[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio5157.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-5157

THE STATE EX REL. PARISI, APPELLANT, v. DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION 

CERTIFIED GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE ET AL., APPELLEES. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified Grievance 

Commt., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5157.] 

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Documents prepared in attorney-discipline 

cases may be sought only through a request made under Sup.R. 44 through 

47—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ sought under Public Records 

Act affirmed. 

(No. 2018-0140—Submitted January 29, 2019—Decided December 17, 2019.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 27123, 

2017-Ohio-9394. 

________________ 

 FISCHER, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Georgianna Parisi, appeals the judgment of the Second 

District Court of Appeals denying her petition for a writ of mandamus against 
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2

appellees, the Dayton Bar Association and the Dayton Bar Association Certified 

Grievance Committee. Because Parisi did not utilize the correct vehicle, Sup.R. 44 

through 47, to seek to obtain the requested records, we affirm the judgment of the 

court of appeals. 

I. BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} In 2016, Parisi sent a letter to the executive director of the Dayton Bar 

Association requesting “any and all records” concerning her in the bar association’s 

possession, pursuant to R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act. She specifically 

requested: 

1. [a]ny and all communications related to and/or 

concerning me, including communications by letter, phone, email, 

text, voice mail, and the like; and 

2. [a]ny and all documents related to and/or concerning me. 

The records sought related to her two attorney-discipline cases, Dayton Bar Assn. 

v. Parisi, case No. 2009-0064 (“Parisi I”), and Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi, case 

No. 2012-0060 (“Parisi II”), both of which had long been resolved. See Dayton 

Bar Assn. v. Parisi, 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012-Ohio-879, 965 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 2; 

Parisi v. Heck, S.D.Ohio No. 3:14-cv-346, 2015 WL 3999300, *4 (July 1, 2015).

{¶ 3} In a letter dated April 8, 2016, the grievance committee provided an 

initial response to Parisi’s request. The grievance committee’s letter expressed that 

it did not believe that the documents Parisi sought were subject to disclosure. 

{¶ 4} Parisi then amended her request to include 

any and all emails, text messages, and any and all electronic 

messages, whether made on [the bar association’s] or an individual’s 

electronic equipment. I am requesting all records concerning me, 
January Term, 2019 

3

and have expanded it to all records which the [bar association] has 

concerning me, including records associated with Parisi I and Parisi 

II. 

In a letter dated April 22, 2016, the grievance committee formally denied Parisi’s 

request. 

{¶ 5} Parisi filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus against the bar 

association and the grievance committee in the Second District Court of Appeals. 

The bar association and the grievance committee filed a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, which the court of appeals converted into a motion for 

summary judgment. Parisi then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

{¶ 6} The court of appeals recognized that, as an initial matter, it was 

required to determine whether Parisi had utilized the correct vehicle to seek to 

obtain the requested attorney-discipline records. However, because the parties had 

not briefed that issue, the court proceeded to decide the merits of Parisi’s petition 

under R.C. 149.43. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the 

bar association and the grievance committee, denied Parisi’s cross-motion, and 

denied the writ of mandamus. 

II. ANALYSIS 

{¶ 7} Parisi appealed to this court. She also filed a “motion to elect 

representation.” We find her motion to be without merit. Furthermore, we 

conclude that because Parisi failed to seek to obtain the attorney-discipline records 

pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47, the court of appeals correctly granted summary 

judgment in favor of the bar association and the grievance committee and correctly 

denied the requested writ of mandamus. 

A. Motion to elect representation 

{¶ 8} Parisi has filed a motion captioned “Motion to Elect Representation” 

requesting that this court order opposing counsel, Lisa Ann Hesse, Stephen Freeze, 
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and the law firm of Freund, Freeze & Arnold (collectively, “Freund Freeze”), “to 

make a determination as to whether they will represent” the bar association and the 

grievance committee or the bar association’s counsel John Ruffolo, former 

president Brian Wildermuth, and former Board of Trustees member Jonathon Beck, 

individuals who are not and have never been parties to this action. 

{¶ 9} Parisi is essentially seeking to disqualify opposing counsel. She 

alleges that Freund Freeze’s representation of the bar association and the grievance 

committee is directly adverse to its prior clients, Ruffalo, Wildermuth, and Beck. 

Parisi posits the existence of an unwaivable conflict, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 

1.7 (prohibiting a lawyer from accepting or continuing a client’s representation if 

that representation will be directly adverse to another client), because those 

individuals “may oppose [Parisi’s] public records request, not on legal grounds, but 

because they personally wish to shield themselves from additional unethical 

behavior being revealed.” We find Parisi’s motion to be without merit. 

{¶ 10} Freund Freeze represents only the bar association and the grievance 

committee, the only other parties to this action besides Parisi. Because the other 

individuals that Parisi mentions are not parties to this action, there is no basis for 

Freund Freeze to “elect representation” in this case. 

{¶ 11} Further, Parisi is not a client of Freund Freeze, and she has not 

identified any obligations or responsibilities that could serve as a basis for opposing 

counsel’s disqualification. Therefore, Parisi lacks standing to assert that Freund 

Freeze has a conflict of interest. See Morgan v. N. Coast Cable Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 

156, 586 N.E.2d 88 (1992), syllabus (“a stranger to an attorney-client relationship 

lacks standing to complain of a conflict of interest in that relationship”). 

{¶ 12} Therefore, we deny Parisi’s “motion to elect representation.” 

B. Writ of mandamus to obtain records relating to attorney-discipline cases 

{¶ 13} Parisi petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the bar 

association and the grievance committee to provide her with documents relating to 
January Term, 2019 

5

her two attorney-discipline cases under only the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. 

The court of appeals addressed the merits of Parisi’s petition under R.C. 149.43. 

{¶ 14} However, as this court has stated in numerous cases since the 

promulgation of Sup.R. 44 through 47, a court must first address the threshold issue 

whether the petitioner has sought the requested documents through the correct 

vehicle, either R.C. 149.43 or Sup.R. 44 through 47. The vehicle used dictates not 

only the documents that are available to the relator and the manner in which they 

are available but also the remedies available to the relator should the relator be 

successful. 

{¶ 15} Thus, before we may address the merits of the appeal, we must 

answer this threshold question of which is the proper vehicle to use in seeking to 

obtain documents related to attorney-discipline cases. 

1. Threshold issue 

a. Promulgation of Sup.R. 44 through 47

{¶ 16} Prior to the promulgation of Sup.R. 44 through 47 in 2009, this court 

followed the Public Records Act in resolving public-records requests for court 

records. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 

2004-Ohio-1581, 805 N.E.2d 1094. This court, however, recognized the need to 

promulgate its own rules to govern the release of public records held by the 

judiciary. Former Chief Justice Moyer acknowledged in a letter to Ohio attorneys 

that “[w]hile the courts in Ohio [had] always acted in accordance with the Public 

Records Act, the act does not govern the courts.” Moyer, A message from the Chief 

Justice: Openness is foundation of Ohio Government, 81 Ohio State Bar Assn. 

Report 170, 171 (2008). Chief Justice Moyer believed—and rightfully so—that the 

“important constitutional principle of separation of powers” required this court to 

regulate judicial records through its Rules of Superintendence. Id.; see State v. 

Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 409, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994), quoting In re Furnishings 

for Courtroom Two, 66 Ohio St.2d 427, 430, 423 N.E.2d 86 (1981) (“ ‘courts 
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6

possess all powers necessary to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled 

exercise of their judicial functions’ ”). 

{¶ 17} So, in 2009, after the proposed rules had been published for over two 

years, with more than 70 individuals and organizations participating in the 

extensive public-comment periods, this court adopted Sup.R. 44 through 47 

through our constitutional superintendence authority under Article IV, Section 

5(A)(1) of the Ohio Constitution. See Public access rules in effect: Court offers 

training, Web page for local authorities, 82 Ohio State Bar Assn. Report 636, 638 

(2009). Those rules set forth the process that the public must utilize to seek to 

obtain records held by the judicial branch. See O’Connor, The Ohio Modern Courts 

Amendment: 45 Years of Progress, 76 Alb.L.Rev. 1963, 1971 (2013). 

b. The effect of Sup.R. 44 through 47

{¶ 18} In promulgating Sup.R. 44 through 47, we announced to the other

branches of government that this court would determine how records held by the 

judicial branch would be made accessible to the public. Id.; see Article IV, Section 

5(A)(1), Ohio Constitution. Indeed, this court emphasized that point in State ex rel. 

Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff, 132 Ohio St.3d 481, 2012-Ohio-3328, 974 N.E.2d 

89, ¶ 23, in which we determined that the relators were entitled to relief under the 

Rules of Superintendence, not the Public Records Act. 

{¶ 19} This court has adhered to that view and has consistently held that the 

threshold issue in public-records cases is whether R.C. 149.43 or Sup.R. 44 through 

47 governs the request. See State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria, 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 

2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Harris v. Pureval, 155 Ohio St.3d 

343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan, 

157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 133 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 5. 

{¶ 20} This is so even if the issue of the appropriate vehicle is not raised by 

the parties or by the lower courts. See Shanahan at ¶ 5. Determining whether the 

Public Records Act or the Rules of Superintendence govern a relator’s request does 
January Term, 2019 

7

not constitute a lack of judicial restraint, as suggested by the concurring opinion; 

instead, the determination is made based on our constitutional superintendence 

authority and is necessitated by the principle of separation of powers. If a party 

seeks to obtain judicial records through means other than Sup.R. 44 through 47, the 

party is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, as the Rules of Superintendence are the 

sole vehicle by which a party may seek to obtain such records. See Laria at ¶ 8; 

Husband at ¶ 6. 

c. Determining the appropriate vehicle

{¶ 21} To determine the appropriate vehicle, we consider the nature of the 

records requested. Generally, if the records requested are held by or were created 

for the judicial branch, then the party seeking to obtain the records must submit a 

request pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47. See Sup.R. 44(B) (defining “court 

record” as including case documents and administrative documents); Sup.R. 

44(C)(1) (defining “case document” generally as a document “submitted to a court 

or filed with a clerk of court in a judicial action or proceeding”); Sup.R. 44(G)(1) 

(defining “administrative document” generally as a document “created, received, 

or maintained by the court to record the administrative, fiscal, personnel, or 

management functions, polices, decisions, procedures, operations, organization, or 

other activities of the court”); Husband at ¶ 6. If the party is not seeking to obtain 

the records through the correct vehicle, the party is not entitled to the requested 

records in that action. See Laria at ¶ 8; Husband at ¶ 6. 

{¶ 22} Our recent decision in Husband best illustrates this process. 

Husband had requested public records relating to his criminal convictions. The 

records were held by the court and were accessible through the clerk of courts. The 

trial court had denied his request. Husband petitioned the First District Court of 

Appeals to issue a writ of mandamus to order the production of the requested 

documents pursuant to R.C. 149.43. The appellate court dismissed Husband’s 

petition under R.C. 149.43 because “an incarcerated person is not entitled to records 
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relating to a criminal investigation or prosecution unless the sentencing court has 

found that the material is necessary to support a justiciable claim of the inmate” 

and the sentencing court had denied Husband’s motion for release of the records. 

{¶ 23} This court determined that the parties and the court of appeals had 

“erroneously applied the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, to Husband’s 

records request.” Husband, 157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 133 N.E.3d 467, 

at ¶ 5. We affirmed the First District’s dismissal of the petition but on the grounds 

that Husband was not seeking to obtain the documents pursuant to the Rules of 

Superintendence. Id. at ¶ 6. We made no judgment as to whether the requested 

records would have been subject to disclosure under Sup.R. 44 through 47. We 

simply recognized that when a requester seeks public records from a court, the 

Rules of Superintendence apply. Id. at ¶ 5. 

2. Records in attorney-discipline cases 

{¶ 24} Parisi seeks to obtain records relating to her attorney-discipline 

cases. Thus, we must determine whether such a records request is subject to Sup.R. 

44 through 47. 

{¶ 25} Attorney-discipline matters are decided exclusively by this court, as 

we have original jurisdiction over the discipline of persons admitted to the bar and 

all other matters relating to the practice of law. See Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g), 

Ohio Constitution. And through the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of 

the Bar of Ohio, this court created the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the Board 

of Professional Conduct and authorized the board to certify grievance committees 

to aid us in managing attorney discipline throughout the state. See Gov.Bar R. 

V(1)(A) and (D) (“[t]here shall be a Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court” consisting of 28 commissioners appointed by this court); Gov.Bar R. 

V(4)(A) (the board, with the approval of the Supreme Court, shall appoint 

disciplinary counsel); Gov.Bar R. V(5)(B) (the board may certify a grievance 

committee to investigate allegations of attorney misconduct). 
January Term, 2019 

9

{¶ 26} While these entities, especially the certified grievance committees, 

function somewhat independently from this court, the documents prepared and 

created in attorney-discipline cases by or for these entities must be considered 

records of this court for purposes of disclosure. That is because this court is the 

ultimate arbiter of attorney discipline, Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Powers, 119 Ohio 

St.3d 473, 2008-Ohio-4785, 895 N.E.2d 172, ¶ 21, and we have the unique and 

complete responsibility, as designated by Article IV, Sections 2(B)(1)(g) and 5(B) 

of the Ohio Constitution, to regulate all matters related to the practice of law. 

Therefore, any documents prepared in attorney-discipline cases, like those 

requested by Parisi, may be sought only through a request made pursuant to Sup.R. 

44 through 47. See Husband, 157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 133 N.E.3d 

467, at ¶ 5; Harris, 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, at ¶ 10; 

Laria, 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, at ¶ 8; see also 

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt. v. Sliwinski, 142 Ohio 

St.3d 1224, 2015-Ohio-1276, 29 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 19; Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Williams, 147 Ohio St.3d 1242, 2016-Ohio-5717, 65 N.E.3d 761, ¶ 20; Gov.Bar R. 

V(8)(F). 

{¶ 27} The concurring opinion expresses concern that this holding will

“create confusion” as to whether there is a judicial remedy to compel access to such 

records. Opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in part at 

¶ 64. This concern is misplaced. The process to obtain these records remains 

unchanged—we are merely clarifying that such records may be sought only through 

Sup.R. 44 through 47, not also through R.C. 149.43. Because Parisi seeks to use 

the procedures set forth in R.C. 149.43 to obtain records related to her attorneydiscipline cases and has disclaimed any entitlement to relief under the Rules of 

Superintendence, this court need not reach the issue whether the requested 

documents are subject to disclosure. Parisi failed to request the documents pursuant 
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to Sup.R. 44 through 47; therefore, she is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. See 

Husband at ¶ 6; Laria at ¶ 8. 

III. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 28} We deny Parisi’s “motion to elect representation.” And because

Parisi did not utilize the correct vehicle, Sup.R. 44 through 47, to seek to obtain the 

requested records, we affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals 

granting summary judgment to appellees and denying the requested writ of 

mandamus. 

 Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and concurs in judgment only in part, with an 

opinion joined by DEWINE and STEWART, JJ. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in 

part. 

{¶ 29} I agree that appellant Georgianna Parisi’s motion seeking to 

disqualify counsel for appellees, the Dayton Bar Association Certified Grievance 

Committee and the Dayton Bar Association, should be denied. I therefore join Part 

II, Section A of the majority opinion. 

{¶ 30} However, I write separately because I would not consider whether—

and cannot subscribe to the majority’s view that—the public-access provisions of 

the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio, Sup.R. 44 through 47, apply 

to the investigatory materials of a bar association’s certified grievance committee. 

The court of appeals did not consider this issue in the first instance, Parisi expressly 

disclaimed reliance on the Superintendence Rules as supporting her claim, and the 

majority gives no persuasive explanation of how a certified grievance committee 

of a private, voluntary bar association is “the Supreme Court” within the meaning 

of Sup.R. 44 through 47. See Sup.R. 44 (“Sup.R. 44 through 47 apply to the 
January Term, 2019 

11 

Supreme Court”). And contrary to the majority’s assumption that the 

Superintendence Rules preempt the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, the 

constitutional grant of authority to this court to adopt rules of superintendence for 

the courts of Ohio does not provide that those rules supersede the enactments of the 

General Assembly; therefore, Parisi’s failure to assert a right to court records under 

the Superintendence Rules in addition to the Public Records Act does not foreclose 

relief. Lastly, by treating the Dayton Bar Association’s certified grievance 

committee as an arm of this court, the majority sows confusion regarding whether 

there is any judicial means to compel a certified grievance committee to release 

public records—a court of appeals lacks authority to issue a writ of mandamus 

against this court or its adjuncts, and this court may not direct a writ against itself. 

{¶ 31} Nonetheless, I concur in the court’s judgment affirming the 

judgment of the court of appeals, because the records that Parisi seeks do not fit 

within the meaning of “public record” as defined by R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). 

Judicial Restraint 

{¶ 32} Parisi’s petition sought records only under the Public Records Act, 

and as the majority acknowledges, the court of appeals did not consider whether 

R.C. 149.43 or the public-access provisions of the Rules of Superintendence are the 

appropriate vehicle for obtaining records from a bar association’s certified 

grievance committee. In her brief to this court, Parisi disclaims entitlement to relief 

pursuant to the Superintendence Rules. But although the bar association and its 

grievance committee make the conclusory assertion that the statute is not the proper 

mechanism to seek to obtain the records of a certified grievance committee, they 

fail to explain how such records are “court records” for purposes of the statute. 

{¶ 33} Whether the public-access provisions of the Superintendence Rules 

apply to a certified grievance committee’s investigatory materials is a question of 

first impression, and this court lacks the benefit of lower-court consideration and 

full briefing and argument on it. The answer to that question is not an obvious one, 
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and we would benefit from the consideration of arguments tested in the crucible of 

the adversarial process by parties with a direct interest in the outcome. 

{¶ 34} Our longstanding policy is not to address an unbriefed issue. E.g., 

Willoughby Hills Dev. & Distrib., Inc. v. Testa, 155 Ohio St.3d 276, 2018-Ohio4488, 120 N.E.3d 836, ¶ 14, fn. 1; State v. Roberts, 150 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio2998, 78 N.E.3d 851, ¶ 85; Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. 

of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 28, citing 

Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 332, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2. The 

rationale for this policy, as well as the premise of the adversarial process itself, is 

that “ ‘ “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and 

research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and 

argued by the parties before them.” ’ ” (Brackets sic.) State v. Quarterman, 140 

Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke,

126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 

177 (D.C.Cir.1983). 

{¶ 35} The process of judicial review depends on the parties to identify, 

preserve, and present issues for appeal. Courts “ ‘do not, or should not, sally forth 

each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to come to us, and when 

they do we normally decide only questions presented by the parties.’ ” Greenlaw 

v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), 

quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir.1987) (Arnold, J., 

concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). As former Justice Cook once wrote, 

“even the most measured sense of judicial restraint confines this court to passing 

upon only those issues developed below.” Fulmer v. Insura Prop. & Cas. Co., 94 

Ohio St.3d 85, 100, 760 N.E.2d 392 (2002) (Cook, J., dissenting). 

{¶ 36} Our review should therefore be confined to the issue actually 

litigated by the parties and decided by the court of appeals in the first instance—
January Term, 2019 

13 

i.e., whether the Public Records Act requires a bar association’s certified grievance 

committee to produce its investigatory materials as public records. 

The Public Records Act 

{¶ 37} The Public Records Act reflects the state’s policy that “open 

government serves the public interest and our democratic system,” State ex rel. 

Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 20, and

“reinforce[s] the understanding that open access to government papers is an integral 

entitlement of the people, to be preserved with vigilance and vigor,” Kish v. Akron, 

109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-1244, 846 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 17. 

{¶ 38} R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires a public office to make copies of public 

records available to any person upon request, within a reasonable period of time. 

However, “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law” are 

not public records subject to release. R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). Gov.Bar R. V(5)(H) 

states that “[n]o employee, appointee, or member of a certified grievance committee 

shall disclose to any person any proceedings, documents, or deliberations of the 

committee.” Further, Gov.Bar R. V(8) establishes when documents relating to the 

investigation of grievances are confidential and when they are discoverable. 

{¶ 39} This leads to two questions: Are Gov.Bar R. V(5) and (8) state law 

for purposes of R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v)? And if so, may a bar association’s certified 

grievance committee withhold documents sought in a public-records request that 

would be discoverable by litigants in a disciplinary proceeding? 

{¶ 40} We addressed a variant of the first question in State ex rel. Beacon 

Journal Publishing Co. v. Waters, 67 Ohio St.3d 321, 617 N.E.2d 1110 (1993). At 

issue in that case was whether Crim.R. 6(E), which provides for grand-jury secrecy, 

is a state law prohibiting the release of records. The plurality opinion explained 

that procedural rules “adopted pursuant to constitutional authority” are state law for 

purposes of the Public Records Act. Id. at 323-324. The plurality opinion therefore 

determined that Crim.R. 6(E) is state law because it had been adopted pursuant to 
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14 

the constitutional authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure granted 

to this court by Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 324. A 

majority of the court subsequently adopted the plurality opinion’s determination in 

State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Petro, 80 Ohio St.3d 

261, 266, 685 N.E.2d 1223 (1997), and State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 77 Ohio 

St.3d 357, 361, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (1997), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. 

Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598. 

{¶ 41} Similarly, Gov.Bar R. V(5)(H) and (8) were adopted according to

our constitutional duty to “make rules governing the admission to the practice of 

law and discipline of persons so admitted,” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 

5(B). In accordance with Beacon Journal Publishing, these rules have the force of 

law in this state, and if they preclude the release of a document, then the document 

is not a public record that must be released pursuant to the Public Records Act, R.C. 

149.43(A)(1)(v). 

{¶ 42} That leaves the second question—whether a record that may be 

discoverable during litigation is subject to release as a public record. 

{¶ 43} Gov.Bar R. V(8)(A)(1) provides that subject to certain enumerated 

exceptions, “[p]rior to a determination of probable cause by the Board [of 

Professional Conduct], all proceedings, documents, and deliberations relating to 

review, investigation, and consideration of grievances shall be confidential.” 

Gov.Bar R. V(8)(A)(3) specifies that subject to exceptions not relevant here, “all 

investigatory materials prepared in connection with an investigation conducted 

pursuant to Section 9 of this rule or submitted with a complaint filed pursuant to 

Section 10 of this rule shall be confidential prior to certification of a formal 

complaint pursuant to Section 11 of this rule.” 

{¶ 44} Gov.Bar R. V(8)(B), however, provides that after the finding of

probable cause, 
January Term, 2019 

15 

the complaint and all subsequent proceedings conducted and 

documents filed in connection with the complaint shall be public 

except as follows: 

* * * 

(3) The summary of investigation prepared by the relator 

shall be confidential as work-product of the relator. All other 

investigatory materials and any attachments prepared in connection 

with an investigation conducted pursuant to Section 9 of this rule or 

submitted with a complaint filed pursuant to Section 10 of this rule 

shall be discoverable as provided in the Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 45} Gov.Bar R. V(8)(B)(3) therefore provides an exception to the 

general rule that after a probable-cause finding, documents filed in a disciplinary 

proceeding are subject to release to the public. Investigatory materials and any 

attachments prepared in connection with an investigation are not public, but they 

are discoverable. 

{¶ 46} That information is discoverable does not make it publicly available. 

“The rules governing discovery do not envision a third party’s access to the 

information exchanged”; rather, discovery “ ‘is essentially a private process 

because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is to 

assist trial preparation.’ ” State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe, 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 

354, 673 N.E.2d 1360 (1997), quoting United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 

1441 (11th Cir.1986). We have therefore recognized that when a government office 

provides documents in discovery to opposing parties in litigation, it does not make 

those documents public records. See id. at 355. 
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16 

{¶ 47} Although investigatory records may be discoverable during a 

disciplinary proceeding, in this case, Parisi sought these types of records through a 

public-records request, so she stands on the same footing as any other member of 

the public who is a stranger to the litigation. Gov.Bar R. V(5)(H) bars the release 

of these documents, and nothing in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(B) makes them public records. 

Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), the documents that Parisi requested 

are not public records. 

{¶ 48} That conclusion should end the analysis. Reaching beyond the 

narrow questions presented in this case even though it is unnecessary to do so would 

contravene “ ‘the cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to 

decide more, it is necessary not to decide more,’ ” State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. 

Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51, quoting PDK 

Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F.3d 

786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in 

judgment). 

The Rules of Superintendence 

{¶ 49} The majority today proceeds to answer an unasked question of first 

impression, and that answer places the public-access provisions of the 

Superintendence Rules in direct conflict with the Public Records Act. 

{¶ 50} This court had long held that Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 

149.43, applies to court records. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 

Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581, 805 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Beacon 

Journal Publishing Co. v. Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 

180, ¶ 9-13; State ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 

30, 33, 485 N.E.2d 706 (1985). After all, the Public Records Act provides that 

“public records” are records kept by a “public office,” R.C. 149.43(A)(1), and a 

court or judicial agency is a public office, R.C. 149.011(A) and (B). No one in this 

case questions the General Assembly’s authority to make the public-records law 
January Term, 2019 

17 

applicable to the judiciary. Yet the majority nonetheless implicitly overturns 

decades of caselaw holding that the Public Records Act applies to the courts based 

on the sudden epiphany—unmoored from legal authority or analysis—that R.C. 

149.43 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. 

{¶ 51} We have previously stated in per curiam opinions that Sup.R. 44

through 47 are the “sole vehicle” for obtaining court records in actions commenced 

after July 1, 2009. (Emphasis omitted.) State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan, 157 

Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 121 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Harris v. 

Pureval, 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 10; State ex rel. 

Richfield v. Laria, 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 8. But 

see State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff, 132 Ohio St.3d 481, 2012-Ohio3328, 974 N.E.2d 89, ¶ 1 (explaining that relief rendered pursuant to the 

Superintendence Rules made any claim under the Public Records Act moot). None 

of these cases suggested that the Public Records Act is unconstitutional as applied 

to the courts. And none of these decisions considered the question whether the 

Ohio Constitution empowers this court to adopt rules of superintendence for Ohio 

courts that preempt the lawful enactments of the legislative branch. 

{¶ 52} Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution vests this court with 

authority to promulgate court rules. Section 5(A)(1) states: “In addition to all other 

powers vested by this article in the supreme court, the supreme court shall have 

general superintendence over all courts in the state. Such general superintending 

power shall be exercised by the chief justice in accordance with rules promulgated 

by the supreme court.” Pursuant to this authority, this court adopted the Rules of 

Superintendence, which “are designed ‘(1) to expedite the disposition of both 

criminal and civil cases in the trial courts of this state, while at the same time 

safeguarding the inalienable rights of litigants to the just processing of their causes; 

and (2) to serve that public interest which mandates the prompt disposition of all 

cases before the courts.’ ” State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 409, 639 N.E.2d 67 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

(1994), quoting State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 109-110, 362 N.E.2d 1216 

(1977). 

{¶ 53} Another type of court rules is authorized by Section 5(B), which 

provides: “The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and 

procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify 

any substantive right. * * * All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further 

force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Article IV, Section 5(B), Ohio 

Constitution. Section 5(B) thus expressly empowers this court to adopt procedural 

rules that supersede the enactments of the General Assembly. Morris v. Morris, 

148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.3d 664, ¶ 30. But the framers of the 

Modern Courts Amendment of 1968, which added Section 5(B) to Article IV, 

placed two important limitations on our authority to supplant the enactments of the 

General Assembly: first, our procedural rules may not abridge, enlarge, or modify 

any substantive right; and second, the General Assembly by joint resolution may 

disapprove any proposed procedural rule prior to its taking effect. Article IV, 

Section 5(B), Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 54} In contrast, nothing in Article IV, Section 5(A)(1) grants this court 

power to preempt the lawful enactments of the legislative branch of government by 

adopting a rule under our authority to supervise lower courts. Unlike Section 5(B), 

Section 5(A)(1) does not provide that the Superintendence Rules supersede all laws 

that are in conflict with them nor does it contain any requirement to submit 

proposed superintendence rules to the General Assembly for review. In fact, we 

have described our superintendence authority as “ensur[ing] that state courts act in 

compliance and consistency with the will of the General Assembly.” State v. Smith, 

136 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013-Ohio-1698, 989 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 4, fn. 2. 

{¶ 55} Ohio courts—including every appellate district—have consistently 

recognized that the rules adopted pursuant to our supervisory power over lower 

courts do not supersede statutes with which they are in conflict and do not create 
January Term, 2019 

19 

either substantive rights or procedural law. State v. Ventura, 2016-Ohio-5151, 69 

N.E.3d 189, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.); State v. Keeble, 2d Dist. Greene No. 03CA84, 2004-

Ohio-3785, ¶ 17; Larson v. Larson, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-11-25, 2011-Ohio6013, ¶ 13; In re K.W., 2018-Ohio-1933, 111 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 99 (4th Dist.); Sepich 

v. Bell, 5th Dist. Stark No. CA-7350, 1988 WL 17155, *3 (Feb. 8, 1988); In re T.C., 

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1106, 2015-Ohio-3665, ¶ 21; In re Guardianship of 

Myers, 7th Dist. Mahoning Nos. 02-CA-6 and 02-CA-42, 2003-Ohio-5308, ¶ 21; 

In re A.P.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100504, 2014-Ohio-1632, ¶ 13; In re Z.H., 

2013-Ohio-3904, 995 N.E.2d 295, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.); Myers v. Wade, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 16AP-667, 2017-Ohio-8833, ¶ 22; In re A.R., 11th Dist. Ashtabula 

No. 2018-A-0078, 2019-Ohio-2166, ¶ 29; In re Guardianship of Bernie, 12th Dist. 

Butler No. CA2018-01-005, 2019-Ohio-334, ¶ 27-28, appeal not accepted, 155 

Ohio St.3d 1469, 2019-Ohio-2100, 122 N.E.3d 1294; see also State v. Singer, 50 

Ohio St.2d 103, 110, 362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977) (“The Rules of Superintendence are 

not designed to alter basic substantive rights of criminal defendants”). 

{¶ 56} As the Third District Court of Appeals has explained, 

“whereas rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court require 

submission to the legislature, rules of superintendence are not so 

submitted and, hence, are of a different category. They are not the 

equivalent of rules of procedure and have no force equivalent to a 

statute. They are purely internal housekeeping rules which are of 

concern to the judges of the several courts but create no rights in 

individual defendants.” 

(Emphasis omitted.) Larson at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Gettys, 49 Ohio App.2d 241, 

243, 360 N.E.2d 735 (3d Dist.1976). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

20 

{¶ 57} Article IV, Section 5(A)(1) of the Ohio Constitution does not 

provide for the public-access provisions of the Superintendence Rules to preempt 

the Public Records Act, and when there is a conflict between them, the statute 

prevails. For this reason, Parisi’s failure to assert a right to access court records 

under Sup.R. 44 through 47 cannot be fatal to her mandamus action. 

Certified Grievance Committees 

{¶ 58} The majority reasons that because this court has the constitutional 

authority to discipline attorneys, the documents prepared and created in attorneydiscipline cases by or for certified grievance committees “must be considered 

records of this court for purposes of disclosure” under Sup.R. 44 through 47. 

Majority opinion at ¶ 26. 

{¶ 59} That conclusion is a non sequitur. The fact that we have 

constitutional authority to discipline attorneys says nothing about whether a 

certified grievance committee maintains court records, either on our behalf or on 

its own. 

{¶ 60} The Rules for the Government of the Bar do not make a certified

grievance committee an adjunct of this court. Instead, certified grievance 

committees are created by the Ohio State Bar Association or by local bar 

associations in Ohio, which may apply to the Board of Professional Conduct for 

certification, Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A) and (B). Certification may be obtained from the 

board and retained by a grievance committee by satisfying the standards set forth 

in Gov.Bar R. V(5)(D), which include requirements for membership and term 

limits, meetings and office staff, designating bar counsel and training volunteers, 

maintaining files and records, funding, establishing procedures for processing 

grievances, and reporting to the board. (None of the standards specifically address 

public records.) If a certified grievance committee fails to comply with its 

obligations under the rules, it may lose the privilege of certification. Gov.Bar R. 

V(5)(F). But neither the standards nor any other provision of the rule authorizes 
January Term, 2019 

21 

this court to exercise the degree of authority and control over these private entities 

for them to be considered an arm of the court for purposes of the Superintendence 

Rules. We do not appoint the members of certified grievance committees, certify 

committees to conduct investigations, or control day-to-day committee operations, 

and we do not review committees’ decisions or decertify committees for failing to 

satisfy the standards set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(5)(D)(1). 

{¶ 61} In support of its conclusion that “any documents prepared in 

attorney-discipline cases, like those requested by Parisi, may be sought only 

through a request made pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47,” majority opinion at 

¶ 26, the majority provides a string citation, but none of the authorities cited 

supports that conclusion. Our decisions in Husband, 157 Ohio St.3d 343, 2019-

Ohio-1853, 121 N.E.3d 337, Harris, 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 

N.E.3d 337, and Laria, 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, 

involved records sought from a common pleas court, a county clerk of courts, and 

a municipal court and its clerk, respectively. 

{¶ 62} The majority’s reliance on Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. Certified 

Grievance Commt. v. Sliwinski, 142 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2015-Ohio-1276, 29 N.E.3d 

987, ¶ 19, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 147 Ohio St.3d 1242, 2016-Ohio5717, 65 N.E.3d 761, ¶ 20, is also misplaced, because those decisions are simply 

boilerplate entries imposing an interim remedial suspension and reciprocal 

discipline, respectively, and each states that each “case document” filed in the 

case—i.e., “a document and information in a document submitted to a court or filed 

with a clerk of court in a judicial action or proceeding,” Sup.R. 44(C)(1)—is subject 

to Sup.R. 44 through 47. Neither entry holds or even suggests that a certified 

grievance committee maintains this court’s records. 

{¶ 63} And Gov.Bar R. V(8)(F), the last authority cited in the majority’s 

string citation, does not support its conclusion either. That provision states that 

“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section or in rules adopted by the Supreme 
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22 

Court, documents and records pertaining to the administration and finances of the 

Board and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, including budgets, reports, and 

records of income and expenditures, shall be made available, upon request, as 

provided in Sup.R. 45.” Although this rule makes some records of the board and 

disciplinary counsel subject to the public-access requirements of the 

Superintendence Rules, it does not allude to the records of a certified grievance 

committee or make them subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47—even though certified 

grievance committees are mentioned throughout Gov.Bar R. V(8). Rather than 

supporting the majority’s position, the language in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(F) cuts against 

it. 

{¶ 64} Gov.Bar R. V(5) invites the Ohio State Bar Association and local 

bar associations to participate in the investigation and prosecution of professional 

misconduct, but that participation does not turn a volunteer association of attorneys 

into “the Supreme Court” for purposes of the Public Records Act. The majority’s 

contrary holding not only is unsupported by reason or authority but also will create 

confusion in Ohio public-records law regarding whether there is any judicial 

remedy to compel access to the public records of any entity affiliated with this court 

in some way. 

{¶ 65} Sup.R. 47(B) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by the failure of a 

court or clerk of court to comply with the requirements of Sup.R. 44 through 47 

may pursue an action in mandamus pursuant to Chapter 2731. of the Revised 

Code.” R.C. 2731.01 provides that “[m]andamus is a writ, issued in the name of 

the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the 

performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an 

office, trust, or station.” As we explained in State ex rel. Wanamaker v. Miller, 

“[b]y its very definition, the writ of mandamus is a writ which shall be issued only 

to an inferior tribunal.” (Emphasis added.) 164 Ohio St. 174, 175, 128 N.E.2d 108 

(1955). 
January Term, 2019 

23 

{¶ 66} Wanamaker involved two original actions filed in the court of 

appeals: a mandamus action seeking to compel the clerk of this court to file an 

affidavit of disqualification and a prohibition action seeking to prohibit this court’s 

justices from hearing that affidavit of disqualification. Id. at 174. Although we 

recognized that the Clerk of the Supreme Court is a ministerial officer of this court 

who is obliged to follow our instructions, we held that “[i]t does not follow from 

that * * * that any court inferior to the Supreme Court has the authority to issue 

similar instructions to such clerk.” Id. at 175. We also noted that a writ of 

prohibition is “ ‘an extraordinary judicial writ, issuing out of a court of superior 

jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal properly and technically 

denominated such’ ” and that “[i]nasmuch as the Supreme Court is not a tribunal

inferior to the Court of Appeals, it is axiomatic that there was no basis for the 

issuance of the writs by the Court of Appeals.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 175-176, 

quoting State ex rel. Nolan v. ClenDening, 93 Ohio St. 264, 270, 112 N.E. 1029 

(1915). 

{¶ 67} Similarly, if a bar association’s certified grievance committee is “the 

Supreme Court” for purposes of Sup.R. 44 through 47, then a court of appeals has 

no authority to issue a writ of mandamus compelling release of its records. 

Following the majority’s analysis would mean that Parisi’s complaint should be 

dismissed rather than denied on its merits. 

{¶ 68} Further, a writ of mandamus may be issued only against an “inferior” 

tribunal. R.C. 2731.01. Therefore, this court may not issue a writ against itself to 

compel release of its own records. As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, 

“[n]othing in our Constitution suggests that this Court can mandamus itself or its 

Justices, nor does such an odd practice find support in our precedent or the history 

of the writ of mandamus.” Clark v. Hunstein, 291 Ga. 646, 650, 733 S.E.2d 259 

(2012); see also People ex rel. Filkin v. Flessner, 48 Ill.2d 54, 56, 268 N.E.2d 376 

(1971) (a judge may not issue a writ of mandamus against another member of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24 

same court); State ex rel. Williams v. Hennepin Cty., 252 Minn. 330, 331, 89 

N.W.2d 907 (1958) (“A judge of the district court cannot order himself to do 

something by a writ of mandamus”); Italian Homestead Assn. v. Lewis, 174 La. 94, 

96, 139 So. 769 (1932) (a judge may not issue a writ against himself or herself). 

Conclusion 

{¶ 69} Parisi’s petition sought records only under the Public Records Act, 

which does not require release of those records. Because Parisi is not entitled to 

relief based on the arguments she makes in this court, it is not necessary to go 

beyond those arguments to resolve this case. As the majority’s decision today 

demonstrates, reaching to answer questions that have not been the subject of 

adversarial briefing and lower-court consideration risks an ill-informed decision 

that may have unintended consequences. And here, the majority assumes that our 

Superintendence Rules preempt the enactments of the legislative branch, and it 

relies on a leap of logic to conclude that a bar association’s certified grievance 

committee is the custodian of this court’s records. The result will be confusion over 

where a person is to turn to compel the production of public records held by an 

entity that is in some way affiliated, however tangentially, with this court. 

{¶ 70} The preferable course would be to leave these issues for a day when 

parties preserve and present them for our review. Accordingly, although I would 

affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, I would do so for reasons different from 

those expressed in the majority opinion. 

DEWINE and STEWART, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Georgianna Parisi, pro se. 

Freund, Freeze & Arnold, L.P.A., Stephen V. Freeze, and Lisa A. Hesse, 

for appellees. 

_________________