alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
50233.

#### POTTS v. THE STATE.

Pannell, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from conviction for escape from custody.

1. When objection to a question on cross examination is made but later withdrawn and the question is answered, no harmful error is shown. *Mitchell v. Schofield’s Sons Co.,*19 Ga. App. 201 (1) (91 SE 275). Here, the record shows that defendant’s counsel had thorough cross examination relating to the answer.

2. Where an indictment for murder, the verdict of voluntary manslaughter and sentence of 18 years is introduced to show proper confinement in a trial for escape, and proper instructions are given by the judge limiting it to confinement only, the introduction of such evidence is not prejudicial nor does it put the defendant’s character in evidence so as to require a reversal of his conviction of escape.

3. Where defendant contends that he was under the influence of drugs, voluntarily or involuntarily, and he escapes from prison and stays out for six days before recapture, the jury is entitled to infer from the time he was out, that he had an intent to escape. The evidence as to *513intention is sufficient. Biddy *v. State,*127 Ga. App. 212 (1) (193 SE2d 31).

Argued February 4, 1975

Decided April 8, 1975.

*Al Bridges,*for appellant.

*Richard Bell, District Attorney, Calvin A. Leipold, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.

4. Where the trial court errs in the charge to the jury on involuntary intoxication as a defense and confuses the jury, but upon the jury returning to the courtroom and asking a recharge on intoxication and intent, and the judge properly charges then at that time, the error is rendered harmless. "Harm as well as error must be shown to authorize a reversal by this court. As was held in *Brown v. City of Atlanta,*66 Ga. 71, 76 : 'When a plaintiff in error brings a case here, he must show error which has hurt him. This court is not an expounder of theoretical law, but it administers practical law, and corrects only such errors as have practically wronged the complaining party.’ ” *Robinson v. State,*229 Ga. 14 (1) (189 SE2d 53).

5. The defendant alleges error on the exclusion of evidence of "loss of good time,” taken from him because of his escape, in the sentencing portion of his trial. The granting and taking of good time is an administrative action of the correctional system of Georgia. This action is upon sentences then being served and does not relate to the imposition of a sentence after conviction. See Georgia Laws, Acts 1956, pp. 161,178 and amendments thereto, as shown by Code Ann. § 77-320.

As this action is for control and rehabilitation of inmates and cannot be considered as permanent punishment under the above Act, it was not error for the judge to exclude evidence as to it.

6. The evidence was sufficient for conviction. The trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Quillian and Clark, JJ., concur.*
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2320 

To reduce temporarily the duty on parts of machinery for the industrial 

preparation or manufacture of dried vegetable snack (small portions 

of food usually eaten other than at meal times) items. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. NELSON of Nebraska introduced the following bill; which was read twice 

and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To reduce temporarily the duty on parts of machinery for 

the industrial preparation or manufacture of dried vegetable snack (small portions of food usually eaten other 

than at meal times) items. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2320 IS

1 SECTION 1. PARTS OF MACHINERY FOR THE INDUSTRIAL 

2 PREPARATION OR MANUFACTURE OF DRIED 

3 VEGETABLE SNACK (SMALL PORTIONS OF 

4 FOOD USUALLY EATEN OTHER THAN AT 

5 MEAL TIMES) ITEMS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

7 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

8 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

9 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Parts of machinery for the 

industrial preparation or 

manufacture of dried vegetable snack (small portions of 

food usually eaten other than 

at meal times) items (provided for in subheading 

8438.90.90) ........................... 0.8% No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

11 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

12 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

13 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 19
- 00504
- CR

Tiffany Wade, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 427TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D
- 1
- DC
- 18
- 202900, THE HONORABLE TAMARA NEEDLES, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Appellant’s brief on appeal was due September 16, 2020 . On counsel’s motion , the time for filing was extended to November 16, 2020 . Appellant’s counsel has now filed a
second motion, requesting that the Court extend the ti m e for filin g appellant’s brief. We grant the motion for extension of time and order appellant to file a brief no later than January 1 9 , 202 1

. No further extension of time will be gran ted and failure to comply with this order will result in
the referral o f this case to the trial court for a hearing under Rule 38.8(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

It is ordered on No vember 2 4 , 2020

.

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Kelly
Do Not Publis h
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21





                                    SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                            Jurisdiction
                                                                              in which
                                                                     Corporate Name Incorporated
                                                                     ---------------------------
<S>                                                                       <C>
PHARMACIA & UPJOHN, INC.                                                  Delaware (Parent)

Subsidiaries (excluding those which when
----------------------------------------
considered in the aggregate as a single
---------------------------------------
subsidiary did not constitute a significant
-------------------------------------------
subsidiary as of December 31, 1996):
------------------------------------


Pharmacia & Upjohn Company                                                        Delaware
Pharmacia & Upjohn AB                                                             Sweden
Pharmacia Treasury Services AB                                                    Sweden
Pharmacia & Upjohn SpA                                                            Italy

</TABLE>
#### Anthony Carl NATHAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 86-2801.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 24, 1988.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Erica M. Raffel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

*318PER CURIAM.

In this appeal from appellant’s conviction of battery and affray, we find error only in that the trial court delegated to appellant’s probation or community control officer the determination of the amount of restitution appellant was to make. On remand, the amount of any restitution to be imposed shall be determined by the trial court. *Mansell v. State,*498 So.2d 604 (Fla.2d DCA 1986); *Buchanan v. State,*483 So.2d 537 (Fla.2d DCA 1986). Appellant’s convictions are otherwise affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and PARKER, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>



                                                                      Exhibit 32

        Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18
                            of the United States Code

I, Robert E. Busch, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of PSE&G
Transition Funding II LLC, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the
Quarterly Report of PSE&G Transition Funding II LLC on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended September 30, 2005 (the "Periodic Report") fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and (ii) the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
PSE&G Transition Funding II LLC.

                            /s/ Robert E. Busch
                            ---------------------------------------------------
                            Robert E. Busch
                            Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
                            November 10, 2005

                                       10
S-900

Customer PO

Date

Job Flight of

Pilot

Spotter

Steps Before Power Up √

Check Black Magic batterie charge BMPCC

Set Aperture & Focus BMPCC

Check presence SD card BMPCC

Check Flight batterie charge Drone Batt #

Check Receiver batterie charge Remote

Check Remote batterie charge Remote

Visual inspection Props & Arms Drone

Visual inspection Connections Drone

Visual inspection Flight batterie anchors Drone

Power Up Checklist

PU Receiver channel Remote

PU Remote Remote

Drone

PU Drone Drone

Last checks before Take-off

Control Remote receiver status Drone

Control IMU status Drone

Control gimbal functions Drone

Start motors & visual check vibrations Drone

Select GPS mode (starts recording) Remote

FPV image & iOS good Remote

Confirm GPS ready status Remote

Start Flight Timer Remote

Power Down Checklist

Stop flight timer time Remote

PD Drone Drone

Stop recording (select manual mode) Drone

N/A

N/A

Parameters Comments

N/A

LEDs Comments

N/A

N/A

N/A

Comments

Reading Comments

N/A

N/A

N/A

Parameters

N/A

N/A

Pre-Flight Checklist

Steve

Stop recording (select manual mode) Drone

Check SD content iPad

Check flight batterie charge charge Drone

Inspect drone Drone

PD Receiver Remote

PD Remote Remote

Signatures:

SPOTTER PILOT

Mission Debriefing:

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
ATSDR/NCEH Comments on the IRIS Dichloromethane dra ft: January 27, 2010

Submitted by Paula Burgess, MD, MPH ATSDR/NCEH appreciates the opportunity to review th e IRIS draft document on dichloromethane. Overall, this toxicological review is well written. EPA has clearly synthesized the scientific eviden ce and presents a non-cancer and cancer hazard assessment of dichloromethane that is logical, transparent, and concise. While the derivation of the RfC of 0.2 mg/m3 and th e selection of the critical effect of hepatic vacuolization is scientifically sound, we believe t his process would be improved by deriving the RfC f rom a human study utilizing neurological effects as thecritical end point. The two studies(Cherry et al, 1983; Lash et al 1991) mentioned in section 5.2.6, “RfC C omparison information” measured neurological function in humans subsequent to inhalation exposur e to dichloromethane and derived RfDs of 3.5 mg/m3 (Cherry et al) and 0.55 mg/m3 ( Lash et al). These two studies with human neurological endpoints offer more relevance and biological signi ficance than the relatively nonspecific (hepatic vacuolization) endpoints in rats from which the pro posed RfC of 0.2 mg/m3 is derived.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2461 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2461

        To suspend temporarily the duty on didecanoyl peroxide.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

  Mr. Cornyn introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
        To suspend temporarily the duty on didecanoyl peroxide.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DIDECANOYL PEROXIDE.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.01.00       Didecanoyl          Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/ ''.
                          peroxide (CAS No.                                                  31/2011.......
                          762-12-9)
                          (provided for in
                          subheading
                          2915.90.50)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Ronnie D. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. BR-437.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Sept. 17, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1987.

Ronnie D. Brown, pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

Appellant appeals the denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have reviewed the four grounds for relief raised by appellant and find them to be without merit. With one exception, the issues raised were previously considered and rejected in appellant’s direct appeal. *Brown v. State,*464 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), *aff'd,*487 So.2d 1073 (Fla.1986). As to the remaining ground, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant failed to meet the requirements set forth in *Knight v. State,*394 So.2d 997 (Fla.1981) and therefore is not entitled to relief. Consequently, the trial court was correct in denying his motion.

AFFIRMED.

JO ANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10
- 18
- 00142
- CR No. 10
- 18
- 00147
- CR EX PARTE JOHN R. POW ELL

From the 12th District Court Walker County, Texas Trial Court No s . 27986 & 25048

REINSTATMENT ORDER
The appellant’s brief in appellate case number 10

- 18

- 00142

- CR is overdue

. We
abate d th is appeal to the trial court to conduct any necessary hearings pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(b)(2) and (3). T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 38.8(b)(2), (3). The required hearing was held. Accordingly, this appeal is reinstated. Further, the Court ORD ERS the brief of appellant which was filed in appellate case
number 10

- 18

- 00147

- CR to be also filed in appellate case number 10

- 18

- 00142

- CR. The State’s briefs in these appeals are due 30 days from the date of this order.

PER CURIAMEx parte Powell Page 2

Before Chief J ustice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Appeal reinstated Order issued and filed August 22 , 2018
#### TEXOMA BROADCASTERS, INC. d/b/a KLFY-TV (“KLFY”) The Abellor Corporation, d/b/a KATC-TV (“KATC”) and KADN Broadcasting, Inc., d/b/a KADN-TV (“KADN”) v. HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Supplemented to HCA Health Services of Louisiana, d/b/a Cypress Hospital.

No. 89-C-1216.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re Hospital Corporation Am.; HCA Health Serv. La. d/b/a; Cypress Hospital; —Defendants); applying for writ of certio-rari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA87-1422; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 86-1155.

Prior report: La.App., 542 So.2d 780.

Denied.
**Exhibit 31.2** CERTIFICATION         I, Richard J. Carbone, certify that**:**     1.      I have reviewed this annual report on    Form 10-K    of The Prudential Variable Contract Real Property Account;     2.      Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue    statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact    necessary to make the statements made, in light of the    circumstances under which such statements were made, not    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;     3.      Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other    financial information included in this report, fairly present in    all material respects the financial condition, results of    operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the    periods presented in this report;     4.      The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are    responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls    and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act    Rules 13a-15(e)    and    15d-15(e))    for the registrant and we have:      a)      Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such    disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our    supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the    registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made    known to us by others within those entities, particularly during    the period in which this report is being prepared;      b)      Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure    controls and procedures and presented in this report our    conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls    and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this    report based on such evaluation; and      c)      Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s    internal control over financial reporting that occurred during    the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the    registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual    report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to    materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over    financial reporting; and     5.      The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have    disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal    control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s    auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board    of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):      a)      All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the    design or operation of internal control over financial reporting    which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the    registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and    report financial information; and      b)      Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or    other employees who have a significant role in the    registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.     Date: March 23, 2007 /s/  Richard    J. Carbone    Richard J. Carbone    Chief Financial Officer    The Prudential Insurance Company of America
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-2640

HOBERT A. SCHELL,

Petitioner,

versus

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;

ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.

(95-0845-BLA)

Submitted: December 12, 1995 Decided: March 19, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Hobert A. Schell, Petitioner Pro Se. Patricia May Nece, Rita A.

Roppolo, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C.;

Douglas Allan Smoot, JACKSON & KELLY, Charleston, West Virginia,

for Respondents.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks review of the Benefits Review Board's decision

and order affirming the administrative law judge's denial of black

lung benefits pursuant to 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (West 1986 & Supp.

1995). Our review of the record discloses that the Board's decision

is based upon substantial evidence and is without reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the Board. Schell v.

Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, No. 95-0845-BLA

(B.R.B. July 31, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
#### Howard F. HATCH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Crawford DAVIS, and William G. Dyer, individually and as General Partners for Real Estate Development Consultants, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 20960.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. 12, 1986.

Howard F. Hatch, pro se.

Michael E. Dyer, Orem, defendants and respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff appeals an order of dismissal entered in the district court in Kane County. The dismissal was on the grounds that venue was improper and that the same case is pending in Utah County.

Plaintiff Hatch is the general partner in a limited partnership known as Real Estate Development Consultants (“REDC”). De*1335fendants Davis and Dyer are limited partners (although they are designated as general partners in this lawsuit). All parties are residents of Utah County, and the principal asset of the limited partnership is real property located in Kane County.

Dispute arose over the management of the partnership and, in February 1983, Davis and Dyer filed a complaint in Utah County. In that action, Davis and Dyer sought an accounting, damages, and dissolution of the limited partnership. In early 1985, Hatch filed a pro se complaint in Kane County. Hatch alleged that Davis and Dyer had wrongfully attempted to sell the Kane County property, and he sought, inter alia, “[a]n injunction against further usurpation by Defendants of the rights of the Plaintiff to act as the General Partner of [REDC].” Davis and Dyer made a special appearance to contest venue and moved to dismiss the action. This motion was ultimately granted by the district court in Kane County.

On appeal, Hatch points out that he included a quiet title cause of action in his lawsuit. He argues that under U.C.A., 1953, § 78-13-1, he is entitled to have the lawsuit adjudicated in Kane County since that is where the property is located. The problem with Hatch’s argument is that it is undisputed that the property is owned by the limited partnership REDC, which is not a plaintiff in the Kane County suit.1 Therefore, the action is not brought by one who claims a legal interest in the real property. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-40-1. Moreover, this is not a dispute over the ownership of the Kane County land, but a dispute between partners over their respective rights and duties. Venue is therefore controlled by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-13-7, which provides generally that an action is to be tried “in the county in which the cause of action arises, or in the county in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the action.” Since all parties to this lawsuit are residents of Utah County, the case should be heard there. This is particularly so since a similar lawsuit was already ongoing in Utah County between these same parties.2

The order of dismissal is therefore affirmed. Costs to Davis and Dyer.

1

. In his reply brief, Hatch states, “We both agree that title rests and should rest in the record name of REDC.”

2

. See Utah R.Civ.P. 13(a) for requirements of filing a compulsory counterclaim.