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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM PLUMMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1623 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003690-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM PLUMMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2070 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0015155-2013

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM PLUMMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 262 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003689-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
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MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2023

William Plummer appeals, pro se, from the orders dismissing his petition 

for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Plummer raises numerous ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims. We affirm.

This Court previously set forth the underlying facts as follows:

On September 29, 2013, at around 1:00 a.m., Ronald Elliot left 

his girlfriend, Kandis Fowler’s, home at 3601 Conshohocken 

Avenue and went to the apartment building’s parking lot. 

[Plummer] and two other men, holding fake police badges, 

jumped out of the bushes and yelled “Freeze, Police.” Elliot ran 

out of the parking lot and across the street as the three men 

chased him. [Plummer] stopped pursuing Elliot and acted as a 

lookout standing on the sidewalk on the parking lot side of the 

street while the other two men caught Elliot across the street. 

After the two men hit Elliot four or five times in the head with a 

firearm, cutting him on the head, the two men took Elliot’s watch, 

money and car keys. The men joined back up with [Plummer] and 

all three men ran to the parking lot. Elliot saw [Plummer] drive off 

in Fowler’s Ford Expedition. 

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1 Plummer filed timely appeals at 1623 EDA 2021 and 2070 EDA 2021. At 262 

EDA 2022, Plummer filed a pro se notice of appeal from the July 8, 2021 order 

on January 11, 2022, which would make the appeal untimely. However, the 

PCRA court docket does not indicate that the July 8, 2021 order was served 

on Plummer or the date of service of the order. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1) 

(“A copy of any order or court notice promptly shall be served on ... the party

if unrepresented.”); Pa.R.Crim.P.114(C)(2)(c) (requires the criminal docket 

entries to include “the date of service of the order”); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907(4) (providing that a PCRA court order dismissing a petition without a 

hearing “shall be filed and served as provided in Rule 114.”). Therefore, we 

consider the appeal at 262 EDA 2022 to be timely. Furthermore, because 

these appeals have a substantially similar procedural history and raise the 

same legal questions, we consolidate them sua sponte and will consider them 

together.
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On February 5, 2014, after [Plummer] had been arrested and 

charged with [the] robbery of Elliot, Elliot received multiple phone 

calls from [Plummer]. [Plummer] threatened Elliot, explaining that 

if Elliot attended the next court date [Plummer] was going to 

firebomb the homes of Elliot’s mother, girlfriend, and grandparent 

and kill Elliot....

On February 9[,] 2014, Valerie and Russell Fowler, Kandis Fowler’s 

parents, were living in a row home on Washington Lane. At about 

4:00 a.m., Valerie Fowler heard a “bang” and smelled smoke. 

Russell Fowler went downstairs and saw a small fire in the back 

yard. After the fire was extinguished, Russell Fowler noted that 

the first floor back window was broken and saw a bottle with a 

wick in it in the back yard. 

Detective Timothy Brooks of the Philadelphia Police’s Bomb 

Disposal Unit and an expert in arson explosives arrived at the 

Fowler’s home on Washington Lane shortly after the fire was 

extinguished. Outside the back of the house, Detective Brooks 

observed two bottles with wicks in them, one intact and the other 

shattered, which he believed to be Molotov cocktails. Detective 

Brooks observed strike marks on the back window and a broken 

bottle at the bottom of the basement steps that indicated that a 

Molotov cocktail had struck the house and fallen to the ground. 

The intact bottle contained liquid and a cloth wick, which smelled 

of gasoline. Detective Brooks recovered the bottles, wicks, and 

liquid. 

On February 9, 2014, Detective Kevin Sloan requested that 

Philadelphia prison authorities search [Plummer’s cell]. The prison 

authorities recovered a cell phone in [Plummer’s] cell. According 

to Cricket Communications’ records, the cell phone recovered 

from [Plummer’s] cell had been used to call Elliot four times on 

February 5, 2014. 

[Plummer] testified on his own behalf. [He] asserted that in the 

first week of September 2013, Elliot gave [Plummer] $15,000 to 

purchase drugs for him. [Plummer] kept the money but did not 

purchase the drugs. [Plummer] asserted that on September 29, 

2013, he was not on Conshohocken Avenue but instead was in 

Norristown. [Plummer] explained that he was unable to run 

because he was shot many years before. [Plummer] admitted that 

he had called Elliot but claimed the call was to arrange to return 

Elliot’s money in exchange for Elliot not appearing at trial.
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[Plummer] was charged with numerous crimes at the abovecaptioned docket numbers. Ultimately, a jury convicted him of one 

or more counts each of conspiracy, aggravated assault, robbery, 

robbery of a motor vehicle, arson, risking a catastrophe, 

intimidation of a victim, retaliation against a victim, and 

contraband (non-controlled substance). [Plummer] received an 

aggregate sentence of thirty to sixty years of incarceration. On 

direct appeal, this Court affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied 

[Plummer]’s petition for allowance of appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Plummer, 153 A.3d 1110 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 159 A.3d 938 (Pa. 

2016). 

[Plummer] filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and counsel was 

appointed. Counsel filed an amended petition, including only four 

of the many claims that [Plummer] raised in his pro se filings. 

Displeased by the omissions, [Plummer] applied for the 

appointment of new counsel. [Plummer] also filed a letter in which 

he contended that PCRA counsel had a duty to pursue each and 

every claim that [Plummer] wished to raise, or to file “a hybrid 

[Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc) letter” explaining why there was no merit in the claims he 

chose not to include in the amended petition. Citing [Plummer’s] 

lack of faith in his representation, counsel sought to withdraw and 

have the PCRA court appoint new counsel or hold a hearing 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 

1998).... For reasons not apparent from the certified record, the 

PCRA court denied the request without conducting a Grazier

hearing.

[Plummer] next filed a motion to proceed pro se, which the PCRA 

court addressed at the outset of the hearing it had scheduled on 

the claims raised in counsel’s amended petition. [Plummer] 

informed the court that he did not want to represent himself, but 

rather he desired to have counsel pursue all of the claims that he 

wished to raise. The PCRA court deferred addressing that issue, 

instead having PCRA counsel conduct the questioning of witnesses 

in connection with the issues raised in the counseled petition. At 

the end of the hearing, the PCRA court scheduled another date for 

[Plummer] to present additional witnesses. 
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In between hearings, [Plummer] filed another motion to proceed 

pro se, citing “irreconcilable differences and the lack of 

communication on strategy.” At the second PCRA hearing, the 

PCRA court did not conduct a Grazier hearing or otherwise 

address [Plummer’s] renewed request for self-representation. 

Instead, counsel continued to represent [Plummer] at the second 

hearing, presenting and cross-examining witnesses. Following the 

close of evidence and the arguments of counsel, the PCRA court 

invited [Plummer] to state “what it is that you want preserved for 

the record[.]” [Plummer] indicated, inter alia, that he wanted the 

pro se PCRA claims that counsel omitted from the amended 

petition to be “exhausted.” At that point, the PCRA court 

conducted a colloquy to determine whether [Plummer] wished to 

make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. The 

PCRA court [dismissed the amended PCRA petition. Further, the 

PCRA court] concluded that [Plummer] desired to proceed pro se

on appeal, and ultimately entered an order allowing counsel to 

withdraw.

Commonwealth v. Plummer, 2042 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 1, 2020) 

(unpublished memorandum at 2-5) (citations and footnote omitted).

On appeal, this Court vacated the order, finding that the PCRA court 

erred in failing to conduct a Grazier hearing when the court was first 

presented the issue of Plummer’s desire to raise all of his PCRA claims. 

Accordingly, this Court remanded for Plummer to file a pro se amended PCRA 

petition, raising the claims he wished the PCRA court to resolve. See id.

(unpublished memorandum at 15-16).

