alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

| (1) | the      Report fully complies with the requirements of §13(a) or 15(d) of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78m or 78o(d),      and, |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated:  May      14, 2008 | /s/ Darin M. Myman                         |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|                                | Darin      M. Myman                        |
|                                | President      and Chief Executive Officer |

----
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 98-1169

ANTHONY R. SAGNELLA, APPELLANT,

 V.

TOGO D. WEST, JR.,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

Before KRAMER, IVERS, and STEINBERG, Judges.

O R D E R

On September 22, 1999, the Court, in a single-judge memorandum decision, affirmed in part

the March 16, 1998, decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board or BVA). On October 29,

1999, the appellant, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration or a decision by a panel. For

the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the appellant's alternative motions.

In his motion for reconsideration, the appellant's primary assertion is that he was never

afforded the opportunity to contest the effective date assigned to his rating for total disability based

on individual unemployability (TDIU). In response to these arguments, the Court reiterates that the

Court has no jurisdiction over the effective date for a TDIU rating because there is no jurisdictionconferring Notice of Disagreement (NOD). See Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687

§ 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988) (found at 38 U.S.C. § 7251 note). Nevertheless, the Court notes

that, to the extent that the appellant is asserting that he was not properly provided with notice of the

VA regional office (RO) decision that awarded a TDIU rating and assigned an effective date, it

appears that the appellant's TDIU claim was referred to the RO by the Board in its February 1997

decision (Record (R.) at 362) and that, after a subsequent decision in which the RO awarded a TDIU

rating and assigned an effective date (R. at 379), the appellant may have been improperly notified

that the matter would be returned to the BVA (along with claims that had been remanded by the

BVA in its February 1997 decision) (R. at 383). In so noting, however, the Court does not make any

conclusions as to whether the RO committed any errors in processing the appellant's TDIU claim,

nor does the Court make any conclusions as to whether, if an error occurred, it would require the RO

now to provide notice of that decision or would permit the present filing of an NOD. See Mindenhall

v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 271, 274 (1994) (RO must mail to appellant decision and notification of

procedural and appellate rights; NOD must be filed within one year from date of mailing); Hauck

v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (where appellant "never received notification of any denial

. . . , the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with 'the date of mailing

of notice of the result of initial review or determination,' did not begin to run"). 

Upon consideration of the record on appeal and the foregoing, it is by the single judge
2

ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. It is by the panel

ORDERED that the motion for a decision by a panel is DENIED.

DATED: Februarty 14, 2000 PER CURIAM.
**Exhibit      32.1**

**Certification      of Principal Executive Officer**

**Pursuant      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to**

**Section      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

| (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/ Richard                A. Rappaport                                                                       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Richard                A. RappaportPrincipal                Executive Officer October                21, 2008 |

----
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7433** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. CALVIN TYRONE YOUNG, a/k/a Too Short , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro
. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr. , Senior District Judge. ( 4:96

- cr - 00243

- NCT

- 1 ; 1:12

- cv 00368

- NCT

- JEP )

Submitted : January 14, 2016 Decided: January 20, 2016

Before AGEE , WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Calvin Tyrone Young , Appellant Pro Se. Robert Michael Hamilton, Michael Francis Joseph , Angela Hewlett Miller , Assistant U nited S tates Attorney s, Greensbor o, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Calvin Tyrone Young seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on hi s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012)
. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the d enial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the const itutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the disposit ive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Young has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability , deny Young’s motion to appoint counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented3 in t he materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Ford et al. *v.*Deigendesch, Appellant.

*Negligence*— Vehicle *driver*— Narrow *street*— *Horse on trot*— *Slack rein*— Shying *of horse*— Throwing *of wagon on*sidewalk— *Injury to pedestrian*— Case *for jury.*

In .an action for personal injuries, where it'appeared that the driver of defendant’s horse and wagon drove the horse at a trot, with loose rein, along a six and one-half foot roadway bordered by a sidewalk only two feet in width, and that the horse suddenly shied and moved sidewise, throwing a wheel of the wagon upon the sidewalk and striking plaintiff, a small boy, the questions whether the driver had exercised due care in proceeding at such speed and with slack rein were for the jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff were sustained.

Argued March 26, 1918.

Appeal, No. 347, Jan. T., 1917, by defendant from judgment of C. P. No. 4, Philadelphia Co., March T., 1917, No. 3533, on verdicts for plaintiffs in case of Francis X. Ford, by his next friend and father, William J. Ford, and William J. Ford, v. Paul H. Deigendesch.

Before Mestrezat, Potter, Moschzisker, Frazer and Walling, JJ.

Affirmed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before Audenried, P. J.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Verdict for plaintiffs, Francis X. Ford and William J. Ford, for $1,820 and $300 respectively, and judgments thereon. Defendant appealed.

*Error assigned,*among others, was in refusing defendant’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.

*248
      *Williami G.*Wright, for appellant.

*Augustus Trash Ashton*and *Victor Frey,*for appellees, were not heard.

April 22, 1918:

Per Curiam,

The evidence in this case shows that an employee of defendant drove defendant’s horse at a trot, with a loose rein, through a narrow roadway, some six and a half feet in width, bordered by a sidewalk only two feet in width. It appears that the horse suddenly shied, and moved sidewise, so that the wheel of the wagon to which he was attached, was thrown upon the narrow sidewalk, striking and injuring the plaintiff, a small boy. Whether or not the driver exercised due care, under the circumstances, in permitting the horse to travel at such a rate of speed, or whether it ivas careless in him to drive with a slack rein at that time and place, were questions for the jury to determine. Binding instructions in favor of defendant were properly refused, and the question of the driver’s negligence was submitted to the jury in a charge to which no exception was taken.

The judgment is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2409 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2409

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on sodium petroleum sulfonic 
                          acids, sodium salts.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

  Mrs. Hagan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To extend the temporary suspension of duty on sodium petroleum sulfonic 
                          acids, sodium salts.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SODIUM PETROLEUM SULFONIC ACIDS, SODIUM SALTS.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.34.01 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to sodium petroleum sulfonic 
acids, sodium salts) is amended by striking ``12/31/2009'' and 
inserting ``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As
Adopted Pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and in
connection with the annual report on Form 10-K of Simtrol, Inc. (the "Company")
for the year ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on or about the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, who are
the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each
hereby certify that (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





This Certification shall not, except to
the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.





This Certification is signed on April
26, 2010.





/s/
      Oliver M. Cooper, IIIOliver
      M. Cooper, IIIPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer/s/
      Stephen N. SampStephen
      N. SampChief
      Financial Officer
#### STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shannon W. RICHMOND, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 18325.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 1, 1983.

Stephen R. McCaughey, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a nonjury conviction for misdemeanor theft in a case where a felony burglary charge only was filed. The trial judge, upon trial of the matter, found there was no burglary, but that the petit theft shown was an included offense, and sentenced the appellant to six months in jail.

The appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which was denied. It was based on the contention that the offense of theft is not one included in burglary, being one unnecessary for commission of the latter.

The State’s attorney agreed with appellant’s claim and officially made such commitment a matter of record in this case by confessing error in its brief and by joining the appellant in seeking reversal of the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

This Court is in agreement with the request for reversal.1 The case is remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

STEWART, J., dissents.

1

. See *State v. Elliott (Clayton),*Utah, 641 P.2d 122 (1982).
#### Edward WALKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. BM-343.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 30, 1987.

*79Michael E. Allen, Public Defender; and Kenneth L. Hosford, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen.; and Patricia Con-ners, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

Walker appeals from the sentence imposed following the revocation of his probation contending that the court erred by failing to give him credit for time served on the front end of his sentence, as required, in his opinion, by section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes. We reverse.

On May 31, 1984, Walker entered a plea of nolo contendere to grand theft and was sentenced as a youthful offender to three years’ incarceration, followed by two years’ probation. On April 21, 1986, the trial court entered an order revoking probation, adjudicated appellant guilty of grand theft, and sentenced him to a period of two years to be served consecutively to the term appellant was already serving on the offense underlying the probation revocation. Appellant did not receive credit for the time served while incarcerated on the original split sentence.

