IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-94

No. 489A20

Filed 27 August 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: A.S.D.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 7 

August 2020 by Judge Wesley W. Barkley in District Court, Caldwell County. This 

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 21 June 2021 but 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Lucy R. McCarl for petitioner-appellee Caldwell County Department of Social 

Services.

Matthew P. McGuire for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

David A. Perez for respondent-appellant mother. 

MORGAN, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent, the mother of the juvenile A.S.D. (Amanda),1 appeals from the 

trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. After careful review, we affirm.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

 

1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 

reading.
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¶ 2 On 4 December 2018, the Caldwell County Department of Social Services 

(DSS) filed a petition alleging that Amanda, who was less than two weeks old, was a 

neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS stated that it was currently involved with 

Amanda’s half-brother, D.D., who was in DSS custody. DSS claimed that respondentmother had an extensive history of mental illness, had been diagnosed with several 

mental health disorders, and had a history of “polysubstance abuse.” DSS 

additionally alleged that respondent-mother did not have safe, stable housing and

that respondent-mother had reported to hospital staff that she had been ousted from 

the home that she shared with Amanda’s father and had nowhere to stay. DSS also 

claimed that respondent-mother had been involved in “multiple violent relationships” 

and had several criminal convictions. DSS stated that respondent-mother had placed 

Amanda in a kinship placement in the same home as D.D.

¶ 3 On 6 March 2019, the trial court adjudicated Amanda to be a neglected and 

dependent juvenile based upon respondent-mother’s stipulations to the allegations 

contained within the juvenile petition. In a separate dispositional order, the trial 

court ordered that custody of Amanda be placed with DSS and that DSS have the 

authority to arrange a placement for the juvenile. The trial court further ordered 

respondent-mother to enter into an Out-of-Home Safety Agreement as her case plan

and allowed respondent-mother to engage in supervised visitation with Amanda for 

one hour each week.
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¶ 4 The trial court entered a permanency planning order on 30 May 2019 in which 

it found that respondent-mother was not consistently attending mental health or 

substance abuse treatment and did not have stable housing. The trial court set the

primary permanent plan as reunification with a secondary plan of adoption.

¶ 5 In a permanency planning review order entered on 3 October 2019, the trial 

court found as fact that respondent-mother had not attended mental health services

since January 2019. The trial court additionally found that respondent-mother was 

not receiving substance abuse treatment and that respondent-mother refused to 

submit to hair follicle drug screens because she “believes that such may result in the 

use of Black Magic on her hair.” The trial court also found as fact that respondentmother still did not have stable housing.

¶ 6 On 5 March 2020, the trial court filed a permanency planning review order in 

which the trial court found that DSS had made numerous attempts to administer 

drug screens to respondent-mother, but that such attempts were often unsuccessful—

such as on 25 November 2019 and 7 February 2020 when respondent-mother refused 

to come to the door on both occasions. The trial court also found that respondentmother was living in a mobile home with her boyfriend, and that respondent-mother

was unemployed because her boyfriend did not want respondent-mother to work and 

was paying respondent-mother $100 per week to complete chores around the home

rather than have her to seek employment. The trial court further found as fact that 
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respondent-mother had not visited with the juvenile since respondent-mother had 

refused a drug screen on 14 October 2019. The trial court changed the primary 

permanent plan for Amanda to adoption and the secondary plan to guardianship with 

an approved caretaker.

¶ 7 On 12 March 2020, DSS filed a motion in the cause to terminate respondentmother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (9), based on 

neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, and the fact that respondentmother’s parental rights with respect to another child had been terminated 

involuntarily and respondent-mother lacked the ability or willingness to establish a 

safe home. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (9) (2019). On 7 August 2020, the trial court 

entered an order in which it determined that grounds existed to terminate 

respondent-mother’s parental rights as alleged in the motion. The trial court further 

concluded that it was in Amanda’s best interests that respondent-mother’s parental 

rights to Amanda be terminated. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondentmother’s parental rights.2 Respondent-mother appeals.

II. Analysis

 

2 The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of Amanda’s father. He is 

not a party to the proceedings before this Court.
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¶ 8 Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by concluding that 

grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. A termination of parental rights 

proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 

7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110 (1984). At the 

adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence” the existence of one or more grounds for termination under 

subsection 7B-1111(a) of our General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f). We review 

a trial court’s adjudication “to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, 

cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In 

re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982)). 

¶ 9 “[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient 

to support a termination of parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019). 

