Filed 12/10/19

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONNIE EARL HOWELL, SR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F078241

(Super. Ct. No. F18902563)

OPINION

THE COURT

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan M. 

Skiles, Judge.

Conness Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, 

Kimberley A. Donohue and R. Todd Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exception of part I. of the Discussion.
2

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Ronnie Earl Howell, Sr., contends the trial court order authorizing the 

involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is not supported by substantial 

evidence and must be reversed. In an issue of first impression, Howell also contends that 

Senate Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill 1187) is retroactive and the 

maximum term of commitment for restoration of his competency should be reduced from 

three to two years.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the order for involuntary 

administration of antipsychotic medication. In the published portion of this opinion, we 

also conclude that Sen. Bill 1187 is not retroactive.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The Fresno County District Attorney filed a complaint in case No. F18902563 

(case No. 563) on April 17, 2018. The complaint charged Howell in count 1 with felony 

driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)); in count 2 with 

driving with an elevated blood alcohol level (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)); and in 

count 3 with hit and run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). Vehicle Code 

section 23550.5, subdivision (a) enhancements, alleging a prior Vehicle Code 

section 23152, subdivision (b) conviction, were alleged as to counts 1 and 2. It also was 

alleged that Howell had suffered numerous prior felony convictions and had served prior 

prison terms.

On July 10, 2018, the trial court appointed the public defender to represent 

Howell. Howell pled not guilty to the charges and denied all allegations and 

enhancements. The public defender declared a conflict and on July 13, 2018, the public 

defender was relieved as counsel and alternate counsel was appointed to represent 

Howell.
3

Howell was the defendant in another criminal proceeding in case No. F18902159 

(case No. 159) where a doubt as to Howell’s competency to stand trial had been declared, 

pursuant to Penal Code1section 1368.2 Defense counsel declared doubt as to Howell’s 

competency to stand trial in the current case and the trial court ordered criminal 

proceedings suspended and instituted section 1368 proceedings.

On July 18, 2018, the trial court appointed Howard Terrell, M.D., to examine 

Howell and assess his competency to stand trial. The competency report was due 

August 10, with a hearing on competency scheduled for August 15, 2018. Howell filed a 

handwritten objection to the section 1368 proceeding.

Terrell submitted his report on August 6, 2018. Terrell recommended the trial 

court find Howell incompetent to stand trial. During the examination, Howell appeared 

to be responding to internal stimuli, indicated he was having problems with his memory, 

and initially claimed to be 30 years younger than his actual age.

Howell reported that he has been under treatment for schizophrenia, anxiety, and 

“[d]eep depression.” He had been hospitalized twice, for about nine months each time, 

for psychiatric reasons. Howell reported suffering visual hallucinations off-and-on for 

the past three years and reported auditory hallucinations as well. Howell had been 

prescribed antipsychotic medication in the past but complained it had been discontinued 

and “he [has] been feeling much worse ever since.”

Howell reported “episodes of rapid thoughts and speech with the ability to go up 

to two days without any need for sleep.” He denied ever using “street drugs” but 

admitted to consuming up to six cans of beer, 16 ounces each, per day. When asked 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Howell is the defendant in two other appeals pending before this court in case 

Nos. F075026 and F078070.
4

about any history of paranoia, Howell paused and appeared to be responding to internal 

stimuli.

When asked about the charges against him, Howell erroneously believed he was 

charged with theft. Terrell questioned Howell about his understanding of the actual 

charges pending against him. Howell told Terrell “in a paranoid manner that he does not 

trust his attorney.” Howell believed attorneys in the past had “plotted and conspired 

against him.”

Terrell described Howell as someone “who showed frequent evidence of response 

to internal stimuli as well as paranoia. Impressed me as acutely psychotic.” Howell’s 

“[a]ssociations fluctuated from coherent to loose and tangential with a paranoid theme.” 

His moods “fluctuated from euthymic to upset and paranoid.” Terrell found Howell’s 

reality contact to be poor and memory to be poor to fair.

Terrell’s professional opinion was that Howell “suffers from a psychotic mental 

disorder, which renders him unable to assist his attorney in a rational manner.” Howell 

needed antipsychotic medication if he was to be restored to mental competency. The 

evaluation noted that Howell “did not appear to be imminently suicidal or homicidal.” 

Terrell expressed concern, however, about Howell’s “irrational and psychotic state of 

mind as well as his long history of felonious behavior.” Terrell opined that Howell “will 

be at substantial risk of harming himself or others in the foreseeable future” if not taking 

antipsychotic medication. Terrell also opined that Howell was not “mentally competent 

to give informed consent.” Terrell recommended the trial court issue an order 

authorizing the administration of antipsychotic medication “with or without consent.”

Terrell was “concerned about the possibility of early dementia.” Terrell stated, “If 

it is determined that he has dementia, antipsychotic medication can increase the rate of 

sudden death. A wise psychiatrist would provide antipsychotic medication only if it is 

believed that the potential risks of antipsychotic medication are substantially outweighed 
5

by the potential benefits.” Terrell recommended that Howell undergo a “dementia 

workup by a qualified neurologist.”

At the August 15, 2018, hearing to consider the evaluation and determine 

competency, both the prosecution and the defense submitted on the report. The trial court 

found Howell was not competent and ordered criminal proceedings continue to be 

suspended. The parties agreed to follow the placement order that had been filed in case 

No. 159, where Howell had already been committed to the state hospital. Howell was 

ordered committed to the state hospital until competency was restored. The placement 

evaluation in case No. 159 provided that antipsychotic medication be administered 

involuntarily if necessary, as authorized by court order. 

On August 21, 2018, an order was filed in the current case committing Howell to 

the state hospital. The order stated that Howell had been found mentally incompetent 

pursuant to section 1370. The order provided that the state hospital was to file a written 

report within 90 days setting forth an opinion concerning the mental competency of 

Howell and to file such reports every six months thereafter. In addition, the order 

reiterated the stipulation of the parties adopting the commitment order from case No. 159 

and stated the maximum term of commitment exceeds three years. The order further

provided:

“The Court authorizes the treatment facility to involuntarily 

administer antipsychotic medication to the defendant when and as 

prescribed by the defendant’s treating psychiatrist for the following reason: 

The defendant lacks the capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic 

medication, the defendant’s mental disorder requires medical treatment 

with antipsychotic medication, and, if the defendant’s mental disorder is not 

treated with antipsychotic medication, it is probable that serious harm to the 

physical or mental health of the patient will result.”

Howell filed a notice of appeal on October 3, 2018. He filed a second notice of 

appeal on October 9, 2018.
6

DISCUSSION

Howell raises two issues in this appeal. He contends the trial court order 

authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is not supported 

by substantial evidence and must be reversed. In an issue of first impression, Howell also 

contends that Sen. Bill 1187 is retroactive and the maximum term of commitment for 

restoration of his competency should be reduced from three to two years. 

I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Order*

Standard of Review

A competent adult has a common law and constitutional right to refuse medical 

treatment, including the administration of antipsychotic drugs. (Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 

504 U.S. 127, 143; In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14.) However, a criminal defendant 

may forcibly be treated with antipsychotic medication if: (1) important governmental 

interests are at stake; (2) involuntary medication will significantly further the 

concomitant state interests of timely prosecution and a fair trial; (3) involuntary 

medication is necessary to further those interests; and (4) administration of the drugs is 

medically appropriate. (Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, 180–183; People v. 

O'Dell (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 562, 569.) 

The trial court must conduct a hearing and may issue an order authorizing 

involuntary medication be administered if five factors are present: (1) the defendant is 

charged with a serious crime; (2) involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication 

is likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial; (3) the medication is unlikely to 

have side effects that interfere with the defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the 

criminal proceedings or assist counsel; (4) less intrusive treatments are unlikely to have 

 

* See footnote, ante, page 1.
7

the same result; and (5) antipsychotic medication is in the defendant’s best medical 

interest. (Carter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 992, 1001.) 

“We review an order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic 

medication for substantial evidence.” (People v. Fisher (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1006, 

1016.) Substantial evidence is evidence of legal significance, reasonable in nature, 

credible, and of solid value. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) We draw all 

reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s findings. (People v. Clark (2000) 82 

Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the order. 

(Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence or decide the credibility of witnesses. (Id. at 

pp. 1082–1083.) 

Analysis

Here, Howell acknowledged that he has been under treatment for schizophrenia, 

anxiety, and depression. He reported auditory and visual hallucinations. Howell 

apparently was aware of his situation and acknowledged the existence of his condition. 

Howell also complained that his antipsychotic medication had been discontinued, and 

that he felt “much worse” since then.

However, Howell also presented as acutely psychotic, paranoid, and frequently 

responding to internal stimuli. His thought processes fluctuated from coherent to loose 

and tangential. Terrell found Howell to exhibit poor judgment and insight. He had an 

irrational and psychotic state of mind. Terrell concluded that Howell was not competent 

to give informed consent for psychotropic medication.

California Rules of Court,

3

rule 4.130, provides that when the trial court appoints 

an expert to examine a defendant and determine mental competency to stand trial, the 

expert’s report is to be submitted to the trial court, counsel for the defendant, and the 

prosecution. (Rule 4.130(d)(2).) The expert’s report must include a statement on 

 

3 References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
8

“whether the defendant has capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic or other 

medication.” (Rule 4.130(d)(2)(E).)

The parties submitted the matter on the basis of Terrell’s report. Terrell’s report 

addressed each of the five factors set forth in section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(III). 

The report noted that Howell had been charged with a felony offense, opined that Howell 

could not be restored to competency without the use of antipsychotic medication, and 

stated that Howell was not mentally competent to give consent for psychotropic 

medication. The report also stated it was “very unlikely” use of antipsychotic medication 

would worsen Howell’s mental condition or his ability to assist defense counsel in a 

rational manner. Without the administration of antipsychotic medication, Terrell opined 

that Howell was at substantial risk of harming himself or others and that “less-invasive 

intervention” would not be adequate to restore mental competency.

A single witness’s testimony is sufficient to uphold a finding. (People v. Barnwell 

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) The 

“centrality of expert reports” to the trial court’s determination of competency “is 

demonstrated by the rule that a formal adversary hearing on the issue of competence is 

not required if the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulate that the competency 

determination be made by the court based on the written reports of the court-appointed 

experts.” (In re John Z. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058, citing People v. Weaver

(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 903–905.) Terrell’s report supports the trial court’s order for 

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. 

Furthermore, the parties stipulated to adopting the commitment order that was 

used in case No. 159. The evaluation provided that antipsychotic medication be 

administered involuntarily if necessary. Presumably, Howell’s commitment in case 

No. 159 provided for involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.
9

Terrell’s report supports the trial court’s order that Howell be involuntarily 

medicated, if necessary, and constitutes substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s 

order. (People v. Fisher, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.)

II. Senate Bill No. 1187

On September 30, 2018, the Governor approved Sen. Bill 1187, which went into 

effect on January 1, 2019. This bill amends section 1370 to reduce the maximum term of 

commitment for competency restoration to two years instead of three. (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1008, § 2.)

On February 13, 2019, appellate counsel directed a letter to the trial court 

notifying the court that Sen. Bill 1187 provides that the maximum term of commitment 

for restoration to competency is two years. Appellate counsel requested that the superior 

court modify the commitment order to reflect a maximum commitment period of 

two years. The trial court did not act on the letter.

Howell contends that Sen. Bill 1187 is retroactive and the maximum term of 

commitment for restoration of his competency should be reduced from three to two years.

Analysis

Section 3 states that Penal Code provisions do not apply retroactively unless they 

specifically so state. In the case of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 747–748

(Estrada), the Supreme Court held that, absent evidence to the contrary, the Legislature 

intended amendments to statutes that reduce the punishment for a particular crime to 

apply to all defendants whose judgments were not yet final on the operative date of the 

amendment. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 306–308; People v. 

Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323.) 

Howell contends Sen. Bill 1187 applies retroactively to him, citing Estrada. The 

rule of Estrada does not apply to Howell’s case because “competency proceedings are 

civil in nature and collateral to the determination of defendant’s guilt and punishment.” 
10

(Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 43.) Statutes addressing mental 

competency proceedings are curative and protective measures aimed at restoring 

competency, not punishment for commission of a crime. (Ibid.) 

Howell also cites legislative history as support for his contention that Sen. Bill

No. 1187 applies retroactively. Howell cites to language in the legislative history where 

the author of the legislation states the three-year period for restoration of competency was 

no longer “reasonable” because “medication-treatment of severely mentally ill 

individuals has advanced, competency restoration treatment programs have been shown 

to have consistently high success rates, and we have learned that committed persons 

attain competency in time periods far shorter than what was considered ‘reasonable’ in 

1974.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187.) The author also 

claimed that “the vast majority (80–90%) becomes [sic] trial-competent within 

six months of starting treatment, and nearly all who attain competency do so within a 

year.” (Ibid.)

However, had the Legislature intended Sen. Bill 1187 to have retroactive 

application, it could have included a specific provision to so provide. (Evangelatos v. 

Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1212. Moreover, even though a statute may be 

applied retroactively if there is a clear and compelling indication the Legislature intended 

such a result (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 754), no such clear and compelling 

indication is present with SB No. 1187. 

Crediting the author’s statements, 80 to 90 percent of those found mentally 

incompetent to stand trial would be unaffected by the change in law because competency 

would be restored within six months of treatment, and nearly all who attain competency 

do so within one year of starting treatment. For those who have not attained competency 

in this period of time, we see no indication in the legislative history that the Legislature 

intended to usurp the conclusions of the medical professionals and their prescribed 
11

courses of treatment for individuals under their care by potentially cutting short 

competency restoration treatment. Medical professionals may have prescribed a different 

course of treatment if the available treatment period was two, rather than three, years.

Absent a clear intent from legislative history that Sen. Bill 1187 applies retroactively, the 

“default rule” that no part of a statute is retroactive applies. (§ 3; People v. Brown, supra, 

54 Cal.4th at p. 319.) 

Consequently, we conclude Sen. Bill 1187 does not apply retroactively.

DISPOSITION

The order filed on August 21, 2018, committing Howell to the state hospital until 

mental competency is restored is affirmed.

_____________________

FRANSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________

LEVY, Acting P.J.

_____________________

POOCHIGIAN, J.