1

 The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-3446

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Glen Thomas Dotson, *

 * 

Appellant. *

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Submitted: June 12, 2009

Filed: July 7, 2009

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Before BYE, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Glen Thomas Dotson guilty of conspiracy to commit murder-forhire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, and conspiracy to deliver a firearm to a

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1) and 371. The district court1

sentenced Dotson to 120 months imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively.

Dotson appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742,

this court affirms. 
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I. 

Dotson claims there was insufficient evidence for both convictions. This court

reviews the sufficiency of evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict. United States v. Bower, 484 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 2007).

This court will reverse only if it concludes that no reasonable jury could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Santana, 524 F.3d

851, 853 (8th Cir. 2008). 

First, Dotson argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction for conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire. To prove a conspiracy to

commit murder-for-hire, the government must prove that there was an agreement to

kill Cox, Dotson knew of the agreement, and Dotson intentionally joined the

agreement. See United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 954 (8th Cir. 2008).

Circumstantial evidence alone can prove the elements of conspiracy. Id. Evidence

that a co-conspirator participated in acts that furthered the conspiracy is substantive

evidence of the conspiracy’s existence. United States v. Titlbach, 339 F.3d 692, 697

(8th Cir. 2003). 

The government presented evidence that Dotson was aware of Jackson’s desire

to kill Cox, procured and delivered a firearm at Jackson’s direction, and knew the

ultimate purpose for the firearm. A reasonable jury could conclude:

• Dotson was the “right hand man” of bail bondsman Virgil Lee

Jackson. 

• Jackson, a convicted felon, had a grudge against Gerald Cox for

opposing a Missouri Senate Bill that would permit convicted

felons to apply for bail-bond licenses. 

• Jackson hired another bail bondsman to kill Cox. 
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• Dotson conspired with Jackson to procure a weapon for the

shooter. 

• Dotson acquired a firearm and delivered it to Jackson. 

There was sufficient evidence that Dotson conspired to commit murder-for-hire.

Next, as to the conspiracy to deliver a firearm to a convicted felon, Dotson

contends that there was insufficient evidence that the weapon at issue was a “firearm”

for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), and not an “antique firearm.” A firearm

manufactured in or before 1898 is an antique firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(16)(A). A

government expert testified that the firearm was manufactured in 1900. In addition,

an ATF firearms examiner determined that it was likely that the firearm was

manufactured in 1900. There was ample evidence that the weapon was not an antique.

 

II. 

Dotson claims the district court procedurally erred in calculating his advisory

sentencing range for the murder-for-hire conviction. Since Dotson failed to make this

objection below, this court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Burnette, 518

F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 2008). Dotson was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1958.

The Statutory Index, Appendix A of the Sentencing Guidelines, says that for § 1958

convictions, the corresponding guideline is U.S.S.G. § 2E1.4, which states: 

(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greater):

(1) 32; or

(2) the offense level applicable to the underlying unlawful 

conduct.
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Under subsection (2), the district court cross-applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5 for Conspiracy

or Solicitation to Commit Murder, which has a base offense level of 33, and a 4-level

increase if the offense involved the offer or receipt of anything of pecuniary value for

undertaking the murder. The consideration for the proposed murder was additional

bail-bond business, which has pecuniary value, bringing the offense level to 37. As

37 is greater than 32, the appropriate base offense level was 37 under § 2E1.4. 

Dotson argues that subsection (2) should be applied only if the crime

encompassed “underlying unlawful conduct” in addition to that required to violate 18

U.S.C. § 1958. Dotson’s argument is contrary to the plain language of § 2E1.4(a),

which does not contain an additional conduct requirement. As part of an exhaustive

analysis of § 1958 cases, Dotson relies on United States v. Smith, 232 F.3d 650, 651

(8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Smith was also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1958.

Id. Unlike Dotson, Smith aided a murder-for-hire that resulted in a murder. Id. This

court determined that first degree murder was the underlying unlawful conduct for

purposes of § 2E1.4(a)(2), and affirmed Smith’s life sentence. Id. at 651-52. Smith

does not address an “additional conduct” requirement, and like this case, crossapplied the guideline for the underlying unlawful conduct. There is no additional

unlawful conduct requirement for applying § 2E1.4(a)(2). The district court did not

err in its calculation of Dotson’s advisory sentencing range. 

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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