UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

BRANDE L. SAMUELS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA; OKLAHOMA 

BAR ASSOCIATION CITY OF TULSA; 

TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY OFFICE; TULSA COUNTY 

INVESTIGATOR; TULSA COUNTY 

PUBLIC DEFENDERS; G T BYNUM; 

CLAIRE V. EAGAN; SHARON ELAIN 

ALLEN HOLMES; JAMES KEELY; 

STEVE KUNZWEILER; ISSAC 

SHIELDS; CHUCK JORDAN; DAVID 

BEEN; RONALD PALMER; MIKE 

WILLIAMS; JERROD HART; TIMOTHY 

MEANS; RICHARD ASCHOFF; RUSTY 

BROWN; CLARK E. WILLIAMS; 

LARRY L. EDWARDS; STEVEN T. 

NIEMITALO; DONALD R. CHANDLER; 

RUFUS E. NEWSOME; STEVEN L. 

SANDERS; DOUGLAS K. SCHULKE; 

JAYE W. TAYLOR; CORBIN CLARK 

BREWSTER; BRIAN JAMES RAYL; 

STEWART SOUTHERLAND; ROBERT 

NIGH; KIMBERLY HAYS; CHARLES 

W. CHESTNUT; RICHARD STEVENS; 

JOHN W. COYLE III; KALEB K. 

HENNIGH; JAMES L. KEE; D. KENYON 

WILLIAMS JR.; MATTHEW C. BEESE; 

JIMMY D. OLIVER; BRYON J. WILL; 

JAMES R. HICKS; BRIAN K. MORTON; 

ALISSA PREBLE HUTTER; NATHAN 

D. RICHTER; MARK KENNEDY; CITY 

OF TULSA; TULSA COUNTY JAIL; 

VICTOR REGALADO; DAVID 

No. 19-5002 

(D.C. No. 4:18-CV-00267-EFM-KGG) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 8, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

PARKER; GWENDOLYN BRIGGS, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Proceeding pro se, Brande Samuels brought suit against various individuals 

and entities (collectively, the defendants), alleging they violated his constitutional 

rights by “willfully, wantonly, recklessly, and deliberately subjecting [him] to 

unlawful arrest, detention[,] and prosecution.” R. vol. 6, 14 (emphasis omitted).1

Samuels also asserted state-law claims for assault and infliction of emotional distress. 

A magistrate judge screened the complaint and recommended dismissing for 

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 

1915A(a)–(b). Specifically, the magistrate judge (1) recommended dismissing 

Samuels’s claims against certain defendants because Samuels failed “to include any 

[specific] factual allegations” against them, R. vol. 6, 213 (emphasis omitted); 

(2) recommended dismissing most of Samuels’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 

 * After examining Samuels’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument wouldn’t materially assist in the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment 

isn’t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 We liberally construe Samuels’s pro se filings. But we won’t “assume the 

role of [his] advocate.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 
3 

§ 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 

403 U.S. 388 (1971), because the claims were barred by the two-year statute of 

limitations; (3) recommended dismissing Samuels’s state-law tort claims because 

they were also time-barred; (4) recommended dismissing any claims arising from 

conduct that allegedly occurred after Samuels submitted his amended complaint 

because such conduct necessarily didn’t “occur[] within the limitations period,” id. at 

218; and (5) recommended dismissing Samuels’s remaining claims for failure to state 

a claim. The magistrate judge also denied Samuels’s motions for appointment of 

counsel. 

Samuels then filed a flurry of documents, including objections to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendations, a motion for summary judgment, a motion to 

supplement the complaint, a motion to amend the complaint, a motion to enjoin statecourt proceedings, and a motion to expedite a ruling on the motion to enjoin. The 

district court overruled Samuels’s objections to the magistrate judge’s 

recommendations because (1) Samuels failed to “address the [magistrate judge’s] 

reasons” for “recommend[ing] dismissal of his claims” and (2) Samuels’s objection 

to the magistrate judge’s order refusing to appoint counsel was moot. R. vol. 7, 186. 

It then denied Samuels’s motions to supplement and amend because Samuels “failed 

to explain how he would amend or supplement his complaint, as required by the local 

rules, or why [his] attempts to amend or supplement would not be futile.” Id. at 187–

188. Finally, the district court denied Samuels’s remaining motions as moot in light 
4 

of its decision to adopt the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim. 

Samuels now appeals the district court’s order. But much like the objections he 

filed in district court—which neither acknowledged most of the magistrate judge’s 

specific recommendations nor challenged the reasoning behind them—Samuels’s 

appellate brief likewise fails to engage with either the district court’s rulings or its 

reasoning. 

For instance, Samuels doesn’t dispute that his claims against certain 

defendants were subject to dismissal because he failed “to include any [specific] 

factual allegations” against them. R. vol. 6, 213. Likewise, he doesn’t attempt to 

demonstrate that his motions to amend or supplement complied with the applicable 

local rules. Nor does he dispute that most of his claims were time-barred or make any 

effort to refute the district court’s reasons for concluding that his remaining claims 

failed as a matter of law. Finally, he doesn’t challenge the district court’s conclusion 

that dismissing his complaint rendered his remaining motions moot. 

Critically, to succeed on appeal, an appellant must “explain what was wrong 

with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision.” Nixon v. 

City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). Because Samuels 

provides no such explanation here, we affirm the district court’s order without further 

discussion. See id. at 1369 (summarily affirming district court’s ruling because 

appellant’s “opening brief contain[ed] nary a word to challenge the basis” for it). As 

a final matter, we deny Samuels’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on 
5 

appeal and his motion to appoint counsel. See Lister v. Dep’t Of Treasury, 408 F.3d 

1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “to succeed on a motion to proceed IFP, the 

movant must show . . . the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law 

and facts in support of the issues raised”); cf. Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 

978–79 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming order denying motion to appoint because “even 

with appointed counsel, [appellant] had little likelihood of prevailing on the merits”). 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge