MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 140 Docket: Kno

- 18

- 220 Argued : February	5,	2019 Decided: August	29,	2019
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , and HJELM , JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. MICHAEL J. WARNER II

SAUFLEY , C. J. [¶1] The State appeals	from the combined order of	the	Superior	Court (Cumberland,	 Kennebec,	 and	 Knox	 Counties, Murphy , J. )	 granting	 Michael J. Warner II ’s motion	 to	suppress	evidence	obtained	pursuant	 to (1) a	search warrant	 for	 Warner’s cell phone account data authorized	 by	 Jud g e	 Dow on September	9,	2015,	and (2) a	search	warrant	for	codefendant	Taylor	Shultz’s cell phone account data authorized by Justice	Mills on September	 14,	2015. 1 The	State	argues that	Warner	lacked	standing	to	challenge	the	warrant	issued to	 search	 Shultz’s account data	 and that the	 court ( Murphy,	 J. ) erred	 in determining that neither search	 warrant was supported	 by	 probable	 c ause.

1 Neither Taylor	Shultz nor	Charles	York,	a nother codefendant, is	a	party to	this appeal.2 Because	we conclude	that (1) the	affidavit	for	the	September	9,	2015 , warrant to	 search	 Warner’s account data was	 supported	 by probable	 cause , and (2) Warner lacked standing	 to	challenge	 the	September	14,	2015,	warrant to search	 Shultz’s account data , we	 vacate	 the	 order to	 the	 extent	 that	 it
suppresses the	evidence	obtained	through	th os e	two warrants

. I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	 following	 facts	are	drawn	 from the affidavit	in	 support	 of an application , dated	 September	 9,	 2015, for	 a	 warrant to	 search	Warner’s cell phone	account data. See State	v.	Nunez ,	2016	ME	185,	¶	20,	153	A.3d	84

. [¶ 3 ] On July	30,	2015, a	deputy of	the	Kennebec	County	Sheriff’s	Office responded	 to	 a	 reported	 burglary	 at	 Tobey’s	 Grocery	 in	 China,	 Maine. An employee at Tobey’s	Grocery	showed the	deputy video surveillance	footage	of the	 store	at	 the	 time	 of	 the	burglary.		 The footage show ed two	men	 running from a	park

- and

- ride near	Tobey’s	Grocery to	propane	tanks	next	to the	store

. One	 individual was	 wearing dark	 pants, a	 dark	 hooded	 sweatshirt,	 gloves, a camouflage	fac e mask	and	hat, and dark	shoes	with	white	on	the	side s of	the soles. Th at individual pried	open	a	back	door	to	the	store, kick ed the office	door
open, found	cash,	took	it,	and	then	left

. During	this	time ,	the	surveillance	video3 showed	 a	 small , dark

- colored , four

- door	 car,	 believed	 to	 be	 a	 Volkswagen,

mov ing through	the	Tobey’s	Grocery	parking	lot. [¶ 4 ] A Maine State Police t rooper and	his	partner arrived	at	the	scene	to
assist the	deputy ,	and one	of	them noted	the	similarity	between	the	burglary	at Tobey’s	 Grocery	 and	 a	 number	 of	 other	 commercial	 burglaries	 that	 had occurred	in	the	area. [¶ 5 ] Later	that	day, the	same	trooper received	a	report	from	a	manager at	Tobey’s	Grocery	that	an	employee	of	Cumberla nd	Farms	in	Brunswick had reported finding a	blue	money	bag	with	checks	written	out	to	Tobey’s	Grocery in	the	dumpster	near	the	gas	pumps. The	trooper and	his	partner went	to	the Cumberland	 Farms	 store,	 collected	 the	 money	 bag,	 and	 watched	 the	 store’s vid eo	 surveillance footage

