NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TRANCITO CASTANEDA DE LEON,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 21-470

Agency No.

A099-504-282

MEMORANDUM*

PAOLA DIEGO CASTANEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 21-471

Agency No.

A202-097-231

ISABEL DIEGO CASTANEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 21-472

Agency No.

A202-097-233

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUN 28 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-470

SHEYLA DIEGO CASTANEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 21-473

Agency No.

A202-097-232

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 26, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Trancito Castaneda de Leon and her three children—Paola, Isabel, and 

Sheyla Diego Castaneda—seek review of an order from the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeals of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of 

their motion to terminate removal proceedings and of their applications for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the 

agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial 

evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). We 

deny the petition for review.

** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for 

decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 21-470

1. The BIA correctly determined that the Notices to Appear that 

initiated the removal proceedings against Castaneda de Leon and her children 

vested jurisdiction with the IJ, even if they did not contain the date and time of 

the initial removal hearing. See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 

1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

2. The BIA properly denied Castaneda de Leon and her children’s 

asylum and withholding claims. The BIA did not err in determining that 

Castaneda de Leon’s neighbor’s threats to “do something” to her or to “take” one 

of her children if she did not repay a debt did not establish past persecution. The 

neighbor’s threats were vague, and she did not follow through on them. See 

Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019); Villegas Sanchez 

v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021).

In addition, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that 

Castaneda de Leon and her children cannot establish a risk of persecution based 

on race or family membership. There is no nexus between these characteristics 

and the harm that they fear. The record demonstrates that the neighbor targeted 

Castaneda de Leon because of her failure to repay the debt, not because of her 

Konjobal ethnicity. And Castaneda de Leon’s family members have not been 

harmed in Guatemala, undermining her and her children’s race- and family-based 

claims for relief. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010).

Moreover, the BIA correctly determined that Castaneda de Leon and her 

children are not entitled to relief based on their status as Guatemalans returning 
4 21-470

from the United States who are perceived to be wealthy. We have “clearly held 

that ‘imputed wealthy Americans’ are not a discrete class of persons recognized 

as a particular social group.” Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2019) (quoting Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016)).

Finally, the BIA correctly determined that Castaneda de Leon and her 

children are not entitled to relief based on the proposed particular social group

consisting of “Konjobal women who, while living without a man in their lives, 

were threatened in the past and will be persecuted, tortured, or killed upon return 

to Guatemala and would not be protected by the police because of their Konjobal 

race.” The BIA correctly determined that this proposed particular social group is 

not cognizable because it lacks particularity and social distinction. Any other 

errors in its analysis are harmless. See Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213, 1228 

(9th Cir. 2021).

First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that this group 

lacks social distinction, as there is no evidence that Guatemalans perceive women 

living without a man (regardless of ethnicity) to be a distinct group. See DiazTorres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2020). And even if people target 

Castaneda de Leon because they perceive her as weak due to her ethnicity or 

relationship status, this consideration does not establish social distinction because 

social distinction is not “assessed from the perspective of the persecutors.” Id. 

Second, the BIA correctly determined that the group is not defined with 

particularity. See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020). The 
5 21-470

group lacks “definable boundaries.” See id. (quoting In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 

Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2014)). It is unclear whether it includes only single women 

or women who are temporarily separated from a partner, and it is unclear which 

Konjobal women living without a man “would not be protected by the police

because of their Konjobal race.”

3. The BIA properly denied Castaneda de Leon and her children’s CAT 

claims. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the 

neighbor’s threats did not constitute torture. See Kaur v. Garland, 2 F.4th 823, 

836 (9th Cir. 2021). And the record does not compel the conclusion that the 

Guatemalan government would acquiesce in future torture. Even if police cannot

assist Castaneda de Leon because of a language barrier, ineffective law 

enforcement does not establish government acquiescence. Garcia-Milian v. 

Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Anyway, the record demonstrates 

that Guatemala has tried to combat violence against indigenous women. Finally, 

the BIA did not err by failing to consider whether relocation would be reasonable 

because “the reasonableness of a relocation is not relevant to a CAT claim.” 

Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022).

4. We will not consider Castaneda de Leon and her children’s argument

that the IJ violated their due process rights because it is unexhausted. See Amaya 

v. Garland, 15 F.4th 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2021). And their argument that the BIA 

violated their due process rights fails because they do not show that any violation 

prejudiced them or prevented them from presenting their case. See Olea-Serefina 
6 21-470

v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2022).

PETITION DENIED.