NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT BAKER, an individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DYKEMA GOSSETT, LLP, a professional 

law corporation; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-55989 

17-56506 

D.C. No. 

2:16-cv-08434-GW-JEM 

MEMORANDUM*

ROBERT BAKER, an individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC.; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-56301 

D.C. No. 

2:16-cv-08434-GW-JEM 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 26, 2019**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 28 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Before: FARRIS, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

In Appeal No. 17-55989, Robert Baker appeals pro se the district court’s 

order dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims against multiple 

defendants. In No. 17-56301, Baker appeals the district court’s sanction and prefiling review order. In No. 17-56506, he appeals the district court’s order rejecting 

a certificate of service. Our jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In 17-

55989 and 17-56301, we affirm. We dismiss No. 17-56506 for lack of jurisdiction.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) of Baker’s claims as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

McGreevey v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 897 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018). We 

review the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. Rentmeester v. 

Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 

(2019). We also review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s order 

imposing a sanction and pre-filing review. Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cty. of L.A., 761 

F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (vexatious litigant order); Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 

F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2005) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanction).

In appeal no. 17-55989, we affirm. As the district court explained, Baker 

had discovered the facts underlying his claims by, at the latest, July 31, 2012, when 

he filed his complaint in a prior federal action in which he raised claims that were 
3 

nearly identical to the claims raised in the current suit. Thus, the various 

applicable two-, three-, or four-year statutes of limitations barred Baker’s current 

claims because he filed his complaint on November 14, 2016, more than four years 

after July 31, 2012. See e.g. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6(a) (statute of limitations 

for claim of attorney malpractice). The district court correctly concluded that 

Baker’s new allegations, in his proposed second amended complaint, of conduct in 

2017, did not make his claims timely. Baker’s allegations regarding the 

involvement in his prior litigation of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which investigates 

fraud, do not show that Baker was previously unaware of the facts underlying 

defendants’ alleged fraud. See Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc., 236 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 790, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (cause of action for fraud accrues when 

plaintiff discovers the facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to 

suspect fraud).

We reject the argument that defendants failed to timely file their motions to 

dismiss. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med. Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (defendant may file motion to dismiss at any time prior to filing of 

answer).

The district court did not err in dismissing Baker’s claims as barred by the 

various statutes of limitations, and it properly exercised its discretion in denying 
4 

leave to file a second amended complaint. See Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1125 (no 

abuse of discretion in dismissing with prejudice when amendment would be futile).

In appeal No. 17-56301, we affirm. The district court properly exercised its 

discretion in sanctioning Baker under Rule 11 and entering a pre-filing review 

order. Taking into account Baker’s pro se status and his developmental disorder, 

the district court gave him notice and an opportunity to be heard, considered the 

nature of his lawsuits, and properly found that they were frivolous and were 

brought for the purpose of harassment. See Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062. 

In addition, the order was narrowly tailored because it was limited to one set of 

defendants and one court. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

In appeal No. 17-56506, we dismiss because we lack jurisdiction to review 

the district court’s order rejecting Baker’s proof of service. See Am. Ironworks & 

Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (a 

ministerial post-judgment order is not final and appealable); Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. 

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 93 F.3d 529, 540 (9th Cir. 1996) (no 

jurisdiction to review order not material to the judgment).

Nos. 17-55989 and 17-56301: AFFIRMED.

No. 17-56506: DISMISSED.