alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Donnie Lawayne FOX, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-82-556.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Aug. 21, 1984.

E. Alvin Schay, Asst. Public Defender, Norman, for appellant.

Michael C. Turpén, Atty. Gen., William H. Luker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

PARKS, Judge:

On appeal from his conviction of Larceny of an Automobile After Former Conviction of a Felony, Case No. CRF-82-11, and sentence of ten (10) years imprisonment from the District Court of Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, the appellant, Donnie Lawayne Fox, hereinafter referred to as defendant, *293raises a single assignment of error. The facts of the case need not be set forth for purposes of this appeal.

Defendant complains that the trial court committed error by refusing to give a requested instruction on the lesser included offense of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, which differs from Larceny of an Automobile only in that it requires the perpetrator intended to temporarily deprive the owner of possession of his vehicle as opposed to permanently depriving the owner of possession of his vehicle. The defense at trial was the defendant was in such a state of intoxication as to be unable to form the specific intent required at the time he took possession of the automobile. As such, there was no evidence presented that the defendant intended to deprive the owner only temporarily. *Smith v. State,*544 P.2d 558 (Okl.Cr.1975). Where there is no evidence to support a lesser included offense of the crime charged, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to so instruct the jury. *Johnson v. State,*632 P.2d 1231 (Okl.Cr.1981); *Campbell v. State,*640 P.2d 1364 (Okl.Cr.1982); *Wren v. State,*556 P.2d 1308 (Okl.Cr.1976).

In the present case, if the jury believed the defendant was so intoxicated that he could not form any criminal intent, they could not convict him of any crime; and therefore, there could be no lesser included offense. If the defendant’s mental facilities were so overcome by alcohol that he was incapable of forming the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his car, then he was also incapable of forming the intent to temporarily deprive him of it.

Accordingly, the judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED.

BUSSEY, P.J., and BRETT, J., concur.
Charles E White Jr 

6818 - 110th Street 

Lubbock Texas 79424 

August 6, 2015 

U S Department of Transportation 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Docket Management System 

1200 New Jersey Ave SW 

Washington DC 20590 

RE: Petition of Charles White for Exemption to Section 333 of the FAA Reform Act 

Gentlemen: 

Pursuant to Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 and 14 CFR part 

11, Charles White, an individual that intends to preform aerial inspection and photography 

work in the agriculture, livestock, wildlife management and real estate promotions in Texas, 

Eastern New Mexico and Western Oklahoma area, hereby applies for an exemption from 

FAR's to allow commercial operations of small unmanned aerial vehicles "UAV". 

Charles White is proficient in both the flying and maintenance of the UAV in use and has 

completed over 100 flights in a safe manner. He also operates the UAV, A DJI Phantom 2 

Vision Plus, in strict accordance with all FAA guide line regarding No Fly zones and proper 

altitude limits. The UAV in use is less than 15 lbs. fully loaded, carries no pilot or passengers 

and is kept current with all updates as they are made available to insure safe flight and 

present no risk to the public. 

The UAV's battery operates for approximately 25 minutes and the UAV has an automatic 

return home feature when the battery life reached 25%. The UAV carries no fuel or 

combustible material that would present ecological or human danger at all. The UAV has a 

top speed of approximately 25 mph and range of 1400 feet, and altitude limits of 400 feet 

allowing a continuous line of sight flight with the UAV. 

At this time a request and justification for the exemption allowing commercial operation of a 

UAV is made. Should you require any further information please contact; 
Charles White 

6818 - 110th Street 

LubbockTexas79424 

806-787-8811 

cewjr59@att.net 

Sincerely, 

Charles E White Jr
# L_2006015EN.01004501.xml

| 20.1.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 15/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.1.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 15/45

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 98/2006

of 19 January 2006

concerning tenders notified in response to the invitation to tender for the import of sorghum issued in Regulation (EC) No 2094/2005

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003, on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1), and in particular Article 12(1) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | An invitation to tender for the maximum reduction from third countries in the duty on sorghum imported into Spain was opened pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2094/2005 (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

An invitation to tender for the maximum reduction from third countries in the duty on sorghum imported into Spain was opened pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2094/2005 (2).

| (2) | Article 7 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1839/95 (3), allows the Commission to decide, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 and on the basis of the tenders notified to make no award. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Article 7 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1839/95 (3), allows the Commission to decide, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 and on the basis of the tenders notified to make no award.

| (3) | On the basis of the criteria laid down in Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1839/95 a maximum reduction in the duty should not be fixed. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On the basis of the criteria laid down in Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1839/95 a maximum reduction in the duty should not be fixed.

| (4) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

No action shall be taken on the tenders notified from 13 to 19 January 2006 in response to the invitation to tender for the reduction in the duty on imported sorghum issued in Regulation (EC) No 2094/2005.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 20 January 2006.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 19 January 2006.

For the Commission

Mariann FISCHER BOEL

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 270, 21.10.2003, p. 78. Regulation as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1154/2005 (OJ L 187, 19.7.2005 p. 11).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 335, 21.12.2005, p. 4.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 177, 28.7.1995, p. 4. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1558/2005 (OJ L 249, 24.9.2005, p. 6).

3

---
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of TAL International Group, Inc. (the ‘‘Company’’) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the ‘‘Report’’), I, Brian M. Sondey, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|  |           |                                                                                                                            |
|--|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | (1)  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

|  |           |                                                                                                                                                      |
|--|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | (2)  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

Date: August 7, 2007

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| /s/ Brian M. Sondey                                         |
| Brian M. SondeyPresident and Chief Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

----
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2221 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on camel hair, carded or combed. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself and Mr. DODD) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on camel hair, 

carded or combed. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CAMEL HAIR, CARDED OR COMBED. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.12.22 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 camel hair, carded or combed) is amended by striking ‘‘12/ 

7 31/2009’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2221 IS

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-6247
FRANK LATHAN HINTON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; US MARSHAL’S OFFICE; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; BUREAU OF PRISONS, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District Judge. (2:05-cv-00453-RBS) Submitted: July 20, 2006 Decided: July 26, 2006 Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frank Lathan Hinton, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).*For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
- 2 - PER CURIAM: Frank Lathan Hinton seeks to appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) petition and the order denying his motion for reconsideration. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s judgment was entered September 13, 2006, and the order denying reconsideration was entered September 20, 2005. The notice of appeal was filed on February 3, 2006. * Because Hinton failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and- 3 - legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
1 Daniels, Nia (FAA)

From: Daniels, Nia (FAA) Sent: Monday, August 10, 2015 2:32 PM To: 'shadwyc@gmail.com' Cc: '333exemptions@faa.gov' Subject: Request for Additional Inform ation: Epic Aerial (FAA-2015-2215)

August 10, 2015

Dear Mr. Wyckoff:
This letter is to inform you th at the following information is mi ssing from your petition (Docket No. FAA

− 2015

− 2215). This information is necessary for the Fe deral Aviation Administration (FAA) to process your petition.

 Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) which is required by Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, S ection 1. If you wish for us to proceed without this manual and remove closed-set filming from your proposed operat ion please inform of us of your intention by the requested response date listed below.

Please submit the additional information (non-proprietary) to your docket at www.regulations.gov and submit any proprietary information to the FAA Hea dquarters or electronically via email to 333exemptions@faa.gov . If you want us to process your request any further, we must receive the information described above by August 24, 2015. If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267-2999.
EXHIBIT 4

Certification of Aaron Regent, Chief Executive Officer

In
connection with the Annual Report of Falconbridge Limited (the "Company") on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 (the "Report"), I, Aaron Regent,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that:



Date:
May 19, 2003

| | /s/Aaron Regent                     
| | ------------------------------------
| | Aaron Regent
Chief Executive Officer

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Falconbridge Limited and will be retained by Falconbridge Limited and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6251

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BENJAMIN ROBERT DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:11-cr-00311-BO-1; 5:15-cv-00014-BO)

Submitted: May 31, 2018 Decided: June 21, 2018

Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Keith Alan Williams, 

KEITH A. WILLIAMS, PA, Greenville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Seth Morgan 

Wood, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Benjamin Robert Davis seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on 

his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motions. The orders are not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When 

the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the 

dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of 

the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Davis has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Felix OLMOS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20671.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Jan. 10, 1986.

David Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant appeals from an order of the district court dismissing his appeal from a judgment of the circuit court.

The record in this case is sparse, and defendant has failed to refer to pages of the record in support of his points on appeal. These deficiencies will normally require us to assume regularity in the proceedings and correctness in the judgment appealed from. *State v. Jones,*Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 (1982); *State v. Steggell,*Utah, 660 P.2d 252 (1983). Nevertheless, this appeal is defective for an even more basic reason: jurisdiction.

Defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor in circuit court and appealed to the district court. On October 26, 1984, defendant was given notice of various defects in appellate procedure. The district court ordered defendant to cure the defects within ten days or have his appeal dismissed with prejudice. On December 4, 1984, Judge Conder determined that defendant still had not complied with proper appellate procedure and dismissed the appeal. For some reason not apparent from the record, the case remained in district *288court, and on February 25, 1985, Judge Wilkinson signed a notice stating that *“if*the appeal is not perfected by the 29th of March, 1985, then this notice shall serve as a dismissal of the appeal with prejudice by order of the Court.” 1 On April 1, 1985, by minute entry, Judge Wilkinson dismissed the case and remanded it to circuit court for disposition of sentence. Also on April 1, 1985, Judge Fishier signed an order granting defendant a fourteen-day extension for filing a brief. Thereafter, on April 22,1985, Judge Wilkinson signed yet another order dismissing the appeal.

From the foregoing facts, it would appear that defendant's appeal was properly dismissed at the district court level. However, we do not reach the merits of that decision in view of jurisdictional limitations on our review of cases which originate in circuit court. We have consistently held that under U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3-5, decisions of the district court on appeal from circuit courts are final except in cases involving a constitutional issue. *State v. Taylor,*Utah, 664 P.2d 439 (1983).

Before this Court, defendant urges that Judge Wilkinson’s order of April 1, 1985, conflicted with the extension granted by Judge Fishier on the same date. Defendant claims that the motion for extension was submitted on March 29, 1985, and that the entry of conflicting orders on April 1, 1985, was due to a mistake on the part of the court clerk. In so claiming, defendant has not raised a constitutional issue.

The appeal to this Court is therefore dismissed.

STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

1

. The deficiencies noted included failure to file a transcript and failure to file a statement of points and authorities. By its terms, the order appears to be self-executing.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000949859
<NAME>                        CFC INTERNATIONAL, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                           5,434,595
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,767,135
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (625,000)
<INVENTORY>                                      7,434,686
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,228,551
<PP&E>                                          28,085,111
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (12,761,406)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  39,279,696
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,922,199
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        20,970,636
<OTHER-SE>                                               0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    39,279,696
<SALES>                                         51,047,399
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                51,047,399
<CGS>                                           31,914,511
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   31,914,511
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                11,366,381
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,289,336
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 569,573
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,907,599
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,259,607
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,647,992
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,647,992
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .82
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .80
        


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, David O'Neill, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Global Electronic Recovery Corp., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	the amended quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Global Electronic Recovery Corp. for the interim period ended April 30, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Global Electronic Recovery Corp.

Dated: November 29, 2006

/s/ David O'NeillDavid O'Neill
President, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)