16-1831-cr 

United States v. Lamica 

1 

16-1831-cr 

United States v. Lamica 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 3rd day of May, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, 

 GUIDO CALABRESI, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 16-1831-cr 

v. 

JOSEPH A. LAMICA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

FOR APPELLEE: JOSEPH J. KARASZEWSKI, Assistant United 

States Attorney, for James P. Kennedy, 

Acting United States Attorney for the 

Western District of New York, Buffalo, 

NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: ANNE M. BURGER, Federal Public 

Defender’s Office, Western District of 

New York, Rochester, NY. 
16-1831-cr 

United States v. Lamica 

2 

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New 

York (Elizabeth A. Wolford, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the May 13, 2016 judgment is AFFIRMED. 

 Defendant-appellant Joseph A. Lamica appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on 

May 13, 2016, pursuant to a plea of guilty to an Information charging him with receiving child 

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and 2252A(b)(1). The District Court 

sentenced Lamica to 168 months’ imprisonment followed by a forty-year period of supervised 

release. 

On appeal, Lamica challenges the special condition of supervised release imposed by the 

District Court that required Lamica to submit to a search of his person or property undertaken “at 

any time with or without a warrant by any law enforcement or probation officer with reasonable 

suspicion involving a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct” by Lamica. 

App’x 169. Specifically, Lamica argues that the District Court erred in requiring him to submit to 

warrantless police searches based only on reasonable suspicion of “unlawful conduct,” rather than 

criminal conduct. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural 

history of the case. 

We review the imposition of conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Brown, 402 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2005).1

 A district court may impose a condition of 

supervised release if it is “reasonably related to: (A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and 

the history and characteristics of the defendant; (B) the need for the sentence imposed to afford 

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) the protection of the public; and (D) the rehabilitative 

and medical care needs of the defendant.” Id. at 136–37 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In addition, “[a] special condition must [ ] involve ‘no greater deprivation 

of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes’ of sentencing, and it must be ‘consistent 

with any pertinent policy statements’ in the Guidelines.” Id. at 137 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(2), 

(3)). Any “unusual and severe conditions” are subject to careful scrutiny. Id. 

We cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in imposing the search 

condition challenged by Lamica on appeal. First, the search condition imposed by the District Court 

 

1

 The government argues that plain error review is warranted because Lamica’s basis for 

appealing the imposition of the search condition is slightly different than his objection to the search 

condition in the District Court. Because Lamica’s objection below “fairly alert[ed] the court and 

opposing counsel to the nature of the claim,” we will review his claim for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1990). 
16-1831-cr 

United States v. Lamica 

3 

is a standard condition of supervised release for persons convicted of sex offenses, authorized 

verbatim by Section 3583(d) of Title Eighteen of the United States Code. See also U.S.S.G. § 

5D1.3(d)(7)(C) (listing the same search condition as a “special” condition of supervised release on 

convictions for sex offenses). 

Second, in light of the facts of Lamica’s case, the challenged search condition appears 

“reasonably related” to the “nature and circumstances of [Lamica’s] offense” and does not involve a 

deprivation of liberty that was greater than necessary for the purposes of sentencing. Brown, 402 F.3d 

at 136–37. At the sentencing hearing, the District Court made clear that “a significant supervised 

release term is appropriate . . . based upon all of the reasons that . . . a significant prison term is 

appropriate,” App’x 166, which included, among other things, that Lamica “targeted children 

because of inappropriate sexual interests in children,” id. at 163, and that Lamica’s “conduct here 

was not an isolated incident,” id. at 164. The District Court also considered the circumstances 

surrounding his arrest, which, although not the conduct to which Lamica pled guilty, showed Lamica 

interacting in a sexual nature with a young boy in person and not just over electronic devices. Id. at 

161. These reasons support the imposition of the challenged search condition as part of Lamica’s 

supervised release, even though the District Court imposed a separate monitoring and search 

condition for electronic devices. See United States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 348–49 (2d Cir. 2016) 

(holding that district court did not err in imposing similar search condition). 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Lamica and find them to be without 

merit. For the foregoing reasons, the May 13, 2016 judgment is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk