[Cite as Zimmerman v. Bowe, 2019-Ohio-2656.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LUCAS COUNTY 

Joel R. Zimmerman, et al. Court of Appeals No. L-18-1200 

 

 Appellants Trial Court No. CI0201703587 

 

v. 

 

Carolina E. Bowe, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellees Decided: June 28, 2019 

* * * * * 

 Patrick R. Millican, for appellants. 

 Sheila A. McKeon and Joseph S. Center, for appellees. 

* * * * * 

OSOWIK, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common 

Pleas which denied appellants’ motion to enforce settlement. For the reasons set forth 

below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court. 
2. 

{¶ 2} On August 3, 2017, and as amended by leave of court on November 30, 

2017, plaintiffs Joel R. Zimmerman and Kathleen M. Zimmerman (hereafter, the 

“appellants”) filed a complaint in Lucas County Common Pleas Court against defendants 

Carolina E. Bowe, Mary L. Bowe, Patrick E. Bowe (hereafter, the “appellees”), and codefendant Paramount Insurance Company. Appellants alleged on July 21, 2016, Carolina 

E. Bowe negligently drove a vehicle in Monclova Township, Lucas County, Ohio, and 

collided with the vehicle driven by Joel R. Zimmerman, causing various damages, 

including permanent personal injuries. Appellants further alleged loss of consortium for 

Joel R. Zimmerman’s wife, Kathleen M. Zimmerman. Appellants further alleged Mary 

L. Bowe and Patrick E. Bowe negligently entrusted the vehicle they owned to their 

daughter, Carolina E. Bowe. Appellants further alleged Joel R. Zimmerman’s health care 

insurer’s plan administrator, Paramount Insurance Co., had a claim of subrogation to 

appellants’ claims. The relief appellants sought included damages “in the amount of at 

least Twenty Five Thousand ($25,000.00) Dollars plus interest and costs and all other and 

further relief as this Court determines Plaintiffs are entitled to in law or in equity.” 

{¶ 3} Following a period of pleadings involving various answers and cross- and 

counter-claims by Paramount Insurance Co. and discovery efforts among the parties, the 

trial court held a status conference on June 18, 2018. While no transcript of the telephone 

conference is in the record, the trial court’s June 20, 2018 journalized order states: 
3. 

This matter is before the Court for Telephone Conference. Present 

were Counsel for Plaintiff, PATRICK MILLICAN, and Counsel for Bowe 

Defendants, SHEILA MCKEON. Parties reported to the Court that they 

had entered into a settlement agreement. However, Plaintiffs’ Counsel has 

reported they do not intend to sign the Defendants’ Release, requested by 

Defendants. It is therefore ORDRED that the parties brief the issue, as to 

whether a release is required. Defendant is to file her Brief on or before 

July 18, 2018. Plaintiff shall respond to Defendants’ Brief, in accordance 

with the Local Rule. It is further ORDERED that Attorney Millican shall 

hold in good faith, any settlement check(s) issued to Plaintiffs until further 

order of this Court. It is further ORDERED that interest shall not accrue 

during the pendency of this case. (Emphasis sic.) 

{¶ 4} Prior to any briefing as ordered by the trial court, on June 28, 2018, 

appellants filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement they claimed occurred on 

June 5, 2018. According to appellants, the settlement agreement had three parts: 

appellees to pay appellants $38,000; appellees to pay Paramount Insurance $2,000; and 

“The claims of all parties are to be dismissed with prejudice at Defendants (sic) costs.” 

Separately, appellants argued they were entitled to interest accrual on the settlement 

funds from June 5, 2018, until paid in full. In the accompanying affidavit by appellants’ 

attorney, “The Plaintiffs have not received their settlement proceeds as of this date.” 
4. 

{¶ 5} Appellees opposed the motion on July 19, 2018, and Paramount Insurance 

Co. did not. Appellees argued only some terms of the litigation were settled on June 5, 

2018. Appellees argued a settlement occurred only after they waived the requirement of 

a release on July 5, 2018: “We will forego a release and rely on the dismissal with 

prejudice.” Also on July 5, 2018, appellees delivered to appellants’ attorney two checks: 

one for $38,000, and one for $87.60 for interest. Appellees argued they paid interest in 

good faith “at 4% per annum for 21 days” plus a slightly greater amount “to allow for 

normal turnaround time for process and receipt of the check,” even though the trial 

court’s June 20, 2018 order stated no interest would accrue. 

{¶ 6} Following appellants’ reply on July 27, 2018, on August 28, 2018, the trial 

court journalized its order on appellants’ motion to enforce settlement in which it stated: 

The Court has reviewed the relevant pleadings, the record in the 

case, the parties’ supporting and opposing arguments, and the applicable 

law. Having done so, the Court finds the Defendants have already complied 

with the terms of the parties’ settlement by delivering settlement checks to 

Plaintiffs’ attorney and to Defendant Paramount Insurance Company’s 

attorney on or about July 5, 2018. Therefore, no issues remain for the 

Court to resolve, and Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied as set forth in the 

following Journal Entry. JOURNAL ENTRY. It is ORDERED that 

“Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement,” filed June 28, 2018, is 
5. 

DENIED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs are authorized to cash the 

$38,000 and $87.60 settlement checks being held by their attorney, Patrick 

R. Millican. It is further ORDERD that this case is SETTLED. It is further 

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants * * * and 

Defendant Paramount Insurance Company’s Counterclaim against Plaintiffs 

and Cross-Claim against Defendants Carolina E. Bowe, Mary L. Bowe, and 

Patrick E. Bowe * * * are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, at Defendant 

Carolina E. Bowe’s costs. (Emphasis sic.) 

{¶ 7} Appellants then filed this appeal setting forth three assignments of error: 

I. The trial court erred in finding that the Defendants had already 

complied with the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. 

II. The trial court erred in ordering that interest shall not accrue 

during the pendency of the case. 

III. The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff’s (sic) Motion to 

Enforce Settlement. 

{¶ 8} We will address appellants’ third assignment of error first, as the challenge 

to the trial court’s decision denying appellants’ motion to enforce settlement of the 

subject litigation is dispositive to the remaining assignments of error. 

{¶ 9} “‘To establish a breach of a settlement agreement, the party alleging the 

breach must prove: 1) existence of the [s]ettlement [a]greement, 2) performance by the 
6. 

[nonbreaching party], 3) breach by the [other party], [and] 4) resulting damages or loss to 

the [nonbreaching party].’” Savoy Hosp., LLC v. 5839 Monroe St. Assocs. LLC, 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-14-1144, 2015-Ohio-4879, ¶ 26, quoting Raymond J. Schaefer, Inc. v. 

Pytlik, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-09-026, 2010-Ohio-4714, ¶ 24. The burden of proof for 

each element is by a preponderance of the evidence on the party seeking to enforce the 

settlement agreement. Id. 

{¶ 10} If appellants fail to meet their burden for any of the elements for a motion 

to enforce settlement, then the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion was proper. The 

first element requires appellants to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a 

settlement agreement existed with appellees. “[P]reponderance of evidence means the 

greater weight of evidence. * * * The greater weight may be infinitesimal, and it is only 

necessary that it be sufficient to destroy the equilibrium.” Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Gath, 

118 Ohio St. 257, 261, 160 N.E. 710 (1928). 

{¶ 11} We review de novo as a question of law a trial court’s decision on a motion 

to enforce settlement of whether a settlement agreement exists as a contract between the 

parties to terminate a claim by preventing or ending litigation. Marine Max of Ohio, Inc. 

v. Moore, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-15-033, 2016-Ohio-3202, ¶ 14; Savoy Hosp. at ¶ 30. 

Settlement agreements are “a particularized form of a contract” and enforceable by either 

party. Ohio Turnpike Comm. v. Alexanderian, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-05-060, 2006-

Ohio-4301, ¶ 11. The law highly favors settlement agreements. Id. Where a settlement 
7. 

agreement constitutes a binding contract, the trial court has authority to enforce a 

settlement agreement in pending litigation. Savoy Hosp. at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 12} In meeting our primary objective of ascertaining the intent of the parties, 

we examine the language that they chose to employ. Id. at ¶ 29. If the disputed language 

is plain and unambiguous, we do not need to look beyond that language to determine the 

rights and obligations of the parties, and interpretation of the agreement is a matter of 

law. Id. at ¶ 30. 

{¶ 13} If the language is ambiguous such that the language is unclear, indefinite, 

and reasonably subject to dual interpretations, we look to whether the ordinary meaning 

of common words can be applied unless a manifest absurdity results or some other 

meaning is clearly evidenced from the overall agreement. Id. at ¶ 29. Resolution of an 

ambiguity to determine the intent of the parties to the agreement is a question of fact. Id. 

at ¶ 31. We will not reverse the trial court’s factual determinations so long as some 

competent, credible evidence supports it. Id. “Competent evidence is admissible 

evidence for the purpose of proving a relevant fact.” Hall v. Hall, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. 

S-18-011, 2018-Ohio-4453, ¶ 8. “Credible evidence means evidence found worthy of 

being believed.” Id.

{¶ 14} Settlements are preferred to be in writing. Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 15. However, oral settlement agreements 
8. 

may be enforceable where the words, deeds, acts, and silence of the parties indicate there 

is sufficient particularity to form a binding contract. Id.

{¶ 15} A contract must contain the essential elements of offer, acceptance, 

contractual capacity, consideration, a manifestation of mutual assent, and legality of 

object and of consideration. Id. at ¶ 16. To be enforced, there must be a meeting of the 

minds as to the essential elements of the contract. Id. We will not create a new contract 

on appeal by finding an intent not clearly and unambiguously found in the language used 

by the parties. D & M Painting Corp. v. Perrysburg, 186 Ohio App.3d 231, 2010-Ohio465, 927 N.E.2d 60, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). 

{¶ 16} Appellants argue the three essential terms of settlement with appellees 

occurred on June 5, 2018: (1) appellees to pay appellants $38,000; (2) appellees to pay 

Paramount Insurance Co. $2,000; and (3) dismissal with prejudice at appellees’ costs. 

Appellants acknowledge on July 5, 2018, checks were delivered by appellees totaling 

$38,087.60. Appellants argue that payment was due when they reached settlement on 

June 5, 2018, and that statutory interest accrued from June 5, 2018, until the trial court’s 

August 28, 2018 order when the trial court authorized the July 5, 2018 checks could be 

cashed. Appellants calculated the total interest owed pursuant to R.C. 1343.03 was 

$349.81, of which appellees paid $87.60, leaving $262.21 unpaid. 

{¶ 17} However, in addition to appellants arguing appellees failed to pay sufficient 

accrued interest, appellants argued, “At the time that the two settlement checks were 
9. 

delivered to Plaintiff’s attorney, no dismissal entry was sent to him or filed with the 

court.” It is unclear in the record where the parties agreed as part of settlement terms on 

June 5, 2018, it was appellees’ responsibility to prepare and file the dismissal with 

prejudice. Where appellees did not file in the record any counterclaims against 

appellants, it is unclear what dismissal with prejudice appellees could have filed without 

appellants’ cooperation. 

{¶ 18} Appellees disagree that the essential terms of a settlement agreement 

occurred on June 5, 2018: “June 5, 2018, did not mark the day that settlement was 

finalized, but only the date on which certain terms, including the settlement value, but not 

all terms, were finalized.” Appellees argue they never reached agreement with appellants 

regarding the essential term of when the settlement payment was due and payable. 

Appellees argued payment was not due until appellants agreed to sign a release: “no 

interest was due on the settlement because there was no settlement while the release issue 

was undecided.” Appellees argue a binding settlement agreement was not reached with 

appellants until July 5, 2018, when payment was delivered to appellants or, alternatively, 

on August 28, 2018, when the trial court ordered the litigation settled. 

{¶ 19} We review the entire record for the chronological development of 

settlement communications. 

{¶ 20} The record shows appellants relied on the June 25, 2018 affidavit of their 

attorney accompanying their motion to enforce settlement. Their attorney averred 
10. 

“Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 contain the negotiations of all parties to this lawsuit of a 

settlement agreement and acceptance of the terms and conditions of the settlement 

agreement.” 

{¶ 21} Exhibit 1 was an email dated May 17, 2018 from appellees’ attorney to 

appellants’ attorney stating, “Patrick, based upon our conversation at your client’s 

deposition where you reiterated your settlement demand of $40,000, we have a deal. * * 

* Please let me know how the settlement check to your client should be made payable. 

Please also provide me with a W-9 for your firm if you are to be included on the check.” 

{¶ 22} Exhibit 2 was an email chain beginning on May 18, 2018. On that date, 

appellees’ attorney emailed appellants’ attorney stating, “Do we have a problem with the 

settlement? * * * If we don’t have a settlement, please let me know so I can proceed 

accordingly.” 

{¶ 23} On May 22, 2018, appellants’ attorney responded to appellees’ attorney, “I 

am in the process of contacting my client on your proposal. * * * However, my client 

never agreed [the $2,000 for Paramount Insurance Co.] would be deducted from his 

$40,000.00 demand. Also I have not seen any proposed dismissal with prejudice order at 

defendant Bowe’s costs for the parties to sign.” On that date, appellees’ attorney emailed 

appellants’ attorney stating, “Obviously, I disagree with your interpretation of events. * * 

* If you want to take the position that your client did not agree to pay Paramount, then 

there is clearly no deal. I didn’t send you a proposed dismissal because I have no 
11. 

confirmation of a settlement. Any settlement would be with prejudice at defendants’ 

costs.” 

{¶ 24} On June 5, 2018, appellants’ attorney responded to appellees’ attorney, 

“My clients accepted the settlement, with a dismissal with prejudice as to all parties, at 

defendants’ costs. The check should be made out to Joel Zimmerman and Kathleen 

Zimmerman.” On that date, appellees’ attorney emailed appellants’ attorney asking, “Are 

you to be included in the check? If so, I will need a W-9.” And appellants’ attorney 

responded, “No.” 

{¶ 25} Appellees admit “there was no discussion about a release” on June 5, 2018. 

{¶ 26} Both parties acknowledge appellees then sent appellants a release, but 

neither identifies exactly when. Appellants describe the event as, “Attorney Millican 

informed attorney McKeon that the Plaintiffs had not agreed to sign a release – just join 

in filing a dismissal with prejudice. Attorney McKeon contacted the court for a 

telephone conference to be held regarding the release issue.” Appellees describe the 

event as, “Counsel for Bowe provided a release which Zimmerman refused to sign stating 

it was not a part of the settlement agreement.” 

{¶ 27} On June 18, 2018, the trial court held a telephone conference with the 

parties. Appellants describe the telephone conference as “the court was informed of the 

settlement, the issue of the Release requested from Plaintiff by the Defendants and that 

Plaintiffs were claiming they were entitled to interest on the settlement amount.” 
12. 

Appellees describe the telephone conference as “regarding the issue of whether 

Zimmerman was required to sign a release,” and the trial court ordering the parties to 

“brief whether a release was required with Bowe’s initial brief due July 18, 2018.” 

{¶ 28} It is well-settled that a court of record generally speaks only through its 

journal. Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109, 111, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953).

{¶ 29} The trial court’s journalized entry is in the record. On June 20, 2018, the 

trial court reported, “Parties reported to the Court that they had entered into a settlement 

agreement. However, Plaintiffs’ Counsel has reported they do not intend to sign the 

Defendants’ Release, requested by Defendants.” The trial court clearly requested the 

parties brief the issue of a release, ordered appellants’ attorney to “hold in good faith, any 

settlement check(s) issued to Plaintiffs until further order of this Court,” and “interest 

shall not accrue during the pendency of this case.” We find the trial court did not 

determine the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement as of June 5, 2018, or 

even on June 20, 2018, because of the disputed settlement issues. We find the trial court 

was clear and unambiguous in its order “that interest shall not accrue during the pendency 

of this case.” 

{¶ 30} The next evidence in the record regarding the settlement discussions is an 

exhibit attached to appellees’ opposition to the motion to enforce settlement. In a letter 

dated July 5, 2018, appellees delivered two checks totaling $38,087.60 to, and payable to, 

appellants. The checks were for the principal of the settlement plus an amount for 
13. 

interest that appellees disputed they owed. As part of that delivery, appellees stated, “We 

will forgo a release and rely on the dismissal with prejudice. I trust this will resolve this 

matter.” Appellees argue, “Until that moment, a central and necessary term of the 

settlement agreement remained unresolved, that is, whether Zimmerman would sign a 

release – an issue sufficiently material that the parties sought court intervention. Bowe’s 

written waiver of the issue on July 5, 2018, resolved the final obstacle to settlement.” 

{¶ 31} The dispute between the parties is when payment was due and payable on 

the settlement and the accrual of statutory interest pursuant to R.C. 1343.03. Appellants 

rely heavily on the authority of Hartmann v. Duffey. The Ohio Supreme Court has 

determined R.C. 1343.03 is clear and unambiguous. Hartmann v. Duffey, 95 Ohio St.3d 

456, 2002-Ohio-2486, 768 N.E.2d 1170, ¶ 8. R.C. 1343.03(A) “is written in the 

conjunctive” and applies where “a settlement that has not been reduced to judgment 

clearly falls within the purview of R.C. 1343.03(A) * * *.” Id. In contrast, R.C. 

1343.03(B) “is triggered only when a settlement has been reduced to judgment or where 

there has been a decree or order. In such a case, interest is computed from the date of the 

judgment, decree or order.” Id. at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 32} R.C. 1343.03(A) states: 

In cases other than those provided for in [R.C. 1343.01 and 

1343.02], when money becomes due and payable * * * upon any settlement 

between parties, * * *, and upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any 
14. 

judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or 

a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate 

per annum determined pursuant to [R.C. 5703.47], unless a written contract 

provides a different rate of interest in relation to the money that becomes 

due and payable, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate 

provided in that contract. 

{¶ 33} In contrast, R.C. 1343.03(B) states:

Except as provided in divisions (C) and (D) of this section and 

subject to [R.C. 2325.18], interest on a judgment, decree, or order for the 

payment of money rendered in a civil action based on tortious conduct or a 

contract or other transaction, including, but not limited to a civil action 

based on tortious conduct or a contract or other transaction that has been 

settled by agreement of the parties, shall be computed from the date the 

judgment, decree, or order is rendered to the date on which the money is 

paid and shall be at the rate determined pursuant to [R.C. 5703.47] that is in 

effect on the date the judgment, decree, or order is rendered. That rate shall 

remain in effect until the judgment, decree, or order is satisfied. 

{¶ 34} The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently confirmed that Hartmann did not 

determine what constitutes the settlement date. Layne v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 

104 Ohio St.3d 509, 2004-Ohio-6597, 820 N.E.2d 867, ¶ 9. The parties must negotiate 
15. 

and agree upon the due and payable date, a certain date on which interest would accrue, if 

it is to be different from the date of settlement and incorporated into the written 

settlement agreement. Id. at ¶ 13; Bellman v. Am. Internatl. Group, 113 Ohio St.3d 323, 

2007-Ohio-2071, 865 N.E.2d 853, paragraph two of the syllabus. A trial court must 

make a factual finding of the date the payment is due and payable only where R.C. 

1343.03(A) applies. See Wakeman Eagles Aerie No. 4354, Inc. v. Seitz, 6th Dist. Huron 

No. H-13-017, 2014-Ohio-1007, ¶ 2-4. 

{¶ 35} To be enforced, there must be a meeting of the minds as to the essential 

terms of the settlement agreement. It is clear in the record there is no written settlement 

agreement, and the parties did not have a meeting of the minds as to when the settlement 

payments by appellees were due and payable to appellants. The trial court’s June 20, 

2018 journal entry sought some resolution to the disputed matter by having the parties 

brief the issue of a release. The trial court also ordered no interest would accrue during 

the litigation, which is further evidence the essential terms of a settlement agreement 

were not reached between the parties to trigger R.C. 1343.03(A). Further, the Ohio 

Supreme Court acknowledges a reasonable amount of time is expected from when the 

last party says, “okay,” and when administrative steps are taken to issue and deliver 

payment before interest accrues. Bellman at ¶ 13, citing Layne at ¶ 16 (Pfeifer, J., 

concurring). However, the court in Bellman had a written, dated settlement agreement 

from which to state, “Thus, unless otherwise specified, a claimant is entitled to 
16. 

postsettlement interest from the date of settlement agreement until the date of payment. 

Those who delay in forwarding settlement drafts incur postsettlement interest from the 

date of the agreement unless a different due and payable date is specified in the 

settlement agreement.” Id. at ¶ 14. That is not the case in this matter. 

{¶ 36} Appellants’ motion to enforce settlement was filed before any briefing on 

the disputed settlement issue of a release could occur. The trial court eventually denied 

appellants’ motion on August 28, 2018, by determining payments were previously 

delivered by appellees to appellants, leaving no remaining issues to be resolved. The trial 

court was clear and unambiguous in its August 28, 2018 order when it specifically stated 

“no issues remain for the Court to resolve.” The trial court then clearly ordered the 

litigation was settled on August 28, 2018, with no further payments between the parties, 

and dismissing the matter with prejudice. We find the trial court’s factual determinations 

in its August 28, 2018 entry were supported by some competent and credible evidence in 

the record, and we will not disturb those determinations. 

{¶ 37} We do not find the existence of a settlement agreement as a matter of law. 

Appellants failed to meet their burden by a preponderance of the evidence of the 

existence of a binding settlement agreement. We do not find appellants and appellees 

intended to be bound on the disputed issues of a release and interest accrual as part of 

their settlement discussions to determine when payment was due and payable. CIG 

Toledo LLC v. NZR Retail of Toledo, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1282, 2019-Ohio-
17. 

160, ¶ 18. Based on the foregoing, there is no evidence in the record of a settlement 

discussion on or before June 5, 2018, on the disputed issues of a release and interest 

accrual. Without evidence of the intention of appellants and appellees to be bound on the 

disputed issues, the issue of when the settlement payment was due and payable remained 

outside of the settlement agreement, and there was no settlement agreement to breach. 

“Without the existence of a settlement agreement on [the disputed issues], there was no 

breach of a settlement agreement * * * to enforce.” Id. at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 38} We find as a matter of law R.C. 1343.03(A) does not apply in this matter 

because there was no settlement agreement as to the essential terms. However, R.C. 

1343.03(B) may apply in the absence of a settlement agreement because the underlying 

litigation was a civil action based on tortious conduct. See Hartmann at ¶ 9 and 15 

(Cook, J., dissenting) (when parties fail to expressly agree to a term specifying the date 

on which the settlement proceeds become “due and payable,” by default R.C. 1343.03(B) 

governs the calculation of interest). Even if R.C. 1343.03(B) applied, we do not find it 

provides the relief appellants seek for $262.21 for additional interest. The trial court’s 

August 28, 2018 judgment entry was well after appellants acknowledged to the court on 

July 5, 2018, they received two checks from appellees, including interest which the trial 

court previously ordered “shall not accrue during the pendency of this case.” Pursuant to 

R.C. 1343.03(B), no interest is owed prior to the “judgment, decree, or order is rendered” 
18. 

as a matter of law. State ex rel. Shimola v. Cleveland, 70 Ohio St.3d 110, 112, 637 

N.E.2d 325 (1994). 

{¶ 39} Nevertheless, appellants argued in their third assignment of error the trial 

court erred by denying their motion to enforce settlement because the “amount of 

judgment” against appellees was unresolved. However, on August 28, 2018, the trial 

court ordered appellants were authorized to cash the checks totaling $38,087.60, ordered 

the case was settled, and dismissed the litigation with prejudice at appellees’ costs. 

Despite appellants’ argument, we find the trial court’s journalized order identified the 

“amount of judgment” against appellees. 

{¶ 40} We reviewed de novo the entire record and find as a matter of law there 

was no settlement agreement between the parties in the absence of a meeting of the minds 

as to the essential terms in dispute. We find as a matter of law the trial court did not err 

when it denied appellants’ motion to enforce settlement. 

{¶ 41} Appellants’ third assignment of error is not well-taken. 

{¶ 42} In light of our foregoing decision, appellants’ first and second assignments 

of error are moot. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

{¶ 43} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellants are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal 

pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 
19. 

Joel R. Zimmerman, et al. 

v. Carolina E. Bowe, et al. 

C.A. No. L-18-1200 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________ 

 JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

____________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

____________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.