NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DARCI V., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.V., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0413 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JD511143 

The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Czop Law Firm PLLC, Higley 

By Steven Czop 

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa 

By Amanda L. Adams 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
DARCI V. v. DCS, M.V. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined. 

M c M U R D I E, Judge: 

¶1 Darci V. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s termination 

of her parental rights to her daughter M.V. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 Mother and Brett M. (“Father”) are the biological parents of 

M.V., born on July 28, 2015.1 Mother’s rights to her son L.V., born June 4, 

2013, were terminated in April 2014, after Mother failed to appear at the 

termination hearing, and based on chronic substance abuse and time in an 

out-of-home placement exceeding six months. 

¶3 In August 2015, the Arizona Department of Child Safety 

(“DCS”) initiated dependency proceedings as to M.V., alleging Mother 

neglected M.V. because of her substance abuse, mental illness, lack of stable 

housing or employment, and involvement in domestic violence. In October 

2015, the superior court adjudicated M.V. dependent. In June 2016, DCS 

moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights, alleging as grounds for 

severance Mother’s chronic abuse of dangerous drugs and M.V.’s 

out-of-home placement of nine months or longer. 

¶4 The superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights on 

both grounds in September 2016. The court also found severance was in 

M.V.’s best interests.2 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

 

1 Father’s parental rights to M.V. were terminated in August 2016. 

Father is not a party to this appeal. 

2 Mother does not challenge the superior court’s best interests finding 

on appeal. Mother has therefore waived any claim regarding that finding. 

See State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure to argue a claim usually 

constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”). 
DARCI V. v. DCS, M.V. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A) 

(2016).3

DISCUSSION 

¶5 A parent-child relationship may be terminated when a court 

finds at least one of the statutory grounds for severance and determines that 

severance is in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Mary Lou C. v. 

ADES, 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). We review a court’s severance 

determination for an abuse of discretion, adopting its findings of fact unless 

clearly erroneous. Id. A court’s decision “must be based on clear and 

convincing evidence [and] will be affirmed unless we must say as a matter 

of law that no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and 

convincing.” Denise R. v. ADES, 221 Ariz. 92, 94, ¶ 7 (App. 2009) (quotation 

omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Jesus M. v. ADES, 203 

Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). 

A. Grounds for Severance. 

¶6 Mother argues DCS failed to prove either ground for 

severance by clear and convincing evidence because: (1) Mother tested 

negative for drugs, did not need to participate in substance abuse 

treatment, and did not appear under the influence during her visits with 

M.V.; and (2) Mother made appreciable efforts to comply with offered 

services because she completed some drug testing; substance abuse intake, 

through which no counseling was recommended; completed visitations, 

most parent aide’s goals, and parenting classes; demonstrated parenting 

ability; and visited M.V. despite having an unstable housing situation. 

¶7 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), a parent’s rights may be 

terminated when the parent has a history of chronic drug abuse, resulting 

in an inability to discharge parental responsibilities. Severance on this basis 

is appropriate when the court also finds “there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate 

period.” Raymond F. v. ADES, 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 15 (App. 2010). 

 

3 We cite to the current version of applicable statutes or rules when no 

revision material to this case has occurred. 
DARCI V. v. DCS, M.V. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

1. History of Chronic Drug Abuse. 

¶8 At the severance hearing, a DCS case worker testified Mother 

had a history of substance abuse. Mother self-reported her history of 

methamphetamine and marijuana use, and parental rights to her first child 

were terminated because of substance abuse. 

¶9 In December 2013, Mother was evaluated by an independent 

psychologist. The psychologist noted Mother had a significant, long-term 

history of drug abuse. Mother was diagnosed with poly-substance 

dependence, alcohol dependence, and mood and personality disorders 

with dependent, narcissistic and histrionic traits. The psychologist stated 

Mother has an “addictive personality” and that “long term alcohol 

dependence [is] evident.” Mother was offered the opportunity to 

participate in an updated psychological evaluation, but she failed to 

demonstrate sobriety for the necessary 30 days to qualify for the service. 

Therefore, DCS could not order an updated psychological evaluation. 

2. Inability to Discharge Parental Responsibilities. 

¶10 When determining whether a parent can discharge parental 

responsibilities with a history of chronic substance abuse, the court must 

consider how the substance abuse hinders the parent’s ability to effectively 

parent. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377–78, ¶ 19. In making this finding, the 

court has flexibility to consider the circumstances of each case. Id. at 378, 

¶ 20. 

¶11 At the severance hearing, the DCS case worker testified 

Mother was offered the following services: TASC drug testing; a referral to 

TERROS Family First drug treatment; parent aide services; domestic 

violence counseling; psychological evaluation; housing and employment 

assistance; and supervised visitations. However, Mother failed to test 

consistently with TASC, having missed approximately 50 of 53 tests since 

August 2015. Moreover, the court specifically ordered Mother to provide 

hair follicle and urinalysis tests beginning on March 23, 2016, and Mother 

did not complete the tests or missed them. According to the case worker, 

Mother could not demonstrate sobriety because of the limited number of 

drug tests she provided. While Mother did not complete TASC testing 

within the last year, no records indicated she appeared under the influence 

of drugs at her supervised visitations. 

¶12 Mother completed several intakes, but none of the services 

were successfully completed. Mother completed a TERROS intake, and was 

not referred for services. Although Mother completed some of her visits 
DARCI V. v. DCS, M.V. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

with M.V. and the parent aid, despite difficulties caused by her 

homelessness, she was closed out from the parent aid service 

unsuccessfully due to her inability to finish all goals, and her tardiness or 

altogether cancelled visits. Mother completed intake for a domestic violence 

service, but failed to participate in any classes. Throughout the case, Mother 

was unable to secure stable housing, even though she was consistently 

employed by a single employer for the ten months preceding the hearing.

¶13 The DCS case worker also opined Mother will be unable to 

successfully parent in the foreseeable future because Mother failed to 

consistently participate in offered services, her substance abuse, 

involvement in domestic violence, and unstable housing. The court found 

Mother “has not demonstrated that she can maintain sobriety in order to 

parent the child.” 

3. Reasonable Belief Chronic Substance Abuse Will Continue. 

¶14 Evidence sufficient to support a finding that Mother’s 

substance abuse will continue may include her abuse history and failure to 

complete or engage in offered services. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378–79, 

¶ 26. A parent’s failure to abstain from substances despite a pending 

severance is “evidence [the parent] has not overcome [his or her] 

dependence on drugs.” Id. at 379, ¶ 29. 

¶15 Mother failed to consistently participate in drug testing 

ordered by the court after the severance motion was filed by DCS. The 

record provides reasonable evidence supporting the court’s conclusion that 

“there are reasonable grounds to believe that [Mother’s chronic substance 

use] will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period,” and DCS made 

“reasonable efforts to provide Mother with rehabilitative services but those 

efforts have been unsuccessful.” 

¶16 Because we accept the court’s findings of fact unless clearly 

erroneous, we find the court did not err in severing Mother’s rights to M.V. 

See Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994). 

When clear and convincing evidence supports at least one of the grounds 

for severance, we need not address the other reasons for severance. Crystal 

E. v. DCS, 1 CA-JV 16-0236, 2017 WL 897343, *1, ¶ 5 (App. Mar. 7, 2017); 

Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3. 
DARCI V. v. DCS, M.V. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

CONCLUSION 

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.