NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22-2106

JOHN DOE 1, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 1;

JANE DOE 1, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 1;

JOHN DOE 2, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 2;

JANE DOE 2, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 2;

JOHN DOE 3, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 3;

JANE DOE 3, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 3;

JOHN DOE 4, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 4;

JANE DOE 4, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 4;

JOHN DOE 5, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 5;

JANE DOE 5, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 5

and on behalf of those similarly situated,

 Appellants

v.

UPPER SAINT CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Pennsylvania governmental entity;

PHILLIP J. ELIAS, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity as

members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors; DAPHNA GANS,

all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper

Saint Clair School District Board of Directors; BARBARA L. BOLAS, all individual

elected officials sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair

School District Board of Directors; PATRICK A. HEWITT, all individual elected 

officials sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair School 

District Board of Directors; LOUIS P. MAFRICE, JR., all individual elected officials 

sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board 

of Directors; MICHAEL R. MASCARO, all individual elected officials sued in their 

official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors;

ANGELA B. PETERSEN, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity

as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors;

JENNIFER A. SCHNORE, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity

as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors;

DANIELLE Z. WETZEL, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity

as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors; UPPER SAINT
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CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS, a Pennsylvania elected 

legislative body

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-22-cv-00112)

District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 11, 2023

Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 13, 2023)

____________

OPINION*

____________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants (for ease of reference, “Plaintiffs”) are school-age children and 

their parents who sued to enjoin the Upper Saint Clair School District from instituting an 

optional COVID-19 masking policy in January 2022. They claimed violations of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 

In connection with Plaintiffs’ complaint, they sought a temporary restraining order 

from the District Court. That request was denied. Plaintiffs next filed an interlocutory 

appeal with us. Along with their appeal, they moved for emergency injunctive relief. We 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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granted that relief on a temporary basis the same day it was sought to preserve the Parties’ 

status quo pending our decision on the merits. We then extended the temporary injunction

pending further briefing and oral argument. 

But before we could consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims (much less render a 

decision), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published revised 

guidance for COVID-19 mitigation measures. We concluded that guidance mooted 

Plaintiffs’ claims. As such, we dismissed their appeal and directed the District Court on 

remand to dismiss their complaint without prejudice. Following dismissal on remand, 

Plaintiffs motioned the District Court for attorneys’ fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; 

29 U.S.C. § 794a. It denied that request, ruling that they were not prevailing parties entitled 

to statutory relief. We agree.

Plaintiffs have not obtained a “judgment on the merits” or a “court-ordered consent 

decree.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 

U.S. 598, 605 (2001). This case also does not present the “rare situation where a meritsbased determination is made at the injunction stage.” Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. 

Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing People Against Police 

Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2008)). We merely issued limited 

injunctive relief “on a temporary basis” to facilitate the forming of a “full three-judge panel 

of this Court” to consider the substance of Plaintiffs’ claims. J.A. 390. In the end, the

Parties’ dispute was resolved by the CDC’s “nonjudicial alteration of actual 

circumstances,” a situation that does not call for an award of attorneys’ fees or costs. 

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 (cleaned up).
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Because Plaintiffs achieved none of the outcomes that warrant the relief they seek, 

we affirm.