alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2337 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2337

         To suspend temporarily the duty on Pyrethrum Extract.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

Mrs. Feinstein introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
         To suspend temporarily the duty on Pyrethrum Extract.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PYRETHRUM EXTRACT.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.01.00       Pyrethrum Extract   Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/ ''.
                          (CAS No. 8003-34-                                                  31/2011.......
                          7) (provided for
                          in subheading
                          1302.14.00)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

Order 

October 9, 2009 

138917 & (72) 

138919 

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

v SC: 138917 

 COA: 277574 

Mason CC: 05-000436-CZ 

FERWERDA ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a 

HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS LUDINGTON, 

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ 

Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

and 

DARYL BRONKEMA, Next Friend of 

JACKSON THOMAS BRONKEMA, 

CALEB ANDREW BRONKEMA and 

SAVANNAH JOY BRONKEMA, and 

DARYL BRONKEMA and MELISSA 

BRONKEMA, Husband and Wife, 

Defendants-Appellants/ 

Cross-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

v SC: 138919 

 COA: 277574 

Mason CC: 05-000436-CZ 

FERWERDA ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a 

HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS LUDINGTON, 

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ 

Appellee/Cross-Appellee, 

and 

DARYL BRONKEMA, Individually and 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

October 9, 2009 

p1006 

 

2

Next Friend of JACKSON THOMAS 

BRONKEMA, CALEB ANDREW 

BRONKEMA and SAVANNAH JOY 

BRONKEMA, and MELISSA BRONKEMA, 

Defendants-Appellants/ 

Cross-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the applications for leave to appeal the April 9, 2009 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and the applications for leave to appeal as crossappellant are considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to 

appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case 

to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the trial court properly assessed 

attorney fees and penalty interest against plaintiff Auto-Owners Insurance Company. 

The circuit court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants 

because the subject policy unambiguously provided coverage for the defendants’ claim. 

Accordingly, we REINSTATE the circuit court’s judgment and we REMAND this case 

to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. 

 We do not retain jurisdiction.
#### Joel Smith *vs.*Sidney E. Harmon.

July 18, 1884.

Practice — Setting Aside *Judgment.*— Held, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside a judgment.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Crow Wing county to recover the value of goods sold and delivered. The summons was served on September 13, 1883, and, the defendant having failed to appear in the action, judgment by default was entered on October 12, 1883. Defendant had actual notice of the judgment on October 15, 1883, and appeals from an order by *Stearns,*J., made on December 26, 1883, denying a motion to set aside the judgment and for leave to answer.

*E. N. Donaldson,*for appellant.

*Prater é Pernalcl,*for respondent.

Gilfillan, C. J.

The application to set aside the judgment and for leave to answer was addressed to the discretion of the court below. There is no pretence for saying that there was any abuse of discretion, and the order appealed from must be affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report of Chisen Electric Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:





1.           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





Date: February 28, 2011
By:
/s/Liu ChuanjieName:
Liu ChuanjieTitle:
Chief Financial Officer, Principal Financial andAccounting Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Chisen Electric Corporation will be retained by Chisen Electric Corporation and furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-14-00337-CV

In the Matter of J.M.

From the 289th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2005JUV01800

The Honorable Carmen Kelsey, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 25, 2014

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Appellant is attempting to appeal an adjudication order or a disposition order in a juvenile 

case. Both orders were signed by the juvenile court on December 7, 2005. Juvenile appeals proceed 

under the rules governing civil cases. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(a) (West 2014); In the 

Matter of G.C.F., 42 S.W.3d 194, 195 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); In the Matter of 

J.C.H., Jr., 12 S.W.3d 561, 562 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). In this case, appellant’s 

notice of appeal was due within thirty days from the signing of these orders, or by January 6, 2006. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (providing that the notice of appeal in a civil case must generally be filed 

within 30 days after the judgment is signed). Appellant filed his notice of appeal on May 1, 2014, 

which is untimely and fails to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. We ordered appellant to show 

cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant filed a written 
04-14-00337-CV

response to our order; however, nothing in this response shows that we have jurisdiction over this 

appeal. This appeal is therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See G.C.F., 42 S.W.3d at 196

(dismissing juvenile appeal for lack of jurisdiction when the notice of appeal was untimely); 

J.C.H., 12 S.W.3d at 562 (same).

