alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Nellie L. LAWRENCE v. Satyarthi GUPTA, M.D.

No. 88 CM *0233.*

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 21, 1988.

Victoria Alexander, Mandeville, for plaintiff-appellee.

Frank J. Varela, Metairie, for defendant-appellant.

Joseph Bishop, Mandeville, for Medical Review Panel, appellee.

Before WATKINS, CARTER and FOIL, JJ.

CARTER, Judge.

This court has issued an order on motion of plaintiff-appellee, Nellie L. Lawrence, directing the parties to show cause why this devolutive appeal should not be dismissed.

Ms. Lawrence filed a medical malpractice complaint with the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance against defendant-appellant, Satyarthi Gupta, an ophthalmologist. Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(2)(a), Dr. Gupta filed a peremptory exception in the district court urging that Ms. Lawrence’s claim has prescribed. After a hearing, the trial court overruled the exception, and Dr. Gupta devolutively appealed that decision.1 Ms. Lawrence has moved to dismiss Dr. Gupta’s appeal on the basis that it was taken from a nonappealable, interlocutory judgment.

An appeal may be taken from a final judgment or from an interlocutory judgment which causes irreparable injury. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083. A judgment which denies a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription is an interlocutory judgment and is not appealable in the absence of a showing of irreparable harm. *See Miller v. Upjohn Company,*461 So.2d 676 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984).

The test for determining whether an interlocutory judgment may cause irreparable injury is whether any error in the judgment may be corrected as a practical matter in an appeal following a determination of the merits. *Yeager v. Baton Rouge General Hospital,*469 So.2d 47 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985). The denial of a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescrip*1113tion can be cured on appeal if found to be error. *See Miller v. Upjohn Company, supra.*

In his response to the motion to dismiss, Dr. Gupta contends the judgment is appeal-able because it will cause him irreparable injury. He alleges he will suffer harassment, mental anguish, unnecessary expense, and undue delay if he is required to continue with the proceedings before the medical review panel.

It is well settled that the inconvenience and expense of a trial caused by the court’s refusal to sustain an exception do not constitute irreparable injury so as to allow an appeal from such a judgment. *Parkerson v. Swaggart,*478 So.2d 922 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985). Likewise, mental and emotional anguish which a defendant may experience from having to proceed with a trial on the merits do not constitute “irreparable injury” within the purview of LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083. *Parkerson v. Swaggart, supra.*Consequently, Dr. Gupta has not shown he will suffer any irreparable injury from having to continue with the medical review proceedings.

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss the appeal is granted at appellant’s costs.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

1

. Dr. Gupta also filed an application for supervisory writs, which this court denied stating Dr. Gupta has an adequate remedy on appeal from the final judgment on the merits.
50277.

50278.

#### DONALDSON v. THE STATE. HENDERSON v. THE STATE.

Quillian, Judge.

These two companion cases involve basically identical facts and arise out of the same incident. William Charles Donaldson (Case No. 50277) and James Lester Henderson (Case No. 50278) were indicted, tried and convicted for possession of marijuana (less than one ounce). They were both sentenced to serve 12 months each by the trial judge. Both defendants filed motions for new trial which were overruled and appeal was taken to this court.

The facts giving rise to the defendants’ arrest are as follows. The defendant, Donaldson, was driving an automobile owned by the defendant Henderson. The defendant, Henderson, was asleep in the back seat of the automobile which was also occupied by two other individuals, both of whom were sitting in the front seat with the defendant Donaldson. The automobile was *756stopped by a Jones County Deputy Sheriff to investigate a possible violation of driving under the influence of intoxicants. The deputy testified that the car had crossed over the center line. The defendant Donaldson consented to a test for intoxication conducted on the scene. This test was negative and he and the other members of the vehicle were released. The deputy testified that he had seen one of the other passengers who was sitting on the far right-hand side make a "throwing motion.” He therefore searched around the car to see if any item had been thrown from such car but found none. However, after the car left he picked up a plastic bag which he suspected of being marijuana. He therefore pursued the car in which the defendants were riding, stopped it and placed them under arrest for the possession of marijuana. *Held:*

Argued March 10, 1975

Decided May 9, 1975.

*Westmoreland, Patterson & Moseley, R. Robider Markwalter,*for appellant.

It is well established that merely having been in the vicinity of contraband does not, without more, establish possession. *Jones v. State,*127 Ga. App. 137 (193 SE2d 38); *Ennis v. State,*130 Ga. App. 716 (204 SE2d 519). "Merely finding contraband on premises occupied by a defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction if it affirmatively appears from the evidence that persons other than the defendant had equal opportunity to commit the crime.” *Gee v. State,*121 Ga. App. 41, 43 (172 SE2d 480). While *Gee*applies to premises, the same rule appertains to automobiles. *Elrod v. State,*128 Ga. App. 250, 251 (196 SE2d 360). Here the contraband was not even found in the automobile.

In this case the evidence failed to show that either of the two defendants was in possession of contraband, and was insufficient to show that any conspiracy existed. *Brewer v. State,*129 Ga. App. 118, 123 (199 SE2d 109). Hence, it was error to overrule the defendants’ motions for new trial on the general grounds.

*Judgments reversed.*

*Pannell, P. J., and Clark, J., concur.*

*757
      *Joseph H. Briley, District Attorney,*for appellee.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

600 

CA 12-01504 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, CARNI, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL GONZALEZ, 

PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALE ARTUS, SUPERINTENDENT, GOWANDA CORRECTIONAL 

FACILITY, AND BRIAN FISCHER, COMMISSIONER, NEW 

YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 

COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

 

MICHAEL GONZALEZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT PRO SE.

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (FRANK BRADY OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court,

Erie County (Penny M. Wolfgang, J.), dated June 26, 2012 in a

proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The judgment dismissed the

petition. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking a writ

of habeas corpus. Supreme Court (Feroleto, J.) converted the

proceeding to one pursuant to CPLR article 78. The case was then

assigned to a different Supreme Court Justice (Wolfgang, J.), who

ultimately dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm.

Respondents concede that the record does not conclusively

establish that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies, and thus we reach the merits of this appeal (cf. generally

Matter of Karlin v Cully, 104 AD3d 1285, 1286). Here, petitioner

pleaded guilty to violating two conditions of his parole. Petitioner

now challenges the parole revocation determination on the ground that

one of the conditions of parole at issue, i.e., the condition

precluding fraternization with any person petitioner knows to have a

criminal record (fraternization condition) (see 9 NYCRR 8003.2 [g]),

is unconstitutionally vague. That challenge survives petitioner’s

guilty plea (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 231 n 2; People v

Lee, 58 NY2d 491, 494), but is not properly before us inasmuch as the

record does not establish that it was raised before the motion court

(see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 985; cf. Palermo v

Taccone, 79 AD3d 1616, 1618). Petitioner’s further contention that
-2- 600 

CA 12-01504 

the fraternization condition was arbitrarily applied to him is

foreclosed by his guilty plea (see Hansen, 95 NY2d at 231 n 3; People

v Rodriguez, 55 NY2d 776, 777). Additionally, with respect to both of

the conditions of parole at issue, we note that petitioner’s “plea of

guilty . . . precludes [a] challenge to the legal sufficiency of the

evidence of guilt” and, “[i]n any event, the guilty plea constitutes

substantial evidence of his guilt” (Matter of Holdip v Travis, 9 AD3d

825, 826). We have reviewed petitioner’s remaining contention and

conclude that it lacks merit.

Entered: June 14, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
EXHIBIT 32.2





WRITTEN STATEMENT


PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In connection with Quarterly Report of China Energy Corporation and its subsidiaries (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended May 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Alex Gong , Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13a-14(b) or 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated: July 20, 2011
By:
/s/  Alex GongName:    Alex GongTitle:      Chief Financial Officer
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y A lton Thomas Davis,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 15, 2010

p0908 

# Order

September 15, 2010

141033

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 141033 COA: 296159 Wayne CC: 08-009824-FC LAMAR CLINTON CRAIG, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 2, 2010 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for amendment of the judgment of sentence to reflect a single conviction under MCL 750.338b for gross indecency between male and female as a sexually delinquent person as defined by MCL 750.10a , with a single sentence of 13 to 40 years, pursuant to the plea and sentence agreement. MCL 750.10a is a definitional statute, and does not carry the possibility of a separa te conviction or sentence inde pendent of other charges in the Criminal Code. In all other respects, le ave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining qu estions presented should be re viewed by this Court.

D AVIS , J., not participating. I recuse myse lf and am not participating because I was on the Court of Appeals panel in this case. See MCR 2.003(B).
106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 143

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives

2 concurring), That in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 3676)

3 entitled ‘‘An Act to establish the Santa Rosa and San

4 Jacinto Mountains National Monument in the State of

5 California’’, the Clerk of the House of Representatives

6 shall make the following corrections:

7 (1) In the second sentence of section 2(d)(1),

8 strike ‘‘and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutri9 tion, and Forestry’’.

10 (2) In the second sentence of section 4(a)(3),

11 strike ‘‘Nothing in this section’’ and insert ‘‘Nothing

12 in this Act’’.

13 (3) In section 4(c)(1), strike ‘‘any person, in14 cluding’’.

15 (4) In section 5, add at the end the following:

16 ‘‘(j) WILDERNESS PROTECTION.—Nothing in this

17 Act alters the management of any areas designated as

18 Wilderness which are within the boundaries of the Na19 tional Monument. All such areas shall remain subject to
2

SCON 143 ES

1 the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.), the laws des2 ignating such areas as Wilderness, and other applicable

3 laws. If any part of this Act conflicts with any provision

4 of those laws with respect to the management of the Wil5 derness areas, such provisions shall control.’’.

Passed the Senate October 5 (legislative day, September 22), 2000.

Attest:

Secretary.
106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 143

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

To make technical corrections in the enrollment of

the bill, H.R. 3676.
50358.

#### PAUL et al. v. LEWIS.

Submitted March 3, 1975

Decided April 24, 1975

Rehearing denied May 7, 1975.

*Willis J. Richardson, Jr.,*for appellants.

*Downing, McAleer & Gaskin, James Edward Mc-Aleer,*for appellee.

Bell, Chief Judge.

In this appeal from the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, an examination of the pleadings and the evidence show that there are material questions of fact for resolution by a jury.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Webb and Marshall, JJ., concur.*
EGU MACT RIA - Interagency comments on Ch 1 and 5 

 12/14/2011 05:05 PM 

From: "Higgins, Cortney" <Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov> 

 

To: RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA 

 

Cc: Bill Maxwell/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA 

Hi Bob, 

Attached are interagency comments on the redline versions of Chapter 1 

and 5 of the RIA. 

 

Regards, 

Cortney 

Chapter 5_HealthWelfareCobenefits_1209_InteragencyCommentsunderEO13563.docx 

Chapter 1_IntroductionBackground_1209_InteragencyCommentsunderEO13563.doc
#### Felipe COS and Kimboo, Inc., Appellants, v. TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC. and Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., Appellees.

No. 87-1747.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 25, 1988.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 1988.

Rex E. Russo of Weitzner & Russo, P.A., Miami, for appellants.

Jerard C. Heller, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

DELL, Judge.

This appeal arises out of a dispute over demurrage charges for retention of cargo trailers. The trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment and this appeal follows.

Appellants raised as an affirmative defense the contention that they timely notified appellee that the trailers were ready to be picked up by appellees. At oral argument, appellees contended that the applicable tariffs provided that it was appellants’ responsibility to return the trailers. Those tariffs are not part of the appellate record and there is no indication they were part of the record below. Similarly, there is no indication that any evidence was made part of the record below which would allow the trial court to pierce the corporate veil, holding Felipe Cos personally liable for the judgment.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the summary final judgment and the award of attorney’s fees to appellees as questions of fact remain precluding the entry of summary judgment. *See Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Clark,*299 So.2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (an appellate court reviewing a summary judgment may only consider that which was properly made part of the trial record).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

HERSEY, C.J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
November 17, 2015



### JUDGMENT


## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

ALLEN F. CALTON , Appellant

NO. 14

- 15

- 00460

- CV V.

JASON NEWMAN, LAUREN TANNER AND BAKER BOTTS, LLP , Appellee

________________________________ Today the Court heard its own motion to dismiss the appeal from the judgment signed by the court below on January 20, 2015. Having considered the motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED

. We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by appellant, Allen F. Calton.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
#### Laura J. REESE v. WINN-DIXIE OF LOUISIANA, INC.

No. 89-C-1305.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re Winn Dixie of Louisiana Inc.; — Defendants); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA87-1085; Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court, Div. *“A”,*No. 44790-A.

Prior report: La.App., 542 So.2d 68.

Denied.
Exhibit 32.1





SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS




This Certificate is being delivered pursuant to the requirements of Section 1350 of Chapter 63 (Mail Fraud) of Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the United States Code and shall not be relied on by any person for any other purpose.




The undersigned, who are (i) the Chief Executive Officer of UMTH Land Development, L.P., the general partner of United Development Funding III, L.P. (the “Partnership”) and (ii) the Chief Financial Officer of UMTH Land Development, L.P., the general partner of the Partnership, each hereby certify as follows:




The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Partnership (the “Report”), which accompanies this Certificate, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and all information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.




Dated this 16th day of May, 2011.





/s/ Hollis M. GreenlawHollis M. GreenlawChief Executive Officer of UMTH Land

Development, L.P., sole general partner

of the Registrant, and President and

Chief Executive Officer of UMT

Services, Inc., sole general partner of

UMTH Land Development, L.P./s/ Cara D. ObertCara D. ObertChief Financial Officer of UMTH Land

Development, L.P., sole general partner

of the Registrant





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the registrant and will be retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
# Exhibit 32

Certifications of Chief Executive
Officer and Chief Financial Officer pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.

---

# Exhibit 32

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, the Chief Executive
Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of Beach First National Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company), each certify that, to his or her knowledge on the date of this
certification:

| | 1. | The annual report of the Company for the period ending December 31, 2003 as
          filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the
          Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| |  | /s/  Walter E. Standish, III
| |  | ----------------------------
| |  | Walter E. Standish, III     
| |  | Chief Executive Officer     
| |  | March 19, 2004              

| |  | /s/  Richard N. Burch  
| |  | -----------------------
| |  | Richard N. Burch       
| |  | Chief Financial Officer
| |  | March 19, 2004
#### The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SAGUACHE COUNTY, Colorado, Petitioner, v. David L. FORD, guardian of the Estate of Wendy Marie Ford, a minor, and Ford Farms, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Respondents.

No. 83 SC 339.

Supreme Court of Colorado.

Feb. 1, 1984.

Jeffrey R. Wheeler, Colorado Springs, Robert Crites, Monte Vista, for petitioner.

Frank Plaut, Plaut, Lipstein & Beckman, P.C., Denver-Lakewood, William Bartlett, Monte Vista, for respondents.

ORDER OF COURT

Upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss filed by counsel for Petitioner and the Confession of Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by counsel for Respondents herein, and now being sufficiently advised in the premises,

It Is This Day Ordered that said Motion shall be, and the same hereby is, Granted, and this Petition for Writ of Certiorari is Dismissed and the matter Remanded to the Court of Appeals for any further proceedings.

BY THE COURT, JANUARY 30, 1984.
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