THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDEN TIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRE CEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

McGuinn Construction Management, Inc., Respondent,

v.

Saul Espino and Mara Espino, Petitioners.

And

Saul Espino and Mara Espino, Petitioners,

v.

Gates Commons, LLC, S. Wade McGuinn, Individually, and Town of Lexington, Defendants,

Of whom Town of Lexington is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001291

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT O F APPEALS

Appeal from Lexington County James W. Johnson Jr., Circuit Court Judge,

William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2018-MO-030 Heard April 17, 2018 – Filed August 29, 2018REVERSED

Andrew A. Aun, of Aun & McKay, PA, of Irmo, and Blake

A. Hewitt, of Bluestein Thompson Sullivan, LLC, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

S. Jahue Moore, and John Calvin Bradley Jr., of Moore Taylor Law Firm, P.A., of West Columbia, and Andrew

F. Lindemann, of Lindemann, Davis & Hughes, PA, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: This is a consolidated action primarily concerning the scope of a sewer easement across Petitioner's property. In 2005, McGuinn Construction Management, Inc., brought an ac tion (the McGuinn action) agains t Petitioners for declaratory relief concerning the scope of the easement and als o for slander of title

and tortious interference with contract. McGuinn and Petitione rs filed cross motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgme nt to Petitioners

in 2008. McGuinn moved for rec onsideration. Later in 2008, Petitioners commenced an action against the Town of Lexington (the Town act ion) for negligence, gross negligence, slander of title, regulatory taki ng, trespass, and

conversion. That action is still pending in the circuit court. While McGuinn's

motion for reconsideration was still pending, the circuit court granted the Town 's motion to consolidate both actions. In its order denying McGui nn's motion for reconsideration, the circuit court specifically noted it was no t making a determination as to whether the Town was bound by the grant of summary judgment to Petitioners in the McGuinn action. In an unpublished decisi on, the court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in the McGuinn a ction and

remanded the McGuinn action and the Town action back to the cir cuit court. McGuinn Const. Mgmt., Inc. v. Espino , Op. No. 2016-UP-138 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 23, 2016). This remand placed both actions in the circuit court for trial.

In the McGuinn action, we reverse the court of appeals and rein state the circuit court's grant of summary judgmen t regarding the scope of the se wer easement and regarding McGuinn's claims for slander of title and tortious in terference with a contract. We do so pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the fol lowing authorities: Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., Inc. , 381 S.C. 326, 329, 673 S.E.2d 801, 802 (2009) ("Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genu ine issue ofmaterial fact and it is clear t he moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."); id. at 329-30, 673 S.E.2d at 802 ("In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all inferences which can be rea sonably drawn from

the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.");

Bovain v. Canal Ins. , 383 S.C. 100, 105, 678 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2009) ("An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment under the same s tandard applied by the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); Mead v. Beaufort Cty. Assessor , 419

S.C. 125, 131, 796 S.E.2d 165, 168 (Ct. App. 2016) ("[C]ross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evi dence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parti es.") (quoting Alltel Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue , 399 S.C. 313, 319 n.2, 731 S.E.2d 869, 872

n.2 (2012)); Wiegand v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n , 391 S.C. 159, 163, 705 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2011) ("Where cross motions for summary judgment are filed, th e parties concede the issue before [the court] s hould be decided as a matter of l aw."); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing when the disposition of a prior issue is disp ositive of an appeal, an analysis of the remaining issues is unnecessary).

Petitioners acknowledged at oral ar gument that the Town action is not before this Court and that there has been no ruling as to whether the circuit court order in

the McGuinn action is binding on the Town. The Town action wil l be tried before

the circuit court. See Ellis by Ellis v. Oliver , 307 S.C. 365, 367, 415 S.E.2d 400, 401 (1992) (" Under a consolidation order, the parties and the pleadings are not merged and each action retains its own identity.").

REVERSED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTRED GE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.