alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| (1)   | The              report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)              of              the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The              information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material              respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the              Company. |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                |                                             |                              |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                           |                                        |                         |
| Dated:              August 14, 2007 | By:/s/                                      |  Craig              Hodgkins |
|                                | Craig              Hodgkins                      |
|                                | President              and              Director |
|                                | (Principal              Executive Officer)       |

----
49916, 49917.

49918.

#### BROWN v. McNAIR (two cases). BROWN v. COLEMAN.

Submitted November 4, 1974

Decided February 7, 1975

Rehearing denied February 20, 1975.

*Henning, Chambers & Mabry, Eugene P. Chambers, Jr., Peter K. Kintz,*for appellant.

*Charles A. Pemberton, Edward T. Floyd,*for appellees.

Bell, Chief Judge.

These denials of motions for summary judgments were appealed on an erroneous principle enunciated in *McKnight v. Guffin,*118 Ga. App. 168 (4) (162 SE2d 743) which was repudiated *in Burnette Ford v. Hayes,*124 Ga. App. 65 (183 SE2d 78). Thus material issues of fact exist in this case as to whether the vehicle involved was a family purpose car.

*Judgments affirmed.*

*Quillian and Clark, JJ., concur.*
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Wylie C. ROSS.

No. 87-KA-605.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 8, 1987.

*382John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Dorothy Pendergast, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gretna, for plaintiff-appellee.

Martin E. Regan, Jr., New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

Before CHEHARDY, GAUDIN and DUFRESNE, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Judge.

Wylie C. Ross pled guilty on April 7, 1987, to the offense of armed robbery. Following the return of a pre-sentence investigation, he was sentenced by Judge Walter Kollin to serve twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Although defense counsel objected to the sentence as severe at the time of sentencing, no motion for appeal was filed until June 22, 1987.

The appeal is untimely. C.Cr.P. art. 914 states:

> A motion for an appeal may be made orally in open court or by filing a written motion with the clerk. The motion must be made no later than five days after the rendition of the judgment or ruling from which the appeal is taken. The motion shall be entered in the minutes of court.

Following the expiration of time limitations for seeking an appeal, the conviction and the sentence imposed become final and are no longer subject to review under the ordinary appellate process, unless the defendant obtains the reinstatement of his right to appeal. See *State v. Counterman,*475 So.2d 336, 338 (La.1985).

The appropriate procedural vehicle to seek the exercise of the right to appeal after the legal delays have expired is an application for post conviction relief. See *State v. Counterman,*supra. As the motion for appeal appearing in the record was filed after the conviction and sentence became final, and as the defendant in the present case did not seek reinstatement of his appellate rights, the appeal is not properly before the court and should be dismissed. See also *State v. Meihan Chan,*515 So.2d 831 (La.App. 5th Cir.1987).

There is nothing in the record which shows that the defendant obtained reinstatement of his right to appeal as per *Counterman.*

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the case remanded to allow the defendant to seek reinstatement of his right to appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED; CASE REMANDED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          20,957
<SECURITIES>                                    51,176
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,160,423
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (187,140)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,263,685
<PP&E>                                          16,400
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (9,134)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,543,360
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,374,475
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       177,719
<OTHER-SE>                                     (8,834)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,543,360
<SALES>                                        271,889
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               373,874
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  143,297
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               215,171
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              64,789
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (49,383)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (20,415)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (28,968)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (28,968)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.17)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This  Schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
financial  statements contained in the body of the accompanying Form 10-K and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1

<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>  Year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    Jun-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                         Jun-30-1999
<CASH>                                               100
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       100
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             100
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         100
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
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</TABLE>
#### John H. CREECH and Denice S. Creech v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Curtis R. Hawkins, Hawkins Painters & Decorators, Inc., Martha H. Young and Allstate Insurance Company.

No. 88-C-0011.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 5, 1988.

In re Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 19065-CA; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 309614.

Prior report: La.App., 516 So.2d 1168.

Denied.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Kenneth LINDSEY, Appellee.

No. 4-86-0493.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 28, 1987.

*175Robert A. Butterworth, Jr., Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Eddie J. Bell, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Cindy E. D’Agostino, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

STONE, Judge.

The state appeals an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant is charged with failing to timely return a leased vehicle, although it was returned prior to the filing of the information. Section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes (1985), provides:

> (3) FAILURE TO REDELIVER HIRED VEHICLE. — Whoever, after hiring a motor vehicle under an agreement to redeliver the same to the person letting such motor vehicle or his agent, at the termination of the period for which it was let, shall, without the consent of such person or persons and with intent to defraud, abandon or willfully refuse to redeliver such vehicle as agreed shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.

The state filed a traverse which, it contends, raised as a disputed fact the issue of whether the car was returned within a reasonable time, and which contested the issues of intent and willful refusal to redeliver the vehicle. In the traverse the state said that it neither admitted nor denied whether the vehicle was returned within a reasonable time. It was the state’s position that return within a reasonable time is not a defense.

The trial court determined that there was no violation of the statute, finding the vehicle was returned within a reasonable time. However, we conclude that the traverse sufficiently placed in contention the issues of intent, reasonable time and willful refusal. *See State v. Pugh,*350 So.2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); *State v. Harris,*334 So.2d 674 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). *See also State v. Oberholtzer,*411 So.2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA), *rev. denied,*419 So.2d 1199 (Fla.1982) (once state files traverse specifically denying material facts alleged in defendant’s motion to dismiss, trial court has no alternative but to deny motion).

The order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
#### Louanna FORNESS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 88-1528.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 18, 1988.

Louis 0. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, James T. Miller, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Desmond V. Tobias, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

There is no competent, substantial evidence in this record which supports appellant's involuntary commitment. *Schexnay-der v. State,*495 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The order of involuntary commitment is REVERSED.

SMITH, C.J., and ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George FIORELLI, Appellee.

No. 4-86-2944.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 10, 1987.

Robert A. Butterworth, Jr., Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Penny H. Brill, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Gary Caldwell, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We reverse the order dismissing the information on the authority of *State ex rel. Bludworth v. Kapner,*394 So.2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HERSEY, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 350



## ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II No. CR-13-1012

DENARIUS A. MARTIN APPELLANT V. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE Opinion Delivered June 4, 2014 APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. CR-2008-459] HONORABLE RANDY F. PHILHOURS, JUDGE AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED BILL H. WALMSLEY, Judge On June 30, 2008, appellant Denarius Martin pleaded guilty to burglary, and he received five years’ probation and was ordered to pay restitution, fines, fees, and costs. On April 22, 2013, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation alleging, among other things, that Martin failed to make any payments toward what he owed. The Crittenden County Circuit Court found that Martin had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and, upon revocation, sentenced him to two years in a regional correctional facility followed by seven years’ suspended imposition of sentence. Defense counsel has filed a motion to withdraw on the basis that there is no merit to an appeal. Pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Rule 4-3(k) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, defense counsel’s motion was accompanied by a brief that purports to address all adverse rulings with an explanation whyCite as 2014 Ark. App. 350

each ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Martin was provided with a copy of counsel’s brief and notified of his right to file pro se points for reversal. Martin has not filed any points. From our review of the record and the briefs presented to us, we agree with defense counsel that there is no merit to an appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order of revocation and grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted. H ARRISON and W YNNE , JJ., agree. C. Brian Williams , for appellant. No response.

2
### Regular Totals (Operators)

Airport = EWR

Operator = 0001(Exclude)

Status Date = 07/01/2010 (Current & Future) 12/21/2010 07:54:50



### Query Parameters:

### 12/21/2010 07:54:50

Carrier 

### Regular Totals (Operators)

Excludes FAA Held Slots Held less than 5 days are Excluded PF7 Status Date = 07/01/2010 (Current & Future)

EWR

AAL AMERICAN AIRLINES 36

ABX ABX AIR 1

ACA AIR CANADA 18

AFR AIR FRANCE 2

AIC AIR INDIA 2

ASA ALASKA AIRLINES 4

ASH MESA AIRLINES 4

AVI L'AVION/OPENSKIES 4

AZA ALITALIA 2

BAW BRITISH AIRWAYS 6

CHQ CHAUTAUQUA 4

CKS KALITTA FLYING SERVICES (AMERICAN INT'L 3

COA CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 902

COM COMAIR AIRLINES 7

CPZ COMPASS AIRLINES 7

CSQ CARGOJET 2

DAL DELTA AIR LINES 38

DLH DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA 6

EGF AMR EAGLE HOLDING COPR. (FORMERLY 13

ELY EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES 1

FDX FED EX 5

FLG PINNACLE AIRLINES (dba NORTHWEST 3

GJS GOJET AIRLINES 7

JAI JET AIRWAYS 2

JBU JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP. 27

JZA AIR CANADA JAZZ 6

LOF TRANS STATES, INC. 6

LOT LOT - POLISH AIRLINES 3

MES MESABA AVIATION 4

PDT PIEDMONT AIRLINES, INC. (FORMERLY 9

POE PORTER AIRLINES 19

RPA REPUBLIC AIRLINES 4

SAS SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES 4

SIA SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED 2

SWR SWISS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (SWISSAIR 2

TAP TAP-AIR PORTUGAL 2

UAL UNITED AIRLINES 20

UPS UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 3

USA US AIRWAYS 19

VIR VIRGIN ATLANTIC AIR 4

WJA WESTJET 2

Page 2
Exhibit 10.7

SIXTH EXTENSION OF AMENDED STUDIO LEASE AGREEMENT

THIS SIXTH EXTENSION OF THE AMENDED STUDIO LEASE AGREEMENT("Amendment") is made as of
January 1, 2009 by and between THE HEARST CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation ("Hearst"), and HEARST-ARGYLE TELEVISION, INC., a Delaware corporation (the "Company").

W I T N E S S E T H

WHEREAS, Hearst and the Company entered into a Studio Lease Agreement dated as of August 29, 1997 (the "Studio Lease
Agreement"), pursuant to which the Company leased to Hearst the Leased Premises (as defined in the Studio Lease Agreement);

WHEREAS,
Hearst and the Company entered into an Amendment to Studio Lease Agreement dated as of August 29, 2000 (the "Amended Studio Lease Agreement");

WHEREAS,
Hearst and the Company extended the term of the Amended Studio Lease Agreement pursuant to an initial Extension and a subsequent Second Extension of the Amended Studio Lease
Agreement; and

WHEREAS,
Hearst and the Company mutually desire to further extend the term of the Amended Studio Lease Agreement, as set forth hereinafter;

NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, the Amended Studio Lease Agreement as so amended is hereby extended by substituting the date of December 31, 2009 for the date of August 31, 2004 in paragraph 2
(Term of Lease) in the Studio Lease Agreement as so amended.

Except
as expressly set forth herein, all terms and conditions of the Studio Lease Agreement as so amended shall continue in full force and effect.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this extension of the Studio Lease Agreement as so amended as of the date first above written.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this extension of the Studio Lease Agreement as so amended as of the date first above written.

THE HEARST CORPORATION

HEARST-ARGYLE TELEVISION, INC.By:

/s/ RONALD J. DOERFLER

By:

/s/ JONATHAN C. MINTZERName:
Title:

Ronald J. Doerfler Sr. VP and CFO



Name:
Title:

Jonathan C. Mintzer Vice President, General Counsel andDated:

12/31/08





SecretaryDated:

12/31/08


---
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4057-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2012-0002]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the Commonwealth of Kentucky (FEMA-4057-DR), dated March 6, 2012, and related determinations.

# DATES:

*Effective Date:*                         March 9, 2012.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Peggy Miller, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency                               ( print page 16047)                            Management Agency, 500 C Street SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of a major disaster declaration for the Commonwealth of Kentucky is hereby amended to include the following areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the event declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of March 6, 2012.

Magoffin and Wolfe Counties for Individual Assistance.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050 Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.)

W. Craig Fugate,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2012-6481 Filed 3-16-12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
Exhibit 13(a)

CERTIFICATION OF OLIVIER BOHUON AND JULIE BROWN

906 CERTIFICATION

The certification set
forth below is being submitted in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2014 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Olivier Bohuon, the Chief Executive
Officer and Julie Brown, the Chief Financial Officer of Smith & Nephew plc, each certifies that, to the best of their knowledge:



|1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Smith & Nephew plc.
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 5, 2015



By:

/s/ Olivier BohuonName:

Mr Olivier BohuonTitle:

Chief Executive Officer




By:

/s/ Julie BrownName:

Mrs Julie BrownTitle:

Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 23


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-8 (Nos. 333-74018 and 333-74020) of Indian River Banking Company, of our
report, dated February 1, 2002, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of
Indian River Banking Company as of December 31, 2001 and 2000, and the related
consolidated statements of operations, changes in stockholders' equity and cash
flows for each of the years ended December 31, 2001, 2000 and 1999.


/s/ McGladrey & Pullen, LLP


Fort Lauderdale, Florida
March 13, 2002
49543.

#### MARCHMAN v. THE STATE.

Stolz, Judge.

The decision of this court in the present case affirming the judgment of the trial court *(Marchman v.*
      *537
      *State,*132 Ga. App. 677 (209 SE2d 88)) having been reversed by the Supreme Court *(Marchman v. State,*234 Ga. 40), our decision is hereby vacated and the judgment of the trial court is reversed in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in this case.

Decided April 10, 1975.

*Weiner & Bazemore, Paul S. Weiner, Faye L. Smith, Terrell A. Abernathy,*for appellant.

*Ben J. Miller, District Attorney,*for appellee.

*Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs, II, Executive Assistant Attorney General, John*W. *Dunsmore, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Richard L. Chambers, William F. Bartee, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General,*amicus curiae.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Deen, P. J., and Marshall, J., concur.*