## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 20

- 00063

- CV

DELTA COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT , Appellant
V. PPF GIN & WAREHOUSE, LLC , Appellee

On Appeal from the 62nd District Court Delta County, Texas Trial Court No

. 11193

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ. Opinion by Justice Burgess2 

### O P I N I O N This case arises out of an ad valorem property

- tax dispute regarding seven cotton module trucks owned by PPF Gin & Warehouse, LLC (PPF Gin). In two points of error, Delta County Appraisal District (DCAD) contends that the trial court erred (1) when it granted PPF Gin’s motion for summary judgment and denied DCAD’s motion for summary judgment 1 and (2) when it granted PPF Gin’s motion for summary judgment desp ite the existence of an issue of
material fact. 2 For the reasons below, we a ffirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background During a cotton harvest, cotton farmers use harvesting machines to remove cotton bolls from cotton plants. Specially equipped mac hinery gathers the raw cotton bolls into large
“modules

. ” In their harvested state, the modules contain both cotton fiber and other debris that must be “ginned” out of the cotton so it can be used by the textile industry. The modules are left
in the fiel d to be picked up by cotton module trucks and transported to the gin. At the gin, the modules are placed on a conveyor where the harvested cotton is unwrapped and taken through a filtering process, removing any debris from the cotton fiber. The “ginned” cotton is then sold.
PPF Gin was founded in 2014 and is a Texas limited liabi lity company located in Delta County. PPF Gin grows and harvests its own cotton. In 2018 and 2019, PPF Gin owned seven

1 In its brief, DCAD argues, in its first point of error, that t he tria l c ourt erred when it granted PPF Gin’s motion for summary judgment and, in its second point of error, that the trial court erred when it denied DCAD’s motion for summary judgment. Yet, the two points of error address the same issue, and DCAD brief ed thos e p oints coll ectively. Consequently, the Court will address DCAD’s first two points of error as a single point of error and will refer to it as DCAD’s first point of error.

2 DCAD entitles its third argument, that the trial court erred when it gr anted P PF Gin’s moti on for summary judgment despite the existence of an issue of material fact, as an “alternative argument.” We will address that argument as DCAD’s second point of error.3

cotton module trucks that were registered with the State o f Texas as cotton vehicles. The module trucks are designed to load the cotto n modules in the field and transport them to the gin for processing, and PPF Gin uses them in that manner. When it is not cotton harvesting season, the module trucks are parked a nd not used. On May 15, 2018, PPF Gin received a notice from DCAD containing the appraised value of its personal property for the 2018 tax year. The seven cotton module trucks were appraised at $1,096,640.00. PPF Gin subsequently filed a protest with th e Delta County Appraisal Review Board (the Board) on the grounds that the mar ket value was incorrect and unequal and that the module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxation under the Texas Tax Code. Following a hearing before the Board, PPF Gin receiv ed a written order on July 6, 2018, denying PPF Gin’s protest. On August 28, 2018, PPF Gin filed an original petition against DCAD, asking the district court to review the Board’s order denying PPF Gin’s claims (1) that the 2018 appraisal of
its cotton mo dule trucks was excessive under Section 42.25 of the Texas Tax Code 3 and (2) unequal under Section 42.26 of the Texas Tax Code 4 and (3) that the cotton module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxation.

3 Section 42.25 of the Texas Tax Code states, “If the court determines tha t t he apprais ed value of property according to the appraisal roll exceeds the appraised value required by law, the property owner is entitled to a reduction of the appraised value on t he appraisal roll to the appraised value determined by the court.”

4 S ect ion 42.26 states, in part, (a) The district court shall grant relief on the ground that a property is appraised unequally if: (1) the appraised ratio of the property exceeds by at least 10 percent the median level of appraisal of a reasonable and repr ese ntative sa mple of other properties in the appraisal district; (2) the appraisal ration of the property exceeds by at least 10 percent the median level of appraisal of a sample of p roperties in the appraisal district consisting of a reasonable number of ot her proper ties similarly situated to, or of the same general kind o r character as, the property subject to the appeal; or4

On May 10, 2019, PPF Gin received a 2019 tax appra isal notice appraising the same seven cotton module trucks at $1,008,920.00 . PPF Gin filed another protest with the Board on the grounds that its 2019 tax value was excessive and unequal and that the tax exemption had again been denied. On July 2, 2019, the Board issued a written order denying PPF Gin’s protest regarding the 20 19 tax appraisal. On August 29, 2019, PPF Gin filed an amended petition against DCAD, adding a complaint regarding the Board’s 2019 tax appraisal of the cotton
module trucks and al leging the same bases as those contained in its original petition. On
Febr uary 13, 2020, PPF Gin filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the trial court to find, as a matter of law, that its seven cotton module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxat ion as implements of husbandry for tax years 2018 and 2019. On May 28, 20 20, DCAD filed a response to PPF Gin’s motion and its own motion for summary judgment, arguing that, because PPF Gin’s cotton module trucks were not implements of husbandry, they we re not exempt from ad valorem taxation . On July 7, 2020, the trial court

e ntered an order finding that PPF Gin’s seven cotton module trucks were exempt , granting PPF Gin’s summary judgment motion, and denying DCAD’s motion. It further ordered “that [DCA D ] correct its appraisal roll for tax years 2018 and 2019 and exempt from p roperty taxation the [seven cotton module trucks] as constituting implements of husbandry.” Finally, the trial court ordered DCAD “to inform the appropriate taxing unit of this cor r ection as required by the Texas Tax Code.” This appeal followed.

(3) the appraised value of the property exceeds the median appraised value of a reasonable number of comparable properties appropr iat ely adjust ed. T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN

. § 42.26(a)(1)

– (3). The statute goes on to set out how the court should calculate any relief awarded to the property owner. T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN

. § 42 .26(b).5

II. Stan dard of Review “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Tarr v.
Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n , Inc. , 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018) (citing Jo e v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture , 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 (2004)). “To preva il on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” T EX

. R. C IV

. P . 166a(c). “The evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable an d fair

- minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all the summary judgment evidence.” Lam v. Phuong Nguyen , 335 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2011, pet. denied ) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes , 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 20 07) (per curiam)). We consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion.” City o f Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). As in this case,
whe n the trial court’s order granting a party’s summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied upon, an appellate court must affirm if any of the summary judgment grounds are

mer i torious. Cunningham v. Tarski , 365 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err When it Granted PPF Gin’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Denied DCAD’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
A. Introduction The summary judgm e nt evidence in this case establishes that the module truck s in question are equipped with cotton module retriever beds, which are designed to load and haul harvested cotton modules to the gin, where they will be unloaded and filtered. The trucks are6

equi p ped with bed chains and tracks to guide the modules when t hey are being loaded. The beds have sidewalls, bows, and a tarp to enclose the cotton modules during transportation. The truck manufacturer, Stover Equipment Company, Inc. (Stover), markets, se ll s , repairs, and services the
trucks in all cotton

- producing states around the United States to cotton gins, independent cotton producers , and custom cotton haulers. Customers select the type of chassis they want, and then
Stover will add or mount the modu l e bed. Notably, to add the cotton module bed to the chass is, alterations are made to the plumbing, shafts, and cylinders, and oil tanks can be added. These additions or alterations make PPF Gin’s cotton module trucks specific to the cotton

- farming
indus t ry. When the trucks are not being used during the harvest ing season, they are “parked” and not used for any other reason. The trial court ruled that the module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxation under
Section 11.161 of the Tax Code , which state s : “Machinery and equipment items that are used in the prod uction of farm or ranch products or of timber, regardless of their primary design, are considered implements of husbandry and are exempt from ad valorem taxation.” T EX

. T AX
C ODE A NN . § 11.161. Re s olution of this case turns on the correct interpretation o f Section
11.161.
B. Rules of Statutory Construction Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. MCI Sales & Serv.,
Inc. v. Hinton , 329 S.W.3d 475, 500 (Tex. 2010). Our p rimary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys.,
Inc. , 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999); Pilgram’s Pride Corp. v. Cernat , 2 05 S.W.3d 110, 1177

(Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2 006, pet denied). “Where text is clear, text is determinative of that
intent.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009) (citing State v.
Shumake , 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) (“[W]h en possible, we discern [legislative int e nt] from the plain meaning of the words chosen.”)); see also Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., LP v.
Johnson , 209 S.W.3d 644, 651

– 52 (Tex. 2006). This is because “the Legislature expresses its intent by the words it en acts and declares to be law.” Bosque Di s posal Sys., LLC v. Parker City Appraisal Dist. , 555 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Molinet v. Kimbrell , 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011)). We begin with the “plain and common meaning of the statute’s words.” Fi tzgerald , 996 S.W.2d at 865 (quoting Lib e rty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors , 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998)). We construe the statute according to its plain language if the language is unambiguous. McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2 003); Fitzgerald , 996 S.W.2d
at 865

– 66. “This general rule applies unless enforcing the plain language of the statute as written would produce absurd results.” Summers , 282 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999)). Further, in determining l e gislative intent, we look at the statute as a whole and not isolated portions. In re M.N. , 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008). “We also presume that the Legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose, se e Eddins

- Walcher Butane Co. v.
Calvert , 2 98 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1957), and that words not included were purposefully omitted.” Id. (citing Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. , 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981)). When a statutory term is undefined, we will not fi nd “a meaning that is out of harmony or i nconsistent with other8

provisions in the statute.” McIntyre , 109 S.W.3d at 745 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Needham , 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002)). Similarly stated, we look to the meaning of the words used, or of a particular clause,
within the context of the statute, which “requires us to study the language of the specific provision at issue, within the context of the statute as a whole, endeavoring to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” Ritchie v. Rupe , 443 S.W.3d 856, 867 (Tex. 2014) (citing
In re Office of Att’y Gen. , 422 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013); Fitzgerald , 996 S.W.2d at 866). Generally, “the words [the Legislature] chooses sh ould be the surest guide to legislative intent.”
Summers , 282 S.W.3d at 437 (quoting Fitzgerald , 996 S.W.2d at 866). “Only when those words are ambiguous will we ‘resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids.’” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Nash , 22 0 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. 2007)). Nevertheless, “[i]n construing a statute,
whether or not the sta t ute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: (1) object sought to be obtained; (2) circumstances under which the st atute was enacted; [and] (3) legislative history. . . .” T EX . G OV’T C ODE A NN . § 311.023.
As DCAD points out, “Exemptions from taxation are not favored by the law and will be strictly construed.” Bullock v. Nat’l Bancshares Corp. , 584 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex . 1979). Statutory tax exemptions are strictly construed because they result in placing a greate r burden on some taxpayers, rather than all of them. Baptist Mem’l Geriatric Ctr. v. Tom Green Cty. Appraisal Dist. , 851 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1993, pe t. denied). However, “the rule of strict construction” does not “require the adoption of the lea s t reasonable of two possible constructions, and particularly if that one be less effective to accomplish the manifest purpose of9

the exemption.” City of Abil ene v. State , 113 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 1937, writ dism’d), disapproved on other gr o unds by City of Beaumont v. Fertitta , 415 S.W.2d 902, 911 (Tex. 1967).
C. Application
1. Legislative His tory of Section 1 1.161

a. Const itut io nal Autho rity for Section 11.161 and the November 2, 1982 , Constitutional Amendment
Pursuant to the power granted in A rt i cle VIII, Section 1 , of the Texas Constitution , the
6 7 th Tex as L e gis lature adopted Sec tion 11.161 of the Tax Code . T ex. Att ’ y Gen . O p. No. MW

451 (1982). In its original form, Section 11.161 stated, “ Implements of Farming or Ranching.
An individ ual i s e ntitled to an exemption fro m ta xation of implements of farming or ra nching
that he owns and uses i n the production of farm or ranc h p ro ducts. ” Act of Aug. 10, 1981, 67 th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 13, § 32, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 117, 127 ( co dified as an ame n dme nt to T EX

. P ROP

. C ODE § 11.161). In 1982 , during the sec on d called se ssion of the 67 th Legislature , the Texas Legislature adopted a j oint r esolution proposing to a mend Ar ticle VIII of the T e xas Constitution by adding Se ction 19a, to state : “Implement s o f husbandry that are used i n t he production of fa rm or ranc h products are exemp t fr om ad v alorem ta xation. ” Act of May 28, 1982, Tex. S.J. Res. 8, § 1, 67th Leg., 2d C.S., 1982 Tex. Gen. Laws 50, 50 (enacted).
The Texas Legisla tive Coun cil noted in i ts an al ysis of this pro posed constitutional
amendm ent , The proposed amendment does not define “ implements of husbandry, ” but express language li miting the ava ilabilit y of the exemption to those impl ements of husbandry used in th e prod uction of farm o r ra n c h product s implies tha t the10

exemption applies only to those implements that are actually used for agricultural purposes such a s growing crops or raising lives tock. A lthough “ implements of husbandry ” t raditionally may have refer red to agricultur al to ols o r u tensi ls that formed part of, or were attached to, equipm ent or machinery driven by horsepower, in recent times th e term has come to include various self

- pro pelled m achinery and equipment items suc h as tractors, planting machin es, and combines. The ball o t proposi tion for the prop osed amendment includes clarifying language indica ting that “ implements of husbandry ” includes “ agricultural machinery and equipment , ” demon strating an intent to adopt the broader, modern meaning of the word.
Texa s Legislat ive C o un cil, A n alysis of Pro p osed Const it utional Amendme nts Appearing on
N ovember 2, 1982 , Ballot, Information Report No. 8 2

- 3, Jul y 1 982 , https://lrl.texas.gov/ s canned/ Constitutional_Amendments/Amendments67_tlc_1982

- 11

- 02.pdf

. 5 On November 2 , 1982, the
citi zen s of the State of Te xas approved the amendment to Article VIII of the Texas Constitution

to a dd Section 19 a
. See T EX . C ONST

. a rt. V I I I , § 19a.

5 Th e analysis went on to state the arguments for th e amendment:

1. Th e p roposed amendment pro mises partia l relief for economically hard

- pres se d farmers a nd ra nchers wi thout seriou s adverse effect on local governments ’ tax bases. 2. Taxing agricultural equipme nt and machinery often is barely cost

- effective becaus e of the disp ro p or tionatel y high expense of locatin g the property and assessing and coll e cting the tax. It then l isted the a r guments against the amendment:

1. The voters have amended t he constitution twice since 1979 to g ive tax relief to farmers and ranchers

-- expanding e li g ib ility fo r favorable metho ds of va luing agricul tural land and totally e x empting fr om taxation l ivestock and pou ltry in the hands of the producer. A dditional tax r el ief for farmers and ranc he r s is not needed. 2. I t is trite b ut true: a tax e xemption mere ly sh i fts par t of the tax burden from the beneficiaries

-- farmers and ranche r s in this case
-- to all o ther t axpaye rs. O wners of homes and businesses, among others, will hav e to pay for the propose d exemptio n through higher property taxes. Texa s Legislative Co u nc il, A n al ysis of Prop osed Const it u tional Amendme nts Appearing on N ovemb e r 2, 1982 , Ballot, Information Repo rt No. 8 2

- 3, Jul y 1 982 , https://lrl.texas.gov/ scanned/Constitutional_Amendments/ Amendments67_tlc_1982

- 11

- 02.pdf

. By approving the ame ndment, the citizens of the State of Texas rejected the arguments against t he amen dm e nt and ac cepted the arguments in fa vor of the amendment.11 b. Subsequ e nt Legis lative Amendm ents to Section 11.161 After the Adopti on of Article VIII, Section 19a , of the Te xas Constitution
Th e Texas Legislature significantly amended Section 11.161 on two occasions after
Article VII I, Section 19a , of the Tex as C on st i tution was adopte d , e ach time ex pa nding the

exem ption in Section 11.161

. 6 It was first amended in 1983 to exp and the exemption fr om property owne d and used by the taxpayer to simply property “ used in the production of farm

. . . products. ” “ Sec. 11.161. IMPLEM ENT S OF FARMING OR RANCHING

. Im p l em e nts of husbandry that are use d in the production of farm or ran ch products are exempt from ad valorem

tax ation

. ” A ct of May 25, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 851, § 7, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4819, 4823 (footnote omitted) (ef

f. Aug. 29, 1983). Sec tion 11.161 was also amended i n 2005 to read as it presently reads : 7 “ Sec. 1 1. 1 61

. I M PLEMENTS OF HUSBANDRY. Mach inery and equipment
items that are use d in the production of farm o r ranch products or o f timber, regar dle ss of their primary design, are considered to be implements of husbandry and are exemp t fro m ad valorem
taxatio n. ” Act of M ay 27, 20 0 5, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 412, § 6, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1103, 1 105 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006). Our resolution of this case calls for us to interpret Section 11 .161 i n l i ght of
th e s e constitutional and l egislative amendments

.

6 Se ction 11.161 was a mended on three other occasions, n one of which factor i nto our opinion. See Act of Mar. 25, 1991, 7 2d Leg., R.S., ch. 16, § 17.01, 1991 Tex. Gen Laws 244, 367 ; Act of M ay 22 , 1989, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 631, § 3, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3191, 3191 (eff. Jan. 1 , 2020) ; and Act of May 19, 2019 , 86th Leg., R. S. , ch. 370, § 1, 2019 Tex . Sess. Law Serv. 672, 672 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000).

7 The 2019 amendment design ated the origina l langua ge as subsection (a) and added new subsec tion (b), but it did not alter the lang ua ge of the statute as it existed after 2005.12 2. The Module Trucks Are Use d in The Pr oduction of Farm Products.

a. The Plain Language of Section 11.161 Supports PP F Gin ’ s Argu ment t hat t he Module Trucks Are Exempt F rom A d Valor em Taxation
W e begin by observing t hat Sec ti o n 1 1.161 does not state that “implements of h usbandry

are ex empt fro m ad valorem taxation ” ; instead, it states that “machinery and equipment items
that are used in the production of farm

. . . pro d ucts

. . . are exempt from ad valorem taxation .”
T E X

. T AX C OD E A NN

. § 11.161 (emphasis added)

. Althoug h Section 11.16 1 declar es that such “machinery and equipment items . . . are considered implements of husbandry , ” the question
before us is not whether the mo dule trucks in this cas e are “implement s of h usba nd ry ” but
ins tead whether they are “machinery or equipment items that ar e used in the produ ction of farm . . . products. ” Id

. Accordingly, the f irst qu estion we mu st resolve is whe ther the mod ul e tr ucks
i n this case are “ used in the production of farm

. . . products. ” The term “p roduction” i s not def ined by Section 11.161, and there are no cases interpreting that section. In this instance, the Supreme Court has held,
When a statu te uses a wo rd tha t it d o es no t define, our tas k is to determine and apply the word’s common, ordinary meaning. T he fact t hat the word ma y someti mes be used to convey a different meaning is the very reason why we look for its common, ordinary meaning. To determine i ts com mon, o r dinar y meaning , we loo k to a wide variety of sources, including dictionary de finitions, t reatises or commentaries , our ow n prior constr uctions of the word in other contexts, the use s and definitions of t he word in other statutes and ordinances , and the u se s of t he words in our r ules of evidence and procedure.
Jaster v. Comet II Con struction, I nc . , 438 S.W.3d 556, 56 3 (Tex. 2014).
Webste r’s Dictionary defines the term “production” as “2 a: the act or pr ocess of producing b: the cre ation of ut ility , esp : t he mak ing of go ods available for use 3: total output,13

esp. of a com modity or an industry avail able for use.” Product ion , W EB STER ’ S C OLLEGIATE
D ICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2006). Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “production” as “ 1. The

ac t o r pr ocess o f m aking o r growin g things, esp. those to be sold <the production of consumer goods >
. . . 3. The creation of eco nomic va lue; the making available of goods to satisfy human desires <the production and consump tion of wealth>

. ” Produc tion , B LAC K’ S L AW D ICTI ON AR Y ( 10 th ed. 2014 ). T herefore , the term production is defined in two ways. According to the f irst
definition , produc tion is synonymous with the mere crea tion of farm products

. Using that
defin ition , th e pr o duction of cotton would end w h en the cotton b ol ls r ipen on the plan t

. Accor ding to the seco nd definition , production is the creation of farm prod u cts to the extent that they become available for use by other s and create economic value

. Using that defin i t ion , the productio n of co tton wou l d inclu de every s tage of prod uction fr om the cultivation of the cotton plants to the point that the cotton o n those plants become a vailable for sale in a form that is usable by others

. As explained below, w e find that the se cond defin ition is the correc t one
. To begi n with , Sectio n 11.161 states that the exemption applies to “machinery or equipment items that are used in th e p roduc tion of farm . . . products .” T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN

. § 11 .161 ( emphasis added)

. While Section 11 .161 does not define the term “farm p rodu cts, ”
Section 11.1 6 does

. T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN . § 11.16 (a) , (b) (Supp.)

. Section 11. 16 provides “ a n exemption f

rom taxa tion of the farm products that [a producer] produces and owns ” as well as
those “ in the hands of the pro ducer. ” T E X

. T AX C ODE A NN

. § 1 1. 16 ( b ). Section 11.1 6 g oes on to

state that “ ‘ [f] arm products ’ include livestock, poultry, and t imb er , ” T EX

. T A X C ODE A NN

. §
11.16 (c)(1) , and that “[a] n ursery product, as defined by Section 71.041, Agricu lture Code, is a14

farm prod uct for purpose s of thi s se ction if it is in a growing state , ” T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN

. §
11.16 (a). S ection 71.041 (3) of the A gri culture Code defines “ n ursery product” as “a tree, shrub, vine, cutting, graft, scion, grass , bulb, or bud that is grown for, kept f or, or is ca pable of,
p r opagation and distri bution fo r sale or lease.” T E X

. A GRIC

. C ODE A NN . § 71.041 (3).
T hus, under a p lain reading of Sect ion 11.16 of the Tax Code and Section 71.041 (3) of
the A gricu lture Code , farm products “include livestock, poultry, and timber,” as wel l as any “t re e, shrub, vine, cutt ing, graf t, scion , grass, bulb, or bud that is g rown for, kept fo r, or is capabl e of, pr opagation and distribution for sale o r lea se.” Id

. This definition of “ farm products ” includes every stage from the creation of the p r oduct to t he point that it is av ailable f or sale in a form that is usable by oth ers
. Therefore, w he n Section 11 .161 ’ s l anguage “ used in the
pro duction of fa rm . . . products ” is read in light of t he definition of “ farm products ” in Section
11. 16 , then Se c tion 11.16 1 ’ s exemption for “ mac hinery or equipment items that are used in the
p roduc tion of farm

. . . products ” would include all “ machinery or equip ment i tems ” used by the producer 8 fr om the creation of the crop to the point that the product i s availab l e for sale in a form

t hat is us able by others

.

8 As noted, under the facts of this case, P P F Gin is the pr odu cer of the cott on that the module tr ucks pi cked up and d elivered to t he gin

. According ly, we need not examine the effect of the 1983 amendment changing t he exemption from “ implements o f farming or ranching ” that an individual “ owns and uses in the production of f arm or ranch products ” to “ machinery or equipment items used in the production of farm or ranch products. ” Rather, our int erpretatio n of S ection 1 1.161 in this case is limited to “ machinery or equipment items u sed in the p roduc tion of farm . . . products ” by t he producer

. W e ex press no opinion regarding the applic abi lity of Section 11.1 61 to any such “ machinery or equipment items ” use d by som eone other than the producer.15 b. Exemption of t he Module Tru cks Is Consistent With t he Prop erty Ta x Scheme in Chapter 11 of the Tax Code
Second , this conclus ion is cons is tent with the statut ory schem e in Chapter 11

. Secti on 11.01 (c) cr e ate s broad authority for taxing tangible personal property

. T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN

. § 11. 01 (c) ( “ This sta te has jurisd i c tion to tax tangible personal property if the property is (1) located i n this state for lon ger than a temporary period. ” ). Section 1 1.14 (a) cr eate s a broad exemption from taxation for “ all tangible pers onal property . . . that [a] pe rson ow ns and t hat is
not held or used for the p roduction of income. ” T EX

. T AX C ODE A N N . § 11.1 4 (a). 9
Co nsequen tl y, when Section s 11.01 ( c) and 11.1 4 (a ) are read to gether , th e State 10 only has the authority to tax tangible p ers onal property that is “ held or use d fo r t he product ion of i ncome
. ” Clearly, the machinery and equi pment items o f a commercial farme r “ used i n the production of farm

. . . products ” are “ used t o produce income ” ; therefore, the tangible personal property o f a commercial farmer would ordinari ly be subject t o tax ati on under S ection 11.01 (c)
because it is not exempt f r om taxation under Se ction 11. 14. However, Sectio n 11.1 61 exempts

“ m achi nery or eq uip ment items used in the production of farm

. . . products

. ” T EX

. T AX C ODE
A NN . § 11.1 61. Yet, b ec ause Section 11 .14 e xempts from taxation all tangible personal property (including machi n ery and equipment items ) that are not inc ome producing , then an y n on
incom e
- produci ng “ machinery or equi pment i te m s used in the produc tion of f arm . . . products ”

9 Sec tion 311.005 (2) of the Government Code states , “ ‘ Person’ includes corporation, organization, go ver nment or governm ental subd ivision or agency , b usiness t rust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal entit y .” T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 311.005 (2). And the exemption in Sec tion 1 1.14 (a) au tomatically applies wi thout any action by t

he owner. See T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN . § 11.43 (a).

10 A rtic le VIII, Section 1

- e , of the Texas C onstitution states, “No ad valorem taxes s hall be levied upon any property within this State. ” T EX . C ONST

. a rt. VIII, § 1

- e. Nevertheless, local governmental a ge nci es s till retain th e power to levy ad valorem t a xes
. W

. Oran ge - Cove Consol. Indep

. Sch

. Dist. v. Alan is , 78 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tex. A p p.

— Austin 2002), rev ’d on othe r grounds , 10 7 S .W.3d 558 ( Tex. 2003)

.16

w oul d already be ex empt from ad valorem taxation. Thus, the exemption in Section 11.1 61 m ust
be directed towards machinery or equi p ment item s that are income producing ; o therwise, there
woul d be no need fo r the exemption under Section 11.161

. Merely gro wi ng a crop is no t i ncome produc ing; t herefore, the exemption in Section 11.1 61 must exte nd to all uses of “ machinery an d equipment items

. . . in the productio n of farm . . . products ” that a re necessary to develop the crop to the point tha t it is available fo r sale in a manner t hat is useable by others

. Moreover , the secon d i nterpretation is consistent with the la nguage of Section 11. 14.
Sectio n 11.14 exempt s “ tangib le personal pr operty . . . that is not held or used for p roduc tion of
income. ” T EX

. T AX C OD E A NN . § 11. 14 ( a ). Sec t ion 11.1 6 exe mp t s specific inco me pr oducing

t angible personal pro perty that is “ held ” by the owner
. T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN . § 11.1 6 ( a ) , (b) ( “ farm products that [a producer] produces and owns ” and “ farm pro duc ts in the hands of the
pro ducer ” ). S e ction 11 .1 61 exempt s ot he r specific income

- pro ducing ta ngible personal p roperty
that is “ used ” by the owner

. 11 T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN . § 11.1 61 ( “ ma chi nery or equipment items
that are used in the production of fa rm . . . products ” ). Consequently , w e find that Section
11 .161 use s t he t e rm “production” in t he second sense

— i.e

. , that production includes every sta ge of production by the producer from the mere creation of fa rm products to the point that th ey are avail able for sale in a form that is us abl e by others

— a nd ther efore, Sectio n 1 1.161 ’ s exemption
fo r “ machin ery or equipment items that are used in the produc tion of farm

. . . products ” would
inclu de all “ machinery or equip ment items ” owned and used by the pro ducer from the creation of
the crop to the point t h at the product is av ai l able for sale in a f orm that is usable by others

.

11 See supra note 11.17 c. Exemption of t h e Module Trucks Is Consistent w ith t he Constitution al a nd Legisl ative History of Section 11.161 Finally, as noted previously, Article VIII, Section 19( a) , was inte nded to “ adopt th e broader, mo de rn meaning of the term ” “ impleme nts of husband ry. ” Texa s Legislative Council,
A nalysis of Prop osed Const it utio nal A mendme nts Appearing on N ovember 2, 1982 , Ballot,
In formation Report No. 8 2

- 3, Jul y 1 982 , http s:/ /lrl.texa s.g ov/ scanned/ Con stitutional_
Amendments/ Amendments67_tlc_1982

- 11

- 02.pdf

. And , the Legisla ture has twice amended
Section 11.1 61 after the adoption of Section 19 (a) to expand t he s c ope of tha t exempt ion. Thu s, both S ection 19(a ) and the Legi s lati ve hi story behind Section 11.1 61 indicate an intent by both
the citizens of the State of Texa s and the Texas L e gislature to apply the exemption in Section
11.161 broadly

. Consequen tl y, the second definition of “ produ ction ” is mo re consistent with the

c ons ti tut ion al and l eg islative history of Section 11.161 than the first d efinition

. W hen we appl y
t he second definition t o the module trucks in question, it is c l ear that t h ey are exempt f rom a d
valorem taxation under S e ction 11. 161. Logically, a crop mu s t be h arv este d to be available for sale in a form that is us able by
others . Therefore, a c ombine would be exempt from ad valorem taxes as an “implement of husbandry” under S ection 11.161 b ecau se it is “used in t he produ c tion of f arm . . . products.”
T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN

. § 11.161. And the Le gislativ e Coun cil ’ s analysis of Article VIII, Section 19(a) , state s t hat , “ in recent times , the term [implements of husbandry] has come to include

. . . equi pment item s suc h as tractors , planting ma chines, a nd c ombines

. ” Id

. (emp hasis added). Yet,

a comb in e merely removes the cotto n bolls from the plant and compresses the m into a module in the field. At that point , the crop is literally still in the field “[un]av ailab le for use.” Production,18

W EBSTER ’ S C OLLEGIATE D ICTI O NARY (11 t h e d

. 2006). To be fully available for sa le in a form
that is usable by others, th e n, the modules must be removed from the field. Accordi ngly,
removal of the modules from the field is related to “the production of farm

. . . pro ducts.” T EX

. T A X C ODE A NN

. § 11.161. Because one of the module truck ’ s functions is to r emove the cotton
mod ules from the field , and in li ght of th e intent to “ adopt the broader, mo dern meaning of the

term ” “ implements of husbandry , ” the module trucks c onstitute “machin e ry . . . used in the production of farm

. . . produc t s ” 12 and ar e, the refore , exempt from ad valorem taxes under
Section 11.161

. 13

2. U se of The Module Tr ucks t o Transpo rt t he Modules to t he Gin Does Not Defeat t he Exem ption Under Section 11.161 Of course, a s noted p r eviously , the modul e trucks in this case no t only remov e t he cotton
modules from th e field, the y also transport the m to th e gin. DCAD argues that t here is a
disti nction for purposes of S ection 11.161(a) between product ion of farm product s and

t r ansp ortat i on fo r processing and that , because PPF G in ’ s cotton m o dul e trucks a re transportati on veh icles, the y are not im plements of husbandry

. DCAD contends that the truck s

12 See Texas Legislative Council Analysis, supra p. 17.

13 We note that the Texas Leg islative Council’s Analysis states that although the proposed amendment does not define ‘implements of husbandry,’ . . . the express language limiting the availability of the exemption to those implements of husbandry used in the production of farm or ran ch products implies that the exemption applies onl y to those implements that are a ctually used for agricultural purposes such as growing crops or raising livestock

. See Texas Legislative Council Analysis, supra p. 10 (emphasis added)

. If read in isolation , it could be argued that the highlighted language suggests that the exemption do e s not apply to any machinery or equipment items used after the fruit ripens on the plant. Nevertheless , the analysis goes on to say that “combines”

— which are clearly not u sed in “growing crops”

— are included within “the broader, modern meaning of the w ord [ machinery or equipment items ].” Id . Therefore, our interpretation and Section 11.161 does not conflict with the Legislative Council’s Analysis of Art. VI I I, Section 19 a , of the Texas Constitution

.19

“are no t designed for or used in the pro cess of growing or harvesting cotton. T h ey are
sp e cific ally designed for and m arke ted to co tt on processor s as hauler s , and used in t he pro cess of hauling and pro cessing ha rvested cotton into cotton fiber.” Consequ ently , DCAD maintains , they are not “impl ements of h usband ry” and are, therefor e, not tax e x empt pur suant t o Section
11.161

. DCAD did n o t attach summ ary judgment e vi dence to its motion or to its respon se to PPF
Gin’s motion. Instead, it relie d entirely on PPF’s summary judgment evidence. It directs us to a 1982 a ttorney g eneral ’s o p inion , on e civil a nd one criminal case , an d two sectio n s of the Texas
Tra nsportat ion Code purport i ng to define implements of husbandry i n the context of vehi cle
l icensi ng tax exemptions. Those authori ties are clearly dis tinguishable from the prese nt case

. To beg i n with, A ttorney G eneral O pi nion number MW

- 4 51 , cited by DC AD , was issue d prior to the a doption of Article VIII , Section 1 9(a). G i ven the s ignificant amendments to Section
11.161 since the n, the a ttorney g eneral o pinion is no longer pers uasive

. In addit i on, th e opini on relied on cases i nterpreting t he statute declar ing certain property to be e xempt from execution by
creditors , whi ch includes implements of husbandry

. T he Office of the Attorne y General (OAG)
op in ed that implements of husb andry a r e “ t hose i t ems of equipment or machinery whose p rimary design and primary use or purpo se is th at of an implem ent used by a farmer or rancher in conducting his farming o r ranchin g operation s
. ” Tex. Att ’ y Gen. Op. No. MW

- 451 ( 1982) ( citing former T EX

. R EV

. C IV

. S TAT

. A NN

. art. 3832(4) , now codified at T EX . P ROP

. C O DE A NN § 42.0 02 (a) (4) )

. Nevertheless , in 2006

— subsequent to t he O AG ’ s opinio n

— the Texa s Legis l at ure amen d ed Section 11.161 by adding the language stating that th e e xemption applies to20

“mac hinery o r equipme n t items that are used in the production of farm . . . products . . . , regardless of their primary design

. ” T E X . T AX C O DE A NN

. § 11.161 (emp hasis added ). Thus,
the OAG ’ s opinion now contradicts th e express language of Section 11.1 61. Although an
attorn e y general’s opinio n may be persuasive, it is not binding on thi s Cour t. See Ci ty of Dallas
v. Abbott , 3 04 S.W. 3d 380, 3 84 (Tex. 2010 ) (citin g Holmes v. Morales , 924 S.W .2d 920, 924 (Tex. 1996) )

. W hile w e ag ree with the OAG opinion th at the det e rmination of whether property is exempt from ad valorem taxation is made on a case
- by

- case basis , we reject the OAG ’ s int erpr etation of th e scope of Section 11 .161 ’ s exe m ption

. 14
DCAD als o direct s us to A llre d v. J.C. Engelman , Inc. ( Allred I ) , 40 S. W.2 d 9 45, 946 ( T ex. App.

— San Antonio 1 931 , writ ref ’ d ). Th er e are actually tw o court of ap peals opinions

an d one Supreme Court o pinion in Allr ed , all of which considered the applicability of a statuto ry exemption to a vehicle li cense fee for “ implements of hus b and ry. ” I d

. ; Allred v. J

.C. Engleman,
Inc

. ( Allred II ) , 54 S.W.2d 352 (Tex . App.

— Sa n Antonio 1932) , aff irme d , Allred v. J.C. Eng elman, Inc

. (

Allred III ) , 61 S.W.2d 75, 78 ( Tex. 193 3 )

. In Allred I , the court of appeals

re viewed the trial cour t ’ s order gr a nting a t e mporary injunct ion. Allred II I , 61 S.W.2d at 78. In
Allred I I , th e cour t of a ppeals review ed the trial court ’ s ju dgm ent making the prelim inary injunction permanent. A ll red II , 54 S.W.2d at 352. In both cases, t he court of appeals
d eterm ined t hat truck s used to car ry wat er to i rr igate citrus trees and a gasoline t ruck des igned

an d u sed fo r the sol e purpos e of p r oviding gasoline to tractors in the orchards and fields were exempt from the lice nsi ng requ irement s as implements o f husban dry b e cause they were used in

14 We express no opinion re g arding t he OAG ’ s opinions dist inguishing between sta tionary structures vers us mov eable machinery and equipment ite ms.21

grow ing cro ps rat he r than in a commercial nature. Id. Pursua nt to Allred I , D CAD cont ends that
the c o tton module tr uck s are commercia l in n ature but that they were not used to grow crops.
A llred I , II , and I

II examined the moto r veh ic le licen s e exemption for vehicles tr avel ing public roads contained in A rticle s 6675a

- 1 (q) and 6675a

- 2 of the T exas Civi l Statutes. Allred II , 54 S.W .2d at 352 ( citing T EX

. R EV

. C IV . S TAT . A NN

. , now codified at T EX . T RANS

. C ODE A NN

. § § 502.001 (20 ), 502.0 40 (Su pp.) )

. At the time of A ll red I , II , and I II , the motor vehicle

r egistration statute s p rovided tha t “ owners of

. . . implements of husbandry, operated or moved temporarily upon the high ways shall not be requi red to register such . . . im plements of
h u s b andry. ” Allred I

II , 61 S.W. 2d at 77. In ruling that Allred ’s equipment was exempt from
vehicl e regist ration as impleme nts of husbandry, the Supreme C ourt held, “ It is clear that the purpose of the legi slation was to exempt from re gistrat ion al l motor v eh icles pr i marily des igned
and used for a gricultural purpose s, temporarily using the highw a ys. ” Id

. 15
As with the O AG o pinion, the Supreme Court rel ied on the primary design or purpose of
the equipment in question to determine that they were ex em pt from t he r egis t ration req uirements as imple ments of husbandry , w hereas Section 11.1 61 now exempts “ m achinery or equip ment

15 T he Supreme Co urt co ncluded, The water trucks are de signed for the so le pu rpose of carrying wa ter for irrigation purposes, and because of their design could hardl y be used for an y other pu rpose. I t is shown by the record that the tract in question was in that section o f the state which requires irrigation in order to mak e the land pr oductive. I t i s also shown that no irrigat ion ditch was available to provide wate r to this particular tract. O bviously, with these facts in m ind, the defend ant in error has obtained these t rucks and designed them for the purpos e of carrying t he wa ter which is necessa r y to make the land productive

. I t is hard to conceive of any motor vehic le wh ich could more ne arl y be designed primarily for agricul tural purposes. I n like manner, the gasolin e carriers have been designed by their owner fo r the pa

rti cular use to which t h e y are being put, and with ou t [sic ] which the tractors in the orch ards a nd fields would be ren dered useless. W hile they might conceivably be put to other uses, they were de sig ned primarily and used exclusively for agri cultural p ur pos es. Allred III , 61 S.W. 2d at 7 8.22

item s used in the production of fa rm . . . products . . . , regardless of their primary design

. ” T EX

. T AX C ODE A NN

. § 11.16 1 (emphasis ad de d). Als o , th e reg istration stat ute in question con tained a temporar y use elem ent that is not present in S ection 11.161. Allred I II , 61 S.W. 2d a t 77 ( “ owners of . . . implements of husbandry, oper ated or moved temporarily upon the high ways

s hall not be re quired t o reg ister such . . . implements of husband ry ” ) (emph asis added )

. And,

on ce again, Section 11.161 does no t exe mpt implements of h usbandry per se , it exempts “machinery or equipment items used in the production o f farm . . . pr oducts

. ” T EX . T AX C O DE
A NN

. § 11.161

. Accordingly, we find that the Allred opinions are dis tinguishabl e from the
pr esen t case.
DCAD also cites to Reaves v. S tate , 50 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Crim. App . 1931). R eaves was a cri minal cas e interpret ing an ex cept io n to a penal statu te that m a d e it illegal for a person to “oper[a te] upon a publi c highway a mo tor vehic le of f orbidden l ength.” Id. at 286

. The
defendant did not dispute that he had operated a ve hic le in a ma nner t hat v iolat ed the st atute, yet
he argued th at his conduct fel l withi n an exception for “implements o f husba ndry . . . temporar ily propelle d o r moved upo n the public h ighways.” Id

. The Court of Cr imina l A ppeals held that , “without d iscu ssi ng or decidi ng” wheth er a vehicle m ore than fo rty

- five feet i n length coul d
p ractica l ly be used on a farm, it admitt ed that , “if a farmer shou ld desire to tran sport such vehicle
alon g the highway s from place of purc has e t o place of intended use, or from on e place of us e t o

ano ther, this wou ld be the ‘ temporary pro pe lling or movi ng’ contem p lated by [the exception] . . .
and hen ce would be permiss ible.” Id. at 28 7

. Th us, the court in Reaves as sume d , without deciding , t hat the defendant’s equipment constituted an “implement of husbandry , ” but23

concluded t hat the excep ti on did not a ppl y ba sed on the defendant’s p rimar y use of that equipment to transport a load a cross the h ig h ways
. Id

. As noted above , Section 11.161 does not

e xempt implements of husbandry per se, it has no ele ment for the dur ation of use o n the public

ro ads , and it app lies “ r e g ardless of [the machinery or equipment items ’ ] primary design

. ” T EX

. T AX C ODE A N N

. § 11.161

. Thus, Reaves i s not applicable to this case

. DCAD also r efers to Se ction 541.201(6) of the Texas Transportation C ode, whi ch defines
“i mp lement of hu sba ndry” a s

(A) a vehi cle, other tha n a p asseng er car or truck, that is designed and adapte d for use as a fa rm implemen t , machinery, or tool fo r ti lling the soil ; (B) a to wed vehicle that transpo rts to the field and sp reads fe rtilizer or a gr icultu ral ch emi cals; o r (C) a motor vehi cle desig ned a nd ado pted to deliver feed to livestock

. T EX

. T RA NSP

. C ODE A NN . § 541.201(6) ( Supp.)

. Once again, Sectio n 11.161 does not exempt

“ implements of husbandry ” per se, it exempts “machinery or equipment i tems used in th e produ c tion of farm . . . products , ” and it do es so “ regardless of their primar y design

. ” T EX . T AX
C ODE A NN

. § 11.16 1

. The constitutio nal and legislative history behind Section 11.16 1 refl ects a unique concern reg arding ad val or em taxation of ag ricul tur al equi p ment as opposed to lic e nsure
. B e cause Sectio n 541.201(6) is a licensing st atute rathe r than an ad valo rem tax a tion statute, it is inapposite to thi s case. Finall y , DCAD direct s us to Section 5 02.146 of the Texas Transp ortation Co de , w hich

sta tes , in pa r t, as follows:

(a) The depar tment shall iss ue distinguishing license pl at es to a veh icle des cribe d by Sub s ec t ion (b) or (c). The fee for th e license plates is $5 and shall be depos ited to the credit of the Texas Depart ment of Mo t or V ehicle fu nd.24 (b) A n owner is not required to re giste r a vehicle that is used onl y tempo rar il y on the hi ghways i f the veh icle is:

(1) a farm trailer or farm s emitrailer with a gross weight of more th an 4,000 pou nds but not m ore tha n 34,0 00 poun ds t ha t is used exc lus ively:

(A) to transport seasonall y har vested agricultural products or liv est oc k from the place of prod ucti on t o the p lace of processing, market, or storage.

. . . . (c) An owner is n o t required to registe r a vehicl e that is:

(1) a fa rm trailer o r far m semit r ailer owned by a cotton g in an d used exclusively to transp ort agr icu lt ural produc ts witho ut ch arge fro m the pl a ce of production to the pl ace of processing, market, o r storage

. . . . T EX

. T R ANSP

. C ODE A NN . § 5 02.146 (Supp.)

. W it hout offering any legal a uthority in support of it s posi tion, DCAD asserts that Sect ion
502 .14 6 , subsectio ns (b) an d (c) , “ ackno w ledge t he difference between vehi cles used as implements of husbandry and vehicl es used f or transportation of ha rvested far m pr oducts, as wel l

a s disti n gui sh [] the place of prod uction from the place of processin g.” Yet, e ven if we a ssume with out d e c iding that D C AD ’ s interpretation of S ec tion 502.146 is correct, that statute con tains a temporary

- use element that is not presen t i n Section 11.161 , a nd its d efini tion of the term

“ im plements of husbandry ” for purposes of that co de ’ s licen s ing and re gistrat ion req uire m ents
does not reflect the constitutional and legi slative history be hind Section 11. 16 1 ’ s exemption for
“m achinery or e qu ipment items u sed in the production of farm . . . products . . . , regardless of their primary design

. ” T EX . T AX C OD E A NN

. § 11.161

. A ccordingly, we find n othing in Section 502.146(c)(1) tha t cha nges our analysis.25 3. Summary In summary , DCAD ’ s prop os ed interpretation of Se ction 1 1 .161 would restric t

a pplication of the exemption to non

- transport ation uses. It would effectively disregard the

c onstitutional and legislative amendments since 1982 and return the scope of Se ction 11.161 ’ s exemption to its pre
- 1982 status. N ot hin g in the s t atute suggests such a d istinction, and , in fact,
the constitutional and l egislative history behind Section 11.1 61 in d i cates an opposite intent to
exp and the exemption to apply to modern agricul tural machinery that perform inc ome
- p roducing
fun cti ons. B eca u se exemption of the modul e t rucks in this case is consi stent with the plain language of Section 11.161, the tax ation s cheme in Chapter 11 of the Tax Code , as well as t he constitutional and legislative history behin d Sect ion 1 1.161 , we find th at the module trucks in
this case are exempt from ad valore m taxation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting
PPF Gin ’ s motion for summary j udgment.
IV . DCAD Faile d to Prop er ly Brief Its Second Point of Err or
In its sec ond p oi nt of error, DCA D c ontends th a t the tr ial court e rre d in gran ting PPF Gin’s motion for summary j udgment des pite the existenc e of a disputed issue of m a terial fact as to whether PPF Gin’s vehic les were us ed during the production of f arm produ cts. I n resp on se, PPF Gin m ain tai ns that DC A D waived its point o f error because it did not make a clear and

co ncise argum ent or cite to th e re cord in support of its position. W e agree. “The Texas Rul es of Appellat e Procedure control the require d content s and o r ganiz at ion for an ap pel lan t’s brief. ” Valade z v. Avita , 23 8 S.W. 3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2007 , n o pet.) (ci ting T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.1)

. In order to av o id forfeitin g a legal argument for i nadeq uate26

brie fi ng, an appellant’s brief must contain “ a clear and co nci se argument f or the conten t ions
mad e, with ap p r op riate c itations to authorities and the recor d. ” T EX . R . A PP . P. 38.1(i)

. “ Failure to cite legal a uthority or provide substantive anal ysis of the le ga l issues presented results in
waiver o f the co mplai nt .” Id. (citing Mar tine z v . E l Paso C ty

. , 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.

— E l Paso 2007 , pet. struck).
He re, DCAD’s second point of error is presente d as follows:
B ased on the re le vant [summary judgment] authorities in dica ting that t h e use of a vehicle for production of far m pr odu c ts is no t the same as its use for transportatio n or proces sing of harvested far m products, the summary judgment ev idence do e s not show the re is no dispu te as to the fact that PPF ’s vehicles we re u sed “ in t he production” of farm products.
As s u ch, DCA D d i d n ot provide us with a clear and concise argum ent and did not direct us to the necessary and appropriate authorit ies and r e cord citati ons . Ac cord ingly , DCAD has failed to
prope rly raise t he issu e for ou r r eview

. DCAD’s second point of error i s , ther efo r e, overruled.
V. Conclusion We affirm the ju d gment of th e trial court.

Ralph K. Burgess Justice
Date Sub m itte d: March 2 4 , 20 21 D ate D ec ided: Ju ly 29 , 2021