alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6945

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KENNETH EARL LOGAN, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.

(CR-99-141, CV-02-197)

Submitted: July 19, 2002 Decided: August 1, 2002

Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kenneth Earl Logan, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Laura Marie Everhart,

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* On direct appeal, we found that the evidence was sufficient

to convict Logan on all counts, that his claim under Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), lacked merit and that the district

court properly held him accountable for between 500 grams and 1.5

kilograms of cocaine. See United States v. Roach, 2001 WL 242209

(4th Cir. Mar. 12, 2001) (No. 00-4163) (unpublished).

Logan now challenges his attorney’s alleged failure to press

a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion, to raise an Apprendi claim, and to

attack the quantity of drugs for which he was held responsible.

These Sixth Amendment claims were not decided on direct appeal.

Nonetheless, they are without merit because counsel’s performance

cannot be deficient when she fails to raise substantive claims that

were found to be baseless on direct appeal.

2

PER CURIAM:

Kenneth Earl Logan, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.

2002). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion

and find no reversible error.* Accordingly, we deny the motion for

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the

reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Logan, Nos.

CR-99-141; CV-02-197 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2002). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Luis F. Saenz, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Li3 Energy, Inc. for the period ended December 31, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Li3 Energy, Inc.





Date: February 22, 2011
By:
/s/ Luis F. SaenzName:
Luis F. SaenzTitle:
Chief Executive Officer





A signed original of this written statement, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement, has been provided to Li3 Energy, Inc., and will be retained by Li3 Energy, Inc., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Shirley McNAMARA, Secretary of the Department of Revenue & Taxation, State of Louisiana v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL CO. CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge, et al. v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL CO.

No. 87-C-1384.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 25, 1987.

In re Stauffer Chemical Co.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. CA86 0822, CA86 0823; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, Nos. 224477, 295451.

Prior report: La.App., 506 So.2d 1252.

Denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2270 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2270

To modify and extend the temporary suspension of duty on certain cases 
or containers to be used for electronic drawing toys, electronic games, 
                          or educational toys.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

Mrs. Feinstein introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To modify and extend the temporary suspension of duty on certain cases 
or containers to be used for electronic drawing toys, electronic games, 
                          or educational toys.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN CASES OR CONTAINERS TO BE USED FOR ELECTRONIC 
              DRAWING TOYS, ELECTRONIC GAMES, OR EDUCATIONAL TOYS.

    (a) In General.--Subheading 9902.11.90 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to certain cases or containers 
to be used for electronic drawing toys, electronic games, or 
educational toys) is amended--
            (1) in the article description, by inserting after ``or 
        9504'' and inserting ``, or educational toys or devices of 
        heading 8543''; and
            (2) in the effective period column, by striking ``12/31/
        2009'' and inserting ``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) apply to 
goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 
the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
----

----

| (1)   | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| August      7, 2009 | /s/      David J. Bryant                                  |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
|                | David      J. Bryant                                      |
|                | Chief      Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer |
|                |                                                      |

----

----
Opinion issued December 10, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00644-CV

———————————

WILLIAM COOK, Appellant

V.

US BANK NA AS TRUSTEE FOR ASSET BACKED SECURITIES 

CORPORATION HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST SERIES OOMC 2006 

HE5 ASSETT BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 

OOMC 2006 HE5, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 and Probate Court of 

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. CI049170

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, William Cook, has neither paid the required fees nor established 

indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 20.1; see also
2

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.207, 51.941(a), 101.041 (West 2013); Order 

Regarding Fees Charged in Civil Cases in the Supreme Court and the Courts of 

Appeals and Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Misc. Docket 

No. 07-9138 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2007), reprinted in TEX. R. APP. P. app. A § B(1). 

Further, Cook has not paid or made arrangements to pay the fee for preparing the 

clerk’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b). After being notified that this appeal 

was subject to dismissal, appellant did not adequately respond. See TEX. R. APP. P.

5; 42.3(b), (c).

We dismiss the appeal for nonpayment of all required fees and for want of 

prosecution. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown.
#### STATE ex rel. Ferdinand JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 89-KH-0303.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re Jackson, Ferdinand; — Plaintiff(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “C”, No. 316-873; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. KW-0294.

Denied. Moot. Relator was returned to Hunt Correctional Center shortly after he filed this application.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2356 

To suspend temporarily the duty on a mixture of 1-(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8-octahydro2,3,8,8-tetramethyl-2-naphthalenyl)-ethan-1-one (and isomers). 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. VOINOVICH (for himself and Mr. BROWN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on a mixture of 1- 

(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8-octahydro-2,3,8,8-tetramethyl-2- 

naphthalenyl)-ethan-1-one (and isomers). 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 1-(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8-OCTAHYDRO-2,3,8,8- 

4 TETRAMETHYL-2-NAPHTHALENYL)-ETHAN-1- 

5 ONE (AND ISOMERS). 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

7 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

8 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

9 new heading: 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2356 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Mixture of 1-(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8- 

octahydro-2,3,8,8- 

tetramethyl-2-naphthalenyl)- 

ethan-1-one (and isomers) 

(CAS Nos. 54464–57–2; 

68155–66–8; 68155–67–9) 

(provided for in subheading 

2914.29.50) ........................... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
#### SIERRA HOLDING, INC., a dissolved Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Donald SAYNER, Appellee.

No. 4-86-1326.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 29, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1987.

Henry W. Ciar, Miami, for appellant.

Charles T. Becker, P.A., Fort Lauder-dale, Jane Kreusler-Walsh and Larry Klein of Klein & Beranek, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Reversed. Upon review of the record we believe it was error for the clerk of the trial court to enter a default against the appellant. *Turner v. Allen,*389 So.2d 686 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). We also believe that appellee’s jurisdictional allegations concerning appellant are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a proper predicate for constructive service of process, and appellant’s motion to quash such service should have been granted. Notwithstanding our holding, upon remand the appellee should be afforded yet another opportunity to amend his complaint to state a proper predicate for service of process and to attempt to secure jurisdiction over the appellant. *See Sierra Holding, Inc. v. Sayner,*469 So.2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

*66ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ„ and FEDER, RICHARD YALE, Associate Judge, concur.
EXHIBIT
      32.1





Certification
      of Principal Executive and Financial Officer


Pursuant
      to


Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June
      30,
      2008 (the “Report”) of Highbury Financial Inc. (the “Registrant”), as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, the undersigned
      hereby certify that, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant for the
      period certified.




Date:
      July 31, 2008


By:
            /s/ Richard S. FooteRichard
                S. Foote
              President
                and Chief Executive Officer
              (Principal
                Executive Officer)




By:
              /s/ R. Bradley ForthR.
                    Bradley Forth
                  Executive
                    Vice President, Chief Financial Officerand
                    Secretary
                  (Principal
                    Financial
                    Officer)


The
      foregoing certifications are being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
      Commission as part of the accompanying report on Form 10-Q. A signed original
      of
      this statement has been provided to Highbury Financial Inc. and will be retained
      by Highbury Financial Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
      Commission or its staff upon request.
##### 



EXHIBIT 21.0 INCOME OPPORTUNITY REALTY INVESTORS, INC.
SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT The following is a list of all subsidiaries and partnership interests of Income Opportunity
Realty Investors, Inc. and the state or other jurisdiction of organization or incorporation: JURISDICTION OFORGANIATION ORNAME OF ENTITY
    
    OWNERSHIP %
    
    INCORPORATIONCorporationsIORI Valley View, Inc.
    
    100%
    
    NevadaIORI Enclave 5, Inc.
    
    100%
    
    NevadaIORI Minerals, Inc.
    
    100%
    
    NevadaTranscontinental Brewery, Inc.
    
    100%
    
    NevadaTranscontinental Parkway Corporation
    
    100%
    
    NevadaPartnershipsNakash Income Associates
    
    40%
    
    GeorgiaTCI Eaton Square LP
    
    10%
    
    Texas
#### Louis Beryl EISNER, Appellant, v. Ruth Sidonie Cohn EISNER, Appellee.

No. BS-8.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 20, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 1987.

*674Dennis M. Flath, of Flath & Ruff, Gainesville, for appellant.

Allison E. Folds, of Watson, Folds, Steadham, Christmann, Brashear & Tovkach, Gainesville, for appellee.

ZEHMER, Judge.

The husband appeals an award of child support contained in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. He complains about the amount of child support awarded and argues that counsel for appellee wife had an improper *ex parte*communication with the trial judge. We reverse.

At the close of the evidence the trial judge requested the wife’s attorney to “write me a letter, just put in it what you’ve asked for, so I’ll take it under consideration. I’m not saying I’ll grant it, but I’ll go down the list” (T 218). Appellee’s counsel submitted a three-page letter to the trial court without serving a copy on the husband. The letter went further than just stating the relief requested, and restated many of the arguments that had been made at the hearing. This communication with the trial judge without serving a copy on the adverse party amounted to a prohibited *ex parte*communication. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.080; Fla.Bar Rules Professional Conduct 4-3.5(b). The husband was not represented by Counsel, was not served with a copy of the letter and, thus had no opportunity to rebut the statements made in the letter. The final judgment is substantially in accord with the requests made in the letter. Given these facts we are unable to conclude that this improper *ex parte*communication was harmless error.

The husband also contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $1500 per month total child support. We have been unable, on the record before us, to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. No express findings of fact were made as to the husband’s income and his ability to pay support and we are uncertain of the amounts used by the trial court. Nor does the final order indicate the basis of the children’s monthly needs which would justify the $1500 award of child support. Accordingly, meaningful appellate review is not possible. While we express no view on the propriety of the amount of child support awarded, upon remand the trial court should make these necessary findings of fact. *Ashe v. Ashe,*509 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); *DePoorter v. DePoorter,*509 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); *Barrs v. Barrs,*505 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

The provisions of the judgment relating to child support are vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

JOANOS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES AIR RESOURCES 

DIVISION CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE NOTICE OF PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD AND PUBLIC 

HEARING In accordance with New Hampshire Administrative Rule, Env-A 204.01(b) and Title 

40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 51.102, notice is hereby given that the 

New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, Air Resources Division (the 

Department) has prepared, and intends to submit to the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, a revision to New Hampshire's State Implementation Plan (SIP) to meet the 

requirements of the federal Clean Air Act, section 169A, pertaining to visibility protection for 

Federal Class I Areas. The federal requirements that New Hampshire and other states must 

meet are contained in Title 40: Protection of Environment, Part 51 - Requirements for 

Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, Subpart P - Protection of 

Visibility (40 CFR 51.300-309). These regulations, often referred to as the Regional Haze Rule, 

seek to address the combined visibility impacts at Federal Class I Areas caused by various air 

pollution sources over a large geographic region. New Hampshire's SIP revision provides a 

plan consistent with the national goal of restoring natural visibility conditions to Federal Class I 

Areas by 2064. Components of the plan include an assessment of baseline and natural 

visibility conditions, an air monitoring strategy, analyses for Best Available Retrofit 

Technology, a set of reasonable progress visibility goals, and a long-term strategy for 

achieving those goals. The Department hereby solicits comment on this SIP revision and offers 

the public the opportunity to request a public hearing on this SIP revision. Comments or 

requests for a public hearing must be submitted in writing or by email to Charles Martone, Air 

Resources Division, NH Department of Environmental Services, P.O. Box 95, Concord, NH 

03302-0095; email Charles.Martone@des.nh.gov. A public hearing has been tentatively 

scheduled for 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, June 24, 2009, in Room 110-111 at 29 Hazen Drive, 

Concord, NH 03301. If no request for a public hearing is received by 4:00 p.m. on Monday, 

June 22, 2009, the Director will cancel the hearing by posting a notice on the Department's 

website at http://www.des.nh.gov (search for "Regional Haze"). Members of the public may 

call 603-271-1370 to find out whether the hearing has been cancelled. All comments on the 

proposed SIP revision must be received by 4:00 p.m. on Friday, June 26, 2009, to be entered 

into the record. A copy of the SIP revision, with attachments, is available for public inspection 

at the Department's offices at 29 Hazen Drive, Concord, NH, during regular working hours 

from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The main text of the SIP revision, 

without attachments, may be downloaded from the Department's website at 

http://des.nh.gov, as above. Robert R. Scott Director, Air Resources Division NH Department 

of Environmental Services Dated: May 22, 2009 

Appeared in: The Union Leader on Monday, 05/25/2009
#### PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., Appellant, v. Sandra WALKER, Appellee.

No. 4-86-3126.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 22, 1987.

*40John P. Wiederhold of Wiederhold Moses & Bulfin, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Michael P. Maguire of Maguire & Friend, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellee.

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals an order granting the plaintiffs a partial summary judgment on issues of comparative negligence. The appellant contends that the appeal is from a final order.

Piecemeal appeals should not be permitted where the claims are legally interrelated, involve the same transaction, and where the same parties remain in the lawsuit. *Kirkland By and Through Kirkland v. State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,*489 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); *Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Authority v. Metropolitan Dade County,*469 So.2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), *rev. denied,*482 So.2d 349 (Fla.1986). In this instance, the comparative negligence claim is interrelated with the negligence claim. The same transaction—an automobile accident—is involved, in all counts, and the same parties remain in the suit.

The court in *Kirkland*restated the criteria used in *Szewczyk v. BayShore Properties,*456 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), for determining whether a partial summary judgment is a final appealable order:

> (1) Could the cause of action disposed of by the partial summary judgment be maintained independently of other remaining causes of action? (2) Were one or more parties removed from the action when the partial final summary judgment was entered? (3) Are the counts separately disposed of based on the same or different facts?

489 So.2d at 801.

A final order, dismissing less than all of several interrelated claims which involve the same transaction and parties, is not appealable where there is any interrelated claim involving the same transaction and parties remaining in the suit. *S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb,*304 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1974); *Odham v. Mouat,*484 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Rule 9.110(k), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, states that partial final judgments are reviewable either on appeal from the partial final judgment or on appeal from the final judgment in the entire case. However, Rule 9.110(k) does not make all partial judgments immediately ap-pealable, nor does it expand in any way the class of orders immediately appealable. *Stein v. Hospital Corporation of America,*481 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Here, we conclude that the partial summary judgment is not a final appealable order. The order is also not appealable as a non-final order. It does not fit under any of the *41categories set out in Rule 9.130 for review of non-final orders.

The appellee’s motion to dismiss is, therefore, granted.

ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN and STONE, JJ., concur.
#### STATE ex rel. Eddie Jerome MURPHY v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 88-KH-0018.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 29, 1988.

In re Murphy, Eddie Jerome; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 887-424.

Denied. Moot. The district court acted.