1 Eric H. Holder, Jr., has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the United States, and is substituted as responde nt pursuant to Federa l Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c). 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-2320

___________ Blanca Salguero-Fuentes; * Francisco Mejia-Aguilar, *
* Petitioners, * Petition for Review of an * Order of the Board of v. * Immigration Appeals.
* Eric H. Holder, Jr. 1 , Attorney General * of the United States, *
* Respondent. *

___________ Submitted: March 10, 2009 Filed: June 25, 2009

___________ Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Blanca Salguero-Fuentes seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) removal order, whic h affirmed the immigration court’s determination that it lacked jurisdicti on to consider de novo Salguero-Fuentes’s Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a when-2- Salguero-Fuentes failed to e xhaust her administrative remedies. We grant the petition for review and remand the case to the BIA for further interpretation of the statutory framework.
I. Background

On March 9, 2001, the United States A ttorney General designated El Salvador for TPS status following major earthquakes inthat country. This status extends to certain designated countries with on-going ar med conflict or instability due to major natural disasters, providing temporary hum anitarian relief by protecting from removal those aliens in the United States who are nationals of countries with TPS status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a et seq

. Salguero-Fuentes, a citizen and national of El Salvador living in the United States, filed an unsuccessful TPS applica tion during the initial registration period in 2002 and then a second application in 2003, which the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) denied for lack of su fficient evidence of eligibility. SalgueroFuentes then filed an untimely appeal to the DHS’s internal Administrative Appeals Unit (“AAU”) attempting to cure the allege d evidentiary deficiencies, but failed to perfect her AAU appeal because of its untimeliness. Se veral months after the AAU denied the appeal for untimeliness, DHS served her with a charging document placing her in removal proceedings together with her son.
An immigration judge found Salguero-Fu entes removable as charged. The judge ruled, applying TPS re gulations, that the immigration court had no jurisdiction to determine de novo TPS protection in th e removal proceedings because SalgueroFuentes had not perfected an AAU appeal. Therefore, Salguero-Fuentes could not rely on TPS eligibility in the removal proceedings.-3- Salguero-Fuentes appealed the immigration judge’s ruling to the BIA, a single member of which affirmed the immigrati on judge. Salguero-Fuentes then petitioned this Court for review, arguing that the immi gration judge erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over her TPS eligibility.

II. Discussion
This Court reviews the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, “according substantial deference to the [BIA’s] interp retation of the statutes and regulations it administers.” Regalado-Garcia v. I.N.S. , 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Tang v. I.N.S. , 223 F.3d 713, 718-19 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Salguero-Fuentes argues that the unamb iguous language in the TPS statute expressly permits her to asse rt TPS protection during rem oval proceedings, despite her failure to perfect an AAU appeal. She points to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(B), which requires the establishment of an administra tive appeal process for applicants denied TPS benefits, but further provides that “[s]uc h [a] procedure shall not prevent an alien from asserting protection under this secti on in removal proceedings.” SalgueroFuentes also contends that the decision in her case violates a precedential decision, In re Barrientos , 24 I. & N. Dec. 100 (BIA 2007), whic h, according to Salguero-Fuentes, interprets the relevant regul ations as permitting aliens to raise TPS eligibility during removal proceedings without first exhausting their administrative remedies.
In response, the government requests a re mand for an explanation of the BIA’s interpretation of the relevant statutory framework. The government argues that without such explanation, this Court cannot effectively review the agency’s interpretation of the law. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Na tural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).-4- We agree that such a remand is necessary. Th e BIA, in a short opinion, affirmed the immigration court based on that court’s opinion. However, neither court fully addressed why, under the statutory framework, the failure to perfect an AAU appeal bars an alien from raising TPS eligibility at the removal proceedings. Distinguishing In re Barrientos , wherein the petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies, the BIA here simp ly cited the TPS statute for the proposition that an alien may raise TPS eligibility at removal proceedings only after exhausting administrative remedies. Salguero-Fuentes ar gues that the statute clearly stands for the opposite proposition. In the first instance, the BIA should review and interpret the applicable statutes and decide whether an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before being able to rely on TPS elig ibility in removal proceedings.

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons and for thatpurpose, we rema nd to the BIA for further proceedings. We request an exped ited determination of the matter in issue. Petitioner, if suffering an adverse ruling, may renew an appeal to this Court.

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