alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>







                                  Exhibit 3.4
            Third Amendment to the Bylaws of InterWest Bancorp, Inc.









<PAGE>

                        THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE BYLAWS OF
                             INTERWEST BANCORP, INC.


THIS AMENDMENT to the Bylaws of InterWest Bancorp, Inc., a Washington
Corporation (the "corporation"), was adopted by more than a two-thirds majority
vote of a quorum of the Board of Directors of the corporation, at a regular
meeting held on July 21, 1998, at which a quorum was present and voting:

Section 6.1 is amended to read as follows:

6.1.    The shares of stock issued by the corporation may be either with or
        without par value, as authorized by the Articles of Incorporation. The
        shareholders at any regular or special meeting called for that purpose
        may authorize the issuance of additional capital stock upon such terms
        and conditions as may be included in such authorization.

        The board of directors may change the number of authorized shares of 
        stock to effectuate a split of, or stock dividend in, the corporation's
        own shares, and to change the number of authorized shares in proportion
        thereto.

         DATED this 21st day of July, 1998.




                                                    /s/ B.R. Beeksma
                                                    ---------------------------
                                                    B.R. Beeksma, Chairman

Attested by:




/s/ Margaret Mordhorst
-----------------------------
Margaret Mordhorst, Secretary
United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 13, 2015

Before

No. 13‐3296            

      

LEE BLANKENSHIP,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

KIMBERLY BIRCH,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 10‐542‐GPM

G. Patrick Murphy,

Judge.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the Petition for Rehearing filed by Plaintiff‐Appellant on

March 5, 2015, this court’s order of November 5, 2014 is amended as follows. In all other

respects, all members of the original panel have voted to deny the petition for rehearing.

No active judge called for a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, in all

other respects, the petition for rehearing is DENIED.

1) In the third paragraph: Delete the words “Two months” in the fourth sentence

of the third paragraph of the order, and begin the sentence with “After.” In the

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
No. 13‐3296 Page 2

final sentence, delete the phrase “he reported no pain, and” and begin the

sentence with “Dr. Birch.”

2) In the penultimate paragraph delete the two sentences beginning with the

phrase “to the contrary, his medical records are devoid of any complaints

about elbow pain” and ending with the phrase “surgery is not a cure.”
##### 



EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND ACTING CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER RELATING TO A PERIODIC REPORT
CONTAINING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

I, David H. McCormick, Chief Executive Officer of
FreeMarkets, Inc., hereby certify to my knowledge, and I, Sean
M. Rollman, Acting Chief Financial Officer, of FreeMarkets,
Inc., hereby certify to my knowledge, that:




(a) The Companys periodic report on
Form 10-K/A for the annual period ended December 31,
2003 (the Form 10-K/A), fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended; and







(b) The information contained in the
Form 10-K/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




* * *




|                                              |  |                                        
|--------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------
|Chief Executive Officer                       |  | Acting Chief Financial Officer         
|                                             
|By:  /s/ DAVID H. MCCORMICKDAVID H. MCCORMICK |  | By:  /s/ SEAN M. ROLLMANSEAN M. ROLLMAN
|                                             
|Date: April 29, 2004                          |  | Date: April 29, 2004                   




A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear
in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
FreeMarkets, Inc. and will be retained by FreeMarkets, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.

78
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James C. JONES.

No. 88-KH-2413.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 21, 1989.

In re Jones, James C.; — Defendant(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 245-663.

Denied.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2092 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain perfluorocarbon alkanes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain perfluorocarbon 

alkanes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN PERFLUOROCARBON ALKANES. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.01.00 C5-C8 Perfluorocarbon 

alkanes (CAS No. 86058–42– 

1) (provided for in subheading 2903.39.20) ............. Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2092 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 207 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a deduction for 

health insurance premiums. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 12, 2009 

Mrs. BOXER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a 

deduction for health insurance premiums. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Health Insurance Tax 

5 Relief Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEDUCTIBILITY OF HEALTH INSURANCE PRE7 MIUMS. 

8 (a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.— 

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 

10 213 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
2 

•S 207 IS

1 to medical, dental, etc., expenses) is amended to 

2 read as follows: 

3 ‘‘(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.—There shall be 

4 allowed as a deduction the following amounts not com5 pensated for by insurance or otherwise— 

6 ‘‘(1) the amount by which the amount of ex7 penses paid during the taxable year (reduced by the 

8 amount deductible under paragraph (2)) for medical 

9 care of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, and the 

10 taxpayer’s dependents (as defined in section 152, de11 termined without regard to subsections (b)(1), 

12 (b)(2), and (d)(1)(B) thereof) exceeds 7.5 percent of 

13 adjusted gross income, plus 

14 ‘‘(2) so much of the expenses paid during the 

15 taxable year for insurance which constitutes medical 

16 care under subsection (d)(1)(D) (other than for a 

17 qualified long-term care insurance contract) for such 

18 taxpayer, spouse, and dependents as does not exceed 

19 $2,000 ($4,000 in the case of a joint return).’’. 

20 (2) LIMITATION BASED ON ADJUSTED GROSS

21 INCOME.—Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code 

22 of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the fol23 lowing new subsection: 

24 ‘‘(f) LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN MED25 ICAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS.—The amount of the deducVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:58 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S207.IS S207

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
3 

•S 207 IS

1 tion allowed by subsection (a)(2) (determined without re2 gard to this subsection) shall be reduced (but not below 

3 zero) by 5 percent of so much of the taxpayer’s adjusted 

4 gross income as exceeds $75,000 ($150,000 in the case 

5 of a joint return).’’. 

6 (b) DEDUCTION ALLOWED WHETHER OR NOT TAX7 PAYER ITEMIZES DEDUCTION.—Section 62(a) of the In8 ternal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining adjusted gross in9 come) is amended by inserting after paragraph (21) the 

10 following new paragraph: 

11 ‘‘(22) HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS.—The 

12 deduction allowed by section 213(a)(2).’’. 

13 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

14 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

15 December 31, 2008. 

Æ 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

___________

No. 96-2308

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

James Turner, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: August 28, 1996

 Filed: August 30, 1996

___________

Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

James Turner challenges the 135-month sentence imposed by the

District Court following his guilty plea to conspiring to distribute

1

cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846

(1994). Turner contends the District Court erred in calculating his base

offense level, because authorities engaged in sentencing manipulation by

lengthening their investigation and arranging more drug buys merely to

increase his sentence.

We reject Turner's sentencing-manipulation argument. The three drug

purchases at issue here involved increasingly larger amounts, and resulted

in the accumulation of evidence sufficient to 
-2-

arrest Turner's co-conspirator. Cf. United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647,

649 (8th Cir. 1993) (approving chain of transactions between undercover

agent and drug dealer to ascertain what drug quantity defendant was willing

and able to deal), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1203 (1994); United States v.

Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1993) (repeated buys may be necessary

to gain drug dealer's confidence); United States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119,

123 (8th Cir. 1992) (police must be given leeway to probe depth and extent

of criminal enterprise, determine whether co-conspirators exist, and trace

drug deeper into distribution hierarchy). We thus conclude the District

Court did not err in calculating Turner's base offense level.

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Troy B. DUPLISSEY.

No. 88-K-2515.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 27, 1989.

In re Duplissey, Troy B.; — Defendants); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 19730-KA; Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 87-219A.

Prior report: La.App., 529 So.2d 1379.

Granted.
#### Aaron Pitter and Company, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Rosa Segal, Appellant.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Francis N. Pécora, J.), entered October 9, 1990, which, *inter alia,*denied defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action of the complaint and for a protective order, is unanimously reversed to the extent appealed from, on the law, and the motion granted, without costs or disbursements.

Defendant Segal is a former employee of plaintiff Dorjean Textiles, Ltd., Inc. now owned by plaintiff Aaron Fitter and Company, Inc. After she left Dorjean’s employ, this action alleging two causes of action, was commenced against her. In the first cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that defendant wrongfully took proprietary information of customers and accounts belonging to Dorjean, converting this information to her own use and benefit. In the second cause of action, plaintiffs alleged "on information and belief’ that defendant, before terminating her employment, took and received orders from Dorjean’s customers and converted these orders to the use and benefit of herself and her new employer.

After discovery, defendant moved for partial summary judgment as to the second cause of action. In support of this motion, she submitted her verified denial that she had converted sales orders *(see,*CPLR 105 [t]; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3212:15, at 436). The motion was also supported by plaintiffs’ admission in answers to interrogatories and discovery de*160mands that they did not possess any information or documents demonstrating defendant’s claimed misconduct in the second cause of action. In opposition, plaintiffs relied on an affirmation of counsel without personal knowledge of the facts. In addition, the affirmation simply alleged conclusory and speculative allegations of defendant’s wrongdoing which are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment *(see, Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 560; *Citibank v Furlong,*81 AD2d 803, 804). Likewise, although CPLR 3212 (f) permits an opposing party to obtain further discovery if "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated”, it should not be utilized to embark upon a "fishing expedition” simply exploring the possibility of asserting a cause of action. *(Oates v Marino,*106 AD2d 289, 292; *Citibank v Furlong, supra,*at 804.) Concur—Murphy, P. J., Milonas, Ross and Asch, JJ. *[See,*174 AD2d 439.]
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jerald WILSON.

No. 88-KK-0199.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 29, 1988.

In re Wilson, Jerald; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, prohibition, man-danus and/or supervisory writ; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 87-1246; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 87-K-888.

Denied.
**Exhibit
      32**





Certification
      of Principal Executive and Financial Officer


Pursuant
      to


Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A for the quarter ended
      June
      30, 2006 (the “Report”) of Highbury Financial Inc. (the “Registrant”), as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, the undersigned
      hereby certify that, to the best of the undersigneds’ knowledge:




(1)         The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)         The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant for the
      period certified.




Date:
                October 13, 2006
            
            By:
            
            /s/
                Richard S. Foote**Richard
                S. Foote****President
                and Chief Executive Officer****(Principal
                Executive Officer)**By:
            
            /s/
                R. Bradley Forth**R.
                Bradley Forth****Executive
                Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and
                Secretary****(Principal
                Financial Officer)**
# BANKGREENVILLE
FINANCIAL CORPORATION

# Exhibit 32             Section 1350
Certifications

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, the Chief Executive
Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of BankGreenville Financial Corporation (the
Company), each certify that, to his or her knowledge on the date of this
certification:

| | 1. | The quarterly report of the Company for the period ended March 31, 2009 as filed
               with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the
               Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
               15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
               respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|                    |  |                              
|------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|                    |  |                              
|Date:  May 13, 2009 |  | By:   /s/  Russel T. Williams
|                    |  | Russel T. Williams           
|                    |  | Chief Executive Officer      

|                    |  |                         
|------------------- |  | ------------------------
|                    |  |                         
|Date:  May 13, 2009 |  | By:   /s/  Paula S. King
|                    |  | Paula S. King           
|                    |  | Chief Financial Officer
#### Ex parte: Harold E. HAYDEN. (In re State of Alabama v. Harold E. Hayden).

4 Div. 168.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 23, 1988.

W. Terry Bullard, Dothan, for petitioner.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen. and Charles W. Hart III, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Henry D. Binford, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dothan, for respondent.

BOWEN, Presiding Judge.

This is a petition for writ of mandamus wherein the petitioner seeks to compel the circuit judge to order his release from jail. The facts are:

> January 7, 1988 Petitioner pleaded guilty to Theft III and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment.

> January 28 Probation was denied.

> May 6 On petitioner’s oral motion, the trial judge, without prior notice to the district attorney, modified and reduced the sentence to 99 days (which the petitioner had already served) and released the petitioner.

> June 4 The district attorney filed a motion to reinstate sentence.

> June 14 After a hearing, the trial judge reinstated the original 12 months’ sentence.

In reinstating the original sentence, the trial judge stated, “Although this Court has been under the understanding that Circuit Courts had the authority to modify sentences beyond 30 days from the imposition of sentence as argued in DEFENDANT’S Memorandum of Law, the cases of *Stout v. State,*45 Ala.App. 262, 229 So.2d 37 (1969) (paragraph 1), and *Ex parte Pennington,*57 Ala.App. 128, 326 So.2d 656 (1976), although not directly on point, indicate that the Court has no power to suspend the execution of sentence after the date sentence is ordered.”

Since there was no motion for new trial or request to modify sentence filed within 30 days of sentencing, the trial judge lost all jurisdiction to modify the defendant’s *941sentence. *Pickron v. State,*475 So.2d 599 (Ala.1985); *State v. Green,*436 So.2d 803 (Ala.1983). See also Rule 13, Temp.A.R.Cr. P. The circuit court’s order of May 6th reducing and modifying the petitioner’s sentence was a nullity. Therefore, this petition is due to be denied.

PETITION DENIED.

All Judges concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0243

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ZECHARIAH JUSTIN DANIEL SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including April 14, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 8 2023

03/08/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0243
#### Phil BEGUE, d/b/a French Quarter Realty v. Frank S. BRUNO.

No. 88-CA-0664.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Nov. 29, 1988.

Randall K. Brooks, New Orleans, for Phil Begue, d/b/a French Quarter Realty, plaintiff-appellant.

Frank S. Bruno, New Orleans, pro se.

Before BYRNES, CIACCIO and WARD, JJ.

WARD, Judge.

Phil Begue, a licensed real estate broker d/b/a French Quarter Realty sued Frank S. Bruno for payment of a real estate commission. The Trial Court awarded Begue $500.00 plus interest and costs. Begue appeals, assigning error to the Trial Court’s quantum award contending the amount due is $1,440.00. We affirm the ruling of the Trial Court.

Bruno owned an apartment complex on Decatur Street. He contends he orally agreed to pay a commission of *lh*the first month’s rent for every tenant Begue procured for the complex. Begue introduced a prospective tenant to Bruno and asked that Bruno show the tenant one of the apartments as Begue had another appointment and was unable to do so. Bruno showed the apartment and approximately 10 days after this meeting, the tenant contacted *1385Bruno to negotiate the terms of a lease. Ultimately, the tenant and Bruno signed a 24 month lease on two apartments to be used as an office for a total monthly rental of $1,000.00. After this introduction, Be-gue made no other attempt to contact the tenant until after the tenant moved into the complex.

After the lease was signed, Bruno sent Begue a commission check. Begue returned the check contending the amount was insufficient. Begue filed suit seeking $1,440.00.

Begue testified that on the day he introduced Bruno to the tenant, he told Bruno his commission in this instance was the standard commercial lease commission, 6% of the rent for the term of the lease. Bruno claims Begue never told him this and he testified that in previous dealings with Be-gue, the commission was always *lk*of the first month’s rent. Moreover, Bruno contends that in addition to procuring a tenant, Begue had to provide services to earn the commission as he had done in the past. Begue had to obtain a financial statement, background information, the first month’s rent, a deposit and prepare the lease for Bruno’s acceptance. Begue admits he provided none of these services in this instance, but contends he was prevented from doing so because Bruno dealt directly with the tenant instead of allowing Begue to represent his “client.”

The only testimony at trial was that of the parties, and it was contradictory. The Trial Court heard the testimony, observed the parties, and concluded Begue was only due *5⁄8*of the first month’s rent. The Trial Judge’s finding of fact favorable to Bruno is supported by the record and in the absence of manifest error, we will not disturb that finding. *Arceneaux v. Domingue,*365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed; all costs of this appeal are assessed to Begue.

AFFIRMED.
#### F. G. WHITE, Appellant, v. B. J. BRADNER, as Receiver for Lake View Oil and Refining Co., et al., Appellees.

No. 9193.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Jan. 15, 1940.

Thornton Wilson, of Oakland, Cal., for appellant.

Bradner & Weil, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee Bradner, etc.

Joseph J. Rifkind, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee Oil Well Supply Co.

Before DENMAN, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Upon motion of appellant that the appeal herein be dismissed, and good cause therefor appearing, ordered- appeal herein dismissed, that a decree of dismissal be filed and entered accordingly, and that the mandate of this court in this cause issue forthwith.