IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

NO. 84-502 

IN THE MATTER OF: 

T.L.G. and M.E.H., Youths. 

ORDER DENYING WRIT 

AND OPINION f&m~ OF @UPREME COURT 

L~~~AX GE BilhsnTANA 

The State of Montana, acting through the County Attorney's office of Butte-Silver Bow, Montana, has made application to this Court seeking a writ of supervisory control, a 

writ of prohibition, or other appropriate writ, against the 

Youth Court of the Second Judicial Distri.ct of the State of 

Montana, in and for the County of Silver Bow. 

The writ sought would in effect overrule the Youth 

Court's order of November 13, 1984, denying the State's 

motion to arrest proceedings in two cases pending in the 

Youth Court involving T.L.G. and M.E.H. The youths are 

facing charges in the Youth Court that each is a delinquent 

youth in that each had committed three counts of deliberate 

homicide, that T.L.G. had committed robbery by accountability, and that M.E.H. had committed robbery, all felonies. 

T.L.G. is fourteen years of age, having been born on January 

16, 1970. M.E.H. is fifteen years of age, having been born 

on March 1, 1969. 

The purpose of the State in moving to arrest proceedings in the Youth Court was to further move that the youths 

be transferred to criminal court under 5 41-5-206, MCA. That 

statute, however, requires that before such charges may be 

transferred to the criminal court, the youth charged must 
have been sixteen years of age or more at the time of the 

conduct alleged to be unlawful. 

In making the application, the State contends in effect 

that the sixteen-year-old requirement for transfer has the 

effect of placing in the Youth Court total iurisdiction over 

all criminal cases amounting to a fel.ony if the youth charged 

is less than sixteen years old and that such statutory provision is in con£ l.i.ct with Art. VII, Sec. 4 (1 ) , Montana Constitution 1972. 

We set out in full the constitutional provision in 

question: 

"Section 4. District court jurisdiction. 

(1) The district court has original 

iurisdiction in all criminal cases 

amounting to felony and all civil matters 

and cases at law and in equity. . . . 

" (3) Other courts ma.y have jurisdiction 

of criminal cases not amounting to felony 

and such jurisdiction concurrent with 

that of the district court as may be 

provided. by law. " 

The State contends that the provisions of the 1972 

Montana Constitution gives t.he District Court original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to a felony, and that 

und-er the decision of this Court in State ex re].. Ell-iot v. 

District Court (Mont. 1984), 684 P.2d 481, 41 St.Rep. 1184, 

an individual under the age of sixteen is legally caps-ble of 

committing a felony. 

We have concluded that the State is not entitled to 

relief by supervisory control, writ of prohibition, or other 

writ for two principal reasons: (1) the term "original iurisdiction" as used in Art. VII, Sec. 4, of the 1372 Montana 

Consti.tution should not be interpreted to mean exclusive 
-jurisdiction; and (2) in any event, wher; the Youth Court 

acts, it is the District Court acting in that capacity. 

If the term "original jurisdiction," as used in the 

Constitution, meant "exclusive original jurisdiction," as the 

State here assumes, it would mean, of course, that the ].egislature would have no power to provide for the prosecution of 

a crime amounting to a felony in any other forum but a District Court. Courts have not given the term "original jurisdiction" such a narrow construction. The question has a-risen 

in several cases interpreting the term "original jurisdiction" found in the Civil Rights Act in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For 

example, in Brown v. Pitchess (Cal. 1975), 119 Cal..Rptr. 204, 

"Unless Congress confers exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts, state courts 

competent to exercise it have concurrent 

jurisdiction to enforce federal law in 

civil actions. [Citing authority.] 

"Section 1983 does not itself address the 

question of jurisdiction. The jurisdictional provision governing section 

1983--28 United States Code section 

1343(3)--confers 'original jurisdiction' 

on the federal district courts. The 

phrase 'original jurisdiction' means the 

power to entertain cases in the first 

instance, as distinguished from appellate 

jurisdiction; it does not mean exclusive 

iurisdiction. [Citing authority.] When 

intending to confer exclusive, as well as 

original, jurisdiction on the federal 

district courts, Congress is quite capable of making itself understood. For 

example, section 1338(a) of title 28 of 

the United States Code provides: - ' The 

district courts sha.11 have original 

iurisdiction of any civil action arising 

under any - Act of Congress relating to 

patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction 

shall be exclusive of the courts of the 

sta-tes in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.'" 

In accord see, Sanchez v. Attorney General (N.M. 1979), 598 

P.2d 1170; Will-iams v. Greene (N.C. 19781, 243 S.E.2d 156. 
We determine that nothing in the language of the Constitution using the term "original jurisdiction," without 

additional language showing that such jurisdiction is to be 

exclusive, prevents the prosecution of youths as delinquents 

under the Youth Court Act in cases amounting to felony. 

Nothing that this Court said in State ex rel. Elliot v. 

District Court, supra, conflicts with that determination. 

The second reason that. we determine that the state 

constitution is not offended by the prosecution of felonies 

in the Youth Court is that it appears obvious that the Youth 

Court, when it acts in jurisdiction, is acting as a District 

Court. 

Section 41-5-201, MCA, provides that each judicial 

district of the state shall have at least one judge of the 

Youth Court. It further provides that in multi-judge judicial districts the judges shall by court rule designate one 

of their number to act as a Youth Court judge in each county 

of the c?istrict. The legislature encourages continuity of 

service as to the appointed Youth Court judge. Id. In Youth 

Court cases, however, the legislature has provided for "exclusive original jurisdiction," saying: 

"41-5-203. Juridiction -- of the court. 

Except as provided in subsection (2) the 

court has exclusive original jurisdiction 

of all proceedings under the Montana 

Youth Court Act in which a youth is 

alleged to be a delinquent youth . . ." 

The exception noted in 5 41-5-203, MCA, relates to concurrent 

jurisdiction in justice, municipal and city courts with 

respect to alcoholic beverage violations and traffic or fish 

and game law viol.ations, and has no application here. 

The constitutional framers recognized. that the Legislature might enact laws which enhance the protection of persons 
not adults. In Art. 11, Sec. 15, 1972 Mont. Const., it 

provided that the rights of persons under eighteen years of 

age include all the fundamental rights granted by the Constitution unless specifically precluded by laws "which enhance 

the protection of such persons." 

In accordance with these view, IT IS HEREBY ORDEFED 

that the application of the State in this cause for 2 writ of 

supervisory control, writ of prohibition or other appropriate 

writ be DENIED and the application is dismissed. 

The Clerk of this Court shall serve copies of this 

order and opinion upon counsel of record for the parties, and 

upon the Youth Court of the Second Judicial District. 

i% 

DATED this - day of December, 19f!4. 

'\ / / 

* 4 ,IXJ , ! k ,, , Justice B 

h7e concur: 

- Chief Justice 

Justice Frank R. Morrison, Jr., has authorized a statement 

that he concurs with the foregoing result but would deny the 

application for reason that a fifteen-year-old youth cannot 

be charged with a felony during the time he or she is a 

youth. Since a felony charge cannot be filed, the constitutional provision given the District Court jurisdiction of 

felonies has no application.