NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

SOPHIA ARIANNA MORENO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-10182 

D.C. No. 

4:19-cr-03393-JAS-LCK-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 18, 2023**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: OWENS and BADE, Circuit Judges, and BAKER,***International Trade 

Judge.

Sophia Moreno appeals from the district court’s judgment following her 

conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to transport, for profit, noncitizens who have 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of 

International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 20 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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entered or remain in the United States unlawfully, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. 

Moreno contends that the district court, in adopting the magistrate judge’s report 

and recommendation, erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence after 

finding that a border patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. We 

review reasonable suspicion determinations de novo and any underlying factual 

findings for clear error. United States v. Bontemps, 977 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 

2020). Because this de novo review is “slightly more circumscribed than usual,” 

we “defer to the inferences drawn by the district court and the officers on the 

scene, not just the district court’s factual findings.” United States v. Valdes-Vega, 

738 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

Border patrol officers may conduct “brief investigatory stops without 

violating the Fourth Amendment if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable 

suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. at 1078 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine whether an officer had 

reasonable suspicion, we look at the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citation 

omitted). In a border context, such as here, the totality of the circumstances may 

include factors such as the “characteristics of the area, proximity to the border, 

usual patterns of traffic and time of day, previous alien or drug smuggling in the 

area, behavior of the driver, appearance or behavior of passengers, and the model 
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and appearance of the vehicle.” Id. at 1079.

Applying these standards, the border patrol agent had reasonable suspicion

to conduct the vehicle stop. The stop occurred about forty-five miles from the 

border on a route commonly used by smugglers. See id. at 1078-80 (finding 

reasonable suspicion, in part, because the stop was seventy miles north of the 

United States–Mexico border along a route commonly used by smugglers). The 

checkpoint located on the route was also closed due to rain, which, according to 

the agent, usually results in an uptick in smuggling cases. Although the district 

court relied on this factor without first determining whether a smuggling operation 

would have had time to respond to the checkpoint’s closure, we “defer to the 

inferences drawn by the district court and the officers on the scene.” Id. at 1077. 

Further, the agent observed Moreno driving closely behind another agent’s vehicle 

that was pursuing another car on an otherwise empty highway, which is contrary to 

the behavior of “a typical driver [who] would give a law enforcement vehicle 

space.” See United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(finding reasonable suspicion based on a driver’s “unusual car and driving 

behavior”). Finally, the agent received notice of a Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System (“TECS”) alert attached to Moreno and her vehicle for 

previous smuggling activity just two weeks prior. See United States v. Cotterman, 

709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (finding reasonable suspicion based on
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a TECS alert). 

The district court also did not clearly err in making these factual 

determinations. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, which had relied on the agent’s testimony after finding him

credible and “quite knowledgeable about alien smuggling investigations.” 

Although Moreno contends that the district court clearly erred in relying on the 

agent’s mistaken assumption about the fastest route to Green Valley, the mistake 

was not unreasonable given that the discrepancy between the two routes was only

two minutes. See United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2001) (finding the police’s mistake that a rental car was overdue reasonable, even 

though the car was not due for about another eight hours). 

Even if we were to find the other factors that Moreno challenged in her brief

less probative than the district court did, the totality of the circumstances still

supports a finding of reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 

266, 274 (2002) (holding that the reasonable suspicion analysis precludes a 

“divide-and-conquer” approach in which the court gives no weight to a factor that 

is “by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation”). Thus, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. 

AFFIRMED.