Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 21-0461

══════════

Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

MRC Permian Company, 

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued October 25, 2022

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This mineral-lease dispute concerns the interpretation of a force 

majeure clause. Typically, a lessee invokes a force majeure clause to 

avoid the harsh result of lease termination when confronted with 

circumstances beyond its control that impede compliance with a lease 

deadline or obligation. But here, the lessee mistakenly scheduled 

operations to drill a new well to commence after the deadline to suspend 

lease termination under a continuous-drilling program. After missing 

the deadline, the lessee discovered its scheduling error and only then 
2

invoked the lease’s force majeure clause, referencing an allegedly 

qualifying event that had occurred nearly a month before the drilling 

deadline. Though the event did not cause the lessee to miss the 

deadline, the lessee argues the clause extended the drilling deadline and 

prevented the lease from terminating. We disagree. 

As with other lease clauses, the application of a force majeure 

clause depends on the terms the contracting parties freely chose. The 

clause here provides that “[w]hen Lessee’s operations are delayed by an 

event of force majeure, being a non-economic event beyond Lessee’s 

control,” and timely notice is given, the lease shall “remain in force” 

during the delay and the lessee shall have 90 days to “resume 

operations.” According to the lessee, its invocation of the clause 

retroactively kept its lease “in force” through the deadline because an 

earlier wellbore instability on an unrelated lease (the alleged force 

majeure event) required that the lessee effectively redrill portions of 

that well, setting back its rig schedule for subsequent drilling on other 

leases—including the untimely scheduled operation—by 30 hours. 

Before receiving notice, however, the lessors signed new leases. 

Contending the force majeure clause extended the lease, the original 

lessee sued the putative successor in interest and others for, among 

other claims, tortious interference with its lease. The putative successor 

responded that the original lease terminated when the lessee missed the 

deadline and that the size of any retained interests in production units 

for already-drilled wells was limited. 

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court 

determined that (1) the force majeure clause did not extend the lease as 
3

a matter of law, (2) the putative successor was entitled to a take-nothing 

summary judgment on the lessee’s tortious-interference claims, and 

(3) the lessee’s retained production units were not limited as a matter of 

law to the smaller of two possible capped sizes. On permissive 

interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals focused on the phrase 

“Lessee’s operations are delayed” to conclude that the lease deadline and 

untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking the force 

majeure clause. Reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding the 

case, the appellate court determined that fact issues exist both as to 

whether the clause applied and as to each element of the lessee’s 

tortious-interference claims and that, given its holdings, the issue of the 

production-unit size was not “ripe” for decision.

We hold that, construed in context, “Lessee’s operations are 

delayed by an event of force majeure” does not refer to the delay of a 

necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the 

deadline for perpetuating the lease. We therefore (1) reverse the court 

of appeals’ judgment on the force majeure and tortious-interference 

issues, (2) render judgment that the force majeure clause did not save 

the lease, (3) render a take-nothing judgment in part on the lessee’s 

tortious-interference claims to the extent those claims are predicated on 

the force majeure clause’s saving the lease, and (4) remand the case to 

the court of appeals to consider two issues preserved but not reached: 

the size of the production units when the lease terminated and whether 

the evidence raised a fact issue supporting the lessee’s 

tortious-interference claims regarding any leasehold interest in the 

retained production units.
4

I. Background

A. The MRC Lease

In 2014, the Lessors1 executed four identical leases (collectively, 

the MRC Lease) granting MRC Permian Company an exclusive 

leasehold estate of around 4,000 gross acres in Loving County for 

exploring, developing, producing, and marketing oil and gas. The MRC 

Lease’s primary term ended on February 28, 2017. During the primary 

term, MRC drilled five horizontal oil wells, spudding2 the last well—the 

Totum well—on November 22, 2016. 

The lease provisions, including a retained-acreage clause,3

provide that after the primary term, the lease “shall automatically 

divide” into separate production units and terminate as to all lands and 

depths not then included in a production unit. A production unit, as 

defined by the lease, is the area and depths of the lease allocated to a 

producing well. Within 90 days after completing a well, MRC “shall file” 

1 The Lessors are (1) TJ Bar, LLC, with Holland Acquisitions, Inc., d/b/a 

Holland Services as its agent; (2) Tubb Memorial, LP, with Bank of America, 

N.A., as its agent; (3) The Deborah Jackson Revocable Trust, with 

PlainsCapital Bank as its trustee; and (4) Janelle Jackson Marital Trust Part 

M2, Janelle Jackson Marital Trust Part M1, and Family Credit Shelter Trust 

Part B, with Bank of America, N.A. as their trustee.

2 “‘Spudding-in’ is a term of art in the oil-and-gas industry that means 

‘[t]he first boring of the hole in the drilling of an oil well.’” Sundown Energy 

LP v. HJSA No. 3, Ltd. P’ship, 622 S.W.3d 884, 886 n.1 (Tex. 2021) (quoting 

Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS—MANUAL OF OIL 

AND GAS TERMS 1007 (16th ed. 2015)).

3 A retained-acreage clause “typically divides the leased acreage such 

that production or development will preserve the lease only as to a specified 

portion.” Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 

586, 598 (Tex. 2018).
5

a written designation of the production unit in the county where the well 

is located. For a horizontal oil well, the production unit “shall not 

exceed” either 160 or 320 acres (plus 10% tolerance) depending on 

whether “more than 5000 feet of its wellbore extends horizontally in the 

producing formation.” 

MRC could “temporarily suspend automatic termination” of the 

lease at the end of the primary term by conducting a continuous-drilling 

program, and the “lease will remain in force . . . so long as the 

Continuous Drilling Program is conducted by Lessee.” Under that 

program, MRC had to spud a new well every 180 days measured from 

the spud date of the last well. If not, the MRC Lease “shall terminate 

as to all lands and depths” not then included in a production unit. 

Because MRC spudded the Totum well on November 22, 2016, MRC had 

until May 21, 2017, to spud a new well and continue “temporarily 

suspend[ing]” the lease’s termination. 

In early 2017, MRC’s executive committee scheduled a May 11 

spudding of a sixth well—the Toot 211 well—using Patterson Drilling 

Rig 295, the same rig it had used to drill the Totum well. Rig 295, 

according to MRC, is “specially equipped to handle the high pressures” 

found in Loving County, and its “special equipment and crew make 

Rig 295 safer and more efficient for the area than other rigs.” 

Subsequently, however, MRC’s operations team created a new 

drilling schedule. By April 18, Rig 295’s schedule listed June 2 as the 

spud date for the Toot 211 well and erroneously identified June 19, 

rather than May 21, as the MRC Lease’s expiration date absent a timely 

spudded well. Around two weeks after the correct expiration date, MRC 
6

discovered the scheduling mistake. MRC concedes it had mistakenly 

calculated June 19 as the expiration date based on the rig-release date 

from the Totum well, rather than its spud date as required by the lease. 

B. Force Majeure

Having missed the May 21 deadline to continue “temporarily 

suspend[ing]” lease termination, and upon discovering its scheduling 

mistake, MRC determined in early June that an April 21 force majeure 

event provided 90 days from resolution of that event to spud the 

Toot 211 well. The lease provision MRC relied on provides:

13. Force Majeure. When Lessee’s operations are delayed 

by an event of force majeure, being a non-economic event 

beyond Lessee’s control, if Lessee shall furnish Lessor a 

reasonable written description of the problem encountered 

within 60 days after its commencement, and Lessee shall 

thereafter use its best efforts to overcome the problem, this 

lease shall remain in force during the continuance of such 

delay, and Lessee shall have 90 days after the reasonable 

removal of such majeure within which to resume 

operations; provided, however, this paragraph shall not 

extend this lease or relieve Lessee for liability for any 

breach thereof for a period in excess of 180 days, and 

Lessee’s obligation to pay sums due hereunder shall not be 

affected by an event of force majeure.

MRC sent force majeure notices to the Lessors on June 13—

53 days after the alleged force majeure event and more than three weeks 

after the MRC Lease would have terminated under the May 21 

continuous-drilling deadline if no savings clause applied.4 In the 

4 Savings clauses, including force majeure clauses, are lease provisions 

designed to prevent automatic termination of a lease. See BP Am. Prod. Co. v. 

Red Deer Res., LLC, 526 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2017) (“Many mineral leases

contain savings clauses designed to prevent the automatic termination of the
7

notices, MRC alleged that around April 21, MRC began experiencing 

“operational issues with the rig scheduled to drill the Toot 211 well” and 

“wellbore stability issues that required a reaming operation for over 

2,500 feet of the lateral,” which “have caused a delay in drilling the 

Toot 211 well beyond MRC’s control.”5 The notices did not mention the 

erroneously scheduled June 2 spud date; in fact, the notices referenced 

the earlier schedule, claiming the Toot 211 well “was scheduled to be 

spud[ded] . . . on May 11, 2017.” MRC alerted the Lessors that it 

“currently anticipates that a rig will be arriving at the Lease acreage to 

drill the Toot 211 well as early as next week.” 

Discovery during litigation revealed that the delay caused by the 

April 21 wellbore instability lasted for only 30 hours while Rig 295 was 

drilling a well—the Dorothy White well—on an unrelated lease 60 miles 

away. This wellbore instability, as MRC’s senior vice president of 

operations later explained, occurred when MRC was running production 

casing and the wellbore caved in. MRC overcame the problem through 

a reaming operation, redrilling over 2,500 feet of the wellbore. 

According to MRC, the delay on the Dorothy White well “necessarily set 

lease upon a cessation of production.”); Hardin-Simmons Univ. v. Hunt 

Cimarron Ltd. P’ship, No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 WL 3197920, at *7 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo July 25, 2017, pet. denied) (“The category of clauses that might 

extend the duration of an oil and gas lease beyond a determinable condition, 

generally known as ‘savings clauses,’ include, among others, the ‘drilling 

operations clause,’ ‘continuous operations clause,’ or ‘reworking clause.’”); 

4 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS 

LAW § 683 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2022) (“Another such savings clause 

which has made its way into leases . . . is the so-called force majeure clause.”).

5 On appeal, MRC does not allege any rig “operational issues” other than 

the delay due to the wellbore instability that required a reaming operation.
8

back the schedule for all of the subsequent wells on [Rig 295]’s schedule 

by approximately 30 hours, including the drilling of the Toot #211.” 

As noted on Rig 295’s April 18 schedule, two other wells on 

another unrelated lease—the Barnett wells—were scheduled to be 

drilled before the Toot 211 well. On April 24, after completing the 

Dorothy White well, MRC moved Rig 295 to drill the Barnett wells, and 

as of the May 21 deadline for the MRC Lease, MRC was still drilling 

those wells. MRC’s drilling superintendent and its expert admitted that 

MRC would have had enough time to move Rig 295 to the Toot 211 well 

and commence drilling by early May, but they explained that MRC chose 

to drill the Barnett wells first.

On June 15, Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC, instead of the 

Lessors, responded to MRC’s June 13 force majeure notices. Point 

Energy explained that after reviewing publicly available drilling data, 

it “questioned whether MRC’s drilling schedule was sufficient to 

maintain the Continuous Development Program” and therefore had 

taken “leases from the mineral owners” on June 7. Point Energy 

requested documentation regarding the force majeure event but did not 

dispute that MRC is entitled to a leasehold interest in production units 

for the five wells already drilled. Finally, Point Energy stated that 

without additional information, it had “serious concerns that any entry 

onto the land to drill the Toot 211 may constitute bad faith trespass.” 
9

C. Procedural History

MRC sued Point Energy; the Lessors and their trustees and 

agents; and certain entities affiliated with Point Energy,6 alleging 

trespass to title and that (1) some of the Lessors, trustees, and agents 

had repudiated and breached the MRC Lease by signing new leases with 

Point Energy; and (2) Point Energy and the affiliated defendants had 

engaged in a civil conspiracy and tortiously interfered with an existing 

contract in their efforts to acquire the new leases from the Lessors. MRC 

also sought declaratory relief that the MRC Lease remains in full force 

and effect, that MRC met all requirements to suspend its drilling 

obligation, that the force majeure clause should be construed not to 

include certain additional requirements to invoke the clause,7 and that 

the production-unit size should be 320 acres plus 10% tolerance if the 

MRC Lease terminated. 

Point Energy and other defendants (collectively, Point Energy) 

counterclaimed for breach of the MRC Lease, trespass to try title, and 

an accounting and constructive trust. As part of their 

trespass-to-try-title claim, the counter-plaintiffs asserted that MRC is 

limited to 160 acres plus 10% tolerance for each production unit because 

the wellbores do not “extend[] horizontally in the producing formation” 

6 These affiliated entities are Robert Gaudin, John Sabia, Bryan Moody, 

and Vortus Investment Advisors, LLC. MRC later nonsuited its claims against 

Gaudin. 

7 Specifically, MRC requested declarations that (1) the force majeure 

event “does not have to occur on the Leasehold Estate” or “cause MRC to miss 

a deadline” and (2) MRC does not have to “try to conduct operations . . . before 

the 90-day extended deadline” or “try to overcome the effects of the force 

majeure.” 
10

“more than 5000 feet” and MRC did not satisfy the written-designation 

requirement for allocating acreage to each well. 

Point Energy then moved for partial summary judgment that the 

force majeure clause did not perpetuate the MRC Lease, arguing that 

the alleged force majeure event was economically motivated and within 

MRC’s control; the delayed operations had to be “on-lease”; the 

scheduling error rather than the force majeure event caused the delay; 

and the delay was foreseeable. MRC responded with a cross-motion for 

partial summary judgment, requesting declarations regarding the 

construction of the clause and arguing that Point Energy seeks to 

impose requirements not in the clause.8 Point Energy then moved for 

traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on all claims. 

The trial court granted Point Energy’s motion for partial 

summary judgment on the force majeure issue and denied MRC’s 

corresponding motion; denied Point Energy’s motion to limit the 

production units to 160 acres each; and granted Point Energy’s motion 

for a take-nothing summary judgment on MRC’s tortious-interference 

claims. Based on these rulings, the trial court declared the MRC Lease 

to have terminated “as of May 22, 2017,” as to all property not included 

in a production unit. The trial court then permitted a permissive 

interlocutory appeal from the order, identifying three controlling 

questions of law: (1) “whether the [MRC Lease] terminated as to the 

portion of the Leasehold Estate not included in a Production Unit for a 

Commercial Well by May 22, 2017”; (2) “what is the size of the 

8 MRC also moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment 

on the breach-of-contract counterclaim, which the trial court denied. 
11

Production Units retained under the [MRC Lease]”; and (3) “if the [MRC 

Lease] did not terminate, whether the Point [Energy] Leases, and/or the 

acts of Defendants related thereto, can support a claim for tortious 

interference under Texas law.”9

The court of appeals accepted the interlocutory appeal,10 reversed 

the trial court’s judgment in part,11 and remanded the case. As to the 

force majeure dispute, the court distilled the disagreement to three 

issues: (1) whether the force majeure event needed to be “on-lease”;12

(2) whether the event must have caused MRC to miss a lease deadline 

and not just delay operations; and (3) whether the event was under 

MRC’s control and driven by financial considerations.13 The court held 

9 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d). 

10 624 S.W.3d 643, 650-51 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021) (citing TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f)).

11 Although the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on 

the primary issues, the court also (1) affirmed the trial court’s denial of MRC’s 

motion for summary judgment on both the force majeure issue and the 

breach-of-contract counterclaims and the trial court’s “ruling that TJ Bar 

cannot be held liable for tortious interference with its own lease with MRC,” 

(2) did not reach the trial court’s ruling on MRC’s estoppel defense, and 

(3) severed and abated the appeal as to Holland Acquisitions after it filed for 

bankruptcy. Id. at 651 n.2 & n.4, 663, 670. 

12 The parties dispute the court of appeals’ characterization of this 

specific issue. Point Energy claims the court “thought the issue was whether 

the force majeure event had to occur on the Lease, not the delayed operations,” 

but “[t]he parties agree the force majeure clause requires delayed operations 

on the Lease no matter where the triggering event occurs.” MRC asserts, “The 

delayed operations that matter are those on the lease, and the court of appeals 

did not hold otherwise. The only disputed issue has always been the location 

of the triggering event.” 

13 Id. at 658-61. 
12

that the MRC Lease did not require the force majeure event to be 

“on-lease” or to cause MRC to miss a lease deadline; even if there were 

a causation requirement, testimony from MRC’s employee raised a fact 

issue; and the record “is fraught with conflicting evidence” on MRC’s 

control over and economic motivation for the force majeure event.14 

Given the “uncertainty surrounding the continued existence of MRC’s 

lease,” including “when the new [Point Energy] leases were negotiated 

and signed,” the court concluded that the question of the production-unit 

size was unripe and that “there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 

each element of MRC’s tortious interference claims.”15 

We granted Point Energy’s petition for review, which contends in 

three issues: (1) the court of appeals erred in holding the force majeure 

clause applied when only off-lease operations and plans were delayed, 

MRC would have missed its deadline even if the alleged force majeure 

event had never occurred, and this failure resulted from MRC’s 

choices—not events beyond its control; (2) the production-unit question 

should be decided in its favor as a matter of law; and (3) no fact issues 

exist on the elements of MRC’s tortious-interference claims. 

14 Id.

15 Id. at 664-69; see id. at 670-71 (Alley, J., concurring and dissenting) 

(disagreeing with the majority that a fact issue exists as to the “willful and 

intentional act of interference” element of MRC’s tortious-interference claims).
13

II. Discussion

We review summary judgments and construe mineral leases de 

novo.16 A traditional summary-judgment movant will prevail only by 

establishing that no material fact issue exists and it is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.17 A lease that has a “certain and definite 

meaning” is unambiguous and interpreted as a matter of law; but if it is 

subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, summary judgment 

is improper.18 When both parties move for summary judgment on an 

issue and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we 

review the summary-judgment evidence and render judgment that the 

trial court should have rendered.19

General contract-construction principles govern the construction 

of an oil-and-gas lease, although special interpretation rules also apply 

because the lease determines interests in real property.20 Consistent 

with the law’s “strong public policy favoring freedom of contract,” 

contracting parties are generally free to determine the lease’s terms, and 

those terms define their respective rights and duties.21 Our duty is to 

16 See Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Tex. 

2022); Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 586, 

595 (Tex. 2018).

17 TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Rosetta Res., 645 S.W.3d at 218. 

18 Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 

682, 690 (Tex. 2022); Rosetta Res., 645 S.W.3d at 219.

19 Rosetta Res., 645 S.W.3d at 218.

20 See Discovery Operating, 554 S.W.3d at 595; XOG Operating, LLC v. 

Chesapeake Expl. Ltd. P’ship, 554 S.W.3d 607, 611-12 (Tex. 2018). 

21 Discovery Operating, 554 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Phila. Indem. Ins. 

Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tex. 2016)).
14

“respect and enforce” those terms by ascertaining the parties’ intent as 

expressed within the lease’s four corners.22 To that end, we examine the 

entire lease, focusing on the plain language, considering the context in 

which words are used, and attempting to harmonize all the lease’s parts 

to “determine, objectively, what an ordinary person using those words 

under the circumstances in which they are used would understand them 

to mean.”23 We also construe contracts “from a utilitarian standpoint 

bearing in mind the particular business activity sought to be served, and 

avoiding unreasonable constructions when possible and proper.”24 

A. The Force Majeure Clause

Generally speaking, a force majeure clause is a “contractual 

provision allocating the risk of loss if performance becomes impossible 

or impracticable, esp[ecially] as a result of an event or effect that the 

parties could not have anticipated or controlled.”25 Force majeure 

clauses, however, come in many shapes, sizes, and forms.26 For 

22 Id. at 595 (quoting White, 490 S.W.3d at 471).

23 Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 615 S.W.3d 144, 

148 (Tex. 2020) (quoting URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 764 (Tex. 

2018)). 

24 Id. at 148 (quoting Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors 

Inc., 473 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. 2015)).

25 Force-Majeure Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see 

5 Nancy Saint-Paul, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 57:28 (rev. 3d ed. 2018) (“The 

force majeure clause protects the lessee when events that are beyond the 

lessee’s control intervene to delay performance of the lease covenants.”).

26 Martin & Kramer, supra note 4, at § 683.1 (noting that “[t]he verbiage 

of force majeure clauses varies from approximately fifty words to five or six 

hundred words” and describing some of “the many variants of force majeure 

clauses”); 4 Eugene Kuntz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 53.5 
15

example, in oil-and-gas leases, these clauses may vary according to 

their: 

• “force majeure” definition;27

(1990) (noting that force majeure clauses “vary considerably” regarding “the 

enumerated causes which will constitute a force majeure” and “the type of 

performance that will be excused”).

27 For example, the clause may define force majeure by (1) specifying a 

list of qualifying events, see, e.g., In re Nueces Petroleum Corp., No. 05-44617, 

2007 WL 418889, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2007) (“[B]y operation of force 

majeure including storm, flood or other act of God, fire, war, rebellion, 

insurrection, riot, or as a result of some order, requisition, or necessity of any 

governmental agency having jurisdiction[.]”); (2) listing events with a catchall, 

see, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (listing force majeure events of 

“fire, flood, storm, act of God, governmental authority, labor disputes, war or

any other cause not enumerated herein but which is beyond the reasonable 

control of the Party whose performance is affected”); Roland Oil Co. v. R.R. 

Comm’n, No. 03-12-00247-CV, 2015 WL 870232, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 

27, 2015, pet. denied) (including as force majeure events those caused “by a 

strike, fire, war, civil disturbance, act of god; by federal, state, or municipal 

laws; by any rule, regulation, or order of a governmental agency; by inability 

to secure materials; or by any other cause or causes beyond reasonable control 

of the party”); Va. Power Energy Mktg., Inc. v. Apache Corp., 297 S.W.3d 397, 

403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“The term ‘Force 

Majeure’ as employed herein means any cause not reasonably within the 

control of the party claiming suspension . . . [and] shall include, but not be 

limited to . . . physical events such as acts of God, landslides, lightning, 

earthquakes, fires, storms or storm warnings, such as hurricanes, which result 

in evacuation of the affected area, floods, washouts, explosions, breakage or 

accident or necessity of repairs to machinery or equipment or lines of pipe.”); 

or (3) broadly defining the event with or without carve-outs, see, e.g., El Paso 

Mktg., L.P. v. Wolf Hollow I, L.P., 383 S.W.3d 138, 140 n.6 (Tex. 2012) (“[A]n 

‘Event of Force Majeure’ means any act or event that prevents the affected 

Party from performing its obligations (other than the payment of money) under 

this Agreement if such act or event is beyond the reasonable control of and not 

a result of the negligence or intentional act of the affected Party[.]”). 
16

• causal-nexus requirement;28

• remedial-action requirement;29

• notice requirement;30 and

28 Among other alternatives, the clause may require that the force 

majeure event (1) caused the failure to perform, see, e.g., Va. Power, 297 S.W.3d 

at 403 (“[N]either party shall be liable to the other for failure to perform a Firm 

obligation, to the extent such failure was caused by Force Majeure.”); 

(2) prevented or hindered compliance, see, e.g., Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P’ship, 

918 F.2d 1244, 1246 (5th Cir. 1990) (“This lease shall not be terminated . . . if 

compliance . . . is prevented or hindered by” a force majeure event.); TEC 

Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 179 (“Should either Party be prevented or hindered from 

complying with any obligation . . . by reason of” force majeure events, then the 

performance of the obligation is suspended.); or (3) delayed or interrupted

operations, see, e.g., Nueces Petroleum, 2007 WL 418889, at *2 (“When any of 

the operations contemplated by this lease are delayed or interrupted by 

operation of force majeure . . . the time of such delay or interruption shall not 

be counted against Lessee.”); Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 

277, 280 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (“When drilling or other 

operations are delayed or interrupted by” force majeure events, “the time of 

such delay or interruption shall not be counted against Lessee[.]”).

29 Some options include requiring due diligence or reasonable efforts 

(1) to overcome or mitigate the effects, see, e.g., El Paso Mktg., 383 S.W.3d at 

140 n.6 (requiring that a party affected by force majeure “has been unable by 

the exercise of due diligence to overcome or mitigate the effects of such act or 

event”); (2) to remove the force majeure event, see, e.g., Perlman, 918 F.2d at

1246 (“Lessee shall use all reasonable efforts to remove such force majeure[.]”); 

Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 716 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (requiring that force majeure 

“shall so far as possible, be remedied with all reasonable dispatch”); or (3) both, 

see, e.g., Va. Power, 297 S.W.3d at 403 (“Seller and Buyer shall make 

reasonable efforts to avoid the adverse impacts of a Force Majeure and to 

resolve the event or occurrence once it has occurred[.]”).

30 Some clauses, for example, may require written notice within a 

certain time. See, e.g., Perlman, 918 F.2d at 1246 (“Lessee shall notify Lessor 

in writing . . . within fifteen days of any force majeure[.]”). Others may require 

notice only “as promptly as possible.” See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt 

Petroleum (AEC), Inc., 157 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
17

• grace period excusing or delaying contractual 

performance.31

As with other mineral-lease clauses, the application of a 

particular force majeure clause depends on the terms the contracting 

parties freely chose, and each clause must be construed according to its 

own terms because there is no “one size fits all” construction.32

2004, no pet.) (“[P]arty shall give notice and details of Force Majeure in writing 

to the other party as promptly as possible after its occurrence.”).

31 As examples, force majeure clauses may suspend performance 

obligations or lease termination during the period of prevention or delay. See, 

e.g., TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 179 (“[T]he performance of any such obligation 

is suspended during the period of, and only to the extent of, such prevention or 

hindrance[.]”); Roland Oil, 2015 WL 870232, at *5 (“All obligations imposed by 

this agreement . . . shall be suspended while compliance is prevented[.]”); 

Zurich Am., 157 S.W.3d at 464 (suspending obligations “during the 

continuance of any inability so caused”). Others may excuse performance 

based on whether the failure to perform was caused or affected by the force 

majeure event. See, e.g., El Paso Mktg., 383 S.W.3d at 140 n.6 (excusing party 

“from whatever performance is affected by the Event of Force Majeure to the 

extent so affected”); Va. Power, 297 S.W.3d at 403 (“[N]either party shall be 

liable to the other for failure to perform a Firm obligation, to the extent such 

failure was caused by Force Majeure.”); Kodiak 1981, 736 S.W.2d at 716 

(“[N]either party hereto shall be liable for any failure to perform the terms of 

this Agreement, when such failure is due to ‘force majeure[.]”). 

32 See Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 

S.W.3d 586, 598 (Tex. 2018) (describing the construction of retained-acreage 

clauses in a similar manner); see also Perlman, 918 F.3d at 1248 (“[T]he 

‘doctrine’ of force majeure should not supersede the specific terms bargained 

for in the contract.”); Roland Oil, 2015 WL 870232, at *5 (“[W]e agree with 

Roland that the scope and effect of a force majeure clause depend ultimately 

on the specific language used in the contract and not on any traditional 

definition of the term[.]”); Va. Power, 297 S.W.3d at 402 (“The scope and effect 

of a ‘force majeure’ clause depends on the specific contract language, and not 

on any traditional definition of the term.”); Allegiance Hillview, L.P. v. Range 

Tex. Prod., LLC, 347 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.)

(“‘[W]hen the parties have themselves defined the contours of force majeure in 
18

The force majeure clause in the MRC Lease addresses each of 

these types of variations. The clause describes the force majeure event 

as “being a non-economic event beyond Lessee’s control.” By requiring 

“Lessee’s operations” to be delayed “by” a force majeure event, the clause 

imposes a causal-nexus requirement that is a necessary predicate to 

properly invoke the clause.33 For remedial action, a lessee must use its 

“best efforts to overcome the problem,” and, “within 60 days after its 

commencement,” a lessee must provide notice and include a “reasonable 

written description of the problem.” Finally, the clause provides a grace 

period that maintains the lease “during the continuance of such delay” 

while affording 90 days “to resume operations” after the “reasonable 

removal of such majeure,” not to exceed a total of 180 days.

Although Point Energy raises other challenges to MRC’s 

invocation of the force majeure clause, we focus our discussion on 

whether MRC satisfied the predicate causal-nexus requirement: “[w]hen 

Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event of force majeure . . . .” 

Specifically, we focus on what it means for “Lessee’s operations” to be 

their agreement, those contours dictate the application, effect, and scope of 

force majeure,’ and reviewing courts ‘are not at liberty to rewrite the contract 

or interpret it in a manner which the parties never intended.’” (quoting Sun 

Operating, 984 S.W.2d at 283)); Zurich Am., 157 S.W.3d at 466 (“Regardless of 

its historical underpinnings, the scope and application of a force majeure 

clause depend on the terms of the contract.”); Sun Operating, 984 S.W.2d at 

283 (noting that the clause’s “scope and application, for the most part, is utterly 

dependent upon the terms of the contract in which it appears”).

33 Dictionaries define “by” as “through the means or instrumentality of” 

or “[t]hrough the agency or action of.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 

DICTIONARY 307 (2002); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE 255 (5th ed. 2016).
19

“delayed by” a force majeure event and whether that requirement 

interacts with lease deadlines. MRC identifies the scheduled June 2 

spudding of the Toot 211 well as the only “Lessee’s operation[]” allegedly 

delayed for the purpose of the force majeure clause. And it is undisputed 

that if there had been no delay, the operation as scheduled would not 

have satisfied the May 21 continuous-drilling deadline to perpetuate the 

MRC Lease. Nevertheless, MRC argues it is irrelevant that the 

operation was already scheduled to commence after the deadline 

because “nothing in the [force majeure] clause here ties force majeure to 

performance or compliance [with lease deadlines]—just delayed 

operations.” According to MRC, “delay” means to make late as to the 

operation’s scheduled date but not in relation to the lease deadline for 

that operation.34 Thus, even a slowdown of an operation erroneously 

scheduled to commence after the lease deadline could trigger the force 

majeure clause.

When viewed in isolation and taking an unduly literal 

interpretation, the phrase “Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event 

of force majeure” could be read to support MRC’s position. But we do 

not read contractual phrases in isolation,35 and we must avoid “taking 

literalism too literally and adopting a wooden construction foreclosed by 

34 See, e.g., Delay, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE 479 (5th ed. 2016) (“To cause to be later or slower than 

expected or desired[.]”).

35 Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882, 

891 (Tex. 2019).
20

[the legal text’s] context.”36 “‘Context,’ after all, ‘is a primary 

determinant of meaning.’”37 Words “must be construed in the context in 

which they are used,” and their meaning “‘turns upon use, adaptation 

and context as they are employed to fit various and varying 

situations.’”38 And a “vital part” of a text’s context is “the purpose of the 

text,” as gathered “from the text itself, consistently with the other 

aspects of its context.”39

In light of the phrase’s textual context of the MRC Lease’s 

operation deadlines and the force majeure clause’s grace periods and 

purpose, we cannot conclude that the contemplated “delay[]” of “Lessee’s 

operations” is entirely divorced from the lease deadlines. The MRC 

Lease repeatedly yokes operations with lease deadlines, which, if not 

met, result in lease termination, including: 

36 Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 451 (Tex. 2011) (Willett, 

J., concurring); see Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 615 

S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. 2020) (declining to interpret a contested sentence in a 

contract in a “hyper-literal fashion”); URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 

755, 764 (Tex. 2018) (“[W]ords are simply implements of communication, and 

imperfect ones at that. Oftentimes they cannot be assigned a rigid meaning, 

inherent in themselves.” (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of Sw. 

Nat’l Ass’n, 354 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1962))).

37 Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2023) (quoting

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 

LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012)).

38 URI, 543 S.W.3d at 764 (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Mental Hygiene, 354 

S.W.2d at 579); see Scalia & Garner, supra note 37, at 323 (“[C]ontext is as 

important as sentence-level text. The entire document must be considered.”).

39 Scalia & Garner, supra note 37, at 33.
21

• a drilling-commitment deadline;40

• a substitute-well deadline;41

• a continuous-drilling deadline;42

• a production-unit deadline;43 and 

• a review-of-production-units deadline.44 

40 “MRC agrees to commence drilling operations on or before the 

expiration of eighteen (18) months from the effective date of this lease . . . . 

Failure to timely commence drilling operations on the well will result only in 

termination of the lease[.]”

41 “If, in the conducting of any of the drilling operations . . . MRC 

encounters any conditions or difficulties . . . [which] make further drilling and 

completion of any well impossible or impracticable, then MRC shall have the 

option to commence operations for the drilling of a substitute well within sixty 

(60) days after cessation of drilling operations on the well[.]”

42 “‘Continuous Drilling Program’ means the period of time during 

which Lessee is timely commencing Actual Drilling of Continuous Program 

Wells and ending on the calendar day upon which more than 180 consecutive 

days have elapsed since the commencement of Actual Drilling of the most 

recent Continuous Program Well,” and “Lessee may temporarily suspend 

automatic termination of this lease at the expiration of the primary term by 

conducting a Continuous Drilling Program.” 

43 “[I]f production of oil and gas should cease from the Production Unit, 

this lease will not terminate as to such Production Unit so long as Lessee 

commences Actual Drilling of a new well or the Recompleting, Reworking or 

Refracing of an existing well on the Production Unit or before the expiration of 

60 days from date of the cessation of production and proceeds with such 

operations with no cessation of more than 60 consecutive days until 

commercial production of oil and/or gas is restored.”

44 “At any time after the tenth anniversary date of this lease, if a 

Production Unit contains more acreage than is necessary to meet regulatory 

allowable and spacing requirements . . . upon request from Lessor, Lessee shall 

commence and diligently pursue either a Continuous Drilling Program on the 

Production Unit or Recompleting, Reworking or Refracing operations. If 

Lessee fails to commence a Continuous Drilling Program, Recompleting, 

Reworking or Refracing within 90 days of the request from Lessor . . . Lessee 

shall release this lease as to [that unnecessary] acreage[.]”
22

The operations described in these clauses are necessary to 

preserve the lease under certain circumstances and must be performed 

within specified time periods. If these operations were delayed by a force 

majeure event such that the lessee missed the corresponding deadline, 

then a force majeure clause, to be effective, would need to keep the lease 

in force during the delay and provide time for the lessee to resume the 

lease-preserving operations. 

This force majeure clause does precisely that. Its expressly stated 

purpose is to keep the MRC Lease “in force during the continuance of 

such delay” of “Lessee’s operations” and provide the lessee with 90 days 

“to resume operations.” On the other hand, there would be no need for 

the clause to provide that remedy if the operation would not otherwise 

keep the lease in force or the delay did not cause a missed deadline. The 

textual context provides no indicia of the contracting parties’ intent to 

cover a delay of an operation already scheduled to commence after a 

critical contractual deadline for perpetuating the lease. Indeed, the 

textual context signifies that the “delay[]” of “Lessee’s operations” 

relates to lease deadlines and obligations. MRC’s complete untethering 

of operations from their corresponding lease deadlines in claiming a 

“delay[]” of “Lessee’s operations” is at odds with a fair reading of the 

force majeure clause and embraces a wooden, isolated literalism over a 

natural, contextual construction.45 

45 Scalia & Garner, supra note 37, at 33 (endorsing a “fair reading” 

interpretive approach that construes a legal text “on the basis of how a 

reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the 

text at the time it was issued” and considers the text’s purpose derived “only 

from the text itself, consistently with the other aspects of its context”).
23

MRC’s construction of the phrase as applied to the June 2 

scheduled operation also rests on circular reasoning. To properly invoke 

the force majeure clause, the delayed operation must be “Lessee’s 

operations.” Had there been no delay, however, the lease would have

terminated before the June 2 scheduled operation. In that scenario and 

at the time of the scheduled operation, MRC would no longer have been 

the “Lessee[]” and would have been conducting the operation on 

someone else’s property rather than on the lease.46 In other words, 

MRC’s June 2 operation—as scheduled and before any delay—would not 

have been “Lessee’s operation[]” unless a savings clause would have 

perpetuated the MRC Lease until at least the operation’s scheduled 

date. But this results in the following circularity: MRC’s June 2 

scheduled operation would be “Lessee’s operation[]” only if the force 

majeure clause (or some other savings clause not at issue in this appeal) 

would have kept the MRC Lease in force through June 2; but MRC could 

properly invoke the force majeure clause to keep the lease in force 

46 The parties agree that “Lessee’s operations” refers to on-lease 

operations. See supra note 12. Although the parties do not dispute the 

on-lease requirement for “Lessee’s operations,” we note that in other contexts, 

depending on the lease terms and definitions, “operations” could include 

off-lease operations that are related to the lease. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kramer, 

Keeping Leases Alive in the Era of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic 

Fracturing: Are the Old Workhorses (Shut-in, Continuous Operations, and 

Pooling Provisions) Up to the Task?, 49 WASHBURN L. J. 283, 306 (2010) (noting 

that with horizontal drilling “one needs to make sure that operations that take 

place off the leasehold premises are included” in the lease’s definition because 

“if the vertical portion of the well bore needs to be reworked and the horizontal 

or lateral section is shut-in, the reworking operations will not necessarily be 

on the leased premises”).
24

beyond the May 21 drilling deadline only if the delay of the June 2 

scheduled operation was a delay of “Lessee’s operations.” 

We conclude that an ordinary person using the phrase “[w]hen 

Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event of force majeure,” given its 

textual context, would not understand those words to encompass a 

30-hour slowdown47 of an essential operation that was already destined 

to be untimely due to a scheduling error.48 Our construction is further 

buttressed by viewing the clause from a utilitarian perspective, “bearing 

in mind the particular business activity sought to be served, and 

avoiding unreasonable constructions when possible and proper.”49 Force 

majeure clauses like this one generally exist to allocate risk when a 

lessee encounters an irresistible force beyond a party’s control that may 

lead to the harsh result of lease termination.50 Here, the language the 

47 In its briefing, MRC argued that the clause “does not require any 

minimum amount of delay.” At oral argument, however, MRC’s counsel 

conceded that a de minimis exception is implied within the force majeure 

clause, but explained, “A day in the oil field is important. We’ve seen leases 

lost by somebody missing it by a day. . . . If we’re getting into something that 

addresses what I would refer to as a de minimis kind of effect, that’s for another 

day, that’s for another case.” As we need not reach the issue of whether a 

30-hour delay falls within a de minimis exception, we agree with MRC’s 

counsel that this question is “for another day [and] for another case.”

48 See URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 764 (Tex. 2018)

(“[O]ur quest is to determine, objectively, what an ordinary person using those 

words under the circumstances in which they are used would understand them 

to mean.”).

49 Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 615 S.W.3d 144, 

148 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors 

Inc., 473 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. 2015)).

50 Martin & Kramer, supra note 4, at § 683 (“Another such savings 

clause which has made its way into leases to protect lessees from liability or 
25

contracting parties chose evinces that this force majeure clause’s 

purpose is the same. But if an untimely operation would not otherwise 

suspend termination of the lease—even absent any delay—the alleged 

force majeure event does not impose any risk of lease termination. The 

risk of lease termination derives from the scheduling error, which the 

parties agree the force majeure clause is not designed to remedy.

Of course, parties are free to contract in a manner that either 

allocates the risk for when a lessee erroneously schedules an untimely 

operation or allows a lessee to invoke a force majeure clause based on

operational delays entirely divorced from lease deadlines, regardless of 

whether such contractual language produces odd results or comports 

with a utilitarian perspective.51 But the contracting parties to the MRC 

loss of leases for causes beyond their control is the so-called force majeure

clause.”); 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS Particular clauses or provisions § 50:58 

(4th ed. 2022) (“The purpose of a force majeure clause is to relieve an oil and 

gas lessee from the harsh termination of the lease due to circumstances beyond 

the lessee’s control that would make performance untenable or impossible.”); 

Kuntz, supra note 26, at § 53.5 (“It is not uncommon for the oil and gas lease 

to contain a force majeure clause which is designed to relieve the lessee from 

the consequences of a failure to comply with the terms of the lease if such 

failure is the result of certain described causes.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

CONTRACTS, introductory note to ch. 11 (1981) (“Contract liability is strict 

liability. It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to be 

kept. . . . The obligor who does not wish to undertake so extensive an obligation 

may contract for a lesser one by using one of a variety of common clauses 

[including] . . . a force majeure clause[.]”).

51 See Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC, 573 

S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2019) (noting that parties are free to contract for odd 

results and “that lease drafters are not always driven by logic” (quoting 

Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Hyder, 483 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex. 2016))).
26

Lease did not do that, and the textual context here forecloses such a 

construction.52 

Applying well-established contract-construction principles, we 

construe “Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event of force majeure” 

to have a “certain and definite meaning”53 that would not encompass a 

slowdown of MRC’s June 2 scheduled operation to spud the Toot 211 

well when that operation would not have met the May 21 deadline even 

if there had been no delay. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment 

as to the force majeure clause and render judgment that the clause did 

not extend MRC’s drilling deadlines or perpetuate the MRC Lease.54 

Accordingly, as a matter of law, the MRC Lease terminated as to the 

52 MRC argues that the clause “uses a soft-trigger/hard-cap design,” 

setting “a low threshold for lessees like MRC to declare force majeure (freeing 

the lessor—or its agent, the bank—from the burden of scrutinizing each claim)” 

but capping the lease extensions “at just 180 days.” The clause, however, does 

not provide the lessee with unfettered discretion to declare force majeure, and 

even if the “soft trigger” is construed as a relatively “low threshold,” we 

conclude that, as a matter of law, MRC did not satisfy it here by alleging the 

delay of an already untimely operation. 

53 Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 

682, 690 (Tex. 2022).

54 The court of appeals also held that “even if there were a causal link 

requirement” between the force majeure event and a missed deadline, “there 

is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the off-lease delay caused 

MRC’s missed deadline, or whether the delay resulted from a calendaring error 

by an MRC employee.” 624 S.W.3d 643, 660 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021). But 

the evidence the court of appeals relied on connected the force majeure event 

only with delaying the scheduled June 2 operation, not with missing the 

May 21 deadline. Id. at 660-61. We cannot agree with the court of appeals 

that this evidence, or any other evidence in the record, raised a fact issue on 

“whether the off-lease delay caused MRC’s missed deadline[.]” 
27

portion of the leasehold estate not included in production units when 

MRC failed to spud a new well by May 21, 2017.

B. Retained Acreage

In its second issue, Point Energy complains of the court of appeals’ 

decision to defer disposition of the dispute over the size of the production 

units MRC retained following lease termination. Point Energy’s 

summary-judgment motion asserted that MRC’s retained acreage was 

limited to 160 acres per production unit based on (1) the 

written-designation requirement and (2) how far the “wellbore extends 

horizontally in the producing formation.” After concluding that Point 

Energy had not established that the lease had terminated, the court of 

appeals held that determining “the amount of acreage MRC may retain 

when, and if, its lease terminated” would require “imagin[ing] a scenario 

in which MRC’s lease in fact terminated.”55 Accordingly, addressing the 

issue “when the lease may not terminate at all ‘would create an 

impermissible advisory opinion’” and “‘eschew the ripeness doctrine.’”56

We disagree that such a determination would create an 

impermissible advisory opinion or implicate the court of appeals’ 

jurisdiction under the ripeness doctrine. “[I]n evaluating ripeness, we 

consider ‘whether, at the time a lawsuit is filed, the facts are sufficiently 

developed so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than 

55 Id. at 664.

56 Id. (quoting Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 853 

(Tex. 2000)).
28

being contingent or remote.’”57 An intermediate appellate court’s 

answer to a predicate merits question within the same lawsuit may 

make disposition of additional merits-based issues unnecessary to 

resolve the appeal, but it does not affect ripeness or, in the ordinary case, 

the appellate court’s jurisdiction. As we recently explained:

It may turn out, when the dust settles, that one element or 

another of a court’s decision ended up being irrelevant to 

the ultimate outcome. That does not mean the court lacked 

jurisdiction to decide that part of the case. Even assuming 

the remaining issues were rendered superfluous by the 

court of appeals’ resolution of [a predicate] question, the 

possibility remained that this Court would take a different 

view of [that] question, as we have done. The dispute over 

the remaining issues therefore remained live, and its 

resolution still impacted the parties’ rights—even though 

the extent to which it did depended on how the case 

progressed in the future. Resolving the remaining issues 

would not have amounted to an advisory opinion by the 

court of appeals.58

We also noted that “[t]he prudential practice of courts to decline to reach 

issues not necessary to the disposition of a case should not be confused 

with the constitutional prohibition on advisory opinions” and whether 

the court of appeals “could have reached” or “was obligated to reach” 

those issues are two distinct inquiries.59 

Because we have reversed the court of appeals’ judgment as to the 

termination of the MRC Lease, we need not address whether the court 

57 Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Gibson, 

22 S.W.3d at 851-52).

58 Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. Maverick County, 642 S.W.3d 537, 

549 (Tex. 2022). 

59 Id. at 549-50.
29

was obligated to determine the production-unit size. The court will have 

the opportunity to address the issue in the future—assuming the parties 

maintain their current positions. When reversal necessitates 

consideration of issues raised in but not decided by the court of appeals, 

we ordinarily remand the case to that court for further proceedings.60 

Although we have discretion to take up those issues, we adhere to our 

usual practice and remand this issue to the court of appeals.61

C. Tortious Interference

Point Energy’s final issue concerns MRC’s tortious-interference 

claims. As pleaded, MRC’s claims are based on two theories of liability: 

(1) a primary theory of interference with the MRC Lease; and (2) if the 

MRC Lease had terminated, a secondary theory of interference with the 

leasehold interest in the retained acreage. In the court of appeals, MRC 

admitted that “once the trial court erroneously held that the MRC leases 

expired after May 21, 2017, MRC’s primary theory of interference—

which relied on actions taken in June 2017—fell by the wayside, leaving 

only the secondary ‘acreage issue.’” After disagreeing with the trial 

court on the applicability of the force majeure clause, the court of 

appeals held that there are fact issues about “whether there existed a 

valid contract subject to interference” and as to the tortious-interference 

elements.62 The court focused only on MRC’s primary theory of 

interference without considering the secondary theory.

60 Id. at 550.

61 See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4; Maverick County, 642 S.W.3d at 550-51.

62 624 S.W.3d 643, 665-68 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021).
30

We have agreed with the trial court that the force majeure clause 

did not extend the MRC Lease as a matter of law. The court of appeals’ 

contrary conclusion led to its erroneous determination that fact issues 

exist as to each tortious-interference element under MRC’s primary 

theory of liability. We therefore reverse the court’s judgment on this 

issue and render judgment in part that MRC take nothing on its 

tortious-interference claims to the extent they are based on the lease 

perpetuating beyond May 21, 2017. The court of appeals, however, did 

not consider MRC’s secondary theory of interference. Because the 

relevant evidence may relate to the question of the production-unit size, 

which we have remanded, we also remand the tortious-interference 

issue to the extent it relates to the retained acreage.

III. Conclusion

We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment on the force majeure 

and tortious-interference issues, render judgment that the force majeure 

clause did not extend the lease, render a take-nothing judgment in part 

on MRC’s tortious-interference claims, and remand the case to the court 

of appeals to consider the remaining issues.

 

 John P. Devine

 Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: April 21, 2023