UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 04-0491
J ONATHAN L. H AAS , A PP EL L ANT

V
. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued January

10, 2006 Dec ided Aug ust 16, 2006 )

Louis J. George, wi th w ho m Barton F. Stichman , was on the br ief, b oth of Washington, D. C., fo r t

he a pp e lla nt.
W illiam L . Puchnick

, wi th w ho m Tim S. McClain, Ge ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Brian B. Rippel , Depu t y As s i stant Gene ral Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., wer e on the br ief for the appe llee.
Be fore HAGEL , MOORMAN, and LANCE, J ud ge s. MOORMAN, Judge : The appe llant, J onathan L . Haa s, appea ls a Fe bruar y 20, 2004, Boa

rd of Ve tera ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd) de cision that d en i ed enti tlement to service connec tion for diabete s
me lli tu s, wi th p e ri ph e ra l ne ur op a thy , n e ph ro pathy , a nd re tin op a thy

a s a re su lt o f e xpos ur e to he rb ic ide s d

ur inghis Vi e tna

m- e ra se rv ic e . Re c or d ( R.) a t 11 ; see S TE D MAN ' S M ED I CA L D I CT I O N A RY 1211, 1191, 1560 (27th ed. 2000) (def ining "ne uropathy " a s "a

disease involving the cr anial ner ves or the pe riphera l or autonomic ner vous sy stem"; " nephropathy " a s "a ny disease of the ki dney "; a nd "r etinopathy " a s "noninflammatory deg ener ative disease of the retina" ). The Boa rd deter mined that althoug h Mr. Haa s had serve d in the water s off the shor e of the Republic of Vietnam, such servic e did no t w arr ant a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he presumpt ion

of e xpos ur e to h e rb ic ide s und e r 3 8 C. F .R. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii) (2004), which, the Boa rd conclude d, require d a ser vice membe r to set foot on land2

in t he Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m. M r. Ha a s d id n ot s e t f oo t on land in the Re pu

bli c of Vi e tna m. T hu s, at issue in this appeal is whethe r VA' s asser ted reg ulatory definition of "servic e in the R epublic of Vietnam" is a permissible interpre tation of the authorizing statute, 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f ), and w hether the B oa rd ' s i n t e r

p r e t a t i o ni s a

r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o no f

V A ' s r e g u l a t i o n , 3 8 C

. F

. R. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii). The appellant, initially unrepr esente d, filed an informal brief. After the appe llant obtained counse l in J une 2005, both par ties filed supplemental brie fs and the a ppellant filed a supplemental re ply

brief. O n J anuar

y 10, 2006, the parties prese nted ora l argument. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252 (a) and 7 2 6 6 (a ) to revie w the F ebrua ry 2004 Boa

rd decision. After consideringthe par

ties' briefs and oral argument, we hold that ( 1) 38 U.S.C. §1116(f) is not clear on its fac e conce rning the meaningof the phra se " service in the Republic of Vietnam." There fore , the statute is ambig uous, and t h e S ec re t ary may promulg ate r eg ulations to resolve that ambig uity so long a s the regulations reasona bly interpre t both the lang uag e of the stat u t e an d the intent of Congr ess in enac ting the le g islation. W e fur ther hold (2) that 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f) does not by i t s t e r m s l i m i t a

p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r e s u mp t i o n o f s e r v i c e c o n n e c t i o n f

o r h e r b i c i d e e xpos ur e to those who set foot on the soil of the Republic of Vietnam. We hold (3) that the Sec ret ar y 's

re g u lati o n s , w h il e a p e r

mi s s ib le e xe r c is e o f h is r u le ma k in g a u th o r it y , d o n o t c le ar ly

prec lude

a pp lic a tio n o f the pr e su mpt ion to a me mbe r o f t

he Ar me d F or c e s w ho se rv e d a

bo ard a sh ip i n c los e proxi mity to the land mass of the Republic of Vietnam. We hold (4) that the provisions of the VA Ad jud ic a tio n Pr oc e dure Manu a l [he re ina ft e r M 21 -1 ] in e ff e c t a t the tim e the a

pp e lla nt f ile d h is c la im in 2001 entitled him to a presumption of service connec tion based upon his rec eipt of the Vie tnam Service Medal (V SM). We hold (5) that VA' s attempt to rescind that version of the M21-1 pr ovision more fa vorable to the appellant wa s ineffe ctive bec ause V A did not comply wi t h t he notice a nd comment re quirements of the Administrative Procedur es Ac t (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)( A). And, finally , we hold (6) that if servic e conne ction for diabet es mellitus i s g rante d upon rema nd,

s e c o n d ar y s e r v i c e c o n n e c t i o nm u s tb e c o n s i d e r e d f o r t h e v e t e r an ' s c l a i m s o f

p e r i p h e r a l n e u r o p a t h y, nephropathy , and re tinopathy . For these re asons, the Court w ill re verse the B oard' s determination that the appe llant was not entitled to the presumption of exposure to her bicides and r eman d the matter for rea djudication consistent with this decision.3 I. F AC TS Mr. Haa s serve d on active duty in the U.S. Navy from September

1959 to September 1960, and fr om May

1963 to J une 1970. R. at 15. He later tra nsfer red to t h e Reser

ve compone nt and retire d from the Na

val R eser ves effec tive J uly

1, 1982. R. at 304. During his entranc e examination in M arc h 1 95 9, Mr . H a a s r e po rt e d a fa mil y his tor

y of dia be te s, bu t a t that tim e a lso state d th a t he did not have diabe tes mellitus. R . at 22. The e x aminer noted that Mr. Haas was in good hea lth. R. at 23. Throug hout his service , Mr. Haa s routinely noted a f amily history of diabe tes during his phy sical examinations, but also repor ted that he did not suffe r from diabetes mellit us. R. at 61, 71, 78, 253. Mr. Haa s was hospitalized from Octobe r 4, 1967 , t o October 10, 1967, at the U.S. Nava l Hospital at S u b i c B ay , Republic of the Philippines, for an uppe r re spiratory infec tion and inflammation of the rig ht foot. R. at 124- 25, 500. During his hospital stay , Mr. Haa s was diag nosed as having"a cute g outy arthritis with hy

perur icemia," and a h o rs es h o e kidney with left py e loc a lie c ta sis . R. a t 12 4; see D OR L AND ' S M ED I CA L D I CT I O N A RY 800, 1392 (27 t h ed

. 1988) (def ining " hy perur icemia" as " excess of uric a cid or urate s in the blood; it is a prer equisite for the development of

g out and may

lead to renal disease "; a

nd "py eloca liectasis" as " dilation of the kidney pelvis and ca lices" ). The r esults of a g lucose test taken at that time were abnorma l. R. at 124, 127. I n an August 1968 service medical report, an examiner repor ted t hat Mr. Ha as would have to u nd e rg o f ur the r t e sti ngto r

ule ou t di a

be te s me lli tus

. Th e e xami ne r furt he r not e d tha t the g luc os e toleranc e test conduc ted i n October 1967 was "mildly abnorma l but not significa ntly and may be a ref lection of [Mr. Haa s' s] obesit y ." R. at 140. I n Dec emb er 1 972, Mr. Haa s was found to be phy sically

qualified to continue service . L aboratory tests conducted a

t that time revea led normal

a lbumin and su g ar l e ve ls, and no rm a l ser olo g y re po rt s. R. at 19 2. He wa s a lso de e me d p hy sic a lly quali fi ed for active- duty -for -trainingservice afte r phy sical examinations in May 1973, Fe bruar

y 1975, Augu s t 1 9 7 6 , and September 1977. R. at 200, 238, 257. He wa s disqualified from a ctiveduty -for -trainingservice in September 1978 a fter f aili n g t o m ee t weig ht require ments. R. at 273. I n Fe bruar

y 1981, Mr. Haa s reque sted a tra nsfer to the "r etired list without pay "; his re quest was g rante d and dee med ef

fec tive J uly

28, 1981. R. at 298. On J uly 19, 1982, he wa s transfe rre d to the Retired Reser

ves, ef fec tive J uly

1, 1982. R. at 304.4

I n Aug ust 2001, Mr. Haa s submitt ed an a pplication for VAdisability compensation,

re qu e sti ngse rv ice con nect ion fo r d ia be te s me lli tus , p e ri ph e ra l ne ur op a thy , a nd los s o f e y e sig ht, resulting from " e xp o s u

r e to [A ]g e nt [ O ]r ang e/ra dioactive mate rials" during his service . R. at 313-21. He indicated that thes e disabiliti es first manife sted sometime in 1980 and that he ha d rec eived treatment for these conditions at the VA medic al ce nter in Phoenix , Arizona. Id. A VA r eg ional office (RO) sent Mr. H aas a letter in August 2001 informing him that in order fo r t he RO to a

pp ly the pr e su mpt ion of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n fo r dia be te s me lli tus du e to e xpos ur e to he rb ic ide s d

ur ingse rv ic e , h e mus t " have ph y sic a lly se rv e d o r v isi te d in

the Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m, inc lud ingser vi c e in t

he wate rs of

fs ho re if the c on dit ion s o f s e rv ic e inv olv e d d uty or vis itatio n in Vietnam. This means the ship must have co m e t o p o rt in the [R epublic of V ietnam] and y ou disembarke d." R. at 323-27. I n response to this notice, Mr. Haa s took e x ception to the criter ia for "se rvice in the R epublic of Vietnam." R. at 329. He r eporte d that he had se rved on a n "a mmuniti on ship and [had] resupplied boats and ships patrolling the coa stal water of Vietnam with ammuniti on, food, stores a

nd fuel. Ammunition ships and tankers did not enter the ports of Vietnam due to the ri sk s o f ex p l o s i o n d u e t o e nem y fi re or sab ot age." Id. He f

urther note d that he had r ece ived four VSMs, and there fore , "se rved in the Republic of Vietnam without the ' ship g oing into port in [ the Re publ ic of Viet nam ] and

. . . d is emb arki ng.'" Id. I n September 2001, he contende d that "se rvice in the Republic of Vietna m," a s defined by

38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii), must be read to include service in the water s offshore . R. at 331-32. I n May 2002, the P h oenix, Ariz ona, RO denie d presumptive ser

vice c onnection for

diabetes me llitus with periphe ral ne uropathy , nephropathy , and retinopathy . R. at 455-60. I n J une 2002, Mr. Haa s filed a Notice of Disag ree ment (NOD ), and in Dec ember 2002, the RO issued a Statement of the Case (SOC), maintaining its de nial of his claim on the basis that Mr. Ha a s d id n ot h a ve se rv ic e in t he Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he de fi nit ion

se t f or th i n VA Ge nera l Counsel Precede nt Opinion (G.C. P rec .) 27-97 ( J uly 23, 1997). R. at 521-39 (the Court notes that both the RO decision and the SOC re fer to a VA Gene ral Counsel prec edent opinion that was published in September 1996; however , the only VA Ge nera l Counsel prec ed ent opi nions of

rec ord re g ardingthe issue of what constitutes service in the Republic of Vie tnam are G.C. Prec. 7- 93 (1993) a nd G.C. Prec. 27- 97 (1997)) . Mr. Haa s fi l ed an ap peal with the B oard in January 2003,1. See NavSourc e Online: Service Ship Photo A rchi v e, AE-16 Mount Katmai , at

http:// www.na

vsource .org /arc hives/09/0516.htm (last visi ted Aug

. 10, 2006) (noting the leng th of the U.S.S. Mount Katmai as 459 fe et).
5 asser ting that VA ' s interpre tation of " service in the Republic of Vietnam ," w as " arbitra ry and capr icious, and . . . contra ry to regulation and law." R. at 543. I n Ju ly 2 0 0 3 , M r
. H a a s te s ti f ie d b e f o r e a me mb e r o f th e B o ar d

. R. a t 5 6 0

- 7 1

. M r
. Haa s state d th a t duri nghis tou

r a bo ard the U. S.S. Mount Katmai , h e of te n s aw l arg e c lou ds of

c he mic a ls being dropped by

airc raf t over the f

orests. He further

stated: " [T] hese larg e clouds would drif t out

ov e r t he wate r b e c a

us e of the pr e va ili ngof

fs ho re wi nd s, and

the y woul d engul f s hip s, my

sh ip i n particula r. Now you could see the che micals, y ou could t aste them, smell them, and they landed on y our skin." R. at 562. Mr. Haa s repor ted that his e x posure oc curr ed in 1966 or 1967. R. at 563. He

n o t e d t h a th e w a s o nana m m u n i t i o n s h i p a b o u t " 4 2 0 , [ 4 ] 2 5 f

e e t [ l o n g ] " f

o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 0 d a ys 1 at a time, for

eig ht months during ea ch of his two deploy ments. R. at 564- 65. He testified that he would have to na

vigate in close proximit y

to the shoreline to de liver supplies beca use the " boats that

wer e doin g the patrolling could not leave the stations more than a cer tain amount of time[.]

. . . [T] hey couldn' t ste am out 5 miles to pick up supplies." R. at 565. The Boar d subsequently issued the dec ision on appeal he re, de ny ing pr esump t i v e service c onnection for diabetes me llitus on the ba sis that Mr . H a a s n e ve r s e t f oo t on land in the Re pu

bli c of Vi e tna m. T he B oa

rd did no t e va luate Mr. Haa s' s claim under the direc t service -conne ction provisions of VA re g ulations. R. at 1-16.

II. CONTENTIO NS ON AP P EAL On ap p ea l , t h e ap p el l an tm ak es t h re e a s s er t i o n s o f e rr o r. Fi rs t , h e c o n t en d s t h at VA 's

re g ulator y de fi nit ion

of wh a t c on sti tut e s " se rv ic e in the Re pu bli c of Vi e tna

m" c on tr a dic ts the pla in meaningof the a

uthorizi ng statute, 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f) . Second, he a sserts that if the Court finds the language of 38 U. S.C. § 1 11 6( f) to b e a mbi g uo us , V A' s g a p- fi lli ngre g ulatio n, 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 07 (a )( 6) (i ii) , is no t a

pe rm iss ibl e int e rp re ta tio n of wh a t ma y c on sti tut e " se rv ic e in t

he Re pu bli c of Vietnam
. " Finally , he asse rts that VA' s M21-1 provisions addressingthe application of the presumption of ser

vice c onnection for h er b icide exposure ar e substantive in nature and have the forc e and e ffe ct of law , and that VA c ommitt ed er ror by retr o actively

applying the Fe bruar

y 20022. The Court note s that in our rec ent dec ision in Pratt v. Nicholson , __ Vet.App. __, __, No.

04 -0 45 1, sli p o p. a t 5 (Aug . 11, 20 06 ), we he ld that the pla in langua g e of the ph ra se " in t

he Re pu bli c of Vietnam," a s used in 38 U.S.C. § 1831(2), was suff iciently clea r to resolve the question prese nted. Acc ording ly , we r ejec ted the appellant' s claim that the veter an' s service in the San Dieg o, California, are a qualifie d the appellant for benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1805. Id. Our c onclusion in this case that the statut or

y langua g e is a

mbi g uo us a s to se rv ic e in t he wate rs of

f t he c oa st o f V ie tna

m is no t in conflict with Pratt

. Rather, these two case s illust rate the principle that statutory ambig uity is not an absolute conc lusion, but is a case -by -ca se dete rmination as to whether the lang uag e answ ers the pa rt ic ula r q ue sti on pr e se nte d. He nc e , s ta tut or y langua g e tha

t pla inl y ans we rs on e qu e sti on may sti ll be ambig uous when a

pplied to another.

6 version of M21- 1, para g raph 4.24( g ). As a r esult, the appe llant asserts that the F ebrua ry 2004 Boa

rd decision should be re verse d. Th e Se c re tary

fi rst a sse rt s th a t th e te rm " Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m" c on ta ine d in

38 U. S.C. § 1116(f) is not ambiguous g iven the languag e and the context withi n which the statute w as ena cted; howeve r, if the Court conc ludes that the term is a mbiguous, then VA' s regulatory definition of what constitutes service in the R epublic of Vietnam is a permissibl e and r easona ble interpre tation of that lang uag e. S econd, he m aintains that the M21-1 provisions at issue in this case a re inter pretive r ather than substantive in nature ; thus, they do not have the f orce and ef

fec t of law a

nd do not dictate an

awa rd of pr esumptive servic e conne ction in this case. The Secre tary asser ts that if the Court finds that the M 21-1 provisi ons are substantive, howeve r, that under any version of the M21-1 provisions

a dd re ssi ngpr e su mpt ive se rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or he rb ic ide e xpos ur e , th e a pp e lla nt' s o wn state me nts

are sufficie nt to rebut the presumption. Finally , the Secre tary conce des that a rema nd is nece ssary for the B oard to c onsider entitlement to servic e conne ction for diabe tes mellitus on a dire ct servic ec on ne c tio n b a sis

.

III . A NA LY SIS A. Standard of

Review At issue in this case is the mean i n g of the statute a nd regulations gove rning presumptive exposure to cer

tain h er b i ci d e age nts as the re sult of service in the Republic of Vietnam and what constitutes "se rvice in the Republic of Vietnam." These are questions of law that the Court re views 27

de no vo
. I n de c idi ng the se iss ue s, the Court mus t fi rs t ana ly ze the langua g e of

the a uth or izin g statut e anddet erm in e "whet her C on gress h as d ir ect ly sp ok en t o t he p reci se q ues ti on at i ss ue. " Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v . Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 46 7 U .S. 83 7, 84 2 ( 19 84 ); see 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (p ro vidi ng th e Co urt' s sc op e of re vie w) ; Go od

Sa ma rit an Ho sp . v . S

ha lal a , 508 U.S. 402, 409 ( 1 99 3) ; se e als o T

ri lle s v . W est , 1 3 V e t.A

pp . 3 14 , 3 21 (2 00 0) (e n b anc ). I f t he te xt of the statut e speaks unambiguously

direc tly to the question at issue, then " that is the end of t he matter ; for the [C ]ourt, as well as the ag ency , must give e ffe ct to the unambig uously expressed intent of Cong ress." Chevron , 4 67 U. S. at 84 2- 43 ; see also Gardn er v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 584, 586- 87 (1991) (a d dre s s i n g p ri n ci p l es o f s t at u t o ry co n s t ru ct i o n an d n o t i n g t h at , wh er e as t at u t e h as a p l ai nm ea n i n g, the Court shall g ive ef

fec t to that meaning ), aff'

d sub nom. Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115 (1994);

se e als o M

e e k s v . W est, 12 Vet.App. 352, 354 ( 1999) (" ' [E]a c h p art or se c tio n [of

a statut e ] sho uld b e c o n s t ru edi nco n n ec t i o nwi t h ev ery o t h er p ar to r s ec t i o n s o as t o p ro d u ce a h ar m o n i o u s wh o l e. '" (quoting 2A N. S I NGER , S UTHE R L AND O N S TATUTOR Y C ONS TR UC TI ON § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992)) ). I f, ho we ve r, the statut e is s ile nt a s to the ma tte r at is su e , V A' s atte mpt a t fi lli ng that g a

p " wi ll g e ne ra lly be sus tai ned as lo ng as it refl ect s a perm is si bl e con st ruct io n o f t he s tat ut e." NLRB v. United Food & Commercial W

orkers Union , 484 U. S. 1 12 , 1 23 (1 98 7) ; see Chev ron , 46 7 U. S. a t 84 2- 43 ; Felton

v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 363, 370 ( 1993). B. Statutory

Provision 1. Plain Lan gu ag e of 3 8 U .S .C. § 1 11 6(

f) Se c tio n 1 11 6( f) , ti tle 38 , o f t he U. S. Co de , p ro vid e s: For purposes of establishing service connec tion f or a disability or death re s u l ting from exposure to a herbic ide age nt, including a pre sumption of service- connec tion under this section, a veter an who, during active milit ary , naval, or air ser vice, serve d in the Republic of Vietnam du ri n g the per iod beg inning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975, shall be pre sumed to have be en exposed during such ser vice to an her bicide ag ent containing diox in . . . and may be pre sumed to have be en e xpos e d d ur ingsu c h s e rv ic e to any oth e r ch e mic a l com po un d in an h e rb ic ide a g e nt, un le ss the re is af

fi rm a tiv e e vid e nc e to es ta bli shthat th e ve te ra

n w a s n ot e xpos e d to any such ag ent during that service

. Id . (empha sis added). The prec ise question at i ssue i n this case is the m eaning of the phra se " serve d in the Republic of Vietnam." The re a re ma ny way s in which to interpre t the boundarie s of a

so ve re ig n n a tio n s uc h a s th e former Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m, w hic h is no w p art

of the Soc ia lis t3. I n 1 95 4, purs ua nt t o th e Ge ne va

Ag re e me nt o n V ie tna

m, the c ountr

y wa s te mpo ra

ri ly partitioned i nto North and South Vietnam at the 17t h para llel; the northern part wa s ref err ed to as the " Democr atic Republic of Vietnam," with its capital in Hanoi, and the s outhern part was known as the Republic of Vietnam, with its capital in Saigon. In the 1960s, U.S. mili tary troops wer e sent to S ou th V ie tna

m to su pp or t th e Sa ig on go ve rnme nt i n ma int a ini ngits ind e pe nd e nc e fr om N or th Vi e tna m. I n 1 97 3, a ft e r s ig nin g the Pari s A g re e me nt, the Un ite d State s be g an to wi thd ra w i ts tro op s, and in the springof 1975, the northe rn and souther n parts of V ietn am wer e unified. O n April 25, 1976, the country , now including both the northern and southern parts of the territory , was re named the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. See Embassy of t he S ocialist Republic of Vietnam in the United States of Am er ica, History of Vietnam, at http:// www.vietnamembassy -usa.or g /learn_a bout _vietnam/history

(last ac cesse d Mar. 20, 2006)

. 8 Republic of Vietna

m. For instance, suc h boundarie s can be define d solely by the mainland 3 g eog raphic are a. See C IA W OR L D F AC TB OOK , Vietnam, available at www.c ia.g ov/cia/publications /fac tbook/ge os/vm.htm l (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (noting t he land boundarie s of Vietnam as 4,369 ki l o meters) . The pre sent boundarie s of the Republic of V ietnam ca n also be c onstrued to include the surrounding islands it controls in the Hoang Sa and TruongSa arc hipelag os. See Embassy of the Socialist Republic o f Vi etnam in t he United States of A merica , Maps of Vie tnam, at http:// www. vietnamembassy-usa.or g/learn_a b o u t

_ v i et n am / geo grap h y

/ m ap s (l as tac ce s s edM ar. 2, 2006). Using int e rn a tio na l la

w p ri ncipl es, th e Re pu

bli c of Vi e tna m c ou ld b e de fi ne d f

ur the r t o in c lud e its territoria l seas, extending 12 na utical miles from its coastline, or e ven as f ar a s its ex clus ive

e c on om ic z on e, e xten din g its bo un da ry 20 0 n a uti c a l mi le s b e y on d th e c oa stl ine , a nd fu rt he r t o include its airspac e. See United Nations Convention on the L aw of the Sea, Par

t I I , Dec . 10, 1982,
at http://www.un.or g

/Depts/los/convention_agree ments/ t ex t s /u n cl o s / cl o s i ndx .htm (last visit ed Mar

. 2, 2006) (" The sover eig nty of a c oastal State extends, bey ond its land territory and int erna l water s and, in the ca se of a

n arc hipelag ic State, its a

rchipe lag ic water s, to a

n adjac ent belt of sea , descr ibed

a s th e te rr ito ri a l se a . T his so ve re ig nty e xten ds to t

he a ir sp a c e ov e r t

he te rr ito ri a l se a

a s w e ll a s to its be d a nd su bs oil ." ); see also United Nations Convention on the L aw of the Sea, Par

ticipants, at http:// u ntrea ty .un.org /ENGL I SH/bible/englishinterne tbible/ partI /chapter XXI /treaty6.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (noting that the Republic of Vie tnam signe d the Convention on Dec

. 1 0 , 1 982, and

ratif ie d it o n July

25 , 1 99 4) ; cf. United Nations Convention on the Ter ritorial Sea a

nd the Contiguous Z on e, Apr. 29, 1958, Participa nts, at htt p:/ /un tr e a ty .un. or g /E NG L I SH/ bib le /e ng lis hin te rn e tbi ble9

/partI/chapter

XXI /treaty 1.asp (last a cce ssed J une 30, 2006) ( repor ting that the U nited States signe d this treaty on Sept.15, 1958, and ratified t he treaty on Apr. 12, 1961, thus adopting the 12 nautica l mile standard f

or its territorial sea s, and the 200 na utical mile standard f

or its contiguous zone). The a ppellant ar g ues that the text of this st at u t e i s clea r, that the phra se " Republic of Vietnam" must be rea d, in a ccor dance with Pre sidential Proclamation 5928, 54 Fe d. Reg . 777 (Jan. 9, 1989) to include both the nation' s land mass and ter ritorial sea s. Appellant' s Supplemental Br ief at 6 (noting that the territoria l se a of a sovere ign nation extends 12 nautical miles). The a ppellant

argue s th a t th e Court

mus t pr e su me that w he n Co ng re ss e na c te d s e c tio n 1 11 6( f) , it kn e w the " wi de ly

a c c e pte d te rr ito ri a l de fi nit ion of a so ve re ig n c ountr

y ," and that by us ingthe ph ra se " in t

he Re pu bli c of Vietnam," it intended to adopt that de finit i o n. Id. I n response , the Secr etar y maintains that beca use the re g ulation first defining "se rvice in the R epublic of Vietnam" (38 C .F.R. § 3.311a( a)( 1) (1985)) , predated the ena ctment of 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f) , the Court must presume that Cong ress wa s
awa re of VA' s then-extant regulatory provision, and t h er ef

o re , i t is rather the ag ency ' s regulatory definition that Congr ess must have intende d to adopt. The Court notes, howe ver, that at the time section 1116(f) was enac ted in 1991, there w ere tw o ex tan t V A regul ati on s d efi ni ng "s e r v i c e i n t h e R epubl ic o f Vi etn am. " Compare 38 C.F .R. § 3.311a(a )(1) (1985) ( defining "se rvice in the Republic of Vietnam" as "inc lud[ ing] servic e in the water s offshore and service in other locations, if the conditi ons of service invol ved duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietna m") , with 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 13 (1 99 0) (e nti tle d " Cla ims ba se d o n s e rv ic e in Vietnam" and def

ining " service in the Republic of Vietnam" a s including " service in the water s of fs ho re , o r s e rv ic e in o the r l oc a tio ns if the c on dit ion s o f s e rv ic e inv olv e d d uty or vis itatio n in Vietnam" ). B a s e d

o n the diffe rent sy

ntax and punctuation used in these re g ulations supposedly using the same de fi nit ion fo r V ie tna m- e ra se rv ic e , it

is e a sy to s e e ho w o ne c ou ld i nte rp re t and a pp ly thi s de fi nit i o n d i f

f e r e n t l y i n p r a c t i c e
. F o r e xamp l e , b a s e d o n t h e p l a c e m e n t o f t h e c o m m a in § 3.311a(a )(1) (1985), the c lause " if the conditions of s er v i ce i n volved duty or visitation in the Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m" c an b e re a d to mod if

y bo th " se rv ic e in th e wat ers of fs ho re " and

" se rv ic e in other locations," althoug h even that inte rp re t at i on is not certain to flow f rom the languag e and sy ntax. The same clause, howeve r, in § 3.313 " Claims based on servic e in Vietnam," based on the comma plac ement, ca

n be re ad to m odify only "se rvice in other locations;" thus, service in the water s10

offshore could constitute servic e in the Republic of V ietnam re g ardle ss o f wh e th e r th e vete ran visited

or ha d d uty on land in V ie tna m. It is fu

rt he r un c le ar wh a t the re a de r sh ou ld c on c lud e fr om t he us e of " and " a ft e r " wate rs of

fs ho re " in § 3. 31 1a (a )( 1) , a nd the us e of

" or " a ft e r " water s o ff

sh or e " in § 3. 31 3. Th e Court c ann ot c on c lud e , the re fo re , ba se d on the se va ry ing de fi nit ions , t hat Cong re ss intended to adopt either the i nternational law definition as the appellant conte nds, or, as the Sec reta ry
asser ts, the regulatory

definitions e x tant at the time that the Ag ent Ora ng e Ac t of 1991 was e nacte d. Thus, the Court c annot conclude that the text of the statute is c lear on its face

. See Che vron, supra.

2. Le gis lat iv e Hi

sto ry an d Co nte

x t of 38 U. S. C. §

11 16 ( f) We m us t ne xt loo k to the le g isl a tiv e his tor y of thi s st a tut e to d isc e rn w het her Con g re ss otherwise spe cified its intent reg ardingthe meaningof the phra se "s er v i ce in the Republic of Vi etn am. " See Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ( noting that disce rning Congr ess' s intent

c an be a c c omp lis he d by re vie wi ng the le g isl a tiv e his tor y of a statut e ). Th e me anin g of the statut e
as a w hole also wa

rra nts scrutiny

. Se e Mo re au v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A pp . 3 89, 39 6 (19 96 ) (" [I ]t is fu nd a me nta l th a t sec tio ns of a statut e sh ou ld not be re a d in iso la tio n f

ro m th e c on te xt of

the wh ole

a c t , an d t h a ti nf u l f i l l i n g o u r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n i n t e r

p r e t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n , ' w e m u s t n o tb e g u i d e d b y a single sentenc e or member of a sente nce, but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, a nd t o i t s o b j ec tan d p o l i cy
. '" ( qu o t i n g Richards v. United States , 369 U. S. 1, 1 1 ( 19 62 )) ); se e als o Cot tle v. Principi , 1 4 V e t

. A p p
. 3 2 9 , 3 34 (2 00 1) ; Me eks , 1 2 V e t.A pp . at 35 4; Talley v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 282, 286 ( 1992). As noted a bove, af ter such r eview, if

the intent of C ong ress is unclea r, then we must d ef

er t o VA ' s construction of the statutory term, if it is a permissible interpre tation. Se e Che v ro n, su

pra ; see also Barnhart v. W alton , 535 U.S. 212, 217-18 (2002). Al tho ug h c ur

re nt s e c tio n 1 11 6( f) w a s n ot e na c te d unti l 19 91 , in 19 83 Con g re ss f

ir st addre ssed the issue of cre ating a statutory presumption of ser

vice c onnection for

diseases r esulting from Ag ent Ora

ng e exposure. See Ag ent Ora ng e Ac t of 199 1 , P u b

. L

. No

. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (c od if y ing c ur re nt se c tio n 111 6( f) a t 38 U.S. C. § 31 6( a )( 3) ); see also H. R. R EP
. N O . 98-592 (1984) , as re pr int e d in 19 84 U. S.C. C.A .N

. 44 49 (d e ta ili ng the his tor y of H. R. 19 61 , the pr e c ur so r o f P ub lic L aw 98- 542, the Vete rans' Diox in and Radiation Compensation Standards Ac t ). I n Marc h 1983, H. R. 1 96 1 w a s in tr od

uc e d in an ef

fo rt to " a uth or ize te mpo ra

ry mon e tary be ne fi ts p e nd ingthe re su lts and re ceipt of the epidemiolog ical study mandated by Public L aw 96-151 for Vietnam vete rans who11

suffe r fr om soft-tissue sarc oma, po rp h y ri a cu t anea

tarda . . . and chlor acne ." 1984 U .S.C.C .A.N. 4449. The 1983 bill, in its orig inal form, would have "pr ovid[ ed] a st atutory presumption of serviceconnec tion for anyveter an who se rve d in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era and wh o late r i s sh own to hav e on e of th e con di ti on s id ent if ied in th e bi ll ." Id. (empha sis a dded). In further repor ting the results of its pre vious ove rsig ht inve stigations, the U.S. House Committ ee on V eter ans' Affa irs (her einaf ter the Committee) re cog nized that the main issues that stil l ne eded to be addre ssed wer e not the t o x i cit y

of the dioxi n contained in Ag ent Ora ng e, but rather " how much exposure to the d i o x i nwa s ex p er i en ce d

b y Vi et n am v et er an s , h o w m u ch ex p o s u re ca n b e ex p ec t ed t o p ro d u ce l o n gterm hea lth effe cts, and at what rate, o r fr eq u en cy , if any , are these e ffe cts being experience d by vet eran s w ho ser vedin S ou th east As ia. " Id. at 4451. Until these questions c ould be answe red by the var ious studies that Congr ess had mandated in Public L aws 96-151 and 97-72, the Committee proposed the te mporary

pay ments set forth in H.R. 1961. Id. at 4453. I n October

1984, Congr ess ena cte d t he Ve tera ns' Diox in and Radiation Expos ure Com pe ns a tio n St and ard s A c t, P ub lic L aw 98 -54 2, ba se d o n H .R. 19 61 . In th is a c t, C on g re ss
rec og nized that there wa s scientific a nd medical unc erta inty

reg ardingthe long -term e ffe cts of

e xpos ur e to A g e nt O ra

ng e , a nd no te d th a t th e re wa s e vid e nc e that th e dis e a se s c hlo ra c ne , p or ph y ri a cutane a tarda , and soft tissue sa rcoma wer e assoc iated with her

bicide exposure. See Pub. L . No. 98- 542, §2(2), ( 5), 98 Stat. 2725 (1984). Fur ther observing that VA had not promulgated re g ulations setting f orth g uidelines for the adjudication of claims based on exposure to Ag ent Ora ng e, and noting the unique diffe renc es betwe en these ty pes of c laims a

nd claims for se rvice connec tion based on an injury in service , Congr ess then author ized VA to "pr escr ibe re g ulations to establish g uidelines and (whe re a ppropriate ) standar ds and criteria for the resolution of claims for benefits .

