This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

16175 

Vol. 77, No. 54 

Tuesday, March 20, 2012 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 50 

[NRC–2011–0299] 

RIN 3150–AJ08 

Station Blackout 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or the Commission) 

is issuing this Advance Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to begin 

the process of considering amendments 

of its regulations that address a 

condition known as station blackout 

(SBO). SBO involves the loss of all 

onsite and offsite alternating current (ac) 

power at a nuclear power plant. The 

NRC seeks public comment on specific 

questions and issues with respect to 

possible revisions to the NRC’s 

requirements for addressing SBO 

conditions to develop new SBO 

requirements and a supporting 

regulatory basis. This regulatory action 

is one of the near-term actions based on 

lessons-learned stemming from the 

March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident in Japan. 

DATES: Submit comments by May 4, 

2012. Comments received after the 

comment period deadline will be 

considered if it is practical to do so, but 

the NRC is only able to ensure 

consideration of comments received on 

or before the end of the public comment 

period. Due to priority of this regulatory 

action and the associated effort on the 

part of the Commission to expedite the 

action, the Commission will not accept 

requests for extensions of the public 

comment period unless extraordinary 

circumstances exist. 

ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID 

NRC–2011–0299 in the subject line of 

your comments. For additional 

instructions on submitting comments 

and instructions on accessing 

documents related to this action, see 

‘‘Submitting Comments and Accessing 

Information’’ in the SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION section of this document. 

You may submit comments by any one 

of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

NRC–2011–0299. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; 

telephone: 301–492–3668; email: 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

• Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

• Email comments to: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive a reply email confirming 

that we have received your comments, 

contact us directly at 301–415–1677. 

• Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

Federal workdays. (Telephone: 301– 

415–1677.) 

• Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301– 

415–1101. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Timothy A. Reed, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U. S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 

1462, or email: Timothy.Reed@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Submitting Comments and Accessing 

Information 

II. Fukushima Dai-ichi Event and the NRC 

Regulatory Response 

III. Background 

A. General Design Criteria 2 and 17 

B. Station Blackout Rule 

C. Petition for Rulemaking on Station 

Blackout Due to Coronal Mass Ejection 

D. Mitigating Strategies 

IV. Discussion and Request for Public 

Comment 

A. Advance Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking Purpose 

B. Rulemaking Scope 

C. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria 

D. Functional Considerations and 

Requirements for Supporting Structures, 

Systems, and Components and 

Procedures 

E. Applicability to NRC Licenses and 

Approvals 

F. Relationship Between Existing Station 

Blackout Requirements in Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations Section 

50.63 and the New Station Blackout 

Requirements 

G. Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards Recommendations 

V. Public Meeting 

VI. Rulemaking Process 

VII. Availability of Supporting Documents 

I. Submitting Comments and Accessing 

Information 

Comments submitted in writing or in 

electronic form will be posted on the 

NRC Web site and on the Federal 

rulemaking Web site, http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

The NRC requests that any party 

soliciting or aggregating comments 

received from other persons for 

submission to the NRC inform those 

persons that the NRC will not edit their 

comments to remove any identifying or 

contact information, and therefore, they 

should not include any information in 

their comments that they do not want 

publicly disclosed. 

You can access publicly available 

documents related to this document 

using the following methods: 

• NRC’s Public Document Room 

(PDR): The public may examine and 

have copied for a fee, publicly available 

documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O– 

1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): Publicly available documents 

created or received at the NRC are 

available online in the NRC Library at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. From this page, the public 

can gain entry into ADAMS, which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s 

PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 

or 301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. 

• Federal Rulemaking Web Site: 

Public comments and supporting 

materials related to this advance notice 

of proposed rulemaking can be found at 

http://www.regulations.gov by searching 

on Docket ID NRC–2011–0299. 


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II. Fukushima Dai-ichi Event and the 

NRC Regulatory Response 

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 

earthquake struck off the coast of the 

Japanese island of Honshu. The 

earthquake resulted in a large tsunami 

that is estimated to have exceeded 14 

meters (45 feet) in height, which 

inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

Nuclear Power Plant site. The 

earthquake and tsunami produced 

widespread devastation across 

northeastern Japan, and significantly 

affected the infrastructure and industry 

in the northeastern coastal areas of 

Japan. 

When the earthquake occurred, 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 

were in operation, and Units 4, 5, and 

6, were shut down for routine refueling 

and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 

reactor fuel had been offloaded into the 

Unit 4 spent fuel pool (SFP) to facilitate 

maintenance activities in the reactor 

pressure vessel. Following the 

earthquake, the three operating units 

automatically shut down and offsite 

power was lost to the entire facility. The 

emergency diesel generators started at 

all six units, providing ac electrical 

power to critical systems at each unit. 

The facility response to the earthquake 

appears to have been normal. 

Approximately 40 minutes following 

the earthquake and shutdown of the 

operating units, the first large tsunami 

wave inundated the site, followed by 

additional waves. The tsunami caused 

extensive damage to site facilities and 

resulted in a complete loss of all ac 

electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a 

condition known as SBO. In addition, 

all direct current (dc) electrical power 

was lost early in the event on Units 1 

and 2, and after some period of time at 

the other units. Unit 6 retained the 

function of one air-cooled emergency 

diesel generator. Despite their actions, 

the operators lost the ability to cool the 

fuel in the Unit 1 reactor after several 

hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about 

70 hours, and in the Unit 3 reactor after 

about 36 hours, resulting in damage to 

the nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of 

cooling capabilities. 

In the days following the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi nuclear accident in Japan, the 

NRC Chairman directed the staff to 

establish a senior-level agency task force 

to conduct a methodical and systematic 

review of the NRC’s processes and 

regulations to determine whether the 

agency should make additional 

improvements to its regulatory system 

and to make recommendations to the 

Commission for its policy direction. 

This direction was provided in a tasking 

memorandum dated March 23, 2011, 

from the NRC Chairman to the NRC 

Executive Director for Operations 

(COMGBJ–11–0002). In SECY–11–0093, 

‘‘The Near-Term Report and 

Recommendations for Agency Actions 

Following the Events in Japan,’’ dated 

July 12, 2011, the Near-Term Task Force 

(NTTF) provided its recommendations 

to the Commission regarding SBO and 

the need for revising the NRC’s SBO 

rule (Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) section 50.63). The 

staff requirements memorandum (SRM) 

for SECY–11–0093, dated August 19, 

2011, directed the staff to ‘‘identify and 

make recommendations regarding any 

NTTF recommendations that can, and in 

the staff’s judgment, should be 

implemented, in part or in whole, 

without unnecessary delay.’’ 

The NTTF provided a specific 

proposal for SBO mitigation that was 

subsequently endorsed by the National 

Resources Defense Council in a petition 

for rulemaking (PRM), PRM–50–101 (76 

FR 58165) as a way to address SBO 

mitigation. The approach for SBO 

mitigation put forth by the NTTF as 

NTTF Recommendation 4.1 was: 

Initiate rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.63 

to require each operating and new reactor 

licensee to: (1) Establish a minimum coping 

time of 8 hours for a loss of all ac power, (2) 

establish the equipment, procedures, and 

training necessary to implement an 

‘‘extended loss of all ac’’ coping time of 72 

hours for core and spent fuel pool cooling 

and for reactor coolant system and primary 

containment integrity as needed, and (3) 

preplan and prestage offsite resources to 

support uninterrupted core and spent fuel 

pool cooling, and reactor coolant system and 

containment integrity as needed, including 

the ability to deliver the equipment to the 

site in the time period allowed for extended 

coping, under conditions involving 

significant degradation of offsite 

transportation infrastructure associated with 

significant natural disasters. 

In SECY–11–0124 and SECY–11– 

0137, the staff provided for Commission 

consideration its recommendations on 

those NTTF action items that should be 

initiated, in part or in whole, without 

unnecessary delay, and the associated 

prioritization for each item. Regarding 

SBO mitigation actions the staff 

recommended that the NRC, as a nearterm action: 

Engage stakeholders in support of 

rulemaking activities to enhance the 

capability to maintain safety through a 

prolonged SBO. These activities will include 

the development of the regulatory basis, a 

proposed rule, and implementing guidance. 

In SRM–SECY–11–0124, dated 

October 18, 2011, the Commission 

approved the staff’s proposed actions to 

implement without unnecessary delay 

the NTTF recommendations as 

described in SECY–11–0124. 

Subsequently, in SRM–SECY–11–0137, 

dated December 15, 2011, the 

Commission approved the staff’s 

proposed prioritization of the NTTF 

recommendations and supported action 

on the recommendations subject to the 

direction in the SRM. 

Regarding regulatory actions to 

address SBO, the Commission directed 

the staff to initiate a rulemaking on 

NTTF Recommendation 4.1 in the form 

of an ANPR. This document is 

responsive to that Commission 

direction. 

In November 2011, the Institute of 

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 

issued INPO–11–005, ‘‘Special Report 

on the Nuclear Accident at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 

Station.’’ In SRM–SECY–11–0137, the 

Commission directed the staff to use 

INPO–11–005 as an input to its 

development of technical bases for any 

proposed regulatory changes. Much of 

the technical information regarding the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi accident discussed 

in this document has been derived from 

INPO–11–005. 

III. Background 

A. General Design Criteria 2 and 17 

As defined in 10 CFR 50.2, ‘‘design 

bases’’ means that information which 

identifies the specific functions to be 

performed by a facility structure, 

system, or component (SSC), and the 

specific values or ranges of values 

chosen for controlling parameters as 

reference bounds for design. The actual 

detailed design of facility SSCs must 

reflect the assigned design basis 

functions and assure performance of 

those functions within the reference 

bounds for design. An applicant for a 

construction permit or combined license 

for a facility is required, pursuant to 10 

CFR 50.34(a)(3) or 52.79(a)(4)(i), 

respectively, to describe the principal 

design criteria (PDC) for the proposed 

facility. The PDC generally identify 

facility SSCs and their functions, which 

is part of the design bases described 

above. U.S. facilities for which 

construction permits were issued before 

1971 had plant-specific PDC, since the 

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the 

authority that was the predecessor to the 

NRC, had yet to develop generic 

requirements for facility design criteria 

at that time. 

On July 11, 1967, the AEC published 

for comment a proposed amendment to 

10 CFR part 50 entitled ‘‘General Design 

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant 

Construction Permits’’ (32 FR 10213). 

Subsequently, on February 20, 1971, the 

AEC published the final general design 


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criteria (GDC) and added appendix A, 

‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ to 10 CFR part 50 (36 FR 

3255). The GDC provide minimum 

requirements for facility PDC, and form 

part of the facility design basis since 

they identify SSCs and their required 

functions at a high level. NRC 

regulations, including the GDC and 

plant-specific PDC, set general 

minimum standards for the values or 

ranges of values chosen for controlling 

parameters as reference bounds for 

design, which is the second element of 

the design bases defined in 10 CFR 50.2. 

These values or ranges of values are 

determined in accordance with detailed 

NRC guidance applicable to the 

particular SSCs found in nuclear power 

facilities. The GDC relevant to this 

ANPR are GDC 2, which governs 

consideration of natural phenomena, 

and GDC 17, which governs electrical 

system design. For facilities with 

construction permits issued before 1971, 

plant-specific PDC, which differ in 

certain respects from GDC 2 and 17, are 

also relevant to this ANPR. 

GDC 2 

General Design Criterion 2 currently 

requires nuclear power plants designed 

in accordance with appendix A to 10 

CFR part 50 to be protected against 

natural phenomena. Specifically, SSCs 

important to safety shall be designed to 

withstand the effects of natural 

phenomena such as earthquakes, 

tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, 

and seiches without loss of capability to 

perform their safety functions. The 

design bases for these structures, 

systems, and components shall reflect: 

(1) Appropriate consideration of the 

most severe of the natural phenomena 

that have been historically reported for 

the site and surrounding area, with 

sufficient margin for the limited 

accuracy, quantity, and period of time 

in which the historical data have been 

accumulated; (2) appropriate 

combinations of the effects of normal 

and accident conditions with the effects 

of the natural phenomena; and (3) the 

importance of the safety functions to be 

performed. Severe natural phenomena 

may be reflected in a facility design 

basis through selection and appropriate 

consideration of severe events that will 

then be the basis for establishing the 

reference bounds for the design. 

Accordingly, the questions in this ANPR 

will refer to the specific values or ranges 

of values chosen for controlling 

parameters as reference bounds for 

design associated with natural 

phenomena as ‘‘the bounding events 

selected for design purposes.’’ 

GDC 17 

General Design Criterion 17 governs 

electric power systems for nuclear 

power plants designed in accordance 

with appendix A to 10 CFR part 50. The 

draft version of this GDC published for 

comment in 1967 was proposed GDC 39, 

‘‘Emergency Power for Engineered 

Safety Features (Category A)’’ (32 FR 

10213). Proposed GDC 39 read as 

follows: 

Alternate power systems shall be provided 

and designed with adequate independency, 

redundancy, capacity, and testability to 

permit the functioning required of the 

engineered safety features. As a minimum, 

the onsite power system and the offsite 

power system shall each, independently, 

provide this capacity assuming a failure of a 

single active component in each power 

system. 

