[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio5157.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2019-O HIO -5157

T HE S TATE EX REL
. P ARISI , A PPELLANT , v . D AYTON B AR A SSOCIATION C ERTIFIED G RIEVANCE C OMMITTEE ET AL ., A PPELLEES
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5157.] Mandamus—Public-records requests—Documents prepared in attorney-discipline cases may be sought only through a request made under Sup.R. 44 through 47—Court of appeals’ judgment denyi ng writ sought under Public Records Act affirmed. (No. 2018-0140—Submitted January 29, 2019—Decided December 17, 2019.)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals fo r Montgomery County, No. 27123,
2017-Ohio-9394.

________________ F ISCHER , J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Georgianna Parisi, app eals the judgment of the Secon d District Court of Appeals denying her petition for a writ of ma ndamus againstS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 appellees, the Dayton Bar Association and the Dayton Bar Associ ation Certified
Grievance Committee. Because Parisi did not utilize the correc t vehicle, Sup.R. 44 through 47, to seek to obtain the requested records, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I. BACKGROUND {¶ 2} In 2016, Parisi sent a letter to the executive director of the Dayton Bar Association requesting “any and all records” concerning her in the bar association’s possession, pursuant to R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act. She specifically requested:

1. [a]ny and all communications related to and/or concerning me, including comm unications by letter, phone, email , text, voice mail, and the like; and 2. [a]ny and all documents related to and/or concerning me.

The records sought related to her two attorney-discipline cases , Dayton Bar Assn.

v. Parisi , case No. 2009-0064 (“ Parisi I ”), and Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi , case No. 2012-0060 (“ Parisi II ”), both of which had long been resolved. See Dayton

Bar Assn. v. Parisi , 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012-Ohio-879, 965 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 2;
Parisi v. Heck , S.D.Ohio No. 3:14-cv-346, 2015 WL 3999300, *4 (July 1, 2015). {¶ 3} In a letter dated April 8, 2016, the grievance committee provid ed an initial response to Parisi’s request. The grievance committee’ s letter expressed that
it did not believe that th e documents Parisi sought were subjec t to disclosure. {¶ 4} Parisi then amended her request to include

any and all emails, text messages, and any and all electronic messages, whether made on [the b ar association’s] or an individ ual’s electronic equipment. I am requ esting all records concerning m e,January Term, 2019

3 and have expanded it to all reco rds which the [bar association] has concerning me, including records associated with Parisi I and Parisi

II

.

In a letter dated April 22, 2016, the grievance committee forma lly denied Parisi’s request. {¶ 5} Parisi filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus against the bar association and the grievance committee in the Second District Court of Appeals. The bar association and the grievance committee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the court of appeals converted into a motion for summary judgment. Parisi the n filed a cross-mo tion for summary judgment. {¶ 6} The court of appeals recognized that, as an initial matter, it was required to determine whether Parisi had utilized the correct v ehicle to seek to obtain the requested attorney-discipline records. However, bec ause the parties had not briefed that issue, the court proceeded to decide the merit s of Parisi’s petition under R.C. 149.43. The court of appeals granted summary judgme nt in favor of the bar association and the grievance committee, denied Parisi’s cr oss-motion, and
denied the writ of mandamus.
II. ANALYSIS {¶ 7} Parisi appealed to this court. She also filed a “motion to ele ct representation.” We find her mo tion to be without merit. Furt hermore, we
conclude that because Parisi fa iled to seek to obtain the attor ney-discipline records pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47, the court of appeals correctl y granted summary judgment in favor of the bar asso ciation and the grievance comm ittee and correctly denied the requeste d writ of mandamus. A. Motion to elect representation {¶ 8} Parisi has filed a motion captioned “Motion to Elect Representa tion” requesting that this court orde r opposing counsel, Lisa Ann Hes se, Stephen Freeze,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 and the law firm of Freund, Freeze & Arnold (collectively, “Fre und Freeze”), “to make a determination as to whether they will represent” the bar association and the grievance committee or the bar association’s counsel John Ruffolo, former president Brian Wildermuth, and former Board of Trustees member Jonathon Beck,
individuals who are not and have ne ver been parties to this act ion. {¶ 9} Parisi is essentially seeking to disqualify opposing counsel. She alleges that Freund Freeze’s repr esentation of the bar associat ion and the grievance committee is directly adverse to its prior clients, Ruffalo, Wi ldermuth, and Beck. Parisi posits the existence of an unwaivable conflict, in viola tion of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 (prohibiting a lawyer from accepting or continuing a client ’s representation if that representation will be dir ectly adverse to another client) , because those individuals “may oppose [Parisi’s] public records request, not on legal grounds, but because they personally wish to shield themselves from addition al unethical behavior being revealed.” We find Parisi’s motion to be withou t merit. {¶ 10} Freund Freeze represents only the bar association and the griev ance committee, the only other parties to this action besides Parisi . Because the other
individuals that Parisi mentions are not parties to this action , there is no basis for Freund Freeze to “elect repre sentation” in this case. {¶ 11} Further, Parisi is not a client of Freund Freeze, and she has n ot identified any obligations or responsibilities that could serve as a basis for opposing counsel’s disqualification. There fore, Parisi lacks standing t o assert that Freund
Freeze has a conflict of interest. See Morgan v. N. Coast Cable Co. , 63 Ohio St.3d 156, 586 N.E.2d 88 (1992), syllabus (“a stranger to an attorney -client relationship lacks standing to complain of a conflict of interest in that re lationship”). {¶ 12} Therefore, we deny Parisi’s “m otion to elect representation.” B. Writ of mandamus to obtain records relating to attorney-discipline cases {¶ 13} Parisi petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the bar association and the grievance committee to provide her with doc uments relating toJanuary Term, 2019

5 her two attorney-discipline cases under only the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. The court of appeals addressed the merits of Parisi’s petition under R.C. 149.43. {¶ 14} However, as this court has stated in numerous cases since the promulgation of Sup.R. 44 throug h 47, a court must first addres s the threshold issue whether the petitioner has sought the requested documents throu gh the correct vehicle, either R.C. 149.43 or Sup.R. 44 through 47. The vehicle used dictates not only the documents that are availa ble to the relator and the ma nner in which they
are available but also the remedies available to the relator sh ould the relator be
successful. {¶ 15} Thus, before we may address the merits of the appeal, we must answer this threshold question of which is the proper vehicle t o use in seeking to
obtain documents related to atto rney-discipline cases.
1. Threshold issue a. Promulgation of Sup.R. 44 through 47 {¶ 16} Prior to the promulgation of Sup.R. 44 through 47 in 2009, this court followed the Public Records Act in resolving public-records req uests for court
records. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler , 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581, 805 N.E.2d 1094. This court, however, recogniz ed the need to promulgate its own rules to govern the release of public record s held by the judiciary. Former Chief Justice Moyer acknowledged in a letter to Ohio attorneys that “[w]hile the courts in Ohio [had] always acted in accordan ce with the Public Records Act, the act does not govern the courts.” Moyer, A message from the Chief Justice: Openness is foundation of Ohio Government , 81 Ohio State Bar Assn. Report 170, 171 (2008). Chief Justi ce Moyer believed—and right fully so—that the “important constitutional principle of separation of powers” re quired this court to regulate judicial records throug h its Rules of Superintendence. Id. ; see State v. Steffen , 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 409, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994), quoting In re Furnishings for Courtroom Two , 66 Ohio St.2d 427, 430, 423 N.E.2d 86 (1981) (“ ‘courtsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 possess all powers necessary to secure and safeguard the free a nd untrammeled exercise of their judi cial functions’ ”). {¶ 17} So, in 2009, after the proposed rules had been published for ov er two years, with more than 70 individuals and organizations particip ating in the extensive public-comment periods, this court adopted Sup.R. 44 through 47 through our constitutional superintendence authority under Arti cle IV, Section 5(A)(1) of the Ohio Constitution. See Public access rules in effect: Court offers training, Web page for local authorities , 82 Ohio State Bar Assn. Report 636, 638 (2009). Those rules set forth th e process that the public must utilize to seek to obtain records held by the judicial branch. See O’Connor, The Ohio Modern Courts Amendment: 45 Years of Progress , 76 Alb.L.Rev. 1963, 1971 (2013). b. The effect of Sup.R. 44 through 47 {¶ 18} In promulgating Sup.R. 44 through 47, we announced to the other branches of government that this court would determine how reco rds held by the judicial branch would be mad e accessible to the public. Id. ; see Article IV, Section 5(A)(1), Ohio Constitution. Indeed, this court emphasized that point in State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff , 132 Ohio St.3d 481, 2012-Ohio-3328, 974 N.E.2d 89, ¶ 23, in which we determined that the relators were entitle d to relief under the Rules of Superinte ndence, not the Public Records Act. {¶ 19} This court has adhered to that view and has consistently held t hat the threshold issue in public-records cases is whether R.C. 149.43 or Sup.R. 44 through 47 governs the request. See State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria , 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Harris v. Pureval , 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan , 157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 133 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 5. {¶ 20} This is so even if the issue of the appropriate vehicle is not raised by the parties or by the lower courts. See Shanahan at ¶ 5. Determining whether the
Public Records Act or the Rules o f Superintendence govern a rel ator’s request doesJanuary Term, 2019

