## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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. 13-0605

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### B R O W N 

### & G A Y 

### E N G IN E E R IN G 

### , I N C



### . , P E T IT IO N E R 

### ,

v
. 

### Z U L E IM A 

### O L IV A R E S 

### , I N D IV ID U A L L Y A N D A S T H E 

### R E P R E S E N T A T IV E O F T H E 

### E S T A T E O F 

### P E D R O 

### O L IV A R E S 

### , J R



### . , & P E D R O 

### O L IV A R E S 

### , R E S P O N D E N T S

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F O U R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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Argued October 15, 2014

J U S T I C E L E H R M A N N delivere d the opinion of the C ourt, in which J U S T I C E G R E E N , J U S T I C E J O H N S O N , J U S T I C E B O Y D , and J U S T I C E D E V I N E joined.
C H I E F J U S T I C E H E C H T filed an opinion concur ring in the judgme nt, in which J U S T I C E W I L L E T T and J U S T I C E G U Z M A N joined.

J U S T I C E B R O W N did not participate in the de cision.

The doctrine of sovere ign immunit y bars suit ag ainst the g overnme nt ab s en t l egislative

consent. I n this case , a private eng ineer ing firm l awf ully contra cted with a g overnme ntal unit to
d es i gn and construct a roadw ay , and a third party sued the firm for neg lige nce in car ry ing o u t i t s responsibilities. The firm filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking the same sovere ign- immunit y protec tion that the g overnme ntal unit would enjoy had it perf ormed the work itself. The trial courtg rante d the plea, but the court of appea ls reve rsed, holding that the firm was not immune from suit.

We hold that extending sovere ign immunit y to the eng ineer ing firm d o es not serve the purposes underly ing the doctrine, and we there fore decline t o d o s o. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the court of

appea ls’ judgme nt. I. Background During the ear ly hours of J anuar y 1, 2007, an intox icated driver enter ed an exit ramp of the Westpark Tollway in Fort Be n d C o u n ty

. He proce eded east in the westbound lanes for approximately eig ht miles befor e colliding wit h a car driven by Pedro Olivare s, J r. Both drivers

wer e killed.
The For t Be nd County portion of the Tollway fell under the purview of the For t Be nd County
Toll Road Authority , a local g overnme nt corpor ati o n cre ated to desig n, build, and opera te the Tollway

. Rather than utilize g overnme nt e mploy ees to c arr y out its responsibilities, the Authority

enter ed into an Eng ineer ing Ser vices Ag ree ment with B rown & Gay Eng ineer ing, I nc. pursuant to
Texas Transpor

tation Code section 431.066(b), which authorizes local g overnme nt corpor ations to

re t ain “eng ineer ing service s require d to develop a transporta tion fac ility or sy stem.” Under that

ag ree ment, the Authority deleg ated the responsibility of desig ning road signs and traff ic lay outs to
Br own & Gay , subject to approval b y t h e Au t h o rity ’s Boa rd of Direc tors. Br own & Gay was 1

contra ctually responsible for furnishing the nece ssary equipment and personne l to perf orm its duties
and was require d to maintain insuran ce for the projec t, including worke rs’ compensa tion,

T h e A u t h o r i t y m a i n t a i n e d n o f u l l

- t i m e e m p l o y e e s
. 1
2commerc ial g ener al liability , busine s s a u to mo b il e li a

b il it y , u mb r e ll a e xc e s s li a

b il it y , a n d p rofe ssional liability

. Olivare s’s mother, individually and as representa tive of his estate, and his fathe r sued the
Au t h ority and Br own & Gay , among others, alleg ing that the failure to desig n and install proper 2 signs, war ning flasher s, and other traff ic-c ontrol device s around the exit ramp wher e the intox icated
driver entere d the Tol lway proxi mately cause d Olivare s’s dea th. The Authority filed a ple a to t he jurisdiction on g overnme ntal-immunity g rounds. The trial court denied the plea, b u t o n inte rlocutory

appea l the court of appea ls reve rsed, holding that the Authority was immune from claims based on
its discretionar

y acts rela ted to the place ment and sufficie ncy of signs and other traff ic-c ontrol and
traff ic-saf ety device s. Fort Bend Cnty. Toll Road Auth. v. Olivares , 316 S.W .3d 114, 121–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2010, no pet.). The court of appea ls rema nded the case to the trial court

to g ive the Olivare ses an opportunity to amend thei r p l ea d i n gs
. Id. at 129. On rema nd, the
Olivare ses nonsuited the Authority , whose immunity is no longe r at issue in this proce eding

. Br own & Gay then filed its own plea to the jurisdiction, arg uing that it was an employ ee of
the Authority being sued in its officia l capa city and was th e r e f o r e e n ti tl e d to g o v e rnmental immunit y
. See Tex. Adjutant Gene ral’s Office v. Ngakoue , 408 S.W .3d 350, 356 (Tex. 2013) (explaining that

a suit ag ainst a g overnme nt officia l acting in an officia l capa city is “mer ely another way of pleading

an action ag ainst the entity of which the officia l is an ag ent” (interna l quotation marks and citation

T h e O l i v a r e s e s i n i t i a l l y s u e d t h e A u t h o r i t y , H a r r i s C o u n t y , F o r t B e n d C o u n t y , t h e T e x a s D e p a r t m e n t o f 2 T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , a n d t h e H a r r i s C o u n t y T o l l R o a d A u t h o r i t y
. T h e y a m e n d e d t h e i r p e t i t i o n t o a d d B r o w n & G a y a n d M i c h a e l S t o n e E n t e r p r i s e s , I n c
. a s d e f e n d a n t s
. H a r r i s C o u n t y , F o r t B e n d C o u n t y , T x D O T , a n d t h e H a r r i s C o u n t y T o l l R o a d A u t h o r i t y h a v e a l l b e e n n o n s u i t e d

. S t o n e E n t e r p r i s e s i s n o t a p a r t y t o t h e p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w f

i l e d i n t h i s C o u r t

. 3omitted)). The trial court g rante d the plea, but the court of appea ls reve rsed, holding that Br own &

Gay was not entitled to g overnme ntal immunit y b ecause it was an independe nt contra ctor, not an “employ ee” of the Authority as that term is define d in the Texas Tort Claims Act. 401 S.W .3d 363, 3 378–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2013).

I n this Court, Br own & Gay arg ues that its status as an independe nt contra ctor rathe r than a
g overnme nt employ ee does not fore close its ent i t l em ent to the same immunit y aff orded to the
Aut h o ri t y
. I t arg

ues that the court of appea ls’ relianc e on the Tort Claims Act was misplaced
beca use the Act “uses ‘employ ee’ to delineate the circ umstances wher e the g overnme nt will be liable
under a waiver of immunit y ,” not “to limit the scope of

. . . u n wa ived g overnme ntal immunit y .”

Br own & Gay further arg ues that the purposes of sovere ign immunit y are serve d by extending it to

p r iv a te e n ti ti e s p e r f

o r mi n g authorized g overnme ntal functions for which the g overnme nt itself w o u ld
be immune. II. Analysi s

A. Origin and P urpose of S overe ign Imm uni ty
Once ag ain we are prese nted with questions about the para meters of sovere ign immunit y , the
well-e stablished doctrine “that ‘no state can be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent.’” Tooke v. City of Mex ia , 197 S.W .3d 325, 331 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Hosner v. DeYoung , 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847))

. Whil e sovere ign immunit y develope d

T h e T o r t C l a i m s A c t d e f i n e s “ e m p l o y e e ” a s “ a p e r s o n , i n c l u d i n g a n o f f i c e r o r a g e n t , w h o i s i n t h e p a i d s e r v i c e 3

o f a g o v e r n m e n t a l u n i t b y c o m p e t e n t a u t h o r i t y , b u t d o e s n o t i n c l u d e a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r , a n a g e n t o r e m p l o y e e o f a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r , o r a p e r s o n w h o p e r f o r m s t a s k s t h e d e t a i l s o f w h i c h t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l u n i t d o e s n o t h a v e t h e l e g a l r i g h t t o c o n t r o l

. ” T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E § 1 0 1

. 0 0 1 ( 2 )

. 4as a common-law doctrine, we “have consistently defe rre d to the L eg islature to waiv e s u ch

immunit y .” Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dall. , 197 S.W .3d 371, 375 (Tex. 2006) (empha sis omitted). Refer

red to as g overnme ntal immunit y when applied to the state’s political subdivisions , 4

Tra vi s C en t

. Appraisal Dist. v. N orman , 342 S.W .3d 54, 57–58 (Tex. 2011), sovereig n immunit y
encompa sses both immunit y from suit and immu n it y f r o m li a b il ity , Reata Constr. Corp. , 197 S.W .3d

at 374. I mmunity from liability is an aff irmative defe nse that bars enfor ceme nt of a judgme nt ag ainst

a g overnme ntal entity , while immunit y from suit bars suit ag ainst the entity altog ether and may be
raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. State v. Lueck , 290 S.W .3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009); W ichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W .3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2003). Although the doctrine’ s orig ins lie in the antiquated “fe udal fiction that ‘the King can do no
wrong ,’” m odern- day justifications revolve around protec ting the public trea sury
. Taylor , 106
S.W .3d at 695. At its core , the d o ctrine “prote cts the State [and its political subdivisions ] from
lawsuits for money damag es” an d other forms of relief , and leave s to the L eg islature the
deter mination of when to allow tax resour ces to be shifted “aw ay from their intended purposes
toward defe nding lawsuits and pay ing ju d g ments.” Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 853–54 (Tex. 2002) (plurality op.); see also Tex. Dep’ t of Transp. v. Sefzik , 355 S.W .3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011) (per curia m) (noting that sovere ign immunit y “shield[s] the state
from lawsuits see king othe r for ms of relief

,” not just suits seeking money judgme nts). And while
inhere ntly connec ted to the p r o te c ti o n o f th e p u b li c f is c, sovere ign immunit y prese rves separ ation-of-

W e w i l l u s e t h e t e r m s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e o p i n i o n t o r e f

e r t o b o t h d o c t r i n e s
. 4
5power s principles by preve nting the judiciary from interfe ring with the L eg islature’s prer og ative to

allocate t ax d o l lars. See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black , 392 S.W .3d 88, 97 (Tex. 2012) (noting that
immunit y respe cts “the rela tionship betwee n the leg islative and judicial branc hes of g overnme nt”);

see a l s o F ed

. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ. , 951 S.W .2d 401, 414 (Tex. 1997) (He cht, J ., concur ring ) (outlining moder

n political and financ ial justifications for sover eig n immunit y ). Sovereig n immunit y thus protec ts the public as a whole by preve nting potential disruptions

o f key g overnme nt service s that could occur when g overnme nt funds are unexpectedly and substantially

diverted by

litigation. I t also rec og nizes that the L eg islature has the responsibility to
deter mine how t hese public funds wil l be spent. But with this benefit comes a signific ant cost: in “shield[ing] the public from the costs and conseque nces of improv ident actions of their

g overnme nts,” Tooke , 197 S.W .3d at 332, so vere ign immunit y place s the burden of shouldering
those “costs and conseque nces” on injured individuals. See Bacon v. Tex. Historical Comm’n , 411
S.W .3d 161, 172 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (noting th at “s o v ere ign immunit y g ener ally
shields our state go v er nment’s improvident acts—howe ver improvident, harsh, unjust, or
in f u r ia ti n g ly b o n e heade d these acts may seem” (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)). An d
it do es so by fore closing —absent a leg islative waiver —the litigation and judicial reme dies that
would be available to the injured person had the complained- of acts bee n co mmitt ed by private

persons. Id.

I n this case , we do not consider whether a g overnme ntal unit is immune from suit or whether
the g overnme nt’s immunit y has been waived. I nstead, a private company that perf ormed alleg edly

neg lige nt acts in car

ry ing out a contra ct with a g overnme ntal unit seeks to invoke the same immunit y

6that the g overnme nt itself enjoy s. Wit h the considerations outlined above in mind, we examine the

parties’ arg uments.
B. Ef fect of Statutes Extendin g or Lim iting Imm uni ty Notwithstanding the doctrine’ s judicial orig ins, both parties arg ue in part that the L eg islature
has resolved whether to extend sovere ign immunit y to a p ri v ate contra ctor like Br own & Gay

. Br own & Gay cites a statute that expli citly prohibits private parties that contra ct with the g overnme nt
to finance , construct, ope rate , maintain, or mana g e cor rec tional fac iliti es from claiming sovere ign
immunit y in a suit a

rising from service s under the contra ct. T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E §§ 495.001, .005. 5

Br own & Gay infers from this provision that sovere ign immunit y ex t en d s t o private entities

contra cting to perf

orm g overnme nt f

unctions, unless otherwise provided by statute. We disa g ree
. The fac t that a statute rec og nizes t h at p ri v ate contra ctors are not entitled to sovere ign immunit y
under certa in circ umstances does n o t i m p l y t h at such entit ies are entitled to immunit y in all other
situations.
On the other hand, the Olivare ses contend that aff irmative statutory extensions of immunit y to private c ontrac tors in some instances demonstrate legislative int ent t o fore close such immunity
absent a specific leg islative g rant. Fo r example, the Transpor tation Code provides that an independe nt co ntrac tor of a reg ional transporta tion authority that “per forms a function of the authority or [certain other specifie d entities] is liable for damag es only to the extent that the authority

or entity would be liable” for perf orming the function itself. T E X

. T R A N S P

. C O D E § 452.056; see also

“ A p r i v a t e v e n d o r o p e r a t i n g u n d e r a c o n t r a c t a u t h o r i z e d b y t h i s s u b c h a p t e r m a y n o t c l a i m s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y 5 i n a s u i t a r i s i n g f

r o m t h e s e r v i c e s p e r f

o r m e d u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t b y t h e p r i v a t e v e n d o r o r c o u n t y
. ” T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 4 9 5

. 0 0 5

. 7id. § 452.0561 (extending the same immunit y to i n d ep endent contra ctors of cer tain statutory
transporta tio n en t i t i es ). The Olivareses arg ue that the absence of simil ar leg islation applicable to

contra ctors of local g overnme nt corpor ations like the Authority evince s leg islative intent to deprive
such contra ctors of immunit y
. That may be the case , but it does not answe r the question befor e us. Sovereig n immunit y is a common-law cre ation, and “it rema ins the judiciary ’s responsibility

to define the boundar ies of the . .

. doctrine and to deter mine under what circ umstances sovereig n
immu n i t y ex i s t s in the first instance.” Reata Constr. Corp. , 197 S.W .3d at 375. By contra st, as
noted above, the L eg islature deter mines when and to what extent to waive that immunit y
. Id.
Acc ording ly , the absenc e of a statutory g rant of immu n i t y i s irrele vant to whether , as a matter of

common law, the boundarie s of sovere ign immunit y encompa ss private g overnme nt contra ctors exercising their independe nt discretion in perf orm i n g go vernme nt functions. For the rea sons 6 discussed below, w e hold that they do not.
C. Sovere ign Imm uni ty and Pr ivate Contr actor s
1. Extendin g Sovereign Im m uni ty to Brown & Gay Doe s Not F urther

the Doc trine’s R ationale and P urpose
Gu iding our analy sis of whether to extend sovere ign immunit y to private contra ctors like

Br own & Gay is whether doing so comports with and further s the leg itimate purposes that justify this
otherwise harsh doctrine. Br own & Gay contends that extending immunit y serve s these purposes. We disag ree
.

T o t h a t e n d , B r o w n & G a y i s c o r r e c t t h a t t h e T o r t C l a i m s A c t d o e s n o t c r e a t e s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y ; i t “ p r o v i d e s 6

a l i m i t e d w a i v e r ” o f t h a t i m m u n i t y
. T e x

. D e p ’ t o f P a r k s & W i l d l i f e v

. M i r a n d a , 1 3 3 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 7 , 2 2 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 4 )

. 8Seizi ng on the g ener al purpose of protec ting the public fisc, Br o wn & Gay arg ues that

immunit y for g overnme nt contra ctors will save the g overnme nt money in the long term. More specific ally , while Br own & Gay rec og nizes that its exposure to defe nse costs and a money judgme nt
will not aff

ect the Tollway projec t’s cost to the g overnme nt, Br own & Gay asser ts that the incre ased

costs g ener ally associate d with contra ctors’ litigation exposure will be passed on to the g overnme nt, resulting in highe r contract prices and g overnme nt expense. Citi ng the s ame rationale, an amicus
brief urg es us to adopt a fra mework that would extend sovere ign imm u n i t y to a private entity perf orming discretionar

y g overnme nt work, so long as the contra ctor is authorized to do so and the

g overnme nt w ould be immune had it perfor med the wor

k itself. I n proposing this test, the amicus
contends that, just as sovere ign immunit y has been extended to politica l s u b d ivisions perf orming

g overnme ntal functions, it should be extended to p ri v at e entities authorized to perf orm those
functions.
As an initial matter, we no t e t h at Br own & Gay cites no evidenc e to support its proposed justification and ig

n o res the many fac tors at play within the highly competitive world of g overnme ntco n t ra ct bidding. I t also disreg ards the fac t that private companies can and do manag e their ris k

exposure by obtaining insurance , as Br own & Gay did in this case
. But even assuming that holding private entities liable fo r t h eir own neg lige nce in fac t makes contra cting with those entities more expensive for the g overnme n t , t h i s argume nt supports extending sovere ign immunit y to these

contra ctors only

if the doctrine is strictly

a cost-sa ving me asure . I t is not. Sovereig n immunit y has never been defe nded as a mecha nism to avoid any and all incre ases
in public expenditures. Rather, it was design ed t o g uard ag ainst the “unfor esee n expenditures”

9associate d with the g overnme nt’s defe nding lawsui t s an d p ay ing judgme nts “that could hamper

g overnme nt functions” by diverting funds from their allocate d purposes. Sefzik , 355 S.W .3d at 621; IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 853. I mmuniz ing a private contra ctor in no way further s this rationale

. Even
if holding a private party liable for its own improvident actions in perf orming a g overnme nt contra ct indirectly leads to highe r overa ll costs to g overnme nt entities in eng ag ing private contra ctors, those

costs will be ref

lected in the neg otiated contra ct price

. This allows the g overnme nt to plan spending on the projec t with reasona ble ac cura cy
. B y c o n tr a st, immuniz ing the g overnme nt—both th e St a te a n d it s p o li ti c a l s u

b d iv is io n s

— f

r o m
suit direc tly serve s the doctrine’ s purposes beca use t h e costs associate d with a potential lawsuit
cannot be anticipate d at t h e project’s out set. L itigation aga inst the gover nment there fore disrupts
the g overnme nt’s allocation of funds on the back end, when the only option may be to divert money previously ear

marke d for another purpose. I t is this diversion—and the associate d risk of disrupting 7

g overnme nt service s—that sovere ign immunit y addre sses. Acc ord in g ly , th e r a ti o n a le u nderly ing the
doctrine of

sovere ign immunity

does not support extending that immunity to Brow n & G ay
. 2. Sovereign Im m uni ty Doe s Not Extend to P rivate Com pani es Exerc isin g Ind ependent Discre tion
We have never direc tly addre ssed the extension of immunit y to private g overnme nt

contra ctors, but our analy sis in K.D.F. v. Rex , 878 S.W .2d 589 (Tex. 1994), is instructive. I n that

case , we examined w hether a private company that contra cted with the Kansa s Public Employ ees’

A s n o t e d a b o v e , p r i v a t e p a r t i e s l i k e B r o w n & G a y h a v e a n e s t a b l i s h e d m e a n s o f p r o t e c t i n g t h e m s e l v e s f r o m 7 t h e s p e c t e r o f c o s t l y l i t i g a t i o n

— i n s u r a n c e
. I n d e e d , a s n o t e d a b o v e B r o w n & G a y w a s c o n t r a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e d t o , a n d d i d , p u r c h a s e s e v e r a l c a t e g o r i e s o f i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e o n t h e T o l l w a y p r o j e c t

. T h e p r e m i u m s f o r t h i s c o v e r a g e w e r e u n d o u b t e d l y t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t d u r i n g t h e b i d d i n g p r o c e s s
. 1 0Retirement Sy stem, a Kansa s g overnme ntal entity cre ated to manag e and invest Kansas state

employ ees’ retire ment saving s, could benef it from the sy stem’s sovere ign immunit y and take
advanta g e of a Ka

nsas statute that re quired a ll “actions ‘directly or i ndirec tly ’ aga inst the s y stem”
to be broug ht in a particula r county in Kansa s. Id. at 592. K.D.F. require d us to interpre t statutory lang uag e that is not at issue here ; howeve r, in reje cting the private company ’s asser tion that any lawsuit ag ainst it was “indirec tly ” a la wsuit ag ainst the sy stem, we telling ly noted:
Whil e sovere ign immunit y protec ts the a c ti v it ie s o f g o v e r n me n t e n ti ties, no sovere ign is entitled to ex tend that protec tion ad infinit um throug h nothing more than private contra cts. [The private entity ] is not entitled to sovere ign immunit y protec tion unless i t ca n demonstrate its actions wer e actions of the Kansa s g overnme nt, executed subject to the control of

