(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE

CO. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09–448. Argued April 26, 2010—Decided May 24, 2010 

After medical problems forced petitioner Hardt to stop working, she 

filed for long-term disability benefits under her employer’s long-term 

disability plan. Upon exhausting her administrative remedies, Hardt 

sued respondent Reliance, her employer’s disability insurance carrier, alleging that it had violated the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by wrongfully denying her benefits

claim. The District Court denied Reliance summary judgment, finding that because the carrier had acted on incomplete medical information, the benefits denial was not based on substantial evidence. 

Though also denying Hardt summary judgment, the court stated that

it found “compelling evidence” in the record that she was totally disabled and that it was inclined to rule in her favor, but concluded that 

it would be unwise to do so without giving Reliance the chance to address the deficiencies in its approach. The court therefore remanded 

to Reliance, giving it 30 days to consider all the evidence and to act 

on Hardt’s application, or else the court would enter judgment in 

Hardt’s favor. Reliance did as instructed and awarded Hardt benefits. Hardt then filed a motion under 29 U. S. C. §1132(g)(1), a feeshifting statute that applies in most ERISA lawsuits and provides 

that “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee 

and costs . . . to either party.” Granting the motion, the District

Court applied the Circuit’s framework governing attorney’s fee requests in ERISA cases, concluding, inter alia, that Hardt had attained the requisite “prevailing party” status. The Fourth Circuit vacated the fees award, holding that Hardt had failed to establish that

she qualified as a “prevailing party” under the rule set forth in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health 
2 HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. 

Syllabus 

and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 604, that a fee claimant is a 

“prevailing party” only if he has obtained an “enforceable judgmen[t]

on the merits ” or a “court-ordered consent decre[e]. ” The court reasoned that because the remand order did not require Reliance to

award Hardt benefits, it did not constitute an enforceable judgment 

on the merits. 

Held: 

1. A fee claimant need not be a “prevailing party” to be eligible for 

an attorney’s fees award under §1132(g)(1). Interpreting the section

to require a party to attain that status is contrary to §1132(g)(1)’s

plain text. The words “prevailing party” do not appear in the provision. Nor does anything else in §1132(g)(1)’s text purport to limit the 

availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party.” Instead, 

§1132(g)(1) expressly grants district courts “discretion” to award attorney’s fees “to either party.” (Emphasis added.) That language

contrasts sharply with §1132(g)(2), which governs the availability of

attorney’s fees in ERISA actions to recover delinquent employer contributions to a multiemployer plan. In such cases, only plaintiffs who

obtain “a judgment in favor of the plan” may seek attorney’s fees.

§1132(g)(2)(D). The contrast between these two paragraphs makes 

clear that Congress knows how to impose express limits on the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA cases. Because Congress failed to

include in §1132(g)(1) an express “prevailing party” requirement, the

Fourth Circuit’s decision adding that term of art to the statute more

closely resembles “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpret[ing]

one.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 359. Pp. 8–9.

2. A court may award fees and costs under §1132(g)(1), as long as

the fee claimant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” 

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 694. The bedrock principle known as the American Rule provides the relevant point of reference: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a 

statute or contract provides otherwise. E.g., id., at 683–686. This 

Court’s “prevailing party” precedents do not govern here because that

term of art does not appear in §1132(g)(1). Instead, the Court interprets §1132(g)(1) in light of its precedents addressing statutes that 

deviate from the American Rule by authorizing attorney’s fees based

on other criteria. Ruckelshaus, which considered a statute authorizing a fees award if the court “determines that such an award is appropriate,” 42 U. S. C. §7607(f), is the principal case in that category. 

Applying that decision’s interpretive approach to 29 U. S. C. 

§1132(g)(1), the Court first looks to “the language of the section,” 463

U. S., at 682, which unambiguously allows a court to award attorney’s fees “in its discretion . . . to either party.” Ruckelshaus also lays

down the proper markers to guide a court in exercising that discre-
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 

Syllabus 

tion. Because here, as in the statute in Ruckelshaus, Congress failed

to indicate clearly that it “meant to abandon historic fee-shifting 

principles and intuitive notions of fairness,” 463 U. S., at 686, a fees

claimant must show “some degree of success on the merits” before a

court may award attorney’s fees under §1132(g)(1), see id., at 694. 

Hardt has satisfied that standard. Though she failed to win summary judgment on her benefits claim, the District Court nevertheless

found compelling evidence that she is totally disabled and stated that

it was inclined to rule in her favor. She also obtained the remand order, after which Reliance conducted the court-ordered review, reversed its decision, and awarded the benefits she sought. Accordingly, the District Court properly exercised its discretion to award

Hardt attorney’s fees. Pp. 9–13. 

336 Fed. Appx. 332, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, 

JJ., joined, and in which STEVENS, J., joined as to Parts I and II. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 09–448 

BRIDGET HARDT, PETITIONER v. RELIANCE 

STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[May 24, 2010] 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In most lawsuits seeking relief under the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat.

829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq., “a reasonable 

attorney’s fee and costs” are available “to either party” at 

the court’s “discretion.” §1132(g)(1). The Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit has interpreted §1132(g)(1) to require that a fee claimant be a “prevailing party” before he

may seek a fees award. We reject this interpretation as 

contrary to §1132(g)(1)’s plain text. We hold instead that 

a court “in its discretion” may award fees and costs “to

either party,” ibid., as long as the fee claimant has 

achieved “some degree of success on the merits,” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 694 (1983). 

I 

In 2000, while working as an executive assistant to the

president of textile manufacturer Dan River, Inc., petitioner Bridget Hardt began experiencing neck and shoulder pain. Her doctors eventually diagnosed her with

carpal tunnel syndrome. Because surgeries on both her

wrists failed to alleviate her pain, Hardt stopped working 
2 HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

in January 2003.

In August 2003, Hardt sought long-term disability

benefits from Dan River’s Group Long-Term Disability 

Insurance Program Plan (Plan). Dan River administers 

the Plan, which is subject to ERISA, but respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company decides whether a 

claimant qualifies for benefits under the Plan and underwrites any benefits awarded. Reliance provisionally approved Hardt’s claim, telling her that final approval

hinged on her performance in a functional capacities 

evaluation intended to assess the impact of her carpal 

tunnel syndrome and neck pain on her ability to work.

Hardt completed the functional capacities evaluation in 

October 2003. The evaluator summarized Hardt’s medical 

history, observed her resulting physical limitations, and

ultimately found that Hardt could perform some amount 

of sedentary work. Based on this finding, Reliance concluded that Hardt was not totally disabled within the 

meaning of the Plan and denied her claim for disability 

benefits. Hardt filed an administrative appeal. Reliance 

reversed itself in part, finding that Hardt was totally

disabled from her regular occupation, and was therefore

entitled to temporary disability benefits for 24 months. 

While her administrative appeal was pending, Hardt 

began experiencing new symptoms in her feet and calves,

including tingling, pain, and numbness. One of her physicians diagnosed her with small-fiber neuropathy, a condition that increased her pain and decreased her physical

capabilities over the ensuing months. 

Hardt eventually applied to the Social Security Administration for disability benefits under the Social Security 

Act. Her application included questionnaires completed 

by two of her treating physicians, which described Hardt’s

symptoms and stated the doctors’ conclusion that Hardt

could not return to full gainful employment because of her

neuropathy and other ailments. In February 2005, the 
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Social Security Administration granted Hardt’s application and awarded her disability benefits.

About two months later, Reliance told Hardt that her 

Plan benefits would expire at the end of the 24-month

period. Reliance explained that under the Plan’s terms, 

only individuals who are “totally disabled from all occupations” were eligible for benefits beyond that period, App. to 

Pet. for Cert. 36a, and adhered to its conclusion that, 

based on its review of Hardt’s records, Hardt was not 

“totally disabled” as defined by the Plan. Reliance also 

demanded that Hardt pay Reliance $14,913.23 to offset 

the disability benefits she had received from the Social 

Security Administration. (The Plan contains a provision

coordinating benefits with Social Security payments.) 

Hardt paid Reliance the offset. 

Hardt then filed another administrative appeal. She 

gave Reliance all of her medical records, the questionnaires she had submitted to the Social Security Administration, and an updated questionnaire from one of her 

physicians. Reliance asked Hardt to supplement this

material with another functional capacities evaluation.

When Reliance referred Hardt for the updated evaluation,

it did not ask the evaluator to review Hardt for neuropathic pain, even though it knew that Hardt had been 

diagnosed with neuropathy after her first evaluation. 

Hardt appeared for the updated evaluation in December 

2005, and appeared for another evaluation in January

2006. The evaluators deemed both evaluations invalid 

because Hardt’s efforts were “submaximal.” Id., at 37a. 

One evaluator recorded that Hardt “refused multiple tests 

. . . for fear of nausea/illness/further pain complaints.” 

Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lacking an updated functional capacities evaluation, 

Reliance hired a physician and a vocation rehabilitation 

counselor to help it resolve Hardt’s administrative appeal. 

The physician did not examine Hardt; instead, he re-
4 HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

viewed some, but not all, of Hardt’s medical records. 

Based on that review, the physician produced a report in

which he opined that Hardt’s health was expected to 

improve. His report, however, did not mention Hardt’s

pain medications or the questionnaires that Hardt’s attending physicians had completed as part of her application for Social Security benefits. The vocational rehabilitation counselor, in turn, performed a labor market study

(based on Hardt’s health in 2003) that identified eight 

employment opportunities suitable for Hardt. After reviewing the physician’s report, the labor market study,

and the results of the 2003 functional capacities evaluation, Reliance concluded that its decision to terminate 

Hardt’s benefits was correct. It advised Hardt of this 

decision in March 2006. 

After exhausting her administrative remedies, Hardt

sued Reliance in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia. She alleged that Reliance

violated ERISA by wrongfully denying her claim for longterm disability benefits. See §1132(a)(1)(B). The parties

filed cross-motions for summary judgment, both of which 

the District Court denied. 

The court first rejected Reliance’s request for summary

judgment affirming the denial of benefits, finding that

“Reliance’s decision to deny benefits was based on incomplete information.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. Most 

prominently, none of the functional capacities evaluations 

to which Hardt had submitted had “assessed the impact of

neuropathy and neuropathic pain on Ms. Hardt.” Ibid. In 

addition, the reviewing physician’s report “was itself

incomplete”; the basis for the physician’s “medical conclusions [wa]s extremely vague and conclusory,” ibid., and 

the physician had “failed to cite any medical evidence to

support his conclusions,” id., at 43a, or “to address the 

treating physicians’ contradictory medical findings,” id., at 

44a. The court also found that Reliance had “improperly 
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

rejected much of the evidence that Ms. Hardt submitted,” 

id., at 45a, and had “further ignored the substantial 

amount of pain medication Ms. Hardt’s treating physicians had prescribed to her,” id., at 46a. Accordingly, the 

court thought it “clear that Reliance’s decision to deny Ms. 

Hardt long-term disability benefits was not based on

substantial evidence.” Id., at 47a. 

The District Court then denied Hardt’s motion for summary judgment, which contended that Reliance’s decision

to deny benefits was unreasonable as a matter of law. In 

so doing, however, the court found “compelling evidence” 

in the record that “Ms. Hardt [wa]s totally disabled due to

her neuropathy.” Id., at 48a. Although it was “inclined to 

rule in Ms. Hardt’s favor,” the court concluded that “it 

would be unwise to take this step without first giving

Reliance the chance to address the deficiencies in its approach.” Ibid. In the District Court’s view, a remand to 

Reliance was warranted because “[t]his case presents one

of those scenarios where the plan administrator has failed

to comply with the ERISA guidelines,” meaning “Ms.

Hardt did not get the kind of review to which she was 

entitled under applicable law.” Ibid. Accordingly, the 

court instructed “Reliance to act on Ms. Hardt’s application by adequately considering all the evidence” within 30

days; “[o]therwise,” it warned, “judgment will be issued in 

favor of Ms. Hardt.” Id., at 49a. 

Reliance did as instructed. After conducting that 

review, Reliance found Hardt eligible for long-term disability benefits and paid her $55,250 in accrued, past-due

benefits. 

Hardt then moved for attorney’s fees and costs under

§1132(g)(1). The District Court assessed her motion under 

the three-step framework that governed fee requests in

ERISA cases under Circuit precedent. At step one of that 

framework, a district court asks whether the fee claimant 

is a “‘prevailing party.’” Id., at 15a–16a (quoting Martin 
6 HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc., 115 F. 3d 

1201, 1210 (CA4 1997), and citing Buckhannon Board & 

Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and 

Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 603 (2001)). If the fee 

claimant qualifies as a prevailing party, the court proceeds

to step two and “determin[es] whether an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate” by examining “five factors.”1 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. Finally, if those five factors

suggest that a fees award is appropriate, the court “must 

review the attorneys’ fees and costs requested and limit

them to a reasonable amount.” Id., at 17a (citing Hensley 

v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983)). 

Applying that framework, the District Court granted

Hardt’s motion. It first concluded that Hardt was a prevailing party because the court’s remand order “sanctioned 

a material change in the legal relationship of the parties

by ordering [Reliance] to conduct the type of review to

which [Hardt] was entitled.” Id., at 22a. The court recognized that the order did not “sanctio[n] a certain result on

remand,” but found that it “quite clearly expressed the

consequences to [Reliance] were it to fail to complete its

reconsideration in an expeditious manner.” Id., at 19a. 

Accordingly, the remand order “signif[ied] that the court

was displeased with the cursory review that [Reliance] 

had initially given to [Hardt’s] claim, but was inclined to

reserve judgment and permit [Reliance] to conduct a

proper review of all of the medical evidence.” Ibid. The 

—————— 

1These factors are: “ ‘(1) the degree of opposing parties’ culpability or 

bad faith; (2) ability of opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) whether an award of attorneys’ fees against the opposing

parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; 

(4) whether the parties requesting attorneys’ fees sought to benefit all

participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits

of the parties’ positions.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a (quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 987 F. 2d 1017, 1029 (CA4 1993)). 
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

court next concluded that a fees award was appropriate 

under the five-factor test, see id., at 22a–25a, and 

awarded $39,149 in fees and costs, id., at 25a–30a. 

Reliance appealed the fees award, and the Court of 

Appeals vacated the District Court’s order. According to

the Court of Appeals, Hardt failed to satisfy the step-one 

inquiry—i.e., she failed to establish that she was a “prevailing party.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court of

Appeals relied on this Court’s decision in Buckhannon, 

under which a fee claimant qualifies as a “prevailing

party” only if he has obtained an “‘enforceable judgmen[t]

on the merits’” or a “‘court-ordered consent decre[e].’” 336 

Fed. Appx. 332, 335 (CA4 2009) (per curiam) (quoting 532

U. S., at 604). The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the remand order “did not require Reliance to award

benefits to Hardt,” it did “not constitute an ‘enforceable 

judgment on the merits’ as Buckhannon requires,” thus

precluding Hardt from establishing prevailing party 

status. 336 Fed. Appx., at 336 (brackets omitted). 

Hardt filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking

review of two aspects of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 

First, did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that

§1132(g)(1) permits courts to award attorney’s fees only to

a “prevailing party”?2 Second, did the Court of Appeals 

—————— 

2The Courts of Appeals are divided on this issue. Some (a few only

tentatively) agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion here that only

prevailing parties are entitled to fees under §1132(g)(1). See, e.g., 

Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F. 3d 220, 225 (CA1

1996) (“Congress declared that, in any ERISA claim advanced by a

‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may

allow a reasonable attorney’s fee’ to the prevailing party” (emphasis 

added)); Tate v. Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried Employees of 

Champion Int’l Corp. #506, 545 F. 3d 555, 564 (CA7 2008) (“In analyzing whether attorney’s fees should be awarded to a ‘prevailing party’ in 

an ERISA case, a court should consider whether the losing party’s 

position was justified an taken in good faith. However, we have held 

that a claimant who is awarded a remand in an ERISA case generally 
8 HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

correctly identify the circumstances under which a fee 

claimant is entitled to attorney’s fees under §1132(g)(1)? 

We granted certiorari. 558 U. S. ___ (2010). 

II 

Whether §1132(g)(1) limits the availability of attorney’s

fees to a “prevailing party” is a question of statutory construction. As in all such cases, we begin by analyzing the

statutory language, “assum[ing] that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative

purpose.” Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 

___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its terms. Carcieri v. Salazar, 

555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 7); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 5). 

Section 1132(g)(1) provides: 

“In any action under this subchapter (other than an 

action described in paragraph (2)) by a participant,

beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion 

may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 

The words “prevailing party” do not appear in this provision. Nor does anything else in §1132(g)(1)’s text purport

to limit the availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing 

party.” Instead, §1132(g)(1) expressly grants district 

courts “discretion” to award attorney’s fees “to either 

—————— 

is not a prevailing party in the truest sense of the term” (some internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)); Graham v. Hartford Life and 

Accident Ins. Co., 501 F. 3d 1153, 1162 (CA10 2007) (“We also afford

certain weight to prevailing party status, even though we acknowledge 

that the ERISA attorney’s fees provision is not expressly directed at 

prevailing parties”). Other Courts of Appeals have rejected or disavowed that position. See, e.g., Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F. 3d 

1066, 1074 (CA2 1995); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F. 3d 491, 503 (CA5 2000); 

Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co., 996 F. 2d 1116, 1119 (CA11 1993). 
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

party.” (Emphasis added.)

That language contrasts sharply with §1132(g)(2), which

governs the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA actions 

under §1145 (actions to recover delinquent employer 

contributions to a multiemployer plan). In such cases, 

only plaintiffs who obtain “a judgment in favor of the plan” 

may seek attorney’s fees. §1132(g)(2)(D). The contrast 

between these two paragraphs makes clear that Congress

knows how to impose express limits on the availability of 

attorney’s fees in ERISA cases. Because Congress failed

to include in §1132(g)(1) an express “prevailing party” 

limit on the availability of attorney’s fees, the Court of 

Appeals’ decision adding that term of art to a fee-shifting 

statute from which it is conspicuously absent more closely

resembles “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpret[ing] 

one.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 359 

(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We see no reason to dwell any longer on this question, 

particularly given Reliance’s concessions. See Brief for 

Respondent 9–10 (“On its face,” §1132(g)(1) “does not

expressly demand, like so many statutes, that a claimant 

be a ‘prevailing party’ before receiving attorney’s fees”). 

We therefore hold that a fee claimant need not be a “prevailing party” to be eligible for an attorney’s fees award 

under §1132(g)(1). 

III 

We next consider the circumstances under which a court 

may award attorney’s fees pursuant to §1132(g)(1). “Our 

basic point of reference” when considering the award of 

attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the 

“‘American Rule’”: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s

fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides

otherwise. Ruckelshaus, 463 U. S., at 683; see id., at 683– 

686; Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 

421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975); Buckhannon, supra, at 602–603; 
10 HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

see also Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip 

op., at 5). Statutory changes to this rule take various

forms. Most fee-shifting provisions permit a court to

award attorney’s fees only to a “prevailing party.” 3 Others 

permit a “substantially prevailing” party 4 or a “successful” 

litigant 5 to obtain fees. Still others authorize district 

courts to award attorney’s fees where “appropriate,” 6 or 

simply vest district courts with “discretion” to award fees.7 

Of those statutory deviations from the American Rule,

we have most often considered statutes containing an 

express “prevailing party” requirement. See, e.g., Texas 

State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 

489 U. S. 782, 792–793 (1989); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 

103, 109–114 (1992); Buckhannon, supra, at 602–606; Sole 

v. Wyner, 551 U. S. 74, 82–86 (2007). Our “prevailing

party” precedents, however, do not govern the availability 

of fees awards under §1132(g)(1), because this provision 

does not limit the availability of attorney’s fees to the 

“prevailing party.” Supra, at 8–9; see also Gross, supra, at 

___, (slip op., at 6) (cautioning courts “conducting statutory interpretation . . . ‘not to apply rules applicable under

one statute to a different statute without careful and 

critical examination’” (quoting Federal Express Corp. v. 

Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 393 (2008))). 

Instead, we interpret §1132(g)(1) in light of our precedents addressing statutory deviations from the American

Rule that do not limit attorney’s fees awards to the “pre-

—————— 

3See, e.g., Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 

Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 601–603 (2001) 

(citing examples); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 684, n. 3 

(1983) (same). 4See ibid., n. 4 (citing examples). 5See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §2707(c); Ruckelshaus, supra, at 684, n. 5 (citing examples). 6See Ruckelshaus, supra, at 682, n. 1 (citing examples). 7See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §§77k(e), 77www(a), 78i(e), 78r(a), 7706(g)(4);

20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i); 42 U. S. C. §2000aa–6(f). 
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

vailing party.” In that line of precedents, Ruckelshaus is 

the principal case. There, the Court interpreted §307(f) of

the Clean Air Act, which authorizes a court to award fees 

“whenever it determines that such an award is appropriate.” 42 U. S. C. §7607(f). We began by noting that because nothing in §307(f)’s text “clear[ly] show[ed]” that 

Congress meant to abandon the American Rule, 463 U. S.,

at 685, fee claimants must have achieved some litigating 

success to be eligible for a fees award under that section, 

id., at 686. We then concluded that by using the less 

stringent “whenever . . . appropriate” standard instead of 

the traditional “prevailing party” standard, Congress had 

“expand[ed] the class of parties eligible for fees awards 

from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties—

parties achieving some success, even if not major success.” 

Id., at 688. We thus held “that, absent some degree of

success on the merits by the claimant, it is not ‘appropriate’ for a federal court to award attorney’s fees under

§307(f).” Id., at 694. 

Applying the interpretive approach we employed in 

Ruckelshaus to §1132(g)(1), we first look to “the language

of the section,” id., at 682, which unambiguously allows a

court to award attorney’s fees “in its discretion . . . to 

either party,” §1132(g)(1). Statutes vesting judges with 

such broad discretion are well known in the law, particularly in the attorney’s fees context. See, e.g., n. 7, supra; 

see also Perdue, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). 

Equally well known, however, is the fact that a “judge’s

discretion is not unlimited.” Ibid. Consistent with Circuit precedent, the District Court applied five factors to

guide its discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees under §1132(g)(1). See supra, at 6, and n. 1. 

Because these five factors bear no obvious relation to 

§1132(g)(1)’s text or to our fee-shifting jurisprudence, they 

are not required for channeling a court’s discretion when

awarding fees under this section. 
12 HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

Instead, Ruckelshaus lays down the proper markers to 

guide a court in exercising the discretion that §1132(g)(1) 

grants. As in the statute at issue in Ruckelshaus, Congress failed to indicate clearly in §1132(g)(1) that it 

“meant to abandon historic fee-shifting principles and 

intuitive notions of fairness.” 463 U. S., at 686. Accordingly, a fees claimant must show “some degree of success

on the merits” before a court may award attorney’s fees 

under §1132(g)(1), id., at 694. A claimant does not satisfy

that requirement by achieving “trivial success on the 

merits” or a “purely procedural victor[y],” but does satisfy

it if the court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation 

some success on the merits without conducting a “lengthy

inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party’s

success was ‘substantial’ or occurred on a ‘central issue.’” 

Id., at 688, n. 9.8 

Reliance essentially agrees that this standard should 

govern fee requests under §1132(g)(1), see Brief for Respondent 13–31, but argues that Hardt has not satisfied it.

Specifically, Reliance contends that a court order remanding an ERISA claim for further consideration can never 

constitute “some success on the merits,” even if such a 

remand results in an award of benefits. See id., at 34–50. 

Reliance’s argument misses the point, given the facts of

this case. Hardt persuaded the District Court to find that

“the plan administrator has failed to comply with the 

ERISA guidelines” and “that Ms. Hardt did not get the 

kind of review to which she was entitled under applicable 

law.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a; see 29 U. S. C. §1133(2),

29 CFR §2560.503–1(h) (2009). Although Hardt failed to 

win summary judgment on her benefits claim, the District 

—————— 

8We do not foreclose the possibility that once a claimant has satisfied

this requirement, and thus becomes eligible for a fees award under

§1132(g)(1), a court may consider the five factors adopted by the Court

of Appeals, see n. 1, supra, in deciding whether to award attorney’s 

fees. 
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

Court nevertheless found “compelling evidence that Ms. 

Hardt is totally disabled due to her neuropathy,” and 

stated that it was “inclined to rule in Ms. Hardt’s favor” on 

her benefits claim, but declined to do so before “first giving

Reliance the chance to address the deficiencies in its” 

statutorily mandated “full and fair review” of that claim.

App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a; 29 U. S. C. §1133(2). Hardt 

thus obtained a judicial order instructing Reliance “to act

on Ms. Hardt’s application by adequately considering all 

the evidence” within 30 days; “[o]therwise, judgment will

be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

49a. After Reliance conducted that court-ordered review, 

and consistent with the District Court’s appraisal, Reliance reversed its decision and awarded Hardt the benefits 

she sought. App. 120a–123a. 

These facts establish that Hardt has achieved far more 

than “trivial success on the merits” or a “purely procedural

victory.” Accordingly, she has achieved “some success on 

the merits,” and the District Court properly exercised its

discretion to award Hardt attorney’s fees in this case.

Because these conclusions resolve this case, we need not 

decide today whether a remand order, without more, 

constitutes “some success on the merits” sufficient to make 

a party eligible for attorney’s fees under §1132(g)(1).9 

* * * 

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 

Fourth Circuit and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

9Reliance has not preserved any separate objection to the reasonableness of the amount of fees awarded. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 

U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 7–8, 14). 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 09–448 

BRIDGET HARDT, PETITIONER v. RELIANCE 

STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[May 24, 2010] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in 

the judgment. 

While I join the Court’s judgment and Parts I and II of 

its opinion, I do not believe that our mistaken interpretation of §307(f) of the Clean Air Act in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680 (1983), should be given any special weight in the interpretation of this—or any other—

different statutory provision. The outcome in that closely

divided case turned, to a significant extent, on a judgment 

about how to read the legislative history of the provision 

in question. Compare id., at 686–693, with id., at 703–706 

(STEVENS, J., dissenting). I agree with the Court in this

case that 29 U. S. C. §1132(g)(1) does not impose a “prevailing party” requirement; I agree, further, that the

District Court acted well within its discretion in awarding 

attorney’s fees to this petitioner. But I would examine the 

text, structure, and history of any other federal statute 

authorizing an award of fees before concluding that Congress intended the same approach under that statute as

under this one.