[Cite as State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471.] 

THE STATE EX REL. N.A., APPELLANT, v. CROSS, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471.] 

Juvenile courts — Jurisdiction over delinquency case after alleged delinquent 

child turns 21 — R.C. 2152.02 — Writ of prohibition denied.

(No. 2009-1689 — Submitted March 31, 2010 — Decided April 8, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, No. 08CA0045-M. 

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Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for a 

writ of prohibition to prevent a juvenile court judge from proceeding with an 

adjudicatory hearing in a delinquency case after the alleged delinquent child had 

turned 21 years old. Because the juvenile court judge does not patently and 

unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed, we affirm. 

Facts 

{¶ 2} Appellant, N.A., was born on May 15, 1987. On November 4, 

2005, the prosecuting attorney filed a complaint in the Medina County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, alleging that N.A. appeared to be a delinquent 

child for committing two acts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), 

which would be felonies of the first degree if committed by an adult. The 

complaint alleged that the rapes occurred in a specified period in 2003 when N.A. 

was 16 years old. In March 2006, the juvenile court adjudicated N.A. to be a 

delinquent child and committed him to the Department of Youth Services for 

concurrent terms of three years with the commitment not to exceed his attainment 

of age 21. 

{¶ 3} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Medina County reversed the 

judgment because the juvenile court violated Juv.R. 37(A) by not properly 
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recording N.A.’s adjudicatory hearing. In re N.A., Medina App. No. 06CA0032-

M, 2008-Ohio-1322. The court of appeals remanded the cause to the juvenile 

court for a rehearing. Id. at ¶ 7-8. 

{¶ 4} On remand, Judge Judith A. Cross, a judge sitting by assignment in 

the juvenile court, presided over N.A.’s delinquency case. Judge Cross began the 

adjudicatory hearing in April 2008, before N.A. turned 21 years old, and 

scheduled a continuance of the hearing to a date after his 21st birthday. 

{¶ 5} In June 2008, N.A. filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a 

writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Cross from exercising jurisdiction in the 

delinquency case. In the complaint, as subsequently amended, N.A. claimed that 

the writ should issue because there is “no statute that authorizes a juvenile court to 

conduct a trial after a person has turned twenty-one.” Judge Cross filed a motion 

to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The court of appeals 

dismissed the complaint. 

{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court upon N.A.’s appeal as of right. 

Legal Analysis 

{¶ 7} N.A. claims entitlement to a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 

Cross from proceeding in the juvenile delinquency case. To be entitled to the 

requested writ, N.A. was required to establish that (1) Judge Cross is about to 

exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is 

unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no 

adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Furnas v. 

Monnin, 120 Ohio St.3d 279, 2008-Ohio-5569, 898 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 10. Judge 

Cross has exercised judicial power by proceeding in the delinquency case. 

{¶ 8} For the remaining requirements, Judge Cross has basic statutory 

jurisdiction over the delinquency matter under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), which 

provides that the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction “[c]oncerning 

any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or 
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information is alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * * child.” See also R.C. 

2151.011(B)(5) (for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, “child” generally “means a 

person who is under eighteen years of age”). The complaint alleged that N.A. 

was a delinquent child based on rapes he had committed when he was less than 18 

years old. 

{¶ 9} More pertinently, the complaint alleging N.A. to be a delinquent 

child was filed in the juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 2152.021(A)(1) (“any person 

having knowledge of a child who appears * * * to be a delinquent child may file a 

sworn complaint with respect to that child in the juvenile court of the county in 

which the child has a residence or legal settlement or in which the * * * 

delinquent act allegedly occurred”). “Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, effective January 1, 

2002, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9447, significantly revised many juvenile statutes 

and reorganized the Revised Code by moving delinquency into a new chapter, 

R.C. Chapter 2152,” 1 and “Juv.R. 2(D) was amended effective July 1, 2001, to 

reflect that the definition of ‘child’ that formerly appeared in R.C. 2151.011 now 

appears in R.C. 2152.02.” State v. Warren, 118 Ohio St.3d 200, 2008-Ohio-2011, 

887 N.E.2d 1145, ¶ 40, fn. 6. In turn, Juv.R. 29 and 34 provide the procedure for 

adjudicatory and dispositional hearings in the juvenile court. 

{¶ 10} Under R.C. 2152.02(C)(2), subject to a provision that is 

inapplicable here, “any person who violates a federal or state law or a municipal 

ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a ‘child’ 

irrespective of that person’s age at the time the complaint with respect to that 

violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is held.” N.A. is alleged to have 

committed rape before he was 18. See also Juv.R. 2(D) (“ ‘Child’ has the same 

meaning as in sections 2151.011 and 2152.02 of the Revised Code”). Therefore, 

Judge Cross does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed 

 

1. Both parties’ arguments are premised on various sections of R.C. Chapter 2152, and neither 

party suggests that this chapter is inapplicable. 
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with the delinquency case even though N.A. turned 21 years old before the case 

concluded. And notwithstanding N.A.’s argument to the contrary, even though 

the latest hearing in the matter was precipitated by the court of appeals’ remand 

for a rehearing, that proceeding is still a “hearing on the complaint.” 

{¶ 11} N.A. asserts that R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) is limited by other statutory 

provisions in R.C. Chapter 2152, including R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), which provides 

that the “juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated a 

delinquent child * * * prior to attaining eighteen years of age until the person 

attains twenty-one years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to 

that adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a person who is so 

adjudicated a delinquent child * * * shall be deemed a ‘child’ until the person 

attains twenty-one years of age.” R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), however, is inapplicable 

because N.A. was not adjudicated a delinquent child before he was 18 years old. 

N.A. concedes this in his reply brief. 

{¶ 12} N.A.’s citation of other statutes is similarly misplaced. Cf. R.C. 

2152.17(F) (“A court shall not commit a delinquent child to the legal custody of 

the department of youth services under this division for a period that exceeds the 

child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age”) and R.C. 2152.22(A) (“all other 

dispositional orders made by the court under this chapter shall be temporary and 

shall continue for a period that is designated by the court in its order, until 

terminated or modified by the court or until the child attains twenty-one years of 

age”); see also R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(a) through (e). These statutes restrict the 

juvenile court’s dispositional power to commit delinquent children to the custody 

of the Department of Youth Services only until they are 21 years old. There is no 

indication here that Judge Cross intends to commit N.A. to the department’s 

custody now that he has reached 21 years of age. 

{¶ 13} Moreover, as Judge Cross notes, even though N.A. is now over 21 

years old, the delinquency proceeding is still important because if he is 
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adjudicated a delinquent child based on the rape offenses, N.A. would still be 

subject to the juvenile-offender-registration provisions. See R.C. 2152.82(C) (if 

an order classifying a child as a juvenile-offender registrant is issued, “the child’s 

attainment of eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate the 

order”); see also R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) (juvenile court has exclusive original 

jurisdiction to “conduct the hearings, and to make the determinations, 

adjudications, and orders authorized or required under sections 2152.82 to 

2152.86 * * * of the Revised Code regarding a child who has been adjudicated a 

delinquent child”). 

{¶ 14} Therefore, Judge Cross does not patently and unambiguously lack 

jurisdiction to proceed in the juvenile delinquency case, and N.A. has an adequate 

remedy by appeal to raise his claim. McGhan v. Vettel, 122 Ohio St.3d 227, 

2009-Ohio-2884, 909 N.E.2d 1279, ¶ 16. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 15} N.A. is thus unable to establish the latter two requirements for the 

requested extraordinary relief in prohibition. Consequently, we affirm the 

judgment of the court of appeals dismissing N.A.’s prohibition action. We also 

deny N.A.’s motion for oral argument because the parties’ briefs are sufficient to 

resolve this appeal. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J.,2 and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

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2. The late Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer participated in the deliberations in, and the final 

resolution of, this case prior to his death. 
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 Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellant. 

 Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Russell A. 

Hopkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

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