. . [where] the cl ai m o f s er v i ce co n n ec t i o ni s b as edo na v et er an 's ex p o s u re d u ri n g service. . . in the R ep u b l i c of Vietnam during the Vietnam e ra to a herbic ide containing diox in." Pub. L . No. 98-542, §5(a )(1) (A), 98 Stat. 2727 (1984) (empha sis added). F inally , the ac t amended 38 U .S.C. § 354, adding note ( a)( 1) to allow for " interim benef its for disability

or death in certa in case s." This note pr ovided: I n the ca se of a

veter an – (A) who serve d in the active milit ary , naval, or air ser vice in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam e ra; a nd12

(B ) who ha s a disease descr ibed in subse ction (b) that be came manifest within one y ear afte r the date of the ve tera n' s most rece nt departure fr om the Republic of Vi e tna m du ri ngthat se rv ic e , the A dm inistr a tor sh a ll ( e xce pt a s p ro vid e d in su bs e c tio n ( C) ) p ay

a mon thl y dis a bil ity be ne fi t to the ve te ra

n in a c c or da nc e wi th t his section. Pub. L . No. 98-542, §9, 98 Stat. 2732 (1984) ( emphasis adde d). Al tho ug h th e or ig ina l bi ll, H. R. 1 96 1, wo uld hav e pro vide d th e te mpo ra ry pa y me nt t o Vi e tna m- e ra ve te ra ns wh o s e rv e d in

" Sou the a st As ia ," a s no te d a bo ve , in the pr ov isi on

ult imate ly pas sed by Co ngres s, th at term was repl aced w it h "R epu bl ic o f Vi etn am. " Com pa re H. R. R EP
. N O
. 98-592, as r e

p r i n t e d in 1 9 8 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4449 (noting that the statutory presumption would be aff orded to ve tera

ns "w ho serve d in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam e ra" ), with Pub. L . No. 98- 54 2, § 9 , 9 8 S t a t

. 2 7 3 2 ( 1 9 8 4 )

. T h e r e i s n o e xp l an a t i o ni nt h e 1 9 8 4 C o m m i t t e e R e p o rtf o r t his chang e in the text. I n addition, the 1984 act f ocused mainly on the promul g ation of VA regulations, to include the re qu ir e me nt that the re g ulatio ns be pr omu lg a te d thro ug h th e pu bli c re vie w a

nd c omm e nt p ro c e ss dictated by

the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553, a nd that the re g ulations include " a re quirement that a claimant fi lin g a c la im ba se d upo n . . . e xpos ur e to a he rb ic ide c on ta ini ngdio xin . . . ma y no t be re qu ir e d to produce evidenc e substantiating the veter an' s exposure during active military , naval, or air ser vice if the inf or ma tio n in the ve te ran's se rv ic e re c or ds and oth e r r e c or ds of

the De pa rtme nt o f D e fe ns e is not inconsist ent with the claim that the veter an was prese nt w here and when the claimed e x posure
occur red." Pub. L . No. 98-542, §5(b) (3)( B) , 98 Stat. 2729 (1984). As re lated to any re gu l ation promulg ated pur suant to this act, Congr ess explicitl y adopted the de fini t i o n s for " Vietnam er a,"

" ve te ra n, " " se rv ic e -c on ne c te d, " and " a c tiv e mil ita

ry , n a va l, o r a ir

se rv ic e ," a s se t fo rt

h in 38 U. S.C. § 101. Pub. L . No. 98-542, § 9(g ), 98 Stat. 2733 (1984). The act, howe ver, did not def ine what

con st it ut es "s ervi ce i n t he R epu bl ic o f Vi etn am. " Id. I n o rd e r f or the Court

to t ra c e fu rt he r t he le g isl a tiv e his tor

y of 38 U. S.C. § 1 11 6( f) , it

is

nece ssary to briefly discuss the subsequent re g ulatory actions of the Sec ret ar y

following the 1984 act and o th e r

s u b s e qu e n t p r o c e d

u r a l h is to r

y th a t p r o mp te d

f u rth e r le g is lati v e a c ti o no nth is is sue. Pursuant to the 1984 cong ressional mandate, in April 1985 VA propose d 38 C.F.R. § 3.311a,

" Di oxin R ule ," wh i c h

b e c a m e e ff e c tiv e on Se pte mbe r 2 5, 19 85 . T his re g ulatio n, a mon g oth e r t hin g s,13

define d "se rvice in the Republic of Vietnam" a s "inc lud[ ing] s ervic e in the waters off shore a nd service in other locations, if the conditions of service involved duty or vi sitation in the R epublic of Vi etn am. " See 5 0 Fe d

. R eg. 3 4 , 4 5 2 , 3 4 , 4 5 8 (A u g. 2 6 , 1 9 8 5 ). I ni t s n o t i ce o f p ro p o s edru l em ak i n g, VA re co gn i z edt h at m o re t h an 2

. 4 m i l l i o nU. S

. m i l i t ary p er s o n n el s er v edi nVi et n am , an d al t h o u gh it could not pinpoint exactly who may have be en ex p o s ed to Agent Or ang e, it acknow ledg ed that many of these individuals wer e deploy ed in or near locations wher e Ag ent Ora ng e wa s spray ed. See 50 Fe d. R eg. 1 5,848, 15,849 (Apr. 22, 1985) . Thus, VA stated that "se rvice in the Republic of Vi e tna m" wo u l d " e n c o m p a s s se rv ic e s e lse wh e re if

the pe rs on

c on c e rn e d a c tua lly

wa s in the Re pu bli c of V iet nam , h owe ver b ri efl y ." Id. The notice contained no f urther indication as to what constituted "actu all y
. . . i n t he R epu bl ic o f Vi etn am. " Id. VA is sued t he final regulation without chang e, noting fu rt he r t hat th e pr e su mptio n was based on the e xtre me dif

fi c ult y of tr a c kin g tr oo p mo ve me nts to deter mine exactly who m ay have been ex posed t o Ag ent Orang e. See 50 Fe d. Reg . 34,452, 34,455 (Aug . 26, 1985). I n Fe bruar

y 1987, a g roup of Vie tnam-er a vete rans a nd surviving spouse s filed a c lass action suit in t he United States District Court, Norther n District of California, a lleg ing that this final regulation was invalid beca use i t not only

violated provisions of the 1984 ac t, but in the process of promulg ating the regulation, V A also violated provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and the fifth amendme nt to the U.S. Const itution. See Ne hmer v . U.S. Vete rans' Ad ministrati on , 7 12 F. Supp. 1404, 1410-11 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ( noting that the c ourt could exercise jurisdiction because the action wa s filed prior to the e nactment of the Vete ran' s J udicial Rev i ew Ac t , which veste d jurisdiction over statutory challeng es to VA rule making filed af ter Septembe r 1, 1989, with the F e de ra l Cir c uit ). Th e c ourt he ld t hat th e " c a

us e and e ff e c t te st" e mpl oy e d b y

VAin 3 8 C. F .R. § 3.311a(d) to determine the relationship between dioxi n ex p o s ure a nd diseases w as inconsistent with both VA' s prior practice and the purpose of the 1984 act. Id. at 1418. The c ourt also held that the 1984 ac t require d VA to apply t h e b en ef i t of the doubt doctrine in the a g g reg ate r ulemaking proce ss. I n rea ching this conclusion, the court re lied on the statement of Senator Simpson, i n which he a sse rt e d th a t th e " [198 4] A c t w a s in te nd e d to e ns ur e that ve te ra ns ' have th eir ex po su re c la ims

a dju dic a te d und e r u

nif or m and c on sis te nt re g ulatio ns that in c or po rate ra tio na l sc ie nti fi c jud g me nts , as o p p o s edt o t h e p ri o r sy s t em , i n wh i ch t h e cl ai m s ar e 'co m m i t t ed t o t h e s o u n d j u d gm en to f t h e V A's14

a d j u di cat io n o ffi cers ' who d eci de t hem on 'a case-b y -cas e bas is .'" Id. a t 1 4 2 2 ( c it in g s tate me nt of Senator Simpson, 130 C ONG
. R EC . S1 35 91 (d a ily e d. Oc t. 4 , 1 98 4) ; cf. K

ing v. St. Vincent's Hosp. , 50 2 U .S. 21 5 ( 19 91 ) ( ho ldi ng that vet e ra ns be ne fi ts statut e s shou ld be c on str ue d li be ra lly

fo r t he ir benef iciarie s). I n its conclusion, the court stated that "[t] he Administrator both imposed an imp e rm iss ibl y

de mand ingte st f

or g ra nti ngse rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or va ri ou s d ise a se s and refu sed to give v ete rans th e ben efi t o f t he d oubt in mee ti ng th at s tan dard ." Nehmer, 712 F. Supp. at 1423. The court thus invalidated 38 C.F .R. § 3.311a(d), the portion of the re g ulation t h at d en i ed service

c on ne c tio n f

or a ll dise a se s othe r tha

n ch lor a c ne , an d void e d all de c isi on s deny ing be ne fi ts und e r t his regulation. Id. Following VA' s regulatory action and the U.S

. District Court's de cision in Nehmer , Co ng re ss ultimately enac ted t he Age nt Ora ng e Ac t of 1991. See Ag ent Ora ng e Ac t of 1991, Pub. L . No. 102- 4, 10 5 St a t. 1 1; se e als o Statements on I ntroduce d Bills and Joi nt Resolutions , Veter ans' Ag ent Ora ng e Ex posure and Vietnam Servic e B enef its Act of 1989, 135 C ONG
. R EC
. S6413 (daily ed. June 8, 1989) (noting that a proposed bill, S. 1153, establishing presumptive s ervic e conne ction based on exposure to Ag ent Ora

ng e, wa s desig ned to " complement t h e ef forts Secr etar

y Der winski will be making throug h the new Ag ent Orang e Regulations . . . . This process will allow the VA' s regulatory proce dure to g o forwa

rd and g ive NHL [non-Hodgkin' s ly mphoma] and S TS [ soft-tissue sarc oma] victims the benefit of the doubt in the meantime." ); Amendment to S. 13, The Ve tera n' s Be nefits and Hea lth Care Ac t of 1989, 135 C ONG
. R EC . S12, 628 (daily ed. Oc t. 4, 1989). As stated by Represe ntative Dan B urton, this leg islation ser ved to c odify a prior VA administrative decision that deeme d three diseases service connec ted for c ompensation purposes. See 137 C ONG
. R EC . E390-03 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991) (statement of Rep. Bur ton). The 1991 act also requir ed that the National Aca demy of Scienc es conduc t a comprehensive review of "all the ava ilable and f uture e vidence on the lon g -t e rm

he a lthe ff

e c ts o f expo sure " to he rb ic ide s, and that the Se c re tary , u po n r e c e ipt

of thi s revi ew, det erm in e wh eth er "any fur th er pr esu mp ti on s fo r any di seas e sh ou ldbe gran ted ." Id. Although the 1991 act f

ocused ma inly

on addre ssing the issues raised in Nehmer , su pr a , it also codified, in similar for m, the 1984 n o t e t o 3 8 U.S.C. § 354 at 38 U.S.C. § 316(a)(3), w hich provided:4. I t is noteworthy that the U.S. Supreme Court' s decision in Brown v . Gardner , 513 U.S. at 118, does not appe ar to a

pply in this i nstance . I n Terry v. Principi , t he U.S. Court of Appe als for the Fe dera l Circuit (Fe dera l Circuit) observe d that the principle e nunciated in Brown is "a canon of statutory construction that require s that resolution of interpre tive doubt a rising from st atut ory lang uag e be resolved in fa vor of the ve tera

n." 340 F .3d 1378, 1384 (F ed. Cir. 2003). The Fe dera l C i rc u i tt h en co n cl u d edt h at t h e c an o n"d o es n o taf fe ct t h e d et er m i n a t i o n o f wh et h er an age n cy 's regul ati on is a per mi ss ib le c on st ruct io n o f a s tat ut e." Id. 15 For the purposes of

this subsection, a veteran who, during active military , naval, or a ir se rv ic e , s e rv e d in

the Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m du ri ng th e Vi etn a m e ra

and ha s a disease r efe rre d to in parag raph ( 1)(B ) of this subsection shall be presumed to have been e x posed duringsuch ser v i ce t o an herbic ide ag ent containingdiox in or 2,4- dichlorophenoxy ace tic acid, a nd may be presumed t o have been ex posed during such se rv ic e to a

ny oth e r c he mic a l com po un d in an h e rb ic ide a g e nt, un le ss t he re is aff irmative evide nce to e stablish that the veter an wa s not ex posed to any such ag ent during that service

. Pub . L . N o. 10 2- 4, §2 , 1 05 Stat. 1 11 ; see also Veter ans Educa tion and Be nefits Expansion Act of 2001, Pub. L . No.107-103, § 201(c )(1) (A) ( rede s i gn at i n g provision 38 U.S.C. § 316(a)(3) as 38 U.S .C. § 1116(f)) . The leg islative history of the 1991 a ct, howeve r, is silent conce rning what constitutes "se rvice in the Republic of Vietnam." Rathe r, it indicates Congr ess' s intent to ensure that a fa ir and indepe ndent sy stem wa s est ablished to deter mine the re lationship between he rbicide exposure and the manifestation of cer tain diseases. Thus, afte r reviewing the pl ain t ext of the statute, in conce rt with the leg islat i ve history of both the 1984 ac t and the Ag ent Ora ng e Ac t of 1991, the Court c annot conclude that the intent of Congr ess is so clea r as to r equire either an interpr etation that "se rvice in the Republic of Vietna m" is limited solely

to Vietnam' s mainland, or that such se rvice

nece ssarily

includes ser

vice in Vietnam's te rritorial sea s. C. VA’s Reg ulatory

Provisions 1. ChevronDefere nce T h e S ec re t ary

h as at t em p t edt o re s o l v e t h e a mb i gu i t y i n3 8 U. S

. C

. § 1 1 1 6 (f

) t h ro u gh regulation 38 C.F.R. § 3.307( a)( 6)(iii), as inter prete d in subsequent VA Ge nera l Counsel Precede nt opinions 7-93 and 27-97, a nd M21-1 provision s , d at ed from 1990. Given the ambig uity of the statut e , V A i s pe rm itt e d to iss ue re g ulatio ns in o rd e r t o r e so lve the a mbi g uit y , s ub je c t, h ow e ve r, to the re quirement that such r eg ulations ex press a permissible interpre tation of the s t at u t e. I f the 416

regulations me et this test, they wi l l b e afforde d Chevron defe renc e. B ased on the following , the Court concludes that the regulation, on its fa ce, is a mbiguous reg arding whether service on the land in Vietnam is require d for the pr esumption to apply

. I n defining "se rvice in the Republic of Vietnam " b efor e the Court, the Sec reta ry has used intercha ng eably the def initions in 38 C.F.R

. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii) and § 3.313(a) , thus impl y ing that there is no d if

fe re nc e in t

he me anin g of

thi s d e fi nit ion

a s it a pp e ars in t

he se pa ra te re g ulatio ns
. Compare Secre tary ' s Br ief (Sec ' y Br .) at 13 (r elying on the construction of §3.313 to de fine ser vice in the context of applying the presumption of exposure to herbic ides), with Secre tary ' s Supplemental B ri e f (Se c ' y Sup pl. B r. ) at 22 (r e lyingon §3 .3 07 (a )( 6) (i ii) ); see also Aue r v. Robbins , 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997) (re ly ing on litig ation documents to deter mine ag ency 's i n t erp retation). Upon revie wing the construc tion of these two provisions, howeve r, the Court cannot conclude the same. As noted above , for e x am p l e, 3 8 C.F.R. §3.307(a) (6)( iii) defines " service in the Republic of Vietnam" as including "se rvice in the water s offshore and service in other locations if the conditions of ser vice involved duty or visitation in the republic of Vietnam," while 38 C.F.R. § 3.313, which is entitled "Claims based on se rvice in Vietnam," define s such servic e as " service in the water s
o ffshore , or s e r v i c e i n o t h e r l o c a t i o n s i f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s e r v i c e i n v o l v e d d

u t y o r v i s i t a tio n in Vietnam." (empha sis added). A lt h o u gh s imilar wording is used in these re g ulations, the construction of bo th d e fi nit ion s, no ta

bly the c omm a

pla c e me nt i n § 3. 31 3 and the us e of

dif fe re nt c on jun c tio ns , is quite differe nt. When read w ithout the aid of the Secr etar y ' s ass er t i o n as to the underlying meaningof this phrase, it is not c lear what kind of service is meant to be included f or application of the pr e su mpt ion

of e xpos ur e to h e rb ic ide s. Th e va ry ing c on str uc tio ns of thi s phr a se on ly se rv e to heig hten the ambig uity

of the re g ulatory

lang uag e. Thus, base d o n t h e const ruction of the

re g ulatio ns , the C ourt

c on c lud e s th a t th e Se c re tary me re ly ha s r e pla c e d s ta tut or

y a mbi g uit y wi th regulatory

ambig uity

and Chevron defe renc e will not be af forde d. See Sm ith (

Ellis) v . Nicholson , 451 F.3d 1344, 1350 ( Fe d. Cir. 2006). I n situations such a s this, VA ' s interpre tation of its own reg ulation "be comes ' of controlling wei ght un les s it is pl ain ly erro neo us or i nco ns is ten t w it h t he re gulat io n. '" Sm ith ( El lis ) , 451 F.3d at 1 3 5 0 (q u o t i n g Bowles v. Sem inole Rock & Sand Co. , 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) a nd maintaining that such def ere nce is afforde d even in case s wher e the ag ency announce s its int erpr etation in litigation17

documents). F urther, a s the U.S. Supre me Court noted in Ma rti n v . O c c up ati on al S afe ty an d H e alt h Rev iew Commission , 499 U.S. 144, 150- 51 (1991), whe re " ' the m ea n i n g o f [ re gu l at o ry ] l an gu age is no t f re e fr om d ou

bt, ' the [Court ] sho uld

g ive e ff e c t to [VA ' s] in te rp re ta tio n s o lo nga s it is

' rea sonable,' that is, so long as the interpre tation 'se nsibly confor ms to the purpose and the wording of th e regul ati on s. '" Id. (q u o t i n g Ehlert v. United States , 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) and N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak W alton League of Am., Inc. , 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975)). I n deter mining whe ther VA ' s interpre tation of its r eg ulation is "r easona ble," the Court will consider,

amo ng ot her th in gs, the "ti mi ng and con si st ency of th e agency 's in ter pret ati on ," Ba tte rto n v . F

ra nc is , 43 2 U .S. 41 6, 42 5-26 n. 9 ( 19 77 ); see I NS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (maintaining that an age n cy 's i n terpre tation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpre tation is "' entitled t o co nsiderably less defe renc e' than a c onsistently held ag ency

view" (q u o t i n g W

att v. Alaska , 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)) ); the "thoroug hness evident in its consideration, [ and ] th e val id it y

of i ts reas on in g," Skidmore v . Swift & Co. , 323 U. S. 134 , 1 40 (1 94 4) (" [R]uli ng s, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , an d

o p i n i o n s
. . . w h i l e n o tc o n t r o l l i n g u p o n t h e c o u rt s b y r e a s o n o f t h e i r a u t h o r i t y, do constitute a body

of experienc e and inf

ormed judg ment . . . proper ly resor t[ ed] [t o] for guidance

. The we ight of

such a judg ment . . . will de pend upon the thoroug hness evident in its consideration, the va lid ity

of its re a so nin g , it s c on sis te nc y wi th e arl ie r a

nd la te r p ro no un c e me nts , a

nd a ll tho se fac tors which g ive it power to pe rsuade ." ). For the following rea sons, the Court concludes the int e rp re ta tio n off

e re d to the Court by VA of its re g ulator y de fi nit ion of wh a t con sti tut e s " se rv ic e in the Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m" is i nc on sis te nt w ithpr ior , c on sis tent ly hel d ag e nc y vie ws , p la inl y
err oneous in light of its i nterpre tation of l eg islative history , and unre asonable as an inter pretation of VA' s own regulations. Thus, the curr ent interpre tation w ill not be affor ded def ere nce. See CardozaFonseca , Bowles , and Sk

idm or e , a ll supra;see also Smith ( Ellis), supra. 2. Inconsistent Regulatory I nterpretation As n o t ed ea rl ier, a

n "a g ency ' s interpre tation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpr etation is ' entitled to considera bly less defe renc e' than a c onsistently held ag ency

view." Cardoza-Fonseca, 48 0 U. S. a t 44 6 n .3 0; se e als o S e . Cm ty . Co ll. v . D av is , 442 U.S. 397, 412 n.11 (1979). Af

ter re viewing VA' s M2 1 -1 p ro v isions, it is clear to the Court that the most rece nt interpre tation of § 3.307(a) (6)( iii), that se rvice in V ietnam require s that a vete ran a ctually set foot18

on land, conf

licts with VA' s past policy in det er m i n i n g "s ervic e in the Republic of V ietnam" for application of the presumption of exposure to herbic ides. I n November

199 1 , VA issued M21-1, pa rt I I I , para g raph 4.08( k)(1) -(2) . This provision stated: (1 ) It ma

y be ne c e ssa

ry to d e te rm ine if a ve te ra

n h a d " se rv ic e in V ie tna

m" in c onnect ion w ithc la ims fo r s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or no n- Ho dg kin s ly

mph oma , s of

ttissue sarcoma

and chlor acne
. . . . I n the abse nce of contra dictory

evidenc e, " service in Vietnam" will be conce ded if the r ecor ds shows [si c] that the veter an re ceive d the Vi e tna m Se rv ic e Me da l. (2) I f a veter an who did not re ceive the Vietnam Ser vice Me dal claims ser

vice con n e c ti o n f

o r n o n - H o d g k in ' s ly

mp h o ma , s o f

t- ti s s u e s ar c o ma o r c h lo r a c ne and alleg es ser

vice on a ship in the waters of

fshore Vietnam, re view the r ecor d for evidenc e that the ship wa s in the vicinity of Vietnam for some sig nificant pe riod of time (i.e., more tha

n just in transit throug h the ar ea) . I f the ve tera n cannot pr oduce evidenc e that the ship was in the waters off shore Vie tnam, contac t the Compensation and Pension Service Projects Staff. B e prepare d to furnish t he name of t he shi p, the number of the ship, a

nd the dates that it is alleg ed to have been in the w ater s offshore Vietnam. Centra l Office will attempt to obtain confirmat i o n fr o m the Depa rtment of De fense

. Id. I t appea

rs to the Court that this provision re mained in e ffe ct throug hout the promulg ation and even after the final publication of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii), which thus conce des the a pplication of the pre sumption based upon the mere rec eipt of the VSM, w ithout any additional proof that the veter an ac tually

set foot on land in the Republic of Vietnam. Furthermor e, eve n in the absenc e of a vete ran' s rec eipt of the VSM, this provision requires VAadjudicator s t o re v iew the r ecor d for evidenc e that the ve tera

n' s "ship wa s in the vicinity of Vietnam for some sig nificant pe riod of time." Ba sed on this lang uag e, it cannot be conclu d ed , as t he Secr etar y would urg e us to conc lude, that VA' s longstandinginterpre tation of what constitutes servic e in Vietnam ha s been to e x clude se rvice in the water s offshore unless the veteran had duty or vi sitation on land. I f that we re the case , there

wo uld b e n o r e qu i r e m e n t t o e xam i n e w h e t h e r a s h i p " w a s i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f V i e t n a m f or so me signific ant period of time" beca use such e vidence would be irre levant under the interpre tation that VA now ur g es on the Court. See Appellee ' s Opposed Motion to Correct Mist ake at Ora l Arg ument Dated January

10, 2006, at 2 (asse rting that service in Vietnam would never be concede d under a ny19

provision of the M21-1 i f there was " evidenc e to the contr ary ," inc luding the ve tera n' s own statements that he ne ver se t foot on land in the Republic of Vie tnam); see also M21-1, pt. I I I , para
. 4.08(k)( 1)-( 2) (Nov. 8, 1991) ; M21-1, pt. I I I , para . 4.24(g )(1) -(2) , chang e 23 (Oct. 6, 1993); M21-1, p t

. I I I , p ar a. 4

. 2 4 (g) (1 )- (2 ), ch an ge 41 (J u l y 1 2 , 1 9 9 5 ); M 2 1 -1 , p t

. I I I , p ar a. 4

. 2 4 (g) (1 )- (2 ), ch an ge 76 (June 1, 1999). Fur thermore , this provision was amended in 1995, r efle cting the holding of a 1993 VA Ge ne ra l Co un se l pr e c e de nt o pin ion in wh ic h VA de te rm ine d that in div idu a ls w ho pa rt ic ipate d o nly in hi g h a lt it

u d e f li g h ts o v e r th e Re p u

b li c o f V ie tn a m an d r e c e iv e d th e V SM a s a r e s u lt o f such service would not be entitled to the pre sumption. See G. C. Pr e c . 7 -9 3 ( ma int a in in g that th e se veter ans we re e x cluded f

rom the scope of the re g ulatory definition beca

use t h ey d i d not share the

same e xpe ri e nc e s a s th os e wh o ser ve d in Vi e tna m or in the waters offs hore of Vietnam ). Th is version of M21- 1, part I I I , para g raph 4.24(g ), st ill allowed for a pplication of the pre sumption based up on the re c e ipt

of the VSM and

a lso requ ir ed VAto c on du c t a dd iti on a l de ve lop me nt i n c a se s in wh ic h th e ve te ra

n s e rv e d o n a

sh ip i n th e wate rs of

fs ho re of Vi e tna

m but d id n ot r e c e ive the VSM , thus allowing f

or the infe renc e that the pr esumption would be applicable in case s wher e a vetera n
se rv e d in the wate rs of

fs ho re of Vi e tna

m and re c e ive d a

VSM fo r s uc h s e rv ic e , b ut n e ve r h a d d uty

o r visited on land in the Republic of Vie tnam as the Sec reta ry now asser

ts is required. C

o m p a re M21-1, pt. I I I , para . 4.24(g )(1) -(2) , chang e 41 (Jul y 12, 1995) (noting t hat t his version wa s published afte r the publication of § 3.307(a) (6)( iii) (1994)), with 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii) ( 1994) (de fining "se rvice in the Republic of Vietna m") . Thus, it a

ppear s that the M21-1 provision contains a dditional criter ia not prese nt in the re g ulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)( 6)(iii), that mandate the application of the presumption of ser

vice c onnection. The ref

ore, c ontrary

to the Secre tary ' s arguments, it appear s that it was the long standing policy of VA to awa rd service connection on a presumptive basis in case s i nwh i ch t h e v et er an s er v edi n wa t er s o ff s h o re an d re ce i v ed t h e VS M , wi t h o u t re gar d t o t h e v et er an 's phy sical pre sence on land in Vietnam.

3. Plainly Erroneous Regulatory Inte rpretation The Court also conclude s that VA' s curr ent interpre tation of its reg ulatory definition is based on a misg uided and plainly err oneous review of the l eg islative history of 38 U.S.C. § 101(29), which sets forth the pe riod for V ietnam-e ra se rvice , an d wh i ch VA aver s supports its conclusion that20

Congr ess intended to limit the period to cover only "those veter ans who a ctually serve d within the border s of t he R epublic of Vietnam," and, thus , "se rvice in the R epublic of Vietnam" must also be limit ed to those vete rans who se rved on the land mass of Vietnam. See G. C. Pr e c . 2 7- 97 ; se e als o Bowles , su

pra (n oti ngthat an a g e nc y int e rp ret ati on of a

re g ulator y pr ov isi on

c on tr ols un le ss i t is

" plai nl y erro ne ou s o r i nc on sis te nt" ); Sm ith ( El lis ) , s up ra . This history

is set forth in VA Ge nera l Couns e l pr e c e de nt o pin ion 27 -9 7. Al tho ug h the B oa rd is bo un d by su c h op ini on s, the Court is n ot. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1; se e als o Th e iss v. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 204, 210 ( 2004)

. Th e statut or

y p r o v i s i o n d i s c u s s e d i n V A G e n e r a l Couns e l pr e c e de nt o pin ion 27 -9 7, 38 U. S.C. §101(29), was amende d in 1996 with the passage of the Ve tera ns' Be nefits I mprovements Ac t, Pub. L . No. 104-275, § 505, 110 Stat. 3322, 3341 (1996). I n introducing this amendment to the Senate, Se nator Simp so n sta te d tha t the statut or y de fi nit ion of Vi e tna

m- e ra se rv ic e e xtan t at the tim e on ly

cover ed ser

vice f rom Aug ust 5, 1964 (the date o f t he Gulf of Tonkin resolution), forw ard, thus excluding those troops who w ere in Vietnam as e arly as F ebrua

ry 28, 1961, participating in combat missions . 142 C ONG
. R EC . S1 1, 77 4, 11 ,7 79 (d a ily e d. Se pt. 28 , 199 6)

. He no te d th a t it wa s " e nti re ly appropr iate that [VA] benefits be extended to those who a ctually fac ed per il in Vietnam before that war's 'l egal' st art in g date ." Id. Simi larly , the Senate repor ted that, for the purpose of sec tion 1116(f), the appr opriate pe riod of ser vice would star

t from J anuar

y 9, 1962, the date on w hich the use of herbic ides and de foliants in Vietnam beg an. See S. R EP
. N O
. 1 0 4

- 3 7 1 ( 1 99 6) , a s r epri nted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,762, 3,772. Thus, Congre ss determined that "b enefits that are pr emised on pr e su me d e xpos ur e to d e fo lia nts and he rb ic ide s sh a ll b e a va ila ble to a ll wh o s e rv e d in

the Re pu bli c of Vietnam when such materials we re pr esent ther e, but that they not be extended to those who

ser ved in th e Re publ ic o f Vi etn am o nl y befo re s uch mat eri als were i nt rod uced ." Id. Thus, contra ry to the Secre tary ' s assertion, this amendment wa s not based on Congr ess' s intent to focus solely on g round fo rc es, but rathe r it was mea nt to encompass all vete rans who ma y have be en at r isk for exposure based on the time frame during which those he rbicides a nd defoliants we re spr ay ed in the Republic of Vietnam. Fur thermore , even if it is a corre ct interpre tation of section 1116(f ), this VA Gene ral Counsel prec edent opinion, limited to a spe cific ty pe of ser vice – se rvice on a dee p water vessel off

shore of Vietnam – is ina

pplicable to the appellant' s claim. This opinion ca nnot be re ad to furthe r exclude5. During oral a rg ument , i n an at tempt to clarify the limits of the Sec reta ry ' s brig ht-line int e rp re ta tio n, the Court

a sk e d a se ri e s o f q

ue sti on s. Th e Se c re tary ' s r e sp on se s o nly se rv e d to c on fi rm the Court ' s c on vic tio n th a t V A' s in te rp re ta tio n is un re a so na ble , a nd wh e n a pp lie d, re su lts in such disparate outcomes that it ca nnot be said to comport with Cong ress' s intent in enacting 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f). When aske d to apply the re g ulatory

interpre tation in the case of a vete ran w ho was in the waters off

of Vietnam, in such sufficient de p t h of water that his fe et did not touch the seabe d, versus a veter an who was in the waters off of Vietnam and was able to touch t he sea bed, the Secre tary responde d that neither ve tera n would be entitled to the pre sumption because the regulatory definition is lim ited to t h o s e v et er an s "w ho set foot on land, if y ou will boots on ground, not touching the oce an floor." Fu rt hermore , when a sked whe ther ther e wa s a rational disti nction betwee n the ca se of a

veter an aboa

rd a ve ssel floating up an i n l an d b ody of wa ter such a s a river (w hic h, a c c or din g to t

he Se c re tary ' s argume nt, c ou ld b e mil e s wid e ), wh o n e ve r t ou c he d la nd wi thi n the g eog raphic are a of V ietnam, and a veter an who serve d on a ship w ithin 100 fe et of the shor eline who neve r touche d the land , t h e S ecr etar y simply responde d without rationale that the latter for m of ser vice would not wa

rra nt application of the presumption. Finally , when a sked whe ther the issue wa s if t h e v e t e r anh a d

b e e ns u b j e c tt o b e i n g s p r ay e d

w i t h A g e n tO r an g e , t h e S e c r e t ar y s i mp ly reiter ated that the ve tera

n in this case , who testified that he had serve d within c lose proxi mity to the sh or e , d id n ot h a ve se rv ic e in t he Re pu bli c of Vi e tna

m ac c or din g to t

he re g ulator

y de fi nit ion . T hu s, when further g iven the opportunity to provide a r easone d basis for this brig ht-line rule, the Sec reta ry c ou ld n ot. 21 another ty pe of se rvice that was not c ontemplated by VA in G ener al Counsel prec edent opinion 27- 97, ser vic e su c h a s th a t de sc ri be d b y the a pp e lla nt i n h is unc on tr a dic te d te sti mony , th a t hi s sh ip sailed in close pr ox imity

to the shore, y et he ne ver se t foot on l an d

. Using VA' s risk-of-e x posure test outlined in its June 2001 notice of fina l rulemaking , g iven the spra y ing of Ag ent Ora

ng e along the coa stline and the wind borne eff ects of such spra

y ing, it appe ars that these veter ans ser ving on vessels in close pr o x i m ity to land would have the same risk of e x posure to the he rbicide A g ent Ora ng e as ve tera

ns servingon adjac ent land, or an even gr eate r risk than that borne by those veter ans who may have visited a

nd set foot on t he land of t he R epublic of Vietnam only briefly

. See 66 Fe d. Reg . 23,166. This ty

pe o f s er v i ce m ay

rea sonably

be equated to that of the ve tera n servingon a vessel oper ating in the inland water way s of the Republic of V ietnam without having set foot on land, contra

ry to the Secre tary ' s assertions m ade during oral argument. The S ecr etar y has provided 5

n o r a ti o n a l d is ti n c ti o n b e tw e e n th e s e ty p e s o f s e r v ic e an d th e Co u rt c an divine none. See Sm ith ( El lis ) , 451 F.3d at 1351 (noting c onditions under which VA' s interpre tation as set forth in liti g ation do c ume nt s and proce e din g s is e nti tle d to de fe re nc e ); se e als o A ue r, 51 9 U .S. a t 46 1- 62 . T hu s, in light of the lack of

clea r leg islative history

on this subject and VA' s own plainly erroneous and22

underinc lusive interpre tation, the Court concludes that § 3.307(a)( 6)(iii) must be rea d to include at least ser vice of the nature descr ibed by

the appe llant, that is, service in the water s near the shore of Vi e tna m, w ith ou t r e g ard

to a c tua l vi sit a tio n o r d uty on land in the Re pu bl ic of V ie tna m. Fur thermore , this int er

p re t at i o ni s s u

p p o rt edb y

VA 's M 2 1 -1 p ro v i s i o n s , as o u t l i n edea rl i er , reg arding the a pp lic a tio n of the pr e su mpt ion in c la ims fo r se rv ic e c on ne c tio n ba se d on e xpos ur e to h e rb ic ide s.

4. Unreasonable I

nterpretation of Regulation Finally , the Court note s that VA also has not pr ovided valid or thoroug h rea soning f or either its present interpr etation of what constit utes "se rvice in the R epublic of Vietnam," or t he diffe renc e in construction of the de finition among the various re g ulations i n corporating the def inition. See Sk idm or e , su

pra . I n September 1993, pur suant to the cong ressional ma ndate of the 1991 ac t, VA proposed de leting § 3.311a and r eplac ing it with § 3.307(a )(6) (iii). I n its noti ce of proposed rulemaking , VA re ported that its regulations a ddresse d the issue of disea ses re sulting fr om herbicide exposur e u n d e r

tw o s e p ar a te s e ts o f

c r it e r ia , a t 3 8 C. F

. R. § § 3

. 3 0 7 an d 3

. 3 0 9 ( im

p le me n ti n g the statutory presumption established by Congr ess under

Public L aw 102- 4), and at 38 C.F.R. § 3.311a, wh ic h e sta

bli sh e d s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n o n th e ba sis of ex posure to h e rb ic ide s c on ta ini ngdio xin pursuant to Public L aw 98- 542. VA noted that s ince " [s] ection 10 of Public L aw 102- 4 amende d Public L aw 98- 542 by removing the provisions c oncer ning diox in e x posure
. . . there is .

. . no need for VAto ma intain se parate regulations on this issue." 58 Fe d. Reg . 50,528, 50,529 (Sept. 28, 1993). VA ther efor e propose d "to amend 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a )(6) so that it . . .[ b]ases the presumption of service connec tion on ex posure to ce rtain her bicide ag ents rathe r than on ser vice in the Republic of Vietnam duringthe Vietnam e ra a s it curre ntly does, . . . [and] incorporates the def inition of the term 'serv ice in th e R epu bl ic o f Vi e t n a m ' f r o m 38 C. F.R . § 3. 31 1a. " Id. No comments we re r eporte d

rec eived, a

nd the re gu l at i o n was a dopted without chang e. See 59 Fe d. Reg . 5106 (F eb. 3, 1994) (noting that 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii) defines " service in the Republic of Vietnam" a s including "se rvice in the water s offshore and ser vice i n o t h er locations if the conditions of ser vice involved duty or visitation in the R epublic of Vietnam" ). The notice of propose d rulemaking , as we ll as the notice of the final rule, doe s not contain any explanation indicating that VAviewed this re g ulation as limiti ng application of the presumption to those who ac tually set foot on land in the Republic of Vietnam. The Court notes that 38 C.F.R. § 3.313, promulgated in 1990 a nd also defining"se rvice23

in the R epublic of Vietnam," was neither amended nor remove d by this chang e and rema ins in effe ct today

. See id.; see also 3 8 C. F

. R. § 3

. 3 1 3 ( 2 0 0 5 )

. T h e v ar ia n c e in f o r m o f these re g ulatory pr ov isi on s de fi nin g " se rv ic e in the Re pu bli c of Vi e tna

m," a s dis c us se d e arl ie r, le a ve s th e Court to ponder, w hat, exactly , VA intended in se eking to fill the ga p left by section 1116(f

). Se e su pr a at 9. The critica l a

mbiguity in V A' s interpre tation of its defining r eg ulation simi larly leave s vetera

ns and VA a djudicators to puzz le over how the re g ulation should be applied. Fur thermore , on J uly

9, 2001, when VA added dia betes mellitus, the disease f or which the ap p el l an ts ee k s s er v i ce co n n ec t i o n , t o t h e l i s to f p re s u mp t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , i t n o t ed , i n ad d i t i o nt o VA 's previous interpr etation (a lthough not set for th expl icitly

during prior rulemaking s, as evide nt above) , that the term " service in the Republic of Vietnam" is construe d as including service in the inland

wate rw ay s, bu t no t se rv ic e in w a te rs of fs ho re un le ss s uc h s e rv ic e inv olv e d d uty in o r v isi ta tion to the Republic of Vie tnam. See 66 Fe d. Reg

. 23,166 (Jul y 9, 2001). In response to a comment that specific ally

reque sted that VA include service in the waters offshore of Vietnam, VA relied on the

argume nt t

hat, s inc e the re g ulatio n p re date d th e e na c tme nt o f 3 8 U .S. C. § 11 16 (f ), Con g re ss c ou ld not have intende d to broade n the d efinition. The Court has a lrea dy found this argument unper s u a s iv e
. I na d d it io n , w it h o u t c it in g an y

a u th o r it y o r e v id e n c e s u

p p o rti n g it s a

ppare nt

c on te nti on

that e xpos ur e wa s mo re pr e va le nt a mon g Vi e tna m- e ra ve te ra ns wh o h a d s pe nt s ome tim e on land, no matter howflee ti n g, VA dec lined to make a c hang e to its proposed re g ulation on the basis that "the commenter cited no authority for concluding that individuals who were servingin the water s offshore of the Republic of Vietnam we re subjec t to the same risk of e x posure a s those who

ser ved wi th in th e geograph ic bo un dari es of th e R epu bl ic o f Vi etn am. " Id. I ti s n o ta c o m m en t er 's responsibility

to provide a rationale for VApolicy ; rather , it is t he ag ency ' s obligation to account for the re levant data

and provide an explanation f or its decision. See B urlington T ruck Lines v. U

nited States , 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Absent any

discussion reg ardingthe scientific studies mandated by Congr ess on t his subject

or any oth e r e vid e nc e that c on tr ibute d to VA ' s d e c isi on to l imi t th e de fi nit io n, the Court c an o nly conclude that VA' s asser

ted interpre tation of this re g ulation is not the produc t of ag ency expertise. Apply ing this interpr etation, VA would a ffor d the pre sumpt i on of exposure to Ag ent Ora ng e to a Vietnam-e ra ve tera

n who serve d only

in the inland water

way s of t he Republic of V ietnam and ne ver24

set foot on land; y et, i n order for a Vietnam-e ra vetera n serving in the waters surroundingVietnam to b e e nti tle d to the pr e su mpt ion , h e or sh e mus t hav e se t foo t on la nd , w ith ou t c on sid e ra

tio n a s to either the leng th of time spe nt patrolling in the water s offshore , or the risks of windblown exposure to Age n t Ora

ng e spra y ed alongVietnam' s coastline. L ikewise, a staff of fice r whose only

contac t with the Republic of Vietnam was a one -hour stop at the a irport at Saig on would be entitled to the pre s u mp ti o n o f e xp o s u r e to h e r b ic id e s , b u t a s e r

v ic e me mb e r w h o s p e n t mo n th s p a tr o ll in g the

near shore c oastline of the Republic of Vietnam without setting f oot on its soi l, would not. Fur thermore , these distinctions do not comport with the leg islators' view of the purpose of the 1984 ac t (which set f

orth VA' s authority

to promulg ate such regulations), as expressed by Senator Simps on, that veter ans " have the ir exposure claims adjudicated under u n iform and c onsistent regulations that incorporate rational scientific judg ments." 130 C ONG
. R EC . S1 3, 59 1 ( da ily e d. Oc t. 4, 1984). Given Congr ess' s express conce rn that exposure to Ag ent Ora ng e could not be de termined by trac king tr oop movements, and VA ' s acknow ledg ment that it could not pinpoint exactly who may have be e n e xpos e d to dio xin de sp ite the fa c t that ma ny of the 2. 4 mi lli on

tr oo ps we re de plo y e d in

or nea r loca tions where A g ent Ora

ng e wa s spray ed, it is clea r t o the Court that VA' s interpre tation of its re g ulator

y de fi nit ion fa ils to c on sid e r a n im po rt ant a sp e c t of

the pr ob le m c on te mpl a te d b y bo th Congr ess and VA : the inability to determine e x actly

who was e x posed to Ag ent Ora ng e. There fore , the Court cannot c onclude that VAwas e ither thoroug h in its consideration of this most recent interpre tation of this definition, or that its reasoning is valid. Se e Ma rti n and Sk idm or e , both su

pr a . D. Eff ect of M21-1 Provisions 1. M21-1 prov isions are substant ive in nature. The Sec reta

ry maintains that the M21-1 provisions allowing for a pplicati o n of the pr e su mpt ion

of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n ba se d on re c e ipt of the VSM are int e rp re tiv e in na tur e and me re ly exis t to provide g uidance in adjudicating claims; thus, the regulatory definition should control the outcome in this instance. See Sec' y Suppl. Br. at 16. Even if the re g ulation were clea r, which w e have alre ady deter

mined it is not, the Court c annot ag ree
. The Court ha s held, in c ases simil ar to the instant matter, that wher e the M21-1 pr ovision does not mer ely clar ify or explain an exist ing r

ule or statut e bu t " pres cri be s w hat a c tio n mu st b e take n in the ini tia l le ve ls o f a dju dic a tio n, " the ru le is substantive rathe r t h an proc edura l and has the f orce and ef

fec t of law. Fugere v . Derwinski ,25

1 V e t.A pp . 1 03 , 1 07 (1 99 0) ; see H amilton v. Derwinski , 2 Vet.App. 671, 675 ( 1991) (holding that

" [s]ub sta nti ve ru le s, tho se wh ic h have the fo rc e of law a nd na rr ow ly lim it a dmi nis tr a tiv e a c tio n, in the VAAd

jud ic atio n Pr oc e dure Manu a l are the e qu iva le nt o f D e pa rtme nt Re gulat ion s" ). Suc h is the ca se in the instant appea l. The Sec reta

ry argues that should the Court be per s u ad ed t h at the M21-1 pr ovisions are substantive, then this case is similar to that discussed in Dyme nt v. Principi , 287 F.3d 1377, 1381 (F ed. Cir. 2002), in w hich the Fe dera l Circuit determined that M21-1, pa rt VI §7.68(b)( 2), did not

cre ate a presumption of exposure to asbestos and was simply an interpre tive rule not subje ct to the notice and comment process dictated by 5 U.S.C. § 553(a). Dyme nt , 287 F.3d at 1381 (holding not substantive in nature a

n M21-1 provision, w hich mere ly aler ted adjudicator s to the fac t that vetera ns wh o s e rv e d in

U. S. N a va l sh ipy ard s d

ur ingWWI I

mig ht h a ve a

g re a te r i nc ide nc e of

e xpos ur e to asbestos, and, thus, a mor e extensive revie w of their se rv ice r ecor ds should be conducte d). Simi larly , the Secre tary maintains that M21-1, part I I I , para g raph 4.24(g ), provides on l y advis ory g uidelines for the adjudication of he rbicide e x posure c laims. The M21-1 pr ovision in t his instanc e, howeve r, does more than me rely caution adjudicators

a s to the po ssi ble e xpos ur e to he rb ic ide s fo r Vi e tna m- e ra ve te ra

ns ; it ins tr uc ts a dju dic a tor s to a

pp ly the pre sumption i n case s in which the veter an rec eived the VSM. I t c reates additional criter ia not prese nt in the statute or re g ulation that w ould w arr ant application of the presumption, which, whe n
a pp lie d, dic ta te the awa

rd of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n a

nd , th us , e sta bli she nti tle me nt t o a

mon thl y
mon et ar y benef it. Se e W alt e rs v . Na t'l A sso c . o

f R ad iat ion Su rv iv or

s , 473 U.S. 305, 312 (1985) (ac know le d g in g th a t V A b e n e f it s ar e s im il ar

to th e So c ia l S e c u r it

y b e n e f it s th e Su p r e me Co u rt addre ssed in Matthews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976), and determined t hat t he continued

rec eipt of such be nefits is a prope rty in t er es t p ro t ec ted by

the fifth ame ndment). Thus, the Court cannot c onclude that this provision is merely interpre tive in nature. Rathe r, it is substantive and has the forc e and e ffe ct of law , indisti ng uishable fr om an ag ency regulatio n p ro m u l gat ed throug h the appropr iate public notice a nd comment proc ess. The Court is not persuade d by the Secr etar

y ' s argument that the ea

rl i er M21- 1 provision

conce ding qua lify ing se rvice if the vete ran was awarde d the VS M "in the absenc e of c ontradictory evidenc e" was intende d t o i n d icate that "e vidence to the contra ry " inc luded evidenc e that the26

rec ipient never

set foot on Vietname se soil. W er e t h i s t he ca se, there would be no nee d for the pr ov isi on of su bp ara g ra ph (2 ), wh ic h re qu ir e s ana ly sis of a sh ip' s o pe ratin g e nv ir on me nt f or tho se who serve d offshore and did not rec eive the V SM. Rather, it appe ars to the Court that it is far more

rea sonable to interpr et this provision as conce ding se rvice for the pur pose of ap p l i ca t i o n o f the pr e su mpt ion un le ss the re wa s e vid e nc e that th e re c ipi e nt o f t he VSM ha d r e c e ive d it

fo r s e rv ic e in a neig hboring country

or location that reasona

bly prec luded exposure to Ag ent Ora ng e. 2. Failure to Comply with 5 U.S.C . § 553 The Sec reta

ry argues that should the Court be per suaded that the M21-1 provisi ons in effe ct at the time th e appellant f iled his claim are substantive in nature, those pr ovisions mus t be considere d void since they wer e not promulg ated pursuant to the require ments of 5 U.S.C. § 553(a). See Se c ' y Sup pl. B r. a t 20 . I t is surp ri sin g tha t th e Secret ary sh ou ld ma ke su c h a n a rgume nt, attempting to be nefit fr om an asser tion of his own noncom p l iance with the law. Se e Fu ge re , 1 Vet.App. at 109-10 (striking down the same argument as applied to a n attempted re scission of an M21-1 provision). Addit ionally , the S ecr etar y argues t hat the pre -F ebrua ry 2002 M21-1 provisions should not be enfor ced in this instance beca use t hey do not comply with the statutory authority since they do not addre ss phy sical pre sence on land. This a rg ument must a lso f

ail beca use, as noted above , the term " service in the R epublic of Vietnam" is sufficie ntly vag ue that it does not mandate a ctual ph y sic a l pr e se nc e on land in ei the r the statut e or the Se c re tary ' s r e g ulatio ns . In c a se s su c h a s th is, wher e VA ha s faile d t o co m p l y wi th the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a), a nd aff ord vete rans notice and opportunity

to comment reg ardin g t h e promulg ation and re scission of substantive rules, VA regulations require that "no pe rson shall be re quired to re sort to, or be a dverse ly aff ecte d by any
ma tte r r e qu ir e d to be pu bli sh e d .

. . in t

he F e de ra l Re g ist e r a

nd no t so publ ish e d. " 38 C.F .R. § 1

. 5 51(c) . Acc ording ly , the Fe bruar y 2002 attempted re scission was " without observanc e of p r o c e d u r e r e qu i r e d

b y l aw " an d

i s s e ta s i d e p u r s u an tt o 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 7 2 6 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( D )

. C o n s e qu e n t l y, the M21-1 provision in eff ect prior to the Fe bruar

y 2002 resc ission is binding on the A g ency
. See Hamilton , 2 Ve t.A

pp . at 67 5; Fu

ge re , 1 Vet.App. at 107. 3. Applying the Appropriate M21-1 Provisions At the time the appe llant filed his claim in August 2001, the M21-1 provision in eff ect since 1991 allowed f

or appl i ca t i o n o f t he pre sumption based on rec eipt of the VSM, except under the27

Ge n er al C o u n s el 's i n t er

p re t at i o nt h at i t d i d n o t ap p l y i n ca s es wh er e t h e v et er an p ar t i ci p at edi nh i gh

a lt it ud e fl ig hts on ly . In F e br ua ry 20 02 , V A r e pla c e d th a t pr ov isi on wi th a pr ov isi on

tha t c le a rl y sp e lle d o ut V A' s li mit e d c ur re nt i nte rp re ta tio n o f i ts o wn re g ulatio n, a s f

oll ow s: (1 ) It ma y be ne c e ssa

ry to d e te rm ine if

a ve te ra n ha d " se rv ic e in V ie tna

m" in connec tion with claims based on exposure to herbic ide ag ents. A ve teran must have actually serve d on land wit hin the Republic of Vietnam . . . to qualify for the presumption of ex posure to herbic ides.

. . . The fact that a veteran has been a war ded the Vietnam Ser

vice Medal does not prove that he or she w as " in country ." Ser vice me mbe rs wh o w e re statio ne d o n s hip s o ff sh or e , o r w ho fl e w m iss ion s o ve r V ie tna m, bu t ne ve r s e t f

oo t in -c ountr

y we re so me tim e s awa

rd e d th e Vi e tna

m Se rv ic e Me da l.

. . . . (2 ) I f a

ve te ra n c la ims se rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or e xpos ur e to h e rb ic ide a g e nts , and alleg es ser

vice on a ship in the w ater s offshore of Vietnam, revie w the re cord f or e vid e nc e that th e sh ip w a s in the wate rs of

f V ie tna m and that the veteran's service involved duty

or visitation on l and. I f the ve te ra n c ann ot p ro du c e e vid e nc e of thi s, r e qu e s tv e r i f

i c a t i o nf r o m t h e N a v y. M21-1, pt. I I I , para . 4.24(e) (1)- (2), c hang e 88 (F eb. 27, 2002) ( emphasis adde d). Be cause these M21-1 pr ovision s h av e t h e force a nd eff ect of Depa rtment regulations, the Court will apply

its caselaw

reg ardingchang es in the law dur ing the course of a c laim's pr ocessing and adjudication. The Court has pre viously held that " wher e the law

or re g ulation c hang es afte r a claim has been filed or reopened but befor e the administrative or judicial appea l proce ss has bee n conclude d, the ver sion most favorable to the a ppellant . . . will apply

unless C o n gre ss provided ot herw is e or perm it ted th e S ecret ary to do ot herw is e andth e S ecret ary di d s o. " Karnas v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 308, 313 ( 1991), overruled on othe r grounds by Kuzma v. Principi, 341 F.3d 1327, 1328 (F ed. Cir. 2003)

. The F eder al Circuit clar ified t his rule in Kuzma , su pra , b y ho ldi ngtha

t a statut e may have suc h a re troac tive eff ect if Cong ress c lear ly

intends that result. Kuzma, 341 F.3d at 1328 (c i t i n g Lan dg

ra f v. US I Fil m Pro ds

. , 511 U.S. 244, 272-73 (1994) , and holding that section 3(a ) of the Vete rans Claims Assistance A ct of 2000, Pub. L . No. 106-475, 1 1 4 S t at

. 2096, could not be applied re troac tively beca use C ong ress made no mention of such an int ention). The a pplication of

an ame nd e d r e g ulatio n w ill be de e me d to have a re tr oa c tiv e effect "w he n a su bs tanti ve ri g ht [i s] t ak en aw ay o r n arro we d , " o r "w o u l d i mp ai r ri gh t s a p ar t y p o s s es s edwh en h e a ct ed , i n cr ea s e ap ar t y 's liability for pa st conduct, or impose ne w duties with respe ct t o t ransa ctions alrea dy completed." Landgraf, 51 1 U .S. a t 28 0; s e e S to la s z v
. Ni c h olson , 19 Vet .App . 3 55 , 3 60 (2 00 5) ; Rodriguez v.28

N i chols on , 1 9 V e t

. A p p
. 2 7 5 , 2 8 7 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e a

p p l i c a t i o n o f a m e n d e d 3 8 C. F .R. § 3.22 would take a

substantive rig ht from the appe llant). I n this instance , there is no cong ressional mandate authorizing a retroa ctive applicat i o n of the Fe bruar

y 2002 version of M21- 1, part I I I , para g raph 4.24( e). F urthermor e, ap p l ication of the Fe bruar y 2002 M21-1 provision deprive d the appe llant of a subst antive rig ht to the application of the pre sumption of ex posure to her bicides b as ed u p o n his rece ipt of the VSM, which would have be e n a pp lie d und e r t

he M2 1- 1 v e rs ion

in e ffect at th e tim e the a pp e lla nt f ile d h is c la im. Ac c or din g ly , e ve n if

the Februa

ry 20 02 pr ov isi on

wa s d e e me d to be in a c c or da nc e wi th l a w, its application in this instance would have an impermissible r etroa ctive eff ect, which would re quire that the Court rema

nd for a pplication of the a

ppropriate M21-1 provision. E. Consideration of Dire ct and Sec ondary Service Connection Th e Se c re tary

ha s c on c e de d th a t a

re mand is wa rr ante d be c a

us e the B oa

rd fa ile d to e va luate the appe llant's c laim un d er d i rect service connec tion principles. Given the e vidence of diabe tes mellitus sy

mptomatology

during service and wi t h i n one y ear afte r ser vice, a s outlined su

pr a , the Court ag ree s. Howeve r, bec aus e o f t h e Court's r ever sal as to the B oard' s determination that the appellant wa s not entitled to the presumption of exposure to herbicide s, such consider ation is not

ne c e ssa ry up on re mand . A lth ou g h th e app ell ant r e qu e sts that w e re mand thi s matte r w ith instructions to award se rvice connec tion, we ar e not in a position to do so. The a ppellant is corr ect that the B oard, in its decision, did not challeng e his diag nosis of diab et es mellitus. However, 38 C.F .R. § 3.307(a)( 6)(ii) doe s not allow for pre sumptive service

connec tion for any

of the listed disease s unless the disease has "be come manifest to a deg ree of 10 perc ent or more at any

time after

service ." I

n this case , there has not y et bee n a dete rmination that th e a p p e ll an t' s d ia

b e te s me ll it

u s is d is a b li n g to a c o mp e n sable de g ree
. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.120, Diag nostic Code 7913 (2005) ( detailing the re q u i re m ents for a compensa

ble disability

rating for diabetes) . Acc ording ly , an aw ard of service connec tion at this t ime would be pre mature a nd rema nd is the appropr iate re medy

. See E lkins v. Gobe r, 22 9 F .3 d 1 36 9, 13 77 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 0) ; se e als o Majee d v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 525, 530 ( 2006) (noting that the Secr etar y must make the initial deter mination of whether

a disability

rises to a leve l that makes it compensable ).29

Upon re mand, the appe llant is free to argue this issue, and pre sent any additional evidenc e and ar g uments to the Boa rd, and the Boa

rd is require d to consider them. See Ka y v
. Principi , 16 Ve t.A pp . 5 29 , 5 34 (2002) ; Kut sc he ro us k yv . W est , 12 Vet.App. 369, 372 ( 1999) (pe r cur iam order ). Additionally , should the Boa rd aw ard se rvice connec tion for diabete s me l l i tus, the Court expects that the proper

proce dure w ill be af

fo rd ed to the appellant' s claims for se condar y service

con n e c ti o n f

o r p e r ip h e r a l n e u r o p a thy , n e p h r o p a thy , an d r e ti n o p a thy , a ll c la im e d a s r e s id u als of diabetes me llitus

. See R. at 5 ( no tin g that the B oa rd fo un d th a t " VAc lin c ia l r e c or ds be g inn ingin 2 0 0 0 r e v e a l d i a g n o s e s o f t yp e - II d i a

b e t e s , p e r i p h e r a l n e u r o p a t h y , n e p h r o p a t h y, an d r e t i n o p a t h y, the re by satis fy ingthe ini tia l e le me nt o f a se rv ic e -c on ne c tio n c la im" ). Th e Se c re tary is e xpe c te d to provide e x peditious treatment of the se matters pur suant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109B, 7112.

IV . C ON CL USI ON After consideration of the appellant' s and the Secre tary ' s briefs, or al ar g ument as pre sented

on J anuar y 10, 2006, and a revie w of the rec ord on appea l, the Court f inds that V A' s re gu l ati on defining "se rvice in the Republic of Vietnam," 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (6)( iii), is permissibl e pursua nt to Chevron ; however , the re g ulation is ambiguous. VA' s argued interpr etation of the r eg ulatory term

" se rv ic e in t

he Re pu bli c of Vi e tna m," a ff or din g the a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he pr e su mpt ion of e xpos ur e to herbic ides only

to V ietnam-e ra veter ans who set foot on land and not to the a ppellant, is inconsistent with longstandingag ency views, pl ainly err oneous i n light of leg islative and reg ulatory history , and

unrea son a

b le , an d mu s t b e SE T A SI D E

. I n th is c a s e , th e M 2 1

- 1 p r o v is io n a ll o w in g f o r the

a pp lic a tio n o f t

he pr e su mpt ion

of e xpos ur e to h e rb ic ide s b a se d o n th e re c e ipt of the VSM c on tr ols

. T h e Fe b ruary

2004 Boa

rd dec ision, therefor e, is REVERSED to the ext ent that the B oard de nie d th e a

pp e lla nt t he pr e su mpt ion of e xpos ur e to he rb ic ide s and the ma tte r i s RE MA

ND ED wi th ins tr uc tio ns to ap ply the pr e su mpt ion in a mann e r co ns ist e nt wit h the int e rp re ta tio n set fo rt h in thi s opinion. I f ser

vice c onnection for

diabetes me llitus is awar ded upon re mand, VA should ensur e appropr iate proc essing of the a ppellant' s claims for se condary service connec tion for per iphera l neuropathy , nephropathy , and re tinopathy , claimed a s residuals of dia betes mellitus. Furthe rmore, M2 1- 1, pa

rt I I I , p ara g ra

ph4. 24 (e ), c ha

ng e 88 (F e b. 27 , 2 00 2) , is SET ASI DE purs ua nt t o 3 8 U .S. C. § 7261(a) (3)( D).