22-815-cv

Mirza v. Orange Reg’l Med. Ctr.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO 

A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS 

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S 

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH 

THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 18th day of June, two thousand twenty-four. 

PRESENT: 

DENNIS JACOBS,

EUNICE C. LEE,

SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

Tahira F. Mirza, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 22-815-cv

Orange Regional Medical Center; Garnet Health, 

FKA Greater Hudson Valley Health System, Inc.; 

Dr. Gerard Galarneau; Jerry Dunlavey, MBA; 

James Oxley; Dr. Mohammad Siddiqui; Garnet 

Health Doctors, P.C., FKA GHVHS Medical 

Group, P.C.; Garnet Health Medical Center, FKA 

Orange Regional Medical Center, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_____________________________________ 
2 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: TAHIRA F. MIRZA, pro se, 

Hartford, CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: JOSEPH A. SACCOMANO, JR., 

Jackson Lewis P.C., 

White Plains, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Philip M. Halpern, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

* * *

Dr. Tahira Mirza, now proceeding pro se, brought a lawsuit against her former employer 

and associated individuals and entities, claiming primarily that she had been the victim of unlawful 

retaliation in violation of the federal and New York False Claims Acts (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3730(h) and N.Y. State Fin. Law § 191(1), for objecting to “upcoding” billing practices that, in 

her view, constituted Medicare and Medicaid Fraud. Mirza’s counseled operative complaint also 

contained a variety of other New York common law and statutory claims. For instance, she 

brought a claim under New York’s health care whistleblower law, N.Y. Lab. Law § 741, as well 

as a claim for retaliatory defamation related to a reference letter recommending Mirza “with 

reservations.” 

After denying two of her motions to compel discovery and declining to vacate or modify a 

confidentiality stipulation, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
3 

judgment. The district court concluded that Mirza had not demonstrated a prima facie FCA claim 

because the record did not show activity protected by the FCA, an adverse action, or but-for 

causation. See Mirza v. Garnet Health, No. 20-CV-00556 (PMH), 2022 WL 826410, at *9–13 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2022). The district court held that Mirza’s other state law claims failed 

because, among other things, she had failed to identify a law relating to patient care that the 

defendants allegedly violated, and because a broad release she had signed immunized the 

defendants from liability in connection with the allegedly defamatory reference statement. See 

id. at *13–16. Mirza appealed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remainder of the

underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as 

necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

I. Discovery and Confidentiality Stipulation

We review the denial of a motion to compel discovery for abuse of discretion. See In re 

650 Fifth Ave. and Related Props., 934 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2019). A district court abuses its 

discretion in this context “only when the discovery is so limited as to affect a party’s substantial 

rights.” Clark v. Hanley, 89 F.4th 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 

Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir. 2008)). We also review a decision declining “to vacate or modify 

a protective order for abuse of discretion.” Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 139 

(2d Cir. 2004). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the challenged orders. Mirza fails 

to explain how her substantial rights were violated by the district court’s decision denying her 

motions to compel. Regarding the stipulation, a court generally should not modify a protective 
4 

order when a party has reasonably relied on it, absent extraordinary circumstances or a compelling 

need. See S.E.C. v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, the defendants 

provided discovery in reliance on the confidentiality stipulation, and Mirza has not met her burden 

of showing extraordinary circumstances or a compelling need to vacate or modify it.

1

 

II. Summary Judgment

We review the summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the record and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in Mirza’s favor. See Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163, 164 

(2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 

 The district court concluded that Mirza’s FCA claims failed due in part to a lack of evidence 

showing a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse actions. Mirza has not 

addressed the district court’s holding on this point and references causation only in passing on 

appeal. Causation—a showing that an adverse action was taken because an employee engaged in 

a protected activity—is a necessary element of an FCA retaliation claim under both federal and 

state law. See United States ex rel. Chorches for Bankr. Est. of Fabula v. Am. Med. Response, 

Inc., 865 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Comptroller of City of N.Y. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon 

1 Mirza also raises arguments relating to the district court’s management of the summary judgment process; for 

instance, she contends that the district court erred in striking her re-filed opposition papers as an unauthorized surreply. A review of the challenged rulings reveals no abuse of the district court’s considerable discretion to direct and 

manage its docket. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 722 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasizing 

the “particular deference” we afford to a district court in reviewing its discretionary determinations for orderly and 

expeditious litigation management). 

 
5 

Corp., 200 A.D.3d 58, 60 (1st Dep’t 2021) (applying federal FCA standard to New York’s FCA). 

By extension, a failure to meaningfully argue causation on appeal amounts to the functional

abandonment of Mirza’s FCA claims. See Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728 

F.3d 139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (Notwithstanding the latitude traditionally accorded to them, pro 

se litigants abandon arguments that are raised only “obliquely and in passing.”); see also McCarthy 

v. S.E.C., 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e need not reach McCarthy’s due process and 

evidentiary challenges because an independent ground for the Commission’s decision remains 

unchallenged.”). Were we to excuse Mirza’s forfeiture, we would affirm on the merits because 

Mirza failed to create a triable issue of fact on whether the non-retaliatory reasons for the 

defendants’ actions were mere pretext for retaliation. See Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 

F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 2013).2

 

Along the same lines, Mirza has abandoned her other New York statutory and common 

law claims by failing to address all of the grounds upon which the district court relied in granting 

summary judgment. For instance, the district court ruled that claims arising out of the allegedly 

defamatory reference were barred by the valid release that Mirza signed. But Mirza does not 

challenge the validity of the release or argue that the defendants’ alleged conduct does not fall 

2 In granting summary judgment, the district court evaluated the alleged adverse actions under the standard applicable 

to Title VII discrimination claims, which requires “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of 

employment” that is “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Mirza, 

2022 WL 826410, at *11 (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015)). But 

the standard for retaliation claims is less onerous, covering any action that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker 

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 

Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)), and reaching “a broader range of conduct than does the adverse-action standard 

for claims of discrimination under Title VII,” id. We need not determine whether the district court’s decision on this 

ground is open to challenge because the FCA claims fail for the reasons discussed supra. 
6 

within the scope of the release. Thus, she has forfeited any challenge to this part of the district 

court’s order. See Gerstenbluth, 728 F.3d at 142 n.4. 

* * *

We have considered Mirza’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court