16098 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 

Wolf Creek Generating Station 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp., 

Docket No. 50–482, License No. NPF– 

42 

Mr. Matthew W. Sunseri, President and 

Chief Executive Officer, Wolf Creek 

Nuclear Operating Corporation, P.O. 

Box 411, Burlington, KS 66839 

Requirements for Mitigation Strategies 

for Beyond-Design-Basis External 

Events at Operating Reactor Sites and 

Construction Permit Holders 

This Order requires a three-phase 

approach for mitigating beyond-designbasis external events. The initial phase 

requires the use of installed equipment 

and resources to maintain or restore 

core cooling, containment and spent 

fuel pool (SFP) cooling capabilities. The 

transition phase requires providing 

sufficient, portable, onsite equipment 

and consumables to maintain or restore 

these functions until they can be 

accomplished with resources brought 

from off site. The final phase requires 

obtaining sufficient offsite resources to 

sustain those functions indefinitely. 

(1) Licensees or construction permit 

(CP) holders shall develop, implement, 

and maintain guidance and strategies to 

maintain or restore core cooling, 

containment and SFP cooling 

capabilities following a beyond-designbasis external event. 

(2) These strategies must be capable of 

mitigating a simultaneous loss of all 

alternating current (ac) power and loss 

of normal access to the ultimate heat 

sink and have adequate capacity to 

address challenges to core cooling, 

containment, and SFP cooling 

capabilities at all units on a site subject 

to this Order. 

(3) Licensees or CP holders must 

provide reasonable protection for the 

associated equipment from external 

events. Such protection must 

demonstrate that there is adequate 

capacity to address challenges to core 

cooling, containment, and SFP cooling 

capabilities at all units on a site subject 

to this Order. 

(4) Licensees or CP holders must be 

capable of implementing the strategies 

in all modes. 

(5) Full compliance shall include 

procedures, guidance, training, and 

acquisition, staging, or installing of 

equipment needed for the strategies. 

Requirements for Mitigation Strategies 

for Beyond-Design-Basis External 

Events at Col Holder Reactor Sites 

(VOGTLE Units 3 and 4) 

Attachment 2 to this order for Part 50 

licensees requires a phased approach for 

mitigating beyond-design-basis external 

events. The initial phase requires the 

use of installed equipment and 

resources to maintain or restore core 

cooling, containment and spent fuel 

pool (SFP) cooling capabilities. The 

transition phase requires providing 

sufficient, portable, onsite equipment 

and consumables to maintain or restore 

these functions until they can be 

accomplished with resources brought 

from off site. The final phase requires 

obtaining sufficient offsite resources to 

sustain those functions indefinitely. 

The design bases of Vogtle Units 3 

and 4 includes passive design features 

that provide core, containment and SFP 

cooling capability for 72 hours, without 

reliance on alternating current (ac) 

power. These features do not rely on 

access to any external water sources 

since the containment vessel and the 

passive containment cooling system 

serve as the safety-related ultimate heat 

sink. The NRC staff reviewed these 

design features prior to issuance of the 

combined licenses for these facilities 

and certification of the AP1000 design 

referenced therein. The AP1000 design 

also includes equipment to maintain 

required safety functions in the long 

term (beyond 72 hours to 7 days) 

including capability to replenish water 

supplies. Connections are provided for 

generators and pumping equipment that 

can be brought to the site to back up the 

installed equipment. The staff 

concluded in its final safety evaluation 

report for the AP1000 design that the 

installed equipment (and alternatively, 

the use of transportable equipment) is 

capable of supporting extended 

operation of the passive safety systems 

to maintain required safety functions in 

the long term. As such, this Order 

requires Vogtle Units 3 and 4 to address 

the following requirements relative to 

the final phase. 

(1) Licensees shall develop, 

implement, and maintain guidance and 

strategies to maintain or restore core 

cooling, containment and SFP cooling 

capabilities following a beyond-designbasis external event. 

(2) These strategies must be capable of 

mitigating a simultaneous loss of all ac 

power and loss of normal access to the 

normal heat sink and have adequate 

capacity to address challenges to core 

cooling, containment, and SFP cooling 

capabilities at all units on a site subject 

to this Order. 

(3) Licensees must provide reasonable 

protection for the associated equipment 

from external events. Such protection 

must demonstrate that there is adequate 

capacity to address challenges to core 

cooling, containment, and SFP cooling 

capabilities at all units on a site subject 

to this Order. 

(4) Licensees must be capable of 

implementing the strategies in all 

modes. 

(5) Full compliance shall include 

procedures, guidance, training, and 

acquisition, staging, or installing of 

equipment needed for the strategies. 

[FR Doc. 2012–6547 Filed 3–16–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1); 

License Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1); 

EA–12–050; [NRC–2012–0069] 

In the Matter of All Operating Boiling 

Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I 

and Mark II Containments; Order 

Modifying Licenses With Regard To 

Reliable Hardened Containment Vents 

(Effective Immediately) 

I 

The Licensees identified in 

Attachment 1 to this Order hold licenses 

issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or Commission) 

authorizing operation of nuclear power 

plants in accordance with the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, ‘‘Domestic 

Licensing of Production and Utilization 

Facilities.’’ Specifically, these Licensees 

operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs) 

with Mark I and Mark II containment 

designs. 

II 

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 

earthquake struck off the coast of the 

Japanese island of Honshu. The 

earthquake resulted in a large tsunami, 

estimated to have exceeded 14 meters 

(45 feet) in height, which inundated the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant 

site. The earthquake and tsunami 

produced widespread devastation across 

northeastern Japan, and significantly 

affected the infrastructure and industry 

in the northeastern coastal areas of 

Japan. 

When the earthquake occurred, 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 

were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 

were shut down for routine refueling 

and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 

reactor fuel was offloaded to the Unit 4 

spent fuel pool. Following the 

earthquake, the three operating units 

automatically shut down and offsite 

power was lost to the entire facility. The 

emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 

started at all six units providing 

alternating current (ac) electrical power 

to critical systems at each unit. The 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 16099 

1See Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 

(INPO) report ‘‘INPO 11–005, Special Report on the 

Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 

Power Station, Revision 0,’’ issued November 2011, 

p. 72. 

facility response to the earthquake 

appears to have been normal. 

Approximately 40 minutes following 

the earthquake and shutdown of the 

operating units, the first large tsunami 

wave inundated the site, followed by 

additional waves. The tsunami caused 

extensive damage to site facilities and 

resulted in a complete loss of all ac 

electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a 

condition known as station blackout 

(SBO). In addition, all direct current 

electrical power was lost early in the 

event on Units 1 and 2, and after some 

period of time at the other units. Unit 

6 retained the function of one air-cooled 

EDG. Despite their actions, the operators 

lost the ability to cool the fuel in the 

Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the 

Unit 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and 

in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36 

hours, resulting in damage to the 

nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of 

cooling capabilities. 

Operators first considered using the 

facility’s hardened vent to control 

pressure in the containment within an 

hour following the loss of all ac power 

at Unit 1. The Emergency Response 

Center began reviewing accident 

management procedures and checking 

containment venting procedures to 

determine how to open the containment 

vent valves without power.1 Ultimately, 

without adequate core and containment 

cooling, primary containment (drywell) 

pressure and temperature in Units 1, 2, 

and 3 substantially exceeded the design 

values for the containments. When the 

operators attempted to vent the 

containments, they were significantly 

challenged in opening the hardened 

wetwell (suppression chamber) vents 

because of complications from the 

prolonged SBO, and high radiation 

fields that impeded access. 

At Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, 

and 4, venting the wetwell involved 

opening motor- and air-operated valves. 

Similar features are used in many 

hardened vent systems that were 

installed in U.S. BWR Mark I 

containment plants following issuance 

of Generic Letter (GL) 89–16, 

‘‘Installation of a Hardened Wetwell 

Vent.’’ In the prolonged SBO situation 

that occurred at Fukushima, operator 

actions were not possible from the 

control room because of the loss of 

power, and the loss of pneumatic 

supply pressure to the air-operated 

valves. The resultant delay in venting 

the containment precluded early 

injection of coolant into the reactor 

vessel. The lack of coolant, in turn, 

resulted in extensive core damage, high 

radiation levels, hydrogen production 

and containment failure. The leakage of 

hydrogen gas into the reactor buildings 

resulted in explosions in the secondary 

containment buildings of Units 1, 3, and 

4, and the ensuing damage to the facility 

contributed to the uncontrolled release 

of radioactive material to the 

environment. 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, and 

4 use the Mark I containment design; 

however, because Mark II containment 

designs are only slightly larger in 

volume than Mark I containment 

designs and use wetwell pressure 

suppression, it can reasonably be 

concluded that a Mark II under similar 

circumstances would have suffered 

similar consequences. 

Following the events at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 

plant, the NRC established a senior-level 

agency task force referred to as the NearTerm Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF 

was tasked with conducting a 

systematic and methodical review of the 

NRC regulations and processes and 

determining if the agency should make 

additional improvements to these 

programs in light of the events at 

Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this 

review, the NTTF developed a 

comprehensive set of recommendations, 

documented in SECY–11–0093, ‘‘NearTerm Report and Recommendations for 

Agency Actions Following the Events in 

Japan,’’ dated July 12, 2011. These 

recommendations were enhanced by the 

NRC staff following interactions with 

stakeholders. Documentation of the 

staff’s efforts is contained in SECY–11– 

0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions To Be 

Taken Without Delay From the NearTerm Task Force Report,’’ dated 

September 9, 2011, and SECY–11–0137, 

‘‘Prioritization of Recommended 

Actions To Be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned,’’ dated 

October 3, 2011. 

As directed by the Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM) for SECY–11– 

0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF 

recommendations within the context of 

the NRC’s existing regulatory framework 

and considered the various regulatory 

vehicles available to the NRC to 

implement the recommendations. 

SECY–11–0124 and SECY–11–0137 

established the staff’s prioritization of 

the recommendations based upon the 

potential safety enhancements. 

Current regulatory requirements and 

existing plant capabilities allow the 

NRC to conclude that a sequence of 

events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. 

Therefore, continued operation and 

continued licensing activities do not 

pose an imminent threat to public 

health and safety. However, the 

importance of reliable operation of 

hardened vents during emergency 

conditions was already well established 

and this understanding has been 

reinforced by the clear lessons of 

Fukushima. While not required, 

hardened vents have been in place in 

U.S. plants with BWR Mark I 

containments for many years but a wide 

variance exists with regard to the 

reliability of the vents. Additionally, 

hardened vents are not required on 

plants with BWR Mark II containments 

although as discussed above, Mark II 

containments are only slightly larger 

than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting 

systems in BWR facilities with Mark I 

and Mark II containments are needed to 

ensure that adequate protection of 

public health and safety is maintained. 

In SRM–SECY–11–0137, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to 

take certain actions and provided 

further guidance including directing the 

staff to consider filtered vents. The staff 

has determined that there are policy 

issues that need to be resolved before 

any regulatory action can be taken to 

require Licensees to install filtered 

vents. These policy issues include 

consideration of severe accident 

conditions in the design and operation 

of the vent, addition of filters to 

hardened reliable vent systems, and 

consideration of vents in areas other 

than primary containment. However, 

the NRC has also determined that 

Licensees should promptly begin the 

implementation of short-term actions 

relating to reliable hardened vents and 

to focus these actions on improvements 

that will assist in the prevention of core 

damage. As such, this Order requires 

Licensees to take the necessary actions 

to install reliable hardened venting 

systems in BWR facilities with Mark I 

and Mark II containments to assist 

strategies relating to the prevention of 

core damage. With respect to the policy 

issues discussed above, the NRC staff 

plans to submit a Policy Paper to the 

Commission in July 2012. 

Additional details on an acceptable 

approach for complying with this Order 

will be contained in final Interim Staff 

Guidance (ISG) scheduled to be issued 

by the NRC in August 2012. This 

guidance will also include a template to 

be used for the plan that will be 

submitted in accordance with Section 

IV, C.1 below. 

III 

Reasonable assurance of adequate 

protection of the public health and 

safety and assurance of the common 


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16100 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 

defense and security are the 

fundamental NRC regulatory objectives. 

Compliance with NRC requirements 

plays a critical role in giving the NRC 

confidence that Licensees are 

maintaining an adequate level of public 

health and safety and common defense 

and security. While compliance with 

NRC requirements presumptively 

assures adequate protection, new 

information may reveal that additional 

requirements are warranted. In such 

situations, the Commission may act in 

accordance with its statutory authority 

under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954, as amended, to require 

Licensees to take action in order to 

protect health and safety and common 

defense and security. 

To protect public health and safety 

from the inadvertent release of 

radioactive materials, the NRC’s 

defense-in-depth strategy includes 

multiple layers of protection: (1) 

Prevention of accidents by virtue of the 

design, construction and operation of 

the plant, (2) mitigation features to 

prevent radioactive releases should an 

accident occur, and (3) emergency 

preparedness programs that include 

measures such as sheltering and 

evacuation. The defense-in-depth 

strategy also provides for multiple 

physical barriers to contain the 

radioactive materials in the event of an 

accident. The barriers are the fuel 

cladding, the reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, and the containment. These 

defense-in-depth features are embodied 

in the existing regulatory requirements 

and thereby provide adequate protection 

of public health and safety. 

The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi 

highlight the possibility that extreme 

natural phenomena could challenge the 

prevention, mitigation, and emergency 

preparedness defense-in-depth layers. 

At Fukushima, limitations in time and 

unpredictable conditions associated 

with the accident significantly 

challenged attempts by the responders 

to preclude core damage and 

containment failure. In particular, the 

operators were unable to successfully 

operate the containment venting system. 

The inability to reduce containment 

pressure inhibited efforts to cool the 

reactor core. If additional backup or 

alternate sources of power had been 

available to operate the containment 

venting system remotely, or if certain 

valves had been more accessible for 

manual operation, the operators at 

Fukushima may have been able to 

depressurize the containment earlier. 

This, in turn, could have allowed 

operators to implement strategies using 

low-pressure water sources that may 

have limited or prevented damage to the 

reactor core. Thus, the events at 

Fukushima demonstrate that reliable 

hardened vents at BWR facilities with 

Mark I and Mark II containment designs 

are important to maintain core and 

containment cooling. 

The Commission has determined that 

ensuring adequate protection of public 

health and safety requires that all 

operating BWR facilities with Mark I 

and Mark II containments have a 

reliable hardened venting capability for 

events that can lead to core damage. 

These new requirements provide greater 

mitigation capability consistent with the 

overall defense-in-depth philosophy, 

and therefore greater assurance that the 

challenges posed by severe external 

events to power reactors do not pose an 

undue risk to public health and safety. 

To provide reasonable assurance of 

adequate protection of public health and 

safety, all licenses identified in 

Attachment 1 to this Order shall be 

modified to include the requirements 

identified in Attachment 2 to this Order. 

Accordingly, the NRC has concluded 

that these measures are necessary to 

ensure adequate protection of public 

health and safety under the provisions 

of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 

50.109(a)(4)(ii), and is requiring 

Licensee actions. In addition, pursuant 

to 10 CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that the 

public health, safety and interest require 

that this Order be made immediately 

effective. 

IV 

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 

161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR 

2.202, ‘‘Orders,’’ and 10 CFR part 50, it 

is hereby ordered, effective immediately, 

that all licenses identified in attachment 

1 to this order are modified as follows: 

A. All Licensees shall, 

notwithstanding the provisions of any 

Commission regulation or license to the 

contrary, comply with the requirements 

described in Attachment 2 to this Order 

except to the extent that a more 

stringent requirement is set forth in the 

license. These Licensees shall promptly 

start implementation of the 

requirements in Attachment 2 to the 

Order and shall complete full 

implementation no later than two (2) 

refueling cycles following the submittal 

of the overall integrated plan, as 

required in Condition C.1. (scheduled to 

be issued in August 2012), or December 

31, 2016, whichever comes first. 

B. 1. All Licensees shall, within 

twenty (20) days of the date of this 

Order, notify the Commission (1) if they 

are unable to comply with any of the 

requirements described in Attachment 

2, (2) if compliance with any of the 

requirements is unnecessary in their 

specific circumstances, or (3) if 

implementation of any of the 

requirements would cause the Licensee 

to be in violation of the provisions of 

any Commission regulation or the 

facility license. The notification shall 

provide the Licensee’s justification for 

seeking relief from or variation of any 

specific requirement. 

2. Any Licensee that considers that 

implementation of any of the 

requirements described in Attachment 2 

to this Order would adversely affect the 

safe and secure operation of the facility 

must notify the Commission, within 

twenty (20) days of this Order, of the 

adverse safety impact, the basis for its 

determination that the requirement has 

an adverse safety impact, and either a 

proposal for achieving the same 

objectives specified in the Attachment 2 

requirement in question, or a schedule 

for modifying the facility to address the 

adverse safety condition. If neither 

approach is appropriate, the Licensee 

must supplement its response to 

Condition B.1 of this Order to identify 

the condition as a requirement with 

which it cannot comply, with attendant 

justifications as required in Condition 

B.1. 

C. 1. All Licensees shall, by 

February 28, 2013, submit to the 

Commission for review an overall 

integrated plan including a description 

of how compliance with the 

requirements described in Attachment 2 

will be achieved. 

2. All Licensees shall provide an 

initial status report sixty (60) days 

following issuance of the final ISG, and 

at six (6)-month intervals following 

submittal of the overall integrated plan, 

as required in Condition C.1, which 

delineates progress made in 

implementing the requirements of this 

Order. 

3. All Licensees shall report to the 

Commission when full compliance with 

the requirements described in 

Attachment 2 is achieved. 

Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, 

B.2, C.1, C.2, and C.3 above shall be 

submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 

50.4, ‘‘Written Communications.’’ 

The Director, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation may, in writing, 

relax or rescind any of the above 

conditions upon demonstration by the 

Licensee of good cause. 

V 

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the 

Licensee must, and any other person 

adversely affected by this Order may, 

submit an answer to this Order, and 

may request a hearing on this Order, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 16101 

within twenty (20) days of the date of 

this Order. Where good cause is shown, 

consideration will be given to extending 

the time to answer or to request a 

hearing. A request for extension of time 

in which to submit an answer or request 

a hearing must be made in writing to the 

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555, 

and include a statement of good cause 

for the extension. The answer may 

consent to this Order. 

If a hearing is requested by a Licensee 

or a person whose interest is adversely 

affected, the Commission will issue an 

Order designating the time and place of 

any hearings. If a hearing is held, the 

issue to be considered at such hearing 

shall be whether this Order should be 

sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 

2.202(c)(2)(i), the licensee or any other 

person adversely affected by this Order, 

may, in addition to demanding a 

hearing, at the time the answer is filed 

or sooner, move the presiding officer to 

set aside the immediate effectiveness of 

the Order on the ground that the Order, 

including the need for immediate 

effectiveness, is not based on adequate 

evidence but on mere suspicion, 

unfounded allegations, or error. 

All documents filed in NRC 

adjudicatory proceedings, including a 

request for hearing, a petition for leave 

to intervene, any motion or other 

document filed in the proceeding prior 

to the submission of a request for 

hearing or petition to intervene, and 

documents filed by interested 

governmental entities participating 

under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in 

accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule 

(72 FR 49139, August 28, 2007). The EFiling process requires participants to 

submit and serve all adjudicatory 

documents over the internet, or in some 

cases to mail copies on electronic 

storage media. Participants may not 

submit paper copies of their filings 

unless they seek an exemption in 

accordance with the procedures 

described below. 

To comply with the procedural 

requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 

days prior to the filing deadline, the 

participant should contact the Office of 

the Secretary by email at 

hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone 

at (301) 415–1677, to request (1) a 

digital ID certificate, which allows the 

participant (or its counsel or 

representative) to digitally sign 

documents and access the E-Submittal 

server for any proceeding in which it is 

participating; and (2) advise the 

Secretary that the participant will be 

submitting a request or petition for 

hearing (even in instances in which the 

participant, or its counsel or 

representative, already holds an NRCissued digital ID certificate). Based upon 

this information, the Secretary will 

establish an electronic docket for the 

hearing in this proceeding if the 

Secretary has not already established an 

electronic docket. 

Information about applying for a 

digital ID certificate is available on 

NRC’s public Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/ 

apply-certificates.html. System 

requirements for accessing the ESubmittal server are detailed in NRC’s 

‘‘Guidance for Electronic Submission,’’ 

which is available on the agency’s 

public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 

may attempt to use other software not 

listed on the Web site, but should note 

that the NRC’s E-Filing system does not 

support unlisted software, and the NRC 

Meta System Help Desk will not be able 

to offer assistance in using unlisted 

software. 

If a participant is electronically 

submitting a document to the NRC in 

accordance with the E-Filing rule, the 

participant must file the document 

using the NRC’s online, Web-based 

submission form. In order to serve 

documents through the Electronic 

Information Exchange, users will be 

required to install a Web browser plugin from the NRC Web site. Further 

information on the Web-based 

submission form, including the 

installation of the Web browser plug-in, 

is available on the NRC’s public Web 

site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. 

Once a participant has obtained a 

digital ID certificate and a docket has 

been created, the participant can then 

submit a request for hearing or petition 

for leave to intervene. Submissions 

should be in Portable Document Format 

(PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 

available on the NRC public Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. A filing is considered 

complete at the time the documents are 

submitted through the NRC’s E-Filing 

system. To be timely, an electronic 

filing must be submitted to the E-Filing 

system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern 

Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 

a transmission, the E-Filing system 

time-stamps the document and sends 

the submitter an email notice 

confirming receipt of the document. The 

E-Filing system also distributes an email 

notice that provides access to the 

document to the NRC Office of the 

General Counsel and any others who 

have advised the Office of the Secretary 

that they wish to participate in the 

proceeding, so that the filer need not 

serve the documents on those 

participants separately. Therefore, 

applicants and other participants (or 

their counsel or representative) must 

apply for and receive a digital ID 

certificate before a hearing request/ 

petition to intervene is filed so that they 

can obtain access to the document via 

the E-Filing system. 

A person filing electronically using 

the agency’s adjudicatory E-Filing 

system may seek assistance by 

contacting the NRC Meta System Help 

Desk through the ‘‘Contact Us’’ link 

located on the NRC Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html, by email at 

MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a tollfree call at (866) 672–7640. The NRC 

Meta System Help Desk is available 

between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern 

Time, Monday through Friday, 

excluding government holidays. 

Participants who believe that they 

have a good cause for not submitting 

documents electronically must file an 

exemption request, in accordance with 

10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper 

filing requesting authorization to 

continue to submit documents in paper 

format. Such filings must be submitted 

by: (1) First class mail addressed to the 

Office of the Secretary of the 

Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, Attention: Rulemaking and 

Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, 

express mail, or expedited delivery 

service to the Office of the Secretary, 

Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland, 20852, Attention: 

Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 

Participants filing a document in this 

manner are responsible for serving the 

document on all other participants. 

