SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0736-16T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AMADO SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted April 17, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner and Hoffman.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 

14-10-1240.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Molly O'Donnell Meng, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Mary E. Stevens, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

July 11, 2018
2 A-0736-16T4

Defendant Amado Sanchez appeals from his conviction for

second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), thirddegree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(d), and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). He also appeals from the sentence of seven 

years in prison subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-7.2.

The charges arose from a June 15, 2014 incident, in which 

defendant allegedly cut the victim, Mr. Pajuada, on the arm with 

a large knife. Pajuada and his former girlfriend Ms. Rodriguez1

testified about the incident, as did defendant. On this appeal, 

defendant raises the following points of argument:

I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PRECLUDED 

DEFENDANT FROM ELICITING TESTIMONY ABOUT THE 

COMPLAINING WITNESS'S DISMISSED CHARGES AND 

INADEQUATELY CHARGED THE JURY AS TO THE 

PENDING CHARGES OF THE STATE'S OTHER 

EYEWITNESS, DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHTS 

TO CONFRONTATION, DUE PROCESS, AND A FAIR 

TRIAL.

A. The Trial Court Improperly 

Precluded Defendant From Eliciting 

Testimony About Complaining Witness 

Pajuada's Aggravated Assault 

Charges For Stabbing A Man, Which 

Were Dismissed Eight Weeks Before 

Defendant's Trial.

 

1 The witnesses' first names are irrelevant to our opinion, and 

we omit them to protect their privacy. 
3 A-0736-16T4

B. The Trial Judge's Inadequate 

Instruction Regarding Charges 

Pending Against Rodriguez, The Only 

Other Eyewitness, Unfairly 

Neutralized The Effect Of That 

Testimony. (Not raised below)

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 

INSTRUCT THE JURY ON SELF-DEFENSE, WHICH WAS 

CLEARLY INDICATED BY TESTIMONY THAT THE 

COMPLAINING WITNESS ACTED AS THE AGGRESSOR AND 

BEAT DEFENDANT WITH A RAKE PRIOR TO THE 

INTRODUCTION OF A KNIFE INTO THE FIGHT.

III. THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED 

TO GIVE ANY REASONS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 

FOR THE TWO AGGRAVATING FACTORS IT FOUND AND 

FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RELEVANT 

MITIGATING FACTORS THAT WERE SUPPORTED BY THE 

RECORD.

After reviewing the record, we find no merit in any of those 

contentions. We affirm the conviction and the sentence.

I

We summarize the most pertinent trial evidence, in light of 

the issues raised. There was no dispute that someone cut Pajuada 

on the arm. The wound severed an artery and required several 

surgeries to repair. The issue was whether defendant, or someone 

else, stabbed Pajuada. 

According to Pajuada, at the time of the incident, he had 

known defendant for several years, and the two of them did not get 

along. In the early morning hours of June 15, 2014, Pajuada got 

into a fight with defendant's cousin Luis. Pajuada testified that 
4 A-0736-16T4

Luis had a broken bottle, and Pajuada punched him. However, 

Pajuada was not injured in that fight. After the fight with Luis, 

several other people confronted Pajuada, and during that 

confrontation, defendant pulled out a large knife and tried to 

stab Pajuada in the torso. Pajuada testified that defendant "was 

stabbing me in the body, but I moved and so he got me in the arm."

After being injured, Pajuada chased defendant for a short distance, 

before collapsing due to loss of blood. Pajuada testified that 

on the night of the fight, he was unarmed. 

Pajuada gave a statement to the police the day after the 

assault, and another statement a month later. In both statements, 

he identified defendant as the one who cut him. In a statement 

to the police the day after the assault, Rodriguez also named 

defendant as the assailant, and she showed the police a Facebook 

photo of defendant on her cell phone.

Rodriguez testified that at the time of the incident, she had 

known defendant for several years, and the two of them were 

friends. She had been Pajuada's girlfriend, had a child with him, 

and still had a friendly relationship with him. On the night of 

June 15, 2014, she went to an "after hours" drinking house2 on 

Ferry Street. Pajuada was already there. Defendant and Luis, 

 

2 The house was also referred to as a "speakeasy." 
5 A-0736-16T4

whom Rodriguez described as a "young boy," arrived a

few minutes later. Someone told Rodriguez that Luis had a knife, 

and she took it away from him and hid it. 

According to Rodriguez, defendant got into an argument with 

Pajuada, and the two men and Luis went outside the house. Once 

outside, Luis and Pajuada got into a physical confrontation. Luis 

had a broken bottle in his hand, but Rodriguez grabbed it from 

him. Pajuada pushed Luis down, and defendant yelled at Pajuada 

to leave his cousin alone. Rodriguez admitted that Pajuada then 

challenged defendant to "fight like a man." 

Shortly thereafter, defendant pulled out a large knife and 

started brandishing it at Pajuada. Rodriguez tried to intervene 

but Pajuada pushed her out of the way. According to Rodriguez, 

Pajuada was unarmed at first, but grabbed a rake after defendant 

pulled out the knife. She testified that defendant had a clear 

path to leave the scene and could have walked away from the fight, 

as she was begging him to do, but he did not. After defendant 

"stabbed" Pajuada, defendant ran away, and Pajuada ran after him 

until he collapsed, bleeding. Rodriguez ran after Pajuada, and 

tried to stop the bleeding with a tourniquet. When the police 

arrived, Rodriguez told them defendant stabbed Pajuada. She 

repeated that statement later at the police station.
6 A-0736-16T4

In his trial testimony, defendant implicitly blamed his 

cousin Luis for injuring Pajuada. Defendant stated that he was 

at the Ferry Street house with Luis at around 3:40 a.m. on June 

15, 2014. Pajuada was there, too, and got into an argument with 

Luis. Pajuada and Luis went outside, but defendant remained in 

the house "talking to a friend." A few minutes later, defendant 

and the friend went out the kitchen door to smoke a cigarette. 

Defendant testified that, after stepping outside, he saw that 

Pajuada and Luis were having a fight. Luis had a bottle in his 

hand and Pajuada had "a jack knife." They were both bleeding. 

According to defendant, Pajuada pushed Luis to the ground. 

Defendant walked over and lifted Luis up and told him to run, 

because Pajuada had a knife. Luis started running away, with 

Pajuada chasing him. Defendant walked away from the scene.

Defendant denied having a weapon, and said he did not know how 

Pajuada "got injured." 

II

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in precluding 

the defense from cross-examining Pajuada about a 2011 assault 

charge, which the State dismissed about eight weeks before 

defendant's 2016 trial began. At an in limine hearing prior to 

the trial, the prosecutor represented to the court that the State 

dismissed the charge because her office could not "get in contact 
7 A-0736-16T4

with the victim." The defense did not question that 

representation. The defense also conceded that the prosecutor's 

office had told Pajuada that the assault charge against him had 

no connection to the charges against defendant. In other words, 

the State did not offer Pajuada a deal to dismiss the charge 

against him in return for his truthful testimony against defendant. 

The trial judge concluded that, under the circumstances, the 

fact that Pajuada previously faced an assault charge, which had 

been dismissed, admittedly with no deal, was not probative as to 

his credibility as a witness in this case. The judge further

reasoned that, as a crime victim, Pajuada had the right to testify, 

without being questioned about irrelevant, dismissed charges. 

As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in State v. Bass, 

224 N.J. 285 (2016), ordinarily, a witness's pending or resolved 

criminal charges are appropriate subjects for cross-examination, 

to show possible bias. Id. at 304-05. 

[T]he case law envisions that a trial court 

will undertake a careful evaluation of a 

defendant's claim that a witness is biased.

The nature of the witness's alleged offense, 

and the sentencing exposure that he or she 

confronts by virtue of that offense, is a 

significant factor. If a witness faces a 

pending investigation or unresolved charges 

when he or she gives a statement to law 

enforcement, cooperates with the prosecution 

in preparation for trial, or testifies on the 

State's behalf, that investigation or charge 

is an appropriate subject for cross-
8 A-0736-16T4

examination. The trial court should also 

review the terms of the witness's plea 

agreement. 

[Id. at 305.]

In the circumstances of this case, we agree with the trial 

judge that the prior, dismissed charge was not probative as to 

Pajuada's credibility. Pajuada had told essentially the same 

story since the night of the assault, when he was interviewed in 

the hospital. There is no evidence that he changed his story to 

incriminate defendant, after the State dropped the charges. 

Further, the defense did not question the prosecutor's explanation 

that the State dropped the charges because the victim could not 

be found, and there was no plea deal. Under those circumstances, 

Pajuada was not beholden to the State at the time of defendant's 

trial, and the State had nothing to hold over him, as it would if 

Pajuada were on probation or had promised to give testimony in 

exchange for dismissal of the charges. 

Lastly, on this record, if there was error in precluding 

defendant from eliciting evidence of the dismissed charge, the 

error was harmless. See R. 2:10-2; Bass, 224 N.J. at 307-08.

For the first time on appeal, defendant also contends that 

the judge gave an inadequate jury instruction, after allowing the 

defense attorney to cross-examine Rodriguez about pending charges 

against her. The charges were filed in 2016, and there was no 
9 A-0736-16T4

evidence that the State had offered Rodriguez a plea deal or 

otherwise suggested to her that she might get favorable treatment 

if she testified against defendant. Nonetheless, the trial judge 

properly allowed defense counsel to elicit from Rodriguez the fact 

that she had been charged with assault by auto and two weapons 

offenses, for which she could be sentenced to prison if convicted. 

After Rodriguez gave that testimony, the judge gave the jury 

a limiting instruction, telling them that they could only consider 

the testimony as it bore on Rodriguez's credibility. He told them 

they might consider whether someone who did not follow society's 

rules might also be likely not to give truthful testimony, and

cautioned them that a person charged with a crime is nonetheless 

entitled to a presumption of innocence. At the next break, the 

judge specifically asked both attorneys if they had any objections 

to the limiting instruction he had just given. Defense counsel 

responded, "I have nothing, Your Honor."

In summation, defense counsel made the point that Rodriguez 

was "currently being prosecuted by this prosecutor's office in a 

different case" and "testified in favor of the State in order to 

save herself." She argued that the jury could determine that

Rodriguez hoped that testifying "would help her receive favorable 

treatment from the State in how they handle those charges." In 

response, the prosecutor argued that Rodriguez had been telling 
10 A-0736-16T4

the same consistent story "since the early hours of June 15, 

[2014]." 

In his final charge to the jury, the judge thoroughly 

instructed the jury about how to consider the pending charges as 

possible evidence of bias. He explained to the jury that they 

could consider the pending charges against Rodriguez 

only to the extent that you determine that it 

has biased [her] in favor of the State, that 

is to say if you believe that [] Rodriguez 

testified as she did because of the charges, 

and because she hoped that her testifying 

would help her to receive favorable treatment 

from the State in how they handled those 

charges.

The judge also, correctly, told the jury not to consider the 

"mere fact" of the pending charges as meaning that Rodriguez was 

guilty of the charges, or that she was "less likely to comply with 

our society's rules and, therefore, more likely to ignore the oath 

requiring truthfulness." Rather the issue was whether the pending 

charges influenced her to testify favorably to the State. There 

were no objections to the charge. 

Although the instructions the judge gave immediately after 

Rodriguez testified were not on point, the judge corrected the 

error in the final jury instructions. We find that the final 

charge adequately conveyed to the jury the concepts discussed in 
11 A-0736-16T4

Bass, and in the Model Charge on Testimony of a Cooperating 

Witness. We find no plain error. R. 2:10-2. 

III

Defendant next argues that the judge should have charged the 

jury as to self-defense. The argument is without sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion beyond these brief comments. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2). 

Beginning with defense counsel's opening statement, and 

continuing throughout the trial, the defense theory was that 

defendant had nothing do to with the stabbing of Pajuada. At the 

end of the testimony, the judge noted that a self-defense charge 

would be inconsistent with the defense theory, but he gave defense 

counsel until the next trial day to tell him whether she wanted a 

self-defense charge. Defense counsel did not request a selfdefense charge, and giving due regard to the defense theory of the 

case, the judge did not give the charge. Defense counsel did not 

object to any aspect of the judge's final instructions. We find 

no error, much less plain error, in the judge's course of action.

R. 2:10-2. In the context of this case, giving a self-defense 

charge would have undermined the defense. See State v. Perry, 124 

N.J. 128, 162-64 (1991); State v. Vasquez, 265 N.J. Super. 528, 

550 (App. Div. 1993). 
12 A-0736-16T4

IV

Finally, we address defendant's sentencing arguments. The 

judge found aggravating factors three and nine but did not give 

them any particular weight. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(a)(9). The judge also considered the particular 

seriousness of the victim's injury, which required five surgeries. 

The judge found mitigating factor seven, defendant's lack of any 

prior criminal convictions. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). The judge 

considered all of the other mitigating factors defendant proposed 

and explained why he found they did not apply. After considering 

the factors he found, the judge imposed a seven-year term, which 

was in the mid-range for a second-degree crime. See N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-6(a)(2). We find no abuse of discretion in the sentence.

See State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64-65 (2014); State v. Bolvito, 

217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014). No further discussion of this point is 

warranted. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.