SHERRY CORRIE,

Appellant,

v.

DAVID LEE KEUL,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-1146

_____________________________/

Opinion filed March 16, 2015.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Elizabeth A. Senterfitt, Judge.

Diana L. Johnson of Johnson & Lufrano, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Robert C. Davis, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC
We grant Appellant’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion, and 

substitute this opinion in its place. We deny Appellant’s motion for rehearing en 

banc. 

Appellant, Sherry Corrie, appeals the trial court’s Amended Final Judgment 

of Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence (After Notice), arguing that 

the injunction is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.1

 For the 

reasons that follow, we agree with Appellant’s argument and reverse the 

injunction.

In his Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence, 

Appellee, David Lee Keul, alleged that Appellant lived within 500 feet of his 

house and had “anger issues with [him], [his] wife and [his] dog.” He further 

alleged that Appellant, for the last three years, had been “constantly harassing, 

verbally abusing, stalking, threatening [him], [his] family and friends.” Appellant 

allegedly threatened to take Appellee’s home and have him thrown in jail, and she

“says she has a gun.” According to Appellee, on February 17, 2014, Appellant 

approached him while he was working in his yard and “continually screamed and 

hollered” at him. On August 10, 2014, Appellant allegedly chased Appellee and 

his dogs down the sidewalk, and on August 21, 2014, Appellant allegedly 

1 Although Appellant did not make this argument below, this type of insufficiency 

of the evidence argument need not be preserved for appeal. See Achurra v. 

Achurra, 80 So. 3d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 

1.530(e)). 

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approached Appellee on his driveway about his car being parked on the street and 

would not leave when Appellee asked her to do so. Appellant also allegedly took 

pictures of people who went to Appellee’s home. In the section of the injunction 

petition asking whether the respondent owns or is known to have guns, Appellee 

wrote, “Her comment it hold 1 in the chamber and 8 more.” The trial court entered 

a temporary injunction for protection against repeat violence. During the 

subsequent hearing, Appellant provided testimony about what she claimed was 

Appellee’s harassing behavior. After Appellant called three other witnesses, the 

trial court asked Appellee whether he had any witnesses. After responding “Yes . . 

. . [My wife] also has video of [Appellant] over here screaming on the sidewalk at 

. . . me and my wife when we are sitting on our porch,” the trial court stated, “All 

right. I am going to enter the injunction.” The trial court then entered an 

Amended Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence 

(After Notice). This appeal followed.

An injunction entered pursuant to section 784.046, Florida Statutes, must be 

supported by competent, substantial evidence. Power v. Boyle, 60 So. 3d 496, 498 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see also Goudy v. Duquette, 112 So. 3d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2013) (noting that to support an injunction against repeat violence, each 

incident of violence must be proven by competent, substantial evidence). The term 

“violence” is defined as “any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated 

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battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or 

false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death, 

by a person against any other person.” § 784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The term 

“repeat violence” means “two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the 

respondent, one of which must have been within 6 months of the filing of the 

petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate 

family member.” § 784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. An “assault” is “an intentional, 

unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled 

with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded 

fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.” § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. 

The “offense of battery” occurs when a person “[a]ctually and intentionally 

touches or strikes another person against the will of the other” or “[i]ntentionally 

causes bodily harm to another person.” § 784.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Stalking occurs 

when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or 

cyberstalks another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. “Harass” means “to engage 

in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial 

emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 

784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. 

Turning to the case at issue, the allegations made in support of the injunction 

included Appellant’s alleged anger issues and threats of taking Appellee’s home 

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and having him thrown in jail, her act of screaming at Appellee, her act of chasing 

Appellee and his dogs down the sidewalk on one occasion, and her statement that 

“it hold 1 in the chamber and 8 more.” Appellee presented no evidence at the 

hearing other than stating that his wife had video of Appellant screaming at the two 

of them while they were sitting on their porch. As Appellant argues on appeal, and 

as this Court has explained, “‘Mere shouting and obscene hand gestures, without 

an overt act that places the victim in fear, does not constitute the type of violence 

required for an injunction.’” Russell v. Doughty, 28 So. 3d 169, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2010) (citation omitted). It has also been held that “[e]ven a representation that the 

offender owns a gun and is not afraid of using it is insufficient to support an 

injunction absent an overt act indicating an ability to carry out the threat or 

justifying a belief that violence is imminent.” Sorin v. Cole, 929 So. 2d 1092, 

1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). There was no allegation or evidence in this case of an 

overt act on Appellant’s part that indicated an ability to carry out any of her threats 

or that justified a belief that violence was imminent. 

Moreover, we reject Appellee’s argument that his allegations and the 

testimony presented at the hearing showed that Appellant engaged in stalking and 

harassment. Here, unlike the situation in Goosen v. Walker, 714 So. 2d 1149, 

1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), where the testimony showed that the appellant 

videotaped the appellees on two to four occasions during the preceding four 

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months when the appellees were in their own yard or the adjoining area and where 

the Fourth District found that the conduct constituted stalking, this case presents 

only a general allegation without any supporting testimony that Appellant took 

pictures of Appellee’s guests. While Appellee also argues that there are certain 

threatening and violent situations between neighbors where courts have no choice 

but to enter an injunction, this case does not present one of those situations. See

Banks v. McFarland, 148 So. 3d 162, 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (reversing the 

temporary injunction for repeat violence entered against the appellant because the 

appellant’s statements to the appellee, his neighbor, that “I will shoot and kill all of 

you” and “I’ll F you up” in addition to making other ugly remarks and taunts and 

engaging in intrusive behavior did not constitute repeat violence where there was 

no showing of an overt act); Power, 60 So. 3d at 497 (reversing the injunctions 

entered against the appellants and concluding that the evidence of several 

disagreements between the parties, who were neighbors, obscenities yelled by one 

of the appellants, and one of the appellants allowing her dog to urinate on the 

appellees’ garage door and writing profane and inappropriate notes on mail that 

was delivered to the appellees’ residence did not constitute violence).

Accordingly, we reverse the Amended Final Judgment of Injunction for 

Protection Against Repeat Violence (After Notice).

REVERSED.

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LEWIS, C.J., WOLF and ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR.

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