UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RONALD STEVE MASON, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

No. 14-5085 

 v. (D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00717-TCK-TLW) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

EMMA WATTS, Warden 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

 Ronald Steve Mason, a state prisoner, filed a pro se motion under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 seeking habeas corpus relief from his convictions and sentences. 

The issue before us is whether the district court was correct in its procedural 

ruling—specifically, that the petition was untimely. Because we conclude that 

jurists of reason would not find it debatable that the district court was correct in 

 

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of 

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 5, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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its procedural ruling, we deny Mason a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

this appeal. 

On May 16, 2012, he pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary after two or 

more felony convictions (knowingly concealing or receiving stolen property, 

1983; second-degree burglary, 1983; first-degree burglary, 1988; knowingly 

concealing or receiving stolen property, 1989; second-degree burglary, 1990; 

attempt to obtain controlled drug by forged or altered prescription, 2001; petit 

larceny AFCF, 2001), Case No. CF-2011-3379. He was sentenced to 20 years’ 

imprisonment. On June 26, 2012, he pleaded guilty to knowingly receiving or 

concealing stolen property after two or more felony convictions, Case No. CF2011-2978. For this conviction, he was also sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, 

to run concurrently. 

 On April 1, 2013, Mason filed a “request for court documents at state 

expense due to state of indigency” in both of his cases. The state district judge 

denied his requests on May 24, 2013. R. vol. 1 at 195. 

On June 11, 2013, Mason filed an application for post-conviction relief in 

Case No. CF-2011-3379. The state district court denied his request because 

Mason did not timely file a direct appeal. He attempted to perfect a postconviction appeal, but on September 12, 2013, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals (“OCCA”) declined jurisdiction because Mason had improperly filed it, 

and dismissed the appeal. 
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Also on June 11, 2013, Mason filed an application for post-conviction 

relief in Case No. CF-2011-2978. The district court denied this request for the 

same reason. Mason attempted to perfect the post-conviction appeal, but on 

September 12, 2013, the OCCA declined jurisdiction for the same reason and 

dismissed the appeal. 

On October 31, 2013, the Clerk of Court received and filed Mason’s federal 

writ of habeas corpus. Mason claims that he placed the petition in the prison 

mailing system on October 25, 2013. Accordingly, under the prison mailbox rule, 

the earliest filing date for this petition is October 25, 2013. See Houston v. Lack, 

487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

Mason raises four claims in his habeas petition: (1) that the court illegally 

enhanced his sentences with a misdemeanor that was improperly accelerated to a 

felony (petit larceny); (2) that his sentences were illegally enhanced by Case No. 

CF-2001-1967; 1 (3) that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and 

(4) that the court’s conclusion of law and finding of facts are insufficient and 

contrary to well-settled Oklahoma law as announced by the court. The district 

court denied Mason’s writ because it was time-barred. Mason now seeks a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”) from this court, appealing both the timeliness 

issue and asserting the merits of his claims. 

 1 In Case No. CF-2001-1967, Mason was convicted of a felony—attempt to 

obtain controlled drug by forged or altered prescription—on September 26, 2001. 
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 An appeal from a writ of habeas corpus may only be taken to the court of 

appeals if that court first grants a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We may only 

issue a COA if the petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies a habeas 

petition on procedural grounds and does not reach the underlying claims, the 

court of appeals should only grant a COA if “jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court 

was correct in its procedural ruling.” § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

474 (2000) (“Resolution of procedural issues first is allowed and encouraged by 

the rule that this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question if there is also 

present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”). Where 

there is a procedural bar and the district court correctly invokes it to dismiss the 

habeas petition, “a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district 

court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to 

proceed further.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. In that case, no appeal would be 

warranted. Id. Viewing the petition before us, we agree with the district court’s 

procedural ruling as explained below. Therefore, we deny Mason’s request for a 

COA and dismiss this appeal. 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established a 

one-year limitations period for habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The 

limitation period begins to run from the date on which the judgment became final. 
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§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a state 

application for post-conviction relief properly filed during the limitations period. 

§2244(d)(2). Mason’s convictions became final on July 5, 2012, and July 6, 2012, 

ten days after the pronouncement of his Judgment and Sentence on June 25, 2012, 

and June 26, 2012, respectively. See Rule 4.2(A), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18 App. (2011) (providing petitioner with ten 

days from the time of his conviction to file an application to withdraw his guilty 

plea or appeal before his conviction becomes final). Thus, absent a tolling event, 

Mason had until July 8, 2013, to file a timely habeas petition for both 

convictions. At the earliest, he filed his petition on October 25, 2013, which is 

more than three months beyond the deadline. Thus, absent a statutory tolling, his 

petition is time-barred. 

 The district court properly concluded that Mason’s motion requesting court 

documents did not constitute an application for post-conviction relief, and 

therefore did not trigger the statutory tolling period under § 2244(d)(2). See May 

v. Workman, 339 F.3d 1236, 1237 (10th Cir. 2003). 

 The district court also properly concluded that even though Mason’s 

attempts to obtain post-conviction relief did toll the limitations period in which to 

file a habeas petition, his petition was still time-barred. The habeas limitations 

period is tolled during the pendency of a properly filed post-conviction 

proceeding. § 2244(d)(2); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 

1998). Mason properly filed his applications for post-conviction relief on June 
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11, 2013, 27 days before the end of his one-year habeas limitations period. Those 

applications were denied on July 31 and August 6, 2013.

Subsequently, Mason failed to perfect his post-conviction appeals in 

compliance with Rule 5.2(C)(2), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18 App. (2011), resulting in dismissal of those appeals. A 

petitioner’s habeas limitation period is tolled for an additional 30 days to enable 

the petitioner to perfect a post-conviction appeal, regardless of whether the 

petitioner actually appeals or not. Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 

2000). Even crediting Mason with the longest tolling period possible, his 

limitation period still ended on September 5, 2013, 30 days after the denial of his 

application for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, under the rule, Mason’s 

limitation period was tolled from June 11, 2013, when he filed his applications, 

through September 5, 2013, when the 30 days expired. This left Mason 27 days, 

the time remaining in his one-year period, to file his federal habeas corpus 

petition, making his deadline for filing October 2, 2013. But he did not file his 

petition until October 25 at the earliest, 23 days late. As such, Mason failed to 

file his petition timely, resulting in its being time-barred. 

Based on the foregoing, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

this appeal. 

 ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

 Gregory A. Phillips 

 Circuit Judge