The public comments on proposed 

GDC 39 stated that the requirement that 

offsite power must satisfy the ‘‘single 

failure criterion’’ was impractical and 

asked the Commission to eliminate all 

reference to offsite power. The 

resolution to the comment stated the 

following: 

The criterion has been rewritten to make it 

clear that the offsite power system need not 

meet the ‘‘single failure criterion.’’ Reference 

to offsite power has not been deleted because 

we believe that offsite power is required to 

provide adequate assurance of safety (see 

New Criterion 17). New Criterion 17 has been 

discussed with the IEEE [Institute of 

Electrical and Electronics Engineers] 

Subcommittee which is developing criteria 

for power requirements for nuclear power 

units. The members of the subcommittee 

indicated that the new criterion is acceptable 

and consistent with their requirements. 

Therefore, the Commission 

promulgated GDC 17 in appendix A to 

10 CFR part 50 to state as follows: 

An onsite electrical power system and an 

offsite electrical power system shall be 

provided to permit functioning of structures, 

systems, and components important to safety. 

The safety function for each system 

(assuming the other system is not 

functioning) shall be to provide sufficient 

capacity and capability to assure that (1) 

specified acceptable fuel design limits and 

design conditions of the reactor coolant 

pressure boundary are not exceeded as a 

result of anticipated operational occurrences 

and (2) the core is cooled and containment 

integrity and other vital functions are 

maintained in the event of postulated 

accidents. 

The onsite electrical power sources, 

including the batteries, and the onsite 

electrical distribution system, shall have 

sufficient independence, redundancy, and 

testability to perform their safety functions 

assuming a single failure. 

Electrical power from the transmission 

network to the switchyard shall be supplied 

by two physically independent transmission 

lines (not necessarily on separate rights of 

way) designed and located so as to suitably 

minimize the likelihood of their 

simultaneous failure under operating and 

postulated accident and environmental 

conditions. Two physically independent 

circuits from the switchyard to the onsite 

electrical distribution system shall be 

provided. Each of these circuits shall be 

designed to be available in sufficient time 

following a loss of all onsite alternating 

current power sources and the other offsite 

electrical power circuit, to assure that 

specified acceptable fuel design limits and 

design conditions of the reactor coolant 

pressure boundary are not exceeded. One of 

these circuits shall be designed to be 

available within a few seconds following a 

loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core 

cooling, containment integrity, and other 

vital safety functions are maintained. 

Provisions shall be included to minimize 

the probability of losing electrical power 

from any of the remaining sources as a result 

of, or coincident with, the loss of power 

generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss 

of power from the transmission network, or 

the loss of power from the onsite electrical 

power sources. 

Section 8.2, ‘‘Offsite Power System,’’ 

of NUREG–75/087, ‘‘Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis 

Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR 

Edition’’ (SRP), published May 1980, 

and NUREG–0800, originally published 

November 1975 with the most current 

revision published May 2010, provide 

the review guidelines and acceptance 

criteria for the offsite power system. 

Similarly, Section 8.3 of the SRP 

provides the review guidelines and 

acceptance criteria for the onsite ac 

power system. For nuclear power plants 

that were licensed before GDC 17 

applied, the plant-specific PDC, which 

are set forth in the Updated Final Safety 

Analysis Report, provide the applicable 

design criteria. A significant fraction of 

currently operating nuclear power 

facilities were licensed in accordance 

with plant-specific PDC rather than the 

GDC. 

B. Station Blackout Rule 

The availability of ac electrical power 

is essential for the safe operation and 

accident recovery of commercial nuclear 

power plants. The plant itself or offsite 

power sources normally supply this 

power through the plant switchyard, 

through which the plant is connected to 

the electrical grid. The term SBO is 

defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as follows: 

Station blackout (SBO) means the complete 

loss of alternating current (ac) electric power 

to the essential and nonessential switchgear 

buses in a nuclear power plant (i.e., loss of 

offsite electric power system concurrent with 

turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite 

emergency ac power system). Station 

blackout does not include the loss of 

available ac power to buses fed by station 


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batteries through inverters or by alternate ac 

sources as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, nor does 

it assume a concurrent single failure or 

design basis accident (DBA). At single unit 

sites, any emergency ac power source(s) in 

excess of the number required to meet 

minimum redundancy requirements (i.e., 

single failure) for safe shutdown (non-DBA) 

is assumed to be available and may be 

designated as an alternate power source(s) 

provided the applicable requirements are 

met. At multi-unit sites, where the 

combination of emergency ac power sources 

exceeds the minimum redundancy 

requirements for safe shutdown (non-DBA) of 

all units, the remaining emergency ac power 

sources may be used as alternate ac power 

sources provided they meet the applicable 

requirements. If these criteria are not met, 

station blackout must be assumed on all the 

units. 

Because many of the safety systems 

relied upon for reactor core decay heat 

removal and containment heat removal 

are dependent on ac power, the 

consequences of an SBO could be 

significant. In the event of an SBO, the 

capability to cool the reactor core is 

dependent on the availability of systems 

that do not rely upon ac power from the 

essential or nonessential switchgear 

buses for a specified time, and on the 

ability to restore ac power within the 

specified time. Unavailability of power 

can have a significant adverse impact on 

a plant’s ability to achieve and maintain 

safe-shutdown conditions. In fact, risk 

analyses performed for nuclear power 

plants indicate that the loss of all ac 

power can be a significant contributor to 

the risk associated with plant operation, 

contributing more than 70 percent of the 

overall risk at some plants. Therefore, 

the frequency of a loss of offsite power 

(LOOP) and the time for subsequent 

restoration of offsite power are 

important inputs to plant risk models, 

and these inputs must reflect current 

industry performance in order for plant 

risk models to accurately estimate the 

risk associated with LOOP-initiated 

scenarios. 

One important subset of LOOPinitiated scenarios involves SBO 

situations in which the affected plant 

achieves safe shutdown by relying on 

components that are not ac powered, 

such as turbine- or diesel-driven pumps. 

Thus, the reliability of such 

components, dc battery depletion times, 

and characteristics of offsite power 

restoration are important in determining 

risk from an SBO. 

The SBO rule was developed based on 

insights gained from several plantspecific probabilistic safety studies; 

operating experience; and reliability, 

accident sequence, and consequence 

analyses completed between 1975 and 

1988. One such study, WASH–1400, 

‘‘Reactor Safety Study,’’ issued in 1975, 

indicated that SBO could be an 

important contributor to the total risk 

from nuclear power plant accidents. In 

1980, the Commission designated the 

issue of SBO as Unresolved Safety Issue 

A–44, ‘‘Station Blackout.’’ The technical 

findings of the staff’s studies of the SBO 

issue are presented in NUREG–1032, 

‘‘Evaluation of Station Blackout 

Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants, 

Technical Findings Related to 

Unresolved Safety Issue A–44,’’ June 

1988. 

