1The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-3204

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Ramon Guel, Jr.,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Iowa.

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Submitted: March 12, 1999

 Filed: July 7, 1999

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Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and PERRY,1 District

Judge.

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Ramon Guel, Jr., on charges of acting as an accessory after the

fact to the offense of possession with intent to distribute amphetamine, and with
2The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and amphetamine. The district court2

sentenced Guel to a total term of 189 months in prison. On appeal, Guel challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him and certain sentencing decisions. We

affirm.

I. Facts

Ramon Guel, Jr., distributed drugs in Waterloo, Iowa. In January 1995, Guel

and Jose Hernandez, another Waterloo drug source, were stopped by the California

Highway Patrol while traveling in California. The officers searched the vehicle and

discovered 19 packages of methamphetamine hidden in a spare tire. Lab testing later

showed that the packages contained 15 pounds of 85 percent pure methamphetamine.

The officers also discovered approximately $9,600 in cash—roughly $6,600 was found

in Guel's boots, and another $3,000 was found in a pair of his jeans stowed in a bag.

Guel was arrested but he returned to Waterloo after being released in August 1995.

In early 1996, law enforcement officials in the Waterloo area began investigating

a suspected drug dealer named Julie Sue Mask. On April 1, 1996, police officers

attempted to conduct a traffic stop of Mask. The stop, however, was unsuccessful and

Mask eluded apprehension. As she was fleeing from the police, Mask discarded a

black bag containing drugs she believed to be methamphetamine. The police recovered

such a bag shortly thereafter.

After evading capture, Mask eventually secured a room at a local Econolodge

hotel. Within a few days, Guel located Mask. Using the name "Daniel Bettencourt,"

Guel checked her into another room at the same hotel. According to Mask, Guel was

planning to obtain and sell a pound of methamphetamine so that he and Mask could flee
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the area. Mask indicated that she wanted to surrender to the police, but Guel told her

not to, and he directed Mask and her son, Korey Christian, to collect outstanding drug

debts from Mask's customers. Christian testified that he thereafter assisted Guel in

collecting money from Mask's customers.

The police eventually discovered Mask's hideout and conducted surveillance of

the Econolodge. During this time, they observed a man leave room 207. After the

police had entered room 207, they observed the same man trying to look inside the

room. When the police confronted this man, he identified himself as Daniel

Bettencourt. At trial, a police officer testified that the man the officers observed was

Guel, and Mask testified that Guel left the room shortly before the police arrived.

During a search of room 207, the police found drugs, more than $1,000 in cash,

and a green coat. The coat contained a set of brass knuckles and an additional $8,000

in cash. The police also found Guel's car keys inside the coat, as well as a key to

another motel room registered to a person named Daniel Bettencourt, a business card

from Logan Avenue Truck Sales, and a handwritten note from Mask to Guel. It was

later discovered that a person claiming to be Daniel Bettencourt had recently purchased

a truck from Logan Avenue Truck Sales. Mask and Christian testified that the coat

belonged to Guel. Christian further testified that Guel wore the green coat while they

were attempting to collect outstanding drug debts.

During Guel's trial, at least two persons testified that Guel supplied them with

controlled substances for resale. Mask testified that Guel supplied her with various

quantities of methamphetamine, including three separate one-pound deliveries. Mask

sold the first pound, returned one pound because of its poor quality, and sold a portion

of the last pound prior to her arrest. Mask testified that she received the third onepound delivery in late March 1996, and that she possessed a portion of this delivery

when the police attempted to stop her on April 1, 1996. According to Mask, Guel set

resale prices and received the proceeds from her sales. In exchange, Guel gave Mask
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drugs for her personal use. Another witness, Richard Fairbanks, testified that Guel

supplied him with both methamphetamine and cocaine, and that Guel provided him

with a digital scale for making accurate weight measurements.

Finally, Mask testified that while Guel was in jail in California, he asked her to

help him explain the large amount of cash found in his boots and jeans. According to

Mask, Guel wanted her to tell the police that she had paid him $3,000 for a car. Mask

claimed, however, that she had agreed to pay Guel only $1,500 for a car, and of that

amount, she had paid him only "[a] couple hundred bucks" prior to the California trip.

(Trial Tr. at 248.)

On October 18, 1996, a two-count superseding indictment was filed in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. Count 1 charged Guel

with being an accessory after the fact to the offense, committed by Julie Sue Mask, of

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine on or about April 1, 1996. Count

2 charged that between June 1994 and April 1996, Guel conspired to distribute more

than one kilogram of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of

methamphetamine. A jury convicted Guel on both counts. The district court denied

Guel's motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial. The court sentenced Guel to

189 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and imposed $100 in special

assessments. Guel appeals his conviction and aspects of his sentence.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Guel asserts that insufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict on both charges.

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See United States

v. Surratt, 172 F.3d 559, 563 (8th Cir. 1999). We resolve "evidentiary conflicts in

favor of the government," and we accept "all reasonable inferences drawn from the

evidence that support the jury's verdict." Id. (quotations omitted). On this strict

standard of review, we uphold the verdict so long as "a reasonable minded jury could
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have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 563-64 (quotations

omitted).

A. Accessory After the Fact

In order to convict Guel on Count 1, the accessory after the fact charge, the jury

had to find each of the following elements:

One, Julie Sue Mask had committed the offense of possession with

intent to distribute amphetamine[;]

Two, defendant Ramon Guel, Jr., knew that Julie Sue Mask had

committed the offense of possession with intent to distribute

amphetamine; and

Three, after the crime of possession with intent to distribute

amphetamine had been committed by Julie Sue Mask, defendant Ramon

Guel, Jr., helped her, in order to prevent her arrest, trial, or punishment.

(Final Jury Instr. No. 6.) See also 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). Guel does not dispute

elements one and three. He contends only that there was insufficient evidence showing

that he knew Mask had committed the offense of possession with intent to distribute

amphetamine. See United States v. Bissonette, 586 F.2d 73, 76 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting

that 18 U.S.C. § 3 requires "knowledge that a federal offense has been committed" and

that the "jury can infer from the evidence presented that the accused had the requisite

knowledge"). We disagree with Guel's contention.

Guel's argument rests on the faulty assumption that because he had no contact

with Mask on April 1, 1996—the day Mask fled from police—the government did not

prove that he knew Mask had committed the offense of possession with intent to

distribute amphetamine. Even assuming that Guel was unaware of Mask's specific

actions on April 1, 1996, the government offered a great deal of circumstantial evidence

that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Guel knew Mask had committed
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the offense of possession with intent to distribute amphetamine. Cf. United States v.

Armstrong, 16 F.3d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that circumstantial evidence may

be relied upon to prove knowledge). For example, Mask testified that she received a

pound of methamphetamine from Guel in late March 1996, and that Guel knew she was

going to sell the methamphetamine. She also testified that Guel supplied the drugs that

she discarded as she fled from the police on April 1, 1996. Furthermore, Mask testified

that while she was hiding from the police, she and Guel discussed selling more drugs

and collecting outstanding drug debts in an effort to secure enough funds to flee the

area. Finally, when she told Guel that she was considering surrendering to law

enforcement authorities, he dissuaded her. 

Based on the foregoing evidence, we hold that a reasonable jury could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Guel knew Mask had committed the predicate

offense of possession with intent to distribute amphetamine. Guel does not challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence or any other issue with respect to the remaining

elements of the crime. Thus, we affirm the district court's judgment as to Count 1.

B. Conspiracy to Distribute

Guel next asserts that insufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict on Count

2, the conspiracy charge. To prove that Guel participated in "a conspiracy to

manufacture or to distribute illegal drugs, the government must demonstrate (1) that

there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to manufacture or to distribute, (2) that the

defendant knew of the conspiracy, and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the

conspiracy." United States v. Hester, 140 F.3d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing United

States v. Jones, 101 F.3d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1160

(1997), and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1202 (1997)). Accord United States v. Rogers, 91

F.3d 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1996). "Once a conspiracy is established, even slight evidence

connecting a defendant to the conspiracy may be sufficient to prove the defendant's

intentional involvement." Hester, 140 F.3d at 761 (quotations omitted). 
3Guel attacks the form of the government's evidence. He refers to the

government's case as being "based largely on circumstantial evidence" and "includ[ing]

a large dose of co-conspirator hearsay." (Appellant's Br. at 15.) Of course, the

government can prove its entire case using circumstantial evidence. See Armstrong,

16 F.3d at 292 (noting that the government may prove the elements of the charged

offense "by circumstantial evidence, and the evidence need not exclude every

reasonable hypothesis except guilt"). Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of

Evidence, a defendant's own admissions and qualifying coconspirator statements are

not considered hearsay at all. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2); see also United States v.

