alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Trevor COCHRAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 86-346.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 22, 1987.

*50James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Brad Permar, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Erica M. Raffel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

LEHAN, Acting Chief Judge.

We affirm defendant’s, conviction for burglary with attempt to commit assault and defendant’s sentence upon revocation of probation. We reverse and remand for resentencing with respect to defendant’s sentence for burglary with attempt to commit assault.

In sentencing defendant for burglary with attempt to commit assault the trial court departed from the guidelines recommended sentencing range on the basis that defendant was an habitual offender. Habitual offender status is not a valid reason for departure. *See Whitehead v. State,*498 So.2d 863 (Fla.1986). We cannot say that the trial court’s reasons for finding defendant to be an habitual offender were sufficient in and of themselves to justify the departure and therefore reverse and remand for resentencing. *See Albritton v. State,*476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985).

One of defendant’s other contentions is that he was erroneously required to repeat before the jury words allegedly spoken by the assailant to the victim. The state, citing *United States v. Wade,*388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), contends that there was no impropriety. *Wade*found no error in a defendant having been required to recite at a lineup words which an assailant had allegedly spoken to the victim. Whether or not there was error in this respect in this case under all the circumstances, we do not conclude that there was reversible error. After the defendant repeated those words before the jury, the victim continued to be unable to identify the defendant as the assailant. It does not appear that the outcome could not have been used in favor of defendant.

Reversed and remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

HALL and SANDERLIN, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2391 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2391

  To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Benzenesulfonic acid, 
      [(9,10-dihydro-9,10-dioxo-1,4-anthracenediyl)bis[imino[3-(2-
          methylpropyl)-3,1-propanediyl]]]bis-, disodium salt.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

  Mrs. Hagan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Benzenesulfonic acid, 
      [(9,10-dihydro-9,10-dioxo-1,4-anthracenediyl)bis[imino[3-(2-
          methylpropyl)-3,1-propanediyl]]]bis-, disodium salt.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. BENZENESULFONIC ACID, [(9,10-DIHYDRO-9,10-DIOXO-1,4-
              ANTHRACENEDIYL)BIS[IMINO[3-(2- METHYLPROPYL)-3,1-
              PROPANEDIYL]]]BIS-, DISODIUM SALT.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.24.95 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to Benzenesulfonic acid, 
[(9,10-dihydro-9,10-dioxo-1,4-anthracenediyl)bis[imino[3-(2-
methylpropyl)-3,1-propanediyl]]]bis-, disodium salt) is amended by 
striking ``12/31/2009'' and inserting ``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Charles R. LIBBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 88-317.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 26, 1988.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s summary denial, on the merits, of appellant’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the denial of appellant’s motion, not on the merits of the allegations raised therein, but because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion.

Appellant filed his rule 3.850 motion in the trial court on October 21, 1987. In his motion he alleged that an appeal from his judgment and sentence was pending in this court. Our court records reveal that appellant’s notice of appeal was filed in the trial court on August 11, 1987, and is currently pending disposition here.

The supreme court has held that “while appeal proceedings or certiorari proceedings are pending in an appellate court, the trial court is without jurisdiction to entertain a motion to vacate.” *State v. Meneses,*392 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1981). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s rule 3.850 motion without prejudice to appellant (1) filing another such motion after his present appeal has been decided and has become final or (2) as recognized in *Meneses,*seeking an order from this court to temporarily relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for the purpose of being heard on his motion.

RYDER, A.C.J., and LEHAN and PARKER, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Michael NICHOLAS.

No. 86-KH-2439.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 9, 1987.

In re Nicholas, Michael; applying for remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 301-353; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-6412.

Denied. Appeal is pending.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2273 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2273

   To extend the temporary suspension of duty on oysters (other than 
                    smoked), prepared or preserved.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

Mrs. Feinstein introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To extend the temporary suspension of duty on oysters (other than 
                    smoked), prepared or preserved.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. OYSTERS (OTHER THAN SMOKED), PREPARED OR PRESERVED.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.23.07 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to oysters (other than smoked), 
prepared or preserved) is amended by striking the date in the effective 
period column and inserting ``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 23.1


                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-83653; on Form S-3/A (No. 333-67361) (and on
Forms S-8 and S-3 (Nos. 333-88712) of our report dated March 24, 2000, except
for Note 2 and the last three paragraphs of Note 7, as to which the date is
April 14, 2000 relating to the consolidated financial statements, which
appear in Hudson Hotels Corporation Inc.'s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 1999. We also consent to the reference to us under
the headings "Experts" in such Registration Statements.




/s/ PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP



Rochester, New York
April 14, 2000
#### Peter S. THOMAS, Jr., Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Patrick DiSALVO, Trustee, etc., et al., Appellees/Cross Appellants.

No. 4-86-2654.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 28, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 2, 1988.

John S. Wilbur, Jr., and Randie S. Kir-schner of Caldwell & Paeetti, Palm Beach, for appellant/cross appellee.

Joseph A. Vassallo, Lake Worth, and John Beranek of Klein & Beranek, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees/cross appellants.

PER CURIAM.

Finding that it is supported by substantial competent evidence, we affirm the final judgment in favor of the plaintiff. However, on the cross appeal we reverse the order of the trial court granting a set-off for sums collected by the plaintiff in a separate settlement with a codefendant. The record reflects that the damages for which the set-off was awarded arose out of a clearly separate and distinct claim, unrelated to the damages for which plaintiff recovered the judgment. There is no need to address the other issues raised by the cross appeal.

Affirm the appealed judgment; reverse the cross-appealed order.

HERSEY, C.J., and LETTS and STONE, JJ., concur.
#### Rosemary HOUSTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1607.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 12, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 15, 1988.

Max P. Engel and Kenneth Speiller, Miami, for appellant.

*941Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Nancy C. Wear, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and NESBITT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Rosemary Houston appeals her conviction for trafficking in cocaine. We affirm.

Defendant offered to sell an undercover police officer two kilos of cocaine. On the way to the house where the drugs were located, she talked of her experience in the drug business and of past trouble for heroin trafficking charges. Once at the drug site, the officer inspected the package of cocaine then returned to his car for money. At that time, he signaled to his backups that he had seen the cocaine; then he returned, unarmed, to the house. The door closed and locked behind him. There was disputed testimony as to whether the police announced their presence before they broke the door down and entered the house. The cocaine was seized and the defendant was arrested. A motion to suppress the cocaine based on the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the knock-and-announce requirements of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1987) was denied. Houston was convicted of drug trafficking. She now appeals.

We affirm the conviction based on the rule of *State v. Hume,*512 So.2d 185 (Fla.1987). In that case, as here, the defendant invited an undercover agent into his home and openly engaged in criminal conduct in the agent’s presence. The supreme court held that statutory provisions did not require “that the arresting officers ‘knock and announce’ after the agent within the premises had summoned them to assist in safely arresting the defendant and seizing the contraband.” *Id.*at 189. By comparison, only the accident of the door completely closing behind the undercover agent separates this case factually from *Hume*where the agent within opened the door for his backups. Therefore, because the facts of this case come within the parameters of *Hume,*we uphold the conviction.

As to defendant's second ground for reversal, we hold that only proper evidence of predisposition was admitted to rebut her claim of entrapment. Thus, neither was admission of evidence concerning the defendant’s prior criminal acts a ground for reversal.

Accordingly, we uphold the conviction.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TENET
INFORMATION SERVICES, INC. JUNE 30, 1996 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1996
<CASH>                                         209,589
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  149,934
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,500
<INVENTORY>                                      5,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               357,023
<PP&E>                                         119,302
<DEPRECIATION>                                  84,945
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 573,442
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          675,907
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           11,397
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      94,911
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   573,442
<SALES>                                      1,054,453
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,054,453
<CGS>                                          559,955
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,625,010
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               546,884
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,929
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,132,370)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,132,370)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,132,370)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.12)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.12)
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 24

                               POWER OF ATTORNEY



     KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned constitutes and
appoints Frank L. Conner, his true and lawful attorney in fact and agent with
full powers of substitution and resubstitution, for him and in his name, place
and stead, in any and all capacities to sign the Annual Report on Form 10-K, and
any or all amendments thereto (including post-effective amendments), to be filed
by American Freightways Corporation in accordance with the rules and regulations
governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned hereby sets his hand this 18th day of
January, 1996.



/s/Ben A. Garrison
------------------------------------
Ben A. Garrison, Director



State of  Arkansas  )
                    )
County of  Boone    )

     This 18th day of January, 1996, personally came before me Ben A. Garrison,
who, being by me duly sworn says that he is a Director for American Freightways
Corporation, an Arkansas corporation, and that said writing was signed and
sealed by him, on behalf of said corporation, by its authority given.



