The Honor able Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge f or the Southern District of * New Y ork, sitting by

designation. 09-1283-c r United States v. Merc ado U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER RULI NG S BY S UM M ARY O RDER DO NO T H AVE P RECEDE NTI AL E F F ECT . C I TATI O N TO A SUMM ARY O RDER F I LED O N O R AF TER J ANUARY 1, 2007 , I S P ER MI T T E D A N D I S GOVE RNED B Y F EDERAL RU L E O F A P P ELL ATE P RO CEDURE 32. 1 AND THI S CO URT ’ S L O CAL RU L E 32. 1.1 . W H EN CI TI NG A S UM M ARY O RDER I N A DO CUM ENT F I LED W I TH THI S CO URT , A P ARTY MUST CI TE EI TH ER T H E F E D E R AL A PP ENDI X O R AN E L ECTRONI C DATAB AS E ( W I TH THE NO TATI O N “ S UM M ARY O RDER ”). A P ARTY CI TI NG A S UM M ARY O RDER M US T S ERVE A CO P Y O F I T ON ANY P ARTY NOT REP RES ENTE D BY COUNSEL . At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 25 day th of Mar ch, two thousand ten. Pr e se nt: RA L PH K . WI NT ER, ROBERT A. K

ATZ MANN, Circuit Judges , J ED S . RAKO FF, District Judge
. *

________________________________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appellee , v. No. 09-1283-c r DAMI ON TOWNSEND, also known a s Poochie, DARRYLWI NFREE, a lso known as Fa tboy , De fe nd an ts , IS A IA H M E R C A D O , a l s o kn o wna s S p anky,

Defendant-

Appellant
.

________________________________________________2

For Def endant- Appellant I saiah Merc ado: G A I L J A COBS , Gre at Nec k, NY For Appellee : G L EN A. K OPP , Assistant United States Attorney (Michae l D. Maimin, Assistant United St ates Attorney , of counsel), for Preet B hara ra, United States Attorney

for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, Ne w York, N Y Appea l from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York (Ke enan, J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , i ti s h e r e b y OR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , and DE CREED that th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

e nte re d M arc h 2 4, 20 09 , is AF F IRM ED
. Def endant- Appellant I saiah Mer cado a ppeals fr om a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (K eena n, J. ), ente red Ma

rch 24, 2009,
r e v o k in gh is te r

m o f s u p e r v is e d r e le a s e an d

s e n te n c in gh im

to 1 2 mo n th s ’ im

p r is o nme n t. We assume the pa

rties’ fa miliarity with the fac ts, procedur al history , and spec ification of issues on
a pp e a l. Merc ado first a

rgues that the district cour t erre d in denying his motion to suppress the
e vid e nc e on

wh ic h th e g ov e rnme nt r e lie d to e sta bli shthat he ha d v iol ate d th e te rm s o f h is
s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e . A ta

s u p p r e s s i o nh e ar i n g , th e g o v e r nm e n tb e ar s th e b ur d e no f s h o w i n g , b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, that the e vidence was law fully obtained. See, e .g. , United States
v . H e ath , 455 F.3d 52, 69 ( 2d Cir. 2006). We review the district court’s f

indings of f

act f or cle ar
e rr or and its le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo
. See, e .g. , United States v. Pe terson , 100 F.3d 7, 11 ( 2d Cir. 1996). Me rc a do ’s su

pe rv ise d r e le a se wa s su

bje c t to the c on dit ion

that3

[t]he de fe nd ant s ha ll s ub mit his pe rs on , r e sid e nc e . . . o r a ny oth e r p re mis e s und e r h is control to a sea

rch on the basis that the probation officer has re asonable belief that contra band or othe r evide nce of a violation of the c onditions of the relea se may be found. The sea rch must be c onducted at a re asonable time and in a re asonable manner . Sup p. Ap p. 95 . H e argue s th at th e qu antum of e vid e nc e ne c e ssa

ry to gro un d th e “ re a so na

ble be lie f” re qu ir e d to se arc h h is r e sid e nc e is at le a st e qu a l to the qu antum of e vid e nc e ne c e ssa

ry to g round a “ rea sonable suspicion” f or the purpose s of a stop and f risk under Te rry

v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968). He further asser ts that the information provided to his probation off icer by the B ro nx Di stric t A tto rn e y ’s of fi c e wa s n ot s uf

fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli sh a “ re a so na ble be lie f” be c a

us e it ultimately

came from a c onfidential informa nt, and there was insuffic ient corr oborating information or knowle dg e of the vera city of the infor

mant to deem it reliable
. We h ave pr e vio us ly

e xpla ine d th at th e fe de ra l syste m of su pe rv ise d r e le a se “ pr e se nts ‘spec ial needs’ beyond normal law e nforc ement that may justify depar tures fr om the usual
war rant a nd probable -ca

use re quirements.” Unites States v. Re yes , 283 F.3d 446, 461 ( 2d Cir. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Gr iff

in v . W isc on sin , 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)) . In Rey es , we he ld that beca use of the strongg overnme nt interest in ensuringthat a re lease e complies with the ter ms of his su pe rv ise d r e le a se , “ the pr ob a ble c a us e re qu ir e me nts of

the F ourt h Ame ndme nt, wh ic h a

pp ly to a re gula r l aw e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r e xec uti nga

se arc h w arr ant f

or an in div idu a l’ s h ome , s imp ly do not apply

to visit s by

probation off

icer s to the homes of convic ted per sons servinga ter m of supervised r elea se.” Id. at 462. We did not address the r equire ments for c onductinga sea rch ( as opposed to a visit) of a r elea see’ s home pursuant to a c ondition of his supervised rele ase. Howeve r, the Supreme Court’s holding in Gr iff in establishes that, whe re “ specia l needs” such as those prese nted by

the supervise d rele ase sy stem exi st, it i s “re asonable to permit information4

provided by

a police of

fice r, whether or not on the basis of fi rsthand knowledge , to support a . . .
sear ch.” 483 U .S. at 879-80 (empha sis added and f ootnote omitted). Indeed, the circ umstances of Gr iff in are simil ar to those pr esente d here : there, a probation off

icer rec eived infor

mation from the police depar

tment that “there wer e or might be guns in [ the probationer’s] apar tment.” Id. at 871. A sea

rch of the probationer’s home w as conduc ted on the basis of this unador ned information, and c ontraba nd was found. Id. We need not, at this juncture, spe cify whether the “r easona

ble belief ” standa rd imposed by the se arc h c on dit ion

of Me rc a do ’s su

pe rv ise d r e le a se is e qu iva le nt t o th e “ re a so na ble g rounds” c ondition at issue in Gr iff in , id. , b e c a

us e the inf

or matio n r e c e ive d b y

Me rc a do ’s pa

ro le office r wa s more deta iled and spec ific than the infor mation rec eived by

the par ole offic er the re. In this case, both the B ronx Dist rict Attorney ’s offic e and the New Y ork Police De partment confirme d that Merc ado wa s a per son of intere st in an ong oing inve stigation of an unsolved robber y and homicide. A B ronx Assi stant District Attorney provided Mer cado’ s parole of fice r with details about the crime that she had le arne d from a c onfidential witness, includingthat the perpe trators “ waited in bushes outside the house of [a] drug de aler , and whe n the drugdeale r
came home, the other

individual, not Mr. Merca do, shot the victim twice, killing him, and two duffe l bag s of marijuana

wer e stolen at that time.” Supp. App. 24. Eve n assuming, f or the sake of ar gument, that a “r easona ble belief ” standa rd is close to the “ rea sonable suspicion” standa rd that applies in the Te rry

context, thi s case is a far cry from the a

nony mous phone ca ll to the police that the Supre me Court found inade quate to esta blish a “re asonable suspicion” in Florida
v . J .L. , 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). Mer cado’ s probation offic er r ece ived spec ific information from law e nforc ement off icials workingon an ong oing inve stigation that sugg ested c ontraba nd5

might be f

ound in Merca do’s home. The sear ch did not violate Merc ado’s F ourth Amendment rights, and his suppression motion was proper ly denied. Merc ado next argues that the e vidence did not support the district court’s findingthat he ha d v iol ate d th e te rm s o f h is s up e rv ise d r e le a se by po sse ssi ngammunit ion

be c a us e he sh are d h is bedroom, whe re the contra band wa s found, with his brother. “ [T] he dec ision to revoke probation will only be over turned if the district c ourt abused its discre tion.” Un ite d S tates v . B ar th , 899 F.2d 199, 202 ( 2d Cir. 1990). We review the cour t’s fac tual finding s for c lear err or. See U

nited States v. Thomas , 239 F.3d 163, 168 ( 2d Cir. 2001). At a re vocation hea ring , the g overnme nt must prove the violation or violations by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) (3). The ba gcontainingthe ammunition was found under a bed that Merca do’s mother identified a s his; on a crate next to t he bed w ere pay stubs and renta l car

rec eipts bearing his name. In light of these fa cts, the district court’ s finding that it was more likely than not that the ammunition be lon g e d to Me rc a do wa s n ot c le arl y e rr on e ou s. F ina lly , M e rc a do argue s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in imp os ingse nte nc e be c a

us e 1) it fa ile d to art ic ulate its re a so ns fo r t he se nte nc e imp os e d, and 2) the se nte nc e wa s e xce ssi ve in leng th. In g ener al, “[t] he standa rd of r eview on the appea l of a sente nce f or violation of supervised r elea se is now the same standard a s for sente ncingg ener ally : whether the sentenc e imposed is reasona

ble.” Un ite d S

tates v . M c Ne il , 4 15 F .3 d 2 73 , 2 77 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ). B e c a us e Me rc a do ra ise d n o o bje c tio n o n th e g ro un d o f e ith e r p ro c e dura l or su bs tanti ve unre a so na

ble ne ss at the time of sente ncing , howeve r, we revie w for pla in error
. See F e d. R. C ri m. P . 5 2(b) ; United Sta te s v . E sp inoza , 514 F.3d 209, 212 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (c ), a se nte nc ingc ou

rt “ at th e tim e of

se nte nc ing , s ha ll s tate in6

open cour t the rea sons for its imposit ion of the par ticular sente nce,” and in g ener al, a district court c ommits proce dural e rror “if it fails ade quately

to expl ain its chosen sente nce,” United Sta te s v . Ca v e ra , 5 50 F .3 d 1 80 , 1 90 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ) ( e n b anc ). He re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt , in imp os ing a on e -ye ar t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt, did

no t e xpla in i ts r e a so ns fo r d oin gso e xce pt t o n ote that th is w a s th e te rm

re c omm e nd e d b y

the Pr ob atio n O ff

ic e . H ow e ve r, a s w e e xpla ine d in Es pin oz a , [e]s ta bli sh ingthat a

se nte nc ingc ourt

fa ile d to fu lf

il the “ op e n c ourt ” re qu ir e me nt i s n ot, howeve r, tantamount to establishingplain err or. . . . [F]ailure to satisfy the open c ourt require ment of § 3553(c ) . . . does not constitute “pla in error ” if the district c ourt relies on the PSR , and the f

actua l findings in the PSR are a dequate to support the sentenc e. 514 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). B y

the same toke n, in the context of a sentenc ing f

or a violation of supe rvised re lease , the district court’s r eliance on the
rec ommendation of the Probation Of fice amounts to an ade quate e x planation of the r easons f or the sentenc e imposed, at lea st for the purpose s of plain er ror r eview. Finally , we a

re not pe rsuade d by

Merc ado’s c laim that the district court’s sente nce w as substantively

unrea sonable. “ We will . . . set aside a district cour t’s substantive deter

mination
o n l y i nex ce p t i o n al ca s es wh er e th e [ d i s tri ct ] co urt ’s d ec i s i o ncann o tb e l o ca t edwi th i nth e r an ge of per missibl e dec isions.” Cav e ra , 550 F.3d at 189 (emphasis and inter nal quotation marks omitted). Here , Merc ado possessed a mmuniti on, a small quantity of drug s, and drug para pherna lia within a year

of beingrele ased f

rom prison followinghis conviction on a fe lon-inpossession char g e. Although Merc ado wa s otherwise c ompliant with the terms of his supervised rele ase, unde r the c ircumstance s, a one- year sentenc e wa s not unreasona ble. Moreove r, the Guidelines re vocation ra

ng e wa s 18-24 months. “Althoug h we do not pre sume that a Guide lines7

sentenc e is rea sonable, we have r ecognized that ‘in the overwhe lming majority of ca ses, a Guidelines sentenc e will fall comfor tably within the broad ra

ng e of se ntence s that would be
rea sonable in the pa

rticular c ircumstance s.’” Un ite d S tates v . E be rh ar d, 525 F.3d 175, 179 ( 2d C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Fe rnandez , 443 F.3d 19, 27 ( 2d Cir. 2006)). The fac t that the term of imprisonment imposed wa s less than the Guidelines’ sug g ested sente nce r einforc es
our conc lusion that the district court did not commit pl ain er ror. We have c onsidered Me rca do’s other a rguments and find them without merit. For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t. FOR THE COURT: CA TH ERI

NE O’ HA GA

N WO L F E, CL ERK