### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 23-1016
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

B RIAN P ATRICK C OOK, Defendant-Appellant

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 4:22-cr-40012 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED N OVEMBER 1, 2023

— D ECIDED J ULY 17, 2024

____________________

Before S YKES , Chief Judge, and S T

. E VE and L EE , Circuit Judges

. L EE , Circuit Judge . Armed with what appeared to be a gun,Brian Cook entered a bank in a western Illinois village, threatened two tellers to give him money, and fl ed the scene with a bag full of cash. He later pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). During the sentencing hearing, the parties disputed whether Cook had simply “brandished” his gun (which turned out to be an air pistol) or2 No. 23-1016

had “otherwise used” it in th e commission of the crime; the former triggers a three-level enhancement to Cook’s o ff ense level under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, while the la tt er prompts a four-level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). The district court agreed withthe government, applied a four-level enhancement, and sentenced Cook to 144 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Cook now challenges that ruling as wellas a number of other factors the court considered for sentencing. Finding no error, we a ffi rm the judgment.

I. Background Cook entered Citizens National Bank in Roseville, Illinois, on July 31, 2021, wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt, a neck gaiter mask, and sunglasses. He immediately walked toward the teller window, pointed what appeared to be a gun at the teller, and announced, “you are being robbed.” Cook continued to point the gun (which authorities later determined was an air pistol) at the teller as he directed her to get money from the bank vault. As the teller was accessing the vault, Cook noticed a second teller, pointed the weapon at her, and instructed her to stay put. After the fi rst teller opened the vault, Cook gave her a green fl oral-pa tt erned grocery bag and instructed her to fi ll it with money. Cook then took the bag of money and fl ed.

A bank customer saw Cook fl ee in the passenger seat of a maroon Ford F-350 pickup truck and reported the truck and license plate number to the authorities. Within fi fteen minutes of the robbery, law enforcement o ffi cers spo tt ed the truck and conducted a tra ffi c stop. Inside the truck in plain view wereNo. 23-1016 3

the blue sweatshirt and a green fl oral-pa tt erned grocery bag containing a large amount of cash. After obtaining a search warrant for the contents of the truck, law enforcement o ffi cers found $193,000 in United States currency bundled in bankwraps, which noted Citizens National Bank’s parent company as the owner. O ffi cers also discovered fi ve cell phones in the truck and a black air pistol in the pocket of the blue swea tshirt. Based on a search of the cell phones, law enforcement determined that Cook, wholived elsewhere, had searched the internet in the months before the robbery, searching for banks in the Roseville area and entering dozens of queries about Roseville’s weather. In May 2022, a federal grand ju ry returned an indictment charging Cook with bank robbery under 28 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Cook pleaded guilty to the crime three months later. In its presentence report, the United States Probation O ffi ce recommended 84 to 105 months’ imprisonment followed by one to three years of supervised release based on a total o ff ense level of twenty- fi ve and a criminal history category of IV. In the report, the Probation O ffi ce recommended that the court apply a four-level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).At sentencing, the government concurred with the Probation O ffi ce that a four-level increase under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) was appropriate because Cook ha d pointed the gun at the two tellers and used the gun to direct a teller to the vault. Cook contested this account of the fa cts, argued that he only had brandished the gun during the robbery, and urged the court to adopt the three-level increase under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). The district court, after consider ing the arguments and reviewing videos of the event, found that Cook did more than simply4 No. 23-1016

brandish the gun and applied the four-level enhancement to Cook’s base o ff ense level. The district court did not stop there, however. It remarked that, even if it had applied on ly the three-level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E), it still would have imposed the samesentence because, in the court’s words, Cook’s criminal history was “the worst pa tt ern of undeterred behavior of a single type of category o ff ense that [the court had] ever seen.” This history included multiple conv ictions for burglary, forgery,and theft, as well as for stealing property and possessing marijuana. Furthermore, fi nding that prior punishments and admonishments had not deterred Cook from criminality, the district court determined that an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and imposed a term of imprisonment of 144 months to be followed by three years of supervised release. Cook now challenges the sentence on numerous grounds.

II. Analysis As we have said on countless occasions, “[d]istrict courtshave ‘wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose.’” United States v. Shaw , 824 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)). “Wewill not disturb a district court’s sentence unless it is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. Our review involves a “two-step process.” United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 378 (7th Cir. 2022). “First, we ensure that the sentencing judge did not commit any signi fi cant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, tr eating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting aNo. 23-1016 5

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Jackson , 547 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omi tt ed). Procedural challenges to a criminal sentence are reviewed de novo , but the court’s factual fi ndings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Baldwin , 68 F.4th 1070, 1074 (7th Cir. 2023). If the district court followed the proper procedure, we then examine whether the senten ce was substantively reasonable. Jackson , 547 F.3d at 792. When considering a sentence’ssubstantive reasonableness, we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Baker, 56 F.4th 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 2023). To be substantively reasonable, “[t]he sentencing court must apply the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in deciding whether to impose a sentence within the advisory guidelines range.” Jackson , 547 F.3d at 792. The open-ended nature of those factors “leav[es] the senten cing judge with considerable discretion to individualize the sentence to the o ff ense and offender as long as the judge’s reasoning is consistent with § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omi tt ed). Indeed, “the mere fact thatwe might have chosen a di ff erent sentence in the fi rst instance is insu ffi cient for reversal.” Id. This is because the “sentencin g judge is in a superior position to fi nd facts and judge their im port under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations, has fu ll knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 No. 23-1016

A. “Brandishing” or “Otherwise Using” According to Cook, the district court procedurally erred when it found that he had “otherwise used” the gun, thereby triggering the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), rather than just “brandishing” it. If the district court had found the la tt er, Cook’s Guidelines range would have been 77 to 96 months of imprisonment, rather than 84 to 105 months. When construing the Guidelin es, we start with the text and consult any relevant commentary. See Stinson v. United States , 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (Guidelines commentary is “authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline”); United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 537 (7th Cir. 2024) (following Stinson ).Section 2B3.1 of the Guidelines addresses robbery offenses. Subpart (b)(2)(D) mandates a four-level increase to the defendant’s base o ff ense level “if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used.” Meanwhile, su bpart (b)(2)(E) requires a three-level increase “if a dangerous weapon was brandished or possessed.” To be tt er understand what these terms mean, we refer to § 1B1.1 (“Application Instructions”). Application note 1(C) of that provision de fi nes “brandished” to mean that “all or part of the weapon was displayed, or the presence of the weapon was otherwise made known to another person, in orde r to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the weapon was directly visible to that person. Accordingly, although the dangerous weapon does not have to be directly visible, the weapon must be present.” § 1B1.1, application note 1(C). At the same time, underNo. 23-1016 7

application note 1(J), “otherwise used” denotes conduct that “did not amount to the discharge of a fi rearm but was more than brandishing, disp laying, or possessing a fi rearm or other dangerous weapon.” § 1B1.1, application note 1(J). As we have remarked elsewhere, these de fi nitions are not exactly paradigms of clarity. See United States v. Kruger, 839 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he language of the relevant guidelines and the accompanying commentary provide[] no clear guidance on what will distinguish mere brandishing of a weapon from other use, shor t of actual discharge of the weapon, that will qualify for the enhancement.”). Nevertheless, when di ff erentiating between the two, we have held that “brandishing typically occurs where a defendant generally displays a weapon or points th e weapon at a group of people rather than a speci fi c individual.” United States v. Eubanks , 593 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2010); see United States v. Hernandez , 106 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the di ff erence between “pointing or waving about a fi rearm and leveling the weapon at the head of a victim ”). But where a defendant uses a dangerous weapon to create “a personalized threat of harm,” he has more than “brandished” the weapon, he has “otherwise used” it. Eubanks , 593 F.3d at 651 (cleaned up). Here, the parties agree that, after Cook entered the bank, he leveled the air pistol at a teller and stated, “you are being robbed.” He then directed her to get money from the vault and commanded her to put the money in his bag. Cook also pointed the gun at a second teller and ordered her to stay put. As Cook sees it, this conduct fa lls short of warranting the fourlevel enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).

Cook fi rst tries to distance himself from other cases where

we a ffi rmed the application of the four-level enhancement for8 No. 23-1016

“otherwise using” a fi rearm, noting that he did not verbally threaten anyone with the gun. For example, Cook cites United States v. Seavoy, where we held that the district court did not clearly err in applying the fo ur-level enhancement when the defendant had pointed a fi rearm at a bank loan o ffi cer, ordered her to lay on the fl oor, and later threatened that his accomplice would shoot one of the bank employees. 995 F.2d 1414, 1422 (7th Cir. 1993). Cook also points to United States v. Warren , where we a ffi rmed the use of the “otherwise using” enhancement when the defendant had pointed a gun at a bank teller, ordered her into the vault room, and personally threatened her. 279 F.3d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 2002). Cook tries to make these cases say more than they do. As we held in United States v. Taylor , “[n]othing in the language of [§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(D)] ca lls for the use of the weapon to be coupled with a verbal threat.” 135 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1998). Cook also contends that § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) requires some physical force to be used with the gun. In Eubanks , for instance, we a ffi rmed the enhancement where the defendant had pointed his weapon at a speci fi c employee and forced her to the ground. 593 F.3d at 651. Similarly, in Hernandez , another

case a ffi rming the enhancement, the defendant had held the kidnapping victim at gunpoint and “the fi rearm was part andparcel of the victim’s forcible abduction.” 106 F.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks omi tt ed). 1

1 Although Hernandez involved the Sentencing Guideline for the useof a dangerous weapon during a kidnapping, abduction, or unlawful restraint, § 2A4.1(b)(3), in interpreting that Guideline, courts look to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) for instruction. See 106 F.3d at 741; Kruger , 839 F.3d at 578.No. 23-1016 9

This argument, however, was laid to rest in Warren . There, the dispute centered around whether the defendant had touched the teller’s back with a gun. 279 F.3d at 562. In a ffi rming the application of the four-level enhancement, we concluded that “physical contac t between the weapon and the victim is not a prerequisite to fi nding that the defendant ‘otherwise used’ a dangerous weapon.” Id. Accordingly, whether the defendant had “touched the teller’s back with the gun orwhether he simply came close to touching her is not an important distinction for purposes of determining the applicability of the enhancement.” Id. In fact, it was su ffi cient that the defendant had intimidated the victim and threatened her with the gun. Id. at 563 (noting “[w]e have a ffi rmed ‘otherwise used’ adjustments when pointing a weapon at a speci fi c victim created a personalized threat of harm”). Here, the district court determined that Cook had “clearlyused the gun ... to control [the teller’s] movement and to comply with his commands which were very clear – – ‘you are being robbed’ – – and then [to] direct her with the gun to the vault and to maintain compliance with his further directives.” The record supports this fi nding. “Having a gun pointed at me telling me to hurry up demanding money scared me so much!” the fi rst teller recounted. “The feeling of that gun pointed at me was a feeling of complete fear.” Additionally, photographs of the bank robbery show that Cook leveled the gun directly at the teller. And he used the gun to threaten a se cond teller by pointing it at her and ordering her to stay put. Given these facts, the district court did not clearly err in fi nding that Cook’s conduct went beyond merely brandishing, displaying, or possessing a fi rearm, but rather, created a10 No. 23-1016

personalized threat of harm to both bank tellers. Accordingly,the district court did not commit procedural error by applying the “otherwise used” enhancement.But even if the district judge had procedurally erred by increasing Cook’s o ff ense level by four levels rather than three, that error would have been harmless. See United States v. Abbas , 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A fi nding of harmless error is only appropriate whenthe government has proved that the district court’s sentencing error did not a ff ect the defendant’s substantial rights ....”). Here, the district court went
on to state: I think that even if my ruling on your guideline speci fi c o ff ense characteristics in terms of using the fi rearm as opposed to just brandishing is wrong legally, I still think that under 3553(a), the seriousness of the o ff ense conduct, speci fi

cally as it relates to your use of ... the dangerous weapon in directing the tellers with your commands and inducing comp liance with the use of the fi rearm will be addressed similarly under3553(a) with the sentence that I’m going to impose. A court’s statement that “it would have imposed the samesentence,” even if it had improperly calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range, renders the error harmless. United States v. Shelton , 905 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2018). And, as we will discuss below, the court’s assessment is well supported by the record.No. 23-1016 11

B. The Above-Guidelines Sentence Next, Cook argues that the district court procedurally and substantively erred when imposing a sentence that was above the Guidelines range. Among the factors the court considered in arriving at the sentence was Cook’s criminal history and his

e ff orts to select the particular bank. In Cook’s view, the court procedurally erred by not adequately explaining why these two factors justi fi ed an upward variance. He also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.Cook’s Guidelines range was 84 to 105 months of imprisonment. The Guidelines, of course, are advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The go vernment asked the court to impose an imprisonment term of 120 months, but the court went further and levied a 144-month sentence. According to Cook, the court failed to su ffi ciently explain the basis for the above-Guidelines sentence, thereby commi tt ing procedural

error.Cook is correct that “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an ex planation for any deviation from the Guidelines range”—is procedural error. Gall , 552 U.S. at 51. “[A] district court adequately explains a sentence or deviation when it thorou ghly documents its reasoning therefor.” United States v. Jerry, 55 F.4th 1124, 1132 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Moreover, we must keep in mind that “[w]hen evaluating the procedural soundness of a sentence, we do not explore its reasonable ness; that inquiry is reserved for a substantive challenge.” United States v. Morgan , 987 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2021). Instead, the reviewing court focuses on “whether the record reveal[s] the district court’s reasons for imposing the sentence.” Jerry, 55 F.4th at 1132. And “a12 No. 23-1016

major departure should be supported by a more signi fi cant justi fi cation than a minor one.” Gall , 552 U.S. at 50.

1. Prior Convictions Here, the district court deci ded to impose a sentence greater than the Guidelines range after considering the 18U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including Cook’s extensive prior criminal history that stretched back decades. In doing so, the court did not rely upon an upward-departure Guidelines provision, but exercised its discretion under Booker, 543 U.S. 220, to vary from the Guidelines range. See United States v. Crundwell , 735 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2013). In Cook’s view, an upward v ariance does the same job as an upward departure. Thus, he argues, the judge should have followed U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1), a provision that allows an upward departure only when there is “reliable information” indicating that “a defendant’s criminal history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelih ood that the defendant will commit other crimes.” Although he acknowledges his extensive criminal past (which includes convictions not counted as part of his criminal history category ), Cook believes that the courterred by not explaining how these old convictions reliably established that his criminal history category understates his criminality or likelihood of recidivism. What Cook overlooks is that “[s]ince the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, however, we do not require adistrict court to follow § 4A1.3 when imposing an aboveguidelines sentence.” United States v. McIntyre, 531 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omi tt ed). After Booker, “sentencing judges have discretion under § 3553(a) to give non-guidelineNo. 23-1016 13

sentences for reasons speci fi c to the defendant or based on policy disagreements with the Guidelines.” United States v. Mans fi eld, 21 F.4th 946, 956 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omi tt ed). And “[n]onserious and outdated convictions may serve as the basis for an up ward departure when they are evidence of a ‘lifelong pa tt ern of criminality.’” United States v. Dawson , 494 F. App’x 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944, 947–48 (7th Cir. 1996)). Moreover, such convictions may “be considered for the limited purpose of establishing the incorrigible character of the defendant’s criminal propensities.” Walker, 98 F.3d at 948.Here, contrary to Cook’s contention, the district court provided a thorough explanat ion of its reasoning: [R]eally what’s driving the train here is yourpersonal history and characteristics and my extreme concern of your risk to recidivate, and I also think that the advisory guideline range very inadequately addresses that concern ....

The court continued: So, this is, by my count, your 13th but certainly in double digits o ff ense involving stealing or theft or forgery or burglary or anything of that nature. This is perhaps the most serious one, so the trend is going in the wrong direction. The nature of your o ff ense conduct, while still staying within that lane of being a thief, you’re a serial thief and burglar. You’re a career o ff ender in the area of stealing. And this is going in thewrong direction because this is even a more serious and aggravating type of theft that you’ve14 No. 23-1016

commi tt ed and that was, obviously, the armed bank robbery. This is by far, I think, the worst pa tt ern of undeterred behavior of a single type of category of

o ff ense that I’ve ever seen. Beginning at the age of 18, going all the way up until the present day, decades of stealing and pu tt ing others at – –having just a complete disregard for the property and possessions of others, and having a disregard of how your actions will impact others, and also having a comp lete disregard for any prior criminal justice system and for, in many ways, authority because of the way that you acted and interacted with parole o ffi cers and probation o ffi cers and the like. In addition, the court observed that Cook had been in and out of prison his entire life for theft o ff enses. The judge listed, for instance, Cook’s stealing and burglary convictions at age eighteen, forgery conviction at age nineteen, theft conviction at age twenty, stolen property conviction at age twenty-one, stealing and burglary conviction at age twenty-four, forgery conviction at age thirty-one, conv iction for escape in a stolen vehicle while on work release at age thirty-one, and burglaryconviction at age forty-six. Cook also had been on parole multiple times when he commi tt ed new crimes. The court summed up: “You’ve appeared in front of di ff erent judges. You’ve been admonished and sentenced, and you’ve served time, yet each and every one of those instances failed to deter you from your life-style. I do n’t know how else to describe this, but it’s your life-style.”No. 23-1016 15

The court’s statements clearl y elucidated its thinking— Cook’s convictions over four decades evidenced his lifelong pa tt ern of criminality and obdurate character that made him less susceptible to deterrence than the typical o ff ender. Thisdetermination is entirely reasonable given Cook’s record. Accordingly, the district court di d not procedurally err when it decided to impose a greater-than-Guidelines sentence based on the entirety of Cook’s criminal background.

2. Targeting a Small-town Bank

Another factor the district court highlighted during the sentencing hearing was Cook’s e ff orts to target a small-town bank. Cook argues that the cour t provided no explanation as to why this was relevant information for sentencing. But the record shows otherwise. In fact, the district court explained that Cook’s decision to target a small-town bank was signi fi cant for two reasons.First, the evidence showed that Cook had deliberately targeted the bank after much research because it had fewer security measures. The video of th e bank robbery supports this conclusion—a person could enter the lobby at will, and there was no security guard. Second, the court noted, tellers in smaller communities often know the customers and develop a higher level of trust—trust that Cook destroyed. This again is a reasonable assessment of the record, and the court did not err by considering these facts.

3. Substantive Reasonableness Relying on statistical information, Cook next contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence far above the Guidelines range in what he believes was a run-of-the-mill bank robbery.16 No. 23-1016

“We will uphold an above-guidelines sentence so long as the district court o ff ered an adequate statement of its reasons, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553( a), for imposing such a sentence.” United States v. Aldridge, 642 F.3d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omi tt ed). Indeed, “there is no presumption that an above-guid elines sentence is unreasonable.” United States v. Moultrie, 975 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). That said, an above-Guidelines sentence is morelikely to be upheld as reasonable “if it is based on factors suffi ciently particularized to the in dividual circumstances of the case rather than factors common to o ff enders with like crimes.” Jackson , 547 F.3d at 792–93 (internal quotation marks omi tt ed). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that a “district court need not recite and apply every single § 3553(a) factor, so long as the record indicates that the district court considered the sentencing factors in toto and created an adequate record for review.” United States v. Hendrix , 74 F.4th 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2023).According to the Judiciary Sentencing Information database (which is administered by the United States Sentencing Commission), during the fi ve years preceding Cook’s sentencing, forty-four o ff enders had a total o ff ense level of 24 (Cook’s argument assumes that his total o ff ense level is 24) and a criminal history category of IV. See h tt ps://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/judiciary-sentencing-information. The average term of imprisonment for these o ff enders was eighty-two months. Becaus e his sentence exceeded the average by fi fty-seven percent, Cook argues, it was substantively unreasonable. The problem with this argumen t is that, in reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence ou tside of the Guidelines range,No. 23-1016 17

the Supreme Court has “reject[e d] the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justi fi cations required for a speci fi c sentence.” Gall , 552 U.S. at 47. Accordingly, we “may consider the exte nt of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. at 51. Here, the district court gave a detailed explanation of why the circumstances in this case indicated that a within-Guidelines sentence was insu ffi cient to re fl ect the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a). First, the court stated, given Cook’s entrenched criminal behavior and the ine ffi cacy of his priorsentences, an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the public from further criminal behavior. See § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C). The district court also explained that the upward variance was essential to promote respect for the law, given that Cook had continued to commit crimes even while serving terms of probation. See § 3553(a)(2)(A). Additionally, the court observed that the robbery marked an alarming trend to more serious crimes and, therefore, an above-Guidelines sentence be tt er re fl ected the seriousness of the o ff ense. See id

. The court’s thorough explanation of these considerations su ffi ciently justi fi es the aboveGuidelines sentence. Lastly, Cook argues that the district court undervalued the signi fi cance of his declining health and how it might impede his ability to commit further crimes. But district courts have broad discretion to weigh both aggravating and mitigatingfactors, and a defendant’s disagreement with how a court balances these countervailing factor s does not make a sentence18 No. 23-1016

substantively unreasonable. United States v. Hatch , 909 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2018); see United States v. Saldana-Gonzalez , 70 F.4th 981, 986 (7th Cir. 2023).

III. ConclusionBecause Cook’s sentence was neither procedurally erroneous nor substantively unreasonable, the judgment is AFFIRMED.