NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3461-20

OLIVIA CHECCHIO, a minor

by her guardian ad litem,

LISA KUMP-CHECCHIO, and

LISA KUMP-CHECCHIO,

individually,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

EVERMORE FITNESS, LLC, 

d/b/a SKY ZONE SOUTH 

PLAINFIELD ("SKY ZONE"),

SKY ZONE FRANCHISE 

GROUP, SKY ZONE LLC,

CIRCUSTRIX HOLDINGS, LLC,

CIRCUSTRIX, LLC,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________________

Argued December 14, 2021 – Decided February 15, 2022

Before Judges Currier, DeAlmeida and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-7065-

20.

Jill A. Mucerino argued the cause for appellants 

(Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP, attorneys; 

Kelly A. Waters, of counsel and on the briefs; Jill A. 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

February 15, 2022

APPELLATE DIVISION
A-3461-20 2

Mucerino, Carolynn A. Mudler, and Sean P. 

Shoolbraid, on the briefs). 

Kenneth W. Elwood argued the cause for respondents 

(Blume, Forte, Fried, Zerres & Molinari, PC, 

attorneys; Kenneth W. Elwood, on brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

CURRIER, J.A.D.

In August 2018, fourteen-year-old Olivia Checchio went to Sky Zone 

South Plainfield—an indoor trampoline park—with four friends and Gina 

Valenti—the mother of one of the children. Upon arrival at the park, Valenti 

signed a document entitled "Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption 

of Risk (The Agreement) – Sky Zone South Plainfield, NJ" (2018 agreement). 

The 2018 agreement included an arbitration provision under which the signing 

adult on behalf of the minor child waived a jury trial and agreed to arbitrate 

any dispute or claim arising out of the child's use of the Sky Zone premises.

The 2018 agreement also stated: 

I understand that this agreement extends forever into 

the future and will have full force and legal effect 

each and every time I or my child(ren)/ward(s) visit 

Sky Zone, whether at the current location or any other 

location or facility.

. . . .

By signing below, I represent, warrant and certify that 

I am the parent, legal guardian, or power-of-attorney 

of the above listed [c]hild(ren) and have the authority 
A-3461-20 3

to execute this [a]greement on his/her or their behalf 

and to act on his/her or their behalf. 

Valenti was not Olivia's1 parent, legal guardian, or holder of a power-ofattorney.

After Olivia was injured while using the facilities, her mother, Lisa 

Kump-Checchio, filed a suit on behalf of Olivia and for her own individual 

claims. Defendants2 moved to enforce the arbitration agreement. The trial

court denied the motion, stating that because Valenti signed the arbitration 

agreement Olivia's parents "never agreed to the arbitration provision and . . . 

mutual consent [was] lacking." 

Defendants moved for reconsideration, including in their application five 

agreements signed by Lisa on behalf of Olivia when she had taken Olivia to 

Sky Zone on five occasions in 2016 (2016 agreements). The judge granted 

defendants' motion for reconsideration on April 25, 2021. He found that, 

because Lisa signed five prior agreements, she "realized when the child was

going to the park . . . Ms. Valenti was going to be confronted with a release 

that she had to sign in order to let the kids in the park." Therefore, the trial

court found Valenti had actual and apparent authority to sign the arbitration 

agreement. 

1

 We refer to plaintiffs by their first names for clarity.

2

 We refer to all defendants collectively as defendants.
A-3461-20 4

Two weeks later, this court issued its decision in Gayles v. Sky Zone 

Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 21-22 (App. Div. 2021), finding that a 

non-parent lacked apparent authority to sign defendants' waiver agreement on 

behalf of a minor child and therefore, the plaintiffs were not bound by the 

defendant's arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the 

April 25, 2021 order. The judge granted the motion on June 17, 2021, 

vacating the April 25, 2021 order and restoring the matter to the active trial 

docket. The court found there was "no evidence that [Lisa] . . . actually gave 

authority to . . . [Ms. Valenti] to waive [Lisa's] child's rights." 

Defendants appeal from the June 17, 2021 order, contending Valenti had 

apparent authority to sign the 2018 agreement on behalf of Olivia and the trial 

court misapprehended the law established in Gayles. 

Our review of an interpretation of a contract, including an arbitration 

clause, is de novo. Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019);

Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011). "Whether a contractual 

arbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law, and we need not defer 

to the interpretative analysis of the trial . . . courts unless we find it 

persuasive." Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020) (citing Kernahan v. 

Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)). 

Defendants assert that Lisa's execution of the 2016 agreements on behalf 

of Olivia on five prior occasions when she brought Olivia to Sky Zone 
A-3461-20 5

demonstrates a pattern of conduct sufficient to find Valenti had actual and 

apparent authority to sign the 2018 agreement when Valenti brought Olivia to 

the park. We disagree.

Although defense counsel asserted during oral arguments before this 

court that Valenti had actual and apparent authority to execute the agreement 

on behalf of Olivia, defendants did not produce any authority in their briefs or 

during argument to support a finding of actual authority. And the evidence in 

the record does not sustain a finding of any manifestation made by Lisa to 

Valenti to expressly imbue Valenti with the power to waive any rights 

regarding any claims Olivia was entitled to pursue against Sky Zone. Lisa did 

not sign an agreement waiving Olivia's rights to a jury trial on the day Olivia 

was injured. Valenti never testified that Lisa gave her the specific authority to 

waive Olivia's rights regarding any personal injury claim that might arise from 

Olivia's time at the park.

Instead, defendants assert Valenti had apparent authority to execute the 

agreement and to bind Olivia (and Lisa) to its contents. We turn then to a 

scrutiny of those principles.

Apparent authority focuses on a third party's reasonable expectations in 

their interactions with the principal's agent. N.J. Laws.' Fund for Client Prot. 

v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 203 N.J. 208, 220 (2010). "Apparent authority 

arises 'when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on 
A-3461-20 6

behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's 

manifestations.'" Ibid. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (Am. 

Law Inst. 2006)). "There need not be an agreement between [the principal and 

agent] specifying an agency relationship; rather, 'the law will look at their 

conduct and not to their intent or their words as between themselves but to 

their factual relation.'" Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 337 (1993) 

(quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 374 (1960)).

The party seeking to rely on the apparent agency relationship must 

establish: 

(1) that the appearance of authority has been created 

by the conduct of the alleged principal and it cannot 

be established alone and solely by proof of [conduct 

by] the supposed agent; (2) that a third party has relied 

on the agent's apparent authority to act for a principal; 

and (3) that the reliance was reasonable under the 

circumstances. 

[Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 324 N.J. Super. 290, 

317-18 (App. Div. 1999) (alteration in original) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).] 

And, when determining an agent's apparent authority, courts should not focus 

on the alleged agent's actions, but must look to the conduct of the alleged 

principal. Id. at 318. 

As noted, we recently considered and rejected an identical apparent 

authority argument proffered in Gayles. There, the minor plaintiff was also 

injured while playing at the defendants' trampoline park. 468 N.J. Super at 19-
A-3461-20 7

21. The minor's friend's mother signed an agreement on the minor's behalf that

was required for admission to the park. The agreement contained a similar 

arbitration provision. Id. at 20. We found that a non-parent lacked apparent 

authority to sign a waiver agreement and therefore, the minor and his mother 

were not bound by the arbitration agreement. Id. at 21-22.

However, defendants contend Gayles is distinguishable from the 

circumstances here because Lisa executed an agreement on behalf of Olivia 

when she took her to the park on five prior occasions in 2016. Defendants do 

not seek to enforce the 2016 agreements. Instead, defendants urge that the 

agreements demonstrate a pattern of prior conduct, and, therefore, establish 

apparent authority. We are not persuaded.

The 2016 agreements did not vest Valenti with the authority to enter into 

the 2018 agreement or any future agreement on Olivia's behalf. Nor do the 

2016 agreements manifest any understanding on Lisa's part that Valenti or any 

other adult could sign a future waiver agreement in the place of Lisa or on 

Olivia's behalf. To the contrary, the 2016 agreements state that any 

"DISPUTE SHALL BE BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DATE OF 

THIS AGREEMENT AND WILL BE DETERMINED BY BINDING 

ARBITRATION." Therefore, under the 2016 agreements, Lisa only waived 

Olivia's trial rights as to the events that occurred on the specific date of each of 
A-3461-20 8

those visits in 2016, and the parties were required to arbitrate any claims 

within a year of each agreement.

Furthermore, unlike the 2018 agreement, the 2016 agreements did not 

include the clause stating the agreement "extends forever into the future and 

will have full force and legal effect each and every time I or my 

child(ren)/ward(s) visit Sky Zone, whether at the current location or any other 

location or facility."3 The 2016 agreements contained different language than 

the 2018 agreement. There is no evidence Lisa would have signed the 2018 

agreement. And, Lisa's prior execution of the agreement did not establish a 

pattern that she would authorize another person to sign an agreement on behalf 

of her daughter. Therefore, the 2016 agreements do not establish Valenti had 

apparent authority to waive Olivia's trial rights under the 2018 agreement. 

Finally, defendants were unaware of the 2016 agreements when Olivia 

and Valenti came to the trampoline park in August 2018. Defendants did not 

find the 2016 agreements until after the court ruled on the initial motion to 

dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. Therefore, defendants could not 

3

 The points raised in this appeal do not require us to address whether this 

language in the 2018 agreement is enforceable. But see Cottrell v. Holtzberg,

468 N.J. Super. 59, 72-73 (App. Div. 2021) (holding that an arbitration 

agreement governing the plaintiff's initial admission to the defendant's nursing 

home is insufficient to demonstrate assent to arbitrate claims related to a 

subsequent admission to the nursing home). 
A-3461-20 9

have reasonably relied on the 2016 agreements to demonstrate that Lisa gave 

Valenti apparent authority in 2018 to waive Olivia's trial rights. 

Defendants have not demonstrated apparent authority to permit Valenti 

to waive Olivia's rights. Apparent authority relies on the principal's 

manifestations—not those of the agent. Mercer, 324 N.J. Super. at 318. 

Therefore, although Valenti executed the agreement in which she represented 

and certified she was the parent, legal guardian, or power of attorney of the 

listed minors, she was not. Defendants did not establish any previous conduct 

on Lisa's part to create an appearance of authority, and defendants' reliance on 

Valenti's signature to their agreement was not reasonable under the 

circumstances. 

Affirmed.