NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

CHRISTINE LEAH SHEMER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

PETER ANTHONY MENGHINI, Respondent/Appellant.

NON-PARTY TRUSTS AND FAMILY LLCs, Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0005 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC 2016-091275

The Honorable Marvin L. Davis, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Peter Menghini, Scottsdale

Respondent/Appellant

Christine Shemer, Scottsdale

Petitioner/Appellee

Scottsdale Family Law PLLC, Scottsdale

By Claudia D. Work

Counsel for Appellees, Non-Party Trusts and Family LLCs

FILED 8-25-2022
SHEMER v. MENGHINI

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Peter Menghini (Father) appeals from an order authorizing 

Christine Shemer (Mother) to sign documents on his behalf, pursuant to 

Rule 89 of the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure (Rules). Father

contends the order was “based on lies.” Because the record supports the 

family court’s order, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This appeal arises out of proceedings to enforce a judgment,

on remand, after the parties’ appeal of their 2018 decree of dissolution. See 

Menghini v. Menghini, 1 CA-CV 19-0057 FC, 2020 WL 1026627 (Ariz. App. 

Mar. 3, 2020) (mem. decision). In that judgment, the court ordered Father to 

assign his membership interests in several limited liability companies (The 

Family LLCs) to two trusts operated for the benefit of the parties’ children.1

¶3 To execute the assignment, the family court ordered Father to 

sign two partially executed documents within 30 days. Pursuant to the 

assignment documents, Father was obligated to transfer his membership 

interests to the two trusts, with the children’s maternal grandparents

designated as trustees.2 Father refused to sign the documents, continuing 

to argue the children’s grandparents should not be the trustees. Instead of 

complying with the court’s decree, he executed different documents which 

would have assigned his membership interests to a different trust—one that 

named both parents as trustees.

¶4 Five months after entering the judgment, the family court 

granted Mother’s Rule 89 motion, authorizing her to sign the original 

assignment documents on Father’s behalf. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 89(a).

1 The Family LLCs and the two trusts were joined on remand. 

2 The documents had already been signed by the grandparents.
SHEMER v. MENGHINI

Decision of the Court

3

Following the entry of another final judgment, Father timely appealed, 

challenging the authorization orders.

DISCUSSION

¶5 Father appears to argue the authorization orders were not 

supported by the evidence.3 Because the relevant facts are not disputed, we 

assume a de novo standard applies to our review.

4 See Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 

Ariz. 227, 231, ¶ 8 (App. 2012) (“We review . . . questions involving the 

application and interpretation of court rules de novo.”).

I. Rule 89 Orders

¶6 In cases where a party fails to comply with a judgment, Rule 

89 authorizes the family court to empower another person to act on the 

party’s behalf:

A Party’s Failure to Act; Ordering Another to Act. If a 

judgment requires a party to convey land, to deliver a deed or 

other document, or to perform any other specific act and the 

party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may 

order the act to be done--at the disobedient party’s expense--

by another person appointed by the court. When done, the act 

has the same effect as if done by the party.

Ariz. R. Fam. Law. P. 89(a). Here, the court ordered Father to sign two 

specific documents within 30 days. Father refused. These facts are 

undisputed. Father continues to argue about who should serve as trustees 

for the children’s trusts. While that issue might have been germane in an 

3 To the extent Father contends the family court erred by ruling 

without allowing or considering evidence, that argument is waived because 

he fails to develop it or to support it with citation to legal authority and the 

record. See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009); see also

ARCAP 13(a)(7). Father also contends opposing counsel should be “held 

accountable” for including untrue and misleading statements in the 

briefing on Mother’s Rule 89 motion. This argument is also waived because 

Father did not raise it in the family court. See Englert v. Carondelet Health 

Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 26–27, ¶ 13 (App. 2000) (explaining issues raised for 

the first time on appeal are generally waived).

4 In his brief, Father fails to cite the applicable standard of review, in 

violation of ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B).
SHEMER v. MENGHINI

Decision of the Court

4

appeal from the original judgment ordering him to sign the documents, it 

is irrelevant to whether the court erred by authorizing Mother to sign the 

documents on his behalf.5 Because Father failed to timely comply with the 

original judgment, the court did not err in authorizing Mother to sign the 

documents on his behalf pursuant to Rule 89.

II. Request for Award under A.R.S. § 12-349

¶7 Mother, the non-party trusts, and the Family LLCs 

(collectively, Appellees) request their attorney’s fees and taxable costs 

incurred on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349, contending Father “had no 

legal or factual basis” for his appeal and brought it solely to harass 

opposing counsel. See A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1), (2). We need not decide 

whether Father filed this appeal solely to harass opposing counsel because 

his appeal lacked substantial justification. See A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1). An 

appeal lacks substantial justification “when it is both ‘groundless’ and ‘not 

made in good faith.’” Takieh v. O’Meara, 252 Ariz. 51, 61, ¶ 37 (App. 2021)

(quoting A.R.S. § 12-349(F)). Father’s appeal was groundless because, as 

explained above, he lacked any rational factual or legal basis to challenge 

the Rule 89 order. See id. (“A claim is groundless if the proponent can 

present no rational argument based upon the evidence or law in support of 

that claim.” (quotation omitted)). Moreover, Father’s appeal was brought 

in bad faith because, in his opening brief, he misrepresented the only facts 

relevant to resolution of this appeal, claiming he “executed all the required 

forms/documents.” Because Father’s appeal lacked substantial 

justification, we award the non-party trusts and Family LLCs their 

attorney’s fees, and we award Appellees their taxable costs, pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1).6 Because Father’s appeal was rooted solely in a bad 

faith misrepresentation of the record, in our discretion, we also award 

Appellees double damages of not to exceed $5,000.00.

CONCLUSION

¶8 For the reasons above, we affirm the family court’s final 

judgment filed on November 8, 2021. Appellees are entitled to recover their 

taxable costs incurred on appeal as well as double damages, not to exceed 

$5,000.00, pending their compliance with ARCAP 21. The non-party trusts 

5 To the extent Father challenges the original judgment, his appeal is 

untimely. See ARCAP 9(a) (requiring notice of appeal to be filed “no later 

than 30 days after entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken”). 

6 Mother represented herself in this appeal.
SHEMER v. MENGHINI

Decision of the Court

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and Family LLCs are also entitled to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees

incurred on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.