alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**CERTIFICATION        OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT        TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|  | (1) | The                  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or                  15(d) of                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                  and |
|--|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | The                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of                  the                  Company. |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                      May 15, 2008 | By:    | /s/                      Annette Eggert                                 |   |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                    |   | Annette                      Eggert                                     |   |
|                                    |   | Chief                      Financial Officer                            |   |
|                                    |   | (Principal                      Financial                      Officer) |   |

----
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2239 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2239

            To suspend temporarily the duty on Metconazole.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

Mrs. Feinstein introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
            To suspend temporarily the duty on Metconazole.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. METCONAZOLE.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00      (1RS, 5RS; 1RS,     Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                        5SR)-5-(4-                                                         31/2011.......
                        chlorobenzyl)-2,2-
                        dimethyl-1-(1H-
                        1,2,4-triazol-1-
                        ylmethyl)cyclopen
                        tanol (CAS No.
                        125116-23-6)
                        (provided for in
                        subheading
                        2933.99.22)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT
32.1





Certification
by the Chief Executive Officer


of


Boardwalk
GP, LLC


pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


(as
adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)








Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the
undersigned chief executive officer of Boardwalk GP, LLC, hereby certifies, to
such officer’s knowledge, that the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period
ended March 31, 2009, (the "Report") of Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, (the
“Partnership”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Partnership.





April 29,
2009


/s/ Rolf A.
Gafvert


Rolf A.
Gafvert


President,
Chief Executive Officer and Director


(Principal
Executive Officer)
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-50825

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAY SANTAANA,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-96-CR-96-1

- - - - - - - - - -

February 21, 1997

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ray SantaAna appeals the sentence he received after he

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine and distribution of cocaine. He argues that he should

have received an adjustment for his acceptance of responsibility

of his offense. We have reviewed the record and the briefs of

the parties and AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district

court. See United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1372 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1861, 2119 (1994).

AFFIRMED.
#### EL PONCE de LEON CONVALESCENT CENTER, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Appellee.

No. 86-725.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 10, 1987.

Broad and Cassel and Richard E. Reek-son, Miami, for appellant.

Theodore E. Mack, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON, and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final order of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) denying El Ponce de Leon Convalescent Center’s (El Ponce) request for an interim rate increase. We affirm on the authority of *Greynolds Park Manor, Inc. v. State,*496 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (HRS’s interpretation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 10C-7.-48(6)(i) prohibiting retroactive payments for a closed cost reporting period upheld).

El Ponce’s alternative argument is that HRS is estopped from denying the rate increase due to alleged representations made by certain key HRS employees. The hearing examiner found that no state employee represented to El Ponce that adjustments for alleged underpayments could be reimbursed following the close of the cost reporting period. El Ponce’s claim that such a statement was made involves a credibility determination which was resolved adversely to El Ponce by the hearing examiner. We will not disturb the hearing examiner’s assessment of witness credibility where it is supported by the record.

The other points raised by El Ponce are without merit.

The final order of HRS is, accordingly,

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1

Section 906 Certification

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of NCI, Inc. (the Company)
for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company
certifies, to the best of his knowledge and belief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |                                     
|----------------- |  | ------------------------------------
|Date: May 9, 2006 |  | /s/ Charles K Narang                
|                  |  | Charles K. Narang                   
|                  |  | Chairman of the Board,              
|                  |  | Chief Executive Officer and Director
|                  |  | (Principal Executive Officer)       

A signed original of the written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to NCI, Inc. and will be
retained by NCI, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



25
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7433

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CALVIN TYRONE YOUNG, a/k/a Too Short,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (4:96-cr-00243-NCT-1; 1:12-cv00368-NCT-JEP)

Submitted: January 14, 2016 Decided: January 20, 2016

Before AGEE, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Calvin Tyrone Young, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Michael Hamilton, 

Michael Francis Joseph, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United

States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Calvin Tyrone Young seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order 

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Young has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability, deny Young’s motion to appoint 

counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 
3

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Felipe N. Perez et al., Respondents, v Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center et al., Appellants.

In a medical malpractice action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants separately appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Roberto, J.), dated November 8, 1989, which denied their separate motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 for failure to prosecute.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motions are granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

We agree with the defendants’ contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying their motions to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute. The record reveals that the instant malpractice action was commenced in 1981, predicated upon acts of alleged malpractice which were committed in 1978. The plaintiff Felipe Perez sustained an injury to his left little finger and was treated by the defendants. He claims that he sustained a loss of mobility in his finger as a result of the defendants’ negligence. In general, however, the plaintiffs have failed to actively pursue this matter. Twice the defendants were forced to resort to judicial intervention to compel discovery. It appears that the plaintiffs responded to their disclosure obligations only under threat of preclusion or dismissal. Under circumstances such as these, although the instant delay in serving a note of issue and certificate of readiness was comparatively short, we find the plaintiffs’ excuse, that counsel’s long-time secretary had retired, thus disrupting the efficient functioning of his law office, to be *531insufficient to constitute a justifiable excuse for the delay *(see, Nichols v Agents Serv. Corp.,*133 AD2d 912).

Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ opposition to the defendants’ separate motions was not supported by an affidavit of merit by an expert physician, a requirement crucial to support this malpractice action *(see, Fiore v Galang,*64 NY2d 999). Rather, the plaintiffs’ claims of malpractice were purportedly substantiated by an unsworn letter from a physician who concluded that the loss of motion sustained by Mr. Perez in his injured finger was not an uncommon complication of the type of injury he sustained and who found it "difficult to establish with reasonable medical certainty that a deviation from normal standard practice * * * occurred”. Such an unsworn statement which tends to negate any claim that Mr. Perez possessed a meritorious medical malpractice cause of action can hardly be said to constitute an affidavit of merit *(see, Brice v Westchester Community Health Plan,*143 AD2d 170). Accordingly, the defendants’ respective motions to dismiss are granted *(see, Mistrulli v Kings Highway Hosp.,*139 AD2d 707; *Groves v City of Newburgh,*126 AD2d 605; *Vernon v Nassau County Med. Center,*102 AD2d 852). Kunzeman, J. P., Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1



                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 33-98212) pertaining to the 1995 Stock Option/Stock Issuance Plan,
Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Logic Works, Inc. of our report dated February
10, 1998, except for Note 14 as to which the date is March 14, 1998, with
respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule, included in this
Annual Report (Form 10-K) of Logic Works, Inc.



                                                              Ernst & Young LLP

Princeton, New Jersey
March 25, 1998
EDGAR HTML



      

      

         


      



      Exhibit 4.1
      


      THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
      


      NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON 


      240 GREENWICH STREET, 22W FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10286 


        


      November 24, 2020 


        


      Hennion & Walsh, Inc. 


      2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza 


      Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 


      SmartTrust 498 (the “Fund”)
      


      Dear Sirs: 


      The Bank of New York Mellon is acting as trustee for the Fund, consisting of the unit investment trusts (the “Trusts”) included in the Registration Statement relating to the Fund. We enclosed a list of the securities to be deposited in the Trusts on the date hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our evaluation of such securities as of close of business on November 23, 2020, in accordance with the valuation method set forth in the applicable Standard Terms and Conditions of Trust and Trust Agreements. We consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations of the Trust securities in the Registration Statement (No. 333-248065) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the registration of the sale of the Units of the Trusts and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.
      


      


      
         	

                  


               	

                  Very truly yours, 


               
	

                    


               	

                    


               
	

                  


               	

                  /s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO 


               
	

                  


               	

                  Gerardo Cipriano 


               
	

                  


               	

                  Vice President
#### The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, In the Interest of D.G., Minor Child-Appellant, And Concerning M.G., Respondent.

No. 85CA1169.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Aug. 21, 1986.

*1167Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Cynthia A. Savage, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-ap-pellee.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Karen M. Ashby, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for minor child-appellant.

No appearance for respondent.

STERNBERG, Judge.

Following a delinquency adjudication based upon D.G.’s admission of one count of aggravated robbery and one count of violent juvenile offender, the juvenile court committed D.G. to the department of institutions for a period of two years, no less than one year of which was to be spent in a juvenile institution. Thereafter, D.G. filed a motion pursuant to Crim.P. 35(c) seeking to have this disposition vacated. In reliance on *People v. Montoya,*709 P.2d 58 (Colo.App.1985) (cert, granted November 18, 1985), he argued that the application of the violent juvenile offender provision, § 19-3-113.1(1), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.), to the charge of aggravated robbery, § 18-4-302, C.R.S. (1978 RepLVol. 8), constituted a violation of equal protection. The juvenile court denied D.G.’s motion. On appeal by D.G., we affirm.

In *People v. Haymaker,*716 P.2d 110 (Colo.1986), the supreme court expressly disapproved *Montoya,*holding that the imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range under § 18-l-105(9)(a)(I), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) for conviction of a crime of violence under § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) did not deny the defendant due process or equal protection. *See also People v. Mozee,*723 P.2d 117 (Colo.1986); *People v. Vigil,*718 P.2d 496 (Colo.1986); *People v. Powell,*716 P.2d 1096 (Colo.1986). The violent juvenile offender statute is similar to the crime of violence statute in that it does not create a separate and distinct offense; instead, it is a dispositional statute associated with the underlying delinquent act. *People in Interest of M.A.W.,*651 P.2d 433 (Colo.App.1982); § 19-1-103(28), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.). Accordingly, the analysis in *People v. Haymaker, supra,*applies and we hold there was no equal protection violation here.

Order affirmed.

PIERCE and METZGER, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Charys Holding Company, Inc.(the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended April 30, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Raymond J. Smith, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

     1.     The  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     2.     The  information  contained  in  the  Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Date: September 2, 2005

                                 /s/ Raymond J. Smith
                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                 Raymond J. Smith, Chief Financial Officer


<PAGE>
#### Marion R. Fitzgerald, Wife of/and Thomas P. FITZGERALD v. Lowell M. HURWITZ, M.D., and Chalmette General Hospital.

No. CA-7316.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Dec. 15, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1988.

Gerald J. Martinez, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael J. Furman, Deborah Cunningham Foshee, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.

Before GARRISON, WILLIAMS and CADE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court granting an exception of pre*413maturity and dismissing plaintiff’s suit *without prejudice.*From that judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Lowell M. Hurwitz and Chalmette General Hospital. Dr. Hurwitz is a health care provider certified as an enrollee under medical malpractice review panel. Plaintiff failed to file a claim under the panel prior to institution of suit as required under R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(l)(a)(i). Accordingly, the exception of prematurity was properly granted.

Plaintiff raises a totally irrelevant argument on the constitutionality of “caps” which has nothing to do with an exception of prematurity. This argument is totally without merit.

For the reasons discussed, the judgment below is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.
#### Josephine Augello MAYEUX, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Children, James Joseph Mayeux, Jodie Marie Mayeux, and Eugene Paul Mayeux v. WEISER SECURITY SERVICES, INC., d/b/a Weiser Detective Agency.

No. 87-C-1375.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 25, 1987.

In re Mayeux, Josephine Augello, Ind.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or re*455view; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-6780; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “L”, No. 84-2754.

Prior report: La.App., 508 So.2d 132.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.