[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Tidwell , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2072.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -2072
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . T IDWELL , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Tidwell , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2072.] Constitutional law—Fourth Amendment—Investigative stop—Police officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain su spect in order to confirm or dispel an unidentified witness’s assertion that suspect was operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated—Court of appeals’ judgment upholding trial court’s order granting motion to suppress reversed. (No. 2020-0290—Submitted Mar ch 30, 2021—Decided June 24, 2021.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, Nos. C-180511 and C-180512, 2019-Ohio-4493.

_________________ D ONNELLY , J. {¶ 1} The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures does not forbid a police officer from initiating a bri ef investigatory stop of a person if the officer has reas onable suspicion to believe tha t the person is or isS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 about to be engaged in criminal activity. In this case, the is sue is whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain appellee, Sh erry Tidwell, in order to confirm or dispel an unidentified witness’s assertion that T idwell was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Based on the totality of th e circumstances then confronting the officer, we hold that his investigatory stop of Tidwell was
reasonable and thus did not vio late the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals that upheld the Hamilton County Municipal Court’s order granting Tidwell’s motion to suppress, and we remand this case to the tr ial court for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 2} At 8:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 11, 2017, Sergeant Jacques Illanz—on duty, in uniform, and in a marked state-highway-patro l cruiser— happened upon a two-car collision on Fields-Ertel Road in Warre n County, Ohio. Because the vehicle damage was minor and Fields-Er tel Road is a heavily traveled road at that time of day, Sergeant Illanz quickly marked the sc ene of the accident
and directed the drivers of both vehicles into a nearby Speedwa y parking lot to complete an accident report. {¶ 3} As Sergeant Illanz was completing the accident report in the Speedway parking lot, a man standing in the doorway to the Spee dway store yelled to Sergeant Illanz: “Hey, you need to stop that vehicle. That lady is drunk.” The man directed Sergeant Illanz’s attention to an SUV that was bac king out of a parking space. Sergeant Illanz did not know the identity of th e man who yelled to him, but he later learned that he was a Speedway customer. {¶ 4} Sergeant Illanz watched as the driver backed her vehicle out of its parking space at an unusually slow speed and then slowly drove forward, heading toward nearby Fields-Ertel Road, which was still busy with heav y traffic. At that time, Sergeant Illanz saw that the driver had a blank stare on her face, and heJanuary Term, 2021

3 testified that he knows from his t raining and experience that a blank stare may indicate impairment. {¶ 5} At that point, Sergeant Illanz w alked in front of the vehicle t o get the driver’s attention and gestured for her to stop. Sergeant Illa nz estimated that approximately 30 seconds elapsed between the time that he heard the Speedway customer yell to him and the time that he stopped the vehicle. There is no dispute that Sergeant Illanz stopped Tid well’s vehicle out of his conce rn for public safety. {¶ 6} When the vehicle stopped, Sergean t Illanz asked the driver, Tid well, to roll down her window, turn off the car, and hand him the car key. After Tidwell complied with those requests, Sergeant Illanz asked her some qu estions. He later testified, “I started just maki ng some simple conversation with her, asked her, you know, what’s going on, where’s she going, stuff like that.” Se rgeant Illanz detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and noticed th at Tidwell’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. He testified that when he asked Tid well for her driver’s license, it took her “a good couple of minutes” to comply, due to her slow and exaggerated movements, and she m aintained a blank stare when ha nding it to him. {¶ 7} In response to Sergeant Illanz’s questions, Tidwell said she wa s heading home after having purchased alcohol from the Speedway s tore. When
asked whether she had be en drinking, Tidwell told Sergeant Illa nz that she had not had anything to drink. Tidwell al so told him that before arriv ing at the Speedway,
she had been at a house with fri ends, watching a college footba ll game. {¶ 8} Throughout the course of this e ncounter, Sergeant Illanz contin ued to detect an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. The blank s tare on Tidwell’s face likewise persisted. Sergeant Illanz additionally noted th at Tidwell’s speech was slow, very slurred, and at times unintelligible. Sergeant Illanz stated that this
encounter with Tidwell laste d no more than five minutes. {¶ 9} As Sergeant Illanz was about to radio for dispatch to call for a response from a law-enforcement agency that had jurisdiction ov er the privateS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 Speedway premises, Hamilton County Deputy Sheriff Randy Reynold s, having previously been dispatched to respond to the two-car collision on Fields-Ertel Road, arrived at the Speedway. Upon Deputy Reynolds’s arrival, Serge ant Illanz told him why he had stopped Tidwell’s vehi cle and asked him to take over the investigation. {¶ 10} As Deputy Reynolds talked with Tidwell, he detected a strong od or of alcohol coming from her facial area. He observed that Tidwe ll’s eyes were watery and bloodshot, that her eyelids were droopy, and that he r speech was slow and slurred. When Deputy Reynolds asked Tidwell whether she ha d been drinking, she said yes and asked him to take her home to her son. {¶ 11} Deputy Reynolds then asked Tidwe ll if she would exit the vehicl e and submit to field sobriety tests, and she agreed to do so. S he stumbled as she got out of the vehicle. Deputy Reynolds continued to smell alcohol coming from
Tidwell after she was outside the vehicle. He then administere d a series of field sobriety tests; the tests indicated that Tidwell was impaired a nd unable to legally operate a motor vehicle. {¶ 12} While Deputy Reynolds was talking to Tidwell, Sergeant Illanz entered the Speedway store and spoke with the clerk who was wor king behind the
counter. The clerk stated that he had sold alcohol to Tidwell and, concerned that she was intoxicated, had told the unidentified Speedway custome r, as the customer was leaving the store, to make Sergeant Illanz aware of Tidwell ’s possible
intoxication. The unidentified cu stomer had left the premises before Sergeant
Illanz entered the store. {¶ 13} After Deputy Reynolds conclude d that Tidwell was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, he placed her under arrest. Tid well was charged with operating a vehicle while under th e influence of alcohol or dru gs in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (h). {¶ 14} Tidwell filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered from t he stop. Following a hearing, the Hamilton County Municipal Court granted Tidwell’sJanuary Term, 2021

5 motion, finding that Tidwell had not driven her vehicle erratic ally, she had not been involved in an accident, and the anonymous tip from the unident ified Speedway customer was “essentially unreliable.” {¶ 15} On appeal, the First District C ourt of Appeals affirmed the tri al court’s judgment. The court of appeals held that Sergeant Illa nz lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to effectuate a lawful investiga tory stop because the unidentified Speedway customer’s anonymous tip lacked sufficien t indicia of reliability and there was no evidence of any erratic driving by Tidwell prior to the stop. {¶ 16} We accepted jurisdiction over th e following proposition of law:

Simple face-to-face contact between an unnamed citizen and a police officer may be enough to remove the citizen from the category of “anonymous” and consider him a “citizen informant,” whose tip merits a high degree of credibility and value, render ing the tip sufficient to withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge without independent police corroboration.

See 158 Ohio St.3d 1504, 2020-Ohio-2819, 144 N.E.3d 451.
ANALYSIS {¶ 17} In this case, the trial court granted Tidwell’s motion to suppr ess after determining that the investigator y stop effectuated by Sergeant Illanz was
unreasonable and thus violated th e Fourth Amendment. We must d ecide whether the court of appeals correctly upheld that decision. Our analy sis begins with consideration of the appli cable standard of review. Standard of Review {¶ 18} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. An appe llate court must accept the t rial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. See State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). The appellate cour t must decide questions of law de novo, without d eference to the lower court’ s legal conclusions.
Burnside at ¶ 8. Investigatory Stop Base d on Reasonable Suspicion {¶ 19} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit s unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 Under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a police officer who lacks probabl e cause to arrest may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigator y stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if t he officer has reasonable suspi cion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014). {¶ 20} Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possesse d by police and its degree of re liability.” Alabama
v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). “ Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances—the whole pictur e,’ * * *, that must be taken int o account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.” Id. , quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct.690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Poli ce officers may “draw on their own experience and specialized training to m ake inferences
from and deductions about the cum ulative information available to them that ‘might
well elude an untrain ed person.’ ” United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), quoting Cortez at 418.

1. The court of appeals and the argument section of Tidwell’s m erit brief filed in this court each made a single reference to Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Co nstitution. Because the decision below and the arguments on appeal are based entirely on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, we likewise decide this case on that body of law.January Term, 2021

7 {¶ 21} “[T]he brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amend ment interests is an important factor in determining whether the sei zure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiabl e on reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Declinin g to adopt a hardand-fast time limit for a permissible Terry stop, the United States Supreme Court,
in United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985),
instead instructed that it was “a ppropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detai n the defendant.”
Id. at 686. In that case, the court held that a 20-minute stop was not unreasonable, because the police acted diligently and the suspect’s actions c ontributed to the length of the detention. {¶ 22} In the case before us, Sergeant Illanz initiated an investigati ve traffic stop of Tidwell when he walked in front of her vehicle and gest ured for her to stop. He then obtained Tidwell’s car key from her before engaging her in conversation; thus, Tidwell plainly was not fr ee to leave, which Sergeant Ill anz admitted. The issue here is whether the information then available to Sergean t Illanz gave him reasonable suspicion to initiate a brief investigatory stop. Information Obtained from Others {¶ 23} The information then available to Sergeant Illanz included the
information that first drew his attention to Tidwell’s vehicle— the unidentified Speedway customer who yelled to Sergeant Illanz: “Hey, you need to stop that vehicle. That lady is drunk.” T he parties here dispute the ex tent to which Sergeant Illanz could rely on that statement to justify the stop. Case law provides some helpful guideposts. {¶ 24} To start, the United States Supreme Court has “firmly rejected the argument ‘that reasonable cause for a[n investigative stop] can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supp lied by anotherS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 person.’ ” (Brackets sic.) Navarette , 572 U.S. at 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680, quoting Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). {¶ 25} In Adams , a known informant told an officer on patrol in a highcrime area that a person seated in a nearby vehicle was carryin g narcotics and had a gun at his waist. Id . at 144-145. In evaluating whether the officer had had reasonable suspicion to stop the suspect, the United States Sup reme Court stated: “Informants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One si mple rule will not cover every situation.” Id . at 147. Observing that a tip from a known informant is more reliable than an anonymous tele phone tip, the court held that i n that case, there was sufficient indicia of reliability because the known informant “ came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene” and could have been subject to immedi ate arrest if he had knowingly made a false report. Id . at 146-147. {¶ 26} In White , 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, an anonymous caller told the police that a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth st ation wagon with a broken right taillight and would have cocaine with her. Id. at 327. Acknowledging
that the determination whether police had had the reasonable su spicion necessary to initiate an investigatory stop required examining both the c ontent of the information possessed by the po lice and its degree of reliabili ty, the United States Supreme Court stated that “if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.” Id . at 330. In that case, the police officers were able to corroborate the tip’s innocuous details b efore they stopped the station wagon as it neared the motel. Id . at 331. Because that anonymous tip accurately predicted future behavior, the tipster demonstrated “a specialJanuary Term, 2021

9 familiarity” with the suspect’s affairs, which implied that the tipster had “access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities .” Id . at 332. Although the court said it was “a close case,” it held that the anonymou s tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability under the totality of the circumstances to justify the investigatory stop of the suspect’s car. Id

. {¶ 27} By contrast, in Florida v. J.L ., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), the police received an anonymous telephone call providing a bare-bones tip that a young blac k man standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Id . at 268. The tipster did not explain how he or she knew about the gun, did not suggest that he or she had any special familiarity with the young man’s affairs, and did not provide any predictiv e information that could be corroborated to assess the tipster’s credibility. Id . at 271. That anonymous tip thus lacked even the moderate indicia of reliability that w as present in White

. J.L. at 271. The J.L. court observed:

An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited s ense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tip ster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the t ipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determina te person.

Id . at 272. {¶ 28} In Navarette , which is the most recent United States Supreme Court case to address this issue, a 9-1-1 caller reported that a silv er pickup truck traveling south at a particular mile marker had run the caller off the ro adway. 572 U.S. at 395, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680. The caller provided the suspect truck’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 license-plate number. Id . Shortly after hearing a police radio dispatch of the 9-1-1 caller’s report, a highway-patrol officer spotted the truck and pulled it over. As officers approached the stopped truck, they smelled marijuana, and they discovered 30 pounds of marijuana in a subsequent search of the truck bed. Treating the 9-1-1 call as an anonymous tip, the Navarette court found sufficient indicia of reliability from the fact that the tip reporting the alleged dangerous driv ing was made immediately after it occurred—whi ch was tantamount to a “presen t-sense impression” and an “excited uttera nce” in hearsay-exception par lance—and it was made seemingly without time for reflection base d on where the s uspect was pulled over in comparison to the mile-marker location where the tipste r said the truck had
run her off the road. Id . at 398-400. Additionally, 9-1-1 calls can be recorded, and the police can identify the phone number from which a 9-1-1 cal l was made and where the phone was at the time of the call, which are facts th at the court noted could deter callers from making a false report to the police. Id. at 400-401. Because the 9-1-1 caller’s contemporaneous report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of the ong oing criminal offense of drunk d riving, the court held that the investigatory traffic stop was reasonable. Id . at 401-404. Categories of Informants {¶ 29} In attempting to ascertain wheth er information provided by an informant’s tip bore some indicia of reliability that establish ed reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, many c ourts, including this court, h ave found it useful to place the informant into one of three categories: (1) anonymous informant, (2) known informant (someone from th e criminal world who has provid ed previous reliable tips), and (3) identified citizen informant. Maumee v. Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 300, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999); State v. Jordan , 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004- Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 36, overruled on other grounds , State v. Harper , 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248.January Term, 2021

11 {¶ 30} In Weisner , a motorist telephoned the po lice to report that he was following a car that he suspected was being driven by a drunk d river. The caller provided the make, color, and li cense-plate number of the suspe ct vehicle and
described it as “ ‘weavin g all over the road.’ ” Id. at 295. The caller also identified himself to the police dispatcher , providing his name and cellph one and home-phone numbers. When the caller reporte d that the car was stopped at a railroad crossing, a police officer pulled into a parking lot opposite the railroa d crossing to wait. After the train passed, the officer spotted the suspect vehicle and r adioed the dispatcher for verification. Approximatel y 30 to 40 seconds elapsed, duri ng which the officer did not observe any erratic driving or weaving. After receivin g confirmation from the police dispatcher, the offi cer stopped the car, questioned the driver, and arrested him for drunk driving. {¶ 31} In that case, we said that when “the information possessed by t he police before the stop stems solely from an informant’s tip, th e determination of reasonable suspicion will be limited to an examination of the w eight and reliability due that tip.” Id . at 299. “The appropriate analy sis, then, is whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigat ive stop.” Id

. Acknowledging the three recognized categories of informants, we noted that an anonymous informant was compara tively unreliable and would cons equently require independent police corrobor ation in order to demonstrat e some indicia of reliability. Id. at 300. By contrast, we determin ed that an identified citizen informant may be highly reliable and, therefore, a strong showi ng as to other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary. Id

. {¶ 32} We concluded that the tipster in Weisner qualified as an identified citizen informant whose information possessed a greater indicia of reliability than that of an anonymous informant. Id ., 87 Ohio St.3d at 301-302, 720 N.E.2d 507. We emphasized, however, that our c ategorization of the informan t did not itself
determine the outcome of the cas e but rather wa s just one eleme nt in the totality ofS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 the circumstances. Id . at 302. The informant’s credi bility in that case was enhance d by the fact that he identified h imself and provided an eyewitne ss account of the suspect’s dangerous driving as it happened. Id . When we took all the facts into consideration, we found the identif ied-citizen informant’s tip to merit a high degree of credibility and value, rendering it sufficient to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge without indepe ndent police corroboration. Id . at 302-303. Categorizing the Speedway Customer {¶ 33} In this case, the state argues that the face-to-face contact be tween the unidentified Speedway customer a nd Sergeant Illanz was sufficie nt to remove the customer from the category of “ anonymous informant,” whose tip would have had minimal indicia of reliability and would have required independ ent police corroboration to establish reasonable suspicion, to the categor y of “citizen informant,” whose tip had a greater indicia of reliability, eve n though the customer’s identity remained unknown. And in the state’s view, “[t]he tip of a ‘citizen-informant,’ named or unna med, is presumptively reliabl e and does not require independent police corroboration.” {¶ 34} But Weisner makes clear that it was the combination of facts in that case—the informant contacted the police, provided identifying i nformation including his name and cellphone and home-phone numbers, and re mained in constant contact with the police dispatcher through the course of the incident—that sharply reduced the likelihood that the informant was making a false report and gave his tip a higher indicia of reliability. Id . at 301-302. The informant’s identified status was integral to the court’s determination tha t the tip had a high indicia of reliability. {¶ 35} In contrast, in this case, it is undisputed that the Speedway c ustomer initiated contact with Sergeant Illanz but his identity was and remains unknown.
When the customer called out to Sergeant Illanz, Sergeant Illan z did not have any information as to the customer’s veracity, reliability, or basi s of knowledge.January Term, 2021

13 Sergeant Illanz did not know whether the customer personally pe rceived Tidwell to
be intoxicated or whether he was simply passing on information from someone else (which may in fact have been the case, considering the Speedway clerk’s subsequent statement t o Sergeant Illanz) or whether he simply m ade the whole thing up. {¶ 36} Because Sergeant Illanz’s attention was naturally focused on Tidwell’s vehicle, there was no real opportunity to obtain addi tional information
from the customer before he left the scene. It nevertheless wo uld require a strained analysis to ascribe to this unidentified citizen informant the higher degree of reliability that we ascribed to the identified citizen informan t in Weisner

. {¶ 37} Tidwell, on the other hand, maintains that the Speedway custome r falls into the category of anonymous informant and thus his tip lacked the indicia of reliability necessary to establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. But treating this customer strictly as anonymous fails to take into account certain facts that may have given his information som e indicia of reliability. {¶ 38} Specifically, the customer directed his statement to Sergeant I llanz and made no effort to conceal his physical appearance or demean or. Further, his tip described what was then an existing condition—Tidwell’s int oxication—that the customer seemingly had a c ontemporaneous opportunity to per ceive and that could immediately be confirmed or dispelled by Sergeant Illanz. Given the urgency of the situation—an allegedly drunk motorist about to drive ont o a busy road— obtaining identification from the Speedway customer simply to e nhance his indicia of reliability surely was not Sergeant Illanz’s most pressing p riority at that time. And based on Sergeant Illanz’s r esponse to the tip, he must hav e seen nothing in
the customer’s demeanor to mak e him doubt the customer’s veraci ty. {¶ 39} We observed in Weisner that “the distinctions between these categories are sometimes blurred,” 87 Ohio St.3d at 300, 720 N. E.2d 507, and the
facts in this case illustrate t hat the Speedway customer did no t fit neatly into eitherS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 category. He resembled an identified citizen informant in some respects by having initiated face-to-face communication with Sergeant Illanz, but he also resembled an anonymous informant in that his identity was unknown. As in dicated in
Weisner , however, categorical classifications of informants may be ins tructive but are not necessarily outcome determinative. Id . at 302. We agree with the following observation by the Second Distric t Court of Appeals: “[T]the ca tegories * * * are not always neat and tidy. But the categories are simply a tool used to assist in the ultimate determination of the informant’s reliability.” State v. Cook , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-28, 2019-Ohio-3918, ¶ 12. {¶ 40} Rather than attempt to force the Speedway customer into one of the categories, we determine the reas onableness of this investigato ry stop by considering the totality of the circumstances as they were know n to Sergeant Illanz prior to the time he stopped Tidwell, together with reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the circumstances, keeping in mind that each piec e of information may vary greatly in its value and degree of reliability. See White , 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301; Adams , 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d
612. Totality of the Circumstances {¶ 41} In this case, the information available to Sergeant Illanz prio r to his investigatory stop of Tidwell’s ve hicle consisted essentially o f two components, specifically (1) what he was told—the information communicated to Sergeant Illanz by the Speedway customer and (2) what he observed—Sergea nt Illanz’s own observations of Tidwell and the way she operated her motor vehi cle up until the
time he walked in front of her car. Based on the information t hen available to Sergeant Illanz and reasonable in ferences that could be drawn t herefrom, we conclude that the investigat ory stop he initiated in this case was reasonable. {¶ 42} First, it is significant that the Speedway customer initiated t his faceto-face contact with Sergeant Illanz. While information from a n identified citizenJanuary Term, 2021

15 informant who comes forward to provide eyewitness information a bout a crime in progress may have a higher indicia of reliability than that pro vided by an anonymous informant, Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d at 302, 720 N.E.2d 507, information
from an unidentified citizen informant who initiates face-to-fa ce public contact with the police to report criminal activity then occurring, wit h no attempt to conceal his identity, is not necessarily without investigative value. See, e.g. , Cook , 2019- Ohio-3918 (upholding investigator y traffic stop based on open, public contact initiated by unidentified citizen who informed officer in marke d cruiser that person in car directly behind cruis er was waving a gun around); State v. Ramey , 129 Ohio App.3d 409, 412-413, 717 N.E.2d 1153 (1st Dist.1998) (upholding investigatory traffic stop that was based in pa rt on an officer’s radio trans mission indicating that a witness had flagged down the officer to report that a gold Ho nda with a specified license-plate number traveling on particular road was “ ‘a poss ible DUI’ ”). Moreover, face-to-face contact with an informant allows an offi cer to personally
observe the informant’s demea nor and evaluate his veracity. {¶ 43} That the informant’s identity was unknown cannot be ignored insofar as it limited Sergeant Illanz’s ability to fully assess his veracity, reliability, basis of knowledge, and motive fo r coming forward. But the inf ormant could not know whether his identity might later be discovered based on hi s face-to-face contact with the police, surveillance video at the Speedway, or further investigation.
Even an unidentified informant who comes forward with accusator y information does so at some legal peril if h e knowingly makes a false repor t. See R.C. 2917.32(A). An informant’s uniden tified status does not necess arily extinguish all indicia of reliability from the informant’s tip given the poten tial for subsequent positive identification. See Navarette , 572 U.S. 393, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d
680

. {¶ 44} Second, and as was the case in Navarette and Weisner , the informant’s tip was about a possible crime that was then occurr ing—operating aS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 motor vehicle while intoxicated. The informant here urged Serg eant Illanz to stop a specific vehicle because the w oman driving it was drunk. The accusation here was not about a past crime but rather was about alleged crimina l activity that was
then afoot. The informant surel y recognized that the immediate reaction he expected from Sergeant Illanz would either prove him right or p rove him wrong. The informant’s suggested knowle dge of Tidwell’s present condit ion and anticipated response from the offi cer thus gave the tip some fu rther indicia of reliability. {¶ 45} Third, because the informant’s tip was communicated contemporaneously with the allege d crime’s occurrence, the enco unter gave the officer no apparent cause to question the informant’s motive. Thus, because the alleged crime was reported as it was occurring, the informant’s contemporaneous report gave the tip a further degree of trustworthiness. {¶ 46} Fourth, Sergeant Illanz testifie d that he observed a blank star e on Tidwell’s face after she slowly backed her vehicle out of its p arking space and then began driving slowly toward Fiel ds-Ertel Road. That significan t observation
tended to corroborate the informan t’s report that Tidwell was i ntoxicated. Without doubt, a motorist’s blank stare c ould be due to any number of i nnocent noncriminal
circumstances. But to the extent that police-officer training and experience shows
that a motorist’s blank stare is consistent with an impaired dr iving condition, Sergeant Illanz’s observation here lent credence to the Speedwa y customer’s report. “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks th e precise level of information necessary for pr obable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams , 407 U.S. at 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612. {¶ 47} Fifth, Sergeant Illanz effectuated the investigatory stop only after he
watched the driver with a blank stare drive at an unusually slo w speed toward Fields-Ertel Road, which was still busy with heavy traffic at t hat time of night.January Term, 2021

17 Approximately 30 seconds elapse d between the time that Sergeant Illanz heard the Speedway customer yell to him and the time that he stopped the vehicle. It is undisputed that Sergeant Illanz s topped the vehicle because he believed there was a public-safety concern. Given t he information then available to Sergeant Illanz, it was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances for him to approach the vehicle in this public area and br iefly detain its driver in or der to make a most basic inquiry as to whether an immedi ate danger to public safety exis ted. {¶ 48} An investigatory traffic stop, such as the one that occurred he re, is a brief, minimally intrusive res ponse that enables a law-enforcem ent officer with at least reasonable suspicion that a crime is being or is about to be committed to obtain more information that can quickly confirm or dispel the officer ’s suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Adams , 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612; Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605. Indeed, a brief conversation with the target of a drunk-d riving report could not only confirm or dispel the suspicion but could also provide information to support charges against the inform ant if the informant’s report was knowingly false. {¶ 49} In granting the motion to suppre ss, the trial court relied on t he fact
that there was no indication that Tidwell had driven erraticall y before Sergeant Illanz stopped her. In our view, this is immaterial in this ca se. Sergeant Illanz was advised face-to-face by a tipster that a person, whom Sergeant Illanz could reasonably assume had just interacted with the tipster inside t he Speedway store, was drunk and was about to drive onto a busy street. Sergeant Illanz reacted to the
information and observed Tidwe ll for 30 seconds before stopping her from leaving the parking lot. During that 30 seconds, Sergeant Illanz witne ssed some indications of impaired driving—blank stare and slower driving than typical for the circumstances. Sergeant Illanz knew that if Tidwell was drunk, as the Speedway customer asserted, the danger she posed was real and immediate. In our view, theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 circumstances provided Sergeant Illanz with reasonable suspicio n to initiate the stop. {¶ 50} To be sure, this tip, like the anonymous telephone tip in J.L . (that a young black man standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun), supra , 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254, was to
some extent a bare-bones asserti on that identified the person t he Speedway
customer meant to accuse but did not divulge the informant’s ba sis of knowledge or provide any predictive info rmation. But unlike the telephon e tip in J.L., which a brief encounter with the subject of the tip would not by itse lf enable the officer to confirm or dispel, Sergeant Illanz’s brief encounter with Tidwe ll immediately enabled him to confirm that Tidwell was operating a motor vehic le while intoxicated based on what he personally smelled, saw, and heard . The customer’s face-to-face contemporaneous re port of alleged criminal activit y occurring right before Sergeant Illanz’s eyes justified the investigatory respo nse Sergeant Illanz
took in this case. {¶ 51} The court of appeals ruled th at the unidentified Speedway customer’s tip did not give Sergeant Illanz reasonable suspicio n that Tidwell was committing a crime, because the tip did not provide any predict ive information and did not contain any detail. 2019-Ohio-4493, ¶ 17. We readily acknowledge that particularized details and predictive information may increase a tip’s indicia of reliability. Compare White , supra , 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301,
with J.L ., supra . An informant’s tip that a person is a drug dealer who has bu ndles of heroin packed in the trunk of his car has a greater indicia of reliability if the tipster provides partic ularized details and/or predictive infor mation so as to allow law enforcement to better assess the informant’s veracity, reli ability, and basis of knowledge. By contrast, an infor mant’s tip that a drunk person is starting her car and about to drive away concerns observable and well-recognized behavior that does not necessarily require deta ils and/or predictive informat ion.January Term, 2021

19 {¶ 52} In the circumstances confronting Sergeant Illanz, he received a citizen report of an alleged cr ime in process—drunk driving—and made his own limited corroborating obs ervation of the suspect before briefly detaining her. That the degree of reliability of the unidentified Speedway customer ’s tip cannot be quantified with mathematical p recision does not mean that it la cked investigative value. Based on the totality of the circumstances then confron ting the officer, we hold that his investigatory stop of Tidwell was reasonable and thus did not violate
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION {¶ 53} In allowing investigatory detentions, “ Terry [392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] accepts the risk that officers may stop i nnocent people.”
Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 126, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). “Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts the risk in connection wi th more drastic police action; persons arrested a nd detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly inves tigate further.”
Wardlow at 126. {¶ 54} In this case, Sergeant Illanz had reasonable suspicion to inves tigate whether Tidwell was driving wh ile drunk based on the unidentifi ed Speedway customer’s tip and the officer’s own partial corroboration of t hat tip. Considering the totality of the circumstances then confronting the officer, we hold that the brief investigatory stop of Tidwell wa s reasonable and thus did not v iolate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We accordingly re verse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals that upheld the trial court’s suppression of evidence obtaine d following that investigatory s top, and we remand the cause to the Hamilton County M unicipal Court for further pr oceedings. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , S TEWART , and
B RUNNER , JJ., concur.

_________________ Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mel ynda J. Machol and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. The Law Offices of Steven R. Adams, L.L.C., and Tad K. Britting ham, for appellee. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor Gen eral, and Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicito r General, urging reversal fo r amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost. Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Marley C. Nelson, Assi stant State Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Offi ce of the Ohio
Public Defender.

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