The State argues that section 921.161(1) does not allow credit for jail time served in other than county jails prior to sentencing, and thus Walker is not entitled to credit for the state prison time already served. Although we agree that section 921.161 applies solely to credit for time served in a county jail, *Kronz v. State,*462 So.2d 450 (Fla.1985), Walker is nonetheless entitled to credit for all time spent in jail pursuant to his original sentence. *Hutchinson v. State,*467 So.2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); *State v. Holmes,*360 So.2d 380 (Fla.1978); *State v. Jones,*327 So.2d 18 (Fla.1976).

Although the State argues that this Court, if it agrees with appellant, should vacate the sentence and remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing under *Crosby v. State,*475 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), we find the circumstances in *Crosby*to be distinguishable. In *Crosby,*it appeared probable on the face of the record that the court imposed a lesser term of incarceration in order to give the defendant credit for the time already served. There is no such appearance on the face of the record in the instant case.

Accordingly, we REMAND the cause with instructions to credit appellant’s sentence with time already served.

ERVIN and FRANK, RICHARD H„ Associate Judge, concur.
EXHIBIT 23.1

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement File Nos:
33-44036, 33-44035, 33-55094, 33-56856, 33-72512, 33-81314, 333-18237,
333-18239, 333-30597, 333-44407, 333-48635, 333-83035, 333-87561, 333-35578,
333-128420, and 333-120782 of our report dated February 17, 2006, except for
footnote 11, to which the date is February 23, 2006, relating to the
consolidated financial statements of Simtrol, Inc., which report includes an
explanatory paragraph as to an uncertainty with respect to Simtrol, Inc.'s
ability to continue as a going concern, appearing in this Annual Report on Form
10-KSB of Simtrol, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2005.


/s/ Marcum & Kliegman LLP


Marcum & Kliegman LLP
New York, NY
March 30, 2006
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2010 of Provision Holding, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Curt Thornton, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities   Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.





Date: November 22, 2010
By:
/s/ Curt ThorntonChief Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board,

President and Director(Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Charles NORTON, Defendant-Appellant, and Cynthia K. Norton, Claimant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Charles Norton, Defendant-Appellant, and Cynthia K. Norton, Claimant.

Nos. 03-1336, 03-1394.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 29, 2003.

Decided June 3, 2003.

Richard Charles Norton, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Jack Bondurant, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Sharon Burham, Office of the United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Charles Norton appeals the district court’s order denying is motion for an evidentiary hearing and a subsequent order entering a stay of judgment pending appeal. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See United States v. Norton,*No. 99-78 (W.D.Va. Jan. 31, 2003 & Mar. 21, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the ma*412terials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Fred T. RODGERS v. CHARITY HOSPITAL OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.

No. 87-CC-2618.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 8, 1988.

In re Charity Hosp. of LA at N.O.; Le-berte, Mark M.D.; Summers, Warren M.D.; Klein, Russell M.D.; Delaney, Patrick M.D.; Swerwonska, Maria M.D.; Maso, C. M.D.; Wells, W. M.D.; Hernandez, Richard M.D.; Champagne, Kenneth M.D.; Sottara, Victor M.D.; Rohr, W.B. M.D.; Boudreaux, Phillip M.D.; Tandron, Ileana M.D.; Jones, Susan Ann M.D.; applying for writ of cer-tiorari and/or review and supervisory *370writs; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “A”, No. 84-21050; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CW-8939.

Demed.
Exhibit
32.2





Certification of Principal
Financial Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report
of SRKP 5, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2010
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Anthony C. Pintsopoulos, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Anthony C. PintsopoulosAnthony
      C. Pintsopoulos
              Principal
      Financial Officer
              July
      26, 2010
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                             799
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,135
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (148)
<INVENTORY>                                        760
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,038
<PP&E>                                           2,820
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (2,076)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   4,911
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,989
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            12
<OTHER-SE>                                      (1,209)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     4,911
<SALES>                                          7,132
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 7,132
<CGS>                                            3,716
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,600
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,052
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (2,520)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (2,520)
<DISCONTINUED>                                    (320)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (2,840)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.23)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.23)



</TABLE>