UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) MA RY RI CH ARDS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 08 -00 07 (P L F) ) OPTI ON ONE MORTGAGE CORP., e t al

. , ) ) De fe nd ants
. ) __________________________________________)
OPI NI ON This action ar ose fr om an alleg edly wrong ful fore closure by

defe ndant Option One Mortg ag e Corporation (“Option One” ) on plaintiff Mar y Richards’s home and def endant Alvin Gross’s subseque nt purcha se of the pr operty at a f orec losure sale . This matter is befor e the Court on se pa rate mot ion s f

or summa ry jud g me nt f

ile d b y Op tio n O ne and

by Mr . G ro ss. After hear ing or al ar g ument on defe ndant Gross’s motion for judg ment on the ple a din g s o r, in t

he a lte rn ativ e , f

or summa ry jud g me nt, the Court

g ra nte d G ro ss’ s mo tio n o n a ll counts of plaintiff’ s complaint ag ainst Mr. Gross except Count One — plaintiff’ s claim for a decla ratory judgme nt to set aside the tra nsfer of title. See Orde r at 1, Dkt. No. 37 ( J uly 23, 2009). It reque sted additional brief ing on “ the issues relating to ava ilable re medies for wrong ful fore closure a

nd on when one become s a bona f ide purc haser

for va lue” to assist in the resolution of def endant Gr oss’s motion as to Count One. See id. On August 25, 2009, the Court heard or al
argume nt o n G ro ss’ s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt o n th e re ma ini ngc ount a g a ins t hi m a s w e ll as on Option One’ s motion for summary judgme nt on all counts ag ainst it. The parties ther eaf terThe Court had be fore it the following pa pers: the Complaint (“Compl.”); Option 1 One Mortg ag e Corporation’s Motion for Summ ary J udg ment (“O pt. One Mot.”); Plaintiff Richards’s Me morandum in Opposition to Defenda nt Option One’s Motion for Summary Judg me nt ( “ Op p. to O pt. On e ” ); Op tio n O ne Mo rt g a g e Cor po ra tio n’ s Re ply

Me mor and

um i n Support of its Moti on for Summary J udg ment (“O pt. One Rep.” ); Def endant Alvin E. Gr oss, J r.’s Motion to Dism iss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary

J udg ment; Plainti ff Richa rds’s M e m o r an d

u mi nO p p o s i t i o nt o D e f

e n d an tG r o s s ’ s M o t i o nt o D i s m i s s , o r A l t e r n at i v e l y, Summary Judg me nt; De fe nd ant A lvi n E . G ro ss, Jr.’ s Re ply to P la int if

f’ s O pp os iti on

to M oti on

to Dismiss or, I n the Alternative Motion for Summary J udg ment; Defe ndants’ Joi nt Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their Motions for Summary J udg ment as to Count 1 of Plainti ff’ s Com pla int (“ Joint Sup p. ” ); Pla int if

f’ s Su pp le me nta l Me mor and

um i n O pp os iti on

to D e fe nd ants ’ Motion for Summary

J udg ment (“Pl. Supp.”); and De fenda nts’ J oint Response to Pl aintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum. 2 eng ag ed in limited additional discovery with the Court’s permission. See Richar ds v. Option One, Civil Action No. 08-0007, 2009 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 77958 at *6 (D.D.C. Aug . 28, 2009). After car eful c onsideration of the parties’ paper s and attac hed exhibits , the re levant ca se law a nd statutes, and the or al ar g uments prese nted by counsel, the Court now grants both motions for
summa ry jud g me nt. 1
I . BA CKGROUND Plaintiff Mary

Richards wa s the fee simple owner of her home , located at 630 Emerson Stree t, Northwest, Washing ton, District of Columbia (the “prope rty” or “ the Emerson Street Addre ss”). See Opt. One Mot., Statement of Undisputed Material F acts (“ Opt. One F a c ts” ) ¶ 1; O pp . to Op t. O ne , Pl a int if f’ s Co un te r- State me nt o f D isp ute d M ate ri a l F a c ts ( “ Pl. F a c ts” ) ¶ 1. She is a

ho me bo un d s e nio r c iti zen . Se e Pl. F a c ts ¶ 7. At so me po int

pr ior to Oc tob e r 1 1, 20 06 , Ri c ha

rd s and Ke nya Ray mon d, Ms. Ric ha

rd s’ s g ra nd da ug hte r a nd “ atto rn e y in fa c t,” be g an d isc us sio ns wi th D anie l B ott s, a mor tg a g e br ok e r f

or Pr e mie r M or

tg a g e Ca pit a l, about re financ ing Richa

rds’s prope rty . See Mot, Ex. A, Deposition of Daniel R. Botts, J r.Al tho ug h p la int if f d e nie s th is f

a c t, s e e Pl. F a c ts ¶

2, the on ly

ba sis fo r h e r d e nia l is 2 that Mr. B otts’s name does not appe ar on O ption One’s loan a pproval stateme nt as the broke r. See Opp. to Opt. One , Ex . N. Whether Mr. B otts was the named br oker is irre levant. Plaintiff acknow ledg es that Mr. B otts did di scuss the loan with her . See Pl. Fac ts ¶ 4. Mr. B otts is related to plaintiff. See Opt. One Fa cts ¶ 2; B otts Dep. at 10.

Plaintiff denies this assertion of f act, but she but doe s not have a ny evidenc e, such 3 as a swor n statement fr om her or f

rom Ray mond, stating that the doc uments were not rec eived. See Pl. Fac ts ¶ 7. 3 (“ B ott s D e p. ” ) at 28 ; O pt. On e F a c ts ¶ ¶ 2 , 3 ; Pl. F a c ts ¶

3. Th e re a ft e r, B ott s v isi te d th e pr op e rt y 2 and met with plaintiff, Mar y Richards, Ke ny a Ray

mond, and Denise Richards, plaintiff’ s daug hter a

nd Ray mond’s mother, to discuss a loan on the pr operty and to have plaintiff re view and sig n various loan doc uments. See Opt. One Fa cts ¶ 4; Pl. Fac ts ¶ 4. Botts testified that he spoke with plaintiff and that she appe are d to understand what he was sa ying. See Botts Dep. at 43. On Octobe r 11, 2006, plaintiff submitted a Unifor m Residential L oan Application to Premier Mortg ag e Capital, see Opt. One Mot., Ex. B, and a Credit Authorization to P remier Mortg ag e Capital. See O pt. One Mot., Ex. C ; Botts Dep. at 53. The loan wa s shopped out to a number of le nders, includingOption One. See O pt. One F acts ¶ 5; B otts Dep. at 47. On Oc tober 26 , 2 00 6, B ott s r e tur

ne d to the pr op e rt

y and pr e se nte d nume ro us loa

n d isc los ur e do c ume nts to Richards for

her r eview a

nd/or signature. See Opt. One F acts ¶ 7; B otts Dep. at 51-63. After 3 the loan close d with Option One, B otts met with R ichar ds and Ray mond at the prope rty ; he confirme d that they

wer e satisfied w ith the loan and lea rned that the proce eds fr om the cashout pa y me nt — a pp ro ximate ly

$3 8, 00 0 —

ha d b e e n r e c e ive d. Se e Op t. O ne F a c ts ¶ 9, B ott s D e p. at 74 -7 5. Th e monthl y

loa n p ay me nts re qu ir e d w e re $1 ,7 47 .8 6, e ve n th ou g h p la int if f’ s mo nth lyPlaintiff orig inally alleg ed that an individual fr om Option One demande d $30,000 4 in repa y ments and that the money went missing. See Compl. ¶¶ 20-21. Afte r discover y , it has become clea

r that there is no basis for these a lleg ations and plaintiff doe s not pursue them. See Opt. One Mot., Memora

ndum of Points and Authorities in S upport at 13-14. Although pla intiff denies the f acts re lating to the notice provided by BG& W, she 5 does not provide a

ny evidenc e in support of he r denia l other than B G & W’s alleg edly bad reputation. See Pl. Facts ¶¶ 13, 14, 17. 4 income wa s only

approximately

$974. See Pl. Fac ts ¶ 32. 4 Plaintiff defa

ulted on the mortg ag e and O ption One employ ed B ierman, G eesing & War d, L L C (“B G & W”) to take leg al ac tion. See Opt. One F acts ¶ 12. O n J uly 30, 2007, BG& W sent a le tter by

first-cla ss mail to Ms. R ichar ds at the Emer son Street addr ess advising that a for eclosure sale mig ht be sche duled. See Opt. One Mot., Ex . G, Aff idavit of J acob Gee sing ( “Ge esingAff.” ) ¶ 4. BG& W also sent a doc ument entitled “Important Notice 5 Reg ardingAlternatives to Fore closure” to the Emerson Stree t addre ss by first class mail and
cer tified mail on J uly

30, 2007. See id. ¶ 6. Ne ither of these was re turned a s not having been de liv e re d. Se e id. ¶¶

5, 7. On Au g us t 3, 20 07 , th e a

uc tio ne e r s e nt a

No tic e of F or e c los ur e Sa le to Richards and to “ Occ upant” at the Emerson Stree t addre ss by first class re g ular mail and
cer tified retur

n rec eipt reque sted mail. See Opt. One Mot., Ex . H, Aff idavit of J ody

Krieg er ¶ 5. The re turn rec eipt car ds were returne d to the auctionee r by the United States Postal Service showing that the Notice of For eclosure Sale had be en re ceive d and sig ned for by Kenya D. Ray mond. See id. ¶ 7. On August 17, 2007, BG & W sent letters by first class mail and c ertified mail to Ms. R ichar ds and to “Oc cupant” at the Emer son Street addr ess advisingthat a for eclosure sale ha d been sc heduled f or September

6, 2007. See Ge esingAff. ¶ 9. The August 17, 2007
cer tified letters we re sig ned for by “Timothy

Richards” and none of

the letters se nt by

regular5

mail were returne d to BG & W. S ee id. ¶ ¶ 5, 7, 11. The notice of for eclosure sale wa s rec orded amongthe L and Rec ords of the Rec order of De eds of the D istrict of Columbia on August 3, 2007 and also wa s adver

tised in the Washington Times on August 27, 29, 31 and September 1 a nd 5, 2007. See Opt. One Fa cts. ¶ 19.

Duringthe summer of 2007, pla intiff attempted to obtain a r ever se mortg ag e fr om Country wide B ank, F SB (“ Country wide”) . See Pl. Fac ts ¶ 36; Praec ipe, Dkt. No. 55, De position of Doug las Helvig(“H elvigDep.” ) at 20, 22-25. She r ece ived a loan c ommitm ent letter f rom Country wide for an amount that would have paid off the balanc e of the loan from Option One
. Se e Pl. F a c ts ¶

¶ 3 6- 38 ; se e a lso Op p. to O pt. On e , E x. A, L e tte r f ro m Co un tr

y wi de to M s. Richards dated J uly

27, 2007 (“L oan Commitm ent L etter” ). Althoug h plaintiff orig inally made
re pr e se ntatio ns to t

he c on tr ary , it

is n owc le ar t

hat sh e and

Countr y wi de ne ve r c los e d o n th is loan. Country

wide’s r ecor ds for the loa n classify the loan as “ canc elled.” See J oint Supp., Ex . 1
at 8, Comme nts re loa

n to Mary Ric ha rd s ( “ Countr

y wi de L oa n Co mme nts ” ). Th e fi na l e ntr y in Country wide’s r ecor ds for the loa n states: “Canc ellation: Due to borrow er’ s numbers disconnec ted, could not contac t borrowe r to set up closingto avoid fore closure. B orrowe rs eventua lly

called us da

y of for eclosure , but home sold in morning. In Wash DC, not redemption elig ible.” I d.; see a lso Opt. One Rep., Ex. E, Deposition of Kendra Ray mond (“Ray

mond Dep.”)
at 35 0- 51 (a g re e ing

that sh e ha d n o k

no wl e dg e that Ms . Ri c ha

rd s e ve r c los e d o n th e re ve rs e mortg ag e loan) . Although pla intiff previously alleg ed that with the assistanc e of F ranc isco Enriquez, a Country

wide loan a g ent, she attempted to pay off the de bt to Option One on the day of the for eclosure sale, see Compl. ¶¶ 28-31, the re cords f rom Country

wide show that a

ny attempt by

her to do so wa s too late and c erta inly would not have be en succ essful. She neve rOn August 28, 2009, the Court issued a Memora ndum Opinion and Orde r 6 decliningto gr ant summary judgme nt for either

defe ndant and notingthat Kendr a Ray mond’s aff idavit sugg ested that “ she wa s rea dy , willing, and a ble to tender

the full amount of the mortg ag e loan ba lance and that Option One r efuse d to acc ept this tender pr ior to fore closure” and that Ray mond had testified at he r deposition that she had spoke n with both Fra ncisco Enr iquez and Gr oss immediately

afte r the for eclosure sale. See Richards v. Option One Mortg ag e Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 77958 at *4. The Court sug g ested that de position t estimony from Mr. Enri qu e z wo uld

be he lpf ul f or re so lut ion

of the iss ue . Se e id. at *6 . T he pa rt ie s w e re un a

ble to locate Mr . Enriquez for f

urther disc overy , but, with the permission of the Court, took a deposition of Doug las Helviga cor porate repr esentative of B ank of A merica (bec ause B ank of Americ a had pur chase d Country wide duringthe per iod since the e vents rele vant to this case took place ). See O rder , Dkt. No. 51 (Oc t. 10, 2009). The Court is now in rec eipt of the fr uits of the parties’ additional limit ed discove ry . 6 closed on the r ever se mortg ag e and the ref ore she did not have the f unds nece ssary

to pay off the orig inal mortg ag e. On September 6, 2007, the fore closure sa le occ urre d and the pr operty was 6 purcha sed by

Mr. Gross. See Opt. One F acts ¶ 24.

I I
. ST A N D A RD O F RE V I E W Summary judgme nt may

be g rante d if “the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits [ or dec larations] show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c) ; see a lso Anderson v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D .C. Cir. 2006). “A fa ct is ‘mater ial’ if a dispute ove r it might af fec t the outcome of

a suit under the g overninglaw; fa ctual disputes that ar e ‘irr eleva nt or
unnece ssary ’ do not aff

ect the summar

y judgme nt determination.” H olcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895 (quotingAnder son v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 248). An issue is “g enuine” if the
e vid e nc e is s uc h th at a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld r e tur

n a ve rd ic t f or the no nmo vin gpa

rt y . Se e Sc ott7

v. Ha rr is, 55 0 U .S. 37 2, 38 0 ( 20 07 ); An de rs on v. L ibe rt y L ob by , Inc ., 47 7 U .S. at 24 8; H olc omb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895.

When a motion for summary judgme nt is under consider ation, “the e vidence of the non-movant is to be believe d, and all justifiable infe renc es ar e to be dr awn in [her] favor.” Ander son v. L iberty

L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. Potomac Elec tric Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 849-50 ( D.C. Cir. 2006); Aka v. Washing ton Hospital Center, 156 F .3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ( en banc ); Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hea lth and Human Se rv ic e s, 86 5 F .2 d 3 20 , 3 25 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 9) . T he no nmo vin gpa rt y ’s op po sit ion , h ow e ve r, mus t consist of more than me re unsuppor ted alleg ations or denials a nd must be supported by aff idavits, declar ations or other c ompetent evidenc e, settingforth spec ific fa cts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f

or trial. F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(e) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32 4 ( 19 86 ). She is r e qu ir e d to pr ov ide e vid e nc e that w ou ld p e rm it a re a so na ble jur y to f ind in her f avor. L aning ham v. United States Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). I f the nonmovant’s evidenc e is “mer ely colora ble” or “not sig nificantly

probative,” summary

judgme nt may be g rante d. Ander son v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 249-50; see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 380 (“[W] here the re cord taken as a whole could not lea d a rational trier of f act to find for the no n- mov ingpa

rt y , th e re is ‘ no g e nu ine iss ue fo r t ri a l.’ ” ) ( qu oti ngMatsu sh ita El e c tr ic Industrial Co. v. Ze nith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). To def eat a motion for summary judgme nt, a plaintiff must have more than “a scintilla of evidenc e to support [her] claims.” F ree dman v. MCITelec ommunications Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2001). On a motion for summary

judgme nt, the Court must “eschew makingcre dibilit y

deter minations or weig hing the evidenc e.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F .3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).Plaintiff raised a dditional claims in her complaint, but she and O ption One re port 7 that they wer e able to resolve those c laims. See Third Status Report, Dkt. No. 33 (D.D .C. Apr. 27, 2009) ¶ 1. The se counts ther efor e will be dismissed as to Option One.

Pla int if f a lso inc or

po rate s th e se a lle g atio ns int o h e r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im 8 (C o un tT h re e) as an al l ege d v i o l at i o no f t h e c o v en an to f go o d fa i than d fa i r d ea l i n g. 8 I I I . DI SCUS SI ON Plaintiff makes three claims ag ainst Option One: Count One is for a decla ratory judgme nt to set aside dee ds and to quiet title to the property ; Count Two is for violations of the District of Columbia Right to Cure Residential Mortg ag e F orec losure De fault Ac t; and Count Three is for bre ach of

contra ct ag ainst Option One for violations of its dut ies of g ood faith and fa ir de a lin gwi th R ic ha

rd s in its loa n a dmi nis tr atio n a

nd c oll e c tio n a c tiv iti e s —

inc lud inga

duty to deal honestly

with her c oncer

ning the nature and extent of her oblig ations under the mor tga g e. 7 B e c a us e Count O ne — whic h is a lso the on ly c ou nt r e ma ini nga g a ins t de fe nd ant G ro ss — inc or po rate s ma

ny of the su bs tanti ve argume nts ma de in C ounts Tw o a nd Thre e , th e Court

wi ll addre ss Count One last.
A. Count Tw o

Count Two alleg es violations of the District of Columbia Right to Cure Residential Mortg ag e De fault Ac t, D.C. Code § 42-815.01. The Ac t provides that af ter a notice 8 of int e nt t o f

or e c los e a re sid e nti a l mo rt g a g e is g ive n, “ at any tim e up to 5 bu sin e ss d ay s p ri or to the c omm e nc e me nt o f b idd ing at a tr us te e sa le
. . . th e re sid e nti a l mo rt g a g e de bto r o r a nyon e in his behalf . . . may

cure his default and pr event sa le or other dispositi on of the re al estate ” by tender ing the amount require d to bring the ac count cur rent a nd cer tain additional fee s and
e xpe ns e s. D. C. C od e § 4 2- 81 5. 01 (b ) a nd (c ). Pla int if

f a sse rt s th at sh e se c ur e d a c omm itm e nt t o9

a re verse mortg ag e fr om Country wide B ank on Jul y

27, 2009, well in advanc e of the fore closure sale, a nd that this loan would have be en more than suffic ient to pay off the ba lance of the loan from Option One. See Pl. Facts ¶¶ 37-38. She ar g ues that Option One violate d Section 815.01 beca use it ref used to provide he r with ac curate payoff infor mation, thus making it impossibl e for Country wide to close timely

on the re verse mortg ag e and the ref ore impossible for he r to cure her defa ult to Option One. See Opp. to Opt. One a t 13. She also argues that a Country wide loan office r, F ranc isco Enriquez, attempted to wire transfe r the pa y off amount to Option One on the day of the for eclosure sale, but that Option One r efuse d to acc ept pay ment up until the tim e the sale wa s finalized. See Opp. to Opt. One a t 4-5. Wit h reg ard to plaintiff’ s argument that Option One’s f ailure to provide her or Countr y wi de wi th t

he pa y of f a mou nt n e c e ssa

ry to c ur e he r d e fa

ult ma de it i mpo ssi ble fo r h e r t o stop the fore closure sa le, the evide nce be fore the Court shows that these fa ctual asse rtions are without foundation. Option One now ha s produce d evidenc e that it s e nt a pa

y off sta te me nt to the de signate d s e ttl e me nt a g e nt f or Countr y wi de on Au g us t 21 , 2 00 7. Se e Joint Sup p. , E x. 1 at 14-15, F ax from Option One to L ender s First Choice dated August 21, 2007 (identifying pa y off amount). And Country

wide’s r ecor ds show that it rece ived the update d payoff infor mation and verifie d the payoff a

mount on August 28, 2007. See HelvigDep. at 84-87 (discussingdocument in Country

wide’s possession which ide ntified payoff amount); Country wide L oan Comments at 9A B ank of A merica corpor ate r epre sentative, Doug las Helvig , testified at the 9 deposition beca

use B ank of A merica

has ac quired Country

wide since these e vents occ urre d. See J oint Supp. at 2 n.1.

Whil e plaintiff a ssumes that if the lender does not provide a

payoff amount upon 10 reque st, it has breac hed Section 815.01 of Title 42 of the District of Columbia Code, she does not provide leg al support for this ar g ument, and such a conclusion is not evident from the te x t of the statut e or the re le va

nt c a se law. Th e Court

ne e d n ot r e so lve thi s q

ue sti on , h ow e ve r, be c a

us e it has found that the undisputed f acts show that Option One did provide the re quested pa y off amount. Plaintiff argues that her phone wa s not actually

disconnec ted, see Pl. S upp. at 5, 11 but whether

or not her a ssertion is true, the fa ct re levant to this case is that Country wide neve r closed on the r ever se mortg ag e loan. 10 (entry on August 28, 2007 states “re ceive d updated pa y off” ). No additional payoff infor mation 9 would have be en re quired for Country wide to close on the reve rse mortg ag e loan. 10 As fo r p la int if

f’ s argume nt t

hat Co un tr

y wi de atte mpt e d to te nd e r p ay me nt t o Option One on the da

y of the for eclosure sale, but that the pa y ment was re fused by

Option One, these a lleg ations are also contra dicted by the undisputed evidenc e. Plaintiff has produc ed
ev i d en ce th atC o un try

wi d e p ro v i d edh er

wi tha “ C o m m i t m en tL et t er ” f o r t h e r ev er s e m o rt gage loan, see L oan Commitm ent L etter, but the e vidence is clear that Country

wide and pla intiff never closed on the loa

n. See Country

wide L oan Comments at 8; see a lso Ray mond Dep. at 350- 51 (a gre ei n g th ats h e h adn o kn o wl ed ge t h atM s . R i ch ar d s ev er cl o s edo nth e r ev er s e m o rt gage loa n) . Ind e e d, Countr

y wi de ’s re c or ds sh owthat th e loa n c omm itm e nt w a s c anc e lle d b e c a us e Richards’s phone number wa s disconnecte d and Country wide “c ould not contact borr ower to set up [t he] closing to avoid f orec losure.” See Country wide L oan Comments at 8. Wit hout having 11
c los e d o n th e loa

n, Ms. Ric ha

rd s w ou ld n ot h ave ha d mo ne y ava ila ble to t e nd e r t o O pti on

On e in order to cure the def

ault. Despite he r asse rtions to the contrar y , the evidenc e is undisputed that“ Ev e ry c on tr a c t im

po se s u po n e a c h p art

y a duty of g oo d f a ithand fa ir de a lin gin 12 its pe rf or manc e and

e nf or c e me nt. ” Se e Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of Contr a c ts § 20 5; s e e a lso Minebea Co. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 188 (D.D.C. 2006) (“ The scope of the implied covena nt of g ood faith and f

air de alingis defined in par t by the justified expectations of the contra ctingparties. A pa rty may brea ch the c ovenant by

violating a

n implied term of the contra ct.”)
. 11 plaintiff could not have attempted to make a pay ment to cure the def

ault on her mortg ag e on the day of the for eclosure sale be cause she neve r re ceive d the loan proc eeds that would have e nabled her to do so. Ac cording ly , her a rgument that Option One re fused to ac cept this alleg ed pay ment is unsupported by

any evidenc e and is without merit.

B. Count Thr ee As to C ount T hr e e , b re a c h o f c on tr a c t, p la int if f i nc or po ra te s a ho st o f t he or ie s, a ll
o f w h i ch ar e p re m i s edo nv i o l at i o n s o f t h e i mp l i edco v en an to f go o d fa i than d fa i r d ea l i n g. 12 Although he r complaint orig inally focuse d on Option One’s a lleg ed induce ment of her to take the loan, plaintiff has not pursue d this theory following discovery . Instead, plaintiff nowargues that the mortg ag e should neve r have been a pproved be cause its mont hly pay ment amounts exceede d her a bility to repa y the loan, that Option One f ailed to provide a dequate notice of c erta in loan terms, and, a s discussed su pra at 9-11, that Option One wrong fully fore closed by

not providing payoff a mounts to pl aintiff and by not acc eptingher a lleg ed tende r of pa y ment on the day

of fore closure. Plaintiff argues that Option One violate d its im plied covena nt of g ood faith and fair de alingwith her by

providing a loan whose monthly pay ments exceede d her a

bility to repa y . Plaintiff incorporates into her ar g ument the District of Columbia Code prohibition on lenders “mak[ing] a cove red loa

n if the borr ower , at the time that the cove red loa n is closed, ca

nnot12

rea sonably

be expected to make the sche duled pay ments.” D.C. Code § 26-1152.02( a). See Opp. to Opt. One at 8-9. Certainly it is undi sputed that the monthly loan pay ments require d of her w ere g reater than pla intiff’s monthly income. Option One points out, howeve r, that had plaintiff intended to asse rt a violation of Section 26-1152.02, she should have amended he r complaint to do so. See Opt One O pt. One Rep. at 2. Option One’s ar g ument is well taken. The Court ne ve rt he le ss w ill a ssume fo r t

he mom e nt t

hat th e imp lie d c ov e na

nt o f g oo d f

a ithand fa ir de a lin gre qu ir e s c omm e rc ia l le nd e rs to a dh e re to c omm e rc ia l le nd inglaws and that a fa ilure to adher e to such law s would brea ch that duty . Even makingthis assumpti on, plaintiff ca nnot d e f e ats u m m ar

y j u d g m e n to nth i s th e o r

y. First, as O ption One cor

rec tly points out, t here is no evidence that plaintiff’s mortg ag e wa s a “c overe d loan” within the mea ning of Section 26-1152.02. See O pt. One Rep. at 2-3. To have been “ cover ed,” the annual pe rce ntag e rate on the loan ha d to exceed by more than six perc entag e points the yield on United States Tre asury secur ities having compar able r ates of
matur ity . Se e D. C. C od e § 2 6- 11 51 .0 1( 7) (A ). Pla int if f h a s n ot a lle g e d th at he r l oa n w a s a “cove red loa

n,” nor ha s she introduce d any evidenc e to establish that she mee ts this or any of the other c riteria of

such a loa

n under the statute. Plaintiff theref ore c annot def

eat summary judgme nt for Option One on this g round.

Second, with re g ard to plaintiff’ s more g ener al ar g ument that Option One violated the implied covena

nt of g ood faith and f

air de alingby

providing her w ith the loan in question despite her

ag e, low income a

nd history of cr edit delinquencie s, see Opp. to Opt. One at 8, defe ndant has submitted evidenc e showingthat plaintiff in fac t qualified for the loan. Option One a pproved he r for

an “A lt-A” loan. See Opt. One Rep. at 4. To qualify for suc h a loan she13

was not re quired to provide a ny proof of income, employ

ment or asse ts, although she was require d to cer

tify that she wa s not relying on f ix ed income to r epay

the loan, which she did. See Opt. One Mot., Aff

idavit of Dale M. Sugimoto (“Sug imoto Aff.”) , Ex . 1 at 3 (B orrowe r’s Certification for No Income Doc umentation L oan Prog ram). T he only require ment was that plaintiff’s cr edit score be at lea st 660, see id., which it was a ccor ding to e ach of the three major
cr ed i tre p o rt i n g age n ci es . S ee Op p . t o Op t
. On e, E x . H a t2 (C re d i tS co re R ep o rt ). Al th o u gh pla int if f p oints o ut t

hat a ll o f t

he se c re dit

re po rt s id e nti fy

“ se ri ou s d e lin qu e nc ie s, ” the c or po rate repr esentative for Option One , Dale Sug imoto, testi fied that so longas plaintiff’s c redit scor e
was a dequate , the re port of delinquenc ies would not disqualify her f or the loan. See Opt. One Rep., Ex. A, Deposition of Dale M. Sug imoto at 140-41. Be cause plaintiff qualified f or the loan for whic h she applied — or , in other words, r ece ived the contr act she barg ained f or — the Court
c on c lud e s th at de fe nd ant d id n ot b re a c h th e imp lie d c ov e na nt o f g oo d f

a ithand fa ir de a lin gwi th plaintiff by

extending the loan to he r. See Minebe a v. Pabst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68 at 188 (“ no obligation can be implied that would be inc onsistent with . . . ex press ter ms of the contra ctual relationship”) (quotation omitted).

Third, plaintiff alleg es that Option One violate d the implied covena nt of g ood faith and f

air de alingby

failingto provide her

with notice about the ter

ms of the loan and the require d monthly

pay ments. Option One has submitted evidenc e that it g ave pla intiff numerous do c ume nts pr ov idi ngno tic e a bo ut t he te rm s o f t

he loa n, inc lud ingthe amou

nt o f h e r m on thl y pay ment. See Opt. One Fa cts ¶¶ 7- 8; see a lso Botts Dep. at 51-63; Sugimoto Aff. ¶ 5. Ap pa re ntl y no w r e c og nizi ngthat O pti on On e c omp lie d w ithmany of its dis c los ur e ob lig atio ns , in her opposition to summ ary judgme nt plaintiff focuse s exclusively on Option One’s a lleg edA wrong ful fore closure ma y be re medied either

with damag es or by

setting the 13 fore closure a side. See National L ife Ins. Co. v. Si lverman, 454 F .2d 899, 905-06 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ( en banc ) (“ For

a wr ong ful fore closure the borrowe r has a lternative a nd inconsistent re me die s. He may

le t th e wr on g fu l f

or e c los ur e sta

nd and a sk fo r d ama g e s . . . . O r, he may a sk to 14 fa ilure to d isc los e the yie ld s pr e a d p re mium ( mon e y pa id t o th e mor

tg a g e br ok e r) . Se e Op p. to Opt. One at 14. Plainti ff ba ses her argument on Botts’s stateme nt that he is uncer tain whether

he told plaintiff about the yield sprea d premium. See B otts Dep. at 73. Mr. Sug imoto has provided a sworn statement, howeve r, that a written notice of the yield sprea d premium entitled “B roker Com pe ns atio n ( YSP ) a

nd the F e e s in

Yo ur Tr ans a c tio n” is i n O pti on On e ’s loa

n f ile fo r M s. Ric ha rd s and the re fo re pr e suma

bly wa s p ro vid e d to he r. Se e Sug imo to A ff . ¶ 5. In f a c t, t his d o c u me n t h a s M s . Ri c h ar d s ’ s s ign atu r e o nit , d ate d

N o v e mb e r

1 0 , 2 0 0 6
. Se e Su g im o to A f f
. , E x. 1 at 4. Plaintiff provides no evide nce to c halleng e the va lidity of this document. Absent
e vid e nc e to t

he c on tr ary , th e Court

c on c lud e s th at O pti on

On e did pr ov ide pla int if

f w itha de qu ate notice of the yield sprea d premium.

Finally , plaintiff ar g ues that Option One br eac hed its contrac t with her by
wr on g fu lly

pr e ve nti nghe r f

ro m pa yingof f t he ba lanc e of

the mor tg a g e . A s d isc us se d w ith reg ard to Count Two, su

pra at 10 -1 1, the un dis pute d f a c ts s ho w t

hat th is a lle g atio n is unsupported by

the evidenc e. The Court will gra nt Option One’s motion for summary judgme nt on Count Three, the brea ch of c ontrac t claim.
C. Count One Plaintiff alleg es that the for eclosure was wr ong ful bec ause the loan violated
va ri ou s lo c a l and

fe de ra l le nd inglaws be c a us e Op tio n O ne fa ile d to pr ov ide c e rt a in n oti c e s to he r. She se e ks a

de c larator

y jud g me nt t o r e sto re tit le to t he pr op e rt

y to h e r o n th e se g ro un ds
. 13have the wr on g fu l f or e c los ur e se t a sid e .” ) ( c iti ngRoya ll v . Yud e le vit , 2 68 F .2 d 5 77 , 5 80 (D .C. Cir. 1959)). I f plaintiff c ould show that the fore closure w as wrong ful, she mig ht be succ essful on Count One. 15 As discussed su

pra at 13-14, howe ver, the only specific notice that plaintiff now a lleg es that she did not rece ive is the yield sprea d premium, and the Court c oncludes that the undisputed mate rial fac ts show that she did in fact r ece ive this notice. Plaintiff also argues that the loan w as unlawf ul beca use it exceede d her a

bility to make its monthly

pay ments. As discussed su

pra at 11 -1 2, wi th reg ard to Count Three , plaintiff ca nnot succe ed on this point. Finally , plaintiff asser ts that Option One wr ong fully

did not allow her to cur e her defa ult and that title should be restored on this basis. As discussed su pra at 10-11, with re spect to Count Two, plaintiff ca nnot succe ed on this pointeither.

In addition to these arguments, plaintiff asser ts that she did not rece ive the notice of the for eclosure sale that is re quired by statute. See Compl. ¶ 50. As shown by defe ndant’s statement of f

acts a nd its corre sponding e x hibits, however, it is clea r that plaintiff re ceive d extensive notice of the f

orec losure and the subsequent sale . See Opt. One Fa cts ¶¶ 13- 23. She
no w h a s e sse nti a lly

c on c e de d th is p oint and

do e s n ot p ur su e it i n h e r o pp os iti on , o the r t ha n to state that Richar ds cannot re call re ceivingnotice. See Pl. Fa cts ¶¶ 13- 14, 18. Under District of Columbi a law, how ever , “ac tual notice of a fore closure sa le is not require d if the statutory
re qu ir e me nts are a dh e re d to .” Yo un gv. F ir st A m. F in. Se rv s. , 9 92 F . Su pp . 4 40 , 4 45 (D .D .C. 19 98 ). Th e statut e wa s satis fi e d b y se nd ingthe no tic e of

fo re c los ur e sa le to p la int if fs ’ l a st known addr ess by

cer tified mail, return r ece ipt requested, a nd by deliveringa copy

of the notice to the Mayor (or

his designated ag ent) at least thirty day s prior to the sche duled sale, both of wh ic h d e fe nd ant d id. Se e 42 D. C. C od e § 4 2- 81 5( b) ; O pt. On e F a c ts ¶ ¶ 1 7, 19 . T he Court

wi ll16

g rant de fenda

nt Option One’s motion for summary judgme nt on Count One. Be cause the Court conclude s that the fore closure w as not wrong ful, the question of wh e the r d e fe nd ant G ro ss h a d n oti c e of the a lle g e d wro ng fu lne ss o f t he fo re c los ur e — whic h is the only rema ining a lleg ation ag ainst him — is m oot. The Court will gr ant summary judgme nt for de fenda

nt Gross on Count One as we ll. A nO r d e r c o n s i s t e n tw i thth i s O p i n i o nw i l l i s s u e th i s s am e d ay. /s/_________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN DA T E : Fe b ru ary

4 , 2 0 1 0 Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge