Xo. 84-354 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

JOHN A. DAVIS (FATAL) VIVIAN 

MARIE DAVIS, 

Claimant and Respondent, 

GEORGE W. JONES, Employer, 

and 

MOUNTAIN WEST FA,W BUREAU MUTUAL 

INSURANCE COMPAYY , 

Defendaht and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy 

Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Utick, Grosfield & Uda; Andrew J. Utick, Helena, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Joseph E. Engel, 111, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 28, 1985 

Decided: June 13, 1985 

--- 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Defendant Mountain West appeals from an order of the 

Workers' Compensation Court finding employer and insurer 

liable to claimant for benefits under the Workers' 

Compensation Act. 

This is a continuation of a case that has previously 

been before this Court. In Davis v. Jones (Mont. 1983), 661 

P.2d 859, 40 St.Rep. 570, we held that the employer, Jones, 

was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations to bar 

claimant's request for compensation. The present action is 

an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Court's 

determination that Davis' fatal heart attack was a 

compensable injury. 

Testimony indicated the following facts: On February 

16, 1980, John Davis was working as a ranch hand. One of his 

duties was to chop through the ice covering cattle watering 

holes so that the cattle could drink. To do this, he used a 

dull ax to break the ice and a shovel or pitchfork to rpmove 

the broken ice from the hole. He would have to chop a hole 

through the ice two feet wide and ten feet long. This 

activity usually led to Davis getting wet from the knees 

down, and otherwise was very strenuous work. On the date in 

question, the air temperature was somewhere between -10 and 

+20 degrees Fahrenheit, with a wind chill down to -31 

degrees. 

Prior to 10:30 a.m. on February 16, Davis had already 

chopped one watering hole. Sometime during that morning he 

began to experience a sensation like a brick on his chest 

while chopping ice to make the second watering hole. One 
time he passed out on the ice and when regaining 

consciousness felt very cold. At approximately 10:30 a.m., 

after Davis regained consciousness, the employer and a 

co-employee, Louis Velasco, found him sitting or kneeling on 

the ice and leaning against the handle of his ax he used to 

chop through the ice. The employer spoke with employee Davis 

who complained of chest pain and said that he did not feel 

well. The employer suggested that he leave work and see a 

doctor. 

Shortly thereafter, Davis left the water hole and 

proceeded to his vehicle. He continued to experience chest 

pain, although less severe than originally experienced. 

Between approximately noon and 1:00 p.m., he was sitting in 

his vehicle and continuing to experience moderate chest pain. 

He declined to help a co-employee. Davis told another 

co-employee that he was going to see a doctor and that he 

felt sick, as though he had the flu. 

At approximately 1:00 p.m. that day, Davis arrived at 

the home of Judy and Ralph Paddock. While standing in the 

front yard, he complained to Judy Paddock about having felt 

like there was a brick on his chest while chopping ice, 

passing out, and feeling very cold when regaining 

consciousness. He complained of still being cold, of chest 

pain, and repeatedly said he wanted to call Dr. Sidensticker. 

Other complaints were of numbness in his hands and aching in 

his arms; and while he did so he rotated his shoulders and 

arms. To Judy Paddock, he appeared pale, cold and 

"shook-up." In the Paddock house, Davis told Ralph Paddock 

that he had passed out while chopping ice that morning and 

that right then he felt cold and had a chest pain. Ralph 
Paddock testified that Davis appeared upset, nervous and 

scared. 

Davis left the Paddocks' house at approximately 4:30 

p.m. While driving home he almost blacked-out three times 

and had to stop his vehicle on each occasion. When he 

arrived home about 7:30 or 8:00 p.m., he immediately asked 

his wife, the claimant, for something cold to drink, 

complaining about having been thirsty all day and about not 

having been able to get enough cold fluids to drink. He then 

sat down and drank approximately a gallon of ice tea. He 

looked tired, gray and was shaking. He told his wife that 

while chopping ice during the morning he had passed out after 

experiencing chest pain. He also complained of having "hard 

chest pains on and off all day." A little bit later while 

sitting at the dinner table, Davis complained of chest pains 

and numbness in one arm. He did not finish dinner. He asked 

for something cold to eat and then ate two bowls of ice 

cream. His wife ran a tub of hot water so that he could take 

his usual bath, but he said that he was too tired, and that 

he would rather lie down. He then got up from the dinner 

table and went into the bedroom. Soon after Davis left the 

kitchen and while his wife was removing the dinner dishes she 

heard him moaning in the bedroom. She entered the bedroom 

and saw that he had vomited. He was rolling on the bed 

holding his chest and moaning, acting as though he was unable 

to get enough air. 

Vivian Davis, the claimant, got her husband into the 

family car and then drove to a nearby gasoline service 

station. As they pulled up to the gas stat-ion, John Davis 

grabbed his chest and starting gasping for breath and 
rocking. The claimant attempted to clear his throat. He 

suddenly quit breathing. She gave him artificial respiration 

and revived him temporarily. His heart attack continued, and 

several minutes later he sighed deeply and died. 

The Workers' Compensation Court found that the decedent 

died of a heart attack. It also found that his heart attack 

began while he was chopping ice to make a second watering 

hole on the morning of February 16, 1980 and continued 

throughout the day and ended with his death that evening. On 

those findings, the Workers' Compensation Court held that 

employer and insurer were liable for claimant's benefits 

under the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellant, Mountain 

West Farm Bureau, presents the following issues for review: 

(1) Whether there was a causal relati-onship between 

John Davis' myocardial infarction and resulting death and his 

work activities. 

(2) Whether, even assuming there was a causal 

relationship between John Davis' myocardial infarction and 

his work activities, such myocardial infarction is a 

compensable injury under the Montana Workers' Compensation 

Act. 

The Workers' Compensation Court held that the decedent 

died from a myocardial infarction and that this injury was 

sufficiently work related so as to bring it within the ambit 

of the Workers' Compensation Act. In challenging this 

determination, the appellant raises inconsistencies and 

weaknesses in claimant's case, alleging an insufficient 

causal relationship between claimant's work activities and 

the heart attack. In considering such an argument, we have 

firmly adhered to the view that where the findings are based 
on conflicting evidence, this Court's function on review is 

confined to determining whether there is substantial evidence 

to support the findings, and not to determine whether there 

is sufficient evidence to support contrary findings . Little 

v. Structural Systems (1980), 188 Mont. 482, 614 P.2d 516; 

Jensen v. Zook Brothers Construction Company (1978), 178 

Mont. 59, 582 P.2d 1191; see also Jones v. St. Regis Paper 

Company (1981), 196 Mont. 138, 639 P.2d 1140. 

We find that the Workers' Compensation Court's order 

was based on substantial credible evidence in the record. In 

a well-reasoned and comprehensive opinion, the Workers' 

Compensation Court addressed many factors that went into its 

decision. The claimant herself was found to be a very 

credible witness. The claimant's hypothetical question 

presented to each party's expert was found to be accurate. 

The claimant1 s medical expert was found to be more qualified 

and his opinion was accorded greater weight. Finally, the 

nature of decedent's work and the particular activity he was 

engaged in at the time the initial heart attack occurred 

lends support to the Workers' Compensation Court's order. 

Given the presumption of correctness that accompanies the 

Workers' Compensation Court's findings when they reach this 

Court, we will not overrule this order, Erhart v. Great 

Western Sugar Company (1976), 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055; 

Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Company (1975), 167 Mont. 303, 308, 

538 P.2d 344, 346; Hunt and Luinstra, "The Montana Workers' 

Compensation Court" 41 Mont.L.Rev. 1, 18, (1980). 

As to the second issue, we have in the past held that 

in certain cases heart attacks are cornpensable injuries under 

Montana Workers' Compensation Act. See, Rathbun v. Taber 
Tank Lines, Inc. (1955), 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966, 

(compensation allowed); Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Constr. 

Company (1979), 183 Mont. 190, 598 P.2d 1107; Hurlbut v. 

Vollstedt Kerr Company, supra; Ness v. Diamond Asphalt 

Company (1964)" 143 Mont. 560, 393 P.2d 43, (compensation 

denied) . See also Grosfiel d , Montana Workers ' Compensation 

Manual 53.40 (1979). The question of whether an employee 

suffered a job related "tangiable happening of a traumatic 

nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain resulting 

in . . . harm," section 39-71-119, MCA, is one of fact. In 

that regard the court must "rely on credible medical evidence 

to determine" whether the injury is compensable, Jones v. 

Bair's Cafe (1968), 152 Mont. 13, 19, 445 P.2d 923, 926, see 

also Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Constr. Company, supra, at 205, 

206, 598 P.2d at 1107. 

The lower court in this case noted that "in the instant 

case, the decedent was performing strenuous physical labor 

and . . . the medical evidence proved it caused his heart 

attack. I' The Hurlbut case, supra, upon which appellant 

relies is distinguishable in the fact that this Court, 

quoting the medical witness, noted that he could - not state 

what was the cause of Mr. Hurlbut's heart attack and held: 

"Claimant failed to carry his burden and therefore cannot 

qualify under the statute for benefits." In accord are 

Dumont , supra Hurlbut, supra, Ness , supra, and Ra thbun , 

supra. 

Again, we are presented with the question of whether 

there is substantial evidence on the record to support the 

Workers' Compensation Court's determination that the 

decedent's heart attack was caused by his work. Experts 
testified on behalf of each side. Each elaborated upon the 

cause of decedent's heart attack. The court heard this 

testimony, and held that the claimant had established by a 

preponderance of the credible medical evidence that 

decedent's heart attack was work related. We find there is 

substantial evidence in the record and the court's order is, 

therefore, affirmed. 

We concur: N /' 

i Justice