alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE ex rel. Walter L. SMITH, a/k/a Walter L. Shelton v. Charles C. FOTI, Jr., Criminal Sheriff, Orleans Parish.

No. 87-KH-Q655.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Smith, Walter L. a/k/a; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, habeas corpus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “J”, No. 287-623.

*453Denied. Relator’s first two claims do not warrant post conviction relief. The five claims submitted in a supplemental petition have not been submitted to the district court.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 2 1 , 2020

NO. 03

- 20

- 00341

- CR

Carlos Gomez a/k/a Carlos Ulloa, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 147TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUS TICE ROSE, JUSTICES BAKER AND TRIANA

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE TRIANA

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction r en d ered by the tr i a l court. Having rev iewed

the record, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal . Therefore, the Court

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction

. Because appellant is indigent and u nable to pay

costs, no adjudica t i on of costs is made.
Exhibit 32.1 WESTCOTT PRODUCTS CORPORATION Certification of Principal Executive and Financial Officer PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of Westcott Products Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2009, Wayne Bassham and Todd Albiston hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods presented therein.


|      |                  |  |     |                       
|----- | ---------------- |  | --- | ----------------------
|Date: | December 9, 2009 |  | By: | /s/Wayne Bassham      
|      |                  |  |     | Wayne Bassham         
|      |                  |  |     | President and Director
|      |                  |  |     |                       
|Date: | December 9, 2009 |  | By: | /s/Todd Albiston      
|      |                  |  |     | Todd Albiston         
|      |                  |  |     | Vice President
#### 210 BARONNE STREET LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE, et al.

No. 89-C-1263.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re 210 Baronne St. Limited Prtn.;— Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari *1220and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 88CA-1989; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “E”, No. 87-21090.

Prior report: La.App., 543 So.2d 502.

Denied.
Exhibit 23.1
Consent of Independent Auditors



The Board of Directors and Stockholders
World Airways Inc:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No.
333-13575, No. 333-14461 and No. 333-14457) on Form S-8 and registration
statements (No. 333-14455, No. 333-39673 and No. 333-42681) on Form S-3 of World
Airways, Inc. of our report dated February 11, 2000, except as to Note 19 which
is as of March 16, 2000, relating to the balance sheets of World Airways, Inc.
as of December 31, 1999 and 1998, and the related statements of operations,
changes in stockholders' deficiency, and cash flows for each of the years in the
three-year period ended December 31, 1999, which report appears in the December
31, 1999 annual report on form 10-K of World Airways, Inc.

KPMG LLP



McLean, Virginia
March 29, 2000
#### In re the MARRIAGE OF David J. NELSON, Appellant, and Marilyn R. Nelson, Appellee.

No. 83CA1289.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Aug. 1, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1985.

Certiorari Granted Dec. 16, 1985.

*1176Ratcliffe & Chamberlin, Sarah D. Claas-sen, Steamboat Springs, for appellant.

Carlyle V. Perry, Steamboat Springs, for appellee.

METZGER, Judge.

In this dissolution of marriage action, husband, age 41, appeals from the trial court’s property division order which included husband’s pension plan either as marital, property or as an economic circumstance. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A pension plan is not marital “property” under § 14-10-113 C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.) if the plan lacks cash surrender value, loan value, redemption value, lump sum value, or value realizable after death. *Ellis v. Ellis,*36 Colo.App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975), *aff'd,*191 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976). Likewise, property which might be acquired in the future is not subject to division as marital property. *Menor v. Menor,*154 Colo. 475, 391 P.2d 473 (1964). And, future pension benefits which are subject to divestment are not marital property. *In re Marriage of Ward,*657 P.2d 979 (Colo.App.1982).

Here, husband’s pension plan was funded solely by employer’s contributions, it had no present exchangeable value, and receipt of benefits of any kind was contingent upon his reaching the age of 55. Accordingly, husband’s pension plan was not marital property.

We agree as well with husband’s contention that the trial court erred when it considered the pension plan to be an “economic circumstance” in its division of property.

Property must be valued as of the date of the dissolution hearing or as of the date of the property division hearing, whichever occurs first. Section 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. Where, as here, a pension plan bears none of the indicia of property as defined in *Ellis v. Ellis, supra,*it has no ascertainable value. Thus, it cannot be considered as an economic circumstance for purposes of property division.

*1177Therefore, the order as to property division is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

KELLY and BABCOCK, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 3(viii)

                             CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                       TO
                           CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATION
                                       OF
                                 PREFERRED STOCK
                                       OF
                         CLEAN DIESEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.


     CLEAN DIESEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (the "Company"), a corporation organized
and existing under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, does
hereby certify as follows:

     FIRST:  That in accordance with the requirements of Sections 141 and 242 of
the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, the Board of Directors of
the Company (the "Board") duly adopted a resolution proposing and declaring
advisable that

(i) the Certificate of Designation, as amended (the "Certificate") for the
Company's Series A Convertible Preferred Stock (the "Stock") be amended to
revoke in its entirety Section 3 (v) thereof and to substitute in its place the
following new Section 3(v), as follows:

          (v) Mandatory Conversion By Vote. Upon the requisite affirmative vote,
              ----------------------------
     after December 10, 2001, of the holders of Convertible Preferred Stock
     provided below in Section 13(c) to convert their holdings of Convertible
     Preferred Stock to Common Stock and subject, within 90 days of such
     affirmation vote, to the admission to trading of the Common Stock on the
     Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange, then,
     notwithstanding the Conversion Price in Section 3 (b) above, each share of
     Convertible Preferred Stock then issued and outstanding shall be converted
     into shares of Common Stock at a conversion rate of 373.33 shares of Common
     Stock for each share of Convertible Preferred Stock as converted, such
     event being a Mandatory Conversion by Vote. Upon a Mandatory Conversion By
     Vote, accrued and unpaid stock dividends through July 1, 2001, regardless
     of whether the same shall be issued and outstanding, shall also convert
     into shares of Common Stock, on the same terms as the underlying Preferred
     Stock.

(ii)  and that such amendment be recommended to the holders of the Stock and
submitted to such holders for their consent and approval.

     SECOND:  That thereafter, pursuant to a resolution of the Board, the
holders of the Stock, in accordance with Sections 228 and 229 of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, on December 12, 2001 duly consented to
and approved the aforesaid amendment of the Certificate.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Certificate of Amendment to
Certificate of Designation of Preferred Stock to be duly executed and
acknowledged in accordance with Section 103 of the General Corporation Law of
the State of Delaware on this 14th Day of December, 2001.


CLEAN DIESEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.


By: /s/ C. W. Grinnell
   -----------------------------
       Charles W. Grinnell
     Vice President & Secretary


                                       30
<PAGE>
#### Robert Howard GREGORY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. BM-34.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 5, 1987.

Ann Cocheu, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, Alan Chipperfield, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Patricia Conners, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *Mack v. State,*504 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); and *State v. Stevens,*500 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

SMITH, SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 23

- 00182

- CR

R UDOLPH G UY

, Appellant

V

.

T HE S TATE OF T EXAS §

§

§

§

§ On Appea l from Criminal District

Court No. 2

of Tarrant County ( 1614845 )

S eptember 7 , 2023

Memorandum Opinion by Chief

Justice Sudderth

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the

appeal should be dism is sed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed

.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice Bonnie Sudderth
#### The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of C.R.B., a Child, Appellant, And Concerning L.T. (SF), and G.T., Respondents-Appellants.

No. 82CA0720.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

March 17, 1983.

J.D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Joel W. Cantrick, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Patricia A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner-ap-pellee.

Levi Martinez, Denver, for appellants.

SILVERSTEIN *, Judge.

C.R.B., a child, was charged in a delinquency petition with acts which would have been a felony and a misdemeanor if committed by an adult. The petition was sustained and the child was adjudicated a delinquent child for the fourth time. At the dispositional hearing, he was committed to the Department of Institutions for not less than one year as a mandatory sentence offender. He appeals the commitment. We affirm.

*199C.R.B. contends that the trial court erred (1) in sentencing him as a “mandatory sentence offender” pursuant to §§ 19 — 1— 103(19.5) and 19-3-113.1(2)(b), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.); and (2) in determining that the court had no discretion in its disposition under the statute.

I.

C.R.B. asserts that he had no notice that he was being tried as a multiple offender and claims that the mandatory sentence offender statutes are analogous to the habitual criminal laws which require that an accused be charged with specific counts before his sentence can be enhanced. These assertions are without merit.

The mandatory sentence statutes do not enhance the disposition but merely require the court to impose a specific disposition on the offender, namely, that the “court shall place or commit [the] offender out of the home for not less than one year.” Section 19-3 — 113.1(2)(b), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum. Supp.).

Further, the record discloses that an advisement hearing was held. No transcript of that hearing is included in the record, and, therefore, we must presume that as required by C.R.J.P. 3(b), C.R.B. was advised of “[t]he dispositional alternatives available to the court if the petition is proven or admitted.” *See Hinshaw v. Dyer,*166 Colo. 394, 443 P.2d 992 (1968).

II.

C.R.B. contends that the General Assembly cannot take away all discretion from the court. However, “it is the legislature’s prerogative to define crimes and prescribe punishments.” *See People v. Hinchman,*196 Colo. 526, 589 P.2d 917 (1978), and *People in the Interest of R.R.,*43 Colo.App. 208, 607 P.2d 1013 (1979). And, courts have no jurisdiction to enter dispositions inconsistent with the terms specified by statute. *Hinchman, supra.*So, here, the trial court correctly determined that it had no discretion in the disposition under the statute.

Order affirmed.

VAN CISE and KELLY, JJ., concur.

*

 Retired Court of Appeals Judge sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of the *Colo. Const.,*Art. VI, Sec. 5(3), and § 24-51-607(5), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.).
#### Dorothy Williams CORLEY, et al. v. Alfred McKinley CRAFT, et al.

No. 87-CC-2075.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Twin City Gas Company; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 19390-CW; Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 84-2711.

Denied.
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# ORIGINAI

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 24-0068
ASHLEY LeANN TINTINGER,

Petitioner and Appellee, and SAMUEL VERNON TINTINGER,

Respondent and Appellant. ORDER

Through counsel, Appellee Ashley Tintinger (Ashley) moves this Court for dismissal of this appeal because self-represented Appellant Samuel Vernon Tintinger (Samuel) appeals a Permanent Order of Protection, issued by the Standing Master ofthe Fourth JudicialDistrict Court, Missoula County, without having filed any objections in the district court. Samuel did not file awritten response tothis motion;however, Ashley notes Samuel's objection to the motion. This Court only recently became aware ofthe pending motion when the matter was sent tothe Court for classification after the completion ofbriefing. This Court attempts to handle pending motions in a more expedited manner than this. Turning to Ashley's motion, she argues that Samuel's appeal is improperly before this Court. Under Montana law, a party cannot appeal a decision by a standing master directly to this Court. Scrantom v. Masters, 2018 MT 109, ¶9, 391 Mont. 251, 417 P.3d 339 (citing Beals v. Beals, 2013 MT 120, ¶ 13, 370 Mont. 88, 300 P.3d 1158). Ashley explains that she sought a temporary order ofprotection against Samuel in December 2023 and that the matter was referred to a standing master, pursuant to § 3-5-124(1), MCA. She addsthat upon grantingthetemporaryorder,the standingmaster set ahearing onDecember 29, 2023, where both parties appeared. Ashley points out that after the standing master issued a Permanent Order ofProtection along with Findings ofFacts and Conclusions of Law on January 4, 2024, Samuel did not file any objections to the Order, as required by 08/27/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0068

### § 3-5-126(2), MCA, to place the matter before the District Court for review. Ashley

reiterates that the specific objection requirement is statutorily required to ensure due processprotectionsto both parties. In re Marriage ofMcMichael, 2006 MT237,¶ 15, 333 Mont. 517, 143 P.3d 439; Scrantom, ¶ 12. Ashley requests dismissal because Samuel bypassed the written objection requirement by filing an appeal directly with this Court, thereby waiving any objection. Upon review,we concludethat Ashley'smotion isdispositive ofthisappealbecause Samuel did not comply with the statutory procedures, as listed in § 3-5-126(2), MCA. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 1. Ashley's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED without prejudice; and 2. the Clerk is directed to CLOSE this matter as ofthis Order's date. The Clerk also is directed to provide a copy ofthis Order to counsel ofrecord and to Samuel Vernon Tintinwersonally. DATED this Z:9- day ofAugust, 2024.


# FILED AUG 2 7 2024 Bowen Greenwood Clerk of Suprerne Court State of Montana



### 2 ChiefJustice

Justices
#### Rex HYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 86-2683.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 28, 1987.

PER CURIAM.

Rex Hyer appeals the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

Appellant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise him that he was entitled to elect guidelines sentencing. This allegation presents a factual issue that is not resolved by the attachments to the order summarily denying the motion. *See Wright v. State,*492 So.2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); *Buford v. State,*496 So.2d 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); *Hendrix v. State,*491 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). The remaining contentions of appellant are without merit.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with rule 3.850. Any party aggrieved by the subsequent action of the trial court must file a notice of appeal within thirty days to obtain appellate review.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 4.39**

 

FIRST AMENDMENTTODISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT

 

This First Amendment to Distribution Agreement is made as of this 6thday of August 2003 by and between Cardinal Health 414, Inc., a Delawarecorporation formerly known as Syncor International Corporation (“CardinalHealth”), and Draximage, Inc., a Canadian corporation (“Draximage”), and amendsthat certain Distribution Agreement, dated July 12, 2000 (the “Agreement”),by and between Cardinal Health and Draximage. Initially capitalized terms usedbut not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed thereto in theAgreement.

 

Cardinal Health and Draximage hereby agree to the following amendmentsto the Agreement:

 

1.             Section 2(A) of the Agreement is herebyamended to add the following second paragraph:

 

“Notwithstanding the foregoing, Draximage may distribute the Product toIndependent Radiopharmacies in the Territory, subject to the provisions of Section 6A.”

 

2.             Section 4(B) of the Agreement is herebyamended to add the following second paragraph:

 

“In the event that Draximage sells the Product to an IndependentRadiopharmacy as permitted under the second paragraph of Section 2, ***

 

3.             The following Section 6A is hereby addedto the Agreement:

 

**“6A.****DRAXIMAGE********SALES****TO****INDEPENDENT****RADIOPHARMACIES.  **In the event that Draximage sells the Product to an IndependentRadiopharmacy as permitted under the second paragraph of Section 2, anysuch sale ***. In addition, for any such sale to an Independent Radiopharmacy,Draximage shall ***

 

----

 

Except as amended herein, all other terms and conditions of theAgreement remain in full force and effect.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this FirstAmendment as of the date first written above.

 

 
|   | CARDINAL  HEALTH 414, INC. |
|--------|----------------------------|
|   |                       |
|   |                       |
|   | By:                        | /s/ Gordon Troop |   |
|   | Name:                      | Gordon Troop |
|   | Title:                     | President, HPS |
|   |                       |
|   | DRAXIMAGE,  INC.           |
|   |                       |
|   |                       |
|   | By:                        | /s/ Richard J. Flanagon |   |
|   | Name:                      | Richard J. Flanagon |
|   | Title:                     | President |
|   |                       |
|        |                            |  |  |  |

 

----
----

----

**EXHIBIT        32.2**

**CERTIFICATION        PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

| (1) | The                  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                  and |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of                  the                  Company. |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| November                  14, 2007 | /s/                  Richard R. Ivanovick       |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                               | Richard                  R. Ivanovick                                         |
|                               | Chief                  Financial Officer                                      |

----