alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 2233** 

HOANG TAING , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. PENNY PRITZKER, Honorable; Secretary of Commerce; KATHRYN H. ANDERSON, Honorable; Office of Civil Rights, CENHQ 3H068; WILLIAM W. HATCHER, Honorable; U.S. Census Bureau/RCC; DANA JAMES BOENTE, Honorable; US Acting Attorney; LORETTA E. LYNCH, Honorable; Attorney General , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria
. T.S. Ellis, III , Senior District Judge. ( 1:13

- cv - 01281

- TSE

- TCB )

Submitted : June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015

Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by un published per curiam opinion
. Hoang Taing, Appellant Pro Se. Antonia Marie Konkoly, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee s . Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 P ER CURIAM: Hoang Taing a ppeals the di strict court’s order s granting summary judgment to Appellees and denying her Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration in this employment discrimination action
. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
W hen the United States or its officer or agenc y is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after the entry of the district court ’ s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The district court’s order granting summary judgment to Appellees was entered on the docket on July 7, 2014. The notice of appeal was filed on November 10, 2014. Because Hoang Taing failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the order granting summary judgment or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
. Turning to the order denying reconsideration, w e have reviewed the record and find no reversible error . Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Rule 60(b) relief for the reasons stated by the district court. Hoang T aing v. Pritzker , No. 1:13

- cv - 0 1231

- TSE

- TCB (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 5, 2014; entered Nov. 6 , 2014). W e dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions3 are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30165

FIREFIGHTERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM; MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA; NEW ORLEANS 

FIREFIGHTERS’ PENSION & RELIEF FUND, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CITCO GROUP LIMITED; CITCO FUND SERVICES (CAYMAN ISLANDS), 

LIMITED; CITCO BANKING CORPORATION, N.V., 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and HO, Circuit Judges.

JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:

As this court recently reaffirmed, “there is no final decision if a plaintiff 

voluntarily dismisses a defendant without prejudice, because the plaintiff ‘is 

entitled to bring a later suit on the same cause of action.’” Williams v. Taylor 

Seidenbach, Inc., 958 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting Ryan v. 

Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1978)). We also 

observed that, under Rule 54(b), “in a suit against multiple defendants, there 

is no final decision as to one defendant until there is a final decision as to all 

defendants.” Id.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 7, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-30165 Document: 00515479728 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/07/2020
No. 19-30165

2

Those principles control this case. Here, a group of Louisiana pension 

funds sued various defendants for their alleged involvement in a Ponzi scheme. 

The district court later entered summary judgment for a set of defendants—

the Citco Group and various related entities. To appeal that decision, the 

Funds voluntarily dismissed one defendant without prejudice and then 

resolved all remaining claims either by settlement or default judgment.

The only difference between this case and Williams is the order of 

dismissals after the adverse decision. In Williams, the voluntary dismissal 

without prejudice disposed of all remaining defendants in the case. 958 F.3d 

at 344. Here, the Funds voluntarily dismissed one defendant without prejudice 

and then adjudicated their claims against other defendants. But that is a 

distinction without a difference. The Funds sought to render an interlocutory 

decision appealable by dismissing at least one defendant without prejudice. 

And under Williams, that means—absent some further act like a Rule 54(b) 

certification—there is no final, appealable decision. See id. at 343.1

We dismiss the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction.

1 Because the dismissal without prejudice in this case occurred after the order the 

Funds seek to appeal, we do not decide how Williams and Ryan would apply where the 

dismissal occurred before the adverse, interlocutory order. See Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 

F.3d 1257, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that there was a final decision in such a 

case). For that reason, this decision does not create a split with the Eleventh Circuit—and 

may explain why the Funds did not cite Schoenfeld in arguing that appellate jurisdiction 

exists here.

 Case: 19-30165 Document: 00515479728 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/07/2020
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-16-00421-CR

Santiago “Jimmy” LOMAS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 8581-A

Honorable Enrique Fernandez, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 8, 2017

REVERSED AND REMANDED

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion for post-conviction 

DNA testing. After appellant’s brief was filed, but before the State filed its brief, the parties filed 

a “Motion to Enter Agreed Order to Conduct DNA Testing on Biological Materials.” Based on 

the parties’ agreed motion, we reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion for DNA 

testing and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the parties’

agreed motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3(a). 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2349 

To reduce temporarily the duty on frames and mountings for spectacles, 

goggles, or the like, the foregoing of plastics. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. VOINOVICH (for himself and Mr. BROWN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To reduce temporarily the duty on frames and mountings 

for spectacles, goggles, or the like, the foregoing of plastics. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FRAMES AND MOUNTINGS FOR SPECTACLES, 

4 GOGGLES, OR THE LIKE, THE FOREGOING OF 

5 PLASTICS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

7 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

8 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

9 new heading: 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2349 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Frames and mountings for 

spectacles, goggles, or the 

like, the foregoing of plastics 

(provided for in subheading 

9003.11.00) ........................... 2.3% No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### STATE ex rel. Abdullah Hakim EL-MUMIT a/k/a Thomas Sparks, Jr. v. FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL, State of Louisiana, et al.

No. 86-KH-2341.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 9, 1987.

In re El-Mumit, Abdullah Hakim a/k/a; Sparks, Thomas Jr.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, and writ of prohibition and mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “D”, No. 300-867; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-6471.

Denied.
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Chisen Electric Corporation (the “Company”) on Form
10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the
undersigned hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his
knowledge:




1.           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2.           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.




Date:
      February 17, 2009
                        By:
                        /s/ Xu
      KechengName:
                        Xu
      KechengTitle:
                        President,
      Chief Executive Officer and Principal Executive
  Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to Chisen Electric Corporation will be
retained by Chisen Electric Corporation and furnished to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Daries BARNES a/k/a Skinny Red, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-351.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 24, 1987.

*59Danes Barnes, in pro. per.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Richard L. Polin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Foster v. State,*400 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1981); *Mills v. State,*462 So.2d 1075 (Fla.1975).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LAFAYETTE MCKOY, a/k/a L.A.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District

Judge. (1:99-cr-00526-WMN-8; 1:06-cv-01036-WMN)

Submitted: June 21, 2007 Decided: June 27, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lafayette McKoy, Appellant Pro Se. Martin Joseph Clarke, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Lafayette McKoy appeals the district court’s order

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United States

v. McKoy, No. 1:99-cr-00526-WMN-8; 1:06-cv-01036-WMN (D. Md. Aug.

31, 2006). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Donald LaCHANCE, Appellant, v. FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO., Appellee.

No. 87-1363.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 1, 1988.

*331Ralph P. Ezzo, Miami, for appellant.

Steel, Hector & Davis and Kathleen A. Monahan, Miami, for appellee.

Before HENDRY, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See Gordon v. Gordon,*59 So.2d 40 (Fla.), *cert. denied,*344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 165, 97 L.Ed. 680 (1952); *Thomson v. Petherbridge,*472 So.2d 773, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); *Pumo v. Pumo,*405 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA), *review denied,*412 So.2d 469 (Fla.1981); *State Road Dep’t v. Lewis,*156 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963), *aff'd in part, rev’d in part,*170 So.2d 817 (Fla.1964).
#### STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*MICHAEL WATSON

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15924.

*Mark Rademacher,*assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

*Frederick W. Fawcett,*assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided April 28, 1998

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 47 Conn. App. 794 (AC 16560), is granted, limited to the following issues:

> “1. Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court’s instruction that the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence are ‘designed to protect the innocent and not the guilty’?

> “2. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court properly permitted the state to cross-examine the defendant’s alibi witness regarding her failure to report the alibi to the proper authorities?”

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2114 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2114

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 3,6,9-Trioxaundecanedioic 
                                 acid.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

   Mr. Bond introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 3,6,9-Trioxaundecanedioic 
                                 acid.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. 3,6,9-TRIOXAUNDECANEDIOIC ACID.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.04.09 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to 3,6,9-Trioxaundecanedioic 
acid) is amended by striking ``12/31/2009'' and inserting ``12/31/
2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE ex rel. Van HILLIARD v. Hilton BUTLER, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 88-KH-1706.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re Hilliard, Van; applying for writ of habeas corpus, post-conviction relief, and supervisory writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, Nos. 273-328, 274-126.

Denied.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2011-0564

Directorate Identifier: 2011NM021AD

601R-34-147, RA --- 11/3/09

601R-34-147 --- 4/1/09

670BA-34-030, RA --- 11/3/09

670BA-34-030 --- 4/1/09

IPC 34-11-15 --- 11/20/10

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS, CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF CHANGES IN SHAREHOLDERS' INVESTMENT, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF
CASH FLOWS AND NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       1,057,368
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  442,992
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    201,700
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,514,148
<PP&E>                                      84,449,083
<DEPRECIATION>                                 775,401
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             102,892,956
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,226,661
<BONDS>                                     83,592,136
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        295
<COMMON>                                         4,788
<OTHER-SE>                                  13,312,032
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               102,892,956
<SALES>                                     14,148,049
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            14,148,049
<CGS>                                       10,708,414
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,708,414
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,068,440
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,482,772
<INCOME-TAX>                                   472,014
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            636,050
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   636,050
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12


</TABLE>
-79 -78 -77 -76 -75

 38

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 40

★

▲

▲

▲

▲

★

▲

▲ ▲ ▲

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 1500

 500

18 12 06 00

08/24

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 24 Aug 06

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 38.92 N 77.01 W Meters AGL
#### In re COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FILE NO. 7984 And Nos. 8218, 8222, 8288, 8295, 8347, 8533, 8588, 8594, 8596 & 8972.

No. 87-OB-1234.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 12, 1987.

In re LSBA Comm. File No. 7984; applying for motion to appoint A Curator Ad Hoc.

Motion granted. Alan Katz, is appointed Curator Ad Hoc.
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ N O . 09
- 19
- 00249
- CR

__________________
IN RE BENNIE RAY JOHNSON

__________________________________________________________________ Original Proceeding 221st District Court of Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 19
- 07
- 09863
- CR

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION In an original petition for a writ of mandamus, Bennie Ray Johnson complains that he has been held in jail on a charge of burglary of a habitation following a probable c ause hearing based upon the arresting officer’s police report and not upon a complaint signed by the victim of the burglary. Johnson failed to provide any supporting documentation with his mandamus petition. Additionally, “[i] t is well
settled that an info rmation may be predicated upon a complaint or affidavit made2 upon information and belief. ” Catchings v. State , 285 S.W.2d 233, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955). Release from confinement in a criminal case is obtained through habeas corpus, over which this Court lacks original jurisdiction. See Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 11.01, 11.05 (West 2015). Furthermore, t o the extent his petition seeks relief against the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office and the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, or the o fficials holding those offices, we lack mandamus jurisdiction. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (West Supp. 2018 ). To the extent that he seeks mandamus relief against the Judge of the 221st District Court of Montgomery County, Johnson has failed to show t hat he is entitled to the relief sought. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a)(1) (relator must file with petition “a certified or sworn copy of every document that is material to the relator ’ s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying proceeding [] ”)

. Ac cordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
PETITIO N DENIED.

PER CURIAM Submitted on August 20 , 2019 Opinion Delivered August 21, 2019 Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
Exhibit 4.1


 


THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


240 Greenwich
Street, 22W Floor, New York, NY 10286


 


 


 


December 4, 2020


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


SmartTrust 499 (the “Fund”)


 


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for the Fund, consisting of the unit investment trust (the “Trust”) included in
the Registration Statement relating to the Fund. We enclosed a list of the securities to be deposited in the Trust on the date
hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our evaluation of such securities as of close of business on December 3, 2020, in
accordance with the valuation method set forth in the applicable Standard Terms and Conditions of Trust and Trust Agreement. We
consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations of the Trust securities in the
Registration Statement (No. 333-248809) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the registration of the
sale of the Units of the Trust and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


Very truly yours,


 


/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO               


Gerardo Cipriano


Vice President
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 35

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives

2 concurring), That when the Senate recesses or adjourns

3 at the close of business on Thursday, May 27, 1999, on

4 a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution

5 by its Majority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed

6 or adjourned until noon on Monday, June 7, 1999, or until

7 such time on that day as may be specified by its Majority

8 Leader or his designee in the motion to recess or adjourn,

9 or until noon on the second day after Members are notified

10 to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent res11 olution, whichever occurs first; and that when the House

12 adjourns on the legislative day of Thursday, May 27,

13 1999, on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent res14 olution by its Majority Leader or his designee, it stand

15 adjourned until 12:30 p.m. on Monday, June 7, 1999, for

16 morning-hour debate, or until noon on the second day

17 after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to sec18 tion 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.
2

SCON 35 ES

1 SEC. 2. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the

2 Speaker of the House, acting jointly after consultation

3 with the Minority Leader of the Senate and the Minority

4 Leader of the House, shall notify the Members of the Sen5 ate and House, respectively, to reassemble whenever, in

6 their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

Passed the Senate May 26, 1999.

Attest:

Secretary.
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 35

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess

the House of Representatives.of the Senate and a conditional adjournment of