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Filed 4/20/16 P. v. Putnam CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEPHEN EUGENE PUTNAM,

Defendant and Appellant.

C074860

(Super. Ct. No. 62100613A)

A jury found defendant Stephen Eugene Putnam guilty of pimping and pandering

and the trial court sentenced him to seven years four months in prison. The jury also 

convicted defendant’s codefendant, Syla Debra Thongsy, of pimping and pandering, plus 

transporting a minor for the purpose of a lewd act. (Pen. Code § 266j.) In a separate 

appeal, this court recently affirmed Thongsy’s conviction and upheld her sentence of nine 

years four months. (People v. Thongsy (Aug. 14, 2015, C075112) [nonpub. opn.].)

Defendant now contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

and there is insufficient evidence that defendant aided and abetted Thongsy in pimping 

and pandering; (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive prison terms; and 

(3) the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by admitting 

into evidence a letter addressed to Thongsy.
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Disagreeing with defendant’s contentions, we will affirm the judgment and direct 

the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2010, defendant lived in a residential neighborhood in Roseville that his 

neighbors described as “family-oriented,” “desirable” and “quiet.” Some of his

neighbors testified that two or three years earlier, they had noticed a number of scantilyclad young women coming and going from defendant’s home and numerous unfamiliar 

men arriving and leaving again within an hour. In response to neighbor complaints at 

that time, police located an Internet advertisement that ultimately led to an undercover 

operation confirming prostitution in defendant’s home. A prostitute was apprehended. 

During the operation, police found defendant upstairs, viewing a prostitution 

advertisement on a laptop computer with a woman named Latasha. When an officer 

called the number on the advertisement, Latasha’s nearby telephone rang. Defendant was 

charged with maintaining a house of prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 316

and his plea of no contest to that charge was admitted into evidence in the instant trial 

without objection.

Later in 2010, the neighbors noticed the pattern of vehicle traffic and young 

women had returned to their neighborhood. One neighbor thought as many as five or six 

women were living in defendant’s house. Groups of women left defendant’s house 

dressed in stilettos, very short skirts and small tops. They looked like they were going 

to work in a strip joint or as prostitutes.

Neighbors often saw Thongsy at defendant’s house and driving defendant’s 

vehicles. At the same time, a woman who described herself as a dancer was renting

defendant’s pool house; she said the high-traffic activities started at the house at about 

the time Thongsy arrived in the summer of 2010. The dancer saw Thongsy come to the 

house with two girls she later told police appeared to be about 15 and 17 years old. 
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The dancer sent defendant a text message telling him he needed to get the underage girls 

out of the house, but she saw the same girls continue to come and go.

The victims who testified at trial were girls aged 15 and 16 years old in the 

summer of 2010. They had been friends since seventh or eighth grade. The older victim 

had been in and out of foster care because her mother had died and her father was in jail. 

The younger victim had also been in and out of foster care because her parents were on 

drugs.

The older victim met Thongsy at a mall after she ran away from home and needed

a place to stay. Thongsy picked her up at a park and took her to the home of Thongsy’s 

mother. In addition to shelter, Thongsy gave the older victim money for food, clothes 

and personal hygiene items. Thongsy later took the older victim to defendant’s house

and introduced defendant as Thongsy’s boyfriend.

The victims had been maintaining contact through social media and the older one 

told the younger one she had run away but had found a friend who supplied food, clothes

and a safe place to stay. The younger victim testified that the older victim claimed to be 

living with a “pretty lady” or “porn star” who bought her all kinds of things and took her 

places. One night, the younger victim got in trouble and did not want to go back home, 

so she contacted the older victim for help. The younger victim had no money, no 

toiletries and only the clothes she was wearing. Thongsy and the older victim went to 

pick up the younger victim in a silver or grey Altima. Thongsy took the victims to a store 

and bought them underwear and toiletries. They used the same car for a trip to Oakland. 

The car was registered to defendant.

Thongsy took the girls to defendant’s house and then to a Motel 6 where Thongsy 

rented a room for them. At trial, a motel employee recognized Thongsy as a frequent 

customer and authenticated room receipts in her name. Thongsy told the girls they could 

not continue “living off her for free.” It was clear that staying with Thongsy meant 

becoming a prostitute. The Motel 6 was on what the older victim called the “ho strip” 
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because of its reputation for prostitution. Buttressed by the drugs and alcohol supplied by 

Thongsy, the victims walked the street, taking men back to the motel room to engage in 

sexual intercourse for money. Thongsy told them $100 was the minimum price they 

should charge for sex and she warned them to have customers touch them first because an 

undercover police officer cannot touch a prostitute. Thongsy supplied condoms. The 

older victim said she gave Thongsy some of her earnings. The younger victim said she 

gave Thongsy all of her earnings.

The older victim took provocative pictures of herself and the younger victim in 

defendant’s bathroom for a portfolio Thongsy was creating. The younger victim said 

defendant gave her money to buy underwear at Victoria’s Secret so she could have a 

“photo shoot” at defendant’s house. She said defendant advised her she would do better 

advertising on the Internet than “walking the track” (a place where street prostitution 

occurs, often near motels). The older victim said Thongsy gave her the same advice. 

An expert regarding the commercial sexual exploitation of children (juvenile prostitution) 

testified at trial that Internet prostitution is much more lucrative than street prostitution.

The jury found defendant guilty of pimping the younger victim, a minor under 16 

years of age (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (b)(2) -- count three); pandering in connection 

with the younger victim (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (b)(2) -- count four); pimping the older 

victim, a minor 16 years of age or older (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a) -- count five); and 

pandering in connection with the older victim (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(2) -- count 

six). The jury found defendant not guilty on counts one, two, eight, nine, ten and eleven.

In sentencing defendant, the trial court concluded defendant was a danger to 

children from disadvantaged neighborhoods and that he had actively aided and abetted 

Thongsy’s pimping and pandering by enticing vulnerable children from a “very rough 

lifestyle” with his large home and “middle- to upper-class” lifestyle. Considering the 

aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate 

prison term of seven years four months as follows: the middle term of six years on the 
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count three charge of pimping (designated the principal offense); the middle term of six 

years on the count four charge of pandering, stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654; 

a consecutive one third the mid-term of one year four months on the count five charge of 

pimping; and the middle term of four years on the count six charge of pandering, stayed 

pursuant to Penal Code section 654.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant contends the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him 

before jury deliberations because the prosecution’s evidence against his codefendant was 

insufficient to support convictions against either of them for pimping and pandering. 

Defendant’s arguments presume liability against him was derivative, although the 

prosecution also argued it had proven direct liability for pandering.

The trial court denied a joint defense motion for acquittal. Defendant contends 

that even if the motion was properly denied, there was insufficient evidence to support 

the verdict because the defense established (1) the younger victim was once observed 

wearing sexy lingerie while chatting with men on the Internet; (2) she saw her boyfriend 

but did not tell him she wanted to leave; and (3) defendant was out of town for three days

while the victims were in Thongsy’s company.

In determining whether evidence is sufficient to support the denial of a motion to 

dismiss or to sustain a conviction, appellate courts do not independently adduce the facts 

from the evidence; instead, we must look at the whole record, presuming in support of the 

judgment every fact that the jury could have reasonably deduced. (People v. Hajek and 

Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1182-1183.) We turn to the evidence supporting each of the 

crimes for which defendant was convicted.

A

To pander is to cause, induce, persuade or encourage another person to become a 

prostitute by “promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme.” (Pen. Code, 
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§ 266i, subd. (a)(2).) Citing People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 (Beeman), 

defendant argues that aiding and abetting liability requires a defendant’s actual 

knowledge of the principal’s intent but in this case the prosecution did not prove he knew

what happened before Thongsy introduced him to the victims. We assume defendant’s 

point is that Thongsy must have persuaded the victims to become prostitutes before he 

met them. But if a panderer persuades someone to engage in continuing acts of 

prostitution, it is a continuing crime. (People v. Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 

490.) And when a crime continues, the intent of one who aids and abets it can be formed 

at any time before all the elements constituting the offense have ceased. (People v. 

Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164-1165.) Accordingly, the fact that the victims had 

been with Thongsy a few days before defendant met them is of no consequence.

A juvenile prostitution expert testified that underage girls involved in prostitution 

are usually runaways looking for somebody to take care of them and treat them as family. 

The expert described a grooming process in which juveniles are a rich target because they 

cannot drive, do not have the ability to get jobs and cannot take care of themselves; the 

pimps first provide them with food and housing and then later tell them they need to 

repay the favors by engaging in prostitution. Many pimps also provide drugs and alcohol 

to lower inhibitions or as rewards. The expert said he had never met a juvenile prostitute 

who worked independently of pimps. The jury arguably might have concluded Thongsy 

was the pimp and defendant was just trying to be helpful when he suggested Internet 

advertising for prostitution in lieu of “walking the track.” But knowingly helping with 

advertisements for prostitution is sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting

pandering. (People v. Leonard, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 491.)

As we have recounted, the victims were young runaways who received care from 

Thongsy and then were told they would need to engage in prostitution to stay on. At 

sentencing, the trial court concluded that staying in defendant’s home and being driven in 

his car was part of the inducement for the victims to believe they could attain a better
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lifestyle by cooperating with Thongsy. The younger victim said she feared both 

defendants. There was significantly more evidence adduced at trial, including extensive 

telephone records demonstrating defendant’s active role in the prostitution business with 

Thongsy and other prostitutes, but the cited testimony was sufficient to support 

defendant’s conviction for pandering. The defense evidence apparently did not persuade 

the jurors.

B

The jury also convicted defendant of pimping minors. That crime is defined as 

follows: “Any person who, knowing another person is a prostitute, lives or derives 

support or maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings or proceeds of the person's 

prostitution . . . when the prostitute is a minor, is guilty of pimping a minor . . . .” 

(Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (b).) The amount of money a pimp receives from the prostitute 

is irrelevant and it is not a defense that the defendant had sufficient income from other 

sources. (People v. Jackson (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 207, 210.)

Defendant contends there was no direct evidence that he knew when he met the 

victims that Thongsy intended to obtain support or maintenance from their acts of 

prostitution. At the close of the prosecution’s case, he argued there was no evidence he 

knew Thongsy took money from the victims. Minimizing the prosecution evidence, 

defendant again insists there was no proof he had “direct first-hand knowledge” of

Thongsy’s intent for the victims. He argues that Thongsy’s conduct appeared to him to 

be more consistent with someone who was prostituting herself than with someone who 

was pimping or pandering others.

Beeman established that an aider and abettor must share the specific intent of the 

perpetrator, meaning he “knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and 

gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s 

commission of the crime.” (Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) We do not read this 
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requirement as defendant does, requiring direct proof that the aider and abetter directly 

observed every element of the crime as it unfolded.

Both victims accepted money for sex in a motel room rented by Thongsy and then 

gave Thongsy some or all of their earnings. This was sufficient to prove pimping by 

Thongsy. (See People v. Jackson, supra, 114 Cal.App.3d 207, 209-210 [money given 

by victim to defendant for single act of prostitution was sufficient to prove pimping].) 

But there was more. The younger victim testified that she spent most of her time with 

Thongsy either in Oakland or at defendant’s house. She said defendant made sexual 

advances to her while she was at his house and Thongsy was away; communicating by 

text message, Thongsy refused defendant permission to have intercourse with the victim, 

but the victim twice gave him “hand jobs” instead. A reasonable juror could conclude 

that this conduct acknowledged and supported Thongsy’s role as pimp. 

Defendant also told the younger victim she would make more money advertising 

on the Internet, then he gave her money to buy lingerie for a photo shoot at his house. 

By that time, the older victim had left and the younger victim had overheard Thongsy 

“putting a hit out” on her, so she was frightened. Instead of doing the photo shoot, she 

had a relative pick her up and take her to her mother. The victim told detectives a 

Playboy photographer was at the house with the defendants when she left. A reasonable 

juror could have concluded from this and other evidence at trial that defendant had 

expertise in the prostitution business and that, even if he was not a pimp, he intended to 

help Thongsy improve her income from pimping the victims by actively encouraging and 

facilitating provocative photography for Internet advertising. Defendant proffered no 

other motive for helping teenagers he barely knew become successful as prostitutes.

There was substantial evidence to support the pimping conviction.

II

Defendant next contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive 

prison terms.
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The trial court imposed the middle term of six years on the count three charge of 

pimping the younger victim plus a consecutive one-third the mid-term of one year four 

months on the count five charge of pimping the older victim. Pursuant to Penal Code 

section 654, the trial court imposed but stayed execution of additional sentences for 

pandering. Defendant contends the trial court should have ordered all the sentences to 

run concurrently pursuant to California Rule of Court, rule 4.425 because there was no 

evidence he had a separate intent or knowledge with respect to the individual victims and 

also because the victims spent very little time at defendant’s house and, on one occasion 

when they were there, he was out of town.

California Rule of Court, rule 4.425 requires a court to impose a sentence on every 

count for which a defendant is convicted but to stay execution as necessary to implement 

Penal Code section 654. (People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472.) To 

implement Penal code section 654, a trial court must determine the defendant's objective 

and intent. (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639.) “If he entertained multiple 

criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, 

he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective 

even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible 

course of conduct.” (Ibid.)

Whether a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives is a fact question 

committed to the broad discretion of the trial court and its findings will not be reversed 

if there is any substantial evidence to support them. (People v. Jones (2002) 

103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) In a substantial evidence review, we assess the trial 

court’s factual conclusions in the light most favorable to the judgment and we presume 

the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. 

(Ibid.)

In this case, defendant’s objective to gain financial support from pimping and 

pandering may have been singular as he contends, but the trial court imposed consecutive 
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terms because there were two victims. Separate punishments are proper when a 

course of conduct results in crimes against separate victims. (People v. Butler (1996) 

43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1248.) Moreover, any circumstance in aggravation or mitigation 

may be considered in deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 4.425(b).) Being on probation when a crime is committed is an aggravating 

factor. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4).) The trial court found that defendant was 

on probation for a crime involving prostitution.

Carrying out a crime in a way that indicates planning, sophistication or 

professionalism is also an aggravating factor relevant to sentencing. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 4.421(a)(8).) Committing a crime against a particularly vulnerable victim is another. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3).) The trial court’s observation that defendant 

enticed children from disadvantaged backgrounds by allowing them to share in his more 

affluent lifestyle suggests it applied one or both of these additional factors, each of which 

was supported by facts recounted ante. (See People v. Mathews (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 

704, 710 [sophistication and professionalism are imprecise terms that appear calculated to 

invest trial courts with a considerable latitude in sentencing discretion].) Defendant’s 

contention lacks merit.

III

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his 

constitutional rights by admitting into evidence what was marked as exhibit 52, a letter 

addressed to Thongsy.

Police discovered the handwritten letter in a black bag inside the vehicle Thongsy

was in when she was apprehended. The author asked whether “Lala” had any kind of 

work the author could do to earn some money. Thongsy’s nickname was “Lala.” The 

letter, dated July 21, 2010, stated:

“Hello Baby Girl, [¶] I hope all is well with you. I wrote you in county but the 

letter came back. I miss you so much LALA. I hope and pray you are doing good. Ill be 
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[out] September 3rd. Im almost out of here just 43 more days. I cant wait to see you! I 

hope that we can hook-up like we talked about. Write to me. I get a letter from my mom 

she’s not that mad any more and she is sending me my parole box. So Im happy for that. 

LaLa if you have any kind of work that I can do let me know “K” As I need to make 

some $. I will be lucky to get home and buy dinner when I get out. [¶] Well little one 

write to me “K” I have alot of love for you. This place has changed so much. I hate it 

here now. I pray I never come back to this place. Its almost program time so Ive got to 

go for now.”

Defendant suggests the prosecution did not lay a proper foundation for the letter, 

but he cites no evidence that he objected on that ground. We will not consider a new 

objection on appeal. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434.) Defendant also 

argues the letter was inadmissible hearsay and that it was irrelevant because it did not 

name defendant or the victims. He also contends it was highly prejudicial because it 

showed Thongsy was at some point in custody and that prejudiced defendant because his 

liability was derivative of hers. We disagree.

The trial court concluded the letter was circumstantial non-hearsay evidence that 

Thongsy “may have been operating with others in the pimping or pandering, procuring, 

or soliciting [of] prostitutes to work for her.” Expressly rejecting the defense contention 

that the letter was unduly prejudicial, the trial court mentioned that it had earlier excluded 

less relevant evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant contends the trial 

court’s ruling was clouded by its reference to the excluded evidence. But the issue was 

fully briefed and argued and the trial court’s comment about other evidence merely 

explained distinctions among its rulings. Defendant provides neither argument nor 

authority for his assignment of error, so we reject it. (See People v. Harper (2000) 

82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4 [argument forfeited on appeal if not supported by 

analysis and authority].)
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We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, 

including the hearsay nature of proffered evidence. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 

690, 725.) We will not disturb an evidentiary ruling unless we conclude it was arbitrary, 

capricious or patently absurd and that it resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. 

(People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)

Hearsay is evidence of an out-of-court statement that is offered to prove the truth 

of the matter asserted. (Evid. Code § 1200, subd. (a).) An out-of-court statement of a 

nonparty is admissible if it is offered for a non-hearsay purpose and that purpose is 

relevant to an issue in dispute. (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 535-536.) The 

letter was not offered to prove that the author was looking for work, but rather that the 

recipient was not just generously helping young runaways in the summer of 2010, but 

was actively working as a pimp. The letter was relevant and admissible. Defendant was 

free to argue that it did not mention him or the victims and that it did not prove what the 

prosecution suggested.

Defendant also contends the letter should not have been admitted because it was 

so prejudicial. “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create a substantial 

danger of undue prejudice. . . .” (Evid. Code § 352.) This means evidence should be 

excluded if it poses an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings or reliability of 

the outcome. (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 36.)

Defendant argues the jurors could have inferred that Thongsy received the letter 

while she was incarcerated. But defendant does not explain why a reasonable juror 

would reach that conclusion or why such an inference would outweigh the probative 

value of the letter. Similarly, although defendant argues the court’s reference to having 

excluded other items of evidence “bespeaks an abuse of discretion,” he offers no 

explanation and no citation to relevant authority. In conclusion, defendant further 

contends admitting the letter into evidence violated his right to due process but, again, 
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he offers only a brief and bald assertion that his rights were violated. We decline 

to address any of these unsupported arguments. (See People v. Harper, supra, 

82 Cal.App.4th at 1419, fn. 4 [argument forfeited on appeal if not supported by analysis 

and authority].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the letter into 

evidence.

IV

In our review we have identified a discrepancy between the trial court’s sentencing 

orders and the abstract of judgment. Although this issue was not raised by the parties, 

because the law appears clear we will order correction of the abstract without further 

briefing in the interest of judicial economy. Any party aggrieved may petition for 

rehearing. (Gov. Code, § 68081.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of 

judgment to reflect that defendant was convicted on count three of violating Penal Code 

section 266h, subdivision (b)(2), pimping a minor, and that defendant was convicted on 

count four of violating Penal Code section 266i, subdivision (b)(2), pandering with a 

minor. The trial court shall forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment 

to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

 /S/

Mauro, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 /S/

Murray, J.

 /S/

Hoch, J.