United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2139

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Mary Lisa Lane

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Mack H. Ball, Jr., Judge, Chicot County; Chicot County, Arkansas

 Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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Submitted: April 15, 2021

Filed: July 26, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

An Arkansas judge fired Mary Lane after she refused to return to work once

her medical leave was over. She filed a lawsuit claiming that the decision to fire her, 
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rather than grant a requested accommodation, was discriminatory. The district 

court1 dismissed the case at summary judgment, and we affirm.

I. 

Lane, who is black, worked for Chicot County Judge Mack Ball, Jr. for several

years. She had numerous responsibilities, some of which required direct interaction 

with the public.

After Lane was diagnosed with breast cancer, Judge Ball gave her extended 

periods of medical leave. To accommodate her illness, she also asked to work from 

home during the day and only come into the office at night. Although there is some 

dispute about how he handled the request, both sides agree that he denied it. 

When the time came, Lane did not return to work, so he ended up firing her.

2

 

Not long after, Lane sued Judge Ball and Chicot County for race and disability

discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),12112(a). 

II. 

 We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. 

See Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment 

[was] appropriate [if] the evidence, viewed in [the] light most favorable to [Lane], 

shows no genuine issue of material fact exists and the [defendants were] entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quotation marks omitted).

1

The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Arkansas.

2

Lane argues that she was still on leave when she was fired, but there is no 

support in the record for her position. 
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For each type of claim she brought, Lane had to establish a prima-facie case 

of discrimination. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R., 327 F.3d 707, 711–12

(8th Cir. 2003) (outlining the analytical frameworks for failure-to-accommodate and 

disparate-treatment claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Grant v. City 

of Blytheville, 841 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework to Title VII claims in the absence of direct evidence of 

discrimination). As the district court concluded, she fell short in her efforts. 

Judge Ball’s refusal to allow Lane to work a modified schedule was not 

actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act absent “a facial showing that 

[she] was able to complete the essential function[s] of [her] job with or without an

accommodation.” Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc’ns Corp., 779 F.3d 803, 812–13 

(8th Cir. 2015). One “essential function” she had to perform was handling questions

and requests from members of the public, which she could not do outside of business 

hours or from home. Id. at 812 (explaining that “a task may be an essential function 

even if the employee performs it for only a few minutes each week”); see also Kallail 

v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n 

employer need not reallocate or eliminate the essential functions of a job to 

accommodate a disabled employee.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And to 

the extent she argues that she could have done the job without an accommodation, 

her own statements were to the contrary. For example, she stated at one point that 

she needed to spend “[p]retty much” the entire workday lying down. 

Lane’s remaining claims fare no better. One is a claim for race discrimination 

based on the denial of an accommodation, which she tried to prove by identifying a 

similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment. See Grant, 841 

F.3d at 774 (explaining various ways to prove an inference of discrimination). The 

employee she identified was Judge Ball’s administrative assistant, who had a 

modified work schedule similar to the one Lane had requested. Still, the assistant 

was not “similarly situated in all relevant respects” because her job involved less 

interaction with the public and she worked out the flexible schedule before she was 

hired. Id. (quotation marks omitted); Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 578
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(8th Cir. 2014) (reaching the same conclusion when employees had “different jobs” 

with “different” requirements). 

Nor did Lane establish a prima-facie case that her firing was discriminatory. 

See Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 244 F.3d 654, 657, 659–60 (8th Cir. 2001)

(discussing disparate-treatment claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act);

Grant, 841 F.3d at 774 (same for Title VII). She cannot identify any employee, let 

alone one of a different race or without a disability, who was retained despite failing

to return to work after taking medical leave. See Pye, 641 F.3d at 1020 (asking 

whether other employees “were accused of comparable conduct and not fired”). 

There is, in other words, no evidence of discriminatory treatment. See Lowery, 244 

F.3d at 657, 659–60; Grant, 841 F.3d at 774.

III. 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

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