J-S19017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEVEN EVERETT

Appellant No. 2700 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgments of Sentence Entered August 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos: CP-51-CR-0004228-2012;

CP-51-CR-0004238-2012; and CP-51-CR-0004237-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 13, 2016

Appellant Steven Everett appeals from the August 19, 2014 judgments 

of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

(“trial court”) following Appellant’s bench convictions for two counts of 

forgery, two counts of theft by unlawful taking, attempted theft by unlawful 

taking, two counts of theft by deception, two counts of identity theft, two 

counts of receiving stolen property, two counts of tampering with records or 

identification, two counts of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and two 

counts of altering, forging, or counterfeiting documents and plates.1 

Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw, alleging that this appeal 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4101(a)(1), 3921(a), 901(a), 3922(a)(1), 4920(a), 

3925(a), 4104(a), and 3928(a), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7122(1). 
J-S19017-16

- 2 -

is wholly frivolous, and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 

2009). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Appellant’s judgments of 

sentence, and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

The facts and procedural history underlying this case are undisputed. 

As recounted by the trial court:

On January 12, 2012, [Appellant] contacted Collin’s Towing 

to come pick up a car in the area of 52nd and Baltimore Ave in 

Philadelphia for the purpose of selling it for scrap. When the tow 

truck driver for the company, Pedro Santos, arrived at the 

location, [Appellant] directed him to a 1998 green Bonneville 

parked on the street. [Appellant] provided Mr. Santos with a 

temporary title document which had his name on it and the 

vehicle identification number (“VIN”) that matched the 

Bonneville. Mr. Santos then had [Appellant] sign the towing 

agreement stating that the Bonneville belonged to him. Mr. 

Santos paid [Appellant] $300 for the vehicle and towed it to the 

junkyard. Later it was determined that the temporary title 

document was fake and the car actually belonged to Amelia 

Brown. Ms. Brown did not give [Appellant] permission to 

possess or tow her car from where she had parked it on the 

street. 

On January 25, 2012, a similar incident occurred involving 

[Appellant]. [Appellant] contacted another towing company, 

Four Daughters. An employee from Four Daughters, Jose Colon, 

went to 61st and Chestnut Streets to buy a junk car from 

[Appellant] to sell for scrap. Again, [Appellant] provided a 

forged title document indicating that he owned the vehicle to be 

towed. Mr. Colon gave [Appellant] $350 for the vehicle and 

[Appellant] then left the area. While Mr. Colon was still at the 

location, the owners of the vehicle arrived and stated that they 

were the true owners of the car. 

On January 26, 2012, Philadelphia police executed a 

Warrant on [Appellant’s] home address, 605 East Stafford St. 

While inside the property they found two other fraudulent 

registration forms for a Geo Prizm and a Cadillac that had altered 

VINs and [Appellant’s] name. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/15, at 2-3. Eventually, Appellant was convicted of 

all of the above-referenced crimes. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an 
J-S19017-16

- 3 -

aggregate term of 1 to 3 years’ imprisonment, followed by four years’ 

probation. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions, but timely 

appealed to this Court. Following Appellant’s filing of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

On November 23, 2015, Appellant’s counsel filed in this Court a motion 

to withdraw as counsel and filed an Anders brief, wherein counsel raises 

three issues for our review:

[I.] Whether Appellant’s convictions were against the weight and 

credibility of evidence.

[II.] Whether the adjudication of guilt is based upon insufficient 

evidence that Appellant forged any document or that he took 

possession of another’s property.

[III.] Whether the [trial court] erred when it imposed an unduly 

harsh, excessive and unwarranted sentence.

Anders Brief at 6. 

When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the underlying issues without first examining counsel’s petition to 

withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (en banc). It is well-established that, in requesting a withdrawal, 

counsel must satisfy the following procedural requirements: 1) petition the 

court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious 

examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be 

frivolous; 2) provide a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the 

defendant that he or she has the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro 

se or raise additional arguments that the defendant considers worthy of the 
J-S19017-16

- 4 -

court’s addition. Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 

2009).

Instantly, counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation provides 

that counsel reviewed the record and concluded that the appeal is frivolous. 

Furthermore, counsel notified Appellant that he was seeking permission to 

withdraw and provided Appellant with copies of the petition to withdraw and 

his Anders brief. Counsel also advised Appellant of his right to retain new 

counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems worthy of 

this Court’s attention. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel has satisfied 

the procedural requirements of Anders. 

We next must determine whether counsel’s Anders brief complies with 

the substantive requirements of Santiago, wherein our Supreme Court 

held: 

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to 

the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel 

believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s 

reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Here, our review of counsel’s brief indicates 

that he has complied with the briefing requirements of Santiago. We, 

therefore, conclude that counsel has satisfied the minimum requirements of 

Anders/Santiago.
J-S19017-16

- 5 -

Once counsel has met his obligations, “it then becomes the 

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the 

appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5. Thus, 

we now turn to the merits of Appellant’s appeal. 

