alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1005 

KA 14-01971 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DEVON SCOTT, ALSO KNOWN AS “GHOST”,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ROBERT L. KEMP OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL J. FLAHERTY, JR., ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (NICHOLAS

T. TEXIDO OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Russell

P. Buscaglia, A.J.), rendered August 8, 2013. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a

plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25

[1]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is not

valid and that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress statements

he made to the police as well as identification testimony from several

witnesses. We reject defendant’s contentions.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, “the waiver of the right to

appeal was not rendered invalid based on the court’s failure to

require defendant to articulate the waiver in his own words” (People v

Dozier, 59 AD3d 987, 987, lv denied 12 NY3d 815). Moreover, the

record establishes that the court “describ[ed] the nature of the right

being waived without lumping that right into the panoply of trial

rights automatically forfeited upon pleading guilty,” and ensured that

defendant’s waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

entered (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 257; see e.g. People v McClain,

112 AD3d 1334, 1335, lv denied 23 NY3d 965; People v Verse, 61 AD3d

1409, 1409, lv denied 12 NY3d 930). Defendant further contends that

the waiver of the right to appeal was not knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily entered based on his mental limitations, including

potential learning disabilities. Although the record establishes that

defendant “may be learning disabled,” there is no “ ‘indication that

defendant was uninformed, confused or incompetent when he’ waived his

right to appeal” (People v DeFazio, 105 AD3d 1438, 1439, lv denied 21
-2- 1005 

KA 14-01971 

NY3d 1015), nor is there any basis to conclude that the court did not

adequately mold its colloquy to the “age, experience and background of

the accused” (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 11). 

The valid waiver of the right to appeal forecloses any challenge

by defendant to the court’s suppression rulings (see People v Kemp, 94

NY2d 831, 833; People v Burley, 136 AD3d 1404, 1404, lv denied 27 NY3d

993). 

Entered: November 10, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Stereotaxis, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael P. Kaminski, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title
18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

|                  |  |  |  |                        
|----------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|                  |  | 
|Date: May 7, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ Michael P. Kaminski
|                  |  |  |  | Michael P. Kaminski    
|                  |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer
|                  |  |  |  | Stereotaxis, Inc.
**Exhibit 32.1**











**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**


**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**










In connection with the Annual Report of MC Shipping Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):







I, Antony Crawford , Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






January 31, 2005








/S/ ANTONY CRAWFORDAntony CrawfordChief Executive Officer
<PAGE>   1
                                                                        PAGE 1
        [STATE OF DELAWARE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE LETTERHEAD]

        I, EDWARD J. FREEL, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, DO
HEREBY CERTIFY THE ATTACHED IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
DESIGNATION OF "CROWN LABORATORIES, INC.", FILED IN THIS OFFICE ON THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY, A.D. 1997, AT 3 O'CLOCK P.M.


[STATE OF DELAWARE SEAL]                /s/ EDWARD J. FREEL
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        Edward J. Freel, Secretary of State

2188590  8100                           AUTHENTICATION: 8407528
971108309                                         DATE: 04-07-97
<PAGE>


                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.27

                               VOTING AGREEMENT

                         Dated as of February 6, 1998


         The parties to this agreement are T/SF Communications Corporation, a
Delaware corporation ("T/SF") and eight wholly-owned subsidiaries
(collectively, the "Subsidiaries") of T/SF, namely Atwood Convention
Publishing Inc., a Missouri corporation, GEM Communications, Inc., an Oklahoma
corporation, Galaxy Registration, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Galaxy Design
and Printing Inc., a Maryland corporation, Expo Magazine, Inc., a Kansas
corporation, Casino Publishing Company, a Minnesota corporation, T/SF of
Nevada, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and T/SF Europe, Inc., an Oklahoma
corporation.

         T/SF and each of the Subsidiaries are members (the "Members") of T/SF
Holdings, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Holdings"), pursuant to
the Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement (the "Agreement")
of Holdings. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Members elect the board of
managers of Holdings. The parties wish to provide that the Members shall vote
to elect managers of Holdings as determined by T/SF.

         It is therefore agreed as follows:

 1.  Voting. T/SF and each of the Subsidiaries agree to vote as Members of
     Holdings for the election of the board of managers of Holdings, as
     determined by T/SF. To effect this voting agreement, each of the
     Subsidiaries is executing and delivering to T/SF an irrevocable proxy in
     the form of Exhibit A.

 2.  Term. This agreement shall remain in effect for the duration of Holdings
     pursuant to section 7 of the Agreement.

 3.  Applicable Law. This agreement shall be governed by and construed in
     accordance with the law of the State of Delaware applicable to contracts
     made and to be performed in Delaware.

 4.  Enforcement. The parties recognize that irreparable damage will result in
     the event that this agreement shall not be specifically enforced, and
     they accordingly agree that the provisions hereof shall be enforceable by
     a decree of specific performance, without any bond or other security
     being required.

 5.  Entire Agreement; Modification. This agreement contains the entire
     agreement of the parties with respect to its subject matter and no change
     or modification may be made orally.


T/SF COMMUNICATION CORPORATION


By:____________________________________


ATWOOD CONVENTION PUBLISHING INC.


By:____________________________________


GEM COMMUNICATIONS, INC.


By:____________________________________


<PAGE>


GALAXY REGISTRATION, INC.


By:____________________________________


GALAXY DESIGN AND PRINTING INC.


By:____________________________________


EXPO MAGAZINE, INC.


By:____________________________________



CASINO PUBLISHING COMPANY


By:____________________________________


T/SF OF NEVADA, INC.


By:____________________________________


T/SF EUROPE, INC.


By:____________________________________
#### STATE ex rel. Wesley McKNIGHT v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, State of Louisiana.

No. 88-KH-1121.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 1988.

In re McKnight, Wesley; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “L”.

Granted in part. The district court is ordered to vacate and set aside the additional two year consecutive sentence imposed under La.R.S. 14:95.2 in accordance with our holding in *State v. Sanders,*523 So.2d 209 (La.1988).
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 104 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 104

      To authorize testimony, production of documents, and legal 
 representation in United States v. Nippon Miniature Bearing, Inc., et 
                                  al.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 20, 1999

    Mr. Lott (for himself and Mr. Daschle) submitted the following 
             resolution; which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
      To authorize testimony, production of documents, and legal 
 representation in United States v. Nippon Miniature Bearing, Inc., et 
                                  al.

Whereas, in the case of United States v. Nippon Miniature Bearing, Inc., et al., 
        Court No. 96-12-02853, pending in the United States Court of 
        International Trade, a subpoena for testimony and documents has been 
        issued to Tim Osborn, a former employee of the Senate Committee on Small 
        Business, concerning the performance of his duties on behalf of the 
        Committee.
Whereas, pursuant to sections 703(a) and 704(a)(2) of the Ethics in Government 
        Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 288b(a) and 288c(a)(2), the Senate may 
        direct its counsel to represent Members or employees of the Senate with 
        respect to any subpoena, order, or request for testimony or documents 
        relating to their official responsibilities;
Whereas, by the privileges of the Senate of the United States and Rule XI of the 
        Standing Rules of the Senate, no evidence under the control or in the 
        possession of the Senate may, by the judicial process, be taken from 
        such control or possession but by permission of the Senate; and
Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or in the possession of 
        the Senate may promote the administration of justice, the Senate will 
        take such action as will promote the ends of justice consistently with 
        the privileges of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That Tim Osborn, and any other former Senate Member or 
employee from whom testimony may be required, are authorized to testify 
and produce documents in the case of United States v. Nippon Miniature 
Bearing, Inc., et al., except concerning matters for which a privilege 
should be asserted.
    Sec. 2. The Senate Legal Counsel is authorized to represent Tim 
Osborn, and any other former Member or employee of the Senate from whom 
testimony may be required, in connection with the case of United States 
v. Nippon Miniature Bearing, Inc., et al.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of the Accounting of Patrick Creegan, as Administrator of the Estate of Ellen Toolan, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County,

March 17, 1959.

*Harold L. HasMn*and *Herbert A. O’Brien*for Patrick Creegan, claimant.

*Alfred J. Rameri*for administrator, *d. b. n.*

*John L. Molloy*for Matthew Creegan and another.

*W. Wesley Hill,*as special guardian.

John D. Bennett, S.

In this accounting proceeding the objectant, whose claim to certain shares of corporate stock has been rejected, seeks an examination of the administrators *d. b. n.*as “ adverse parties”. The representatives also seek an examination of the claimant.

The respondent is entitled to an examination of the representatives under both section 263 of the Surrogate's Court Act and section 288 of the Civil Practice Act.

‘ ‘ This is an application by an alleged creditor of decedent, to examine one of the coadministrators concerning her account and administration of the estate and the rejected claim of the movant. A creditor or a person claiming to be a creditor whose *537claim has been rejected is entitled to such relief under section 263 of the Surrogate’s Court Act and section 288 of the Civil Practice Act respectively *(Matter of Stapf’s Will,*128 N. Y. S. 2d 850).” *(Matter of Keren,*206 Misc. 769; cf. *Matter of O’Shaughnessy,*144 Misc. 533.)

The administrators are directed to produce all books and papers in their custody or control for use upon the examination pursuant to section 296 of the Civil Practice Act.

The representatives are entitled to an examination of the objectant as to his claim under section 288 of the Civil Practice Act *(Matter of Schwarts,*4 Mise 2d 982) and the production of books and records under section 296 of the Civil Practice Act.

Since the respondent’s motion is a cross motion and subsequent in time to the accountants’, the examination of the accountants will follow that of the objectant (Rules Civ. Prac., rule 121-a; *Desiderio*v. *Oabrielli,*284 App. Div. 976).

The objectant’s request for the alternative examination of ‘ ‘ attorney or agents ’ ’ without specifically naming such persons is denied.

Settle order on five days’ notice.
1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

December 24, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-40489

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SEBASTIAN MARTINEZ-CARRISALES,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. L-02-CR-1445-ALL

--------------------

Before DUHE’, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

Sebastian Martinez-Carrisales appeals from his conviction of

being found in the United States after deportation following a

conviction of an aggravated felony. He contends that the district

court erred by adjusting his offense level by 16 levels for

commission of a crime of violence based on a 1999 Illinois

convict ion of residential burglary. He argues that his burglary

conviction was not an aggravat ed felony for sentencing purposes

and, for the first time on appeal, that the Sentencing Commission2

did not i ntend for the crime-of-violence adjustment to apply to

offenses that are not also aggravated felonies. He also contends

for the first time on appeal that the “felony” and “aggravated

f elony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional in

light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

The district court did not err by adhering to a literal

i nterpretation of the language of the U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A),

which provides for a 16-level adjustment for commission of a crime

of violence. Interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is

subject to ordinary rule s of statutory construction, and if the

guideline’s language is unambiguous, our inquiry begins and ends

with an analysis of the plain meaning of that lang uage. U nited

States v. Carbajal

, 290 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 537

U.S. 934 (2002). The only exception to this rule is when a clear

contrary legislative intention is shown, an exception that applies

only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.” See Ardestani v.

INS

, 502 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1991). Martinez has not established

that the commentary to and history of the amended U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2

e stablish that the Commission did not intend that some of fenses

that do not qualify as “aggravated felonies” within the meaning of

the guideline nonetheless warrant the guideline’s top offense-level

increase.

Martinez’s Apprendi contention is foreclosed by the caselaw of

this court. S ee United States v. Dabeit

, 23 1 F.3d 979, 984 (5th3

Cir. 2000). Martinez concedes that his contention is foreclosed,

but he raises it to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
23.1- UPDATED AND COMING FROM GRANT THORNTON





CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We have
issued our reports dated March 5, 2009, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements, schedule, and internal control over financial
reporting included in the Annual Report of Fuel Tech, Inc. on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 2008.  We hereby consent to the incorporation
by reference of said reports in the Registration Statement of Fuel Tech, Inc. on
Form S-8 (No. 333-137735 effective October 2, 2006).





/s/
      Grant Thornton LLPChicago,
      IllinoisMarch
      5, 2009
#### Sigmund Bottner, Respondent, *v.*Louis Petchers, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

December 19, 1957.

*Irving F. Berger*for appellant.

*Harold L, Glasser*and *Norman P. Horwits*for respondent.

*672
      *Per Curiam.*

The question of whether the transaction between defendant and the Texas Company was a real estate transaction requiring plaintiff to have a real estate broker’s license as a condition of recovery is one of fact. An issue is thereby presented.

The order should be affirmed, with $10 costs.

Stetjeb and Hecht, JJ., concur; Hoestadteb, J., concurs in result.

Order affirmed, etc.
Page & Paragraph 

Number

(e.g, 1.3.2.1) 

Commenter Name, 

Phone Number & 

Organization

Comment & Rationale Recommended Change/Proposed Rewrite

Comment Form for Advisory Circular (AC) 90-106A

Enhanced Flight Vision Systems

Date of Review & Comment: _________________________________
---

Exhibit 32.1





SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO\


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the annual report of ECCO Energy Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Samuel M. Skipper, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: April 15, 2010








/s/ Jesse M. OzboltJesse M. Ozbolt,

Chief Executive Officer
#### DIXIE STATE BANK, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John Paul JOHNSTON, Jeffrey A. Richard, and Nanette Richard, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 19693.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 28, 1986.

LaMar J. Winward, St. George, for plaintiff and appellant.

Brent A. Gold, Park City, for defendants and respondents.

*1160HOWE, Justice:

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review an order of change of venue.

On or about May 4, 1982, defendant Johnston financed the purchase of an automobile through plaintiff. To secure the loan of $8,313.22, he gave plaintiff a security interest in the automobile. He made only one payment in the amount of $248.27. In October, 1982, plaintiff took possession of the automobile and, after giving notice, sold it at a private sale for $5,500. In the first count of its complaint, plaintiff seeks to recover from Johnston the deficiency plus interest, costs, and attorney fees.

Sometime before the private sale, defendants Richard tendered to plaintiff a check in the amount of $744.81 for delinquent payments. This check was returned to plaintiff uncollected, the check being marked “account closed.” In the second count of its complaint, plaintiff seeks to recover from the Richards the amount of the bad check plus interest, costs, and attorney fees.

Plaintiff filed its complaint in Washington County. Defendants moved alternatively to dismiss the complaint or to change venue to Salt Lake County since all of defendants were residents of that county. The district judge denied the motion to dismiss, but granted the motion for change of venue, and the case was transferred to Salt Lake County.

We do not decide whether the change of venue was properly granted because plaintiff acquiesced in the change by filing in the District Court of Salt Lake County a motion for default judgment, and subsequently took a default judgment against defendant Johnston for the balance owing on the agreement, plus attorney fees. A motion was filed to set aside that judgment and plaintiff entered its written objections to that motion. All of this activity occurred while plaintiff was seeking a review of the change of venue in this Court. Since plaintiff has availed itself of the resources of the District Court of Salt Lake County and pursued its action there, it has waived any objection it had to the change of venue. For that reason we do not disturb the order changing venue.

Order affirmed.

HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

STEWART, J., concurs in the result.