UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4868

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ABDULMALIK ABDULLA,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4877

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

AHMED MOHSSEN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. 

(1:14-cr-00050-RDB-1; 1:14-cr-00050-RDB-2)

Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: December 3, 2015

Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.
2

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gerald C. Ruter, LAW OFFICES OF GERALD C. RUTER, P.C., Towson, 

Maryland, Warren E. Gorman, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. 

Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, David I. Sharfstein, 

Leo J. Wise, Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Abdulmalik Abdulla and Ahmed Mohssen appeal their 

convictions and respective 48-month sentences for four counts of 

food stamp fraud, in violation of 7 U.S.C.A. § 2024(b)(1) (West 

Supp. 2015), and seven counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). They argue that the district court erred 

in striking a juror for cause, determining that each Defendant 

was responsible for over $1 million in losses, and rejecting 

Mohssen’s request for a minor or minimal role adjustment. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendants contend that they were denied due process 

under the Fifth Amendment when the district court struck 

Prospective Juror Number 58 (Juror 58) for cause. During voir 

dire follow up questioning, Juror 58 stated that she believed 

that food stamp fraud was an everyday and common occurrence in 

the Baltimore area. However, Juror 58 also answered that she 

could be a fair and impartial juror. Defendants contend that 

the strike created a jury that was biased in violation of the 

Sixth Amendment because Juror 58 was excused for allegedly 

invalid reasons. Defendants argue that because Juror 58 stated 

that she had not personally seen food stamps traded for cash, 

she was not closely familiar with anyone who had, and she could 

be a fair and impartial juror, the court abused its discretion 

in striking her for cause.
4

We review a district court's determination whether to 

remove a juror for cause for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 190 (4th Cir. 2013). “It is 

well-settled, of course, that an accused is entitled under the 

Sixth Amendment to trial by a jury composed of those who will 

adhere to the law and fairly judge the evidence.” United 

States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 219 (4th Cir. 2006). The trial 

judge “is best situated to determine competency to serve 

impartially.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 (1984); see

United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 749 (4th Cir. 

2011). Thus, the trial judge possesses “very broad discretion 

in deciding whether to excuse a juror for cause.” 

Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749. 

This court will recognize an abuse of such discretion and 

will reverse “if the court demonstrates a clear disregard for 

the ‘actual bias’ of an individual venireman.” United States v. 

Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2004). The appellate 

court’s role is to determine whether “‘the trial judge [was] 

very careful to see that the jury obtained is fair and 

impartial,’” and permitted “sufficient information to come 

forward so that he could exercise his discretion in an informed 

way.” Id. at 118 (quoting Neal v. United States, 22 F.2d 52, 53 

(4th Cir. 1927)). To this end, the court “is bound either to 

make or to permit such inquiries to be made as will enable him 
5

in the exercise of his discretion to exclude from the jury 

persons who have formed fixed opinions about the case and are 

not fair and impartial jurors within the contemplation of the 

law.” Neal, 22 F.2d at 53.

While the Defendants’ observations are not wholly lacking 

in merit, they do not entitle them to relief. The court 

considered that the juror’s response could cut against the 

Government or the defense. Because the juror stated that 

trading food stamps for cash is an everyday occurrence and that 

it happens all the time, she could presume that the facts 

alleged were true based on her perception that food stamp fraud 

is rampant in Baltimore. Juror 58’s statements were based on 

her outside sources rather than any evidence received during 

trial. The strike could have preserved the Defendants’ due 

process rights because Juror 58’s statements could easily have 

led her to believe that the allegations must be true since such 

acts are so frequently done in Baltimore. On the other hand, 

the court was also concerned that Juror 58’s knowledge of the 

widespread food stamp fraud may have caused her to be less 

likely to convict because food stamp fraud is an everyday 

occurrence and potentially not deserving of criminal prosecution 

despite the statutory requirement. 

The district court’s decision to strike Juror 58 for cause 

was not an abuse of its wide discretion. Although the juror 
6

stated that she could be fair and impartial, there was a real 

possibility of partiality based on her preconceived impression 

and opinion. Further, although the Defendants complain that the 

court violated their due process rights, their counsel did not 

take the opportunity to question Juror 58. The trial judge is 

in the best position to evaluate a potential juror’s 

impartiality and credibility based on the juror’s answers to 

questions presented. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749. We have 

reviewed the record and find that the court did not abuse its 

discretion.

Next, the Defendants contend that the district court erred 

in determining the amount of loss at sentencing at nearly $1.2 

million. They contend that the cost of goods determined by 

expert witness David Rutledge should be reduced because “several 

items” were left out of the calculation; they, however, do not 

identify these items. An increase in the cost of goods sold 

would reduce the amount of the fraudulent funds received. The 

Defendants also do not address the district court’s 

determination that the reduction that they sought would require 

a finding of a 39 percent addition in the cost of goods sold—

also unsupported by the trial evidence or any materials in their 

sentencing memoranda.

Mohssen also argued that he should be held responsible for 

less than the $1,185,583 loss amount because there were some 
7

“missing invoices”—again with no further specific information—

that would increase the cost of goods. Mohssen further contends

that he should only be responsible for the funds deposited in 

the Wells Fargo account because he was not a signor on the M&T 

account.1

In assessing a challenge to the district court’s 

application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review the district 

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal 

conclusions de novo. United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 

609, 612 (4th Cir. 2010). The amount of loss for sentencing 

purposes “is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3(A) (2013). 

When calculating the loss attributable to a defendant, a 

district court “need only make a reasonable estimate of the 

loss, given the available information.” United States v. 

Miller, 316 F.3d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 2003). Here, the cost of 

goods and loss calculation methodologies were thoroughly 

explained by FBI Forensic Accountant, and expert witness, David 

 1 Defendants also briefly alternatively argue that they 

should only be held responsible for the amounts specified in the 

counts in the superseding indictment (resulting in an offense 

level of 7 for $772.04), or that they should split the amount 

deposited in the Wells Fargo because they were each a signor, 

instead of both being responsible for the full amount. For the 

reasons stated below, the district court did not err in 

determining the loss to be over $1,183,000 for each Defendant.
8

Rutledge, and U.S. Department of Agriculture Special Agent 

Stanley Wojtkonski. These witnesses adequately supported their

reasoning. Moreover, the Defendants did not point to specific 

items that would have changed the cost of goods sold and 

subsequently the total estimated loss related to the food stamp 

fraud. We therefore conclude that the district court 

appropriately determined that the estimated loss from the 

Defendants’ scheme was over $1 million and did not clearly err 

in determining the loss amount.

The court also did not err in rejecting Mohssen’s request 

to split the loss between the Defendants. Members of a 

conspiracy or scheme to defraud can be held responsible at 

sentencing for the entire foreseeable loss caused by the 

conspiracy or scheme. See United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 

471, 498 (4th Cir. 2003) (“In calculating fraud loss, a 

sentencing court must first apply the principles of relevant 

conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. 

Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1993) (“one participant 

in a multi-participant . . . conspiracy may be held accountable, 

for sentencing purposes, for a greater or lesser [amount] than 

other coparticipants”). “[T]he fraud loss properly attributable 

to a defendant[] must be determined on the basis of (1) the acts 

and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, 

induced, procured, or willfully caused by a defendant; and 
9

(2) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all 

reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 

furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” 

Bolden, 325 F.3d at 499; see USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 

There was testimony at trial by three witnesses that the 

Defendants jointly operated Sam’s, thus the Defendants quite 

clearly participated in “jointly undertaken criminal activity.” 

The court did not clearly err in determining that the same loss 

amount should apply to both Defendants.

Finally, Mohssen argues that the district court erred in 

determining that he did not play a minor or minimal role in the 

fraud. See USSG § 3B1.2. Mohssen contends that he was entitled 

to the offense level reduction because he was not an owner or 

supervisor of Sam’s, was not listed as an owner on the property 

bill of sale, was not a signor on the M&T account, only received 

a disbursement of $23,592.50 to his personal bank account, and 

did not sign or submit the application to become a food stamp 

retailer.

A district court’s determination regarding a defendant’s 

role in the offense is reviewed for clear error. United 

States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2012). To 

establish eligibility for a reduced offense level under § 3B1.2, 

“[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that he is entitled to a mitigating role 
10

adjustment in sentencing.” Powell, 680 F.3d at 358-59 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The court examines “whether the 

defendant’s conduct is material or essential to committing the 

offense.” United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 202 (4th 

Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mohssen was certainly more than a minor or minimal 

participant in the food stamp fraud scheme. His girlfriend and 

other witnesses testified that Mohssen ran the store 

approximately half of the time. Mohssen’s girlfriend also 

testified that Mohssen told her that he and Abdulla were 

co-owners of Sam’s. Further, although Mohssen attempts to 

characterize his financial benefit from the scheme as minimal 

because he only had approximately $23,000 disbursed to his 

personal checking account, he used the Wells Fargo Sam’s account 

as “his own personal piggybank” and withdrew funds regularly. 

He also recruited at least one food stamp participant to sell 

his benefits for cash. These are not circumstances signifying 

decreased culpability. We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not clearly err in determining that Mohssen was not 

entitled to the role in the offense reduction.2

 2 Defendants briefly argue that their 48-month sentences are 

substantively unreasonable in consideration of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2) (2012) because there is no need for deterrence as 

they are subject to deportation after they have served their 

sentences. They also claim that their sentences are 

(Continued)
11

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 

substantively unreasonable, without any specific supporting 

argument. As the Defendants’ sentences are within the properly 

calculated Guidelines range and they have not rebutted the 

presumption that their sentences are reasonable balanced against 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, we conclude the court 

did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences. See

United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.) 

(citation omitted) (“[A]ny sentence that is within or below a 

properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively 

[substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be 

rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when 

measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”), cert. 

denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).