FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ANUARY 25, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1391 5 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 05-00110 -CV -BBM- 1 TINA MARIE SM ITH, RYAN ANDREW

LOLLE Y, Plaintiffs-CounterDefen da nt s- App el la nt s, ve rs us DE LT A A IRL IN ES , INC, DELTA FAMILY CARE RETIR EMENT PLAN, JAM ES F. MERNA, BEVERLY HORD, MARGIE D. RACE, Defen da nt s- App el le es , DELTA FAMILY-C ARE DISABILITY AND SURVIVORSHIP P LAN, DELTA FAMILY CARE M EDICAL PLAN, De fendants-CounterCl ai m an ts -Ap pe ll ees , L.S., Co un te r-Defe nd an t,2

TERRI MAR TINEZ, in h er c ap ac ity a s pare nt an d g ua rd ia n o f L.S., Counter-De fendantCo un te r-Cl ai m an t-Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J an ua ry 25, 200 7) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , D U BIN A , a nd C A RN E S, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Tina Marie Sm ith (“ Ms. S m ith”) and Ry an AndrewLolley (“ Mr. Lolley ”) ap p e a l f r o m th e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’s g r a n to f s u mmary j u d g me n td i s mi s s i n g t h e i r c l a i ms as se rt ing vio la tio ns o f the E m plo y ee Re tir em en t I nc om e Se curi ty A ct of 197 4 (“ E RI SA ”) , 29 U . S. C. §§ 1 001 et se q. Ms . S m ithsou ght

be ne fi ts f

ro m the D el ta Fam ily -Car e D isabilityand Survivorship Plan (“ the Plan”) a fter her husband Jerry D . S m ith , Jr . ( “ Mr . S m ith ”) , aD el tae m plo y ee , die d f

ro m ase lf -i nf lic te d gunsho t w ound in the e ar ly

m or nin g ho ur s of

Jul y 9, 200 2. T he P lan de nie d th e be ne fi ts, co nc lud ing that M s. S m ithw as not a n e lig ibl e be ne fi ci ar

y be ca use on the day

of Mr . S m ith ’ s de ath, she did not “ [l ] ive in the E m

plo y ee ’ s ho use hol d or

onl yMr . L oll e y , M s. Smith’ s n atur a l- bo rn so n a nd Mr . Sm ith ’s ste ps on , is no t in de pe nd e ntl y 1 e lig ibl e fo r b e ne fi ts. He is e lig ibl e fo r b e ne fi ts und e r t he De lta F amil y Care Me dic a l Pla

n if Ms. Smit h is found to be elig ible under the Survivorship Pl an. Our discussion will t here fore focus on h e r e l i g i b i l i ty. 3 te m por ar ily r es ide out sid e the E m

plo y ee ’ s ho use hol d, ” as r equir ed by the Su rv i v o rs h i p Pl an . On ap p ea l , M s . S m i t h co n t en d s t h at t h e S u rv i v o rs h i p Pl an ’s 1 adm inistrator acted arbitrar ily and capriciously

in reac hing this conclus ion. A fter care ful reviewof the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, we find no error in the district co urt’ s gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t. T ha t gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t i s su

bj ec t t o “ple nary

r ev ie w , ” an d th is court applies the “ sam e legal standards as those controlli ng the dis trict court. ” Param or e v. D el taA ir

L ine s, I nc . , 129 F . 3d 1 446, 144 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) . T he Su pr em e Co urt of

the U nit ed

S ta te s ha s e sta

bli she d th re e standard s f

or r ev ie w ing a de nia l of be ne fi ts b y

a n E RI SAplan a dm ini str at or : ( 1) de nov o r ev ie ww he re the plan do es not

gr an t di sc re tio n to the a dm ini str at or , ( 2) a rb itr ar y a nd c ap ri ci ous re vie ww he re the plan do es gr an t di sc re tio n to the a dm ini str at or , a nd ( 3) he igh te ne d arb itr ar

y a nd c ap ri ci ous re vie ww he re the plan gr an ts d isc re tio n to the adm inistrator, but the adm inistrator operates under a conflict of intere st. S ee Fi re sto ne T ir e & R

ubbe r Co . v. Br

uc h, 489 U . S. 101 , 115 , 109 S . Ct . 948 , 956 -5 7 (1989); W illiam s v. Be llSouth Telecom m s., Inc. , 373 F. 3d 11 32, 1134 (11t h Cir.We ag ree with the district court that this definition is a rea sonable c onstruction of the 2 term and thus within the Plan’s g rant of disc retionar y authority . See Hunt v. Ha wthorne A ssoc., Inc., 119 F .3d 888, 912 (11th Cir.1997) (a pplying a rbitrar y and ca pricious standar d of re view wher e ERI SA plan “conta ins ex press languag e conf err ing disc retionar

y authority upon the administrator to construe its terms”). In fac t, the Plan’s definition adopts verbatim the dictionary definition of the wor d “household.” See Mer riam-Webster’ s Collegiate Dictionary 562 (10th ed. 4 2004 ). H er e, the appe llant d oe s no t su gge st the re w as ac onf lic t of int er es t and ag re es that the plan gr an ts d isc re tio n to the a dm ini str at or ; thus, a s c onc ed ed by the ap pe llant, w e re vie wthe de ci sio n to de ny be ne fi ts o nly

und er the a rb itr ar

y a nd cap ri ci o u s s t an d ar d . Th i s s t an d ar do f r ev i ew ap p l i es t o “ b o t h t h e a d m i n i s t ra t o r’s construction of the plan and concom itant factual findings with respect to each case. ” Param ore, 129 F.3d at 1451. An “ adm inistrator’ s fact- based de te rm in at io ns wil l n ot be di st urbe d i f reas on ab le ba se d o n t he in fo rm at io n k no wn to the a dm ini str at or

a t the ti m e the de ci sio n w as r en de re d. ” I d. U nde r the pr ovi sio ns o f the plan a t i ssu e, Ms . S m ithw as e nti tle d to r ec ei ve s u rv i v o rs h i p b en ef

i t s as an el i g i b l e s p o u s e o n l y i f, at t h e t i m e o f h erh u s b an d ’s de ath, she ( 1) “ [l ] ive [d ] in [h er hus band’ s] hou se hol d” or ( 2) “ onl y te m por ar ily reside[d] outsid e [her

husband ’ s] househo ld.” The P lan determ ined that neith er cr ite ri on a

ppl ie d to Ms . S m ithon the e ve nt d at e. E va luatin g th e fi rs t c ri te ri on, the Plan concluded that sh e did not li ve in her husband ’ s “ hous ehold,” defining that t e rm u n d e r

i t s d i s c r e t i o n a ry au t h o r i t y t o me a n “th o s e w h o dw e l l u n d e r t h e s a me ro of a nd c om pose af am ily . ” A t the ti m e of

Mr . S m ith ’ s de ath onJul y 9, Ms . 21999) (“ those who dwe ll under the same roof a nd compose a

family”). Ms. Smith argues that the Plan’s deter

mination that the Smi ths no longe r constituted a house hold conflicts with state law on the def inition of a marital household. See V arna doe v. State F arm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Ga . App . 3 66 , 3 69 (1 96 5) (n oti ngthat w hil e hu sb and and wi fe “ may

te mpo ra ri ly so jou rn to ano the r p la c e or

a bo de , . . . the y

are sti ll a pa rt of the same ho us e ho ld s o lo nga s n o a c tio n is taken to end the marital re lationship”). Howe ver, the Plan was not bound to follow state law when it def

ined the ter

m “household” a s used in the Plan provisions so long as its def inition was no t arb itr ary

and c a pr ic iou s. 5 Sm ith resided at the fam ily ’ s residence in H enry County , G eorgia. Mr. Sm ith had been arr ested at his hom e on July5 on charges of battery and child cruelty

after an inc ide nt o f dom es tic abuse . H e w as r el ea se d onJul y 8. T ha t day , Ms . S m ith soug ht and r ec ei ve d apr ote ct ive or de r m ak ing it il le ga l f or Mr . S m ithto stay

a t the He nry County residence or e nter it without poli ce esc ort. I t is uncertain whether Mr. Sm ith establis hed another residence in the fewhours before his suicide, althoug h he did lis t his parents’ address in Cobb Coun ty , G eorgia on an ap pli catio n f

or ac he ck ing a cc ount

a t the D el ta

Cr ed it U nio n onthe day

of his re le as e. H e al so r etri ev ed som e of his be lon gin gs f

ro m the H en ry

Co unty res id en ce (u nd er t he req ui redpo li ce es co rt) th e sa m e d ay . Ms . S m ithc ont en ds tha t sh e “ [l ] ive [d ] in [h er hus band’ s] hou se hol d” be ca use she c ont inu ed

to re sid e at

the H en ry

Co unty r es ide nc e an d th at

Mr . S m ith did not e sta bli sh anothe r hous eh old . W e ne ed not de ci de w he the r Mr . S m ith suc ce ssf ull y e sta bli she d anothe r hous eh old ; a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv ed , nothin g in the Plan’ s definition of “ hous ehold” requires that a person have one. H owever ,6

the P lan’ s de fi nit iondoe s r equir e that the e m plo y ee a nd h is o r he r spou se “ dw el l unde r the sam e ro of

. ” I t i s c le ar

that the pr ote ct ive or de r pr ev en te d M r. a nd M s. Sm ith from

satisfy ing th is condit ion. A ccordingly , Ms. Sm ith failed to qualify unde r the f

ir st e lig ibi lity

c ri te ri on. T he se co nd c ri te ri on p re se nts ac los er que sti on. I n or de r fo r the P lan to de te rm ine w he the r Ms . S m ith“ onl y te m por ar ily r es ide [d ] out sid e [h er

hus band’ s] ho us eh ol d,” itwas n eces sa ry to di vi ne th e fu tu re i nt en ti on s o f Mr. an d M s. Sm it h. T he P lan ba se d it s c onc lus ionthat the se paratio n w as not te m por ar y on the fo llo w ing f

ac ts: ( 1) the e xtr ao rd inary r el ie f gr an te d M s. S m ithby the pr ote ct ive or de r, w hic h aw ar de d he r sol e an d e xc lus ive use of the r es ide nc e; ( 2) inf

orm at ion providedby

Mr. Sm ith’s par ents stating that their son was planning to see an attor ne y on July 10 t o be gindiv or ce pr oc ee din gs; ( 3) inf orm at ionpr ovi de d by

Ms . T er ri Mart ine z (M r. S m ith ’ s pr ev iou s w if e) that M s. S m ithstate d sh e w oul d no t ta ke Mr . S m ithba ck

f or f ear that the G eo rg iaD ep ar tm en t of F am ily a nd Ch ildre n’ s S er

vic es ( D FA CS ) w oul d r em ove he r son if she m ove d ba ck

in w ith Mr. Sm ith; (4) inform ation from the De lta Em

ploy ees Cr edit Union sho wing that Mr . S m ithc hange d hi s a cc ount a ddr es s f ro m the H en ry

Co unty a ddr es s to his pa ren ts ’ ad dr es s an d l is te d h is m ot he r as hi s n eare st li vi ng rel at iv e, no t M s. Sm it h. Based upon th is inform ation, the Plan concluded that Mr. and Ms. Sm ith had7

pe rm an en tly

se parate d. W e find no groun ds for invalidatin g the Plan’ s determ ination as arbitrary an d c ap ri ci ous. T o be sur e, Ms . S m ithc ite s se ve ra l f ac ts tha t w oul d pe rm it re as ona ble m ind s to r ea chac ontrary c onc lus ion . F ir st, it

is tr ue that M r. S m ith fa ile d to take m an y

ste ps n orm al ly

a sso ci at ed

w ithape rm an en t se paratio n f ro m one’ s spou se. He did no t change his address with Delta’ s hum an resource de partm en t, c hange his te le phon e num be r, c hange his dr ive r’ s li ce nse , f or w ar d hi s m ai l, or hir e m ove rs . Ms . S m ithm ai nta ins that this e vid en ce ( or r athe r ab se nc e of ev ide nc e) , w he n c om

bin ed w iththe c oupl e’ s hi sto ry of f igh tin g and r ec onc ili ng, supp orts h er

vie wthat the re w as no p er m an en t se paratio n. S til l, it is not sur pr isi ng that M r. S m itha cc om

pli she d li ttl e in the w ay

of r earr an gin g hi s a ff

ai rs giv enthe fewhours he had between his release from j ail and his death. T he Plan w as j ust if ie d inpla ci ng g re at er

w ei ght on the ste ps M r. S m ithdid take —su cha s ch an gin g th e ad dr es s onhis c re dit uni on a cc ount , w hic h e vin ce d ade sir e to se parate f inanc ia lly f ro m his w if e— than onthe ste ps h e did

not . Second, Ms. Sm ith po ints to several obj ective fa cts tending to linkMr. Sm ith to th e H enry

County residence that he and Ms. Sm ith shared. F or instance, the plan hired an investi gator to determ ine the residence of Mr . and Ms. Sm ith at the ti m e of

Mr . S m ith ’ s de at

h. T he inv es tig at or ’ s r ep ort, w hil e not dr aw ing aNeither Ms. Smi th nor the Plan has cited a ny decision treating a

plan administrator’s 3 discretion to consider

statements made by

potentially

biased pa rties, nor have we uncover ed one. We think a blanket prohibition on consideringsuch statements would c onflict with the defe renc e owed to the plan a dminist rator’ s conclusions under the arbitra ry and ca pricious standar d. See Wil liams, 373 F.3d at 1137. 8 conclusio n from

the fac ts uncov ered, does sho w that searches based on social security num bers, interviews w ith acquaintances, and other various searches sh owe d t ha t re co rd s s ti ll refl ect edth atMr. an d M s. Sm it h s ha redth e sa m e ad dr es s. A lso , Mr . S m ith ’ s de ath c er tif ic at e lis ts the H en ry

Co unty r es ide nc e as his la st address. A gain, however , it is not surprising that the Sm iths’ brie f separation was no t yet fo un d i n t he reco rd s an d m em or ie s o f th os e th ey cam e in to co nt actwit h. E ve n if the inv es tig at or ’ s r ep ort and the de ath c er tif ic at e ha ve the a dvanta ge of obj ec tiv ity , the y

say li ttl e ab out

the f uture int en tio ns o f Mr . a nd M s. S m ith . T he Plan chose to rely

instead on evid ence like Mr. Sm ith’s plans to see a divorce attor ne y a nd the c hangi ng o f his c re dit uni on a cc ount

a ddr es s, w hic h m or e dir ec tly refle ct his intent to separate perm anently from his wife. Third, and m ost sig nificantly , Ms. Sm ith argues that the Plan acted arbitrar ily and capriciously

in crediting the self-serving statem ents m ade by Mr. Sm ith ’ s pare nts a nd b y

