If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

CHARLES LOUIS VAN FLETEREN, JR.,

Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellant,

UNPUBLISHED

July 16, 2019

v No. 341458

Oakland Circuit Court

THOMAS J. SHUGAR and KELSEY A. 

SHUGAR,

LC No. 2017-159547-CK

Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellees.

Before: TUKEL, P.J., and JANSEN and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants, Thomas J. Shugar

(Thomas) and Kelsey A. Shugar (Kelsey), summary disposition, and the trial court’s order 

denying plaintiff’s motion for further relief, in this dispute over the ownership of real property. 

We affirm the order granting defendants summary disposition, but reverse the subsequent trial 

court orders only to the extent that they deny plaintiff an opportunity to claim improvements, and 

remand for a hearing under MCR 3.411(F) regarding plaintiff’s claims for improvements made 

to the property. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants summary 

disposition without first taking evidence and making findings of fact under MCR 3.411(D)(1). 

We disagree. Additionally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred after granting defendants 

summary disposition by failing to take evidence and determine whether plaintiff was entitled to 

compensation for the improvements that he made to the real property under MCR 3.411(F). We 

agree.

This matter arises from a dispute over real property located on Buckhorn Drive, in Lake 

Orion, Michigan, owned by defendants. Defendants were good friends with plaintiff and his 

former wife. When defendants decided to move out of the property, according to plaintiff, they 

proposed that plaintiff and his former wife pay monthly installment payments of $2,000 to reside 
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at the property, in exchange for the right of delivery of the deed whenever plaintiff wanted. 

Defendants would convey the property when plaintiff’s monthly payments satisfied the mortgage 

debt that remained on the property. After plaintiff and his former wife divorced, Ruth Warren 

moved into the property with plaintiff, and plaintiff and Warren decided that Warren would also 

share an interest in the property. Together, plaintiff and Warren applied for a mortgage loan to 

satisfy the remaining part of the mortgage payoff balance. The bank required a purchase 

agreement to act on such a loan, so Warren obtained a “real estate sales agreement” online, filled 

in the blanks and the $227,525 purchase price provided by Thomas, and the parties signed the 

letter. However, plaintiff and Warren were later notified by the bank that the letter did not 

satisfy the requirements for the loan. So plaintiff hired an attorney to complete the real estate 

transaction with defendants, and defendants gave plaintiff written notice to quit the premises 

immediately. Plaintiff then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment, specific enforcement, 

specific performance, a constructive trust, and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion for 

summary disposition, which the court granted. Plaintiff later made a claim for the increased 

value of the property based on the improvements that he made. This appeal followed. 

I. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

The trial court properly granted defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims, did 

not err by failing to take evidence or make findings before granting defendants summary 

disposition, and did not abuse its discretion by denying what it deemed to be plaintiff’s motion 

for reconsideration. 

Defendants filed their motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and 

(C)(10). However, the trial court granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(10) only because it determined that there was “no genuine issue of material fact that 

[p]laintiff has no ownership interest in the [p]roperty.” This Court reviews a motion for 

summary disposition de novo. Gorman v American Honda Motor Co, Inc, 302 Mich App 113, 

115; 839 NW2d 223 (2013). This Court reviews only the evidence that was presented at the time 

that the trial court made its decision on the motion. Id. at 120. A motion for summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) challenges the factual sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Id.

at 115. The trial court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Id. Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if “ ‘there is no genuine issue 

regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” 

Id. at 116 (citation omitted). There is a genuine issue of material fact “ ‘when the record, giving 

the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which 

reasonable minds might differ.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). An action to quiet title is an equitable 

matter, MCL 600.2932(5), and equitable matters are reviewed de novo, Beach v Lima Twp, 489 

Mich 99, 106; 802 NW2d 1 (2011). 

The court determined that plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and for other relief 

was essentially a motion for reconsideration. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a 

motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Sanders v McLaren-Macomb, 323 Mich 

App 254, 264; 916 NW2d 305 (2018). “ ‘[A]n abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial 

court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.’ ” Id., quoting 

Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). 
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MCL 600.2932(1) provides:

Any person, whether he is in possession of the land in question or not, who claims 

any right in, title to, equitable title to, interest in, or right to possession of land, 

may bring an action in the circuit courts against any other person who claims or 

might claim any interest inconsistent with the interest claimed by the plaintiff, 

whether the defendant is in possession of the land or not. 

