IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

) ..... n 

= (J"JQ 

NGUYET T. TANG, ) No. 67666-1-1 ,_., ~c:: .>;;1..") 

) :X r:;; -t ,.. 0 

Appellant, ) DIVISION ONE 

:00 0-q 

-~~- ""1'1 

) :...~~~r }.::·-or· 

v. ) :r.- (fJ f'Tl i 

:X :E:Po 

) :z..:r- - CJU> 

STATE OF WASHINGTON ) UNPUBLISHED .. -:o 

U1 oDEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ) .,- z< 

SECURITY, ) FILED: March 11, 2013 - ) 

Respondent. ) 

) 

Cox, J.- Nguyet Tang, former employee of Lexus of Bellevue, appeals 

the decision of the Commissioner of the Employment Security Department 

denying her unemployment benefits. She claims that certain findings of fact in 

the decision are not supported by either substantial or admissible evidence. We 

disagree and affirm. 

Tang worked as a finance and leasing consultant, earning commissions 

by preparing financial documents and selling certain products to customers 

purchasing cars. On July 28, 2010, Tang spent several hours, including two 

hours after her shift, preparing documents for a customer, to whom she also sold 

a dealership warranty for $3,800. The next morning, before Tang's shift, the 

customer returned to the dealership dissatisfied with the purchase. The sales 
No. 67666-1-1/2 

manager, Nick Wilcox, agreed to "unwind" the sale and allow the customer to 

purchase a different car which was covered by a factory warranty. Wilcox 

assigned a different finance consultant, who was then at work and who sold other 

additional products to the customer. 

When Tang learned that the other finance consultant would receive the 

commission, she complained repeatedly to General Manager Mark Babcock. 

Babcock refused to credit the sale to her. Tang did not appear for her shift on 

July 30. Babcock sent Tang an email saying he would process her termination if 

she did not come to work the next day. Tang did not appear for her scheduled 

shifts on July 31 or August 1. On August 2, Babcock terminated Tang for job 

abandonment. 

Thereafter, Tang applied for unemployment insurance benefits. Following 

investigation, the Employment Security Department (Department) denied Tang's 

request. 

Tang sought review of the Department's decision. An administrative law 

judge (ALJ) affirmed the decision denying Tang benefits, concluding that Tang 

voluntarily quit her job without good cause as defined by RCW 50.20.050(2)(b). 

The ALJ also concluded that Tang was able to, available for, and actively 

seeking work during the weeks at issue, as required by RCW 50.20.010(1)(c). 

Tang sought review of the ALJ's decision. The Commissioner adopted all 

but one of the ALJ's findings of fact with modifications and adopted all but one of 

the conclusions of law. The Commissioner concluded that Tang quit her job 

without good cause. The Commissioner concluded that Tang's compliance with 

2 
No. 67666-1-1/3 

RCW 50.20.010(1)(c), which requires one to actually seek work, warranted 

further consideration. Accordingly, the Commissioner remanded that issue to the 

Department for further consideration and determination. 

Tang appealed the Commissioner's decision. The King County Superior 

Court affirmed. 

Tang appeals. 

Good Cause 

Tang first contends that the record does not support the Commissioner's 

determination that she quit her job without good cause. Instead, she claims the 

evidence established that she had good cause to separate based on continuing 

unchecked discrimination. We disagree. 

Judicial review of a decision made by an Employment Security 

Department commissioner is governed by the Washington Administrative 

Procedure Act (WAPA). 1 In reviewing the decision, we apply the standards of the 

WAPA directly to the administrative record before the agency. 2 Relief from an 

agency decision is granted when the agency has erroneously interpreted or 

applied the law, the order is not supported by substantial evidence, or it is 

arbitrary or capricious. 3 

A person who voluntarily leaves work without good cause is disqualified 

from unemployment insurance benefits 4 But a person who voluntarily leaves 

1 Tapper v. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). 

2 ld. 

3 RCW 34.05.570(3)(d),(e), (i). 

4 RCW 50.20.050(2)(a). 

3 
No. 67666-1-1/4 

work for good cause is not disqualified from benefits. 5 One circumstance 

constituting good cause exists if the "individual left work because of illegal 

activities in the individual's worksite, the individual reported such activities to the 

employer, and the employer failed to end such activities within a reasonable 

period of time."6 Whether a claimant leaves employment for good cause is a 

mixed question of law and face 

We review findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by 

substantial evidence8 To the extent the commissioner modifies or replaces 

findings by an administrative law judge, we review the commissioner's findings. 9 

Using this approach, we give the agency's factual findings the proper level of 

deference to which they are entitled under the circumstances. 10 Unchallenged 

findings are verities on appeal. 11 

The application of law to the facts is a question of law that we review de 

novo. 12 

We consider a commissioner's decision to be prima facie correct. 13 The 

party challenging the agency's action bears the burden of demonstrating its 

invalidity. 14 

5 RCW 50.20.050(2)(b). 

6 RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(ix). 

7 Terrv v. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 82 Wn. App. 745, 748, 919 P.2d 111 (1996). 

8 Barker v. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 127 Wn. App. 588, 592, 112 P.3d 536 

(2005). 

9 Tapper, 122 Wn.2d at 406. 

10 ld. at 403. 

11 Fuller v. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 52 Wn. App. 603, 606, 762 P.2d 367 (1988). 

12 Terrv, 82 Wn. App. at 748-49. 

13 RCW 50.32.150. 

14 RCW 50.32.150; RCW 34.05.570(1 )(a). 

4 
No. 67666-1-1/5 

Tang challenges the Commissioner's modified findings Nos. 3 through 13, 

which state in relevant part: 

As more fully set forth in the November 8, 2010 Initial Order, 

evidence of record establishes as follows: Over the course of the 

four year employment relationship, one of the employer's sales 

managers (Mr. Wilcox) made disparaging comments regarding 

people of various ethnicities, including Asians. The claimant is 

Asian and was offended. The claimant complained to the 

employer's general manager (Mr. Babcock), and he intervened, but 

Mr. Wilcox continued to make comments. The employer does not 

condone discrimination or work-related harassment. Approximately 

165-170 employees work at the employer's Bellevue dealership. 

40-50 of those employees are Asian-Americans. 50 percent of the 

dealership's employees are women. The employer's human 

resources director (Ms. Hunt) is Asian-American. Although Ms. 

Hunt's office is at the claimant's workplace, and Ms. Hunt was 

readily accessible to employees (including the claimant), the 

claimant did not report her complaints regarding Mr. Wilcox to Ms. 

Hunt. 

The job separation was premised on a commission-related disagreement. 

[T)he claimant was upset because she ... believed she had earned 

and should have received the commission. The claimant faulted Mr. 

Wilcox and complained to the general manager (Mr. Babcock}, but 

Mr. Babcock determined Mr. Wilcox had complied with procedure 

regarding the sales and commissions. On July 30, 2010, the 

claimant was scheduled to work but was a no call/no show. Via 

email correspondence, the claimant was cautioned that her 

services were essential and that her absence burdened her 

coworkers. The claimant was further cautioned that, if she did not 

return to work the following day, the employer would consider the 

employment relationship terminated. The following day (July 31), 

the claimant did not return to work. But for her belief that she had 

been unfairly denied a commission, the claimant would have 

reported for work. She attributed her decision to a "matter of 

principle."1151 

Tang first claims that the Commissioner discounted substantial evidence 

that she was subjected to a racially hostile work environment and that the 

15 Clerk's Papers at 7-9. 

5 
No. 67666-1-1/6 

circumstances of the July 28-29 car deal was the "straw that broke the camel's 

back."16 To support this claim, Tang provides bare citations to her petitions for 

review to the Commissioner and the superior court as well as her testimony 

before the administrative law judge without any explanation or argument. Tang 

also argues that substantial evidence does not support the specific finding: "The 

employer does not condone discrimination or work-related harassment." We 

disagree. 

The findings reflect that the Commissioner considered Tang's testimony 

that Wilcox made offensive racial comments during the four years of her 

employment, and continued to do so even after she complained and Babcock 

intervened. The Commissioner also considered Tang's admissions that she did 

not report the racial comments to the human resources director and that she 

would have returned to work in the last days of July if Babcock had given her the 

disputed commission. 

Babcock testified that the disputed commission was allocated in 

accordance with consistent company policy, describing his preference to serve 

the complaining customer with the personnel present at the time of the 

replacement sale and to allocate the commission to the person who sold the 

replacement product. Babcock also testified: 

[W]e are very, very conscientious of any kind of threatening 

workplace. We have a very diverse workplace. We have controls 

in place and checks and balances. We have ways for people to go 

above anybody in the company and report such claims, and we 

16 Brief of Appellant at 13. 

6 
No. 67666-1-1/7 

take it very serious. So we obviously ve~ much disagree with her 

statements of a threatening workplace.!17 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the challenged statement 

regarding the employer's view of workplace discrimination or harassment. And 

the Commissioner was entitled to decide from this and other evidence whether a 

discriminatory or retaliatory animus played a role in the allocation of the disputed 

commission and whether the reported racial comments contributed to Tang's 

decision not to return to work. Mere disagreement with the Commissioner's view 

of the evidence does not show a lack of substantial evidence to support the 

challenged findings. Because Tang does not challenge any of the 

Commissioner's conclusions of law or present any additional argument 

establishing any error in the conclusions, she is not entitled to relief. 

Actively Seeking Work 

Tang next assigns error to the Commissioner's finding No. 2, arguing that 

it is not supported by admissible evidence. Without citation to authority, Tang 

claims that the Commissioner could not properly consider Babcock's closing 

statement as a basis to remand the issue for further proceedings. We disagree. 

During cross-examination at the hearing before the ALJ, Tang admitted 

that she had not applied for any finance positions at any car dealerships since 

leaving her job. At the end of the hearing, the ALJ asked Tang for her ''final 

statement," saying, "And this isn't testimony, anything you say in your final 

17 Certified Agency Record at 60. 

7 
No. 67666-1-1/8 

closing I'm not going to consider as evidence."18 When the ALJ asked Babcock 

for a final statement, he replied: 

We disagree with [Tang's] claims, obviously. If there were any truth 

to, you know, a hostile work environment or, you know, even that 

she disagrees with our policy on, you know, one car deal, my 

question would be why has she not applied for a finance job at any 

other car dealership? 

It's our opinion that she planned on leaving and was working 

towards that many weeks before she actually - and then she has a 

reason to want to collect these benefits. And in this marketplace 

she could go work yet this afternoon in an S and I position 

anywhere in this city. And, you know, so our position is that this is 

fabricated and we think the benefits should be denied.l191 

In Finding of Fact No.2, the ALJ found, "During the weeks at issue the 

claimant was willing and able to accept any offer of suitable work and sought 

work as directed by the Department."20 In Conclusion of Law No. 7, the ALJ 

concluded: 

RCW 50.20.010(1)(c) requires each claimant to be able to, 

available for, and actively seeking work. The claimant was able to, 

available for, and actively seeking work during the weeks at issue 

and is therefore not subject to denial under the above-cited statute 

and related laws and regulations as it pertains to that issue[21 1 

The Commissioner did not adopt the ALJ's finding No. 2, finding instead 

as follows: 

Prior to her four year tenure with the interested employer, the 

claimant was employed for approximately three years by another 

dealership and performed a finance-related job. Thus, the 

claimant's most recent seven years of work experience is limited to 

18 ld. at 66. 

19 1d. at 69. 

20 ld. at 100. 

21 ld. at 102-03. 

8 
No. 67666-1-1/9 

auto-finance. The claimant has not applied for positions in the 

auto-finance industry, which the claimant attributes to lack of 

employment opportunities. However, the employer's general 

manager testified that there are numerous employment 

opportunities consistent with the claimant's experience in the 

claimant's labor market area.1221 

The Commissioner did not adopt the ALJ's conclusion No. 7, concluding instead: 

Unemployment benefit eligibility is premised in part on proof the 

claimant was able, available, and actively looked for work during 

each week benefits were claimed. RCW 50.20.010(c). Here, the 

employer's reply to the claimant's petition for review raises the 

issue of the claimant's compliance with the above cited statute. 

The claimant's most recent seven years of work experience has 

been limited to auto-finance. However, the claimant admittedly has 

not applied for any jobs with car dealerships during the weeks at 

issue. Whether (or not) such job opportunities existed in the 

claimant's labor market area is a point of conflict. The issue (raised 

by an aggrieved party, the employer) merits further 

consideration. 1231 

The Commissioner then ordered, "The issue of claimant's compliance with RCW 

50.20.010(1)(c) during the weeks at issue is REMANDED to the Department for 

further consideration and determination."24 

Contrary to Tang's characterization of the record, the Commissioner did 

not consider Babcock's final statement as evidence of whether finance jobs at 

car dealerships were available during the weeks at issue. Instead, the 

Commissioner found that Babcock's statement at the hearing, as well as a similar 

statement in his response to Tang's petition for review before the Commissioner, 

identified a conflict between the parties justifying remand to the Department for 

22 Clerk's Papers at 7. 

23 ld. at 10. 

24 ld. 

9 
No. 67666-1-1/10 

further consideration. Tang fails to argue or establish that the order was invalid 

or exceeded the Commissioner's authority. 25 

Affirmed. 

Cm.T 

WE CONCUR: 

25 See RCW 50.32.080 (Commissioner's review procedure. After having 

acquired jurisdiction for review, the commissioner shall review the proceedings in 

question. Prior to rendering his or her decision, the commissioner may order the 

taking of additional evidence by an appeal tribunal to be made a part of the 

record in the case. Upon the basis of evidence submitted to the appeal tribunal 

and such additional evidence as the commissioner may order to be taken, the 

commissioner shall render his or her decision in writing affirming, modifying, or 

setting aside the decision of the appeal tribunal. Alternatively, the commissioner 

may order further proceedings to be held before the appeal tribunal, upon 

completion of which the appeal tribunal shall issue a decision in writing affirming, 

modifying, or setting aside its previous decision. The new decision may be 

appealed under RCW 50.32.070. The commissioner shall mail his or her 

decision to the interested parties at their last known addresses.). 

10