alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
___________ No. 96-1260

___________ Frank Christian Nichols, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Eastern v. * District of Arkansas. * United States of America, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: August 23, 1996 Filed: August 30, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Frank Christian Nichols pleaded guilty to drug and firearm charges, an d was sentenced to 80 months imprisonment. He did not appeal. Nichols the n filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, asserting that there was not a sufficient factual basis for the gun charge and that he was denie d effect ive assistance of counsel. Relief was denied, and we affirmed
. Nichols v. United States , No. 93-2067, 1993 WL 474108 (8th Cir. Nov. 19 , 1993) (un published per curiam). In May 1995, Nichols filed the instan t section 2255 motion, asserting only that his criminal convictions an d sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibiti on against multiple pu nishments for the same offense, because approximately $22,000, a truck, and a boat seized from him at the time of his arrest had been

### The Honorable Elsijane Trimble Roy, United States District Court 1 

### fo r the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report an d recommendation of the Honorable H. David Young, United State s Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

### -2- forfeited to the government. The district co urt denied this motion on the 1 merits, and Nichols appeals. Although Nichols may have procedurally defaulted the double jeopardy issue, and his second section 2255 motion may constitute an abuse of th e writ , we address the merits because the district court did so. Se e Rodriguez v. United States , 1 7 F.3d 225, 226 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). We conclu de that Nichols's double jeopardy claim is foreclosed for th e reasons set forth in United States v. Ursery , 115 S. Ct. 2135, 2148-4 9 (1 996) (holding civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and (7) are neither "punishment" nor crim inal for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause), and Unit ed States v. One 1970 36.9' Columbia Sailing Boat , No. 95-3158 , 1996 WL 403038, at *3-4 (8th Cir. July 19, 1996) (holding Urseryapplie s to forfeitures under § 881(a)(4)). Accordingly, we affirm.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7200

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JERMAINE LEE OSBORNE, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (7:05-cr-00094-sgw-mfu-1; 7:09-cv-80147-sgw-mfu)

Submitted: October 20, 2009 Decided: November 9, 2009

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jermaine Lee Osborne, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Jermaine Lee Osborne seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Osborne has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### STATE ex rel. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant, v. FLEET FINANCE & MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 85-1467.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 22, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1986.

Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept, of Revenue, Tallahassee, for appellant.

James V. Lau of Lau, Lane, Pieper & Asti, P.A., Tampa, for appellee.

LEHAN, Judge.

The Florida Department of Revenue appeals from a summary judgment in this declaratory judgment suit. The judgment declared that the state’s interest in the assets of a defunct corporation is inferior to that of appellee, Fleet Finance & Mortgage Company, Inc., the assignee of a mortgage on those assets. We affirm.

The state claims its interest by reason of sales taxes collected by the corporation but not paid to the state before the time the mortgage was given to Fleet’s predecessor in interest. There was no showing that any of the sales tax receipts could be traced to funds remaining in the corporation. The remaining assets of that corporation appear to consist principally of real estate and contract rights.

It is undisputed that Fleet’s mortgage was recorded well prior to the recordation of the state’s tax warrant issued by reason of those unpaid sales taxes. “Sales taxes do not become a lien against real or personal property until a tax warrant is recorded and they become a lien on the property of the delinquent taxpayer ‘in the same manner as a recorded judgment.’ ... As such, sales tax liens are governed by the ‘first in time, first in line’ principle.” *American Bank of Merritt Island v. Con’s Cycle Center, Inc.,*466 So.2d 255, 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). *See also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Tom Norton Motor Co.,*366 So.2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).

We do not subscribe to the state’s innovative arguments which appear essentially to be attempts to avoid the effect of *Con’s Cycle Center, Tom Norton Motor Co.,*and the wording of section 212.15(4), Florida Statutes (1984), and its predecessors upon which those cases rely. The substance of the arguments would, we believe, more appropriately be addressed to the Legisla*34ture. That statute specifically provides that delinquent sales taxes become a lien upon the recordation of a tax warrant for the amount of those taxes.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SANDERLIN, J., concur.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 20676 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
MASON ALLEN STAGGS , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:17

- CR

- 680

- 1

Before CLEMENT, ELROD, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Mason Allen Staggs appeals the 120

- month within

- guidelines sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for stealing firearms from a federally licensed dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(m). He first argues that the district court plainly er red in determining his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). Staggs pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement wherein he waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence on any

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 25, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 18-20676 Document: 00515173743 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2019No. 18

- 20676

2 ground, reserving only a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government seeks enforcement of the appeal waiver. Our r eview of the record shows that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, as he knew that he had the right to appeal and that he was giving up that right by entering into the plea agreem ent. See United States v. Bond , 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Portillo , 18 F.3d 290, 292

- 93 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the waiver precludes consideration of Staggs ’s challenge to the base offense level

. See United States v. Story , 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006)

. Staggs also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to challenge the base offense level on the ground that his Texas juvenile adjudications did not qualify as convictions for pur poses of § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). He asserts that the record is sufficiently developed to consider this claim on direct appeal. The Supreme Court has emphasized that a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is the preferred method for raising claims of ineffective assistanc e of counsel. Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 503

- 09 (2003). Contrary to Staggs’s argument, h is claim was not developed sufficiently in the district court to
enable this court to evaluate it. See United States v. Higdon , 832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1987). We therefore decline to consider Staggs’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without pre judice to h is right to assert the claim on collateral review. See United States Isgar , 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014); Higdon , 832 F.2d at 314. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED. Case: 18-20676 Document: 00515173743 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/25/2019
#### STATE ex rel. Walter BRUMFIELD v. JUDGE, SECTION IV, 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE.

No. 87-KH-0214.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 29, 1987.

In re Brumfield, Walter; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “H”.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the *202post conviction petition submitted July 10, 1986, if it has been filed.
EXHIBIT
32




CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Phoenix India Acquisition Corp. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ramesh
Akella, President, Chief Strategy Officer and Director (Principal Executive
Officer and Principal Financial Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company for the period
certified.





Pursuant
to the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, this
certification is being furnished and is not deemed filed.




Signed
      on this 19th day of November, 2008/s/
            Ramesh
      AkellaRamesh
      Akella
              President,
      Chief Strategy Officer and Director
              (Principal
      Executive Officer and Principal Financial
  Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (Replace this text with the legend)
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000845750
<NAME>                        WNC CALIFORNIA HOUSING TAX CREDITS, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                              47,877
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    47,877
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   1,235,567
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              957,395
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                                         278,172
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     1,235,567
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     1,817
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      144,360
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   300,256
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (442,799)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (442,799)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (442,799)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (58.84)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0



</TABLE>
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 23

- 00182

- CR

Alejandro Garcia v. The State of Texas

On Appeal from the 187th District Court of Bexar County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2022CR4999

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed

. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance.
December 7 , 2023
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of Lakeland Bancorp, Inc. (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2010 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), Thomas J. Shara, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, and Joseph F. Hurley, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and
consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented.
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: March 16, 2011



|    |  |                                                     
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|    | 
|By: |  | /s/    THOMAS J.
SHARA                              
|    |  | Thomas J. Shara                                     
|    |  | President and Chief Executive Officer               
|   
|    | 
|By: |  | /s/    JOSEPH F.
HURLEY                             
|    |  | Joseph F. Hurley                                    
|    |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

This certification has been furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
#### AMERICAN PREMIER UNDERWRITERS, INC. *v.*NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ET AL.

*James T. Shearin*and *Andrew McDonald,*in support of the petition.

*Charles A. Deluca,*in opposition.

Decided February 18, 1998

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 47 Conn. App. 384 (AC 16247), is denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLAR
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       5,868,749
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             5,134,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 24,950,725
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         340,276
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           340,276
<LOANS>                                    219,206,929
<ALLOWANCE>                                  2,158,026
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             264,385,344
<DEPOSITS>                                 213,958,895
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          2,395,998
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        21,473
<OTHER-SE>                                  19,172,217
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             264,385,344
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             16,775,792
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            1,928,455
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            18,704,247
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           8,686,678
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          10,324,540
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        8,379,707
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                1,660,741
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              7,745,331
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                896,874
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   610,711
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .35
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.67
<LOANS-NON>                                    848,942
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             1,828,060
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                1,380,614
<RECOVERIES>                                    49,839
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            2,158,026
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         2,158,026
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
EXHIBIT 31.2

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 302(a) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      I, Xin Zhang, certify that:

      1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Universal
Travel Group.

      2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;

      3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

      4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

            a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
and

            b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

            a) all significant deficiencies and material weakness in the design
or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data; and

            b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.


Date: August 2007                                 /s/ Xin Zhang
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Name: Xin Zhang
                                                  Title: Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, J. William Blackham, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ J. William Blackham              
|J. William Blackham                  
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|November 1, 2006                     



34