IN T H E C O U R T O F C R IM IN A L A P P E A L S O F T E N N E S S E E 

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs December 18, 2013

WILLIAM ARTHUR SHELTON v. TONY HOWERTON, WARDEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Morgan County

No. 2013-CR-49 E. Eugene Eblen, Judge

No. E2013-01687-CCA-R3-HC-FILED-FEBRUARY 14, 2014

The Petitioner, William Arthur Shelton, appealsthe Morgan County Circuit Court’ssummary

dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2004 convictions for first degree

murder, three counts of false imprisonment, and two counts of vandalism and his effective

life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying relief.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE

and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

William Arthur Shelton, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe, Senior Counsel; and

Russell Johnson, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Petitioner was convicted upon proof that he stabbed Brian Hyatt to death after

becoming convinced that the victim and the Petitioner’s wife were having an affair, that he

damaged the victim’s cars, and that he prevented three people from leaving the Petitioner’s

cousin’s home in an attempt to confront the victim about the alleged affair. The Petitioner

appealed his convictions, and this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. See State

v. William Arthur Shelton, No. E2005-02014-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006),

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2007). The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the

ground that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court denied relief.

This court affirmed the denial. See William Arthur Shelton v. State, No. E2009-00582-CCA-
R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 12, 2010). The

Petitioner now seeks habeas corpus relief.

In his habeas corpus petition, the Petitioner contended that the first degree murder

statute effective when the offenses were committed was unconstitutional. He also contended

that the indictment was invalid because it failed to allege the killing was committed with

malice, lacked sufficient specificity to ensure the Petitioner understood the nature of the

charges against him, failed to state that the grand jurors were “duly elected, impaneled,

sworn, and charged” and were “good and lawful men,” erroneously identified the Petitioner

as John Shelton, and failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court summarily

dismissed the petition for relief, finding that the petition was “not well-taken.” This appeal

followed.

The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition

for habeas corpus relief. He argues that the indictment was invalid for the same reasons

raised in his petition for relief. The State responds that the trial court properly dismissed the

petition. We agree with the State.

The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question of

law that is reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Livingston, 197

S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2006); Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2001). In

Tennessee, habeas corpus relief is available only when it appears on the face of the judgment

or the record that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence the defendant

or that the sentence has expired. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). When

applicable, the purpose of the habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely a

voidable, judgment. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999); State ex rel. Newsom

v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968).

A void, as opposed to a voidable, judgment is “one that is facially invalid because the

court did not have the statutory authority to render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 212

S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007). A voidable judgment “is one that is facially valid and

requires proof beyond the face of the record or judgment to establish its invalidity.” Id. at

255-56. The burden is on the petitioner to establish that the judgment is void or that the

sentence has expired. State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (Tenn. 1964).

The trial court, however, may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus without a hearing

and without appointing a lawyer when the petition does not state a cognizable claim for

relief. Hickman, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004); State ex rel. Edmondson v. Henderson,

421 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Tenn. 1967); see T.C.A. § 29-21-109 (2010).

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Our supreme court has concluded that “the validity of an indictment and the efficacy

of the resulting conviction may be addressed in a petition for habeas corpus when the

indictment is so defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction.” Dykes v. Compton, 978

S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998). “A valid indictment is an essential jurisdictional element,

without which there can be no prosecution.” Id. (citing State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727

(Tenn. 1997); State v. Stokes, 954 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tenn. 1997)). An indictment must

provide an accused adequate notice of the charged offense, adequate grounds upon which a

proper judgment may be entered, and protection against double jeopardy. Wyatt v. State, 24

S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Lindsey, 208 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2006). The statutory and constitutional requirements for an indictment are satisfied when the

indictment fulfills the “overriding purpose of notice to the accused.” State v. Hammonds, 30

S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tenn. 2000). The only defects which may be challenged at any time are

those that create a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the court and those that show the

indictment failed to charge an offense. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)(B); State v. Nixon,

977 S.W.2d 119, 120-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

In this case, the indictment stated, in relevant part, that

And the Grand Jurors upon their oath do further present that

WILLIAM ARTHUR SHELTON aka JOHN SHELTON

On or about the 21 day of October, 2003, in Bradley County, Tennessee, and

st

before the finding of this indictment, did unlawfully, intentionally and with

premeditation kill BRIAN HYATT, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-202, all of

which is against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.

The indictment was signed by the District Attorney General for the Tenth Judicial District.

At the time the offenses were committed in 2003, first degree murder was defined, in

relevant part, as “a premeditated and intentional killing of another.” T.C.A. § 39-13-

202(a)(1) (2010). We conclude that the indictment was not defective. The indictment

detailed the facts of the offense and referenced the first degree murder statute. The

indictment provided the Petitioner sufficient notice of the charged offense and provided the

trial court with adequate subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

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In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

___________________________________

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, PRESIDING JUDGE

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