16-3154 

Sehgal v. United States 

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 

1st 3 day of December, two thousand seventeen. 

4 

5 Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

6 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

7 PETER W. HALL, 

8 Circuit Judges. 

9 _____________________________________________________ 

10 

11 SHASHIBALA SEHGAL, 

12 

13 Movant-Appellant, 

14 

15 v. 16-3154 

16 

17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

18 

19 Respondent-Appellee. 

20 _____________________________________________________ 

21 

22 Appearing for Appellant: Florian Miedel, Miedel & Mysliwiec LLP, New York, N.Y. 

23 

24 Appearing for Appellee: Jason M. Manning, Assistant United States Attorney (Jo Ann M. 

25 Navickas, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for

26 Bridget M. Rohde, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern 

27 District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y. 

28 

29 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Feuerstein, 

30 J.). 

31 
2 

1 ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

2 AND DECREED that the order of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED. 

3 

4 Appellant Shashibala Sehgal appeals from the August 19, 2016 opinion and order of the 

5 District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Feuerstein J.) denying, without a full-blown 

6 evidentiary hearing, her habeas motion to vacate, set aside or correct her sentence of 

7 imprisonment on the ground that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. We assume the 

8 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for 

9 review. 

10 

11 “We review the district court’s denial of a hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for abuse of 

12 discretion.” Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. 

13 Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 627 (2d Cir. 1986)). In a Section 2255 case, “[u]nless the motion and the 

14 files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court 

15 shall . . . grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and 

16 conclusions of law with respect thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). However, “[i]t is within the 

17 district court’s discretion to determine the scope and nature of a hearing.” Raysor v. United 

18 States, 647 F.3d 491, 494 (2d Cir. 2011). “[W]hen the judge who tried the underlying 

19 proceedings also presides over a § 2255 motion, a full-blown evidentiary hearing may not be 

20 necessary.” Id.; see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81-82 (1977) (“[A]s is now 

21 expressly provided in the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases, the district judge ... may 

22 employ a variety of measures in an effort to avoid the need for an evidentiary hearing ... In short, 

23 it may turn out ... that a full evidentiary hearing is not required.”). “Although our precedent 

24 disapproves of summary dismissal of petitions where factual issues exist, it permits a middle 

25 road of deciding disputed facts on the basis of written submissions.” Raysor, 647 F.3d at 494 

26 (citations and alterations omitted). 

27 

28 Here, the district court, which presided over the trial and sentencing, did not exceed its 

29 discretion in declining to hold a full-blown evidentiary hearing. Sehgal’s written submissions in 

30 her motion regarding her decision not to testify were contradicted by her prior statements to the 

31 court, both in a letter and at her sentencing hearing. Under these circumstances, the district court 

32 was not required to hold a testimonial hearing, and properly resolved factual issues on the basis 

33 of written submissions alone. See Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 2009) 

34 (district court need not “assume the credibility of [a movant’s] factual assertions ... where the 

35 assertions are contradicted by the record in the underlying [criminal] proceeding.”). As a result, 

36 there was no error in the district court’s decision to deny the petition without a full-blown 

37 evidentiary hearing.

38 

39 We have considered the remainder of Sehgal’s arguments and find them to be without 

40 merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. 

41 

42 FOR THE COURT: 

43 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 

44 

45