UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ BRANDE L. SAMUELS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA; OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION CITY OF TULSA; TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE; TULSA COUNTY INVESTIGATOR; TULSA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS; G T BYNUM; CLAIRE V. EAGAN; SHARON ELAIN ALLEN HOLMES; JAMES KEELY; STEVE KUNZWEILER; ISSAC SHIELDS; CHUCK JORDAN; DAVID BEEN; RONALD PALMER; MIKE WILLIAMS; JERROD HART; TIMOTHY MEANS; RICHARD ASCHOFF; RUSTY BROWN; CLARK E. WILLIAMS; LARRY L. EDWARDS; STEVEN T. NIEMITALO; DONALD R. CHANDLER; RUFUS E. NEWSOME; STEVEN L. SANDERS; DOUGLAS K. SCHULKE; JAYE W. TAYLOR; CORBIN CLARK BREWSTER; BRIAN JAMES RAYL; STEWART SOUTHE RLAND; ROBERT NIGH; KIMBERLY HAYS; CHARLES W. CHESTNUT; RICHARD STEVENS; JOHN W. COYLE III; KALEB K. HENNIGH; JAMES L. KEE; D. KENYON WILLIAMS JR.; MATTHEW C. BEESE; JIMMY D. OLIVER; BRYON J. WILL; JAMES R. HICKS; BRIAN K. MORTON; ALISSA PREBLE HUTTER; NATHAN D. RICHTER; MARK KENNEDY; CITY OF TULSA; TULSA COUNTY JAIL; VICTOR REGALADO; DAVID No. 19-5002 (D.C. No. 4:18-CV -00267-EFM-KGG) (N.D. Okla.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 8, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 PARKER; GWENDOLYN BRIGGS, Defendants - Appellees.

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , McHUGH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Proceeding pro se, Brande Samuels brought suit against various individuals and entities (collectively, the d efendants), alleging they viol ated his constitutional rights by “willfully, wantonly, r ecklessly, and deliberately su bjecting [him] to unlawful arrest, detention[,] and prosecution.” R. vol. 6, 14 ( emphasis omitted). 1
Samuels also asserted state-law claims for assault and inflicti on of emotional distress. A magistrate judge screened the c omplaint and recommended dismi ssing for failure to state a claim on wh ich relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a)–(b). Specifically, the m agistrate judge (1) recommende d dismissing Samuels’s claims against certain defendants because Samuels fai led “to include any [specific] factual allegations” against them, R. vol. 6, 213 (e mphasis omitted); (2) recommended dismissing most o f Samuels’s claims arising und er 42 U.S.C.

* After examining Samuels’s brie f and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wouldn’t materially a ssist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitt ed without oral argument. This order and judgment isn’t binding precedent, except un der the doctrines of law of t he case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it ma y be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 We liberally construe Samuels’s pro se filings. But we won’t “ assume the role of [his] advocate.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).3 § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because the c laims were barred by the two- year statute of limitations; (3) recommended dism issing Samuels’s state-law tor t claims because they were also time-barred; (4) recommended dismissing any clai ms arising from conduct that allegedly occurred after Samuels submitted hi s amended complaint because such conduct necessarily didn’t “occur[] within the lim itations period,” id. at 218; and (5) recommended dismissi ng Samuels’s remaining claims for failure to state a claim. The magistrat e judge also denied S amuels’s motions for appointment of counsel. Samuels then filed a f lurry of documents, including objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendati ons, a motion for summary judgme nt, a motion to supplement the complaint, a moti on to amend the complaint, a mo tion to enjoin statecourt proceedings, and a motion to expedite a ruling on the mot ion to enjoin. The district court overruled Samuels’ s objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations because (1) Samue ls failed to “address the [mag istrate judge’s] reasons” for “recommend[ing] dismi ssal of his claims” and (2) S amuels’s objection to the magistrate judge’s orde r refusing to appoint counsel was moot. R. vol. 7, 186. It then denied Samuels’s motions to supplement and amend becaus e Samuels “failed to explain how he would amend or supplement his complaint, as r equired by the local rules, or why [his] attempts t o amend or supplement would not b e futile.” Id. at 187– 188. Finally, the district court denied Samuels’s remaining mot ions as moot in light4 of its decision to adopt the ma gistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Samuels now appeals the district court’s order. But much like t he objections he filed in district court—which neither acknowledged most of the magistrate judge’s specific recommendations nor c hallenged the reasoning behind th em—Samuels’s appellate brief likewise fails to engage with either the distri ct court’s rulings or its reasoning. For instance, Samuels doesn’t dis pute that his claims against c ertain defendants were subject to dismis sal because he failed “to incl ude any [specific] factual allegations” against th em. R. vol. 6, 213. Likewise, he doesn’t attempt to demonstrate that his motions to amend or supplement complied wi th the applicable local rules. Nor does he dispute that most of his claims were t ime-barred or make any effort to refute the district court’s reasons for concluding th at his remaining claims failed as a matter of law. Fina lly, he doesn’t challenge the di strict court’s conclusion that dismissing his complaint re ndered his remaining motions mo ot. Critically, to succeed on appeal, a n appellant must “explain wh at was wrong with the reasoning that the dis trict court relied on in reachin g its decision.” Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver , 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). Because Samuels provides no such explanation here , we affirm the district court ’s order without further discussion. See id. at 1369 (summarily affirming di strict court’s ruling because appellant’s “opening br ief contain[ed] nary a word to challenge the basis” for it). As a final matter, we deny Samuel s’s motion to proceed in forma pa uperis (IFP) on5 appeal and his moti on to appoint counsel. See Lister v. Dep’t Of Treasury , 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (no ting that “to succeed on a motio n to proceed IFP, the movant must show . . . the exist ence of a reasoned, nonfrivolou s argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised”); cf. Rucks v. Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 978–79 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirm ing order denying motion to appo int because “even with appointed counsel, [appellant ] had little likelihood of pr evailing on the merits”).

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge