# FILED
March 16, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF AP PEALS OF TENNESSEE, AT NASHVILLE

____________________________________________________________ ) THE WILSON COUNTY SCHOOL ) Davidson County Chancery Court SYSTEM , ) No. 91 -2675 -II ) Plaintiff/Appelle

e/Cross-Appella

nt, ) ) C.A. No. M1999-0035 9-COA-R3-CV VS. ) ) CREAD CLIFTON and wife , TAMELA ) CLIFTON, as next of kin for their minor ) son, WILLIAM (KYLE) CLIFTON , )

) Defendants/App

ellants/Cross-App

ellees. ) )

______________________________________________________________________________ From the Chancery Court of Davidson County a t Nashville. Honorable Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor
J. Page Garrett , Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Nashville, Tennessee Attorney fo

r Defendants/Ap

pellants/Cross-Ap

pellees. Michael R. Jennings , Lebanon, Tennessee Attorney fo

r Plaintiff/Appell

ee/Cross-Appell

ant.

OPINION FIL

ED: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FARMER, J. CRAWFORD, P.

J., W.S. : (Concurs) HIGHERS, J. : (Concurs)1 For the curren t version of t

he IDEA, see 20 U.S.C .A. §§ 1400– 1487 (West 200 0). Creadand Tamela Clifton , on behalf of the

ir minor son, William Kyle Clifton, appeal the trial court’s judgment denying their request for prejudg ment interest on a reimbursement award andan attorney ’s fee award e ntered in their f avor pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The Wilson County School System also has appealed, contending that the trial court erred (1) in granting the Cliftons’ claim for reimbursement, and (2) in awar ding the Clif

tons’ attorney’sfees based upon the court’s ruling tha t the Cliftons were t

he prevailing p

arty in this litigation. After careful

ly reviewing the record, we affirm the trial cou rt’ s ju dgme nt i n it s en tir ety.

I. The Individuals with D isabilities Education Ac

t (IDEA)

The Cliftons brought this action against theWilson County School System pursuant to the Individual s with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 1 Before setting forth the factual and proceduralhistory of this case, we find it useful to outline some of the ba sic purposes and requirements

of the IDEA. In enacting the IDEA, Congress intended, inter alia , “to ensure that a ll children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and p repare them f

or employment

and independent living.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (West 2000). To this end, the IDEA requires public school districts to develop a curriculum “tailored to the unique needs of the [disabled] child by means of an ‘individualized educational program’” (IEP). Cleveland HeightsUniv. He ights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss , 144 F.3d 3 91, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1 998) (quot ing Board of Educ. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1982)).

An IEP is “the wri

tten statement whic

h sets out an educa

tional program t

o meet the particularizedneeds of a child w ith disabil

ities.” Tennessee Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardat ion v. Paul B. , 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th Cir. 1996). The IEP’s “deve

lopme nt an d implementation . . . are the cornerstones of the [IDEA].” Id . Among other thin gs, each I EP must set forth “the child’s cur

rent a bilities, a descri

ption of the servic

es to be provided,

and progress2 The current version of the IDEA provides that an IEP m ust contain, inter alia , the following elements: (i) a statement of the child’s present levels o f educational performance, . . . (ii) a statement of measurable annual g oals, including benchmarks or short-term objectives, . . . (iii) a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and serv ices to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement of th e program modifications or supports for school personnel that will be prov ided for the child . . . (iv) an explanation

of the extent,

if any, to w

hich the child will not participate with nondisabled children in the re gular class . . .

. . . . (vi) the projected date for the beginning of the s ervices and modificatio ns describe d in clause (i ii), and the a nticipate d frequency, location, and duration of those services and modifications;

. . . . (viii) a statement of – (I) how the child’s progress toward the annu al goals described in clause (ii) will be m easured; and (II) how the child’ s parents will be regularly informed . .

. of . . . [th

eir child’s prog

ress]. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1) (A) (West 2000)
. goals.” Wise v. Ohio Dep’t of Edu c. , 80 F.3 d 177, 183 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(20)). 2

The IDEA requirespublic school distr icts to ensure tha

t children with

disabilities are educated “to the maximum extent appropriate” with nondisabled children. Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d455, 460 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1108 (1994); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (West 2000). In t

his way, Congres s has state d a “very strong” p reference for “mainstrea ming” disabled children by

placing them in

regular classes where feasible. Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d at 460. Nevert heless, th is “mainst reaming” requirement is not absolute, and courts have recognized that mainstreaming is

not required in every case. Id
. Instead, the proper inquiry remains whether the proposed placement is appropriate under the IDEA. Id
.

Under the IDEA, pare

nts who complain

about the adequacy of their child’s IEP may request an impartial due process hearing to be conducted by the local educational agency. See 20U.S.C.A. § 1415(f) (West 2000). If the parents are dissatisfied with the results of

the due process hearin g, the parents may appeal to the state educational agenc y, which is required to cond uct a n impartial review of the local educational agency’ s decision. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(g) (West 2000). After exhausting the state’s administrative procedures, the parents may

bring a civil ac

tion in state court or federal district court. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2) (West 2000).

If the parents ultimately pursue such a civil action, the trial court is require d to use
a modified de novo standard for reviewing the decision of the stat e education al agency. Peck v. Lansing Sch. Dist. , 148 F.3d 619, 625 ( 6thCir. 1998); Doe v. Metropolita n Nashville Pub. Sch. , 133 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998). This standard requires the trial court to conduct an independent reexamination of the evidence. Renner v. Board of Educ. , 185 F.3d 635, 641 (6th Cir. 1999). In conducting its review, however, the trial court must give “due weight” to the state administrative pr

oceedings and,

specifically

, to the findings and determinations of the hearing officer or the administrative law judge who heard the case. Peck , 148 F.3d at 625-3 6; Doe v . Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Sch. , 133 F.3d at 388; Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ. , 932 F.2d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1991). This deferen ce to the final decisions of state authorities

is required beca

use “courtsare general

is ts with no expertise in the ed ucational needs o

f [disabled] childre

n, and will benefit from the factfinding of a state agency with expertise in the field.” Renner , 185 F.3d at 641 (quoting Doe v. Smith , 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 1025 (1990)). Due to their technical expertise, “administrative agencies are traditionall y better sui

ted to make these types of determinations.” Babb v. Knox County Sch. Sy s. , 965 F.2d 104, 107 ( 6th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 941 (1992).

In co nstruing the IDEA’s requirement of a free appropria te public education, the federalcourts repeatedly have emphasized that public scho ol s are not required to maximize a disabled student’s educational potential. Renner v. Board of Educ. , 185 F.3d 635, 644 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1108 (1994); Cordrey v. Euckert , 917 F.2d 1460, 1473-74 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 499 U.S. 938 (1991); Brimmer v. Traverse City Ar ea Pub. Sch. , 872 F. Supp. 447, 454 (W.D. M i ch. 1994). Public schools need only

(1) comply with the IDEA’s procedura l requirements, and (2) develop an IEP that is “reasonably

calculated to en

able the child to receive educational benefits.” Renner , 185 F.3d at644; Babb , 965 F.2d at 107; Cordrey , 917 F.2d at 1464. I n this regard, the IDEA requires only that public schools “provide children with disabilities an appropriate education, not the ver y best po ssible special education services.” Wise v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ. , 80 F.3d 177, 185 (6th Cir. 1996); accord Cordrey , 917 F.2d at 1474. The IDEA “provides no more than a ‘basic f loor o f opportunity.’” Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d at 459 ( quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982)); see also Walczak v. Florida Un ion Free Sch. Dist. , 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 199 8) (noting that IEP need not maximize child’s potential, offer superi or opportunities, or provide optimal level of services).

Nevertheless,

in order to be “ap

propriate,” the

educational ben

efits provided by the school district must be more than de minimis
. Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d at 459. The “ basic floor of opportunity

” provided by

the IDEA shou

ld consist of “access to specialized instruction and related ser vic es w hic h are ind ivi dua lly d es igned” to “confer some educational benefit” upon the disab led child. Rowley , 458 U.S. at 201. Thu s, the IEP prop

osed by the s

chool distric

t shoul d provide an opportunity for “meaningful” and not merely “tr

ivial” advancem

ent. Walczak , 142 F.3d at 130; see also Bonnie Ann F. v. Calall en Indep. Sch. Dist. , 835 F. Sup p. 340, 346

(S.D. Tex. 1993) (indicating that, although IDEA does not require school district to attempt to maximize each child’s potent ia l, educational benefit provided to child must be “meaningful”), aff’d , 40 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1084 (1995).

If the parents unilaterally place their child in a private program

pending the outc

ome of the administrative and judicial review process, the parents may seek retroactive reimbursement for educational expenses and related services under the IDEA. Babb v. Knox County Sch. Sy s. , 965 F.2d104, 107 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 9 41 (1992) (c iting School Comm. v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Educ. , 471 U.S. 359, 3 69 (19 85)). In such a case, however, the parents have the burden of proving by a prepon

derance of the

evidence that the

proposed IEP w

as “inadequate,” “inappr opriate,”
or “improper” and, further, that the private school placement was “pro per” or “ appropriate.” Rennerv. Board

of Educ. , 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th C ir. 1999); Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Sch. , 133 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998); Wise v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ. , 80 F.3d 177, 184 (6th C

ir. 1996); Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d4 55, 458 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1108 (1994) ; Babb v. Knox County Sch. Sys. , 965 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir.), cert.3 See Tenn. Code An n. § 49-10

-102(1) (19

90).
4 An M-Team

consists of “a

group of ind

ividuals, inc

luding educa

tors and med

ical profession

als with knowledge of a child’s cond ition, who are required to develop an I ndividualized Educational Program or

IEP . . . , specifying

the necessary

special educat

ion and related

services whi

ch the child needs in order to receive a free appropriate pu blic education.” Tennessee Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Paul B. , 88 F.3d 146 6, 1471 (6th C

ir. 1996) (citi

ng 34 C.F. R. §§ 300.34

0–350). denied , 506 U.S. 941 (1992) ; Doe v. Defendant I , 898 F.2d 1 186, 1 191 (6 th Ci r. 199 0). In accordance

with the foregoing authorities, the parents do not meet this burden merely by proving that the private facility

provided their child with superior services. Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d at 459. Rather, the parents

first must prove that the public school was “unable to provide [their] child with an appropriate education.” Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ. , 932 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1991).

II. Factual and Proce

dural History of the Clif

tons’ IDEA Claim

The present dispute focu ses on the Wil son County School System’s efforts to develop
an appropriate

IEP for the Clif

tons’ son, Ky

le. Prior to his sec

ond birthday

, Kyle was diagnosed as having a bilateral hearing impairment, and he was fitted for a hearing aid. As a result of his hearing impairment,Kyle’s development of receptive and expressive language was delay ed. For purposes of these proceedings, the parties did not dispute that Kyle had a disability and that he was entitled to special educati

on services in ac

cordance with

the IDEA. The

parties also did

not dispute that Ky

le became eligible to rec

eive these services when he reached the age of four years on March 23, 1990. 3

Prior to Kyle’s fourth birthday, Ky le’s mother, Tamela Clifton, contacted the Wilson County School System to inquire about providing special education services for Kyle. In response to this request, the School System assembled an initial M-Team 4 meeting for

Kyle in February 1990. At this meeti ng, School System representativeslearned that Kyle also suffered from dy spraxia and that this condition might have further delayed his speech and language development. The condition hadbeen tentatively diagnosed by the staf f of the Bill Wilkerso

n Hearing and Sp

eech Center in Nashvil le, where Kyle

was a student, and

the diagnosis lat

er was confirme

d by Dr. Russe

ll Jac k Love, a speech and lan

guage patholo

gist. Dr. Lov

e explain ed that dyspraxia was a movement disorder and that, more specifically, dyspraxia of speech w as an inability to plan and sequence the5 The evidence indicated that an FM auditory trainer was a system worn by Kyle and his teacher that overrode other noises in the room when the teacher spoke. movements

of speech. TheBill Wilkerson Center’s staff first suspected that Kyle had this condition when they observed that he did not move his mouth when he spoke.

The M-Team met on at least two subsequent occasions, once in March 1990 and again in May 1990. Du

ring this proces s, School Syste m employees

attempted to

addressconcerns raised by the Cliftons and, at each meeting, they proposed an I EP that they hoped would a ssuage the Cliftons’ concerns . Despite these efforts, at the conclusion of each meeting, the Cliftons rejected the proposed IEP

as unacceptable, and they ultimately requested a due process hearing in acc ordance with the IDEA. Pending

the administrative proceedings that followed, Kyle remained a student at the Bill Wilkerson Cente

r. Consequently

, in addition to chal

lenging the Sch

ool System’s f

inal IEP, the Cliftons sought reimbursement for theexpense of educating Kyle at the Bill Wilkerson Center.

The final IEP proposed by the School Sy stem in May 1990 is the subject of th is dispute. In this

IEP, the School

System offe

red Kyle th

e following spec

ial education ser

vices:

1. Placement in special education classroom taught by B everly Mai nla nd t hree days per w eek, six hou rs p er da y; 2. Use of FM auditory trainer 5 at school; 3. Classroomassistance of deaf e du cator Chris Refse th thirty minutes per week; 4. Sp eechand language therapy provided by Jane Ann Elrod thr ee da ys pe r wee k, t hir ty mi nut es p er da y; 5. Audiology evaluation three times per y ear; and 6. Occupational therapy evaluation.

In July 1990, Michael Dover, the School System’s Direc tor of Sp ecial Education Services, wrote a letter to

the Cliftons in which he summarized the Sc hool System’s

May 1990 I

EP. In addition to describing the foregoing services, Dover indicated that the School System w

ould “also take [deaf educator Chri s Refseth’s] advice regar ding physical changes in the classroom environment needed to enhance Ky

le’s ability

to learn and [would

] make those

modifications immediately upon6 The September 1990 due process hearing did not result in a decision because the ALJ presidin g over the hearing subsequently rec used himself. The Comm issioner of the Tennessee Department of Education assigned the case to another A LJ, who conducted a hearing on the m erits in April 1991. her rec ommendation. ” Although the Clif tons previously

had voiced speci

fic objections ab

out certain physical characteristics of the classroom proposed for Kyle, Dover ’s letter did not i ndicate what physical changes Refseth had advised or what modifications the School System proposed to make.

At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), 6 Mrs. Clifton explained
someof t he reasons the Cliftons rejected the final IEP proposed by the School System for Kyle. After describing the classroom proposed for Kyle, Mrs. Clifton explained her o bjections t

o the room’s acoustic c

onditions:

What I observed about the classroom first on initial impact, was the size of the room. It w as very big. It had very large ceilings. There was no carpet, there [were] no curtains on the windows. . . .

. . . . Well, the reason that th

ere is a problem w

ith a large room and high ceilings is

b ecause acoustically that’s not correct for hear ing impairedchildren. On parents’ terms and mother’s terms, Kyle does nothear a s well i n a large room. There is more roo

m for noises. Carpet is alw ays applied in hearin g impaired child

ren’s rooms because it j u st kee ps the sound – just makes it lo uder f or the m. It makes the [teacher’s] vo

ice – it makes – it just sort of closes in the room, an d so it really he lped them talk. The

re was also an ai

r conditioning unit that was going on and off during this time because Kyle has – or heating

unit – I’m not sur

e whic h. Be cause Kyle has normal hearing in

the low frequency, normal to a mild loss, he’s very sensitive to a low frequency sound. Soeverytime

that furnace ca

me on, Kyle said, I hear it, I

hear it. And I have talked to Wilson County about this matter. They said while Kyle was in the classr oom they would just turn the furnace off so he wouldn’t have that problem.

Mrs. Clifton also complained that the classroom’s visually stimulating appearance andthe teacher’s i

nst ructional methods w ere designed for special education c hildren and not hearingim paired childr en. In additio n to expressing co

ncern over the te

acher’s lack of

experience with hearing-impaired children, Mrs. Clifton explained:

But the other thing is bec ause it was v ery visually stim ulating. When you work with he ar ing impaired chi ldren, you d

o not try to visually stimulate them. The

y don’t nee

d to have – for themost part, andfor Kyle, the individual we’re talking about, he doesn’t haveemot i onal or lack of environmental needs, that he [doesn’t] see things, so he doesn’t nee

d to be visuall

y stimulated. How they [the BillWilkerson Center’ s staff] work with hi m mostly is to develop his auditory skills. They put

their hands over t

heir mouth when they

talk to him to make sure he’s listening, and not so he can look at all these things.

. . . .

. . . And I had so

me problems w

ith the way the class was taught because it was vi

sually stimu

lating, and because it was designed for th

esechildren and not for a hearing impaired child, the lan guag e – t he p art of l angu age w as o nly a minor part of their class. They’d had A-B-C time, they had language time, they had math time, they had this time, and they had that time, so l angua ge wa s on ly a small part, whereas, with a hearing impair

ed child, they

need to just have all the speech and language that they can possibly have.

The Clift ons’ o bjections were supported by several educators who testified on the Cliftons’ behalf. Mary Ann Schaffer, the director of the Bill Wilkerson Center’searly intervention program,had a master’s de gree in speech and language pathology . Schaffer described observations that she made of th

e proposed class

room during a Ma

y 1990 visit:

T he classroom was very large and very noisy. There was an a

i r conditioning unit that ran continuously during the time that I was in the classroom,and every once in a while it would kind of kick in and become even louder. And the classroom was not carpeted, the room echoed, there were very high open ceilings, the r e were a lot of windows without drapes, and it was a very stimulating classroom.

Schaffer explained why these physical charac teristics presented problems for a hearing-impaired child like Kyle:

One of the necessities for educating a hearing impaired child is that we look at their deficit, which is that they have difficulty he aring, and if you put them in an environment wher e it makes it almost impossible

for them to hear, you’re not going to get a lot of

input into t he child. So one of the first things that we look for in s erving a hearing impaired child is that they be in an acoustica

lly comforta

ble environment. And there are a lot of things tha t can be done to a classroom,like using drap es , carpeting, c orkboard, things like that, that will absorb the sound.

In addition t o the foregoi ng c oncerns, Sc haffer opined that the proposed classroom setting was inappropriate

for Kyle for another reason. The teache r of the comprehen sive d evelopmentclassroom,Beverly M ainland, was a

special education teacher, but she was not trained to work with hearing-impaired children.

Simi l ar concerns were expressed by Tracy Jo Duncan Burkhardt, the regional coordinator

for the Tennessee

Infant Parent Program. Burkhardt, who had a master’s de gree in deaf education, testified that the comprehensive development classroom in which the Sch oo l System proposedto place Kyle “was an exceptional classroom as far as [she] was concerned in terms of what it offer[ed] for comprehensive developmental delays.” Burkha rdt did not believe, however, that the classroom

was appropriate for

a hearing-impaired child. Burkhardt pointed out that the classroom teacher’s expertise was in special education. Burkhardt also explained that the classroom’s language curriculum,

which was designed for special education children rather than for hear ing-imp aired children, was not appropriate for Kyle:

I felt lik e the language approach that they we re using should be completely

redirecte d in terms of Kyle, that they needed to use a different type of approach, and I

recommended some

approaches in terms of a language curriculum that would be more appropriate for a hearing impaired child.

The Cliftons also called Beverly Mainland, the teacher o f the comprehensive development

classroom,as a wit

ness. Mainland tes

tified that she had

a bachelor’s de

gree in elementary

education, with a concentration in special education. During her ten-year teaching career, Mainland had taught several hearing-impaired children, but she wasnot certified in deaf education
or speech and language pathology . Mainland ha d no ex perience teaching dyspraxic children, and any familiarity

that she had with dy

spraxia was devel

o ped t hrough her con

tact with the Clifton

s. Mainland was not familiar with a ny particul

ar instructional m

ethods or approa

ches that should

be used when teaching

dysp raxic chi ldren. Mainland provided the following physical description of her classroom:

The ceilings are high, the walls – my room is basically the sameas it was [in May 1990]. We had added – I have a carpe t in the toy corner. I have a central air unit, but that can be cut off and on at our discretion. We hav

e a lot of things on

the wall, colorfu

l t h ings and stimulating things.In defending its May 1990 IEP, the School System presented the testimony of, inter alia , Lynn Sewell, an educational specialist who worked for the School System’s special education department,

and Ch ris Ref seth (now Chris Lewis), the School System’s deaf education teac her. Lynn Sewell testified

that, by the time the second M-Team meeting took place in March 1990, the School System was aware of the classroom’s acoustical problems and the nee d to m ak e modifications:

There was a lot of discussion at this M-Team and prior

to this M-Team, observations of the classroom, so we had been informed of the acoustics and

how that might affect Kyle. And at this M-Team, one o f the responsibilit

ies that we had wa

s also to address tha t concern. Our recommendation was ultimately that one time a week our person that’s in charge of deaf education, Chris Refseth, that she meet with – she meet

with the teacher, wit h the speech and language therapist and observ e Kyle. But one of her responsibilities and one of the go als that was written at the M-Team was for Chris to tell us what we needed to do to

acoustically

treat the room, be

cause it does have very high

ceilings, and the

air conditioner

made more noise, and this room is – this room als o, we had been tol

d that it was visually very distract ing, and we understood that, because this room is very highly dec orated. So at this M-Team we were aware of

the need to acoustically

attend to the room, and Chris had experience and h a d somet rai ning in those areas, so she was the person that we recommended advise us.
Although Sewell’s testimony demonstrated tha

t the School Sy

ste m was aware of specific problems with the classroom’s acoustics and appearance as early as March 1990, neither the School System’s Ma

rch 19 90 IEP nor its May 1990 IEP proposed spec ific modifications to the classroom. Sewell testified that such modifications were incl uded as a “goal” on both the March 1990 IEP and the May 1990 IEP, but she a cknowledged that

the School System provided nospecifics
as to how these problems would be remedied. Sewell first defended this failure to provide specifics
on the fact that, at the M a rch 1990 M-Team m eeting, Chris Ref

seth had not y

et visited Bever

ly Mainland’s classroom. Sewel l late r defended the Sc

hool System’s

failure to make sp

ecific proposal

s
on the fact that the S chool System h ad “not yet h

ad permission to

serve Kyle

, so there [had] been no implementation of any of the goals written, so there would have been no c hanges.” Wh en Chris Refseth testified, she indicated that she was qualified and willing to make recommendations to the School System concerning any ne cessary classroom

modifications. The School System presented
no testimony, ho

wever, as to

any specif

ic modifications that Refseth had recommended or that theSchool S ystem had agreed to implement to make the classroom a more appropr iate instructional setting for Kyle.

On June 17, 1991, the ALJ entered a final order that granted prospective injunctive relief in that it directed the School System to make availa ble an IEP con

taining the compo

nents outlined in the ALJ’s orde r, the School Sy

stem’s proposed Ma

y 1990 IE P, and the School System’s correspondence

and representations to the Cliftons. In this regard, the ALJ’s final order directed the School System to “provide the necessary r elatedservices, including but not limited to, modification of the facilities to create an acoustically treated environment” a nd, further, to “provide qu alified professionals to ‘appropriately’ address [Ky le’s] hearing, speech, and language impairments.”

In addition to

directing the School System to develop an appropriate IEP, the AL J’s final order

granted the Clif

tons’ claim

for reimbursement for the expense of educating Kyle at the BillWilkerson Center from March 23, 1990, Kyle ’s fourth birthda y, until June 17,

1991, the date of the ALJ’s ord

er. Despite the Cl

iftons’ success

on their reimbursement claim, the ALJ declared the School Syste m to be the p revailing p arty in this action. The ALJ supported this ruling by reasoning that “present placem ent,” rat her than reimbursement, was “the issue of paramount concern” in this litigation.

As permitted by the IDEA, the School System sought review of

the ALJ’s final order byfiling a petition in the trial court. The record indicates that the trial court affirmed the A LJ’ s decision by a judgment entered on October 2, 1992; however, the October 1992 judgment does not appear in the record. The School System then appealed the trial court’ s judgment to this court.

The first time this

case was appe aled, this court reman ded it for fu rther procee dings because the October 1992 judgment was not a final judgment. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). In April 1994, the trial court en

tered a final judgment , and this case again was appealed. On the second appeal to this court, rather than deciding the case on the merits, this court vacated the trialcourt’s judgment and remanded the case for t he ALJ to sup plement hi s final ord er with addi tional fin dings of fact and conclusions of law in accor da nce with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-3-1287 Section 27- 3-128 auth orizes the ap

pellate court in all cases, where, in its opinion, com plete justice cannot be had by reason of some defect in the record, w ant of proper parties, or oversight without culpable negligence, rem and the cause to the court below for further proceedings, with proper directions to e ffectuate the objects of the order, and

upon such ter

ms as may

be deemed r

ight. Tenn. Code An

n. § 27-3- 128 (1980). (1980). 7 Wilson County Sch. Sys. v. Clifton , No. 01A01-9604-CH-00152, 1996 WL 656109, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1996) ( no perm. app. filed ). In November 1997, the ALJ entered a revised final order that attempted to address some of the concerns expressed in this court’s opinion.

Upon review of the ALJ’s revised f inal order, the trial court ruled that the preponderance

of the eviden ce supported the ALJ’s findings that the School System’s I EP was inappropriate

and that the Bill Wilkerson Center placement

was appropriate. Accordingly, the trial
c ourt uphel d the ALJ’s decision to grant the Cliftons’ claim for reimbursement in the amount of $12,058.32. O n the other hand, the trial court did not uphold the ALJ’s finding that the School System was the prevailing party. The court reasoned that the Cliftons prevailed on a significant issue in this litigation when the ALJ granted their claim for reimbursement. In a subsequent order, the trial court awarded attorney’s

fees to the Cliftons’ attorneys in the total amount of $18,069.25. The court deniedthe Clift ons’ reques t for prejud gm ent inter est. Both parties appealed the trial court’s judgment, and this appeal is again before this court for review.

III. The Cliftons’ Claim f or Reimbursement Under the IDEA

After carefully reviewing the e

vidence presen

ted at th e admini strative hearing, we agree with the trial court that

the evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that the School System’s I EP
was inappropriate a

nd that the Bill Wilk

erson Center placemen

t was appropriate. The Cliftons’ witnesses testified to numerous physical problems with the proposed classroom, including the high ceiling, the loud heating and cooling unit,

the lack of carpeting, drapery, corkboard, and other soundabsorbing materials, and the plethora of visua

lly stimulating

materials. Although the School System claimedto have addressed these problems in its final IEP, notably, the Sch o ol System’s own witnesses acknowledged that the May 1990 I EP failed to propose any

specific modifications to the8 In this regard, we note that Tenne ssee’s own special education statutes provided that [p]hysical aspects and specifications of schools, c lassrooms and other facilities

for, or likel

y to be used by, [children with disabilit

ies], shall be related to their special physical, education al and psychological needs. To this end, school districts, special education services associations, agencies of t he state and its

subdivision

s, and any p

rivate persons or entities constructing, renovating or repairing facilities with or aided by pub

lic funds, whi

ch facilities ar

e expressly i

ntended for or

are likely to be used by [children w ith disabilities], shall plan, locate, design, construct, equip and maintain them with due regard for the special capabilities, [

disabilities] an

d requiremen

ts of the [child

ren with disabilities] to be accommodated therein. Tenn. Code An

n. § 49-10

-103(f) (19

90). classroom. 8 The only con crete sugge

stion made by

the School Sys

tem was t hat the teacher

could turn off the heating and cooling unit while Kyle was in the classroom. The School Sy stem did not indicate how it proposed to control the classroom’s climate if the heatingand cooling unit was turned off during the si

x hours per day

that Kyle wa

s scheduled to be in

the classroom.

In a ddition to attesting

to the classroom’s

physical de

ficiencies, the

Cli ftons ’ witnesses testified that the classroom’s curriculum and instructional methods were inappropriate for Kyle. Beverly Mainland’s comprehensive development classroom offered a general curriculum for special educati

on students. The classroom’s curriculum was not designed for hearing-impaired or dyspraxic children, and it did not emphasize the speech an d language instruction needed by Ky le. Moreover, Mainland had not received formal training or certification in the areas of deaf education
or s peec h an d la ngua ge pa tho logy.

In our view, the defici encies attested to in the present c

ase are similar t

o those observed in T.H. v. Board of Education , 55 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838-43 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed , 202 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1999). In that case, T.H. was diagnosed as having autism. T.H. , 55 F. Supp. 2d at 836. At

the administrative

hearing, the e

vidence showed th

at T.H. had “the c

apacity to acquire
new s ki lls when the educa tional environmen

t [was] free from di

stractions and wh

en there [was] continuous intervention by an adult trained to focus [T.H.’s] attention on an appropriate exercise.” Id
. at 837-38. The sch

ool district propose

d placing T.H. in

a cross-categ

oric al classroom four mornings per week for sessions lasting two and one-half hours each. Id . at 839.Autism experts who testified at the hearing opined that the cr os s-categorical classroom

was not an appropriate setting for T.H.’s training. Id . at 839. One expert , Dr. Luce, testified that early

training for ch

ildren with autism sh

ould take place in

a setting where distractions
were minimized. Id . T.H.’s mother testified that T.H. was bothered by singing and loud noises, and she was convinced “that the highly stimu

lating classroo

m setting would mak

e it difficult

for [T.H.] to learn.” Id
.

The early childhood program in which the

school district proposed placing T.H. was notspecifical ly designed t o meet the needs of autistic children. Id . at 838. Another expert, Dr. Lorber, visited the school district’s early childhood classrooms. Id . During his vi si ts, Dr. Lorber observed “that the teache

rs could not descr

ibe or easily

discuss their appr

oach to teaching autist

ic childre n.” Id . In fact, the school district “di

d not present a sing

le early c hildhood te acher wit

h significant training in the education of autistic children.” Id . at 838 n.9.

Yet another expert, Dr. Leventhal, tes tified tha t T.H. neede d “a fairly high student/teacher ratio and . . . a lot of complex and coordinated intervention between language and communication people, behavioral management people as well as social skills development folks.” Id
. a t 839. In D r. Leventhal’s opinion, the placement proposed by the school district lac ked sufficient individual programming and structure to benefit T.H. Id . at 840.

In the pre sent case , the evidence showed that Kyle needed the benefits of an acoustically-treated

classroom containing minimal visual distractions. Instead, the School System proposedplacing Kyle in a special education classroom that the Schoo l System’s o

wn witnesses acknowledged

was not acoustically-treated, was equipped with an intermittently noisy heating and cooling unit, and was highly decorated.

Educators who testified on behalf of the Cliftons at the hearing opined that the proposedclassroom setting was not appro priate for Kyle. In addition to the noise and visual di stractions, th ese educators observed that the instructional methods employed in the classroom were designed for special education students, b ut not for hearing-impaired students. Whereas the9 Although the evidence supported the Cliftons’ claim that the School Sys tem’s May 1990 IEP was inappropr

iate for Kyle, we reject the Cli ftons’ contenti

on that the I

EP was inadeq

uate because it lacked “any intermediate objective goal sheets for charting the child’s prog ress.” In evaluating this ty pe of alleged procedural deficiency, courts h ave adopted a harmless error analy sis. See Cleveland HeightsUniv. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss , 144 F.3d 39 1, 399 (6th C ir. 1998); Doe v. Defen

dant I , 898 F.2d 1186, 1190-

91 (6th Cir. 1 990); Moubry v. Independent Sch. Dist. 696 , 9 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102-04 (D. Minn. 1998); Logue v. Shawnee Mission Pub. Sc h. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512 , 959 F. Supp. 1338, 1349 (D. Kan. 1997), aff’d , 153 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 1998). Here, the Cliftons’ brief fails to explain how th ey were prejudiced by the IEP’s failure to include “intermediate objective goal shee ts.”
10 In its decision, the court cited a 1992 policy guidance of the United Sta tes Department of Education, which suggested that p ublic school systems have no t adequately considered “the unique communication and related needs” of many deaf children in dev eloping IEP’s for them. Brougham , 823 F. Supp. at 17 (q uoting Deaf Students Education Services Policy G uidance , 57 Fed. Reg. 49,274 (1992)). comprehe nsive development classroom offered a multi-subject curriculum, Kyle needed a curriculu m that consistently

emphasized and re

inforced his spee

ch and languag

e development.

Moreover, the classroom teacher, B everly Mai nland, had limited experience teaching hearin g-impaire d children, a nd she was no t certified in deaf educa tion or spe ech and langu age pat hol ogy. Mainland candidly admitted that she had no experience teaching dyspraxic children and that she was u nfami liar w ith i nstru ction al met hods u sed to teach child ren wi th dysp raxi a. In contrast, the evidenceshowed that none of these problems existed at the Bill Wilkerson Center and that Kyle’s placement there was appropriate. 9

By way of comparison, we not e that the I EP approved in Brougham v. Town of Yarmouth , 823 F. Supp. 9 (D. Me. 1993), contained many of the elements that the witnesses testified
were lacking in this ca

se. In that ca

se, the evidence

showed that Travis, a t hirteen-year-old deaf student, had been delayed by a s much as four or fiveyears in his speech and language de velopment due to his hearing impairment. Brougham , 823 F. Supp . at 11. The IEP proposed by the school sys temincluded placement in a classroom of seven children, two of whom also had h earin g impairments. Id . at 18. The class room teacher wa s a teacher of the deaf who taught speech and language to high school an d middle sch ool students. Id . at 18 n.9. The teacher’s instructional methods emphasized language development so that Travis would receive “the intensive linguis

tic focus” that he required. Id . at 17. After considering these elements, the court concluded that the proposedIEP satisfie d the IDEA’s req uirement o f providin g a free appropriate edu

cation to Travis. Id . at 18. 10Sim ila rly, in Bonnie Ann F. v. Calallen Independent School District , 835 F. Supp.

340, 347 (S.D. Tex. 1993), aff’d , 40 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1084 (1995),
a c ase involving a three-year-old hearing -impaired child, the court approved a placement tha t containedthe following co mponents. Along w

ith five other hea

ring-imp aired c hildren, Bonnie attendedRegional Day

School for the Deaf classes at a public elementary school. Bonnie Ann F. , 835 F. Supp. at 343. The classroom teacher held certificates in s peec h pa tho logy, speech and hearing therapy, and deaf education. Id . The major elements of Bonnie’s educational program were

la ngua ge developmen t, speech de velopment , auditory trai ning, preschool read

iness activities, a

nd motor developme

nt.

. . . [The teacher] provided Bonnie with individual auditory training and spe ech t hera py f or a short period of time during the school day. She the

n reinforced an

d inte gr ated these lessons t hroughout the day. Lang

uage development training was incorporated in daily cla

ss activities.

Id
. This classroom speech and language training was supplemented with the services of one of the school district’s speechtherapis ts, who pro vided Bonni e with indi vidual spe ech and langu age therapy for forty-five minutes per week. Id
. After reviewing these components, the court held that “the IEP developed f or Bonnie th rough the IDEA’s pr ocedures was re

asonably c

alculated to ena

ble her to receive educational benefits.” Id . at 347.

On appeal, the School System insists that, contrary to the ALJ’s explicit findings as to the imp rop rie ty of the May 1 990 IEP, the ALJ i mpl ici tly m ust have found the IEP to be appropriate

because he ordered the School System to implement a new IEP

that contained the

same components. We di sagree . The A LJ ’s f inal order did not m

erely orde

r the School Sy

stem to implementan IEP contain ing the same comp

onents as its May 1990 IEP. The ALJ also ordere d the School System to inclu

de in its IEP the components outlined in the ALJ’s fin al o rder . Sp eci fic all y, the AL J ordered the Schoo l System to “pr

ovide the necess

ary relat ed services, inc

luding but no t limited to, modification of the facilities to create an acoustically

treated environment” and, further, to “pro vid e qu ali fie d pr ofes sio nal s to ‘app rop ria tel y’ address [Ky le’s] hearing, spe ech, and lan guage impairments.” Inasmuch as these components related directly to the deficiencies in the May 1990 IEP identified by the Cliftons’ witnesses, we conclude that the ALJ’s order requir ed t he Sc hool11 At the administrative hearing, th e evidence indicated that, at the beginn ing of the 1990-91 school year,

a more appr

opriate classro

om placem

ent develope

d when the Sc

hool System

added a third early intervention classroom to its cu rriculum. This class was taught by Dorothy Swan, who had a d ual endorsement from the state of Tennessee in both special education and speech and lang uage pathology. The classr oom was in a new sch ool buildin g, and its acous tic design was more appropria te for heari ngimpaired children than the classroom proposed in the May 1990 IE P. In fact, one of the students enrolled in the class was hearing-im paired. The evidence was undisputed, ho wever, that the School System never offered the Cliftons an IEP proposing this placement for Kyle. System to provide important services that exceeded the leve l of services proposed by the School System. 11
IV. The Cliftons’ Request for Attorney ’s Fees Under the ID EA

In light of our affirmance of the trial court’s judgment orderi ng the School System to reimburse the Cliftons the sum of $12,058.32 for Kyle’s education at the Bill Wilkerson Center from March 1990 to June 19

91, we likewise af

firm the trial cou

rt’s decision to

award the Cliftons’ attorney’sfees incurred

in pursuing this action. The IDEA authorizesthe trial court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the par en t s of a disabled child when they are the prevailing party in an IDEA action. See 20 U .S. C.A . § 1 415 (i) (3) (B) ( Wes t 20 00) . To be a “ prev ail ing p art y” under the IDEA, the parents must succeed on at least one significant issue in the litigation, and they must obtain at least some relief on the merits of their claim. Payne v. Board of Educ. , 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996); Phelan v. Bell , 8 F.3d 369, 373 (6th

Cir. 1993). One way to demonstrate such
successis by

obtaining anenforceable judgment against the school district. Payne , 88 F.3d at 397. Thus, the trial court, in its discretion, may award attorney’ s fees to parents who prevail on a c

laim for reimbursement under the IDEA. See, e.g. , M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ. , 56 F. Supp. 2d 243, 260 (D. Conn. 1999); Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Dep’t of Educ. , 969 F. Supp. 801, 815 (D.P.R. 1997); Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 , 919 P.2d 334, 343 (Idaho 1996).

In the present case, the pri mary issue before the ALJ and the trial court was the propriety of the IEP proposed f

or Kyle by

the School Sys

tem. In order

to prevail on their claim for reimbursement,

the Cliftons had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposedIEP

was “inadequate,” “inappropriate,” or “improper” and, further, that Kyle’s placement at the Bill Wilkerson Center was “proper” or “appropriate.” Rennerv. Board of Educ. , 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Metropolitan Nashvill e Pub. Sch. , 133 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.),cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998); Wise v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ. , 80 F.3d 177, 184 (6th Cir. 1996);

Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1108 (1994 ); Babb v. Knox County Sch. Sys. , 965 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S
. 941 (1992); Doe v. Defendant

I , 898 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1990). The Cliftons met this burden and , co nse que ntl y, obtaineda judgment ordering the School System to reimburse them for Ky le’s past educational expenses at the Bill Wilkerson Center. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court’s ruling that the Cliftons were the prevailing party, and we hold that the trial cour

t did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Cliftons’ attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing this action.

We also affirm the trial cour t’s decision as to the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. Like the trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees, the determination of the amount of attorney’s fees

to be awarded is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Chaille v. Warren , 635 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Preston Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Kilgore , 525 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). In the court below, the School System raised specific objections to some of the hours c

laimed by the

Cliftons’ attorneys in their affidavits submitted in support of the Cl iftons’ request for atto rney’s fe es. The trial cour

t’s final judgmen

t awarding th

e Cliftons ’ attorney’sfees indicated that the cour t properly c onsidered each

of these objectio

ns but that, ultimately, the court found the claimed hours to be reasonable.

On appeal, the School System again contends that the hours claimed

by the Clifton

s’ attorney’swere excessive. Our review of this issue is hampered, however, by the fact that the record
on appeal contains neither a transcript of the hearing on the Cliftons’ request for attorney’s fees nor the affidavits submitt

ed by th e Cliftons’ attorneys in support of their fee request. Pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant bears the burden of preparing “a transcript of such part of the evidenceor proceeding s as is necessary

to convey a

fair, accurat

e and complete account of what transpire

d with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b); see also Johnson v. Hardin , 926 S.W.2d 236, 239 (T enn. 1996); Nickas v. Capadalis , 954 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. 1997). In t

he absence of th

e attorney ’s affidavit

s or any other evidence on this issue, we are unable to conclude that the

trial court abuse

d its discretion in awarding the Cliftons’ attorney’s fees in the full amount requested.12 The parties have not raised, and we do n ot decide, the issue of when postjudgm ent interest began to accrue in this case. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14- 122 (1995) (providing that “[i]nterest shall b e computed on every judgm ent from the day on which the jury or the court, sitting without a jury, retu rned the verdict w

ithout regard

to a motion for a new trial” ). V. The Cliftons’ Re

quest for Prejudgment Int erest
Having affirmed the

trial court’s awards for reimbursement and attorney’s fe es, we
now turn to the final issue raise d in this appeal: whe

ther the trial cou

rt erred in denying th

e Cliftons’ request for prejudgmen

t interest on both

the reimbursement award and the attorney’s fee a ward. As
a general rule, a claimant’s entitlement to prejudgment interest under a federal statute is a question of federal law. See Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc. , 100 F.3d220, 224 (1st Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Bartec Indus., Inc. v. United Pac. Co. , 976 F.2d 1274, 1279 (9th Cir. 1992), amended on other grounds , 15 F.3d 855 (9th Cir . 1994); United States ex rel. Georgia Elec. Supply Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. , 656 F.2d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Balf Co. v. Casle Corp. , 895 F. Supp. 420, 429 (D. Conn. 1995) . If the federal statute is silent on the issue, however, c

ourts may loo

k to state law for guidance. Cottrill , 100 F.3d at 224-2 5; United Pac. , 976 F.2d at 1279; USF&G , 656 F.2d at 997; Casle Corp. , 895 F. Supp. at 429.

Under Tennessee law, trialcourts are autho rized to award pre

judgment intere

st as an element of damages “in accordance with the principles of equity .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-123 (1995). 12 In Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn. 1998), our supreme court explained that an award of

prejudgment inte

rest under this sta

tute

is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the decision will notbe disturbed by an a pp ellate court unle

ss the record re

veals a manifest a nd palpable abuse of discretion. . . . This standard of review clearly vests the

trial court with considerable deference in the prejudgment

interest decision. Generally stated, the abuse of d iscretion standard does not authorize an appe

llate court to me

rel y substitute its judgment for that of

the trial court. T

hus, in cases where the evidence supports the trial court’s decision, noabuse of discretion is found.
Myint , 970 S.W.2d at 927 (citations omitted).In addition to clarifying the standard to be applied in prejudgment

interest cases, the supreme court set forth se

veral principle

s to guide trial c

ourts in exercising

their discretion t

o award or deny pre

judgment intere

st:

Foremo st are the principles of equity. . . . Simply stated, the cou r t must decide whether the award of prejudgment interest is fair, given the particular circumstances of the case. In reaching an e quitabl e decision, a

court must keep in mind that the purpose of awarding the interest is to fully

compen sate a plaintiff for the loss of the use of funds to which he or she w as legally entitled, not to penalize a defendant for wrongdoing. . . . In addition to

the principles of

equity, two other criteria have emerged from Tennessee commonlaw. The first criterion provides that p reju dgment interest is allowed when the amount of the obligation is certain, or can be ascertained by a proper accou nting, andthe amount is not disputed on reasonable grounds. . . . The secondprovides that in terest is allowed when the existence of the obligation itself

is not disputed on re

asonable groun

ds.

Id . (citations omitted).

In accordance w

ith these principle

s, we concludethat the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in denying the Cliftons’ request for prejudgment interest. T he Clif tons convincingly argue that they have been unfairly

denied the use of a substantialsum of money throughout the nine-year history of this litigation. The Cliftons’ loss of use of these funds, however, was merely one of the factors that the trial court was requir ed to consider in deciding the Cliftons’ request for prejudgment interest. Following the Myint decision, the appellate courts of this state have recognized that a trial court does not abuse its di

scretion in

denying a claim for

prejudgment interest where the defendant reasonably

disputes either the amount of the obligation or the existence of the obligation itself. See, e.g. , Alexander v. Inman , 974 S.W.2d 689, 698 (T enn. 1998); Brandt v. BIB Enters., Ltd. , 986 S.W.2d 586, 595 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. 1998); see also Newton v. Cox , 954 S.W.2d 746, 748-49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

The record in the pre

sent case revea

ls that , although ultimately unsuccessful, the School System rea sonab ly disputed the existence of its obligation to reimburse the Cliftons for Kyle’splacement at

the Bill Wilkerson Center a

nd, concomitantly

, its obligation to p

ay the Clifto

ns’ attorney’sfees. Despite this court’s affirmance of the t rial court’s judgment ordering the School13 The record also reveals that t he School Sy

stem reasona

bly disputed

the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. In its final judg ment, the trial court implicitly, if not explicitly, acknowledged the reasonableness

of the School

System’s o

bjections to the amount of fe es requested w

hen the court observed that the objections “focuse[d] on entries that border[ed] on excessive time.” D espite these objections, the trial court foun d the fees requ

ested “to be w

ithin the rang

e of reasonable

ness,” and it awarded the Cliftons’ attorneys the full am ount requested. This case illustr

ates why, in

our view, th

e award of pre

judgment int

erest on attorn

ey’s fees is problematic.

As in the pre

sent case, the reasonableness of the attorney ’s fees to be aw arded often is disputed, and the amount of the aw ard is not established with certainty until entry of the final judgment. Even in cases where the amoun t is not disputed, attorney’s fees may be gradually incurred over an extended period of time. In the present case, for example, the C liftons’ attorney’s fees were incurred over a nine-

year period.

In such ca

ses, the probl

em arises as to when prejudg ment interest

would begin to accrue. System to reim burse the Cliftons, we believe that the evidence at the administrative hearing presented a close question as to whether the School System’s proposed IEP was appropriate for Kyle. This belief has been reinforced by an extensive review of I DEA case law, during which we wer e constantly

reminded that the IDEA

provides no more th

an a “basic floor

” of educationa

l opportunity for disabled children and that it does not require public school districts to provide the “best” possible program. Board of Educ. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982); Wise v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ. , 80 F.3d177, 185 (6th Cir. 19 96); Doe v. Board of Educ. , 9 F.3d455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1108 (1994); Cordrey v. Euckert , 917 F.2d 1460, 1473-74 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 499 U.S. 938 (1991). Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the Scho ol System reasonably

disputed its obligations to the Cliftons under the IDEA, andwe decline to disturb the trial court’s decision

to deny the Cl

iftons’ request f

or prejudgment i

nterest. 13

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed, and this cause is remanded for furthe r proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Wilson County School Syst em, for whi ch ex ecut ion may i ssu e ifnece ssa ry.

_ ______________

_____________________ _ FARMER

, J.

______________________________ CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S.

______________________________ HIGH ERS, J.