Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1409-CR-426 | January 14, 2016 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Aaron E. Haith

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregroy F.Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Steven Wright,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

January 14, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1409-CR-426

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court, Criminal Division, Room 

No. 1

The Honorable Steven Rubick, 

Magistrate

The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G01-0211-FB-276086

Altice, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1409-CR-426 | January 14, 2016 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Steven Wright appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his 

sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] The facts underlying Wright’s convictions were set out on direct appeal by our 

Supreme Court as follows:

Wright was the stay-at-home caregiver for four very young 

children, whom he battered and neglected over a substantial 

period of time. 

* * *

When the Marion County Sheriff’s Department went to Wright’s 

home on September 2, 2001, to investigate the concern of an 

alarmed relative who had recently seen the children, it was not 

the first indication that Wright was abusing and neglecting the 

children in his care. In April 1999, Ma. W., then five months 

old, arrived at the hospital with a fever, but medical examination 

revealed she also had seven right rib fractures and two left rib 

fractures and a healing fracture in her right femur. Wright told 

investigating officers that the leg was broken when an uncle had 

lost his grip while holding the child and grabbed her to prevent 

her from falling. At that time, Wright had no explanation for the 

broken ribs, except to suggest that he had, perhaps, held Ma. W. 

too tightly. At trial, however, Wright suggested the possibility 

that both the ribs and femur were broken when the uncle grabbed 

his daughter to prevent her from falling.
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The scene observed by the sheriff’s deputies thirty months later 

was a chilling one. Two twins lying on a couch presented such a 

shocking appearance that the officers immediately called an 

ambulance. The children’s heads were enlarged and swollen; 

their bodies were malnourished and thin; their eyes were popping 

out of their heads. Medical examination showed that each child 

had suffered at least seventeen fractures on various parts of their 

bodies. At seven months of age, they weighed barely ten pounds 

apiece. The record is replete with details of brain injury and 

other damage to the twins. Upstairs, the deputies found Ma. W. 

and her sister, ages three and two, in somewhat less distressful 

condition.

Wright v. State, 829 N.E.2d 928, 929 (Ind. 2005) (citations to record omitted).

[4] Wright was convicted of two counts of neglect of a dependent and four counts 

of battery, all class B felonies. Wright was subsequently sentenced to fifteen 

years on every count with three terms ordered consecutive thereby resulting in 

an aggregate executed sentence of forty-five years. Wright appealed challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence and the appropriateness of his sentence. This 

court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Wright v. State, 818 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004), trans. granted. The Indiana Supreme Court summarily affirmed 

this court’s opinion insofar as it was determined that the evidence was sufficient 

to support Wright’s convictions, but held that while several aggravating factors 

could be relied upon to support consecutive sentences, those aggravators could 

not be used to enhance Wright’s sentences. The Court remanded for a new 

sentencing hearing. On September 1, 2005, the trial court reduced Wright’s 

sentence from fifteen years on each count to ten years on each count and then 
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ordered the sentences on four counts to run consecutively for an aggregate 

sentence of forty years imprisonment.

[5] On March 28, 2014, Wright filed a Motion for Reduction of or a Suspension of 

Sentence pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17. On April 30, 2014, the State filed 

an objection to Wright’s motion. On May 7, 2014, the trial court requested a 

conduct report from the Department of Correction. A hearing on Wright’s 

motion was held on July 18, 2014. The trial court denied the motion on August 

18, 2014. This appeal ensued.

Discussion & Decision

[6] Wright argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

reduce or suspend his sentence. Wright maintains that the trial court ignored 

the intent of I.C. § 35-38-1-17, which, he asserts “presents a question of 

rehabilitation which must be considered not from the stand point of the initial 

sentencing decision but by the convicted person’s conduct and achievements 

toward the desired goal of rehabilitation - reformation.” Appellant’s Brief at 8 

(citing Ind. Const. art. 1, §§ 16 and 18).

[7] Before we address Wright’s argument, we note the State, relying upon the 

version of I.C. § 35-38-1-17 in effect at the time of Wright’s original sentencing 

and still in effect when Wright filed his request for modification, argues that the 

trial court did not have authority to modify Wright’s sentence without the 

prosecutor’s approval. See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(b) (2014) (“If more than three 

hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the convicted person began 
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serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is 

present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of 

the prosecuting attorney.” (emphasis supplied)). This statute, however, was 

amended again and the current version, which went into effect on May 5, 2015 

now “applies to a person who: (1) commits an offense; or (2) is sentenced; 

before July 1, 2014.” See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(a) (2015); P.L. 164-2015. The 

amended statute further provides, in pertinent part, that a convicted person who 

is not a violent criminal1 “may file a petition for sentence modification . . . 

without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(j). Another 

panel of this court recently considered the amended statute and held that “[i]n 

light of the legislature’s clear intent that the statute be applied retroactively, we 

agree with the State that the amended statute applies to [defendant], whose 

appeal was pending when the retroactivity amendment went into effect.”2 

Vazquez v. State, 37 N.E.3d 962, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The same is true in 

this case. Wright’s appeal was pending when the amended statute went into 

 

1

For purposes of this statute, “violent criminal” is defined in I.C. § 35-38-1-17(d). The State argues that the 

facts underlying Wright’s crimes would constitute aggravated battery pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5, 

and thus asserts that Wright should be deemed a violent criminal. See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(d)(6). If classified as 

a “violent criminal” under this statute, a convicted person “may not file a petition for sentence modification 

without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(k). In this appeal, we will not reclassify 

Wright’s crimes as aggravated battery.

2

In Vazquez, the defendant pleaded guilty in 2004 and filed his most-recent petition to modify his sentence in 

October 2014. The Vazquez court ultimately determined that the amended statute did not entitle the 

defendant to the relief sought because the defendant’s request for modification was untimely as it was filed 

less than three months after his previous request for modification. The court noted the amended statute

mandates this result in that it clearly provides that “[a] convicted person who is not a violent criminal may 

file a petition for sentence modification under this section . . . not more than one (1) time in any three 

hundred sixty-five (365) day period . . . .” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(j)(1). 
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effect. The prosecutor’s consent was therefore not required in order for the 

court to have authority to consider Wright’s request for modification of his 

sentence.

[8] We now turn to Wright’s argument. A decision to grant or deny a motion for 

sentence modification is within the trial court’s discretion. Hawkins v. State, 951 

N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion will 

not be found unless the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 

(Ind. 2007).

[9] During the hearing on Wright’s motion, Wright noted his many 

accomplishments while incarcerated, including completion of a self-help 

program and receiving an associate’s degree in finance, as well as his good 

behavior and family support, in arguing to the court that he had been 

rehabilitated and was deserving of a modified sentence. In response, the State 

objected to any modification based “mostly [on] the nature of the crime.” 

Transcript at 9. In its order denying Wright’s motion, the trial court concluded 

that having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence before it, 

modification of Wright’s sentence was “neither warranted nor appropriate.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 12. 
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[10] We reject the notion espoused by Wright that the court was limited to 

considering only his achievements and efforts at rehabilitation occurring after 

the initial sentencing decision. While such efforts are to be considered, the facts 

and circumstances of the crimes are undoubtedly important to consider when 

the court decides whether to modify a sentence. In fact, we have before held in 

considering a different statute allowing for sentence modification that “the 

heinousness of a person’s crime alone can serve as the basis for denying a 

sentence reduction.” Myers v. State, 718 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); 

see also Marshall v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (balancing 

defendant’s rehabilitative conduct against the aggravating circumstances in 

original sentencing order in affirming denial of motion to modify sentence), 

trans. denied. As our Supreme Court observed on direct appeal, “even in the 

substantial flow of cases reflecting child abuse, Steven V. Wright’s appeal 

stands out.” Wright, 829 N.E.2d at 929. Wright was the stay-at-home caregiver 

for four very young children, whom he battered and neglected over a substantial 

period of time, the alarming details of which are recounted above. 

[11] The trial court’s decision to modify, reduce, or suspend a sentence is entirely 

discretionary, and the fact that rehabilitation has begun does not compel a 

modification of the underlying sentence. Given the extreme depravity of 

Wright’s crimes, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Wright’s motion to modify his sentence. 

[12] Judgment affirmed.
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Barnes, J., concur.

Robb, J., concurring in result with opinion.
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Steven Wright,

Appellant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee

January 12, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1409-CR-426

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

Robb, Judge, concurring in result

[1] The sentences for the crimes for which Wright was convicted (neglect of a 

dependent and battery) are, by law, modifiable. It is not the fact of the crimes 

themselves that cause me to agree they should not be modified. I do not believe 

the heinousness of the crime alone is sufficient to deny modification, if Indiana 

law has not excluded the crime from consideration. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-

17(d); see also slip op. at 5 n.1. I ultimately agree with the majority that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright’s motion for sentence 

modification. I agree based on a consideration of the facts of his crime—

specifically his position of trust over four small children and the severity of the 
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damage he inflicted on them—and his efforts at rehabilitation since—which are 

admirable but do not appear targeted toward his ability or willingness to resist 

abusing such a position of trust in the future. I respectfully concur in result.