If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 21, 2024

v No. 366280

Wayne Circuit Court

VERNON ANTHONY JOHNSON, LC No. 21-005331-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and BORRELLO and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by leave granted1his guilty-plea convictions of second-degree murder, 

MCL 750.317, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 

750.227b. On appeal, defendant challenges the order denying his motion to dismiss the charges 

against him. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arose out of defendant shooting and killing the victim on August 30, 2020.

2

Defendant fled to Vermont and as a result, was not arrested until April 22, 2021. A preliminary 

examination was conducted on June 30, 2021 and August 5, 2021, and revealed defendant, while 

 

1 People v Johnson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 13, 2023 (Docket No. 

366280) 

2 Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) (homicide, willful, 

deliberate and premeditated) (Count I); felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f (felon-inpossession) (Count II); and felony-firearm (Counts III and IV), with a third offense notice. He 

was also charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12. Defendant pleaded guilty to 

second-degree murder (Count I), and felony-firearm (Count III). In exchange, the prosecution 

agreed to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge (Count II), and the additional felony-firearm 

charge (Count IV). The prosecution also withdrew the fourth-offense habitual offender notice, 

and the third offense enhancement on the felony-firearm charge.
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incarcerated in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), made calls to a family friend, 

instructing them to encourage defendant’s son, a key eye-witness not to cooperate with law 

enforcement. Defendant was arraigned on May 11, 2021, and bound over to the circuit court on 

August 11, 2021, where he was charged as noted. Despite defendant’s assertions to the contrary, 

we cannot find in the record where the prosecution received a 180 Day Notice Letter from the 

MDOC.3

Defendant moved to quash the bindover on September 30, 2021, which the trial court 

denied. After defendant rejected a plea offer, his counsel failed to complete the Jury Trial 

Readiness Form before a scheduled hearing on February 4, 2022, which then needed to be

rescheduled for February 8, 2022. In setting the trial date for October 31, 2022, the trial court 

explained the limitation on holding trials was because of the need to manage the number of jurors 

in the courthouse because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On August 4, 2022, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, alleging his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, and the 180-day rule had been violated 

because of a delay greater than six months resulting in prejudice to defendant. The trial court 

denied the motion, identifying defendant’s failure to state in his motion the length of the delay, the 

reason for the delay, or how he was prejudiced. The trial court also noted the COVID-19 pandemic 

caused Michigan to be in a state of emergency, which caused delay not attributable to either party.

Defendant proceeded to trial as scheduled, but before the prosecution rested, he pleaded 

guilty to second-degree murder and felony-firearm, and was sentenced to 22 to 45 years’ 

imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, and 2 years’ imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction to run consecutively. Defendant now challenges the denial of the motion to 

dismiss the charges against him.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We “review for an abuse of discretion a circuit court’s decision on a motion to dismiss.” 

People v Witkoski, 341 Mich App 54, 59; 988 NW2d 790 (2022). “An abuse of discretion occurs 

 

3 We note that the prosecutor submitted to this Court with its brief on appeal, appendices B and C 

which, respectively are: (1) a 180 Day Notice Letter dated April 22, 2021, and (2) the affidavit of 

Gregory Blackburn, (believed to be in charge of the prosecutor’s Freedom of Information Act 

requests) dated October 11, 2023. However, neither of these documents were provided to the trial 

court. As this Court has explained, “to consider evidence presented on appeal that the parties failed 

to present to the trial court would be an impermissible expansion of the lower-court record.” 

People v Morrison, 328 Mich App 647, 655; 939 NW2d 728 (2019), citing MCR 7.210(A). The 

prosecution did not move to expand the record on appeal, this Court did not enter such an order, 

and a stipulation to include them as part of the record was not provided to this Court. 

Consequently, these appendices cannot be considered. Morrison, 328 Mich App at 655.
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when the trial court’s outcome falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” 

People v Meeker (On Remand), 340 Mich App 559, 563; 986 NW2d 622 (2022). However, “a 

trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law[.]” People v Zitka, 325 

Mich App 38, 43-44; 922 NW2d 696 (2018) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). 

The trial court’s attribution of delay is reviewed for clear error. Witkoski, 341 Mich App at 59.

This case also involves the interpretation of MCL 780.131. We review issues of statutory 

interpretation de novo. People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 554; 773 NW2d 616 (2009). “Our primary 

purpose in construing statutes is ‘to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.’ ” People 

v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 251; 716 NW2d 208 (2006), quoting People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 

330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). “We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that 

language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly 

expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be 

enforced as written.” Id. Finally, whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial is an 

issue of constitutional law, which we also review de novo. People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602, 605;

684 NW2d 267 (2004).

Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against 

him because of violation of MCL 780.131(1), commonly known as the 180-day rule.

B. WAIVER 

We initially consider the prosecution’s argument that defendant cannot raise a 180-day rule 

or a speedy trial claim because both were waived defendant’s unconditional guilty plea. “[W]aiver 

is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” People v. GonzalezRaymundo, 308 Mich App 175, 187; 862 N.W.2d 657 (2014) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Waiver consists of (1) specific knowledge of the constitutional right and (2) an

intentional decision to abandon the protection of the constitutional right.” Williams, 475 Mich at 

261. Courts “should ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental 

constitutional rights.’ ” People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641; 683 NW2d 597 (2004) (citations 

omitted). 

Here, defendant could have retained his right to appeal the decision of the trial court to 

deny his 180-day violation claim by entering a conditional guilty plea under MCR 6.301(C)(2).

4

 

Defendant did not do so. Rather, defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to the charges 

listed supra. It is well-settled that an unconditional guilty plea waives all claims regarding the 

capacity of the state to prove factual guilt, while a conditional plea may not. People v Andrews, 

192 Mich App 706, 707; 481 NW2d 831 (1992). 

In People v Smith, 438 Mich 715, 719-729; 475 NW2d 333 (1991) (BOYLE, J., 

concurring), overruled on other grounds by Williams, 475 Mich at 248, Justice Boyle wrote that 

“a violation of the 180-day rule is waived by an unconditional guilty plea.” In her concurrence 

Justice Boyle further stated: “In conclusion, it is my view that where the statutory 180-day rule is 

applicable, a defendant waives any error based on violation of the rule by unconditionally pleading 

 

4 As is stated more fully infra, even if defendant tendered a conditional guilty plea preserving his 

180-day rule claim and his constitutional right to a speedy trial he would not have prevailed on 

appeal.
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guilty. To state otherwise is to ascribe to the Legislature an intent to preclude a counseled 

defendant from voluntarily relinquishing the protection of the statute, and would separate 

Michigan from the great weight of authority holding that an unconditional guilty plea waives 

noncompliance with statutory provisions for speedy trial.” Smith, 438 Mich at 729. 

In People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 269-270; 794 NW2d 9 (2011), our Supreme Court 

adopted Justice Boyle’s reasoning, writing:

Justice Boyle reached this very result following a well-reasoned analysis in her 

concurring opinion in People v. Smith when she concluded that a violation of the 

180–day rule is waived by an unconditional guilty plea. Observing that the term

‘jurisdiction’ is susceptible of various meanings within the realm of criminal 

procedure,” she opined that the term as employed in MCL 780.133 ‘cannot be said 

to unambiguously refer to the power of the court to entertain a class of cases, i.e., 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Rather, the statute represents a limitation on the power 

to prosecute in specified circumstances, viz., where an existing warrant, 

information or charge against a prisoner is not disposed of in a timely manner as 

provided in MCL 780.131.’ Because ‘the statute decrees that a court loses its power 

over a particular matter in specified circumstances,’ personal jurisdiction—which 

‘deals with the authority of the court over particular persons’—is at issue; and it is 

‘a fundamental principle that defects in personal jurisdiction may be waived....’ We 

adopt Justice Boyle’s analysis on these points.

Our Supreme Court in Lown, we on to further state:

Our conclusion that a violation of the statutory 180–day rule does not deprive the 

court of subject matter jurisdiction is significant because it further defeats 

defendant's argument that if the 180–day period is exceeded for a reason other than 

vindication of a defendant's constitutional rights, the court is forever deprived of 

the power to hear the case. To the contrary, because subject matter jurisdiction is 

not at issue, a defendant may forfeit the rule requiring commencement of action 

within 180 days by requesting or consenting to delays...Our conclusion also 

reinforces the text of the statute, which clearly conveys that the 180–day period 

does not describe an automatic cut-off point when the court loses jurisdiction, no 

matter what events have transpired in the meantime, unless the defendant sought a 

continuance to protect a constitutional right. Rather, as long as good-faith action 

was commenced within the 180–day period in order to ready the case for trial, the 

trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction although the trial itself is not commenced 

or completed within the period. Id. at 270.

In his appeal, defendant does not allege that his unconditional guilty plea was made 

unknowingly, under duress, or that his plea was by any manner compromised. From the record 

we glean that defendant was fully informed of the rights he would be giving up if he pleaded guilty. 

Defendant therefore voluntarily and knowingly pled guilty thereby waiving any claim he may have 

for either a violation of the 180-day rule or for a speedy trial. Lown, 488 at 270. 

However, in the interests of thoroughness, and assuming defendant did not waive his rights 

by tendering an unconditional guilty plea, we address his arguments that his rights to the 180-day 

rule or a speedy trial were violated. 
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C. 180-DAY RULE

Relying on an unpublished case of this Court, defendant characterizes the 18-month delay 

in bringing his case to trial as an inexcusable “bureaucratic failure.” He argues this was the basis, 

rather than a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. He portrays the prosecution in this matter as not 

consistently taking steps toward prosecuting defendant.5 

The requirements of the 180-day rule are in MCL 780.131(1), which states, in relevant 

part:

Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in this 

state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth 

against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which 

a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought 

to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered 

to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, 

information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of 

the inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, 

information, or complaint. [Emphasis added.]

The 180-day period begins running on the day after the prosecutor receives the required notice. 

Williams, 475 Mich at 256 n 4. When a prosecutor violates the 180-day rule, the following 

consequences apply:

In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action 

is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no 

court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried 

warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and 

the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [MCL 780.133 

(emphasis added).]

The statute has a long legal history, beginning, notably, with People v Hendershot, 357 

Mich 300, 303; 98 NW2d 568 (1959), wherein our Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature 

did not intend to require that a trial commence within 180 days. “The statute does not require the 

action to be commenced so early within the 180-day period as to insure trial or completion of trial 

within that period.” Id. at 304. Rather, if “apparent good-faith action is taken well within the 

period and the people proceed promptly and with dispatch thereafter toward readying the case for 

trial, the condition of the statute for the court’s retention of jurisdiction is met.” Id.

Our Supreme Court expanded on its analysis of the 180-day rule in Lown, 488 Mich at 246 

explaining: “The object of this rule is to dispose of new criminal charges against inmates in 

 

5

In their appeal, the prosecution presents arguments that many of defendant’s arguments were not 

properly preserved and therefore are subject to the plain-error analysis set forth in People v 

Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-766; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). However, for purposes of this appeal, 

and without directly deciding the issue, we treat all of defendant’s claims of error as preserved.
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Michigan correctional facilities; the rule requires dismissal of the case if the prosecutor fails to 

commence action on charges pending against an inmate within 180 days after the [MDOC] delivers 

notice of the inmate’s imprisonment.” Id. at 246. “[T]he rule does not require that a trial be 

commenced or completed within 180 days of the date notice was delivered.” Id. Rather, “it is 

sufficient that the prosecutor proceed promptly and move the case to the point of readiness for trial 

within the 180-day period.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[G]ood faith is an 

implicit component of proper action by the prosecutor, who may not satisfy the rule simply by 

taking preliminary steps toward trial but then delaying inexcusably.” Id. at 246-247. Stated 

differently, “the requirement that a prosecutor proceed in ‘good faith’ means simply that [the 

prosecutor] must in fact commence action and cannot satisfy the rule by taking preliminary steps 

without an ongoing, genuine intent to promptly proceed to trial, as might be evident from 

subsequent inexcusable delays.” Id. at 273.

We have been instructed by our Supreme Court that the plain and unambiguous language 

of MCL 780.131(1) must be enforced as written. Williams, 475 Mich at 250. “The clear language 

of MCL 780.131(1) provides that MDOC must send written notice, by certified mail, to the 

prosecutor to trigger the 180-day requirement.” People v Rivera, 301 Mich App 188, 192; 835 

NW2d 464 (2013). “Our Supreme Court has held that the 180-day rule’s statutory requirements 

‘expressly provide’ that notice must be sent to the prosecuting attorney.” Id., quoting Williams, 

475 Mich at 256. In Rivera, this Court held where the MDOC sent a notice letter to the district 

court but not to the prosecuting attorney by certified mail, the 180-day rule was never triggered, 

so it could not have been violated. Rivera, 301 Mich at 192. As stated earlier in this opinion, the

record on appeal in this case does not reflect the prosecution ever received a notice letter. 6 As in 

Rivera, the 180-day rule was never triggered in this case, so it could not have been violated. 

Accordingly, assuming defendant has not waived his statutory right to the 180-day rule, the trial 

court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him as defendant 

was responsible for many of the delays. See, Williams, 475 Mich at 270.

D. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

Though defendant does not specifically make a speedy trial argument in his brief he implies 

in his argument that by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the 180-day rule, 

defendant’s right to a speedy trial was also implicated. Again, presuming that defendant did not 

waive his right to a speedy trial with his unconditional guilty plea, in the interest of thoroughness, 

we examine the merits of his arguments. 

A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is found in both the United 

States and Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. “[T]he federal and 

state constitutions and Michigan statutory law guarantee criminal defendants a speedy trial without 

reference to a fixed number of days.” People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 644; 672 NW2d 

860 (2003). “In contrast to the 180-day rule, a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not violated 

after a fixed number of days.” Williams, 475 Mich at 261. The right to a speedy trial is codified 

in MCL 768.1, which states “persons charged with crime are entitled to and shall have a speedy 

 

6 See footnote 3.
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trial” and that the case be brought to “a final determination without delay except as may be 

necessary to secure to the accused a fair and impartial trial.”

Whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial is violated depends on consideration of four 

factors: “(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, 

and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” Williams, 475 Mich at 261-262. “Following a delay of 18 

or more months, prejudice is presumed, and the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that there 

was no injury.” Id. “The establishment of a presumptively prejudicial delay ‘triggers an inquiry 

into other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether 

a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.’ ” People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 

442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997) (citation omitted).

The length of delay between defendant’s arrest on April 22, 2021, and the beginning of his 

trial on October 31, 2022, is 18 months and nine days. Under the first factor, the delay is 

presumptively prejudicial, even if only by nine days, but is not determinative of a speedy trial 

claim because the delay does not approach the outer limits of other delays this Court has 

addressed.7 However, the length of the delay triggers evaluation of the other listed factors. 

Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 459. Under the second factor, the prosecution offers the COVID-19 

pandemic as a compelling reason why defendant’s trial could not commence earlier.8 As we have 

previously concluded, the pandemic resulted in docket congestion, which, although technically 

attributable to the prosecution, is “given a neutral tint and [is] assigned only minimal weight in 

determining whether defendant was denied a speedy trial.” Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 460. Other 

factors contributing to the delay in commencement of defendant’s trial included defendant 

encouraging his son not to speak to law enforcement, causing more than a one-month delay in 

finishing the preliminary examination, defendant filing a motion to quash the bindover, and 

defense counsel failing to fill out the Jury Trial Readiness Form in time for defendant’s February 

4, 2021 pretrial hearing, which needed to be adjourned to February 8, 2021. The trial court 

accurately weighed these facts heavily against defendant. 

Regarding the third factor, defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial on August 4, 2022, 

three months before his trial. Until this point, defendant did not challenge any previous delays in 

bringing his case to trial, including the multiple pretrial conferences, which occurred before a trial 

 

7 See People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 564; 526 NW2d 33 (1994) (4 1⁄2 years); People v 

Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 319-320; 299 NW2d 346 (1980) (31 months); People v Cutler, 86 

Mich App 118, 126; 272 NW2d 206 (1978) (37 months).

8 On March 15, 2020, the Michigan Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 2020-1, 

which imposed emergency measures on Michigan courts as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Administrative Order No. 2020-2 was entered three days later on March 18, 2020, and instructed 

trial courts to adjourn all criminal matters, including jury trials until after April 3, 2020, with a few 

exceptions not relevant here. Administrative Orders 2020-1 and 2020-2 were later extended to 

April 14, 2020, see Administrative Order No. 2020-5, then April 30, 2020, see Administrative 

Order No. 2020-7, and finally for an indefinite period, Administrative Order No. 2020-12. On 

April 23, 2020, all jury trials were delayed until the latter of June 22, 2020, or further notice. 

Administrative Order No. 2020-10.
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date could be scheduled. More importantly, throughout these proceedings and on appeal, 

defendant has failed to assert how he was prejudiced. Rather, he seems content to simply rely on 

the simple conclusion that the delay in bringing him to trial caused prejudice. However, in the 

absence of any specifics, we cannot conclude that defendant was subjected to any form of 

prejudice.

Regarding the fourth factor, “there are two types of prejudice which a defendant may 

experience, that is, prejudice to his person and prejudice to the defense.” Williams, 475 Mich at 

264 (citation omitted). Again, defendant’s sole argument has been there was inexcusable delay in 

bringing his case to trial. Despite defendant’s argument, this Court has held the fourth factor may 

properly weigh against a defendant incarcerated for even longer than 19 months if his defense is 

not prejudiced by the delay. Id. Defendant makes no specific argument his defense was prejudiced 

by the delay in bringing him to trial. Analyzing the factors listed in Williams, defendant’s right to 

a speedy trial was not violated as he was partially responsible for the delay. Lown, 488 Mich at 

270. Accordingly, the trial court properly declined to dismiss the charges against defendant.

Affirmed.

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Noah P. Hood