Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed September 20, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00408-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

KRISTEN SUSSANNE RUBLE, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1704218

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The State of Texas appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of driving-whileintoxicated charges against appellee Kristen Sussanne Ruble. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

art. 44.01(a)(1). Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the information against him, claiming 

that his equal protection rights had been violated. Because we conclude that no violation 

of appellee’s constitutional rights has been established and no statutory or common law 

basis for dismissal is alleged, we reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand 

for further proceedings.
2

On September 2, 2011, 2011, appellee Kristen Sussanne Ruble was charged by 

information with the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). As a 

first-time offender, appellee was eligible to participate in the Harris County District 

Attorney’s Office (the “HCDAO”) pre-trial diversion program, DIVERT.1The DIVERT 

program postpones prosecution for first offender class B misdemeanor DWI cases, such 

as appellee’s. To participate in the program, the defendant must, among other things, 

execute a waiver of trial by jury, enter a plea of guilty, and agree to punishment. 

Importantly, a defendant’s entry into this program requires judicial approval. A finding of 

guilt is deferred pending the successful completion of the conditions of the program, and 

the defendant’s case is reset. Should the defendant successfully complete the program, 

the charges against him or her are dismissed at the reset hearing. In the event of a 

violation of the program, the defendant is found guilty and the agreed-upon sentence is 

imposed.

Appellee’s case was randomly assigned to Harris County Criminal Court at Law 

No. 2, Judge William Harmon presiding. The record reflects that HCDAO offered 

appellee entry into the DIVERT program. Our record further establishes that Judge 

Harmon has stated in open court that, in his opinion, the DIVERT program violates the 

statutory prohibition on permitting DWI offenders to participate in deferred 

adjudication.2 At numerous hearings involving defendants seeking entry into the 

DIVERT program, Judge Harmon repeatedly stated his opinion that this program runs 

afoul of legislative authority. Judge Harmon has refused to approve entry into the 

DIVERT program to any eligible first-time DWI offenders. During these hearings, he has 

communicated clearly to the HCDAO that he will continue to refuse entry into this 

program. The record reflects that the fourteen other Harris County Criminal Courts at 

Law have permitted defendants to participate in the DIVERT program. 

 

1 DIVERT is an acronym for “Direct Intervention using Voluntary Education, Restitution, and 

Treatment.” It is a pretrial diversion program offered by the Harris County District Attorney’s Office 

rather than pursuant to a statutory scheme.

2

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 5(d)(1)(A) (prohibiting deferred adjudication for the 

offense of DWI).
3

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the charges against her based on an alleged 

equal protection violation. The only basis for dismissal is an alleged constitutional 

violation involving a denial of appellee’s right to equal protection; no common law or 

statutory basis for dismissal is asserted. Judge Harmon heard appellee’s motion to 

dismiss on December 13, 2011, at the same time that he heard motions to dismiss 

alleging the same grounds filed by eight other defendants. During this hearing, Judge 

Harmon admitted the reporter’s records from hearings on September 22, 2010, October 

15, 2010, and October 28, 2011 involving various defendants eligible for the DIVERT 

program. At the conclusion of the hearing on the motions to dismiss, Judge Harmon 

dismissed the charges against appellee and the other eight defendants.

In its appeal, the State raises a single issue asserting that the trial court erred in 

granting appellee’s motion to dismiss because no equal rights violation, or any other 

violation requiring dismissal, has occurred. Our review of the record reveals three equal 

protection arguments considered by the trial court in dismissing the charges against 

appellee: (1) a claim of selective prosecution; (2) an alleged equal protection violation 

based on appellee’s assignment to Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 2 because 

Judge Harmon refuses to approve any DIVERT agreements; and (3) an alleged equal 

protection violation because appellee was not placed into a traditional pretrial diversion 

program, and other first-time DWI offenders had been, during the time period that 

charges against appellee were pending. 

The principle of equal protection guarantees that all similarly situated persons 

should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 

(1985); see also Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998). A 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause may occur when the government discriminates 

against the members of a class of individuals who have historically suffered 

discrimination, i.e., a “suspect” class, or when the government impairs the members of a 

class from exercising a fundamental right. Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1994). Generally, to establish an equal protection claim when a fundamental 
4

right or suspect class is not at issue, a party must prove that he or she was treated 

differently than other similarly situated parties without a rational basis. See Canady v. 

State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

Today, this court has considered arguments identical to those raised by the State in 

this appeal in its appeal from the dismissal of another defendant’s DWI case in Harris 

County Criminal Court at Law No. 2. See State v. Dinur, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 14-12-

00406-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 20, 2012, no pet. h.). As in this case, 

the dismissal was based on equal protection grounds because the defendant was not 

permitted to participate in the DIVERT program. Id. After reviewing the records from the 

same hearings that are part of the record in this case and the relevant authorities, we held 

that no equal protection violation had been established. Id. Because no other basis for 

dismissal was alleged, we reversed the dismissal order and remanded the cause to the trial 

court. Id. 

For the reasons set forth in Dinur, we conclude that no violation of appellee’s right 

to equal protection under the law was established. Because there was no constitutional 

violation, and no statutory or common law basis for dismissal was alleged, the trial court 

abused its discretion in dismissing the charging instrument without the consent of the 

State. See State v. Mungia, 119 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that a 

court may dismiss a case without the prosecutor’s consent only if authorized by statute, 

common law, or constitution). 

We sustain the State’s sole issue on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 

court’s dismissal order signed December 13, 2011, and remand this cause to the trial 

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Brown and Busby.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).