This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A15-1574 

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Joseph Otten, et al., 

Defendants, 

Paul Braun, 

Appellant. 

Filed May 23, 2016 

Affirmed 

Smith, Tracy, Judge 

Sherburne County District Court 

File No. 71-CV-14-585 

Scott G. Williams, Kyle P. Dareff, HKM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Michael B. Healy, Michael Healy Law, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith, Tracy, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

SMITH, TRACY, Judge 

Appellant Paul Braun appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, arguing that the district court erred 

as a matter of law by determining that State Farm had no duty to indemnify its insureds 
2 

against Braun’s wrongful-eviction claim. Because the insurance policy does not cover the 

insureds’ intentional acts resulting in intended harm, and because the undisputed facts 

establish that there is no coverage here, we affirm. 

FACTS 

Joseph and Kristen Otten and T.E.O. Properties, Inc. own a rental home insured 

under a Rental Dwelling Policy issued by State Farm. The policy provides businessliability coverage as follows: 

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for 

damages because of bodily injury, personal injury, or property 

damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an 

occurrence, and which arises from the ownership, 

maintenance, or use of the insured premises, we will: 

1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages 

for which the insured is legally liable; and 

2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of 

our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any 

claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to 

defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for 

damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment resulting 

from the occurrence, equals our limit of liability. 

(Emphasis added.) The policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including exposure 

to conditions” that results in (1) bodily injury; (2) property damage; or (3) personal injury. 

“Personal injury” under the policy means injury arising out of any of a number of listed 

“offenses,” including “wrongful eviction.” 

The policy also contains an intentional-acts exclusion, which excludes coverage for: 

a. bodily injury, personal injury, or property damage: 

(1) which is either expected or intended by an 

insured; or 

(2) to any person or property which is the result of 

willful and malicious acts of an insured; 
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b. bodily injury, personal injury, or property damage 

arising out of the rendering or failing to render professional 

services . . . . 

In addition, the policy contains a separate exclusion related to mold. 

In May 2011, Braun and his then wife entered a lease agreement to rent the home 

from June 1, 2011 to May 31, 2012. Before entering the lease, the Brauns inquired about 

the presence of mold in the home because Braun’s stepdaughter had respiratory problems. 

The Ottens said they were unaware of any mold. 

On May 16, 2012, a toilet malfunctioned in the home, causing water to flood the 

bathroom floor. When Joseph Otten visited the home to perform repairs, Braun asked him 

to have the home inspected for mold. According to Braun, Joseph Otten then revealed that 

the home had mold when he purchased it. Joseph Otten refused to have the home inspected 

and asked the Brauns to move out. 

On May 18, 2012, the Ottens gave the Brauns a letter titled “Notice to end lease,” 

stating: “The rental agreement ends May 31, 2012 12:00 noon. You must be moved out 

by that time. An unlawful detainer will be filed if this is not met.” The Brauns vacated the 

home on May 31. 

Braun sued the Ottens and T.E.O., alleging several claims, including wrongful 

eviction. The parties in Braun’s lawsuit entered a Miller-Shugart agreement1

 in which the 

 

1

 When the insurer does not “wholeheartedly defend the insured,” the insured may enter a 

Miller-Shugart agreement with the claimant in which the claimant agrees only to “sue for 

the insurance proceeds to enforce the settlement.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. 

Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 325 & n.2 (Minn. 1993); see Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 

729, 733-36 (Minn. 1982). 
4 

Ottens and T.E.O. agreed there was a substantial likelihood they would be found liable and 

(1) consented to pay $500 on Braun’s fraudulent-inducement claim and all issues related 

to mold and (2) consented to a $35,892 judgment on Braun’s breach-of-contract and 

wrongful-eviction claims. Braun agreed not to collect the judgment from the Ottens and 

T.E.O. but only to “seek to satisfy this judgment from State Farm.” The district court 

entered judgment for Braun against the Ottens and T.E.O. in the amount of $35,892. 

In discovery, the Ottens admitted that the lease agreement required them to provide 

30 days’ notice before evicting the Brauns and that they “were aware of the lease’s notice 

provisions but felt the circumstances warranted the May 18th notice.” Kristen Otten 

testified in a deposition that she knew of the 30-day notice requirement but decided to give 

the Brauns less than 30 days’ notice due to the circumstances. She further testified that the 

Ottens knew that the Brauns would incur costs associated with moving and finding a new 

place to live. 

State Farm sued the Ottens, the Brauns, and T.E.O., seeking a declaratory judgment 

that it had no duty to indemnify the Ottens and T.E.O. It also moved for summary 

judgment. Following a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm 

and declared that State Farm had no obligation to indemnify the Ottens and T.E.O. in 

Braun’s lawsuit. The district court found that Braun’s “non-mold-related breach of 

contract or wrongful eviction” claims were excluded from insurance coverage because the 

Ottens acted intentionally and that Braun’s mold-related claims were excluded under the 

separate mold exclusion. 

Braun appeals. 
5 

D E C I S I O N 

A district court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. We review the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment de novo to determine if there are any issues of material fact and 

whether the district court erred in applying the law. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 

N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2014). “In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins. 

Co., 819 N.W.2d 602, 610 (Minn. 2012). 

“Generally, the extent of an insurer’s liability is determined by its insurance contract 

with its insured.” Hanbury v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 865 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. App. 

2015), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2015). We review de novo the interpretation of an 

insurance policy and its application to the facts of the case. Remodeling Dimensions, Inc., 

819 N.W.2d at 610. “Insurance policies are contracts and, absent statutory provisions to 

the contrary, general principles of contract law apply.” Id. at 611. “When the language of 

a contract is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the agreement of the parties as expressed 

in the contract.” Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. 

2012). The insured has the initial burden of demonstrating coverage. Midwest Family 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. 2013). The insurer bears the burden 

to show that a coverage exclusion applies. Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc., 505 N.W.2d at 

327. 
6 

The district court concluded both that coverage was not triggered because there was 

no “occurrence” and that, even if coverage had been triggered, the intentional-acts 

exclusion applied because the injuries were expected or intended. Braun argues that as a 

matter of law the policy must be interpreted to cover the wrongful-eviction claim here. In 

the alternative, Braun argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

injuries were “expected or intended” and therefore as to whether the exclusion applies.2

1. 

We first address Braun’s argument regarding interpretation of the insurance policy. 

Braun argues that the policy is ambiguous because it both provides coverage for the 

intentional act of wrongful eviction and excludes coverage for the insured’s intentional 

acts, and that the policy therefore should be construed in favor of coverage. We disagree. 

Braun is correct that the insurance policy generally contemplates coverage for 

wrongful eviction. The policy generally provides coverage for “personal injury,” including 

injury arising from a “wrongful eviction.” The policy, however, provides coverage for 

personal injury only if the injury is “caused by an occurrence.” An “occurrence” is defined 

as an “accident.” While “accident” is not defined by the policy, our supreme court has 

defined “accident” as it appears in an insurance policy to mean “an unexpected, unforeseen, 

or undesigned happening or consequence.” Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 

605, 608 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). The policy also contains an intentional-acts 

 

2

 On appeal, Braun challenges the district court’s interpretation of the insurance policy as 

it relates to his wrongful-eviction claim only. He makes no argument regarding his breachof-contract claim. 
7 

exclusion, which excludes from coverage claims for “personal injury” when the injury is 

“expected or intended” by the insured. The plain and unambiguous language of the 

“occurrence” requirement and the intentional-acts exclusion requires a wrongful eviction 

to be accidental and the resulting injury to be unintended for coverage to apply. 

Contrary to Braun’s argument, this conclusion does not defeat coverage for all 

wrongful-eviction claims. The insurance policy does not define “wrongful eviction.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “wrongful-eviction action” as “[a] lawsuit brought by a 

former tenant . . . against one who has put the plaintiff out of possession, alleging that the 

eviction was illegal.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1752 (9th ed. 2009). In addition, it defines 

“wrongful” as “[c]haracterized by unfairness or injustice” or “[c]ontrary to law.” Id. at 

1751. Neither of these definitions requires intent. As State Farm argues, it is possible for 

a landlord to accidentally dispossess the wrong tenant or to make another mistake that 

unintentionally results in a wrongful eviction and, in such a case, coverage would apply. 

Because a “wrongful eviction” may or may not be intentional, the insurance policy does 

not both cover and exclude the same wrongful-eviction claim. 

We conclude that the district court did not err by interpreting the insurance policy 

to provide coverage only for accidental wrongful evictions where injury is not expected or 

intended. 

2. 

We turn next to Braun’s argument that, even under this reading of the insurance 

policy, summary judgment was erroneous because a genuine issue of material fact remains 
8 

regarding whether the Ottens acted intentionally. The district court concluded that “the 

Ottens’ actions were not accidental, but were intended as a matter of law.” 

“The questions of whether an injury is the result of an accident and whether 

coverage is excluded because the injury is the result of an intentional act are for all practical 

purposes, identical issues.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwich, 749 N.W.2d 108, 112 

(Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). As in Schwich, the policy here “excludes coverage 

when the insured acts with specific intent to cause injury.” See id. Such an intentionalacts exclusion applies when the insured acts “with specific intent to cause harm” and 

intends not just to act, but “intend[s] the harm itself.” Walser, 628 N.W.2d at 611 

(quotations omitted). 

Braun argues that the Ottens lacked the required intent because, at the time of the 

eviction notice, they believed that they had provided sufficient notice. In making this 

argument, Braun cites to portions of Joseph Otten’s deposition testimony that are not in the 

record, and we can find no evidence in the record to support Braun’s assertion. To the 

contrary, the record includes a portion of Kristen Otten’s deposition in which she stated 

that she knew the Ottens were required to provide 30 days’ notice but decided to give the 

Brauns less than 30 days’ notice due to the circumstances. The record also contains the 

Ottens’ admission that the lease required 30 days’ notice and that they “were aware of the 

lease’s notice provisions but felt the circumstances warranted the May 18th notice.” On 

May 18, 2012, the Ottens provided notice to the Brauns to vacate the home by May 31, just 

13 days later. The record shows no genuine issue of material fact that the Ottens 

intentionally provided inadequate notice to the Brauns. 
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Braun also argues that the Ottens lacked the required intent to cause harm because 

they did not know that the Brauns would suffer financial losses from the wrongful eviction 

and did not intend the specific injuries Braun suffered from the eviction. But the Ottens 

did not have to intend to cause Braun the specific harm he suffered. See Walser, 628 

N.W.2d at 611 (“[T]o find that an insured acted intentionally, a court need only find that 

the insured intended some harm, not that the insured intended the specific harm that 

resulted.”). In her deposition, Kristen Otten testified that the Ottens knew that the Brauns 

would incur costs associated with moving and finding a new place to live. This undisputed 

evidence supports the conclusion that the Ottens intended “some harm.” See id. 

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Ottens knew that the 

notice given was inadequate and that the Brauns would suffer financial losses, the district 

court properly concluded that the insurance policy does not cover the Ottens’ intentional 

and wrongful eviction of the Brauns as a matter of law. See Schwich, 749 N.W.2d at 112 

(defining “accident” as “an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or 

consequence” and “intentional conduct” as requiring “a specific intent to cause injury” 

(quotations omitted)). State Farm therefore was not required to indemnify the Ottens, and 

the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to State Farm. We need not 

consider State Farm’s alternative argument that the mold exclusion would also bar 

coverage for Braun’s claim. 

Affirmed.