Appellant first raises a weight of the evidence challenge, which he has 

failed to preserve for our review. A challenge to the weight of the evidence 

must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived. Pennsylvania Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 607 requires that a “claim that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a 

new trial: (1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing; (2) by 

written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a post-sentence 

motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. This claim must be presented to the trial court 

while it exercises jurisdiction over a matter since “appellate review of a 

weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 1037 (2003) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 927 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2007). Instantly, Appellant 

failed to raise the weight of the evidence claim orally or in writing prior to or 

after sentencing. In fact, Appellant raised it for the first time in his Rule 

1925(b) statement. Accordingly, as the trial court notes, the challenge has 

been waived. 
J-S19017-16

- 6 -

Appellant next appears to argue that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his convictions for forgery, theft by unlawful taking, attempted theft 

by unlawful taking, theft by deception and unlawful use of a motor vehicle. 

“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of 

law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(emphasis added), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).

We first address Appellant’s contention that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain a conviction for forgery. 

Section 4101 of the Crimes Code, relating to forgery, provides in part:

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of forgery if, with 

intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is 

facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the 

actor:

(1) alters any writing of another without his authority[.]
J-S19017-16

- 7 -

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4101(a). “Thus, the Commonwealth must prove that there

was a false writing, that the instrument was capable of deceiving, and that 

the defendant intended to defraud.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 682 A.2d 

811, 815 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 687 A.2d 

376 (Pa. 1996).

Here, based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that Appellant’s conviction for forgery was supported by sufficient 

evidence. As the trial court found:

In this case, there was sufficient evidence presented that 

[Appellant] altered the temporary title documents or “pink slips” 

of Ms. Brown’s Bonneville which he then sold to Pedro Santos of 

Collins Towing. [Appellant] also altered the temporary title 

documents of the vehicle which he sold to Jose Colon of Four 

Daughters towing. This court was presented with copies of the 

title documents that [Appellant] used to show proof of ownership 

of the vehicles he was looking to sell. It is this court’s 

determination that the documents presented were not authentic 

and not issued by PennDOT. Additionally, both tow truck drivers 

as well as Philadelphia Police Officer John Castro and Detective 

Slobodian testified that the title documents they reviewed from 

[Appellant] were forgeries, especially noting that the font used 

for the VIN and vehicle information was different than what is 

normally used for official temporary title documents.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/15, at 5. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to 

relief on his sufficiency challenge with respect to the forgery convictions.

We now address Appellant’s argument that sufficient evidence did not 

support his conviction for theft or attempted theft by unlawful taking. 

Section 3921(a) of the Crimes Code, “theft by unlawful taking or 

disposition,” describes the elements of the conduct which constitutes theft of 

movable property: “A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or 

exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with intent to 
J-S19017-16

- 8 -

deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a). “A person commits an 

attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which 

constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).

Instantly, upon reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court that 

Appellant’s convictions for theft by unlawful taking or attempted theft by 

unlawful taking were supported by sufficient evidence. As the trial court 

found:

In the present case, the evidence clearly establishes that 

[Appellant] unlawfully exercised control over the two vehicles 

which he then sold to the two towing companies. He did so with 

the intent to deprive the owners of those vehicles permanent use 

of their property. Additionally, when [Appellant] was arrested, 

officers found additional forged title forms for other vehicles that 

showed that he was in the process of conducting a similar theft 

in the near future. [Appellant] therefore took a substantial step 

in committing similar thefts to those that he had already 

completed.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/15, at 7. 

Appellant also argues that sufficient evidence did not support his 

conviction for theft by deception. We disagree.

A person is guilty of the crime of theft by deception “if he intentionally 

obtains or withholds property of another by deception.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3922(a). A person deceives if “he intentionally creates or reinforces a false 

impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other 

state of mind; but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise 

shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently 

perform the promise.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a). 
J-S19017-16

- 9 -

Instantly, based on our review of the record, Appellant’s convictions 

for theft by deception were supported by sufficient evidence. As the trial 

court found:

[T]he false impression created by [Appellant] was the forged 

title forms showing that he was the lawful owner of the vehicles 

that he sold to the towing companies. The deception was fully 

for pecuniary gain and was wholly intentional by [Appellant]. He 

altered the title documents to deceive both tow truck operators 

into believing that he could lawfully sell them the vehicles. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/15, at 8.

Appellant’s final sufficiency challenge appears to be directed at his 

convictions for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

To convict [Appellant] of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, the 

Commonwealth was required to prove that he: (1) operated the car without 

the owner’s consent; and (2) knew or had reason to know that he lacked 

permission to operate the car. See Commonwealth v. Carson, 592 A .2d 

1318, 1321 (Pa. Super. 1991).

Appellant’s convictions for unauthorized use a motor vehicle were 

supported by sufficient evidence. As the trial court found, “[Appellant] 

operated the two vehicles by causing them to be removed from the street by 

the tow operators. [Appellant] did this by forging the title documents to 

show that he owned the vehicles, causing them to be removed from the 

street.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/15, at 9. Accordingly, Appellant is not 

entitled to relief. 
J-S19017-16

- 10 -

Appellant lastly argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him to 1 to 3 years’ imprisonment. Appellant, however, cannot 

challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence on appeal because he 

failed to do so in a post-sentence motion before the trial court. It is settled 

that “[i]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court 

during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a 

discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth v. 

Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted), appeal 

denied, 75 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2013). Accordingly, no relief is due on this 

claim. 

We have conducted an independent review of the record and 

addressed Appellant’s arguments on appeal. Based on our conclusions 

above, we agree with counsel that the issues Appellant seeks to litigate in 

this appeal are wholly frivolous. Also, we do not discern any non-frivolous 

issues that Appellant could have raised. We, therefore, grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgments of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 
J-S19017-16

- 11 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/13/2016