[Cite as State v. Stevens, 2012-Ohio-4095.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

RICHARD W. STEVENS 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 11CA009995 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE Nos. 10CR080870 and 

 10CR080938 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 10, 2012 

 

BELFANCE, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Richard Stevens appeals from decisions of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} An indictment was filed against Mr. Stevens on August 5, 2010, in case number 

10CR080870 for one count of kidnapping with two specifications, one count of rape with a 

specification, one count of aggravated burglary with one specification, and one count of 

disrupting public services. That same day an indictment was filed against Mr. Stevens in case 

number 10CR080938 for one count of theft. Both indictments relate to conduct that allegedly 

took place on June 17, 2010. 

{¶3} On April 6, 2011, Mr. Stevens filed a motion to dismiss asserting a violation of 

his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied on April 7, 2011, following a hearing. The 

cases proceeded to a consolidated trial by jury. The jury found Mr. Stevens not guilty of rape, 
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kidnapping, and aggravated burglary and guilty of disrupting public services and unauthorized 

use of a motor vehicle (as a lesser included offense of theft). Mr. Stevens was sentenced to a 

total of 18 months in prison. Mr. Stevens has appealed, raising four assignments of error for our 

review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATING DEFENDANT’S 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL[.] 

{¶4} Mr. Stevens asserts in his first assignment of error that the trial court violated his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, Mr. Stevens’ entire argument focuses on an 

alleged violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, and he offers no argument explaining 

how his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Thus, this Court will focus on Mr. 

Stevens’ statutory right to a speedy trial. See App.R. 16(A)(7). 

{¶5} This Court has previously stated: 

“[t]he right of an accused to a speedy trial is recognized by the Constitutions of 

both the United States and the State of Ohio.” State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 

218, 219 (1980). There is also a statutory right to a speedy trial in Ohio. “Upon 

motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged with an 

offense shall be discharged if he is not brought to trial within the time required by 

sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2945.73(B). Under 

Section 2945.71(C)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code, a person charged with a felony 

must be brought to trial within 270 days of his arrest. 

State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. No. 11CA010012, 2012-Ohio-3524, ¶ 8. R.C. 2945.71(E) provides 

that “each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall 

be counted as three days.” “The defendant’s speedy trial clock begins to run on the day after 

arrest or service of summons.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. No. 11CA010026, 2012-Ohio-3417, ¶ 
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25. However, R.C. 2945.72 lists various events that will toll the running of the speedy-trial 

clock. 

{¶6} Mr. Stevens was arrested June 17, 2010, and, thus, his speedy-trial time began to 

run on June 18, 2010. Ultimately, Mr. Stevens’ jury trial began on April 13, 2011. Thus, the 

date of Mr. Stevens’ trial marked the 300th day following his arrest. 

{¶7} On April 6, 2011, Mr. Stevens filed a motion to dismiss (in both cases), asserting 

that his statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated.1 That motion was later 

renewed and clarified on the date of trial prior to its commencement. 

{¶8} On appeal, Mr. Stevens’ sole argument is that the trial court erred in not applying 

the triple-count provision found in R.C. 2945.71(E), and thus, Mr. Stevens had to be brought to 

trial in 90 days, as opposed to 270 days. In so doing, Mr. Steven relies on State v. Parker, 113 

Ohio St.3d 207, 2007-Ohio-1534. The State, however, concedes that Parker and R.C. 

2945.71(E)’s triple-count provision applies to Mr. Stevens’ case. We agree. See Parker at 

paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 

{¶9} Between June 18, 2010, and August 13, 2010, 56 days, or 168 days applying the 

triple-count provision, passed without any tolling events. On August 13, 2010, Mr. Stevens 

signed a speedy-trial waiver that provided he waived his speedy-trial rights from August 13, 

2010, to August 27, 2010. Further, on August 27, 2010, until January 27, 2011, time was tolled 

as various pretrials were continued or set at Mr. Stevens’ request. See State v. Zimmerman, 9th 

Dist. No. 23089, 2006-Ohio-6004, ¶ 10, fn. 1; State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio6658, ¶ 34; R.C. 2945.72(E). However, there appears to be no tolling event between January 27, 

 1

 Notably, while Mr. Stevens referenced his constitutional right to speedy trial in his 

motion to dismiss, he made no argument concerning that right either in his motion or at the 

hearing on his motion. 
4 

 

2011, and February 18, 2011. Between those two dates, 22 days passed (66 employing the triple 

count provision), bringing the total days chargeable to the State to 78 actual days and 234 days 

employing the triple-count provision. 

{¶10} On February 18, 2011, prior to the expiration of Mr. Stevens’ speedy-trial time 

when taking into account tolling events, at a pretrial, the trial court sua sponte continued the trial 

date from February 23, 2011, until April 13, 2011, stating that the trial was continued because 

“the court is in trial on another case” on February 23, 2011. R.C. 2945.72(H) permits the 

speedy-trial clock to be tolled for the “period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own 

motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s own 

motion.” “When a trial court exercises its discretion to continue the period for trial beyond the 

statutory limit, the continuance is entered under the second clause of subsection (H) and, 

therefore, the period of continuance must be reasonable.” State v. Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309, 

2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 28. “Ideally, [w]hen sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 

2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by 

journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a 

defendant to trial.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 32. If the trial court fails 

to perfectly comply with this requirement, “an appellate court may affirm a conviction 

challenged on speedy-trial grounds even if the trial court did not expressly enumerate any 

reasons justifying the delay when the reasonableness of the continuance is otherwise 

affirmatively demonstrated by the record.” Id. at ¶ 33. 

{¶11} Here, at the hearing on Mr. Stevens’ motion to dismiss, the record reflects that, at 

the time of the scheduled trial in February 2011, the court was already in trial. In addition, there 

were uncontested assertions that the parties agreed to the April 13, 2011 trial date and that that 
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trial date was the first trial date at which counsel for both parties were available. Likewise, in the 

trial court’s entry denying Mr. Stevens’ motion to dismiss, the trial court noted that April 13, 

2011, was selected as the trial date, because it was “[t]he earliest date available for trial[.]” In 

light of the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court’s continuance of the trial date to April 

13, 2011, was unreasonable, and, thus, the continuance tolled the speedy-trial clock. See id. at ¶ 

28. 

{¶12} We also note that, in the same entry continuing the trial date, the trial court 

indicated that Mr. Stevens requested that a final pretrial be set for March 17, 2011, which would 

also toll the speedy-trial clock. See R.C. 2945.72(E). In addition, in the entry, the trial court 

ordered Mr. Stevens to provide the State with discovery. It is unclear when the State requested 

the discovery it did not receive. The only discovery request from the State in the record was 

filed August 23, 2010. As of the date of the motion to dismiss hearing held on April 7, 2011, the 

State indicated that Mr. Stevens still had not complied with the State’s discovery request. Thus, 

the trial court could have charged at least a portion of that time to Mr. Stevens due to his neglect 

in responding to discovery requests. See State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374, 

paragraphs one through three of the syllabus; see also State v. Miller, 9th Dist. No. 07CA0037-

M, 2008-Ohio-1002, ¶ 10; R.C. 2945.72(D). Further, the filing of the motion to dismiss on April 

6, 2011, tolled the clock until it was ruled upon on April 7, 2011. See State v. Szorady, 9th Dist. 

No. 02CA008159, 2003-Ohio-2716, ¶ 14. Moreover, Mr. Stevens has not explained how, given 

the tolling events, he was tried outside the speedy-trial timeframe, even when applying the triplecount provision. See App.R. 16(A)(7). 

{¶13} In light of all of the foregoing, we conclude that Mr. Stevens’ statutory speedytrial rights were not violated because, when tolling events are taken into account, Mr. Stevens 
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was brought to trial within the requisite time period. Accordingly, Mr. Stevens’ first assignment 

of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 

SUPPORT A FINDING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 

APPELLANT WAS GUILTY[.] 

{¶14} Mr. Stevens asserts in his second assignment of error that the jury’s finding of 

guilty on the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle charge is based upon insufficient evidence. 

We do not agree. 

{¶15} In determining whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a 

conviction, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State 

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274 (1991). Furthermore: 

[a]n appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind 

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶16} R.C. 2913.03(A) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly use or operate an 

aircraft, motor vehicle, motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle without the 

consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent.” “A person acts knowingly, 

regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result 

or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is 

aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). 
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{¶17} Mr. Stevens and the victim were involved in a tumultuous relationship which 

ended in the end of May 2010 when Mr. Stevens moved out of the victim’s residence following a 

heated argument. Subsequently, Mr. Stevens sent a series of emails to the victim professing his 

love for her and expressing his desire to resume their relationship. The victim averred that he 

also frequently called her. In one email in response, the victim told Mr. Stevens that she was 

seeing someone else and that they both should move on with their lives. 

{¶18} In the early morning hours of June 17, 2010, the victim alleged that Mr. Stevens 

broke into her apartment and raped her. During the incident, the victim asked Mr. Stevens how 

he got to her apartment and he told her that he “stole Venny’s car.” The victim identified Venny 

as a friend of Mr. Stevens that “he had been renting off of.” The victim also testified that, after 

the alleged attack, “[she] realized that [she] had no idea what kind of car Venny had, so [she] 

wouldn’t be able to tell anybody what [Mr. Stevens] left in, so [she] went to the patio door * * * 

and [she saw] a light-colored SUV go out and [she] knew that it was him.” 

{¶19} Detective Lisa Dietsche testified that the victim told her that the victim saw Mr. 

Stevens get into a white SUV after he left her apartment. Upon further investigation, police 

discovered that Mr. Stevens had a possible connection to Venise Bryant. When officers drove 

past Ms. Bryant’s residence they saw a white SUV in her driveway. 

{¶20} Venise Bryant testified that she owns a white 1998 Ford Explorer and that on June 

17, 2010, Mr. Stevens was living in her home. She testified that she had allowed him to drive 

her vehicle before she found out he did not have a driver’s license but not after. She also 

indicated that Mr. Stevens had never asked to borrow her vehicle and that he did not have keys to 

the vehicle. She testified that Mr. Stevens was at home on the computer when she went to bed 

around 11:30 pm on June 16, 2010, and that, when police arrived the next morning, Mr. Stevens 
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was in his bed. The police then asked her to take her vehicle to the police station. At the station, 

Ms. Bryant noticed that her belongings were not where she left them. She stated that she noticed 

that her “bingo bag was in the floorboard and [she] had went to bingo the night before, and [she] 

had set it in [her] passenger seat[.]” She stated she always kept her bingo bag on her passenger 

seat. Ms. Bryant thereafter filed a stolen vehicle report. 

{¶21} We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence, if believed, whereby a 

jury could find Mr. Stevens guilty of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. There was evidence 

presented that Mr. Stevens told the victim that he stole “Venny’s” vehicle to get to the victim’s 

home. Immediately after the incident, the victim saw a white SUV leaving her residence. Ms. 

Bryant owned a white SUV, and there was testimony that Mr. Stevens was staying at Ms. 

Bryant’s home at the time. Ms. Bryant indicated that Mr. Stevens had never asked to borrow the 

vehicle and that she stopped letting him use the vehicle after she found out that he did not have a 

license. Ms. Bryant further testified that her belongings were out of place when she saw the 

vehicle the next day. From all of the above, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Stevens 

knowingly used the white SUV owned by Ms. Bryant without her consent. See R.C. 2913.03(A). 

Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Stevens’ second assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE[.] 

{¶22} Mr. Stevens asserts in his third assignment of error that his conviction for 

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We do not 

agree. 

{¶23} In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the appellate court: 
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must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. 

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). 

{¶24} Mr. Stevens essentially argues his conviction is against the manifest weight 

because there was no physical evidence or eyewitnesses placing Mr. Stevens in the white SUV. 

In addition, Mr. Stevens alleges that Ms. Bryant’s testimony is not credible because she was 

acting to protect her own interests and did not want to be involved in the investigation. We are 

not persuaded by Mr. Stevens’ arguments. 

{¶25} As discussed above, there was substantial circumstantial evidence that linked Mr. 

Stevens to the white SUV at issue. Initially we note that there was testimony that Mr. Stevens 

admitted to stealing a vehicle from Venny to get to the victim’s apartment. The victim saw a 

white SUV leaving the scene. Ms. Venise Bryant, with whom Mr. Stevens lived, owned a white 

SUV and noticed that her belongings that she kept in the vehicle were not where she left them 

following the incident in question. Moreover, Ms. Bryant stated that Mr. Stevens did not ask to 

borrow her vehicle and that, once she learned that he did not have a driver’s license, she no 

longer allowed him to use the vehicle. 

{¶26} With respect to Ms. Bryant’s credibility, we note that the jury was able to observe 

Ms. Bryant’s demeanor and facial expressions and more fully evaluate her credibility. We find 

nothing in her testimony specifically evidencing any bias or ulterior motivation, and Mr. Stevens 

has not pointed to anything that evidences the same. Based upon the record before us, we cannot 

say that the jury’s credibility determinations were unreasonable or that it lost its way in 
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convicting Mr. Stevens of unauthorized use of a vehicle. Mr. Stevens’ third assignment of error 

is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV 

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE MAXIMUM STATED 

SENTENCE. 

{¶27} Mr. Stevens asserts in his fourth assignment of error that the trial court erred in 

imposing the maximum sentence of 18 months for his conviction for disrupting public services. 

{¶28} Mr. Stevens acknowledges that he has already completed his prison sentence and 

concedes that “the issue may[ ]be moot,” yet he nonetheless believes that we should address the 

issue on appeal. Mr. Stevens has provided no compelling argument as to why we should address 

this issue when we could provide him with no relief, even assuming the trial court erred in 

fashioning his sentence. Accordingly, and in light of our resolution of his other assignments of 

error, we decline to address his argument. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

III. 

{¶29} In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Lorain County Court of 

Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 
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 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 EVE V. BELFANCE 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, P. J. 

CONCURS.

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.

APPEARANCES:

JENIFER C. BERKI, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.