J-A17040-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

_____________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

LEO J. DOLAN, JR. AND CHERIE M. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

DOLAN, H/W : PENNSYLVANIA

:

Appellees :

:

v. :

:

HURD MILLWORK COMPANY, INC., :

BENTLEY HOMES, LTD., GARVIN :

MITCHELL CORPORATION, CHADWELL :

ASSOCIATES, L.P., CHADWELL REALTY, :

INC., HARRISON COMMUNITY :

ASSOCIATION :

:

Appellants : No. 2951 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 26, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Civil Division at No(s): 2005-005801

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED January 13, 2017

Appellants, Bentley Homes, Ltd., Garvin Mitchell Corporation, Chadwell 

Associates, L.P., Chadwell Realty, Inc., and Harrison Community Association, 

appeal from the judgment entered in the Delaware County Court of Common 

Pleas, in favor of Appellee, Leo J. Dolan, Jr.1 We remand for preparation of a 

thorough supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion and retain panel jurisdiction. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

In July 1999, Appellee and Cherie M. Dolan entered into an agreement of 

 

1 Appellee and Cherie M. Dolan divorced while the case was pending in the 

trial court. As a result, Cherie M. Dolan is not a party to this appeal. 
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sale with Appellants for a new custom home for the purchase price of 

$1,941,669.00. Settlement took place on November 10, 2000. Hurd 

Millwork Company, Inc. provided many of the windows used in the 

construction of Appellee’s home. Within a year, the home developed 

substantial defects including air and water leaks around the windows. 

On April 5, 2001, Hurd Millwork sued Appellants for unpaid invoices 

related to the construction of Appellee’s home and other homes in the same 

community. Appellants filed an answer and new matter counterclaim 

against Hurd Millwork, which claimed Hurd Millwork provided defective 

windows. Appellants further claimed the defective windows provided by 

Hurd Millwork caused air and water leaks in numerous homes in the 

community. In October 2002, Appellants and Hurd Millwork entered a 

settlement agreement, which contained specific admissions that numerous 

homes in the development, including Appellee’s home, suffered from 

extensive defects and leaks. 

During the pendency of the litigation between Hurd Millwork and 

Appellants, Appellee experienced numerous additional problems with the 

home including, but not limited to, severe air and water leaks, rotted wood, 

and issues with the stucco wall. Appellants made some repairs to the home; 

however, the leaks and damage continued to worsen. Ultimately, Appellee 

hired a civil engineer to assess the home and determine what repairs were 

necessary to fix the problems with the home. The repairs and associated 
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costs necessary to fix Appellee’s home totaled $826,695.99. 

On May 24, 2005, Appellee filed a writ of summons against Appellants 

and Hurd Millwork. Appellee subsequently filed a complaint against 

Appellants and Hurd Millwork on September 6, 2005. The complaint raised 

the following claims against Appellants: (1) negligence; (2) breach of 

express and implied warranty; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) fraud 

and/or intentional misrepresentation; and (5) violations of the Unfair Trade 

Practice and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”). Appellee’s complaint 

sought punitive damages against Appellants. The September 6, 2005 

complaint also raised the following claims against Hurd Millwork: (1) breach 

of express and implied warranty; (2) negligence; and (3) products liability. 

On November 4, 2005, Appellants filed preliminary objections, which the 

court overruled on February 2, 2006. Appellants then filed an answer, new 

matter and cross-claim against Hurd Millwork on March 1, 2006. Appellants’ 

cross-claim alleged Hurd Millwork was solely or jointly liable for Appellee’s 

injuries. 

On March 2, 2006, Hurd Millwork filed an answer to Appellants’ crossclaim. Hurd Millwork then filed a separate answer and new matter to 

Appellee’s complaint on March 13, 2006, as well as a cross-claim against 

Appellants, which alleged Appellants were solely or jointly liable for 

Appellee’s injuries. Appellants filed an answer to Hurd Millwork’s cross-claim 

on March 14, 2006. Appellants subsequently filed joinder complaints against 
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numerous other parties involved in the construction of Appellee’s home. All 

parties then underwent settlement discussions, which resulted in the 

dismissal of the joined defendants from the case and a settlement 

agreement between Appellee and Hurd Millwork. 

The case eventually proceeded to a bench trial on January 26, 2015. 

The only claims remaining for the court to address were Appellee’s claims 

against Appellants and Appellants’ cross-claim against Hurd Millwork. 

Despite the pending cross-claim, Hurd Millwork did not appear at trial. Prior 

to the presentation of testimony, the parties stipulated to the defective 

nature of the Hurd Millwork windows used in the construction of Appellee’s 

home. Appellee then presented the only evidence at trial, which addressed 

his claims against Appellants. Appellants did not present any evidence to 

rebut Appellee’s claims or to prove its cross-claim against Hurd Millwork. At 

the conclusion of trial, the court took the matter under advisement pending 

the preparation of proposed findings of fact/conclusions of law by both 

parties. Both parties filed their respective proposed findings of 

fact/conclusions of law on May 20, 2015. On June 18, 2015, the court 

entered a general verdict in favor of Appellee and awarded Appellee 

$500,000.00 in damages. The court’s ruling did not specifically address 

Appellants’ pending cross-claim. 

On June 26, 2015, Appellants filed a motion for post-trial relief, and 

Appellee filed a motion for delay damages on June 30, 2015. On August 19, 
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2015, the court denied Appellants’ motion for post-trial relief. The court 

then granted Appellee’s motion for delay damages and molded the verdict to 

$748,287.67 on August 21, 2015. Appellee filed a praecipe for entry of 

judgment on August 26, 2015. On September 16, 2015, Appellants timely 

filed a notice of appeal. The court did not order Appellants to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

and Appellants did not file one. 

Appellants raise the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER A PARTY IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

FROM OBTAINING DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENCE WHERE 

THAT CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE GIST OF THE ACTION 

DOCTRINE, THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE, AND THE 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS[?]

WHETHER [APPELLEE] IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW FROM OBTAINING DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES WHERE THOSE 

CLAIMS CANNOT BE MAINTAINED AGAINST 

[APPELLANTS], ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 

LIMITATIONS, [APPELLEE] FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 

OF THE TERMS OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES AT TRIAL, 

AND [APPELLEE] FAILED TO GIVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO 

REPAIR OR NOTICE OF THE DEFECTS FOR WHICH THE 

PARTY NOW SEEKS THE AWARD OF DAMAGES[?]

WHETHER A PARTY IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

FROM OBTAINING DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENT 

MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD/INTENTIONAL 

MISREPRESENTATION WHERE THOSE CLAIMS ARE 

BARRED BY THE GIST OF THE ACTION DOCTRINE, THE 

ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE, AND THE STATUTE OF 

LIMITATIONS[?]

WHETHER A PARTY IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

FROM OBTAINING AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 

WHERE PENNSYLVANIA LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE AN 
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INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE 

DAMAGES AND NONE OF THE CLAIMS CAN SUPPORT A 

CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES[?]

WHETHER A PARTY IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

FROM OBTAINING DAMAGES UNDER THE [UTPCPL] WHERE 

THAT CLAIM CAN BE MAINTAINED, IF AT ALL, ONLY 

AGAINST THE SELLER AND THE FRAUDULENT OR 

DECEPTIVE CONDUCT UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS BASED 

OCCURRED, IF AT ALL, AFTER THE PURCHASE OF THE 

REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE[?]

WHETHER A PARTY IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

FROM OBTAINING AN AWARD OF DAMAGES WHERE BY 

THE PARTY’S OWN ADMISSION, THE PARTY FAILED TO 

MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES AND RENDERED IT IMPOSSIBLE 

FOR THE COURT TO DETERMINE THE PROPER AMOUNT OF 

DAMAGES TO AWARD TO THE PARTY[?]

WHETHER THE PARTY IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW FROM OBTAINING AN AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR 

BREACH OF CONTRACT WHERE THE PARTY NEVER [PLED] 

SUCH A CLAIM, DID NOT SEEK LEAVE AT TRIAL TO AMEND 

TO INCLUDE SUCH A CLAIM, AND ANY SUCH CLAIM IS 

BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS[?]

WHETHER A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 

INDEMNIFICATION AND/OR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST A 

CO-DEFENDANT WHERE THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT 

THE CO-DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT CAUSED INJURY TO THE 

PLAINTIFF AND THE BASIS OF THE DEFENDANT’S 

LIABILITY TO THE PLAINTIFF IS DUE TO THE CODEFENDANT’S CONDUCT[?]

WHETHER A PARTY IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

FROM OBTAINING DELAY DAMAGES WHERE THE 

UNDERLYING ACTION IS BASED UPON THE CONTRACTUAL 

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION AND 

DELAY DAMAGES ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN CONTRACT 

ACTIONS[?]

(Appellants’ Brief at 6-7). 

Preliminarily, we observe that upon receipt of a notice of appeal, the 
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trial court shall file an opinion that explains the court’s reasons for its 

decision if the reasons do not already appear of record. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

“The purpose of Rule 1925(a) is to give the appellate court a reasoned basis 

for the trial court’s decision and to require a trial [court] to consider 

thoroughly decisions regarding post-trial motions.” Gibbs v. Herman, 714 

A.2d 432, 435 (Pa.Super. 1998). “Ordinarily, the remedy for noncompliance with [Rule] 1925(a) is a remand to the trial court with directions 

that an opinion be prepared and returned to the appellate court.” Cooke v. 

Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 723 A.2d 723, 

727 (Pa.Super. 1999). The absence of an adequate trial court opinion poses 

a substantial impediment to meaningful and effective appellate review. 

Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

Instantly, the parties proceeded to a bench trial on January 26, 2015. 

At the conclusion of trial, the court took the matter under advisement 

pending the preparation of proposed findings of facts/conclusions of law by 

both parties. The court subsequently entered a general verdict in favor of 

Appellee and awarded Appellee $500,000.00 on June 18, 2015. The court’s 

decision did not explain: (1) which of Appellee’s claims warranted relief; (2) 

whether the damages award included a punitive damages component; or (3) 

whether the court ruled in favor or against Appellants on their cross-claim 

against Hurd Millwork. On June 26, 2015, Appellants filed a motion for posttrial relief, which raised numerous, complex issues concerning all of 
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Appellee’s claims and the award of damages. The court, however, denied 

relief on August 19, 2015, without any explanation. After Appellants 

appealed, the court again failed to provide adequate explanations for its 

decisions in the case when it issued a three-page Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Instead of clarifying its general verdict, award of damages, or denial of 

Appellants’ post-trial motion, the trial court opinion cursorily states: (1) the 

evidence presented at trial was overwhelmingly in favor of Appellee; (2) the 

general verdict disposed of all claims; (3) the gist of the action doctrine did 

not bar Appellee’s negligence claim; and (4) the award of delay damages

was appropriate under the circumstance of the case. Because the court 

failed to explain its decision throughout this case, its short trial court opinion 

is plainly insufficient to aid meaningful appellate review of Appellants’ issues 

raised on appeal. See Jones, supra. Thus, the best resolution of this case 

is to remand to the trial court for preparation of a comprehensive opinion. 

See Cooke, supra. The court’s supplemental trial court opinion must (1)

state which of Appellee’s claims warranted relief; (2) provide a detailed 

explanation for why the court ruled in favor of Appellee on those claims; (3)

explain what type of damages it awarded Appellee; (4) specify the amount 

of each type of damages awarded; (5) state whether the court found in 

favor or against Appellants on their cross-claim against Hurd Millwork; and 

(6) provide a detailed explanation for the court’s denial of each issue raised 

in Appellants’ motion for post-trial relief. Accordingly, we remand for 
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preparation of a thorough supplemental trial court opinion. The trial court is 

directed to forward the supplemental opinion to this Court within sixty (60) 

days of our remand. 

Case remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction is retained. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/13/2017