In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 21, 2023

S22G1035. IN THE INTEREST OF A. H., A CHILD.

 COLVIN, Justice.

After adjudicating A. H. delinquent but finding that he was not 

in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision, the juvenile 

court in this case entered an order dismissing the delinquency 

proceedings under OCGA § 15-11-600 (d) and sealing the record 

under OCGA § 15-11-701. The State appealed the juvenile court’s 

decision to seal the record, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the 

appeal, concluding that neither subsection (a) (1) nor subsection 

(a) (6) of OCGA § 5-7-1 authorized the State to appeal from the 

juvenile court’s order. We granted certiorari to determine whether 

“the Court of Appeals err[ed] in concluding that the State was not 

permitted to appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a).” 

1. After carefully considering the full record and the briefs 
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of the parties, this Court has determined that the writ of certiorari 

issued in Case No. S22G1035 was improvidently granted. The Court 

of Appeals determined that the juvenile court’s order was not 

appealable under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) because it was not a “void” 

order. But this issue is a difficult one given the state of our case law 

in this area, and the issue was neither fully litigated below nor 

briefed by the parties in significant depth in this Court. Thus, 

although this issue is properly before us in a narrow sense, it is not 

presented in a form that would allow us to clarify the law or 

otherwise provide meaningful guidance. Accordingly, the writ is 

vacated, and the petition for certiorari in Case No. S22C1035 is 

denied.

2. In connection with this case, we observe that this Court 

has not fully explained the contours of what makes an erroneous 

order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction “void” under state 

law for purposes of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) (providing that the State 

may appeal “in criminal cases and adjudication of delinquency cases 

. . . [f]rom an order, decision, or judgment of a court where the court 
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does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the 

Constitution or laws of this state” (emphasis supplied)). We have 

held that, even when a court has jurisdiction over a case, certain 

types of errors can render the court’s order “void,” but we have not 

explicitly identified what principle or principles of law distinguish 

erroneous-but-valid orders from erroneous orders that are “void and 

of no legal effect.” Triola v. Triola, 299 Ga. 220, 221 (1) (787 SE2d 

206) (2016). Compare State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 212 (3) (b) (766 

SE2d 66) (2014) (stating that “[a] judgment entered on mutually 

exclusive verdicts is void” without explaining why such an error 

renders the judgment void rather than merely erroneous), overruled 

on other grounds as recognized by Booth v. State, 311 Ga. 374 (858 

SE2d 39) (2021); State v. Sumlin, 281 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (637 SE2d 36) 

(2006) (holding that an order granting a mistrial after the jury 

returned its verdict was void because “the time for granting a 

mistrial ha[d] passed,” but not explaining why this procedural error 

caused the order to be void rather than merely erroneous); and 

Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 610 (1) (409 SE2d 517) (1991) 
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(noting our longstanding rule that criminal sentences and 

judgments are “void if [a] court imposes punishment that the law 

does not allow,” without explaining the basis for that rule); with 

State v. Evans, 282 Ga. 63, 65 (646 SE2d 77) (2007) (noting that not 

just “any improper exercise of a trial court’s authority renders a 

judgment void” and holding that a court’s decision to conduct a 

bench trial over the State’s objection resulted only in “an ineffective 

waiver of the right to trial by jury, not a void judgment,” without 

explaining why an error of that type did not render the judgment 

void (emphasis in original)); and State v. Glover, 281 Ga. 633, 633

(641 SE2d 543) (2007) (holding that an order dismissing the State’s 

appeal pursuant to a statute authorizing orders of that type was not 

void without fully explaining why the court’s procedural and factual 

errors did not render its order void). Perhaps we will have an 

opportunity to further explain the legal principles governing 

voidness in a case where the issue is squarely presented and fully 

briefed. But this is not that case.

Writ of certiorari vacated and petition for certiorari denied. All 
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the Justices concur, except Pinson, J., who concurs in Division 1 and 

in the judgment.