FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ODILIA DE JESUS VELASQUEZESCOVAR,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 10-73714

Agency No.

A088-753-610

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 11, 2014*

Pasadena, California

Filed September 29, 2014

Before: Barry G. Silverman, Richard C. Tallman,

and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Odilia de Jesus Velasquez-Escovar’s

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

denial of her motion to reopen an in absentia removal order.

The panel held that the BIA abused its discretion in

finding that Velasquez was not entitled to notice of her

deportation hearing. The panel wrote that aliens are entitled

to notice unless they fail to give a current address to the

government, or fail to let the government know when they

move, and held that Velasquez did neither. The panel held

that the BIA arbitrarily discounted Velasquez’s unrefuted

claim without providing a reason, because the two reasons it

provided did not support its decision. The panel held that

this court could not affirm the BIA’s decision pursuant to

8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(d)(1), which places the burden on an alien

to inform the immigration court that the government used the

wrong address on a Notice to Appear, because the BIA’s

decision did not invoke that regulation, and because the NTA

itself did not mention § 1003.15(d)(1) or otherwise put

Velasquez on notice.

Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson would find that the BIA did

not act in an arbitrary or irrational fashion, and that it gave a

reasoned explanation for its ruling. Judge Rawlinson would

find Velasquez’s failure to provide her current address to the

agency in writing fatal to her case. Judge Rawlinson would

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 3

find that § 1003.15(d)(1) should apply to this case. Applying

an abuse of discretion standard of review, Judge Rawlinson

would find no abuse, and would deny the petition.

COUNSEL

Alejandro Garcia, Commerce, California, for Petitioner.

TonyWest, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Civil Division; Holly

M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration

Litigation; Claire L. Workman, Trial Attorney, Civil

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

At the outset of her removal proceedings, Odilia de Jesus

Velasquez-Escovar gave immigration officials her current

address in Los Angeles. But those officials did not properly

record it. Instead, they recorded another outdated address and

then sent Velasquez’s hearing notice there. Velasquez never

got that notice and, without it, she did not know when to

appear for her deportation hearing. Understandably, she

failed to appear and was ordered removed in absentia. When

she found out about that order, Velasquez moved to reopen. 

An Immigration Judge denied that motion, and the Board of

Immigration Appeals affirmed. In so doing, it abused its

discretion. Accordingly, we grant Velasquez’s petition for

review.
4 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

I

Odilia de Jesus Velasquez-Escovar is Guatemalan. She

illegally entered the United States around 1990, settling in

Los Angeles. She has four children; two are native-born

citizens of the United States. She admits that she remains

here unlawfully.

In 2007, Velasquez returned brieflyto Guatemala. On her

way back to Los Angeles, she was pulled over in Refugio,

Texas, by local police. Those officers called federal

immigration officials, who met Velasquez at the Calhoun

County Jail. There, she admitted her alienage and was

transported to the Corpus Christi Border Patrol Station for

processing.

Velasquez claims that the Corpus Christi-based

immigration officials asked her for her current address. She

says that she told them that she and her daughters had just

moved to 14001 Vanowen Street, Van Nuys, California. 

Next, she claims she was asked whether she had ever lived at

11827 Valerio Street in Los Angeles. Petitioner says she told

them that she had lived at Valerio Street, but that the

Vanowen address was her current one. Velasquez says the

agents told her that they found the Valerio address by looking

up her “identification number,” which she assumes meant the

number on her California state identification card.

After hand-serving Velasquez with a Notice to Appear

(NTA), immigration authorities released her. The NTA

charged her as removable and ordered her to appear in Los

Angeles for an immigration hearing at a date and time “to be

set” later. The NTA mistakenly listed the Valerio Street

address as Velasquez’s current address. We do not know
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 5

whether Velasquez noticed the error, but we do know that she

never brought it to the government’s attention.

NTA in hand, Velasquez returned to California. Since her

return, she has lived at the Vanowen address. She spent

roughly six months regularly visiting an attorney’s office to

check on the status of her case. Eventually she gave up. 

Having received no further word from the government, she

assumed her case had been closed. She was wrong. Fifteen

months after Velasquez stopped visiting the lawyer—which

was almost two years after she was arrested in Texas—the

immigration court mailed a notice setting a date and time for

Velasquez to appear. The notice went to Velasquez’s old

address on Valerio Street, not her current address on

Vanowen. Velasquez did not receive the notice, did not

appear, and was ordered removed in absentia. A copy of the

removal order was sent to the Valerio address and returned as

undeliverable.

Roughly six months later, Velasquez was detained by

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (The record does not

say why.) While detained, she learned of the outstanding

removal order and immediately filed a motion to reopen. She

argued that she should not have lost her right to a hearing

because the government improperly recorded—and then sent

notice to—an old address, rather than the current one she

claims to have given them. The government argued that it

was her burden to tell it that it had the wrong address because

she should have noticed the error on the NTA. The IJ agreed

with the government and denied the motion to reopen. The

BIA dismissed Velasquez’s appeal of that denial. Velasquez

now petitions for review.
6 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

II

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2012). 

Our review includes the “validity of the notice provided to the

alien” and “the reasons for the alien’s absence” from the

hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(D) (2012).

III

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of

discretion. Hamazaspyan v. Holder, 590 F.3d 744, 747 (9th

Cir. 2009). Here, the BIA reviewed the IJ’s decision de novo,

so we review only the BIA’s decision. Hosseini v. Gonzales,

471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006). The BIA abuses its

discretion when it acts “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to

the law.” Lainez-Ortiz v. INS, 96 F.3d 393, 395 (9th Cir.

1996).

IV

There is only one question here: Did the BIA abuse its

discretion when it decided that Velasquez was not entitled to

notice under the immigration statutes? The answer is “yes”

because neither of the BIA’s two reasons support its decision.

It is arbitrary to discount Petitioner’s unrefuted claim without

providing a reason.

A

The immigration statutes governing notice do three

things:

(1) They create a right to notice;
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 7

(2) They create an exception to that right for aliens who

do not fulfill two simple obligations; and

(3) They describe those obligations.

Two provisions create the right to notice. First, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229(a)(1) requires that “In removal proceedings . . .

written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to

appear’) shall be given in person to the alien (or, if personal

service is not practicable, through service by mail . . . ) . . .

specifying . . . [t]he time and place at which the proceedings

will be held.” Sometimes the NTA leaves the hearing time

“to be set,” as it did here. Section 1229(a)(2)(A) covers those

cases and cases where hearings are continued: “[I]n the case

of any change or postponement in time and place . . . a

written notice shall be given in person to the alien (or, if

personal service is not practicable, through service by mail

. . . ).” Between them, these two provisions create, at a

minimum, a right to “written notice” “serv[ed] by mail.” 8

U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A).

That right is “subject to subparagraph (B).” Id.

Subparagraph (B) creates the exception: “[A] written notice

shall not be required . . . if the alien has failed to provide the

address required under paragraph [28 U.S.C.

§ 1229(a)](1)(F).” 28 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(B); see also

28 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) (identical exception in provision

dealing specificallywith absentia proceedings). The “address

required” language refers to the section that describes the two

simple obligations that aliens must perform to retain their

right to notice.
8 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

Those two obligations are:

(1) “[T]he alien must immediately [upon

service of the NTA] provide (or have

provided) the Attorney General with a

written record of an address and telephone

number (if any) at which the alien may be

contacted respecting [the removal]

proceeding,” and

(2) “[The alien] must provide the Attorney

General immediatelywith a written record

of any change of the alien’s address or

telephone number.”

28 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)–(ii). These are the only two

address-related obligations that the statutes impose on aliens. 

(A regulation, as we will see, may add a third.)

Put simply, aliens are entitled to notice unless they fail to

give a current address to the government or fail to let the

government know when they move. Here, Velasquez did

neither. She claims that she gave the Corpus Christi-based

immigration officials her current address on Vanowen Street

and that she never moved. Nothing in the record refutes

either claim. Accordingly, the statutes entitled her to notice.

B

The BIA’s contrary decision was an abuse of discretion. 

The BIA decided that Velasquez was not entitled to notice for

two reasons. First, the BIA concluded that Velasquez was not

entitled to notice because she failed to provide the

government with her address: “the respondent was informed
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 9

of her obligation to inform the Immigration Court of her

mailing address. She did not do so. The respondent therefore

is not entitled to receive actual notice of her hearing.” Just

before it wrote that Velasquez “did not” tell the government

her address, the BIA wrote that Velasquez “allegedly

informed the DHS that she was living with her daughters at

14001 Vanowen Street.”

In other words, the BIA concluded that Velasquez “did

not” provide her current address after acknowledging that she

claims she did. This is arbitrary because the BIA gives no

reason for discounting Velasquez’s claim. And there is no

reason it could give. The claim is facially plausible and

supported by Velasquez’s declaration. There is no contrary

evidence, and no adverse credibility finding. So far as we can

tell, the BIA disbelieved Velasquez for no reason. It can not

do that.

The BIA’s second reason is no better. The BIA wrote that

“even assuming [Velasquez] told the officer that [Valerio]

was her prior address and that officer misunderstood

[Valerio] to be her current address, it would not change the

result of this case.” It went on: “[Velasquez] was on notice

through the address on the NTA and the advisal included with

it that she had a duty to notify the Immigration Court of her

current address. In other words, it was incumbent on

[Velasquez] to ensure that a correct address was supplied . . . . 

[S]he did not do so.” This reason is as inconsistent as the

last. The BIA says that “it was incumbent on [Velasquez] to

ensure that a correct address was supplied” and then

concludes that “she did not do so.” But Velasquez’s

unrefuted claim is that she did supply the correct

address—Vanowen Street.
10 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

Possibly, the BIA meant to say that Velasquez was

required to “ensure that the correct address was written

down” instead of that she was required to “ensure that the

correct address was supplied.” This too would be an abuse of

discretion because it takes the NTA advisal’s meaning and

stretches it too far. That advisal says only that “You are

required to provide the DHS, in writing, with your full

mailing address and telephone number.” Nothing in the

advisal mentions or fairly implies any continuing duty, much

less a continuing duty to correct the government. Once the

alien provides an address and phone number, the alien’s work

is done. If the BIA meant to say otherwise, then it abused its

discretion.

C

Rather than defend the BIA’s reasoning, the government

relies on three alternate grounds to defend the result below.

First, the government points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(d)(1). 

This regulation provides that “if the address on the . . . Notice

to Appear is incorrect, the alien must provide to the

Immigration Court where the charging document has been

filed, within five days of service of that document, a written

notice of an address and telephone number at which the alien

can be contacted.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(d)(1). In effect, this

regulation adds a third obligation to the two mentioned in the

statutes. In other words, the statutes require aliens to (1)

provide an address and (2) tell the government if they move,

and the regulation demands that they also (3) tell the

government if it puts the wrong address on the NTA.

We agree with the government that the regulation fits the

situation here. Velasquez admits receiving the NTA, which

bears an incorrect address. The regulation—and common
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 11

sense—put the burden on the alien to inform the immigration

court that the government got it wrong. But because the

BIA’s decision failed to invoke § 1003.15(d)(1), either by its

name or by its logic, this court cannot rely on it to affirm. 

E.g., Navas v. I.N.S., 217 F.3d 646, 658 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding that we cannot affirm the BIA “on a ground upon

which it did not rely”).1

Moreover, the NTA itself never mentions § 1003.15(d)(1)

or otherwise puts aliens on notice that an NTA with an

incorrect address is their problem. Rather, the NTA warns

aliens that they will be removed in absentia if they fail to

appear and that the “government shall not be required to

provide [them] with written notice” if they fail to provide a

current address or fail to notify the government when they

move.2 This tracks the statutes but not the regulation. It

1 The dissent argues that the Petitioner had an obligation to provide her

address in writing to the agency. Dissenting Opinion, pp. 15–16.

However, neither the BIA nor the Immigration Judge raised this issue,

therefore, similar to the regulatory invocation of § 1003.15(d)(1), this

Court cannot affirm the BIA on grounds upon which it did not rely.

Furthermore, the government’s brief did not raise the written address

issue, thus it is waived. See Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2013).

 

2

 The whole warning reads:

Failure to appear: You are required to provide the

DHS, in writing, with your full mailing address and

telephone number. You must notify the Immigration

Court immediately by using Form EOIR-33 whenever

you change your address or telephone number during

the course of this proceeding. You will be provided

with a copy of this form. Notices of hearing will be

mailed to this address. If you do not submit Form

EOIR-33 and do not otherwise provide an address at

which you may be reached during proceedings, then the
12 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

never says anything like “if the address listed on the front of

this form is incorrect, it is your responsibility to notify the

immigration court.”

And this omission may preclude the government from

relying on the regulation in cases like this. According to the

BIA, aliens cannot be held to the two statutory obligations

until the government gives them notice of those obligations

by serving the NTA. In re G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 181,

184–86 (BIA 2001) (en banc). In other words: no notice, no

obligation.3 By that logic, even aliens who have been served

an NTA cannot be held to the address obligation in

§ 1003.15(d)(1) because the NTA does not mention it. Thus,

even if the BIA had relied on § 1003.15(d)(1) here, the BIA’s

own precedent would still compel us to reverse.

Next the government relies on dicta in Hamazaspyan v.

Holder, 590 F.3d 744, 746 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). There, the

immigration court sent a mis-addressed hearing notice to

Hamazaspyan and no notice at all to his lawyer. 

Hamazaspyan, 590 F.3d at 745–46. Neither appeared, and

Hamazaspyan was ordered removed in absentia. Id. The IJ

and BIA denied his motion to reopen, but we granted his

Government shall not be required to provide you with

written notice of your hearing. If you fail to attend the

hearing at the time and place designated on this notice,

or any date and time later directed by the Immigration

Court, a removal order may be made by the

immigration judge in your absence, and you may be

arrested and detained by the DHS.

3 The dissent points out a distinction without a difference with respect

to the facts in In re G-Y-R-. See Dissenting Opinion, p.17–18. A defective

notice and no notice both amount to no notice.
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 13

petition for review, holding “that serving a hearing notice on

an alien, but not on the alien’s counsel of record, is

insufficient . . . .” Id. at 749.

The government does not rely on this holding. Rather, it

points to a footnote where we rejected Hamazaspyan’s

alternative argument: “[E]ven if Hamazaspyan provided the

government with his correct address, and the government

agents incorrectly transcribed what he said, Hamazaspyan

would not be entitled to relief because he failed to correct the

mistake when it was brought to his, or his counsel of record’s,

attention.” Id. at 746 n.3. But the BIA did not rely on

Hamazaspyan. So, for the same reason that § 1003.15(d)(1)

cannot save the government, neither can Hamazaspyan. 

Navas, 217 F.3d at 658 n.16.

Finally, the government attempts to win by analogy. It

says that this case—where an alien failed to correct her

address—is like cases where asylum applicants fail to correct

their own false testimony, Ahir v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 912,

918 (9th Cir. 2008), or the false testimony of their witnesses,

Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2011). 

But—again—the BIA did not rely on this analogy, so we

cannot either. Navas, 217 F.3d at 658 n.16. Nor would we if

we could. The analogy does not work because deception and

carelessness are two different things.

V

Although we hold that Velasquez was entitled to notice,

we understand why the IJ, the BIA, and the government

pressed the opposite result. What makes that result so

attractive is that it would have been so easy for Velasquez to

notice the error on the NTA and so easy for her to correct it. 
14 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

A little diligence and common sense on her part could have

avoided this appeal. But neither diligence nor common sense

are notice. Notice is notice. And, under the circumstances

here, Velasquez was entitled to notice.

PETITION GRANTED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. Applying an abuse of discretion

standard of review, I would deny the petition.

When ruling on a motion to reopen immigration

proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) abuses

its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or irrational fashion,

renders a decision that is contrary to governing law, or

neglects to give a reasoned explanation for its decision. See

Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005).

The majority accuses the BIA of “discount[ing]

Petitioner’s unrefuted claim without providing a reason.”

Majority Opinion, p. 6. Yet, two pages later, the majority

articulates two reasons given by the BIA for its decision. See

id., p. 8. In any event, there was nothing irrational or

arbitrary about placing the burden upon Petitioner of

providing written notice of her address to the immigration

authorities. Indeed, as the majority acknowledges, there is a

regulation that so provides. See Majority Opinion, pp. 10

(referencing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(d)(1)). Although the

majority concludes that the regulation has no place in our

analysis of this case, I disagree. In any event, the BIA could

not act arbitrarily or irrationally by imposing an obligation
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 15

that has been memorialized in a regulation. For the same

reason, the decision of the BIA was not contrary to governing

law. Finally, the BIA gave a reasoned explanation for its

ruling. Cf. Movsisian, 395 F.3d at 1098 (“Here the BIA

denied Movsisian’s motion to reopen stating in toto: ‘The

respondent’s motion to reopen is denied. . . .’”).

Nevertheless, the majoritydetermines that the BIA abused

its discretion, relying primarily on the Petitioner’s assertion

that during an interview with Border Patrol agents, she

verbally provided a new address to the agents.1 Rather than

sending the NTA to the address verbally provided by

Petitioner, the Department of Homeland Security sent the

notice to the address that was in the agency files. It is this

occurrence that the majority relies upon to support its

conclusion that the BIA abused its discretion when it denied

Petitioner’s motion to reopen.

In my view, the majority’s analysis ignores the

Petitioner’s obligation to provide her current address to the

agency in writing, and absolved her of the obligation to

provide an address in writing upon service of the NTA. 

These requirements are fatal to Petitioner’s case.

As the majority notes, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)

provides that the alien must, upon service of the NTA

“provide (or have provided) the Attorney General with a

written record of an address . . . at which the alien may be

contacted respecting [removal] proceedings . . .” (emphasis

1 Characterizing this interview as “the outset of [Petitioner’s] removal

proceedings,” is somewhat hyperbolic. We all know that removal

proceedings commence with the filing of a Notice to Appear (NTA). See

Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2009).
16 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

added). The wisdom of requiring a written record of the

address is demonstrated by the inconclusive he said-she said

nature of the dispute in this case. It is undisputed that the

petitioner failed to provide a written record of the address that

she maintains should have been used.

I am also persuaded that when petitioner received the

NTA which contained an incorrect address, it was incumbent

upon her to notify the agency of her correct address. As the

majority acknowledges, the NTA contains a warning that the

alien is “required to provide the DHS, in writing with [her]

full mailing address and telephone number . . .” Majority

Opinion, p. 11 n.2 (emphasis added). The majority also

confirms that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(d)(1) provides that if the

address on the NTA is incorrect, it is the alien’s obligation to

provide a correct address. See id., p. 10. Nevertheless, the

majorityabsolves Petitioner of her obligation for two reasons: 

1) the BIA did not rely on the regulation in rendering its

decision, and 2) the NTA did not adequatelyinform Petitioner

of her obligation to correct the address. See Majority

Opinion, pp. 10–12.

I am not persuaded to join the absolution. That the BIA

did not cite the regulation in its decision does not constitute

an abuse of discretion. Rather, our focus is on whether the

decision was contrary to governing law. See Movsisian, 395

F.3d at 1098.2

It was not. The NTA warns that the recipient

2 For the same reason, I disagree with the majority’s rejection of the

government’s citation to the alternative ruling in Hamazaspyan v. Holder,

590 F.3d 744, 746 n.3 (9thCir. 2009). The majority takes the position that

because the BIA did not explicitly quote the governing regulation or case

authority, Petitioner’s lack of compliance with the regulation must be

excused. However, our review is of the “grounds” upon which the BIA

made its decision. See Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 497 F.3d 919,
VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER 17

must provide the DHS, in writing, the recipient’s mailing

address. If the mailing address noted on the NTA is

incorrect, the direction to provide the address in writing

should resonate even more strongly with the recipient. In

addition, I do not agree that the BIA failed to invoke the logic

of the regulation in its decision. The BIA decision noted that

Petitioner was “on notice through the [invalid] address on the

NTA and the advisal included with it that she had a duty to

notify the Immigration Court of her current address. . . .”

(emphasis added). The decision also reasoned that “it was

incumbent on [Petitioner] to ensure that a correct address was

supplied to the Immigration Court after she was personally

served with the [NTA] containing the aforementioned

advisal. . . .” There would be no reason for the decision to

refer to notifying the Immigration Court of a current address

and to supplying a correct address unless the BIA was

referring to the non-current and incorrect address on the

NTA. Because this reference reflects the requirements of the

regulation, there was no abuse of discretion. See Movsisian,

395 F.3d at 1098 ) (holding that the BIA abuses its discretion

when it acts contrary to the law). Indeed, as the majority

concedes, the governing regulation “fits the situation

here. . . .” Majority Opinion, p. 10. Because the regulation

fits, the BIA decision could not be contrary to it, and no abuse

of discretion determination can rationally be predicated on

that premise.

Finally, I disagree with the majority’s reliance on In re GY-R, 23 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2001) (en banc) to absolve

Petitioner of her obligation to provide, in writing, her current

921–22 (9th Cir. 2007). And it is unquestioned that the “ground” upon

which the BIA based its decision was Petitioner’sfailure to give the notice

as required by law.
18 VELASQUEZ-ESCOVAR V. HOLDER

address to the agency. That case involved a different

circumstance, notably a complete failure to serve the NTA

upon the alien. In that circumstance, the BIA ruled that an

alien may not be removed in absentia

when the Service mails the [NTA] to the last

address it has on file for an alien, but the

record reflects that the alien did not receive

the [NTA], and the notice of hearing it

contains, and therefore has never been

notified of the initiation of removal

proceedings or the alien’s address obligations

under . . . the Act. . . .

Id. at 192.

In contrast to the facts in G-Y-R, it is unquestioned that

Petitioner received the NTA and the notice of hearing

notifying her of the removal proceedings and of her

obligation to notify the agency, in writing, of her current

address. G-Y-R simply does not support a determination that

the BIA abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion

to reopen.

Because the BIA did not act in an arbitrary or irrational

fashion, rule contrary to law, or neglect to give a reasoned

explanation for its decision, the denial of the motion to

reopen did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See

Movsisian, 395 F.3d at 1098. I would deny the petition for

review.