J-A28042-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CARLOS VALENTINE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1002 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order March 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-46-CR-0003521-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2017

Appellant, Carlos Valentine, appeals from the Order entered in the 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas dismissing as untimely his 

second Petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.1 After careful review, we conclude that Appellant’s 

pro se Petition was untimely and affirm.

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1

 Appellant’s pro se Notice of Appeal erroneously states he is appealing from 

an Order dated January 22, 2017. This Court issued a Rule to Show Cause 

as to why the appeal should not be quashed as it appears to be from a nonexistent order. Appellant responded pro se without explicitly addressing that 

question. It is apparent from his response, however, that Appellant was, in 

fact, appealing from the PCRA Court’s March 7, 2017 Order and that his 

Notice of Appeal filed March 21, 2017, was timely. Accordingly, we decline 

to quash the appeal and we have amended the caption. 
J-A28042-17

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Following a non-jury trial, the court convicted Appellant of Aggravated 

Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Disorderly Conduct and two 

counts each of Simple Assault and Harassment.2 On August 15, 2012, the 

court sentenced him to a term of three-and-a-half to ten years’ 

imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. His Judgment of 

Sentence, thus, became final on September 14, 2012.3

On May 20, 2014, Appellant filed his first PCRA Petition pro se and 

counsel was appointed. On September 10, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed 

the Petition as untimely, and on April 8, 2015, this Court affirmed.

Commonwealth v. Valentine, 2874 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(unpublished memorandum). 

On February 7, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se Writ of Habeas Corpus 

contending his sentence was illegal. The PCRA court properly treated the 

filing as a second PCRA petition4 and, after filing a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice,

dismissed it as untimely. 

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2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1); 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1), respectively.

3 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that a Judgment of Sentence 

becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 

4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (holding “[i]ssues that are cognizable under the PCRA 

must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A28042-17

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This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

(a) Whether the court abused its discretion to convert 

Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad 

subjiciendum into a petition for post-conviction collateral 

relief, when the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 

prohibited such an action by anyone?

(b) Whether the court abused its discretion to convert 

Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad 

subjiciendum into a petition for post-conviction collateral 

relief knowing that relief would be barred specifically by 

the PCRA’s time limitations which relief pursuant to state 

habeas corpus would have been available?

(c) Whether the court erred in dismissing the issue 

questioning the court’s jurisdiction over the subject 

matter; pertaining to a void judgment of sentence order, 

when such a claim is nonwaivable and can be pursued at 

any time?

(d) Can a claim of subject matter jurisdiction or void 

judgment be time barred?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must determine 

whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the underlying PCRA petition. “The 

PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may 

not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

corpus petition. . . . [A] defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by 

titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.”) (footnote omitted).
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timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa. 

2007). “Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the 

PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the 

exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 

1999). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii) (setting forth timeliness 

exceptions).

Here, Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence became final on September

14, 2012. The instant PCRA petition is, thus, facially untimely. Appellant 

did not plead or prove any timeliness exception. Therefore, we lack 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of his Petition. See Copenhefer, 941 

A.2d at 648-49. Accordingly, we affirm the Order of the PCRA court 

dismissing his PCRA petition as untimely.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2017