The final rule containing SBO 

requirements was published in the 

Federal Register (53 FR 23203) on July 

21, 1988. The Commission issued the 

SBO rule based on operating experience 

suggesting that both onsite emergency 

ac power systems and offsite power 

from the transmission network might be 

less reliable than originally anticipated, 

even for plants designed to meet GDC 17 

of appendix A to 10 CFR part 50. The 

objective of the rule is to reduce the risk 

of severe accidents resulting from SBO 

by maintaining highly reliable ac 

electric power systems and, as 

additional defense-in-depth, assuring 

that plants can cope with an SBO for a 

specified duration. NRC guidance for 

implementing the SBO rule can be 

found in Regulatory Guide 1.155, 

‘‘Station Blackout,’’ August 1988 (RG 

1.155), which endorses Nuclear 

Management and Resources Council 

(NUMARC) 8700, ‘‘Guidelines and 

Technical Bases for NUMARC 

Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout 

at Light Water Reactors,’’ November 

1987. Additional background regarding 

the SBO rule, its basis, and NRC 

guidance relating to SBO is referenced 

within RG 1.155. 

The SBO rule requires that nuclear 

power plants have the capability to 

withstand an SBO and maintain core 

cooling and containment integrity for a 

specified duration. The specified SBO 

duration for a plant is determined based 

on (1) the redundancy of the onsite 

emergency ac power sources, (2) the 

reliability of the onsite emergency ac 

power sources, (3) the expected 

frequency of LOOP at the particular site, 

and (4) the probable time needed to 

restore offsite power. The assumption 

used for a LOOP at a plant site was an 

initiating event resulting from a 

switchyard-related or grid-related event 

due to random faults, or an external 

event, such as a grid disturbance, or 

weather events such as high winds, 

snow, and ice loading that affects the 

offsite power system either throughout 

the grid or at the plant. During the 

development of the current SBO rule, it 

was concluded that there was a 

sufficiently low likelihood of a LOOP 

generated by a fire, flood, or seismic 

activity and that preexisting licensing 

requirements specified sufficient 

protective measures such that LOOPs 

from such causes need not be 

considered under the SBO rule 

requirements (see NUREG–1032 and 

NUREG/CR–3226 for further detail). 

In order to meet the requirements of 

the SBO rule and depending on the 

station’s existing capability, some 

stations were modified (i.e., by adding 

an alternate ac power source or 

increasing the capacity of the station 

batteries, plant/instrument air system, 

or condensate storage tank) in order to 

cope with the longer station blackout 

duration. In addition, licensees 

enhanced station procedures and 

training for restoring both offsite and 

onsite ac power sources. The NRC and 

its licensees also increased their 

emphasis on establishing and 

maintaining high reliability of onsite 

emergency power sources. The SBO rule 

does not require systems and equipment 

used to cope with SBO to meet 10 CFR 

part 50 quality assurance requirements 

for safety-related equipment; instead, 

Appendix A of RG 1.155 provides the 

applicable quality assurance guidance 

for non-safety systems and equipment 

used to meet the SBO rule requirements. 

Once the NRC has approved the 

‘‘specified duration’’ of an SBO and the 

coping analysis for a particular facility, 

the SBO rule does not require licensees 

to update either the specified duration 

or the coping analyses. However, the 

parameters that were used for inputs 

into both the determination of the 

specified duration and the SBO coping 

analysis are subject to change over time. 

These parameters include the number of 

LOOP events expected at a particular 

site, recovery time for offsite power, 

frequency of grid blackout events, and 

diesel generator reliability. Changes to 

these parameters may have a significant 

effect on the SBO duration and coping 

analyses originally performed by the 

licensees. Nonetheless, if the NRC 

determines that a licensee’s plans for 

coping with an SBO are no longer 

adequate, the NRC could require a 

licensee to modify its SBO plans or 

related equipment as necessary, so long 

as the NRC satisfies the requirements of 

the Backfit Rule (10 CFR 50.109). 

C. Petition for Rulemaking on Station 

Blackout Due to Coronal Mass Ejection 

The NRC has received a petition for 

rulemaking (PRM–50–96) from Thomas 

Popik (the petitioner) that deals with 

long-term cooling and unattended water 

makeup of SFPs due to potential long 

term grid loss stemming from extreme 


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solar activity (76 FR 26223, dated May 

6, 2011). The petitioner believes that a 

widespread and prolonged grid outage 

of a year or longer is possible and could 

result in degradation of societal 

infrastructure to the extent that normal, 

commercial deliveries of diesel fuel to 

reactor sites could not be relied upon. 

In this scenario, grid failure might lead 

to a delayed SBO when onsite fuel for 

emergency diesel generators was 

exhausted. The NRC has not yet 

completed its evaluation of PRM–50–96 

and it is unclear whether there are any 

implications for the SBO rulemaking 

activity which is the subject of this 

ANPR. Persons interested in the NRC 

action on PRM–50–96 may follow the 

NRC activities at the regulations.gov 

Web site under the docket heading 

NRC–2011–0069. Pending further 

evaluation of PRM–50–96, the SBO 

rulemaking activity will proceed 

independently. 

D. Mitigating Strategies 

Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the NRC ordered 

licensees to develop and implement 

specific guidance and strategies to 

maintain or restore core cooling, 

containment, and SFP cooling 

capabilities using existing or readily 

available resources that can be 

effectively implemented under the 

circumstances associated with loss of 

large areas of the plant due to 

explosions or fire. After further 

development, these requirements were 

imposed as license conditions for 

individual licensees and formalized in 

the rulemaking of March 27, 2009, in 10 

CFR 50.54(hh)(2) (74 FR 13969). Events 

at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear 

Power Station following the March 11, 

2011, earthquake and tsunami 

highlighted the further potential 

benefits for these same strategies to 

mitigate the effects of prolonged SBOs 

or other events that may challenge core 

cooling, containment, and spent fuel 

pool cooling. 

IV. Discussion and Request for Public 

Comment 

A. Advance Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking Purpose 

In its SRM on SECY–11–0124, the 

Commission directed the staff to initiate 

a rulemaking to address SBO by means 

of an ANPR. Accordingly, this ANPR’s 

objective is to solicit external 

stakeholder input to support the staff’s 

efforts to assemble a regulatory basis for 

a rule that amends SBO requirements. 

The Commission also encouraged the 

staff to craft recommendations that 

continue to realize the strengths of a 

performance-based system as a guiding 

principle. The Commission indicated 

that, to be effective, approaches should 

be flexible and able to accommodate a 

diverse range of circumstances and 

conditions. The Commission stated that 

for consideration of events beyond the 

design basis, a regulatory approach 

founded on performance-based 

requirements will foster development of 

the most effective and efficient sitespecific mitigation strategies, similar to 

how the agency approached the 

approval of licensee response strategies 

for the ‘‘loss of large area’’ event 

addressed in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). 

The NRC is open to flexible, 

performance-based strategies to address 

SBO mitigation. The following 

questions are intended to solicit 

information that will support 

development of such a framework and 

assembly of a complete and adequate 

regulatory basis for any rule changes 

that are ultimately determined to be 

justified. In this context, commenters 

are encouraged to provide information 

on any aspect of SBO mitigation that 

would support this regulatory objective, 

whether in response to an ANPR 

question or not. 

B. Rulemaking Scope 

The NRC would like external 

stakeholders to respond to the following 

questions to support the NRC’s efforts to 

define the scope of the regulatory 

framework. 

1. Recognizing the uncertainties 

associated with natural phenomena and 

in the context of establishing a set of 

events upon which to base reference 

bounds for design, should SBO 

equipment be designed to withstand 

natural phenomena which the facility is 

not already designed to withstand, and 

should SBO mitigation strategies 

consider such natural phenomena? 

What severity of natural phenomena 

should be considered (e.g., length of 

return period or duration of the 

phenomena)? For example, flooding 

risks are of concern due to a ‘‘cliff-edge’’ 

effect, in that the safety consequences of 

a flooding event may increase sharply 

with only a small increase in the 

flooding level. Therefore, to address 

uncertainties for SBO events and to 

build in additional defense-in-depth 

margin to mitigate SBO for such events, 

should analysis of an SBO consider a 

flood elevation at some prescribed level 

above the level for which the plant is 

designed? If so, what criteria should be 

used to establish the prescribed level? 

What is the basis for your position? 

2. If such an analysis (per the above 

question) is warranted, what margin in 

addition to that included in the 

reference bounds for design should be 

considered? For existing facilities, 

should such an analysis include factors 

such as the existence of nearby dams or 

water sources? 

3. For events that do not fall within 

the reference bounds for design, but 

may result in SBO conditions, it may be 

necessary for licensees to take early 

action in order to increase the potential 

for successful mitigation. Recognizing 

that there are several actions that take 

time during such events that include, 

but are not limited to (1) the need to 

properly identify and diagnose the event 

or situation, (2) the need to make the 

decision to implement actions or 

strategies to mitigate existing or 

imminent SBO conditions, and (3) the 

time for licensees to implement the 

strategies once the decision is made; 

what time constraints do stakeholders 

understand to be important in 

developing SBO mitigation 

requirements? For example, what 

should be the coping time with no 

mitigation for SBO conditions given 

time constraints that include the time to 

(1) identify and determine the need to 

take mitigative actions and (2) 

implement these strategies under worst 

case conditions? How long should 

mitigation strategies be expected to be 

deployed before the receipt of offsite 

assistance? If certain mitigation actions 

must be taken early in the event to avert 

core damage, how should those actions 

be determined and how should the time 

when they must be performed be 

determined? 

4. Similar to question B.2, but from a 

broader perspective of establishing all 

the new SBO mitigation requirements: 

Different regions of the United States 

have different natural phenomena that 

are more significant in terms of 

potentially creating SBO conditions. 

Should the NRC construct a new 

regulatory framework containing criteria 

that enable licensees to establish the set 

of natural phenomena of concern for 

their sites? If so, what criteria should be 

used to determine whether an event 

needs to be considered at a particular 

site? Please provide the basis for your 

position. 

5. The current requirements in 10 CFR 

50.63 for SBO are ‘‘unit-specific,’’ 

meaning that the total loss of all ac is 

not assumed to extend to all the power 

reactors at a given site. Based on the 

lessons learned from the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi event, the NRC believes the 

SBO requirements may need to be 

expanded to consider an SBO for the 

entire site (i.e., assume the SBO 

condition occurs to all the units for 

multi-unit sites). What are stakeholder 

views on this matter, and how should it 


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be addressed in the new SBO rule? 

Please provide the basis for your 

position. 

6. The current provisions in 10 CFR 

50.63 require a facility to withstand, for 

a specified duration, and recover from 

an SBO as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. 

Should the new SBO rule require longterm cooling and water makeup to SFPs 

during an SBO? Please provide the basis 

for your position. 

7. Should the SBO rule address how 

external events would affect the 

‘‘specific duration’’ of the SBO and the 

associated coping time? Specifically: 

a. Should the NRC require 

consideration of the likelihood of 

external events that fall outside the 

bounding events selected for design 

purposes in the determination of SBO 

specified duration, or the capability to 

cope with an SBO for the specified 

duration, or both? If so, what should the 

rule require? What is the basis for your 

position? 

b. Should the NRC require 

consideration of additional margin in 

the probability or magnitude (or both) of 

bounding events selected for design 

purposes with respect to natural 

phenomena (e.g., design basis external 

flood plus 10 additional feet or 

extending the ability to withstand the 

total loss of ac power for longer 

durations) in the determination of SBO 

specified duration or the capability to 

cope with an SBO during the specified 

duration, or both? Provide any proposed 

rule provisions and a discussion that 

supports your position. 

c. Should the SBO rule require 

applicants and licensees to address a 

more challenging condition such as the 

total loss of all ac, including ac from the 

dc batteries through inverters? Please 

provide the basis for your position. 

8. If new requirements as discussed in 

this section should be imposed for 

existing licensees or with respect to 

existing certified designs, what sort of 

benefits or costs do stakeholders 

estimate could be incurred? 

C. Rulemaking Objectives/Success 

Criteria 

The NRC is considering whether 

enhancements to current SBO 

requirements are advisable in order to 

consider natural phenomena beyond the 

plant-specific events selected as 

bounding for design purposes, even if 

the plant’s design basis meets the NRC 

requirements and guidance for natural 

phenomena that are applicable to new 

plant applications. The NRC would like 

stakeholder views on specific regulatory 

objectives and success criteria for the 

potential rulemaking, as follows: 

1. What specific objectives should the 

SBO rule be designed to achieve? 

a. For example, should the objective 

of the SBO rule be to significantly 

reduce the frequency of core damage 

from a prolonged SBO, or would it be 

better to focus on the reduction of the 

frequency of large early release of 

radiation for low probability external 

events that result in SBO conditions? 

Please provide the basis for your 

position. 

b. Alternatively, should the SBO rule 

be designed to achieve a more 

qualitative safety objective such as 

increasing, as a defense-in-depth 

measure, requirements for the mitigating 

strategies to cope with prolonged SBO 

conditions stemming from events that 

do not fall within the reference bounds 

for the design, assuming GDC 2 (or the 

corresponding PDC) is satisfied? Please 

provide the basis for your position. 

c. Should the SBO rule provide 

increased assurance that the facility can 

achieve and maintain a safe shutdown 

condition under SBO conditions for a 

set of initiating events that lead to SBO 

conditions, and as one way of doing 

this, enable licensees to use a criterion 

for determining the set of conditions 

that apply to their plants or sites? Please 

provide the basis for your position. 

d. Should the NRC adopt an SBO rule 

that is more performance-based and 

which would not specify the events that 

must be considered in determining the 

SBO duration or the capability for 

coping with an SBO of specified 

duration? Specifically should the NRC 

structure an SBO rule as follows: 

(1) Require each applicant and 

licensee to develop, implement, and 

maintain SBO procedures that describe 

how the licensee will address the 

following areas if the plant experiences 

an event that exceeds the values or does 

not fall within the ranges of values 

chosen for the reference bounds for the 

design of the facility: 

(i) Communication with onsite 

personnel and offsite entities providing 

support to mitigate the event; 

(ii) Onsite actions necessary to 

enhance the capability of the facility to 

mitigate the consequences of the loss of 

all ac power and other equipment 

damage; 

(iii) Dispersal of equipment and 

personnel, as well as rapid entry into 

site protected areas for essential onsite 

personnel and offsite responders who 

are necessary to mitigate the event; and 

(iv) Recall of site personnel. 

(2) Require each applicant and 

licensee to develop and implement 

guidance and strategies intended to 

maintain or restore core cooling, 

containment, and SFP cooling 

capabilities under the circumstances 

associated with the loss of all ac power, 

from an event that does not fall within 

the reference bounds chosen for the 

design of the facility, including: 

(i) Station blackout coping and power 

restoration activities; 

(ii) Operations to mitigate fuel 

damage; and 

(iii) Actions to minimize radiological 

release. 

Please provide the basis for your 

position. 

e. Recognizing that the SBO 

mitigation requirements could address a 

set of events that fall outside the 

reference bounds for design of the plant 

and may lead to SBO conditions, 

success criteria might be more readily 

established. Should the rule establish 

success criteria or requirements that 

apply as a function of the probability of 

the events? For example, for the more 

probable/common SBO events, such as 

those that 10 CFR 50.63 currently 

addresses, the current 10 CFR 50.63 

requirements could largely remain in 

place. For the low probability, high 

consequence, hazard-driven SBOs, a 

different set of success criteria could be 

established that recognize the lower 

probabilities of occurrence of these 

types of SBOs. Please provide the basis 

for your position. 

2. How should actions taken to 

address the staff’s recommended 

approach for NTTF Recommendation 

4.2 be used to support the development 

of SBO mitigation requirements within 

a coherent, integrated regulatory 

framework? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

3. The NRC would like stakeholder’s 

views on a regulatory approach to SBO 

mitigation that conceptually follows the 

NTTF proposal in NTTF 

Recommendation 4.1. Specifically, do 

stakeholders believe that the best 

conceptual approach for SBO mitigation 

is to establish requirements for an initial 

coping period (no ac power available), 

during which time licensees establish 

mitigation strategies; followed by an 

interim period during which time the 

mitigation strategies are employed for a 

duration sufficient to enable offsite 

relief to arrive; followed by a final phase 

where offsite relief has arrived and a 

stable shutdown condition is 

established? Alternatively, if 

stakeholders have alternative 

approaches or suggested changes to this 

conceptual approach, please provide the 

basis for them. 

The NRC notes that there is a close 

relationship between the SBO 

mitigation requirements under 

consideration in this regulatory effort 

and several other near-term actions 


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stemming from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

event (and identified in SECY–11–0124 

and SECY–11–0137). Regulatory actions 

taken in response to these other 

activities may have an impact on any 

regulatory actions taken to address SBO. 

In this regard, the NRC would like 

stakeholder views on the following: 

4. Recognizing that SBO mitigation 

may rely upon Emergency Operating 

Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident 

Management Guidelines (SAMGs), how 

should regulatory actions taken to 

address NTTF Recommendation 8 with 

regard to coordination of EOPs, SAMGs, 

and Extensive Damage Mitigation 

Guidelines be best integrated with SBO 

mitigation requirements to ensure that 

actions to address each of these NTTF 

recommendations do not unduly 

overlap or inadvertently introduce 

unnecessary redundancy, inconsistency, 

or other unintended consequences? 

5. Recognizing that the containment 

function is a key defense-in-depth 

measure for SBO events, how should 

regulatory actions to address NTTF 

Recommendation 5.1, which discusses 

installation of reliable hardened 

containment vent systems for boiling 

water reactors with Mark I and II 

containments designs, be integrated 

with potential SBO load-shedding 

mitigation activities to ensure that 

actions to address each of these NTTF 

recommendations do not unduly 

overlap or inadvertently introduce 

unnecessary redundancy, inconsistency, 

or other unintended consequences? 

6. Recognizing the importance of SFP 

cooling and the need to understand the 

condition of the SFP, how should 

regulatory actions taken to address 

NTTF Recommendation 7.1, which 

addresses SFP instrumentation, be 

integrated into SBO mitigation plans to 

ensure that actions to address each of 

these NTTF recommendations do not 

unduly overlap or inadvertently 

introduce unnecessary redundancy, 

inconsistency, or other unintended 

consequences? 

D. Functional Considerations and 

Requirements for Supporting Structures, 

Systems, and Components and 

Procedures 

An important element of a new set of 

SBO requirements would be identifying 

the functions that need to be performed 

under SBO conditions, since 

performance of these functions relates 

directly to achieving the objectives of 

the rulemaking. Additionally, 

establishing the functions that must be 

performed enables the identification of 

the set of SSCs (SBO mitigation 

equipment) and supporting procedures, 

guidelines, and strategies that would 

need to be employed. The NRC 

considers the key safety functions 

identified below to be the essential 

functions for SBO mitigation, and 

would like stakeholder’s views on 

whether this is the correct set: 

1. Reactor core cooling; 

2. Spent fuel pool cooling; and 

3. Containment. 

With regard to the requirements that 

would stem from identification of the 

SBO mitigation functions, the NRC 

would like stakeholder views on: 

1. What requirements (e.g., design, 

inspection, testing, quality assurance, 

corrective action) should be applied to 

the SBO mitigation SSCs that perform 

the key safety functions to provide 

increased assurance that the functions 

can be performed? What constitutes 

increased assurance (i.e., what must be 

achieved with the additional treatment 

requirements) for the mitigation of SBO 

conditions stemming from either design 

basis events or from external events that 

exceed the events chosen as bounding 

for design purposes? Please provide the 

basis for your position. 

2. What requirements for supporting 

procedures, guidelines, strategies, and 

training should be included within the 

SBO rule (also refer to question C.6)? 

Please provide the basis for your 

position. 

3. Should the SBO rule address 

licensee staffing requirements for SBO 

mitigation for an event involving more 

than a single unit (for multi-unit sites)? 

Please provide the basis for your 

position. 

4. Should the NRC require 

surveillance testing and limiting 

conditions for operation for some or all 

equipment credited for mitigating an 

SBO event? Alternatively, should the 

NRC use a different approach for testing 

of SBO equipment, such as either 

specific testing requirements in a new 

rule, use of 10 CFR 50.65 (Maintenance 

Rule), or other existing plant processes? 

Please provide the basis for your 

position. 

5. Should the NRC require applicants 

and licensees to describe the SSCs, 

supporting procedures, and programs 

used to implement the new SBO 

requirements in the Final Safety 

Analysis Report? Alternatively, should 

the NRC consider a special change 

control requirement for these SSCs, 

procedures, and programs? If 

stakeholders agree that such a 

requirement would be valuable, what 

criteria would be used to determine 

when changes could be made without 

prior NRC review and approval? 

6. If new requirements under the 

items above were to be imposed for 

existing licensees or with respect to 

existing certified designs, what sort of 

benefits and costs do stakeholders 

estimate could be incurred? 

E. Applicability to NRC Licenses and 

Approvals 

The NRC would apply any new SBO 

requirements to power reactors, both 

currently operating and new reactors, 

and would like stakeholder input on 

this aspect of the rule. Accordingly, the 

NRC envisions that this would include 

(but not be limited to): 

1. Nuclear power plants currently 

licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52; 

2. Nuclear power plants currently 

being constructed under construction 

permits issued under 10 CFR part 50, or 

whose construction permits may be 

reinstated; 

3. Current and future applications for 

standard design certification and 

standard design approval under 10 CFR 

part 52; 

4. Future nuclear power plants whose 

construction permits and operating 

licenses are issued under 10 CFR part 

50; 

5. Future nuclear power plants whose 

combined licenses are issued under 10 

CFR part 52, and 

6. Future nuclear power plants that 

are manufactured under 10 CFR part 52. 

F. Relationship Between Existing Station 

Blackout Requirements in Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations, Section 

50.63 and the New Station Blackout 

Requirements 

The NRC is considering how any new 

SBO requirements would relate to the 

existing SBO requirements in 10 CFR 

50.63, and has identified three 

approaches: 

1. Approach 1 (Base Case— 

Supplementary SBO Requirements): The 

new SBO requirements would 1) 

address SBO issues which are separate 

from, and address scenarios which go 

beyond, the existing 10 CFR 50.63 

requirements; and 2) be added to the 

existing 10 CFR 50.63 SBO 

requirements, possibly in a new section 

(e.g., 10 CFR 50.XX). This approach 

would not change the existing 10 CFR 

50.63 requirements, with the exception 

of some conforming changes needed to 

ensure coordination between the 

existing, unchanged 10 CFR 50.63 

requirements, and the newly-added SBO 

requirements. 

2. Approach 2 (Unified SBO 

Requirements): The new SBO 

requirements would: (1) Address SBO 

issues which are separate from, and 

address scenarios which go beyond, the 

existing 10 CFR 50.63 requirements 

(same as Element 1 of Approach 1); and 

(2) be integrated into a single rule, 


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representing a unified overall approach 

to SBO. This differs from Approach 1 in 

that the NRC would develop new rule 

language that presents a single, unified 

approach to SBO covering the full 

spectrum of issues, accidents, plant 

conditions, and performance objectives 

that each nuclear power plant must 

meet. The new rule would include the 

current 10 CFR 50.63 requirements. 

3. Approach 3 (Superseding SBO 

Requirements): The new SBO 

requirements would envelope the full 

spectrum of issues, accidents, plant 

conditions, and performance objectives 

that each nuclear power plant must 

meet, so that the existing SBO 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.63 would be 

subsumed in the new rule. This 

approach differs from Approach 1 in 

that the new SBO requirements would 

address SBOs whose characteristics and 

scope may be more ‘‘severe’’ than 

originally envisioned in 10 CFR 50.63. 

Under Approach 3, the new SBO 

requirements would entirely supersede 

and displace the existing SBO 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.63. All 

existing SBO requirements would be 

removed from 10 CFR 50.63 and 

licensees would be required to change 

their SBO licensing bases (e.g., change 

or remove a Final Safety Analysis 

Report description, a technical 

specification, or a license condition) to 

comply with the new requirements. 

The NRC therefore seeks stakeholder 

views on which of these options is best 

suited for implementing new 

requirements recommended in response 

to ANPR Sections B, C, and D, above. 

What is the basis for your position? 

G. Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards Recommendations 

By letter dated October 13, 2011, the 

Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS) provided its 

recommendations concerning near-term 

actions that should be taken without 

delay. With regard to the mitigation of 

SBO, the ACRS recommended that: 

Staff should also require licensees to 

provide an assessment of capabilities to cope 

with an extended SBO, including system 

vulnerabilities (e.g., reactor coolant pump 

seal qualifications) and capabilities to 

mobilize and deliver offsite resources (e.g., 

portable generators, fuel supplies, water 

pumping equipment). This information will 

inform staff interactions with the industry 

during the rulemaking process and help 

develop guidance that can be applied in the 

near term for enhanced confidence that each 

site has identified their available options. 

Accordingly, the NRC is interested in 

stakeholder feedback regarding both 

current and projected future (i.e., 

considering other actions that could 

stem from the staff’s recommendation to 

address NTTF Recommendation 4.2 as 

well as other relevant NTTF actions) 

capabilities for coping with an extended 

SBO, including system vulnerabilities. 

Additionally, the NRC would like 

stakeholder views concerning the 

capabilities to mobilize and deliver 

offsite resources (e.g., portable 

generators, fuel supplies, water 

pumping equipment) as contemplated 

by both the NTTF and by the industry 

conceptual approach described in the 

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) paper, 

‘‘An Integrated, Safety-Focused 

Approach to Expediting Implementation 

of Fukushima Daiichi LessonsLearned,’’ dated December 16, 2011. 

V. Public Meeting 

The NRC plans to hold a category 3 

public meeting with stakeholders during 

the ANPR public comment period. The 

public meeting is intended to provide a 

forum to discuss the ANPR with 

external stakeholders and inform 

stakeholder views on SBO mitigation to 

enable stakeholders to provide feedback. 

The meeting is not intended for the NRC 

to receive comments and instead the 

NRC will encourage stakeholders to 

provide any comments in written form. 

To support full participation of 

stakeholders, the staff plans to provide 

teleconferencing and Webinar access. 

The NRC does not intend to transcribe 

the meeting. The NRC will issue the 

public meeting notice at least 10 days 

prior to the public meeting. 

Stakeholders should monitor the NRC’s 

public meeting Web site: http:// 

www.nrc.gov/public-involve/publicmeetings/index.cfm. 

VI. Rulemaking Process 

The NRC does not intend to provide 

detailed comment responses for 

information provided in response to this 

ANPR. The NRC will consider timely 

comments on this ANPR in the rule 

development process. If the NRC 

ultimately develops a proposed rule on 

SBO requirements, any notice of 

proposed rulemaking will provide an 

opportunity to comment on the 

proposed rule, and the NRC will 

document its responses to any 

comments received in accordance with 

the notice. If supporting guidance is 

developed for a proposed rule, 

stakeholders will have an opportunity to 

provide feedback on the guidance as 

well. 

VII. Availability of Supporting 

Documents 

The following documents provide 

additional background and supporting 

information regarding this rulemaking 

activity. The documents can be found 

using any of the methods provided in 

the table. Instructions for accessing 

ADAMS were provided under the 

ADDRESSES section of this document. 

Date Document ADAMS Accession No./Web link/Federal 

Register citation 

July 12, 2011 ............................ SECY–11–0093, ‘‘The Near-Term Report and Recommendations 

for Agency Actions following the Events in Japan’’.

ML111861807. 

August 19, 2011 ....................... Staff Requirements—SECY–11–0093, ‘‘The Near-Term Report and 

Recommendations for Agency Actions following the Events in 

Japan’’.

ML112310021. 

July 26, 2011 ............................ PRM–50–101, Petition for Rulemaking to Revise 10 CFR 50.63 ...... http://www.regulations.gov by searching 

on Docket ID NRC–2011–0189. 

September 9, 2011 .................. SECY–11–0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions to be Taken Without 

Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report’’.

ML11245A127, ML11245A144. 

October 18, 2011 ..................... Staff Requirements—SECY–11–0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions to 

be Taken Without Delay From The Near-Term Task Force Report’’.

ML112911571. 

October 3, 2011 ....................... SECY–11–0137, ‘‘Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be 

Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned’’.

ML11272A203, ML11269A204. 

December 15, 2011 ................. Staff Requirements—SECY–11–0137, ‘‘Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to the Fukushima 

Lessons Learned’’.

ML113490055. 


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Date Document ADAMS Accession No./Web link/Federal 

Register citation 

January 28, 1971 ..................... SECY–R–143, ‘‘Amendment to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50—General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants’’.ML072420278. 

July 11, 1967 ............................ General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits.32 FR 10213. 

May 1980 ................................. NUREG–75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety 

Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition.

ML042080088. 

May 2010 ................................. NUREG–0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety 

Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition, Section 

8.2, ‘‘Offsite Power System’’.

ML100740246. 

October 1975 ........................... WASH–1400 (NUREG–75/014), Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.ML072350618. 

June 1988 ................................ NUREG–1032, ‘‘Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear 

Power Plants, Technical Findings Related to Unresolved Safety 

Issue A–44’’.

Accessible from U. S. Department of Energy’s Information Bridge at http:// 

www.osti.gov/bridge/ 

purl.cover.jsp?purl=/5122568-gvK0cy/ 

5122568.pdf. 

March 21, 1986 ........................ Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Station Blackout (10 CFR 50.63) .. 51 FR 9829. 

June 21, 1988, Sept. 22, 1998 Station Blackout (10 CFR 50.63) ........................................................ 53 FR 23203, 63 FR 50480. 

March 27, 2009 ........................ 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) ........................................................................... 74 FR 13969. 

March 23, 2011 ........................ Tasking Memorandum from Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko to the Executive Director for Operations (COMGBJ–11–0002): NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan.ML110950110. 

November 2011 ........................ INPO–11–005, ‘‘Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station’’.

ML11347A454. 

March 15, 2011 ........................ PRM–50–96 ........................................................................................ http://www.regulations.gov by searching 

on Docket ID NRC–2011–0069. 

76 FR 26223. 

February 20, 1971 .................... Amendment to 10 CFR Part 50—General Design Criteria For Nuclear Power Plants.36 FR 3256. 

July 6, 1970 .............................. Status Report On General Design Criteria ......................................... ML003726549. 

August 28, 2007 ....................... Appendix A to Part 50—General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power 

Plants.

72 FR 49505. 

April 1, 2002 ............................. Staff Guidance on Scoping of Equipment Relied on to Meet the Requirements of the Station Blackout (SBO) Rule (10 CFR 50.63) 

for License Renewal (10 CFR 54.4(a)(3)).

ML020920464. 

August 28, 2007 ....................... Final Rule: Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear 

Power Plants.

72 FR 49352. 

December 16, 2011 ................. NEI Submittal of An Integrated, Safety-Focused Approach to Expediting Implementation of Fukushima Daiichi Lessons Learned.ML11353A008. 

October 13, 2011 ..................... Initial ACRS Review of: (1) the NRC Near-Term Task Force Report 

on Fukushima and (2) Staff’s Recommended Actions to be Taken 

Without Delay.

ML11284A136. 

August 1988 ............................. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.155, ‘‘Station Blackout’’ ............................. ML003740034. 

November 1987 ........................ ‘‘Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors,’’ NUMARC 8700.ML12074A007. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day 

of March 2012. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

R.W. Borchardt, 

Executive Director for Operations. 

[FR Doc. 2012–6665 Filed 3–19–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

10 CFR Part 430 

[Docket No. EERE–2011–BT–NOA–0013] 

Energy Conservation Program: Data 

Collection and Comparison With 

Forecasted Unit Sales of Five Lamp 

Types 

AGENCY: Office of Energy Efficiency and 

Renewable Energy, Department of 

Energy. 

ACTION: Notice of data availability. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE) is informing the public of 

its collection of shipment data and 

creation of spreadsheet models to 

provide comparisons between actual 

and benchmark estimate unit sales of 

five lamp types (i.e., rough service 

lamps, vibration service lamps, 3-way 

incandescent lamps, 2,601–3,300 lumen 

general service incandescent lamps, and 

shatter-resistant lamps), which are 

currently exempt from energy 

conservation standards. As the actual 

sales do not exceed the forecasted 

estimate by 100 percent for any lamp 

type (i.e., the threshold triggering a 

rulemaking for an energy conservation 

standard for that lamp type has not been 

exceeded), DOE has determined that no 

regulatory action is necessary at this 

time. However, DOE will continue to 

track sales data for these exempted 

lamps. Relating to this activity, DOE has 

prepared, and is making available on its 

Web site, a spreadsheet showing the 

comparisons of anticipated versus 

actual sales, as well as the model used 

to generate the original sales estimates. 

The spreadsheet is available at: http:// 

www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/ 

appliance_standards/residential/ 

five_lamp_types.html. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

Lucy deButts, U.S. Department of 

Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and 

Renewable Energy, Building 

Technologies, EE–2J, 1000 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20585–0121. 

Telephone: (202) 287–1604. Email: 

Lucy.Debutts@ee.doe.gov. 


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