UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

RONALD STEVE MASON, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 14-5085

v. (D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00717-TCK-TLW) (N.D. Okla.) EMMA WATTS, Warden Respondent - Appellee.

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

Ronald Steve Mason, a state pr isoner, filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking ha beas corpus relief from his convicti ons and sentences. The issue before us is whether the distri ct court was correct in its procedural ruling—specifically, that th e petition was untimely. B ecause we conclude that jurists of reason would not find it debatabl e that the district court was correct in

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata , and collateral est oppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 5, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-2- its procedural ru ling, we deny Mason a certificat e of appealability and dismiss this appeal. On May 16, 2012, he pleade d guilty to second-degree burglary after two or more felony convictions ( knowingly concealing or rece iving stolen property, 1983; second-degree burglar y, 1983; first-degree burglary, 1988; knowingly concealing or receiving stolen prope rty, 1989; second-de gree burglary, 1990; attempt to obtain controlled drug by forged or altere d prescription, 2001; petit larceny AFCF, 2001), Case No. CF-2011-33 79. He was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. On June 26, 2012, he pl eaded guilty to knowingly receiving or concealing stolen property after two or more felony convictions, Case No. CF2011-2978. For this conviction, he was also sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently. On April 1, 2013, Mason filed a “req uest for court doc uments at state expense due to state of indi gency” in both of his cases. The state district judge denied his requests on May 24, 2013. R. vol. 1 at 195. On June 11, 2013, Mason filed an application for post-conviction relief in Case No. CF-2011-3379. The state distri ct court denied his request because Mason did not timely file a direct appeal. He at tempted to perfect a postconviction appeal, but on September 12, 2013, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) declined jurisdiction because Mason had im properly filed it, and dismissed the appeal.-3- Also on June 11, 2013, Mason filed an application for post-conviction relief in Case No. CF-2011- 2978. The district court deni ed this request for the same reason. Mason attempted to perf ect the post-conviction appeal, but on September 12, 2013, the OCCA declined jurisdiction for the same reason and dismissed the appeal. On October 31, 2013, the Clerk of Court received and filed Mason’s federal writ of habeas corpus. Mason claims that he placed the petition in the prison mailing system on October 25, 2013. Acco rdingly, under the prison mailbox rule, the earliest filing date for th is petition is October 25, 2013. See Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Mason raises four claims in his habeas petition: (1 ) that the court illegally enhanced his sentences with a misdemeanor that was im properly accelerated to a felony (petit larceny); (2) th at his sentences were ille gally enhanced by Case No. CF-2001-1967; 1 (3) that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (4) that the court’s conclu sion of law and finding of facts are insufficient and contrary to well-settled Oklahoma law as announced by the court. The district court denied Mason’s writ because it was time-barred. Mason now seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) from th is court, appealing both the timeliness issue and asserting the me rits of his claims.

1 In Case No. CF-2001-1967, Mason was convicted of a felony—attempt to obtain controlled drug by fo rged or altered prescrip tion—on September 26, 2001.-4- An appeal from a writ of habeas corpus may only be taken to the court of appeals if that court first grants a C OA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We may only issue a COA if the petitioner makes a “s ubstantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253( c)(2). When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural gr ounds and does not reach th e underlying claims, the court of appeals should only grant a COA if “jurists of re ason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of re ason would find it debatabl e whether the district court was correct in its pro cedural ruling.” § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000) (“Resolution of procedural issu es first is allowed and encouraged by the rule that this Court will not pass upo n a constitutional questi on if there is also present some other ground upon which th e case may be disposed of.”). Where there is a procedural bar a nd the district court correctly invokes it to dismiss the habeas petition, “a reasonable jurist coul d not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner s hould be allowed to proceed further.” Slack , 529 U.S. at 484. In that case, no appeal would be warranted. Id. Viewing the petition before us, we agree with the district court’s procedural ruling as explai ned below. Therefore, we deny Mason’s request for a COA and dismiss this appeal. The Antiterrorism and Effective Deat h Penalty Act (AEDPA) established a one-year limitations period for habeas corpus peti tions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The limitation period begins to run from the date on which th e judgment became final.-5- § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a state application for post-convicti on relief properly filed duri ng the limitations period. §2244(d)(2). Mason’s convictions became final on July 5, 2012, and July 6, 2012, ten days after the pronouncement of hi s Judgment and Senten ce on June 25, 2012, and June 26, 2012, respectively. See Rule 4.2(A), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals , Title 22, Ch. 18 App. (2011) (providing petitioner with ten days from the time of his conviction to fi le an application to withdraw his guilty plea or appeal before his conviction becomes final). Thus , absent a to lling event, Mason had until July 8, 2013, to file a timely habeas petition for both convictions. At the earliest, he filed his petition on Oc tober 25, 2013, which is more than three months be yond the deadline. Thus, absent a statutory tolling, his petition is time-barred. The district court prope rly concluded that Mason’ s motion requesting court documents did not constitute an appl ication for post-conviction relief, and therefore did not trigger the statut ory tolling period under § 2244(d)(2). See May v. Workman , 339 F.3d 1236, 1237 ( 10th Cir. 2003). The district court also properly concluded that even though Mason’s attempts to obtain post-convic tion relief did toll the limi tations period in which to file a habeas petition, his petition was still time-barre d. The habeas limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a properly file d post-conviction proceeding. § 2244(d)(2); Hoggro v. Boone , 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998). Mason properly filed hi s applications for post-c onviction relief on June-6- 11, 2013, 27 days before the end of his one-year habeas limitations period. Those applications were denied on July 31 and August 6, 2013. Subsequently, Mason failed to perf ect his post-conviction appeals in compliance with Rule 5.2(C)(2), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals , Title 22, Ch. 18 App. (2011), resulti ng in dismissal of those appeals. A petitioner’s habeas limitati on period is tolled for an a dditional 30 days to enable the petitioner to perfect a post-conviction appeal, re gardless of whether the petitioner actually appeals or not. Gibson v. Klinger , 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 2000). Even crediting Mason with the longest tolling period possible, his limitation period still ended on September 5, 2013, 30 days after the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, under the rule, Mason’s limitation period was tolled from June 11, 2013, when he filed his applications, through September 5, 2013, wh en the 30 days expired. This left Mason 27 days, the time remaining in his one-year period, to file his federal habeas corpus petition, making his deadline for filing Oc tober 2, 2013. But he did not file his petition until October 25 at the earliest, 23 days late. As such, Mason failed to file his petition timely, resulti ng in its being time-barred. Based on the foregoing, we deny a certifi cate of appealability and dismiss this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge