J-S95033-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.P.S.B., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

APPEAL OF: C.B., Father : No. 1725 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order May 9, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000100-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0001739-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.N.S.B., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

APPEAL OF: C.B., Father : No. 1726 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order May 9, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000101-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0001149-2012

BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 01, 2017

C.B. (“Father”) appeals from the Orders1 granting the Petitions filed by 

the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily 

terminate his parental rights to his daughter, A.N.S.B., born in February 

2011, and his son, C.P.S.B., born in July 2012 (collectively, “Children”), 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing 

 

1 This Court, sua sponte, consolidated Father’s appeals from the termination 

Orders.
J-S95033-16

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their permanency goals to adoption.2 Additionally, Gary S. Server, Esquire 

(“Attorney Server”), Father’s counsel, has filed a Petition to Withdraw as 

counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant Attorney Server’s Petition to Withdraw, and 

affirm the trial court’s termination Orders.

The trial court aptly summarized the factual and procedural history of 

this case, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 9/9/16, at 1-2. 

Father, through counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal. On October 

12, 2016, Attorney Server filed a Petition to Withdraw as counsel.

In the Anders Brief, the following questions are presented for our 

review:

I. Whether[,] under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 6351, and 

55 Pa. Code [§] 3130.74, in accordance with the provisions of 

the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act [“ASFA”], 42 U.S.C. 

[§] 671 et seq., reasonable efforts were made to reunite [] 

Father with [] Children[?] 

II. [W]hether the goal changes to adoption were the dispositions 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and 

moral welfare of [] Children[?]

III. Whether it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that 

Father’s parental rights should be terminated under [23 

Pa.C.S.A. §] 2511(a) [and] (b)[?]

 

2 DHS included S.S. (“Mother”) in its Petitions for involuntary termination of 

parental rights. On June 6, 2016, the trial court involuntarily terminated 

Mother’s parental rights to Children. Mother is not a party to the instant 

appeal.
J-S95033-16

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Anders Brief at 6 (numbering added, claims separated to conform to 

arguments set forth in brief). Father neither filed a pro se brief, nor retained 

alternate counsel for this appeal.

We must first determine whether Attorney Server has complied with 

the dictates of Anders in petitioning to withdraw from representation. See 

In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “[w]hen counsel 

files an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits without first 

addressing counsel’s request to withdraw.”). This Court has extended the 

Anders principles to a first appeal by an indigent parent from a decree 

involuntarily terminating his or her parental rights. See In re V.E., 611 

A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992). Pursuant to Anders, when an attorney 

believes that an appeal is frivolous and wishes to withdraw as counsel, he or 

she must

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record and 

interviewing the [client], counsel has determined the appeal 

would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the 

record of arguable merit, and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to 

[the client] and advise him of his right to retain new counsel or 

to raise any additional points that he deems worthy of the 

court’s attention. 

In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform the 

client of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has held 

that counsel must “attach to [a] petition to withdraw a copy of the letter 
J-S95033-16

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sent to the[] client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. 

Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that a 

proper Anders brief must

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Once 

counsel has satisfied the above requirements, this Court “must undertake an 

independent examination of the record to determine whether the appeal is 

wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237.

Here, Attorney Server has complied with the requirements set forth in 

Anders by indicating that he “made a thorough and objective review” of the 

record and determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, the 

record contains a copy of the letter that Attorney Server sent to Father, 

informing him of Attorney Server’s intention to withdraw and advising him of 

his right to proceed pro se, retain counsel, and file additional claims. Finally, 

Attorney Server’s Anders Brief meets the standards set forth in Santiago. 

Because Attorney Server has complied with the procedural requirements for 

withdrawing from representation, we will independently review the record to 

determine whether Father’s appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.
J-S95033-16

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In his first claim, Father asserts that DHS did not make reasonable 

efforts to reunite Father and Children. Anders Brief at 18. Father argues 

that the social workers assigned to his case “simply did not complete the 

tasks necessary to verify[] his employment or to show the [c]ourt that his 

housing was appropriate and safe for [C]hildren.” Id. Based on these 

contentions, Father claims that DHS violated the Juvenile Act and AFSA.3 

Id.

However, Attorney Server points out that this argument is rendered 

frivolous by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding, in In re D.C.D., 

105 A.3d 662, 673-74 (Pa. 2014), that it is unnecessary to demonstrate that 

an agency has made reasonable efforts to reunite a parent with his child 

before the parent’s rights may be terminated. Anders Brief at 18. Attorney 

Server also indicates that, even if Father could present such a claim, it would 

not be supported by the evidence of record. Id. at 19. Attorney Server 

states that “[t]he appropriate referrals, opportunities and services were 

provided to [F]ather. It was [F]ather’s inability[,] over the course of 21 

months[,] to completely avail himself of the services that were offered to 

him, or to provide the necessary documentation, or to abide by the simple 

common sense rules of his visitation that ensured the safety of [C]hildren, 

that thwarted the attempt to reunify this family.” Id. at 20.

 

3 Citing to 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B), Attorney Server asserts that AFSA 

“requires that a social service agency formulate a plan for assuring that the 

child receives safe and proper care and that services are provided to the 

parents.” Anders Brief at 19.
J-S95033-16

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As Attorney Server correctly points out, the Juvenile Act does not 

require a showing of reasonable efforts in order to terminate parental rights. 

See In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 673-74.4 Specifically, the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania has held that,

while reasonable efforts should be considered and indeed, in the 

appropriate case, a trial court could insist upon their provision, 

we hold that nothing in the language or the purpose of Section 

6351(f)(9) [of the Juvenile Act] forbids the granting of a petition 

to terminate parental rights, under Section 2511, as a 

consequence of the agency’s failure to provide reasonable efforts 

to a parent.

Id. at 675. Thus, we conclude that Father’s first claim is frivolous.

As Father’s second and third claims are related, we will address them 

together. In his second claim, Father argues that the change in Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption “was not the disposition best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of [Children].” 

Anders Brief at 20. Father asserts that, during the hearing, Father “claimed 

to have fulfilled some of his objectives,” and “denied that he had received 

the necessary continuity in [social] workers that he needed.” Id. Father 

also claims that he has a strong bond to Children, he has obtained stable 

housing, and he is ready to assume his parental responsibilities. Id. 

 

4 Although Attorney Server suggests that there may be a question as to 

whether Pennsylvania state law is in conflict with federal law, he fails to 

identify the particular conflict, or cite to any legal authority in support of 

such argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring that each point in an 

argument contain “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed 

pertinent.”). Nevertheless, our independent research reveals no legal 

authority supporting such a claim.
J-S95033-16

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However, Attorney Server points out that “[F]ather[,] throughout the 

case[,] refused to accept completely the service[s] that could have been 

provided to him ... service[s that were] designed to keep him free of drugs 

and to provide him with the necessary skills to avoid drug addiction and to 

keep [C]hildren safe.” Id. at 21. Attorney Server further indicates that “a 

goal change to adoption in a loving family setting would be the disposition 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare 

of [C]hildren ... [b]ecause [F]ather failed to affirmatively assume his parental 

duties within the 21 months and failed to ... fully complet[e] the rather 

simple objectives imposed upon him in this case[.]” Id. at 22.

In his third claim, Father contends that DHS failed to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that his parental rights to Children should be 

terminated under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Anders Brief 

at 23. Father claims that he sufficiently fulfilled his objectives, is “clean 

from substances,” has stable housing and employment, and is capable of 

providing Children with the essential parental care, control and subsistence 

necessary for their physical and mental well-being. Id. at 25-26. Father 

asserts that the conditions and causes that led to his incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal have been remedied within the time allotted by the 

Adoption Act. Id. at 26. Father argues that he is “best suited to provide 

[for] the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

[C]hildren.” Id.
J-S95033-16

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However, Attorney Server contends that Father’s third claim is 

frivolous because he refused or was unable to achieve stability for himself or 

for Children. Id. Attorney Server asserts that “[F]ather demonstrated a 

total lack of insight into the problems that led to the placement of 

[C]hildren” and blamed the social workers for the termination of his parental 

rights. Id. Attorney Server also claims that Father failed to avail himself of 

drug treatment, obtain documentation of his employment, or allow access to 

his home. Id. Further, Attorney Server states that “the conditions that led 

to the incapacity, abuse and neglect had not been remedied” due to Father’s 

failure to cooperate with his social workers. Id. at 27. Attorney Server 

argues that “[t]he evidence showed that [C]hildren had been in placement 

for almost two years, that they did not appear to have a meaningful bond 

with [F]ather, ... and that they would not be harmed in any way by 

terminating [Father’s] parental rights.” Id. at 27-28.

In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed 

Father’s second and third claims, and concluded that they lack merit. See

Trial Court Opinion, 9/9/16, at 3-6. We agree with the reasoning of the trial 

court and affirm on this basis as to Father’s second and third claims. See 

id.

Further, our independent examination of the record indicates that 

there are no other non-frivolous claims that can be raised. See In re 
J-S95033-16

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S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237. Accordingly, we conclude that Father’s appeal is 

frivolous, and Attorney Server is entitled to withdraw as counsel.

Petition to Withdraw granted; Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/1/2017
A summary of the relevant procedural history is set forth as follows: 

On January 15, 2012, Jo-Home Protective Services ("IHPS") through North East Treatment Center 

(NET) was implemented for Shakeema Sipps ("mother") and Christopher Baker ("father"). 

In January 2012, Mother entered a drug and alcohol treatment impatient program through 

Gaundenzia and continued there until March 2012. Mother left the treatment program without 

being discharged. 

At the Shelter Care Hearing, held on June 29, 2012, the Court referred mother and father to the 

Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for an assessment and a forthwith drug and alcohol screen. The 

Court ordered the temporary commitment to DHS to stand. 

At the Adjudicatory Hearing held on July 9, 2012, A.N.S.B. was adjudicated dependent and fully 

committed to DHS. Mother and father were also referred to CEU for a drug and alcohol screen. 

On July, 30, 2012, mother gave birth to C.P.S.B. 

Factual and Procedural Background: 

This appeal arises from this Court's Order on May 9, 2016, terminating the parental rights of 

Christopher Baker ("father"), pursuant to the petitions filed on behalf of the Department of Human 

Services ("OHS") by the City of Philadelphia Solicitor's Office. Gary Server, attorney for father, 

filed a timely appeal from the May 9, 2016 order terminating father's parental rights including an 

attached Concise Statement of Errors, Affidavit of Service, and other related documents necessary 

to perfect this Appeal. 

Younge, J, 

OPINION 

Superior Court 

No. 1725 EDA 2016 

No. 1726 EDA 2016 

APPEAL OF: C.B., Father 

CP-51-DP0001149-2012 

CP-5 l-AP-0000101-2016 

N RE: A.N.S.B. 

.. 

.. 

CP-5l-DP-0001739-2014 

CP-5 l-AP-0000I00-2016 

11\ RE: C.P.S.B · 

THE COURT OF COlvu\iiON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

FAMILY COURT DIVISION 

Oct page 1 05 2016 09:12AM Judge Peter F. Rogers 2156867823 Circulated 01/09/2017 11:16 AM
2 

Thereafter, in October 201 S, father was released from incarceration at State Correctional 

Institution ("SCI") Graterford and made himself available to CUA. Shortly thereafter, OHS held a 

Family Service Plan (FSP) meeting. The objectives identified for father were to: 1) housing; 2) 

employment; 3) attend children's medical appointments; and 4) visits. 

On May 9, 20 I 6, during the Termination of Parental Rights hearing for father, the Court found by 

clear and convincing evidence that father's parental rights as to A.N.S.B. and C.P.S.B. should be 

terminated pursuant to the Juvenile Act. Furthermore, the Court held it was in the best interest of 

the children that the goal be changed to Adoption. 

On October 4, 2012, at a Permanency Review Hearing, the Court found that Aggravated 

Circumstances existed as to father. The Court ordered that DHS was to make no efforts to reunify 

father with A.N.S.B. DHS was instructed to explore a mother/baby placement at Gaudenzia when 

appropriate. 

, Thereafter) on April 15, 2013, at a Permanency Review Hearing the Court noted that A.N.S.B. had 

been residing with mother in a mother/baby drug and alcohol program at Gaudenzia. However, 

mother and A.N.S.B. 's whereabouts became unknown to OHS. DHS made several attempts to 

locate the family to no avail. The Court ordered that the DHS commitment be discharged 

retroactive Lo March 28, 2013 and the petition was to remain open. 

On September 25, 2013, OHS received a General Protective Services Report ("GPS") alleging that 

mother frequently left her children alone without adult supervision. The report alleged an 

additional household member reportedly had five children also residing in the home with mother. 

The report further alleged there was no adult supervision in the home for the seven children. The 

report stated the children felt neglected and in fear. There was no furniture nor refrigerator in the 

home, except for two mattresses. Additionally, mother had an outstanding warrant for her arrest. 

The report was substantiated. 

On December 9, 2013, at a Permanency Review Hearing, the Court noted that the family's 

whereabouts were unknown to OHS. The Court ordered the petition to remain open and the open 

bench warrant was to stand. DHS was to complete a Parent Locator Search ("PLS") for the family; 

DHS was to obtain an Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") and place the children when 

appropriate. 

Subsequently, in December 2013, mother came to OHS for help. Mother and the children entered 

the Eliza Shirley House, but only remained for a few days and left on her own accord. 

On July 7, 2014, at a Permanency Review Hearing, the Court ordered that the bench warrant as to 

mother was to stand; that the Community Umbrella Agency ("CUA") Turning Points for Children 

("TPC") was to hire an on-ground private investigator to assist in locating mother and A.N.S.B., 

and if the A.N.S.B. were located, an OPC was to be obtained through OHS and to place her with 

police assist, if necessary. 

On July 2 I , 2014, the private investigator located the fa.mil y at a residence on Pratt Street. On the 

same day, DHS obtained and OPC and placed A.N.S.B. in foster care. 

On July 3, 2014, at a Shelter Care Hearing, the Court lifted the OPC and discharged the temporary 

commitment as to A.N.S.B, and recommitted her to DHS; the Court also ordered tbe temporary 

commitment to OHS as to C.P.S.B. to stand. 

Oct 05 2016 09:12AM Judge Peter F. Rogers 2156867823 page 2 
3 

Discussion 

TI1e grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are enumerated in the Adoption Act at 

23 Pa.C.S. § 25 J l. Under this statute, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated process in which 

it initially focuses on the conduct of the parent under § 2511 (a). In the Interest of B. C., 36 A.3d 

601 (Pa.Super 2012). If the trial court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination 

under§ 2511 (a), it mu.st then engage in an analysis of the best interest of the child under§ 2511 (b). 

Id. 

In the present case, father's parental rights were terminated based on §§251 l(a)(l), (2), (5), (8) 

and §251 l(b). 

In proceedings to in voluntarily terminate parental rights the burden of proof is on the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for termination. 

in re Adoption of Atencio; 650 A.2d J 064 (Pa. 1994). The standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction without hesitation of tbe truth of the precise facts in 

issue." In re JD. WM, 810 A2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). 

To satisfy§ 2511 (a)(l ), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct 

sustained for at least six (6) months prior to fr ling oftbe termination petition, which reveal a settled 

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties. It is 

clear from the record that for a period of six (6) months leading up to the filing of the Petition for 

Involuntary Termination, father failed to perform parental duties for the children. The Court found 

by clear and convincing evidence that the father refused or failed to perform her parental duties. 

In the instant matter, father was given revised FSP objectives in October 2015, after his release 

from incarceration at SCI. (N.T. 519116, p. 15). Testimony of social worker revealed, father was 

found, at best, to have only partially completed some of his FSP objectives. (N.T. 5/9/16, pp. 36, 

37). Moreover, father did not provide the Court with any documentation that would substantiate 

a finding that the children could safely be returned to his care. Id. Father failed to demonstrate 

that he could provide the children with stable housing, or that he was gainfully employed (N. T. 

5/9/16 pp. 36,37) Testimony revealed father did not attend child's medical appointment (N.T. 

5/9/16 pp. 36, 37) 

A parent has an affirmative duty to act in her children's best interest. "Parental duty requires that 

the parent not yield to every problem, but must act affirmatively, with good faith interest and effort, 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

Issues 

1) Whether under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. C.S. section 6351, and 55 Pa.Code Section 

3130. 74, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Adoption and Safe families 

Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 671 ct seq., reasonable efforts were made to reunite the Father 

with his child and whether the goal change to Adoption was the disposition well suited to 

the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. 

2) Whether it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father's parental rights 

should be terminated under Sections 25 l l (a)(2) and 251 l(b). 

The appeal of father is as follows: 

Oct 05 2016 09:12.AM Judge Peter F. Rogers 2156867823 page 3 
4 

circumstances." In re Dale A .. If, 683 A.2d 297, 302 (Pa. Super. 1996). In reference to the parental 

contact, "to be legally significant, the contact must be steady and consistent over a period of time, 

contribute to the psychological health of the child, and muse demonstrate a serious intent on the 

part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child relationship, and must demonstrate and willingness 

and capacity to undertake the parenting role". In re D.JS., 73 7 A2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) 

(quoting In re Adoption of Hamilton, 549 A.2d 1291, 1295 (Pa.Super. 1988)). 

In the present matter, A.N.S.B. and C.P.S.B. have been in their current placement for twenty one 

months. (N.T. 5/9/16, p. 9, 12). The testimony established the children are residing in a positive 

environment with their foster parents and pre-adoptive resource for almost two years. Id. Further, 

the foster parents provide for A.N.S.B.'s and C.P.S.B.'s daily needs and the children have 

developed a parent-child bond with them. (N.T. 5/9/16, pp. 11, 12). While the record also reflects 

that father has had visits with the children in the community, once a week, father's visits never 

increased to overnight or weekend visits. (N.T. 5/9/16, p. 16). 

Section 2511 (a)(2) requires that "repeated and continued incapacity, abuse neglect or refusal of 

the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for her physical or mental well-being and the condition and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect, or refusal, cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511 (a)(2). 

It is incumbent upon a parent, when separated from his children, to maintain communication and 

association with the children. This requires an affirmative demonstration of parental devotion, 

imposing upon the parent the duty to exert himself, to take and maintain a place of importance in 

his children's lives. In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

Termination of parental rights under §2511 (a)(2) is not limited to affirmative misconduct but may 

include acts of refusal, as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. in re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa.Super. 2002). 

As of the May 9, 2016 hearing, A.N.S.B. and C.P.S.B. have been in care for twenty-one (21) 

months, and father had not progressed in his FSP permanency objectives in a way that would 

permit reunification to occur (N.T. 5/9/16, p. 36-38}. Moreover, father is no stranger to OHS, as 

he knows first-hand through OHS' involvement with his other three children and the subsequent 

in voluntary termination of his parental rights and the importance of bis role in regaining custody 

of A.N.S.B. and C.P.S.B. (N.T. 5/9/16, pp. 33, 34). 

The Court is not convinced that father would have the ability to exercise proper judgment in the 

future towards parenting these extremely young children, ages three and five, respectively. (N.T. 

519116, pp. 16, 26). Moreover, father's housing situation is speculative. Testimony revealed 

father's name is not on the lease where he resides, and father and his children would, indeed, be at 

the mercy of his paramour. (N.T. 5/9/16, pp. 31, 32). Thus, father would ask the Court to place 

the children in a situation where he and the children could potentially become homeless. 

Additionally, father faj)ed to follow-up with CEU, so that a determination could be made whether 

he needed treatment. (N.T. 5/9/16, p. 29). Father's own conduct, has served as a barrier to 

reunification, as father is unable to perform his parental duties. · 

§2511 (a)(5) requires that: 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions 

Oct 05 2016 09:12AM Judge Peter F. Rogers 2156867823 page 4 
5 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which Jed to the 

removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the! child. 

§2511 (a)(8) states: 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency, twelve (12) months or more has elapsed from the date 

of the removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist and termination of the parental rights would serve the best needs 

and welfare of the child. 

The evidence as discussed above pursuant to §2511 (a)(5) and (a)(8), equally support the Court's 

conclusion to terminate father's parental rights. 

In order to terminate the parental rights, the party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interest of the child. 23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (b); 

In re Bowman, 647 A.2d 217 (Pa. Super. 1994). The best interest of the child is determined after 

consideration of the needs and welfare of the child. The trial court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination 

of this parental rights to determine if the evidence, in the light of the totality of the circumstances, 

clearly warrant involuntary termination. 

When determining the best interest of the child, many factors are to be analyzed, "such as love, 

comfort, security, security and stability. In re Adoption oJTB.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 

2003). Another factor that a court is to consider is what, if any, bond exist for the child. In re 

Involuntary Termination ofC. WS.M and K.A.L.M., 839 /\.2d 410, 415 (Pa. Super 2003). 

Pursuant to Section 2511 (b), the trial court roust take account whether a natural parental bond 

exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. In re C.S., 761 A.2d l J 97(Pa. Super. 2000). 

In the instant matter, the testimony established that A.N.S.B. and C.P.SB. would not suffer 

irreparable emotional harm if father's parental rights were terminated. (N.T. 519116, pp. 8-11, 17, 

18). The testimony of the CUA social worker, Ms. Dixon, established that A.N.S.B. and C.P.S.B. 

are with pre-adoptive foster parents who have developed a strong parent-child bond with them. 

(N.T. 5/9/16, pp. 9, 10, 12). In fact, Ms. Dixon testified that during father's most recent visit with 

C.P.S.B., she ran away from father and back to the foster parents. (N.T. 519116, p. 9). Further, that 

C.P .S.B. has expressed her desire not to see father. (N. T. 5/9/ l 6, p.10). Although, it was noted that 

A.N.S.B. made no affirmative comment regarding her desire to see father, Ms. Dixon clearly stated 

that both children through their actions express a continued resistance toward visiting with father, 

and that the children's behavior toward such visits grew progressively worse. (N.T. 5/9/16, pp. 9, 

18, 19). Furthermore, the social worker testified that during father's visits, she did not observe a 

parent-child relationship between father and the children, and that father did not have a parent 

child bond with either child. The social worker's testimony noted such a relationship between both 

children with their foster parents. (N.T. 5/9/16, pp. 9-11). 

Oct page 5 05 2016 09:13AM .lldge Peter F. Rogers 2156867823 
6 

Moreover, even if father were given the opportunity to care for A.N.S.B. and C.P.S.B, father's 

plans for the future are speculative. Therefore, this Court found based on all the evidence presented 

that terminating the parental rights of father as to A.N.S.B. and C.P.S.B. would not cause them 

irreparable harm due to their parent-child bond with their foster parents meet their daily needs. 

Accordingly, A.N.S.B. and C.P .S.B. should be adopted, as it is in their best interest. (N.T. 5/9/16, 

pp. 8, 18). ' 

The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Human Services 

met its statutory burden pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a) & (b) and that it was in the best interest 

of the children to change the goal to adoption. (N.T. 5!9/16, pp. 36-38). 

Conclusion: 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Department of Human Services met its statutory 

burden by clear and convincing evidence regarding the termination of parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a)(t ), (2), (5) and (8) and §2511 (b ). Furthermore, the Court finds that its ruling 

will not cause A.N.S.B. nor C.P.S.B. to suffer irreparable harm and it is in the best interest of the 

children based on the testimony regarding tbe children's safety, protection, mental, physical and 

moral welfare, to tenn.inate father's parental rights. 

Accordingly, the Trial Court's Order entered on May 9, 2016, terminating the parental rights of 

father, Christopher Baker, shou]d be properly affirmed. 

Oct 05 2016 09:14AM Judge Peter F. Rogers 2156867823 page 6