Filed 11/19/21 P. v. Finch CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT FINCH,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B307002

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA460458)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.

Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Nicholas J. Webster, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————
2

Robert Finch appeals from his judgment of conviction of

three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,1

§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, Finch contends the evidence

was insufficient to support a finding that he had knowledge of

two firearms that were found inside his vehicle. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Evidence at Trial

On August 23, 2017, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department executed a search warrant on Finch’s residence. The 

premises consisted of a two-bedroom home with a backyard and

garage. Finch and his girlfriend, Shatioishia Van, resided in the 

home. At the time of the search, Finch was a convicted felon. 

A 1984 Oldsmobile that was registered under Finch’s name 

and home address was parked in the backyard. The vehicle was 

unlocked and appeared to have been parked in the same spot for 

a long time. Officers found a loaded .38-caliber Smith and 

Wesson revolver and a loaded .45-caliber Para semiautomatic 

handgun underneath the driver’s seat of the Oldsmobile. In the

unlocked garage located in the backyard, officers found a .22-

caliber Marlin rifle, a .22-caliber Winchester rifle, and a metal 

filing cabinet containing a holster and numerous .45-caliber 

rounds of ammunition. All four firearms were operable and in 

good condition. 

The common areas inside the home included a dining room 

with an armoire and a computer. Inside the armoire, officers 

recovered numerous rounds of ammunition compatible with the 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to 

the Penal Code.
3

two rifles found in the garage. The computer contained

photographs of firearms, including a photograph of the two 

handguns found in the Oldsmobile. 

One bedroom inside the home contained men’s clothing, 

along with paperwork bearing Finch’s name and address. No 

firearms or ammunition were found in this bedroom. The other 

bedroom contained women’s clothing and was occupied by Finch’s 

girlfriend, Van. Officers found a small .38-caliber revolver in this 

bedroom. While Van admitted to the police that the revolver 

belonged to her, she denied knowledge of any other firearms 

recovered from the residence. None of the ammunition found at 

the residence was compatible with the firearm found in Van’s 

bedroom. 

Van was charged with one count of possession of a firearm

by a felon in connection with the .38-caliber revolver seized from

her bedroom. She later pleaded guilty to that charge. As part of 

the factual basis for her plea, Van stated that she possessed the

revolver that was found in her bedroom, and that she had no 

knowledge of any other firearms in the residence or the garage.

The officer in charge of the investigation opined that, based 

on the paperwork and other items found during the search, the

only occupants of the residence were Finch and Van. The officer 

did not see any indication that anyone was living in the 

Oldsmobile or the garage. 

The Verdict and Sentencing

Finch was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon 

in connection with the .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun seized 

from the Oldsmobile (count 1), the .38-caliber revolver seized 

from the Oldsmobile (count 2), and one of the .22-caliber rifles

seized from the garage (count 3). At the conclusion of the trial, 
4

the jury found Finch guilty as charged on all three counts. The 

trial court sentenced Finch to a total term of four years in state 

prison. 

Finch filed a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Finch challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions in counts 1 and 2 for possession of a 

firearm by a felon. He specifically contends the evidence was 

insufficient to support a finding that he had knowledge of the 

two firearms that were found inside the Oldsmobile.

Standard of Review

“ ‘ “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in 

the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether 

it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable 

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” [Citation.] We determine “whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] In so doing, 

a reviewing court “presumes in support of the judgment the 

existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the 

evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 626.) 

Our “task is not to resolve credibility issues or evidentiary 

conflicts, nor is it to inquire whether the evidence might 

‘ “ ‘be reasonably reconciled with the defendant’s innocence.’ ” ’

[Citations.] The relevant inquiry is whether, in light of all 
5

the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could have found the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Gomez

(2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278.) “ ‘The standard of review is the same 

in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial 

evidence.’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 324.)

