No. 81-340 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

AARON FELIX, 

Petitioner, 

MEL MOHLER, DIRECTOR, SWAN 

RIVER YOUTH FOREST CAMP, FOR 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, 

Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

For Petitioner: 

Patterson, Marsillo, Tornabene & Schuyler, 

Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Belena, 

Montana 

Edward L. McLean, Deputy County Attorney, 

Missoula, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: October 22, 1981 

Decided: November 12, 1981 

Filed: 

NOV 12 198f' 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Petitioner, Aaron Felix, applies for a writ of habeas 

corpus stemming from an order of the Fourth Judicial District 

Court entered on May 27, 1981. This order revoked a three 

year deferred sentence given petitioner on May 22, 1978 and 

imposed a three and one-half year sentence at the Montana 

State Prison upon petitioner . 

Petitioner was convicted of theft, a felony, in the 

District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula 

County. On May 22, 1978, he was given a three year deferred 

imposition of sentence on the condition that restitution be 

made. 

On August 20, 1979, this deferred sentence was continued 

and petitioner was ordered to complete restitution by November 

5, 1980. Petitioner failed to comply with this order by 

November 5, 1980, and a petition to revoke petitioner's 

deferred sentence was filed on January 16, 1981. A hearing 

on this petition was held May 27, 1981, three years and five 

days after the initial deferral. 

At this hearing, petitioner moved to dismiss the proceeding 

on the grounds that the District Court was without jurisdiction. 

The District Court overruled petitioner's objection concluding 

that the Court retains " . . . jurisdiction (when) the petition 

is filed within the (deferral) time." 

The District Court sentenced petitioner to three and 

one-half years in the Montana State Prison. Petitioner has 

been incarcerated since, either at the Montana State Prison 

or the Swan River Youth Forest Camp. 

Petitioner raises the following issue: 

1) Whether a District Court retains jurisdiction to 

revoke a deferred imposition of sentence beyond the time 

period of deferral if a petition to revoke is timely filed? 
In State v. Porter (1964), 143 Mont. 528, 540, 541, 

391 P.2d 704, 711, this Court stated that: 

" [tlhis state is committed to the doctrine that once a valid sentence has been 

pronounced, the court imposing the same 

is lacking in jurisdiction to vacate or 

modify the sentence, except as otherwise 

provided - by statute . . ." (Emphasis 

added. ) 

Section 46-18-203, MCA, is a specific procedural statute 

granting judges, magistrates, or justices of the peace 

authority to revoke a suspended sentence or impose sentence 

following a deferred imposition of sentence. Section 46-18- 

203, MCA, provides: 

"Revocation of suspended or deferred 

sentence. A judge, magistrate, or justice 

of the peace who has suspended the execution of a sentence or deferred the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under 

46-18-201 or his successor is authorized, 

during - the period of the suspended sentence 

- or deferred imposition of sentence, his 

discretion, to revoke - the suspension - or 

impose sentence and order the person Emitted. He may also, in his discretion, 

order the prisoner placed under the jurisdiction of the board of pardons as provided by law or retain such jurisdiction with 

his court. Prior to the revocation of an 

order suspending or deferring the imposition 

of sentence, the person affected shall be 

given a hearing." (Emphasis added.) 

This authority must be exercised in accordance with the 

precise provisions of this section; action by a judge, 

magistrate, or justice of the peace outside the provisions 

of Section 46-18-203, MCA, is without jurisdiction. State 

y. Porter, supra. 

The controlling language in Section 46-18-203, MCA, is 

". . . during the period of such suspended sentence or 

deferred imposition of sentence. . ." Determining the 

meaning of this phrase disposes of this petition. 

It is well settled that if a ". . . statute is plain, 
unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute speaks for 

itself and there is nothing left for the court to construe." 

Shannon v. Keller (1980), Mont. , 612 P.2d 1293, 1294, 

37 St. Rep. 1079, 1081. Such is the case before this Court. 

The words "during the period" are extremely plain and 

unambiguous. The clear import is that a court is vested 

with jurisdiction to revoke a suspended or deferred sentence 

only during the running of the suspended or deferred sentence. 

Once such time has expired a court is without jurisdiction 

to decide petitions for revocation filed by the State. 

The State requests this Court to construe Section 46- 

18-203, MCA, to mean that a timely filed petition for 

revocation vests jurisdiction in the Court, regardless 

whether the hearing on such petition is held after the 

suspended or deferred sentence has expired. The State 

relies on decisions from Nevada and Oklahoma in support of 

this contention. See Sherman v. Warden, Nevada State Prison 

(1978) Nev. , 581 P.2d 1278; Degraffenreid v. 

State (1979), 0k.Cr. , 599 P.2d 1107. 

These authorities are not in point. Nevada and Oklahoma 

have statutory provisions which vest jurisdiction in the 

courts for purposes of revocation of suspended or deferred 

sentences upon the filing of a petition for revocation. 

Therefore a timely filed petition of revocation in these 

states vests jurisdiction in courts when the time of the 

suspended or deferred sentence has run. 

Montana ' s statute pertaining to revocations of suspended 

or deferred sentences, Section 46-18-203, MCA, contains no 

language stating that a timely filed petition for revocation 

invokes a court's jurisdiction over these matters. It is 

axiomatic that this Court cannot insert what the legislature 
has not statutorily included. Section 1-2-101, MCA. 

In conclusion, we hold that Section 46-18-203, MCA, 

grants jurisdiction to judges, magistrates, or justices of 

the peace to revoke suspended sentences or impose sentences 

following deferred sentences only during the period of the 

suspended or deferred sentences. This jurisdiction extends 

only through the running of the suspended or deferred sentence, 

regardless of whether a petition for revocation has been 

filed prior to the termination of the suspended or deferred 

sentence. 

Therefore, petitioner's request for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus is granted. It is hereby ordered that such writ 

issue immediately and that petitioner be discharged from the 

custody of the Swan River Youth Forest Camp. 

We concur: 

Chief Justice