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*********************************************** 
PATRICK RIDER v. BRIAN RIDER, CONSERVATOR

(ESTATE OF LEIGH RIDER), ET AL.

(AC 44067)

Alvord, Suarez and Lavine, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decree of the Probate

Court approving the final account filed by the defendant. The Probate

Court had mailed notice of its decree on December 22, 2017. Prior to

filing his appeal with the Superior Court on March 2, 2018, the plaintiff

filed a motion for revocation with the Probate Court on December 26,

2017, which the Probate Court denied on February 8, 2018. Thereafter,

the Superior Court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that it was untimely pursuant

to the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 45a-186 (a)) that requires an

appeal from a Probate Court decree to be filed in the Superior Court

within forty-five days of when the decree was mailed to the parties. On

appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that his motion for revocation

tolled the appeal period. Held that the Superior Court properly dismissed

the probate appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground

that it was untimely: the plaintiff did not file his appeal with the Superior

Court within forty-five days of when the Probate Court mailed its decree,

and his motion for revocation, filed pursuant to statute (§ 45a-128), did

not toll the appeal period for the Probate Court’s underlying decision

approving the final account, as the legislature clearly addressed tolling

the appeal period in its statutory scheme governing appeals in probate

cases and did not include the filing of a motion pursuant to § 45a-128

as an action that tolls the appeal period.

Argued December 2, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

Procedural History

Appeal from the decree of the Probate Court for the

district of North Central Connecticut approving the final

account filed by the defendant, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to

the court, Cobb, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal,

from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Matthew S. Carlone, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Charles D. Houlihan, Jr., for the appellee (defendants).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, Patrick Rider, appeals from

the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his probate appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On

appeal, he claims that the court incorrectly concluded

that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal on the basis

that it was untimely.1 We affirm the judgment.

The following procedural history is relevant to our

resolution of this appeal. In July, 2017, Leigh Rider

(Rider)2

filed a petition with the Probate Court

requesting a voluntary conservatorship with the defendant Brian Rider appointed as conservator of his person

and estate. The Probate Court granted the petition. One

month later, in August, 2017, Rider requested that the

court ‘‘revoke his voluntary conservatorship,’’ and the

Probate Court granted this request. On October 31,

2017, the defendant filed a final account with the Probate Court. The Probate Court then noticed and

assigned a hearing on allowance of the final account.

Before the hearing was held, on December 2, 2017,

Rider died.

The hearing on allowance of the final account was

held on December 13, 2017.3 During the hearing, the

plaintiff objected to the account, challenging the attorney’s fees expended because ‘‘the amount of time and

itemization . . . was not provided to the court’’ or to

the plaintiff and arguing that assets that should have

been included in the account were not included. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the court asked: ‘‘All right.

Is that it, [plaintiff]? You done?’’ The plaintiff responded:

‘‘Yes, Your Honor. I am done.’’ The court closed the

hearing by saying: ‘‘Okay. I’m going to have to spend

some time on this myself so I’m going to have to continue this hearing.’’

On December 22, 2017, the court issued a ‘‘Decree:

Final Account,’’ allowing and approving the final

account without scheduling another hearing. On

December 26, 2017, the plaintiff, acting in a self-represented capacity,4

filed a ‘‘Motion for Revocation of Probate Decree Allowing the Approval of the Accounting

of the Conservator, [General Statutes § 45a-128 (a) and

(b)]’’ (motion for revocation).5 The plaintiff was concerned that records of attorney’s fees were not provided, an explanation of claimed irregularities in the

account had yet to be discussed, and there had not

been a continued hearing on the account.6 The plaintiff

then requested ‘‘a hearing as per [§ 45a-128] and an

order that [the attorney for the conservatorship] send

out his time slips for all pre-conservatorship fees and

fees during the conservatorship . . . .’’

On February 8, 2018, the Probate Court denied the

motion for revocation pursuant to § 45a-128 (b),7

stating

that ‘‘the request . . . does not meet the requirements

outlined in . . . [§] 45a-128 as all parties in interest
have not filed a consent to reconsider, all parties in

interest did receive notice of hearing . . . no scrivener

or clerical error has been identified, and no discovery

or identification of parties unknown to the court was

made.’’

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a complaint, appealing from the Probate Court’s decree accepting the final

account, with the Superior Court. The complaint was

not filed until March 2, 2018. In both the original complaint and the amended complaint, filed March 14, 2018,

the plaintiff asserted that he ‘‘filed a written motion for

reconsideration with the Probate Court reasserting the

plaintiff’s objections described herein. However, as of

the date hereof, no action has been taken on said

motion.’’ The plaintiff requested a de novo review of

the final account and listed several objections to the

account,8 arguing that the Probate Court never considered those objections despite stating that it would continue the hearing on the final account in order to do so.

On March 16, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to

dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal. The defendant argued

that, inter alia, General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 45a-186

(a) ‘‘requires the filing of an appeal in a conservatorship

matter by filing a complaint in the Superior Court no

later than forty-five (45) days after the mailing of the

order. The underlying order was mailed on December

22, 2017. The complaint must therefore be filed in Superior Court by no later than February 5, 2018. This case

was filed in Superior Court on March 2, 2018, seventy

(70) days after the order, and was therefore untimely.’’

On April 30, 2018, after a hearing, the Superior Court,

Cobb, J., denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that

‘‘the plaintiff has timely appealed from an order denying

a motion entitled ‘motion for revocation,’ which the

plaintiff indicates is [a] motion for reconsideration. As

this act of the Probate Court constitutes ‘any order,

denial or decree of’ a court of probate, it is an appealable

order, and from this order the parties agree the appeal

is timely. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied.’’9

(Quoting in part General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 45a186 (a)).

On April 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed his brief in support

of his appeal to the Superior Court wherein he argued

that (1) his rights were prejudiced when the court issued

the decree approving the proposed final account without completing the hearing and by not providing notice

that the hearing would not be completed and (2) the

probate hearing on the final account was ‘‘statutorily

deficient.’’ Aside from the procedural statement that

there was a motion for revocation which was denied,

the plaintiff did not raise issues related to the Probate

Court’s denial of that motion. In response, the defendant

made several arguments in support of affirmance of the

decree approving the final account and reasserted his

contention that the Superior Court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because the appeal was untimely as it

was not filed within the appeal period set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 45a-186 (a).

On January 29, 2020, the Superior Court issued a

memorandum of decision. The court first determined

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal insofar as it related to the Probate Court’s

decree accepting the final account. Specifically, the

Superior Court stated: ‘‘In denying the defendant’s

motion to dismiss, this court found that the plaintiff’s

appeal from the order denying the motion for revocation

was timely.10 Implicit in that ruling, and to clarify, the

plaintiff’s appeal from the Probate Court’s December

22, 2017 order approving the final account was not

timely commenced because it was not filed until March

2, [2018], well beyond the thirty or forty-five day limitations in General Statutes § 45a-186. Thus, the only Probate Court order that the court has jurisdiction to consider in this appeal is the Probate Court’s order denying

the motion for revocation: it is jurisdictionally barred

from considering claims related to the Probate Court’s

decision approving the defendant’s final account.’’

(Footnote added; footnote omitted.) The court continued, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff contends that the Probate Court

acted in violation of the General Statutes and that it

abused its discretion in denying [his] motion [for] revocation. The plaintiff’s argument, however, focuses

almost exclusively on the procedural deficiencies of

the December 13, 2017 hearing on the final account and

the Probate Court’s order approving the final account.

As stated previously, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider these matters because the plaintiff’s appeal from

the December 22, 2017 decree was untimely.’’ The plaintiff now appeals to this court.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the Superior Court

incorrectly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal from the Probate

Court’s decree approving the final account because his

motion for revocation tolled the appeal period applicable to that Probate Court decision.11 The defendant

asserts that the Superior Court properly dismissed the

appeal because it was not filed within forty-five days

of the Probate Court’s December 22, 2017 decree

accepting the final account. We agree with the defendant that the Superior Court correctly determined that

it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s

appeal from the Probate Court’s decree approving the

final account.

We first set forth our standard of review and relevant

principles of law. ‘‘Our Supreme Court has long held

that because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our

review is plenary. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental

rule that a court may raise and review the issue of

subject matter jurisdiction at any time. . . . Subject
matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court

to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the

action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without

jurisdiction . . . . The subject matter jurisdiction

requirement may not be waived by any party, and also

may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at

any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal. . . .

‘‘[W]e are . . . mindful of the familiar principle that

a court [that] exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under

the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation. . . . Our

courts of probate have a limited jurisdiction and can

exercise only such powers as are conferred on them

by statute. . . . They have jurisdiction only when the

facts exist on which the legislature has conditioned the

exercise of their power. . . . The Superior Court, in

turn, in passing on an appeal, acts as a court of probate

with the same powers and subject to the same limitations. . . . It is also well established that [t]he right to

appeal from a decree of the Probate Court is purely

statutory and the rights fixed by statute for taking and

prosecuting the appeal must be met. . . . Thus, only

[w]hen the right to appeal . . . exists and the right has

been duly exercised in the manner prescribed by law

[does] the Superior Court [have] full jurisdiction over

[it] . . . . Failure to comply with the relevant time limit

set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 2017)] § 45a186 (a) deprives the Superior Court of subject matter

jurisdiction and renders such an untimely appeal subject to dismissal.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Probate Appeal of Knott, 190

Conn. App. 56, 61–62, 209 A.3d 690 (2019).

We next set forth the statute governing appeals of

Probate Court orders. General Statutes (Rev. to 2017)

§ 45a-186 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘any person

aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a Probate

Court in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may, not later than forty-five days after

the mailing of an order, denial or decree for a matter

heard under any provision of,’’ inter alia, General Statutes § 45a-660,12 ‘‘appeal therefrom to the Superior

Court. Such an appeal shall be commenced by filing a

complaint in the superior court . . . .’’

The plaintiff argues that his motion for revocation

tolled the appeal period relating to the Probate Court’s

decree accepting the final account, which the parties

agree began to run on December 22, 2017. Specifically,

the plaintiff argues that ‘‘when a party files a motion

for reconsideration pursuant to . . . § 45a-128, the

time for filing an appeal does not start running until

the Probate Court either rules on the motion for reconsideration or provides notice that it does not intend to

act on the motion for reconsideration.’’13 Therefore, he
asserts, the appeal period did not begin to run until

February 8, 2018, when the Probate Court denied his

motion for revocation, providing him with forty-five

days from that date to file his appeal of the decree

accepting the final account with the Superior Court,

and, therefore, his March 2, 2018 filing of the appeal

was timely.

Because ‘‘[t]he right to appeal from a decree of the

Probate Court is purely statutory and the rights fixed

by statute for taking and prosecuting an appeal must

be met’’;In re Probate Appeal of Knott, supra, 190 Conn.

App. 61; we turn to the language of the statute governing

probate appeals. As noted previously, General Statutes

(Rev. to 2017) § 45a-186 (a) creates a forty-five day

period within which to file an appeal. The statutory

scheme that governs appeals in probate cases provides

the sole circumstance that tolls the appeal period. General Statutes § 45a-186c provides that the appeal period

is tolled when an application for a waiver of costs is

filed. Our legislature clearly addressed tolling the

appeal period and did not include the filing of a motion

pursuant to § 45a-128 as an action that tolls the appeal

period. See General Statutes § 45a-186c.

