alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.1

                            ULTRASTRIP SYSTEMS, INC.


                                AMENDMENTS TO THE
                             2003 STOCK OPTION PLAN
                            FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND
                             ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS



1.       Section 4(a) of the 2003 Stock Option Plan for Outside Directors and
         Advisory Board Members (the "Plan") is amended by increasing the number
         of shares available to be granted under the Plan from 2,000,000 to
         4,500,000.

2.       Section 5(b)(v) of the Plan is deleted and replaced with the following:

                 On the first business day following the date of each Annual
                 Meeting at which Outside Directors are elected by the Company's
                 shareholders, each elected Outside Director who has served as a
                 Director for at least the previous twelve (12) months shall
                 automatically be granted an Option to purchase Twenty Five
                 Thousand (25,000) Shares. In lieu of this grant, the Chairman
                 of the Board of Directors of the Company shall receive an
                 automatic grant of 500,000 non-qualified options upon initial
                 election or appointment as Chairman of the Board of Directors.
                 Upon all future re-elections or re-appointments as Chairman,
                 the Director shall automatically receive an additional grant of
                 250,000 non-qualified options. The options shall be exercisable
                 for a 10-year period from the date of grant at Fair Market
                 Value as defined in the Plan. Notwithstanding any provisions of
                 the Plan to the contrary, all grants of options to the Chairman
                 for serving as Chairman shall vest in two equal installments
                 six and twelve months following the date of each grant.
EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Cole Credit Property Trust, Inc.;
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;
 3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;
 4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
   Cole Credit Property Trust, Inc.Date: May 14, 2010
    By:
    /s/ Christopher H. ColeName:
    Christopher H. ColeTitle:
    Chief Executive Officer, President, and
Director 

(Principal Executive Officer)
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of QC Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q
for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Don Early, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: May 9, 2006



/s/ Don EarlyDon EarlyChairman of the Board andChief Executive Officer




Page 34
#### Fu CHING and Helen Ching v. The CHUBB GROUP OF INSURANCE COMPANIES et al.

No. 86-C-2206.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 12, 1986.

In re Blue Cross of Louisiana; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 85-1020; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “H”, No. 82-3632.

Prior report: La.App., 499 So.2d 1049.

Denied.
NO. 07-01-372-CV IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL C NOVEMBER 7, 2001

________________________________ IN THE INTEREST O F A. N. H., a CHILD

_________________________________ FROM THE 47 TH DISTRICT COURT OF RA NDALL COU NTY; NO. 48,249-A; HON. DAVID L. GLEASON, PRES IDING

_______________________________ Before QUINN, REAVIS, and JOHNSON, JJ. The brief of appellant, Rebecca Vaughn, was due on O ctober 19, 2001. It was not filed by that deadl ine. This ci rcumstance was made known to her by letter from this court dated October 26, 2001. Furthermore , in that same l etter, we 1) directed her to expl ain, by November 5, 2001, w hy the bri ef was not so fil ed and 2) told her thather failure to so respond could result in t he dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution. The fifth o f November, 2001, passed wi thout appellant r esponding to our

letter of October

26 th , filing an appellant’s brief, or mov ing for an ex tension of time to fil e such a brief. Acco rdin gly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution pursuant to Texas Rul es of Appellate Proced ure 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(b) and (c).

Per Cu riam Do not publish

.
Exhibit 10.2


 


FORM OF

PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT


 


BROADVISION, INC.


CHANGE OF CONTROL SEVERANCE BENEFIT PLAN


 


Name of Participant:                             


 


You have been selected to participate in the BroadVision, Inc.
Change of Control Severance Benefit Plan (the “Plan”).  Under the terms of the Plan, a copy of which
is attached as Exhibit A to this Agreement, you may become entitled to
receive severance benefits in the event your employment with the Company is
terminated in a Covered Termination.  A
Covered Termination means you are Involuntarily Terminated Without Cause (as
defined in the Plan) or you voluntarily terminate your employment by reason of
a Constructive Termination (as defined in the Plan) within one month prior to
or 24 months following the effective date of a Change of Control (as defined in
the Plan).


 


In accordance with Section 4(a) of the Plan, you have been
designated a Level [I, II or III]
Eligible Employee.  The schedule of
benefits you may become entitled to receive is found in Appendix A to the Plan.


 


If your employment with the Company is terminated for any reason other
than a Covered Termination, you will not be eligible for severance benefits
under the Plan.


 


By signing this Participation Agreement, you agree that any benefits that
may become payable under the Plan shall be offset by any benefits that may
become payable under the Company’s Executive Severance Benefit Plan or any
other plan or agreement you may have with the Company.  If you elect not to sign this Participation
Agreement, the terms of the Executive Severance Benefit Plan and any other
applicable plan or agreement you may have with the Company will control the
provision of severance benefits, if any, following a Change of Control, and you will not be an Eligible Participant in the
Plan.


 


To participate in the Plan, please sign and date this Participation
Agreement in the space provided below and return it to         
no later than            .  The extra copy is for your file.  On behalf of BroadVision, I am pleased to
welcome you as an Eligible Employee under the Plan.


 


Sincerely,


 


	
  BROADVISION, INC.

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Date

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Participant’s Signature

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Date

  	
   

  	
   

  
								



 





















 


EXHIBIT A


 


BROADVISION, INC.


CHANGE OF CONTROL SEVERANCE
BENEFIT PLAN


 


(As previously filed in the Company’s Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2003 filed on August 14, 2003)
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATIONBY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

I, Steven Tanner, certify that:

1.             I have reviewedthis report on Form 10-Q of Real Mex Restaurants, Inc.;

2.             Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.             Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.             The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)[Intentionally omitted];

c)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

d)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.             The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

a) Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

b) Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

Date: November 6,2006
| /s/ Steven Tanner       |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| Steven Tanner           |
|                    |
| Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 04-2051

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JAMES T. LATA, SR.,

Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA

The opinion of this court issued on June 24, 2005, is amended

as follows:

On page 9, note 2, line 2, replace "Miller v. Florida, 413

U.S. 185 (1977)," with "Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36

(1987),".
**EXHIBIT31.2**

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Lyn Holtmann, certify that: 

     1. I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of U.S. Premium Beef, LLC; 

     2. Basedon my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

     3. Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report; 

     4. The registrant'sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

     a)designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared; 

     b)evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and 

     c)disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent quarter(the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

     5. Theregistrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

     a)all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and 

     b)any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financialreporting. 

|     |  |                                       |
|-----|--|---------------------------------------|
| By: |  | /s/ Lyn   Holtmann                    |
|     |  |                                       |
|     |  | Lyn Holtmann*Chief Financial Officer* |

Date: January 10, 2005
#### Franklin B. BYSTROM, Dade County Property Appraiser, and Stephen L. Smith, Dade County Tax Collector, Appellants, v. FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellee.

No. 87-89.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 6, 1987.

*743Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade Co. Atty., and Daniel A. Weiss, Asst. Co. Atty., for appellants.

John G. Fletcher, South Miami, for appel-lee.

Before HENDRY, NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

The Property Appraiser and Tax Collector of Dade County appeal an order entered by the trial court, without hearing testimony, which set an expert witness’s fee at $250.00. Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion by setting an unreasonably low fee which failed to take into account the cost of time for the preparation of the expert witness’s testimony. We agree.

In the underlying case, Florida Rock Industries, Inc. challenged Dade County’s tax assessment of underdeveloped land Florida Rock owned. The trial court, adopting verbatim the opinions and testimony of an appraiser introduced by the county as their expert witness, upheld the tax assessment, which we affirmed. *Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. Bystrom,*485 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA), *review denied,*492 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1986). Appellants then filed a motion to tax the costs incurred in defending this action against Florida Rock. This motion included an expert witness fee of $5,071.22 due the appraiser for 62.5 hours of preparation time and actual testimony. The trial court, without hearing testimony concerning the expert witness fee, set the fee at $250.00.

