### 1 OP 13 - 0789 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 201 4 MT 76

_________________ MEA - MFT, the Montana State AFL - CIO The Montana Public Employees Association, the Montana Human Rights Network and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,

Petitioners, v. THE STATE OF MONTANA, HONORABLE TIM FOX, in his capacity as Attorney General,

Respondent. O P I N I O N A N D O R D E R

_________________ ¶1 This is an original proceeding . The petition challeng es the legal sufficiency of Le gislative Referendum 127 ( LR - 127 ) , a measure enacted by the Legislature in 2013 as a referendum to be put to a public vote at the time of the November 2014 general election. ¶2 The petition alleges that the Attorney General’s approval of the proposed ballot measure for legal sufficiency was incorrect under Montana law, and seeks to enjoin the State of Montana from placing the measure on the general election ballot. P etitioners a lso seek attorney fees and costs. ¶3 On Decembe r 5, 2013 , the Attorney General fi led a response asserting that the legal review was correct and asking that the petition be denied. O n December 10, 2013 , this Court asked the parties for supplemental briefing. The briefs have been filed and the matter is ripe for a decision. March 25 2014

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¶4 This Court has original jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s determination that a ballot measure referred by the Legislature is legally sufficient. Section 3 - 2 - 20 2(3), MCA; Mont. Const. art . IV, § 7. ¶5 We restate the issue as follows: Whether the State of Montana should be enjoined from placing LR - 127 on the general election ballot in 2014 because of legal deficiencies in it s title. **DISCUSSION** ¶6 LR - 127 was passed by the Montana Le gislature in 2013 as Senate Bill 408. The measure proposes to eliminate political party primary elections as they traditionally have been held in this State, replacing them with a system in which al l candidates would appear on a single primary ballot. The two candidates who receive the most votes would advance to the general election, regardless of party affiliation. ¶7 In Montana the people may enact laws by initiative, and may approve or reject any act of the Le gislature except for appropri ations of money. M ont. Const. art. III, §§ 4, 5. As in the case of LR - 127, the people may vote in a referendum upon matters referred to them upon order of the Legislature . Mont. Const. art. III, § 5. The Mo ntana Constitution allows Montana citizens to go to court and present pre - election challenges to the manner in which a referendum qualifies for the ballo t. Mont. Const. art. IV, § 7(2) (enacted as Const. Amend. No. 21, approved November 6, 1990). This Court has original jurisdiction as provided in § 3 - 2 - 202, MCA , to review the Attorney General’s ballot statements for referred measures and the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency

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determination in an action brought under § 13 - 27 - 316, MCA. The petitioners have invoked those constitutional and statutory provisions in this action. 1 

### ¶8 Montana law requires the Attorney General to examine proposed ballot issues “for legal sufficiency, ” which means compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements governing submission of the proposed issue to the voters. S ection 13 - 27 - 312(1) and - ( 7), MCA. 2 

### Montana law further provides that both proponents and opponents of ballot measures may initiate original proceedings in this Court to challenge the sufficiency of the Attorney General’s review. S ection 13 - 27 - 316, MCA. This Court is required to examine th e issue and to “render a decision as to the adequacy of the ballot statements or the correctness of the attorney general’s determination.” S ection 13 - 27 - 316(3)(c), MCA. ¶9 For many decades the Le gislature has limited the number of words that may appear in th e title of matters that it refers to the people for a referendum vote. See e.g. State ex rel. Bonner v. Dixon , 59 Mont. 58, 195 P. 841 (1921). The current limitation, in place since 1979, provides that “[a]ll bills referred by the legislature to a vote o f the people shall have a title of no more than 100 words.” Section 5 - 4 - 102, MCA. T he 100 - word limitation applies only to measures that the Le gislature refers to the people for a vote.

1 Many of

the cases ci

ted by the Dissent regarding this Court’s reticence to entertain pre - elect io n challenges to ballot measures were decided prior to enactment of these provisions and thus provide at best tepid support for a lack of judicial act io n in this case.

2 Thi s legal review determines whether the proposal co mp lies wi th a pplicable constitutio nal and statutory r equi rements, but does not include considerat io n of the substant ive legalit y of

the provision . Montanans Opposed to I - 166 v. State , 2012 MT 168, ¶ 3, 365 Mont. 520, 285 P.3d 435.

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¶10 The Petitioners’ challenge to LR - 127 is that it violates § 5 - 4 - 102, M CA , because the title exceeds 100 words. The title to LR- 127 is: AN ACT GENERALLY REVISING ELECTION LAWS; PROVIDING THAT THE TWO CANDIDATES WHO RECEIVE THE MOST VOTES IN CERTAIN PRIMARY ELECTIONS FOR PARTISAN OFFICES ADVANCE TO THE GENERAL ELECTION IRRESP ECTIVE OF PARTY AFFILIATION; ELIMINATING SEPARATE PARTY BALLOTS AND PROVIDING FOR ONE PRIMARY BALLOT CONTAINING ALL PRIMARY RACES; PROVIDING THAT THE PROPOSED ACT BE SUBMITTED TO THE QUALIFIED ELECTORS OF MONTANA; AMENDING SECTIONS 2 - 16 - 615, 5 - 2 - 402, 5 - 2 - 4 03, 5 - 2 - 404, 5 - 2 - 406, 7 - 2 - 2219, 7 - 3 - 176, 7 - 3 - 218, 7 - 3 - 313, 7 - 3 - 412, 7 - 3 - 512, 7 - 3 - 704, 7 - 3 - 1256, 7 - 4 - 2106, 7 - 4 - 2206, 7 - 4 - 2302, 7 - 4 - 2310, 7 - 4 - 4112, 13 - 1 - 101, 13 - 1 - 103, 13 - 4 - 102, 13 - 10 - 201 , 13 - 10 - 203, 13 - 10 - 204, 13 - 10 - 209, 13 - 10 - 211, 13 - 10 - 301, 13 - 10 - 325, l3 - 10 - 326, l3 - 10 - 327, 13 - 10 - 402, 13 - 10 - 403, 13 - 10 - 404, 13 - 10 - 405, 13 - 10 - 501, 13 - 10 - 504, 13 - 10 - 505, 13 - 12 - 201, 13 - 12 - 202, 13 - 12 - 203, 13 - 12 - 205, l3 - 12 - 207, 13 - 13 - 214, 13 - 13 - 225, 13 - l3 - 241, 13 - 14 - 111, 13 - 14 - 112, l3 - 1 4 - 113, 13 - 14 - 114, 13 - 14 - 115 , 13 - 14 - 117, 13 - 14 - 118, 13 - 15 - 201, l3 - 15 - 205, 13 - 15 - 206, 13 - 15 - 208, 13 - 15 - 405, 13 - 15 - 406, 13 - 15 - 507, l3 - 16 - 101, 13 - 16 - 201, 13 - 16 - 211, 13 - 16 - 412, 13 - 16 - 418, 13 - 16 - 419, 13 - 16 - 501, 13 - 17 - 103, 13 - 19 - 205, 13 - 21 - 205, 13 - 25 - 101, 13 - 25 - 201, 13 - 25 - 205, 13 - 25 - 303, 13 - 35 - 106, 13 - 35 - 205, 13 - 35 - 206, 13 - 35 - 207, l3 - 35 - 214, 13 - 35 - 218, 13 - 35 - 221, 13 - 35 - 225, 13 - 35 - 226, 13 - 36 - 101, l3 - 36 - 102, 13 - 36 - 103, 13 - 36 - 104, 13 - 36 - 201, 13 - 36 - 202, 13 - 36 - 203, 13 - 36 - 206, 13 - 36 - 207, 13 - 36 - 209, 13 - 36 - 210, 13 - 36 - 211, 13 - 36 - 212, 13 - 37 - 127, 13 - 37 - 216, 13 - 37 - 218 , 13 - 38 - 101, AND 13 - 38 - 201, MCA; REPEALING SECTIONS 13 - 10 - 302, 13 - 10 - 303, 13 - 10 - 305, 13 - 10 - 311, 13 - 10 - 502, 13 - 10 - 503, 13 - 10 - 507, 13 - 10 - 601, 13 - 10 - 602, 13 - 10 - 604, AND 13 - 38 - 204, MCA; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE AND AN APPLICABILITY DATE. The point of disagreement between the Petitioners and the Attorney General is whether to count the many statutes listed in the title of LR - 127 as “words” under § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA. These citations list each section of the Montana Code that must be either amend ed or repealed to effectuate the Le gislature’s proposal for a new primary election system. Petitioners assert that each of these statutory citations must be considered as a word,

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while the Attorney General urges that statutory citations are not words and should not count in d etermining compliance with § 5 - 4 - 102 , MCA. There are three alternatives for applying § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA: i gnore all the statutory citations; count each of the statutory citations as one word; or treat each of the statutory citations as the number of words required to say the citation (“13 - 12 - 203” would be counted as “thirteen, twelve, two zero three” for a total of five words) . The only way to find that the title complies with § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA , is to ignore each of the statutory citations. ¶11 The closest judicial decision that bears upon this issue is Bonner . In that case this Court considered a post - election challenge to an initiative that had been approved by the voters. The statute in effect at that time (1921) imposed a ten - word limit on the title of such a measure as it would appear on the ballot. The title of the initiative contained the number “$5,000,000,” and the dispute was whether that should be counted as one wo rd or three under the statute ( i f three words, it would be read as “five million dollars.”) . 3 

### This Court ultimately determined that even if the number were read as three words the title would only violate the ten - word limit by two words. The Court determined that no person could have been misled by the title even if it violated the ten - word limi t by two words, and such a minor technical violation of the statute was not sufficient to defeat the

3 In considering the word - co unt is sue, this Court did not co unt the phrase “For [or “Against”] Ini

ti at ive Measure No. 19” that appeared on the ballot just before the actual t it le of the me asure that was subject to the ten- word limitat io n. T hese words were part of the ballot language under a separate directive to allow the voter to check the box on the ballot that reflected his or her vote, and were not a part of the ti tle that was subject to the statutory w ord - co unt limitation.