7 not constitute a lack of judicial restraint, as suggested by th e concurring opinion; instead, the determination is made based on our constitutional superintendence authority and is necessitated by the principle of separation of powers. If a party seeks to obtain judicial recor ds through means other than Sup.R . 44 through 47, the party is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, as the Rules of Su perintendence are the sole vehicle by which a party may seek to obtain such records. See Laria at ¶ 8;
Husband at ¶ 6. c. Determining the appropriate vehicle {¶ 21} To determine the appropriate vehicle, we consider the nature of the records requested. Generally, if the records requested are hel d by or were created for the judicial branch, then the party seeking to obtain the r ecords must submit a request pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47. See Sup.R. 44(B) (defining “court record” as including case docum ents and administrative document s); Sup.R. 44(C)(1) (defining “case document” generally as a document “sub mitted to a court or filed with a clerk of court in a judicial action or proceedi ng”); Sup.R. 44(G)(1) (defining “administrative document” generally as a document “cr eated, received, or maintained by the court to record the administrative, fiscal , personnel, or management functions, polices , decisions, procedures, operation s, organization, or other activities of the court”); Husband at ¶ 6. If the party is not seeking to obtain the records through the correct vehicle, the party is not entit led to the requested
records in that action. See Laria at ¶ 8; Husband at ¶ 6. {¶ 22} Our recent decision in Husband best illustrates this process. Husband had requested public records relating to his criminal c onvictions. The records were held by the court a nd were accessible through the clerk of courts. The trial court had denied his request. Husband petitioned the Fir st District Court of Appeals to issue a writ of manda mus to order the production of the requested documents pursuant to R.C. 149.43. The appellate court dismiss ed Husband’s petition under R.C. 149.43 because “an incarcerated person is n ot entitled to recordsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 relating to a criminal investigation or prosecution unless the sentencing court has
found that the material is nece ssary to support a justiciable c laim of the inmate” and the sentencing c ourt had denied Husba nd’s motion for releas e of the records. {¶ 23} This court determined that the parties and the court of appeals had “erroneously applied the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, to Husband’s records request.” Husband , 157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 133 N.E.3d 467, at ¶ 5. We affirmed the First District’s dismissal of the peti tion but on the grounds that Husband was not seeking to obtain the documents pursuant t o the Rules of Superintendence. Id. at ¶ 6. We made no judgment as to whether the requested records would have been subject to disclosure under Sup.R. 44 t hrough 47. We simply recognized that when a requester seeks public records fr om a court, the Rules of Superintendence apply. Id. at ¶ 5. 2. Records in attorney -discipline cases {¶ 24} Parisi seeks to obtain records relating to her attorney-discipl ine cases. Thus, we must determine whether such a records request is subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47. {¶ 25} Attorney-discipline matters are decided exclusively by this cou rt, as we have original jurisdiction ove r the discipline of persons ad mitted to the bar and all other matters relating to the practice of law. See Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g), Ohio Constitution. And through the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, this court created the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the Board
of Professional Conduct and author ized the board to certify gri evance committees to aid us in managing attorney discipline throughout the state. See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A) and (D) (“[t]here shall be a Board of Professional Cond uct of the Supreme Court” consisting of 28 commissioners appointed by this court); Gov.Bar R. V(4)(A) (the board, with the a pproval of the Supreme Court, sha ll appoint disciplinary counsel); Gov.Bar R. V(5)(B) (the board may certif y a grievance committee to investigate allega tions of attorney misconduct).January Term, 2019

9 {¶ 26} While these entities, especially the certified grievance commit tees, function somewhat independently f rom this court, the documents prepared and created in attorney-discipline cases by or for these entities m ust be considered records of this court for purposes of disclosure. That is beca use this court is the ultimate arbiter of attorney discipline, Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Powers , 119 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008-Ohio-4785, 895 N.E.2d 172, ¶ 21, and we have th e unique and complete responsibility, as design ated by Article IV, Sections 2(B)(1)(g) and 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, to regulate all matters related to th e practice of law. Therefore, any documents prepared in attorney-discipline cases, like those requested by Parisi, may be sought only through a request made pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47. See Husband , 157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 133 N.E.3d 467, at ¶ 5; Harris , 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, at ¶ 10;

Laria , 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, at ¶ 8; see also Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt. v. Sliwinski , 142 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2015-Ohio-1276, 29 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 19; Disciplinary Counsel v.
Williams , 147 Ohio St.3d 1242, 2016-Ohio-5717, 65 N.E.3d 761, ¶ 20; Gov .Bar R. V(8)(F). {¶ 27} The concurring opinion expresses concern that this holding will
“create confusion” as to whether t here is a judicial remedy to compel access to such records. Opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in part at ¶ 64. This concern is misplaced. The process to obtain these records remains unchanged—we are merely clarifying that such records may be sou ght only through Sup.R. 44 through 47, not also through R.C. 149.43. Because Pa risi seeks to use the procedures set forth in R.C. 149.43 to obtain records relat ed to her attorneydiscipline cases and has disclaimed any entitlement to relief u nder the Rules of Superintendence, this court need not reach the issue whether th e requested documents are subject to disclosu re. Parisi failed to request the documents pursuantS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 to Sup.R. 44 through 47; therefore, she is not entitled to a wr it of mandamus. See
Husband at ¶ 6; Laria at ¶ 8.
III. CONCLUSION {¶ 28} We deny Parisi’s “motion to elect representation.” And because Parisi did not utilize the correct vehicle, Sup.R. 44 through 4 7, to seek to obtain the requested records, we affirm the judgment of the Second Distric t Court of Appeals granting summary judgment to appellees and denying the requeste d writ of
mandamus. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and F RENCH and D ONNELLY , JJ., concur.

K ENNEDY , J., concurs in part and concurs in judgment only in part, wit h an opinion joined by D E W INE and S TEWART , JJ.

_________________ K

ENNEDY , J., concurring in part and conc urring in judgment only in part. {¶ 29} I agree that appellant Georgianna Parisi’s motion seeking to disqualify counsel for appellees, the Dayton Bar Association Ce rtified Grievance Committee and the Dayton Bar Association, should be denied. I therefore join Part II, Section A of the majority opinion. {¶ 30} However, I write separately because I would not consider whethe r— and cannot subscribe to the major ity’s view that—the public-acc ess provisions of the Rules of Superintendence fo r the Courts of Ohio, Sup.R. 44 through 47, apply to the investigatory materials of a bar association’s certified grievance committee. The court of appeals did not consider this issue in the first i nstance, Parisi expressly disclaimed reliance on the Supe rintendence Rules as supporting her claim, and the majority gives no persuasive exp lanation of how a certified gri evance committee of a private, voluntary bar associ ation is “the Supreme Court” within the meaning of Sup.R. 44 through 47. See Sup.R. 44 (“Sup.R. 44 through 47 apply to theJanuary Term, 2019

11 Supreme Court”). And contrary t o the majority’s assumption tha t the Superintendence Rules preempt the Public Records Act, R.C. 149. 43, the constitutional grant of authority to this court to adopt rules of superintendence for the courts of Ohio does not provi de that those rules supersede the enactments of the General Assembly; therefore, Parisi’s failure to assert a right to court records under the Superintendence Rules in a ddition to the Public Records Act does not foreclose relief. Lastly, by treating the Dayton Bar Association’s certi fied grievance committee as an arm of this court, the majority sows confusion regarding whether there is any judicial means to compel a certified grievance com mittee to release public records—a court of appeals lacks authority to issue a wr it of mandamus against this court or its adj uncts, and this court may not dire ct a writ against itself. {¶ 31} Nonetheless, I concur in the c ourt’s judgment affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, because the records that Pari si seeks do not fit within the meaning of “public record” as defined by R.C. 149.43 (A)(1)(v).
Judicial Restraint {¶ 32} Parisi’s petition sought records only under the Public Records Act, and as the majority acknowledge s, the court of appeals did not consider whether R.C. 149.43 or the public-access provisions of the Rules of Sup erintendence are the appropriate vehicle for obtaini ng records from a bar associatio n’s certified grievance committee. In her brief to this court, Parisi discla ims entitlement to relief pursuant to the Superintendence Rules. But although the bar as sociation and its grievance committee make the conclusory assertion that the stat ute is not the proper mechanism to seek to obtain the records of a certified grievanc e committee, they fail to explain how such records are “court records” for purpos es of the statute. {¶ 33} Whether the public-access provisions of the Superintendence Rul es apply to a certified grievance committee’s investigatory materi als is a question of first impression, and this court l acks the benefit of lower-cou rt consideration and full briefing and argument on it. The answer to that question is not an obvious one,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 and we would benefit from the consideration of arguments tested in the crucible of the adversarial process by partie s with a direct interest in th e outcome. {¶ 34} Our longstanding policy is not to address an unbriefed issue. E.g. , Willoughby Hills Dev. & Distrib., Inc. v. Testa , 155 Ohio St.3d 276, 2018-Ohio4488, 120 N.E.3d 836, ¶ 14, fn. 1; State v. Roberts , 150 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio2998, 78 N.E.3d 851, ¶ 85; Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife , 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 28, citi ng Sizemore v. Smith , 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 332, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2. The rationale for this policy, as we ll as the premise of the advers arial process itself, is that “ ‘ “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards o f legal inquiry and research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters of legal questi ons presented and argued by the parties before them.” ’ ” (Brackets sic.) State v. Quarterman , 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke , 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Don nell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Carducci v. Regan , 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983). {¶ 35} The process of judicial review depends on the parties to identi fy, preserve, and present issues for appeal. Courts “ ‘do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to com e to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the part ies.’ ” Greenlaw
v. United States , 554 U.S. 237, 244, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), quoting United States v. Samuels , 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir.1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in the denial of rehe aring en banc). As former Just ice Cook once wrote, “even the most measured sense of judicial restraint confines th is court to passing upon only those issues developed below.” Fulmer v. Insura Prop. & Cas. Co. , 94 Ohio St.3d 85, 100, 760 N.E.2d 392 (2002) (Cook, J., dissenting ). {¶ 36} Our review should therefore be confined to the issue actually litigated by the parties and decided by the court of appeals in the first instance—January Term, 2019

13 i.e., whether the Public Records Act requires a bar association ’s certified grievance committee to produce its investigat ory materials as public reco rds.
The Public Records Act {¶ 37} The Public Records Act reflects the state’s policy that “open government serves the public int erest and our democratic system ,” State ex rel. Dann v. Taft , 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 20, and “reinforce[s] the understanding t hat open access to government papers is an integral entitlement of the people, to be preserved with vigilance and v igor,” Kish v. Akron , 109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-1244, 846 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 17. {¶ 38} R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires a public office to make copies of pu blic records available to any person upon request, within a reasonab le period of time. However, “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law” are not public records subject to release. R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). Gov.Bar R. V(5)(H) states that “[n]o employee, a ppointee, or member of a certified grievance committee shall disclose to any person any proceedings, documents, or del iberations of the committee.” Further, Gov.Bar R. V(8) establishes when document s relating to the investigation of grievances are confidential and when they are discoverable. {¶ 39} This leads to two questions: Are Gov.Bar R. V(5) and (8) state law for purposes of R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v)? And if so, may a bar ass ociation’s certified grievance committee withhold documents sought in a public-recor ds request that would be discoverable by litigants in a disciplinary proceeding ? {¶ 40} We addressed a variant of the first question in State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Waters , 67 Ohio St.3d 321, 617 N.E.2d 1110 (1993). At issue in that case was whether Crim.R. 6(E), which provides for grand-jury secrecy, is a state law prohibiting the release of records. The plurali ty opinion explained that procedural rules “adopted pursuant to constitutional autho rity” are state law for purposes of the Public Records Act. Id . at 323-324. The plurality opinion therefore determined that Crim.R. 6(E) is state law because it had been a dopted pursuant toS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 the constitutional authority to promulgate rules of practice an d procedure granted to this court by Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitut ion. Id. at 324. A majority of the court subseque ntly adopted the plurality opinio n’s determination in State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Inform ation Network, Inc. v. Petro , 80 Ohio St.3d 261, 266, 685 N.E.2d 1223 (1997), and State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis , 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 361, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (1997), overruled on other grounds , State ex rel.
Caster v. Columbus , 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598. {¶ 41} Similarly, Gov.Bar R. V(5)(H) and (8) were adopted according to our constitutional duty to “make rules governing the admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons so admitted,” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B). In accordance with Beacon Journal Publishing , these rules have the force of law in this state, and if they preclude the release of a docume nt, then the document is not a public record that must be released pursuant to the Pu blic Records Act, R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). {¶ 42} That leaves the second question—whether a record that may be discoverable during litigation i s subject to rel ease as a publi c record. {¶ 43} Gov.Bar R. V(8)(A)(1) provides that subject to certain enumerat ed exceptions, “[p]rior to a determination of probable cause by th e Board [of Professional Conduct], all proceed ings, documents, and delibera tions relating to review, investigation, and consid eration of grievances shall be confidential.” Gov.Bar R. V(8)(A)(3) specifies that subject to exceptions not relevant here, “all investigatory materials prepared in connection with an investig ation conducted pursuant to Section 9 of this rule or submitted with a complain t filed pursuant to Section 10 of this rule shall be confidential prior to certific ation of a formal complaint pursuant to Section 11 of this rule.” {¶ 44} Gov.Bar R. V(8)(B), however, provides that after the finding of probable cause,January Term, 2019

15 the complaint and all subsequent proceedings conducted and documents filed in connection with the complaint shall be public
except as follows : * * * (3) The summary of investigation prepared by the relator shall be confidential as work-pr oduct of the relator. All othe r investigatory materials and any attachments prepared in connect ion with an investigation conducted pursuant to Section 9 of this r ule or submitted with a complaint filed pursuant to Section 10 of this rule
shall be discoverable as provided in the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 45} Gov.Bar R. V(8)(B)(3) therefore provides an exception to the general rule that after a proba ble-cause finding, documents fil ed in a disciplinary proceeding are subject to release to the public. Investigatory materials and any attachments prepared in connection with an investigation are no t public, but they
are discoverable. {¶ 46} That information is discoverable does not make it publicly avai lable. “The rules governing discovery do not envision a third party’s access to the information exchanged”; rather, discovery “ ‘is essentially a p rivate process because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpo se of discovery is to assist trial preparation.’ ” State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe , 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 354, 673 N.E.2d 1360 (1997), quoting United States v. Anderson , 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir.1986). We have therefore recognized that when a government office provides documents in discovery to opposing parties in litigati on, it does not make those documents public records. See id . at 355.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 {¶ 47} Although investigatory records may be discoverable during a disciplinary proceeding, in this case, Parisi sought these type s of records through a public-records request, so she stands on the same footing as an y other member of the public who is a stranger to the litigation. Gov.Bar R. V(5 )(H) bars the release of these documents, and nothing in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(B) makes the m public records. Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), the documents that Parisi requested are not public records. {¶ 48} That conclusion should end the analysis. Reaching beyond the narrow questions presented in this case even though it is unnec essary to do so would contravene “ ‘the cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if i t is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more,’ ” State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v.

Brunner , 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51, quo ting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United Stat es Drug Enforcement Administration , 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J ., concurring in part and co ncurring in judgment). The Rules of Superintendence {¶ 49} The majority today proceeds to answer an unasked question of fi rst impression, and that answer plac es the public-access provisions of the Superintendence Rules in direct conflict with the Public Record s Act. {¶ 50} This court had long held that Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, applies to court records. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler , 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581, 805 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Bond , 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 9-13; State ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers v. Gosser , 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 33, 485 N.E.2d 706 (1985). After all, the Public Records A ct provides that “public records” are records kept by a “public office,” R.C. 14 9.43(A)(1), and a court or judicial agency is a public office, R.C. 149.011(A) an d (B). No one in this case questions the General Assembly’s authority to make the pub lic-records lawJanuary Term, 2019

17 applicable to the judiciary. Y et the majority nonetheless impl icitly overturns decades of caselaw holding that th e Public Records Act applies to the courts based on the sudden epiphany—unmoored from legal authority or analysi s—that R.C. 149.43 violates the separati on-of-powers doctrine. {¶ 51} We have previously stated in per curiam opinions that Sup.R. 44 through 47 are the “sole vehicle” for obtaining court records i n actions commenced after July 1, 2009. (Emphasis omitted.) State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan , 157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 121 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Harris v.
Pureval , 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria , 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 8. But

see State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff, 132 Ohio St.3d 481, 2012-Ohio3328, 974 N.E.2d 89, ¶ 1 (explaining that relief rendered pursu ant to the Superintendence Rule s made any claim under the Public Records A ct moot). None of these cases suggested that the Public Records Act is unconst itutional as applied to the courts. And none of these decisions considered the ques tion whether the Ohio Constitution empowers this court to adopt rules of superin tendence for Ohio courts that preempt the lawful enactments of the legislative br anch. {¶ 52} Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution vests this court with authority to promulgate court rules. Section 5(A)(1) states: “ In addition to all other powers vested by this article in the supreme court, the supreme court shall have general superintendence over all courts in the state. Such gen eral superintending power shall be exercised by the c hief justice in accordance wit h rules promulgated by the supreme court.” Pursuant to this authority, this court adopted the Rules of Superintendence, which “are designed ‘(1) to expedite the dispo sition of both criminal and civil cases in the trial courts of this state, whi le at the same time safeguarding the inalienable rights of litigants to the just pr ocessing of their causes; and (2) to serve that public int erest which mandates the prompt disposition of all
cases before the courts.’ ” State v. Steffen , 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 409, 639 N.E.2d 67S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 (1994), quoting State v. Singer , 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 109-110, 362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977). {¶ 53} Another type of court rules is a uthorized by Section 5(B), whic h provides: “The supreme court sha ll prescribe rules governing pr actice and procedure in all courts of the st ate, which rules shall not abr idge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. * * * All laws in conflict with such rul es shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Article I V, Section 5(B), Ohio Constitution. Section 5(B) thus expressly empowers this court to adopt procedural rules that supersede the enactments of the General Assembly. Morris v. Morris , 148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.3d 664, ¶ 30. But t he framers of the Modern Courts Amendment of 1968, wh ich added Section 5(B) to Ar ticle IV, placed two important limitations on our authority to supplant t he enactments of the General Assembly: first, our procedural rules may not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right; and sec ond, the General Assembly by join t resolution may disapprove any proposed procedural rule prior to its taking eff ect. Article IV, Section 5(B), Ohio Constitution. {¶ 54} In contrast, nothing in Article IV, Section 5(A)(1) grants this court power to preempt the lawful enactments of the legislative branc h of government by adopting a rule under our authority to supervise lower courts. Unlike Section 5(B), Section 5(A)(1) does not provide t hat the Superintendence Rules supersede all laws
that are in conflict with them nor does it contain any requirem ent to submit proposed superintendence rules to the General Assembly for revi ew. In fact, we have described our superi ntendence authority as “ensur[ing] tha t state courts act in compliance and consistency with the will of the General Assembl y.” State v. Smith , 136 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013-Ohio-1698, 989 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 4, fn. 2. {¶ 55} Ohio courts—including every appe llate district—have consistentl y recognized that the rules adopted pursuant to our supervisory p ower over lower courts do not supersede statutes with which they are in conflic t and do not createJanuary Term, 2019

19 either substantive rights or procedural law. State v. Ventura , 2016-Ohio-5151, 69 N.E.3d 189, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.); State v. Keeble , 2d Dist. Greene No. 03CA84, 2004- Ohio-3785, ¶ 17; Larson v. Larson , 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-11-25, 2011-Ohio6013, ¶ 13; In re K.W. , 2018-Ohio-1933, 111 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 99 (4th Dist.); Sepich
v. Bell , 5th Dist. Stark No. CA-7350, 1988 WL 17155, *3 (Feb. 8, 1988) ; In re T.C. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1106, 2015-Ohio-3665, ¶ 21; In re Guardianship of Myers , 7th Dist. Mahoning Nos. 02-CA-6 and 02-CA-42, 2003-Ohio-5308, ¶ 21;

