IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 51930-5-II

Respondent,

v.

DHENA RAY ALBERT, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

SUTTON, J. —Dhena Albert appeals her convictions for possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance—methamphetamine, and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree.1

The Vancouver Police Department obtained information from a confidential, reliable informant

(CRI) about Albert’s sale of methamphetamine and used the CRI to arrange a controlled buy of 

methamphetamine from Albert at her residence between August 16 and 18, 2017. The police 

department then obtained a search warrant and seized evidence from Albert’s residence, including 

a surveillance device and a handgun with a loaded magazine in a safe.

The State charged Albert with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance—

methamphetamine—and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, and a third charge 

that was later dropped. Pretrial, Albert filed a motion for a Franks2hearing and a motion for a 

trial continuance to view the surveillance device seized by the police. The court denied these 

 

1 Albert had prior felony convictions and could not possess a firearm. 

2 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

April 7, 2020
No. 51930-5-II

2

motions. A jury found Albert guilty of both charges. Albert filed a post-trial motion for a new 

trial and/or arrest of the judgment, which the court denied. Based on a pending federal charge, 

and after Albert filed a motion for an appeal bond, the court set bail at four million dollars.

Albert argues that the trial court erred by denying her pretrial motion for a Franks hearing

and her motion for a continuance. She also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion 

to suppress the evidence seized during the search, denying her motion for a new trial or 

alternatively, to arrest judgment, and setting her appeal bond at four million dollars. 

We hold that the trial court did not err by denying Albert’s request for a Franks hearing

because she failed to meet her burden of proof for a Franks hearing, and the trial court did not err 

by denying Albert’s motion for a continuance related to the surveillance device. We decline to 

decide the remainder of Albert’s assignments of error because she either failed to adequately 

preserve these issues or failed to adequately brief them. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s orders 

and Albert’s convictions.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Vancouver Police Department obtained and executed a search warrant on August 25, 

2017, for an apartment in Vancouver where Albert allegedly resided. The warrant was based on 

the affidavit by Vancouver Police Detective Chadd Nolan. In his affidavit, Detective Nolan 

described his reason to believe that two individuals, including Albert, were selling 

methamphetamine out of the residence at that location. His belief came from information from a 

CRI. This CRI informed the police that he or she knew that Albert sold methamphetamine from 

her residence. The CRI positively identified Albert from a photograph and provided substantial 
No. 51930-5-II

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information about Albert. The CRI described the way that Albert communicates with her 

customers, the way that she measures the methamphetamine for sale, and that the CRI had 

previously purchased methamphetamine from Albert on numerous occasions using cash. 

Detective Nolan searched Albert’s driver’s license and discovered that her address matched the 

address given by the CRI. 

Based on this information, Detective Nolan set up a controlled buy with the CRI, whereby 

the CRI would buy methamphetamine from Albert under Detective Nolan’s supervision. Detective 

Nolan stated that the controlled buy occurred between August 16 and August 18, 2017. Prior to 

the purchase, Detective Nolan thoroughly searched the CRI for any controlled substances and 

provided the CRI with prerecorded currency with which to purchase the methamphetamine. The 

officers watched the CRI as the CRI entered Albert’s residence, and they continued to watch the 

residence until the CRI left. After the CRI left the residence, the CRI met the officers at a 

predetermined location. 

The CRI presented Detective Nolan with a substance that Detective Nolan recognized as 

methamphetamine. The substance was field tested and tested positive for methamphetamine. The 

CRI informed Detective Nolan that Albert had a safe where she kept her methamphetamine and 

money. The CRI also informed Detective Nolan that Albert had pipes commonly used for smoking 

methamphetamine, a scale, and packaging material. The police then obtained a search warrant for 

Albert’s residence, and during the search, the police found a handgun with a loaded magazine in a

safe. They seized the gun, drug evidence, and Albert’s cell phone. Albert has a prior conviction 

for a serious offense and was not lawfully allowed to possess a firearm. 
No. 51930-5-II

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The CRI cooperated with the Vancouver Police Department in exchange for “favorable 

consideration on a criminal charge.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 101. Detective Nolan was 

forthcoming in his affidavit about the CRI’s history with drug abuse and prior criminal history.

The State charged Albert on August 29, 2017, with (1) one count of possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver—methamphetamine, with enhancements for being 

within 1000 feet of a school bus route, while armed with a firearm, and it being a major violation 

of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,

3

(2) one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in 

the first degree,

4

and a third charge which was later dismissed.

II. PRETRIAL MOTIONS

A. MOTION FOR A FRANKS HEARING AND RELATED MOTIONS

Pretrial, Albert filed a motion for a Franks5hearing, a supporting declaration, and a summary 

of her whereabouts and cellphone usage on the days of the alleged controlled buy by the CRI. 

Albert also filed a motion to seal her declaration and a motion to obtain sealed records documenting 

the CRI’s allegations. Albert argued that the affidavit for the search warrant was unreliable 

because “the affiant does not give a date or time” that the CRI bought the methamphetamine from 

Albert, the affidavit does not say who observed the controlled buy, and Albert was not at her 

residence for a substantial period of time between August 16 to August 18, 2017. 

 

3 Ch. 69.50 RCW.

4 RCW 9.41.040(1)(a).

5 Franks, 438 U.S. 154.
No. 51930-5-II

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Albert’s counsel informed the trial court that he had Albert’s cell phone data, including her 

text messages, extracted with the assistance of a private investigator to establish her whereabouts 

during the three-day period the CRI had bought from her. From this information, Albert’s counsel

determined that Albert was not at home for substantial periods of time during that time period

based on the exhibits he had prepared and attached to the motion. When the court asked Albert’s 

counsel whether he was arguing that the affiant, Detective Nolan, either lied or recklessly 

disregarded the truth, Albert’s counsel stated, “Whether it’s his reckless disregard of the truth or 

the informant’s, I’m not sure that line is that bright.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP)

at 33. 

The trial court found that Albert did not meet her preliminary burden of proof for a Franks

hearing. 

There isn’t anything in any of these affidavits which would allow the [c]ourt to find 

that the officer had some information which indicated the [CRI] is not telling . . . 

the truth about what happened during this controlled buy, and having that 

information [Detective Nolan] either disregarded it, [or] intentionally omit it, or 

having the information he [didn’t] care whether it’s true or not . . . . The defendant 

has to show . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant either 

intentionally misrepresented something or recklessly disregarding the truth. So, the 

focus was not what the affiant knew at the time they did the affidavit, and I have 

nothing in this information that would allow me to find that they had anything other 

than what they put in the affidavit. 

VRP at 37-38 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court denied Albert’s motions for a Franks 

hearing, for disclosure of the CRI and the logs and records of the CRI, and to seal her declaration,

but it granted Albert’s motion for the return of the surveillance device. 
No. 51930-5-II

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B. MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS VIDEO DATA FROM SURVEILLANCE DEVICE AND FOR A CONTINUANCE

Albert also filed a pretrial motion to suppress the video from the surveillance device, which 

was seized during the execution of the search warrant. She also filed a motion for a continuance 

to view the surveillance device, believing it may contain exculpatory evidence confirming that she 

was not at home for substantial periods of time during the three-day period of the controlled buy. 

The court denied the motion for a continuance, stating, “I haven’t heard that there is in fact any 

exculpatory evidence, just the possibility that there might be. There ha[s] been ample time to try 

to develop the things that are suggested.” VRP at 44. Trial began on May 7, 2018. On May 8, the 

State informed Albert that she could pick up the surveillance device and review the surveillance 

device. 

C. TRIAL COURT RULING-USE OF SURVEILLANCE DEVICE VIDEO DATA IN REBUTTAL 

During trial, the officers were finally able to gain access to the data contained in the

surveillance device but only after the State had rested its case. Once they did gain access by using 

special software, the video data showed Albert sitting in her kitchen on August 22, 2017, three 

days prior to the execution of the search warrant, next to a large bag of methamphetamine and a 

large scale. The trial court ruled that because of the late disclosure, the State could not use the 

video data in its rebuttal, but that it could be used as impeachment evidence if Albert chose to 

testify. Albert did not testify, and she rested her case. 

The jury found Albert guilty on both counts. During trial, Albert had not been detained. 

Following her conviction, the trial court remanded her into custody pending sentencing with bail 

set at $750,000. 
No. 51930-5-II

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D. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

Post-trial, the State moved to hold Albert without bail based on information it had received 

from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI had informed the State that it had served 

a search warrant on Albert two days after her trial concluded. The State was concerned that 

because Albert was then facing a federal criminal charge, she may have more incentive to flee 

pending sentencing. Based on this concern, the State requested a no-bail hold. The court granted 

the State’s request. 

Albert then filed a motion for discovery regarding the state’s evidence of the FBI’s search 

warrant and a motion for discovery of the surveillance device. Albert argued that the FBI allegedly 

had information of where she had been living and for how long, which was relevant to her request 

for a Franks hearing. 

Albert also filed a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, a motion for arrest of the 

judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence and that the court erred by denying her

motion to suppress evidence and her motion for an in-camera interview of the CRI. The court 

denied both motions. 

That same day, the court sentenced Albert to 170 months of confinement and 12 months 

of community custody. It also heard Albert’s motion for an appeal bond. The court set bail at four 

million dollars. 

As pointed out by counsel in his motion on the appeal bond, a no-bail hold is 

inappropriate unless I find one of four things that are laid out in a case of this type. 

I cannot find any of them, although I will find that I think [Albert] is likely to flee 

if she’s not held on a substantial bond, but a stay doesn’t regard unreasonable 

trauma to the victims, haven’t dealt with legal financial obligations, and wouldn’t 

unduly diminish a deterrent effect of punishment. So, based upon all that, I set bail 

at four million dollars.
No. 51930-5-II

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VRP at 466.

Albert appeals.

ANALYSIS

Albert argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for a Franks hearing and her 

motion for a continuance, and also makes several other assignments of error. We hold that the 

trial court did not err by denying Albert’s request for a Franks hearing or by denying Albert’s 

motion for a continuance. However, we decline to decide Albert’s other assignments of error 

because those issues were either not preserved at the trial court, or they were inadequately briefed

and thus, we affirm the trial court’s orders and Albert’s convictions.

I. FRANKS HEARING

Albert argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a Franks hearing because 

she provided evidence to establish that she was not at the residence for a substantial period of time 

during the period of the controlled buy. We hold that the trial court did not err by denying Albert’s 

motion for a Franks hearing.

In Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a 

trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon the defendant’s request if the defendant makes 

a substantial preliminary showing that an affiant deliberately or recklessly made material 

misstatements in a search warrant affidavit. 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 

667 (1978). “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistakes are insufficient.” Franks, 438 U.S. 

at 171. Rather, to be entitled to a Franks hearing, “[t]here must be allegations of deliberate 

falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an 

offer of proof.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
No. 51930-5-II

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Albert’s counsel informed the court that he used Albert’s cell phone records to establish 

her whereabouts during the three-day period that the CRI purported to have bought 

methamphetamine from her. Her counsel prepared this information with assistance from a private 

investigator. Counsel argued that this information demonstrated that Albert was not at home for 

substantial periods of time during that three-day time period. When the court asked Albert’s 

counsel whether he was arguing that Detective Nolan, the affiant, either lied or recklessly 

disregarded the truth, Albert’s counsel stated, “Whether it’s his reckless disregard of the truth or 

the informant’s, I’m not sure that line is that bright.” VRP at 33. 

The court reviewed Detective Nolan’s affidavit for the search warrant which detailed the 

CRI’s allegations, knowledge of Albert, and the controlled buy that occurred between August 16 

and August 18, 2017. Detective Nolan described how the CRI knew Albert and described the 

controlled buy in great detail. He admitted that the CRI is a known drug user and that the CRI 

“has provided this information . . . for favorable consideration on a criminal charge.” CP at 101.

The trial court found that Albert did not meet her preliminary burden of proof for a Franks

hearing. Albert did not present any evidence to show that Detective Nolan had information which 

indicated that the CRI was not telling the truth. Instead, Albert focused on whether the CRI lied, 

but she failed to make a substantial showing that Detective Nolan either lied or recklessly 

disregarded the truth in his affidavit, as required for a Franks hearing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 

Because Albert failed to meet her preliminary burden, we hold that the trial court did not 

err by denying her motion for a Franks hearing.
No. 51930-5-II

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II. MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE

Albert argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a continuance. She argues 

that a continuance was necessary due to the prejudicial nature of the surveillance device; that the 

denial of a continuance forced a trial, terminating her ability to testify; and that the denial “created 

a structural inherent ineffective assistance of counsel in that [Albert]’s trial counsel was unaware 

of the video showing [Albert] sitting in the apartment next to an ounce of methamphetamine[.]” 

Br. of Appellant at 14. Albert also argues that a continuance was necessary because her trial 

counsel was unaware of the surveillance device video which showed her sitting next to a large 

brick of methamphetamine, and if he had known about it, he would have likely advised her to take 

the State’s plea offer. We hold that the trial court did not err by denying Albert’s motion for a 

continuance. 

A. PREJUDICE FROM DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE

Under CrR 3.3(f)(2), the court may continue the trial “when such continuance is required 

in the administration of justice and the defendant will not be prejudiced in the presentation of his 

or her defense.” We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance for abuse 

of discretion. State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 135, 216 P.3d 1024 (2009). We will not disturb 

the trial court’s decision “unless there is a clear showing it is ‘manifestly unreasonable, or 

exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’” Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d at 135 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Flinn, 154 Wn.2d 193, 199, 110 P.3d 748 (2005)). 

Here, one week before trial, Albert requested a trial continuance to access the contents of 

the surveillance device, believing it may corroborate her argument that she was not home for 

substantial periods of time during the period of the controlled buy. At the time of her motion, she 
No. 51930-5-II

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had not yet seen the video data contained on the surveillance device. The trial court denied the 

motion, saying “I haven’t heard that there is in fact any exculpatory evidence, just the possibility 

that there might be. There ha[s] been ample time to try to develop the things that are suggested.” 

VRP at 44. 

During trial, the officers still could not gain access to the data contained in the surveillance 

device until after the State rested its case. Once they did gain access by using special software, 

the surveillance device showed Albert sitting in her kitchen on August 22, 2017, three days prior 

to the execution of the search warrant, next to a large bag of methamphetamine and a large scale. 

The court ruled that the State could not use the device as rebuttal evidence, but that it could use it 

as impeachment evidence if Albert chose to testify, which she declined to do. 

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A claim that counsel was ineffective is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de 

novo. State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 338, 352 P.3d 776 (2015). The Sixth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee the 

right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court set forth 

a two-prong inquiry for reversal of a criminal conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Under the Strickland test, the defendant bears the burden to show (1) 

counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Failure to make the required showing of either deficient 

performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
No. 51930-5-II

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We do not determine whether Albert’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient because 

she fails to make any argument explaining how her trial counsel’s performance was deficient. RAP 

10.3(a)(6). Because Albert fails to make any showing of deficient performance, we do not 

determine whether Albert was prejudiced. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.

C. CRR 4.7 VIOLATION

The State has the obligation to provide the defendant with certain material and information 

within the State’s knowledge, possession, or control. CrR 4.7(a). CrR 4.7(h)(2) imposes on the 

State a continuing duty to disclose certain evidence to the defense, stating:

Continuing Duty to Disclose. If, after compliance with these rules or orders 

pursuant thereto, a party discovers additional material or information which is 

subject to disclosure, the party shall promptly notify the other party or their counsel 

of the existence of such additional material, and if the additional material or 

information is discovered during trial, the court shall also be notified.

“Discretion is abused when the trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable, or is exercised on 

untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 830, 845 P.2d 

1017 (1993). “Exclusion or suppression of evidence or dismissal for a discovery violation is an 

extraordinary remedy and should be applied narrowly.” State v. Vance, 184 Wn. App. 902, 911, 

339 P.3d 245 (2014).

Here, the State provided the defense with the surveillance device as soon as it was 

available, once the officers were able to gain access to it after the State rested its case. Once the 

device was provided, the trial court ruled that because of the late disclosure, the State could not 

use the device in its rebuttal, but that it could be used as impeachment evidence if Albert chose to 

testify, which she did not do. We hold that the court properly exercised its discretion to impose a 
No. 51930-5-II

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sanction against the State for its late disclosure, and did not abuse its discretion by denying Albert’s 

request for a continuance. 

III. ADDITIONAL ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR-NOT PRESERVED OR INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 

Albert makes a number of other assignments of error. See assignments of error 1, 3, 5, 8, 

and 9. However, Albert makes no argument nor cites authority associated with these assignments 

of error. Therefore, we decline to decide these issues on the merits. RAP 10.3(a)(6) (a brief must 

contain “[t]he argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to 

legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record”), 10.3(g); see also State v. Harris, 

164 Wn. App. 377, 389 n. 7, 263 P.3d 1276 (2011) (assignment of error waived where appellant 

failed to present supporting argument and legal authority).

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s orders denying Albert’s motions for a Franks hearing and for a 

continuance, and thus, we affirm the convictions.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

SUTTON, A.C.J.

We concur:

MAXA, .J.

GLASGOW, J.