Filed 4/16/14 Jenkins v. Skinner CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ELIZABETH JENKINS, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. RICHARD R. SKINNER, Defendant and Appellant. D063866

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00037283- CU-HR-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sa n Diego County, William R. Nevitt, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Richard R. Skinner, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. William M. Nolan for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appella nt Richard R. Skinner, a self -represented litigant, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court' s issuance of a civil harassment2 restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure 1 section 527.6 in favor of plaintiff and respondent Elizabeth Jenkins a nd specified family members. Skinner contends the court did not have clear and convin cing evidence to issue the rest raining order against him or evidence of good cause to include Jenkins's family members. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
Jenkins first met Skinner in line at a co ffee shop. He initiated small talk by telling Jenkins, "I like the curls in your hair.'' Skinner noticed Jenkins's employee badge indentifying her as a school teacher at a La Jolla academy, and told her his daughter attended the academy and ex-wife worked ther e. Skinner said he had not seen his daughter in three years and asked about her. Feeling increasingly uncomfortable, Jenkins told him she did not know his daughter. Skinner told Jenkins a story about how his daughter had lied in the past. When Jenkins repeated that she did not know Skinner's daughter, Skinner started talking about his ex-wife, calling her manipulative and a liar and claiming she had lied in college by accus ing a professor of sexual harassment. Jenkins later provided Skinner's ex-w ife with a declaration describing her encounter, which was used in a family court proceeding. Le arning Jenkins had done so, Skinner called Jenkins at her home and "ber ate[d]" her in an intimidating manner. Jenkins told him not to call her again, hung up and called police. Skinner then emailed

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 Skinner has not provided a reporter's transcript of the hearing on Jenkins's proceedings and has elected to proceed by me ans of an appendix in lieu of a clerk's transcript. Jenkins has file d a respondent's appendix, and we gather the factual background from Skinner's rather limited re cord and the respondent's appendix.3 the academy and accused Jenkins and his ex-wife of conspiring against him, claiming Jenkins's declaration "really sounds like so mething [Jenkins] and [my ex-wife] cooked up. I am very disappointed and I hope you will address it." Follo wing his email, Skinner mailed a letter to Jenkins's home in part stating, "What you wrote in the enclosed declaration sounds like something [my ex-w ife] would come up w ith. . . . Your declaration says a lot about you and as mu ch as you are attractive on the outside, the inside could use some work. [¶] . . . In College [my ex-wife] alleged that a professor sexually harassed her. [My ex-wife] boasts ab out how she got even with the professor she didn't like. It is evil." Skinner thereafter spoke to several of Jenki ns's neighbors and gave them copies of the letter he sent Jenkins along w ith copies of her declaration. 3 Jenkins reported the incident to a deputy sheriff, who told her Skinner had an arrest record and recommended she obtain a restraining order against him. Jenkins filed a petition for a civil harassmen t restraining order ag ainst Skinner. In a sworn declaration accompanying the petition, she stated, "Skinner is obsessing about the declaration I gave in his family law procee ding. . . . [He] appa rently thinks I have

3 Skinner concedes in his opening brief that he "wanted very much to get to the truth and decided to conduct his own investigation." He further states: "Ms. Jenkins is a neighbor of Mr. Skinner and Mr. Skinner di scussed Ms. Jenkins['s] declaration with several of them. Mr. Skinner al so gave several of the neighbors a copy of Ms. Jenkin[s]'s declaration hoping that someone might come forward with informa tion that Ms. Jenkins has a history of engaging in unscrupulous behavi or." Skinner also states he "had a right to do everything that he di d"; that he should be "allowe d to call anyone, including Ms. Jenkins, . . . allowed to talk to his and Ms . Jenkins['s] neighbors in an attempt to legitimately investigate if they have inform ation that would assist him" and had an "absolute right" to contact his child' s school "to express his concerns."4 hurt his cause in the divorce case, and is no w harassing me. Skinne r lives 100 yards from me, and knows where I live. He is a self-e mployed contractor, with time and opportunity to do harm to me, my children, and my elderly mo ther. I fear for the safety of all of us." Jenkins also asked the court to extend the rest raining order to include her mother and two sons, explaining, "Skinner lives around the corner from my hom e . . . . My children are a toddler [] and infant twins []. My mother, [] stays with my children at my home while I am at work, and at other times. My husband is in the Navy and is to be deployed on April 1, 2013." In March 2013, the court held a hear ing on the matter with both parties in attendance. The court heard testimony from Je nkins, Skinner, and Skinner's ex-wife. At the hearing's conclusion, the court imposed a three-year restraining order against Skinner requiring him to stay 50 yards away from Je nkins, her mother, her husband and two sons; prohibiting him from contacting them; and pr ohibiting him from harassing, intimidating, stalking and taking other si milar actions against them.
DISCUSSION
I. It is axiomatic that ''[an] order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and erro r must be affirmatively shown .'' ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) An appellant must affirmativel y demonstrate error through reasoned argument, citation to the appellate record, and discussion of legal authority

