alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
32.2


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Atlas America Public #15-2005 (A) L.P.
(the “Partnership”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Matthew A. Jones, Chief Financial Officer of the Partnership,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and


(2)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Partnership.





By:
            /s/ Matthew A.
      JonesName:
            Matthew
      A. JonesTitle:
            Chief
      Financial Officer of the Managing General PartnerDate:
            November
      16, 2009
#### Andrew BROCK V. SCHWEGMANN GIANT SUPERMARKETS, INC.

No. 87-CC-2156.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 13, 1987.

In re Schwegmann Bros. Supermkts., Inc.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “A”, No. 87-2691; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CW-8440.

Granted.
EXHIBIT 24.1**Power of Attorney**Know all persons by these present that each of the undersigned has made, constituted andappointed, and BY THESE PRESENT make constitute and appoint George H. Hepburn, III and Joseph R.Doolan, true and lawful ATTORNEYS for himself and in his name, place and stead to sign that certainAnnual Report on Form 10-K, including all exhibits hereto, which Form 10-K is to be filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on or before April 2, 2007 to be executed by the undersigned inhis capacity as a Director of APAC Customer Services, Inc., and to perform any and all other actsnecessary in order to consummate such transaction, giving and granting unto George H. Hepburn, IIIand Joseph R. Doolan, said ATTORNEYS full power and authority to do and perform all and every actand thing whatsoever, requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully, toall intents and purposes, as the undersigned might or could do if personally present at the doingthereof, with full power of substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying and confirming all thatGeorge H. Hepburn, III and Joseph R. Doolan, said ATTORNEYS or their substitutes shall lawfully door cause to be done by virtue hereof.               /s/ Theodore S. Schwartz   Theodore S. Schwartz               /s/ Robert J. Keller   Robert J. Keller               /s/ Thomas M. Collins   Thomas M. Collins               /s/ John W. Gerdelman   John W. Gerdelman               /s/ John J. Park   John J. Park               /s/ Cindy K. Andreotti   Cindy K. Andreotti               /s/ John C. Kraft   John C. Kraft
#### A. C. Teston, Plaintiff in Error, v. The State of Florida, Defendant in Error.

A dim carbon copy of the bill of exceptions in the transcript of the record of a criminal cause violates the rule, is not a permanent record and the errors based thereon will not be considered.

This case was decided by Division A.

Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of. Eecord for Hillsborough County.

*J. J. Lunsford,*for Plaintiff in Error.

*TV. H. Ellis,*Attorney-General, for the State.

Per Curiam.

The portion of the transcript containing the evidence in this case does not conform to our rule that requires the use of “black *mlc,”*but, on the contrary, is a diin carbon copy. This entails not only much inconvenience and risk to the eyesight of the Justices who would be required to read carefully through the one hundred and thirty pages thus presented, but also entails danger to the permanency of our records, should we permit their accuracy to rest only on the future possibility of deciphering this carbon after years of rubbing and erasure.

Moreover, it is unfair to the county of Hillsborough “to permit it to be liable to payment at full value for first-class workmanship, when neither the county nor the court get adequate results. In a large majority of the criminal cases brought to this court the counties are charged with the costs, and to minimize these costs as much as possible *138our rule requires but one transcript in criminal cases and no copies are necessary as in civil cases. For the sake of reducing costs to litigants in civil cases we have permitted carbon copies that are clear and legible, but with so many copies the permanency of our records is reasonably secured, and the reasons for permitting the relaxation of the rule do not exist in criminal cases.

An order will be entered, therefore, that unless before the twelfth day of December next a certified copy of the Bill of Exceptions clearly and legibly printed or typewritten in black ink be filed in this court the assignments of error that call for an examination of the testimony will be treated as abandoned. No costs will be allowed for the copy now before the court.

Shackleford, C. J., Cockrell and Whitfield, JJ., concur.

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, JJ., concur in the opinion.
### IN THE UNI TED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCUIT

No. 10-10707 Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. JAMES GREGORY MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:09-CR-101-1
Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * After a bench trial, James Morris was convicted of two counts of receiving child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U

. S

. C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (a)(5)(B). He was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment to be followed by a life term of supervised release. Morris appeals the conviction, argu i ng that the Government failed to prove the jurisdictional element of the crimes. He argues that under the langu a g e o f § 2252A, as it existed at the time when the offense w a s c o m m itted, the Government had to U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Octob er 7, 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 , the court hasd ete rm inedthat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 10-10707 Document: 00511626235 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/07/2011No. 10-10707

prove that the images were transported in interstate commerce. Thus, Morris reasons, because the Gov e r n ment only presented evidence that the child pornography was downloaded from the Internet, th e e vidence was insufficient to show that the material actually crossed state lines. Morris’s argument is c o ntr ary to our holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is t a ntamount to moving photographs

across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.” United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 200 2) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 221- 21 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Runyan as an alternative basis for concluding that proof that images traveled in interstate commerce was not re quire d , albeit under

a different statute). His arguments th at the evidence did not support his conviction for possession is additionally without merit in light of United States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2947 (2011). For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

2 Case: 10-10707 Document: 00511626235 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/07/2011
302 CERTIFICATION

I, W. Ross C. Corace, certify that:

         1. I have reviewed the amendment to the quarterly report on
Form 10-QSB of MailTec, Inc.;

         2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;

         3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;

         4.  I am responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
12a-14) and internal controls over financial reporting (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and
have:

      a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure
that material information  relating to the registrant,  including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those
entities, particularly  during the period in which this quarterly
report is being prepared;

      b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing
date of this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

      c)  presented in this quarterly report my conclusions about the
effectiveness  of the disclosure  controls and procedures based on my
evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

         5.  I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board
of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

         a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which
are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.

Date: August 11, 2006                /s/W. Ross C. Corace
                                   ----------------------------
                                   W. Ross C. Corace
                                   Chief Executive Officer
                                   Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
                     906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Caribou Coffee Company, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 2, 2006, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Michael J. Coles, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.

August 11, 2006

                                   /s/ Michael J. Coles
                                   --------------------------------------------
                                   Michael J. Coles
                                   President and Chief Executive Officer
#### Beatrice B. DUNCAN v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, et al.

No. 87-C-0345.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 13, 1987.

In re Duncan, Beatrice B.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA 5505; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “E”, No. 85-1995.

Prior report: La.App., 499 So.2d 632.

Denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Edwin R. HILL.

No. 88-K-3139.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 27, 1989.

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 88KA-0080, 88KA-0800; Parish *1249of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “E”, No. 318-306.

Prior report: La.Ap., 534 So.2d 1296.

Writ and *stay order denied.*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2643
ERNESTINE JOHNSON TOMS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Shelby. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (CA-95-185-4) Submitted: July 8, 1997 Decided: October 8, 1997 Before HALL and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ernestine Johnson Toms, Appellant Pro Se. Clifford Carson Marshall,Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Ernestine Johnson Toms appeals the district court's order upholding the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) finding that she was not under a disability for purposes of the Social Security Act for the period beginning October 3, 1980, through September 30, 1986. Toms claims that the ALJ erredbecause: (1) his hypothetical to the vocational expert was improper; (2) he incorrectly evaluated her allegations of pain; and (3) his decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Because Toms' claims are without merit and we find no reversible error, we affirm the Commissioner's decision. See generally English v. Shalala , 10 F.3d 1080, 1085 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an ALJ's hypothetical questions to a vocational expert must be based uponconsideration of all relevant medical record evidence of the claimant's impairments); Craig v. Chater , 76 F.3d 585, 595-96 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating this court's standards for evaluation of pain and substantial evidence). We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2398 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 9,10-Anthracenedione, 1,8- 

bis(phenylthio)-. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mrs. HAGAN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 9,10- 

Anthracenedione, 1,8-bis(phenylthio)-. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 9,10-ANTHRACENEDIONE, 

4 1,8-BIS(PHENYLTHIO)-. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.24.87 of the Har6 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

7 9,10-Anthracenedione, 1,8-bis(phenylthio)-) is amended by 

8 striking ‘‘12/31/2009’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

9 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

10 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2398 IS

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### Harry T. UMBEL, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Jeanette Maria Umbel and Michael Thomas Umbel, deceased, Appellant, v. Dipakkumar M. UPADHYAYA, Appellee.

No. 86-2487.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 6, 1987.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1987.

Michael K. Bailey of Parrish and Bailey, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.

Thomas L. Clarke, Jr. of Lane, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand & Williams, P.A., Lake-land, for appellee.

DANAHY, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party (the ap-pellee) in a medical malpractice action. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in making the award because the statute authorizing such an award was repealed prior to the court’s entry of judgment. We find no error and affirm.

The cause of action in this suit accrued on October 23, 1983. Appellant filed this medical malpractice suit on July 19, 1985. When appellant filed his complaint, section 768.56, Florida Statutes (1983), was in effect. That statute provided that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party in a medical malpractice action. During the pendency of this case in the trial court the legislature repealed this section. Ch. 85-175, § 43, Laws of Fla. The effective date of the repealing act was October 1, 1985. Ch. 85-175, § 55, Laws of Fla. Appellee moved for attorney’s fees in March 1986, and they were awarded in August 1986. This appeal ensued.

At first glance, appellant's argument appears logical. Appellee did not become a prevailing party until after repeal of the statute at issue here, so, appellant argues, the right to fees as a prevailing party did not vest until it was known who the prevailing party was. Appellee, on the other hand, draws our attention to *Young v. Altenhaus,*472 So.2d 1152 (Fla.1985), wherein the supreme court held that the prevailing party’s rights regarding attorney’s fees in medical negligence actions vested on the date that the cause of action accrued. While *Young v. Altenhaus*disposes of the issue before us, we note that the court did not have before it the new law which took effect later that year, 1985. The provisions of chapter 85-175, section 48, Laws of Flor*33ida, cause us to reach the same result. That section reads:

> Except as otherwise provided, all provisions of this act shall apply prospectively, and shall not apply to actions filed on or before the effective date.

Our research discloses no provision in the act providing a different effective date for the repeal of section 768.56. We hold that appellee is entitled to attorney’s fees as a prevailing party pursuant to section 768.56 Fla.Stat. (1983).

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

SCHEB and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32



Written Statement of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350



Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer and Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Midwest Air Group, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation (the Company), hereby certify, based on our knowledge, that the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Timothy E. Hoeksema

Timothy E. Hoeksema

Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer



/s/ Curtis E. Sawyer

Curtis E. Sawyer

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



Date: February 15, 2006
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Michael JACOBS, Sr.

No. 88-KH-1794.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 13, 1988.

In re Jacobs, Michael Sr.; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish *974of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court, Div. *“A”.*

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring to the district court for filing and prompt consideration.
#### Stephen J. STEPHENS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief Drivers License Services, Utah Department of Public Safety, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 19487.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Aug. 8, 1984.

Phil Hansen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The plaintiff’s drivers license was revoked by the Department of Public Safety after a hearing in which it was found that he had refused to submit to a chemical test following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. The revocation of plaintiff’s license was upheld by the district court after a trial de novo. Plaintiff now takes this appeal, contending that under *467the facts he did not refuse to consent to the chemical test.

The facts stated by plaintiff are not supported by the record by reference thereto as required under Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah R.Civ.P. The plaintiff has neither requested nor filed a transcript of the testimony under Rule 75(a). In such event, we presume the findings to have been supported by admissible, competent, substantial evidence.1

The judgment is affirmed without any award of costs on appeal.

1

. *Sawyers v. Sawyers,*Utah, 558 P.2d 607 (1976); *State v. Hamilton,*18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966).
EXHIBIT  23.2

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We  hereby  consent  to  the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the Registration
Statement  on  Forms  S-8  (Nos.  333-04479,  333-05923,  333-42111,  333-71025,
333-88451,  333-52162,  333-52166  and 333-74820) and Forms S-3 (Nos. 333-14549,
333-23193,  333-39787, 333-49825, 333-65397, 333-66287, 333-69737, 333-72357 and
333-84017)  of  Talk  America  Holdings,  Inc.  (formerly Talk.com Inc.) and its
subsidiaries  of  our  reports  dated February 7, 2000 relating to the financial
statements  and  financial statement schedules which appear in the Annual Report
on  Form  10-K  for  the  year  ended  December  31,  2001.


BDO  Seidman,  LLP


New  York,  New  York
April  10,  2002
**CAUSE NO.** **007-0396-03 THE** **STATE OF** **TEXAS VS.** **WILLIE RAY** **IN THE** **7th JUDICIAL** **DISTRICT COURT** **IN AND** **FOR SMITH** **COUNTY, TEXAS**

### ORDER**DENYING DEFENDANT'S** **PETITION FOR** **REFORMATION OF** **JUDGMENT On** **the 27th** **day of November,** **2012, the** **above-entitled and** **numbered cause** **came before** **the**

### Court**for the** **purpose of** **Defendant Willie** **Ray's Petition** **for Reformation** **of Judgment** **filed on** **November 16,** **2012. The** **Court takes** **judicial notice** **of the** **Court's file** **herein and** **the evidence** **presented.**

### The**Court finds** **that Defendant** **Willie Rays's** **Petition for** **Reformation of** **Judgment should** **be DENIED.** **IT IS** **THEREFORE ORDERED** **that Willie** **Rays's Petition** **for Reformation** **of Judgment** **is DENIED.** **IT IS** **SO ORDERED.** **Signed on** **this the** **27th day** **of November,** **2012. BLE** **KERRY L.** **IIUSSELL Judicial** **District Court** **Texas cc:** **Willie Ray** **TDCJ# 1210691** **Louis C.** **Powledge Unit** **1400 FM** **3452 Palestine,** **TX 75803** 

# i'-j**NOV 2012** **i'-JTY**