UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4251

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRACEY CAROL WRIGHT, a/k/a Tracey Hakes Wright,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas David 

Schroeder, District Judge. (1:10-cr-00026-TDS-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2011 Decided: December 15, 2011

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Frank J. Chut, Jr., 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Tracey Carol Wright pled guilty to making, possessing, 

and uttering a counterfeit security, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 513 (2006). Wright appeals her sentence, arguing that the 

district court erred by finding that the intended loss was equal 

to the face value of the counterfeit check that Wright tendered 

as payment for a home. Wright argues that she knew she could 

not have escaped detection, and thus could not have intended to 

cause a loss equal to the full value of the check. We affirm.

This Court reviews the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error, and its legal interpretation of the 

Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Dawkins, 202 F.3d 711, 

714 (4th Cir. 2000). Additionally, because Wright did not raise 

her claim of error in the district court, this Court’s review is 

for plain error. United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 

(4th Cir. 2010) (requiring specific objections where defendant 

goes beyond “simply challenging the substantive reasonableness 

of [a] sentence due to its length or non-specific 

considerations”), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2011 WL 4536007 

(U.S. Oct. 3, 2011). Thus, Wright bears the burden of showing 

“that an error (1) was made, (2) is plain (i.e., clear or 

obvious), and (3) affects substantial rights.” United States v. 

Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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Intended loss “includes intended pecuniary harm that 

would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.” USSG § 2B1.1 

cmt. n.3(A)(ii). Although at some point “the extreme 

improbability of a loss might undermine a finding of intent,” 

this is not such a case. United States v. Stockheimer, 157 F.3d 

1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. McBride, 

362 F.3d 360, 374-75 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming loss calculation 

which included market value of residences owned by district 

judge, defense attorneys, and IRS agent against whom McBride 

filed fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petitions). Wright did 

not clearly show below that she lacked the intent to cause a 

loss equal to the full amount of the check; indeed, Wright 

tendered the check for the purchase price of the house after an 

initial check for rent of the same house was discovered to be 

worthless. See United States v. Himler, 355 F.3d 735, 740-41 

(3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Miller

Accordingly, we affirm Wright’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal conclusions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

, 316 F.3d 495, 505 (4th 

Cir. 2003). Thus, the district court did not clearly err in 

determining the intended loss amount.

AFFIRMED