1

Filed 8/29/14 Marin General Services Authority v. Novato Taxi CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MARIN GENERAL SERVICES 

AUTHORITY et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

NOVATO TAXI et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 A139070

 (Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. CIV 1001653)

State law requires local government to regulate privately operated taxicab 

companies to protect public safety. (Gov. Code, § 53075.5.)

1 State law also requires that 

such regulations include a mandatory controlled substance and alcohol testing 

certification program. (§ 53075.5, subd. (b)(3)(A).) In Marin County, regulation and 

permitting of taxicabs is conducted by the Marin General Services Authority (MGSA), a 

joint powers authority (§ 6500 et seq.), which administers a variety of county-wide 

programs. MGSA regulations require taxicab companies to report the results of 

employees’ drug and alcohol screening tests as a condition of permitting.

Novato Taxi and its owner, Dan Carlson (collectively appellants), refused to 

complete permit applications, maintaining that the reporting requirement conflicted with, 

and was preempted by, section 53075.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv). MGSA and the City 

of Novato (collectively respondents) filed an action in Marin County Superior Court 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
2

seeking to enjoin appellants from operating a taxicab company without the necessary 

permits, and to impose fines and penalties. After a bench trial, the trial court issued an 

order permanently enjoining appellants from operating a taxicab business without the 

required permits. Appellants argue that the trial court misconstrued section 53075.5 and 

abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony. We affirm.

I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The California Constitution provides: “A county or city may make and enforce 

within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in 

conflict with general laws.” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) “The regulation of the taxicab 

industry is a traditional subject of the police power of cities and counties. [Citations.]” 

(Cotta v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1560; see also 

Veh. Code, § 21100, subd. (b) [“[l]ocal authorities may adopt rules and regulations by 

ordinance or resolution” regarding “[l]icensing and regulating the operation of vehicles 

for hire and drivers of passenger vehicles for hire”].) “California courts have consistently 

held that taxicab drivers do not obtain any vested right in the grant of permission to 

operate taxicabs on the public roadways. Rather, that permission may be altered at the 

discretion of the issuing authority.” (Cotta, at p. 1560.)

The Legislature of the State of California has specifically determined that local 

governments must regulate privately operated taxicab companies to protect public safety. 

(§ 53075.5, as amended by Stats. 1995, ch. 405, § 1, p. 2359; Stats. 1986, ch. 248, § 87, 

p. 1242 [renumbering and amending former § 53075]; Stats. 1983, ch. 1260, §§ 1–2, 

p. 4999 [enacting former § 53075].) Section 53075.5 provides in relevant part:

“(a) Notwithstanding Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 5351) of Division 2 of 

the Public Utilities Code, every city or county shall protect the public health, safety, and 

welfare by adopting an ordinance or resolution in regard to taxicab transportation service 

rendered in vehicles designed for carrying not more than eight persons, excluding the 

driver, which is operated within the jurisdiction of the city or county.

“(b) Each city or county shall provide for, but is not limited to providing for, the 

following: [¶] . . . [¶]
3

“(3)(A) A mandatory controlled substance and alcohol testing certification 

program. The program shall include, but need not be limited to, all of the following 

requirements:

“(i) Drivers shall test negative for each of the controlled substances specified in 

Part 40 (commencing with Section 40.1) of Title 49 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations,[2] before employment. Drivers shall test negative for these controlled 

substances and for alcohol as a condition of permit renewal or, if no periodic permit 

renewals are required, at such other times as the city or county shall designate. As used 

in this section, a negative test for alcohol means an alcohol screening test showing a 

breath alcohol concentration of less than 0.02 percent.

“(ii) Procedures shall be substantially as in [federal regulation 40.1 et seq.], except 

that the driver shall show a valid California driver’s license at the time and place of 

testing, and except as provided otherwise in this section. Requirements for rehabilitation 

and for return-to-duty and follow-up testing and other requirements, except as provided 

otherwise in this section, shall be substantially as in [federal regulation 382.101 et seq.].

“(iii) A test in one jurisdiction shall be accepted as meeting the same requirement 

in any other jurisdiction. Any negative test result shall be accepted for one year as 

meeting a requirement for periodic permit renewal testing or any other periodic testing in 

that jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction, if the driver has not tested positive subsequent 

to a negative result. However, an earlier negative result shall not be accepted as meeting 

the pre-employment testing requirement for any subsequent employment, or any testing 

requirements under the program other than periodic testing.

“(iv) In the case of a self-employed independent driver, the test results shall be 

reported directly to the city or county, which shall notify the taxicab leasing company of 

record, if any, of positive results. In all other cases, the results shall be reported directly 

 

2 Subsequent references to “federal regulations” are to the parts in title 49 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations.
4

to the employing transportation operator, who may be required to notify the city or 

county of positive results.

“(v) All test results are confidential and shall not be released without the consent 

of the driver, except as authorized or required by law.

“(vi) Self-employed independent drivers shall be responsible for compliance with, 

and shall pay all costs of, this program with regard to themselves. Employing 

transportation operators shall be responsible for compliance with, and shall pay all costs 

of, this program with respect to their employees and potential employees, except that an 

operator may require employees who test positive to pay the costs of rehabilitation and of 

return-to-duty and followup testing.

“(vii) Upon the request of a driver applying for a permit, the city or county shall 

give the driver a list of the consortia certified pursuant to [federal regulation 382.101

et seq.] of that the city or county knows offer tests in or near the jurisdiction.

“(B) No evidence derived from a positive test result pursuant to the program shall 

be admissible in a criminal prosecution concerning unlawful possession, sale or 

distribution of controlled substances.

“(c) Each city or county may levy service charges, fees, or assessments in an 

amount sufficient to pay for the costs of carrying out an ordinance or resolution adopted 

in regard to taxicab transportation services pursuant to this section.

“(d) Nothing in this section prohibits a city or county from adopting additional 

requirements for a taxicab to operate in its jurisdiction.

“(e) For purposes of this section, ‘employment’ includes self-employment as an 

independent driver.” (Italics added.)
5

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

The City of Novato has delegated primary responsibility for taxicab regulation to 

MGSA, but retained its traditional police power authority over enforcement of its 

ordinances. In 2006, MGSA passed the Marin General Services Authority Taxi 

Regulation Program (MGSA Taxicab Regulations), which is the subject of this litigation. 

The MGSA Taxicab Regulations require company, driver, and vehicle permits for 

taxicabs operating within Marin County.

Under the MGSA Taxicab Regulations, “[n]o [c]ompany shall operate or permit a 

Taxicab owned or controlled by it to be operated as a vehicle for hire . . . without having 

first obtained a Company Permit from the MGSA.” One of the requirements for a 

company permit is “[s]ubmission of a copy of the Company’s drug and alcohol policy 

which must include at a minimum that employment or an offer of employment for any 

Driver is conditioned upon an acceptable drug and alcohol test meeting the requirements 

of these regulations and of . . . Section 53075.5 . . . .” In order to obtain a permit, a driver 

is required to provide “[e]vidence of compliance with the mandatory controlled substance 

and alcohol testing certification program, as set forth below: [¶] i. Drivers shall show 

proof from a drug testing company approved by the Executive Officer that the Driver 

tested negative for each of the controlled substances specified in [federal regulation 40.1

et seq.], before employment. Drivers must also test negative for alcohol. Drivers must 

show proof of negative tests for these controlled substances and for alcohol as a condition 

of Permit issuance or renewal. Drivers may be also be [sic] subject to random drug 

and/or alcohol testing during the term of his/her Permit. . . . All test results shall be 

reported to the [MGSA] Executive Officer or his/her designee; and [¶] . . . [¶] iv. In the 

case of either a Company employee or a self-employed independent Driver, the test 

 

3 Appellants, in their appellate briefs, often fail to support their factual assertions 

with citations to the appellate record. We do not consider such factual assertions. (See 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 

63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [appellate court may treat as waived any factual contentions 

not supported by a citation to the record].)
6

results shall be reported directly to the Company and the [MGSA] Executive Officer, who 

shall notify the taxicab leasing company of record, if any, of positive results.”4 (Italics 

added.)

