IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-CA-01203-COA KEVIN B. McCALL APPELLANT

v. CYNTHIA C. McCALL APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/26/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBBRA K. HALFORD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: W A LTHALL COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CHAD KENNETH KING MATTHEW THOMPSON ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: MARK R. HOLMES ALTON LAMAR W ATTS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 01/29/2019 DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. GRIFFIS, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In 2 014, Cy

nthia and Kevin McCall were divorced on the g r o u n d of irreconcilable dif f erences. Their property -settlem ent agreem ent r equired Kevin to pay $3,500 per m onth
in child support a nd required Kevin to m ake an additional lum p-sum child-support pay

m ent of $100,000. ¶2. In Oc t o b e r 2016, Kevin f iled f or m odif ication o f his child-support obligation. The chancellor determ ined that Kevin was in arrears on his child-support obligation in the sum of $ 198,205.82. Cy

nthia responded to the m otion and f iled a counterclaim , asking the courtto f

ind Kevin in contem

pt f or his f ailure to pay h is child-support obligation. The chancellor d e n i e d the m odif

ication and f

ound Kevin in contem

pt of c ourt. The chancellor en t e r e d a judgm ent that increased K evin’s m onthly obligation by $ 1 , 0 00 and awarded Cy nthia attorney ’s f

ees. It is f

rom this judgm ent that Kevin now appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. Kevin and Cy

nthia McCal l w e r e married f or thirteen y ears. They had two children born of the m arriage. ¶4. In April 2014, th e M c Calls were granted a divorce on t he ground of irreconcilable dif f erences. The McCalls agreed upon, and t he chancellor a ccepted, a property -settlem ent
agreem ent that was signed by both parties. 1 In the agreem ent, Kevin and Cy nthia agreed that Cy nthia w ould have f

u ll legal a nd p h y s i c a l custody of the children. The agreem ent also provided that Kevin would pay child support in m onthly pay m ents of $3,500 and a lum p-sum
pay m ent of $100,000, due on May

15, 2014. ¶5. On June 11, 2014, C y nthia f il e d a P e t i t i o n f

o r C i t ation f

or Crim i nal and Civil
Contem pt. In the p etition, Cy

nthia a lleged, am ong other claim s, that K e v i n M cCall had
f ailed to pay t he lum

p sum child support p ay

m ent of $100,000 b y May 15, 2014, as agreed. ¶6. On August 6, 2014, Kevin f iled a Response to Petition f o r Citation f

or Contem

pt and Counter-Petition f

or Modif i c a t i o n o f Judgm ent of D ivorce and/or Relief f rom Judgm ent

1 Ju st b ef o re h e sig n ed th e p ro p erty -settlem en t ag reem en t, K ev in w a s in carcerated f o r f ailu re to co m

p l ete d i sco v e ry . K ev in w as r eleased to atten d th e co n tem p t h earin g . K ev in stated th at h e w o u ld lik e to sig n th e p ro p erty

- settlem en t ag reem e n t to f

in a l ize th e d iv o rce. K e v i n stated th at h e w as n o t p ressu red to sig n th e ag reem e n t to g e t o u t o f j ail. In th is actio n , K e v i n d o es n o t ch allen g e th at h e lack ed cap acity to sig n th e ag reem en t o r th at h is sig n atu re w a s n o t h is v o lu n tary

act. 2under Mississippi R ule of Civil P rocedure 60(b). T he chancellor entere d a n o r d er, dated
Novem ber 7, 2014, that denied Kevin’s Petition f or Relief f rom J udgm e nt under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b). Kevin did not f ile a tim ely

appeal. ¶7. In A pril 2 015, Kevin and Cy nthia were bef

o re t he c o urt on a contem

pt m otion. I n an agreed order, Kevin was cited f o r contem pt. Kevin a greed that he was in arrears on m onthly child-support pay

m ents in the sum

of $21,955 and the $100,000 lum p-sum pay m ent. ¶8. In March 2016, Kevin f iled a m otion f

o r m odif ication of his child-support o bligation.
He argued that he l ost ownership of a s a w mi l l 2 he owned in Texas a s the b asis f or his

ma t e r i al change o f circum stances. The chancellor denied the m otion and f ound Kevin i n
contem pt of court. Kevin now appeals this judgm ent.

S TANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9. In Evans v. Evans , 994 So. 2d 765, 768 (¶9) (Miss. 2008), the Mississippi Suprem e Court held tha t “[ d]om estic-relations m atters are reviewed under t he lim ited substantialevidence/m anif

est-error rule. A chancellor’s f indings w ill not be disturbed ‘unless the chancellor w as m anif

estly wrong, clearly e r r o n e o us or an erroneous legal standard was applied.’” (Citations om itted).
ANALYSIS ¶10. The r eview of a chancellor’s decision on the m o dif ication of child support begins with several general statem e nts of applicable law. In Evans , the court ruled that: There can be no m odif

ication of a child support decree absent a s u bstantial and m aterial change in the circum stances of one of the interested parties a rising

2 D u rin g th eir m arriag e , K e v i n o w n ed a saw m ill in M i ssissip p i. 3subsequent t o t he entry of the decree sought to be m odif ied. The c hange m

ust occur as a result of af

ter-arising circum stances of the parties, not rea s onably anticipated at the tim e of the agreem ent. S om e of the f act o r s w h i c h m ay be considered i n d eterm ining whether a m aterial change has taken p lace include: (1) increased needs caused by a dvanced age and m aturity of the children; (2) increase in expenses; (3) inf lation; ( 4) the relative f inancial condition and earning capacity of the p a r t i es; (5) the health and spec i a l needs of the child, both phy sical and psy chological; (6 ) t h e health and special m e d ical needs of the p arents, b o th phy sical and psy chological; (7) the n ecess a r y living expenses of the no n - c ustodial parent; (8) the estim ated am ount of i ncom e taxes the respective p arties m ust pay on their incom es; ( 9) the f

ree use of a residence, f urnishings, and autom obile; and (10) such o ther f a c t s a n d c ircum stances t hat bear on the support subject shown by the evidence. Id. at 770 (¶16) (citations and i nternal quotation m ark om itted). Also, in Laird v
. Blackburn , 788 So. 2d 844, 849 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), this Court held: Child support i s awarded to the custodial parent f or the benef

it and protection of the child. Such benef

its belong to the child, and the custodial parent has a f iduciary duty to hold them f or the use of the child. The obligations vest i n the child as they accrue, and n o c o u r t m ay t hereaf ter m odif y or f o rgive them if they are not paid. Child support m o ney b elongs to the child, n ot t o the custodial p arent[ ,] and the custodial parent has n o right to t he support m oney independent of

the child. (Citations om itted). ¶11. Kevin’s f

irst i ssue has two parts. Both c hallenge the 2014 f inal j udgm ent of divorce. The f irst p art concerns whether the chancellor erred in 2014 b y the f ailure to approve child support consistent with the statutory guidelines, Miss. C ode Ann. § 43-19-101(1), and f ailure

to m ake the required f

indings, M iss. C o d e A n n . § 43-19-101(2). T h e second part of this issue concerns whether the chancellor erred in the award of l um p-sum child support. ¶12. T h e second issue is whether t he chancellor erred in the decision to den y K e v i n ’ s

4m otion f

or m odif i cation of his child-support obligations.
1. W hether the chancellor erred in denying a m o dification because the 2014 j udgment v iolated Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101 or awarded lump-sum child support. ¶13. Kevin did not appeal the 2014 divorce. I nstead, he uses the m otion f or m odif ication of child support to challenge the valid i t y o f the 2014 f inal judgm ent of divorce. Kevin
argues that the chancellor erred i n 2 014 when the parties’ property -settlem ent agreem ent was approved and incorporated in the f inal judgm e nt of

divorce. ¶14. The Mississippi Suprem e Court has h eld that “[ a] f inal judgm e nt on t he m erits of an action precludes the parties

. . . f rom relitigating claim s t hat were or could have b een raised
in that action.” W

alton v. Bourgeois , 512 So. 2d 698, 700 (Miss. 1 987). “ A f i nal j udgm ent has been def

ined by this C ourt as a judgm e nt adjudicating the m erits of the controversy [ that] settles all the issues as to all the p arties.” S anford v. Bd. of

Supervisors , 421 So. 2 d 488, 490-
91 (Miss. 1982). “ [ A]n order is considered f inal if i t e n d s t h e litigation o n the m erits and leaves nothing f

o r the court to do but execute the judgm ent.” LaFontaine v. Holliday , 110 So. 3d 785, 787 (¶8) (Miss. 2013). ¶15. H e r e , t he 2 014 judgm ent of divorce was a f inal judgm ent. Because there w a s n o appeal, Kevin’s attack on the 2 0 1 4 f i n al judgm ent i s barred by res judicata. “Res judicata bars all i ssues t hat m ight have been (or could h ave been) raised and decided in the initial suit, plus all i ssues that were actually decided in t he f irst cause o f a c t i o n . ” L ittle v. V & G
W elding Supply Inc. , 704 So. 2 d 1 336, 1337 (¶8) (Miss. 1997). It m ay n ot b e litigated again under the guise of

a m otion f

or m odif ication.

5¶16. In addition, Kevin f iled a m otion f

or relief f rom the judgm e nt under Mississippi Rule of C ivil Procedure 60(b). In Entergy Miss. In c
. v
. R i c h ardson , 134 S o. 3d 287, 2 91 (¶10) (Miss. 2014), the suprem e court held: Rule 60(b) p rovides f

or e xtraordinary relief which m ay be granted only upon an adequate s howing of exceptional circum stances, and that neither ignorance nor carelessness o n the part of a n attorney w ill provide grounds f o r relief

. Rule 60( b ) i s n ot a n escape hatch f or litigants who have p rocedural opp ortunities a f

f orded u nder other rules and who without c ause f ailed to pursue those procedural rem edies. Rule 60(b)(6)’s “catch-all” provision does not grant trial judges blanket discretion to reinstate cases. This Court has h eld that f or a p arty t o be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6), he m ust dem onstrate extraordinary c i r c um stances which prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute his case. Rule 60(b) m otions should be denied where t hey a r e m erely an attem pt to relitigate the case. The chancellor denied Kevin’s m o tion f or relief f rom the judgm ent, on these sam e grounds, by order, dated Novem

ber 7, 2014. Kevin did not f ile a tim ely a

p peal. ¶17. A s a result, we have determ ined that Kevin’s attem pt t o r elitigate th e 2 0 1 4 f i n a l judgm ent of

divorce is barred by

the doctrine o f res j udicata and is not properly bef ore the
Court. Thus, it is not necessary f or this Court to c on s i d e r t h e question of w hether the chancellor erred in 2 014 by t he f ailure t o approve child support consistent with the statutory guidelines, Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(1), and f ailure to m ake the required f indings, Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(2). The dissent sim ply determ ines that the 2014 judgm ent m ay be relitigated or c hallenged even though there was no tim ely appeal of t he 2014 judgm ent and no tim ely appeal of

the denial of the m otion f or relief f rom the judgm ent under Rule 60. ¶18. Nevertheless, the Court has determ i n e d i t i s appropriate to address the challenge to the lum p -sum child-support award.

6¶19. Mississ i p p i l a w is clear that “that child support should never b e awarded in lum p

sum .” 3 Pittman v. Pittman , 909 S o. 2d 148, 152-53 ( Miss. Ct. App. 2 005) (em phasis added).
Two of M ississippi’s distinguished law prof essors, who have written a book o n d o me sticrelations law, agree t hat lum p-sum child s upport is not proper. Mississippi College School of Law P rof

essor Shelton H and discusses the issue in h is treatise. N. Shelton H and, Miss. Divorce, A l i mony and Child C ustody , § 11 (6th e d

. 2003); see a lso Matthew Thom pson, Miss. Divorce, Alimony and Child Custody , § 15:10 n.1 (2018) (“Essentially , there is no such thing as lum

p sum child support.”) Likewise, U niversity of Mississippi School of Law Dean and Prof essor Deborah Bell stated that “child s u p p o r t s hould not be awarded in lum p sum f orm .” Deborah H. Bell, Bell o n Mississippi Family Law , § 1 13.10[ 5], a t 460 ( 2d ed. 2011). Thus, i f the a ward of lum

p-sum c hild support were properly bef ore this Court f

or review, we would hold that it is not a proper award of c h ild support. The d issent a ppears to agree with this conclusion. ¶20. However, t he issue of whether a chancellor h as awarded lum p-sum child support is

not bef ore this Court. Instead, t his Court recognizes that “pro p e r t y s e t tlem ent agreem ents

are contractual obligations.” In re Estate of Hodges , 807 S o. 2d 4 38, 442 ( ¶20) ( Miss. 2002). The provisions of a property -settlem ent agreem ent executed prior to t h e d issolution of

m arriage m

ust be interpreted by courts as a ny other contract. Id. at 445 (¶26). In East v. East , 493 So. 2d 927, 931-32 (Miss. 1986), the suprem e court h eld that “ [ a] true and genuine property settlem ent agreem ent is no dif f erent f rom any other c ontract, and the m ere f act that

3 It is im p o rtan t to n o te th at, in P ittm a n , th is C o u rt rev iew e d th e c h a n cello r ’s d ecisio n to a w a rd lu m

p -su m ch i ld su p p o rt. T h is issu e w as p ro p erly b ef o re th is C o u rt. H ere, it is n o t. 7it is between a divorcing husband and wif e, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character.” 4 ¶21. Although t his Court d o e s n o t a u t h orize the award of lum p sum child support, we recognize that circum stances m ay arise between divorcing parties, such as here, where the divorcing parties m ay determ ine that there is a j ust and a reasonable basis f or a non-custodial
par e n t t o agree to p a y the custodial parent a lum p sum am ount to satisf

y child support obligations. ¶22. This Court f

inds no m erit to this issue.
2. W hether the chancellor erred in the decision to d eny Kevin’s motion

for modification of his child-support obligations. ¶23. Next, Kevin argues that the chancellor erred in the decision to deny K e v in’s m otion
f or m odif ication of his child support obligations. ¶24. First, we consider whether t he chancellor had the ability to m odif y the $100,000 lum

p

sum child support award. In Laird 788 So. 2d at 849 (¶8), this Court held: Child support i s awarded to the custodial parent f or the benef

it and protection of the child. Such benef

its belong to the child, and the custodial parent has a f iduciary duty to hold them f or the use of the child. The obligations vest i n the child as t hey accrue, and no court may ther eafter modify or forgive them if they are not p aid. C hild support m oney belongs to the child, not to the c u s t o d i a l p arent and the custodial parent has no right to the support m one y independent of

the child.

4 U n lik e P ittm a n , h ere w e d o n o t c o n s i d er w h eth er K e v in h ad th e p o w er o r th e au th o rity t o ag ree to p ay h is w if e $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 f

o r t h e b en ef

it o f h is ch ild ren . K ev in ag reed to t h e p a y men t, th e c h an c ello r a

p p ro v ed it in th e 2 0 1 4 j u d g m en t, it w as n o t p aid in a t i m e l y m an n er, an d th ere w as an d is n o p ro p er ch allen g e to th i s aw ard

. L ik ew ise, it i s n o t f o r th is C o u rt to co n sid e r o r d eterm in e K ev i n ’s reaso n to ag ree to th e l u m p -su m p ay

m en t. A s a b u sin essm an , K ev in m ay h av e d eterm in ed th at th e v o latile n atu re o f h is b u sin ess m ad e su ch p ay m en t n ecessary

f o r th e p ro tectio n an d b en ef i t o f h is ch ild ren . 8(Em

phasis added & citations om itted). Because t he $100,000 lum p -sum ch i l d -support award had vested, we f

ind that the c hancellor did not have the authority to “m odif y or f orgive t hem
if t hey were not paid.” I

d. Thus, we f

ind no e r r or i n t he c hancellor’s decision to deny the

m otion f or m odif i cation of the lum p-sum child-support pay

m ent. ¶25. Ho w e v e r , K e v i n ’ s r e q u e s t t o mo d i f y his m onthly child-support obligation was properly bef

ore the c hancellor. H e argues that he presented s uf f icient e v idence f

or the chancellor to reduce hi s m onthly obligation. T he suprem e court has established that the

m aterial change “m

u s t also be one that could not have been a nticipated by the parties at the tim e of the original decree.” T

ingle v. Tingle , 573 So. 2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990). ¶26. This Court has a ddr e s s e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f e n f o r c e a bility of p roperty

settlem ent
agreem ents that include child-support obligations outside the statutory guidelines. Seeley v. Stafford , 840 So. 2d 111, 113-14 ( ¶ ¶ 10-13) (Miss. C t. App. 2003). Firs t we consider the enf orceability

of such agreem ents. ¶27. I n S

eeley , this Court ruled that a chancellor’s r e f u s a l t o mo d i f

y c h i l d

- s u p p o r t obligations was valid. Id. The f acts of Seeley are sim ilar t o the ones presented here. W hen Seeley a nd Staf

f ord divorced, Seeley voluntarily agreed to pay child support that was double the statutory requirem ent. Id

. at (¶10). Seeley lef t his job on his own and, a s a result, m ade less than he did when he originally signed the agreem ent. Id

. at (¶12). This Court, however,
f ound that it was not a m aterial change of circum stances that w a s unf oreseeable at the t im e of the agreem ent. Id

. at (¶15). W e reasoned that, because the parties agreed to the am ount of child support, the statutory lim it was not controlling. Id . at (¶¶13-17).

9¶28. Kevin cites Clausel v. Clausel , 714 So. 2d 265 (Miss. 1998), to argue that the court

f ailed to apply the f

actors necessary f

or a de t erm ination of child support outside of the

statute. T he key dif

f erence is that the decision of the trial c our t in Clausel cam e af ter a contested hearing. Seeley v. Stafford , 840 So. 2d 111, 113 ( ¶14) (Mis s . Ct. App. 2003) (citing Clausel v. Clausel , 714 So. 2d 265 (¶1) (Miss. 1998)). Like in Seeley , this Court is

no t p r e s e n t ed with a contested h e aring, but instead a signed agreed o rder entered by both parties. Id

. at (¶14). The trial court was n ot required to produce any additional e vidence f or why the court deviated f

rom t he statutory guidelines because K evin had agreed to the original

am ount of child s u

pport. Here, the agreem e nt as to the m o nthly am ount of c hild support was enf orceable. ¶29. Next, Kev i n c h a l l e n g es the chancellor’s decision to deny his request to m odif y the

m onthly child support obligation. In the 2014 agreem ent, Kevin agreed and w as ordered to
pay $3,500 in child support each m onth. Unf ortunately , the only p ay

m ents Kevin m ade were the result of

contem pt proceedings and Kevin’s incarceration. ¶30. Kevin told the chancellor t hat he was unable to pay his o rdered child s upport af ter he lost the Texas sawm i ll in March 2016. Wh i l e n o r ma l ly this Court would see the loss of a substantial incom e as a ma t e r i a l change o f circum stance, Kevin was delinquent on his
pay m ents f or child support long bef

o re 2016. The chancellor noted that: Virtually all of t he pay

m ents that [ Cy

nthia] has received f

or the support of the f am ily s ince the inception o f the case have been f orced, involuntary pay

m ents withheld f

rom [ Kevin’s] accounts or earnings; paid by h im to avoi d incarceration; paid to secure a release f ro m i n c a r ceration, or paid to prevent adverse adm inistrative actions against him by t he State of

Texas.

1 0W e agree. Kevin h as only pa i d h i s s u p p o rt obligations when he has been threatened by

another contem

pt action. Had Kevin wished to c ontest his original agreem ent, he should have d one so at the tim e the divorce d ecree was entered. S ee id. a t 114 (¶15). He has been delinquent in his pay

m ents since bef

ore he lost the sawm ill; theref ore h i s argum ent f

or

m odif ication was properly

denied. ¶31. AFFIRMED.
BARNES AND CARLTON, P.JJ., WILSON, GREENLE E , TINDELL, McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY WESTBROOKS, J. McCARTY, J., DISSENTING: ¶32. B e c a

u s e t h e p r o p e r t y -settlem ent agreem ent contracted f or a b anned f

orm of lum p-su m child support, I believe we cannot approve it. Contracts c annot be upheld when they are void against public policy

. Furtherm ore, the record was clear that Kevin had suf f e red a m aterial change of circ u ms t a n ces warranting a m odif ication of child support. Thus, I respectf ully dissent. ¶33. “W hile a chancellor’s d ecisions in a divorce action are reviewed f or m anif est error,

a p roperty settlem ent agreem ent is a contract, a nd c ontract interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.” McFarland v. McFarland , 105 So. 3d 1111, 1118 ( ¶21) (Miss. 2013). ¶34. Our Court has previously r uled “that child s upport should n ever be awarded in lum p

sum .” Pittman v. Pittman , 909 So. 2d 148, 153 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Even f ourteen
y ears a go, we declared t hat “[ w]e know of no authority perm itting an initial lum p sum award

1 1of

child support,” and even the party benef itting f rom it in that case could not cite any

. Id

. Every m ajor treatise that a ddress lum p-sum c hild support have likewise concluded it is banned in our courts. See M a tthew Thom pson, Miss. Divorce, A limony and Child Custody , § 10:14 n. 20 (2018); Debbie Bell, Miss. Family Law , § 13.10[ 5] (2d ed. 2010); N. Shelton Hand Jr., M

iss. Divorce, Alimony and Child Custody , § 10:9 (6th ed. 2003). ¶35. By their very nature, lum p-sum child-support pay

m ents p reem

pt t h e p r erogative of

the Legislature to set guidelines f o r child support and m odif i cation. As t he Suprem e Court of
N e b raska has pointed out, “child support is a t all t im es subject to change[ , ] and

. . . the Nebraska Legislature had provided f or such changes by

allowing f

or m odif ication of child support.” Johnson v
. Johnson , 862 N.W .2d 7 40, 755 ( Neb. 2 015). To allow lum p-sum child support m eans the m odif

ication law is eroded. Id

. 5 ¶36. Under that sound reasoning, “[ i]t is i m proper under the law t o m ake a f i nal, def inite, and positive entry of such a j udgm ent f or the support o f a m inor child, f or the am ount to be paid m u st vary with the several needs of the child f or f ood, clothing, a n d expenses involved
i n h i s e ducation, with his necessary m edical and surgical r equirem e n ts,

. . .” as w e l l a s changes in t he f

inancial status of the parents. Id

. (quoting Gibson v
. Gibson, 26 N .W .2d 6, 10 (1947)). ¶37. This is why “the law has provided that the m on t h ly pay m ents can be changed f

rom

5 T h e Jo h n so n C o u rt f

u rth er n o ted th at “ alth o u g h lu m p -su m ch ild su p p o rt aw ard s are n o t f av o red u n d er th e l aw in N eb rask a, an o b lig o r m ay receiv e cred it ag ain st f u t u r e o b lig atio n s f

o r p ay m en ts alread y m ad e , in clu d in g a lu m p -su m p ay

m en t alread y m ad e w h ere su ch p ay m en t d o e s n o t p reclu d e f u tu re ch i l d s u p p o r t aw ard s o r ad j u stm e n ts.” Id

. at 7 5 6

. T h eref o re in t h at s tate a lu m

p -su m p ay

m en t m ay b e accep t ab le so lo n g as it d o es n o t strain ag ain st th e statu to ry

g u id elin e s o f

m o d if icatio n . 1 2tim e to tim e as the evidence warrants,” provided m odif ication is g rante d

. I

d

. ; s ee also
Masnev v. Masnev , 253 So. 3d 638, 639 ( Fla. Dist. Ct. A pp. 2018) (reversing an a w a rd of lum p-sum child support “because no statutory o r p recede n t i a l a uthority allows f

or such a lum p sum child support award” and holding that “ [ i ] f t h e Florida Legislature intended to
perm it a lum

p sum child support award, then perhaps the Legislature would have included such a provision”). ¶38. Although chancellors have judicial oversight over property -settlem ent agreem ents, a chancellor cannot be f

orced to approve a n a greem ent that is void because it is a gainst public policy

. As Prof

essor Hand noted, granting l um p-sum c h ild support “predeterm ines the needs of the child a nd would insulate the r esponsible parent f orm changes in need or o t her circum stances t hat m ight dem a nd adjustm ents i n t h e am ount of support.” H and, Miss. Divorce, Alimony and C

hild Custody § 10:9 ( 6th ed. 2 003). Consequently , chancery courts “retain continuous jurisdiction over f inal decrees providing f

or alim ony , custody of children and child support, and m ay m odif y a f orm er decree when the circum stances and conditions have changed af

ter rendition of a f

orm er decree.” Campbell v. Campbell , 357 So. 2d 129,
130 (Miss. 1978). “Further, no decree o f alim ony or child support is ever truly a f inal jud g me nt, but alway s subject to m odif ication based upon a m aterial c hange of circum stances.” Austin v. Austin , 981 So. 2d 1000, 1005 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). 6

6 T h e m aj o rity d eterm in es th at K ev in n ev er ap p ealed th e f in al j u d g m e n t o f d iv o rce o r th e ch an c ello r’s d en ial o f h is m o ti o n f o r relief u n d er R u le 6 0 ( b ), an d so h is attem p t to seek a m o d if

i ca t i o n is b arred

. H o w ev er, o n ce K ev in ’s p etitio n f o r m o d if i catio n o f ch ild su p p o rt w as b ef

o re th e co u rt, in clu d in g a ch allen g e to th e v alid ity o f t h e l u mp - s u m ch ild su p p o rt, i t i s f

i t f o r o u r rev iew

. O u r statu te an ticip a t es t h a t m o d if icatio n o f th e o rig i n al j u d g m en t o f d iv o r c e m a y b e n ecessary , statin g “T h e co u rt m ay a f terw ard s, o n p etitio n , 1 3¶39. Since I also believe that Ke v i n p r o v e d a s u b s t a n t i a l a n d ma t e r i a l change in

circum stances warranting m odif ication, I would reverse and rem and f or the chancellor to recalculate Kevin’s m onthly child-support pay

m ents. As such, I respectf ully dissent. WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

ch an g e th e d ecree, an d m ak e f ro m tim e to t im e su ch n ew d ecrees as t h e case m ay req u ire.” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 3 -5 -2 3 (R ev . 2 0 1 8 ). 1 4