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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CV-15-988

NATHANIEL SMITH, MD, MPH, 

DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND HIS 

SUCCESSORS IN OFFICE

APPELLANT

V.

MARISA N. PAVAN AND TERRAH D.

PAVAN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS

PARENTS, NEXT FRIENDS, AND

GUARDIANS OF T.R.P., A MINOR

CHILD; LEIGH D.W. JACOBS AND

JANA S. JACOBS, INDIVIDUALLY,

AND AS PARENTS, NEXT FRIENDS,

AND GUARDIANS OF F.D.J., A

MINOR CHILD; COURTNEY M.

KASSEL AND KELLY L. SCOTT,

INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS,

NEXT FRIENDS, AND GUARDIANS

OF A.G.S., A MINOR CHILD

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered: October 19, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 60CV-15-3153]

HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS

FOX, JUDGE

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice

This case is before us once again after the Supreme Court of the United States granted 

the appellees’ petition for a writ of certiorari, reversed the judgment of this court, and 

remanded for “further proceedings not inconsistent with” the opinion of the Court. Pavan 

v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam). The Supreme Court held that pursuant to 

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), Arkansas’s birth-certificate law, 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-18-401 (Repl. 2014), is unconstitutional to the extent 

it treats similarly-situated same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples. The 
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2

parties have now filed supplemental briefs with this court. We take this opportunity to 

reject appellant’s interpretation of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion and the 

suggestion that a gender-neutral reading of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-201(a) 

(the assisted-reproduction statute) would adequately address the constitutional infirmity 

found. The birth-certificate law must be addressed,1 but we cannot simply affirm the circuit 

court’s previous order, which impermissibly rewrote the statutory scheme. An order

rewriting a statute “amounts to a judicial intrusion upon the legislative prerogative and 

violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.” Cox v. Comm’rs of Maynard 

Fire Imp. Dist. No. 1, 287 Ark. 173, 176, 697 S.W.2d 104, 106 (1985). On remand, the 

circuit court should award declaratory and injunctive relief as necessary to ensure that samesex spouses are afforded the same right as opposite-sex spouses to be listed on a child’s birth 

certificate in Arkansas, as required under Pavan v. Smith, supra. Extending the benefit of the 

statutes at issue to same-sex spouses will implement the mandate of the Supreme Court of 

the United States without an impermissible rewriting of the statutes. See McLaughlin v. Jones 

in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017) (extending the benefit of Arizona’s statutory 

marital-paternity presumption to similarly situated female spouses rather than nullifying the 

statute).

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order, and we remand for entry of a final 

judgment consistent with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States. 

Reversed and remanded.

 

1 We note that Arkansas Code Annotated sections 20-18-401(e), (f) and 20-18-

406(a)(2) (Repl. 2014) were at issue in the present case.
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WOMACK, J., concurs. 

BAKER, GOODSON, and HART, JJ., dissent.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority that we 

must reverse and remand this case to the circuit court following the Supreme Court’s 

decision. However, I would additionally require the circuit court to conduct a hearing and 

make findings of fact regarding how, specifically, the law treats similarly situated same-sex 

couples differently than opposite-sex couples and to make specific findings as to how those 

couples are similarly situated for the purpose of the application of the statutes in question. 

While the majority of this court remands to the circuit court only for an order consistent 

with the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court’s majority on remand clearly calls for 

“further proceedings.” Only after conducting such further proceedings and making the 

necessary findings of fact should the circuit court then issue an order, based on those 

findings. Said order should determine the constitutionality of the relevant statutes in a way 

that both comports with the law and is narrowly tailored so as to balance the legislative 

presumption in favor of constitutionality with the equal treatment of law under the statutes

and should have limited application to parties and circumstances that are, in fact, similarly 

situated. 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution prohibits a government actor from 

treating similarly situated people dissimilarly. See Brown v. State, 2015 Ark. 16, at 6, 454 

S.W.3d 226, 231; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). There 

is no doubt that the position of the parties has drastically changed since this case was

originally presented to the circuit court below. See Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, 505 
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S.W.3d 169 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The appellant even avers

in its brief that the department of health has since revised its policy regarding birth certificates 

for assisted-reproduction situations. As noted before, that information is not in the record 

before us. Additionally, despite the cornerstone that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 

dissimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals, there is no analysis of that rule in the

circuit court’s order; nor is there a specific analysis regarding how the classification survives 

the appropriate level of scrutiny. See Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 

1994) Therefore, it would be not only prudent, but indeed mandatory according to the 

Supreme Court’s ruling, to order the circuit court to conduct a hearing and make specific 

findings of fact as stated above. 

Finally, beyond determining the constitutionality of various portions of the 

challenged statutes, it is not the role of this or any other court to attempt to fashion a remedy 

that breaches into the realm of policy making. The role of determining policy belongs to 

the people through their elected representatives in the legislature. Once the scope of 

constitutional application is finally determined, it is incumbent upon the General Assembly 

to re-engage and to establish the state of the law going forward within those boundaries.

KAREN R. BAKER, Justice, dissenting. I dissent from the majority’s opinion 

because I would not remand this matter to the circuit court. I would simply vacate our 

previous opinion and issue a substituted opinion reversing and dismissing the circuit court’s 

order which impermissibly rewrote the statute. Further, based on Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. 

Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam) and the State’s concession that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-201 is 

unconstitutional, I would declare Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-10-201(a) and 20-18-401(f)(1) 
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unconstitutional, stricken, and void. We should not remand this matter to the circuit court 

for an order consistent with the majority’s opinion. Moreover, despite the State’s urging to 

take up a pen and set off through the Arkansas Code replacing the words “husband” and 

“wife” with “spouse” or other gender-neutral alternatives, the truth is that that pen does 

not belong to us, nor does it belong to the circuit court. The pen belongs to the legislature 

and it is their duty to determine the best way to address the constitutional infirmity in these 

two statutes. We cannot fashion the remedy, the authority to do so rests solely with the 

legislature. Thus, there is no need to remand this matter to the circuit court, which is in no 

better position and has no more authority than we do to rewrite these statutes. To do so 

only delays this matter further. Therefore, based on the State’s concession that Ark. Code 

Ann. § 9-10-201 is unconstitutional and the United States Supreme Court’s mandate in 

Pavan, supra, I would reverse the circuit court’s order and declare that Ark. Code Ann. §§ 

9-10-201(a) and 20-18-401(f)(1) are unconstitutional, stricken and void. 

GOODSON and HART, JJ., join.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Monty V. Baugh, Deputy Att’y Gen., for appellant.

Cheryl K. Maples, for appellees.