ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Supreme Court

People v. Donelson, 2013 IL 113603

Caption in Supreme

Court:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CHARLES

DONELSON, Appellant.

 

Docket No. 113603

Filed

Rehearing denied

March 21, 2013

May 28, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Where a defendant who had entered into a fully negotiated plea

agreement for concurrent terms claimed that it was void because

consecutive sentences were required by statute, but where the maximum

term which the parties had originally intended was clear, it was proper to

order a contract reformation on remand which would correct the parties’

mutual mistake by reconfiguring the sentences so as to impose

consecutive terms which implemented that maximum sentence.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court

on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Lawrence

Edward Flood, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy

Defender, and Jessica D. Pamon, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the

Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, and Charles

Donelson, pro se, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez,

State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz and

Sheilah O’Grady-Krajniak, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for

the People.

Justices JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Burke,

and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 In this appeal, we consider the proper remedy where the State and the defendant, parties

to a fully negotiated plea agreement, are mutually mistaken as to the manner in which

sentences of imprisonment must be served, but otherwise agree upon the maximum number

of years to be served. Faced with this issue, the appellate court acknowledged that

consecutive sentencing was statutorily mandated, and in that respect the concurrent

sentencing structure of the parties’ plea agreement rendered defendant’s sentencing void.

2011 IL App (1st) 092594, ¶ 9. However, the appellate court concluded that the plea

agreement, “taken as a whole, is not contraryto statutoryauthorityand thus not void,” insofar

as sentences could be fashioned, within statutory constraints, to effectuate the parties’intent,

i.e., that the defendant “receive a total of 50 years’ imprisonment.” 2011 IL App (1st)

092594, ¶ 18. Thus, the appellate court remanded this cause to the circuit court “to

resentence defendant in accordance with both the plea agreement and the applicable

statutes.” 2011 IL App (1st) 092594, ¶ 22. We allowed the defendant’s petition for leave to

appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate

court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant, Charles Donelson, was charged, in indictment number 98 CR 11525, with

first degree murder, home invasion, residential burglary, and aggravated criminal sexual

assault. Defendant was charged separately, in indictment number 98 CR 11527, with

aggravated criminal sexual assault. The cases were consolidated and proceeded to a jury trial

on January 30, 2001. After opening statements, and commencement of the State’s case in

chief, the parties informed the court that they had reached a plea agreement.

¶ 4 The parties agreed that defendant would plead guilty to first degree murder and home

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invasion, as charged in indictment number 98 CR 11525, and aggravated criminal sexual

assault, under indictment number 98 CR 11527. It was further agreed that he would receive

prison sentences of 55, 30 and 30 years, respectively, to be served concurrently.

¶ 5 The court admonished defendant regarding the rights he was giving up bypleading guilty.

Defendant said he understood. The court advised defendant of the maximum sentences that

could be imposed for each offense. Defendant again indicated he understood. The court

confirmed that the proposed prison sentences—including a 55-yearsentence of imprisonment

for murder—met with defendant’s expectations. Upon inquiry by the court, defendant

responded that no one had forced him to plead guilty and no promises had been made to him

other than the stated terms of the plea agreement.

¶ 6 The defendant then stipulated that the facts as stated in the prosecutor’s opening

statement would serve as the factual basis for the guilty plea. The court found a sufficient

factual basis for the guilty plea and sentenced defendant in accordance with the parties’

agreement.

¶ 7 On February 27, 2001, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On

March 30, 2001, the circuit court denied the motion and defendant appealed. The State

confessed error based on erroneous plea admonishments, and the appellate court remanded

the case. People v. Donelson, No. 1-01-2127 (2002) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 23).

¶ 8 On remand, defendant, by counsel, filed new motions in each case, “to withdraw the plea

of guilty and vacate the sentence.” Ultimately, on May 22, 2003, defense counsel announced

an agreement by which defendant would withdraw his motions in exchange for the State’s

offer of a five-year sentence reduction on defendant’s first degree murder conviction. The

prosecutor confirmed the agreed sentence reduction, and added, without objection or

disagreement: “As part of [the] agreement *** the defendant would withdraw the previously

mentioned motions and not litigate that issue any further.” The court questioned defendant

as to his understanding of the agreement, and emphasized that only“one sentence” was being

reduced, “first degree murder ***, the significant sentence, from 55 years to 50 years.”

Defendant indicated he understood and expressed his satisfaction with his attorney’s

performance. Pursuant to the parties’ new agreement, the circuit court reduced defendant’s

55-year sentence for murder to 50 years. Defendant’s 30-year sentences were unaffected.

¶ 9 A little over two months after the parties’ May 2003 agreement, and the resulting

reduction of defendant’s murder sentence, a docket entry, dated August 5, 2003,

acknowledges receipt of yet another motion filed by defendant, this one for a further

“reduction of sentence.” In his motion, defendant referenced only his 50-year sentence. A

subsequent docket entry indicates the motion was heard and denied on August 8, 2003. A late

notice of appeal, to which defendant subscribed, evinces defendant’s attempt to appeal from

that judgment. He cited May 22, 2003, as the date of his sentence, and the only sentence

specified as cause for concern was his 50-yearsentence for murder. An entry of record, dated

December 1, 2003, states: “Late Notice of Appeal Denied.”

¶ 10 Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition on February 18, 2005. In that petition,

defendant referenced only his 50-year sentence for murder. He generally asserted vague

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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, with equally amorphous flourishes of

constitutional jargon; however, he did make one specific claim: “Iwas promised 30 years and

I didn’t receive it. I was told by counsel that the State would allow me to file a reduction of

sentence and if I like to file a withdraw motion of guilty plea, appeal the motion to reduce

sentence.” A record sheet of the circuit clerk states that postconviction relief was “denied”

on March 15, 2005. The relevant entries use the phrases “successive petition” and “frivolous

and patently without merit.” In this portion of an obviously jumbled and fragmentary record

on appeal, a partial transcript of a March 30, 2001, hearing appears, wherein defendant’s

attorney as of that date told the judge she had offered the State 30 years in defendant’s plea

negotiations, but the State had never offered defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to

murder in exchange for 30 years. The prosecutor confirmed that, stating: “Absolutely not,

Judge. In fact, this would have been a case where we had sought death.” This portion of the

transcript bears a stamped filing date of February 18, 2005, suggesting that it was considered

contemporaneously with defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶ 11 In a notice of appeal, file stamped April 26, 2005, defendant lists “murder-sexual assault”

as the offenses of which he was convicted. The only sentence listed is defendant’s 50-year

sentence of imprisonment. It is unclear what transpired on appeal. Docket entries indicate

that an appellate court mandate was filed with the circuit court on January 3, 2007, and the

appeal was dismissed, pursuant to “appellant’s motion” on January 11, 2007.

¶ 12 On April 23, 2009, defendant submitted, for filing, a pro se motion for leave to file a

petition for relief from judgment, pursuant to section 2-1401(f) of the Code of Civil

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2008)), along with the petition itself. Defendant

challenged various aspects of his guilty plea, suggesting that he received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, that the trial court failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006), and that his plea was involuntary. Although he claimed the

judgment evincing his convictions and sentences was void for sundry reasons, improper

concurrent sentencing was not one of them. The circuit court dismissed defendant’s petition

on July 17, 2009. On July 27, 2009, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of

his petition for relief from judgment, which the circuit court denied on August 14, 2009. The

ensuing notice of appeal identifies defendant’s “sentence” as “50 yrs. concurrent.”

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant contended that concurrent sentencing rendered his sentences and

his plea void. 2011 IL App (1st) 092594, ¶ 7. As indicated at the outset of this opinion, the

appellate court agreed that the sentencing structure was void, insofar as the sentences were

ordered to run concurrently (2011 IL App (1st) 092594, ¶ 9); however, the court concluded

that the parties’ agreement was not void, as the intent of the parties—that defendant serve

an agreed number of years in prison—could be implemented by resentencing defendant “in

accordance with both the plea agreement and the applicable statutes.” 2011 IL App (1st)

092594, ¶¶ 18, 22. The appellate court so ordered.

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Contrary to the position it took in the appellate court, the State now concedes that

defendant’s concurrent sentences were improper. As the appellate court correctly observed:

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“A conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault(720 ILCS5/12-14 (West 1998)) triggers

mandatory consecutive sentences where the defendant is convicted of multiple offenses

whetherthe offenses were committed during a single course of conduct (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)

(West 1998)) or whether the offenses were committed during separate courses of conduct

(730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1998)). People v. Harris, 203 Ill. 2d 111, 116-17 (2003).” 2011

IL App (1st) 092594, ¶ 9. A sentence, or portion thereof, that is not authorized by statute is

void. People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 23 (2004). Hence, the sentencing structure

employed in defendant’s case renders his sentences void to the extent they were ordered to

be served concurrently.

¶ 16 Defendant, with the refrain “void is void,” and the insistence that our recent decision in

People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, controls the outcome here, contends that finding should

end our inquiry, that this court should “vacate [defendant’s] plea, and remand the cause for

further proceedings, during which [defendant] and the State can attempt to reach a new plea

agreement or proceed to trial.” To that end, defendant suggests that he negotiated for specific

sentences, that this was not a situation where he pled for a sentencing cap. Apparently unable

to posit any additional arguments on his own behalf, defendant opines—anticipating and

opposing implementation of the appellate court’s remedy—“the trial court should not be

allowed to unilaterally modify the sentences and deprive the State of the benefit of its

bargain, *** rather the plea should be withdrawn and the parties should be returned to their

positions prior to imposition of the void sentence.”

¶ 17 The State argues that the appellate court’s remedy would give the defendant the essential

term of his bargain—“a total period of incarceration of 50 years”—and, not surprisingly, the

State appears to be unconvinced that withdrawal of defendant’s guilty plea would inure to

its benefit. The State seems more concerned that it “would be prejudiced if it were forced to

attempt to re-try the case more than 14 years after defendant committed first-degree murder

and aggravated criminal sexual assault.” The State notes that “plea agreements, like all

contracts, occasionally include mistakes of law or fact,” and suggests that the “equitable

solution” reached by the appellate court in this casemakes wayfor reformation of the parties’

agreement in such a way as to give both parties the benefits of their bargain. We agree with

the State.

¶ 18 This court has recognized that the plea-bargaining process, and negotiated plea

agreements, are vital to, and highly desirable for, our criminal justice system. People v.

Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 325 (1996). Plea bargaining leads to prompt disposition of cases,

preserves finite judicial and financial resources, and allows the State to focus its

prosecutorial efforts where they are most needed. People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 416 (1985).

When properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 325.

As we have frequently stated, and recently observed in People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817,

¶ 68, a plea agreement has often been compared to an enforceable contract, and this court has

applied contract law principles in appropriate circumstances. See also People v. Absher, 242

Ill. 2d 77, 87-88 (2011); Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 326-27.

¶ 19 Where a plea rests in any significant degree upon a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration for the plea,

that feature of the agreement must be fulfilled. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 68. The principal

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inquiry, in that respect, is whether the defendant has received the benefit of his bargain.

Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 69. Though rarely emphasized in this court’s jurisprudence, the

other half of the contractual equation is the benefit of the bargain accruing to the State, a

consideration that looms larger as the temporal gap between the commission of the offenses

and attempts to withdraw the guilty plea widens.

¶ 20 Here, the defendant and the State were mistaken insofar as they believed that defendant

could be sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for murder, home invasion, and

aggravated criminal sexual assault. However, pursuant to contract principles, contracting

parties’ mutual mistake may be rectified by recourse to contract reformation (Czarobski v.

Lata, 227 Ill. 2d 364, 371-72 (2008)), where they are in actual agreement and their true intent

may be discerned (Wheeler-Dealer, Ltd. v. Christ, 379 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869 (2008)).

¶ 21 The State argues that defendant would receive the benefit of his bargain if, upon remand,

he is resentenced to consecutive sentences totaling 50 years in prison. The appellate court’s

disposition explained how that could be accomplished within the constraints of consecutive

sentencing statutes (see 2011 IL App (1st) 092594, ¶ 18 (“defendant could properly receive

a total of 50 years’ imprisonment in light of the sentencing ranges of 20 to 60 years for first

degree murder and 6 to 30 years for the other two offenses”)) and it prescribed that remedy

on remand.

¶ 22 The procedural history of this case does in fact indicate that defendant’s concern—apart

from limiting his criminal convictions to three—was to set an upper limit on the time he

would spend in prison. Defendant originally bargained for a 55-year sentence of

imprisonment on his murder conviction, and 30-year sentences on his convictions for

aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion. The 30-yearsentencesrepresented the

maximum nonextended-term sentences for those offenses.

¶ 23 On February 27, 2001, defendant embarked upon the first of what would be successive

attempts to withdraw his guilty plea and either reduce his “sentence” or vacate his sentences.

When that first action resulted in an appellate court remand to the circuit court, defendant

ultimately agreed to withdraw a motion to “withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the

sentence” in exchange for a five-year reduction of his lengthiest sentence, i.e., the sentence

everyone believed would dictate defendant’s maximum term of incarceration. Defendant’s

30-year sentences were unaffected. When—in contravention of the understanding that the

sentence reduction would put an end to the litigation—defendant almost immediately filed

another motion for “reduction of sentence,” defendant referenced only his 50-yearsentence.

When that proceeding came to naught, defendant’s 2005 resurrection of the matter via

postconviction proceedings again referenced only his 50-year sentence. The record belied

defendant’s allegation that he “was promised 30 years” and, in the end, defendant was denied

postconviction relief. His notice of appeal from that judgment lists only one sentence of

imprisonment—50 years. Finally, when defendant’s petition for relief from judgment was

denied by the circuit court, and defendant appealed that ruling, the ensuing notice of appeal

identified defendant’s “sentence” as “50 yrs. concurrent.”

¶ 24 In short, nothing in the defendant’s actions, or the procedural history of this case, evinces

any concern over the two 30-year sentences defendant received. Most notably, when he

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negotiated for a reduction of his sentence, he did so only with respect to the greater sentence,

the sentence everyone believed would determine the amount of time defendant would spend

in prison. Clearly, that was defendant’s concern in negotiations, from start to finish.

¶ 25 Defendant’s bald assertion that he negotiated for specific sentences—that this was not

a situation where he pled for a sentencing cap—rings hollow. He has not identified any

consequence attributable to the length of these shorter sentences in this context. At the time

the parties negotiated the plea agreement, their understanding was that the 30-yearsentences

would run concurrently with the longer 55-year sentence, which was later reduced to 50

years. Whether the lesser sentences were for six years, or 30, the parties clearly believed they

would not affect the maximum amount of time defendant would spend in prison. Moreover,

the lesser, 30-year, sentences for which he “negotiated” represented the maximum

nonextended-term sentences for the attendant offenses. These were the “specific sentences”

defendant sought for home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault. His conduct, in

the course of this litigation, indicates they did not matter to him at all.

¶ 26 We turn to defendant’s misplaced reliance upon White. In White, defendant had not been

properly admonished about the applicable sentencing range when he entered into a plea

agreement with the State, nor could the prison term to which he agreed be legally imposed,

as it was inconsistent with statutory mandates. When White entered into a plea agreement

for 28 years’ imprisonment, he was correctly advised of the sentencing range for first degree

murder—20 to 60 years’ imprisonment—however he was not told about the mandatory 15-

year enhancement for use of a firearm. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2004). As this

court noted, because of the mandatory sentencing enhancement, “defendant was subject to

the mandatory minimum sentence of 35 years’ imprisonment, which is more than the 28

years he received.” White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 19. Thus, the inadequate admonishment led to

a sentence that could not stand as it was inconsistent with statutory requirements. In short,

the plea agreement could not be implemented as White could not receive the 28-year

sentence for which he bargained. Given those circumstances, this court ordered the cause

“remanded to the circuit court with directions to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea

and proceed to trial, if he chooses.” White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 31.

¶ 27 The obvious differences are these: (1) this defendant does not claim that he was

improperlyadmonished regarding sentencing rangesforindividual sentences when he agreed

to a 50-year sentence; (2) defendant’s sentence can be reconfigured, consistently with

statutory mandates, in such a way as to give him the benefit of his bargain.

¶ 28 When a defendant’s guilty plea “ ‘rests in any significant degree on a promise or

agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’ ” Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 68 (quoting

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). Here, it can and will be fulfilled.

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, remanding this

cause to the circuit court with directions that the court resentence defendant in accordance

with both the plea agreement and applicable statutes.

¶ 30 Affirmed.

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