J-S77014-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY AURSBY

Appellant No. 3082 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 12, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0002749-2012

BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015

Jeffrey Aursby appeals from the judgment of sentence entered for his 

convictions of violating the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA). He argues the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because police officers lacked 

reasonable suspicion to perform an investigative detention of him. We 

affirm.

On January 12, 2012, Philadelphia Police Officer Leon Telesford and his 

partner were on routine patrol at 24th and Indiana Streets in a marked

police vehicle.1 Officer Telesford was assigned to that area because of a 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Unless otherwise noted, we take this summary from the Trial Court Rule 

1925(a) Opinion, 6/20/14, at 1-3.
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recent string of robberies and shootings. He regarded the area as a “very 

dangerous, high-crime, high-narcotics area.” See also N.T. Suppression, 

7/15/13, at 14-15.

At about 11:43 p.m., Officer Telesford saw a man, later identified as 

Appellant, walking near the 3000 block of 24th Street. Appellant was closely 

following a second man walking northbound. Appellant was walking faster 

than the second man, and closed the gap between them to about one carlength. Appellant was also reaching for his waistband. Officer Telesford had 

arrested numerous people for illegally carrying handguns. In his experience, 

those people often carried their weapons in their waistbands. Based on his 

experience and training, and the above circumstances, Officer Telesford 

believed Appellant was about to rob the second man. 

The officers pulled next to Appellant in the police car with the 

emergency lights and siren off. Before the officers stepped outside, 

Appellant looked at the officers, and took off running. In response, the 

officers yelled, “Police! Stop! Let me see your hands!” Appellant did not 

comply, so the officers got out of their car and followed him on foot 

westbound, down Indiana Street. When Officer Telesford was within a few 

feet of Appellant, he discarded a handgun. Officer Telesford apprehended 

Appellant, and his partner retrieved the handgun approximately five feet 

from the point of detention.

Appellant moved to suppress the evidence of his apprehension and 

subsequent arrest. The trial court denied the motion. After a waiver trial, 
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the court convicted Appellant of three VUFA2and sentenced him to 5 to 10 

years in prison. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant contends the stop was illegal. He argues that 

touching his waistband while walking behind another person at 11:30 p.m. is 

insufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the officers’ 

subsequent attempt to stop him. He further contends his abandonment of 

the firearm was the result of police coercion. 

Where a trial court denies a motion to suppress,

we must determine whether the record supports the trial court’s 

factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are free from error. In so doing, we may consider 

only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in 

the context of the record as a whole.[3] Where the record 

supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching 

its legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Commonwealth v. Bowmaster, 101 A.3d 789, 792 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quotation omitted).

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 (persons not to possess firearms), 6106 (carrying a 

firearm without a license), and 6108 (carrying a firearm on public property

or streets in Philadelphia).

3 Our Supreme Court has clarified that the scope of appellate review is 

limited to the evidence produced at the suppression hearing—not the entire 

record. In the Interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1079 (Pa. 2013). The decision in 

L.J is not retroactive. Id. at 1088-89. The suppression hearing in this case 

occurred on July 15, 2013, and L.J. was decided on October 30, 2013. 

Therefore, it does not apply here. 
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“The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops . . . when a 

law enforcement officer has a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” 

Commonwealth v. Carter, --- A.3d ---, 2014 PA Super 265, 2014 WL 

6756271, at *3, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4539, at *8 (filed Dec. 2, 2014) (en 

banc) (quoting Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014)). 

Reasonable suspicion is judged based on the totality of the circumstances. 

In the Interest of D.M. (D.M. II), 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). 

Under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, unprovoked flight in a high-crime area is sufficient reasonable 

suspicion to justify a Terry4stop, i.e., an investigative detention. See 

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000); D.M. II, 781 A.2d at 

1164, 1165 n.2 (applying Wardlow and declining to adopt greater state 

constitutional rights). 

Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Telesford had 

reasonable suspicion to perform an investigative detention of Appellant. 

Officer Telesford was on patrol in a marked police car in a neighborhood 

known for violent crime and drug trafficking. In fact, he was specifically 

tasked to patrol that area because of a recent string of violent crimes. It 

was almost midnight, and Officer Telesford saw Appellant walking down the 

____________________________________________

4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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street, making movements that looked to Officer Telesford like a robbery 

was about to occur. Officer Telesford positioned his police car next to 

Appellant with the lights and sirens off. Appellant immediately fled before 

the officers could say anything to him. 

Indeed, prior to Appellant’s flight, police officers made less of a 

showing of authority than in Wardlow. In Wardlow, police were driving in 

a four-car caravan through a neighborhood known for drug trafficking, 

prompting Wardlow to flee—an action, which, according to the Supreme 

Court of the United States, constituted reasonable suspicion to stop. See 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-22, 124.

Appellant misses the point in attempting to minimize the suspicious 

nature of his behavior. Terry does not require police to observe 

unquestionably criminal behavior before they may perform an investigative 

detention. Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1190 (Pa. 

2004)). Potential innocent explanations for Appellant’s behavior do not 

negate reasonable suspicion. Id. 

Appellant argues that “intrusive police conduct prompted by nothing 

more substantial than an individual’s decision to depart when approached by 

the police[] has traditionally been recognized in Pennsylvania as unlawful.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 15 (citing Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 608 A.2d 1030 

(Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Barnett, 398 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 1979); and 

Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 311 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1973)). Those three cases 
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generally held that flight alone did not constitute reasonable suspicion 

under the Fourth Amendment. DeWitt, 608 A.2d at 1033-34; Barnett, 398 

A.2d at 1021; Jeffries, 311 A.2d at 916. Wardlow, however, holds that 

unprovoked flight from police in a high-crime area constitutes 

reasonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25. To the extent 

Appellant attempts to rely upon DeWitt, Barnett, and Jeffries, his reliance 

is misplaced. None of those cases involved flight from a high-crime area, as 

here. See DeWitt, 608 A.2d at 302 (noting stop occurred in a parking lot of 

a church which had complained to police about suspicious vehicles, but not 

noting whether stop occurred in high-crime area); Barnett, 398 A.2d at 213 

(listing facts found by suppression court, which did not include whether area 

of police stop was a high-crime area); Jeffries, 311 A.2d at 325-26 (holding 

defendant’s “simply walking on a public street in Pittsburgh in broad 

daylight,” quickening his pace upon seeing a police officer, and then running 

after the officer gave chase was insufficient reasonable suspicion to stop).

In sum, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress. The arresting officer noticed Appellant acting suspiciously in a 

high-crime area at night, and Appellant fled unprompted when he saw the 

police officers’ marked vehicle. Under the totality of the circumstances, the 

officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We affirm the 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Jenkins joins the Memorandum.
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Judge Strassburger files a Concurring Statement. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/19/2015