alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2457 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2457

       To extend the temporary reduction of duty on sorbic acid.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

  Mr. Cornyn introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To extend the temporary reduction of duty on sorbic acid.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SORBIC ACID.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.10.25 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to sorbic acid) is amended by 
striking ``12/31/2009'' and inserting ``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Gary Eugene BLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1695.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 19, 1988.

Rehearing Denied June 22, 1988.

Kurt Andrew Simpson of Kurt Andrew Simpson, P.A., Jacksonville Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ellen D. Phillips, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In resentencing the defendant,1 the trial court departed from the recommended guidelines sentence pursuant to a plea bargain in which the defendant entered a plea of *nolo contendere,*and stipulated that factors existed allowing departure, in exchange for which the state *nolle prossed*another criminal charge. We affirm on the authority of *Holland v. State,*508 So.2d 5 (Fla.1987); *Key v. State,*452 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), *rev. denied,*459 So.2d 1041 (Fla.1984).

AFFIRMED.

COWART and DANIEL, JJ., concur.

DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially with opinion.

1

. *See Bland v. State,*507 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

DAUKSCH, Judge,

concurring specially.

Appellant executed the following:

> Comes now the Defendant and his attorney, and hereby specifically waives his *948right to a sentence pursuant to the Guidelines and in support thereof shows:

> 1. The Defendant, GARY EUGENE BLAND, is entering a plea of nolo to the second count of the above-styled Information, which is a Lewd and Lascivious Assault Upon a Minor Child. The statutory penalty for said offense is 15 years in the State prison.

> 2. The Defendant herein understands that the Court has the right to sentence him to the maximum of 15 years, Florida State Prison, if it desires and finds it appropriate.

> 3. The Defendant herein further specifically waives his right to be sentenced pursuant to the Guidelines and further waives his right to appeal any lawful sentence this Court may impose, which can be 0-15 years, Florida State Prison, in this case.

Then he got his appellate attorney to say that a fifteen year sentence is illegal. I have a few things to point out and a comment. First, I would point out the maximum penalty is fifteen years incarceration and he got only nine years in prison followed by six years on probation. So he did not receive the maximum he agreed he could get. Second, he was permitted at his request to plead guilty to a lewd and lascivious assault and the state attorney, for whatever reason, agreed to not prosecute him for sexual battery. The sexual battery count which the state attorney charged carried a maximum life imprisonment with a *minimum*of twenty-five years in prison. Third, he makes no complaint regarding fraud or threats or illegal inducements to make him plead nolo contendere to the charge (after he had signed a court document admitting his *guilt).*

Those are things I wanted to point out. My comment regards the filing of the appeal, which appeal is totally without any legal or logical foundation and which is frivolous.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 25, 2009

p0922 

# Order

September 25, 2009

138462

In re Estate of EDWARD JOSEPH McCORMICK, Deceased.

________________ _______________ __________/

ERIC A. BRAVERMAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of EDWARD JOSEPH McCORMICK, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellee,

v SC: 138462 COA: 277558 Wayne Probate: 1992-513517-DE LINDA McCORMICK, and MARY McCORMICK, Respondents-Appellants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 11, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE th e judgment of the Court of Appeals. We REVERSE the order of the Wayne Pr obate Court approving petitioner’s 12 th , 13 th , 14 th and final accountings and granti ng his petition for complete estate settlement, and we
REMAND this case for further proceedings. We DIRECT the probate court to require the petitioner to provide an itemized accountin g that establishes his and the receiver’s entitlement to the specific amounts they receive d from the estate as compensation. See MCR 5.310(C)(2)(c). In particular, the pr obate court shall require the petitioner to provide an itemization of the $41,485 paym ent to himself from the estate, and the $105,156 payment to the recei ver from the proceeds of the sale of the real property.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

C AVANAGH

, J., would deny leave to appeal.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Jackson, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Hillery, J.), rendered July 27, 1989, convicting him of murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree, attempted robbery in the first degree (two counts), and attempted robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of the predicate felonies underlying his conviction for felony murder. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the People’s witnesses, including several eyewitnesses to the incident, established that the defendant had participated in the attempted robbery of the victim, and that upon the command of an accomplice to the crime, the defendant fired the fatal shot in the victim’s head at close range.

The defendant’s alternative argument that the evidence was insufficient because the testimony of the accomplice was uncorroborated by independent evidence tending to show that he planned or participated in the attempted robbery was not raised with sufficient specificity at trial and is unpreserved for review *(see, People v Balls,*69 NY2d 641). In any event, the defendant’s contention is without merit. The record reveals that the testimony of the accomplice was amply supported by corroborative evidence of the eyewitnesses and the defendant’s own statements tending to connect him with the attempted commission of the robbery (CPL 60.22).

Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit. Brown, J. P., Sullivan, Lawrence and Ritter, JJ., concur.
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-22-00325-CV 

 

IN THE INTEREST OF O.J.N., A CHILD 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

 Lubbock County, Texas 

Trial Court No. DC-2022-FM-0905, Honorable Mark Hocker, Presiding 

December 19, 2022 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Appellant, Katelyn Hannah, appeals from an Order in Suit Affecting the ParentChild Relationship issued by the trial court. We dismiss the untimely appeal for want of 

jurisdiction.

The trial court signed the order on July 25, 2022. Hannah timely filed a motion for 

new trial. Hannah’s notice of appeal was, therefore, due within ninety days after the order

was signed, i.e. by October 24, 2022. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a), 26.1(a). Hannah filed 

a notice of appeal on October 27, 2022. The following day, Hannah electronically 

submitted a motion for an extension of time to file her late notice of appeal. The Clerk of 
2

this Court rejected the motion, however, as it failed to include a certificate of service and

a certificate of conference as required by the appellate rules. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

10.1(a)(4), (5). Hannah was notified of these deficiencies and was directed to correct and 

file the motion by October 31, 2022. Hannah never filed a corrected motion for extension.

A timely notice of appeal is essential to invoking this Court’s jurisdiction. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.1(b), 26.1. We may extend the time to file a notice of appeal by fifteen days 

if an appellant files a notice of appeal and a motion for an extension of time that 

reasonably explains the need for an extension. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3, 10.5(b). A motion 

for extension is implied if the notice of appeal is filed within fifteen days after the notice 

deadline. Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). However, an appellant 

must still reasonably explain the delay in filing the notice of appeal when a motion for 

extension is implied. Jones v. City of Houston, 976 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex. 1998).

By letter of November 17, 2022, we notified Hannah that a motion for extension 

was implied because her notice of appeal was filed within fifteen days of the appellate 

deadline. We, thus, directed her to file a written response explaining why her notice of 

appeal was filed untimely. We advised Hannah that if she did not file a response by 

November 30, we would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Hannah has not filed 

a response to date. 

Because Hannah failed to provide a reasonable explanation for her untimely notice 

of appeal, we cannot grant an implied motion for extension. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3, 

10.5(b); Phillips v. Gunn, No. 07-14-00094-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 4027, at *2–3 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo Apr. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). And, as her late notice of appeal failed 
3

to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

Per Curiam
<PAGE>
 
                      Consent of Independent Accountants

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of
People's Savings Financial Corp. and Subsidiary (the "Corporation") on Form S-8
(File Nos. 33-55936) and 33-55940) of our report dated January 21, 1997, on our
audit of the consolidated financial statements of the Corporation as of December
31, 1996 and 1995, and for the years ended December 31, 1996, 1995, and 1994,
which is incorporated by reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.


                              /s/ Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P.
                              Coopers & Lybrand

Hartford, Connecticut
March 18, 1997
#### STATE ex rel. Arthur E. JACKSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 87-KH-2337.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Jackson, Arthur E. Jr.; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “D”, No. 314-858; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. KW-8822.

Denied.
EXHIBIT 99.2
         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE ACT
         ------------------------------------------------

     I, Evon Au hereby certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Thai One
On, Inc.

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this quarterly report.

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
material respects our financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.

4. The other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) and we have:

a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
    material information relating to Thai One On, Inc., including
    its subsidiaries, if any, is made known to us by others within
    those entities, particularly during the period in which this
    quarterly report is being prepared;

b)  evaluated the effectiveness of our disclosure controls and
    procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the
    filing date of this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c)  presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
    effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on
    our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.  The other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to our auditors and the audit committee of our
board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)  that there were no significant deficiencies in the design or
    operation of internal controls which could adversely affect our
    ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data
    and have further advised our auditors that there we are not aware
    of any material weaknesses in our internal controls; and

b)  that there was no fraud, whether or not material, that involved
    our management or other employees who have a significant role in
    our internal controls; and

6.  The other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly
that there were no significant changes in internal controls or in other
factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to
the date of our most recent evaluation.

                                   Thai One On, Inc., Registrant

Dated: November 13, 2004           /s/ Evon Au
                                   -------------------------------------
                                   By: Evon Au, Chief Executive
                                   Officer, President and Chairman of
                                   the Board of Directors
<PAGE>
                                                  EXHIBIT 10(D)
                                 
    AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDED AND RESTATED ELECTED NON-EMPLOYEE
  DIRECTOR STOCK OPTION PLAN OF AMERICAN FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION


     THIS AMENDMENT, made by the Board of Directors of American
Freightways Corporation (the "Company") is effective as of the date
indicated below.

                       W-I-T-N-E-S-S-E-T-H:

     WHEREAS, the Company sponsors the Amended and Restated Elected
Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan of American Freightways
Corporation (the "Plan"); and

     WHEREAS, Section 5 of the Plan authorizes the Board of
Directors of the Company to amend the Plan from time to time; and

     WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company has determined
that it is in the best interests of the Plan's participants and
beneficiaries and the Company's shareholders to amend Section 3 of
the Plan to move the automatic grant date under the Plan from the
first day of February of each year to the first day of January of
each year, unless otherwise specified by the Board.

     NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:

     1.   Effective December 30, 1998, Section 3 of the Plan is
amended by deleting the first paragraph thereof and adding in its
place the following:

          3.   ELIGIBILITY.  Each person who shall
          have been elected a director of the
          Company at its annual meeting of
          stockholders shall automatically be
          granted options to purchase 6,000 shares
          of the Company's common stock (subject to
          further adjustment as provided herein) on
          the date such person is initially elected
          to the Board (but not on subsequent
          election dates) and on each succeeding
          first day in January (or such other time
          during the year as the Board may
          determine), beginning January 1, 2000,
          provided, that such automatic option
          grants shall be made only if the recipient
          director (i) is not otherwise an employee
          of the Company or any subsidiary on the
          date of grant, (ii) is a member of the
          Board of Directors on the date such option
          is granted.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,  I, Richard J.  Carbone,  Chief  Financial
Officer of The Prudential  Insurance Company of America (the "Company"),  hereby
certify  that the  Company's  Annual  Report  on Form  10-K  for the year  ended
December  31,  2004,  containing  the  financial  statements  of The  Prudential
Variable  Contract Real Property  Account (a separate  account of The Prudential
Insurance Company of America) and The Prudential Variable Contract Real Property
Partnership  (the "Report"),  fully complies with the requirements of Section 13
(a) or 15 (d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 and that the  information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition  and results of operations of The  Prudential  Variable  Contract Real
Property Account and The Prudential Variable Contract Real Property Partnership.


                                                  Date: March 31, 2005


                                               /s/Richard J. Carbone
                                               ---------------------------------
                                                  Name: Richard J. Carbone
                                                  Title: Chief Financial Officer


The foregoing  certification  is being  furnished  solely  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section  1350 and is not  being  filed as part of the  Report  or as a  separate
disclosure document.
III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 121

To authorize testimony and legal representation in C. William Kaiser v.

Department of Veterans Affairs.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 14, 1999

Mr. LOTT (for himself and Mr. DASCHLE) submitted the following resolution;

which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

To authorize testimony and legal representation in C.

William Kaiser v. Department of Veterans Affairs.

Whereas, in the case of C. William Kaiser v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, Docket No. BN–0351–99–0110–I–1,

pending before the Merit Systems Protection Board, testimony has been requested from Richard Lougee, an employee of Senator Judd Gregg;

Whereas, pursuant to sections 703(a) and 704(a)(2) of the

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(a)

and 288c(a)(2), the Senate may direct its counsel to represent employees of the Senate with respect to any subpoena, order, or request for testimony relating to their

official responsibilities;

Whereas, by the privileges of the Senate of the United States

and Rule XI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, no evi-
2

SRES 121 ATS

dence under the control or in the possession of the Senate may, by the judicial process, be taken from such control or possession but by permission of the Senate; and

Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or

in the possession of the Senate may promote the administration of justice, the Senate will take such action as will

promote the ends of justice consistently with the privileges of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That Richard Lougee is authorized to tes2 tify in the case of C. William Kaiser v. Department of

3 Veterans Affairs, except concerning matters for which a

4 privilege should be asserted.

5 SEC. 2. The Senate Legal Counsel is authorized to

6 represent Richard Lougee in connection with the testi7 mony authorized in second one of this resolution.

Æ
**Exhibit
      32.1**





**Certification
      of Principal Executive Officer**


**Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to**


**Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of SRKP 5, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
      10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard A. Rappaport,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
                Richard A. RappaportRichard
                A. RappaportPrincipal
                Executive OfficerMay
                6, 2008
#### Betty HALE v. PINECREST STATE SCHOOL, et al.

No. 87-C-1057.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 12, 1987.

In re Pinecrest State School; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA85-887; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 132285.

Prior report: La.App., 505 So.2d 987.

Denied.