IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30079

Summary Calendar

PATRICIA PETER-TAKANG, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

SUZY SONNIER, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of 

Children and Family Services; TOURO INFIRMARY HOSPITAL; DR. GLEN 

STEEB, M.D., 

 Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:14-CV-1078

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Patricia Peter-Takang, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of her complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Because the operative complaint at the time Defendant–

Appellee Suzy Sonnier was dismissed did not plead jurisdiction, and because 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 4, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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the subsequent amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, we affirm.

I

According to the complaint, in 2002, Dr. Glen Steeb performed surgery 

on Peter-Takang at the Touro Infirmary Hospital (Touro). At the time, PeterTakang was pregnant with twins. She alleges that after the surgery, Dr. Steeb 

told her that the twins had died during surgery. Although not in her 

complaint, she asserts in her briefs (and in her briefs in the district court) that 

Dr. Steeb told her days after the surgery that “there were no babies” in the 

first place, and that he had simply removed scar tissue from her abdomen

during the surgery. She also claims, for the first time on appeal, that nurses 

at Touro told her in the surgery’s immediate aftermath that her twins had not

died and that Dr. Steeb had removed them during surgery and taken them out 

of the hospital alive. 

Three years after the surgery, Peter-Takang read a story in the 

newspaper about twin toddlers found walking down a highway. Believing the 

children to resemble her husband, and therefore believing they may have been 

the twins with which she was pregnant in 2002, Peter-Takang sought to have 

the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) genetically 

test the twins for a determination as to whether they were biologically hers. 

However, the DCFS refused to perform the requested maternity test. PeterTakang further alleges that when she made the request, representatives of the 

DCFS initially told her that they had to first speak with Dr. Steeb and a 

representative at Touro and that when she returned a week later, she “was 

informed that Dr. Steeb told [the DCFS] that [her] children were born dead[,]

and not to entertain [her].” The DCFS has still not performed a maternity test 

despite Peter-Takang’s continued requests.

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Peter-Takang brought suit in federal district court against Touro, Dr. 

Steeb, and Suzy Sonnier, sued in her official capacity as Secretary of DCFS,

seeking a maternity test from the DCFS and damages. She filed a first 

amended complaint before any party had filed a responsive pleading. Sonnier 

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which the district court granted. PeterTakang then moved for reconsideration of Sonnier’s dismissal and amended 

her complaint a second time. The district court denied Peter-Takang’s motion 

for reconsideration, then granted Touro’s and Dr. Steeb’s motions to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6). Peter-Takang appealed.

II

Peter-Takang argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting 

Sonnier’s motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and in granting 

Touro’s and Dr. Steeb’s motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). We review 

dismissals under both Rules de novo.1

With respect to the DCFS, the district court granted Sonnier’s motion to 

dismiss before Peter-Takang amended her complaint the second time, when 

Peter-Takang’s first amended complaint was the operative pleading. In the 

first amended complaint (written as a supplement to the original complaint, 

rather than a replacement), Peter-Takang did not plead any facts or legal 

claims that would support federal jurisdiction. She did not allege any federal 

causes of action nor diversity of citizenship. To the extent she now argues on 

appeal that the federal courts have diversity jurisdiction based on the DCFS’s

status as an arm of the Louisiana government, Peter-Takang, herself a 

resident of Louisiana, has offered no support for the argument that diversity 

 

1 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011); Scanlan 

v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).

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may be invoked merely by pleading that the defendant is a state actor.2 

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Peter-Takang’s complaint 

against Sonnier. 

We note that after Sonnier’s dismissal, Peter-Takang’s second amended 

complaint purported to add federal causes of action. In the second amended 

complaint, Peter-Takang alleged that Sonnier deprived her of her federal

“rights to hold her children as babies, to hear them say momma or daddy, to 

watch them grow,” and generally to rear them. The district court appears to 

have considered these additional allegations in denying Peter-Takang’s motion 

for reconsideration of Sonnier’s dismissal. 

However, even if we were to consider these post-dismissal claims 

asserted against Sonnier, the second amended complaint would nevertheless 

be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). To the extent she alleges a 

substantive due process violation, and even if Peter-Takang has a substantive 

due process right to rear her biological children, or to have children tested for 

a determination as to whether they are her own (rights upon which she does 

not elaborate or offer any authority), she has not set forth any facts that 

plausibly allege a denial of that right. Rather, even if those supposed rights 

were cognizable, her claim here is entirely speculative, because, among other 

reasons, she has failed to offer any plausible basis for concluding that the

children at issue are biologically her own. Peter-Takang simply has not alleged 

facts that would support a constitutional right to have the twins allegedly in 

the DCFS’s custody genetically tested. To the extent Peter-Takang is claiming 

that the DCFS has a state-imposed obligation to test the children at issue, 

there is no basis for concluding that the DCFS or Sonnier has waived sovereign 

 

2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

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immunity.3 Accordingly, the district court properly granted Sonnier’s motion 

to dismiss and denied Peter-Takang’s motion for reconsideration.

With respect to Touro’s and Dr. Steeb’s motions to dismiss, Peter-Takang 

argues on appeal that her complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion. It is not clear what wrongdoing Peter-Takang alleges on the 

part of Touro or Dr. Steeb, but reading her complaint liberally, it appears that 

she claims Dr. Steeb wrongfully instructed DCFS “not to entertain” PeterTakang’s requests for DNA testing of the children at issue. The district court 

granted the motions to dismiss on the ground that they failed to allege any 

cognizable claim and that to the extent Peter-Takang attempted to assert 

negligence and malpractice claims in her opposition brief, those claims are 

prescribed under Louisiana law.

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Peter-Takang’s second 

amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief against Touro or Dr. Steeb. 

She fails to allege what duty either party had in her favor or how either 

breached any such duty, and in general she fails to set forth any cause of action 

she could possibly have against either based on Dr. Steeb’s alleged conduct in 

instructing the DCFS “not to entertain” her. She also does not press any 

negligence, malpractice, or fraud claims on appeal, so we need not address the 

district court’s conclusions with respect to those allegations.4 In any event, to 

the extent Peter-Takang’s complaint could be interpreted as alleging a claim 

 

3 See Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[S]overeign immunity 

bar[s] federal courts from hearing state law claims brought in federal court against state 

entities.”); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984) 

(“The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the state is the real,

substantial party in interest. . . . And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a 

suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether 

it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

4 See, e.g., Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Although we liberally 

construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that arguments must be briefed to be 

preserved.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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sounding in tort, her claims would be barred by Louisiana’s prescription 

statute. Under Louisiana law, tort actions must be brought within one year.5 

Peter-Takang’s allegations relate to conduct occurring, at the latest, in 2005, 

and she has not alleged any facts that would support a tolling of the deadline. 

Accordingly, the district court properly granted Touro’s and Dr. Steeb’s 

motions to dismiss.

Finally, Peter-Takang asserts that the district court should have given 

her another opportunity to amend her complaint before dismissing her action 

with prejudice. However, Peter-Takang did not ask the district court for an 

additional opportunity to amend. Moreover, she has already amended her 

complaint twice, and she has not set forth what other facts she would allege if 

given another opportunity. The district court therefore did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to give Peter-Takang another opportunity to amend her 

complaint. 

* * *

For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED. Peter-Takang’s motions to supplement the record with new 

evidence are DENIED.

 

5 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492; see also Sudo Props., Inc. v. Terrebonne Par. 

Consol. Gov’t, 503 F.3d 371, 378 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Louisiana tort claims have a prescriptive 

period of one year.”). In her reply, Peter-Takang contends that the prescriptive period is ten 

years. However, the statute she cites, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3499, applies only when the 

prescriptive period for a cause of action is not otherwise specified, which to the extent she 

claims that Touro or Dr. Steeb committed negligence or malpractice, is not the case here.

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