1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r:

____

____ ____ ___ 3 Fi lin g D at e: N ove m

be r 18, 201 4 4 N O. 31, 998 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 6 Pl ai nti ff

-Appe llant, 7 v

. 8 LARRY B. TAYLOR, 9 De fendant-Appellee. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF RO OSEV ELT C OUN TY 11 St ep he n K. Qu in n, D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 Gary K. King, Attorney

Ge neral 13 San ta Fe, NM 14 M. A nne Kelly , A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 16 fo r Appe llant 17 Jorge A. Alvar ado, Chief Public De fender 18 J.K . T heodos ia Johns on, A ssistant Appellate D efender 19 Santa Fe , N M 20 for Appellee1 OPIN ION

2 VIGIL, Judge. 3 { 1} T his is an oth er

S ixth A m en dm en t sp ee dy tr ia l case

. T he c en tr al que sti on 4 pr es en te d is w he the r a de fe ndant p er m an en tly w ai ve s hi s c onst itu tio na l r igh t t o a 5 spe edy tr ia l be ca

use his a tto rn ey

m ove s f or atr ia l se tti ng to be va ca te d du e to a 6 schedulin g conflict with another t ri al setting and s tipul ates that the resulting delay 7 w ill not be at tr ibu ta

ble to the S ta te

. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed , “ it is n ot r ea sona ble 8 t o s a y th a tt h i s ‘w a i v e r ’ w o u l da l l o w ao n e ( 1 ) ye a r , t h r e e ( 3 ) mo n t h s a n ds i x ( 6 ) d a ys 9 delay ” and dism issed the crim inal inform ation with pre ju dice on groun ds that 1 0 D e f e n d a n t ’s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l w a s v i o l a t e d

. We a g r e e a n da f f i rm. 11 BACKGRO UND 12 { 2} On January

25, 2010, police responded to a dom estic abuse call, which re sulted 13 in Def endant’ s arre st. T he following day two separa te crim inal com plaints were f

iled 14 in the m ag istra te co urt. T he fi rs t ch ar ge d D ef en da nt w ith cr im ina l se xua l pe ne tr at ion 15 in the thi rd de gr ee , an d the se co nd all eg ed m isd em eanor ba tte ry w ith re spe ct to the 16 sa m e vi ct im

. A ft er

pos tin g bo nd, D ef

en da nt w as r el ea se d onF eb ru ar y 2, 201 0. 17 D ef en da nt f ile d a w ri tte n de m an d f

or aspe edy tr ia l i n th e fe lon y

c as e on F eb ru ar

y 11, 18 2010 , and a wr itten dem and for a speedy trial in the m isdem eanor case on February 19 16, 2010. A wa iver of prelim inary hearin g an d presentation to th e grand j ury wa s2

1 fil edon Feb ru ary 17 , 20 10 , a n d t he cas e was bo un d o ve r to th e d is tri ctco ur t. On 2 Marc h 5, 201 0, ac ri m ina l i nf orm at ionw as f

ile d inthe dis tr ic t c ourt c ha rg ing both 3 cr im in al se xua l pe ne tr at ionin the thi rd de gr ee a nd m isd em eanor ba tte ry on a 4 hous ehold m em

ber. 5 { 3} O n Ju ne 15, 201 0, aj ur y tr ia l w as sc he dul ed

to co m m en ce be fo re Jud ge T at

um 6 on J ul y 27 , 20 10

. H ow e ve r , on Ju l y 6, 20 10 , Ju dg e T a tum vo l un t a r ilyrec used 7 him se lf f ro m the c as e, a nd i t w as a ssi gne d to Jud ge H ar tle y . O n Ju ly

12, 20 10, the 8 St at e re cu se d Ju dge H ar tle y f ro m he ar ing the c as e, a nd o n Ju ly 26, 201 0, Jud ge O rl ik 9 w as a ssi gne d to the c as e. O n S ep tem be r 17, 201 0, tr ia l w as se t t o c om m en ce on 10 O ct obe r 6, 201 0 be fo re Judg e O rl ik. O n O ct obe r 5, 2010 , D ef en da nt fi le d am oti on 11 to v ac at e the tr ia l ongr ound s th at D ef en da nt’ s a tto rn ey

ha d a nothe r j ur

y tr ia l se t on 1 2 t h e s ame d at e a n dt i m e. Th e S t at e c o n cu rr ed i n t h e mot i o n wi t h De fe n d an t ’s 13 sti pul at iontha t “ an y

de lay r es ult ing f

ro m ac ont inu an ce wil l no t co unt a ga ins t the 14 State in speedy

trial determ ination s.” Howev er, at no tim e af ter this m otion wa s 15 gr an te d, did

the S ta te r eque st a

ne w tr ia l se tti ng. 16 { 4} Judg e O rlik passed away on May 28, 2011 , and Judg e Mowre r wa s appoin ted 17 to r ep la ce him

. T he c as e w as the n e rr one ousl y a ssi gne d to Judg e Q uin n onJun e 6, 18 2011 , a nd wh en th e m ist ak e w as dis co ve re d, the c as e w as r e- as sig ne d to Jud ge 19 Mowre r on J uly 19, 2011

