Filed 7/7/23 Zorikova v. Pease CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ALLA ZORIKOVA,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRYAN PEASE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G061152

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-00036459)

 O P I N I O N 

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Katherine A. Bacal, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with 

directions.

Pease Law and Bryan Pease; Law Offices of Casey Gish and Casey Gish; 

Law Offices of G. David Tenenbaum and G. David Tenenbaum, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Alla Zorikova, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
2

In this first of two related appeals, defendant Bryan Pease, an attorney,

appeals from the trial court’s order denying in part his special motion to strike (antiSLAPP motion) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1

 The court found 

plaintiff Alla Zorikova’s claims against defendant arose out of protected activity and 

plaintiff demonstrated a probability of prevailing on her defamation and libel claims. But 

the court held she did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her claims for 

invasion of privacy or tortious interference with business relations.

On appeal, defendant contends plaintiff cannot demonstrate a probability of 

prevailing on her defamation and libel claims. According to defendant, his statements 

about plaintiff and her business were either privileged or true. For the reasons below, we 

agree some of defendant’s statements were privileged or true. But plaintiff showed her 

claims had minimal merit to the extent they were based on defendant’s statements she 

illegally occupied certain land and ran an illegal business. We accordingly affirm the 

trial court’s order in part and reverse it in part, and we remand with instructions to strike 

certain allegations as detailed below.

FACTS

The Complaint

In October 2020, plaintiff filed the operative complaint against defendant 

alleging four causes of action: (1) defamation; (2) libel; (3) invasion of privacy; and (4) 

tortious interference with business relations. The complaint generally alleges defendant 

made various false statements about plaintiff as a breeder and seller of German Shepherd 

dogs. The alleged statements were made to law enforcement or posted online. 

With respect to defendant’s statements to law enforcement, the complaint 

alleges defendant called the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department on August 8, 

1

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise stated.
3

2020 and made false reports about plaintiff. This included false reports that plaintiff was 

“illegally occupying [Bureau of Land Management] land, that [there were] more than 100 

dogs on the property without shelter, nor food, nor water, that dead carcasses of German 

Shepherds are on the surface of that property all over and in the hundreds of those 

carcasses.” The police then arrested plaintiff and her daughter. When plaintiff was 

released from jail, she learned some of her dogs were taken to an animal shelter while 

others were taken by an animal rescue group to Las Vegas, Nevada. She picked up the 

dogs from the animal shelter but was unable to track down the other dogs taken by the 

animal rescue group.

On October 5, 2020, defendant allegedly called the San Bernardino County 

Land Use Services Code Enforcement Division and falsely reported “that [p]laintiff lives 

on BLM land, does not own the Property, has dogs on the Property without shelter, nor 

food nor water and runs illegal aggressive [dog bite] business.” The complaint alleges a 

code enforcement officer found no violation and indicated he would close the case 

against plaintiff after her “submitted application for kennel” was approved. A few days 

later, defendant “made . . . false allegations” to animal control about plaintiff and her 

dogs. After animal control arrived on plaintiff’s property, they found no issues and left. 

Finally, the complaint generally alleges defendant “disseminated this defamation” to the 

Los Angeles County Department of Consumer Affairs and the Los Angeles City 

Attorney.

With respect to defendant’s statements online, the complaint alleges 

defendant made various false statements on his personal Web site, Facebook, and 

Twitter. This included false statements that plaintiff “is squatting on [the] land and

doesn’t own the land,” “runs [an] illegal aggressive [dog bite] business,” “keeps the 

[d]ogs under straight sun,” and “was arrested on Animal Cruelty Charges.” The 

complaint further alleges defendant falsely stated plaintiff’s dogs “are in horrible 

condition,” her “business has been ordered ‘to shut down,’” and a “Notice of Violation 
4

WAS issued on October 13 of 2020 . . . by San Bernardino County [Land Use Services] 

Code Enforcement . . . .” Finally, the complaint alleges defendant posted a photograph of 

plaintiff online that “displays [p]laintiff not in real normal appearance” along with an 

image of plaintiff’s private property.2

The Anti-SLAPP Motion

In December 2020 and May 2021, defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion

and a later amended motion. He argued plaintiff’s claims arose from protected activity 

because the challenged statements: (1) related to matters under judicial review in 

pending cases where defendant was counsel of record; (2) were connected to matters 

under investigation by the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; or (3) were 

made in a public forum in connection with a matter of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. 

(e)(2)-(3).) Defendant also argued plaintiff could not show a probability of success on 

the merits.

The trial court granted in part and denied in part the anti-SLAPP motion. 

First, the court held defendant demonstrated plaintiff’s claims arose from protected 

activity pursuant to section 425.16 subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(3). The court briefly noted 

plaintiff did not “specifically address either of these subsections, apparently conceding

that they apply.” The court concluded, “This is enough to find that the defendant 

satisfied his burden on the first prong.” The court added, “It is also clear that statements, 

such as the ones in question, would be within the ambit of the statute.” 

Second, the trial court found plaintiff demonstrated a probability of 

prevailing on her defamation and libel claims but not her claims for invasion of privacy 

and tortious interference with business relations. With respect to the former, the court

noted the complaint alleged defendant made various statements about plaintiff’s 

2

It appears the complaint attached defendant’s online posts, but the 

complaint’s attachments are not included in the record on appeal.
5

treatment of German Shepherd dogs and questioned her ownership of the property. 

While defendant argued his statements were true, the court held that “the mere fact that 

there are pending cases and/or investigations being conducted against plaintiff does not 

necessarily prove she has abused any animals.” Because plaintiff had “not been 

convicted of anything” to date and “present[ed] evidence of her treatment of her dogs and 

ownership of the property,” the court denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to the defamation 

and libel causes of action.3

DISCUSSION 

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless 

lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of 

public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike 

a claim ‘arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition 

or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in 

connection with a public issue.’” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

871, 883-884.)

The trial court conducts a potentially two-step inquiry to evaluate an antiSLAPP motion. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 

(Bonni).) First, the court must decide whether the defendant has met its burden of 

establishing the plaintiff’s claim arises from protected activity in which the defendant has 

engaged. (Ibid.) Second, assuming defendant has met its burden, the court determines 

3

Plaintiff disputes the court’s ruling granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to 

the claims for invasion of privacy and tortious interference with business relations in a 

related appeal. (Zorikova v. Pease (July 7, 2023, G0601154) [nonpub.opn.].) We 

accordingly do not address those causes of action in this appeal.
6

whether the plaintiff has established “there is a probability . . . the plaintiff will prevail on 

the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In meeting this burden, “the plaintiff must show the 

claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.”’” (Bonni, at p. 1009.)

We review the trial court’s ruling de novo, applying the legal principles 

discussed above. (Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 

506, 518.)

Protected Activity

In determining whether plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity, “the 

critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected 

free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) “At 

this first step, courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what 

actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for 

liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged 

claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined 

category of protected activity.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) “We review the 

parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other supporting documents at this stage of the 

analysis only ‘to determine what conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine 

whether the conduct is actionable.’” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 

491.)

If a plaintiff pleads mixed causes of action based on allegations of both 

protected and unprotected activity, “[a]nalysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined 

to evaluating whether [the] entire cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff, arises from 

protected activity or has merit.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) Instead, courts 

analyze each act supplying a basis for relief to determine whether the acts are protected. 

(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393, 395 (Baral).) “So long as a ‘court 

determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the 
7

statute, the second step is reached’ with respect to these claims.” (Bonni, at p. 1010.) 

But “[a]llegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a 

claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, at p. 394.)

The anti-SLAPP statute identifies four categories of protected activity: “(1) 

any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial 

proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral 

statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 

legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by 

law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a 

public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in 

furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right 

of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (e)(1)-(4).)

Relying on the second and third categories, defendant contends plaintiff’s 

defamation and libel claims arise from protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)-(3).) 

He argues these two causes of action are based on what he said on matters of public 

interest or on statements connected to matters under official review. We agree.

Here, the complaint alleges defendant made various false statements about 

plaintiff on his personal Web site, Facebook, and Twitter. “Web sites accessible to the 

public, . . . are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Barrett v.

Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 41, fn. 4; Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 

1366 (Wong).) Plaintiff suggests defendant’s personal Web site does not qualify as a 

public forum because it does not allow for public comment or participation. But whether 

the Web site is privately controlled is irrelevant. As plaintiff’s complaint acknowledges, 

the website was accessible to the public and viewed by third parties. In short, 

defendant’s Web site, Facebook, and Twitter were public forums for purposes of the antiSLAPP statute. (Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 199 [“‘[It] cannot 
8

be disputed that Facebook’s Web site and the Facebook pages at issue are “public 

forums,” as they are accessible to anyone who consents to Facebook’s Terms.’”]; Jackson

v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1252 [postings on Facebook page and 

Instagram account were made in a public forum].)

We also find defendant’s online statements were of public interest. 

(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) “[A]lthough ‘not every Web site post involves a public issue’ 

[citation], consumer information that . . . implicates matters of public concern that can 

affect many people is generally deemed to involve an issue of public interest for purposes 

of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wong, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366.) Courts have 

found that consumer protection information such as a warning not to use someone’s 

services is a matter of public interest. (Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 

1146; Wong, at pp. 1365-1367.) We similarly conclude online statements about plaintiff, 

her allegedly illegal business, and her purported animal cruelty implicate matters of 

public concern. The statements were not made to simply air a private dispute but to warn 

the public about plaintiff’s business. 

The complaint also challenges various oral statements defendant made to 

law enforcement or similar authorities, including the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 

Department, the San Bernardino County Land Use Services Code Enforcement Division, 

the Los Angeles County Department of Consumer Affairs, the Los Angeles City 

Attorney, and animal control. These statements arose from protected activity. (§ 425.16, 

subd. (e)(2); see Chabak v. Monroy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511 [“statements to 

the police clearly arose from protected activity”]; Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 

Cal.App.4th 931, 941 [“communications to the police are within SLAPP”]; Wallace v.

McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1186, disapproved on other grounds in Baral,

supra, 1 Cal.5th 376 [“Reports to governmental agencies intended to prompt an 

investigation constitute activity in furtherance of the right of free speech or petition”]; 

Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258 [complaint to the City 
9

of Santa Monica about a neighbor’s playhouse and e-mail to City’s director of planning 

were protected].)

Because defendant met his burden of showing plaintiff’s defamation and 

libel claims arose from protected activity, the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish a 

probability of prevailing on the claims.

Probability of Success on the Merits

Our Supreme Court has described the second step of the anti-SLAPP 

analysis “as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation.] The court does not weigh 

evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the 

plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing 

sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and 

evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a 

matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’” 

(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385, fn. omitted.)

Defamation can involve either libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) Libel is 

defamation if based on a “publication by writing” or “other fixed representation” that can 

be seen. (Id., § 45.) To establish a prima facie case for defamation, a plaintiff must show 

“‘(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a 

natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 683, 720.) “Publication occurs when a defamatory statement is made to at least 

one third person.” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 

869, 884.) Because “‘“[t]he sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the existence 

of a falsehood,”’” truth is an absolute defense to a defamation action. (Ibid.)

As discussed, ante, there are two categories of statements alleged in the 

complaint: (1) defendant’s communications with law enforcement or similar authorities, 

and (2) defendant’s online statements. The former category of statements is privileged
10

and not actionable as defamation. But plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of 

prevailing on some of defendant’s online statements. 

A. Communications with Law Enforcement or Similar Authorities

Here, the complaint focuses on defendant’s alleged communications with 

the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department, the San Bernardino County Land Use 

Services Code Enforcement Division, the Los Angeles County Department of Consumer 

Affairs, the Los Angeles City Attorney, and animal control. This included statements 

that plaintiff was illegally occupying land, mistreating dogs, and running an illegal 

business.

Civil Code section 47 “establishes a privilege that bars liability in tort for 

the making of certain statements.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 350, 360 (Hagberg).) This includes “[a] privileged publication or broadcast” 

made “[i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official 

proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding 

authorized by law . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) As our Supreme Court has noted, 

most cases have found reports to police of suspected criminal activity are privileged 

under section 47, subdivision (b). (Hagberg, at p. 364.) The privilege also covers 

communications to “government authorities reporting a crime or suspected crime.” 

(Comstock v. Aber, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) These reports may not serve as the 

predicate for a tort claim except a claim for malicious prosecution. (Hagberg, at p. 360.) 

The California Legislature amended the statute, effective January 1, 2021, 

to make the privilege inapplicable to false reports made with knowledge of falsity or 

reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the report. (Stats. 2020, ch. 327, § 2; Civ. 

Code, § 47, subd. (b)(5).) But the amended statute does not apply to the instant case 

because defendant’s alleged communications occurred in 2020 and there is no indication 

of legislative intent to apply the amendment retroactively. (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 
11

Cal.4th 945, 955 [“there is a presumption against retroactive application unless the 

Legislature plainly has directed otherwise by means of ‘“express language of retroactivity

or . . . other sources [that] provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the 

Legislature intended retroactive application”’”]; Myers v. Philip Morris Companies,

Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841 [statutes are construed to apply prospectively if 

retroactive application is ambiguous].) 

Because a privileged statement cannot be actionable as defamation, plaintiff 

cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the defamation claim to the extent it is

based on defendant’s alleged communications with law enforcement or similar 

authorities. (Civ. Code, §§ 45, 46; Taus v. Loftus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 720.)

The complaint further fails to allege what defamatory statements were even 

made to the Los Angeles County Department of Consumer Affairs, the Los Angeles City 

Attorney, or animal control. Instead, the complaint generally alleges defendant made 

“false allegations” to animal control and “disseminated this defamation” to the Los 

Angeles County Department of Consumer Affairs and the Los Angeles City Attorney. 

Because the complaint does not identify any specific statement, plaintiff fails to state a 

viable claim for relief as to these allegations.

B. Online Statements

With respect to defendant’s online statements, the parties only dispute the 

falsity element of defamation. Defendant contends his statements were true while 

plaintiff disagrees. In determining if plaintiff has satisfied her burden on the element of 

falsity, we keep in mind that on review of an anti-SLAPP motion, we must accept as true 

the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and that a “‘plaintiff needs to show only a case of 

“minimal merit.”’” (Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 348.) We 

draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the plaintiff. (Tuchscher
12

Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 

1219, 1238-1239.)

In support of her opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, plaintiff submitted 

her declaration, which denied the truth of defendant’s statements. To undermine 

defendant’s statement, she was squatting on the land, plaintiff also attached a grant deed 

suggesting she owned the property at issue. In response to defendant’s statement plaintiff 

ran an “illegal aggressive [dog bite] business” or abused the animals, plaintiff provided 

evidence of a report from animal control. The report included notes from animal control 

officers who visited plaintiff’s property in August 2020. Among other things, the notes 

indicated the dogs “had shade and shelter” and appeared to be “healthy,” “normal,” and 

not “in distress.” Because plaintiff presented evidence of her treatment of the dogs and 

ownership of the property, plaintiff showed her claims had minimal merit to the extent 

they were based on defendant’s statements that plaintiff “is squatting on [the] land and 

doesn’t own the land,” “runs [an] illegal aggressive [dog bite] business,” and “keeps the 

[d]ogs under straight sun.”

Defendant counters the above evidence by relying on plaintiff’s own Web

site, which he claims supports the veracity of his statements. He points to his declaration, 

which included a screenshot of a Web site stating: “Our German Shepherds come 

through acclimatization to low and high temperatures that they strive while in mountains 

or performing their duties in any climate.” But this statement does not prove plaintiff ran 

an illegal business or kept the dogs “under straight sun.” 

Defendant also relies on a notice of violation issued in October 2020 by the 

San Bernardino County Land Use Services Code Enforcement Division. The notice 

indicates plaintiff was “[o]perating a kennel on a property listed as vacant with no 

established Primary Use . . . .” The notice appears to include the investigator’s notes, 

which indicate plaintiff said she would try to obtain the required permits. As the trial 

court correctly found, “the mere fact that there are pending cases and/or investigations 
13

being conducted against plaintiff does not necessarily prove she has abused any animals” 

or was running an “illegal aggressive [dog bite] business.” But we agree the notice of 

violation defeats the complaint’s allegation that defendant “falsely states . . . on [his] 

Facebook page . . . that Notice of Violation WAS issued on October 13 of 2020 . . . .” 

Because defendant’s evidence shows his alleged statement was true (a notice of violation 

was issued on October 13, 2020), this allegation is stricken.

Defendant next points to an October 2020 temporary restraining order 

issued in another case. The temporary restraining order enjoined plaintiff from keeping 

dogs without required permits, failing to provide housing, food, or water for the dogs, or 

tethering a dog for longer than three hours in a 24-hour period. Because plaintiff was 

enjoined from keeping dogs without the required permits, the trial court essentially shut 

down her business for some period of time. In other words, defendant’s statement that 

plaintiff’s business was ordered to shut down is true. While plaintiff contends the court 

ultimately denied defendant’s request for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff’s business 

still was shut down (even if just for one day). We accordingly strike the complaint’s 

allegation that defendant falsely stated plaintiff’s “business has been ordered ‘to shut 

down.’”

Defendant further argues his statement that plaintiff’s dogs “are in horrible 

condition” is a nonactionable statement of opinion. We agree. The criticism is too vague 

to be actionable and does not imply a provably false assertion of fact. (Nygard, Inc. v.

Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1047-1058 [employee’s statement about 

“‘“horrible working experiences”’” was protected opinion]; Gallagher v. Connell (2004) 

123 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1270 [“a subjective judgment of the person making the statement”

is not one that implies a provably false factual assertion].)
14

Defendant’s statement that plaintiff “was arrested on Animal Cruelty 

Charges” also is nonactionable because it is true. Indeed, the complaint concedes officers 

“detained [p]laintiff” in August 2020. The complaint explains plaintiff and her daughter 

“were taken to jail, where they spent 4 days without access neither to phone call, nor 

requested attorney with bail status as ineligible.” This occurred after defendant allegedly 

called the police to report plaintiff was illegally occupying land and kept dogs on the 

property without shelter, food, or water. Despite these allegations, plaintiff contends she 

was not arrested “but detained only and no criminal case against her was [ever] opened 

and County had paid $325000 as settlement . . . for mistakes of unwarranted detention by 

deputy . . . .” But defendant never said plaintiff was prosecuted or convicted of animal 

cruelty. He said she was arrested for animal cruelty, which plaintiff does not dispute. 

Finally, the complaint alleges defendant posted a photograph of plaintiff

that “displays [p]laintiff not in real normal appearance” along with an image of plaintiff’s 

private property. According to defendant’s declaration, one of defendant’s clients took 

the unaltered photograph of plaintiff while animal rescuers took the photograph of 

plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff does not explain how the photographs were inaccurate. But 

we acknowledge the potentially defamatory aspect arises from the caption defendant 

included with his posts: “Meet Alla Zorikova, animal abuser being helped by San 

Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department. Click here to see an interactive map of the 

land she is squatting on to run an illegal ‘protection dog’ business.” “[T]he publication of 

[these] photograph[s] with the innuendo in the caption, viewed in the light most favorable 

to [plaintiff], was reasonably susceptible of a libelous meaning . . . .” (Gomes v.

Fried (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 924, 935.)

For the foregoing reasons, paragraphs 11, 37, 42, 54, 55, 56, and 57 of the 

complaint are stricken. As to the remaining allegations, the trial court properly found 

plaintiff satisfied the minimal merit showing.
15

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed in part and reversed in part. On remand, the trial 

court is directed to enter a new order granting the anti-SLAPP motion in part with respect 

to the defamation and libel claims. The court is ordered to strike paragraphs 11, 37, 42, 

54, 55, 56, and 57 of the complaint. The anti-SLAPP motion is otherwise denied as to 

the remaining allegations in the defamation and libel causes of action. In the interests of 

justice, each side is to bear his or her own costs on appeal. 

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.