# Europeiska unionens C 40/2020

| | ISSN 1977-1061 |
| --- | --- |
| Europeiska unionens
  officiella tidning | C 40 |
| | |
| Svensk utgåva | Meddelanden och upplysningar | 63 årgången6 februari 2020 |

ISSN 1977-1061

Europeiska unionens

officiella tidning

C 40

Svensk utgåva

Meddelanden och upplysningar

63 årgången6 februari 2020

---

| Innehållsförteckning | Sida |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Upplysningar |
| | UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER, BYRÅER OCH ORGAN |
| | Europeiska kommissionen |
| 2020/C 40/01 | Eurons växelkurs — 5 februari 2020 | 1 |
| | UPPLYSNINGAR OM EUROPEISKA EKONOMISKA SAMARBETSOMRÅDET |
| | Eftas övervakningsmyndighet |
| 2020/C 40/02 | Beslut nr 085/19/KOL av den 4 december 2019 om inledande av ett formellt granskningsförfarande angående eventuellt beviljat statligt stöd till Remiksgruppen rörande avfallshantering (ärende 84370) Uppmaning att inkomma med synpunkter enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol för statligt stöd | 2 |
| 2020/C 40/03 | Beslut nr 86/19/KOL av den 5 december 2019 om inledande av ett formellt granskningsförfarande angående påstått beviljat statligt stöd till Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur Uppmaning att inkomma med synpunkter enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol för statligt stöd | 16 |

Innehållsförteckning

Sida

IV   Upplysningar

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER, BYRÅER OCH ORGAN

Europeiska kommissionen

2020/C 40/01

Eurons växelkurs — 5 februari 2020

1

UPPLYSNINGAR OM EUROPEISKA EKONOMISKA SAMARBETSOMRÅDET

Eftas övervakningsmyndighet

2020/C 40/02

Beslut nr 085/19/KOL av den 4 december 2019 om inledande av ett formellt granskningsförfarande angående eventuellt beviljat statligt stöd till Remiksgruppen rörande avfallshantering (ärende 84370) Uppmaning att inkomma med synpunkter enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol för statligt stöd

2

2020/C 40/03

Beslut nr 86/19/KOL av den 5 december 2019 om inledande av ett formellt granskningsförfarande angående påstått beviljat statligt stöd till Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur Uppmaning att inkomma med synpunkter enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol för statligt stöd

16

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| | V   Yttranden |
| --- | --- |
| | DOMSTOLSFÖRFARANDEN |
| | Efta-domstolen |
| 2020/C 40/04 | Eftadomstolen Domstolens Dom av den 13 november 2019 i mål E-2/19 | 33 |
| | FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV DEN GEMENSAMMA HANDELSPOLITIKEN |
| | Europeiska kommissionen |
| 2020/C 40/05 | Tillkännagivande om att giltighetstiden för vissa antidumpningsåtgärder snart kommer att löpa ut | 34 |
| | FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN |
| | Europeiska kommissionen |
| 2020/C 40/06 | Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration (Ärende M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax) Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande (
  1
  ) | 35 |
| 2020/C 40/07 | Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration (Ärende M.9719 — Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited/OMERS Administration Corporation/Riverstone Barbados Limited) Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande (
  1
  ) | 37 |
| | ÖVRIGA AKTER |
| | Europeiska kommissionen |
| 2020/C 40/08 | Offentliggörande av ett meddelande om godkännande av en standardändring av produktspecifikationen för ett namn i vinsektorn enligt artikel 17.2 och 17.3 i kommissionens delegerade förordning (EU) 2019/33. | 38 |
| 2020/C 40/09 | Meddelande till företag som har för avsikt att släppa ut fluorkolväten i bulk på marknaden i Europeiska unionen under 2021 | 47 |

V   Yttranden

DOMSTOLSFÖRFARANDEN

Efta-domstolen

2020/C 40/04

Eftadomstolen Domstolens Dom av den 13 november 2019 i mål E-2/19

33

FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV DEN GEMENSAMMA HANDELSPOLITIKEN

Europeiska kommissionen

2020/C 40/05

Tillkännagivande om att giltighetstiden för vissa antidumpningsåtgärder snart kommer att löpa ut

34

FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN

Europeiska kommissionen

2020/C 40/06

Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration (Ärende M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax) Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande (
  1
  )

1

35

2020/C 40/07

Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration (Ärende M.9719 — Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited/OMERS Administration Corporation/Riverstone Barbados Limited) Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande (
  1
  )

1

37

ÖVRIGA AKTER

Europeiska kommissionen

2020/C 40/08

Offentliggörande av ett meddelande om godkännande av en standardändring av produktspecifikationen för ett namn i vinsektorn enligt artikel 17.2 och 17.3 i kommissionens delegerade förordning (EU) 2019/33.

38

2020/C 40/09

Meddelande till företag som har för avsikt att släppa ut fluorkolväten i bulk på marknaden i Europeiska unionen under 2021

47

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text av betydelse för EES. |

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(1)   Text av betydelse för EES.

1

| SV | |
| --- | --- |

SV

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IV Upplysningar

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER, BYRÅER OCH ORGAN

Europeiska kommissionen

| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/1

---

Eurons växelkurs (1)

5 februari 2020

(2020/C 40/01)

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,1023 |
| JPY | japansk yen | 120,94 |
| DKK | dansk krona | 7,4728 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,84444 |
| SEK | svensk krona | 10,5450 |
| CHF | schweizisk franc | 1,0717 |
| ISK | isländsk krona | 138,10 |
| NOK | norsk krona | 10,1173 |
| BGN | bulgarisk lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjeckisk koruna | 25,055 |
| HUF | ungersk forint | 335,76 |
| PLN | polsk zloty | 4,2491 |
| RON | rumänsk leu | 4,7734 |
| TRY | turkisk lira | 6,5975 |
| AUD | australisk dollar | 1,6299 |
| CAD | kanadensisk dollar | 1,4644 |
| HKD | Hongkongdollar | 8,5572 |
| NZD | nyzeeländsk dollar | 1,7006 |
| SGD | singaporiansk dollar | 1,5202 |
| KRW | sydkoreansk won | 1 302,97 |
| ZAR | sydafrikansk rand | 16,2246 |
| CNY | kinesisk yuan renminbi | 7,6858 |
| HRK | kroatisk kuna | 7,4568 |
| IDR | indonesisk rupiah | 15 036,47 |
| MYR | malaysisk ringgit | 4,5382 |
| PHP | filippinsk peso | 55,961 |
| RUB | rysk rubel | 69,0320 |
| THB | thailändsk baht | 34,133 |
| BRL | brasiliansk real | 4,6614 |
| MXN | mexikansk peso | 20,4923 |
| INR | indisk rupie | 78,4330 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

US-dollar

1,1023

JPY

japansk yen

120,94

DKK

dansk krona

7,4728

GBP

pund sterling

0,84444

SEK

svensk krona

10,5450

CHF

schweizisk franc

1,0717

ISK

isländsk krona

138,10

NOK

norsk krona

10,1173

BGN

bulgarisk lev

1,9558

CZK

tjeckisk koruna

25,055

HUF

ungersk forint

335,76

PLN

polsk zloty

4,2491

RON

rumänsk leu

4,7734

TRY

turkisk lira

6,5975

AUD

australisk dollar

1,6299

CAD

kanadensisk dollar

1,4644

HKD

Hongkongdollar

8,5572

NZD

nyzeeländsk dollar

1,7006

SGD

singaporiansk dollar

1,5202

KRW

sydkoreansk won

1 302,97

ZAR

sydafrikansk rand

16,2246

CNY

kinesisk yuan renminbi

7,6858

HRK

kroatisk kuna

7,4568

IDR

indonesisk rupiah

15 036,47

MYR

malaysisk ringgit

4,5382

PHP

filippinsk peso

55,961

RUB

rysk rubel

69,0320

THB

thailändsk baht

34,133

BRL

brasiliansk real

4,6614

MXN

mexikansk peso

20,4923

INR

indisk rupie

78,4330

---

(1)  Källa: Referensväxelkurs offentliggjord av Europeiska centralbanken.

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UPPLYSNINGAR OM EUROPEISKA EKONOMISKA SAMARBETSOMRÅDET

Eftas övervakningsmyndighet

| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/2

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Beslut nr 085/19/KOL av den 4 december 2019 om inledande av ett formellt granskningsförfarande angående eventuellt beviljat statligt stöd till Remiksgruppen rörande avfallshantering (ärende 84370)

Uppmaning att inkomma med synpunkter enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol för statligt stöd

(2020/C 40/02)

Genom det beslut som det hänvisas till ovan, och som återges på det giltiga språket efter denna sammanfattning, har Eftas övervakningsmyndighet meddelat de norska myndigheterna sitt beslut att inleda ett förfarande enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol i fråga om ovan nämnda åtgärd.

| Eftas övervakningsmyndighet |
| --- |
| Registreringsenheten |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| registry@eftasurv.int |

Eftas övervakningsmyndighet

Registreringsenheten

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

registry@eftasurv.int

Synpunkterna kommer att meddelas de norska myndigheterna. En berörd part som inkommer med synpunkter kan skriftligen begära konfidentiell behandling av sin identitet, med angivande av skälen för begäran.

Sammanfattning

Förfarande

| (1) | Den 16 augusti 2016 mottog myndigheten ett klagomål från branschorganisationen Norsk Industri. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | Efter förfrågningar mottog myndigheten information från de norska myndigheterna den 5 oktober 2016, den 28 februari, 20 mars, 22 augusti, 31 oktober och 20 november 2017 och den 5 mars 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Beskrivning av åtgärderna

| (3) | De påstådda stödmottagarna är Remiks Miljøpark AS, Remiks Næring AS och Remiks Produksjon AS. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

| (4) | Remiks Miljøpark AS ägs till 99,99 % av Tromsø kommun. Remiks Miljøpark AS äger 100 % av Remiks Næring AS och Remiks Produksjon AS. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | Remiks Miljøpark AS äger också 100 % av Remiks Husholdning AS. Detta bolag utför emellertid bara tjänster åt Tromsø kommun och är inte aktivt på marknaden. Remiks Husholdning AS:s köp kan tillskrivas kommunen. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | Från början av 2010 till den 1 februari 2017 köpte Tromsø kommun avfallsinsamlingstjänster från Remiks Næring AS för sitt egna industriavfall. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | Sedan början av 2010 har Tromsø kommun med hjälp av sin indirekta kontroll gett Remiks Husholdning AS i uppdrag att samla in hushållsavfall i kommunen. Sedan den 1 februari har Tromsø kommun gett Remiks Husholdning AS i uppdrag att också samla in kommunens egna industriavfall. Remiks Husholdning AS sköter dessa tjänster åt kommunen enligt en självkostnadsprincip, vilket betyder att företaget kompenseras för hela kostnaden, exklusive vinst. Remiks Husholdning AS samlar in avfallet, men köper de nödvändiga avfallshanteringstjänsterna från sitt systerbolag Remiks Produksjon AS. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | Under 2010 och 2012, i samband med att Remiksgruppen upprättades, överförde Tromsø kommun kapital, skulder, lös egendom och fast egendom till moderbolaget Remiks Miljøpark AS. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

| (9) | Detta beslut rör tre åtgärder: (i) Tromsø kommuns köp av avfallsinsamlingstjänster från Remiks Næring AS, (ii) Remiks Husholdning AS:s köp av avfallshanteringstjänster från Remiks Produksjon AS och (iii) överföringar från Tromsø kommun till Remiksgruppen 2010 och 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Bedömning av åtgärderna

| (10) | Angående åtgärd (i) och (ii) ovan hyser myndigheten tvivel om huruvida Tromsø kommun respektive Remiks Husholdning AS har betalat marknadspriser för de tjänster de har köpt. Angående åtgärd (iii) hyser myndigheten tvivel om huruvida överföringarna från Tromsø kommun till Remiksgruppen skedde på marknadsvillkor, i linje med principen om marknadsekonomiska aktörer. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

| (11) | Om åtgärderna utgör statligt stöd har skyldigheten enligt artikel 1.3 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol att anmäla stödet till övervakningsmyndigheten innan det genomförs inte iakttagits. Det statliga stödet skulle därför vara olagligt. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

| (12) | De norska myndigheterna har inte lagt fram några argument som styrker att åtgärderna, i den mån de utgör statligt stöd, kan anses vara förenliga med EES-avtalet. Myndigheten hyser därför tvivel om dessa tre åtgärders förenlighet med EES-avtalet. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Decision No 085/19/COL of 4 December 2019 to open a formal investigation into potential state aid granted to the Remiks Group related to waste handling services

1.   Summary

| (1) | The EFTA Surveillance Authority (the ”Authority”) wishes to inform Norway that, having assessed a complaint relating to (i) Tromsø municipality’s purchase of waste collection services from Remiks Næring AS, (ii) Remiks Husholdning AS’ purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon AS, and (iii) transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012 (the ”measures”), the Authority has doubts as to whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, and as to the compatibility of the measures with the EEA Agreement. Therefore, the Authority is required to open a formal investigation procedure (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | The complainant has also submitted a separate complaint about alleged violations of the public procurement rules. This decision, however, concerns the state aid complaint only, and remains without prejudice to the ongoing investigation concerning public procurement handled by the Authority’s Internal Market Affairs Directorate (2). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

| (3) | The Authority has based its decision on the following considerations. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

2.   Procedure

| (4) | By letter dated 16 August 2016, Norsk Industri, the Federation of Norwegian Industries, (the ”complainant”) lodged a complaint against the measures (3). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | The Norwegian authorities submitted comments to the complaint on 5 October 2016 (4). The Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities on 18 January 2017 (5), which was provided by letters dated 28 February (6) and 20 March 2017 (7). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | The Authority provided the complainant with a preliminary view on the complaint by letter dated 24 May 2017 (8). The Authority received further information from the complainant on 22 June 2017 (9), and from the Norwegian Authorities on 22 August 2017 (10). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | By letter dated 31 August 2017, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (11). By letters dated 31 October and 20 November 2017, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request (12). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | By letter dated 16 January 2018, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (13), and the Norwegian authorities provided information by letter dated 5 March 2018 (14). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

| (9) | The complainant sent additional information by emails of 14 December 2016; 15 September and 13 November 2017; and 12 January, 31 January and 22 May 2018 (15). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

3.   Background

3.1   
  Historical development

| (10) | In Norway, waste handling services are regulated by the Pollution Control Act (16). The Act makes a distinction between household waste, which is all waste from the municipalities’ households, and industrial waste, which is the waste from public and private enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

| (11) | Up until 2009, Tromsø municipality organised its waste management services in-house through municipal units and enterprises. In 2009, the municipal council decided to organise the municipality’s waste management in a group of limited liability companies (17). This was done to put an ”arm’s length” between the municipality and the activities exposed to competition (18). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

| (12) | In June 2009, the municipal council converted the municipal enterprise Tromsø Miljøpark KF (19), which had previously performed waste management services for Tromsø municipality, into Remiks Miljøpark AS (20). In December 2009, three subsidiaries were established under Remiks Miljøpark AS (21): Remiks Husholdning AS (”Remiks Husholdning”), Remiks Næring AS (”Remiks Næring”) and Remiks Produksjon AS (”Remiks Produksjon”). Collectively the companies are referred to as the ”Remiks Group”. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

3.2   
  Transactions involving the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

| (13) | On 23 June 2010, Tromsø municipal council made the formal decision to transfer the capital and liabilities that were left in the municipal enterprises Tromsø Miljøpark KF and Remiks Tromsø KF to Remiks Miljøpark AS (22). The transactions involved movables, capital, liabilities, and real estate, including the waste handling facility Remiks Miljøpark (the same name as the parent company) where the Remiks Group companies have their business. The assets were converted into share capital in Remiks Miljøpark AS (23). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

| (14) | In 2012, Tromsø municipal council decided to transfer real estate and a loan to Remiks Miljøpark AS, in addition to adjusting the value of the real estate transferred in 2010 (24). In both the preparatory paper (25) and the decision (26), Tromsø municipality specified a requirement for a 9 % return on the investment. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

3.3   
  The current company structure

| (15) | Per November 2019, the Remiks Group is organised as follows (27):






  — | Remiks Miljøpark AS is the parent company in the Remiks Group. It is owned 99,99 % by Tromsø municipality and 0,01 % by Karlsøy municipality (28). It provides services and rents out property to its subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(15)

—

Remiks Miljøpark AS is the parent company in the Remiks Group. It is owned 99,99 % by Tromsø municipality and 0,01 % by Karlsøy municipality (28). It provides services and rents out property to its subsidiaries.

| — | Remiks Husholdning is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Until 2017, it only collected household waste for Tromsø municipality. As of 1 February 2017, it also collectes Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste. |
| --- | --- |

—

Remiks Husholdning is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Until 2017, it only collected household waste for Tromsø municipality. As of 1 February 2017, it also collectes Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste.

| — | Remiks Næring is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Remiks Næring specialises in the collection of industrial waste, and offers such services on the market. Until 1 February 2017, it had an agreement with Tromsø municipality for the collection of Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste. |
| --- | --- |

—

Remiks Næring is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Remiks Næring specialises in the collection of industrial waste, and offers such services on the market. Until 1 February 2017, it had an agreement with Tromsø municipality for the collection of Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste.

| — | Remiks Produksjon is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. It provides waste treatment services on the market, primarily to its sister companies. |
| --- | --- |

—

Remiks Produksjon is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. It provides waste treatment services on the market, primarily to its sister companies.

| (16) | Below is an illustration of the Remiks Group’s structure: |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Image 1

3.4   
  Household waste

| (17) | The Norwegian Pollution Control Act, section 27a, first paragraph, defines household waste as waste from private households, including large objects such as furniture, etc. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

| (18) | Under the Pollution Control Act, sections 29 and 30, the municipalities are obliged to collect and have facilities to treat household waste (29). The costs associated with the waste management are to be covered by a fee, levied on the inhabitants (30). The municipal waste fee are to be calculated based on a self-cost principle; covering the total costs of collecting and handling the waste on behalf of the municipality, without generating a profit for the municipality, in accordance with the Waste Regulation, chapter 15 (31). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

| (19) | When Tromsø municipality reorganised its waste handling services and established the Remiks Group in 2010, by way of its control in Remiks Husholdning it instructed Remiks Husholdning to collect the household waste on behalf of the municipality, based on the self-cost principle. Remiks Husholdning collects and sorts the waste. However, it purchases the waste treatment services, consisting of incineration, depositing and recycling, from its sister company Remiks Produksjon. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

3.5   
  Industrial waste

| (20) | The Norwegian Pollution Control Act, section 27a, second paragraph, defines industrial waste as waste from public and private enterprises and institutions. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

| (21) | The Norwegian Pollution Control Act does not oblige the municipalities to organise the collection or handling of industrial waste. Any operator can therefore offer these services on the market. However, all producers of industrial waste are obliged to ensure the proper disposal and handling of their waste. Tromsø municipality, as a producer of industrial waste, is therefore obliged to ensure the proper collection and treatment of its own industrial waste, produced by the different municipal units (kindergartens, hospitals, nursing homes, municipal offices, etc.) (32). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

| (22) | Before 2010, Tromsø municipality ensured the collection of its own industrial waste through a municipal enterprise (33). When Tromsø municipality reorganised its waste handling services and established the Remiks Group, Remiks Næring took over the collection of the municipality’s own industrial waste (34). Therefore, the agreements for the services were not tendered out or renegotiated. From 2010, Remiks Næring merely continued to provide the same services to the municipality as the municipal enterprise had done before the reorganisation. The only thing that changed was the invoicing system, from internal and centralised to external and decentralised. This meant that each municipal unit (municipal offices, kindergarten, etc.) paid for the service from their budget, and Remiks Næring treated them as individual customers (35). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

| (23) | Because of this continuation of the collection services, Remiks Næring and Tromsø municipality never entered into a formal contract for the waste collection services (36). The Norwegian authorities have described the arrangement as an unwritten framework agreement where each municipal unit decided its need for waste collection, and was invoiced separately (37). The Authority will refer to the arrangement between Tromsø municipality and Remiks Næring, regarding the collection of industrial waste, simply as an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

| (24) | In 2016, Tromsø municipality decided to terminate the agreement with Remiks Næring, and concluded a new framework agreement with Remiks Husholdning for the collection of the municipality’s industrial waste, starting 1 February 2017. The agreement was awarded directly, and based on a self-cost principle, meaning that the compensation covers the full costs, but no profits (38). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

| (25) | Remiks Husholdning foresaw a total price for the services in 2017 of approximately NOK 8,2 million. This was NOK 3,2 million less than the combined total price all the individual municipal units paid to Remiks Næring in 2016 (39). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

4.   Measures covered by the complaint

| (26) | The complainant has complained about three separate measures: |
| --- | --- |

(26)

| (27) | First, alleged overpayment under the agreement between Tromsø municipality and Remiks Næring for collection of industrial waste for the period running from 2010 until 1 February 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

| (28) | Second, alleged overpayment in relation to Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from its sister company Remiks Produksjon. This agreement has been in force since the establishment of Remiks Husholdning in 2010 and is ongoing. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

| (29) | Third, certain transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012, which allegedly were not conducted on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

5.   Presence of state aid

5.1   
  Introduction

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement stipulates that:
  ”Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.” |
| --- | --- |

(30)

”Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.”

| (31) | The qualification of a measure as aid within the meaning of this provision therefore requires the following cumulative conditions to be met: (i) the measure must be granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) it must confer an advantage on an undertaking; (iii) favour certain undertakings (selectivity); and (iv) threaten to distort competition and affect trade. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

5.2   
  Presence of state resources

5.2.1   Introduction

| (32) | For the measure to constitute aid, it must be granted by the State or through state resources. State resources include all resources of the public sector, including resources of intra-state entities (decentralised, federated, regional or other) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

| (33) | The transfer of state resources may take many forms, such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the capital of companies and benefits in kind. A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; waiving revenue that would otherwise have been paid to the state constitutes a transfer of state resources (41). |
| --- | --- |

(33)

5.2.2   Tromsø municipality’s purchase of industrial waste collection services

| (34) | The remuneration Tromsø municipality paid to Remiks Næring for the collection of industrial waste came from the budget of Tromsø municipality, as does the remuneration which Remiks Husholdning is currently receiving for the same services. The remuneration therefore constitutes state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

5.2.3   Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon

| (35) | The notion of state aid as expressed in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is to be interpreted widely, therefore it covers not only aid granted directly via the state budget but also compulsory contributions imposed by state legislation. Measures financed through parafiscal charges or compulsory contributions imposed by the State and managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of public rules imply a transfer of state resources, even if not administered by the public authorities (42). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

| (36) | Remiks Husholdning is financed through the waste fee, which is fixed in accordance with the principles laid down in section 34 of the Pollution Control Act and chapter 15 of the Waste Regulation. The fee is collected by the municipality and disbursed via the municipal budget (43). Thus, the public authorities determine both the size and use of the fee. Further, its legal basis and the way it is collected indicates that it is under the permanent control of public authorities. The fee must therefore be considered to constitute state resources. This Assessment is in line with the Authority’s conclusion in its decision on the financing of municipal waste collectors in Norway in 2013 (44). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

| (37) | Further, it must be considered whether Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon is imputable to Tromsø municipality. That is, whether Tromsø municipality must be regarded as having been involved in the adoption of the measures (45). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

| (38) | Remiks Husholdning is indirectly owned by Tromsø municipality and subject to public law, such as the public procurement rules (46). The purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon is conducted under the control and instruction of Tromsø municipality, in accordance with the Pollution Control Act. Furthermore, as Remiks Husholdning has been granted an exclusive right to collect the household waste by Tromsø municipality it is not subject to competition on the market, but rather operating under a monopoly (47). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

| (39) | Based on this, Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon appears imputable to Tromsø municipality, so as to constitute state resources for the purposes of Article 61(1) EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

5.2.4   The transactions involving the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

| (40) | If public authorities or public undertakings provide goods or services at a price below market rates, or invest in an undertaking in a manner that is inconsistent with the market economy operator (”MEO”) principle, this implies foregoing state resources (as well as the granting of an advantage) (48). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

| (41) | Therefore, if the transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012 were not conducted on market terms, state resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA might have been involved. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

5.3   
  Undertaking

| (42) | Only advantages granted to ”undertakings” are subject to state aid law. The concept of an undertaking covers any entity that engages in an economic activity regardless of its status and the way it is financed. Hence, the public or private status of an entity, or the fact a company is partly or wholly publicly owned, has no bearing on whether or not the entity is an ”undertaking” (49). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

| (43) | An activity is economic in nature where it consists in offering goods and services on a market (50). The assessment of the activity must be based on the factual evidence, and the question is whether there is a market for the services concerned (51). In this regard, it is relevant to consider whether the entities receive compensation for the services, at what level, and whether they face competition from other undertakings (52). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

| (44) | Remiks Næring has, since its establishment in 2010, been providing services for collection of industrial waste for remuneration in competition with other undertakings. Based on this, Remiks Næring appears to engage in economic activity so as to constitute an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

| (45) | Remiks Produksjon offers waste treatment services. The services are offered on the market for remuneration and in competition with other providers. Remiks Produksjon thus appears to engage in economic activity so as to constitute an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

| (46) | In relation to the transfers from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012, the Group must be considered to form one economic unit (53). An entity which, owning controlling shareholdings in a company, actually exercises that control by involving itself directly or indirectly in the management thereof must be regarded as taking part in the economic activity carried on by the controlled undertaking (54). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

| (47) | The subsidiaries in the Remiks Group are fully owned by Remiks Miljøpark AS, and the Authority does not have any indications that Remiks Miljøpark AS is not involved in the management of its fully owned subsidiaries. The Authority has preliminarily concluded that both Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon undertake economic activity (see immediately above). With this, it is also the Authority’s preliminary conclusion that the Remiks Group, as one economic unit, constitutes an undertaking for the purposes of the application of state aid rules, in so far as it is engaged in the economic activities of Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon (55). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

5.4   
  Advantage

5.4.1   Introduction

| (48) | The qualification of a measure as state aid requires that it confers an advantage on the recipient. An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit that an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions (56). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

| (49) | The measure constitutes an advantage not only if it confers positive economic benefits, but also in situations where it mitigates charges normally borne by the budget of the undertaking. This covers all situations in which economic operators are relieved of the inherent costs of their economic activities (57). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

| (50) | Economic transactions carried out by public bodies are considered not to confer an advantage on the counterpart of the agreement, and therefore not to constitute aid, if they are carried out in line with normal market conditions (58). This is assessed pursuant to the MEO principle (59). Therefore, when public authorities purchase a service, it is generally sufficient, to exclude the presence of an advantage, that they pay market price. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

| (51) | Whether a transaction is in line with market conditions can be established on the basis of a generally accepted, standard assessment methodology, relying on the available objective, verifiable and reliable data, which should be sufficiently detailed and should reflect the economic situation at the time at which the transaction was decided, taking into account the level of risk and future expectations (60). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

5.4.2   Tromsø municipality’s purchase of waste collection services from Remiks Næring

5.4.2.1   Introduction

| (52) | According to the MEO principle, the decision to carry out a transaction must have been taken on the basis of economic evaluations comparable to those which, in similar circumstances, a rational MEO (with characteristics similar to those of the public body concerned) would have carried out to determine the profitability or economic advantage of the transaction (61). When examining compliance with the principle it is only the information known at the time of the decision which is relevant (62). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

| (53) | The purchase of the services through a competitive tender is only one of several methods for ensuring that a transaction does not confer an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. To establish whether a transaction is in line with market conditions, that transaction can be assessed in the light of the terms on which comparable transactions carried out by comparable private operators have taken place in comparable situations (benchmarking) (63) or through a qualified financial assessment (64). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

| (54) | Below, the Authority examines the different lines of reasoning that the complainant has brought forward in support of its assertion that Remiks Næring has been overcompensated. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

5.4.2.2   Benchmarking

| (55) | The complainant alleges that Tromsø municipality has paid disproportionally more than Bodø municipality for similar waste collection services in the same period. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

| (56) | The complainant states that Tromsø municipality in 2016 paid to Remiks Næring five times what Bodø municipality paid to Retura Iris AS for collection of industrial waste. Both Tromsø and Bodø are municipalities in the North of Norway, located by the coast, and with a road network interrupted by fjords. The complainant argues that the two municipalities are comparable in size and population density. While there are 5 100 people working in Tromsø municipality at 160 municipal locations, there are 3 100 people working in Bodø municipality, at 100 locations. On that basis, the complainant argues that the price paid in Tromsø should not exceed a price which is proportionally higher (approximately 60–65 % higher) than that paid in Bodø for similar services (65). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

| (57) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the agreements in Tromsø and Bodø are different in both size and nature, and that the agreement with Bodø municipality therefore cannot serve as an appropriate benchmark. The municipality of Tromsø has paid a fixed price for waste collection services, based on the size of the bins, regardless of the actual weight. Thus, Remiks Næring carried the risk of the municipality disposing of more waste than budgeted for. The fixed price also covered additional services such as picking up waste that had fallen outside of the bins and additional bags placed next to the bins – in addition to educating the public, raising climate and environmental awareness (66). The municipality of Bodø had an agreement where it paid a price based on the actual weight of waste collected, which means the municipality carried the risk of disposing of more waste than budgeted for. Thus, the scope of and risk allocation under the two agreements are different. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

| (58) | Further, the Norwegian authorities argue that the difference in geography, the population density, and municipal locations, including the number of municipal employees, justify different prices for the collection of industrial waste in Tromsø and Bodø. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

| (59) | Based on the above, it is the Authority’s preliminary conclusion that benchmarking against Bodø municipality is not an appropriate way to evaluate the market price for the waste collection services (67). |
| --- | --- |

(59)

5.4.2.3   Negotiating a better price

| (60) | The complainant argues that the municipality of Tromsø is the largest purchaser of waste collection services in the area concerned, and that it therefore should have been able to negotiate a better price (68). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

| (61) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions (69). To establish whether a transaction complies with market conditions, the transaction can be assessed in the light of the terms under which comparable transactions carried out by a comparable private operator would have taken place in a comparable situation (70). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

| (62) | The Norwegian authorities have provided documentation indicating that a number of private undertakings have purchased comparable products at the same or a higher price than Tromsø municipality (71). However, it is not clear whether the list includes the majority of Remiks Næring’s other customers, or only a smaller selection. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the proportion of other customers that have purchased comparable products to a price equal to or higher that paid by Tromsø municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

5.4.2.4   Increase in remuneration during the contract period

| (63) | The complainant further points out that the total compensation paid to Remiks Næring for the relevant services increased from NOK 7,7 million in 2010 to NOK 11,4 million in 2016, so almost 50 % over six years. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

| (64) | The Norwegian authorities have provided documentation showing that the number of inhabitants and municipal employees has increased in the same period, and that the municipality has made several investments in new municipal buildings and units, which has led to an increase in the production of waste. The increase in remuneration to Remiks Næring is also mirrored in a corresponding increase in operating expenditure (72). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

| (65) | The Authority, however, has doubts as to whether the information provided can explain a 50 % increase in price over a period of six years. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the basis for the increases in the total remuneration paid. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

5.4.2.5   Difference compared to the price budgeted by Remiks Husholdning for 2017

| (66) | As of 1 February 2017, Tromsø municipality terminated the agreement with Remiks Næring, and instructed Remiks Husholdning to collect the municipal industrial waste on an in-house basis, at a price not exceeding the costs (self-cost). Remiks Husholdning estimated budget for 2017 was NOK 8,2 million, which is NOK 3,2 million less than the NOK 11,4 million that Remiks Næring received for the services in 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

| (67) | The complainant argues that, provided the costs for the waste collection services were the same in 2016 and 2017, Remiks Næring would have had a profit of NOK 3,2 million for the services it provided in 2016. This would entail a margin on these services of 30 %, which is considerably higher than the market standard, which the complainant estimates at 0–8 % (73). |
| --- | --- |

(67)

| (68) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the services provided by Remiks Næring under the 2016 agreement and the services provided by Remiks Husholdning under the 2017 agreement are materially different. Under the agreement with Remiks Næring, Tromsø municipality had a fixed price agreement whereby Remiks Næring carried the risk of the municipality disposing of more waste than budgeted for (74). Under the self-cost agreement with Remiks Husholdning, Tromsø municipality entered into an agreement based on the actual weight disposed, which means that the municipality carries the risk of disposing of more waste than budgeted for. The Norwegian authorities argue that the allocation of risk under the two agreements is thus not comparable, and justifies different prices. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

| (69) | Further, the Norwegian authorities argue that Remiks Husholdning has been able to take advantage of synergies and efficiency gains when coordinating the collection of industrial waste with the collection of household waste, leading to lower overall costs. It is also argued that Remiks Husholdning is currently at its most efficient, and therefore able to take full advantage of its resources. In the view of the Norwegian authorities, this justifies the difference in price between the remuneration paid to Remiks Næring in 2016 and Remiks Husholdning’s budget for 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

| (70) | While the Norwegian authorities have provided explanations seeking to justify the difference in remuneration in 2016 and 2017, the Authority has not been provided with documentation underlying these explanations. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation evidencing the efficiency gains and synergies said to justify the difference. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

5.4.2.6   Conclusion

| (71) | Based on the above, the Norwegian authorities have not at present time provided sufficient evidence showing that the price paid to Remiks Næring for collection of industrial waste, complies with the MEO principle. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

| (72) | In light of the above, and in particular in light of the absence of sufficient evidence supporting that the price paid for the collection of industry waste in the period from 2010 to 1 February 2017 was determined in line with normal market conditions, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that Remiks Næring may have received an advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

5.4.3   Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon

| (73) | The Norwegian authorities argue that it is impossible for Remiks Husholdning to purchase waste treatment services from any other undertaking than Remiks Produksjon. The reason being that for Remiks Husholdning to purchase waste treatment services from such a third party, the waste that goes through Remiks Husholdning’s optical sorting machine would have to be transported out of Remiks Miljøpark, through Remiks Produksjon’s business area. Remiks Produksjon has not consented to allowing third parties to enter its business area, let alone transport waste through it. This explains why Remiks Husholdning has been purchasing waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon without tendering out the services (75). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

| (74) | The complainant intimates that the purchase of these services, without a tender, has led to Remiks Husholdning paying a price above market price for waste treatment services. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

| (75) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the services Remiks Husholdning purchase from Remiks Produksjon are provided on market terms and in accordance with the arm’s length principle in the Limited Liability Companies Act, section 3-9 (76). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

| (76) | In determining an appropriate price for Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon, the two parties looked at the price Remiks Næring paid to Remiks Produksjon for waste treatment services. Remiks Husholdning and Remiks Næring considered that the services Remiks Husholdning purchased were comparable in type and volume to those purchased by Remiks Næring, and that the costs for treating household and industrial waste are similar. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

| (77) | The Authority is, however, not convinced that the prices paid by another company in the same group is an appropriate benchmark for establishing market price. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

| (78) | In light of the above, and in particular in light of the absence of evidence supporting that the compensation paid to Remiks Produksjon did not lead to overcompensation, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that Remiks Produksjon may have received an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

| (79) | The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation to substantiate that the compensation paid to Remiks Produksjon in line with normal market conditions (77). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

5.4.4   Transactions to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

| (80) | The complainant argues that Tromsø municipality did not require a sufficient return on the transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

| (81) | With the establishment of the Remiks Group in 2010, Tromsø municipality transferred (a) capital, (b) debt, (c) movables and (d) real estate to the Remiks Group (78). The assets were converted into share capital. The preparatory paper drafted for the purpose of the transactions (79) underlined the importance of complying with the MEO principle. However, it is not clear how the municipality actually ensured compliance with the principle. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

| (82) | In 2012, Tromsø municipality transferred (a) real estate and (b) debt to Remiks Miljøpark AS, in addition to (c) adjusting the value of the real estate transferred in 2010 (80). The Tromsø municipal board decided to require a 9 % return. The preparatory paper prepared for the purpose of the transactions underlined the need to determine an appropriate level of return on the basis of the MEO principle. The preparatory paper included a discussion on whether the fact that only 40 % of the Remiks Group’s activities are conducted in a competitive market, while the remaining 60 % are activities for which the municipality cannot obtain a profit, is relevant for the MEO principle, but does not seem to reach a conclusion on this point (81). The preparatory paper found a 9 % return appropriate (82), but did not set out the economic assessment explaining why. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

| (83) | The complainant further argues that the 9 % level of return set in 2012 was determined based on only 40 % of the Remiks Group’s turnover originating from the group’s commercial activities (Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon). According to the complainant, the division between commercial and non- commercial activity shifted, and in 2016, 58 % of the turnover was linked to the commercial activities in Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon (83). Allegedly, as the conditions for setting the relevant rate of return changed, Tromsø municipality should have adjusted the level of return (84). |
| --- | --- |

(83)

| (84) | Whether a transaction complies with the MEO principle must be examined on an ex ante basis, having regard to the information available at the time the transactions were decided. The relevant evidence is the information which was available, and the developments which were foreseeable, at the time when the investment decision was made (85). |
| --- | --- |

(84)

| (85) | The question is therefore whether, based on the information available at the time, a rational market economy operator (with characteristics similar to Tromsø municipality) would have carried out similar transactions. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

| (86) | In relation to the transactions referred to in paragraph (81) above, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the transfers and how these comply with the MEO principle. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

| (87) | In relation to the transactions referred to in paragraph (82) above, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation for, and further elaborate on, the assessments forming the basis for an assessment of compliance with the MEO principle, and the relevant level of return. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

5.5   
  Selectivity

| (88) | To be characterised as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must also be selective in that it favours ”certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”. Not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, only those which grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings, categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

| (89) | The purchase of services from Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon are specific transactions benefitting the two undertakings respectively. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

| (90) | Similarly, the transfers to the Remiks Group are specific transactions benefitting the company group. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

| (91) | Accordingly, the alleged measures must be considered selective in the sense of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

5.6   
  Effect on trade and distortion of competition

| (92) | In order to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measures must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

| (93) | Measures granted by the State are considered liable to distort competition when they are liable to improve the position of the recipient compared to other undertakings with which it competes. A distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is generally found to exist when the State grants a financial advantage to an undertaking in a liberalised sector where there is, or could be, competition (86). |
| --- | --- |

(93)

| (94) | Public support may be liable to distort competition even if it does not help the recipient undertaking to expand or gain market share. It is enough that the aid allows it to maintain a stronger competitive position than it would have had if the aid had not been provided (87). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

| (95) | To the extent that the relevant measures have not been carried out in line with normal market conditions, they have conferred an advantage on the relevant undertakings which may have strengthened the undertakings’ position compared to other undertakings competing with them. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

| (96) | The measures must also be liable to affect trade between EEA States. Where state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, this is assumed to have effect on trade between EEA States (88). |
| --- | --- |

(96)

| (97) | The Authority has previously found that public support to waste collection services in Norway is liable to distort competition and affect trade between EEA States (89). Waste collection and treatment is increasingly an international industry. In 2017, Norway exported 1,7 million tons of waste (90). The practice of tendering out waste services also means that undertakings from other EEA States can compete for waste handling contracts in other municipalities (91). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

| (98) | The competitive situation is also highlighted in one of the preparatory papers in relation to the establishment of the Remiks Group in 2010. The paper notes an increasing number of undertakings competing on the markets for collection and handling of industrial waste, and highlights that the competition includes both national companies and companies with international owners (92). |
| --- | --- |

(98)

| (99) | Thus the Authority cannot exclude that the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

5.7   
  Conclusion

| (100) | Based on the information provided by the Norwegian authorities and the complainant, the Authority cannot exclude that the measures described above may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

6.   Procedural requirements

| (101) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (”Protocol 3”): ”The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.” |
| --- | --- |

(101)

| (102) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the measures before putting them into effect. The Authority therefore concludes that, if the measures constitute state aid, the Norwegian authorities will not have respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

7.   Compatibility of the aid measure

| (103) | The Norwegian authorities have not provided any arguments substantiating why the measures, if they were to constitute state aid, should be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has also not identified any clear grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

| (104) | Thus, if the measures constitute state aid, the Authority has doubts as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement |
| --- | --- |

(104)

8.   Conclusion

| (105) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, and as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

| (106) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority hereby opens the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures do not constitute state aid, or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

| (107) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 6 January 2020, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

| (108) | The Norwegian authorities are requested to immediately forward a copy of this decision to the Remiks Group. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

| (109) | If this letter contains confidential information which should not be disclosed to third parties, please inform the Authority by 13 December 2019, identifying the confidential elements and the reasons why the information is considered to be confidential. In doing so, please consult the Authority’s Guidelines on Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions (93). If the Authority does not receive a reasoned request by that deadline, you will be deemed to agree to the disclosure to third parties and to the publication of the full text of the letter on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Bente ANGELL-HANSEN

President

Responsible College Member

Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

Högni KRISTJÁNSSON

College Member

Carsten ZATSCHLER

Countersigning as Director,

Legal and Executive Affairs

---

(1)  Reference is made to Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.

1

(2)  Case No 78085.

2

(3)  Document No 814858.

3

(4)  Document No 821154.

4

(5)  Document No 840687.

5

(6)  Document No 844198.

6

(7)  Document No 848555.

7

(8)  Document No 854974.

8

(9)  Document No 862433.

9

(10)  Document No 870978.

10

(11)  Document No 870978.

11

(12)  Documents No 880582 and 884931.

12

(13)  Document No 882703.

13

(14)  Document No 901145.

14

(15)  Documents No 831575, 873959, 882172, 896066, 895954 and 914528.

15

(16)  Forurensningsloven, LOV-1981-03-13-6.

16

Forurensningsloven

(17)  Attachments 2, 3 and 4b to letter dated 3.5.18, Documents No 901215, 901211 and 901203; Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582, and Attachment 7 to the letter, Document No 880592.

17

(18)  Preparatory papers from Tromsø municipality’s administration to the municipality council, Attachment 2 to letter dated 5.3.18, Document No 901215.

18

(19)  A municipal enterprise (in Norwegian: kommunalt foretak, shortened KF) is an administrative branch of the central municipality, and not a separate legal entity. Municipal enterprises are regulated by the Local Government Act chapter 11.

19

kommunalt foretak

(20)  Tromsø municipality’s letter, dated 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582, and Attachments 6 and 7 to the letter, Documents No 880590 and 880592.

20

(21)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145, and Attachment 4 to the letter, Document No 901219, and Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582 and Attachment 7 to the letter, Document No 880592.

21

(22)  Attachment 8a to Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901189. The transfers were decided on in 2010, but backdated to the establishment of Remiks Miljøpark AS in 2009.

22

(23)  Attachments 4, 4c and 8a to Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 5 mars 2018, Documents No 901219, 901205 and 901189.

23

(24)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145, and attachments 8, 8b, 8c, 8d and 9 to the letter, Documents No 901183, 901181, 901177, 901179 and 901175.

24

(25)  In Norwegian: saksfremlegg.

25

saksfremlegg

(26)  Attachment 9 to the letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901175.

26

(27)  Based on information obtained at www.purehelp.no 21 november 2019.

27

(28)  The 0,01 % ownership by Karlsøy municipality seems to be related to intentions that Tromsø and Karlsøy would cooperate on waste handling, but this seems not to have materialised. See letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145.

28

(29)  This means that any private operator needs an explicit permission from the municipality, in order to provide the service.

29

(30)  The Pollution Control Act, section 34. The fees can be secured through a statutory charge pursuant to the Mortgage Act (panteloven, LOV-1980-02-08-2).

30

panteloven

(31)  The Waste Regulation (avsfallsforskriften, FOR-2004-06-01-930), chapter 15.

31

avsfallsforskriften

(32)  The Pollution Control Act, section 32, first paragraph.

32

(33)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145.

33

(34)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145.

34

(35)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145.

35

(36)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145.

36

(37)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145, and letter of 31 oktober 2017, Document No 880582.

37

(38)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145, and attachment 16 to the letter, Document No 901161.

38

(39)  This is based on calculations conducted by the complainant in letter from the complainant dated 22.6.17, Document No 862433.

39

(40)  See the Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of state aid (”NoA”) (OJ L 342, 21.12.2017, p. 35), and EEA Supplement No 82, 21 december 2017, p. 1, para. 48.

40

(41)  NoA, para. 51.

41

(42)  See NoA, para. 58; Decision No 306/09/COL of 8 juli 2009 on the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, section 1.2.1, and judgment in Italy v Commission, 173/73, EU:C:1974:71, para. 16.

42

Italy

Commission

(43)  The fifth paragraph of section 34 of the Pollution Control Act.

43

(44)  Decision No 91/13/COL of 27 februari 2013, on the financing of municipal waste collectors, para. 26.

44

(45)  Judgment in France v Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, para. 52.

45

France

Commission

(46)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145.

46

(47)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145. See also NoA, para. 43.

47

(48)  NoA, para. 52.

48

(49)  Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, para. 42.

49

Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania

(50)  NoA, section 2.1.

50

(51)  Judgment in Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven v Commission, T-696/17, EU:T:2019:652, para. 56.

51

Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven

Commission

(52)  Case E-29/15 Sorpa [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 825, paras 51–64.

52

Sorpa

(53)  NoA, para. 11.

53

(54)  Judgment in AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission, C-480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787, para. 49.

54

AceaElectrabel Produzione

Commission

(55)  NoA, para. 11.

55

(56)  NoA, para. 66.

56

(57)  NoA, para. 68.

57

(58)  Judgment in SFEI and others, EU:C:1996:285, C-39/94, paras 60–62.

58

SFEI and others

(59)  NoA, para. 76.

59

(60)  NoA, para. 101.

60

(61)  NoA, para. 79.

61

(62)  NoA, para. 78.

62

(63)  NoA, paras 98–100.

63

(64)  NoA, paras 101–105.

64

(65)  The Complaint, dated 15 augusti 2016, Document No 814858, and Annexes IV–VII to the complaint, Documents No 818909–818911.

65

(66)  Letter from Remiks Group, dated 30 oktober 2017, Document No 880602.

66

(67)  See also the Authority’s letter dated 24 maj 2017, Document No 854974.

67

(68)  Letter from the complainant, dated 15 december 2016, Document No 831575.

68

(69)  NoA, para. 66.

69

(70)  NoA, para. 98.

70

(71)  Letter from Remiks Næring, dated 29 september 2016, Document No 821156.

71

(72)  Letter from Tromsø Municipality, dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901145.

72

(73)  Letter from the complainant, dated 13 november 2017, Document No 882862.

73

(74)  Further explained in section 7.4.2.2.

74

(75)  Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5.3.18, Document No 901145.

75

(76)  Lov om aksjeselskaper, LOV-1997-06-13-44.

76

Lov om aksjeselskaper

(77)  NoA, para. 74.

77

(78)  Attachment 8a to letter dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901189.

78

(79)  Attachments 4, 4a, 4b and 4c to the letter from Tromsø municipality dated 5 mars 2018, Documents No 901219, 901213, 901203 and 901205.

79

(80)  Attachment 9 to letter dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901175.

80

(81)  The same assessment is included in the preparatory paper in relation to the 2010 transfer, Attachment 4 to the letter from Tromsø municipality dated 5 mars 2018, Document No 901219.

81

(82)  Attachments 8, 8b, 8c, 8d to letter dated 5.3.18, Documents No 901183, 901181, 901177 and 901197.

82

(83)  Note that some of the revenues in Remiks Produksjon stem from treating household waste from Remiks Husholdning. The complainant has not explained whether or how this affects the calculations.

83

(84)  The complainant’s letter dated 22 maj 2018, Document No 914528.

84

(85)  Judgment in Commission v EDF, C-124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paras 83–85 and 105; judgment in France v Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paras 71–72.

85

Commission

EDF

France

Commission

(86)  NoA, para. 187.

86

(87)  NoA, para. 189.

87

(88)  Judgment in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, para. 66.

88

Eventech

(89)  Decision No 91/13/COL of 27 februari 2013, on the financing of municipal waste collectors, para. 41.

89

(90)  Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities, Competition in the waste management sector, section 3.2.4:

90

https://konkurransetilsynet.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Nordic-Report-2016-Waste-Management-Sector.pdf

(91)  Judgment in Altmark, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paras 78–79.

91

Altmark

(92)  Preparatory paper 29 april 2009, attachment 2 to letter dated 5 mars 2018, Document 901215. The Authority’s office translation.

92

(93)  OJ L 154, 8.6.2006, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 29, 8 juni 2006, p. 1.

93

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| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/16

---

Beslut nr 86/19/KOL av den 5 december 2019 om inledande av ett formellt granskningsförfarande angående påstått beviljat statligt stöd till Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

Uppmaning att inkomma med synpunkter enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol för statligt stöd

(2020/C 40/03)

Genom det beslut som det hänvisas till ovan, och som återges på det giltiga språket efter denna sammanfattning, har Eftas övervakningsmyndighet meddelat de isländska myndigheterna sitt beslut att inleda ett förfarande enligt artikel 1.2 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol i fråga om ovan nämnda åtgärd.

Berörda parter kan skicka synpunkter på åtgärden i fråga, inom en månad från offentliggörandet, till:

| Eftas övervakningsmyndighet |
| --- |
| Registreringsenheten |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| registry@eftasurv.int |

Eftas övervakningsmyndighet

Registreringsenheten

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

registry@eftasurv.int

Synpunkterna kommer att framföras till de isländska myndigheterna. En tredje part som inkommer med synpunkter kan skriftligen begära konfidentiell behandling av sin identitet, med angivande av skälen för begäran.

Sammanfattning

Förfarande

Den 26 oktober 2016 mottog myndigheten ett klagomål från det isländska teleföretaget Síminn hf. angående statligt stöd som Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (nedan kallat OR) påstås ha gett sitt dotterbolag Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur (nedan kallat GR). Myndigheten mottog ytterligare information och kommentarer från klaganden genom skrivelser och e-post av den 23 november 2016, den 16 januari 2017, den 28 mars 2017, den 1 januari 2018, den 20 april 2018, den 21 september 2018, den 26 mars 2019 och den 13 september 2019.

Efter förfrågningar mottog myndigheten information från de isländska myndigheterna genom skrivelser av den 7 februari 2017, den 22 juni 2017, den 25 maj 2018 och den 4 juni 2019.

Beskrivning av åtgärderna

Klagomålet rör OR:s investeringar i bredband från 1999, när GR:s föregångare Lina.Net grundades, fram till i dag, men framför allt perioden från och med den 1 januari 2007, efter det att GR grundades. Det rör särskilt det statliga stöd som OR påstås ha gett GR på olika sätt, exempelvis genom kapitaltillskott och lån som inte gavs på marknadsvillkor.

OR upprättades den 1 januari 1999 som ett offentligt företag i och med Reykjavíks stadsfullmäktiges beslut att slå samman stadens el- och värmeverk. OR ägs av tre isländska kommuner, (i) staden Reykjavík (93,5 %), (ii) kommunen Akranes (5,5 %) och (iii) kommunen Borgarbyggð (1 %). Fem ledamöter i OR:s styrelse är utnämnda av Reykjavíks stadsfullmäktige, och en är utnämnd av Akranes kommunfullmäktige.

GR är ett teleföretag som upprättades 2007. GR upprättades som en självständig rättslig enhet för att uppfylla krav från Islands post- och teleförvaltning (nedan kallad PTA) om en uppdelning mellan OR:s konkurrensutsatta och icke konkurrensutsatta verksamheter. GR är helägt av OR. Enligt GR:s bolagsordning är syftet med företaget att driva ett tele- och dataöverföringsnät.

GR är en registrerad operatör (dataöverföring och datatjänster) i enlighet med den isländska lagen om elektronisk kommunikation nr 81/2003 (nedan kallad EK-lagen). Artikel 36 i EK-lagen ska säkra att konkurrensutsatta telekomverksamheter inte understöds av inkomster från verksamheter som skyddas av exklusiva rättigheter eller på annat sätt.

I enlighet med artikel 36 i EK-lagen försäkrar PTA att inkomster från icke konkurrensutsatta sektorer inte understöder verksamheter i den konkurrensutsatta telekomsektorn. Därför har PTA fått uppdraget att utreda OR:s investeringar i telekommarknaden och affärsrelationerna mellan GR och OR. Utredningarna kan inledas på PTA:s eget initiativ eller efter klagomål från berörda parter. GR måste också rapportera vissa åtgärder till PTA.

Mellan 2006 och 2019 antog PTA nio formella beslut angående den ekonomiska uppdelningen mellan OR och GR. PTA:s utredningar innehöll en granskning av GR:s affärsplan, som måste förnyas årligen, i förhållande till aktuella ekonomiska uppgifter. I denna granskning undersökte PTA till exempel huruvida avkastningen för investeraren (OR) överensstämde med telekommarknaden överlag. PTA såg också över kapitalstrukturen och undersökte huruvida priserna mellan OR och GR var marknadsmässiga.

I tre fall fastslog PTA konkreta överträdelser av artikel 36 i EK-lagen. I två av dessa fall krävde PTA att stöden skulle betalas tillbaka, men inte i det tredje.

De isländska myndigheterna hävdar att OR har agerat i enlighet med principen om marknadsekonomiska aktörer i alla interaktioner med GR och att GR inte har fått något stöd. De understryker att alla de åtgärder rörande de ekonomiska relationerna mellan OR och GR som varit föremål för klagomål har bedömts av PTA på grundval av artikel 36 i EK-lagen. Enligt de isländska myndigheterna är den prövning som PTA utfört jämförbar med det kriterium som Eftas övervakningsmyndighets använder när de ska bedöma om en åtgärd är marknadsmässig. De isländska myndigheterna uppmärksammar också att Eftas övervakningsmyndighet redan har avfärdat klagandens påståenden om OR:s investeringar i Lina.net i beslut nr 300/11/KOL av den 5 oktober 2011.

Bedömning av åtgärderna

Med tanke på bland annat OR:s rättsliga status, företagets partnerskapsavtal och dess styrelsesammansättning kan myndigheten inte utesluta att åtgärderna kan tillskrivas staten och att de medför överföring av statliga resurser om och i den utsträckning som de ger GR fördelar.

Dessutom är det så att även om GR inte säljer sina egna tjänster över sitt fiberoptiknät ger de neutral och öppen nättillgång till alla intresserade telekomleverantörer. Myndigheten anser att tillhandahållandet av nättillgång för ett fast pris till tredjeparts-tjänsteleverantörer är en ekonomisk aktivitet och att GR därför förefaller uppträda som ett företag i den mening som avses i artikel 61.1 i EES-avtalet.

Med tanke på PTA:s beslutspraxis inom ramen för artikel 36 i EK-lagen om finansieringen av GR och granskningsnivån i bedömningen av de olika åtgärderna, är det myndighetens preliminära bedömning att den prövning som PTA genomfört i enlighet med artikel 36 ger en generell försäkran om att alla transaktioner mellan GR och OR eller andra närstående företag sker på marknadsvillkor. PTA:s bedömning är antagligen inte identisk med den bedömning som myndigheten skulle ha gjort i enlighet med EES regler om statligt stöd, i förhållande till principen om marknadsekonomiska aktörer, men den säkerställer samma utfall, dvs. den förhindrar transaktioner som inte sker på marknadsvillkor. Därför har myndigheten i detta läge den preliminära ståndpunkten att PTA utför en bedömning som är likvärdig med myndighetens bedömning i förhållande till principen om marknadsekonomiska aktörer.

Om PTA i efterhand upptäcker överträdelser av artikel 36 i EK-lagen, dvs. om de upptäcker att en viss transaktion inte skett enligt marknadsvillkor, har den befogenhet att beordra parterna att förhindra alla möjligheter till förmåner genom att vidta lämpliga åtgärder. Men för att de ska kunna kräva att förmånerna betalas tillbaka måste åtgärderna som stridit mot marknadsvillkoren vara tydligt definierade och obestridliga, som exempelvis en viss summa pengar eller ett villkor i ett låneavtal. När PTA krävde att GR skulle betala tillbaka sina förmåner krävde de dessutom inte att de skulle betalas tillbaka med ränta.

PTA fastslog tre fall av konkreta överträdelser av artikel 36 i EK-lagen. I två av dessa fall krävde PTA att stöden skulle betalas tillbaka, men inte i det tredje. Myndigheten ansåg att de åtgärder som PTA hade granskat hade gett GR förmåner som det inte skulle ha fått under normala marknadsvillkor. Dessutom hade inte förmånerna krävts tillbaka fullständigt från GR.

Därför är det myndighetens preliminära ståndpunkt att GR har fått en förmån i den betydelse som avses i artikel 61.1 i EES-avtalet genom att (i) inte betala marknadsränta på en förmån de fått genom ett tillfälligt uppskov av räntebetalningar, (ii) indirekt ta emot pengar från OR för installationen av ett fiberoptiskt kabelnät i kommunen Ölfus, (iii) ta emot kortfristiga lån från OR och (iv) genom att skriva in ett villkor om OR:s fortsatta majoritetsägande i GR i GR:s låneavtal med privata långivare.

Myndighetens preliminära ståndpunkt är att dessa åtgärder är selektiva eftersom de är enskilda åtgärder som endast är riktade till GR. Dessutom förefaller åtgärderna kunna snedvrida konkurrensen och påverka handeln i EES.

Om åtgärderna utgör statligt stöd har skyldigheten enligt artikel 1.3 i del I i protokoll 3 till avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättandet av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol att anmäla stödet till övervakningsmyndigheten innan det genomförs inte iakttagits. Ett sådant statligt stöd skulle vara olagligt.

De isländska myndigheterna har inte lagt fram några argument som styrker att åtgärderna, i den mån de utgör statligt stöd, kan anses vara förenliga med EES-avtalet. Myndigheten hyser därför tvivel om dessa fyra åtgärders förenlighet med EES-avtalet.

Decision No 86/19/COL of 5 December 2019 to open a formal investigation into alleged state aid granted to Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

1   Summary

| (1) | The EFTA Surveillance Authority (”the Authority”) wishes to inform the Icelandic authorities that some measures covered by the complaint related to Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur (”GR”) might entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts concerning the compatibility of these measures with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. Therefore, the Authority is required to open a formal investigation procedure into these measures (*) (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | The Authority has based its decision on the following considerations. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

2   Procedure

| (3) | By a letter dated 26 October 2016 (2), Síminn hf. (”the complainant”) made a complaint regarding alleged state aid granted by Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (”OR”) to its subsidiary GR. By letter dated 7 November 2016, the Authority acknowledged receipt of the complaint (3). By email of 23 November 2016, the complainant submitted further information (4). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

| (4) | By letter dated 28 November 2016 (5), the Authority forwarded the complaint and the additional information received to the Icelandic authorities, and invited them to submit information and observations. By email dated 16 January 2017, the Authority received additional information from the complainant (6). By letter dated 7 February 2017, the Icelandic authorities submitted their comments to the Authority (7).The complainant submitted further information by email of 28 March 2017 (8). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | On 7 June 2017, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Icelandic authorities at the annual package meeting in Reykjavík. On 22 June 2017, the Icelandic authorities provided the Authority with copies of various decisions of the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland (”PTA”), concerning the financing of GR (9). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | On 25 September 2017, the Authority met with the complainant, at its request, in Reykjavík. On 1 January 2018, the complainant submitted further comments (10). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | By letter dated 13 March 2018 (11), the Authority informed the complainant about its preliminary assessment that the financing of GR did not raise concerns concerning potential state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. By letter dated 20 April 2018 (12), the complainant submitted its response to the Authority’s preliminary assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | By letter dated 27 April 2018 (13), the Authority forwarded the complainant’s response and additional information received to the Icelandic authorities, and invited them to submit their observations. By letter dated 25 May 2018 (14), the Icelandic authorities submitted their comments. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

| (9) | On 6 June 2018, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Icelandic authorities and received a presentation from the PTA at the annual package meeting in Reykjavík (15). By letter dated 21 September 2018 (16), the complainant submitted further information. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

| (10) | By letter dated 26 March 2019 (17), the Authority received additional information concerning new developments from the complainant. On 29 April 2019, the Authority requested additional information and clarifications from the Icelandic authorities (18). By letter dated 4 June 2019 (19), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request and provided the requested information and clarifications. Finally, the complainant submitted additional comments and information by letter dated 13 September 2019 (20).The complaint |
| --- | --- |

(10)

2.1   
  The complainant - Síminn hf.

| (11) | The complainant is a telecommunications company which provides communication solutions to private and corporate clients in Iceland. It offers a range of services, such as: (i) mobile services on its 2G/3G/4G network, (ii) fixed line telephony, (iii) fixed broadband, and (iv) television. The complainant also offers communications and IT solutions for companies of all sizes. The complainant’s subsidiary, Míla ehf., owns and operates a telecommunications network covering the entire country, which builds mostly on fibre optic cables, but also on copper lines and microwave connections. Míla sells its services at a wholesale level to companies with a telecommunications licence in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

2.2   
  Scope of the complaint

| (12) | The complaint concerns OR’s investments in fixed broadband from 1999, when GR’s predecessor Lina.Net was established, until today. However, the complaint predominantly concerns the period from 1 January 2007 onwards, following the establishment of GR. In particular, the complaint concerns alleged state aid granted by OR to GR through various means, such as capital injections and lending that was not on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

| (13) | Moreover, the complaint concerns the terms of loans GR has obtained from [...]. According to the complainant, the interest rates on GR’s loans are not on market terms that reflect the credit risk inherent in an undertaking such as GR, with a very high debt to EBITDA ratio (21). The complainant maintains that the interest rates offered to GR are directly connected to its ownership, as no market lender would have offered GR such rates without a direct link to its public ownership. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

2.3   
  Arguments brought forward by the complainant

| (14) | The complainant maintains, in general terms, that GR’s activities represent a political rather than a commercial project. It alleges that the company has been operated with a view to enhance competition on the telecommunications market, and that a private investor would not have acted in the same way as OR, when providing loans and capital injections to GR. The complainant moreover alleges that OR has provided GR with several capital injections and loans to finance their operations, which have not been on market terms, as well as more favourable access to OR infrastructure than other market players could receive. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

| (15) | According to the complainant, a major part of the alleged unlawful state aid has been in the form of interest rates for loans granted by OR to GR, which have not corresponded to market terms. Furthermore, after the majority of GR’s loans were gradually replaced by loans financed by private lenders (with full replacement at the end of 2017), the interest rates have continued to not correspond to normal market conditions, as OR has provided lenders with a guarantee that it would maintain its majority ownership of GR. The complainant considers that this must be considered as state aid that is incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

| (16) | The complainant puts forward that the assessment performed by the PTA under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act is substantially different from the assessment conducted by the Authority under the state aid rules. According to the complainant, the application of the said rule by the PTA has consisted in assessing the return on equity. It seems that PTA has not made a detailed comparison with other market investors. The focus has rather been on assessing the financing generally, concentrating on whether the measures provide a direct loss for OR, as opposed to assessing whether the financing would have been provided by an investor operating on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

3   Description of the measures

3.1   
  Background

3.1.1   OR – Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

| (17) | OR was established on 1 January 1999 as a public undertaking with the decision of the City Council of Reykjavík to merge the operations of the electricity and heat utilities owned by the city. A year later, the water utility was also incorporated into the new company. The company was operated on the basis of Regulation No 793/1998, issued by the Ministry of Industry and the City Council of Reykjavik, with reference to legislative Act No 38/1940 on the Reykjavik Heating Utility, and the Power Act No 58/1967. OR currently provides the following services through its three subsidiaries: electricity (Orka Náttúrunar), geothermal water for heating, cold water, sewage services (Veitur) and fibre-optic data connections (GR). |
| --- | --- |

(17)

| (18) | On 1 December 2001, OR merged with a utility company owned by several small municipalities in the western part of Iceland. After the merger, the City of Reykjavík owns 93,5 % of the company, the municipality of Akranes owns 5,5 % and the municipality of Borgarbyggð 1 %. Five members of the board of directors are appointed by the City Council of Reykjavík and one is appointed by the Municipality Council of Akranes (22). OR currently operates as a public partnership company, sameignarfélag (23), on the basis of Act No 136/2013 on OR (24) and Regulation No 297/2006 (25). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

3.1.2   GR – Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

| (19) | GR is a telecommunications company established in 2007 as an independent legal entity, in order to comply with the requirements of the PTA on separation between the competitive and non-competitive operations of OR. GR is fully owned by OR. The purpose of GR, according to its articles of association, is the operation of a telecommunication and data transmission network. It provides wholesale access to its fibre optic network, for a number of retail service providers that operate in the residential and businesses markets with different fixed broadband and data transmission services. GR also offers services on the household market, where it charges end-users directly for the use of the access network. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

| (20) | OR began investing in the telecommunications market in 1999, when it established the subsidiary Lina.Net, with the purpose of providing general telecommunication services with emphasis on data transmission and internet connections in urban areas in Iceland. Its operations were later expanded into the setting up of an electronic telecommunications network using fibre optic cables. The Authority investigated several capital injections into Lina.Net during the years 1999–2001 in its Decision No 300/11/COL and found that they were in line with the actions of a private investor such that no state aid was granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(20)

| (21) | Lina.Net invested considerable sums in its fibre optic networks and, since 2007, GR has continued to expand the network. In total, the investments between 2002 and 2010 amounted to around ISK 8 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

3.2   National legal basis

| (22) | GR is a registered operator (data transmission and service) (27) under the Electronic Communications Act No 81/2003. Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, on separation of concession activities from electronic communications activities, provides:
  ”Electronic communications undertakings or consolidations operating public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, which enjoy special or exclusive rights in sectors other than electronic communications, must keep their electronic communications activities financially separate from other activities as if they were two separate undertakings. Care shall be taken to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities”. (emphasis added) |
| --- | --- |

(22)

”Electronic communications undertakings or consolidations operating public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, which enjoy special or exclusive rights in sectors other than electronic communications, must keep their electronic communications activities financially separate from other activities as if they were two separate undertakings. Care shall be taken to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities”. (emphasis added)

| (23) | According to the legislative proposal (frumvarp) of the Electronic Communications Act, Article 36 is meant to ensure that competitive telecommunication operations are not subsidised through income from operations that are protected by exclusive rights or by other means (28).The proposal also makes it clear that the provision is applicable regardless of the undertaking’s market share and regardless of whether the telecommunications operations are carried out within the same undertaking or by a separate legal entity which it controls (29). |
| --- | --- |

(23)

3.3   The PTA’s monitoring role

3.3.1   General

| (24) | The PTA operates according to the Act on Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003, which implements the provisions of the EU’s regulatory framework for electronic communications (30). As a supervisory authority, the PTA, inter alia, ensures, in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, that revenues stemming from non-competitive sectors do not subsidise operations in the competitive telecommunications sector. Therefore, the PTA is entrusted with scrutinising OR’s investments in the telecommunications market and the business relations between GR and OR. Such investigations can start at the PTA’s own initiative or through complaints from interested parties. GR is also obligated to notify specific measures, such as increase in share capital (31), to the PTA to obtain prior approval and interested parties can be parties to such cases, if they demonstrate that they have a legitimate interest in the result of the case (32). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

| (25) | An interested party can challenge decisions of the PTA before the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications and Postal Affairs (33). This includes decisions taken on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (34). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

| (26) | The following is a brief summary of the PTA’s main decisional practice concerning OR’s investments in the telecommunications market and the business relations between GR and OR to which the complainant has referred. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

3.3.2   OR’s purchase of the fibre-optic network from Lina.Net

| (27) | In October 2002, OR purchased the fibre-optic network from Lina.Net for ISK 1 758 811 899. In early 2003, after the enactment of the Electronic Communications Act, the PTA sent OR an inquiry regarding how the company intended to fulfil the conditions for separation of activities stipulated by Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (35). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

| (28) | In the ensuing PTA procedure, the PTA requested two expert reports , from the two consultancies KPMG and Rafhönnun (36), on the fair market value of the Lina.Net fibre-optic network (37). Both reports concluded that there was no indication that the purchase price was below market value. Moreover, the audit firm KPMG analysed certain parts of the operational and financial separation (38). The PTA accepted the results of the expert reports. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

3.3.3   The establishment and financing of GR as a separate legal entity

| (29) | As part of the aforementioned procedure, the PTA required OR to submit a business plan for the operations of the fibre-network and telecommunication services, demonstrating an adequate rate of return on the investment. KPMG performed a due diligence review of the business plan and determined that the rate of return on the investment was appropriate. Moreover, the PTA instructed OR to fulfil the following conditions (39):






  (i) | Separation of accounts. The PTA instructed OR to establish a separate entity, entrusted with the telecommunications operations, which should keep separate accounts in line with established corporate practices. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(29)

(i)

Separation of accounts. The PTA instructed OR to establish a separate entity, entrusted with the telecommunications operations, which should keep separate accounts in line with established corporate practices.

| (ii) | Prepare a foundation balance sheet (stofnefnahagsreikningur), comprising the telecommunication assets (valued at an appropriate market price) as well as the liabilities that stemmed from the financing of the telecom operations of OR (with the reservation that if the terms were more favourable than market terms, the new entity would have to compensate OR for any difference). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Prepare a foundation balance sheet (stofnefnahagsreikningur), comprising the telecommunication assets (valued at an appropriate market price) as well as the liabilities that stemmed from the financing of the telecom operations of OR (with the reservation that if the terms were more favourable than market terms, the new entity would have to compensate OR for any difference).

| (iii) | Arm’s-length terms should apply to all dealings between the new entity and OR. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

Arm’s-length terms should apply to all dealings between the new entity and OR.

| (30) | On 1 January 2007, in accordance with instructions of the PTA described above, OR established the private limited liability company GR as a new legal entity. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

| (31) | On 8 March 2007, a framework agreement was concluded between OR and GR, setting out the terms of the investment and the opening balance sheet of GR. OR transferred assets to GR. GR provided payment in the form of a loan and issuing share capital to OR. The interest rate to be paid by GR to OR on its loan principal over a payback period of [...] years was based on the [...] plus a margin of [...] basis points, and was linked to the exchange rates of several foreign currencies. According to the consulting firm Deloitte, the loan agreement contained normal market practice terms, comparable to agreements concluded between private undertakings, as regards the event of default, the provision of information to the lender, and other covenants. Deloitte submitted a declaration in accordance with Article 5 of the Act on Private Limited Companies No 138/1994 (40), dated 7 March 2007, on the value of the assets, and concluded that they had been valued at a fair price. The terms of the loans were also reviewed and approved by the PTA (41). |
| --- | --- |

(31)

| (32) | On 21 May 2010, the PTA issued Decision No 14/2010, concerning the financial separation between OR and GR. In its Decision, the PTA confirmed that GR had to obtain prior approval from the PTA for any increase in share capital on behalf of OR or related companies. The PTA also noted that it would only approve such measures if they were on arm’s-length terms and if they did not entail the subsidisation of competitive operations (42). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

| (33) | Following the financial crisis in Iceland in 2008, the ISK devalued considerably, and GR became unable to fulfil its commitments under the loan agreement. An agreement was made with OR on temporary suspension of interest payments. The PTA was informed and subsequently intervened. The PTA required that the suspension of payments be revoked on the grounds that it did not comply with the required arm’s-length terms (43). GR complied and paid instalments and accrued interests in full. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

3.3.4   GR’s rate of return and the share capital increase of December 2008

| (34) | In December 2008, OR increased its share of GR’s capital. On 22 December 2010, the PTA adopted Decision No 39/2010, concerning the share capital increase and GR’s rate of return on capital. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

| (35) | With this Decision, the PTA noted that the operations of GR went according to the initial business plan in the year 2007. GR’s equity ratio was approximately 52 % at the end of 2007 and the company made a profit of ISK 120 million that year. The financial crisis of 2008 hit the company hard and in spite of increasing operating revenues, the losses of 2008 were close to ISK 3 billion, almost solely attributable to the devaluation of the ISK, which caused the debt of the company to increase. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

| (36) | To urgently restore the viability of GR, OR decided to increase the share capital before the end of 2008. The capital was increased by ISK 1,2 billion, setting an equity ratio of 23 %. The PTA Decision states that in absence of the share capital increase, ”practically all equity would have been wiped out”, due to the financial collapse and sharp devaluation of the operating currency whilst the liabilities were all linked to foreign currency rates (44). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

| (37) | Furthermore, the PTA observed that in 2008 OR and GR had contacted private lenders with the intention to finance further investment in ongoing projects (45). The financial markets, however, were completely frozen by the end of the year. The Icelandic authorities maintain that, as an investor, OR inevitably had to invest further, in order to protect its significant initial investment (46). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

| (38) | The PTA highlighted that OR’s decision to increase the share capital had to be considered not only from its perspective as GR’s owner, but also as GR’s largest creditor. The PTA noted that creditors of several telecommunication companies had acquired them following the financial crisis, and either converted debts to equity or restructured loans. Moreover, the PTA found that GR’s updated business plans convincingly demonstrated a satisfactory level of profitability for a telecommunication company in a competitive market, within a reasonable timeframe, and that there was a normal correlation between the profitability and the owner’s contribution (47). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

3.3.5   The conversion of debt into equity in 2014

| (39) | Like many companies in Iceland, GR needed to reorganize its financial affairs after the financial crisis of 2008. OR’s application for permission to increase the share capital of GR in July and August 2013 was the subject of PTA’s Decision No 2/2014 of 24 March 2014. The reorganisation involved: (i) a conversion of ISK 3,5 billion of debt into equity, and (ii) that GR would enter the financial markets to refinance all remaining debt owed to OR. Finally, OR intended to dispose of a large portion of its shares post-refinancing. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

| (40) | The PTA accepted that the debt conversion would not increase the total financing of GR by OR, since it only changed the composition of the financing. The PTA also recognised that the conversion would change the equity ratio of GR from 22 % to 52 %, thereby leaving the ratio at the same level as GR’s main competitor, Míla (48). The PTA also assessed the initial business plan of GR, and determined that it was credible. The cash flow analysis demonstrated that if the devaluation of the operating currency had not hit the company in 2008, there would not have been a need for refinancing. Moreover, the PTA’s financial analysis confirmed that the rate of return for the investor and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of GR were in conformity with the general benchmark set by the PTA (49). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

| (41) | Míla intervened in the procedure before the PTA. The PTA rejected all the objections from Míla. The PTA adopted its Decision No 2/2014 on 24 March 2014, and the debt conversion was finalized in early April 2014. In June 2014, Míla initiated a court case against the PTA, GR and OR, requesting the courts to annul the PTA’s decision (50). The District Court of Reykjavík dismissed the case on 26 February 2015, and the Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the District Court by judgment of 27 March 2015 (51). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

3.3.6   The implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017

| (42) | On 20 March 2019, the PTA adopted Decision No 3/2019, concerning the implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017, and whether it was in compliance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (52). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

| (43) | The PTA concluded that the financial separation between OR and GR had been in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act in the years 2016 and 2017, except for short-term lending to GR from a shared cash pool by OR and GR. The PTA found that these loan arrangements between OR and GR infringed an earlier PTA decision from 13 November 2006, as well as PTA Decision No 14/2010, since there was no loan agreement concluded between OR and GR reflecting the conditions that prevailed on the market for such loans (53). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

| (44) | The PTA also commented on conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. The loan agreements in question had included special conditions that if the ownership of OR in GR went below 50% then the lender was authorised to demand repayment, terminate the loan agreement, or declare the loan immediately due. Such a provision has been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced by the end of 2017 (54). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

| (45) | The PTA noted that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (55). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunication undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (56). Moreover, the PTA considered that this provision in the loan agreements constituted a connection between OR and GR that was not in accordance with the financial separation imposed in order to ensure that the two acted as unrelated parties (57). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

| (46) | The PTA concluded that measures were required to ensure an efficient financial separation between OR and GR, in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. The PTA decided that:






  a) | OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions, infringed the PTA Decision of 13 November 2006 and, therefore, also Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(46)

a)

OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions, infringed the PTA Decision of 13 November 2006 and, therefore, also Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act.

| b) | GR’s debt from the shared cash pool was not to, at any given time, exceed ISK [...]. |
| --- | --- |

b)

GR’s debt from the shared cash pool was not to, at any given time, exceed ISK [...].

| c) | GR was to obtain prior authorisation from the PTA for any loans from OR, or any other undertaking within the company group. GR shall submit an application to the PTA along with the necessary documents, e.g. a draft loan agreement, an appropriate business plan, a calculation of the profitability requirements, as well key social security numbers and the acceptance of other landers. Such a credit increase was to be in line with standard separation of accounts, and was to entail that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights. |
| --- | --- |

c)

GR was to obtain prior authorisation from the PTA for any loans from OR, or any other undertaking within the company group. GR shall submit an application to the PTA along with the necessary documents, e.g. a draft loan agreement, an appropriate business plan, a calculation of the profitability requirements, as well key social security numbers and the acceptance of other landers. Such a credit increase was to be in line with standard separation of accounts, and was to entail that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights.

| d) | New loan agreements with private lenders could not contain a provision stipulating that if the ownership of OR in GR goes below 50 % then the lender is authorised to declare the loan immediately due. |
| --- | --- |

d)

New loan agreements with private lenders could not contain a provision stipulating that if the ownership of OR in GR goes below 50 % then the lender is authorised to declare the loan immediately due.

| (47) | On 4 October 2019, following an appeal from GR, the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications issued Ruling No 2/2019, confirming the decision of the PTA. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

3.3.7   Other cases

| (48) | In addition to the decisions referred to above, the PTA adopted a decision in 2013, under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, to temporarily allow GR to extend its loan agreement with OR (58). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

| (49) | Moreover, in 2014, Míla complained to the PTA about certain measures relating to an agreement GR had concluded with Ölfus Municipality, which included funds indirectly deriving from OR. The funds had initially been paid by OR into the Ölfus Revegetation Fund (”ÖRF”) in connection with OR’s geothermal power plant project in the municipality. OR had joint control of the ÖRF together with representatives from the municipality. In 2014, the ÖRF decided to use its funds to finance GR’s rollout of a fiber optic network in Ölfus Municipality. After assessing the measures, the PTA found that they were contrary to Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, and instructed GR to undertake certain measures to ensure that it did not obtain an advantage from the funds deriving from OR (59). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

4   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

| (50) | The Icelandic authorities point out that the Authority has already dismissed allegations by the complainant as regards OR’s investments in Lina.Net in its Decision No 300/11/COL of 5 October 2011 (60). |
| --- | --- |

(50)

| (51) | The Icelandic authorities maintain that in all its relations with GR, OR has acted in accordance with the market economy operator (”MEO”) test, and that no aid has been granted to GR. In that regard, the Icelandic authorities highlight that all of the measures complained of concerning the financial relations between OR and GR, have been assessed by the PTA on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. According to the Icelandic authorities, the test applied by the PTA is comparable to the criterion applied by the Authority when determining whether a measure is on market terms (i.e. the MEO test). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

| (52) | The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that GR’s current investments are financed with cash provided by its operating activities and loans from [...]. According to the Icelandic authorities, these loans do not constitute state aid in any way, and nor do they indicate that state aid has been extended to GR by its owner, as it is clear that the loans from [...] to GR were solely based on commercial motives. They state that the loans are fully in line with normal market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

5   Presence of state aid

| (53) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ”[...] any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.” |
| --- | --- |

(53)

”[...] any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.”

| (54) | The qualification of a measure as aid within the meaning of this provision therefore requires the following cumulative conditions to be met: (i) the measure must be granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) it must confer an advantage on an undertaking; (iii) favour certain undertakings (selectivity); and (iv) be liable to distort competition and affect trade. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

5.1   
  Presence of state resources

| (55) | The measure must be granted by the state or through state resources. The transfer of state resources may take many forms, such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the capital of companies and benefits in kind. A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; foregoing state revenue is sufficient. Waiving revenue which would otherwise have been paid to the state constitutes a transfer of state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

| (56) | The state, for the purpose of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, covers all bodies of the public administration, from the central government to the city or the lowest administrative level. Resources of public undertakings may also constitute state resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement because the state is capable of directing the use of these resources (61). For the purposes of state aid law, transfers within a public group may also constitute state aid if, for example, resources are transferred from the parent company to its subsidiary (62). However, the measure must be imputable to the state. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

| (57) | The mere fact that a measure is taken by a public undertaking is not per se sufficient to consider it imputable to the state. However, it does not need to be demonstrated that, in a particular case, the public authorities specifically incited the public undertaking to take the measure in question (63). Therefore, the imputability to the state of a measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which the measure was taken (64). Among the relevant indicators set out by the Court of Justice are:






  — | the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking into account the requirements of the public authorities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(57)

—

the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking into account the requirements of the public authorities;

| — | the nature of the undertaking’s activities and the extent to which the activities were exercised on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators; |
| --- | --- |

—

the nature of the undertaking’s activities and the extent to which the activities were exercised on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators;

| — | the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, and the degree of control which the state has over the public undertaking; and |
| --- | --- |

—

the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, and the degree of control which the state has over the public undertaking; and

| — | any other indicator showing an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of the measure, or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains. |
| --- | --- |

—

any other indicator showing an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of the measure, or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains.

| (58) | The Authority will therefore need to assess, in light of the aforementioned indicators, whether OR, in its dealings with GR, was acting as an autonomous entity, free of any influence from its owners, or whether its actions are imputable to the Icelandic authorities, i.e. the City of Reykjavík and the municipalities of Akranes and Borgarbyggð. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

| (59) | As noted in paragraph (18) above, OR operates as a public partnership company on the basis of Act No 136/2013 on OR (65) and Regulation No 297/2006 (66). OR is therefore distinct from private companies which are subject to ordinary company law. OR’s annual accounts are also reflected in the City of Reykjavík’s consolidated financial statements (67). |
| --- | --- |

(59)

| (60) | The Board of OR consists of six members, five appointed by the Reykjavík City Council and one by the Municipality Council of Akranes. Currently, three board members are politicians who also serve as either City Council or Municipal Council representatives. According to OR’s partnership agreement, the Board is responsible for the company’s affairs between owner’s meetings and should monitor the company’s direction, organisation and that its operations are in good shape and in accordance with the ownership policy. The Board sets an overall policy and future vision for OR and adopts decisions concerning major matters within the limit of the ownership policy. Before adopting unusual or important decisions or policy decisions, the Board must consult with the owners of OR. The same applies to similar decisions regarding subsidiaries (such as GR). The Board is also responsible for recruiting OR’s Director, drafting his/her job description and his/her eventual employment termination (68). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

| (61) | OR produces and sells electricity in a liberalised market open to competition. The company also has legal obligations to provide utility services (heating and water) and carries out other projects in the municipalities of its owners as well as other municipalities (69). Those utility services have since 2014 been carried out by OR’s subsidiary, Veitur, in order to comply with the Electricity Act, which prohibits cross subsidisation between utility activities, as well as between activities enjoying exclusive rights and competitive operations (70). According to OR’s ownership policy, the company’s administrative practices shall reflect professionalism, efficiency, prudence, transparency and responsibility. The Board is responsible for adopting the company’s policies concerning dividends, risk management, purchasing, etc. (71). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

| (62) | Although it appears that OR’s owners have taken steps to separate its public utility services and its competitive operations, in order to ensure that the latter are operated in line with commercial practices on the market, with OR’s management being somewhat autonomous in its decision making process, there are nevertheless elements to indicate that the public authorities may influence the company’s strategy and decisions. As noted above, the Board sets OR’s policies in various fields and must approve the company’s major decisions, which in some instances requires consulting with OR’s owners. It appears that many of the measures complained of concern major investments, loan guarantees and loan transactions between OR and GR, which may have been subject to the Board’s scrutiny and approval. The Board, as noted above, is politically appointed, and currently half of the board members also serve as City or Municipal Council representatives. This arrangement has been evaluated by the Enquiry Committee on Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, which in its 2012 report noted that this arrangement could lead to a lack of professional knowledge and experience on the Board, and that its work could be characterised by political conflict and disunity (72). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

| (63) | In light of the legal status of OR, the composition of its Board and the general circumstances described above, the Authority is unable to exclude that the measures are imputable to the State and that they entail the transfer of state resources, if and to the extent they confer advantages on GR. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

| (64) | Against this background, the Icelandic authorities are invited to comment on the issue of imputability. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

5.2   
  Conferral of an advantage on an undertaking

5.2.1   General

| (65) | The qualification of a measure as state aid requires that it confers an advantage on the recipient. An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

5.2.2   Does GR constitute an undertaking?

| (66) | The EU Courts have consistently defined undertakings as entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (73). Consequently, the public or private status of an entity or the fact that an entity is partly or wholly publicly owned has no bearing as to whether or not that entity is an ”undertaking” within the meaning of state aid law (74). |
| --- | --- |

(66)

| (67) | Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (75). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods or services on a given market do not constitute undertakings. A single entity may carry out a number of activities, both economic and non-economic, provided that it keeps separate accounts for the different funds that it receives, so as to exclude any risk of cross-subsidisation of its economic activities by means of public funds received for its non-economic activities (76). |
| --- | --- |

(67)

| (68) | As described in paragraph (19) above, GR was established on 1 January 2007, and its role is to provide Icelandic households and businesses access to high quality services on an open access network (77). GR operates a telecommunications and data transmission network and it provides wholesale access to its fibre optic network for a number of retail service providers that operate in supplying homes and businesses with different fixed broadband and data transmission services. GR also offers services on the household market, where it charges end-users directly for the use of the access network. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

| (69) | Although GR does not sell its own services in the retail market, it offers neutral and open network access to all interested telecommunications providers. The Authority considers that the provision of network access for a fixed price to third-party service providers and households constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, GR appears to operate as an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (78). |
| --- | --- |

(69)

| (70) | Any advantage involved in the transactions between OR and GR will therefore have been conferred upon an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

5.2.3   PTA’s monitoring and decisional practice

| (71) | The measures complained of, concerning the financial relations between OR and GR, have, as described in Section 3.3 above, all been assessed by the PTA on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

| (72) | The Icelandic authorities maintain that the test applied by the PTA is comparable to the test applied by the Authority when determining whether a measure is on market terms (i.e. the MEO test). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

| (73) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view, considering the decisional practice of the PTA under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act on the financing of GR and the level of scrutiny involved in the assessment of the various measures, that the test applied by the PTA under Article 36 generally ensures that all transactions between GR and OR, or other related companies, are on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

| (74) | The PTA’s approach may not be identical to the MEO assessment that would be carried out by the Authority under the EEA state aid rules, but it nonetheless ensures the same outcome, i.e. it prevents transactions that are not on market terms. Therefore, at this stage the Authority is of the preliminary view that the PTA provides an assessment similar to the Authority’s MEO assessment. The enforcement of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act by the PTA thus appears to effectively prevent GR from obtaining an advantage from its dealings with OR and when infringements are found the PTA has the competence to order the clawback of any advantages. However, there are instances where the PTA has either not ordered the full clawback of advantages with interest, or not ordered clawback at all. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

| (75) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, i.e. in the absence of state intervention, thereby placing it in a more favourable position than its competitors (79). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

| (76) | Generally, when examining this question, the Authority applies the MEO test (80), whereby the conduct of states or public authorities, when selling or leasing assets, is compared to that of private economic operators (81). |
| --- | --- |

(76)

| (77) | The purpose of the MEO test is to assess whether the state has granted an advantage to an undertaking by not acting like a private market economy operator with regard to a certain transaction, e.g. loan agreements or the sale of asset (82). In order to fulfil the test, the public authority must disregard public policy objectives and instead focus on the single objective of obtaining a market rate of return or profit on its investments and a market price for the sale or lease of assets (83). This assessment must take into account any special rights or obligations attached to the asset concerned, in particular those that could affect the market value. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

| (78) | It follows from this test that an advantage is present whenever a state makes funds available to an undertaking, which, in the normal course of events, would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature (84). |
| --- | --- |

(78)

| (79) | The PTA, as described above, has examined the strategy and financial prospect of the relevant measures, in order to determine whether the financing of the operations of GR has been carried out in line with normal market conditions. In its assessment, the PTA has considered independent expert reports and drawn comparisons with other, private operators in the same market. The PTA’s assessment is normally carried out on an ex ante basis. However, there are also examples of the PTA having carried out an ex post assessment of the financial separation between OR and GR, as well as individual measures. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

| (80) | More precisely, from 2006 until 2019, the PTA adopted nine formal decisions regarding the financial separation of OR and GR. The PTA did not make formal comments for the years 2013–2015. The PTA’s investigations included a review of GR’s business plan, which must be renewed annually, in accordance with actual financial data. In its review, the PTA e.g. checks whether the rate of return for the investor (OR) is in conformity with the telecom market in general, and looks at the capital structure and whether transactions between OR and GR are on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

| (81) | GR has been obliged to submit to the PTA, on an annual basis, detailed operational and economic information, together with its revised business plans and profitability requirements. Whenever necessary, the PTA has requested additional data and has assessed whether the operations were in line with market terms and, if not, whether there was a reason for taking action. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

| (82) | In a letter from the PTA to the complainant, dated 6 September 2018, the PTA confirmed that it does not have legal powers to perform a cost analysis of the prices OR sets for renting out its facilities. The complainant has argued that because of this, the PTA’s assessment of the financial separation cannot replace that of the Authority, when assessing possible state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

| (83) | It is the preliminary view of the Authority that even though the PTA does not have the legal basis to perform a cost analysis of OR’s prices, the PTA has other ways to ensure that OR’s pricing practices for renting out facilities are on market terms. Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act obliges OR to ensure equality in pricing when renting out facilities to related and unrelated companies. Furthermore, OR is obliged to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities. The PTA then enforces these obligations. As the PTA explains in its letter to the complainant, it did in fact open an investigation into OR pricing practices for renting out facilities, and concluded that OR’s pricing was in full conformity with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (85). |
| --- | --- |

(83)

| (84) | The PTA has found that in order to ensure that the effectiveness of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act is guaranteed, the concept of ”subsidy” should be understood in a broad sense, so as to include any measures from OR, both direct and indirect, which potentially provide GR with an advantage that its competitors on the market do not enjoy. The PTA has also noted that its monitoring role, pursuant to Article 36, is comparable to the Authority’s, when it comes to assessing whether an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is present (86). |
| --- | --- |

(84)

| (85) | It is the Authority‘s preliminary view that there is an efficient system in place in Iceland that entails an assessment similar to the MEO test. Consequently, Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act sets up a system under which the PTA can ensure that GR’s operations are not subsidised through income from OR’s operations. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

| (86) | It follows from the test that an advantage is present whenever OR makes funds available to GR, which, in the normal course of events, would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria. The PTA can conduct a formal investigation on its own initiative or based on a complaint. If a transaction is not in conformity with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, the PTA can instruct the parties to eliminate any advantage through the adoption of relevant measures set forth in an administrative decision by the PTA. The decisions are challengeable before the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications and Postal Affairs and the Courts. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

| (87) | The Icelandic authorities have explained that the PTA’s monitoring role is primarily focused on an ex ante assessment of GR’s business plans, financing, profitability requirements, loan arrangements, etc., with the PTA imposing conditions and obligations when necessary in order to ensure financial separation between OR and GR, and that the latter’s competitive operations are not subsidised by the mother company (87). |
| --- | --- |

(87)

| (88) | Where the PTA ex post finds an infringement of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, i.e. where it finds that a particular transaction was not on market terms, it can instruct the parties to eliminate any potential advantage through the adoption of relevant measures. The advantage is then recovered from the beneficiary in accordance with national law (88). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

| (89) | However, for the PTA to order an advantage clawed back, the incompatible measure must be clearly defined and be incontestable, e.g. a particular monetary sum, a condition in a loan agreement, etc. (89). Moreover, when the PTA has ordered advantages granted to GR to be clawed back, it has not required those advantages to be recovered with interest. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

| (90) | As described in Section 4.3 above, there are three examples of the PTA having established concrete infringements of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. In two of those cases, the PTA ordered that the measures be clawed back. In the third case, the PTA did not order any clawback. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

| (91) | The first case, described in paragraph (33) above, concerned a temporary suspension of interest payments on loans provided by OR to GR (90). The PTA concluded that this temporary suspension had been in breach of the requirement imposed by the PTA concerning arm’s-length terms in transactions between OR and GR. Moreover, the PTA found that the suspension of interest payments had provided GR with an advantageous subsidy. Considering the facts of this case, the nature of transactions, as well as the PTA’s assessment, the Authority is also of the preliminary view that the measure provided GR with an advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

| (92) | The PTA ordered GR to pay back the suspended interest payments, however, it did not order the company to pay back interest on those suspended payments (91). In order to effectively recover an unlawful advantage at national level, the beneficiary must be ordered to pay interest for the whole of the period in which it benefitted from that aid. The interest must at least be equivalent to that which would have been applied if the beneficiary had had to borrow the amount on the market at the time (92). Although GR has paid back the market interest it was obliged to pay in the first place, it has not been required to pay back market interest on the advantage it obtained through the temporary suspension of interest payments. Therefore, the full advantage has not been adequately clawed back. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

| (93) | The second case, briefly described in paragraph (49) above, concerned funds deriving from OR and used to finance GR’s fiber optic cable project in Ölfus Municipality (93). The PTA concluded that the transfer of funds from ÖRF (but deriving from OR) to GR had amounted to a cross-subsidy between OR’s protected geothermal activities and GR’s competitive operations. Having considered the facts of the case and the PTA’s assessment, the Authority takes the preliminary view that ÖRF’s financing of the fibre optic cable network was not on market terms and therefore provided GR with an advantage. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

| (94) | The PTA ordered GR to undertake appropriate measures to repay the funds it received from ÖRF, although it did not stipulate how GR should go about this. Nevertheless, the PTA suggested that GR could either repay the funds to Ölfus Municipality or that the municipality could obtain an appropriate share in the project proportional to its investment. The Authority does not have information concerning how GR reacted to the PTA’s proposals and which measures it adopted following the decision. At this stage, it is therefore not clear to the Authority whether the advantage has been fully clawed back from GR. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

| (95) | Finally, in its latest decision concerning the implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017 (see Section 4.3.6 above), the PTA found two infringements of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (94):






  (i) | The first infringement concerned OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(95)

(i)

The first infringement concerned OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions.

| (ii) | The second infringement concerned conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. Such provisions had been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced at the end of 2017. The PTA found that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (95). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunications undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (96). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

The second infringement concerned conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. Such provisions had been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced at the end of 2017. The PTA found that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (95). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunications undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (96).

| (96) | The Authority, considering the benchmarks applied by the PTA and its detailed assessment of these measures, takes the preliminary view that these two measures provided GR with an advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. Due to proportionality considerations, the PTA did not order the clawback of the aforementioned advantages. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

5.2.4   Preliminary conclusions

| (97) | Based on the above considerations, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that GR has obtained an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, which it could not have obtained under normal market conditions, by: (i) not paying market interest on the advantage it obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receiving funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) receiving short-term lending from OR, and (iv) through the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s continued majority ownership in GR. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

5.3   
  Selectivity

| (98) | To be characterised as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must also be selective in that it favours ”certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”. Not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, but only those which grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings, categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

| (99) | The potential aid measures at issue, i.e. (i) not paying market interest on the advantage GR obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receipt of funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) short-term lending from OR to GR, and (iv) the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s continued majority ownership in GR, are individual measures addressed only to GR. The measures therefore appear to be selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

5.4   
  Effect on trade and distortion of competition

| (100) | The measures must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

| (101) | According to CJEU case law, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether the aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (97). Furthermore, it is not necessary that the aid beneficiary itself is involved in intra-EEA trade. Even a public subsidy granted to an undertaking, which provides only local or regional services and does not provide any services outside its state of origin, may nonetheless have an effect on trade if such internal activity can be increased or maintained as a result of the aid, with the consequence that the opportunities for undertakings established in other Contracting Parties are reduced (98). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

| (102) | GR is active in deploying a fibre network infrastructure in a market which can be entered directly or through financial involvement by participants from other EEA States. In general, the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to trade and competition between operators and service providers across the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

| (103) | Therefore, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

5.5   
  Conclusion

| (104) | Based on the information provided by the Icelandic authorities and the complainant, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that the measures, i.e. (i) not paying market interest on the advantage GR obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receipt of funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) short-term lending from OR to GR, and (iv) the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s, fulfil all criteria in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore constitute state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

6   Procedural requirements

| (105) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (”Protocol 3”): ”The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. .... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.” |
| --- | --- |

(105)

| (106) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the potential aid measures to the Authority. It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of the potential aid therefore appears to be unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

7   Compatibility

| (107) | Having reached a preliminary conclusion that the measures might constitute unlawful aid, the Authority must assess whether they would be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

| (108) | The Authority can declare state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement under its Articles 59(2) and 61(3)(c) provided that certain compatibility conditions are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

| (109) | It is for the Icelandic authorities to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for compatibility are met (99). However, the Icelandic authorities have not provided any arguments substantiating why the measures should be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In particular, no arguments supporting the conclusion that the aid is targeted at a well-defined objective of common interest have been presented. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities have not presented evidence suggesting that GR has been entrusted with a public service obligation. The Authority has also not identified any clear grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

| (110) | To the extent that the measures constitute state aid, the Authority therefore has doubts as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement |
| --- | --- |

(110)

8   Conclusion

| (111) | As set out above, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that the measures fulfil all criteria in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore appear to constitute state aid. The Authority furthermore has doubts as to whether the measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

| (112) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority hereby opens the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures do not constitute state aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

| (113) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 January 2020 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

| (114) | The Icelandic authorities are requested to immediately forward a copy of this decision to OR. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

| (115) | If this letter contains confidential information which should not be disclosed to third parties, please inform the Authority by 13 December 2019, identifying the confidential elements and the reasons why the information is considered to be confidential. In doing so, please consult the Authority’s Guidelines on Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions (100). If the Authority does not receive a reasoned request by that deadline, the Icelandic authorities will be deemed to agree to the disclosure to third parties and to the publication of the full text of the letter on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/ and in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

| (116) | Finally, the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication. The comments will be communicated to the Icelandic authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Bente ANGELL-HANSEN

President

Responsible College Member

Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

Högni KRISTJÁNSSON

College Member

Carsten ZATSCHLER

Countersigning as Director,

Legal and Executive Affairs

---

(*)  The information in square brackets is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.

*

(1)  Reference is made to Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.

1

(2)  Document No 825150, and Annexes 1–43 (Document Nos 825151, 825152, 825152, 825153 and 825156).

2

(3)  Document No 825249.

3

(4)  Document No 827877.

4

(5)  Document No 828509.

5

(6)  Document No 835622 and three attachments (Document Nos 835623, 835624 and 835625).

6

(7)  Document Nos 840228 and 840229, and Annex 1 (Document No 840230).

7

(8)  Document No 850420.

8

(9)  Document No 862626 and eight attachments (Document Nos 862628, 862635, 862639, 862641, 862645, 862648, 862651 and 862655).

9

(10)  Document No 892188.

10

(11)  Document No 882024.

11

(12)  Document No 910552 and Annexes 1 and 2 (Document No 910554).

12

(13)  Document No 911001.

13

(14)  Document No 915072.

14

(15)  Document No 919903.

15

(16)  Document Nos 931137, 931138 and 931139.

16

(17)  Document No 1060941.

17

(18)  Document No 1066345.

18

(19)  Document No 1073306 and Annexes 1–5 (Document Nos 1073308, 1073310, 1073312, 1073314 and 1073316).

19

(20)  Document No 1087462 and Annexes 1–5 (Document Nos 1087456–1087460).

20

(21)  Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is a measure of a company’s operating performance.

21

(22)  https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/stjorn/.

22

(23)  https://www.rsk.is/fyrirtaekjaskra/leit/kennitala/5512983029.

23

(24)  https://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/2013136.html.

24

(25)  https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/allar/nr/297-2006.

25

(26)  OJ C 10, 12.1.2012, p. 6 and EEA Supplement No 2, 12 januari 2012, p. 4.

26

(27)  Based on a general authorisation to operate telecommunication networks and services in accordance with Art. 4 of The Electronic Communications Act No 81/2003, see https://www.pfs.is/english/telecom-affairs/registration-and-licences/.

27

(28)  Submitted to Parliament in the 128 parliamentary session 2002–2003; http://www.althingi.is/altext/128/s/0960.html.

28

(29)  Ibid.

29

(30)  The framework is made up of a package of primarily five Directives and two Regulations: Framework Directive 2002/21/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33); Access Directive 2002/19/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7); Better Regulation Directive 2009/140/EC (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37); Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21); the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51); the Regulation on Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 1); and the Regulation on roaming on public mobile communications networks (OJ L 172, 30.6.2012, p. 10).

30

(31)  PTA Decision No 14/2010 of 21 maj 2010.

31

(32)  PTA Decision No 20/2013 of 10 oktober 2013.

32

(33)  Article 13 of the Act on The Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003.

33

(34)  See for example Ruling of the Ruling Committee of 17 July 2006 in Case No 8/2006.

34

(35)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 1.

35

(36)  Attachments contained in Document No 862628.

36

(37)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 5.

37

(38)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 16.

38

(39)  PTA Decision of 13 november 2006, p. 15–23.

39

(40)  Article 5 of the Act (available in English here) concerns the special provisions that a Memorandum of Association should contain. According to section 5 in paragraph 2 there should be attached to the Memorandum of Association a report containing ”a declaration to the effect that the specific valuables correspond at least to the agreed remuneration, including the nominal value of the shares to be issued plus a conceivable surcharge on account of overprice; the remuneration must not exceed the amount at which these valuables may be credited in the Company’s accounts”.

40

(41)  PTA Decision No 32/2008 of 30 december 2008.

41

(42)  PTA Decision No 14/2010 of 21 maj 2010, p. 15.

42

(43)  PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7 september 2010.

43

(44)  PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22 december 2010, p. 21.

44

(45)  PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22 december 2010, p. 21.

45

(46)  Document No 840229, p. 8.

46

(47)  PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22 december 2010, p. 24 and 26.

47

(48)  PTA Decision No 2/2014 of 24 mars 2014, p. 35.

48

(49)  PTA Decision No 2/2014 of 24 mars 2014, p. 40–42.

49

(50)  According to Article 13, paragraph 4, of the Act on the Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003, a party can decide to avoid the Ruling Committee and appeal a decision of the PTA directly to the District Court within 3 months from the time they are aware of the decision.

50

(51)  Supreme Court of Iceland judgment of 27 mars 2015 in Case No 219/2015.

51

(52)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019.

52

(53)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraphs 372–373.

53

(54)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraph 375.

54

(55)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraph 353.

55

(56)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraph 353.

56

(57)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraph 354.

57

(58)  PTA Decision No 26/2013 of 1 november 2013.

58

(59)  PTA Decision No 11/2015 of 2 juni 2015.

59

(60)  Reply from the Icelandic authorities, dated 7 februari 2017, pages 2 and 3. Document No 840228.

60

(61)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of state aid (”NoA”) (OJ L 342, 21.12.2017, p. 35), and EEA Supplement No 82, 21 december 2017, p. 1, paragraph 49.

61

(62)  Judgment in SFEI and others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 62.

62

SFEI and others

(63)  NoA, paragraph 41.

63

(64)  Judgment in France v Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 55.

64

France

Commission (Stardust Marine)

(65)  https://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/2013136.html.

65

(66)  https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/allar/nr/297-2006.

66

(67)  See for example: https://reykjavik.is/sites/default/files/ymis_skjol/skjol_utgefid_efni/city_of_ reykjavik_-_financial_statements_2018.pdf.

67

(68)  https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/stjorn/. .

68

(69)  See Article 2 of OR’s ownership policy: https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/eigendastefna/,

69

(70)  Article 16 of the Electricity Act No 65/2003.

70

(71)  See Article 6 of OR’s ownership policy: https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/eigendastefna/. .

71

(72)  See Report of the Enquiry Committee on Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, page 73, https://rafhladan.is/handle/10802/5777.

72

(73)  Judgments in Pavlov and others, C-180/98 to C-184/98, EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 74, and Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and others, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 107; Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 62, paragraph 78.

73

Pavlov and others

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and others

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

(74)  Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v Ayuntamiento de Getafe, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 42.

74

Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania

Ayuntamiento de Getafe

(75)  Judgment in Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 108; and Case E-29/15 Sorpa [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 825, paragraph 72.

75

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

Sorpa

(76)  Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 51.

76

Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania

(77)  See https://www.ljosleidarinn.is/gagnaveita-reykjavikur.

77

(78)  See the Authority’s Decision No 444/13/COL, The Deployment of a Next Generation Access network in the municipality of Skeiða- and Gnúpverjahreppur (OJ C 66, 6.3.2014, p. 6) and EEA Supplement No 82, 21 december 2017, p. 1, paragraph 56.

78

The Deployment of a Next Generation Access network in the municipality of Skeiða- and Gnúpverjahreppur

(79)  Judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60, and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

79

SFEI and Others

Spain

Commission

(80)  NoA, chapter 4.2.

80

(81)  For the application of the MEO test, see Case E-12/11 Asker Brygge [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 536, and judgment in Land Burgenland, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.

81

Asker Brygge

Land Burgenland

(82)  NoA, paragraph 133.

82

(83)  Judgment in Land Burgenland, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.

83

Land Burgenland

(84)  See for example, the Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in Spain v Commission, C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92, EU:C:1994:112, paragraph 28. See also judgments in Belgium v Commission, 40/85, EU:C:1986:305, paragraph 13, France v Commission, 301/87, EU:C:1990:67, paragraphs 39–40, and Italy v Commission, 303/88, EU:C:1991:136, paragraph 24.

84

Spain

Commission

Belgium

Commission

France

Commission

Italy

Commission

(85)  Document No 931139.

85

(86)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraphs 338–340.

86

(87)  Document No 1073308.

87

(88)  Judgment in Eesti Pagar, C-349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 89.

88

Eesti Pagar

(89)  Document No 1073308.

89

(90)  PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7 september 2010.

90

(91)  PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7 september 2010.

91

(92)  Judgment in Eesti Pagar, C-349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 142.

92

Eesti Pagar

(93)  PTA Decision No 11/2015 of 2 juni 2015.

93

(94)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019.

94

(95)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraph 353.

95

(96)  PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20 mars 2019, paragraph 353.

96

(97)  Case E-6/98 Norway v ESA [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 76.

97

Norway

ESA

(98)  See for example judgments in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 66, Libert and others, C-197/11 and C-203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 77, Friulia Venezia Giulia, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41.

98

Eventech

Libert and others

Friulia Venezia Giulia

(99)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

99

Italy

Commission

(100)  OJ L 154, 8.6.2006, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 29, 8 juni 2006, p. 1.

100

---

V Yttranden

DOMSTOLSFÖRFARANDEN

Efta-domstolen

| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/33

---

EFTADOMSTOLEN DOMSTOLENS DOM

av den 13 november 2019

i mål E-2/19

D och E

(Fri rörlighet för personer – Områdesspecifika anpassningar för Liechtenstein – Uppehållsrätt – Härledd uppehållsrätt för familjemedlemmar – Direktiv 2004/38/EG)

(2020/C 40/04)

Mål E-2/19, D och E – FRAMSTÄLLAN till domstolen enligt artikel 34 i avtalet mellan Eftastaterna om upprättande av en övervakningsmyndighet och en domstol från förvaltningsdomstolen i Furstendömet Liechtenstein (Verwaltungsgerichtshof des Fürstentums Liechtenstein) om tolkningen av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/38/EG av den 29 april 2004 om unionsmedborgares och deras familjemedlemmars rätt att fritt röra sig och uppehålla sig inom medlemsstaternas territorier, i dess anpassade lydelse enligt avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet. Domstolen var sammansatt av presidenten Páll Hreinsson (referent) samt domarna Bernd Hammermann och Ola Mestad (ad hoc). Domslutet av den 13 november 2019 lyder:

De områdesspecifika anpassningarna av bilagorna V och VIII till EES-avtalet, särskilt punkt III, berövar inte familjemedlemmar till en EES-medborgare som har ett giltigt uppehållstillstånd och är bosatt i Liechtenstein rätten att medfölja eller ansluta sig till en EES-medborgare i Liechtenstein på grundval av artikel 7.1 d i direktiv 2004/38/EG, även om det uppehållstillstånd som EES-medborgaren har i Liechtenstein inte beviljades på grundval av det system som föreskrivs i de områdesspecifika anpassningarna.

---

FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV DEN GEMENSAMMA HANDELSPOLITIKEN

Europeiska kommissionen

| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/34

---

Tillkännagivande om att giltighetstiden för vissa antidumpningsåtgärder snart kommer att löpa ut

(2020/C 40/05)

1.   I enlighet med artikel 11.2 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2016/1036 av den 8 juni 2016 om skydd mot dumpad import från länder som inte är medlemmar i Europeiska unionen (1) tillkännager kommissionen att de antidumpningsåtgärder som anges nedan kommer att upphöra att gälla det datum som anges i tabellen, såvida inte en översyn inleds i enlighet med förfarandet nedan.

2.   Förfarande

Unionstillverkare får lämna in en skriftlig begäran om översyn. En sådan begäran måste innehålla tillräcklig bevisning för att dumpningen och skadan sannolikt skulle fortsätta eller återkomma om åtgärderna upphör. Om kommissionen beslutar att göra en översyn av de berörda åtgärderna kommer importörerna, exportörerna, företrädarna för exportlandet och unionstillverkarna att ges tillfälle att utveckla, dementera eller yttra sig över de uppgifter som lämnats in i begäran om översyn.

3.   Tidsfrist

På de grunder som anges ovan får unionstillverkare inge en skriftlig begäran om översyn till generaldirektoratet för handel vid Europeiska kommissionen (European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Unit H-1, CHAR 4/39, B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussels, Belgien (2)) från och med den dag då detta tillkännagivande offentliggörs, dock senast tre månader före det datum som anges i tabellen.

4.   Detta tillkännagivande offentliggörs i enlighet med artikel 11.2 i förordning (EU) 2016/1036.

| Produkt | Ursprungs- eller exportländer | Åtgärder | Referens | Datum då åtgärden upphör att gälla (3) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Vissa kornorienterade valsade platta produkter av kisellegerat elektrostål | Folkrepubliken Kina
  Japan
  Sydkorea
  Ryska federationen
  Amerikas förenta stater | Antidumpningstull | Kommissionens genomförandeförordning (EU) 2015/1953 av den 29 oktober 2015 om införande av en definitiv antidumpningstull på import av vissa kornorienterade valsade platta produkter av kisellegerat elektrostål med ursprung i Amerikas förenta stater, Japan, Folkrepubliken Kina, Ryska federationen och Republiken Korea
  (EUT L 284, 30.10.2015, s. 109) | 31.10.2020 |

Produkt

Ursprungs- eller exportländer

Åtgärder

Referens

Datum då åtgärden upphör att gälla (3)

Vissa kornorienterade valsade platta produkter av kisellegerat elektrostål

Folkrepubliken Kina

Japan

Sydkorea

Ryska federationen

Amerikas förenta stater

Antidumpningstull

Kommissionens genomförandeförordning (EU) 2015/1953 av den 29 oktober 2015 om införande av en definitiv antidumpningstull på import av vissa kornorienterade valsade platta produkter av kisellegerat elektrostål med ursprung i Amerikas förenta stater, Japan, Folkrepubliken Kina, Ryska federationen och Republiken Korea

(EUT L 284, 30.10.2015, s. 109)

31.10.2020

---

(1)  EUT L 176, 30.6.2016, s. 21.

(2)  TRADE-Defence-Complaints@ec.europa.eu

(3)  Åtgärden upphör att gälla vid midnatt det datum som anges i den här kolumnen.

---

FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN

Europeiska kommissionen

| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/35

---

Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration

(Ärende M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax)

Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande

(Text av betydelse för EES)

(2020/C 40/06)

1.

Denna anmälan berör följande företag:

| — | Viacom International Inc. (Viacom, Förenta staterna), som ägs av ViacomCBS Inc.. |
| --- | --- |

—

Viacom International Inc. (Viacom, Förenta staterna), som ägs av ViacomCBS Inc..

| — | beIN Media Group, LLC (beIN, Qatar), som ägs av beIN Corporation. |
| --- | --- |

—

beIN Media Group, LLC (beIN, Qatar), som ägs av beIN Corporation.

| — | MMX Media Finance, LLC (Miramax, Förenta staterna), som för närvarande kontrolleras helt av beIN. |
| --- | --- |

—

MMX Media Finance, LLC (Miramax, Förenta staterna), som för närvarande kontrolleras helt av beIN.

Viacom och beIN förvärvar, på det sätt som avses i artikel 3.1 b och 3.4 i koncentrationsförordningen, gemensam kontroll över Miramax.

Koncentrationen genomförs genom förvärv av aktier.

2.

| — | Viacom: globalt media- och underhållningsföretag. |
| --- | --- |

—

Viacom: globalt media- och underhållningsföretag.

| — | beIN: underhållningsföretag verksamt bl.a. inom sportmedier. |
| --- | --- |

—

beIN: underhållningsföretag verksamt bl.a. inom sportmedier.

| — | Miramax: underhållningsföretag som producerar och distribuerar filmer och tv-program. |
| --- | --- |

—

Miramax: underhållningsföretag som producerar och distribuerar filmer och tv-program.

3.

Det bör noteras att detta ärende kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande, i enlighet med kommissionens tillkännagivande om ett förenklat förfarande för handläggning av vissa koncentrationer enligt rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004 (2).

4.

Synpunkterna ska ha kommit in till kommissionen senast tio dagar efter detta offentliggörande. Följande referens bör alltid anges:

M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax

Synpunkterna kan sändas till kommissionen per e-post, per fax eller per post. Använd följande kontaktuppgifter:

E-post: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Post:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  EUT L 24, 29.1.2004, s. 1 (koncentrationsförordningen).

1

koncentrationsförordningen

(2)  EUT C 366, 14.12.2013, s. 5.

2

---

| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/37

---

Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration

(Ärende M.9719 — Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited/OMERS Administration Corporation/Riverstone Barbados Limited)

Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande

(Text av betydelse för EES)

(2020/C 40/07)

1.

Denna anmälan berör följande företag:

| — | Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (FFHL, Kanada), |
| --- | --- |

—

Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (FFHL, Kanada),

| — | Kingston Infrastructure Holdings Inc. (Kingston, Kanada), som kontrolleras av OMERS Administration Corporation (OMERS, Kanada), |
| --- | --- |

—

Kingston Infrastructure Holdings Inc. (Kingston, Kanada), som kontrolleras av OMERS Administration Corporation (OMERS, Kanada),

| — | Riverstone Barbados Limited (Riverstone, Barbados). |
| --- | --- |

—

Riverstone Barbados Limited (Riverstone, Barbados).

FFHL och Kingston förvärvar, på det sätt som avses i artikel 3.1 b och 3.4 i koncentrationsförordningen, gemensam kontroll över hela Riverstone.

Koncentrationen genomförs genom förvärv av aktier.

2.

| — | FFHL är ett holdingbolag som är verksamt inom fastighets- och olycksfallsförsäkring samt återförsäkring och därmed sammanhängande portföljförvaltning. |
| --- | --- |

—

FFHL är ett holdingbolag som är verksamt inom fastighets- och olycksfallsförsäkring samt återförsäkring och därmed sammanhängande portföljförvaltning.

| — | OMERS är administratör för pensionssystemet för kommunalanställda i Ontario (Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Primary Pension Plan) och förvaltare av pensionsfonderna. Omers förvaltar en diversifierad global portfölj av aktier och obligationer samt fastigheter, riskkapital och infrastrukturinvesteringar. |
| --- | --- |

—

OMERS är administratör för pensionssystemet för kommunalanställda i Ontario (Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Primary Pension Plan) och förvaltare av pensionsfonderna. Omers förvaltar en diversifierad global portfölj av aktier och obligationer samt fastigheter, riskkapital och infrastrukturinvesteringar.

| — | Riverstone förvaltar avveckling av försäkringsföretag och portföljer. |
| --- | --- |

—

Riverstone förvaltar avveckling av försäkringsföretag och portföljer.

3.

Det bör noteras att detta ärende kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande, i enlighet med kommissionens tillkännagivande om ett förenklat förfarande för handläggning av vissa koncentrationer enligt rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004 (2).

4.

Synpunkterna ska ha kommit in till kommissionen senast tio dagar efter detta offentliggörande. Följande referens bör alltid anges:

M.9719 — FFHL / OMERS / Riverstone

Synpunkterna kan sändas till kommissionen per e-post, per fax eller per post. Använd följande kontaktuppgifter:

E-post: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Post:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  EUT L 24, 29.1.2004, s. 1 (koncentrationsförordningen).

1

koncentrationsförordningen

(2)  EUT C 366, 14.12.2013, s. 5.

2

---

ÖVRIGA AKTER

Europeiska kommissionen

| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/38

---

Offentliggörande av ett meddelande om godkännande av en standardändring av produktspecifikationen för ett namn i vinsektorn enligt artikel 17.2 och 17.3 i kommissionens delegerade förordning (EU) 2019/33.

(2020/C 40/08)

Detta meddelande offentliggörs i enlighet med artikel 17.5 i kommissionens delegerade förordning (EU) 2019/33 (1).

MEDDELANDE OM GODKÄNNANDE AV STANDARDÄNDRING

”Coteaux d’Ancenis”

PDO-FR-A0928-AM01

Datum för meddelandet: 12 november 2019

BESKRIVNING AV OCH MOTIVERING TILL DEN ÄNDRING SOM GODKÄNTS

1   geografiskt område

Det geografiska området ändras på följande sätt: ”Alla steg i produktionen ska äga rum i det geografiska område som har godkänts av Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité vid sammanträdet i den behöriga nationella kommittén den 28 september 2011. Vid det datum då denna produktspecifikation godkändes av den behöriga nationella kommittén omfattade detta område följande kommuner på grundval av 2018 års officiella geografiska kodex:

| — | Departementet Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire och Vair-sur-Loire. |
| --- | --- |

—

Departementet Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire och Vair-sur-Loire.

| — | Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré och La Varenne). |
| --- | --- |

—

Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré och La Varenne).

De kartografiska dokument som representerar det geografiska området finns att läsa på webbplatsen för Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité. ”

Redaktionell ändring: den nya förteckningen över administrativa enheter tar hänsyn till de sammanslagningar och andra ändringar i den administrativa områdesindelningen som har skett sedan produktspecifikationen godkändes. För att öka rättssäkerheten hänvisas vid denna förteckning till den gällande versionen av den officiella geografiska kodexen som ges ut varje år av den franska nationella statistikbyrån INSEE.

Slutligen nämns att de kartografiska dokument som representerar det geografiska området finns tillgängliga på INAO:s webbplats, för att förbättra allmänhetens tillgång till information.

Det sammanfattande dokumentets avsnitt om det avgränsade geografiska området ändras på motsvarande sätt i punkt 6.

2.   Avgränsat odlingsområde

I kapitel 1 avsnitt IV.2 ersätts orden ”det avgränsade odlingsområdet” med ordet ”produktionsområdet”.

Detta är en redaktionell ändring som inte påverkar det avgränsade odlingsområdet.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

3.   Område intill det berörda området

I kapitel 1 avsnitt IV.3 ersätts förteckningen av kommuner med följande:

| — | Departementet Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdon-sur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles och Vallet. |
| --- | --- |

—

Departementet Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdon-sur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles och Vallet.

| — | Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Puiset-Doré och Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Saint-Laurent-des-Autels och Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont) och Sèvremoine (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Tillières). |
| --- | --- |

—

Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Puiset-Doré och Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Saint-Laurent-des-Autels och Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont) och Sèvremoine (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Tillières).

Redaktionell ändring: den nya förteckningen över administrativa enheter tar hänsyn till de sammanslagningar och andra ändringar i den administrativa områdesindelningen som har skett sedan produktspecifikationen godkändes.

Det sammanfattande dokumentets avsnitt om andra villkor ändras på motsvarande sätt i punkt 9.

4.   Druvbestånd

Röda viner och roséviner kommer hädanefter att få framställas med cabernet franc som sekundär druvsort.

Cabernet franc är en historisk druvsort för området och beteckningen. Den ger vinet en viss struktur utan att ändra dess karaktär. Detta gör det möjligt att ytterligare säkra produktionen, eftersom denna druvsort inte är lika känslig för frost och svampsjukdomar som gamay.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

5.   Sammansättning

| — | Följande stycke läggs till i kapitel 1 avsnitt V:






  ”2 | – Regler om andelar för användning |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Följande stycke läggs till i kapitel 1 avsnitt V:

”2

– Regler om andelar för användning

Den sekundära druvsorten får utgöra högst 10 % av druvbeståndet.

Druvbeståndens överensstämmelse med reglerna bedöms, för varje vintyp, övergripande för alla jordbrukslotter som tillhör det jordbruksföretag som producerar vinet med den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen.”

| — | Följande led a läggs till i kapitel 1 avsnitt IX:






  ”a) | – Sammansättning av druvsorter |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Följande led a läggs till i kapitel 1 avsnitt IX:

”a)

– Sammansättning av druvsorter

De röda vinerna och rosévinerna framställs genom sammansättning av druvor eller vin i samma proportioner som de som anges för druvbeståndens sammansättning.”

I och med att druvsorten cabernet franc läggs till måste det också läggas till en regel om druvbestånd och sammansättning och denna druvsorts andel begränsas till 10 %.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

6.   Förpackning

I avsnitt IX.2 har reglerna ändrats om hur länge resultatet av analyser av de förpackade partierna ska sparas. Analysresultaten ska nu sparas i 12 månader i stället för 6, för att säkerställa en bättre kontroll.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

7.   Förflyttning mellan godkända upplagshavare

I kapitel 1 punkt IX.4 stryks led b om datum för förflyttning av vinet mellan godkända upplagshavare.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

8.   Samband med det geografiska området

Sambandet har setts över för att uppdatera antalet berörda kommuner (16 i stället för 22).

Det sammanfattande dokumentets avsnitt om samband med det geografiska området ändras på motsvarande sätt i punkt 8.

9.   Övergångsbestämmelse

De övergångsbestämmelser som har löpt ut har tagits bort från produktspecifikationen.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

10.   Märkning

I avsnitt XII läggs följande till: ”c) Märkningen av viner med den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen kan ange en mindre geografisk enhet, förutsatt att

| — | det rör sig om en registrerad plats, |
| --- | --- |

—

det rör sig om en registrerad plats,

| — | denna plats nämns i skördedeklarationen. |
| --- | --- |

—

denna plats nämns i skördedeklarationen.

De bokstäver som används för denna registrerade plats får varken på höjden eller på bredden eller i tjocklek vara mer än hälften så stora som de bokstäver som används i den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningens namn. Namnet på den registrerade platsen ska anges i samma synfält som den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningens namn.”

Det sammanfattande dokumentets avsnitt om andra villkor ändras på motsvarande sätt i punkt 9.

11.   Förhandsdeklaration av fördelningen av jordbrukslotter

I kapitel 2 avsnitt 1.1 tas perioden på fem år bort för förnyelse genom tyst samförstånd i syfte att undvika problem på grund av glömska och enbart behålla förnyelse genom tyst samförstånd om operatören inte har anmält några förändringar.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

12.   Deklaration om anspråk

Deklarationen om anspråk ska lämnas in senast den 31 december, i stället för den 10 december.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

13   Förhandsdeklaration om försäljning av otappat vin

I kapitel 2 avsnitt II.3 första stycket läggs ordet ”första” till före ordet ”försäljning” och orden ”av det första partiet från det berörda året eller det första utsläppandet på marknaden avsett för vinkonsumenten” efter ordet ”försäljning”.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

14.   Förhandsdeklaration om tappning av vin

Följande strecksats läggs till i kapitel 2 avsnitt II.4:

| ”– | Förväntat datum för tappning” |
| --- | --- |

”–

Förväntat datum för tappning”

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

15   Deklaration om nedklassning

I kapitel 2 avsnitt II.6 ersätts orden ”inom en månad” med ”senast den 15 december”.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

16.   Vinodlingsregister

Kapitel 2 avsnitt II.1 ändras på följande sätt:

| ”1 | – Vinodlingsregister






  a) | Varje operatör som odlar vinrankor som är lämpliga för framställning av vin med den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen ska före den 1 juni skördeåret lämna in ett register över de jordbrukslotter på vilka operatören avstår från att producera den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen och på vilka produktionsvillkoren för vinodling avsedd för den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen inte ska tillämpas.
  Producentorganisationen får begära att operatörer översänder en kopia av detta register. |
| --- | --- | --- |

”1

– Vinodlingsregister

a)

Varje operatör som odlar vinrankor som är lämpliga för framställning av vin med den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen ska före den 1 juni skördeåret lämna in ett register över de jordbrukslotter på vilka operatören avstår från att producera den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen och på vilka produktionsvillkoren för vinodling avsedd för den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen inte ska tillämpas.

Producentorganisationen får begära att operatörer översänder en kopia av detta register.

| b) | Varje operatör som berörs av en (eller flera) övergångsbestämmelse(r) ska ge producentorganisationen och det godkända kontrollorganet tillgång till en förteckning över de berörda jordbrukslotterna, med uppgifter om






  — | jordbrukslottens referensnummer i fastighetsregistret, |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

Varje operatör som berörs av en (eller flera) övergångsbestämmelse(r) ska ge producentorganisationen och det godkända kontrollorganet tillgång till en förteckning över de berörda jordbrukslotterna, med uppgifter om

—

jordbrukslottens referensnummer i fastighetsregistret,

| — | den berörda övergångsbestämmelsen.” |
| --- | --- |

—

den berörda övergångsbestämmelsen.”

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

17.   Källarregister

I kapitel 2 avsnitt II.2 ersätts begreppet ”bok” med ”register” och det görs ett tillägg om att nedklassningar förekommer i registret.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

18   Huvudsakliga punkter som ska kontrolleras

Kapitel 3 har setts över för att skapa samstämmighet i förhållande till de huvudsakliga punkter som ska kontrolleras i produktspecifikationerna i Nantesområdet.

Det sammanfattande dokumentet påverkas inte av denna ändring.

SAMMANFATTANDE DOKUMENT

1.   Produktens namn

Coteaux d’Ancenis

2.   Typ av geografisk beteckning

SUB – Skyddad ursprungsbeteckning

3.   Kategorier av vinprodukter

| 1. | Vin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Vin

4.   beskrivning av vinet eller vinerna

Röda viner

Vinerna är stilla röda viner

Vinerna har följande analytiska egenskaper:

| — | Minsta naturliga alkoholhalt: röda viner 10,5 volymprocent. |
| --- | --- |

—

Minsta naturliga alkoholhalt: röda viner 10,5 volymprocent.

| — | Högsta totala alkoholhalt efter berikning: röda viner 12,5 volymprocent. |
| --- | --- |

—

Högsta totala alkoholhalt efter berikning: röda viner 12,5 volymprocent.

| — | Total syrahalt: röda viner mellan 57,1 och 102,1 milliekvivalenter per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Total syrahalt: röda viner mellan 57,1 och 102,1 milliekvivalenter per liter.

| — | Högsta halt av flyktiga syror: röda viner 13,3 milliekvivalenter per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Högsta halt av flyktiga syror: röda viner 13,3 milliekvivalenter per liter.

| — | Halt av jäsbart socker (glukos och fruktos): röda viner högst 3 gram per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Halt av jäsbart socker (glukos och fruktos): röda viner högst 3 gram per liter.

| — | Högsta halt av äppelsyra: högst 0,3 gram per liter för röda viner. Den malolaktiska jäsningen har avslutats för röda viner. |
| --- | --- |

—

Högsta halt av äppelsyra: högst 0,3 gram per liter för röda viner. Den malolaktiska jäsningen har avslutats för röda viner.

De röda vinernas totala svaveldioxidhalt och totala verkliga alkoholhalt ska följa de regler som fastställs i unionslagstiftningen.

De röda vinerna ska ha en vinröd färg i nyanser som kan variera från ceriserött till granatrött. Doften domineras ofta av röda bär, ibland följt av kryddiga toner. De har ofta eleganta tanniner som ger vinerna en karakteristiskt len och mjuk smak, följt av en viss friskhet.

| Allmänna analytiska egenskaper |
| --- |
| Högsta totala alkoholhalt (i volymprocent) | |
| Lägsta verkliga alkoholhalt (i volymprocent) | |
| Lägsta totala syrahalt | |
| Högsta halt av flyktiga syror (i milliekvivalenter per liter) | |
| Högsta totala halt av svaveldioxid (i milligram per liter) | |

Allmänna analytiska egenskaper

Högsta totala alkoholhalt (i volymprocent)

Lägsta verkliga alkoholhalt (i volymprocent)

Lägsta totala syrahalt

Högsta halt av flyktiga syror (i milliekvivalenter per liter)

Högsta totala halt av svaveldioxid (i milligram per liter)

Vita viner

Vinerna är stilla vita viner.

Vinerna har följande analytiska egenskaper:

| — | Minsta naturliga alkoholhalt: vita viner 11,5 volymprocent. |
| --- | --- |

—

Minsta naturliga alkoholhalt: vita viner 11,5 volymprocent.

| — | Högsta totala alkoholhalt efter berikning: vita viner 13,5 volymprocent. |
| --- | --- |

—

Högsta totala alkoholhalt efter berikning: vita viner 13,5 volymprocent.

| — | Total syrahalt: vita viner mellan 57,1 och 112,3 milliekvivalenter per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Total syrahalt: vita viner mellan 57,1 och 112,3 milliekvivalenter per liter.

| — | Halt av jäsbart socker (glukos och fruktos): vita viner mellan 20 och 40 milliekvivalenter per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Halt av jäsbart socker (glukos och fruktos): vita viner mellan 20 och 40 milliekvivalenter per liter.

De vita vinerna, som har en gul och fyllig färg, utvecklar i allmänhet intensivt aromatiska noter som påminner om välmogna bär eller exotiska frukter. Reglerna om analytiska normer för dem ger oftast garantier för att dessa bordsviner är välbalanserade, med en rondör av jäsbart socker som balanserar den karakteristiska friskheten hos vinerna i Loiredalen.

| Allmänna analytiska egenskaper |
| --- |
| Högsta totala alkoholhalt (i volymprocent) | |
| Lägsta verkliga alkoholhalt (i volymprocent) | 10. |
| Lägsta totala syrahalt | |
| Högsta halt av flyktiga syror (i milliekvivalenter per liter) | 13,3. |
| Högsta totala halt av svaveldioxid (i milligram per liter) | |

Allmänna analytiska egenskaper

Högsta totala alkoholhalt (i volymprocent)

Lägsta verkliga alkoholhalt (i volymprocent)

10.

Lägsta totala syrahalt

Högsta halt av flyktiga syror (i milliekvivalenter per liter)

13,3.

Högsta totala halt av svaveldioxid (i milligram per liter)

Roséviner

Vinerna är stilla roséviner.

Vinerna har följande analytiska egenskaper:

| — | Minsta naturliga alkoholhalt: roséviner 10 volymprocent. |
| --- | --- |

—

Minsta naturliga alkoholhalt: roséviner 10 volymprocent.

| — | Högsta totala alkoholhalt efter berikning: roséviner 12 volymprocent. |
| --- | --- |

—

Högsta totala alkoholhalt efter berikning: roséviner 12 volymprocent.

| — | Total syrahalt: roséviner mellan 57,1 och 102,1 milliekvivalenter per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Total syrahalt: roséviner mellan 57,1 och 102,1 milliekvivalenter per liter.

| — | Högsta halt av flyktiga syror: roséviner 10,2 milliekvivalenter per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Högsta halt av flyktiga syror: roséviner 10,2 milliekvivalenter per liter.

| — | Halt av jäsbart socker (glukos och fruktos): roséviner högst 4 gram per liter. |
| --- | --- |

—

Halt av jäsbart socker (glukos och fruktos): roséviner högst 4 gram per liter.

Rosévinernas totala svaveldioxidhalt och totala verkliga alkoholhalt ska följa de regler som fastställs i unionslagstiftningen.

Rosévinerna har en klar färg som går från blekrosa till laxrosa. Deras fina och diskreta aromer är friska och har i allmänhet fruktiga toner. Vinerna utmärks av sin lätta och friska smak och en viss livlighet.

| Allmänna analytiska egenskaper |
| --- |
| Högsta totala alkoholhalt (i volymprocent) | |
| Lägsta verkliga alkoholhalt (i volymprocent) | |
| Lägsta totala syrahalt | |
| Högsta halt av flyktiga syror (i milliekvivalenter per liter) | |
| Högsta totala halt av svaveldioxid (i milligram per liter) | |

Allmänna analytiska egenskaper

Högsta totala alkoholhalt (i volymprocent)

Lägsta verkliga alkoholhalt (i volymprocent)

Lägsta totala syrahalt

Högsta halt av flyktiga syror (i milliekvivalenter per liter)

Högsta totala halt av svaveldioxid (i milligram per liter)

5.   Vinframställningsmetoder

a.   Grundläggande oenologiska metoder

Odlingsmetoder

Planteringstätheten ska vara minst 6 000 stockar per hektar.

Avståndet mellan raderna får vara högst 1,60 meter och avståndet mellan plantorna i samma rad måste vara minst 0,90 meter och högst 1,10 meter.

Vinrankorna beskärs med någon av följande tekniker, med högst 12 skott per stock:

| — | Kort beskärning (cordon de Royat-metoden, gobeletmetoden, solfjädersform). |
| --- | --- |

—

Kort beskärning (cordon de Royat-metoden, gobeletmetoden, solfjädersform).

| — | Enkel guyotbeskärning. |
| --- | --- |

—

Enkel guyotbeskärning.

Beskärningen ska vara avslutad före den 31 maj skördeåret.

Vid fruktsättningsstadiet ska antalet fruktbärande grenar det året vara högst 10 per stock.

Specifika oenologiska metoder

Vid framställningen av roséviner är det förbjudet att använda kol för oenologiskt bruk, enskilt eller som blandning i beredningar.

Subtraktiva berikningsmetoder är tillåtna för roséviner. Vid partiell koncentrering får inte ursprungsvolymen minska med mer än 10 %.

Vinernas totala alkoholhalt i volymprocent efter berikning får inte överstiga följande: vita viner 13,5 volymprocent, roséviner 12 volymprocent, röda viner 12,5 volymprocent.

Därutöver måste vinerna uppfylla alla oenologiska krav i EU:s regelverk och i den franska lagen om jordbruk och fiske (Code rural et de la pêche maritime).

b.   Högsta avkastning

Vita viner

55 hl/ha.

Röda viner och roséviner

66 hl/ha.

6.   Avgränsat geografiskt område

Alla steg i produktionen ska äga rum i det geografiska område som har godkänts av Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité vid sammanträdet i den behöriga nationella kommittén den 28 september 2011. Vid det datum då denna produktspecifikation godkändes av den behöriga nationella kommittén omfattade detta område följande kommuner på grundval av 2018 års officiella geografiska kodex:

| — | Departementet Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire och Vair-sur-Loire. |
| --- | --- |

—

Departementet Loire-Atlantique: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Barbechat), Ligné, Loireauxence (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Varades), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire och Vair-sur-Loire.

| — | Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré och La Varenne). |
| --- | --- |

—

Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Mauges-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Saint-Florent), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Bouzillé, Champtoceaux, Drain, Landemont, Liré och La Varenne).

7.   Huvudsakliga druvsorter

Gamay N

Pinot gris G

8.   Beskrivning av samband

Beskrivning av de naturliga faktorerna bakom sambandet

Det geografiska området ligger på ömse sidor av Loirefloden, halvvägs mellan Nantes och Angers. Vinodlingarna ligger främst på sluttningarna som vetter direkt mot floden, men ibland även på utlöparna från de angränsande dalarna. Odlingarna ligger i terrasser på sluttningarna, oftast på 20–80 meters höjd. De är lätta att urskilja i det omgivande slättlandskapet, som är inriktat på blandjordbruk och djuruppfödning. Det geografiska området med centrum i kommunen Ancenis omfattar 16 kommuner i departementen Loire-Atlantique och Maine-et-Loire.

Vinodlingarna ligger på gamla metamorfiska avlagringar från det armorikanska massivet och består i huvudsak av skiffer, glimmerskiffer och gnejs. Dessa hårda klippor har gett upphov till kiselhaltig och ofta stenig, mycket grund jord på sluttningarna som tidigare har eroderats av Loirefloden. Av tradition utgörs jordbrukslotterna i det avgränsade området för skörd av druvor av lotter på sluttningarna, som huvudsakligen och traditionellt har använts för vinodling. Jordmånen är frisk och grund, har en begränsad förmåga att hålla vatten och är måttligt bördig. Denna jord torkar och värms upp snabbt.

Det geografiska området har ett tempererat kustklimat där Loirefloden bidrar till att föra kustklimatets inverkan längre in i landet. I Ancenisregionen har floden till och med samma riktning som de dominerande vindarna. De årliga genomsnittstemperaturerna ligger omkring 11,5 °C, med milda vintrar och svala somrar. Nederbörden på ungefär 700 millimeter per år är väl fördelad över året, men med ett tydligt vattenunderskott på sommaren. Det geografiska området har ofta en blåsig och torr period i början av hösten, innan högvattnen vid höstdagjämningen.

Beskrivning av de mänskliga faktorerna bakom sambandet

Vin har odlats i området sedan mycket lång tid tillbaka, men vinodlingen spreds framför allt i Ancenisregionen från 1000-talet, då flera kloster etablerades längs Loiredalen. De tionden som betalades för vinprodukterna vittnar om en intensiv vinodlingsverksamhet vid flodens stränder under medeltiden. Hamnen i Ancenis fick snabbt en central roll för handeln med och transporten av vinerna från området. År 1573 gav Karl IX tillstånd för fyra vinmäklarkontor i Ancenis hamn. Antalet utökades till tio år 1584 och under Ludvig XVI:s tid besöktes staden regelbundet av ett tjugotal fartyg som deltog i vinhandeln.

Från och med 1600-talet utökade vinodlingsområdet Ancenis sin produktion av halvsöta vita viner, då druvsorten pinot gris G infördes. Vinet från den druvan fick gradvis beteckningen ”Malvoisie”. Andra druvsorter framträdde senare, såsom druvsorten gamay N, som infördes i mitten av 1800-talet. Vinhandeln nådde då sin höjdpunkt och vinerna exporterades till Paris via Orléans eller till Nordeuropa och Bretagne via Nantes.

Efter vinlusutbrottet återuppbyggdes vinodlingsområdet och de druvsorter och skötselmetoder som används än i dag infördes, framför allt en planteringstäthet på mellan 6 000 och 7 000 stockar per hektar. Produktionen av torra roséviner och röda viner började dominera över de halvsöta vita vinerna med beteckningen ”Malvoisie”. Vinodlingssyndikatet i arrondissementet Ancenis, som bildades 1907, står för kontinuiteten i den lokala vinodlingens utveckling. De produktionsregler som producenterna fastställde efter andra världskriget ledde 1954 till att ursprungsbeteckningen för kvalitetsvin (”vin délimité de qualité supérieure”) ”Coteaux d’Ancenis” godkändes.

År 2009 omfattar vinodlingsområdet 180 hektar. Ett trettiotal producenter är verksamma i området och producerar i genomsnitt mer än 10 000 hektoliter per år, varav 45 % roséviner, 38 % röda viner och 17 % vita viner. De vita vinerna, som har en gul och fyllig färg, utvecklar i allmänhet intensivt aromatiska noter som påminner om välmogna bär eller exotiska frukter. Reglerna om analytiska normer för dem ger oftast garantier för att dessa bordsviner är välbalanserade, med en rondör av jäsbart socker som balanserar den karakteristiska friskheten hos vinerna i Loiredalen.

De röda vinerna ska ha en vinröd färg i nyanser som kan variera från ceriserött till granatrött. Doften domineras ofta av röda bär, ibland följt av kryddiga toner. De har ofta eleganta tanniner som ger vinerna en karakteristiskt len och mjuk smak, följt av en viss friskhet.

Rosévinerna har en klar färg som går från blekrosa till laxrosa. Deras fina och diskreta aromer är friska och har i allmänhet fruktiga toner. Vinerna utmärks av sin lätta och friska smak och en viss livlighet. Det geografiska området ligger mellan vinodlingsområdena i Nantes och Angers, vid stranden av den viktiga transportväg som Loirefloden utgör. Detta har gett producenterna av ”Coteaux d’Ancenis” möjlighet att ta vara på detta dubbla inflytande för att införa tekniska produktionsmetoder som är anpassade efter den naturliga miljön i området.

Sluttningarna i det geografiska området, som har mejslats fram av Loirefloden i de metamorfiska avlagringarna från det armorikanska massivet, består oftast av jord som snabbt värms upp, har en snabb naturlig avrinning och en begränsad förmåga att hålla vatten. Detta främjar druvornas mogning, vilket har lett till att en aktiv kommersiell vinframställning har vuxit fram kring hamnen i Ancenis sedan medeltiden. Klimatet i det geografiska området påverkas visserligen av närheten till havet, men har också ofta en blåsig och torr period i slutet av sommaren och början av hösten. I kombination med det öppna landskapet längs Loireflodens stränder är dessa naturliga förhållanden en stor del av förklaringen till att produktionen av röda viner och roséviner har vuxit fram i området. De magra och sura jordarna i de odlingsområden som används för skörd av druvor är särskilt lämpliga för druvsorten gamay N, eftersom de begränsar den livskraft som ofta utmärker denna druvsort, vilket förklarar varför den har ersatt de befintliga blå sorterna, även om den infördes sent. Den anpassade vinodlingsmetoden och kontrollen av avkastningen ger de röda vinerna utrymme att utveckla alla sina aromer och rosévinerna kan få sina delikata fruktiga toner.

Klimatet gör det också möjligt att framställa halvsöta vita viner, då druvorna skördas friska och fullmogna. Dessutom har klimatet främjat en snabb anpassning av den ömtåliga druvsorten pinot gris G. De milda somrarna i det geografiska området är perfekta för att bevara finessen i druvans aromer och bidrar till att begränsa nedbrytningen av de organiska syrorna i druvorna, vilket säkerställer vinernas karakteristiska friskhet. Dessa viner, som lokalt kallas ”Malvoisie”, är verkligt unika och är en symbol för det lokala vinodlingsarvet.

Producenterna har varit organiserade i ett syndikat sedan början av 1900-talet och arbetar ständigt för att förbättra produkternas kvalitet. Godkännandet av ”Coteaux d’Ancenis” som kontrollerad ursprungsbeteckning parallellt med en koncentration av det avgränsade odlingsområdet till de bästa sluttningarna, en begränsning av druvbestånden till de båda druvsorterna gamay N och pinot gris G, samt strängare produktionsregler bäddar för att vinernas typiska egenskaper kommer att förstärkas ännu mer i framtiden.

9.   väsentliga ytterligare villkor (förpackning, märkning, andra krav)

Rättslig ram:

Nationell lagstiftning

Typ av ytterligare villkor:

Avvikelse med avseende på produktionen i det avgränsade geografiska området

Beskrivning av villkoret:

Området intill det berörda området, som definieras av undantag för vinodling och framställning av viner, omfattar följande kommuners territorium på grundval av 2018 års officiella geografiska kodex:

| — | Departementet Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdon-sur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles och Vallet. |
| --- | --- |

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Departementet Loire-Atlantique: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (endast området för den delegerade kommunen La Chapelle-Basse-Mer), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdon-sur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles och Vallet.

| — | Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Puiset-Doré och Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Saint-Laurent-des-Autels och Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont) och Sèvremoine (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Tillières). |
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Departementet Maine-et-Loire: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Puiset-Doré och Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges), Orée d’Anjou (endast områdena för de delegerade kommunerna Saint-Laurent-des-Autels och Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont) och Sèvremoine (endast området för den delegerade kommunen Tillières).

Rättslig ram:

Nationell lagstiftning

Typ av ytterligare villkor:

Kompletterande bestämmelser om märkning

Beskrivning av villkoret:

Namnet på den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen får kompletteras med den geografiska beteckningen ”Val de Loire” enligt de regler för användning av denna beteckning som fastställs i produktspecifikationen.

Namnet på den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen får kompletteras med bruksnamnet ”Malvoisie” enligt de regler som fastställs för användning av denna beteckning i produktspecifikationen. Detta namn får endast användas för stilla vita viner.

Valfria uppgifter, vilkas användning enligt unionens bestämmelser får regleras av medlemsstaterna, ska anges med teckensnitt som varken på höjden eller på bredden får vara mer än dubbelt så stora som de tecken som används i den kontrollerade ursprungsmärkningens namn.

De teckensnitt som används för den geografiska beteckningen ”Val de Loire” och för bruksnamnet ”Malvoisie” får varken på höjden eller på bredden vara större än två tredjedelar av de tecken som används i den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningens namn.

Rättslig ram:

Nationell lagstiftning

Typ av ytterligare villkor:

Kompletterande bestämmelser om märkning

Beskrivning av villkoret:

Märkningen av viner med den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningen kan ange en mindre geografisk enhet, förutsatt att

| — | det rör sig om en registrerad plats, |
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det rör sig om en registrerad plats,

| — | denna plats nämns i skördedeklarationen. |
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denna plats nämns i skördedeklarationen.

De bokstäver som används för denna registrerade plats får varken på höjden eller på bredden eller i tjocklek vara mer än hälften så stora som de bokstäver som används i den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningens namn. Namnet på den registrerade platsen ska anges i samma synfält som den kontrollerade ursprungsbeteckningens namn.”

Länk till produktspecifikationen

https://info.agriculture.gouv.fr/gedei/site/bo-agri/document_administratif-0569c539-0b4c-4402-9b68-c63cca20f36f

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(1)  EGT L 9, 11.1.2019, s. 2

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| 6.2.2020 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 40/47 |
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6.2.2020

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 40/47

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Meddelande till företag som har för avsikt att släppa ut fluorkolväten i bulk på marknaden i Europeiska unionen under 2021

(2020/C 40/09)

1.

Detta meddelande riktas till företag som har för avsikt att lämna en deklaration om att släppa ut fluorkolväten i bulk på marknaden i Europeiska unionen under 2021, i enlighet med artikel 16.2 och 16.4 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 517/2014 (1) (nedan kallad förordningen).

2.

HFC-23, HFC-32, HFC-41, HFC-125, HFC-134, HFC-134a, HFC-143, HFC-143a, HFC-152, HFC-152a, HFC-161, HFC-227ea, HFC-236cb, HFC-236ea, HFC-236fa, HFC-245ca, HFC-245fa, HFC-365mfc, HFC-43-10mee.

3.

Varje utsläppande på marknaden av dessa ämnen, med undantag för de användningsområden som anges i artikel 15.2 a–f i förordningen eller en total årlig kvantitet av dessa ämnen på mindre än 100 ton koldioxidekvivalenter per år, omfattas av kvantitativa begränsningar i det kvotsystem som fastställs i artiklarna 15 och 16 i samt bilagorna V och VI till förordningen.

4.

Importörerna måste vid tiden för övergång till fri omsättning av fluorkolväten ha en giltig registrering som importörer av fluorkolväten i bulk i portalen för fluorerade växthusgaser och licenssystemet för fluorkolväten (2) i enlighet med kommissionens genomförandeförordning (EU) 2019/661 (3). En sådan registrering betraktas som en obligatorisk importlicens. En liknande licens behövs för export av fluorkolväten (4).

5.

Importörer bör anges som ”Mottagare” (fält 8) i det administrativa enhetsdokumentet. Importörer rekommenderas att ange mängden fluorkolväten i koldioxidekvivalenter vid tidpunkten för övergång till fri omsättning direkt i det administrativa enhetsdokumentet (fält 44), eftersom det då blir betydligt lättare att tullklarera deras varor och fastställa att de följer kraven i förordning (EU) nr 517/2014.

6.

Enligt bilaga VI till förordningen ska summan av de kvoter som tilldelats på basis av referensvärden subtraheras från den högsta tillåtna mängden för 2021 för att fastställa den mängd som ska tilldelas från denna reserv.

7.

Alla uppgifter som lämnas in av företag samt kvoter och referensvärden lagras elektroniskt i portalen för fluorerade växthusgaser och licenssystemet för fluorkolväten. Alla uppgifter i portalen för fluorerade växthusgaser och licenssystemet för fluorkolväten, inklusive kvoter, referensvärden och företags- och personuppgifter, kommer att behandlas konfidentiellt av Europeiska kommissionen.

8.

Företag som önskar erhålla kvoter från denna reserv måste följa det förfarande som beskrivs i punkterna 9–12 i detta meddelande.

9.

I enlighet med artiklarna 16.2 och 17.1 i förordningen måste företaget ha en giltig registreringsprofil, som godkänts av kommissionen i enlighet med genomförandeförordning (EU) 2019/661, som producent och/eller importör av fluorkolväten i online-portalen för fluorerade växthusgaser och licenssystemet för fluorkolväten. För att ansökan om registrering ska kunna behandlas korrekt, även med tanke på att det eventuellt behövs ytterligare information, måste den göras absolut senast en månad före deklarationsperiodens början, dvs. före den 14 mars 2020 (se punkt 10). För ansökningar som inkommer senare kan det inte garanteras att ett slutligt beslut om ansökan om registrering kan fattas före deklarationsperiodens slut (se punkt 10). För företag som ännu inte är registrerade, finns det på GD Klimatpolitiks webbplats (5) vägledning om hur man anmäler sig.

10.

Företaget måste lämna in en deklaration om förväntade mängder för 2021 i portalen för fluorerade växthusgaser och licenssystemet för fluorkolväten under deklarationsperioden från och med den 14 april till och med den 14 maj 2020, kl. 13.00 CET.

11.

Kommissionen kommer bara att beakta korrekta och vederbörligen ifyllda deklarationer som inkommit senast den 14 maj 2020, kl. 13.00 CET.

12.

På grundval av dessa deklarationer tilldelar kommissionen dessa företag kvoter i enlighet med artikel 16.2, 16.4 och 16.5 i samt bilagorna V och VI till förordningen.

13.

I artikel 7 i genomförandeförordning (EU) 2019/661 föreskrivs att alla företag med samma verkliga huvudman för ändamålet att tilldela kvoter för utsläppande på marknaden av fluorkolväten enligt artikel 16.5 i förordning (EU) nr 517/2014 ska anses vara en enda deklarant i enlighet med artikel 16.2 och 16.4 i den förordningen.

14.

Kommissionen kommer att informera företagen om totala tilldelade kvoter för 2021 via portalen för fluorerade växthusgaser och licenssystemet för fluorkolväten.

15.

Registrering i portalen för fluorerade växthusgaser och licenssystemet för fluorkolväten och/eller en deklaration om avsikt att släppa ut fluorkolväten på marknaden 2021 ger i sig inte automatiskt rätt att släppa ut fluorkolväten på marknaden under 2021.

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(1)  Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 517/2014 av den 16 april 2014 om fluorerade växthusgaser och om upphävande av förordning (EG) nr 842/2006 (EUT L 150, 20.5.2014, s. 195).

1

(2)  Det register som har inrättats i enlighet med artikel 17 i förordning (EU) 517/2014,https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ods2/resources/domain

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(3)  Kommissionens genomförandeförordning (EU) 2019/661 av den 25 april 2019 om säkerställande av ett välfungerande elektroniskt register över kvoter för utsläppande på marknaden av fluorkolväten (EUT L 112, 26.4.2019, s. 11).

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(4)  Se även artikel 1.2 i kommissionens genomförandeförordning (EU) 2017/1375 (EUT L 194, 26.7.2017, s. 4).

4

(5)  https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/f-gas/docs/guidance_document_en.pdf

5

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