COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

June 23, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP1030 Cir. Ct. No. 2020CV70

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

JEFF VEACH AND RAMONA VEACH,

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

 V.

CHARLES BARBER, MARGO BARBER, CLINT ZIEGLER,

JILL ZIEGLER, COREY J. ROUDEBUSH, MARTHA J. ROUDEBUSH,

NOEL MATTEI AND LAURA MATTEI,

 DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Columbia County: 

TROY D. CROSS, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Fitzpatrick, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2021AP1030

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Charles and Margo Barber own a parcel of land

(the “Barber parcel”), and the deed for that parcel conveys an easement for ingress 

and egress (“the easement”) that passes across other parcels. One of the parcels 

across which the easement passes is owned by Jeff and Ramona Veach (the 

“Veach parcel”). The deed for the Veach parcel references a certified survey map 

that depicts the portion of the easement that passes across the Veach parcel, but 

that deed does not state that the Veaches have been granted an easement. 

¶2 The Veaches filed a complaint in the Columbia County Circuit Court 

against the Barbers and the owners of the other parcels across which the easement

passes. The Veaches requested that the court enter a declaratory judgment stating 

that the language of the easement benefits all of the parcels across which it passes, 

including the Veach parcel. The Veaches also requested that the court enter an 

order correcting their deed pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 847.07 (2019-20)1and

reforming the deed pursuant to the court’s equitable authority so as to grant an 

easement to the Veaches. Finally, the Veaches asked for an order granting an 

easement to their property through the doctrines of implication, necessity, 

estoppel, and prescription. The Barbers and the Veaches both moved for summary 

judgment. The court granted the Barbers’ motion and denied the Veaches’ 

motion. 

¶3 On appeal, the Veaches argue that the circuit court erroneously 

granted summary judgment for the Barbers because the deed for the Veach parcel, 

the certified survey map referenced in the Veaches’ deed, and the language of the

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2021AP1030

3

easement establish that the Veaches were conveyed an easement for access to their 

property.

2

 In the alternative, the Veaches argue that the circuit court erred in 

failing to reform the deed for the Veach parcel based on mutual mistake. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the court’s order granting summary judgment for 

the Barbers and denying the Veaches’ summary judgment motion.

¶4 The Barbers request an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in 

this appeal because, in their view, the Veaches’ entire appeal is frivolous. We 

deny the Barbers’ motion.

BACKGROUND

¶5 There is no dispute as to the following material facts.

¶6 In 1993, Earl Hillestad executed a warranty deed conveying to the 

Barbers a parcel of land—i.e., the Barber parcel—in the Town of Lodi, Wisconsin.

This parcel is landlocked and does not border a public road. The deed for the 

Barber parcel included an easement for access to the Barber parcel from Cactus 

Acres Road across five parcels that were owned by Hillestad at that time, 

including what is now the Veach parcel. For convenience, we refer to those other 

 

2

 The Veaches’ briefing in this court repeatedly uses the phrase “use the easement” to 

describe the Veaches’ alleged entitlement to an easement. The Veaches’ operative complaint

filed in the circuit court often uses a form of the term “grant” in referring to their requests for 

relief. We do not interpret the Veaches’ use of different phrasing of their requested relief as a 

change in their position on appeal. This opinion generally uses forms of the words “grant” or 

“convey” to be consistent with the Veaches’ operative complaint and WIS. STAT. ch. 706. See, 

e.g., WIS. STAT. § 706.02(1)(c). 
No. 2021AP1030

4

four parcels as the “Roudebush parcel,” the “Ziegler parcel,” the “Mattei parcel,”

and the “Right-of-Way parcel.”3

¶7 The Barber, Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, Mattei, and Right-of-Way

parcels are depicted on the following map4:

 

3

 These four parcels are currently owned by the following persons: the Roudebush 

parcel is owned by Corey J. Roudebush and Martha J. Roudebush; the Ziegler parcel is owned by 

Clint Ziegler and Jill Ziegler; and the Mattei parcel and Right-of-Way parcel are owned Noel 

Mattei and Laura Mattei. We refer to the Right-of-Way parcel in that manner to distinguish it 

from the Mattei parcel and because the easement describes that land as a “right-of-way for 

pedestrian and vehicular travel.” 

The Roudebushes and Zieglers filed statements with this court that their interests are 

“adequately represented” by the Barbers’ response brief. See WIS. STAT. § 809.19(3)(a)3. The 

Matteis did not file a brief in this appeal or any statement in support of the briefing of any party. 

4

 Regarding the map, we note the following. 

The Matteis also own an adjacent parcel north of what is designated on the map as the 

Mattei parcel. A map in the record depicts the Mattei property as one continuous parcel. 

However, the parties do not dispute that the land owned by the Matteis existed as separate parcels 

before purchase by the Matteis. Accordingly, we have added the dashed lines at the upper right 

side of the map to denote the boundaries of the Mattei parcel, the Right-of-Way parcel, and the 

separate parcel that is owned by the Matteis. In the remainder of this opinion, we use the term 

“Mattei parcel” to refer to the parcel labeled “Mattei” on the map and the term “Right-of-Way 

parcel” to refer to the narrow parcel on the right edge of the map labeled “Right-of-Way.” Some

information on a version of this map in the record is not pertinent to this appeal and has been 

removed from the map for ease of use.

In addition, as depicted on the map, the Barbers also own two other parcels to the south 

and east of what is designated on the map as the “Barber” parcel with an asterisk. Those parcels 

are separate from the “Barber parcel” and are not pertinent to the issues presented to this court on 

appeal. Further, the parcels labelled as “Gilles” and “Leu” on the map are not relevant to this 

appeal.
No. 2021AP1030

5

¶8 The easement approximately follows the dotted line from the bottom 

left of the Barber parcel, along the top of the map, and down the right side of the 

map. The easement is located on a 66-foot strip of land that: begins at the 

southern border of the Barber parcel; passes along the southern edge of the Barber 

parcel; passes along the northern edge of the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, and 

Mattei parcels; passes along the length of the Right-of-Way parcel; and ends at the 

point at which the Right-of-Way parcel borders Cactus Acres Road. The full text 

of the instrument that conveyed the easement is reproduced later in this opinion. 

¶9 After purchasing the Barber parcel, the Barbers built a driveway

(“the driveway”) to Cactus Acres Road along the length of the easement. 

Following the sale of the Barber parcel, Hillestad sold the Veach, Roudebush, 

Ziegler, Mattei, and Right-of-Way parcels. The deeds for the Veach, Roudebush, 
No. 2021AP1030

6

and Ziegler parcels do not include the description of the easement that appears in 

the deed for the Barber parcel.

5

¶10 The Barbers and the Matteis both use the portion of the driveway 

that passes across the Right-of-Way parcel. Additionally, consistent with the 

conveyance of the easement, the Barbers use the portion of the driveway that 

passes across the northern edge of the Mattei, Veach, Roudebush, and Ziegler 

parcels. The Veaches, Roudebushes, and Zieglers do not utilize any portion of the 

driveway and have not contributed to the cost of building, maintaining, or plowing 

the driveway. 

¶11 The Veaches filed a complaint against the Barbers, the Roudebushes, 

the Zieglers, and the Matteis.6 The complaint sought relief that can be 

summarized as follows: (1) an order declaring that the easement is a nonexclusive easement that entitles the Veaches to an easement for ingress and egress; 

(2) an order pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 847.07(1)(a)7correcting the legal description 

 

5

 The deeds for the Mattei parcel and the Right-of-Way parcel are not in the record on 

appeal. 

6

 The operative complaint is the Veaches’ second amended complaint, and we refer to 

that pleading as “the complaint.”

7

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 847.07(1)(a) states:

(1) The circuit court of any county in which a 

conveyance of real estate has been recorded may make an order 

correcting the description in the conveyance on proof being 

made to the satisfaction of the court that any of the following 

applies:

(a) The conveyance contains an erroneous description, 

not intended by the parties to the conveyance.

Sec. 847.07(1)(a). 
No. 2021AP1030

7

of the deed for the Veach parcel to include a grant of an easement; (3) an order

pursuant to the court’s equitable powers under WIS. STAT. § 706.04(1)8to correct

the “mutual mistake” of Hillestad and the Veaches in not including a grant of an

easement in the Veaches’ deed; and (4) an order granting an easement to the 

Veaches through the doctrines of implication, necessity, estoppel, and

prescription. 

¶12 The Barbers moved for summary judgment on each claim in the 

Veaches’ complaint.9 The Veaches responded by filing both their own motion for 

summary judgment and a response opposing summary judgment for the Barbers. 

In these pleadings the Veaches argued that they are entitled to summary judgment 

because the easement is “non-exclusive” and because the language of the 

easement demonstrates the intent to provide a right of access to the Veach, 

Roudebush, Ziegler, and Mattei parcels for the owners of those parcels. The 

 

8

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 706.04 states, in relevant part:

A transaction which does not satisfy one or more of the 

requirements of [WIS. STAT. §] 706.02 may be enforceable in 

whole or in part under doctrines of equity, provided all of the 

elements of the transaction are clearly and satisfactorily proved 

and, in addition:

(1) The deficiency of the conveyance may be supplied 

by reformation in equity.

Sec. 706.04(1).

9

 The Roudebushes and Zieglers each filed separate answers to the complaint, but did not 

file responses to the Veaches’ summary judgment motion. Rather, the Roudebushes and Zieglers 

submitted letters in support of the Barbers’ motion for summary judgment. The Matteis did not 

appear in the circuit court and submitted letters to the circuit court stating that they did not want 

to “be involved” with this lawsuit. 
No. 2021AP1030

8

Veaches’ motions also requested that the court correct the deed for the Veach 

parcel based on “mutual mistake.”

10

¶13 The circuit court granted the Barbers’ motion for summary judgment 

and denied the Veaches’ motion for summary judgment. The court determined 

that neither the deed for the Veach parcel nor the deed for the Barber parcel

entitled the Veaches to an easement for access to the Veach parcel. The court also

dismissed all claims against the Zieglers, Roudebushes, and Matteis as moot. The 

Veaches filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court denied that motion. The 

Veaches appeal the court’s order granting summary judgment for the Barbers and 

denying the Veach summary judgment motion.

11

 

10

 During the summary judgment proceedings in the circuit court, the Veaches did not 

pursue the assertions in their complaint regarding the claim for an easement by implication, 

necessity, estoppel, and prescription. The Veaches do not raise any arguments on those issues on 

appeal, and we therefore do not address those claims.

11

 At various times in the circuit court proceedings and on appeal, the Veaches assert that 

the Veach parcel is “landlocked” because a Town of Lodi ordinance purportedly prohibits the 

construction of a driveway from Cactus Acres Road to the Veach parcel. However, the Veaches 

make clear in briefing in this court that the issue of whether the Veach parcel is landlocked is not 

germane to their appeal. The Veaches filed a motion to amend the complaint a third time, and the 

circuit court denied that motion. The Veaches appealed the circuit court’s order denying this 

motion, but the Veaches do not raise any arguments regarding that issue in their briefing in this 

court. Thus, we do not address either the purportedly landlocked status of the Veach parcel or the 

motion to amend the complaint again. 

As noted, the Veaches filed a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court’s summary 

judgment order, and the court denied that motion. On appeal, the Veaches’ briefs provide this 

court with record cites to materials that are in their motion for reconsideration. The Veaches also 

refer this court to portions of their motion for reconsideration to “further explain” their arguments 

on appeal. Because the Veaches appeal only the order granting summary judgment for the 

Barbers, we do not consider the materials and explanations from the Veaches’ subsequent motion 

for reconsideration that were not before the circuit court on summary judgment. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.10(4) (“An appeal from a final judgment or final order brings before the court all prior

nonfinal judgments, orders and rulings adverse to the appellant and favorable to the respondent 

made in the action or proceeding not previously appealed and ruled upon.” (emphasis added)). 

Regardless, even if we were to consider those additional materials and explanations, we conclude 

that those would not affect our decisions in this case. 
No. 2021AP1030

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¶14 Additional facts are discussed later in this opinion. 

DISCUSSION

¶15 The Veaches argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment to the Barbers, and denying their summary judgment motion, because 

the pertinent instruments and extrinsic evidence establish that the Veaches were 

granted an easement to access their property. The Barbers respond that the court 

properly granted summary judgment in their favor because the Veaches fail to

establish that there was an intent to convey an easement to the Veaches. We begin 

by setting forth our standard of review and governing principles regarding

summary judgment and deed interpretation.

I. Standard of Review and Governing Principles Regarding Summary 

Judgment and Deed Interpretation.

¶16 We review a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny summary 

judgment de novo, applying the same methodology as the circuit court. Konneker 

v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶22, 326 Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432. On summary

judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” WIS.

STAT. § 802.08(2); see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Klomsten, 2018 WI App 25, ¶31, 

381 Wis. 2d 218, 911 N.W.2d 364. “An issue of fact is genuine if a reasonable 

jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Central Corp. v. Research Prods. 

Corp., 2004 WI 76, ¶19, 272 Wis. 2d 561, 681 N.W.2d 178. “A material fact is 

such fact that would influence the outcome of the controversy.” Id.
No. 2021AP1030

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¶17 This appeal requires that we interpret the language of the deeds for

the Barber and the Veach parcels as well as the certified survey map referenced in 

the Veaches’ deed. A “certified survey map” is a map or plan of record of a land 

division that complies with the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 236.34. A map that 

is referenced in a deed is considered to be one of the terms of the deed. See 

Pavela v. Fliesz, 26 Wis. 2d 710, 715, 133 N.W.2d 244 (1965); Slauson v. 

Goodrich Transp. Co., 99 Wis. 20, 25, 74 N.W. 574 (1898) (“A deed containing a 

description, and referring to a map having lines drawn upon it, and marking 

natural boundaries and the natural objects delineated on its surface, should be 

considered as giving the true description of the land, as much as if the map were 

marked down on the deed.”).

¶18 When interpreting deeds, our goal is to determine the parties’ intent. 

Gilbert v. Geiger, 2008 WI App 29, ¶10, 307 Wis. 2d 463, 747 N.W.2d 188 (citing 

Rikkers v. Ryan, 76 Wis. 2d 185, 188, 251 N.W.2d 25 (1977)). “The primary 

source for determining intent is what is written within the four corners of the 

deed,” including any map that is referenced in the legal description in the deed. 

Id.; Pavela, 26 Wis. 2d at 715. If the language of the deed is unambiguous, then 

we do not consider extrinsic evidence. Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game Club, 

Inc., 2010 WI 93, ¶20, 328 Wis. 2d 436, 787 N.W.2d 6. The construction of an 

unambiguous deed is a question of law. Gilbert, 307 Wis. 2d 463, ¶10. 

¶19 If the language of the deed is ambiguous, we may “resort to extrinsic 

evidence in an effort to determine the intent of the parties.” Grygiel, 328 Wis. 2d 

436, ¶20. The language of a deed is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to more than 

one reasonable interpretation.” Id. Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of 

law that we review independently. Konneker, 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶23. “[I]f the 
No. 2021AP1030

11

language of the deed is ambiguous, then the intent behind the language presents a 

question of fact.” Id.

II. The Circuit Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment to the Barbers.

¶20 The Veaches argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment to the Barbers because the language of the deeds for the Veach and 

Barber parcels establishes that the Veaches have been granted an easement. The 

Veaches also argue that extrinsic evidence demonstrates the parties’ intent to grant

the Veaches an easement. In the alternative, the Veaches argue that the court 

should have corrected their deed based on the parties’ “mutual mistake.” We 

address each argument in turn. 

A. Neither the Deed for the Veach Parcel nor the Deed for the Barber Parcel 

Establishes That the Veaches Were Granted an Easement.

¶21 The Veaches argue that the deeds for the Veach and Barber parcels

establish that the Veaches were conveyed an easement for the following reasons: 

(1) the easement is “non-exclusive”; (2) the language regarding the easement in 

the deed for the Barber parcel provides the legal description of the portion of each 

parcel through which the easement passes; (3) the deed for the Veach parcel

references a certified survey map which in turn depicts the portion of the easement 

that runs through the Veach parcel; and (4) extrinsic evidence indicates that the 

parties to the deed for the Veach parcel intended to grant the Veaches an

easement. 

1. Non-Exclusive Easement.

¶22 The Veaches contend that they are entitled to an easement to access 

their property because the easement is non-exclusive. The Veaches suggest that 
No. 2021AP1030

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the non-exclusive nature of the easement prohibits the Barbers from excluding the 

Veaches from the entire easement. The Barbers agree that the easement is nonexclusive but contend that this fact means that the Veaches are entitled to use the 

portion of the easement that passes through the Veach parcel. For the following 

reasons, we agree with the Barbers. 

¶23 An easement is “an interest in land which is in the possession of 

another.” Garrett v. O’Dowd, 2009 WI App 146, ¶7, 321 Wis. 2d 535, 775 

N.W.2d 549. An appurtenant easement12 like the one in this case creates two 

distinct property interests: the dominant estate and the servient estate. Gojmerac 

v. Mahn, 2002 WI App 22, ¶19, 250 Wis. 2d 1, 640 N.W.2d 178. The dominant

estate “enjoys the privileges granted by an easement,” and the servient estate 

“permits the exercise of those privileges.” Id. “The dominant owner does not 

obtain an estate in the servient property, but only a right to use the land consistent 

with the general property rights of the servient owner.” Id. Accordingly, “the 

owner of the servient estate may make ‘all proper use of his land including the 

right to make changes in or upon it,’ as long as he or she does not unreasonably 

interfere with the easement holder’s use of the land.” Garrett, 321 Wis. 2d 535, 

¶7 (quoting Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Reynolds, 2 Wis. 2d 649, 652, 87 N.W.2d 285 

(1958)). In the present case, the dominant estate is the Barber parcel and the 

servient estates are the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, and Mattei parcels, as well as 

the Right-of-Way parcel. 

 

12

 Easements come in two classes, “appurtenant” and “in gross.” Borek Cranberry 

Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson Cnty., 2009 WI App 129, ¶6, 321 Wis. 2d 437, 773 N.W.2d 522, aff’d, 

2010 WI 95, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615. “An appurtenant easement is one which is ‘tied 

to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land,’ while an easement in gross is 

not tied to ownership or occupancy of a unit or parcel.” Id. (quoting Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2002 

WI App 22, ¶18, 250 Wis. 2d 1, 640 N.W.2d 178).
No. 2021AP1030

13

¶24 An exclusive easement “modifies the ordinary relationship between 

the dominant estate and the servient estate” by granting “unfettered rights to the 

owner of the easement to use the easement for purposes specified in the grant ‘to 

the exclusion of all others.’” Id., ¶8 (quoted source omitted). An “exclusive 

easement, in effect, strips the servient owner of the right to use the land for certain 

purposes, thus limiting the fee, and itself has been called almost a conveyance of 

the fee.” Id. This court has recognized that an easement “must contain an 

affirmative statement of exclusivity in order to convey the right to exclude the fee 

owner.” Id., ¶6. As noted, the parties agree that the easement is non-exclusive.

¶25 The Veaches misstate the meaning of the term “non-exclusive” in 

this context. Contrary to the Veaches’ argument, the fact that the easement is nonexclusive means that the Veaches—as owners of the servient estate—may use the 

portion of their property encumbered by that easement, so long as they do not 

“unreasonably interfere” with the Barbers’ use of that easement. See id., ¶7. In 

other words, the term non-exclusive means that the Veaches are not excluded from 

using the portion of their property through which the easement passes. The phrase

does not mean that the Veaches have been conveyed an easement.

2. Legal Description of the Easement.

¶26 Next, the Veaches argue that the legal description of the easement in 

the deed for the Barber parcel indicates that the Veaches have a right to use the 

entire easement. The deed for the Barber parcel contains the following pertinent 

description of the property conveyed from Hillestad to the Barbers: “Being a 

parcel of land [legal description of Barber parcel], along with an easement 

described in the attached.” The attachment to the Barber deed provides the 

following legal description of the property encumbered by the easement:
No. 2021AP1030

14

Along with an easement described as follows: A 

right-of-way for pedestrian and vehicular travel [legal 

description of Right-of-Way parcel] commencing at the 

centerline of Cactus Acres Township Road and proceeding 

North for 624.96 feet.

To a strip of land 66 feet wide and 679 feet long 

along the Northern edge of the following described parcels;

[Legal descriptions of the Mattei, Ziegler, 

Roudebush, and Veach parcels]

To a strip of land along the Southern 66 feet of the 

following described parcel: [Legal description of the 

Barber parcel] up to and including the boundary of [the 

parcel directly south of the Barber parcel].

¶27 The Veaches argue that the inclusion of the legal descriptions of the

Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, Mattei, and Right-of-Way parcels in the easement 

granted by Hillestad to the Barbers unambiguously establishes the intent of 

Hillestad to grant a separate easement to each of those parcels. The Veaches 

contend that any other reading of the easement would render meaningless the 

language that includes those legal descriptions. We disagree. The language of the 

Barber deed and its attachment makes manifest that the legal descriptions of those 

parcels were included to identify the precise land through which the easement 

passes. Indeed, the easement would not be valid without such a description. See 

WIS. STAT. § 706.02(1)(b) (“Transactions under [WIS. STAT. §] 706.001(1) shall 

not be valid unless evidenced by a conveyance that satisfies all of the following: 

... Identifies the land.”).13 Nothing in the language of the deed for the Barber 

parcel can be reasonably read to establish that those legal descriptions were 

 

13

 According to WIS. STAT. § 706.001(1), “this chapter shall govern every transaction by 

which any interest in land is created, aliened, mortgaged, assigned or may be otherwise affected 

in law or in equity.” Sec. 706.001(1). Thus, the easement is a transaction under § 706.001(1). 

Prezioso v. Aerts, 2014 WI App 126, ¶21, 358 Wis. 2d 714, 858 N.W.2d 386 (“An easement is an 

interest in land and therefore governed by WIS. STAT. ch. 706.”).
No. 2021AP1030

15

included to provide the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, Mattei, and Right-of-Way

parcels with an easement in favor of those parcels. 

¶28 The Veaches make a related argument, the parameters and basis of 

which are difficult to discern. The Veaches appear to argue that the particular

language of the legal descriptions of the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, and Mattei

parcels in the description of the easement in the Barber deed creates separate 

easements for each of those parcels. Each of those legal descriptions is written in 

the following format, with specific measurements unique to each parcel:

Commencing at the Iron Pin located at the Northeast corner 

of Section 8; thence [measurements] to an Iron Pin and 

being the Point of Beginning of this boundary description; 

thence [measurements of the parcel’s boundaries] to the 

Point of Beginning.

Contrary to the Veaches’ contention, this language does not create a separate 

easement for each parcel. Rather, these legal descriptions only state that: (1) the 

“Point of Beginning” for the description of each parcel is an iron pin whose 

precise location is determined relative to the location of a separate iron pin at the 

northeast corner of Section 8; and (2) the measurements of each parcel’s 

boundaries are determined relative to that “Point of Beginning.” These legal 

descriptions identify the metes and bounds descriptions of the parcels through

which the easement passes. Those descriptions, reasonably interpreted, do not 

create a separate easement benefitting each of those parcels. 

¶29 Accordingly, we conclude that the language of the deed for the 

Barber parcel does not grant to the Veaches an easement.

14

 

 

14

 The Veaches also provide the following reason why the Barbers’ interpretation of the 

easement is incorrect:

(continued)
No. 2021AP1030

16

3. The Deed for the Veach Parcel.

¶30 The Veaches argue that the language of their deed establishes that 

they were conveyed an easement. The legal description of the Veach parcel in the 

deed for that parcel provides, in full: “Lot 1, Certified Survey Map No. 3093, 

recorded in Vol. 20 of Certified Surveys, page 90 as #590983, in the Town of 

Lodi, Columbia County, Wisconsin.” The certified survey map (CSM) referenced 

in the deed for the Veach parcel depicts the Veach parcel and labels a section 

along the northern boundary of that parcel as a “[66-foot-wide] easement for 

ingress & egress.”15 The Veaches argue that such language in their deed and the 

CSM is unambiguous and shows that they were conveyed an easement. 

¶31 As noted earlier, the construction of an unambiguous deed—

including the interpretation of a map referenced by the deed—is a question of law. 

Gilbert, 307 Wis. 2d 463, ¶10; Pavela, 26 Wis. 2d at 715.

 

The Barbers argue that they are the only lot owners that 

have access to the easement. If Barbers’ interpretation of the 

easement document is accepted, the interpretation would have 

made the lot owned by the Manchesters[] landlocked. 

Mr. Hillestad would not have intended on land-locking the 

Manchesters.

(record citations omitted). The Veaches do not explain who the “Manchesters” are or how the 

Barbers’ interpretation of the easement would “landlock[]” the Manchesters, and we cannot 

discern that information from the record. We decline to address this undeveloped argument. See 

State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that this court 

may decline to address undeveloped arguments because we “cannot serve as both advocate and 

judge”). 

15

 The copy of the CSM in the record is so grainy that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 

read some of the text. Nonetheless, the Veaches provide the pertinent language from that map in 

their brief-in-chief to this court, and the Barbers do not dispute the accuracy of that language. We 

remind counsel to provide the most legible copies of exhibits for the record and, when 

appropriate, also provide explanations and clarifications as to any portions that may be illegible.
No. 2021AP1030

17

¶32 The deed and CSM for the Veach parcel contain no language

expressly stating that the grantors conveyed any interest in an easement to the 

Veaches. The only mention of an easement is the CSM’s reference to the “[66-

foot-wide] easement for ingress & egress.” We agree with the Barbers that this 

reference cannot reasonably be interpreted as conveying to the Veaches an interest 

in the easement. Neither the deed for the Veach parcel nor the CSM states that the 

Veach parcel benefits from such an easement, and neither document describes the

full contours or boundaries of any such easement. Rather, as the Barbers correctly 

observe, the “[66-foot-wide] easement” is merely an indication that the Veach 

parcel is encumbered by the easement. Indeed, in order to be a valid conveyance, 

the deed for the Veach parcel must identify any portion of the Veach parcel that is 

encumbered by an easement. See WIS. STAT. § 706.02(1)(c) (“Transactions under 

[WIS. STAT. §] 706.001(1) shall not be valid unless evidenced by a conveyance 

that satisfies all of the following: ... Identifies the interest conveyed, and any 

material term, condition, reservation, exception or contingency upon which the 

interest is to arise, continue or be extinguished, limited or encumbered.”). 

Therefore, we conclude that there is no reasonable reading of the deed for the 

Veach parcel that establishes that the Veaches were conveyed an easement.16

 

16

 The Veaches also argue that, “[a]t the very least, [the CSM] creates a fact issue 

regarding the easement being included in the legal description of Veaches’ lot and the Veaches’ 

right to use the easement.” As noted earlier, whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law. 

Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶23, 326 Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432. If a deed is not 

ambiguous, then our interpretation of that deed is also a question of law. Gilbert v. Geiger, 2008 

WI App 29, ¶10, 307 Wis. 2d 463, 747 N.W.2d 188. Because the Veaches agree that the deed for 

the Veach parcel is not ambiguous, we conclude that the language within the four corners of that 

deed—including the CSM—does not entitle the Veaches to use the easement. Further, as already 

discussed in the main text, the CSM does not create an issue of fact as to the intent of the parties 

to that deed. 
No. 2021AP1030

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4. Extrinsic Evidence.

¶33 The Veaches argue that, if the deeds for the Barber parcel and the 

Veach parcel are ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence establishes Hillestad’s intent 

to convey to the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, and Mattei parcels a right to use the 

easement. Hillestad died in 2004, so the Veaches provide an affidavit of Robert 

Daehling, Hillestad’s real estate broker. This affidavit states that, at the time of 

the sale of the Veach parcel to the Veaches, “there was absolutely no question that 

the Veaches had access to their lot over the easement for ingress and egress” and 

that “[e]veryone involved understood the easement to be a non-exclusive easement 

available for use by the lot owners.” The Veaches also point to the minutes of a 

Town of Lodi Board meeting which state that Margo Barber acknowledged that 

the driveway constructed by the Barbers was a “shared drive.” 

¶34 As mentioned earlier in this opinion, “[t]he primary source for 

determining intent is what is written within the four corners of the deed.” Gilbert, 

307 Wis. 2d 463, ¶10. If the language of the deed is unambiguous, then we will 

not look at extrinsic evidence. Grygiel, 328 Wis. 2d 436, ¶20; Konneker, 326 

Wis. 2d 268, ¶26 (“If the language is unambiguous, it would be improper to resort 

to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent.”). Whether a deed is 

ambiguous is a question of law that we review independently. Konneker, 326 

Wis. 2d 268, ¶23. 

¶35 The Veaches acknowledge that a court may not look to extrinsic 

evidence unless a deed is ambiguous, but they do not identify any language in 

their deed or the deed for the Barber parcel that could be ambiguous. In other 

words, the Veaches do not develop an argument that any language in those 

instruments is susceptible of “more than one reasonable interpretation.” See 
No. 2021AP1030

19

Grygiel, 328 Wis. 2d 436, ¶20. As explained above, we have concluded that the 

Veaches’ interpretation of the language in those instruments is not reasonable and 

that there is only one reasonable interpretation of that language. See supra, ¶¶27, 

32. Therefore, we have no basis to consult extrinsic evidence of the parties’ 

intent.

17

B. The Veaches Are Not Entitled to a Corrected Deed 

Based on Mutual Mistake.

¶36 In the alternative to their other arguments, the Veaches contend that 

the lack of language in their deed regarding their alleged right to use the easement 

is the result of “mutual mistake” that can be corrected by a court. “Wisconsin law 

is plain that once a deed or similar instrument has been properly executed and 

recorded, a court may not alter the document—aside from fraud or mistake—when 

a party later expresses a different intent than what was memorialized.” Wynhoff 

 

17

 The Veaches also argue that the “submission of Mr. Daehling’s affidavit alone created 

an issue of fact preventing the granting of summary judgment to the Barbers.” As noted earlier,

however, “[t]he primary source for determining intent is what is written within the four corners of 

the deed.” Gilbert, 307 Wis. 2d 463, ¶10. If the deed is unambiguous, then our interpretation of 

that deed is a question of law. Konneker, 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶23. Accordingly, we need not 

address whether Daehling’s affidavit creates an issue of fact as to the intent of the parties to the 

deed for the Veach parcel because we conclude as a matter of law that the deed does not entitle 

the Veaches to use the easement.

The Veaches also observe that Daehling’s affidavit refers to an instrument entitled “Grant 

of Easement.” This instrument is separate from the easement included in the deed for the Barber 

parcel and was executed by Hillestad in 2000 after he had sold the Barber, Veach, Roudebush, 

and Ziegler parcels, but before he had sold the Mattei and Right-of-Way parcels. In this 

instrument, Hillestad granted an easement to the Barber, Veach, Roudebush, and Ziegler parcels 

(among others) for ingress, egress, and utility purposes. This easement is located on the Mattei 

and Right-of-Way parcels in approximately the same location as the earlier easement at issue in 

this case. Daehling’s affidavit states that this “Grant of Easement” reflects Hillestad’s intent that 

the earlier easement would benefit each of the parcels across which it passes. For the reasons 

previously explained in the main text, we need not consider the substance of Daehling’s affidavit, 

including the import of the “Grant of Easement.” 
No. 2021AP1030

20

v. Vogt, 2000 WI App 57, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 673, 608 N.W.2d 400. The party who 

seeks reformation based on mutual mistake “must offer clear and convincing proof 

that both parties intended to make a different instrument and had agreed on facts 

that were different than those set forth on the instrument.” Chandelle Enters., 

LLC v. XLNT Dairy Farm, Inc., 2005 WI App 110, ¶18, 282 Wis. 2d 806, 699 

N.W.2d 241. 

¶37 The Veaches argue that their deed should be reformed to include 

language establishing their right to an easement. The Veaches contend that the 

circuit court erred in determining that there was no evidence that the parties to the 

deed for the Veach parcel intended to grant such an easement. The Veaches assert

that the following evidence is clear and convincing proof of the mutual mistake of 

the parties to their deed: (1) the language of the deed for the Veach parcel; (2) the 

language granting the easement for the Barber parcel; (3) Daehling’s affidavit; and 

(4) Margo Barber’s comments made at the Lodi Town Board meeting.

¶38 We conclude that the Veaches have failed to demonstrate that they 

are entitled as a matter of law to reformation of their deed based on mutual 

mistake. First, the Veaches’ arguments regarding the language of their deed and 

the easement merely rehash their arguments that those documents conclusively 

establish the Veaches’ right to an easement. As explained earlier in this opinion, 

we reject the Veaches’ contention that those documents evidence the parties’

intent to grant such an easement to the Veach parcel. The Veaches’ reliance on 

the language of the easement is particularly problematic because that easement 

was only included as part of the transaction between Hillestad and the Barbers; it 

does not shed any light on the intent of the Veaches or Beth and Peter Jug—the 

persons from whom the Veaches purchased the Veach parcel. See id. (holding that 

the reformation of a deed based on mutual mistake requires determining the intent
No. 2021AP1030

21

of the parties to that deed). Thus, we conclude that neither the easement nor the 

deed for the Veach parcel provides a basis to reform the deed for the Veach parcel 

based on mutual mistake. 

¶39 Second, Daehling’s affidavit is not admissible as evidence of the 

intent of the Jugs and the Veaches with respect to the mutual mistake claim

because that affidavit does not explain how Daehling has personal knowledge of 

those parties’ intent. Affidavits in support of summary judgment “shall be made 

on personal knowledge.” WIS. STAT. § 802.08(3). “Affidavits ‘made by persons 

who do not have personal knowledge’ are insufficient to support summary 

judgment ‘and will be disregarded.’” Gemini Cap. Grp., LLC v. Jones, 2017 WI 

App 77, ¶22, 378 Wis. 2d 614, 904 N.W.2d 131 (quoting Leszczynski v. Surges, 

30 Wis. 2d 534, 538, 141 N.W.2d 261 (1966)).

¶40 Daehling’s affidavit provides the following statements. Daehling 

averred that he “was a real estate broker for Earl Hillestad for the sale of the lots in 

the unrecorded Cactus Acres plat” and “was involved in the sale of the lot to Jeff 

and Mona Veach.” According to Daehling, “it was absolutely clear that at the 

time that the Veaches purchased the property from the Jugs that they would have 

use of the easement in question” and “[e]veryone involved understood the 

easement to be a non-exclusive easement available for use by the lot owners.”

Daehling also stated that “Earl Hillestad told me that his intent was always that 

each lot would have access to the easement running across the northern parts of 

the lots.” 
No. 2021AP1030

22

¶41 These statements do not demonstrate that Daehling had personal 

knowledge of the intent of both the Jugs and the Veaches with respect to the 

conveyance of an easement from the Jugs to the Veaches.

18 The only portions of

the affidavit suggesting that Daehling had personal knowledge of the parties’ 

intent are Daehling’s statements that he was involved in the sale of the Veach 

parcel to the Veaches and that he was Hillestad’s real estate broker. However, the 

general statement that Daehling was “involved” in the sale to the Veaches does not

provide a sufficient basis to reasonably infer that Daehling had personal 

knowledge of the intent of the Jugs and the Veaches. For instance, there is no 

indication in the affidavit that Daehling represented the Jugs or the Veaches in the 

sale of the Veach parcel and there is no information about Daehling’s level of 

involvement in that transaction. The affidavit also provides no explanation why 

Daehling—as Hillestad’s real estate broker—would have been involved in a 

transaction to which Hillestad was not a party. As a result, without evidence that 

Hillestad was a party to the transaction between the Jugs and the Veaches, 

Daehling’s statement regarding Hillestad’s intent has no bearing on the 

reformation of the Veaches’ deed. See Chandelle Enters., 282 Wis. 2d 806, ¶18 

(reforming a deed based on mutual mistake requires determining the intent of the 

parties to that deed). 

¶42 Daehling’s affidavit is inadmissible because it does not “reasonably 

impl[y]” that Daehling has personal knowledge of the intent of both the Jugs and 

 

18

 The deed conveying the Veach parcel from Hillestad to the Jugs is not in the record, 

and it is not clear whether the Jugs were granted an easement by that deed. As a result, it is 

unclear whether the Jugs ever had any rights to the easement that could have been conveyed to 

the Veaches. In any event, as explained in the main text, we conclude that Daehling’s affidavit is 

inadmissible as evidence of the parties’ intent. 
No. 2021AP1030

23

the Veaches regarding the conveyance of an easement in the Jugs’ sale of the 

Veach parcel to the Veaches. See Gemini Cap. Grp., 2017 WI App 77, ¶23 

(holding that an affidavit cannot support summary judgment under WIS. STAT.

§ 802.08(3) if nothing in the affidavit “reasonably implies” that the affiant had 

personal knowledge of the facts stated in the affidavit). Thus, because Daehling’s

affidavit is inadmissible as evidence of the parties’ intent, it cannot constitute 

“clear and convincing” proof as would be necessary to support the reformation of 

the Veaches’ deed.

¶43 Also, Margo Barber’s comments at a Lodi Town Board meeting in 

2001 have no bearing on the issue of mutual mistake in the present case. At this 

meeting, the Lodi Town Board approved a variance for the construction of a 

driveway connecting the Veach parcel to the easement contingent on the Veaches 

showing “evidence of a joint driveway agreement with all property owners.” The 

Veaches do not provide a transcript of that meeting, but the meeting minutes note 

that Margo Barber commented during that meeting: “Margo Barber expressed 

safety concerns of the proposed shared drive.” The minutes do not provide any 

other indication of the substance of the Barbers’ comments on this issue. The 

Veaches fail to explain how a few words in a single sentence in the minutes of this

meeting which summarizes Margo Barber’s comments at that meeting would shed 

any light on whether the parties to the sale of the Veach parcel intended to create

an easement. See Chandelle Enters., 282 Wis. 2d 806, ¶18 (when a court 

determines whether to reform a deed based on mutual mistake, it must determine 

the intent of the parties to that deed). Thus, the Veaches have failed to provide 
No. 2021AP1030

24

“clear and convincing proof” that both the Jugs and the Veaches intended to grant 

an easement to the Veach parcel.

19

III. The Veaches’ Appeal Is Not Frivolous.

¶44 The Barbers request an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in

this appeal pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 809.25 on the ground that the Veaches’ entire 

appeal is frivolous. Whether an appeal is frivolous is a question of law. Howell v. 

Denomie, 2005 WI 81, ¶9, 282 Wis. 2d 130, 698 N.W.2d 621. Sanctions for a 

frivolous appeal will be imposed if the court concludes that the “party or party’s 

attorney knew, or should have known, that the appeal ... [had no] reasonable basis 

in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an 

extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” Id. (quoting 

§ 809.25(3)(c)2.). This standard is objective, so we must examine what a 

“reasonable party or attorney knew or should have known under the same or 

similar circumstances.” Id. Importantly, to award costs and attorney fees, we

must conclude that the entire appeal is frivolous. Id.

¶45 As discussed in this opinion, the Veaches’ arguments on appeal are 

weak and do not succeed. However, we cannot conclude in these circumstances

that the Veaches’ entire appeal lacks any “reasonable basis in law or equity.” See 

 

19

 Additionally, the Veaches assert that “the extrinsic facts create a genuine issue of fact 

regarding ... the need to reform the deed.” However, as explained in the main text, the Veaches 

have failed to provide evidence that could reasonably demonstrate that the parties to the deed for 

the Veach parcel intended to convey an easement. Thus, there is no genuine issue of fact as to the 

Veaches’ mutual mistake claim. See Central Corp. v. Research Prods. Corp., 2004 WI 76, ¶19, 

272 Wis. 2d 561, 681 N.W.2d 178 (“An issue of fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for 

the nonmoving party.”).
No. 2021AP1030

25

id. Accordingly, we conclude that the Veaches’ appeal is not frivolous, and we 

deny the Barbers’ motion.

CONCLUSION

¶46 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.