FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 JUNE 3, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-13765 

Non-Argument Calendar

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00102-MP-AK

SARAH C. SCOTT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Northern District of Florida

 ________________________

(June 3, 2011)

Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Sarah Scott appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s

denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental

security income benefits. Scott argues the hypothetical questions posed by the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to the vocational expert (VE) regarding her

ability to work failed to address the full extent of her mental impairments or

limitations. Specifically, Scott contends the ALJ’s hypothetical failed to include

her moderate inability to: maintain attention and concentration for extended

periods, complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms, and perform at a consistent pace without an

unreasonable number and length of rest periods. After review, we affirm the

ALJ’s decision.

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The Social Security regulations establish a five-step, sequential evaluation

process to determine disability for both SSI and disability insurance benefits

claims. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The last two steps are relevant to

this appeal: whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to

perform her past relevant work, and whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age,

 “We review the [ALJ’s] decision to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence 1

and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158

(11th Cir. 2004). “This limited review precludes deciding the facts anew, making credibility

determinations, or re-weighing the evidence.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th

Cir. 2005).

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education, and work experience, there are other jobs the claimant can perform. Id. 

If a claimant proves she can no longer perform her past relevant work, at the final

step, “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the existence of other jobs in

the national economy which, given the claimant’s impairments, the claimant can

perform.” Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation

omitted). An ALJ may rely solely on the testimony of a VE in determining

whether there are other jobs the claimant can perform; however, “the ALJ must

pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.” 

Id. at 1229–30. 

The record here demonstrates that the ALJ posed hypothetical questions

which encompassed all of Scott’s impairments. The ALJ asked the VE to assume

“moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace” in

addition to the physical limitations discussed in the initial hypothetical. The

specific limitations noted in Scott’s argument are a subset of “sustained

concentration and persistence” concerns in the Mental RFC Assessment. The

VE’s testimony constituted substantial evidence that Scott was not disabled. 

AFFIRMED.

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