*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Accordingly, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 13, 2010*

Decided July 15, 2010

Before

     ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

        DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

        JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 10‐1191

TONY FORE ,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

LAKESIDE BUSES OF WISCONSIN,

INCORPORATED,

Defendant‐Appellee,

Appeal from the

United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 09‐C‐242

Aaron E. Goodstein,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Tony Fore claims that he was fired from his position as a bus driver for Lakeside

Buses of Wisconsin, Inc., because he is black.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1).  The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of Lakeside and we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10‐1191 Page 2

Lakeside Vice President Paul Kolo was monitoring company drivers when he saw a

Lakeside bus accelerate through an intersection.  He tailed the bus, and while following

observed the driver commit a number of traffic violations, including driving too close to

another bus, changing lanes without signaling, and speeding.  After a dispatcher confirmed

that the driver was Fore, Kolo filed a report with personnel director Mary Dotson.  

Together Kolo and Dotson reviewed Fore’s employment record, which revealed a

history of performance problems.  Fore’s employment record reflected that he had served

three suspensions in less than two years on the job and received notice that a fourth was

pending.  The conduct underlying the suspensions included failing to report an accident,

running a route early, letting children off at an unauthorized stop, speeding, and poor

attendance.  Fore had been warned in writing that further violations could result in

termination and that the company made firing decisions based on a cumulative review of

an employee’s work history.  His records also showed four additional complaints about

speeding, aside from the traffic violations that brought him to Kolo’s attention in the first

place.  Fore admits serving only two suspensions; apart from those, he claims Lakeside did

not inform him before firing him that he had violated company policy.  Kolo and Dotson

eventually fired Fore for “overall poor work history.”

This lawsuit followed.  A magistrate judge, presiding with the parties’ consent,

granted Lakeside’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Fore could not establish

a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method of proof.  See McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  The court explained that Fore “utterly

failed” to show that he had met the second prong of the prima facie case—meeting

Lakeside’s lawful employment expectations—and specifically rejected Fore’s contention

that Lakeside was lying about its legitimate expectations in order to set up a false rationale

for firing him.  Moreover, the court determined that Fore failed to meet the fourth prong of

the prima facie case by presenting evidence that Lakeside treated a similarly situated

employee of another race more favorably.     

On appeal Fore reiterates that the district court improperly disregarded evidence of

pretext in determining that he had not satisfied Lakeside’s performance expectations.  He

points to the negative work history in his personnel file and suggests that it must be

falsified or fabricated because it is too negative to be plausible.  He argues, in short, that if

the performance complaints were authentic, he would have been fired sooner.

In cases like this, where the question whether the employee was meeting the

company’s legitimate expectations merges with the question whether the company’s

reasons for the discharge are honest, we focus on the issue of pretext.  See Senske v. Sybase,
No. 10‐1191 Page 3

Inc., 588 F.3d 501, 506‐07 (7th Cir. 2009); Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 602 (7th

Cir. 2009).  If Fore cannot prove pretext, he cannot show that he was meeting Lakeside’s

legitimate expectations.  Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 822‐23 (7th Cir. 2006).   

The district court’s analysis was sound.  Fore has no evidence to substantiate his

allegation that he was performing satisfactorily at the time he was fired.  Lakeside, on the

other hand, can point to Fore’s checkered employment record, which documents a series of

complaints and suspensions triggered by repeated incidents of poor performance.  Given

Lakeside’s disciplinary policy, which allows the company to treat any post‐suspension

infraction as a terminable one, the district court was correct to conclude that Fore was not

meeting Lakeside’s legitimate expectations.

Fore insists that he was never disciplined after serving the second suspension and

urges us to infer from this that any infraction recorded after his second suspension was

phony.   But even if we credited this assertion—one flatly contradicted by his employment

record reflecting that he served three suspensions and received notice of a fourth—it would

be unreasonable to infer from this that Lakeside fabricated the remaining complaints that

led to no punishment.  Lakeside’s policy does not require that every infraction be met with a

penalty, and the company may have had any number of legitimate reasons for withholding

punishment.  Fore’s theory that the infractions went unpunished because they were

manufactured is merely speculative and cannot create a genuine fact issue. See Evans v. City

of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 933 (7th Cir. 2006); Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003).  

Fore’s second argument is equally unavailing.  He contends that the district court

overlooked as potential evidence of pretext a remark Kolo made three weeks before he was

fired.  The remark— “It’s not hard to hate Tony”—is hardly evidence that Lakeside lied

about its reasons for firing Fore.  And even if it were, it would not suggest that race was the

motivating factor in his discharge, as is required to show pretext.  See Jones v. Union Pac. R.R.

Co., 302 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2002).

   AFFIRMED.