[J-53A&B-2020][M.O. - Dougherty, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

NANCY K. RAYNOR, ESQUIRE AND 

RAYNOR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

v.

MATTHEW D’ANNUNZIO, ESQUIRE; 

KLEHR HARRISON HARVEY 

BRANZBURG LLP; WILLIAM T. HILL, 

ESQUIRE; MESSA & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; 

JOSEPH MESSA, JR., ESQUIRE AND 

ROSALIND W. SUTCH, AS EXECUTRIX 

OF THE ESTATE OF ROSALIND 

WILSON, DECEASED

APPEAL OF: MESSA & ASSOCIATES, 

P.C. & JOSEPH MESSA, JR., ESQUIRE

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No. 35 EAP 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Superior 

Court entered on 3/8/19 at No. 3313 

EDA 2017 (reargument denied 5/14/19) 

affirming, reversing and remanding the 

order entered on 8/29/17 in the Court of 

Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, 

Civil Division at No. 0211 January Term, 

2017

ARGUED: May 27, 2020

NANCY K. RAYNOR, ESQUIRE AND 

RAYNOR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

v.

MATTHEW D’ANNUNZIO, ESQUIRE; 

KLEHR HARRISON HARVEY 

BRANZBURG LLP; WILLIAM T. HILL, 

ESQUIRE; MESSA & ASSOCIATES, P.C.;

JOSEPH MESSA, JR., ESQUIRE AND 

ROSALIND W. SUTCH, AS EXECUTRIX 

OF THE ESTATE OF ROSALIND 

WILSON, DECEASED

APPEAL OF: MATTHEW D’ANNUNZIO, 

ESQUIRE, KLEHR HARRISON HARVEY 

BRANZBURG LLP, WILLIAM T. HILL, 

ESQUIRE, AND ROSALIND W. SUTCH, 

AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

ROSALIND WILSON, DECEASED

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No. 36 EAP 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Superior 

Court entered on 3/8/19 at No. 3313 

EDA 2017 (reargument denied 5/14/19) 

affirming, reversing and remanding the 

order entered on 8/29/17 in the Court of 

Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, 

Civil Division at No. 0211 January Term, 

2017

ARGUED: May 27, 2020
[J-53A&B-2020][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 2

DISSENTING OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: December 22, 2020

I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority that the term “civil 

proceedings” as used in the Dragonetti Act is ambiguous, I disagree with its conclusion 

that the present post-trial motion -- seeking more than a million dollars in contempt 

sanctions -- does not qualify as an actionable civil proceeding. 

Initially, the majority recognizes that, under the applicable statutory definition 

provided at Section 102 of the Judicial Code, the contempt proceedings comfortably are 

civil “proceedings” under the Dragonetti Act. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 22 

(explaining that, subject to a material exception, proceedings encompass “every 

declaration, petition or other application which may be made to a court under law” 

(quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §102)). Because, however, the definition does not encompass 

actions -- but clearly the Dragonetti Act was intended to apply to actions -- the majority 

reasons that “proceedings,” for purposes of the Dragonetti Act, should be read as 

entirely excluding intra-case filings (such as Appellants’ post-trial motion for contempt). 

See id. at 23.

Although I concur that strict application of the Section 102 definition would be 

unreasonable, I do not believe that the Court, in disregarding it, is faced with the eitheror proposition suggested by the majority. Rather, it seems more likely to me that the 

Legislature chose the broader term to encompass both actions and certain intra-case 

proceedings.

In this regard, the Dragonetti Act closely tracks the language of Section 674 of 

the Restatement Second of Torts, from which it seems most likely to have been derived. 
[J-53A&B-2020][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 3

Accordingly, courts have referenced the commentary to the Restatement in interpreting 

the Pennsylvania enactment.1 The comments from the Restatement make clear that an 

action for wrongful use may be based on intra-case proceedings qualifying as ancillary 

ones:

f. Ancillary proceedings. A particular civil proceeding may 

be ancillary to other proceedings . . .. Even though the 

principal proceedings are properly brought, the ancillary 

proceeding may be wrongfully initiated. In this case the 

wrongful procurement and execution of the ancillary process 

subjects the person procuring it to liability under the rule 

stated in this Section.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674, cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 1977).

Although I certainly would not hold that all petitions, motions, and applications 

trigger ancillary proceedings for purposes of the Dragonetti Act, presently, I support the 

Superior Court’s conclusion that Appellants’ high-stakes contempt petition was 

“tantamount to the filing of a civil lawsuit.” Raynor v. D’Annunzio, 205 A.3d 1252, 1261 

(Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that, “[i]n a fashion similar to a civil lawsuit, the parties 

exchanged pleadings, and the trial court held a hearing, issued an adjudication of 

contempt, and imposed sanctions”).

The majority also takes the position that acceptance that some intra-case matters 

may implicate the Dragonetti Act would render the sanctions provisions of Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1023.1 or the Act itself superfluous. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 23. In 

my view, however, the availability of discretionary, sanctions-based relief does not 

supplant the substantive entitlement to compensatory damages prescribed by the 

 

1 See, e.g., U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 394 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(explaining that the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings “as applied in Pennsylvania 

conforms with section 674 of the Second Restatement of Torts”); Rosen v. Am. Bank of 

Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. 1993) (“The statutory definition of the tort is now in 

agreement with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 674.”). 
[J-53A&B-2020][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 4

Legislature. See generally Villani v. Seibert, 639 Pa. 58, 80, 159 A.3d 478, 491 (2017) 

(explaining that the Dragonetti Act “manifests a legislative purpose to compensate 

victims of frivolous and abusive litigation and, therefore, has a strong substantive, 

remedial thrust”).2 Indeed, the Note to Rule 1023.1 specifically explains that “Section 

8351 et seq. relating to wrongful use of civil proceedings” provides “additional relief from 

dilatory or frivolous proceedings.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1023.1, Note (emphasis added). 

Finally, the majority does not reach the issue of Appellee’s standing to assert the 

Dragonetti action as its holding renders the argument obsolete. Conversely, I would 

hold that Appellee had standing to bring the action for wrongful use of civil proceedings. 

Generally, standing under the Dragonetti Act requires that the complainant be a party to 

the underlying action. See Hart v. O’Malley, 544 Pa. 315, 322, 676 A.2d 222, 225 

(1996). However, this Court recognized in Hart that there is an “exception to that rule in 

recognition of the nature and effect of certain civil proceedings.” Id. That exception 

exists when a “civil proceeding operate[s] against a non-party in a direct and particular 

way as fully as against a party[.]” Id. 

Here, although Appellees were not parties to the underlying action that gave rise 

to the Dragonetti claim, the trial court imposed a sanction of nearly $950,000, which was 

eventually overturned on appeal. Nevertheless, Appellants moved for the issuance of 

writs of attachment, execution in attachment, and summonses upon various garnishees, 

including Citizen’s Bank, where Appellees had numerous bank accounts. Particularly, 

given the severity of the sanction and the ensuing enforcement actions by Appellants, 

Appellees were aggrieved in a direct and specific fashion. 

Justice Donohue joins this dissenting opinion.

 

2 To the degree that the majority suggests that Villani or any other decision of this Court 

has already embraced the proposition that the Dragonetti Act cannot apply to intra-case 

proceedings, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at 23, I respectfully disagree.