We begin our analysis with the consideration of whether grounds existed to terminate 

respondent-mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 

¶ 10 Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a trial court may terminate parental 

rights if “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside 

the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court 

that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those 

conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). “[T]he 

willfulness of a parent’s failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 
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conditions that led to a child’s removal from the family home ‘is established when the 

[parent] had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the 

effort.’ ” In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124, 136 (2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting 

In re Fletcher, 148 N.C. App. 228, 235 (2002)).

¶ 11 In support of its adjudication of grounds pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)

3, 

the trial court made the following findings of fact:

14. . . .

a. Respondent[-]mother has an extensive history of 

substance abuse for which she has received 

inadequate treatment. She received an updated 

Comprehensive Clinical Assessment (CCA) on 

January 27, 2020. She was recommended to 

complete 90 hours of Substance Abuse Intensive 

Outpatient Treatment (SAIOP). She has only 

attended a few classes. 

b. Respondent[-]mother has submit[ted] to urine 

drug screens as requested by the Movant on 5/1/19, 

5/15/19, and 6/19/19. She refused to submit to a hair 

follicle drug screen on 9/5/19 and again in January 

of 2020. She has on numerous other occasions not 

made herself available for drug screens. She has 

never had a consistent six (6) month period of 

negative drug screens. 

 

3 We note that Finding of Fact 14 and its subparts were in reference to the grounds to 

terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1), but the findings also demonstrate respondent-mother’s failure to make reasonable 

progress in correcting the conditions which led to Amanda’s removal, which supports the trial 

court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
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c. Respondent[-]mother completed a psychological 

evaluation with Dr. Jennifer Cappelletty. Dr. 

Cappelletty diagnosed Respondent[-]mother with 

Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type; Cannabis 

Use Disorder; Stimulant Use Disorder –

Amphetamine Type; and Opioid Use Disorder. Dr. 

Cappelletty made the following recommendations 

for Respondent[-]mother: (a) participate in 

psychotherapy; (b) participate in a psychiatric 

evaluation and comply with all recommendations; (c) 

participate in the Assertive Community Treatment 

Team (ACTT) program; (d) refrain from use of nonprescribed substances; and (e) participate in 

Vocational Rehabilitation Services. Respondent[-

]mother has refused to take any prescription 

medication to address her mental health issues. In 

addition to the psychological evaluation by Dr. 

Cappelletty, Respondent[-]mother has completed 4 

or 5 other mental health assessments. She has not 

addressed any of the issues identified by Dr. 

Cappelletty. She has not completed any mental 

health treatment. She did not participate in the 

ACTT program. She did not participate in 

Vocational Rehabilitation Services. 

d. Respondent[-]mother has lived a transient 

lifestyle during the course of her involvement with 

the Movant up until the last few months. She has 

moved at least six (6) times since the birth of the 

juvenile. She currently lives with a boyfriend and is 

totally dependent upon him. She is unemployed and 

has had only sporadic employment during her 

involvement with the Movant. She exhibited no 

consistency from February 2019 to March 2020. The 

brief period of stability during the last few months 

does not outweigh the year of instability during 

which her environment shifted on a monthly basis. 
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e. Respondent[-]mother has not visited with the 

juvenile since October 14, 2019, due to her refusal to 

submit to drug screens. 

f. Respondent[-]mother has a history of domestic 

violence for which she has received no treatment. 

. . . .

16. Grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of 

Respondent[-]mother pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(2). The juvenile has been willfully left in foster care 

or placement outside the home for more than 12 months 

without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that 

outside of consideration of poverty, reasonable progress 

under the circumstances has been made [in] correcting the 

conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile. 

Specifically, Respondent[-]mother has not completed any of 

the objectives of her case plan with [DSS] or complied with 

the prior orders of the court in order to reunify with the 

juvenile. She demonstrated no consistency for a period in 

excess of a year.

“Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent 

evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019).

Furthermore, this Court limits its review of findings of fact “to those challenged 

findings that are necessary to support the trial court’s determination that . . . parental 

rights should be terminated.” In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 900 (2020) (emphasis added).

¶ 12 Respondent-mother challenges several of the trial court’s findings of fact. First, 

respondent-mother disputes Finding of Fact 14(a), arguing that there was no 

evidence to show that substance abuse was a continuing issue at the time of the 
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termination of parental rights hearing.4 We are not persuaded by this argument. In 

this finding, contrary to respondent-mother’s assertion, the trial court did not purport 

to determine that respondent-mother was continuing to use drugs at the time of the 

hearing; rather, the trial court found that respondent-mother had an extensive 

history of substance abuse for which she received inadequate treatment. This finding 

is supported by the evidence of record. We note that respondent-mother stipulated to 

the allegations in the juvenile petition that she had “an extensive history of 

polysubstance abuse [and] a long history of using methamphetamines, 

benzodiazepines, opiates, and marijuana, as well as other substances.” Additionally, 

a DSS social worker testified at the termination hearing that respondent-mother had 

an extensive history of substance abuse and that respondent-mother did not complete 

the required substance abuse treatment. The trial court also observed that 

respondent-mother was referred to intensive outpatient treatment but attended only 

a few classes. Respondent-mother does not challenge this finding of fact on appeal, 

and therefore it is deemed to be binding on this Court. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407.

Furthermore, we recognize that Dr. Cappelletty stated in her psychological 

evaluation of respondent-mother that, in her opinion, “the combination of 

[respondent-mother’s] severe and chronic mental illness and her history of substance 

 

4 Respondent-mother makes additional arguments regarding Finding of Fact 14(a), 

but we do not address them because they are not relevant to grounds for termination under 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 900 (2020).
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abuse has combined in such a way as to have a significant impact on her capacity to 

maintain stability and effectively parent.” Also, on several occasions, respondentmother refused drug screens and hair follicle tests. Thus, there is clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence to support Finding of Fact 14(a).

¶ 13 Next, respondent-mother contends that the portion of Finding of Fact 14(b) 

that she had “on numerous other occasions not made herself available for drug 

screens” is not supported by the evidence. We disagree with this contention. The DSS 

social worker testified that respondent-mother refused to participate in drug screens 

on 1 May, 15 May, 19 June, and 14 October 2019. Additionally, respondent-mother

refused to participate in hair follicle tests on 5 September 2019 and 6 January 2020.

Consequently, we conclude that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports this 

finding of fact.

¶ 14 Respondent-mother further contends that Finding of Fact 14(d), which states 

that she exhibited “no consistency from February 2019 to March 2020,” is erroneous. 

As support for her stance, respondent-mother cites the testimony of the DSS social 

worker that respondent-mother had maintained stable housing since December 2019, 

and that her “home was appropriate, clean and had space for Amanda were she to be 

returned.” Respondent-mother does not challenge, however, the portions of the trial 

court’s Finding of Fact 14(d) that respondent-mother had lived a “transient lifestyle” 

during the course of the case and had moved at least six times since Amanda was 
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born, that respondent-mother was unemployed and only had sporadic employment 

during the course of the case, and that respondent-mother lived with her boyfriend 

and was “totally dependent” upon him. Furthermore, the evidence of record showed 

that respondent-mother had moved multiple times during the course of the case, was 

not employed at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing, and had not 

been employed since losing her job in June 2019. Respondent-mother also 

acknowledged at the termination hearing that she was completely dependent upon 

her boyfriend. The trial court favorably noted that respondent-mother had exhibited 

a “brief period of stability during the last few months,” but nonetheless still assessed 

that this positive stint did not “outweigh the year of instability during which her 

environment shifted on a monthly basis.” We conclude that the trial court’s finding 

that respondent-mother did not exhibit consistency from February 2019 to March 

2020 was a permissible inference available to the trial court based upon the evidence 

and unchallenged findings of fact. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016) (stating 

that it is the trial court’s duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon the credibility 

of the witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom); 

see also Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C. App. 382, 388 (2003) (stating that when the trial court 

sits as fact-finder, it is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given to the 

evidence, and it is not the role of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for 

that of the trial court).
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¶ 15 Respondent-mother maintains that Finding of Fact 14(e) is erroneous because 

she visited with Amanda in March 2020. Respondent-mother claims that she was 

eligible to visit earlier but could not do so because Amanda was out of town. We agree

with respondent-mother on this point. The DSS social worker testified that 

respondent-mother had not visited with Amanda since October 2019 because 

respondent-mother “had to pass two [drug] screens” before she would be permitted 

visitation. The social worker further went on to testify, however, that respondentmother passed drug screens in January 2020 and was eligible to visit with the 

juvenile during that month but could not do so because Amanda went with her “foster 

family . . . on a trip to California.” The trial court’s Finding of Fact 14(e) does not 

properly reflect the evidence submitted at the termination of parental rights hearing, 

and hence we disregard this finding of fact. See In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 684 (2020).

¶ 16 We next consider respondent-mother’s representation that a segment of 

Finding of Fact 16 is erroneous in its establishment that she had not completed any 

objectives of her case plan or complied with the prior orders of the trial court in order 

to reunify with Amanda, and that respondent-mother had demonstrated no 

consistency for a period in excess of twelve months. We begin by recalling that we 

have already determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Finding of Fact 

14(d) that respondent-mother exhibited “no consistency from February 2019 to March 
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2020,” and likewise conclude that the same evidence supports the trial court’s similar 

finding regarding respondent-mother’s lack of consistency in Finding of Fact 16.

¶ 17 As for the balance of Finding of Fact 16, we conclude that there was clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding. First, respondentmother admitted at the termination of parental rights hearing that she did not do 

anything toward completing her case plan other than working, and that she was 

unemployed by the time of the termination hearing. Second, we have found that there 

was sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s findings of fact that respondentmother did not always make herself available for drug screens, that she did not 

complete substance abuse treatment, and that she did not complete any mental 

health treatment. Furthermore, while the trial court acknowledged that at the time 

of the termination of parental rights hearing respondent-mother had a brief period of 

stability with regard to housing, nonetheless she had previously been transient, and 

the trial court thereupon determined that respondent-mother’s short period of 

stability did not outweigh her lengthy period of instability. Therefore, Finding of Fact 

16 is properly supported by the record.

¶ 18 Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that 

grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to terminate her parental 

rights. Although respondent-mother concedes that she was slow to address many 

components of her case plan, respondent-mother contends that she made reasonable 
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progress and rectified the issues which led to Amanda’s removal from respondentmother’s care by the time of the termination of parental rights hearing. We are not 

persuaded by these representations of respondent-mother.

¶ 19 This Court has recognized that “parental compliance with a judicially adopted 

case plan is relevant in determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant 

to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384 (2019). A trial court 

should refrain from finding that a parent has failed to make reasonable progress in 

correcting the conditions that led to the child’s removal “simply because of his or her 

‘failure to fully satisfy all elements of the case plan goals.’ ” Id. at 385 (quoting In re 

J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 163 (2006)). However, “a trial court has ample authority to 

determine that a parent’s ‘extremely limited progress’ in correcting the conditions 

leading to removal adequately supports a determination that a parent’s parental 

rights in a particular child are subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(2).” Id.

¶ 20 Here, respondent-mother admits that Amanda has resided in foster care or

placement outside of the home for more than twelve months. However, respondentmother asserts that she made reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions 

which led to Amanda’s removal from her care. This contention is without merit.

Respondent-mother’s case plan was directed at resolving her issues concerning 

substance abuse, mental health, and instability. The case plan also aimed at 
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addressing respondent-mother’s lack of stable, safe housing. The evidence in the

record, which yielded the trial court’s supported findings of fact, demonstrates that 

respondent-mother largely failed to comply with her case plan. Significantly, 

although it was recommended that respondent-mother complete ninety hours of 

intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment, she only attended a few classes and 

failed to complete the treatment. Respondent-mother also failed to complete mental 

health treatment and refused to take any prescription medication to address her 

mental health issues. In like manner, respondent-mother demonstrated continued 

instability during most of the course of this case; she was consistently transient and 

unable to maintain stable employment. Respondent-mother remained completely 

dependent upon her boyfriend, even up to the time of the termination hearing.

Although respondent-mother cites progress made by her just prior to the termination

of parental rights hearing, it was within the trial court’s authority to decide that these 

improvements were insufficient in light of the historical facts of the case. See In re 

T.M.L., 2021-NCSC-55, ¶ 32 (concluding that while the respondent “made some lastminute attempts to comply with the case plan by the time of the termination hearing 

. . . [his] partial steps—undertaken after DSS had filed petitions to terminate his 

parental rights and two years or more after the children’s removal from the home—

[were] insufficient to constitute reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(2)”); see also In re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645, 654 (2020) (concluding that, with 
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respect to grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), that 

although the respondent may have made some recent, minimal progress, “the trial 

court was within its authority to weigh the evidence and determine that these 

eleventh-hour efforts did not outweigh the evidence of his persistent failures to make 

improvements . . . and to conclude that there was a probability of repetition of 

neglect.”). Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that 

grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to terminate respondentmother’s parental rights.

III. Conclusion

¶ 21 The trial court’s conclusion that a ground for termination existed pursuant to 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) is sufficient in and of itself to support termination of 

respondent-mother’s parental rights. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395. As such, we do 

not need to address her arguments regarding N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (9). 

Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that termination 

of her parental rights was in Amanda’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of 

respondent-mother. 

AFFIRMED.