This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1574 State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Respondent,

vs. Joseph Otten, et al., Defendants, Paul Braun, Appellant. Filed May 23, 2016 Affirmed Smith, Tracy, Judge Sherburne County District Court File No. 71-CV-14-585 Scott G. Williams, Kyle P. Dareff, HKM, P. A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Michael B. Healy, Michael Healy Law, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith, Tracy, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SMITH, TRACY , Judge Appellant Paul Braun appeals from the dist rict court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, arguing that the district court erred as a matter of law by determini ng that State Farm had no duty to indemnify its insureds2 against Braun’s wrongful-eviction claim. Beca use the insurance policy does not cover the insureds’ intentional acts resu lting in intended harm, and b ecause the undisputed facts establish that there is no coverage here, we affirm. FACTS Joseph and Kristen Otten and T.E.O. Prop erties, Inc. own a rental home insured under a Rental Dwelling Policy issued by St ate Farm. The policy provides businessliability coverage as follows: If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury , personal injury, or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, and which arises from the ownership, maintenance, or use of th e insured premises, we will: 1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and 2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make a ny investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment resulting from the occurrence, equals our limit of liability. (Emphasis added.) The policy defines “occu rrence” as “an accide nt, including exposure to conditions” that results in (1 ) bodily injury; (2) property da mage; or (3) personal injury. “Personal injury” under the po licy means injury arising out of any of a number of listed “offenses,” including “w rongful eviction.” The policy also contains an intentional-act s exclusion, which excludes coverage for:

a. bodily injury, personal in jury, or property damage: (1) which is either expected or intended by an insured; or (2) to any person or property which is the result of willful and malicious ac ts of an insured;3 b. bodily injury, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the rendering or failing to render professional services . . . . In addition, the policy contains a se parate exclusion related to mold. In May 2011, Braun and his then wife entered a lease agreement to rent the home from June 1, 2011 to May 31, 2012. Before entering the leas e, the Brauns inquired about the presence of mold in the home because Braun’s stepdaughter had respiratory problems. The Ottens said they were unaware of any mold. On May 16, 2012, a toilet malfunctioned in the home, causing water to flood the bathroom floor. When Joseph Otten visited the home to perfo rm repairs, Braun asked him to have the home inspected for mold. According to Braun, Jo seph Otten then revealed that the home had mold when he purchased it. Joseph Otten re fused to have th e home inspected and asked the Brauns to move out. On May 18, 2012, the Ottens gave the Brau ns a letter titled “Notice to end lease,” stating: “The rental agreement ends May 31, 2012 12:00 noon. You must be moved out by that time. An unlawful detainer will be file d if this is not met.” The Brauns vacated the home on May 31. Braun sued the Ottens and T.E.O., allegi ng several claims, including wrongful eviction. The parties in Braun’s lawsuit entered a Miller-Shugart agreement 1 in which the

1 When the insurer does not “wholeheartedly defend the insured,” the insured may enter a Miller-Shugart agreement with the claimant in which the claimant agrees only to “sue for the insurance proceeds to enforce the settlement.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben , 505 N.W.2d 323, 325 & n.2 (Minn. 1993); see Miller v. Shugart , 316 N.W.2d 729, 733-36 (Minn. 1982).4 Ottens and T.E.O. agre ed there was a substantial likeliho od they would be found liable and (1) consented to pay $500 on Braun’s fraudul ent-inducement claim and all issues related to mold and (2) consented to a $35,892 judgment on Braun’s breach-of-contract and wrongful-eviction claims. Bra un agreed not to collect the judgment from the Ottens and T.E.O. but only to “seek to sa tisfy this judgment from State Farm.” The district court entered judgment for Braun against the Otte ns and T.E.O. in th e amount of $35,892. In discovery, the Ottens admitted that th e lease agreement required them to provide 30 days’ notice before evicting th e Brauns and that they “wer e aware of the lease’s notice provisions but felt the circumstances warrant ed the May 18th notice.” Kristen Otten testified in a deposition that she knew of th e 30-day notice requirement but decided to give the Brauns less than 30 days’ notice due to th e circumstances. She furt her testified that the Ottens knew that the Brauns would incur cost s associated with moving and finding a new place to live. State Farm sued the Ottens, the Brauns, a nd T.E.O., seeking a de claratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify the Ottens and T.E.O. It also moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm and declared that State Farm had no obligation to indemnif y the Ottens and T.E.O. in Braun’s lawsuit. The district court found that Braun’s “non-mold-related breach of contract or wrongful eviction” claims were excluded from insuranc e coverage because the Ottens acted intentionally and that Braun’s mold-related claims were excluded under the separate mold exclusion. Braun appeals.5 D E C I S I O N A district court must grant summary ju dgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. We review th e district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine if there are any issues of material fact and whether the district court e rred in applying the law. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 855 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2014). “In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins.
Co. , 819 N.W.2d 602, 610 (Minn. 2012). “Generally, the extent of an insurer’s liability is determined by its insurance contract with its insured.” Hanbury v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co ., 865 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2015). We review de novo the interpretation of an insurance policy and its applicati on to the facts of the case. Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. , 819 N.W.2d at 610. “Insurance policies are contracts and, absent statutory provisions to the contrary, general principles of contract law apply.” Id. at 611. “When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, we enforc e the agreement of the parties as expressed in the contract.” Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc. , 820 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. 2012). The insured has the initial burden of dem onstrating coverage. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters , 831 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. 2013). The insurer bears the burden to show that a coverage exclusion applies. Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. , 505 N.W.2d at
327.6 The district court concluded both that c overage was not triggered because there was no “occurrence” and that, even if coverage had been triggered, the intentional-acts exclusion applied because the injuries were e xpected or intended. Braun argues that as a matter of law the policy must be interpreted to cover the wrongful-eviction claim here. In the alternative, Braun argues that there is a genuine issue of ma terial fact as to whether the injuries were “expected or intended” and th erefore as to whether the exclusion applies. 2
1. We first address Braun’s argument regarding interpretation of the insurance policy. Braun argues that the policy is ambiguous because it bot h provides coverage for the intentional act of wrongful eviction and excl udes coverage for the insured’s intentional acts, and that the policy therefor e should be construed in favor of coverage. We disagree. Braun is correct that the insurance polic y generally contemplates coverage for wrongful eviction. The policy generally provides coverage for “personal injury,” including injury arising from a “wrongful eviction.” The policy, however, pr ovides coverage for personal injury only if the injury is “caused by an occurrence.” An “occurrence” is defined as an “accident.” While “accident” is not de fined by the policy, our supreme court has defined “accident” as it appears in an insurance polic y to mean “an unex pected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence.” Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser , 628 N.W.2d 605, 608 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). Th e policy also contains an intentional-acts

2 On appeal, Braun challenges the district cour t’s interpretation of the insurance policy as it relates to his wrongful-evic tion claim only. He makes no ar gument regarding his breachof-contract claim.7 exclusion, which excludes from coverage claims for “personal injury” when the in jury is “expected or intended” by the insured. The plain and un ambiguous language of the “occurrence” requirement and the intentional- acts exclusion requires a wrongful eviction to be accidental and the resulting injury to be unintended for c overage to apply. Contrary to Braun’s argument, this conc lusion does not defeat coverage for all wrongful-eviction claims. The insurance po licy does not define “wrongful eviction.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “wrongful-ev iction action” as “[a] lawsuit brought by a former tenant . . . against one who has put the plaintiff out of possession, alleging that the eviction was illegal.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1752 (9th ed. 2009). In addition, it defines “wrongful” as “[c]haracterized by unfairness or injustice” or “[c]ontrary to law.” Id. at 1751. Neither of these definitions requires inte nt. As State Farm argues, it is possible for a landlord to accidentally disp ossess the wrong tenant or to make another mistake that unintentionally results in a wron gful eviction and, in such a case, coverage would apply. Because a “wrongful eviction” may or may no t be intentional, th e insurance policy does not both cover and exclude the sa me wrongful-eviction claim. We conclude that the district court did not err by interpreting the insurance policy to provide coverage only for acc idental wrongful evic tions where injury is not expected or intended.
2. We turn next to Braun’s argument that, ev en under this reading of the insurance policy, summary judgment was erroneous because a genuine issue of ma terial fact remains8 regarding whether the Ottens act ed intentionally. The district court concluded that “the Ottens’ actions were not accidental, but were intended as a matter of law.” “The questions of whether an injury is the result of an accident and whether coverage is excluded becau se the injury is the re sult of an intentional ac t are for all practical purposes, identical issues.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwich , 749 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). As in Schwich , the policy here “excludes coverage when the insured acts with specific intent to cause injury.” See id. Such an intentionalacts exclusion applies when th e insured acts “with specific intent to cause harm” and intends not just to act, but “intend[s] the harm itself.” Walser , 628 N.W.2d at 611 (quotations omitted). Braun argues that the Ottens lacked the re quired intent because, at the time of the eviction notice, they believed that they had provided sufficient notice. In making this argument, Braun cites to portions of Joseph Otten’s deposition testimony that are not in the record, and we can find no ev idence in the re cord to support Braun’ s assertion. To the contrary, the record includes a portion of Kr isten Otten’s deposition in which she stated that she knew the Ottens were required to pr ovide 30 days’ notice but decided to give the Brauns less than 30 days’ noti ce due to the circumstances. Th e record also contains the Ottens’ admission that the lease required 30 da ys’ notice and that they “were aware of the lease’s notice provisions but felt the circumst ances warranted the Ma y 18th notice.” On May 18, 2012, the Ottens provid ed notice to the Brauns to vacate the home by May 31, just 13 days later. The record s hows no genuine issue of materi al fact that the Ottens intentionally provided inadeq uate notice to the Brauns.9 Braun also argues that the O ttens lacked the required intent to cause harm because they did not know that the Br auns would suffer financial losses from the wrongful eviction and did not intend the specific injuries Braun suffered from the eviction. But the Ottens did not have to intend to cause Brau n the specific harm he suffered. See Walser , 628 N.W.2d at 611 (“[T]o find that an insured acte d intentionally, a court need only find that the insured intended some harm, not that th e insured intended the specific harm that resulted.”). In her deposition, Kristen Otten testified that th e Ottens knew that the Brauns would incur costs associated w ith moving and finding a new pl ace to live. This undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that the Ottens intended “some harm.” See id. Because there is no genuine issue of materi al fact that the Ottens knew that the notice given was inadequate and that the Brauns would suffer financial losses, the district court properly concluded that the insurance po licy does not cover the Ottens’ intentional and wrongful eviction of the Br auns as a matter of law. See Schwich , 749 N.W.2d at 112 (defining “accident” as “an unexpected, unf oreseen, or undesi gned happening or consequence” and “intenti onal conduct” as requiring “a specific intent to cause injury” (quotations omitted)). State Farm therefore wa s not required to inde mnify the Ottens, and the district court did not err by granting summ ary judgment to State Farm. We need not consider State Farm’s alternative argument that the mold exclusion would also bar coverage for Braun’s claim. Affirmed.