### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs M

arch 14, 2001 ARTHUR ARMSTRONG, A/K/A HAKI AL-BEY v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 99-2630-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2000-02328-COA-R3-CV - Filed June 7, 2001

An inmate who was found guilty of three disciplinary infractions challenged those convictions by filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The trial court dismissed the Petition. We affirm the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded
B EN H. C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., delivered theopinion of the court, in which W ILLI AM C. K OCH , J R
. and W ILLI

AM B. C AIN , JJ., joined. Arthur L. Armstrong, Only, Tennessee , Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Terri L. Bernal, Assista

nt Attorney G

eneral, for the appellee

, Department of Co

rrection, Lt

. Vance, and Warden Ricky

Bell.
OPINION
I.
Arthur Armstrong, also known as Haki Al-Bey, is an inmate at the Turney Center Industrial Prison and Farm. In the course of an eight-day period in May of 1999, Mr. Armstrong was written up for three disciplinary infractions: possession of contra band, violation of Department of Corrections policies, andattemptedintimidation of an of ficer. The cont

raband was a swe

atshirt with the arms cut off and a hole cut out in front; the violation of policy was the wearing of a hat that was turnedbackwards; and the attempted intimidation occurred when the officer began to write up one of the infractions,

and Mr. Armstrong stated that “the federal judge

will soon stop all the

se simple retaliatory

write-ups”, whic

h the officer too

k to be a threat of

a lawsuit.1 We would point out that both Mand ela and Woodrow Wilson dealt wit h prisons r

un by a privat

e entit y, and by statute t

he private entit

y cannot punish prisoners under its control. This case arose in a state-run institut ion; therefore neither Mand ela nor Woodrow Wilson has any application her e. -2- Mr. Armstrong was p

lac ed in disciplinary segregation on May 30, 1999. On June 8, the InstitutionDisciplinary Board convicted Mr. Armstrong of the three infractions. The penalty was loss of sentence red

uction credit

for the time

spent in segreg

ation pending the

disciplinary

hearings, a written repriman

d, and a verbal w

arning. The disc

iplinary co

nvic tions we re later upheld by Warden Ricky Bell.
Mr. Armstrong filed

a Petition for Writ of

Certiorari on Sept

ember 16, 1999. I

n addition to the Department

of Correction, his petition named Warden Bell and Lieutenant Vance, the Chairman of the Disciplinary Board, as respondents. The respon d ents filed a Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment, and Mr. Armstrong filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion.
On August 11, 2000 the trial court filed a Memorandum and Order, which dismissed all of Mr. Armstrong’s claims. The court dismissed the claims against Warden Bell and Lieutenant Va nce because the only proper respondent was the Department of Correction. See Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 27- 9-101 through 27-9-11 4; Mandela v. Campbe ll , 978 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1998); Woodrow Wilson v. SouthCentral Correctiona l Facility Disciplin

ary Board

, No. M2000-00303- COA-R3- CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2000). 1 The claims against the Department were dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Rule 12.02(6), Tenn. R. Civ. P. This appeal followed.
II.
As the trial court correctly pointed out, the scope of review under a common law writ of certiorari is very narrow. It does not involve an inquiry into th

e intrinsic corre

ctness of the decision of the tribunal below, but only as to whether that tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, or acted ill egal ly, fraudulently or arbitrarily. See Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Board , 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 199

4); Yokley v. State , 632 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). The writ is not availa ble a s a matter of right, but is granted under unusual or extraordinary c ircumstances. Clark v. Metro Governme

nt of Nashville , 827 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Its grant or denial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Boyce v. Williams , 389 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. 1965).
Mr. Armstrong claims that the discipline imposed upon him violated his free speech rights. However, the United States Su preme Court has no

ted that the uniq

ue requirements of prison life necessarily

involve the retraction or withdrawal from inmates of many rights and privileg es that are routinely afforded to ordinar y citizens. Wolff v. McDo nnell , 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Thus, even though a priso n er does not surre nder all his free

speech rights w

hen the gates of

the prison close behindhim, an expression of opinion, stated in a belligerent manner and/or at an inappropriate time, canform the basis for a dis ciplinary infraction. See Monroe Davis v. Commissioner Donal Campbell, et al. , No. 01- A-01-9712-CH-00755 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1998). Similarly, the-3-

choice of what clothing to wear, or the manner o f wearing it, no rmally a mat

ter of taste in civ

il society, ca

n be strictly

regulated with

in prisons.
In his appellate brief, Mr. Armstrong claims that it was illegal for the Disciplinary Board to punish him for the clothing he wore because the Department has not promulgated “ any TDOC regulations , policies or rule s , pertaining to ho w an inmate can we

ar his personal head gear or h is personal sweat shirt, during the assigned recreation time.” (Emphasis by Mr. Armstrong). Contrary to Mr. Armstrong’s ar

gument that the TD

OC policies, only

apply to clothing issued by the Department, wenotethat #504.05 (VI)(K) of its Administrative Policies and Procedures states simply that “clothing shall be worn in the manner intended (i.e. pants shall be worn above buttocks.) Failureto comply with

this requirement m

ay result in

disciplinary action.” It does not appear to us that the Department or the prison aut hor ities need spell out in detail exactly how every article of clothing must be worn in order to enforce this general rule.
We also note that the record indicates that Mr. Armstrong was told to get rid of his sweatshirt several times before being written up for possession of contraband, and that he was given the opportunity

to turn his hat aroun d bef ore being cited for that infraction. Mr. Armstrong therefore cannot be heard to compla

in that h e r eceived inadeq uate notice of the

rules he was expec

ted to follow, or that the Disciplinary Board exceeded its jurisdiction by meting out punishments for the three disciplinary infractions.
As for the question of whethe

r the disciplinary

proceedings w

ere themselves c

onducted in a constitutional o

r lawful manner, th

is depends on the du

e process righ

ts to which an inmate

is entitled in regard to disciplinary hearings. Those rig hts, in turn, depend on the nature of t h e sanctions imposed. See Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
In the Sandincase, Demont Conner was serving a sentence of thirty y ears to life in maximum security for multiple serious crimes. He an gril y r esisted an officer’s attempt to perform a body search, whil e using foul language. After a hearing on the incident, he wa s sent to disciplinary segregation

for thirty da

ys. Mr . Conner complaine d that alle ged irregulari ties in th e proceedings violated his due pr

ocess rights.
The Supreme Court held

that a liberty

interest which en

titles an inmate to li

mited due process canexist in the context of a disciplinary proceeding, but only when the sanctions imposed for an alleged infraction subje

ct the inmate to a de

privation or hard

ship which is aty

pical in relation t

o the ordinary incidents of

pri son lif e. 5 15 U .S. at 4 86. The cou rt f oun d th at t hir ty da ys in disciplinary segregation

was well with

the normal incidents that Mr. Conner might expect from a lengthy prison term, and that it did not trigger a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees.
In the present case

, Mr. Armst

rong ser ved ten days in solitary confinement, with loss of sentencereduction credits for that time, received written and verbal warnings, and his sweatshirt was confiscated. We hardly think that such a punishment triggers the constitutional protections that he-4-

is asking for, and we do not belie ve that the trial c

ourt abused its disc

retion in declining

to grant him the writ of certiorari.
III.
The order of the trial court is affirmed. Remand this cause to the Chancery Court of Davidson County for f

urther proceed

ings consistent w

ith this opinion. Tax the costs on appe al to the app ell ant , Ar thu r Arm str ong, als o kn own as H aki Al- Bey.

_________________________________________ BEN H. CANTREL

L, PRESIDI

NG JUDGE, M.S.