F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

R I C H A R D D E A N H U R L E S , Petitioner-Appellant ,

v.

C H A R L E S L

. R Y

A N , W arden; G E O R G E H E R M A N , W arden, Ariz ona State Prison - Ey man Complex , Respondents-Appellees. No. 16-99007

D.C. No. 2:00-cv-00118-DL R

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Doug las L . Ray es, District J udg e, Presiding
Arg ued and Submitted December 10, 2018 San F rancisco, California

F iled F ebruary

1, 2019

B efore: Sidney

R. Thomas, Chief J udg e, and Richard A. Paez and N. Randy

Smith, Circuit J udg es. Per Curiam OpinionH U R L E S V

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SUMMARY *

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s judg ment, on remand for a

n evidentiar y hearing , dismissing a h abeas corpus petition.

The panel could not say that the district court committed

c l e a r error in its determinations, after conducting a n evidentiary he a ri n g on remand, that there was no actual judicial bias.

The panel held that the petitioner’s clai m of ineffective assistance of a

ppellate counsel is not viable in lig ht of Davila

v. Davis , 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017), which held that the holding in Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U .S. 1 (2012) – that a successful claim of post-conviction ineffective assistanc e of counsel

can ex cuse a procedurally defaulted c laim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel – d oes not ex tend t o procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

co u n s el. The panel wrote that b ecause Davila is clearly irreconcilable with this court’s p ri o r precedent, Nguyen v

. Curry , 73 6 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2013), Nguyen does not control the panel’s d e c i s ion, and a p rior panel’s pre- Davila decision apply ing Nguyen to this case does not bind this panel.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.H U R L E S V

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COUNSEL
Emily Katherine Skinner (arg ued) and Natman Schay e , Associate Counsel, Ariz ona Capital Representation Proj ect, Tucson, Ariz ona; Denise Young , Tucson, Ariz on a; for Petitioner-Appellant.

J ulie Ann Done (arg

ued), Assistant Attorney General, Capital L itig ation Section; L a cey Stover Gard, Chief Counsel; Mark B rnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix , Ariz o na; for Respondents-Appellees.

OP INION

PER CURI AM:

This appeal returns to us after a prior panel remanded the

case to the district court for an e v identiary hearing

. Hurles v

. Ryan , 752 F .3d 768 (9th Cir. 2014). After co nsidering the record, briefs, and arg uments, we affirm. The factual record in the case was thoroug hly discussed in o ur prior opinion, so we need not recount it here.

B e cause Hurles filed his federal habeas petition in 2000, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) g overns. Hurles , 752 F. 3 d at 777. AEDPA “bars relitig ation of a

ny c laim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in stat e court, subject only to the ex ceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1)

a n d (2).” Harrington v. R ichter , 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011)

. Relief should not be g ranted unle ss the state court proceeding s either “(1) r esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unre a s o n a ble application of, clearly established F e deral law, as d etermined by theH U R L E S V

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Supreme Court of the U n i t ed States” o r “(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination o f the facts in lig h t of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding

. ” 28 U.S.C. § 22 5 4 (d )

. Clearly established law is limited to the Supreme Court’s holding s at the time of the state court decision. W

illiams v

. Taylor , 529 U.S. 3 6 2 , 412 (2000). We review d e novo the district court’s dismissal o f the petition and its finding s of fact f o r clear e rror. Brown v

. Ornoski , 503 F .3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007).

1. The prior panel remanded the issue of judicial b ias for

an evidentiary hearing on risk of actual bias. The district court conducted a thoroug h heari n g on that issue and made factual finding s that no b ias occurred. After reviewing the record, the briefs, and considering the arg uments of counsel, we cannot say that the district court committed clear e rror in its factual determinations. 1

2. A s to the q

uestion of ineffective assistance o f appellate counsel, the prior p anel ex cused the procedural default because it held that post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective in failing to raise t h e ineffective assistance o f appellate counsel claim. H u r l e s , 752 F

. 3d at 781–83. I n so holding , the panel a

p plied Ngyuen v. Curry , 736 F .3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2013). Ngyuen is an e x tension of Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1 (2012), w here the Supreme Court h e l d that a
s u c c essful claim of post c o nviction ineffective assistance o f

counse l c an ex cuse a procedurally defaulted claim o f

1 P u rsu an t to th e j u r i sp r u d e n t ial d o ctrin e o f law o f th e case, w e d eclin e to reco n sid er m atters p ertain in g to th is issu e w h ich w ere d ecid ed i n t h e p rio r ap p eal. Jeffries v. W o o d , 1 1 4 F.3 d 1 4 8 4 , 1 4 8 8

– 8 9 (9 th C i r

. 1 9 9 7 ) (en ban c). T h e o n ly q u estio n p resen ted i n th is ap p eal is w h eth er th e d istrict co u rt’ s f

actu al f in din g s o n

rem an d w ere clearly erro n eo u s.H U R L E S V

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ineffective assis t a n c e o f trial counsel. I n Nguyen , we h eld that the same reasoning applied to d efaulted claims o f ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Ngyuen , 736 F .3d at 1289.
Subsequently , ho wever, the Supreme Court decided Davila v. Davis , 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017), in which it held that Martinez does not ex tend to procedurally defaulted claims o f in e f f e c t ive assistance of appellate counsel. Id. at 2065–66. W h ere intervening Supreme Court authority is “ clearly irreconcilable” with prior circuit authority , the intervening auth o r i t y binds the panel. Miller v. Gammie , 335 F .3d 889, 900 ( 9th Cir. 2003). I ntervening authority is clearly irreconcilable if it “undercut[ s] t h e theory or r easoning underly ing the prior circuit precedent.” Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC , 728 F .3d 9 75, 979 (9th Cir. 2 013) (quoting Miller , 335 F .3d a t 900). B ecause Davila is clearly irreconcilable with our p r ior circuit precedent, Ngy u e n does

n o t c o ntrol our decision. F urther, because Davila is intervening authority , the prudential law of the case doctrine does not bind this panel. 2 Under D a v ila , the petitioner’s claim is not viable. 3

2 S ee Jeffries , 1 1 4 F.3 d at 1 4 8 8

– 8 9 ( n o tin g th at in t erv en in g
co n tro llin g au th o rity

is o n e o f th e th ree ex cep tio n s to th e law o f th e case d o ctrin e).

3 W e are b o u

n d b y ou r preced en t em

p h asizin g th at “ on ly th e S u p rem e Co u rt co u l d ex p an d th e ap p licatio n o f Ma rtin ez to o th er are as,” an d

“ f u rth er su b stan tiv e ex p an s io n ” o f Ma r t i n e z i s “ n o t

. . . f o rth co m in g .” Pizzu to v. Ra mirez , 7 8 3 F .3 d 11 7 1 , 1 1 76

– 7 7 (9 th Cir. 2 01 5 ) (ref u sin g to ap p ly Ma rtin ez to p ro ced u rally d ef au l ted claim s o f j u d icial b i as); s ee a l so Hu n to n v. Sin cla ir , 7 3 2 F.3 d 1 1 2 4 , 1 1 2 6– 2 7 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 3 ) (rej ectin g th e arg u m en t t

h at Ma rtin ez p erm itted resu scitatio n o f a p ro ced u rally d ef au lted Bra d y claim ). Ev en if Da vila w ere co n stru ed t o allo w an ex cep tio n to th e g en eral ru le u

n der Co lema n v. Th o mp so n , 5 0 1 U.S. 72 2 , 7 5 2

– 5 4 (1 9 9 1 ),H U R L E S V

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Given o ur resolution of the case, we n eed not, and do not, reach any other issues presented by the parties.

AF F IRMED.

su ch an ex cep tio n w o u ld n o t ap p ly h ere. T rial co u n sel req u ested f u n d in g f o r a Co m p u t er A ssisted T o p o g ra p hic Map p in g scan , w h i ch w as th en d en i ed b y th e state co u

rt o n p ro ced u ral g ro u n d s. H u rles su g g ests th at
o rd ers den ied o n p ro ced u ral g ro u n d s s h o u ld b e co n sid ered as u n p reserv ed trial erro rs w ith in th e m ean in g o f t h e p oten t ial ex cep tio n id en tif ied in Da vila , b u t Da v i la d o es n o t d raw th at d istin ctio n an d th ere is n o o th er
su p p o rt f or t h at p ro p o sitio n i n Su

p r e m e Co u rt j u risp ru d en ce. Hu rles’ s in terp retatio n w o u ld co n sid erab ly bro ad en th e “ lim ited circu m s t a n ces”

m eritin g Ma r tin ez ’ s “h i g h ly circu m scrib ed , eq u itab le ex cep t io n .” Id

. at 2 0 6 6 (citin g Ma rtin ez , 1 3 2 S. Ct. at 1 3 2 0 ).