Unlike other taxicab companies in Marin County, Novato Taxi’s drivers, other 

than Carlson and his wife, are employees and not independent contractors. In April 2008, 

Novato Taxi and its employees began the process of applying for permits under the 

MGSA Taxicab Regulations. The applications were not completed because Carlson 

refused to sign a release allowing MGSA to directly receive the results of all employee 

drug tests.5 Carlson maintained that, pursuant to section 53075.5, 

subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv), an independent driver’s test results must all be reported to 

MGSA, but only an employee’s positive test results can be reported outside the company.

In December 2009, MGSA’s executive officer issued a compliance order, which 

demanded that Novato Taxi comply with the MGSA Taxicab Regulations or face the 

threat of judicial enforcement. MGSA also notified appellants that it intended to seek 

termination of Novato Taxi’s telephone service, pursuant to section 53075.8. Appellants 

filed a protest and requested a hearing.

On February 9, 2010, the MGSA Board held a hearing at which appellants, 

represented by counsel, argued that the MGSA Taxicab Regulations violated 

section 53075.5, as well as federal regulations upon which section 53075.5 was modeled. 

MGSA took the position that its regulations did not conflict with section 53075.5 because 

it was merely imposing “additional requirements for a taxicab to operate in its 

jurisdiction.” (§ 53075.5, subd. (d).) MGSA also argued that its regulations did not 

conflict with the federal regulations. It relied on federal regulation 40.331(e), which

provides: “If requested by a Federal, state or local safety agency with regulatory 

 

4 The italicized language was added to the regulations after Carlson first refused to 

agree to report employees’ negative test results.

5 The form authorizes release of test results to “Marin County Drug Program 

Coordinator Jeff Rawles” and “[t]he Back Up Anti-Drug Program coordinator for the 

company [an applicant drives] for.”
7

authority over you or the employee, you must provide drug and alcohol test records 

concerning the employee.”

The MGSA Board rejected appellants’ preemption argument. Thereafter, 

respondents filed an action in Marin County Superior Court requesting that the court 

issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining appellants from operating a 

taxicab company without the necessary permits. Respondents also sought a fine and an 

order terminating Novato Taxi’s telephone service.

On June 17, 2010, the Honorable James R. Ritchie issued an order granting a 

preliminary injunction. Appellants moved, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 533, to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Judge Ritchie denied the motion. We 

dismissed, as untimely, appellants’ appeal from the trial court’s order denying the 

motion. (Marin General Services Authority v. Novato Taxi (Apr. 17, 2012, 

No. A130764) [nonpub. opn.].) Thereafter, appellants submitted the results of the drug 

and alcohol tests, obtained the necessary permits from MGSA, but reserved their rights to 

“argu[e] any issue whatsoever in the pending case . . . .”

The case proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Faye D’Opal. At trial

the facts were undisputed, but appellants continued to maintain that the requirement that 

all employee drug test results be reported directly to MGSA conflicted with, and was 

preempted by, section 53075.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv). Appellants presented 

legislative history materials, as well as the testimony of Carolina Rose, an attorney, who 

opined that “local government was [not] given discretionary authority to require that all 

test results of employees be reported directly to local government.” Respondents 

objected to Rose’s testimony as inadmissible legal opinion.

Initially, Judge D’Opal allowed Rose’s testimony, but later reconsidered the 

evidentiary ruling and sustained respondents’ objections. The trial court also entered 

judgment for respondents, issued a permanent injunction compelling appellants to 

comply with the MGSA Taxicab Regulations prior to operating any taxi, and ordered 

appellants to pay a fine of $5,000. The court’s statement of decision provides: “Nothing 

in [the] legislative history [of section 53075.5] bars any City or County from also 
8

requiring the drug test results for employee drivers to be submitted directly to them.

[¶] The legislative purpose in adopting the statutory language was not to force these 

agencies to incur unwanted expense, oversight duties or liability in administering the 

drug testing program. If the Cities and Counties voluntarily decided it was in the interest 

of public safety to take a more active role in ensuring the sobriety of taxicab drivers, and 

to require the testing labs to also send all drug tests (for both independent and employee 

drivers) directly to them, there is nothing in the statute or in the legislative history to 

indicate that they should be prevented from adopting the additional regulation at issue 

here.” (Some italics omitted.) Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the 

judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

In their briefs, appellants do not argue that the MGSA Taxicab Regulations violate 

the Fourth Amendment or Novato Taxi employees’ right of privacy under article I, 

section 1, of the California Constitution.6 Instead, appellants contend that the trial court 

erred by failing to conclude that the challenged ordinance is preempted by 

section 53075.5. Appellants also maintain that the trial court abused its discretion by 

excluding Rose’s expert testimony. Neither argument has merit.

A. Preemption

Appellants argue that the plain language of section 53075.5, and its legislative 

history, suggests that the Legislature sought to prohibit local government from requiring

direct government reporting of all drug test results. They urge, “By permitting the 

MGSA and the City to enact an ordinance that requires the very conduct that the plain 

language of the statute precludes, and which the legislature had considered and rejected 

 

6 At oral argument, appellants attempted to raise new arguments, which we will 

not address. (See People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 110, fn. 13 [an argument not 

made in briefs is forfeited and cannot properly be raised at oral argument]; Sunset Drive 

Corp. v. City of Redlands (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 215, 226 [“[a]bsent a sufficient showing 

of justification for the failure to raise an issue in a timely fashion, we need not consider 

any issue which, although raised at oral argument, was not adequately raised in the 

briefs”].)
9

in enacting the law, the trial court interpreted the statute in a manner that renders . . . 

section 53075.5(b)(3)(A)(iv) superfluous.” Respondents, on the other hand, argue the 

challenged regulation is authorized by section 53075.5, subdivisions (b)(3)(A) and (d).

We review questions of statutory interpretation and preemption de novo. (Farm 

Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10; Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc. 

v. Clovis Unified School Dist. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 64, 69; Bank of America v. Giant 

Inland Empire R.V. Center, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1276.) “ ‘[T]he 

construction of statutes and the ascertainment of legislative intent are purely questions of 

law. This court is not limited by the interpretation of the statute made by the trial court 

. . . .’ [Citation.] Nor are we limited to the evidence presented on the question in the trial 

court. [Citation.]” (Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 

391–392.)

“The party claiming that general state law preempts a local ordinance has the 

burden of demonstrating preemption. [Citation.]” (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of 

Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.) “[I]n view of the long tradition of local 

regulation and the legislatively imposed duty to preserve and protect the public health, 

preemption may not be lightly found. [¶] ‘Local legislation in conflict with general law is 

void. Conflicts exist if the ordinance duplicates [citations], contradicts [citation], or 

enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication 

[citations]. If the subject matter or field of the legislation has been fully occupied by the 

state, there is no room for supplementary or complementary local legislation, even if the 

subject were otherwise one properly characterized as a “municipal affair.” [Citations.]’ 

[Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶] Preemption by implication of legislative intent may not be found 

when the Legislature has expressed its intent to permit local regulations. Similarly, it 

should not be found when the statutory scheme recognizes local regulations.” (People ex 

rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 484–485.)

Preemption analysis “consists of four questions, which in order of increasing 

difficulty may be listed as follows: (1) Does the ordinance duplicate any state law? 

(2) Does the ordinance contradict any state law? (3) Does the ordinance enter into a field 
10

of regulation which the state has expressly reserved to itself? (4) Does the ordinance enter 

into a field of regulation from which the state has implicitly excluded all other regulatory 

authority? [Citations.]” (Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage, supra,

16 Cal.App.4th at p. 397.) Section 53075.5 expressly makes clear that further local 

regulation was expected. Thus, appellants apparently concede that the challenged 

regulation does not duplicate state law or enter into a field expressly or implicitly 

reserved to the state. Instead, they focus only on the second test. They contend: “[T]he 

MGSA ordinance clearly contradicts the Government Code because it directs that drug 

test results[, which section 53075.5] commands be delivered only to an employer[,] also 

be delivered to [MGSA’s] designated officer.” The MGSA Taxicab Regulations

unquestionably require direct reporting of an employee’s test results, including negative 

results, to local government. However, the parties disagree regarding whether that 

requirement conflicts with section 53075.5. We must construe the statute.

“The relevant principles that guide our decision are well known. ‘ “Our function 

is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. 

[Citation.] To ascertain such intent, courts turn first to the words of the statute itself 

[citation], and seek to give the words employed by the Legislature their usual and 

ordinary meaning. [Citation.] When interpreting statutory language, we may neither 

insert language which has been omitted nor ignore language which has been inserted. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) The language must be construed in the context of the statutory 

framework as a whole, keeping in mind the policies and purposes of the statute [citation], 

and where possible the language should be read so as to conform to the spirit of the 

enactment. [Citation.]” ’ [Ciations.] [¶] We also must endeavor to harmonize, both 

internally and with each other, separate statutory provisions relating to the same subject. 

[Citation.]” (Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Clovis Unified School Dist., supra,

90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 69–70.) “ ‘ “It is an elementary rule of construction that effect 

must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.” A statute 

should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 

inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy 
11

another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.’ [Citations.]” 

(Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1269.)

“If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is 

it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) 

. . . . [Citations.]” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) “When the 

language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a 

variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be 

remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative 

construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]” 

(People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008.) “We must select the construction 

that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to 

promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an 

interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. [Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins 

(1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246.)

Section 53075.5 provides, in relevant part: “(b) Each city or county shall provide 

for, but is not limited to providing for, the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) [¶] (A) A mandatory 

controlled substance and alcohol testing certification program. The program shall 

include, but need not be limited to, all of the following requirements: [¶] (i) Drivers shall 

test negative for each of the controlled substances specified in [federal regulation 40.1

et seq.], before employment. Drivers shall test negative for these controlled substances 

and for alcohol as a condition of permit renewal or, if no periodic permit renewals are 

required, at such other times as the city or county shall designate. As used in this section, 

a negative test for alcohol means an alcohol screening test showing a breath alcohol 

concentration of less than 0.02 percent. [¶] (ii) Procedures shall be substantially as in 

[federal regulation 40.1 et seq.], except that the driver shall show a valid California 

driver’s license at the time and place of testing, and except as provided otherwise in this 

section. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (iv) In the case of a self-employed independent driver, the test 

results shall be reported directly to the city or county, which shall notify the taxicab 

leasing company of record, if any, of positive results. In all other cases, the results shall 
12

be reported directly to the employing transportation operator, who may be required to 

notify the city or county of positive results. [¶] (v) All test results are confidential and 

shall not be released without the consent of the driver, except as authorized or required by 

law. [¶] . . . [¶] (B) No evidence derived from a positive test result pursuant to the 

program shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution concerning unlawful possession, 

sale or distribution of controlled substances. [¶] . . . [¶] (d) Nothing in this section 

prohibits a city or county from adopting additional requirements for a taxicab to operate 

in its jurisdiction.” (Italics added.)

According to appellants, because the express language of section 53075.5 provides 

that employees’ drug test results “shall” be reported to the employer, the Legislature 

necessarily expressed its intent that all results shall not be reported to local government. 

Appellants are correct that “shall” ordinarily means “must” and is inconsistent with 

discretion. (People v. Municipal Court (Hinton) (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 951, 954.) But, 

the trial court’s and MGSA’s interpretation of the statutory language does no violence to 

the “shall” in section 53075.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv). Under the MGSA Taxicab 

Regulations, the results of an employee’s drug test are being reported to his or her 

employer. The question is what the statute provides with respect to reporting results to 

local government. With respect to employee test results, section 53075.5, 

subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv) states that employers “may be required to notify the city or 

county of positive results.” Nothing in section 53075.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv), 

explicitly prohibits reporting an employee’s negative test results to local government.

Appellants also rely on expressio unius est exclusio alterius and argue, “the 

expression that the employer is the recipient of employees’ drug test results necessarily 

involves exclusion of the city and county, which entities are not expressed.” One could 

also argue that by stating employers “may be required to notify the city or county of 

positive results,” the Legislature intended to exclude negative results. “A recognized rule 

of statutory construction is that the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily 

involves exclusion of other things not expressed—expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” 

(Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397, 403.) The problem with 
13

appellants’ argument is that it overlooks section 53075.5, subdivision (d), which invites 

local authorities to “adopt[] additional requirements for a taxicab to operate in its 

jurisdiction.” Ignoring this language, as appellants ask us to do, would violate the 

fundamental rule that “[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if 

possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage. [Citation.]” (Big 

Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1155.) The plain 

language of section 53075.5 compels local governments to promulgate regulations 

meeting the minimum requirements of the statute, but it also grants local government the 

authority to promulgate additional requirements not in conflict. MGSA has done just 

that. The MGSA Taxicab Regulations ensure that results of employee drug tests are 

provided to the employer, but they additionally provide for reporting all results to the 

MGSA. Thus, the MGSA Taxicab Regulations provide an “additional requirement,” not 

a contradictory requirement.

Inasmuch as the plain language of section 53075.5 expresses a clear legislative 

intent to grant local government authority to include additional reporting requirements, 

we need go no further. But even if some ambiguity were to exist in the statutory 

language, our conclusion is reinforced by the legislative history.

During the 1994–1995 regular legislative session, drug and alcohol testing for 

taxicab drivers was proposed in Senate Bill No. 46, introduced by Senator Ayala. 

Originally, the bill proposed legislation that differs significantly from that ultimately 

enacted. (Compare Stats. 1995, ch. 405, § 1, pp. 2359–2361 with Sen. Bill No. 46

(1994–1995 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Dec. 19, 1994, p. 2.) A March 27, 1995 

amendment to the bill proposed, in relevant part, that “[s]ection 53075.5 . . . [be] 

amended to read: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) Each city or county shall provide for, but is not limited to 

providing for, the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) A mandatory controlled substance and alcohol 

testing program that is functionally equivalent to the program required under Section 

34520 of the Vehicle Code. The city or county shall require that tests be administered 

before employment and as a condition of permit issuance or renewal, and may require 

that the tests be administered after an accident and at random times. Results of the tests 
14

shall be reported directly to the city or county, and shall not be used for criminal 

prosecution. . . .” (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 46 (1994–1995 Reg. Sess.) March 27, 

1995, pp. 2–3, some italics omitted.)

When Senate Bill No. 46 was amended again on April 25, 1995, the proposed 

reporting provisions first distinguished between employee drivers and independent 

contractors. (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 46 (1994–1995 Reg. Sess.) April 25, 1995, 

p. 3.) Specifically, the April 25, 1995 amendment proposed, in relevant part: “(b) Each 

city or county shall provide for, but is not limited to providing for, the following: [¶] . . . 

[¶] (3) (A) A mandatory controlled substance and alcohol testing program that is 

functionally equivalent to the program required under Section 34520 of the Vehicle 

Code. . . . [¶] (B) In the case of a self-employed independent contractor applying for a 

permit, the results of the test shall be reported directly to the city or county issuing the 

permit. In the case of an employee applying for a permit and in all other test instances, 

whether an employee or an independent contractor, the results shall be sent directly to 

the employing transportation operator or the taxicab leasing company who shall notify 

the applicable city or county of any positive test results.” (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 

46 (1994–1995 Reg. Sess.) April 25, 1995, pp. 2–3.) Significantly however, the 

amendment also proposed recordkeeping and inspection requirements for employers and 

taxicab leasing companies. (Id. at p. 3.) The legislative history is not explicit about the 

reason for the amendment. However, the distinction apparently was made after the 

Taxicab Paratransit Association of California proposed the language italicized above.

7

 

7 On April 17, 1995, the Taxicab Paratransit Association of California had written 

the Senate Transportation Committee to express its “concern [that it be made] clear that 

the adoption of this testing program does not result in an increased level of liability for 

employing transportation operators and taxicab leasing companies.” Letters to legislators 

expressing support or opposition to a bill generally “do not aid in interpretation of the 

statute, but merely state the individual opinions of their authors.” (Quintano v. Mercury 

Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062, fn. 5.) Here, however, we are not interested 

in the letters for the opinions stated therein, but rather because they illustrate the context 

in which the Legislature arrived at the ultimately enacted statute. They are relevant on 

this basis. (See City of Brentwood v. Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Bd. 
15

But it was not until the bill was further amended in the Assembly that the disputed

language now found in section 53075.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A) first appeared. (Assem. 

Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 46 (1994–1995 Reg. Sess.) June 13, 1995, pp. 3–5.) Again, the 

legislative history is not explicit about the reason for the changes. However, on May 3, 

1995, the League of California Cities had written Senator Ayala and the Senate 

Appropriations Committee and expressed its concerns with the legislation: “[C]ities are 

wary of the procedural and financial burdens this measure will impose on local agencies. 

Cities were in general, supportive of the earlier version of [Senate Bill No. 46], which 

was modeled after the private sector truck program in that the employer is responsible for 

self policing their employees with federal oversight. [Senate Bill No. 46] puts cities in 

the position of policing a whole class of independent private employees. Cities are 

extremely uncomfortable with this situation.” (Italics added.)

On May 4, 1995, the California State Association of Counties had also written 

Senator Ayala to express its concern that “[Senate Bill No. 46] would put counties in the 

position of watching over a whole class of privately employed, independent individuals. 

We envision liability problems arising out of this responsibility to police taxicab drivers 

through county administration of drug and alcohol tests.” Yet the California State 

Association of Counties still envisioned results of testing being reported directly to the 

city or county, and it also proposed the language that would become section 53075.5, 

subdivision (d).

Thereafter, on June 13, 1995, the inspection and recordkeeping requirements were 

removed and the language regarding reporting of employees’ positive test results was 

changed from “shall notify the applicable city or county” to “may be required to notify 

the city or county of positive results.”8 (Italics added.) At the same time, subdivision (d) 

 

(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 714, 728.) Furthermore, appellants have raised no objection to 

consideration of these legislative materials.

8 Compare Senate Amendment to Senate Bill No. 46 (1994–1995 Reg. Sess.) 

April 25, 1995, pages 2–3 and Senate Amendment to Senate Bill No. 46 (1994–1995 
16

of section 53075.5 was added, permitting cities and counties to adopt additional 

requirements for taxicab operations. (See fn. 8.)

Appellants maintain that their interpretation of section 53075.5 is “confirmed by 

the legislative history . . . , which demonstrates that the legislature expressly considered 

the very requirement that the MGSA seeks to impose . . . and rejected it.” We disagree. 

The history of the legislation suggests that the Legislature intended to grant local 

government discretion with respect to the enforcement scheme. Nothing indicates that 

the Legislature intended to limit local government’s authority so that it could only obtain 

positive test results from employees. And we cannot conceive that the Legislature would 

intend to so limit local discretion in the enforcement scheme but also include 

subdivision (d) in the statute. By removing record-keeping and inspection provisions

from section 53075.5, adding subdivision (d), and providing in subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv)

that employers “may be required to notify the city or county of [an employee’s] positive 

results,” the Legislature demonstrated its intent to provide local government with 

flexibility. We agree with the trial court that “[t]he legislative purpose in adopting the 

statutory language was not to force these agencies to incur unwanted expense, oversight 

duties or liability in administering the drug testing program. If the Cities and Counties 

voluntarily decided it was in the interest of public safety to take a more active role in 

ensuring the sobriety of taxicab drivers, and to require the testing labs to also send all 

drug tests (for both independent and employee drivers) directly to them, there is nothing 

in the statute or in the legislative history to indicate that they should be prevented from 

adopting the additional regulation at issue here.” (Some italics omitted.) Even if the 

statutory language was ambiguous, the legislative history shows an intent to allow local 

government precisely the kind of discretion that MGSA has exercised.

Appellants’ reliance on the federal regulations does not assist their cause. It is 

undisputed that taxicab companies and drivers are not directly regulated by these federal 

 

Reg. Sess.) May 10, 1995, page 3 with Assembly Amendment to Senate Bill No. 46 

(1994–1995 Reg. Sess.) June 13, 1995 at pages 3–5.
17

regulations or the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). (See fed. 

reg. 40.1.) Rather, appellants point out that “[t]he [Claifornia] legislature . . . 

demonstrated its intent that [section 53075.5] be interpreted consistently with” certain 

federal regulations. (See § 53075.5, subd. (b)(3)(A)(ii) [“[p]rocedures shall be 

substantially as in [federal regulation 40.1 et seq.]”].) According to appellants, the 

MGSA Taxicab Regulations are not in “substantial compliance” with the federal 

regulations because they require release of all drug test results to a “third party.”