The statute reflects the Legislature’s intent to confer standing on individuals who claim an 

interest in real property, and authorizes suits to determine competing parties’ interests in land. 

Trademark Props of Mich, LLC v Fed Nat’l Mtg Ass’n, 308 Mich App 132, 137-138; 863 NW2d 

344 (2014). MCR 3.411 “applies to actions to determine interests in land under MCL 

600.2932.” MCR 3.411(A). The plaintiff in an action to quiet title bears the burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of title. Boekeloo v Kuschinski, 117 Mich App 619, 628; 324 

NW2d 104 (1982). The plaintiff must allege facts in the complaint that establish the superiority 

of the plaintiff’s claim. MCR 3.411(B)(2)(c). If the plaintiff cannot meet this burden, summary 

disposition is appropriate. Special Prop VI v Woodruff, 273 Mich App 586, 590; 730 NW2d 753 

(2007). “If the plaintiff established his title to the lands, the defendant shall be ordered to release 

to the plaintiff all claims thereto.” MCL 600.2932(3). 

MCR 3.411(D)(1) provides that “[a]fter evidence has been taken, the court shall make 

findings determining the disputed rights in and title to the premises.” Plaintiff relies on this court 

rule to assert that the court should have taken evidence and made findings of fact before 

dismissing his complaint. However, under the circumstances of this case, the court was not 

required to make specific findings of fact because it granted defendants’ motion for summary 

disposition of plaintiff’s complaint. See MCR 2.517(A)(4) (factual findings and legal 

conclusions “are unnecessary in decisions on motions unless findings are required by a particular 

rule.”). The court granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116, which contains no 

specific requirement that it make factual findings or conclusions of law. Therefore, the trial 

court did not err when it failed to take evidence and make findings before granting defendants 

summary disposition.

Thus, to the extent that plaintiff also argues that the court erred in granting defendants 

summary disposition of his quiet title claim based on the merits, the issue before this Court is 

whether plaintiff met his burden of establishing his superior title to the property. MCR 

3.411(B)(2)(c). Plaintiff failed to meet this burden, and the trial court did not err by granting 

defendants summary disposition. MCR 3.411(C)(2) provides that the plaintiff in an action to 

determine interests to land must attach to the complaint “a statement of the title on which the 

pleader relies.” Attached to plaintiff’s complaint was the October 2, 2016 letter, a copy of a 

sticky note upon which Thomas allegedly wrote the remaining payoff balance due on the house, 

and a copy of defendants’ Bank of America mortgage documents upon which Thomas allegedly 

circled the outstanding balance. Although plaintiff argues that he did not assert that he had a 

contractual right to the property based on the letter, and that the trial court erred in relying on the 

letter, plaintiff provided no other written proof of his alleged superior right to title over that of 
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defendants. Plaintiff asserts that the letter was merely a culmination of the conversations and 

acts of the parties throughout the years that demonstrate the parties’ intent to one day transfer 

title to plaintiff.1 

In Michigan, the form of a contract for the sale of land is governed by the statute of 

frauds. Zurcher v Herveat, 238 Mich App 267, 276; 605 NW2d 329 (1999). To survive a 

challenge under the statute of frauds, a contract for the sale of land must “(1) be in writing and 

(2) be signed by the seller or someone lawfully authorized by the seller in writing.” Id. at 277 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The substance of a contract for the sale of land is 

governed by general contract law. Id. at 279. “A contract for the sale of land is, quite simply, a 

purchase agreement.” Id. at 291. “[T]here must be a meeting of the minds regarding the 

‘essential particulars’ of the transaction,” id. at 279, and the material provisions that must be 

included are “the identification of (1) the property, (2) the parties, and (3) the consideration,” id. 

at 290-291. 

Although the October 2, 2016 letter provided a description of the property, the parties, 

and the purchase price, it provided as follows: 

The purpose of this letter is to set forth some of the basic terms and conditions of 

the proposed purchase by the undersigned (the “Buyer”) of certain real estate 

owned by you (the “Seller”). The terms set forth in this Letter will not become 

binding until a more detailed “Purchase Agreement” is negotiated and signed by 

the parties, as contemplated below by the section of this Letter entitled “NonBinding.” 

* * *

9. NON-BINDING. This Letter of Intent does not, and is not intended to, 

contractually bind the parties, and is only an expression of the basic conditions to 

be incorporated into a binding Purchasing Agreement. This Letter of Intent does 

not address all of the essential terms of any potential Purchase Agreement. This 

Letter does not require either party to negotiate in good faith or to proceed to the 

 1 Plaintiff asserts for the first time in his reply brief on appeal that evidence of the parties’ 

previous dealings is not excluded by the parol-evidence rule. Issues raised for the first time in 

appellate reply briefs are untimely. Blazer Foods, Inc v Restaurant Props, Inc, 259 Mich App 

241, 252; 673 NW2d 805 (2003). “Reply briefs may contain only rebuttal argument, and raising 

an issue for the first time in a reply brief is not sufficient to present the issue for appeal.” Id. 

Moreover, the parol-evidence rule provides that “[p]arol evidence of contract negotiations, or of 

prior or contemporaneous agreements that contradict the written contract, is not admissible to 

vary the terms of a contract which is clear and unambiguous.” Schmude Oil Co v Omar 

Operating Co, 184 Mich App 574, 580; 458 NW2d 659 (1990). However, as discussed herein, 

there was no written contract or purchase agreement between the parties, and plaintiff asserts that 

he did not plead that the October 2, 2016 letter was a binding contract, so this argument lacks 

merit. 
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completion of a binding Purchase Agreement. The parties shall not be 

contractually bound unless and until they enter into a formal, written Purchase 

Agreement, which must be in form and content satisfactory to each party and to 

each party’s legal counsel, in their sole discretion. Neither party may rely on this 

Letter as creating any legal obligation of any kind; neither party has taken or will 

take any action in reliance on this non-binding Letter of Intent, whether a contract 

claim, a claim for reliance or estoppel (such as a claim for out-of-pocket expenses 

incurred by a party), or a claim for breach of any obligation to negotiate in good 

faith. 

This letter on its face provides that it is not a binding purchase agreement, and therefore, 

plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing a superior claim to title of the property. MCR 

3.411(B)(2)(c). As such, the trial court did not err when it determined that there was no “genuine 

issue of material fact that [p]laintiff has no ownership interest in the [p]roperty.” Therefore, the 

trial court properly granted defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims. As the court 

was not required to take evidence and make findings of fact before dismissing plaintiff’s claims 

under MCR 2.116, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion to 

amend the complaint and other relief as a motion for reconsideration because plaintiff was not 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his claims. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR IMPROVEMENTS

The trial court committed plain error affecting substantial rights when it failed to follow 

the procedure provided in MCR 3.411(F), and hold a hearing to determine whether plaintiff had 

a right to recover any value corresponding to the improvements that he made to the property.

“Generally, an issue is not properly preserved if it is not raised before, addressed by, or 

decided by the lower court or administrative tribunal.” Gen Motors Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 

290 Mich App 355, 386; 803 NW2d 698 (2010). Plaintiff asserted in his motion to amend the 

complaint and for other relief that he was entitled to recover for the improvements that he made 

to the property. The court denied plaintiff’s motion in its entirety, but did not specifically 

address plaintiff’s claim for improvements. Plaintiff then filed a “Claim under MCL 600.2932 

and MCR 3.411(F)(1) for Improvements Made on Premises” in the trial court. Thereafter, 

defendants filed a motion to enforce the November 8, 2017 opinion and order, plaintiff filed a 

brief in opposition, and the court entered an order maintaining the November 8, 2017 opinion 

and order in full effect. Thus, it does not appear that the trial court ruled on plaintiff’s claims for 

the value of the improvements, or whether he was entitled to a hearing regarding same, and this 

issue is not preserved for appeal. Id. Because this issue is unpreserved on appeal, it is reviewed 

for plain error affecting substantial rights. Lawrence v Mich Unemployment Ins Agency, 320 

Mich App 422, 442; 906 NW2d 482 (2017). “ ‘[A]n error affects substantial rights if it caused 

prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.’ ” Id. at 443 (citation omitted). 

As provided above, MCR 3.411 “applies to actions to determine interests in land under 

MCL 600.2932,” i.e., actions to quiet title. MCR 3.411(A). The complaint to quiet title must 

allege the claimed interests of the various parties. MCR 3.411(B). However, the court rule does 

not require that the complaint include allegations regarding the value of any improvements to the 

property. Rather, MCR 3.411(F)(1) provides that, within twenty-eight days after the finding of 
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title, a party may file a claim against the party found to have title for the amount that the present 

value of the premises has been increased by the improvements made by the party making the 

claim. If such a claim is filed, the court “shall hear evidence” on the value of the improvements 

made on the premises, and the value the premises would have had without the improvements. 

MCR 3.411(F)(2). The court “shall determine” the amount that the premises would have been 

worth at the time of the claim without the improvements and the amount the value increased at 

the time of the claim by the improvements. Id. However, “[t]he party claiming the value of the 

improvements may not recover their value if they were made in bad faith.” MCR 3.411(F)(3).

Thus, the court rule requires that the determination whether a claimant is entitled to 

compensation for the value of improvements to the property be made after the court determines 

the issue of title. MCR 3.411(F)(1). In this case, defendants’ motion for summary disposition 

only addressed the question of title, and the validity of the letter as a purchase agreement. 

Plaintiff asserted a right to recover the amount of the increased value from the improvements in 

his motion to amend the complaint and other relief, and the court denied that motion in its 

entirety. Then plaintiff specifically filed a claim under MCL 600.2932 and MCR 3.411(F)(1) for 

the improvements that he made to the property, and it is unclear whether the order entered by the 

court on February 14, 2018, dealt with plaintiff’s claim because the order maintained the 

November 8, 2017 opinion and order in full effect, and ordered plaintiff to remove the notice of 

lis pendens from the register of deeds.

Regardless, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and 

determined that plaintiff had no property interest. Thereafter, the circuit court erred in failing to 

hold a hearing under MCR 3.411(F) when plaintiff made a claim for the improvements. Plaintiff 

is entitled to this opportunity to present evidence regarding the value of the improvements, as the 

pleadings provided to the lower court do not go into detail regarding what improvements were 

made, and how they increased the value of the property. Plaintiff and Warren provided a total 

amount that they alleged the improvements were worth, and the only “improvement” specified 

was plaintiff’s model train set. Defendants argue on appeal that plaintiff acted in bad faith 

because he did not have an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in the property. The 

applicable test under MCR 3.411(F)(3) is whether the improvements “were made in bad faith.” 

To recover under MCR 3.411, the party found to have title (defendants) has the burden of 

proving that, in making the disputed improvements, the claimant (plaintiff) acted with a lack of 

good faith, i.e., without an honest belief in his right or title. As the trial court failed to hold a 

hearing, this determination was not made. 

Defendants argue on appeal that plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for 

improvements because he was a tenant with no ownership interest. Defendants rely on caselaw 

for the proposition that there must be a specific agreement between the tenant and the lessor for 

reimbursement for improvements. However, the caselaw relied upon by defendants is 

distinguishable from this matter. 

In Leslie v Smith, 32 Mich 64, 65 (1875), a landowner made an agreement with another to 

make improvements to his land in exchange for payment or a deed to some of the land. The 

Michigan Supreme Court provided that, “[u]nder the law of landlord and tenant, the doctrine is 

very clear, that there must be some distinct agreement to entitle a tenant to pay for 

improvements, and such an agreement must have some elements of certainty in it.” Id. at 68. 
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However, the oral nature of the parties’ contract made it unnecessary for the Michigan Supreme 

Court to determine this issue because the violation of the statute of frauds negated the entire 

agreement. Id. Another case relied upon by defendants provided that a building, even in the 

course of construction on leased land, became a part of the land, and belonged to the landlord. 

See Schneider v Bank of Lansing, 337 Mich 646, 651; 60 NW2d 187 (1953). Although plaintiff 

has not specified what improvements were made, there is no indication that plaintiff constructed 

any building on defendants’ property, but rather, plaintiff moved into the home that defendants 

previously resided in. Neither of these cases dealt with a party’s claim for improvements under 

MCR 3.411(F) in a quiet title action. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s November 8, 2017 opinion and order granting defendants 

summary disposition is affirmed, the trial court’s November 21, 2017 opinion and order and 

February 14, 2018 order are reversed to the extent that they deny plaintiff the opportunity to 

claim the value of improvements, and this matter is remanded for a hearing in accordance with 

MCR 3.411(F). We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Jonathan Tukel

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Michael J. Riordan