                                       /s/Robbie Schriner
                                       ------------------------------------
                                       Notary Public


My commission expires:  February 1, 2002
                      --------------------



                                                     (SEAL)
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of SRKP 5, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
      10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Anthony C.
      Pintsopoulos, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to
      ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Anthony
              C. PintsopoulosAnthony
                      C. Pintsopoulos
                    Principal
                      Financial Officer
                    August
                      9, 2007
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER O N M OTION

Appellate case name: In the Interest of N.I.W

. , A Child

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 8

- 00 576

- CV

Trial court case number: 201 6

- 0 3594 J

Trial court: 31 5 th District Court of Harris County

This is an accelerated appeal from a judgment in a suit in which the termination of the parent

- child relationship is at issue (“parental termination case”). The appellate records were completed in this case after t he clerk’s record was filed on July 17 , 201 8 , which set appellant’s brief due to be filed within 20 days, or by August 6 , 201 8

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.6(a)( 2 ). On August 3, 2018, app ellant’s appointed counsel, Elizabeth M. Bruman , filed an unopposed motion for a first extension of time to file the appellant’s brief, requesting a
t wenty

- one day extension until August 27 , 201 8

. Appeals in parental termination cases are to be brought to final disposition within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed, so far as reasonably possible. See T EX

. S T

. J UD

. A DMIN

. R. 6.2(a) (West 201 6 ). The notice of appeal in this case was timely filed

on June 26, 2018 , in the trial court from the June 21 , 201 8 decree for t ermination, by counsel for the appellant, L

. I

. B

. , mother of the child, N.I.W., set ting the 180

- day compliance deadline for December 21 , 201 8

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1(b). Although this is appellant’s counsel’s first extension request and is unopposed, t h e accelerated schedule in parental termination cases requires greater compliance with briefing deadlines and greater scrutiny of extension requests

. See , e.g. , T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 28.4(b)(2) (stating that record extension requests in parental termination cases may be granted by appellate court, but must not exceed 30 days cumulatively, absent extraordinary circumstances).

Appellant’s counsel contends that an extension is needed be cause she needs additional time because s he has been busy preparing for trials and other work commitments in other cases, in addition to a preplanned vacation, which has prevented her from completing the brief on time

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 10.5(b)(1)(C), 3 8.6(d).Accordingly, the appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file appellant’s brief

is GRANTED until August 27 , 201 8 , but no further extensions will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.6(d).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes

 Acting individually Acting for the Court

Date: August 1 6 , 2018
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                            MERCURY FINANCE COMPANY

Subsidiaries

Mercury Finance Corporation of Alabama (Al)
Mercury Finance Company of Arizona (Az)
Merc Finance Company of California (Ca)
Mercury Finance Company of Colorado (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Delaware (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Florida (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Georgia (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Idaho (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Illinois (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Indiana (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Iowa (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Kansas (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Kentucky (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Louisiana (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Michigan (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Mississippi (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Missouri (Mo)
Mercury Finance Company of Nevada (Nv)
Mercury Finance Company of New Mexico (De)
Mercury Finance Company of New York (De)
Mercury Finance Company of North Carolina (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Ohio (De)
MFC Finance Company of Oklahoma (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Oregon (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Pennsylvania (De)
Mercury Finance Company of South Carolina (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Tennessee (Tn)
MFC Finance Company of Texas (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Utah (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Virginia (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Washington (De)
Mercury Finance Company of Wisconsin (De)
MFC Financial Services, Inc. (Fl)
Filco Marketing Company (De)
Gulfco Investment Inc. (La)
Gulfco Finance Company (La)
Midland Finance Co. (IL)
MFN Insurance Company (Turks and Caicos)
**EXHIBIT
        32.2**
 
 
 **Certification
        by the Chief Financial Officer**
 **of**
 **Boardwalk
        GP, LLC**
 **pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350**
 **(as
        adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)**
 
 
 Pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the
        undersigned chief financial officer of Boardwalk GP, LLC hereby certifies,
        to
        such officer's knowledge, that the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the
        period
        ended June 30, 2007, (the "Report") of Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP (the
        "Partnership") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
        of
        the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the
        Report
        fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
        of operations of the Partnership.
 
 July
        31,
        2007
 /*s/  Jamie
        L. Buskill*
 Jamie
        L.
        Buskill
 Chief
        Financial Officer
 (principal
        financial officer)
Exhibit
32




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the quarterly report of Coda Octopus Group, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended January 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Geoff Turner,
President and Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:




(1) This
report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Geoff TurnerGeoff
      TurnerPresident,
      Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial OfficerDate:
      March 17, 2010