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[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 192 (Tuesday, October 4, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61350-61351]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-25523]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DOE Response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's Request 
for Clarification on Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste 
Treatment and Immobilization Plant

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: On August 12, 2011, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board (DNFSB) requested clarification on DOE's response to 
Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and 
Immobilization Plant. In accordance with section 315(b) of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b), the following 
represents the Secretary of Energy's clarification response to the 
DNFSB's request.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the 
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 
Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004 within thirty (30) 
days from the date of this publication.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. John Vorderbrueggen, Nuclear 
Engineer, Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 19, 2011.
Mari-Josette Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.

September 19, 2011

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004-2901

Dear Mr. Chairman:

    This letter responds to your August 12, 2011 letter, which 
requested clarification on four areas identified in our original June 
30, 2011, response to your Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the 
Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). As you know, because 
this issue is of such great importance to the Department of Energy 
(DOE), I have designated Deputy Secretary Poneman as the Responsible 
Manager for this Recommendation, and he has already begun our efforts 
to address the issues our staffs have discussed. The Department 
appreciates the opportunity to provide further

[[Page 61351]]

clarification and believes that keeping avenues of communication open 
will help improve our safety culture. In our previous correspondence, 
the Department conveyed its acceptance of the Recommendation 2011-1 and 
now offers the following clarification in the areas requested:
    1. DOE's present assessment of the safety culture at WTP in light 
of the additional sources of supporting information now available to 
DOE.
    The Department has reviewed the incoming public comments and 
additional WTP safety culture-related information. On one hand, we are 
pleased that individuals have felt encouraged to step forward and 
express their concerns, to the extent that indicates that our broad 
message welcoming such input is being heard. On the other hand, the 
content of many of these messages shows that we need to continue to 
improve WTP's safety culture. The Department will also continue to 
evaluate the efficacy of applicable DOE and contractor policies and 
procedures, including the procedures for resolving differing 
professional opinions and other employee concerns.
    2. DOE's current understanding of the conclusions of the HSS 
report.
    The Health, Safety and Security (HSS) report, like all reports 
based on interviews, captured a snapshot in time. The report reflected 
the views of the interviewees as they perceived the existing situation, 
as interpreted by the report's authors. As your letter implies, given 
our steadfast commitment to safety we must continually update data and 
refresh conclusions based on what we learn. We have done that by 
reviewing the incoming comments we have received during the Deputy 
Secretary's July visit to Hanford and subsequently through other 
channels; as noted above, these have made clear that we have more work 
to do. That is why we have asked HSS to conduct a follow-on safety 
culture review at WTP as part of its broader extent-of-condition review 
across the DOE complex. Those reviews are scheduled to begin later this 
month, and we will apply what we learn in those reviews to continue our 
efforts to improve the safety culture at Hanford.
    3. DOE's present understanding and response to Sub-recommendation 
3.
    DOE understands the distinction being made by the Board that there 
is a difference between judging the merits of a particular case between 
opposing parties still in dispute, and the effect that the perceptions 
of that controversy--regardless of the merits of the underlying case--
may have on a community. We also agree with the Board that such 
perceptions can have a material effect on the safety culture at a site 
and in a community. In developing our Implementation Plan on 
Recommendation 2011-1, the DOE therefore will continue to work to 
establish a strong safety culture that takes the power of perceptions 
fully into account.
    4. The independence, public stature, and leadership experience of 
the implementation team that will be called upon to provide safety 
culture insights and assessments to the Secretary and Senior DOE 
leadership.
    We accept the implicit premise of the request, i.e., that the 
independence, stature, and leadership experience of the implementation 
team that will be called upon to provide safety culture insights and 
assessments to the Secretary and Senior DOE leadership is of crucial 
importance. In this regard, the review team members are selected based 
on their technical competence, objectivity, experience in safety 
management, executive leadership, and a clear understanding of 
corporate culture. DOE recognizes the heightened need to include 
``knowledgeable others'' in the safety culture review process. The 
Department will therefore engage independent industry safety culture 
experts to evaluate the Implementation Plan (IP), and also to evaluate 
the quality of major IP deliverables.
    Both DOE and Bechtel National Incorporated (BNI) will be performing 
safety culture reviews at WTP. The Department welcomes BNI's initiative 
in engaging qualified industry experts. DOE will monitor and cooperate 
with--but not partner in--the BNI review in order to gauge the validity 
of the BNI process. DOE will also examine the results of the review for 
relevant findings.
    Of course, BNI's activities are not a substitute for DOE-directed 
reviews, which is why we are undertaking our own assessment 
concurrently. The HSS review will also help update our understanding of 
the current status of nuclear safety culture at WTP. The results of the 
HSS review will, of course, be shared with the Board upon its 
completion.
    I hope this clarification is helpful. We are enthusiastic about our 
work toward the shared goal of safety excellence throughout the DOE 
complex. Given the importance of this issue, I hope you will continue 
to work closely with Deputy Secretary Poneman as we strengthen our 
efforts to promote a strong safety culture at WTP and across the DOE 
complex.

Sincerely,

Steven Chu

[FR Doc. 2011-25523 Filed 10-3-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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