PER CURIAM

- 2 -
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Warren B. Kanders, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Armor Holdings, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


Date: March 12, 2004                             By: /s/ Warren B. Kanders
                                                    ----------------------------
                                                 Name:  Warren B. Kanders
                                                 Title:  Chief Executive Officer
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2193 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 10,10′-Oxybisphenoxarsine. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. CASEY) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 10,10′- 

Oxybisphenoxarsine. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 10,10′-OXYBISPHENOXARSINE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.02.29 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 10,10′-Oxybisphenoxarsine) is amended by striking ‘‘12/ 

7 31/2009’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies with respect to goods entered, or 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2193 IS

1 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

2 the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
50659.

#### In Re: THOMAS.

Argued April 30, 1975

Decided May 8, 1975.

*Grace W. Thomas,*for appellant.

Evans, Judge.

On October 15,1974, a citation for contempt of court was issued against Attorney Thomas, and a rule nisi was issued on October 17, 1974. At the completion of the hearing, the court orally stated that it was finding counsel in contempt and imposing a fine of $200 to be paid within thirty days, and instructed Attorney Thomas that a written order would be entered. No such order was ever entered, and the clerk of the lower court so states in the certificate preparing the record for this court.

There being no final written order in this case, there is no question presented to this court for consideration on appeal. See *Construction &c. Union v. Williams Const. Co.,*212 Ga. 691 (1) (95 SE2d 281); *Olivet v. State,*117 Ga. App. 860 (1) (162 SE2d 306); *Gibson v. Hodges,*221 Ga. 779 (2) 781 (147 SE2d *329); Benton v. Smith,*226 Ga. 722 (177 SE2d *230); Bonzheim v. Bonzheim,*227 Ga. 478 (181 SE2d 363). There is simply nothing to appeal.

On May 7, 1975, the clerk of this court received a belated written order signed by the judge of superior court in this case, dated April 16, 1975, purporting to be a nunc pro tunc order, and making the written judgment relate back to the date of the oral pronouncement. We repeat that the appeal in this case was from the oral pronouncement (which can in no sense be termed a final judgment which is subject to appeal), and this belated order can not change the situation. A nunc pro tunc order cannot be used for the purpose of correcting non-action on the part of the court. See *General Tire Service Co. v. Carlisle,*84 Ga. App. 288 (66 SE2d 161); *Pendergrass v. Duke,*147 Ga. 10 (92 SE 649). Whether or not this order filed on April 16, 1975, may be appealed "within 30 days after entry” is not here passed upon. See Code Ann. § 6-803.

*Appeal dismissed.*

*Deen, P. J., and Stolz, J., concur.*

*729*Joseph J. Drolet, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Harold R. WILLIS, Appellee.

No. 88-403.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 16, 1988.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James A. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.

THREADGILL, Judge.

Harold Willis was charged with sexual battery on June 18, 1987. He filed a demand for speedy trial on December 2,1987, and on January 22, 1988, the fifty-first day after the demand, moved for discharge pursuant to Rule 3.191, Fla.R.Crim.P. A hearing was held five days later, and because the trial could not be scheduled within 60 days of the original demand, the court granted the motion for discharge. The state charges error in the failure of the court to allow ten days after the hearing for trial pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(i). We agree and reverse.

In discharging this defendant for the state’s violation of the speedy trial rule, the trial court reasoned that a defendant is entitled to trial within sixty days of his initial demand. However, Rule 3.191(i)(4) now gives the state fifteen days after the filing of a motion for discharge to bring' a defendant to trial. *Bloom v. McKnight,*502 So.2d 422 (Fla.1987). *See also Win-field v. State,*503 So.2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The committee note to the 1984 amendment of subsection (i) clearly indicates that the intent was to give the prosecutor a full fifteen days after the filing of a motion for discharge because ten days was deemed insufficient time in which to bring a felony defendant to trial.

The trial court erred in failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 3.191(i)(4) that trial be set within ten days of the hearing on the motion for discharge. We therefore reverse the order of discharge and remand with instructions that the defendant be brought to trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
III

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 74

Recognizing the United States Border Patrol’s 75 years of service since

its founding.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 17, 1999

Mrs. HUTCHISON (for herself, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. KYL, and Mr. GRAMM) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on the Judiciary

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Recognizing the United States Border Patrol’s 75 years of

service since its founding.

Whereas the Mounted Guard was assigned to the Immigration Service under the Department of Commerce and

Labor from 1904 to 1924;

Whereas the founding members of this Mounted Guard included Texas Rangers, sheriffs, and deputized cowboys

who patrolled the Texas frontier looking for smugglers,

rustlers, and people illegally entering the United States;

Whereas following the Department of Labor Appropriation

Act of May 28, 1924, the Border Patrol was established

within the Bureau of Immigration, with an initial force

of 450 Patrol Inspectors, a yearly budget of $1 million,
2

•SCON 74 IS

and $1,300 yearly pay for each Patrol Inspector, with

each patrolman furnishing his own horse;

Whereas changes regarding illegal immigration and increases

of contraband alcohol traffic brought about the need for

this young patrol force to have formal training in border

enforcement;

Whereas during the Border Patrol’s 75-year history, Border

Patrol Agents have been deputized as United States Marshals on numerous occasions;

Whereas the Border Patrol’s highly trained and motivated

personnel have also assisted in controlling civil disturbances, performing National security details, aided in foreign training and assessments, and responded with security and humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of numerous natural disasters;

Whereas the present force of over 8,000 agents, located in

146 stations under 21 sectors, is responsible for protecting more than 8,000 miles of international land and

water boundaries;

Whereas, with the increase in drug-smuggling operations, the

Border Patrol has also been assigned additional interdiction duties, and is the primary agency responsible for

drug interdiction between ports-of-entry;

Whereas Border Patrol agents have a dual role of protecting

the borders and enforcing immigration laws in a fair and

humane manner; and

Whereas the Border Patrol has a historic mission of firm

commitment to the enforcement of immigration laws, but

also one fraught with danger, as illustrated by the fact

that 86 agents and pilots have lost their lives in the line

of duty—6 in 1998 alone: Now, therefore, be it
3

•SCON 74 IS

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives

2 concurring), That Congress recognizes the historical sig3 nificance of the United States Border Patrol’s founding

4 and its 75 years of service to our great Nation.

Æ
#### Andre Lamonta FRISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 88-704.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Nov. 23, 1988.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Colin Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

SHARP, Chief Judge.

Frison appeals his sentence of 100 years in prison which he received following his conviction for sexual battery with a deadly weapon in violation of section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1987). His sentencing guidelines scoresheet totalled 712 points, which corresponded to a recommended life sentence. The statutory maximum sentence for this offense was a term of imprisonment for life or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. *See*§ 775.082(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987).

Appellant’s counsel opined that the sentencing error should be deemed harmless because under the guidelines, Frison might be better off with a 100 year term than with a life sentence. In view of this argument, we wonder why this appeal was taken. Illegal sentences (in excess of the stat*955utory maximum) constitute fundamental error not subject to the curative application of harmless error. *Reynolds v. State,*429 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); and *Lawson v. State,*400 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We have no choice but to vacate the sentence and remand this cause for resen-tencing.

Sentence VACATED; cause REMANDED.

ORFINGER and COWART, JJ., concur.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24A1338. JUNIOR JOSEPH v. THE STATE.

This case was docketed by this court on April 16, 2024. The Appellant’s brief

and enumeration of errors were due May 6, 2024. As of the date of this order, the

Appellant still has not filed a brief and enumeration of errors and has not requested

an extension of time in which to do so. The filing is 42 days late. Accordingly, this

appeal is hereby deemed abandoned and DISMISSED pursuant to Court of Appeals

Rules 13 and 23 (a). 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office,Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

June 17, 2024

06/17/2024
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-40569

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROLAND ANGELLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas

(1:95-CV-153)

January 15, 1996 Before GARWOOD, DUHÉ and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. *

PER CURIAM:

Roland Angelle appeals the district court’s dismissal of his2

motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Angelle contends that

the sentencing court should not have imposed a four-point increase

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1. 1 to his offense level for being an

organizer or leader. Angelle also contends that counsel was

ineffective because he failed to contest the four-level increase,

he filed a memorandum less than twenty-four hours bef ore the

sentencing hearing, and he did not appeal the four-level increase.

F inally, Angelle contends that the district court erred i n

dismissing his section 2255 motion without affording him the

o pportunity to file a traverse or objections to the governmen t’s

response.

We have reviewed the district court’s decision and find no

revers ible error. Defense counsel filed objections to the PSR,

which were addresse d in an addendum to the PSR, and also a

sentencing memora ndum, each of which urged, among other things,

that the PSR’s proposed four-level enhancement for role in the

offense was improper. At sentencing the district court expressly

stated that it had considered the objections and the memorandum and

found the four-level enhancement proper based on the P SR (the

district court did sustain the objections and memorandum as to

acceptance of responsibility). The record, particularly the PSR,

adequately supports the four-level enhancement. There is nothing

to show either that counsel’s performance w as constitutionally

deficient or that Angelle was prejudiced thereby, and there is

nothing to indicate that Angelle ever expres sed any desire to

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision.3 AFFIRMED