In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1786

DONALD W. BAUER, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KIMBERLY G. KOESTER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 18-cv-1215-MJR-RJD — Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 10, 2020* — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2020

____________________

Before KANNE, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. This appeal arises out of Illinois foreclosure 

proceedings on real estate owned by Donald and Lauretta 

Bauer. Even though they were able to redeem their property, 

* We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral 

argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 19-1786

the Bauers and two of their children, Karla and David 

(collectively, “the Bauers”), believe they were harmed by the 

proceedings and now seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The Bauers named as defendants many of the people and 

entities involved in the foreclosure: Donald and Lauretta’s 

attorneys, the attorneys for the foreclosing plaintiffs, the 

bank that maintained an escrow account at issue and its 

employees, the state-court clerk and deputy clerks, and the 

judge who presided over the foreclosure proceedings. The 

district court dismissed the Bauers’ suit as barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 

460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

Because the district court properly applied that doctrine, we 

affirm. 

This case has an extensive history. In 1973 Donald and 

Lauretta purchased seven tracts of land from Donald’s 

parents and executed two promissory notes and a mortgage 

for the property. Upon the deaths of Donald’s parents in the 

late 1980s, his parents’ interest in the promissory notes 

transferred to their remaining children, excluding Donald. In 

2002 six of the eight interest holders (Donald’s siblings) filed 

for foreclosure seeking a deficiency judgment against 

Donald and Lauretta and a judgment that Donald and 

Lauretta’s six children (including Karla and David, two of 

the plaintiffs here) took no legal or equitable interest in the 

property at issue. 

In late 2013 the state court held a bench trial and found 

that Donald and Lauretta had defaulted on the promissory 

notes and mortgage. The judge entered a judgment for 

foreclosure and judicial sale and a monetary judgment 

against Donald and Lauretta for nearly $250,000. No judicial 
No. 19-1786 3

sale took place, however, and in March 2015 the Bauers tried 

to redeem the property by tendering a check satisfying the 

judgment. The foreclosure plaintiffs then issued citations to 

discover assets and moved for, among other things, additional interest incurred since the judgment. 

In December 2015 the state court found that Donald and 

Lauretta owed an additional $33,782.96 in interest. The judge 

set a deadline to pay the interest and ordered a judicial sale 

to occur if Donald and Lauretta did not pay by that date. 

Donald and Lauretta met the deadline, and at the end of 

2015, the plaintiffs filed a satisfaction of judgment and 

cancellation of notice of lis pendens with the state court. 

Three months later the Bauers filed a complaint in the 

Eastern District of Missouri (seemingly basing venue on the 

residency of some, but not all, of the defendants) against 

many of the same defendants as this case. The judge dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Bauer v. Lauth, No. 4:16-CV-410 CAS, 2016 WL 6679846 (E.D. 

Mo. Nov. 14, 2016) (nonprecedential disposition). 

The Bauers then returned to state court, suing many of 

the same defendants for tampering with evidence and 

engaging in an abuse of process by seeking to extort money 

through issuance of citations to discover assets. The judge

dismissed the complaint, and the state appellate court 

upheld the dismissal. Bauer v. Niemerg, No. 5-18-0229, 

2019 WL 1170883 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 11, 2019), appeal denied, 

132 N.E.3d 325 (Ill. 2019).

While their appeal was pending in state court, the Bauers 

filed this action in the Southern District of Illinois. They 

generally invoked their right to due process, equal protec-
4 No. 19-1786

tion, and an unbiased tribunal. The Bauers alleged, first, that

the defendants, including the state-court judge, had conspired to introduce a forged version of the escrow account 

into evidence during the foreclosure trial. Second, they 

alleged that the state-court judge and the clerk’s office 

allowed the foreclosure plaintiffs to issue baseless citations 

to discover assets—a means to extort money without an 

underlying judgment. 

The district court granted the defendants’ motions to 

dismiss the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That 

doctrine precludes federal district-court jurisdiction “over 

cases brought by state court losers challenging state court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced.” Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div., 

837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); see also

Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The RookerFeldman doctrine applies when the state court’s judgment is 

the source of the injury of which plaintiffs complain in 

federal court.”). The judge explained: “Simply put, [the 

Bauers’] alleged injuries stem from the 2013 state court 

foreclosure judgment ... .”

On appeal the Bauers argue that Rooker-Feldman does not 

apply because they do not seek to set aside the state court’s 

order of foreclosure or the monetary judgment against them. 

Instead, they mean to challenge the “collection practices” of 

the defendants and their collusion to introduce forged 

evidence. 

This suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, because any finding in favor of the Bauers would 

require us to contradict the state court’s orders. See Moore v.
No. 19-1786 5

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 908 F.3d 1050, 1062 (7th Cir. 2018). 

The injuries for which the Bauers seek redress ($350,000 in 

actual damages and $5 million in punitive damages) resulted 

from the state court’s judgment of foreclosure and its order 

awarding additional interest. See Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 

852 F.3d 669, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Rooker-Feldman 

where the requested relief challenged the state-court determination of amounts due and an obligation to pay). RookerFeldman bars review of claims that allege injury caused by a 

state-court order. Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d

387, 391 (7th Cir. 2019). Here, were it not for the state court’s 

foreclosure order and order awarding additional interest, no 

injury would have resulted from the allegedly forged escrow 

exhibit or the citations to discover assets. Indeed, the defendants needed to prevail in the state court to effectuate 

their alleged fraud, so the Bauers’ claims are barred by 

Rooker-Feldman because they “ultimately require us to evaluate the state court judgments.” Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 

548 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Relying on Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 

1995), the Bauers also contend that Rooker-Feldman does not 

bar federal review of a fraud-based claim like theirs in which 

the defendants “so far succeeded in corrupting the state 

judicial process as to obtain a favorable judgment.” In Nesses, 

however, the plaintiff alleged in his breach-of-contract suit 

that “a massive, tentacular conspiracy among the lawyers 

and the judges” corrupted the entire state judicial process 

such that his claims fell beyond Rooker-Feldman’s scope. Id. at 

1004–05 (stating in dicta that Rooker-Feldman does not block 

an independent claim based on the right to be judged by “a 

tribunal ... uncontaminated by politics”); see also Loubser v. 

Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2006) (Rooker-Feldman 
6 No. 19-1786

does not bar a sprawling conspiracy claim that included a 

state-court judge, court reporters, and many others, to 

manipulate the entirety of divorce proceedings). The Bauers’ 

case differs from Nesses and Loubser in that they do not allege 

that a widespread conspiracy undermined the entirety of the 

state-court proceedings; as the Bauers acknowledge, they 

merely challenge the state court’s decisions regarding the 

supposedly forged exhibit and the citations to discover 

assets. 

The Bauers next argue that Rooker-Feldman applies only 

to final state-court judgments and thus does not apply to the 

state court’s foreclosure judgment, which was not a final 

appealable order under Illinois law. They base this argument 

on language from Feldman stating that a federal district court 

“has no authority to review final judgments of a state court 

in judicial proceedings.” 460 U.S. at 482. They maintain that 

without a final appealable order entered against them, they 

cannot be considered state-court losers. See, e.g., Green v.

Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that 

Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the plaintiff (a woman 

whose child was temporarily removed from her custody) 

did not “lose” in state court, and she complained only of 

injuries caused by a state-court interlocutory order); see also 

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 

2015) (highlighting the conclusion of the Supreme Court of 

Illinois that a foreclosure judgment is not a final judgment 

“because it does not dispose of all issues between the parties 

and it does not terminate the litigation”) (quotation marks 

omitted).

We have stated that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “does 

not apply independently to interlocutory orders.” Kowalski v. 
No. 19-1786 7

Boliker, 893 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2018). But we have also 

stated that “interlocutory orders entered prior to the final

disposition of state court lawsuits are not immune from the 

jurisdiction-stripping powers of Rooker-Feldman.” Sykes, 

837 F.3d at 742 (emphasis added). The Bauers’ argument 

fails because the record shows that the foreclosure case 

against them is effectively final. The Bauers paid all monetary judgments against them, thus negating the need for a 

judicial sale, and the foreclosure plaintiffs then filed a satisfaction of judgment and cancellation of notice of lis pendens 

with the state court. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(f)(3) 

(requiring that upon receipt of all payment owed, the mortgagee shall furnish a release of the mortgage or a satisfaction 

of the judgment and evidence of any indebtedness secured 

by the mortgage shall be cancelled). 

Because the satisfaction of judgment effectively ended 

the state proceeding, there is a “judgment” under RookerFeldman. Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 459 

(3d Cir. 2019) (agreeing with the holding of six other circuits 

that there is a state-court “judgment” under Rooker-Feldman,

even in the absence of a final appealable order so long as the 

state-court interlocutory order is “effectively final”). And

even if the Bauers were correct that there is no final judgment for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, “[n]othing in the 

Supreme Court’s decisions suggests that state-court decisions too provisional to deserve review within the state’s 

own system can be reviewed by federal district and appellate courts.” Harold, 773 F.3d at 886.

The Bauers relatedly argue that because the foreclosure 

order was not final and appealable, Rooker-Feldman does not 

bar their constitutional claims because they had no reasona-
8 No. 19-1786

ble opportunity to raise them in state court. See Jakupovic v.

Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2017). But the “reasonable 

opportunity” inquiry focuses on “difficulties caused by 

factors independent of” opposing parties’ actions that preclude a plaintiff from litigating federal claims in state court. 

Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The 

Bauers do not identify any such difficulties. Indeed, the 

record reflects that the Bauers pursued these arguments both 

in the foreclosure case (through a filing notifying the state 

court of defendants “tampering with the evidence”) and in 

their later state suit (which raised substantially the same 

allegations as those made here). 

Finally, the Bauers contend that Rooker-Feldman should 

not apply because none of the defendants were a party to the 

state-court foreclosure action. But whether any defendant 

was a party to the state-court action is a consideration under 

the doctrine of claim preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman. See

Moore, 908 F.3d at 1062 n.8. 

We have considered the Bauers’ remaining arguments, 

and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED