alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

 Appellant,

v.

CENTEX HOMES and CENTEX 

REAL ESTATE CORP., BUILDERS 

FIRST SOURCE-FLORIDA, LLC,

 Appellees.

_______________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

CASE NO. 1D15-1069

Opinion filed January 12, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Lawrence P. Haddock, Judge.

Anthony J. Russo, Fay E. Ryan, Ezequiel Lugo, and Matthew J. Lavisky of Butler 

Pappas Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, for Appellant.

Mark A Boyle and Amanda K. Anderson of Boyle, Gentile & Leonard, P.A., Ft. 

Myers, for Appellees Centex Homes and Centex Real Estate Corp.

No appearance for Builders First Source-Florida, LLC.

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of appellee’s motion to dismiss, appellant’s response, 

and appellee’s reply, the Court has determined that the order on appeal is not final 
2

as related claims remain pending below. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is 

granted and the appeal is dismissed. The dismissal is without prejudice to 

appellant’s right to seek appellate review upon entry of a final order.

THOMAS, SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.
#### Conway V. PHILLIPS v. Randall J. BROUSSARD, et al.

No. 87-CC-2327.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 18, 1987.

PER CURIAM.

Granted. The judgment sustaining the exception of vagueness is set aside, and the exception is overruled. Exceptor may utilize discovery if the petition remains vague in certain particulars. The case is remanded for further proceedings.
#### Faron P. ASHMORE v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and Lonnie L. Price.

No. 89-C-1210.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 30, 1989.

In re Ashmore, Faron P.; — Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or re*1216view; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR87-1404; Parish of Rapides, Pine-ville City Court, Div. “A”, No. 87-257.

Prior report: La.App., 542 So.2d 201.

Denied.
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 55 (Wednesday, March 21, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 16537]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-6819]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 1820]


Approval for Expansion of Manufacturing Authority, Foreign-Trade 
Subzone 78A, Nissan North America, Inc. (Electric Passenger Vehicles), 
Smyrna and Decherd, TN

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 
June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade 
Zones Board (the Board) adopts the following Order:

    Whereas, Nissan North America, Inc. (NNA), operator of Subzone 78A, 
at the NNA manufacturing facilities in Smyrna and Decherd, Tennessee, 
has requested an expansion of the scope of manufacturing authority to 
include new finished products (FTZ Docket 39-2011, filed 6-7-2011);
    Whereas, notice inviting public comment has been given in the 
Federal Register (76 FR 34203, 6-13-2011) and the application has been 
processed pursuant to the FTZ Act and the Board's regulations; and
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
Board's regulations are satisfied, and that the proposal is in the 
public interest;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby orders:
    The application to expand scope of FTZ manufacturing authority to 
include new finished products, as described in the application and 
Federal Register notice, is approved, subject to the FTZ Act and the 
Board's regulations, including Section 400.28.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 8th day of March 2012.
Paul Piquado,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, Alternate 
Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.
    Attest:
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-6819 Filed 3-20-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7108

WILLIAM CLAYTON MCKINNEDY, III,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

GARY D. MAYNARD; JIM HODGES, Governor of South

Carolina; CHARLES MOLONY CONDON, Attorney

General; KENNETH MCKELLAR, Director of

Security; MR. MCKIE, General Counsel; ROBERT

WARD; RICKIE HARRISON, Warden; ROBERT E.

PETERSEN; BEN MONTGOMERY; MR. MIRO, Warden;

DONALD DEASE; RICHARD P. STROKER; J VICENT

BARTON; CRYSTAL ROCKARD; MARY DAVENPORT; DAVID

TATARSKY; PATRICIA RAINEY; JAMES SIMMONS, III;

TRACI BRAXELY, Grievance Branch; CALVIN

ANTHONY; DAVID DUNLAP; DAVID NELSON; ROBERT

MURRAY, Captain; SINGLETARY, NFN; SOLOMON

SANYO; MR. ROBINSON; MR. MILLER; MR. JERNIGAN;

MR. BROGDAN; MR. SEWARD; MR. WALTZ; REGGIE

BOWERS; MR. FIERSON; MR. REDFERN; DAVIS

HARMON; SARGEANT CUSTODIO; SARGEANT COMER;

SARGEANT ROBERTSON; OFFICER MACKEY; MR.

GALLAWAY; OFFICER CUTLIP; MR. BURRELL; MR.

GARY; MR. CLYBURN; MR. ALLEN; MR. GOODWIN;

JOHN LANE; MR. MCCOWAN; MR. NEADLE; MR. WEST;

DEBRA WISE; OFFICER MITCHELL; MR. WOODLIEF;

MR. FLEMING; C. A. BALKCUM; MR. MEDLOCK; MR.

LONG; MR. HARDIN; MR. NELSON; MR. STEEN; MR.

ROBINSON; MR. ARMSTRONG; MICHAEL R. MATHEWS;

NATHANIEL HUGHES, SCDC; J. L. GOWAN, Doctor;

MR. MCKINNEY; MR. COOKE; SENYA L. ADAMS; MR.

PHILIPS; MR. GARDNER; MR. ANDERSON; RAY N.

STEVENS; CAROLYN MATTHEWS; JUDY C. ANDERSON;
2

JOHN ADAMS; KELLI G. MADDOX; MR. SUTTENS;

OFFICER WILSON, Correctional Officer,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-02-4027-6-20-AK)

Submitted: October 9, 2003 Decided: October 21, 2003

Before LUTTIG, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Clayton McKinnedy, III, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Michael

Pruitt, MCDONALD, PATRICK, TINSLEY, BAGGETT & POSTON, Greenwood,

South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
*

 To the extent that the denial of McKinnedy’s motion for

reconsideration of an earlier order denying him transfer from state

to federal prison is not interlocutory, we find his claim on this

issue to be without merit.

3

PER CURIAM:

South Carolina inmate William Clayton McKinnedy, III, seeks to

appeal the denial of several motions made during the course of his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation against the Defendants. This court may

exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291

(2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 (2000). The order McKinnedy seeks to appeal is neither a

final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.*

 We

also deny Appellant’s motions for injunctive relief and for

appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         493,350
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       3,996,991
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,490,341
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,473,199
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,490,341
<SALES>                                        310,015
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               333,395
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   92,407
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                240,988
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            240,988
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   240,988
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    19.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    19.43
        

</TABLE>
#### Charles S. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 86-2211.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 2, 1988.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Robert F. Moeller, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

While appellant raises three issues on appeal, only the third issue has merit. The record contains no evidence that appellant intelligently and knowingly waived his right to a jury trial. There is no written waiver signed by appellant nor is there any indication that the judge asked appellant if he wished to waive his right to a jury trial. The only mention of a jury trial is contained in defense counsel’s statement: “I would like to try this thing nonjury.” This is not a sufficient waiver.

Under *Otis v. State,*444 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) and *Cirio v. State,*440 So.2d 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), we reverse and remand since there is no indication that appellant knowingly waived his right to a jury trial. *See*Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.260.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Charys Holding
      Company, Inc. for the fiscal year ending April 30, 2007, I, Raymond J. Smith,
      Chief Financial Officer of Charys Holding Company, Inc., hereby certify pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
      that:





1.           Such
      Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ending April 30, 2007, fully
      complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The
      information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year
      ending April 30, 2007, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of Charys Holding Company, Inc.





Dated:
      November 2, 2007.





/s/  Raymond
                J. SmithRaymond
                J. Smith, Chief Financial Officer ofCharys
                Holding Company, Inc.
#### Davies’ Estate.

*Wills*— Beneficiaries—Relinquishment *of rights during testatrix’s lifetime*— Failure *of testatrix to modify will*— Testatrix’s *declaration that such beneficiary should share in estate*— Devisee’s *right to share.*

Where a testatrix by will devised all her property equally to her son arid two daughters and thereafter the son executed a paper relinquishing all his right, title and interest in his mother’s estate, but the testatrix made no modification of the will, although she lived for three years thereafter, and, according to the testimony of one of her daughters (testifying against her own interest) testatrix had declared three weeks before her death “do you think I am going to deprive (the son naming him) of the things that are coming to him? Tie has just as much right to the things as you and (the other daughter, the exceptant),” the court properly refused to give effect to the paper signed by the son, and permitted him to share equally with his sisters in the estate.

Argued May 6, 1918.

Appeal, No. 5, Jan. T., 1919, by Margaret Beckenbaugh, from decree of O. C. Lackawanna Co., 1913, No. 316, dismissing exceptions to adjudication in Estate of Mary I. Davies.

Before Brown, C. J., Stewart, Moschzisker, Frazer and Walling, JJ.

Affirmed.

Appeal from adjudication. Before Sando, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

The lower court dismissed the exceptions to the adjudication. Margaret Beckenbaugh, exceptant, appealed.

*Charles H. Soper,*for appellant.

*John R. Edwards,*for appellees.

June 3, 1918:

Per Curiam,

The complaint of the appellant is of the refusal of the court below to give effect to a certain paper signed by her *526brother, the-appellee, agreeing to relinquish all his right, title and interest in their mother’s estate. At the time he signed this paper she was living and he had no interest in anything belonging to her to be released. But, aside from this, she chose to let her will stand thereafter as it had been executed, more than® three years before, dividing her estate equally between her three children, the appellant, the appellee and a second daughter. She not only made no change in her will after her son had signed the said agreement, but, according to the testimony of the second daughter, testifying against her own interest, she said, with emphasis, about three weeks before her death, when spoken to about the agreement: “Do you think I am going to deprive Ellsworth of the things that are coming to him? He has just as much right to the things here as you or Margaret.” The only possible conclusion of the court below was that the contention of the appellant was groundless in law and in fact, and her appeal is, therefore, dismissed at her costs.
MOOR1VIAN TATE HALEY UPCHURCH & YATES, LLP 

R. HAL MOORMAN*t 

STEVEN C. HALEY 

LAURA UPCHURCH 

WENDY YATES* 

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 

207 EAST MAIN STREET 

BRENHAM, TEXAS 77833 

P.O. BOX 1808 

BRENHAM, TEXAS 77834-1808 

(979) 836-5664 

FAX (979) 830-0913 

stww.moormantate.com 

BOARD CERTIFIED 

*ESTATE PLANNING & PROBATE LAW 

tCIVIL TRIAL LAW 

TEXAS BOARD OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 

ANDREW J. HEFFERLY 

CHRISTOPHER S. HARDY 

GEORGE R. MOORMAN (1919-2011) 

MILTON Y. TATE, JR. (RETIRED) 

July 28, 2015 

Fourth Court of Appeals 

Cadena-Reeves Justice Center 

300 Dolorosa, Ste. 3200 

San Antonio, Texas 78205-3037 

RE: El Caballero Ranch, Inc. and Laredo Marine, L.L.C. v. Grace River Ranch, 

LLC; No. 04-15-00127CV, 4thJudicial District, San Antonio, Texas 

Dear Justices of the Fourth Court of Appeals: 

By way of supplement of the Brief of Appellee filed herein, Grace River Ranch, 

LLC provides the following citations and succinct comment by way of additional 

authority: 

La Salle County Not an Indispensable Party 

Appellants suggest (without authority) that an injunction against Appellants 

interference with a public road was improper absent joinder of La Salle County as a 

party. 

A county has no proprietary interest in public roads dedicated to the public. 

City of Mission v. Popplewell, 294 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. 1956); Hicks v. City of 

Houston, 524 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Tex. Civ. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref d. 

{18705.43065-00395217.DOCX) 

ACCEPTED

04-15-00127-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

7/29/2015 9:25:33 AM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 07/29/2015 9:25:33 AM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
July 28, 2015 

Page 2 

The county is only a trustee of the public in such roads of the public interest may 

require. City of Mission v. Popplewell, supra at 715; Hicks v. City of Houston, supra 

at 545. It is not necessary that the public entity so charged as trustee with regulating 

and controlling a public road belonging to the public be sued as agent for the public 

or as trustee for the public in order for the existence of a public easement can be put 

n issue. ty of Fort Worth v. Taylor, 346 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. 1961). 

Sincerely, 

SCH:mb 

Enclosures 

cc: Annalyn G. S h 

Schmoyer Re nhard, LLP 

17806 I-10W, Ste. 400 

San Antonio, Texas 78257 

E-mail: asmith dar-11p.corn 

Kimberly S. Keller 

Keller Stolarczyk PLLC 

234 West Bandera Road, No. 120 

Boerne, Texas 78006 

E-mail: kimq,kellsto.com 

{18705.43065-00395217.DOCX) 
July 28, 2015 

Page 3 

Donato D. Ramos, Jr. 

Law Offices of Donato D. Ramos 

6721 McPherson 

P.O. Box 452009 

Laredo, Texas 78045 

donatoramosjr@ddrlex.corn 

{18705.43065-00395217.DOCX)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Hyman Edelstein, Appellant.

Reported below, 169 App. Div. 967.

(Submitted February 21, 1916;

decided February 29, 1916.)

,Motion to dismiss an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second *662judicial department, entered June 17, 1915, which affirmed a judgment of the Kings County Court rendered upon a verdict convicting the defendant of the crime of extortion.

The motion was made upon the ground of failure to file the required return.

*James C. Cropsey, District Attorney (Ralph E. Hemstreet*of counsel), for motion.

*Martin T. Manton*opposed.

Motion denied on condition that the return be filed and the case served within ten days; if this condition be not complied with the motion to dismiss appeal is granted.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2371 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2371

   To suspend temporarily the duty on artificial flowers of man-made 
                       fibers assembled as picks.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

 Mr. Voinovich introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To suspend temporarily the duty on artificial flowers of man-made 
                       fibers assembled as picks.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS OF MAN-MADE FIBERS ASSEMBLED AS PICKS.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00      Artificial flowers  Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                        of man-made                                                        31/2011.......
                        fibers assembled
                        as picks
                        (provided for in
                        subheading
                        6702.90.35)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Cougar Biotechnology, Inc. does hereby certify that, to his knowledge:



| | (a) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Cougar Biotechnology, Inc. for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Cougar Biotechnology, Inc.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |  |  |                                    
|------------------------ |  |  |  | -----------------------------------
|Dated: November 10, 2008 |  |  |  | /S/ ALAN H. AUERBACH               
|                         |  |  |  | Alan H. Auerbach                   
|                         |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer & President
# Europeiska unionens C 210A/25 m

| | ISSN 1977-1061 |
| --- | --- |
| Europeiska unionens
  officiella tidning | C 210A |
| | |
| Svensk utgåva | Meddelanden och upplysningar | 65 årgången25 maj 2022 |

ISSN 1977-1061

Europeiska unionens

officiella tidning

C 210A

Svensk utgåva

Meddelanden och upplysningar

65 årgången25 maj 2022

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| Innehållsförteckning | Sida |
| --- | --- |
| | Rättelser |
| 2022/C 210 A/01 | Rättelse till Det gemensamma företaget för ett cirkulärt, biobaserat Europa – utlysning av en ledig tjänst som verkställande direktör (Tillfälligt anställd – lönegrad AD 14) – COM/2022/20077 ( EUT C 206 A, 23.5.2022 ) | 1 |

Innehållsförteckning

Sida

Rättelser

2022/C 210 A/01

Rättelse till Det gemensamma företaget för ett cirkulärt, biobaserat Europa – utlysning av en ledig tjänst som verkställande direktör (Tillfälligt anställd – lönegrad AD 14) – COM/2022/20077 ( EUT C 206 A, 23.5.2022 )

( EUT C 206 A, 23.5.2022 )

1

---

| SV | |
| --- | --- |

SV

---

Rättelser

| 25.5.2022 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | CA 210/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.5.2022

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

CA 210/1

---

Rättelse till Det gemensamma företaget för ett cirkulärt, biobaserat Europa – utlysning av en ledig tjänst som verkställande direktör (Tillfälligt anställd – lönegrad AD 14) – COM/2022/20077

(
  Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 206 A av den 23 maj 2022
  )

(2022/C 210 A/01)

Sidan 5, ”Sista ansökningsdag”, första stycket

| I stället för: | ”Du kan ansöka fram till den 13 juni 2022, kl. 12.00 (lokal tid, Bryssel). Därefter är registrering inte längre möjlig.” |
| --- | --- |

I stället för:

”Du kan ansöka fram till den 13 juni 2022, kl. 12.00 (lokal tid, Bryssel). Därefter är registrering inte längre möjlig.”

| ska det stå: | ”Du kan ansöka fram till den 4 juli 2022, kl. 12.00 (lokal tid, Bryssel). Därefter är registrering inte längre möjlig.” |
| --- | --- |

ska det stå:

ska det stå:

”Du kan ansöka fram till den 4 juli 2022, kl. 12.00 (lokal tid, Bryssel). Därefter är registrering inte längre möjlig.”

---