T h e lan d p u rc h a se d b y the G a m b re lls wa s n o t en c u m b e re d b y re stric tive c o v e n a n ts. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 10, 200 7 S es sio n
JO E GAMBRE LL, ET AL 

### . v. SO NNY NIVENS, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for F ayett e County No. 12072 Dewey C. Whitenton, Chancellor

No. W2007-00102-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2008

Th is c a se inv olv e s th e e nf or c e me nt o f r e str ic tiv e c ov e na nts in e qu ity . A ft e r s ub div idi ngth e ir proper ty , imposing re strictions on the three lots they sold, a nd reta ining the rema ining land, ve ndors broug ht suit aga inst remote g rante es to enfor ce the restric tive covena nts and to enjoin them from operating a

weddingchape l, for commer cial use, on the l and. The central issue on appeal is whe ther the re strictions bind the remote g rante es whe n the covena nts w ere listed on an undate d and unsig ned
a tta c hme nt t o a de e d that ne ith e r ide nti fi e d e nc umb ra nc e s n or inc or po ra te d th e a tta c he d r e str ic tio ns

. F oll ow inga

tr ia l on the matte r, the tr ia l c ourt pe rm ane ntl y e njo ine d th e c omm e rc ia l a c tiv ity be c a us e the remote g rante es took title with a ctual notice of the re strictions. Finding ample support for the imposit ion of an e qui t ab l e servitude, we concur in the trial court’ s judgme nt. Affirme d and
rema nded.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

J . Pay son Matthews, S omerville, Tennessee and David M. Sulli van, Memphis, Tenne ssee, for the
a pp e lla nts , So nny

Ni ve ns and

Carr ie Ni ve ns

. JohnMars ha ll Jon e s, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e s, Joe G ambr e ll a

nd Jer i G ambr e ll.

OP IN ION

In 1991, J oe and Jeri Gambr ell (Mr. Ga mbrell, Ms. Gambre ll, or the Gambre lls) purcha sed approximately

69 acr es in Fayette C ounty and subdi vided t he parce l into four (4) l ots, selling thre e

1 (3) of them, and re taining one (1), twe nty -one a cre lot for themselves. In September of 1992, they sold the subject l ot to Mr. Frank Foshee (Mr. Foshee)

. In the dee d to Mr. Foshe e, the Ga mbrells left blan k th e s p a c e r e s e r

v e d f o r r e c it in g e n c u mb r an c e s o n th e p r o p e rty

. In s te a d , th e y a tt a c h e d to the-2-

deed a n untitled, undated, and unsigne d pag e listi ng the restric tions and rec orded it alongwith the deed. T he dee d made no mention of the attachme nt, nor did the text of the attachment re fer to the de e d. Th e a tta c hme nt s e t f or th, in p e rt ine nt p art , th e fo llo wi ng :
1. THE S E C OVE NAN TS AR E TO RUN W I TH THE L AND AND S HAL LBE BI NDI NG ON AL L PARTI ES AND AL LPERS ONS CL AI MI NG UND ER TH EM F OR

A PER I OD OF TH I RTYYE AR S F RO M T HE DA TE TH ESE COVENANT S ARE REC ORDED . . . .

2. ENF ORCE M E NT – ENF ORCEMENT SHAL LBE B Y A PROCEEDI NG AT LAW OR I

N EQUI TY AGA I

NST ANY PERSO N OR PERS ONS VI OLATI NG OR ATTEMPTI

NG TO VI OL ATE ANYCOVENANT , EI TH ER T O R EST RA I

N V I OLAT I ONOR

TO REC OV ER D AM AG ES.

. . . . 4. L AND USE AN D B UI L DI NG TYPE – NO L OT SHAL LBE U SED EX CEP T F OR

RES I DENT I AL

PURPOS ES. NO MO B I L E, MO DU L AR , OR PREFAB H OMES SHAL LBE PERMI TTED . . . .

. . . . 8

. T H E O WN E R

O F E A C H LO T ( S ) S H A LL B E R E S P O N S IB LE A N D H E LD L I AB L E FO R MAI NTAI NI NG, WH E T H E R O R N O T ANY I MPROVEMENTS HA VE BEEN MADE THEREON , THE CONDI TI ON OF H I S/I TS L OT(S), I

NCL UDI NG B UT I

N NO WAY L I MI TED TO, CL EARI NG OF ANY TRASH OR L I TTER, HAVI NG THE G RASS CUT TO A REAS ONAB L E L ENGTH A ND KEEPI

NG THE PROPERTY I

N A GENERALSTATE OF REPAI R SO AS NOT TO DI STURB OR AESTHETI CAL L Y OF FEN D T H E CH A RA CT ER OF TH E SURROUNDI

NG L OT(S).

9. NO N O X IOU S O R O F F E N S IVE T R A DE O R A CT I VI TY S HAL L BE CA RRI E D O NU PO NA

N YL O T , N O R A

N YTHI NG B E DONE T HEREON WHI CH MAY BE O R BECOME AN A NNOYA NCE OR NUI SANCE TO THE NEI GHB ORHOOD.
The Ga mbrells employ ed this format for the first two lots they sold but expressly incorporated the
a tta c hme nt i n th e 19 93 de e d c onve yingthe thi rd lot . T he y

pla c e d the same re str ic tio ns , v e rb a tim , up on a ll thr e e lot s.
Mr. Foshe e conveyed his lot to Sonny and Carrie Nivens (Mr. Nivens, Ms. N ivens, o r t he Nivenses) b y w a

r r an ty d e e d in M ay o f 1 9 9 6

. T h e d e e d a f f ir mati v e ly r e c it e d th a t th e r e w ere noT he N i venses em p hasi ze t hat t hei r s al e co nt ract wi t h M r. Fo shee was co nt i n g e n t u p o n t hei r acquir i ng 2 permi s s i on t o op er at e a weddi ng ser vi ce on t he propert y
. T hi s p oi nt p er t ai ns t o what eve r gr i eva nce t he N i ven s es may hav e wi t h M r

. Fosh ee, wh i ch i s not at i s s ue i n t hi s ca s e.