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will of the voters who had already enacted the provision. Bonner , 59 Mont. at 87, 195 P. at 848. ¶12 The Bonner case is instructive on several points applic able to the current proceeding. F irst, when applying a statute limiting the number of words in the title of a ballot measure, this Court clearly decided the case based upon the underlying assumption that numbers count as words . I f the number in the title had not been considered to be at least one word, there would have been no basis for the controversy and no need for the decision. Second, the Court determined that a minor or technical violation of a statute limiting the number of words in a title will n ot automatically invalidate an initiative already enacted by the people. Third, an important consideration in determining the materiality of a violation of a statutory word limit is whether v oters could have been misled. LR - 127 does not withstand scrutiny when examined using any of these criteria. ¶13 The Le gislature has not specifically defined “word” for purposes of § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA. “Word” is defined in Montana law as part of the term “folio,” which means “100 words, counting every two letters or numbers ne cessarily used as a word.” 4 

### Section 1 - 1 - 203(3), MCA. This equation of words and numbers is significant because “[w]henever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined in any part of this code, such definition is applicable to the same word or phrase wher ever it occurs, except where a contrary intention plainly appears.” S ection 1 - 2 - 107, MCA. This Court has applied that rule of statutory construction on numerous occasions. Dept. of Revenue v. Gallatin

4 There were fo rmerly a numb er of s tatutes that provided that payment, such as fo r published legal notices, would be per “fo lio .” See e.g . § 18 - 7 - 203, MCA.

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Outpatient Clinic , 234 Mont. 425, 430, 763 P.2d 1128 , 1131 (1988); State v. Merry , 2008 MT 288, ¶ 12, 345 Mont. 390, 191 P.3d 428; Graziano v. Stock Farm Homeowners Assoc ., 2011 MT 194, ¶ 32, 361 Mont. 332, 258 P.3d 999. ¶14 Other authorities also support the conclusion that numbers and discrete combinations o f numbers, are words. The usual and ordinary meaning of a “word” includes any character or set of charters separated by whitespace, which includes numbers. This definition of “word” is widely supported. The American Heritage Dictionary defines “word” as “a sound or combination of sounds, or its representation in writing or printing, that symbolizes and communicates a meaning.” Word, American Heritage Dictionary Online, (last accessed March 3, 2014). S imilarly, Merriam- Webster defines “word” as a “writt en or printed character or combination of characters representing a spoken word.” Word, Merriam - Webster Dictionary Online (last accessed March 3, 2014 ) . Under these common definitions of “word” a printed section number of a statute constitutes a word bec ause it is a series of characters in writing that communicates a spoken meaning. ¶15 Election authorities regularly define word to include numbers. In Florida, “[e]ach whole number shall count as a word” when determining the word count for constitutional in itiative ballot titles and summaries. Fl. Admin. Code IS - 2.009(4)(g). In California, the Elections Code provides that “any num ber consisting of a digit or digits shall be considered as one word. Any number which is spelled, such as ‘one’ shall be consid ered as a separate word or words. ‘One’ shall be counted as one word whereas ‘one hundred’ shall be counted as two words. ‘100’ shall be counted as one word.” Cal. Elections Code

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§ 1 - 209(a)(7). S imilarly, Oregon defines “words” to include numbers. O r. Admin. R. 165 - 022 - 000(c). ¶16 Si milarly, other courts have treated numbers as words. Northbrook Digital v. Vendio Services , 625 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733 - 734 (D. Minn. 2008) (the phrase “Docket 59” constituted two words); Franklin v. Florida , 887 So. 2d 1063, n. 3 (Fla. 2004) (court implicitly accepted the numerical sections of statutes as words); Cook v. Baker , 214 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1950) (the phrase “section 14” constituted two words); Educ. Initiative PAC v. Comm. to Protect Nev. Jobs , 293 P.3d 874 (Nev. 2013) ( implicitly finding that “Section 501(c)” constitutes two words); and Bendi v. Kulongoski , 902 P.2d 1189 (Or. 1995) (“March 30, 1995” is three words). ¶17 At the same time, there is no authority that would either allow or require a construction of § 5 - 4 - 102, M CA , that would just ignore all of the statutory citations in LR - 127. A

p erson reading the title would naturally read the statutory citations as words. The numeral “13” means and is read as the word “thirteen.” There is no other way to logically apply § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA. ¶18 This does not mean that the Le gislature may submit to the voters only simple measures that impact few existing statutes. There is no binding authority that specifically requires inclusion of the citation of each amended or repealed statute in the title of a referred measure. While State v. Duncan , 74 Mont. 428, 240 P. 978 (1925) has been cited for this proposition, it is inapposite to the statute at issue here. D uncan was convicted of the unlawful transportation and possession of intoxicati ng liquor. On appeal he attacked the validity of the statute under which he was charged, arguing that it violated

