1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 09 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### HAR D T v . R E L IAN C E S TA N D ARD LIFE INS U RA N C E CO. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09–4 48. Ar g u ed Apr il 26, 201 0—Dec i ded M a y24, 2010 Aftermedic a lpr oblems for c e d petitionerHar d t to sto p wor k ing , she

filed for long-t erm disab ilitybenefi ts under he r employe r ’s long-term dis a b ility pla n . Upon exha us ting her a d m i nis t ra t ive remedies , Ha rdt sued respondent Reliance, her empl oyer’s disabili ty insurance car rier, alleging that it had vi olat ed the Employee Retirement Income Sec u r i tyAc t of 19 74 ( ERI SA) bywr on gfu llyden y in g h e rben e fits cla i m. The Di s t rict Court denied Relia nce s u mma ry j u dgment, find

ing t h a tb e ca us e t h e ca rrie rha d a c t e d o nincom p let e m e dica l infor

mation, the b e nefits denia lwas no tba se d onsu bs ta nt ial evidence. Though also d e ny ingHar d t summar y judg ment, the c o urt st ated tha t it found “com pelling evidence” in th ereco rd that she was tot a lly dis

abledan d th atitwas in c lin ed to r u le in her favor, b u tconcluded t h at it would be unwise to do so without givingRelia n ce t h e cha n ce t o a d

dress the def i ciencies inits approach. The co urt therefore remanded t o R e lia nce, giving it3 0 da ys t o co nsider all the evidence and to act on Har d t’ s applic ation, orelse the c o ur t would enterj u dg ment in Ha rdt ’ s favor. Relia n ce did a s ins t ruct ed a n d a w a r ded Ha rdt b e ne fits. Har d t th enfiled a mot i onu n d er29 U. S. C. §1132 (g)(1), a fee

shifting sta t ute that a pplie s in most ER ISA law s ui ts and provides that “the c o ur t in i t s disc r e t i on maya llow a r e asona b le a ttor n ey ’ s fee and c o sts

. . . to ei therpar t y . ” Gr antingthe motion, the Distr i c t Court applie dthe Circuit’s framew ork governing atto rney’s fee re

qu ests inERI SA c a ses, c o n c lu din g , int e r alia, that Har d t had at

tained the req u isite “ p revail ing part y” status. The Fourt hCircuit va

c a ted the fees awar d, holdingthat Har d t had failed to e s ta bli s h that she qualified as a “prevail ing party” unde rthe rule set fo rth in Buck

hannon Board & Care Home, Inc

. v. WestVirginia Dep t . of Health2 HARDT v. RELIANCE S TA N DARD LIFE INS. CO. Sy llabu s and Human Resour ce s , 53 2 U. S. 598, 604, th at a fee c l aiman tis a “prevailing party” only if hehas ob ta ined an “enforceable judgmen[t] on the merits ” or a “court-orderedcons en tdecre[e]. ” The courtrea soned that be cause the remand order did not require Reliance to awar d Har d t ben e fits, it di d n o t c o nstitute an enforc eable judg ment on the mer i ts. Held: 1. A fee claim a nt need not be a “prevaili ng party” to b e eligible fo r anat tor n ey ’ s fees awar d u n der§113 2(g)(1 ). In ter p r e tin gth e sec t ion to r e qu ir e a par t yto attainth at sta t u s i s c o n t r a r yto §113 2(g)(1)’ s plain text. The words “pre vailing pa rty” do not appear in the provi

sion

. Nordoes an y t h i n gelse in§1132(g) ( 1 )’ s tex tpu r p or t to limit th e availa bili ty of attorney’s fees to a“pr e vailing part y.” Instead, §113 2(g)(1) ex pr esslyg r an ts distr i c tc o u r ts “di s c r e tion” to awar d at

torney’s fees “to eitherparty.” (Emphasis added.) T h at language contrasts sh arply with §11 3 2 (g)(2), which governs the a v ailab ility of attorney’s fees in ERISA actions t o recove r delinq u ente m ployer con

tributions to amultiemp loyer plan. Insu chc a ses, on lyplain t iffs w h o obtain “a judg ment in fav o rof th e plan” may seek attorney’s fees. §1132(g)(2)(D). Theco ntrast be tween these two paragraphs make s clea r t h a tCongres s knows how t o im pose express lim its on the avail

abil i ty of attor n ey’s fees in E R IS A c a se s. Bec a u s e Con g r e ss failed to in c l u d e in§1132(g)(1) anex pr ess “pr e v a ili n gpar t y” r e quir emen t, th e Four th Circ uit’ s dec i sion addingthat ter m of ar t to the s t atute mor e closely resembles “invent[ing] a st atute r a therthan inter p r e t[ing] one.” Pasquantinov. Unit ed States , 544 U. S. 349, 35 9. Pp. 8–9. 2. A c o u r t ma yawar d fees an d c o sts u n d er§113 2(g)(1), as lon gas the fee clai mant has achieved “so m e degre e of success onthe merits.” Ruck elsha u sv. Sierra Club , 463 U. S. 68 0, 69 4. Th e bed r oc k pr inc i

ple known as the American Rule provides the relevant point of refer

ence: Each litigant pays his own atto rney’s fees, win or l o se, unless a s t at ut e or con t ra ctpr ovides otherwise. E.g., id ., at 683–68 6. Th is Court’s “prevailing party” precedents do not govern here because that ter mof ar t does n o t appearin§1132(g)(1). In stead, th e Cou r t in ter

prets §1 13 2(g)(1) in light of its pr ecedents addressings t at ut es t h at deviate from the American Rule by authorizing attorney’s fees based on ot her crit e r i a . Ruck elsha u s, which cons idered a statute authoriz

in ga fees awar d if th e c o u r t “deter min e s th at su c hanawar d is ap propriate,” 42 U. S. C. §7607 (f), is th e principal case in t h at category. Applying t h a tdecis i on’s int e rpre tiv e appr oac hto 29 U. S. C. §113 2(g)(1), th e Cour t fir s tl ooks to “the la ng uag e of the sec t ion,” 4 6 3 U. S., at 68 2, wh ic hun ambig u ou slyallo ws a c o u r t to awar d at tor

ney ’ s fees “in i t s disc r e tion .

. . to either party

. ” Ruck e lsh ausalso lay s down the pro p er markers to guide a cour tin exercis i ngt h a tdis cre -3 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Sy llabu s tion. Because here, as in th e statute in Ruck els h aus , Con g r e ss failed to indic a te c l ear l ythat it “meant to abandon historic fee-shifting pr in c i ples an d in tu itiv e n o tion s of fair n e ss ,” 463 U. S., a t68 6, a fee s claimant must show “some degree of suc c e ss on the mer i ts” befor e a c o u r t mayawar d attor n ey ’ s fees u n d er§113 2(g)(1), see id. , at 694. Har d t h a s sat i sfied th at s t a n dar d

. Th oughsh e failed to w i nsu m mar yjudg ment on herbenefits c l a i m, the Distr i c tCour t nev e r t heless found compelling evidence that she is tot a ll y disa bled and st ated th a t it was inclined to rule in he r favor. She also obtained the remand or

der, a f t e r which Relia nce conduct e d t h ecourt

- orderedreview, re

vers ed it s decis i on, a n d a w a r ded t h e b e nefit s s h e s o ught

. Acco rd

ingly, t h eDis t rictCourtpr operly exe rcis e d it s dis cret i on t o a w a r d Har d t attor n ey ’ s fees. Pp. 9–13. 336 Fed. Appx . 332, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

T HOMAS , J., d e livered the opinion of the Court, in whi c h R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALI A , K ENNEDY , G IN SB U R G , B RE Y E R , ALITO , an d S OTOMAYOR , JJ., joined, and in whichS TEVENS , J., join ed as to P a r t s I an d II. S TEVENS , J ., filed a nopinion con c ur ring i npa r ta n d concu rri ng in thej u dg

ment._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–4 48 

### BRIDGET HARDT, P E TITIONER v. RELIA NCE S TAN DARD LIFE INS U RA N C E C O MPA NY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [M ay24, 2010 ] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. In most la wsuits seeking relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act o f 1974 (ERI SA), 88 Sta t

. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §10 01 et seq ., “a reasonable attorney’s f ee and costs” are available “to eit h er party” at the court’s “discretion.” §1132(g)(1). The Court of Appeal s for the Fourth Circuit has interpreted §1132(g)(1) to re

quire that a fee claimant be a “prevailing party” before he may seek afees award

. We reject this inter p retation as contrary to §1132(g)(1)’s plain text. We hold instead that a court “in its discretion” may award fees and costs “to either part y,” ibid., as long as the fee cla i mant has achieved “some degreeof success on the m e ri ts,” Ruckels

hausv. Si er ra Club , 46 3 U. S. 680, 694 (1983). I In 2000, while working as an exe c utive assistant to th e president of textile manufacturer Dan River, Inc., peti

tioner Bridget Har d t began experiencing neck and sho u l

der pain. Her doctors even tually diagnosed her with carpal tunn el syndrome. Because surgeries on both her wrists failed to allevia t e he r pain, Hardt s t opped workin g2 HARDT v. RELIANCE S TA N DARD LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of theCourt 

### in January 2003. In August 2003, Hardt sought long-term disability benefits from Dan Ri ver’s Group Long-Term Disability Insurance Program Pl an (Plan). Dan River administers the Plan, which is subj ect to ERISA, but respondent Reli

ance Standard Life Insurance Company deci des whether a claimant qualifies for benefits un der the Plan and under

writes any benefits awarded. Reliance provi s ionally ap

proved Hardt’s claim, telling her that fi nal approval hinged on her performance in a functio nal capacities evaluation intended to assess the impact of her carpal tunnel syndrome and neck pain on her ability to work. Hard t comp leted the functio nal capacities evaluation in October 20 03. The ev aluator summarized Hard t’s me dical history, observed her resulting physical limitations, and ultimately found that Hard t could perform some amount of sedentary work. Based onthis finding, Reliance con

cluded thatHard t wa s not totally disabled within th e meaning of the Plan and denied her claim for disabilit y benefits. Hardt filed a nadministrative appea l

. Reliance reversed it self in part, finding that Hard twas totally disabled fr om her regu lar occupation, and was therefor e entitled to temporary disability benefits for 24months. While h e r administrative appeal was pending, Hard t began experiencing new symptom s in h e r feet and calves, including ti ngling, pain , and numb n ess. One of her physi

cians diagnosed her with small-fib e r neuropathy, a condi

tion that increased her pain an d decreased her physical capabilities over the ensuing months. Hard t even tually applied to the S o cial Security A d mini

stration for disability benefits under the So cial Security Act. Her application included questionnair e s completed by two of h e r treating physicians, which described Hardt’s symptoms and stated the doctors’ conclusion that Har d t could not re turn to full gainful employment because of her neuropathy and other ailments. In February 2005, th e3 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### Social Secu rity Admin i stration gr anted Ha r d t’s ap plica

tion and awarded her disability benefits. About two months later, Reliance told Har d t that her Plan benefits would expire at th e end of t h e 24-mont h period. Reliance explained that under the Plan’s term s, only individuals who are “totally disabled from all occupa

tions” were eligible for benefits bey o nd that period, App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a, and adhered to its conclusion that, based on its review of Hardt ’ s r e cords, Ha rdt was not “totally disabled” as d e fined by t h e Plan. Reliance also demanded that Ha rdt pay Reliance $14,913.23 to offs et the disability benefits she hadreceived from the Social Security Administration. (The Plan contains a provision coordinating benefits withSo ci al Securit ypayments. ) H a rdt paid Reliance the offset. Hard t then filed anot h er administrative ap peal. She gave Reliance all of her medical records, the question

naires she had submitted to th e Social Security Admini

stration, and an updated questionnaire from one of h e r physicians. Reliance asked Ha rdt to supplement this material with another functio nal capacities evaluation

. When Reliance referred Ha rdtforthe update d evaluation, it did not ask the evaluator to review Hardt for neuro

pathic pain , even though it kne wthat Ha rdt had be en diagnosed with neuropathy after her first evaluation. Hard t appe ared for the updated ev aluation in December 2005, and appeared for another evaluation in January 2006. The evaluators deemed both evaluations invalid because Hardt’s efforts were “submaximal.” Id. , at 37 a. One evaluator recorde dthat Har d t “refused multiple tests

. . . for fea rof nausea/illnes s/further pain complaints.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Lacking anupdated f unctio nal capacities evaluation, Reliance hi red a physician and a vocation rehabilitation counselor t o help it resolve Hardt’s administrative appeal. The physician did not examine Hardt; instead, he re

-4 HARDT v. RELIANCE S TA N DARD LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of theCourt 

### viewed some, but not all, of Hard t’s me dical recor d s. Based on that review, the physician produced a report in which he opined that Hardt’s health was expected to improve. His report, howeve r, did not mention Hard t’s pain medications or t h e question naires that Hardt’s at

tending ph ysicians had completed as pa rt o f her applica

tion for Soc i al Securitybene fits. The vocatio nal rehabili

tation counselor, in turn, performed a labor market stu d y (based on Hardt’s health in 20 03) that identified eigh t employment opportunities suitable for Hardt. After re

viewing th e physician’s report, t h e labor market stud y , and the res u lts of the 2003 functi onal capacities evalua

tion, Reliance concluded that it s decision to terminat e Hard t’s benefits was correct. It advised Hardt of this decision in March 2006. After exhausting her admini strative remedies, Hardt sued Reliance in the United State s District C o urt for the Eastern Di strict of Virginia. She alleged that Reliance violated ERISA by wro n gfully den ying her cl aim for long

term disability benefits. See §1132(a)(1)(B). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, b o th of which the DistrictCourt denied. The court f i rst rejecte d Reliance’s request for summar y judgment a ffirming th e denial of benefits, finding that “Reliance’s decision to deny benefits was based on incom

plete infor m ation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. Most prominently, none of the function al capacities evaluations to which Hardt had su bmitted had “assessed the impact of neuropathy and neuro p athic pain on Ms. Hardt.” Ibid. I n addition, the reviewing phys ician’s report “was itself incomplete”; the basis for the phys ician’s “medical conclu

sions [wa]s extremely vague and conclusory,” ibid. , and the physician had “failed to cite any medical evidence to support his conclusion s,” id. , at 43a, or “to address the treating ph ysicians’ co ntradi ctor ymedical findings,” id. , at 44a. The c o urt also found that Reliance had“improperly5 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### rejected mu ch of the ev idence that Ms. Har d t submitted,” id. , at 45a , and had “further i g nored the substantial amount of pain medication Ms. Hard t’s t r eating physi

cians had p r escribed to her,” id. , a t46a. Acco rdingly, the court though t it “clear that Re liance’s decision to deny Ms. Hardt long-term disability benefits was not based on substantial evidence.” Id. , at 47a. The Distric tCourt then denied Hardt’s motion for sum

mary judgment, which contended that Reliance’s decision to deny benefits was unreasonable as a matter of law. In so doing, however, the cou rt found “compelling evidence ” in the recor dthat“Ms. Hard t [ w a]s totally disa bled due to her neuropathy.” Id. , at 48a. Although it wa s “inclined to rule in Ms. Hardt ’ s favor,” the c o urt concluded that “it would be unwise to take this step without first givin g Reliance the chance to address the deficiencies in its ap

proach.” Ibid. In the District Court’s view, a remand to Reliance was warranted because “[t]his case presents one of those scenarios where the plan administrator has failed to comply with the ERISA gui d elines,” meaning “Ms. Hard t did not get the kind of re view to wh ich she was entitled under applicable law.” Ibid. Acco rdingly, th e court instr u cted “ R eliance to acton Ms. Ha rdt’s a p plic a tion by ade quately con s idering all the eviden ce” within 30 days; “[o]therwise,” it warned, “judgment will be issued in favor of Ms. Hard t.” Id. , at 49a. Reliance did as instructed. Af ter condu cting that review, Reliance foundHardt eligible for lon g -term dis

ability benefits and paid her $55,250 in accrued, past-due benefits. Hard t then moved for attorney’s fees and costs under §1132(g)(1). The District Court assessed her m o tion under the three-step frameworkthat go verned fee requests in ERISA cases under Circuit precedent. At step one of th at framework, a district court asks whether the fee claimant is a “ ‘prevailing party.’ ” Id. , at 1 5a–16a (quoting Martin6 HARDT v. RELIANCE S TA N DARD LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of theCourt


### v. Blu eCross & Blu e Shield of V i rginia, Inc. , 115 F. 3d 1201, 1210 (CA4 1997), and citing Bu ckhan n on Board & CareHome, Inc. v. West V i rgini aDe pt. of Hea l th an d Human R e s o urces , 532 U. S. 598, 603 (2001)). If the fee claimant qualifies as a prevailing party, the co urt proceeds to step two and “determin[es] whether an a w ard of attor

neys’ fees is appropriate” by examining “five factors.” 1 

### App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. Finally, if those five factors suggest tha ta fees award is appropriate, the court “mus t review the attorneys’ f ees and costs requested and limit them to a reasonable a m ount.” Id. , at 17a (citing Hen s le y v. Ecke rhar t , 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983)). Applying t hat framework, the District Court gran te d Hard t’s motion. It fir s t concluded that Har d t was a pr e vailing party because t h e court’s remand order “sanctioned a material change in the legal relationship of the parties by ordering[Reliance] to conductthe ty pe of review t o which [Hardt] was entitled.” Id. , a t22a. The court reco g nized that the order did not “sanctio[n] a certain result on remand,” but found that it “quite clearly expressed the consequenc es to [Relia nce] were it to fail to complete its reconsideration in an expeditious manner.” Id. , at 19 a. Accordin gly , the remand order “signif[ied] that the court was displeased with the cursor yreview th at [Relianc e] had initiall y given to [Hardt’s] claim, but was inclined t o reserve jud g ment andpermit [R eliance] to conduct a proper review of all of the medical evidence. ” Ibid. T h e

——————

1 These factors are: “ ‘(1) the degree of oppo sing parties’ culpabil i ty or bad fa ith ; (2) abil i tyof opp o sin gpar t ies to sa tisfyan awar d of at to r neys’ fees; (3) whether an award of a ttorn eys’ fees again s t the oppo sin g pa rt ies would det e r ot her pers ons a c t i ng under s i m i la r circum s t a nces ; (4) whether the par t ies r e questingatto rneys’ fees sought to benefit all par t ic ipan t s an d ben e fic i ar ies of anERISA planorto resolv e a sig n ifi

ca ntlega l q u es t i on rega rdin g ERIS A itse lf; and (5) the relative merit s of the parties’ positions.’ ” App. to Pet. forCer t . 16a (qu o tin g Que s i n b erryv. Lif eI n s. Co. of Nor t h Am., 987 F. 2d 101 7, 10 29 (CA4 1 993)).7 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### court next concluded that a fees award was appropriate under the five-factortest, see id. , at 2 2a–25a, and awarded $3 9,149 in fees and costs, id. , at 25a–30a. Reliance appealed the fees award, and th e Court of Appeals va cated the DistrictCo urt’s or der. Accordingto the Court o f Appeals, Hard t failed to satisfythe step-one inquiry— i.e. , she failed to establish that she was a “pre

vailing party.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on this Court’s decision in Buckhannon , under which a fee cl aimant qualifies as a “prevailing party” only if he has obtained an “ ‘enforceable judgmen[t] on the merits’ ” or a“ ‘c ourt-ordered consent d e cre[e].’ ” 3 36 Fed. Appx. 332, 335 (C A4 2009) (per curiam) (quoting 532 U. S., at 6 04). The Court of Appeals reasoned that be

cause the remand order “did not require Reliance to award benefits to Hard t,” it did “n ot constitute an ‘enforceable judgment o nthe merits’ as Bu ck hannonrequires,” thus precluding Hardt from establi s hing prevailing party status. 336 Fed. Appx., at 336 (brackets omitted). Hard t fileda petitionfor a writof certiora r i seeking review of two aspects of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. First, did t h e Court of Appe als correctly co nclude that §1132(g)(1) permits courts to award attorney’s fees on ly to a “prevaili ng par t y” ? 2 

### Second, di d the Cour t of Ap peals

——————

2 The Courts of Appeal s are divided ont h i s i s s u e . S o m e ( af e wo n l y tentatively) agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion here that onl y prev ailingparties are enti tled to fees u n der §1132(g)(1). See, e.g. , Cottrill v. Sp arrow, Johnso n & Ursillo, I n c. , 100 F. 3d 220, 225 (CA 1 199 6) (“Con g r e ss dec l ar ed t h at, inan yERISA c l aim a dv a n c ed bya ‘pa r t i cipa nt , beneficia r y, o r fiducia r y , the c o ur t in its disc r e tion ma y allow a reaso n able attorney’s fee’ to the prevailing party” (emphas i s added)); Tatev. Lon g

T erm Disability Plan for Salar i e dEmployees of Champion Int’l Corp. #506, 545 F. 3d 55 5, 564 (CA 7 2 0 0 8) (“Inan a l y z ing whether a ttorney’s fees should beawarded to a ‘prevailing party’ in a nERIS A cas e , acourtshould cons ider whet her t h e los i ng pa rty’s position w a s j u stified an t a ken in good faith. However, we have he ld th at a c l ai ma n twh o is awa r ded a r e man dinanE R IS A c a se g e n e r a lly8 HARDT v. RELIANCE S TA N DARD LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of theCourt 

### correctlyid entify the circumstan ces under which a fe e claimant is entitled to attorney’s fees under §1132(g)(1)? We granted certiorari. 558 U. S. ___ (2010). II Whether §1132(g)(1) limits the availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” is a question of s t atutory co n struction. As in all su ch cases, we begin by analyzing the statutory l anguage, “a ssum[in g] that the ordinary mean

ing of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Gross v. F BL Financi a lServi ces, Inc. , 557 U. S.

___, ___ (2 009) (slip op., at 7) (i nternal quotation marks omitted). We must enforce plain and unambiguous statu

tory langua ge accordin g to its terms. Carcie r iv. Salaza r , 555 U. S. ___, ___ (200 9) (slip op., at 7); Jimenez v. Qua r term an , 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (sl i p op., at 5). Section 1132(g)(1) provides: “In any action under this subcha pter (other than an action described in pa ragraph (2)) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiducia r y, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and cos t s of ac

tion to either part y.” The words “prevailing party” do not appear in this provi

sion. Nor d oes anythin g else in§1 132(g)(1)’s text purport to limit the availabilit y of attorne y ’s fees to a “prevailing party. ” Instead, §1132(g)(1) e x pressly grants distri ct courts “discretion” to aw ard at torney’s fees “to eithe r

—————— is nota prevailing party in t h e truestsens e of the term” (some interna l quotation mar k s and c i t a tio nomitted)); G r aham v. Hartford Life and Acci den tIns

. Co. , 501 F. 3d115 3, 11 62 ( CA10 20 07) ( “ We also affor d certain weightto prevailing party st a t us, even though we acknowled g e that the ERI SA a ttor n ey ’ s fees provisio n is not expressly directedat prevailing parties”). Other Courts of Appeals have rejected or dis

avowed that position. See, e.g., Millerv. U n ited Welfa re Fund , 72 F. 3d 106 6, 107 4 (C A2 19 95); Gibbs v. Gibbs , 2 10 F. 3d 49 1, 503 (C A5 2 0 0 0 ); Freem anv. Continental I n s. Co. , 996 F. 2d 111 6, 111 9 (C A11 1 9 9 3 ).9 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### party. ” (Emphasis added.) That langu a ge contras t s sharply with §1132(g)(2), which governs the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA actions under §1145 (actions to recove r delinquent employer contributions to a m u ltiemployer plan). In such cas e s, only plainti ffs who obta in “a judgment in favor of the plan” may seek attorney’s fees. §1132 (g)(2)(D). The contra st between these two par a graphs makes clear that Congress knows how to impose express limits on the availability of attorney’s f ees in ERISA cases. Because Congress failed to include in §1132(g) (1) an express “prevailing party” limit on the availabili ty of attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals’ de cision adding that term of art to a fee-shifting statute from which it is conspicuously absent more closely resembles “i nvent[ing] a statute rather than interpret[in g] one.” Pasq uantino v. UnitedSta t es , 544 U. S. 349, 35 9 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We see no reason to dwell any longer on thi s question, particularlygiven Reliance’s conc essions. S ee Brief for Respondent 9–10 (“On its face,” §1132(g)(1) “does not expressly demand, like so manystatutes, that a claimant be a ‘prevailing party’ before rec e iving attorney’s fees”). We therefore hold that a fee claim ant need not be a “pre

vailing party” to be el igible for a nattorney’s fees award under §1132(g)(1). III We next consider the circumstances under which a court may award attorney’s fees pursuant to §1132(g)(1). “Ou r basic pointof referen c e” when considering the award of attorney’s f ees is thebedrock principle k n own as the
“ ‘AmericanRule’ ”: Each litigant pays his own attorne y ’s fees, win or lose, unless a st atute or contract provide s otherwise. Ruckelshau s , 463 U. S., at 683; see id. , at 683– 686; Alyesk a Pipe line Servi ce Co. v. Wilder ness Socie t y , 421 U. S. 2 40, 247 (1975); Buckhannon , supra , at 602–60 3;10 HARDT v. RELIANCE S TA N DARD LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of theCourt 

### see also Perduev. Kenny A. , 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5). Sta t utory changes to this rule take various forms. Most fee-shifting provisions permit a court t o award attorney’s fees only to a “prevailing party.” 3

### O t h e r s permit a “substantially prevailing” party 4

### or a “successful” litigant 5

### to obtain fees. Still others authorize district courts to a w ard a ttor n ey’s fees where “app ropriate,” 6

### or simply vest district cou rts wi th “ d iscretion” to award fees. 7 

### Of those statutory deviations from the American Rule, we have most often consider ed statutes containing an express “prevailing party” requirement. See, e.g., Texas Sta t e Tea c h ers A ssn. v. Garland Independen tSchool Dist. , 489 U. S. 782, 792–793 (1989); Farra rv. Hobby , 506 U. S. 103, 109–114 (1992); Buckhanno n , supra , a t602–606; Sole v. Wyner , 551 U. S. 74, 82–86 (2007). Our “prevailing party” pre c edents, however, do not govern the availabilit y of fees awa r ds under §1132(g)(1), because this provision does not l i m it the availability of attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party.” Supra , at 8–9; see also Gross , supra , a t ___, (s lip o p ., at 6) (cautioning courts “conducting statu

tory inter p r e tation .

. . ‘not to applyrules applicable under one statute to a diff erent statute without careful and critical examination’ ” (quoting Fe deral Exp r ess Cor p . v. Holowecki , 552 U. S. 389, 393 (2008))). Instead, we interpret §1132(g)(1) in light of our prece

dents addressing statutory de viations from the America n Rule that d o not limit attorney’s f ees awards to the “ p re -

——————

3 See, e. g., B u c k hannon Boar d & Care Ho me, Inc

. v. W est Virg inia Dept. of Healt hand Hum a nResour ces , 532 U. S. 5 98, 6 01– 60 3 (2 001 ) (citing examples); Ruck els h ausv. Sie rra Cl ub , 463 U. S. 680, 6 84, n

. 3 (198 3) (same).

4 See ibid., n. 4 (citing examples). 5 See, e. g . , 18 U. S. C. §2707 (c ); Ru ck els h a u s , sup r a , at 684, n

. 5 (c it

ing examples).

6 See Ruck els h a u s , sup r a , at 682, n

. 1 (c itin g ex amples). 7 See, e. g . , 15 U. S. C. §§77k(e), 77www( a), 78i(e), 78r(a), 7706(g)(4); 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)( 3 )(B)(i); 42 U. S. C. §2000 aa–6(f).11 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### vailing party.” In that line of precedents, Ruckelshau sis the principal case. There, the Court interpre ted §307(f) of the Clean Air Act, wh ich autho rizes a court to award fe es “whenever it determines that such an award is appropri

ate.” 42 U. S. C. §7607(f). We began by no ting that b e cause nothing in §307 (f)’s text “clear[ly] show[ed]” that Congress meant to aba ndon the A m erican Rule, 463 U. S., at 685, fee claimants must hav e achieved some litigating success to be eligible f o r a fees a w ard under that section , id. , at 686. We thenconcluded that by using the less stringent “whenever .

. . appropri ate” standa r d instead of the traditional “prevailing pa rty” standard, Congress had “expand[ed] the class of parties eligible for fees awards from prevailing parties to partially prevaili ng parties— parties achieving some succe ss , eve nif not maj o r success.” Id. , at 688. We thus held “that, absent som e degree of success on the merits by the clai mant, it is not ‘app rop r i

ate’ for a f e deral court to awar dattorney’s fees under §307(f).” Id

. , at 694. Applyingt h e interpretive app r oach we e m ployed i n Ruckelshau s to §1132(g)(1), we first look to “the language of the secti on,” id., at 682, which unambiguously allows a court to award at tor n ey’s fees “in its discretion .

. . to either party,” §1132(g)(1). Statutes vesting judges wi th such broad discretion are well k n own in the law, particu

larly in the attorney ’s fees context

. See, e. g., n. 7, sup ra; see als o Perdue , 559 U. S., at ___ (sl i p op., at 14). Equally wel lknown, ho wever, is th e fact that a “judge’s discretion is not unlimited.” Ibid. Consistent with Cir

cuit preced ent, the District Cour t applied five factors t o guide its discretion in deciding whether to award a ttor

ney’s fees under §1132(g)(1). See supra , at 6, and n. 1. Because these five factors bear no obvious relation to §1132(g)(1)’s text or to our fee- shif ting jurisprudence, they are not required for channeling a court’s di scretion wh en awarding fe es under this section.12 HARDT v. RELIANCE S TA N DARD LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of theCourt 

### Instead, Ruckelshau slays down the proper mark ers to guide a court in exercising the discretion that §1132(g)(1) grants. As in the statute at iss ue in Ruckelshaus , Co n gress failed to indicate clearly in §1132( g)(1) that it “meant to abandon historic f ee-shifting pri nciples an d intuitive notions of fairness.” 463 U. S., at 6 86. Accord

ingly, a fees claimant must show “some degree of succes s on the merits” before a court ma y awar d at torney’s fees under §1132(g)(1), id. , at 694. A claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving “trivial success on the merits” or a “purelyp r ocedural v i ctor[y],” bu t does satis fy it if the co urt canfair ly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits witho ut conduc ting a “lengt hy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party’s success was ‘substantia l’ or occu rr ed on a ‘ce n tral issue.’ ” Id. , at 688, n. 9. 8 

### Reliance es sentially a grees that this standard should govern fee requests under §1132(g)(1), see Brief for Re

spondent 13–31, but a r gues that Hardt has not satisfied it. Specifically, Reliance contends that a court order remand

ing an ERI SA claim for further consideration can never constitute “ some success on the merits,” ev en if such a remand results in an a w ard of benefits. See id

. , at 34–50. Reliance’s a r gument misses the poi nt, given the facts o f this case. Hard t persuaded th e District Co urt to find that “the plan administrat o r has failed to comply with t h e ERISA gui d elines” and “that Ms. Hardt didnot get the kind of review to which she was entitled under applicable law.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a; see 29 U. S. C. §1133(2), 29 CFR §2560.503–1(h) (2009). Although Hardt failed to win summary judgmen ton her be nefits claim, the District

——————

8 We do not for e c l ose the pos s ibi litytha to n c e a c l aimanthas s a ti sfie d th is r e qu ir em en t, an d th u s bec o mes elig ible for a fee s awar du n der §113 2(g)(1), a c o u r t mayc o nsiderth e fiv e fac t or s adop te d byth e Cou r t of Appeals, se e n. 1, supra , in deciding whether to a w ard attorney’s fees.13 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### Court nevertheless found “comp elling evidence that Ms. Hardt is totally disabled due to her neuropathy,” a n d stated that it was “incli ned to rule in Ms. Har d t’s fa vor” o n her benefits claim, but declined to do so before “first givin g Reliance the chance to address the deficiencies in it s” statutorily mandated “full and fa ir review” of that claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a; 29 U

. S. C. §1133(2). Hardt thus obtained a judicial order inst ructing Reliance “to ac t on Ms. Hardt’s applica t ion by adequately considering all the evidence” within 30 days; “[o]therwise, judgment will be issued i nfavor of Ms. H a rd t. ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. After Reliance conducted th at court-ordered review, and consistent with t h e DistrictCourt’s ap praisal, Reli

ance reversed its decision and awa r ded Ha rdt the benefits she sought. App. 120a– 123a. These facts establish that Hardt has achieved far more than “trivia lsuccess on the merits” or a “purely procedura l victory. ” Accordingly, she has achieved “some success on the merits,” and the District Courtproperly e x ercised its discretion to award Hardt atto rn ey’s fees in this case. Because these conclusions resolve this case, we need not decide today whethe r a reman dorder, without more, constitutes “some success on the merits” suffic i ent to make a party eligible for attorney’s fees under §1132(g)(1). 9 

### * * * We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circ uit and remand this case for proceedings con

sistent with this opinion. It is so orde red.

——————

9 Relia nce ha s not pres erveda n y s e pa rate objection to the reason

ableness of th e amount of f ees awarded. See Perduev. Kenny A. , 559 U. S. ___, ___ (201 0) (slip op., at 7–8, 1 4)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–4 48 

### BRIDGET HARDT, P E TITIONER v. RELIA NCE S TAN DARD LIFE INS U RA N C E C O MPA NY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [M ay24, 2010 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , con c urring in part and co ncurring in the judgme nt. While I join the Court’s judgment and Parts I and II of its opinion, I do not believe that our mistaken interpreta

tion of §307(f) of the Clean Air Act in Ruc k elshaus v. Si

erraClub , 463 U. S. 6 80 (1983), should be given any spe

cial weightin the interpretation of this—or any other

— different statutory pro vision. The outcome in that closely divided cas e turned, to a significant extent, o na judgme nt about how to read the legislative history of the provision in question. Compare id., at 686–693, with id., at 703–706 (S TEVENS 

### , J., dissenting). I agree with the Court in this case that 29 U. S. C. § 1132(g)(1) does not impose a “pre

vailing party” require ment; I agree, further, that the District Court acted well within its discretion in awarding attorney’s f ees to this petitioner. But I would examine the text, stru cture, and history of any other federal statute authorizing an awa r d of fees before concludi ng that Co n gress intended the same approach under th at statute as under this one.