COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DOLLAR GENERAL STORE, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 0747-95-2 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

BEATRICE V. CRIDLIN MARCH 26, 1996 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Ralph L. Whitt, Jr. (Jennifer G. Marwitz; 

Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on brief), 

for appellants. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 Beatrice V. Cridlin ("claimant") filed a claim for benefits 

with the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission alleging an 

injury by accident she sustained in March 1994 while working for 

Dollar General Store ("employer"). The deputy commissioner 

awarded temporary total disability for a one-week period at a 

rate of $140.01. The full commission affirmed. Employer 

appeals, contending the commission erred in its finding that 

claimant had sustained an injury by accident arising out of and 

in the course of her employment. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 I. 

 On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. 

v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

The commission's findings of fact on the issue of causation will 

be upheld if supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol 
- 2 - 

Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 

(1989); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 684, 688, 376 

S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). 

 As an assistant manager for employer, claimant's duties 

included running the cash register, helping on the floor, and 

helping with stock. On March 28, 1994, claimant helped unload a 

delivery truck, removing boxes from a waist-high conveyor belt 

extending from the truck. The unloading began at approximately 

10:00 a.m. and lasted three to four hours, during which time 

claimant estimated she unloaded close to 1000 boxes. Claimant 

testified that between 11:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m., after she had 

unloaded several hundred boxes, she felt "the muscles pulling in 

[her] neck" upon lifting a box of ironing boards from the 

conveyor belt. The box contained four ironing boards, was taller 

than claimant, and was the heaviest box she had unloaded that 

day. Although claimant immediately felt the "pull," she did not 

feel any pain until the following day. 

 In reports to her treating physicians and supervisor, in her 

claim for benefits, and in a conversation with the insurer's 

claims representative, claimant described her injury as occurring 

while unloading boxes. She did not specifically state that it 

occurred when she unloaded a box of ironing boards. Claimant's 

condition was diagnosed by medical personnel at the hospital as 

an "overuse injury/bursitis right shoulder" and by her physician 

as a "trapezius strain" and "tendinitis of the right shoulder." 
- 3 - 

 "Injury by accident" is defined, within the context of the 

Workers' Compensation Act, as "an identifiable incident or sudden 

precipitating event [that results] in an obvious sudden 

mechanical or structural change in the body." Morris v. Morris, 

238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989). By contrast, a 

gradually incurred injury is not an injury by accident within the 

meaning of the Act. Middlekauff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 Va. 

150, 154, 439 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1994). Though an injury by 

accident must be "`bounded with rigid temporal precision,' . . . 

[a]n injury need not occur within a specific number of seconds or 

minutes . . . but instead, must occur within a `reasonably 

definite time.'" Brown v. Caporaletti, 12 Va. App. 242, 243-44, 

402 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1991) (quoting Morris, 238 Va. at 589, 385 

S.E.2d at 864). 

 Employer argues that the commission erred in finding 

claimant's condition to be an injury by accident. It contends 

that claimant's testimony that the injury was caused when she 

unloaded a box of ironing boards is insufficient when weighed 

against other evidence in the case, which fails to reflect such 

an event. 

 Claimant did not report until the hearing that unloading a 

box of ironing boards caused her injury. The commission weighed 

that factor and resolved the issue in favor of claimant. We will 

not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, which 

had an opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their 
- 4 - 

credibility. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 

374, 382, 363 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1987), appeal after remand, 9 Va. 

App. 120, 384 S.E.2d 333 (1989). 

 II. 

 Next, employer contends that claimant's medical records 

indicate she suffered from cumulative trauma rather than an 

identifiable injury. Citing Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Hosey, 

208 Va. 568, 159 S.E.2d 633 (1968), employer argues that the 

commission violated the well settled rule that it "must look to 

the medical evidence to ascertain the cause or mechanism of 

claimant's injury." 

Hosey, however, does not support employer's assertion. 

Although Hosey found causation in that case based on claimant's 

medical records, id. at 570, 159 S.E.2d at 634-35, the Court's 

ruling does not support employer's argument that medical evidence 

is dispositive, or required, to establish causation. 

 "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is 

subject to the commission's consideration and weighing." 

Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401 

S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991) (addressing evidence used to establish 

percentage of incapacity suffered by employee). The testimony of 

a claimant may also be considered in determining causation, 

especially where the medical testimony is inconclusive. See

Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 

281, 348 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1986). As noted in 2B Arthur Larson, 
- 5 - 

The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 79.51(a) (1995): 

 To appraise the true degree of 

indispensability which should be accorded 

medical testimony, it is first necessary to 

dispel the misconception that valid awards 

can stand only if accompanied by a definite 

medical diagnosis. True, in many instances 

it may be impossible to form a judgment on 

the relation of the employment to the injury, 

or relation of the injury to the disability, 

without analyzing in medical terms what the 

injury or disease is. But this is not 

invariably so. In appropriate circumstances, 

awards may be made when medical evidence on 

these matters is inconclusive, indecisive, 

fragmentary, inconsistent, or even 

nonexistent. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 The commission clearly considered claimant's medical 

records. It gave the records little weight in its determination 

of the legal cause of claimant's injury, finding that the 

treating physicians were primarily interested in treating 

claimant's condition and not in establishing the cause of the 

injury. The reports reflect only the results of claimant's 

physical examinations and do not purport to establish the cause 

or causes of her injury. See Morris, 3 Va. App. at 282, 348 

S.E.2d at 879. Indeed, neither doctor was asked to give an 

opinion as to the causal relationship between claimant's work and 

her disability. See id. at 281-82, 348 S.E.2d at 878-79. 

 In short, the commission was free to credit claimant's 

testimony at the hearing as a basis for its finding of causation. 

 The fact that contrary evidence may appear in the record "is of 

no consequence if there is credible evidence to support the 
- 6 - 

commission's finding." Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. 

App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). 

 III. 

 Employer next argues that claimant is precluded from 

receiving benefits because her injury was expected. It contends 

claimant lifted the box in contravention of her physician's 

direction to lift nothing heavy because of her breast cancer 

surgery. 

 An injury by accident must be unexpected to be compensable. 

See, e.g., Hosey, 208 Va. at 570-71, 159 S.E.2d at 635 (injury 

to knee while making door-to-door survey unexpected); Lynchburg 

Foundry Co. v. Irvin, 178 Va. 265, 270-71, 16 S.E.2d 646, 648 

(1941) (pinching of "safety shoe" causing toe injury unexpected); 

Ellis v. City of Norfolk, 68 O.I.C. 47, 52 (1989) (finding injury 

expected therefore noncompensable). However, claimant's injury 

cannot be considered an "expected" result of a deviation from the 

heavy lifting restriction placed on her activities because of her 

breast cancer surgery; her shoulder injury was not one the 

restriction was intended to avoid. Cf. Miller v. Dixon Lumber 

Co., 67 O.I.C. 71, 73 (1988); Bragg v. Buchanan General Hosp., 59 

O.I.C. 30, 32-33 (1980); Dobbins v. Contractors Equip. & Supply 

Co., 58 O.I.C. 104, 106 (1979). 

 Accordingly, the decision of the commission is affirmed. 

Affirmed.