* 1 The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice

2 (Retired) of the United States Supreme Court, sitting by

3 designation.

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06-0086-cv

Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3

4 August Term 2006

5 (Argued: October 11, 2006 Decided: April 24, 2007)

6 (Amended: July 12, 2007)

7 Docket No. 06-0086-cv

8 -----------------------------------------------------x

9 ARBOR HILL CONCERNED CITIZENS NEIGHBORHOOD

10 ASSOCIATION, ALBANY COUNTY BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL

11 ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,

12 AARON MAIR, MARYAM MAIR, AND MILDRED CHANG,

13

14 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

15

16 -- v. --

17

18 COUNTY OF ALBANY AND ALBANY COUNTY BOARD OF

19 ELECTIONS, 

20

21 Defendants-Appellees,

22

23 –- and -–

24

25 THE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS OF THE ALBANY COUNTY

26 LEGISLATURE,

27

28 Intervenors.

29

30 -----------------------------------------------------x

31

32 B e f o r e : JACOBS, Chief Judge, WALKER, Circuit Judge,

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice Retired.

* 33

34 Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for

35 the Northern District of New York (Norman A. Mordue, Judge)

36 granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs-appellants’

37 motion for attorney’s fees.
1 1 After due consideration of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ petition

2 for rehearing, which is denied, we have sua sponte amended our

3 opinion. 

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1 AFFIRMED.

2 MITCHELL A. KARLAN (Mark E. Bini

3 and Michelle Craven, on the brief),

4 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, New

5 York, New York, for Plaintiffs6 Appellants.

7

8 THOMAS J. O’CONNOR, Napierski,

9 Vandenburgh & Napierski, LLP,

10 Albany, New York, for Defendants11 Appellees.

12

AMENDED OPINION1 13

14 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

15 In this appeal from the district court’s disposition of

16 their motion for an award of attorney’s fees, plaintiffs17 appellants (“plaintiffs”), who prevailed in a suit brought under

18 the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), seek a recalculation of

19 the amount that they may recoup. The fee –- historically known

20 as the “lodestar” –- to which their attorneys are presumptively

21 entitled is the product of hours worked and an hourly rate. 

22 Plaintiffs argue that the district court applied an unnecessarily

23 strict “forum rule”: The district court, they contend, required

24 them to show extraordinary special circumstances before it would

25 use in its “lodestar” calculation an hourly rate greater than the

26 hourly rate charged by attorneys in the district where the

27 district court sits. 
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1 We agree that the district court may have applied the forum

2 rule in too unyielding a fashion. We therefore clarify its

3 proper application in this circuit: While the district court

4 should generally use the prevailing hourly rate in the district

5 where it sits to calculate what has been called the “lodestar” –-

6 what we think is more aptly termed the “presumptively reasonable

7 fee” -- the district court may adjust this base hourly rate to

8 account for a plaintiff’s reasonable decision to retain out-of9 district counsel, just as it may adjust the base hourly rate to

10 account for other case-specific variables. 

11 Moreover, this dispute concerning the “forum rule” is but a

12 symptom of a more serious illness: Our fee-setting jurisprudence

13 has become needlessly confused -- it has come untethered from the

14 free market it is meant to approximate. We therefore suggest

15 that the district court consider, in setting the reasonable

16 hourly rate it uses to calculate the “lodestar,” what a

17 reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay, not just in

18 deciding whether to use an out-of-district hourly rate in its fee

19 calculation. A plaintiff bringing suit under the Voting Rights

20 Act, pursuant to which fees can be recovered from the other side,

21 has little incentive to negotiate a rate structure with his

22 attorney prior to the litigation; the district court must act

23 later to ensure that the attorney does not recoup fees that the

24 market would not otherwise bear. Indeed, the district court
2 1 Our decision today in no way suggests that attorneys from

2 non-profit organizations or attorneys from private law firms

3 engaged in pro bono work are excluded from the usual approach to

4 determining attorneys’ fees. We hold only that in calculating

5 the reasonable hourly rate for particular legal services, a

6 district court should consider what a reasonable, paying client

7 would expect to pay. See Pastre v. Weber, 800 F. Supp. 1120,

8 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding force to the “argument that

9 [defendant] should not be required to pay for legal services at

10 the rate Hughes Hubbard would charge to [its corporate clients] .

-4-

1 (unfortunately) bears the burden of disciplining the market,

2 stepping into the shoes of the reasonable, paying client, who

3 wishes to pay the least amount necessary to litigate the case

4 effectively. 

5 Bearing these background principles in mind, the district

6 court should, in determining what a reasonable, paying client

7 would be willing to pay, consider factors including, but not

8 limited to, the complexity and difficulty of the case, the

9 available expertise and capacity of the client’s other counsel

10 (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case

11 effectively (taking account of the resources being marshaled on

12 the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the

13 timing demands of the case, whether the attorney had an interest

14 (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the

15 litigation or initiated the representation himself, whether the

16 attorney was initially acting pro bono (such that a client might

17 be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent

18 remuneration), and other returns (such as reputation, etc.) the

attorney expected from the representation.2 19 
1 . . but should . . . compensate plaintiff only for what would

2 have been charged by a competent attorney specializing in civil

3 rights litigation”). Attorneys -- regardless of whether they are

4 pursuing litigation on behalf of a paying client or a non-paying

5 client -- should receive out-of-district fees only if a

6 reasonable, paying client would have retained out-of-district

7 counsel.

-5-

1 Although we clarify the application of the forum rule, we

2 affirm the judgment of the district court in this case. It is

3 clear that the district court would adhere to its fee award were

4 we to vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for

5 reconsideration. Indeed, we believe that a reasonable, paying

6 resident of Albany would have made a greater effort to retain an

7 attorney practicing in the Northern District of New York, whether

8 in Syracuse, Binghamton, Utica, or Kingston, than did plaintiffs. 

9 The rates charged by attorneys practicing in the Southern

10 District of New York would simply have been too high for a

11 thrifty, hypothetical client -- at least in comparison to the

12 rates charged by local attorneys, with which he would have been

13 familiar. 

14 BACKGROUND

15 On April 22, 2003, plaintiffs filed a complaint against

16 Albany County and its Board of Elections (“Albany defendants”)

17 alleging that Albany County’s 2002 legislative redistricting plan

18 violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See 42 U.S.C. §

19 1973. On August 22, 2003, the District Court for the Northern

20 District of New York (Mordue, Judge) enjoined Albany County from
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1 conducting its scheduled November 2003 election pending adoption

2 by the Albany County Legislature of a revised redistricting plan. 

3 Further proceedings below culminated in the district court’s

4 rejection of plaintiffs’ request that it order Albany County to

5 hold a special election to take the place of the enjoined

6 November 2003 election; plaintiffs then appealed to this court. 

7 On January 28, 2004, we vacated the district court’s judgment and

8 ordered the County to hold the special election on March 2, 2004. 

9 See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of

10 Albany, 357 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Arbor Hill I”). 

11 Plaintiffs then moved in this court for an award of

12 attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e). While we

13 acknowledged the merit of the motion in principle, we remanded

14 for a determination of the appropriate fee. See Arbor Hill

15 Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 369

16 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Arbor Hill II”). We noted that

17 plaintiffs had not demonstrated that “special circumstances

18 existed” that would justify the use of higher rates than those

19 prevailing in the Northern District of New York in calculating

20 that fee. Arbor Hill II, 369 F.3d at 96 (quoting In re “Agent

21 Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1987)).

22 During the course of this litigation, three entities have

23 rendered legal services to the plaintiffs: (1) the Albany law

24 firm of DerOhannesian & DerOhannesian (“D&D”), as local counsel;
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1 (2) the Washington, D.C.-based non-profit Lawyer’s Committee for

2 Civil Rights Under Law (“LCCRUL”), selected for its voting rights

3 expertise; and (3) the Manhattan law firm of Gibson, Dunn &

4 Crutcher (“Gibson Dunn”), chosen because of the firm’s practice

5 before the Second Circuit and the firm’s “muscle,” specifically,

6 its ability to quickly prepare the appeal on an abbreviated

7 briefing schedule. 

8 Gibson Dunn sought in the district court to recoup

9 attorney’s fees calculated on the basis of the hourly rate

10 charged by most attorneys in the Southern District of New York

11 (and the hourly rate usually charged by Gibson Dunn). The

12 district court denied Gibson Dunn’s request that it adjust the

13 hourly rate it would use to calculate the fees due from that

14 prevalent in the Northern District of New York. The district

15 court explained, “[i]t is undisputed that plaintiffs did not even

16 attempt to contact attorneys or law firms in the Northern

17 District of New York outside of Albany County insofar as

18 obtaining representation in this matter.” Noting that “it was

19 plaintiffs[’] obligation to submit factual support for their

20 claim that there were no [law firms in Syracuse, Binghamton,

21 Utica or Kingston] ready, willing or able to take [their] case,”

22 the district court held that plaintiffs had not adequately

23 justified their request for higher fees.

24 In addition, the district court reduced the fee award
-8-

1 proposed by Gibson Dunn in various other respects not relevant to

2 this appeal. Plaintiffs then timely appealed the fee award,

3 challenging only the district court’s decision to award Gibson

4 Dunn a fee based on the hourly rate commonly charged in the

5 Northern District.

6 ANALYSIS

7 I. A Brief History of Attorney’s Fees Awards

8 Courts in the United States have historically applied the

9 “American Rule,” under which each party is to bear its own costs

10 of litigation, unmitigated by any fee-shifting exceptions. See

11 Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240,

12 247 (1975). In 1976, however, Congress enacted the Civil Rights

13 Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, which, like the provision of the VRA

14 at issue in this appeal, provided that prevailing parties could

15 recoup “reasonable attorney’s fee[s].” See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b);

16 cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce

17 the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment,

18 the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . .

19 . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”). 

20 In the accompanying Senate Report, Congress implicitly

21 endorsed two existing methods of calculating the “reasonable fee”

22 that were developed in the 1970s by the circuit courts. 

23 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983). The

24 first, developed by the Third Circuit, was the “lodestar” method. 
3 1 The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor

2 required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3)

3 the level of skill required to perform the legal service

4 properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to

5 acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate;

6 (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time

7 limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the

8 amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the

-9-

1 See Lindy Bros. Builder, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary

2 Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). The lodestar was the product

3 of the attorney’s usual hourly rate and the number of hours

4 worked. See id. at 167 (directing district courts to calculate

5 the lodestar using the attorney’s “normal billing rate”); see

6 also City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 559 (1992). 

7 After determining the lodestar, the district court could adjust

8 it in setting the reasonable fee. See generally Hensley, 461

9 U.S. at 433 (“The most useful starting point for determining the

10 amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably

11 expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly

12 rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to

13 make an initial estimate . . . .”) (emphasis added); Lindy, 487

14 F.2d at 168-69. Thus, the lodestar method involved two steps:

15 (1) the lodestar calculation; and (2) adjustment of the lodestar

16 based on case-specific considerations. 

17 The second method, developed by the Fifth Circuit, was for

18 district courts to consider twelve specified factors to establish

19 a reasonable fee. See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488

F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),3 20 abrogated on other grounds by
1 experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the

2 “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

3 professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in

4 similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.

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1 Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 92-93, 96 (1989) (declining

2 to limit fee award to amount stipulated in attorney-client

3 agreement). The Johnson method differed from the lodestar method

4 in that it contemplated a one-step inquiry.

5 These two circuits had sought to channel the district

6 court’s discretion in different ways. The lodestar method was

7 consistent with the law firm practice of accounting for each

8 billable hour. See Lindy, 487 F.2d at 167 (“[T]he first inquiry

9 of the court should be into the hours spent by the attorneys . .

10 . .”); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 800-01

11 (2002) (“As it became standard accounting practice to record

12 hours spent on a client’s matter, attorneys increasingly realized

13 that billing by hours devoted to a case was administratively

14 convenient . . . .”). When the lodestar did not accurately

15 reflect the market, the district court retained authority to

16 adjust the lodestar to ensure that the fee ultimately awarded was

17 reasonable. By contrast, under the Johnson method, the “hours

18 claimed or spent on a case” were not “the sole basis for

19 determining a fee.” Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717. Rather than

20 depending on market forces, the Johnson method relied on the

21 district court’s experience and judgment. See id. at 718 (“[T]he

22 trial judge’s expertise gained from past experience as a lawyer
-11-

1 and his observation from the bench of lawyers at work become

2 highly important”); id. at 720 (discussing the necessary

3 “balancing process”). Compare id. (“By this discussion we do not

4 attempt to reduce the calculation of a reasonable fee to

5 mathematical precision.”), with Lindy, 487 F.2d at 167. 

6 In theory, therefore, a district court that adopted the

7 lodestar method was expected to consider fewer variables than a

8 district court utilizing the Johnson method. In practice,

9 however, both considered substantially the same set of variables

10 –- just at a different point in the fee-calculation process. A

11 district court using the lodestar method would set the lodestar

12 and then consider whether, in light of variables such as the

13 difficulty of the case, it should adjust the lodestar before

14 settling on the reasonable fee it was ultimately inclined to

15 award. See, e.g., Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir.

16 1982); Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208,

17 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1978) (permitting the district court to multiply

18 the lodestar by a “contingency factor” and accepting, in theory,

19 that obtaining an exceptional result might justify a further

20 upward departure from the lodestar). By contrast, a district

21 court employing the Johnson method would consider factors, such

22 as the difficulty of the case, earlier in the fee-calculation

23 process by weighing them in setting its tentative reasonable fee,

24 from which there would seldom be a need to depart. See, e.g., In
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1 re First Colonial Corp. of Am., 544 F.2d 1291, 1299-1300 (5th

2 Cir. 1977) (outlining a process whereby first, the attorney

3 seeking fees would document the hours devoted to the case;

4 second, the district court would consider the Johnson factors and

5 set a reasonable hourly rate; and third, the district court would

6 explain how it balanced the Johnson factors to arrive at the

7 reasonable hourly rate). 

8 The Supreme Court adopted the lodestar method in principle,

9 see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886

10 (1984), without, however, fully abandoning the Johnson method. 

11 Rather than using the attorney’s own billing rate to calculate

12 the lodestar and then examining the lodestar in light of case13 specific variables to ensure that it was in fact a reasonable

14 fee, as the Third Circuit had suggested, the Supreme Court

15 instructed district courts to use a reasonable hourly rate –-

16 which it directed that district courts set in light of the

17 Johnson factors –- in calculating what it continued to refer to

18 as the lodestar. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9 (“The district

19 court also may consider other factors identified in [Johnson]

20 though it should note that many of these factors usually are

21 subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably

22 expended at a reasonable hourly rate.”) (citation omitted)

23 (emphasis added); Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-900. The Supreme Court

24 collapsed what had once been a two-step inquiry into a single-
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1 step inquiry; it shifted district courts’ focus from the

2 reasonableness of the lodestar to the reasonableness of the

3 hourly rate used in calculating the lodestar, which in turn

4 became the de facto reasonable fee. 

5 But the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the Third Circuit’s

6 economic model, see, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283

7 (1989) (“Our cases have repeatedly stressed that attorney’s fees

8 . . . are to be based on market rates for the services

9 rendered.”), and its simultaneous invocation of the equitable

10 Johnson factors at an early stage of the fee-calculation process,

11 proved to be in tension, see Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (“We

12 recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate ‘market

13 rate’ for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult . . .

14 [since m]arket prices . . . are determined by supply and

15 demand.”). While the Third Circuit had expected district courts

16 to correct for market dysfunction, the Supreme Court now asked

17 district court judges to hypothesize that market on the basis of

18 their experience as lawyers within their districts and on the

19 basis of affidavits provided by the parties. Generally speaking,

20 the rates an attorney routinely charges are those that the market

21 will bear; yet the Supreme Court required that the district

22 courts conjure a different, “reasonable” hourly rate. 

23 After Hensley and Blum, circuit courts struggled with the

24 nettlesome interplay between the lodestar method and the Johnson
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1 method. Compare Rutherford v. Harris County, Tex., 197 F.3d 173,

2 192 (5th Cir. 1999) (“To decide an appropriate attorney’s fee

3 award, the district court was first required to calculate a

4 lodestar fee depending on the circumstances of the case and the

5 Johnson factors. The court was next obligated to consider

6 whether the lodestar amount should be adjusted upward or

7 downward, depending on the . . . Johnson factors.”) (emphasis

8 added), with Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir.

9 1984)(“[T]he reasonable hourly rate which is incorporated into

10 the lodestar figure generally reflects the reputation and ability

11 of the attorney, the attorney’s experience, and the level of

12 skill required for the particular case.”), and Bebchick v. Wash.

13 Area Metro. Transit Comm’n, 805 F.2d 396, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

14 (“Of course, ‘the actual rate that applicant’s counsel can

15 command on the market is itself highly relevant proof of the

16 prevailing community rate.’”). 

17 And the Supreme Court has not yet fully resolved the

18 relationship between the two methods. In cases decided after

19 Hensley and Blum, it has both (1) suggested that district courts

20 should use the Johnson factors to adjust the lodestar, see, e.g.,

21 Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 94 (stating that the district court should

22 arrive at an initial estimate and then “adjust this lodestar

23 calculation by other factors”); see also id. (“The Johnson

24 factors may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar amount . . .
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1 .”); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 582-83 (1988) (Brennan,

2 J., concurring) (suggesting that factors might exist “that would

3 justify an enhancement of the lodestar”), and (2) reiterated its

4 holding in Hensley and Blum that “many of the Johnson factors

5 ‘are subsumed within the initial calculation.’” Penn. v. Del.

6 Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986). 

7 Our court has done little to resolve this confusion. 

8 Compare Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 255-56 (2d

9 Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s authority to “reduce

10 the fee awarded to a prevailing plaintiff below the lodestar by

11 reason of the plaintiff’s ‘partial or limited success’”)

12 (emphasis added), with Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 116

13 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The product of the number of reasonable hours

14 times a reasonable hourly rate, however, does not end the

15 inquiry. There remain other considerations, based on the facts

16 of the particular case, that may lead the district court to

17 ultimately make an adjustment to the hourly structure.”)

18 (internal citations omitted), and McDonald v. Pension Plan of the

19 NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 2006)

20 (lodestar calculated on the basis of “prevailing rate

21 [specifically] for ERISA practitioners in this Circuit”)

22 (emphasis added), and Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots

23 Pension Plan, 885 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1989) (suggesting, in

24 determining the lodestar, that “smaller firms may be subject to
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1 their own prevailing market rate”). 

2 The net result of the fee-setting jurisprudence here and in

3 the Supreme Court is that the district courts must engage in an

4 equitable inquiry of varying methodology while making a pretense

5 of mathematical precision. See Report of the Third Circuit Task

6 Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 247 (1985)

7 (“The Lindy process creates a sense of mathematical precision

8 that is unwarranted . . . .”). The “lodestar” is no longer a

9 lodestar in the true sense of the word –- “a star that leads,”

10 Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1329 (1981). Nor do

11 courts use it in the way the term was first used by the Third

12 Circuit –- as a base amount that is susceptible of ready

13 adjustment; rather, circuit court deference to the district

14 court’s estimate of a “reasonable” hourly rate is a “lodestar”

15 only in the sense that it is a guiding jurisprudential principle,

16 see Dague, 505 U.S. at 562 (“The ‘lodestar’ figure has, as its

17 name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting

18 jurisprudence.”). What the district courts in this circuit

19 produce is in effect not a lodestar as originally conceived, but

20 rather a “presumptively reasonable fee.” See id. (holding that

21 the fee applicant bears the “burden of showing that ‘. . . an

22 adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable

23 fee’”). The focus of the district courts is no longer on

24 calculating a reasonable fee, but rather on setting a reasonable
4 1 While we do not purport to require future panels of this

2 court to abandon the term –- it is too well entrenched –- this

3 panel believes that it is a term whose time has come.

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1 hourly rate, taking account of all case-specific variables. 

2 The district court’s opinion, including the report and

3 recommendation of Magistrate Judge David R. Homer, with which the

4 district court agreed after de novo review, reflects the general

5 confusion surrounding the lodestar calculation. In places, the

6 district court appears to envision a two-step lodestar7 calculation process; yet elsewhere it seems to contemplate

8 undertaking the calculation in one step. Likewise, at times, the

9 district court emphasizes its role in approximating the workings

10 of the market, but it also suggests some difference between

11 “rates . . . paid by private retained clients . . . [and rates]

12 ordered by courts.” 

13 The meaning of the term “lodestar” has shifted over time,

14 and its value as a metaphor has deteriorated to the point of

unhelpfulness. This opinion abandons its use.4 15 We think the

16 better course –- and the one most consistent with attorney’s fees

17 jurisprudence –- is for the district court, in exercising its

18 considerable discretion, to bear in mind all of the case-specific

19 variables that we and other courts have identified as relevant to

20 the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in setting a reasonable

21 hourly rate. The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying

22 client would be willing to pay. In determining what rate a
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1 paying client would be willing to pay, the district court should

2 consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear

3 in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the

4 minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively. The district

5 court should also consider that such an individual might be able

6 to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to

7 obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being

8 associated with the case. The district court should then use

9 that reasonable hourly rate to calculate what can properly be

10 termed the “presumptively reasonable fee.” 

11 II. The Forum Rule

12 We turn now to the particular fee-calculation rule at issue

13 in this case. It was against the muddled legal landscape we have

14 just described that the Second Circuit promulgated what we will

15 call the “forum rule.” The Supreme Court directed that district

16 courts should use the “prevailing [hourly rate] in the community”

17 in calculating the lodestar –- or what we are now calling the

18 presumptively reasonable fee. After Blum, we explained that the

19 “community” for purposes of this calculation is the district

20 where the district court sits. See Polk v. N.Y. State Dep’t of

21 Corr. Servs., 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). 

22 However, district courts –- and indeed our court –- quickly

23 succumbed to the general confusion surrounding the difference

24 between a “lodestar” and a reasonable hourly rate. Sometimes,
5 1 Attorneys have had trouble understanding the strict forum

2 rule. For instance, in this case, Michael C. Lynch, counsel to

3 the Albany defendants, explained in an affidavit filed with this

4 court in Arbor Hill II that the “‘relevant community’ for

5 purposes of . . . [setting the hourly rate] is the Albany,

6 Capital District region in the Northern District of New York.”

7 See also Farbotko v. Clinton County of New York, 433 F.3d 204,

8 209 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he prevailing market rate for attorneys

9 in Syracuse and Albany . . . may not accurately reflect the rate

10 prevailing across the entire Northern District.”). The district

11 court, by contrast, considered the “relevant community” to be the

12 entire Northern District of New York. 

13 Confusion surrounding the forum rule is endemic, and not

14 unique to our circuit. Other circuits, too, have debated whether

15 to consider out-of-district rates in setting the reasonable

16 hourly rate or in setting the reasonable fee (after arriving at a

17 presumptively reasonable fee using in-district rates). Compare

18 Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Minn.,

19 771 F.2d 1153, 1160 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that the district

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1 they considered the variation between indistrict and out-of2 district rates in setting the hourly rate (which they then used

3 to calculate the presumptively reasonable fee); but sometimes,

4 they considered that variation only in deciding whether to adjust

5 the presumptively reasonable fee after they had arrived at it (on

6 the basis of in-district rates). Compare Polk, 722 F.2d at 25

7 (“[T]he rate prevailing in the appropriate community is only one

8 of many factors bearing on determination of a fee award.”), with

9 Arbor Hill II, 369 F.3d at 96-97 (intimating that a district

10 court should permit plaintiffs to recover more than a fee

11 calculated on the basis of the hourly rate usually charged by

12 attorneys in the forum district only if plaintiffs could “show[]

13 . . . that the case required special expertise beyond the

competence of [forum district] law firms”).5 14
1 court should first “compute[] the base ‘lodestar’ figure by

2 multiply[ing] the number of hours reasonably expended times the

3 lawyer’s regular hourly rate” and only then “look also to the

4 ordinary fee for similar work in the community”) (internal

5 quotation marks omitted), with Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v.

6 Reimer & Koger Assocs., 165 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1999)

7 (readily upholding use of out-of-district rates in calculating

8 the presumptively reasonable fee). And those that have adopted a

9 comparatively strict forum rule have struggled to apply it. See,

10 e.g., Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 n.14 (9th Cir.

11 1992) (discussing whether to use Sacramento or San Francisco

12 hourly rates); McDonald v. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456, 1460 n.6

13 (8th Cir. 1988) (“We are not at all convinced that central

14 Missouri is the relevant ‘community’ . . . . [T]he argument for

15 an expansive reading of ‘community’ is particularly strong in a

16 case such as this, since Jefferson City is the capitol of the

17 state and lawyers from throughout the state have business

18 there.”). Compare Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larsen, 749 F.2d 945,

19 955 (1st Cir. 1984) (using county–based version of the forum

20 rule), with Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 267

21 (3d Cir. 1985) (location of attorney’s home office is the

22 relevant community), and Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy

23 Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. E.P.A., 169 F.3d 755, 759 (D.C.

24 Cir. 1999) (announcing an exception to the forum rule to govern

25 cases where “the home market is substantially less costly and the

26 site of the bulk of the legal work”).

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1 We now clarify that a district court may use an out-of2 district hourly rate –- or some rate in between the out-of3 district rate sought and the rates charged by local attorneys –-

4 in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee if it is clear

5 that a reasonable, paying client would have paid those higher

6 rates. We presume, however, that a reasonable, paying client

7 would in most cases hire counsel from within his district, or at

8 least counsel whose rates are consistent with those charged

9 locally. This presumption may be rebutted -- albeit only in the

10 unusual case -- if the party wishing the district court to use a

11 higher rate demonstrates that his or her retention of an out-of-
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1 district attorney was reasonable under the circumstances as they

2 would be reckoned by a client paying the attorney’s bill. 

3 We believe that the district court’s assessment of the

4 reasonableness of a prevailing party’s decision to retain out-of5 district counsel is best considered in setting the hourly rate –-

6 rather than in deciding whether to adjust a presumptively

7 reasonable fee –- for three reasons. First, our holding comports

8 with the holdings of several sister circuits and with the Supreme

9 Court’s focus on reasonable hourly rates rather than reasonable

10 fees. See, e.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 (emphasizing the

11 importance of using the “market rate” in calculating attorney’s

12 fees); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175

13 (4th Cir. 1994) (“In circumstances where it is reasonable to

14 retain attorneys from other communities . . . the rates in those

15 communities may also be considered.”); Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d

16 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1982) (“If a local attorney could perform the

17 service, a well-informed private client, paying his own fees,

18 would probably hire local counsel at the local, average rate.”);

19 Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 769 (7th Cir. 1982)

20 (querying whether “the choice of counsel was improvident”).

21 Second, in Pierce v. Underwood, a case interpreting the

22 attorney’s fees provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act

23 (“EAJA”), the Supreme Court hinted that in the “broad spectrum of

24 litigation,” the difficulty of obtaining local counsel competent
-22-

1 to prosecute a particular case is “little more than [a] routine

2 reason[] why market rates are what they are,” 487 U.S. 552, 573

3 (1988) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court distinguished that

4 “broad spectrum of litigation” from the attorney’s fees provision

5 of the EAJA, which stipulates that fees “shall be based upon

6 prevailing market rates” but “shall not be awarded in excess of

7 $125 per hour unless the court determines that . . . the limited

8 availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved

9 justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii); see

10 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 571-72; see generally Healey v. Rovner, No.

11 06-0525, Slip. Op. at *10 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2007).

12 Third and finally, our holding honors the Supreme Court’s

13 emphasis on the need to use the approximate market rate for an

14 attorney’s services in calculating the presumptively reasonable

15 fee. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 283. The legal communities of

16 today are increasingly interconnected. To define markets simply

17 by geography is too simplistic. Sometimes, legal markets may be

18 defined by practice area. See A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York City

19 Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“So long as the

20 law provides for or permits fee awards based on geographic

21 markets for services, a lawyer may be paid at different rates for

22 otherwise indistinguishable services.”). On the other hand, many

23 cases (including many voting rights cases) are intrinsically

24 local, and the relevant legal market may be coextensive with or
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1 smaller than the district itself. By asking what a reasonable,

2 paying client would do, a district court best approximates the

3 workings of today’s market for legal services. See Malthur v.

4 Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 317 F.3d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 2003)

5 (“The realities of the legal community today mean that though

6 some attorney probably could have represented [the plaintiff],

7 one factor or another prevented them from taking the case when he

8 needed a lawyer.”). Not incidentally, a reasonable, paying

9 client might consider whether a lawyer is willing to offer his

10 services in whole or in part pro bono, or to promote the lawyer’s

11 own reputational or societal goals. Indeed, by focusing on the

12 hourly rate at which a client who wished to pay no more than

13 necessary would be willing to compensate his attorney, the

14 district court can enforce market discipline, approximating the

15 negotiation that might ensue were the client actually required to

16 pay the attorney’s fees. 

17 In occasionally permitting a deviation from forum rates in

18 setting the rate that will yield the presumptively reasonable

19 fee, we have in mind no substantial change in circuit law; where

20 circumstances have warranted it, we have not insisted on strict

21 adherence to the forum rule. In Polk, we approved the use of an

22 out-of-district hourly rate. 722 F.2d at 25 (considering whether

23 “[c]ounsel might . . . have expected plaintiff’s claim to be

24 adjudicated in the Southern District”). In Agent Orange,
6 1 Of the three cases cited in Agent Orange, two have since

2 been called into question to the extent they purport to require

3 strict application of the forum rule. Compare Chrapliwy, 670

4 F.2d at 768-69, with People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ.,

5 Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The

6 attorney’s actual billing rate for comparable work is

7 ‘presumptively appropriate’ to use as the market rate.”); compare

8 Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137, 139-40 (8th Cir.

9 1982) (en banc), with TCBY Sys., Inc. v. RSP Co., 33 F.3d 925,

10 931 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[Defendants] argue they should be awarded

11 the Minneapolis rate because they reasonably chose Minneapolis

12 counsel after TCBY sued them. The [defendants] point out that

13 they are Minnesota residents who were forced to litigate the case

14 in Arkansas under the agreement’s forum selection clause, and

15 they were unfamiliar with Arkansas counsel . . . . [T]he district

16 court could have properly based the fee award on the higher

17 Minneapolis rates . . . .”).

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1 although we emphasized that district courts should generally use

2 “the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing

3 court sits” in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee, 818

4 F.2d at 232, we again upheld a district court’s decision to use

different rates.6 5 And since Polk and Agent Orange, we have urged

6 district courts where appropriate to employ out-of-district rates

7 in calculating the fee due. See, e.g., New York City Dep’t of

8 Educ., 407 F.3d at 81 & n.17 (“[T]here is good reason for a

9 district court not be wed to the rates in its own community. If

10 they are lower than those in another district, skilled lawyers

11 from such other district will be dissuaded from taking

12 meritorious cases in the district with lower rates.”). 

13 In both Polk and Agent Orange, the touchstone of our

14 analysis was the belief that district courts should award fees

15 just high enough “to attract competent counsel,” Lewis v.
7 1 Indeed, Polk said that the panel was simply applying

2 established law. And when we decided Polk, circuit precedent was

3 clear that district courts had considerable flexibility in

4 setting the relevant legal community for purposes of determining

5 the hourly rate to be used in calculating the presumptively

6 reasonable fee. See, e.g., Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police

7 Comm’rs, 638 F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the

8 district court should have looked to prevailing rates “in the

9 area”).

8 1 Were a strict forum rule the settled law of this circuit,

2 we could not have used a lower hourly rate than the hourly rate

3 prevailing in the district where the district court sat to

4 calculate the presumptively reasonable fee in Crescent

5 Publishing. See also Sands v. Runyon, 28 F.3d 1323, 1333-34 (2d

6 Cir. 1994) (permitting district court to consider retainer

7 agreement in setting hourly rate below prevailing hourly rate in

8 the district); cf. Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294 (8th

9 Cir. 1996). But see Reiter v. MTA New York City Transit Auth.,

10 457 F.3d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating district court

11 judgment because district court used hourly rate set forth in

12 retainer agreement without considering prevailing Southern

13 District rates).

-25-

1 Coughlin, 801 F.2d 570, 576 (2d Cir. 1986). See, e.g., Agent

2 Orange, 818 F.2d at 233 (“Undercompensation could deny counsel

3 their right to fair and just fees; overcompensation would not be

consistent with the need to prevent windfalls.”);7 4 cf. Crescent

5 Publ’g Group, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 246 F.3d 142, 151

6 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that an attorney-client agreement may

provide compelling evidence of the “prevailing market rate”).8 7

8 We adhere to this touchstone, but we would not be true to it by

9 insisting on an overly strict application of the forum rule. 

10 Rather, to reiterate, a district court should consider the rate a

11 reasonable, paying client would pay, and use that rate to

12 calculate the presumptively reasonable fee.
-26-

1 III. The District Court’s Decision

2 For the foregoing reasons, we agree with plaintiffs that the

3 district court may have applied the forum rule too strictly. 

4 They suggest that the district court calculated the presumptively

5 reasonable fee (on the basis of in-district rates) and then

6 queried whether the plaintiffs had shown sufficient cause to

7 rebut the presumption that it was, in fact, the ultimate

8 reasonable fee. 

9 However, we find no error in the district court’s fee award,

10 even when evaluated under the analysis we use. We are confident

11 that a reasonable, paying client would have known that law firms

12 undertaking representation such as that of plaintiffs often

13 obtain considerable non-monetary returns — in experience,

14 reputation, or achievement of the attorneys’ own interests and

15 agendas — and would have insisted on paying his attorneys at a

16 rate no higher than that charged by Albany attorneys (and there

17 is no cross-appeal). 

18 Moreover, the considerable deference that we owe to a

19 district court’s assessment of the Johnson and other factors, see

20 Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 210 (“The district court is in closer

21 proximity to and has greater experience with the relevant

22 community whose prevailing market rate it is determining.”),

23 counsels against remanding this case to the district court for

24 further, likely unnecessary, proceedings. 
-27-

1 CONCLUSION

2 For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of

3 the district court.