alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 56 (Thursday, March 22, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 16817]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7032]


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CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meetings

    Federal Register Citation of Previous Announcement: Vol. 77, No. 
52, Friday, March 16, 2012, page 15737.

ANNOUNCED TIME AND DATE OF MEETING: Wednesday, March 21, 2012, 10 a.m.- 
11 a.m. Meeting Canceled.
    For a recorded message containing the latest agenda information, 
call (301) 504-7948.

CONTACT PERSON FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Todd A. Stevenson, Office of 
the Secretary, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814 (301) 504-
7923.

    Dated: March 20, 2012.
Todd A. Stevenson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-7032 Filed 3-20-12; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 17, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2287-2288]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-700]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project Nos. 12929-002 and 14079-000]


FFP Project 40, LLC and Northland Power Mississippi River LLC; 
Notice Announcing Preliminary Permit Drawing

    The Commission has received two preliminary permit applications 
deemed filed on February 1, 2011, at 8:30 a.m.,\1\ for proposed 
projects to be located on the Mississippi River, near the town of 
Helena, in Phillips County Arkansas, and Tunica and Coahoma counties, 
Mississippi. The applications were filed by FFP Project 40, LLC for 
Project No. 12929-002, and Northland Power Mississippi River LLC for 
Project No. 14079-000.
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    \1\ Under the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, any 
document received after regular business hours is considered filed 
at 8:30 a.m. on the next regular business day. 18 CFR 385.2001(a)(2) 
(2011).
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    On January 17, 2012, at 9 a.m. (eastern time), the Secretary of the 
Commission, or her designee, will conduct a random drawing to determine 
the filing priority of the applicants identified in this notice. The 
Commission will select among competing permit applications as provided 
in section 4.37 of its regulations.\2\ The priority established by

[[Page 2288]]

this drawing will be used to determine which applicant, among those 
with identical filing times, will be considered to have the first-filed 
application.
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    \2\ 18 CFR 4.37 (2011).
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    The drawing is open to the public and will be held in room 2C, the 
Commission Meeting Room, located at 888 First St. NE., Washington, DC 
20426. A subsequent notice will be issued by the Secretary announcing 
the results of the drawing.

    Dated: January 10, 2012.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-700 Filed 1-13-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
#### STATE ex rel. Reginald MARKS v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 87-KH-2738.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 8, 1988.

In re Marks, Reginald; applying for writ of habeas corpus, supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “G”, No. 121340.

Denied.
<PAGE>

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


Board of Directors
Carolina First BancShares, Inc.


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (No.
33-63390) on Form S-3,  (No.  33-43037) on Form S-8 and (No.  333-73221) on Form
S-8, of Carolina  First  BancShares,  Inc., of our report dated January 20, 1999
relating to the consolidated  balance sheets of Carolina First BancShares,  Inc.
and  subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998 and 1997 and the related  consolidated
statements of income,  changes in shareholders' equity and comprehensive income,
and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31,
1998,  included in the December 31, 1998 Annual  Report on Form 10-K of Carolina
First BancShares, Inc.





                                                     /s/ KPMG, LLP
                                                       KPMG, LLP




Charlotte, North Carolina
March 30, 1999
#### Steven M. MINCHOW, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. A-15.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

Oct. 21, 1983.

H. Conner Thomas, Asst. Public Defender, Nome, and Dana Fabe, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

James V. Gould, Dist. Atty., Nome, and Norman C. Gorsuch, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

Before BRYNER, C.J., and COATS and SINGLETON, JJ.

OPINION

SINGLETON, Judge.

Steven M. Minchow was convicted of murder in the second degree, AS 11.41.-110(a)(2), an unclassified felony, AS 11.41.-110(b), punishable by a sentence of five to ninety-nine years, AS 12.55.125(b). He received a sentence of thirty years with parole at the discretion of the parole board. He appeals contending that the sentence is too severe. We affirm.

On September 6, 1982, Minchow shot and killed Bruce Hayes. Minchow had been drinking at a Nome bar and became involved in two fistfights which were broken up by bystanders. Angered at this, he went home, got his gun and returned to the bar. According to Minchow, while he was drinking he was accosted by Hayes who expressed an interest in fighting. When Hayes reached for his pocket, Minchow grabbed his gun and shot and killed Hayes. A search of Hayes revealed that he had no weapon. Minchow was intoxicated at the time.

Minchow has a criminal record for assault-related crimes but no felony record. He has a drinking problem.

The state recommended a sentence of forty-five years and the defense requested a sentence of twenty-two years or less. Judge Tunley carefully considered the rec*720ord including the circumstances of the offense and Minchow’s history of assaultive behavior. Judge Tunley mentioned each of the *Chaney*criteria. *See State v. Chaney,*477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970). *See also*AS 12.55.005. Finally, Judge Tunley discussed the guidelines we suggested for sentencing second-degree murder offenders in *Page v. State,*657 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska App.1983) (establishing a target sentence of twenty to thirty years in the absence of statutory aggravating or mitigating factors). Judge Tunley noted that neither the state nor the defense had argued that any aggravating or mitigating factors existed. He concluded that Minchow was not a worst offender but that in light of the facts of the case (Minchow’s return with a loaded gun to a bar after an earlier fight) and his history of misdemeanor assaults, Minchow should be sentenced at the upper end of the target range for second-degree murder sentences. The record supports Judge Tunley’s conclusions. The sentence imposed was not clearly mistaken. *McClain*v. *State,*519 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1974).

Judge Tunley is to be commended for his careful consideration of this case. He explained in detail his reasons for the sentence. His remarks, in our opinion, reflect a thorough understanding of the goals of sentencing and provide an excellent example for others engaged in the sentencing process.

The sentence of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
#### Timothy J. BREAUX v. INSURED LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 87-CC-2641.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 8, 1988.

In re Equity General Ins. Co. — Third Party; applying for writ of prohibition, certio-rari, mandamus and remedial writ; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW87-1042; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “K”, No. 86-0380 G.

Prior report: La.App., 515 So.2d 453.

Denied.
Motion Granted, Appeal and Cross-Appeal Dismissed, and Memorandum 

Opinion filed September 2, 2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00176-CV

DEFENSE ENERGY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE D/B/A NATIONAL 

SECURITY TECHNOLOGY ACCELERATOR, A TEXAS NON-PROFIT 

CORPORATION; AND NATIONAL SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 

ACCELERATOR, A NORTH CAROLINA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, 

Appellants / Cross-Appellees

V.

NSTI, LLC D/B/A TECHCONNECT, Appellee / Cross-Appellant

On Appeal from the 334th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-06530

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This proceeding comprises an appeal and a cross-appeal from a final judgment 

signed December 28, 2020. On August 13, 2021, the parties filed a joint motion to 

dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal as they have settled their dispute, and they have 
2

agreed they will bear their own costs. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a). The motion is 

granted, and the appeal and cross-appeal are dismissed. Each party will bear its own 

costs in this proceeding.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Hassan and Poissant.
50550.

#### HERRING v. HERRING.

Deen, Presiding Judge.

This garnishment was filed June 6, 1972. Plaintiff Dorothy Herring obtained judgment on June 18, 1973. The defendant William Herring filed a motion for new trial which was overruled November 11, 1973, and on November 25 he filed a notice of appeal from the judgment in the case, reciting the filing and overruling of the motion for new trial. The record was not forwarded at that time, and on February 6,1974, he filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which was denied on May 1,1974. The case was not docketed in this court until February 13, 1975, and contains a certificate of the clerk that the delay was due to the press of work. No transcript of evidence is included, the notice of appeal specifically stating that it will not be filed, but it also appears that counsel for the parties could not agree on a transcript and the trial court did not remember. *Held:*

1. As pointed out, the notice of appeal assigns error only on the final judgment in the case. All enumerations of error require a consideration of evidence, and no error is enumerated either on the denial of the motion for new trial or on the denial of the motion to set aside the judgment.

There are no enumerations of error which we can consider absent a transcript of the evidence. This in itself requires an affirmance of the judgment. *Dunaway v. Beam,*129 Ga. App. 220 (199 SE2d 395); *Willadsen v. Willadsen,*230 Ga. 607 (198 SE2d 318). Further, since neither the denial of the motion for new trial nor of the motion to set aside the judgment is appealed from or *767enumerated as error, the law of the case is established by these two judgments, and there remains no question for decision. *Tiller v. State,*224 Ga. 645 (164 SE2d 137); *Ruff v. State,*132 Ga. App. 568 (208 SE2d 581).

Argued April 29, 1975

Decided May 9, 1975.

William Herring, *pro se.*

*Richard R. Kirby,*for appellee.

2. Code Ann. § 6-808 provides in part: "Where no transcript of evidence and proceedings is to be sent up, the clerk shall prepare and transmit the record within 20 days after the date of filing of the notice of appeal. If for any reason the clerk is unable to transmit the record and transcript within the time hereinbefore required ... he shall state in his certificate the cause of the delay, and the appeal shall not be dismissed.” The entire record in this case consists of forty-three pages up to the time of the filing of the notice of appeal and an additional thirty-seven pages involving the subsequent motion to set aside the judgment and related proceedings. The court notes that appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as stale, and, in spite of the clerk’s certificate, it appears incredible to us that the press of work in that office would require a delay of a year plus two and a half months to do what the statute requires be done within twenty days in a record of this size. Nevertheless, since the case is being affirmed, this issue will not be passed upon.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Evans and Stolz, JJ., concur.*
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50252.

#### YAWN v. THE STATE.

Deen, Presiding Judge.

1. Under the decision in *Anderson v. State,*123 Ga. App. 57 (179 SE2d 286) the officer had a right to stop the defendant for a routine check when he saw him driving away from what appears from the evidence here to have been a closed pool hall and building at approximately 4:45 a.m.

2. The only evidence that the defendant possessed marijuana is the testimony of the state’s witness that while he took the defendant to the police station for the purpose of administering a chemical test to determine the amount of alcohol in his blood (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 633, 672; Code Ann. § 68A-902.1) the vehicle was searched by another police officer who later informed him he had discovered marijuana therein. The statement is hearsay, since the witness was not present but was in the station with the defendant while the car was allegedly being searched. Accordingly, it was error to deny the motion to suppress.

3. From the record before us it does not appear that the defendant was arrested for any offense prior to being taken to the police station, or that he consented to go voluntarily. Consent to have the test administered is presumed only where the defendant has been "lawfully arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the *78person was driving or operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor” and is always "incidental to a lawful arrest.” Code Ann. § 68-1625.1. We do not pass on the issue of whether the defendant was under lawful arrest at the time the vehicle was searched.

Submitted February 11, 1975

Decided February 20, 1975.

*Lovett & New, Walter H. New,*for appellant.

*H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, William O. Hitchcock, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.

4. The odor of marijuana smoke is not, in and of itself, sufficient to afford probable cause for a warrantless search, but it may be considered and may be a part of a totality of circumstances sufficient to validate one. *Brewer v. State,*129 Ga. App. 118, 120 (199 SE2d 109) as modified by *Rogers v. State,*131 Ga. App. 136, 139 (205 SE2d 901) and *Cunningham v. State,*131 Ga. App. 133, 136 (205 SE2d 899).

The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence of a quantity of marijuana allegedly discovered in the defendant’s automobile.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Evans and Stolz, JJ., concur.*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-6327
DRYNE PRICE, Petitioner - Appellant, v. WARDEN, PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent - Appellee, and JON OZMINT, Director, Respondent. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson. David C. Norton, Chief District Judge. (8:07-cv-00386-DCN) Submitted: July 15, 2008 Decided: July 29, 2008 Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Dryne Price, Appellant Pro Se. William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General, Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.- 2 - Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 3 - PER CURIAM: Dryne Price seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Price has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
NOTE


 





	U.S. $15,000,000	December 8, 2020



 


FOR VALUE RECEIVED,
the undersigned, ADMA Biologics, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Borrower”), hereby promises to pay
to Perceptive Credit Holdings II, LP (the “Lender”), in immediately available funds, the aggregate principal
sum set forth above, or, if less, the aggregate unpaid principal amount of all Loans made by the Lender pursuant to Section 2.01
of the Credit Agreement and Guaranty, dated as of February 11, 2019 (as amended or otherwise modified from time to time, the
“Credit Agreement”), among the Borrower, the Subsidiary Guarantors from time to time party thereto, the
Lenders from time to time party thereto and Perceptive Credit Holdings II, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, as administrative
agent for the Lenders (in such capacity, together with its successors and assigns, the “Administrative Agent”),
on the date or dates specified in the Credit Agreement, together with interest on the principal amount of such Loans from time
to time outstanding thereunder at the rates, and payable in the manner and on the dates, specified in the Credit Agreement.


 


This Note is a Note
issued pursuant to the terms of Section 2.03 of the Credit Agreement, and this Note and the holder hereof are entitled
to all the benefits and security provided for thereby or referred to therein, to which Credit Agreement reference is hereby made
for a statement thereof. All defined terms used in this Note, except terms otherwise defined herein, shall have the same meaning
as in the Credit Agreement.


 


THIS NOTE AND THE RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES HEREUNDER SHALL BE GOVERNED BY, AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH, THE LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
WITHOUT REGARD TO PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS THAT WOULD RESULT IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF ANY OTHER JURISDICTION; PROVIDED
THAT SECTION 5-1401 OF THE NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW SHALL APPLY.


 


The Borrower hereby
waives demand, presentment, protest or notice of any kind hereunder, other than notices provided for in the Loan Documents. The
non-exercise by the holder hereof of any of its rights hereunder in any particular instance shall not constitute a waiver thereof
in such particular or any subsequent instance.


 


THIS NOTE MAY NOT BE
TRANSFERRED EXCEPT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CREDIT AGREEMENT.


 


[Signature Page Follows]


 






    


    


    

 


	 	ADMA BIOLOGICS, INC.
	 	 
	 	By	/s/ Brian Lenz
	 	Name:  	Brian Lenz
	 	Title:	Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary



 


 


 


[Signature Page to Note]
#### Verel T. WESTOVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1865.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 9, 1988.

*345Mina Morgan, Tampa, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Lauren Hafner Sewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PARKER, Judge.

Westover alleges that the trial court illegally enhanced his sentence at a second resentencing hearing held after remand from this court. We agree and reverse.

On February 7, 1986, this court affirmed Westover’s convictions for first degree arson, burning to defraud, and insurance fraud but reversed the trial court’s imposition of probation. We remanded the case solely for resentencing because the trial court had previously departed downward from the recommended guidelines sentence without providing written reasons.1

On April 25, 1986, Westover appeared at the resentencing hearing pursuant to this court’s mandate. The trial court once again departed and orally sentenced West-over to fifteen years probation, ordering him to pay $17,000 restitution. Without Westover being present, the trial court unilaterally entered an order on May 16, 1986, sentencing Westover to thirty years probation on the arson charge and five years probation on the other two offenses, all terms to run concurrently.2 Westover moved for correction or modification of probation. The trial court denied the motion at a hearing on May 26, 1986, restating its May 16 sentence.

An increase in a lawful sentence is expressly prohibited grounded upon the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. *Troupe v. Rowe,*283 So.2d 857 (Fla.1973). Once a defendant begins to serve his sentence, the trial court has no authority to impose a harsher sentence. *Daniels v. State,*513 So.2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); *Hinton v. State,*446 So.2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

The trial court’s action in increasing its previously imposed lawful sentence of fifteen years probation to thirty years probation violated Westover’s constitutional right against double jeopardy. *Daniels; Hinton.*

Accordingly, we reverse Westover’s thirty year sentence of probation and remand this case with instructions that the trial *346court resentence Westover to the fifteen-year probationary term originally set.

RYDER, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.

1

. *Westover v. State,*482 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

2

. This order also set forth written reasons for departure in compliance with this court’s instructions on remand; that aspect of the order is not before us in this appeal.