Filed 4/1/14 NBCUniversal Media v. Superior Court CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

NBCUNIVERSAL MEDIA, LLC et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent,

LARRY MONTZ et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest.

 B250892

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC475995)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Ernest M. Hiroshige, Judge. 

Petition granted.

Katten Muchin Rosenman, Gail Migdal Title, Joel R. Weiner, and Gloria C. 

Franke for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Law Offices of Martin N. Buchanan, Martin N. Buchanan; Girardi & Keese, 

and Graham B. LippSmith for Real Parties in Interest.
2

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners NBCUniversal Media, LLC, formally known as NBC Universal, 

Inc. and Universal Television Network seek a writ of mandate directing the 

superior court to vacate its order denying their motion for summary judgment and 

to enter an order granting the motion of summary judgment against real parties in 

interest Larry Montz and Daena Smoller (RPIs). For the reasons stated below, we 

will issue a peremptory writ of mandate.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 29, 2011, RPIs filed a complaint for damages against 

petitioners in Los Angeles County Superior Court, alleging (1) breach of implied 

contract, and (2) breach of confidence. According to RPIs, from 1996 through 

2001, they presented ideas and concepts for a television program, entitled Ghost 

Expeditions: Haunted, (referred to as “Concepts”) to petitioners, “consistent with 

well-established customs and practices of the entertainment industry . . . .” RPIs’ 

idea was a reality television series where “professional paranormal investigators”

would lead a team that included “normal people with regular jobs” to investigate 

haunted houses throughout the country. After informing RPIs they were not 

interested, petitioners then teamed up with another company to “misappropriate, 

use and exploit Plaintiffs’ Concepts by producing the hit series Ghost Hunters

without Plaintiffs’ permission . . . and/or without compensating Plaintiffs . . . .”

1

 

RPIs alleged petitioners breached an implied contractual obligation not to

“disclose, use and/or exploit the Concepts without Plaintiffs’ permission and/or 

 

1

Respondents also sued Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., Craig Piligian, and 

Jason Conrad Hawes, who produced the Ghost Hunters show. The trial court 

granted summary adjudication as to these defendants, and respondents did not 

appeal that ruling. 
3

without compensating Plaintiffs in the form of payments, credit and other 

consideration . . . .” RPIs further alleged that as a result of their conduct, a

confidential relationship formed between petitioners and them, and that petitioners

“breached the confidential relationship by, among other actions, teaming up with 

and using [another company] to disclose, misappropriate, use and exploit 

Plaintiffs’ Concepts by disclosing Plaintiffs’ Concepts and producing the hit series

Ghost Hunters, repackaged as Defendants’ own projects without Plaintiffs’ 

permission and/or without compensating Plaintiffs . . . .” RPIs sought injunctive 

and other equitable relief, petitioners’ profits, and punitive damages. 

Petitioners filed an answer, generally denying the allegations. They also 

asserted 20 affirmative defenses, including the defense that each of the causes of 

action was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code

of Civil Procedure section 339.

2

On December 13, 2012, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, 

asserting (1) that RPIs’ claims were time-barred by the applicable two-year statute 

of limitations, and (2) that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Ghost 

Hunters was created independent of petitioners’ Concepts. In their separate 

statement of undisputed material facts in support of the motion for summary 

judgment, petitioners asserted -- and RPIs did not dispute: (1) that petitioners 

approved the Ghost Hunters show in April 2004; (2) that the show premiered on 

the Syfy cable channel on October 6, 2004; (3) that RPIs first filed a lawsuit based 

upon the purported misappropriation of their ideas more than two years later in 

federal court on November 8, 2006; and (4) that after a series of court proceedings 

(including voluntary dismissal of their copyright infringement claim), RPIs re-filed 

the remaining state law claims in superior court on December 29, 2011. 

 

2

All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
4

Petitioners also produced evidence that on July 22, 2004, Robyn LattakerJohnson, petitioners’ director of development for alternative programming at Syfy,

sent an e-mail to Eric Mofford, RPIs’ producer, informing him about the Ghost 

Hunters show. The e-mail described the show as a “docu soap about a group of 

plumbers-by-day/ghost-hunters-by-night that set out on missions to disprove 

ghosts or paranormal activity.” Mofford immediately forwarded the e-mail to 

Montz. In his deposition, Montz admitted speaking with Mofford about the e-mail: 

“I[] asked him if he had found out if this was our show that was stolen or not, and 

he replied by saying that Robyn says it’s not our show, that it’s a docu-soap.” 

Montz stated that he did not know what a “docu-soap” was; he asked Mofford, but 

was not enlightened. Montz also admitted that at that time it seemed possible that 

the show Ghost Hunters was an improper use of his idea for a television show. 

Montz and Mofford continued to discuss Ghost Hunters on two subsequent 

occasions, and at one point, Mofford told Montz that “he had pitched the show 

directly to [petitioners], as well as others . . . , and it looked like our show had been 

lifted from us.” 

Petitioners argued that the statute of limitations on RPIs’ claims began to 

run, at the latest, when the Ghost Hunters series premiered on the Syfy channel on 

October 6, 2004 (more than two years before RPIs filed suit), and that RPIs were 

on inquiry notice months before that date. 

RPIs opposed the motion for summary judgment, arguing that their claims

were not precluded by the statute of limitations, and that there were triable issues 

of material fact regarding petitioners’ independent creation defense. As to the 

statute of limitations, RPIs contended that they were entitled to delayed accrual of 

their claims under discovery rule, as they did not discover their claims until 

sometime in 2005, when Smoller saw “an episode of the show . . . upon which she 
5

realized that Ghost Hunters was not a fictional show.” They noted that Montz 

could not recall the exact date “he was made aware of Defendants’ Ghost Hunters

series when [sic] he believed Plaintiffs’ concepts [were] being used improperly.” 

RPIs further asserted that they were not put on inquiry notice by the July 22, 2004 

e-mail from Lattaker-Johnson, as they did not know the meaning of the term 

“docu-soap.”

In support of their opposition, RPIs produced transcript excerpts from the 

depositions of Montz and Smoller. Montz testified that he “believe[d]” he saw two 

episodes of Ghost Hunters after the lawsuit was filed. Before the lawsuit was 

filed, he saw “segments” while he was “changing channels, [when he] stopped on 

that show for like a minute and a half, and that was it.” Montz stated he did not 

watch more because he was not interested in seeing a show “stolen from me” that

“duplicated our treatment.” He knew the show had copied his idea from “reading 

the review or a few of their shows on the Internet and in watching the promos and 

a few segments.” Smoller testified that after she first saw an episode of Ghost 

Hunters in 2005, she discussed the show with Montz. The substance of their 

discussion was that the show “apparently . . . wasn’t a soap opera, and it wasn’t 

portrayed as something fictional, and it seemed shockingly similar to what we had 

been pitching.” 

Petitioners’ reply argued that RPIs had filed their claims more than a month 

after the statute of limitations had expired. Petitioners asserted that RPIs were not 

entitled to delayed accrual under the discovery rule. They contended that delayed 

discovery was inapplicable because the offending work -- Ghost Hunters -- had 

been publicly televised. Moreover, even if the discovery rule applied, RPIs were 

on inquiry notice before the show premiered on Syfy. 
6

In a tentative ruling, the trial court found that RPIs had met their burden to 

show a triable issue of fact as to whether they should have suspected a factual basis 

for their claims prior to November 8, 2004. The court noted that RPIs had 

submitted evidence: (1) that they were informed in July 2004 that Ghost Hunters

was a “docu soap,” but that they did not know the meaning of the term “docu 

soap”; (2) that Montz could not recall that date he was made aware that RPIs’ 

Concepts were being used improperly; and (3) that Smoller did not see an episode 

of the show until 2005. On July 31, 2013, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion 

for summary judgment. Regarding the statute of limitations, the court ruled: 

“In this case, Plaintiffs originally filed their action on November 8, 2006, 

only a month after the two-year statute of limitations would have expired based on 

the public release date of October 6, 2004. As discussed in the tentative ruling and 

in Plaintiffs’ papers, there is evidence to explain that one-month delay that must be 

considered by the trier of fact. The cases cited by Defendants generally involved 

public release of a movie in theaters, which would draw more attention than 

release of a television series on a cable television network. Those cases also 

generally involved much longer delays in filing suit after public release of the 

defendant’s work.” 

On August 27, 2013, petitioners filed a verified petition for writ of mandate, 

seeking a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to set aside and 

vacate its order denying petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and enter a 

new order granting the motion in its entirety. On November 21, 2013, this court 

issued a request for a preliminary response from RPIs and a reply from petitioners, 

on the sole issue of the statute of limitations. After considering the preliminary 

response and reply, on January 24, 2014, this court issued an alternative writ of 
7

mandate directing the superior court either to grant the relief requested by 

petitioners or to show cause why it should not be ordered to do so.3 

On February 13, 2014, RPIs filed a return to the alternative writ. RPIs 

attempted to distinguish the cases cited in this court’s alternative writ and 

contended that the holdings in Shively and Hebrew Academy addressing the 

discovery rule were limited to claims governed by the Uniform Single Publication 

Act (USPA); as RPIs’ claims were not governed by the USPA, they contended the 

holdings in those cases did not control. Alternatively, RPIs argued that even if the 

USPA applied, it would bar only those claims based on episodes of Ghost Hunters

broadcast more than two years before the lawsuit was filed. Finally, RPIs 

contended that under “continuing-wrong principles,” the statute of limitations did 

not bar their claims. 

On February 27, 2014, petitioners filed their reply, arguing that RPIs had 

failed to demonstrate their claims were not time-barred. Petitioners asserted that 

the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the discovery rule in Shively and Hebrew 

Academy were not limited to cases governed by the USPA, and that the statute of 

limitations thus began to run no later than the public disclosure of the material, i.e., 

 

3

In our alternative writ, we cited Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502 

(Davies) [statute of limitations accrues no later than date of public dissemination of 

disputed material]; Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 607 

F.3d 620 (Benay) [generally, accrual date for breach of implied contract is date on 

which work is released to public]; Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230

(Shively) [discovery rule inapplicable once alleged defamatory material published]; 

Hebrew Academy of San Francisco v. Goldman (2007) 42 Cal.4th 883 (Hebrew 

Academy) [discovery rule did not extend statute of limitations beyond publication 

of alleged defamatory statements although dissemination to public was extremely 

limited]; and Long v. Walt Disney Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 868 (Long) [statute 

of limitations for exploitation of likeness accrued when disputed images were 

broadcast on national television; discovery rule inapplicable].
8

the October 6, 2004 broadcast. They further contended that RPIs had forfeited 

their “continuing wrong” arguments by failing to raise them in the trial court or in 

RPIs’ preliminary response.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

An order denying summary judgment is reviewable by a petition for writ of 

mandamus. (Transport Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 984,

1011.) “‘Where the facts are undisputed and the law establishes the right of a party 

to an order or to the relief which the court has refused, the writ will lie.’” 

(Whitney’s at the Beach v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 258, 265, quoting 

California Pine Box & Lbr. Co. v. Superior Court (1910) 13 Cal.App. 65, 70.) “A 

defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the record establishes as a matter of

law that none of the plaintiff’s asserted causes of action can prevail. [Citation.]” 

(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) Generally, “the party 

moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a 

prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he 

carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then 

subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of 

the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) 

Here, petitioners contend that on the undisputed facts, they are entitled to 

summary judgment, as RPIs’ claims were filed after the statute of limitations had 

run. For the reasons explained below, we agree. 
9

B. Statute of Limitations 

RPIs’ causes of action are governed by the two-year limitations period set 

forth in section 339. (§ 339, subd. (1) [claims based on a contract, obligation or 

liability not founded upon an instrument of writing]; Blaustein v. Burton (1970) 

9 Cal.App.3d 161, 185 (Blaustein) [breach of implied contract claim governed by 

two-year limitations period of section 339, subdivision 1]; Davies, supra,

14 Cal.3d at p. 511 [assuming action for breach of confidence is valid cause of 

action, it is governed by two-year limitations period of section 339, subdivision 1.)4 

Generally, the limitations period starts running when the last element of a 

cause of action is complete. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 

797, 806 (Fox).) As used in this context, the “‘elements’” of a cause of action are 

the “‘generic’” elements of wrongdoing, causation, and injury. (Id. at p. 807.) “A 

suit for breach of an implied contract not to exploit an idea without paying for 

it . . . arise[s] only with the sale or exploitation of the idea.” (Davies, supra, 

14 Cal.3d at pp. 511-512.) Whether and when an idea has been exploited -- as 

understood and intended by the parties -- may be difficult to ascertain. For 

example, exploitation of an idea may occur the moment a preliminary script is 

written embodying the idea, even if no subsequent publicly-disclosed work based 

upon such script is ever produced. On the other hand, the exploitation may occur 

 

4

RPIs alleged a claim for “breach of confidence,” as opposed to a claim for 

breach of a confidential relationship. (See Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 510, 511 

[noting difference between two claims; no support for a finding of existence of 

confidential relationship where defendant was not a trusted friend or adviser, but 

rather “a prospective purchaser or exploiter of Davies’ idea”].) Although several 

lower California courts have recognized a breach of confidence cause of action 

(see Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1345), 

the California Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the validity of such a cause of 

action. (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 798, fn. 5.)
10

upon defendants’ “disclosure of the idea to a substantial segment of the public 

since such use would tend to destroy any further marketability of the idea.” 

(Blaustein, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at p. 186.) Due to the difficulty in ascertaining the 

parties’ intent in implied contract cases, “California courts generally assume that 

the accrual date is the date on which the work is released to the general public,” as 

the public release would destroy any further marketability. (Benay v. Warner Bros. 

Entertainment, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3d 620, 633.) For a breach of confidence 

cause of action, the accrual date is easier to ascertain: the statute of limitations 

runs from the date of the first unauthorized disclosure. (Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d 

at p. 512.) 

“While resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of 

fact, where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible 

of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly 

& Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112 (Jolly); see also Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 

21 Cal.4th 383, 405 (Norgart) [affirming summary judgment on statute of 

limitations ground]; Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 902-903 [same]; 

Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 103 [same].)

C. Motion for Summary Judgment

In their motion for summary judgment, petitioners made a prima facie 

showing that RPIs’ causes of action were time-barred as a matter of law. With 

regard to both RPIs’ breach of implied contract and breach of confidence claims, 

the causes of action accrued no later than the date when the Ghost Hunters show 

was released to the general public, i.e., October 6, 2004. Thus, RPIs had until 

October 5, 2006 to file their lawsuit. They did not do so until November 8, 2006. 

Accordingly, RPIs’ causes of action were time-barred, unless an exception applies.
11

D. The Rationales for Applying the Discovery Rule to Delay Accrual.

The most important exception to the general rule regarding accrual of a 

cause of action is the “‘discovery rule.’” (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 797.) “It may be expressed by the Legislature or implied by 

the courts.” (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.) The discovery rule “postpones 

accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, 

the cause of action.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807.) RPIs contend they are 

entitled to delayed accrual of their causes of action under the discovery rule

because they did not see an episode of Ghost Hunters until sometime in 2005. We 

disagree.

RPIs have the burden of demonstrating their entitlement to delayed accrual 

of their causes of action. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th 

at p. 850 [once party moving for summary judgment makes a prima facie case

showing nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, burden shifts to 

opposing party to show a triable issue of material fact].) “In order to rely on the 

discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose 

complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of 

the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of 

discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable 

diligence.’” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808, quoting McKelvey v. Boeing North 

American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160, superseded in part by statute, as 

stated in Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, fn. 8, 

italics omitted; accord, April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 

805, 832 (April Enterprises) [“plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to convince the 

trial judge that delayed discovery was justified”].) 
12

A plaintiff’s inability to discover a cause of action may occur “when it is 

particularly difficult for the plaintiff to observe or understand the breach of duty, or 

when the injury itself (or its cause) is hidden or beyond what the ordinary person 

could be expected to understand.” (Shively, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1248; accord 

April Enterprises, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 831 [“A common thread seems to 

run through all the types of actions where courts have applied the discovery rule. 

The injury or the act causing the injury, or both, have been difficult for the plaintiff 

to detect.”].) For example, where a professional, such as a doctor or a lawyer, 

breaches a duty of care, “delayed accrual is justified on the basis that the expertise 

expected of professionals is beyond the ability of laypersons to evaluate, and on 

the further basis that it may be impossible for a layperson even to observe the 

professional’s application of this expertise.” (Shively, at p. 1248, citing Neel v. 

Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 188 [legal 

malpractice claim].)5

Although delayed accrual under the discovery rule generally applies to most 

tort actions, it has been held applicable to certain types of breach of contract 

actions, such as those involving fraud or misrepresentation by the defendant. 

(April Enterprises, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 830 [citing cases]; cf. Bernson v. 

Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 936 [“[A] defendant may be 

equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations when, as the result of 

intentional concealment, the plaintiff is unable to discover the defendant’s actual 

 

5

The discovery rule has also been applied to “causes of action involving the 

breach of a fiduciary relationship” (April Enterprises, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 827) on the rationale that in fiduciary relationships, a plaintiff is often unable to 

observe or understand a breach of fiduciary duty because the fiduciary is “in full 

control of [the plaintiff’s] affairs and of the expenditure of its funds.” (San 

Leandro Canning Co., Inc. v. Perillo (1931) 211 Cal. 482, 487).
13

identity”].) For example, section 339 provides that in “[a]n action based upon the 

rescission of a contract not in writing,” “[w]here the ground for rescission is fraud 

or mistake, the time does not begin to run until the discovery by the aggrieved 

party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (§ 339, subd. 3.)6 

Finally, for “certain, rather unusual breach of contract actions,” “the 

discovery rule may be applied to breaches which can be, and are, committed in 

secret and, moreover, where the harm flowing from those breaches will not be 

reasonably discoverable by plaintiffs until a future time.” (April Enterprises,

supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 832 [breach of contract claim].)

7

 In April Enterprises, 

the court provided the following rationale for this holding: “In most instances 

[where the discovery rule has been applied], the defendant has been in a far 

superior position to comprehend the [wrongful] act and the injury. And in many, 

the defendant had reason to believe the plaintiff remained ignorant he had been 

wronged. Thus, there is an underlying notion that plaintiffs should not suffer 

where circumstances prevent them from knowing they have been harmed. And 

often this is accompanied by the corollary notion that defendants should not be 

allowed to knowingly profit from their injuree’s ignorance.” (Id. at p. 831.)

 

6

Section 339 also provides that a cause of action “upon a contract, obligation 

or liability, evidenced by a certificate, or abstract or guaranty of title of real 

property, or by a policy of title insurance” “shall not be deemed to have accrued 

until the discovery of the loss or damage suffered by the aggrieved party 

thereunder.” (§ 339, subd. 1.) Respondents’ causes of action, however, are not 

based on a contract, obligation or liability evidenced by a writing.

7 Where a breach of contract is also a breach of a fiduciary duty, a plaintiff is 

entitled to delayed accrual of the breach of contract action. (April Enterprises, 

supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 832; Lee v. Escrow Consultants, Inc. (1989)

210 Cal.App.3d 915, 922-923 [same].)
14

E. RPIs Have Failed to Show They Are Entitled to Delayed Accrual Under the 

Discovery Rule.

Here, while RPIs have pled facts showing the time and manner of their 

discovery of their causes of action (Smoller’s viewing of an episode of Ghost 

Hunters in 2005), they have not pled facts showing an inability to discover their 

claims earlier despite reasonable diligence. RPIs alleged that the Ghost Hunters

series, including its initial episode, constituted an unlawful appropriation of the 

Concepts they shared in confidence with petitioners. As a matter of law, their 

causes of action were complete no later than the date of the initial broadcast, 

October 6, 2004, because on that date, the marketability of the Concepts was 

destroyed due to its disclosure to the public. (Blaustein, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 186.) Due to the initial broadcast, petitioners’ alleged breach of the implied 

contract or breach of confidence was no longer “particularly difficult for [RPIs] to 

observe or understand.” (Shively, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1248) Likewise, the 

injury itself (or its cause) was no longer “hidden or beyond what the ordinary 

person could be expected to understand.” (Ibid.) 

RPIs do not contend, nor does the evidence show, that petitioners 

fraudulently concealed the broadcast from them, or that they lacked a meaningful 

ability to view it. (Long , supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 875 [“Allowing these 

plaintiffs to sue years after the broadcasts ceased, without any indication of fraud

or a meaningful inability to discover the broadcasts, would violate the principal 

policy that underlies the [discovery] rule.”].) Thus, there were no “circumstances 

prevent[ing] them from knowing they ha[d] been harmed.” (April Enterprises, 

supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 831; cf. Perez-Encinas v. Amerus Life Ins. Co. (N.D. 

Cal. 2006) 468 F. Supp.2d 1127, 1136-1137 [declining to apply discovery rule to 

delay accrual of breach of contract action because alleged breach of contract not 
15

difficult to detect, breach was not secretive, and defendant not responsible for 

circumstances preventing plaintiffs from knowing about alleged breach].)

The mere fact that RPIs did not personally view the program until sometime

after the first broadcast is irrelevant, as the discovery rule does not operate to delay 

accrual of a cause of action “beyond the point at which their factual basis became 

accessible to plaintiff to the same degree as it was accessible to every other 

member of the public.” (Shively, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1253 [notwithstanding 

fact that plaintiff was not aware of defamatory statements in book until December 

1996, statute of limitations ran from when book was published in October 1996]; 

see also Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 468, 483 (Christoff) [no 

delayed accrual for misappropriation of likeness cause of action where the likeness 

of the plaintiff appeared on a product label that was “‘not published in an 

inherently secretive manner,’” but was distributed widely to the public]; Hebrew 

Academy, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 895 [“Because plaintiffs in the present case had 

access to the [defamatory] document from the time it was published, the discovery 

rule does not apply”]; Long, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 874 [discovery rule 

inapplicable where plaintiffs’ images were broadcast on national television].) 

Even in non-USPA cases, the Supreme Court has declined to delay accrual under 

the discovery rule where the cause of action could be ascertained from publicly 

available information. (See Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water 

Dist. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1185, 1197 [declining to delay accrual of statutory-based 

action to recover alleged overcharges paid to public utility because information 

about excessiveness of the charges was in the public record].) 

We reject the trial court’s ruling that RPIs are entitled to delayed accrual 

under the discovery rule because Ghost Hunters was broadcast on the Syfy channel 

rather than released in theatres. Regardless of whether the trial court was correct in 
16

surmising that release in theaters would attract more attention than release of a 

series on a cable television network, public disclosure to even a limited audience is 

sufficient to preclude a plaintiff from arguing that the breach and injury were 

secretive and difficult to detect. (See Hebrew Academy, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 

pp. 888, 895 [discovery rule inapplicable despite fewer than 10 copies of 

transcripts containing defamatory statements being published and distributed to a 

limited audience].) 

RPIs’ reliance on Nelson v. Indevus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2006) 

142 Cal.App.4th 1202 (Nelson) is misplaced. There, the appellate court rejected 

the argument that the statute of limitations on a product liability claim began to run 

when the dangers of the product were publicized in media reports. (Id. at pp. 1205, 

1208.) The Nelson court held that inquiry notice could not be imputed based solely 

on media reports. (Ibid.; accord Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of 

California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364.) As the Nelson court noted, its

holding was bolstered by section 340.8, subdivision (c)(2), which expressly 

provides that: “‘Media reports regarding the hazardous material or toxic substance 

contamination do not, in and of themselves, constitute sufficient facts to put a 

reasonable person on inquiry notice that the injury or death was caused or 

contributed to by the wrongful act of another.’” (Nelson, at pp. 1208-1209 [section 

340.8 applies to claims alleging injury from prescription drugs].) As RPIs’ claims 

do not involve hazardous materials or toxic substance contamination and they 

identify no statute with comparable language applicable to their claims, Nelson is 

of no assistance to them. 

More important, RPIs were on inquiry notice prior to the public broadcast of 

the Ghost Hunters show. A plaintiff is on inquiry notice when she “suspects or 

should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done 
17

something wrong to her.” (Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1110.) Montz had asked 

Mofford “if he had found out if this was our show that was stolen or not, and he 

replied by saying that Robyn says it’s not our show, that it’s a docu-soap.” 

Mofford’s reply was based on a July 22, 2004 e-mail from Robyn LattakerJohnson, which he forwarded to Montz the same day. Thus, at the latest, by July 

22, 2004, Montz suspected wrongdoing on the part of petitioners. That RPIs did 

not understand the meaning of the term “docu-soap” and did not view an episode 

of the Ghost Hunters show until 2005 is legally irrelevant.8Once RPIs were on 

inquiry notice, they were charged with information that could have been gained by 

examining public records. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 875.) 

As Ghost Hunters was publicly released and RPIs have not asserted that they were 

prevented from viewing the program, they are charged with knowledge of it. 

Accordingly, the discovery rule did not operate to delay accrual of RPIs’ causes of 

action beyond October 6, 2004.9

 

8

RPIs do not argue -- nor do the allegations in the complaint support -- that 

Lattaker-Johnson was in a fiduciary relationship with Montz that could have 

relieved him of an obligation to make further inquiry. (See Hobbs v. Bateman 

Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 174, 201-202 [“Where a 

fiduciary relationship exists, facts which ordinarily require investigation may not 

incite suspicion [citation] and do not give rise to a duty of inquiry [citation]”; 

however, “once a plaintiff becomes aware of facts which would make a reasonably 

prudent person suspicious, the duty to investigate arises and the plaintiff may then 

be charged with knowledge of the facts which would have been discovered by such 

an investigation.”].)

9

RPIs’ contention that Davies supports their argument that the statute of 

limitations did not run until they actually discovered the breach turns the holding 

of Davies on its head. There, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations 

on a breach of confidence claim began to run on the date the plaintiff actually 

discovered the breach, not a later date when the offending work was publicly 

released. This was because the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the breach preceded 
18

F. Continuing-Wrong Accrual Principles

In their return to the alternative writ, RPIs argued for the first time that under 

continuing-wrong accrual principles, a new cause of action accrued for each new 

episode of Ghost Hunters using their ideas without compensation. (See Aryeh v. 

Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1197-1198 (Aryeh)

[explaining continuing-wrong accrual principles].) RPIs concede they did not raise 

this issue in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Nor did they 

raise it in their preliminary response. At the hearing on the motion for summary 

judgment, RPIs’ counsel discussed a case, Goldberg v. Cameron (N.D. Cal. 2007) 

482 F.Supp.2d 1136 (Goldberg), where “because there were continuing instances 

of infringement, it could not be concluded that the claim was time barred in its 

entirety.” However, Goldberg was a copyright infringement case, and RPIs do not 

have a copyright infringement claim. Thus, counsel’s statement was insufficient to 

invoke the continuing-wrong accrual principles, and RPIs have forfeited this

argument. (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591 [arguments raised 

for first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited]; DiCola v. White Brothers 

Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676 [possible theories 

that were not fully developed or factually presented to the trial court cannot create 

a “triable issue” on appeal].) 

Moreover, resolution of the argument requires application of equitable

principles to a factual record that RPIs have failed to develop. Thus, we decline 

RPIs’ invitation to exercise our discretion to consider this new argument. 

(Zimmerman, Rosenfeld, Gersh & Leeds LLP v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 

 

the public release. (Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 511-512.) No similar facts are 

present here, except to the extent RPIs should or could have discovered their 

claims earlier than the initial broadcast. 
19

1466, 1488 [argument deemed forfeited “if it was not raised below and requires 

consideration of new factual questions”]; Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 

87 Cal.App.4th 953, 983 [“As a general rule, a new theory may not be presented 

for the first time on appeal unless it raises only a question of law and can be 

decided based on undisputed facts.”].)10

 

10 In addition, on the facts alleged, continuing-wrong accrual principles do not 

assist RPIs. Those principles include the continuing violation doctrine and the 

theory of continuous accrual. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1197.) The 

continuing violation doctrine applies to aggregate a series of small harms, any one 

of which may not be actionable on its own, into a single cause of action. The 

statute of limitations would run from the date of the last harmful act. Here, even 

were acts such as disclosure, screenwriting and filming not actionable on their 

own, the premiere of Ghost Hunters on Syfy on October 6, 2004 would be the last 

act necessary for a discrete cause of action against petitioners. 

As to the theory of continuous accrual, the statute of limitations runs from 

each breach of a continuous or recurring obligation. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 

p. 1199.) However, RPIs alleged that petitioners exploited their idea for a reality 

television series. Thus, each broadcast of a new episode of the Ghost Hunters

series is part of a single breach. Each broadcast of Ghost Hunters would constitute 

not a new breach, but rather additional harm. (See Blair v. Nevada Landing 

Partnership (Ill.Ct.App. 2006) 859 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 [misappropriation of 

likeness for use in advertising campaign from 1995 to 2004 not a continuing 

violation, as it constituted a single overt act with continuing ill effects; “To hold 

otherwise would cause an attendant problem of an endless tolling of the statute of 

limitations . . . .”]; see also Kourtis v. Cameron (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 989, 

1000-1001 [in case alleging breach of implied contract for uncompensated use of 

plaintiffs’ concept in a film, court declined to apply continuing wrong theory to 

delay accrual of claim beyond date of film’s public release, despite later release of 

film on DVD and use of same concept in sequel], abrogated on other grounds by 

Taylor v. Sturgell (2008) 553 U.S. 880; cf. Christoff, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 478, 

482 [declining to address continuing wrong argument and remanding for 

development of factual record whether use of likeness in advertising campaign 

constituted single publication under USPA].) 

The situation is analogous to a case where there has been an injury but the 

amount of resulting harm is uncertain. There, the statute of limitations runs from 
20

In sum, the undisputed facts and the law established the right of petitioners 

to an order granting their motion for summary judgment. 

DISPOSITION

It is ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding 

respondent superior court to set aside and vacate its order denying motion for 

summary judgment signed and filed July 31, 2013, and to enter an order granting 

 

the infliction of “appreciable and actual harm.” (Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d at 

p. 514.) In Davies, the plaintiff suffered appreciable and actual harm when the 

defendant first disclosed the writer’s confidential idea in 1955 and destroyed the 

marketability of the idea, though the defendant earned no profits from the 

disclosure until 1958. (Id. at p. 511; see also Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 797 [“Must the plaintiff sue even if doing so will require the

jury to speculate regarding prospective damages? Or can the plaintiff delay suit 

until a more accurate assessment of damages becomes possible? Generally, we 

have answered those questions in favor of prompt litigation, even when the extent 

of damages remains speculative.”].) Similarly, here, respondents suffered 

appreciable and actual harm at the latest, by October 6, 2004, when the Ghost 

Hunters show premiered on Syfy, and destroyed any marketability for their idea of 

a paranormal investigation reality television series. Thus, under continuing-wrong 

accrual principles, the two-year statute of limitations began running on October 6, 

2004. Because RPIs’ claims were filed more than two years later, they are timebarred. 
21

summary judgment as prayed for in petitioners’ notice of motion filed December 

13, 2012. 

Petitioners shall have their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MANELLA, J. 

We concur:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

EDMON, J.*

________________________________________________________________________

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.