## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 20

- 2139

___________________________ Mary Lisa Lane

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.
Mack H. Ball, Jr., Judge, Chicot County; Chicot County, Arkansas

Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

____________

Submitted: April 15, 2021 Filed: July 26, 2021 [Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM

.

An Arkansas judge fired Mary Lane after she refused to return to work once her medical leave was over . She filed a lawsuit claiming that the decision to fire her

,-2- rather than grant a requested accommodation, was discriminatory

. The district

court 1 dismissed the case at summary judgment , and w e affirm.

I.

Lane, who is black, worked for Chicot County Judge Mack Ball, Jr. for several

years

. She had numerous responsibilities , some of which required direct interaction with the public.

After Lane was diagnosed with breast cancer, Judge Ball gave her extended period s of medical leave

. To accommodate her illness , she also asked to work from home during the day and only come into the office at night

. Although there is some dispute about how he handled the request

, both sides agree that he denied it.

When the t ime came

, Lane did not return to work, so he ended up fir ing her

. 2 Not long after , Lane sued Judge Ball and Chicot County for race and disability
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e -2(a)(1), 12112 (a)

.

II.

W e review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo

. See Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc. , 641 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment [was] appropriate [if] the evidence, viewed in [the] light most favorable to [Lane]

, shows no genuine issue of material fact exists and the [defendants were ] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Phillips v. Mathews , 547 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2008) ( quotation marks omitted).

1 The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

2 Lane argues that she was still on leave when she was fired, but the re is no support in the record for her position

.-3- For each type of claim she brought, Lane had to establish a prima

- facie case
of discrimination

. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minn

. & E. R. R. , 327 F.3d 707, 711

– 12 (8th Cir. 2003) ( outlining the analytical frameworks for failure- to

- accommodate and disparate

- treatment claims under th e Americans with Disabilities Act ); Grant v. City of Blytheville , 841 F.3d 767, 77 3 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
burden

- shifting framework to Title VII claims in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination)

. As the district court concluded, she fell short in her efforts.

Judge Ball’s refusal to allow Lane to work a modified schedule was not
actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act absent “a facial showing that [ she ] was able to complete the essential function [ s] of [her] job with or without an accommodation

. ” Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc ’ ns Corp. , 779 F.3d 803, 812

– 13 (8th Cir. 2015)

. One “essential function” she had to perform was handl ing questions and requests from members of the public, which she could not do outside of business
hours or from home. I d. at 812 (explaining that “a task may be an essential function even if the employee performs it for only a few minutes each week”) ; see also Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., Inc. , 691 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2012) (“ [A]n employer need not reallocate or eliminate the essential functions of a job to accommodate a disabled employee

. ” (internal quotation marks omitted) ). And to the extent she argues that she could have done the job without an accommodation,
her own statements were to the contrary

. For example, she stated at one point that she needed to spend “ [p] retty much” the entire workday lying down.

Lane’s rema ining claims fare no better. One is a claim for rac e discrimination based on the denial of an accommodation, which she tried to prove by identifying a similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment

. See Grant , 841
F.3d at 774 (explaining various ways to prove an inference of discrimination ). The employee she identified was Judge Ball’s administrative assistant, who had a
modified work schedule similar to the one Lane had requested. Still, the assistant

was not “ similar ly situated in all relevant respects ” because her job involved less interaction with the public and she worked out the flexible schedule before she was
hired

. I d. (quotation marks omitted) ; Young v. Builders Steel Co. , 754 F.3d 573, 578-4- (8th Cir. 2014) ( reaching the same conclusion when employees had “different jobs” with “different” requirements).

Nor did Lane establish a prima

- facie case that her firing was discriminatory

. See Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. , 244 F.3d 654, 657 , 659

– 60 (8th Cir. 2001) ( discussing disparate

- treatment claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act );
Grant , 841 F.3d at 774 ( same for Title VII). She cannot identify any employee , let
alone one of a differen t race or without a disability

, who was retained despite failing
to return to work after taking medical leave

. See Pye , 641 F.3d at 1020 (asking whether other employees “were accused of comparable conduct and not fired”)

. There is, in other words, no evidence of discriminatory treatment

. See Lowery , 244
F.3d at 657 , 659

– 60; Grant , 841 F.3d at 774.

III.

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________