SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA 

En Banc 

JANICE K. BREWER, Governor of ) Arizona Supreme Court 

the State of Arizona, in her ) No. CV-09-0168-SA 

official capacity, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

ROBERT BURNS, individually and ) 

as President, Arizona State ) O P I N I O N

Senate; KIRK ADAMS, individually ) 

and as Speaker, Arizona House of ) 

Representatives; The ARIZONA ) 

STATE SENATE; The ARIZONA HOUSE ) 

OF REPRESENTATIVES; and CHARMION ) 

BILLINGTON, individually and as ) 

Secretary of the Arizona State ) 

Senate, ) 

 ) 

 Respondents. ) 

__________________________________) 

Special Action 

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED 

________________________________________________________________ 

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR Phoenix 

 By Joseph A. Kanefield, General Counsel 

 Vanessa Hickman, Deputy General Counsel 

Attorneys for Janice K. Brewer 

CANTELME & BROWN, P.L.C. Phoenix 

 By David J. Cantelme 

 D. Aaron Brown 

 Paul R. Neil 

 Samuel Saks 

Attorneys for Robert Burns, Kirk Adams, the Arizona House of 

Representatives, the Arizona State Senate, and Charmion 

Billington 

________________________________________________________________ 
2 

B A L E S, Justice 

¶1 Because Arizona’s constitution directs that “[e]very 

measure when finally passed shall be presented to the governor 

for [her] approval or disapproval,” art. 4, pt. 2, § 12, this 

Court ruled on June 23, 2009, that the Respondents 

(collectively, the “Legislature”) cannot pass bills and then 

withhold them to prevent the Governor from exercising her power 

to approve or veto legislation. Given the unusual circumstances 

of this case, however, we also declined to order the Legislature 

to immediately present the Governor the budget bills at issue 

here. This opinion explains our earlier order. 

I. 

¶2 This litigation arises from a dispute between the 

Governor and the Legislature regarding the state budget for the 

2010 fiscal year. 

¶3 On June 4, 2009, the Arizona Senate passed, by a 

simple majority vote, several appropriations bills: Senate Bills 

1027, 1028, 1029, 1031, 1035, 1036, 1145, 1187, 1188, and 1258 

(collectively, the “Budget Bills”). After passage, the Senate 

President, Robert Burns, signed the engrossed version of the 

bills in open session and ordered the bills transmitted to the 

Arizona House of Representatives, which passed the bills that 

day. Upon signing the bills, Kirk Adams, Speaker of the House 

of Representatives, directed the Chief Clerk to return them to 
3 

the Senate. 

¶4 Governor Janice K. Brewer publicly announced her 

opposition to the Budget Bills and her intent to veto them at 

least in part. The Legislature, however, declined to present 

them to her. On June 15, 2009, the Governor delivered a letter 

to President Burns and Speaker Adams requesting that they 

present the Budget Bills to her by 5:00 p.m. that day. They 

responded that the bills would be presented during the 

legislative session, but it would be “premature” to transmit 

them before the Legislature and Governor had reached agreement 

on a budget. 

¶5 The next day, the Governor filed a petition for 

special action asking this Court to order the Legislature to 

present the Budget Bills to her without further delay. After 

expedited briefing, this Court heard oral argument on June 23, 

2009. 

II. 

¶6 Both the Legislature and the Governor candidly 

acknowledge that their disagreement over the timing of the 

presentment of the Budget Bills reflects an effort by each 

branch to enhance its position in ongoing budget negotiations. 

The enactment of a budget often involves political disagreement, 

bargaining, and compromise. Because this Court is reluctant to 

enter the arena of political disputes between the executive and 
4 

legislative branches, we first consider whether the issue 

presented is proper for judicial resolution. 

A. Jurisdiction 

¶7 Article 6, Section 5(1) of the Arizona Constitution 

grants this Court original jurisdiction over “mandamus, 

injunction and other extraordinary writs to State officers.” We 

exercise this jurisdiction through the special action procedure, 

but our decision to accept jurisdiction is “highly 

discretionary.” Forty-Seventh Legislature v. Napolitano, 213 

Ariz. 482, 485 ¶¶ 10-11, 143 P.3d 1023, 1026 (2006); Randolph v. 

Groscost, 195 Ariz. 423, 425 ¶ 6, 989 P.2d 751, 753 (1999). 

¶8 This case warrants the exercise of our special action 

jurisdiction. The key issue is whether our constitution allows 

the Legislature to pass bills, but then refuse for political 

reasons to present them to the Governor for her veto or 

approval. We accepted jurisdiction because the two political 

branches have a good faith dispute over their respective powers 

in the lawmaking process and the issue is of first impression 

and statewide importance. See Forty-Seventh Legislature, 213 

Ariz. at 485-86 ¶ 11, 143 P.3d at 1026-27; Randolph, 195 Ariz. 

at 425 ¶ 6, 989 P.2d at 753. 

¶9 The Legislature argues that even if special action 

jurisdiction is appropriate, the Governor should have instead 

filed this action in the superior court because there are 
5 

“intense fact questions.” We disagree. The relevant facts are 

undisputed; the merits of this case turn on the meaning of a 

constitutional provision. In light of the parties involved, the 

issue, and the timing of this dispute in relation to the 

enactment of a budget, special action relief was properly sought 

from this Court. See League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin, 

219 Ariz. 556, 558 ¶ 4, 201 P.3d 517, 519 (2009). 

B. Standing and Ripeness 

¶10 The Legislature also argues that the Governor lacks 

standing and the dispute is not ripe for judicial resolution. 

¶11 Although “we are not constitutionally constrained to 

decline jurisdiction based on lack of standing,” Sears v. Hull, 

192 Ariz. 65, 71 ¶ 24, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1998), “[c]oncern 

over standing is particularly acute” when this Court is asked, 

in effect, to referee disputes between the political branches. 

See Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 525 ¶ 20, 81 P.3d 311, 

316 (2003) (“Without the standing requirement, the judicial 

branch would be too easily coerced into resolving political 

disputes between the executive and legislative branches, an 

arena in which courts are naturally reluctant to intrude.”). 

¶12 To have standing, a party generally must allege a 

particularized injury that would be remediable by judicial 

decision. See id. at ¶¶ 18, 22. The Governor contends that she 

has standing because the Legislature’s refusal to present her 
6 

with finally passed bills violates the constitutionally 

established procedure for lawmaking and undermines her express 

authority to veto or approve bills. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, 

pt. 2, § 12; art. 5, § 7. 

¶13 The Legislature, in contrast, argues that the 

Governor’s constitutional power to veto or approve a bill is not 

triggered until it is presented to her, and therefore she cannot 

complain of any constitutional injury based on the Legislature’s 

refusal to present the bills. 

¶14 The Governor has the better argument on standing. If 

she is correct that the Legislature has violated the 

constitution by withholding finally passed bills from her 

review, then she has sustained a direct injury to her 

constitutional authority. Cf. Forty-Seventh Legislature, 213 

Ariz. at 487 ¶ 15, 143 P.3d at 1028 (finding that Legislature 

had standing to challenge alleged unconstitutional exercise of 

line-item veto). The Legislature’s standing arguments presume 

that the Legislature is correct on the merits, that is, that the 

Legislature can, at its discretion, withhold finally passed 

bills from the Governor and thus she has sustained no injury. 

Our standing analysis, however, looks to whether the petitioner 

has plausibly alleged particularized injury as a precondition to 

the Court’s deciding the merits; defendants cannot defeat 

standing merely by assuming they will ultimately win. 
7 

¶15 The Legislature similarly argues that the Governor’s 

lawsuit is not ripe because when this case was submitted for 

decision, the Legislature was still in session and the Governor 

is not entitled to the presentment of finally passed bills 

before the Legislature adjourns. The Legislature cites Campaign 

for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, which held that because the 

New York Constitution implicitly requires the presentment of 

bills within a “reasonable time,” the New York Legislature could 

not adjourn without transmitting bills it had passed. 661 

N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (N.Y. 1995). The Legislature’s argument here 

again goes more to the merits than to ripeness. The Governor 

argues that the constitution requires transmittal of a bill once 

it has finally been passed, even if the Legislature has not yet 

adjourned. If the Governor is correct in her interpretation of 

the constitution, she suffered a constitutional injury. 

C. Justiciability 

¶16 The Legislature finally argues that this case presents 

a nonjusticiable political question. Even if a case is within a 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is timely brought by a 

party with standing, a court should abstain from judicial review 

of the merits if the issue is properly decided by one of the 

“political branches” of government. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of 

Regents, 216 Ariz. 190, 192-93 ¶¶ 11-12, 165 P.3d 168, 170-71 

(2007). 
8 

¶17 The fact that a lawsuit involves a disagreement 

between the political branches does not necessarily mean that it 

presents a political question. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 

942-43 (1983) (noting that “the presence of constitutional 

issues with significant political overtones does not 

automatically invoke the political question doctrine”); Baker 

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (observing that doctrine 

concerns “political questions” rather than “political cases”). 

A controversy only presents a nonjusticiable political question 

if it involves “a textually demonstrable constitutional 

commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department” or 

lacks “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for its 

resolution. Kromko, 216 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 11, 165 P.3d at 170 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Forty-Seventh 

Legislature, 213 Ariz. at 485 ¶ 7, 143 P.3d at 1026. 

¶18 The Legislature first argues that the Arizona 

Constitution allows it to determine the timing of presentment of 

bills to the Governor because Article 4, Part 2, Section 8 

states that each house shall “determine its own rules of 

procedure.” This provision, however, cannot limit or otherwise 

qualify the directive in Article 4, Part 2, Section 12 that 

“[e]very measure when finally passed shall be presented to the 

Governor.” Section 12 does not by its terms commit to the 

Legislature the decision on the timing of presentment of finally 
9 

passed bills. 

¶19 The Legislature alternatively argues that there are no 

judicially identifiable and manageable standards for determining 

how promptly the Legislature must present bills to the Governor. 

But this argument also presumes a particular resolution of the 

merits. The Legislature contends that if it does not have 

unfettered discretion to determine when to present bills to the 

Governor, then the only alternative is for courts to assess 

whether the Legislature has acted “reasonably” in delaying 

presentment, and this inquiry is inherently subjective and 

political. 

¶20 We also reject this argument. Courts regularly assess 

the reasonableness of actions in many contexts, ranging from 

searches and seizures to the enforceability of contractual 

terms. Perhaps even more importantly, resolving this case on 

the merits does not necessarily imply that courts will need to 

assess on a case-by-case basis whether the Legislature has 

“reasonably” decided to delay presentment. The Governor’s 

argument is that the constitution might instead simply require 

presentment when bills are finally passed, with only such delay 

as might reasonably be required for the Legislature to complete 

the ministerial tasks of signing the bills and arranging for 

formal transmittal. 

¶21 The issue here is not whether the Legislature should 
10 

include particular items in a budget or enact particular 

legislation. Such issues, like the Governor’s decision whether 

to veto or approve a bill or the Legislature’s decision whether 

to attempt an override, clearly are political questions. FortySeventh Legislature, 213 Ariz. at 485 ¶ 7, 143 P.3d at 1026. 

Instead, this case concerns the respective powers of the 

Legislature and the Governor once the Legislature has finally 

passed a bill. 

¶22 Rather than concern a political question, this issue 

is one of law and appropriate for judicial resolution. As we 

noted in a case in which a legislature challenged a governor’s 

actions in the lawmaking process: “To determine whether a branch 

of state government has exceeded the powers granted by the 

Arizona Constitution requires that we construe the language of 

the constitution and declare what the constitution requires. 

Such questions traditionally fall to the courts to resolve.” 

Id. at ¶ 8. 

III. 

¶23 We accordingly turn to the merits. Arizona’s 

constitution details the procedure for final passage of bills by 

stating that every bill shall be read three times, except in 

cases of emergency, that “[t]he vote on the final passage of any 

bill . . . shall be taken by ayes and nays on roll call,” art. 

4, pt. 2, § 12, and that “[a] majority of all members elected to 
11 

each house shall be necessary to pass any bill,” id. § 15. Once 

these steps are completed, a bill is “finally passed” for 

purposes of Section 12. See Cox v. Stults Eagle Drug Co., 42 

Ariz. 1, 4-5, 21 P.2d 914, 915 (1933) (noting that “final 

passage” occurs when each house has approved bill in the same 

form, as “there is nothing further for either of them to do with 

it to complete it”), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. 

La Prade v. Cox, 43 Ariz. 174, 30 P.2d 825 (1934). 

¶24 After a bill is finally passed, both the constitution 

and the legislative rules contemplate the completion of certain 

ministerial tasks before it is presented to the Governor. The 

presiding officer of each house must sign all passed bills in 

open session. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 15. The Senate has 

designated its Secretary as the custodian of bills, Arizona 

Senate Rule 3(B) (2009-10), and the House has provided that its 

Chief Clerk shall be responsible for transmitting bills. 

Arizona House of Representatives Rule 5 (2009-10). Thus, these 

officers also have ministerial responsibilities in transmitting 

finally passed bills to the Governor. 

¶25 The Budget Bills were finally passed by the 

Legislature on June 4, 2009, so the dispute among the parties 

concerns solely the timing of their delivery to the Governor. 

The constitution declares that “[e]very measure when finally 

passed shall be presented to the governor for [her] approval or 
12 

disapproval.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 12. The Governor 

argues that the constitution requires such bills to be delivered 

to her with only such delay as may be reasonably necessary to 

complete ministerial acts related to transmittal. The 

Legislature first argued that it could delay presentment of 

finally passed bills at its discretion or, alternatively, could 

at least wait until the end of a legislative session. After 

this Court announced its ruling, the Legislature filed a motion 

for reconsideration arguing instead that it should be allowed to 

delay presentment for some “reasonable time.” 

¶26 The “Constitution should be construed so as to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the 

framers and the people who adopted it.” State ex rel. Morrison 

v. Nabours, 79 Ariz. 240, 245, 286 P.2d 752, 755 (1955). We 

give effect “to the purpose indicated, by a fair interpretation 

of the language used, and unless the context suggests otherwise 

words are to be given their natural, obvious and ordinary 

meaning.” Id.

¶27 In ordinary usage, the phrase “when finally passed” 

would be understood to mean upon final passage and not at 

whatever later time the Legislature might deem appropriate. 

Dictionary definitions of “when,” both contemporary and 

historical, signal a point in time related to the occurrence of 

a specific event. See, e.g., Webster’s II New College 
13 

Dictionary 1286 (3d ed. 2005) (defining “when” as “at which 

time” or “[a]s soon as”); 2 A Standard Dictionary of the English 

Language 2055 (N.Y., Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1895) (defining “when” 

as “[a]t which or what time” or “[a]fter that; as soon as”). 

Because nothing in the constitution indicates a different 

meaning, we construe the use of “when” to require presentment 

upon final passage of a bill. The use of “shall” further 

underscores the mandatory nature of the Presentment Clause. See

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 32 (“The provisions of th[e] Constitution 

are mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be 

otherwise.”).1

 

1

 At the 1910 Constitutional Convention, delegates offered 

various proposals suggesting language about presentment. As the 

concurrence notes, Proposition 6, Section 14 stated that bills 

“when finally passed” would be filed with the secretary of 

state, but this language was replaced by Substitute Proposition 

6, which provided in Section 12 that such bills would be filed 

with the Governor. The Records of the Arizona Constitutional 

Convention of 1910, at 1047 (John S. Goff, ed. 1991) 

[hereinafter “Records”]. After further amendments, Section 12 

of Substitute Proposition 6 became the basis for Article 2, Part 

2, Section 12. Id. at 584, 799. The concurrence concludes that 

“[t]he amendment from transmission to the secretary of state to 

transmission to the Governor demonstrates that the language 

‘when finally passed’ simply means ‘after’ the bill’s passage.” 

See ¶ 47, infra. 

 We interpret the history of Section 12 differently. That 

the provision initially contemplated transmittal to the 

secretary of state rather than the Governor suggests that the 

Framers viewed post-passage transmittal as a ministerial act. 

Nothing in the records of the Convention indicates that Section 

12 was intended to give the legislature discretion to delay 

presentment to the Governor. Finally, Section 12 must be 
14 

¶28 The constitution, as the Governor acknowledges, cannot 

practically be interpreted to require presentment immediately 

when a bill receives the required approval by each house. We 

interpret the language directing that presentment “shall” occur 

for bills “when finally passed” to allow such time as may 

reasonably be necessary to complete ministerial acts such as the 

signing of the bill by the presiding officer and other tasks to 

effect the transmittal to the Governor. Cf. State ex rel. 

Berger v. McCarthy, 113 Ariz. 161, 163, 548 P.2d 1158, 1160 

(1976) (noting that statutory directive that action “shall” be 

done contemplates performance within period which will promote 

 

considered against the backdrop of the Framers’ approval of 

Article 5, Section 7. 

 On the afternoon of November 30, 1910, the Convention 

approved Substitute Proposition 33, which concerned the 

executive branch and became the basis for Article 5. Records at 

794, 1365. Section 7 of Substitute Proposition 33 provided that 

“[e]very bill passed by the legislature, before it becomes a 

law, shall be presented to the governor.” Id. at 1128. Later 

that day, the Convention again considered Substitute Proposition 

6, and Mr. Winsor successfully moved to amend Section 12 to 

replace the language “sent to the governor” with the phrase 

“presented to the Governor for his approval or rejection.” Id. 

at 799. 

The concurrence interprets Section 12 in a way that makes 

it redundant to Article 5, Section 7, which itself requires 

presentment after passage. Mr. Winsor, however, specifically 

stated that his proposed change to Section 12 had independent 

force: “This particular provision is for the disposition of the 

bill after it is passed, and there is no other provision 

covering this point anywhere in any proposition.” Records at 

799. 
15 

prompt and orderly conduct of the proceedings). We are 

confident that the Legislature can expeditiously transmit 

finally passed bills to the Governor and that litigation will 

not be necessary or appropriate regarding relatively short 

delays in presentment to complete ministerial tasks and orderly 

delivery. 

¶29 We reject, however, the Legislature’s alternative 

argument that it should be allowed to “reasonably” delay 

presentment on a more open-ended basis, and that this Court 

should “leave the determination of what is reasonable to the 

Legislature’s discretion.” Such an amorphous standard would 

vitiate the constitutional directive that presentment occur 

“when” bills are finally passed. 

¶30 Nor are we persuaded by the concurrence’s suggestion 

that the Legislature should be allowed to delay presentment for 

a “reasonable time” beyond that reasonably required for the 

orderly transmittal of bills. Even under this test, the 

Legislature could not delay presentment indefinitely, see ¶¶ 43, 

54, infra, and the concurrence evidently concludes that the 

Legislature unreasonably withheld the Budget Bills here, see ¶¶ 

43-44, infra. But the concurrence does not explain how courts 

are to assess if a delay is reasonable. Because this standard 

is not tethered to the time needed to complete orderly delivery, 

it would undesirably require courts to make subjective, ad hoc 
16 

evaluations of the Legislature’s delay in transmitting bills. 

¶31 The Legislature also argues that other state courts, 

in construing presentment clauses that lack any specified time 

requirement, have not interpreted their constitutions as 

requiring prompt presentment of bills to the governor. See, 

e.g., Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 582 P.2d 1082, 1087 (Idaho 1978). 

Many state constitutions say nothing about the timing of 

presentment other than indicating it must occur sometime after 

passage. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. 5, § 125 (“Every bill 

which shall have passed both houses of the legislature, except 

as otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall be presented 

to the governor.”); Idaho Const. art. 4, § 10 (“Every bill 

passed by the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be 

presented to the governor . . . .”). 

¶32 Arizona’s constitution, in contrast, specifies that 

measures shall be presented “when finally passed.” Thus, we are 

not persuaded by the out-of-state cases cited by the 

Legislature. We also note that some state courts have concluded 

that legislatures do not have unlimited discretion to withhold 

bills, although these courts were also interpreting 

constitutional language that differs from Arizona’s. See 

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 661 N.E.2d at 1373 (construing New 

York’s constitution as implicitly requiring presentment within a 

reasonable time after passage); State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly 
17 

v. Brunner, 872 N.E.2d 912, 924 (Ohio 2007) (stating that Ohio 

Constitution, by use of term forthwith, requires presentment 

promptly). 

¶33 The Legislature also contends that requiring 

presentment upon final passage would be inconsistent with 

legislative practices dating from early statehood. Longestablished practices, accepted by other branches of government, 

may be relevant in construing constitutional provisions. See, 

e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) 

(propriety of requiring justices to sit as circuit judges 

established by “practice and acquiescence . . . commencing with 

the organization of the judicial system”). In this regard, the 

Legislature argues that its own rules, both as adopted by the 

First Legislature and currently, contemplate that the 

Legislature may reconsider bills after final passage, and that 

past legislatures have sometimes held bills for days or even 

weeks. 

¶34 Neither the current rules nor the rules of the First 

Legislature specifically address the reconsideration of finally 

passed bills. Instead, the current rules more generally provide 

that each house may reconsider its vote on any matter if an 

appropriate motion is filed no later than the next day the 

legislature is in session. See Arizona Senate Rule 13; Arizona 

House of Representatives Rule 24. The rules of the First 
18 

Legislature are not materially different in this regard. See 

Arizona Senate Rule 16 (1912); Arizona House of Representatives 

Rule 48 (1912). The Legislature also notes that each house can 

suspend its rules, which conceivably would allow a motion for 

reconsideration to be filed later than the day after the vote. 

¶35 This case does not present and we do not address the 

effect of a motion for reconsideration on the Legislature’s 

constitutional duty of presentment to the Governor. We reject, 

however, the suggestion that the Legislature’s power to 

prospectively suspend or amend its internal rules somehow 

establishes that, in the absence of such a motion, the 

Legislature may delay indefinitely, or at least to the end of 

the legislative session, the presentment of finally passed 

bills. 

¶36 The Legislature also notes that, over the last 

eighteen years, some twenty-five bills were delayed in their 

transmittal from six to forty-nine days. The basis for these 

delays, however, is not clear and it does not appear that any of 

them were challenged.2

 The Legislature in fact appears to have 

 

2 The Legislature also identifies two bills that were finally 

passed but not transmitted to the Governor. Senate Bill 1007 

was passed during the second regular session of the Thirty-Eight 

Legislature. Journal of the House of Representatives, 38th 

Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 1127 (1988). Although not transmitted to 

the Governor as Senate Bill 1007, the text of the bill, as 

amended, was subsumed within Senate Bill 1261, which was signed 

into law by the Governor on July 1, 1988. See 1988 Ariz. Sess. 
19 

almost always presented bills to the Governor promptly upon 

their final passage. The Governor notes, and the Legislature 

does not dispute, that all 315 bills finally passed during the 

Second Regular Session of the Forty-Eighth Legislature were 

presented to the Governor within two days. Similarly, a partial 

review of bills passed in the first two legislatures suggests 

that each house regularly transmitted bills to the Governor upon 

receipt of a message from the other house indicating final 

passage. The corresponding legislature’s journal entries state 

something to the effect of: “The President announced that 

Senate Bill No. 1 had been passed by the Senate and the House of 

Representatives and the Secretary was instructed to transmit 

same to the Governor.” 

¶37 The Legislature has not demonstrated any tradition of 

its withholding finally passed bills – or any acceptance of that 

practice by the other branches – sufficient to justify departing 

from the ordinary meaning of the constitution. At most, the 

Legislature has identified isolated instances when the 

 

Laws, ch. 271, §§ 25, 26, 35, 44 (2d Reg. Sess.); S.B. 1007, 

38th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1988) (Senate engrossed 

version). House Bill 2408 passed during the first regular 

session of the Forty-Second Legislature. Journal of the House 

of Representatives, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 695 (1995). The 

bill was held by the House after passage because the bill was 

identical to Senate Bill 1199, which was signed by the Governor 

on April 17, 1995. See id.; 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 136, § 1 

(1st Reg. Sess.); H.B. 2408, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 

1995) (Senate engrossed version). 
20 

presentment of finally passed bills was delayed for unexplained 

reasons and apparently without objection from the Governor. 

¶38 Finally, in its motion for reconsideration, the 

Legislature contends that “practical difficulties” will result 

if it must promptly present finally passed bills to the 

Governor. Delay in presentment, the Legislature argues, will 

allow it the opportunity to “fix” legislative mistakes or 

otherwise reconsider bills. We find this argument unpersuasive. 

The constitution outlines a process to protect against the 

precipitous enactment of legislation – the Legislature itself 

determines when to enact bills, which are subject to three reads 

in each house and a roll call final vote. Ariz. Const. art. 4, 

pt. 2, § 12. If the Legislature concludes that it has 

mistakenly enacted a bill, members can urge the Governor to veto 

the bill or they can enact a corrective repeal or amendment. As 

noted above, this case does not involve a motion seeking 

reconsideration of a house’s approval of a bill, and we do not 

address the effect of such a motion on the duty of presentment. 

¶39 Because the constitution directs that bills shall be 

presented to the Governor “when finally passed,” we hold that 

the Legislature must present such bills to the Governor with no 

more delay than is reasonably necessary to complete any 

ministerial tasks and otherwise effect their orderly 

transmittal. This standard was not met here. 
21 

IV. 

¶40 Although we agree with the Governor that the 

Legislature cannot delay its presentment of finally passed bills 

to avoid her constitutional veto power, we declined in this case 

to grant the requested relief. The Governor sought an order 

compelling the Legislature to deliver the Budget Bills to her by 

5:00 p.m. on June 23. 

¶41 Mandamus is based on equitable principles. Sines v. 

Holden, 89 Ariz. 207, 209, 360 P.2d 218, 220 (1961). Thus, 

“even in a case where an absolute legal right is shown,” we 

retain discretion to determine what relief, if any, should be 

granted. Id. For several reasons, we declined to grant the 

requested relief here. 

¶42 This case involves a good-faith dispute between the 

political branches of government about their respective roles in 

Arizona’s lawmaking process. Had the Legislature anticipated 

our decision it might have waited to finally pass the bills 

until nearer the end of the session. Moreover, the Legislature 

committed to this Court to deliver the Budget Bills to the 

Governor by June 30, 2009. Because these bills contained 

appropriations, the Governor was not faced with the prospect of 

signing or vetoing each of them in toto. See Ariz. Const. art. 

5, § 7. Instead, she had the power – and could have announced 

her intent before the bills were presented – to use her line-
22 

item veto authority to approve or reject particular parts of 

each bill. In these circumstances, granting the Governor’s 

requested order would have advanced the delivery of the Budget 

Bills by merely a week and unnecessarily involved the Court 

further in this dispute among the political branches. 

V.

¶43 We conclude that the presentment of the Budget Bills 

did not occur within the time mandated by the Arizona 

Constitution, but under the unique circumstances presented, we 

decline to grant the relief the Governor requested. 

 _______________________________________ 

 W. Scott Bales, Justice 

CONCURRING: 

_______________________________________ 

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Michael D. Ryan, Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Ruth V. McGregor, Justice (Retired) 

B E R C H, Chief Justice, concurring in the result 

¶44 The Court concludes that the Arizona Constitution’s 

Presentment Clause requires the immediate presentment of bills 
23 

to the Governor, allowing time only “to complete any ministerial 

tasks and otherwise effect their orderly transmittal.” Op. 

¶ 38; see art. 4, pt. 2, § 12 (presentment clause). Because I 

conclude that the constitution requires only the transmittal of 

bills within a reasonable time, I do not join in that portion of 

the majority opinion. 

¶45 The Governor argues that the phrase “when finally 

passed” requires immediate transmittal; the Legislature 

maintains that it may transmit bills at its leisure. Both 

sides, in my opinion, overstate the case. 

¶46 The majority emphasizes the Presentment Clause phrase 

“when finally passed” in concluding that transmittal must occur 

immediately after completion of ministerial tasks. The clause 

itself does not specify the timing of presentment, but the 

context in which the phrase “when finally passed” is used 

suggests that it simply means “once” or “after.” See Kilpatrick 

v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 419, 466 P.2d 18, 24 (1970) 

(requiring courts to construe the constitution as a whole and 

read its various provisions together). Section 12 provides in 

full as follows: 

Every bill shall be read by sections on three 

different days, unless in case of emergency, twothirds of either House deem it expedient to dispense 

with this rule. The vote on the final passage of any 

bill or joint resolution shall be taken by ayes and 

nays on roll call. Every measure when finally passed 
24 

shall be presented to the Governor for his approval or 

disapproval. 

The section thus sets forth the general procedure for enacting a 

bill into law: The bill must be read three times, unless the 

reading is waived, and then passed by a roll call vote in each 

chamber. The “finally passed” bill must then be presented to 

the Governor, who may approve it or not. The section does not 

say when the presentment must occur, and it is plausible to 

conclude, as the majority has, that presentment must occur 

immediately. But given that the Framers did not explicitly 

require “prompt” or “immediate” presentation, it is more likely 

that the Framers intended presentment to occur within a 

reasonable time, but not necessarily immediately after final 

passage. 

¶47 Several pieces of historical evidence support the 

conclusion that transmittal within a reasonable time is the 

appropriate standard. Sources contemporaneous with the drafting 

of Arizona’s Constitution show that the Framers likely 

understood the word “when” to be synonymous with “if” or “on the 

condition that.” See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Beaird, 169 S.W. 

1050, 1051 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (“‘[W]hen presented[]’ . . . is 

equivalent to ‘in case it is presented,’ or ‘on condition that 

it be presented.’”); see also Mendenhall v. State, 72 So. 202, 

205 (Fla. 1916) (“The word ‘when’ has a conditional concept in 
25 

it, and as here used means ‘if.’”); Allen v. Powell, 115 N.E. 

96, 99 (Ind. App. 1917) (“[When] is frequently used in the sense 

of ‘provided,’ ‘in case of,’ ‘and if,’ or ‘if.’” (citation 

omitted)); Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary 1644 (Noah 

Porter ed., 1913) (noting meaning as “at what time; at, during, 

or after the time that”). The Framers’ understanding of “when” 

as encompassing “after” and “if,” and their failure to include a 

term such as “forthwith,” “promptly,” or “immediately,” suggests 

that presentment was to occur within a reasonable time after 

final passage of a bill. No language in the constitutional 

provision mandates immediate transmittal. 

¶48 When a constitutional clause requires interpretation, 

we often look to the records of the constitutional convention 

for guidance. E.g., Cain v. Horne, 220 Ariz. 77, 82, ¶ 20, 202 

P.3d 1178, 1183 (2009). Those records show that the provision 

compelling transmittal of a bill “when finally passed” 

originally required filing of the bill in the office of the 

secretary of state, presumably after it not only had passed each 

chamber of the Legislature, but also had been signed by the 

Governor or vetoed and overridden by the Legislature. See The 

Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, at 

1040 (John S. Goff, ed. 1991) [hereinafter “Records”] 

(Proposition 6 § 14 initially provided that “[e]very measure 

when finally passed shall be filed in the office of the 
26 

secretary of state.”); id. at 1047 (replacing “secretary of 

state” with “office of the Governor”); id. at 583 (discussing 

the change from secretary of state to Governor). As so used, 

the phrase “when finally passed” clearly did not mean 

immediately after the roll call vote of ayes and nays in each 

chamber. The amendment from transmission to the secretary of 

state to transmission to the Governor demonstrates that the 

language “when finally passed” simply means “after” the bill’s 

passage.3

 The Framers never discussed and did not intend to add 

an immediate transmittal requirement. See id. at 583. The 

discussion focused on who should receive the bill, not when it 

 

3

 The records contain the following discussion, in which the 

framers also appear to use the terms “when” and “after” 

interchangeably: 

Mr. Franklin: . . . After a measure is passed by the 

legislature and signed by the governor, it is filed 

with the office of the secretary. 

Mr. Webb: . . . [A] bill after final passage is 

submitted to the governor for his approval or 

disapproval . . . . 

. . . 

Mr. Webb: . . . After final passage [a bill] is filed 

with the governor, and it is never returned and he 

files it with the secretary of state. 

Mr. Winsor: . . . [T]he procedure is that after a 

bill is finally passed by the legislature it is filed 

with the governor for his action. . . . 

Mr. Franklin: . . . When the bill is passed by the 

legislature, it is submitted to the governor [and if 

it becomes law] it is then filed in the office of the 

secretary of state . . . . 

Id. (emphasis added) (using the terms “when” and “after” 

interchangeably); see also id. at 794, 799 (mentioning that the 

legislative presentment clause was included to indicate what 

happens to the bill “after passage”). 
27 

should be transmitted. Nothing suggests that the provision was 

included to prevent delay in presentment. Id. at 853. 

¶49 The conclusion that a reasonable presentment time was 

anticipated is further supported by the rules adopted by the 

First Legislature, several members of which served as delegates 

to the constitutional convention and therefore presumably 

understood the Framers’ intent.4 Each chamber of the Legislature 

adopted a rule based on Article 4, Part 2, Section 12. Compare

First Legislature of the State of Arizona, Rules of the House of 

Representatives, 15 (1912) (Rule 59) (noting constitutional 

basis for rule) [hereinafter First House Rules], and State of 

Arizona, Rules of the First State Senate 21 (1912) (Rule 21(4)) 

[hereinafter First Senate Rules], with Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 

2, § 12. Those rules allowed timely reconsideration of bills on 

which members had already voted. First House Rules 13 (Rule 

48); First Senate Rules 17-18 (Rule 16). These reconsideration 

rules comport with the historical understanding that presentment 

need not occur immediately; a chamber may take a short but 

reasonable time after passing a bill to reconsider the wisdom of 

that act. 

 

4

 Several convention delegates served in the legislature. 

Records at 1387-98. The first Speaker of the House and the 

first Senate President were each convention delegates, and each 

chaired the rules committee in his respective body. Id. at 

1387, 1389; State of Arizona, Rules of the First State Senate, 

2, 6 (1912); Journal of the First Legislature, Arizona House of 

Representatives, 17. 
28 

¶50 Every subsequent legislature has also permitted 

reconsideration of bills. For example, the Third Legislature 

entertained a motion for reconsideration on a bill that had 

already passed both houses. Third Legislature of the State of 

Arizona, Journal of the Senate 336, 338 (1917) (passing H.B. 4 

without amendment, ordering its transmittal to the House, and 

then passing a motion for reconsideration, amending the bill, 

and transmitting the amended bill to the House), in State of 

Arizona, Journals of the Arizona Legislature (1917). This 

historical evidence suggests that the Presentment Clause does 

not anticipate immediate transmittal because it would be 

inconsistent to require immediate presentment, yet allow the 

legislature discretion to reconsider a bill on which it had 

already affirmatively voted. 

¶51 The majority suggests that the absence of delay 

between the time the First Legislature passed bills and their 

transmittal to the Governor suggests that that body contemplated 

an immediate transmittal requirement. Perhaps. On the other 

hand, it may simply show that the First Legislature had no 

reason to delay transmission of those bills. The Legislature 

may choose to promptly present bills, even if doing so is not 

constitutionally compelled. In contrast to this course of 

practice, the Legislature presented evidence of twenty-five 

bills on which presentment was delayed, in most cases from three 
29 

to four weeks. Although the majority dismisses this evidence 

because the Legislature did not show why the bills were delayed, 

see Op. ¶ 35, under the majority’s analysis, if immediate 

presentment is constitutionally required, the motivation for the 

delay should not matter. If the Legislature lacks discretion to 

delay for any purpose, then any presentment that does not 

immediately follow prompt completion of ministerial tasks 

violates the constitution. 

¶52 Because we generally respect our coordinate branches’ 

actions as constitutional unless a clear violation exists, 

Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 224-25, 178 P.2d 436, 438 

(1947), we should not lightly find unconstitutional the actions 

of previous Legislatures and the acquiescence of previous 

Governors in those actions. On balance, the evidence of past 

Legislatures’ delay in presenting bills supports the current 

Legislature’s position that it has some constrained discretion 

to determine the timing of presentment. 

¶53 Additionally, although the language of the 

constitutional presentment clauses across the nation vary, no 

court analyzing a provision with language similar to Arizona’s 

provision has found immediate transmission required. See 

Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 582 P.2d 1082, 1087 (Idaho 1978) (“There is 

no provision in our Constitution governing the time within which 

the legislature must present bills to the governor, and it is 
30 

not for this Court to impose any limitation as to time.”); 

Gilbert v. Gladden, 432 A.2d 1351, 1355 (N.J. 1981) (A general 

presentment requirement does not “limit[] the time within which 

presentment may be accomplished.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 

Inc. v. Marino, 661 N.E.2d 1372, 1373 (N.Y. 1995) (“[A] bill 

which has passed both houses of the Legislature [must] be 

presented to the Governor for enactment into law or vetoing 

within a reasonable time after its passage.”); Zimmerman v. 

State, 348 N.Y.S.2d 727, 733 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (“When a bill is to 

be presented is a determination to be made by the Legislature.” 

(citing Opinion of the Justices, 213 A.2d 415 (N.H. 1965)); 

State v. Heston, 71 S.E.2d 481, 492 (W. Va. 1952) (The “section 

which requires every bill passed by the Legislature to be 

presented to the Governor before it becomes a law, prescribes no 

time within which it must be so presented.”) The Court’s 

opinion makes Arizona an outlier on this issue. 

¶54 Finally, logic and practice support allowing a 

reasonable time for transmittal. The Governor has only five 

days to sign a bill while the legislature is in session or the 

bill will become law without her signature. Ariz. Const. art. 

5, § 7. Some bills are very long and complex. Governors have a 

lot to do. Sometimes they are not available for short periods. 

As a session nears its conclusion, many bills may be passed 

within a short time. In such cases, a Governor might benefit 
31 

from the courtesy of advance notice and delayed transmission of 

a bill. The rule the majority adopts does not allow for such 

cooperation and professional courtesy. Under the rule announced 

today, the legislature lacks discretion to delay presentment 

beyond the time needed to complete ministerial tasks, despite a 

Governor’s request for additional time or acquiescence in the 

delay.5

¶55 The majority criticizes allowing presentment within a 

reasonable time after final passage as a test lacking certainty. 

Op. ¶ 30. Yet as the majority itself recognizes, “[c]ourts 

regularly assess the reasonableness of actions in many 

contexts.” Id. ¶ 20. We can assess reasonableness in this 

context as well. The reasonableness of any delay is tethered to 

the time of final passage by the constitutional requirement of 

presentment. 

¶56 As with most standards, the contours for testing what 

constitutes a reasonable time would naturally develop as cases 

presenting the issue arose. Because the Court does not adopt 

this standard and because reasonableness must be determined in 

light of the context in which the question arises, there is 

little utility in engaging in the academic exercise of 

 

5

 I recognize that each chamber maintains control over when 

voting occurs and thus may, as a practical matter, inject delay 

into the process. 
32 

surmising, in the absence of context, how much time would be 

presumptively reasonable. 

¶57 For the reasons expressed, I conclude that the 

Presentment Clause requires that bills that pass both houses be 

presented to the Governor within a reasonable time, but does not 

require immediate presentment. 

 __________________________________ 

 Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice