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No. 05-15-00796-CV

In The 5th Court of Appeals

Dallas, Texas

Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann

v.

Transport Workers Union Local 556

ON APPEAL FROM THE 116TH CIVIL DISTRICT COURT

DALLAS COUNTY TEXAS

TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO DC-13-13347

JUDGE TONYA PARKER, PRESIDING

APPELLANTS FIRST BRIEF ON THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL

Appellant: 

Chris Click 

1711 Waltman Road 

Edgewood, MD 21040 

(410)507-9082 

Jerry Lindemann 

20802 Phlox Meadow 

San Antonio, TX 78259 

(210)269-6654 

ACCEPTED

05-15-00796-CV

FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS

10/14/2015 8:25:10 PM

LISA MATZ

CLERK

 FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 10/14/2015 8:25:10 PM LISA MATZ Clerk
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Chris Click, Pro Se

1711 Waltman Road

Edgewood, MD 21040

5

TH COURT OF APPEALS FOR DALLAS COUNTY

CHRIS CLICK AND JERRY LINDEMANN,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 556,

Defendant(s)

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Case No.: 05-15-00796-CV

APPELLANTS BRIEF ON THE MERITS

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant/Plaintiff: Pro Se

Christopher L Click

1711 Waltman Road 

Edgewood, MD 21040

(410)507-9082

Appellant/Plaintiff: Pro Se

Jerry Lindemann

20802 Phlox Meadow

San Antonio, TX 78259

(210)269-6654
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Original Trial Judge:

Honorable Tonya Parker, Presiding

George L Allen Sr Courts Building

600 Commerce Street, 6th Floor New Tower

Dallas, TX 75202

(214)653-6015

Appellee/Defendant: Attorney For Defendant:

Transport Workers Union Local 556 Edward Cloutman

7929 Brookriver Drive Suite 750 3301 Elm Street

Dallas, TX 75247 Dallas, TX 75226
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL.............................................................................2

TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................................................................................4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..............................................................................................................5

STATEMENTS OF THE CASE............................................................................................................6

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENTS........................................................................7

ISSUES PRESENTED..........................................................................................................................8

STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................................................9

ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................................................11

PRAYER..........................................................................................................................................................14

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS................................................................................................................16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..........................................................................................................19
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INDEX OR TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1. American Bank v. Waco Airmotive Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 178 (Tex. App. 

- Waco 1991, writ denied).

2. Dawson Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998).

3. Gabauer, et al v. Woodcock, et al., 425 F.Supp 1, 2 (E.D. Missouri 

1976)

4. Holdeman v.Sheldon, 311 F.2d 2, 3 (2nd Cir. 1962)

5. Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972).

6. Larrumbide v. Doctors Health Facilities, 734 S.W.2d 685, 693-94 

(Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, writ denied).

7. L.M. Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs, 929 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. 1996).

8. McNamara, et al v. Johston, et al., 522 F.2d41157, 1167 (7th Cir. 

1975)

9. Mulligan v. Parker, 805 F.Supp 592, n. 4 (ND Illinois 1992)

10. Texas Educ. Agency v. Maxwell, 937S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. 

App. - Eastland 1997, writ denied);
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STATEMENTS OF THE CASE

1. On November 8th, 2013, Defendant Transport Workers Union Local 556, 

through their attorney Edward Cloutman filed a civil action against 

Christopher Click and Jerry Lindemann in the 116th Civil Ciruit Court 

seeking damaged and other relief pertaining to Click and Lindemann’s 

service as Officers in the Local Union.

2. On February 2nd, 2014, Attorneys for Lindemann and Click filed a 

motion to Consolidate the case into a third open case against Stacy 

Martin who was also being sued in the 116th court for damaged. 

3. Chris Click served as the Vice President on the Executive Board for 

Transport Workers Union Local 556 from May 2012 through May 2013. 

Jerry Lindemann also served on the Executive Board for Transport 

Workers Union Local 556 from May 2012 through May 2013.

4. The Motion to Consolidate was not opposed by TWU Local 556 or their 

counsel Edward Cloutman and as such were combined into action number 

DC-13-13347 (TWU Local 556, v. Stacy Martin, et al)

5. On November 26th, 2014 Attorney Dan Nelson (attorney for Click and 

Lindemann) filed a Traditional AND No Evidence Motion for Summary 

Judgment and requested a hearing to present oral arguments on said 

motion.

6. On December 16th, 2014, Attorneys for TWU Local 556 filed their 

opposition to Click and Lindemanns Motion for Summary Judgment.

7. After Oral Arguments from both parties regarding the Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Judge Tonya Parker ruled on motion GRANTING Click 

and Lindemann’s No Evidence and Traditional Summary Judgment and 

exluded them from the Jury Trial set to begin three days later.
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8. Defendant TWU Local 556 Did not Appeal the decision of the trial 

judge within thirty (30) days of the decision of the court which 

means the judgment GRANTING the Motion for Summary Judgment is 

FINAL.

9. On January 29th, 2015 the Jury Trial in the matter of TWU Local 556 

v. Stacy Martin, et all proceeded in the 116th Circuit Court with 

Honorable Judge Tonya Parker Presiding. After three days of 

testimony and hours of deliberations the courts returned a guilty 

verdict against Stacy Martin and awarded TWU Local 556 monetary 

damages.

10. Judge Parker signed a final judgment on February 19th, 2015. 

Ordering that Stacy Martin pay TWU Local 556 monetary damages and 

that TWU Local 556 take nothing from Click and Lindemann.

11. On March 3rd, 2015 Attorneys for Click and Lindemann filed a 

Motion to Modify Judgment as a final award decision for the Motion 

for Summary Judgment had not been addressed in the final ruling.

12. On June 3rd, 2015 the Honorable Judge Tonya Parker signed an 

amended Final Judgment regarding TWU Local 556 v. Stacy Martin, 

however had still not addressed the Motion for Summary Judgment and 

ultimately the dismissal of the case against Click and Lindemann.

13. On July 1st, 2015, Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann both Pro 

Se filed a Notice of Appeal with the 116th Circuit Civil Court and it 

was submitted on the same day to the 5th Court of Appeals. Case was 

assigned number 05-15-00796-CV

STATEMENTS REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENTS

1. Plaintiff Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann do not feel the presentation 

of Oral Arguments will aid the appellate courts decision in the matter, 

nor are oral arguments appropriate.
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ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Did the Trial Court err in the final judgment by excluding awards 

for both Click and Lindemann in regards to the GRANTING of a Motion 

for Summary Judgment?

2. Is there factually sufficient case law and evidence to support the 

judgment in the trial court and again in the appeals court?

3. Are Click and Lindemann entitled to attorney fees and other relief 

as decided by the court and filed in the Original Motion for Summary 

Judgment?

4. Are Click and Lindemann entitled to a portion of relief as decided 

by the appellate court based on the Original Motion for Summary 

Judgment and the decision of the judge in her final judgment against 

Martin in DC13-13347?

5. Did Click and Lindemann file in a timely manner and in accordance 

with Texas Procedural Law their Motion to Modify Judgment?

6. Is there a long standing practice that shows a history and policy of 

“permitting union officers who have successfully defended themselves 

against charges of 501 of the LMRDA, wherein there is an adequate 

protection of union officers from baseless litigation”?

7. Is there case law in place “Permitting a union to reimburse a 

defendant if he is successful in his defense, and in which provides 

sufficient financial protection of union officials against nuisance 

suits.”?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. In March 2012, Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann were elected to serve 

as Vice President and Treasurer of Transport Workers Union Local 

556. Click and Lindemann ran on a slate with three others (Stacy 

Martin/President, Dawn Wann/2nd Vice President, and Jannah 

Dalak/Recording Secretary). During their first year in office Click 

and Lindemann were presented with charges no fewer than six times. 

During that time the board found the charges improper.

2. In November 2012, when Martin, Click and Lindemann had discovered 

that several Executive Board Members had been claiming work on their 

time sheets and being paid for that work, without the work actually 

being done, Martin made a move to slash the budget for these 

officers and refused to pay time sheets for work that could not be 

verified of being completed. Many board members were upset by these 

decisions.

3. In January and February of 2013 during normally scheduled Membership 

Meeting, Click and Martin shared the financial findings with members 

of the local during routine question and answer sessions regarding 

financial expenditures. The Board Members who had taken part in the 

pay schemes were upset about this decision and considered Martins 

actions “harmful to them as members”

4. The Executive Board moved to present charges against Click, Martin 

and Lindemann and in April 2013, May 2013 and again in June 2013 

found Stacy Martin, Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann guilty of 

various articles of the Constitution and Bylaws of the Local. They 
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were removed from office and restricted from holding elected or 

appointed office for a period of three additional years.

5. In November 2013, TWU Local 556 presented civil actions separately 

against Stacy Martin, Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann for the costs 

incurred during trials and expenses incurred after their removal 

from office (during suspension and after being removed).

6. In November 2014, Attorneys for Chris Click, Stacy Martin and Jerry 

Lindemann filed Motions for No Evidence and Traditional Summary 

Judgment to the courts. December 2014, TWU Local 556 filed their 

oppositions to motion and both motions were set for oral arguments 

after the Holiday break.

7. In January 2015 attorneys for both parties presented oral arguments

in the 116th Circuit Court regarding the Motions for Summary 

Judgment. The Court GRANTED in WHOLE the Motion for Summary 

Judgment for Click and Lindemann and DENIED the Motion for Summary 

Judgement for Martin. Stacy Martin proceeded to jury trial three 

days after.

8. In January 2015, the jury trial for Stacy Martin proceeded and 

Martin was in the end found guilty of the charges against him. 

Martin was not found guilty of the charges against Click and 

Lindemann.

9. In February 2015 the Trial Judge Parker issued her final judgment 

and did not issue a signed final ruling for CLICK and LINDEMANN’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment.

10. In March 2015, Attorneys for Click and Lindemann filed a 

Motion to Modify Judgment seeking the honorable Parker to sign her 

oral ruling of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
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11. In June 2015, the Honorable Parker issued an amended ruling 

in the matter of TWU Local 556 v. Stacy Martin however still failed 

to address the Motion for Summary Judgment.

12. In July 2015, Click and Lindemann filed (pro se) their 

Notice to Appeal the decision of the trial court due to the fact a 

decision had not been rendered in the final award for Click and 

Lindemann. Appellant has appealed their case to the 5th Court of 

Appeals at Dallas County, Texas asking the appellate court to modify 

the courts final judgment.

ARGUMENT

1. If the judgment did not award a party all the relief it 

was entitled to, or awarded the other party more relief than it was 

entitled to, the complaint must be brought to the attention of the 

trialcourt in a written motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. § 329b(g).

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment if the court did 

not award the correct amount of prejudgment interest. If a party 

does not bring the issue to the attention of the trial

court in a motion to modify the judgment or make some other 

objection that appears on the record, the party cannot raise the 

issue on appeal. Larrumbide v. Doctors Health Facilities, 734

S.W.2d 685, 693-94 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, writ denied).

2. A party should file a motion to modify the judgment when the 

trial court does not award attorneys fees or does not award the 

correct amount of fees. Texas Educ. Agency v. Maxwell, 937
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S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1997, writ denied); American 

Bank v. Waco Airmotive Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 178 (Tex. App. - Waco 

1991, writ denied).3

3. A party should file a motion to modify the judgment when the 

judgment does not award costs, awards costs to the wrong party, or 

does not award the correct amount of costs. Dawson Austin v. Austin, 

968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998). A party should file a motion to modify 

the judgment if there is any other error in the judgment. L.M. 

Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs, 929 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. 1996).

On July 14, 2014, 

4. Defendants Click and Lindemann filed their No-Evidence Motion 

for Summary Judgment praying this Honorable Court grant their Motion 

and requested relief, both special and general, at law and in 

equity. On November 26, 2014, Defendants filed their Traditional 

Motion for Summary Judgment praying this Honorable Court to grant 

their Motion, and pray and requested relief for Attorneys Fees, 

costs of court, pre and post judgment interest and any other relief 

they may so justly be entitled to in law or equity.

On January 22, 2015, this Honorable Court GRANTED Defendants Click 

and Lindemann’s Motions for Summary Judgment; however, no Order or 

Judgment has been entered as to the relief requested by Defendants 

Click and Lindemann, and that of which they are entitled.

Moreover, there is long standing precedence that shows a history of 

policy “permitting union officers who have successfully defended 

themselves against charges of § 501 of the LMRDA, wherein there is 

an adequate protection of union officers from baseless litigation.”

Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972).
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Citing Holdeman v. Sheldon, where the 2nd Circuit originally held 

that there is a policy in place “permitting a union to reimburse a 

Defendant if he is successful in his defense...[which]

provides sufficient financial protection of union officials against 

nuisance suits.” Holdeman v.Sheldon, 311 F.2d 2, 3 (2nd Cir. 1962); 

See also, McNamara, et al v. Johston, et al., 522 F.2d4

1157, 1167 (7th Cir. 1975)(“Union officials charged as defendants in 

suits [under section 501 of the LMRDA] should retain independent 

counsel and bear the financial burden of their defense;

however, if they prevail, they may properly be reimbursed by the 

union for the costs of their legal defense.”); See also, Gabauer, et 

al v. Woodcock, et al., 425 F.Supp 1, 2 (E.D. Missouri 1976)(“Union 

officials charged as defendants in suits [under section 501 of the 

LMRDA] should retain independent counsel and bear the financial 

burden of their defense; however, if they prevail, they may properly 

be reimbursed by the union for the costs of their legal defense.”); 

See also, Mulligan v. Parker, 805 F.Supp 592, n. 4 (ND Illinois 

1992) quoting Holdeman (“The policy of permitting the union to 

reimburse the officers for successful defense provides sufficient

financial protection of the officers against harassing lawsuits.”)

5. Therefore, Defendants Click and Lindemann are entitled to the 

relief requested, and move this Honorable Court to modify the 

Judgment in this matter to award for the said relief of which

they are so justly entitled.

6. The Appellee Will ARGUE that the costs would have been incurred 

for Martin regardless and because he was found guilty they are not 

liable for the defense of CLICK and LINDEMANN, but in fact CLICK and 

LINDEMANN had their cases dismissed by the honorable court and were 
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not tried by jury. As such the resulting trial against MARTIN has 

no bearing on the matter of law listed in this appeal. Further, the 

affidavit attached from attorney Dan Nelson lists fees due by Click 

and Lindemann only and the fees for Martin are much greater than 

listed above. Collectively the three clients in the original trial 

has spent in excess of $120,000 and are continuing to acquire debt 

on the matter due to still unpaid invoices due to our attorney. In 

the matter above, the listed amount found in the prayer section 

provides for the money owed by CLICK AND LINDEMANN only and is shown 

in the affidavit listed in the APPENDIX.

PRAYER

1. This Honorable Court enter Order of Judgment GRANTING Defendants 

Click and Lindemann’s No-Evidence and Traditional Motions for 

Summary Judgment.

2. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to pre and post 

judgment interest accruing at a rate of 5%.

3. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to all court costs 

attributable to each of them.

4. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to their uncontested 

reasonable attorneys fees. (“See attached Exhibitsof Defendants 
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Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment - Defendants’ Uncontested 

Affidavit for Attorneys’ Fees”).

E. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN request and pray for any other and 

further relief of which they may so be justly entitled.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY

LINDEMANN pray this Court GRANT their Motion for Modification of 

Judgment, and award them all relief herein requested of which they 

are so justly entitled, and for any other and further

relief that this Honorable Court may deem appropriate
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APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS

Chris Click, Pro Se

1711 Waltman Road

Edgewood, MD 21040

5

TH COURT OF APPEALS FOR DALLAS COUNTY

CHRIS CLICK AND JERRY LINDEMANN,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 556,

Defendant(s)

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Case No.: 05-15-00796-CV

ORDER GRANTING APPEAL AND FINAL 

JUDGMENT

FINAL JUDGMENT

This Honorable Court having considered all the pleadings, evidence, and 

arguments herein is of the opinion that Defendants’ CHRIS CLICK and JERRY 

LINDEMANN’s Motion to Modify should be GRANTED.

Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Final Judgment is

awarded to Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN, as follows:

(A). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to all

pre and post judgment interest accruing at a rate of 5%.

(B). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to all

costs of the court of which are attributable to each Defendant in the amount 

of $________.____

(C). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to

their uncontested attorneys fees in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Three 

Hundred Seventy-One Dollars and nineteen cents ($44,371.19).

________________________

JUDGE PRESIDING
1

CAUSE NO. DC-13-13347

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

UNION LOCAL 556, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

§

STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK, §

AND JERRY LINDEMANN §

§

Defendants. § 116th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

COMES NOW, DEFENDANTS STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK and JERRY 

LINDEMANN, and files this, their Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(c). Defendants would respectfully show unto this Honorable 

Court the following:

I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 2013, Plaintiff, Transport Workers Union, 556 (“TWU”) sued 

Defendants Stacy Martin, Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann individually in Dallas County 

District Court. Defendant Martin’s case was assigned cause number DC-13-13347, and was filed 

in the 116th Judicial District. Defendant Lindemann’s case was assigned cause number DC-13-

13348, and was filed in the 192nd Judicial District. Defendant Click’s case was assigned cause 

number DC-13-13350, and was also filed in the 116th Judicial District. On February 14, 2014, 

Defendants filed a Motion to Consolidate, and on May 15, 2014, all three cases were Ordered 

consolidated under Defendant Martin’s cause number, which is the above cited caption. 

FILED

DALLAS COUNTY

11/26/2014 11:28:01 AM

GARY FITZSIMMONS

DISTRICT CLERK
2

Specifically, Plaintiff TWU sued Defendant Martin for alleged causes of action of (1) 

Misappropriation of Union Funds – Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and (2) Conversion of Union 

Property. Further, Plaintiff TWU also sued Defendants Lindemann and Click for alleged 

Misappropriation of Union Funds – Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 

Defendants individually filed their Answers, and generally denied all claims and 

allegations as lawfully allowed pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 92. Further, 

Defendants individually filed affirmative defenses of abuse of process, negligence, mitigation, 

waiver, estoppel and frivolous suit.

Defendants now move for traditional summary judgment based on Plaintiff TWU’s lack 

of evidence to support its causes of action in this matter, and their inability to demonstrate any 

genuine issue of material fact that exists and is in dispute. Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment because Plaintiff TWU has had an adequate time for discovery, and cannot 

demonstrate that there is any evidence to support their causes of action as plead against 

Defendants.

II.

BACKGROUND

The allegations asserted by Plaintiffs arise from a detailed history amongst both sides. In 

2011, the then active/current top officers of the TWU Local 556 Executive Board (“Plaintiffs”)

consisted of the following:

President: Thom McDaniel

1st Vice-President: Michael Massoni

2nd Vice-President: Stacy Martin

Secretary: Cuyler Thompson

Treasurer: John Parrott

(“Defendant’s Exhibits 1- 3 - Affidavits of Defendants Martin, Lindemann and Click”)
3

Prior to the 2012 elections, Thom McDaniel, then Board President, made it known to the 

Local 556 that he would not seek re-election as president, as he was taking a position with the 

International Union. (“id”). Also, Michael Massoni made it known that he too would not seek reelection. (“id”). Moreover, at the same time, Defendants Martin, Lindemann and Click 

(“Defendants”) were making it known of their intention to run for the top officers spots. (“id”). 

Specifically, Defendant Click made it known he was running for 1st Vice-President, 

(“Defendant’s Exhibit 3”). Defendant Martin made it known he was running for President,

(“Defendant’s Exhibit 1”), and Defendant Lindemann made it known he was running for 

Treasurer. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 2”). The then current Executive Board all knew of Defendants’ 

intention of running for office. (“Defendants Exhibits 1, 2 and 3”). 

In 2012, two groups of candidates ran for the top officer positions, which consisted of the 

following:

Lauck Group:

President: Allyson Parker Lauck

1st Vice-President: Audrey Stone

2nd Vice-President: Brett Nevarez

Secretary: Cuyler Thompson (re-election)

Treasurer: John Parrott (re-election)

Martin Group:

President: Stacy Martin

1st Vice-President: Chris Click

2nd Vice-President: Dawn Wann

Secretary: Jannah Dalak

Treasurer: Jerry Lindemann

(“Defendants Exhibits 1, 2 and 3”). 

Thom McDaniel made it abundantly clear that his allegiance for replacement was with 

the Lauck Group. (“id”). 
4

In March of 2012, elections were held and the Martin Group won the election with a vote 

of 65%. (“id”). The new board members were set to take over on May 1st, 2012. (“id”). 

In the preceding months before the turnover, as was standard and necessary, then current 

board members were required to aid in the transition of the newly elected officers. (“id”). This 

consisted of training, transferring information, and essentially, getting them up to speed and 

making the transition as smooth as possible. (“id”). However, during this time period, while still 

acting President, Thom McDaniel instructed the other then current board members to deny the 

newly elected officers from entering the union office. (“id”). This was done solely to stifle the 

transition and make it as difficult as possible for the newly elected members to transition into 

their new positions. (“id”). 

Almost immediately after taking office in May of 2012, members of the Lauck Group 

including Allyson Parker Lauck, Cuyler Thompson, Brett Nevarez, as well as other members 

supporting the Lauck Group, including Audrey Stone’s boyfriend Kevin Schnittiker and Don 

Shipman embarked on a systematic dismantling of the union’s electoral system and democratic 

structure by filing a barrage of unfounded charges against the newly elected officers simply as a 

means to harass and disrupt the union’s infrastructure and business. (“id”). 

Members and supporters of the Lauck Group made it well known that they were going to 

do everything they could to get the Martin Group removed from office. (“id”). On no less than 

five times subsequent to the Martin Group taking over did Cuyler Thompson submit unfounded 

charges simply to harass the Martin officers in an attempt to undermine the electoral system and 

disrupt the basic democratic structure by doing everything he could no matter what to remove 

them from office and have himself reinstated. (“id”). 
5

On no less than four times subsequent to the Martin Group taking over did Allyson 

Parker Lauck submit charges against the Martin Group simply to harass and undermine the 

electoral system and disrupt the union democratic infrastructure. (“id”). 

In November of 2012, a required audit of the union financials had revealed that several of 

the board members had been paid excessive amounts of money for work that was unverified.

(“id”). Subsequently, in December 2012 during the Executive Board Meeting, Defendant Martin

as president outlined and proposed immediate changes. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 1”). The changes 

Defendant Martin installed were to modify the future payouts to reduce the expenses. (“id”). 

Defendant Martin was acting to protect the treasury and limit board pay, which during the board 

meeting, Defendants revealed through a slideshow these expenses had increased for some board 

members by 190% in one year. (“id”). 

Seizing another opportunity, members of the Lauck Group submitted false accusations 

and charges that the Defendants were maliciously spreading false information. (“Defendants’ 

Exhibits 1- 3”). However, the audit clearly verified the information put forth in the December 

meeting, and further, the information being revealed was in fact not confidential and public 

information for all members. (“id”). 

Subsequently, Cuyler Thompson, at this time only a union member, filed charges with the 

Recording Secretary Board Member Jannah Dalak, alleging that Defendants Lindemann and 

Click “conducted themselves in a manner unbecoming a Member of our Union and in violation 

of the TWU International Constitution and Local 556 Bylaws.” (“Defendant’s Exhibit 4 -

Thompson’s Charges Against Lindemann and Click”). 

Also, around this time in March of 2013, Defendant Click attended a rally in Washington 

DC to protest the TSA change of allowing knives to pass through security checkpoints and be 
6

allowed on commercial aircraft. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 3”). Defendant Click attended this rally 

to protest the change. (“id”). He was not there in any official capacity as Vice-President, but 

simply as member of Local 556 voicing his opposition. (“id”). 

During this rally, Defendant Click was carrying a sign that read “Ain’t nobody got time 

for dat.” (“id”). Another member of the union, Ms. Corliss King Hale, who attended the rally, 

and was a supporter of the Lauck Group, reported the sign to the Local 556, wherein again 

members of the opposition saw an opportunity to submit charges against Defendant Click for 

alleged misconduct. (“id”). Charges of racial discrimination were submitted against Defendant 

Click based on the sign being allegedly offensive. (“id”).

Defendant Click was then suspended from his role as 1st Vice President, and was banned 

from acting in any capacity whatsoever as 1st Vice President. (“id”).

Thereafter, during the April 2013 TWU Local 556 Executive Board Meeting, the 

Executive Board reviewed the charges brought by Thompson and King Hale against Defendants 

Lindemann and Click and “found them proper, requiring that trial be held.” (“Defendant’s 

Exhibit 5 - Certified Letter from Plaintiff to Lindemann; Defendnat’s Exhibit 6 - Certified Letter 

from Plaintiff to Click”). Subsequently, on April 30th, 2013, Recording Secretary Jannah Dalak 

sent certified letters to Defendants Lindemann and Click informing them that charges have been 

found proper against them, and trials will be held. (“id”). 

Further, the certified letters to Defendants Lindemann and Click regarding the Thompson 

charges stated, “The Executive Board has selected Flight Attendants Carissa Orr, David Weber, 

Michelle Ryder to serve on the trial committee.” (“Defendants Exhibit 5”). Also, the certified 

letter to Defendant Click regarding the King Hale charges stated, “The Executive Board has 
7

selected Flight Attendants Sharon King, Ryan Rodney and Javier Pedraza to serve on the trial 

committee.” (“Defendant’s Exhibit 6”). 

Further, the certified letters indicated that the accused Defendants Lindemann and Click 

“may challenge any Member of this Committee on the grounds that he/she is a party to or 

directly interested in the charges against you. Any such challenge must be made to the Executive 

Board by May 8, 2013.” (“Defendants’ Exhibits 5 and 6”). 

The certified letters also informed Defendants Lindemann and Click that they had until 

May 8, 2013 to challenge any Member of the Trial Committee. (“id”). And finally, the certified 

letters informed Defendants Lindemann and Click that their Trial Committee Hearings were 

scheduled for Defendant Click on the 14th of May 2013 (King Hale charges) and the 15th of the 

May 2013 (Thompson charges), and for Defendant Lindemann on the 15th of May 2013 

(Thompson charges). (“id”).

On May 8, 2013, Defendant Click sent an email to the Executive Board challenging the 

Members of the Trial Committee. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3; and Defendants’ Exhibit 7 - Click 

Email to the Executive Board”). Defendant Click challenged two members of Plaintiff’s trial 

committee on the basis that they signed a petition to recall him from his position as 1st Vice 

President, as well as challenges to Mark Hattoon, Jeff Haley and Milton Matthews (alternates). 

(“id”). Defendant Click’s challenges were denied. (“id”). 

Defendant Click arrived in Dallas on Monday May 13th, the day before his hearings, 

which were set by Plaintiff for the 14th and 15th of May 2013. Upon arrival, Oakland Based 

representative Matt Hettich informed Defendant Click, for the first time, through email, that his 

hearings were rescheduled. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 3; Defendant’s Exhibit 8 - Verified Transcript

of the May 15th, 2013 Trial Committee Hearing for Click and Lindemann (pgs. 7-9”). Defendant 
8

Click consulted with President Defendant Martin, and Defendant Martin informed Defendant 

Click that his hearings were in fact moving forward and that he believed Hettich had no authority 

to cancel the hearings. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 1, 3 and 8”). 

Defendant Click’s May 14th Trial Committee Hearing went forward as set by Plaintiff in 

front of Plaintiff’s personally selected Trial Committee Members. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 1 and 

3”). Defendant Click had no say in whether to continue the Trial Hearing on the 14th, or 

postpone the Hearing. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 1 and 3”). Defendant Click was told to show up for 

the Trial Committee Hearing on the 14th, specifically scheduled by the Plaintiff, as well as told 

to him by Local Union President Defendant Martin. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 1 and 3”). 

Both Defendants Lindemann and Click attended their Trial Committee Hearings on May 

15th, 2013, as scheduled by Plaintiff. That morning of the Trial Committee Hearing on the 15th, 

around 9:00 a.m., two Executive Board members, Jimmy West and Addie Crisp, interrupted the 

proceedings informing the Committee that the trial had been rescheduled. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 

2, 3 and 8”). This was the first time Defendant Lindemann had ever been informed that his trial 

was allegedly rescheduled. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 2 and 8”). 

The Trial Committee deliberated amongst themselves on whether the Trial Committee 

Hearing should stop, or continue as scheduled. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 8”). After consideration, 

the Trial Committee Members decided that there was no authority to postpone the Hearing, and 

they themselves chose to continue the proceedings. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 8”). Defendants 

Lindemann and Click had no say whether to continue or postpone the Trial Committee Hearings 

against them. (“Defendants Exhibits 2, 3 and 8”). 

Ultimately, Members of the Local 556 Executive Board contacted Defendant Martin on 

May 13th, 2013, and insisted that he delay the May 14th and 15th 2013 hearings for Defendants 
9

Lindemann and Click. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 1”). However, Defendant Martin could not 

reschedule the Hearings because he believed the Constitution for the Transportation Workers 

Union of the AFL-CIO (“TWU Constitution”) proscribed only two instances underwhich Article 

XIX and Article XXI hearings may be rescheduled; (1) if the claimant removes the charges; or 

(2) the accused successfully challenges the impartiality of a member(s) of the Trial Committee.

(“Defendant’s Exhibit 9 - TWU Constitution”). Neither of these instances occurred.

(“Defendant’s Exhibit 1 and 9”). Defendant Martin, as President believed rescheduling the Click 

and Lindemann trials from May 14th and 15th, 2013 to May 22nd and 23rd, 2013, would have 

required him to violate the clear terms of the Constitution. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 1 and 9”).

Thus, the Trial Committee Hearings for Defendants Lindemann and Click went forward 

as scheduled by Plaintiffs on the 14th and 15th of May 2013. (“Defendants Exhibits 1-8”). Every 

single party to the Hearings showed up as scheduled by Plaintiffs, including the court reporter, 

the union attorney, counsel for Defendants, Defendants’ witnesses, and the trial committee

members selected by the Union’s Executive Board. (“Defendants Exhibits 1-8”). The only 

individuals not to show were Plaintiffs, or the accusers. (“Defendants Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 8”). 

The Trial Committee Members found Defendants Lindemann and Click Not Guilty on all 

charges. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 10 - Trial Committee Findings for May 15th”). Despite the Not 

Guilty findings in the May 14th and 15th Trial Committee Hearings, Plaintiff not satisfied with 

the outcome, took it upon themselves to set up new Trial Committee Hearings for Defendants 

Lindemann and Click for the charges against them. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 9; 

Defendants’ Exhibit 11 - Correspondence dated 5/16/2013 from Cuyler Thompson”). 

Thus, Defendants Lindemann and Click’s Trial Committee Hearings from the 14th and

15th of May were rescheduled to the 24th of May, 2013. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 11”). Defendant
10

Click requested that Plaintiffs set a new date for the Second Trial Committee Hearing as he 

indicated it was impossible for his witnesses to return for the new hearing on short notice, and 

that his counsel was unavailable on such short notice as well for a re-trial. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 

3”). Plaintiff Click’s request for a continuance was denied, and subsequently he requested the 

board provide him with Positive Space Air Transportation to the new trials, which is required 

and standard for him to attend the Second Trial Committee Hearings; however, Plaintiff denied 

him this request. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3”). 

Shortly after the May 15th Trial Committee Hearing, Defendant Lindemann went on 

approved medical leave from the Union and his employer Southwest Airlines. (“Defendants’ 

Exhibit 2”). Defendant Lindemann requested a continuance, as he indicated that due to his 

medical leave he would be physically unable to attend the unauthorized Second Trial Committee 

Hearing. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 2; Defendants’ Exhibit 12 - Correspondence to Board”).

Plaintiffs denied his request, and proceeded with the Second Trial Committee hearing without 

him being present. (“id”). 

Ultimately, all three Defendants were removed permanently from their positions on the 

Executive Board, and banned from running for re-election for three years. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 

1-3”). Several months later, and without exhausting any internal union procedures for discipline 

as required by their Constitution, Plaintiff filed three separate lawsuits against Defendants for 

allegedly “misappropriating Union funds - breach of fiduciary duty,” and for Defendant Martin 

“conversion of Union property” (Defendants’ Exhibits 9, 13-15 - Plaintiff’s Original Petitions”). 
11

III.

FACTS ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF

A. Defendant Lindemann

Under section V of Plaintiff’s Original Petition against Defendant Lindemann, Plaintiff 

alleges the following:

(1). “Because of scheduling conflicts and other logistical issues...the aforementioned 

Article XIX trial [of Defendant Lindemann]...needed to be postponed from its 

original setting on May 15, 2013. (Defendants’ Exhibit 13; page 3 - §V(10”). 

(2). “As such, the Executive Board directed Defendant [Lindemann] to reschedule the 

hearing.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 13; page 3 - § V(10)”).

(3). “Sufficient notice of the need for postponement was given to the Defendant 

[Lindemann].” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 13; page 3 - § V(10)”).

(4). “Rather than acknowledge this necessity, the Defendant [Lindemann] insisted on 

ordering the expenditure of the time and resources necessary for the Article XIX 

trial to take place on its originally set date(sic) and against the explicit instruction 

from the Executive Board.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 13; page 3 - § V(10)”). 

(5). “As a result, significant time and money was wasted and the Plaintiff was left to 

foot-the-bill.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 13; page 3 § V(10)”).

(6). “Defendant [Lindemann]’s portion of these expenses totaled Two Thousand Four 

Hundred Eighty-Four Dollars and Ten Cents ($2,484.10).” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 

13; page 3 § V(10)”).

(7). “Plaintiff has repeatedly asked that Defendant [Lindemann] reimburse the Union 

for his share of all the aforementioned unnecessary and wasteful expenditure of 

Union resources. Defendant [Lindemann] has repeatedly refused to acknowledge 

or respond to said demands.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 13; page 4 § V(12)”).

These allegations are taken verbatim from Plaintiff’ Original Petition against Defendant 

Lindemann, and no other facts have been pleaded against Defendant Lindemann. (“Defendants’ 

Exhibit 13”). Defendant Lindemann generally and specifically denies each and every allegation.
12

B. Defendant Click

Under section V of Plaintiff’s Original Petition against Defendant Click, Plaintiff alleges 

the following:

(1). “Because of scheduling conflicts and other logistical issues...the aforementioned 

Article XIX trial [of Defendant Click]...needed to be postponed from its 

original settings on May 14-15, 2013. (Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 3 - §V(10”). 

(2). “As such, the Executive Board directed Defendant [Click] to reschedule the 

hearing” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 3 - § V(10)”).

(3). “Sufficient notice of the need for postponement was given to the Defendant 

[Click].” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 3 - § V(10)”).

(4). “Rather than acknowledge this necessity, the Defendant [Click] insisted on 

ordering the expenditure of the time and resources necessary for the Article XIX 

trial to take place on its originally set dates and against the explicit instruction 

from the Executive Board.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 3 - § V(10)”). 

(5). “As a result, significant time and money was wasted and the Plaintiff was left to 

foot-the-bill.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 3 § V(10)”).

(6). “Defendant [Click]’s portion of these expenses totaled Two Thousand Four 

Hundred Eighty-Four Dollars and Ten Cents ($6,210.26).” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 

14; page 3 § V(10)”).

(7). “After the Defendant [Click] was removed from office by virtue of both trials, he 

refused to vacate his office. Defendant [Click], and others with whom he acted in 

concert, unlawfully occupied Plaintiff’s offices for several days and refused to 

vacate until explicitly directed to do so by the TWU International President. The 

costs to Plaintiff deriving from this unlawful siege were Four Thousand Four 

Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Forty Cents ($4,422.40)(Defendant [Click]’s 

portion of which amounts to Two Thousand Two Hundred Eleven Dollars and 

Twenty Cents ($2,211.20).” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 4 - § V(12)”). 

(8). “Lastly, Defendant [Click] continued to misuse Union funds when, after his 

suspension, Defendant [Click] took his wife to London (where TWU International 

was having a conference) for several days and charged the entire cost of the trip to 

Plaintiff. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 4 - § V(13)”).

(9). “Furthermore, representatives of TWU International explicitly warned Defendant

[Click] that because of his suspension his attendance at the conference would be 

wholly unauthorized.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 4 - § V(12)”)
13

(10). “The costs to Plaintiff deriving from this knowingly unlawful use of Union funds 

were One Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Four Dollars and Five Cents 

($1,164.05).” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 4 - § V(12)”)

(11). “Plaintiff has repeatedly asked that Defendant [Click] reimburse the Union for his 

share of all the aforementioned unnecessary and wasteful expenditure of Union 

resources. Defendant [Click] has repeatedly refused to acknowledge or respond to 

said demands.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14; page 4 § V(10)”).

These allegations are taken verbatim from Plaintiff’s Original Petition against Defendant 

Click, and no other facts have been pleaded against Defendant Click. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14”).

Defendant Click generally and specifically denies each and every allegation. 

C. Defendant Martin

Under section V of Plaintiff’s Original Petition against Defendant Martin, Plaintiff 

alleges the following:

(1). “Because of scheduling conflicts and other logistical issues...the aforementioned 

Article XIX trial [of Defendants Click and Lindemann]...needed to be postponed 

from its original settings on May 13-14, 20131. (Defendants’ Exhibit 15; page 3 -

§V(10”). 

(2). “As such, the Executive Board directed Defendant [Martin] to reschedule the 

hearing” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15; page 3 - § V(10)”).

(3). “Sufficient notice of the need for postponement was given to the Defendant 

[Martin].” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15; page 3 - § V(10)”).

(4). “Rather than acknowledge this necessity, the Defendant [Martin] insisted on 

ordering the expenditure of the time and resources necessary for the Article XIX 

trial on its originally set dates despite his knowledge that the accusing party 

would not be able to proceed on that date and against the explicit instruction from 

the Executive Board.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15; page 3 - § V(10)”). 

(5). “As a result, significant time and money was wasted and the Plaintiff was left to 

foot-the-bill.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15; page 3 § V(10)”).

(6). “Defendant [Martin]’s portion of these expenses totaled Two Thousand Four 

Hundred Eighty-Four Dollars and Ten Cents ($6,210.26).” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 

15; page 3 § V(10)”).

 1 Defendants believe that Plaintiff’s accidentally plead “their original proceedings on May 13-14, 2013” by mistake, as the 
14

(7). “After the Defendant [Martin] was removed from office by virtue of both trials, 

he refused to vacate his office. Defendant [Martin], and others with whom he 

acted in concert, unlawfully occupied Plaintiff’s offices for several days and 

refused to vacate until explicitly directed to do so by the TWU International 

President. The costs to Plaintiff deriving from this unlawful siege were Four 

Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Forty Cents 

($4,422.40)(Defendant [Martin]’s portion of which amounts to Two Thousand 

Two Hundred Eleven Dollars and Twenty Cents ($2,211.20).” (“Defendants’ 

Exhibit 15; page 4 - § V(12)”). 

(8). “Plaintiff has repeatedly asked that Defendant [Martin] reimburse the Union for 

his share of all the aforementioned unnecessary and wasteful expenditure of 

Union resources. Defendant [Martin] has repeatedly refused to acknowledge or 

respond to said demands.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15; page 4 § V(10)”).

(8). “Additionally, Defendant [Martin] has engaged in the unlawful conversion of 

Union property since being removed from office. Specifically, Defendant [Martin 

has refused to either return or pay for the laptop computer valued at over Four 

Thousand two Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($4,275.00).” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 

15; page 4 - § V(14)”). 

(9). “The Defendant [Martin]’s unlawful appropriation of this valuable piece of Union 

property has been brought to his attention with a corresponding demand for 

payment for/or return of said property. Defendant [Martin] has thus far refused to 

remedy this unlawful conduct, as well. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15; pages 4-5; § 

V(15)”). 

These allegations are taken verbatim from Plaintiff’ Original Petition against Defendant 

Martin, and no other facts have been pleaded against Defendant Martin. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 

15”). Defendant Martin generally and specifically denies each and everyone of these allegations.
15

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

(1). Whether any fiduciary relationship existed between Defendant Lindemann and 

Plaintiff, and if so, whether any fiduciary duty existed when his Article XIX 

Hearing on May 15th, 2013 was adjudicated.

(2). Whether any fiduciary relationship existed between Defendant Click and Plaintiff, 

and if so, whether any fiduciary duty existed when his Article XIX Hearings on May 

14th and 15th were adjudicated.

(3). Whether any fiduciary duty existed when Defendant Click allegedly failed to vacate 

Union offices after being removed from office as 1st Vice President.

(4). Whether any fiduciary duty existed when Defendant Click attended an

International meeting in London after being suspended from office as 1st Vice 

President.

(5). Whether any fiduciary duty existed between Defendant Martin and Plaintiff when 

Defendants Lindemann and Click’s Article XIX Trial Committee Hearings were 

adjudicated on May 14th and 15th, 2013.

(6). Whether any fiduciary relationship or duty existed when Defendant Martin

allegedly failed to vacate Union offices after being removed from office as President. 

V.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, which governs summary judgment practice, permits 

a party to obtain a prompt disposition of a case involving patently unmeritorious claims and 

untenable defenses. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989). To prevail on a 

traditional motion for summary judgment asserted under Rule 166a(c) of the Tex. R. Civ. P., a 

movant must prove that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). 

A party moving for traditional summary judgment on a claim for which it does not bear 

the burden of proof must either (1) disprove at least one element of the Plaintiff’s cause of 
16

action, or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense to 

rebut the Plaintiff’s cause. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). 

Once the movant establishes its right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts 

to the non-movant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Espalin v. 

Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 682 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2000, no pet.). 

VI.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

In order for a Plaintiff to establish a cause of breach of fiduciary duty, he or she must 

prove the following elements:

(1). The Plaintiff and Defendant had a fiduciary relationship;

(2). The Defendant breached its fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff; and

(3). The Defendant’s breach resulted in 

(a). Injury to the Plaintiff, or

(b). Benefit to the Defendant.

Johnston v. Kruse, 261 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2008, n.p.h.); Dearing, Inc. v. 

Spiller, 824 S.W.2d 728, 733-34 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). 

To prove an action for breach of fiduciary duty, the Plaintiff must establish that 

Defendant was the Plaintiff’s fiduciary. Lacy v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 781, 788 (Tex. 

App. - Dallas 1990), writ denied, 803 S.W.2d. 265 (Tex. 1991). When one person is under a 

duty, created by law or contract, to act on or give advice for the benefit of another within the 

scope of the relationship, that person has a fiduciary relationship with the other person. Id.

Whether Plaintiff and Defendant have a formal fiduciary relationship is a question of law. 

Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2008, n.p.h.). 
17

In 1959 Congress enacted the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 

(“LMRDA”) as a result of congressional findings of widespread corruption, breaches of trust, 

and disregard of the individual rights of employees. LMRDA § 2b, 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1970). 

The Act provides union members with a general “bill of rights,” election safeguards, trusteeship 

regulations, and places detailed financial reporting and disclosure requirements on unions, 

employers, and union officials. LMRDA §§ 101-105, 201-211, 301-306, 401-404, 501(a); 29 

U.S.C. §§ 411-415, 431-440, 461-466, 481-484, 501(b) (1970). Additionally, in a subchapter 

entitled “Safeguard for Labor Organizations - Fiduciary Responsibility of Officers of Labor 

Organizations,” the Act provides for the continuing judicial supervision of individual union 

officers in section 501. LMRDA § 501(a-c). 

In Section 501(a), the Act states that the persons who are subject to the position of 

fiduciary are “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization 

who occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group” Id.

Further, the LMRDA under § III, “Definitions” in subsection (q) defines “Officer, agent, shop 

steward, or other representative, when used with respect to a labor organization, as elected 

officials and key administrative personnel, whether elected or appointed (such as business 

agents, heads of departments or major units, and organizers who exercise substantial independent 

authority), but does not include salaried non-supervisory professional staff, stenographic 

personnel.” LMRDA § III(q) “Defenitions” 

Further, to prove an action for breach of fiduciary duty, the Plaintiff must establish the 

Defendant breached some fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff. Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 

944 (Tex. 1997). Fiduciary duties do not extend to matters beyond the scope of the underlying 

relationship of the parties. Rankin, at 944.
18

The scope of the underlying relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants in this matter 

is specifically enumerated in Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). Specifically 

those duties enumerated to the “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a 

labor organization who occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members 

as a group (“Fiduciaries”)” are required as follows:

(1). That these [Fiduciaries] hold the organization’s money and property solely for the 

benefit of the organization and its members;

(2). That these [Fiduciaries] manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with 

its constitution and by-laws, and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted 

thereunder;

(3). That these [Fiduciaries] refrain from dealing with the organization as an adverse 

party or in behalf of an adverse party in any adverse party in any matter connected 

with their duties;

(4). That these [Fiduciaries] not hold or acquire any pecuniary or personal interest 

which conflicts with the interests of the organization; and

(5). That these [Fiduciaries] account to the organization for any profit received by 

them in whatever capacity connected with business conducted by them on behalf 

of the organization.

LRMDA § 501(a), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)

A. DEFENDANT CLICK

A detailed recitation of the facts alleged against Defendant Click are outlined above; 

however, the only cause of action Plaintiff is alleging against Defendant Click is a breach of 

fiduciary duty for allegedly misappropriating Union funds.

ELEMENT 1 - FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

(1). Defendant Click Was NOT in a Position of Fiduciary When He Allegedly 

Wasted Union Funds Regarding His May14th and 15th Hearings

In Plaintiff’s Original Petition against Defendant Click, Plaintiff alleges, “The 

events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims begin in late 2012 through early 2013. At that 
19

time, Defendant [Click] was an elected official of TWU LOCAL 556 with his primary 

office in Dallas County, Texas.” (“Defendant’s Exhibit 14, pg. 2 § V(6)”). 

Plaintiff then goes on to allege that because of “scheduling conflicts” and “other 

logistical issues,” Defendant Click’s Article XIX Trial Committee Hearings “needed to 

be postponed from their original settings on May 14-15, 2013.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14, 

pg. 2 § V(10)”). 

Plaintiff goes on to further allege that, “sufficient notice of the need for 

postponement was given to the Defendant [Click]. Rather than acknowledge this 

necessity, the Defendant [Click] insisted on ordering the expenditure of the time and 

resources necessary for the Article XIX trial on its originally set dates.” (“id”). As a 

result of these allegations, Plaintiff allegedly had to “foot-the-bill” for alleged,

“significant time and money [being] wasted”. (“id”). 

Plaintiff does not allege any specific dates for their accusations, other than the 

events giving rise to their claims began in late 2012 through early 2013, and that 

Defendant Click’s First Trial Committee Hearings were held on May 14th and 15th of 

2013. From what Defendants can glean from Plaintiff’s poorly delineated timeline, is that 

some time before the May 14th and 15th Trial Committee Hearings, Plaintiff allegedly 

gave Defendant Click “sufficient notice of the need for postponement.” However,

Plaintiff does not provide a specific date for when they allegedly informed him of this 

need. 

Nonetheless, Defendants have provided through summary judgment evidence a 

correspondence dated May 16, 2013 from Cuyler Thompson which reads, “Dear Brothers 

Click and Lindemann...The Executive Board takes the position that no duly constituted 
20

trial has taken place on these charges, as they were re-set for hearing on May 10, 2013, 

by vote of the Executive Board.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 11”). The letter further goes on to 

read, “Notice was given to the Charging Party and the Charged Party of this change of 

hearing.” (“id”). Again, nowhere does Plaintiff indicate specifically when it gave this 

“notice of change” to Defendant Click. However, based on the pleadings and this 

correspondence from Mr. Thompson we know it had to have allegedly taken place 

sometime between May 10th, 2013 and May 16, 2013. (“id”)

In April of 2013, Plaintiff suspended Defendant Click from his duties as 1st Vice 

President. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 3 and 16”). Plaintiff relieved Defendant Click of all of 

his duties incumbent upon his official position as 1st Vice President, and stripped him of 

all authority. (“id”). Plaintiff removed Defendant Click from occupying his position of 

trust, and took away all substantial authority he held. (“id”).

As stated above, “Section 501(a) of the LMRDA states that the persons who are 

subject to the position of fiduciary are “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other 

representatives of a labor organization who occupy positions of trust in relation to such 

organization and its members as a group” Id. Further, the LMRDA under § III, 

“Definitions” in subsection (q) defines “Officer, agent, shop steward, or other 

representative, when used with respect to a labor organization, includes elected officials 

and key administrative personnel, whether elected or appointed (such as business agents, 

heads of departments or major units, and organizers who exercise substantial independent 

authority), but does not include salaried non-supervisory professional staff, stenographic 

personnel.”
21

Once Defendant Click was suspended from his position as 1st Vice President, and 

stripped of all his duties and authorities, he no longer was in any fiduciary relationship

contemplated under Section 501(a) and subsection (q) of the LMRDA.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of Fiduciary 

Duty against Defendant Click for alleged “time and money wasting” surrounding his May 

14th and 15th Trial Committee Hearings fails as a matter of law because the summary 

judgment evidence indisputably demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact that exists whether Plaintiff and Defendant had a fiduciary relationship. 

They simply did not. 

(2). Defendant Click Was NOT in a Position of Fiduciary When He 

Allegedly Failed to Vacate Union Offices After Being Removed From His 

Position as 1st Vice President.

Plaintiff Judicially admits in its Original Petition against Defendant Click that he 

“was removed from his official position within TWU LOCAL 556 and has not been 

reinstated.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14, pg. 4 - § V (11 and 12)”). Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant “unlawfully occupied Plaintiff’s offices for several days and refused to 

vacate” (“id”). However, as Plaintiff Judicially admits in its Original Petition, Defendant 

Click was “removed from his official position within TWU LOCAL 556 and has not been 

reinstated.” (“id”). Assuming arguendo that Defendant Click did in fact “unlawfully 

occupy Plaintiff’s offices,” it was not done so in any official capacity as an elected 

officer, because as Plaintiff judicially admits, he was no longer an officer. (“id”).

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of Fiduciary 

Duty against Defendant Click for allegedly “unlawfully occupying Plaintiff’s office for 

several days and refusing to vacate” fails as a matter of law because by Plaintiff’s own 
22

judicial admissions and the indisputable summary judgment evidence demonstrates, there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact that exists as to whether Plaintiff and 

Defendant had a fiduciary relationship. They simply did not.

(3). Defendant Click Was NOT in a Position of Fiduciary When He 

Allegedly Misused Union Funds When He Attended an International 

Conference in London.

Plaintiff alleges in its Original Petition against Defendant Click that “Lastly, 

Defendant [Click] continued to misuse Union funds when, after his suspension, 

Defendant took his wife to London (where TWU International was having a conference) 

for several days and charged the entire cost of the trip to Plaintiff.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 

14, pg. 4 - § V (13)”). 

Again, unfortunately due to Plaintiff’s poorly delineated timeline in its Original 

Petition against Defendant Click, it is difficult to know when Defendant went to London. 

The only indication Plaintiff gives is that it was “after his suspension.” (“id”). Defendant 

Click was suspended from all of his 1st Vice Presidential duties and authorities in early 

April 2013. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3”)

To sustain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty the Plaintiff must show 

that Defendant was Plaintiff’s fiduciary. Lacy, at 788. The facts, summary judgment 

evidence and Plaintiff’s own judicial admissions indicating Defendant Click was 

suspended (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14 and 16”) indisputably show that Defendant Click 

was not Plaintiff’s fiduciary at the time of his trip to London. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of Fiduciary 

Duty against Defendant Click for allegedly “misusing Union funds to fly to London” fails 

as a matter of law because by Plaintiff’s own judicial admissions and as the indisputable 
23

summary judgment evidence demonstrates, there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact that exists as to whether Plaintiff and Defendant had a fiduciary relationship. They 

simply did not.

ELEMENT 2 - FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED

(1). Plaintiff CANNOT Establish That Defendant Click Owed Plaintiff 

Any Fiduciary Duty Involving His May 14th and 15th Hearings.

Defendant again, emphatically reemphasizes that no fiduciary relationship existed 

between Defendant Click and Plaintiff. However, should the Court find a relationship 

existed, Defendant would argue as follows:

Section 501(a) has not been addressed very much in the State of Texas, either in 

Federal or State Court. However, Defendants believe the seminal case in this matter is the 

5th Circuit’s decisions in Hoffman v. Kramer, et al, 362 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2004)2. 

Hoffman has provided us with the guideline of where allegations of breach of fiduciary 

duties fall under Section 501 of the LMRDA. Id. 

The Court in Hoffman stated that “the fiduciary obligations imposed are primarily 

pecuniary in nature-that is, having to do with the custody, control, and use of a union’s 

money and its financial interests or property and the conduct of union officials in relation 

thereof.” Hoffman v. Kramer, et al, 362 F.3d 308, 317 n.4 (5th Cir. 2004). 

The Court goes on to further state that “disagreements over the wisdom or 

appropriateness of particular administrative and employment actions and decisions are 

usually not amenable to suit under the LMRDA.” Hoffman, at 322. 

Further, the Court states that “most of these matters are the sort of internal 

grievances properly left to be worked out via union democratic processes...and not by a 

 2 Defendants have attached a copy of the Hoffman v. Kramer Case for this Court’s reference.
24

federal court sitting as a sort of super-review board.” Hoffman, at 322 (citing United 

Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union Local 911 v. United Food and Commercial 

Workers Int’l Union, 301 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Thus, the Court puts a perspective on where allegations of Section 501 may fall. 

Ultimately we have a spectrum that ranges from: 

Pecuniary Fiduciary Obligations in Nature 

To

Disagreements Over Appropriateness of Administrative Actions and Decisions

Hoffman, at 322. 

Specifically, when deciding the issues in Hoffman, the 5th Circuit stated that the

allegations against Defendants merely amounted to a “derelict[ion] in the performance of 

[Defendant’s] employment obligations,” which did not give rise to a breach of fiduciary 

duty under Section 501(a) of the LRMDA. Hoffman, at 322. 

In Hoffman, the allegations against Defendants were as follows: 

(1). Defendants conspired to rig the November 1999 election, and Plaintiff 

sought damages for funds allegedly misused during and as a result of this 

conspiracy; and

(2). Defendants were accused of maladministration of the union’s affairs, such 

as allegedly destroying union and budget records, and accepting a plane 

ride without disclosure.

Hoffman, at 319-22.

The Court ruled that no breach of fiduciary duties transpired for allegations under 

(1) because “the remedy for the defective electoral process is not this suit but the 

intervention of the Labor Department...and the money spent to re-run the election did not 

personally benefit the Defendants.” Hoffman, at 320. 
25

Further, the 5th Circuit reasoned that no breach of fiduciary duties transpired for 

the allegations under (2) because “however stupid and wasteful the former officers’ 

actions may have been, they raise issues of time, attendance, performance and 

administration - not breach of fiduciary duty. The law confides these concerns to the 

union membership through the election of officers; in fact, the Defendants have already 

been replaced on the union’s board.” Hoffman, 321-22. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Click “wasted significant time and money” 

when he allegedly “insisted on ordering the expenditure of the time and resources 

necessary for the Article XIX trial on its originally set dates, despite sufficient notice that 

the accusing party would not be able to proceed because of scheduling conflicts and other 

logistical issues.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14, pg. 3 § V (10)”). 

The best Defendants can glean from this allegation is that Defendant Click

allegedly breached subsection (2) “That these [Fiduciaries] manage, invest, and expend 

the same in accordance with its constitution and by-laws, and any resolutions of the 

governing bodies adopted thereunder” under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. 

501(a). 

(a). Sufficient Notice of Need For Postponement.

As stated above, based on the summary judgment evidence, and viewing 

the facts and evidence in the light as best as possible for Plaintiff, the absolute 

earliest Plaintiff could have notified Defendant of the “need for postponement” 

was May 10, 2013, when Plaintiff allegedly voted to re-set Defendant Click’s 

Hearings. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 11”). 
26

However, the summary judgment evidence produced clearly shows that 

the first time Defendant Click was ever made aware of any possible reset was that 

Monday, May 13th, 2013 when he arrived in Dallas the day before his Hearings 

on the 14th and 15th, wherein he received an email from Oakland based Rep Matt 

Hettich saying the Hearings were rescheduled. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3 and 8”).

Sending Defendant an email the day before his Hearing is not sufficient 

notice. 

(b). Defendant Did NOT Insist On Ordering the Expenditure of the 

Time and Resources Necessary for His Trial Committee Hearings on 

the 14th and 15th of May, 2013.

In any event, Plaintiff is under some misguided belief that Defendant 

Click had any power whatsoever to “order” his Hearings on the 14th and 15th of 

May, 2013 to move forward on those dates. All the facts and summary judgment

evidence clearly show that Defendant Click received a correspondence from 

Recording Secretary Jannah Dalak dated April 30, 2013. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3 

and 5”). The letter indicated that Defendant Click had a Trial Committee Hearing 

set against him on May 14th and 15th of 2013. (“id”). Subsequently, Defendant 

Click attempted to challenge several of the Trial Committee Members; however, 

he was unsuccessful. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3 and 7”).

On Monday, May 13th, 2013, Defendant Click got on a plane from 

Baltimore and flew to Dallas for said Hearings. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3 and 8). 

On May 13th, 2013, Defendant Click received an email from Matt Hettich, an 

Oakland based rep telling him that his Hearings had been rescheduled. (“id”). 
27

After reading the email, Defendant Click called the President of the 

LOCAL 556 Union, Defendant Martin, and inquired if his Hearings had been 

rescheduled. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 1 and 3”). Disagreeing with Matt Hettich, 

and other members of Plaintiff’s Executive Board over union policies and what 

the Constitution stated, Defendant Martin in his Presidential administrative role 

told Defendant Click that he did not believe that the Plaintiff had any authority to 

reschedule his Hearings, and thus advised him to show up for the Hearings. 

(“Defendants’ Exhibit 1 and 3”). 

