In a n o rd e r fil e d o n J a n u a ry 1 8 , 2 0 0 7 , Ju stice G a ry R . W a d e re c u se d hi m s e lf fr o m t h e a dju d ic a tio n o f t h is 1 appeal

. Ju s t i ce E

. R i l ey A nder s on (r et i r ed) was appo i nt ed by t he C our t t o s er ve as Speci al Ju s t i ce, i n pl ace of Ju s t i ce W ade. 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe bruary1, 200 7 S es sio n
PHIL BR EDE SEN , G overnor of th e St ate of Te nnessee v. TE NN ESSE E

JUDI CIAL S ELE CTI ON COMMI SSI ON, ET AL 

### .
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 06-2275-III Ellen H. Lyl e, Chancellor

No. M2006- 02722-SC-RDM -CV

- F iled on February 21, 2007

Th is ap p e a l c o n c e rn s th e p r o c e s s f o r ap p o in ti n g a n e w ju s ti c e to b e c o me th e f if th me mber of the Tenne ssee Supre me Court. The iss ues i n this case involve the proper i nterpre tation of sections 17-4- 101 to 17-4-118 of the Tenne ssee Code A nnotated (“ the Tenne ssee Pl an ”) and matter s of constitutional law. For the rea sons stated below, we hold that: (1) the first list of nominees certified to the Governor under

the Tenne ssee Plan was not render ed invalid upon one nominee ’s subsequent withdrawa l from consider ation for a ppointment; (2) an individual listed on a pane l of nominees
certified to the Gov er nor by the Tenne ssee Judicial Selection Commi ssion (“the Commission”) which has be en re

jected by the Governor may

no t b e i ncluded on the se cond pane l of nominees
certified to the Governor under the Tenne ssee Plan; (3) the Governor’s re j ection of L ewis and Gordon did not violate the Te nnessee Human Rig hts Act (“ THRA”) beca use a nominee or applicant to fill a judicial vacancy

is not a n “employ ee” for pur poses of the TH RA; (4) the e qual protec tion challeng e to the Gove rnor’ s rejec tion of the first panel is a non-justiciable political question; (5) the
e qu a l pr ote c tio n c ha lle ng e to the Go ve rn or ’s re je c tio n o f the fi rs t pan e l is oth e rw ise wi tho ut m e ri t; (6) the Governor' s letter reje cting the first list of nominees did not encr oach on the power s assig ned to the Commi ssion by

the Tenne ssee Plan; and ( 7) the trial c ourt err ed i n i ts determination of the
ap p r o p r i a t e r e m e d y.
Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 16-3-201(d); Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed, As Modifi ed

W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C. J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w h ich J ANI CE M. H OL DER and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , S P

. J ., joined. 1-2-

Charle s W. Bone a nd Charles Robert Bone , Nashville, Tenne ssee; Ly le Reid, Br ownsville, Te nn e sse e ; a ndIrm a

Me rrill Str a tto n a ndTi mothy W. Smi th , M e mp h i s , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, J . Houston Gordon.

J o h n S p au l d i n g H i c k s , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , G e o r g e T

. Le w i s , III

. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter , and Janet M. Kleinfelter , Senior Counsel, for the appe llee, Gove rnor Phil Bre desen.

Be n H. C antre ll, Nashville, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Te nnessee J udicial Selection Commissi on.

OP IN ION

The fa cts of this c ase are undisputed. I n early 2006, J ustices E. Riley Ander son and Adolpho A. B irch, Jr., eac h announce d that they would be re tiring f rom the Tenne ssee Supre me Court at the end of the ir terms of o ff i ce , Au gust 31, 2006. Soon after those announceme nts, the Tennesse e Judic ia l Se le c tio n Co mmi ssi on be g a n th e statut ory pr oc e ss f or fi lli ng th e vac a nc ie s w hic h w ou ld
o c c u r u p o n Ju s ti c e s A n d e r s o n ' s a n d B ir c h ' s r e ti r e me n ts

. O n e o f th e e xp e c te d v a c a n c ie s w as s u b s eq u en t l y fi l l ed b y t h e Go v er n o r's ap p o i n t m en to f J u s t i ce Ga ryR

. W ad e, t h en P re s i d i n g J u d ge of theCou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls.
Following the appointment of J ustice W ade, the J udicial Selection Commissi on initiated the proce ss for filling t h e s econd e x pecte d vacancy on the Court. On J uly

18, 2006, the Commiss ion
c e rt if ie d b y le tte r t o th e Go ve rn or the na me s of thr e e no min e e s for the va c a nc y : Rich ardH. Di nkins , J. Ho us tonGo rd on , a ndGe or g e T. “ B uc k” L e wi s. Ap pr o xi m at e l y o n e w e e k l a t e r , o n Ju l y 2 4 , 2 0 0 6 , R i c h ar d H

. D i n k i n s s u b m i t t e d a l e tte r t o the Governor withdraw ing his na me from c onsideration for appointment to the Supreme Court. That same day , Governor B rede sen wrote a letter to the Chairman of the J udicial Selection Commissi on; t h e b o d y o f

t h e G o v e r n o r ’ s l e t t e r

s t a t e s i n i t s e n t i r e t y:

I am writing to return to the Judicial Sele ct i o n C o m m ission the panel of
no min e e s c e rt if

ie d to me la st we e k fo r the va c a nc y on theTe nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt

. I have rec eived a

letter fr om Chancellor Richa rd Dinkins withdrawing his name as one of the three nominees, and the refo re I am re questing pursuant to Tenn. Code An n. § 1 7- 4- 11 2( a ) that th e Com mis sio n s ub mit a ne w p a ne l of

no min e e s.

I appre ciate the outstanding w ork that Chance llor Dinkins ha s done as a trial court judg e, and I respe ct his de cision to put his children’s nee ds ahea d of his car eer

. This St a teh a s b e e n p r iv il e g e d o v e r th e p a s t th irte e n y e ar s to h a v e a n e xc ellent S u p r e m e C o u rtt h a t r e f

l e c t s t h e d i v e r s i t y o f

T e n n e s s e e

. A s yo u kn o w , I h a v e a l w a ys so ug ht t o a

pp oin t ju dg e s w ho me e t the hig he st pr of e ssi on a l a nd pe rs on a l st a nd ard s.-3-

Among such hig hly

qualified pe rsons, diversity is a signif

icant fa ctor that Ibelieve should be consider ed. With C hance llor Dinkins’ withdrawa l, I no longe r have the opportunity

to consider that f

actor

.
I there fo re re q u estthat the Commiss ion send me a ne w pane l of nominees that includes qualified mino ri t y candidates. I further reque st that the Commi ssion selec t the new panel as expeditious ly as possible, so that I can ma ke this appointment be fo reSe pte mbe r 1 st, wh e n th e c ou rt va c a nc y oc c ur s.
OnAu g us t 9, 20 06 , th e Chairma n o f t he J ud ic ia l Se le c tio n Co mmi ssi on wr otea le tte r t o Governor B rede sen, not ing that the C ommissi on had met the preceding day . The Chairma n’s letter state d that “ [t]he Com mis sio n vo te d to r e qu e st the g ov e rn or to c lari fy , inwriti ng , if

he int e nd e d to reje ct the entire panel in his J uly 24, 2006 letter and if so, his reasons for reje cting the pane l.” The Go v er n o r r es p o n d ed i n a l et t er(a l s o d at ed Au gu s t9 ) t o t h e C h ai rm an o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n , s t at i n g:

I n my pr e vio us le tte r, I re qu e ste d that the Judic ia l Se le c tio n Com mis sio n su bmi t to
me a ne w pane l of nominees for the vac ancy

on the Ten n es s ee S u preme Court pursuant to Te n n

. Code Ann. § 17-4- 112(a) . By invoking Sec tion 17-4-112(a ), I reje cted the f

irst panel of nominee s. Please ac cept this letter as a r eaf firmation that I reje cted the panel for the rea son stated i n my previous letter, which is attache d and incorporated her ein.

On Au gu s t2 2 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e J u d i ci al S el ec t i o n C o m m i s s i o n m etan d p as s ed a r es o l u t i o n s t at i n g, in summary , that the rema ining eig ht origina l a pplicants (following Richard H. Dinkins’ withdrawa l of his name f

rom consider ation) would be co n s i d er ed fo r the sec ond panel to be submitted to the Go ve rn or ; th e Com mis sio n a lso re op e ne d th e app lic a tio n pr oc e ss t o a llo w o the rs to f ile app lic a tio ns , setting a new de adline of A ug ust 29, 2006, for the filing of applications. The re solution also st ated that “the Commiss i o n i s co m m itted to submi tting a dive rse body of qualified c andidates to the Governor for consideration, and there fore deems a per se exclusion of an applicant sole l yo n the basis of his or her

rac e to be unc onstitut ional.”

Seventee n individuals (including the r emaining eig ht orig inal app li c an ts ) ti me ly qualified for consideration by the Commi ssion. On September 5, 2006, the Commi ssion met to select the sec ond panel of nominees for

the va ca n cy

on the Court. I n a letter dated Septembe r 7, 2006, the C o m mission certified to the Gove rnor the names of D’ Army Bailey , J . Houston Gordon, and Willi a m C. Ko c h, Jr., a s th e se c on d p a ne l of no min e e s. On September 1 8 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e G o v er n o r ( re p re s en t ed b y t h e A t t o rn eyGe n er al & R ep o rt er) filed a “c omplaint for dec laratory judgme nt” in the Davidson County Chance ry

Court, seeking a ruling
a s to theva lid ity

of these c on d p a ne l. Th e c omp la int a lle g e d th a t th e Go ve rn or ’s re je c tio n o f the fi rs t panel c onstitut ed a rejec tion of each of the nom inees on that panel and that “in submitti ng a sec ond panel to the Gove rnor, the T ennesse e Plan requires t hat t he C ommissi on submit a pane l that contains three new nominee s and does not include oneor more of the re jected nominee s from the fir st panel.”-4-

The Gove r n o r w e n t o n to a ll e g e in th e c o mp lain t th a t th e s e c o n d p a n e l s u b mi tt e d to h im by the Commi ss ionis “ no t a

va lid ly c on sti tut e d p a ne l pu rs ua nt t o T e nn . Co de An n. § 1 7- 4- 11 2( a ) a s it contains the na me of a reje cted nominee from the first panel.” The c omplaint concluded by asking the trial court to declar e that “Plaintiff [the Governor] has no leg al duty to make any

appointment to f ill thec ur re nt v a c a nc y

in the Sup re me Cou rt

pu rs ua nt t o T e nn . Co de An n. § 1 7- 4- 11 2( a ), un le ss and until the Commi ssion submi ts a pane l that is validly constituted in a ccor dance with Tenn. Code A n n

. § 1 7

- 4

- 1 1 2 ( a ) [. ]”

The Te nnessee J udicial S elec tion Commi ssion was named as the de fendant in the complaint filed by the Governor. The trial court subseque ntly permitted J. Houst on Gordon a nd Geor g e T. “B uck” L ewis to intervenein the proce eding s. The court scheduled a hearing on D ecem b er 13, 20 06 , f or or a l arg ume nts on thepa rt ie s’ re sp e c tiv e mot ion s f or su mma ry jud g me nt.

On Dec ember

14, 2006, the t rial court issued its memorandum opinion and order , g ranting theGo ve rn or ’s mot ionfo r s umm ary ju dgmen t, e ff e c tiv e ly ru lin g in f

a vo r o f the Go ve rn or

on a ll issues. The c o u rt o r d e r e d th e Co mm is s io n to r e mo v e J. H o u s to n G o r d o n ’ s n a me f r o m th e li st of
no min e e s o n th e se c on d pa ne l a nd to se le c t a thi rd no min e e fr om the re ma ini ng pr e vio us app lic a nts for the se cond vac ancy

and to ce rtify

his or her name to the Governor.
Gordon and L ewis both filed notices of a ppeal. Gor don also filed in the trial c ourt a motion fo r a stay pe nd ing app e a l. Go rd on a nd L e wi s simu ltane ou sly fi le d mo tio ns in the Sup re me Cou rt , reque sting that this Court a ssume jurisdiction of the appe al, pursuant to Te nnessee Code Annotated section 16-3- 201(d) ( Supp. 2006) (the “r eac h-down statute” ). In his reac h-down motion, Gordon also moved this Court to stay the trial court’s judgme nt pe nding the appea l. T he Gove rnor f iled a response to the rea ch-dow n motions, agr eeing with the request that this Court assume jurisdiction of thi s a pp e a l.

On J anuary

2, 2007, the trial co u rt denied the motion for a stay pending appea l. On J anuary 3, this Court gra nted the two re ach- down motions and thereby assumed jurisdiction of the appea l; we also adopte d an ex p edit ed brie fing schedule and set the c ase f or ora l arg ument on Fe bruary 2, 2007. Due to a pu b l i c announce ment by the Chairman of

the J udicial Selection Com m i s s i o n that the Commiss ion would take no further a ction pending this appeal, we denied G o r d o n ’ s m o t i o n f

o r a s t a y.
S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW The issues pre sented for

revi ew

— i s s u es o f s t at u t o ryco n s tru ct i o n an d co n s t i t u t i o n al l aw—a re qu e sti on s o f l a w w hic h th is C ou rt re vie ws de no vo wi th n o p re su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss a c c or de d to the trial court’s conclusions. State v. B urns, 205 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tenn. 2006); Killingsworth v. Ted Russell For d, I nc., 205 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Tenn. 2006); L avin v. J ordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 364 (Tenn. 2000) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

A N A L Y SIS-5-

The appellants, J

. Houston Gordon and Geor g e T. “Buc k” L ewis, have raised se parate issues in their respe ctive brie fs. I n addition, the Tennessee J udicial S elec tion Commi ssion has raised other issues in its brief. Be cause three of the four parties raise separ ate issues for the Court’s re view, the fo llo wi ng a na ly sis wi ll be or g a nize d by re fe re nc e to e a c h of tho se pa rt ie s. We b e g in, ho we ve r, wi th
an overview of the “Te nnessee Plan.”

I. T HE T ENN ESS EE P L AN

I n 1 9 9 4 , the Gene ral Asse mbly enac ted the “T ennesse e Plan,” g overning the selec tion of judge s serving on the various Tenne ssee courts. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-101 to - 118 (1994 & Sup p. 20 06 ). Se c tio n 1 7- 4- 10 1( a ) s tate s th e pu rp os e a ndint e nt of the Te nn e sse e Pla n a s f oll ow s:

Iti s t h e de cl ar ed p u rp o s e an d i n t en to f t h e ge n er al as s em b l y b y t h e p as s age of this chapter

to assist the gove rnor in finding and appoi n t i n g t h e best qualified persons a vailable f

or service on the a

ppellate c ourts of Tenne ssee, and to assist the
e le c tor a te of Ten ne sse e to e le c t th e be st q ua lif ie d p e rs on s to thec ou rt s; t o in su late the judg es of the c ourts from political influenc e an d p re s s u re; to i mprove the administration of justice; to enh an ce the prestig e of and respe ct for the courts by eliminating the nece ssity of political a ctivities by appellate justices and judg es; and to make the c ourts “nonpolitical.”

I n enac ting the T ennesse e Plan, the Ge nera l A ssembly “esta blished as a pa

rt of the judicial branc h of the state a judicial selec tion c ommissi on.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 102(a) (1994). The Commi ssion origina lly

was c omprised of fiftee n individuals who wer e appointed by the Speake r of the State Senate and the Speaker of the State House of Represe ntatives; in 2001, t h e G en er al Assembly expand ed t h e C o m mission t o sevente en member s. 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 459, § 9 (codifie d as ame nded at Te nn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 102(a) (Supp. 2006)).

The Te nnessee Plan sets out a proce ss for filli ng vacancies on the va rious courts, under

which the J udicial S elec tion Commi ssion selec ts a li st of nom inees from which the Governor may appoint
a new judge

. The statutory provisions gove rning the selec tion and appointment proce ss are at the he art of thi s ca se , an d we the re fo rewi ll r e vie w the re le va nt p ortio ns of thestatut e in g re a te r d e ta il. Se c tio n 1 7- 4- 10 9( a )( 2) (S up p. 20 06 ) p ro vid e s:

I f a va c a nc y oc c ur s during the te rm of of fi c e of a jud g e of

thesu pr e me c ou rt , then the judicial sele ction commission shall, at t h e ea rl iest prac ticable date, hold a public meeting in Nashville. Howeve r, if an incumbent judgefails to file a w ritten decla ration of c andidac y

as re quired b y § 17-4-114 or § 17-4-115, or

if the commission is reliably informed that a vacanc y is impending for

another rea son, then t h e p u b l i c m e e t i n g m a y b e h e l d p r i o r t o a c t u a l o c c u rr e n c e o f

t h e v a c a n c y.A rtic le V I, se c tio n 2 o f t h e T e n n e sse e C o n stitutio n p ro v id e s , in p e r ti n e n t p a rt: “T h e S u p re m e C o u rt sh a ll 2

c o n sist o f f

ive J u d g e s, o f wh o m no t m o re tha n two sh a ll re sid e in a n y o n e o f t h e gr a n d d ivisio n s o f t h e S ta te .”
-6- Pursuant to the fore g oing pr ovision, the public announce ment s o f J u s t i ce A nderson’ s and Jus tice Birc h’s planned r etireme nts led to the C ommissi on initiating t he statutory proce ss for sele cting two new justices to fill the vac ancie s which would occ ur upon those re tirements.

Th e statut e se ts out the pr oc e du re to b e fo llo we d b y theCom mis sio n infu lf

ill ing its ro le in these le c tio n a ndapp oin tme nt p ro c e ss:

(b) Noticeof the time, plac e and pur pose of the m ee t i n g shall be g iven by newspa pers, r adio news, an d t elevisi on news a nd by such other me ans as the commission deems proper

. (c ) A ny me mbe r o f the pu bli c , b othla y and attorn e y , s ha ll b e e nti tle d to attend the mee ting and express orally or in writing sug g estions of possible nominees and/or suc h ci t i zen’s approval of or objec tions to any sug g ested nominee for the judicial v ac an cy . Any

licensed attorney

may appea r and make a statement, ora l or written, in support of such attorney ’s own nomination.
(d) Af ter one (1) p u b l i c hea

ring , the commission may hold such additional private or public meeting s as it de ems nece ssary

. The commission shall m ake ind e pe nd e nt i nv e sti g a tio n a nd in qu iry to d e te rm inethequ a lif

ic a tio ns of

po ssi ble
n o m i n e e s f

o r t h e j u d i c i a l v a c a n c y a n d s h a l l e n d e av o r t o e n c o u r a g e q u a l i f

i e d a t t o r n e ys t o a c c e p tn o m i n a t i o n a n d a g r e e t o s e r v e i f ap p o i n t e d t o t h e j u d i c i a l v a c a n c y. (e) As soon as prac ticable and not later than sixty(60) day s from re ceipt of
writt e n n oti c e fr om the g overno r that a va c a nc y ha s o c c ur

re d, thec omm iss ion , in public or private meeting , by a majority vote s hall selec t three ( 3) per sons whom the commission deems best qualified a nd available t o fi ll the vacancy and ce rtify

the
n a m e s o f t h e t h r e e ( 3 ) p e r s o n s t o t h e g o v e r n o r a s n o m i n e e s f

o r t h e j u d i c i a l v a c a n c y. Howeve r, if an inc umbent judgefails to file a w ritten dec lara tion of candida cy as require d by

§ 17-4-114 or § 17-4-115, or if the commission is reliably informed that
a v ac an cy is impending for another rea son, then the commission may meet, sele ct such per sons and certify the names of such nominees to the g overnor prior to ac tual
rec eipt of written notice from the g overnor that a vac ancy

has occ urre d.
(f) The judicial sele ction commission, in compil ing its list of nominees for a supre me cour t p o s i t i o n , shall assure that the require ments of ar t. VI , § 2, of the Tenne ssee Constitution are satisfied. 2
Tenn. Code Ann. § 17- 4-109 (Supp. 2006).F o r ea se o f refere nc e, we wil l refer t o M r. G o rd o n a nd M r. L ew i s b y t he i r resp ec t i ve surna m es. 3

-7- Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 17-4-109 sets out the J udicial Selection Commissi on’s
ro le a ndre sp on sib ili tie s inno min a tin g ind ivi du a ls f or consi de ratio n b y

theGo ve rn or

a s p os sib le appointees to fill an e x isting or impending judicial vacancy

. S ec t i o n 17-4-112 se ts out the Governor’s role a nd responsibilities in appointing a ne w judg e to fill such a va canc y . Section 17-4- 11 2 p ro vid e s: (a) When a vacancy occur s in the officeof an a ppellate c ourt afte r September 1, 1994, by

dea t h , resig nation or otherw ise, the g overnor shall fill the vacancy

by appointing one(1) of

the three (3) pe rsons nominated by the judicial selec tion commi s s i o n , or the g overnor may requirethe commission to subm it one (1) other panel of three (3) nominee s. I f the g overnor reje cts the first pane l of nominees, the g overnor shall selec t one (1) of the nominees in the second panel. I f t h e go v ernor reje cts the first pane l, the g overnor shall state in writing for the judicia l selection
c omm iss ionthere a so ns fo r the re je c tio n o f the pa ne l.
(b ) T he te rm

of a jud g e app oin te d u nd e r this se c tio n sh a ll e xpir e on Au g us t 31 afte r the ne x t reg ular Aug ust election occ urring more than thirty (30) day s after theva c a nc y

oc c ur s. By comparing se ctions 17-4-109 a nd 17-4-112, it bec o m es clear that the T ennesse e Plan bifurcates the nomi n ati o nan d a p p o intment pr ocesse s for filling judicial vacancies. Sec tion 17-4-109 g ives the Judi cial Selec tion Com mission t he sole authority to nominate persons to be consider ed for
app oin tme nt t o f

ill a jud ic ia l va c a nc y , whi le se c tio n 17- 4- 11 2 g ive s the Go ve rn or theso le auth ority to choose which individual to appoint from those n o m i n ee s ce rt ified to the Gove rnor by the C o m m i s s i o n

. W e a l s o n o t e, i m p o r t a n t l y , t h ats ec t i o n 1 7 -4 -1 1 2 (b ) l i m i t s t h e t er mo f aj u d ge appointed under

the Tennessee Pl an, effec tively providing that the appointed judg e’s name must be p l ac ed o n t h e b al l o ti n t h e n ex t b i en n i al el ec t i o n fo r th e vo t er s t o d ec i d e w h et h ert o re t ai n t h e j u d ge in office . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 114.

II. I SSU ES R AI S E D B Y J. H OUS T ON G ORDO N

J . Houston Gordon (“G ordon”) raises two issues in his brief . First, he a sserts that Richard 3 H. Di nkins ’ w ith dr a wa l fr om c on sid e ratio n f or app oin tme nt r e nd e re d th e fi rs t pane l in va lid . A s a result, Gordon c ontends that the Gove rnor’ s purported “ return” or “re jection” of

the first pane l had
no le g a l e ff

e c t. He arg ue s tha t the Com mis sio n sho uld ha ve re pla c e d D inkins ’ n a me wi th the na me of a no the r n omi ne e a ndthe n s ho uldha ve re su bmi tte d th e fir st p a ne l to theGo ve rn or fo r h is consideration. Second, Gordon a rg ues in th ealte rn ative that, assuming a rg uendo that the Gove rnor’ s reje ction of the fir st list was va lid, the Tennesse e Plan d o es n o t prec lude the Commissi on from including on a second panel the name of a pe rson listed on a first pane l of nominees re jected by the Governor. We will address e ach of these two issues in turn.-8-

Go rd on ’s fi rs t is su e is b a se d u po n his inte rp re tatio n of se c tio n 17- 4- 10 9( e ), wh ic h p ro vid e s, in pertinent part: “the commission, in public or private meeting , by a majority vote shall selec t three (3) persons whom the commission dee ms be st qua lified and available to fill the vacancy and ce rtify the names of

the t hree(3) pe rsons to the g overnor as nominees f

or the judicial va canc y .” Unde r Go rd on ’s arg ume nt, on e no min e e ’s wi thdra wa l f ro m c on sid e r ati o nfo r a

pp oin tme nt c on tr a ve ne s th is statute b e c au s e th e w ith d r a w a l r e s u lt s inle s s th a n th r e e n a me s c e rti f ie d to th e G o v ernor

. Acc ording ly , he ar g ues that the list certified to the Governor by the Commi ssion becomes void upon the withdraw al of one nominee and the list shoul d be returned to the Com mission for the addition of a ne w third nominee.

Th is i ssu e is o ne of

statut ory c on str uc tio n. “W hen int e rp re tin g statut e s, thi s Co urt mu st
asce rtain and g ive ef

fec t to the leg islative i n t en t wi thout restricting or expanding the statute’s intended meaning or

application.” Killingsworth, 205 S.W.3d at 408. As we stat ed i n Clark v. L ow e ' s H omeCe nte rs , 2 01 S.W. 3d64 7, 64 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) :

I n t en t i s d et er m i n ed “f

ro m t h e n at u ra l an d o rd i n ar y m ea n i n g o f t h e s t at u t o ryl an gu age within the context of the entire statute without any forc ed or subtle construction that
wo u l d extend or limi t the statute’s mea ning.” State v. Flemming , 19 S.W .3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000) . I f the statute’ s lang uag e is clea r, wemust apply

its plain meaning without a forc ed interpre tation. Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W .3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000)

. Apply ing the se rules of

statutory construction, we must reject Gor don’s ar gu m en t. The Tenne ssee Plan is completely silent as t o the effec t of t he withdrawal of one nomi nee c ertified to the Go ve rn or by the Com mis sio n. Se c tio n 17 -4 -1 09 (e ) re qu ir e s the Judic ia l Se le c tio n Co mmi ssi on to “sele ct three (3) persons whom the c ommissi on deems be st qualified and a vailable to fill the vac ancy and ce rtify

the names of

the three (3) pe rsons to the governor as nominee s for the judicia l vacancy .” Th a t is e xac tly

wh at oc c ur

re d inthi s ca se —o n J uly 18 , 200 6, theCom mis sio n c e rt if ie d b y le tte r t o the Governor the na mes o f t h re e n o m inees for the expected va canc y

on this Court: Richard H. Di nkins , J. H ou sto n G or do n, a ndGe or g e T. “ B uc k” L e wi s. On c e theCom mis sio n c e rt if ie d th os e thr e e na me s to theGo ve rn or , it s r olein the se le c tio n a ndapp oin tme nt p ro c e ss s e t ou t in thestatut e was c omplete, unless and until the Governor exercise d his statutory rig ht to rejec t the fi rs t list of nominees. We conc lude that Gordon’ s proposed c onstruction of sect i o n 17-4-109( e) is a “ forc ed interpre tation” of the statute. See Clark, 201 S.W.3d at 649.

We also conclude that Gordon’s interpre tation of section 17-4- 109(e) is inconsistent with t he
o v e r a l l p u rp o s e a n d i n t e n tb e h i n d t h e T e n n e s s e e P l a n

. S e e T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 1 7

- 4

- 1 0 1 ( a )

. If Go rd on ’s int e rp re tatio n o f t he statut e we re to pr e va il, a tr ou bli ng e le me nt o f g a me smans hip c ou ld be introduce d into the j udicial appointment proc ess. For example, one nominee who be lieves that
a no the r n omi ne e is a

bo ut t o be app oin te d by the Go ve rn or c ou ld p re e mpt that app oin tme nt m e re ly by withdrawing his or her name. Thus, the uni latera l action of a si ng le i ndividual could derail the statut ory pr oc e ss f or se le c tin g a nd app oin tin g a pe rs on to fi ll a judi c ia l vac a nc y ; tha t indi vid ua l c ou ld both “ invalidate” the list of nominees ce rtified by the Commiss ion and interfe re w ith the Governor ’s-9-

statutory authority to appoint a re maining nominee or to re quest a sec ond list of nominees. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 17- 4-112(a ).

Thereis another pr actica l flaw in Gordon’ s arg ument on this iss ue. In his brief, Gor don
a sse rt e d th a t hea ndL e wi s h a d th e “ le gal ri gh t” to b e c on sid e re d f or app oin tme nt t o th e Sup re me Court and that Dinkins’ withdraw al “f rustrate d” that “rig ht.” It is difficult t o see how the withdraw al
o f o n e o f threenominees for appointment could “f

rustrate ” the c hance s of the two re maining
n o m i n e e s

— i n d e e d , t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f o n e c a n d i d a t e o b v i o u s l y increases the likelihood that one of the two re m ai n ing nominee s would be appointed. In other wor ds, there w as no leg al impediment to the Governor appointing either Gordon or L ewis af ter Dinkins’ withdra wal; he simply exercised his statutory

authority to rejec t the first pane l and to reque st that the Commi ssion submi t a sec ond panel f rom which to make the appointment. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 112(a)

.
I n his se cond issue, Gordon arg ues in the alternative that the Tenne ssee Plan d o es not prec lude the re nomination, on a second panel, of a person who w as listed on a first pa nel re jected by the Governor. In summ ar y , he ar g ues that a list or pane l of nominees should be view ed as an entity and that a se cond pane l theref ore is lawful if it contains at least one differe nt name fr om the three names on the first list. Thus, under his a rg ument, a sec ond panel of nominees conta ining the name of one pre viouslyreje cted nominee plus two new nom inees is a different pa ne l f ro m th e fi rs t panel.

We c on c lud e that Go rd on ’s arg ume nt is wi tho ut me ri t. S e c tio n 1 7- 4- 11 2( a ) p ro vid e s th a t, upon the Co mm is s io n ’ s c e rti f ic a ti o n o f a f

ir s t li s t o f th r e e n o mi n e e s , “ th e g o v e r n o r s h a ll f ill the
vacancy by appointing one(1) of the thre e per sons nominated by the judicial selec tion commissi on, or the g overnor may require the commission to submit one (1) other panel of three (3) nominee s.” (Emphasis adde d.) The word “other ,” as use d in section 17-4-112( a), must be c onstrued in light of
se c tio n 17- 4- 10 1( a ), wh ic h sta te s tha t “[i]t is the de c lare d pur po se a nd int e nt of

theg e ne ra l a sse mbl y by the passag e of this cha

pter to as sis t

the g overnor

in finding and app o i n t i n g t h e best qualified persons ava il ab lef

o r s e r v ic e o n th e ap p e ll a tec o u rts o f T e n n e s s e e

. ” ( E mp h a s is a d d e d

. ) T he Governor’s re

jection of a

first pane l of nom inees must be under stood not onlyas a r ejec tion of the panel but also a s a re

jection of e ach pe rson nominated by the J udicial Selection Commissi on to be on the pane l. Obviously , the Governor would not reje ct a f irst panel if he intended to appoint one of the no min e e s on that pa ne l. Mo re ov e r, a lth ou g h the Te nn e sse e Pla n c ha rg e s th e Com mis sio n w ith
c e rt if y ing “ on e (1 ) oth e r pa ne l of thr e e (3 ) nom ine e s” fo r the Go ve rn or ’s c on sid e ratio n, no thi ng in the statu to r

y s cheme expressly

allows the Commissi on to certify a sec ond panel c onsisting of pe rsons who w e r e a lr e a d y r e

je c te d b y th e G o v e r n o r

. I n th e ab s e n c e o f s p e c if ic s tatu to r y lan g u a g e , we are unwilling to re ach suc h a conc lusion. According ly , we co n cl u d e that a se cond (“ other” ) pane l selec ted by the C ommissi on must consist of three new nominees and that the Commission ex cee ded its authority

in renominating Gordon on the se cond pane l cer tified to the Governor.
We hold that Dinkins’ withdrawal did not invalidate the f irst panel, and w e also hold t hat the J udicial Selection Commissi on err ed in re nominating Go rd o n on the sec ond panel c ertified to the-10-

Governor. Ha ving c onsidered and reje cted the arg uments made by Gordon, we turn ne x t to consider theiss ue s r a ise d b y

L e wi s.

III
. I SSU ES R AI S E D B Y G EOR GE T. L E W IS

L e wi s c on te nd s th a t th e Go ve rn or ’s reject ion of Go rd on a ndL e wi s, fo llo wi ng Di nkins ’ wi thdra wa l, w a s impe rm iss ibl y ba se d sole ly up on the ra c e of thetw o r e ma ini ng no min e e s. As L e wi s states in his brief, “ t h e [ Go v er n o r’s July24, 2006] l etter le ads to the inesca pable c onclusion that solely beca use L ewis and G ordon ar e both Cauca sian, the Go v er n o r reje cted the panel.” That
c on te nti on fo rm s th e ba sis fo r the tw o is su e s r a ise d in L e wi s’ s bri e f. As his fi rs t issu e , L e wi s a sse rt s that the trial court erre d in r u l i n g t h at t h e Te nnessee Human Rig hts Act does not apply to the Governor’s re

jection of Gor don and L ewis. As his second issue, L ewis ar gu es t h at t he trial c ourt
err ed in ruling “that L ewis and G ordon’s state and fede ral c onstitut ional rig hts to equal protec tion of the law did not restric t the Governor’s discr etion to rejec t a pane l of nominees base d solely upon the ra ce of

the nominees.”

We first will a d dr e s s Le wis’s claims under the Tenne ssee Human Rights Act ( “THRA” ). The THRA is set out in Titl e 4, Chapter 21 of the Te nnessee Code Annotated. L ewis re lies upon various portions of the THRA in ar g uing that the Act applies to the G overnor ’s r ej ec t i o n o f L ewis and Go rd on on a lle g e d r a c ia l g ro un ds . H e fi rs t c ite s se c tio n 4 -2 1- 10 1, wh ic h p ro vid e s: (a) It is the purpose and intent of the g ener al assembly by this chapter to:
(1) Provide for execution within Tennesseeof the policies e mbodied in the fede ral Civil Ri g ht s Acts of 1964, 1968 and 1972, the Preg nancy Amendment of 1978, and the Ag e Discrimination in Em ploy ment Act of 1967, a s amende d;
(2) Assur e that Te nnessee has appr opriate le g islation prohibiti ng dis c ri min a tio n ine mpl oyme nt, pu bli c a c c omm od a tio ns a ndho us ing su ff ic ie nt t o jus tif y thede fe rr a l of

c a se s b y

thefe de ra l e qu a l e mployme nt o pp ortun ity commission, the department of housing and urban develo p m en t , the sec reta ry of la bo r andthede pa

rt me nt o f j us tic e un de r tho se statut e s; (3) Saf eg uard a ll indivi duals within the s tate from discrimination because of
rac e, cr eed, c olor, relig ion, sex , ag e o r n ationa l orig in in connection with employ ment and public ac commodations, and b ec au s e o f ra ce, c olor, cre ed, re ligion, sex or
n at i o n al o ri gi n i n co n n ec t i o n wi t h h o u s i n g; (4) Protec t their interest in per sonal dig nity and fr eedom f

rom humiliation;
(5 ) M ake a va ila

bleto the state the ir fu ll pr od uc tiv e c apa c ity in e mpl oyme nt;Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 4- 21- 401( a) ( 2005) ( “ Empl oy er pr ac t i ce s ”) for pr ov i s i on s a ppl y i n g t o a ppl i ca n t s for 4

e m p lo ym e n t. F o r e a se o f re fer e n c e , w e w ill us e “e m p lo ye e (s )” in this o p inio n , ra the r th a n “a p p lica n t(s) .”
-11- (6 ) S e c ur e the state a g a ins t dome sti c strif e a nd un re st that wou ld m e na c e its de moc ratic ins tituti on s; (7) Pre serve the public safe ty , health and g ener al welf are ; and
(8 ) Furthe r the int e re st, ri g hts , o pport un it ie s a nd privi le g e s o f i nd ivi du a ls within the state.
(b ) T he pro hib iti on s inthi s c ha pte r a g a ins t di sc ri min a tio n b e c aus e of a g e in
c on ne c tio n w ithe mpl oyme nt andpu bli c a c c omm od a tio ns sh a ll b e limit e d to individuals who are at least forty (40) y ear s of ag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21-101 (2005)

.
I n addition, L ewis re lies upon section 4-21-401( a), which states that “[i] t is a discriminatory p ra ct i ce fo r a n em p l o y ert o ” d o t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1 ) F a il o r re fu se to hir e or dis c ha rg e a ny pe rs on or oth e rw ise to d isc ri min a te ag ainst an individual with respec t to compensation, terms, conditions or privileg es of employment beca

use of suc h individual’s rac e, cr eed, c olor, relig ion, sex , ag e or national orig in; or
(2 ) Limi t, s e g re g a te or

c la ssi fy a n e mpl oy e e or

app lic a nts fo r e mpl oyme nt i n any wa y t h at would deprive or tend to de prive a n individual of employ ment opportunities or otherwise adver sely aff ect the statu s o f an employ ee, be cause of
rac e, cr eed, c olor, relig ion, sex , ag e or national orig in.

L ewis ar g ues that the Gove rnor, as ag ent for the State of Tenne ssee, is an “ employ er” for purposes of the THRA. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-21- 102(4) ( 2005) (including “the state ” in t he TH RA ’s de fi nit ionof

“ e mpl oy e r” ). Simi larl y , L e wi s a sse rt s tha t he andGo rd on , a s n omi ne e s to fill the judicial vacancy

on the Supreme Court, must be conside red a s “employ ees” (or, more
acc urate ly , as “a

pplicants”) cover ed by

the THRA. L ewis t here fore contends that the Governor’s 4 reje ction of L ewis and G ordon, which a lleg edly was ba sed solely

on t h ei r race, violated the provisions of the THRA.

The Gove rnor a

rg ues in responsethat the Governor’s a ppoi n t ment to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court of Te nnessee is not an employ ment decision under e ither fe dera l or state law. F or that r e a so n, theGo ve rn or c on te nd s th a t th e TH RA is i na pp lic ableto s uc h a

pp oin tme nts

.W e n ot e t h at Le wi s ’ s a r g u men t s on t h i s i s s u e t h eor et i ca l l y c ou l d a ppl y t o a p p lica n ts fo r a ju d ic ia l va c a n c y, 5
i

. e. , pe rs o ns who ap p l y t o t he Jud i ci al Select i o n C o m m i ss i o n fo r consi d e ra tio n , i n ad d i t i o n t o nom i nees s el ect ed and cert i f i ed t o t he G o vernor b y t he C o m m i ss i o n.

T he C o urt of A p p eal s, how ever, co rr ect l y o b ser ved t hat “[ t ]hes e fed eral prece d ent s are, of co urs e, not b i nd i ng 6

o n T e n n e sse e c o u rts a n d d o no t l im it o u r a b ili ty t o giv e the fulles t p o ssib le e ff e c t t o the T e n n e sse e H u m a n R igh ts A c t.” W i l s on , 104 S. W

. 3d a t 48 n

. 6.
-12- Th e re sp e c tiv e brie fs fi led by L e wi s a ndtheGo ve rn or e a c h c on ta in d e ta ile d a ndwe llrea soned ar g uments as to w hether a nominee f

or a judicia l vacancy

is an “e mploy ee” for pur poses of the TH RA (and the re fo re c ov e re d, or no t c ov e re d, by the Ac t)

. Ea c h p arty c omp are s a ndc on tr a sts
va ri ou s p ortio ns of

Ti tle VII of theCiv il Rig hts Ac t of 1 96 4, 42 U. S.C. §§ 20 00 e to 2 00 0e -1 7, wi th portions of the THRA in support of their respe ctive ar g um ents. The pa rties also cite pe rtinent
case s—Tennesse e and f

eder al ca ses, as we ll a s case s from other states—on the “employ ee” issue.

We beg in by

emphasizing that the que stion in t his case is not whe ther judg es ar e employ ed by the State. The que stion is whether a nominee or applicant to fill a judicial vacancy is an 5 “employ ee” for purposes of the THRA

. For the reasons stated below, w e answ er that question in the neg ative.
Although the THRA contains a de finition of “employ er,” see Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-21-102( 4), t he Ac t does not contain a de finition of the word “ employ ee.” We observe, how ever , that section 4-21- 101(a) (1) state s that one of the primary purposes of the THRA is to “[p] rovide for execution within Tenne ssee of the policies embodied in the f eder al Civil R ights Ac ts of 1964, 1968 and 1972, the Pre g nancy

Amendment of 1978, and the Age Discrimination in Employ ment Act of 1967, as ame nded[.] ” As the Te nnessee Court of Appea ls has stated:

I n light of the intended overla p in pur pose betwee n the Tenne ssee Human Rights Act and fe dera l anti- d i s crimi nation laws, Tenne ssee’ s courts re g ularly consult the decisions of their f

eder al counter

parts for g uidance when c alled upon to construe and
app ly theTe nn e sse e Hu ma n Ri g hts Ac t.

Wil son v. Rubin, 104 S .W.3d 39, 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); see a lso L y nch v. C ity of Jelli co, 205 6 S.W .3d 384, 399 (Tenn. 2006) (stating t h at b ec au s e “[t] he intent of the TH RA is to provide for execution within Te n n essee of the policies e mbodied in the fede ral c ivil rights statutes . . . an analy sis of claims under the THRA is the same a s under Title VII of the F eder al Civil R ights Ac t”).

Given that the TH RA is ge nera lly interpre ted consistently

with Ti t l e VII , we note that the latter de fines “e mploy ee” as “an individual employ ed by an employ er.” 42 U.S

. C

. § 2000e(f ). Al tho ug h th is d e fi nit iontake n alo ne is rathe r unh e lpf ul, we fi nd it sig nif

ic a nt, a s did the tria l c ou rt , that the Title VI I

definition excludes certain individuals such as elec ted state off icials, persona l staff of ele cted state officia ls, ap p o i ntees by elec ted state off

icials on the policymaking level, and immediate advisors to ele cted state officia ls. I d.O ne j udge, due t o h i s di s abi l i t i es , us ed a c ane an d a mo t or s coot er for mob i l i t y , an d t he ot her j udge s uf fer ed 7
f r om mu l t i pl e s cl er os i s a n d t r i g emi n al n eu r al g i a. T h omps on , 979 S. W

. 2d a t 679 n n

. 1 & 2.
-13- I n any event, wefurther

note that the question of whe ther a n individual is an employ ee f or purposes of T itle VI I

is resolved by

apply ing c o m m o n law princ iples of ag ency . See Shah v. Dea coness Hosp., 355 F .3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating, i n a ca s e broug ht under fe dera l dis c ri min a tio n s tatut e s, “ we app ly thec omm on la w a g e nc y

te st t o d e te rm inewh e the r a hir e d p arty is an independe nt contrac tor or an e mploy ee” ); O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 ( 2d Cir. 1997) (s tatin g , “ it i s w e ll e sta

bli sh e d th a t w he n Co ng re ss u se s the te rm ‘e mpl oy e e ’ w ith ou t de fi nin g it w ith p recision, courts should presume that Cong ress ha d in mind ‘the conventional master -servant
re l at i o n shi p as u n d er s t o o d b y t h e c o m m o n -l aw age n cyd o ct ri n e’ ”)

. C f. C l ac k am as Ga s tro en t er o l o gy As so c s. , P. C. v . We lls , 5 38 U. S. 4 40 , 4 44 -5 1 ( 20 03 ) ( app lying c omm on la w p ri nc ipl e s in de te rm ini ng wh e the r p hy sic ia n- sh are ho lde r w a s a n e mpl oy e e fo r p ur po ses o f A me ri c a ns wi th Disabilities Act).
The Supreme Court of the United States has summarized the relevant common-law a g ency princ ipl e s a s f

oll ow s:

I n determining whe ther a

hired pa rty is an employ ee unde r the g ener al common law of ag ency , we c onsider the hiring party ’s rig ht to control the manner and means by which the pr oduct is acc omplished. Among the other fa ctors re levant to t his inquiry
are the skill required; the sour ce of the i nstrumentalities and tools; the location of the
wo rk ; the du ratio n of the re latio ns hip be tw e e n the pa rt ie s; w he the r the hiring pa rty has the rig ht to assign a dditional proje ct s t o t h e hired pa rty ; the extent of the hired party ’s discre tion over when and how long to work; t he method of pay ment; the hired party ’s role in hiring and p aying a ssistants; whether the wor k is part of the r eg ular business of the hiring party ; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
e mpl oy ee ben efits; a ndtheta x tre a tme nt o f the hir e d p arty . Se e Re state me nt § 220(2) ( setting forth a nonexhaustive list of factor s relevant to determining whether a hire d party

is an employ ee) . No one of these fa ctors is determinative.
Cmty . f or Cr e a tiv e No n- Vi ole nc e v. Re id, 49 0 U. S. 73 0, 75 1- 52 (1 98 9) (f oo tno te s o mitte d) ; se e a lso Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991) (stating compar able f actor s for de termining whether

a wor k relationship i s that of employ er- employ ee or independe nt contrac tor for pur poses of wor

kers’ compensation statutes).

I n Thompson v. Cit y

of A u s tin, 979 S.W .2d 676 (Tex. App. 1998), the Te x as Court of Appea ls c onsidered the issue of whether municipal court judge s wer e employ ees f or purpose s of the Texas C o mmissi on on Human Rig hts Act (“T CHRA”), sec tions 21.001-.405, Texas L abor Code An no tate d. I n th a t c a se , tw o mu nic ipa l cou rt jud g e s h a d n ot b e e n r e app oin te d b y thec ity c ou nc il, and the judg es filed suit under the TCHRA, alleg ing that the city council had not r eappointed the m beca use of their

respe ctive disabiliti es. The Texas c ourt held that the municipal c ourt judg es we re 7I n T homp s on, t he cour t appl i ed t he “ hy bri d ‘ economi c r eal i t i es

- com mo n l aw c ont r ol ’ t es t ” pr evi ous l y appl i ed 8
i n G uer r er o v. Ref

ug i o C ount y , 946 S. W

. 2d 5 58 , 5 66 (T ex. A pp

. 1 99 7). T hat t es t di f fer s s l i gh t l y f

r om t he com mo n- l aw agency t est dis cuss ed earl i er, but any d i f ferences between t he eco no m i c rea l i t i es and co m m o n- l aw agenc y t est s “ar e
m inim a l.” S h a h , 3 5 5 F .3 d a t 4 9 9 . F o r p u rp o se s o f o u r a n a lysis, an y su c h d iff e re n c e s a re im m a te ria l.

J u dg es , of

c ou r s e, a r e s u bj ec t t o t h e et h i cs r u l es s et ou t i n T en n es s ee Su pr eme Co urt R ul e 8 ( “ Rul es of 9
P rof ess i o nal C o nd uct ”) and T enness ee S up rem e C o urt R ul e 1 0 (“ C o d e o f Jud i ci al C o nd uct ”). Se e al so T enn. C o d e A nn. § § 17

- 5

- 1 0 1 t o - 3 1 4 (19 9 4 & Sup p

. 20 0 6 ) ( est ab l i sh ing th e C o u rt o f t he Jud i ci ary and pro vi d i ng fo r di sci p l i nary p roce d ures fo r r esolvi ng et hi cal co m p l ai nt s agai nst judges).
-14- not employ ees f

or purpose s of the TCHRA. I d. at 682. I n rea ching that co n cl usion, the court 8 focuse d primarily

on the fa ct that the cit y council lac ked any authority to control the “me ans and
manner ” of the municipal court judg es’ pe rformance of their duties. I d.

After considering the c o m m o n -l aw f actor s set out above f

or dete rmining w hether

an individual is an employ ee, w e re ach the same c onclusion that was re ache d in Thompson—state court judge s (and he nce nominees to f ill a judicial vacancy ) are not e mploy ees for purposes of the THRA. Most impo rt an t l y , t h e Governor (the “ hiring party ”) ha s no authority to control, in any

way , the “manne r and me ans” by

which judg es perform their of ficial duties. Nor does t he Governor ( nor any other st at e o ff

i ce r) have the power

to demote or terminate a state court judg e. Judges may be
remove d from off

ice only in limi ted circ umstances, i.e., by the elec torate in a

rete ntion election, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-114 and 17-4- 115, or by constitutional means, see Te nn. Const. art. V, § 4 (providing that “[t] he Gove rnor, Judge s of the Supreme Court, J udg es of Inferior Courts, [ and] Chance llors . . . shall be liable to impea chment, whene ver they may , in the opinion of the House of Represe ntatives, commit any crime in their of

ficial c apac ity

which may

requiredisqualification”) and ar t. VI , § 6 (providing that “Judges and Attorney s for the State may be remove d from off ice by
a conc urre nt vote of b o t h Ho u s es of the Ge nera l Assembly ”). Additionally , none of the other 9

c omm on -l a w fa c tor s qu ote d abo ve we ig h in fa vo r of fi nd ing no min e e s to fi ll a jud ic ia l va c a nc y

to be employ ees f

or purpose s of the THRA.

Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

irm th e tria l c ou rt ’s ruli ng that th e TH RA do e s n ot a pp ly to this pr oc e e din g . We turn n e xt to c on sid e r L e wi s’ s e qu a l pr ote c tio n c la ims

.
I n his second issue, L ewis asserts that the Governor’s reje ction of the first pane l violated the
e qu a l pr ote c tio n pr ov isi on s of the Con sti tut ion of the Un ite d St a te s a ndtheCon sti tut ionof theState of Tenne ssee. Hecontends that the f irst panel wa s reje cted solelydue to the ra cial cla ssification of L ewis and G ordon and that the rejection of t he first panel is pre sumptivelyinvalid. L ewis g oes on to arg ue that: (1) this Court must review the reje ction of the fir st panel applying stric t scrutiny ; (2) the re jection of the f

irst panel wa s not nece ssary to a chieve a compelling state interest; and (3) the
re je c tio n o f the fi rs t pa ne l wa s no t na rr ow ly ta ilo re d to a c hie ve a c omp e lli ng state int e re st. L e wi s relies primarily

upon three decisions of the Supre me Court of the United States, de aling with the extent to which state g overnme nt may classify applicants o n t h e basis of racein the interest of diversity : Grutter v. B ollinger , 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger , 539 U.S. 244 (2003); andAs f or h i s cl ai m under ar t i cl e I , s ect i on 8, and ar t i cl e X I , s ect i on 8 of t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on, Lewi s ci t es 10
G a llah e r v . E la m , 1 0 4 S .W .3 d 4 5 5 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 3 ); S ta te v. W h iteh e a d , 4 3 S .W .3 d 9 2 1 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ); S ta te
v. R o b i nson, 29 S.W

. 3 d 47 6 (T enn. 20 0 0 ).
-15- Reg ents of Univ. of Cal. v. Ba kke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). L ewis asse rts that, as stated in his brief : 10 “The se dec isions considered c ollectively indicate that rac e may sometimes be consider ed as a plus fa c tor a lon g wi th a ll o f the oth e r i nd ivi du a l c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f the app lic a nts , bu t on ly wh e n the reis pr oo f o f a

c omp e lli ng state int e re st andon ly wh e n th e reis p ro of t hat th e raci a l c la ssi fi c a tio n is
nece ssary and is part of

a nar rowly -tailored policy .” L ewis arg ues that those criteria ha ve not bee n met in the pending case and that the Governor’s rejec tion of t he first panel there fore violated equa l pr ote c tio n p ri nc ipl e s.
The Gove rnor de n i es t h at an equa l protection violation occur red. H e ar g ues that Grutter , Gratz, and Bakke ar e cases involving the a dmissions prog rams of c erta in public educational ins tituti on s, pr og rams that in c lud e d s pe c ia l pr ov ision s a ime d at in c re a sin g a dmi ssi on of min ority
app lic a nts . T he Go ve rn or a sse rt s th a t th e pe nd ing c a se is w ho lly dif fe re nt f ro m thos e thr e e c a se s; this is a case involving the exercise o f a go vernor ’s discre tionary authority , acting pursuant to a statut e e na c te d by the le g isl a tur e , to app oin t me mbe rs of the jud ic ia l br a nc h of state gov ernm ent. Th e Go ve rn or

c on te nd s th a t th e fu nd a me nta l iss ue in this c a se is w he the r h e ma y , c on sis te nt w ith the Equal Protec tion Cl ause, c onsider diver sityin ma king appointments to the judiciary under the Tenne ssee Plan.

I n addition, the Governor arg ues that the Supreme Court of the United States has re cog nized t h a tc a s e s i n v o l v i n g d i s c r e t i o n ar y
- ap p o i n t m e n t c h a l l e n g e s r e q u i r e a m o r e c i r c u m s p e c tap p r o a c h

. In May or of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality L eag ue, 415 U.S. 605 (1974), the Supreme Court wa s prese nted with an equal protec tion challeng e to Philadelphia’s sy stem for a ppointment of members of the B oard of

Education, a scheme that para llels the Tenne ssee Plan. An Educational Nominating Panel (made up partl y o f appoint ees by the May or) would c ertify a list of three nominees to the May or for

appointment to the Boa

rd of Educ ation. I d. at 607. The May or would t h en have the option of rejec ting the nominees an d as k i ng for another list of three nominees. I d. The suit was broug ht by

Afric an-A merican members of the community

alleg ing that the May or violated the Equa l Protection Clause by

discriminating a g ainst Afric an-A mericans when ap p o i nting membe rs of the Educational Nominating Pane l, which in turn, had an a dverse disparate impact on the Afric an-A merican population of the Board of Education. I d. at 608-10. Althoug h the Court decide d the ca se on other g rounds, the Co u rt discussed the “ delicate issues” pre sented in equa l protection
c ha lle ng e s to dis c re tio na

ry app oin tme nts by

state a ndloc a l e xec uti ve of fi c e rs :
[T] o the deg ree that the principles c ited by the May or re flec t con ce rn t h at j udicial oversig ht of di scre tionary appointments may interfe re with the ability of an e lected officia l to respond to the mand at e o f h i s constituency , they are in point. There a

re a lso de lic a te iss ue s o f f

e de ra l- state re latio ns hip s u nd e rl yi n g th is c a se . T he fe de ra lis m questions are made pa

rticularly complex bythe interplay of the Equa l Protection Clau s e o f t he F ourtee nth Amendment, with its special re g ard f or the status of the-16-

rig hts of minorityg roups and f or the ro l e of the Fe dera l Governme nt in protecting those rig hts.

. . . [A] s rec ently as in Carter

v. J ury Comm'n of Gr eeneCounty , . . . [we] recog nized “the problems that would be involved in a fede ral c ourt’s orde ring the Governor of a

State to exercise his discre tion in a particular way . . . .”

I d. at 615 (quoting Carter , 396 U.S. 320, 338 (1970)). A lthough the G overnor concedes that the fe de ra lis m is su e me nti on e d inEd uc a tio na l E qu a lity L e a g ue is n ot p re se nt in the p e nd ing c a se beca use it has bee n broug ht in state, not fede ral, c ourt, he a rg ues that the “ delicate issues” identified in Educational Equa lityL eag ue ar e “no le ss significant” in this procee ding.

The Gove rno r goes on to ar g ue in the alternative that eve n if discre tionary executive appointments to fill judicial vacancies are reg ulated in some fashion by the Equal Protec tion Cl ause, thetria l court c or

re c tly fo un d th a t th e un dis pu te d f a c ts o f this c a se do no t ma ke ou t a prima fa c ie showing that L ewis was discriminated against on acc ount of hi s rac e. Ag ain in the alternative, the Governo r contends that, if theCou rt

c on c lud e s th a t e qu a l pr ote c tio n a na ly sis mus t beapp lie d, his actions conc erning the re

jection of the f

irst panel satisfy

the strict-scr

utin y t es t ap p l ied in such an
a na ly sis

.
I n considering the parties ’ ar gu m en t s, we c annot overlook the doctrine of separ ation of power s and the re lated political-que stion doctrine that in part dictates our re solution of this issue.

Article II , section 1 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution pr ovides: “The power s of the Government sh a ll b e div ide d int o th re e dis tin c t de pa rt me nts : th e L e g isl a tiv e , E xec uti ve , a ndJudic ia l.” Artic le I I , s e c tio n 2 , w hic h is tit le d “ Limi tatio n of po we rs ,” pr ov ide s: “ No pe rs on or pe rs on s b e lon g ing to
on e of the se de pa

rt me nts sh a ll exe rc ise a ny of the po we rs pr op e rl y be lon g ing to ei the r of theoth e rs , except in the case s here in directe d or permitted.” These two c on s t i t u t i o n al provisions are the
corne rstone of the doctrine of separ ation of powe rs. As we previously have stated:
The separation of powers doctrine arises from the prec ept that “[i] t is essential to the maintenanc e of republican g overnme nt that the action of the leg islative, judicial, and
ex ec u t i v e d ep ar t m en t s s h o u l d b e k ep t s ep ar at e an d d i s t i n ct

. ” R i ch ar d s o n v

. Yo u n g, 122 T e n n

. 4 7 1 , 4 9 2 , 1 2 5 S. W. 6 6 4 , 6 6 8 ( 1 9 1 0 )

. T h e Co u rt o f A p p e a ls h as su mma ri zedthedo c trinea s f

oll ow s:

I n g ener al, the “le g islative power ” is the authority to make, orde r, and repe al law; the “ executive power ” is the authority to administer and enfor ce the law; and the “ judicial power ” is the authority to interpret and apply law. The Tenne ssee c onstitut ional provision preve nts an
encr oachme nt by any of t he departments upon t he powe rs, func tions
a ndpr e ro g a tiv e s o f the oth e rs . T he br a nc he s o f g ov e rn me nt, h o weve r, ar e g uided by

the doctrine of che cks and ba lance s; the doctrine of

separ ation of powe rs is not absolute.-17-

State v. Br acke tt, 869 S.W .2d 936, 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (citations omitted). Thus, while the thre e branches of g overnme nt are independe nt and co- equal, they are to a deg ree interdepe ndent as we ll, with the functions o f o n e branch ofte n overla pping that of another . Under wood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1975).

State v. Ki ng , 9 73 S.W. 2d58 6, 58 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; se e a lso Richardson v. Tenn. B d. of De ntistry , 913 S.W .2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995)

. Occ asionally

a court case involves a particula r issue—in this case, an alleg ed violation of the constitutional gua

rante e of equal protection under the law—which collides with the constitutional separ ation of powers. I n such cases, t he court must consider whethe r the issue pre sented is a nonjusticiable political question; in rare c ases, the c ourt must conclude that the doctrine of sepa ration of po we rs pr e c lud e s c on sid e ratio n o f the pa rt ic ula r i ssu e or c la im r a ise d b y

the pa rty

. Th e po lit ic a lquestion doctrine wa s summarized by the Court of Appe als in Mayhew v. Wilder:

Article II , Section 2 of our Constitution prohibi ts a person be longing to o n e o f the thr e e g re a t de pa

rt me nts of

g ov e rn me nt f

ro m e xer c isi ng thepo wer s d e le g a te d to another department, ex c e

pt a s th e Con sti tut ion its e lf d ire c ts o r p e rm its . The c ou rt s ma y , o f c ou rs e , ho ld an act of theL e g isl a tur e un c on sti tut ion a l, T ow n o f S ou th Carthag e v. B arr ett, 840 S.W .2d 895 (Tenn. 1992), and in certain limit ed ca ses the courts may

provid e a re m ed y

wher e the a ction (or inac tion) of the executive or le g is lati v e b r a n c h e s d e p r iv e th e p e o p le o f th e ir c o n s ti tu ti o n a l r ig h ts

. I n Baker v. Carr , 3 69 U. S. 1 86 , 8 2 S. Ct. 69 1, 7 L .E d. 2d66 3 ( 19 62 ), the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt h eld t hat the Te nnessee L eg islature’s r efusa l to re-a pportion the state’s leg islative districts violated the equal pr otection provisions o f t he United States Constit ution. I n Powell v. McCormack, 395 U .S. 486, 89 S.C t. 1944, 23 L .Ed.2d 491 (19 6 9 ), the same c ourt held that the House of Repre sentatives could not exclude a member who h a d b e e n d u ly e le c te d a n d p o s s e s s e d a ll th e r e q u ir e me n ts of membership expressly

presc ribed in the Constituti on.

Howeve r, these inc ursions are rar e. Where the question prese nted and the relief soug ht are of the ty

pe that do not admit of judicial re so lution, or if the issue prese nted is a pure ly

“political question,” the sepa ration of powe rs provisions of our constitutions m ake it non-justiciable. I d. at 516, 517, 89 S.Ct. 1944. I n Ba ker v. Car r [369 U.S . at 217], the court discussed what makes a que stion non-justi ciable:

Prominent on the surfac e of an y ca se held to involve a political question is foun d a t ex t u al l y d em o n s trab l e c o n s t i t u t i o nal commitment of the iss ue to a c oo rd inate po lit ic a l de pa rtme nt; or a la c k o f j ud ic ia lly discovera ble and mana g eable standards f or re solving it; or the impossibi lity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly

for nonjudicial discr etion; or the impos s i b i l i t y of a-18- court’s unde rtaking independe nt resolution with o u t expressing la ck of the re spect due coor dinate branches of g overnme nt; or an unusual need f or unquestioni ng adher enceto a political decision alre ady made; or the potentiality of embarra ssment from multifarious pronounce ments by

various depa

rtments on one question.

46 S.W .3d 760, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), pe rm. appe al denied ( Tenn. Mar ch 19, 2001), r eh’g denied ( Tenn. Apr . 30, 2001).

Under the principles stated in Mayhew, we a re f ace d in the pending case with the question of whe ther the e qual protec tion claim asserte d by L ewis is a non-justi ciable politi cal question. The first two fac tors quoted from Ba ker v. Carr are particula

rly prominent in this case

. First, L ewis’s equal pr otection claim is a c halleng e to the Gove rnor’ s appointment to fill the curre nt vacancy on thi s Co urt; o n th e su bje c t of fi lli ng vacan c ie s inof

fi c e , th e reis a

“ te xtua lly

de mon str able constitutional commit ment of the issue to a c oordinate political dep artment”—the Tenne ssee Con sti tut ionpr ov ide s th a t “ [t]he e le c tio n of a ll of fi c e rs , a ndthefi lli ng of

a ll v a c a nc ie s n ot o the rw ise dir e c te d o r p rovi ded by th is Con sti tut ion , s ha ll b e ma de in s uc h mann e r a s th e L e g isl a tur e sh a ll dir e c t.” Te nn . Co ns t. a

rt

. VII , § 4. Pur su a nt to this c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on , th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y enac ted the Te nnessee Plan, setting out the manne r in which j u d i ci al vac ancie s are to be filled. Under the Tenne ssee Plan, the Gove rnor a lone is empower ed to make a ppointments to fill such
vacancies.
Reg arding the sec ond fac tor fr o m Ba ker v. Car

r (“ lack of

judicially

discovera

ble and manag eable standards for resolving [t he issue]”), we note the far -re aching implications of L ewis’s equal pr otection cha lleng e. If judicial appointments made pursuant to the Tenne ssee Plan ar e subjec t to equal prote ct i o n challeng es, e v e ry such appointment could theor etically be the subjec t of litigation. And althoug h pre-appointment e qu a l pro te c tio n c ha lle ng e s, sim ila r t o L e wi s’ s c la im i n this case, c ould “mere ly ” for estall the filling of a judicial vac ancy , nothing would appea r to prec lude
a post-appointment

equal protection challeng e to judicial appointments. The consequenc es t o the Te nn e sse e jud ic ia l sy ste m c ou ld b e c ha oti c . F or e xamp le , w hat r e me dy

wo ulde xist a ft e r a

jud g e is d u l y ap p o i n t e d b y t h e G o v e r n o r ? If t h e j u d g e w e r e r e t a i n e d i n o f f i c e f o l l o w i n g t h e s t a t u t o r i l ymandated r etention elec tion, what would be the e ffe ct on the cha lleng ed judge ’s status? Moreove r, L e wi s’ s ow n su g g e ste d re me dy fo r a pr e -a pp oin tme nt c ha lle ng e ill us tr a te s th e la c k o f a “ ma na g e able standard f or re solving the issue” —he asks this Court to order the Governor to fill the curr ent vac ancy by appointing e ither L ewis or Gordon, but assuming arg uendo that the r eason a dvance d by the Governor in reje cting L ewis and Go rd o n violated equa l protection principles, L ewis’s propose d
reme dy overlooks the f

act that the G overnor

still would have the statut o ry prer og ative under the Te nn e sse e Pla n to ask fo r a se c on d p a ne l, i f h e ha s a ny a dd iti on a l r e a so n f

or do ing so . It c le ar ly would be a violation of the separ ation-of- powe rs doctrine f or us to prec lude the Gove rnor f rom asking fo r a s econd panel for some rea son other than the onestated in his letter re jecting the
rema ining panel of L ewis and G ordon. F or these r easons, we conclude that the s econd f actor stated in B ake r a

pp lie s— we c on c lud e that th e reis “ a la c k o f j ud ic iall y di sc ov e ra blea ndma na g e able standards f

or re solving” L ewis’s e qual protec tion claim.-19-

Our c onclusion that L ewis’s e qual protection challeng e presents a non-justiciable political qu e sti on do e s n ot i mpl y

that the Go ve rn or ’s re

je c tio n of the tw o re ma ini ng no min e e s o n th e fi rs t li st (L e w is a n d G o r d o n ) v io late d e q u a l p r o te c ti o n p r in c ip le s

. I n d e e d , w e b e li e v e th a t th e G o v e rnor’ s actions neither

implicated nor ran afoul of e qual protec tion principles.

As a thre shold matter, we conclude , as di d the t rial court, that the unusual circ umstances of thi s c a se didno t ma

ke ou t a prima fa c ie sh ow ing that L e wi s wa s disc ri min a te d a g a ins t ontheba sis of ra ce. A s discussed in g reat detail in this opinion, the Tennessee Pl an re quired the Commission to c e rt if y a pa ne l of app lic a nts that w e rethe“ be st q ua lif ie d” to f ill theSup re me Cou rt

va c a nc y ; it did so by certify ing the panel consisting of Dinkins, G ordon, and L ewis. The Tenne ssee Plan then g ave the Governor the option of appointing one of the three applicants or reque sting a second panel of three applicants. The Governor’s J uly 24 letter reve als that he reje cted the first pane l presente d to him bythe Commiss ion beca use one of t he thre e applicants, Dinkins, volunt arily withdrew f

rom consi d er at i o n

. I n d ee d , t h e l et t ers p ec i fi ca l l y s t at ed : “I ha v e r ec ei v ed a l et t erfr o mC h an ce l l o r R ichard Dinkins withdrawing his name as one of the three nominee s, and therefore I am reque sting pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-112( a) that the Commission submit a new panel of nominee s .”
Notwithstanding, L ewis’s c laim that he was den ied equa l protection by virtue of his ra ce hinge s solely

on the fa ct that the Gove rnor’ s letter stated that “diver sityis a signif icant fa ctor that I believe should be consider ed.” In our view, this g limpse into butone of the Governor’s considerations must be re ad in the conte x t of the entire letter, which unequivoca lly stressed that the Governor’s g oal was to “appoint judg es who mee t the highe st professional a nd persona l standards.” Up on Di nkins ’ w ith dr a wa l, the Go ve rn or no lon g e r h a d a

fu ll p a ne l of

the“ be st q ua lif

ie d” app lic a nts fr om w hic h to e xer c ise his dis c re tio n by e xami nin g a ny

nu mbe r o f c on sid e ratio ns , o f w hic h d ive rs ity was just one. As a

result, the Gove rnor e x erc ised his statutory option to reject the fi rs t p an el for another panel co n t ai n i n g t hree applicants fr om which to make the a ppointment. W e will not sp e c ulate or

oth e rw ise int e rp re t th e le tte r a s me a nin g theGo ve rn or wo uldno t app oin t a w hit e applicant or

would only

appoint a minority

applicant; instead, the Governor, afte r determining that the fi rs t pan e l wa s no long e r a c omp le te pa ne l w ithwh ic h to e va luate the“ be st q ua lif ie d” app lic a nts , took a cour se of a ction available to him bystatute under the Tenne ssee plan.

As noted above , the fac tua l ba sis for L ewis’s c laim r esembles none of the c ases he has cited in support of his positi on in which the United States Supreme Court found rac ial classifications. S ee Grutter, 539 U .S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; and B akke, 438 U .S. 265. Thes e ca ses involve the admissions prog rams of public educational insti tutions t hat included pr ovisions for incre asing the admission o f m i n o ri ty

applicants. In contra st, this case involves the exerc ise of a g overnor ’s discretionary au t h ority

pursuant to a c omprehe nsive statute ena cted by the leg islature to appoint members of

the judicial bra nch of state g overnme nt. See Educ. Equality L eag ue, 415 U.S. at 614.

Howeve r, eve n assuming f or the pu rp o s e of arg ument that the Governor’s July24 letter constitutes a ra cial cla ssification, we c onclude that ther e wa s no equal pro t ec t i o n v i olation. The Sup re me Cou rt

su mma ri zedin Gru tte r the a na lytic a l f rame wo rk

fo r e qu a l pr ote c tio n c a se s:-20- We have he ld that all rac ial classifications im posed by g overnme nt “must be analy zed by a revie wing court under strict scrutiny .” This me an s t h at s u ch classifications are c onstitut ional only if they are narr owly

tailored to further compelling g overnme ntal interests. “A bsent sear ching j u dicial inquiry into the justification for such r ace -base d measure s,” we have no w ay to det ermine w hat “cla ssifications are ‘beni g n’ or ‘ reme dial’ and w hat classific ations are in fac t
mo ti v a te d b y il le g it im a te n o ti o n s o f r a c ia l in f e r io r ity o r s imp le r a c ial po li ti c s

. ” We apply strict scrutiny

to all rac ial classifications to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate use s of
rac e by assuring that [govern m en t] is pursuing a g oal important enoug h to warr ant use of a highly suspect tool.”

Str ic t sc ru tin

y is n ot “ str ic t in the or y , but fa tal

in f ac t.” Al tho ug h a ll go v e rn me nta l us e s of ra c e are su bje c t to str ic t sc ru tin y , no t al l are inv ali da te d b y it. As we ha ve e xpla ine d, “wh enever theg ov e rn me nt t

re a ts any pe rs on un e qu a lly be c aus e of

his or he r r a c e , th a t pe rs on ha s su ff e re d a n in jury that f a lls sq ua re ly wi thi n the l ang uag e and spirit of t he C onstitut ion’s g uarantee of equal protection.” B ut that
o b s er vation “say s nothing a bout the ultimate validityof any particula r law; that determination is t he job of the c ourt applying stric t scrutiny .” When ra ce- based action is nec essary

to further

a compe lling g overnme ntal interest, such a ction does not violate the constitutional gua rante e of e qual protec tion so long as the
narr ow-tailoring require ment is also satisfied.
Grutter, 539 U .S. at 326-27 (empha sis added; citations omitted).

I n upholdin g t he Univer sityof Michig an L aw School’s written admission poli cy , which included conside ra t i o n o f class diversity in making a dmission decisions, the Court found a compelling state intere st which supported the use of ra ce a s a fa ctor in admissions. I d. at 328. The Court went on to d i s cuss “the e ducational be nefits that diversity is designe d to produce ” and conclude d that those bene fits are “substantial.” I d. at 330. As the Court stated:
This Court has long rec o gn i zed that “educ ation . . . is the very foundation of g ood ci t i z en s h i p

. ” F o r t h i s re as o n , t h e d i ff u s i o n o f k n o wl ed ge a n d o p p o rt u n i t y t h ro u gh pu b l i c i ns tituti on s o f h ig he r e du c a tio n mu st b e a c c e ssi bleto a ll i nd ivi du a ls r e g ard le ss of rac e or ethnicity

. The United St ates, as amicus curiae, affirms that “[e] nsuring that public inst itutions are open and available to all segme nts of American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, r eprese nts a paramount governme nt objective .” An d, “ [n]ow he reis the imp orta nc e of su c h o pe nn e ss m or e a c utethan in the context of highe r educ ation.” Effective participation by membe rs o f all racial and ethnic g r o u

p s in the civic life of our Nation is essential i f the dream of one Nation, i ndivisible, is to be realized

.
Moreove r, uni versities, and in particular , law schools, re prese nt the training g rou n d f o r a la r g e n u mb e r o f o u r N a ti o n ’ s le a d e r s

. I n d iv id u a ls w ith la w deg ree s-21-

occupy roug hly half the state g overnor ships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate, a nd more than a third of the seats in t h e Un i t ed S t ates House of Represe ntatives. The pattern is even more st riking when it comes to hig hly selec tive law schools. A handful of these schools acc ounts for 25 of the 100 U nited States Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appe als judg es, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States District Court judge s.

In or d er to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the ey es of the citizenry, it is nece ssary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of eve ry race and ethnicity.

I d. at 331-32 (e mphases adde d; citations omit ted).

Th e g e ne ra l pri nc ipl e s sta te d in the pr e c e din g qu otatio n, e sp e c ia lly thela st s e nte nc e , c ou ld ha rd ly be imp ro ve d u po n a s a state me nt of the c omp e lli ng state int e re st in s e e kin g to h a ve a div e rs e judiciary . I ndeed, the interest in ac hieving a diver se judiciary , particula rly at the state level, has bee n the subject of nume rous studies. See B arba ra L . Graham, T o wa rd an U nderstanding of Judi cial Di ve rs ity in A me ri c a n Co urts, 10 Mic h. J. Ra c e & L . 1 53 (2 00 4) ; Sh e rrilyn A . I fi ll, Ra c ia l D ive rs ity
on the Benc h : B e y o n d Ro leM o d e ls a n d Pu b li c Co n f id e n c e , 5 7 Wa s h

. & L e e L

. Re v

. 4 0 5 ( 2 0 0 0 ). As one c ommentator has e x presse d:

The c ase f

or diversity

is especia lly

compelling for the judiciary . It is the business of thec ou rt s, af

te r a ll, to d isp e ns e jus tic e fair ly a nda dmi nis te r the la ws e qu a lly . It is thebr a nc h o f g ov e rn me nt u lti mate ly c ha rg e d w ith sa fe g ua

rd ing c on sti tut ion a l rig hts , pa rt ic ula rl y pr ote c tin g theri g hts of vu lne ra ble a nd dis a dv a nta g e d mi no ri tie s a g a ins t
encr oachme nt by

the majority . How can the public have confide nce and trust in such an instituti on if it is segr eg ated – if the communities it i s supposed to p ro tect ar e e x c l u d e d f

r o mi t s r a n k s ?

Edwar d M. Chen, The Judiciary , Diversity , and J ustice for All, 91 Cal. L . Rev. 1109, 1117 (2003) ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d )

. S i m i l ar l y:

The lack of ra cial and e thnic diversity at the ca pstone of the leg al profe ssion, the judiciary , is one of the most compe l l i n g and conte ntious iss ues surrounding judicial selec tion in the United States. I n broad pe rspec tive, t h e l ac k of judicial div e rs i t y o v e r l ap s a

r a n g e o f o t h e r i m p o rt a n ti s s u e s i n v o l v i n g t h e j u d i c i a l s y s t e m: jud ic ia l in de pe nd e nc e , p ub lic c on fi de nc e in the c ou rt s, a ndthec ommitm e nt t o democr atic princ iples of equa lityand justice.

Graham, Towa

rd an Understanding of J udicial Diversity in Americ an C ourts, 10 Mich. J . Race & L . at 153.I n r eac hi ng our conc l us i ons , we hav e di s cus s ed nu merous cas es i nv ol vi ng equal prot ect i on pri nci pl es un der 11

t he U ni t ed Stat es Co nst i t ut i o n. W e em p hasi ze, how ever, t hat t he d e c isio n w e r e a c h t o d ay i s b ased no t only on t he Fou r t ee n t h A men dmen t t o t h e U n i t ed St at es C on s t i t u t i on but al s o on i n depe n den t g r ou n ds u n der a r t i cl e I , s ec t i on 8 of the T e n n e sse e C o n stitutio n . S e e S ta te v. H o w e ll, 8 6 8 S .W .2 d 2 3 8 , 2 5 9 n.7 (T e n n . 1 9 9 3 ).
-22- Acc ording ly , we c onclude it entire ly appropriate f

o r a Gove rnor to inc lud

e div e rsi ty as a sin gle fac tor

am ong man y oth e r im

po rta nt f ac tor s which he or

she consider s in making judicia l
app oin tme nts , e .g ., e du c a tio na l ba c kg ro un d, pr of e ssi on a l e xpe ri e nc e , li ke ly jud ic ia l te mpe rame nt, profe ssional and civic a ctivities, etc. Intere stingly , L ewis appe ars to conc ede t h at the Gove rnor could have permissibly

considere d rac e in choosing an appo intee fr om the orig inal list of three
no min e e s: D inkins (a ssu min g he ha d n ot w ith drawn), Go rd on a ndL e wi s. As L e wi s st a te s inhis brie f:
The issue, of c ourse, is not whethe r the Governor could ha ve permissibl y considere d
rac e as a fac tor along with othe r individual char acte ristics in making his appointment had C h ance llor Dinkins not withdrawn. Likewise, the issue is not whethe r the Governor could ha ve permissibl y considere d rac e as a

fac tor along with other individual char ac t er i s tics when a ppointing fr om a sec ond panel. The issue is the reje ction, not the appointment. L ewis and Gordon had the rig ht to be considere d as individuals based upon their individual cha rac teri s t i cs

. They

had the right to be judge d upon char acte ristics other than their rac e. I n other wor ds, race m ay have been one factor which the Gov ernor would have used to de cide who to appoint, but race was the exc lusive reason for his decision to rejec t the first panel

. (Emphasis adde d.) As discussed a bove, we disag ree that rac e wa s the exclusive rea son for the Governor’s action. Moreove r, L ewis’s purported distinction between c onsidering rac e in appointing but not in rejecting nominees is a distinction without a differe nce. In appointing oneindividual from
a mon g thr e e , th e Go ve rn or ne c e ssa ri ly wo uldbe re

je c tin g tw o n omi ne e s.
The ne x t ste p in an equal protec tion analy sis would be to consider whe ther the me ans chose n to a c c omp lis h th e g overnmen t’ s a sse rt e d p ur po se is “ ‘s pe c if

ic a lly a ndna rr ow ly fr a me d to
acc omplish t hat purpose.’ ” Gr utter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 8 9 9 , 908 (1 99 6) ). On c e Chanc e llo r D inkins wi thdre w f ro m c on sid e ratio n f

or app oin tme nt t o th is C ou rt , Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d sec tio n 17- 4- 11 2( a ) g a ve theGo ve rn or on ly on e op tio n to a llo w h im t o consider dive rsity

(among other fa ctors) in making his appointment—that option was to rejec t the two rema ining nominee s on the first pane l and to req u es t a sec ond panel ( asking the J udicial Sele c ti o nCo mmis s io nto in c lu d eq u ali f ied minority

candidates). Ac cording ly , the Governor’s a ction
was na rrowly tailored to ac complish the purpose of c onsidering diversity in making judicia l
app oin tme nts

. 11

I n summ ar y , we hold that: (1) the THRA does not apply to this case, (2) L ewis’s e qual protec tion challeng e to t he Governor’ s actions presents a non-justi ciable politi cal question, and (3)-23-

L ewis’s e qual protec tion challeng e is otherwise without merit. Having con s i d er ed and r ejec ted L ewis’s a rg uments, we turn ne x t to consider the issues raised by the J udicial Selection Commissi on.
IV. I SSU ES R AI S E D B Y J U D I C I A L S E L E CT I ON C OM M I S S I ON

I n its first issue, the J udicial Selection Commissi on joins L ewis in arg uing that the trial court
err ed i n ruling that the Tenne ssee Human Rights Act doe s not apply to the Governor whe n appointing individuals to fill judicial vac an ci es

. Fo r the re asons stated a bove in our a naly sis of L ewis’s issues, we aff

irm the trial court’s ruling that the THRA does not a pply in this case.

I n its second issue, the Commissi on arg ues th at t h e Governor’s letter dated July24, 2006, in which he r eq u es t ed that the Commiss ion send him “a ne w pane l of nominees that includes qualified mi nority

candidates,” e ncroa ched on the power s assig ned to the Commissi on by the Te nn e sse e Pla n. Th e Com mis sio n a sse rt s th a t th e Go ve rn or ’s le tte r amou nte d to a n in str uc tio n to the Commiss ion that the second panel contain one or more minority nominees and that such an instruction invades the autho ri t y o f the Commission t o determine the “be st qualified per sons a va ila blefo r s e rv ic e .” Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 17- 4- 10 1( a ). Th e tria l cou rt re je c te d th is a

rg ume nt, concluding that the disputed portion of the Gove rnor’ s letter wa s “c l ea rl y a re q uest” a nd that the letter “ does not rise to the leve l of an e x ecutive dir ective or order .”

We a g ree with the trial court’ s char acte rization of the Governor’s letter as a “ reque st,” rathe r than an “ executive direc tive or orde r.” The ref ore , we co n clude that the Governor ’s letter did not impermissiblyencr oach upon the Commi ssion’s powers.

I n its thi rd issue, the Commission asserts that the trial court erre d in its determination of the appr opriate r emedy . Ba sed upon its resolution of the various issues raised by the parties, the trial
c ou rt or de re d th e Com mis sio n to c e rt if y and su bm it t o th e Go ve rn or a se c on d p a ne l of

no min e e s, which pane l could not include the name s of Gordon or L ewis. The trial court we nt further , howeve r, a ndpr ov ide d th a t:

3. The Commission s hall not open the matter to new applicants or convene additional public hearings, but shall minimi ze the t ime and expense a nd draw upon the work the y

[si c] have a lrea dy

done by considering the applications of the pool alre ady collecte d.

4. Fr om that pool, the Comm ission s h al l select a third nominee to add to and complete the second panel alre ady comprised of J udg e D’Army Bailey an d J u d ge Wil liam Koch.

Th e Com mis sio n arg ue s that the re me dy imp os e d by the tria l c ou rt we nt t oo fa

r and“ un du ly restric ts the manner in whic h the Commiss ion is to perform its statutory duties.” The Commission g oes on to assert in its brief:A t t he t i m e o f o ral arg um en t o f

t his case , t his C o urt had b ee n w i t ho ut a f i f t h ju st i ce fo r just o ve r f i ve m o nths. 12

T hi s co ncl usi o n do es not af fect our ho l d i ng t hat t he wi t hd rawal of a no m i nee p revi o u sly c e rti f i ed t o t he 13
G o vernor d o es not af

fect t he val i d i t y of t he p anel . T he i ncl usi o n of an i nel i gi b l e no m i nee o n a l i st cert i f i ed t o t he G over nor i s deci dedl y di f fer ent t han t he cer t i f

i cat i on of

a l i s t of t hr ee el i gi bl e n om i nee s an d t he s ubs equen t wi t hdr awal of one of t hos e nomi nee s

. I n t he former ca s e, t he panel i s voi d ab i ni t i o; i n t he l at t er ca s e, t he wi t hdr awal of a n om i nee f r om a v al i d pa n el doe s n ot i n s t an t l y r en der t h e pan el i n v al i d.
-24- As a re sult of the Governor’s a ctions and the Chanc ellor’s ruling in this case, the l andsca

pe has chang ed. There fore , the C ommissi on respe ctfully reque sts that the Court (1) re verse the part of the Chance llor’s Or d er restric ting the se lection of the third na meto th e c u rr e n t p o o l o f ap p li c a n ts , a n d ( 2 ) a ll o w th e Co mm is s io n the discretion as to how it will proce ed to pick the third nominee

. Among the trial judg e’s state d rea s o n s fo r t he limited scope of the reme dy was the importance of filling, a s soon as prac ticable, the e x isting vac ancy on this Court. Whil e we 12 commend the tria l judge for he r conc ern a bout the vacancy ’s impac t o n t h i s Court and on Tenne ss ee ’s j udicial sy stem, we a g ree with the Commi ssion that the remedy order ed by

the trial court unduly

restric ts the Commi ssion’s authority under th e Te nnessee Plan. As stated in the Commi ssion’s brief, “ [o] ther than se tting out some g ener al rules to g uide the Commissi on’s work, Te nn . Co de An n. § 1 7- 4- 10 9, theTe nn e sse e Pla n le a ve s th e ba sic op e ratin g pr oc e du re s to Commi ssion’s discretion.”
Section 17-4-109( e) pr ovides that the Commissi on “by a majority vote shall selec t three ( 3) persons whom the commissi on deems be st qualified and a vailable to fill the vac ancy and ce rtify

the
names of the three (3) pe rsons to the g overnor as nominees f

or the judicial va canc y .” B eca use an ineligible nominee(Gordon) was include d on the sec ond panel c ertified to the G overnor , the statutory require ment that the Commiss ion certify “the names of thre e per sons” was ne ver satisfied; under th ose circ umstances, the panel was void a b initio, and the Comm ission mus t reinstitute the
se le c tio n p ro c e ss f

or a ll thr e e no min e e s to be inc lud e d o n th e se c on d p a ne l. 13

Even if wewer e to conc lude t hat t he panel was not void ab initio, there is another rea son why the Commiss ion must reinstit ute the sele ction proce ss for the se cond pane l. T he Commissi on arg ues in part that the trial c ourt err ed in limiti ng the Commiss ion’s d iscretion to ac cept a dditional
app lic a tio ns fo r the se c on d p a ne l. We no te a g a in that th e Com mis sio n h a s th e statut ory du ty to “sele ct three (3) pe rsons whom the commission deems best qualified and available to fill the
va c a nc y .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 1 7- 4- 10 9( e ). It lo g ic a lly fo llo ws fr om the statut e that, i n order to make an informed judg ment as to which ap p l i ca n t s are the three persons “ best qualified and available ,” the Commi ssion necessa rily must compare e ach a

pplicant with all of theoth e r a pp lic a nts wh o s e e k to fi ll the jud ic ia l vac a nc y

. Con se qu e ntl y , it wo uld c on tr a dic t the int e nt o f the statut e if theCom mis sio n w e reto s e le c t on e no min e e fr om a g ro up of app lic a nts that dif fe rs , eithe r i n w ho le or in part, f

rom th e group of a

pplicants from whic h the other two nominee s wereselec ted. The Commi ssion therefor e must consider tog ether , in a s in g le g roup , all applicants to fill the judicial
vacancy

.T ho se app l i cat i o ns wo ul d i ncl ud e t he ap p l i cat i o ns o f Jud ges K o ch and B ai l ey, am o ng t he o t her app l i cat i o ns 14
pr ev i ou s l y s u bmi t t ed.

Co ns i s t ent wi t h our hol di ng vi s a vi s G ordon’ s err oneous i ncl us i on on t he prev i ous s econd pane l ce r t i f i ed 15

t o th e G ov er n or by t h e Commi s s i on , n ei t h er G or don n or Le wi s w ou l d be e l i g i bl e for n omi n at i on on t h e n ew s eco nd p a n e l.
-25- For t h e foreg oing r easons, wehold that the Commi ssion is required to re -institute the
se le c tio n p ro c e ss fo r al l thr e e of the no min e e s to be ce rt if ie d to theGo ve rn or

a s th e se c on d p a ne l. Ac c or din g ly , w e mod if

y thetria l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt by ov e rr uli ng the re me dy

or de re d b y

that c ou rt

. As requir ed by

section 17-4- 112(a) , the Commiss ion shall select and c ertify to the Governor a s ec o n d p an el o f t h re e n o m i n ee s t o fi l l t h e j u d i ci al v ac an cyo n t h i s C o u rt

. Al t h o u gh we en co u ra ge the Commiss ion to act expeditiousl y , we lea ve to its discretion the manner in which it will select and
c e rt if y thethr e e no min e e s. We n ote , fo r theCom mis sio n’ s g uid a nc e , h ow e ve r, that it ma y , b ut i s not require d to, do any

of the following : (1) conside r all of the a pplications previously submitt ed for the sec ond panel; (2) a cce pt additional applications fo r consider ation; or (3) hold a dditional 14 hearings a s part of the selec tion process. Upon c oncluding the proc ess adopted by the Commiss ion, t h e C o m m i s s i o n s h a l l s e l e c t a n d c e rt i f y t o t h e G o v e r n o r t h r e e n o m i n e e s t o f i l l t h e j u d i c i a l v a c a n c y. 15

C ONCL US I ON

For the re asons set out above, we affirm, as modified, the judg ment of the trial c ourt. The Ap pe llate Cou rt

Cle rk is h e re by

or de re d to iss ue ma nd a te im med iat ely up on thefi lin g of

thi s o p i n i o n

. T en n

. R

. Ap p

. P

. 4 2

. T h e c o s t s ar e t ax ed t o t h e ap p el l an t s , J

. Ho u s t o n Go rd o n an d Ge o rge T

. L e w i s , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM M. BA RKER, CHI EF JUSTI CE