1

09- 4318- cv H am i l t on v. C i t y o f N ew Y ork UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m, 201 0 (A rgue d: Sep te mb er

28, 201 0 Dec id ed: Dec emb er 3, 2 010) Do cket No . 09 -4 318 -c v

_______________________________ E S TATE O F P AU L ET T E H A MI L T ON , S UB HAS H N A IK , GAMAL H A NNA , and N I VI NE E L S HA R OUN Y , Plainti ffs-Appella nts, v. T HE C I TY O F N E W Y O RK and S CO TT O’ N EI LL ,

Defenda nts-App ellees
.

_________________________________________ B ef or e: J ACO BS , Chi

ef Judge , W

ALKER and C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ges . Appea l from a September 21, 2009 judg ment of the United States Distr ict Court for the So uthern D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Den ny Chin , Judge

) granting summary judgment to defendants on federal and state law cla ims r elating to alleg ed instances of employment discrimination. W e a ffi rm th e j ud gm en t of the Di stri ctC ou rt i n a llre spe ct s, save for i ts di smi ssa l o f pl ain ti ffs’ clai ms un der

New Yor k L abo r

La w § 19 0 et seq . We co nclud e that th e Cit y of New Yor k’s def

ens e that it is no t c ov er ed b y the r elev ant pr ov is io ns of th e New Yor k L abo r

La w mu s t b e af

fi r mat ive ly p lead ed purs uant to Rule 8(c). Therefor e, we vaca te the Distr ict Court’s dismis sal of plaintiffs ’ New Y ork Labor Law cla ims, and remand for consideration of whether it would be appropriate to construe def end ant s ’ m ot

io n f or s um mar y ju dgm ent

as a mo ti onto ame ndth e ans wer to as s er t anaf

fi r mat ive def ens e f or th e f ir s t t im e.H a m il to n d ied o n F e b ru a ry 1 , 2 0 0 7
. H e r e state w a s su b sti tu ted as a p lain ti ff b y the D ist ric t C o u rt. 1 2

B AR R Y D. H AB ERM AN , N ew Cit y, N Y, for Plaintiffs-App ellants
. R ONA L D E. S TERNBERG , (Michael A . Ca rdozo, Corporation Counsel of th e Cit y of New Yor k, a ndLe on ar d Koerner andChr is to ph er A. Seac or d, of counsel

), New Yor k, N Y, for Defendants-Ap pellees.

P ER C URI AM : Plaintiffs -appella nts Gamal Hanna, Nivine E lsharouny, Subhash Naik, a nd the Estate of Paulette Hamil ton appea l from a judgment of the United States Distr ict Court for the Southern 1 Di s tr ict of New Yor k ( Den ny Chin , Judge

), di smi ssin g, wi th p re ju di ce , t he ir c om pl ain t a ga in st defendants-appelle es Scott O’Neill and the C ity of New York. Plai ntiffs brought s uit for employment di s cr imin ati onun der

Tit le VI I of th e Civ il Right s Act

of 196 4 ( “Tit

le VI I ”) , 42 U.S .C. § 200 0e et seq. ;
un der 42 U .S. C. § 1 983 (“ § 19 83”); un der th e New Yor k St ate Hu manRigh ts La w, N .Y. Exec . L aw § 290 et seq. ; an d u nd er

th e New Yor k Cit

y Hu manRigh ts La

w, N .Y. Cit

y Ad mi n. Cod e § 8- 101 et seq . Ad di ti on a ll y, pl ain ti ffs a dv a nc ed cl aim s tha t th ey (1 ) suf fe re d re ta li a ti on for f

ilin g d isc rim in a ti on cl aim s, (2) were deprived of due process of law in viola tion of § 1983, and (3) we re denied w age s that were
owe d t o theminvio lat

io n o f N ew Yo r k L abo r

La w § 19 0 et seq. (“ La bo r Law” cl aim s)
. T he D is tr ict Cou r t h eldth at p lai nt

if fs hadaban do nedth eir

du e pr oce s s andr et ali ati onclai ms . Fu r th er mo r e, the Co ur t gr ant ed s um mar y ju dgm ent

to def end ant s onth e s tat e andfe der al di scrim in a ti on cl aim s a s we lla s the La bo r Law c la im s. O n a pp ea l, pl ain ti ffs c ha ll en ge a llof t he se
r ul ings , ex cep ti ng the r et ali ati onclai m, as well as cer tai n ev