On remand, Plummer filed several amended PCRA petitions, raising 

ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and PCRA counsel claims. The PCRA 

court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. Plummer filed a response. Thereafter, 

the PCRA court dismissed Plummer’s petition. These timely appeals followed.
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On appeal, Plummer raises a voluminous amount of ineffectiveness 

claims regarding his trial, appellate, and PCRA counsel, and claims of error by 

the PCRA court. See Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (raising 8 issues); Appellant’s 

Supplemental Brief at 4-9 (raising 22 issues labeled A through V). In essence, 

Plummer argues that (1) trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective 

for failing to challenge the trial court’s jury instruction as to criminal 

conspiracy; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 

suppress the cell phone found in his prison cell; (3) trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate a corroborating witness who was 

Plummer’s cellmate; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 

testimony or evidence relating to the cellphone found in his prison cell; (5) 

trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking discovery from the Commonwealth 

regarding his character; (6) PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

numerous claims; and (7) the PCRA court erred in failing to order him to file 

a Rule 1925(b) concise statement so that it could more fully address his 

claims. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-18; Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 10-

51.

Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s order “is whether the 

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is 

free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344, 347 (Pa. Super. 

2017). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 
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support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 

23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

Further, to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, Plummer must 

demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that “(1) the underlying claim 

has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action 

or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s 

action or inaction.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150 (Pa. 2018) 

(citation omitted). Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden is on 

Plummer to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 

260 (Pa. 2013). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness 

will require rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 244 

A.3d 359, 368 (Pa. 2021).

To be eligible for relief on a claim that appellate or PCRA counsel was 

ineffective, the petitioner “must meet all three prongs of the . . . test for 

ineffectiveness” for each counsel. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 

1128 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). “A failure to satisfy any of the three prongs 

of the [ineffectiveness] test requires rejection of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, which, in turn, requires rejection of a layered claim 

of ineffective assistance of” appellate or PCRA counsel. Id. (citation omitted).

First, Plummer claims that trial and direct appeal counsel were

ineffective for failing to argue that the court improperly instructed the jury in 

response to a jury question on the criminal conspiracy charge. See Appellant’s 
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Brief at 12-14. More specifically, Plummer argues that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the instruction, baldly claiming that the 

instruction relieved the Commonwealth of its burden to prove each element 

of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 12. Plummer 

asserts that the trial court failed to explain to the jurors that they had to find

the Commonwealth had proved every element of the robbery charges before 

they could find him guilty. See id. at 13. According to Plummer, his claim has 

arguable merit, neither counsel had a reasonable basis to fail to raise this 

issue, and he was clearly prejudiced. See id. at 13-14. Plummer also claims 

that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain affidavits from trial and 

appellate counsel to determine whether either counsel had a reasonable basis 

for their failure to raise the jury instruction issue. See id. at 13.

When evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court will 

look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated 

portions, to determine if the instructions were improper. We 

further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this 

Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing 

its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the 

law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for 

its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion or an 

inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations and brackets omitted).

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court: “If we find that the 

defendant is guilty of criminal conspiracy the night of the carjacking, does that 
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make him guilty of the other charges?” N.T. 2/12/15, at 9. The trial court 

responded as follows:

I want to start off by telling you that to reemphasize – not

reemphasize, but to reiterate that there are two different types of

conspiracy involved in this case. There is a conspiracy as a type 

of liability, and that was when I talked to you about how you can 

be responsible for the crime even if you didn’t physically commit 

it under a conspiratorial liability and/or accomplice liability.

Then I said that the crime of conspiracy in and of itself is a crime

in Pennsylvania. And you have separate incidents in this case. So

the simple answer is let’s talk about the one incident in which the

defendant is charged with the robbery, the carjacking, conspiracy,

and the PIC.

You can have a conspiracy for that evening, all right, and we will 

talk about those incidents, but I want to make it clear that that

conspiracy would not jump ahead to the other incidents. There

would have to either be separate conspiratorial liability for the 

other charges, the intimidation, the retaliation, the arson, and the

conspiratorial liability, or the defendant has been charged with the

crime of conspiracy, and that's why there’s two separate charges 

of conspiracy.

Now, you may have already figured that out and that may not be

exactly what you were asking, but I wanted to preface my reading

of the criminal conspiracy again to just make it very clear to you 

that if -- you have to look on the specific date to see if there was 

a conspiracy.

So you have conspiratorial liability. Now we’re going to get to the 

crime of conspiracy. Understand that the elements are the same,

okay. So what it really breaks down to is you can be convicted on 

a conspiratorial liability without ever being charged with 

conspiracy, but in this particular case the defendant has been 

charged with conspiracy.

So in order to determine whether or not he’s guilty of -- we refer

to it as the underlying crime or crimes, so in this case you’ve

specifically asked about carjacking, what you have to do is make

sure that the object of the crime if there's a conspiracy the specific

crime that you’re evaluating.
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So, in other words, I don’t know what facts you’ve determined,

and I’m not going to speculate on that because that’s not my job, 

but you have to remember make sure that the object crime or the

agreement is a specific crime that you’re considering.

So in order -- let me use your example of carjacking. In order to

convict the defendant of criminal conspiracy, you would have to

determine that there was an agreement and that there was a 

specific agreement to commit the carjacking. If you look at the 

robbery, then you have to determine whether there was a specific 

agreement to commit the robbery. And that one person or more 

took a substantial step in furtherance of the agreement.

In other words, there has to be the common understanding and

it’s a firm common understanding that the particular crime would 

be committed.

So, remember, there’s the agreement and then the defendant

cannot be convicted of conspiracy unless he or a fellow conspirator

does something more, an overt act. So as long as someone does 

an overt act in the furtherance of the conspiracy, that means 

something that would further the goal of the conspiracy, that 

shows that the parties have a firm agreement and they’re not just 

talking about or thinking about a crime, as I said to you before, 

the act has reached the action stage.

So in this particular case remember what happens is under

conspiratorial liability the defendant becomes responsible for the

actions of the other individuals for the specific crime.

Then when you look at the charge of conspiracy, it’s a whole

separate charge itself. So the law says it’s not just a theory of

liability. In Pennsylvania we’re making the agreement and the 

action in furtherance of the agreement an additional charge other 

than just let’s say the robbery or the carjacking.

Id. at 9-14.

Contrary to Plummer’s assertion of error, our review of the record 

reveals that, when taken in its entirety, the jury instruction was specifically 

tailored to answer the question and appropriately reflected the law and 
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accurately described the differences between conspiratorial liability and the 

conspiracy. Importantly, during the original charge, the trial court also 

instructed the jury on the robbery and robbery of a motor vehicle charges. 

See id. at 200-02. Moreover, the trial court has provided the jury with an 

extensive instruction for the conspiracy charges in its original charge. See 

N.T., 2/11/15, at 197-200, 202-06. It is presumed that the jury will “follow the 

trial court’s instructions,” Commonwealth v. Vucich, 194 A.3d 1103, 1113 

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted), and Plummer takes no issue with the

original instructions. Accordingly, Plummer fails to demonstrate that there was 

arguable merit to his underlying claim or that any of the verdicts would have 

been different with any additional charge. Therefore, trial counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s instruction, and by extension,

appellate counsel was not ineffective. See Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1128 (noting 

that “if the petitioner cannot prove the underlying claim of trial counsel 

ineffectiveness, then petitioner’s derivative claim of appellate counsel 

ineffectiveness of necessity must fail”). Likewise, Plummer’s claim that PCRA 

counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain affidavits is also without merit, as 

trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective. See id.

Next, Plummer argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

suppress the cell phone seized from his jail cell, and the information obtained 

from the phone. See Appellant’s Brief at 14-15, 16; see also Appellant’s 

Supplemental Brief at 34-35. Plummer claims the search of his jail cell was 
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conducted without a warrant and in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 15. Plummer therefore contends that the contents of 

his phone is also subject to suppression. See id.

The PCRA court focused on Plummer’s status as a prisoner in concluding 

trial counsel was not ineffective:

[Plummer] was incarcerated at Curran-Fromhold Correctional 

Facility (“CFCF”) at the time he used an illegal cell phone to 

threaten Elliot. After Elliot informed the police that [Plummer] was 

the individual who called and threatened him, the police requested 

that prison officials search [Plummer’s] prison cell. When prison 

officials searched his cell, they confiscated his illegal cell phone, 

which he was not entitled to possess under any circumstances. 

See 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5123[(c.2)]. After correctional officers 

turned the cell phone over to police officers, officers obtained a 

valid search warrant and pulled the call records from Cricket 

Wireless. These records indicated that the phone was used to call 

Elliot four different times. ...

[Plummer] has not shown that there was a reasonable basis for 

counsel to litigate a suppression motion. There was nothing 

improper with law enforcement’s search and seizure of

[Plummer’s] cell phone and any motion to suppress it would have 

been frivolous. The applicability of both the federal and 

Commonwealth constitutional protections against unreasonable 

search and seizure to prisoners is limited. Commonwealth v. 

Moore, 928 A.2d 1092, 1099 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Hudson 

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). Additionally, an incarcerated 

individual has a limited right to privacy while in prison. Moore, 

928 A.2d [at 1102] ...; DeBlasio v. Pignoli, 918 A.2d 822 (Pa. 

[Cmwlth]. 2007) .... Courts have consistently upheld these 

limitations on a prisoner’s right to privacy because of the need to 

ensure the safety and operational function of the prison.

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 580 A.2d 393, 394 (Pa. [Super.] 

1990).

Prison officials’ search of [Plummer’s] prison cell was justified 

because of the need to ensure the safety and function of the 

prison. Police officers gave prison officials credible information 

that [Plummer] possessed an illegal cell phone and was using it to 
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threaten another individual. Because “society is not prepared to 

recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that 

a prisoner might have in his prison cell,” trial counsel had no basis 

to litigate a suppression motion, and the claim fails. See Hudson, 

468 U.S. at 517 ....

[Plummer] claims that counsel failed to present evidence that he 

was incarcerated at the time when he threatened Elliot. This claim 

is belied by the record. It was clear from trial counsel’s opening 

statement and the evidence presented at trial that [Plummer] was

incarcerated at CFCF at the time Elliot’s house was firebombed. 

N.T.[,] 2/10/15[,] at 60. Thus, his claim fails.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/8/21, at 6-8.

We agree with the sound reasoning of the PCRA court. See id.; see 

also Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(finding that because the claim that the evidence should have been 

suppressed was without merit, counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to suppress). Therefore, Plummer’s ineffectiveness claim is without 

merit.2

Plummer also contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain 

exculpatory evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 16. Plummer’s claim in its 

entirety is as follows:

Trial counsel’s failure to investigate or interview potential 

corroborating witness Desean Dobbins who was cell mates with 

[Plummer] at the time of these calls to uncover exculpatory

evidence that would have supported [Plummer’s] trial testimony.

United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir. 1989)[.] See also

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2 Plummer also raised a claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise this claim. See Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 34. However, as noted 

below, he fails to provide any pertinent analysis to support his ineffectiveness 

claim in this regard. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Accordingly, this claim is waived.
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Commonwealth v. Mabie, 359 A.2d 369, 374 (Pa. 1976).

Counsel’s actions had no reasonable basis and prejudice resulted 

from counsel’s failure to investigate, interview potential witness

Desean Dobbins, had trial counsel done so, Desean Dobbins would 

have been called to [testify] in-order to corroborate [Plummer’s] 

trial testimony. 

Id.

While recognizing that this Court can liberally construe a pro se brief, 

we conclude that Plummer’s argument is woefully inadequate. See 

Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating 

that “a pro se litigant must still comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure.” (citation omitted)). Plummer merely provides 

conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective without indicating whether 

Dobbins was available to testify on his behalf or the contents of his alleged 

corroborative statements. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 

1250 (Pa. 2006) (“[B]oilerplate, undeveloped” arguments regarding

ineffective assistance of counsel are “insufficient to establish an entitlement 

to post-conviction relief.” (citation omitted)). Therefore, Plummer waived this 

claim. See Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 444 (Pa. 2011) (stating 

that when an appellant fails “to set forth all three prongs of the ineffectiveness 

test and [to] meaningfully discuss them, he is not entitled to relief, and we 

are constrained to find such claims waived for lack of development”) (citation 

omitted)).

Plummer also contends that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective 

for failing to challenge the evidence obtained from the cell phone, because it 
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was not properly authenticated and was unreliable. See Appellant’s Brief at 

16-17. However, Plummer fails to meaningfully discuss the three prongs of 

the ineffectiveness test; therefore, we conclude that this claim is also waived. 

See Paddy, 15 A.3d at 444; Spotz, 896 A.2d at 1250.

Next, Plummer baldly argues that “[t]rial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance where he failed to demand reciprocal discovery regarding any 

negative character evidence during appellant’s trial testimony.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 17. Again, Plummer has not provided any other argument and does 

not meaningfully discuss the three prongs of the ineffectiveness test; as a 

result, the claim is waived. See Paddy, 15 A.3d at 444; Spotz, 896 A.2d at 

1250.

Additionally, Plummer asserts that the PCRA court erred in failing to 

order him to file a concise statement so that it could address his numerous 

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claims in an opinion. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 17-18. According to Plummer, the PCRA court did not discharge its 

duty to address all of his claims. See id. at 18. 

Here, Plummer supports his argument by citing to case law related to 

counsel’s withdrawal from PCRA representation under Turner/Finley, 

claiming that the PCRA court must conduct an independent examination of the 

record. Such an argument does not in any way establish that the PCRA court 

did not address all of his pro se claims in this case or that the PCRA court had 

a legal duty to order the filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. In 
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fact, Plummer neglects to acknowledge that Rule 1925(a) opinions are merely 

advisory and are issued for the benefit of appellate review. See Youst v. 

Keck’s Food Serv., Inc., 94 A.3d 1057, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also 

Commonwealth v. Lobiondo, 462 A.2d 662, 665 n.4 (Pa. 1983) (noting that 

a trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion “is intended as an aid to the reviewing 

appellate court and cannot alter a previously entered verdict”). Because 

Plummer fails to demonstrate that the PCRA court did not consider his claims 

prior to dismissing his petition, he is not entitled to relief on this claim.3

We now turn to Plummer’s supplemental brief, in which he raises 22 

claims relating to PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. As a preliminary matter, our 

Supreme Court recently held that the proper procedure for enforcing the right 

to effective PCRA counsel is by “allowing a petitioner to raise claims of

ineffective PCRA counsel at the first opportunity [(after obtaining new counsel

or acting pro se)], even if on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 

381, 405 (Pa. 2021). 

In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be 

sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised 

ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate 

court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further 

development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such 

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3 We additionally note that Plummer argues our Supreme Court “condemned 

the wholesale adoption of a party’s brief in lieu of filing a PCRA court opinion 

on the grounds that the independent role of the judiciary is not properly served 

absent some autonomous judicial expression of the reasons for dismissing the 

PCRA petition.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. However, Plummer cites to no portion 

of the PCRA court’s opinion wherein the PCRA court adopted a party’s brief. 

Therefore, this claim is without merit.
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claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to 

advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to 

provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue 

concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is 

not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be 

afforded. 

Id. at 402 (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). In other words, 

“appellate courts will have the ability to grant or deny relief on straightforward 

claims, as well as the power to remand to the PCRA court for the development 

of the record.” Id. at 403.

We acknowledge that Plummer timely raised his PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness claims in his PCRA petitions upon remand by this Court. 

