IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2017

JULIUS PERKINS v. MIKE PARRIS, WARDEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 16-CR-10262 R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge

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No. W2016-02341-CCA-R3-HC

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The Petitioner, Julius Perkins, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary denial 

of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction of first 

degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that 

his conviction is void because of a faulty indictment and that the court erred by 

dismissing his petition without appointing counsel. Based upon the record and the 

parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined.

Julius Perkins, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Robert W. Wilson, Assistant 

Attorney General; and C. Phillip Bivens, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State 

of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

In March 2002, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Petitioner for first 

degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder. With regard to the felony 

murder charge, the indictment alleged that on December 9, 2001, the Petitioner “did kill 

Ron Palmer during the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate robbery, in violation of 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-202, and against the peace and dignity of the State of 

Tennessee.” In October 2002, a jury found the Petitioner guilty of that offense but 

acquitted him of first degree premeditated murder. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s 

01/10/2018
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conviction on direct appeal, State v. Julius Q. Perkins, No. M2003-01761-CCA-R3-CD, 

2005 WL 49339 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jan. 6, 2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 

Oct. 31, 2005), and the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction 

relief, Julius Perkins v. State, No. M2011-00522-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 1484193 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. at Nashville, Apr. 24, 2012), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2012). 

On September 29, 2016, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, asserting that he was entitled to relief because the indictment failed to allege that 

he committed first degree felony murder “with the intent to commit the enumerated 

offense[]” as required by the felony murder statute or, in the alternative, failed to cite the 

statutory subsections for first degree felony murder, Tennessee Code Annotated section 

39-13-202(a)(2) and (b). The Petitioner also asserted that he was entitled to relief 

because the indictment failed to cite the statutory code for the underlying felony of 

robbery and failed to charge him with a separate count of robbery. The Petitioner 

claimed that the indictment was so defective as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, 

thus, rendering his conviction void. In support of his claim, he attached the indictment to 

the petition. On October 25, 2016, the habeas corpus court summarily denied the 

petition, stating that the indictment “does not appear to be void or illegal.”

II. Analysis

The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a question of law. 

Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007). As such, we will review the trial 

court’s findings de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id. Moreover, it is the 

petitioner’s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the 

sentence is void or that the confinement is illegal.” Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 

(Tenn. 2000).

Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees an accused the right 

to seek habeas corpus relief. See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). 

However, “[s]uch relief is available only when it appears from the face of the judgment 

or the record of the proceedings that a trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence a 

defendant or that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” 

Wyatt, 24 S.W.3d at 322; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101. In other words, habeas 

corpus relief may be sought only when the judgment is void, not merely voidable. 

Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. “A void judgment ‘is one in which the judgment is facially 

invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or 

because the defendant’s sentence has expired.’ We have recognized that a sentence 

imposed in direct contravention of a statute, for example, is void and illegal.” 

Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 

83).
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Typically, challenges to an indictment are not proper for a habeas corpus action. 

Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). However, our 

supreme court has held that “the validity of an indictment and the efficacy of the resulting 

conviction may be addressed in a petition for habeas corpus when the indictment is so 

defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction.” Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 

(Tenn. 1998). It is undisputed that a valid indictment is essential to establish jurisdiction 

for prosecution. Id. Generally, an indictment is valid if the information contained therein 

provides sufficient information “(1) to enable the accused to know the accusation to 

which answer is required, (2) to furnish the court adequate basis for the entry of a proper 

judgment, and (3) to protect the accused from double jeopardy.” State v. Hill, 954 

S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997). Moreover, our supreme court has concluded that there is 

no need to conform to traditionally strict pleading requirements which are fraught with 

empty technicalities. Id. at 727-28.

The Petitioner maintains on appeal that the indictment was fatally defective 

because it (1), failed to allege that he committed first degree felony murder “with the 

intent to commit the enumerated offense” of robbery or, in the alternative, failed to cite 

the statutory subsections for first degree felony murder, Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 39-13-202(a)(2) and (b); (2), failed to cite the statutory code for the underlying 

felony of robbery; and (3), failed to charge him with a separate count of robbery. As 

noted by the State, though, this court addressed similar claims in Edgar Bailey, Jr. v.

Dwight Barbee, Warden, No. W2012-01729-CCA-R3-HC, 2013 WL 865329, at *4 

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 5, 2013). In that case, this court “observed ‘that a 

felony murder indictment must allege that the killing was committed during the 

perpetration of a felony, but specific allegations of the elements and facts of the 

underlying felony are unnecessary.’. . . The State [is] not required to charge the elements 

of robbery or cite to those statutes in the indictment.” (quoting State v. Alfonzo E. 

Anderson, No. W2000-00737-CCA-R3-CO, 2002 WL 1558491, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App.

at Jackson, Jan. 9, 2002). Moreover, when a petitioner has been indicted for felony 

murder committed during the commission of a robbery, “the requisite intent can be 

gleaned from the robbery statute.” Id. 

Like the indictment in Edgar Bailey, Jr., the indictment in the present case tracked 

the language of the felony murder statute, specifically referred to the statute, named the 

underlying felony, stated the date of the offense, and identified the victim; thus, it 

satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements of Hill. Id. Accordingly, the 

Petitioner was notified of the offense charged, and the habeas corpus court properly 

denied the petition. See id.
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The Petitioner also contends that the court erred by dismissing his petition without 

appointing counsel. However, a petition that fails to state a cognizable claim may be 

summarily dismissed by the habeas corpus court “without appointment of counsel,

without an evidentiary hearing, and without the opportunity to amend the petition, if, 

from the face of the petition, the reviewing court finds nothing to indicate that the 

appellant’s challenged convictions might be void.” Earl Thomas Mitchell, Jr. v. Howard

Carlton, Warden, No. 03C01-9704–CR-0125, 1998 WL 8505, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at 

Knoxville, Jan. 12, 1998) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109). Therefore, the court did 

not err by summarily denying the petition.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the 

habeas corpus court.

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NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE