17). This was done to put an “arm’s length” between the municipality and the activities exposed to competition (18). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

| (12) | In June 2009, the municipal council converted the municipal enterprise Tromsø Miljøpark KF (19), which had previously performed waste management services for Tromsø municipality, into Remiks Miljøpark AS (20). In December 2009, three subsidiaries were established under Remiks Miljøpark AS (21): Remiks Husholdning AS (“Remiks Husholdning”), Remiks Næring AS (“Remiks Næring”) and Remiks Produksjon AS (“Remiks Produksjon”). Collectively the companies are referred to as the “Remiks Group”. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

3.2   
  Transactions involving the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

| (13) | On 23 June 2010, Tromsø municipal council made the formal decision to transfer the capital and liabilities that were left in the municipal enterprises Tromsø Miljøpark KF and Remiks Tromsø KF to Remiks Miljøpark AS (22). The transactions involved movables, capital, liabilities, and real estate, including the waste handling facility Remiks Miljøpark (the same name as the parent company) where the Remiks Group companies have their business. The assets were converted into share capital in Remiks Miljøpark AS (23). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

| (14) | In 2012, Tromsø municipal council decided to transfer real estate and a loan to Remiks Miljøpark AS, in addition to adjusting the value of the real estate transferred in 2010 (24). In both the preparatory paper (25) and the decision (26), Tromsø municipality specified a requirement for a 9 % return on the investment. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

3.3   
  The current company structure

| (15) | Per November 2019, the Remiks Group is organised as follows (27):






  — | Remiks Miljøpark AS is the parent company in the Remiks Group. It is owned 99,99 % by Tromsø municipality and 0,01 % by Karlsøy municipality (28). It provides services and rents out property to its subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(15)

—

Remiks Miljøpark AS is the parent company in the Remiks Group. It is owned 99,99 % by Tromsø municipality and 0,01 % by Karlsøy municipality (28). It provides services and rents out property to its subsidiaries.

| — | Remiks Husholdning is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Until 2017, it only collected household waste for Tromsø municipality. As of 1 February 2017, it also collectes Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste. |
| --- | --- |

—

Remiks Husholdning is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Until 2017, it only collected household waste for Tromsø municipality. As of 1 February 2017, it also collectes Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste.

| — | Remiks Næring is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Remiks Næring specialises in the collection of industrial waste, and offers such services on the market. Until 1 February 2017, it had an agreement with Tromsø municipality for the collection of Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste. |
| --- | --- |

—

Remiks Næring is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Remiks Næring specialises in the collection of industrial waste, and offers such services on the market. Until 1 February 2017, it had an agreement with Tromsø municipality for the collection of Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste.

| — | Remiks Produksjon is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. It provides waste treatment services on the market, primarily to its sister companies. |
| --- | --- |

—

Remiks Produksjon is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. It provides waste treatment services on the market, primarily to its sister companies.

| (16) | Below is an illustration of the Remiks Group’s structure: |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Image 1

3.4   
  Household waste

| (17) | The Norwegian Pollution Control Act, section 27a, first paragraph, defines household waste as waste from private households, including large objects such as furniture, etc. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

| (18) | Under the Pollution Control Act, sections 29 and 30, the municipalities are obliged to collect and have facilities to treat household waste (29). The costs associated with the waste management are to be covered by a fee, levied on the inhabitants (30). The municipal waste fee are to be calculated based on a self-cost principle; covering the total costs of collecting and handling the waste on behalf of the municipality, without generating a profit for the municipality, in accordance with the Waste Regulation, chapter 15 (31). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

| (19) | When Tromsø municipality reorganised its waste handling services and established the Remiks Group in 2010, by way of its control in Remiks Husholdning it instructed Remiks Husholdning to collect the household waste on behalf of the municipality, based on the self-cost principle. Remiks Husholdning collects and sorts the waste. However, it purchases the waste treatment services, consisting of incineration, depositing and recycling, from its sister company Remiks Produksjon. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

3.5   
  Industrial waste

| (20) | The Norwegian Pollution Control Act, section 27a, second paragraph, defines industrial waste as waste from public and private enterprises and institutions. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

| (21) | The Norwegian Pollution Control Act does not oblige the municipalities to organise the collection or handling of industrial waste. Any operator can therefore offer these services on the market. However, all producers of industrial waste are obliged to ensure the proper disposal and handling of their waste. Tromsø municipality, as a producer of industrial waste, is therefore obliged to ensure the proper collection and treatment of its own industrial waste, produced by the different municipal units (kindergartens, hospitals, nursing homes, municipal offices, etc.) (32). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

| (22) | Before 2010, Tromsø municipality ensured the collection of its own industrial waste through a municipal enterprise (33). When Tromsø municipality reorganised its waste handling services and established the Remiks Group, Remiks Næring took over the collection of the municipality’s own industrial waste (34). Therefore, the agreements for the services were not tendered out or renegotiated. From 2010, Remiks Næring merely continued to provide the same services to the municipality as the municipal enterprise had done before the reorganisation. The only thing that changed was the invoicing system, from internal and centralised to external and decentralised. This meant that each municipal unit (municipal offices, kindergarten, etc.) paid for the service from their budget, and Remiks Næring treated them as individual customers (35). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

| (23) | Because of this continuation of the collection services, Remiks Næring and Tromsø municipality never entered into a formal contract for the waste collection services (36). The Norwegian authorities have described the arrangement as an unwritten framework agreement where each municipal unit decided its need for waste collection, and was invoiced separately (37). The Authority will refer to the arrangement between Tromsø municipality and Remiks Næring, regarding the collection of industrial waste, simply as an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

| (24) | In 2016, Tromsø municipality decided to terminate the agreement with Remiks Næring, and concluded a new framework agreement with Remiks Husholdning for the collection of the municipality’s industrial waste, starting 1 February 2017. The agreement was awarded directly, and based on a self-cost principle, meaning that the compensation covers the full costs, but no profits (38). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

| (25) | Remiks Husholdning foresaw a total price for the services in 2017 of approximately NOK 8,2 million. This was NOK 3,2 million less than the combined total price all the individual municipal units paid to Remiks Næring in 2016 (39). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

4.   Measures covered by the complaint

| (26) | The complainant has complained about three separate measures: |
| --- | --- |

(26)

| (27) | First, alleged overpayment under the agreement between Tromsø municipality and Remiks Næring for collection of industrial waste for the period running from 2010 until 1 February 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

| (28) | Second, alleged overpayment in relation to Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from its sister company Remiks Produksjon. This agreement has been in force since the establishment of Remiks Husholdning in 2010 and is ongoing. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

| (29) | Third, certain transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012, which allegedly were not conducted on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

5.   Presence of state aid

5.1   
  Introduction

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement stipulates that:
  “Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.” |
| --- | --- |

(30)

“Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.”

| (31) | The qualification of a measure as aid within the meaning of this provision therefore requires the following cumulative conditions to be met: (i) the measure must be granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) it must confer an advantage on an undertaking; (iii) favour certain undertakings (selectivity); and (iv) threaten to distort competition and affect trade. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

5.2   
  Presence of state resources

5.2.1   Introduction

| (32) | For the measure to constitute aid, it must be granted by the State or through state resources. State resources include all resources of the public sector, including resources of intra-state entities (decentralised, federated, regional or other) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

| (33) | The transfer of state resources may take many forms, such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the capital of companies and benefits in kind. A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; waiving revenue that would otherwise have been paid to the state constitutes a transfer of state resources (41). |
| --- | --- |

(33)

5.2.2   Tromsø municipality’s purchase of industrial waste collection services

| (34) | The remuneration Tromsø municipality paid to Remiks Næring for the collection of industrial waste came from the budget of Tromsø municipality, as does the remuneration which Remiks Husholdning is currently receiving for the same services. The remuneration therefore constitutes state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

5.2.3   Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon

| (35) | The notion of state aid as expressed in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is to be interpreted widely, therefore it covers not only aid granted directly via the state budget but also compulsory contributions imposed by state legislation. Measures financed through parafiscal charges or compulsory contributions imposed by the State and managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of public rules imply a transfer of state resources, even if not administered by the public authorities (42). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

| (36) | Remiks Husholdning is financed through the waste fee, which is fixed in accordance with the principles laid down in section 34 of the Pollution Control Act and chapter 15 of the Waste Regulation. The fee is collected by the municipality and disbursed via the municipal budget (43). Thus, the public authorities determine both the size and use of the fee. Further, its legal basis and the way it is collected indicates that it is under the permanent control of public authorities. The fee must therefore be considered to constitute state resources. This Assessment is in line with the Authority’s conclusion in its decision on the financing of municipal waste collectors in Norway in 2013 (44). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

| (37) | Further, it must be considered whether Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon is imputable to Tromsø municipality. That is, whether Tromsø municipality must be regarded as having been involved in the adoption of the measures (45). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

| (38) | Remiks Husholdning is indirectly owned by Tromsø municipality and subject to public law, such as the public procurement rules (46). The purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon is conducted under the control and instruction of Tromsø municipality, in accordance with the Pollution Control Act. Furthermore, as Remiks Husholdning has been granted an exclusive right to collect the household waste by Tromsø municipality it is not subject to competition on the market, but rather operating under a monopoly (47). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

| (39) | Based on this, Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon appears imputable to Tromsø municipality, so as to constitute state resources for the purposes of Article 61(1) EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

5.2.4   The transactions involving the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

| (40) | If public authorities or public undertakings provide goods or services at a price below market rates, or invest in an undertaking in a manner that is inconsistent with the market economy operator (“MEO”) principle, this implies foregoing state resources (as well as the granting of an advantage) (48). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

| (41) | Therefore, if the transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012 were not conducted on market terms, state resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA might have been involved. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

5.3   
  Undertaking

| (42) | Only advantages granted to “undertakings” are subject to state aid law. The concept of an undertaking covers any entity that engages in an economic activity regardless of its status and the way it is financed. Hence, the public or private status of an entity, or the fact a company is partly or wholly publicly owned, has no bearing on whether or not the entity is an “undertaking” (49). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

| (43) | An activity is economic in nature where it consists in offering goods and services on a market (50). The assessment of the activity must be based on the factual evidence, and the question is whether there is a market for the services concerned (51). In this regard, it is relevant to consider whether the entities receive compensation for the services, at what level, and whether they face competition from other undertakings (52). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

| (44) | Remiks Næring has, since its establishment in 2010, been providing services for collection of industrial waste for remuneration in competition with other undertakings. Based on this, Remiks Næring appears to engage in economic activity so as to constitute an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

| (45) | Remiks Produksjon offers waste treatment services. The services are offered on the market for remuneration and in competition with other providers. Remiks Produksjon thus appears to engage in economic activity so as to constitute an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

| (46) | In relation to the transfers from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012, the Group must be considered to form one economic unit (53). An entity which, owning controlling shareholdings in a company, actually exercises that control by involving itself directly or indirectly in the management thereof must be regarded as taking part in the economic activity carried on by the controlled undertaking (54). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

| (47) | The subsidiaries in the Remiks Group are fully owned by Remiks Miljøpark AS, and the Authority does not have any indications that Remiks Miljøpark AS is not involved in the management of its fully owned subsidiaries. The Authority has preliminarily concluded that both Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon undertake economic activity (see immediately above). With this, it is also the Authority’s preliminary conclusion that the Remiks Group, as one economic unit, constitutes an undertaking for the purposes of the application of state aid rules, in so far as it is engaged in the economic activities of Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon (55). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

5.4   
  Advantage

5.4.1   Introduction

| (48) | The qualification of a measure as state aid requires that it confers an advantage on the recipient. An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit that an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions (56). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

| (49) | The measure constitutes an advantage not only if it confers positive economic benefits, but also in situations where it mitigates charges normally borne by the budget of the undertaking. This covers all situations in which economic operators are relieved of the inherent costs of their economic activities (57). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

| (50) | Economic transactions carried out by public bodies are considered not to confer an advantage on the counterpart of the agreement, and therefore not to constitute aid, if they are carried out in line with normal market conditions (58). This is assessed pursuant to the MEO principle (59). Therefore, when public authorities purchase a service, it is generally sufficient, to exclude the presence of an advantage, that they pay market price. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

| (51) | Whether a transaction is in line with market conditions can be established on the basis of a generally accepted, standard assessment methodology, relying on the available objective, verifiable and reliable data, which should be sufficiently detailed and should reflect the economic situation at the time at which the transaction was decided, taking into account the level of risk and future expectations (60). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

5.4.2   Tromsø municipality’s purchase of waste collection services from Remiks Næring

5.4.2.1   Introduction

| (52) | According to the MEO principle, the decision to carry out a transaction must have been taken on the basis of economic evaluations comparable to those which, in similar circumstances, a rational MEO (with characteristics similar to those of the public body concerned) would have carried out to determine the profitability or economic advantage of the transaction (61). When examining compliance with the principle it is only the information known at the time of the decision which is relevant (62). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

| (53) | The purchase of the services through a competitive tender is only one of several methods for ensuring that a transaction does not confer an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. To establish whether a transaction is in line with market conditions, that transaction can be assessed in the light of the terms on which comparable transactions carried out by comparable private operators have taken place in comparable situations (benchmarking) (63) or through a qualified financial assessment (64). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

| (54) | Below, the Authority examines the different lines of reasoning that the complainant has brought forward in support of its assertion that Remiks Næring has been overcompensated. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

5.4.2.2   Benchmarking

| (55) | The complainant alleges that Tromsø municipality has paid disproportionally more than Bodø municipality for similar waste collection services in the same period. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

| (56) | The complainant states that Tromsø municipality in 2016 paid to Remiks Næring five times what Bodø municipality paid to Retura Iris AS for collection of industrial waste. Both Tromsø and Bodø are municipalities in the North of Norway, located by the coast, and with a road network interrupted by fjords. The complainant argues that the two municipalities are comparable in size and population density. While there are 5 100 people working in Tromsø municipality at 160 municipal locations, there are 3 100 people working in Bodø municipality, at 100 locations. On that basis, the complainant argues that the price paid in Tromsø should not exceed a price which is proportionally higher (approximately 60–65 % higher) than that paid in Bodø for similar services (65). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

| (57) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the agreements in Tromsø and Bodø are different in both size and nature, and that the agreement with Bodø municipality therefore cannot serve as an appropriate benchmark. The municipality of Tromsø has paid a fixed price for waste collection services, based on the size of the bins, regardless of the actual weight. Thus, Remiks Næring carried the risk of the municipality disposing of more waste than budgeted for. The fixed price also covered additional services such as picking up waste that had fallen outside of the bins and additional bags placed next to the bins – in addition to educating the public, raising climate and environmental awareness (66). The municipality of Bodø had an agreement where it paid a price based on the actual weight of waste collected, which means the municipality carried the risk of disposing of more waste than budgeted for. Thus, the scope of and risk allocation under the two agreements are different. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

| (58) | Further, the Norwegian authorities argue that the difference in geography, the population density, and municipal locations, including the number of municipal employees, justify different prices for the collection of industrial waste in Tromsø and Bodø. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

| (59) | Based on the above, it is the Authority’s preliminary conclusion that benchmarking against Bodø municipality is not an appropriate way to evaluate the market price for the waste collection services (67). |
| --- | --- |

(59)

5.4.2.3   Negotiating a better price

| (60) | The complainant argues that the municipality of Tromsø is the largest purchaser of waste collection services in the area concerned, and that it therefore should have been able to negotiate a better price (68). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

| (61) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions (69). To establish whether a transaction complies with market conditions, the transaction can be assessed in the light of the terms under which comparable transactions carried out by a comparable private operator would have taken place in a comparable situation (70). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

| (62) | The Norwegian authorities have provided documentation indicating that a number of private undertakings have purchased comparable products at the same or a higher price than Tromsø municipality (71). However, it is not clear whether the list includes the majority of Remiks Næring’s other customers, or only a smaller selection. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the proportion of other customers that have purchased comparable products to a price equal to or higher that paid by Tromsø municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

5.4.2.4   Increase in remuneration during the contract period

| (63) | The complainant further points out that the total compensation paid to Remiks Næring for the relevant services increased from NOK 7,7 million in 2010 to NOK 11,4 million in 2016, so almost 50 % over six years. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

| (64) | The Norwegian authorities have provided documentation showing that the number of inhabitants and municipal employees has increased in the same period, and that the municipality has made several investments in new municipal buildings and units, which has led to an increase in the production of waste. The increase in remuneration to Remiks Næring is also mirrored in a corresponding increase in operating expenditure (72). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

| (65) | The Authority, however, has doubts as to whether the information provided can explain a 50 % increase in price over a period of six years. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the basis for the increases in the total remuneration paid. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

5.4.2.5   Difference compared to the price budgeted by Remiks Husholdning for 2017

| (66) | As of 1 February 2017, Tromsø municipality terminated the agreement with Remiks Næring, and instructed Remiks Husholdning to collect the municipal industrial waste on an in-house basis, at a price not exceeding the costs (self-cost). Remiks Husholdning estimated budget for 2017 was NOK 8,2 million, which is NOK 3,2 million less than the NOK 11,4 million that Remiks Næring received for the services in 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

| (67) | The complainant argues that, provided the costs for the waste collection services were the same in 2016 and 2017, Remiks Næring would have had a profit of NOK 3,2 million for the services it provided in 2016. This would entail a margin on these services of 30 %, which is considerably higher than the market standard, which the complainant estimates at 0–8 % (73). |
| --- | --- |

(67)

| (68) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the services provided by Remiks Næring under the 2016 agreement and the services provided by Remiks Husholdning under the 2017 agreement are materially different. Under the agreement with Remiks Næring, Tromsø municipality had a fixed price agreement whereby Remiks Næring carried the risk of the municipality disposing of more waste than budgeted for (74). Under the self-cost agreement with Remiks Husholdning, Tromsø municipality entered into an agreement based on the actual weight disposed, which means that the municipality carries the risk of disposing of more waste than budgeted for. The Norwegian authorities argue that the allocation of risk under the two agreements is thus not comparable, and justifies different prices. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

| (69) | Further, the Norwegian authorities argue that Remiks Husholdning has been able to take advantage of synergies and efficiency gains when coordinating the collection of industrial waste with the collection of household waste, leading to lower overall costs. It is also argued that Remiks Husholdning is currently at its most efficient, and therefore able to take full advantage of its resources. In the view of the Norwegian authorities, this justifies the difference in price between the remuneration paid to Remiks Næring in 2016 and Remiks Husholdning’s budget for 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

| (70) | While the Norwegian authorities have provided explanations seeking to justify the difference in remuneration in 2016 and 2017, the Authority has not been provided with documentation underlying these explanations. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation evidencing the efficiency gains and synergies said to justify the difference. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

5.4.2.6   Conclusion

| (71) | Based on the above, the Norwegian authorities have not at present time provided sufficient evidence showing that the price paid to Remiks Næring for collection of industrial waste, complies with the MEO principle. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

| (72) | In light of the above, and in particular in light of the absence of sufficient evidence supporting that the price paid for the collection of industry waste in the period from 2010 to 1 February 2017 was determined in line with normal market conditions, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that Remiks Næring may have received an advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

5.4.3   Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon

| (73) | The Norwegian authorities argue that it is impossible for Remiks Husholdning to purchase waste treatment services from any other undertaking than Remiks Produksjon. The reason being that for Remiks Husholdning to purchase waste treatment services from such a third party, the waste that goes through Remiks Husholdning’s optical sorting machine would have to be transported out of Remiks Miljøpark, through Remiks Produksjon’s business area. Remiks Produksjon has not consented to allowing third parties to enter its business area, let alone transport waste through it. This explains why Remiks Husholdning has been purchasing waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon without tendering out the services (75). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

| (74) | The complainant intimates that the purchase of these services, without a tender, has led to Remiks Husholdning paying a price above market price for waste treatment services. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

| (75) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the services Remiks Husholdning purchase from Remiks Produksjon are provided on market terms and in accordance with the arm’s length principle in the Limited Liability Companies Act, section 3-9 (76). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

| (76) | In determining an appropriate price for Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon, the two parties looked at the price Remiks Næring paid to Remiks Produksjon for waste treatment services. Remiks Husholdning and Remiks Næring considered that the services Remiks Husholdning purchased were comparable in type and volume to those purchased by Remiks Næring, and that the costs for treating household and industrial waste are similar. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

| (77) | The Authority is, however, not convinced that the prices paid by another company in the same group is an appropriate benchmark for establishing market price. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

| (78) | In light of the above, and in particular in light of the absence of evidence supporting that the compensation paid to Remiks Produksjon did not lead to overcompensation, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that Remiks Produksjon may have received an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

| (79) | The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation to substantiate that the compensation paid to Remiks Produksjon in line with normal market conditions (77). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

5.4.4   Transactions to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

| (80) | The complainant argues that Tromsø municipality did not require a sufficient return on the transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

| (81) | With the establishment of the Remiks Group in 2010, Tromsø municipality transferred (a) capital, (b) debt, (c) movables and (d) real estate to the Remiks Group (78). The assets were converted into share capital. The preparatory paper drafted for the purpose of the transactions (79) underlined the importance of complying with the MEO principle. However, it is not clear how the municipality actually ensured compliance with the principle. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

| (82) | In 2012, Tromsø municipality transferred (a) real estate and (b) debt to Remiks Miljøpark AS, in addition to (c) adjusting the value of the real estate transferred in 2010 (80). The Tromsø municipal board decided to require a 9 % return. The preparatory paper prepared for the purpose of the transactions underlined the need to determine an appropriate level of return on the basis of the MEO principle. The preparatory paper included a discussion on whether the fact that only 40 % of the Remiks Group’s activities are conducted in a competitive market, while the remaining 60 % are activities for which the municipality cannot obtain a profit, is relevant for the MEO principle, but does not seem to reach a conclusion on this point (81). The preparatory paper found a 9 % return appropriate (82), but did not set out the economic assessment explaining why. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

| (83) | The complainant further argues that the 9 % level of return set in 2012 was determined based on only 40 % of the Remiks Group’s turnover originating from the group’s commercial activities (Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon). According to the complainant, the division between commercial and non- commercial activity shifted, and in 2016, 58 % of the turnover was linked to the commercial activities in Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon (83). Allegedly, as the conditions for setting the relevant rate of return changed, Tromsø municipality should have adjusted the level of return (84). |
| --- | --- |

(83)

| (84) | Whether a transaction complies with the MEO principle must be examined on an ex ante basis, having regard to the information available at the time the transactions were decided. The relevant evidence is the information which was available, and the developments which were foreseeable, at the time when the investment decision was made (85). |
| --- | --- |

(84)

| (85) | The question is therefore whether, based on the information available at the time, a rational market economy operator (with characteristics similar to Tromsø municipality) would have carried out similar transactions. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

| (86) | In relation to the transactions referred to in paragraph (81) above, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the transfers and how these comply with the MEO principle. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

| (87) | In relation to the transactions referred to in paragraph (82) above, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation for, and further elaborate on, the assessments forming the basis for an assessment of compliance with the MEO principle, and the relevant level of return. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

5.5   
  Selectivity

| (88) | To be characterised as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must also be selective in that it favours “certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”. Not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, only those which grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings, categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

| (89) | The purchase of services from Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon are specific transactions benefitting the two undertakings respectively. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

| (90) | Similarly, the transfers to the Remiks Group are specific transactions benefitting the company group. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

| (91) | Accordingly, the alleged measures must be considered selective in the sense of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

5.6   
  Effect on trade and distortion of competition

| (92) | In order to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measures must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

| (93) | Measures granted by the State are considered liable to distort competition when they are liable to improve the position of the recipient compared to other undertakings with which it competes. A distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is generally found to exist when the State grants a financial advantage to an undertaking in a liberalised sector where there is, or could be, competition (86). |
| --- | --- |

(93)

| (94) | Public support may be liable to distort competition even if it does not help the recipient undertaking to expand or gain market share. It is enough that the aid allows it to maintain a stronger competitive position than it would have had if the aid had not been provided (87). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

| (95) | To the extent that the relevant measures have not been carried out in line with normal market conditions, they have conferred an advantage on the relevant undertakings which may have strengthened the undertakings’ position compared to other undertakings competing with them. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

| (96) | The measures must also be liable to affect trade between EEA States. Where state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, this is assumed to have effect on trade between EEA States (88). |
| --- | --- |

(96)

| (97) | The Authority has previously found that public support to waste collection services in Norway is liable to distort competition and affect trade between EEA States (89). Waste collection and treatment is increasingly an international industry. In 2017, Norway exported 1,7 million tons of waste (90). The practice of tendering out waste services also means that undertakings from other EEA States can compete for waste handling contracts in other municipalities (91). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

| (98) | The competitive situation is also highlighted in one of the preparatory papers in relation to the establishment of the Remiks Group in 2010. The paper notes an increasing number of undertakings competing on the markets for collection and handling of industrial waste, and highlights that the competition includes both national companies and companies with international owners (92). |
| --- | --- |

(98)

| (99) | Thus the Authority cannot exclude that the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

5.7   
  Conclusion

| (100) | Based on the information provided by the Norwegian authorities and the complainant, the Authority cannot exclude that the measures described above may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

6.   Procedural requirements

| (101) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“Protocol 3”): “The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.” |
| --- | --- |

(101)

| (102) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the measures before putting them into effect. The Authority therefore concludes that, if the measures constitute state aid, the Norwegian authorities will not have respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

7.   Compatibility of the aid measure

| (103) | The Norwegian authorities have not provided any arguments substantiating why the measures, if they were to constitute state aid, should be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has also not identified any clear grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

| (104) | Thus, if the measures constitute state aid, the Authority has doubts as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement |
| --- | --- |

(104)

8.   Conclusion

| (105) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, and as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

| (106) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority hereby opens the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures do not constitute state aid, or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

| (107) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 6 January 2020, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

| (108) | The Norwegian authorities are requested to immediately forward a copy of this decision to the Remiks Group. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

| (109) | If this letter contains confidential information which should not be disclosed to third parties, please inform the Authority by 13 December 2019, identifying the confidential elements and the reasons why the information is considered to be confidential. In doing so, please consult the Authority’s Guidelines on Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions (93). If the Authority does not receive a reasoned request by that deadline, you will be deemed to agree to the disclosure to third parties and to the publication of the full text of the letter on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Bente ANGELL-HANSEN

President

Responsible College Member

Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

Högni KRISTJÁNSSON

College Member

Carsten ZATSCHLER

Countersigning as Director,

Legal and Executive Affairs

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(1)  Reference is made to Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.

1

(2)  Case No 78085.

2

(3)  Document No 814858.

3

(4)  Document No 821154.

4

(5)  Document No 840687.

5

(6)  Document No 844198.

6

(7)  Document No 848555.

7

(8)  Document No 854974.

8

(9)  Document No 862433.

9

(10)  Document No 870978.

10

(11)  Document No 870978.

11

(12)  Documents No 880582 and 884931.

12

(13)  Document No 882703.

13

(14)  Document No 901145.

14

(15)  Documents No 831575, 873959, 882172, 896066, 895954 and 914528.

15

(16)  Forurensningsloven, LOV-1981-03-13-6.

16

Forurensningsloven

(17)  Attachments 2, 3 and 4b to letter dated 3.5.18, Documents No 901215, 901211 and 901203; Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582, and Attachment 7 to the letter, Document No 880592.

17

(18)  Preparatory papers from Tromsø municipality’s administration to the municipality council, Attachment 2 to letter dated 5.3.18, Document No 901215.

18

(19)  A municipal enterprise (in Norwegian: kommunalt foretak, shortened KF) is an administrative branch of the central municipality, and not a separate legal entity. Municipal enterprises are regulated by the Local Government Act chapter 11.

19

kommunalt foretak

(20)  Tromsø municipality’s letter, dated 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582, and Attachments 6 and 7 to the letter, Documents No 880590 and 880592.

20

(21)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145, and Attachment 4 to the letter, Document No 901219, and Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582 and Attachment 7 to the letter, Document No 880592.

21

(22)  Attachment 8a to Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901189. The transfers were decided on in 2010, but backdated to the establishment of Remiks Miljøpark AS in 2009.

22

(23)  Attachments 4, 4c and 8a to Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 5 maart 2018, Documents No 901219, 901205 and 901189.

23

(24)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145, and attachments 8, 8b, 8c, 8d and 9 to the letter, Documents No 901183, 901181, 901177, 901179 and 901175.

24

(25)  In Norwegian: saksfremlegg.

25

saksfremlegg

(26)  Attachment 9 to the letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901175.

26

(27)  Based on information obtained at www.purehelp.no 21 november 2019.

27

(28)  The 0,01 % ownership by Karlsøy municipality seems to be related to intentions that Tromsø and Karlsøy would cooperate on waste handling, but this seems not to have materialised. See letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145.

28

(29)  This means that any private operator needs an explicit permission from the municipality, in order to provide the service.

29

(30)  The Pollution Control Act, section 34. The fees can be secured through a statutory charge pursuant to the Mortgage Act (panteloven, LOV-1980-02-08-2).

30

panteloven

(31)  The Waste Regulation (avsfallsforskriften, FOR-2004-06-01-930), chapter 15.

31

avsfallsforskriften

(32)  The Pollution Control Act, section 32, first paragraph.

32

(33)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145.

33

(34)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145.

34

(35)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145.

35

(36)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145.

36

(37)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145, and letter of 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582.

37

(38)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145, and attachment 16 to the letter, Document No 901161.

38

(39)  This is based on calculations conducted by the complainant in letter from the complainant dated 22.6.17, Document No 862433.

39

(40)  See the Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of state aid (“NoA”) (OJ L 342, 21.12.2017, p. 35), and EEA Supplement No 82, 21 december 2017, p. 1, para. 48.

40

(41)  NoA, para. 51.

41

(42)  See NoA, para. 58; Decision No 306/09/COL of 8 juli 2009 on the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, section 1.2.1, and judgment in Italy v Commission, 173/73, EU:C:1974:71, para. 16.

42

Italy

Commission

(43)  The fifth paragraph of section 34 of the Pollution Control Act.

43

(44)  Decision No 91/13/COL of 27 februari 2013, on the financing of municipal waste collectors, para. 26.

44

(45)  Judgment in France v Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, para. 52.

45

France

Commission

(46)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145.

46

(47)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145. See also NoA, para. 43.

47

(48)  NoA, para. 52.

48

(49)  Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, para. 42.

49

Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania

(50)  NoA, section 2.1.

50

(51)  Judgment in Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven v Commission, T-696/17, EU:T:2019:652, para. 56.

51

Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven

Commission

(52)  Case E-29/15 Sorpa [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 825, paras 51–64.

52

Sorpa

(53)  NoA, para. 11.

53

(54)  Judgment in AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission, C-480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787, para. 49.

54

AceaElectrabel Produzione

Commission

(55)  NoA, para. 11.

55

(56)  NoA, para. 66.

56

(57)  NoA, para. 68.

57

(58)  Judgment in SFEI and others, EU:C:1996:285, C-39/94, paras 60–62.

58

SFEI and others

(59)  NoA, para. 76.

59

(60)  NoA, para. 101.

60

(61)  NoA, para. 79.

61

(62)  NoA, para. 78.

62

(63)  NoA, paras 98–100.

63

(64)  NoA, paras 101–105.

64

(65)  The Complaint, dated 15 augustus 2016, Document No 814858, and Annexes IV–VII to the complaint, Documents No 818909–818911.

65

(66)  Letter from Remiks Group, dated 30 oktober 2017, Document No 880602.

66

(67)  See also the Authority’s letter dated 24 mei 2017, Document No 854974.

67

(68)  Letter from the complainant, dated 15 december 2016, Document No 831575.

68

(69)  NoA, para. 66.

69

(70)  NoA, para. 98.

70

(71)  Letter from Remiks Næring, dated 29 september 2016, Document No 821156.

71

(72)  Letter from Tromsø Municipality, dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901145.

72

(73)  Letter from the complainant, dated 13 november 2017, Document No 882862.

73

(74)  Further explained in section 7.4.2.2.

74

(75)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5.3.18, Document No 901145.

75

(76)  Lov om aksjeselskaper, LOV-1997-06-13-44.

76

Lov om aksjeselskaper

(77)  NoA, para. 74.

77

(78)  Attachment 8a to letter dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901189.

78

(79)  Attachments 4, 4a, 4b and 4c to the letter from Tromsø municipality dated 5 maart 2018, Documents No 901219, 901213, 901203 and 901205.

79

(80)  Attachment 9 to letter dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901175.

80

(81)  The same assessment is included in the preparatory paper in relation to the 2010 transfer, Attachment 4 to the letter from Tromsø municipality dated 5 maart 2018, Document No 901219.

81

(82)  Attachments 8, 8b, 8c, 8d to letter dated 5.3.18, Documents No 901183, 901181, 901177 and 901197.

82

(83)  Note that some of the revenues in Remiks Produksjon stem from treating household waste from Remiks Husholdning. The complainant has not explained whether or how this affects the calculations.

83

(84)  The complainant’s letter dated 22 mei 2018, Document No 914528.

84

(85)  Judgment in Commission v EDF, C-124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paras 83–85 and 105; judgment in France v Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paras 71–72.

85

Commission

EDF

France

Commission

(86)  NoA, para. 187.

86

(87)  NoA, para. 189.

87

(88)  Judgment in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, para. 66.

88

Eventech

(89)  Decision No 91/13/COL of 27 februari 2013, on the financing of municipal waste collectors, para. 41.

89

(90)  Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities, Competition in the waste management sector, section 3.2.4:

90

https://konkurransetilsynet.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Nordic-Report-2016-Waste-Management-Sector.pdf

(91)  Judgment in Altmark, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paras 78–79.

91

Altmark

(92)  Preparatory paper 29 april 2009, attachment 2 to letter dated 5 maart 2018, Document 901215. The Authority’s office translation.

92

(93)  OJ L 154, 8.6.2006, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 29, 8 juni 2006, p. 1.

93

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| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/16 |
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6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/16

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Besluit nr. 86/19/COL van 5 december 2019 tot inleiding van de formele onderzoeksprocedure ten aanzien van vermeende staatssteun van Ganaveita Reykjavíkur

Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken

(2020/C 40/03)

Door middel van het bovengenoemde besluit, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, heeft de Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA de IJslandse autoriteiten in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot inleiding van de procedure van artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-Staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie ten aanzien van de bovengenoemde steunmaatregel.

Belanghebbenden kunnen hun opmerkingen over de betrokken maatregel binnen één maand vanaf de datum van de bekendmaking indienen bij:

| Toezichthoudende autoriteit van de EVA |
| --- |
| Register |
| Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| registry@eftasurv.int |

Toezichthoudende autoriteit van de EVA

Register

Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

registry@eftasurv.int

Deze opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van de IJslandse autoriteiten worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

Samenvatting

Procedure

Op 26 oktober 2016 heeft de Autoriteit een klacht ontvangen van het IJslandse telecommunicatiebedrijf Síminn hf met betrekking tot vermeende staatssteun van Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (“OR”) aan zijn dochteronderneming Ganaveita Reykjavíkur (“GR”). De Autoriteit heeft aanvullende informatie en opmerkingen van de klager ontvangen via brieven en e-mails van 23 november 2016, 16 januari 2017, 28 maart 2017, 1 januari 2018, 20 april 2018, 21 september 2018, 26 maart 2019 en 13 september 2019.

In reactie op haar verzoeken heeft de Autoriteit informatie van de IJslandse autoriteiten ontvangen bij brieven van 7 februari 2017, 22 juni 2017 en 25 mei 2018 en 4 juni 2019.

Beschrijving van de maatregelen

De klacht heeft betrekking op investeringen van OR in breedband vanaf 1999, toen de voorganger van GR, Lina.Net, werd opgericht, tot op heden. De klacht heeft echter voornamelijk betrekking op de periode vanaf 1 januari 2007, na oprichting van GR. De klacht heeft in het bijzonder betrekking op vermeende staatssteun die OR op verschillende manieren aan GR heeft verleend, zoals kapitaalinjecties en niet-marktconforme leningen.

OR is opgericht op 1 januari 1999 als overheidsbedrijf bij het besluit van de gemeenteraad van Reykjavik om de ondernemingen voor de elektriciteits-en warmtevoorzieningen in eigendom van de stad te fuseren. OR is in eigendom van drie IJslandse gemeenten: (i) de stad Reykjavik (93,5 %), (ii) de gemeente Akranes (5,5 %) en (iii) de gemeente Borggarbyggð (1 %). Vijf leden van de raad van bestuur van OR worden benoemd door de gemeenteraad van Reykjavik en één wordt benoemd door de gemeenteraad van Akranes.

GR is een telecommunicatiebedrijf dat is opgericht in 2007. Het bedrijf is opgericht als zelfstandig rechtspersoon om te voldoen aan de vereisten van de IJslandse Post-en Telecommunicatieautoriteit (“PTA”) voor scheiding tussen de concurrerende en niet-concurrerende ondernemingen van OR. GR is in volledig eigendom van OR. Volgens zijn statuten is het doel van GR een telecommunicatie- en een datatransmissienetwerk te exploiteren.

GR is een geregistreerde marktdeelnemer (datatransmissie en -diensten) volgens de Wet op Elektronische Communicatie nr. 81/2003 (“de EC-wet)”. Artikel 36 van de EC-wet is bedoeld moet ervoor zorgen dat concurrerende telecommunicatie-exploitanten niet gesubsidieerd worden door middel van inkomsten uit activiteiten die door exclusieve rechten of anderszins worden beschermd.

Overeenkomstig artikel 36 van de EC-wet zorgt de PTA ervoor dat inkomsten uit niet-concurrerende sectoren niet gebruikt worden voor het subsidiëren van activiteiten in de concurrerende telecommunicatiesector. De PTA is daarom belast met het onderzoeken van de investeringen van OR in de telecommunicatiemarkt en de zakelijke betrekkingen tussen GR en OR. Dergelijke onderzoeken kunnen op eigen initiatief van de PTA of naar aanleiding van klachten van belanghebbende partijen worden opgezet. GR is ook verplicht om specifieke maatregelen aan de PTA te melden.

Van 2006 tot 2019 heeft de PTA negen formele besluiten aangenomen met betrekking tot de financiële scheiding van OR en GR. Het onderzoek van de PTA omvatte een herziening van het ondernemingsplan van GR, dat jaarlijks moet worden vernieuwd in overeenstemming met de daadwerkelijke financiële gegevens. In haar beoordeling controleert de PTA bijvoorbeeld of het rendement voor de investeerder (OR) in overeenstemming is met de telecommarkt in het algemeen. Ook kijkt ze naar de kapitaalstructuur en onderzoekt ze of de prijzen tussen OR en GR marktconform zijn.

In drie gevallen heeft de PTA concrete inbreuken op artikel 36 van de EC-wet vastgesteld. In twee van deze gevallen heeft de PTA besloten dat de middelen teruggevorderd moeten worden en in het derde geval heeft de PTA niet tot terugvordering besloten.

De IJslandse autoriteiten stellen dat OR in al haar betrekkingen met GR overeenkomstig het criterium van de marktdeelnemer in een markteconomie (“MEO”) heeft gehandeld en dat er geen steun is verleend aan GR. In dat opzicht benadrukken zij dat alle maatregelen inzake de financiële betrekkingen tussen OR en GR waarover wordt geklaagd, op basis van artikel 36 van de EC-wet door de PTA zijn beoordeeld. Volgens de IJslandse autoriteiten is het door de PTA toegepaste criterium vergelijkbaar met het criterium dat door de Autoriteit wordt toegepast om te bepalen of een maatregel marktconform is (d.w.z. het MEO-criterium). Ook heeft Autoriteit volgens de IJslandse autoriteiten beweringen van de klager met betrekking tot de investeringen van OR in Lina.Net reeds afgewezen in haar Besluit nr. 300/11/COL van 5 oktober 2011.

Beoordeling van de maatregelen

In het licht van onder meer de juridische status van OR, de partnerschapsovereenkomst van de onderneming en de samenstelling van de raad van bestuur kan de Autoriteit niet uitsluiten dat de maatregelen aan de staat kunnen worden toegeschreven en dat zij daardoor staatsmiddelen worden overdragen indien en voor zover zij GR bevoordelen.

Hoewel GR geen eigen diensten verkoopt over zijn glasvezelnetwerk, biedt het alle belangstellende telecommunicatiediensten neutrale en open toegang. De Autoriteit is van mening dat het verlenen van toegang aan derde dienstverleners voor een vaste prijs een economische activiteit is, en dat GR daarom lijkt te handelen als een onderneming in de zin van artikel 61, lid 1, van de EER-Overeenkomst.

Rekening houdende met de besluitvormingspraktijk van de PTA op grond van artikel 36 van de EC-wet over de financiering van GR en het niveau van controle dat is gebruikt bij de beoordeling van de verschillende maatregelen, is het voorlopige standpunt van de Autoriteit dat het door de PTA toegepaste criterium onder artikel 36 over het algemeen ervoor zorgt dat alle transacties tussen GR en OR, of andere daaraan verbonden bedrijven, marktconform zijn. Hoewel de benadering van de PTA niet identiek is aan de MEO-beoordeling die de Autoriteit overeenkomstig de EER-staatssteunregels zou verrichten, leidt deze wel tot hetzelfde resultaat, d.w.z. het voorkomen van niet-marktconforme transacties. Daarom is het voorlopige standpunt van de Autoriteit in dit stadium dat de PTA een beoordeling levert die gelijkwaardig is aan de MEO-beoordeling van de Autoriteit.

Wanneer de PTA achteraf inbreuken op artikel 36 van de EC-wet vaststelt, d.w.z. wanneer er een bepaalde transactie wordt gevonden die niet marktconform was, is zij bevoegd om de partijen op te dragen elk potentieel voordeel weg te werken met relevante maatregelen. De PTA kan echter alleen terugvordering van een voordeel eisen als de onverenigbare maatregelen duidelijk omschreven en onbetwistbaar zijn, bijv. een bepaald geldbedrag, een voorwaarde in een leningsovereenkomst enz. Daarnaast heeft de PTA bij het verzoek om terugvordering van de aan GR toegekende voordelen niet geëist dat de voordelen met rente worden teruggevorderd.

Er zijn drie voorbeelden waarin de PTA concrete inbreuken op artikel 36 van de EG-wet heeft vastgesteld. In twee van deze gevallen heeft de PTA besloten dat de maatregelen teruggevorderd moeten worden, en in het derde geval heeft de PTA niet tot terugvordering besloten. De Autoriteit stelde vast dat de maatregelen die de PTA voor die zaken heeft beoordeeld voordelen voor GR hebben opgeleverd die het niet zou hebben verkregen in normale marktomstandigheden. Bovendien zijn deze voordelen niet volledig van GR teruggevorderd.

Het voorlopige standpunt van de Autoriteit is derhalve dat GR een voordeel heeft verkregen in de zin van artikel 61, lid 1, van de EER-overeenkomst door: (i) geen marktrente te betalen over een voordeel dat verkregen is door een tijdelijke opschorting van rentebetalingen, (ii) indirect financiering van OR te krijgen voor een glasvezelkabelnetwerk in de gemeente Ölfus, (iii) kortlopende leningen van OR te ontvangen en (iv) in de leningsovereenkomsten met particuliere kredietverleners een voorwaarde op te nemen inzake voortzetting van de meerderheidseigendom van OR in GR.

Het voorlopige standpunt van de Autoriteit is dat deze maatregelen selectief zijn, aangezien het individuele maatregelen betreft die alleen bedoeld zijn voor GR. Daarnaast kunnen deze maatregelen de mededinging verstoren en het handelsverkeer binnen de EER ongunstig beïnvloeden.

Als de maatregelen staatssteun vormen, is de verplichting van artikel 1, lid 3, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie om de steun bij de Autoriteit aan te melden alvorens deze te implementeren niet in acht genomen. Dergelijke staatssteun zou illegaal zijn.

De IJslandse autoriteiten hebben geen argumenten aangevoerd om de maatregelen, voor zover zij staatssteun vormen, als verenigbaar met de werking van de EER-overeenkomst te kunnen beschouwen. De Autoriteit heeft derhalve twijfels ten aanzien van de verenigbaarheid van alle vier de maatregelen.

Decision No 86/19/COL of 5 December 2019 to open a formal investigation into alleged state aid granted to Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

1   Summary

| (1) | The EFTA Surveillance Authority (“the Authority”) wishes to inform the Icelandic authorities that some measures covered by the complaint related to Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur (“GR”) might entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts concerning the compatibility of these measures with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. Therefore, the Authority is required to open a formal investigation procedure into these measures (*) (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | The Authority has based its decision on the following considerations. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

2   Procedure

| (3) | By a letter dated 26 October 2016 (2), Síminn hf. (“the complainant”) made a complaint regarding alleged state aid granted by Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (“OR”) to its subsidiary GR. By letter dated 7 November 2016, the Authority acknowledged receipt of the complaint (3). By email of 23 November 2016, the complainant submitted further information (4). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

| (4) | By letter dated 28 November 2016 (5), the Authority forwarded the complaint and the additional information received to the Icelandic authorities, and invited them to submit information and observations. By email dated 16 January 2017, the Authority received additional information from the complainant (6). By letter dated 7 February 2017, the Icelandic authorities submitted their comments to the Authority (7).The complainant submitted further information by email of 28 March 2017 (8). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | On 7 June 2017, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Icelandic authorities at the annual package meeting in Reykjavík. On 22 June 2017, the Icelandic authorities provided the Authority with copies of various decisions of the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland (“PTA”), concerning the financing of GR (9). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | On 25 September 2017, the Authority met with the complainant, at its request, in Reykjavík. On 1 January 2018, the complainant submitted further comments (10). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | By letter dated 13 March 2018 (11), the Authority informed the complainant about its preliminary assessment that the financing of GR did not raise concerns concerning potential state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. By letter dated 20 April 2018 (12), the complainant submitted its response to the Authority’s preliminary assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | By letter dated 27 April 2018 (13), the Authority forwarded the complainant’s response and additional information received to the Icelandic authorities, and invited them to submit their observations. By letter dated 25 May 2018 (14), the Icelandic authorities submitted their comments. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

| (9) | On 6 June 2018, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Icelandic authorities and received a presentation from the PTA at the annual package meeting in Reykjavík (15). By letter dated 21 September 2018 (16), the complainant submitted further information. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

| (10) | By letter dated 26 March 2019 (17), the Authority received additional information concerning new developments from the complainant. On 29 April 2019, the Authority requested additional information and clarifications from the Icelandic authorities (18). By letter dated 4 June 2019 (19), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request and provided the requested information and clarifications. Finally, the complainant submitted additional comments and information by letter dated 13 September 2019 (20).The complaint |
| --- | --- |

(10)

2.1   
  The complainant - Síminn hf.

| (11) | The complainant is a telecommunications company which provides communication solutions to private and corporate clients in Iceland. It offers a range of services, such as: (i) mobile services on its 2G/3G/4G network, (ii) fixed line telephony, (iii) fixed broadband, and (iv) television. The complainant also offers communications and IT solutions for companies of all sizes. The complainant’s subsidiary, Míla ehf., owns and operates a telecommunications network covering the entire country, which builds mostly on fibre optic cables, but also on copper lines and microwave connections. Míla sells its services at a wholesale level to companies with a telecommunications licence in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

2.2   
  Scope of the complaint

| (12) | The complaint concerns OR’s investments in fixed broadband from 1999, when GR’s predecessor Lina.Net was established, until today. However, the complaint predominantly concerns the period from 1 January 2007 onwards, following the establishment of GR. In particular, the complaint concerns alleged state aid granted by OR to GR through various means, such as capital injections and lending that was not on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

| (13) | Moreover, the complaint concerns the terms of loans GR has obtained from [...]. According to the complainant, the interest rates on GR’s loans are not on market terms that reflect the credit risk inherent in an undertaking such as GR, with a very high debt to EBITDA ratio (21). The complainant maintains that the interest rates offered to GR are directly connected to its ownership, as no market lender would have offered GR such rates without a direct link to its public ownership. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

2.3   
  Arguments brought forward by the complainant

| (14) | The complainant maintains, in general terms, that GR’s activities represent a political rather than a commercial project. It alleges that the company has been operated with a view to enhance competition on the telecommunications market, and that a private investor would not have acted in the same way as OR, when providing loans and capital injections to GR. The complainant moreover alleges that OR has provided GR with several capital injections and loans to finance their operations, which have not been on market terms, as well as more favourable access to OR infrastructure than other market players could receive. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

| (15) | According to the complainant, a major part of the alleged unlawful state aid has been in the form of interest rates for loans granted by OR to GR, which have not corresponded to market terms. Furthermore, after the majority of GR’s loans were gradually replaced by loans financed by private lenders (with full replacement at the end of 2017), the interest rates have continued to not correspond to normal market conditions, as OR has provided lenders with a guarantee that it would maintain its majority ownership of GR. The complainant considers that this must be considered as state aid that is incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

| (16) | The complainant puts forward that the assessment performed by the PTA under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act is substantially different from the assessment conducted by the Authority under the state aid rules. According to the complainant, the application of the said rule by the PTA has consisted in assessing the return on equity. It seems that PTA has not made a detailed comparison with other market investors. The focus has rather been on assessing the financing generally, concentrating on whether the measures provide a direct loss for OR, as opposed to assessing whether the financing would have been provided by an investor operating on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

3   Description of the measures

3.1   
  Background

3.1.1   OR – Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

| (17) | OR was established on 1 January 1999 as a public undertaking with the decision of the City Council of Reykjavík to merge the operations of the electricity and heat utilities owned by the city. A year later, the water utility was also incorporated into the new company. The company was operated on the basis of Regulation No 793/1998, issued by the Ministry of Industry and the City Council of Reykjavik, with reference to legislative Act No 38/1940 on the Reykjavik Heating Utility, and the Power Act No 58/1967. OR currently provides the following services through its three subsidiaries: electricity (Orka Náttúrunar), geothermal water for heating, cold water, sewage services (Veitur) and fibre-optic data connections (GR). |
| --- | --- |

(17)

| (18) | On 1 December 2001, OR merged with a utility company owned by several small municipalities in the western part of Iceland. After the merger, the City of Reykjavík owns 93,5 % of the company, the municipality of Akranes owns 5,5 % and the municipality of Borgarbyggð 1 %. Five members of the board of directors are appointed by the City Council of Reykjavík and one is appointed by the Municipality Council of Akranes (22). OR currently operates as a public partnership company, sameignarfélag (23), on the basis of Act No 136/2013 on OR (24) and Regulation No 297/2006 (25). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

3.1.2   GR – Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

| (19) | GR is a telecommunications company established in 2007 as an independent legal entity, in order to comply with the requirements of the PTA on separation between the competitive and non-competitive operations of OR. GR is fully owned by OR. The purpose of GR, according to its articles of association, is the operation of a telecommunication and data transmission network. It provides wholesale access to its fibre optic network, for a number of retail service providers that operate in the residential and businesses markets with different fixed broadband and data transmission services. GR also offers services on the household market, where it charges end-users directly for the use of the access network. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

| (20) | OR began investing in the telecommunications market in 1999, when it established the subsidiary Lina.Net, with the purpose of providing general telecommunication services with emphasis on data transmission and internet connections in urban areas in Iceland. Its operations were later expanded into the setting up of an electronic telecommunications network using fibre optic cables. The Authority investigated several capital injections into Lina.Net during the years 1999–2001 in its Decision No 300/11/COL and found that they were in line with the actions of a private investor such that no state aid was granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(20)

| (21) | Lina.Net invested considerable sums in its fibre optic networks and, since 2007, GR has continued to expand the network. In total, the investments between 2002 and 2010 amounted to around ISK 8 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

3.2   National legal basis

| (22) | GR is a registered operator (data transmission and service) (27) under the Electronic Communications Act No 81/2003. Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, on separation of concession activities from electronic communications activities, provides:
  “Electronic communications undertakings or consolidations operating public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, which enjoy special or exclusive rights in sectors other than electronic communications, must keep their electronic communications activities financially separate from other activities as if they were two separate undertakings. Care shall be taken to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities”. (emphasis added) |
| --- | --- |

(22)

“Electronic communications undertakings or consolidations operating public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, which enjoy special or exclusive rights in sectors other than electronic communications, must keep their electronic communications activities financially separate from other activities as if they were two separate undertakings. Care shall be taken to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities”. (emphasis added)

| (23) | According to the legislative proposal (frumvarp) of the Electronic Communications Act, Article 36 is meant to ensure that competitive telecommunication operations are not subsidised through income from operations that are protected by exclusive rights or by other means (28).The proposal also makes it clear that the provision is applicable regardless of the undertaking’s market share and regardless of whether the telecommunications operations are carried out within the same undertaking or by a separate legal entity which it controls (29). |
| --- | --- |

(23)

3.3   The PTA’s monitoring role

3.3.1   General

| (24) | The PTA operates according to the Act on Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003, which implements the provisions of the EU’s regulatory framework for electronic communications (30). As a supervisory authority, the PTA, inter alia, ensures, in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, that revenues stemming from non-competitive sectors do not subsidise operations in the competitive telecommunications sector. Therefore, the PTA is entrusted with scrutinising OR’s investments in the telecommunications market and the business relations between GR and OR. Such investigations can start at the PTA’s own initiative or through complaints from interested parties. GR is also obligated to notify specific measures, such as increase in share capital (31), to the PTA to obtain prior approval and interested parties can be parties to such cases, if they demonstrate that they have a legitimate interest in the result of the case (32). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

| (25) | An interested party can challenge decisions of the PTA before the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications and Postal Affairs (33). This includes decisions taken on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (34). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

| (26) | The following is a brief summary of the PTA’s main decisional practice concerning OR’s investments in the telecommunications market and the business relations between GR and OR to which the complainant has referred. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

3.3.2   OR’s purchase of the fibre-optic network from Lina.Net

| (27) | In October 2002, OR purchased the fibre-optic network from Lina.Net for ISK 1 758 811 899. In early 2003, after the enactment of the Electronic Communications Act, the PTA sent OR an inquiry regarding how the company intended to fulfil the conditions for separation of activities stipulated by Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (35). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

| (28) | In the ensuing PTA procedure, the PTA requested two expert reports , from the two consultancies KPMG and Rafhönnun (36), on the fair market value of the Lina.Net fibre-optic network (37). Both reports concluded that there was no indication that the purchase price was below market value. Moreover, the audit firm KPMG analysed certain parts of the operational and financial separation (38). The PTA accepted the results of the expert reports. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

3.3.3   The establishment and financing of GR as a separate legal entity

| (29) | As part of the aforementioned procedure, the PTA required OR to submit a business plan for the operations of the fibre-network and telecommunication services, demonstrating an adequate rate of return on the investment. KPMG performed a due diligence review of the business plan and determined that the rate of return on the investment was appropriate. Moreover, the PTA instructed OR to fulfil the following conditions (39):






  (i) | Separation of accounts. The PTA instructed OR to establish a separate entity, entrusted with the telecommunications operations, which should keep separate accounts in line with established corporate practices. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(29)

(i)

Separation of accounts. The PTA instructed OR to establish a separate entity, entrusted with the telecommunications operations, which should keep separate accounts in line with established corporate practices.

| (ii) | Prepare a foundation balance sheet (stofnefnahagsreikningur), comprising the telecommunication assets (valued at an appropriate market price) as well as the liabilities that stemmed from the financing of the telecom operations of OR (with the reservation that if the terms were more favourable than market terms, the new entity would have to compensate OR for any difference). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Prepare a foundation balance sheet (stofnefnahagsreikningur), comprising the telecommunication assets (valued at an appropriate market price) as well as the liabilities that stemmed from the financing of the telecom operations of OR (with the reservation that if the terms were more favourable than market terms, the new entity would have to compensate OR for any difference).

| (iii) | Arm’s-length terms should apply to all dealings between the new entity and OR. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

Arm’s-length terms should apply to all dealings between the new entity and OR.

| (30) | On 1 January 2007, in accordance with instructions of the PTA described above, OR established the private limited liability company GR as a new legal entity. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

| (31) | On 8 March 2007, a framework agreement was concluded between OR and GR, setting out the terms of the investment and the opening balance sheet of GR. OR transferred assets to GR. GR provided payment in the form of a loan and issuing share capital to OR. The interest rate to be paid by GR to OR on its loan principal over a payback period of [...] years was based on the [...] plus a margin of [...] basis points, and was linked to the exchange rates of several foreign currencies. According to the consulting firm Deloitte, the loan agreement contained normal market practice terms, comparable to agreements concluded between private undertakings, as regards the event of default, the provision of information to the lender, and other covenants. Deloitte submitted a declaration in accordance with Article 5 of the Act on Private Limited Companies No 138/1994 (40), dated 7 March 2007, on the value of the assets, and concluded that they had been valued at a fair price. The terms of the loans were also reviewed and approved by the PTA (41). |
| --- | --- |

(31)

| (32) | On 21 May 2010, the PTA issued Decision No 14/2010, concerning the financial separation between OR and GR. In its Decision, the PTA confirmed that GR had to obtain prior approval from the PTA for any increase in share capital on behalf of OR or related companies. The PTA also noted that it would only approve such measures if they were on arm’s-length terms and if they did not entail the subsidisation of competitive operations (42). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

| (33) | Following the financial crisis in Iceland in 2008, the ISK devalued considerably, and GR became unable to fulfil its commitments under the loan agreement. An agreement was made with OR on temporary suspension of interest payments. The PTA was informed and subsequently intervened. The PTA required that the suspension of payments be revoked on the grounds that it did not comply with the required arm’s-length terms (43). GR complied and paid instalments and accrued interests in full. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

3.3.4   GR’s rate of return and the share capital increase of December 2008

| (34) | In December 2008, OR increased its share of GR’s capital. On 22 December 2010, the PTA adopted Decision No 39/2010, concerning the share capital increase and GR’s rate of return on capital. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

| (35) | With this Decision, the PTA noted that the operations of GR went according to the initial business plan in the year 2007. GR’s equity ratio was approximately 52 % at the end of 2007 and the company made a profit of ISK 120 million that year. The financial crisis of 2008 hit the company hard and in spite of increasing operating revenues, the losses of 2008 were close to ISK 3 billion, almost solely attributable to the devaluation of the ISK, which caused the debt of the company to increase. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

| (36) | To urgently restore the viability of GR, OR decided to increase the share capital before the end of 2008. The capital was increased by ISK 1,2 billion, setting an equity ratio of 23 %. The PTA Decision states that in absence of the share capital increase, “practically all equity would have been wiped out”, due to the financial collapse and sharp devaluation of the operating currency whilst the liabilities were all linked to foreign currency rates (44). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

| (37) | Furthermore, the PTA observed that in 2008 OR and GR had contacted private lenders with the intention to finance further investment in ongoing projects (45). The financial markets, however, were completely frozen by the end of the year. The Icelandic authorities maintain that, as an investor, OR inevitably had to invest further, in order to protect its significant initial investment (46). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

| (38) | The PTA highlighted that OR’s decision to increase the share capital had to be considered not only from its perspective as GR’s owner, but also as GR’s largest creditor. The PTA noted that creditors of several telecommunication companies had acquired them following the financial crisis, and either converted debts to equity or restructured loans. Moreover, the PTA found that GR’s updated business plans convincingly demonstrated a satisfactory level of profitability for a telecommunication company in a competitive market, within a reasonable timeframe, and that there was a normal correlation between the profitability and the owner’s contribution (47). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

3.3.5   The conversion of debt into equity in 2014

| (39) | Like many companies in Iceland, GR needed to reorganize its financial affairs after the financial crisis of 2008. OR’s application for permission to increase the share capital of GR in July and August 2013 was the subject of PTA’s Decision No 2/2014 of 24 March 2014. The reorganisation involved: (i) a conversion of ISK 3,5 billion of debt into equity, and (ii) that GR would enter the financial markets to refinance all remaining debt owed to OR. Finally, OR intended to dispose of a large portion of its shares post-refinancing. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

| (40) | The PTA accepted that the debt conversion would not increase the total financing of GR by OR, since it only changed the composition of the financing. The PTA also recognised that the conversion would change the equity ratio of GR from 22 % to 52 %, thereby leaving the ratio at the same level as GR’s main competitor, Míla (48). The PTA also assessed the initial business plan of GR, and determined that it was credible. The cash flow analysis demonstrated that if the devaluation of the operating currency had not hit the company in 2008, there would not have been a need for refinancing. Moreover, the PTA’s financial analysis confirmed that the rate of return for the investor and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of GR were in conformity with the general benchmark set by the PTA (49). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

| (41) | Míla intervened in the procedure before the PTA. The PTA rejected all the objections from Míla. The PTA adopted its Decision No 2/2014 on 24 March 2014, and the debt conversion was finalized in early April 2014. In June 2014, Míla initiated a court case against the PTA, GR and OR, requesting the courts to annul the PTA’s decision (50). The District Court of Reykjavík dismissed the case on 26 February 2015, and the Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the District Court by judgment of 27 March 2015 (51). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

3.3.6   The implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017

| (42) | On 20 March 2019, the PTA adopted Decision No 3/2019, concerning the implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017, and whether it was in compliance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (52). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

| (43) | The PTA concluded that the financial separation between OR and GR had been in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act in the years 2016 and 2017, except for short-term lending to GR from a shared cash pool by OR and GR. The PTA found that these loan arrangements between OR and GR infringed an earlier PTA decision from 13 November 2006, as well as PTA Decision No 14/2010, since there was no loan agreement concluded between OR and GR reflecting the conditions that prevailed on the market for such loans (53). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

| (44) | The PTA also commented on conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. The loan agreements in question had included special conditions that if the ownership of OR in GR went below 50% then the lender was authorised to demand repayment, terminate the loan agreement, or declare the loan immediately due. Such a provision has been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced by the end of 2017 (54). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

| (45) | The PTA noted that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (55). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunication undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (56). Moreover, the PTA considered that this provision in the loan agreements constituted a connection between OR and GR that was not in accordance with the financial separation imposed in order to ensure that the two acted as unrelated parties (57). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

| (46) | The PTA concluded that measures were required to ensure an efficient financial separation between OR and GR, in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. The PTA decided that:






  a) | OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions, infringed the PTA Decision of 13 November 2006 and, therefore, also Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(46)

a)

OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions, infringed the PTA Decision of 13 November 2006 and, therefore, also Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act.

| b) | GR’s debt from the shared cash pool was not to, at any given time, exceed ISK [...]. |
| --- | --- |

b)

GR’s debt from the shared cash pool was not to, at any given time, exceed ISK [...].

| c) | GR was to obtain prior authorisation from the PTA for any loans from OR, or any other undertaking within the company group. GR shall submit an application to the PTA along with the necessary documents, e.g. a draft loan agreement, an appropriate business plan, a calculation of the profitability requirements, as well key social security numbers and the acceptance of other landers. Such a credit increase was to be in line with standard separation of accounts, and was to entail that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights. |
| --- | --- |

c)

GR was to obtain prior authorisation from the PTA for any loans from OR, or any other undertaking within the company group. GR shall submit an application to the PTA along with the necessary documents, e.g. a draft loan agreement, an appropriate business plan, a calculation of the profitability requirements, as well key social security numbers and the acceptance of other landers. Such a credit increase was to be in line with standard separation of accounts, and was to entail that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights.

| d) | New loan agreements with private lenders could not contain a provision stipulating that if the ownership of OR in GR goes below 50 % then the lender is authorised to declare the loan immediately due. |
| --- | --- |

d)

New loan agreements with private lenders could not contain a provision stipulating that if the ownership of OR in GR goes below 50 % then the lender is authorised to declare the loan immediately due.

| (47) | On 4 October 2019, following an appeal from GR, the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications issued Ruling No 2/2019, confirming the decision of the PTA. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

3.3.7   Other cases

| (48) | In addition to the decisions referred to above, the PTA adopted a decision in 2013, under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, to temporarily allow GR to extend its loan agreement with OR (58). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

| (49) | Moreover, in 2014, Míla complained to the PTA about certain measures relating to an agreement GR had concluded with Ölfus Municipality, which included funds indirectly deriving from OR. The funds had initially been paid by OR into the Ölfus Revegetation Fund (“ÖRF”) in connection with OR’s geothermal power plant project in the municipality. OR had joint control of the ÖRF together with representatives from the municipality. In 2014, the ÖRF decided to use its funds to finance GR’s rollout of a fiber optic network in Ölfus Municipality. After assessing the measures, the PTA found that they were contrary to Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, and instructed GR to undertake certain measures to ensure that it did not obtain an advantage from the funds deriving from OR (59). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

4   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

| (50) | The Icelandic authorities point out that the Authority has already dismissed allegations by the complainant as regards OR’s investments in Lina.Net in its Decision No 300/11/COL of 5 October 2011 (60). |
| --- | --- |

(50)

| (51) | The Icelandic authorities maintain that in all its relations with GR, OR has acted in accordance with the market economy operator (“MEO”) test, and that no aid has been granted to GR. In that regard, the Icelandic authorities highlight that all of the measures complained of concerning the financial relations between OR and GR, have been assessed by the PTA on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. According to the Icelandic authorities, the test applied by the PTA is comparable to the criterion applied by the Authority when determining whether a measure is on market terms (i.e. the MEO test). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

| (52) | The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that GR’s current investments are financed with cash provided by its operating activities and loans from [...]. According to the Icelandic authorities, these loans do not constitute state aid in any way, and nor do they indicate that state aid has been extended to GR by its owner, as it is clear that the loans from [...] to GR were solely based on commercial motives. They state that the loans are fully in line with normal market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

5   Presence of state aid

| (53) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  “[...] any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.” |
| --- | --- |

(53)

“[...] any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.”

| (54) | The qualification of a measure as aid within the meaning of this provision therefore requires the following cumulative conditions to be met: (i) the measure must be granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) it must confer an advantage on an undertaking; (iii) favour certain undertakings (selectivity); and (iv) be liable to distort competition and affect trade. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

5.1   
  Presence of state resources

| (55) | The measure must be granted by the state or through state resources. The transfer of state resources may take many forms, such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the capital of companies and benefits in kind. A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; foregoing state revenue is sufficient. Waiving revenue which would otherwise have been paid to the state constitutes a transfer of state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

| (56) | The state, for the purpose of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, covers all bodies of the public administration, from the central government to the city or the lowest administrative level. Resources of public undertakings may also constitute state resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement because the state is capable of directing the use of these resources (61). For the purposes of state aid law, transfers within a public group may also constitute state aid if, for example, resources are transferred from the parent company to its subsidiary (62). However, the measure must be imputable to the state. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

| (57) | The mere fact that a measure is taken by a public undertaking is not per se sufficient to consider it imputable to the state. However, it does not need to be demonstrated that, in a particular case, the public authorities specifically incited the public undertaking to take the measure in question (63). Therefore, the imputability to the state of a measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which the measure was taken (64). Among the relevant indicators set out by the Court of Justice are:






  — | the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking into account the requirements of the public authorities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(57)

—

the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking into account the requirements of the public authorities;

| — | the nature of the undertaking’s activities and the extent to which the activities were exercised on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators; |
| --- | --- |

—

the nature of the undertaking’s activities and the extent to which the activities were exercised on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators;

| — | the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, and the degree of control which the state has over the public undertaking; and |
| --- | --- |

—

the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, and the degree of control which the state has over the public undertaking; and

| — | any other indicator showing an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of the measure, or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains. |
| --- | --- |

—

any other indicator showing an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of the measure, or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains.

| (58) | The Authority will therefore need to assess, in light of the aforementioned indicators, whether OR, in its dealings with GR, was acting as an autonomous entity, free of any influence from its owners, or whether its actions are imputable to the Icelandic authorities, i.e. the City of Reykjavík and the municipalities of Akranes and Borgarbyggð. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

| (59) | As noted in paragraph (18) above, OR operates as a public partnership company on the basis of Act No 136/2013 on OR (65) and Regulation No 297/2006 (66). OR is therefore distinct from private companies which are subject to ordinary company law. OR’s annual accounts are also reflected in the City of Reykjavík’s consolidated financial statements (67). |
| --- | --- |

(59)

| (60) | The Board of OR consists of six members, five appointed by the Reykjavík City Council and one by the Municipality Council of Akranes. Currently, three board members are politicians who also serve as either City Council or Municipal Council representatives. According to OR’s partnership agreement, the Board is responsible for the company’s affairs between owner’s meetings and should monitor the company’s direction, organisation and that its operations are in good shape and in accordance with the ownership policy. The Board sets an overall policy and future vision for OR and adopts decisions concerning major matters within the limit of the ownership policy. Before adopting unusual or important decisions or policy decisions, the Board must consult with the owners of OR. The same applies to similar decisions regarding subsidiaries (such as GR). The Board is also responsible for recruiting OR’s Director, drafting his/her job description and his/her eventual employment termination (68). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

| (61) | OR produces and sells electricity in a liberalised market open to competition. The company also has legal obligations to provide utility services (heating and water) and carries out other projects in the municipalities of its owners as well as other municipalities (69). Those utility services have since 2014 been carried out by OR’s subsidiary, Veitur, in order to comply with the Electricity Act, which prohibits cross subsidisation between utility activities, as well as between activities enjoying exclusive rights and competitive operations (70). According to OR’s ownership policy, the company’s administrative practices shall reflect professionalism, efficiency, prudence, transparency and responsibility. The Board is responsible for adopting the company’s policies concerning dividends, risk management, purchasing, etc. (71). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

| (62) | Although it appears that OR’s owners have taken steps to separate its public utility services and its competitive operations, in order to ensure that the latter are operated in line with commercial practices on the market, with OR’s management being somewhat autonomous in its decision making process, there are nevertheless elements to indicate that the public authorities may influence the company’s strategy and decisions. As noted above, the Board sets OR’s policies in various fields and must approve the company’s major decisions, which in some instances requires consulting with OR’s owners. It appears that many of the measures complained of concern major investments, loan guarantees and loan transactions between OR and GR, which may have been subject to the Board’s scrutiny and approval. The Board, as noted above, is politically appointed, and currently half of the board members also serve as City or Municipal Council representatives. This arrangement has been evaluated by the Enquiry Committee on Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, which in its 2012 report noted that this arrangement could lead to a lack of professional knowledge and experience on the Board, and that its work could be characterised by political conflict and disunity (72). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

| (63) | In light of the legal status of OR, the composition of its Board and the general circumstances described above, the Authority is unable to exclude that the measures are imputable to the State and that they entail the transfer of state resources, if and to the extent they confer advantages on GR. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

| (64) | Against this background, the Icelandic authorities are invited to comment on the issue of imputability. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

5.2   
  Conferral of an advantage on an undertaking

5.2.1   General

| (65) | The qualification of a measure as state aid requires that it confers an advantage on the recipient. An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

5.2.2   Does GR constitute an undertaking?

| (66) | The EU Courts have consistently defined undertakings as entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (73). Consequently, the public or private status of an entity or the fact that an entity is partly or wholly publicly owned has no bearing as to whether or not that entity is an “undertaking” within the meaning of state aid law (74). |
| --- | --- |

(66)

| (67) | Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (75). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods or services on a given market do not constitute undertakings. A single entity may carry out a number of activities, both economic and non-economic, provided that it keeps separate accounts for the different funds that it receives, so as to exclude any risk of cross-subsidisation of its economic activities by means of public funds received for its non-economic activities (76). |
| --- | --- |

(67)

| (68) | As described in paragraph (19) above, GR was established on 1 January 2007, and its role is to provide Icelandic households and businesses access to high quality services on an open access network (77). GR operates a telecommunications and data transmission network and it provides wholesale access to its fibre optic network for a number of retail service providers that operate in supplying homes and businesses with different fixed broadband and data transmission services. GR also offers services on the household market, where it charges end-users directly for the use of the access network. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

| (69) | Although GR does not sell its own services in the retail market, it offers neutral and open network access to all interested telecommunications providers. The Authority considers that the provision of network access for a fixed price to third-party service providers and households constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, GR appears to operate as an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (78). |
| --- | --- |

(69)

| (70) | Any advantage involved in the transactions between OR and GR will therefore have been conferred upon an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

5.2.3   PTA’s monitoring and decisional practice

| (71) | The measures complained of, concerning the financial relations between OR and GR, have, as described in Section 3.3 above, all been assessed by the PTA on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

| (72) | The Icelandic authorities maintain that the test applied by the PTA is comparable to the test applied by the Authority when determining whether a measure is on market terms (i.e. the MEO test). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

| (73) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view, considering the decisional practice of the PTA under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act on the financing of GR and the level of scrutiny involved in the assessment of the various measures, that the test applied by the PTA under Article 36 generally ensures that all transactions between GR and OR, or other related companies, are on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

| (74) | The PTA’s approach may not be identical to the MEO assessment that would be carried out by the Authority under the EEA state aid rules, but it nonetheless ensures the same outcome, i.e. it prevents transactions that are not on market terms. Therefore, at this stage the Authority is of the preliminary view that the PTA provides an assessment similar to the Authority’s MEO assessment. The enforcement of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act by the PTA thus appears to effectively prevent GR from obtaining an advantage from its dealings with OR and when infringements are found the PTA has the competence to order the clawback of any advantages. However, there are instances where the PTA has either not ordered the full clawback of advantages with interest, or not ordered clawback at all. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

| (75) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, i.e. in the absence of state intervention, thereby placing it in a more favourable position than its competitors (79). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

| (76) | Generally, when examining this question, the Authority applies the MEO test (80), whereby the conduct of states or public authorities, when selling or leasing assets, is compared to that of private economic operators (81). |
| --- | --- |

(76)

| (77) | The purpose of the MEO test is to assess whether the state has granted an advantage to an undertaking by not acting like a private market economy operator with regard to a certain transaction, e.g. loan agreements or the sale of asset (82). In order to fulfil the test, the public authority must disregard public policy objectives and instead focus on the single objective of obtaining a market rate of return or profit on its investments and a market price for the sale or lease of assets (83). This assessment must take into account any special rights or obligations attached to the asset concerned, in particular those that could affect the market value. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

| (78) | It follows from this test that an advantage is present whenever a state makes funds available to an undertaking, which, in the normal course of events, would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature (84). |
| --- | --- |

(78)

| (79) | The PTA, as described above, has examined the strategy and financial prospect of the relevant measures, in order to determine whether the financing of the operations of GR has been carried out in line with normal market conditions. In its assessment, the PTA has considered independent expert reports and drawn comparisons with other, private operators in the same market. The PTA’s assessment is normally carried out on an ex ante basis. However, there are also examples of the PTA having carried out an ex post assessment of the financial separation between OR and GR, as well as individual measures. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

| (80) | More precisely, from 2006 until 2019, the PTA adopted nine formal decisions regarding the financial separation of OR and GR. The PTA did not make formal comments for the years 2013–2015. The PTA’s investigations included a review of GR’s business plan, which must be renewed annually, in accordance with actual financial data. In its review, the PTA e.g. checks whether the rate of return for the investor (OR) is in conformity with the telecom market in general, and looks at the capital structure and whether transactions between OR and GR are on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

| (81) | GR has been obliged to submit to the PTA, on an annual basis, detailed operational and economic information, together with its revised business plans and profitability requirements. Whenever necessary, the PTA has requested additional data and has assessed whether the operations were in line with market terms and, if not, whether there was a reason for taking action. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

| (82) | In a letter from the PTA to the complainant, dated 6 September 2018, the PTA confirmed that it does not have legal powers to perform a cost analysis of the prices OR sets for renting out its facilities. The complainant has argued that because of this, the PTA’s assessment of the financial separation cannot replace that of the Authority, when assessing possible state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

| (83) | It is the preliminary view of the Authority that even though the PTA does not have the legal basis to perform a cost analysis of OR’s prices, the PTA has other ways to ensure that OR’s pricing practices for renting out facilities are on market terms. Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act obliges OR to ensure equality in pricing when renting out facilities to related and unrelated companies. Furthermore, OR is obliged to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities. The PTA then enforces these obligations. As the PTA explains in its letter to the complainant, it did in fact open an investigation into OR pricing practices for renting out facilities, and concluded that OR’s pricing was in full conformity with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (85). |
| --- | --- |

(83)

| (84) | The PTA has found that in order to ensure that the effectiveness of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act is guaranteed, the concept of “subsidy” should be understood in a broad sense, so as to include any measures from OR, both direct and indirect, which potentially provide GR with an advantage that its competitors on the market do not enjoy. The PTA has also noted that its monitoring role, pursuant to Article 36, is comparable to the Authority’s, when it comes to assessing whether an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is present (86). |
| --- | --- |

(84)

| (85) | It is the Authority‘s preliminary view that there is an efficient system in place in Iceland that entails an assessment similar to the MEO test. Consequently, Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act sets up a system under which the PTA can ensure that GR’s operations are not subsidised through income from OR’s operations. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

| (86) | It follows from the test that an advantage is present whenever OR makes funds available to GR, which, in the normal course of events, would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria. The PTA can conduct a formal investigation on its own initiative or based on a complaint. If a transaction is not in conformity with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, the PTA can instruct the parties to eliminate any advantage through the adoption of relevant measures set forth in an administrative decision by the PTA. The decisions are challengeable before the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications and Postal Affairs and the Courts. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

| (87) | The Icelandic authorities have explained that the PTA’s monitoring role is primarily focused on an ex ante assessment of GR’s business plans, financing, profitability requirements, loan arrangements, etc., with the PTA imposing conditions and obligations when necessary in order to ensure financial separation between OR and GR, and that the latter’s competitive operations are not subsidised by the mother company (87). |
| --- | --- |

(87)

| (88) | Where the PTA ex post finds an infringement of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, i.e. where it finds that a particular transaction was not on market terms, it can instruct the parties to eliminate any potential advantage through the adoption of relevant measures. The advantage is then recovered from the beneficiary in accordance with national law (88). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

| (89) | However, for the PTA to order an advantage clawed back, the incompatible measure must be clearly defined and be incontestable, e.g. a particular monetary sum, a condition in a loan agreement, etc. (89). Moreover, when the PTA has ordered advantages granted to GR to be clawed back, it has not required those advantages to be recovered with interest. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

| (90) | As described in Section 4.3 above, there are three examples of the PTA having established concrete infringements of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. In two of those cases, the PTA ordered that the measures be clawed back. In the third case, the PTA did not order any clawback. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

| (91) | The first case, described in paragraph (33) above, concerned a temporary suspension of interest payments on loans provided by OR to GR (90). The PTA concluded that this temporary suspension had been in breach of the requirement imposed by the PTA concerning arm’s-length terms in transactions between OR and GR. Moreover, the PTA found that the suspension of interest payments had provided GR with an advantageous subsidy. Considering the facts of this case, the nature of transactions, as well as the PTA’s assessment, the Authority is also of the preliminary view that the measure provided GR with an advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

| (92) | The PTA ordered GR to pay back the suspended interest payments, however, it did not order the company to pay back interest on those suspended payments (91). In order to effectively recover an unlawful advantage at national level, the beneficiary must be ordered to pay interest for the whole of the period in which it benefitted from that aid. The interest must at least be equivalent to that which would have been applied if the beneficiary had had to borrow the amount on the market at the time (92). Although GR has paid back the market interest it was obliged to pay in the first place, it has not been required to pay back market interest on the advantage it obtained through the temporary suspension of interest payments. Therefore, the full advantage has not been adequately clawed back. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

| (93) | The second case, briefly described in paragraph (49) above, concerned funds deriving from OR and used to finance GR’s fiber optic cable project in Ölfus Municipality (93). The PTA concluded that the transfer of funds from ÖRF (but deriving from OR) to GR had amounted to a cross-subsidy between OR’s protected geothermal activities and GR’s competitive operations. Having considered the facts of the case and the PTA’s assessment, the Authority takes the preliminary view that ÖRF’s financing of the fibre optic cable network was not on market terms and therefore provided GR with an advantage. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

| (94) | The PTA ordered GR to undertake appropriate measures to repay the funds it received from ÖRF, although it did not stipulate how GR should go about this. Nevertheless, the PTA suggested that GR could either repay the funds to Ölfus Municipality or that the municipality could obtain an appropriate share in the project proportional to its investment. The Authority does not have information concerning how GR reacted to the PTA’s proposals and which measures it adopted following the decision. At this stage, it is therefore not clear to the Authority whether the advantage has been fully clawed back from GR. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

| (95) | Finally, in its latest decision concerning the implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017 (see Section 4.3.6 above), the PTA found two infringements of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (94):






  (i) | The first infringement concerned OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(95)

(i)

The first infringement concerned OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions.

| (ii) | The second infringement concerned conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. Such provisions had been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced at the end of 2017. The PTA found that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (95). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunications undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (96). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

The second infringement concerned conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. Such provisions had been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced at the end of 2017. The PTA found that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (95). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunications undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (96).

| (96) | The Authority, considering the benchmarks applied by the PTA and its detailed assessment of these measures, takes the preliminary view that these two measures provided GR with an advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. Due to proportionality considerations, the PTA did not order the clawback of the aforementioned advantages. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

5.2.4   Preliminary conclusions

| (97) | Based on the above considerations, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that GR has obtained an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, which it could not have obtained under normal market conditions, by: (i) not paying market interest on the advantage it obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receiving funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) receiving short-term lending from OR, and (iv) through the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s continued majority ownership in GR. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

5.3   
  Selectivity

| (98) | To be characterised as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must also be selective in that it favours “certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”. Not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, but only those which grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings, categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

| (99) | The potential aid measures at issue, i.e. (i) not paying market interest on the advantage GR obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receipt of funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) short-term lending from OR to GR, and (iv) the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s continued majority ownership in GR, are individual measures addressed only to GR. The measures therefore appear to be selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

5.4   
  Effect on trade and distortion of competition

| (100) | The measures must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

| (101) | According to CJEU case law, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether the aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (97). Furthermore, it is not necessary that the aid beneficiary itself is involved in intra-EEA trade. Even a public subsidy granted to an undertaking, which provides only local or regional services and does not provide any services outside its state of origin, may nonetheless have an effect on trade if such internal activity can be increased or maintained as a result of the aid, with the consequence that the opportunities for undertakings established in other Contracting Parties are reduced (98). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

| (102) | GR is active in deploying a fibre network infrastructure in a market which can be entered directly or through financial involvement by participants from other EEA States. In general, the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to trade and competition between operators and service providers across the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

| (103) | Therefore, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

5.5   
  Conclusion

| (104) | Based on the information provided by the Icelandic authorities and the complainant, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that the measures, i.e. (i) not paying market interest on the advantage GR obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receipt of funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) short-term lending from OR to GR, and (iv) the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s, fulfil all criteria in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore constitute state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

6   Procedural requirements

| (105) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (“Protocol 3”): “The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. .... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.” |
| --- | --- |

(105)

| (106) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the potential aid measures to the Authority. It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of the potential aid therefore appears to be unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

7   Compatibility

| (107) | Having reached a preliminary conclusion that the measures might constitute unlawful aid, the Authority must assess whether they would be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

| (108) | The Authority can declare state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement under its Articles 59(2) and 61(3)(c) provided that certain compatibility conditions are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

| (109) | It is for the Icelandic authorities to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for compatibility are met (99). However, the Icelandic authorities have not provided any arguments substantiating why the measures should be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In particular, no arguments supporting the conclusion that the aid is targeted at a well-defined objective of common interest have been presented. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities have not presented evidence suggesting that GR has been entrusted with a public service obligation. The Authority has also not identified any clear grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

| (110) | To the extent that the measures constitute state aid, the Authority therefore has doubts as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement |
| --- | --- |

(110)

8   Conclusion

| (111) | As set out above, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that the measures fulfil all criteria in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore appear to constitute state aid. The Authority furthermore has doubts as to whether the measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

| (112) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority hereby opens the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures do not constitute state aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

| (113) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 January 2020 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

| (114) | The Icelandic authorities are requested to immediately forward a copy of this decision to OR. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

| (115) | If this letter contains confidential information which should not be disclosed to third parties, please inform the Authority by 13 December 2019, identifying the confidential elements and the reasons why the information is considered to be confidential. In doing so, please consult the Authority’s Guidelines on Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions (100). If the Authority does not receive a reasoned request by that deadline, the Icelandic authorities will be deemed to agree to the disclosure to third parties and to the publication of the full text of the letter on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/ and in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

| (116) | Finally, the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication. The comments will be communicated to the Icelandic authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Bente ANGELL-HANSEN

President

Responsible College Member

Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

Högni KRISTJÁNSSON

College Member

Carsten ZATSCHLER

Countersigning as Director,

Legal and Executive Affairs

---

(*)  The information in square brackets is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.

*

(1)  Reference is made to Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.

1

(2)  Document No 825150, and Annexes 1–43 (Document Nos 825151, 825152, 825152, 825153 and 825156).

2

(3)  Document No 825249.

3

(4)  Document No 827877.

4

(5)  Document No 828509.

5

(6)  Document No 835622 and three attachments (Document Nos 835623, 835624 and 835625).

6

(7)  Document Nos 840228 and 840229, and Annex 1 (Document No 840230).

7

(8)  Document No 850420.

8

(9)  Document No 862626 and eight attachments (Document Nos 862628, 862635, 862639, 862641, 862645, 862648, 862651 and 862655).

9

(10)  Document No 892188.

10

(11)  Document No 882024.

11

(12)  Document No 910552 and Annexes 1 and 2 (Document No 910554).

12

(13)  Document No 911001.

13

(14)  Document No 915072.

14

(15)  Document No 919903.

15

(16)  Document Nos 931137, 931138 and 931139.

16

(17)  Document No 1060941.

17

(18)  Document No 1066345.

18

(19)  Document No 1073306 and Annexes 1–5 (Document Nos 1073308, 1073310, 1073312, 1073314 and 1073316).

19

(20)  Document No 1087462 and Annexes 1–5 (Document Nos 1087456–1087460).

20

(21)  Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is a measure of a company’s operating performance.

21

(22)  https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/stjorn/.

22

(23)  https://www.rsk.is/fyrirtaekjaskra/leit/kennitala/5512983029.

23

(24)  https://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/2013136.html.

24

(25)  https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/allar/nr/297-2006.

25

(26)  OJ C 10, 12.1.2012, p. 6 and EEA Supplement No 2, 12 januari 2012, p. 4.

26

(27)  Based on a general authorisation to operate telecommunication networks and services in accordance with Art. 4 of The Electronic Communications Act No 81/2003, see https://www.pfs.is/english/telecom-affairs/registration-and-licences/.

27

(28)  Submitted to Parliament in the 128 parliamentary session 2002–2003; http://www.althingi.is/altext/128/s/0960.html.

28

(29)  Ibid.

29

(30)  The framework is made up of a package of primarily five Directives and two Regulations: Framework Directive 2002/21/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33); Access Directive 2002/19/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7); Better Regulation Directive 2009/140/EC (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37); Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21); the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51); the Regulation on Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 1); and the Regulation on roaming on public mobile communications networks (OJ L 172, 30.6.2012, p. 10).

30

(31)  PTA Decision No 14/2010 of 21 mei 2010.

31

(32)  PTA Decision No 20/2013 of 10 oktober 2013.

32

(33)  Article 13 of the Act on The Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003.

33

(34)  See for example Ruling of the Ruling Committee of 17 July 2006 in Case No 8/2006.

34

(35)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 1.

35

(36)  Attachments contained in Document No 862628.

36

(37)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 5.

37

(38)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 16.

38

(39)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 15–23.

39

(40)  Article 5 of the Act (available in English here) concerns the special provisions that a Memorandum of Association should contain. According to section 5 in paragraph 2 there should be attached to the Memorandum of Association a report containing “a declaration to the effect that the specific valuables correspond at least to the agreed remuneration, including the nominal value of the shares to be issued plus a conceivable surcharge on account of overprice; the remuneration must not exceed the amount at which these valuables may be credited in the Company’s accounts”.

40

(41)  PTA Decision No 32/2008 of 30 december 2008.

41

(42)  PTA Decision No 14/2010 of 21 mei 2010, p. 15.

42

(43)  PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7 september 2010.

43

(44)  PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22 december 2010, p. 21.

44

(45)  PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22 december 2010, p. 21.

45

(46)  Document No 840229, p. 8.

46

(47)  PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22 december 2010, p. 24 and 26.

47

(48)  PTA Decision No 2/2014 of 24 maart 2014, p. 35.

48

(49)  PTA Decision No 2/2014 of 24 maart 2014, p. 40–42.

49

(50)  According to Article 13, paragraph 4, of the Act on the Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003, a party can decide to avoid the Ruling Committee and appeal a decision of the PTA directly to the District Court within 3 months from the time they are aware of the decision.

50

(51)  Supreme Court of Iceland judgment of 27 maart 2015 in Case No 219/2015.

51

(52)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019.

52

(53)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraphs 372–373.

53

(54)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraph 375.

54

(55)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraph 353.

55

(56)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraph 353.

56

(57)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraph 354.

57

(58)  PTA Decision No 26/2013 of 1 november 2013.

58

(59)  PTA Decision No 11/2015 of 2 juni 2015.

59

(60)  Reply from the Icelandic authorities, dated 7 februari 2017, pages 2 and 3. Document No 840228.

60

(61)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of state aid (“NoA”) (OJ L 342, 21.12.2017, p. 35), and EEA Supplement No 82, 21 december 2017, p. 1, paragraph 49.

61

(62)  Judgment in SFEI and others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 62.

62

SFEI and others

(63)  NoA, paragraph 41.

63

(64)  Judgment in France v Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 55.

64

France

Commission (Stardust Marine)

(65)  https://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/2013136.html.

65

(66)  https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/allar/nr/297-2006.

66

(67)  See for example: https://reykjavik.is/sites/default/files/ymis_skjol/skjol_utgefid_efni/city_of_ reykjavik_-_financial_statements_2018.pdf.

67

(68)  https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/stjorn/. .

68

(69)  See Article 2 of OR’s ownership policy: https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/eigendastefna/,

69

(70)  Article 16 of the Electricity Act No 65/2003.

70

(71)  See Article 6 of OR’s ownership policy: https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/eigendastefna/. .

71

(72)  See Report of the Enquiry Committee on Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, page 73, https://rafhladan.is/handle/10802/5777.

72

(73)  Judgments in Pavlov and others, C-180/98 to C-184/98, EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 74, and Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and others, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 107; Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 62, paragraph 78.

73

Pavlov and others

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and others

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

(74)  Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v Ayuntamiento de Getafe, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 42.

74

Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania

Ayuntamiento de Getafe

(75)  Judgment in Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 108; and Case E-29/15 Sorpa [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 825, paragraph 72.

75

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

Sorpa

(76)  Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 51.

76

Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania

(77)  See https://www.ljosleidarinn.is/gagnaveita-reykjavikur.

77

(78)  See the Authority’s Decision No 444/13/COL, The Deployment of a Next Generation Access network in the municipality of Skeiða- and Gnúpverjahreppur (OJ C 66, 6.3.2014, p. 6) and EEA Supplement No 82, 21 december 2017, p. 1, paragraph 56.

78

The Deployment of a Next Generation Access network in the municipality of Skeiða- and Gnúpverjahreppur

(79)  Judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60, and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

79

SFEI and Others

Spain

Commission

(80)  NoA, chapter 4.2.

80

(81)  For the application of the MEO test, see Case E-12/11 Asker Brygge [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 536, and judgment in Land Burgenland, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.

81

Asker Brygge

Land Burgenland

(82)  NoA, paragraph 133.

82

(83)  Judgment in Land Burgenland, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.

83

Land Burgenland

(84)  See for example, the Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in Spain v Commission, C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92, EU:C:1994:112, paragraph 28. See also judgments in Belgium v Commission, 40/85, EU:C:1986:305, paragraph 13, France v Commission, 301/87, EU:C:1990:67, paragraphs 39–40, and Italy v Commission, 303/88, EU:C:1991:136, paragraph 24.

84

Spain

Commission

Belgium

Commission

France

Commission

Italy

Commission

(85)  Document No 931139.

85

(86)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraphs 338–340.

86

(87)  Document No 1073308.

87

(88)  Judgment in Eesti Pagar, C-349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 89.

88

Eesti Pagar

(89)  Document No 1073308.

89

(90)  PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7 september 2010.

90

(91)  PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7 september 2010.

91

(92)  Judgment in Eesti Pagar, C-349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 142.

92

Eesti Pagar

(93)  PTA Decision No 11/2015 of 2 juni 2015.

93

(94)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019.

94

(95)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraph 353.

95

(96)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 maart 2019, paragraph 353.

96

(97)  Case E-6/98 Norway v ESA [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 76.

97

Norway

ESA

(98)  See for example judgments in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 66, Libert and others, C-197/11 and C-203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 77, Friulia Venezia Giulia, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41.

98

Eventech

Libert and others

Friulia Venezia Giulia

(99)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

99

Italy

Commission

(100)  OJ L 154, 8.6.2006, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 29, 8 juni 2006, p. 1.

100

---

V Bekendmakingen

GERECHTELIJKE PROCEDURES

EVA-Hof

| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/33

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EVA-HOF ARREST VAN HET HOF

van 13 november 2019

in zaak E-2/19

D en E

(Vrij verkeer van personen – sectorale aanpassingen voor Liechtenstein – verblijfsrecht – afgeleid verblijfsrecht voor familieleden – Richtlijn 2004/38/EG)

(2020/C 40/04)

In zaak E-2/19, D en E – VERZOEK aan het Hof, overeenkomstig artikel 34 van de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie, ingediend door het administratieve hof van het Vorstendom Liechtenstein (Verwaltungsgerichtshof des Fürstentums Liechtenstein), betreffende de uitlegging van Richtlijn 2004/38/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 29 april 2004 betreffende het recht van vrij verkeer en verblijf op het grondgebied van de lidstaten voor de burgers van de Unie en hun familieleden, zoals aangepast aan de Overeenkomst betreffende de Europese Economische Ruimte, heeft het Hof, samengesteld uit Páll Hreinsson, voorzitter (rechter-rapporteur), Bernd Hammermann en Ola Mestad (ad hoc), rechters, op 13 november 2019 een arrest gewezen, waarvan het dictum als volgt luidt:

Door de sectorale aanpassingen in de bijlagen V en VIII bij de EER-Overeenkomst, en met name punt III, wordt het familielid van een EER-onderdaan, die een geldige verblijfstitel heeft en in Liechtenstein verblijft, niet het recht ontnomen de EER-onderdaan in Liechtenstein te begeleiden of zich bij hem te voegen op grond van artikel 7, lid 1, onder d), van Richtlijn 2004/38/EG, ook al werd de verblijfstitel die de EER-onderdaan in Liechtenstein bezit, niet afgegeven op basis van het systeem waarin de sectorale aanpassingen voorzien.

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PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN DE GEMEENSCHAPPELIJKE HANDELSPOLITIEK

Europese Commissie

| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/34

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Bericht van het naderend vervallen van bepaalde antidumpingmaatregelen

(2020/C 40/05)

1.   Overeenkomstig artikel 11, lid 2, van Verordening (EU) 2016/1036 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 8 juni 2016 betreffende beschermende maatregelen tegen invoer met dumping uit landen die geen lid zijn van de Europese Unie (1) maakt de Europese Commissie bekend dat de hieronder vermelde antidumpingmaatregelen op de in onderstaande tabel vermelde datum zullen vervallen, tenzij een nieuw onderzoek wordt geopend overeenkomstig de volgende procedure.

2.   Procedure

Producenten in de Unie kunnen een schriftelijk verzoek om een nieuw onderzoek indienen. Dit verzoek moet voldoende bewijsmateriaal bevatten om aan te tonen dat bij het vervallen van de maatregelen voortzetting of herhaling van dumping en schade waarschijnlijk is. Indien de Commissie besluit een nieuw onderzoek naar de betrokken maatregelen te openen, zullen de importeurs, de exporteurs, de vertegenwoordigers van het land van uitvoer en de producenten in de Unie in de gelegenheid worden gesteld de in het verzoek om een nieuw onderzoek verstrekte informatie aan te vullen, te weerleggen of daarover opmerkingen te maken.

3.   Termijn

De producenten in de Unie kunnen een schriftelijk verzoek om een nieuw onderzoek indienen, dat uiterlijk drie maanden voor de in onderstaande tabel vermelde datum moet zijn ontvangen door de Europese Commissie, directoraat-generaal Handel (Eenheid H-1), CHAR 4/39, 1049 Brussel, België (2).

4.   Dit bericht wordt bekendgemaakt overeenkomstig artikel 11, lid 2, van Verordening (EU) 2016/1036.

| Product | Land(en) van oorsprong of van uitvoer | Maatregelen | Referentie | Vervaldatum (3) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bepaalde gewalste platte producten met georiënteerde korrel van siliciumstaal | Volksrepubliek China
  Japan
  Republiek Korea
  Russische Federatie
  Verenigde Staten van Amerika | Antidumpingrecht | Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1953 van de Commissie van 29 oktober 2015 tot instelling van een definitief antidumpingrecht op bepaalde gewalste platte producten met georiënteerde korrel van siliciumstaal van oorsprong uit de Volksrepubliek China, Japan, de Republiek Korea, de Russische Federatie en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika
  (PB L 284 van 30.10.2015, blz. 109) | 31.10.2020 |

Product

Land(en) van oorsprong of van uitvoer

Maatregelen

Referentie

Vervaldatum (3)

Bepaalde gewalste platte producten met georiënteerde korrel van siliciumstaal

Volksrepubliek China

Japan

Republiek Korea

Russische Federatie

Verenigde Staten van Amerika

Antidumpingrecht

Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1953 van de Commissie van 29 oktober 2015 tot instelling van een definitief antidumpingrecht op bepaalde gewalste platte producten met georiënteerde korrel van siliciumstaal van oorsprong uit de Volksrepubliek China, Japan, de Republiek Korea, de Russische Federatie en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika

(PB L 284 van 30.10.2015, blz. 109)

31.10.2020

---

(1)  PB L 176 van 30.6.2016, blz. 21.

(2)  TRADE-Defence-Complaints@ec.europa.eu

(3)  De maatregel vervalt om middernacht op de in deze kolom vermelde datum.

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PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/35

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Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie

(Zaak M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax)

Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2020/C 40/06)

1.

Deze aanmelding betreft de volgende ondernemingen:

| — | Viacom International Inc. (“Viacom”, Verenigde Staten), die deel uitmaakt van ViacomCBS Inc.; |
| --- | --- |

—

Viacom International Inc. (“Viacom”, Verenigde Staten), die deel uitmaakt van ViacomCBS Inc.;

| — | beIN Media Group, LLC (“beIN”, Qatar), die deel uitmaakt van beIN Corporation; |
| --- | --- |

—

beIN Media Group, LLC (“beIN”, Qatar), die deel uitmaakt van beIN Corporation;

| — | MMX Media Finance, LLC (“Miramax”, Verenigde Staten), die momenteel onder uitsluitende zeggenschap staat van beIN. |
| --- | --- |

—

MMX Media Finance, LLC (“Miramax”, Verenigde Staten), die momenteel onder uitsluitende zeggenschap staat van beIN.

Viacom en beIN verkrijgen gezamenlijke zeggenschap in de zin van artikel 3, lid 1, onder b), en artikel 3, lid 4, van de concentratieverordening over Miramax.

De concentratie komt tot stand door de verwerving van aandelen.

2.

| — | Viacom: internationaal media- en entertainmentbedrijf; |
| --- | --- |

—

Viacom: internationaal media- en entertainmentbedrijf;

| — | beIN: entertainmentbedrijf met onder meer activiteiten in de sportmedia; |
| --- | --- |

—

beIN: entertainmentbedrijf met onder meer activiteiten in de sportmedia;

| — | Miramax: entertainmentbedrijf dat films en televisieprogramma’s produceert en distribueert. |
| --- | --- |

—

Miramax: entertainmentbedrijf dat films en televisieprogramma’s produceert en distribueert.

3.

Er zij op gewezen dat deze zaak in aanmerking komt voor de vereenvoudigde procedure zoals uiteengezet in de mededeling van de Commissie betreffende een vereenvoudigde procedure voor de behandeling van bepaalde concentraties krachtens Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (2).

4.

Deze opmerkingen moeten de Commissie uiterlijk tien dagen na de datum van deze bekendmaking hebben bereikt. De volgende referentie moet altijd worden vermeld:

M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax

Opmerkingen kunnen per e-mail, per fax of per post aan de Commissie worden toegezonden. Gelieve de onderstaande contactgegevens te gebruiken:

E-mail: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postadres:

| Europese Commissie |
| --- |
| Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie |
| Griffie voor concentraties |
| 1049 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

Europese Commissie

Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie

Griffie voor concentraties

1049 Brussel

BELGIË

---

(1)  PB L 24 van 29.1.2004, blz. 1 (“de concentratieverordening”).

1

(2)  PB C 366 van 14.12.2013, blz. 5.

2

---

| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/37

---

Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie

(Zaak M.9719 — Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited/OMERS Administration Corporation/Riverstone Barbados Limited)

Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2020/C 40/07)

1.

Deze aanmelding betreft de volgende ondernemingen:

| — | Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (“FFHL”, Canada); |
| --- | --- |

—

Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (“FFHL”, Canada);

| — | Kingston Infrastructure Holdings Inc. (“Kingston”, Canada), die onder zeggenschap staat van OMERS Administration Corporation (“OMERS”, Canada); |
| --- | --- |

—

Kingston Infrastructure Holdings Inc. (“Kingston”, Canada), die onder zeggenschap staat van OMERS Administration Corporation (“OMERS”, Canada);

| — | Riverstone Barbados Limited (“Riverstone”, Barbados). |
| --- | --- |

—

Riverstone Barbados Limited (“Riverstone”, Barbados).

FFHL en Kingston verkrijgen gezamenlijke zeggenschap in de zin van artikel 3, lid 1, onder b), en artikel 3, lid 4, van de concentratieverordening over het geheel van Riverstone.

De concentratie komt tot stand door de verwerving van aandelen.

2.

| — | FFHL: holdingmaatschappij die zich bezighoudt met eigendoms- en ongevallenverzekeringen, alsook herverzekeringen en aanverwant beleggingsbeheer; |
| --- | --- |

—

FFHL: holdingmaatschappij die zich bezighoudt met eigendoms- en ongevallenverzekeringen, alsook herverzekeringen en aanverwant beleggingsbeheer;

| — | OMERS: beheerder van het Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Primary Pension Plan en trustee van de pensioenfondsen. Zij beheert een wereldwijd gediversifieerde portefeuille van aandelen en obligaties alsook beleggingen in vastgoed, private equity en infrastructuur; |
| --- | --- |

—

OMERS: beheerder van het Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Primary Pension Plan en trustee van de pensioenfondsen. Zij beheert een wereldwijd gediversifieerde portefeuille van aandelen en obligaties alsook beleggingen in vastgoed, private equity en infrastructuur;

| — | Riverstone: beheerder van run-off verzekeringsactiviteiten en -portefeuilles. |
| --- | --- |

—

Riverstone: beheerder van run-off verzekeringsactiviteiten en -portefeuilles.

3.

Er zij op gewezen dat deze zaak in aanmerking komt voor de vereenvoudigde procedure zoals uiteengezet in de mededeling van de Commissie betreffende een vereenvoudigde procedure voor de behandeling van bepaalde concentraties krachtens Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (2).

4.

Deze opmerkingen moeten de Commissie uiterlijk tien dagen na de datum van deze bekendmaking hebben bereikt. De volgende referentie moet altijd worden vermeld:

M.9719 — FFHL / OMERS / Riverstone

Opmerkingen kunnen per e-mail, per fax of per post aan de Commissie worden toegezonden. Gelieve de onderstaande contactgegevens te gebruiken:

E-mail: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postadres:

| Europese Commissie |
| --- |
| Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie |
| Griffie voor concentraties |
| 1049 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

Europese Commissie

Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie

Griffie voor concentraties

1049 Brussel

BELGIË

---

(1)  PB L 24 van 29.1.2004, blz. 1 (“de concentratieverordening”).

1

(2)  PB C 366 van 14.12.2013, blz. 5.

2

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ANDERE HANDELINGEN

Europese Commissie

| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/38

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Bekendmaking van een mededeling van de goedkeuring van een standaardwijziging van een productdossier voor een naam in de wijnsector als bedoeld in artikel 17, leden 2 en 3, van Gedelegeerde Verordening (EU) 2019/33 van de Commissie

(2020/C 40/08)

Deze mededeling wordt bekendgemaakt overeenkomstig artikel 17, lid 5, van Gedelegeerde Verordening (EU) 2019/33 (1) van de Commissie.

MEDEDELING VAN DE GOEDKEURING VAN EEN STANDAARDWIJZIGING

“Coteaux d’Ancenis”

PDO-FR-A0928-AM01

Datum van de mededeling: 12 november 2019

BESCHRIJVING VAN EN REDENEN VOOR DE GOEDGEKEURDE WIJZIGING

1.   Geografisch gebied

Het geografische gebied wordt als volgt gewijzigd: “Alle fasen van de productie vinden plaats in het geografische gebied dat het Institut National de l’Origine et de la Qualité tijdens de vergadering van het bevoegde nationale comité op 28 september 2011 heeft goedgekeurd. De omtrek van dit gebied omvat op de datum van goedkeuring van dit productdossier door het bevoegde nationale comité het grondgebied van de volgende gemeenten op basis van de officiële geografische code van 2018:

| — | Departement Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire, Vair-sur-Loire. |
| --- | --- |

—

Departement Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire, Vair-sur-Loire.

| — | Departement Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré en La Varenne). |
| --- | --- |

—

Departement Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré en La Varenne).

De kaarten waarop het geografische gebied staat aangegeven, zijn te vinden op de website van het Institut National de l’Origine et de la Qualité.”

Redactionele wijziging: de nieuwe lijst van gemeenten houdt verband met samenvoegingen of andere wijzigingen in de administratieve gebiedsindeling die sinds de goedkeuring van het productdossier hebben plaatsgevonden. Voor meer rechtszekerheid wordt verwezen naar de huidige versie van de officiële geografische code, die jaarlijks door INSEE wordt gepubliceerd.

Tot slot wordt vermeld dat de kaarten waarop het geografisch gebied is aangegeven, zijn te vinden op de website van het INAO ten behoeve van een betere informatievoorziening aan het publiek.

Bijgevolg wordt ook punt 6 van het enig document gewijzigd wat het afgebakende geografisch gebied betreft.

2.   Afgebakend perceelgebied

In het productdossier worden in hoofdstuk 1, deel IV, punt 2 de woorden “afgebakende perceelgebied” vervangen door “productiegebied”;

Het betreft een redactionele wijziging die niet van invloed is op het afgebakende perceelgebied.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

3.   Gebied in de onmiddellijke nabijheid

In hoofdstuk 1, deel IV, punt 3, wordt de lijst van gemeenten vervangen door:

| — | Departement Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdonsur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles, Vallet. |
| --- | --- |

—

Departement Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdonsur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles, Vallet.

| — | Departement Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Puiset-Doré en Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Saint-Laurent-des-Autels en Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont), Sèvremoine (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Tillières). |
| --- | --- |

—

Departement Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Puiset-Doré en Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Saint-Laurent-des-Autels en Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont), Sèvremoine (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Tillières).

Redactionele wijziging: de nieuwe lijst van gemeenten houdt verband met samenvoegingen of andere wijzigingen in de administratieve gebiedsindeling die sinds de goedkeuring van het productdossier hebben plaatsgevonden.

Bijgevolg wordt ook punt 9 van het enig document gewijzigd wat de aanvullende voorwaarden betreft.

4.   Wijnstokrassenbestand

De rode en roséwijnen mogen voortaan worden geproduceerd met de accessoire druivensoort cabernet franc.

Cabernet franc is een oud druivenras uit het gebied en van de benaming dat een bepaalde structuur aan de wijn geeft zonder de typische kenmerken ervan te wijzigen. Hierdoor kan een bepaalde productie veilig worden gesteld, aangezien het ras niet zo gevoelig is voor vorst als gamay en ook niet voor schimmelziekten.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

5.   Assemblage

| — | In hoofdstuk 1, deel V, wordt de volgende alinea ingevoegd:






  “2 | - Regels voor het aandeel druivenrassen op het bedrijf |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

In hoofdstuk 1, deel V, wordt de volgende alinea ingevoegd:

“2

- Regels voor het aandeel druivenrassen op het bedrijf

Het aandeel van het accessoire druivenras is kleiner dan of gelijk aan 10 % van het wijnstokrassenbestand.

De conformiteit van het wijnstokrassenbestand wordt, voor de betrokken kleur, beoordeeld voor de totaliteit van de bedrijfspercelen waarop de wijn met gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming wordt geproduceerd. ”

| — | In hoofdstuk 1, deel IX, wordt punt a) ingevoegd:






  “a) | Assemblage van druivenrassen: |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

In hoofdstuk 1, deel IX, wordt punt a) ingevoegd:

“a)

Assemblage van druivenrassen:

De rode of roséwijnen worden verkregen door assemblage van druiven of wijnen in dezelfde verhoudingen als die welke voor het wijnstokrassenbestand zijn vastgesteld. ”

Met de toevoeging van het druivenras cabernet franc moet een regel voor het wijnstokrassenbestand en de assemblage worden toegevoegd waarmee het aandeel van dit ras tot 10 % wordt beperkt.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

6.   Verpakking

In deel IX, punt 2, wordt de bewaartermijn van de analyseresultaten van verpakte partijen gewijzigd van 6 naar 12 maanden om een betere controle te waarborgen.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

7.   Verkeer tussen erkende depothouders

In hoofdstuk 1, deel IX, punt 4, betreffende de datum van het in verkeer brengen van de wijnen tussen erkende entrepothouders wordt b) geschrapt.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

8.   Verband met het geografische gebied

Dit deel is herzien in verband met de actualisatie van het aantal betrokken gemeenten (16 in plaats van 22).

Bijgevolg wordt ook punt 8 van het enig document gewijzigd wat het geografisch gebied betreft.

9.   Overgangsmaatregel

De vervallen overgangsmaatregelen zijn uit het productdossier geschrapt.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

10.   Etikettering

In deel XII wordt het volgende punt toegevoegd: “c) Op het etiket van de wijnen met gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming mag de naam van een kleinere geografische eenheid worden vermeld op voorwaarde dat:

| — | het gaat om een plaatsnaam die is opgenomen in het kadaster |
| --- | --- |

—

het gaat om een plaatsnaam die is opgenomen in het kadaster

| — | deze naam staat vermeld op de oogstaangifte. |
| --- | --- |

—

deze naam staat vermeld op de oogstaangifte.

De in het kadaster opgenomen plaatsnaam staat vermeld in lettertekens die in hoogte, breedte of dikte niet groter zijn dan de helft van de lettertekens van de naam van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming. De naam moet in hetzelfde gezichtsveld als de naam van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming worden vermeld. ”

Bijgevolg wordt ook punt 9 van het enig document gewijzigd wat de aanvullende voorwaarden betreft.

11.   Voorafgaande aangifte van de bestemming van de percelen

In hoofdstuk 2, deel 1, punt 1 wordt de periode van 5 jaar voor stilzwijgende verlenging geschrapt om eventuele problemen door verzuim te voorkomen, zodat de verlenging alleen stilzwijgend plaatsvindt zolang de exploitant geen wijzigingen meldt.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

12.   Aangifte van aanspraak

De aangifte van aanspraak wordt in plaats van 10 december voortaan uiterlijk vóór 31 december verzonden.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

13.   Voorafgaande aangifte van een transactie van niet-verpakte wijn

In hoofdstuk 2, deel II, punt 3 wordt in de eerste alinea het woord “eerste” ingevoegd vóór het woord “transactie” en wordt het zinsdeel “van de eerste partij van het betrokken jaar of het voor het eerst in de handel brengen van wijn voor verkoop aan de consument” ingevoegd na het woord “transactie”.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

14.   Voorafgaande aangifte van verpakking

In hoofdstuk II, deel 2, punt 4, wordt een nieuw streepje ingevoegd:

| “- | de vermoedelijke verpakkingsdatum” |
| --- | --- |

“-

de vermoedelijke verpakkingsdatum”

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

15.   Aangifte van declassering

In hoofdstuk 2, deel II, punt 6, wordt het zinsdeel “binnen een maand” vervangen door “uiterlijk op 15 december”.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

16.   Wijnbouwregister

Hoofdstuk 2, deel II, punt 1, wordt als volgt gewijzigd:

| “1° | – Wijnbouwregister






  a) | – Elke marktdeelnemer die wijnstokken exploiteert die geschikt zijn voor de productie van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming houdt een register bij en dient vóór 1 juni van het oogstjaar te vermelden voor welke percelen hij afziet van de productie van wijn met de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming en de productievoorwaarden voor de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming niet wenst toe te passen.
  Het Organisme de défense et de gestion kan de marktdeelnemers verzoeken een afschrift van dat register te verstrekken. |
| --- | --- | --- |

“1°

– Wijnbouwregister

a)

– Elke marktdeelnemer die wijnstokken exploiteert die geschikt zijn voor de productie van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming houdt een register bij en dient vóór 1 juni van het oogstjaar te vermelden voor welke percelen hij afziet van de productie van wijn met de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming en de productievoorwaarden voor de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming niet wenst toe te passen.

Het Organisme de défense et de gestion kan de marktdeelnemers verzoeken een afschrift van dat register te verstrekken.

| b) | Elke marktdeelnemer die te maken heeft met een of meer overgangsmaatregelen stelt een inventaris van de betrokken percelen ter beschikking aan het Organisme de défense et de gestion waarin het volgende wordt vermeld:






  — | de kadastrale omschrijving van het perceel; |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

Elke marktdeelnemer die te maken heeft met een of meer overgangsmaatregelen stelt een inventaris van de betrokken percelen ter beschikking aan het Organisme de défense et de gestion waarin het volgende wordt vermeld:

—

de kadastrale omschrijving van het perceel;

| — | de bedoelde overgangsmaatregel. ” |
| --- | --- |

—

de bedoelde overgangsmaatregel. ”

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

17.   Register van wijnpakhuizen

In hoofdstuk 2, deel II, punt 2, wordt het woord “dossier” vervangen door “register” en wordt toegevoegd dat de declasseringen in dat register zijn opgenomen.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

18.   Voornaamste te controleren punten

Hoofdstuk 3 is herzien om te zorgen voor samenhang met de belangrijkste punten die in de productdossiers van het gebied pays nantais moeten worden gecontroleerd.

Deze wijziging heeft geen gevolgen voor het enig document.

ENIG DOCUMENT

1.   Naam van het product

Coteaux d’Ancenis

2.   Type geografische aanduiding

BOB - beschermde oorsprongsbenaming

3.   Categorieën wijnbouwproducten

| 1. | Wijn |
| --- | --- |

1.

Wijn

4.   Beschrijving van de wijn(en)

Rode wijnen

Het betreft stille rode wijnen

De wijnen hebben de volgende analytische kenmerken:

| — | minimaal natuurlijk alcoholvolumegehalte: rode wijnen 10,5 % |
| --- | --- |

—

minimaal natuurlijk alcoholvolumegehalte: rode wijnen 10,5 %

| — | maximaal totaal alcoholvolumegehalte na verrijking: rode wijnen 12,5% |
| --- | --- |

—

maximaal totaal alcoholvolumegehalte na verrijking: rode wijnen 12,5%

| — | totale zuurgehalte: rode wijnen tussen 57,1 en 102,1 milli-equivalent per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

totale zuurgehalte: rode wijnen tussen 57,1 en 102,1 milli-equivalent per liter

| — | maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren: rode wijnen 13,3 milli-equivalent per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren: rode wijnen 13,3 milli-equivalent per liter

| — | gehalte aan fermenteerbare suikers (glucose en fructose): rode wijnen lager dan of gelijk aan 3 gram per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

gehalte aan fermenteerbare suikers (glucose en fructose): rode wijnen lager dan of gelijk aan 3 gram per liter

| — | maximaal appelzuurgehalte: lager dan of gelijk aan 0,3 gram per liter voor rode wijnen. Voor de rode wijnen wordt de malolactische gisting voltooid. |
| --- | --- |

—

maximaal appelzuurgehalte: lager dan of gelijk aan 0,3 gram per liter voor rode wijnen. Voor de rode wijnen wordt de malolactische gisting voltooid.

Het totaal zwaveldioxidegehalte en het totale effectief alcoholgehalte van de rode wijnen voldoen aan de communautaire regelgeving.

De rode wijnen hebben een heldere kleur die varieert van kersenrood tot granaatrood. De neus van deze wijnen wordt vaak gedomineerd door aroma’s van rood fruit, soms gepaard met kruidige toetsen. De wijnen hebben doorgaans elegante tannines die een soepele en zachte smaak met een zekere frisheid geven.

| Algemene analytische kenmerken |
| --- |
| Maximaal totaal alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent) | |
| Minimaal effectief alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent) | |
| Minimale totale zuurgraad | |
| Maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren (in milli-equivalent per liter) | |
| Maximaal totaalgehalte aan zwaveldioxide (in milligram per liter) | |

Algemene analytische kenmerken

Maximaal totaal alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent)

Minimaal effectief alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent)

Minimale totale zuurgraad

Maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren (in milli-equivalent per liter)

Maximaal totaalgehalte aan zwaveldioxide (in milligram per liter)

Witte wijnen

Het betreft stille witte wijnen

De wijnen hebben de volgende analytische kenmerken:

| — | minimaal natuurlijk alcoholvolumegehalte: witte wijnen 11,5 % |
| --- | --- |

—

minimaal natuurlijk alcoholvolumegehalte: witte wijnen 11,5 %

| — | maximaal totaal alcoholvolumegehalte na verrijking: witte wijnen 13,5 % |
| --- | --- |

—

maximaal totaal alcoholvolumegehalte na verrijking: witte wijnen 13,5 %

| — | totale zuurgehalte: witte wijnen tussen 57,1 en 112,3 milli-equivalent per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

totale zuurgehalte: witte wijnen tussen 57,1 en 112,3 milli-equivalent per liter

| — | gehalte aan fermenteerbare suikers (glucose en fructose): witte wijnen tussen 20 en 40 gram per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

gehalte aan fermenteerbare suikers (glucose en fructose): witte wijnen tussen 20 en 40 gram per liter

De witte wijnen met de gele kleur die weelderigheid oproept, ontwikkelen over het algemeen intense aroma’s met toetsen van zeer rijp of exotisch fruit. De regels inzake hun analysenormen garanderen de doorgaans mooie evenwichtige smaak van deze wijnen, waarbij de rondheid die is verkregen door de fermenteerbare suikers een fijn tegenwicht biedt tegen de kenmerkende frisheid van de Loire-wijnen.

| Algemene analytische kenmerken |
| --- |
| Maximaal totaal alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent) | |
| Minimaal effectief alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent) | 10 |
| Minimale totale zuurgraad | |
| Maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren (in milli-equivalent per liter) | 13,3 |
| Maximaal totaalgehalte aan zwaveldioxide (in milligram per liter) | |

Algemene analytische kenmerken

Maximaal totaal alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent)

Minimaal effectief alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent)

10

Minimale totale zuurgraad

Maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren (in milli-equivalent per liter)

13,3

Maximaal totaalgehalte aan zwaveldioxide (in milligram per liter)

Roséwijnen

Het betreft stille roséwijnen.

De wijnen hebben de volgende analytische kenmerken:

| — | minimaal natuurlijk alcoholvolumegehalte: roséwijnen 10 % |
| --- | --- |

—

minimaal natuurlijk alcoholvolumegehalte: roséwijnen 10 %

| — | maximaal totaal alcoholvolumegehalte na verrijking: roséwijnen 12 % |
| --- | --- |

—

maximaal totaal alcoholvolumegehalte na verrijking: roséwijnen 12 %

| — | totale zuurgehalte: roséwijnen tussen 57,1 en 102,1 milli-equivalent per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

totale zuurgehalte: roséwijnen tussen 57,1 en 102,1 milli-equivalent per liter

| — | maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren: roséwijnen 10,2 milli-equivalent per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren: roséwijnen 10,2 milli-equivalent per liter

| — | gehalte aan fermenteerbare suikers (glucose en fructose): roséwijnen lager dan of gelijk aan 4 gram per liter |
| --- | --- |

—

gehalte aan fermenteerbare suikers (glucose en fructose): roséwijnen lager dan of gelijk aan 4 gram per liter

Het totaalgehalte aan zwaveldioxide en het totale effectief alcoholgehalte van de roséwijnen voldoen aan de communautaire regelgeving.

De roséwijnen hebben een heldere lichtroze tot zalmroze kleur. Ze hebben fijne, discrete, over het algemeen fruitige aroma’s die zorgen voor frisheid. In de mond kenmerken deze wijnen zich vaak door hun lichte en frisse smaak en een vleugje levendigheid.

| Algemene analytische kenmerken |
| --- |
| Maximaal totaal alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent) | |
| Minimaal effectief alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent) | |
| Minimale totale zuurgraad | |
| Maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren (in milli-equivalent per liter) | |
| Maximaal totaalgehalte aan zwaveldioxide (in milligram per liter) | |

Algemene analytische kenmerken

Maximaal totaal alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent)

Minimaal effectief alcoholgehalte (in volumeprocent)

Minimale totale zuurgraad

Maximumgehalte aan vluchtige zuren (in milli-equivalent per liter)

Maximaal totaalgehalte aan zwaveldioxide (in milligram per liter)

5.   Wijnbereidingsprocedés

a.   Essentiële oenologische procedés

Teeltwijze

De minimale beplantingsdichtheid bedraagt 6 000 wijnstokken per hectare.

De afstand tussen de rijen bedraagt ten hoogste 1,60 meter en de afstand tussen de wijnstokken in eenzelfde rij bedraagt 0,90 tot 1,10 meter.

De wijnstokken worden gesnoeid met maximaal 12 ogen per stok:

| — | hetzij door korte snoei (cordon de Royat, gobelet, palmet); |
| --- | --- |

—

hetzij door korte snoei (cordon de Royat, gobelet, palmet);

| — | hetzij door enkele Guyot-snoei. |
| --- | --- |

—

hetzij door enkele Guyot-snoei.

Het snoeien moet vóór 31 mei van het oogstjaar zijn voltooid.

Tijdens het fenologisch stadium “vruchtzetting” is het aantal vruchtdragende takken van dat jaar per wijnstok kleiner dan of gelijk aan 10.

Specifiek oenologisch procedé

Bij de bereiding van de roséwijnen is het gebruik van houtskool voor oenologische doeleinden, als afzonderlijk product en in mengsels, verboden.

Subtractieve verrijkingstechnieken zijn toegestaan voor de rode wijnen en het maximumpercentage gedeeltelijke concentratie ten opzichte van de gebruikte hoeveelheid is vastgesteld op 10 %.

Het totaal alcoholvolumegehalte van de wijnen mag na verrijking niet hoger zijn dan: witte wijnen 13,5 %, roséwijnen 12 %, rode wijnen 12,5 %.

Naast de bovengenoemde bepalingen moeten de wijnen wat oenologische procedés betreft voldoen aan de verplichtingen die zijn vastgesteld op communautair niveau en in het wetboek landbouw en zeevisserij.

b.   Maximumopbrengsten

Witte wijnen

55 hectoliter per hectare

Rode en roséwijnen

66 hectoliter per hectare

6.   Afgebakend geografisch gebied

Alle fasen van de productie vinden plaats in het geografische gebied dat het Institut National de l’Origine et de la Qualité tijdens de vergadering van het bevoegde nationale comité op 28 september 2011 heeft goedgekeurd. De omtrek van dit gebied omvat op de datum van goedkeuring van dit productdossier door het bevoegde nationale comité het grondgebied van de volgende gemeenten op basis van de officiële geografische code van 2018:

| — | Departement Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire, Vair-sur-Loire. |
| --- | --- |

—

Departement Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire, Vair-sur-Loire.

| — | Departement Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré en La Varenne). |
| --- | --- |

—

Departement Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré en La Varenne).

7.   Voornaamste wijndruivenrassen

Gamay N

Pinot gris G

8.   Beschrijving van het (de) verband(en)

Beschrijving van de natuurlijke factoren die bijdragen tot het verband

Het geografische gebied strekt zich uit aan weerszijden van de Loire, halverwege tussen de steden Nantes en Angers. De wijnstokken zijn overwegend aangeplant op de hellingen direct langs de rivier, soms ook op de hellingen van secundaire valleien. Zij staan in rijen boven elkaar op de hellingen, vaak op een hoogte van 20 tot 80 meter, en zijn in het landschap duidelijk te onderscheiden van de omliggende hoogvlakten, waar de activiteiten op gemengde teelt en veeteelt zijn gericht. Het geografische gebied ligt rondom de gemeente Ancenis en bestrijkt het grondgebied van 16 gemeenten van de departementen Loire-Atlantique en Maine-et-Loire.

De wijngaarden zijn aangelegd op formaties van metamorfe gesteenten van het Armoricaans Massief, die voornamelijk bestaan uit schist, glimmerschist en gneis. Deze harde rotsen hebben gezorgd voor kiezelhoudende en vaak steenachtige bodems, die op de hellingen zeer ondiep zijn, en die vroeger onderhevig waren aan erosie door de Loire. Volgens de gebruiken bestaat het afgebakende perceelgebied voor de druivenoogst uitsluitend uit percelen die op de heuvels liggen, die voornamelijk en traditioneel met wijnstokken zijn beplant en die bestaan uit gezonde, ondiepe, matig vruchtbare bodems met een beperkte waterreserve. Deze bodems drogen en warmen snel op.

Het geografische gebied heeft een gematigd zeeklimaat. De Loire draagt er aan bij dat de invloed van de zee verder wordt doorgevoerd naar het binnenland, met name doordat de rivier in de regio Ancenis dezelfde richting op stroomt als de overheersende winden. De gemiddelde jaartemperatuur bedraagt ongeveer 11,5 °C, met zachte winters en koele zomers. De neerslag, ongeveer 700 mm per jaar, valt goed verspreid over het jaar, met echter een aanzienlijk neerslagtekort in de zomer. Het geografische gebied kent aan het begin van de herfst, voor het springtij van de equinox, vaak een droge en winderige periode.

Beschrijving van de menselijke factoren die bijdragen tot het verband

De wijnbouw die al zeer lange tijd aanwezig is in het gebied, zou zich vanaf de 11e eeuw hebben verspreid over de regio Ancenis, met het ontstaan van talloze priorijen langs de Loire. Over de opbrengsten van de wijngaarden werden tienden betaald, waaruit blijkt dat er in de middeleeuwen sprake was van intensieve wijnbouw langs de oevers van de rivier. De haven van Ancenis speelt al snel een centrale rol in de handel en het vervoer van de wijnen uit de regio. Zo worden in 1573 met toestemming van Karel IX vier wijnmakelaars aangesteld in de haven van Ancenis. Dit aantal wordt in 1584, onder Louis XVI, uitgebreid naar tien en in de stad liggen regelmatig een twintigtal schepen die betrokken zijn bij de wijnhandel.

Vanaf de 17de eeuw wordt de productie van witte mousserende wijnen uit de wijngaarden van Ancenis verhoogd met de introductie van het druivenras pinot gris G. De wijn die met deze druif wordt verkregen, krijgt na verloop van tijd de naam “Malvoisie”. Later doen andere druivenrassen hun intrede, zoals de druivensoort gamay N die omstreeks halverwege de 19e eeuw wordt geïntroduceerd. De wijnhandel bereikt vervolgens zijn hoogtepunt, de wijnen worden via Orléans naar Parijs of via Nantes naar het noorden van Europa en Bretagne verscheept.

Na de phylloxera-crisis worden de wijngaarden opnieuw aangelegd, waarbij definitief wordt gekozen voor de druivenrassen en de aanplantmethoden die vandaag de dag nog steeds worden gebruikt, met name de beplantingsdichtheid van 6 000 tot 7 000 wijnstokken per hectare. De productie van droge roséwijnen en rode wijnen wordt steeds belangrijker ten koste van de witte mousserende wijnen “Malvoisie”. De oprichting in 1907 van het Syndicat viticole in het district Ancenis illustreert de continuïteit en vitaliteit van de lokale wijnbouwcultuur. De productievoorschriften die de producenten na de Tweede Wereldoorlog vaststellen, zorgen ervoor dat de “Coteaux d’Ancenis” in 1954 wordt erkend als “appellation d’origine vin délimité de qualité supérieure”.

In 2009 beslaat het wijnbouwareaal 180 hectaren. Dit wordt door ongeveer dertig wijnbouwers geëxploiteerd met een gemiddelde jaarproductie van meer dan 10 000 hectoliter, waarvan 45 % roséwijnen, 38 % rode wijnen en 17 % witte wijnen. De witte wijnen met de gele kleur die weelderigheid oproept, ontwikkelen over het algemeen intense aroma’s met toetsen van zeer rijp of exotisch fruit. De regels inzake hun analysenormen garanderen de doorgaans mooie evenwichtige smaak van deze wijnen, waarbij de rondheid die is verkregen door de fermenteerbare suikers een fijn tegenwicht biedt tegen de kenmerkende frisheid van de Loire-wijnen.

De rode wijnen hebben een heldere kleur die varieert van kersenrood tot granaatrood. De neus van deze wijnen wordt vaak gedomineerd door aroma’s van rood fruit, soms gepaard met kruidige toetsen. De wijnen hebben doorgaans elegante tannines die een soepele en zachte smaak met een zekere frisheid geven.

De roséwijnen hebben een heldere lichtroze tot zalmroze kleur. Ze hebben fijne, discrete, over het algemeen fruitige aroma’s die zorgen voor frisheid. In de mond kenmerken deze wijnen zich vaak door hun lichte en frisse smaak en een vleugje levendigheid. De producenten van de “Coteaux d’Ancenis” hebben met de ligging van het geografisch gebied tussen de wijngaarden van Nantes en Angevin en langs de Loire, die een belangrijke verbindingsroute vormt, deze dubbele invloed weten te benutten door technische productieprocedés in te voeren die zijn aangepast aan de natuurlijke omgeving.

De heuvels van het geografische gebied, die door de Loire zijn gevormd tot formaties van metamorfe gesteenten van het Armoricaans Massief, hebben meestal bodems met een hoge opwarmcapaciteit, een snelle natuurlijke afwatering en een beperkte waterreserve, die de rijpheid van de druiven bevorderen. De actieve commerciële wijnbouw heeft zich dankzij deze elementen vanaf de middeleeuwen rondom de haven van Ancenis kunnen ontwikkelen. Het klimaat van het geografische gebied wordt, onder invloed van de oceaan, in het bijzonder gekenmerkt door een winderige en droge periode aan het einde van de zomer en aan het begin van de herfst. Deze natuurlijke context in combinatie met het open landschap langs oevers van de Loire vormt grotendeels de verklaring voor het feit dat de productie van rode en roséwijnen zich in de regio zich heeft ontwikkeld. De arme en zure bodems van de afgebakende percelen voor de druivenoogst zijn met name geschikt voor de druivensoort gamay N. Deze bodemeigenschappen zorgen ervoor dat de vaak waargenomen kracht van dit druivenras wordt beperkt en verklaren het feit dat dit druivenras, hoewel laat geïntroduceerd, de bestaande zwarte variëteiten heeft verdrongen. De wijngaarden worden beheerd met behulp van aangepaste leimethoden en door de beheersing van de opbrengsten, zodat de aroma’s van de rode wijnen zich volledig kunnen ontwikkelen en de roséwijnen hun verfijnde fruitige toetsen krijgen.

Het klimaat leent zich ook voor het produceren van mousserende witte wijnen wanneer gezonde druiven worden geoogst die volledig rijp zijn. Dankzij het klimaat heeft ook het kwetsbare druivenras pinot gris G zich snel kunnen aanpassen. De zachte zomertemperaturen in het geografische gebied dragen er echt toe bij dat de verfijnde aroma’s van de druif behouden blijven en dat de afbraak van de organische zuren die aanwezig zijn in de druiven wordt beperkt, en staan garant voor de kenmerkende frisheid van de wijnen. Deze wijnen, die lokaal bekend zijn onder de naam “Malvoie”, hebben een zeer origineel karakter en staan symbool voor het erfgoed van de lokale wijnbouw.

De producenten hebben zich aan het begin van de 20e eeuw verenigd in een syndicaat en werken voortdurend aan het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van de producten. De erkenning van “Coteaux d’Ancenis” als gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming, die gepaard is gegaan met een concentratie van het afgebakend perceelgebied op de beste hellingen, een beperking van de wijnstokrassen tot de twee druivenrassen gamay N en pinot gris G en strengere productievoorschriften, garandeert ook in de toekomst het typische karakter van de wijnen.

9.   Andere essentiële voorwaarden (verpakking, etikettering, andere vereisten)

Rechtskader:

Nationale wetgeving

Soort aanvullende voorwaarde:

Afwijking betreffende de productie in het afgebakende geografische gebied

Beschrijving van de voorwaarde:

Het gebied in de onmiddellijke nabijheid waarin de wijnen bij wijze van uitzondering mogen worden bereid en gerijpt, bestaat uit het grondgebied van de volgende gemeenten op basis van de officiële geografische code van 2018:

| — | Departement Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La ChapelleHeulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le LorouxBottereau, Maisdon-sur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-deConcelles, Vallet. |
| --- | --- |

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Departement Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La ChapelleHeulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le LorouxBottereau, Maisdon-sur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-deConcelles, Vallet.

| — | Departement Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Puiset-Doré en Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Saint-Laurent-des-Autels en Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont), Sèvremoine (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Tillières). |
| --- | --- |

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Departement Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Puiset-Doré en Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeenten Saint-Laurent-des-Autels en Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont), Sèvremoine (alleen het grondgebied van de deelgemeente Tillières).

Rechtskader:

Nationale wetgeving

Soort aanvullende voorwaarde:

Aanvullende bepalingen met betrekking tot de etikettering

Beschrijving van de voorwaarde:

De gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming kan worden aangevuld met de geografische benaming “Val de Loire” volgens de regels die in het productdossier zijn vastgelegd voor het gebruik daarvan.

De gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming kan worden aangevuld met de gebruikelijke benaming “Malvoisie” volgens de regels die in het productdossier zijn vastgelegd voor het gebruik daarvan. Deze naam mag alleen worden gebruikt voor de stille witte wijnen.

Facultatieve aanduidingen waarvoor de lidstaten op grond van communautaire regelgeving zelf voorschriften voor het gebruik kunnen vaststellen, worden op de etiketten aangegeven in lettertekens die maximaal tweemaal zo hoog, breed en dik zijn als de letters van de naam van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming.

De lettertekens van de vermelding van de geografische benaming “Val de Loire” en de gebruikelijke benaming “Malvoisie” mogen niet groter, breder of dikker zijn dan twee derde van de lettertekens van de naam van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming.

Rechtskader:

Nationale wetgeving

Soort aanvullende voorwaarde:

Aanvullende bepalingen met betrekking tot de etikettering

Beschrijving van de voorwaarde:

Op het etiket van de wijnen met de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming mag de naam van een kleinere geografische eenheid worden vermeld, op voorwaarde dat:

| — | het gaat om een plaatsnaam die is opgenomen in het kadaster; |
| --- | --- |

—

het gaat om een plaatsnaam die is opgenomen in het kadaster;

| — | deze naam staat vermeld op de oogstaangifte. |
| --- | --- |

—

deze naam staat vermeld op de oogstaangifte.

De in het kadaster opgenomen plaatsnaam staat vermeld in lettertekens die in hoogte, breedte of dikte niet groter zijn dan de helft van de lettertekens van de naam van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming. De naam moet in hetzelfde gezichtsveld als de naam van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming worden vermeld.

Link naar het productdossier

https://info.agriculture.gouv.fr/gedei/site/bo-agri/document_administratif-0569c539-0b4c-4402-9b68-c63cca20f36f

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(1)  PB L 9 van 11.1.2019, blz. 2.

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| 6.2.2020 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 40/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 40/47

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Bericht aan ondernemingen die in 2021 fluorkoolwaterstoffen in bulk in de Europese Unie in de handel willen brengen

(2020/C 40/09)

1.

Dit bericht is gericht tot ondernemingen die overeenkomstig artikel 16, leden 2 en 4, van Verordening (EU) nr. 517/2014 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad (1) (hierna “de verordening” genoemd) willen verklaren voornemens te zijn in 2021 fluorkoolwaterstoffen in bulk in de Unie in de handel te brengen.

2.

HFC-23, HFC-32, HFC-41, HFC-125, HFC-134, HFC-134a, HFC-143, HFC-143a, HFC-152, HFC-152a, HFC-161, HFC-227ea, HFC-236cb, HFC-236ea, HFC-236fa, HFC-245ca, HFC-245fa, HFC-365mfc, HFC-43-10mee.

3.

Voor het in de handel brengen van deze stoffen — behalve voor de in artikel 15, lid 2, onder a) tot en met f), van de verordening vermelde toepassingen of voor een totale jaarlijkse hoeveelheid van deze stoffen van minder dan 100 ton CO2-equivalent per jaar — gelden kwantitatieve limieten overeenkomstig de quotumregeling van de artikelen 15 en 16 van en de bijlagen V en VI bij de verordening.

4.

Wanneer zij HFK’s in het vrije verkeer brengen, moeten importeurs overeenkomstig Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2019/661 van de Commissie (2) beschikken over een geldige registratie als importeur van HFK’s in bulk in het “F-Gas-portaal en HFK-vergunningensysteem” (3). Een dergelijke registratie wordt beschouwd als een verplichte invoervergunning. Een soortgelijke vergunning is vereist voor de uitvoer van HFK’s (4).

5.

Importeurs moeten worden aangegeven als “Geadresseerde” (vak 8) van het enig document (ED). Importeurs worden sterk aangemoedigd om de hoeveelheden HFK’s rechtstreeks in het ED (vak 44) aan te geven in CO2-equivalenten op het moment waarop zij in het vrije verkeer worden gebracht, aangezien dit de douaneafhandeling van hun goederen en het controleren van hun naleving van Verordening (EU) nr. 517/2014 aanzienlijk kan vergemakkelijken.

6.

Overeenkomstig bijlage VI bij de verordening wordt de som van de op basis van de referentiewaarden toegekende quota afgetrokken van de voor 2021 beschikbare maximumhoeveelheid om de uit deze reserve toe te wijzen hoeveelheid te bepalen.

7.

Alle gegevens die door ondernemingen zijn ingediend en alle quota en referentiewaarden worden opgeslagen in het elektronische “F-Gas-portaal en HFK-vergunningensysteem”. Alle gegevens in het F-Gas-portaal en HFK-vergunningensysteem, met inbegrip van quota, referentiewaarden en commerciële en persoonsgegevens, zullen door de Europese Commissie vertrouwelijk worden behandeld.

8.

Ondernemingen die een quotum uit deze reserve wensen te ontvangen, moeten de in de punten 9 tot en met 12 van dit bericht beschreven procedure volgen.

9.

Overeenkomstig artikel 16, lid 2, en artikel 17, lid 1, van de verordening moet de onderneming beschikken over een door de Commissie overeenkomstig Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2019/661 goedgekeurd geldig registratieprofiel als producent en/of importeur van fluorkoolwaterstoffen in het online “F-Gas-portaal en HFK-vergunningensysteem”. Om zeker te zijn dat de registratieaanvraag naar behoren kan worden behandeld, met inbegrip van de eventuele behoefte aan aanvullende informatie, moet zij uiterlijk één maand vóór het begin van de aangifteperiode, d.w.z. vóór 14 maart 2020, worden ingediend (zie punt 10). Voor aanvragen die na deze termijn worden ontvangen, kan niet worden gewaarborgd dat vóór het einde van de aangifteperiode een definitief besluit over de registratieaanvraag kan worden genomen (zie punt 10). Bedrijven die nog niet geregistreerd zijn, vinden uitleg over de registratieprocedure op de website van DG CLIMA (5).

10.

De onderneming moet tijdens de aangifteperiode van 14 april tot en met 14 mei 2020 om 13.00 uur Midden-Europese tijd (MET) in het “F-Gas-portaal en HFK-vergunningensysteem” een verklaring afleggen betreffende de verwachte hoeveelheden voor 2021.

11.

Alleen correct ingevulde en vóór 14 mei 2020 om 13.00 uur MET ontvangen verklaringen worden door de Commissie in aanmerking genomen.

12.

Op basis van deze verklaringen zal de Commissie overeenkomstig artikel 16, leden 2, 4 en 5, van en de bijlagen V en VI bij de verordening aan deze ondernemingen een quotum toekennen.

13.

In artikel 7 van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2019/661 is vastgesteld dat voor de toewijzing van quota voor het op de markt brengen van fluorkoolwaterstoffen uit hoofde van artikel 16, lid 5, van Verordening (EU) nr. 517/2014, alle ondernemingen met dezelfde uiteindelijke begunstigde(n) worden beschouwd als één enkele declarant overeenkomstig artikel 16, leden 2 en 4, van de verordening.

14.

De Commissie zal de ondernemingen op de hoogte brengen van het totale toegekende quotum voor 2021 via het “F-Gas-portaal en HFK-vergunningensysteem”.

15.

De registratie in het “F-Gas-portaal en HFK-vergunningensysteem” en/of een verklaring betreffende het voornemen om in 2021 fluorkoolwaterstoffen in de handel te brengen geven op zichzelf niet het recht om in 2021 fluorkoolwaterstoffen in de handel te brengen.

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(1)  Verordening (EU) nr. 517/2014 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 16 april 2014 betreffende gefluoreerde broeikasgassen en tot intrekking van Verordening (EG) nr. 842/2006 (PB L 150 van 20.5.2014, blz. 195).

1

(2)  Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2019/661 van de Commissie van 25 april 2019 betreffende het waarborgen van de vlotte werking van het elektronisch quotaregister voor het op de markt brengen van fluorkoolwaterstoffen (PB L 112 van 26.4.2019, blz. 11).

2

(3)  Het overeenkomstig artikel 17 van Verordening (EU) 517/2014 ingestelde register: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ods2/resources/domain

3

(4)  Zie ook artikel 1, punt 2, van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2017/1375 van de Commissie (PB L 194 van 26.7.2017, blz. 4).

4

(5)  https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/f-gas/docs/guidance_document_en.pdf

5

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