id ent iar y de cis io ns mad e by

th e co ur t b elo w. We af fi r m the D is tr

ict Cou r t i n all r es pec ts s ave f or it s di s mi s s al o f p lai nt

if fs ’ L abo r La w claim s ; we remand for consideration of whether it would be appropriate to construe defendants’ motion for3

s um mar y ju dgm ent

as a mo ti onto ame ndth e ans wer to as s er t anaf

fi r mat ive def ens e f or th e f ir s t t im e. BAC KGROUND Plaintiffs are current or former employee s of the Controlled Substance Analy sis Section of the New Y ork City Police Department Crime Laboratory (“crime la b”). All four were born abroad: Ha nna and El sharouny in Egypt, Na ik in India, a nd Hamilton in Jamaic a. Al most all employee s in the crime lab a re “Criminali sts ,” ranging i n assignment levels from I -IV. Generally, a ll supervisor y duties are
s up po s ed t o b e pe r fo r medby Cr imin ali s ts I V. Despite being only

Criminalists II I, plaintiffs all w ere give n supervis ory respons ibilities for a subs tantial pe riod of time. Although these increased responsibilities were not accompa nied by improved salary, bene fits , or formal title, plaintiffs were referred to as Criminalists I II- Supervisor within the crime la b. I n 2 005 , t wo n ew Cr

imin ali s t IV po s it

io ns wer e cr eat ed w

ithi n the Co ntr olledSu bs tan ce section. Defendant O’Neil l, who wa s the immediate supervisor of that section, was tasked with filling th es e vac anci es . I n acc or dan ce wi thth e cu s to m an d p r act ice o f the c r

im e lab , n o ge ner al
announce ment was made to a dvertise these vacanc ies and O’Neill di d not conduct any interviews. In his affidavit, O’Neill cl aimed tha t his top choice for the job was Vito Ca sella—an Italia n-born Cr imin ali s t I I I -S up er

vis or —b ut th at Ca s ell a hadtu r nedhi m d own . I ns te ad, O’ Neill hir ed M atthew J oh ns onandT ho mas Hi ckey , the o nly t wo whi te , Am er

ican -b orn m ales of

th e s evenin di

vid ual s th en holding the (informal, but apparently well e stablished) designation of Criminalist II I-Supervis or, despite th e f act th at all f ou r pl ain ti ff s hadcon s id er ably lo nge r

te nu r es as emp lo yees of

th e cr im e lab
. Following the a scension of J ohnson and Hickey , there remained only five people holding the position of Criminalist I II- Supervisor in the crime lab—the four plaintiffs and C asella. With Johnson andHi ckey

no w f ill ing f ormal s up er vis or y r ol es , O ’N eill co nclud ed that it was app r op r

iat e andfe as ib leP la in tiff s n o w c la im e d th a t th e y h a d b e e n d isc r im in a te d a g a in st o n th e b a sis o f th e ir r a c e a n d n a tio n a l o r ig in
. 2 H a m ilto n a n d E lsh a r o u n y c la im e d th a t th e y w e r e d isc r im in a te d a g a in st o n th e b a sis o f s e x a s w e ll. 4 to eli mi nat e the p os it

io n o f Cr imin ali s t I I I -S up er

vis or alt oge th er

s o that all s up er vis or y f un ct io ns would be p er fo r medby Cr

imin ali s ts I V only, as hadbee n o r igi nally i nt end ed. Pl ain ti ff s wer e in fo r medth at th ey wer e be ing r eli evedof th eir s up er vis or y f un ct io ns , b ut th eir s alar y, b ene fi ts , an d f

ormal ti tl e remained unc hange d. Sh or tly af te r th es e eve nt s , p lai nt

if fs fileda com pl ain t w

ith the N ew Yo r k P ol

ice D epar tm ent ’s Office of Equal E mployment Opportunity (“OEEO”) cla iming that they ha d been de nied promotions on the basis of their national origin. This clai m was investigated a nd ultimately de termined to be witho ut mer it du e t o the f

act th at J oh ns onandHi ckey

wer e f ou ndto hav e hadgen er ally be tt er perform ance eval uations than eac h of the plaintiffs. I n 2006, pla intiffs filed cha rges of employment discrimination with the Equa l Employme nt Opportunity Commission (“EEOC ”). Contrary to the 2 OEEO , the EE OC f

ou ndat l eas t that

th er e was r eas onto bel

iev e a vi ol ati onhadocc urr ed. Plaintiffs filed a c omplaint in NewYork state court in August 2006. The case wa s r emoved to fe der al co ur t, andpl ain ti ff s tw ice a men dedth eir

com pl ain t, mo s t r ecen tly inOct ob er 200 7. While this
cas e was bef

or e the D is tr

ict Cou r t, ano th er

Cr imin ali s t IV po s it

io n b ecam e availab le i n the Co ntr olled Substances section of the crime lab. By this time, O’Neill, who ha d since been promoted to be Deputy Di r ect or of th e cr im e lab , h ad d ecid ed t o adver ti s e vac anci es in te r nally an d co nd uct fo r mal in te r views of all app lic ant s . P lai nt

if fs Han na, Els har ou ny, andNai k all ap pl iedfo r this po s it io n, bu t n on e of

th em
s cor ed w ell

eno ughdu r

ing the i ni ti al i nt er

view t o advan ce t o the s eco ndr ou ndof in te r views . T her eaf te r , a whit e, Am er

ican -b orn m ale w as s elec te d f or this pr om ot

io n, as well
. Def end ant s mo vedfo r

s um mar y ju dgm ent

onall clai ms inNo vem ber

200 8, a ndth e Di s tr

ict Court dismis sed plaintiffs’ complaint on that basis in September 2009. This appeal followe d.W e no t e t hat our an al ys i s m i gh t ha ve b een di ff er ent i n a di s par at e- i m pac t cl ai m under Ti t l e VI I
. I n t hat 3 s i t uat i on, a pl ai nt i ff

m ay be r equi r ed t o es t abl i s h t hat t her e was an equal l y va l i d and l es s di s cr i m i nat or y m et hod of e v a lu a tio n th a t th e d e fe n d a n t-e m p lo y e r re fu se d to u se . S ee 4 2 U .S .C . § 2 0 0 0 e -2 (k )(1 )(A ). B e c a u se R u le 4 0 7 e x p lic itly pe rm i t s ev i d en ce of su bse q u en t rem ed i al m ea su res t o b e a d m i t t ed t o p rov e the feasibi l i t y o f pre ca u t i on ary pra cti ce s, O ’N e ill’ s c h a lle n g e d sta te m e n t m ig h t h a v e b e e n a d m iss ib le in a d isp a r a te -im p a c t c o n te x t. S e eA da m s v. C ity of C hicago , 469 F
. 3 d 6 0 9 , 6 1 2 (7th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ). 5 DISCUSSI ON A. Evidentia ry iss

ues B ef or e co ns id er

ing the m er

it s of pl ain ti ff s ’ cl aim s , we m us t f

ir s t c on s id er

what evi den ce was pr op erly b ef

or e the D is tr

ict Cou r t at th e s um mar

y ju dgm ent

s tag e. Spi

eg el v. S chulmann , 60 4 F .3d72, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (“It is well established that, in determining the a ppropriateness of a grant of summ ary judgment, [this court], like the distr ict court in awa rding summary judgment, may rely onl y on admissible evidenc e.” (quotation marks omitted)). Here, plaintiffs argue that the Distr ict Court
er r on eou s ly ex clu dedvar

io us it ems of

evi den ce. E ach o f thes e ch all eng es is witho ut mer it
. Fi r s t, we h ol d that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t c orr ect

ly ex clu dedpl ain ti ff

s ’ p r of fe r of O’ Neill’ s statement that, following the cha llenge d promotions , “mana gerial staff determined that involving more in di vid ual s inth e pr om ot

io n p r oce s s might

help p r even t u ns ucc es s ful can di dat es fr omfe eli ng a s if th ey were unfairly pa ss ed over for prom otion.” Such a statement plainly runs afoul of Rule 40 7 of the Federal Rules of Evidence , which g enerally prohibits a pla intiff f

rom intr oducing e vidence of subs equent remedia l measures taken by the de fendant in order to establish the defenda nt’s underlying lia bilit y. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc. , 383 F.3d 580, 58 5 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing that there is no r eason to limit applic ation of this rule to nonintentional torts). 3 Nex t, pl ain ti ff

s com pl ainth at they

s ho ul d h ave b eenpermi tt ed t o i ntr od uce a s tat eme nt giv en to th e OE EO b y P et er

Pi zzo la, O’ Neill’ s bo s s , inwhi ch P izzo la as s er te d that O’ Neill h ad t ol d him Cas ell a was no t “ s up er

vis or y ma te r ial .” T hi s hear s ay s tat eme nt was r igh tly exc lu dedfr omevi den ce as itI n t hei r r epl y br i ef , pl ai nt i ffs f

or t he f i r s t t i m e a r gue t hat Pi z z ol a’ s s t at em ent i s not hea r s ay at al l s i nce i t was 4 m a d e c o n c e r n in g a m a tte r w ith in th e sc o p e o f P izz o la ’s e m p lo y m e n t. S ee F e d . R . E v id . 8 0 1 (d )(2 )(D ). B e c a u se th is a r g u m e n t w a s n o t a d v a n c e d b e fo r e th e D istr ic t C o u r t o r in p la in tiff s’ o p e n in g b r ie f, w e c o n sid e r it fo r fe ite d
. Pr e s ide n t i al G a rd ens A sso cs. v. U nite d

S tates , 1 7 5 F
. 3 d 1 3 2 , 1 4 1 (2d C ir. 1 9 9 9 ). 6 is n ot su bj ec t to a ny

of t he he a rsa y e xc ep ti on s ci te d b y p la in ti ffs. 4 Pl ain ti ff s als o ch all eng e the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s r ef

us al t o co ns id er

th e EEO C’s det er mi nat

io ns th at all fo ur pl ain ti ff s hadbee n dis cr

imin ate d ag ain s t b as ed o n n ati on al o r igi n. T he c as e law

of ou r cir cui t i s clea r th at the d ecis io n t o co ns id er EEOC f in di ngs is lef

t t o the “ s ou nddi s cr et

io n” o f the dis tr

ict cou r t. Paolitto v. B rown E.&C. , Inc. , 15 1 F .3d60, 65 ( 2dCir . 19 98) . I n i ts op inio n, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t c ar ef

ully exp lai nedit s dec is io n t o ex clu de the EE OC’ s det er mi nat io ns onth e gr ou nd s th at thes e f in di ngs (a)
we re co nc lu sory , a nd (b) fail ed to a dd re ss the de fe nd a nts’ stro ng estevid en ce re ga rdi ng pl ain ti ffs’ inferior perf

ormance ev alua tions. Defendants are unable to demonstrate any e rror on the part of the Di s tr ict Cou r t, mu ch l es s an “ abu s e of di s cr et io n. ” See generally Sims v. Blot , 534 F.3d 117, 13 2 (2d Cir. 200 8) (“ A di s tr

ict cou r t h as abu s e[d

] i ts di s cr et

io n i f i t b as ed i ts r ul

ing onan err on eou s view of th e law
or ona cle arly err on eou s as s es s men t o f the e vid enc e, o r r end er ed a d ecis io n that

cann ot be l ocat ed within the range of permis sible decisions.” (quotation marks omitt ed)). Fi nally, ins epar ate af

fi dav it s , thr ee o f the p lai nt

if fs all ege that

O’ Neill t ol d themth at h e wan te d to “chang e the face ” of the Criminalist III -Supervisor position. T he District Court declined to consider this evidence be cause, in thei r prior deposition testimony, all three plaintiffs answered in the neg ati ve wh en as kedif

O’ Neill, or

any o th er emp lo yee o f the N ew Yo r k P ol ice D epar tm ent , h ad ev er mad e any com men ts to th em that

couldbe i nt erpr et ed as di s cr imin ato ry. Give n thi s di r ect
con tr adi ct io n, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t w as r

igh t n ot to giv e weight

to th e lat er

af fi dav it s . Mack v. United States, 81 4 F .2d120 , 12 4 (

2dCir . 19 87) (“ I t i s well

s et tl ed i n thi s cir cui t that

a par ty ’s af

fi dav it whi ch contradicts his own prior

deposition testimony s hould be disregarded on a motion for summary7

judgment.”).

B. Dis cr imin ati o n cl aims We turn now to the discrimination cla ims at the heart of plaintiffs ’ case a nd appea l. The Di s tr ict Cou r t gr ant ed s um mar

y ju dgm ent

to def end ant s onpl ain ti ff

s ’ cl aim s th at they

hadbee n discriminated aga inst in violation of Title VII and § 19 83; as wel l as in violation of the NewYork State Hu manRigh ts La

w, N .Y. Exec . L aw § 2 90 et seq. ; an d the N ew Yo r k Cit y Hu manRigh ts La

w, N .Y. Cit y Ad mi n. Cod e § 8- 101 et

seq. “We review a distr

ict court’s grant of s ummary judgment de novo , dr awing all

in fe r enc es infa

vo r of th e no nm ov

ing pa r ty .” Ruiz v

. Co unt y o f Ro ck land , 60 9 F .3d486 , 49 1 (2 d Ci r . 20 10)
. “Our consideration of claims brought under the state and ci ty human rights laws parallel s the anal ys is us ed i n Tit

le VI I clai ms .” Cruz

v. Coach Stores, Inc. , 20 2 F .3d560 , 56 5 n .1 ( 2dCir . 20 00)
. Pl ain ti ff s as s er t that

th ey wer e di s cr

imin ate d ag ain s t i n t

wo dis ti nct

ways : f ir s t, th ey wer e pas s ed o ver fo r pr om ot io n t o the Cr

imin ali s t IV po s it

io ns ; s eco nd , they

wer e “d emo te d” t o Cr

imin ali s t I I I af

te r having he ld the title of Criminalist III -Supervisor . We consider the failure to promote and demotion clai ms in turn. (1) Failure to promote In order to establish a prima facie c ase of a discriminatory failure to promote, a Title VII plaintiff ordinarily must demons trate that: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) s he appli ed and was qualifie d for a job for which the e mployer wa s s eeking applic ants; (3) s he wa s r ejec ted for the position; and (4) the position r emaine d open and the e mployer continued to seek a pplica nts having the pl ain ti ff ’s qu ali fi cat

io ns .” Petr

o si no v. B el l A tl
. , 385 F.3d 210, 22 6 (2d Cir. 2004) (referencing Mc Do nnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 7 92, 802 (1973)) (quotation marks omitted). For sake of the argument,P la in tiff s v ig o r o u sly c o n te st th is p o in t o n th e b a sis o f P izz o la ’s in a d m iss ib le h e a r sa y te stim o n y a b o u t O ’N e ill’ s 5 com m ent t o hi m t hat C as el l a was not “ s uper vi s or y m at er i al
. ” I nas m uch a s t hi s s t at em ent was deem ed i nadm i s s i bl e a nd t ha t Pi z z ol a l a t er t es t i f

i ed dur i ng h i s de po s i t i on t ha t h e ha d “ m i s s po ke n, ” t he D i s t r i ct Cour t p r op er l y a cc ep t ed a s t r ue O ’N e ill’ s s ta te m e n t th a t C a se lla w a s h is f irs t c h o ic e fo r p r o m o tio n . In d e e d , C a se lla h im se lf a c k n o w le d g e d th a t O ’N e ill h a d o ffe r e d h im th e p r o m o tio n .

P la in tiff N a ik w a s a n u n su c c e ss fu l a p p lic a n t fo r tw o o th e r p r o m o tio n s in o th e r se c tio n s o f th e c r im e la b
. 6 T h e r e to o , d e fe n d a n ts c la im th a t h e w a s p a ss e d o v e r o n th e b a sis o f h is p o o r p e r fo r m a n c e in th e fir st- r o u n d in te r v ie w . 8 we a ss ume, as did the District Court, that plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of discrimination on th e bas is of

r ace, nat io nal or igi n, ands ex. Under the familiar burden-shift ing framework set for th by the Supreme C ourt in Mc Do nnell Do ug las , after a prima facie instance of discrimination has been ide ntified, the burden shifts to the emp lo yer “t o ar ti cul ate s om e leg

it im ate , n on di s cr

imin ato ry r eas onfo r

th e em pl oye e’s r ejec ti on .” Mc Do nnell D o ug

las , 41 1 U. S. a t 8 02. Def

end ant s po in t t o n um er ou s , le git im ate fa ct or s s up po r ti ng thei r promotion decisions. Regarding the two promotions made in 2005, defendants note that the candid ate s who wer e pr om ot ed t o Cr imin ali s t IV po s it

io ns hadunif

orml y be tt er per fo r man ce eval uations than the plaintiffs. In addition, O’Neill’s firs t choice for promotion was Vito Casella , who
was bo r n i n I tal

y, thu s cas ti ng s ignif

ican t d ou bt

onpl ain ti ff

s ’ im pl ici t c lai ms th at O ’N eill was pre ju di ce d a ga in st fo re ign-b orn in divi du a ls. 5 As for the subs equent promotion made in 2007 , defendants state that the plaintiffs did not f are 6 well during the rele vant interview s. Defendants also point out that O’Neill himself wa s born outside the United States (he wa s born in Scotland), a nd furthermore, prior to 2005, allseven Criminalists IV
wor king inth e Con tr olledSu bs tan ces s ect io n h ad b eenbo r n o ut s id e of th e Unit ed S tat es . Because the defenda nts have proff ered a va lid reason for their promotion determinations, “the question in adjudica ting the defenda nts’ mot ion for s ummary judgment bec omes simply whether the evidenc e in pla intiff[s ’] favor, when vie wed in the light most f avorable to the plaintiff[s] , is suf ficient to
sus tain a rea sonable finding that [the adv erse employment dec ision] was motivated at lea st in partPl ai nt i ffs al s o a r gue t hat t hey had m or e ex per i ence t han t he c andi dat es pr om ot ed ahe ad of t hem
. Exper i ence , 7 however , i s not a s ubs t i t ut e f or per f or m anc e, an d defe ndant s ha d ever y r i gh t t o pl ace g r eat er em pha s i s on t he p e r fo r m a n c e e v a lu a tio n s o f th e c a n d id a te s f o r p r o m o tio n . S e eB

yrniev. Town of

C ro m w e l l B d. of E duc. , 243 F. 3d 93, 103 ( 2d C i r . 2001 ) ( “‘ O ur r ol e i s t o pr even t unl awful hi r i ng pr act i ces , not t o a ct as a ‘ s uper per s onne l depar t m ent ’ t hat s econ d gue s s es em pl oyers’ busi ness j ud gm ent s . ’ ” ( qu ot i ng S im m s v. O k l a . ex rel
. D ep’t of M enta l H ealth & S ub stan ce A b use S ervs. , 165 F
. 3 d 1 3 2 1 , 1 3 3 0 (10 th C ir. 1 9 9 9 )))
. 9 by . . . dis cr

imin ati on .” T

o mass i v . I ns ig nia F in. Gr p. , 478 F.3d 111, 11 4 (2d Cir. 2007). Plai ntiffs are
s im ply un abl e t o m eet

this bu r den . F or

exam pl e, they

fo cus onth e s up po s ed dis pu te ov er whe th er Cas ell a was r eally of

fe r ed a Cr imin ali s t IV po s it

io n. B ut evenas s uming (

whi ch w e do no t, see no te 5, ante ) that Cas ell a was no t O ’N eill’s fi r s t c ho ice, def end ant s ’ b as ic ar

gum ent —that pl ain ti ff s wer e no t as qu ali fi ed as th os e s elec te d f or pr om ot io n—r emain s un challenged
. Pl ain ti ff s po in t t o n o ev

id enc e 7 in di cat ing that th e r elev ant

per fo r man ce ev alu ati on s wer e bi as ed o r manif es tly in accu r ate . Acc or di ngl y, we agr ee wi thth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t that

pl ain ti ff s ’ dis cr imin ati onclai ms bas ed o n thei r failu r e t o r ecei

ve pr om ot io ns cann ot

s ur viv e s um mar

y ju dgm ent . (2) Demotion Pl ain ti ff s als o ar gue th at they

wer e im pr op erly dis cr

imin ate d ag ain s t whenth ey wer e all egedly dem ot ed i n 2 005 . Sp ecif

ically, fo llo wing the p r om ot io n o f H ick ey an d J oh ns on , the r emaining f ive Criminalist III -Supervisor s—the four plaintiffs and Casella—were relie ved of their supervis ory respons ibilities. We aga in assume, for purpos es of our McDonnell Douglas a na ly sis, tha t th is re pre sen ts a prima facie c ase of discrimination. O’ Neill j us ti fi ed thes e “d emo ti on s ” by ob s er ving that af te r Hi ckey andJ oh ns onhadbee n promoted to Criminalist I V, the crime la b no longer neede d Criminalist III s to perf orm s upervisory duties—a supervisor

y arrangeme nt that O’Neill dee med to be “ina ppropriate.” Defendants also note that Ca sella had hi s s upervisory duties r evoked a s well, and he had bee n O’Neill’s firs t choice for promotion—in other wor ds, the plaintiffs were not specifica lly targete d. Once a gain, pl aintiffs have failed to ide ntify suf ficient evide nce in the rec ord to s ustain aH avi ng af f i r m ed t he D i s t r i ct C our t ’ s di s m i s s al of pl ai nt i ffs ’ di s cr i m i nat i on c l ai m s , we m us t al s o a ff i r m t he 8 d ism iss a l o f p la in tiff s’ d e r iv a tiv e § 1 9 8 3 c la im s a g a in st O ’N e ill an d th e C ity o f N e w Y o r k
. 10 r eas on abl e f

in di ng that

this adv er s e em pl oym ent

act io n was mo ti

vat ed, at l eas t i n p ar t, by i mp r op er discrimination. The plaintiffs m ake the indisputable point that, following the demotions, there were fewer s up er vis or s inth e cr

im e lab , b ut

th ey p ut fo r war d n o ev

id enc e s ugg es ti ng that

addit io nal
s up er vis or s wer e ne ede d af

te r Hi ckey andJ oh ns onas s um ed thei r po s it io ns as Cr imin ali s ts I V. Plaintiffs also argue that the secrec y surr ounding the dec ision to eliminate the C riminalist II ISu per vis or po s it io n i s in di cat

ive of def end ant s ’ dis cr

imin ato ry in te nt . Su ch a c lai m, witho ut mo r e, i s fa r too speculative to a llow pla intiffs to sur vive summary judgment. 8 C. Labo r Law

cl aim s Plaintiffs argue that the District Court improper ly granted de fendants sum mary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim that they w ere not properly compensated for the work that they had pe rformed on beh alf of th e Cit y. See N. Y. L abo r

La w § 19 0 et seq. The Di stri ctC ou rt ru le d fo r de fe nd a nts b ec a use New Yor k L abo r

La w § 19 0( 3) pr ov

id es th at “ [t

]h e t er m ‘ emp lo yer ’ s hall n ot in clu de a g ov er nm ent al age ncy,” and the NewYork Police Depa rtment clearly is a gove rnmental age ncy. Pla intiffs do not
con te s t thi s po in t; r ath er , they mai nt ainth at thi s def

ens e was un availab le t o d ef end ant s bec aus e it

was
no t af fi r mat ive ly p lead ed u nd er

Rul e 8(c) of

th e F ede r al Rules of

Civil P r oce du r e. Rule 8(c) identifies nineteen sepa rate affirmative defenses, but this list is not exhaustive, a nd

cou r ts hav e s trugg

ledwith i den ti fy

ing pr ecis ely what

els e co ns ti tu te s an “ avo id ance or af fi r mat ive def ens e.” See 5 Ch arles AlanWr igh t &Ar th ur

R. Mill er , Federal Practice and Procedure § 1278 (3d e d. 200 4) . Un der

ou r cir cui t p r eced ent , wh en a d ef end ant s eeks to r ais e a po in t ab ou t s om ethi ng that “is not an ele ment which the pl aintiff must establish to make out a prima faci e showing of liability,” he
mu s t p leadit

as an af fi r mat ive def ens e. See U.S. ex rel. Maritime Admi n. v. Cont’l Ill. Na t’l Bank & Trust11

Co. , 8 89 F.2 d 1 24 8, 12 53 (2 d C ir. 19 89 ). In N ewY ork , “ [i ]t i s awe ll -se ttl ed rul e . . . tha t a pa rty ha s a right to s ue on any

cause of ac tion which he holds, and any statutory exce ption to that right mus t be di s ti nct ly ex pr es s ed. ” Saxe v. Peck , 12 4 N .Y. S. 1 4, 1 5 ( App . D iv. 3dDep ’t

191 0) . T he ques ti onth en i s wh et he r th e l a ngua ge in § 1 90 (3 ) c on sti tut es a “st a tut ory ex ce pti on ”: pl ain ti ffs ma in ta in tha t i t do es, while d ef end ant s in s is t that

th e s tatut e it s elf

is in app lic abl e t o all go vernm ent ent it ies . We thi nk

th at pl ain ti ff s hav e the b et te r

of this argum ent . Al th ough n ot fo r mally s ty

ledas an “ exce pt

io n, ” § 1 90(3)
un do ub te dly f

un ct io ns as on e by

car ving ou t g ov er nm ent al ag enc ies fr omth e r eachof th e s tatut e. While a p lai nt

if f m aki ng aLa bo r

La w claims ur ely h as th e bu r dento dem on s tr ate th at the d ef end ant is an “ emp lo yer ,” w e ar e no t c onvin cedth at the p lai nt if f m us t al s o, inall

cas es , af fi r mat ive ly alleg e that the de fe nd a nt i n que sti on is not a “go vernm ent al ag enc y.” Our holding is consis tent with federal ca se law interpreting similar provisions in Title VII and th e F air La bo r St and ar ds Act

(“ FL SA”), 29 U .S. C. § 2 01 et seq. For i nsta nc e, Title VI I sta te s: The term ‘employee’ me ans an individua l employe d by an e mployer, exc ept that the term ‘em pl oye e’ s hall n ot

in clu de any pe r s onelec te d t o p ub lic of fi ce inany S tat e or

po lit ical subdivision of

any Sta te by the qua lified voters thereof, or any pe rs on chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s pers onal staff, or an appointee on the poli cy ma king lev el or an immedia te adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal pow ers of the office. The exem pt io n s et fo r thinth e pr eceding s ent enc e s hall n ot in clu de e mp lo yees s ub ject to th e civ il s er vic e law s of

a St ate gov er nm ent , go vernm ent al ag enc y or po lit ical s ub di vis io n. With r es pec t to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individua l who is a citiz en of the Unit ed S tat es . 42 U .S. C. § 2 000 e( f) . P er s on al s taf f o f apu bl

ic o ff icer ar e exp r es s ly ex clu dedfr omTit le VI I ’s def init io n o f “ emp lo yee, ” yet

th e F if thCir cui t h as hel d that

this “ex cep ti on ” m us t b e af fi r mat ive ly pl eade d u nd er

Rul e 8(c)
. See Oden v. Oktibb eha C ounty , 246 F.3d 458, 46 6-67 (5th Cir. 2001). Courts hav e r each ed i den ti cal c on clu s io ns incas es invo lvi ng s imila r “ex emp ti on s ” in clu dedinth e F LS A. See, e.g. , Brennan v. Valley Towing Co. , 515 F.2d 100, 10 4 (9th Cir. 1975). Ac cordingly, w e hold that the def ens e that § 19 0( 3) s hi eld s def

end ant s fr omlia bilit

y mu s t b e af

fi r mat ive ly p lead ed p ur s uan t t o Rule12

8( c)
. Def

end ant s ’ f ail ur e inthis r egar d i s fa r

fr omfa tal , h owe ver . “[

A] dis tr ict cou r t m ay s till entertain affirmative defenses at the summary judgment stage in the a bsence of undue prejudice to the plaintiff, bad faith or dilatory motive on the pa rt of the defendant, futility, or undue de lay of the pr oce edi ngs .” Saks v. Franklin C ove y Co. , 31 6 F .3d

337 , 35 0 (

2dCir . 20 03) . P lai nt

if fs hav e no t i den ti fi ed any r eas onwhy , o n r ema nd , the D is tr ict Cou r t s ho ul d n ot

all ow d ef end ant s to r ais e thei r

clea r
ex em pti on a s a n a ffi rma tive de fe nse a nd we ca nn ot t hi nk of a ny . N ev er the le ss, i f suc h a re a son ex ist s, plaintiffs deser

ve an opportunity to present their case to the Distr ict Court as it inevitably

considers whether it would be appropriate to construe defendants’ motion f or s ummary judgment as a motion to
ame ndth eir

ans wer .

CONCLUSI ON Ac co rdi ng

ly , t he ju dgme nt o f th e D ist ric t C ou rt i s AFFIRMED in all respects, save for the Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s di s mi s s al o f p lai nt if fs ’ cl aim s un der

New Yor k L abo r

La w § 19 0 et seq ., whi ch i s VACAT ED
. The ca use is REMA

NDED to the Distr

ict Court for pr ocee dings consist ent with this opinion.