MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 27 Docket: Wal

- 18

- 197 Submitted

On	Briefs: November	28,	2018 Decided: February	21,	2019
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER , MEAD, JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
JACOB	BERRY

v. MAINESTREAM	FINANCE

HJELM ,	J. [¶1] This	case	involves	the	fate	of	a	race car	that	may

— or	may	not

— be
the	 one called “Outlaw.” Jacob	 Berry	 appeals	 from a summary judgment
entered in the	District	Court	( Belfast , Worth,	J. ) in	favor	of MaineStream	Finance

on Berry’s	complaint	seeking the return	of a	2016	Chevrolet	Camaro

. The court based	the	judgment on the implicit	conclusion that Berry’s claim i s barred by the	res	judicata	effect of a judgment in a 2016 action between MaineStream	and Berry’s	uncle ,	Dwight M. Moody ,	Jr.,	in	which	the	court	determined	that Outlaw was	owned	by	Moody	and	not	Berry

. Because ,	however, the	summary	judgment
record does	not	establish	that Outlaw	is the same vehicle as	the	one that	is at issue	here , we vacate	the	judgmen t

.2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	 following	 facts	 are	 taken	 from MaineStream’s statement	 of
material	 fact s , which	 we view	 in	 the	 light	 most favorable	 to	 Berry	 as	 the nonprevailing	 party and which ,	 in	 any	 event, are	 undisputed because	 Berry
admitted	each	of	MaineStream’s factual statements	and	presented	none	of	his

own . S ee M.R.	Civ. P.	56(h) ; Avis	Rent	a	Car	Sys.,	LLC	v.	Burrill ,	2018	ME	81,	¶	2,
187	A.3d	583

. [¶ 3 ] In	2016,	MaineStream	 filed	a n	action	against	Moody	 to repossess
two	race cars	 that Moody	had pledged	as	collateral in a	security	agreement. 1 Prior	 to	 the	 hearing on	 the	 complaint, MaineStream seized	 one	 of	 the	 race

cars — “Outlaw”

— from	 Moody’s	 property. At	 the	 hearing,	 Moody	 disputed
MaineStream’s claim	that	it	was	entitled	to	repossess Outlaw because,	Moody contended,	it	was not	one	of	the	two	vehicles	pledged in the	security	agreement
and because	the	car was actually owned by Berry.		Berry was	not	a	party	to	the
action but testified at	 the	 hearing that	 he owned	 the car	 in	 MaineStream’s possession and	 that	it never	belonged	 to	Moody. After	hearing	 the	evidence,

1 MaineStream	also	named	another	person	as	a	co

- defendant	in	that	case,	but	the	co

- defendant was	 never	 served	 with	 process,	 and	 the	 action	 proceeded	 against	 Moody	 alone	 based	 on	 the understanding	 that	Moody	 had	 sole	 possession	 of	 the	 race	 cars in	which	Mai neStream	 claimed	a security	interest

.3
t he court found that Moody wa s	 the	 owner	 of Outlaw and entered a	 final judgment. MaineStream’s	 Rule	 56( h )	 submission	 filed in	 this	 case	 does	 not contain	any	assertion	that	identif ies the	party	for	whom	judgment	was	entered or	the	nature	of	any	relief	granted,	and	the	record	on	summary	judgment	does not	provide	any	identifying	or	descriptive	information	about	Outlaw	other	than
its	name. [¶ 4 ] In	 March	 of	 2017,	 Berry	 brought the	 present action	 against
MaineStream to	recover personal	property. See 14	M.R.S.	§	7071 (1) (201 8 )

. In his	 complaint, Berry	 allege d that MaineStream ,	 in	 attempting	 to	 enforce	 its security	 agreement	 with Moody, had seized	 a	 2016	 Chevrolet	 Camaro	 that Berry	 owns	 but	 that the	 seizure	 was	 wrongful because MaineStream “misidentified	 [Berry’s]	 vehicle	 and	 took	 possession	 of	 his	 vehicle	 in	 error

. ” Berry	 went	 on	 to	 allege	 that the	 two	 vehicles in	 which	 Moody	 granted MaineStream	a	security	interest were	2012	and	2013	Chevrolet Impalas

. [¶ 5 ] In	 January	 of	 2018,	 MaineStream filed a motion	 for summary judgment based	on	an	assertion that , in	the 2016 action ,	the	court	determined that	 Moody	 owns	 t he	 car and	 that ,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 doctrine	 of res	 judicata , Berry is	 barred from seeking	 relief	 here .	 	 The	 court granted	 MaineStream’s
motion in	a very	brief order	that	stated	only	that	the	motion	was	granted	and4 that	judgment	was	 entered	 against	 Berry. Berry filed	 a timely	 appeal to	 us

. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (201 8 ) ; M.R.	App. P. 2B(c)(1)

. II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 6 ] We	 review a grant	 of	 summary	judgment	 de	 novo “ and consider both	the	evidence	and	any	reasonable	inferences	that	the	evidence	produces	in
the light	most	favorable	to	the	party	against	whom	the	summary	judgment	has been	granted .” Canney v. Strathglass Holdings, LLC , 2017 ME 64, ¶ 10, 159 A.3d
330 (quotation marks omitted)

. Summary	judgment	is appropriate only “ when the	parties’	statements	of	material	facts	and	the	portions	of	the	record	referred to	therein	disclose	no	genuine	issues	of	material	fact	and	reveal	that	one	party is	entitled	to	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law.” Id. ; see M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). [¶ 7 ] As	a central	tenet	of	summary	judgment	motion	practice,	“[f] acts	not set	 forth	in	 the	statement	of	material	 facts	are	not in the	summary	judgment record, even	 if	 the	 fact	 in	 question	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 affidavits	 or	 other documents	 attached	 to,	 and	 even	 referred	 to	 in	 portions	 of,	 a	 statement	 of
material	fact. ” HSBC	Bank	USA,	N.A.	v.	Gabay ,	2011	ME	101, ¶	22,	28	A.3d	1158 ( alteration	and quotation	marks omitted)

. [¶ 8 ] MaineStream’s summary	judgment	motion	is	predicated on the	two aspects	of	the	doctrine	of	res	judicata. The	first	is	c ollateral	estoppel ,	or	issue5 preclusion, which is	the fact

- focused branch	of	res	judicata	that “ prevents the relitigation	of	issues	already	decided	if	the	identical	issue	was	determined	by	a prior	 final	 judgment,	 and	 the	 party	 estopped	 had	 a	 fair	 opportunity	 and incentive	to	litigate	the	issue	in	a	prior	proceeding. ” Town	of	M ount Vernon	v.
Landherr ,	2018	ME 105,	¶	15,	190	A.3d	249 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. Based

on this	 doctrine, MaineStream	 asserts	 that	 the	 2016	 judgment collaterally estops Berry	from	asserting	an	essential	element	of	his	cause	of	action,	namely, that	he	has	an	 ownership	interest	in	 the	 ve hicle	 that	he	claims	MaineStream wrongfully	 repossessed. See 14	M.R.S.	 §	7071(1). MaineStream	 also	asserts that	 Berry’s	 action	 is	 barred	 by	 the	 other	 aspect	 of	 res	 judicata

— claim preclusion. C laim	 preclusion forecloses relitigation	 of	 claims	 only	 when “(1) the	same	parties	or	 their	privies	are	involved	in	both	actions;	(2) a	valid final	judgment	was	entered	in	the	prior	action;	and	(3)	the	matters	presented
for	decision in	the	second	action	were,	or	might	have	been,	lit igated	in	the	first
action.” Pushard	 v.	 Bank	 of	 Am.,	 N.A. ,	 2017 ME	 230,	 ¶ 20,	 175	 A.3d	 103 (quotation	marks	omitted). MaineStream contends	that the	present	action	is
barred	because MaineStream’s	claim	in	the 2016 proceeding encompassed the question	of	wh o	owned	the	race	car	that	Berry	seeks	to	recover	here.6 [¶9] Although	the	parties	have	focused	their	presentations	on	whether the	judgment	 operates	 to	 bind	 Berry even though he was	 not	 a	 party	 to	 the
2016 proceeding, 2 the	judgment	entered	in	that	case	does	not	bar	his	claim	for a	simpler	reason

— the	record	on	summary	judgment	does	not	establish	that in
the	2016	matter the court	determined	the	ownership	of	the	vehicle	Berry	now claims	to	own	or	that	ownership	of	th at veh icle	was	even	at	issue	then

. [¶ 10 ] To	be	entitled	 to	a	summary	judgment	 that	is	predicated	on the principle	 of	 collateral	 estoppel , MaineStream	 must indisputably establish, among	 other	 things,	 that	 the	 vehicle	 Berry	 now	 claims	 to	 own is the	 same vehicle	 that,	in	 2016,	 the	 court	 determined was	 owned not	 by	 Berry , but	 by Moody. To	be	entitled	to	summary	judgment	predicated	on the other	form	of res	 judicata

— claim	 preclusion

— MaineStream must indisputably establish , among	other	things, that	t he	ownership	of	the 2016 Camaro	that	Berry	claims
to	own	in	 this	case	was a	matter	 that was	or	could	have	been	litigated in the
2016 proceeding.

2 MaineStream	contends	that	the	2016	judgment	bars	Berry	from	pursuing	the	claim	here	either because	 he	 and	Moody	were	in	 privity	during	 the	2016	 proceeding	 or	 because	 Berry	 could	 have become	a	party	by	seeking	to	i ntervene	on	the	basis	that	his	ownership	claim	was	in	the	balance.		We do	not	reach	these	contentions	because,	on	this	record,	MaineStream’s	assertion	of	res	judicata	fails for	the	separate	reason	addressed	in	the	text.7 [¶1 1 ] MaineStream’s	 statement	 of	 material	 facts	 falls	 well	 short	 of establishing that	 the	 car	 Berry	 claims	 here is either	 Outlaw	 or	 one	 of	 the
vehicles	 that MaineStream	 sought	 to	 repossess in	 the	 2016	 action

. MaineStream’s	 statement	 of	 material	 fact s describes	 the	 vehicle	 whose ownership	was	adjudicated	in	the	2016	case	only	as “ Outla w, ” and	the	vehicle that	 Berry	 seeks	 to	 recover	 from	 MaineStream	 in	 this	 action	 only	 as	 a

“ 2016 Chevrolet	 Camaro

. ” 3 N othing	 in	 this	 record	 establishes	 that the
2016 Camaro	 at	issue	 here is	Outlaw

. 4 Further, MaineStream’s statement	 of
material	fact s does not	establish	that	the	2016	Camaro	is	one	of	the	vehicles in which	MaineStream	had	a	security	interest	and	thereby sought	to	repossess	in
the	2016	case. [¶ 1 2 ] B ecause MaineStream	 has	 not	 established	 through	its	 summary judgment	submissions	that	Berry’s	claim	of	ownership of	the	2016	Camaro wa s

3 Berry’s	complaint	describes	the	c ar	in	the	same	way.

4 Even	 if	 we	 were	 to	 delve	 into	 the	 judgment	 that	 is	 referenced

— but	 not	 described

— in	 the statement	 of	 material	 fact s ,	 MaineStream	 would	 not	 benefit	 because	 the	 judgment	 grants MaineStream	the	right	to	possession	of a 2012	and a 2013 Chevrolet	 Impala,	not	a	2016	Camaro. Further,	although	MaineStream	also	referenced	the	transcript	of	the	hearing	in	the	2016	case,	only scattered	portions	of	that	transcript	were	submitted	in	support	of	the	summary	judgment	motion, and	 those	portions	of	 t he	 transcript, particularly	in	light	 of the	nature	of	 the	presentations	at	 the hearing,	cannot	be	confidently	read	to	support	the	conclusion	that	Outlaw	is	the	subject	of	this	action.8 or	might	have	been	adjudicated	in	the 2016	proceeding, we	vacate	the summary judgment and	remand	for	the	case	to	proceed	to	tria l

. The	entry	is: Judgment vacated .	 	 R emanded	 for	 further proceedings consistent	with	this	opinion

.

Aaron	Fethke,	Esq.,	Fethke	Law	Offices,	Searsport,	for	appellant	Jacob	Berry Ryan	 P.	 Dumais,	 Esq.,	 Eaton	 Peabody,	 Brunswick,	 for	 appellee	 Maine S tream Finance

Belfast	District	Court	docket	number	SA

- 2017

- 30 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY