In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 7, 2023

S23A0144. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.

 ELLINGTON, Justice.

A Toombs County jury found Israel Timothy Williams guilty of 

malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of 

a felony in connection with the shooting death of Brandon Colson.1

Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contends his 

trial counsel was ineffective, and argues that the trial court erred in 

 1 On November 14, 2019, a Toombs County grand jury indicted Williams 

and co-defendant Hollis Bryant for felony murder (Count 1), possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 2 and 4), malice murder 

(Count 3), and aggravated assault (Count 5). Bryant pled guilty to felony 

murder prior to trial. During a trial that began March 29, 2021, the jury found 

Williams guilty of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a crime, and aggravated assault and not guilty of felony murder. 

The court sentenced Williams to life in prison without parole for malice murder 

and to a consecutive five-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a crime. The trial court merged the aggravated assault count 

into the malice murder count at sentencing. Williams filed a motion for a new 

trial on April 5, 2021. New counsel entered an appearance on April 19, 2021, 

and filed an amended motion for a new trial on March 31, 2022. After a hearing 

held on April 21, 2022, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial on July 

21, 2022. On August 4, 2022, Williams filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was 

docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2022 and was 

submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2

denying his request for a jury instruction on coercion. Because 

Williams failed to carry his burden of showing reversible error, we 

affirm his convictions as well as the trial court’s order denying his 

motion for a new trial.

1. Williams contends that, because his co-defendant, Hollis 

Bryant, gave trial testimony exculpating Williams of the crimes, the 

evidence was constitutionally and statutorily insufficient to support 

his convictions by proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bryant testified at trial that he shot and killed Colson and that 

Williams was merely present when he committed the crime. Bryant, 

who pleaded guilty to murder prior to Williams’s trial, also testified

that the murder weapon belonged to him, not Williams. Further, 

Williams, who testified in his own defense, claimed that he only

helped Bryant conceal the murder because Bryant had coerced him 

into doing so. However, as explained below, the jury was authorized 

to reject this testimony and find, based upon other direct and 

circumstantial evidence, that both Williams and Bryant were 

parties to Colson’s murder, and that Williams killed Colson because 
3

Colson had quit his job while owing Williams thousands of dollars.

When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), 

we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable 

to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes 

for which he was convicted. See Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 679 (2)

(872 SE2d 722) (2022). In so doing, “[w]e leave to the trier of fact the 

resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility 

of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts, 

and we do not reweigh the evidence.” (Citations and punctuation 

omitted.) Id. Pursuant to Georgia statutory law, “[t]he testimony of 

an accomplice must be corroborated to sustain a felony conviction.” 

Yarn v. State, 305 Ga. 421, 423 (826 SE2d 1) (2019) (citing OCGA § 

24-14-8). Additionally, the jury may find a defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt if the evidence shows either that he directly 

committed the crime or that he was a “party thereto.” See OCGA § 
4

16-2-20 (a). A person is a party to the crime if he aids or abets in its 

commission or if he “advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or 

procures another” to commit it. Id. at (b) (4). See also Carter v. State, 

314 Ga. 317, 319 (2) (a) (877 SE2d 170) (2022). And although the 

defendant’s mere presence at the scene is not enough to convict him 

as a party to the crime, the jury may infer his criminal intent from 

his “presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after 

the offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 314 

Ga. 214, 231-232 (3) (875 SE2d 737) (2022).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the 

evidence presented at trial showed the following. At the time of his 

October 4, 2019 death, Colson lived in CKT Mobile Home Park in 

Lyons, Georgia, which was located behind Truax Veneer Company, 

where he, Williams, and Bryant worked. The three men knew each 

other from work and lived near each other. Also, Bryant’s cousin was 

married to Colson. Bryant’s wife, Kaleigh Dowd, testified that she 

and Bryant lived on a large, wooded property in Toombs County a 

few miles from Colson. Dowd testified that she knew Colson because 
5

he had been to their home a few times. She said that Williams and 

Bryant were much closer to each other than they were to Colson. 

She testified that Williams and Bryant had matching “GDB” tattoos 

that meant “Gorillas Don’t Bend.” 

About four weeks before his death, Colson and his stepfather, 

Shane Powell, went to CKT Mobile Home Park to rent Colson’s

home. Colson, who had separated from his wife, borrowed the money 

to rent his home from Williams. Williams, who met them there, 

engaged Colson in a conversation about hunting. Powell testified 

that he heard Williams say that he wanted to shoot somebody just 

to see what it would be like. Powell also heard Williams tell Colson 

that if they just shot Colson’s wife all of his problems would be over. 

Colson then looked at Williams as if to say “how do you come up with 

that?” Williams made similar comments to Gabriel Kersey, who 

worked with him at Truax Veneer and was Colson’s next-door 

neighbor. Kersey testified that Williams asked him and Colson if 

they had ever seen anyone who had been shot in the head, and when 

they said “no,” Williams replied: “They lay on the ground for a little 
6

while and twitch.” On another occasion, Williams told Kersey that 

he was going to put Colson’s “head on a stick and sight [his rifle 

scope] in on his f***ing head.” 

Dowd testified that, at about 2:30 p.m. on October 4, as she was 

getting ready to leave her home to pick up her children from school, 

Bryant gave her $200. When Dowd asked Bryant where he had 

gotten the money, he told her not to worry about it and then went 

back outside. Later that day, as it was getting dark, Dowd saw 

Bryant walking around outside with Williams. At one point, 

Williams came inside and asked for water bottles for Bryant and 

himself, but said nothing else. When Bryant went inside, Dowd 

noticed that he was dirty, as if he had been doing yardwork. He was 

also sweaty, pale, clammy, and had a “weird smell” about him. Dowd 

later came to believe that Bryant and Williams had murdered 

Colson that day and buried him on the property.

Colson’s daughter’s birthday was on October 4. When he

missed her birthday celebration, Colson’s wife called Bryant to ask 

if he had seen Colson, and Bryant said he had not. On Sunday, 
7

October 6, Colson’s neighbor, Kersey, sent a text message to Colson’s 

mother, Beverly Powell, stating he believed something was wrong 

because Colson failed to appear for a planned dinner at his home. 

After receiving the text, Powell went to her son’s home but found it 

locked. She drove to Williams’s home, but no one was there. Powell 

drove to the Toombs County Sheriff’s Department and reported her 

son missing. Shortly thereafter, an officer with the Lyons Police 

Department met with Powell, and she gave him the names of some 

of Colson’s friends. After speaking with Powell and doing some 

preliminary investigation, the officer turned the case over to 

Detective Andrew Britton. 

Detective Britton went to Truax Veneer, where he learned that 

the last time anyone had seen Colson was on Friday, October 4, 

when he picked up his paycheck. Colson cashed his paycheck that 

day around lunchtime. After the detective searched Colson’s trailer 

and saw that the windows were all intact and that nothing appeared 

broken or out of place, he went to see Williams, who, according to 

Colson’s mother, was likely the last person to have seen her son. 
8

Williams told the detective that Colson was having marital 

problems, was depressed, and quit his job on September 30. 

Williams said that he last saw Colson between noon and 1:15 p.m. 

on Friday, October 4. Detective Britton testified that, based on 

Williams’s hesitation and stuttering when answering questions, he 

suspected that Williams was not being entirely truthful with him, 

so he asked Williams to come to his office and give him an official

statement. 

On October 11, Williams gave a recorded statement to 

Detective Britton. Williams said that he drove Colson on Friday, 

October 4, to pick up his final check from Truax Veneer and then to 

the bank to cash it. Thereafter, he and Colson went to get something 

to eat and “hung out” at Williams’s home for a while. Williams said 

he dropped off Colson at his mobile home at 1:15 p.m. and then he 

drove back home after seeing Colson go inside. The detective 

testified that, during the interview, Williams appeared calm.

Colson’s neighbor, Kersey, testified that after Colson 

disappeared, Williams appeared to grow increasingly paranoid and 
9

stressed. Williams confronted Kersey about talking to law 

enforcement, telling him that he had “better quit running [his] 

mouth because the streets are talking[.]” Kersey testified that 

Williams also talked about missing persons reports and wondered 

how long it takes to find missing people. 

After ten days of searching for Colson without success, the 

Lyons Police Department asked the GBI for help. GBI Agents Craig 

Pittman and Jason Shoudel assisted in the investigation. Agent 

Pittman and Detective Britton interviewed Dowd and her friend and 

co-worker, Miyata Dixon, both of whom later testified at trial. Dowd 

testified that it was Dixon who first informed her that Colson was 

missing. Dixon also told Dowd that Williams and Bryant had 

bragged about “taking care of somebody.” Dowd confided in Dixon 

that she suspected that Williams and Bryant may have buried 

Colson on her property, based on the way Bryant was acting and 

how he smelled on the evening of October 4. Dowd later told Dixon 

that Bryant admitted to her that he and Williams had killed Colson 

and burned his body. Dixon shared this information with a friend of 
10

hers in law enforcement in a neighboring county, and ultimately 

with the law enforcement officials investigating Colson’s death. 

Agents Pittman and Shoudel arrested Bryant and interviewed 

him at the Toombs County Jail. In his recorded interview, which was 

played for the jury, Bryant initially claimed that someone named 

“Low-key” had killed Colson when a drug deal went bad on Dowd’s 

property. However, Bryant eventually admitted that the drug-deal 

story was a “back-up story” that he and Williams had concocted in 

the event that they were arrested. Bryant told the agents that 

Williams had loaned Colson money to rent a mobile home and was 

upset that Colson had quit his job before paying him back. Bryant 

admitted that Williams told him that it was “time to do something 

with [Colson]” and that he went along with it.

Bryant told the agents that Williams’s plan was to lure Colson 

out to the sandpit behind Bryant and Dowd’s home and to shoot 

Colson with Bryant’s shotgun, which is what they did. Bryant 

admitted that, after Colson “got hit in the head,” he helped Williams 

“do whatever” needed to be done. At Williams’s direction, Bryant
11

used his lawnmower to cut the grass, obscuring blood and brain 

matter spattered on the grass, while Williams dug a hole for Colson’s 

body. Bryant said that he owed Williams over $800, and that 

Williams said he would forgive the debt if Bryant helped him with 

the clean-up. Williams also took cash from Colson’s body and gave 

$200 of it to Bryant, which Bryant gave to Dowd after they buried 

the body. Bryant said their first attempt at digging a grave was 

thwarted by tree roots. So they dug a second grave in another area

and dragged Colson there by his feet. It was Williams’s idea to start 

a fire over the grave to burn the body. Later, after concealing the 

body, Williams went to Bryant’s home to smoke cigarettes. They did 

not talk about the murder. 

After interviewing Bryant, the agents arrested Williams. 

Agents Pittman and Shoudel interviewed Williams after he waived 

his rights under Miranda2 and agreed to speak with them. According 

to the agents, Williams appeared relaxed during the interview. In 

his recorded interview, which was played for the jury, Williams 

 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
12

admitted that he had loaned Colson over $1000 during the previous 

six months, but claimed that Colson always paid him back and that 

he and Colson had no disagreements. Williams said that Bryant had 

asked him and Colson to “hang out” at his house on October 4, and

they played video games for a couple hours before they went into the 

woods. Williams said he walked ahead of Bryant and Colson, who 

were walking beside each other. He said he heard a gunshot, turned 

around, saw Colson on the ground, and then witnessed Bryant shoot 

Colson “in the face a second time.” 

Williams maintained that it was Bryant, not him, who had shot 

and killed Colson, and that all he did was help Bryant bury the body. 

He further claimed that he did not know if Bryant had a plan to kill 

Colson, insisting he had just gotten “caught up” in what Bryant had 

done. He said he helped Bryant and did not call the police because 

he worried that Bryant would “come for” him or his family. Williams 

stated that, in the days after the shooting, he returned to Bryant’s 

house and used the murder weapon to do some target practice. When 

the agents asked Williams if that bothered him, he replied that he 
13

just tried to forget about the shooting. Williams claimed that he 

returned to Bryant’s property because he did not want Bryant to 

think anything was amiss.

On October 24, agents searched Bryant and Dowd’s property 

for Colson’s body. As they searched the wooded area behind the 

house, they saw a 20-foot-wide area where trees had been felled in a 

circle, as well as a pile of fallen limbs and trees piled about six feet 

high. It appeared that some of the trees were cut with a chainsaw, 

while others were cut with an axe. They also observed what 

appeared to be freshly disturbed soil and a sandy area where it 

looked like something had been burned. After removing the trees, 

the police found a water bottle containing suspected gasoline along 

with burned tree limbs. When cadaver dogs alerted to the presence 

of a body, the agents called Agent Matthew Bryan, a GBI forensic 

expert, to excavate the grave.

Agent Bryan testified that, as he made his way to the victim’s 

grave, he saw a lawnmower in the path as well as an area that 

looked as if it had been mowed recently. Further down the path he 
14

saw a long, shallow hole where it appeared someone had tried to dig, 

but there were too many tree roots to dig deeply. Upon locating the 

suspected grave-site, the agent began his forensic excavation. After 

removing burned logs, the agent found Colson’s body about two and 

a half feet beneath the surface. Agent Bryan processed the 

lawnmower blades on November 5, and they tested positive for 

human blood. Also, during a search of Bryant’s home, agents found 

the shotgun used to shoot Colson, a Remington R70 Express 

Magnum pump-action shotgun.

A GBI medical examiner performed an autopsy on Colson’s

body on October 25, 2019. He testified that the front of the skull was 

collapsed, with “a massive fragmentation” in the center of the face. 

The medical examiner found birdshot in the head and the hull of a 

shotgun shell inside the mouth. A second shot cup was found 

attached to Colson’s clothing. The medical examiner opined that the 

trajectory of the shot was slightly upward and that Colson was shot 

at close range. Colson’s shirt and body were both partially burned. 

While incarcerated at the Toombs County Jail, Williams called 
15

his mother and spoke to her about his case. During this recorded 

call, which was played for the jury, Williams told his mother that he 

asked his attorney to send “a paper” to Bryant instructing Bryant to 

say that Williams had nothing to do with the shooting, that Williams

had just been in the wrong place at the wrong time, and that Bryant 

was “in charge.” Williams’s mother told him to listen to his lawyer 

and “keep [his] story straight.” 

At trial, Bryant testified that he alone killed Colson. He said 

that he told the GBI agents that Williams was responsible because 

he was afraid and because he and his wife were expecting a child. 

Bryant testified that, after Williams and Colson got off work, they 

came over to his house. He said they walked around for a few 

minutes on his property and that he shot Colson. He testified that 

Williams did not participate in the shooting, but “was just kind of 

caught up in the moment.”

Williams testified in his own defense. He denied making a 

comment about shooting Colson’s wife, denied saying he wanted to 

know what it was like to kill someone, denied saying he wanted to 
16

sight his rifle on Colson’s head, denied bragging about having killed 

someone, and denied making a statement about someone getting 

shot in the head and watching them twitch. He also denied shooting 

Colson or having anything to do with his death, and further denied 

that he knew Bryant was going to shoot Colson. Williams testified 

that, although he was present when Bryant shot and killed Colson, 

his participation was limited to helping conceal the body. He said he 

did so because he “felt like [he] was part of it” and was afraid Bryant 

would “do something” to him or his family. He claimed that they 

went out to the sandpit area behind Bryant’s house to shoot at 

targets and that he was leading the way. He testified that, as they 

were walking, he heard a gunshot, turned around and saw the victim 

on the ground, and then saw Bryant shoot the victim a second time. 

Williams claimed that when Bryant told him to help him dispose of 

the body, he was “in shock” and did not know what to do, so he just 

walked over and helped him move the body. Williams said that after 

he did that, he did not “feel right,” so he left. 

Williams testified that, later that night, he agreed to return to 
17

Bryant’s house to help bury the body to show that he was not going 

to the police. He said that Bryant told him the body was already 

burned and that all Williams needed to do was help cover up the 

grave. Williams said he helped push dirt in the grave. After they 

were done, Williams said he stayed at Bryant’s house for about 30 

more minutes and then went home. Williams admitted that, at the 

time he was interviewed by Detective Britton on October 11, he 

knew Colson was dead, but did not tell the truth. He admitted that 

he did not tell law enforcement in his interviews that he was afraid 

of Bryant or that Bryant had threatened him. He further admitted 

that he had loaned Colson about $1000, but claimed he had forgiven 

the debt the same day Colson died. Williams testified that he and 

Bryant both had “GDB” tattoos because they belonged to the same

“clique.” Colson was not a member of that clique. Finally, Williams 

admitted going out with Bryant after the shooting and using the 

murder weapon to shoot at metal barrels, which Williams described 

as “playing around.” 

Williams argues that this evidence was both constitutionally
18

and statutorily insufficient to support his convictions for malice 

murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime 

because it shows that he did not intend to kill Colson and was not a

party to the crimes. He relies on Bryant’s trial testimony as well as 

his own testimony to prove that his involvement was limited to 

helping conceal the murder and that he did so under duress. 

However, Bryant gave a recorded statement in which he described 

in detail Williams’s involvement in the murder immediately prior to, 

during, and after the murder, and further testified that the attack 

on Colson was Williams’s idea and motivated by Colson’s failure to 

repay a debt he owed Williams. To the extent Bryant’s statement

conflicts with his and Williams’s trial testimony, any conflicts or 

inconsistencies were for the jury to resolve, and the jury was entitled 

to disbelieve Williams’s testimony and to reject his defense theory.

See Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551, 553 (1) (783 SE2d 891) (2016) (“[I]t 

is axiomatic that resolving evidentiary conflicts and assessing 

witness credibility are within the exclusive province of the jury.” 

(citing Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. 284, 285 (1) (527 SE2d 872) 
19

(2000)). 

Further, Bryant’s statement to the police was sufficiently 

corroborated. When the only witness to testify at trial on the issue 

of the defendant’s participation is an accomplice, corroborating 

evidence is required to support a guilty verdict. See Edwards v. 

State, 299 Ga. 20, 22 (1) (785 SE2d 869) (2016). Whether accomplice 

testimony has been sufficiently corroborated is a question for the 

jury, and even slight corroborating evidence of a defendant’s 

participation in a crime is sufficient. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 313 

Ga. 325, 329 (1) (869 SE2d 389) (2022); Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582, 

588 (2) (a) (820 SE2d 679) (2018); Parks v. State, 302 Ga. 345, 348 

(806 SE2d 529) (2017). 

Here, the forensic evidence and the testimony of other 

witnesses both corroborate Bryant’s custodial statement and show

that Williams participated in the murder. Dixon testified that 

Williams and Bryant both bragged about “taking care of somebody.”

Dowd testified that she saw Williams and Bryant walking around in 

her yard together on the night Colson disappeared, that Bryant gave 
20

her $200, and that Bryant later admitted to her that he and 

Williams had killed Colson and buried his body on the property. 

Witnesses testified about Williams’s desire to shoot someone in the 

head, about Williams’s desire to shoot Colson’s head specifically, and 

about Williams’s paranoia after Colson disappeared. Williams also 

admitted being present during the murder and acknowledged that 

Colson had owed him money. The State presented evidence that 

Williams and Bryant were close friends and that Williams had sent 

Bryant instructions to testify that Williams was not involved in the 

killing. And the forensic evidence, including the location of the grave 

sites and the blood evidence on the lawnmower, was consistent with 

details from Bryant’s custodial statement. Finally, even though 

Williams testified that the extent of his involvement was to help

Bryant conceal the murder because he felt coerced to do so, Williams 

never told law enforcement that he had been threatened by Bryant 

to participate in the crimes. Moreover, the jury could infer from 

testimony about Williams and Bryant spending time together after 

the murder, “playing around” and doing target practice with the 
21

murder weapon, that Williams did not feel coerced. 

Thus, despite conflicts in the evidence regarding Williams’s

particular role in Colson’s murder, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the evidence was both 

constitutionally and statutorily sufficient for the jury to find 

Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes

of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission 

of a felony. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B); Eckman v. State, 

274 Ga. 63, 65 (1) (548 SE2d 310) (2001) (concluding that the 

evidence was sufficient to find that defendant was a party to the 

crimes where, inter alia, she was present when the crimes were 

committed, fled the crime scene with her companions, and “used the 

fruits” of the crimes). See also Sams v. State, 314 Ga. 306, 312 (2) (b)

(875 SE2d 757) (2022) (holding that testimony of an accomplice, in 

addition to non-accomplice evidence, was sufficient to corroborate 

accomplice testimony); Floyd v. State, 272 Ga. 65, 66 (1) (525 SE2d 

683) (2000) (defendant’s own statements served to corroborate 

accomplice testimony).
22

2. Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move for a directed verdict. To prevail on his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams must show that his 

counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that the 

deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable 

likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial 

would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If Williams fails to meet 

his burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the 

reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong. See id. at 

697 (IV); Nelson v. State, 285 Ga. 838, 839 (2) (684 SE2d 613) (2009).

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, “we accept the trial court’s 

factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly 

erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the 

facts.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nelson, 285 Ga. at 839 

(2).

As stated in Division 1, supra, the evidence presented was

sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts beyond a reasonable 
23

doubt. Had counsel made a motion for a directed verdict, it would 

have been meritless, and failing to file a meritless motion is not 

deficient performance. See Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 499 (2) (c) 

(842 SE2d 22) (2020) (failing to file a meritless motion to suppress 

is not deficient performance); Nelson, 285 Ga. at 839 (2) (“[C]ounsel’s 

failure to move for a directed verdict presents an insufficient ground 

as a matter of law for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.”);

Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 880 (608 SE2d 229) (2005) (“In light of this 

Court’s holding . . . that the evidence adduced at trial satisfied the 

requirements of Jackson v. Virginia, counsel’s failure to move for a 

directed verdict presents an insufficient ground as a matter of law 

for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.”(citations and 

punctuation omitted)). Id. Having failed to show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient in this respect, Williams has not carried 

his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (IV); 

Nelson, 285 Ga. at 839 (2).

3. Williams contends that the evidence warranted a jury 
24

instruction on the defense of coercion, given that he testified that he 

was scared, in shock, and worried about what Bryant would do to 

him or his family if he did not “go along with” Bryant’s crime and 

help him conceal the body. Given this evidence, Williams contends 

the trial court committed reversible error in denying his request for 

a charge on coercion. Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in 

failing to give the coercion charge, we conclude that any error was 

harmless.

During trial, the trial court and the parties discussed whether 

a jury instruction on the defense of coercion should be given. The 

trial court stated that coercion cannot be a defense to malice murder; 

indeed, OCGA § 16-3-26 explicitly provides that coercion is not a 

defense to the crime of murder.3 See Frazier v. State, 309 Ga. 219, 

229 (3) (845 SE2d 579) (2020). Williams’s counsel agreed, but argued 

that the defense of coercion could apply to Williams’s aggravated 

 3 “A person is not guilty of a crime, except murder, if the act upon which 

the supposed criminal liability is based is performed under such coercion that 

the person reasonably believes that performing the act is the only way to 

prevent his imminent death or great bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-3-26.
25

assault charge. The trial court reserved ruling until the charge 

conference, where it revisited the issue. After hearing counsel’s 

arguments, the trial court found that there was no evidence 

supporting a charge on coercion:

There’s no evidence here of coercion. There’s no evidence 

of a threat. There’s no evidence of any violence. There’s 

no evidence that [Bryant] threatened him and made him 

do it. There’s just no evidence of coercion . . . . [“]I thought 

he might get mad if I didn’t help him,[”] is not coercion. 

Williams then renewed his request for the charge, and the trial court 

denied it.

As Williams states in his appellate brief, a jury instruction on 

the defense of coercion, though inapplicable to malice murder, could

apply to the “other felonies” for which he was charged.4 See Frazier, 

 4 In his appellate brief, Williams does not specifically argue that the trial 

court should have instructed the jury that coercion could be a defense to his 

felony murder, aggravated assault, or firearms possession charges. Rather, he 

states that there was “clear evidence that [Williams] was coerced into 

cooperating, to the extent that he did, with [Bryant].” Williams testified that 

the extent of his participation in the charged crimes was in helping Bryant 

conceal Colson’s body. Williams, however, was not charged with concealing 

Colson’s death. Also, Williams was acquitted of felony murder and his 

aggravated assault count merged with his malice murder conviction. This

Court generally treats as moot a claim of instructional error that only affects

a count that has not resulted in a conviction because of acquittal or merger. 
26

309 Ga. at 229 (3). But, in order to be entitled to the instruction, 

there must be at least slight evidence supporting a charge on

coercion. See Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 833-834 (843 SE2d 870) 

(2020) (“There need be only slight evidence supporting the theory of 

the charge to authorize a requested jury instruction.”).

Pretermitting whether such slight evidence existed warranting an 

instruction on the defense of coercion, the trial court’s failure to give 

the requested charge was harmless error given that the evidence of 

Williams’s guilt for the crimes of which he was convicted was 

substantial, and it is therefore highly probable that the failure to 

 

See Williams v. State, 313 Ga. 325, 332 (4) (869 SE2d 389) (2022) (“Because 

the jury found [the defendant] guilty of malice murder, the felony murder count 

was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault that formed the 

predicate for the felony murder count was merged into the malice murder 

conviction. Any enumerated error with regard to jury instructions on felony 

murder or the underlying aggravated assault is therefore moot.” (citations

omitted)); Solomon v. State, 304 Ga. 846, 849 (823 SE2d 265) (2019) (“[T]he 

aggravated assault merged with the murder, and [the defendant] was not 

convicted of aggravated assault. Accordingly, his claim of error with respect to 

the instruction on aggravated assault is moot.” (citations omitted)). Further, 

this Court has expressly reserved the question of whether coercion can be a 

defense to felony murder. See Frazier, 309 Ga. at 229 n.11; Brooks v. State, 305 

Ga. 600, 605 n.4 (826 SE2d 45) (2019). Thus, the only remaining offense to 

which the coercion defense arguably might have applied is possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a crime.
27

instruct the jury on the defense of coercion did not contribute to the 

jury’s verdicts. See, e.g., Shah v. State, 300 Ga. 14, 21 (2) (b) (793 

SE2d 81) (2016) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional 

harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not 

contribute to the verdict.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); 

Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 797 (2) (756 SE2d 507) (2014) (“The 

fact that the failure to give the instruction where warranted is error 

does not, of course, necessarily demand reversal. A conviction in a 

criminal case will not be reversed when it is highly probable that an 

erroneous jury instruction did not contribute to the verdict.”

(citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted)).

Here, the evidence of Williams’s guilt, as summarized above, 

was substantial and compelling. It showed that Williams was, at a 

minimum, a party to the crimes of murder and possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a crime. But the State also 

presented evidence from which the jury could infer that Williams 

was the shooter. As discussed more fully in Division 1, the forensic 

evidence and the testimony of a number of other witnesses 
28

corroborated Bryant’s custodial statement concerning the 

circumstances of the murder. The evidence showed that Williams 

was angry with Colson for quitting his job before paying him back

and that Williams had expressed his desire to shoot Colson in the 

head. The evidence also shows that Williams was in control: He paid 

Bryant to help him clean up the crime scene and dispose of Colson’s 

body and he instructed Bryant to testify that Williams was not 

involved in the killing. Also, the jury was properly instructed, among 

other things, on the presumption of innocence, circumstantial 

evidence, credibility of witnesses, mere presence, parties to a crime, 

the elements of the crimes charged, and the State’s burden to prove 

every essential element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable 

doubt.

Accordingly, we conclude that it is highly probable that the 

trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on coercion did not contribute 

to the verdicts. Error, if any, in the trial court’s failure to give a 

charge on coercion was harmless and does not require a new trial. 

See Hodges v. State, 302 Ga. 564, 568 (3) (807 SE2d 856) (2017) (It 
29

was highly probable that the trial court’s refusal to charge on 

coercion did not contribute to the felony murder verdict given the 

compelling evidence of the defendant’s participation in the 

underlying armed robbery.). See also Rogers v. State, 289 Ga. 675, 

677-78 (2) (715 SE2d 68) (2011) (no reversible error in failing to give 

involuntary manslaughter charge where there was overwhelming 

evidence inconsistent with appellant’s version of events but 

supportive of the jury’s finding him guilty of malice murder).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.