However, Plummer is not entitled to relief on these claims or further remand 

to develop the record. Indeed, for his claims labeled A through T and V, 

Plummer merely raises bald allegations of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for 

failing to raise multiple claims, and mostly cites to case law regarding the

general standards applicable to an ineffectiveness assistance of counsel claim

without any further analysis establishing ineffectiveness based upon the 

discrete claims. See Supplemental Appellant’s Brief at 10-48, 51; see also 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (noting that an argument must include a pertinent 

discussion and citation to authorities). To that end, Plummer has failed to 

satisfy any of the three prongs of the ineffectiveness test for each counsel, 

which requires a rejection of his claim. See Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1128; Spotz, 
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896 A.2d at 1250.

4 Accordingly, based upon this argument and record, we 

conclude that Plummer’s PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claims are without 

merit. See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (noting that boilerplate allegations of 

ineffectiveness do not entitle a petitioner to relief); see also Commonwealth 

v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that this Court will 

not act as counsel or develop arguments for appellant, and that raising issues 

without analysis or citation to pertinent authority precludes appellate review 

of the claim).

For his claim at U in the supplemental brief, Plummer contends that 

PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not asserting trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to object to inflammatory comments by the 

prosecution during closing argument. See Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 

48-50. Plummer argues that the prosecution made a joke about his disability. 

See id. at 48 (citing N.T., 2/11/15, at 143 (“I don’t think he can’t walk as 

much as he wants you to think as he sort of stumbles his way up to the chair, 

but he probably can’t run.”)). According to Plummer, the central issue for the 

jury to decide was the credibility of the witnesses, and prosecutor’s statement 

influenced the jury. See id. at 49-50. Plummer also claims that there was no 

____________________________________________

4 We additionally note that Plummer’s claims J, R, T, and V in his supplemental 

appellate brief merely incorporate prior sections of his argument, and he does 

not articulate any new assertions. See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 

291, 342 (Pa. 2011) (stating that the appellate rules do not allow 

incorporation by reference arguments and it “is an unacceptable manner of 

appellate advocacy for the proper presentation of a claim for relief”).
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reasonable basis for either counsel’s failure to raise the issue, and that he was 

prejudiced by the failure to object to the statement. See id. at 50.

A prosecutor’s arguments to the jury are generally not a 

basis for the granting of a new trial unless the unavoidable effect 

of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their 

minds fixed bias and hostility towards the accused which would 

prevent them from properly weighing the evidence and rendering 

a true verdict.

A prosecutor must have reasonable latitude in fairly 

presenting a case to the jury and must be free to present []

arguments with logical force and vigor. The prosecutor is also 

permitted to respond to defense arguments. Finally, in order to 

evaluate whether the comments were improper, we do not look at 

the comments in a vacuum; rather we must look at them in the 

context in which they were made.

Commonwealth v. Solomon, 25 A.3d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

and brackets omitted).

Here, the prosecutor made the statement in the context of the facts of 

the case, noting that Plummer stopped chasing Elliot and allowed his two 

cohorts to chase Elliot because Plummer cannot run. See N.T., 2/11/15, at 

143. Importantly, the prosecutor emphasized that Plummer admitted that he 

could not run. See id. The statement cited by Plummer does not in any way 

indicate that the prosecutor was joking about Plummer’s disability. Therefore, 

the contested statement was proper in the context of the evidence of the case 

and Plummer’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective does not have arguable 

merit. See Solomon, 25 A.3d at 383. Likewise, Plummer fails to establish 

that this single statement prejudiced him where the evidence established that 

as Elliot approached the vehicle in question, Plummer and two other men 
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jumped out from behind some nearby bushes and confronted Elliot; the two 

men, but not Plummer, chased Elliot across the street before they were able 

to catch him and take the car keys from him; and Plummer drove the car away 

from the scene. In light of the foregoing, Plummer’s ineffectiveness claims 

regarding trial and PCRA counsel are without merit. See Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 

1128.

In summary, we conclude all of Plummer’s claims of PCRA court error 

are either meritless or waived. We therefore affirm the orders dismissing his 

amended PCRA petition.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/16/2023