alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of BioMed Realty Trust, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
 Date: November 14, 2005
    /s/ JOHN F. WILSON, IIJohn F. Wilson, IIChief Financial Officer
#### STATE ex rel. Ronald BELL v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 87-KH-0966.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 5, 1988.

In re Bell, Ronald; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Or*124leans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 268-096.

Denied.
#### STATE ex rel. Harold SCOTT v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 86-KH-1505.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 20, 1987.

In re Scott, Harold; applying for supervisory writs; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “M”, No. 1179433.

Denied.
#### James R. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 88-2194.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 28, 1988.

PER CURIAM.

James Wilson appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconvietion relief. All five grounds set forth in the motion relate to the sentencing guidelines. We agree with the trial court that the motion is facially insufficient, and affirm. In so doing we write primarily to emphasize that one seeking to “correct” a sentence bears the burden of demonstrating why that sentence requires such correction.

*1013Upon a plea of nolo contendere Wilson was sentenced to twenty years for attempted sexual battery, a felony of the first degree.1 He now claims that the sentence should have been no more than seven years. However, Wilson does not explain how he reached this more lenient calculation, or how the trial court arrived at the more severe disposition. Despite some indication from Wilson that a guideline departure occurred, and certain references to the appropriate point score, it is not discernible from the motion whether the length of sentence was reached by agreement *{e.g.,*in exchange for a reduction from capital sexual battery), whether the court intended a departure based on other reasons, or whether the sentence was within the guideline range.

If the trial court did impose a departure sentence, and Wilson had reason to question the legality of the reasons given, that problem should have been dealt with on direct appeal. *Trimble v. State,*511 So.2d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). If the length of sentence was affected by mistakes of fact contained within the presen-tence investigation, such as a misrepresentation of Wilson’s prior record, it is necessary for one to have objected to those errors at the time of sentencing. *Lomont v. State,*506 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Alternatively, a failure to clarify known factual errors at the time of sentencing could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. *Pettway v. State,*502 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). However, any such claim requires a showing that, but for counsel’s omissions, a lesser sentence would have been imposed. *See, e.g., Morris v. State,*493 So.2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCÁ 1986). Finally, if Wilson believes the sentence is solely the result of a computational error in the scoresheet, he is required to show where such error occurred and how it affected the length of sentence. *Cf Brunson v. State,*489 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (scoresheet errors which do not affect the length of sentence are deemed harmless).

Because Wilson s motion contains little more than conclusory statements regarding the adequacy of counsel’s representation and the deficiencies of the present sentence, he has failed to set forth a prima facie showing of his entitlement to relief. Accordingly, the trial court was justified in denying the motion without requiring a response from the state, attaching evidence from the case files and records, or conducting an evidentiary hearing.

AFFIRMED.

RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur.

1

. §§ 777.04(4)(a) and 794.011(2), Fla.Stat. (1987).
RO 11482 9551.1989(03)

OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

DEC 20 1989

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Applicability of the Land Disposal Restrictions to Recycled Hazardous Wastes

FROM: Devereaux Barnes, Director

Characterization and Assessment Division

TO: Gerald M. Levy, Chief MA Waste Management Branch Region I

This memorandum responds to your November 9, 1989, request for clarification concerning the applicability of the Part 268 Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) program to recycled wastes that are subject to the provisions of Part 266; in particular, recyclable materials from which precious metals are reclaimed (i.e., wastes subject to 40 CFR 261.6(a)(iv) and Subpart F of Part 266).

The requirements of Part 268 are applicable (as stated at 40 CFR 268.1(b)) unless specifically provided otherwise in Part 261 (or in Part 268). Section 261.6(a)(2) does not specifically provide otherwise and, therefore, the LDR requirements, including the applicable notification, certification and demonstrations required by the generator of a restricted hazardous waste, are applicable to those recyclable materials listed in section 261.6(a)(2). (For comparison, section 261.6(a)(3) does specifically provide otherwise and, therefore, the LDR requirements do not apply to those wastes listed in 261.6(a)(3)).

In future rulemakings, we will consider adding "Part 268" to the introductory paragraph of 40 CFR 261.6(a)(2), specifically stating that "the following recyclable materials" are subject to the LDR requirements to help clarify the applicability of Part 268. However, we have consistently maintained and believe it isRO 11482 understood that such "recyclable materials" (and, in fact, all hazardous wastes, unless specifically provided otherwise) are (or will be) subject to the LDR requirements. For example, Subpart C of Part 266 was specifically modified (see 53 FR at 31197, August 17, 1988) due to the LDR statutory requirement that a hazardous waste must meet the treatment standards prior to placement on the land. Were those recyclable materials listed in 261.6(a)(2) not subject to Part 268, this modification would not have been necessary.

Should you have further questions, or need more information please contact Andrea McLaughlin, of my staff, at FTS 382-6946.

cc: RCRA Branch Chiefs, Regions II-X Jim Thompson, OWPE
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       3,096,691
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,359,779
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (10,000)
<INVENTORY>                                      2,792
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,513,979
<PP&E>                                      56,590,903
<DEPRECIATION>                              30,607,968
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              31,562,870
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       35,699,431
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  2,658,996
<COMMON>                                         1,559
<OTHER-SE>                                 (6,797,116)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                31,562,870
<SALES>                                      8,177,716
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             8,177,716
<CGS>                                          518,337
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,634,957
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,666,314
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,054,803)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,054,803)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,054,803)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.27)


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 7, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50658 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus GERARDO MUNOZ-SAUCEDO, also known as Guillermo Martinez-Morales, also known as Anthony Lee Martinez, also known as Guillermo Morales Martinez, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:05-CR-2409-ALL

-------------------- Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Gerardo MunozSaucedo raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 182

Designating October 1999 as ‘‘National Stamp Collecting Month’’.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 13, 1999

Mr. LEVIN (for himself and Mr. COCHRAN) submitted the following resolution;

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

OCTOBER 1, 1999

Committee discharged; considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Designating October 1999 as ‘‘National Stamp Collecting

Month’’.

Whereas over 150 years ago, United States commemorative

stamps began honoring the people, places, and events

that have shaped our Nation’s history;

Whereas in 1999, more than 22,000,000 Americans, including children, collect and learn about our Nation through

stamps, making stamp collecting one of the most popular

hobbies in our Nation and the world;

Whereas as we stand on the threshold of the 21st century,

it is important that we pause to reflect on our Nation’s

history;
2

SRES 182 ATS

Whereas stamps honor statesmen and soldiers who fought for

freedom and democracy, recognize our Nation’s scientific

and technological achievements, pay tribute to our Nation’s artistic legacy, and celebrate the strength of our

Nation’s diversity;

Whereas starting October 1, 1999, ‘‘National Stamp Collecting Month’’ will transform more than 100,000

schools, libraries, and post offices into learning centers

where our Nation’s young people can honor the past and

celebrate the future through stamps;

Whereas the founders and participants of ‘‘National Stamp

Collecting Month’’ include millions of adult and youth

collectors, thousands of teachers and schools, the American Philatelic Society, and the United States Postal

Service;

Whereas the people, places, and events shaping America

today will be United States commemorative stamps tomorrow;

Whereas ‘‘National Stamp Collecting Month’’ will help empower our Nation’s children and future generations to

study and learn from our Nation’s history; and

Whereas as our Nation’s children learn the lessons of the

past, the children will be better prepared to guide our

Nation in the future: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate designates October 1999

2 as ‘‘National Stamp Collecting Month’’.

Æ
#### CANTRELLE FENCE AND SUPPLY CO., INC., Carol Cantrelle, Norma K. Cantrelle, Wanda Cantrelle Romero, and Charmaine Cantrelle Chaisson, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Chrystal Chaisson v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 87-C-1109.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 12, 1987.

In re Allstate Insurance Co.; applying for writ of certiorari; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA86 1028; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 80364.

Prior report: La.App., 507 So.2d 22.

Granted.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Field CALHOUN.

No. 88-KK-0151.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 5, 1988.

In re Calhoun, Field; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 136984; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 19595-KW.

Granted in part. The district court is ordered to comply with La.C.Cr.P. art. 703 G. Otherwise, denied.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 1416

_____________________________
D ANA P ETERSON , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay County

. John H. Skinner , Judge

.
October 3, 2019

P ER C URIAM

. The trial court committed fundamental error in finding that Appellant was competent to proceed based on defense counsel’s stipulation where there is no indication that the trial court reviewed the expert’s report, made an independent determination that Appellant’s competency had been restored , or entered a written order to that effect

. See Davis v. State , 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2059 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 13, 2019); Robinson v. State , 250 So. 3d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); Zern v. State , 191 So. 3d 962, 964

- 6 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Accordingly, we reverse and remand f or a retroactive determination of compe tency , if possible

. Davis , 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D2059; Robinson , 250 So. 3d at 778

- 79; Zern , 191 So. 3d at 965. If the trial court finds that Appellant was competent at the time he entered his plea, it must enter a nunc pro tunc written2 order memorializing that finding with no change in the judgment. See Bowden v. State , 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2261 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 9, 2019). However, if the trial court cannot make a retroactive determination, it must allow Appellant to withdraw his plea and adjudicate his pr esent competency to proceed. Id.

R EVERSED and R EMANDED

.
R AY , C.J., and B ILBREY and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Megan Long , Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee

, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee

, for Appellee.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-50487 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus EPIFANIO GONZALES-HERNANDEZ, also known as Epifanio Hernandez Gonzalez, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. A-99-CR-214-1-JN

-------------------- August 15, 2001 Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Epifanio Gonzales-Hernandez has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Gonzales-Hernandez has received a copy of counsel’s brief. He requests permission to proceed
pro se , and he has filed a brief. Gonzales-Hernandez’s request for permission to proceed pro

se , filed after counsel filed the Anders brief, is DENIED asNo. 00-50487 -2- untimely to invoke the statutory right of self-representation. United States v. Wagner , 158 F.3d 901, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1998). In his brief, Gonzales-Hernandez argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Gonzales-Hernandez knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence except in certain limited circumstances not applicable here. See United States v. Portillo , 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994). This argument is therefore foreclosed. Gonzales-Hernandez also argues that he did not waive his right to effective assistance of counsel and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the managerial role adjustment. The record has not been adequately developed for us to consider this argument on direct appeal. See United States v. Haese , 162 F.3d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 1998). Our independent review of the brief, the record, and Gonzales-Hernandez’s response discloses no nonfrivolous issue in this direct appeal. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANTTO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

I, G.J. Hart, ChiefExecutive Officer of Texas Roadhouse, Inc. (the “Company”), certify,pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,that:

 

(1)    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly periodended March 31, 2009 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirementsof Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934; and

 

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Date: May 8, 2009 | By:    | /s/  G.J.  HART           |
|------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|
|                   |   |
|                   |   | G.J. Hart                      |
|                   |   | President, Chief  Executive Officer |

 

1

----
Exhibit 31.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



I, Paul Kim, Chief Financial Officer of Cogent, Inc. (the Registrant), certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant;



2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
quarterly report;



4. The Registrants other certifying
officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and we have:



(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;



(b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The Registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditors and the audit committee of Registrants board of directors:



(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls
over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the Registrants internal controls over financial reporting.



Dated: August 11, 2005



|                                                                             
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                             
|/s/    PAUL KIM                                                              
|Paul Kim Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)