Defendant Click showed up to his Hearings on May 14th and 15th, 2013, 

where every single person scheduled to be there: Defendants, Defendants’

witnesses, the Union attorney, Defenses’ counsel, the court reporter, and the Trial 

Committee Members were all ready to proceed with a Trial Committee Hearing. 

(“Defendants’ Exhibit 3 and 8”). Defendant had no reason to believe otherwise 

that his trial was rescheduled. 

At the behest of the Trial Committee Members, and not because 

Defendant Click “insisted on ordering the expenditure of the time and resources to 

proceed” his May 14th and 15th Hearings were adjudicated, wherein he was 

found not guilty of the allegations. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 3, 8 and 10”). 

Moreover, the certified transcripts from Defendant Click’s May 15th 

Hearing clearly indicate that the Trial Committee Members deliberated on 

whether Plaintiff had any authority to reschedule the Hearings, and after 

deliberation clearly decided, making the decision themselves, that the Trial 

Committee Hearing would proceed. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 8”). Not Defendants.
28

The Hearings against Defendant Click took place on May 14th and 15th, 

2013 because (1) Plaintiff scheduled his Hearings for those dates, (2) the 

President of the Local Chapter of the Union told him that his Hearings were not 

rescheduled; and (3) The Trial Committee Members chosen by Plaintiff to 

adjudicate the Hearing chose to proceed with the 14th and 15th Hearings.

In no way, shape or form did Defendant Click “insist on ordering the 

expenditure of the time and resources necessary for the Article XIX trial on its 

originally set dates despite sufficient notice of any postponement.” 

(c). Plaintiffs Allegations Do NOT Rise to Any Level of Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty Contemplated under § 501(a) of the LRMDA.

Assuming arguendo that this Honorable Court were to disregard the 

overwhelming amount of summary judgment evidence and precedence, and 

believe that the allegations asserted by Plaintiff had any merit, Defendant Click’s 

actions would still not rise to any level of breach of fiduciary duty enumerated 

under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA.

The Defendants in Hoffman were accused of misusing union funds by 

rigging their November 1999 elections. Hoffman, at 320. Similary, Defendant 

Click in this case is being accused of wasting time and money, or misusing Union 

funds, to force the Trial Committees on May 14th and 15th to proceed despite 

some alleged notification otherwise. 

In Hoffman, the Court found no good cause to proceed on the misuse of 

union funds because “the remedy for the defective election process [was] not the

lawsuit, but the intervention of the Labor Department.” Hoffman, at 320. Further, 

the Court in Hoffman stated that “The money spent to re-run the elections did not 
29

personally benefit the Defendants.” Id. Further, the Court in Hoffman ruled that 

“the general allegations that officers conducted an illegal election does not state a 

breach of the duties referred to in § 501(a), although it may violate other 

provisions of the Act.” Id.

Just as in Hoffman, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Click misused 

union funds by allegedly ordering his Article XIX Trials to move forward despite 

some alleged notification they were rescheduled, simply does not state a breach of

fiduciary duty contemplated under § 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

Further, as in Hoffman, the money spent on rescheduling and retrying the 

Hearings on May 24th did not personally benefit Defendant Click in anyway. In 

fact, it was extremely detrimental to Defendant Click, whereas he was found 

guilty on the re-trials, and permanently removed from office entirely. 

Finally, even if the Court were to believe that Defendant Click “wasted 

significant time and money,” Hoffman clearly states that “however stupid and 

wasteful the former officers’ actions may have been, issues of time, attendance, 

performance and administration are not a breach of fiduciary duty. The law 

confides these concerns to the union membership through the election of officers; 

in fact, the Defendants have already been replaced on the union’s board.” 

Hoffman, 321-22. As in Hoffman, Defendant Click was removed form office and 

replaced.

The allegations against Defendant Click are exactly the kind, which the 

5th Circuit identifies as “the sort of internal grievances properly left to be worked 
30

out via union democratic processes...and not by a federal court sitting as a sort of 

super-review board.” Hoffman, at 322.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty against Defendant Click for allegedly “misusing Union funds by 

wasting significant time and money” surrounding his May 14th and 15th Trial 

Committee Hearings fails as a matter of fact and law because the summary 

judgment evidence indisputably demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact that exists wherein Defendant breached any fiduciary duty owed 

to Plaintiff.

(2). Defendant Click Did NOT Breach Any Fiduciary By Allegedly Failing to 

Vacate Union Offices After Being Removed From His Position as 1st Vice 

President.

Again, Defendant maintains that no fiduciary relationship existed between 

Defendant Click and Plaintiff, after Plaintiff removed him from office as 1st Vice 

President. However, despite the indisputable summary judgment evidence otherwise, 

should the Court believe a fiduciary relationship existed, Defendant Click’s alleged 

“failure to vacate Union offices” does not rise to any breach of fiduciary duty under 

Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

Taking as true all facts alleged by Plaintiff and viewing them in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, “unlawfully occupying Plaintiff’s offices for several days and 

refusing to vacate until directed to do so by the TWU International President” does not 

rise to a level of fiduciary duty contemplated under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

Assuming arguendo, Defendant Click, in fact refused to vacate Union offices, it 

was not done so because he was breaching some fiduciary duty, its because they clearly 
31

did not agree with the “appropriateness of the administrative actions and decisions” taken 

against them by Plaintiff. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3”). There was a clear disagreement over 

whether the Executive Board had the authority to remove him from office. (“id”). 

Refusing to vacate the Union offices does not rise to a level of a fiduciary duty owed. 

Worst case scenario, Defendant Click’s actions amounted to a dereliction of his

officer duties. Once again the 5th Circuit in Hoffman has stated that “Section 501(a) does 

not permit derivative actions for dereliction of employment duties.” Hoffman, at 322. 

The 5th Circuit Court in Hoffman clearly ruled that “disagreements over the 

wisdom or appropriateness of particular administrative and employment actions and 

decisions are usually not amenable to suit under the LMRDA’s” Section 501(a) breach of 

fiduciary duties offenses. Hoffman, at 322. 

Plaintiff’s Executive Board made an administrative decision to remove Defendant 

Click from his 1st Vice President position, after he had already been suspended for nearly 

two months. (“Defendant’s Exhibits 14 and 16”). Defendant Click disagreed whether 

Union policies gave Plaintiff’s Executive Board the authority to do so. (“Defendants’ 

Exhibits 3”). 

Thus, even taking as true that Defendant Click mishandled the internal 

administration of the union by failing to vacate Union offices, as directed by Plaintiff, 

causing the Union to incur costs; their actions still fall well short of the subject matter 

contemplated under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

Again, even if Plaintiff some how incurred cost for Defendant failing to vacate 

Union offices, the 5th Circuit’s decision in Hoffman clearly states, “however stupid and 

wasteful the former officers’ actions may have been, issues of time, attendance, 
32

performance and administration” do not fall within the subject matter of Section 501(a) 

of the LMRDA. Hoffman, 321-22.

Even with this Court viewing Plaintiff’s allegations in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, at most, Defendant Click’s refusal to vacate Union offices amounted to a 

dereliction of his duties as 1st Vice President because he disagreed with the 

appropriateness of an administrative Executive Board action telling him to vacate. This 

simply cannot rise to any level of fiduciary duty owed, and is simply not something 

contemplated under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of Fiduciary 

Duty against Defendants Click for allegedly “refusing to vacate Union offices” fails as a 

matter of fact and law because the summary judgment evidence indisputably 

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that exists wherein 

Defendant breached any fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff.

(3). Defendant Click Did NOT Breach Any Fiduciary Duty By Flying to 

London to Attend a TWU International Meeting.

Again, Defendant maintains that no fiduciary relationship existed between 

Defendant and Plaintiff when Plaintiff removed him from office as 1st Vice President. 

However, despite the indisputable summary judgment evidence otherwise, should the 

Court believe a fiduciary relationship existed, Defendant Click’s trip to London does not 

rise to any breach of fiduciary duty under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA.

As judicially admitted by Plaintiff, prior to the International conference in 

London, Defendant Click was suspended from his officer position of 1st Vice President. 

(“Defendants’ Exhibit 14 and 16”). However, prior to Defendant Click’s suspension, 

TWU International had specifically requested Defendant Click to attend the conference in 
33

London. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3”). Moreover, Plaintiff had specifically approved their 

budget, and the funds to send a representative to London for this conference. (“id”).

Defendant Click at that time was the Safety Chair of the Local 556 Union, and 

also, a member of the Cabin Air Quality Board (“CAQB”). (“id”). The specific 

conference in London was the Global Cabin Air Quality Executive Conference, and thus, 

as Safety Chair and a member of the CAQB at that time, Plaintiff chose to send 

Defendant Click. (“id”). 

Defendant Click was scheduled to fly to London two days after his suspension. 

(“id”). After being suspended, Defendant Click contacted the TWU International 

President, Mr. James Little, and local Union President at the time, Defendant Martin, and 

asked if his attendance in London was still required despite being suspended. (“id”). Mr. 

Little and Defendant Martin both indicated that the entry fee and other expenses had 

already been purchased and were non-refundable, and told Defendant Click he should 

still attend the meeting. (“id”). Moreover, Defendant Click was not being paid to attend 

this conference. (“id”).

It was not until Defendant Click had already arrived in London, and participated 

fully in an entire day of the conference, until Plaintiff contacted Defendant Click and told 

him to not attend the conference anymore. (“id”). Subsequently, Defendant Click 

contacted Denver based representative Chris Sullivan to attend on behalf of Plaintiff. 

(“id”). As requested, Defendant Click did not participate in the remainder of the 

conference, and returned home on his scheduled flight. (“id”). 

Defendant Click’s attendance at the International Conference in London does not 

give rise to any breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff specifically budgeted for Defendant 
34

Click to attend the International Conference in London. (“id”). Plaintiff suspended 

Defendant Click two days before he was scheduled to leave for London for the 

conference. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 3 and 14”). The President of the TWU International 

specifically told Defendant Click that expenses had been paid, and his attendance was 

required at the Conference in London. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 3”). Plaintiff did not inform 

Defendant Click that his presence was no longer required at the London conference until 

the second full day of the trip. (“id”). As soon as Defendant Click was informed he was 

no longer to attend the conference, another rep was contacted to fill in for him. (“id”). 

Assuming arguendo, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true that Defendant Click 

was “explicitly warned that because of his suspension his attendance at the conference 

would be wholly unauthorized [and] despite the warning, Defendant [Click] went to 

London ...and used Union funds” cannot and does not rise to any level of breach of any 

fiduciary duty. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 14”).

The 5th Circuit has abundantly determined that “claims generally alleging 

maladministration of the union’s affairs...are either not amenable to monetary damages, 

for example the alleged destruction of union and budget records or the acceptance of a 

plane ride without disclosure; or were not for the Defendants’ personal benefit. As such 

they do not appear to fall within the subject matter of Section 501(a) of the LMRDA.” 

Hoffman, at 321. 

The indisputable facts clearly show that (1) Plaintiff specifically budgeted for

Defendant Click to attend the International Conference in London prior to his suspension; 

(2) Plaintiff used the monetary funds budgeted to purchase Defendant Click’s entry fee to 

the conference, his flight to the conference, and his hotel room during the conference; (3) 
35

Plaintiff chose to suspend Defendant Click 2 days prior to his departure date from the 

London conference, wherein no other member was selected to fillin; (4) Defendant Click 

was informed by then Local President Defendant Martin that the expenses were not 

refundable and he was required to attend despite the suspension; (5) upon being informed 

on the second day of the conference that he was no longer to attend the conference, 

Defendant Click did not participate any further and another member filled in; and (6) 

Defendant Click was in no way compensated or benefited financially from this trip. 

Even in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts alleged at most amount to a 

dereliction of Defendant’s duties over the appropriateness of a particular administrative 

action or decision. The entire basis of this allegation stems from an administrative 

decision entirely out of the control of Defendant.

The 5th Circuit in Hoffman, once again, clearly ruled that “disagreements over the 

wisdom or appropriateness of particular administrative and employment actions and 

decisions are usually not amendable to suit under the LMRDA”... no matter “however 

stupid and wasteful the former officer’s actions may have been [because] they raise 

issues of time, attendance, performance and administration - not breach of fiduciary 

duty.” Hoffman, at 321-22. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of Fiduciary 

Duty against Defendant Click for allegedly “attending a conference in London without 

authorization” fails as a matter of fact and law because the summary judgment evidence 

indisputably demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that exists 

wherein Defendant breached any fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff.
36

B. DEFENDANT MARTIN

A detailed recitation of the facts alleged against Defendant Martin are outlined above; 

however, Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant Martin breached a fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff 

for allegedly misappropriating Union funds.

ELEMENT 1 - FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

(1). Defendant Martin Was NOT in a Position of Fiduciary When He 

Allegedly Failed to Vacate Union Offices After Being Removed From His 

Official Position.

Again, Plaintiff judicially admits in its Original Petition against Defendant Martin 

that he “was removed from his official position within TWU LOCAL 556 and has not 

been reinstated.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15, pg. 4 - § V (11 and 12)”). Again, as with 

Defendant Click, assuming arguendo that Defendant Martin did in fact “unlawfully 

occupy Plaintiff’s offices for several days and refused to vacate” he was not doing so in 

any official capacity with any authority to do so. (“id”). As Plaintiff judicially admits, 

Defendant Martin “ was removed from his official position within TWU LOCAL 556 and 

has not been reinstated.” (“id”). Defendant was no longer in a fiduciary position. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of Fiduciary 

Duty against Defendant Martin for allegedly “unlawfully occupying Plaintiff’s office for 

several days and refusing to vacate” fails as a matter of law because by Plaintiff’s own 

judicial admissions and indisputable summary judgment evidence demonstrates, there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact that exists as to whether Plaintiff and Defendant 

had a fiduciary relationship. They simply did not.
37

ELEMENT 2 - FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED

(1). Defendant Martin Did NOT Breach Any Fiduciary Duty Allegedly Owed to 

Plaintiff By Insisting that Defendant Lindemann and Click’s Trial 

Committee Hearings Proceed on May 14th and 15th.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Martin “wasted significant time and money” when 

he allegedly “insisted on ordering the expenditure of the time and resources necessary for 

Defendants Lindemann and Click’s Article XIX trials on its originally set dates despite 

sufficient notice that the accusing party would not be able to proceed because of 

scheduling conflicts and other logistical issues.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 15, pg. 3 § V 

(10)”). 

The best Defendants can glean from this allegation is that Defendant Click 

allegedly breached subsection (2) “That these [Fiduciaries] manage, invest, and expend 

the same in accordance with its constitution and by-laws, and any resolutions of the 

governing bodies adopted thereunder” under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. 

501(a). 

(a). Sufficient Notice of Need For Postponement

As stated above, based on the summary judgment evidence, and viewing 

the facts and evidence in the light as best as possible for Plaintiff, the absolute

earliest Plaintiff could have “directed Defendant [Martin] to reschedule”

Defendants Lindemann and Click’s Hearings due to a “need for postponement” 

was May 10, 2013, when Plaintiff allegedly voted to reset the Hearings. 

(“Defendants’ Exhibit 11”).

However, the summary judgment evidence clearly shows that on May 

10th, members of the Executive Board were conferring and deliberating on 
38

Defendant Click’s objections to the Trial Committee Members. (“Defendants’ 

Exhibit 1”). Also, the Executive Board had proposed moving Defendants 

Lindemann and Click’s Hearings to the 24th of May, but had never made a 

decision. (“id”). 

On Sunday May 12th, the Executive Board finally rendered a 6-5 vote 

denying Defendant Click’s objections, and also, voted to move the Hearings to 

May 24th. (“id”).

It wasn’t until that Monday the 13th in the afternoon, the day before 

Defendant Click’s May 14th Hearing, when Thompson and Hettich approached 

Defendant Martin in his office to tell him that the Executive Board voted and

wanted him to postpone the Hearings. (“id”). 

Defendant Martin, believing that the Executive Board did not have the 

authority according to the Constitution to reschedule, and acting in his role as 

President, as is required by him, contacted the Trial Committee members involved 

in the matter to inform them that Hearings would proceed on the 14th and 15th of 

May 2013. (“id”). 

Also, as indicated above, Hettich sent an email to Defendant Click on May 

13th informing him his Hearings had been rescheduled. (“Defendants’ Exhibits 1, 

3 and 8”). Defendant Martin received a phone call from Defendant Click, wherein 

Defendant Martin conveyed to Defendant Click that he did not believe the 

Executive Board had the authority to reschedule his Hearings and that he needed 

to show up and proceed with the Hearings. (“id”). 
39

The next morning, May 14th, 2013, the Executive Board met, wherein the 

first order of business was to send Defendant Martin to Defendant Click’s 

Hearing and tell the Committee Members that Defendant Click’s Hearing was 

rescheduled. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 1; Defendants’ Exhibit 16 - Board Minutes 

from May 14-17, 2013”). However, prior to Defendant Martin leaving to inform 

the Committee Members of this decision, the Executive Board voted to suspend 

him from his duties as President. (“id”).

(b). Plaintiffs Allegations Do NOT Rise to Any Level of Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty Contemplated under § 501(a) of the LRMDA.

As stated above, Defendant Martin was informed on Monday May 13th, 

2013 that the Executive Board voted to reschedule Defendants Lindemann and 

Click’s Hearings scheduled for May 14th and 15th 2013. (“id.”). Upon receiving 

this information, Defendant Martin consulted the Union’s Constitution, contacted 

various members of the International Union, and determined that the Executive 

Board did not have the authority to reschedule the Hearings by simply voting to 

have them rescheduled. (“id”). 

Defendant Martin believed he could not reschedule the Hearings because 

he believed the Constitution for the Transportation Workers Union of the AFLCIO proscribed only two instances underwhich Article XIX and Article XXI 

hearings may be rescheduled; (1) if the claimant removes the charges; or (2) the 

accused successfully challenges the impartiality of a member(s) of the Trial 

Committee. (“Defendant’s Exhibit 1 and 9”).

Ultimately, the basis for all three of these lawsuits amounts to a 

disagreement between the Executive Board and the President of the Local Union. 
40

In Hoffman, the Court stated that the allegations against Defendants 

amounted to “disagreements in which Defendants handled the internal 

administration of the union during their tenure.” Hoffman, at 321. The Court ruled 

that “claims generally alleging maladministration of the union’s affairs by the 

Defendants are either not amenable to monetary damages... or were not for the 

Defendants’ personal financial benefit...[and] as such do not appear to fall within 

the subject matter of Section 501 of the LMRDA.” Hoffman, at 321. 

Taking as true Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Martin was “directed 

to reschedule the hearings,” and acting as President, based on his belief that the 

Constitution did not allow for the rescheduling, still “insisted on ordering the 

expenditure of the time and resources necessary for the Article XIX Hearings on 

its originally set dates... which result[ed] in significant time and money wasted, 

causing Plaintiff to foot-the-bill” still does not rise to any level of breach under 

Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. Hoffman, 321-22. 

Hoffman clearly ruled that, “disagreements over the wisdom or 

appropriateness of particular administrative and employment actions and 

decisions are usually not amenable to suit under the LMRDA.” Hoffman, at 322. 

Indeed, the Court in Hoffman goes on to rule that “most of these matters 

are the sort of ‘internal union grievances’ properly left to be worked out via union 

democratic processes (as they eventually were) and not by a federal court sitting 

as sort of super-review board.” Hoffman, at 322; United Food and Commercial 

Workers Int’l Local 911, 301 F.3d at 475. 
41

Moreover, the Hoffman Court ruled that, “Section 501(a) does not permit 

these derivative actions for dereliction of employment duties. Disputes over 

whether elected union officials are adequately performing their employment 

obligations are matters usually to be worked out within the union and its 

governing structure and not in federal courts.” Hoffman, at 322. 

Finally, the Hoffman Court reasoned that, “however stupid and wasteful 

the former officers’ actions may have been they raise issues of time, attendance, 

performance and administration - not breach of fiduciary duty.” Hoffman, at 321. 

Thus, even taking as true all of Plaintiff’s allegations, at most, Defendant 

Martin’s actions as union President stemmed from a disagreement of the

administration of union policy, which assuming he was in the wrong about the 

policy, could at worst be seen as a dereliction of his Presidential duties. The 

matter was handled internally when he was suspended from his duties as 

President, charges were brought against him, and he was ultimately removed as 

President. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 16”). 

Like in Hoffman, the matter was handled internally, as it should have 

been. Moreover, even if Defendant Martin did wrongly “Order the adjudication of 

the Hearings on their original dates,” he in no way benefited financially from it. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty against Defendant Martin for allegedly “misusing Union funds by 

wasting significant time and money” by “insisting on ordering the May 14th and 

15th Trial Committee Hearings” of Defendants Lindemann and Click fails as a 

matter of fact and law because the summary judgment evidence indisputably 
42

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that exists 

wherein Defendant breached any fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff.

(2). Defendant Martin Did NOT Breach Any Fiduciary Duty By Allegedly Failing 

to Vacate Union Offices After Being Removed From His Position as

President.

Again, Defendant Marin maintains that no fiduciary relationship existed between 

himself and Plaintiff, after Plaintiff removed him from office as President. However, 

despite the indisputable summary judgment evidence otherwise, should the Court believe 

a fiduciary relationship existed, Defendant Martin’s alleged “failure to vacate Union 

offices” does not rise to any breach of fiduciary duty under Section 501(a) of the 

LMRDA. 

Taking as true all facts alleged by Plaintiff and viewing them in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, “unlawfully occupying Plaintiff’s offices for several days and 

refusing to vacate them until directed to do so by the TWU International President” does 

not rise to a level of fiduciary duty contemplated under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

Assuming arguendo, Defendant Martin, in fact refused to vacate Union offices, it 

was not done so because he was breaching some fiduciary duty, its because he clearly did 

not agree with the “appropriateness of the administrative actions and decisions” taken 

against him by Plaintiff. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 1”). There was a clear disagreement over 

whether the Executive Board had the authority to remove Defendant Martin from office. 

(“id”). Refusing to vacate the Union offices simply does not rise to a level of a fiduciary 

duty owed. 
43

Worst case scenario, Defendant Martin’s action amounted to a dereliction of his 

officer duties. Once again the 5th Circuit in Hoffman has stated that “Section 501(a) does 

not permit derivative actions for dereliction of employment duties.” Hoffman, at 322. 

The 5th Circuit Court in Hoffman clearly ruled that “disagreements over the 

wisdom or appropriateness of particular administrative and employment actions and 

decisions are usually not amenable to suit under the LMRDA’s” Section 501(a) breach of 

fiduciary duties offenses. Hoffman, at 322. 

Plaintiff’s Executive Board made an administrative decision to remove Defendant 

Martin as President. (“Defendant’s Exhibits 15-16”). Defendant Martin disagreed 

whether Union policies gave Plaintiff’s Executive Board the authority to do so. 

(“Defendants’ Exhibits 1”). 

Thus, even taking as true that Defendant Martin failed to vacate Union offices, as 

directed by Plaintiff, therefore mishandling the internal administration of the union that 

removed him, and thereby causing the Union to incur costs; Defendant Martin’s actions 

still fall well short of the subject matter contemplated under Section 501(a) of the 

LMRDA. 

Again, even if Plaintiff some how incurred cost for Defendant failing to vacate 

Union offices, the 5th Circuit’s decision in Hoffman clearly states, “however stupid and 

wasteful the former officers’ actions may have been, issues of time, attendance, 

performance and administration” do not fall within the subject matter of Section 501(a) 

of the LMRDA. Hoffman, 321-22.

Even with this Court viewing Plaintiff’s allegations in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, at most, Defendant Martin’s refusal to vacate Union offices amounted to a 
44

dereliction of his duties as President because he disagreed with the appropriateness of an 

administrative Executive Board action. This simply cannot rise to any level of fiduciary 

duty owed, and is simply not something contemplated under Section 501(a) of the 

LMRDA. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of Fiduciary 

Duty against Defendant Martin for allegedly “refusing to vacate Union offices” fails as a 

matter of fact and law because the summary judgment evidence indisputably 

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that exists wherein 

Defendant breached any fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff.

C. DEFENDANT LINDEMANN

A detailed recitation of the facts alleged against Defendant Lindemann are outlined 

above; however, Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant Lindemann breached a fiduciary duty owed 

to Plaintiff for allegedly misappropriating Union funds.

ELEMENT 2 - FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED

(1). Defendant Lindemann Did NOT Breach Any Fiduciary Duty Allegedly Owed 

to Plaintiff Involving his May 15th Trial Committee Hearing.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lindemann “wasted significant time and money” 

when he allegedly “insisted on ordering the expenditure of the time and resources 

necessary for his Article XIX trial on its originally set dates despite sufficient notice that 

the accusing party would not be able to proceed because of scheduling conflicts and other 

logistical issues.” (“Defendants’ Exhibit 13, pg. 3 § V (10)”). 

The best Defendants can glean from this allegation is that Defendant Lindemann 

allegedly breached subsection (2) “That these [Fiduciaries] manage, invest, and expend 

the same in accordance with its constitution and by-laws, and any resolutions of the 
45

governing bodies adopted thereunder” under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. 

501(a). 

(a). Sufficient Notice of Need For Postponement

As stated above, based on the summary judgment evidence, and viewing 

the facts and evidence in the light as best as possible for Plaintiff, the absolute 

earliest Plaintiff could have notified Defendant Lindemann of the “need for 

postponement” was May 10, 2013, when Plaintiff voted to re-set Defendant 

Lindemann’s Hearings. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 11”). 

However, the summary judgment evidence produced clearly shows that 

the first time Defendant Lindemann was made aware of any possible reset was 

Wednesday morning, May 15th, 2013, during his Trial Committee Hearing. 

(“Defendants’ Exhibit 2 and 8”). Plaintiff sent two Board Members to interrupt 

Defendant Lindemann’s Trial Committee Hearing the morning of May 15th, 2013 

to inform everyone there that the Hearings were rescheduled. (“id”). That was the 

first time Defendant Lindemann had heard about his Hearing being rescheduled. 

(“id”). 

Telling someone their Trial Committee Hearing had been rescheduled 

during that Hearing does not come anywhere close to being “sufficient notice.” 

(b). Defendant Did NOT Insist on Ordering the Expenditure of the Time 

and Resources Necessary for His Trial Committee Hearing on the 

15th of May 2013.

Again, Plaintiff is under some misguided belief that Defendant Lindemann 

had any power whatsoever to “order” his Hearing on the 15th of May, 2013 to 

proceed. All the facts and summary judgment evidence clearly show that 
46

Defendant Lindemann received a correspondence from Recording Secretary 

Jannah Dalak dated April 30, 2013. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 2 and 6”). The letter 

indicated that Defendant Lindeman had a Trial Committee Hearing set against 

him on May 15th of 2013. (“id”). 

As expected, Defendant Lindemann showed up to his Hearing on May 

15th, 2013, where every single person scheduled to be there: Defendants, 

Defendants’ witnesses, the Union attorney, Defenses’ counsel, the court reporter, 

and the Trial Committee Members were all ready to proceed with a Trial 

Committee Hearing. (“Defendants’ Exhibit 2 and 8”). Defendant had no reason to 

believe otherwise that his trial was rescheduled. 

That morning as the Trial Committee Members commenced proceedings, 

Plaintiff sent two individuals to interrupt the Hearings and inform everyone that 

the Hearings had been rescheduled. (“id”). That was the first time Defendant 

Lindemann was ever made aware that Plaintiff was trying to reschedule his 

Hearing. (“id”). 

At the behest of the Trial Committee Members, and not because 

Defendant Lindemann “insisted on ordering the expenditure of the time and 

resources to proceed,” his May 15th Hearing as adjudicated; wherein he was 

found not guilty of the allegations against him. (“id”). 

Moreover, the certified transcripts from Defendant Lindemann’s May 15th 

Hearing clearly indicate that the Trial Committee Members deliberated on 

whether Plaintiff had any authority to reschedule the Hearings, and after said 

deliberation the Trial Committee Members clearly decided, making the decision 
47

themselves, that the Trial Committee Hearing would proceed. (“Defendants’ 

Exhibit 8”).

The Hearing against Defendant Lindemann took place on May 15th, 2013 

because (1) Plaintiff scheduled his Hearing for that date, (2) Prior to his May 15th 

Trial commencing, he had not been informed by anyone that his Hearing was 

being rescheduled; (3) The morning of his Hearing was the first time Defendant 

Lindemann had ever been made aware that his Hearing was being rescheduled

and (4) The Trial Committee Members, chosen by Plaintiff to adjudicate the 

Hearing, themselves chose to proceed with the May 15th Hearing believing that 

Plaintiff had no authority to reschedule it. 

In no way, shape or form did Defendant Lindemann “insist on ordering the 

expenditure of the time and resources necessary for the Article XIX trial on its 

originally set dates despite sufficient notice of any postponement.” 

(c). Plaintiff’s Allegations Do NOT Rise to Any Level of Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty.

In any event, assuming arguendo that this Honorable Court were to 

disregard the overwhelming amount of summary judgment evidence and 

precedence, and believe that the allegations asserted by Plaintiff had any merit, 

Defendant Lindemann’s actions would still not rise to any level of breach of 

fiduciary duty enumerated under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

In Hoffman, the Defendants were accused of misusing union funds by 

rigging their November 1999 elections, Hoffman, at 320. Similary, Defendant 

Lindemann in this case is being accused of wasting time and money, or misusing 
48

Union funds, to force the Trial Committees on May 15th to proceed despite some 

alleged notification otherwise. 

In Hoffman, the Court found no good cause to proceed on the misuse of 

union funds because “the remedy for the defective election process [was] not the 

lawsuit, but the intervention of the Labor Department.” Hoffman, at 320. Further, 

the Court in Hoffman stated that “The money spent to re-run the elections did not 

personally benefit the Defendants.” Id. Finally, the Court in Hoffman ruled that 

“the general allegations that officers conducted an illegal election does not state a 

breach of the duties referred to in § 501(a), although it may violate other 

provisions of the Act.” Id.

Just as in Hoffman, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Lindemann 

misused union funds by allegedly ordering his Article XIX Trials to move 

forward, despite some alleged notification they were rescheduled, simply does not 

state a breach of duty referred to in § 501(a) of the LMRDA. 

Further, as in Hoffman, the money spent on rescheduling and retrying the 

Hearing on May 24th did not personally benefit Defendant Lindemann in any 

way. In fact, it was extremely detrimental to Defendant Lindemann, whereas he 

was found guilty on the re-trial, and removed from his officer position. 

(“Defendants’ Exhibit 13). 

Finally, even if the Court were to believe that Defendant Lindemann 

“wasted significant Union time and money,” Hoffman clearly states that “however 

stupid and wasteful the former officers’ actions may have been, issues of time, 

attendance, performance and administration are not a breach of fiduciary duty. 
49

The law confides these concerns to the union membership through the election of 

officers; in fact, the Defendants have already been replaced on the union’s board.” 

Hoffman, 321-22. And as in Hoffman, Defendant Lindemann was removed from 

office.

The allegations against Defendant Lindemann are exactly the kind, which 

the 5th Circuit identifies as “the sort of internal grievances properly left to be 

worked out via union democratic processes...and not by a federal court sitting as 

a sort of super-review board.” Hoffman, at 322.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim of Misappropriation of Union Funds - Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty against Defendant Lindemann for allegedly “misusing Union 

funds by wasting significant time and money” surrounding his May 15th Trial 

Committee Hearings fails as a matter of fact and law because all summary 

judgment evidence and precedence indisputably demonstrates that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact that exists wherein Defendant Lindemann 

breached any fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has failed to provide even a mere scintilla of evidence to demonstrate that a 

genuine issue of material fact exists on each and every one of their causes of action against 

Defendants Martin, Click and Lindemann. As a matter of law Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief 

they seek, and moreover, have demonstrated no basis whatsoever, in law or fact, to justify their 

allegations against Defendants. 
50

By their own admissions, Plaintiff has established that no fiduciary relationship existed 

between Defendants and Plaintiff, let alone any duty owed. Plaintiff simply fails to even come 

close to meeting the requirements to overcome summary judgment. Therefore, as a mater of law, 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 

VIII.

PRAYER

A. Requests For Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to T.R.C.P. § 13 & Texas C.P.R.C § 10

Tex. R. Civ. P. § 13 authorizes the imposition of sanctions against any attorney, a 

represented party, or both, who filed a pleading that is either (1) groundless and brought in bad 

faith; or (2) groundless and brought to harass. Tex. R. Civ. P. § 13. The rule defines “groundless” 

as having “no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, 

modification, or reversal of existing law.” Tex. R. Civ. P. § 13. 

Similarly, Chapter 10 of the Texas Civ. P. and Rem. Code allows a trial court to sanction 

an attorney or a party for filing motions or pleadings that lack a reasonable basis in fact or law. 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 10.001-.005; Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. 

2007). Chapter 10 must show (1) the pleading or motion was brought for an improper purpose; 

(2) there were no grounds for the legal arguments advanced; or (3) the factual allegations or 

denials lacked evidentiary support. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 10.001; Low, at 614.

A sanction under Chapter 10 may include ordering a party to pay the reasonable 

attorney’s fees (“Defendants’ Exhibit 17”) incurred by the other party because of the filing of the 

frivolous pleadings. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann § 10.004(c)(3).

For the reasons stated above in Defendants’ brief in support of their Traditional Motion 

for Summary Judgment, Defendants seek relief from this Honorable Court pursuant to the Tex. 
51

R. of Civ. P. § 13 and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 10.001-005. Plaintiff’s lawsuits against 

Defendants are groundless, and have been brought simply to harass them. By their own 

admissions, Plaintiff had no grounds to bring forth these lawsuits. Plaintiff’s allegations lack 

evidentiary support, as well as any facts or law to justify their advancement of these lawsuits. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants further pray that their Motion 

for Traditional Summary Judgment be in all things GRANTED, and that all of Plaintiff’s claims 

be dismissed with prejudice. Further, Defendants pray that this Honorable Court award all 

attorneys fees, costs of court, pre-judgment and post-judgment interests they may so justly be 

entitled to. And for such other and further relief, both special and general, at law and in equity, to 

which Defendants my show themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

 NELSON PURSLEY, PLLC

By: /s/ John F. Nelson

DANIEL B. NELSON

State Bar No. 14888470

JOHN F. NELSON

State Bar No. 24074802

4635 Southwest Freeway, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77027

(O) 713-589-8811

(F) 713-589-7159

john.nelson@nelsonpursley.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,

STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK, 

and JERRY LINDEMANN
52

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded by 

facsimile and/or regular US mail on all parties and/or attorneys of record on this the 26th day of 

November 2014.

Edward B. Cloutman, III

Edward B. Cloutman, IV

Cloutman & Cloutman

3301 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75226

/s/ John F. Nelson

JOHN F. NELSON
CAUSE NO. DC-13-13347

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

UNION LOCAL 556, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

§

STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK, §

AND JERRY LINDEMANN §

§

Defendants. § 116th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ON THIS day came to be heard Defendants STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK and 

JERRY LINDEMANN’s Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment. After considering the 

Motion, the response and evidence, if any, this Honorable Court finds that Defendants’ Motion 

should, in all respects, be GRANTED.

It is THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK and 

JERRY LINDEMANN’s Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

SIGNED on this the _____ day of ________________, 2014.

______________________________

JUDGE PRESIDING
1

CAUSE NO. DC-13-13347

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

UNION LOCAL 556, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

§

CHRIS CLICK, §

AND JERRY LINDEMANN §

§

Defendants. § 116th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, DEFENDANTS CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN 

(“Defendants”), and files this, their Motion to Modify Judgment pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure 329b. Defendants would respectfully show unto this Honorable Court the following:

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. On July 14, 2014 Defendants filed their No-Evidence Motion for Summary 

Judgment.

2. On November 26, 2014, Defendants filed their Traditional Motion for Summary 

Judgment.

3. This Honorable Court set an Oral Hearing for both Defendants’ Motions for NoEvidence Summary Judgment and Traditional Summary Judgment for January 16, 2015. 

4. On January 16, 2015, this Honorable Court heard oral arguments on Defendants’ 

Motions for Summary Judgment; however, the Hearing was not concluded and continued for 

January 22, 2015.

5. On January 22, 2015, this Honorable Court continued its Oral Hearing on 

Defendants’ Motions for No-Evidence and Traditional Summary Judgment, and this Honorable

Lantz Sandra

FILED

DALLAS COUNTY

3/13/2015 3:08:48 PM

FELICIA PITRE

DISTRICT CLERK
2

Court GRANTED Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to Defendants CLICK and 

LINDEMANN.

6. However, as of the date of filing this Modification of Judgment, no entry of 

Judgment or Order has been entered as to the relief entitled to Defendants CLICK and 

LINDEMANN.

7. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN move this Court to enter Judgment and/or

Order as to Defendants’ relief herein entitled.

II.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

If the judgment did not award a party all the relief it was entitled to, or awarded the other 

party more relief than it was entitled to, the complaint must be brought to the attention of the trial 

court in a written motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. § 329b(g).

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment if the court did not award the correct 

amount of prejudgment interest. If a party does not bring the issue to the attention of the trial 

court in a motion to modify the judgment or make some other objection that appears on the 

record, the party cannot raise the issue on appeal. Larrumbide v. Doctors Health Facilities, 734 

S.W.2d 685, 693-94 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, writ denied). 

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment when the trial court does not award 

attorneys fees or does not award the correct amount of fees. Texas Educ. Agency v. Maxwell, 937 

S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1997, writ denied); American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, 

Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 178 (Tex. App. - Waco 1991, writ denied).
3

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment when the judgment does not award 

costs, awards costs to the wrong party, or does not award the correct amount of costs. DawsonAustin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998). 

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment if there is any other error in the 

judgment. L.M. Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs, 929 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. 1996). 

On July 14, 2014, Defendants Click and Lindemann filed their No-Evidence Motion for 

Summary Judgment praying this Honorable Court grant their Motion and requested relief, both 

special and general, at law and in equity. On November 26, 2014, Defendants filed their 

Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment praying this Honorable Court to grant their Motion, 

and pray and requested relief for Attorneys Fees, costs of court, pre and post judgment interest, 

and any other relief they may so justly be entitled to in law or equity. 

On January 22, 2015, this Honorable Court GRANTED Defendants Click and 

Lindemann’s Motions for Summary Judgment; however, no Order or Judgment has been entered 

as to the relief requested by Defendants Click and Lindemann, and that of which they are 

entitled. 

Moreover, there is long standing precedence that shows a history of policy “permitting 

union officers who have successfully defended themselves against charges of § 501 of the 

LMRDA, wherein there is an adequate protection of union officers from baseless litigation.” 

Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972). 

Citing Holdeman v. Sheldon, where the 2nd Circuit originally held that there is a policy 

in place “permitting a union to reimburse a Defendant if he is successful in his defense...[which] 

provides sufficient financial protection of union officials against nuisance suits.” Holdeman v. 

Sheldon, 311 F.2d 2, 3 (2nd Cir. 1962); See also, McNamara, et al v. Johston, et al., 522 F.2d 
4

1157, 1167 (7th Cir. 1975)(“Union officials charged as defendants in suits [under section 501 of 

the LMRDA] should retain independent counsel and bear the financial burden of their defense; 

however, if they prevail, they may properly be reimbursed by the union for the costs of their 

legal defense.”); See also, Gabauer, et al v. Woodcock, et al., 425 F.Supp 1, 2 (E.D. Missouri 

1976)(“Union officials charged as defendants in suits [under section 501 of the LMRDA] should 

retain independent counsel and bear the financial burden of their defense; however, if they 

prevail, they may properly be reimbursed by the union for the costs of their legal defense.”); See 

also, Mulligan v. Parker, 805 F.Supp 592, n. 4 (ND Illinois 1992) quoting Holdeman (“The 

policy of permitting the union to reimburse the officers for successful defense provides sufficient 

financial protection of the officers against harassing lawsuits.”)

Therefore, Defendants Click and Lindemann are entitled to the relief requested, and move 

this Honorable Court to modify the Judgment in this matter to award for the said relief of which 

they are so justly entitled.

III.

RELIEF REQUESTED

A. This Honorable Court enter Order of Judgment GRANTING Defendants Click 

and Lindemann’s No-Evidence and Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment.

B. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to pre and post judgment 

interest accruing at a rate of 5%.

C. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to all court costs attributable to 

each of them.
5

D. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to their uncontested reasonable 

attorneys fees. (“See attached herein, Exhibit 17 of Defendants Traditional Motion for Summary 

Judgment - Defendants’ Uncontested Affidavit for Attorneys’ Fees”).

E. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN request and pray for any other and further 

relief of which they may so be justly entitled.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY

LINDEMANN pray this Court GRANT their Motion for Modification of Judgment, and award 

them all relief herein requested of which they are so justly entitled, and for any other and further 

relief that this Honorable Court may deem appropriate.

Respectfully Submitted,

 NELSON PURSLEY, PLLC

By: /s/ John F. Nelson

DANIEL B. NELSON

State Bar No. 14888470

JOHN F. NELSON

State Bar No. 24074802

4635 Southwest Freeway, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77027

(O) 713-589-8811

(F) 713-589-7159

john.nelson@nelsonpursley.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,

CHRIS CLICK and JERRY 

LINDEMANN
6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded by 

facsimile and/or regular US mail on all parties and/or attorneys of record on this the 13th day of 

March 2015.

Edward B. Cloutman, III

Edward B. Cloutman, IV

Cloutman & Cloutman

3301 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75226

/s/ John F. Nelson

JOHN F. NELSON
7

CAUSE NO. DC-13-13347

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

UNION LOCAL 556, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

§

CHRIS CLICK AND §

JERRY LINDEMANN §

§

Defendants. § 116th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FINAL JUDGMENT

This Honorable Court having considered all the pleadings, evidence, and arguments 

herein is of the opinion that Defendants’ CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN’s Motion to 

Modify should be GRANTED.

Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Final Judgment is 

awarded to Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN, as follows:

(A). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to all 

pre and post judgment interest accruing at a rate of 5%.

(B). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to all 

costs of the court of which are attributable to each Defendant in the amount of $________.____

(C). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to 

their uncontested attorneys fees in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Three Hundred SeventyOne Dollars and nineteen cents ($44,371.19). 

________________________

JUDGE PRESIDING
EXHIBIT

T7
CAUSE

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS

UNION LOCAL 556,

DC-13-r3347

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

NO.

$

s

s

$

$

$

$

s

s

$

Plaintiff,

v.

STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK,

AND JERRY LINDEMANN

DALLAS COUNTY. TNXAS

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT IN

I I6th JTJDICIAL DISTRICT

SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS' FEFJ,S

STA]'IJ OII'fIIXAS

COTJNl'Y OII HARRIS

lllrFORlr MIr. the undersigned authority" on this day pcrsonally appcarcd.fOtlN It

Nfll.SON who being lirst duly sworn, stated as lbllows:

l. "My namc is John Ir. Nelson. I am an attorney in the above-stylcd and numbered Causc

fbr and on behalf of Def'endants. Stacy Martin. Chris Click and Jerry Lirrdemann. I am ovcr

eightecn ( I 8) ycars o1' age and am fully competcnt and duly authorized to makc this Af f rdavit.

which fircts arc true and correct.

2. I am an attorney dply licenscd by the Statc of 'l'cxas. I am currcntly practicing out of

f{ouston. Ilarris County. Texas. I am fanriliar with the f-ees charged by attorneys in ancl arouud

Dallas County. Texas. fbr services of a similar nature to those perlbrmed herein.

3. t)et-cndants Stacy Martin, Chris Cllick and.lerry Lindenlann have retained thc law llrm o1'

NELSON PURSLIIY, PLI.C to represent thcm in the instant suit brought against thcm by

Transportation Workers Llnion, l,ocal 556. Plaintil-l' hcrein.

4. A11 legal services perfbrmed on behalf o1'Def-endants Stacy Martin. Chris Click and.ferry

l,indemann have been reasonable and necessary.

5. In my opinion, a usual and customary hourly billing rate for Mr. Daniel B. Nelson. a duly

licensed attorney in and for the State of Texas for 27 years. should be $375.00. and an hourly

billing rate for myself, being duly licensed in and fbr the State of Texas fbr 4 years, should be

tiJ

$

,'i

J"
$275.00. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the sum of Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred and

0/100 Dollars ($41.500.00) is a reasonable and customary f-ee fbr the legal services perfbrmed in

this matter fbr and on behalf of Defendants in and around Dallas County. In the event this case

is appealed to the Court of Appeals an additional Fifleen Thousand and 00/100 Dollars

($15,000.00) would be reasonable and necessary attorneys' f-ees. and an additiclnal Ten'l'housand

and 00/100 Dollars ($10,000.00) if this case is appealed to the Sqpreme Court of Texas would be

reasonable and necessary attorneys' f-ees.

6. In addition. Def-endants have expended another Two 'fhousand I'.ight F{undred and

Seventy-One Dollars and 19/100 ($2.921.19) in reasonable and necessary crxpenscs associated

with this litigation.

7 . My opinion is based on a numbcr of f'acts. including without limitation, to the fbllowing:

a. l'he time and labor required. the novelty and difllculty of the qucstions involved.

and thc skill requisite to perfbrm the legal serviccs properly:

b. The I'ee customarily charged in the locality firr similar legal services:

c. The amounl of time involved:

d. The time limitation imposed by thc client and the circumstances;

e. 'l'he nature and length of thc prof'essional relationship with the client; and

f. The experience of the attorneys pcrlorrning these services."

8. In November o1'2013, Plaintiff lllcd thrce separatc lawsuits against each Def-endant.

Since thcn. De1'ensc counsel has spent in excess ol'over 150 hours thus far dcl-ending Plaintilf s

allegations. The lbregoing has included, but is not limited to: client meetings. rcccipt and

analysis of pleadings, preparation ol'deltnsc pleadings, legal research. preparation ol- motions to

the Court. attendance of hearings. documcnt revicw. mediation attendance. cliscovcry. and trial

preparation."

FURTI IIlR At' F'lAN]' SAYET'H NOl'

ELSON

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this th

Notary Public in and fbr

the State of Texas

By:

DANIET BRYAN NELSON

Notorv Public, Slole ot Texos

My Commission Explres

MoY 06, 2016
1

CAUSE NO. DC-13-13347

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

UNION LOCAL 556, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

§

CHRIS CLICK, §

AND JERRY LINDEMANN §

§

Defendants. § 116th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, DEFENDANTS CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN 

(“Defendants”), and files this, their Motion to Modify Judgment pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure 329b. Defendants would respectfully show unto this Honorable Court the following:

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. On July 14, 2014 Defendants filed their No-Evidence Motion for Summary 

Judgment.

2. On November 26, 2014, Defendants filed their Traditional Motion for Summary 

Judgment.

3. This Honorable Court set an Oral Hearing for both Defendants’ Motions for NoEvidence Summary Judgment and Traditional Summary Judgment for January 16, 2015. 

4. On January 16, 2015, this Honorable Court heard oral arguments on Defendants’ 

Motions for Summary Judgment; however, the Hearing was not concluded and continued for 

January 22, 2015.

5. On January 22, 2015, this Honorable Court continued its Oral Hearing on 

Defendants’ Motions for No-Evidence and Traditional Summary Judgment, and this Honorable

Lantz Sandra

FILED

DALLAS COUNTY

3/13/2015 3:08:48 PM

FELICIA PITRE

DISTRICT CLERK
2

Court GRANTED Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to Defendants CLICK and 

LINDEMANN.

6. However, as of the date of filing this Modification of Judgment, no entry of 

Judgment or Order has been entered as to the relief entitled to Defendants CLICK and 

LINDEMANN.

7. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN move this Court to enter Judgment and/or

Order as to Defendants’ relief herein entitled.

II.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

If the judgment did not award a party all the relief it was entitled to, or awarded the other 

party more relief than it was entitled to, the complaint must be brought to the attention of the trial 

court in a written motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. § 329b(g).

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment if the court did not award the correct 

amount of prejudgment interest. If a party does not bring the issue to the attention of the trial 

court in a motion to modify the judgment or make some other objection that appears on the 

record, the party cannot raise the issue on appeal. Larrumbide v. Doctors Health Facilities, 734 

S.W.2d 685, 693-94 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, writ denied). 

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment when the trial court does not award 

attorneys fees or does not award the correct amount of fees. Texas Educ. Agency v. Maxwell, 937 

S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1997, writ denied); American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, 

Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 178 (Tex. App. - Waco 1991, writ denied).
3

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment when the judgment does not award 

costs, awards costs to the wrong party, or does not award the correct amount of costs. DawsonAustin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998). 

A party should file a motion to modify the judgment if there is any other error in the 

judgment. L.M. Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs, 929 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. 1996). 

On July 14, 2014, Defendants Click and Lindemann filed their No-Evidence Motion for 

Summary Judgment praying this Honorable Court grant their Motion and requested relief, both 

special and general, at law and in equity. On November 26, 2014, Defendants filed their 

Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment praying this Honorable Court to grant their Motion, 

and pray and requested relief for Attorneys Fees, costs of court, pre and post judgment interest, 

and any other relief they may so justly be entitled to in law or equity. 

On January 22, 2015, this Honorable Court GRANTED Defendants Click and 

Lindemann’s Motions for Summary Judgment; however, no Order or Judgment has been entered 

as to the relief requested by Defendants Click and Lindemann, and that of which they are 

entitled. 

Moreover, there is long standing precedence that shows a history of policy “permitting 

union officers who have successfully defended themselves against charges of § 501 of the 

LMRDA, wherein there is an adequate protection of union officers from baseless litigation.” 

Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972). 

Citing Holdeman v. Sheldon, where the 2nd Circuit originally held that there is a policy 

in place “permitting a union to reimburse a Defendant if he is successful in his defense...[which] 

provides sufficient financial protection of union officials against nuisance suits.” Holdeman v. 

Sheldon, 311 F.2d 2, 3 (2nd Cir. 1962); See also, McNamara, et al v. Johston, et al., 522 F.2d 
4

1157, 1167 (7th Cir. 1975)(“Union officials charged as defendants in suits [under section 501 of 

the LMRDA] should retain independent counsel and bear the financial burden of their defense; 

however, if they prevail, they may properly be reimbursed by the union for the costs of their 

legal defense.”); See also, Gabauer, et al v. Woodcock, et al., 425 F.Supp 1, 2 (E.D. Missouri 

1976)(“Union officials charged as defendants in suits [under section 501 of the LMRDA] should 

retain independent counsel and bear the financial burden of their defense; however, if they 

prevail, they may properly be reimbursed by the union for the costs of their legal defense.”); See 

also, Mulligan v. Parker, 805 F.Supp 592, n. 4 (ND Illinois 1992) quoting Holdeman (“The 

policy of permitting the union to reimburse the officers for successful defense provides sufficient 

financial protection of the officers against harassing lawsuits.”)

Therefore, Defendants Click and Lindemann are entitled to the relief requested, and move 

this Honorable Court to modify the Judgment in this matter to award for the said relief of which 

they are so justly entitled.

III.

RELIEF REQUESTED

A. This Honorable Court enter Order of Judgment GRANTING Defendants Click 

and Lindemann’s No-Evidence and Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment.

B. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to pre and post judgment 

interest accruing at a rate of 5%.

C. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to all court costs attributable to 

each of them.
5

D. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN be entitled to their uncontested reasonable 

attorneys fees. (“See attached herein, Exhibit 17 of Defendants Traditional Motion for Summary 

Judgment - Defendants’ Uncontested Affidavit for Attorneys’ Fees”).

E. Defendants CLICK and LINDEMANN request and pray for any other and further 

relief of which they may so be justly entitled.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY

LINDEMANN pray this Court GRANT their Motion for Modification of Judgment, and award 

them all relief herein requested of which they are so justly entitled, and for any other and further 

relief that this Honorable Court may deem appropriate.

Respectfully Submitted,

 NELSON PURSLEY, PLLC

By: /s/ John F. Nelson

DANIEL B. NELSON

State Bar No. 14888470

JOHN F. NELSON

State Bar No. 24074802

4635 Southwest Freeway, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77027

(O) 713-589-8811

(F) 713-589-7159

john.nelson@nelsonpursley.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,

CHRIS CLICK and JERRY 

LINDEMANN
6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded by 

facsimile and/or regular US mail on all parties and/or attorneys of record on this the 13th day of 

March 2015.

Edward B. Cloutman, III

Edward B. Cloutman, IV

Cloutman & Cloutman

3301 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75226

/s/ John F. Nelson

JOHN F. NELSON
7

CAUSE NO. DC-13-13347

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

UNION LOCAL 556, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

§

CHRIS CLICK AND §

JERRY LINDEMANN §

§

Defendants. § 116th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FINAL JUDGMENT

This Honorable Court having considered all the pleadings, evidence, and arguments 

herein is of the opinion that Defendants’ CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN’s Motion to 

Modify should be GRANTED.

Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Final Judgment is 

awarded to Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN, as follows:

(A). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to all 

pre and post judgment interest accruing at a rate of 5%.

(B). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to all 

costs of the court of which are attributable to each Defendant in the amount of $________.____

(C). Defendants CHRIS CLICK and JERRY LINDEMANN are hereby entitled to 

their uncontested attorneys fees in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Three Hundred SeventyOne Dollars and nineteen cents ($44,371.19). 

________________________

JUDGE PRESIDING
EXHIBIT

T7
CAUSE

TRANSPORTATION WORKERS

UNION LOCAL 556,

DC-13-r3347

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

NO.

$

s

s

$

$

$

$

s

s

$

Plaintiff,

v.

STACY MARTIN, CHRIS CLICK,

AND JERRY LINDEMANN

DALLAS COUNTY. TNXAS

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT IN

I I6th JTJDICIAL DISTRICT

SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS' FEFJ,S

STA]'IJ OII'fIIXAS

COTJNl'Y OII HARRIS

lllrFORlr MIr. the undersigned authority" on this day pcrsonally appcarcd.fOtlN It

Nfll.SON who being lirst duly sworn, stated as lbllows:

l. "My namc is John Ir. Nelson. I am an attorney in the above-stylcd and numbered Causc

fbr and on behalf of Def'endants. Stacy Martin. Chris Click and Jerry Lirrdemann. I am ovcr

eightecn ( I 8) ycars o1' age and am fully competcnt and duly authorized to makc this Af f rdavit.

which fircts arc true and correct.

2. I am an attorney dply licenscd by the Statc of 'l'cxas. I am currcntly practicing out of

f{ouston. Ilarris County. Texas. I am fanriliar with the f-ees charged by attorneys in ancl arouud

Dallas County. Texas. fbr services of a similar nature to those perlbrmed herein.

3. t)et-cndants Stacy Martin, Chris Cllick and.lerry Lindenlann have retained thc law llrm o1'

NELSON PURSLIIY, PLI.C to represent thcm in the instant suit brought against thcm by

Transportation Workers Llnion, l,ocal 556. Plaintil-l' hcrein.

4. A11 legal services perfbrmed on behalf o1'Def-endants Stacy Martin. Chris Click and.ferry

l,indemann have been reasonable and necessary.

5. In my opinion, a usual and customary hourly billing rate for Mr. Daniel B. Nelson. a duly

licensed attorney in and for the State of Texas for 27 years. should be $375.00. and an hourly

billing rate for myself, being duly licensed in and fbr the State of Texas fbr 4 years, should be

tiJ

$

,'i

J"
$275.00. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the sum of Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred and

0/100 Dollars ($41.500.00) is a reasonable and customary f-ee fbr the legal services perfbrmed in

this matter fbr and on behalf of Defendants in and around Dallas County. In the event this case

is appealed to the Court of Appeals an additional Fifleen Thousand and 00/100 Dollars

($15,000.00) would be reasonable and necessary attorneys' f-ees. and an additiclnal Ten'l'housand

and 00/100 Dollars ($10,000.00) if this case is appealed to the Sqpreme Court of Texas would be

reasonable and necessary attorneys' f-ees.

6. In addition. Def-endants have expended another Two 'fhousand I'.ight F{undred and

Seventy-One Dollars and 19/100 ($2.921.19) in reasonable and necessary crxpenscs associated

with this litigation.

7 . My opinion is based on a numbcr of f'acts. including without limitation, to the fbllowing:

a. l'he time and labor required. the novelty and difllculty of the qucstions involved.

and thc skill requisite to perfbrm the legal serviccs properly:

b. The I'ee customarily charged in the locality firr similar legal services:

c. The amounl of time involved:

d. The time limitation imposed by thc client and the circumstances;

e. 'l'he nature and length of thc prof'essional relationship with the client; and

f. The experience of the attorneys pcrlorrning these services."

8. In November o1'2013, Plaintiff lllcd thrce separatc lawsuits against each Def-endant.

Since thcn. De1'ensc counsel has spent in excess ol'over 150 hours thus far dcl-ending Plaintilf s

allegations. The lbregoing has included, but is not limited to: client meetings. rcccipt and

analysis of pleadings, preparation ol'deltnsc pleadings, legal research. preparation ol- motions to

the Court. attendance of hearings. documcnt revicw. mediation attendance. cliscovcry. and trial

preparation."

FURTI IIlR At' F'lAN]' SAYET'H NOl'

ELSON

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this th

Notary Public in and fbr

the State of Texas

By:

DANIET BRYAN NELSON

Notorv Public, Slole ot Texos

My Commission Explres

MoY 06, 2016
APPELLANTS BRIEF ON THE MERITS - 18

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Respectfully Submitted, 

Dated this 15th of October, 2015

Christopher Click, Pro Se

Jerry Lindemann, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 15th, 2015 a copy of the foregoing 

“APPELLANTS BRIEF ON THE MERITS” was served on the following counsel for 

Appellee TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 556. Served to 

Edward B Cloutman IV

CLOUTMAN AND CLOUTMAN

3301 Elm Street

Dallas, TX 75226