Madrigal, 152 F.3d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that "[s]tatements of a

coconspirator identifying a fellow coconspirator as his source of controlled substances

[are] in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore admissible") (quotations omitted).

Moreover, Guel does not argue that any of the coconspirator testimony was

inadmissible.

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The evidence against Guel was more than sufficient for a jury to find him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. At least two of Guel's coconspirators, Julie Mask and

Richard Fairbanks, testified that Guel supplied them with methamphetamine for resale.3

Mask further testified that Guel had provided her with one-pound deliveries of

methamphetamine on at least two occasions, and another pound of purported

methamphetamine on a different occasion. Mask's son, Korey Christian, testified that

he assisted Guel in collecting money from Mask's customers. Furthermore, Richard

Fairbanks testified that Guel supplied him with methamphetamine for resale. Finally,

as the government correctly points out, the evidence associated with the California

traffic stop that uncovered 15 pounds of methamphetamine and large sums of cash

corroborates the testimony linking Guel with a conspiracy to distribute drugs. We hold

that sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict with respect to Count 2.

III. Sentencing Issues

A. Role in the Offense
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The probation office recommended that Guel receive a four-level increase to his

base offense level for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five

or more participants. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(a) (1997).

After considering the evidence, however, the district court found that Guel was more

appropriately characterized as a manager or supervisor, and that the criminal activity

did not involve five or more individuals. Consequently, the district court applied only

a two-level increase pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(c). Guel argues that even this twolevel enhancement is unwarranted. We review the district court's factual determinations

regarding Guel's role in the offense for clear error. See United States v. Ayers, 138

F.3d 360, 364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 219 (1998).

We find ample evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that Guel was

a manager or supervisor in the offense. For example, both Mask and Fairbanks

testified that Guel provided them with controlled substances for resale. Mask further

testified that Guel set the price for the drugs, and that Guel received the proceeds from

Mask's drug sales. Fairbanks testified that Guel supplied him with methamphetamine

and a digital scale. Finally, Christian testified that he assisted Guel in collecting money

from Mask's customers. Such evidence strongly supports the district court's finding that

Guel was a manager or supervisor. We hold, therefore, that the district court did not

clearly err in determining Guel's role in the offense.

B. Possession of Brass Knuckles

Finally, Guel contends that the district court erred in applying a two-level

increase for possession of a dangerous weapon, namely the brass knuckles. See USSG

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). We review for clear error the district court's finding that Guel

possessed a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense. See

United States v. Rogers, 150 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.

888 (1999).
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As an initial matter, we hold that brass knuckles are dangerous weapons. See

USSG § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(d)) (defining dangerous weapon to mean "an instrument

capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury"); see also State v. Tusing, 344

N.W.2d 253, 254 (Iowa 1984) (stating that the only use of brass knuckles "is to inflict

injury"); United States v. Boman, No. 95-2066, 1996 WL 19254, at *3 (7th Cir. Jan.

18, 1996) (unpublished) (noting that "[a]pproximately 30 states explicitly define brass

knuckles and bludgeons as deadly or dangerous weapons per se"). Thus, we focus our

inquiry on whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Guel possessed the

brass knuckles in connection with drug trafficking activities.

The police arrested Mask in room 207 at the Econolodge. The police found the

brass knuckles in the pocket of a green coat in room 207. The police had previously

observed Guel leaving room 207, and Mask and Christian testified that Guel owned the

green coat in question. Other items found in the green coat strongly suggest that the

coat belonged to Guel. For example, Guel used the alias "Daniel Bettencourt." The

police found a key in the coat for a motel room registered to a Daniel Bettencourt. The

police also found a business card for Logan Avenue Truck Sales in the coat. The

government produced evidence that a person using the name Daniel Bettencourt had

recently purchased a truck from Logan Avenue Truck Sales. Finally, the police found

a note from Mask to Guel inside the coat. Thus, the foregoing evidence reasonably

supports a conclusion that Guel possessed the coat, and therefore, the brass knuckles.

See Surratt, 172 F.3d at 564 (holding that evidence of constructive possession is

sufficient to prove possession of contraband). 

Finally, we have little doubt that Guel possessed the brass knuckles in

connection with his drug trafficking activities. At the time in question, Guel was

attempting to obtain additional drugs and to collect outstanding drug debts. Hence, we

hold that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the green coat belonged

to Guel, and that Guel possessed the brass knuckles in connection with a drug

trafficking offense.
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IV. Conclusion

The district court's judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT