alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-41148 Conference Calendar

ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-00-CV-475

-------------------- June 19, 2002 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Alejandro Gutierrez, Texas inmate #788616, appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as barred by the 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations. The district court granted Gutierrez a certificate of appealability. Gutierrez contends that equitable tolling applies because his attorney did not notify him of the April 14, 1999, refusal ofNo. 01-41148 -2- his petition for discretionary review (“PDR”). Gutierrez asserts that he learned of the decision on June 15, 1999. Gutierrez relies on Phillips v. Donnelly , 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.), modified on limited grounds , 223 F.3d 797 (5th Cir. 2000), as support for his position. We review a district court’s decision on equitable tolling for an abuse of discretion. Fisher v. Johnson , 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is “actively misled” about the cause of action or is “prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Coleman v. Johnson , 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotations omitted). Ignorance of the law and pro se status do not constitute “rare and exceptional” circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Felder v. Johnson , 204 F.3d 168, 171-73 (5th Cir. 2000). The instant case is distinguishable from Phillips . Although Gutierrez contends that he did not learn of the April 14, 1999, refusal of his PDR until June 15, 1999, he waited until June 1, 2000, to file a state habeas application, and he waited three additional months following the denial of his state habeas application to submit a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. In addition, Gutierrez’s situation did not accompany a change in the law. Equitable tolling is for parties who proceed with “diligence and alacrity.” Phillips , 216 F.3d at 511; see Fisher , 174 F.3d at 715-16 . Gutierrez’s self-imposed delays in filing a stateNo. 01-41148 -3- habeas application and a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition occurred after he had learned of the delay caused by counsel. Gutierrez did not act with “diligence and alacrity.” Phillips , 216 F.3d at 511. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
# Exhibit 32

Section 1350
Certifications

---

# Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, the Chief Executive
Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of BankGreenville Financial Corporation (the
Company), each certify that, to his or her knowledge on the date of this
certification:

| | 1. | The quarterly report of the Company for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the Report) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|                    |  |                              
|------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|                    |  |                              
|Date:  May 12, 2006 |  | By:   /s/  Russel T. Williams
|                    |  | Russel T. Williams           
|                    |  | Chief Executive Officer      

|                    |  |                         
|------------------- |  | ------------------------
|                    |  |                         
|Date:  May 12, 2006 |  | By:   /s/  Paula S. King
|                    |  | Paula S. King           
|                    |  | Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








I, Jason
Smart, Chief Executive Officer of Zandaria Ventures, Inc., (the "Company"),
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:




(1) The
Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,
2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
Jason
Smart


Jason
Smart


Chief
Executive Officer





Date:
November 9, 2009




This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and  shall not be
deemed  filed by the  Company  for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
 
 A
signed  original of this
written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of
this written  statement required by Section 906,  has
been  provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the  Securities  and
Exchange  Commission or its staff upon
request.
EXHIBIT
32





Certification
of Principal Executive and Financial Officer


Pursuant
to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)





In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30,
2009 (the “Report”) of Highbury Financial Inc. (the “Registrant”), as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, the undersigned
hereby certify that, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant for the
period certified.





Date:
August 11, 2009




By:
                /s/
      Richard S. FooteRichard
      S. FootePresident
      and Chief Executive Officer
                  (Principal
      Executive Officer)




By:
                /s/
      R. Bradley ForthR.
      Bradley ForthExecutive Vice President, Chief
      Financial Officer and Secretary
                  (Principal
      Financial Officer)




The
foregoing certifications are being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission as part of the accompanying report on Form 10-Q. A signed original of
this statement has been provided to Highbury Financial Inc. and will be retained
by Highbury Financial Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Don J. GINES, et ux. v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY CO., et al.

No. 88-C-0009.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 5, 1988.

In re Carrier Corporation; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.; applying for writ of certiorari *128and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 19149-CA; Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 33376.

Prior report: La.App., 516 So.2d 1231.

Denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1602 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1602

 To amend title 10, United States Code, to ensure that excess oil and 
   gas lease revenues are distributed in accordance with the Mineral 
                  Leasing Act, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 6, 2009

   Mr. Udall of Colorado (for himself and Mr. Bennet) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                             Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 10, United States Code, to ensure that excess oil and 
   gas lease revenues are distributed in accordance with the Mineral 
                  Leasing Act, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF OIL SHALE RESERVE RECEIPTS.

    Section 7439(f) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
    ``(3)(A) The moneys deposited in the Treasury under paragraph (1) 
that exceed the amounts described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
paragraph (2) shall be transferred by the Secretary of the Treasury in 
accordance with section 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act (30 U.S.C. 191) 
to the State of Colorado for use in accordance with subparagraph (B).
    ``(B)(i) Of the amounts to be distributed under subparagraph (A), 
the Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer--
            ``(I) 40 percent to Garfield County, Colorado;
            ``(II) 40 percent to Rio Blanco County, Colorado;
            ``(III) 10 percent to Moffat County, Colorado; and
            ``(IV) 10 percent to Mesa County, Colorado.
    ``(ii) The amounts provided to the counties under clause (i) shall 
be used by the counties, or any cities or political subdivisions within 
the counties to which the funds are transferred by the counties, to 
mitigate the effects of oil and gas development activities within the 
affected counties, cities, or political subdivisions.
    ``(iii) Amounts provided to the counties under clause (i) shall not 
be considered for the purpose of calculating payments for the counties 
under chapter 69 of title 31, United States Code.''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Marine Growth Ventures, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to such officer’s knowledge that:





(i)  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (subject to the Company's position prevailing in regard to the remaining unresolved SEC comment, as more fully described in the Report); and





(ii)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





By:
/s/ Katherine A. OstruszkaKatherine A. OstruszkaChief Financial Officer & Controller(Principal Financial Officer)
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-89,294-01

EX PARTE JUSTIN BRYAN BELL, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 26444-A IN THE 42 DISTRICT COURT ND

FROM TAYLOR COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of aggravated

kidnapping, sexual assault, and assault family violence. He was sentenced to sixty years’

imprisonment for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and to ten years’ imprisonment for each of

the other two convictions. The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Bell v. State,

No. 11-15-00271-CR (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 31, 2017) (not designated for publication).

Applicant contends, among other things, that histrial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington,
2

466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In these

circumstances, additional facts are needed. As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294

(Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court

shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised

on the writ form and further developed in the memorandum of law. The trial court may use any

means set out in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). In the appropriate case, the trial court

may rely on its personal recollection. Id.

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the

performance of Applicant’s trial counsel was deficient and, if so, whether counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced Applicant. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact and

conclusions of law that it deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for

habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time must

be requested by the trial court and shall be obtained from this Court.

Filed: February 27, 2019

Do not publish
#### Frank BIONDO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-144.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 16, 1988.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Candance M. Sunderland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. .

We affirm defendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

We do not agree with defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in permitting the state to rebut prematurely defendant’s entrapment defense before that defense had been raised. At the time the state introduced evidence in anticipation of *911the entrapment defense the defendant had already inserted that defense into the case through defense counsel’s opening statement and defense counsel’s cross-examination of a state witness.

Also we do not agree with defendant’s contention that the testimony of two witnesses for the state as to other crimes committed by defendant was not properly admitted into evidence. The testimony of the two state witnesses indicated that defendant had previously sold cocaine to them. Whether or not that constituted *Williams*Rule evidence,1 that testimony was properly admitted because it was relevant to rebut the entrapment defense by showing defendant’s predisposition to commit crimes of the type involved here. *See Bryan v. State,*533 So.2d 744, 745-46 (Fla. 1988).

We agree with defendant’s additional contention that the prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to defendant as “slime” was improper. *See Duque v. State,*.498 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). However under all the circumstances we do not conclude that that impropriety by itself in this case was sufficiently egregious to require reversal.

Affirmed.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., LEHAN and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.

1

. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1983); *Williams v. State,*110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

QUANTUM LIMITED PARTNERS, LTD., QUANTUM PARK OVERLAY DEFENDANT DISTRICT, DESHA PENCHEFF, AL SLAMAN, CYNTHIA

BENSON, QUANTUM PARK PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION,

INC., EUGENE GERLICA, DOUGLAS MACDONALD, FIORENZO BRESOLIN, and HEATHER RINTOUL a/k/a HEATHER MAC DONALD, Appellant s ,

v.

OLEN PROPERTIES CORP., a Florida Corporation and

SECURED HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada Corporation, Appellee s

.

No. 4D 1 8

- 1700

[ May 23, 2019 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fif teenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County ; David E. French , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2015

- CA

001721

- XXXX

- MB

.

Irwin R. Gilbert, Cristopher S. Rapp and Eric M. Yesner of Kelley Kronenberg, West Palm Beach, for appellant Quantum Limited Partners,

LTD

.

Robert Rivas of Sachs Sax Caplan, P.L., Tallahassee, for appellees Olen Properties Corporation and Secured Holdings, Inc.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

G ERBER
, C.J., W ARNER and C ONNER
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### TASK ENTERPRISES, INC., an Illinois corporation and Christopher Kachemov, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PRATT ADJUSTMENT COMPANY, Brian Lee Hustler, and Colonial Bank of Rockford, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83CA0563.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

Sept. 27, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 1, 1984.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 4, 1985.

James M. De Rose, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants.

*763Grossman & Grossman, Alan M. Gross-man, Denver, for defendants-appellees.

BABCOCK, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Task Enterprises, Inc., and Christopher Kachemov, appeal the judgment entered against them and in favor of defendant Colonial Bank of Rockford (Bank) on the parties’ respective claims for damages arising out of the Bank’s repossession of an automobile. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in refusing to award the expenses incurred to obtain return of the vehicle after they had allegedly tendered payment of the amount required to redeem. They also contend that the trial court should not have awarded the bank collection costs incurred after the alleged tender was refused. We affirm.

Task Enterprises defaulted in making three monthly payments on a note it had executed in favor of the Bank. The note was personally guaranteed by Kachemov and was secured by an automobile owned by Task Enterprises. After default, the Bank effected a peaceable repossession of the vehicle. Kachemov then deposited funds sufficient to redeem the vehicle in a bank account and offered to send such funds to the Bank on condition that he be allowed to examine the vehicle. Insisting upon receipt of payment before the vehicle would be made available, the Bank declined the offer.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that their offer constituted a tender of full payment. We disagree.

After default a debtor may generally redeem collateral which has been repossessed by “tendering fulfillment” of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as repossession expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party. Section 4-9-506, C.R.S. “Tendering fulfillment” requires an actual, present, unconditional, physical production of payment, and a mere willingness, readiness, or proposition to pay is not enough. *Winne v. Colorado Springs Co.,*3 Colo. 155 (1877). *See also*§ 4-1-103, C.R.S.

Here, Kachemov proposed to pay the Bank the total amount due if he were allowed to inspect the vehicle. Thus, because conditional, no tender occurred.

Pursuant to the terms of the note and security agreement upon which its damages for collection and repossession costs were based, the Bank claims that it is entitled to an award of additional attorney fees incurred in this appeal. We agree. *See Zambruk v. Perlmutter 3rd Generation Builders, Inc.,*32 Colo.App. 276, 510 P.2d 472 (1973).

The judgment is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a hearing for determination of the reasonable value of the services of the Bank’s counsel in defending its judgment on appeal, and to enter judgment against plaintiffs for that amount, in addition to the judgment previously entered and herein affirmed.

BERMAN and METZGER, JJ., concur.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2271 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain infant products. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain infant products. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN INFANT PRODUCTS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Image projectors (provided 

for in subheading 

9008.30.00) capable of projecting images onto a ceiling 

or wall, with audio player, designed to sooth or entertain 

infants) .................................. Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2271 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to articles entered, or withdrawn 

3 from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2244 

To extend the temporary reduction of duty on artichokes, prepared or 

preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not frozen. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary reduction of duty on artichokes, 

prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic 

acid, not frozen. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ARTICHOKES, PREPARED OR PRESERVED OTH4 ERWISE THAN BY VINEGAR OR ACETIC ACID, 

5 NOT FROZEN. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.03.89 of the Har7 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

8 certain artichokes) is amended— 

9 (1) by striking ‘‘13.8%’’ and inserting 

10 ‘‘13.34%’’; and 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2244 IS

1 (2) by striking ‘‘12/31/2009’’ and inserting 

2 ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

4 subsection (a) applies with respect to goods entered, or 

5 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

6 the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS