SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4141-17T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JASON E. LOUIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted April 28, 2020 – Decided May 12, 2020

Before Judges Gilson and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 16-01-0350.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen Anton

Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Around 3:00 a.m. on May 8, 2015, Orange Police officers were dispatched 

to the area of South Day Street, following a report that a storeowner had been 

robbed at gunpoint and the suspect had "jump[ed]" into a white Acura. Sergeant 

Raymond Hamm was patrolling the area in a marked police car when he saw a 

car matching that description approach and make a right turn in front of him. 

With the lights and sirens of his patrol car activated, Hamm followed the Acura 

for one and a half miles. 

Reaching speeds in excess of sixty miles per hour in a thirty-five-mileper-hour zone, crashing into poles, driving on the sidewalk, and spewing debris 

in its wake, the Acura ultimately crashed into another pole and stopped. All 

three occupants ran from the car; responding officers gave chase; and Hamm 

apprehended the driver – defendant Jason E. Louis. 

Following a four-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree 

eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b).1 Pertinent to this appeal, the State admitted into 

 

1

 The jury acquitted defendant of the remaining charges: second-degree 

conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-1; and third-degree 

resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a). After finding the mitigating factors 

substantially outweighed the aggravating factors, the trial judge sentenced 

defendant at the bottom of the third-degree range to a three-year term of 

imprisonment. Defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal. The two 

other occupants of the Acura were charged in the same indictment with various 

offenses, tried with defendant, and acquitted of all charges.
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evidence – without objection – three summonses issued to defendant: reckless 

driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; driving while his license was suspended, N.J.S.A. 

39:3-40.1; and unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10. This 

appeal followed. 

On appeal, defendant raises a single point for our consideration:

POINT ONE

THE INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF TWO 

UNPROVEN, IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL 

MOTOR VEHICLE SUMMONSES WAS CLEARLY 

CAPABLE OF LEADING TO AN UNJUST RESULT. 

(Not raised below)

More particularly, defendant argues, "the [S]tate improperly introduced 

irrelevant, prejudicial, and unproven bad acts - motor vehicle summonses for 

driving while suspended and unlicensed [driver] - that had the clear capacity to

lead to his conviction, thereby tainting the verdict and rendering it unjust." The 

State concedes those summonses "simply [were] not relevant to whether the 

defendant eluded police via flight in a motor vehicle in this case" and, as such, 

they did not satisfy the Cofield2factors for admission as bad-act evidence under 

 

2

 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992). In Cofield, the Court established 

the following four-prong test for the admissibility of other crimes evidence:
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N.J.R.E. 404(b). But, the State argues that evidentiary error does not require 

reversal. 

We find insufficient merit in defendant's belated argument to warrant 

extended discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We therefore 

affirm, adding only a few comments.

We agree with the parties that the summonses were improperly admitted 

in evidence because they were not probative to the eluding charge. See State v. 

Bakka, 176 N.J. 533, 546 (2003) (recognizing in the context of aggravated 

manslaughter and vehicular homicide charges, "the mere fact that a defendant is 

an unlicensed driver does not by itself suggest an awareness of risk"). And as 

 

1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible 

as relevant to a material issue;

2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in 

time to the offense charged;

3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and 

convincing; and

4. The probative value of the evidence must not be 

outweighed by its apparent prejudice. 

[Id. at 338.]

The Court has since recognized, however, that the second prong does not 

necessarily apply in all cases. State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 130-34 (2007).
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the State correctly argues, that error was not "clearly capable of producing an 

unjust result." R. 2:10-2 (setting forth the plain error standard to determine 

whether the error requires reversal). 

We apply the plain error standard because defendant did not object to 

admission of the summonses at trial. Under that standard, "the error will be 

disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to 

a result that it otherwise might not have reached." State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 

456 (2015). We must evaluate the error in view of the "overall strength of the 

State's case." State v. Chapman, 187 N.J. 277, 289 (2006); see also State v. 

Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 588 (2018). A defendant's failure to object leads to the 

reasonable inference the issue was not significant in the context of the trial. 

State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333 (1971).

Applying that standard, we are satisfied there was strong, independent 

evidence offered against defendant on the eluding charge. Hamm's unrefuted 

testimony concerning the events he personally observed on May 8, 2015 was 

corroborated by responding officers, who testified as to their observations. And, 

defendant's front-seat passenger testified at trial and acknowledged defendant 

was "speeding" while driving the car with police in "pursuit." That evidence 
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constitutes "overwhelming admissible evidence on which to convict defendant"

for second-degree eluding. Prall, 231 N.J. at 588-89.

Moreover, other than fleeting references to the summonses in establishing 

their foundation for admission in evidence, the State did not mention the 

summonses in summation and the judge did not reference them in the jury 

instructions. By contrast, the judge properly incorporated the reckless driving 

summons issued to defendant as part of the jury instruction for second-degree 

eluding, and the inference the jury may draw to determine whether defendant's 

actions "creat[ed] a risk of death or injury to any person." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); 

see also Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Eluding an Officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

2(b))" (rev. Nov. 15, 2004). Accordingly, the trial judge appropriately 

instructed the jury to focus on the elements necessary to prove that charge, 

without reference to the erroneous evidence. 

Affirmed.