1 NOT DE S IGNA T ED F OR PU B LICAT I ON

No. 122, 2 59

IN THE C OURT OF A PPEALS OF T H E S T ATE OF KANS A S

S T A TE O F K A N S AS

, Appellee

,

v.

A RM A ND O C I P R I AN O L I R A

, Appellant

.

MEMO R AND U M OP I NION

A ppeal fr o m Wya n do t t e Di s t r i c t C ou r t ; J ENNIF E R L

. M YER S

, j ud g e. Op i n i on f il e d M a r ch 26,

2021. A f f i r m e d

.

Ryan J. E d d i n g e r

, o f K an sa s Appe l l a t e D e f en d er O f f i c e, f o r ap p e l l a n t

.

D an i el G

. O be r

m e i e r

, a s s i s t a n t d i s t ri c t a t t o r n ey, M ark A. D upr e e S r

. , d i s t r i ct a t t or ney, and D e r e k

Schmi d t

, a tt o r ney gen e r a l

, f

or ap p e l l ee.

Before B R U N S

, P.J., G R E E N and A T CH E S O N

, JJ.

P E R C U R I A M : Armando Lira appea l s his a gg r avated robb e ry, aggr av ated assault,

and driv i ng with a sus p ended l i cen s e convi c ti on s. Lira ar g ues that we should rev e rse his

convict i ons becaus e

, a f

ter his warr a ntless a r r e st, the trial court d i d n o t promptly make a

judicial d e t e rminat i on of probable cause in v i olation of h is righ t s u n der the Fo u rth

Amendme n t to the Un i ted States Consti t ution and K.S. A

. 2020 Supp. 22

- 2901( 1 ).

Neverthele s s, becau s e Lira ' s a r gument is not warranted b y law a n d f act, we affi r m his

convict i on s

.2

Backgrou n d

On October 17, 2 0 18, a round 9:20 p.m., J osh u a Wells rep o rted to t he police that

Armando L ira had j ust driven away in his tow truck after f o rcing h i m out of his t ow tru c k

at gunp o i n t, threa t e ni n g Wells wi t h his o wn h andgun. B e cause W e ll s ' tow t r uck

contain e d a GPS t r ack e r, the police quickly l o cated Well s ' tow truck within m i nutes of

Wells' r e port. W hen t h e police arre s ted Lira a round 9:30 p.m., Lira was walki n g away

from Wel l ' s t o w truck with Wel l ' s ha n dgun n e ar his feet.

Two days a fter his wa r rantless ar r e st, on O ct o ber 19, 20 1 8, a trial ju d ge signed

Lira ' s ar r est warr a nt. T hree days af t er this o n October 22, 2018, t he State charg e d Lira

with kidn a pping, a ggr a vated robbe r y, aggr a v a ted assault, theft, cr i m i nal damage to

property, a n d driv i ng w ith a susp e nd e d lic e nse. At this s a me time on October 22, 2018,

the court c le r k certifi e d Lira's a r rest war r ant. S ignificantl y

, this w as t h e same arrest

warrant that the trial j u dge had alre a dy si g ned sometime on Oct o ber 1 9, 2018. T hen, the

next day, O ctober 2 3, 2 018, t he tri a l court held Lira ' s f i rst app e arance.

The transcr i pt of Li r a ' s first appear a nce is n o t i n the record on appe a l. Even so,

because the t rial cou r t did not di s miss t he Sta t e ' s char g es agai n st Lir a

, it is readi l y

apparent t hat at his f

irst appearance, t he trial c ourt deter m ined that p r obable cause

supported Lira's warr a ntless arrest five d a ys e arlier on Oc t ober 17, 2 018, arou n d 9:30

p.m.

Next, before his ju r y tr i al, Lira m o ved to d i sm i ss the Stat e ' s c harges a gainst hi m

.

In his m o t i on to d ismi s s, Lira a rgu e d that t he t rial cour t ' s failu r e to t i mely cond u ct a

probable ca u se heari n g following his war r ant l ess arrest v i olated h is r i ghts under the

Fourth A mendm e nt. In making th i s argu m ent, Lira point e d to the Uni t ed States S upreme

Court ' s holdi n g in C ou nty of Rive r side v. Mc L aughli n

, 5 00 U.S. 44, 5 6, 111 S. Ct. 16 6 1

,

114 L. Ed. 2d 49 ( 199 1 ). The Cou r t held t hat t he Fourth Amen d ment requires a j u dicial3

determinat i on of p r ob a ble cause fo l lowing a d efendant ' s warra n tless arrest to oc c ur

within 48 hours of that defendan t ' s warr a ntless arrest. 500 U.S. at 5 6

- 57. Lira th e n

asserted t hat the fi v e

- d ay delay be t ween h i s w arrantless ar r est and p r obable cause

determinat i on at his fi r st appearance prejud i c e d his defe n se becau s e t he delay pr e vented

him from b eing "r e lea s ed [from jai l ] to ob t ain the legal rep r esentat i on of his cho i ce."

The State r e spond e d t h at Lira ' s motion was m eritless bec a use rega r d l ess of wh e n

Lira ' s fi r st appe a rance occurred, a t r ial jud g e s igned Lir a ' s arre s t war r ant within two da y s

of his arres t

. The S t ate further res p onded t h at even if the t r ial court d i d not time l y make a

judicial det e rminat i on of probable cause in v i olation of K.S.A. 2 2

- 2 9 01(1), di s missal of

its charges a gainst Lira was an ext r eme san c t i on not war r anted u n der the facts of Lira ' s

case.

The trial c o urt held a h earing on L i ra ' s motio n

. Although Lir a ' s writt e n motion t o

dismiss f o cused o n a p otential vi o lation o f the Fourth A mendm e nt at the hearing, Lira

also arg u ed that an un n ecessary de l a y betwe e n his warra n t less arr e st a nd the trial cour t ' s

probable ca u se dete r m i nation at h i s first a ppe a rance violat e d his r i gh t s under K

. S.A. 2 2

-

2901(1). In the end, h o wever, the t r ial court d enied Lir a ' s mo t ion. T h e trial court agreed

with the S t ate ' s argum e nt, ruling t hat a t i mely j udicial dete r minati o n o f probable c a use

occurred in Lira ' s case because a tri a l judge s i gned Lir a ' s arrest warr a nt just two days

after his wa r rantless ar r est.

After deny i ng Lir a ' s m otion to d i smiss, the tr i al court held Lir a ' s jury trial. At t h e

conclus i on of his t rial, the jury fo u nd Lira gui l ty of aggra v ated ro b be r y, aggravat e d

assault, and drivi n g wi t h a sus p e n ded lice n se. The jury w a s unab l e to reach a unan i mous

verdict on L ira ' s kidn a pping, thef t

, and cr i mi n al damage t o proper t y c harges. The trial

court t h en s entenced L i ra to a cont r olling t e rm of 259 m o nth s ' impr is onment fo l lowed b y

36 month s ' p o strelease supervisi o n.4

Lira timely appealed.

Whether a t r i al court v i olated a def e ndan t ' s ri g ht to a pr o mpt j u d i cial

determinat i on of p r ob a ble cause fo l lowing his o r her warr a ntless a r r e st const i t u tes a

question of law ov e r w hich this c o urt exer c is e s unlimit e d review. See Doe v. T h ompso n

,

304 Kan. 2 91, 30 7

, 373 P.3d 750 (2016) ( hold i ng that " ' [w]h e n the a p plication of a statute

is challeng e d on c o nsti t utional gr o und s

, [ a n a p pellate] cou r t exercis e s an unlimi t ed, de

novo stan d ard of r e vi e w ' " )

, o v erruled on oth e r grounds by State v

. P e terse n

- Bea r d

, 304

Kan. 192, 377 P.3 11 2 7 (2016); s ee also S tate v. Garci a

, 282 K a n. 2 5 2, 260, 1 4 4 P.3d

684 (2006) (holdi n g t h at an appell a te cour t ' s r eview over t he trial c o u rt ' s den i al of a

defendan t ' s mo t ion to d ismiss hi n ges on the g r ound on w hich the def e ndant sou g ht

dismissal).

Following a warra n tle s s arrest, the Fourth A m endment re q uires a pr o mpt judi c i a l

determinat i on of p r ob a ble cause. G erstein v

. P ug h

, 420 U.S. 1 0 3, 11 4

, 95 S. Ct. 854, 4 3

L. Ed. 2d 5 4 (197 5 ). T o be consi d ered pr o mpt for Fourth Amen d me n t purposes, a judic i al

determina t i on of p r ob a ble cause m ust occ u r w ithin 48 h o urs of a def e ndant ' s warrant l ess

arrest. Mc L aughlin

, 5 0 0 U.S. at 5 6

- 57. Y et, e ven if a def e ndant e s t a blishes th a t there w as

an unt i me l y jud i ci a l d e termina t ion of pro b able cause fo l l o wing h i s or her war r antl e ss

arrest, t he " appropr i ate remedy for f ailure t o c onduct a t i mely pr o ba b le cause h ear i ng will

depend on t he parti c ul a r facts and c i rcumst a n c es of the ca s e." Sta t e v. Hershbe r ge r

, 27

Kan. App. 2d 485, Syl. ¶ 2, 5 P. 3 d 1004 ( 200 0 ). Also, in such ca s es, t he "dism i ssal of

charges is a n extre m e r emedy on l y warran t ed if the p rol o nged de t ent i on sub s ta n tially

impedes a d efendan t ' s ability to p repare a d e f ense." 27 Kan. A p p. 4 8 5, Syl. ¶ 2.

In Kansas, K.S.A. 2 2

- 2 901(1) also requires t h e prompt j u dicial d e te r m i nation o f

probable ca u se foll o w i ng a defend a nt ' s warr a ntless arres t

. In rele v a n t part, K.S

. A. 20 2 0

Supp. 22

- 2901(1) prov i des that if t he defe n da n t ' s "arr e st has b een ma d e on proba b le

cause, wi t h out a wa r r a nt, he s hall be taken w i thout unne c essary d el a y be f ore the nearest5

available m a gistra t e an d a comp l a i nt sha l l be f iled for t hw i th." U nder K.S.A. 2 2

- 2901( 1 ),

"[w]hether a delay i s u nreasonable or prej u di c ial must d e pend on the facts and

circums t anc e s of ea c h case." State v. Cr o uc h

, 230 Kan. 7 83, 78 6

, 641 P. 2 d 394 (1982).

Still, K.S

. A. 2 2

- 2 901( 1 ) "provid e s no sa n ctio n s in the ev e nt there i s u nnecessary delay in

taking a pe r son un d er a rrest before t he neare s t available m a gistrate

. " S tate v. Wake f iel d

,

267 Kan. 1 16, 12 3

, 977 P.2d 941 (1999). Furt h ermore, "[a ] n u nwar r a n ted delay in taking

the accused before a m agistrate after he or s he has been ar r ested is n o t in itself a denial of

due process unless it h a s in some way pre j udi c ed the right of the a c c u sed to a fair trial."

Wakefiel d

, 2 67 Ka n

. 1 1 6, Syl. ¶ 6.

Thus, rega r dless of w h ether a defe n dant ' s cha l lenge falls u nder the F o urth

Amendme n t or K

. S.A. 2 2

- 2901(1 )

, to be e ntit l ed to dis m issal of the S tate ' s ch a rges ba s ed

on the trial cour t ' s unt i mely judic i al dete r mi n ation of pr o bable c a use following a

defendan t ' s warr a ntless arrest, the d efendant m ust prove t he foll o wing three thin g s: (1)

that there w a s an u n ne c essary delay in the j ud i cial determ i nation of p r obable c a use

following his or h er w a rrantless arr e st; (2) t hat this u n nec e ssary d e lay prejudiced his or

her defense; and (3) t h a t this unne c essary d el a y prejud i ced his o r her defense to a n extent

that the on l y equit a ble remedy avai l able is di s missal of t he Stat e ' s c h arges.

On appeal, Lira argu e s that the fiv e

- day del a y between his warrant l e s s arrest and

the trial co u rt ' s probab l e cause dete r minati o n a t his first a ppearance v i olated his r ights

under the F ourth A me n dment and K.S.A. 2 2

- 2 901(1). In making this argument, L ira

concedes t h a t a tr i al ju dge si g ned his arre s t w arrant two d ays after h i s warrant l e s s arres t

.

Nonethele s s, Lira p oin t s out that t here is n o e v idence conce r ning t h e exact time when the

trial judge signed h is a r rest warrant. As a r e su l t, Lira asser t s that d es p ite signing his arr e st

warrant two days af

t er his warrant l ess arre s t, t he trial ju d ge may h ave signed his arrest

warrant mo r e than 4 8 h ours after h i s warra n tl e ss arrest. T hus, acc o rd i ng to Lira, this

means that the reco r d d oes not def i nitively es t ablish that the trial co u rt made a p r ompt6

determinat i on of p r ob a ble cause aft e r his w a r r antless ar r e s t as req u ir e d under the Fourth

Amendme n t to the Un i ted States Consti t ution and K.S. A

. 2 2

- 2 9 01(1).

Alternative l y, Lira a rg ues that reg a rdless o f w hen the trial judge s ig n ed his arrest

warrant, the act of s i g n ing his arr e st warra n t d oes not sat i sfy K

. S.A. 22

- 2901(1 ) ' s

requirement to have a p rompt pro b able ca u se h earing before a mag i st r ate judge. L ira then

asserts t hat the tr i al co u rt ' s fail u re to m a ke a p r ompt p rob a ble cau s e d etermina t i o n

following his warr a ntl e ss arrest pr e judiced his defense bec a use it " pr e vented him from

marshalli n g the re s our c es he needed to secu r e an attorney a nd dev e l o p a defense

. "

Indeed, the precedi n g a rgument is Lira ' s sole a rgument a b out w h y the fiv e

- day de l ay

between his warrant l e s s arrest and the trial c o urt ' s p r obable c a use de t erminat i on at his

first appear a nce prej u d i ced his def e nse. Ne v er t heless, t h ere are sig n if i cant probl e ms with

Lira ' s a r gumen t s.

To begin w ith, Lira ar g ues that the trial ju d ge may have s i gned h i s a r rest warrant

more than 4 8 hours af

t er his warr a ntless ar r e s t. The poli c e arrested L ira around 9 :30 p

. m.

on Wedne s day, Oc t ob e r 17, 2018. Thus, t he b urden was on Lira t o s h ow a McL a ughlin

and a K. S

. A. 22

- 2 901 ( 1) violati o n had oc c ur r ed between October 1 7

, 201 8

, and October

19, 2018. Here, it i s u n disputed t h at a t r ial ju d ge signed L ira ' s arrest warrant at s ome point

on F riday, Octo b er 19, 201 8

. Becau s e L ira has sh o wn no 4 8

- h o ur violati o n, he has failed

to e s t ablish t hat t he trial cou r t made a n untimely p robable c au s e determina t ion. See First

Na t ' l Bank & Tr u st Co. v. L ygrisse

, 231 Kan. 595, 602, 6 4 7 P. 2 d 1268 (1 9 82) (holding

t h at "[o]n ap p eal, error be l ow is n e v e r presumed and the bu r den is on t he appellant to

make it af f irmati v ely a ppear").

Next, not w ithsta n ding t he preceding probl e m, Lira ' s a r gument conce r ning h o w t he

five

- day del a y betw e en his warrantless arr e st a nd the trial cour t ' s pro b able cause

determinat i on at his fi r st appearance prejud i c e d his defe n se is fat a lly flawed. As the Sta t e

correctly p o i nts o u t in i ts brief, ev e n if the t rial court ' s probable cau s e determinat i on7

following Lira ' s warra n tless arrest was unt i me l y, the record on app e al entirely

undermines Lir a ' s con t ention that the trial co u rt ' s unt i mely d e termin a tion of pr o bable

cause in his case " p re v ented h i m f r om ma r sh a lling the r e sources he n eeded to se c ure an

attorney and devel o p a defense."

For examp l e, the re c o r d on appeal shows that Lira never re t ained an attorney to

represent h i m in h i s cr i minal case. I nstead, a p pointed co u nsel re p res e nted Lira

throughout the pe n den c y of his cr i minal c a se. A n d appo i nted co u nsel continues t o

represent Li r a on ap p e a l. Also, al t hough t he tr i al court set Lira ' s bond at his f i rst

appearance at $75,0 0 0, it see m s L ira lacked t h e resources t o bond out of jail beca u se he

remained in jail thr o u g hout the p e ndency of h i s criminal c ase. In s ho r t, the record on

appeal clear l y estab l i s h es that Lira had no r es o urces avai l a b le to b o nd out of jail let alo n e

to retain an a ttorney to develop his defense.

Based on t he prece d in g

, it is readi l y appar e nt t hat Lira ' s conte n tion t h at the fiv e

day delay b e tween h is warrantless arrest a n d t he trial cou r t ' s p robable cause

determinat i on at his fi r st appearance prejud i c e d his defe n se becau s e it "prevented him

from mars h alling t he r e sources he needed to s e cure an atto r ney and d e velop a def e n se" is

meritless. Because Lira is not ent i tled to a ny r e medy or s a nction f or t h e trial cour t ' s

allegedly u ntime l y det e rminat i on of prob a ble c ause con t ra r y to h i s F o urth A m e n dment

and K.S. A

. 22

- 2 9 01(1) rights abs e nt a sh o wing of prejudic e

, Lir a ' s fai l ure to estab l ish

prejudice is fatal. S e e Wakefield

, 2 67 Ka n

. 1 1 6, Syl. ¶ 6 ; Hers h berg e r

, 27 Kan. App. 4 85,

Syl. ¶ 2.

Finally, it is im

p ortant to note that in his brief, Lira never e xplains h o w the

outcome of his case w o uld have be e n differ e nt had he been ab l e to re t ain counsel during

the fiv e

- day delay b e t w een his war r antless a rr e st and the t r ial cour t ' s p robable cau s e

determinat i on at his fi r st appearanc e

. Nor d o e s Lira allege that his a p pointed co u nse l ' s

representati o n of h i m was some h ow pre j udi c ed by th i s f

ive

- day del a y. It is a w e l l

- kno w n8

rule that " [ c ]onclu s ory contentio n s with o ut ev i dentiary ba s is are n ot s ufficient for relief."

Gilkey v. St

a te

, 31 Ka n

. App. 2d 77, 82, 60 P

. 3d 351 (2 0 03). In t his c ase, even if we were

to ignore t h e evide n ce i ndicating ( 1 ) that L i ra f ailed to m e e t his b u rd e n to show that the

trial court made an u nt i mely prob a ble cause d e termination follow i ng Lira's ar r est and ( 2)

that Lira c o uld not a ff

o rd to retain a n attor n ey regardl e ss o f any u n ti m ely judicial

determinat i on of p r ob a ble cause, L i ra ' s argu m ent that the trial co u r t wrongly d e nied h i s

motion to dismi s s wou l d still fail because L ira neither expl a ins nor s h ows how h is inability

to retain c ou n sel during t he fiv e

- day delay betwe e n his w ar r antless arre s t and t h e trial

cour t ' s pr o bable c a use determ i nation at h i s first appe a rance ac t u a lly negativ e ly affected his

defense.

Thus, for e a ch of the p r eceding rea s ons, we af f irm the trial cour t ' s de n ial of Lir a ' s

motion to dismi s s.

Affirmed.