In addition, § 45a-128, which governs motions for

reconsideration, modification and revocation in probate matters, addresses the appeal procedure for such

motions14 and does not provide that such motions toll

the appeal period with respect to the underlying decision. See General Statutes § 45a-128 (c); see also Burnell v. Chorches, 173 Conn. App. 788, 792 n.2, 164 A.3d

806 (2017) (noting that plaintiffs had provided no legal

support for claim that motion for reconsideration tolled

thirty day time period and noting that court similarly

was not aware of any such authority). We find persuasive that the legislature expressly addressed appellate

procedure in § 45a-128 and did not provide that such a

motion would toll the appeal period for the underlying

court action. See General Statutes § 45a-128 (c); cf.

Ierardi v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 15 Conn. App. 569, 575–76, 546 A.2d 870 (appeal

period in administrative case tolled because governing

statute provided that ‘‘[a] request for reconsideration

postpones the running of the appeal period . . . until

‘the decision thereon’ ’’), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 813,

550 A.2d 1082 (1988).

For this court to agree with the plaintiff’s argument

would require us to graft on to the relevant statutes

discussed herein an exception that does not exist. ‘‘We

are not in the business of writing statutes; that is the

province of the legislature. Our role is to interpret statutes as they are written. . . . [We] cannot, by [judicial]

construction, read into statutes provisions [that] are

not clearly stated.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn.

391, 412, 999 A.2d 682 (2010). Reading the relevant
statutory scheme with the well established principles

regarding the statutory right of appeal in probate cases,

we conclude that a motion pursuant to § 45a-128 does

not toll the appeal period for the underlying decision.

Thus, the plaintiff’s appeal from the decree approving

the final account was untimely, and the Superior Court

correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff also claims on appeal that (1) his rights were prejudiced

by the Probate Court’s approval of the proposed final account without

completing the hearing and (2) the hearing was statutorily deficient. Because

we conclude that the Superior Court correctly determined that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal, we need not consider

these claims.

2 Patrick Rider, the plaintiff, and Brian Rider, the defendant, are both sons

of Leigh Rider. Brian Rider was named as a defendant in the complaint in

the Superior Court in both his individual capacity and as conservator of the

estate of Leigh Rider. Leigh Rider will be referred to as Rider throughout

this opinion.

3 Prior to this hearing, the plaintiff’s attorney requested a continuance

‘‘for the reason that he could not attend the hearing in person and had just

been retained by the plaintiff, and needed more time to consider the petition

for final account.’’ The motion was denied and the plaintiff’s counsel attended

the hearing via telephone.

4 Although the plaintiff was represented by counsel at this point in the

proceedings, at oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel represented that the plaintiff had filed this motion himself on the mistaken belief

that he was no longer represented by counsel.

5 The plaintiff, as well as the Probate Court and the Superior Court, at

times refer to this motion as a motion for reconsideration. For the sake of

consistency and clarity, we refer to the motion as a motion for revocation

throughout this opinion.

We also note that whether the plaintiff’s motion is referred to as a motion

for reconsideration or a motion for revocation is inconsequential to our

analysis because the governing statute applies to both motions. See General

Statutes § 45a-128 (‘‘[t]he court may reconsider and modify or revoke any

such order or decree for any of the following reasons . . . .’’ (emphasis

added)).

6 On the basis of these contentions, the plaintiff asserted that the decree

approving the account was ‘‘an ex parte [§] 45[a]-128 (a) decision . . . .’’

Section 45a-128 (a), which governs ex parte orders and decrees, provides

in relevant part that ‘‘an ex parte order or decree is an order or decree

entered in a proceeding of which no notice is required to be given to any

party and no notice is given’’ and that ‘‘[r]econsideration may be made on

the court’s own motion or, for cause shown satisfactory to the court . . . .’’

7 General Statutes § 45a-128 (b) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he court

may reconsider and modify or revoke any such order or decree for any of

the following reasons: (1) For any reason, if all parties in interest consent

to reconsideration, modification or revocation, or (2) for failure to provide

legal notice to a party entitled to notice under law, or (3) to correct a

scrivener’s or clerical error, or (4) upon discovery or identification of parties

in interest unknown to the court at the time of the order or decree.’’

8 The plaintiff included assertions that ‘‘the accounting was materially

incomplete . . . materially inaccurate . . . sought approval of attorney’s

fees that were not sufficiently substantiated by the accounting itself . . .

sought approval of attorney’s fees that had no nexus to the conservatorship

and therefore not reasonable; and/or . . . the conservator negligently and/

or intentionally failed to perform the duties required by law.’’

9 The plaintiff did not appeal from the Probate Court’s denial of his motion

for revocation. See footnote 10 of this opinion.

10 Each party, as well as the Superior Court, suggested at various points

that the plaintiff appealed from the court’s denial of his motion for revocation. Our careful review of the record reveals that the plaintiff never appealed

from the Probate Court’s denial of his motion for revocation and does not

raise claims on appeal to this court with respect to the denial of his motion.

In fact, the plaintiff’s complaint to commence his appeal in the Superior
Court was dated prior to the Probate Court’s ruling on the motion for

revocation, and he did not make arguments before the Superior Court related

to the Probate Court’s ruling on that motion. Therefore, despite the Superior

Court’s comments to the contrary in both the decision on the motion to

dismiss and in its memorandum of decision, the plaintiff only appealed from

the court’s decision to accept the final account and not from the court’s

denial of his motion for revocation. See Silverstein v. Laschever, 113 Conn.

App. 404, 414, 970 A.2d 123 (2009) (‘‘[a]n appeal [brings] before the Superior

Court for review only the order appealed from’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also In re Probate Appeal of McIntyre, 207 Conn. App. 433,

440, 263 A.3d 925 (2021) (‘‘The Superior Court may not consider or adjudicate

issues beyond the scope of those proper for determination by the order or

decree attacked. . . . The Superior Court, therefore, cannot enlarge the

scope of the appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

11 The plaintiff also argues that, ‘‘[i]irrespective of the tolling effect of the

motion for reconsideration, the decision’s flawed analysis is evidenced by

which date it considers the appeal period began in this matter. . . . The

Court’s holding misapplies the ‘final judgment doctrine’ by measuring the

commencement of the appeal period as December 13, 2017 [the date of the

hearing on the account]; in contrast the court correctly measured the appeal

period from December 22, 2017 [the date of the court’s ruling on the account]

when the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. . . . The trial

court in this case ruled that the appeal period commenced on December

13, 2017 even though there was no, ‘order, denial or decree of a Probate

Court’ to appeal from until December 22, 2017. This simple fact negates the

whole of the trial court’s flawed reasoning . . . .’’

With respect to this argument, it appears that the plaintiff has misread

the Superior Court’s memorandum of decision. Although the court referenced the date of the hearing with respect to its review of the Probate

Court’s denial of the motion for revocation, the court did not use that date

in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Superior Court

clearly measured the appeal period as beginning on the date of the Probate

Court’s approval, concluding that ‘‘the plaintiff’s appeal from the Probate

Court’s December 22, 2017 order approving the final account was not timely

commenced because it was not filed until March 2, [2018], well beyond the

thirty or forty-five day limitations in General Statutes § 45a-186.’’ Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff’s argument.

12 General Statutes § 45a-660 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) A conserved

person may, at any time, petition the Probate Court having jurisdiction for

the termination of a conservatorship. . . .

(b) (1) In any case under subsection (a) of this section, the conservator

shall file in the court the conservator’s final account, and the court shall

audit the account and allow the account if it is found to be correct. . . .’’

13 In making this argument, the plaintiff relies solely on Superior Court

decisions that are not binding on this court. See Towbin v. Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 71 Conn. App. 153, 177, 801 A.2d 851, cert. denied, 262

Conn. 908, 810 A.2d 277 (2002).

14 General Statutes § 45a-128 (c) provides that ‘‘[u]pon any modification

or revocation there shall be the same right of and time for appeal as in the

case of any other order or decree.’’