Federal regulation 40.321 does not support this argument. That section provides

in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided in this subpart, as a service agent or 

employer participating in the DOT drug or alcohol testing process, you are prohibited 

from releasing individual test results or medical information about an employee to third 

parties without the employee’s specific written consent.” (Italics added.) But, “third 

party” is defined as “any person or organization to whom other subparts of this regulation 

do not explicitly authorize or require the transmission of information in the course of the 

drug or alcohol testing process.” (Id., 40.321(a).) And, the federal regulations 

specifically require employers to disclose test results, upon request, to federal, state, and 

local agencies. (See Id., 40.331(e) [“[i]f requested by a Federal, state or local safety 

agency with regulatory authority over you or the employee, you must provide drug and 

alcohol test records concerning the employee”].)9 Thus, MGSA is not a “third party”

under the federal regulations.

 

9 Federal regulation 40.331 provides, in relevant part: “As an employer or service 

agent you must release information under the following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) If 

you are an employer, you must, upon request of DOT agency representatives, provide the 

following: [¶] (1) Access to your facilities used for this part and DOT agency drug and 

alcohol program functions. [¶] (2) All written, printed, and computer-based drug and 

alcohol program records and reports (including copies of name-specific records or 

reports), files, materials, data, documents/documentation, agreements, contracts, policies, 

and statements that are required by this part and DOT agency regulations. You must 

provide this information at your principal place of business in the time required by the 

DOT agency. [¶] (3) All items in paragraph (b)(2) of this section must be easily 

accessible, legible, and provided in an organized manner. If electronic records do not 
18

Contrary to appellants’ contention, the MGSA Taxicab Regulations are not in 

substantial conflict with the federal scheme. We conclude that the challenged ordinance 

is not preempted by section 53075.5.

B. Exclusion of Expert Testimony

Appellants also argue that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Rose’s 

expert testimony. We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for

abuse of discretion. (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 928.)

We see no such abuse of discretion. Rose essentially opined that section 53075.5 

did not give local entities the discretionary authority to require direct government 

reporting of all employee test results. This was the legal question to be decided by the 

court. “An expert witness may not properly testify on questions of law or the 

interpretation of a statute.” (Communications Satellite Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1984) 

156 Cal.App.3d 726, 747.) “The reason is that the lawyer-expert who expounds on the 

law usurps the role of the trial court.” (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 

69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.)

The authority relied on by appellants does not hold otherwise. (See, e.g., Huber, 

Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 278, 313 [involving expert 

testimony regarding standard of care applicable to architects]; Western Medical 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Albers (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 383, 392 [“[a]t no point in the record 

cited by appellant [did the witnesses] testify as to the proper judicial interpretation of 

Medi-Cal rules and regulations”].) Appellants also misplace their reliance on American 

Home Assurance Co. v. Hagadorn (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1898, 1902–1903, Fallbrook 

Sanitary Dist. v. San Diego Local Agency Formation Com. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 753, 

 

meet these standards, they must be converted to printed documentation that meets these 

standards. [¶] . . . [¶] (d) If requested by the National Transportation Safety Board as part 

of an accident investigation, you must provide information concerning post-accident tests 

administered after the accident. [¶] (e) If requested by a Federal, state or local safety 

agency with regulatory authority over you or the employee, you must provide drug and 

alcohol test records concerning the employee.” (Italics added.)
19

764, and Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 781–782. These cases do 

not address an argument regarding the admissibility of expert opinion testimony on 

legislative intent. Opinions are not authority for propositions not considered. (People v. 

Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566.) The trial court properly considered the legislative 

history in resolving the legal question presented. Appellants have not demonstrated that 

the trial court abused its discretion.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.

_________________________

Bruiniers, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Jones, P. J.

_________________________

Simons, J.