F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

M I CH A EL J OE M UR DAUGH ,

Petitioner-Appellant ,

v.
C H A RLES L. RYAN ,

Respondent-

Appellee

. No. 10-99020

D.C. No. 2 : 0 9

- C V

- 0 0 8 3 1

- F JM

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona Fr eder ick J . Martone, D istrict J udg e, Presiding

Argued and Submitted F e br ua ry 13 , 2 01 3— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed July 26, 2013
B e fo re : D or othy

W. N e lso n, Ste ph e n Re inh ard t, and Mil an D . Sm ith , Jr. , Ci rc uit Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Ne lsonM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Habeas Corpus/Death Pe nalty The pa nel re verse d in part and a ffirme d in part the district court’s de nial of a 28 U .S

. C

. § 2 2 54 habea s corpus pe tition challeng ing a

conviction and c apital sentenc e for murder. The pa nel re versedthe district court’s de nial of re lief as to p e ti ti o n e r

M ur d a u g h ’ s c la im

o f e r r o r under Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which r equir es a jury deter mination of the prese nce or absenc e of a g g ravating fac tors supporting the death pe nalty . After acknowl ed gi ng that Ring err or i s subject t o the har mless error

test, the pane l conclude d that the Ring err or had a substantial and injurious eff ec t o r i n fluenc e on the tria l court’s fa ilure to find the mit ig a tin g fa c tor

re g ard ingMu rdaugh’ s c a pa c ity to a pp re c iate the wr on g fu lne ss o f h is c on du c t or c on fo rm it t o the re q u i reme nts of law, and thus on the tria l court’s imposit ion of a death sentenc e. The panel e x plained that, had the state su

pr e me c ourt

c on sid e re d a ll o f the e vid e nc e , it would have be en impossible to conclude that no r ational jury
c ou ld h ave fo un d this fa c tor

. Ha vin g g ra nte d r e lie f a s to thi s c la im, the pa

ne l r e se rv ed ju dg me nt o n M ur da ug h’ s c la ims about his competenc e to w aive the pr esentation of miti g ating ev i d en ce ats en t en ci n g. The pa nel otherw ise aff

irmed the dist rict cour

t’s decision. Th e pa ne l ne xt he ld t

hat th e state c ourt

did no t vi olate Murdaug h’s constituti o n al ri gh t s by apply ing a nM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 3

unconstitutional ca u s al nexus test to m itigatingevidenc e of his dru g u s e and delusions. The pa nel also held that Murdaug h was not denie d his right to conf lict-free repr esentation when th e p rosec utor prese nted mitigating ev i dence at the behe st of the trial cour t after Murdau gh de c lin e d to pr e se nt s uc h ev ide nc e , be c a us e the pr os e c uto r d id no t r e pr e se nt M ur daugh. The pa ne l a lso de nie d r e lie f a s to Murdaug h’s cha lleng es to his guilty plea.

CO UN SEL
Pa ula K. Ha rm s (a rgue d) and Th e re se M. Da y , F e de ra l Pu

bli c Def ender ’s Off

ice, Phoenix, Ariz ona, forPetitionerAp pe lla nt.
J eff rey A. Z ick (a

rgued), A rizona Attorney

Gene ral’s O ffice , Phoenix , Arizona, for Responde nt-Appellee

.

OP IN ION
NEL SON, Senior Circuit J udg e:
Pe tit ion e r M ic ha e l Joe Murd a ug h a pp e a ls the de nia l of

his fede ral hab eas petition, which challeng es his murder conviction and de ath sente n ce
. Murdaug h claims that the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingc la ims br ou ght purs ua nt t o Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584 (2002), a nd Tennard v. Dretk

e , 542 U.S. 274 (2004), as w ell as claims raising other err ors by the state c ourt

and the ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi st anc e of

c ouns e l. Murdaug h also argues t hat t he dis trict court e rre d in deeming various cla ims procedur ally defa ulted. W e grant relief onM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

4

T h es e f

ac t s a r e dr aw n f

r om t h e Ar i zon a Su pr eme Cour t ’ s s u mmar y of 1 the e v id e n c e su p p o rting M u rd a u g h ’s c o n v ic tio n s, w h ic h a re “p re su m e d to b e co rr e c t,” unl ess M urdaugh reb ut s t hat presum p t i o n by “ cl ear and
con v i n ci n g e v i den ce
. ” 28 U

. S. C. § 2254( e) ( 1)

. M urdau g h doe s n ot chal l enge any o f

t hese f act s i n hi s p et i t i o n. Murd a ug h’ s Ring

claim and reser

ve judgment on Murdaugh’s claims about his competenc e to waive the pres entation of mit ig a tin g e vid e nc e . We oth e rw ise a ff ir m the dis tr ic t c ourt

. I. Bac kgr ound
1. The Murders of David Reynold s and Douglas Eggert
On June 26 , 1 99 5, Murd a

ug h’ s g ir lf

ri e nd , Re be c c a

Rohrs , met David Rey

nolds at a g as station. She told him s he wa s 1 looking f or a job, a

nd they ex ch an g ed phone numbe rs. The conver sation took a sordid turn when Re y nolds of fer ed to pay Rohrs to perfor

m oral sex. Rohrs declined, re t u rn ed home,
an d d es cr i b e d t h e en co un t er t o M urd au gh

. M urd au gh de c ide d “ to te a c h Rey

no lds a le sso n, ” and

tol d Ro hr s to inv ite him ov e r. Murd a

ug h th e n le ft wi th his fr ie nd Jess e De zar

n to buy methamphetamine, instruc ting R o hrs to pag e them as soon as Rey

nolds arrive d.
W h en th ey

l ea rn ed th at R ey

n o l d s h ad arri v ed , M urd au gh and De zarn quickly re t urned to the house , brandishing firea rms. Whil e Murda

ug h confr onted Rey

nolds, Rohrs and her f riend B etty

Gross looted Rey

nold s’s plumbing va

n outside. Mu rd au g h eventua lly came out of the house a nd
r e p r im an d e d

th e m f o r n o t w e ar in g g lo v e s an d le av ing fing erpr ints on every

t h i n g . He e x claimed, “ Do y ou know
w h a tIamg o i n g t o h av e t o d o n o w ?”M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 5

L at er th atn i gh t , M urd au ght o o k R ey n o l d s t o h i s gar age and order ed him into the trunk of his car . Murdaug h, Dezarn, Gross , an d Ro h r s a ll r e tu r n e d to th e g ar a g e thr o u g h o u t the night to use me thamphetamine.
In the ea rly hours of the n ex t morning, Mur daug h and D e z ar nd e c i d e d t o a

b an d o nR e yn o l d s ’ s v ann e ar a c e m e t e r y. Whil e stopping for g as on the way back to the house, they ran int o a n a c qu a int anc e , Ro n Jes se . T he y a sk e d Jes se fo r d

ru g s, and he re tur ne d to the ho us e wi th the m. D e zar n a nd Jess e then left the house to buy more methamphetami ne. Upon their return, Murdaug h, Dezarn, and J esse bega n u sing me tha mph e tamin e in t

he g ara g e . At a

ro un d 8 :30 AM , G ro ss and Rohrs joi ne d th e m, a

nd the g ro up c on tin

ue d ta kin g dr ug s.
Whil e they

wer e all in the g ara g e, Murdaug h opened the trunk of his c ar to show J esse that he was holdi n g R ey n olds ins ide

. At thi s po int , Re y no lds a sk e d to us e th e bathro om. Murdaug h led Rey

nolds to a corne r of the gara g e to urinate , and wh ile Re y

no lds ’s ba c k wa s turn e d, Murd a ug h s tr uc k h im on the hea d with a meat tende rizer. Rey n olds fell to the g round, and Murdaug h picked up a metal jackhammer spike and continued to hit him in th e fa ce an dhead. T hree major crushingblows to Rey

nolds’s skull kil led him. Murdaugh t h en i n structed Gr oss and Rohrs to sprinkle horse ma nure over the body

and the surr ounding blood.
At some point afte r t he murde r, Jesse attempted to leave Murdaug h’s p ro p erty

but could not beca

use the g ate wa s loc ke d. Murd a

ug h ap pr oa c he d Jes se and thr e a te ne d h im, s ayi n g th ati f h e t o l d

an y o n e w h ath ap p en ed , M urd au gh would “kill [ J esse] last and pee l the skin off his children.”M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

6
That eve ning, Mur daug h and De zarn loaded Rey n o l d s’s bo dy int o M ur da

ug h’ s h or se tr a ile r. Murd a ug h told Rohrs to cl ea nu p th e b l o o d

i nt h e ga ra ge an d th en l ef t t o go ca mp i n g. At the c amps ite , Murd a

ug h d ism e mbe re d Re y

no lds ’s bo dy

in an ef fort to pre vent identification of the rema ins. He cut off Re y no lds ’s he a d a

nd ha nd s, sli c e d o ff Re y

no lds ’s fi ng e r p a ds , and pulled out Rey

nolds’s teeth. As he w as drivingto a separ ate s i t e t o bury

the body , he thre w the tee th and fing er pads from the window of his truck. He then buried the head and hands in one shallow g rave and the torso in anothe r.
Over the next s ever al day s, the police be g an investig ating Rey nolds’s disappear ance
. The poli ce found Rey nolds’s van, obtained copie s of Rey

nolds’s cell phone r ecords, and then c on ta c te d Rohrs
. Th e po lic e a lso int e rv ie we d Jess e , w ho tol d them he had w itnessed Rey nolds ’s murder . The police o b t ai n eda s ea rc hwa rr an tfo r M ur d a u g h ’s h o m e a n d gar age and found the scene exactly as Murda

u gh h ad l eft it. The Maricopa County Sheriff’ s Offic e put out an alert notifying law enf orce ment ag encie s that they wer e looking for Murdaug h.
Investig ators ult imately trac ked down Murda ug h afte r he chec ked himself into an eme rg ency room for a

knife wound he sust ained while clea

ning one of his horses’s hooves. A fter
w a i v i n g h i s Miranda rig hts, Murdaug h confe ssed to the murder a nd told the detectiv es whe re to find Rey nolds’s body . Be cause Rey

nolds’s murder w as si m i l ar to the previous murde r of a

victim named Doug las Eg g ert, the po lic e a sk e d Murd a

ug h if he ha d e ve r d on e any

thi nglik e thi s befor e. Murda

ug h then admit ted to killing Eg g ert by beating him to death with a meat tende rizer.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 7

2. Conviction
An Ar izon a g ra nd jur y c ha rged Mur da

ug h w ithfi rs t deg ree murder , kidnapping , ag g ravated robbe ry , and
a g g r av a t e d

a s s a u l ti nc o n n e c t i o nw i thR e y n o l d s ’ s d e a th

. It also cha rged M urdaugh with the first-degree murder a nd kid na pp ingof Eg g e rt . T he s tat e a

pp ointe d Jes s L or on a

to repr esent Murda

ug h.
In November

1998, the trial cour

t ordere d a compe tency sc re e nin g of

Murdaugh. D r. Jac k Po tts , a fo re ns ic psy cholog ist, noted that Murdaug h held some fri n ge belief s bu t e xpre sse d a

de sir e to p le a d guil ty

to a vo id p utt inghis fa mil y an d

th o s e o f t h e v i c t i m s t h r o u g ha

tr i a l

. D r
. P o tts c on c lud e d th a t Murd a

ug h w a s awa

re of the c ha rg e s a g a ins t him and understood both his constit u t ional rig hts and the c o n s e qu e n c e s o f

p l e a d i n g g u i l ty.
Th e c ourt the n a pp ointe d D rs . Sc ia lli and Sin de lar t o as s es s M urd au gh ’s co mp et en ce
. Bo thfo un d M urd au gh competent to plea d g uilty . The pa rt i es stipulated that the c ourt c ou ld de te rm ine Murd a ug h’ s c omp e te nc y on th e ba sis o f t h es e r ep o rt s
. T h e t ri al co urt t h en fo un d M urd au gh c omp e te nt.
Ar ound thi s time , Mur da

ug h r e pe a te dly

re qu e ste d a

sk ull
x -ra y beca use he be lieved that a tr ackingdevice had bee n implanted in his head. The deputy district attorney , Mark Ba rry , asked the court to order the s kull x -ra y . He a rgued that the x -ra y would rea ssure Murdaug h that no trac kin g device exis ted and that it would “alleviate any potential coer cive alleg ations raised at any fu t u re ple a proc eeding s.” The tr ial c ourt g ra nte d th e re qu e st.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

8
In May

1999, the trial cour

t ordere d a competency scre eningto ree valuate Mur daug h. Dr. Potts submitt ed a sc re e nin g e va luatio n o f M ur da ug h in Se pte mber 199 9, in which he de scribed Mur daug h as “c ontinuing to expe ri en ce pa ra no id b e liefs a

nd de lus ion s se c on da

ry to h is p a st amphetamine a

buse.” Dr. P otts rec ounted t hat M urdaugh had reque sted a skull x -r ay

but had re ceive d a CT sca n instead. The sca n did not show an implant, but Murdaug h believed the re su lts we re do c tor e d a

nd re qu ested

an M RI . D r. Potts c on c lud e d th a t Murd a

ug h “ is an inte lli g e nt m an w ho is sim ply e xpre ssi nga

ve ry str ong d esi re b a se d o n a c le arl y false be lief. He is capa

ble of weig hing va

rious options.” Dr. Potts opined that Murdaug h “fully appre ciates the nec essar y wa ive r o f h is r ig hts by

e nte ri nga

ple a of g uil ty ,” and

“ fu lly understands the conseque nces of enter ing the plea.” Murdaug h pled guilty

to both indi ctments in J anuar y of 2000. The plea ag ree ment provided that the state would not seek the death pe nalty

for Eg g ert’s murd er , but that the conviction for that crime c ould stil l constitute an ag g ravating fac tor in sentencingMurdaug h for Rey nolds’s murder.
3. Se nt e nc ing
Over the cour se of the ne x t y ear , the def ense te am prepared a

mitigation ca se by

reta ining a

psy chiatrist and a

n addictionolog ist, see king the rele ase of Murdaug h’s Rolodex from the state to contact c hara cter witnesses, and ha

ving the mitigation spec ialist prepar e a mitig ation rep o rt . The trial court orde red Mur daug h’s mitigation experts, Dr. D emming
and Dr . Sh aw, and

L isa Chr ist ians on , to s ub mit the ir re po rt s to the state by

August 24, 2001.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 9

On August 27, 200 1 , L o rona notified the state that Murdaug h woul d n ot allow him to file with the court, or provide to the prosecution, any of t he mitigation materials the defe nse had prepa

red. The state move d to compel and soug ht sanctions ag ainst L orona.
The trial c ourt held a he aringon S eptember 7, 2001. L orona told the c ourt that Murdaug h fea red t hat his life was in dang er a

nd believed that staying in t h e Ar izona De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio ns wo uld

e ff e c ti vely be a de a th sentenc e whether or not he was sentenc ed to de at h

. L o rona had aske d the state to ag ree to an interstate c ompact to allow Murd a ug h to se rv e his tim e outsi de Ar izon a , b ut t he sta te re fu se d. Th e c ourt

c lari fi e d th a t it did no t have the a uth or ity to tell the Depar

tment o f C orre ctions where to place a n inmate.
Be cause he could not ser ve a life sentenc e out s i de of Arizona, Murdaugh instructed his counsel that he did not want to put on any mitigation ca se at a ll. The court infor med Murdaug h that if he did not prese nt miti gat ion, the court wo uld se e k mi tig a tin g e vid e nc e fr om a ny so ur c e le g iti mate ly
ava ila ble to t he c ourt and wo uld put the burd e n on the state to provide mitigating e vidence

. Three wee ks later, the court held a nother he aringabout Murdaug h’s objection to the pre sentation of mitigating evidenc e. L orona e x pl ained that though he thoug ht Murdaug h was c o m p etent to waive mitigatingevidenc e, the court wa s require d to determine the competenc y issue befor e proce eding . The c ourt consider ed whe ther it could compe l either side to pr esent m itigatingevidenc e and a sked for evidenc e re g ardingMurdaug h’s compete nce.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

10
The DA o ff

er ed the testimony

of the state’ s expert, Dr. L ang
. Dr

. L ang had e x perie nce c onducting competenc y evaluations but di d not do one in this case. She testified that duringthe time she spent with Murdaug h, she did not observe
any in d ic a ti o n s th a t t

h e p e ti ti o n e r

w a s un a b le to u n d e r s tand t h e natur e of the proce eding s ag ainst him or that he was inc omp e te nt. Dr . L anga lso te sti fi e d th a t Murd a ug h w a s a ble to state the cha

rg es ag ainst him, seemed to under s t and her questions, and appe are d coher ent, and that she had no r eason to disag ree with the prior com p et ency deter minations made befor e Murda

ug h pled guilty . L orona a sked the c ourt to take jud ic ia l no tic e of

the e arl ie r r e po rt s su

bmi tte d by Dr s. Sc ia lli , Sin de lar, and

Potts r e g ard ingMurd a

ug h’ s c omp e te nc e to plead guilty . The c ourt did so.
Th e c ourt fo un d M ur da

ug h c om pet e nt t o a ssi st c ouns e l, to u nd e rs tand the natur e of the pr oc e e din g s, and to w a ive his ri g ht t o p re se nt m iti g a tin g e vid e nc e . T he c ou rt we nt o n to conclude that the petitioner had a F ifth Amendment rig ht “not to testify direc tly or indirec tly

throug h other mea

ns.” The court rule d that it would not compel the defe nse to prese nt mitigation but that it would compel the state to do so.
The state the n proce eded to present mitigating e vidence

. The state f

irst moved to admit the mater ials Dr. De ming use d i n p re paringhis report, a s well as a pr eliminary draf t of Dr. Deming ’s report and a 1978 me dical re cords e valuation of Murdaug h. Def

ense c ounsel ob

jected, a rguing that any information beyon d what wa s contained in the Rule 11 competenc y

repor ts was private . The trial court sustained the objection and declined to consider these mate rials, finding that to do so would moot Murdaug h’s waive r of mitiga tion.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 11

The state ne x t called Dr . L angto offer mitigating evidenc e. Dr . L angtestified that she ha d diag nosed Murd a ug h w ithpo ly su

bs tanc e de pe nd e nc e ba se d o n h is history of drugabuse a

nd with antisocial persona lity disorder based o nh is h is to r

y o f a g g r e s s iv e an d

v io le n t b e h av ior, disrespec t for socie ty , involvement in illega l activity , and persona lity

testing. D r. L angalso testified t h at she did not believe Mur daug h was pa ranoid or de lusional at the time of the offe n s e, t hat neither his capa city

to appre ciate the wrong fulness of his c onduct nor to c onform his conduc t to the re qu ir eme nts of

law w e re signif

ic antl y imp a ir e d at th e tim e of the off

ense, a nd that his cog nitive functioning was unimpaired.
More than ha lfway

throug h this testimony , L orona a sked, “I s there some mitigation here som ewhe re? ” The c ourt noted its concer

n that the state wa s us i n g the pre sentation of mitigatingevidenc e as a prete nse to introduce a dditional ag g ravating e vidence . The court then proceede d to question Dr . L angdir e c tly

a bo ut M ur da

ug h’ s d ru g u se le a din g up to Re y n o ld s ’ s mu

r d e r an d h o wit a f f e c te d M ur d a u g h ’ s me ntal state. Dr. L angtestified that the psycholog ical impact of methamphetamine ing estion varies but c an include e uphoria,
a fe e lin g of

po we r, inc re a sed e ne rgy , a nd de c re a se d n e e d to sleep or e at; it al s o m ay

ag g ravate ag g ression and pa ranoia

. De fe n s e c o un s el d ec l i n edt o cr o s s -e x am i n e D r. L an g. Despite Murda

ug h’s dec ision to wa ive mitigation, L orona fi le d a six- pa g e se nte nc ing me mor and um t hat w a s li mit e d to the evidenc e that had been filed with the court. I t d i dnot ref er to a ny of the mitiga

tion reports. Counsel ar gu ed that Murd a ug h’ s c onvic tio ns fo r E g g e rt ’s de a th c ou ld e stablis hM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

12

At t h e t i me of

M u r dau g h ’ s s en t en ci n g , Ar i zon a l aw r equ i r ed a 2 sent enci ng judge t o fi nd o ne o r mo re of f o urt een enum erat ed aggravat i ng c irc u m sta n c e s b e fo re a c a p ital d e fen d a n t co u ld b e e ligi b le fo r th e d e a th p e n a lty. See A ri z. R ev. S ta t. § 1 3

- 7 0 3 (E ). T he f o ur aggr avat i ng ci r cums t anc es r el eva nt t o t hi s appeal ar e:

( F)( 1). T he d ef

endan t ha s been conv i ct ed of an ot her
o f f ense i n t he U ni t ed Stat es f o r w h ic h unde r Ari zo na l aw a s ent enc e o f

l i f e i mp r i s onment or deat h w as i mp osa bl e. (F )( 2 ). T h e d e fen d a n t ha s b e e n o r w a s p re v io u sly
con v i ct ed of

a s er i ou s of

f en s e, w h et h er pr epa r at or y or com pl et ed. C onvi ct i ons f or s er i ous of

f ens es comm i t t ed on t he s ame occas i on as t he homi ci de, or not comm i t t ed
o n t he same occ asi o n but co nsol i d at ed f o r t ri al wi t h t he homi ci de, s hal l be t r eat ed as a ser i ous of f ens e u nder t hi s p aragraph. ( F) ( 5)

. T h e de f

e n da n t c om mi t t e d t h e of f e n s e as co nsi d erat i o n f

o r t he rec e ipt, or i n exp ect at i o n of t he
r ece i pt , of

an y t hi ng of

pecu ni ar y va l ue. ( F)( 6). T he def

endan t comm i t t ed t he of f ens e i n a n espec i al l y hei no us, cruel or d ep raved m anner.
S e e id

. § 13

- 7 0 3 (F). either of two ag g ravating f

actor s : t h at E g g ert’s murde r wa s

2
a cr ime for whic h Murdaug h could be se ntence d to life imprisonment or the death penalt y , (F )(1) , or that Eg g ert’s murde r w a s a

pr ior vio le nt f e lony , ( F )( 2) . A ri z. Re v. Stat. §§ 13-703(F )(1) , (F )(2) (2001). Counsel ar g ued, thoug h, that in acc ordanc e with the ter ms of the plea a g ree ment, Eg g ert’s murder c ould not establish both factors. Counsel also argued that the s t ate ha d not established ag g ravating f actor (F )(5) , pecunia ry g ain. Fina lly , counsel a

rgued that the state had not proved be y ond a re asonable doubt fac tor (F )(6) o r t hat theM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 13

A riz o na l aw at t he t i m e requir ed a s ent enci ng judge t o co nsi d er f i ve 3 “st atuto ry” m i t i ga t i ng circum st an ce s:

(G )( 1 ). T he d ef

end ant ’ s cap aci t y t o ap p reci at e t he
wr ongf ul nes s of hi s conduct or t o c onf

orm hi s conduc t t o t h e r equ i r eme n t s of

l aw w as s i g n i f

i ca n t l y i mpai r ed, b u t not so i m p ai red as t o co nst i t ut e a d ef ense t o p rosecut i o n. (G )( 2 ). T he d ef

end ant was under unusual and
s ubs t ant i al dur es s , al t houg h n ot s uch as t o c ons t i t ut e a d ef ense t o pro secut i o n. (G )( 3 ). T he d ef

end ant was l egal l y acco unt ab l e f o r t he
con du ct of an ot h er u n der t h e pr ov i s i on s of § 1 3

- 303, bu t h i s pa r t i ci pat i on w as r el at i v el y mi n or , a l t h ou g h n ot
so m i no r as t o co nst i t ut e a d ef ense t o pro secut i o n. (G )( 4 ). T he d ef

end ant co ul d not reasona b l y have f o res een t hat his co nd uct i n t he co urs e o f t he
com mi s s i on of

t he of f ens e f or w hi ch t he def

endan t was con v i ct ed wou l d ca u s e, or wou l d cr ea t e a g r av e r i s k of causi ng, de at h t o ano t her person. ( G ) ( 5). T he def

endan t ’ s ag e.
A riz . R e v . S t at

. § 1 3

- 7 0 3 (G ). I t al so requir ed t he judge to co nsi d er any o the r “n o n sta tuto ry” m it ig a tin g c irc u m sta n c e s tha t we re “re le v a n t i n det er mi ni ng wh et her t o i mp ose a s ent enc e l es s t han deat h. ” I d. offe nse wa s committe d in an espe cially heinous, crue l, or depra ved manne r. With respect to st atutory mitigating c ir c ums ta nc e s, cou n s e l a s s e r te d th a t M u r d a u g h’s 3 methamphetamine use rende red him una ble to appre ciate the wrong fulness of his conduct or to confor m his conduct to the require ments of the law , but not so much as to constitute a defe nse. Counsel pointed to testimony offe red at presente nceM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

14
hear ings that Murdaug h was unde r the influence of
m et h am p h et am i n e a tth e t i m e o f t h e k i l l i n g.
The trial c ourt sentenc ed M u rdaugh to de ath. The c ourt fo un d Re y

n o ld s ’ s mu

r d e r w a s e s p e c ia ll y c r

u e l, h e in o u s or depra ved under Arizona Revised Statute § 13-703(F )(6) , and found Eg g ert’s murde r to be a n ag g rava t ing c ircumstance under A rizona Revised Statute § 13-703(F )(1) . The c ourt considere d the five statutory mitigatingfac tors. Id. §§ 13- 703(G)( 1)–(5)

. The c ourt found that ther e wa s some evidenc e to s up po rt

fa c tor (G )( 1) , th a t th e de fe nd ant’ s cap aci ty to a pp re c iate the wr on g fu lne ss o f hi s con du c t or c on fo rm his c on du c t to the re qu irement s o f t he law w a s si g nif

ic antl y impair e d

. T h is e v id e n c e in c lu d e d th e f o u r r e p o rts p r e p ared for Murda

ug h’s compete ncy

deter minations before he pled g uil ty , h is p a

ra no id t ho ug hts , a

nd his lon g his tor

y of c hr on ic drugabuse. The court a lso cons i dere d the testimony of Dr. L ang , but “only

to the extent her t est imony offe red mitigatingevidenc e.” T he cour t ultimately conclude d that the evidenc e did not establish the (G) (1) mitigating f actor

. The c ourt n ex t found eig ht non-statutory mitigating fac tors: (1) Murda

ug h was unde r the influenc e of drug s at the time of the cr ime; (2) he was a chronic dr ug abuser ; (3) he ha s a pe rs on a lity di sord e r; (4 ) h e e xpe ri e nc e s p ara no id thoughts; (5) the combination of these four ci rc u mstances may have impac ted his mental abilities; (6) he c ooperated with law enforce ment; (7) he lacke d a prior c riminal rec ord; and (8) he admitted guilt and expressed conc ern towa rd the fa mil ie s of h is v ic tim s. Th e c ourt a ff or de d th e se fa c tor s li ttl e weig ht and the ag g ravating f actor s g reat weig ht. The cour t c on c lud e d th a t th e no ns tatut or y fa c tor s w e re ins uf

fi c ie nt t o w ar r an tl e n i e n c y.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 15

4. Direc t Appeal
The Ar izona Supreme Court up held Murdaugh’s convictions and de ath sentenc e on dire ct appe al. S ta te v. Murdaugh , 97 P.3d 844 (Ariz. 2004) (en ba nc). The court add res sed f

our i ssu e s. F ir st, it h e ld t hat th e de lay

in Murdaug h’s ca se did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. a t 85 1. Se c on d, it h e ld t hat r e a so na

ble ev i d en ce s u

p p o rt edt h e t ri al co urt ’s fi n d i n g th at M urd au gh was c ompetent to plead guilty

. Id. at 852. Third, the co urt reje cted Murda

ug h’s ar g ument t h at his guilty plea wa s not kn ow ing ly ma de be c a

us e he wa s no t tol d he had a S ix th Amendment rig ht to have a jury deter mine his sentence

. Id. at 853–54. The c ourt held that such a rig ht did not ex ist at the time Murdaug h pled guilty

. Id. at 853. Add i t i onally , the court found nothingin the rec ord that indicate d that Murdaug h’s dec ision to pl ead guilty wa s influence d by whether a judg e or a

jury would decide if he d eser ved to be sentenc ed to death. Id. at 854.
F ina lly , the c ourt

a dd re sse d M ur da

ug h’ s Ring

claim that h e w a s i mp r o p e r l y s e n t e n c e d b y a j u d g e r a th e r

t h ana j ur y. Id. a t 854– 62

. Th e c ourt be g an b y re ite ratin g that Ring

err or is procedur al er

ror subjec t to harmless erro r review, not structura l error

as Murdau gh argued. Id. at 854–55. Reviewing Murdaug h’s s entenc e for harmless e rror , the cour t found that the (F )(1) ag g ravating f actor fell outside the Ring rule a nd that the state ha d proven the (F )(6) aggra vating fac tor beyond a re asonable doubt. Id. at 855–58. Considering the mitigatingevidenc e adduc ed duringthe penalty p h a s e , in c lu ding Mur daug h’s sentenc ing memorandum, Dr . L ang ’s testimony duringthe sentenc ing hear ing, the fac ts as rec ounted by the trial court, evidenc e that Murdaug h took steps to avoid detec tion, and the compete ncyM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

16

re po rt s p ro du c e d b e fo re the ple a a g re e me nt, the c ourt

he ld that no rea sonable jury

could find that the e v i d ence was “suff iciently substantial” to call for leniency

. Id. at 859–60. The court

fu rt he r h e ld t

hat be c a us e no me nta l he a lth profe ssional fo und a ca usal nexus between Murda ug h’s para noi d t h oug hts and delusions and the murde rs, no rea sonable jury

would have w eig hed t h ese factor s any differ ently than did the trial judge

. Id. at 8 6 0. Finally , the court noted that the rec ord did not support any m i t i gat ing circ umstance not considere d by the trial cour

t. Id. at 861–62.
J ustice Berc h dissented on the Ring issue. Id. at 862–64. She argued th at a jury

could have found the e vidence of Murd a ug h’s me nta l im

pa ir me nt f ro m c hr on ic dr

uga bu se more important than the judge d id in deciding the (F )(6) ag g ravating f

actor

. Id. at 863–64. She also pointed out that the m ajority acknow ledg ed that “some evidenc e support[ed]
a finding of the statutory mitigating fac tor [ o f d rug impairment] under [Ariz . Rev. Stat.] § 13-703(G) (1)” making it plausible that a rea sonable jury could have found that the fac tor exist ed. Id. at 864. Fina lly , she noted that the ag g ravating f

actor s here wer e simila r t o those in State v. Pa nd e li , 65 P.3d 950 (Ariz. 2003), a ca se in which the c ourt rema nded for rese ntencing

. Id.
5. P ost-Conviction Revie w
Murd a ug h r a ise d tw e lve c la ims in hi s pet iti on fo r p os tconviction re view, and the Arizona state cour t denied re lief. Concerninghis c laim that the competenc y deter mination was inadequate, the cour

t f ound that there was no need f or the trial cour t t o conduct a

further competenc y

deter mination, as the rec o r d w a s d e v o id

o f an y e v id e n c e s u g g e s ti n g thatM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 17

Murd a ug h’ s d e c isi on

to p le a d guil ty

wa s not base d o n h is de sir e to s pa

re the vic tim ’s fa

mil y and his fa mil y fr om t ri a l.
Th e c ourt he ld that Murd a ug h’ s se c on d c la im f

or inv a lid wa ive r o f m iti g a tio n wa s pr e c lud e d be c a us e he fa ile d to ra ise th e c l ai m o n ap p ea l

. T h e co urt fu rt h er fo u n d th at M urd au gh was a war e of the mitigation evidenc e that could be prese nted but ne ve rt

he le ss dec ide d n ot t o p re se nt i t. T he c ourt a lso noted that the trial c ourt “c onsidered a nd found mitigation” despite Murda

ug h’s waive r.
The c ourt found Murda ug h’s third claim for

mental competenc e wa s prec luded.
Th e c ourt dis mis se d Murd a

ug h’ s f ourt h c la im that hi s g uilty plea and decision t o waive mitig ation wer e involuntary be c a us e the y we re the pr od

uc ts of fa lse pr omi se s and

thr e a ts, fi n d i n g th atth e t ri al co urt ca re fu l l y q u es t i o n edM urd au gh duringhis plea colloquy and that Murda ug h told the trial c ourt the re we re no oth e r p ro mis e s ma de to h im.
The c ourt set an e videntiary h ea ri ng to determine the merits of Murdaug h’s six th claim for inef fec tive assistance of trial counsel. The court re jected Mur daug h’s claims about ina de qu a te pu

bli c fi na nc ing of his tr ia l and

a pp e llate c ouns e l, finding that there was n o leg al basis to deter mine that the Of fi c e of Co ur

t App ointe d Co un se l’ s a

uth or ize d p ay

sc a le was inade quate.
The c ourt held the trial c ou rt ’s orde r that the prose cutor prese nt miti g ation ev i d ence did not cre ate a conflict of interest, and a dditionally

that this claim was pre cluded.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

18
Conc e r

n in g M ur d a

u g h ’ s c la im

th a t t h e s e n te n c in g c o urt used an unc onstitut ional nexus t ext, t he cour t held that the court us ed t he lac k of a c ausal ne x us to weig h the evidenc e, rathe r than to scr een it out. The c o u rt p o i n t ed out t hat the trial court did in fa ct find Murda ug h’s mental state a

nd
m et h am p hetamine a ddiction at the time of the c rime to be mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s, and g ave the m li ttl e we ig ht.
The c ourt summarily

dismiss ed Murda

ug h’s claim that the Arizona Supreme Court e rro neously deter mined that the Ring vio latio n w a s subj e c t to ha rm le ss er ro r an a ly sis , an d h is c la im that hi s app e llate c ouns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto raise the issue of whe ther a R ing vi ol ation is su bje c t to harmless e rror

analy sis and for failingto raise whe ther ther e was a proper deter m i n at i on that the Ring

violation was harmless e rror
. The c ourt also dismissed Murdaug h’s claim that lethal inj e c tio n is c ru e l and

un us ua l pu nis hme nt.
6. St at e Co ur t E vid e nt iar y He ar ing
Th e po st- c onvic tio n co ur t hel d an e vid e nti ary he ari ngto deter mine the merits of Murda ug h’s alleg ed fifte en instance s of ineffe ctive assistance of trial counsel. Murda ug h claimed his counsel k n ew or should have known that he was not c omp e te nt to wa ive mit ig a tio n an d that couns e l br e a c he d h is duty to investigate Murdaugh’s co m p etenc y further . The court re viewed a ll of the doctors’ r eports tha t t ri al counsel had bef ore Mur daug h waived mi t i g ation and found that nothing in the rec ord, or in the evidenc e pre sented duringthe evidentiar y hear ing, show ed that Murdaug h’s competence at the tim e he wa ive d mit ig a tio n ha d d e te ri or a te d f ro m th e tim e he wa s deeme d competent at his chang e of ple a. More o v er,M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 19

no evidenc e had been prese nted to undermine the tria l court’s finding o f co mpetence . The c ourt also conc luded that Murdaug h failed to show pr ejudice both because a compe tent de fe nd ant h a s the ri g ht to ig no re the int e lli g e nt a dv ic e of his counsel, a

nd beca use the mi tigating e vidence , if prese nted, would not h av e overcome the ag g ravating e vidence . The court de clined to consider trial counsel’ s perf

ormanc e.
The Arizona Supreme Court denie d Murdaug h’s petition for r eview of

the denial of

post-conviction re lief.
7. District

Court De cision Murdaug h filed a f

eder al habe as petition, which the district court denied in full. The court a lso denied Murdaug h’s m otions for evidentiar y development. The court found that m any of t he claims wer e re cord- based a nd did not require evidentiar

y development. F or t h o s e that were not rec ord-ba sed, the court found that Murdaug h had not shown g ood cause for discove ry or had f ailed to i dentify

contested fa c ts b e ari ngon

the me ri ts o f h is p eti ti on . T he c ourt a lso de nie d a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ng . T he c ourt

g ra nte d a c e rt if ic a te of appe alability

with respec t t o ei ght claims. We ex panded the ce rtificate of appe alabi l ity to include four a dditional c la ims br ie fe d b y

Murd a ug h o n a pp e a l.
II. Stand ard of Review
We reviewthe denial of habea s relief de novo, Doody v

. Ryan , 649 F.3d 986, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) (en ba nc), a nd the district court’s finding s of fa ct for c lear err or, Brown v. Ornoski , 503 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007). We revie w the de n ia l o f ane v id e n ti ar

y h e ar in g f

o r a b u s e o f d is c r etion. Sta nle yv . S c hr iro , 598 F.3d 612, 617 ( 9th Cir. 2010).M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

20
The Antiterr orism and Eff ective D eath Pena l ty

Act (“ AE DPA ” ) g ov e rn s Murd a ug h’ s pe tit ion be c a

us e he fi le d it afte r the statute we nt into effe ct. See Lindh v. M urphy , 52 1 U .S. 32 0, 33 6– 37 (1 99 7) . A EP DA circ ums c ri be s a fede ral c ourt’s powe r to g rant ha beas r elief to a

state prisoner

. S e e Cu lle n v

. P in h o ls ter , 131 S. Ct . 1388, 1398 (2011). “ A state cour t’s deter mination that a claim lacks merit prec ludes fe de ra l ha

be a s re lie f so lon g a s ‘f a ir min de d jur ist s cou ld disag ree ’ on the c orre ctness of the s t ate court’s dec ision.” Harrington v. Richter , 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (q u oting Y arborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). When a st at e co u rt has adjudicated a c laim on the merits, we may g ra nt r e lie f onl y

if the state c ourt ’s re so lut ion of tha t c la im “(1) resulted in a de cision that was contra ry to, or involved an unrea sonable application of, c lear ly established F eder al law, as dete rmined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2 ) r e su lte d in

a de c isi on tha t w a s b a se d o n a

n unr e a so nab le d et er m ination of the fa cts in light of the e vidence prese nted in the State court proc eeding .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Clearly established fe dera l law “r efe rs to the holdings, a s opposed to the dicta, of th[ e Supreme] Court’ s decisions as of the time of the re levant st at e-court dec ision.” W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court de cision can involve an unre asonable ap p l ication of Supreme Court prec edent in one of

two way s: “[I ]f the s tate court identifies the cor rec t gove rni n g leg al rule f rom [the Supreme] C ourt’s case s but unr easona

bly applies it to the fac ts of the par ticular state prisoner ’s ca se,” or “if the stat e court either unre a so na

bly e xten ds a le g a l pr inc ipl e fr om [Sup re me Court ] prec edent to a ne w context where it should not ap p ly or un r e a s o n a

b ly r e f u s e s to e xte n d th a t p r in c ip le to a n e w c o n te xt wher e it should apply .” Id. at 407. “Stated simply , a fe dera l habea s court makingthe ‘unreasona ble application’ inquiryM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 21

sh ou ld a sk

wh e the r t

he state c ourt ’s app li c a tio n o f c le arl y established federa l law was objectively unrea sonable.” Id. at 40 9. In c on sid e ri ngwhe th er the state c ourt unre a so na

bly
a pp lie d c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d f e de ra l law , r e vie w i s li mit e d to the fa ctual re cord that was b efor e the state court that adjudicate d the claim on the mer its. Pinholster , 131 S. Ct . at 1398.
In deter mining whe ther a state cour t made an unrea sonable determination of the fa cts, “it is not enoug h that we would r ever se in similar circumstanc es if this were an appea l from a district cour t decision. Rather, we must be convin ced that an appe llate pane l, applying the normal standards of

appellate revie w, could not rea sonably conclude that the findingis support ed by the re cord.” Taylor v. Maddox , 366 F.3d 992, 1000 ( 9th Cir. 2004).

III. Discussion
1. Ring Cl aim
In Ring v. Arizona (

Ring II) , 53 6 U. S . 584, 588–89 (2 00 2) , th e Sup re me Court he ld t hat a de fe nd ant i s e nti tle d to a jury determ ination of “the pr esenc e or a bsence of the ag g ravating fac tors require d by Arizona law for imposition of the death penalty .” T h i s holding f ollowed from the Court’ s decision in Apprendi v. N ew Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), that a

criminal def

endant has a Six th Amendment rig ht to hav e a jury

deter mine “any

fac t that increa ses the penalty for a crime be y ond the pre scribed statutory maxim u m. ” In r e s p o n s e to R i n g II , A ri zon a ame nd e d it s capital se ntencingscheme

. S e e S ta te v

. R ing (

R ing III ) , 65 P.3 d 9 15 , 9 26 (A ri z. 2003) (e n b anc ) ( de sc ri bin g Se nate Bill 1 0 0 1 )

. T h e n e w p r o c e d ur e a ll o w e d th e ju

r y to f in d andM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

22

St at e v. Lam ar , 1 1 5 P .3 d 6 1 1 (A riz . 2 0 0 5 ); S t a t e v

. M oody , 94 P. 3d 4 1 1 1 9 (A riz . 2 0 0 4 ); St at e v. D ann , 7 9 P .3 d 5 8 ( A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. M ont ano , 77 P

. 3 d 12 4 6 (Ari z. 20 0 3 ); St at e v. Nor ds t r om , 7 7 P. 3 d 40 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v. Rut l edge , 7 6 P .3 d 4 4 3 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. Pr as er t phong , 7 6 P .3 d 4 3 8 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v. Ri ng , 7 6 P

. 3d 421 ( A r i z. 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. Cropp er , 7 6 P .3 d 4 2 4 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. P r i nce , 75 P. 3d 1 1 4 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. Jones , 7 2 P .3 d 1 2 6 4 (A ri z . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. Phi l l i ps , 6 7 P .3 d 1 2 2 8 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. F i nch , 68 P

. 3d 123 ( A r i z. 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. Tucker , 6 8 P .3 d 1 1 0 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v. Le hr , 67 P. 3d 7 0 3 (A riz . 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v. H ar r od , 65 P

. 3 d 94 8 (Ari z. 20 0 3 ); S t at e v

. P a n d e li , 65 P

. 3 d 9 5 0 ( A ri z. 20 0 3 ); St at e v. H os ki ns , 65 P

. 3d 953 ( A r i z. 2 0 0 3 ); St at e v

. Ca nez , 74 P

. 3 d 93 2 (Ari z. 20 0 3 ). co n s id e r th e e f

f e c t o f a g g r av a ti n g an d

mitig ating circ umstances a

nd to decide whether the defe ndant should be sentenc ed to death. Ariz. Rev. St at. § 13-703.01(D ) (2002)

. On re mand fro m t h e Supreme Court, the Arizona Supreme Court considere d the impact of Ring II on all capital case s then pendingon direc t appea l. Ring III , 65 P.3d at 925. The c ourt held that fa iling t o submit capital ag g ravating fac to r s to a ju

r y d id n o t r e qu ir e r e v e r s in g th e s e n te n c e if the err or wa s harmless. Id. at 9 3 3

– 3 6

. In re v i ew i n g Ring err or fo r harm le ssn e ss, the c ourt c on c lud e d that it wa s re qu ir e d to consider whether

reve rsible Ring err or occur red with respec t to both the agg ravating and mitigatingcirc umstances. See id.
a t 94 2–43 . In s e pa

rate op ini ons, the c ourt

the n in div idu a lly revie wed f

or Ring err or the de ath sentenc es of twe nty -one defe ndants. In nineteen of these c ases, the c ourt found Ring erro r w as n o th arm l es s an d re m an d edfo r r es en t en ci n g. 4 He re , o bv iou sly , th e c ourt did no t.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 23

T he q uest i o n present ed i n Ri ng II w as: “ whether [t he] aggravat i ng 5 fac to r m a y b e fo u n d b y the ju d g e
. . . o r wh e the r th e S ixth A m e n d m e n t’s j u r y t r i al gu ar an t ee
. . . r equ i r es t h at t h e ag g r av at i n g f ac t or de t er mi n at i on be en t r u s t ed t o t h e j u r y
. ” 536 U

. S. a t 597. A) Sc ope of t he Ri ght
We must first deter

mine the s cope of the rig ht articulate d in Ring II . The state a

rgues that our r eview f

or Ring e rr or

is lim i ted by

the express wordingof Ring II , 536 U.S. at 588–89, which addre ssed only “the ag g ravati n g fac tors require d by

Arizona law for imposit ion of t he death penalty .” 5 A nar row re adingof Ring II wo uld e xten d th e Sixth Amendment rig ht no further than its ex press holding by concluding t h at a d efe ndant only has a r ight to have a jury de te rm ine a g g ra

vatin g fa c tor s.
W e ar e no t c onvin c e d th a t Ring II s h o u l d b e r e a d s o n arro wl y
. E ch o i n g Apprendi , the Ring II Court hel d that a jury must find any fact upon which the “ incre ase of a defe ndant’s authoriz ed punishment [is ] contingent.” Ring II , 5 3 6 U. S

. at 6 0 2 (c i t i n g Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 482–83) . The Court stressed that “the inquiry is one not o f fo rm , but of eff ect.” Id. (q u o t i n g Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 4 9 4 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Be cause the pena lty of death was conting ent on the pre sence or absenc e of ag g ravating f actor s un de r Ari zon a

law, the Court

he ld t hat Apprendirequire d a jury to find them. Id. at 609.
But the e x istence of

an ag g ravating fa ct or wa s not the only death-q u alifying e lement of Ar izona’s supersede d c a p it a l s e n te n c in g s ta

tute

. I n R i n g II

, the Supreme Court descr ibed seve ral de terminations that had to occ ur under Arizona law be fore a def endant be came death- elig ible,M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

24

U nl es s ot her wi s e n ot ed, s ubs equen t ci t at i ons t o A r i zona s t at ut es r ef er 6 t o t h os e s t at u t es a s t h ey e x i s t ed i n 2001. including the judge ’s deter mi n at i on that “ther e ar e no mitigatingcirc umstances suff iciently substantial t o call for le n ie n cy .” Id. at 5 93 (qu ot in g Ariz . R ev. S tat . § 13 -70 3(F) (2001))

. Ar izon a ’s se nte nc ingsc he me re qu ir e d a jud g e “ to 6 deter mine if there are any mitigating circ umstances” and “we igh the m ag ainst the ag g ravators and dec ide by ‘sp ecial verdic t’ whethe r a de ath sentenc e is appropr iat e.” State v. Ring ( Ring I) , 25 P.3d 1139 , 1151 (Ariz. 2001) (c itations omitted). The statute re quired “ more than the prese nce of one or more statutorily

define d ag g ravating fac tors to impose the death pe nalty .” Ring III

, 6 5 P.3d at 946. I t also mandated that “a tr ier of fac t

. . . deter mine whether

mitigating circ umstances c all[ed] for lenie ncy .” Id.
Under the superse ded law, a

defe nd an t ’s elig ibilit y

for a death se ntence was e ffe ctively co n tinge nt on the judge ’s fi n d i n g s re gar d i n g bo th ag g ravating a nd mitigating circ umstances. The “ultimate eleme nt” qualify i n g the defe ndant for de ath was “ at least one ag g ravating circ umstan ce n o t outweig hed by one or more mitigating fac tors.” Ring III

, 6 5 P. 3d a t 93 5 (cit in g A ri z. Re v. Stat. § 1 3- 70 3( E) ); se e als o Ring II , 5 3 6 U.S . at 593. A judg e’s deter mination that no mitigatingcirc umstances e x isted there fore also serve d to establish a fa ct that qualified a defe ndant for the d ea th sentence . Applying the rationale of Apprendiand Ring II

, the exis tence or abse nce of a mitigating circ u ms ta n c e w a s th

u s a f in d in g o f f

a c t u p o n w h ic h the

“ in c re a se of

a de fe nd ant’ s a

uth or ize d p un ish me nt [w a s] conting ent.” Ring II

, 536 U.S. at 602.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 25

This rea soning makes sense g iven the natur e of fa c tf in d in g a t t

h e d e a th

- s e n te n c in gs ta g e
. A f in d in g that c e rt a in f a c ts e sta bli shan a g g ra

vatin g fa c tor of

te n n e c e ssa

ri ly implies that the same fa cts do not establish a mitigating fa c tor

. In thi s a

pp e a l, fo r ins tanc e , Murd a ug h a rgues his dis me mbe rm e nt o f R e y no lds ’s bo dy

de mon str a te s h is para noia and de lusions, and theref ore h elps establish a mitigatingcirc umstance. The state ar g ues, conver sely , that th e mu t i l a t i o ne s t a

b l i s h e s t h a tt h e m u r d e r

w a s d e p r av e d

. In finding that dismemberment supported the (F )(6) ag g ravating fa c tor , th e n, the tr ia l ju dg e a lso imp lic itl y fo un d th at th is evidence d i dnot establish any mitigatingfac tors. The i ntertwined nature of the inquiry means that a

fac tfinder’ s ana ly sis of agg ra

vatin g fa c tor s in

iso latio n is c on c e ptu a lly untenable. A jur y ’s fi nd ing s con c e rn ing a g g ra vatin g fa c tor s are a lso nece ssarily

intertwined with its findings about mitigating circ umstances be cause of the proc ess for he aringevidenc e at the sentenc ing sta g e. A jury does not hear

the ag g ravating evidenc e in a void. Rather , a def enda n t prese nts mit iga

ting evidenc e, followingthe state’s presentation of ag g ravating e v i d e n c e , i nana t t e mp tt o e s t a b l i s hs o m e b a s i s f

o r l e n i e n c y. SeeAriz. Rev. State. §§ 13-752(E) –(G) (2012). I t would be impossibl e for

a jury to consider on l y

the ag g ravating evidenc e in deter

mining whe ther the ag g ravating f actor s were met without also impl icitly consideringcontrav ening mitigatingevide n ce
. A jury that has listened to extensive mitigatingevidenc e about the defendant’s good c hara cter , for instance, ma

y be much less likely to f

ind the defe ndant ac ted he ino us ly or c ru e lly in c omm itt ing the of

fe ns e . T he ri g ht t oM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

26

In p ra c tica l effe c t, R i n g II c re a te d a rig h t t o ha v e the ju ry d e te rm ine a ll 7 t he f act s o n whi ch a sent e n c e of d eat h de p end ed , bo t h aggravat i ng and
m i t i gat i ng, s i nce cap i t al sent enci ng st at ut es ass i gned thi s f unct i o n t o one fac tfi n d e r. S ee R i n g II I , 65 P

. 3d at 943

. T he capi t al s ent enc i ng s t at ut es i n a l l s t at es wi t h the d ea t h pen al t y , wi t h t he s ol e e xce pt i on of N ebra s ka,
no w re q u i re j uri es t o co nsi d er mit i gat i ng evi d ence, d et erm i ne t he exi s t enc e or abs enc e of mi t i gat i ng ci r cums t anc es , an d de cid e wh et her d e a th is the a p p ro p ria te se n te n c e
. See Al a. St at

. § 13A- 5- 46( e) ; Ar k

. Code §§ 5- 4- 602 ( 3) –( 5) , 603( a) ; Ar i z. R ev. St at

. § 13- 752; Cal

. Pen al Code § 190. 3; Col o. Rev

. St at

. § 18- 1. 3- 1201( 2) ( a) ; D el

. Code t i t

. 11, § 42 0 9 (c)( 3 ); Fla. Stat

. § 9 2 1

. 1 4 1 (2); G a. C o d e § § 17

- 1 0

- 3 0 (b), 31 (a); I dah o Code § 19- 2515( 3) ( b) ; I n d. Code § 35

- 5 0

- 2- 9( l ) ; K an
. St at

. § 21- 6 6 1 7 (e ); K y. R e v . S ta t. § 5 3 2 .0 2 5 (1 )( b ), (3 ); L a . C o d e C rim . P ro c . ar t. 905. 3 ; M d. Cr i m. La w § 2- 303( i ) ( 1) ; M i s s
. Code § 99- 19- 101( 3) ; M o. R ev. Stat

. §§ 56 5

. 0 3 0

. 4 , 56 5

. 0 3 2 ; N ev. R ev. Stat

. § 1 7 5

. 5 5 4 ; N

. H

. R ev. St at

. § 63 0: 5( I V ) ; N. C. Gen

. S t a t

. § 15 A- 20 00 ( b) ; N. Y

. Cr i m. Pr oc. § 400. 27; O h i o Rev

. Code § 2929. 03( D ) ( 2) ; O k l a. St at

. , t i t

. 21, § 701. 11; O r
. Rev

. St at

. § 163. 150; 42 Pa. Cons

. St at

. § 9711; S. C. Code § 16- 3- 20; S. D

. Codi f

i ed L aws § 23A- 27A- 3; T en n
. Code § 39- 13- 204; T ex
. Code Cr i m. Pr oc. a r t

. 37. 071; U t ah Code § 76- 3- 207; V a. Code § 19. 2- 264. 4; W ash. R ev. C o d e § 1 0

. 9 5

. 0 6 0 ; W y o
. Stat

. § 6

- 2

- 1 0 2

. A l t ho ugh M o nt ana has not r evi s ed i t s ca pi t al s ent enc i ng s che me s i nce R i n g II , s ee M o n t. C o d e 4 6 -1 8 -3 0 1 , t h e sta te a lso ha s n o t se n te n c e d a n y d e fen d a n t t o d e a th sin c e 1 9 9 6

. See D e a th P e n a lty I n fo rm a tio n C e n te r, D e a th Se nt enc e s in t he U ni t ed Stat es f rom 19 7 7 B y Stat e and B y Y ear, h t t p: / / ww w. dea t h pen al t y i n f o. or g / dea t h

- s en t en ce s - u n i t ed

- st at es - 1977- 2008 (l ast vi si t ed A p ri l 18 , 20 1 3 ).

T he j ur y pl ay s a s i mi l ar rol e i n t he f eder al ca pi t al s ent enc i ng s t at ut e. See 18 U

. S.C . § 35 9 4

. E ven i n t ho se s t at es where t he ul t i m at e jur y r ec ommen dat i on of

de at h r ema i n s n on bi n di n g , t h e j u r y r et ai n s t h e r ol e of fi r s t fa c tfi n d e r. See Al a. St at

. § 13A- 5- 46( e) ; D el

. Code t i t

. 11, § 4 2 0 9 (c )( 3 ); F la . S ta t. § 9 2 1 .1 4 1 (2 ); G a
. C o d e § § 1 7 -1 0 -3 0 (b ), 3 1 (a ); K y. R ev. Stat

. § 5 3 2

. 0 2 5 (1)(b), (3). have a ju r y d e te r mi n e a g g r av a ti n g f

a c to r s is th e r e f

o r e a lso a de fa c to r ig ht t o h ave a

jur y de te rm ine mit ig a tin g fa c ts. 7M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 27

A na rr o w re a d ing o f R i n g II is p a rtic u la rly p ro b le m a tic fo r a n a p p e llate 8
cour t r evi ewi ng a Ri ng err o r f o r har m l ess ness
. I n m any ca ses, t he q uest i o n of whether the j ud ge’ s role i n f i nd i ng aggravat i ng f

act o rs p rej ud i ce d t he ve rd i ct wil l d ep en d o n t he ex t an t m i t i ga t i ng circum st an ce s. C o n sid e r a j u d g e w h o fo u n d two a g g ra v a ting fac to rs w h e n a ju ry w o u ld h a v e fo u n d o n ly o n e . If the re a re no m iti g a ting c ir c u m sta n c e s to
c o u n te r b a la n c e th e u n b le m is h e d a g g r a v a to r , t h e e r r o r is in c o n s e q u e n tial— b ut i f t here are s ub st ant i al m i t i gat i ng c i rcum st ances, t he error might m ake
a ll the d iff

e re n c e
. See St at e v. Le hr , 67 P

. 3 d 70 3 , 70 5 (Ari z. 20 0 3 ). As the Supreme Court ha s stressed repe atedly , how a f act is la beled is irreleva

nt to the Apprendianaly sis. See R ing II , 53 6 U .S. a t 60 2; Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 494. I t is the effe ct of
a f a c t th a t d i c t a t e s w h e th e r a j ur y mu s t d e t e r

m i n e it. Apprendi , 5 30 U. S. at 49 4; se e als o Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct . 2151, 2155 (2013) (reiter ating that any fac t that has the effec t of incre asingthe pena lty for a crime must be submitt ed to the jury

). B eca use the e x ist en ce or

absenc e of
m i t i gat i n g circumstan ce s d i re ct l y af fe ct edwh et h er

M urd au gh was de ath elig ible under A rizona law, he ha d a rig ht to have
a jur y de c ide tho se fa c ts. 8 B) Stand ard of Review
We n e xt ad dr e ss M urd aug h’ s argume nt t hat, c on tr ary

to the holding of

the Arizona S upreme Court, Ring e rr or is structura l and shoul d not be subj ect to har mless error

revie w.
In Ring II , the Supreme Court did not rea ch the que stion of whe ther the Ring err or there was ha rm less, noting that “this Court ordinarily

leave s it to lower courts to pass on the harmlessne ss of err or in the first in s t ance .” 536 U.S. at 609
n
. 7 (c i t i n g Neder v

. U

n ite d S tates , 5 2 7 U.S. 1, 25 (1999)). The Court re iterate d that it had left open the question of whether the er

ror in Ring II was ha

rmless in Mitchell v.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

28
Es pa rza , 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). The Court emphasized that wher e it has not set forth a standard of

revie w for a c on sti tu tiona l e rr or

and the Court ’s pr e c e de nt “ is, a t be st, ambi g uous,” a f

eder al cour

t may not overrule a state c ourt’s decision to apply

harmless e rror

revie w. Id

. In Ring III

, th e Ar izon a

Sup re me Cou

rt de fi nit ive ly answe red this question, applying the harmless e rror standard set forth in Neder . 65 P.3d at 935–36. As part of this re view, the cour t asked w h ether

it could conclude, “ beyond a re a so na ble do ub t, that no ratio na l tr ie r of fact woul d de te rm ine that th e mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s w e re su ff ic ie ntl y substantial to c all for lenie ncy .” Id. at 946. I f, in future Ring err or ca ses, t h e co u rt could not answe r this question in the
a f f i r m a t i v e , i tw o u l d

r e m an d t h e c a s e f

o r r e s e n t e n c i n g b y a jury

. Id . The state c halleng ed the Ar izona Supreme Court’s
a pp lic a tio n o f t

he ha rm le ss e rr or

test , a rguin g that th is application of harmless err or revie w, which included r eview of the mitigating f

actor s for ha

rmless err or, wa s b eyond the scope of the constitutional error

articulated in R ing

II

. See Nordstrom , 77 P.3d at 46 n.5. The Arizona Su p re m e C ourt reje cted this a

rgument, and the Supreme Cour t d enied cer tiorari. Se e Pa nd

e li , 540 U.S. 962 (2003). Thus, it is now we ll- se ttl e d th a t Ring er ror is subject to the ha rmless err or test articulate d in R ing III , and we may

not rec onsider the issue here

. C) Harm less ErrorReview
Harml e ss e rr or

ana ly sis re qu ir e s f

e de ra l c ourt s to deter m i n e “whether the e rror

‘had substantial a

nd injurious eff ect or influence in determining the jury ’s ver dict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson , 5 0 7 U. S

. 6 1 9 , 6 3 7 (1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Kotteakos
v. Un ited States , 3 2 8 U

. S. 7 5 0 , 7 7 6 ( 1 9 4 6 ) )

. We “ a p p ly theM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 29

Brecht t e s tw i th o u tr e g ar d

f o r th e s t a t e c o urt ’ s h ar

m l e s s ne ss deter mination.” Pulido v. Chrones , 629 F .3 d 100 7, 10 12 (9 th C i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( ci t i n g Fry v. P liler , 551 U.S. 1 1 2 , 1 2 1–22 (2007)) . The Brecht

sta nd ard ha s be e n de sc ri be d a s f oll ow s: [I ]f o n e cannot sa

y , with fair a ssuranc e, af

ter ponderingall that happene d without stripping the er roneous a ction from th e whole, that the judgme nt w as not substantially sway ed by the err or, it is impossibl e to c onclu d e that substantial rig hts were not affe cted. The inquiry cannot be mere ly

whether there was enoug h to support the result, apa rt from the phase a ffe cted by

the er ror. It is rather, eve n so, whether

the er ror itself ha d substantial influence

. Merolillo v. Y

ates , 663 F.3d 444, 454 ( 9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kotteakos , 3 28 U. S. at 76 5) . “ Whe re the re c or d is so e ve nly ba lanc e d th a t a jud g e ‘f

e e ls h ims e lf

in v ir tua l e qu ipo ise a s to the har mlessness of the e rror ’ and ha s ‘gr av e doubt about whether an error a ffe cted a

jury [subs tantially

and injuriously ], t he judg e must tre at the err or as if it did so.’” Id. (q u o t i n g O’Neal v. M

cAninch , 5 1 3 U.S. 432, 435, 437–38 (1995)) (alter ation in orig inal) (inter nal quot ations omitt ed). Of c ourse, he re, the underlying e rror is the absenc e of a jury itself. Acc ording ly , the Brecht inquiry is whether the absenc e of a jury as fa ctfinder

at the pena lty s t age “ substantially and injuriously ” af

fec ted or influ en ced the outcome. In other words, we ask whe ther a

rational jury

could have found that the fa cts ca lled for lenie ncy
. I n o rder to determine whether Murdaug h has met the Brecht standard, we review the
a g g ra vatin g and

mit ig a tin g fa c tor s.M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

30

R ecall t hat t he (F)(1) aggravat i ng f act o r i s e sta b lis hed when a 9 def en dan t “ h as bee n con v i ct ed of a n ot h er of

f en s e i n t h e U n i t ed St at es f or whi ch un der A r i zona l aw a s ent enc e o f li f e i mp r i s onment or deat h w as im p o sa b le .” A riz . R e v
. S ta t. § 1 3 -7 0 3

. T h e (F )( 6 ) a g g ra v a ting fac to r is est ab l i shed i f

t he m urder was com m i t t ed i n an “es p eci al l y cruel , hei no us or depr ave d m ann er
. ” I d. a) Aggravat ing f

actor s
The Ar izona Supreme C o u rt held that the (F )(1) ag g ravating f

actor fell outs i de the Ring

rule a nd conclude d that the gover

nment had proven the (F )(6) ag g ravating f actor be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. M urd au ghd o es n o tch a l l en ge

9 the cour t’s deter mination as to the (F )(1) ag g ravating f actor

. Wit h respe ct t o the (F )(6) fac tor, he a rgues that the Ar izona Supreme Court’s c onclusion that any rational jury

would have found the a g g ravating f actor “hing ed upon Murda

ug h’s mutilation of t he body

afte r the c rime,” which the cour t further found “ne eded to be motivated by deba s ement.” S i n ce h e m u t i l at edth e b o dy t o av o i d d et ec t i o n , M urd au gh contends a rational jury might not have f ound the F( 6) fa ctor.
But the c ourt did not “hing e” i t s deter mination that the state had proven the (F )(6) fac tor on Murdaug h’s mutilation of the body

alone. Murdaugh , 97 P.3 dat 856. The c ourt corr ectly noted that t he (F)( 6) aggravating factor w ould have been e stablished if the state ha d proven on l y o n e of the heinous, crue l, or depra

ved ele ments. Id. And, althoug h the court c oncluded that “ mutilation b y i t self will establish the elements of heinousness or de p ra vity ,” id. at 858, the cour t nonetheless f

ound that three o t her f

actor s also supported a fi nd ingthat th e a c t w a s “ he ino us or de pr ave d. ” Ac c or din g to the cour t, the state established be y ond a rea sonable doubt thatM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 31

(1) Murda

ug h relished t h e murder, (2) the murder w as senseless, a

nd (3) the vic tim was helpless. Id. at 856. Murdaug h is also incorre ct in asser ting that the Ari zona Supreme Court found the mutilation “nee ded to be motivated by debase ment.” To the co n t ra ry , the cour t describe d how Murdaug h mutilated the bod y to preve nt identification and cited S ta tev

. James , 685 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Ariz. 1984), for the proposition that “[t] he m o d e of disposing of the body itself demo n strates a

cer tain callousness a

nd depra vity and disreg ard f

or the victim’s family

who might ne ver ha

ve le ar n e d o f th e f

a te o f [th e v ic tim] .” Id

. a t 85 7. Thus , reg ardle ss of Murdaug h’s ul timate purpose in mutilating the body , the court concluded the mutilation demonstrated depra vity for pur poses of findingthe (F )(6) fac tor. Id. Although Mur daug h is co rrect that “he inous and depra ved” r efe rs to the mental state of the def endant, it is the de fe nd ant’ s “ wo rd s and a c tio ns ” wh ic h de mon str ate this mental state. See State v . Gretzler , 659 P.2d 1 , 1 0 ( A r iz

. 19 83 ) ( e n b anc ). Th e Ar izon a Sup re me Court

ha s r e pe a te dly held that nee dlessly

mutilating a b o d y i s the kind of ac tion that shows depra

vity , reg ard l ess of the mutilator’s pur pose. See State v . Spence r , 8 59 P.2 d 1 46 , 1 54 (Ari z. 1 99 3) ; Jame s , 68 5 P. 2d a t 12 99 . We c on c lud e that no rat ion a l jury c ou ld have f ound that the ev i d en ce f ailed to establish the (F )(6) fac tor. b) Mitigating factors Murdaug h next arg ues that a r ational jury could have found that his evidenc e esta blished the (G) (1) miti g ating fac tor and conseque ntly imposed a sentenc e of life, not death. We ag ree . For the reasons discussed below, w e hold that theM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

32 Ring e r r o r h a d a “ s u

b s ta n ti a l an d in

ju r io u s e f f e c t or influence ” on the tria l court’s fa ilure to find the (G )(1) mitigati n g fa ctor a

nd thus the trial court’s imposition of a death se ntence

. Th e (G )( 1) fa c tor

e xists if the “ de fe nd ant’ s c a

pa c ity to a pp re c iate the wr on g fu lne ss o f h is c on du c t or to c on fo rm his c on du ct to t

he re qu ir e me nts of

the law w a s si g nif

ic antl y i mp a i r e d b u t n o t s o i mp a i r e d a s t o c o n s t i tu t e a de fe ns e to prosec ution.” Ariz. Rev. S t at

. § 13-703(G) (1). Dr ug impairment ca

n be a mitigating circ umstance under the ( G)(1) fac tor, but only

if the def

endant c an show a

connec tion betwee n the drug use and the offe nse. See State v . Sansing , 77 P.3d 30, 37 (Ariz. 20 0 3 ). Ty pically , testimony

by an expert witness can establish this c ausal nexus. Id. Th e c la im of drugimpairment is undermined, th oug h, if the evide nce sh ow s “ the de fe nd ant too k ste ps to a vo id p ro se c uti on

sh or tly afte r the murder, or

when it appe ars that intoxi cation did not overwhelm the def

endant’ s ability

to co ntrol his phy sical behavior .” Id. (q u o t i n g State v. Rienh a rdt , 951 P.2d 454, 466–67 (Ariz. 1997) (e n banc) ). Even thoug h Murdaug h did not pr esent a mitigation ca se, the trial court c onsidered the Rule 11 competenc y repor ts and Dr. L ang ’s testimony

in determining wh ether the (G) (1) mitigatingfac tor was e stablished. This evidence included Dr

. Potts’ s c on c lus ion

that “ [t]he us e of me tha

mph e tamin e qu ite likely g reatly contributed to the a lleg ed off enses having occur red,” as well as Dr. Sindelar’s summary of Murda ug h’s “longhistory

of multiple su b stance abuse, inc luding int ra ve no us inj e c tio n o f m e tha mph e tamin e .” B a se d o n this rec ord, the trial c ourt found that Murda ug h (1) e vin ced p ar an o i d th o u g h t s , i n c l u d i n g h i s p ar an o i d b e l i e f th a tth e C IA had plac ed a tr ackingdevice in his head; (2) ha d a longM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 33

his tor y of c hr on ic dr

ug a bu se , wh ic h may

have be e n a

c a us e of his para

noid delusions; (3) was ing esting drug s and was un de r t he inf lue nce of dr ug s w he n h e mur de re d Re y no lds ; and (4) possibly

suffe red from a pe rsonality disorder amplified by

methamphetamine abuse. In consideringthe totality of the circ umstances, the trial court also found t hat Murdaug h arr ang ed for

Rey nolds to be l u red to his hom e, imp ri so ne d h im f

or an e xten de d p e ri od

of tim e , e labor a te ly dismembered his body , and then was able to f ind m ed i cal car e for himself when he injured his leg . The tr ial court conclude dthat “[t] he industry and thoug ht, manifested ove r an extended per iod of time, whi ch we n t into the murder of David R ey

n olds belies a findingthat the Def endant wa s signific antly

impaired.” On this basis, the trial court he ld that the re cord did not establish by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that Murda

ug h’s ca pacity t o appre ciate the wrong fulness of his conduct or to confor m his conduct to the require ments of the law was signific antly impaired, and thus that the evidenc e did not establish th e (G )(1) miti g ating fac tor.
Whil e it i s c e rt a inl y po ssi ble tha t a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld have a g re e d w iththe tr ia l ju dg e and fo un d th at th e fa c ts surroundingthe murder

underm i ned the e vidence of drug imp a ir me nt i n th e Rul e 11 re po rt s, it i s a lso e nti re ly po ssi ble that a ratio na l tr ie r of f

a c t c ou ld h ave dr awn

the op po sit e conclusi o n and found Mur daug h’s ac tions did not evince a sober mind. See, e .g. , No rd s trom , 77 P.3 d at 46 . T his is particula rly true in lig ht of the low burde n of proof for finding a statutory

mitigating fa ctor: a nonuna nimous jury
n e e d o n l y f i n d th e m i t i g a t i n g f

a c t o r s u p p o rt e d b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. SeeA r i z
. R e v
. S t a t. § 13-703(C). F or instance , a reasonable jury might not have found that Murda

ug h’s ac t ions to cover up the mur derM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

34
demons tr a te d

an y k in d o f s o b e r s o p h is ti c a ti o n
. In s te a d

of clea nin g u p t he cr ime scene , Murdaug h asked Rohrs a nd Gross to sprinkle horse manure over Rey nolds’s body and on the surroundingblood, and t h en l ef t the body

there for the re ma ind e r o f t

he da y . I t wa s n ot u

nti l th a t e ve nin g—p ro ba

bly atl ea s tei gh tt o t en h o u r s af t er th e c ri m e—th at M urd au gh dis m em b er ed the body . Thus, a re asonable jury might not have f ound Murdaug h’s attempt to thwart identification of the body to b e i n co n sistent with a finding that Murdaug h was “sig nificantly , but only partially , impaired” at the time of the offe nse. Gretzler , 659 P.2d at 17. That a rational jury might have f ound that the evidenc e established the (G) (1) mitigating fac tor is sufficient to establish pre judice under Brecht

. The Ar izona Supreme Court’s deter mination that any e rr or wa s har

mle ss ca sts no do ub t on our c on c lus ion , b e c a

us e that court c lear ly

failed to c onside r evidence in the reco rd—e vid e nc e that th e tr ia l c ourt did c on sid e r i n deter mining wh ether

the (G) (1) mitigating f actor was established. In revie wing the trial cou rt ’s findingon the (G)( 1) fa ctor for

harmless e rror , the Arizona Supreme Court stated that it considere d the re asoningo f t he trial c ourt, the testimony of Dr. L angand “unc ontroverte d ev i d en ce in the rec ord . . . that Murda

ug h took st ep s to avoid detec tion.” Murdaugh , 97 P.3d at 8 6 0. Th e c ourt fo un d th a t be c a

us e Murdaug h did not present any mitigation, he did not present

“ any ex pert testimony to establish that his abilit y t o control his behavior or

appre ciate the wrongfulne ss of his conduct was signific antly impaired.” Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T hu s, “[b] eca use of the completelack of evide nce o f a ca

usal connec tion be tween Murdaug h’s drug use and the m urder ,” the cour t concluded “ beyond a r ea sonable doubt that no rational jury

would have f

ound that Murdaug h established theM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 35

(G)( 1) mitigating c ircumstance .” Id. a t 86 0 ( e mph a sis added)

. Murd a ug h c or re c tly argue s th a t th e Ar izon a Sup re me Court fa ile d to c on sid e r t

he Rul e 11 c omp e te nc y

re po rts, which included expert testimony establishing a di rec t causa l link between Mur daug h’s druguse and t h e murde r. Unde r then-e x isting Arizona ca se law, the Rule 11 repor ts w ere the kind of evidenc e that could have established drugimpairment for purposes of the ( G)(1) fac tor. See G retzler , 6 5 9 P.2d a t 16–17 (conc luding the e vidence supported trial judge ’s fi n d i n g o f th e ( G) (1 ) f

ac t o r w h en th e d ef

en d an t“u s eddru gs continuously

for a period of ove r nine y ear s” an d“medica l te sti m o n y [s h o w e d ] t

h a tth i s c o n t i nu o u s u s e o f dr u g s l i k e ly imp a ir e d de fe nd ant’ s v oli tio na l c a pa bil iti e s” ). Mo re ov e r, in applying harmless err or analy sis in other Ring err or ca ses, the Arizona Supreme Court has f ound reve rsibl e er ro r as to the (G)( 1) fa ctor ba sed solely on the contra dicted t est imony of one expert. Se e Pa nd

e li , 65 P.3 d at 95 3; see also Nordstrom , 7 7 P

. 3 d at4 6 (f i n d i n g Ring err or wher e defe ndant pre sented evidenc e fr om one ex pert on the possibl e conne ction betwee n def endant’ s alcohol and substanc e abuse and the murde rs even thoug h the evidenc e “w as not particula rly compelling ”). Thus, under the Arizona Supreme Court’s own cas es , we cannot s e e h o w th e A r iz o n a

Su p r e me Co urt c o u ld

h ave re a so na bly c on c lud e d th a t no rational jury cou l d fi nd the evidenc e here supported drug impairment by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Had the Arizona Supreme Court considere d all th e e v i d e n c e i n c o n d

u c t i n g i t s h ar

m l e s s e r r o r r e v i e w , it wo uld have be e n im

po ssi ble to c on c lud e tha

t no rational jury could have found the (G )(1) fac tor.
We conclude that the absenc e of a jury at the sente ncing stag e had a “substantial and injurious eff ect or influence ” onM UR DAUGH V

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36

T ho ugh not p art of o ur prejudice anal y si s here , w e no t e t hat of t he 10 ni net een Ri ng cases remand ed f o r r esent enci ng by a j ury , el even have
re su lted in a se n te n c e o the r th a n d e a th. See J u stin F . M a rc e a u , A ri zon a ’s R in g C y c le , 44 A ri z. St. L.J. 10 6 1 , 10 7 7 (20 1 2 ). Murdaug h’s sentenc e of de ath. Brecht , 507 U.S. at 637 (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). Although a jur y w o u ld h av e f o un d th e ( F ) ( 6 ) a g g r av a ti n g f

a c to r b e y ond a re a s o n a b le d o u b t, s o me e v id e n c e s u

p p o rte d th e ( G)(1) mitigatingfac tor. The expert repor ts, though not dra fted for the purpose of mitigation, provided some details about Murdaug h’s chr onic druguse, which a jury might have found established drugimpairment. Be cause a jury could have found that a pr eponder ance of the e vidence supported the (G )( 1) mit ig a tin g fa c tor , and vo te d f or le nie nc y on that ba sis , the Ring err or wa s prejudicial. W e m ust gr ant the habe as petition. 10
2. Unc ons ti tu ti ona l N e xus Te stCl aim Murdaug h next arg ues that, in revie wing his sentence for harmless e rror , the Arizona Supreme Court ap p l ied an unconstitutional causal nexus test to mi tigating e vi d en ce of his dr ugus e and

de lus ion s.
B e c a us e the state po st- c onvic tio n c ourt did no t a dd res s thi s c la im, we re vie w d e no vo wh e the r t he Ar izon a

Sup re me Court applied an unc onstitu t i o nal test. In his petition for post-conviction re lief, Murda ug h argued that both the sentenc ing c ourt and the A rizona Supreme Cou rt applied an uncons t itutional nex us test. The state post-c onviction court did consider and reje ct Murdaugh’s claim with re spect to the sentenc ing c ourt, a decision Murdaug h does not a ppeal. The state post-convic tion court said nothing, how ever , reg ardingM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 37

Murdaug h’s claim about the Arizona Supreme Court. Give n that th is c la im h a d a

rgua ble me ri t, a

nd in l ig ht o f th e state post-conviction cour

t’s otherwise c are ful consider ation and evaluation of ever

y other claim in Mur daug h’s petition, “the eviden c e le a d s v e r

y c le ar ly to th e c o n c lu s io nth a t a

f e d era l cl ai m was inadve rtently

overlooke d in state court,” thus permitting de novo review. Johnson v. W illiams , 1 33 S. Ct

. 1088, 1097 (2013).
A st a te c o u rt v io late s a c a p it a l d e f e n d an t’ s E igh th

and Four tee nth Ame n d me nt rights to an individualized sentencing when it excludes or re fuses to consider in miti g ation evidenc e that lacks a

causal nexus t o the cr ime. See Sm ith v. Texas , 543 U.S. 37, 45 ( 2004) (pe r cur iam); Tennard v. Dretk e , 542 U.S. 274, 282–88 ( 2 0 0 4 ). A cour t may , howeve r, consider the failure to establish a ca usal conne ction betwee n the mit ig a tin g fa c tor s and the c ri me “ in a sse ssi ngthe qu a lity and streng th of the mitigation evidence .” Towery v. Ry an , 673 F.3d 933, 945 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (quot i n g S chad v. R yan , 671 F.3d 708, 723 ( 9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). Murdaug h argu es that an unla wful nexus test was manifest in the Ar izona Supreme Court’s explanation of why
a rational j u ry

would not have we ighe d the nonstatutory mitigatin g

c irc u msta nces diff ere ntly than the sente ncingcourt did:
The trial c ourt first found that the e vidence proff ere d in s upport of the ( G)(1) mitigating circ umstance al so supported a f inding of [eight] non-statut o ry

m i t i gat i n g ci rc u m s t an ces

. . . . T h e re ports prepa

red by Drs. Sindelar, P o t t s , an d

S ci al l i d o re v ea l th a tM urd au gh experience d cer

tain para noid thoughts andM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

38

A s w e d i scu ssed i n o ur a na l ysi s o f M urd au gh ’ s Ri ng c la im , su p ra 11 Se ct i o n II I( 1 )( C )( b ), t he co urt did neg lect t o co nsi d er r el evant exp ert evi d ence in its d i scus si o n of t he (G )( 1 ) s t at ut o ry m i t i gat i ng f act o r. B ut
n ot h i n g i n t h e court ’ s o p i n i on s u g g es t s t h at omi s s i on w as t h e r es u l t of
a p p lying a ne x u s te st. de lus ion s th a t w e re lik e ly e xac erbate d b y

his history of chr onic methampheta

mine use. But beca use no mental he alth pro fessional found a ca usal nexu s betwee n these c onditions and the mur de rs , w e fi nd

be y on d a

re a so na ble do ubt that no rational jury would have we ig he d th e se fa c tor s any dif fe re ntl y tha n d id the trial judg e. Murdaugh , 97 P.3d at 860 (citations omitted).
Th e c ourt ’s dis c us sio n ma ke s c lea r that it

did no t r e fu se t o co n s i der e vidence that was not ca usally connec ted to the crime. See E

ddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1982). Af

ter obser ving tha t the sentenc ing c ourt found eig ht nonstatutory

mitigatingcirc umstances—including impairment from c hronic a nd concur

rent dru g ab use, a persona lity

disorder, a

nd para noid thoughts—t h e court e xpla ine d th a t it s tas k wa s to “de te rm ine wh e the r a jur y c ou ld have w eig hed these mitigating fac tors differ ently than did the trial judg e,” who “did not g ive [ t h em] much weig ht.” Murdaugh , 97 P.3d at 860. T he Ar izona Supreme Court took no iss ue wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing that the Sin de lar, Potts, and Scialli repor

t s did in fact e stablish various nonstatutory mit ig a tingc ir c ums tanc e s. Rather, the c ourt took the fac t 11 that no e xpe rt

ha d d ra wn a c a us a l link be tw e e n th os e circ umstances and Murdaug h’s crime as compelling evidenc eM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 39

that a rational jury would have affor ded them little weig ht, as the trial cour

t did.
Be cause the court only raised the issue of a c ausal ne x us to “deter mine the weig ht” that a hy pothetical jury

would have “g iven re levant mitiga

ting e viden ce ,” the Court did not vio late Murd a

ug h’ s con sti tut ion a l r ig hts

. Eddings , 4 55 U. S. at 115.
3. Co nflic t o f Int e r e stCl aim Murdaug h argues that the prose cutor’s pr esentation of mit ig a tio n ev ide nc e a t the be he st of the tr ia l c ourt vio late d h is Six th and Fo u rtee nth Amendment rig ht to conflict-fr ee repr esentation. Murdaug h argues that the pr osecutor a cted simult ane ou sly

a s c ouns e l f

or the pr os e c uti on and

the de fe ns e when he prese nted a mitigation case on Mur daug h’s beha lf. A) P r oc e dur al D e fault
Murd a ug h d id n ot r a ise thi s c la im i n h is di re c t a pp e a l to the Arizona Su p re m e C ourt. The post-c onviction review court subseque ntly

held that the cla i m was pre cluded unde r Arizona Rule o f C riminal Procedur e 32.2(a )(3) , which fore closes post-convic tion relief on c laims that are w aived “ at trial, on appe al, or in any

previous collate ral proc eeding .” Murdaug h’ s c la im i s n ot p ro c e dura lly de fa ult e d b e c a

us e he did not violate a state proce dural rule. Arizona courts tre at conflict of interest claims as a specie s o f i n eff ective assist an ce of counse l claims. See, e .g. , State v. Je nkins , 715 P.2d 716, 718–19 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc)

. And Arizona law only permits defe ndants to br ing ineffe ctive assistance of counsel c laims in Ru l e 32 post-conviction re viewM UR DAUGH V

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40

proce edi n g s. See, e .g. , State ex re l. Thomas v. Rayes , 153 P. 3d 1040, 1044 (Ariz. 2007) (e n banc) . Henc e, Murdaugh’ s fa ilure to raise this claim on direct appe al does not bar f eder al re view. See Leev. Kemna , 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002). B) Ana lys is
A def endant’ s Six th Amendm ent rig ht to effe ctive
a ss is tanc e of

c ouns e l “ inc lud e s th e e nti tle me nt t o repr esentation that is free f rom conflicts of inter est.” United Sta te s v. W e lls , 394 F.3d 725, 733 ( 9th Cir. 2005). To e sta bl is h a v iol a tio n o f t

his ri g ht, a

de fe nd ant “ mus t de mon str a te that an a c tua l c on fl ict of in te re st a dv e rs e ly aff ecte d his lawy er’ s perf

ormanc e.” Id. (q u o t i n g Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)).
Murd a ug h c ann ot s ho w that his counsel ha d a conf lict of interest. Murda

ug h’s attorne y

did not pres en t any

evidenc e in miti g ati o n , beca

use Murda

ug h did not let him. The prosec utor was not tra

nsmuted into de fense counsel whe n, at the trial judg e’s r equest, he pre s ented a mitigation ca se on Murd a ug h’s behal f, any

mor e tha n a pr os e c uto r b e c ome s a de fe ns e a tto rn e y

wh e n h e un de rt ake s o the r a c ts f avo ra ble to the def e n dant’s intere sts, such as disclosing material e vidence or advoc ating a downwa

rd sentenc ing de parture

. Arizona law doe s not require the prosec ution to confine its presentation to matters inimical to the def endant: “A t the penalty phase of

the sentenc ing pr ocee ding . . . the prosec ution or the defe ndant may prese nt any

information that is r e le v an t t o an y

o f th e mi ti g a ti n g c ir c u ms ta nces included in subsec t i o n G o f t his section . . . .” Ar iz. R ev. Stat

. 1 3

- 7 0 3 ( C)

. I np r e s e n ti n g a c a s e in mi ti g a ti o n , the n,M UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 41

Murd a ug h’ s p ro se c uto r w a s n ot e ve n a c tin g outsi de his re mit —mu c h le ss a c tin g a s de jure de fe ns e c ouns e l.
Be cause the prosec utor never repr esente d Murdaug h, the pro s e c u to r ’ s p r e s e n tati o n o f th e mi ti g a ti o n c a s e d id not violate Murduagh’s rig ht t o conflict-f ree repr esentation. Murd a ug h’ s d e ri vativ e c la im s th a t hi s tr ia l and a pp e llate counsel we re ine ffe ctive for failingto raise the c onflict of interest cla im are e qually meritless. See B oag v. Raines , 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 ( 9th Cir. 1985).
4. Claim s Concer nin g Murdaugh’s Guilty Ple as Murdaug h contends that hi s g uilty pleas we re not knowing , intelligent, a

nd voluntary

beca use (1) c ounsel was ineffe ctive in re prese ntin g Murdaug h leadingup to and duringhis guilty

plea, a nd (2) the Ring II

decision un de rm ine d th e vo luntari ne ss o f M ur dau gh ’s g uil ty ple a s. Ne ith e r o f t

he se c la ims ha s me ri t. First, the r ecor d does not support Murdaugh’s contention that counsel wa s deficie nt. Murdaug h argues coun sel was ineffe ctive bec ause (1) counsel failed to pr ovide “ba ckg round information” to the evaluating doctors in prepa ration for the Rul e 11 e va luatio n; ( 2) he had “ e xce ssi ve ly

lim ite d a c c e ss” to his counsel; (3) trial counsel failed to e x plain the advanta g es, disadvanta g es, and pote ntial conseque nces of the ple a a g re eme nt an d in ste a d s e nt t he fa c t inve sti g a tor

to discuss the terms of the ple a with Murdaugh; and (4) c ounsel promised Murdaugh an x-ray to prove ther e was no tracking c hip in M ur da

ug h’ s h ead in

or de r t o c onvin c e Murd a ug h to plead guilty . The re cord d o es not show, howeve r, that any d ef iciencie s in counsel’s per formanc e we re “ so serious that counsel was not f

unctioning as the ‘counse l’ g uara nteed theM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN

42
defe ndant by

the Six th Amendment.” Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Se c on d, the Ar izon a

Sup re me Court

did no t unre a so na

bly apply the law or

the fa cts i n d enying Mur daug h’s claim that the R ing II

de c isi on un de rm ine d th e vo luntari ne ss o f h is g uilty pleas. Nothing i n the record indicates that Murdaugh’s decision t o plead guilty

was influenc ed by

whether a judg e or a jury would decide his se ntence . And while it is true that the Supreme Court held that the “ new r ule” of Ring

a pp lie d to criminal ca ses still pending on dire ct re view, see S chri ro v. Su mm e rli n , 5 42 U. S. 3 48 , 3 51 (2004 ), the me re fa c t th a t a new r ule may af

fe ct a def

endant’ s trial rig hts does not nece ssarily undermine the voluntariness of t h e defenda nt’s plea, see Brady

v. U n i t ed States , 397 U.S. 742, 756–57 (1970). Ac cording ly , the Ariz ona S upreme Court’s denial of Murdaug h’s claim wa s not unreasona ble.
5
. Co mp et en ce Cl a i ms
Murd a ug h a lso ra is es va

ri ou s c la ims c on c e rn inghis competenc e to waive the pre sentation of mitigating e vidence

. Spe c if ic a lly , M ur da

ug h c on te nd s th a t he wa s in c omp e te nt t o wa ive mit ig a tio n, that th e tr ia l c ourt ma de an i na de qu a te deter mination of his competence to waive mit iga tion, that trial counsel e rre d in handling the mitigation waive r, and that a pp e llate c ouns e l f

a ile d to ra ise a ll o f t

he c la ims rel ate d to this iss ue on dire ct appe al. Having g rante d relief on Claim 1, we re se rv e any

de c isi on on the se c omp e te nc e iss ue s.
IV. Conclusion
Be cause we r ever se th e d en ial of re lief on Murda ug h’s Ring claim, we n eed not reac h the claims conc erningM UR DAUGH V

. RYAN 43

Murdaug h’s compete nce to wa ive the pre sentation of mitigatingev i d en ce. We other wise af firm the district cour

t and re mand with instructions to g rant the petition unless the state c on du c ts a ne w s e nte nc inghe ari ngwi thi n a re a so na ble period of time. Cf. J

e nn in gs v . W

oo dfo rd , 290 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002).
RE VE RSE D i n par t, AF F IRM ED in pa rt, and REMAND ED.