In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-21-00244-CV 

________________________

ANTONY MCGREGOR DEY, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

SEILEVEL PARTNERS, LP, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 53rd District Court 

Travis County, Texas 

Trial Court No. D-1-GN-21-002722; Honorable Amy Clark Meachum, Presiding 

 

March 23, 2022 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Appellant, Antony McGregor Dey, was employed by Appellee, Seilevel Partners, 

LP and was terminated on January 27, 2021. At the time of his termination, Dey 

accepted a severance package from Seilevel in exchange for certain post-employment 

promises contained in an Agreement and General Release. After his termination, Dey 

engaged in conduct in violation of that agreement which resulted in the underlying suit
2

being filed by Seilevel for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of 

the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act.1 The same day suit was filed, Dey and Seilevel 

approved entry of an Agreed Temporary Restraining Order. Critical to this appeal, the 

temporary restraining order enjoined Dey from “accessing, using, or disclosing any 

Seilevel Information for any purpose,” and it further enjoined him from “directly or 

indirectly soliciting or contacting [seven named] Seilevel customers . . . .” Following a 

period of discovery, Seilevel filed its amended petition seeking temporary injunctive 

relief. After notice and hearing, the trial court granted a temporary injunction enjoining 

Dey from continuing to use trade secrets as well as confidential and proprietary

information. The temporary injunction resulted in this accelerated appeal.

2 Dey presents 

nine issues challenging the trial court’s Order Granting Temporary Injunction as follows:

1. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering direct access to Dey’s 

personal laptop for forensic examination.

2. Does the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in In re Weekley, 295 S.W.3d 

309, 321 (Tex. 2009),3 which limited direct access to a litigant’s electronic 

devices, apply to a direct access order in a temporary injunction? 

3. Even though In re Weekley did not address injunctions, should the same 

principles apply to injunctions?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering a temporary injunction 

ordering direct access to Dey’s personal laptop?

1 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 134A.001 - .008. The Legislature enacted TUTSA in 2013 

to protect misappropriation of trade secrets. Section 134A.006(a) provides in part that “a court shall 

preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means. There is a presumption in favor of 

granting protective orders to preserve the secrecy of trade secrets.” § 134A.006(a).

2 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, sitting in Austin, this appeal was transferred 

to this court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE 

ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013). Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and 

this court on any relevant issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the 

transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 

3 The Supreme Court set forth the proper procedure for searching another party’s electronic 

storage devices under appropriate discovery rules. In re Weekley, 295 S.W.3d at 322. 
3

5. Does the temporary injunction violate the specificity requirements of Rule 

683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure?

6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in issuing a temporary injunction that 

was ambiguous on the non-solicitation portion of the injunction?

7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in enjoining Dey’s use of Seilevel’s 

confidential information where there was no evidence of any imminent 

threat of his using such information?

8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by including a restriction on

solicitation of customers when there was no evidence of any imminent 

threat of Dey causing Seilevel to lose any active customers?

9. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction 

when Seilevel failed to meet the requirements of likelihood of success on 

the merits and irreparable injury?

Distilled to their essence, Dey’s issues are a complaint that the trial court abused its 

discretion in issuing its Order Granting Temporary Injunction. We modify the temporary 

injunction and affirm the order of injunction as modified.

BACKGROUND

Seilevel is in the business of providing ecommerce and marketing information to 

business customers, which includes Fortune 1000 companies. In June 2018, Dey was 

hired as Seilevel’s Ecommerce Practice Manager. His employment required an 

agreement to the conditions of an Employee Innovation Assignment, Nondisclosure, 

Noncompete, and Nonsolicitation Agreement.

