```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 53 (Monday, March 19, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16098-16105]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-6545]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1); License Nos. (as shown in 
Attachment 1); EA-12-050; [NRC-2012-0069]

In the Matter of All Operating Boiling Water Reactor Licensees 
With Mark I and Mark II Containments; Order Modifying Licenses With 
Regard To Reliable Hardened Containment Vents (Effective Immediately)

I

    The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order hold 
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or 
Commission) authorizing operation of nuclear power plants in accordance 
with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Title 10 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of 
Production and Utilization Facilities.'' Specifically, these Licensees 
operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II 
containment designs.

II

    On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast 
of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake resulted in a large 
tsunami, estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in height, 
which inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant site. The 
earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation across 
northeastern Japan, and significantly affected the infrastructure and 
industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan.
    When the earthquake occurred, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 
were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 were shut down for routine 
refueling and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 reactor fuel was 
offloaded to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. Following the earthquake, the 
three operating units automatically shut down and offsite power was 
lost to the entire facility. The emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 
started at all six units providing alternating current (ac) electrical 
power to critical systems at each unit. The

[[Page 16099]]

facility response to the earthquake appears to have been normal.
    Approximately 40 minutes following the earthquake and shutdown of 
the operating units, the first large tsunami wave inundated the site, 
followed by additional waves. The tsunami caused extensive damage to 
site facilities and resulted in a complete loss of all ac electrical 
power at Units 1 through 5, a condition known as station blackout 
(SBO). In addition, all direct current electrical power was lost early 
in the event on Units 1 and 2, and after some period of time at the 
other units. Unit 6 retained the function of one air-cooled EDG. 
Despite their actions, the operators lost the ability to cool the fuel 
in the Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after 
about 70 hours, and in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, 
resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of 
cooling capabilities.
    Operators first considered using the facility's hardened vent to 
control pressure in the containment within an hour following the loss 
of all ac power at Unit 1. The Emergency Response Center began 
reviewing accident management procedures and checking containment 
venting procedures to determine how to open the containment vent valves 
without power.\1\ Ultimately, without adequate core and containment 
cooling, primary containment (drywell) pressure and temperature in 
Units 1, 2, and 3 substantially exceeded the design values for the 
containments. When the operators attempted to vent the containments, 
they were significantly challenged in opening the hardened wetwell 
(suppression chamber) vents because of complications from the prolonged 
SBO, and high radiation fields that impeded access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) report 
``INPO 11-005, Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Revision 0,'' issued 
November 2011, p. 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, and 4, venting the wetwell 
involved opening motor- and air-operated valves. Similar features are 
used in many hardened vent systems that were installed in U.S. BWR Mark 
I containment plants following issuance of Generic Letter (GL) 89-16, 
``Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent.'' In the prolonged SBO 
situation that occurred at Fukushima, operator actions were not 
possible from the control room because of the loss of power, and the 
loss of pneumatic supply pressure to the air-operated valves. The 
resultant delay in venting the containment precluded early injection of 
coolant into the reactor vessel. The lack of coolant, in turn, resulted 
in extensive core damage, high radiation levels, hydrogen production 
and containment failure. The leakage of hydrogen gas into the reactor 
buildings resulted in explosions in the secondary containment buildings 
of Units 1, 3, and 4, and the ensuing damage to the facility 
contributed to the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the 
environment.
    Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the Mark I containment 
design; however, because Mark II containment designs are only slightly 
larger in volume than Mark I containment designs and use wetwell 
pressure suppression, it can reasonably be concluded that a Mark II 
under similar circumstances would have suffered similar consequences.
    Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, 
the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the 
Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a 
systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes 
and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to 
these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a 
result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of 
recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and 
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan,'' 
dated July 12, 2011. These recommendations were enhanced by the NRC 
staff following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the 
staff's efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions To 
Be Taken Without Delay From the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' dated 
September 9, 2011, and SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of Recommended 
Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' dated 
October 3, 2011.
    As directed by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-
0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations within the 
context of the NRC's existing regulatory framework and considered the 
various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to implement the 
recommendations. SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 established the staff's 
prioritization of the recommendations based upon the potential safety 
enhancements.
    Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities 
allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, 
continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an 
imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of 
reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was 
already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by 
the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have 
been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many 
years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the 
vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR 
Mark II containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments 
are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems 
in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to 
ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is 
maintained.
    In SRM-SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed the NRC staff to take 
certain actions and provided further guidance including directing the 
staff to consider filtered vents. The staff has determined that there 
are policy issues that need to be resolved before any regulatory action 
can be taken to require Licensees to install filtered vents. These 
policy issues include consideration of severe accident conditions in 
the design and operation of the vent, addition of filters to hardened 
reliable vent systems, and consideration of vents in areas other than 
primary containment. However, the NRC has also determined that 
Licensees should promptly begin the implementation of short-term 
actions relating to reliable hardened vents and to focus these actions 
on improvements that will assist in the prevention of core damage. As 
such, this Order requires Licensees to take the necessary actions to 
install reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I 
and Mark II containments to assist strategies relating to the 
prevention of core damage. With respect to the policy issues discussed 
above, the NRC staff plans to submit a Policy Paper to the Commission 
in July 2012.
    Additional details on an acceptable approach for complying with 
this Order will be contained in final Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 
scheduled to be issued by the NRC in August 2012. This guidance will 
also include a template to be used for the plan that will be submitted 
in accordance with Section IV, C.1 below.

III

    Reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health 
and safety and assurance of the common

[[Page 16100]]

defense and security are the fundamental NRC regulatory objectives. 
Compliance with NRC requirements plays a critical role in giving the 
NRC confidence that Licensees are maintaining an adequate level of 
public health and safety and common defense and security. While 
compliance with NRC requirements presumptively assures adequate 
protection, new information may reveal that additional requirements are 
warranted. In such situations, the Commission may act in accordance 
with its statutory authority under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, as amended, to require Licensees to take action in order to 
protect health and safety and common defense and security.
    To protect public health and safety from the inadvertent release of 
radioactive materials, the NRC's defense-in-depth strategy includes 
multiple layers of protection: (1) Prevention of accidents by virtue of 
the design, construction and operation of the plant, (2) mitigation 
features to prevent radioactive releases should an accident occur, and 
(3) emergency preparedness programs that include measures such as 
sheltering and evacuation. The defense-in-depth strategy also provides 
for multiple physical barriers to contain the radioactive materials in 
the event of an accident. The barriers are the fuel cladding, the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment. These defense-
in-depth features are embodied in the existing regulatory requirements 
and thereby provide adequate protection of public health and safety.
    The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlight the possibility that 
extreme natural phenomena could challenge the prevention, mitigation, 
and emergency preparedness defense-in-depth layers. At Fukushima, 
limitations in time and unpredictable conditions associated with the 
accident significantly challenged attempts by the responders to 
preclude core damage and containment failure. In particular, the 
operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting 
system. The inability to reduce containment pressure inhibited efforts 
to cool the reactor core. If additional backup or alternate sources of 
power had been available to operate the containment venting system 
remotely, or if certain valves had been more accessible for manual 
operation, the operators at Fukushima may have been able to 
depressurize the containment earlier. This, in turn, could have allowed 
operators to implement strategies using low-pressure water sources that 
may have limited or prevented damage to the reactor core. Thus, the 
events at Fukushima demonstrate that reliable hardened vents at BWR 
facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs are important to 
maintain core and containment cooling.
    The Commission has determined that ensuring adequate protection of 
public health and safety requires that all operating BWR facilities 
with Mark I and Mark II containments have a reliable hardened venting 
capability for events that can lead to core damage. These new 
requirements provide greater mitigation capability consistent with the 
overall defense-in-depth philosophy, and therefore greater assurance 
that the challenges posed by severe external events to power reactors 
do not pose an undue risk to public health and safety. To provide 
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and 
safety, all licenses identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall be 
modified to include the requirements identified in Attachment 2 to this 
Order.
    Accordingly, the NRC has concluded that these measures are 
necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety 
under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii), and 
is requiring Licensee actions. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, 
the NRC finds that the public health, safety and interest require that 
this Order be made immediately effective.

IV

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations 
in 10 CFR 2.202, ``Orders,'' and 10 CFR part 50, it is hereby ordered, 
effective immediately, that all licenses identified in attachment 1 to 
this order are modified as follows:
    A. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any 
Commission regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the 
requirements described in Attachment 2 to this Order except to the 
extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license. 
These Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements 
in Attachment 2 to the Order and shall complete full implementation no 
later than two (2) refueling cycles following the submittal of the 
overall integrated plan, as required in Condition C.1. (scheduled to be 
issued in August 2012), or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
    B. 1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, notify the Commission (1) if they are unable to comply with 
any of the requirements described in Attachment 2, (2) if compliance 
with any of the requirements is unnecessary in their specific 
circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements 
would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any 
Commission regulation or the facility license. The notification shall 
provide the Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or 
variation of any specific requirement.
    2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the 
requirements described in Attachment 2 to this Order would adversely 
affect the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the 
Commission, within twenty (20) days of this Order, of the adverse 
safety impact, the basis for its determination that the requirement has 
an adverse safety impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same 
objectives specified in the Attachment 2 requirement in question, or a 
schedule for modifying the facility to address the adverse safety 
condition. If neither approach is appropriate, the Licensee must 
supplement its response to Condition B.1 of this Order to identify the 
condition as a requirement with which it cannot comply, with attendant 
justifications as required in Condition B.1.
    C. 1. All Licensees shall, by February 28, 2013, submit to the 
Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a 
description of how compliance with the requirements described in 
Attachment 2 will be achieved.
    2. All Licensees shall provide an initial status report sixty (60) 
days following issuance of the final ISG, and at six (6)-month 
intervals following submittal of the overall integrated plan, as 
required in Condition C.1, which delineates progress made in 
implementing the requirements of this Order.
    3. All Licensees shall report to the Commission when full 
compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 is achieved.
    Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, C.1, C.2, and C.3 above 
shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, ``Written 
Communications.''
    The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation may, in writing, 
relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the 
Licensee of good cause.

V

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order,

[[Page 16101]]

within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is 
shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to answer or 
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to 
submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to the 
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause 
for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order.
    If a hearing is requested by a Licensee or a person whose interest 
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating 
the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held, the issue to 
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be 
sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the licensee or any other 
person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding 
a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the 
presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order 
on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139, 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by 
telephone at (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a digital ID certificate, 
which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to 
digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any 
proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise the Secretary 
that the participant will be submitting a request or petition for 
hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or its counsel or 
representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). 
Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish an electronic 
docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the Secretary has not 
already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic 
Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may 
attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should 
note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software, 
and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance 
in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange, users will 
be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC Web site. 
Further information on the Web-based submission form, including the 
installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC's 
public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 
available on the NRC public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others 
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site 
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at 
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at (866) 672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for 
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered 
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing 
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, 
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in 
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at 
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or

[[Page 16102]]

home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other 
law requires submission of such information. With respect to 
copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose 
of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use 
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted 
materials in their submission.
    If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person 
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is 
adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set 
forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty (20) days from the 
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a 
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

     Dated this 12th day of March 2012.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Operating Boiling Water Reactor Licenses With Mark I and Mark II 
Containments

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant......................  BWR-Mark I.
    Tennessee Valley Authority..................
    Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296.......
    License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68......
    Mr. Preston D. Swafford.....................
    Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice
     President.
    Tennessee Valley Authority..................
    3R Lookout Place............................
    1101 Market Street..........................
    Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801..................
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant..................  BWR-Mark I.
Carolina Power & Light Co.......................
    Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324...............
    License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62..............
    Mr. Michael J. Annacone.....................
    Vice President..............................
    Carolina Power & Light Company..............
    Brunswick Steam Electric Plant..............
    P.O. Box 10429..............................
    Southport, NC 28461.........................
Columbia Generating Station.....................  BWR-Mark II.
    Energy Northwest............................
    Docket No. 50-397...........................
    License No. NPF-21..........................
    Mr. Mark E. Reddemann.......................
    Chief Executive Officer.....................
    Energy Northwest............................
    MD 1023.....................................
    P.O. Box 968................................
    Richland, WA 99352..........................
Cooper Nuclear Station..........................  BWR-Mark I.
    Nebraska Public Power District..............
    Docket No. 50-298...........................
    License No. DPR-46..........................
    Mr. Brian J. O'Grady........................
    Vice President--Nuclear and Chief Nuclear
     Officer.
    Nebraska Public Power District..............
    72676 648A Avenue...........................
    P.O. Box 98.................................
    Brownville, NE 68321........................
Dresden Nuclear Power Station...................  BWR-Mark I.
    Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
    Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249...............
    License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25..............
    Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
    President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
    Exelon Nuclear..............................
    4300 Winfield Road..........................
    Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Duane Arnold Energy Center......................  BWR-Mark I.
    NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC............
    Docket No. 50-331...........................
    License No. DPR-49..........................
    Mr. Peter Wells.............................
    Site Vice President.........................
    NextEra Energy..............................
    Duane Arnold Energy Center..................
    3277 DAEC Road..............................
    Palo, IA 52324-9785.........................
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant....................  BWR-Mark I.

[[Page 16103]]

 
    Southern Nuclear Operating Co...............
    Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366...............
    License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5...............
    Mr. Dennis R. Madison.......................
    Vice President..............................
    Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.....
    Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant................
    11028 Hatch Parkway North...................
    Baxley, GA 31513............................
Fermi...........................................  BWR-Mark I.
    Detroit Edison Co...........................
    Docket No. 50-341...........................
    License No. NPF-43..........................
    Mr. Jack M. Davis...........................
    Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
     Officer.
    Detroit Edison Company......................
    Fermi 2--210 NOC............................
    6400 North Dixie Highway....................
    Newport, MI 48166...........................
Hope Creek Generating Station...................  BWR-Mark I.
    PSEG Nuclear, LLC...........................
    Docket No. 50-354...........................
    License No. NPF-57..........................
    Mr. Thomas Joyce............................
    President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
    PSEG Nuclear LLC--N09.......................
    P.O. Box 236................................
    Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038...................
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant........  BWR-Mark I.
    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
    Docket No. 50-333...........................
    License No. DPR-59..........................
    Mike Colomb.................................
    Vice President, Operations..................
    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
    James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant....
    P.O. Box 110................................
    Lycoming, NY 13093..........................
LaSalle County Station..........................  BWR-Mark II.
    Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
    Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374...............
    License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18..............
    Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
    President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
    Exelon Nuclear..............................
    4300 Winfield Road..........................
    Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Limerick Generating Station.....................  BWR-Mark II.
    Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
    Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353...............
    License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85..............
    Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
    President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
    Exelon Nuclear..............................
    4300 Winfield Road..........................
    Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.............  BWR-Mark I.
    Northern States Power Company...............
    Docket No. 50-263...........................
    License No. DPR-22..........................
    Mr. Timothy J. O'Connor.....................
    Site Vice President.........................
    Northern States Power Company--Minnesota....
    Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.........
    2807 West County Road 75....................
    Monticello, MN 55362-9637...................
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station.................  BWR-Mark I & II.
    Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC........
    Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410...............
    License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69..............
    Mr. Ken Langdon.............................
    Vice President Nine Mile Point..............
    Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC........
    P.O. Box 63.................................
    Lycoming, NY 13093..........................

[[Page 16104]]

 
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.........  BWR-Mark I.
    Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
    Docket No. 50-219...........................
    License No. DPR-16..........................
    Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
    President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
    Exelon Nuclear..............................
    4300 Winfield Road..........................
    Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station...............  BWR-Mark I.
    Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
    Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278...............
    License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56..............
    Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
    President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
    Exelon Nuclear..............................
    4300 Winfield Road..........................
    Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1........  BWR-Mark I.
    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
    Docket No. 50-293...........................
    License No. DPR-35..........................
    Mr. Robert Smith............................
    Vice President and Site Vice President......
    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
    Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station...............
    600 Rocky Hill Road.........................
    Plymouth, MA 02360-5508.....................
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station...............  BWR-Mark I.
    Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
    Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265...............
    License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30..............
    Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
    President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
    Exelon Nuclear..............................
    4300 Winfield Road..........................
    Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station..............  BWR-Mark II.
    PPL Susquehanna, LLC........................
    Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388...............
    License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22..............
    Mr. Timothy S. Rausch.......................
    Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
     Officer.
    PPL Susquehanna, LLC........................
    769 Salem Boulevard.........................
    NUCSB3......................................
    Berwick, PA 18603-0467......................
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station............  BWR-Mark I.
    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
    Docket No. 50-271...........................
    License No. DPR-28..........................
    Mr. Christopher J. Wamser...................
    Site Vice President.........................
    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
    Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station........
    320 Governor Hunt Road......................
    Vernon, VT 05354............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Requirements for Reliable Hardened Vent Systems at Boiling-Water 
Reactor Facilities With Mark I And Mark II Containments

1. Hardened Containment Venting System (HCVS) Functional Requirements
    Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments shall 
have a reliable hardened vent to remove decay heat and maintain control 
of containment pressure within acceptable limits following events that 
result in the loss of active containment heat removal capability or 
prolonged Station Blackout (SBO). The hardened vent system shall be 
accessible and operable under a range of plant conditions, including a 
prolonged SBO and inadequate containment cooling.
1.1 The design of the HCVS shall consider the following performance 
objectives:
    1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the reliance on 
operator actions.
    1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize plant operators' 
exposure to occupational hazards, such as extreme heat stress, while 
operating the HCVS system.
    1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be designed to minimize radiological 
consequences that would impede personnel actions needed for event 
response.
1.2 The HCVS shall include the following design features:
    1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the capacity to vent the steam/energy 
equivalent of 1 percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a lower

[[Page 16105]]

value is justified by analyses), and be able to maintain containment 
pressure below the primary containment design pressure.
    1.2.2 The HCVS shall be accessible to plant operators and be 
capable of remote operation and control, or manual operation, during 
sustained operations.
    1.2.3 The HCVS shall include a means to prevent inadvertent 
actuation.
    1.2.4 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the status of the 
vent system (e.g., valve position indication) from the control room or 
other location(s). The monitoring system shall be designed for 
sustained operation during a prolonged SBO.
    1.2.5 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the effluent 
discharge for radioactivity that may be released from operation of the 
HCVS. The monitoring system shall provide indication in the control 
room or other location(s), and shall be designed for sustained 
operation during a prolonged SBO.
    1.2.6 The HCVS shall include design features to minimize unintended 
cross flow of vented fluids within a unit and between units on the 
site.
    1.2.7 The HCVS shall include features and provision for the 
operation, testing, inspection and maintenance adequate to ensure that 
reliable function and capability are maintained.
    1.2.8 The HCVS shall be designed for pressures that are consistent 
with maximum containment design pressures as well as dynamic loading 
resulting from system actuation.
    1.2.9 The HCVS shall discharge the effluent to a release point 
above main plant structures.
2. Hardened Containment Venting System Quality Standards
    The following quality standards are necessary to fulfill the 
requirements for a reliable HCVS:
2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and including the second containment 
isolation barrier shall be designed consistent with the design basis of 
the plant. These items include piping, piping supports, containment 
isolation valves, containment isolation valve actuators and containment 
isolation valve position indication components.
2.2 All other HCVS components shall be designed for reliable and rugged 
performance that is capable of ensuring HCVS functionality following a 
seismic event. These items include electrical power supply, valve 
actuator pneumatic supply and instrumentation (local and remote) 
components.
3. Hardened Containment Venting System Programmatic Requirements
3.1 The Licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures 
necessary for the safe operation of the HCVS. Procedures shall be 
established for system operations when normal and backup power is 
available, and during SBO conditions.
3.2 The Licensee shall train appropriate personnel in the use of the 
HCVS. The training curricula shall include system operations when 
normal and backup power is available, and during SBO conditions.

[FR Doc. 2012-6545 Filed 3-16-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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