* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-20797

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SARAH TESS UY, also known as Sarah Montebello,

also known as Virginia Gonzaga, also known as

Corinna Marie Kanjanasoon; RAFAEL GONZALEZ,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CR-H-95-259-1)

September 15, 1997

Before KING, DAVIS, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

On October 20, 1995, Sarah Tess Uy (“Uy”), a/k/a Sarah

Montbello, a/k/a Virginia Gonzaga, a/k/a Corrinna Marie

Kanjanasoon, was indicted for being the organizer and mastermind of

a scheme and artifice to defraud insurance companies by the filing

of false and fraudulent insurance claims, based primarily upon1 Kapp Tiango, the offi ce manager of Prime Care Rehab and

Therapy Center, was also named in all 11 counts of the indictment.

Tiango is not a party to the instant appeal.

2 staged and false automobile accidents and false doctors’ reports.

Rafael Gonzalez, a physical therapist who worked at Prime Care

Rehab and Therapy Clinic in Houston, Texas, was also indicted as

being involved in the fraud.

In an eleven-count indictment, Uy and Gonzalez were both

charged with one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

371 (count one), and five counts of mail fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1341 (counts two through six). Uy was additionally

charged with five counts of money laundering in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1956(1)(B) (counts seven through eleven). 1

Gonzalez was arraigned on October 24, 1995 and entered a plea

of not guilty. Uy was arraigned on November 3, 1995 and also

entered a plea of not guilty.

On April 8, 1996, the case proceeded to a jury trial. On

April 17, 1996, the district court denied Uy’s motion for judgment

of acquittal, but granted Gonzalez’s motion for acqui ttal on the

charges alleged in counts three through six.

On April 18, 1996, the jury found Uy guilty on all counts

charged in the indictment, and Gonzalez guilty on counts one, two,

four, and five. Uy was remanded into the custody of the Bureau of

Prisons to serve concurrent 108-month terms of confinement on

counts seven through eleven an d concurrent sixty-month terms of3

confinement on counts one through six. The terms of confinement

are to be followed by concurrent three-year and five-year terms of

supervised release. Uy was ordered to pay $400,000 in restitution

and $550 in mandatory special assessments.

Gonzalez was ordered to serve concurrent twenty-seven-month

terms of confinement to be followed by concurrent two-year terms of

supervised release. Gonzalez was ordered to pay mandatory assessments totaling $200.

On appeal, Uy and Gonzalez each argue that the evidence

introduced at trial was insufficient to support their res pective

convictions. Additionally, Uy asserts the following arguments: (1)

the district court abused its discretion by failing to submit to

the jury her requested instructions on the defense of “good faith”

and “multiple conspiracies”; (2) the district court erred by

failing to suppress evidence obtained during a se arch of Uy’s

house; (3) her counsel rendered her ineffective assistance at

trial; and (4) the district court clearly erred in determining her

sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. As to this

last issue, Uy specifically argues that the district court erred in

calculating the amount of loss; adjusting her offense level because

the offense af f ected a financial institution; determining the

amount of restitution; and, imposing consecutive sentences.

We have carefully rev iewed the briefs, the reply brief, the

record excerpts, and relevant portions of the record itself. As to4

both Sarah Tess Uy, a/k/a Sarah Montbello, a/k/a Virginia Gonzaga,

a/k/a Corrinna Marie Kanjanasoon, and Rafael Gonzalez

, we are

satisfied that the judgment of the district court should, in all

things, be AFFIRMED

.