Dey was terminated on January 27, 2021, and the parties entered into an

Agreement and General Release, a severance agreement. Dey’s post-employment 

obligations included a provision that he “ha[d] not divulged any proprietary or confidential 

information of Seilevel and [would] continue to maintain the confidentiality of such 

information” (Paragraph 5) and his affirmation that he “ha[d] returned all of Seilevel’s 
4

property, documents, and/or any confidential information in [his] possession or control, 

including audio pen and recordings, laptop, and other material issued to [him]”

(Paragraph 6). Regarding the laptop, a Macbook Pro, Seilevel allowed Dey to keep it as 

an act of good will on the condition and belief that he would remove all of Seilevel’s 

information.4 

After Dey’s termination, Seilevel discovered it was unable to gain access to 

certain accounts because Dey had created them under a personal Google account and 

not under Seilevel’s workspace. Lisa Hill, vice president of technology strategy and 

Dey’s former direct manager, contacted Dey to obtain the password which he provided 

but it was incorrect. After he provided the correct password, she was still unable to gain 

access because Dey had set up a two-factor authentication. Dey met with Hill on March 

3, 2021, to transfer the two-factor authentication to her cell phone; however, that also 

failed to provide Hill with access because the two-factor authentication had been 

transferred to an application that only Dey could access. After months of back-and-forth

and Hill being denied access, she finally gained control of the accounts on May 27. In 

doing so, she discovered that Dey had been accessing Seilevel’s confidential 

information, downloading files, and contacting Seilevel customers, all in violation of his 

severance agreement.5 She described his activities as “nefarious.”

4 During discovery, Dey claimed he had wiped the laptop in March and sold it to a random 

individual in a van through Facebook Marketplace, but at his deposition in July, he testified that he had 

sold a different laptop and had given the Macbook Pro to his wife to use.

5 Contrary to Hill’s testimony, Dey denied accessing confidential information. He claimed he was 

merely denying authorization for attempts to log in because he was unaware of who was trying to access 

the account.
5

Seilevel filed suit against Dey on June 11, 2021, and that same day the trial court 

granted an agreed temporary restraining order. Several months later, on August 24, 

2021, the trial court held a hearing on the request for a temporary injunction. The four 

who testified were Hill, Joy Beatty, vice president of operations, Matt Danner, an expert 

in digital forensics, and Dey. 

In addition to Hill’s testimony regarding regaining access to Seilevel’s accounts, 

Beatty testified on the harm caused to Seilevel by Dey’s conduct (to be discussed below). 

Danner testified he was consulted by Seilevel to review its Google account and a 

password storing software program to isolate a particular user’s access for the period 

beginning in January through May 2021. His examination identified an IP address that 

was used exclusively by Dey during the relevant timeframe. Danner, however, could not 

determine with certainty if Dey’s log-ins were simply rejections of Hill’s attempts to log 

into the account. He determined that two bulk downloads (eleven items) occurred shortly 

after midnight on February 1, 2021.6

Danner further testified that the best way to determine the specifics of the bulk 

downloads would be to examine the device responsible for them. He was not asked to 

examine a device because Seilevel did not have access to it. He explained that if Dey 

wiped the particular device, “it would be extremely difficult and probably impossible” to 

determine which individual documents were downloaded. 

6 Dey admitted to downloading Seilevel documents in February 2021 but disputed doing so in May 

2021. The expert did not make a finding that Dey downloaded (as opposed to merely accessing) any 

Seilevel documents after March 3.
6

Danner also examined a marketing services account. He discovered the same 

log-in records as the Google account occurred on February 20, 2021. He determined 

the log-ins were associated with an Apple Macintosh computer which could have been 

the Macbook Pro Dey kept. The expert’s examination indicated that Dey continued to 

access Seilevel documents after he was terminated. During cross-examination, 

Danner’s testimony showed that it was possible for Dey to be logged into his devices 

after his termination without actually accessing any of Seilevel’s documents.

The final witness to testify at the hearing was Dey. He did not deny that he 

downloaded and provided Texas Supplements, a Seilevel customer, its website design

which he had created in 2019. He also provided Texas Supplements with other 

confidential information on Seilevel’s resource costs for one of its contractors which was 

less than the amount actually charged to the customer (known in the business as an 

upcharge). According to Beatty, the amount of the upcharge and its cost margins are 

trade secrets. 

Dey testified he purchased a new laptop in March 2021 and completed a factory 

reset of the Macbook Pro he received from Seilevel so that his wife could use it as her 

business computer. He admitted that even after he purchased a new laptop, he moved

fifteen Seilevel documents to that device which he claimed have since been returned. 

He conceded that his conduct in doing so was “very purposeful” because he was building 

a portfolio to find employment. Specifically, he sought to work for Texas Supplements 

and attempted to discuss it with Seilevel’s CEO, who did not respond to his request. 
7

Dey admitted that after his termination he contacted several other Seilevel 

customers. In his deposition, he claimed he did so in anticipation of a temporary 

restraining order which would have prevented him from otherwise contacting Seilevel 

customers. He also testified he “firmly believed [he] did not have a noncompete” 

because he felt certain he had negotiated out of it when he was first employed. However, 

when asked if he “agreed to a version of the noncompete agreement that had an altered 

Paragraph 12,” he answered, “[y]es.”7 He did claim, however that the online signature 

was not provided by him.

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the trial 

court ruled it was granting Seilevel a temporary injunction. The trial court’s ruling was

memorialized in its Order Granting Temporary Injunction. That order recites that it is 

“highly probable that [Dey] will continue to disclose or use Seilevel’s confidential and 

proprietary information and trade secrets while working for current or former Seilevel 

customers . . . .” The order further recites that Seilevel “has shown a probable right to 

relief on its claims for breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Texas Uniform Trade 

Secrets Act, and breach of contract.” The order continues that absent an injunction, 

Seilevel will suffer irreparable injury that cannot be measured in money damages. 

Finally, the order grants three forms of relief: (1) it imposes a restriction on Dey’s access, 

use, or disclosure of confidential or proprietary information; (2) it restricts Dey from using 

any confidential information to solicit, contact, or communicate with seven named 

customers of Seilevel, and (3) it requires that, within ten days, Dey deliver the Macbook 

7 Paragraph 12 of Seilevel’s Employee Innovation Assignment, Nondisclosure, Noncompete, and

Nonsolicitation Agreement is a covenant not to compete for one year following termination.
8

Pro laptop he received from Seilevel to a forensic examiner, to be mutually agreed on by 

the parties, for the purpose of conducting certain forensic analysis.

More specifically, the relief granted in the Order Granting Temporary Injunction

recites as follows:

1. Dey, directly or indirectly, individually or as a member of any business 

organization, along with his agents, servants, consultants, contractors, 

employees, and any person or entity in concert or participation with him, is 

enjoined from accessing, using, or disclosing any of Seilevel’s confidential 

or proprietary information or any information Dey obtained from or created 

for Seilevel for any purpose; and

2. Dey, directly or indirectly, individually or as a member of any business 

organization, along with his agents, servants, consultants, contractors, 

employees, and any person or entity in concert or participation with him, is 

enjoined from directly or indirectly using any Seilevel confidential 

information to solicit or contacting or communicating with current Seilevel 

customers Texas Supplements, Beacon Roofing, Fluitek, Herbalogic, Dell, 

Streakwave, or JL Marine regarding marketing or ecommerce.

These restrictions are reasonably and narrowly tailored to protect Seilevel’s 

confidential and proprietary business information and intellectual property 

and the related goodwill.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, within 10 

days of entry of this Temporary Injunction, Dey must produce the Macbook 

Pro laptop Seilevel provided Dey to a forensic examiner the parties select. 

The forensic examiner shall review the laptop in accordance with a forensic 

protocol agreed to by the parties or ordered by the Court, which shall include 

determining (1) if the laptop produced by Dey is the laptop Seilevel provided 

him, (2) if and when the laptop was wiped by Dey, and (3) if any Silevel 

confidential and proprietary business information and intellectual property 

remains on the laptop.

The temporary injunction was signed on September 13, 2021. Dey filed his notice of 

appeal the next day, before the parties ever attempted to agree to a forensic examiner or 

the necessary protocols, as contemplated by the temporary injunction order.
9

APPLICABLE LAW

Temporary injunctions are an extraordinary remedy and do not issue as a matter 

of right. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Walling v. Metcalfe, 

863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). The purpose of a temporary injunction is 

to preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. 

While preservation of the status quo may be the purpose of a temporary injunction, it 

cannot serve as the basis for its issuance. Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 

S.W.2d 816, 827-28 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.). To obtain a temporary 

injunction, an applicant is not required to establish that it will prevail upon a final trial on 

the merits, but it must plead and prove (1) a cause of action against the opposing party, 

(2) probable right to the relief sought, and (3) probable imminent and irreparable injury 

in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Taylor Hous. Auth. v. Shorts, 549 S.W.3d 

865, 877-78 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.).

Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an order granting an 

injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance. The terms of the injunction “shall 

be specific; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or 

other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the 

parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorney, and upon 

those persons in the active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice 

of the order by personal service or otherwise.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; DHJB Dev., LLC v. 

Graham, No. 03-18-00343-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 9295, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2018, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.).
10

The requirements of Rule 683 are mandatory. InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. 

Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986). An order that does not comply with 

the requirements of Rule 683 “is subject to being declared void and dissolved.” Helix 

Energy Solutions Grp., Inc. v. Howard, 452 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Nov 13, 2014, no pet.) (quoting InterFirst Bank San Felipe, 715 S.W.2d at 641).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision whether to grant or deny a request for a temporary injunction is 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League 

Austin, Southwest, & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. 2020) (citing Walling, 

863 S.W.2d at 58). When an appellate court reviews the granting of a temporary 

injunction, it may reverse the trial court’s decision only when that court has clearly 

abused its discretion. Crestview, Ltd., 621 S.W.2d at 828. A trial court does not abuse 

its discretion when its decision is founded on the resolution of a fundamental fact issue 

based on conflicting evidence. See General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 526 

(Tex. 1998). See also Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011) (noting 

that “to find an abuse of discretion [when factual matters are in dispute], the reviewing

court must conclude the facts and circumstances of the case extinguish any discretion 

in the matter”).

Appellate review is strictly limited to determining whether there has been a clear 

abuse of discretion by the trial court in granting the application for a temporary injunction, 

and a reviewing court does not address the merits of the underlying case. Brooks v. 

Expo Chem. Co., 576 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. 1979) (stating that because “the effect of a 

premature review of the merits is to deny the opposing party the right to trial by a jury . . .
11

it will not be assumed that the evidence taken at a preliminary hearing on temporary 

injunction will be the same as the evidence developed at a trial on the merits”). In making 

this determination, a reviewing court may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court unless its decision was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.

See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.

ANALYSIS

IRREPARABLE AND IMMINENT HARM

By his issues, Dey does not challenge whether Seilevel plead a cause of action 

against him or Seilevel’s probable right of recovery. Rather, he vehemently challenges 

whether there is sufficient evidence to show irreparable and imminent injury. 

Initially, we note that when a party possesses trade secrets and is in a position to 

use them, harm to the trade secret owner may be presumed. IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter 

Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). It is 

undisputed that information accessed by Dey contained Seilevel’s trade secrets. In 

March 2021, presumably from the confidential information shared by Dey, Texas 

Supplements, a Seilevel customer, informed Seilevel that it was cutting its budget for 

marketing services by one-half after Dey had offered to train its employees. Several 

months later, on May 26, 2021, Texas Supplements terminated its ecommerce and 

marketing services with Seilevel and hired Dey as its Chief Marketing Officer beginning 

June 1. However, Dey was terminated that same day without explanation.

Joy Beatty, Seilevel’s vice president of operations, testified that after Dey’s 

termination from Seilevel, he accessed customer prospect lists, cost structures, internal 
12

job descriptions, and its business operating model—all confidential information. She 

testified that Dey’s sharing of Seilevel’s cost structure with its customers cast it in an 

unfavorable light and was “one of the more harmful pieces” shared with customers. 

Dey’s access to internal job descriptions allowed him to demonstrate to customers that 

he could recreate a team to deliver services without Seilevel. In Beatty’s own words, 

Dey’s conduct made Seilevel “look bad.” According to Beatty, Texas Supplements 

produced $2 million of revenue annually and Dey’s sharing of confidential information 

resulted in Texas Supplements eventually terminating all of Seilevel’s services. 

During Beatty’s cross-examination at the hearing on the temporary injunction, 

Dey’s counsel suggested that Dey did not pose a threat of imminent harm. Although 

Beatty agreed there was no imminent threat regarding businesses Seilevel had already 

lost or businesses which had not threatened to terminate Seilevel’s services, Seilevel 

was “still dealing with the harm caused prior to the [temporary restraining order].” She 

testified that Dey’s conduct had damaged Seilevel’s goodwill and relationships with its 

customers.

Seilevel’s counsel asked Beatty about the potential harm of Dey’s sharing 

confidential information. She answered that if he provided it to competitors, they could 

undercut pricing because the work, strategy, and analysis had already been done by 

Seilevel. She explained that she could not fully calculate the harm caused by Dey 

because she did not know how his conduct would impact the future given that Dey did 

not believe he had done anything wrong in accessing confidential information after his 

termination. See Taylor Hous. Auth., 549 S.W.3d at 878 (“An ‘irreparable’ injury refers 

to one that is incapable of being compensated adequately in damages or for which 
13

damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.”). Beatty further 

testified that the temporary restraining order notwithstanding, she could not predict the 

future impact of Dey’s conduct. 

Dey testified that he wiped the Macbook Pro before suit was filed and no longer 

had access to Seilevel’s confidential information. He also testified that because Texas 

Supplements and another customer had terminated their business with Seilevel prior to 

the hearing on the temporary injunction, Seilevel could not prove he posed an imminent 

threat of harm to its business relationships. The trial court, however, was free to 

disbelieve Dey’s testimony given that he had previously said that he sold the Macbook 

Pro to an individual in a van only to later claim he gave it to his wife. Beatty’s testimony 

provided sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that Dey’s access 

to confidential information and his use of that information caused irreparable and 

imminent harm to Seilevel. 

Dey may have also inadvertently provided evidence that his conduct caused injury 

to Seilevel. During questioning from his counsel on whether he anticipated litigation due 

to his conduct, Dey expressed his belief that a lawsuit would ruin Seilevel’s reputation 

with Texas Supplements. He also insinuated that arrogance on the part of Seilevel’s 

CEO, with Dey’s potentially working for Texas Supplements, caused Texas Supplements 

to terminate Seilevel’s services. Based on the testimony, the trial court did not have to 

believe that Dey no longer had access to the information contained in the files he 

admitted to downloading and the court could have made a reasonable inference that 

such information had the potential to cause irreparable and imminent harm to Seilevel.
14

NONDISCLOSURE AND NONSOLICITATION RESTRICTIONS AND RULE 683

Dey asserts the nondisclosure restriction’s use of the terms “confidential or 

proprietary information,” which are not defined, fails to conform to the specificity 

requirements of Rule 683. Similarly, he maintains that the term “Seilevel confidential 

information” in the nonsolicitation restriction is too vague, undefined, and ambiguous to 

be enforceable and, therefore, violates Rule 683. We disagree. 

An injunction must be as definite, clear, and precise as possible, and when 

practicable it should inform the defendant of the acts he is restrained from doing. San 

Antonio Bar Ass’n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697, 702 

(1956). But the injunction must be stated in terms which are sufficiently broad enough 

to prevent repetition of the evil sought to be stopped. Id. In that regard, an injunction 

need not specifically identify every act that might constitute the prohibited action. Id.

Dey complains of the language “confidential and proprietary information” and 

“Seilevel confidential information” as not being sufficiently specific to comply with the 

requirements of Rule 683. We disagree. 

The language in the temporary injunction is almost verbatim from the language in 

the temporary restraining order to which Dey agreed. He did not complain in the trial 

court that the temporary restraining order was vague or ambiguous leaving him uncertain 

of what conduct was being prohibited. Neither did he complain in the trial court that 

certain terms in the temporary injunction were vague or ambiguous. His failure to 

complain in the trial court results in procedural default of his contentions on appeal. TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Even so, during his sworn testimony, he admitted to accessing and 
15

downloading confidential and proprietary information without any clarification needed as 

to what type of information Seilevel considered confidential or proprietary. As such, we 

conclude the language of which he complains is neither vague nor ambiguous. 

DIRECT ACCESS ORDER

Dey contends that Seilevel failed to plead for direct access to the Macbook Pro in 

its original request for a temporary injunction or in its amended pleading. He asserts the 

untimely request for direct access during the hearing was extremely intrusive and caused 

him unfair surprise and prejudice.

An injunction that exceeds a pleading is an abuse of discretion. Webb v. 

Glenbrook Owners Ass’n, 298 S.W.3d 374, 391 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). 

However, in the absence of special exceptions, pleadings seeking injunctive relief are 

construed liberally in favor of the applicant. Henry v. Smith, 226 S.W.3d 226, 243 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. filed) (citing Garden Oaks Maint. Org. v. Chang, 542 S.W.3d 

117, 139 n.19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.)). Seilevel pleaded for Dey 

to “turn over all of Seilevel’s materials.” Dey did not specially except to the absence of 

an allegation to turn over the Macbook Pro. It is not an unreasonable inference that 

some of the information on the Macbook Pro, despite Dey being allowed to keep it, could 

have been considered Seilevel’s “materials” despite Dey’s assertion that he wiped it 

before suit was filed. 

Assuming that Seilevel’s live pleading did not plead for direct access to the 

Macbook Pro, the issue was tried by consent. The rule of trial by consent is limited to 

those instances where the parties clearly tried an unpleaded issue by consent. White v. 
16

Sullins, 917 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, writ denied); TEX. R. CIV. P. 

67. Consent may be found only when evidence concerning an unpleaded issue is 

developed under circumstances indicating both parties understood the issue was being 

contested. Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. 2009).

During Danner’s expert testimony concerning his examination of Dey’s 

unauthorized downloads, he testified “[t]he best way to determine [the actual downloads] 

would be to look at the device that was – was responsible for the download.” When 

questioned on whether he had been asked to examine the Macbook Pro, he explained, 

“I just don’t think we have the device or access to it.” Dey did not object to Danner’s 

testimony on the necessity of accessing the Macbook Pro for examination.

The temporary injunction anticipates that the parties will agree on a forensic 

examiner. It also contemplates that Dey will turn over the Macbook Pro for examination 

“in accordance with a forensic protocol agreed to by the parties or ordered by the Court 

. . . .” Essentially, the direct access order is nothing more than an order contemplating 

the subsequent entry of a clarifying order and preserving the status quo pending entry 

of that order. It is limited in scope to a short period of time. Thus, the issue of direct 

access to the Macbook Pro is not ripe for review by this court obviating a discussion on

whether the procedure for a forensic examination of digital devices set forth in In re 

Weekley should apply to a temporary injunction.

The trial court’s findings in the temporary injunction are not merely conclusory, 

however. Given the nature of trade secrets, the trial court found that without the 

injunction, Seilevel could potentially suffer imminent injury not measurable in money 
17

damages from the information Dey admitted that he had already accessed and 

downloaded. In exercising its sound discretion, the trial court was free to disbelieve that 

Dey had completely wiped the Macbook Pro and returned all the confidential files and 

information he admitted he copied onto his new laptop. The record provides a basis for 

the trial court’s order granting Seilevel’s request for a temporary injunction and that 

decision is not “so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of reasonable discretion.” Butnaru, 

84 S.W.3d at 211. Having found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, Dey’s issues 

are overruled.

MODIFICATION OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

Certain provisions of the Order Granting Temporary Injunction are no longer 

workable due to the passage of time. Therefore, in order to maintain the status quo, and 

to facilitate the entry of further orders as contemplated, the “direct access” provision of 

the Order Granting Temporary Injunction is modified as follows:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, on or 

before the March 28, 2022, Dey must produce the Macbook Pro laptop 

Seilevel provided Dey to Dey’s legal counsel for safe-keeping until such 

time as it is released to a forensic examiner in accordance with the orders 

of this court. During this period of safe-keeping, no one shall have access 

to the contents of the laptop for any purposes. The parties are ordered to 

confer and agree upon a forensic examiner. Should the parties be unable 

to agree upon a forensic examiner by April 15, 2022, that matter shall be 

presented to the trial court for determination. The forensic examiner shall 

review the laptop in accordance with a forensic protocol agreed to by the 

parties, which shall include determining (1) if the laptop produced by Dey is 

the laptop Seilevel provided him, (2) if and when the laptop was wiped by 

Dey, and (3) if any Seilevel confidential and proprietary business 

information and intellectual property remains on the laptop. Should the 

parties be unable to agree upon a forensic protocol by April 15, 2022, that 

matter shall be presented to the trial court for determination.
18

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Seilevel 

shall post bond in the amount of $10,000, by March 28, 2022, to serve as 

sufficient bond for this Order.

CONCLUSION

As modified, the trial court’s Order Granting Temporary Injunction is affirmed.

Per Curiam