1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### MICROSOFT CORP. v . AT&T CORP. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT No. 05–1 05 6. Ar g u ed Feb r u a r y21, 2007 —D ec ided April 30, 20 07 Itis t h e genera l rule under Unit ed S t at es pa t e nt la w t h a tno infringe

mentoccurs when apa t e n t ed productis ma de a n d s o ld in a n ot her country. The r e is an exce ption. Section 271(f) of the Patent Act, adopted in 19 84, pr ov ides t h at in fr in g e men tdoes oc c u rw h e non e “su ppl[ie s ] .

. . fr om th e Un i t ed S tate s,” fo r“c ombin atio n” abr oad, a patented invention’s “components.” 35 U. S. C. §271(f)(1). This case conce rns the applicability of §271(f) tocomputer software first sen t from t h e United S t a t e s t o a foreign ma nufa c t urer on ama st er dis k , or by electroni ctransm ission, then copied by the foreign recipient for in stal lat i ononc o mpu t er s made an d sold ab r o ad.

AT&T holds a pa t e nton ac o mput er us ed t odigit a lly encode a n d compres s reco rded s p eech. Micros oft ’s Windows opera t i ng s y s t em h a s th e poten t ial to in fr in g e th at p aten t bec a u s e Win d ow s in c o r p o r ates softw a r e c o de th at, w h enin stalled, en ables a c o mp u t erto pr oc es s speech in t h e ma nner cla i med b yt h e pa t e nt
. Micros o fts e lls Win

dows t o foreign ma nufa c t u rers who ins t a ll t h e s o ft w a re ont o t h e comput ers t h ey s e ll. Micro s o fts e nds ea ch ma nufa c t u r e r ama s t er vers ion of Windows , eit h er on adis kor viaencrypt ed elect r onic t r a n s m iss i on, whicht h e ma nufa c t ure r us e s t ogenera t ec o pies

. Thos e c o pies, n o t th e masterv e r s ionsen tby M i cr osoft, ar e in s talled onth e foreign ma nuf a c t urer’s com p ut ers . The f o reign-ma de c o mput ers a r e th ensold to u s er s abr oad.

AT&T fi led a ninfringement suitcha rging Micros oftwit hliab ilit y for the foreign installa tions of Windows. By sending Windows to for

eign ma nufa c t urers , AT&T c o nt ended, Mic r os oft“ s upplie[d] .

. . from the United States,” for “combina t i on” abr oad, “c ompon e n t s” of AT&T’s pa t e n t ed s p eech-proces s i ng comput er, a n d, a ccor d ingly, wa s liable under §271(f). Microsoft responde d that unincorporated soft

-2 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Sy llabu s
w a r e , bec a u s e it is in tan gibl e in for mation , c a n n o t be ty ped a “c ompo nent” of an invention under §271(f). Mic r osoft also urged that the foreign- g enera t ed copies of Window s actually insta lled abroad were not “supplie[d] .

. . from th e Unit ed States.” Rejecting these re

sponses, the D i strict Court h e ld Microsoft liable under §271(f), and a divided Federa l Circuitpa nel a ffirmed. Held: Beca us e Micros oftdo es notexportfrom t h e U n it ed S t a t e s t h e

copies of Windows installedon th e foreign-made comp uters in ques

tion, Microsof tdoes not “su ppl[y] .

. . fro mthe United States” “com

ponents” of th ose computers , and therefore is not liable under §271(f) as curre ntly written. Pp. 7–19.

(a) A c o pyof Win d ow s, n o t Win d ow s int h e abs tr ac t, q u alifies as a “component” under §271(f). Sectio n 271(f) attaches liability to the s u pply ab r oa d of t h e “c omponent s of ap a t e nt ed inven t ion, whe re suc h compon e n tsa r e un comb ined in wholeor in pa rt , in s uch ma nner as to ac tiv e lyin du c eth e c o mb in ationof suc h compon ent s .” §271(f)(1) (empha s is a d ded). The provis ion t hus a p plies only t o “s uch compo

n e n t s” a s ar e c o mbin ed to for m th e “p ate n t ed in v e n t ion” atis su e
— here , AT&T’s s p eech-proces s i ng comput er. Until expressed as a com

pu ter

- r e adabl e “c opy , ” e. g. , on a CD-R OM, Windo w s—indeed any s oft wa re det a ched from a na c t iva t i ng medium—rema i ns uncom bin able. It c a n n o t be in ser t ed in to a CD -RO Mdr iv e or dow n l oaded from t h e Int e rnet ; itca nnot b eins t a lled or execut ed on acomput er. Ab st ra cts oft w a re code is a nideawit h outphys ica lemb o diment , a n d as such, it does not matc h §271 (f)’s categorization: “components” amen able to “c ombin a t i on .” Win d ow s abs t r ac ted fr om a tan gible c o py no doub tis informa t i on—a det a iled s e tof ins t ruct ion s—a nd t hus migh t be c o mpar ed to a blu e pr in t (oran yth i n gelse c o n t ain i n gdesig n informa t i on). A b l ueprintma y cont a i n precis e ins t ruct ions for t h e cons t ruct ion a n d comb ina t i on of t h e component s of apa tent ed device, but it is not its e lf a combinab le component.

The fa ctt h a titis ea s yt oenc o de s o ft wa re’s ins t ruct ions ont oacom puter-readable medium do es not counsel a different answer. The copy-produ cin gs t ep is wha trenders s o ft wa re aus ab l e, comb inab l e part of a comp uter; easy or not, the extra step is essential. Moreover, man ytools m a ybe u s ede a sily an d in e x pen s iv elyto g e n e r ate th e parts of a dev i ce. Those tools are not, however, “components” of the devices in w h ich t h epa rt s a r e inco rpora t e d, a tlea s tnot undera n y ordina ry u n de rs t a n ding of t h e t e rm “ c omponent .” Congres s might h av ein c l u d ed w i th in§271(f ) ’s c o mpas s, forex ample, n o t on lya pa t

en ted in v e n t ion ’ s c o mbin able “c ompon e n t s,” bu t also “in f or mation , in

s t ruct ions , or t ools from which t h os e component s rea d ily ma y b egen er ated.” It didn o t. Pp. 9–12

.

(b) Microsoft did not “suppl[ y] .

. . fr om th e Un ited St at es” th e for

-3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s eign-made co pies of Windows insta lled on t h e compu t ers here in

volved. Under a conventional read ing of §271(f)’s text, those copie s w e r e “su pplie[d]” fr om ou tside th e Un ited State s. Th e Feder a l Cir

cuitma j o rit y concluded, ho wever , th at forsoftw a r ec o mpon en ts, th e ac t of c o py in g is su bsu m ed inth e ac t of su pply i n g . A mastersen t abr oad, th e major i tyobserv ed, differ s n o tat all fr om ex ac t c o pies, generated easi ly, inexpensively, an d swiftly from the master. Hence, sen d in ga sin gle c o pyof softw a r eabr oadw i thth e in te n tth at i t be replicated invokes §271(f) liability forthe foreign-made copies. Judge Rader, dissenting, noted tha t“suppl ying” is ordina rily u n ders t o od to meananac tiv i tysepar ate an d distin c tfr om an ysu bsequ e n t“c opy ing,” “ r eplica t i ng,” or “ r epr o ducing”

—in effect , ma nufa c t uring. He further observed that the on ly truediffere nce between software com

ponent s a n d phys ica lcomponent s of ot her pa t e nt ed invent ions is t h a t c o pies of softw a r ear e easierto make an d tr an spor t. But n o th in gin §271(f)’s text, Judge Rader maintai ned, renders ease of copying a relevant, no l e ss decisive, f a ctor intriggering liabilityfor infringe

ment. The Co urt agrees. U n der § 271(f)’s text, the very components su pplied fr om th e Un ited S t ates, an d n o t f o r e ig n - made c o pies th er eof, t r igger liab ility when comb ined ab r oadto form the p a tented inven

tion at issue. While copying soft ware abroad is indeed easy and in

expens ive, t h es a me ca n b e s a id of ot her it ems , s uch a s keys copied from ama s t er . S e ct ion 27 1 (f) cont a i ns no ins t ruct ion t o ga uge whe n duplication is easy and cheap enoughto deem a copy i nfact m a de ab r oa d nevert heles s “s upplie[d] .

