alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 43 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  1st Session
S. CON. RES. 43

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That when the Senate recesses or adjourns at the close of business on 
Thursday, July 1, 1999, Friday, July 2, 1999, or Saturday, July 3, 
1999, on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its 
Majority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed or adjourned until 
noon on Monday, July 12, 1999, or until such time on that day as may be 
specified by its Majority Leader or his designee in the motion to 
recess or adjourn, or until noon on the second day after Members are 
notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent 
resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the House adjourns on 
the legislative day of Thursday, July 1, 1999, or Friday, July 2, 1999, 
on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its 
Majority Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned until 12:30 p.m. on 
Monday, July 12, 1999, for morning-hour debate, or until noon on the 
second day after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 
2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec. 2. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House, acting jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of 
the Senate and the Minority Leader of the House, shall notify the 
Members of the Senate and House, respectively, to reassemble whenever, 
in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

            Passed the Senate July 1, 1999.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
106th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                            S. CON. RES. 43

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess of the Senate and a 
        conditional adjournment of the House of Representatives.
```
#### Layton N. MILLER et al. v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY et al.

No. 86-C-2187.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 5, 1986.

In re Atlantic Richfield Co.; Arco Oil & Gas Corp.; Power Rig Drilling Co. Inc.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 85-1078; Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court, No. 85-1078.

Prior report: La.App., 499 So.2d 1095.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ. See dissent in *Lushute v. Diesi,*354 So.2d 179 (La.1978).
Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
 
 
 To the
Board of Directors
 Presstek,
Inc.:
 
 We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No.
33-80466, 33-61215, 33-39337, 333-76905, 333-97897 and 333-122230) on Form S-8
of Presstek, Inc. of our reports dated April 30, 2008, with respect to the
consolidated balance sheet of Presstek, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 29,
2007 and December 30, 2006, and the related consolidated statements of
operations, changes in stockholders’ equity and comprehensive income, and cash
flows for each of the years ended December 29, 2007 and December 30, 2006, and
the related consolidated financial statement schedule II and the effectiveness
of internal control over financial reporting as of December 29, 2007, which
reports appear in the December 29, 2007 annual report on Form 10-K of Presstek,
Inc.
 
 Our
report dated April 30, 2008, on the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting as of December 29, 2007, expresses our opinion that
Presstek, Inc. did not maintain effective internal control over financial
reporting as of December 29, 2007 because of the effect of material weaknesses
on the achievement of the objectives of the control criteria and contains an
explanatory paragraph that states: Material weaknesses related to
a)  significant or non-routine transactions, b) revenue recognition,
c) account reconciliations and journal entries, and d) inventory have been
identified and included in Management’s Report on Internal
Control over Financial Reporting.
  
  /s/ KPMG
LLP
  Boston,
Massachusetts
 April 30,
2008
50192.

#### CHRISTIE v. HOGAN-SCARBORO CORPORATION.

Evans, Judge.

Hogan-Scarboro Corporation, as plaintiff, filed suit against Lenn M. Christie, individually and d/b/a Christie Developers, as defendant, for $11,800 on a debt alleged to have arisen out of a contract. Plaintiff filed requests for admissions and among other things defendant admitted the authenticity of a letter dated November 30, 1973, mailed by defendant to plaintiff, which included this statement: "Please be advised that I accept your offer of settlement in the amount of $11,800. As soon as I can arrange for the transmittal of a check in the above amount, I will forward it to you.” No check was ever mailed by defendant to plaintiff and on February 22, 1974, about 82 days after receipt of the aforementioned letter, plaintiff filed suit for recovery of the $11,800 indebtedness admitted to be due by defendant’s letter. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment against defendant in the amount of $11,800, which the trial judge granted. Defendant appeals. *Held:*

1. The offer and acceptance are not in dispute, but defendant contends that his language: "As soon as I can arrange for the transmittal of a check in the above amount, I will forward it to you,” allows him a reasonable time to arrange for payment. The debtor’s letter of acceptance is dated November 30,1973, and suit was filed on February 22, 1974, and served on March 8, 1974. *152Counsel for defendant cite *Bearden Mercantile Co. v. Madison Oil Co.,*128 Ga. 695 (3) (58 SE 200); *Trailmobile Div. of Pullman v. Jones,*118 Ga. App. 472, 474 (164 SE2d 346); and *Whitley v. Patrick,*226 Ga. 87, 89 (4) (172 SE2d 692), which hold that when no time is agreed upon to perform a certain act, a reasonable time will be inferred; and that what is a reasonable time depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of taking action, which is ordinarily a matter of fact for determination by a jury.

Submitted February 10, 1975

Decided March 4, 1975.

*Lipshutz, Macey, Zusmann & Sikes, Frank B. Wilensky, Richard P. Kessler, Jr.,*for appellant.

*James V. Hilburn,*for appellee.

2. Thus, the principal issue on which defendant relies, and which he contends should have been submitted to a jury, is as to whether plaintiff waited a reasonable time before filing suit. The fact of the indebtedness is not in dispute. The record shows that about 82 days transpired after defendant assured plaintiff he would pay "as soon as I can arrange for transmittal of a check in the above amount...,” and before plaintiff filed suit. Nothing is shown as to any effort on defendant’s part to arrange for transmittal of the check during this period, and no suggestion is made as to any obstacle which prevented his sending the check during this time. This court is always reluctant to take any issue away from the jury, but here there seems to be nothing from which a jury could have decided that the time lapse before filing suit was unreasonable.

3. The judgment of the trial court in granting summary judgment to plaintiff for $11,800 against defendant is therefore affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Deen, P. J., and Stolz, J., concur.*
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 56 (Thursday, March 22, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 16895]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-6857]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service


Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Meeting Cancellation

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of meeting cancellation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the cancellation of the open meeting 
of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Small Business/Self-Employed Decreasing 
Non-Filers Project Committee scheduled for Tuesday, March 20, 2012 at 
10 a.m. Eastern Time via teleconference, which was originally published 
in the Federal Register on February 14, 2012, (Volume 77, Number 30, 
Page 8329).
    The meeting is cancelled pending renewal of the Taxpayer Advocacy 
Panel Charter.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patricia Robb at 1-888-912-1227 or 
(414) 231-2360.

    Dated: March 14, 2012.
Shawn Collins,
Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.
[FR Doc. 2012-6857 Filed 3-21-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-M
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 7322** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. KENNETH ROSHAUN REID , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Rock Hill
. Cameron McGowan Currie , District Judge. ( 0:04

- cr - 00353

- CMC

- 1 ; 0:13

- cv - 01943

- CMC )

Submitted : September 20, 2013 Decided: September 24, 2013

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Kenneth Roshaun Reid , Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake , Jimmie Ewing , Mark C. Moore , William Kenneth Witherspoon , Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia , South Carolina, for Appellee
. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Kenneth Roshaun Reid seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as successive his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2013 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
. Whe n the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 4 73, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debat able claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Reid has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appe al. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is C ourt and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
AARON FRANKLIN BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

NORTH FLORIDA SURGEONS, 

P. A. AND G. STEVEN WEBB, 

M.D.,

Appellees.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D12-3383

_____________________________/

Opinion filed July 28, 2014.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Jean M. Johnson, Judge.

Robert F. Jordan of Jordan Law Firm, PLLC, Lake City, for Appellant.

James T. Murphy and Jill F. Bechtold of Murphy, Ellis & Weldon, PLLC, 

Jacksonville, for Appellee.

ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

PER CURIAM.

In Brown v. North Florida Surgeons, P.A., 110 So. 3d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2013), we affirmed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. Appellant 
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for review, and by order dated June 9, 2014, 

the Court quashed our decision and remanded for reconsideration upon application 

of Franks v. Bowers, 116 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 2013). We directed the parties to show 

cause why the trial court’s order should not be reversed based upon Franks. The 

parties agree that reversal is required because the agreement containing the 

arbitration clause at issue in this case is the same agreement that was invalidated in 

Franks. Accordingly, the trial court’s order compelling arbitration is reversed and 

this case is remanded for further proceedings. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur JACKSON.

No. 87-KH-0183.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 27, 1987.

In re Jackson, Arthur; applying for remedial writs; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “M”, Nos. 86-1959F, 86-1960F.

Denied. Defendant’s Motion to Quash is pending in Jefferson Parish.
### Center for Regulatory Effectiveness

1601 Connecticut Avenue NW

Suite 500

Washington, DC 20009

Tel: ( 202 ) 265

- 2383 Fax: ( 202 ) 939

- 6969

contact@TheCRE.com www.TheCRE.com

April 16, 2015

The Honorable Dr. Ernest Moniz

U.S. Secretary of Energy

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Ave., SW

Washington, DC 20585

Dear Secretary Moniz :

I am writing you to express my opinion that the precedent setting work your agency is

performing on CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) will be undermined if CCS is mandated as a

regulatory requirement in EPA’s NSPS for coal fired plants.

I make this stat ement because CCS will be the focal point of subsequent litig ation during which

time CCS will be criticized and the resultant record will discourage adoption of the CCS

technology by the regulated community notwithstanding the laudable advances that are

underway but have not yet advanced to the stage of a universa l technology.

To this end my concern is heightened when I read the comprehensive , and recently issued report,

of the DOE FACA advisory body, the National Coal Council, in which it concluded:

“CCS does not yet meet this best system of emission reduction ( BSER) standard, because it has

not yet been adequately demonstrated.”

As I have communicated to the Administrator of EPA

, the preferred method for allowing the

Administration to proceed with its climate change program and at the same time provide an

envir onment which will permit CCS to continue to evolve as a control technology is for EPA to:



###  Issue an interim regulation requiring the best available control technology presently in

existence at coal fire plants exclusive of CCS and



###  Initiate the objective analysis of CCS mandated by both OMB and EPA’s peer review

guidelines which were issued pursuant to the Data Quality Act and then modify, ifneeded, the aforementioned interim rule. One alternative to be examined in detail is the

possibility of mandating CCS Ready in lieu of CCS.

Failure to adopt the aforementioned recommendation could result in litigation based upon a

marriage of the Mandamus and Data Quality Acts as set forth in the attached document.

( http://thecre.com/pdf/Mandamus

- DQA.pdf ) A loss in court would not only set back the US

program to control GHG emissions b ut would also jeopardize comparable programs throughout

the world. Any option chosen other than that identified above should have demonstrably higher

benefits.

As the cabinet member vested with the responsibility for ensuring an adequate and dependable

source of energy we understand that you will continue to be involved with this matter by keeping

the Administrator of EPA advised of your views on the availability of CCS.

Respectfully,

Jim Tozzi

Center for Regulatory Effectiveness

cc: Honorable Shaun Donovan: Director, Office of Management and Budget

Honorable Regina McCarthy: Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2417 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2417

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain synthetic staple fibers that 
      are not carded, combed, or otherwise processed for spinning.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

  Mrs. Hagan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To suspend temporarily the duty on certain synthetic staple fibers that 
      are not carded, combed, or otherwise processed for spinning.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ACRYLIC OR MODACRYLIC SYNTHETIC STAPLE FIBERS, NOT CARDED, 
              COMBED, OR OTHERWISE PROCESSED FOR SPINNING.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.01.00       Acrylic staple      Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/ ''.
                          fibers                                                             31/2011.......
                          (polyacrylonitril
                          e staple)
                          containing 85
                          percent or more
                          by weight of
                          acrylonitrile
                          units and 2
                          percent or more
                          but not over 3
                          percent of water,
                          not pigmented
                          (ecru), crimped,
                          with an average
                          filament decitex
                          of 1.3 (plus or
                          minus 10 percent)
                          and fiber length
                          of 40 mm (plus or
                          minus 10 percent)
                          (provided for in
                          subheading
                          5503.30.00)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### LOUISIANA INTRASTATE GAS CORPORATION v. H.T. OLINDE, Jr. and Joseph B. Olinde, Sr. LOUISIANA INTRASTATE GAS CORPORATION v. H.T. OLINDE, Jr.

No. 87-C-2124.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Olinde, H.T. Jr.; Olinde, Joseph B. Sr.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. CA86 0908, CA86 0909; Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, Nos. 20609, 20610.

Prior report: La.App., 513 So.2d 560.

Denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-01-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          19,853
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,030
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,064
<INVENTORY>                                     14,183
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                54,127
<PP&E>                                          38,919
<DEPRECIATION>                                  28,081
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  89,775
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           34,244
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        96,785
<OTHER-SE>                                    (59,766)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    37,019
<SALES>                                        130,463
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               130,463
<CGS>                                           62,592
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   83,633
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   309
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,491
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (17,562)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       876
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (18,438)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (18,438)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.96)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.96)
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gary Franklin, Appellant.

Casey, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (Vogt, J.), rendered December 5, 1988, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree.

Defendant was permitted to plead guilty to attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree arising out of his indictment of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (three counts), petit larceny (three counts) and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (three counts). He was sentenced as a second felony offender to a term of 1 *Vi*to 3 years’ imprisonment.

On his appeal herein defendant, *pro se,*raises the insufficiency of his plea allocution; the failure of the prosecution to give him notice of the Grand Jury proceeding; his illegal detention for three days before arraignment on the indictment; and the severity of the sentence imposed. Defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v California*(386 US 738) in which it was conceded that there are no nonfrivolous issues that might be raised on defendant’s behalf. We agree.

The plea allocution fully apprised defendant of the effect of his plea and the rights he would be waiving thereby. The plea forfeited defendant’s right to raise the issue of lack of notice of the Grand Jury proceeding that indicted him *(see, People v Roberson,*149 AD2d 926, *lv denied*74 NY2d 746), and also the issue of his illegal detention *(see, People v Homer,*87 AD2d 687). The sentence imposed was the sentence agreed upon as part of the plea bargain and in the absence of any abuse of discretion will not be disturbed. Accordingly, the application for leave to withdraw by defense counsel should be granted and the judgment of conviction affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, and application to be relieved of assignment granted. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.