United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 18-1640 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

BYRON MONTIJO-MAYSONET, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Torruella and Thompson, Circuit Judges. 

 Jessica E. Earl, Assistant Federal Defender, with whom Eric 

Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Vivianne M. Marrero, 

Assistant Federal Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Section, were on 

brief, for appellant. 

Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and 

Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, 

Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee. 

September 1, 2020 
- 2 - 

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.1 When he was twenty-eight, 

Byron Montijo-Maysonet drove three middle schoolers to a motel so 

he and his pal could have sex with them. That's called sexual 

assault, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 5191(a), and federal 

statutes make it a crime to "entice" or "induce" it over the 

Internet or "transport" a minor within Puerto Rico to commit it. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b), 2423(a); see United States v. CottoFlores, No. 18-2013, 2020 WL 4582283, at *9 (1st Cir. Aug. 10, 

2020). Montijo now asks us to flip his convictions and sixteenand-a-half-year sentence. Seeing no reversible error, we affirm.

HOW THE CASE GOT HERE 

The Two "Vueltas" 

It all started in November 2015, when Montijo's cohort, 

Luis Meléndez (a/k/a "Puky"), met CAP (his cousin's daughter) at 

a family birthday party.2 She had just turned fourteen and started 

eighth grade at Marchand Middle School, a school for seventh to 

ninth graders in Manatí, Puerto Rico. The two struck up a chat 

and, before they left, exchanged contact info so Meléndez could 

write to CAP on KIK, an instant messaging app. A few days later, 

1 Judge Torruella concurs in this opinion subject to what he 

stated in his separate opinion in United States v. Cotto-Flores, 

No. 18-2013, 2020 WL 4582283, at *21–23 (1st Cir. Aug. 10, 2020). 

2 Given Montijo's many sufficiency challenges, "we rehearse 

the facts in the light most favorable to the [guilty] verdict," so 

far as the evidence may be reasonably construed to support it. 

United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 65 (1st Cir. 2007). 
- 3 - 

Meléndez messaged CAP and they made plans to meet again, this time 

without her family knowing. In the meantime, Meléndez found CAP's 

friend DPP on Facebook and looped her into a group chat. DPP was 

thirteen years old and also in eighth grade. On a Friday, 

Meléndez, CAP, and DPP used KIK to plan to meet the following 

Monday (November 24, 2015) at the middle school and drive to a 

motel. 

As planned, when they got to school on Monday, CAP and 

DPP walked to a nearby food truck, where Meléndez and Montijo were 

waiting. They weren't in their school uniforms, Montijo stresses. 

Before that day, neither girl had spoken to Montijo. Meléndez 

introduced himself to DPP, said Montijo was his "friend," and told 

her they "were going to go for a ride." 

Montijo drove. First, they stopped at a housing project, 

where the men asked the children if they "wanted to smoke or drink 

anything." Then, Montijo drove to a motel called "El Jackeline," 

a secluded joint tucked away on a long road off of Route 2 and 

surrounded by a hedge and a concrete wall. The motel didn't charge 

an overnight rate. Instead, guests could pay twenty dollars to 

use a room for six hours. To rent a room, you pull into a garage 

next to a cabana, put the money in a drawer, and enter the room. 

An employee looks through a peephole at the gate to see the car's 

license plate number and record the plate number, the room number, 

and the time of arrival — all without seeing the guests. The motel 
- 4 - 

room itself (at least the one Montijo used) is a 200-square-foot 

unit with two plastic chairs, a bathroom, and a double bed 

surrounded by mirrors. The whole set up (the motel's owner later 

testified) is designed to ensure guests' "privacy." 

Once they got there, things happened "fast," DPP 

testified. Montijo and Meléndez rented two cabanas, and Montijo 

pulled the car into a garage next to one of them. Meléndez and 

CAP went into one room, and Montijo and DPP went into another. 

Once in the bedroom, Montijo "quickly told me that I didn't have 

to do anything I didn't want to," DPP later recounted. They sat 

down on the bed and Montijo told her that "he liked [her] hair, 

[her] eyes." In the other room, Meléndez had sex with CAP. Then, 

CAP and Meléndez called DPP to tell them they'd "finished," and 

they all met back at the car. 

Montijo drove the girls back to the school. Once they 

got there, Montijo and Meléndez made sure to stay out of sight. 

Instead of driving DPP and CAP to the school's front door, the men 

dropped them off one street away — according to CAP and DPP, so 

"the teachers and people from the school" wouldn't see the 

defendants. After that, CAP never spoke to Meléndez or Montijo 

again. 

But over the next week, Montijo used KIK to keep in touch 

with DPP. At trial, DPP testified that they "didn't talk about 

anything specific. It was just that [Montijo] wanted to see [her] 
- 5 - 

again." Soon, another "group [chat] was formed," this time among 

Meléndez, Montijo, and DPP. "[O]nce [the chat] was opened, the 

first thing" Meléndez said was that DPP should "bring in [an]other 

person." In context, DPP took this to mean "another girl." So 

she added her friend KVM to the group chat. KVM was also thirteen 

and in eighth grade. With KVM added, Meléndez, Montijo, and DPP 

all said they "wanted to do another outing," meaning another 

"ride." They used the word "vuelta" in Spanish (the same word 

they'd used before). And they planned to "meet in the same way" 

as last time: Montijo and Meléndez would pick the girls up at the 

food truck and drive them back to the motel. 

So, on November 30, 2015 (six days after the first 

outing), Montijo and Meléndez took DPP on another drive, this time 

with KVM. That morning, after DPP's mother dropped her off at 

school, she and KVM met Montijo and Meléndez at the same food 

truck. They were both in school uniform, and DPP had her 

schoolbag. After Meléndez "introduced himself to [KVM]," Montijo 

drove them once more to the housing project, where (once again) 

the men asked the children if they "wanted to drink anything or 

smoke anything." Then he drove to the same motel. On the way 

(DPP testified), KVM asked DPP what "she ha[d] to do." DPP 

(parroting Montijo) "told her that she didn't have to do anything 

she didn't want to do." When they arrived at the motel, the four 

paired off like last time — Meléndez with KVM, Montijo with DPP — 
- 6 - 

into separate cabanas. This time, "when [DPP] got into the cabana 

with [Montijo]," they had sex. 

At that point — in a scene Montijo made the centerpiece 

of his defense — DPP testified that she "took out [her] notebook," 

and Montijo "saw [her] grade" (which was presumably written on the 

notebook) and "asked [DPP] how old [she] was." DPP said thirteen. 

Montijo was "shock[ed]" (shocked!), he tells us. Meléndez and CAP 

had told him she was sixteen and told DPP that Montijo was twenty. 

Montijo told DPP that he was really twenty-eight, and that if he'd 

"known that [she] was [thirteen], he wouldn't have done it." But 

he assured her he would "wait for [her] to come out of high school" 

and "was going to take care of [her]." 

Montijo and DPP then went to the cabana next door, where 

they saw Meléndez and KVM naked on the bed. DPP went into the 

room and "took the money . . . that was right next to [Meléndez]," 

which she'd been told to take to Montijo. Just then, Meléndez's 

phone rang. DPP answered it. On the other line, CAP warned that 

the school had noticed they were gone and the police were waiting 

there. DPP hung up and gave Montijo the news. Once Meléndez and 

KVM got dressed, the men (with Montijo driving) drove the girls to 

a Burger King for an alibi — "so [they] could say" that they'd 

"been eating." 

After the pit stop, Montijo drove the girls back to 

school, where KVM's father was waiting. He ran toward the car. 
- 7 - 

KVM got out, but before DPP could follow, Montijo sped off. He 

drove to a house, where Meléndez spoke to a man DPP didn't know. 

The man ushered the three of them (Montijo, Meléndez, and DPP) 

into a van and drove them back to the housing project, where they 

waited "for things to calm down." When the coast seemed clear, 

another man drove Montijo and DPP to a street near the school, 

where they dropped off DPP. 

The Trial 

A federal grand jury indicted Montijo and Meléndez on a 

slew of sex crime charges. Specifically, count one charged that 

Montijo "used a facility and means of interstate commerce, namely 

the cellular phone application 'KIK,' to knowingly persuade, 

induce, entice, and coerce a 13-year-old minor female [DPP] to 

engage in sexual activity for which any person may be charged with 

a criminal offense under the laws of . . . the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico," which violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Four other 

counts (one per victim per drive) charged him with transporting 

the minors in a "commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 

United States" with the same illicit intent, violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2423(a). 

The indictment charged Meléndez under the same statutes 

and added four unrelated charges against him for producing child 

pornography, which agents had found stored on his cell phone when 
- 8 - 

they searched it.3 Before long, Meléndez entered a plea deal with 

the government and copped to one count of producing child 

pornography. In exchange, the government dropped the remaining 

counts. He was sentenced to 192 months in prison. 

Montijo went to trial.4 To prove its case, the 

government called CAP, DPP, the motel owner (to describe the 

joint), KVM's father, and several government agents from the 

Department of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) task force 

who'd investigated the case. CAP told the jury how she met 

Meléndez at the family party and narrated the first drive to the 

motel, when Meléndez had sex with her. Then DPP recounted both 

drives, the KIK chats, and how Montijo had sex with her on the 

second trip to the motel. By the end of her testimony, when she 

3 When they searched Meléndez's phone, agents found several 

videos of Meléndez having sex with at least one other minor girl 

who confirmed in an interview that she was sixteen at the time. 

See United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 318 F. Supp. 3d 522, 535 

(D.P.R. 2018). 

4 Before that, as we'll explain later, Montijo moved the trial 

judge to dismiss the transportation charges, arguing that based on 

United States v. Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d 339 (1st Cir. 2016), 

§ 2423(a) required travel to or from Puerto Rico and did not apply 

to drives wholly within the island. The district judge denied 

the motion, holding, as we later did, that § 2423(a) covers 

defendants who transport a minor wholly within Puerto Rico. See 

Cotto-Flores, 2020 WL 4582283, at *9.
- 9 - 

described how Montijo told her he'd "wait for [her] to come out 

from high school" and "take care of [her]," DPP broke down sobbing. 

In his defense, Montijo did not dispute DPP's story or 

try to undermine her testimony. He agreed that the two went on a 

"blind date" set up by Meléndez, and that on the second "date," 

they "had sex" (quotes from his lawyer's opening statement). But 

he claimed that he thought DPP was older. During DPP's cross 

examination, Montijo's lawyer got her to describe Montijo's 

reaction to the notebook ("If I knew you were thirteen I wouldn't 

have done it") and hammered that line home in her statements to 

the jury. 

Among other witnesses, the government called HSI Special 

Agent Jose García, who testified he took Montijo's phone during 

the arrest and sent it to forensics to extract the data. Then, 

over Montijo's objections (more on them later), Task Force Officer 

Kimbelly Pérez-Morales took the stand to identify the report 

showing the texts found on Montijo's phone. As Officer Pérez 

explained, the report showed that on the morning of November 24, 

2015, before the duo picked up DPP and CAP for the first motel 

trip, Montijo texted Meléndez to ask what he was wearing to meet 

the girls — a pair of "white Nike shorts, a tank top and white 

Nike tennis shoes," answered Meléndez. Before they left, Meléndez 
- 10 - 

texted Montijo, "Broooo you are horny like a dog. hahahaha."5 He 

told Montijo they were "leaving at about 7:55" and that "[w]e have 

to take them [back] before 11." Meléndez explained: "we have to 

leave these girls before others from Marchand" (the middle school) 

"are out at noon and catch us. Hahahaha." 

The jury found Montijo guilty on all counts. The judge 

denied Montijo's motions for judgment of acquittal and sentenced 

him to 198 months in prison. Montijo now appeals. 

OUR TAKE 

Sufficiency 

We start with Montijo's sufficiency challenges, which he 

mounts against each count of conviction. First, he claims there 

was too little evidence to show he used KIK to "persuade, induce, 

entice, or coerce" DPP to have sex, as § 2422(b) demanded. Second, 

he argues that the proof was too thin to show he knew DPP was 

underage, which the jury had to find to convict him under either 

statute of conviction. Finally, he turns to the last two 

"transportation" charges under § 2423(a), arguing that the 

5 Meléndez actually said, "estas pegado como los perros," a 

Puerto Rican colloquialism. According to the trial judge (with 

whom defense counsel agreed), the phrase literally translates to 

"stuck like dogs," which alludes to when "dogs . . . are stuck 

together" while mating. The defense pointed out that it doesn't 

quite mean "horny like a dog," as the interpreter translated, but 

the government thought that was the "best available translation," 

and the district court let it stand. Montijo hasn't challenged 

that decision on appeal, so we assume that "horny" roughly captures 

how Meléndez described Montijo. 
- 11 - 

government didn't prove he intended CAP or KVM to have sex with 

Meléndez when he drove them to the motel. Montijo argues — as he 

must to show insufficiency — that these holes in the government's 

case mean that no rational jury could have found "beyond a 

reasonable doubt" that the government "proved the essential 

elements of the crime." United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 

72 (1st Cir. 2007). If Montijo is right, we must order acquittal. 

See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that 

"the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the 

reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient"). So 

we tackle these challenges first and take them in order. 

Count One: Enticement 

To prove the first count, the government had to show 

that (as charged in the indictment) Montijo used KIK, a "means of 

interstate commerce," to "persuade, induce, entice, or coerce" DPP 

to "engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be 

charged with a criminal offense." 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Here, the 

"criminal offense" the government alleged Montijo "enticed" and 

"induced" was sexual assault under Puerto Rico law. See P.R. Laws 

Ann. tit. 33, § 5191(a) (defining sexual assault to include sex 

with someone under sixteen); United States v. Saldaña-Rivera, 914 

F.3d 721, 724 (1st Cir. 2019) (explaining that the alleged 
- 12 - 

"chargeable sexual activity" under § 2422(b) "includes crimes 

defined by" state and Puerto Rico law). 

Montijo's opening shot takes aim at the first element: 

he urges that "no evidence, other than" DDP's "uncorroborated" 

testimony, showed that he used KIK to chat with her. But even 

uncorroborated testimony can suffice to sustain a conviction. See 

United States v. Gaudet, 933 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding 

a minor victim's uncorroborated testimony sufficed); United States 

v. Cortés–Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that 

"[w]e repeatedly have held that" even "'the uncorroborated 

testimony of a cooperating accomplice may sustain a conviction so 

long as that testimony is not facially incredible'" (quoting United 

States v. Torres–Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 140 (1st Cir. 2000))). 

And here, DPP's story wasn't uncorroborated; CAP backed it up, 

telling the jury that Montijo and DPP texted each other while CAP 

chatted with Meléndez. And DPP's story went unrebutted. So the 

jury could easily have bought it. 

Even so, Montijo argues, the messages DPP testified he 

sent over KIK — that he "wanted to see [DPP] again" and to go on 

another "vuelta" to the motel, which they planned on the app — 

were not "coercive or enticing in nature." He points out that in 

our cases applying § 2422(b) thus far, the defendants sent lewd 

online messages (to the minor or an adult they thought was the 

minor's parent) that expressly referenced sex acts. See United 
- 13 - 

States v. Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d 1, 3–6, 11 (1st Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 134–35, 140 (1st Cir. 2011); 

Dwinells, 508 F.3d at 73. Other circuits agree that "when a 

defendant initiates conversation with a minor, describes the 

sexual acts that he would like to perform on the minor, and 

proposes a rendezvous to perform those acts, he has crossed the 

line toward persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to 

engage in unlawful sexual activity." United States v. Goetzke, 

494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007).6 But those cases didn't draw 

a line in the sand to insist on explicit sexual overtures. Nor 

did Congress, which meant to cast a broad net (consistent with the 

Constitution) to catch predators who use the Internet to lure 

children into sexual encounters. See H.R. Rep. 105-557, 21, 1998 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 678–79, 690 (June 3, 1998).7 In line with that 

6 In those cases, the defendants never had sex with their 

targets, like Montijo did. They were your typical to-catch-apredator scenarios, where the defendant is arrested before he meets 

the child, or the "child" is a federal agent in disguise. The 

defendants were charged with "attempt[ing]" to "persuade, induce, 

entice and coerce" a minor, which is also a crime under § 2422(b). 

Berk, 652 F.3d at 140; see also Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d at 6; 

Dwinells, 508 F.3d at 67–68, 72–74; Goetzke, 494 F.3d at 1237. 

7 As the Third Circuit has explained, "[t]he first version of 

§ 2422(b) . . . was attached to the Telecommunications Act of 1996" 

with "very little" legislative comment. United States v. Tykarsky, 

446 F.3d 458, 467 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006). "Because the Child 

Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998 rewrote 

§ 2422(b)," raised the maximum penalty, "and made substantial 

changes to related laws," including § 2422(a), courts have looked 

to its legislative history to shed light on § 2422's purpose and 
- 14 - 

intent, the four verbs Congress used — including "entice" and 

"induce" — plainly reach implicit coaxing or encouragement 

designed to "achieve . . . the minor's assent" to unlawful sex. 

Dwinells, 508 F.3d at 71; see Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 

Unabridged, available at http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com 

(defining "entice" as "to draw on by arousing hope or desire: 

allure, attract" and "induce" as "to move and lead . . . by 

persuasion or influence"). That makes sense: people "entice" and 

"induce" each other to have sex all the time without spelling it 

out. 

That's just what Montijo did here — so the jury could've 

found. Remember, when he texted DPP on KIK, they'd already gone 

on one "ride." And it wasn't to a McDonald's: He drove to a motel 

that (it could be inferred without much effort) was designed for 

scope. Id. The House Judiciary Committee explained that the 1998 

Act responded to "highly publicized news accounts in which 

pedophiles" used the web to "seduce or persuade children to meet 

them to engage in sexual activities," and confirmed its intent to 

enact "a comprehensive response to the horrifying menace of sex 

crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by 

computers . . . by providing law enforcement with the tools it 

needs to investigate and bring to justice those individuals who 

prey on our nation's children." H.R. Rep. 105-557, 10, 21, 1998 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 678–79, 690 (June 3, 1998); see also id. at 21 

(explaining that the bill expanded § 2422(a) to "enable law 

enforcement to charge a defendant who attempts to lure individuals 

into illegal sexual activity" even where "the travel did not take 

place"); United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) 

(describing the amendments as "part of an overall policy to 

aggressively combat computer-related sex crimes against 

children").
- 15 - 

discrete sex, where the men each paid $20 for a few hours and 

coupled off with one of the girls. Once alone in the bedroom, 

Montijo wooed DPP — told her she had "beautiful eyes and hair" — 

and assured her she "didn't have to do anything [she] didn't want 

to," a ploy (the jury could've thought) to gain her trust. 

Meanwhile, CAP and Meléndez actually had sex in the other room 

(something Meléndez and CAP likely told their companions about, 

the jury could reason). And before all this went down, Meléndez 

had told Montijo he was "horny like a dog." Jurors don't have to 

check "common sense" or "mature experiences" at the courthouse 

door. United States v. Hernandez, 995 F.2d 307, 314 (1st Cir. 

1993) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 

1992)). With that context in mind, the jury could have used those 

attributes to find that by telling DPP he wanted to get another 

room together at the motel where her friend had had sex with 

Meléndez the first go-round, and by making a plan to do so, Montijo 

meant to "entice" and "induce" her to meet up for sex. And it 

could have inferred he succeeded. After all, when the two met 

again (the jury could've found), Montijo got exactly what he 

wanted. See United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 318 F. Supp. 3d 

522, 530 (D.P.R. 2018) (rightfully pointing out that DPP "traveled 

to the Jackeline Motel [the second time] only because she and 

Montijo planned the . . . 'ride' on KIK," and observing that the 

fact that DPP had sex with Montijo "only after exchanging text 
- 16 - 

messages on KIK supports the inference that [ ] Montijo's 

communications persuaded" her to do so). 

Which brings us to Montijo's last attack on the 

enticement count. Montijo argues that to prove he "knowingly" 

enticed or induced DPP to have sex "for which [he could] be 

charged" under Puerto Rico law, the government had to prove he 

knew DPP was under sixteen years old (the Puerto Rico age of 

consent, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 5191(a)) when he sent the KIK 

messages.8 The government counters that at least two other 

circuits have held that § 2422(b) does not permit a mistake-ofage defense. See United States v. Banker, 876 F.3d 530, 539–40 

(4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d 1237, 1246–50 

(11th Cir. 2012); but see United States v. Cote, 504 F.3d 682, 686 

(7th Cir. 2007) (reading the statute to require knowledge the 

victim was under eighteen to avoid a First Amendment problem); 

United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 

"that the term 'knowingly' refers both to the verbs — 'persuades, 

8 Montijo also argues that § 5191(a) — the Puerto Rico offense 

at issue — requires the defendant to know the victim was under 

sixteen when they had sex. But he does not explain why this would 

matter, since § 2422(b) does not demand the defendant commit — or 

even intend to commit — the local offense itself, see Dwinells, 

508 F.3d at 71 (holding, again, that § 2422(b) "criminalizes an 

intentional attempt to achieve a mental state — a minor's assent 

— regardless of the accused's intentions vis-à-vis the actual 

consummation of sexual activities with the minor"); SaldañaRivera, 914 F.3d at 724 ("Nothing in the language of section 

2422(b) requires the government to show that Saldaña himself could 

have been charged under Article 130."). 
- 17 - 

induces, entices, or coerces' — as well as to the object — 'a 

person who has not achieved the age of 18 years'"). The trial 

judge held that our decision in Dwinells puts us on the Seventh 

and Ninth Circuits' side of the split; and as a result, he held 

that the government had to prove Montijo knew DPP was under 

eighteen. See United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 292 F. Supp. 3d 

568, 569 (D.P.R. 2018) (citing Dwinells, 508 F.3d at 68, 71 

(concluding that § 2422(b) did not raise First Amendment issues 

because it "requires that a defendant possess the specific intent

to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor into committing 

some illegal sexual activity," and "[s]peech intended deliberately 

to encourage minors' participation in criminal sexual conduct" can 

constitutionally be outlawed)(emphasis the trial judge's)). In 

essence, Montijo goes one step further, arguing that the word 

"knowingly" in § 2422(b) requires the defendant to know not only 

that the victim was under eighteen, but that someone could be 

"charged with a criminal offense" for having sex with her — and 

since the relevant Puerto Rico offense requires the victim be under 

sixteen, the government had to show Montijo knew that, too, when 

he did the enticing. 

But even if Montijo is right on the law — an issue we 

don't decide — the jurors had ample evidence that Montijo knew DPP 

was younger than sixteen when he texted her. For starters, he 

picked her up outside a middle school. And Montijo knew DPP went 
- 18 - 

to school there: Meléndez texted him that morning that they had 

to drop the girls off at "Marchand" (the name of the school). The 

jurors' "collective experience" would have told them that middle 

schoolers are rarely over fifteen years old. See United States v. 

Hamie, 165 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that jurors can 

"take full advantage of their collective experience and common 

sense" (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 708 (1st 

Cir. 1994))); Tr. of Trial Day 2 at 103 (where the judge noted 

that "16-year-olds are usually in eleventh grade"). The evidence 

also suggested Montijo knew they'd be in trouble if someone caught 

them with the girls. Before the first drive, Meléndez texted 

Montijo that they "had to leave" DPP and CAP before "others from 

Marchand" realized they were gone, so no one would "catch" the 

men. And when they did drop the girls off, Montijo and Meléndez 

insisted they get out a few blocks away from the building, so 

school staff wouldn't see them. To top it off, photos of DPP and 

her friends showed the jurors how the children looked in 2015 — 

well under sixteen, the jury could have found. 

In his defense, Montijo stresses his reaction when DPP 

told him she was thirteen: he exclaimed that Meléndez had told 

him she was older, and that he "wouldn't have done it" if he'd 

known her real age. But given the swell of other proof washing 

over them, the jurors could have reasonably found that Montijo's 

protestations just confirmed he knew DPP was underage. Conscious 
- 19 - 

he broke the law (they could have inferred), he feigned shock to 

cover his own hide, hoping DPP would buy it and vouch for him if 

the cops found out. In short, the jurors didn't have to believe 

the excuse Montijo gave DPP. Such credibility determinations are 

"uniquely" theirs (not ours) to make. See United States v. RiveraRuiz, 244 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2001). 

The Transportation Counts 

Undeterred, Montijo moves to the four § 2423(a) counts, 

which charged that he "knowingly transported" CAP, DPP, and KVM in 

a "commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States" 

with the intent that each engage in sexual activity for which 

someone (either he or Meléndez) could be charged with a crime — 

again, sexual assault under Puerto Rico law. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); 

see also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 5191(a). 

On that score, he first claims that that statute requires 

travel "in interstate or foreign commerce with respect to [Puerto 

Rico]," and doesn't cover rides from schools to motels within the 

island's borders. But we recently rejected that argument, holding 

Puerto Rico is a "commonwealth" within the meaning of the Act. 

See Cotto-Flores, 2020 WL 4582283, at *7–9; 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) 

(covering transportation "in any commonwealth . . . of the United 

States"). If that's true, Montijo claps back, then the statute 

violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, 

because it treats defendants who transport minors within Puerto 
- 20 - 

Rico differently from those who do the same thing within a state, 

with no justification for the disparity. 

Ordinarily, a law survives an equal protection challenge 

if the distinction it draws is "rationally related to a legitimate 

government interest." United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 

12, 18 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 

413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973)). Montijo urges that in this case, our 

review should have more bite. Laws that single out certain 

"discrete and insular minorities" who lack political power for 

disfavored treatment, Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 

2014) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)), or 

intentionally classify people "based on national origin, ancestry, 

and race" must "withstand the strictest constitutional scrutiny," 

DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001). In 

Montijo's view, that's the deal here. People in Puerto Rico (he 

urges) are a protected class — so by targeting them, § 2423(a) 

triggers strict scrutiny. And even if not, Congress lacked a 

rational basis to regulate conduct in Puerto Rico that it does not 

regulate in the states. 

As Montijo concedes, he did not raise this claim below, 

so we review it for plain error — a "demanding" uphill climb. 

United States v. Ríos-Rivera, 913 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2019). To 

scale its heights, Montijo had to identify "controlling precedent" 

that made it "indisputable" that § 2423(a) violates the Fifth 
- 21 - 

Amendment. Id. (quoting United States v. Morosco, 822 F.3d 1, 21 

(1st Cir. 2016)). He hasn't done so. To be sure, it's crystal 

clear a law targeting people of Puerto Rican origin would draw the 

strictest scrutiny. See DiMarco-Zappa, 238 F.3d at 36. But 

§ 2423(a) has a broader sweep: it applies to anyone (tourists, 

transplants, and travelers) who transports a minor for criminal 

sex on the island. No controlling case holds that folks join a 

protected class once they set foot in Puerto Rico. Indeed, under 

existing precedent, even the millions of U.S. citizens who live 

there — who can't influence by vote the federal laws that regulate 

them (unless they leave their homes for the mainland) — have not 

been recognized as a protected class, even though they're "the 

very essence of a politically powerless group." United States v. 

Vaello Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214 (D.P.R. 2019). Rather, in 

Harris v. Rosario, the Court held that, without violating the 

Constitution's Equal Protection mandate, Congress could "treat 

Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there [was] a 

rational basis for its actions." 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980); see 

also Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 21–23 (holding it was "beyond 

question" that "precedent require[d] us to apply rational basis 

review to the question before us" — whether a federal benefit 

program that discriminated against Puerto Rico residents violated 
- 22 - 

Equal Protection — while noting that Harris was a summary 

disposition that should be read narrowly). 

Therefore, in Ríos-Rivera, we rejected the same argument 

Montijo raises — that § 2423(a) warrants "heightened scrutiny" 

even on plain error review — because Harris foreclosed it. 913 

F.3d at 44. Like Montijo, "Ríos d[id] not seriously challenge the 

notion that Congress may have limited [§ 2423(a)]'s applicability 

within the fifty states because it implicitly recognized potential 

constitutional limits on its power." Id.; see United States v. 

Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (blocking a Congressional 

attempt to regulate intrastate violence "not directed at the 

instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate 

commerce," whose regulation "has always been the province of the 

States"). We held, therefore, that § 2423(a)'s differential 

treatment of states and territories did not clearly lack a rational 

basis. See Ríos-Rivera, 913 F.3d at 44. And so we must here. 

Having struck out swinging at the statute itself, 

Montijo turns back to the facts. As the judge instructed, to prove 

the four § 2423(a) counts, the government had to show: first, 

that Montijo transported DPP, CAP, and KVM within Puerto Rico; 

second, that each girl was then under eighteen; and third, that 

when Montijo transported each girl, he intended she engage in 

"sexual activity" for which someone could be charged with a 

criminal offense under Puerto Rico law. Montijo doesn't dispute 
- 23 - 

the first two elements. Instead, he argues the evidence was 

insufficient to prove he intended CAP, DPP, or KVM to have unlawful 

sex when he took them to the motel. 

This claim has two parts. First, Montijo raises another 

mistake-of-age argument: that he did not know the girls were under 

sixteen (Puerto Rico's age of consent, remember) when he drove 

them to the motel. We've already held that to convict under 

§ 2423(a), the jury need not find the defendant knew the person he 

carted off had "not attained the age of 18 years" such that the 

statute covered them. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); see United States v. 

Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 20 (1st Cir. 2013). Undaunted, Montijo (as 

in his § 2422(b) argument above) urges that a defendant can't 

"inten[d]" that a minor "engage" in sex "for which any person can 

be charged with a criminal offense" unless he knows that the sex 

would be criminal under local law; so when the alleged local 

offense is statutory rape of a minor, he must know the victim was 

under the local-law age of consent to have the "intent" § 2423(a) 

requires.9 

Second, Montijo urges that even if he can't raise a 

mistake-of-age defense — or even if the evidence showed he knew 

9 Montijo also argues, as he did with § 2422(b), that when 

the intended local offense permits a mistake-of-age defense, 

§ 2423(a) should too. But as above, we need not reach this claim. 
- 24 - 

the girls were too young — the jury could not have concluded he 

intended all three to have sex once they got to the motel. 

Once again, however — even if Montijo is right on the 

law (an issue we need not decide) — the jury had ample proof that 

he knew the victims were each under sixteen, and that he intended 

they'd have sex with one of the men when he took them to El 

Jackeline. In case you forgot: as to their age, the girls' childlike looks and the school they emerged from were dead giveaways, 

the jury could've found. If that didn't tip off Montijo, 

Meléndez's instructions — to drop them off at the school before 

noon so staff wouldn't "catch us" — would have raised some red 

flags. So did the school uniforms DPP and KVM wore on the second 

trip. Rounding things off, Montijo's evasive behavior — dropping 

the girls off down the street from the school so staff wouldn't 

see them — would have shown he got the picture. See Pueblo v. 

Alicea Hernández, 2014 WL 7500964, at *19 (P.R. App. Ct. 2014) 

(finding sufficient evidence to reject mistake-of-age defense 

under § 5191(a) where defendant met a 15-year-old at school and 

took her to a motel, where she hid in the back of the car to avoid 

being seen). And as for intent, between Meléndez's texts (calling 

Montijo "horny"), Montijo's flirting (telling DPP she had pretty 

hair and eyes), the offers to give the girls smokes and drinks, 

and, oh right — the two drives to a sex motel — the jury had what 

it needed to convict. See United States v. Ray, 831 F.3d 431, 434 
- 25 - 

(7th Cir. 2016) (holding that defendant's actions in offering minor 

alcohol and marijuana, checking into a motel room for a four-hour 

stay, and having sex with the minor sufficed to show his intent to 

have sex with her); see also United States v. Morales–de-Jesús, 

372 F.3d 6, 21 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that "[w]hen a plausible 

read of the record supports the verdict, we will not overturn the 

jury's determination on appeal"). 

Officer Pérez's Testimony 

Having lost his sufficiency challenges, Montijo launches 

a procedural attack. He argues that the trial judge should not 

have let Officer Pérez testify about the text messages taken off 

Montijo's cell phone, and about the KIK application itself, without 

being qualified as an expert in "cell phone extractions or forensic 

analysis." Appellant's Br. at 27; see Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702. We 

test such claims for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Spencer, 873 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2017). 

In the world of evidence, there are two kinds of 

witnesses: lay witnesses and experts. To give an expert opinion, 

a witness must be "qualified" by "knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education" to do so, and the judge must vet the 

opinion to ensure it's "reliable." Fed. R. Evid. 702; see Lawes 

v. CSA Architects & Eng'rs LLP, 963 F.3d 72, 97 (1st Cir. 2020) 
- 26 - 

(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). 

Lay witnesses not so qualified may only give testimony that is 

(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; 

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's 

testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not 

based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 

Fed. R. Evid. 701. That last (c) prong was added to "eliminate 

the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 

will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert 

in lay witness clothing." Fed. R. Evid. 701, Advisory Committee's 

note to the 2000 amendments. In short, a lay opinion must 

"result[ ] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life." 

Id.; see United States v. Vega, 813 F.3d 386, 394 (1st Cir. 2016). 

As best we can tell, Montijo urges that two opinions 

Pérez gave relied on expert knowledge.10 First, Pérez identified 

words on a spreadsheet (a/k/a, an "extraction report") as the text 

messages Montijo exchanged with Meléndez, which agents extracted 

from Montijo's cell phone. The government argues Pérez's 

"testimony was limited to the fact that . . . she had seen the 

data extraction report from Montijo's cell phone and recognized it 

in court." In fact she went further than that: she identified 

certain texts (e.g., "what are you wearing") as messages sent from 

10 Since Montijo doesn't develop any claim for why any other 

statements Pérez made required expert knowledge, we deem other 

such arguments waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 

17 (1st Cir. 1990). 
- 27 - 

Montijo to "Puky" (Meléndez's nickname, remember) and other texts 

(e.g., "you are horny like a dog") as sent from "Puky" to Montijo. 

She also testified to the date and time the texts were sent. To 

do so, however, all she did was to read from the report, which 

labeled each string of text as an "SMS message" "to Puky" or "from 

Puky," with the date and time. Montijo does not explain why this 

testimony required "scientific, technical, or specialized 

knowledge." And we conclude it didn't. 

These days, most anyone with a cellphone knows they store 

information about text messages, including the sender, recipient, 

and content. You don't need to be a software engineer to pick up 

a cellphone, open a messaging application, and interpret the words 

in the bubbles as messages sent and received. In doing so, 

ordinary people rely on a "process of reasoning familiar in 

everyday life," not any expert knowledge about software coding or 

cellphone circuitry. If Officer Pérez had opened Montijo's phone 

and taken screenshots of his conversations with Meléndez, no one 

suggests she'd need any "scientific, technical, or specialized 

knowledge" to identify them as text messages. See United States 

v. Ganier, 468 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that certain 

"[s]oftware programs . . . may be as commonly used as home medical 

thermometers," such that "[t]he average layperson today may be 
- 28 - 

able to interpret the[ir] outputs . . . as easily as he or she 

interprets everyday vernacular"). 

In this case, investigators used forensic software to 

copy that same info from Montijo's phone and display it on paper. 

To be sure, most of us don't see "extraction reports" every day. 

But as we've held time and again, Rule 701 lets in "particularized 

knowledge" that police officers gain on the job, so long as it's 

"well founded on [their] personal knowledge and susceptible to 

cross examination." Vega, 813 F.3d at 394 (explaining that in 

this circuit, a "police officer noticing patterns of behavior 

across criminal operations" — like code words or what a "drug 

point" looks like — "uses straightforward logic to conclude a 

defendant's behavior fits within that pattern and thus, does not 

need to be qualified as an expert") (quoting United States v. 

Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2005))); see also United 

States v. Belanger, 890 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2018) ("[T]ime and 

again we have stated that Rule 701 lets in 'testimony based on the 

lay expertise a witness personally acquires through experience, 

often on the job.'" (quoting United States v. George, 761 F.3d 42, 

59 (1st Cir. 2014))). 

No less than an experienced drug agent decoding drug 

deals, or an investigator construing a plain-language billing 

chart he found in a suspect's home, see Vega, 813 F.3d at 395 

(holding that a lay case agent properly "interpreted a chart 
- 29 - 

listing medical equipment and containing a column reading 'Rep. 

payment' as evidence that" the defendant's medical-device company 

paid sales reps illegal kickbacks "based on the equipment they 

sold"), Pérez simply interpreted the plain language (like "SMS 

message" and, well, "to" and "from") on the spreadsheet, which was 

labeled with the case number and "which phone it was extracted 

from" (Montijo's) — statements that Montijo does not now challenge 

on hearsay grounds. None of that testimony "turn[ed] on or 

require[d] a technical understanding of the programming or 

internal mechanics of the [forensic extraction] technology." 

United States v. Marsh, 568 F. App'x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding 

agent's testimony that he used software to "retrieve text messages 

and other data from a cellular phone" and explaining "the contents 

of the messages retrieved from the phone" was lay testimony for 

that reason); see also United States v. McLeod, 755 F. App'x 670, 

673 (9th Cir. 2019) (same).11 She relied on simple "logic and 

11 Under Rule 701(b), "where the witness is no better suited 

than the jury to make the judgment at issue," the opinion must be 

excluded to "provid[e] assurance against the admission of opinions 

which would merely tell the jury what result to reach." United 

States v. Vázquez–Rivera, 665 F.3d 351, 363 (1st Cir. 2011)). 

Montijo does not argue that Pérez's testimony was inadmissible 

under that prong, so we do not address that issue. See Zannino, 

895 F.2d at 17 (explaining that arguments undeveloped on appeal 

are waived). 
- 30 - 

pattern recognition" — "a process of reasoning familiar in everyday 

life." Vega, 813 F.3d at 394–95.12 

Second, Pérez testified that KIK is "different from 

other instant text messaging services" because "once the messages 

have been deleted they can't be recovered from the phone," "even 

with . . . law enforcement forensic tools." She knew this, Pérez 

said, because she'd become "familiar" with KIK through her "duties 

investigating child exploitation crimes." Montijo objects that 

this was an expert conclusion that required technical knowledge 

about the KIK application. In the government's eyes, though, 

Pérez's two cents about the app relied on nothing more than "lay 

expertise" she'd gained "through experience . . . on the job" — 

which made it admissible. United States v. Habibi, 783 F.3d 1, 5 

(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting George, 761 F.3d at 59). 

This one is a closer call, but Habibi is a helpful 

guidepost. In that case — a prosecution for illegal gun possession 

12 By the way, Pérez "offered no assurances about how well 

[the extraction software] performed." United States v. ChavezLopez, 767 F. App'x 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding no plain 

error in admitting agent's testimony identifying text messages 

he'd extracted from cell phone). Had Montijo wanted to challenge 

the reliability of the extraction process or suggest the software 

may have malfunctioned, he could have called his own expert or the 

forensic analyst(s) who conducted the extraction. As it stands 

however, aside from his Rule 701 argument, he does not contend 

that the jury lacked a sufficient basis to conclude that the data 

on the extraction report was just what Pérez "purported [it] to 

be." United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 371 (1st Cir. 2013) 

(discussing the requirements for authenticating evidence). 
- 31 - 

— eyewitnesses had testified they saw the defendant pick up the 

gun with his bare hands and stash it in his basement. Id. at 3. 

Yet, test results found no DNA on the gun that belonged to the 

defendant. Id. at 4. To show the negative tests didn't doom its 

case, the government called an FBI agent to testify that he'd 

worked on cases "in which [his] investigation revealed that an 

individual touched or handled a[n] object with a bare hand, but 

when tested, no detectable DNA was found on that object." Id. at 

5. Over the defendant's objection, we held that the challenged 

testimony relied "only on [the agent's] investigative experience" 

and so fell "'comfortably within the boundaries of lay opinion 

testimony.'" Id. at 5–6 (quoting United States v. Valdivia, 680 

F.3d 33, 50 (1st Cir. 2012)). 

Officer Pérez's testimony skirted closer to the line. 

Instead of just saying she'd worked on cases in which suspects 

sent messages on KIK that weren't recovered, she went a step 

further — testifying that the government's forensic software 

"can't" recover KIK messages once they've been deleted. That 

conclusion arguably "require[d] a technical understanding" of the 

government's forensic tools and their capabilities. Marsh, 568 F. 

App'x at 17. But even if it was error to admit that testimony, 

the mistake was harmless. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 

U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (explaining that, even if the trial judge 

erred, we should affirm if the record minus the improper testimony 
- 32 - 

gives us "fair assurance . . . that the [jurors'] judgment was not 

substantially swayed by the error"). On direct, Pérez made clear 

that, like the agent in Habibi, she was testifying based only on 

her lay experience in past investigations with the task force. 

And on cross-examination, she made it pellucid that she had no 

"training in forensic tools." Those clarifications dampened the 

risk that the jury gave determinative weight to her description of 

the government's forensic capabilities. See Torres-Galindo, 206 

F.3d at 141 (holding agent's arguably improper expert testimony to 

be harmless based on his "extensive[ ] cross-examin[ation] by 

defense counsel" and the weight of the evidence against the 

defendant). 

This and the other evidence that Montijo used KIK to 

entice DPP makes it "highly probable" that Pérez's testimony about 

the app "did not contribute to the verdict." Vega, 813 F.3d at 

395 (quoting United States v. Amador-Huggins, 799 F.3d 124, 129 

(1st Cir. 2015)). Remember, DPP testified that Montijo used the 

app to get her to go on the second "vuelta" — and CAP confirmed he 

and DPP texted each other. Montijo never seriously disputed DPP's 

testimony — indeed, just the opposite: he asked the jury to credit 

her account of his "shock" in the motel room (when he "learned" 

she was thirteen). And the motel records, KVM's father, and 

Montijo's text messages backed up the main thrust of her story. 

On the other hand, Montijo never argued that the KIK messages were 
- 33 - 

recoverable, or that the government's failure to introduce them 

meant DPP lied when she described them. Given DPP's otherwise 

corroborated and unrebutted testimony, which Montijo has never 

seriously disputed, it is "highly [im]probable" Pérez's one-liner 

on KIK was the gamechanger. Vega, 813 F.3d at 395 (quoting AmadorHuggins, 799 F.3d at 129).13 

Sentence 

His convictions secure, Montijo claims the judge botched 

his sentencing. In reviewing federal sentences, we take a twostep approach: we ensure the judge (first) followed the prescribed 

procedures and (second) imposed a sentence within the range of 

reason. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In 

other words, we review "for procedural and substantive 

reasonableness." United States v. Hernandez-Maldonado, 793 F.3d 

13 To the extent that Montijo argues that Pérez gave expert 

testimony when she said that KIK used the Internet, that, too, was 

harmless. As a cell phone application, KIK qualifies as "a 

facility or means of interstate commerce" under § 2422(b) whether 

it used the Internet or a cellular network to send messages. See 

United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(explaining that defendant's use of a landline and cell phone was 

enough to establish the "facility or means" element of § 2422(b) 

because "[t]elephones and cellular telephones are 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce"); see also United States 

v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152, 158 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that "a 

telephone is an instrumentality of interstate commerce" regulable 

under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 

30, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a phone is a "facility or means 

of interstate . . . commerce" under a similar statute, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2425). 
- 34 - 

223, 227 (1st Cir. 2015). Montijo claims the judge flunked both 

tests here. In his telling, the judge botched the guideline math 

— a "significant procedural error," Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 — and 

imposed an unreasonable sixteen-and-a-half-year sentence. To test 

these theories, we review the judge's "interpretation of the 

Guidelines de novo, [his] findings of fact for clear error, and 

[his] judgment calls for abuse of discretion." United States v. 

Houston, 857 F.3d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 2017). 

Procedural Reasonableness 

Before we flesh out Montijo's claims, here's what you 

need to know. At each federal sentencing, the judge "must begin 

[his or her] analysis" by calculating the defendant's advisory 

guideline range. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013) 

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6). The range turns on two 

variables. First, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines assign each 

defendant a "total offense level" — a point score based on the 

"specified offense or group of offenses" plus "adjustments for any 

aggravating or mitigating factors." United States v. MartínezBenítez, 914 F.3d 1, 2 n.2 (1st Cir. 2019). Next, they place the 

defendant in a category (I through VI) based on his criminal 

history. Id. The judge then plots those two numbers on a chart 

(a/k/a the "sentencing table") and "ends up with an advisory prison 

range," id. — the "starting point and the initial benchmark" for 

determining the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. "From there, the 
- 35 - 

judge sees if any departures are called for, considers various 

sentencing factors, and determines what sentence (whether within, 

above, or below the suggested range)," Martínez-Benítez, 914 F.3d 

at 2 n.2, is "sufficient" and no more than "necessary" to serve 

the goals of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

When a defendant is convicted of multiple counts, 

computing the first factor — the "total offense level" — is "no 

picnic." United States v. Ponzo, 853 F.3d 558, 586 (1st Cir. 

2017). "The guidelines tell courts to 'group' the counts that 

'involv[e] substantially the same harm,' U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, and 

then do 'group-by-group, not count-by-count, sentencing 

calculations.'" Id. (last quoting United States v. Bivens, 811 

F.3d 840, 842 (6th Cir. 2016), and citing U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.3, 

3D1.4). "The court then calculates the offense level for each 

count within each group, attributes to each group the highest 

offense level of any count within it, compares the groups to 

ascertain which has the highest offense level, [and] considers 

certain further adjustments[.]" United States v. Florence, 143 

F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1998). Those "further adjustments" include 

an up-to-five level enhancement — also called a "multiple count 

adjustment" — based on the number of groups and their relative 

severity. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Once the judge makes those 
- 36 - 

tweaks, he winds up with the total (or "combined") offense level, 

which he plugs into the chart. See Florence, 143 F.3d at 14.14 

The judge worked through that maze here and pegged the 

guideline range at 235–293 months in prison. He started with the 

base offense level for each of the six counts of conviction, then 

notched them up with a series of enhancements. Montijo disputes 

three on appeal: first, the judge added a two-level enhancement 

to each count involving DPP15 because he found Montijo "unduly 

influenced [her] to engage in prohibited sexual conduct." U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). Second, he tacked on two levels to the triplet 

of counts derived from the second daytrip16 because those 

"offense[s] involved the use a computer or an interactive computer 

service to [ ] persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the 

travel of" each minor victim (DPP and KVM) "to engage in prohibited 

sexual conduct." U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). Third, after adding 

those plus-factors, the judge found that each offense had inflicted 

14 The grouping rules aim to limit "the significance of the 

formal charging decision and to prevent multiple punishment for 

substantially identical offense conduct" when a defendant is 

charged with "closely intertwined" offenses. USSG Ch.3, pt. D, 

intro. comment. "In essence, counts that are grouped together are 

treated as constituting a single offense for purposes of the 

guidelines." Id. 

15 Counts one, three, and five — which charged Montijo enticed 

DPP and transported her twice to engage in unlawful sex acts. 

16 Counts one, five, and six — which charged Montijo enticed 

DPP and transported her and KVM to engaged in unlawful sex acts on 

the second outing. 
- 37 - 

"substantially" separate "harm," U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, so he didn't 

group them together. Then, as the Guidelines direct, he took the 

offense with the highest offense level (34) and added a four-point 

multiple-count adjustment. Id. § 3D1.3, 3D1.4. The judge made 

all those adjustments over Montijo's objections — which he repeats 

on appeal. We address his grievances in the order he argues them. 

Montijo first complains that he did not "unduly 

influence[ ]" a minor, to trigger the two-point bump under 

§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). To apply that enhancement, the judge had to 

"closely consider the facts of the case to determine whether 

[Montijo's] influence over" DPP "compromised the voluntariness of 

[her] behavior." Houston, 857 F.3d at 435 (quoting U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G1.3, cmt. n.3(B)). As Montijo agrees, the court could "look 

to a variety of factors, including whether [the offender's conduct] 

displays an abuse of superior knowledge, influence and resources." 

United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002). When 

the alleged influencer is over ten years older than the victim, as 

here, there is a "rebuttable presumption" the enhancement applies. 

Houston, 857 F.3d at 434 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3, cmt. n.3(B)). 

In Houston, for example, we held the judge properly applied the 

increase when the defendant drove a 13-year-old girl between two 

states so his accomplice could prostitute her. Id. at 435. The 

district court found the defendant drove the minor "across state 

borders away from her family and familiar surroundings" to "various 
- 38 - 

locations to meet with adult" johns, "giving her few options other 

than engaging in prohibited sexual conduct." Id. In this case, 

taking cues from Houston, the trial judge applied the two-point 

bump under § 2G1.3 because Montijo drove DPP away from school to 

an unfamiliar motel and was "much older" than her. 

Montijo argues that we must find he rebutted the undueinfluence presumption by showing that DPP (with CAP and Meléndez) 

planned the first meeting without his input and that DPP 

"willing[ly]" had sex during the second one. But even assuming he 

proved those facts, the judge did not err in applying the 

enhancement. As in Houston, Montijo was well over ten years older 

than DPP, who needed her mom to drive her to middle school. He 

had the know-how and "resources," Root, 296 F.3d at 1234, to pick 

her up, drive the car, pay for the motel room, and drop the girls 

off before they were caught. No, Montijo wasn't an interstate sex 

trafficker like Houston. Montijo's few-hour excursions with DPP 

were shorter and arguably less coercive. But § 2G1.3 turns on 

"undue influence," not coercion, and there was ample proof Montijo 

unduly influenced DPP from the beginning: offered her "something 

to smoke or drink," brought her to a secluded motel where he 

flattered her "eyes" and "hair," gained her trust, followed up 

over KIK, and lured her again "from her family and familiar 

surroundings" to the same motel room where, alone with Montijo, 

she'd more likely agree to have sex. Houston, 857 F.3d at 435; 
- 39 - 

see United States v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436, 445 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(upholding the enhancement when the "facts [were] consistent with 

a manipulative adult's building a relationship with a minor for 

the purpose of eventual sexual activity"). In these circumstances, 

the judge was well within his discretion to find that Montijo's 

influence "compromised the voluntariness of [DPP's] behavior" and 

to apply the increase.17 

As for Montijo's second claim — that he didn't use a 

computer to "entice" or "facilitate the travel of" DPP or KVM to 

have unlawful sex, U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A), we've already 

explained why it flops: there was sufficient trial evidence to 

show that Montijo used KIK to entice DPP to come on the second 

trip. As the government points out, the guideline goes beyond the 

17 This case therefore differs from United States v. Calvo, 

596 Fed. Appx. 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2015), hammered by Montijo. In 

Calvo, there was unrebutted evidence the victim initiated pretty 

much everything — that she "willingly befriended Calvo, 

voluntarily engaged in sexual banter with him, requested that he 

pick her up, and willingly engaged in the sexual acts at issue" 

and "[t]here [was] simply no evidence that Calvo did or said 

anything to procure the victim's consent to conduct that she was 

not already inclined to do." Id. In this case, there's no evidence 

DPP was the one who "requested" Montijo pick her up or that she 

was "already inclined" to have sex — if that matters, see id. at 

544 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 

(citing cases around the circuits holding that the minor's 

"willingness" does not bar an undue-influence finding); there's no 

evidence DPP "requested" that Montijo do anything or was willing 

to have sex with Montijo before he took her to a secluded motel 

and came on to her. Indeed, DPP did not agree to have sex until 

the second trip (if she did at all) — after Montijo spent six more 

days pursuing her on KIK. 
- 40 - 

four verbs in § 2422(b) to cover computer use that "facilitate[s] 

the travel of" minors for unlawful sex. Id. Since the evidence 

showed Montijo used KIK to plan the second outing with DPP and 

KVM, the judge appropriately applied the enhancement. See Houston, 

857 F.3d at 436 (affirming the district court's application of the 

enhancement because the defendant's accomplice used her smartphone 

to arrange sexual encounters between the victim and adult men). 

Lastly, Montijo faults the judge for the multiple-count 

adjustment. In his view, the judge should have grouped the three 

counts involving DPP (the enticement under § 2422(b) and the two 

transportation counts). If he'd done that, there would have been 

fewer groups of offenses, and the multiple-count adjustment would 

have been three instead of four. 

The on-point guideline is § 3D1.2, which explains in the 

relevant snippet that "[c]ounts involve substantially the same 

harm within the meaning of this rule" and should be grouped 

(a) When counts involve the same victim and the 

same act or transaction[;] 

(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or 

more acts or transactions connected by a common 

criminal objective or constituting part of a common 

scheme or plan[; or] 

(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is 

treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or 

other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to 

another of the counts. 

U.S.S.G. 3D1.2. 
- 41 - 

Montijo does not dispute that each count involving a 

separate minor inflicted a "substantially" separate "harm" and 

deserved its own group. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2; see id. § 2G1.3, cmt. 

n.6. That said, he argues that "all acts related to [DPP] 

encompassed one victim and one act (the transportation)" under 

prong (a), "or in the alternative, one victim and one common scheme 

(to meet with [DPP] at the motel)" under prong (b). "[C]ounts 

that are part of a single course of conduct with a single criminal 

objective and represent essentially one composite harm to the same 

victim are to be grouped together, even if they constitute legally 

distinct offenses occurring at different times," he reminds us. 

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, cmt. n.4. For example, a conspiracy to commit 

extortion and the extortion itself (though different offenses) are 

grouped — as are mail and wire fraud counts that were "each in 

furtherance of a single fraudulent scheme," "even if the mailings 

and telephone call occurred on different days." Id. But there's 

a flip side: the guideline "does not" permit "the grouping of 

offenses" that do not reflect "one composite harm," such as 

"robbery of the same victim on different occasions," which 

"involves multiple, separate instances of fear and risk of harm." 

Id. (noting that if "[t]he defendant is convicted of two counts of 

rape for raping the same person on different days" the counts 

should stay separate). 
- 42 - 

Unlike an agreement to commit the same crime, or mails 

and wires sent to further the same scam, Montijo's two trips to 

the motel with DPP exposed her to two different sexually-charged 

encounters — away from familiar surroundings — to which she 

couldn't legally consent. See United States v. Nagel, 835 F.3d 

1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding that district court 

properly refused to group two § 2422(b) counts because each "one 

of the[ ] sexual encounters with [the victim] — who was unable to 

consent due to her age — caused a separate harm"); United States 

v. Bivens, 811 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that two 

instances of creating child pornography involving the same victims 

were separate because, in cases involving "sex crimes committed by 

the same defendant against the same victim over an extended period 

of time," "each act usually amounts to a fresh harm the victim 

must face anew"); see also United States v. Wise, 447 F.3d 440, 

447 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding court rightly refused to group counts 

based on separate explicit photos defendant solicited from child 

on separate days). And Montijo "had two separate objectives, to 

have sexual relations with [DPP] two separate times," Nagel, 835 

F.3d at 1375 — even if he didn't succeed on the first drive. So 

the judge did not err in treating the two transporting-DPP counts 

separately. 

Given that outcome, any mistake in grouping the 

enticement and day-two transportation count was harmless. If the 
- 43 - 

judge had treated those counts as separate offenses, he would have 

only decreased the number of "units" for the multiple-countadjustment by one (to 3.5), meaning the four-point enhancement 

would still have applied. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 (equating 3.5–5 

units with a four-level increase). All told, then, the judge 

rightly assessed the disputed enhancements and correctly computed 

the guideline range of 235–293 months in prison. See United States 

v. Hinkley, 803 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that a mistake 

in applying the Guidelines is ordinarily harmless if it does not 

change the guideline range). 

Substantive Reasonableness 

Unable to show nonharmless procedural error, Montijo 

urges that his 198-month sentence — a 37-month downward variance 

— was still unreasonably high. In doing so, he fights an "uphill" 

battle: we have to affirm so long as the judge gave "'a plausible 

explanation' for the selected sentence and 'reached a defensible 

result.'" United States v. Dávila-Bonilla, 968 F.3d 1, 12 (1st 

Cir. 2020) (first quoting United States v. Vixamar, 679 F.3d 22, 

29 (1st Cir. 2012), then quoting United States v. Chisholm, 940 

F.3d 119, 132 (1st Cir. 2019)). We'll overturn a sentence as 

substantively unreasonable only if it goes beyond the "expansive 

universe of reasonable sentences.'" United States v. King, 741 

F.3d 305, 308 (1st Cir. 2014). "When, as in this case, a district 

court essays a substantial downward variance from a properly 
- 44 - 

calculated guideline sentencing range, a defendant's claim of 

substantive unreasonableness will generally fail." United States 

v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Montijo argues that this case is the "long-odds 

exception" — the "rare below-the-range sentence" that remains 

unreasonably harsh. King, 741 F.3d at 310. He stresses that he'd 

"never had a brush with law enforcement" and had supportive family 

and a "promising future" — factors that warranted no more than a 

120-month sentence. But the district judge considered those 

positives: he noted in court that Montijo had a university degree, 

was gainfully employed, and "was raised in a pro-social environment 

with the support of his parents who worked tirelessly to provide 

for their children." And he heard defense counsel's reminder that 

Montijo's family was there at sentencing and "all" the previous 

hearings, and that "having a family to return to after" prison 

bodes "well for positive rehabilitation upon release." See DávilaBonilla, 968 F.3d at 12 (explaining that "we can infer that the 

district judge considered a defendant's sentencing claims by 

comparing what the parties argued and what was in the presentence 

report with what the judge did"). That the judge varied downward 

by 37 months confirms that he weighed those points heavily. But 

he also considered Montijo's "repeat" conduct (on two separate 

days) and the "impact" it had on DPP and her family. And in doing 

so, he found that a 198-month sentence was needed to "reflect[ ] 
- 45 - 

the seriousness of the offense," "promote[ ] respect for the law," 

and ensure adequate "deterrence and punishment" — factors the law 

directed him to consider. Though the judge gave less weight to 

the "mitigating factors" than Montijo "thinks they deserved," 

Dávila-Bonilla, 968 F.3d at 12 (quoting Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593), 

the reasons the judge outlined were "fully sufficient to justify" 

Montijo's substantially-below-guideline sentence. King, 741 F.3d 

at 310. 

END 

So, our careful review complete, we affirm Montijo's 

convictions and sentence.