2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-21-2002

Beeghley v. Beeghley

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 99-1430

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Recommended Citation

"Beeghley v. Beeghley" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 194.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/194
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 No. 99-1430 

 

 BARBARA J. BEEGHLEY, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 JOHN L. BEEGHLEY; LAURA L. BEEGHLEY 

 

 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civil No. 98-cv-05527) 

 District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 March 8, 2002 

 

 Before: SCIRICA and COWEN, Circuit Judges, 

 RESTANI*, Judge, United States Court of International Trade 

 (Filed: March 21, 2002) 

 _______________ 

 OPINION 

 _______________ 

 

*Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of International 

Trade, sitting by 

designation.
COWEN, Circuit Judge 

 In this post-divorce case, we are presented with a challenge to a 

sanctions order of 

the District Court precluding Plaintiff/Appellant Barabra J. Beeghley 

("Plaintiff") from 

any further filings with the District Court. Also presented is the issue 

of a wife's right to 

retirement fund assets after the former spouse has filed for bankruptcy. 

Because we 

conclude that the District Court's order preventing Plaintiff from further 

filings was 

overbroad and undertaken without sufficient notice, we will vacate that 

order and remand 

the matter for further review. In addition, we will remand the retirement 

fund issue to the 

District Court so that the Court may more fully analyze the substantive 

merits of that 

question. 

 I. 

 The procedural history of this case is extremely long and prolix. 

The case 

originated as a divorce-related matter in Delaware Family Court in 1995. 

For the past 

seven years, the parties have engaged in an endless stream of responsive 

motions and 

(sometimes duplicative) filings. For the sake of clarity, we will recite 

only those facts 

and procedural events necessary for the proper disposition of the precise 

issues presented 

in this appeal. 

 Plaintiff and Defendant/Appellee John Beeghley ("Defendant") were 

married in 

1976 and divorced in 1993. Defendant thereafter married 

Defendant/Appellee Laura 

Beeghley. On November 7, 1995, the Family Court of the State of Delaware 

ordered that 

Defendant pay $1,500 per month alimony to Plaintiff. The Court also held 

that Plaintiff's 

interest in Defendant's retirement funds (e.g., Savings Investment Plans 

and Tax Reform 

Stock Ownership Plans) would be split 60% to Plaintiff and 40% to 

Defendant. The 

Court directed the parties to prepare and submit a Qualified Domestic 

Relations Order 

("QDRO") under the provisions of 29 U.S.C.  1056. Approximately two 

years later, the 

Family Court found Defendant in civil contempt for failing to obey the 

alimony order and 

ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff $17,000. 

 On February 26, 1997, Defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy in the 

Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania. The filing of the bankruptcy stayed Defendant's 

legal 
obligation to pay alimony arrears without further order of the court. 

Thereafter, the 

Bankruptcy Court enjoined Plaintiff from making any further filings in the 

case without 

Court permission. Plaintiff filed a number of appeals from the bankruptcy 

case to the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

These appeals were 

either dismissed or consolidated with the present appeal. Among the 

issues raised in the 

appeals was the contention that she had an interest in Defendant's 

retirement assets that 

was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 

 On April 27, 1999, the District Court held a hearing on the merits 

and addressed 

numerous motions of both parties, including a motion by Defendant for 

sanctions against 

Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The day after 

that hearing, it 

entered an order enjoining Plaintiff from filing any further papers in the 

case without 

Court permission or initiating any further action in the District Court 

without such 

permission. The District Court denied Plaintiff's requested relief 

regarding her alleged 

interest in Defendant's retirement funds. This appeal followed. 

 II. 

 We review the order of the District Court which restricted further 

filings in the 

District Court for abuse of discretion. Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 

1032 (3d Cir. 

1993). Plaintiff contends that the District Court's order enjoining her 

from further filings 

was improper since it was entered without adequate prior notice. The 

record does not 

reflect that Plaintiff was on notice and should prepare to defend against 

the all-inclusive 

and broad order enjoining all filings in the District Court. At most, 

Plaintiff was on 

notice to defend against Rule 11 sanctions. Plaintiff was not given 

sufficient notice that 

such a sweeping and all-inclusive sanction would be imposed by the 

District Court. 

Adequate notice must be given to protect a party's basic right to due 

process of law. See, 

e.g., Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994); Brow, 994 F.2d 

at 1038; 

Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81-83 (3d Cir. 1987). 

 In addition, the order enjoining Plaintiff from further District 

Court filings was 

significantly overbroad given the facts of this case. We construe the 

language of the 

order to mean that Plaintiff is permanently forbidden from filing anything 

whatsoever on 
any matter in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania without express Court 

permission. In 

this respect, the order unquestionably went too far. An order enjoining 

future court 

filings should be tailored to the circumstances giving rise to the 

sanction and, absent 

special circumstances, should be limited to filings arising from the same 

substantive 

matters that are before the District Court. See Brow, 994 F.2d at 1039; 

Chipps, 882 F.2d 

at 72-73. 

 III. 

 Plaintiff also appeals the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan 

insofar as it purports 

to discharge her interest in the retirement funds of her former husband. 

She asserts that 

her interest in such a fund is nondischargeable. See Gendreau v. 

Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815 

(9th Cir. 1997). The propriety of this claim was not ruled on by the 

District Court. We 

express no opinion concerning the resolution of this matter, only that the 

issue be 

recognized and fully explicated. 

 IV. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate those parts of the order 

entered on April 

28, 1999 that: (1) sanction Plaintiff; and (2) deny her requested relief 

regarding only the 

retirement fund discharge issue. All other portions of the order remain 

in effect. The 

matter is remanded to the District Court to freshly address the question 

of sanctions and 

to rule on the merits of the retirement fund dischargeability question. 

 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing opinion. 

 /s/ Robert E. 

Cowen 

 United States Circuit Judge