alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the *

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1.

F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 6, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

KINNEY FITZGERALD RUSSELL,

Petitioner-Appellant, No. 06-3394

v. (D. Kansas)

JAMES W. HARRISON, JR.,

Commandant, United States

Disciplinary Barracks,

Respondent-Appellee.

(D.C. No. 06-CV-3126-RDR)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

Before KELLY, MURPHY, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Kinney F. Russell, a military prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the

district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. The
Because Russell is a federal prisoner proceeding under § 2241, he need not 1

obtain a certificate of appealability as a prerequisite to this court reaching the

merits of his appeal. McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm., 115 F.3d 809, 810

n.1 (10th Cir. 1997).

-2-

district court dismissed Russell’s § 2241 petition without prejudice because

Russell had not exhausted his military remedies. See Schlesinger v. Councilman,

420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,1

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Russell does not contend he has exhausted his military remedies. Instead,

he contends the military lost jurisdiction to hold him when he was dishonorably

discharged from the military. Concomitantly, Russell argues that because he is no

longer an active member of the military, the military courts are barred from

reviewing, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the propriety of his

incarceration. As noted by the district court, however, both the Supreme Court

and this court have held that a complete discharge does not deprive the military of

jurisdiction over individuals similarly situated to Russell. Kahn v. Anderson, 255

U.S. 1, 8-9 (1920); Ricks v. Nickels, 295 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002). Thus,

Russell is simply wrong in asserting he cannot exhaust his military remedies

because the military courts no longer have jurisdiction over him and the district

court was correct in dismissing Russell’s § 2241 petition without prejudice based

on Russell’s failure to exhaust.
-3-

The order of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is

hereby AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge
EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A,
Amendment No. 2 of Charys Holding Company, Inc. for the fiscal year ending April
30, 2006, I, Raymond J. Smith, Chief Financial Officer of Charys Holding
Company, Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my
knowledge and belief, that:

     1.     Such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A, Amendment No. 2 for the fiscal
year ending April 30, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.     The information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A,
Amendment No. 2 for the fiscal year ending April 30, 2006, fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
Charys Holding Company, Inc.

     Dated: September 22, 2006.

                                   /s/  Raymond J. Smith
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                                   Raymond J. Smith, Chief Financial Officer of
                                   Charys Holding Company, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7108

WILLIAM CLAYTON MCKINNEDY, III, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus
GARY D. MAYNARD; JIM HODGES, Governor of South Carolina; CHARLES MOLONY CONDON, Attorney General; KENNETH MCKELLAR, Director of Security; MR. MCKIE, General Counsel; ROBERT WARD; RICKIE HARRISON, Warden; ROBERT E. PETERSEN; BEN MONTGOMERY; MR. MIRO, Warden; DONALD DEASE; RICHARD P. STROKER; J VICENT BARTON; CRYSTAL ROCKARD; MARY DAVENPORT; DAVID TATARSKY; PATRICIA RAINEY; JAMES SIMMONS, III; TRACI BRAXELY, Grievance Branch; CALVIN ANTHONY; DAVID DUNLAP; DAVID NELSON; ROBERT MURRAY, Captain; SINGLETARY, NFN; SOLOMON SANYO; MR. ROBINSON; MR. MILLER; MR. JERNIGAN; MR. BROGDAN; MR. SEWARD; MR. WALTZ; REGGIE BOWERS; MR. FIERSON; MR. REDFERN; DAVIS HARMON; SARGEANT CUSTODIO; SARGEANT COMER; SARGEANT ROBERTSON; OFFICER MACKEY; MR. GALLAWAY; OFFICER CUTLIP; MR. BURRELL; MR. GARY; MR. CLYBURN; MR. ALLEN; MR. GOODWIN; JOHN LANE; MR. MCCOWAN; MR. NEADLE; MR. WEST; DEBRA WISE; OFFICER MITCHELL; MR. WOODLIEF; MR. FLEMING; C. A. BALKCUM; MR. MEDLOCK; MR. LONG; MR. HARDIN; MR. NELSON; MR. STEEN; MR. ROBINSON; MR. ARMSTRONG; MICHAEL R. MATHEWS; NATHANIEL HUGHES, SCDC; J. L. GOWAN, Doctor; MR. MCKINNEY; MR. COOKE; SENYA L. ADAMS; MR. PHILIPS; MR. GARDNER; MR. ANDERSON; RAY N. STEVENS; CAROLYN MATTHEWS; JUDY C. ANDERSON;2 JOHN ADAMS; KELLI G. MADDOX; MR. SUTTENS; OFFICER WILSON, Correctional Officer, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge. (CA-02-4027-6-20-AK)
Submitted: October 9, 2003 Decided: October 21, 2003
Before LUTTIG, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William Clayton McKinnedy, III, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Michael Pruitt, MCDONALD, PATRICK, TINSLEY, BAGGETT & POSTON, Greenwood, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* To the extent that t he denial of McKinnedy’s motion for reconsideration of an earlier order denying him transfer from state to federal prison is not interlocutory, we find his claim on this issue to be without merit.

3 PER CURIAM: South Carolina inmate William Clayton McKinnedy, III, seeks to appeal the denial of several motions made during the course of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation against the Defendants. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000). The order McKinnedy seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. * We also deny Appellant’s motions for injunctive relief and for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# Materials Not Included in **Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket**

Docket Number: FAA- 2011 - 0564 Directorate Identifier: 2011NM021AD

601R- 34 - 147, RA --- 11/3/09 601R- 34 - 147 --- 4/1/09 670BA- 34 - 030, RA --- 11/3/09 670BA- 34 - 030 --- 4/1/09 IPC 34 - 11 - 15 --- 11/20/10

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the Supplem ental AD Docket 

### MA **Y BE VIEWED AT:** Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate Rules Docket 1601 Lind Ave. SW., Renton, WA 98057 425.227.1221 **DURING THE HOURS OF:** 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Form Date: 03/05/2008
#### Elmer KREISER, Appellant, v. Helen KREISER, Appellee.

No. 4-86-1040.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 15, 1987.

William H. Stolberg of Law Office of William H. Stolberg, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Catherine M. Rafferty and Joel Miller of Miller, Squire & Rafferty, Chartered, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

*41GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

This is an appeal by a former husband from a final judgment in an action brought by him to modify an unwritten agreement which was recited into the record of the trial court during the parties contested dissolution in 1976, ten years prior to the unsuccessful attempt at modification. The husband was attempting to terminate completely all payments of $1,200 per month, designated in the recited agreement as alimony, and treated by the wife as such on her income tax returns from the time of agreement.

The case represents the converse of *Wolfe v. Wolfe,*424 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), in which the husband deducted the payments of “alimony” for years on his income tax return then opposed the ex-wife’s attempt to modify the alimony on the ground that the wife had executed a true property settlement. We rejected the husband’s argument and by footnote pointed out that attorneys can effectively provide in these agreements that the wife’s alimony is not modifiable. If payments are intended to be a property right and non-modifiable, that, too, can be stated in the agreement. While *Wolfe*postdated the present parties’ dissolution, the attorney’s options did not, given the basic tools then available.

However, we affirm the final judgment for another reason; substantial competent evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the wife had established her affirmative defense that the increase in the wife’s income was foreseeable. Citing *Penland v. Penland,*442 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the wife points out, with which we agree, that it was reasonable to anticipate the corporate stock held by the parties would be liquidated after the parties’ dissolution, thus providing the wife with additional assets and income.

The husband was seeking complete elimination of the wife’s alimony, not just its reduction; and was seeking to undo — ten years after the fact — an agreement whose terms were as grating as they were binding. It was not an independent judicial determination being attacked, but a bargain that bore a monthly reminder by the writing of a check.

GUNTHER, J., and GOLDMAN, MURRAY, Associate Judge, concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 8, 2019

Order 

Clerk

March 8, 2019

157812(74)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, SC: 157812

v COA: 334024

Wayne CC: 15-010216-FC

ARTHUR LAROME JEMISON, Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing 

his brief is GRANTED. The brief will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before 

May 8, 2019.
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-17-00076-CR

DONTAVIOUS TERRELL REDMOND, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 5th District Court

Cass County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017F00119

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Dontavious Terrell Redmond of aggravated sexual assault of a child and 

assessed a sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. Redmond 

appeals. 

In cause number 06-17-00075-CR, Redmond also appeals from another conviction for 

aggravated sexual assault of a child. Redmond has filed a single brief in which he raises issues 

common to both of his appeals. Specifically, Redmond argues (1) that the juvenile court had 

exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings because a motion to transfer proceedings to the district 

court was never filed, (2) that the trial court erred in refusing Redmond’s request that his status as 

a juvenile had already been established in the juvenile proceeding, and (3) that the trial court 

violated his “SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND PRODUCTION 

OF EVIDENCE” by excluding the records of the juvenile proceeding “WHICH WOULD HAVE 

SHOWN BIAS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE’S WITNESSES.”

We addressed these issues in detail in our opinion of this date on Redmond’s appeal in 

cause number 06-17-00075-CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclude (1) that 

Redmond’s first two points of error must be overruled because (a) Redmond was not a juvenile 

when he was arrested, indicted, or tried, and (b) the district court had jurisdiction over these 

proceedings, and (2) that Redmond has failed to preserve his third point error. 
3

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Ralph K. Burgess

Justice

Date Submitted: December 21, 2017

Date Decided: December 22, 2017

Do Not Publish
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

ORDER AMENDING RULE S 1910.4, 1910.16, 1910.16

- 4, 1910.17, 1920.1, 1920.13, 1920.15, 1920.31, 1920.51, 1920.52, 1920.54, 1920.56, AND 1920.74 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: NO. 683

CIVIL PROCEDURAL RULES

DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 30 th day of July, 2018 , upon the recommendation of the
Domestic Relations Procedural Rules Committee ; the proposal having been published for public comment in the Pennsylvania Bulletin , 4 7 Pa.B. 2540 ( May 6, 2017 ) :

It is Ordered pursuant to Article V, Section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania
that Rule s 1910.4, 1910.16, 1910.16

- 4, 1910.17 , 1920.1, 1920.13, 1920.15, 1920.31, 1920.51, 1920.52, 1920.54, 1920.56, and 1920.74 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure are amended in the attached form.

This Order shall be processed in accordance with P a.R.J.A. No. 103(b), and shall
be effective on January 1, 2019

.

Additions to the rule are shown in bold and are underlined.

Deletions from the rule are shown in bold and brackets.
#### Creative Bath Products, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Connecticut General Life Insurance Company et al., Appellants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Beverly S. Cohen, J.), entered April 26, 1990, which denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that it was barred by *res judicata,*and imposed costs and sanctions against defendants on the ground that the motion was frivolous, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in federal court virtually identical to the instant complaint, except that it contained, in addition to causes of action sounding in fraud and *401misrepresentation, a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO; 18 USC § 1961*et seq.).*Upon dismissal of the federal action, in its entirety, plaintiffs commenced the instant State action on their fraud and misrepresentation claims.

The District Court, upon dismissing plaintiffs’ RICO claim, noted that when a federal claim is dismissed prior to trial any pendent State claim should likewise be dismissed. It is clear that the federal court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the State claims and that it made no determination on the merits with respect to those claims. *(Evans v Rothschild Unterberg, Towbin,*131 AD2d 278.) Accordingly, defendants’ motion, based upon the doctrine of *res judicata*was properly denied. Furthermore, we agree that defendants’ motion was so completely without merit as to be frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c). *(Nolan & Co. v Daly,*170 AD2d 320.) Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Kupferman, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of
Chelsea Therapeutics International, Ltd. (the Company) for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the Report), I, J. Nick Riehle, Vice President,
Administration and Chief Financial Officer, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods
presented in the Report.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    J. NICK RIEHLEJ. Nick RiehleVice President, Administration and Chief Financial OfficerAugust 15, 2005
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 21 - 0168

_________________ IN RE THE PARENTING OF A.J.B., a minor child, KATIE MARIE THORNTON,

Petitioner and Appellee, and GREGORY STEVEN BALLARD,

Resp ondent and Appellant. O R D E R

_________________ Pursuant to the Internal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for submission on briefs to a five - justice panel of this Court. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to all counsel of r ecord and to the Honorable Mike Menahan , District Judge . For the Court,

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 10 2021

11/10/2021
Case Number: DA 21-0168
**EXHIBIT 32**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING**

**OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 I, Shaun Passley, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of EPAZZ, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of EPAZZ, Inc.

Date: April 13, 2012

By: */s/ Shaun Passley*

Shaun Passley,

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Executive Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)
**EXHIBIT      32.1 **

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO **

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350, **

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO **

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|  | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                                                                                                                                             |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|        | /s/                Richard A. Rappaport                Richard                A. RappaportPrincipal                Executive OfficerJuly                28, 2006 |
|   |                                                                                                                                                             |

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

BASIL SALEEM GARCIA,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 813 MAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
# C_2006241EN.01000101.xml

| 6.10.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 241/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.10.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 241/1

---

COUNCIL DECISION

COUNCIL DECISION

of 18 September 2006

appointing a member of the Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency

(2006/C 241/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular the second and third paragraphs of Article 54 thereof,

Having regard to Article X of the Statutes of the Euratom Supply Agency (1),

1

Having regard to the Council Decision of 12 July 2005 appointing the members of the Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency (2),

2

Having regard to the opinion of the Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | A member's seat on the above Committee has fallen vacant for Austria. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

A member's seat on the above Committee has fallen vacant for Austria.

| (2) | That vacancy should therefore be filled. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

That vacancy should therefore be filled.

| (3) | The Austrian Government submitted a nomination on 1 December 2005, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Austrian Government submitted a nomination on 1 December 2005,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

Ms Christine GÖSTL is hereby appointed a member of the Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency for the remainder of the Committee's term of office, which ends on 28 March 2007.

Done at Brussels, 18 September 2006

For the Council

The President

J. KORKEAOJA

---

(1)  OJ 27, 6.12.1958, p. 534/58. Statutes last amended by Decision 95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC of 1 January 1995 (OJ L 1, 1.1.1995, p. 1)

1

(2)  OJ C 178, 20.7.2005, p. 1.

2

---
#### STATE ex rel. Ronald MARSH v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 88-KH-2814.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 27, 1989.

In re Marsh, Ronald; — Plaintiff(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “J”, No. 320-154.

Denied. No particularized need shown.