Filed 4/18/16 P. v. Rice CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHN RICE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B266899

(Super. Ct. No. 2009038873)

(Ventura County)

John Rice appeals from a judgment after an order revoking his postrelease 

community supervision (PRCS). (Pen. Code, § 3450 et seq.)1 He contends the 

revocation process violated his right to due process because: he was not provided with 

counsel at his probable cause hearing before the supervising agency; was not brought 

before the court for arraignment within 10 days of arrest; did not have a probable cause 

hearing before the court within 15 days of arrest; and a probation officer asked him to 

waive his rights before the revocation petition was filed. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2012, Rice was convicted after a plea of guilty to false personation. 

(§ 529.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted formal probation. 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
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Rice violated the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked probation and sentenced 

him to a prison term. 

Rice was released in 2012 under PRCS following realignment. The 

Ventura County Probation Department is his supervising agency. As a condition of 

release, he agreed to maintain contact with the probation department and obey all laws, 

among other things. Rice also agreed the probation department could, without a court 

hearing, order “flash incarceration” in a county jail for up to 10 days if he violated the 

conditions of his release. (§ 3453, subd. (q).) 

Following a release from jail in March 2015, Rice did not report to the 

probation department. On July 7, a police officer detained Rice on an outstanding 

warrant and found a methamphetamine pipe with burnt residue in his pocket. He was 

arrested for a new charge (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)) and for violating the 

terms of his PRCS.

Two days after his arrest, Rice appeared with counsel for arraignment. The 

court ordered that he be released from jail upon completion of his flash incarceration 

period. On the same day, Senior Deputy Probation Officer Venessa Meza met with Rice. 

Meza advised Rice in writing that he had the right to written notice of the alleged 

violations, the right to an administrative hearing within two days, and the right at that 

hearing to speak on his own behalf and present letters and documents. Simultaneously,

Meza conducted an administrative probable cause hearing, at which Meza concluded 

there was probable cause to believe that Rice violated the terms of release by failing to 

report to the probation department and failing to obey all laws. Rice acknowledged 

receipt of a “PROS Hold” form that identified the alleged violations. It gave notice of a 

court hearing set for 16 days after Rice’s arrest. Meza advised Rice of his right to a 

formal revocation hearing at which he would have the right to be represented by an 

attorney, the right to call and confront witnesses, and the right to testify or remain silent. 

The advisement was memorialized in a “Postrelease Community Supervision Waivers of 

Rights and Admission Form.” Rice acknowledged receipt of the form and refused to 

waive his rights.
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Seven days after Rice’s arrest, the probation department filed a revocation 

petition. Consistent with the PROS Hold form, the hearing was set for 16 days after his 

arrest. 

Thirteen days after his arrest, Rice moved to dismiss the petition for 

violation of due process. He argued he was entitled to arraignment before a court within 

10 days of arrest and a probable cause hearing before a court within 15 days of arrest.

Counsel do not mention the July 9 arraignment in their arguments to the trial court or to 

this court. 

Rice appeared in court with counsel 16 days after his arrest for the hearing 

on the motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion. It conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on the revocation petition 41 days after his arrest. At the revocation hearing, 

Rice was represented by counsel and admitted the allegations. The trial court found Rice 

in violation and ordered him to serve a 180-day jail sentence. 

DISCUSSION

The trial court properly denied Rice’s motion to dismiss because Rice had access 

to the court and counsel within 10 days of his arrest.

Statutory Framework

The Legislature created PRCS in 2011 as part of its realignment of the 

criminal justice system. (§ 3450 et seq. [Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 

2011]; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 479.) PRCS shifts responsibility for postrelease supervision 

of certain felons from the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to county 

agencies, such as the Ventura County Probation Department. (Ibid.) 

The conditions of release under PRCS include waiver of the right to any 

court hearing before imposition of a flash incarceration in jail for up to 10 days. (§ 3453, 

subd. (q).) A person under PRCS is subject to arrest without a warrant at the direction of 

the supervising agency whenever a peace officer has probable cause to believe the person 

has violated the conditions of release. (§ 3453, subd. (s).) The peace officer may “arrest 

the person and bring him or her before the supervising county agency.” (§ 3455, subd. 

(b)(1).) The supervising agency may hold the supervised person in custody for up to 10 
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days without bringing him or her before a court. (§ 3454, subd. (b) [the supervising 

agency may “order appropriate responses to alleged violations,” including “intermediate 

sanctions,” such as flash incarceration for up to 10 days].) 

If the supervising agency determines that intermediate sanctions are not 

appropriate, it “shall petition the court pursuant to [s]ection 1203.2 to revoke, modify, or

terminate” PRCS. (§ 3455, subd. (a).) The supervised person is statutorily entitled to: 

notice of the petition for revocation upon the “first court appearance in the proceeding”; 

an opportunity to agree to modification or termination and to waive his or her 

appearance; and the right to consult with counsel “[p]rior to the modification or 

termination and waiver of appearance.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(2).) Section 1203.2’s 

revocation procedures apply uniformly to revocation of any supervised release, including 

“probation . . .[,] postrelease community supervision . . .[,] or . . . parole.” (Id., subd. (a); 

see Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2, subd. (a).) The declared purpose of amending the PRCS and 

parole revocation statutes was to “simultaneously incorporate the procedural due process 

protections held to apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer

(1972) 408 U.S. 471, and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, and their progeny.” 

(Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2, subd. (b).) 

Due Process

Revocation of supervised release deprives a person of a conditional liberty 

interest, and may only be had with due process protections. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 

408 U.S. 471, 482 (Morrissey) [parole revocation]; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 

451, 458 (Vickers) [probation revocation].) To conform to due process, revocation of 

conditional release requires a two-step process: (1) an initial determination of probable 

cause to justify temporary detention; and (2) a formal revocation hearing to determine 

whether the facts warrant revocation. (Morrissey, at p. 485; Vickers, at p. 456.) 

(1) Probable Cause Determination

The probable cause determination is a “minimal inquiry,” made near the 

place of arrest “as promptly as convenient after arrest.” (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 

485.) It need not be made by a judicial officer; it may be made by any qualified person 
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“not directly involved in the case.” (Id. at pp. 485-486 [probable cause determination for 

parole revocation may be made by a parole officer other than the officer who reports the 

violation or recommends revocation]; Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457.) 

Officer Meza conducted a Morrissey-compliant administrative probable 

cause hearing two days after arrest when she gave Rice written notice of the claimed 

violations and an opportunity to be heard. Rice “declined to make any statements.”

Meza summarized the hearing and set forth her probable cause determination on an 

“Administrative Probable Cause Hearing” form. Meza was sufficiently “neutral and 

detached” to make the determination because she was not “directly involved in the case.” 

(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 485-486.) Another probation officer prepared the 

report in support of revocation, and a police officer made the arrest. 

Rice was not entitled to a judicial probable cause hearing within 15 days. 

The “independent officer need not be a judicial officer,” and the probable cause hearing 

need only be “promptly as convenient after arrest.” (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 

485-486.) Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636 required a judicial 

probable cause hearing within 15 days for parole revocation, but it was based on prepetition safeguards that are unique to parole. (Id. at pp. 657-658, 662; §§ 3000.08, 3044.) 

Section 3000.08, subdivision (c) provides that an officer with probable cause to believe 

“a parolee” is violating a condition of release may arrest the person and “bring him or her 

before the court.” In contrast, section 3455, subdivision (b)(1) provides that an officer 

with probable cause to believe a person subject to PRCS is violating a condition of 

release may arrest the person and “bring him or her before the supervising county 

agency.” Section 3044, subdivision (a)(1) and (2) provides that the “parolee shall be 

entitled to a probable cause hearing no later than 15 days following his or her arrest for 

violation of parole,” and a formal revocation hearing no later than 45 days after arrest. 

There are no corresponding time requirements for persons arrested for violation of PRCS. 

In any case, the record shows that Rice was brought before the court, with counsel, two 

days after his arrest.
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(2) Formal Revocation Hearing

The formal revocation hearing is the “final evaluation of any contested 

relevant facts” to determine whether revocation is warranted, and it must be held “within 

a reasonable time” after arrest. (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 488.) The minimum 

safeguards at a formal parole revocation hearing are: “(a) written notice of the claimed 

violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity 

to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to 

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically 

finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing 

body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 

lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and 

reasons for revoking parole.” (Id. at pp. 488-489.) Due process requires equivalent 

safeguards in probation revocation proceedings. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 461-

462.) 

Here, the formal revocation proceeding complied with Morrissey and 

Vickers, because it was conducted within a reasonable time of arrest and included all the 

required safeguards, including assistance of counsel. The court heard the revocation 

petition 41 days after arrest, “within a reasonable time.” (§ 3455, subd. (c); Morrissey,

supra, 408 U.S. at p. 488 [a two month interval between arrest and a formal parole 

revocation hearing was not unreasonable].) 

Right to Counsel

Rice was not entitled to counsel at the informal probable cause hearing 

because it was a summary proceeding conducted outside of court proceedings during the 

flash period. Vickers addressed the right to counsel at court proceedings and is 

distinguishable on that basis. Here, Rice was represented by counsel at his court 

proceedings, commencing a mere two days after his arrest.
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The Request for a Waiver of Rights

Rice contends that a waiver of his rights to a revocation hearing or counsel 

is invalid, because Meza asked for his waiver before the petition to revoke was filed. But 

Rice did not waive any rights, so we need not address this argument.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
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Bruce A. Young, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Connie H. Kan, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.