Ms . Mart ine z (whose m ino r ch ild , f athe re d by

Mr . S m ith , now rec eives the Plan benefits in place of Ms. Sm ith and her son) ov er the m ore obj ec tiv e ev ide nc e re co unt ed above . T he P lan di d no t i gnor e the se lf -s er vin g 39

nature of these statem ents; rather, it expressly acknowledged the potential for bias an d gave r ea sons f

or a cc ep tin g th ei r ve ra ci ty

non ethe le ss. I n e va luatin g M s. Mart ine z’ s st at em en t tha t M s. S m ithsa id s he w oul d no t t ak e Mr . S m ithba ck , the Pl anspe ci fi ca lly

f ound that thi s st at em en t i ndi cativ e of Ms . S m ith ’ s in te nti ons that sh e w oul d no lon ge r re sid e in t

he sam e hous eh old

a s M r. S m ith , a nd d es pit e an y potenti al bias that m ight exis t on the part of Ms. Martinez, wa s cr ed ibl e inf

orm at ion . T he [ Pl an ] not ed that M s. Mart ine z, ar es ide nt of Oklahom a, m ight n ot have otherwise been fam iliar w ith the term D FA CS in the abse nc e of Ms . S m ithm ak ing suc h astate m en t. O ne c oul d qu ibb le w iththi s r ea soni ng. Ms . Mart ine z, w ho h ad ti es to the state of Ge orgia through her for

m er husband and father of her c hild, could have heard about DFA CS through a source independent of Ms. Sm ith. A nd Ms. Martinez co uld c er ta inl y be vie w ed

a s havin g asub stanti al pot en tia l f or bia s. Y et

thi s ty pe of j udi ci al se co nd- gue ssi ng i s e xa ct ly w ha t the a rb itr ar

y a nd c ap ri ci ous standard

is m eant to curb. See W illiam s, 373 F. 3d at 113 7. A s for the statem ent by Mr. Sm ith’s par ents that Mr. S m ith plann ed to insti tute divo rce proceedings, the Plan

“ co nsi de re d th [e ] pot en tia l [ fo r bia s] in w ei ghi ng the sig nif ic an ce that sh oul d be pla ce d onthi s a sse rt ion . ” T he P lan ha s th e dis cr et ionto m ak e cr ed ibi lity determ ination s and to weigh conflicting evid ence. See Par am ore, 129 F.3d at 1452 (uphold ing pl an adm inistrator’ s authorityto evaluate conflicting m edicalMs. Smi th contends that the Plan’s de termination was “ contra ry to law” be cause the ex 4 parte protec tive order

would automatically

expire by operation of law unless it were made perma nent af ter a hear ing a nd order . See O.C.G.A. § 19- 13-4(c ). Thus, in her vie w, the Plan e rr e d in c on sid e ri ngthe pr ote c tiv e or de r— and the Smit hs ’ s e pa ratio n— to b e pe rm ane nt. I t is clea r, howe ver, that the Plan understood that the orde r wa s not permane nt; it acknowledg ed that the or de r w a s sc he du le d to be re vie we d o n July 29 , 2 00 2. Mo re ov e r, the Pla n d id n ot b a se its decision on the unde rstandingthat the protec tive order was itself pe rmane nt, but merely on the fi nd ingthat th e or de r e vin c e d th e Smiths ’ i nte nti on to s e pa ra te pe rm ane ntl y . T he or de r c le arl y supports such a f

inding. 10 ev al ua tio ns) . T he P lan ha s gi ve n a de qua te a nd r at ion al r ea sons f or it s de ci sio n to ac ce pt the tr

uthof the se state m en ts. F urthe rm or e, the se state m en ts d o no t op er at e in i sol at ion . T he pr ote ct ive or de r an d M r. S m ith ’ s c hangi ng o f his c re dit uni on account address unqu estionablybuttress the conclus ion th at the separation wa s pe rm an en t. 4 A lth oughMs . S m ithha s pr es en te d m an y r ea sons f or r ea ch ing adif

fe re nt co n cl u s i o n fr o m

t h e o n e r ea ch ed b y t h e P l an , we ca n n o ts ay t h att h e P l an ’s de ci sio n w as a n un re as ona ble r ea din g of

“ the inf orm at ionkno w n to the ad m in is tra to r atth e ti m e th e d eci si on was re nd ered .” Id . at 1 45 1. Th eref or e, we af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t. AFFIRMED.