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*********************************************** 
TOWN OF LEDYARD v. WMS GAMING, INC.

(SC 20418)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins, Kahn and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-161a), ‘‘[i]n the institution of proceedings by any

municipality to enforce collection of any delinquent tax on personal

property from the owner of such property, through . . . any other proceeding in law in the name of the municipality for purposes of enforcing

such collection, such person shall be required to pay any . . . reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by such municipality as a result of and

directly related to such . . . collection proceedings.’’

The plaintiff town sought to collect unpaid personal property taxes that it

had imposed on slot machines that the defendant, W Co., owned and

leased to an Indian tribe for use at the tribe’s casino. After the plaintiff

filed its collection action in state court, the tribe filed an action in federal

court, challenging the plaintiff’s authority to impose property taxes on

the slot machines. A federal court of appeals ultimately held that the

plaintiff’s authority to impose property taxes on the slot machines was

not preempted by federal law. The plaintiff and W Co. then executed a

stipulation regarding the outstanding taxes, interest, penalties, and the

attorney’s fees incurred in the state collection action, but they disagreed

as to whether the trial court could also find W Co. liable for attorney’s

fees incurred by the plaintiff in defense of the federal action commenced

by the tribe, to which W Co. was not a party. The plaintiff and W Co.

filed separate motions for summary judgment on that issue, and the

trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied W Co.’s motion,

concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to the attorney’s fees that it

had incurred in defending the federal action pursuant to § 12-161a. The

trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff only as to liability with

respect to the attorney’s fees incurred in the federal action, and W Co.

appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court reversed the trial

court’s judgment, concluding that the phrase ‘‘as a result of and directly

related to,’’ as used in § 12-161a, required a closer proximal nexus

between the collection proceeding and the requested attorney’s fees

than the expansive interpretation applied by the trial court and that the

claims advanced in the federal action, although significant to the ultimate

resolution of the tax collection issue in the state proceeding, did not

directly result in a final determination of the rights and obligations of

the parties relative to the claimed delinquent taxes. On the granting of

certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate

Court improperly reversed the trial court’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment because the Appellate Court incorrectly

construed § 12-161a narrowly to limit the scope of the plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees to only those fees incurred in the state collection

action: because § 12-161a was ambiguous with respect to the scope of

the attorney’s fees that are considered ‘‘as a result of and directly related

to’’ a state collection proceeding, this court considered extratextual

evidence, including legislative history, statutes containing similar language, and the treatment of the phrase ‘‘as a result of and directly related

to’’ in Connecticut case law, and concluded that the ambit of § 12-

161a includes a directly related federal action that is determinative of

a municipality’s authority to pursue the underlying state collection proceeding; in the present case, the attorney’s fees attributable to the federal

action were a result of and directly related to the state collection action

within the meaning of § 12-161a, as the federal action was filed after

the commencement of the state collection action for the purpose of

staying the state collection action and was determinative of the state

action; moreover, the restrictive construction of § 12-161a adopted by

the Appellate Court and advanced by W Co. would lead to the absurd

result of frustrating government administration insofar as the plaintiff,

after successfully litigating its authority to pursue a specific collection

action, could incur an actual loss of revenue as a result of its inability

to recover attorney’s fees in defending the federal action.
Argued November 19, 2020—officially released April 21, 2021*

Procedural History

Action to recover unpaid personal property taxes,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New London, where the parties

entered into a stipulated agreement; thereafter, the

court, Vacchelli, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment as to liability and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to liability,

and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,

DiPentima, C. J., and Beach, Alvord, Sheldon and Prescott, Js., which granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss

the appeal; thereafter, the defendant, on the granting

of certification, appealed to this court, which reversed

the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case

to that court with direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion

to dismiss and for further proceedings; subsequently, the

Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Noble,

Js., reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded

the case to that court with direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability and

to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

as to liability, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment

directed.

Proloy K. Das, with whom were Lloyd L. Langhammer and Kevin W. Munn, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Aaron S. Bayer, with whom, on the brief, was David

R. Roth, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in this certified

appeal is whether General Statutes § 12-161a,1 which

allows trial courts to award a municipality attorney’s

fees incurred ‘‘as a result of and directly related to’’

proceedings to collect delinquent personal property

taxes, includes attorney’s fees incurred in a related federal action regarding the municipality’s authority to

impose such personal property taxes. The plaintiff, the

town of Ledyard, appeals, upon our grant of its petition

for certification,2

from the judgment of the Appellate

Court reversing the judgment of the trial court and

directing summary judgment for the defendant, WMS

Gaming, Inc. Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 192 Conn.

App. 836, 850, 218 A.3d 708 (2019). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly construed § 12-161a in concluding that the defendant’s liability for attorney’s fees under the statute is limited to

the collection proceeding in state court and does not

include the related federal court proceeding. See id.,

845. We conclude that the ambit of § 12-161a includes

a directly related federal action that is determinative

of a municipality’s authority to pursue the underlying

state collection proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse

the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history, as set forth in the various decisions

issued by this court and the Appellate Court in this

case. See Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 330 Conn. 75,

78–80, 191 A.3d 983 (2018); Ledyard v. WMS Gaming,

Inc., supra, 192 Conn. App. 839–42; Ledyard v. WMS

Gaming, Inc., 171 Conn. App. 624, 625–28, 157 A.3d

1215 (2017), rev’d, 330 Conn. 75, 191 A.3d 983 (2018).

‘‘On August 3, 2006 . . . the Mashantucket Pequot

Tribal Nation (Tribal Nation) filed an action in the

United States District Court for the District of Connecticut challenging the authority of the state of Connecticut

[state] and the plaintiff to impose property taxes on

slot machines owned by Atlantic City Coin & Slot Co.

(AC Coin) and leased to the Tribal Nation, for use in its

gaming operations. In that complaint, the Tribal Nation

alleged that the plaintiff lacked the authority to impose

the property tax because such taxation is preempted

by federal regulation of Indian gaming pursuant to both

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701

through 2721 . . . and the Final Mashantucket Pequot

Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (May 31, 1991),

and that the taxation was an illegal interference with

the Tribal Nation’s sovereignty. The present action was

filed [in the trial court] on June 23, 2008, to collect

unpaid personal property taxes for gaming equipment

owned by the defendant and leased to the Tribal Nation

for its gaming operations.’’3 Ledyard v. WMS Gaming,

Inc., supra, 192 Conn. App. 839.

‘‘[T]he plaintiff [in the present action] sought
$18,251.23 in unpaid personal property taxes, plus costs,

interest, and penalties. In addition, the plaintiff sought

attorney’s fees pursuant to . . . § 12-161a.

‘‘Shortly after the plaintiff had commenced the underlying state action, the Tribal Nation filed [a second]

action in the United States District Court for the District

of Connecticut challenging the authority of the state

. . . and the plaintiff to impose the taxes at issue in

the present state action. Although it was not a party to

the federal action commenced by the Tribal Nation, the

defendant filed a motion to stay the present state action

pending the outcome of the federal action, which the

trial court, Martin, J., granted.

‘‘On March 27, 2012, the District Court ruled on [the

parties’] motions for summary judgment filed in the

. . . federal action. The District Court, determining that

the authority of the state and the plaintiff to impose

the taxes was preempted by federal law, granted the

Tribal Nation’s motion for summary judgment and

denied separate motions for summary judgment filed

by the plaintiff and the state . . . . See Mashantucket

Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard, Docket No. 3:06CV1212

(WWE), 2012 WL 1069342, *12 (D. Conn. March 27,

2012), rev’d, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013). On July 15,

2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment, concluding that the authority of the state and the plaintiff to

impose the taxes was not preempted by federal law.

See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard, 722 F.3d

457, 477 (2d Cir. 2013).

‘‘After the proceedings had resumed in the present

state action, the parties executed a stipulation. Under

the stipulation, the parties agreed that the defendant

had tendered payment to the plaintiff for all outstanding

taxes, accrued interest, and accrued penalties at issue.

They further agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the

underlying state action, the amount of which would be

determined by the trial court and the payment of which

would be accepted by the plaintiff as satisfaction of all

of the taxes, interest, penalties, attorney’s fees, and

costs recoverable by the plaintiff with respect to the

underlying state action. They disputed, however,

whether the trial court could also find the defendant

liable for attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff in

defense of the federal action commenced by the Tribal

Nation to which the defendant was not a party . . . .

The parties agreed to submit to the trial court the issue

of whether the defendant was liable for the federal

action attorney’s fees.

‘‘After executing the stipulation, the parties filed . . .

motions for summary judgment as to liability only with

respect to the federal action attorney’s fees. On October

6, 2016, the trial court, Vacchelli, J., issued its memorandum of decision granting the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, denying the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, and rendering . . . judgment as to

liability only in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the

federal action attorney’s fees. The trial court concluded

that the defendant was liable for the federal action

attorney’s fees pursuant to § 12-161a. The trial court

further stated that the plaintiff could file a motion for

attorney’s fees within thirty days and that a hearing

would be scheduled thereafter to determine the amount

of the attorney’s fees to which the plaintiff is entitled.

Shortly thereafter, on October 11, 2016, the plaintiff

filed a motion for attorney’s fees.

‘‘On October 25, 2016, [before] the trial court [scheduled] a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s

fees, the defendant appealed [from] the trial court’s

decision with respect to the federal action attorney’s

fees [to the Appellate Court].’’ (Footnotes omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Ledyard v. WMS

Gaming, Inc., supra, 192 Conn. App. 839–41. ‘‘The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which [the Appellate

Court] granted on the ground that the trial court’s decision was not yet an appealable final judgment because

it had yet to determine the amount of attorney’s fees

owed to the plaintiff. . . . Thereafter, [this court]

reversed the judgment of [the Appellate Court] and

remanded the case . . . to [the Appellate Court] with

direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.’’

(Citation omitted.) Id., 841–42.

With respect to the merits of the defendant’s appeal,

the Appellate Court concluded on remand that the plain

language of § 12-161a, specifically, ‘‘as a result of and

directly related to,’’ required a ‘‘more restrictive proximal nexus to the collection proceeding in which the

attorney’s fees are requested’’ than a proximate cause

standard. Id., 845. The Appellate Court determined that

the phrase ‘‘directly related,’’ when read in context with

‘‘as a result of,’’ imported a more restrictive meaning

to the language of the statute. Id., 844–45. The court

noted that, although the resolution of the federal action

was significant to the ultimate outcome of the tax collection proceeding in state court, it ‘‘did not result

directly in a final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties relative to the claimed delinquent

tax.’’ Id., 845. Therefore, the Appellate Court held that

‘‘only litigation fees incurred in the prosecution of the

collection action itself would qualify as attorney’s fees

directly related to the collection proceeding as contemplated by § 12-161a.’’ Id.; see id., 845–46 (noting that

nature of ‘‘the claims that were at issue in the federal

action,’’ including claim that Tribal Nation lacked standing, supported its conclusion because, ‘‘far from incurring attorney’s fees directly related to an action that

would result in a final determination of the rights and

obligations of the parties relative to the claimed delinquent tax, the attorney’s fees in the federal action were
incurred in a collateral deviation or diversion from such

a final determination’’); see also id., 847–49 (comparing

§ 12-161a to other attorney’s fee statutes, including General Statutes §§ 12-193 and 49-7). Accordingly, the

Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court

and remanded the case to that court ‘‘with direction to

deny the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.’’ Id., 850. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate

Court improperly construed § 12-161a to limit a municipality’s entitlement to attorney’s fees only to those

incurred in the specific state court collections action.

The plaintiff contends that the plain meaning of ‘‘as a

result of and directly related to,’’ as that phrase is used

in § 12-161a, is ‘‘quintessential proximate cause language . . . .’’ The plaintiff asserts that the Appellate

Court’s narrow interpretation of § 12-161a would lead

to bizarre results, such as a municipality’s seeking to

recoup unpaid property taxes but ultimately incurring

greater financial losses as a result of the municipality’s

efforts, in a directly related case in a different forum,

to defend its authority to impose such taxes. In

response, the defendant argues that the Appellate Court

improperly construed the plain meaning of § 12-161a

because ‘‘interpreting ‘directly related to’ to mean proximate cause would make it duplicative of ‘as a result

of,’ violating a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation.’’

The defendant also argues that the attorney’s fees

incurred by the plaintiff were not actually caused by

the underlying state court collection action against it

because the Tribal Nation had already filed a federal

action against the state and the plaintiff in 2006 challenging similar personal property taxes, meaning that

the plaintiff would have incurred the attorney’s fees in

federal court regardless of whether it brought a collections action against the defendant. Finally, the defendant argues that we should affirm the judgment of the

Appellate Court because the federal action was not

proximately caused by the specific state collection

action involving the plaintiff and the defendant but,

rather, concerned issues of federal Indian law and federal preemption, which are subjects that are beyond

the scope of § 12-161a. We agree with the plaintiff and

conclude that the Appellate Court’s interpretation of

§ 12-161a was too constrained in limiting the scope of

a municipality’s entitlement to attorney’s fees only to

those fees incurred in the specific collection action.

Whether the Appellate Court correctly determined

that the plaintiff was not entitled to its attorney’s fees

in the federal action under § 12-161a is a question of

statutory construction that presents a question of law

over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Boisvert v. Gavis, 332 Conn. 115, 141, 210 A.3d 1 (2019). It

is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule
pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes ‘‘to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut,

Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 45, 213 A.3d 1110 (2019); see id.,

45–46 (setting forth plain meaning rule).

Generally, Connecticut adheres to the American rule

under which parties pay their own attorney’s fees in

the absence of a statutory exception. See, e.g., Aaron

Manor, Inc. v. Irving, 307 Conn. 608, 617, 57 A.3d 342

(2013). Section 12-161a provides an exception in cases

brought to collect delinquent personal property taxes,

allowing trial courts to award to a municipality ‘‘reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by such municipality as a

result of and directly related to such levy and sale,

enforcement of lien or other collection proceedings.’’

(Emphasis added.) See footnote 1 of this opinion (setting forth relevant text of § 12-161a). This statutory

language is the focus of our analysis in this appeal.4

In interpreting statutes, words and phrases are to

be construed according to their ‘‘commonly approved

usage . . . .’’ General Statutes § 1-1 (a); see, e.g., State

v. Panek, 328 Conn. 219, 227–28, 177 A.3d 1113 (2018).

Generally, in the absence of statutory definitions, we

look to the contemporaneous dictionary definitions of

words to ascertain their commonly approved usage.

See, e.g., Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 331 Conn.

711, 718, 207 A.3d 493 (2019). Contemporary to the

passage of § 12-161a in 1982, ‘‘result’’ was defined as

‘‘something that results as a consequence, issue, or conclusion . . . .’’ Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary

(1981) p. 980. ‘‘[D]irect’’ was defined as ‘‘characterized

by close logical, causal, or consequential relationship,’’

and ‘‘in a direct way . . . without an intervening

agency or step . . . .’’ Id., p. 320. Finally, ‘‘related’’ was

defined as ‘‘connected by reason of an established or

discoverable relation . . . .’’ Id., p. 968. The meaning

of the phrase ‘‘as a result of’’ does not seem to be in

dispute because, as the Appellate Court noted, this

court previously held in Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 306, 692 A.2d 709 (1997), that

‘‘as a result of,’’ in the legal context, is synonymous

with proximate cause.5 See Ledyard v. WMS Gaming,

Inc., supra, 192 Conn. App. 844. Instead, the issue in

this case is the meaning of the complete phrase ‘‘as a

result of and directly related to,’’ rather than its individual words. General Statutes § 12-161a.

As required by § 1-2z, we first determine whether this

statutory language is ambiguous. The plaintiff argues

that, because the phrase ‘‘directly related to’’ is analogous to ‘‘direct cause,’’ which has also been interpreted

to be synonymous with proximate cause, it does not

alter the meaning of the phrase. See Sanders v. Officers

Club of Connecticut, Inc., 196 Conn. 341, 349, 493 A.2d

184 (1985) (‘‘A proximate cause is a direct cause. It is
an act or failure to act, followed in its natural sequence

by a result without the intervention of any other superseding cause.’’). The defendant, however, advances a

similarly reasonable reading of the statutory text,

arguing that the Appellate Court properly held that a

closer proximal nexus is required because interpreting

‘‘directly related to’’ as meaning proximate cause would

render the phrase superfluous, given the consensus that

‘‘as a result of’’ has been held to denote proximate

cause. Because the text at issue allows for more than

one plausible meaning, we are confronted with two

reasonable readings of § 12-161a and deem it ambiguous

for purposes of the § 1-2z analysis.6 See, e.g., Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 312 Conn. 513, 534, 93 A.3d 1142 (2014).

Accordingly, we now consider extratextual sources,

including legislative history and similar statutes, to

determine the scope of the attorney’s fees that are ‘‘as

a result of and directly related to’’ a state collection

proceeding. See id.

In considering the scope of § 12-161a, we recognize

the ‘‘well settled principle of statutory construction that

the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly

. . . or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses

to do so.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Stafford v. Roadway, 312 Conn. 184, 194, 93

A.3d 1058 (2014). A review of similarly worded statutes

reveals that, when the legislature intends to limit the

scope of recovery of attorney’s fees to those incurred

only in defense of state actions, it knows how to do

so. For example, General Statutes § 12-140 provides in

relevant part that ‘‘attorney’s fees, for all fees and costs

incurred by the municipality in defending any civil

action brought as a result of a tax sale or an alias tax

warrant or which seeks to enjoin or declare unlawful

any tax sale or alias tax warrant . . . shall be paid

by the delinquent taxpayer . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

See Cornelius v. Rosario, 167 Conn. App. 120, 127, 143

A.3d 611 (2016) (holding that § 12-140 unambiguously

allows recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred

in defending plaintiff’s action challenging tax sales).

Similarly, General Statutes § 36a-237h (c) (2) provides

in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ttorneys’ fees and any related

expenses incurred in defending a legal action for

which immunity or indemnity is available under this

section shall be paid . . . as they are incurred, in

advance of the final disposition of such action upon

receipt . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) A comparison of the

language in § 12-161a, namely, ‘‘any other proceeding

in law in the name of the municipality for purposes of

enforcing such collection, such person shall be required

to pay any court costs . . . or reasonable attorney’s

fees incurred by such municipality as a result of and

directly related to such . . . enforcement of lien or

other collection proceedings,’’ to the language in these

other statutes strongly supports a conclusion that, had
the legislature intended a municipality to be entitled to

only those fees incurred in the state court action for

the prosecution of delinquent personal property taxes,

it would have included such language rather than using

language that suggests a broader reach beyond the

docketed action.

Turning now to the extratextual sources, we note

that there is no relevant legislative history available for

§ 12-161a, which was enacted in 1982; Public Acts 1982,

No. 82-56, § 1; that sheds light on the legislature’s

intended scope of attorney’s fees for municipalities in

tax collection disputes. However, ‘‘it is well settled that

the legislature is always presumed to have created a

harmonious and consistent body of law . . . . [T]his

tenet of statutory construction . . . requires [this

court] to read statutes together when they relate to the

same subject matter . . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at

the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory

scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Felician Sisters of

St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District

Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 850, 937 A.2d 39 (2008).

Thus, we find instructive case law construing § 12-193,7

which contains similar language and provides for a

municipality’s entitlement to attorney’s fees in foreclosure proceedings. See Danbury v. Dana Investment

Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 27, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999). As the

plaintiff points out, § 12-193 was first enacted in 1949

and subsequently was amended in 1975. See id., 27–28.

The 1975 amendment, which was enacted prior to the

passage of § 12-161a, altered the statute to allow municipalities to recover attorney’s fees incurred in foreclosure proceedings. See id.; Public Acts 1975, No. 75-73,

§ 1. This court has previously observed that § 12-193

‘‘was intended to put municipalities on a par with private foreclosing parties regarding costs and fees, and

therefore to incorporate into such cases the long-standing principle that costs and fees in equitable actions

are discretionary with the court . . . but ordinarily are

imposed as in actions at law.’’ Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., supra, 27.

Thus, we consider a series of decisions from the

Superior Court considering the scope of a municipality’s

entitlement to attorney’s fees under the language of

§ 12-193 in the context of foreclosure actions. This line

of cases highlights a key distinction drawn by the Superior Court when denying attorney’s fees for collateral

actions; actions commenced prior to the foreclosure

proceedings have not been considered ‘‘as a result of and

directly related to’’ the underlying foreclosure action.

See Milford Tax, LLC v. Paradigm Milford, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket

No. CV-14-6015774-S (May 28, 2015) (60 Conn. L. Rptr.

473, 476) (work done in prior bankruptcy proceeding

was not directly related to foreclosure action); Groton
v. First Groton, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district

of New London, Docket No. CV-08-5008750 (March 25,

2011) (municipality was not entitled to attorney’s fees

for work related to collection of back taxes and

intervening bankruptcy matters that commenced five

years prior to commencement of foreclosure action);

see also White Sands Beach Assn., Inc. v. Bombaci,

Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket

No. CV-04-0568713 (May 12, 2009) (awarding attorney’s

fees for work directly related to foreclosure action but

not in defense of counterclaim). But see Monroe v.

Mandanici, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield,

Docket No. CV-92-0293234 (March 2, 1995) (awarding

attorney’s fees for defense of counterclaim to foreclosure action). Upon review of these decisions, we recognize that the timing of an action is an important factual

consideration in determining whether an action is ‘‘a

result of and directly related to’’ a state collection proceeding. This case is distinguishable from the aforementioned cases under § 12-193 because the federal action

in this case, concerning the plaintiff’s authority to

impose personal property taxes on the defendant, was

commenced by the Tribal Nation after the plaintiff had

initiated the state collection proceeding. In addition

to timing, it is significant that the federal action was

commenced for the purpose of challenging the plaintiff’s authority to pursue that same collection action on

grounds of federal preemption.8

The defendant argues, however, that the federal

action should not be considered ‘‘as a result of and

directly related to’’ the state collection proceeding

because it was commenced by a third party, namely,

the Tribal Nation, and that litigation focused on issues

of tribal sovereignty and federal preemption rather than

the defendant’s liability in connection with the state’s

tax collection. We disagree. Given the factual context

of this case, in which it is undisputed that the Tribal

Nation and the defendant coordinated and mutually

agreed to bring the federal lawsuit, the fact that the

defendant was not formally a party to the federal action

is not an absolute bar to the plaintiff’s entitlement to

attorney’s fees. As the trial court in the present case

noted, ‘‘even a cursory examination of the complaint

filed in the federal [District Court] demonstrates that

it was an action to prevent the [plaintiff] from taxing

the same . . . gaming machines [owned by the defendant] that were the subject of the [present] case. In

describing the nature of the action, the operative federal

complaint, filed after the [present] case was commenced, states: ‘In clear disregard for well established

principles of federal Indian law, the [plaintiff has]

assessed property taxes on gaming equipment that the

[Tribal Nation] leases from [the] Illinois based [defendant] . . . . The [Tribal Nation] seeks a declaration

that the property taxes are void and illegal, and a permanent injunction preventing the [plaintiff and the state]
from assessing illegal taxes on the leased gaming equipment in the future.’ . . . Thus, there can be no doubt

that the federal action was directly aimed at stopping

the collection proceedings, and, therefore, the fees

incurred by the [plaintiff] in defending against it were

directly related to and a result of the [plaintiff’s] collection proceedings.’’ (Citation omitted.) We further note

that the Tribal Nation and the defendant were, at one

point, represented by the same attorney, and the defendant ‘‘had certain indemnification agreements with the

[Tribal Nation] with respect to the tax liabilities at stake

in the event that the federal litigation was unsuccessful.’’ Finally, it can hardly be ignored that, when seeking

a stay of this state court action pending the federal

litigation, the defendant justified its request by describing that federal action as ‘‘ ‘determinative’ ’’ of the state

collection action.

Indeed, the Appellate Court’s conclusion that municipalities are entitled to attorney’s fees that are incurred

only in the specific, docketed collection action contradicts a basic principle of statutory construction. This

court has often stated that ‘‘it is axiomatic that those

who promulgate statutes . . . do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences

or bizarre results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 703, 12 A.3d 783

(2011). As the plaintiff argues, the Appellate Court’s

limited construction of § 12-161a could well create the

absurd result in which a municipality, required to

defend its authority in federal court to pursue a specific

collection action against a delinquent taxpayer, would

incur ‘‘an actual loss of revenue . . . that adversely

impacts its ability to provide municipal government

services.’’ Because frustration of government administration is an absurd result, the legislature cannot be

presumed to have intended such a consequence. See

id., 705; First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall

Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 294, 869 A.2d

1193 (2005).

Given the plain language of the statutory text and

the treatment of the phrase ‘‘as a result of and directly

related to’’ in prior Connecticut cases, as well as the

potential for an absurd outcome in the present case if

we were to determine otherwise, we conclude that the

Appellate Court’s interpretation of § 12-161a was too

constrained. A municipality may be entitled to attorney’s fees that are incurred in a collateral federal action

that is ‘‘a result of and directly related to’’ a state tax

collection proceeding. We emphasize, however, that our

decision in this certified appeal is limited to a determination of the breadth of § 12-161a as applied to the facts

of this case. The defendant’s ultimate liability and the

appropriate amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to

which the plaintiff is entitled from the federal action

are dependent on factual determinations yet to be made

by the trial court in connection with the plaintiff’s pend-
ing motion for attorney’s fees, namely, the extent to

which the attorney’s fees in the federal action were

incurred in connection with proceedings relating to this

defendant’s slot machines. Accordingly, we conclude

that, because the federal action in this case was commenced after the state collection action, concerned the

plaintiff’s authority to pursue that proceeding, and was

determinative of that proceeding, and the record indicates the participation of the defendant in that collateral

action, it was a result of and directly related to the

state collection action, thus entitling the plaintiff to

reasonable attorney’s fees within the meaning of

§ 12-161a.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* April 21, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 General Statutes § 12-161a provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the institution

of proceedings by any municipality to enforce collection of any delinquent

tax on personal property from the owner of such property, through . . .

any other proceeding in law in the name of the municipality for purposes

of enforcing such collection, such person shall be required to pay any court

costs, reasonable appraiser’s fees or reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by

such municipality as a result of and directly related to such levy and sale,

enforcement of lien or other collection proceedings.’’

2 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that . . . § 12-161a,

which allows trial courts to award attorney’s fees incurred by a municipality

‘as a result of and directly related to’ state court proceedings to collect

unpaid personal property taxes, did not authorize the award of attorney’s

fees incurred by a municipality in defending a collateral action in federal

court that challenged the municipality’s authority to collect the personal

property taxes at issue in the state court action?’’ Ledyard v. WMS Gaming,

Inc., 334 Conn. 904, 904–905, 220 A.3d 35 (2019).

3 We note that, for purposes of this appeal, our focus is on the plaintiff’s

entitlement to attorney’s fees incurred in the related federal action involving

the defendant. The plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees incurred in

defending its authority to tax AC Coin is not directly at issue.

4 We note that neither the plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees nor the

amount to which it is entitled is at issue in this appeal. Rather, this opinion

is limited to the scope of attorney’s fees that may be available to the plaintiff

under § 12-161a.

5 Although the defendant now argues that the Appellate Court improperly

construed § 12-161a to require a closer nexus than proximate cause, the

plaintiff points out that the defendant, in its brief to the Appellate Court,

stated: ‘‘ ‘[T]he phrase ‘‘incurred as a result of and directly related to’’ requires

the [plaintiff] to show that the fees it seeks were proximately caused by

this collection action against [the defendant].’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) The

plaintiff does not, however, argue that this position before the Appellate

Court estops the defendant from advancing these arguments in this certified appeal.

6 We note that, although there must be more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute in order for it to be considered ambiguous, those interpretations need not be necessarily strong or have a high probability of success.

Put differently, a statute is plain and unambiguous when ‘‘the meaning . . .

is so strongly indicated or suggested by the [statutory] language . . . that

. . . it appears to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely

meaning. . . . [I]f the text of the statute at issue . . . would permit more

than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot be said to be plain

and unambiguous.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Kalman, 93 Conn. App. 129, 134, 887 A.2d 950, cert. denied, 277

Conn. 915, 895 A.2d 791 (2006); accord State v. Miranda, 274 Conn. 727,

738–39, 878 A.2d 1118 (2005) (Borden, J., concurring).
7 General Statutes § 12-193 provides: ‘‘Court costs, reasonable appraiser’s

fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by a municipality as a result

of any foreclosure action brought pursuant to section 12-181 or 12-182 and

directly related thereto shall be taxed in any such proceeding against any

person or persons having title to any property so foreclosed and may be

collected by the municipality once a foreclosure action has been brought

pursuant to section 12-181 or 12-182. A municipality shall reimburse a taxpayer for the costs of state marshal fees or any property seized if the court

finds that such costs were incurred because of an error by the tax assessor

or tax collector and not as the result of any action or failure on the part of

the taxpayer.’’ (Emphasis added.)

8 We note that the Tribal Nation had initiated a prior federal action against

the plaintiff in 2006 challenging the plaintiff’s authority to impose taxes on

another vendor working with the Tribal Nation, AC Coin. See Mashantucket

Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard, supra, 2012 WL 1069342, *1. However, the timing

of that action is not germane to this appeal, as the only question before us

is whether the scope of § 12-161a expands beyond the docketed action

to include related actions, such as the one initiated by the Tribal Nation

challenging the plaintiff’s authority to tax the defendant. See footnote 3 of

this opinion.