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the requirement that legislative bills contain only “one subject.” In deciding that the title of the statute at issue contained only one sub ject, this Court stated that the title of an amendatory act should refer to the “statute to be amended with sufficient particularity to identify it.” Duncan , 74 Mont. at 436, 240 P. at 980. Duncan is applicable to legislative actions to adopt and amend s tatutes, and is directed toward legislators who are schooled in the legislative process. It did not involve a matter referred to the people for a vote and did not involve any statute limiting the words in the title of a matter referred to the people for a vote. Listing all affected statutes in the title of a ballot measure is not mandated by law. ¶19 W e conclude that each of the statutory citations in the title of LR - 127 is a “word” for purposes of § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA. The Legislature chose to place the 100 - word limitation into the statute and must comply with its own law when referring a matter to the people for a vote. Furthermore, the title of LR - 127 is not a mere technical violation of the statute, but is substantially in excess of the 100 - word limit imposed by the Legislature. ¶20 Finally, the title of LR - 127 on its face, is complicated and confusing. T he clear purpose of the Legislature’s 1 00 - word limit in § 5 - 4 - 102 , MCA, as this Court determined in regards to the different word limitation in Bonner , is to insure that voters are not misled or confused by com plex titles of the measure in the ballot language . The title of LR - 127 lists approximately 100 separate statutes that would be amended and eleven that would be repealed in order to achieve the new proposed p rimary election system. I t would take most persons well - versed in the law a substantial amount of time and study to understand the details and implications of these changes. Unlike the measure in Bonner ,

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the title of a referendum that lists 111 statutes that would be amended or repealed poses a substantial risk of misleading or confusing voters. ¶21 This Court stated many years ag o that the “purposes of the ballot are: (1) to inform the voters of the nature and purposes of the measure; and (2) to afford each elector a means of expressing his approval or disapproval.” Saw yer Stores v. Mitchell , 103 Mont. 148, 160, 62 P. 342, 349 (1936). T o that end, § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA , limits the titl e of all bills referred by the L egislature to 100 words. The statutory requirement is plain and unambiguous. L egislative enactments must first be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the language in the statute. S ections 1 - 2 - 101 and - 102, MCA; State v. Incashola , 1998 MT 184, ¶ 11, 289 Mont. 399, 961 P.2d 745. ¶22 The Attorney General conducted a legal review of LR - 127 pursuant to § 13 - 27 - 315 

### , MCA , and determined that LR - 127 did not conflict with another ballot issue and that it was le gally sufficient. However, the title of LR - 127 does not comply with the plain meaning of the Le gislature’s 100 - word limit found in § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA. Therefore, LR - 127 is not legally sufficient. Accordingly, ¶23 IT IS ORDERED that the State of Montana is enjoined from placing LR - 127 on the 2 014 general election ballot. ¶24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioners’ request for attorney fees is denied. Dated this 25th day of March, 2014. /S/ MIKE McGRATH

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We Concur: /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT /S/ JIM RICE Justice Beth Baker, concurring. ¶25 I agree with virtually every point made by the Dissent. Idis agree with the Court in particular that the title of the measure in question, especially when considered in conjunction with the other ballot statements, is confusing or misleading. Nonetheless, the Le gislature has created an irreconcilable conflict that only it can resolve and, for that reason, I am constrained to conclude that LR - 127 must be withheld from the ballot. ¶26 It is a fundamental principle that the Court must, in attempting to harmonize statutes, attempt to give effect to all provisions of the law without inserting what the Le gislature has omitted from a statute or omitting what the Le gislature has inserted. Se ction 1 - 2 - 101, MCA. Although it appears to be longstanding practice of the Le gislature and the Le gislative Services Division not to count numbers as words in determining the length of the title of a measure referred to the voters, the plain language of § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA, does not accommodate that practice. ¶27 It would be a simple fix for the Le gislature to amend that section to provide, “All bills referred by the legislature to a vote of the people shall have a title of no more than 100 words, exclusive of sec tion numbers of any statutes being amended.” The Court, however, cannot supply the omitted language. Ib elieve the Court correctly concludes

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that we would have to ignore § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA, in order to deny the Petitioners’ challenge in this case. / S/ BETH BAKER 

### Justice Laurie McKinnon , dissenting. ¶28 Since 1906, the people of M ontana have reserved to themselves the power to approve or rej ect by referendum any act of the Legislature, except an appropriat io n of money. Nicholson v. Cooney , 265 Mont. 406, 410 , 877 P.2d 486, 488 (1994) . The referendum provision is set forth in Art ic le III, Section 5, of M ontana’s Const itution. I n int erpreting this provision , we mu st be guided by the principle that “init iat ive and referendum provision s of the Const itut io n should be broadly construed to maintain the maximum power in the people,” Nicholson , 265 Mont. at 411, 877 P.2d at 488 ( cit ing Chouteau Co. v. Grossman , 172 Mont. 373, 378, 563 P.2d 1125, 1128 (1977) ) and that judicial int ervention in referenda or ini tiat ives prior to an elect io n is not encouraged, Cobb v. State , 278 Mont. 307, 310, 924 P.2d 268, 269 (1996). Addi tionally, in order to effect ively protect and preserve the rights Montanans have reserved to themselves th rough the ref

erendum process, pre - e lect io n review should be very deferent ia l. Harper v. Greely , 234 Mont. 259, 265 - 66, 763 P.2d 650, 654 (1988). 

### ¶29 These principles are primarily based upon two substantive provision s of the Montana Const itut io n. Article II, Section 1, provides:

Popular so vereignt y. All poli ti cal power i s vested in and derived from the people. All

government of right originates wi th the people, i s f

ounded upon thei

r will only, and is inst ituted solely f or the good of the whole. 

### Article II, Section 2, provides:

Self - government. The people have the exclusive right of governin g themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state. They may alter or

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abolish the constitution and form of government whenever they deem it necessary. Wit h these principles in mind, I turn to the primary concern of the Court

— whether a referendum, LR- 127, should be removed from consideration by Montana voters because its title includes mo re than 100 words, if statutory references are included. 

### ¶30 Section 5 - 4 - 102, MCA, provides that bills referred by the Legislature to a vote of the people shall have a ti

tle of no mo re than 100 words. H owever, Montana’s Legislature has not provided guidance as to whether a list of a ffected statutes in a referendum ti tle counts towards the 100 - word limi

t f o r purposes of

§ 5 - 4 - 102, MCA. Alt hough there have been several instances since the enactment of

§ 5 - 4 - 102, MCA, in 1979, where referendum ti tles have exceeded the 100 - word limit, this is the first instance where there has been a challenge made to this Cour t. 5 

### ¶31 Peti

tioners and thi s Court rely on State ex rel. Bonner v. Dixon , 59 Mont. 58, 87 - 88, 195 P. 841, 848 (1921), overruled on other grounds , Bd. of R egents v. Judge , 168 Mo nt. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975), as authorit y that numerals count as words in ballo t ti tles. O pinio n, ¶¶ 11 - 12, 20 . S uch reliance , however, is misplaced. Bonner invo lved a post - election request to enjo in enforcement of

an init iat ive passed under a 10 - word limit on ballot ti tles. T he quest io n was whether “$5,000,000” in the phrase “Pr oviding fo r $5,000,000 Bonds fo r Buildings at State Educational

In st itutions” counted as one word, or as th ree words. Noting that there had been “a substant ia l co mp liance wi th s tatutory requi

rements” and that there was nothing to indicate that the people had been injured or deceived by wording that possibly exceeded the 10 - word limit, the Court rej ected the challenge as a “hai r - spli tting technicalit y.” Bonner, 59 Mont. at 87, 195 P. at 848. Im

portantly, the Court excl

uded actual words f

rom consideration in calculating the word limit because those words were requi red to be in the ti

tle. Thus, the Court held that “[t]he words 5 LR- 11 1 (1993), LR- 115 (2000), and LR- 116 (2000), each included every amended and repealed section in their ti tles and thus arguably exceeded the 100 - word limit.

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‘For Ini ti at ive Measure No. 19,’ and ‘Against Ini ti at ive Measure No. 19,’ are properly excluded fro m co mput ation of

the number of words in the legend on the ballot . . . .” Bonner, 59 Mon t. a t 87, 195 P. at 848. 

### ¶32 Bonner does not, as Petit io ners and this Court maintain , stand fo r the proposi tion that numbers or statutory

ref erences are to be counted as words. O pinio n, ¶ 12. Indeed, the Court in Bonner specifically rejected a mechanical application of a statute similar to § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA, and never direct ly addressed whether numbers count as words. M ore significant ly, however, the ballot issue considered in Bonn er was a ci tizen- proposed init iat ive, not a referendum. We have recognized that ballot ti

tles of ref erenda are ent it led to mo re def erence than ballot statements of init iat ives. In Harper, 234 Mont. at 265, 763 P. 2d at 654, we stated: 

### Because we find th at the legislative referendum is a product of the Le gislature and is passed in the form of a bill, its title should be examined according to the same standard applied to other legislation. I f it results in greater deference being given to the ballot langu ag e which derives from the legislation rather than the petition, then that is appropriate due to the differences between the two sources. Bonner therefore is not controlling authorit y fo r the Court’s determinat io n that statutory sect io n numbers count as “words.” Moreover, if a ballot init iat ive which arguably vio lates a word count was upheld, as it was in Bonner, then the deference to be accorded legislat io n, in the absence of authori ty to the contrary, warrants upholding the validit y of LR- 127’s ti

tle. 

### ¶33 T he Court further overlooks lo ng - standing authori ty that “the ti

tle shall refer to the statute to be amended, wi th sufficient particulari

ty t o ident ify it .” State v. Duncan , 74 Mont. 428, 436, 240 P. 978, 980 (1925) (emphasis added). We explained in Dunc an “the authori ties agree generally that all difficult ies are avo ided if the ti tle of the amendatory

Act gives the number of

the sect io n to be amended and indicates it s subject matter.” Duncan , 74 Mont. at 43 6 - 3 7, 240 P. at9 80. “‘ All that is required in such case is a reasonable degree of c ertaint y as

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to the statute to be amended. ’ ” Duncan , 74 Mont. at 437, 240 P. at 980 (quoting In re White , 33 Neb. 812, 51 N.W. 287 (1892)) (emphasis added). Duncan accords wi th the well - recognized principle that the t it le of

an amendatory

a ct must ident ify “w it h reasonable certaint y” the statute or section to be amended. Norman Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction vo l. 1 A , § 22:9, 277 (7th ed., Thomson 2 009). Our caselaw reflects that an amendatory

a ct “has a sufficient ti

tle, under a const itutional provision l ike ours, if itc it e[s] the number of the section and the chapter of the Code to be amended and affected thereby .” State v. Courtney , 27 Mont. 378, 385, 71 P. 308, 310 (1903); s ee also State v. Silver Bow R ef. Co. , 78 Mont. 1, 16 - 18, 252 P. 301, 3 05 (1926). Conversely, we have invalidated laws where the ti tle did not give sufficient notice of an amendment to exist ing law made in the body of the bill. Coolidge v. M

eagher, 100 Mont. 172, 182 - 83, 46 P.2d 684, 687 (1935). 

### ¶34 The overriding inquiry is whether the ti tle fairly appri ses the reader of the subject of the l egislat io n and the law being amended, or whether the ti tle is misleading. State ex rel. Bray v. Long , 21 Mo nt. 26, 28 - 31, 52 P. 645, 646 - 47 (1898), overruled on oth er grounds Palatine Ins. Co. v. N. Pac. Ry. , 34 Mont. 268, 85 P. 1032 (1906). The Court concl udes that the ti

tle of LR- 127 is “co mp licated and confusing,” Opinio n ¶ 20 , yeti t has fa iled to e xplain how the inclusio n of

the statutory

r eferences will mis lead or co nfuse voters. A s we recent ly noted, the ballot language mu st “identify the measure on the ballot so that a Mo nt ana voter, drawing on both official and unofficial sources of informat io n and educat io n, will [be able to] exercise his or her polit ical

j udgment.” MEA -

MFT v. State , 2014 MT 33, ¶ 11, 374 Mon t. 1, ___ P.3d ___ (quoti ng Harper, 234 Mont. at 269, 763 P.2d at 657). The bill t it le supplied by the Legislature is not the only sourc e of

informat io n explaining a ballot measure. T he ballot also includes the At torney G eneral’s explanatory s tatement, which is the of ficial ballot ti

tle (see

### 16

§§ 13 - 27 - 312, - 315, MCA), and the statements of implication. In light of our authori ty requi ring an amendatory

a ct to give notice of

the statutes iti s amending, the ti tle supplied by the Legislature, together with the At to rney G eneral’s ballot st atement , fa ir ly appri ses the voters of the proposed legislat io n and is not misleading. 

### ¶35 Indeed, SB 256 f rom the 1979 Legislat ive Session , which enacted the 100 - wo rd requi rement, incl

uded ci tations to all of the amended sections in it s ti tle. A s we held in Bonner, when we excluded required language fro m the word co unt, these sect io n references in LR- 127 were mandated by Duncan and thus similarly should be excluded from the word count. 

### ¶36 Contrary

to the Court’s conclusion today, I do not find that the plain meaning of the term “words” includes numbers or statutory references. See Opinio n, ¶ 19 . I n ho ld ing that numbers count as words, the Court relies in part on authorit y fro m states which have specific statutes or rules addre ssing this issue. O pinio n, ¶¶ 15 - 16 . T he Court reaches, and in my opinion errs, in ci ting authori

ty f rom o ther states which have statute s or rules di rect ing how numbers are to be considered. S ta

tu tory r eferences are ci

tations and, absent an indicat io n fro m the Legislature to the contrary, should be construed co nsistent wi th o ur precedent. We have not, as demonstrated by the foregoing dis cussion, previously equated ci tations wi th words. The Court’s determinat io n obscures a very important dist inct io n present here

—the absence of any direct io n fro m our Legislature that statutory referenc es are to be considered words. When a statute is equal ly suscept ible to two int erpretations, the one in favor of the peoples’ rights

— such as the right the people of M ontana have reserved to themselves to adopt laws by init iat ives and ref erenda

— should be adopted. See § 1 - 2 - 104, MCA. Accordingly, § 5 - 4 - 102, M CA, is reasonably suscept ible to an int erpretation that would exclude the list of a ffected statutes fro m the word count.

### 17

¶37 Finally, if Pet it io ners’ arguments were accepted, Montanans would be unable to vote on any issue , no matter how simple, that would re qui re minor technical amendments to many sect io ns of

c ode. S ta

tu tory c onstruction should not le ad to absurd resul ts if a reasonable int erpretation can avoid it . State v. Letasky , 2007 MT 51, ¶ 11, 336 Mont. 178, 152 P.3d 1288. It is likewise plausible that, had LR- 127 not included all affected statutes, a challenge would have been made pursuant to Duncan . S uch a lo se - lo se si tuation leads to absurd resul ts and is inconsistent wi

th the ri ght of

M ontana voters to consider matters referred by the Legislatur e. Letasky , ¶ 11. 

### ¶38 I di ssent fro m the Court’s decisio n which accepts Peti tioners’ argument that LR- 127 is invalid on grounds that it s ti tle contains mo re than 100 words. I n my view, our decisio n is in conflict with the fo llo wing authori ty : the deference to be accorded to the Legislature in constructing the ti

tle to a referendum, Harper, 234 Mont. at 165, 763 P.2d at6 54 ; the requi rement that statutory sect io ns be included in a referendum ti tle, Duncan , 74 Mo nt. at4 28, 240 P. at 980; precedent that establishes that required language be excluded fro m the word count, Bonner, 59 Mont. at8 7, 195 P. at8 48; the preference in favor of a natural r ight, § 1 - 2 - 104, MCA; and the absence of a uthori ty supporting a concl

usion that a number or cit ation should be considered a “word.” Iwo uld allow LR- 127 to be on the ballot, th us enabling Montanans to accomplish the goal s of

p opular sovereignt y and self - government by voting on an important issue referred by the Legislature. To deny the right to vote on LR- 127 because we have decided that numbers are words is in conflict with these principles and precedent. Idissent from the Court’s decisio n to the contrary .

### 18

¶39 The Court does not address Petitioners’ remaining contentions because of its reso lut io n of the word - co unt challenge. A s I have det ermined that § 5 - 4 - 102, MCA , does not render LR- 127 invalid, I will address Petit io ners’ remaining content io ns. 

### ¶40 Peti

tioners contend that the At torney General’s legal sufficiency determinat io n is incorrect because LR- 127 enco mpasses mo re than one subject, in vio lation of Article V, Section 11(3), of the Montana Const itution. According to Peti tioners, LR- 127 changes the election l aws in at least two separate and substant ia l ways: i t provides fo r an open primary elect io n system, and itp rovides that the top two vote winners

— and no other candidates

— will advance to the general elect io n, regardless of p art y affiliat io n. Addi

tionally, according to Petit io ners, LR- 127 “essent ia lly” eliminates the right of third parties to appear on the general elect io n ballot whi le weakening all polit ical parties by allowing only a “party

pref erence” to be stated on the ballot. 

### ¶41 “Consistent wi

th i ts obligat io n to c onstrue the statutes to promote, rather than to curtail, the people’s ri ght of

d ir ect democracy,” this Court int erpret s the At torney General’s lega l sufficiency review authori ty narrowly . Montanans Opposed to I - 166 v. Bullock

, 2012 MT 168, ¶ 13, 365 Mont. 520, 285 P.3d 435 (Baker, J., concurring); see also MEA - MFT , ¶ 11. 

### ¶42 We have stated previously that the reasons “for this Court’s int ervent io n in the init iative process prior to an elect io n are qui te limited.” State ex rel. Mont. Citizens for Preservation of Citizens’ Rights v. Waltermire , 224 Mont. 273, 276, 729 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1986). We have assumed jurisdict io n over pre - elect io n challenges when the init iat ive was not properly submitted under the election laws, e.g., State ex rel. Livingston e v. Murray , 137 Mont. 557, 354 P.2d 552 (1960), and where the init iat ive was unconst itutio nal on it s face, e.g., State ex rel. Steen v. Murray , 144 Mont. 61, 394 P.2d 761 (1964). Moreover, in Waltermire we spe cifically addressed whether an ini

ti at ive was invalid because itp resented mo re than one amendment in a single

### 19

ballot in vio lat io n o f the single - subject rule embodied in Article XIV, Section 11 , of the Montana Const itut io n. We determined that: 

### Even if plaintiffs’ view is correct, this type of multiplicity is not a proper basis for this Court’s intervention in the initiative process prior to election. This challenge does n ot constitute the type of question of unconstitutionality on the face of the Initiative over which this Court has previously accepted pre - election jurisdiction. N either is this a challenge of the propriety of submission of the Initiative to the voters. W ithout ruling upon the merits of the contention, we decline[ ] to consider the issue prior to election. Waltermire , 224 Mont. at 277, 729 P.2d at 1285 - 86. 

### ¶43 I wo uld similarly d ecline to co nsider whether LR - 127 vio lat es the single - subject rule in vio lat io n o f Article V, Section 11 (3), of the Montana Const itution. I would not rule on the meri ts of P et it io ner s ’ content io ns and would conclude only that the challenge is not a proper basis fo r thi s Court’s intervent io n int o the init iat ive process. 

### ¶44 Finally, Pet it ioners contend that the Attorney General’s ballot statement vio lates § 1 3 - 27 - 312, MCA, in that iti s untruthful, mis leading, and contradictory . Section 13 - 27 - 312(4), MCA, requi

res that a ballot statement 

### must express the true and impartial explanation of the proposed ballot issue in plain, easily understood language and may not be arguments or written so as to create prejudice for or against the issue. The ballot statement the Attorney General has approved fo r LR - 127 is as follows: The 2013 Le gislature submitted this proposal for a vote. LR - l27 generally amends election laws to provide that the two candidates who receive the most votes in certain primary elections for partisan offices will advance to the general election irrespective of political party affiliation. C andidates may state a political party preference that will appear on the ballot. LR - l27 does not amend the primary process for party precinct elections or presidential primary elections. LR - 127 amends primary election balloting by requiring all races to appear on the same ballot. LR - 127 also generally amends certain related procedures regarding vacancies, write - in candidates, withdrawal of candidates, recall petitions, election judges, filing deadlines,

### 20

certification o f votes, ballot form and uniformity requirements, recounts, electioneering, election challenges, and contribution limitations. ¶45 Peti

tioners maintain that the At torney G eneral’s ballot statement fo r LR- 127 does not provide fa ir notice, and provides contradictory and misleading informat io n. P eti tioners argue that LR- 127 tells voters the primary process fo r party precinct and presidential primary elections will not change, even though the process will change because the fo rmerly separate, party- based primary ballots would be co mbined int o one ballot. P et it io ners also point out that the referendum only allows candidates to indicate a party p reference, instead of a party a ffiliat io n, and that itimposes a new requirement, in order to have a vote co unt, that vot ers mu st indicate a party p ref erence. P eti

tioners argue that the statement in the ti tle that other subjects will be “generally amended” o mit s certain important changes to the law. 

### ¶46 Section 13 - 27 - 312(2)(a), MCA, establishes a limit of 1 35 words fo r a stat ement of purpose and implicat io n fo r a ballot issue. T hat limit dictates that the statement will provide only a general overview of the ballot issue, not a full list ing of all o f it s possible effects. 

### ¶47 “To fo reclose the prospect of e ndless and subjective challenges,” this Court upholds ballot statements that meet the basic statutory requi rements. Stop Over Spending Mont. v. State , 2006 MT 178, ¶ 18, 333 Mont. 42, 139 P.3d 788. A s lo ng as the At torney G eneral’s wording “fairly states to the voters what i s proposed . . . di scretion as to the cho ice of language . . . is ent ir ely [the Attorney

General’s].” State ex rel. Wenzel v. Murray , 178 Mont. 441, 448, 585 P.2d 633, 637 - 38 (1978). I n Harper, 234 Mont. at 269, 763 P.2d at 657, we rej ected a challenge t o referendum ballot statements even though “the language may not be the best conceivable statement.” 

### ¶48 Here, iti s my opinion that the At torney G eneral ’s statement of p urpose meets the requi rements of

§ 1 3 - 27 - 312, MCA. T herefore, I would decline to int ervene in the referendum

### 21

process on grounds that the At torney General’s ballot statement of purpose and implicat io n does not com ply wit h that statute. 

### ¶49 For the reasons set fo rth above, I co nclude that Petit io ners’ arguments regarding the At torney General’s le gal sufficiency review have no meri

t. 

### /S/ LAURIE McKINNON