. In	 t h at	 footage , a	Volkswagen	sedan	pull ed up	in front	of	the	store	at	12:54 a.m . on	July	30,	2015. Three	men	exited	the	vehicle. Two	 of	 the	men	walked	into	 the	store	while	 the	driver	 removed	some	items from	 the	 trunk ,	 walked	 to a	 dumpster	 near	 the	 gas	 pumps , and	 returned without	the	items	in	his	hands.		The	driver	then	walked	into	the	store. From the	video,	t he	trooper was	able	to	identify the	driver	as Warner. Before leaving Cumberland	 Farms, the	 trooper and	 his	 partner checked	 the	 dumpster	 and4 found	 a	 second	 money	 bag,	 a	 size

- 13	 black	 sneaker,	 and	 a	 blue	 hooded sweatshirt. [¶ 6 ] T he	 trooper forwarded	 photographs	 of	 the	 other	 two	individuals from	 the	 Cumberland	 Farms	 surveillance	 footage	 to	 the	 Biddeford	 Police Department .		The Biddeford	police were	able	to	identify	one	of	the	individuals as	Shultz. [¶ 7 ] The	 trooper	 then learned	 through	 a	 motor	 vehicle	 check	 that Warner	had	a	four

- door,	2003	Volkswagen	Passat	registered	in	his	name	“that
matche [d] the	description	 of	 the	V olkswagen	 seen	 at	 the	Cumberland	 Farms store	and	at	Tobey’s	Grocery	during	 the	burglary.” On	 July	22,	2015, shortly before	 the	 crimes	 at	 issue	 here, a Biddeford p olice o fficer had conducted	 a motor	 vehicle	 stop	 of	 Warner , who had	 been driving	 a	 green	 Volk swagen Passat. At	that	time, Warner and	the third suspect 2 had	been on	probation	for b urglary	and t heft , and	Shultz had	been the	subject	of an	active	arrest	warrant for	failure	to	appear	and had	been subject	to conditions	of	release.		In	addition, Warner	ha d prior	convictions	in	2004,	2005,	and	2011,	for	aggravated	criminal

2 The affidavit identified this	 third	suspect	as	someone	other	 than	Charles	York, but	evidence discovered	later	resulted	in	the	charges	being	brought	against York.5 mischief,	 possession	 of	 burglary	 tools,	 burglary,	 unlawful	 trafficking	 in scheduled	drugs , and	possession	of	schedule d drugs. [¶ 8 ] The	inve stigating	t rooper learned	Warner’s cell phone	number	from Warner’s p robation o fficer.	 	 On	 September	 9,	 2015, the	 Biddeford	 officer conducted	 a	 second	 motor	 vehicle	 stop	 of the	 same vehicle , owned	 and operated	 by	Warner , at	which	 time	Warner	 gave the	 office r the	 same	 phone number	that Warner’s	probation	officer	had provided	to the	trooper

. [¶ 9 ] Based	 on	 the	above	 facts, on	September	9,	2015,	pursuant	 to	 the Stored	Communications	Act , 18	U.S.C.S.	§	2703(a),	(b)(1)(A),	(c)(1)(A)	(LEXIS through	 Pub.	 L.	 No.	 11 6

- 39 ) , and	 16	 M.R.S.	 §§	 642(1)	 and	 648	 (201 5 ), 3 in accordance	with	15	M.R.S.	 §	55	 (201 5 ), 4 a	 detective of the	Kennebec	County Sheriff’s	Office	applied for	a	warrant	to obtain	and	search	records	from wireless provider AT&T	Mobility	that	were associated	with	Warner’s cell phone	account from	July 30, 2015,	to September	9,	2015

— including,	among	other	things,	voice mail,	 text,	 and	multimedia	messages ; text	messaging	logs,	including the date and	 time	 of	 messages ; text	 content ; the	 telephone	 number s	 associated	 with

3 Title 16 M.R.S. § § 642(1)	and	648 ha ve since	been	amended ,	though	the	amendments	are	not relevant	in	 the	 present	 case. See P

. L

. 2017,	 c h .	 14 4,	 §§	 4,	 5 (effective	 June	 8, 2017) (codified	 at 16 M.R.S.	§ § 642(1) , 648 (201 8 ) ).