. Jud ge Mo w re r vol unt ar ily r ec use d he rs el f fr om

the c as e3

1 on Septem

ber 5, 2011 , bec ause as the prior D eputy District A ttor n ey, she had 2 ap pe ar ed

on b eh al f of

the S ta te in the c as e at

apr ior he ar ing

. T enda y s la te r, on 3 Se pte m be r 15, the ca se w as r e- as sig ne d to Jud ge Q uin n. O n hi s ow n m oti on, Jud ge 4 Q uin n he ld a

pr etri al c onf

er en ce on D ecember 13, 201 1, a nd s et the c as e to 5 com m ence tria l on January

11, 2012. A t t h e p retrial c onference, defense counsel 6 alert ed the c ourt tha t the re w er e spe edy tr ia l pr obl em s, a nd the da y be fo re tr ia l, 7 D ef en da nt f ile d am oti on t o dism iss on s pe edy tr ia l gr ound s, w hic h Ju dge Q uin n 8 gr an te d onJanuary

12, 201 2. T he S ta te appe al s. 9 STA ND AR

D O F REVIE W 10 { 5} O n a

ppe al f ro m a n or de r of dis m iss al fo r a vio la tio n of ade fe ndant’ s r igh t t o 11 a spe edy

tr ia l, w e giv e de fe re nc e to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s fa ct ua l fin din gs but re vie w the 12 sp eed y

tri al fact o r s d e n o v o. Sta te v . Spe arm an , 201 2- N MS C- 023, ¶ 19, 283 P

. 3d 13 272. T he spe edy tr ia l fa ct or s we co nsi de r ar e thos e se t f orth i n B ark

er v. W ing o , 407 14 U

. S. 514 , 530 -3 2 ( 1972 ): “ (1 ) the le ngth of the de lay , (2 ) the r ea sons giv enf or the 15 de lay , (3 ) the de fe ndant’ s asse rt ion of the r igh t t o aspe edy tr ia l, a nd ( 4) pr ej udi ce to 16 th e d ef

en d an t.” State v. Collier , 2013-NMS C-015, ¶ 39, 301 P.3d 370 (internal 1 7 quot a t i o n m a rk s a n d c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

. “ E a c h o f th e s e f a c t o r s i s w e i g h e d e i the r in 18 favor of or a gainst t h e St ate or the def endant, and then balanced to determ ine if a 19 defendant’ s right to a speedy trial wa s violated.” Spe arm an , 201 2- N MS C- 023, ¶ 17.4

1 No single B ark

er fa ct or is “ ei the r a ne ce ssary

or suf ficie nt c ondi tio n to the f

ind ing 2 of a de pr iva tio n of

the r igh t of

spe edy tr ia l. R athe r, the y

a re r el at ed

f ac tor s and m

ust 3 be considered togeth er w ith such other circum stances as m ay be rele vant.” Barker , 4 407 U.S . a t 533. Thus, in apply ing th e B ark er fa ct or s, w e re

j ec t a br igh t- lin e an al y sis 5 and analy ze ea ch case on an ad hoc basis in ligh t of it s o wn u niqu e fa ctual 6 ci rcu m st an ces . Sta te v . G arz a , 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 14, 146 N

. M. 499 , 212 P

. 3d 3 87. 7 SP EE D Y TRIA L A N A LY SI S 8 { 6} The S ixth Am endm ent directs that “ [i] n all crim inal prosecution s, the accused 9 shall enjoy

the right to a speedy

. . . trial[. ] ” Id

. ¶ 10 (i nte rn al quot at ion m arks and 10 citation om itted). I n a si m ilar vein, A rticle II , S ection 14 of the NewMexico 11 Constitu tion g uarantees to an ac cused “ a speedy publi c trial[. ] ” G arz a , 2009-NMS C12 038, ¶ 10 n.1. Thus, in our analy sis, w e are m indful that “ [t] he right to a speedy trial 13 is a fu n dam ental right of the accused[, ] ” id. , tha t i s “ guarante ed by both th e Si xth 14 Am endm ent of the United States Constitu tion and Article II, Section 14 of t he Ne w 15 Mexico Constitu tion.” Spe arm an , 20 12 -NMSC -0 23 , ¶ 16

. See B arker , 407 U. S. at 16 53 3 (s ta ti ng th at “ be cau se we are d eal in g wi th a fu nd am en ta l ri gh t o f th e acc us ed ,” 17 the balancing process of the B ark er fa ct or s “ m

ust be c ar ri ed out w ithf ull r ec ogni tio n 18 tha t the accu se d’ s in te re st i n aspe edy tr ia l i s sp ec if

ic al ly a ff irm ed in the 19 Co nst itu tio n” ). T he f ir st s te p inour

a na ly sis is to d et erm in e w he the r the le ngth of5

1 pretrial delay

is “ ‘ presum

ptivelyprej udicial.’ ” G arz a , 200 9- N MSC -0 38 , ¶ 23 2 (quot ing Barker , 407 U

. S. a t 533)

. O nly w he n the le ngth of de lay is “ pr es um

pti ve ly 3 prej udicial” do we procee d to c onsid eration of all of the B ark er fact or s. Se e G arz a , 4 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶

21 ( sta tin g th at

a“ pr es um

pti ve ly pr ej udi ci al ” le ngth of

de lay is 5 “ sim ply a triggering m echanism , r equiring further inqui ry into th e B ark

er factors”)

. 6 { 7} T he dis tr ic t c ourt f ound , a nd the Sta te doe s no t di sput e, tha t this is a sim ple 7 cas e. Se e Sta te v . P lou se , 20 0 3 -N M CA -0 4 8 , ¶ 4 2 , 1 3 3 N.M . 4 9 5 , 6 4 P. 3 d5 2 2 (“W e 8 give due deference to the dist rict court’ s finding s as to the level of com plexity .” ). In 9 G arz a , our S uprem e Court ado pted “ one y ear as a benchm ark for determ ining when 10 a sim ple case m ay

becom e presum

ptively prej udicial.” 2009 -N MSC- 038, ¶ 48. H ere, 11 Defen da nt ’s r ig ht to a sp eed y tri al att ach edup on hi s ar res t. See State v. Laney , 200 3- 12 NMC A- 144, ¶ 10, 134 N. M. 648, 81 P. 3d 59 1 (“ The r ight [to a speedy trial] attaches 13 w he n th e de fe ndant b ec om es a n a cc use d, e ith er a t the tim e of

a rr es t or upo n th e 14 iss ua nc e of

a n in dic tm en t o r in fo rm at ion

. ”)

. T hus, the a lm ost tw en ty -f our -m onth 15 delay betwee n De fendant’ s arre st on January 25, 2 010, and his January 11, 2012 trial 16 date surpasses the twelve-m onth threshold for sim ple cases. W e theref

ore procee d 17 to analy ze and w eigh the four B ark er fact or s.6

1 A . Le ng th of

D el ay 2 { 8} “ Consid ering the length of delay as one of the four B ark er factors, the greater 3 the delay

the m ore heavily

it will potenti ally we igh against the State. ” G arz a , 200 9- 4 N MS C- 038, ¶

24; see also D oggett v. U

nited Sta tes , 505 U

. S. 647, 652 (1 992) ( not ing 5 that, on ce a defendant establishes that delay wa s presum ptively prej udicial, “ the court 6 m ust then con sider, a s one factor am ong several, the extent to which th e delay 7 str et ch es be y ond the bare m ini m um ne ed ed to tr igg er

j udi ci al e xa m ina tio n of the 8 claim ”). 9 { 9} H er e, the de lay

w as a lm ost

tw o y ears , ne ar ly tw ic e as lon g as the tw el ve -m onth 10 threshold for sim

ple cases. W e th eref

ore weigh this factor heavily against the State. 11 Se e Sta te v. V

igi l- G iro n , 201 4-NMC A- 069, ¶¶ 19, 65, 327 P.3d 1129 (concluding that 12 the le ngth of

de lay , w hic h w as tw ic e as lon g a s th e le ngth of de lay c onsi de re d to be 13 pr es um

pt iv el y pre jud ic ia l, wei gh edh e av il y ag ai ns t t he Sta te ), cert. denied , 201 4- 14 N MC E RT -0 06, 328 P

. 3d 1 188; State v. M arqu ez , 2001-NMC A- 062, ¶ 12, 13 0 N. M. 15 651, 29 P. 3d 1052 (h old ing tha t a nin e- m onth de lay

tha t e xte nde d be y ond the the n16 ni ne -m on th th res ho ld forsi m pl e cas es weig he d h eav il y ag ai ns t t he Sta te ). 17 B. R ea son s f

or D el ay 18 { 10} A na ly sis of

thi s Barker

fac tor requires us to address the central question p osed 19 in this case: w hether the rea sons for the alm ost two-y ear delay shoul d be weighed7

1 ag ai ns t t he Sta te , and to what ex te nt

. G arz a , 20 09 -NMSC -0 38 , ¶ 2 5 . “ Barker 2 identified three ty

pes of delay , indicating that ‘ differe nt weights sho uld be a ssign ed 3 to differe nt reasons’ for the delay .” G arz a , 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 25. A t one en d of the 4 spectrum , “ a valid re as on, such as a m issin g witness, should serve to justify 5 appropriate delay .” Id

. ¶ 27 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c ita tio n om itt ed ). A t the 6 other end of the spectrum , “ ‘ official bad fa ith in causin g delay will be wei g h ed 7 heavily against the gov ernm ent,’ and excessive bad-faith delay m ay prese nt an 8 overwhelm ing ca se for dism issal.’ ” Id

. ¶ 25 ( quot ing D ogge tt , 505 U. S. at 656). I n 9 the m idd le li es ne gli ge nt o r adm ini str at ive de lay . A lth ough “ ne gli ge nt, ” the de lay is 10 noneth eless we ighed agains t the State, “ ‘ since the ultim ate re spon s i b i l i t y for such 11 ci rc um stanc es m

ust r es t w iththe go ve rn m en t r athe r than w iththe de fe ndant, ’ ” but 12 su ch a rea s on is no t wei gh edhe av il y . G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 26 ( quot ing 13 Barker , 407 U. S. at 531). 14 { 11} Th e S t at e a ck n o wl ed g es t h at t h e t h i rt y-n i n e d ay d el ay b et we en De fe n d an t ’s 15 arr es t on January

25, 2010, and the filing of the crim inal inform ation in th e district 16 co ur t o n M arch 5, 2 01 0, wei gh s s li gh tl y ag ai ns t t h e St at e. W e ag ree. See State v. 17 P arr ish , 2011 -N MC A -0 33, ¶ 24, 149 N

. M. 506, 252 P. 3d 7 30 ( sta tin g th at the tw o18 m onth de lay

due to the S ta te ’ s di sm iss al of c ha rg es in m ag istra te c ourt and r ef ili ng 19 the sa m e ch ar ge s inthe dis tr ic t c ourt was ne gli ge nt d el ay tha t w ei ghe d sl igh tly8

1 ag ai nst the S ta te ). W e al so a gr ee w iththe S ta te tha t duri ng the f our -m onth pe ri od 2 fr om Marc h 5, 201 0, w he n th e cr im ina l i nf orm at ionw as fil ed in the di str ic t c ourt, 3 unt il Jul y

6, 201 0, w he n Ju dge T at

um vol unt ar ily

r ec use d hi m se lf

on July 6, 201 0, the 4 ca se w as pr ogr e s s i n g i n an o rm a l f a s h i o n , w i t h t h e r e s u l tt h a tt h i s p e r i o di s t o be 5 w e i g h e dn e u t r a l l y. Se e id. ¶ 25 (st at ing tha t four a nd o ne -h al f m onth de lay sho uld be 6 w ei ghe d ne utr al ly be ca use “ the c as e pr ogr es se d w ithc ust om ar y pr om ptn es s du ri ng 7 thi s pe ri od” ). T his w as f oll ow ed by a de lay of ap pr oxi m at el y thr ee m onths, fr om Jul y 8 6 , 2 0 1 0 , u n t i l O c t o b e r 5 , 2 0 1 0 , du r i n g w h i c h t h e c a s e w a s a s s i g n e d t o J u d g e Ha rt l e y, 9 and then reassigned to Judge Orlik, w ho set the case for trial to com m ence on Oc tober 10 5, 201 0. Aga in, w e agr ee w ith the St at e tha t this re as sig nm en t of j udge s “ fa lls w ith in 11 the adm inistrative bu rdens on the crim inal justice sy stem ” and is wei g h ed as 12 ne gl ig en t d el ay

ag ai ns t t he Sta te

. G arz a , 20 09 -NMSC -0 38 , ¶ 29

. 13 { 12} T his br ing s us to the piv ota l pe ri od of de lay in thi s c as e. T ha t pe ri od s pa ns 14 fr om the O ct ob er 6 , 201 0 tr ia l se tti ng b ef or e Judg e O rl ik, w hic h w as va ca te d on 15 D ef en da nt’ s m oti on, to the Ja nuary 11, 2012 tr ia l se tti ng m ad e by Jud ge Q uin n. T his 16 pe ri od w as c al cu la te d by the dis tr ic t c ourt t o be “ fo ur hun dr ed six ty -thr ee (4 63) da y s, 17 oron e (1 ) y ear, t hr ee (3 ) m on th s an d s ix (6) da y s.” 18 { 13} W e be gin our an al y sis w ith D ef en da nt’ s O ct obe r 5, 2010 m oti on to va ca te the 19 O ct obe r 6, 201 0 tr ia l se tti ng. T he S ta te a cknow le dge s init s br ie f “ tha t this lon g of9

1 a d el ay was p ro ba bl y

no t co nt em

pl at ed by Defe nd an t in hi s m ot io n fo r co nt in ua nc e.” 2 W e agre e. D efendant asked that the trial setting be vacated on groun ds that 3 D e f e n d a n t ’s c o u n s e l h a dan o t h e r t r i a l s c h e du l e do n t h e s a me d a t e a tt h e s a me t i me 4 before anoth er j udge. T he m o t i o n ad d ed that “ the parties stipulate that any delay 5 resulting from

a continuance will not count agains t the State i n speedy trial 6 de te rm in at io ns .” W it h th is ag reem en t, th e St at e co nc ur red in th e m ot io n. By it s o wn 7 t e rms , t h e mo t i o n o n l y s t i p u l a t e dt h a td e l a y resul tin g fr om the co nti nuanc e w oul d no t 8 co unt a ga ins t the S ta te in a spe edy tr ia l de te rm ina tio n; i t di d no t pe rm an en tly w ai ve 9 D ef en da nt’ s c onst itu tio na l r igh t t o aspe edy tr ia l. Thu s, De fe ndant’ s c onc es sio n 10 an tic ipa te d a re as ona

ble de lay f or the S ta te to br ing the c as e to tri al r athe r than agr an t 11 to the S ta te of

a n un lim ite d ti m e to d o so . 12 { 14} Ina sse ssi ng h owthi s pe ri od of de lay is to b e co nsi de re d, w e re m ai n m ind fu l 13 tha t our Su

pr em e Co urt ha s r ej ec te d br igh t- lin e ru le s in spee dy tr ia l ana ly se s, opt ing 14 in st ead foran ev al ua ti on of th e ci rcu m st an ces in each in di vi du al cas e. G arz a , 200 9- 15 NMS C-038, ¶ 13 (notin g that the Barker f ac tor s ana ly sis “ spe ci fi ca lly r ej ec ts 16 inf le xib le , br igh t- lin e ap pr oa ch es to an al y zing a spe edy tr ia l c la im ”)

. D ef

en da nt 17 ac cu ra te ly

portr ay s th e ci rc um stanc es of thi s c as e in s ta tin g th at

a ft er his m oti on t o 18 cont in ue was gr an te d, “ [o ] ne m onth pa sse d and the S ta te did nothin g. S ix m onths 19 pa sse d a nd the S ta te did nothin g. A y ear pa sse d a nd the S ta te did nothin g. A ft er

1510

1 m on th s, t he tri al co ur t s ua sp on te or de red a st at us co nf eren ce an d s eta da te fortri al .” 2 The district court m ade the sam e assessm ent and concluded that the long delay after 3 D ef en da nt’ s c ont inu an ce m oti on “ w as c au se d by the S ta te d

ur i n g w hic h ti m e the S ta te 4 to okno st ep s t o o bt ai n a tri al set ti ng .” 5 { 15} In V

igi l- G iro n , w e exam ined the adm inistrative delay i n a ca s e that w as 6 de lay ed

f or thi rty -s ix m onths and co nc lud ed tha t the St at e “ did not go far en oughin 7 pr ovi din g e vid en ce or

e xpl an at ionsho w ing tha t thi s ca se w as pr ope rl y a nd e ff ic ie ntl y 8 m anaged or showing that the case could no t have been m anaged considerably better 9 fo r soc ie ta l purp ose s and t o pr ote ct [ the d] ef en da nt’ s r igh t t o a spe edy tr ia l. ” 201 4- 10 N MC A -0 69, ¶

66. Y et , in tha t c ase the sta te ha d a ct ua lly ta ke n a ct ionto m ove the 11 ca se f or w ar d, f ili ng m oti ons re que sti ng the c ourt t o c lari fy the sta tus of the c as e an d 12 req ue st in g t he co ur t t o ad dr es s th e ou ts ta nd in g m ot io ns as s oo n a s p os si bl e. Id

. ¶ ¶ 4, 13 6. I n th is c as e, on the oth er hand, the S ta te did not

hin g to bring th e case to trial after 14 the continu ance m otion , and offers no expla n at ion for its inaction

. W e theref ore 15 ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt and c onclu de tha t this e nti re pe ri od o f de lay is 16 a t tri bu ta bl e to th e St at e. See M arqu ez , 200 1- N MC A -0 62, ¶ 15 ( “ T he S ta te ha s a 17 co nst itu tio na l du ty

to m ak e a dil ige nt, goo d- fa ithe ff ort t o br ing [ a d] ef

en da nt to 18 tri al .”).11

1 { 16} We a r e t h e r e f

o r e l e f t t o c o n s i d e r w h a twe i g h tt o a s s i g n t o t h i s p e r i o do f d e l a y. 2 Neg li ge nt de la y

is no t o rd in ari ly w ei gh edhe av il y ag ai ns t th e st at e, G arz a , 3 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶

26, but thi s is not

ac as e of m er e ne glige nc e. I nst ea d, thi s is a 4 ca se in w hic h th e St at e w as ine xc usa bly ind if fe re nt t o it s affirm at ive obl iga tio n to 5 br in g a si m

pl e cas e to tri al

. Se e Stat e v. G all eg os , 2010-NMC A- 032, ¶ 21, 148 N. M. 6 182, 231 P

. 3d 1 124 (n oti ng o ur c onc er n f or the S ta te s’ s “ la ck

of pr ogr es s” in m ovi ng 7 the ca se fo rw ar d and h old ing tha t the e la pse d ti m e w ei ghe d he av ily a ga ins t the S ta te 8 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks o m itt ed )) ; Cf

. Spe arm an , 201 2- N MS C- 023, ¶ 30 ( ag re ei ng 9 with the distric t co u rt ’ s conclusio n that the State’ s extrem ely dilatory conduct 10 w ar rante d w ei ghi ng the r ea son fo r the de lay he av ily agai nst

the sta te ); State v. 11 L u c er o , 1 99 9- NMC A -1 02, ¶ 25, 127 N

. M. 672 , 986 P

. 2d 4 68 ( not ing tha t the 12 pr ose cu tor

c an did ly a cknow le dge d th at his ne gli ge nc e in fa ili ng to know the c ont en ts 13 of the pr ose cu tio n f

ile c oul d possibl y

r ise to ba d f

ai th)

. W e re co gni ze tha t vari ous 14 j udge r ea ssi gnm en ts w er e m ad e af te r Judg e O rl ik p as se d a w ay a nd tha t w e w oul d 15 or din ar ily

w ei gh s uc h ade lay

ne utr al ly

. H ow ev er , be ca use the St at e did nothin g to 16 obt ai n a tr ia l se tti ng be tw ee n the tim e tha t the co nti nuanc e m oti on w as gr an te d a nd 17 the tim e tha t Judg e O rl ik pa sse d aw ay (a span of 235 da y s) , or a t any ti m e af te r tha t, 18 we do not do so in this case.12

1 { 17} We therefore hold th at the delay which the Sta te allowed to elapse a fter 2 Defen da nt ’s m ot io n to va cat e sh ou ld be weig he d h eav il y ag ai ns t t he Sta te

. Se e Sta te 3 v. U rban , 200 4- N MS C- 007, ¶ 20, 135 N

. M. 279 , 87 P

. 3d 1 061 (c onsi de ri ng the 4 State’ s “ com

plete lack of an ac ceptable reason for fourtee n m onth s” of delay betwee n 5 the de fe ndant’ s arr es t and h is i ndi ctm en t a s si gni fi cant i n it s de te rm ina tio n th at the 6 de fe ndant’ s spee dy tr ia l r igh t w as vio la te d) ; R uff in v

. Sta te , 663 S. E. 2d 18 9, 199 (Ga

. 7 2008 ) (“ [T ] he w ei ght

w e as sign to of

fi ci al ne gli ge nc e co m

poun ds o ve r tim e as the 8 presum ption of evidentiary

prej udice grows. Thus, our toleration of such negl igence 9 va rie s i nv ers el y

wit h i ts pro tra ct ed ne ss .”). 10 C. Assert ion of the Right 11 { 18} The r ight to a speedy trial is fun d am ental and is not waived even if never 12 as se rte d. Se e G arz a , 200 9 -N M SC -0 3 8, ¶ 32 (“ Rights un der this am endm ent are 13 funda m en ta l i n na tur e so tha t a fa ilure to as se rt the m doe s no t c onst itu te w ai ve r, but 14 the tim eliness and vig or with w hich the right i s as s erted m ay be considered as an 15 ind ic at ion of w he the r a de fe ndant w as de nie d ne ed ed ac ce ss to spe edy tr ia l ov er his 16 obj ec tio n or w he the r the iss ue w as ra ise d onappe al a s a ft er tho ught

. ”)

. D ef

en da nt d id 17 not r ai se the c la im

a s an a ft er

tho ught

. H e as se rt ed

hi s rig ht to aspe edy

tr ia l i n th e 18 m agistrate court, and clear ly still had sp eedy

trial considerations on his m ind when 19 he sti pul at ed

tha t the de lay ca

use d by his m oti on t o c ont inu e w oul d no t c ount a ga ins t13

1 the S ta te , be fo re ult im at el y f ili ng h is m oti on t o di sm iss on s pe edy tr ia l gr ound s. 2 T he se a ct ion s are su ff ic ie nt t o su

ppor t the c onc lus iontha t D ef en da nt a de qua te ly 3 as se rt ed

his r igh t and did not ac qui es ce in the de lay . W e giv e no c onsi de ra tio n to the 4 St at e’ s a sse rt iontha t “ [a ] lth oughit is not D ef en da nt’ s re spon sib ili ty

to ta ke him se lf 5 to tri al , D ef

en da nt did ha ve the re spon sib ili ty to ex pli ci tly re as se rt his ri ght w he n th e 6 de lay be cam e una cc ep ta

ble to him

. ” T he St at e ci te s no au tho ri ty fo r thi s pr opos iti on 7 so we as su m e th ere i s n on e. In re A dopt ion of D oe , 1984-NMS C-024, ¶ 2, 100 N. M. 8 764, 676 P.2d 132 9 (“ W e assum e wher e argum ents in briefs are unsupported bycited 9 au tho ri ty , c ouns el a ft er dilige nt s earc h, w as una ble to fi nd any

sup portin g 10 au th or it y .”). 11 D. Pr ejud ice 12 { 19} O ur

S upr em e Co urt i n G arz a e xpl ai ne d ho w the pr ej udi ce f ac tor is to b e 13 ex am ine d a s f

oll ow s: 14 The U nit ed St ates Suprem e Court has identified three interests under 15 w hic h w e an al y ze pr ej udi ce to the de fe ndant: ( i) to pr ev en t op pr es siv e 16 pr etri al inc ar ce ra tio n; ( ii) to m ini m iz e an xie ty a nd c onc er

n of the 17 ac cu se d; and (ii i) to lim it the pos sib ili ty tha t the de fe nse w ill be 18 im

pa ir ed

. A s to t he fir st tw o ty pe s of pr ej udi ce , som e de gr ee of 19 oppressio n an d an x i ety is inherent for every

defendant who is j ailed 2 0 wh i l e a wa i t i n g t ri al

. Th er ef o re , we we i g h t h i s fa ct o r i n t h e d ef en d an t ’s 21 favor

onl y w he re the pr etri al inc ar cerati on or the a nxi ety suf fe re d is 22 undu e. T he opp re ssi ve na tur e of th e pr etri al inc ar ce ra tio n de pe nds on 23 the le ngth of i nc ar ce ra tio n, w he the r the de fe ndant o bta ine d r el ea se pr ior 24 to tri al , an d w ha t pr ej udi ci al ef fe ct s the de fe ndant ha s shown as ar es ult14

1 of

the inc ar ce ra tio n. . . . H ow ev er , w ith out a pa rt ic ulari ze d show ing of 2 pr ej udi ce , w e w ill not spe cu la te a s to the i m

pa ct of pr etri al inc ar ce ra tio n 3 on a

de fe ndant o r the de gr ee of a nxi et y ade fe ndant s uf

fe rs . 4 G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 35 ( al te ra tio ns, int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks, a nd c ita tio ns 5 om it te d)

. 6 { 20} He re, De fendant wa s release d on bond nine day s after being ar rested and was 7 the re fo re e xpos ed

to m ini m al pr etri al inc ar ce ra tio n. D ef en da nt’ s co unse l arg ue d, a nd 8 the dis tr ic t c ourt a cc ep te d, the tr ad iti ona l pr ej udi ci al co nc er ns suc h as “ re str ic tio n on 9 his m ovem ent, r estrictions on his li berty , e xcessive worry ing abou t the charges 10 ag ai nst

him , ” an d c onc er

n th at the de lay

c oul d have caus ed

the de fe nse to be 11 im paired. How ever, this is no t s u fficient by itself to dem onstrate particularized 12 pr ejud ic e cau se d by th e d el ay . Se e id

. ¶ 37 ( not ing tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d f ound 13 “ som e ac tua l pr ej udi ce in the fo rm of r es tr ic tio ns i m

pose d by pr e- tr ia l c ondi tio ns o f 14 re le as e an d stre ss” but hol din g th at

“ som e non- pa rt ic ulari ze d pr ej udi ce is not the ty pe 15 of prej udice against wh i ch the speedy trial right protects” (a lteration and internal 16 quot at ionm ar

ks o m it te d) ); G all eg os , 201 0- N MC A -0 32, ¶ 27 ( hol din g th at

the 17 de fe ndant’ s lo ss o f his j ob, a nd h is a sse rt ion s of sle ep le ssn es s and ne rv ousn es s di d 18 “ not cons titute the particularized p rej udice required for dism issal und er a speedy trial 19 vi ol at io n” ). N o te sti m ony or doc um en tary

e vid en ce w as of

fe re d or a dm itt ed int o 20 ev id en ce i n s up po rt o f co un se l’s ass ert io n t ha t Def en da nt was p reju di ced

. Spe arm an ,15

1 2012 -N MS C- 023, ¶

39 ( “ [T ] he c la im ed

sho w ing of

pr ej udi ce c am e in the f

orm of 2 al l e g a t i o n s o f

c o u n s e l , b o t h i n t h e w r i t t e n m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s a n da tt h e h e ar ing

. 3 A lle ga t i o n s o f

c o un s e l are not

ge ne ra lly c onsi de re d e vid en ce . [ T he d] ef en da nt s houl d 4 ha ve of

fe re d so m e ac tua l e vid en ce in th e fo rm of a ff idavit s, te sti m ony , or 5 do cu m en ta ti on in su pp or t o f th e al le ga ti on s o f lo st em pl oym en t an d b an kru p t cy .” 6 (ci ta ti on om it te d) ). 7 { 21} L ike w ise , D ef

en da nt p re se nte d no ev id ence tha t hi s de fe nse w as a ct ua lly 8 im pa ir ed by the de lay . A lth oughthi s la st ty pe of pr ej udi ce is the “ m ost se ri ous, ” our 9 Su pr em e Co urt e m

pha siz ed tha t a de fe ndant m

ust “ subs ta nt ia te th is ty

pe of 10 prej udice.” G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 36 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c it ation 11 om itted). N evertheless, our Suprem e Court also a cknowledged that while prej udice 12 is obvi ous if a witness dies or disapp ears during the delay , “ [t] here is also prej udice 13 if de fe nse w itn es se s are una ble to re ca ll ac cu ra te ly

e ve nts of the dis tant p as t[ , ] ” an d 14 this ty pe of prej udice “ is not alway s refle cted in the record beca use what has been 15 forgotten c an rare ly be shown.” Id

. (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 16 W e ac kn ow l e dg e t ha t su c h m a y be t he c a se , bu t he r e w e have no t hi ng m or e than 17 al le ga tio ns o f co unse l, a nd w e w ill not spe cu la te tha t i m

portant witne ss t es tim ony 18 was lo st du e to im

pa ire d m em or ie s ca us edby the de la y .16

1 { 22} We t h er ef

o re co n cl u d e t h at t h e a rg u m en t s o f co u n s el co n ce rn i n g De fe n d an t ’s 2 worr y , anxiety , and the po ssibi lity that his defense could have been im paired failed 3 t o e s t ab l i s h t h e p a rt i c u l a r i z e d s h o w i n g o f p r e ju d i c e a s r e q u i r e db y G arz a . Cf

. V igi l4 G iro n , 201 4- N MC A -0 69, ¶ ¶ 51- 53, 57 ( ci tin g th e de fe ndant’ s te sti m ony r eg ar din g 5 her increa sed anxiety , insom nia, and develop m ent of an autoimm une disease related 6 to the str es s—whic h w as sup port ed by m ed ic al r ec or ds— as w el l a s he r los s of 7 em ploy m ent and inabili ty

to find e m

ploy m ent as a re sult of the ind ictm ent, and actual 8 im pairm ent to her defense due to the death of a w itness). 9 E. Ba lan ci ng Te st 10 { 23} A s in G arz a , “ [t] he prim ary issue raised by

the fac ts of [the] case is w hether a 11 court can find a violation of a defendant’ s speedy trial right without a particularize d 12 sh owing of

pr ej udi ce . ” 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 38. I n G arz a , t h e C o u rt n o t e d t h a t a 13 show ing of ac tua l pre

j udi ce m ay not al w ay s be possi ble an d adop te d the posi tio n of 14 th e U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt i n D ogge tt , 505 U. S. 647, and m any other lower 15 courts that a showing of particularized prej ud i ce i s not necessary in cases in which 16 the other B ark

er factors we igh heavily

in the defendant’ s favor and the defendant has 17 no t ac qu ie sc edin th e d el ay . G arz a sta te s: 18 W e sim ilarly h old [ as in D ogge tt

and m any

other lower

courts] that 19 ge ne ra lly

ade fe nd an t m

ust sho w pa rt ic ulari ze d pr ej udi ce of the kin d 20 ag ai nst

w hic h the spe edy

tr ia l r igh t i s in te nde d to pr ote ct

. H ow ev er , if17

1 the length o f delay and the reasons for the delay we igh heavilyin [the] 2 de fe ndant’ s f

av or a nd [ the ] de fe ndant h as a sse rt ed his r igh t and n ot 3 ac qui es ce d to the de lay , the n the de fe ndant n ee d no t sh owpr ej udi ce f or 4 a co urt t o c onc lud e tha t the de fe ndant’ s r igh t ha s be envio la te d. 5 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶

39. 6 { 24} T his hol din g in G arz a r ei te ra te s th at w e ar e en ga ge d in balanc ing the Barker 7 factors, non e o f w hich is its elf disposit ive, to determ ine whether the constitu tional 8 rig ht to a sp eed y tri al ha s b een vi ol at ed

. Se e Ca ntu v . Sta te , 253 S

. W

. 3d 2 73, 280 -8 1 9 (T x. Cr im . App. 2008) (“ Thus, the gre ater the [s] tate’ s bad faith or officia l negligence 10 and the long er its a ctions delay a trial, the less [a] defendant m ust show a ctual 11 pr ej udi ce or

pr ove dil ige nc e in a sse rt ing his r igh t t o aspe edy tr ia l. ”) ; Sta te v . F

arr el l , 12 727 A

. 2d 5 01, 518 ( N

. J. S upe r. Ct . Ap p. D iv. 199 9) ( “ A s am at te r of log ic a nd 13 decency , giv en that the four fac tors of Barker ca ll fo r a ba lanc ing of c onsi de ra tio ns, 14 w he n th e de lay

in co nc lud ing atr ia l i s e xc es siv el y lon g by an y m ea sur e, as he re , the 15 burden up on a defendant to satisfy the other factors is correspondin gly dim inish ed.”)

.

16 { 25} T he le ngth of

the de lay he re w as ex ce ssi ve ly lon g. A ll pa rt ie s agr ee tha t this 17 is a sim ple c as e, a nd a lm ost

tw o y ears e la

pse d f ro m D ef en da nt’ s arr es t onJanuary 25, 18 2010 , to the tr ia l se tti ng o f Ja nuary 11, 201 2. T his is twi ce the a m ount of ti m e to 19 pr es um e pr ej udi ce in a sim ple c as e. T he S ta te is re spon sib le f or 4 63 da y s of this18

1 de lay , a nd b ec au se the delay r es ult ed f ro m the S ta te ’ s in ex cu sa

ble ne gle ct

a nd 2 co m p l e t e l a c ko f

d i l i g e n c e i n s e e k i n g at r i a l s e t t i n g , t h e p e r i o do f d e l a y w ei ghs 3 he av ily a ga ins t the S ta te

. D ef

en da nt a de qua te ly

a sse rt ed his r igh t t o a spe edy

tr ia l, 4 an d in m ovi ng to va ca te the ini tia l tr ia l se tti ng, D ef en da nt d id n ot p er

m an en tly w ai ve 5 or aba ndontha t r igh t. W e the re fo re hol d tha t notw ith standi ng D ef en da nt’ s f ai lur e to 6 m ak e a par

tic ulari ze d sh ow ing of

pr ej udi ce r es ult ing f

ro m the de lay , he is en tit le d to 7 rel ie f. Se e F

arr el l , 727 A.2 d at 5 1 8 (con cluding that because the delay wa s far 8 be y ond w ha t w as r ea sona ble, a nd the r ea sons f

or the de lay

w er e the pr ose cu tio ns 9 “ clear inattention to its respons ibiliti es” together w ith the court’ s failure to prepar e 10 its el f to try

the m at te r, no s how ing of pr ej udi ce w as r equir ed

f or t he de fe ndant t o 11 suc ce ed

on h is arg um en t tha t he wa s deni ed his ad equa te ly as se rt ed ri ght to a spe edy 12 tri al ). W e th eref

or e aff irm. 13 CON CLU SION 14 { 26} T he or de r of

the dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ing thi s c as e on s pe edy tr ia l gr ound s is 15 affi rm ed

. 16 { 27} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

17

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 18 M IC HA EL E. V IG IL , Ju dg e19

1 WE CO NCUR:

2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 3 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e

4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 5 J. M IL ES HA N IS EE , Ju dg e