In re A.P.D. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100504, 2014-Ohio-1632, ¶ 13; In re Z.H. , 2013-Ohio-3904, 995 N.E.2d 295, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.); Myers v. Wade , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-667, 2017-Ohio-8833, ¶ 22; In re A.R. , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2018-A-0078, 2019-Ohio-2166, ¶ 29; In re Guardianship of Bernie , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-01-005, 2019-Ohio-334, ¶ 27-28, appeal not accepted , 155 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2019-Ohio-2100, 122 N.E.3d 1294; see also State v. Singer , 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 110, 362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977) (“The Rules of Supe rintendence are not designed to alter basic subs tantive rights of criminal defe ndants”). {¶ 56} As the Third District Cour t of Appeals has explained,

“whereas rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court requir e submission to the legislature, rules of superintendence are not so submitted and, hence, are of a different category. They are no t the equivalent of rules of procedure and have no force equivalent t o a statute. They are purely inter nal housekeeping rules which are of concern to the judges of the several courts but create no right s in
individual defendants.”

(Emphasis omitted.) Larson at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Gettys , 49 Ohio App.2d 241, 243, 360 N.E.2d 735 (3d Dist.1976).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 {¶ 57} Article IV, Section 5(A)(1) of the Ohio Constitution does not provide for the public-access pr ovisions of the Superintendence Rules to preempt the Public Records Act, and when there is a conflict between th em, the statute prevails. For this reason, Parisi ’s failure to assert a right to access court records under Sup.R. 44 through 47 cannot be fatal to her mandamus acti on. Certified Grievance Committees {¶ 58} The majority reasons that because this court has the constituti onal authority to discipline attorneys, the documents prepared and c reated in attorneydiscipline cases by or for certified grievance committees “must be considered records of this court for purposes of disclosure” under Sup.R. 44 through 47. Majority opinion at ¶ 26. {¶ 59} That conclusion is a non sequitur. The fact that we have constitutional authority to discipline attorneys says nothing a bout whether a certified grievance committee maintains court records, either o n our behalf or on
its own. {¶ 60} The Rules for the Government of the Bar do not make a certified grievance committee an adjunct of this court. Instead, certifi ed grievance committees are created by the Ohio State Bar Association or by local bar associations in Ohio, which may apply to the Board of Professio nal Conduct for certification, Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A) and (B). Certification may b e obtained from the board and retained by a grievance committee by satisfying the s tandards set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(5)(D), which incl ude requirements for membershi p and term limits, meetings and office staff, designating bar counsel and training volunteers, maintaining files and records, funding, establishing procedures for processing grievances, and reporting to the board. (None of the standards specifically address public records.) If a certified grievance committee fails to c omply with its obligations under the rules, it may lose the privilege of certi fication. Gov.Bar R. V(5)(F). But neither the standa rds nor any other provision of the rule authorizesJanuary Term, 2019

21 this court to exercise the degr ee of authority and control over these private entities for them to be considered an arm of the court for purposes of t he Superintendence Rules. We do not appoint the members of certified grievance co mmittees, certify committees to conduct investigations, or control day-to-day com mittee operations, and we do not review committees’ decisions or decertify committ ees for failing to satisfy the standards set for th in Gov.Bar R. V(5)(D)(1). {¶ 61} In support of its conclusion that “any documents prepared in attorney-discipline cases, like those requested by Parisi, may be sought only through a request made pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47,” major ity opinion at ¶ 26, the majority provides a string citation, but none of the authorities cited supports that conclusion. Our decisions in Husband , 157 Ohio St.3d 343, 2019- Ohio-1853, 121 N.E.3d 337, Harris , 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, and Laria , 138 Ohio St.3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, involved records sought from a common pleas court, a county cle rk of courts, and a municipal court and its clerk, respectively. {¶ 62} The majority’s reliance on Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. Certified
Grievance Commt. v. Sliwinski , 142 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2015-Ohio-1276, 29 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 19, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams , 147 Ohio St.3d 1242, 2016-Ohio5717, 65 N.E.3d 761, ¶ 20, is also misplaced, because those dec isions are simply boilerplate entries imposing an i nterim remedial suspension and reciprocal discipline, respectively, and each states that each “case docum ent” filed in the case—i.e., “a document and information in a document submitted to a court or filed with a clerk of court in a judicial action or proceeding,” Sup. R. 44(C)(1)—is subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47. Neither entry holds or even suggests that a certified grievance committee maintains this court’s records. {¶ 63} And Gov.Bar R. V(8)(F), the last authority cited in the majorit y’s string citation, does not support its conclusion either. That provision states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section or in rules ado pted by the SupremeS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 Court, documents and records pertaining to the administration a nd finances of the Board and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, including budgets , reports, and records of income and expenditure s, shall be made available, up on request, as provided in Sup.R. 45.” Although th is rule makes some records of the board and disciplinary counsel subject to the public-access requirements of the Superintendence Rules, it does not allude to the records of a c ertified grievance committee or make them subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47—even tho ugh certified grievance committees are mentioned throughout Gov.Bar R. V(8). Rather than supporting the majority’s position, the language in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(F) cuts against
it. {¶ 64} Gov.Bar R. V(5) invites the Ohio State Bar Association and loca l bar associations to participate in the investigation and prosec ution of professional misconduct, but that pa rticipation does not turn a volunteer as sociation of attorneys into “the Supreme Court” for purposes of the Public Records Act . The majority’s contrary holding not only is unsupported by reason or authority but also will create confusion in Ohio public-records law regarding whether there is any judicial remedy to compel access to the public records of any entity aff iliated with this court in some way. {¶ 65} Sup.R. 47(B) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by the failure of a court or clerk of court to compl y with the requirements of Sup. R. 44 through 47 may pursue an action in mandamus pursuant to Chapter 2731. of t he Revised Code.” R.C. 2731.01 provides that “[m]andamus is a writ, issue d in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or per son, commanding the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.” As we explained in State ex rel. Wanamaker v. Miller , “[b]y its very definition, the writ of mandamus is a writ which shall be issued only

to an inferior tribunal.” (Emphasis added.) 164 Ohio St. 174, 175, 128 N.E. 2d 108 (1955).January Term, 2019

23 {¶ 66} Wanamaker involved two original acti ons filed in the court of appeals: a mandamus action seekin g to compel the clerk of this court to file an affidavit of disqualification a nd a prohibition action seeking to prohibit this court’s justices from hearing that affidavit of disqualification. Id . at 174. Although we recognized that the Clerk of the Supreme Court is a ministerial officer of this court who is obliged to follow our instructions, we held that “[i]t d oes not follow from that * * * that any court inferi or to the Supreme Court has the authority to issue
similar instructions to such clerk.” Id. at 175. We also noted that a writ of prohibition is “ ‘an extraordinary judicial writ, issuing out o f a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal properly and technically
denominated such ’ ” and that “[i]nasmuch as the Supreme Court is not a tribunal inferior to the Court of Appeals, it is axiomatic that there wa s no basis for the issuance of the writs by the C ourt of Appeals.” (Emphasis sic. ) Id . at 175-176, quoting State ex rel. Nolan v. ClenDening , 93 Ohio St. 264, 270, 112 N.E. 1029 (1915). {¶ 67} Similarly, if a bar association’s certified grievance committee is “the Supreme Court” for purposes of Sup.R. 44 through 47, then a cou rt of appeals has no authority to issue a writ of mandamus compelling release of its records. Following the majority’s analysis would mean that Parisi’s comp laint should be
dismissed rather tha n denied on its merits. {¶ 68} Further, a writ of mandamus may be issued only against an “infe rior”
tribunal. R.C. 2731.01. Therefore , this court may not issue a writ against itself to compel release of its own records. As the Supreme Court of Geo rgia has explained, “[n]othing in our Constitution suggests that this Court can man damus itself or its Justices, nor does such an odd practice find support in our pre cedent or the history
of the writ of mandamus.” Clark v. Hunstein , 291 Ga. 646, 650, 733 S.E.2d 259 (2012); see also People ex rel. Filkin v. Flessner , 48 Ill.2d 54, 56, 268 N.E.2d 376 (1971) (a judge may not issue a writ of mandamus against anothe r member of theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

24 same court); State ex rel. Williams v. Hennepin Cty. , 252 Minn. 330, 331, 89 N.W.2d 907 (1958) (“A judge of the district court cannot order himself to do something by a writ of mandamus”); Italian Homestead Assn. v. Lewis , 174 La. 94, 96, 139 So. 769 (1932) (a judge may not i ssue a writ against hi mself or herself).
Conclusion {¶ 69} Parisi’s petition sought records only under the Public Records Act, which does not require release of those records. Because Paris i is not entitled to relief based on the arguments she makes in this court, it is no t necessary to go beyond those arguments to resolve this case. As the majority’s decision today demonstrates, reaching to answer questions that have not been t he subject of adversarial briefing and lower-c ourt consideration risks an ill -informed decision that may have unintended consequences. And here, the majority assumes that our Superintendence Rules preempt the enactments of the legislative branch, and it relies on a leap of logic to conc lude that a bar association’s certified grievance
committee is the custodian of this court’s records. The result will be confusion over where a person is to turn to compel the production of public re cords held by an entity that is in some way affiliated, however tangentially, wi th this court. {¶ 70} The preferable course would be to leave these issues for a day when parties preserve and present them for our review. Accordingly, although I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, I would do so for reasons different from those expressed in the majority opinion.

D E W INE and S TEWART , JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ Georgianna Parisi, pro se. Freund, Freeze & Arnold, L.P.A., Stephen V. Freeze, and Lisa A. Hesse, for appellees.

_________________