COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Kelsey and Huff Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia BRYAN P. PILATI OPINION BY v. Record No. 0762

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- 1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY DECMEBER 6, 2011 SHARON B. PILATI FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY Randolph T. West , Judge Designate Roy H. Lasris for appellant. E. Th omas C ox for appellee. In this divorce proceeding, t he trial court awarded permanent spousal support to Sharon
B. Pilati . Her husband, Bryan P. Pilati, appeals the support order claiming the trial court did not provide sufficient “ w ritten findings and co nclusions” as required by Code § 20

- 107.1(F). We agree and remand for purposes of complying with this statutory mandate.

I. During the parties’ divorce proceeding, wife sought an award of permanent spousal support. B oth parties provided the trial court with written proffers of fact regarding the statutory factors of Code § 20

- 107.1

. T he court conducted an evidentiary hearing and announced from the
bench an award of $600 a month in spousal support to wife

. Husband’s counsel later objected to the entry o f the support order on the ground that the trial court had not provided sufficient

“ written findings and conclusions” as required by Code § 20

- 107.1(F). App. at 55. The trial court heard argument on the objection and ordered the parties to brief the rele vant statutory factors. The brief filed by wife’s counsel surveyed the evidence supporting the court’s award and recommended findings based upon th at evidence. The brief filed by husband’s counsel proposed findings in support of withholding any award of spousal support.- 2

- The trial court issued a letter opinion that included an itemized list paraphrasing most, but not all, of the statutory factor s listed in Code § 20

- 107.1(E)

. The letter opinion stated the court had “considered the following” in making it s support award : 1. The obligations, needs and financial resources of the parties, including but not limited to income from all sources; 2. The standard of living established during the marriage which the Court found to be high middle class; 3. The duration of the marriage which the Court found to be 22 years; 4. The contribution, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the wellbeing of the family; 5. The property interest of the parties, both real and personal, tangible and intangible; 6. The provisions made with regard to the mar i tal property; 7. the earning capacity of the parties; 8. t he actions of the parties in the dissolution of the marriage although final decree granted on separation for period of 1 year; [and] 9. Such other factors, including tax consequences to each party , as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties. App. at 39. In this recitation, the only mention of any factfinding specific to this case were the findings that the parties had been married “22 years” and enjoyed a “high middle class” st andard of living. Id. The letter opinion ended with the court ’s acknowledgment that husband would continue to pay the mortgage on the marital home until it s sale

. The court entered an order awarding $600 a month in spousal support to wife. The order

re ferred to “rulings” from the bench at the evidentiary hearing and the “ reasons set forth” in its letter opinion , attached as an exhibit to the order

. Id. at 41. Husband’s counsel objected to the order on the ground that neither it nor the letter opi ni on provided sufficient “ written findings and conclusions” as required by Code § 20

- 107.1(F).- 3

- After entry of the order, the parties provided the court with an agreed

- upon statement of facts in lieu of a transcript pursuant to Rule 5A:8(c). The statement of fa cts did not recite any findings or conclusions announced by the court at the evidentiary hearing. Instead, it stated that
the court’s letter opinion provided the “written findings and list of factors rendered pursuant to § 20

- 107.1 which [the court] consi dered in making its $600 per month award (letter attached).” App. at 55. The court signed the statement of facts and added a handwritten addendum : “Although court in [its] letter listed only certain factors under § 20

- 107.1

— all factors were
considered .” Id.
II. In Virginia, a trial court has no common law duty to explain in any detail the reasoning supporting its judgments. Absent a statutory requirement to do so, “ a trial court is not required to give findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Fitz gerald v. Commonwealth , 223 Va. 615,
627 , 292 S.E.2d 798 , 80 5 (1982) . Nor is a trial judge “ required to give any written explanation for his signed, written order.” Bennett v. Commonwealth , 33 Va. App. 335, 345, 533 S.E.2d 22, 27 (2000) ( en banc ).
Trial judges sometimes refrain from providing a detailed explanation because they think
“the reasons self evident.” Freeman v. Peyton , 207 Va. 194, 196, 148 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1966 )

. Others may conclude that, in some cases, saying too much is as detrimental as s aying too little.
The correct balance depends on the unique context of each case, the informative value of an explanation, and the possibility of inflaming an interminable dispute with an overly detailed explanation. With few exceptions, w hen no specific explanation is given by a trial court, we presume the court followed the governing legal principles , White v. White , 56 Va. App. 214, 217, 692 S.E.2d 289, 290

- 91 (2010) , and resolved all factual contests favorable to the prevailing party , James v. Commonw ealth , 53 Va. App. 671, 680 n.2, 674 S.E.2d 571, 576 , n.2 (2009)

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- By statute, however, the General Assembly has identifie d certain decisions that uniquely warrant an explanation by the trial court. Many involve domestic relations disputes. When a trial court rules on child custody and visitation issues, for example, Code § 20

- 124.3 requires the
court to “communicate to the parties the basis for the decision either orally or in writing.” To satisfy this requirement, “ the trial court must provide a case

- s pecific explanation (one that finds its contextual meaning from the evidence before the court) of the fundamental, predominating
reason or reasons for the decision.” Kane v. Szymczak , 41 Va. App. 365, 373, 585 S.E.2d 349,
353 (2003 ) ; see also Artis v. Jon es , 52 Va. App. 356, 363, 663 S.E.2d 521, 524 (2008); Lanzalotti v. Lanzalotti , 41 Va. App. 550, 5 55, 586 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2003).
In cases involving requests for spousal support for an undefined duration , the General Assembly has expressed the duty

- to

- exp lain requirement this way: “I n contested cases in the circuit courts, any order granting, reserving or denying a request for spousal support shall be accompanied by written findings and conclusions of the court identifying the factors in
subse ction E whic h support the court’ s order. ” Code § 20

- 107.1( F ). 1 This provision requires
more than merely communicating “the fundamental, predominating reason or reasons for the
decision.” Kane , 41 Va. App. at 373 , 585 S.E.2d at 353 (interpreting Code § 20

- 124.3)

. I nstead,

t o comply with Code § 20

- 107.1(F ), the trial court should identif y all relevant statutory factor s supporting its decision and provide a n explanation of its resolution of any significant underlying factual disputes. See Benzine v. Benzine , 52 Va. A pp. 256, 261, 663 S.E.2d 105, 108 (2008). 2

1 F or a particular kind of spousal support awa rd

— a defined duration award

— the trial court’s findings must go further and “identify the basis for the nature, amount and duration of the award and, if appropriate, a specification of the events and circumstances reasonably contemplated by the court wh ich support the award.” Code § 20

- 107.1( F ). This difference in degree requires the trial court to address the unique circumstances justifying this type of award.
2 Prior to the enactment of Code § 20

- 107.1(F) in 1998, “when a trial court failed to make f

actual findings or present any explanation of the circumstances that influenced its decision- 5

- The written explanation requirement can be satisfied by trial court orders, written letter opinions filed in the court’s record, oral rulings “from the bench” recorded in a written transcript,
Bruemmer v. Bruemmer , 46 Va. App. 205, 210, 616 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2005), as well as findings and conclusions recorded in a statement of facts in lieu of a transcript pursuant to Rule 5A:8(c). In each of these instances, the trial court’s findings and conclusions may incorpora te by
reference proffers by the parties

. See , e.g. , West v. West , 53 Va. App. 125, 132, 669 S.E.2d 390,
3 94 (2008) (noting “the trial court expressly stated in its final decree that ‘the statutory factors outlined by [mother] at [T]ab 12 . . . are convinc ing in their detail’”). The statutory duty to explain a decision , of course , does not change the nature of the
decision itself. The General Assembly did not intend the statutory decisionm aking factors to devolve into an algorithm and thereby project a pre tense of certitude. No judge who has ever made such decisions would describe the thought process in this way. W hile a trial judge must
consider all the factors , the judge is not “required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or
consideration it h as given to each of the statutory factors.” Duva v. Duva , 55 Va. App. 286, 300, 685 S.E.2d 842, 849 (2009) (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. Robinson , 54 Va. App. 87, 91, 675 S.E.2d 873, 875 (2009). “What weight, if any, to assign to this [or that ] factor in the
overall decis ion lies within the trial court’ s sound discretion. ” Robbins v. Robbins , 48 Va. App. 466, 481, 632 S.E.2d 615, 622 (2006) (citation omitted).
In this case , we conclude t he trial court’s letter opinion provide d the litigants wi th an inadequate explanation of the court’s decision. T he trial court paraphrase d many of the statutory
factors but made only two specific findings of fact: T he parties had been married “22 years” and
regarding spousal support, we could examine the record to determine if the trial court’s decision was supported by evidence relevant to the statutory factors.” Ro binson v. Robinson , 50 Va. App. 189, 195, 648 S.E.2d 314, 317 (2007) (citation omitted)

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- enjoyed a “high middle class” standard of living. Ap p. at 39. The competing letter briefs submitted by the parties , however, reveal ed significant factual disputes on other factors and proffer ed very different proposed resolutions . As husband’s counsel stated in his brief : There was major conflict as to th e causes leading up to the breakup of the marriage (20

- 107.1(A)). Mrs. Pilati asserted that it was because of her husband’s infidelity (his viewing pornography and his visiting prostitutes) that caused their marriage to end. Mr. Pilati asserted that the marriage was “over” many years ago and that his viewing pornography and his visiting prostitutes was simply eviden ce that the marriage was broken. Id

. at 32. The trial court did not expressly resolve this “major conflict,” id. , in its ruling. And

t his om ission cannot be dismissed as legally insignificant. 3 “In Virginia, when ‘ a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial abi lity, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage. ’” Brandau v. Brandau , 52 Va. App. 632, 637, 666 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2008) (quoting
Gamble v. Gamble , 14 Va. App. 558, 573

- 74, 421 S .E.2d 635, 644 (1992) ). Additional conflicts in the evidence arose out of the parties ’ differing positions on wife’s income earning potential, App. at 32

- 33, her alleged inclusion of adult child expenses in her household budget offered in support of her s pousal support claim, id. at 33, and husband’s alleged understatement of his income and overstatement of his expenses, id. at 33, 35

- 36. These

3 See Code § 20

- 107.1(E) (requiring the court , when considering whether to award support, to “consider the circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolut ion of the marriage ”); cf. Cousins v. Cousins , 5 Va. App. 156, 158

- 59, 360 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1987) (interpreting identical language in the equitable distribution statute, Code § 20

- 107.3(E)) ; Bentz v. Bentz , 2 Va. App. 486, 488, 345 S.E.2d 773, 774 (1986) ( same)

. In addition, determining the “nature, amount and duration” of a support award requires consideration of the positive and negative “contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well

- being of the family .” Code § 20

- 107.1(E)(6). See Branda u v. Brandau , 52 Va. App. 632, 638

- 39, 666 S.E.2d 532, 535

- 36 (2008)

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- evidentiary conflicts implicate several statutory decisionmaking factors, and thus, should have
been addressed i n the court’s “ written findings and con clusions” required by Code § 20

- 107.1(F). In short, “where a trial court is required to make written findings supporting its decision,
its failure to do so constitutes reversible error.” Robinson v. Robinson , 50 Va. App. 189, 194, 648 S.E.2d 314 , 316 (2007) . When this occurs, we “remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to provide an explanation in compliance with the statute.” Kane , 41 Va. App. at 376, 585 S.E.2d at 355. This remedy precisely reflec ts the nature of the trial court’s error. We do not address, much less hold, that the support award s hould not have been made at all or that
the amount of the award was too high or too low. The lack of a sufficient explanation for the $600 monthly award of spousal support did not render it unawardable

— just unexplained. T h e error we reverse is not the fact or the amount of the award, but the absence of a sufficient explanation accompanying it.
III. Because the trial court did not provide sufficient “ written findings and conclusions” as required by Code § 20

- 107.1(F) , we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to do

so in compliance with the statute. 4
Reversed and remanded

.

4 If the trial court reaffirms its award on remand and provides a statutorily compliant explanation, the court has the discretion to address whether the award should be made retro active ly as of the date the prior award ceased to be effective by virtue of our appellate mandate

. See generally Young v. Young , 215 Va. 125, 126, 207 S.E.2d 825, 825 (1974) ( authorizing a trial court to use its “sound discretion” in awarding spousal supp ort retroactive ly

“ as of the date of the suit” (citation omitted) )

.