4 Title 15 M.R.S.	 § 55 has	 since	 been	 amended ,	 though	 the	 amendment	is	not	 relevant	in	 the present	case. See P

. L

. 2017,	c h .	144 ,	§	2 (effective	June	8,	2017) (codified at 15	M.R.S.	§	55	(2018) ).6 incoming	 and	 outgoing text	 messages	 and telephone call s ; 5 and	 “PING” information	 to	 assist	 in	 identifying	 the	 device’s	 location. A	 judge	 ( Dow,	 J. ) issued	the	search	warrant. [¶1 0 ] On	 September	 14,	 2015, the	 investigating	 Maine	 State Trooper applied	for a warrant	to obtain	and search records	from	Verizon	Wireless that contained the same	 types	 of information associat ed with	 Shultz’s cell phone

account from July	1,	2015, to September	14,	2015

. The affidavit	was	largely identical	to the affidavit seeking	to	search	Warner’s	data , supplemented	with

some additional	facts,	most	of	which	were	based	on	evidence	obtained through the	search	of	Warner’s account data. A	judge ( Mills,	J. ) issued	the	warrant	as requested	by	the	State. [¶1 1 ] On	Sep tember	24,	2015,	Warner	was	charged	by	complaint	with receiving	stolen	property	(Class	B), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	359(1)(B)(1)(201 8 )

. Warner

was then indicted	on	a	total	of	thirty

- three	crimes allegedly	committed across three	different	counties. 6

5 Although	some	of	the listed information,	such	as	 the	numbers	associated	with	incoming	and outgoing	 telephone	 calls,	 may	 have	 been obtainable without	 a	 warrant, see Johnson	 v.	 Duxbury , No. 18

- 2098,	2019	U.S.	App.	LEXIS	22426,	at	*9

- 13	(1st	Cir.	July	29,	2 019) , this	consideration	is	not material	to	our	analysis,	and	we	do	not	discuss	the	issue	further.

6 Specifically,	on	December	11,	2015,	Warner	was charged	by	indictment in	Cumberland	County with	five	counts	of	burglary	(Class	B), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	401(1)(B)( 5)	(2018) ; six	counts	of	aggravated criminal	mischief	(Class	C), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	805(1)(A) ,	(2) (2018) ; three	counts	of	theft	by	unauthorized7 [¶1 2 ] About	a year	later,	in September 2016,	Warner , Shultz , and	York filed	motion s to	suppress certain	evidence,	including all	evidence	obtained	as	a result of the	search	warrants issued	on September	9,	2015,	 for	Warner’s cell phone account data	and on September	14,	2015,	for	Shultz’s cell phone account data , arguing	that	the	warrants were	not	supported	by probable	cause.		Warner , Shultz,	and	York also	requested	that , if	the	court	determine d that the affidavit s presented	 to	search the account	data were supported	by	probable	cause , the court	conduct	a Franks	v.	Delaware hearing	to	determine	whether the	detective or	the	trooper	deliberately or	with	reckless	disregard	for	the	truth	made	false
statements	in his affidavit. 438	U.S.	154,	1 71

- 72	(1978)

. [¶1 3 ] On	 December	 14,	 2016,	 the	 Superior	 Court	 ( Murphy,	 J. )	 held	 a nontestimonial	 hearing	 and ,	 after	 determining	 that	 the	 defendants	 made	 a sufficient	preliminary	showing	to justify a	hearing , held	a	three

- day hearing	for

taking	(Class	B), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	353(1)(B)(1)	(2018) ; and	one	count	of	theft	by	unauthorized	taking (Class	C), 17

- A	M .R.S.	§	353(1)(B)(4)	(2018)

. On	December	17,	2015,	Warner	was charged by	indictment in	Kennebec	County	with	two	counts of	 burglary	 (Class	C), 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 401(1)(A)	 (2018) ; one	 count	 of	 theft	 by	 unauthorized	 taking (Class B),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	353(1)(B)(1) ; one	count	of	theft	by	unauthorized	taking	(Class	C),	17

