Interim Decision #3000 

MATTER OF LINNAS 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-8085626 

Decided by Board October 16, 1985 

(1) The term "country," used to describe a place of deportation under section 243(a) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982), means, at a minimum, a foreign place with "territory" in a geographical sense and a "government" in the sense of a political organization that exercises power on behalf of 

the people subjected to its jurisdiction. 

(2) Offices maintained in New York City on behalf of the Republic of Estonia do not 

qualify under section 243(a) of the Act as a "country" of deportation. 

(3) When an alien who is a native of Soviet -occupied Estonia steadfastly rejects allegiance to the Soviet Union, that country does not constitute a country of which 

the alien is a "subject, national, or citizen" within the meaning of section 242(a) of 

the Act. 

(4) When no other country but the Soviet Union is willing to accept a deportable 

alien into its territory, then the Soviet Union properly may be designated as the 

country of deportation under the provision in section 243(a)(7) of the Act authorizing deportation of an alien to any country that is willing to accept him. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX1) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX1)]--Excludable at entry 

under sections 2, 10, and 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 

1948 

Sec. 241(aX2) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX2)]—Entered in violation of 

sections 2, 10, and 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 

Sec. 241(2)(19) [8 U.S.C_ § 1251(a)(19)]—Partieipatinn in Nazi 

persecution 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Ivars Bening, Esquire Jeffrey N. Mausner 

484 West Montauk Highway Aron A. Golberg 

Babylon, New York 11702 Trial Attorneys 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Mania-is. Dunne. Morris. and Vacca. Board Members 

This is a case we previously heard on appeal and remanded to 

the immigration judge for designation of a country of deportation 
Interim Decision #3000 

pursuant to section 243(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). It is before us again by means of an appeal 

filed by the respondent challenging the immigration judge's decision of April 9, 1985, designating the U.S.S.R. as the country of deportation. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the immigration judge's designation and shall dismiss the appeal. 

The pertinent facts are as follows. The respondent is a 66-yearold male who is a native of Estonia, one of the three Baltic states 

that were annexed by the Soviet Union after the defeat of Germany in World War H. He entered the United States after the war, 

and in 1960 he became a naturalized citizen of this country. In 1979 

the respondent was denaturalized on the grounds that he had illegally procured his citizenship by failing to disclose the fact that he 

had served at a concentration camp in Estonia under the direction 

of the Nazis during World War II. The Immigration and Naturalization Service subsequently instituted deportation proceedings 

against the respondent, charging him with various grounds of deportability, among which was deportability pursuant to section 

241(aX19) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX19) (1982), for having assisted the Nazis in persecuting others because of their race, religion, 

national origin, or political opinion. The respondent was found by 

the immigration judge to be deportable as charged and was ordered 

deported to the U.S.S.R. On July 31, 1984, we affirmed the finding 

of deportability and, on the basis of that finding, concluded that 

the respondent is statutorily ineligible for various forms of relief 

from deportation, including asylum and withholding of deportation 

from the U.S.S.R. However, in light of the respondent's contention 

that deportation of a native of Estonia to the U.S.S.R. would violate United States foreign policy, which has never recognized the 

legitimacy of the Soviet Union's annexation of Estonia, we remanded the case to the immigration judge to reconsider the issues raised 

by selection of the U.S.S.R. as the country of deportation. Pursuant 

to our order, the immigration judge conducted additional hearings 

between October 1984 and March 1985, at which both the respondent and the Service presented additional evidence on the question 

of the proper country of deportation. On April 9, 1985, the immigration judge issued a new decision designating the U.S.S.R. as the 

country of deportation pursuant to provisions in the Act authorizing deportation to the country in which an alien's place of birth is 

situated at the time he is ordered deported or to any country that 

is willing to accept an alien into its territory. See Sections 248(aX4), 

(7) of the Act. The respondent thereupon filed this appeal. 

Section 243(a) of the Act sets forth, in order of priority, three 

steps for designating a country of deportation. Step #1 provides 
Interim Decision #3000 

that an alien himself may designate a country of deportation. If an 

alien declines to make a proper designation, or if the government 

of the country an alien designates is unwilling to accept hits, or if 

the designation is prejudicial to the United States, then step #2 

authorizes the Attorney General to deport an alien to any country 

of which he is a subject, national, or citizen, so long as the government of that country is willing to accept him into its territory. If 

deportation cannot be accomplished under this step, then step #3 

authorizes the Attorney General to deport an alien to any one of 

the following seven categories of countries without priority as to 

their order: (1) the country from which the alien last entered the 

United States; (2) the country in which is located the foreign port 

at which the alien embarked for the United States; (3) the country 

in which the alien was born; (4) the country in which the place of 

the alien's birth is situated at the time he is ordered deported; (5) 

any country hi which the alien resided prior to entering the country from which he entered the United States; (6) any country that 

had sovereignty over the alien's birthplace at the time of his birth; 

or (7) if deportation to the foregoing is impracticable, inadvisable, 

or impossible, then to any country that is willing to accept the 

alien into its territory. Sections 24.9(a)(1) -(7) of the Act; Mg Kam 

Fook v. Esperdy, 320 F.2d 86, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1963); Matter of Lau, 12 

I&N Dec. 573, 574-75 (31A 1968). 

At both his original deportation hearing and upon remand to the 

immigration judge, the respondent designated the "free and independent Republic of Estonia" as his choice for a place of deportation under the first step of Section 243(a) of the Act, contending 

that since the Republic of Estonia is currently occupied by the 

U.S.S.R., he should be sent to offices maintained by the Republic of 

Estonia in New York City. Since the respondent is required. to designate a "country" as the place of deportation under step *1 Section 243(a) of the Act, his choice raises the issue of whether offices 

maintained on behalf of the Republic of Estonia in New York City 

constitute a "country" within the meaning of the first step of section 243(a). 

Initially, we note that there is authority for the position that 

such offices may come within the meaning of the term "country" 

for purposes of determining a proper place of deportation. During 

World War II, in Delany v. Moraitis, 136 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1943), 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 

the Greek government-in-exile located in England was the proper 

place of deportation for an alien, pursuant to a statutory provision 

authorizing deportation to the "country" whence the alien came. 

The alien in question was a native of Greece which, at the time, 

011A 
Interim Decision #8000 

was under German domination, and the Greek government-in-exile 

in England was recognized by the United States as the de jure government of Greece. The Fourth Circuit construed the term "country" to mean not only a particular geographical territory but the 

recognized state or sovereign that exercises power in international 

matters on behalf of the nationals of that territory. The court 

therefore concluded that the Greek government-in-exile was a 

"country" for purposes of designating a place of deportation. Id. at 

130-31. Two months after the decision in Delany v. Moraitis, however, Congress amended the statutory provision in question expressly to provide that during time of war an alien who was a subject or citizen of a country with a recognized government-in-exile 

could be deported to the country in which the government-in-exile 

was located. 1This alternative provision for selecting a country of 

deportation in cases involving a government-in-exile was carried 

over into the Act and currently appears in section 243(b), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1253(b) (1982). 2We conclude that Congress' creation and continued use of an alternate provision for designating a place of deportation in cases involving a government-in-exile supersedes the Fourth 

Circuit's decision in Delany v. Moraitis. Therefore, to the extent 

that the case stands for the propmition that the term "country" 

can be construed to encompass a government-in-exile, it is no 

longer effective law. 

2 Section 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stet 874, 890, was amended by the 

Act of July 13, 1943, 57 Stat. 553 (repealed 1952) to include, in pertinent part, the 

following language: 

If the United States is ut war and the deportation, in accordance with the preceding provisions of this section, of any alien who is deportable under any law of the 

United States, shall be found by the Attorney General to be impracticable or inconvenient because of enemy occupation of the country whence such alien came 

or wherein is located the foreign port at which he embarked for the United States 

or because of other reasons connected with the war, such alien may, at the option 

of the Attorney General, be deported (a) if such alien is a citizen or subject of a 

country whose recognized government is in exile, to the country wherein is located that government in exile, if that country will permit him to enter its torri. 

tory. . . . 

2 Section 243(b) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

If the United States is at war and the deportation, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a), of any alien who is deportable under any law of the United 

States shall be found by the Attorney General to be impracticable, inadvisable, 

inconvenient, or impossible because of enemy occupation of the country from 

which such alien came or wherein is located the foreign port at which he embarked for the United States or because of rcaoons connected with the war, such 

alien may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be deported as follows: 

(1) If such alien is a citizen or subject of a country whose recognized government is in exile, to the country in which is located that government in exile if 

that country will permit him to enter its territory. . . . 
Interim Decision -#3000 

More recent cases have construed the term "country," as it is 

used to describe a place of deportation in section 243(a) of the Act, 

to have different meanings depending upon the context in which 

the term is used. 3In context of step #2 of section 243(a), the 

Second Circuit, the circuit in which the respondent's case arises, 

has construed the term "country" to mean a foreign territory that 

is under the control of a de jure government recognized by the 

United States. Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, supra, at 88-89 (citing 

United States ex reL Tom Man v. Murff, 264 F.2d 926, 928 (2d Cir. 

1959)).4In the context of step #3 of section 243(a), however, the 

Second Circuit has construed the term "country" to mean merely a 

foreign territory that has a government with authority to accept a 

deportable alien. Chan Chuen v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 

1960) (per curiam); United States ex reL Tom Man v. Murff, supra, 

at 928; United States ex reL Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 

F2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954). 5Under the latter construction, it is immaterial whether the foreign government with jurisdiction over a territory is recognized by the United States, whereas under the 

former construction, official recognition by the United States is required. Compare Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, supra, with United 

States ex reL. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, supra. 

We need not decide which of these two constructions pertains to 

step #1 of section 243(a) of the Act in order to determine whether 

the respondent has properly designated the offices of the Republic 

of Estonia as a "country." The case law discussed above shows that 

under either construction the term "country" has been understood, 

The term "country" has also been construed to have different meanings depending upon whether the term describes a place of deportation for purposes of exclusion 

proceedings under section 237(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1982), or a place of 

deportation for purposes of deportation proceedings under section 243(a) of the Act. 

See United States ex rel. Torn We Shang v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 

1959), aff'd per curiam, 274 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1960). Since we are construing the term 

for purposes of section 243(a), we are not bound by the construction given to the 

term under section 237(a). See id. 

4 This is consistent with the construction that other courts and the Board have 

given to the term as it is used in the second step of section 243(a) of the Act. Cheng 

v. INS, 521 F.2d 1351 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051(1976); Lee Wei Fang 

v. Kennedy, 317 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963); Matter of 

Cheung, 16 MN Dec. 690 (BIA 1979); Matter of S-Y-L-, 9 I&N Dec. 575 (BIA 1962). 

5 This, too, is consistent with the position in other circuits. See, e.g., Ying v. Kennedy, 292 F.241 740 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961); Rogers v. Cheng Fu 

Sheng, 280 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir.), cot denied, 364 U.S. 891 (1960). We have not yet 

fully resolved the issue of whether a "country," for purposes of the third step section 243(a) of the Act, must have a government recognized by the United States. 

Compare Matter of Niesel, 10 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 1962), with Matter of Fue,. 17 I&N 

Dec. 254 MIA 1950) 
Interim Decision #3000 

at a minimum, to mean a foreign place with "territory" in a geographical sense and a "government" in the sense of a political organization that exercises power on behalf of the people subjected to 

its jurisdiction. See Chan Chuen v. Esperdy, supra; Ng Kam Fook v. 

Esperdy, supra; United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, supra; 

United States ex reL Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, supra. 

Indeed, section. 242(a) of the Act clearly contemplates that these 

are essential aspects of a "country," for the language of that section expressly requires, or has been construed to require, that the 

"government" of a country selected under any of the three steps 

must indicate it is willing to accept a deported alien into its "territory." Section 243(a) of the Act; United States ex rel. Torn Man v. 

Murff, supra, at 928. 

The respondent has not shown that the offices he designated 

under step #1 of section 243(a) satisfy these two prerequisites for a 

"country." The respondent's attorney has characterized the offices 

in Nv.,York as either a consulate or an embassy maintained on 

behalf of the Republic of Estonia. Under principles of international 

law a foreign mission is not considered to be the territory of the 

sending state; rather, it is considered to be within the territory of 

the receiving state. See McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 

F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 1983). Therefore, the offices designated are a 

part of the United States and are not a foreign "territory." Id. 

Moreover, these offices have not been shown to possess or to constitute a government. See United States ex rel. Kusman v. District Director, 117 F. Supp. 541, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Since the offices designated. by the respondent do not qualify as a "country," he has not 

made a proper designation under step # 1 of section 243(a) of the 

Act, and we must proceed to the second step in that section. 

The directive in step #2 that an alien is to be deported to the 

country of which he is a subject, national, or citizen has been construed by the Second Circuit to refer to the country to which an 

alien owes allegiance. Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, supra, at 89. This 

construction is based. primarily upon the Second Circuit's conclusion that the words "subject," "national," and "citizen" are synonymous terms describing an individual who owes allegiance to a particnlAr government or political state. /c/. 6 At his original hearing 

8In 1963, when the Second Circuit construed the meaning of the second step in 

'.action 243(a. the language of that provision expressly authorized deportation to the 

country of which an alien was a "subject national, or citizen." See Immigration and 

Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(a), reprinted in 1952 U.S. Code Cong. & 

Ad. News 166, 212. In 1981, however, Congress amended section 243(a) of the Act by 

inserting a comma between the words "subject" and "national," thereby making 

Continued 
Interim Decision #3000 

and on remand the respondent insisted that the only country to 

which he now owes allegiance is the "free and independent Republic of Estonia." Since we have already determined that the offices 

of the Republic of Estonia do not constitute a "country" within the 

meaning of section 243(a) of the Act, these offices are not a proper 

place of deportation under step #2. Moreover, although the Soviet 

Union has annexed Estonia and now exercises de facto jurisdiction 

over it, the respondent steadfastly rejects any allegiance to the 

U.S.S.R Therefore, the Soviet Union is not a country of which the 

respondent is a "subject, national, or citizen." Ng Kant Fook v. 

Esperdy, supra. Since there is no country that fulfills step #2 of 

section 243(a), we must proceed to the last step in order to determine a proper place of deportation for the respondent. 

Under that step, we are authorized to order the respondent's deportation to any country that is willing to accept him. Section 

243(a)(7) of the Act. An affidavit and letters submitted by counsel 

for the Service on remand show that Canada and West Germany 

are not willing to accept the respondent but that the U.S.S.R. is 

willing to do so. The Service has also submitted an affidavit from a 

legal advisor in the Department of State declaring that the respondent's deportation to the U.S.S.R. pursuant to section 243(a)(7) 

of the Act would not contravene our country's longstanding refusal 

to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet annexation of Estonia. 

them two separate terms. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, 

Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 18(i), 95 Stat. 1611, 1620 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1253(a) (1982)). This amendment was intended merely to correct an error in punctuation in the Act as originally published. H.R. Rep. No. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 

84, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2577, 2603. Indeed, prior to 1952 

our immigration laws had contained an identical provision authorizing deportation 

to "any country of which ... an alien is a subject, national, or citizen." Section 20 of 

the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stet. 874, 890, amended by Subversives Activities 

Control Act of 1950, § 23, 64 Stat. 987 (repealed 1952). 

Therefore, since the amendment made by Congress in 1981 was merely to correct, an 

error in punctuation rather than to effectuate a substantive change in the law, we 

do not consider the amendment to have affected the validity of the Second Circuit's 

construction in Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, supra. Moreover, to read "subject" as a 

term that is essentially synonymous with the words "national" and "citizen" in describing an individual who owes allegiance to a state is consistent with the meaning 

that traditionally has been accorded to the term "subject." See Borchard, Diplomatic 

Protection of Citizens Abroad, 11 Colum. L. Rev. 231 (1911); Coudert, Our New Peoples, Citizens, Subjects, Nationals or Aliens, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 13 (1903); 3 C. Gordon 

& H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 11.3b (rev. ed. 1985). 
Interim Decision #3000 

Since no other country is willing to accept the respondent, we conclude that the U.S.S.R. is a proper country of deportation for him.' 

The respondent has argued, however, that the immigration judge 

erred by failing to consider all of the evidence the respondent submitted pertaining to the effect of his deportation to the U.S.S.R. 

upon our foreign policy. The respondent's evidence consists of testimony and letters from various persons, such as former officials and 

residents of the Baltic states, the consul general of Estonia, and the 

Charges d'Affaires of Lithuania and Latvia, expressing the opinion 

that deportation of a native of Estonia to the U.S.S.R. would violate United States foreign policy and would deal a harsh blow to 

the citizens of the Baltic states currently living under Soviet domination. Since the Department of State is the agency in the Government with the responsibility for formulating our foreign policy, we 

consider its opinion to be the only one that is relevant to the issue 

of whether the respondent's deportation to the U.S.S.R. would violate United States foreign policy. Therefore, the respondent's evidence on this issue was irrelevant. Moreover, since this is the case, 

the respondent's argument that his witnesses should have been allowed to present the official positions of various Baltic emigrant organizations has no merit whatsoever. 

Furthermore, we consider the affidavit from the Department of 

State to be sufficient proof of the Government's position on the foreign policy implications of the respondent's deportation to the 

U.S.S.R. Thus, there was no need to solicit the testimony of various 

Government officials on this issue and, contrary to the respondent's argument on appeal, we conclude that the immigration judge 

acted reasonably in refusing a request to subpoena Government officials. Lastly in this regard, we reject the respondent's contention 

that by considering the State Department's position we have failed 

to exercise our discretion to choose among the seven categories of 

countries listed in step #3 of section 243(a) of the Act. Our conclusion that the U.S.S.R. is a proper country of deportation is made 

with knowledge of the State Department's position but is not dictated by that position. Rather, as we previously indicated, we have 

chosen the Soviet Union based upon the facts of the respondent's 

case, most particularly the fact that the U.S.S.R., and no other 

country, has indicated a willingness to accept the respondent into 

its territory. Accordingly, we have not failed to exercise our discre7 Our designation of the U.S.S.R. pursuant to section 248(aXl) of the Act moots 

the respondent's argument on appeal that the immigration judge erred in relying on 

section 242(aX4) as authnrity for selecting the Soviet Union. 

ROO 
Interim Decision #3000 

tion in this matter. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 

The respondent also has argued that it is unconstitutional for us 

to designate the U.S.S.R. because his expulsion to that country will, 

in effect, deprive him of his Life without due process of law. This 

argument rests on the respondent's contention that he has been 

sentenced to death by firing squad in the U.S.S.R. as the result of a 

sham war-crimes trial held in absentia, in which his conviction and 

sentence were preordained by Soviet authorities. 

To prove this contention the respondent attempted to introduce, 

on remand, translated excerpts from a Soviet legal journal reporting the facts of the respondent's 1961 conviction and an affidavit 

from a person alleged to be an expert on Soviet law expressing the 

opinion that the respondent's trial was a sham. The immigration 

judge did not accept these materials as evidence, and the respondent has argued that he was thereby precluded from presenting material evidence about the fundamental unfairness of his Soviet conviction and his deportation to the U S S.R. We note that the record 

of the respondent's original deportation proceeding already contains at least one law review article about the respondent's Soviet 

trial. That article discusses the respondent's trial as a notorious example of Soviet justice, recounting the fact that a Soviet legal journal reported the evidence and events of the respondent's trial, 

along with the fact of his conviction and the nature of his sentence, 

before the trial ever commenced. Since this article is already in the 

record, the additional materials the respondent wished to submit 

were merely cumulative, and the immigration judge did not abuse 

his discretion in refusing to admit them into evidence. 

Although the respondent has been sentenced to death in the 

Soviet Union in what appears to have been a sham trial, the Constitution does not extend beyond our borders to guarantee the respondent fairness in judicial proceedings in the Soviet Union. 

Moreover, under our immigration laws there is no requirement 

that a foreign conviction must conform to our constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Brice v. Pickett, 515 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir. 1975); 

Matter of Awadh, 15 I&N Dec. 775, 777 (BIA 1976). Thus, due process is not violated by the respondent's deportation to the U.S.S.R. 

We are bound by law to designate a country of deportation, and 

the U.S.S.R. is a proper country under section 243(a)(7) of the Act. 

Accordingly, we affirm the designation of the U.S.S.R. and shall 

dismiss the respondent's appeal. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

310