[Cite as In re Estate of Rand, 2013-Ohio-4709.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

No. 99678

ESTATE OF MARTHA O. RAND 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

 

[Appeal By Martha J. Skurla 

 and Robin J. Olds]

JUDGMENT:

DISMISSED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Probate Division 

Case No. 11 EST 0166615 

BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., Celebrezze, J., and S. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 24, 2013 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Jonathan F. Sobel 

Kabat, Mielziner & Sobel 

30195 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 300 

Pepper Pike, OH 44124 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE JUDY JONES, EXECUTOR 

Richard A. Hennig 

Janet L. Hennig 

Baker, Hackenberg & Hennig Co. 

77 North St. Clair Street, Suite 100 

Painesville, OH 44077 
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.:

{¶1} The will of the late Martha Osborne Rand made specific cash bequests to a 

number of beneficiaries, with any remaining assets of her estate bequeathed to the 

Andrews Osborne Academy. Two of the will’s beneficiaries, appellants-heirs Martha 

Skurla and Robin Olds, filed exceptions to the inventory prepared by the estate’s 

executor, appellee Judy Jones. The heirs claimed that the inventory failed to account for 

Rand’s ownership interest in a corporation, specifically challenging whether Rand’s gift 

of the corporate stock to a family member was completed prior to her death. The 

executor asked the court to dismiss the exceptions because the heirs had no standing to 

complain about the contents of the inventory — the value of the estate was more than 

sufficient to fulfill the cash bequests to the individual heirs, so only the Andrews Osborne 

Academy, as the beneficiary of the residual estate, had an interest in the inventory. The 

heirs conceded that they had no direct monetary interest in the inventory, but claimed the 

right to file objections under R.C. 2115.16 as persons “interested in the estate.” The 

court granted the motion to dismiss the exceptions, finding that the heirs had no interest in 

pursuing their exceptions and that any dispute over the validity of stock transfer should 

have been made in a separate declaratory judgment action. The heirs appealed. 

{¶2} Concerned that we lacked a final order, we asked the parties to brief the issue 

of whether the court’s decision affected the heirs’ substantial rights in a manner that 

would create a “final” order for purposes of R.C. 2505.02. The heirs responded by 

claiming that they did not need to have a direct financial interest in the outcome of the 
litigation to have standing. They also argued that if a lack of standing did not affect a 

substantial right, an order dismissing an action for lack of standing could never be 

appealable because the litigant, by definition, would not have standing sufficient to 

establish that a substantial right had been violated. 

{¶3} Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, our jurisdiction 

as an appellate court is limited to reviewing “final” orders. R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) states 

that an order is “final” if it “affects a substantial right in an action that in effect 

determines the action and prevents a judgment.” In Ohio Domestic Violence Network v. 

Pub. Util. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 438, 605 N.E.2d 13 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court 

stated: 

In Ohio Contract Carriers Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 

160, 23 O.O. 369, 42 N.E.2d 758, syllabus, we held that “[a]ppeal lies only 

on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order appealed from. Appeals 

are not allowed for the purpose of settling abstract questions, but only to 

correct errors injuriously affecting the appellant.” We explained that a 

“final order” under former G.C. 544, now R.C. 4903.13, is one “affecting a 

substantial right” (see R.C. 2505.02; Hall China Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.

[1977], 50 Ohio St.2d 206, 4 O.O.3d 390, 364 N.E.2d 852), and 

characterized the interest necessary to create a substantial right as a 

“‘present interest’” and an “‘immediate and pecuniary’” interest. Id., 140 

Ohio St. at 161-162, 23 O.O. at 369-370, 42 N.E.2d at 759. Accord East 

Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 295, 530 N.E.2d 

875, wherein we also recognized that an order may be final as to one party 

but not to another. 

Id. at 439. 

{¶4} The heirs make no argument that the court’s acceptance of the inventory filed 

by the executor will affect any immediate and pecuniary interest they have in the estate. 

The estate assets can easily satisfy the cash bequests made to the heirs even if the 
corporate stock is not included as part of the estate’s assets. In fact, the heirs candidly 

stated that “[i]t is undoubtedly true that neither Robin Olds nor Martha Skurla will obtain 

a direct monetary benefit if their exceptions to the Inventory are sustained.” R. 39. This 

being the case, the outcome of this appeal will not affect their substantial rights, so it is 

not final for purposes of R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). 

{¶5} The heirs maintain that they have the statutory right under R.C. 2115.16, as 

“interested persons” to the estate, to enter objections to an estate inventory and that the 

court’s denial of their right to enter objections affected a substantial right for purposes of 

R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). They argue that a finding that the dismissal of their exceptions to 

the inventory does not affect a substantial right would make any argument relating to a 

lack of standing unreviewable. 

{¶6} This argument confuses the jurisdictional prerequisite of standing to sue, see 

Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 

N.E.2d 1214, at ¶ 22, with the question of whether a judgment affects a substantial right 

for purposes of appeal. The heirs admittedly have no pecuniary interest in the outcome 

of their challenge to Rand’s gift of stock — only the Andrews Osborne Academy does. 

Although R.C. 2115.16 does not limit the class of persons who can raise objections to an 

estate inventory to those with a financial interest in the inventory, the heirs offer nothing 

on appeal to show that the court’s refusal to permit their objections have resulted in their 

being injured or otherwise affected by the court’s decision. While R.C. 2115.16 grants 

interested persons the right to object to an estate inventory, the type of substantial right 
needed to appeal under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) requires more than merely an intellectual or 

curious interest in the outcome of the litigation. 

{¶7} Nothing we say in deciding the merits of the appeal will in any way affect the 

amount of the inheritance appellants are to receive. Nor will a decision on the merits of 

this appeal correct errors injuriously affecting appellants. It follows that we lack a final 

appealable order. 

{¶8} Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR