alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Glenda P. HANNA v. COOSA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION.

Civ. 6338.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 1, 1988.

*874James M. Sizemore, Jr., Montgomery, for appellant.

Robert J. Teel of Teel & Teel, Rockford, for. appellee.

BRADLEY, Presiding Judge.

This appeal results from the termination of a nontenured teacher.

Glenda P. Hanna was hired by the Coosa County Board of Education (the Board) to teach in the county’s public school system. Her contract was for the scholastic year 1984-85.

After teaching at Goodwater High School for two weeks, or ten scholastic days, Hanna was informed by the school’s principal not to return. Mrs. Hanna was paid for the ten days she worked and is now seeking an award of her unpaid salary for the remaining one hundred and seventy days of the school year.

During a jury trial, Mrs. Hanna moved for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court denied her motion. The case was submitted to the jury and it returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Board. After entry of judgment Mrs. Hanna appealed to this court without having filed a motion for j.n.o.v. or a motion for new trial within the thirty-day period authorized by Rules 50(b) and 59(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mrs. Hanna argues here that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict because the evidence was undisputed and she was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

A directed verdict is proper only where there is no scintilla of evidence material to the claim or where there is no disputed issue of fact upon which reasonable men could differ. *Osborn v. Johns,*468 So.2d 103 (Ala.1985). The propriety of the grant of a motion for j.n.o.v. is measured by the same review standard as that of a motion for directed verdict, i.e. whether there can be but one reasonable conclusion from the evidence as to a proper judgment.

> “Other than objections to admissibility, evidentiary challenges are divided into two separate and distinct categories: 1) sufficiency of the evidence, raised by motions for directed verdict and for J.N. O.V. and measured by the objective ‘scintilla’ rule; and 2) weight and preponderance of the evidence, raised by motion for a new trial and measured by the more subjective ‘palpably wrong, manifestly unjust’ standard.”

*Casey v. Jones,*410 So.2d 5 (Ala.1982).

A party who fails to file a motion for j.n.o.v. after having filed a motion for directed verdict waives the right to a review of the evidentiary issue raised by the directed verdict motion. *King Mines Resort, Inc. v. Malachi Mining & Minerals, Inc.,*518 So.2d 714 (Ala.1987). Mrs. Hanna did not file a motion for j.n.o.v. Consequently, she has waived her right to question on appeal the denial of her motion for directed verdict.

Mrs. Hanna argues only the denial of her motion for directed verdict; consequently, we will not concern ourselves with the absence of a motion for new trial and its evidentiary review standard.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

HOLMES, J., concurs in the result only.

INGRAM, J., recuses himself.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Burnell COLEMAN.

No. 87-KH-0398.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 13, 1987.

In re Coleman, Burnell; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. KA-6880; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 313-772.

Denied.
#### Gerald BEMBOW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 86-3145.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 24, 1988.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Stephen Krosschell, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Alan L. Overton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellant contends that the court improperly failed to use a single scoresheet. We agree.

Appellant, Gerald Bembow, pleaded guilty to delivery of cannabis and was placed on probation for two years. On December 2, 1983, Bembow was charged by affidavit with violating his probation for not having written monthly reports, not acquiring employment and not attending GED classes. The court revoked Bem-bow’s probation and sentenced him to two years community control.

On June 10, 1986, Bembow was charged by affidavit with having violated his community control by not filing monthly writ*313ten reports, not paying costs of supervision, not reporting to his community control officer, not staying at his approved residence, and selling cocaine. On October 24, 1986, Bembow pleaded guilty to two counts of delivering cocaine and two counts of possessing cocaine. The judge refused Bembow’s request that his sentence on the cocaine offenses include the 1983 violation of probation. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bembow was adjudged guilty of the substantive offenses and sentenced to two years in prison, concurrent on each count.

At the revocation hearing, Bembow admitted that he had violated his community control. The court revoked his community control, adjudged him guilty of the original offense and sentenced him to three years in prison consecutive to the two two-year concurrent sentences previously imposed.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(1) requires the court to use one guideline scoresheet for all offenses “pending before the court for sentencing.” This case is analogous to *Render v. State,*516 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), where this court said that a trial court’s decision to allow separate sentencing based on separate scoresheets defeats the spirit of the rule especially where the sentences are imposed, as here, on the same day in combined proceedings. We believe that *Render*controls and find, accordingly, that the trial court erred in failing to use a single scoresheet.

Our disposition of appellant’s first argument renders appellant’s second argument moot.

We, therefore, vacate appellant’s sentences and remand to the trial court to sentence appellant in accord with this opinion.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J. concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2442 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2442

  To suspend temporarily the duty on certain yard ornaments depicting 
                            school mascots.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

 Mr. Brownback introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To suspend temporarily the duty on certain yard ornaments depicting 
                            school mascots.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN YARD ORNAMENTS DEPICTING SCHOOL MASCOTS.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.01.00       Yard ornaments      Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/ ''.
                          depicting school                                                   31/2011.......
                          mascots, with
                          silhouette heads,
                          fabric body to
                          catch wind with
                          internal frame to
                          maintain body
                          shape in low
                          winds, and spring
                          steel stake
                          system for wind
                          induced movement
                          (provided for in
                          subheading
                          6307.90.98)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
April 3, 2012, SC DHEC SIP Amendment

Attachment B ‐ SC Attorney General’s November 5, 1993, Opinion

in the Title V Submittal

SC DHEC SIP Amendment 

April 3, 2012

Attachment B 

Page 1
This page intentionally left blank

SC DHEC SIP Amendment 

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Page 2
~tate nf ~nut4GIarnIi1ta

(Office of t~t (iautrnar 

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL• ..JR. POST O....'CE Box 11369 

GOVE.RNOR COLUMBIA 29211 

November 12, 1993 

Patrick M. Tobin, Acting Administrator 

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
 

Region IV
 

345 Courtland Street, N.E.
 

Atlanta, Georgia 30365
 

Dear Mr. Tobin: 

Attached is South Carolina's program submittal package addressing the 

requirements of Section 507 of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act 

and 40 CFR 70. Additional copies are being submitted under separate cover 

directly to your Air, Pesticides and Toxics Management Division. 

This regulatory program covers the entire geographic area of the State of 

South Carolina, including the Catawba Indian Reservation. Although the 

reservation may adopt environmental standards which are more stringent 

than state standards, the reservation is subject to all federal and state 

environmental laws. The Catawbas have not adopted any standards of their 

own to date. No local air pollution control programs exist in the state. 

South Carolina has all of the statutory and regulatory authority necessary for 

full approval of South Carolina's Title V Operating Permit Program. All 

necessary staff and resources are either presently available or will be available 

when EPA authorizes South Carolina's implementation of this program. A 

transition plan for program implementation is also provided. 

South Carolina requests EPA approval of this program. Any suggestions or 

comments your staff may have concerning South Carolina's Title V program 

submittal should be addressed to either Mr. R. Lewis Shaw, Deputy 

•
 

SC DHEC SIP Amendment 

April 3, 2012

Attachment B 

Page 3
Commissioner for Environmental Quality Control, or Mr. James A. Joy, III, 

Chief, Bureau of Air Quality, Department of Health and Environmental 

Control. 

Carroll A. Campbell, r. 

Governor 

CACjr/tad 

•
 

SC DHEC SIP Amendment 

April 3, 2012

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Exhibit 15.2

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements:



|1. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-122801) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew 2004 Executive Share Option Scheme
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-122801) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew 2004 Performance Share Plan
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|3. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-122801) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew 2004
Co-investment Plan
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|4. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-13694) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew 2001 US Share Plan
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|5. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-155173) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew 2001 US Share Plan
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|6. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-155172) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew 2004 Performance Share Plan
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|7. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-158239) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew plc Deferred Bonus Plan
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|8. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-168544) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew Global Share Plan 2010
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|9. | Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-199117) pertaining to the Smith & Nephew Global Share Plan 2010
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

of our report dated February 25, 2015, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Smith & Nephew plc for the year ended 31 December 2014 before
the effects of the adjustments to retrospectively reflect the change in the composition of reportable segments, which report appears in the Annual Report (Form 20-F) for the year ended December 31, 2016.



|                     
|---------------------
|/s/ Ernst & Young LLP
|Ernst & Young LLP    
|London, England      
|March 6, 2017
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2322 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 3,4-Ethylenedioxythiophene. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. KERRY (for himself, Mr. KIRK, and Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 3,4- 

Ethylenedioxythiophene. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 3,4-ETHYLENEDIOXYTHIOPHENE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.29.87 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 3,4-Ethylenedioxythiophene) is amended by striking the 

7 date in the effective period column and inserting ‘‘12/31/ 

8 2011’’. 

9 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

10 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2322 IS

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 10.5


 


May 24, 2017


 


To the Board of Directors of Capitol Investment Corp. V


 


Dear Sirs:


 


The undersigned hereby offers to purchase
an aggregate of 2,875,000 Class B ordinary shares (“Shares”) of Capitol Investment Corp. V (“Company”)
for an aggregate purchase price, and total consideration, of US$16,666.67.


 


The undersigned represents and warrants that
it has been advised that the Shares have not been registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (“Securities
Act”); that it is acquiring the Shares for its account for investment purposes only; that it has no present intention of
selling or otherwise disposing of the Shares in violation of the securities laws of the United States; that it is an “accredited
investor” as defined by Rule 501 of Regulation D promulgated under the Securities Act; and that it is familiar with the proposed
business, management, financial condition and affairs of the Company.


 


This letter agreement shall be governed by
the laws of the Cayman Islands.


 


	 	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 	 
	 	 	CAPITOL ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT V LLC
	 	 	 
	 	By: 	/s/ Mark D. Ein
	 	 	Name: Mark D. Ein
	 	 	Title: Chief Executive Officer


 


Accepted and Agreed:


 


	CAPITOL INVESTMENT CORP. V	 
	 	 	 
	By:	/s/ L. Dyson Dryden	 
	 	Name: L. Dyson Dryden	 
	 	Title: President
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY ANDRE SMITH,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

M. ROENNMANN, Correctional Officer at

S.V.S.P.; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 15238

D.C. No. 5:16

- cv

- 01269

- BLF

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 15 , 2019 **

Before: Farris, D.W. Nelson , and Trott , Circuit Judges.

Gregory Andre Smith, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eight h

Amendment claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo. Albino v. Baca , 747 F.3d 1162, 11 71 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (legal rulings

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 19 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 15238

on exhaustion); Toguchi v. Chung , 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary

judgment) . We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s deliberate

indiffe rence claim against defendant Mack because Smith failed to raise a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether Mack was deliberately indifferent in treating

plaintiff’s symptoms arising from alleged food contamination. See Toguchi , 391

F.3d at 1057

- 60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health; medical malpractice,

negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not

amount to deliberate indiff erence).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s retaliation

claims because Smith failed to exhaust administrative remedies and failed to raise

a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were

effectivel y unavailable to him. See Ross v. Blake , 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858

- 60 (2016)

(setting forth circumstances when administrative remedies are unavailable);

Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (the Prison Litigation Reform Act

requires “proper exhaustion,” which means “using all steps that the agency holds

out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted))

.3 18

- 15238

We do not address Smith’s contentions r elat ing to his claims against

defendants that were resolved i n a separate action.

AFFIRMED.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. David PITTMAN.

No. 87-KK-2094.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Pittman, David; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writ; Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, Nos. 1-80-199, 4-86-237; to the *457Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KW87 1154. Denied.
Exhibit
32.1





SECTION
906 CERTIFICATION





The
undersigned hereby certifies that the Quarterly Report on From 10-Q of Israel
Growth Partners Acquisition Corp. (the “Registrant”) for the quarter ended
October 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of the
Registrant.




Dated:
      December 14, 2010
                /s/
      Craig SamuelsCraig
      SamuelsChief
      Executive Officer
ATSDR/NCEH Comments on the IRIS Dichloromethane draft: January 27, 2010 

Submitted by Paula Burgess, MD, MPH 

ATSDR/NCEH appreciates the opportunity to review the IRIS draft document on dichloromethane. 

Overall, this toxicological review is well written. EPA has clearly synthesized the scientific evidence and 

presents a non-cancer and cancer hazard assessment of dichloromethane that is logical, transparent, 

and concise. 

While the derivation of the RfC of 0.2 mg/m3 and the selection of the critical effect of hepatic 

vacuolization is scientifically sound, we believe this process would be improved by deriving the RfC from 

a human study utilizing neurological effects as the critical end point. The two studies(Cherry et al, 1983; 

Lash et al 1991) mentioned in section 5.2.6, “RfC Comparison information” measured neurological 

function in humans subsequent to inhalation exposure to dichloromethane and derived RfDs of 3.5 

mg/m3 (Cherry et al) and 0.55 mg/m3 ( Lash et al). These two studies with human neurological 

endpoints offer more relevance and biological significance than the relatively nonspecific (hepatic 

vacuolization) endpoints in rats from which the proposed RfC of 0.2 mg/m3 is derived.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 21

- 51025 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,**

Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus
**Fredrick Brown,**

Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:19

- CR

- 524

- 2

Before **Higginbotham** , **Graves** , and **Ho** , Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** * Fredrick Brown pleaded guilty to consp iracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. He now appeals, challenging the district court’s $2,331,639 restitution order, arguing that it exceeds the statutorily authorized amount. Such a challenge is not barred by Brown’s

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47 .5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED July 21, 2022 Lyle W. Cayce C lerk Case: 21-51025 Document: 00516402006 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/21/2022No. 21

- 51025

2 appeal waiver. See United States v. Kim , 988 F.3d 803, 8 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 142 S. Ct. 225 (2021)

. The Mandatory Victim s Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) limits the amount of restitution to the lo sses resulting directly and proximately from the offense of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) . Brown argues that the Government did not satisfy its burden to prove the amount of loss proximately caused to the victims of the offense as required by t he M VR A, resulting in an illegal sentence

. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e); Kim , 988 F.3d at

811

. The “ Restitution Reference Sheet ” incorporated by reference into the revised presentence report (PSR) outlined the amount of pecuniary loss suffered by specific victims as a result of Brown’s offense, and the total amount of those losses corresponds precisely to the district court’s total restitution award. Th at information is considered reliable, see United States v. Harris , 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012) , and the Government cited it in support of the restitution amount at sentencing. Brown presented no argument or evidenc e to rebut the reliability or accuracy of the PSR facts relating to restitution , and the district court was free to adopt them

. See United States v. Dickerson , 909 F.3d 118, 1 29

- 30 (5th Cir. 2018); Harris , 702 F.3d at 230

. In light of the foregoing, t he restitution award did not illegally exceed the amount authorized under the MVRA, see § 3663A(a)(2) ; United States v. Sharma , 703 F.3d 318, 322

- 23 (5th Cir. 2012) , and the judgment of the district court is **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 21-51025 Document: 00516402006 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/21/2022