J-S08018-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TODD MEQUIM ANDERSON

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 808 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-17-CR-0000802-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MARCH 10, 2020

Todd Mequim Anderson (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order1

entered in the Clearfield County Court of Common Pleas granting the petition 

to withdraw filed by Appellant’s post-conviction counsel. Because we conclude 

the order on appeal is interlocutory, we quash this appeal.

On December 7, 2017, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to four 

counts of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances (cocaine),2

and related offenses. On March 5, 2018, the trial court sentenced him to an 

aggregate term of eight to 16 years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file a 

direct appeal.

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1 We have amended the caption to reflect that the notice of appeal was filed 

from the PCRA court’s April 3, 2019, Order. See Notice of Appeal, 5/31/19.

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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Rather, on July 25, 2018, Appellant filed a timely pro se petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),3raising numerous 

allegations concerning the ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Counsel was 

appointed, and on February 28, 2019, filed a petition to withdraw and 

Turner/Finley4 no-merit letter. By order entered April 3, 2019, the PCRA 

court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

Thereafter, on April 17, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se objection to the 

April 3rd order, challenging the propriety of counsel’s no-merit letter, as well 

as the PCRA court’s failure to issue notice of its intent to dismiss the petition

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court then issued Rule 907 notice on 

April 25, 2019. However, before the PCRA court entered an order dismissing

Appellant’s petition, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the April 3, 2019, 

order.5 Subsequently, on September 11, 2019, the PCRA court entered an 

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3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

4 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

5 We note the notice of appeal was docketed on May 31, 2019, more than 30 

days after entry of the court’s April 3rd order. Docket No. CP-17-CR-0000802-

2017, 5/31/19. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 

30 days after entry of order on appeal). However, the certified record includes 

a letter from the Deputy Prothonotary of Clearfield County to this Court, which 

stated that, when the notice of appeal was first received in the PCRA court, 

Appellant did not include the filing fee or request permission to proceed in 

forma pauperis (IFP). See Letter, 11/8/19. The Clearfield County Deputy 

Prothonotary attached a copy of a letter the PCRA court sent to Appellant 

notifying him that it could not process his notice of appeal “received . . . on 
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order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.6 

On appeal, Appellant challenges both the dismissal of the claims raised 

in his PCRA petition, as well as the PCRA court’s grant of counsel’s petition to 

withdraw. However, because Appellant filed an appeal prematurely from an 

interlocutory order, we are constrained to quash this appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 803 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(appellate court can consider appealabilty of order sua sponte because it 

“directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court”) (citation omitted).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide, in relevant part:

[A]n appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order

certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order

as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by 

permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) 

a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).

Tchirkow, 160 A.3d at 803 (citation omitted).

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May 1, 2019” until he paid the required fee or submitted IFP paperwork. Letter 

from Clearfield County to Appellant, 5/6/19.

It is well-established that “[t]he clerk of courts . . . lacks the authority 

to reject, as defective, a timely notice of appeal.” Commonwealth v.

Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 588 (Pa. 2014). Indeed, Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 905 provides that “[u]pon receipt of the notice of appeal 

the clerk shall immediately stamp it with the date of receipt, and that date 

shall constitute the date when the appeal was taken[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(3). 

Therefore, in the present case, we conclude Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal on May 1, 2019, from the court’s April 3, 2019, order. 

6 The docket indicates the September 11, 2019, order was “misplaced.” 

Docket No. CP-17-CR-0000802-2017, at 9/11/19. Thus, a substitute order 

was entered on November 7, 2019.
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Here, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the PCRA court’s April 3, 

2019, order which granted counsel’s petition to withdraw. Clearly, that order 

is not a final order since, at the time it was filed, Appellant’s PCRA petition 

was still outstanding. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) (final order is any order that:

“disposes of all claim and of all parties” or in entered as final order under 

subsection (c)). Furthermore, the April 3rd order is not an interlocutory order 

which may be appealed as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311, or one from 

which this Court granted permission to appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 312 and 

1311.

Thus, Appellant may proceed with this appeal only if we determine the 

PCRA court’s April 3rd order was a collateral order. Pursuant to Rule 313, an 

aggrieved party may file an appeal from a collateral order as of right. 

Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). The Rule defines a collateral order as: 

an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action 

where the right involved is too important to be denied review and 

the question presented is such that if review is postponed until 

final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).

We conclude the PCRA court’s order granting counsel’s petition to 

withdraw is not an appealable collateral order. In Commonwealth v. Wells, 

719 A.2d 729 (Pa. 1998), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an order 

denying PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw, based on a purported conflict 

of interest, did not qualify as a immediately appealable collateral order 

because the claim would not be irreparably lost if denied review. The Court 
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opined:

Appellant’s claim that he is entitled to “conflict-free” PCRA counsel 

will not be irreparably lost if the order denying the Petition to 

Withdraw is not reviewed at this time. Since Appellant has a right 

of appeal if the PCRA court denies his petition, the order denying 

the Petition to Withdraw, and consequently the merits of the 

conflict issue, can be reviewed if or when Appellant files an appeal 

from the court’s PCRA decision. If it is determined that the PCRA 

court improperly failed to remove PCRA counsel due to a conflict 

of interest, any right to conflict-free PCRA counsel is not lost since 

the defendant may be granted a new PCRA hearing and new 

counsel. Thus, since Appellant’s claimed right would not be 

irreparably lost if review of the order were postponed until final 

judgment, the court’s order denying the Petition to Withdraw is 

not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

Id. at 731 (footnotes omitted). 

Although Wells reviewed an order denying counsel’s petition to 

withdraw, the same analysis applies to an order granting counsel’s petition 

to withdraw. Accordingly, we are constrained to quash this appeal. 

Furthermore, we note that after Appellant filed the notice of appeal 

from the April 3rd order, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing 

Appellant’s petition.7 However, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to enter 

that order once Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Pursuant to Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701, “after an appeal is taken . . . the [PCRA] 

court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). 

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7 As noted supra, the PCRA court initially entered dismissal order on 

September 11, 2019, but later entered a substitute order on November 7, 

2019, when the September order was misplaced. In either case, any appeal 

filed by Appellant now would be outside the 30-day appeal period. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 903.
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Accordingly, because we conclude the order on appeal is interlocutory 

and unappealable, we quash this appeal. Moreover, we vacate the court’s 

September 11, 2019, and November 7, 2019, orders purporting to dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA petition. Upon remand, we direct the PCRA court to reissue 

Appellant Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition, so that 

Appellant may have the opportunity to file a timely response. 

Appeal quashed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/10/2020