- A	M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(4) ; one	count	of	aggravated	criminal	mischief	(Class	C),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	805(1)(A) ,	(2); and one	count	of	criminal	mischief	(Class	D), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	806(1)(A) ,	(2) (2018)

. On	Februa ry	3,	2016,	Warner	was charged	by	indictment in	Knox	County	with	two	counts	of	theft by	unauthorized	taking	(Class	B),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	353(1)(B)(1) ; two	counts	of	theft	by	unauthorized taking	 (Class	 C),	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 353(1)(B)(4) ; four	 counts	 of	 burglary	 (Cl ass	 B),	 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(5) ; and	four	counts	of	criminal	mischief	(Class	D),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	806(1)(A) ,	(2)

.8 purposes	of	both	the Franks issue	and the	motions	to	suppress on	February	8, April	 28,	 and	 May	 19,	 2017.	 	 In	 an	 order	 dated	 March	 15,	 2018,	 the	 court rejected all claims	for	relief	under Franks	v.	Delaware ,	finding	that	the	affiants had not	intentionally	or	recklessly	disregard ed the	truth	in their	affidavit s. [¶1 4 ] The	 court	 also	 ruled	 on	 the	 motions	 to	 suppress	 in	 the March 15, 2018,	 order. The	 court held that Warner	 had a	 reasonable expectation	of	privacy	in	his cell phone	account data .		Although the	State argued that	 Warner	 lacked standin g	 to	 challenge the	 warrant	 issued	 for	 Shultz’s

account data ,	the	court	concluded	that	he	did	have	standing	to	challenge	that

warrant because	information	gathered	 from	Warner’s own account data was included	 in	 the	 affidavit	 supporting	 the application	 for	 a	 warrant	 to	 search Shultz ’s	account	data

. [¶1 5 ] The	 court determined that	 both	 warrants	 were	 defective	 and invalid	because	they	failed	to articulate	the nexus	between	the	crime	and	the place	to	be	searched

— i.e.,	the	cell	phone	records

— s t ating that	“there	was	not information	 sufficient	 for	 a	 finding	 of	 probable	 cause	 to	 believe	 that particularized	evidence	[of	a	crime]	could	be	found	on	Warner	or	Shultz’s	cell phones

. ” See State v. Gurney ,	2012	ME	14,	¶	33,	36	A.3d	893

.9 [¶1 6 ] The State filed	a	motion	to	clarify,	for	further	findings	of	fact	and conclusions	 of	 law,	 and	 for	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 decision	 to	 suppress evidence. See M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	41A(d). In	clarifying	its	original	analysis,	the	court

con firmed	its	holding	and	found certa in	other facts	that	Warner	asserted	in	his response	to	the	State’s	motion	for	further	findings	of	facts. It	also	clarified	that, because it	 found that the	 warrants	 were “ facially deficient , ” the	 good	 faith exception	to	the	exclusionary	rule did not	apply. [¶1 7 ] With	the	written	approval	of	the	Attorney	General,	the	State	timely appealed

. 15	M.R.S.	§	2115

- A(1)	(201 8 ) ;	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1) , 21(b)

. 7
II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 8 ] The	 State	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 by	 failing	 to	 show appropriate	 deference	 to	 the judge	 who	 issued	 the	 search	 warrant	 dated September	9,	2015,	for	Warner’s cell phone	account data.		When	reviewed	with proper	deference,	the	State	argues, the affidavit	provide s a	substantial	basis	for the	 warrant	 judge ’ s	 findings	 that	 there	 was	 probable	 cause	 to	 believe	 that Warner’s cell phone	account data	contained	evidence	of	a	crime.

