alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition 

 is not citable as precedent. It is a public record. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

 05-5148 

ORION INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

 UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

 and 

 FIORE INDUSTRIES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: June 16, 2006 

__________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LINN, and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

The government's motion to vacate and dismiss is denied, for a bid protest is not 

routinely mooted whenever the agency terminates the protested contract for convenience. 

On the appeal, the decision of the Court of Federal Claims is affirmed on the 

grounds set forth in that court's opinion.
#### Sal J. PORRELLO, a/k/a Salvatore J. Porrello, Appellant, v. HARMAR OF HELEN STREET, INC., Appellee.

No. 88-230.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Nov. 23, 1988.

*951Jerri A. Blair of Carr & Blair, and Richard E. Dunegan of Dunegan & Associates, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.

J. Michael Malone, of Malone and Watts, Orlando, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion seeking relief from a judgment which appellant alleges was based upon a mistake of fact in an affidavit. It appears to this court that relief should have been granted and that the judgment should have been withdrawn in order to permit the parties to have a trial to resolve all disputed issues of fact.

The order appealed is reversed and this cause remanded for trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SHARP, C.J., and DAUKSCH and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5

<MULTIPLIER>      1000
       
<S>                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>            12-31-95
<PERIOD-END>                 12-31-95
<CASH>                       22967
<SECURITIES>                 229418
<RECEIVABLES>                1196737
<ALLOWANCES>                 (44566)
<INVENTORY>                  0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>             274476
<PP&E>                       14269
<DEPRECIATION>               7247
<TOTAL-ASSETS>               1634918
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>        392413
<BONDS>                      958240
<COMMON>                     176478
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>        0
<PREFERRED>                  0
<OTHER-SE>                   107787
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY> 1634918
<SALES>                      270416
<TOTAL-REVENUES>             348327
<CGS>                        0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>             101233
<LOSS-PROVISION>             30841
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>           57303
<INCOME-PRETAX>              158950
<INCOME-TAX>                 60043
<INCOME-CONTINUING>          98907
<DISCONTINUED>               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>              0
<CHANGES>                    0
<NET-INCOME>                 98907
<EPS-PRIMARY>                .57
<EPS-DILUTED>                .57
        

</TABLE>
##### 



Exhibit 99.2

JPS INDUSTRIES, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of JPS Industries, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending November 2, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Charles R. Tutterow




Charles R. Tutterow
Executive Vice President,Chief Financial Officer and Secretary


January 29, 2003
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RAKEEM HILL , Petitioner ,

v. Case No. 5D 16

- 2419

STATE OF FLORIDA , Respondent

. ________________________________/ Opinion filed July 26, 2016 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, A Case of Original Jurisdiction. Roger Scott, Jr., Orlando , for Petitioner. No Appearance for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Rakee m Hill (“Hill”) was arrested on an outstanding warrant in which he was charged with eighty

- eight counts of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, one count of possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and one count of possessi on of a weapon in commission of a felony. At his first appearance, Hill was denied bond on all counts by the presiding judge. Hill has now filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, requesting that we quash the trial court’s “Order2

Denying Motion to Set Bond” and direct the trial court to either set bond or, alternatively, to “hold a hearing as to [Hill’ s] motion to set bond.” We deny the petition without prejudice. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131(a) provides , in part , that “[ u ] nless charged wi th a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime

. . . shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. ” In his petition, Hil l correctly notes that he has not been charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by up to life in prison. However, pursuant to Florida R ule of Criminal Procedure 3.132(a), under

certain c ircumstances, a person arrested for an offense to whic h he or she may be otherwise entitled to pretrial release may be detained without a bond. Our very limited record contains no transcript of the first appearance hearing, no motion to set bond , and

no order denying a motion to set bond. Additionally, Hill ’s present petition provides no

in dication as to whether the State filed a motion seeking pretrial detention or whether , at first appearance , the S tate reque s ted a three

- day extension to file such a motion, as it is permitted to do, pursuant to rule 3.132( a). Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus, but do so without prejudice to Hill filing a motion with the trial court to set bond. If filed, the trial court is directed to hold an expedited hearing on the motion. This decision is also without prejudice for the State, if it has not already done so, to file a motion for pretrial detention, if appropriate under the present facts of the case. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.132(b). Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus DENIED, without prejudice.

SAWAYA , ORFINGER , and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50771

Summary Calendar

VIOLA PENA

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMPASSIONATE CARE, INC.

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(MO-98-CV-179)

March 15, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Viola Pena claims that Compassio nate Care, Inc., her former

employer, discriminated against her because of her national origin

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She

alleges that Compassionate Care fired her because she is Hispanic.

Judge L. Stuart Platt, United States Magistrate Judge, granted

summary judgment for Compassionate Care, and Pena appeals. Because

the competent summary judgment evidence before the lower court did2

not raise a material fact issue that national origin was a

motivating reason for Pena’s termination, we AFFIRM.

The analysis for Title VII discrimi nation claims is wellest ablished. S ee St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks

, 509 U.S. 502

(1993). The plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case that the

defendant made an employment decisi on that was motivated by a

protected factor. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case,

the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence that its

employment decision was based on a legitimate n ondiscriminatory

reason. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that

the defendant’s proff ered reasons were a pretext for

discrimination. See Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co. , 55 F.3d 1086,

1089 (5th Cir. 1995).

Assuming Pena were to establish a prima facie case, Pena fails

to present competent summary judgment evidence to rebut

Compassionate Care’s proffered reason for her terminat ion: that

Pena submitted a false mileage claim after having been warned not

to do so when had previously submitted a false claim. Pena argues

that similarly situated white employees were treated more favorably

than she was, but this argument is in valid. The white employees

whom Pena claims were similarly situated did not, like Pena, submit

a false mileage claim after having previously done so and been

warned about it. Thus, Pena provides no evidence to show that the

true reason she was terminated was because she was Hispanic.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
#### ROWLEY COMPANY, INC. v. SOUTHBEND CONTRACTORS, INC., Great American Insurance Company and C.B. Fox Company.

No. 88-C-0135.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 12, 1988.

. I.nt.-i?e Great American Ins. Co.; C.B. Fox Company; : applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-7287; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “E”, No. 85-03493.

Prior report: La.App., 517 So.2d 1260.

Not considered; not timely filed.
Exhibit 32.2.2

STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

The undersigned, Stephen R. Theroux, is the Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer, and Chief Financial Officer of New
Hampshire Thrift Bancshares, Inc. (the Company). This statement is being furnished in connection with the filing by the Company of the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the
Report).

By execution of this statement, I certify that:



| | A) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | B) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and
for the periods covered by the Report.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report
so that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not intended
that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original
of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request



|                       |  |                                                                
|---------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: October 15, 2010 |  | /s/ Stephen R. Theroux                                         
|                       |  | Stephen R. Theroux                                             
|                       |  | President, Chief Operating Officer, and Chief Financial Officer
## State of N ew York Su p reme Cou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: November 19, 2015 518170

________________________________ In the Matter of IRYANNA I., Alleged to be a Neglected, Abused and/or Severely Abused Child.
ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent; BENJAMIN K., Appellant.

________________________________ Calendar Date: October 13, 2015 Before: Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ.

__________ Alexander Lesyk, Norwood, for appellant. Maureen C. McGaw, Canton, attorney for the child.

__________ Lahtinen, J.P. Appeals from an order and an amended order of the Family Court of St. Lawrence County (Morris, J.), entered September 13, 2013 and September 16, 2013, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, denied respondent's motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition. In 2013, petitioner commenced this proceeding alleging that respondent had derivatively neglected, abused and/or severely abused the subject child (born in 2013). Respondent moved for summary judgment dismissing the petition. In an order and amended order, Family Court found that triable issues of fact

### - 2

- 518170

existed regarding whether respondent had complied with required counseling and whether the conditions that led to the previous findings of abuse continued and, therefore, it denied the motion. Respondent now appeals. Respondent's counsel seeks to be relieved of his assignment on the ground that there are no nonfrivolous issues to be pursued on appeal (see Anders v California, 386 US 738 [1967]; Matter of Jennifer HH. v Veronica II., 70 AD3d 1072, 1073 [2010]; Matter of William XX. v Broome County Dept. of Social Servs., 11 AD3d 735, 736 [2004]). While "[i]ntermediate orders in Family Ct Act article 10 matters involving abuse and neglect are appealable as of right" (Matter of Ameillia RR. [Megan SS.], 95 AD3d 1525, 1526 [2012]; see Family Ct Act § 1112 [a]; cf. Matter of Confort v Nicolai, 9 AD3d 428, 429 [2004]; Matter of Koch v Ackerman, 142 AD2d 581, 582 [1988]), a hearing was held after the order denying respondent's motion was issued, and Family Court held that petitioner had established that respondent derivatively neglected and abused the subject child. As a result, we agree with the parties that the instant matter is moot (see Matter of Ameillia RR. [Megan SS.], 95 AD3d at 1526; Matter of Alexander K. [Jennifer N.], 77 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2010]) and, therefore, we need not address counsel's application to be relieved of his assignment (see Matter of Alexander K. [Jennifer N.], 77 AD3d at 1024 [2010]; Matter of Chelsea M. [Ernest M.], 68 AD3d 1489, 1489-1490 [2009]). Garry, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ., concur.

### - 3

- 518170

ORDERED that the appeals are dismissed, as moot, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11290

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KEVIN SCOTT THOMPSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00029-RAH-KFP-1

____________________

USCA11 Case: 24-11290 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 10/04/2024 Page: 1 of 2
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11290

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Government’s motion to dismiss this appeal pursuant 

to the appeal waiver in Appellant’s plea agreement is GRANTED. 

See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly 

and voluntarily); United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 

(11th Cir. 2005) (waiver of the right to appeal includes waiver of 

the right to appeal difficult or debatable issues or even blatant error).

USCA11 Case: 24-11290 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 10/04/2024 Page: 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>              5
<LEGEND>               This schedule contains summary financial information
                       extracted from Scotsman Industries, Inc. Condensed 
                       Balance Sheet (Unaudited) as of June 30, 1996 and 
                       Scotsman Industries, Inc. Condensed Statement of Income
                       (Unaudited) for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1996 and 
                       is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
                       financial statements.
<MULTIPLIER>                      1000
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-29-1996
<PERIOD-START>                    JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                      JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     6-MOS
<CASH>                            16,699
<SECURITIES>                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                     77,413
<ALLOWANCES>                      3,161
<INVENTORY>                       54,703
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  157,333
<PP&E>                            46,772
<DEPRECIATION>                    42,011
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    302,100
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             82,845
<BONDS>                           83,712
<COMMON>                          944
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>             0
<PREFERRED>                       1,625
<OTHER-SE>                        120,086                    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      302,100
<SALES>                           189,956
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  189,956
<CGS>                             135,692
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     135,692
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                2,837
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   20,550
<INCOME-TAX>                      9,866
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               10,684
<DISCONTINUED>                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                   0
<CHANGES>                         0
<NET-INCOME>                      10,684
<EPS-PRIMARY>                     1.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                     1.00

</TABLE>
# United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 11-2179 MARY JANE MCGAIR; JOSEPH MCGAIR, Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v. AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA,

Defendant, Appellee,

ERRATA The opinion of this Court issued on September 4, 2012, is amended as follows: On page 12, footnote 4, add the word "zones, " fo llowed by a period, at the end of the sentence, after the quotation marks (i.e., . . . moderate-risk" zones.)
#### STATE ex rel. Henry TALLEY, Sr. v. Jack F. DONNELLY, Warden, Washington Correctional Inst.

No. 87-KH-0956.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 12, 1988.

In re Talley, Henry Sr.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “B”, No. 280-956.

Denied. Moot.
<PAGE>




                                                                   Exhibit 23.1



                         Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 33-83068 dated August 16, 1994 and No. 333-36390 dated May 5, 2000)
pertaining to The 1993 Incentive Plan of Fuel Tech N.V. of our report dated
February 19, 2003, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Fuel
Tech N.V. included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2002.


                                Ernst & Young LLP


Chicago, Illinois
March 11, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 273 A 1 6
Filed 29 September 2017
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. JAMISON CHRISTOPHER GOINS

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 7 8 9 S.E.2d 4 6 6 (201 6 ), reversing an order denying defendant’s motion to suppress entered on 15 A pril 201 5 by Judge Stuart Albright , and vacating defendant’s guilty plea and judgment s e ntered on 11 May 201 5
b y Judge Richard S. Gottlieb , all in Superior Court, Guilford County , and remanding the case for further proceedings

. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 June 2017

.

Joshua H. Stein , Attorney General, by Shawn R. Evans and Kristin J. Uicker , Assistant Attorney s General, for the State

- appellant

. Drew Nelson for defendant

- appellee

.

PER CURIAM. For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
REVERSED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

KANNIS BETANCOURT; DULCE

GIANNA MEDSENIA BRITO,

Defendants-Appellants,

No. 16-50059

 16-50066

D.C. No. 3:15-cr-01303-LAB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 14, 2017** 

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

In these companion appeals, Kannis Betancourt and Dulce Gianna Medsenia

Brito appeal the 36-month sentences imposed following their guilty-plea

FILED

FEB 21 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except

as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 
convictions for making false statements to federal officers, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1001. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Appellants contend that the district court violated their due process rights by

failing to apply the clear and convincing standard of proof to its finding that they

knew there were drugs in the car. This argument fails because the record reflects

that the court expressly declined to find that the defendants knowingly imported

drugs. Instead, the court stated that it was foreseeable to both appellants, based on

their admitted belief that they were smuggling drug proceeds, that the car might

contain drugs. Contrary to appellants’ argument, this was a reasonable inference

from the record, given their admissions and the circumstances of the offense. 

Thus, the court did not violate appellants’ due process rights in imposing their

sentences. See United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935-36 (9th Cir.

2009) (due process violated only when the sentencing court relies on evidence that

“lacks some minimal indicium of reliability” (internal quotations omitted)). 

Moreover, the court’s remaining inferences, including that appellants were

likely attempting to avoid detection when crossing the border, were not clearly

erroneous, given their admissions regarding the purpose of their crossing. See

United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A finding is clearly

erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.”).

2 16-50059 & 16-50066
Finally, appellants contend that their sentences are substantively

unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the aboveGuidelines sentences in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the totality of

the circumstances, including the appellants’ admission that they committed the

offense in the course of their work on behalf of a drug-trafficking organization. 

See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

AFFIRMED. 

3 16-50059 & 16-50066