Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-814 | November 26, 2019 Page 1 of 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Dorothy Ferguson

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Natalie F. Weiss

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of:

A.J., T.M., E.M. (Minor Children)

and

T.M. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner,

November 26, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-814

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable G. George Pancol, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

48C02-1808-JT-162

48C02-1808-JT-163

48C02-1808-JT-164

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-814 | November 26, 2019 Page 2 of 20

Case Summary and Issue

[1] T.M. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her 

children and presents the sole issue of whether the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights was clearly erroneous. Concluding it was not 

clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] Mother has four children, three of whom are the subject of this appeal: A.M., 

born July 20, 2007; T.M., born July 4, 2013; and E.M., born February 10, 2015

(collectively “Children”).

1

 

[3] On or about February 11, 2015, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”)

received a report alleging that the Children were the victims of neglect because 

Mother tested positive for cocaine upon her admission to the hospital to give 

birth to E.M. and Mother admitted to “dealing and cooking” drugs. 

Appellant’s Amended Appendix, Volume V at 117. DCS Family Case 

Manager (“FCM”) Kelli Hoffman met with Mother at the hospital and Mother 

agreed to participate in an informal adjustment. However, before signing the 

agreement, Mother fled her home and DCS was unable to locate her. On 

February 25, 2015, DCS received a second report alleging the Children were the 

1 The parental rights of T.M. and A.M.’s biological fathers were also terminated; however, neither father

participates in this appeal and we have limited our recitation of the facts to those pertaining only to Mother. 

The record also reveals that E.M.’s father signed a consent for E.M. to be adopted. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-814 | November 26, 2019 Page 3 of 20

victims of neglect because Mother was found unconscious in a local hotel room

under the influence of drugs, with her Children present. A “crack pipe,” 

oxycodone, and Klonopin were found in the hotel room. Id. The next day, 

DCS received the results from E.M.’s meconium test which was positive for 

cocaine. The Children were removed from Mother’s care and placed with their 

maternal aunt, P.M.

[4] On February 27, 2015, DCS filed its Verified Petition Alleging the Children 

were Children in Need of Services (CHINS).2 The juvenile court held a factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition, during which Mother admitted the 

Children were CHINS; that her youngest child, E.M., had been born exposed 

to illegal substances; and that she could benefit from substance abuse treatment. 

The juvenile court found the Children to be CHINS. On June 24, 2015, the 

juvenile court held a dispositional hearing and entered a dispositional decree in 

which Mother was required to (among other things): complete a substance 

abuse evaluation; participate in home-based casework services; maintain 

contact with DCS; complete scheduled visitations and comply with visitation 

procedures; obey the law; refrain from consuming alcohol; not use, 

manufacture, trade, distribute, or sell any illegal substance; take only current 

and valid medications prescribed to her in the proper dose and frequencies 

2 DCS filed separate petitions alleging that each of the Children were CHINS; however, the allegations in 

each petition were identical. Similarly, the findings of fact and conclusions thereon in the juvenile court’s 

termination orders are identical. This court ordered the matters to be consolidated for appeal. Accordingly, 

our recitation of the facts and procedural history is applicable to each of the Children at issue in this appeal 

unless otherwise stated.
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specified; submit to random drug screens; secure and maintain suitable housing 

and a stable source of income; attend AA/NA regularly and provide attendance 

verification; attend all scheduled medical and mental health appointments and 

follow all recommendations; and comply with the terms of her probation. See

id. at 22-23. 

[5] At the time DCS became involved in this matter, Mother was on probation for 

a 2010 operating while intoxicated conviction. Mother was arrested in 

September 2015 for violating the terms of her probation. In December 2015, 

the juvenile court held a review hearing and found that Mother had not 

participated in services due to her incarceration. Mother was released from the 

correctional facility in April 2016 and completed a re-entry substance abuse 

assessment but failed to comply with the recommended treatment options. At 

the June 2016 permanency hearing, the juvenile court found that Mother has 

failed to “substantially compl[y] with home-based services and visitation.” 

Appellant’s Amended App., Vol. IV at 187.

[6] On August 1, 2016, DCS filed a three-month progress report, stating that 

Mother had been compliant with her intensive outpatient program (“IOP”)

classes and she had been consistently meeting with her home-based caseworker

since April 2016. However, Mother had tested positive for cocaine and 

Tramadol on July 27, 2016. See id. at 179. Following a review hearing in 

December 2016, the juvenile court found that prior to incarceration, Mother’s 

visitation with the Children was “very sporadic and inconsistent” and since 

being released, Mother has failed to exercise visitation on a “consistent and 
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routine basis.” Id. at 146. Mother complied with services from December 2016 

until April/May 2017, when she was closed out of her substance abuse 

treatment, home-based casework, and random drug screens due to her noncompliance.

[7] On June 21, 2017, the juvenile court issued an order approving a permanency 

plan for the Children, namely reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. 

See id. at 109. On December 13, 2017, the juvenile court found that Mother had

been non-compliant with services, refused to comply with drug screens, and 

“severed all contact” with DCS. Id. at 40. It also found that Mother had active 

warrants for her alleged participation in a robbery and was “currently a fugitive 

from justice.” Id. The juvenile court subsequently appointed a Court 

Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) for the Children. 

[8] On August 31, 2018, DCS filed separate verified petitions for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to each of her Children. Due to 

Mother’s two recent Level 3 felony charges for aiding and inducing armed 

robbery, she violated a condition of her probation and was incarcerated in 

October 2018. The juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on November 29 

and December 4, 2018. At the hearing, Mother testified that she completed 

inpatient treatment and had been sober since July 2018. Following the hearing, 

the juvenile court granted DCS’ petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

as to the Children and found, in relevant part:

[21)]e.Mother states that she has been sober since completing 

inpatient treatment at a hospital she could not identify in July 
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2018. She claims to have been in treatment with Clean Slate 

prior to her recent incarceration, but presents no evidence to the 

Court of either her treatment or of any clean drug screens and 

failed to notify DCS of any such treatment. Mother cites her 

most recent incarceration as preventing her from obtaining these 

records but, by her own admission, she was not incarcerated until 

October 13, 2018, three (3) months since her alleged release from 

inpatient treatment, and had not even informed her attorney of 

the existence of these records until a week before the December 

4, 2018 hearing. The same refusal to cooperate with DCS that 

has hindered Mother’s progress throughout this case hinders her 

from presenting credible evidence of her claimed sobriety. Even 

if, as Mother claims, she sought treatment on her own in July 

and managed to remain sober for the few months before her 

incarceration, that would not be dispositive of this case, as it fits 

clearly within a pattern of her beginning treatment only to 

disappear for extended periods without contact until overtaken 

by another problem, such as her repeated criminal 

entanglements.

* * * 

k. Mother’s assertions that she was ready to take the 

[C]hildren if she were released from incarceration were 

contradicted by her own admissions that she has no source of 

income to support the [C]hildren and no employment prospects.

l. . . . Mother has failed to participate faithfully in services

designed to help her deal with her substance abuse and mental 

health issues and achieve reunification. She was consistently and 

repeatedly closed out of services and what little progress she did 

make in services was frequently interrupted by her multiple 

incarcerations during the life of the CHINS case.
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m. Throughout her testimony, Mother attempted to minimize 

her negative behaviors and her own role in the failure to achieve 

reunification with her [C]hildren. Mother contested that she was 

only sleeping when she was discovered in the hotel room in 2015 

under the influence of multiple substances. Mother blamed her 

sister for her most recent arrest, while at the same time stating 

that she expected this same person to provide for her [C]hildren if 

Mother were to remain incarcerated. Mother appears not to 

appreciate the impact her behaviors have on those closest to her, 

including her [C]hildren and her sister.

Appealed Order at 13-15, 33-34, 54-56.

3

 Based on these findings, the juvenile 

court made the following conclusions:

[28)]a. Mother has failed to faithfully participate in services 

designed to remedy the CHINS conditions which necessitated 

the coercive intervention of the Court and to enable the family’s 

reunification. Mother was offered no less than six (6) 

opportunities to remedy her substance abuse problems but failed 

to complete the assessment or recommended treatment every 

time. Mother was offered home-based casework to enhance her 

ability to participate in that substance abuse treatment but failed 

to put in even minimal effort to participate in those services.

b. Mother has an extensive history of substance abuse, the 

principal reason that the Child[ren were] placed outside of 

Mother’s care. She claims that she has achieved sobriety but has 

evaded all efforts to verify that claim. In light of Mother’s 

continued evasion of DCS even while she claimed to be making 

progress towards sobriety and reunification and her inability to 

provide any evidence to support her claims, the Court finds those 

3 Although the trial court issued three separate orders, the orders are identical with respect to the trial court’s 

findings and conclusions about Mother. Therefore, we have quoted from only one order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-814 | November 26, 2019 Page 8 of 20

claims have little credibility. Even if . . . Mother’s claims are 

taken at face value, however, at best they demonstrate that she 

managed only three (3) months of sobriety on her own before 

being incarcerated yet again. This would be only the latest 

example of Mother’s criminal entanglements disrupting her 

ability to participate in services, visit with the Child[ren], or 

otherwise make any progress towards reunification for the entire 

three and a half years of the CHINS case.

c. Mother cannot provide necessary housing or support for 

herself or her [C]hildren. Mother admitted that she has no 

means of supporting them while incarcerated and, even if Mother 

were to be acquitted of her pending criminal charges and released 

from incarceration at her earliest possible release date, she has no 

housing of her own, has had no documented employment for the 

entirety of the CHINS proceedings, and admitted to having no 

known prospects for employment.

d. After three and a half years, Mother continues to expect 

others to take responsibility for supporting her and her [C]hildren 

and accepts no consequence for repeatedly failing to take that 

responsibility upon herself. Mother expects her sister to continue 

raising her [C]hildren even after her sister testified that she felt 

Mother had not appreciated her efforts and stated that she 

supported termination of Mother’s parental rights. Mother was 

closed out of visitation services and rebuffed DCS’s attempts to 

coordinate a visitation schedule but still expected her sister to 

allow visitation whenever it was convenient for herself. Mother’s 

apparent indifference for the impact of her behaviors on those 

around her and her inability or unwillingness to take on the 

responsibility for parental care is proof that there is no likelihood 

that the conditions which necessitated the [C]hild[ren]’s removal 

will be remedied.

* * *
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29) [T]here is a reasonable probability that the reasons for 

placement outside Mother[’s] home will not be remedied.

30) [T]here is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Child[ren]

poses a threat to the well-being of the Child[ren].

* * *

32) The DCS [FCM] and the Child[ren]’s CASA have both 

testified that termination of Mother[’s] . . . parental rights is in 

the Child[ren]’s best interests, and the Court accepts and adopts 

. . . them as its own finding of fact in these proceedings.

33) [T]here is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the Child[ren], namely . . . adoption[.]

Id. at 18-20, 37-38, 59-60.4 Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be 

supplied as necessary.

Discussion and Decision 

I. Standard of Review

[9] The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a 

parent’s right to raise his or her children. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Although “[a] parent’s interest in the care, 

4 We thank the juvenile court for its thorough and extensive findings of fact and conclusions thereon that 

have aided in our review of this matter.
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custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the 

fundamental liberty interests[,]’” parental interests are not absolute and “must 

be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of 

a petition to terminate parental rights.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family &

Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 

57, 65 (2000)). Thus, the parent-child relationship may be terminated when a 

parent is unable or unwilling to meet their parental obligations. Id. And a 

juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or 

her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before 

terminating parental rights. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 

798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We are cognizant that involuntary 

termination of parental rights is the most severe sanction a court can impose

because it severs all rights of a parent to his or her child. Matter of D.G., 702 

N.E.2d 777, 780-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Therefore, termination is considered 

a last resort, “available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id. 

at 781. 

[10] Given the juvenile court’s unique position, we review the termination of 

parental rights with great deference. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2013). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. Instead, we consider the evidence and 

reasonable inferences most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment. Id. We 

will set aside the trial court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship 

only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-814 | November 26, 2019 Page 11 of 20

1999), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1161 (2002). Thus, if the evidence and 

inferences support the decision, we must affirm. Id. 

[11] Where, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we first determine whether 

the evidence supports the findings, then whether the findings support the 

judgment. K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015). 

“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings do not 

support the court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment 

thereon. Id.

II. Statutory Requirements for Termination

[12] To terminate the parent-child relationship, DCS must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence: 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.
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* * *

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 

(“A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon 

clear and convincing evidence.”). “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a 

petition described [above] are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child 

relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

A. Remedy of Conditions

[13] Mother first argues that the State failed to prove that the conditions that led to 

the Children’s removal and continued placement outside of her care “could not 

be remedied in a reasonable amount of time where [she] completed substance 

abuse treatment and has maintained sobriety since July of 2018.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 9.

[14] In determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the reasons for 

removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a 

two-step analysis. K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641 at 647. First, we identify the conditions 

that led to removal and then, we determine whether there is a reasonable 

probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. With respect to the 

second step,
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the [juvenile] court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for her 

child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions. The [juvenile] 

court must also evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct 

to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of 

the child. Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered 

evidence of a parent’s criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, 

history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of 

adequate housing and employment. The [juvenile] court may 

also properly consider the services offered to the parent by [DCS] 

and the parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether 

conditions will be remedied. Finally, [DCS] is not required to 

provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it 

need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the 

parent’s behavior will not change.

In re I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations and emphasis 

omitted). 

[15] Here, there is no dispute that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal 

and their continued placement outside of Mother’s care are related to Mother’s

substance abuse issues and criminal history of substance abuse related offenses. 

Specifically, E.M., Mother’s newborn, tested positive for cocaine at birth, and 

Mother was found unconscious and under the influence of illegal substances in 

a hotel room with the Children present and otherwise unsupervised. The 

juvenile court found that Mother has an “extensive history of substance abuse” 

and concluded that there was a reasonable probability that these conditions will 

not be remedied. Appealed Order at 19. Mother maintains that she made the 

decision to enter an inpatient rehabilitation program “to get clean for herself[,]”

which demonstrates an “improved insight into her substance abuse issue.” 
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Appellant’s Br. at 12. Mother appears to argue that because she has allegedly 

been sober since July 2018, the only basis for the termination of her parental 

rights was her current incarceration.

[16] We first acknowledge that our supreme court has held that incarceration itself is 

an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 

1257,1264-66 (Ind. 2009). However, contrary to Mother’s assertions, her recent 

incarceration was not the sole basis for terminating her parental rights.

[17] At the fact-finding hearing, Mother testified that she sought inpatient substance 

abuse treatment at Fairbanks in mid-July 2018 and then went to another facility

for longer treatment. Before she was incarcerated in October 2018, Mother 

claimed that she had been attending Clean Slate and she had received negative 

drug screen results but had not yet provided a release allowing DCS to obtain 

those results. FCM Annette Lehman stated that Mother had not had any drug 

screens since summer 2017 and therefore, she was unable to verify Mother’s 

alleged recent sobriety. Although Mother argues that she has remedied her 

substance abuse issues, the juvenile court found that even if Mother has 

completed an inpatient program and maintained sobriety in the few months 

prior to her incarceration, as Mother claims, “that would not be dispositive of 

this case, as it fits clearly within a pattern of [Mother] beginning treatment only 

to disappear for extended periods without contact until overtaken by another 

problem, such as her repeated criminal entanglements.” Appealed Order at 13. 

The record establishes a clear pattern of Mother’s struggle with addiction and 
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other substance abuse related issues, as well as her failure to participate in 

services to remedy her addiction as required by the dispositional decree. 

[18] DCS initially became involved in this case because Mother’s newborn tested 

positive for cocaine and Mother was later found unresponsive in a hotel room 

under the influence of drugs with her Children present. At this time, Mother 

was already on probation for a prior operating while intoxicated conviction. 

Although Mother completed an assessment, she was subsequently incarcerated 

from September 2015 to April 2016. Following her release, Mother completed 

a re-entry substance abuse assessment, which recommended that she participate 

in an IOP for which she was placed on a waitlist. On May 2 and 3, 2016, 

Mother tested positive for cocaine; on May 25, she tested positive for THC; on 

June 3 and 14, she tested positive for Suboxone, which had been prescribed to 

her; and also on June 3, she tested positive for Phenobarbital, which had not 

been prescribed. See Appellant’s Amended App., Vol. IV at 170. Services were 

closed out in August 2016 due to Mother’s non-cooperation with services. In 

December 2016, Mother began participating in substance abuse treatment, 

home-based casework, and drug screens. However, Mother stopped complying 

with services in April/May 2017, and the services were closed out. Mother was 

subsequently charged with two Level 3 felonies for her alleged participation in 

an armed robbery that occurred in July 2017. Mother had active warrants for 

her arrest, became unreachable, and was ultimately arrested in October 2018. 

Mother will be incarcerated for nine months for another probation violation 

due to the new charges. 
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[19] FCM Lehman testified that she had been assigned to this case for 

approximately three years and initially became involved because Mother’s 

substance abuse issues raised safety concerns for the Children. Lehman 

testified that Mother did not fully complete home-based services. She made six

substance abuse assessment referrals for Mother in April, June, and August 

2015, April, June, and December 2016. She testified that Mother completed 

the August 2015 evaluation but then failed to return for recommended 

treatment, and in December 2016, Mother did another assessment and was 

compliant until March/April 2017 when Mother had hernia surgery. 

Following her surgery, Mother failed to comply, and the referral was closed out 

due to her non-compliance. Since that time, Lehman stated that Mother 

“became pretty unobtainable to find [since] she was basically on the run due to 

[the robbery] warrants.” Transcript, Volume I at 39.

[20] Megan Wills, a home-based case worker, received a referral for Mother in 

June/July 2016 and provided services until August 2016. Wills testified, “[W]e 

had been working together for about a month pretty consistently and then 

[Mother] stopped communicating with me after that.” Id. at 82. Due to 

Mother’s non-compliance, Wills closed out services. Wills stated that she

would have liked to see Mother obtain and maintain stability and sobriety and 

her “biggest concern [with Mother] was just the substance abuse at the time and 

then she had some criminal charges[.]” Id. Ultimately, Wills testified that she 

did not believe that Mother’s participation in the services she had provided

resolved any concerns about Mother’s ability to care for the Children. In fact, 
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she stated, “I don’t think we worked together long enough for [Mother] to make 

any big chan[g]es during that time.” Id. at 84.

[21] As our supreme court has explained, the juvenile court must determine a 

parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding “taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions – balancing a parent’s recent 

improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there 

is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 

N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quotation and internal citation omitted). This

“delicate balance” is entrusted to the juvenile court, which has the discretion to 

“weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly 

before termination.” Id. In fact, “[r]equiring [juvenile] courts to give due 

regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parents’ 

past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id. (emphasis 

added).

[22] In this case, the juvenile court judged the credibility of the witnesses, weighed 

Mother’s alleged recent sobriety with her past behavior of addiction related 

issues, and determined that Mother’s non-compliance, extensive substance 

abuse and related issues, and pattern of disappearing was the best predictor of 

her future behavior – concluding that there was a reasonable probability that 

Mother’s behavior will not change. See Appealed Order at 18-20. The juvenile 

court was well within its discretion to so find and Mother’s argument otherwise 

constitutes an improper invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which 

we cannot do. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. We conclude that DCS proved by 
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clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the

conditions resulting in the Children’s removal will not be remedied.5 

B. Best Interests

[23] Mother challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of her 

parental rights is in the best interests of the Children. Mother argues that, 

although she has made poor choices, she has been consistently present in the 

Children’s lives and the Children have not suffered any adverse effects as a 

result of her incarcerations. 

[24] To determine the best interests of the Children, the juvenile court looks to the 

totality of the evidence and must subordinate the interests of the parents to 

those of the children. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267. “A child’s need for 

permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a 

child[.]” In re D.L., 814 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

The juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before 

terminating parental rights. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203. This court has held 

that the recommendation of the FCM and CASA, in addition to evidence that 

the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show 

5 The juvenile court found that DCS proved both that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions, 

namely Mother’s substance abuse issues, that led to the Children’s removal and continued placement outside 

her care will not be remedied, and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

safety and well-being of the Children. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the 

disjunctive, the juvenile court is only required to find that one of the elements of subsection (b)(2)(B) is 

established by clear and convincing evidence. In re I.A., 903 N.E.2d at 153. Therefore, we need not address 

Mother’s argument as it pertains to section (b)(2)(B)(ii).
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by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. 

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[25] In this case, both the FCM and CASA testified at the fact-finding hearing that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests, and 

we have already concluded there is evidence that the conditions that led to the 

Children’s removal will not be remedied. FCM Lehman testified:

I believe [Mother] has some definite substance abuse concerns 

that have yet to be addressed throughout the case as well as I 

think just ongoing even prior to our involvement as well as the 

fact that she has these pending legal issues that could in another 

way take her away from the [C]hildren’s life for a significant 

amount of time. [T]hese [C]hildren are at this point almost four, 

five and eleven so I definitely think they need a safe and stable 

environment for where they are cared for on a daily basis and I 

don’t believe at this point [Mother] can provide that. 

[F]urthermore, we’ve been involved with this case for four years 

almost, so I feel like [the Children] just need that permanency. 

They need that stability and they can’t get it with [Mother.]

Tr., Vol. I at 47. CASA Jan Shryock testified that Mother “hasn’t been a very 

stable influence in the [C]hildren’s lives[.]” Id. at 118. She also stated that even 

if Mother was released from detention today, reunification with her Children 

would not be in their best interests. See id. at 119. In light of this testimony, the 

juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in 

the Children’s best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See 

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1005.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-814 | November 26, 2019 Page 20 of 20

Conclusion

[26] For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that DCS presented clear and 

convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that led to the Children’s removal from Mother’s care will not be remedied and 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. 

As such, the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights as to the 

Children was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.