Under section 92.231(2), Florida Statutes (1985), a trial judge has discretion to determine reasonable expert witness fees and tax these fees as costs. In addition to the cost of any exhibits used, the cost of time for preparation of an expert witness’s opinions and testimony may be included in the taxed costs. *Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co.,*466 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA), *review denied,*476 So.2d 676 (Fla.1985); *Conboy v. City of Naples,*230 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA), *cert. denied,*237 So.2d 537 (Fla.), *cert. denied,*400 U.S. 825, 91 S.Ct. 48, 27 L.Ed.2d 53 (1970).

In the instant case, the appraiser provided as an exhibit a location map which cost slightly over $150.00. Moreover, the appraiser spent a substantial number of hours examining and investigating the assessment and preparing his testimony. In the final judgment, the trial judge states that “[the appraiser’s] testimony was extremely believable and the Court accepts his testimony and opinions verbatim.” Consequently, a fee award of $250.00 is unreasonable in light of the time expended and the quality of the testimony and exhibit provided by the county’s expert witness. Appellants were justified in objecting to such a low fee award. They are entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine a reasonable expert witness fee award. *Posner v. Flink,*393 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA), *review denied,*402 So.2d 612 (Fla.1981). Accordingly, the order appealed from is *744reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except underthe limited circumstancessetforth inLocalRule

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-40090

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

REGINALDO URIBE, also known as Keno,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:94-CR-82-2

October 23, 1996

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Reginaldo Uribe appeals his sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute marihuana, contending that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to

afford him a meaningful opportunity to refute the presentence report, and that it erred in
1United States v. Henderson, 19 F.3d 917 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 207 (1994).

2U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d), p.s.; United States v. Woods, 907 F.2d 1540 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 1070 (1991).

3United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1075

(1988).

2

ignoring the drug quantity stipulated in the plea agreement. He also contends that his

attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

Our review of the record and the briefs of the parties lends inexorably to the

conclusion that Uribe’s due process rights were not violated and that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in the conduct of the sentencing hearing.1 Further, the district court

may base a sentence on conduct or quantities of drugs apart from that charged in the

indictment and stipulated by the parties at the time of the guilty plea.2 Finally, we decline

to address Uribe’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. This complaint was not

presented to the district court and the record before us does not permit evaluation of its

merits.3

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.2


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Atlas America Public #15-2005 (A) L.P. (the “Partnership”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Matthew A. Jones, Chief Financial Officer of the Partnership,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and


(2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.





By:
/s/ Matthew A. JonesName:
Matthew A. JonesTitle:
Chief Financial Officer of the Managing General PartnerDate:
August 14, 2009
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7489

MARIO BALLARD, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CHAIRMAN, VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD, Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District Judge. (CA-01-235-7) Submitted: December 20, 2001 Decided: January 9, 2002 Before LUTTIG, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mario Ballard, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Carson Vorhis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Mario Ballard appeals from the district court’s orders denying his motion for a preliminary injunction, his numerous motions for reconsideration, and his motion for a certificate of appealability. Ballard’s appeal is untimely as to the order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and the July 10, 2001, order denying his June 7, 2001, motion for reconsideration. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); Kraft, Inc. v. United States , 85 F.3d 602, 605 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that, following initial Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion tolling appeal period, successive motions periods are not permitted), modified on other grounds , 96 F.3d 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1996); accord EEOC v. Cent. Motor Lines, Inc. , 537 F.2d 1162, 1165 (4th Cir. 1976). We find that Ballard’s appeal from the denial of the remaining orders states no grounds for relief. United States v. Williams , 674 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding no grounds for relief wheremotion for reconsideration raises no new arguments, seeks only reconsideration of legal issue, or asks court to “change its mind”). Consequently, we dismiss in part and affirm in part. Ballard’s Petition for Hearing En Banc is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART