alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

JOSE MANUAL HERRERA-LOPEZ,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-30207

D.C. No. 1:08-CR-00232-BLW-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 6, 2010** 

Seattle, Washington

Before: CANBY, NOONAN and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

Jose Manual Herrera-Lopez appeals from his 46-month sentence imposed

following a guilty plea to one count of unlawful reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §

1326. Because Herrera-Lopez did not object to the adequacy of the Rule 11 plea

FILED

AUG 11 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
colloquy before the district court, we review for plain error. E.g., United States v.

Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir. 2009). We dismiss in light of the valid appeal

waiver.

The record does not support Herrera-Lopez’s claim that the appeal waiver is

invalid because the district court failed to satisfy Rule 11(b)(1)(N) during the plea

colloquy. The district judge informed Herrera-Lopez that he was “giving up the

majority of [his] rights to appeal the . . . sentence . . . . other than those few that are

delineated in the plea agreement” and confirmed that he understood he was doing

so. The court therefore “addressed the defendant personally” regarding the appeal

waiver and “determine[d] that [he] underst[ood]” the meaning of the waiver in

compliance with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). See United States v. Siu Kuen Ma,

290 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, Herrera-Lopez confirmed—both

in writing before the Rule 11 colloquy and orally during it—that he read the entire

plea agreement, understood its terms, and discussed it with his attorney. See id. at

1005; see also United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008). Further,

the district court provided notice that it could depart from the sentencing guidelines

and was not required to discuss potential guideline adjustments. See United States

v. Barragan-Espinoza, 350 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, any error by

the district court in failing to discuss with Herrera-Lopez the specific terms of the

exceptions to the appeal waiver did not affect his substantial rights. See Ross, 511
Because Herrera-Lopez knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 1

appeal, we do not reach the sentencing enhancement question. See Ma, 290 F.3d at

1005 n.1.

F.3d at 1236. Cf. United States v. Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004)

(setting aside an appeal waiver where there was a “wholesale failure” to mention

it).

Because the district court did not commit plain error in its Rule 11 colloquy,

we enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., Watson, 582 F.3d 1

at 987.

DISMISSED.
#### STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. 4.62 ACRES, MORE OR LESS; Allen Vezey, Mrs. A.G. Blake, aka Lisette Eva Blake; the Estate of Lisette Eva Blake, all of her heirs, devisees, legatees, or assigns; Albert Ramsey; the Estate of Albert Ramsey, all of his heirs, devisees, legatees, or assigns; and also all other persons or parties unknown claiming a right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the real estate described in the complaint in this action, Respondents. STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. 17.727 ACRES, MORE OR LESS; Sitnasuak Native Corporation; Bering Straits Native Corporation; and also all other persons or parties unknown claiming a right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the real estate described in the complaint in this action, Respondents.

No. S-476.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Aug. 23, 1985.

Linda L. Walton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fairbanks, and Norman C. Gorsueh, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for petitioner.

William R. Satterberg, Jr., Fairbanks, for respondents.

Donald C. Mitchell, Anchorage, for ami-cus curiae Alaska Federation of Natives.

Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and BURKE, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Following the filing of a Declaration of Taking by the state, the superior court ordered the state to conduct exploratory drilling on the property in question to determine whether it contained gold deposits. We granted review from this order and now reverse it.

A Declaration of Taking must “contain a statement of the amount of money estimated by the plaintiff to be just compensation for the property or the interest in it.” AS 09.55.430(6). The Declaration must be accompanied by a deposit of money in the amount of the estimate of just compensation. AS 09.55.440(a). The responsibility for estimating just compensation lies with the acquiring authority and the estimate is reviewable, if at all, only for bad faith. *In re United States,*257 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.) *cert. den.*358 U.S. 908, 79 S.Ct. 234, 3 L.Ed.2d 228 (1958); 5 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 18.7, at 18-391-94 (rev. 3d ed. 1981). Here there is no credible evidence that the state acted in bad faith. The order of the superior court is REVERSED.
49329.

#### MOUNTAIN HARDWOODS & PINE, INC. v. COOSA RIVER SAWMILL COMPANY.

Stolz, Judge.

The decision of this court in the present case reversing with direction the judgment of the trial court *(Mountain Hardwoods & Pine v. Coosa River Sawmill Co.,**276132 Ga. App. 224 (207 SE2d 643)) having been reversed by the Supreme Court *(Mountain Hardwoods & Pine v. Coosa River Sawmill Co.,*233 Ga. 414), our decision is hereby vacated and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in this case.

Decided March 13, 1975.

*Wright, Walther & Morgan, Robert G. Walther,*for appellant.

*Rogers, Magruder & Hoyt, Wade C. Hoyt, Jr.,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Deen, P. J., and Marshall, J., concur.*
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2434 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on certain footwear. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. BROWNBACK introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on certain 

footwear. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN FOOTWEAR. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.22.47 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 certain footwear) is amended by striking ‘‘12/31/2009’’ 

7 and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2434 IS

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
#### STATE ex rel. Tyronne J. FORREST, Sr. v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 87-KH-0679.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Forrest, Tyronne Sr.; applying for remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 269-672.

Denied.
EXHIBIT
32.2


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report of FUEGO ENTERTAINMENT, INC. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended November 30, 2008, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Hugo M. Cancio, Principal Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: January
      20, 2009
            By:
            /s/ Hugo
      M. CancioHugo
      M. CancioTitle:
      Principal Financial Officer
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 11-2179

MARY JANE MCGAIR; JOSEPH MCGAIR,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA,

Defendant, Appellee,

ERRATA

The opinion of this Court issued on September 4, 2012, is

amended as follows:

On page 12, footnote 4, add the word "zones," followed by a

period, at the end of the sentence, after the quotation marks

(i.e., . . . moderate-risk" zones.)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SCOTSMAN
INDUSTRIES, INC. CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF JANUARY 3, 1999 AND SCOTSMAN
INDUSTRIES, INC. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED
JANUARY 3, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-03-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-29-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-03-1999
<CASH>                                          22,429
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  119,210
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,214
<INVENTORY>                                     90,908
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               258,327
<PP&E>                                          99,463
<DEPRECIATION>                                  62,932
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 707,650
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          165,022
<BONDS>                                        330,531
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,078
<OTHER-SE>                                     159,455
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   707,650
<SALES>                                        633,044
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               633,044
<CGS>                                          474,679
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  474,679
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              26,820
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 37,600
<INCOME-TAX>                                    18,672
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             18,928
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    18,926
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.79
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.76
        

</TABLE>
#### Thomas BRETTI, Appellant, v. Gail MacDONALD, Appellee. Thomas BRETTI, Petitioner, v. Honorable Francis X. KNUCK, Circuit Court Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent.

Nos. 86-3131, 86-3168.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 27, 1987.

*169Brian R. Hersh and Mitchell J. Panter, Miami, for appellant/petitioner.

Jack T. Headley and Kenneth Sherouse, Jr., Anthony Paterna, Miami, for appellee.

James Dougherty, Miami, for respondent.

Before HUBBART, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, father of a minor child, was awarded custody of the child by a July 1, 1986 decree of a Texas court after a jury trial.1 He brought the child to Florida in the late summer for a temporary stay and while here was served, on September 12, 1986, with a Rule to Show Cause, issued on the mother’s motion. At the hearing on the Rule to Show Cause the court entered a “Temporary Custody Order” awarding “temporary joint custody.”

By subsequent pleadings, including a sworn motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the father made the court aware of the Texas proceedings and the judgment of the Texas court. The father’s motion to dismiss was denied.

We grant the writ of prohibition and dismiss the cause of action for want of subject matter jurisdiction on authority of *Mondy v. Mondy,*428 So.2d 235 (Fla.1983), *Prickett v. Prickett,*498 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), and *Greene v. Greene,*432 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The mother argues that, even if Florida is not the child’s home state, section 61.1308, Florida Statutes (1985), provides for jurisdiction when there are exceptional circumstances. However, the “exceptional circumstances” upon which the mother relies are the same circumstances which the Texas court recently considered and, obviously, rejected. One of the express purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is to “[ajvoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as feasible.” Section 61.1304(6), Florida Statutes (1985). The circuit court should have refused to exercise jurisdiction over the mother’s motion for custody where the Texas court had recently considered the same “exceptional circumstances,” and where the child and petitioner-custodial parent were in Florida only temporarily.

The circuit court’s order awarding temporary custody is quashed and the cause is dismissed.

1

. Texas law provides for jury trials in child custody matters.
### From: Tracy Walters [twalters@mdaqmd.ca.gov] **Sent:** Monday, November 03, 2008 2:29 PM **To:** Au, Patrick@ARB **Cc:** Steckel.Andrew@epamail.epa.gov; Alan De Salvio **Subject:** Amendment of MDAQMD Rule 1165

- Glass Melting Furnaces **Attachments:** Clean MDAQMD Rule 1165.doc; Clean MDAQMD Rule 1165.pdf; 1165 Staff Report final.pdf; 1165_minute

001.PDF; 1165_reso

- 001.PDF; CARB Rule Eval.doc; SIP Checklist.doc Good afternoon, The Governing Board of the Mojave Desert Air Quality Management District (MDAQMD) amended Rule 1165

– Glass Melting Furnaces on August 25, 2008 . Attached for your review are the following documents pertaining to the adoption: * Rule 1165 (PDF and Word version) * Final Staff Report * Proof of Publication (included in Final Staff Report, appendix B) * Signed Notice of Exemption, San Bernardino and Riverside Counties (included in Final Staff Report, appendix D) * Minute item, Official Copy * Resolution 08
- 08, Official Copy * CARB Rule Evaluation Form * SIP Completeness Checklist Rule 1165 is to be included in the State Implementation Plan (SIP) and therefore requires submission to USEPA. 

### The MDAQMD received non
- substantive comments from both CARB and USEPA that were addressed in this rule amendment. The District expects that this will be the version included in the SIP. Please feel free to contact me if you need any further information. Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Tracy Walters Air Quality Specialist (760) 245
- 1661 x 6122 twalters@mdaqmd.ca.gov 

### Page 1 of 1

1/9/2012 file://C:\Program Files\Documentum\CTS\docbases\ProDocbase\config\temp_sessions\6374527059990816441\EP

...
#### Eddie Lee RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1125.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 22, 1988.

*982Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and David A. Davis, Asst. Public Defender, and Donald Mairs, Legal Intern, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Gary L. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

BARFIELD, Judge.

Appellant’s convictions for three counts of possession and three counts of sale of cocaine are reversed. The trial court improperly admitted evidence of a metal matchbox containing cocaine residue which was found on appellant at the time of his arrest.

The crimes charged arose from several controlled buys of cocaine made several hours before the arrest. The matchbox was in no way implicated in the charges as no evidence showed it was used in the sales. No separate charge related to possession of cocaine at the time of the arrest was brought by the state. The trial court admitted the matchbox and testimony that it contained cocaine, over defense objection, on the premise that possession at the time of arrest went to the issue of whether appellant possessed cocaine earlier. The trial court found no violation of the *Williams*Rule1 in admitting such evidence. The trial court likened the matchbox to a bloody knife found on a suspect in a knife murder which would be proper evidence, even if the state did not bring a separate weapons charge. We disagree, finding that the evidence of the matchbox was admitted solely to show propensity to possess cocaine at an earlier time, evidence which is inadmissible under the *Williams*Rule. The trial court admitted as much in allowing admission of the evidence. However, nothing tied the matchbox to any of the charges against appellant, unlike the knife to which the trial court analogized. This similar fact evidence was not offered for any permissible purpose under the *Williams*Rule. It was therefore admitted for an improper evidentiary purpose.

Accordingly, the convictions and sentence are REVERSED and the case REMANDED for a new trial.

THOMPSON, J., concurs.

NIMMONS, J., dissents without opinion.

1

. *Williams v. State,*110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), *cert. den.,*361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), now codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes: "Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity."
#### Agnes BECKSTEAD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Delos BECKSTEAD, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 18331.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 18, 1983.

Don Blaekham, West Valley City, for defendant and appellant.

Don E. Olsen, Kenneth M. Hisatake, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant appeals from a modification of a divorce decree based on changed circumstances.

The parties were divorced in 1979. Defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff $205 per month alimony. At the time of the divorce, the principal marital asset was the family home in Sandy, Utah. There was an outstanding mortgage balance on the home in the amount of about $28,000, which mortgage had been obtained for the benefit of their daughter.1 The court ordered that the. home be sold and that the proceeds be divided 60% to plaintiff and 40% to defendant. The mortgage balance was deducted from plaintiff’s share of the proceeds and she received in its place the daughter’s obligation to the parties for the loan they had made to her.2

In 1981, plaintiff filed a petition to modify the decree based on changed circumstances. The daughter’s debt to her had been discharged in bankruptcy and plaintiff sought an increase in alimony because she had not realized her fair share in the proceeds from the sale of the home. Accordingly, the court increased alimony from $205 to $400 per month. It is from that order that defendant appeals.

*48Defendant contends that there has been no change of circumstances to justify the increased alimony. He argues that the daughter’s bankruptcy did not affect plaintiff in the least, because the daughter had made *no*payments on the debt since the original decree was entered. Defendant also alleges that because of his inability to pay, the trial court abused its discretion in increasing the alimony award.

It is true that in order to secure a change in alimony, the moving party must allege and prove changed conditions arising since the entry of the original decree.3 It is also true that the trial court retains a considerable latitude of discretion in modifying a decree.4 In the instant case, we do not believe that discretion was abused. Clearly, plaintiff has been denied a portion of the proceeds which it was contemplated she would receive from the home. Whether the daughter had or had not made payments since the decree is immaterial in this case, because the property settlement was “inextricably involved” with the alimony award.5

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. Their daughter received the proceeds of the loan and had been making monthly payments on the loan.

2

. Apparently, it was anticipated that the daughter would make monthly payments to plaintiff in the amount of $237.

3

. *Hampton v. Hampton,*86 Utah 570, 47 P.2d 419 (1935).

4

. *Mitchell v. Mitchell,*Utah, 527 P.2d 1359 (1974).

5

.See *Dogu v. Dogu,*Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 (1982).
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2103 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2103

     To suspend temporarily the duty on certain static converters.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

   Mr. Levin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To suspend temporarily the duty on certain static converters.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN STATIC CONVERTERS.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00      Static converters   Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                        capable of                                                         31/2011.......
                        converting up to
                        440 volts direct
                        current to no
                        less than 12
                        volts direct
                        current (provided
                        for in subheading
                        8504.40.95)
                        certified by the
                        importer for use
                        in electrically
                        powered vehicles
                        of subheading
                        8703.90 in which
                        an on board
                        gasoline engine
                        is used to run a
                        generator that
                        recharges the
                        electric drive
                        motor battery....

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
I am writing to record and make my displeasure known about allowing the Avenal Power Center to 

be grandfathered in to the old regulations and not the newer stricter rules. As a life long 

resident of Avenal I have seen the high growth rate of asthma during the last 20 years. 

Which is why the Avenal Power Center needs to be regulated with the most up to date 

regulation to both ensure safe power and safe air coming from the power plant. Please feel 

free to contact me for any questions.

Francisco Lopez

Avenal Power Center 

Francisco Lopez 

to: 

R9AirPermits 

04/12/2011 11:30 PM 

Hide Details 

From: Francisco Lopez 

To: R9AirPermits@EPA 

History: This message has been forwarded. 

Page 1 of 1

4/14/2011