NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-880

ADOPTION OF RAHKEEM.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a trial, the mother and the father appeal from

Juvenile Court decrees finding each of them unfit to parent 

their child, Rahkeem, and terminating their parental rights to 

Rahkeem. The mother also appeals from the denial of her motion

for a new trial, which argued that (1) Rahkeem's former 

temporary custodians should have been afforded counsel at

hearings concerning Rahkeem's removal from, and possible return 

to, their custody; and (2) the judge should have mandated

sibling visitation between Rahkeem and his maternal halfsiblings (Jillian, Sam, and Angela).2 We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts found by the judge

after trial, saving some details for later discussion. Ten 

1 A pseudonym.

2 Also pseudonyms.
2

months before Rahkeem was born, the Department of Children and 

Families (DCF) became involved with the mother when a report 

pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report) was filed alleging 

neglect of her older children (Jillian, Sam, and Angela). After 

an investigation, the report was deemed supported due to mutual 

domestic violence between the mother and Filippo,3 who is the 

father of Sam and Angela.

The mother became involved with the man who would become 

the father of Rahkeem;4 that relationship was fraught with 

domestic violence. The father admitted to previous gang 

involvement and has a significant criminal history, with

convictions for violent crimes, including armed assault with 

intent to murder for which he served a State prison sentence. 

At trial, in response to questions about his relationship with 

the mother, the father asserted his Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution privilege. Throughout the

proceedings, the mother denied or minimized the extent of the 

domestic violence in their relationship. She did obtain two 

G. L. c. 209A restraining orders against the father, but each 

lapsed after two weeks or less.

3 Filippo is also a pseudonym.

4 Hereinafter, all references to "the father" shall be to 

Rahkeem's father.
3

The mother has a long history of alcohol misuse, which she 

denied or minimized; she would not permit DCF or the court to 

verify her participation in substance use disorder treatment.

The mother also has mental health diagnoses including

depression, but would not allow DCF to speak to her clinicians

and concealed from her therapist the extent of her alcohol 

consumption and her continuing relationship with the father. In 

addition, the mother's housing was unstable.

In February 2018, Rahkeem was born. In the first five 

months of Rahkeem's life, the mother failed to bring him to 

three medical appointments. In July 2018, a 51A report alleging 

neglect of Rahkeem was filed and later supported because of

domestic violence between the mother and the father in the 

presence of Rahkeem, Sam, and Jillian. Responding officers saw 

several open beer containers and injuries to the mother,

including swelling and blackness to her eye, but she denied that 

they were the result of domestic violence.

In October 2018, another 51A report alleging neglect of 

Rahkeem was filed and later supported after the mother and the 

father were fighting in public and bystanders called the police. 

When police arrived, the father was gone; the mother was 

intoxicated, her face was bloodied, and she refused to disclose 

her name. Rahkeem was nearby in the mother's car. The mother 
4

denied that her injuries resulted from domestic violence, 

maintaining that she fell down stairs. The mother later 

admitted that the father had caused her injuries, which included 

a broken nose, and that Rahkeem was crying while the father was 

hitting her. A subsequent skeletal survey revealed that Rahkeem

had a skull fracture. The mother later admitted that Rahkeem's

skull fracture likely occurred during a domestic violence 

incident while she was holding Rahkeem, though at trial she 

denied having said that and claimed that Rahkeem fell from the 

bed while her older children were taking care of him or,

alternatively, that Angela had dropped him. During the 

investigation, DCF obtained a photograph of Rahkeem lying next 

to a handgun; the mother refused to say when it was taken or who 

owned the handgun.

DCF filed this care and protection petition and was awarded 

temporary custody of Rahkeem.5 Rahkeem was placed in a kinship 

5 The petition also alleged that Jillian, Sam, and Angela

were in need of care and protection. In 2019, Jillian reached 

age eighteen and was no longer subject to Juvenile Court 

jurisdiction; she was dismissed from the case. On the last day 

of trial, the mother joined DCF's request for Sam and Angela to 

be placed in the permanent custody of Filippo. Decrees issued 

finding the mother unfit to parent Sam and Angela and placing 

them in the permanent custody of Filippo. The mother filed 

notices of appeal from those decrees, but did not enter those 

appeals in this court and does not raise in her brief any issues

as to the care and protection of Sam and Angela. In those 

circumstances, we do not consider any issues concerning the care 

and protection of the mother's older children. We also note 
5

foster placement with the mother's great aunt (aunt) and the 

aunt's son (cousin). During its custody of Rahkeem, DCF 

required that each parent's visits with Rahkeem be supervised

and take place at a DCF office.

In April 2019, an anonymous 51A report was filed alleging 

neglect of Rahkeem because the mother was visiting him at the 

home of the aunt and cousin. After an investigation, that 51A 

report was unsupported, but concerns were noted that the home 

did not meet DCF's standards for a foster placement for reasons 

including that Rahkeem did not have his own bedroom.

Rahkeem filed a motion to be placed in the direct,

temporary custody of the aunt and cousin. On May 29, 2019, the 

Juvenile Court entered an order granting temporary custody to 

the aunt and cousin until September 6, 2019. The conditions of 

temporary custody included that each parent's visits with 

Rahkeem would occur separately, in a public place, and be 

supervised by either the aunt or the cousin. Temporary custody 

was extended repeatedly for short intervals ranging from one to 

four months. Under the aunt's supervision, the mother was able 

to visit Rahkeem multiple times each week. At first the 

father's visits also were supervised by the aunt; he did not 

that in 2023, Sam reached age eighteen and is no longer subject 

to Juvenile Court jurisdiction.
6

have a fixed schedule and sometimes weeks went by during which 

he did not visit Rahkeem.

Beginning in August 2019, the mother was living in a 

domestic violence shelter. She continued to see the father and 

to drink alcohol. In November 2019, a 51A report was filed 

alleging neglect of Rahkeem, Sam, and Angela by the mother and 

the father. The mother had gone to the aunt's home with the 

father seeking to take Rahkeem away with her. While the mother 

was there, Filippo arrived with Sam and Angela. The mother and 

the father engaged in an altercation with Filippo. The aunt 

locked the door to her home so that Rahkeem was not exposed to 

the altercation. The mother later admitted that at that time 

she was drinking a lot.

As a result of the incident and the parents' fighting with 

her, the aunt suspended the parents' visits with Rahkeem for 

about two months. Both parents blamed the aunt for the 

suspension of visits; the father tried to intimidate her, the 

mother tried to manipulate her, and both parents threatened her. 

The aunt told both the ongoing social worker and the court 

investigator that she would be afraid to testify against the 

parents, as she feared retaliation from the father if she told 

the truth, and so if she were required to testify in front of 

the parents, she would lie.
7

At a March 10, 2020, hearing, a Juvenile Court judge 

renewed the temporary custody order so that it awarded custody 

to only the aunt; subsequent orders also were in her name only. 

The judge also amended the conditions of custody so that the 

father's visits would be supervised by an independent social 

worker. Soon after that hearing, in-person visits were 

suspended for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 

father blamed the aunt for the suspension of visits and 

threatened to take her to court. Once visits were reinstated, 

the father's visits continued to be supervised by the social 

worker, but the father did not appear consistently for weekly

visits.

In December 2020, Chelsea police responded to a hotel for a 

domestic violence incident between the mother and the father. 

The mother was intoxicated and reported that the father had 

punched her, knocking out her tooth, but she refused medical 

treatment.

Less than a month before trial began, the mother entered a 

residential facility for treatment of substance use disorder, 

Casa Esperanza. She was continuing to have contact with the 

father. After the ongoing social worker arranged for the 

mother's visits with Rahkeem to be supervised by Casa Esperanza

staff, the mother had some visits with Rahkeem there.
8

Trial began on January 15, 2021 and continued over twelve

nonconsecutive days. On several occasions in early February 

2021, Casa Esperanza staff told the mother that her continued 

contact with the father was putting her and other residents at 

risk, and if she persisted, she would be asked to leave the 

program. The mother was in complete denial about the risk to 

her safety. At about this time, the ongoing DCF clinical team

met with the aunt and told her that the mother's visits with 

Rahkeem could be supervised by staff at Casa Esperanza, and the 

father's visits with Rahkeem were still to be supervised by the 

social worker.

As of early March 2021, two days of trial had taken place. 

The mother left Casa Esperanza, rescinding her releases so that 

DCF could not determine when or why she left. She deceived the 

aunt and cousin, telling them that she had completed the Casa 

Esperanza program and therefore, she could now have unsupervised 

visits with Rahkeem. The aunt needed someone to babysit Rahkeem

while the cousin took her to an appointment for eye surgery on 

the morning of March 12. When the aunt told Filippo that she 

was planning to leave Rahkeem in the mother's care, Filippo

advised her not to do so because the mother would bring Rahkeem

to the father, which could result in harm to Rahkeem as had 
9

happened in the past; the aunt replied that she was "desperate." 