A ccor di ng t o t he t r i al co ur t ’ s f i ndi ng s , M r

. G amb r el l cal l ed M r

. N i ven s when he l ear ned t hat t he N i ven s es ha d 3 b roken gro u n d to s ta rt c o nst ruct i o n on t he chap el

. M r. N i vens t o l d M r. G am b rel l t hat he did no t be l i eve t hey were vi ol at i ng t h e c ov e n a n t s be c a u s e t h e “ Fa y e t t e Cou n t y Pl a n n i n g of f i c e ” h a d g i v e n t h e m p e r mi s s i on t o b u i l d t h e ch apel the re . T h e G a m b re lls t h e n fi le d su it.
-3- encumbr ance s. When Mr. Foshe e first place d the proper ty on the marke t, he provided Ma ry Foster 2 (Ms. Foster), hi s rea l estate ag ent, a copy of the re strictions. She, in turn, provided a c opy of them to M ary Ann T a pp (M s. Ta

pp ), the re a l e state a g e nt f or the Ni ve ns e s and

dis c us se d th e m w ithMs. Tapp duringthe neg otiation phase. Althoug h the Nivense s disputed the evidenc e and testimony on this iss ue at tria l, Ms. Tapp testified that she pr ovided them a c opy of the c ovenants p ri o r to the purcha se but ac knowledg ed she c ould not remember discussing the iss u e with them. As noted below, eve n though the trial court f ound that the Nivense s had ac tual notice of the restric tions, they do no t di sp ute thi s f

ind ingon a pp e a l.

Th e Ni ve nses had be g un

to b uil d a

larg e we dd ing

c ha pe l and fa c ili ty , k

no wn a s Ca ra hil ls Estate, whe n the Gambr ells filed suit on Febr uary 18, 1998, to enforc e the pur ported re strictions and enjoin the Nive n s es fr om completing the chape l’s construction and usingit for commer cial purp os e s. Th e Ga

mbr e lls so ug ht inj un c tiv e re lie f an d $50 ,0 00 in dama g e s. Th e Ni ve ns e s f ile d th e ir 3
answe r on A p ri l 22, 1998, contendingthat the lot they purcha sed wa s unencumbe red, that the "pr o t ec t ive cove nants" did not run with the land, and that they had no notice of

the protec tive
covena nts when they

took titl e to the property

. In addition, they relied upon the ir ac quisiti on of a specia l exception to the residential zoning of the are a. On J anuar y 13, 2001, the trial cour

t gr anted summary judgme nt in favor of the Nivenses, finding that the attachme nt to Mr. Foshe e’s deed w as not properly authenticated and ha d no leg al ef fec t upon the state of the title. The n, on J une 15, 2001,
on pla int if f’s mot ion , th e tr ia l c ourt mod if ie d th a t or de r a

nd g ra nte d p art ia l summa

ry jud g me nt t o the Ni ve ns e s o n th e iss ue of c on str uc tiv e no tic e on ly , r e se rv ingthe iss ue of a c tua l no tic e fo r t

ri a l.
The matter proce eded to a bench t rial on April 4, 2003, af ter whic h the trial cour

t concluded that the Gambr ells were entitled to enforc e the r estrictions beca use the Nivense s had ac tual notice of them prior to the tra

nsfer of title. The trial court found that the attachme nt w as stamped as pa rt of the war ranty deed when rec orded and, at least, constituted a cloud on title. F urther, it found that the Nivense s rec eived a ctual notice of the cove nants duringtheir neg otiations with Mr. F oshee a nd that Ms . T a

pp ’s kn ow le dg e of the c ov e na nts sh ou ld al so be imp ute d to the m. Th e c ourt de c lin e d to
awa rd damag es but rese rved the issue of t he proper remedy for " such time as the Court’s judg ment become s final." Followingthe trial cour

t’s denial of the ir motion to alter or amend, the Nivenses filed a notice of appe al, which this Court dismis sed for lack of a final judgme nt, a s the trial cour t had not enter ed judgme nt on the reme dy

. On Novembe r 13, 2006, the trial court conducte d a hear ing in which the Nivenses pr offe red e vidence that they , alongwith the owner s of the other two lots, ha d executed and
r e c o r d e d a mu tu a l r e l e a s e an d w a i v e r r e g ar d i n g th e c o v e n an t s tw o m o n th s p r i o r t o th e h e ar i n g

. In-4-

that document, the parties waived any brea ches of the purporte d covena

nts related to the w edding service s, and the landowner n e ig h b o r s e xp r e s s ly

consente d to the Nivenses’ operation of the wedding
c ha pe l.
Nonethele ss, the trial court issued a perma nent injunction prohibiting the Nive nses from op e ratin g the c ha

pe l or any ot her c omm e rc ia l e nte rp ri se on the ir pr op e rt y . It st ay e d e nf

or c e me nt,
su a s po nte , pendingthis appeal. Final judgme nt was ente red on D ece mber 5, 2006, a nd the Nivense s filed their notice of appe al on Dec ember 14, 2006.

Issues Presented
The Nive nses ra ise four issues, a s restate d below, for our re view: (1) Whether Plaintiffs are estopped by their wa rra nty deed, which cove nanted that there wer e no encumbr ance s, from enf orcingrestric tive covena

nts they
a tte mpt e d to pla c e on

the pr op e rt

y a g a ins t r e mot e g ra

nte e s; (2) Whether unsigne d "p ro t ec tive covena nts" attache d to, but not incorporated into a deed, r

un with t h e land and are enfor cea ble ag ainst remote g rante es when e very

deed in the r emote g rante es’ c hain of title expressly covena nted that the prope rty

was une ncumber ed; (3) Whether an e quitable servitude e x ists; and (4) Whether the " protec tive covena nts" have bee n rele ased.

Th e Ga mbr e lls fr ame the iss ue on a pp e a l a s f oll ow s:
Whether the Protec tive Covenants, including the provision that " no lot sha ll be used
e xce pt f or re sid e nti a l pu

rp os e s, " are e nf

or c e a ble a g a ins t D e fe nd ants /App e lla nts , Sonny Nivens and Carrie Nivens

. . ., wher e the Nivenses ha d actua l knowledg e of the Protective Covena

nts well befor e they

purcha sed the re al prope rty [at iss ue].

Stan dard of Revie w
In ap pe a ls o f c a se s tr ie d w ith out a jur y , o ur sta nd ard of re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord;
we a c c or d a

pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss to th e tr ial court ' s f ind ing s o f f

a c t and wi ll d ist ur b th os e finding s only

wher e the pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e is otherwise . Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Rawlings v. John Hancoc k Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 1 , 2 9 6 ( T e n n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 )

. In
c on tr a st, we re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ' s le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo , w ithno pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss. Ga nz e v oo rt v . R us se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 296 (Tenn.1997)

.-5- Anal y sis
The re solution of this dispute require s us to address three issues. F irst, we must consider whether the Gambr ells are estopped fr om denying the lang uag e on the fac e of the Gambr ell-F oshee deed indicating ther e ar e no enc umbranc es on the prope rty

. Second, we must determine whe ther the restricti ve c ov e na

nts are e nf

or c e a ble a s a n e qu ita ble se rv itu de . F ina lly , w e a dd re ss t he Ni ve ns e s’ alternative argument that, even if the re strictions wer e enforce able, they have since been rele ased or oth e rw ise te rm inate d. F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e c on c lud e that e sto pp e l by de e d d oe s n ot a

pp ly in t his c a se , that the tr ia l court pr op e rl y imp os e d an e qu ita ble se rv itu de un de r the se unus ua l f a c ts,
and that th e re str ic tio ns c on tin ue to b ind the Ni ve ns e s. Estoppel by De ed
The Nive nses first asse rt that our hol ding in Patterson v. Cook, 6 55 S.W. 2d 95 5 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1983), c ontrols this case. In Patterson , this Court held that the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed pr evente d the plaintiff/g rantor f rom enfor cingrestrictive covena nts that contrave ned the deed’ s rec ital that the land was une ncumber ed. Patterson , 655 S.W .2d at 958. “Estoppel by deed is a ba r whic h p re c lud e s o ne pa

rt y to a de e d an d his p ri vie s f ro m a sse rt inga s a g a ins t th e oth e r p art y and his privies any

rig ht or title in derog ation of t he deed or from denying the truth of any materia l fac ts asserted in it.” Id. (quoting 19 Am. J ur. Estoppel § 6 ). Ac c or din g to the Ni ven se s, thi s authority compels the conclusion that the l anguag e in t he Gambrells’ dee d to Mr. Foshe e estops them from deny

ing the lot is unenc umbere d and fr om enforc ing the covena nts altoge ther. We disag ree

. First, the facts of Patterson v. Cook differ from the de terminative one s here . In Patterson , the orig inal g rantor who had subdivided p ro p er t y i nto many trac ts filed suit ag ainst one of he r g rante es, the o wner of two adjac ent trac ts in the subdivis ion, to enjoin the construction of a g ree nhouse alleg edly intended for commerc ial use. Id. at 957. The de fenda nt/gr antee had purc hased his lots at differe nt points i n time. He took title to the first lot by a dee d specific ally

incorporating restric tions set forth in a defec tively rec orded instrument. Id. a t 95 7. He purc ha se d th e se c on d lo t, the location of the prospec tive g ree nhouse, there afte r, and t o o k t i tle by a g ener al war

ranty deed aff irmatively

rec iting that the lo t wa s unencumbe red. Id. Although the instrument cre ating the restric tions also lis ted the sec ond trac t by number, it was not of r ecor d an d did not impart constructive notice

. Id. at 959. This Court stated that “[i] t se ems g rossly unfair f or the g rantor . . . on the on e h an d to p r o mi s e th e g r an te e

. . . th a t th e p r o p e rty is un e n c u mb e r e d , an d th e n , on the other ha nd, seek to enfor ce an encumbranc e that the g rantor he rself pla ced upon the proper ty .” Id. at 958.

In Patterson, the dispute involved the orig inal parties to a conveyance in which the g rantor had aba ndoned the incorpora

tion languag e from the first deed in f avor of an af

firmative r ecital that the land wa s unencumbe red. The re, th e d ef endant pur chase d adjac ent lots from the same pe rson who, in the first dee d, incorporated re strictions that were not of rec ord. I n the sec ond deed, the (s ame ) gra

nto r a ff ir mativ e ly re c ite d th e lot

wa s une nc umb e re d. In c on tr a st, the or ig ina l pa rt ie s to this tran s ac t i o n , t h e Gambrells and Mr. F oshee, do not dispute that Mr. F oshee pur chase d his lot-6-

encumbe red by these covena nts. Moreove r, unlike the plaintiff/g rantor in Patterson , th e Ga mbr e lls did no t in c or po rate re str ic tio ns int o the fi rs t de e ds the y e xec ute d, on ly to a ba nd on su c h la ngua g e in late r c onve y anc e s. Second, the most striking c ontrast ar ises from the undisputed finding that the Nivense s had actua l notice of the r estrictions. Gene rally , fac tual asser tions contained i n a deed bi nd the g rantor and the g rante e. Dukev. Hoppe r , 48 6 S. W.2 d 7 44 , 7 48 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 97 2) . T o a sse rt e sto pp e l, howeve r, a pa

rty damag ed by

a fa l s e fa ct ual asser

tion must establish (1) its lack of knowledg e, without fault, of the true fac ts, (2) its relianc e upon the f alse fac tual asser

tion, and (3) its conseque nt action base d upon that untrue stateme nt. Id. Indeed, rea sonable reliance lies at t he heart of e very estoppel cla im, and the instant fac ts fall far short of satisfying this re quirement. The trial court
e xpre ssl y fo un d th at th e Ni ve ns e s h a d a c tua l no tic e of the re str ic tio ns pr ior

to e xec uti ngthe sa le contra ct, but they

do not dispute this findi ng on appea l. They could not have r easona

bly relied on th e f a c e o f th e G amb r e l l

- F o s h e e d e e d w h e n th e y h a d a c tu a l n o t i c e o f

th e r e s tr i c t i o n s

. A c c o r d i n g l y, our holding in Patterson does not apply in this ca s e, an d t he trial c ourt’s findingof ac tual notice prec ludes the application of estoppel by deed in this dispute. Enforceability of the Covenants as an Equitable Serv itude

Th e Ni ve ns e s a dd iti on a lly argue that th e c ov e na

nts cann ot be e nf

or c e d a s a

n e qu ita ble servitude be caus e t h er e wa s no common plan of de velopment and be cause the Gambr ells did not simil arly re s t ri ct t h e l ot they

reta ined. They

support this assertion in part by claiming that the Gambre lls have fa iled to abide by these c ovenants, a s evidenc ed by the excessive g rass leng th on their lot and by

the strateg ic dischar g e of Mr . Gambre l l ’s s h o t gu n during one of the wedding
cer emonies. W e conclude, however, that we need not addre ss these que stions because the unusual fac ts of this case indepe ndently establish the eleme nts of an equitable servitude.
Substantive Eleme nts of the Equitable Servitude

An owner of land may sell portions of it a nd make restric tions a s to its use f or the be nefit of himself as we ll as for the be nefit of those to whom he sells. Laughlin v. W agner , 24 4 S

. W . 475 (T e nn . 1 92 2) ; Be nto n v . B us h , 644 S.W .2d 690, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). E ven thoug h Tenne ssee law does not fa

vor private restric tions upon the use and enjoy ment of land, our courts will enforc e the c ov e na

nts a s th e y

wo uld c on tr a c ts, a ccor di ng to t

he c le arl y e xpre sse d inte nti on

of the pa rt ie s. Benton , 644 S.W. 2d

a t 69 1; Car

r v . Tr iv e tt , 14 3 S.W. 2d

90 0, 90 3 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 94 0) . Co ve na nts that fail the more exacting require ments for rea l c ovenants at law may still be enf

orce d in equity

as an e qu ita ble se rv itu de . A n e qu ita

ble se rv itu de is a “ c ov e na nt re sp e c tin g the us e of

land e nf or c e a ble ag ainst succe ssor owner s or possessors in equity reg ardle ss of its e nforc eability at law.” 2 American Law of Property § 9.31 (A.J. C asner ed. 1952). This Court has noted that [w] here an owne r of land e nters into a contr act that he will use or abstain fr om using his land in a particula

r wa y or manner , equity will enforc e the a g ree ment ag ainst any purc ha se r or po sse sso r wi th no tic e wh o a tte mpt s to us e the land in vio latio n of i tsM r. Fo shee di d not t est i f y at t ri al , but t he p art i es s t i p ul at ed t o t he ad m i ss i b i l i t y of hi s d ep o si t i o n. 4

T h e N ive n se s a d v a n c e a rg u m e n ts tha t p e rta in o n ly t o the ru n n ing o f t h e c o v e n a n t’s b u rd e n , no t o f i ts b e n e fit ; 5 specif i cal l y , wi t h respe ct to t he G am b rel l s’ lot , they a rgue o nl y that it w as no t si m i l arl y b urdene d

. T hey d o no t rai se t he i s s ue of wh et her t he G amb r el l s i nt ended t he benef i t of t he r es t r i ct i ons t o r un wi t h t hei r r et ai ned l and or t o i nu r e t o t hem pers onal l y
. A ccor di ng l y , we wi l l not addres s wh et her an equi t abl e s er vi t ude c an exi s t wh en, ev en t houg h t he bur den (c o n tinu e d ...)
-7- te rm s, ir re sp e c tiv e of

wh e the r t

he a g re e me nt c re a te s a va lid c ov e na nt ru nn ingwi th the land a t la w o r n ot. Tennsco Corp. v. Attea , No. M 2001-01378-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 1298808, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 13, 2002) ( no perm. app. filed ) (quoting2 American Law of Property § 9.24 (A.J. C asner ed. 1952)). F or a c ovenant to bind re mote g rante es in equity , (1) it must “touch and c oncer n” the land; (2 ) t he or ig ina l pa

rt ie s to the c ov e na

nt mus t int e nd that it ru

n wi th the land and bin d r e mot e g ra nte e s; and (3) the re mote g rante e must have ha d notice of the covena nt. Id. at *1-*2 (quoti n g 5 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, TheLaw o f R e al Pro

pe rty § 67 3 (1 99 1) ). To have b in di ng effect, valid restri ct i o n s on proper ty need not be in the chain of title if the purcha ser ha d actua l notice of them. Lan d D e v e lop e rs, In c . v . M ax we ll , 537 S.W. 2d 90 4, 91 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) ; Ridley v . Haiman , 47 S.W. 2d 75 0, 75 2 ( Te nn . 1 93 2) ; Stracene r v. Bailey , 737 S.W .2d 536, 539 (Tenn. Ct. A p p

. 1 9 8 6). No ne the le ss, e ve n w he re the re mot e g ra nte e take s title wi th ac tua l noti c e , th e fi rs t tw o r e qu ir e me nts - - t hat th e c ov e na

nt “ tou c h a

nd c on c e rn ” the land and that th e or ig ina l pa rt ie s inte nd

the c ov e na

nt t o run - - must sti ll be established.
The instant fa cts satisfy

eac h element with ea se. F irst, and most fundamental, is the c ovenant itself, as the equitable servitude arises out of a promise. The recor d reve als that a ce ntral ele ment o f th e G amb r e l l

- F o s h e e c o n v e yan c e w a s M r

. F o s h e e ’ s c o v e n an tt o r e s tr i c tth e u s e o f h i s p r o p e rty. We a g ree with the Nivenses’ asser tion that the attachme nt c reating the re strictions is not part of the deed itself. Under

Tenne ssee law , undated a nd unsigne d writing s located be low the sig nature s and the cer tificate of acknow ledg ment in a dee d do not constitute part of that de ed. An de rso n v . H owa rd , 74 S.W. 2d

28 7, 39 0 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 93 4) . T o c on c lud e oth e rw ise wo uld “ op e n wid e the do or to the per petration of fraud.” Id. But ther e is no dispute reg ardingthe ag ree ment betwee n the Ga mb re l l s an d

M r. Fo s h ee att h e t i m e o f t h e c o n v ey an ce

. T h e r ec o rd m ak es cl ea r t h at th e l an gu age of t he dee d itself did not ex press the true intention of the parties. I n his deposition, Mr. Foshe e 4 unequivoca lly

stated that the ter

ms of their contra ct included the restric tions, that he understood the restric tions would run with the land fo r t h i rt y y ear s, and that the list was attac hed to the dee d and duly rec orded. D espite the omission of encumbr ance s on the fac e of the Gambr ell-F oshee de ed, Mr. Foshe e neve r believe d his property to be unenc umbere d. Certainly , t h e u n d ated, unsig ned, and unacknow ledg ed wr itten covena nts f a ilin f o r m; h o w e v e r , the orig inal covena nting pa rties conf irmed their substance

. Ad dit ion a lly , th e langua g e in the a tta c hme nt c le arl y e xpre sse s a

n inte nt t hat th e c ov e na

nts run with the land a

nd bind remote g rante es. The f irst para g ra p h o f t he attac hed re strictions leaves littl e doubt in this reg ard: 5(

. . . con t i n u ed) 5 i nheres i n t he l and , t he b enef i t i s i n gross (i

. e. , pe rs o nal t o t he co venant ee).

-8- 1. THE S E C OVE NAN TS AR E TO RUN W I TH T HE L AND AND S HAL LBE BI NDI NG ON AL L PARTI ES AND AL LPERS ONS CL AI MI NG UND ER TH EM F OR

A PE RI OD OF TH I RTYYE AR S F RO M T HE DA TE TH ESE COVENANT S ARE REC ORDED . . . .

Fur ther, the r estrictions “t o u ch and concer n” the land. A lthough ther e is some dispute among auth o ri t i es as to the test for this require ment, there is lit tle question that building re strictions embodied in a c ovenant be tween owners in fee satisfy this test, both as t o the bene fit and the burde n. Tennsco Corp. , 2 00 2 WL 12 98 80 8, a t *2. An d, fi na lly , as not e d a bo ve , th e Ni ve ns e s d o n ot d isp ute the trial cour

t’s finding that they

had ac tual notice of the covena nts well befor e ac ceptingthe dee d from Mr. F oshee.

Indeed, the case at bar is strikingly simil ar to the la

ndmark Eng lish case of Tulk v. Mox hay , in which the court enforc ed restrictions on equitable pr inciples eve n though the covena nts did not
me e t th e re qu ir e me nts fo r e nf or c e ment a t la

w. Th e re , th e ow ne r o f p ro pe rt y c on ve y e d to his purcha ser the a

rea known as L eice ster Square and included in the deed the cove nant that the g rante e, his heirs, and a ssigns, would ke ep the a rea as a g ard en fo r the be nefit of the r esidents in the ar ea. The g rantor, still owning land adjac en t t o t h e square, sued a remote g rante e, whose deed did not contain the r estriction, but who admitted he took title with notice of it. The c ourt stated:

Her e ther e is no question about the contr act: the owne r of cer tain houses in the square sells land adjoining, w ith a covena nt from the purc haser

. . . And i t is now contende d, not that the vendee could vi olate the contra ct, but that he mig ht sell the piece of land, a

nd that the purc haser

from him may

violate it without t h i s Court havingany

power to interfer e. I f that we re so, it would be impos sible for a n owner of land to sell par

t of it without i n curr ing the risk of re nderingwhat he r etains worthless. I t is said that, the c ovenant beingone which doe s not run with the land, thi s c ourt c ann ot en fo rc e it; but the qu e sti on is, no t w he the r t

he c ov e na nt r un s w ith the land, but whethe r a pa rty shall b e permitted to use the land in a manne r inconsistent with the contrac t entered i n to by his vendor, and w ith notice of which he purc hased. . . .
That t he question does not depend upon whether the cove nant runs with the land is e vident

fr om t his , th a t if

the re wa s a

me re a g re e me nt a

nd no c ov e na

nt, thi s Cou rtw o u l d

e n f o r c e i ta g a i n s ta

p arty p ur c h a s i n g w i thn o t i c e o f i t ; f o r i f ane quit y is atta c he d to the pr op e rt

y by the ow ne r, no on e purc ha sin g wi th n oti c e of that e qu ity can sta nd in a diffe rent situation from the pa rty from whom he pur chase d.
Tulk v. Mox hay , 2 Phill ips 774, 41 Eng. Re p. 1143 (1848), q u o te d in S tra c e ner , 7 3 7 S

. W

. 2 dat 537–38. L ike the plaintiff g rantor in Tulk v. Mox hay , the Gambre lls a re simil arly suing upon writtenT h e d o c trine o f sta n d ing a d d re sse s w h e the r a p a rtic u la r p la intiff is en tit le d to se e k ju d ic ia l re lief. K ni er i m v. 6 Le at her wood , 5 4 2 S .W .2 d 8 0 6 , 8 0 8 (T e n n . 1 9 7 6 ); G ar r i s on v

. St am ps , 10 9 S.W

. 3 d 37 4 , 37 7 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 20 0 3 ). T h e c o u rt m u st d e te rm ine w h e the r, a c c o rd ing to the p a rty’s a lleg a tio n s, the p la intiff h a s a su ff ic ie n tly p e rs o n a l sta k e in the o u tc o m e o f t h e d isp u te to ju stif y ju d ic ia l re so lutio n o f i t. SunTr us t Bank v

. J ohns on , 4 6 S .W .3 d 2 1 6 , 2 2 2 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 0 ); Br owni ng- Fer r i s I ndus

. of Te nn. , I nc. v

. Ci t y of O ak Ri dge , 64 4 S.W

. 2 d 40 0 , 40 2 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 8 2 ).

A re c ip ro c a l ne g a tive e a se m e n t i s a fo rm o f eq u itab le se rv itud e

. S ee L a n d D ev elo p ers , 537 S. W

. 2d a t 912; 7
L e a c h v . L a rk in , No. 91 91 93 , 19 93 W L 37 76 29 , a t * 3 ( T e n n

. Ct

. Ap p. S e pt

. 24 , 19 93 ) ( c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e r e ci procal negat i ve easem ent as t he “ t echni cal nam e o f t he grant ees’ i nt erest s ari si ng f rom t hese r est ri ct i ve co venant s”)

. -9- covena nts of which the d ef

endant took ti tle with actual notice . Additionally , the languag e of the
covena nts in thi s case , like that in Tul k, establishes that the re strictions “touch and c oncer n” the land and that the c ovenantingparties intende d to bind the succe ssors and assig ns of the grante e.

Equitable Servitudes and the Plan of De velopme nt Although the Nivenses do not dispute t he finding of a ctual notice, the y argue that more than
a c tua l no tic e is re qu ir e d for the c ourt to e nf or c e the re str ic tio ns a s an e qu ita ble se rv itu de , s pe c if

ic a lly pointing to the nee d for a comm o n p l an of deve lopment and the re quirement that the grantor’ s reta ined land be similarly restric ted. Couching their cha lleng e in terms of standing , the Nivense s 6
c hie fl y re ly on thr e e c a se s to pr ov e tha

t th e Ga mbr e lls c ann ot e nf

or c e the re str ic tio ns in e qu ity . F ir st, we see no issue of standing here , as the Gambr ells were orig inal parties to the tra nsaction cr eating the cove nants and still owned a por tion of the land. Second, althoug h our exis ting c ase la w on the
su bje c t em ph a size s th e ne e d f or a c omm on pla n o f d e ve lop me nt, the fa c ts b e fo re tho se c ourt s otherwis e lacked proof

of some substantive ele ment of an e quitable servitude. I n those ca ses, the common plan of de velopment provided a basis for the c ourts to ext end the r es trictions by implication. T h e i n s t ant fa cts suffe r no such de ficienc y . We now turn to, and distinguish, the Ni ve ns e s’ c hie f c a se s: Lan d D e v e lop e rs, In c . v . M ax we ll , Ridley v . Haiman , and Tennsco Corp. v. Attea

. In c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s, a g e ne ra l de ve lop me nt p lan a llo ws a c ourt to i mpl y the pr omi se to re s t ri ct the use of one ’s own prope rty when none is otherwise a ppare nt. I n Lan d D e v e lop e rs , g rante es and r emote g rante es sued to enfor ce r estrictions ag ainst the common g rantor who had reta ined a por

tion of the orig inal land without plac ing e x press re strictions upon it. Lan d D e v e lop e rs, In c . v . M ax we ll , 5 37 S.W. 2d

90 4 (Tenn. 19 76 ). Th e re , th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court he ld, in pertinent pa

rt, that wher e a g rantor had s ubdivided his land, s old trac ts to various gra ntees a ccor ding to a g e ne ra l de ve lop me nt p lan, and pla c e d id e nti c a l r e str ic tiv e c ov e na nts in the de e ds to t

he g ra nte e s, the l and remaining in the gra ntor’s poss ession was sim ilarly restric ted. Id. at 913. When the orig inal purc ha se rs a c qu ir e d th e ir

e nc umb e re d lo ts w iththe un de rs tand ing that th e us e of the oth e r l ots wo uld confor m to a uniform plan, t hey also ac quired a rec iproca l neg ative ea sement in the acr eag e re tained 7 by the g rantor. See id. Acc ording ly , they could enf

orce , in equity , simil ar r estri ct ions upon the g rantor’ s use of that pr operty

. See id. In that case , even thoug h it was unclea r whe ther the g rantor ha d e ve r i nte nd e d o r p ro mis e d to c onform to the same re str ic tio ns no te d in the g ra nte e s’ de e ds , equit y ex tended the r estriction by implication. Here , the Gambr ells, common g rantors, a re suingO n e wh o s ee k s en f or ce men t i n s u ch a s i t u at i on m u s t prov e ( 1) t h at bot h pa r t i es de r i v ed t i t l e f r om a c ommon 8 grant o r; (2) t hat t he vend o r s o l d t he l o t s wi t h restrictio n s c o n fo rm i ng t o a general plan of de vel o p m ent ; (3) t hat t he
v en dor i n t en ded t h e r es t r i ct i on s t o be n ef i t al l t h e l ot s s ol d, wh et h er or n ot ex t en ded t o t h e l an d r et ai n ed by h i m; a n d ( 4) t hat bot h par t i es ( or t hei r pre deces s ors ) pur cha s ed t hei r l ot s wi t h t he un ders t andi ng t hat t he r es t r i ct i ons wer e i nt ended to b e n e fit a ll o the r lo ts in the d e v e lo p m e n t p la n

. See Ri dl ey v

. H ai m an , 47 S.W

. 2 d 75 0 , 75 5 (T enn. 19 3 2 ).
-10- up on an e xpre ss p ro mis e ma de by Mr . Fo sh e e

. Th e re is no que sti on that Mr. F os he e pr omi se d to us e his land in conforma

nce w ith the restric tions or that the parties intended that his lot be enc umbere d. A g ener al deve lopment plan can a lso confer standing to a t hird party to sue for enfor ceme nt 8 when the de fenda

nt’s deed does not e x pressly extend the restric tion’s benef its to any one other

than the gra n t o r. For

example, Ridley v . Haiman inv olv e d th e qu e sti on of wh e the r o ne g ra

nte e c ou ld enfor ce r estrictions ag ainst another grante e (e .g ., had standingto sue) whe re the plaintiff g rante e wa s a strang er to the conveyance from the common g rantor to the de fenda nt gr antee , and whe re the deed betwee n the two did not identify the bene ficiar ies of the r estrictions. Ridley v . Haiman , 47 S.W .2d 750, 753 (Tenn. 1932)

. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court a nnounced that “whe re the owner of a tra ct of l an dsubdivides it and sells the differ ent lots to separate g rante es, [and restric ts] the use of the lot[ s] conve y ed

. . . in acc ordanc e with a g ener al building, improve ment, or deve lopment plan, such restric tions may

be enf orce d by any g rante e ag ainst any

other g rante e.” Id. Certainly , if the restric tions placed upon one lot were not intende d to benef it the lot of another pur chase r in the ar ea, th at l o t o wn ercould not sue to enfor ce the restric tion. Yet, wher e ther e is a g ener al plan of development a

nd the seve ral purc haser s acquire encumbe red lots (fr om a common g rantor) with the expectation that the us e of the l and will confor m to that scheme , they also acquir e re ciproc al neg ative
ease ments in all other lots. See id. [A gra ntor’s] intention t o make r estrictive c ovenants mutuall y binding upon the [purchasing ] parties and their suc cessor s and a ssi g ns ne e d no t be sp e lle d o ut w ith in the four c orner s of the dee d[; ]. . . such int en t i o n m ay be g ather ed fr om the
c ir c u ms ta n c e o f a un if o r m b u il d in g , im

p r o v e me n t a

n d d e v e lo p me n t p la

n [. ] Owenby v . Boring , 2 7 6 S. W. 2 d 7 5 7 , 7 6 1 ( T e n n

. Ct

. Ap p

. 1 9 5 4 )

. N o ta b ly , th e c ourt in Ridley
e xpre ssl y dis tin g uis hed th e fa c ts b e fo re it f ro m ot he rs in whic h th e c omm on g ra nto r b ro ug ht s uit ag ainst a g rante e or r emote g rante e. Ridley , 47 S.W .2d at 753. We make the sa me distinction here.

Th e status of

the pa rt ie s as g ra

nto rs or g ra

nte e s and the ir pr oc e dura l po sture in t

his dis pute distinguish this case f

rom both Ridleyand Lan d D e v e lop e rs
. F or e xamp le , in c on tr a st t o th e fa c ts in Ridley , this disput e involves the common g rantors, not a g rante e, see king to e nforc e re strictions
a tta c he d to a

de e d to wh ic h the y we re pa rt ie s. Inq uir y int o a c omm on pla n o f d e ve lop me nt w ou ld be prope r in this case if the Nivenses ha d sued the Ga mbrells to enforc e the same re strictions upon the ir us e of the land or , li ke wi se , if

a ne ig hb ori ngland ow ne r ( g ra nte e ) h a d s ue d th e Ni ve ns e s to enjoin their oper ation of the we dding c hapel. Obviously , we f ind this case in a diff

ere nt posture. Finally , a common plan o f d e v e lo pment may

serve to establish the covena nting pa rties’ intent to b i n d r e m o t e g r an t e e s w h e nth e w r i t t e nr e s tr i c t i o n s d o n o ti n c o r p o r a t e t h e “ h e i r s an d

a s s i g ns ”-11-

lang uag e re quired for

rea l covena

nts at law. Two c ases from this jurisdiction illust rate the nee d for a deve lopment plan when the r estrictions themselves fa il to evidence t h e p ar t i es’ intent to bind
succe ssors. I n Tennsco Corp. v. Attea , a landowner subdivided his pr operty into thre e lots, retaine d the middle lot, and sold the other two lots with the following de ed re striction:

T h i s co n v ey an ce i s m ad e s u b j ec tt o th e r es tri ct i o n s th at an y b u i l d i n gs c on str uc te d o n the land sh a ll b e sin g le fa mil y dw e lli ng s o f t

ra dit ion a l de sig n at le a st 4,000 square fee t in siz e and on lots of one (1) a cre or g reater. Tennsco Corp. v. Attea , No. M2001-01378-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1298808, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 13, 2002)( no perm. app. filed ). Afte r the g rantor sold the lot he had orig inally reta ined, his succe ssor then broug ht suit aga inst a remote g rante e who had take n title to the adjoining lot by an unre stricted deed. Id. The restriction in the deed delivere d to the orig inal purcha ser wa s unenfor cea ble as a rea l
covena nt at law bec ause it did not expressly bind the heirs, succ essors, and assigns of the g rante e, as re quired unde r Tenne ssee law

. Id. at *2. This Court also dec lined to approve enfor ceme nt of the restric ti o n a s an e qu it a

b le s e r v it u d e b e c a u s e it d id n o t a

p p e ar th a t th e g r an to r h a d r e s tr ic te d and conveyed the lots accor ding to a g ener al plan of de velopment. Tennsco Corp. , 2002 WL1298808,
a t *2 . T his Court

c on c lud e d th a t the re str ic tio n in the or ig ina l de e d w a s p e rs on a l to the pa rt ie s, inuring to the g rantor’ s benef it. See id. at *3. Indeed, n o t h i n g i n t h e re cord e stablished the
covena nting pa rties’ intent to bind remote gra n t ee s

. Simi lar to the holding in Tennsco , our conclusion in Essary v. Cox , 844 S.W .2d 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), w as to deny enfor ceme nt of th e r es tri ct i o n s i nequ i ty

wh er e t h e r es tri ct i o ni nt h e d ee d l ac k edt h e “ h e i r s an d

as s i gn s ” l an gu age and where there wa s no common plan of deve lopment. Es sa ry , 8 44 S.W. 2d a t 17 2. Th e re we he ld that “[a]bsent ex press languag e indicating that the parties intende d for the r estriction on the sale of oil a nd g a s p r o d u c t s t o a p p l y t o t h e p art i e s ’ s u c c e s s o r s an d a s s i g n s , th i s C o urti s un w i l l i n g to interfe re w ith Defe ndants’ fr ee a nd unrestrict ed enjoy

ment of their pr operty .” Id. In contra st, we now consider

a dispute in which the written cove nants contain this express lang uag e.
T h e c o v e nants in T

ennsco and Es sa ry

failed to e x press a

substantive element of

a re al
c ov e na nt a t law: the int e nt t o b ind su c c e sso rs , h e ir s, and

a ssi g ns . E qu ity

re qu ir e s p ro of

of the same substantive intent but does not con fi ne the sc ope of inquiry to the lang uag e of the covena nt itself. Nonethele ss, Tennsco and Es sa ry toge ther stand f

or the proposition that our cour ts will broaden the scope o f in qu ir

y o n ly w h e r e th e v e n d o r im p o s e d th e r e s tr ic ti o n s a c c o r d in g to a g e n e r a l p lan of development. A development plan l og ically supports a finding that the pa rties intended the c ovenant to run with the l an d an d b i n d t he g rante es’ suc cessor s, assig ns, and heirs. The very conce pt of a development plan a

nd the conse quent expectations of the pur chase rs re quire the individual burde ns and their corre sponding benefits t o inhere in the land and to bene fit and bind whoeve r occ upies that land. This much see ms impl icit, for a c ommon plan would crumble if the burdens and benefits wer e mere ly persona l to the contrac ting pa rties.
The fa cts in Es sa ry , in particular , bear an im portant l ikeness to - - as we ll as a dete rminative differ ence from - - the ones at bar. In both case s, the g rantor, not the grante e, soug ht leg al and
e qu ita ble e nf or c e me nt o f t

he re str ic tio ns a g a ins t a

re mot e g ra

nte e . Ye t, t

he c ov e na nts in e a c h c a se-12-

wer e unenf

orce able at law for quite differ ent rea sons. I n Es sa ry , the re strictions failed in substance , as noted a

bove. Unlike the written cove nants in Es sa ry that omitted the express intent to bi nd
succe ssors, heirs, and assig ns, the covenants attache d to the Gambrell-Foshe e dee d made this intent expli cit. Instead, the Gambre ll-Foshee covena nts reve al a defe ct i n form only , as t hey wer e omitted from the de ed and instea d set forth on a n undated, unsig ned, and una cknowledg ed docume nt.
Where re strictive cove nants are unenfor cea ble at law beca

use of some defe ct in substance,
our cour ts may enfor ce the restric tions in equity wher e the c ommon gr antor h as re s t ri cted a nd conveyed the pr operty acc ordingto a plan of de velopment. See, e .g., Lan d D e v e lop e rs , 537 S.W .2d 904, 913 (Tenn. 1976) (extending by implication c ovenant’ s restric tion to land reta ined by g rantor) ; R id le y , 47 S.W .2d 750,753 (Tenn. 1932) (allowingg rante e to enf orce restric tions ag ainst another g rante e by

imply ing fr o m d evelopment plan the parties’ intent to benefit all lots within the plan). Where, a s here , the covenants fail at law fr om a def ect in for m but otherwise satisfy

the substantive elements of an equitable servitude, there is no need to inquire into the exi stence of a c ommon plan of deve lopment. We conclude that the G ambre ll-Foshee deed a nd i ts attache d restric tions were d e f i c i e n ti nf o r mb u t s u b s t an t i v e l y s u

p p o rt e d th e i mp o s i t i o n o f ane qu i t a b l e s e r v i tu d e

. A c c o r d i n g l y, th e tr i a l c o urtd i d

n o te r r i nr e s tr i c t i n g th e u s e o f

th e N i v e n s e s ’ p r o p e rty.
Re le as e of C

ov e na nts Finally , the Nivenses contend that, even if the cove nants wer e binding , they have sinc e bee n rele ased. The y

primarily asse rt t hat the mutual waive r and r elea se executed by the Nivense s and the ir ne ig hb or s, ow ne rs of the oth e r tw o lot s, te rm inate d th e op e ratio n o f t he re str ic tio ns . T he re le a se of re strictive covenants requir es the a ssent of those for whose be nefit they

wer e imposed. See Ridley , 47 S.W .2d at 752. Without a re lease executed by the Gambr ells, the undeniable benef iciarie s of the subject restric tions, we fail to see how this rele ase could impact the viability of the c ovenant betwee n the Gambr ells and Mr. F oshee, the Nivenses’ prede cessor in interest.
The Nive nses also conte nd that the re strictions a re no longe r valid beca

use they have c ease d to s e rv e a us e fu l pu rpo se. S pec if

ic a lly , th e y

re ly up on the c ha ng e in zo nin g to s up po rt

thi s p oint. We disag ree

. “While r ezoning of proper ty cover ed by a restric tive covena nt is some evidence of a
c ha ng e in the c ha

ra c te r o f t

he us e of the pr op e rt

y , r e zon inga lon e do e s n ot r e qu ir e the c ourt s to conclude that the re strictive cove nan t n o l o n ger serves a useful purpose .” Hewgley v. Vivo , No. 01-A-01- 9506-CH-00266, 1997 WL 92077, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1997) ( quoting, inter ali a, Hysinger v. Mullinax , 319 S.W. 2d 79 , 82 (T e nn . 195 8) ). We n ot o nly dis a g re e wi th t

he Ni ve ns e s’
overa ll assertion, but we also note t hat re zoning of the a rea did not occur he re. Rathe r, the Nive nses secur ed an exc eption to t

he zon ingor din anc e

. We the re fo re re je c t the ir c on te nti on

that th e c ov e na

nts have be en re lease d or otherw ise terminated.

Conclu sion
We hold that where the languag e in a re strictive cove nant expressly states that the par

ties intend to bind the gr antee ’s succ essors and a ssigns a nd that the cove nant s h al l ru n wi th the land,-13-

equity does not requir e a c ommon plan of deve lopment if the g ran t o r i s t he par ty seeking enfor ceme nt and if the de fenda nt/remote g rante e took title with actual notice of the cove nants. Moreove r, i n t h i s ca s e, the de fense of estoppel by deed likew ise fails; with actua l notice, the Nivenses could not ha

ve rea sonably relied on the absenc e of listed e ncumbra nces on the fac e of the Ga mbr e ll- F os he e de e d. F ina lly , th e mut ua l re le a se and wa ive r is ine ff e c tiv e be c a

us e the Ga

mbr e lls , the un de nia

ble be ne fi c iari e s o f t

he re str ic tio ns , d id n ot e xec ute it o r i n a ny wa y a g re e to i ts t e rm s. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand the matter for e ntry o f ano r d e r d is s o lv in g th e s ta

y an d f o r f urth e r p r o c e e d in g s n o t i n c o n s is te n t w it hth is o p in io n

. We tax t he costs of this appe al t o the Appellants, Sonny Nivens and Carrie Nive ns, and their sure ty , for
w h i c he x e c u t i o ns h a l l i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

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DAVI D R. FARMER, J UDGE