1

Filed 9/28/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re UBER TECHNOLOGIES 

WAGE AND HOUR CASES.

A166355

(San Francisco County Super. Ct.

No. CJC-21-005179; J.C.C.P. 

No. 5179)

In these coordinated proceedings, defendants Uber and Lyft1 appeal 

after the trial court denied their motions to compel arbitration of claims 

brought against them in civil enforcement actions by the People of the State 

of California (the People)2 and by the Labor Commissioner through the 

Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE).3 We conclude the court 

correctly denied the motions because the People and the Labor Commissioner 

1 The defendants are (1) Uber Technologies, Inc., and certain of its 

affiliated entities (collectively, Uber), and (2) Lyft, Inc. (Lyft). 

2 The Attorney General of California, joined by city attorneys of the 

cities of Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, brought the action on 

behalf of the People. 

3 The DLSE is a division within the Department of Industrial 

Relations. (Lab. Code, §§ 21, 79.) We will use the terms DLSE and Labor 

Commissioner interchangeably. 
2

are not parties to the arbitration agreements invoked by Uber and Lyft. We 

therefore affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s Actions Against 

Uber and Lyft

In May 2020, the People filed this action. In their operative complaint, 

the People allege Uber and Lyft violated the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & 

Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) (UCL) by misclassifying their California rideshare and delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, 

thus depriving them of wages and benefits associated with employee status.4

The People allege the misclassification harms workers, competitors, and the 

public. The People seek injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitution

under the UCL. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17204, 17206.) The People 

also seek injunctive relief under the statutory scheme established by 

Assembly Bill No. 5 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 5), specifically 

Labor Code section 2786,5 which authorizes such relief to prevent 

misclassification of employees as independent contractors.

The People sought, and the trial court entered, a preliminary injunction 

prohibiting Uber and Lyft from misclassifying their drivers as independent 

contractors in violation of Assembly Bill 5. (People v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 

supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 281–282.) We affirmed in an October 2020 

opinion. (Id. at p. 316.) Following the passage of Proposition 22, which 

4 We discussed the People’s claims and other relevant background more 

fully in People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266, 273, 274–

282. 

5 The injunctive relief provision of Assembly Bill 5 was originally 

codified as Labor Code section 2750.3, subdivision (j) (Stats. 2019, ch. 296, 

§ 2) and was later transferred to section 2786 (Stats. 2020, ch. 38, §§ 1–2). 

(See People v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 274, fn. 3.) 
3

altered the standards for determining whether app-based drivers are 

independent contractors (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7451), the People and Uber and 

Lyft stipulated to dissolve the preliminary injunction, which had been stayed 

since it was entered. The People’s operative first amended and supplemental 

complaint clarifies that the People seek injunctive relief to the extent 

Proposition 22 is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid.6

In August 2020, the Labor Commissioner filed separate actions against 

Uber and Lyft, pursuant to her enforcement authority under the Labor Code. 

(E.g., Lab. Code, §§ 61, 90.5, 95, 98.3, subd. (b).) The Labor Commissioner 

alleges Uber and Lyft have misclassified drivers as independent contractors 

and have thus violated certain Labor Code provisions and wage orders. The 

Labor Commissioner seeks injunctive relief, civil penalties payable to the 

state, and unpaid wages and other amounts alleged to be due to Uber’s and 

Lyft’s drivers, such as unreimbursed business expenses.7

6 The validity of Proposition 22 under the state constitution is a 

question now pending before the California Supreme Court. (Castellanos v. 

State of California (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 131, review granted June 28, 2023, 

S279622.) 

7 As noted, the People and the Labor Commissioner filed their actions 

pursuant to statutory authority as public enforcement officials. (Bus. & Prof. 

Code, §§ 17203, 17204, 17206; Lab. Code, §§ 2786, 61, 90.5, 95, 98.3, 

subd. (b).) Their actions are not private attorney general actions, i.e., they 

are not actions “brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or 

herself and other current or former employees” as authorized by the Labor 

Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) 

(PAGA). (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a).) They are direct enforcement actions

by public prosecutors acting under specific statutory grants of prosecutorial 

authority. 
4

The People’s action and the Labor Commissioner’s actions were 

coordinated (along with other cases not involved in this appeal)8 as part of 

Uber Technologies Wage and Hour Cases.

B. Uber’s and Lyft’s Motions To Compel Arbitration Based on Their 

Arbitration Agreements With Drivers 

As we noted in People v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 312, fn. 24, foreshadowing this appeal, Uber and Lyft filed motions to 

compel arbitration in the People’s action; they also filed similar motions in

the Labor Commissioner’s actions. Uber and Lyft sought to require 

arbitration of those actions to the extent they seek remedies that Uber and 

Lyft characterize as “driver-specific” or “ ‘individualized’ ” relief, such as 

restitution under the UCL and unpaid wages under the Labor Code. 

Uber’s and Lyft’s motions did not seek to compel arbitration of the 

People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s requests for civil penalties and 

injunctive relief, but they nonetheless asked the court to stay those portions 

of the actions pending completion of any driver arbitrations. Finally, as an 

alternative to their requests to compel arbitration, Uber and Lyft asked the 

court to strike the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s requests for 

restitution and certain other relief.

In their motions, Uber and Lyft relied on arbitration agreements they 

entered into with drivers. The agreements require drivers to arbitrate on an 

individual basis most disputes arising from their relationship with Uber or 

Lyft. The People and the Labor Commissioner are not parties to the 

agreements. 

8 According to the parties’ briefs in this appeal, those other cases (which 

also allege misclassification of employees as independent contractors) were 

brought by private parties under PAGA. 
5

Following coordination, the parties filed additional briefing pertaining 

to the motions, and the trial court heard argument on August 26, 2022. On 

September 1, 2022, the court entered an order denying Uber’s and Lyft’s 

motions. 

Uber and Lyft appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION

Uber and Lyft contend the arbitration agreements they entered into 

with their drivers require that portions of the civil enforcement actions 

brought by the People and the Labor Commissioner be compelled to

arbitration. If this court orders arbitration, they argue, the remaining 

portions of the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s actions should be 

stayed. We conclude, as the trial court did, that there is no basis to compel 

arbitration. 

A. Standard of Review

“Whether an arbitration agreement binds a third party is a legal 

question we review de novo.” (Department of Fair Employment and Housing 

v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 93, 99 (Cisco).) 

B. The People and the Labor Commissioner Are Not Bound by 

Uber’s and Lyft’s Arbitration Agreements with Their Drivers

Both the federal government and California have strong public policies 

“ ‘in favor of arbitration as an expeditious and cost-effective way of resolving 

disputes.’ ” (People v. Maplebear Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 923, 930 

(Maplebear).) But “[e]ven though the ‘ “ ‘law favors contracts for arbitration 

of disputes between parties’ [citation], ‘ “there is no policy compelling persons 

to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to 

arbitrate . . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 931.) 

The trial court correctly concluded there is no basis to compel 

arbitration here because the People and the Labor Commissioner are not 
6

parties to the arbitration agreements Uber and Lyft entered into with their 

drivers. Uber and Lyft contend arbitration nevertheless should be compelled 

on the basis of either (1) federal preemption or (2) equitable estoppel. We 

disagree.9

1. Preemption

Uber and Lyft argue the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) 

(FAA) precludes the People and the Labor Commissioner from pursuing in 

court some of the types of relief they seek in their enforcement actions, 

including restitution under the UCL and unpaid wages and business 

expenses of drivers under the Labor Code. Characterizing these forms of 

relief as “individualized” or “driver-specific,” they argue that, because such

relief may benefit individual drivers, any claim seeking it “belong[s]” to the 

drivers (and the People and the Labor Commissioner only “stand[] in the 

[drivers’] shoes,” while the drivers are the “real parties in interest”). Thus, 

they conclude, those portions of the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s 

actions must be compelled to arbitration. We disagree. 

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that, while the FAA 

embodies a strong federal policy in favor of enforcing parties’ agreements to 

arbitrate, that policy is founded on the parties’ consent, and there is no policy 

in favor of requiring arbitration of disputes the parties have not agreed to 

arbitrate. (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. __, __

9 Because we hold the People and the Labor Commissioner are not 

bound by the arbitration agreements between Uber and Lyft and their 

drivers, we need not address (1) the Labor Commissioner’s argument that 

Uber and Lyft have not provided sufficient evidence of such agreements

because they produced no signed agreements, or (2) defendants’ contentions 

that the agreements are valid and binding as between the parties who 

entered them. We will assume for purposes of this opinion that the

arbitration agreements bind drivers who entered them. 
7

[142 S.Ct. 1906, 1918] (Viking River) [“the ‘first principle’ of our FAA 

jurisprudence” is “that ‘[a]rbitration is strictly “a matter of consent” ’ ”]; id. at 

p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1917]; E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 

279, 294 (Waffle House) [“Because the FAA is ‘at bottom a policy 

guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements,’ 

[citation], we look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, 

not to general policy goals, to determine the scope of the agreement.”].) 

“ ‘ ‘Whether an agreement to arbitrate exists is a threshold issue of 

contract formation and state contract law.” [Citations.] “The party seeking 

to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid 

arbitration agreement.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Because arbitration is a matter of 

contract, generally “ ‘one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to be 

bound by it or invoke it.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘However, both California and federal 

courts have recognized limited exceptions to this rule, allowing 

nonsignatories to an agreement containing an arbitration clause to compel 

arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope 

of that agreement.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘As one authority has stated, there are six 

theories by which a nonsignatory may be bound to arbitrate: 

“(a) incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing or 

alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third party beneficiary.” ’ ” ’ ” (Maplebear, 

supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 931–932.)

Here, as noted, the People and the Labor Commissioner are not parties 

to the arbitration agreements at issue. And none of the above theories

supports compelling their claims to arbitration. We reject Uber’s and Lyft’s 

suggestion that the People and the Labor Commissioner should be bound 

because they allegedly are mere proxies for Uber’s and Lyft’s drivers. (See 

Cisco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 99 [addressing a similar claim; noting the 
8

“proxy” theory was “along [the] lines” of the assumption, agency, and alter 

ego theories].)

The relevant statutory schemes expressly authorize the People and the 

Labor Commissioner to bring the claims (and seek the relief) at issue here. 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17204, 17206 [authority for Attorney General 

and other public prosecutors to sue in the name of the People under the 

UCL]; Lab. Code, § 2786 [authority under Assembly Bill 5]; id., §§ 61, 90.5, 

95, 98.3, subd. (b) [Labor Commissioner’s authority].) The public officials 

who brought these actions do not derive their authority from individual 

drivers but from their independent statutory authority to bring civil 

enforcement actions, and, as we discuss further below, there is no basis for 

binding them to arbitration agreements Uber and Lyft entered with drivers.

a. Waffle House Establishes the Drivers’ Arbitration Agreements Do 

Not Bar the People and the Labor Commissioner from Seeking 

Judicial Relief

In Waffle House, the United States Supreme Court held that the 

federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is not bound by 

employee arbitration agreements because it has the ability to determine 

whether to file suit and what relief to pursue. (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. 

at pp. 291, 282, 285, 297–298.) An employee’s agreement to arbitrate certain 

claims does not bar the EEOC from pursuing “victim-specific judicial relief” 

(as well as injunctive relief) in its own action. (Id. at pp. 282, 285, 297–298.) 

The high court rejected arguments that the EEOC’s claims in this setting are 

“derivative” and that the EEOC is a “proxy for the employee.” (Id. at 

pp. 297–298.) 

Recent decisions by California appellate courts have followed Waffle 

House, holding that public agencies bringing enforcement actions as 

authorized by statute are not bound by arbitration agreements between 
9

private parties. In Maplebear, a case very similar to this one, the San Diego 

City Attorney brought an enforcement action under the UCL on behalf of the 

People, alleging Instacart misclassified its shoppers as independent 

contractors. (Maplebear, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 926.) The trial court 

denied Instacart’s motion to compel arbitration, and the appellate court 

affirmed, holding that, under Waffle House, arbitration agreements between 

Instacart and its shoppers were not binding on the People. (Maplebear, at 

pp. 926–927, 935.) 

The Maplebear court rejected Instacart’s contention that the FAA 

supported a contrary result because the People allegedly were “deputized” by 

the shoppers. (Maplebear, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 934–935.) Instead, 

the court held, the City of San Diego was acting in its own law enforcement 

capacity to seek relief under the UCL. (Maplebear, at p. 934.) The court 

explained that “the FAA is not concerned with the ability of the State of 

California to prosecute violations of the Labor Code and to seek civil 

penalties and related relief for those violations under the UCL. Contrary to 

Instacart’s assertion, the Shoppers are not the real party in interest in this 

case, the People are.” (Id. at p. 935.)

Similarly, in Cisco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 97, the appellate court 

addressed whether the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (now 

named the Civil Rights Department) could be “compelled to arbitrate an 

employment discrimination lawsuit when the affected employee agreed to 

resolve disputes with the employer through arbitration.” Affirming the trial 

court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the appellate court held the 

Department could not be required to arbitrate because it did not agree to do 

so. (Ibid.) The Cisco court rejected the employer’s claim that the Department 
10

should be bound because it was a “proxy” for the employee and was “not 

acting independently.” (Id. at p. 99.) 

Instead, the Cisco court explained, the Department acts independently 

and pursuant to express statutory authority when it sues for violations of the 

Fair Employment and Housing Act. (Cisco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 99–

100, 103–104, citing Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 291.) “As an 

independent party, the Department cannot be compelled to arbitrate under 

an agreement it has not entered.” (Cisco, at p. 104; see Crestwood Behavioral 

Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 560, 581–585 [recognizing, 

following Waffle House, that the Labor Commissioner has independent 

statutory authority to investigate and obtain victim-specific relief under the 

Labor Code and to protect the public interest, regardless of whether an 

individual employee’s claim has been compelled to arbitration].) 

We agree with the analysis in Maplebear and Cisco. We hold that, 

under Waffle House, the People and the Labor Commissioner are not bound 

by arbitration agreements they did not enter. The FAA does not preclude 

them from exercising their statutory authority to enforce the law and to seek 

appropriate remedies, including injunctive relief and civil penalties, as well 

as restitution and other “victim-specific judicial relief.” (Waffle House, supra, 

534 U.S. at p. 282; id. at pp. 285, 297–298.) The trial court correctly so held. 

As we discuss below, Uber’s and Lyft’s arguments to the contrary are not 

persuasive. 

b. Viking River Provides No Basis for Reversal

Uber and Lyft contend the high court’s decision in Viking River

requires that the People and the Labor Commissioner be bound to Uber’s and 

Lyft’s arbitration agreements with their drivers. We disagree. Viking River

involved a different issue—whether California’s rule invalidating waivers of 

representative claims under PAGA is preempted by federal law. (Viking 
11

River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1913]; see Adolph v. Uber 

Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1113–1114 [discussing Viking 

River].) In this case, the actions brought by the People and the Labor 

Commissioner are not private attorney general actions under PAGA. The 

PAGA plaintiff in Viking River, a former employee of the defendant, had 

signed an agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of her employment 

(Viking River, at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1915–1916]), and the high court did 

not address any claim that a plaintiff who was a nonsignatory to the 

agreement should be bound. 

Uber and Lyft dwell on language in a footnote in Viking River

(footnote 4), in which the high court stated that, “[a]lthough the terms of 

[9 U.S.C.] § 2 limit the FAA’s enforcement mandate to agreements to 

arbitrate controversies that ‘arise out of’ the parties’ contractual 

relationship,[10] disputes resolved in PAGA actions satisfy this requirement.

The contractual relationship between the parties is a but-for cause of any 

justiciable legal controversy between the parties under PAGA, and ‘arising 

out of’ language normally refers to a causal relationship. [Citation.] And 

regardless of whether a PAGA action is in some sense also a dispute between 

an employer and the State, nothing in the FAA categorically exempts claims 

belonging to sovereigns from the scope of [9 U.S.C.] § 2.” (Viking River, 

supra, 596 U.S. at p. __, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4].) This passage, 

Uber and Lyft tell us, supports their effort to bind the People and the Labor 

Commissioner to arbitration agreements with their drivers.

10 Section 2 of the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 2) states in relevant part: “A written 

provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 

settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 

transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 

grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract . . . .” 
12

We disagree. In our view, the cited passage establishes that, when an 

employee who has agreed to arbitrate claims against an employer brings a 

PAGA action, then (even if that action could be said to be a dispute between 

an employer and the state) the FAA requires that the employee submit to 

arbitration any claim covered by the agreement, because the claim arises out 

of the contractual relationship between the parties. (Viking River, supra, 

596 U.S. at p. __, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4]; id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at 

pp. 1915–1916].) As we read it, the passage addresses which claims (brought 

by a plaintiff who was a signatory to an arbitration agreement) are to be 

submitted to arbitration pursuant to the FAA’s mandate. (Viking River, at 

p. __, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4].) The Viking River court did not cite 

Waffle House and did not state it was altering or limiting the holding in that 

case. And nowhere in footnote 4 or elsewhere in the Viking River opinion did 

the high court state it was addressing or expanding the category of litigants 

who are covered by the FAA’s mandate to include public enforcement 

agencies who did not agree to arbitrate any claims against the employer. 

Indeed, as noted above, far from suggesting parties should be bound to 

arbitrate where they have not agreed to do so, the Viking River court 

emphasized that “the ‘first principle’ of our FAA jurisprudence” is “that 

‘[a]rbitration is strictly “a matter of consent.” ’ ” (Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at 

p. 1918]; accord, Cisco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 103 [noting that Viking 

River “reaffirmed . . . that arbitration is a matter of consent and a party 

cannot be compelled to arbitrate absent a contractual basis for concluding the 

party agreed to do so”].) We reject Uber’s and Lyft’s argument that Viking 

River supports reversal here. 

The other cases cited by Uber and Lyft in support of their preemption 

argument similarly do not require arbitration by a public enforcement agency 
13

that is not a party to an arbitration agreement. Instead, the cited cases 

involve plaintiffs who agreed to arbitrate certain types of disputes, and the 

issue raised on appeal was which claims or relief pursued by those plaintiffs 

were subject to arbitration in light of their agreements and the FAA. (E.g., 

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. __, __ [138 S.Ct. 1612, 1619–

1621] [employee agreed to arbitrate employment-related disputes on an 

individual basis; FAA required enforcing this agreement and precluding 

employee’s effort to pursue claims in court as representative of a class]; Cruz 

v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303, 309–310, 317–318 

[consumer-plaintiff was alleged to be bound by arbitration agreement; his 

request for restitution under the UCL was arbitrable]; Esparza v. KS 

Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1235, 1239, 1246 [employeeplaintiff agreed to arbitrate employment-related claims and later brought 

PAGA action; appellate court held that, under then-applicable Iskanian11

framework, the employee’s claims for unpaid wages for himself and other 

employees “retain their private nature and continue to be covered by the” 

FAA].) Uber and Lyft cite no case holding a state government body or official 

that did not agree to arbitration can be barred from enforcing the law in court 

based on an arbitration agreement entered by others.

Defendants’ reliance on Preston v. Ferrer (2008) 552 U.S. 346 is also 

misplaced. Preston held that, “when parties agree to arbitrate all questions 

arising under a contract, state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another 

forum, whether judicial or administrative, are superseded by the FAA.” (Id.

at pp. 349–350.) The Preston court distinguished Waffle House, noting that 

11 Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 

348 (Iskanian), overruled in part by Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __

[142 S.Ct. at p. 1924].
14

in that case, “the Court addressed the role of an agency, not as adjudicator 

but as prosecutor, pursuing an enforcement action in its own name . . . .” 

(Preston, at p. 359.) Here, of course, the People and the Labor Commissioner 

are acting as prosecutors, not adjudicators. Waffle House, not Preston, 

controls.

Similarly unpersuasive is Uber’s and Lyft’s reliance on the statement 

in Department of Industrial Relations v. Continental Casualty Co. (1996) 

52 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 3, that the Legislature, through Labor Code 

provisions authorizing the DLSE to collect wages or benefits on behalf of a 

worker without assignment, “intended to put the DLSE right into the shoes 

of the worker for the purpose of such wage litigation.” Based on this 

conclusion, the appellate division in Department of Industrial Relations held 

that the DLSE (like a wage earner) was exempt from a statutory notice 

requirement. (Ibid.) The court addressed no question of arbitrability and did 

not suggest the DLSE or other public agency is bound to an arbitration 

agreement it did not enter. We decline to read the court’s brief, general 

statement as authority for a proposition it did not consider. 

Nor do Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475 and 

Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.

(9th Cir. 2011) 642 F.3d 728, two other cases cited by defendants, persuade 

us reversal is warranted. Those decisions held, in contexts unrelated to 

arbitration, that the legislative conferral of standing to sue does not 

necessarily establish the named plaintiff is the real party in interest. 

(Howitson, at pp. 488–489, 491–492 [in PAGA action, the state is the real 

party in interest, although an aggrieved employee has standing to sue; 

therefore, for purposes of claim preclusion, an employee’s individual lawsuit 
15

and her later PAGA action were not brought by the same party]12; Lucent 

Technologies, at p. 738 & fn. 4 [while state statute “support[ed] a finding that 

California is a real party in interest for the purposes of standing,” the 

statutory language “fail[ed] to render it a real party in the controversy for the 

purposes of [federal] diversity jurisdiction”].) Neither case addresses any 

issue relating to arbitrability or holds that a public enforcement agency must 

arbitrate its claims because the relief it obtains may benefit individuals.

c. Defendants’ Efforts To Distinguish Waffle House Are Not 

Persuasive

In a separate line of attack, Uber and Lyft contend that Waffle House is 

distinguishable, in part because it involved claims for victim-specific relief

brought by a federal agency,13 and that Maplebear and Cisco (which applied

the Waffle House holding to suits by state government actors) are 

distinguishable or were incorrectly decided. We reject these arguments and 

hold Waffle House applies here. 

It is, of course, true that Waffle House involved a federal agency (the 

EEOC) suing under a federal antidiscrimination statute, the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA). (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 282–283.) But 

in our view, the court’s analysis and holding apply here and establish that a 

government body exercising express statutory authority to seek judicial relief

(including “victim-specific” relief) cannot be barred from doing so on the 

ground the agency is supposedly a mere “proxy” of an individual employee 

12 Code of Civil Procedure section 367 (“Every action must be 

prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise 

provided by statute.”).

13 Uber also states Waffle House “predates” the high court’s “modern 

arbitration decisions.” Waffle House has not been overruled, and we will 

follow it.
16

who entered an arbitration agreement. (Id. at pp. 282, 285, 297–298; accord, 

Maplebear, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 926–927, 934–935; Cisco, supra, 

82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 99–100, 103–104.) As with the agencies in Waffle 

House, Maplebear, and Cisco, the People and the Labor Commissioner are not 

parties to the arbitration agreements invoked in this case, and they may

pursue their claims in court. 

Uber and Lyft argue the statutory schemes at issue here differ in 

certain respects from the one in Waffle House, including as to whether the 

government agency has an exclusive right to pursue claims and whether it is 

bound by the same statute of limitations as a private individual. (Waffle 

House, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 291, 287, 297.) But in our view, the Waffle 

House court’s statements on these points do not provide a basis to depart 

from its holding. Like the EEOC (id. at pp. 291–292), the People and the 

Labor Commissioner decide whether to bring claims within their statutory 

authority, and their ability to do so does not depend on the consent or 

approval of individual employees. Despite variations in the statutory 

schemes at issue, we conclude Waffle House applies here. The People and the 

Labor Commissioner are not acting as proxies for drivers but bringing 

independent civil enforcement actions, and they are not barred from seeking 

judicial relief by arbitration agreements they did not enter. (See id. at 

pp. 297–298.) 

As to Maplebear and Cisco, Uber and Lyft contend those cases are 

distinguishable, in part because the defendants there sought to compel larger 

portions of the civil enforcement actions to arbitration. But in both cases the 

relief sought by the public enforcement agencies included restitution or other 

victim-specific relief (Maplebear, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 928; Cisco, 

supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 98), and the appellate courts held that no portion 
17

of those actions should be compelled to arbitration, because the public 

prosecutors had not agreed to arbitrate. (Maplebear, at pp. 926–927, 935; 

Cisco, at pp. 97, 104.) For the reasons we have discussed, we agree.

d. The People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s Exercise of Their 

Statutory Law Enforcement Authority Does Not Pose an Obstacle 

to the FAA

Uber and Lyft argue that, where state agencies are involved, their 

pursuit of restitution and other statutory remedies that may benefit 

individual employees should be held to be preempted because such agency 

action stands as an “obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.” 

(Citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 343, 352.) We 

do not agree. As discussed, the FAA does not embody a policy in favor of 

compelling arbitration of disputes in the absence of consent. (Viking River, 

supra, 596 at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1918]; Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at 

p. 294.) 

Uber contends the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s pursuit of 

restitution and similar relief in court will interfere with drivers’ arbitration 

agreements because a judgment in the present action could be preclusive of 

certain issues in future arbitrations, thus causing drivers to “forever lose the 

ability to bring their claims in the arbitral forum they agreed to.” The People 

dispute Uber’s claim that the present action will have preclusive effect in 

drivers’ individual arbitrations. We need not resolve this point. Even if there 

could be some future preclusive effect on ongoing or future arbitrations, Uber 

presents no authority requiring that litigation in court by nonparties to an 

arbitration agreement must be barred whenever it is possible such litigation 

could affect an arbitration between signatories to an agreement requiring 

that form of dispute resolution in their private relations. 
18

Uber also argues that individual drivers cannot avoid arbitration by 

assigning or transferring their claims to another individual, and Uber asserts 

“that is exactly what is happening here.” Lyft similarly contends that, if a 

“third party” such as “a successor in interest, assignee, bankruptcy trustee, or 

class action representative,” sought to pursue “a driver’s claim for monetary 

relief,” the driver’s arbitration agreement “would control.” But as discussed,

the People and the Labor Commissioner are pursuing their own statutory 

claims. They are not assignees or other similarly situated third parties 

seeking to present claims held by drivers. (DMS Services, LLC v. Superior 

Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353 [The “exceptions to the general rule 

that one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to invoke it or be bound 

by it ‘generally are based on the existence of a relationship between the 

nonsignatory and the signatory, such as principal and agent or employer and 

employee, where a sufficient “identity of interest” exists between them.’ ”].) 

The People and the Labor Commissioner also are not acting as class 

representatives as would an employee representing other similarly situated 

employees. Finally, for the same reason, Uber is incorrect in describing the 

People and the Labor Commissioner as “nominal part[ies] controlling the 

litigation of drivers’ claims” and as the drivers’ “litigation counsel.” 

Uber suggests in its reply brief that a nonsignatory plaintiff such as the 

People should be compelled to arbitration without regard to whether the

nonsignatory has any relationship with a party to the arbitration agreement, 

so long as the nonsignatory’s claims can be said to arise out of the contract 

that contains the agreement. In support, Uber cites Viking River, Epic 

Systems, and Concepcion, but those cases do not support Uber’s argument. In 

each case, the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs bringing a PAGA claim (Viking 

River) or seeking to represent a plaintiff class (Epic Systems, Concepcion) had 
19

entered an arbitration agreement. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __

[142 S.Ct. at pp. 1915–1916]; Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, supra, 584 U.S. at 

p. __ [138 S.Ct. at pp. 1619–1621]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, supra,

563 U.S. at p. 336.) As we have discussed, none of these cases holds that 

public law enforcement officials must arbitrate their statutory claims when 

they have not agreed to do so and have no preexisting relationship with the 

parties to the arbitration agreement. 

Finally, Lyft asserts that state law should not permit public 

enforcement agencies to bring claims “on behalf of” individual drivers who 

entered arbitration agreements, because if that is permissible, then state law 

could similarly “deputize” a private citizen to bring suit on behalf of a person

who has agreed to arbitration, a result that Lyft contends would run afoul of 

the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348. 

That argument is not well taken. 

In the relevant passage from Iskanian (which Lyft quotes only in part),

the court explained that its holding on the PAGA issues raised there “would 

not permit a state to circumvent the FAA by, for example, deputizing 

employee A to bring a suit for the individual damages claims of employees B, 

C, and D. This pursuit of victim-specific relief by a party to an arbitration 

agreement on behalf of other parties to an arbitration agreement would be 

tantamount to a private class action, whatever the designation given by the 

Legislature.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 387–388, italics added.) 

“Under [the high court’s decision in] Concepcion, such an action could not be 

maintained in the face of a class waiver.” (Id. at p. 388.) 

The Iskanian court’s statement that the state could not designate a 

party to an arbitration agreement to pursue the individual damages claims of 

other parties to the agreement has no bearing on the issues presented here. 
20

As discussed, the People and the Labor Commissioner are not parties to the 

arbitration agreements who have been improperly “deputize[d]” to bring suit 

for other such parties. They are nonparties to the agreements who are suing 

in their law enforcement capacities and pursuing statutorily authorized 

remedies. That Lyft can imagine a different scenario that might violate the 

FAA provides no basis for reversal here. 

Underlying Uber’s and Lyft’s preemption arguments is their assertion 

that the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s claims in these actions (to 

the extent they seek restitution or other relief that may benefit individual 

drivers) are really the “drivers’ claims” or claims that “belong to drivers.” We 

have rejected this argument. As discussed, the People and the Labor 

Commissioner are authorized by statute to bring the claims at issue here and 

to seek the relief they request. The fact some of that relief might benefit 

individual drivers (or could be sought by individual drivers on their own 

behalf) does not transform the claims brought here into derivative claims 

brought by a proxy for the drivers. 

2. Equitable Estoppel

Uber and Lyft argue that, apart from federal preemption, the People 

and the Labor Commissioner are bound by the drivers’ arbitration 

agreements based on equitable estoppel. Here, too, we disagree. The trial 

court correctly held there is no basis for equitable estoppel on this record.

a. Equitable Estoppel Does Not Apply

As we have discussed, the general rule is that “ ‘[t]he right to 

arbitration depends on a contract, and a party can be compelled to submit a 

dispute to arbitration only if the party has agreed in writing to do so.’ 

[Citation.] ‘Even the strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not 

extend to those who are not parties to an arbitration agreement or who have 

not authorized anyone to act for them in executing such an agreement.’ ” 
21

(Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 295, 300 (Jensen).) 

But as also noted above, “there are circumstances under which persons who 

have not signed an agreement to arbitrate are bound to do so,” including 

“ ‘ “estoppel.” ’ ” (Ibid.) 

Specifically, “[a] nonsignatory plaintiff may be estopped from refusing 

to arbitrate when he or she asserts claims that are ‘dependent upon, or 

inextricably intertwined with,’ the underlying contractual obligations of the 

agreement containing the arbitration clause. [Citation.] ‘The focus is on the 

nature of the claims asserted . . . . [Citations.] That the claims are cast in 

tort rather than contract does not avoid the arbitration clause.’ [Citation.] 

Rather, ‘ “[t]he plaintiff’s actual dependence on the underlying contract in 

making out the claim against the nonsignatory . . . is . . . always the sine qua 

non of an appropriate situation for applying equitable estoppel.” ’ [Citation.] 

‘[E]ven if a plaintiff’s claims “touch matters” relating to the arbitration 

agreement, “the claims are not arbitrable unless the plaintiff relies on the 

agreement to establish its cause of action.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The fundamental 

point’ is that a party is ‘not entitled to make use of [a contract containing an 

arbitration clause] as long as it worked to [his or] her advantage, then 

attempt to avoid its application in defining the forum in which [his or] her 

dispute . . . should be resolved.’ ” (Jensen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 306; 

accord, DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1354 [“The reason for this equitable rule is plain: One should not be 

permitted to rely on an agreement containing an arbitration clause for its 

claims, while at the same time repudiating the arbitration provision 

contained in the same contract.”].) 

The trial court correctly concluded equitable estoppel does not apply

here because the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s claims are not 
22

founded on Uber’s and Lyft’s contracts with their drivers. Instead, as the 

court recognized, the People and the Labor Commissioner are seeking to 

enforce the UCL and the Labor Code and are not seeking to enforce or take 

advantage of any portion of Uber’s and Lyft’s contracts with their drivers. 

Indeed, as the court noted, the People and the Labor Commissioner “take the 

position that those contracts violate California law requiring Defendants to 

classify their drivers as employees.” 

As defendants note, the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s 

complaints refer to certain provisions of the contracts between defendants 

and their drivers in outlining the nature of their relationship. But referring 

to the contract is not sufficient; for equitable estoppel to apply, the plaintiff 

must rely on the contract in asserting its claims. (Goldman v. KPMG, LLP

(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 218.) Plaintiffs here seek no relief under the 

contracts, and their claims do not rely on them. 

The cases cited by defendants do not persuade us that equitable 

estoppel applies. For example, the present case is different from JSM 

Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1239–1240, on 

which both defendants rely for the principle that a nonsignatory plaintiff may 

in some instances be bound to arbitrate under principles of equitable 

estoppel. JSM Tuscany involved a group of closely related plaintiffs under 

common ownership, some of whom were signatories to the contracts that 

contained the arbitration agreements, and all of whom brought claims that 

were based on obligations imposed by those contracts. (Id. at pp. 1239–1242, 

1226 & fn. 2.) Here, there is no preexisting relationship between the People 

and the Labor Commissioner on the one hand, and the drivers who agreed to 
23

arbitrate on the other.14 And in any event, as discussed, neither plaintiff 

presents claims that depend on, or are inextricably intertwined with, the 

obligations imposed by defendants’ contracts with their drivers. We decline 

to hold the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars government law enforcement 

actions in these circumstances.

Nor does Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, also cited by 

defendants, persuade us it would be inequitable for the People’s and the 

Labor Commissioner’s actions to proceed in court. In Garcia, an employee 

bound by an arbitration agreement with his employer, a staffing company

(Real Time), brought statutory wage claims against the staffing agency and 

the company where the employee had been assigned to work (Pexco), making 

“no distinction” between them. (Id. at pp. 784–785.) Because the claims 

arose out of the plaintiff’s employment relationship with Real Time, and the 

arbitration agreement clearly covered statutory claims against Real Time (id.

at pp. 786–788), the appellate court held that, “[o]n these facts, it is 

inequitable for the arbitration about Garcia’s assignment with Pexco to 

proceed with Real Time, while preventing Pexco from participating” (id. at 

14 See Jensen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 301 (“ ‘The California cases 

binding nonsignatories to arbitrate their claims fall into two categories. In 

some cases, a nonsignatory was required to arbitrate a claim because a 

benefit was conferred on the nonsignatory as a result of the contract, making 

the nonsignatory a third party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. In 

other cases, the nonsignatory was bound to arbitrate the dispute because a 

preexisting relationship existed between the nonsignatory and one of the 

parties to the arbitration agreement, making it equitable to compel the 

nonsignatory to also be bound to arbitrate his or her claim.’ ”); see also JSM 

Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240, fn. 20 

(“[I]t is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a nonsignatory party can 

state a valid claim based on the contract, without having some legal 

relationship with a signatory of the contract or being a third party 

beneficiary of the contract.”). 
24

p. 787). We find no similar inequity here, where the plaintiffs have not 

agreed to arbitrate with anyone and do not seek an “ ‘advantage’ ” (Jensen, 

supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 306) under an employment contract while 

ignoring its arbitration clause, but instead seek statutory remedies for 

defendants’ allegedly wrongful refusal to treat their drivers as employees. 

Finally, in Machado v. System4 LLC (2015) 471 Mass. 204, 210, 212–

216, 205 [28 N.E.3d 401], cited by defendants, the court held equitable 

estoppel applied where plaintiff franchisees brought misclassification and 

other claims against two defendants, one of whom was not a party to the 

arbitration agreement signed by the plaintiffs. The court concluded that the 

franchise agreement was significant to the plaintiffs’ claims, and that the 

plaintiffs had alleged “concerted misconduct” by the defendants. (Id. at 

pp. 212–216.) We are not persuaded a similar result is appropriate here. In 

addition to the differing factual settings (including that the plaintiffs here are 

not signatories to any arbitration agreement), we conclude, as discussed, that 

the misclassification claims asserted in this case are not “dependent upon, or 

founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the underlying contractual 

obligations of” Uber’s and Lyft’s contracts with their drivers. (Goldman v. 

KPMG, LLP, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 218.) 

b. Application of Equitable Estoppel Is Unwarranted

We also agree with the trial court that equitable estoppel does not 

apply here because, under California law, as our Supreme Court has stated, 

“it is clear ‘that neither the doctrine of estoppel nor any other equitable 

principle may be invoked against a governmental body where it would 

operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the 

public.’ ” (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan

Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 316, citing County of San 

Diego v. Cal. Water etc. Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 817, 826.) The trial court may 
25

have overstated the point a bit in suggesting that, if the People and the Labor 

Commissioner were forced into arbitration, it “would nullify the important 

public policies underlying the UCL and the Labor Code.” (Italics added.) But 

we do think the result sought by Uber and Lyft here would fundamentally 

undermine those policies. Semantics aside, we agree with the trial court that 

the outcome Uber and Lyft urge would “effectively negate” Waffle House and 

the other case law we have discussed above establishing that an arbitration 

agreement between private parties does not bar a public enforcement agency 

from seeking judicial relief, including victim-specific relief. Thus, even if the 

elements of equitable estoppel were otherwise established, we would decline 

to apply it here. 

Uber asserts that only the remedies of injunctive relief and civil 

penalties serve “a public function,” while restitution “is mainly about 

restoring property to those owed.” This argument does not persuade us 

equitable estoppel should apply here. We note initially that, under the orders 

sought by defendants, even the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s 

requests for injunctive relief and civil penalties would be stayed pending 

completion of any ordered arbitrations. But in any event, we do not agree 

that an effort by public enforcement officials to obtain restitution of money 

allegedly taken illegally from citizens can be fairly characterized as not 

serving a public purpose in the context of the equitable estoppel issue raised 

here. The Legislature decided to include restitution as a remedy obtainable 

by public prosecutors under the UCL (along with injunctive relief and civil 

penalties) (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17204, 17206), and we decline to hold 

that they actually act as surrogates for private parties when they seek it. 

The defendants’ reliance on State of California v. Altus Finance (2005) 

36 Cal.4th 1284 (Altus Finance) is similarly unpersuasive. In Altus Finance, 
26

the Supreme Court held that, under applicable Insurance Code provisions, 

when the Insurance Commissioner is acting as conservator of an insolvent 

insurance company, the Commissioner has the exclusive right to protect the 

interests of individual policyholders and creditors. (Id. at pp. 1303–1305.) In 

that context, the Attorney General may not seek restitution for the benefit of 

creditors under the UCL “without trespassing on the Commissioner’s role.” 

(Altus Finance, at p. 1306; see id. at pp. 1303–1304, 1307.) In contrast, the 

Insurance Code does not preclude the Attorney General in a UCL action from 

pursuing public injunctive relief or civil penalties payable to the state. (Altus 

Finance, at pp. 1307–1308.)

The Altus Finance court explained: “It is true that the Attorney 

General is the state’s chief law enforcement officer, and that restitution may 

have a collateral law enforcement effect, punishing the wrongdoer against 

whom restitution is sought. But the primary purpose of the Attorney 

General’s attempt at restitution is to recover lost property on behalf of an 

insolvent insurer’s creditors and policyholders. As such, he seeks to perform 

an action that is quintessentially within the scope of the Commissioner’s 

power as conservator and trustee of the insolvent company.” (Altus Finance, 

supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1305.) In this case, by contrast, there is no conflict 

between spheres of authority conferred on different public officers. Nor is 

there anything in the governing statutory text that we might compare to the 

limit on law enforcement power involved in Altus Finance. While that case

involved an Insurance Code provision that established an “express limit” on 

the authority of the Attorney General to seek restitution (Altus Finance, 

supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1303), there is no comparable provision here that 

limits the relief obtainable by the People under the UCL, and there is nothing 
27

that persuades us the available types of relief should be treated differently

for purposes of the equitable estoppel analysis. 

C. Other Issues: Defendants’ Requests for Orders Staying or 

Striking Portions of These Actions

1. The Stay Requests

Since we conclude there is no basis to compel arbitration of any of the 

People’s or the Labor Commissioner’s claims or requests for relief, we need 

not address Uber’s and Lyft’s arguments that, if some claims were compelled 

to arbitration, the other portions of these actions (the portions that are not 

arbitrable) should be stayed pending completion of the individual 

arbitrations. 

2. Lyft’s Motion to Strike

As noted, Uber’s and Lyft’s motions to compel arbitration included 

alternative requests that the trial court strike plaintiffs’ complaints to the 

extent they sought restitution and certain other relief. In its order denying 

the motions to compel, the trial court denied the alternative motions to 

strike. 

Lyft renews its request on appeal,15 arguing briefly that, if this court 

does not compel arbitration, it should “strike the driver-specific remedies that 

are subject to arbitration,” to “avoid creating a conflict with the FAA,” 

because such remedies are arbitrable as between Lyft and its drivers. Even 

assuming the denial of Lyft’s motion to strike is reviewable in this appeal 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1294.216 (which the People dispute), we 

15 Uber does not challenge the denial of its motion to strike. 

16 Code of Civil Procedure section 1294.2 provides in part that, “[u]pon 

an appeal from” an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, “the court 

may review the decision and any intermediate ruling, proceeding, order or 

decision which involves the merits or necessarily affects the order or 

judgment appealed from, or which substantially affects the rights of a party.” 
28

find no basis to strike the assertedly “preempted” remedies. For the reasons 

we discussed in part II.B.1, ante, the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s 

requests for judicial relief, including victim-specific relief, are not preempted. 

III. DISPOSITION

The order denying Uber’s and Lyft’s motions to compel arbitration of, 

and to stay, the People’s and the Labor Commissioner’s actions is affirmed. 

The People and the Labor Commissioner shall recover their costs on appeal. 

STREETER, J. 

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.

FINEMAN, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
In re Uber Technologies Wage and Hour Cases – A166355

Trial Court: Superior Court of California, City & County of San 

Francisco 

Trial Judge: Hon. Ethan P. Schulman

Counsel: Keker, Van Nest & Peters, Rachael E. Meny, R. James 

Slaughter; Munger, Tolles & Olson, Rohit K. Singla, 

Jeffrey Y. Wu, Jennifer L. Bryant and Benjamin G. 

Barokh for Defendant and Appellant Lyft, Inc.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theane Evangelis, Blaine H. 

Evanson, Heather L. Richardson and Alexander N. 

Harris for Defendants and Appellants Uber Technologies, 

Inc., Raiser-CA, LLC, Uber-USA, LLC, and Portier, LLC.

David M. Balter, Miles E. Locker, Alec L. Segarich and

M. Colleen Ryan for Plaintiff and Respondent Lilia

García-Brower.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Satoshi Yanai, Assistant 

Attorney General, Joanna Hull, Lillian Tabe, Kwi Choi, 

Katherine Read and Mana Barari, Deputy Attorneys 

General; Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney (Los

Angeles), Michael Bostrom, Assistant City Attorney, 

Joshua Crowell, Deputy City Attorney; Mara W. Elliott, 

City Attorney (San Diego), Mark Ankcorn, Chief Deputy 

City Attorney, Kevin King and Julie Rau, Deputy City 

Attorneys; David Chiu, City Attorney (San Francisco), 

Yvonne R. Meré, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Sara J. 

Eisenberg, Chief of Complex and Affirmative Litigation, 

Matthew D. Goldberg, Chief Worker Protection Attorney,

and Molly J. Alarcon, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent the People.