It did not occur to the aunt to ask DCF what to do.

At 7 P.M. on March 11, 2021, the aunt and the cousin left 

Rahkeem at a hotel in Chelsea. At 11:45 P.M., police responded 

to a report of a fight at the hotel. The mother was in the 

hotel room with Rahkeem, then three years old. He had a bloody 

gash above his right eye and blood all over his face and shirt. 

The mother told police that Rahkeem's injury occurred when she 

and her boyfriend were fighting and Rahkeem was pushed; at trial 

she denied having said that, but the judge did not credit her 

denial. Rahkeem was taken by ambulance to a hospital. A 51A 

report was filed against the mother and the father.

At about 9 A.M. on March 12, the DCF emergency response 

worker and ongoing social worker arrived at the hotel. The 

mother, the father, and Rahkeem were in the hotel room, which 

was still in disarray, with multiple beer containers strewn 

around and dried blood on the floor and the sheets. Rahkeem was 

sitting on the bed with dried blood on his face, eyelashes, and 

shirt. When the DCF workers asked why the mother was not at 

Casa Esperanza, the mother lied, claiming she had successfully 

completed the program. The father and the mother at first 

denied the father's identity, intentionally misleading DCF. 
10

Then the father screamed, "You can't take my son," and the 

mother told him in Spanish to "shut up."

The DCF workers spoke to the aunt, who admitted through a 

Spanish interpreter that she had dropped Rahkeem off with his 

"mom and dad" the night before so that the mother could babysit 

during the aunt's medical appointment. The aunt acknowledged 

that her doing so violated the court order requiring that the

parents' visits with Rahkeem be supervised. The aunt admitted

that Rahkeem had visited the mother at the hotel on a previous

occasion and claimed that the ongoing social worker had approved

that visit, which was not true. A 51A report was also filed 

against the aunt and later supported.

At an emergency custody hearing on March 15, 2021, see 

G. L. c. 119, § 24, the judge vacated the order granting

temporary custody of Rahkeem to the aunt. Two days later, the 

father moved for custody of Rahkeem to be awarded to the aunt

and the cousin.6 The judge considered the father's motion in 

conjunction with the trial on the merits and permitted the 

father to call the aunt and the cousin out of order to testify. 

6 That motion is not in the appellate record, but from the 

transcript we infer that in it the father sought to award 

custody of Rahkeem to both the aunt and the cousin. At that 

point, the cousin had not been named as custodian of Rahkeem for 

more than one year. The five previous temporary custody orders 

named only the aunt as custodian, including the most recent one 

dated February 24, 2021.
11

Two months after the removal of Rahkeem from the aunt's 

temporary custody, DCF's goal for Rahkeem was changed to 

adoption.

After the close of evidence at trial, the judge denied the 

father's motion for custody of Rahkeem to be awarded to the aunt

and cousin. On November 15, 2021, decrees entered terminating 

the mother's and the father's parental rights to Rahkeem. The 

judge ordered that the parents be offered posttermination visits 

for limited time periods (unless Rahkeem was placed in a 

preadoptive home prior to the expiration of those periods), but

declined to mandate postadoption contact and or visitation 

between Rahkeem and either parent, entrusting those decisions to 

Rahkeem's guardian or adoptive resource. Both parents appealed.

The mother moved pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (5), 

365 Mass. 828 (1974), for a new trial, incorporating by 

reference arguments in a separate motion filed by the aunt and 

cousin asserting that as temporary custodians they should have 

been afforded counsel at the hearings pertaining to Rahkeem's

removal from, and possible return to, their custody. The mother 

also argued that the judge should have mandated sibling 

visitation between Rahkeem and his three maternal half-siblings

(Jillian, Sam, and Angela). The judge denied the motion for a 
12

new trial and request for sibling visitation, and the mother 

appealed.

Discussion. 1. Parents' appeals from the termination of 

their parental rights. The mother and father concede their 

unfitness at the time of trial.7

a. Competing permanency plans. The parents argue that the 

judge abused her discretion in declining to adopt their proposed 

plans to place Rahkeem either in the custody of the aunt or in 

the custody of the aunt and the cousin. We disagree.

The judge explicitly considered the parents' nominations of 

the aunt and the cousin as caretakers. In doing so, the judge 

considered the testimony of the aunt and the cousin, much of 

which she did not credit. In particular, the judge noted 

inconsistencies between their testimony about leaving Rahkeem at 

the hotel and the mother's testimony about the same event. The 

judge also had in evidence a report of a home screening of the 

aunt and the cousin. In addition, the judge considered DCF's 

adoption plan, which noted that Rahkeem was "well-bonded" to the 

aunt. The adoption plan set forth several possible kinship 

7 As stated, neither parent contests the judge's findings as 

to their unfitness. Based on our review of the overwhelming 

evidence of domestic violence and its impact on Rahkeem, we 

would find no merit to any such claims. See Adoption of Jacob, 

99 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 264-265 (2021). See also Custody of 

Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 599 (1996).
13

placements -- which did not include the aunt or the 

cousin -- and the alternative of recruitment of a preadoptive 

foster home.8

The judge found that the aunt "loves" Rahkeem, but credited 

DCF's concern that the aunt and the cousin were unable to keep 

Rahkeem safe. Crediting the testimony of the ongoing social 

worker, the judge found that the aunt was not a suitable 

placement because "[i]t was [the aunt]'s decision to allow 

Mother and [Father] to have unsupervised contact with [Rahkeem], 

which led to the injury of the child," and the aunt was easily 

manipulated by the parents. In addition, the judge found not 

credible the aunt's testimony that she had followed the 

recommendations of an early intervention worker to help Rahkeem

overcome his delays in speech and gross motor skills. The judge 

concluded that placement of Rahkeem with the aunt and the cousin 

would not be in the child's best interests because it "would 

expose [Rahkeem] to the parents['] untreated substance abuse and 

ongoing domestic violence." We discern no abuse of discretion 

in the judge's determination that the aunt and the cousin were

not a suitable placement based on those findings of fact.

8 The judge concluded that the adoption plan was 

sufficiently developed, and we concur. See Adoption of Paula, 

420 Mass. 716, 722 n.7 (1995); Adoption of Gertrude, 99 Mass. 

App. Ct. 817, 823 (2021).
14

The mother argues that the judge abused her discretion by 

declining to order posttermination or postadoption visitation 

between Rahkeem and the aunt and the cousin. "A 'judge who 

finds parental unfitness to be established has broad discretion 

to determine what is in a child's best interests with respect to 

custody and visitation with biological family members 

thereafter.'" Adoption of Ursa, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 571 

(2023), quoting Adoption of Rico, 453 Mass. 749, 756 (2009) 

(rejecting mother's argument that judge should have ordered 

visitation between children and grandmother). We discern no 

such abuse of discretion.

b. Best interests of the child. The father argues that 

the judge erred in terminating his parental rights to Rahkeem, 

contending that the findings as to the best interests of the 

child were "legally insufficient." The father does not contest 

the accuracy of the findings that the judge did make concerning 

the parents' unfitness and the best interests of the child. 

Rather, the father argues that the judge's findings were clearly 

erroneous because they ignored evidence of the feasibility of 

placing Rahkeem with the aunt, which would not have required 

termination of the father's parental rights. We are not 

persuaded. As discussed above, the judge did not abuse her 

discretion in concluding that the aunt was not a suitable 
15

placement because she was unable to keep Rahkeem safe from harm 

that occurred during unsupervised contact with the father. For 

the same reason, the judge did not abuse her discretion in 

concluding that termination of the father's parental rights was 

in the best interests of the child. See Adoption of Nancy, 443 

Mass. 512, 519 (2005).

2. Motion for a new trial. a. Rights to counsel of aunt 

and cousin. The mother argues that the judge should have 

granted her a new trial, contending that the rights to counsel 

of the aunt and cousin were violated at the emergency custody 

hearing and at the portions of trial at which the judge 

considered whether to place Rahkeem in their custody. The 

mother points to G. L. c. 119, § 29, which provides that at all 

hearings in child custody proceedings to which DCF is a party, 

"the parent, guardian or custodian of the child . . . shall have 

and be informed of the right to counsel" (emphasis added).9 The 

mother also relies on Care & Protection of Manuel, 428 Mass. 

527, 530 (1998), which noted that a District Court judge had 

appointed counsel for a temporary custodian at an emergency 

custody hearing. But "allusions to the discretionary decision 

9 Of course, as mentioned above, see note 6, supra, as of 

the emergency custody hearing, the cousin had not been Rahkeem's 

custodian for more than one year.
16

of a single trial judge do not amount to a rule" requiring such 

appointment. Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 270 n.16 

(2021) (trial judge's discretionary decision to permit 

guardianship petitioners full access to care and protection 

proceedings did not amount to rule requiring access in all 

cases).

The mother waived this argument by failing to raise it at 

trial. See Adoption of Ursa, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 570. 

Indeed, at the emergency custody hearing, the mother's position 

conflicted with a return of custody to the aunt. When counsel 

for DCF informed the judge that social workers involved in the 

emergency removal were present and ready to testify, the judge

asked for the position of the mother, who was present, and her 

counsel stated that the mother "would like to go forward with 

the trial . . . to get custody returned to her."10 The mother 

never argued at trial that the aunt or the cousin had a 

statutory right to counsel, and so she waived the issue.11 Cf. 

10 Asked for the position of the father, who was not 

present, his counsel replied that as of the previous hearing, 

the father's position "was that the child should be in the 

custody of the Mother or else in the custody of [the aunt]." 

Two days later, when the father moved to place Rahkeem in the 

custody of the aunt and cousin, the mother now took the position 

that she was "fully supportive" of the father's motion. At 

trial the mother asked for Rahkeem to be placed with the aunt.

11 We do not reach DCF's argument that the disjunctive "or" 

in G. L. c. 119, § 29, should be read to mean that only one of 
17

Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 266 n.11 (noting that 

mother and child both stated at trial that grandparents should 

not be present during care and protection proceedings but argued

converse on appeal).

b. Sibling visitation. The judge ordered that Rahkeem

"shall continue to have regular visitation with his siblings, 

Angela and Sam, within the parameters established by [Filippo]

and [DCF]." The mother contends that the judge should have 

allowed her motion for a new trial to the extent that it sought 

mandatory sibling visitation between Rahkeem and his three 

maternal half-siblings, Jillian, Sam, and Angela.

Putting aside the question whether the mother continued to 

have standing to seek sibling visitation on Rahkeem's behalf 

once her parental rights were terminated, see Adoption of 

Franklin, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 787, 803-805 (2021), we discern no 

abuse of discretion in the judge's ruling that Rahkeem's 

continued regular visitation with Angela and Sam was to take 

place "within the parameters established by [Filippo] and 

[DCF]." The judge properly left such issues as the frequency 

and duration of sibling visits to the children's legal 

custodians. See G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b). See also Adoption of 

the three categories of caretaker -– parent, guardian, or 

custodian – in any given case is entitled to counsel.
18

Garret, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 680-681 (2018). The judge was 

not required to dictate the terms of those visits, particularly 

because she heard and credited evidence that the mother had not 

only manipulated the aunt into giving her unsupervised access to 

Rahkeem, but also manipulated family members into giving her 

access to Angela and Sam, who did not want to see her.12

c. Disrupted placement. The mother contends, as she 

asserted at argument on the motion for a new trial, that the 

decree adopting DCF's permanency plan was no longer "equitable" 

because of the recent disruption of a kinship placement of 

Rahkeem. The judge heard the arguments of counsel as to the 

reasons why the kinship placement was unsuccessful, and by

denying the motion for a new trial rejected the mother's 

argument. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's 

implicit ruling that the unsuccessful kinship placement did not 

undermine the grounds supporting the decree. Cf. Adoption of 

Cesar, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 708, 712-713 (2006) (mother's 

significant improvements after trial did not render finding of 

12 The judge noted that in October 2020 the mother persuaded 

the aunt to arrange a supposedly coincidental encounter between 

the mother and Angela, who did not want to see the mother, and 

that the mother arranged a similar encounter with Sam using the 

maternal grandmother as a go-between. The mother admitted at 

trial that she arranged those encounters and that she did not 

regret doing so, which the judge found, evidenced the mother's 

placing her own needs above those of her children and her 

continued lack of insight into their feelings.
19

unfitness stale). But see Adoption of Franklin, 99 Mass. App. 

Ct. at 792-793, 806-807 (remanding for reconsideration of 

posttermination visitation between father and preteen child who 

wanted visits, where adoption placement with siblings had been 

disrupted due to child's mental illness and child had been in 

institutional care for almost two years).

Conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees and the 

order denying the mother's posttrial motion.

So ordered.

By the Court (Henry, Grant & 

D'Angelo, JJ.13),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: June 3, 2024.

13 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.