## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

People v . Donelson , 2013 IL 113603

Caption in S upreme Court: THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Appellee
, v. CHARL ES DONEL SON, Appellant.

Docke t No. 113603

Filed Rehea ringdenied Marc h 21, 2013

May 28, 2013

Held ( Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Where a defe ndant who had enter ed into a fully neg otiated plea
agr ee ment for concur

rent terms claimed that it was void beca u s e

consec utive sentenc es wer e require d by statute, but wher e the maxi mum term which the parties had orig inally intended was clea r, it was proper to order a contra ct ref

ormation on rema

nd which would corr ect the parties’ mutual mistake by rec onfigu ri ng the sentenc es so as to impose

consec utive terms which implemented that max imum sentence.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the First District; hear d in that court

on appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, the Hon. L awr ence Edwar d Flood, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pelletie r, State Appellate Def ender
, Alan D. Goldberg
, Deputy De fe n der, and J essica D. Pamon, Assistant Appellate Def ender
, of t h e Offic e of the State Appellate Def ender
, of Chicago
, and Charles Donelson, pro se , for a

ppellant.

L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield, and Anita Alvarez, State’s Attorney
, of Chicag o (Alan J

. Spellberg
, M ichelle Katz and Sheilah O’Gr ady -Kra

jniak, Assistant St ate’ s Attorney s, of counse l), for the People.

J ustices J USTI CE KARMEI ER delivere d th e ju d g ment of the court, with opinion. Chief J ustice Kilbride and J ustices Fr eema n, Thomas, Gar

man, Bur ke, and The is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In this appea l, we consider the proper reme dy wher e the State and the defe ndant, par ties
to a fully neg otiated plea ag ree ment, are mutually mistaken as to the manner in which
sentenc es of imprisonment must be serve d, but otherwise agree upon the maxi mum number of y ear s to be serve d. Fa ce d with this issue, the appellate court acknow ledg ed that

consec utive sentenc ing was statutorily mandated, and in that respe ct the concur rent sentenc ing structure of the parties’ plea agree m en t re n d ere d defe ndant’s sentenc ing void. 2011 I L App (1st) 092594, ¶ 9. Howeve r, the ap p el l at e court conclude d that the plea
ag ree ment, “take n as a whole, is not contra ry to statutory authority and thus not void,” insofar

as sentenc es could be fashioned, within statutory constraints, to eff ectuate the parties’ intent, i.e.
, that t h e d ef

endant “re ceive a total of 50 y ear s’ imprisonment.” 2011 I L App (1st) 092594, ¶ 18. Thus, the appellate court rema n d ed t his cause to the circ uit court “to

rese ntence defe ndant in acc ordanc e with both the plea agree ment and the applicable statutes.” 2011 I L App (1st) 092594, ¶ 22. We allowed the defe ndant’s petition for leave to appea l (I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010)), and now aff irm the judgme nt of the appellate
court.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Def

end an t , C h arles Donelson, was char g ed, in indictment number 98 CR 11525, with first deg ree murder, home inv as ion, residential burg lary
, and ag gravated criminal sexual assault. Def

endant was char g ed separ ately
, in indictment number 98 CR 11527, with
ag g ravated criminal sexual assault. The case s wer e consolidated and proce eded to a jury trial

on J an u ar y 3 0
, 2001. After opening statements, and commence ment of the State’s case in chief , the par ties informed the c ourt that they had re ache d a plea

agree ment. ¶ 4 The parties ag ree d that defe ndant wou l d p l ead guilty to first degree murder and home

-2-invasion, as char g ed in indictment number 98 CR 11525, and ag g rava t ed criminal sexual

assault, under indictment number 98 CR 11527. I t was further agree d that he would rec eive prison sentenc es of 55, 30 a nd 30 year s, respe ctively , to be serve d concur rently

. ¶ 5 The court admonished defe ndant reg arding the rig hts he was g iving up b y p le a d ingguilty

. Def endant said he understood. The court advised defe ndant of the maxi mum sentenc es that could be imposed for eac h offe nse. Def endant ag ain indicated he understood. The cour t confirme d tha

t th e p r o p o s e d p r is o n s e nte n c e s

—in c luding a 55-year sentenc e of imprisonment for murder—me t with defe ndant’s expectations. Upon inquiry by the co u rt , defe ndant responde d that no one had forc ed him to plead guilty and no promises had been made to him other than the stated terms of the plea a g ree ment. ¶ 6 The defe ndant then stipulated t h at t h e fa ct s as s t at ed i n t h e prosec utor’s opening
statement would serve as the fac tual basis for the guilty plea. The court found a suffici ent fac tual basis for the guilty plea an d s en t enced defe ndant in acc ordanc e with the parties’
ag ree ment. ¶ 7 On Fe bruar

y 27, 2001, defe ndant fil ed a pro se motion to wit hdrawhis guilty plea. On Marc h 30, 2001, the circ uit court d en i ed t h e motion and defe ndant appea led. The State confe ssed err or based on err oneous plea admonishments, and the appellate court rema nded the case

. People v. Donelson
, No. 1-01-2127 (2002) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 8 On rema

nd, defe ndant, by counsel, filed new motions in eac h case , “to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the sentenc e.” Ultimately
, on May 22, 2003, defe nse counsel announce d
an agree ment by

which def

endant would withdra

w hi s motions i n exchang e for the State’s offe r of a five-year sentenc e reduc tion on defe ndant’s first degree murder conviction. The
prosec utor confirme d the ag ree d sentenc e reduc tion, and added, without objection or disag ree ment: “As part of [t he] agree ment *** the defe ndant would withdraw the previously mentioned motions and not litig ate that issue any further .” The court questioned defe ndant

as to his understanding of the agree ment, and emphasized that only “one sentenc e” was being reduc ed, “first degree murder ***, t h e s i g nificant sentenc e, from 55 y ear s to 50 y ear s.” Def endant indicated he understood and expressed his satisfac tion with his attorney ’s perf ormanc e. Pursuant to the parties’ new agree ment, the circ uit court reduc ed defe ndant’s 55-y ear sentenc e for

murder to 50 year s. Defe ndant’s 30-year sentenc es we re una ffe cted. ¶ 9 A l ittle over two months afte r the parties’ May 2003 agree ment, and t h e re s u l t i n g reduc tion of defe ndant’s murder senten ce , a docket entry , dated August 5, 2003, acknow ledg es rec eipt of y et another motion filed by defe ndant, this one for a furt h er “re duction of sentenc e.” In h i s m o t ion, defe ndant ref ere nced only his 50-year sentenc e. A subsequent docket entry indicates the motion was hear d and denied on August 8, 2003. A late notice of appea l, to which defe ndant subscribed, evince s defe ndant’s attempt to appea l from that j u d gm ent. He cited May 22, 2003, as the date of his sentenc e, and the only sentenc e specifie d as cause for conce rn was his 50-year sentenc e for murder. An entry of rec ord, dated Dec ember

1, 2003, states: “L ate Notice of Appe al Denie d.” ¶ 10 Def

endant f iled a pro se postconviction petition on Fe bruar y 18, 2005. In that petition, defe ndant ref

ere nced only his 50-year s en t en ce for murder. He g ener ally asser ted vague

-3-claims of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel, with equally am o rp hous flourishes of

constitutional jarg on; howeve r, he did make one specific claim: “I was promised 30 y ear s and I didn’t rec eive it. I was told by counsel that the State would allow me to file a reduc tion of
sentenc e and if I like to file a withdraw moti on of guilty plea, appeal the motion to reduc e sentenc e.” A rec ord sheet of the circ uit clerk states that postconviction relief w as “denie d”

on Marc h 15, 2005. The rele vant entries use the phrase s “succ essive petition” and “fr ivolous and patently without merit.” In this portion of an obviously jumbled and fra g mentary rec ord

on appea l, a partia l t ra n s cr i pt of a Marc h 30, 2001, hear ing appea rs, wher ein defe ndant’s attorney as of that date told the judge she had offe red the State 30 y ear s in defe ndant’s plea
neg otiations, but the State had never offe red d efe ndant the opportunity to plead guilty to murder in exchange fo r 3 0 y ear s. The prosecutor confirmed that, stating: “Absolutely not, J udg e. In fac t, this would have been a case wher e we had soug ht death.” This portion of the
transcr ipt bear s a stamped filing date of Fe bruar y 18, 2005, sug g esting that it was considere d contempora

neously with defe ndant’s postconviction petition. ¶ 11 In a notice of appea l, fi le stamped April 26, 2005, defe ndant lists “murde r-se x ual assault” as the off enses of which he w as convic ted. The only sentenc e listed is defe ndant’s 50-y ear sentenc e of imprisonment. I t is unclea r what transpire d on appea l. Docke t entries indi cate that an appellate court mandate was filed with the circ uit court on J anuar y 3, 2007, and the
appea l was dismissed, pursuant to “appe llant’s motion” on J anuar y 11, 2007. ¶ 12 On April 23, 2009, defe ndant submitt ed, for filing, a pro se mo t i o n for leave to file a petition for relief from judgme nt, pursuant to section 2-1401(f ) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2008)), along with the petition itself. Def endant challeng ed various aspect s o f his guilty plea, sug g esting that he rec eived ineffe ctive assistance of trial counsel, that the trial court fa iled to comply with I llinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (ef

f. J uly 1, 2006), and that his ple a was involuntary

. Although he claimed the ju d gm ent evincing his convictions and sentenc es was void for sundry rea sons, improper

concur rent sentenc ing was not one of them. The circ uit court dismiss ed defe ndant’s petition

on J uly 17, 2009. On J uly 27, 2009, defe ndant filed a motion to rec onsider the dismiss al of his petition for relief from judgme nt, which the circ uit court denied on August 14, 2009. The ensuingnotice of a

ppeal identifie s defe ndant’s “se ntence ” as “ 50 y rs. conc urre nt.” ¶ 13 On appea l, de fenda nt c ontended that concur

rent sentenc ing rende red his se ntence s and his ple a void. 2011 I L App (1st) 092594, ¶ 7. As indicated at the outset of this opinion, the appellate court ag ree d that the sentenc ing structure was void, insofar as the sentenc es wer e order ed to run concur

rently (2011 I L App (1st) 092594, ¶ 9); howeve r, the court conclude d that the parties’ ag ree ment was not v o i d
, as t he int ent of the parties—that defe ndant s erve

an ag ree d number of y ear s in prison—could be implemented by rese ntencing defe ndant “in

acc ordanc e with both the plea agree ment and the applicable statutes.” 2011 I L App (1s t) 092594, ¶¶ 18, 22. The appellate court so orde red.

¶ 14 ANALYSI S ¶ 15 Contrary to the position it took in t h e ap p el l at e co u rt , the State now conce des that defe ndant’s concur

rent sentenc es wer e improper. As the appellate court corr ectly observe d:

-4-“A conviction of ag g ravated criminal sexual assa u lt ( 7 2 0 I L CS 5/12-14 (West 1998)) trig g ers mandatory consecutive sentenc es wher e the defe ndant is convicted of multipl e offe nses whether the offe nses wer e committed during a single course of conduct (730 I L CS 5/5-8-4(a ) (West 1998)) or whether the offe nses wer e committed durin g s ep ar ate course s of conduct (730 I L CS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1998)). People v. Harris
, 203 I ll. 2d 111, 116-17 (2003).” 2011 I L App (1st) 092594, ¶ 9. A sentenc e, or portion there of, that is not authorized by statute is void. People v. Thompson
, 209 I ll. 2 d 1 9
, 2 3 (2004). Henc e, the sentenc ing structure employ ed in de fenda

nt’s case rende rs his se ntence s void to the extent they wer e order ed to be ser ved conc urre ntly

. ¶ 16 Def

endant, with the ref

rain “void is void,” and the insistence that our rec ent decision in People v. W

hite
, 2011 I L 109616, controls t he outcome here
, contends t hat findi ng should end our inquiry
, that this court should “vac ate [defendant’ s] plea, and rema nd the cause for further proce eding s, during which [defendant] and the State can attempt to rea ch a new plea
ag ree ment or proce ed to trial.” To that end, defe ndant sug g ests that he neg otiated for specific
sentenc es, that this was not a situation wher e he pled for a sentenc ing cap. Appar ently unable
to posit any additional arguments o n his own behalf
, defe ndant opines—anticipating and opposing implementation of the appellate court’s reme dy —“the trial co u rt should not be allowed to unila t er al l y modify the sentenc es and deprive the State of the benef it of its barg ain, *** rathe r the plea should be withdrawn and the parties should be returne d to their positions prior to im position of the void sentence .” ¶ 17 The State arg

ues that the appellate court’s reme dy would g ive the defe ndant the essential
term of his barg ain—“a total period of incar cer ation of 50 y ear s”—and, not surprising ly
, the State appea

rs t o be unconvinced that withdrawa l of defendant’ s guilty plea would inure to its benef it. The State seems more conce rned that it “would be prejudice d if it wer e forc ed to attempt to re- try the case more than 14 y ear s afte r defe ndant committed first-degree murder and ag g ravated cr i m i nal sexual assault.” The State notes that “plea agree ments, like all
contra cts, occa sionally include mistakes of law or fac t,” and sug g ests that the “equitable solution” rea ched by the appellate court in this case makes way for ref ormation of the parties’
ag ree ment in such a way as to g ive both parties the benef its of their barg ain. We agree with the State. ¶ 18 This court has rec ognize d t h at t h e p l ea -b ar gai n i n g p ro cess, and neg otiated plea
ag ree ments, ar e v i t al to, and highly desirable for, our criminal justice sy stem. People v. Evans
, 174 I l l

. 2 d 320, 325 (1996). Plea barg aining leads to prompt dispositi on of case s, prese rves finit e j u d i cial and financ ial resour ces, and allows the State to focus its
prosec utorial eff

orts wher e they are most neede d. People v. Boyt
, 109 I ll. 2d 403, 416 (1985). When proper ly administered, plea barg aining is to be encour ag ed. Evans
, 174 I ll. 2d at 325. As we have fre quently stated, and rec ently observe d in People v. Hughes
, 2012 I L 112817, ¶ 68, a plea ag ree ment has often been compar ed to an enfor cea ble contra ct, and this court has applied contra ct law principles in appropr iate circ umstances. See also People v. Absher
, 242 I ll. 2d 77, 87-88 (2011); Evans , 174 I ll. 2d at 326-27. ¶ 19 Where a plea rests in any si gn i fi ca n t d egr ee up o n a promise or agree ment of the
prosec utor, so that it c an be said to be pa rt of the induce ment or consider ation for the plea, that feature of the ag ree ment must be fulfilled. Hughes
, 2012 I L 112817, ¶ 68. The principal

-5-inquiry
, in that respe ct, is whether the defe ndan t h as re ceived the benef it of his barg ain. Hughes
, 2012 I L 112817, ¶ 69. Thoug h rar ely emphasized in this court’s jurisprudenc e, the other half of the contra ctual equation is the benef it of the barga i n acc ruing to the State, a consideration that looms larg er as the temporal g ap betwee n the commission of the offe nses and attempts to withdraw the guilty plea wide ns. ¶ 20 Her e, the defe ndant and the State wer e mistaken insofar as they believed that defe ndant could be sentenc ed to concur rent t er m s of imprisonment for murder, home invasion, and
ag g ravated criminal sexual assault. Howeve r, pursuant to contra ct principles, contra cting parties’ mutual mist ake ma y be re ctified by rec ourse to contra ct reformation ( Czarobski v. Lata
, 227 I ll. 2d 364, 371-72 (2008))
, wher e they are in actua l agree ment and their true intent
may be disce rned ( W

heele r-Deale r, Ltd. v. Christ , 379 I ll. App. 3d 864, 869 (2008)). ¶ 21 The State argues that defe ndant would rec eive the benef it of his barg ain if, upon rema nd, he is rese ntence d to consec utive sentenc es totaling 50 y ear s in prison. The appellate court’s dispositi on explained how that could be acc omplished within the constraints of consec utive
sentenc ing statutes (see 2011 I L App (1st) 092594, ¶ 18 (“de fenda nt could proper ly rec eive

a total of 50 y ear s’ imprisonment in light of the sentenc ing rang es of 20 to 60 y ear s for first deg ree murder and 6 to 30 y ear s for the other two offe nses”) ) and it presc ribed that reme dy

on rema nd. ¶ 22 The proce dural history of this case does in fac t indicate that defe ndant’s conc ern—a part from limit ing his criminal convictio ns to three —was to set an upper limit on the time he would spend in prison. Def endant orig inally barg ained for a 55-year sentence of i m prisonment on his murder conviction, and 30-year sentenc es on his convictio n s fo r ag g ravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion. The 30-year sentenc es r e p r e s e nte d the maxi mum nonex tended- term sentenc es for those offe nses. ¶ 23 On Fe bruar

y 27, 2001, defe ndant embar ked upon the first of what would be succ essive attempts to withdraw his guilty plea and either reduc e his “sente nce” or vacate his sentenc es. When that first action resulted in an appellate court rema nd to t h e ci rc u i t court, defenda nt ultimately ag ree d to withdraw a m o t i o n t o “withdra w the plea of guilty and vacate the
sentenc e” in exchang e for a five-year reduc tion of his leng thiest sentenc e, i.e.
, the sentenc e

ever y one believed would dictate defe ndant’s maxi mum ter m of incar cer ation. Def

endant’ s 30-y ear sentenc es wer e unaff ecte d. When—in contravention of the understanding that the
sentenc e reduc tion would put a n end to the litigation—def endant almost immediate ly filed another motion for “re duction of sentenc e,” defe ndant ref ere nced only his 50-year sentenc e. When that proce eding came to naught, def en d ant’s 2005 resur

rec tion of the matter via postconviction proce eding s ag ain ref ere nced only his 50-year sentenc e. The rec ord belied defe ndant’s alleg ation that he “wa s promised 30 y ear s” and, in the end, defe ndant was denied postconviction relief

. His notice of appea l from that judgme nt l i s t s only one sentenc e of imprisonment—50 y ear s. Finally
, when d ef en dant’s petiti on for relief from judgme nt was denied by the circ uit court, and defe ndant appea led that ruling
, the ensuing notice of appea l identified def

endant’ s “sentenc e” a s “50 y rs. conc urre nt.” ¶ 24 In short, nothing in the defe ndant’s actions, or the proce dural history of this case , evince s

an y co n ce rn over the two 30-year sentenc es defe ndant rec eived. Most notably
, when h e

-6-neg otiated for a reduc tion of his sentenc e, he did so only with respe ct to the g rea ter sentenc e, the sentenc e ever

y one believed would deter mine the amount of time defe ndant would spend in prison. Clearly , that was de fenda nt’s conce rn in neg otiations, from start to finish. ¶ 25 Def

endant’ s bald a s s er t i o n t hat he neg otiated for specific sentenc es—that t his was not

a situation wher e he pled fo r a s en t en cing cap—r ings hollow. He has not identified any conseque nce attributable to the leng th of these shorter sentenc es in this context. At the time the parties neg otiated the plea agree ment, their understanding was that the 30-year sentenc es would run concur

rently with the longer 5 5 -y ear sentenc e, which was later reduc ed to 50
y ear s. Whether the lesser sentenc es wer e for six y ear s, or 30, the parties clea rly believed they would not aff

ect the maxi mum amount of time defe ndant would spend in prison. Moreove r, the lesser, 30-y ear , sentenc es for which he “neg otiated” repr esente d the maximu m nonextended-term sentenc es for the attendant offe nses. These wer e the “spec ific sentenc es” defe ndant soug ht for home invasion and ag gravated criminal sexual assault. His conduct, in the cour se of this litigation, indicate s they did not matter to him at all. ¶ 26 We turn to defe ndant’s misplaced relianc e upon W hite

. In W hite
, defe ndant had not been
proper ly admo n i s hed about the applicable sentenc ing rang e when he enter ed into a plea
ag ree ment with the State, nor could the prison term to which he agree d be leg ally imposed, as i t was inconsist ent wit h statutory man d at es. When Whit e entered into a plea agree ment for 28 y ear s’ imprisonment, he was corr ectly advised of the sentenc ing rang e for first deg ree murder—20 to 60 year s’ imprisonment—however he was not told about the mandatory 15-
y ear enhanc ement for use of a firea rm. See 730 I L CS 5/5-8-1(a)(1) (d)( i) (West 2004). As this court noted, be cause of the mandatory sentenc ing e nhance ment, “def endant wa s subject to the m an d atory minimum sentenc e of 35 year s’ imprisonment, which is more than the 28
y ear s he rec eived.” W

hite
, 2011 I L 109616, ¶ 19. Thus, the inadequate admonishment led to a sente nce that could not stand as it was inconsist ent wit h statutory require ments. In short,
t h e p l ea agre ement could not be implemented as Whit e could not rec eive the 28-year sentenc e for which he barg ained. Given those ci rc u m s t ance s, this court order ed the cause “re manded to the circ uit court with direc tions to allow defe ndant to withdraw his guilty plea and proc eed to tria l, if he choose s.” W hite , 2011 I L109616, ¶ 31. ¶ 27 The obv i o u s d i ff er en ce s ar e t h es e: (1 ) this defe ndant does not claim that he wa s improperly admonished reg arding sentenc ing r a n g e s f o r in d iv id u al sentenc es when he agree d
to a 50-y ear sentenc e; (2) defe ndant’s sentenc e can be rec onfigured, consisten tly with statutory mandates, in such a

way as to g ive him the benef

it of his barg ain. ¶ 28 When a defe ndant’s guilty plea “ ‘r es t s i n an y s i gn i fi cant degree on a promise or
ag ree ment of the prosec utor, so that it can be said to be p ar t o f t h e inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’ ” Hughes
, 2012 I L 112817, ¶ 6 8 (quoting Santobello v. New Y

ork, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). H ere , it can and w ill be fulfilled. ¶ 29 For the fore g oing rea sons, we aff irm the judgme nt of the appellate court, rema nding this

cause to the circ uit court with directions that t he court rese ntence defe ndant i n acc ordanc e with both the plea agree ment and applica ble statutes.

¶ 30 Affir

med.

-7-