*The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, United States District Judge forthe Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0189P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0189p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________In re: WILBURG.WESTBERRY,Debtor.________________________INTERNALREVENUESERVICE,Appellee,v.WILBURG.WESTBERRY,Appellant.;>1No. 98-6779Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.No. 98-00438—Todd J. Campbell, District Judge.Argued: February 1, 2000Decided and Filed: June 6, 2000Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; BELL, DistrictJudge.*2In re WestberryNo. 98-6779_________________COUNSELARGUED:Mark H. Westlake, WESTLAKE & MARSDEN,Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. A. Wray Muoio, TAXDIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,D.C., for Appellee.ON BRIEF:Mark H. Westlake,WESTLAKE & MARSDEN, Nashville, Tennessee, forAppellant. A. Wray Muoio, TAX DIVISION,DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., DavidEnglish Carmack, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,APPELLATE SECTION TAX DIVISION, Washington, D.C.,for Appellee._________________OPINION_________________R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. The sole issuepresented in this appeal is whether federal income and selfemployment taxes should be considered consumer debt forpurposes of 11 U.S.C. § 1301, the codebtor stay set forth inthe Bankruptcy Code. For the reasons that follow, we holdthat these taxes are not consumer debt and, therefore,AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.I.The facts are stipulated by the parties. The followingversion is taken from the decision of the bankruptcy court:Wilbur G. Westberry filed Chapter 13 on November 5,1997. The debtor and his nonfiling spouse jointly owedfederal taxes for 1988 of $34,525.02. The debtor’s planproposed to pay the taxes in full in three years. The IRSbegan collection against the nonfiling codebtor byserving a notice of levy on her employer. The debtorfiled a motion to enforce the codebtor stay. The IRSobjected.10In re WestberryNo. 98-67796Because we have determined that income taxes are not consumerdebt under the § 1301 codebtor stay, we need not reach the issue ofwhether the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), preventsenforcement of the codebtor stay on income taxes. SeeIn re Pressimore,39 B.R. at 244.same way), we do not believe our interpretation of theBankruptcy Code need be constrained by the interpretation ofan entirely different statute with a different purpose andhistory.See, e.g., United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 221(1st Cir. 1999) (stating that “precedent teaches that the casefor construing one statute in a manner similar to another isweakest when the two have significant differences and, here,the appellant seeks to compare plums with pomegranates”)(internal citation omitted).6III.For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’sdetermination that income taxes should not be consideredconsumer debt for purposes of the § 1301 codebtor stay.No. 98-6779In re Westberry3The tax debt relates only to income earned in 1988. Inthat year, the debtor was a self-employed insurancesalesman. He incurred federal income andself-employment taxes on his earnings. All incomeearned in 1988 was used by the debtor and his wife forpersonal, family, or household purposes -- to supportthemselves and their three dependents. No businessassets were acquired in 1988, except perhaps atypewriter, and no money was spent on businesses,investments, or other profit-making activities.In re Westberry, 219 B.R. 976, 977 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.1998).The bankruptcy court concluded that income taxes could beconsumer debt for purposes of the codebtor stay and that, inthis case, because the taxes were incurred “for a personal,family, or household purpose,” the codebtor stay applied.SeeWestberry, 219 B.R. at 978-79. The IRS appealed.The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, holdingthat the tax liability at issue was not consumer debt becauseit was not incurred, but “involuntarily imposed by thegovernment for a public purpose” and resulted “from earningmoney rather than consumption.”IRS v. Westberry (In reWestberry), No. 3:98-0438 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 1998).Westberry now appeals the district court’s decision.II.The issue presented here, whether federal income taxesshould be considered consumer debt for purposes of 11U.S.C. § 1301, is a question of law, which we review denovo.See Investors Credit Corp. v. Batie(In re Batie), 995F.2d 85, 88 (6th Cir. 1993).The codebtor stay provides that “a creditor may not act . . .to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor fromany individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor.” 11U.S.C. § 1301. Consumer debt is defined in the BankruptcyCode as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for a4In re WestberryNo. 98-67791At the time of trial, the debtor and his wife had separated andmaintained separate households.personal, family, or household purpose.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(8).Westberry argues that the stay should apply to prevent the IRSfrom attempting to collect from his wife,1the codebtor on the1988 taxes because, as stipulated, the money that should havebeen paid in taxes was used for family and householdpurposes.This is an issue of first impression for our circuit as well asthe federal courts of appeals in general. Almost withoutexception, the bankruptcy courts that have addressed thisquestion have determined that tax debt should not beconsidered consumer debt for purposes of the codebtor stay.See, e.g.,In re Stovall, 209 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Va.1997);In re Dye, 190 B.R. 566, 567 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995);In re Marshalek, 158 B.R. 704, 706 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993);In re Greene, 157 B.R. 496, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1993);Goldsby v. United States(In re Goldsby), 135 B.R. 611, 613-15 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992);In re Reiter, 126 B.R. 961(Bankr. W.D. Texas 1991);Harrison v. Internal RevenueService (In re Harrison), 82 B.R. 557, 558 (Bankr. D. Colo.1987);Pressimone v. Internal Revenue Service(In rePressimone), 39 B.R. 240, 244 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). We find theweight of these opinions and their reasoning persuasive.First, a tax debt is “incurred” differently from a consumerdebt. Although it is true that tax debts may be incurred underthe Bankruptcy Code, this incurrence is not voluntary on thepart of the taxpayer.See Reiter, 126 B.R. at 964;see alsoMarshalek, 158 B.R. at 706 (stating that “volition is essential”to a classification as consumer debt in finding that a vehicularaccident judgment was not consumer debt under Chapter 7).We may at least hope to choose to incur consumer debt; itscertainty being nothing like death and taxes.SeeLetter fromBenjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789).No. 98-6779In re Westberry95Westberry does not argue that these statutes are in conflict, whichwould, of course, require us to interpret the statutes so as to give effect toeach law.the consumer protection statutes upon which the BankruptcyCode’s definition of consumer debt was derived.See id.at1054-55. The profit motive analysis is used, and is clearlyappropriate, to determine whether a debt falls outside thecategory of consumer debt. There is nothing inherent in thistest, or direction from the Bankruptcy Code to suggest, thatthe test defines theonlycategory of non-consumer debt.Therefore, while the profit motive analysis may assist in thedetermination of which debts are not consumer debt, it doesnot prohibit other debts from falling outside of the category ofconsumer debt.See Marshalek, 158 B.R. at 706 (“The profitmotive test is normally applied to cases involvingexpenditures. . . . An inability to classify a particular debt asa business debt does not automatically relegate it to the statusof consumer debt.”).But see Kestell v. Kestell(In re Kestell),99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (using the test to determinethat because debt was not business debt, it was consumerdebt).Westberry also argues that income tax debt has beendeemed personal debt for purposes of the Tax Code and,therefore, the same classification should hold under theBankruptcy Code.5For example, he cites the IRS regulationthat classifies interest on income tax debt as personal interest,which cannot be deducted, to support his argument.See26C.F.R. § 1.163.9T(b)(2)(i)(A). Absent any indication fromCongress,see, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985) (using prior interpretations of anFair Labor Standards Act provision to interpret language inthe Age Discrimination in Employment Act because Congressshowed detailed knowledge of the FLSA when enacting theADEA) or obvious similarity of language or purpose betweenthese statutory provisions,see, e.g., Northcross v. Board ofEduc. of the Memphis City Schs., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)(noting that a similarity of language and a “common raisond’etre” indicate that two statutes should be interpreted in the8In re WestberryNo. 98-6779are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”); 15 U.S.C.§ 1602(h) (defining, under the Truth in Lending Act, a “consumer loan”as “[a transaction] in which the party to whom credit is offered orextended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services whichare the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, orhousehold purposes”).4We note that at least two sister circuits have suggested that taxesshould not be considered “debt” under the Fair Debt Collection PracticesAct. For example,Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1998),states:The [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] defines a “debt” as“any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to paymoney arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction areprimarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whetheror not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). In determining that the personal property taxes atissue in this case are not “debts” within the meaning of theFDCPA, the district court relied principally upon the decision ofthe Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit inStaub v. Harris,626 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.1980). InStaub, the Third Circuit heldthat “at a minimum, the statute contemplates that the debt hasarisen as a result of the rendition of a service or purchase ofproperty or other item of value. The relationship betweentaxpayer and taxing authority does not encompass that type ofpro tanto exchange which the statutory definition envisages.”Id.at 278. We agree with the district court thatStaubis persuasiveauthority and is dispositive in this case.that cases under these similarly worded statutes guide ouranalysis of this issue.4Congress did not indicate, through thelegislative history of § 1301, whether it intended to includetaxes under the codebtor stay.This distinctive treatment of taxes under the BankruptcyCode, as well as the distinctions between tax debt andconsumer debt, indicate that the profit motive test, which wasused by the bankruptcy court in this case, is not determinativeof this issue. The profit motive test determines that debt isnot consumer debt if the debt was “incurred with an eyetoward profit.”In re Booth, 858 F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir.1988). This test was derived from a similar test used underNo. 98-6779In re Westberry5Second, consumer debt is incurred for personal orhousehold purposes, as stated in the statute, while taxes areincurred for a public purpose.See Stovall, 209 B.R. at 854(stating that taxes are “imposed by a government for thepublic welfare” in the course of finding that unpaid personalproperty tax on the debtor’s car was not consumer debt forpurposes of the codebtor stay). The Supreme Court has longnoted, in other contexts, the public purpose of the impositionof taxes.See, e.g., Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664(1874) (“We have established . . . beyond cavil that there canbe no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose.”).Third, taxes arise from the earning of money, whileconsumer debt results from its consumption.See Greene, 157B.R. at 497;Harrison, 82 B.R. at 558;Pressimone, 39 B.R.at 244. Different events give rise to tax debt than to consumerdebt – Westberry’s obligation to the IRS arose from theearning of income, not from his expenditure on personal andfamily items.Finally, unlike taxes, consumer debt normally involves theextension of credit.The sum of these material differences leads us to concludethat Westberry’s tax debts cannot be considered consumerdebt for purposes of the § 1301 codebtor stay.Westberry contends thatIn re Whitelock, 122 B.R. 582(Bankr. D. Utah 1990) counsels us to decide otherwise. Wedisagree. InWhitelock, the debtor took out a loan from FirstSecurity Financial (FSF), secured by his mother’s singlefamily home, to pay an IRS liability.See id.at 584. Thedebtor then took out a second note to pay off the first note;this second note was secured by a deed of trust on the sameresidence.See id.at 585-86. The debtor filed for bankruptcyunder Chapter 13 approximately three months later.See id.The bankruptcy court found that these obligations secured byreal property may be considered consumer debt, despite somelanguage in the legislative history of § 101(7) – the precursorto § 101(8) -- which states that consumer debt does notinclude debt secured by real property.See id.at 587 (quoting6In re WestberryNo. 98-67792This court has not interpreted the “consumer debt” language of theBankruptcy Code, even in other contexts within the Code.See Cohen v.De la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (noting the “presumption thatequivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in the samestatute”). Our sister circuits have examined the “consumer debt”language, as applied to other sections of the Code, but not with respect totax debts.See Stewart v. United State Trustee(In re Stewart), 175 F.3d796 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that a Chapter 7 debtor’s funds were put tohousehold living expenses and, therefore, were consumer debts);Kestellv. Kestell(In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996) (determining, undera profit motive test, that money owed to the debtor’s former wife from adivorce judgment was consumer debt for purposes of § 707);Burns v.Citizens Nat’l Bank(In re Burns), 894 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1990) (findingthat loans taken out to play the stock market were not consumer debt, forpurposes of determining whether attorney fees should be provided under11 U.S.C. § 523(d));Zolg v. Kelly(In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9thCir. 1988) (finding, in a § 707(b) case, that attorney fees were consumerdebt because the suit was begun “for the purpose of recovering moneyallegedly overpaid in purchasing their home”);In re Booth, 858 F.2d 1051(5th Cir. 1988). These cases do not change or detract from our analysis.124 Cong. Rec. H11,090 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statementof Rep. Edwards); 124 Cong. Rec. S17,406 (daily ed. Oct. 6,1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)). The court looked tothe purpose of the debt, concluding that the second loan,which was used to pay off the first loan that payed the IRSdebt, served “a family or household purpose.”Id.at 587. Thecourt assumed that the debt was either consumer or businessand, because there was “no substantial indication that therepayment of the FSF debt was in any manner businessrelated,” it was, therefore, consumer debt.Id.Whitelockisdistinguishable from the present case because the debt wasonly indirectly incurred to cover the IRS liability, not directlyincurred as in this case. Further,Whitelock, in dictum,approvingly quotes two cases which find that tax debt is notconsumer debt.See Whitelock, 122 B.R. at 587 n.8 (citingHarrison, 82 B.R. at 558;Pressimone,39 B.R. at 245).In order to determine the meaning of consumer debt, wealso examine the “language and design of the statute as awhole.”Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1174 (6th Cir.1999).2Throughout the Bankruptcy Code, Congress hasNo. 98-6779In re Westberry73See15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (defining “debt,” under the Fair DebtCollection Practices Act, as “any obligation or alleged obligation of aconsumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transactionclearly treated tax debt differently from other debts, includingconsumer debt. For example, certain tax debts are notdischargeable in bankruptcy, based partially on an assessmentof the importance of the collection of tax revenue.See11U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (nondischargeability of certain tax debts);see also146 Cong. Rec. S167-05 at *S178 (daily ed. Feb. 1,2000) (statement of Sen. Levin) (quoting National BankruptcyReview Commission Final Report, Chapter 1: ConsumerBankruptcy (1997)) (“Other debts are excepted fromdischarge because of the inherent nature of the obligation,without regard to any culpability of the debtor. Regardless ofthe debtor’s good faith, for example, . . . many tax claimsremain nondischargeable. Society’s interest in exceptingthose debts from discharge outweigh the debtor’s need for afresh economic start.”);Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S.358, 361 (1964) (noting, in the context of an application of aprovision of the prior Bankruptcy Code relating to tax debt,that the provision “demonstrates congressional judgment thatcertain problems -- e.g., those of financing government --override the value of giving the debtor a wholly fresh start.”).In addition, tax debts are given a privileged status relative tocertain other debts.See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).We note that although we have analyzed whether taxes areconsumer debt based on the plain language and meaning ofthe statute,seeZolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 912(9th Cir. 1988) (stating that consumer debt capable of plainmeaning interpretation);Reiter, 126 B.R. 961, 964 (finding noneed to resort to legislative history to determine if taxes wereconsumer debt under § 1301), even if we were to find thestatutory language ambiguous, the legislative history is notdecisive of this issue. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of“consumer debt” is derived from consumer protection laws.SeeS. Rep. No. 95-989 at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5808.3Westberry makes no argument