. . from the United States.” The ab

sen c e of an y th i n gaddr essin g c o py in g in th e statu tor ytex tw e igh s ag ain s t a ju di c i al deter m in a t ionth at r e pl i c ationabr oad of a ma ster dispatched fro mthe United States “s uppli e s” the foreign-made copi e s fr om th is c o u n tr y . Pp. 12–14

.

(c) Any doubt that Microsoft’s co nduct falls outside §271(f)’s com

pass w o u l d be r e solv ed byth e pr esu m ptionag ain s t ex tr ater r i tor i al

it y. Foreign c o nductis genera lly t h e doma in of foreig nla w, a n d in th e paten tar ea, th at law mayembody differ e n tpolic yju dg men t s abou tth e r e lativ er i gh ts of in v e n t or s, competitor s, a n d th e pu blic

. Applied here, t h e pres umpt ion t u gs s t rongly a g a i ns tcons t ruing §271(f) to enc o mpass as a “compone nt” not only a ph ysical copy of s oft wa re, b u t a l s o s o ft wa re’s int a n gib l e code, a n d t o render “ s up plie[d] .

. . fro mthe UnitedStates ” not o n ly exported copies of sof t

w a r e , bu t als odu plic ates made ab r o ad. For e ig nla walon e, n o t Unit ed S t a t e s la w, cu rre nt ly go verns t h ema nufa c t urea n d s a le of components of patented inventions inf o r e i g nc o u n t r i e s . I f AT & Td e sir e s to pr ev en t c o py in gabroad, it s remed ylies in obt a i n ing and en

for c i n gfor eign paten t s. Pp. 14– 16.

(d) While reading §271(f) to exclude fro mcoverage fo reign-made4 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Sy llabu s copies of s oftwa re ma y cre a t ea “ l oophole” in favor of software mak

er s, th e Cour t is n o t per s u a ded th at dy n a micju dic i al in ter p r e tation of §271(f) is in order; the “l oophole” is p r operly left for Congress to cons ider, a n d t o clos e if itfinds s uch a c t i on wa rra nt ed. S e ct ion 2 7 1 (f) wa s a directr e s p ons e t o a ga p in U. S

. pat e ntla w revealed b y DeepsouthPack ing Co. v. Laitra m Corp., 406 U. S. 518, where t h e it ems ex por t ed w e r ekits c o n tain i n gall th e ph y s ic al, r e adilyas semb lable pa rt s of a machine (nota nint a n gib l e s e t of ins t ruct ions ), a n d t h ose parts themselves (not foreign-mad e copies of them) wo uld be com

bin e d abr oad byfor eig nbuy e r s . Hav i ng atten d ed to th at g a p, Con

gres s did notaddres s ot her a r guab l e ga ps , s uch a s t h e loophole AT&T des crib e s . Given t h e e x pa n d ed ext r a t e rrit o ria lt hrus tAT&T’s rea d

ing of §271(f) entails, the patent-p rote ctive determination AT& T seeks mu st be left to Con g r e ss. Cf. Sony Corp. of Amer icav. Univ er sal City St ud ios, I nc. , 464 U. S. 417, 431. Con g r e ssis dou btles s a w a r e of t h e e a s ewit hwhic helect r oni cm e dias uch a s s o ft wa re ca n be copied, and has not left the matter untouched. See the Digital M illen n i u mCopy r i gh t Ac t, 17 U. S. C. §1201 et seq
. If pa t e ntla w is to be adju stedbetterto ac c o u n tfor th e r e alit ies of soft w a r e distr ibu

tion , th e alter ationsh ou ld be made af terfoc u s ed legi slativ ec o n s id

er ation , n o t b yth e Ju dic i ar yfor ec astin gCon g r e ss’ likelydispos ition

. Pp. 17–1 9. 414 F. 3d 13 66 , r e v e r s ed.

G IN SB U R G , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 14. S CALIA , K ENNEDY , an d S OUTER , J J ., joined that opinion in full. ALITO , J., filed anopin ion c o n c u r r i ngas to all bu t footn o te 14, inw h i ch T HOMAS an d B REYER , JJ., joined. S TEVENS , J., filed a dissenting opi n ion. R OBERTS , C. J ., t ook no pa rtin t h e cons idera t i on or decis i on of t h e ca s e ._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 05 6 

### MICROSOFT CORP ORATIO N, P E TITION E R v. AT&T COR P

. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FEDERAL CIRC UI T [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 14. It is the general rule under United States patent la w that no infringement occurs whe na patented product is made and sold in another country. There is an exception

. Section 271(f) of the Patent Act, adopted in 1984, provides that infring e ment does occur whe none “supplies . . . from the United States,” for “comb inati o n” abroad, a pa tented invention’s “components.” 35 U. S. C. §271(f)(1). This case concerns the applicability of §271(f) to computer software first sent from the United State s to a forei g n manufac

turer on a master disk, or by electronic trans mission, then copied by t h e foreign recipient for installation on com

puters mad e and sold abroad. AT&T holds a patent on an ap paratus for digitally encoding and compressing record ed speech. Microsoft’s Windows operating system, it is conceded, has the pote n tial to infri n ge AT &T’s pa tent, because Windows incorpo

rates softw a re code th at, when in stalled, enables a com

puter to process speec h in the manner claimed by th at patent. It bears emphasis, however, tha tuninstall e d2 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Windows software does not infringe AT&T ’s patent any more than a computer standing alone does; i n stead, the patent is infringed only when a computer is loaded with Windows and is thereb y renderedcapable of p e rforming as the patented speech processor. The question before u s : Does Microsoft’s liability extend to computers made in another country when loaded with Windows softwar e copied abroad from a master disk or electronic transmis

sion dispatched by Microsoft from the United States? Our answer is “No.” The master disk or electronic transmission Microsof t sends from the United States is never installed on any of the foreign-made computers in question. Ins t ead, copies made abroad are used for installation. Because Microsoft does not export from the United States the copies actual ly installed, it does not “s uppl[y] .

. . from the United States” “components” of the re levant computers, and therefore is not liable under §271(f) as currentl ywritten. Plausible a r guments can be made for and against ex

tending §271(f) to th e conduct charged inthis case as infringing AT&T ’s patent. Recognizing that §271(f) is an exception to the general rule that our patent law does not apply extra territorially, we re sist giving the language in which Congress cast § 271(f) an e x pansive in terpretatio n . Our decision leaves to Congress’ informed judgment any adjustment of §271(f) it d eems necessary or pro p er. I Our decision some 35 years ago in Dee psouth Packi n g Co. v. Laitram Corp. , 406 U. S. 518 (1972), a case about a shrimp deveining machine, led Congress to enact §271(f). In that case, Laitram, holder of a patent on the time-and

expense-saving machine, sued Deepsouth, manufacturer of an infringing deveiner. Deepsouth conceded that th e Patent Act barred it from making and selling its deveining machine inthe United States, but sought to salvage a3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### portion of i t s business : Nothing in United States patent law, Deepsouth urged, stopped it from making in th e United States the partsof its dev e iner, as op posed to the machine its e lf, and sel l i ng those partsto foreign buyers for assembly a n d use abroad. Id. , at 522–524. 1 

### We agreed. Interpreting our paten tlaw as th en written, we reiter

ated in Dee ps out h th at it was “not an infringement to mak e or use a paten t ed product outside of the United States.” Id ., at 527; see 35 U. S. C. §271(a) (1970 ed.) (“[W]hoever without authority mak e s, uses or sell s an y patented in vention, wi thin the U n ited Sta t es duringth e term of the patent ther efor, infringes the patent.”). Deep

south’s foreign buyers did not infringe Laitram’s paten t , we held, because they assembled and used the deveinin g machines o u tside the United States. Deepso uth, we the r e fore concluded, could not be charged withinducing or contributing to aninfringement. 406 U. S., at 526–527. 2 

### Nor could Deepsouth be heldliable as a dir e ct infringer, for it did n o t make, sell, or use the patented invention— the fully assembleddeveining machine—within the United Stat es. The parts of the machine were not them

selves patented, we noted, hence export of those parts, unassembled, did not rank as an infri n gement of Laitram’s p a tent. Id ., at 527–529. Laitram h a d argued in Dee psou ththat resistance to extension of the patent privilege to cover exported part s

——————

1 Deeps o ut h s h i pped it s deveining eq uipme n t“ t oforeign cus t o mers in t hree s e pa ra te b o xes , ea chcont a i ning only pa rt s of the 1 3⁄4 -t on ma c h i n e s, y e t the w h o le [w as] asse mbl able i nless th anone h o ur .” De ep southPack ing Co. v. Laitram Corp. , 406 U. S. 518, 52 4 (19 72).

2 See 35 U. S. C. §271(b) (1 970 e d .) (“Wh oev e rac tiv e ly in du c e s in

fr in g e men tof a paten tsh al l be liab l e as anin fr ing e r . ”); §271(c ) (r en der

ing liab l e as acont rib u t o ryinfringe r a n y o ne who s e lls or import s a “c ompon e n t” of a paten t ed i n v e n t ion , “know i n gth e same to be espe

cially made o respecially a d apted for use in an infr ingement of such paten t , an d n o t a st aple ar t i c l e orc o mmodityof c o mmer c e su itable for subst a ntia l non-infringing use”).4 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### “derived f r om too narr o w and tec hnical an interpretati on of the [Patent Act]. ” Id ., at 529. Rejecting tha targument, we referred to prior decisions h o ld ing that “a combination patent protects only against the operable as sembly of the whole and not the ma nufacture o f its par t s.” Id. , at 52 8. Congress’ c o dification of patent law, we said, signaled no intention tobroaden the scope of the privilege. Id ., at 530 (“When, as here, the Constitution is permissiv e , the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress.”). And we again emphas ized that “[o]ur pate nt system makes no claim to extraterrito

rial effect; t h ese acts of Congress d o not, and were not intended to, operate b e yond the l i mits of th e United States; andwe corres p ondingly r eject the cl aims of others to such controlover our markets.” Id ., at 531 (quoting Brownv. Duc h esne , 19 How. 183, 195 (1857)). Absent “a clear congr e ssional indication of intent,” we stated, courts had no warrant to stop the manufacture an d sale of the parts of patented inventions for assembly an d use abroad. 406 U. S., at 532. Focusing its attention on De epso uth , Congress enacted §271(f). Se e Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, §101, 98 Stat. 33 83; Fisch & Allen, The Application of Domesti c Patent Law to Exporte d Software: 35 U. S. C. §271(f), 25 U. Pa. J. In t’l Econ. L. 557, 565 (2004) (“Congress specifi

cally intended §271(f) as a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth”). 3 

### The provision expands

——————

3 See also, e.g. , Paten tL a wA m en dmen ts of 19 84, S. Rep. No. 98–66 3, pp. 2–3 (1 984) (describing §271(f) a s “a res p onse to the S u preme Court’s 197 2 Deepsout hdecis i on which int e rpret e dt h e pa t e nt law nott oma ke it infringement where the final asse mbly an d sale is ab r o ad”); Sec t ion

by -Sec tionAn aly s is of H. R. 628 6, 13 0 Co n g . Rec. 2806 9 (19 84) (“Th i s proposal resp onds to the United States Supreme Co urt decision in Deepso uth

. . . conce rning th e need for alegis l at ive s o lut i on t oclos e a loophole in [the] patent law.”).5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the definition of infringement to include supplying from the United States a patented invention’ s components: “(1) Whoever without authority s u pplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the compo n ents of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner a s to activel yinduce the combin ation of su ch components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurre d within th e United States, shall be liab l e a s an infringer. “(2) Whoever without authority s u pplies or causes to be suppli e d in or from the United States any com

ponent of a patented invention that is especially made or especiall yadapted for use in th e inventionand not a staple art i cle or commodity of c o mmerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombi ned in whol e or in part, k n owing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component willbe combi n ed outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurre d within th e United States, shall be liab l e as an infringer.” 35 U. S. C. §271(f). IIWindows is designed, authored, and tested at Microsoft’s Redmond, Was h ington, headquarters. Micros o ft sells Windows to end users and computer ma nufacturers , both foreign and domestic. Purchasing manufacturers install the software onto the com p uters theysell. Microsoft sends t o each of t h e foreign manufacturers a mast er version of Windows, e i ther on adiskor vi a encrypte d electronic transmission. The manufacturer uses the mas

ter version to generate copies

. Those copi es, not the ma s ter sent byMicrosoft, are installed on the foreign manu

-6 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### facturer ’ s c o mputers. Once assembly is complete, the foreign-made computers are sold to users abroad. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a–46a. 4 

### AT&T’s pa tent (’580 patent) is for an apparatus (a s relevant here, a comp uter) capab l e of digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech. Windows, the parties agree, contains software that ena b les a computer to proc

ess speech in the man n er claimedby the ’580 patent. In 2001, AT&T filed aninfringement suit inthe United States Dist rict Court for th e Southern District of New York, cha r ging Micro soft with li ability for domestic and foreign installations of Windows. Neither Windows software ( e. g. , in a box on the shelf) nor a computer stan ding alone ( i.e. , with out Windows installed) i n fringes AT&T’s pa tent. Infringement occurs only when Windows is installed o na computer, thereby rendering it capable of perfor ming as the patented speech processor. Microsoft stipulated that by ins t alling Win

dows on its own comp uters durin gthe softw a re develop

ment process, it directl y infringed the ’580 patent. 5 

### Microsoft further ack n owle dged t hat by licensin gcopies of Windows to manufacturers of computers sold in th e United Sta t es, it induced infr ingement of AT&T’s pa tent. 6 

### Id ., at 42a; Brief for P e titioner 3– 4; Brief forResponden t 9, 19. Microsoft denied, however, any liability bas ed on the master disks and electronic transm i ssions it di spatched to

——————

4 Mic r os ofta l s o dis t rib u t e s Windows t oforeign ma nuf a c t urers indi

r e c t ly , bysen d in ga ma sterv e r s ionto anau th or ized fo r e ig n“r eplic a tor” ; th e r e plic atorth enmakes c o pies an d sh ips th em to th e man u f a c tu r e r s . App. t oPet. forCer t . 45a– 46 a.

5 See 35 U. S. C. §271( a) (“[ W]h oev e rw i th ou t au th or itymakes, u s es , offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or import s into t h e Unit ed S t at es a n y pa t e nt ed invent ion durin gt h e ter mof th e paten tth er efor , in fr in g e s th e paten t .”).

6 See §271(b) ( “Whoever actively in duces infringemento f apa t e n t sh all be li able as anin fr in g e r . ”).Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) 7 Opinion of t h eCourt 

### foreign manufacturers , thus joini n g issue with AT&T. By sending Windows to f o reign manufacturers, AT& Tcon tended, Microsoft “supplie[d] .

. . f r om the United States, ” for “combination” abroad, “compo n ents” of AT&T ’s pa t

ented speec h processor; accordingly, AT&T u r ged, Microsoft was liable under §271(f). See supra , a t5 (reproducin g text of §271(f)). Microsoft responded that unincorporated software, b e cause it is intangible information, cannot b e typed a “component” of an invention under §271(f). In any event, Microsoft urged, the foreign-generat e d copies of Windows actually insta lled abroad were not “supplie[d] . . . from the United States.” Rejecting these re sponses, th e District Court held Microsoft liable under§271(f). 7 1 USPQ 2d 1 118 (SDNY 2004). On appeal, a d i vided panel of the Cour t of Ap peals for the F e deral Circ uit affirmed. 414 F. 3d 1 366 (2005). We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. ___ (2006), and now reverse. III A This case poses two questions: First, when, or in what form, does software qualify as a “component” under §271(f)? Second, were “components” of the f o reign-made computers involved in this case “supplie[d]” b yMicrosoft “from the U n ited State s ”? 7 

### As to the first question, no one i nthis litigation argues that softwa re can neverran kas a “component” under §271(f). The parties disagree, however, over the stage at which soft ware becomes a component. Soft ware, the “ s et of instructions, known as code, that directs acomputer t o

——————

7 The reco rd leaves unclear which pa ragra p h of §271(f) AT&T’s claim invokes. While there are difference s between §271(f)(1) and (f)(2), see, e.g . , inf r a , at 18, n. 18, the parties do not suggest that those differences ar e ou tc ome d e ter m in ativ e . Cf. infra , at 14– 15, n

. 16 ( e x p lain in gw h y b o t hpa ra gra p hs yield t h e s a me res u lt). Fo r cla r it y’s s a ke, we fo cus ou r analysis on the text of §271(f)(1).8 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### perform specified functions or operations,” Fantasy Sports Proper tie s , Inc. v. Sportslin e.com, Inc. , 287 F. 3d 1108, 1118 (CA Fed. 2002), can be conceptualized in (at least) two wa ys. One can sp eak of software in the abstract: t h e instructions themselves detached f r om any m e dium. (An analogy: The notes of Beethoven’s Ninth Sym p hony.) One can alternatively envision a tangible “copy” of software , the instruct ions encoded on a medi um such as a CD- R OM. (Sheet music for Beethoven’s Ninth.) AT&T argues tha t software in the abstra ct, not simply a parti cular copy of software, qualifies as a “component” under § 271(f). Microsoft and th e United States argu e that only a copy of soft

ware, not software in th e abstract, c an be a component. 8 

### The significance of the s e diverse views becomes appar

ent when we turn to the second question: Were compo

nents of th e foreign-made computers involved in this case “supplie[d]” by Microsoft “from the United States”? If the relevant components are the copies of Wind ows actually installed on the foreign compute r s, AT& Tc o uld not per

suasively a r gue that those compo n ents, thou gh generated abroad, were “supplie[d] .

. . from the United States” as §271(f) requires for liability to attach. 9

### If, on the othe r

——————

8 M i cr osoft an d th e Un ited St ates str e s s th a tto c o u n tas a c o mpon en t, the copy of software must be expresse d a s “obj ec t c o de.” “ S oftw ar e i n t h e form in w h ich itis writ t e n a n d unders t ood b yhu ma ns is called ‘s ource code.’ To b efunct ion a l, howeve r, s o ft wa re mus tb econve r t e d (or ‘compiled’) int o its ma chine-us ab l e vers ion,” as e q u ence of b i na ry numb e r ins t r uct ions t y ped “ o bj ectcode.” Brief fo r U n it ed S t at es a s AmicusCuria e4, n. 1; 71 USPQ 2d 11 1 8 , 1119, n

. 5 (SD NY 2004 ) (recounting Microsoft’s desc ription of the software dev e lopment proc

ess). I ti s sti p u l ated th at objec tc o de w a s on th e ma sterdi sks an d electronic transmission s M i c r o soft dispa t c h e d fr om th e Un ited St ates.

9 On th is view of “component,” the co pies o f Windows on the master disks an d elec tr on ictr an smi ssion s th at M i c r o soft sen tfr om th e Un ited Sta t es c o u l d n o t th emse lv es serv e as a ba s i s forliabil i ty , bec a u s e th ose copies were notins t a lled on t h e foreign manufa c t ure rs ’ c o mput ers . S ee §271(f)(1) (encompassing only those co mponents “combin[ed] .

. . outside of t h e Unit ed S t at es in amannert h a twou l d infringet h epa t e ntif s uch9 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### hand, Windows in the abstract qualifies as acomponen t within §271(f)’s compass, it would not matter that th e master copies of Windows software dispatched from the United States were not themselv es installe d abroad as working pa rts of the foreign computers. 10 

### Wi th th i s e x pl an at io n of t h e r e lat i on sh ip b e t w e e n th e two quest i ons in v i ew, w e furt herc o nsider t h e tw in in qu ir i e s . B First, when, or in what fo rm, does software become a “component” under §271(f)? We construe §271(f)’s terms “in accordance with[their] ordinary or natu r al meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). Se ction 271(f) applies to the supply a b road of th e “components of a pat

ented invention, where such comp onentsar e u n c o mb i n e d in whole or in part, insuch manner as to actively induce the combination of suc hcomponents .” §271(f)(1) (emphasis added). The provision thus applies only to “ s uch compo

nents” 11 

### as are combined to form the “patented invention” at issue. The patented invention here is AT&T’s speechprocessing computer. Until it is expressed as a computer-readable “copy,” e.g. , on a CD-R OM, Windows softwar e—indeed any softwa re detached from an activating medium—remains uncom

binable. It cannot be inserted into a CD-ROM drive or downloaded from the Internet; it cannot be installed or executed on a computer. Abstract software code is an idea

—————— c o mbin ationo c c u r r e d w i th in th e Un ited States ” ).

10 The Federa l Circuitpa nel in t h is ca s e , relying on t h a tcourt ’s prior decision in Eolas Tec hnolo gi es Inc

. v. Microsoft Corp. , 399 F. 3d13 25 (2005), held that software qualifies as a c o mponent under §271(f). W e a r e unab l e t o det e rmine, however , whet h e rt h e Federa l Circuitpa nels rega rded a s acomponents oft wa re in t h e ab s t ra ct , or aco py of s oft wa re.

11 “Compon e n t” is c o mmon l y defin e d as “ac o n s titu en t par t ,” “ele

ment ,” or “ i ngredient

. ” Web s t e r’s Third New Int e rna t i ona lDict iona ry of th e En glish Lan g u a g e 466 (198 1).10 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### without ph ysical embodiment, and as such, it does not match §271 (f)’s ca tegorization: “components” amenable to “combination.” Windows abstra ct ed from a tangible copy no doubt is information—a detailed set of in structions — and thus might be compared to a blueprint (or anythi n g containing design infor m ation, e.g. , a schemat i c, template, or prototype). A blue print may contain precise instruc

tions for the constructi on and combination of the compo

nents of a patented device, but it is not itself a combinable component of that dev i ce. AT&Tand its ami c ido no t suggest oth e rwise. Cf. Pellegriniv. Analog Devi ces, Inc

. , 375 F. 3d 1 113, 1117–1119 (CA Fed. 2004) (transmission abroad of instructions for production of patented computer chips not covered by §271(f)). AT&T urge s that software, at le ast when e x pressed as machine-readable object code, i s distinguishable from design information presented in a blueprint. Software, unlike a blueprint, is “modular”; it is a stand-alone prod

uct de veloped and ma rketed “for use on m any differe nt types of computer hardware and in conjunction with many other types of softwar e .” Brief f o r Respond e nt 5; Tr. of Oral Ar g. 46. Soft wa re’s modu larity persists even after installation; it can be updated or removed (deleted) with

out affectin gthe ha rd ware on wh ich it is ins t alled. Ibid

. Software, u n like a blueprint, is also “dynamic.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. After a device has b een built accordi n g to a blue

print’s inst r u ctions, the blueprint’s wor kis do ne (as AT& T puts it, the blueprint’s instructions have been “exhausted,” ibid .). Soft ware’s inst r u ctions, in contrast, ar e contained in and continuously performe d by a computer. Brief fo r Respondent 27–28; Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. See also Eolas Technologi e sInc. v. Microsoft Cor p . , 399 F. 3 d1325, 133 9 (CA Fed. 2 005) (“[S]oftware code

. . . drives the functional nucleus of the finished computer product.” (quoting Im

agexpo, L. L. C. v. Mi crosoft Cor p . , 299 F. Supp. 2d 5 50, 553 (ED Va . 2003))).11 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### The dist inc t ions adv a nced by AT &T do not per s uad e us to char act e r i ze softwar e , un co uple d from a me dium , as a c o mb in ab l e c o mponent
. Blu e p r i n t s too, or a n y des i gn in form a t io n for th a t matt er, can be independent l y dev e lop e d, boug ht, and sold. If the point of AT&T’s argu menti s t h atwe d o n o t s e e b l u e pr i n t s li ni ng st or es ’ shelve s, the same o b se rvation may be made about soft

ware in the abstr a ct: What re ta ile rs sell , a n dc o n s u m e r s buy , are c o pies of soft ware. Likew i se, before softw a r e can be c o ntained in and c o nt inuously per f or med by a comput er , bef o r e it ca n be u pdat e d or d e l e t e d , an act u al , p h y s i c al cop y o f t h e so f t wa re m u s t be deli ve re d b yC D

ROM or s o me oth e r me an s ca pable of int e rfac ingwith th e c o mput er . 12 

### Because it is so easy to encode software’s in struction s onto a med i um that can be readby a computer, AT&T intimates, that ext r a s t ep should not play a decisive role under §271(f). But the extra step is whatrenders the software a usable, combinable part of a computer; easy o r not, the copy-producing step is ess e ntial. Mor eover, many tools may be used easil yand inexpensively to generate the parts of a d e vice. A m a chine for making sp r o ckets migh t be used by a manufacturer to produce tens of thousands o f sprockets a nhour. That does not make th e machine a “component” of the tens of thousands of devices in which the sprockets are incorporat ed, at least not under any ordinary u n derstanding of the term “component.” Con

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12 Th e dissen t , e m br ac in gAT &T’s ar g u men t , c o n t en ds th at, “u n like a b l ueprintt h a tmerely ins t r uct s aus er h o w t odo s o met h ing, s o ft wa re a c t u a lly ca us es infringin gc o nductt ooc c ur.” Po st , at 3 (S TEVENS , J., dis s e nt ing). We have emp h a s ized, however, t h a tWindows ca n “ c a u s [ e] infringin gcon d uctt o occur”

— i.e. , f unct io n a s pa rt of AT&T’s speec h

proces s i ng co mput er—onlywhen e x pres s e d a s acomput er-rea dab l e copy. Ab s t ract ed from aus ab l e copy, Windows code is int a n gib l e, uncomb inab l e informa t i on, more like notes of mus i c int h e hea dof a compos er t h an “ aroller t h atca us es aplayer pia n o t oproduce s o und. ” Ibid

.12 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### gress, of course, might have included within §271(f) ’s compass, for example, not only combinable “c omponents” of a patented invention, but also “informati on, instruc

tions, or to ols from which those components readily may be generated.” It did not. Insum, a copy of Windows, n o t Windows inthe abstract, qualifies as a “component” unde r §271(f). 13 

### C The next question, ha s Microsoft “supplie[d] .

. . from the United States” co mponents of the computers here involved? Under a conventio nal reading of §271(f)’s text, the answer would be “No,” for the foreign-made copies of Windows a ctually installed onthe computers were “sup

plie[d]” from places o u tside the United States. The F e d

eral Circuit majority c o nclude d, however, that “for soft

ware ‘comp o nents,’ the act of copy ing is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying.’ ” 4 14 F. 3d, a t1370. A master sent abroad, the majority observed, differs not at all from the exact copie s , easily, inexpensively, and swiftl y generate d from the master; hence “sending a single copy abroad wi th the intent t hat it be replicated invokes §271(f) liabi lity for th[e] foreign-made cop i es.” Ibid.;cf. post , at 2 (S TE VEN S 

### , J., dissenting) (“[A] m a ster disk is the functional equiva

lent of a wa rehouse of components .

. . that Mi crosoft fully expects to be incorporated into foreign-manufactur e d computers.” )

. Judge Rader, dissentin g, noted that “supplying” is ordi

narily understood to mean an a ctivity sepa rate and dis

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13 We n eed n o t a ddr ess w h e th ersoftw a r einth e abstr ac t, oran yoth e r in tan g ible, c a n ev erbe a component under § 271(f). If an intangible meth od orproc ess, forin stan c e , qu alifies as a “p aten t ed in v e n t ion” under §271(f) (a question as to which we express no opinion), the c o mbin able c o mpon en ts of t h at in v e n t ionmigh t be in ta n gible as w e ll

. The invention before us, however, AT &T’s speech-proce ssing computer, is a tan gible t h in g .13 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### tinct from any subsequent “copy i n g, replicating, or repro

ducing—ineffect ma nufacturing.” 414 F. 3d, at 1372– 1373 (internal quotati on marks omitted); see id ., at 137 3 (“[C]opying and supplyi ng are se pa rate acts wi th different consequenc es—particu larly when the ‘supplyi ng’ occu rs in the United States and the copyingoccurs in D ϋ sseldorf or Tokyo. As a matter of logic, one cannot supply one hun

dred comp onents of a patentedinvention without fi rst making one hundred copies of the component

. . . .”). He further observed: “The only true difference between mak

ing and supplying s o ftware co mponents and physical components [of other patented inventions] is that copies of software co mponents are easier to make andtranspor t .” Id ., at 1374. But nothing in §271(f)’s text, Judge Rade r maintained, renders ease of copying a relevant, no les s decisive, factor in triggering li ability for infringement. See ibid

. We agree. Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “fro m the United States .

. . in such manner as to ac tively induce the combination of suc hcomponents .” §271(f)(1) (emphasis added). Under this f o rmulat ion, the very components supplied from the United States, and not co pies thereo f, trigger §27 1 (f) liability when co mbined abroad to form the patented invention at i ssue. Here, as we hav e repeatedly noted, see su p ra , at 1–2, 5–6, the copies of Windows actu

ally installed on the foreign computers w e re not them

selves supp lied from the United States. 14

### In deed, those copies did not exist u n til they w e re generated by thir d parties outside the U n ited States. 15 

### Copying software

——————

14 In a footnote, Microsoft suggests th at even a disk shippe d from the Un ited St ates, an d u s ed to in stall W i n d ow s dir e c t lyon a for eig nc o m put e r, would notgive ris e t o liab i lit y under §2 7 1 (f) if t h e dis kwere r e mov e d after in stal lat i on . See Br ief forP e tition er3 7 , n . 11; c f

. post , at 2–4 (ALITO , J ., conc ur ring)

. We need not a n d do notrea ch t h a tiss u e here.

15 The dissent analogizes Microsoft ’s su pplyof masterv e r s ion s of14 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### abroad, all might agree, is indeedeasy and inexpensive. But the sa me could be said of other items: “Keys or m a chine parts might be copied from a master; chemical or biological s ubstances might be created by reproductio n ; and paper products m i ght be made by electronic copyi n g and printin g .” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. See also supra , at 11–12 (rejecting a r gu ment simila rl y based on ease of copying in construing “component”)

. Section 271(f) contains no instruction to gauge when du

plication is easy and cheap enough to deem a copy in fact made abroad nevertheless “supplie [d] .

. . from the United States.” The absence of anything addressing copying i n the statutory text wei ghs agai nst a judicial determination that replica t ion abroad of a master dispatch ed from the United States “supplies ” the foreign-made copies from the United States within the intendment of §271(f). 16

—————— Windows ab roa dt o “t he exportof a n invent ory of .

. . knives t o be wa rehous ed u n t il us ed t o complet et h e a s s e mb ly of a ninfringin g ma chine.” Post , at 2. Bu t as w eh av e u n d er sc or ed, for ei gn -made c o pies of Windows, not the masters Micros oft dispatched from the United S t at es , were ins t a lled on the comput ers here involve d

. A more apt analogy, there fore, wo uld be the export of knives for co pying abr oad, with the foreign-made copies“w ar eh ou sed u n t il u s ed to c o mplete th e a s s e mb ly of an infrin ging ma chine.” Ibid

. With ou t str e tc h i n g§271(f) b e yond t h e t e xtCongres s compos ed, a copy ma de entirely ab r oa d does n o t fit th e desc r i ption“su pplie[d] . . . from th e Un ited St ates.”

16 Our analysis, while focusing on § 271(f)(1), is equally applicable to §271(f)(2). But cf. po st , at 1 (S TEVENS , J., dissen t in g) (as s er tin g“par a g r aph(2) .

. . best su ppor t s AT&T’s po s i tionh e r e ”). Wh ile th e tw o paragraphs differ, among other things , on the quantityof components th at mu s tbe “su pplie[d]

. . . fr om th e Un ited S tate s ” forliabili tyt o att ac h , see infra , at 18, n . 18, th at di stin c t iondoes n o t affec to u r an aly s is. Par a g r aph(2), lik e (1), c o v e r s on lya “c ompon e n t” a m en able to “combinatio n .” §271(f)(2); see supra , at 9–12 (ex pl ain i n gwh yWin

dows in t h e ab s t ra ctis not acomb inab l e component)

. Pa ra gra p h (2 ), like (1), encom p asse s only the “[s]uppl [y] .

. . from theUnited State s” of
“ s uch [a] component” a s will its e lf “b e comb ined outs ide of t h e Unit ed States.” § 271(f)(2); see supra , at 12– 13 a n d th is pag e( o bserv i n gth at foreign-made copies of Win d ows inst a lled on comput ers ab r oa d were15 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### D Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside §271(f)’s compass would be res o lved by the presumption against extrater r itoriality, on which we have already touched. See supra , a t2, 4. The presumption that United States law governs do mestically but does not rule the world ap plies with pa rtic u lar force i npatent la w. The t r aditional un

derstandingthatour p a tent law“ o perate[s] only domesti

cally and d[oes] not extend to foreign activiti es,” Fisch & Allen, supra , at 559, is embeddedin the Patent Act itself, which p r ovi d es that ap a tent confer s exclusive rights in an invention within the United State s . 35 U. S. C. §154(a)(1) (patentee’s rights ove rinvention apply to manufacture, use, or sale “throughou tthe Unite dSta t es” a n d to impor

tation “into the United States”). See Deepsouth , 406 U. S., at 531 (“Ou r patent system ma kes no claim to extraterri

torial effect”; our legi slation “d[oes] not, and [was] no t intended to, operatebeyond t h e lim its of the Uni t ed States, andwe corresp ondingly reject the clai ms of others to such control over our market s.” (quoting Brown , 1 9 How., at 19 5)). As a principle of general application, moreover, we have stated that courts sho u ld “assume that legi slators take account of the legitimate so vereign interests of other nations when they wri te America nlaws.” F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagra n S. A. , 54 2 U. S. 155, 164 (2004); see EEOC v. Arabian American OilCo. , 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991). Thus, the Uni t ed States accurately conveyed in this case: “Foreign conduct is [g enerally] the domain of foreign law,” and in the area here involved, in particular, foreign law “may embody diffe rent policy judgments abou t the relative rights of i n ventors, c o mpetitors, and the pu b

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—————— not“ s upplie[d] .

. . f r om t h eUnit ed S t at es ” )

. Itis t hus uns urpris i n g th at AT &T d oes n o t join t h e dissen tin su g g e stin gth at th e ou tc om e mightt urn o n whet h er we view t h e ca s eu n d er pa ra gra p h(1 ) or (2 ).16 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### lic in patented inventions.” Bri e f for United States as Amicus Cu riae28. Applied to this case, the presumption tugs strongly against constru ction of §271(f) t o encompass as a “component” not only a physi c al copy of software, b u t also software’s intangible co de, and to render “supplie[d]

. . . from th e United States” not only exported copies o f software, but also duplicates made abroad. AT&T a r gues that the presumption is inapplicable because Congress enacted §271(f) specifically to extend th e reach of United States patent law to cover cer t ain activit y abroad. But as this Court has explained, “the presump

tion is not defeated .

. . just because [a statute] specifical l y addresses [an] issue of extraterritorial application,” Smith v. Uni t ed Sta t es , 507 U. S. 197, 204 (1993); it remai n s instructive in deter m ining the exten tof the statutory exception. See Empagran , 542 U. S., at 161–1 62, 164–165; Smith , 507 U. S., at 20 4. AT&T alternately contends that the presumption holds no sway he re given th at §271(f), by its term s, applies only to domestic conduct, i.e. , to the supply of a patented inven

tion’s components “from the United States. ” §271(f)(1). AT&T ’s rea d ing, howe ver, “ c onver t s a single act of sup p ly from the United Sta t es into a springboard for liability each time a copy of the software is subsequently mad e [abroad] and combined with computer hardware [abroad] for sale [abroad.]” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae29; see 414 F. 3 d , at 1373, 1375 (Rader, J., dissen t

ing). In sh ort, foreign law alone, not United States law, currently governs the manufacture and sal e of componen ts of patented inventions in foreign countries. If AT&T desires to prevent cop y ing in foreign countrie s , its remedy today lies in obtaining and enfo rcing foreign patents. Se e Dee psouth , 406 U. S., at 531. 17

——————

17 AT&T ha s s e cured pa t e nt s for it s s p eec hproces s o r in Ca na da , Fr an c e , G e r m an y , Gr eat Br itain , Jap an , an d Sw eden

. App. inNo. 04–17 Cite as: 55 0 U

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### IV AT&T u r ge s that rea d ing §271(f) to cover only those copies of software act ually dispatched from the United States crea t es a “loophole” fo r software make rs. Liability for infringi ng a United States pa tent could be avoided, as Microsoft’s practice sh ows, by an easily arranged circu m vention: Instead of mak i ng installation copies of software in the United States, the copies can be made abroad, swiftly and at small cost, by genera ting them from a mas

ter supplied from the United Stat es. The Federal Circuit majority found AT&T’s plea compelling: “Were we to hold thatMicrosoft’s supply by exporta

tion of themaster versions of the Window s® soft

ware—spec i fic a lly f o r the p u rpo s e of f o r e ignrep l ica

ti on—a vo i d s in frin gem e n t , we wo u l d be su b v e r ti ng the re med i al nat u re of §271 (f), permitting a technical avo i danc e o f the st atut e by ign o r i ng the adv a nce s i n a f i eld of techn o logy—and its ass o c i at ed indu stry p r a c tices—that developed after the enact m ent of §271(f). . . . Section §271(f), if it is to remain effective, must therefore be interpreted in a manner that is ap

propriate to the nature of the technology at issue.” 414 F. 3d, at 1371. While the majority’s c o ncern is understanda b le, we are not persuaded that d y nam ic judicial i n terpretati on of §271(f) is in order. The “loop hole,” in ou r judgment, is properly left for Con gress to consider, and to close if it finds suc h action warr anted. There is no dispute, we note again, that §27 1 (f) is inap

plicable to the export of design tools—blueprints, schemat

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—————— 128 5 (CA Fed.), p. 1477. AT&T an d its am icido n o t r e late w h at pr otec

tion s an d r e m e dies ar e, or ar e n o t, av ail able u n d erth ese for e ig nr e gimes. Cf. Brief for Respo n dent 46 (o bs erv i n gth at “for eig npaten t protections are sometimeswea k er t h an t h eir U. S

. count erpa rt s ” (emphasis add e d)).18 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ics, templates, and prototypes—all of which may provide the information required to construct and c o mbine over seas the components of inventions patented under United States law. See supra , at 10–12. We have no license to attribute to Congress an unstated intention to place t h e information Microsoft dispatched from the United State s in a separate category. Section 271(f) was a direct resp onse to a gap in our patent lawrevealed by this Cou rt’s Dee pso u th decision. See supra , at 4, and n. 3. The facts of th at case we re undeniably at the fore when §271(f) was inthe congres

sional h o pper. In Deep south , the items exported were kits containing all the physical, readily assemblabl e parts of a shrimp deveining machine (not a nintangible set of in

structions), and those parts them selves (not foreign-made copies of t h em) woul d be comb ined abroa d by foreign buyers. Having attended to the gap made evident i n Dee psouth , Congress did not addre ss other arguable gaps : Section 271(f) does notidentify as an infringing act con

duct in the United Stat es that facilitates making a compo

nent of a patented inventio n outside the United States; nor does the provision check “suppl[ying]

. . . from the United Stat es” information, instructions, or other materi

als needed to mak e copies abroad. 18

### Gi ven th at Congress did not home inon t h e loophole AT&T describes, and in view of the expanded extrate rritor i al thrust AT &T’s read

ing of §271(f) entails, our precede n t leads us to leave in Congress’ c o urt the patent-pro tecti ve determination AT&T

——————

18 Section 271(f) ’s text doe s , in one res p ect , rea ch pa s t the fa ct s of Deepso uth

. Wh ile Deeps o ut h export ed kit s cont a i ning allth e par t s of its deveining machines, §271(f)(1) app lie s to the supply abroad of “all or a su bs tan ti alpor t ionof” a paten t ed in v e n t ion ’ s c o m p on en ts. And §271(f)(2) app lies to the ex port of ev en a single component if it i s “espec ial l yma de orespec i all yadaptedforu s e inth e in v e n t ionan d n o t a sta p le ar tic l e orc o mmodityof c o mmer c e su itable f o rsu bstan ti al noninfri ngin g us e.”19 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### seek s. Cf. Sony Corp. of Ameri cav. Unive rsal Cit ySt u dios, Inc. , 4 64 U. S. 41 7, 431 (198 4) (“In a case like this, in which Con gress has not plainly markedour course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment whichnever contem

plated such a calculus of interests.”). Congress is doubtless aware of the ease with whic h software (and other electronic media) can be copied, and has not lef tthe matter untouched. In 19 98, Congress addressed “the ease with wh ich pirates cou l d copyan d distribute acopy righta ble work in digital form .” Universa l City Studio s , Inc . v. Corley , 273 F. 3d 429, 435 (CA2 2001). The resulting measure, the Digita l Millenniu m Copyri gh t Act, 17 U. S. C. §1201 et s e q ., “bac ked with le gal sanctions the efforts of copyrigh towners to protect their wor k s fro m piracy behind digital walls such as encryption codes or password protections.” Universal City S t udios , 273 F. 3d, at 435. If the patent law is to b e adjusted better “to a c count for th e realities of sof tware distribution,” 414 F. 3d, at 1370, the alterationshould be made after focused legi s lative consideration, and not by the Judiciary forecastin g Congress’ likely disposition. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is Reversed. T HE 

### C HIEF 

### J USTICE 

### tookno part in the consi d eration or decision of t h is case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginpa rt 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 05 6 

### MICROSOFT CORP ORATIO N, P E TITION E R v. AT&T COR P

. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FEDERAL CIRC UI T [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### ALITO 

### , with whom J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### and J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### join, concurring a s to all but f ootnote 14. I agree with the Court that no “ c omponent[s]” of the foreign-made computers involved in this case were “sup

plie[d]” by Microsoft “f rom the United States. ” 35 U. S. C. §271(f)(1). I write sep a rately because I reach this conclu

sion through somewhat different reasoning. I Computer programme r s typicallywrite programs in a “human readable” programming language. This “ ‘source code’ ” is then generally converte dby the computer into a “machine readable code” or “ma c h i ne language” expressed in a binary format. Bri e f for Respondent 5, n. 1 (citing R. White, How Compute r s Work 87 , 94 (8th ed. 2006)); E. Walters, Essential Guide to Com p uting 204–205 (2001). During the Windows writing p r ocess, the program exists in the form of machine readable co de on the m a gnetic tape fields of Mi crosoft’ s co mputers’hard drives. White, supra, at 144–145; Walters, supra, at 54– 55. When Microsoft finishes writing its Windows progr a m in the United States, it encodes Windows o n to CD-ROMs known as “ ‘golden mas t ers’ ” in th e form of machine read

able code. App. 31, ¶4. This is done by engr aving each disk in a specific way such that another computer can read2 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginpa rt 

### the engravi n gs, understand what they mean, and wri te the code on to the magn etic fields of its hard drive. Ibid .; Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 2. Microsoft ships these disks (or sends the code via elec

tronic trans mission) abroad, where the code is copied onto other disks that are then placed into foreign-made com

puters for purposes of installing the Windows progra m. App. 31–32, ¶¶5–8. No physical as pect of a Windows CD

ROM—original diskor copy—is ever incorporated into the computer itself. See Stenograph L. L. C. v. Bossard A s socs., Inc., 144 F. 3d 9 6 , 100 (CADC 1998) (noting that, within the context of the Copyri ght Act, “i nstallation of software onto a computer results in ‘copyi ng’ ”); Whit e, supra, at 1 44–145, 17 2–173. Th e intact CD-ROM is then removed and may be discar ded without affecting t h e computer’ s implemen tation of the code.* The parties agree for purposes of this litigation that a foreign-made computer containing the Windows code would violate AT&T’ s patent if present in the United States. Pet. for Cert. 42a, ¶5. II A I agree with the Court that a component of a machine, whether a shrimp deveiner or a personal computer, mu st be something physical. Ante, at 9–11. This i s because t h e word “comp onent,” when concerning a physic al device, is most naturally read to mean a ph ysical part of the device. See Webst e r’s Third New International Dictionary 46 6 (1976) (component is a“constituent part: I N G REDIENT

### ”) ; Random House Dictionary of the English Language 301

——————

* In a sen s e, th e w h o le pr ocess is ak into anau th orliv i n gpr iorto th e exis t e nce of t h e print i ng pres s , who crea t e d ast ory in his mind, wrot e a ma nus cript , and s e ntit t oa s crivener , wh o in t urn copied t h e s t ory by h a n din to a blan k book.3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginpa rt 

### (1967) (component is “a component part; constituen t”). Furthermore, §271(f) requires that the co mponent be “combined” with other components to form the infringing device, meaning that the component must remain a part of the device. Webster’s, supra, at 452 (combi ne means “t o join in physical or chemical union”; “to become one”; “t o unite into a chemical compound”); Random House, supra, at 293 (com bine means “to brin g or join into aclose union or whole”). For these reasons, I agree with th e Court tha t a set of instructions o nhow to b u ild an infr inging devi ce, or even a template of the device, does not qualify as a component. Ante, at 9– 10. B As the parties agree, an inventor can patent a machine that carrie s out a certain process, and a computer may constitute such a machine when itexecutes commands— given to it by code—th a t allow it t o carry out that proces s. Such a computer wo uld not bec o me aninf r inging device until enough of the co de is installed on the computer to allow it to execute the proce ss in question. The computer would not be an infringing device p r ior to the installation, or even during the installation. And the computer re

mains an infringing d e vice after the installation process because, even though the original installationdevice (such as a CD-ROM) has be en removed from the computer, th e code remains on the hard drive. III Here, Windows software originating in th e Unite d States was sent abroa d, whether on a master disk or b y means of an electronic transmission, and eventually cop

ied onto the hard drives of the fo reign-made computers. Once the c o pying pro c ess was completed, the Windows program w a s recorded in a physical form, i.e. , in magnetic fields on the computers’hard drives. See Brief for Re

spondent 5. The physical form of the Windows program on4 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginpa rt 

### the master disk , i.e. , the engravings on the CD-ROM, remained on the disk i na form u n changed by the copying process. Se e Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 2 (citing White, Ho w Computers Work, at 144–145, 172 –173). There is nothin g in the recor dto sug g est thatany physical pa rt of the dis k became a p h ysical part of the forei g n-made computer, and such an occurrence would be co ntrary to the general work

ings of computers. Because no physical o bject origin ating in th e United States was combined with these computers, there was no violation of §271(f). Accordingl y, it is irrelevant that th e Windows software wa s not copied onto the foreign-made computers direc tlyfrom the master diskor from an ele c tronic tran s mission that originated in the U n ited State s . To be sure, if these c o mputers could not run Windows without ins e rting and keeping a C D -R OM in t h e appropri

ate drive, then the CD-ROMs might be comp onents of the computer. But that is not the case here. * * * Because the physical incarnation of code on the Win

dows CD-ROM supplied from the United States is not a “component” of an infringing device under §271(f), it logi

cally follows that a copy of such a CD-R OM also is not a component. For this reason, I join the Court’s opinion, except for f ootnote 14._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 05 6 

### MICROSOFT CORP ORATIO N, P E TITION E R v. AT&T COR P

. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FEDERAL CIRC UI T [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , dissenting. As the Court acknowledges, “[p]la usible arguments can be made for and a g ainst extendin g §271(f) to the conduct charged in this case as infringing AT&T’s patent.” Ante , at 2. Str o ng policyconsiderat ions, buttressed by t h e presumption against the application of domestic paten t law in foreign market s, support Microsoft Corporation’s position. I am, however, pe rsua ded that a naffirmance of the Cou rt of Appe als’ judgme nt is more faithful t o the intent of the Con gress that enacted §271(f) than a reversal. The provision was a response to our decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. La i t ra m C o rp . , 406 U. S. 518 (1972), holding tha ta pa tent o na shrimp deveining machine had not been in fringed by the export of components for assem

bly abroad. Paragrap h (1) of §271(f) would have been sufficient on its own to overrule Deep south ,* but it i s paragra p h ( 2 ) that bestsupports AT &T’s position here. It

——————

* “Wh oev erw i th ou t au th or itysu pplies or c a u s es to be s u pplied inor from the United States all o ra subs tan t i alpor t ionof th e c o mpon en ts of apat e nt ed inv e nt ion, where s uch compone n t s a r e uncomb ined in whole or in pa rt , in s uch ma nne r a s t o a c t ively induce t h e comb ina t i on of s uch c o mpon en ts o u tside of th e Un itedSt at es in a m a n n erth at w o u l d infringe t h e pa t e nt if s u c hcomb ina t i on occu rred wi t h in t h e United States, shall be liable as an infringe r.” 35 U. S. C. §271(f)(1).2 M I CROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP. S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### provides: “Whoever without authority sup p lies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is es pecially made or es

pecially adapted for u s e in the invention and not a staple artic l e or commodity of co mmerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombi ned in whol e or in part, k n owing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component willbe combi n ed outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurre d within th e United States, shall be liable as an infringer.” §271(f)(2). Under this provision, the export of a special l y designed knife that has no use other than as a part o f a patented deveining machine would cons titute infringement. It follows that §271(f)(2) would cover the export of an inven

tory of such knives to be warehoused until used to com

plete the as sembly of a ninfringing machine. The relevant component in this case is not a physical item like a knife. Both Microsoft and the Cour t think tha t means it cannot be a “component.” See ante , a t10. But if a disk withsoftware i n scribed on it is a “ c omponent,” I find it difficult to und erstand wh y the mostimportan t ingredient of that component is not also a component. Indeed, themaster dis kis the fu nctional eq uivalent of a warehouse of components—components that Microsof t fully expects to be incorporated in to foreign-manufactured computers. Put somewhat differently: Onthe Court ’ s view, Microsoft could be liable under §271(f) only if it sends indivi dual copies of its software direc t ly from the United Sta t es with the intent that each copy would be incorporated into a separate infringing computer. But it seems to me that an i n direct tra nsmission via a master disk wareh o use is likewise covered by §271(f).3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### I disagree with the Court’s su ggestion that because software is analogous to an abstra ct set of instructions, it cannot be regarded as a “component” within the meaning of §271(f). See ante , at 9–10. Whether attached or de

tached fro m any medium, software plainly satisfies the dictionary definition of that word

. See ante, at 9, n. 1 1 (observing that “ ‘[c]omponent’ is commonlydefined as ‘a constituent part,’ ‘eleme nt,’ or ‘ingredient’ ”). And unlike a blueprint that merely instructs a user howto do some thing, softw a re actuallycauses infringing cond uct to occu r . It is more l i ke a rollerthat causes a player piano to pro

duce sound than sheet music that tells a pianist what to do. Moreover, it is surely not “a staple article or commod

ity of commerce suitable for substantial noninf ringing use” as that term is used in §271(f)(2). On the co ntrary, its s o le intended use is an infri n ging use. I would therefore affi rm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.