[t he sy stem].
Id. at 597. I n turn, we held that another private company that “oper ate[d] solely upon the direc tion
of [t he sy stem]” and “exerc ise[d] no discretion in its activities” was indi s t i n gu ishable from the

sy stem, such that “a l aw s u i t aga inst one [wa]s a lawsuit ag ainst the other.” Id. This rea soning implies that private parties exercising independe nt discretion are not entitled to sovere ign immunit y
. The control require ment discussed in K.D.F. is consistent with the rea soning fede ral courts
have utiliz ed in extending deriva tive immunit y to fede ral contra ctors only in limit ed circ umstances.
For example, in Butters v. Vance Intern a t i onal, Inc. , a female employ ee of a private secur ity firm
hired to supplement secur ity at t he C alifornia residenc e of Saudi Ara bian roy als s u ed t h e firm for

g ender discrimination afte r being declined a favor able assig nment. 225 F.3d 462, 464 (4th Cir. 2000). Although the firm had rec ommended the employ ee for t h e assi g nment, Saudi milit ary supervisors reje cted the rec ommendation on the g rounds that the assig nment would offe nd I slamic
law and Saudi c ultural norms. Id. Concluding tha t the Saudi g overnme nt w ould be immune f rom

1 1suit under the F oreig n Sovereig n I mmuniti es Ac t, the Four th Circuit then considered whether that
immunit y attache d to the secur ity

firm. Id. at 465. Holdi ng that it did, the cour t relied on the f

act
that the firm “wa s following Saudi Ara bia’s order s not to promote [t he employ ee],” expressly noting
that the firm “would not [have been] entitled to d eriva tive immunit y ” had the firm rathe r t han the

sovere ign ma de the de cision to decline the pr omotion. Id. at 466.
This limi tation on the extension of immunit y to gove rnment contra ctors is ec hoed in other

case s. For example, in Ack erson v. Bean Dredging LLC , fede ral contra ctors wer e sued for damag es alleg edly cause d by dredg ing in conjunction with the Mississ ippi River Gulf Outlet projec t. 589 F.3d
196 (5th Cir. 2009). Rely ing on Y earsley v. W

.A. Ross Construction C o. , 309 U.S. 18 (1940), the
Fifth Circuit held t hat the contra ctors wer e entitled to immunit y for their actions taken within the

scope of their authority for the purpose of further ing the projec t. 589 F.3d at 206–07, 210. Notably , 8
howeve r, the court found signific ant that the plaintiffs’ alleg ations “attac k[ed] Congr ess’s policy of

cre ating and m ai n t ai n i ng the [project], not any separate act of negligence by the Contractor Defendants .” Id. at 207 (empha sis added) ; see also Y earsley , 3 0 9 U. S. at 20 (holding that a

contra ctor directed by

the fe dera l gove rnment to construc t severa l dikes was im mune from claims arising from the resulting erosion and loss of proper ty when the damag e was alleg edly cause d by the dikes’ existence, not the manne r of their construction).

We cited Y

earsley in a case involving a city contra ctor hired to build sewe r lines along a city

owned ease ment in acc ordanc e with the city ’s plans and specific ations. Glade v. Dietert , 295

T h e F i f t h C i r c u i t n o t e d t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t o r s ’ e n t i t l e m e n t t o d i s m i s s a l w a s n o t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

. 5 8 9 F

. 3 d a t 2 0 7

. 8
1 2S.W .2d 642, 643 (Tex. 1956). The city had i n ad v er t en t l y failed to acquir e the entire easeme nt as

ref lecte d i n t h e p l ans, and the contra ctor was sued for trespass afte r bulldoz ing a portion of a
l an d o wn er ’s p roperty

. Id. Whil e immunit y was not at issue in Glade beca use the city owed th e
landowner compensa tion for a taking , we cited Y earsley and other case law for the proposition that

a public-works contra ctor “is liable to third parties only for n egl i gen ce in the perf ormanc e of the
work a nd not for the r esult of the wor k perf ormed a ccor ding to the c ontrac t.” Id. at 644.

I n eac h of these case s, the complained- of conduct for which the contra ctor was immune was
eff ectively attri b uted to the g overnme nt. That is, the alleg ed cause of the injury was not the independe nt action of the contra ctor, but the action taken by the g overnme nt through the contra ctor. 9

I n this case , the Oli vare ses do not complain of harm caused by Br own & Gay ’s i mplementing th e Authority ’s specifications or following any specific g overnme nt direc tions or order s. Under the

O n e f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t a p t l y s u m m a r i z e d t h e f r a m e w o r k g o v e r n i n g t h e e x t e n s i o n o f d e r i v a t i v e i m m u n i t y 9 t o f e d e r a l c o n t r a c t o r s a s f

o l l o w s :

T h e r a t i o n a l e u n d e r l y i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r a c t o r d e f e n s e i s e a s y t o u n d e r s t a n d

. W h e r e t h e g o v e r n m e n t h i r e s a c o n t r a c t o r t o p e r f o r m a g i v e n t a s k , a n d s p e c i f i e s t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e t a s k i s t o b e p e r f

o r m e d , a n d t h e c o n t r a c t o r i s l a t e r h a l e d i n t o c o u r t t o a n s w e r f o r a h a r m t h a t w a s c a u s e d b y t h e c o n t r a c t o r ’ s c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , t h e c o n t r a c t o r i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e s a m e i m m u n i t y t h e g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d e n j o y , b e c a u s e t h e c o n t r a c t o r i s , u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e f f e c t i v e l y a c t i n g a s a n o r g a n o f g o v e r n m e n t , w i t h o u t i n d e p e n d e n t d i s c r e t i o n
. W h e r e , h o w e v e r , t h e c o n t r a c t o r i s h i r e d t o p e r f o r m t h e s a m e t a s k , b u t i s a l l o w e d t o e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g h o w t h e t a s k s h o u l d b e a c c o m p l i s h e d , i f t h e m a n n e r o f p e r f o r m i n g t h e t a s k u l t i m a t e l y c a u s e s a c t i o n a b l e h a r m t o a t h i r d p a r t y t h e c o n t r a c t o r i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o d e r i v a t i v e s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y , b e c a u s e t h e h a r m c a n b e t r a c e d , n o t t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s a c t i o n s o r d e c i s i o n s , b u t t o t h e c o n t r a c t o r ’ s i n d e p e n d e n t d e c i s i o n t o p e r f

o r m t h e t a s k i n a n u n s a f e m a n n e r
. S i m i l a r l y , w h e r e t h e c o n t r a c t o r i s h i r e d t o p e r f o r m t h e t a s k a c c o r d i n g t o p r e c i s e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s b u t f

a i l s t o c o m p l y w i t h t h o s e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , a n d t h e c o n t r a c t o r ’ s d e v i a t i o n f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t s p e c i f i c a t i o n s a c t i o n a b l y h a r m s a t h i r d p a r t y , t h e c o n t r a c t o r i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o i m m u n i t y b e c a u s e , a g a i n , t h e h a r m w a s n o t c a u s e d b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s i n s i s t e n c e o n a s p e c i f

i e d m a n n e r o f p e r f

o r m a n c e b u t r a t h e r b y t h e c o n t r a c t o r ’ s f a i l u r e t o a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s d i r e c t i v e s
.
B i x b y v

. K B R , I n c

. , 7 4 8 F

. S u p p
. 2 d 1 2 2 4 , 1 2 4 2 ( D

. O r
. 2 0 1 0 )

. 1 3contra ct at issue, Br own & Gay was responsible for prepa ring “dra wing s, specific ations and details
for all signs.” Fur

ther, the Olivare ses do not complain about the decision to build the Tollway or the

mere fac t of its exis tence , but that Br own & Gay was independe ntly neg lige nt in desig ning the signs
and traff ic lay outs for the Tollway

. Br own & Gay ’s decisions in desig ning the Tollway ’s safe g uards

are its own. 1 0
Simi lar principles have be en ec hoed in Tex as appellate court decisions, cited by Br own & Gay , addre ssing the extension of immunit y to private ag ents of the g overnme nt. Two of these case s
extended immunit y to private law firms hired to assist the g overnme nt with collecting unpaid taxes.
Ross v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P. , 333 S.W .3d 736 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); City of Hous. v. First City , 827 S.W .2d 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1 9 9 2 , wr i t d enied)

. I n City of Houston , the court of appea ls eng ag ed in a traditional principal–a g ency analy sis to hold that the law firm was not liable as the city ’s ag ent on the plaintiff’s
claim t hat the city

brea ched a

n “ac cord and satisfac tion.” 827 S.W .2d at 479–80. I n contra st, the
Olivares es d o n ot asser

t that Br own & Gay is liable for the Authority ’s actions; they asser t that

Br own & Gay

is liable for its own ac tions.

I n Ross , the court of appea ls held that the law firm was the “equiva lent of a state officia l or employ ee” being sued in its officia l capa city

. 333 S.W .3d at 742–43. But Br own & Gay has notably
abandone d the very arg ument that the case would seem to support: that the Olivare ses sued Br own
& Gay as a g overnme nt employ ee in its officia l capa city and there fore eff ectively s u ed t h e

A t o r a l a r g u m e n t , B r o w n & G a y ’ s c o u n s e l r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e T o l l w a y p r o j e c t , o r t h e 10

“ d i s c r e t i o n a r y f

u n c t i o n s ” a s p u t b y c o u n s e l , w e r e d e l e g a t e d t o B r o w n & G a y
. 1 4g overnme nt. Moreover , in determining whether the law firm was the equivalent of a state of ficial
in Ross , the court of appea ls examined the pleading s to conclude that the plaintiff had sued the law
firm as an ag ent of the taxi ng entity and had “asse rted no fac ts indicating that the taxi ng entities did

not have the leg al rig ht to control the details of the tax-collecting task deleg ated to [the firm].” Id. Reg ardle ss of whether these case s wer e corr ectly decide d, the g overnme nt’s rig ht to control
that led these c ourts to ext end immunity to a private g overnme nt c ontrac tor is utter ly absent he re.
The evidenc e shows that Br own & Gay was an independe nt contra ctor with discretion to desig n the Tollway ’s sig nag e and r oad lay outs. W e need not establish today whether some deg ree of control by the g overnme nt would extend its immunit y protec tion to a pri v at e party ; we hold only that no
control is deter

minative. 1 1 Finally , Br o wn & Gay cites Foster v. Teacher Retireme nt System , 273 S.W .3d 883 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.), to support the extension of immunit y in this case
. I n that case , a retire d

teac her sued the Tea cher Retirement Sy stem of Texas (a state ag ency ) as well as Aetna, the private

company hired to administer the ag ency ’s insurance plan. Id. at 885. The suit a rose from Aetna’ s
denial of health cover ag e on a claim afte r concluding that the provider was not in- network and the

trea tment was not medically nece ssary
. Id. The court of appea ls held that both the ag ency and Aetna

wer e immune from suit for claims arising out of the cover ag e denial. Id. at 890. Howeve r, the terms

T h e a m i c u s a s s e r t s t h a t “ n o p o l i c y r e a s o n ” s u p p o r t s e m p l o y i n g a c o n t r o l

- o r i e n t e d a n a l y s i s
. I n d o i n g s o , t h e 11

a m i c u s i m p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e s t h a t p o l i c y c o n c e r n s a r e c e n t r a l t o d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r i m m u n i t y s h o u l d b e e x t e n d e d

. A s d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h a b o v e , t h e p o l i c y b e h i n d i m m u n i t y d o e s n o t s u p p o r t i t s e x t e n s i o n h e r e r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r a c o n t r o l

o r i e n t e d a n a l y s i s a p p l i e s
. 1 5of the contra ct , t h e rela tionship betwee n the state ag ency and the contra ctor, and the direc t implication of state funds in that ca se distinguish it from the c ase a t hand.

I n Foster , the court of appea ls rec og nized that Aetna had discretion to interpre t the insurance plan, but explained that, under the contra ct with the ag ency , “Ae tna simply provi d e [d] administrative
service s to fac ilitate the provision of hea lth care to [ cover ed] retiree s.” Id. Fur ther, the insurance plan was fully funded by the state such that Aetna had no stake in a claim’s approva l or denial, the

ag ency set the terms of the plan, Aetna acte d as an ag ent of and in a fiduciar y capa city for the ag ency , and the agenc y ag ree d to indemnify Aetna for any obliga tions arising out of its g ood-fa ith perf ormanc e. Id. at 889–90. The court compar ed Aetna to the “fiduc iary intermediar ies” discussed
in fede ral case law holding that “a private company is protec ted by Eleventh Amendment immunit y
if the suit amounts to one seeking to rec over money from the state.” Id. at 889 (citing case s). I n this

case , no fiduciar

y rela tionship exis ts betwee n Br own & Gay and t h e Au t h ority

. Fur ther, in suing

Br own & Gay the Olivare ses do not eff ectively seek to rec over money from the g overnme nt. Unlike
the cover ag e claims in Foster , which implicated both the state-f u n d ed i nsuranc e plan and the

ag ency ’s duty

to indemnify

Aetna, the underlying suit threatens only Br own & Gay ’s pocke ts.
I n sum, we cannot adopt Br own & Gay ’s contention that it is entitled to share in the Authority ’s sovere ign immunity solely beca use the Authority

was statutorily

authorized to eng ag e
Br own & Gay ’s service s and would have been immune had it perf ormed those service s itself. That is, we decline to extend to private entities the same immunit y the g overnme nt enjoy s fo r re asons
unrela ted t o the rationale that justifies such i mmunity in the first place . The Olivar eses’ suit does
not thr eate n allocate d g overnme nt f unds and does not se ek to hold Br own & Gay liable mere ly for

1 6following the g overnme nt’s direc tions. Br own & Gay is responsible for its own neg lige nce as a cost

of doing business and may (and did) insure ag ainst that risk, just a s it would had it contra cted with a priva te owner

.

D. Justif ications f or Qualif ied and Of

fi cial Im m uni ty Do NotSup port the Extension of

Sovereign Im m uni ty to P rivate P artie s
I n addition to the cost-saving rationale discussed abo ve, Br own & Gay cites the U.S. Supreme Court ’s o p i n i o n in Filarsky v. Delia to arg ue that extending sovere ign immunit y to

g overnme nt contra ctors advanc es the g overnme nt interest in avoiding “unwa rra nted timidi ty ” on the
part of those perf

orming public duties. 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1665 (2012 ). T h e i s s u e in Filarsky was
whether individuals hired to do g overnme nt work “on something other than a perma nent or full-time
basis” enjoy ed the same qualified immunit y as traditional go v er nment employ ees from claims broug ht a g ainst them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1660. The Supreme Court he ld tha t a private
attorney eng ag ed by a city to investiga te a personne l matter could asser t qualified immunit y in a suit alleg ing constitutional violations com m itted during the course of the investiga tion. Id. at 1661,
1 6 6 7

– 68. The Court saw no basis to distinguish betwee n a full-time g overnme nt employ ee, wh o
would be entitled to asser t such immunit y , and an individual hired to do g overnme nt work on some
other ba sis. Id.

Br own & Gay ’s relianc e on Fila r s k y ’s qualified-immunity analy sis is misplaced. The fede ral
doctrine of qualified immunit y “prote cts g overnme nt officia ls ‘fr om liability for civil damag es
insofar as their conduct does not violate clea rly established statutory or constitutional rig hts of which

a rea sonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting

1 7Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))

. Unlike sovere ign immunit y , qualified immunit y

does not protec t the g overnme nt’s tax-funded coff ers from lawsuits and money judgme nts. Rather,
it protec ts g overnme n t o ff i cials’ persona l coff

ers by “shield[ing] officia ls from hara ssment, distraction, and liability

when they

perf orm their duties re asonably .” Id. Qualified immunit y is a uniquely fede ral doctrine, calling into further dou bt Filarsky ’s
rele vance to the iss u e i n t h i s case
. At best, the doctrine bear s some rese mblance to the Texas
common-law defe nse of officia l immunit y , which protec ts g overnme nt office rs from persona l liability in perf

orming discretionar

y duties in g ood faith within the scope of their authority

. Kassen 1 2

v. Hatley , 887 S.W .2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1994); see also Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc. , 144 S.W .3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2004) (“Common law officia l immunit y is based on the nece ssity of public officia ls

to act in the public interest with confide nce and without the hesitation that could arise from having
their judgme n t co n t i n u ally questioned by extended litigation.”)

. I n Kassen , we noted the welle s ta b li s h e d d istinction betwee n “off icial immunit y , which protec ts individual officia ls from liability , [and] sovere ign immunit y , which protec ts g overnme ntal entities from liability .” 887 S.W .2d at 8.
We also rec og nized that a g overnme nt employ ee’ s rig ht to officia l immunit y is unrela ted to a plaintiff’s rig ht to pursue the g overnme n t u n d er a l eg islative waiver of sovere ign immunit y
. Id.

Fur ther, unlike sovere ign immunit y from suit, which as noted above may be ra ised in a plea to the jurisdiction, officia l immunit y is an af firmative de fense that must be pled and proved by the party

asser ting it. City of L ancaster v. Chambe rs , 883 S.W .2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994).

I n C i t y o f L a n c a s t e r v

. C h a m b e r s , w e n o t e d t h a t f e d e r a l l a w o n q u a l i f

i e d i m m u n i t y w a s i n s t r u c t i v e i n 1 2

e v a l u a t i n g w h e t h e r a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w a s e n t i t l e d t o o f

f i c i a l i m m u n i t y f

o r h i s a c t i o n s i n c o n d u c t i n g a h i g h

- s p e e d c h a s e
. 8 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 0 , 6 5 4 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 4 )

. 1 8I n t h is case , Br own & Gay has never arg ued that the officia l-immunit y defe nse may b e

asser ted by a person perf

orming g overnme nt work “on something other than a perma nent o r full-time
basis.” Filarsky , 132 S. Ct. at 1660. Nor has it ever pled or arg ued that the elements of the defe nse

are satisfied here

. I nstead, Br own & Gay arg ues t h at i t i s entitled to the same immunit y that the

g overnme nt itself en

j o y s. But the policies underly ing officia l and qualified immunit y are simply
irrele vant to that contention.

Br own & Gay also arg ues that declining to extend sover ei gn immunit y to contra ctors like

Br own & Gay will make it difficult for the g overnme nt to eng ag e talented private parties fea rful of

persona l liability

. As noted above, such specula tion fails to take into acc ount a private party ’s ability

to manag e th a

t li a bility exposure throug h insurance

. I t also ignor es the counter vailing considerations
that make contra cting with the g overnme nt attrac tive, not the least of which is lack of conce rn about the g overnme nt’s ability

to pay

. Moreove r, a lo n g line of Texas case law rec og nizes g overnme nt contra ctors’ liability for their

neg lige nce in r oad and hig hway construction. See, e.g. , Bay, Inc. v. Ramos , 139 S.W .3d 322, 328 (Tex

. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (holding that a g overnme nt contra ctor hired for highw ay construction work was not entitled to share in the s t ate’ s sovere ign immunit y when the

contra ctor exer c is e d c o n s id e rable discretion in maintaining the construction site wher e the plaintiff’s injury occur

red) ; Ove rstreet v. McClelland , 13 S.W .2d 990, 992 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amar illo 1928,
writ dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that a g overnme nt contra ctor hired for highw ay construction work had

a duty to exercise ordinary car e to protec t trave lers using the h i gh wa y d es p i t e the fac t that the

g overnme nt itself could not be held liable for the neg lige nce of its office rs or ag ents); cf. Strakos v.

1 9Gehring , 360 S.W .2d 787, 790, 793–94 (Tex. 1962) (holding , in the co n t ex t of reje cting the

“ac cepte d work” doctrine, that a county contra ctor hired to reloc ate fenc ing along side widened roads

was not insulated from tort liability for injuries that occur red afte r the county acc epted the work but

wer e cause d by the condition in which the contra ctor left the premises). Br own & Gay cites no
evidenc e supporting a shortag e of w illing contra ctors notwithstanding this li ne of c ases.
III. Conclusi on
We decline to extend sovere ign immunity to private contra ctors based solely on the nature
of the contra ctors’ work when the very rationale for the doctrine provides no support for doing so.
We hold that the trial court err ed in g ranting Br own & Ga y ’s plea to the jurisdiction and that the

court of appea ls proper ly reve rsed that order

. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the court of appea ls’ judgme nt.

_________________________________ Debr a H. L ehrma

nn J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: April 24, 2015

2 0