alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### *V. & S.*Bottle Company, Appellant, *v.*Mountain Gas Company.

*Public service companies*— Gas *companies*— Act *of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1371/, .Sec. 8*— Contracts—Rates—Undue preference— *Bill in equity*— Specific *performance*— Refusal.

A bill in equity by a manufacturing company against a gas company to compel specific performance of a contract for the supply of gas was properly dismissed where the agreement in question gave plaintiff an undue and unreasonable preference and advantage in rate and service, such agreement being rendered inoperative by the Public Service Act of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1314, Section 8.

Argued May 6, 1918.

Appeal, No. 92, Jan. T., 1918, by plaintiff, from decree of C. P. Potter Co., Sept. T., 1917, No. 1, in equity, dismissing bill in equity for specific performance in case of Y. & S. Bottle Company v. Mountain tías Company.

Before Brown, C. J., Stewart, Moschzisker, Frazer and Walling, JJ.

Affirmed.

Bill in equity for specific performance of contract to supply gas and for an injunction. Before Heck, P. J.

From the record it appeared that on October 30,1913, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement under which the latter agreed to sell and deliver to the former at the price of eight cents per thousand cubic feet, based on an eight-ounce pressure, delivered at the place hereinafter mentioned, for the term of five years, and ten cents per cubic feet based on the same pressure, such quantities of natural gas as required by the party of the second part (plaintiff) to supply its factory with natural gas for fuel, light, heat and other necessary purposes, for the proper and successful operation of said factory, for and during the term of ten years from the date thereof; said gas to be used at the factory of said party in the Village of Roulette, Potter County, Penna.

*524The contract further provided that the plaintiff should furnish the necessary pipes, regulators and meters.

The Mountain Gas Company, on December 22, 1913, filed a tariff fixing the price of natural gas to manufacturers in quantities of 100,000 cubic feet daily at ten cents per thousand cubic feet.

The defendant, subsequent to January’1,1914, refused to supply gas to the plaintiff for less than the rate required by such tariff. Plaintiff brought this bill in equity to compel the specific performance of its contract of October 30, 1913.

The lower court found' that the agreement in question gave, the plaintiff company special privileges forbidden by Section 8, sub-division A and B of the Public Service Act of July 26,1913, P. L. 1374, and that such agreement was rendered inoperative from the time the said act went into effect January 1, 1914, and dismissed the bill. Plaintiff appealed.

*Error assigned,*among others, was the decree of the court.

*W. K. Sto&tland,*for appellant.

*S. S. Mehard,*of *Mehard, Scully*cG *Mehard,*with him, *W. F. Dubois,*for appellee.

June 3, 1918:

Per Curiam,

This appeal is dismissed and the decree affirmed, at appellant’s costs, on the correct conclusion of the learned court below that when the public service law went into .effect on January 1, 1914, the agreement in question became inoperative.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 11, 2013

No. 04-13-00454-CV and 04-13-00455-CV

THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE BEST INTEREST AND PROTECTION OF S.S.,

From the Probate Court No 1, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013MH1871 and 2013MH1959

Honorable Polly Jackson Spencer, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellee's motion for extension of time to file brief is hereby GRANTED. Appellant's 

brief is deemed filed as of October 10, 2013.

_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 11th day of October, 2013.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-2383

___________ The Estate of Philip Peterson by its * Administratrix Sandra Peterson, * * Appellant, * * Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, * also known as Liberty Mutual, * * Intervenor, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Western District of Arkansas. * United States of America, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Defendant, * * Holsted Company, Inc., * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: October 7, 1998 Filed: January 12, 1999

___________ Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.T heHonorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for th e 1 Western District of Arkansas. -2- The Estate of Philip Peterson (Estate) appeals the district court’s adverse grant 1 of summary judgment

on the Estate’s tort claim against Holsted Company, Inc. After considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the record, we find no error of law in the court’s ruling. We therefore affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2382 

To suspend temporarily the duty on parts of frames and mountings for 

spectacles, goggles, or the like. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. VOINOVICH (for himself and Mr. BROWN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on parts of frames and 

mountings for spectacles, goggles, or the like. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PARTS OF FRAMES AND MOUNTINGS FOR SPEC4 TACLES, GOGGLES, OR THE LIKE. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

6 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

7 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

8 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Parts of frames and mountings for spectacles, goggles, 

or the like (provided for in 

subheading 9003.90.00) ........ Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2382 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7178

JAMES DION PALMER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE JOHNSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief

District Judge. (CA-02-1762-AM)

Submitted: December 11, 2003 Decided: December 19, 2003

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Dion Palmer, Appellant Pro Se. Mary Kathleen Beatty Martin,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

James Dion Palmer seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,

683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and

conclude that Palmer has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 8, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50111 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee
v. FRANCISCO JAVIER RENDON-LOPEZ Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-1573-ALL Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Francisco Javier RendonLopez raises arguments that are foreclosed by A lmendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government's motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and thejudgment ofthe district court is AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30307

Summary Calendar

BRANDON SCOTT LAVERGNE,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

KENT DAVID KLOSTER,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:13-CV-2145

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Brandon Scott Lavergne, Louisiana prisoner # 424229, pled guilty to two 

counts of first degree murder for the murders of Michaela Shunick and Lisa 

Pate. Thereafter, Lavergne filed a civil rights complaint against Kent Kloster. 

The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous, for failure to state a 

claim, as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and for lack of 

jurisdiction.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 3, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 14-30307 Document: 00512823744 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/03/2014
No. 14-30307

This court reviews a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, applying the same standard that is used to review 

a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Black v. Warren, 

134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998).

In his brief, Lavergne contends that his claims were not untimely filed 

and that Heck does not apply because his claims for libel and slander are not 

grounds to overturn his convictions and because Kloster’s false statements 

were not used in the factual basis for his guilty plea convictions. Even if his 

claims were not all time barred, Lavergne cannot overcome the Heck bar. 

Lavergne’s claims arise out of the Shunick and Pate murder prosecutions, and 

they reflect his view that the prosecutions and his resulting guilty pleas were 

tainted by Kloster’s false statements. If the district court were to award 

Lavergne damages as to any of these claims, it would implicitly call into 

question the validity of his convictions. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Penley v. 

Collin Cnty., Tex., 446 F.3d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Lavergne v. 

Sanford, 570 F. App’x 385 (5th Cir. 2014). Nor was it error for the district 

court to dismiss the Heck-barred claims with prejudice. See Johnson v. 

McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Neither did the district court abuse its discretion in denying his motion 

to appoint counsel or his motion to amend his complaint because the 

amendments were futile in light of the Heck bar. See Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 

405, 417 (5th Cir. 2013); Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 

1982). To the extent Lavergne raises new claims on appeal, we do not address 

them. See Williams v. Ballard, 466 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2006). 

Lavergne’s motion to appoint counsel is DENIED, and the judgment of 

the district court is AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 14-30307 Document: 00512823744 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/03/2014
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS Appeals of

-- Centerra-Parsons Pacific, LLC Under Contract No. N62742-12-D-3601 APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: ) ) ) ) )

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA Nos. 61754, 62139

Kevin Pinkney, Esq.

Arent FoxLLP Washington, DC Craig D. Jensen, Esq.

Navy ChiefTrial Attorney Robyn L. Hamady, Esq.

Trial Attorney OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE THRASHER The parties have resolved their dispute and request that the Board enter judgment in favor ofappellant. It is the Board's decision, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. §§ 7105(e), 7108(b), and the parties'jointmotion to sustain the appeals and request entry ofa consentjudgment, that the appeals are sustained. In the nature ofa consentjudgment, the Board makes a monetary award to appellant in the amount of$1,988,201.27. This amount is inclusive ofinterest. No further interest shall be paid. Dated: October 30, 2019

(Signatures continued) Administrative Judge Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract AppealsI concur 

# -tVC-----

RICHARD SHACKLEFORD Administrative Judge Vice Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals I concur 

## ,,,.-----,, OWE~~~ Administrative Judge Vice Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Opinion and Decision ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 61754, 62139, Appeals of Centerra-Parsons Pacific, LLC, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:

2 PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
#### Laura J. REESE v. WINN-DIXIE OF LOUISIANA, INC.

No. 89-01232.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re Reese, Laura J.; — Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA87-1085; Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 44790-A.

Prior report: La.App., 542 So.2d 68.

Denied.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report of Chisen Electric Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





Date: February 28, 2011
By:
/s/ Xu KechengName: Xu KechengTitle: President, Chief Executive Officerand Principal Executive Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Chisen Electric Corporation will be retained by Chisen Electric Corporation and furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
50331.

#### THE STATE v. TOOMEY.

Stolz, Judge.

This case is an appeal by the state from an order of the Superior Court of Columbia County sustaining the defendant’s motion to suppress.

On April 9, 1974, an investigator of the Columbia County Sheriffs Department was called to Cunningham Industries, in that county, with reference to someone’s using their telephone line. The complaint was that some unauthorized person was tied into the number (private line) which was assigned to Cunningham Industries. The *344investigator was advised that a number of calls had been overheard which involved discussion of drugs, drug parties and the usage of drugs. The investigator was also informed that an individual named Freddie Toomey (defendant) was making and receiving calls on the Cunningham Industries line. Thereafter, the investigator listened in on various conversations. Then he contacted the telephone company to see if there was a telephone registered in the name of the defendant. There was not. Further investigation developed that the defendant was renting a house on Old Evans Road. The investigator then made an affidavit before a justice of the peace based on the information obtained as a result of listening in on the telephone conversations. A search warrant was issued and a search of the premises conducted, which resulted in the defendant’s arrest on a charge of violating the Georgia Drug Abuse Act. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, officials of the telephone company testified that the company had left in operation a station at the defendant’s dwelling which was working at all times pertinent, but which should have been disconnected. *Held:*

The trial judge correctly sustained the motion to suppress. The investigator listening in on the defendant’s telephone conversations had not previously made written application under oath to the district attorney or the Attorney General, showing probable cause, and then obtained an investigation warrant from a judge of superior court. See Code Ann. § 26-3004 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1328; 1972, p. 615; 1972, pp. 952, 953). Failing in this, the investigator was clearly within the prohibition of Code Ann. § 26-3001 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1327): "It shall be unlawful for: (a) any person in a clandestine manner to intentionally overhear, transmit, or record, or attempt to overhear, transmit, or record the private conversation of another which shall originate in any private place; . . . (d) any person to intentionally and secretly intercept by the use of any device, instrument or apparatus the contents of a message sent by telephone, telegraph, letter or by any other means of private communication; . . . (f) any person to commit any other acts of a nature similar to those set out in subsection[s] (a) *345through (e) which invade the privacy of another.”

Argued February 25, 1975

Decided March 20, 1975.

*Richard E. Allen, District Attorney, Richard L. Powell, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellant.

*Hinton R. Pierce, Stanley C. House,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Deen, P. J., and Evans, J., concur.*
EXHIBIT 32-2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of WNC California
Housing Tax Credits, L.P. (the "Partnership") for the year ended March 31, 2009
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), and pursuant to 18 U.S.C., section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Thomas J. Riha, Chief
Financial Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc., general partner of the Partnership,
hereby certify that:

         1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and result of
              operations of the Partnership.




/s/THOMAS J. RIHA
-----------------
Thomas J. Riha
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc.
Date: August 12, 2009
Exhibit 32.1

Section 906 Certification

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of NCI, Inc. (the Company)
for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company
certifies, to the best of his knowledge and belief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |                                     
|---------------------- |  | ------------------------------------
|Date: November 7, 2006 |  | /s/ Charles K Narang                
|                       |  | Charles K. Narang                   
|                       |  | Chairman of the Board,              
|                       |  | Chief Executive Officer and Director
|                       |  | (Principal Executive Officer)       

A signed original of the written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to NCI, Inc. and will be
retained by NCI, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.