.5 ( Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4t h 1108, 1115-1116 ( Guthrey ); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) .) As a general rule, "[a]n appellant must provide an ar gument and legal authority to support his contentions. This burden requi res more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. 'Issues do not have a lif e of their own: If they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . waived.' [Citation.] It is not our place to construct theori es or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and cita tions to authority, we treat the point as waived.'' ( Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Ru les of Court places the burden on appellants to "[s]upport any reference to a matte r in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.'' Thus,'' '[t]he reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassi sted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support th e judgment.' [Citation.] It is th e duty of [appellant] to refer the reviewing court to the portion of the record which supports appellant's contentions on appeal. [Citation.] If no citation 'is furnishe d on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived.' '' ( Guthrey , supra , 63 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1115.) Skinner's opening brief does not meet these standards. Skinner begins by asserting ''the statement of facts will show the Appellate Court that clear and convincing evidence does not exist and that the restraining order was extended to household members unknown to the Appellant." Sk inner then purports to descri be facts and the proceedings6 in the trial court, but none of his assertions are supported by reference to the record as required by California Rules of C ourt, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). Fu rther, his assertions are not limited to matters in the record as requi red by California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C). For example, Skinner states th at during the hearing, "[he] explained to the Court that he believed his former wife was behind the falsified declaration" and "believed his former wife is so ciopathic . . . ." Skinner clai ms he told the court "he has always had a great relati onship with his daughter and that he feels [his] daughter is being alienated by her Mother.'' Skinner suggests he had filed evidence for the hearing that was removed from the court file by his ex-wife. It is Skinner's burden to present an adequate record so as to affirmatively demonstrate trial court error. ( Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 494; Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1794; see Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295 .) "We cannot presume error from an incomp lete record." ( Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412.) " '[I]f the reco rd is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.' " ( Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) Skinner chose to proceed without a reporter's transcript, and thus we are with out ability to consider these assertions. Nor has Skinner set forth legal princi ples governing Jenkins's request for a restraining order, or the applicable standard of review. He provides no reasoned legal analysis or authority as requi red by California Rules of Cour t, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). We need not examine undeveloped claims; our role is to evaluate legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. ( Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th7 975, 984-985; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 .) Skinner gives us no basis to conduct this analysis. None of his bare assertions affirmatively demonstrates the court erred in granting Jenkins's petition. In light of Skinner's failure to affirmatively demonstrate the court erred, to support his legal arguments by legal authority, or to su pport his factual citations to the record, we deem his contentions forfeited. ( Guthrey , supra , 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.) The fact Skinner filed this appeal in propria persona does not exempt him from compliance with well-established appellate rules. ( Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246- 1247 [litigants appearing in propria persona must follow the same procedural rules as attorneys].)
II. Even if Skinner had not forfeited his cl aims of error, we would reject them on grounds the record contains substantial eviden ce to support the issuan ce of the restraining order and extending it to the members of Jenkins's family. Section 527.6, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: "A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting harassment as pr ovided in this secti on." Section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3) defines "har assment'' as "unlawful violen ce, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the pers on, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasona ble person to suffer8 substantial emotional distress, and must actua lly cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.'' '' 'Unlawful violence' is any assault or ba ttery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(7).) '' 'Credible threat of vi olence' is a knowing and willf ul statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose. '' (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) A course of conduct is defined as a "pa ttern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, eviden cing a continuity of purpose.'' (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) It includes fo llowing or stalking a pers on, making harassing telephone calls, or sending harassing correspondence by any means including mail, fax, or email. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1); see Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412-1414.) The course of conduct must by its nature cau se a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3); Brekke , at pp. 1414-1415.) If the court finds by clear and convin cing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, it must issue an injunc tion prohibiting the harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) On a showing of good cause, the tr ial court may also include fa mily members living with the plaintiff. (§ 527.6, subd. (c).)9 " The appropriate test on appeal is whethe r the findings (express and implied) that support the trial court's entry of the restraining order are ju stified by substantial evidence in the record .'' ( R.D. v. P.M . (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 1 88.) "We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of respondent, the pr evailing party, and indu lge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favo r of upholding the trial cour t's findings. [Citation.] Declarations favoring the preva iling party's contentions are de emed to establish the facts stated in the declarations, as well as all facts which may reasonably be inferred from the declarations; if there is a substantial conf lict in the facts includ ed in the competing declarations, the trial court's determination of the controverted fact s will not be disturbed on appeal.'' ( Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137-1138.) The record contains substan tial evidence that Skinner engaged in willful course of harassment directed at Jenkins that served no legitimate purpose. Skinner's conduct in calling Jenkins at home and intimidating he r, emailing the school where she worked, sending her a letter in the mail suggesting she falsified her decl aration, and leaving copies of her declaration on her neighbors' doorsteps, would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and, as Jenkins stated under oath, in fact caused Jenkins great emotional distress. The record also s hows good cause for extending th e restraining order to include Jenkins's family members: a to ddler, two infants, her elderl y mother and her husband. Jenkins expressly stated she feared for her fa mily's safety, and we conclude her fear was reasonable because her husband would not be present after April 1, 2013, and Skinner lived only 100 yards from Je nkins's home, where her mother watched her three young10 children. Jenkins averred he had repeated ly contacted her ther e and she worried he would do the same with them when she was absent. In light of the evidence in the record, including Skinner's own admissions, we conclude substantial evidence supports the tr ial court's findings and its decision to issue the section 526.7 civil harassment restraining order against Skinner. The record also demonstrates good cause for extending the rest raining order to include Jenkins's family members.11 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.