Substantial Evidence Supported Finch’s Convictions 

in Counts 1 and 2

Section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[a]ny 

person who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of the 

United States, the State of California, or any other state, . . . and 

who owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under 

custody or control any firearm is guilty of a felony.” The offense 

“has three elements: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, 

(2) the defendant knew that he possessed the firearm, and (3) the 

defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.” (People v. 

Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 958.)

“To ‘possess’ a firearm means ‘having “ ‘ “actual control, 

care and management of”’ ’ ” ’ the firearm.” (In re Charles G. 

(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945, 951.) “Possession may be actual or 

constructive. ‘ “A defendant has actual possession when the 

weapon is in his [or her] immediate possession or control,” ’ i.e., 

when he or she is actually holding or touching it. [Citations.] ‘To 

establish constructive possession, the prosecution must prove a 

defendant knowingly exercised a right to control the prohibited 

item, either directly or through another person.’ ” (People v. Bay

(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 132.) Possession of a weapon “does 

not require that a person be armed or that the weapon be 

within a person’s immediate vicinity. [Citations.] Rather, it 

encompasses having a weapon in one’s bedroom or home or 

another location under his or her control, even when the 
6

individual is not present at the location.” (In re Charles G., 

at p. 951.) Possession “may be proven circumstantially, and 

possession for even a limited time and purpose may be sufficient.” 

(In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 831.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

judgment, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support 

Finch’s convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon in 

counts 1 and 2. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, 

the jury reasonably could conclude that Finch had possession of 

the two handguns that were found inside the Oldsmobile because 

he knowingly exercised a right to control each of those firearms. 

Generally, an “ ‘inference of dominion and control is easily 

made when the contraband is discovered in a place over which 

the defendant has general dominion and control: his residence 

[citation], his automobile [citation], or his personal effects.’ ” 

(People v. Busch (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 150, 162.) Here, the jury 

easily could infer that Finch had dominion and control over both 

the vehicle where the handguns were found and the backyard of 

the residence where the vehicle was kept. The evidence at trial 

established that Finch was the registered owner of the 

Oldsmobile, and he resided on the premises where the 

Oldsmobile had been parked for an extended period. The officer 

in charge of the investigation testified that there was no 

indication that anyone other than Finch and his girlfriend, Van, 

was residing on the property at the time of the search. While 

Van admitted to possessing a small .38-caliber revolver that was 

found in her bedroom, she denied any knowledge of any other 

firearms that were found on the premises. 

Other circumstances further supported an inference that

Finch knew of the presence of the firearms in his Oldsmobile. 
7

The garage in the backyard contained numerous rounds of 

ammunition that were compatible with one of the firearms, 

the .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun. Two .22-caliber rifles 

were also kept in the garage in plain sight, and ammunition 

compatible with those rifles was kept in a common area of the 

residence. Moreover, a computer in the common area contained

a photograph of the same handguns that were found inside the 

Oldsmobile. The fact that Finch shared the residence with Van, 

and that they both had access to the firearms and ammunition

stored throughout the property, did not preclude the jury from 

inferring that Finch knowingly possessed the two firearms that 

were found inside his vehicle. (See, e.g., People v. Elder (2014) 

227 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1317 [possession of firearms seized from 

home defendant shared with girlfriend where police found one 

gun on entertainment center shelf, another gun in unlocked safe

in bedroom, and photograph of defendant holding gun identical to

one on shelf]; People v. Cordova (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 665, 668, 

670 [possession of rifle found in locked trunk of defendant’s

father’s car where evidence showed car was driven by defendant 

and other family members and ammunition compatible with rifle 

was found in residence defendant shared with wife]; People v. 

Nieto (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 364, 366–368 [possession of guns

found in car defendant owned and was driving even though 

passenger had equal access and claimed guns belonged to him].)

In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that

he had knowledge of the firearms inside his Oldsmobile, Finch 

primarily relies on the decision in People v. Antista (1954) 129 

Cal.App.2d 47. Contrary to Finch’s argument, however, that 

case does not support the reversal of his convictions. In Antista, 

at page 48, during a search of the defendant’s apartment, the 
8

police found marijuana in a cupboard in the living room and in 

a radio in an unused bedroom or storeroom. Although the 

defendant was away from his apartment at the time of the 

search, two other individuals were present, including a female 

friend who was a known user of narcotics and a frequent guest. 

(Id. at pp. 48, 52.) The defendant also would leave a key under a 

mat outside his door for the use of his friends who often came to 

the apartment to watch television while he was away. (Id. at 

p. 48.) In reversing the defendant’s conviction for possession of 

the marijuana found in his apartment, the Court of Appeal held

that “if it is established that one accused of possession returned 

to his apartment, . . . and found it occupied by a user of narcotics, 

and a narcotic was found in it, and if there is no evidence that it 

was there before that time, the fact of its presence, without any 

other fact or circumstance of an incriminating nature, is legally 

insufficient to prove a charge of possession.” (Id. at p. 53.)

In contrast to Antista, this case includes other facts or 

circumstances that reasonably could support a finding that 

Finch had knowledge of the two firearms inside his vehicle. 

As discussed, ammunition compatible with the semiautomatic 

handgun was found in Finch’s garage and a photograph of both 

firearms was found on a computer in Finch’s residence. There 

was no evidence that anyone other than Finch and Van lived on 

the property or otherwise had access to the firearms and rounds 

of ammunition that were discovered at various locations on the 

premises. Furthermore, in both her statement to the police and 

her open plea in court, Van expressly denied knowledge of any 

firearms that were recovered from the residence except for the 

one revolver that was found inside her bedroom. 
9

The other cases on which Finch relies are also readily 

distinguishable. In each of those cases, the defendant’s access to

the premises where the contraband was found was insufficient 

to support a finding of possession because there was no other 

evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that the

defendant had dominion and control over the contraband. (See

People v. Hancock (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 305, 310 [defendant’s 

status as drug user and presence in codefendant’s motel room 

from which heroin was thrown was “not sufficient to prove that 

he had any dominion or control over it”]; People v. Tabizon (1958) 

166 Cal.App.2d 271, 273 [defendant’s presence in motel room 

where drugs were found was insufficient to show possession 

because he “was not a tenant of motel room but was at most a

transient visitor”]; People v. Stanford (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 388, 

391 [defendant’s presence in home did not justify finding that he 

possessed narcotics found in bathroom because “he did not live 

there and therefore he did not have possession or control of the 

premises”]; People v. Fernandez (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 747, 755

[where narcotic was found in suit in dry cleaning shop during

time when defendant-owner had left shop in another’s care, his 

“ownership of the shop is not sufficient to justify an inference 

that he knew the narcotic was in the suit”]; People v. Van Syoc

(1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 370, 373 [defendant’s “mere ownership of 

an unlocked car parked in a public area in which marijuana is 

found and to which [he] has non-exclusive access” did not support

his conviction for marijuana possession]; In re I.A. (2020) 48 

Cal.App.5th 767, 779 [where defendant once touched gun that 

was later used in drive-by shooting but was not present in car 

from which gun was fired, evidence failed to establish that 

defendant “exercised dominion and control over the gun”].)
10

In this case, however, there was substantial evidence 

connecting Finch to the firearms inside the Oldsmobile beyond 

his ownership of the vehicle. Finch also had dominion and 

control over the backyard where the Oldsmobile was parked, the 

garage where ammunition compatible with one of the firearms 

was kept, and the common areas of the home where a photograph 

of the two firearms was stored on a computer. While Finch’s 

control over the premises was not exclusive to him given that he 

shared the residence with his girlfriend, no one other than Finch 

and Van was shown to have access to the various firearms and 

ammunition stored on their private property, and Van denied

any knowledge of the guns in Finch’s vehicle. On this record, the 

jury reasonably could conclude that Finch knowingly exercised 

dominion and control over the two firearms that were found 

inside his Oldsmobile. Accordingly, Finch’s convictions in 

counts 1 and 2 were supported by substantial evidence.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

WINDHAM, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J. EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.