7 Although interlocutory, “[a] n	appeal	may	be	taken	by	the	State	in	criminal	cases	on	questions	of law .	.	.	[f] rom	an	order	of	the	court	pri or	to	trial	which	suppresses	any	evidence,	including,	but	not limited	to,	physical	or	identification	evidence	or	evidence	of	a	confession	or	admission ,” as	long	as the	Attorney	General	provides	written	approval

. 15	M.R.S.	§	2115

- A(1),	(5) (2018)

. Warner does	not argue that	this	appeal	is	either	unripe	for	appellate	review	or	untimely.10 [¶1 9 ] The	 Fourth	 Amendment	 to	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution	 and article	 1,	 section	 5	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 require	 a	 showing	 of	 p robable cause,	 as	 supported	 by	 oath	 or	 affirmation,	 before	 a	 search	warrant	may	 be issued. Gurney ,	2012	ME	14,	¶	31,	36	A.3d	893 ; State	v.	Reese, 2010	ME	30,	¶ 11, 991	A.2d	806

. “ [ T ] he	term	‘probable	cause,’	according	to	its	usual	acceptation, means	less	than	evidence	which	would	justify	condemnation	.	.	.	. It	imports	a seizure	made	under	circumstances	which	warrant	suspicion.” Illinois	v.	Gates , 462	 U.S.	 213,	 23 5 (1983) (quotation marks	 omitted). Probable	 cause	 is satisfied	 when,	 based	 on	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances,	 the	 warrant application	“set[s]	forth	some	nexus	between	the	evidence	to	be	seized	and	the
location s to	be	searched.” Gurney ,	2012	ME	14,	¶ 33,	36	A.3d	893 (qu otation marks	 omitted)

. “ T he nexus	 need	 not,	 and	 often	 will	 not,	 rest	 on	 direct observation,	but	rather	can	be inferred from	the	type	of	crime,	the	nature	of	the items	 sought,	 the	 extent	 of	 an	 opportunity	 for	 concealment	 and	 normal inferences	as	 to	where	a	criminal	would	hide [ evidence	 of	a	crime ] .” Nunez , 2016	 ME	 185,	 ¶	 25,	 153	 A.3d	 84 (alteration	 in	 original) (emphasis added) (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶ 20 ] The	“totality	of	the	circumstances”	test	applicable	when	evaluating whether	 there	 is	 probable	 cause	 for	 a	 search	 “requires	 a	 practical,11

common - sense	decision	whether,	given	all	 the	circumstances	set	 forth	in	 the aff idavit	.	.	.	including	the	veracity	and	basis	of	knowledge	of	persons	supplying hearsay	information,	there	is	a	fair	probability	that	contraband	or	evidence	of a	 crime	 will	 be	 found	 in	 a	 particular	 place.” Gurney ,	 2012	 ME	 14,	 ¶	 32,
36 A.3d 893 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. The	test , a s set	forth	by	the	Supreme
Court of	 the	 United	 States in Illinois	 v. Gates , requires	 a	 jurist	 considering	 a warrant	affidavit	to “deal with probabilit ies. ” 462	U.S. at 231 (quotation	marks omitted)

. Assessing probabilities is “ not technical ”	 but	 rather	 calls for consideration	 of the “factual	and	practical	considerations	 of	everyday	life	 on which	 reasonable	 and	 prudent [people] ,	 not	 legal	 technicians , act

. ” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted) ; see State	 v.	 Mariner , 2017	 ME	 102,	 ¶	 13,
162 A.3d 241

. [¶ 2 1]		When	the	State	appeals from the	suppression	of	evidence	seized pursuant	to	a	search	warrant,	we	review directly the	finding	of	probable	cause made	by	the issuing	judge or	magistrate

. State	v. Simmons ,	2016	ME	103,	¶ 11, 143	A.3d	819

. The	Supreme	Court of	the	United	States	has	established that

a fter

- the

- fact	 scrutiny	 by	 courts	 of	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 an	 affidavit should	 not	 take	 the	 form	 of de	 novo review.	 	 A	 magistrate’s determination	of	probable	cause	should	be	paid	great	deference	by reviewing	 courts.	 	 A	 grudging	 or	 negative	 attitude	 by	 reviewing courts	 towards	 warrants	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 Fourth Amendment’s	strong	preference	for	searches	con ducted	pursuant12 to	 a	 warrant;	 courts	 should	 not	 invalidate	 warrant [ s ] by interpreting	 affidavit [ s ] in	 a	 hypertechnical,	 rather	 than	 a commonsense,	manner. Gates ,	 462	 U.S.	 at	 23 6 (citations	 omitted) (quotation	 marks	 omitted)

. Accordingly,	o ur	review of	pr obable	cause is “ limited	to	determining	whether the	issuing	magistrate	had	a	‘substantial	basis’	to	issue	the	warrant,	drawing	all reasonable	inferences	in	favor	of	probable cause.” Nunez ,	2016	ME	185,	¶	30, 153	A.3d	84. T his	review	is	confined exclusively to	the	information	within	the four	corners	of	the	affidavit ,	and	it	is	not	a de	novo	review. Id. ¶ ¶ 18, 20 ,	30

. [¶ 22 ] In	this	case, the	detective submitted	an	affidavit	in	support	of	his request	for	a	search	warrant	for	Warner’s cell phone account data that did	not explicitly articulate the direct	link between Warner’s cell phone account data and	a	crime

— in	other	words,	the	detective	did	not	explain	in	the	affidavit	why the cell phone	 data	 had	 evidentiary	 value

. T here	 is	 essentially	 no dispute , however, that	the	affidavit	provided	probable	cause	to	believe	that	(1) Warner and Schultz had	engaged	in	a	burglary with	another	person ; (2) Warner	and Schultz had	 coordinated	 their	 movements	 and	 activities	 in	 committing	 the burglary ; (3) Warner had	an	identified cell phone	number ; and	(4) Warner	had multiple	prior	convictions,	seve r al	of	which	related	to	burglaries

.13 [¶ 23 ] What	 the	 affidavit	lacked	was	 a n	 explicit statement	 that, in	 the experience	of	law	enforcement, cell phones	are	often	used to arrange meetings or	 to	 coordinate	 or	 plan a	 multi

- person	 burglary , and that	 the cell phone records may therefore contain	evidence	 of	 that	contact	and	 of	 the	suspected burglars’	whereabouts when the	crimes occurred

. [¶ 24 ] Accordingly,	 o ur	 role	 on	 appeal	 i s	 to	 determine	 whether	 that connection	between	the cell phones	and	the suspected criminal	conduct	could reasonably	be	inferred	by	the	judge	issuing	the	search	warrant. See id. ¶	30. In a	 world	 where cell phones	 are in	 the	 possession	 of	 the	 vast	 majority of individuals, 8 where cell phone	information	can	sometimes	be	obtained	without a	 search	 warrant , 9 and	 where	 Maine	 judges	 routinely	 hear	 evidence that individuals	have	planned	or coordinated criminal	activit ies through	the	use	of cell phones , 10 the	inference	made	by	the	judge	here	was entirely reasonable.		In short,	t he	affidavit	set	forth facts	t hat allow ed the	issuing	judge	to	infer	from

8 See Riley	v.	California ,	573	U.S.	373,	395	(2014) (“[ M ] any	of	t he	more	than	90%	of	American adults	who	own	a	cell	phone	keep	on	their	person	a	digital	record	of	nearly every	aspect	of	their	lives .	.	.	.”).

9 See 18	U.S.C.S.	§	2703	(LEXIS	through	Pub.	L.	No.	116

- 39 ) (authorizing	certain	disclosures	of wire	 or	 electronic	 communications	 information	 without	 a	 warrant); see	 also State	 v.	 Pagnani , 2018 ME	129,	¶	19,	193	A.3d 823 (holding	that	exceptions	to	the	warrant	requirement	apply	to cell phone	information).

10 See,	e.g. , State	v.	Journet ,	2018	ME	114,	¶	4,	191	A.3d	1181 ; State	v.	Lopez ,	2018	ME	59,	¶	8, 184 A.3d	880 ; State	v.	Lemay ,	2012	ME	86,	¶	7,	46	A.3d	1113

.14 the	totality	of	the	circumstances	that	Warner’s cell phone account data	would produce	evidence	of	Warner’s	i nvolvement	in	the	Tobey’s	Grocery	burglary. [¶ 25 ] The	affidavit	was	replete	with	detailed facts that linked	Warner	to the	 burglary	 at	 Tobey’s	 Grocery. Warner	 was	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the individuals	 at	 Cumberland	 Farms	 where	 evidence	 from	 the	 crime	 was dis carded , and	 Warner	 had	 a	 Volkswagen	 Passat	 that	 matched both the description	of	the	car	at	the	burglary	and the description	of	the car observed in the	 video	 surveillance	 from	 Cumberland	 Farms. Warner	 also	 had	 a	 long criminal	 history,	 including	 a	 histor y	 of	 committing	 burglaries. See State	 v. Arbour ,	2016	ME	126,	¶	15	n.11,	146	A.3d	1106 (“ ‘ An	affiant’s	knowledge	of	the target’s	 prior	 criminal	 activity	 or	 record	 clearly	 is	 material	 to	 the	 probable cause	determination. ’ ”	(quoting United	States	v.	Taylor , 985	F.2d	3,	6	(1st	Cir. 1993) ) ( citing State	v.	Gallant ,	531	A.2d	1282,	1284	(Me.	1987) )). Warner was identified	as	one	of three individuals	at	Cumberland	Farms where	evidence	of the	crime	was	discovered, not	long	after at	least two individuals burglarized Tobey’s	Grocery. [¶ 26 ] Because	the	crime	was alleged	to	have	been committed by	more than	 one	 individual , the	 issuing	 judge	 could	 reasonably	 infer that	 the individuals conferred about	 the	crime and	 that	 their cell phone account data15 would contain	evidence	of	the	crime. Cf. Riley	v.	California , 573	U.S.	373,	385 (2014) ( observing	that cell phones	are	“ such a	pervasive	and	insistent	part	of daily	life	 that	 the	 proverbial	 visitor	 from	Mars	might	 conclude	 they	were	 an important	 feature	of	huma n	anatomy” ). F rom	 the totality	of	 these	facts

— the multiple	individuals	seen	together	near	the	hours	of	the	crime,	all	with	criminal histories , with	one	of	them	owning a	vehicle	matching both the	description	of the	car	at	 the	scene	of	 the	crime and the description	of	 the car	observed	at	a location	where	 discarded	 evidence	 of	 the	 crime	was	 found

— the	judge	 could reasonably	 determine that	Warner’s cell phone	 account	 data would	 produce evidence

— for	 instance,	 text	 m e ssages,	 voicemail	 messages,	 call	 history ,	 a nd location	 information

— that c ould	 demonstrate his	 involvement	 in	 the	 crime.
D rawing	all	reasonable	inferences	in	favor	of	probable cause , we	conclude	that the issuing judge had	a	substantial	basis	to	issue	the	warrant

. [¶ 27 ] In	reaching	this	conclusion,	we	emphasize	its	limited	scope.		The warrant	at	issue	sought specifically	identified	aspects	of	Warner’s cell phone records,	covering	a	defined	period,	from	the	wireless	provider. The	detective did	 not	 seek

— and	 the	 court	 did	 not	 issue	 a	 warrant	 for

— the	 seizure	 of Warner’s cell phone	itself.		As	 the	Supreme	Court	has	explained,	a	cell	phone provides	a	wide

- open	window	into	a	person’s	life. Id. at	386,	395

. “Cell	phones16

.	 .	 . place vast	 quantities	 of	 personal	 information	 literally	 in	 the	 hands	 of individuals .” Id. at	386. “ [M]any	of	the	more	than	90%	of	American	adults	who own	a	cell	phone	keep	on	their	person	a	digital	record	of	nearly	every	aspect	of their	lives

— from	the	mundane to	the	intimate.” Id. at	395

. [¶ 28 ] The	 extraordinary	 breadth	 and	 sensitivity	 of	 information	 that people may store	on	their	cell	phones	creates	a	qualitatively	different	factual context	 in	 which	 to	 consider	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 a	 warrant to	 search	 an entire	cell	phone ,	compared	to	the	factual	context	for	the	warrant	issued	in	this case,	 where	 the	 information	 sought	 from	 the	 wireless	 service	 provider	 was much	more	circumscribed. This	case	therefore	does	not	call	for	us	to	consider whether the	issuance	of a	warrant for	the	search	of a	suspect’s cell phone	itself would	be proper if	it	were based	merely	 on	information	 that	more	 than	 one person	 was	 involved	 in	 committing	 the	 crime,	 the	 suspect	 was	 one	 of	 those people,	 and	 the	 suspect	 owned	 a c ell phone. See Commonwealth	 v.	 White , 59 N.E.3d	 369 ,	 371

- 72,	 376

- 77 (Mass.	 2016) (concluding	 that	 those circumstances	were	insufficient	to	support	a determination of probable cause); see	 also United	 States	 v.	 Ramirez ,	 180	 F. Supp.	 3d	 491,	 495	 (W. D. Ky.	 2016) (same) ; Stevenson	 v.	 State ,	 168	 A.3d	 967,	 981

- 86	 (Md.	 2017) (Adkins,	 J., concurring) (same) .		And	we	express	no	view	on	that	issue	today.17 [¶ 29 ] The	 court	 also	 suppressed	 evidence	 obtained	 through the September	14,	2015,	search	warrant	to	search Shultz’s cell phone	account	data

. Ordinarily,	 an	 individual	 lacks	 s tanding	 to	 challenge	 the	 search	 of	 another person’s property unless	the	individual	has	a	reasonable	expectation	of	privacy in	 that	property

. See State	v.	Lovett ,	2015	ME	7,	¶	8,	109	A.3d 1 135 ; State	v. Filion ,	 2009	 ME	 23,	 ¶	 11,	 966	 A.2d	 405 ; State	 v.	 Maloney, 1998	 ME	 56,	 ¶ 6,
708 A.2d	277 .		Warner	argu es ,	however, that	he	ha d standing	to	challenge	the admissibility	 of	 evidence	 discovered	 in	 the	 Shultz search	 because it	 was through	 an	 illegal	 search	 of	 his	 own	 account	 data	 that	 law	 enforcement obtained some	 of the information that it	 provided in	 the	 affidavit	 seeking Shultz’s	 data. See State	 v.	Johndro ,	 2013	ME	 106,	 ¶	 21,	 82	 A.3d	 820 (“[A] ny evidence	obtained	through	the	exploitation	of	police	illegality	must	be	excluded as	fruit	of	the	poisonous	tree. ”)

. [¶ 30 ]		Based	on	our	conclusion	that	there	was	no	illegality	in	the	search of	 Warner’s	 data,	 and given	 that	 Warner	 has	 not	 otherwise	 asserted	 any reasonable	 expectation	 of	 privacy	in	 Shultz’s	 data,	we	 conclude	 that Warner lacks	 standing	 to	challenge	 the	 search	 of	Shultz’s	data. Accordingly,	we	also vacate	 the	court’s	 suppression	 of	 th e evidence obta ined	 through	 that	 search

. W e	need	not ,	and	do	not, reach any	of the	State’s	remaining	arguments.18 The	entry	is:
O rder suppressing evidence obtained	 through the	September	9,	2015 , and	September	14,	2015, warrants vacated

. Remanded	 for	 further proceedings.

Maeghan	 Maloney,	 District	 Attorney,	 Prosecutorial	 District	 4, Augusta ; Jonathan	Liberman,	District	Attorney,	Prosecutorial	District	6, R ockland; and Stephanie	Anderson,	District Attorney ,	and	Carlos	Diaz,	Asst.	Dist.	Atty. (orally) , Prosecutorial	District	2, Portland, for	appellant	State	of	Maine Christopher	R.	Guillory,	Esq. (orally) ,	Saco,	for	appellee	Michael J. Warner II

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number CR

- 2015

- 5750 Kennebec	County	Unified	Criminal	Dock et	docket	number	CR

- 2015

- 2508 Kn ox	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 201 6

- 145 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY