[Cite as State v. Cole, 2010-Ohio-4774.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PICKAWAY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 09CA16 

 : 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

: DECISION AND 

v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

 : 

WILLIAM F. COLE, : 

 : Released 9/29/10 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

______________________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Lori Pritchard Clark, Circleville, Ohio, for appellant. 

Judy C. Wolford, PICKAWAY COUNTY PROSECUTOR, and Rose K. Vargo, 

PICKAWAY COUNTY ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR, Circleville, Ohio, for appellee. 

______________________________________________________________________ 

Harsha, J. 

{¶1} Following a jury trial, William F. Cole was convicted of felonious assault 

and abduction (both with firearm specifications) and simple assault. The charges 

stemmed from an incident in which Cole purportedly went to the home of Natasha 

Thompson, threatened her with a revolver, forced her to ride with him to another home, 

and beat her. On appeal, Cole contends that his conviction for felonious assault was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to show that he 

attempted to cause Thompson physical harm by means of a deadly weapon or 

dangerous ordnance. He also argues that the court erred when it sentenced him for the 

felonious assault offense. However, because the trial court failed to sentence Cole for 

one of the firearm specifications, part of the case remains pending, and there is no final, 
Pickaway App. No. 09CA16 2 

appealable order. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal because we lack 

jurisdiction to hear it. 

I. Facts 

{¶2} The Pickaway County grand jury indicted Cole for felonious assault, 

kidnapping, and simple assault. Cole pleaded not guilty to the charges. After a trial, a 

jury found Cole guilty of felonious assault, a second-degree felony, with a firearm 

specification. In addition, the jury found him not guilty of kidnapping but did find him 

guilty of the lesser included offense of abduction, a third-degree felony, with a firearm 

specification. The jury also found Cole guilty of assault, a first-degree misdemeanor. 

The trial court sentenced him to: 1.) eight years in prison for felonious assault; 2.) three 

years in prison for abduction; 3.) six months in prison for assault; and 4.) three years in 

prison for one of the firearm specifications. The court ordered Cole to serve his 

sentences for felonious assault, abduction, and assault concurrently to each other and 

consecutively to the sentence for the firearm specification, for an aggregate of 11 years 

in prison. The court’s judgment was silent concerning Cole’s sentence for the second 

firearm specification. This appeal followed. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶3} Cole assigns the following errors for our review: 

The State of Ohio failed to proved [sic] each and every element of the 

crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, the guilty verdict was 

entered against the manifest weight of the evidence in violation of due 

process. 

The trial [c]ourt erred to the prejudice of Defendant and abused it’s [sic] 

discretion when it sentenced him to the maximum prison term on the 
Pickaway App. No. 09CA16 3 

charge of Felonious Assault which was clearly and convincingly contrary 

to law.1

III. Final, Appealable Order 

{¶4} Before we address the merits of the appeal, we must decide whether we 

have jurisdiction to do so. Appellate courts “have such jurisdiction as may be provided 

by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of 

record inferior to the court of appeals within the district[.]” Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, 

Ohio Constitution; see, also, R.C. 2505.03(A); R.C. 2953.02. If a court’s order is not 

final and appealable, we have no jurisdiction to review the matter and must dismiss the 

appeal. Eddie v. Saunders, Gallia App. No. 07CA7, 2008-Ohio-4755, at ¶11. If the 

parties do not raise the jurisdictional issue, we must raise it sua sponte. Sexton v. 

Conley (Aug. 7, 2000), Scioto App. No. 99CA2655, 2000 WL 1137463, at *2. 

{¶5} “[I]n order to decide whether an order issued by a trial court in a criminal 

proceeding is a reviewable final order, appellate courts should apply the definitions of 

‘final order’ contained in R.C. 2505.02.” State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, at ¶6, quoting State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 444, 2001-

Ohio-93, 746 N.E.2d 1092. Under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), an order is a final order if it 

“affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents 

a judgment[.]” “Undoubtedly, a judgment of conviction qualifies as an order that ‘affects 

a substantial right’ and ‘determines the action and prevents a judgment’ in favor of the 

defendant.” Baker at ¶9. 

{¶6} “A judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 

when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon 

 

1

 Cole words this assignment of error differently on two pages of his brief, page iv and page 6. We used 

the wording on page iv in this decision 
Pickaway App. No. 09CA16 4 

which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) 

entry on the journal by the clerk of court.” Baker at syllabus, explaining Crim.R. 32(C). 

Moreover, if a defendant is convicted of multiple charges in a single case, the court’s 

order must contain a sentence for each charge before the judgment on any charge is 

final. State v. Phillis, Washington App. No. 06CA75, 2007-Ohio-6893, at ¶4, quoting 

State v. Garner, Trumbull App. No. 2002-T-0025, 2003-Ohio-5222, at ¶7 (“Absent the 

imposition of sentence on each and every offense for which [a defendant] was 

convicted, there is no final appealable order.”) See, also, State v. Goodwin, Summit 

App. No. 23337, 2007-Ohio-2343; State v. Crawford, Cuyahoga App. No. 91402, 2009-

Ohio-1880, at ¶5. Furthermore, allowing multiple documents to create a final 

appealable order is generally improper, and all required information must be present in 

a single document. Baker at ¶17. Cf. State v. Ketterer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio3831, at ¶17 (holding that “[c]apital cases, in which an R.C. 2929.03(F) sentencing 

opinion is necessary, are clear exceptions to Baker’s ‘one document’ rule”). 

{¶7} Here, the charges against Cole stemmed from a single indictment. 

Ultimately, the jury found him guilty of felonious assault and abduction, both with firearm 

specifications, and assault. The court imposed sentences for felonious assault, 

abduction, assault, and one of the firearm specifications. However, the court imposed 

no sentence on the other firearm specification. It is not clear whether the court 

sentenced him for the specification related to the felonious assault charge or the 

abduction charge. In any event, each firearm specification conviction required a 

separate three-year prison term. See R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(a)(ii); R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(b); 

R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(g). Because the court failed to impose any sentence with regard to 
Pickaway App. No. 09CA16 5 

 one of the firearm specifications, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final, appealable 

order.2

{¶8} We note one other problem with the judgment entry. A sentence for an 

offense that does not include a mandatory sentencing requirement is void. See State v. 

Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, at ¶16. Because the trial 

court failed to impose the mandatory three-year prison term for one of the firearm 

specifications, the sentence (or lack thereof) for that specification is void. See R.C. 

2929.14(D)(1)(a)(ii); R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(b); R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(g). However, this does 

not change our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to resolve this appeal. See State ex 

rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 931 N.E.2d 110, at ¶36 

(explaining that void judgments do not constitute final, appealable orders). 

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

 

2

 When the trial court sentences Cole for this firearm specification, it would be helpful if the court clarified 

the number of days in Cole’s sentence for the simple assault charge. At the sentencing hearing, the 

Court ordered Cole to serve a twelve month prison term for this offense. The sentence for a first-degree 

misdemeanor cannot exceed 180 days. R.C. 2929.24(A)(1). Apparently recognizing its misstatement, 

the sentencing entry indicates that the court sentenced Cole to “a period of SIX (6) MONTHS” in prison. 

However, given the variation in the number of days each month contains, the phrase “SIX (6) MONTHS” 

is ambiguous. See State v. DeSalvo, Mahoning App. No. 06MA3, 2007-Ohio-1411, at ¶24 (explaining the 

variation in the number of days each month contains). 
Pickaway App. No. 09CA16 6 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and that Appellant shall pay the 

costs. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway 

County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of 

this entry. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.

McFarland, P.J. and Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

For the Court 

BY: ________________________ 

 William H. Harsha, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.