COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick,* Judges Benton, Coleman, 

 Moon, Willis, Elder, Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

BASSETT-WALKER, INC. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1002-96-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 NOVEMBER 25, 1997 

SHIRLEY JEAN WYATT 

UPON REHEARING EN BANC 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Richard D. Lucas (Carter, Brown & Osborne, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Stephen G. Bass (Carter, Craig, Bass, 

Blair & Kushner, P.C., on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Bassett-Walker, Inc. (appellant) appeals a decision of the 

Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) awarding benefits 

to Shirley Jean Wyatt (claimant). It contends that the 

commission erred when it concluded that claimant's injury arose 

out of her employment. A panel of this Court agreed with 

appellant and reversed the commission's decision. See

Bassett-Walker, Inc. v. Wyatt, No. 1002-96-3, slip op. at 3. 

(Va. Ct. App. March 4, 1997). We granted claimant's petition for 

a rehearing en banc and now affirm the commission's award. 

 

 *When the case was argued Judge Moon presided. Judge 

Fitzpatrick was elected Chief Judge effective November 19, 1997. 
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 I. 

 FACTS 

 Claimant was a knitter whose work involved operating 

knitting machines. Rolls of yarn were placed on creels attached 

to the machines, and the machines functioned by knitting yarn fed 

into them from the creels. Each machine held multiple creels of 

yarn, some of which were "as high as you could reach from the 

floor," while the lowest row of yarn was about "two inches off 

the floor." The machines consumed numerous rolls of yarn during 

the course of claimant's twelve hour shift. Each time a roll of 

yarn was emptied, claimant was responsible for placing a new roll 

on the empty creel. In order to reload the yarn on the 

bottom-most creels of a machine, claimant was required to perform 

a deep knee-bend to reach their location two inches above the 

floor. At the lowest point of each knee-bend, claimant's weight 

rested on her heels, her knees did not touch the floor, and her 

"rear end [was] lower than [her] knees." The operation of the 

knitting machines required claimant to perform these deep 

knee-bends approximately 200 times each twelve hour shift. 

 On March 13, 1995, claimant was performing her duties when 

the machine she was operating emptied a roll of yarn. Claimant 

placed a new roll of yarn on the creel and "squatted down to tie 

the bottom in." Claimant was not holding anything in her hand. 

Before she had reached the deepest position of her knee-bend, 

claimant heard a pop and felt a tearing sensation in her left 
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knee. When she tried to stand up, she was unable to straighten 

her left leg. Claimant's injury was diagnosed as a torn medial 

meniscus, and she underwent arthroscopic surgery to correct the 

injury. 

 Claimant filed a claim for benefits. Following a hearing, a 

deputy commissioner denied her claim, concluding that claimant's 

injury did not arise out of her employment. The deputy 

commissioner found that "the conditions of claimant's employment 

did not contribute to her injury" and that her injury occurred 

during a "normal squatting motion." 

 Claimant appealed, and the commission reversed. The 

commission concluded that claimant's injury was causally related 

to her work reloading the bottom-most creels of the knitting 

machine. It found that "claimant's knee injury followed as a 

natural incident of the work and could be reasonably seen as 

resulting from exposure occasioned by the nature of the 

employment, which required her to squat approximately 200 times 

per shift." It also found that the job-related hazard that 

contributed to her injury was the "need to squat in order to 

perform her work, coupled with the number of times that maneuver 

was required per shift and the length of time which she had to 

maintain the position." 

 II. 

INJURY "ARISING OUT OF" EMPLOYMENT 

 Appellant concedes that claimant suffered an injury during 
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the course of her employment. It contends, however, that the 

commission erred when it concluded that claimant's injury arose 

out of her employment. Appellant argues that claimant's risk of 

injury while performing deep knee-bends at work was no greater 

than the risk to which she was exposed outside of her job and 

that her injury occurred while performing a "normal squat" 

typical of those she would perform at home. Because the record 

indicates that claimant was exposed to an increased risk of 

tearing cartilage in her knees that was peculiar to her 

employment and that this risk contributed to her injury, we 

disagree with appellant's arguments. 

 In order to receive benefits under the Workers' Compensation 

Act, a claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that he or she suffered an injury by accident that arose out of

and in the course of the employment. See County of Chesterfield 

v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183, 376 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1989) (holding 

that "arising out of" and "in the course of" are separate and 

distinct elements). An injury "arises out of" the employment if 

a causal connection exists between the claimant's injury and "the 

conditions under which the employer requires the work to be 

performed" or a "significant work related exertion." Grove v. 

Allied Signal, Inc., 15 Va. App. 17, 19, 421 S.E.2d 32, 34 

(1992); Plumb Rite Plumbing Service v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 482, 

484, 382 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1989) (interpreting Johnson). 

 "'Under this test, if the injury can be seen 

to have followed as a natural incident of the 

work and to have been contemplated by a 
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reasonable person familiar with the whole 

situation as a result of the exposure 

occasioned by the nature of the employment, 

then it arises "out of" the employment. But 

it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be 

traced to the employment as a contributing 

proximate cause and which comes from a hazard 

to which the workmen would have been equally 

exposed apart from the employment. The 

causative danger must be peculiar to the work 

and not common to the neighborhood. It must 

be incidental to the character of the 

business and not independent of the relation 

of master and servant. It need not have been 

foreseen or expected, but after the event it 

must appear to have had its origin in a risk 

connected with the employment, and to have 

flowed from that source as a rational 

consequence.'" Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 

Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938), 

quoting In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 499, 

102 N.E. 697, 697 (1913). 

Baggett Transp. Co. of Birmingham, Alabama v. Dillon, 219 Va. 

633, 638, 248 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1978). Whether an injury arises 

out of the employment is a mixed question of law and fact and is 

reviewable on appeal. Barbour, 8 Va. App. at 483, 382 S.E.2d at 

305. 

 We hold that claimant's knee injury arose out of her 

employment. The unique demands of operating the knitting machine 

provided the "critical link" between claimant's employment and 

her injury. In order to load new rolls of yarn in the lowest 

creels of her knitting machine, claimant was required to perform 

deep knee-bends during each twelve hour shift. The 

circumstantial evidence indicated that this knee-bending or 

"squatting" to reach a position close to the ground was a 

condition of the work to be performed which exposed claimant to 
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the risk of tearing cartilage in her knees every time she 

performed the task. Although claimant testified that the motion 

of her knee-bending at work resembled a knee-bend that she would 

perform "to pick up something at home," bending one's knees until 

a point two inches from the ground is within reaching distance is 

both extreme and uncommon. Moreover, the record did not 

establish that claimant performed deep knee-bends to reach 

positions just inches from the floor in order to load yarn on 

creels while she was away from her employment. The mere fact 

that an unusual movement required by one's employment is 

occasionally done outside the workplace does not necessarily make 

a resulting workplace injury non-compensable. Thus, the 

knee-bending demanded of claimant when operating the knitting 

machines was a condition to which she was not equally exposed 

apart from her employment. Cf. Grove, 15 Va. App. at 20-21, 421 

S.E.2d at 34-35 (claimant's stooping and crouching incidental to 

fixing pipes exposed him to a risk of back injury peculiar to his 

employment); Richard E. Brown, Inc. v. Caporaletti, 12 Va. App. 

242, 245, 402 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1991) (claimant's cutting and 

fitting motions performed in a bent over position while 

installing a 100-pound furnace exposed him to a risk of back 

injury unique to his employment). 

 In addition, the record indicates that the risk associated 

with claimant's operation of the knitting machine was a 

contributing cause of her injury. Claimant was in the act of 
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performing a deep knee-bend to reach the lowest row of yarn on 

the machine when she heard a pop and felt a tearing sensation in 

her left knee. The acute angle knee-bend required to operate the 

knitting machine increased the likelihood that claimant would 

tear the medial meniscus in her knee, and the injury to 

claimant's knee can be fairly traced to this increased risk. 

 This case is distinguishable from those cases in which the 

claimant's injury occurred during the course of the employment 

but was not causally related to a condition or exertion peculiar 

to the job. See Johnson, 237 Va. at 184-85, 376 S.E.2d at 75-76 

(no evidence established that an "actual risk" of employment 

caused claimant's knee to "give way" and claimant to fall to the 

floor); United Parcel Service of America v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 

257, 259, 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985) (no evidence established 

that back strain that occurred when claimant bent over to tie his 

shoe was caused by a hazard peculiar to the workplace); Barbour, 

8 Va. App. at 484, 382 S.E.2d at 306 (no evidence established 

that back strain that occurred when claimant bent over to pick up 

a piece of plastic pipe was caused by a work-related risk or 

exertion). Unlike the injuries in those cases, claimant's knee 

injury did not merely occur during the course of her employment 

as a knitter without any link to her working environment. The 

evidence established a causal connection between the unique 

demands of operating the knitting machine and the torn cartilage 

in claimant's left knee. Operating the knitting machine required 
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claimant to bend her knees until her "rear end [was] lower than 

[her knees]" and her weight rested on her heels. This manner of 

reloading the lowest creels with yarn increased her risk of 

tearing cartilage in her knee and directly contributed to cause 

her injury. Cf. Marion Correctional Treatment Ctr. v. Henderson, 

20 Va. App. 477, 480-81, 458 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1995). 

 Appellant contends that compensation of claimant's injury is 

barred on another ground. It argues that the commission's 

findings indicate that the injury was a cumulative trauma caused 

by a repetitive motion. We disagree. 

 Appellant misconstrues the findings made by the commission. 

 Although job-related impairments resulting from cumulative 

trauma caused by repetitive motion are not compensable under the 

Act, Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 199, 467 S.E.2d 795, 

802 (1996), the commission did not conclude that claimant's 

injury resulted from a cumulative trauma. Instead, the 

commission found that the medial meniscus in claimant's left knee 

was damaged once, on March 13, and that this single injury was 

causally related to the risk of tearing cartilage associated with 

performing deep knee-bends. The commission characterized the 

extreme squatting as a "causative danger" and "a risk connected 

with the employment" and did not find that the knee-bends injured 

claimant gradually over time. 

 We hold that credible evidence supports the commission's 

finding that the tear in claimant's medial meniscus was caused 
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suddenly when she performed the deep knee-bend on March 13. 

Claimant testified that she heard a pop and felt a painful 

tearing sensation in her left knee as she squatted to reload the 

knitting machine on March 13. On March 21, Dr. Charles Kelshaw 

examined claimant and concluded that she had "medial meniscus 

damage" in her left knee. Dr. Peter L. Perry operated on 

claimant's knee on August 4 and discovered "a complex tear of the 

entire posterior horn of the medial meniscus." Dr. Perry later 

opined that this tear was related to the deep knee-bend performed 

by claimant on March 13. No evidence in the record indicates 

that the tear in her medial meniscus occurred gradually as a 

result of cumulative trauma rather than suddenly due to the 

particular knee-bend at issue on March 13. Because the evidence 

in the record supports these findings, they cannot be disturbed 

on appeal. See Code § 65.2-706(A). 

 In light of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of 

the commission. 

 Affirmed. 
 -10- 

Moon, J., dissenting. 

 I dissent for the reasons articulated in the March 4, 1997 

panel opinion. Wyatt testified that the injury occurred before 

she reached a squatting position and that the motion was no 

different from those she carried out in everyday life in 

non-employment-related circumstances: 

 Q. And had you gotten down to the full low 

position when you heard the pop? 

 A. No, sir. 

 Q. All right. Where you somewhere in 

between the high and the low? 

 A. Yes, sir. 

* * * * * * * 

 Q. So you had not even reached your full 

squatted position at the - - - 

 A. No, sir. 

 Q. - - time this popped; is that correct? 

 A. Right. 

* * * * * * * 

 Q. And, is that a squat that you would make 

several times an hour? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. And, is that a squat also that you make 

if you had to bend to pick up something 

at home, pick up around the house or 

whatever? Just a normal squat? 

 A. Yes. 

 Where, as here, there is no significant exertion, the action 

of squatting involves no awkward position, and no condition 
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peculiar to the workplace causes the injury, the injury cannot be 

said to have "aris[en] out of" employment. County of 

Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 185-86, 376 S.E.2d 73, 76 

(1989); Grove v. Allied Signal, Inc., 15 Va. App. 17, 19-20, 421 

S.E.2d 32, 34 (1992); Plumb Rite Plumbing Service v Barbour, 8 

Va. App. 482, 484, 382 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1989). I therefore would 

reverse the commission's award of compensation.