Filing is considered complete by firstclass mail as of the time of deposit in 

the mail, or by courier, express mail, or 

expedited delivery service upon 

depositing the document with the 

provider of the service. A presiding 

officer, having granted an exemption 

request from using E-Filing, may require 

a participant or party to use E-Filing if 

the presiding officer subsequently 

determines that the reason for granting 

the exemption from use of E-Filing no 

longer exists. 

Documents submitted in adjudicatory 

proceedings will appear in NRC’s 

electronic hearing docket, which is 

available to the public at http:// 

ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded 

pursuant to an order of the Commission, 

or the presiding officer. Participants are 

requested not to include personal 

privacy information, such as social 

security numbers, home addresses, or 


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home phone numbers in their filings, 

unless an NRC regulation or other law 

requires submission of such 

information. With respect to 

copyrighted works, except for limited 

excerpts that serve the purpose of the 

adjudicatory filings and would 

constitute a Fair Use application, 

participants are requested not to include 

copyrighted materials in their 

submission. 

If a person other than the Licensee 

requests a hearing, that person shall set 

forth with particularity the manner in 

which his interest is adversely affected 

by this Order and shall address the 

criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d). 

In the absence of any request for 

hearing, or written approval of an 

extension of time in which to request a 

hearing, the provisions specified in 

Section IV above shall be final twenty 

(20) days from the date of this Order 

without further order or proceedings. If 

an extension of time for requesting a 

hearing has been approved, the 

provisions specified in Section IV shall 

be final when the extension expires if a 

hearing request has not been received. 

An answer or a request for hearing shall 

not stay the immediate effectiveness of 

this order. 

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Dated this 12th day of March 2012. 

Eric J. Leeds, 

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

Operating Boiling Water Reactor 

Licenses With Mark I and Mark II 

Containments 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant ............................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Tennessee Valley Authority.

Docket Nos. 50–259, 50–260 and 50–296.

License Nos. DPR–33, DPR–52 and DPR–68.

Mr. Preston D. Swafford.

Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President.

Tennessee Valley Authority.

3R Lookout Place.

1101 Market Street.

Chattanooga, TN 37402–2801.

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant ......................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Carolina Power & Light Co..

Docket Nos. 50–325 and 50–324.

License Nos. DPR–71 and DPR–62.

Mr. Michael J. Annacone.

Vice President.

Carolina Power & Light Company.

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.

P.O. Box 10429.

Southport, NC 28461.

Columbia Generating Station ............................................................................................................................................................. BWR–Mark II. 

Energy Northwest.

Docket No. 50–397.

License No. NPF–21.

Mr. Mark E. Reddemann.

Chief Executive Officer.

Energy Northwest.

MD 1023.

P.O. Box 968.

Richland, WA 99352.

Cooper Nuclear Station ...................................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Nebraska Public Power District.

Docket No. 50–298.

License No. DPR–46.

Mr. Brian J. O’Grady.

Vice President—Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Nebraska Public Power District.

72676 648A Avenue.

P.O. Box 98.

Brownville, NE 68321.

Dresden Nuclear Power Station ......................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC.

Docket Nos. 50–237 and 50–249.

License Nos. DPR–19 and DPR–25.

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Exelon Nuclear.

4300 Winfield Road.

Warrenville, IL 60555.

Duane Arnold Energy Center ............................................................................................................................................................. BWR–Mark I. 

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC.

Docket No. 50–331.

License No. DPR–49.

Mr. Peter Wells.

Site Vice President.

NextEra Energy.

Duane Arnold Energy Center.

3277 DAEC Road.

Palo, IA 52324–9785.

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ............................................................................................................................................................. BWR–Mark I. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 16103 

Southern Nuclear Operating Co..

Docket Nos. 50–321 and 50–366.

License Nos. DPR–57 and NPF–5.

Mr. Dennis R. Madison.

Vice President.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc..

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.

11028 Hatch Parkway North.

Baxley, GA 31513.

Fermi .................................................................................................................................................................................................. BWR–Mark I. 

Detroit Edison Co..

Docket No. 50–341.

License No. NPF–43.

Mr. Jack M. Davis.

Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Detroit Edison Company.

Fermi 2—210 NOC.

6400 North Dixie Highway.

Newport, MI 48166.

Hope Creek Generating Station ......................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

PSEG Nuclear, LLC.

Docket No. 50–354.

License No. NPF–57.

Mr. Thomas Joyce.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

PSEG Nuclear LLC—N09.

P.O. Box 236.

Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ........................................................................................................................................ BWR–Mark I. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..

Docket No. 50–333.

License No. DPR–59.

Mike Colomb.

Vice President, Operations.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

P.O. Box 110.

Lycoming, NY 13093.

LaSalle County Station ....................................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark II. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC.

Docket Nos. 50–373 and 50–374.

License Nos. NPF–11 and NPF–18.

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Exelon Nuclear.

4300 Winfield Road.

Warrenville, IL 60555.

Limerick Generating Station ............................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark II. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC.

Docket Nos. 50–352 and 50–353.

License Nos. NPF–39 and NPF–85.

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Exelon Nuclear.

4300 Winfield Road.

Warrenville, IL 60555.

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ................................................................................................................................................. BWR–Mark I. 

Northern States Power Company.

Docket No. 50–263.

License No. DPR–22.

Mr. Timothy J. O’Connor.

Site Vice President.

Northern States Power Company—Minnesota.

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

2807 West County Road 75.

Monticello, MN 55362–9637.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station ......................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I & 

II. 

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC.

Docket Nos. 50–220 and 50–410.

License Nos. DPR–63 and NPF–69.

Mr. Ken Langdon.

Vice President Nine Mile Point.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC.

P.O. Box 63.

Lycoming, NY 13093.


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16104 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ......................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC.

Docket No. 50–219.

License No. DPR–16.

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Exelon Nuclear.

4300 Winfield Road.

Warrenville, IL 60555.

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station ................................................................................................................................................. BWR–Mark I. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC.

Docket Nos. 50–277 and 50–278.

License Nos. DPR–44 and DPR–56.

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Exelon Nuclear.

4300 Winfield Road.

Warrenville, IL 60555.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 .......................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..

Docket No. 50–293.

License No. DPR–35.

Mr. Robert Smith.

Vice President and Site Vice President.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

600 Rocky Hill Road.

Plymouth, MA 02360–5508.

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ................................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC.

Docket Nos. 50–254 and 50–265.

License Nos. DPR–29 and DPR–30.

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Exelon Nuclear.

4300 Winfield Road.

Warrenville, IL 60555.

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ................................................................................................................................................ BWR–Mark II. 

PPL Susquehanna, LLC.

Docket Nos. 50–387 and 50–388.

License Nos. NPF–14 and NPF–22.

Mr. Timothy S. Rausch.

Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

PPL Susquehanna, LLC.

769 Salem Boulevard.

NUCSB3.

Berwick, PA 18603–0467.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ........................................................................................................................................... BWR–Mark I. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..

Docket No. 50–271.

License No. DPR–28.

Mr. Christopher J. Wamser.

Site Vice President.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

320 Governor Hunt Road.

Vernon, VT 05354.

Requirements for Reliable Hardened 

Vent Systems at Boiling-Water Reactor 

Facilities With Mark I And Mark II 

Containments 

1. Hardened Containment Venting 

System (HCVS) Functional 

Requirements 

Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I 

and Mark II containments shall have a 

reliable hardened vent to remove decay 

heat and maintain control of 

containment pressure within acceptable 

limits following events that result in the 

loss of active containment heat removal 

capability or prolonged Station Blackout 

(SBO). The hardened vent system shall 

be accessible and operable under a 

range of plant conditions, including a 

prolonged SBO and inadequate 

containment cooling. 

1.1 The design of the HCVS shall 

consider the following performance 

objectives: 

1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to 

minimize the reliance on operator 

actions. 

1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to 

minimize plant operators’ exposure 

to occupational hazards, such as 

extreme heat stress, while operating 

the HCVS system. 

1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be 

designed to minimize radiological 

consequences that would impede 

personnel actions needed for event 

response. 

1.2 The HCVS shall include the 

following design features: 

1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the 

capacity to vent the steam/energy 

equivalent of 1 percent of licensed/ 

rated thermal power (unless a lower 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 16105 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3 Initial Payment means, in relation to a CDS 

Contract, the payment, if any, specified as the 

‘‘Initial Payment Amount’’ (or, in relation to certain 

CDS Contracts relating to indices, as the 

‘‘Additional Amount’’) under the Contract Terms 

for such CDS Contract and, in relation to a Bilateral 

CDS Transaction, the payment, usually described 

therein as the ‘‘Initial Payment Amount’’ or 

‘‘Additional Amount,’’ payable by one party thereto 

to the other on the third business day after the trade 

date of such Bilateral CDS Transaction. See ICE 

Clear Europe Clearing Rules, Section 1, Rule 101. 

4The Commission has modified the text of the 

summaries prepared by ICE Clear Europe. 

value is justified by analyses), and 

be able to maintain containment 

pressure below the primary 

containment design pressure. 

1.2.2 The HCVS shall be accessible 

to plant operators and be capable of 

remote operation and control, or 

manual operation, during sustained 

operations. 

1.2.3 The HCVS shall include a 

means to prevent inadvertent 

actuation. 

1.2.4 The HCVS shall include a 

means to monitor the status of the 

vent system (e.g., valve position 

indication) from the control room or 

other location(s). The monitoring 

system shall be designed for 

sustained operation during a 

prolonged SBO. 

1.2.5 The HCVS shall include a 

means to monitor the effluent 

discharge for radioactivity that may 

be released from operation of the 

HCVS. The monitoring system shall 

provide indication in the control 

room or other location(s), and shall 

be designed for sustained operation 

during a prolonged SBO. 

1.2.6 The HCVS shall include design 

features to minimize unintended 

cross flow of vented fluids within a 

unit and between units on the site. 

1.2.7 The HCVS shall include 

features and provision for the 

operation, testing, inspection and 

maintenance adequate to ensure 

that reliable function and capability 

are maintained. 

1.2.8 The HCVS shall be designed 

for pressures that are consistent 

with maximum containment design 

pressures as well as dynamic 

loading resulting from system 

actuation. 

1.2.9 The HCVS shall discharge the 

effluent to a release point above 

main plant structures. 

2. Hardened Containment Venting 

System Quality Standards 

The following quality standards are 

necessary to fulfill the requirements for 

a reliable HCVS: 

2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and 

including the second containment 

isolation barrier shall be designed 

consistent with the design basis of 

the plant. These items include 

piping, piping supports, 

containment isolation valves, 

containment isolation valve 

actuators and containment isolation 

valve position indication 

components. 

2.2 All other HCVS components shall 

be designed for reliable and rugged 

performance that is capable of 

ensuring HCVS functionality 

following a seismic event. These 

items include electrical power 

supply, valve actuator pneumatic 

supply and instrumentation (local 

and remote) components. 

3. Hardened Containment Venting 

System Programmatic Requirements 

3.1 The Licensee shall develop, 

implement, and maintain 

procedures necessary for the safe 

operation of the HCVS. Procedures 

shall be established for system 

operations when normal and 

backup power is available, and 

during SBO conditions. 

3.2 The Licensee shall train 

appropriate personnel in the use of 

the HCVS. The training curricula 

shall include system operations 

when normal and backup power is 

available, and during SBO 

conditions. 

[FR Doc. 2012–6545 Filed 3–16–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–66581; File No. SR–ICEEU– 

2012–04] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; ICE 

Clear Europe Limited; Notice of Filing 

of Proposed Rule Change To Provide 

for a T+1 Settlement of the Initial 

Payment Related to the CDS Contracts 

Cleared by ICE Clear Europe Limited 

March 13, 2012. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder 2

notice is hereby given that on March 6, 

2012, ICE Clear Europe Limited (‘‘ICE 

Clear Europe’’) filed with the Securities 

and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

change as described in Items I and II 

below, which Items have been prepared 

primarily by ICE Clear Europe. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the proposed rule 

change from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

ICE Clear Europe proposes rule 

amendments that are intended to 

modify the terms of each of the various 

CDS Contracts cleared by ICE Clear 

Europe (iTraxx Contracts, Standard 

European Corporate and Sovereign 

Contracts) to make the Initial Payment 3

date the first business day immediately 

following the trade date, provided that 

with respect to CDS Contracts that are 

accepted for clearing after the trade 

date, the Initial Payment date will be the 

date that is the first business day 

following the date when the CDS 

Contract is accepted for clearing. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, ICE 

Clear Europe included statements 

concerning the purpose of and basis for 

the proposed rule change and discussed 

any comments it received on the 

proposed rule change. The text of these 

statements may be examined at the 

places specified in Item IV below. ICE 

Clear Europe has prepared summaries, 

set forth in sections (A), (B), and (C) 

below, of the most significant aspects of 

these statements.4

(A) Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

As noted above, the proposed rule 

changes amend the timing of Initial 

Payments on a cleared CDS Contract. 

The Initial Payment under a CDS 

Contract is established at the time the 

contract is executed and may be payable 

from either the protection buyer to the 

protection seller or vice versa. Under 

the current ICE Clear Europe Rules (by 

way of the incorporated ISDA Credit 

Derivatives Definitions), and consistent 

with practice in the market for 

uncleared credit default swaps, the 

Initial Payment is required to be made 

on the third business day following the 

trade date (the execution date). ICE 

Clear Europe proposes to amend the 

definition of Initial Payment in its 

Clearing Rules to provide instead that 

the Initial Payment is to be made on the 

first business day following the trade 

date (or, if the transaction is accepted 

for clearing after the trade date, the 

initial payment is to be made on the first 

business day following the date of 

acceptance for clearing). ICE Clear 

Europe believes that this change from 

T+3 settlement to T+1 settlement will 

reduce settlement risk for the 


emcdonald on DSK29S0YB1PROD with NOTICES