### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 11, 200 7 S es sio n
GE R A LD IN GL E, d /b /a I N GL E’ S SA WM IL L & LO G C O. v. CHRIS TOPH ER W. HE AD and w ife , BERNADINE L . HEAD

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Hardin Coun ty

No. 6042 Ron E. Harm on, Chan cellor

No. W2006-02690-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 26, 2007

This appea l involves a motion to set aside an execution on a ve h i cl e. The plaintiff r ece ived a jud g me nt a g a ins t th e de fe nd ants in the amou nt of $6 2, 50 0, wh ic h he pr omp tly re c or de d in the c ounty reg ister’s off

ice. The defe ndants subsequently purcha sed a new car , and a sheriff levied execution on the ca r to partially

satisfy the judg ment. The de fenda nts filed this mot ion seekingto have the
e xec uti on se t asi de be c a

us e it w a s d e fe c tiv e fo r v ari ou s r e a so ns , a nd the y c la ime d th a t a

thi rd pa rt y held a se curity

interest in the vehic le and had priority over the execution lien. The trial cour t denied the motion to set aside the execution a nd order ed the sheriff

’s depar tment to sell the vehicle. The de fe nd ants a

pp e a le d. We a ff

ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS ,P. J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Cur tis F . H op pe r, Sava

nn ah, TN , f

or Ap pe lla nts
Chadwick G. H unt, Savannah, TN , for Appe llee-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
On J anuar

y 24, 2003, Ger ald Ing le d/b/a Ing le’s S aw mill & L og Co. (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Ing le”) rec eived a

judgme nt ag ainst Christoph er and Berna dine Hea d (“D efe ndants” or “ Mr. and Mrs. Hea d”) f

or $62,500, in Har din County Chance ry Court. Plaintiff r ecor ded a c ertified c opy of this judgment in the re cord book in the H ardin County Reg ister’s Of

fice on Fe bruar

y 12, 2003.

On Dec ember

2, 2005, Mr. Hea d purcha sed a new 2006 Chevrolet Corvette, white in color, from Chuck Hutton Chevrole t in Memphis, Tennessee . Acc ordingto the bill of sale, the total price of the c ar w as $54,468.18, which was paid in full with no balanc e lef t owing. O n the same da

y that Mr. Hea d purcha sed the ve hicle, he submitt ed an application for cer tificate of title and reg istration to the Tenne ssee De partment of Saf ety

. T h e appli cation did not identify any lien holders and
cer tified that there wer e no liens on the ve hicle.

On J anuar

y 30, 2006, the cler

k and master issued an execution a nd g arnishment direc ting a n office r to take posse ssion of a “2006 Chevr olet Corvette - white,” with a Ve hicle I dentification Number ( “VI

N number” ) of 1G1YY264265107525, belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Hea d, to satisfy the jud g me nt. A s ing le lin e is d ra wn thr ou g h th e VI

N nu mbe r. A d e puty

sh e ri ff le vie d o n th e Cor

ve tte on Fe bruar

y 21, 2006, and the of

fice r’s re turn is dated Mar ch 1, 2006.

On Marc h 2, 2006, Mr. Hea d submitt ed a se cond application for ce rtificate of title and reg istration to the Tennesse e De partment of Safe ty , this ti me listing one D ennis Cossey , of Cordova, Tenne ssee, as a first li en holder on the vehicle , and listing De cembe r 2, 2005, as the date of his lien.

On Marc h 7, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. H ead f iled a “Motion t o Set Aside Ex ecution and Re turn of Property” in H ardin County Chance ry Court. They alleg ed that the execution should be set aside beca use it listed the wrongVI N number for the Corve tte, and they claimed that the Corve tte was encumbe red. A ttached to the motion wer e copies of t he two applications for cer tificate of title and the bill of sal e. These documents listed the Corvette’ s VI N number a s “1G1YY 26 U 265107525.” ( E mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. T h e w r i to f e x e c u t i o nan d th e t e mp o r ar y l i c e n s e t a g o n th e v e h i c l e l i s t e d th e V IN number a s “1G1YY 26 4 265107525.” (Empha sis added).
Chance llor Ron E. H ar m o n h el da hea ringon the motion and order ed the Corve tte to be
re tur ne d to Mr . a

nd Mr s. He a d pe nd ing ano the r he ari ng , but the He a ds we re or de re d to po st a sure ty bond, store the vehicle, and were prohibited from encumbering , damag ing, or otherwise utilizing the vehicle pe nding f

urther or ders of

the cour t.I t appear s t hat M r

. C oss ey di d n ot f i l e a mo t i on t o i nt er ven e i n t hi s cas e, as t he s t y l e of t he ca se re m ai ned 1 G er al d I ngl e d/ b/ a I ngl e’ s Saw m i l l & Log Co. v

. Chr i s t opher and Ber nadi ne H ead

. T he f i nal order r ef

er s t o M r

. Co s s ey
a s a third p a rty.
-3- On May 2, 2006, Dennis Cossey

filed a motion to set aside the ex ec ution claiming that he held a prior secur ity interest in the vehicle. He a tta c he d to the mot ion a c op y of a c e rt if ic a te of tit le 1 for the ve hicle issued on Mar ch 9, 2006, listing him as a lien holder. Mr. Cossey also attac hed what he de sc ri be d a s a

c op y of a pr omi sso ry

no te e xec ute d b y Mr. He a d. Th is “ pr omi sso ry no te ” is a sin g le -p a g e , p re -p ri nte d f or m th a t si mpl y

re a ds : Signed in the pr esenc e of: Wit ness: /s/ J ere my

Cossey Bor rowe r: /s/ Christ opher H ead

. . . GUARANTY We the undersig ned jointly and seve rally

g uara n t y the prompt and punctual pay

ment of all money s due under the af oresa id note and ag ree to remain bound until fully paid.

In the pre sence of: Wit ness: /s/ J ere my

Cossey Guar antor: /s/ Christopher Hea d
There are two are as designate d for a notary ’s s igna ture a nd seal, but the for

m is not not arized or e ven dated.

At a he ari ngbe fo re Cha

nc e llo r H arm on

on May 2, 20 06 , th e pa

rt ie s’ atto rn e y s p re se nte d th e ir oral argument on the motion, but no testimony or other pr oof wa s prese nted. Counsel for Mr. a nd Mrs. Hea d contende d that the execution w as void on its fa ce for three rea sons, a nd he stated that he had “presente d all the documented evidenc e to support this.” The fir st two reasons we re those se t forth in his motion, re g arding the incorre ct VI N number and the encumbr ance on the Corvette. The Hea ds’ attorne y

argued that, by

s t at u t e, an ex ecution must include a pa rticular de scription of the proper ty to be levied on, whic h he conte nded must include the corr ect VI N number of a vehic le. He also argued that Mr. Cossey ’s sec urity interest in the vehic le took priority over Mr . Ing le’s execution lien, and Mr. Cossey ’s attorne y addre ssed this issue as well. Finally , the Hea ds’ attorne y claimed that Mr. Ing le “se i z ed ” t h e C orvette thre e day s befor e the c lerk a nd master issued the writ of
e xec uti on , v iol a tin g the du e pr oc e ss and statut or y ri g hts of Mr

. and Mr s. He a d. Ho we ve r, the ba sis of this argument was not explained.
At the conc lusion of the attorney s’ arg uments, the chancellor stated that he would hea r any proof the pa

rties wished to pre sent for the rec ord. Howe ver, none was pre sented. The chanc ellor
announce d hi s fi n d i ng from the be nch that Mr. Ing le’s cla im had priority over Mr . Cossey ’s lien beca use the e x ecution occ urre d befor e the lien wa s filed with the State of Tenne ssee. The chanc ellor further found that the de scription of t he vehicle included on the e x ecution wa s “more tha n adequate” to identify

it. The Hea ds’ attorney asked about his illeg al “seizure” theory , and the c hance llor statedT he f i nal o r der awar ded j udgment f or M r

. Ing l e i n t he amount o f $62 , 50 0, an d t he def

endan t s wer e or dere d 2
to p a y c o u rt c o sts. T h e e x e c u tio n li sts a ju d g m e n t b a la n c e o f $ 6 2 ,5 0 0 , p lus 2 2 5 .5 0 in c le rk ’s f e e s.
-4- that he did not find the arg ument rele vant t o the case. Mr. I ng le’s attorney was inst ructe d to prepa re a propose d order

. Af te r t he He a ds’ att orn ey

wa s p re se nte d w iththe pr op os e d o rd e r, he fi le d a “ Mo tio n to Clarify J udg ment and to H ear Additional Proof There on,” askingthe cour t to allow additional proof and is sue a ruling on the i lleg al “seiz ure” issue. Chance llor Har mon held another

hear ing, at which the Hea ds’ attorney stated that afte r the first hear ing, he lear ned additional information conc erning “how that execution c ame about,” and he w anted to put on additional proof r eg ardingthe issue. He then explained the basis of his “se izure” arg ument to the chancellor. I t appea rs that the Corvette w as involved in an ac cident on F riday , J anuar y 27, 2006, and a towing company towed the ve hicle fr om the sce ne of the acc ident beca use it was not drivable. Accor ding to the attorney s, at some point, Mr. Ing le lear ned of the ac cident and inf ormed the towingcompany that he had a

judgme nt ag ainst the Hea ds and did no t wa nt the towing c ompany to relea se the Corve tte to the Hea ds. Howeve r, Mr. Ing le did not phy sically

seize or take posse ssion of the Corvette, a nd it remained at the towing fac ility . The c lerk a

nd master issued the writ of execution on Monday , J anuar y 30, 2006, and it was l e v i e d o nth e C o r

v e t t e b y a s h e r i f f ’ s d e p u ty.
After hear ing the attorney s’ summary of the “ seizure” a

rgument, Chance llor Harmon state d that he fo un d n o ba sis fo r a sse rt ingsu c h a c la im a g a ins t Mr . I

ng le . Ch anc e llo r H arm on re state d h is prior rulingthat “the e x ecution issued by the Clerk wa s proper ly executed by

the S heriff

’s Depa rtment and that the pr operty was properly taken in satisfac tion of t he judg ment by the plaintiff.” An o r d e r w a s e n te r e d o n D e c e mb e r 5 , 2 0 0 6 , s e tt in g f o rth th e f

o ll o w in g f

in d in g s o f f

a ct and conclusions of law :

1. On J anuary

24, 2003, the Court enter ed judg ment for the plaintiff ag ainst both na

med defe ndants in the principal sum of $6 2, 72 5. 50

. Th e pla int if f r e c or de d a

c e rt if ie d c op y of thi s 2 ju d g me n t in th e o f

f ic e o f th e H ar d in Co un ty Re g ister on Fe bruar y 12, 2003, in Record B ook 299, pag e 180. 2

. O no r

a b o u t D e c e mb e r 2 , 2 0 0 5 , th e d e f e n d an t C h r is to p h e r

W. H e a d p ur c h a s e d

a w h i t e 2 0 0 6 C h e v r o l e tC o r v e t t e , V IN 1G 1Y Y2 6U 26 51 07 52 5, a t Chuc k H utt on Che vr ol e t Co . in Memphis, Tennesse e. The sales invoice lists no lienholder. 3

. O no r

a b o u t D e c e mb e r 2 , 2 0 0 5 , th e d e f e n d an t C h r is to p h e r

W. Hea d appl i ed for a Te nnessee cer tificate of

title and
re g istratio n f

or the 20 06 Cor

ve tte , c e rt if

yingno lie ns a g a ins t the vehicle

. 4. On J anuar

y 30, 2006, the Har din County Clerk & Master issued an Executi o n and Ga rnishment direc ting a

ny lawful office r to take posse ssion of the ab o ve-r efe renc ed 2006-5- Corvette and to dispose of it pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 26-1-101 et s eq. The Ex ecution and G arnishment descr ibed the prope rty

to be taken a s a 2006 white Chevr olet Corvette, but t he VI

N l isted was 1G1YY 264265107525. No other white Chevr olet Corvette has be en identified a s belong ing to the defe ndants. The de fenda nts filed no notice of their intent to claim any statutory exemption. 5

. O no r

a b o u t M ar c h2 , 2 0 0 6 , th e d e f e n d an t C h r is to p h e r

W. Hea d filed a second application for a Tenne ssee c ertificate of title and reg istration of the 2006 C o rvette, certify ing a lien held by Dennis Cossey

ag ainst the vehicle

. Based up on the fore g oing finding s of fac t, the Court m ak es the following conclusions of law : A. Th e pla int if

f h old s a va lid and e nf

or c e a ble jud g me nt a g a ins t the def endants in the princ ipal sum of $62,725.50. B. The plaintiff holds both a judg ment lien and an e x ecution lien on the 2006 Chevrolet Corve tte. C. These findings of fac t and conc lusions of law rea ched by the Court pe rtain only to those events occur ring afte r the Clerk & Master issued the execution on the 2006 Chevrolet Corvette, and, ther efor e, the Ha

rdin County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment proper ly levied on the 2006 Chevr olet Corvette. D. Th e Exe c uti on

and Ga rn ishme nt i ssu e d by the Ha rd in C ounty Clerk & M as t ersubstantially and ade quately

descr ibed the pr op e rt y to b e take n f

ro m th e de fe nd ants

. E. To the e xtent th a t D e nn is C os se y ha s a va lid se c ur ity int e re st in the subject 2006 Chevrole t Corvette, the lien of the p l a i n t i f f G e r a l d In g l e i s s u

p e r i o r t o th a to f D e n n i s C o s s e y. WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, ADJUD GED A ND DE CREED that the Har din County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment sell the 20 06 Che vr ol et Co rv e tte , V I N 1 G1 YY 26 U2 65 10 75 25 , p ur su ant t o the provisions of T.C.A. § 26-5-101, et seq., in partial satisfaction of the pla int if

f’ s ju dg me nt.
Mr. and Mrs. H ead f

iled a notice of

appea l on D ece mber 11, 2006, and filed a “Motion for Stay

and Enforc ement of Judgment” the followingday , askingthat the s ale of the C orvette be stay ed pending appea l. The He ads contended that a bond f or stay was not nec essar

y beca use the ve hicle wa s secur e. Followinganother hear ing, the motion for stay was denied. Mr. and Mrs. H ead subse quently filed a “Motion for

Emerg ency

Injunctive Relief” in this C ourt, which we interpre ted as a motion for revie w of the trial court’s order denying a stay or injunction pendingappea l, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure . Upon due c onsideration, we d en i ed the motion and de c lin e d to sta

y e xec uti on

of the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.T he H ea d s’ b rief d o es no t cit e a si ng l e c ase i n sup p o rt o f t he i r va riou s argu m en t s. 3

-6- II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED On appe al, Mr. and Mr s. Hea d prese nt the following issues for re view:

1. Whe the r t

he e xec uti on

is d e fe c tiv e in t

hat th e VI N n umb e r w a s in c or

re c t and c ro sse d o ut, thu s , e x e c u t i n g o nth e w r o n g p r o p e rty. 2. Whether the appe llee ca used the seizure of

the vehicle three day s befor e obtainingissuance
o f th e e x e c u t i o n , w i th o u ta

r e c o r d e d a b s tr a c t o r m e m o r an d

u mr e g i s t e r e d

w i th i ns i x ty d ays of the re ndition of t he judg ment pursuant to T.C.A. § 25-5-103, a nd without ex ecution being issued by the cler k. 3. Whether the c ourt err ed in not g iving the lien holder, on the f ace of the title, priority

over the execution. 4. Whether the c ourt err ed in not issuing a sta y on the sale of

the prope rty , violating Te nnessee Rule of Civil P roce dure 62.03 a nd 62.04. F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on

of the c ha nc e ry c ourt

. III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW On appe al, a trial court’s factua l finding s are presumed to be cor rec t, and we w ill not overturn those fac tual finding s unless the evidenc e pre ponderates agai n s t them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2 00 7) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 6 0 S. W.3 d 7 21 , 7 27 (T e nn . 2 00 1). For th e e vid e nc e to p re po nd e rate ag ainst a trial cour

t’s finding of fa ct, it must support another finding of fa ct with g reater c onvincing eff ect. Watson v. Watson , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g W a lke r v. S i d ney Gi lrea th &

As so cs. , 4 0 S. W.3 d 6 6, 71 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, Inc . v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 5 9 6 (T enn. C t. App. 1999)). We re view a tr ial court’s conclusions of lawunder a de novo sta nd ard up on the re c or d w ith no pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss. Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 , 9 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. T he De sc rip tio n of

the Prop e rty On appe al, Mr. and Mrs. Hea d first argue that the execution is void because it desc ribed the Corvette using the wrong VI N number, and the VI

N number w as also cr ossed out. As support for this argument, they rely solely upon the languag e of Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 26-3-108, which simply

states that “[a] description of the prope rty levied on, with the date of the levy , shall be
e nd or se d u

po n o r a pp e nd e d to the e xec uti on .” With out fu rt he r c ita tio n to a uth or ity , the He a ds c la im

3 that the descr iption must include the c orre ct VI N number f

or a ve hicle. As pre viously discussed, theT he V IN num b er l i st ed on t he executi o n m at ched t he V IN num b er on t he t em p o rary l i cense t ag. 4

A s o n e c o u rt a p tly n o te d , “th e T e n n e sse e c a se la w c o n sid e rin g the re q u ire m e n ts fo r a va lid le v y is un ifo rm ly 5

a n c i e n t a n d f

r e qu e n t l y un us ual

. ” In r e H ockaday , 1 6 9 B .R . 6 4 0 , 6 4 2 (B a n k r. M .D . T e n n . 1 9 9 4 ); s ee , e

. g. , St eers v. D an i el , 4 F

. 5 8 7 (C

. C

. W

. D

. T enn. 1 8 8 0 ) (f i nd i ng a levy o n a c o t t o n c o m p res s no t a b and o ned d uri ng “ ep i d em i c o f 18 7 8 ”); Evans v

. H igdon , 60 T enn. 24 5 (18 7 2 ) ( co nsi d eri ng a l evy up o n a m ul e m ad e b y pe eri ng t hrough cracks of ba rn) ; S h a n n o n v . E rw in , 58 T enn

. 337 ( 18 72 ) ( i nv ol vi ng t he t ender of a deed t o re al proper t y del ay ed ni ne y ear s due t o ons et
o f C ivil W a r)

. -7- descr iption listed on the ex ecution in this case misstated the VI N num ber by including a “4” rathe r than a “ U.” 4

I t is clea r from the statute that “[a] description” of the pr operty levied on must be endor sed upon or appe nded to t h e ex ecution. Te nn. Code Ann. § 26-3- 108 (2000). The statute does not distinguish betwee n levies on rea l proper ty or personal proper

ty , but near ly all Tenne ssee opinions applying this requirement have involved levies on r eal pr operty

. In the one c ase that we have 5
e nc ounte re d invo lvi ngthe de sc ri pti on re qu ir e me nt a

nd pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y , th e Sup re me Court

sim ply noted th at t h er e wa s no vagueness or obscurity in the descr iption of the proper ty levied on. See Bal lard v . D ibre ll , 94 Te nn . 229 , 28 S.W. 108 7 (18 95 ). Th e pr op e rt y le vie d o n mu st b e su ff

ic ie ntl y descr ibed bec ause “ purcha sers must have the means of know ing what land is to be sold, so as to form
some estimate of its va lue; and,

. . . there must be such asc erta inment, by descr iption of identity , as shall preve nt one piece of land from beingsold, and a distinct piece conveyed.” Gibbs v. Thom pson , 26 Tenn. (7 H um.) 179 (1846).

In the re alty

context, a description oug ht to show the locatio n o f t h e l an ds levied on to a
rea sonable c erta inty

. Brown v. Dickson , 2 1 T e n n

. ( 2 H u m

. ) 3 9 5 ( 1 8 4 1) ; see also 33 C.J.S. Exe cutions § 120 (2007) ( “A de scription is sufficient if it ena bles one to locate the prope rty and identify it when found.” ). Howe ver, a descr iption of land will be sufficient “ if thos e l i v i n g in the immediate neig hborhood will rec og nize the description.” Chri sti an v . M ynat t , 79 Tenn. 615 (1883) (c i t i n g Freem an on Exe cutions , p. 281). F or example, the land levie d on in Chri stian was de scribed as “two hundr ed ac res of

land, the property of t he defenda nt, ly ing in the 8th c ivil dis trict of Gr aing er county , on the dividing line be tween Kn o x and Gr aing er c ounties, adjoining the lands of Joseph My natt’s heirs, Ma

rtha Smartt and other s.” The Supre me Court explained,
Whether this of itself is or is not a sufficie nt description, it is not
ne c e ssa r y t o d e t e r m i n e , a s th e r e i s f

u l l p r o o f th a tth e l an d

i s w e ll known in the neig hborhood by it, that it is the onl y

land eve r owne d there by the def endant, a nd can be easily p ro ved and loc ated by the descr iption.

Id. Al l th a t is ne c e ssa

ry is “s ome g e ne ra l de sc ri pti on that w ill by

re a so na ble int e ndme nt c onne c t it with the sale a

nd deed, so that a trac t of land diffe rent fr om the one levied on ma y not be sold and conveyed.” Id. (q u o t i n g Parker &Colli er v. Swan , 20 Tenn. (1 Hum.) 80 (1839))

. In another case , the Court held t hat a descr iption of l and identify ing three sides of t he parce l levied on but l eavingT h e H ea ds do a r g u e i n t h ei r br i ef t h at t h ey di d n ot r ec ei v e a r ec ei pt or r et u r n of t h e ex ec u t i on a s r equ i r ed by 6
T en n es s ee Code Ann ot at ed s ec t i on 26- 1- 402. T h i s ar g u men t wa s n ot pr es en t ed i n t h e t r i al cou r t a n d i s t h er ef or e wa i v ed. Cor r el l v . E. I
. D uPont

de Nem our s & Co. , 20 7 S.W

. 3 d 75 1 , 75 7 (T enn. 20 0 6 ) ( “[ I] ss ues not rai sed i n t he t ri al co urt
can not be r ai s ed f

or t he f i r s t t i me on appeal

. ”)

. H owever , we not e t hat t he deput y ’ s ret ur n i s d at ed M ar ch 1, wh i ch was t h e t h i r t i et h da y a f

t er i t w as i s s u ed, i n a cc or dan ce w i t h t h e r equ i r eme n t s of s ec t i on s 26- 1- 401 a n d - 402.
-8- the fourth unidentifie d was not voi dfor unc erta inty beca use the four

th side was ca

pable of being deter mined. Stephens v. Taylor , 74 Tenn. 307 (1880) . Ex amples of de scriptions that were found to be void f

or vagueness are : “ lot No. --, in the town of Gre enville, with its im proveme nts,” Bro wn v. Dickson , 2 1 T e nn . (2 Hum.) 39 5 (18 41 ), and “ thr e e hund re d an d fif

ty a c re s of land , the pr op e rt y of Edmond Collins,” La

ff e rty v . Co nn , 35 Tenn. (3 Snee d) 221 (1855)

. Applying the se principles to the c ase be fore us, we c onclude that the description of the Corvette on the e x ecution is sufficie nt. The prope rty levied on i s d es cr i bed as a “2006 Chevrole t Corvette - white,” with a VI N num ber of 1G1YY264265107525, belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Head. The VIN n umber ha s a sing le line throug h it, although it is not clear who cr ossed it out. Mr. and Mrs. Hea d did not contend that they owned any other white Corve tte so that a per fec t description of the VI N number w as nec essar

y to identify

the vehicle

. The sheriff

’s deputy was a ble to identify

the proper ty to be levied on, a s indicated by his return. We find that a suf ficient de scription of the proper ty levied on, and the d at e o f the levy , appea rs on the fa ce of

the execution and satisfies the require ments of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 26-3-108.

B. “ Se izure ” W

itho ut Ex e c utio n or

a Re c orde d M

e morand um Next, we addre ss the Heads’ argument that Mr. I ng le caused the seizure of the Corvette thre e day s befor e obtainingthe issuance of the e x ecution, without reg istering a re corde d abstrac t or memorandum within six ty day s of t he judgment pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 25- 5-103.

Initially , we note that the Hea ds’ brief does not addre ss the i ssue of whether an abstra ct or me mor and

um w a s r e c or de d p ur su ant t o T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d se c tio n 2 5- 5- 10 3 o the r t ha n in this one ref

ere nce in its statement of the issues. The trial court expressly found that “[t] he plaintiff
re c or de d a

c e rt if ie d c op y of [the Janu ary

24 , 2 00 3] ju dg me nt i n th e of fi c e of the Ha rd in C ounty Reg ister on Fe bruar

y 12, 2003, in Record Book 299, pag e 180,” and there is nothing in the re cord t o co n tra d i ctth i s fi n d i n g. 6

No w, re g ard ingthe “ se izure” argume nt, the He a ds ’ b ri e f s e ts f or th t he same a lle g e d f

a c ts about an a ccide nt occur

ringand Mr. Ing le telling the tow tru ck co m p an y that he had a

judgme nt
a g a ins t th e He a ds and did no t want the Cor ve tte to b e re le a se d. Th e He a ds c on te nd that th e se fa c ts
are “ c le ar fr om the Ev ide nti ary Re c or d a s we ll a s th e Te c hn ic a l Re c or d, ” and that th e fa c ts c le arl y de mon str a te that th e ir

du e pr oc e ss a

nd law of the land ri g hts we re vio late d, and the e xec uti on

sh ou ld be set a side. We disag ree

.In t ha t c a se , M s. R eg uli p urc ha sed a ne w B M W using m o ne y s he ha d b o rro w ed f ro m he r d au gh t er, M s. 7 S e n e c a l. R eg u li , 88 8 S.W

. 2 d a t 4 4 1

. H o wever, w hen she subm i t t ed a n a p p l i cat i o n for ce rt i f i cat e o f t i t l e and regi st rat i o n, sh e c e rtifi e d the re w e re no li e n s o n the ve h ic le

. I d. K ee p F resh F i l t ers, Inc. o b t aine d a d efau l t jud gm en t ag ainst M s. R e g u li a n d p ro m p tly re c o rd e d a c o p y in the re g ister ’s o ff ic e

. I d. T he cl erk and ma s t er i s s u ed a wr i t of e x ec u t i on d ire c ting the sh e riff to tak e p o sse ssio n o f th e B M W , a n d the e x e c u tio n w a s p ro p e rly lev ie d

. I d. M s

. Regul i t hen sub m i t t ed a ne w ap p l i ca t i o n for c erti f i ca t e o f t i t l e a nd reg i st rati o n, c l aim i ng tha t h er d au gh t er’s li en o n t he ve hicle aro se
o n the d a te the ve h ic le w a s p u rc h a se d

. I d.
-9- T h e H e a d s ’ ar g u me n t is n o t s u p p o rte d b y e v id e n c e in th e r e c o r d o r c it a ti o n s to relevant
a uth or ity in t he ir br ie f. Th e “ fa c ts” tha

t f or m the ba sis of

the He a ds ’ a

rgume nt w e re on ly

state d to Chance llor Har

mon by the Hea ds’ attorney at the second hear ing, which was held afte r the cha ncellor had rule d in favor of

Mr. Ing le at the f

irst hear ing. Cha

ncellor Harmon specifically offe red to hear proof on this issue at the first hear ing, and none was prese nted by the Hea ds. Stil l, e ven assuming that Mr. Ing le did inform the tow truc k company of his judgme nt ag ainst the Hea ds and say that he did not “want” the car

to be re lease d, we perc eive no a ppare nt claim that would arise in f avor of the Hea ds ag ainst Mr. I ng le. The tow truck company maintained possession of the ve hicle at a ll releva nt times, and if the He ads we re de nied possession of the vehicle , it was by

the tow truck c ompany , not by Mr. Ing le. The Hea ds fail to c ite any authority for their argument that these actions re quire the execution to be set aside.

In addition, the Hea ds’ alleg ations fail to state a cl ai m for violation of their constituti onal ri g hts to d

ue pr oc e ss. “ State a c tio n” is n e c e ssa ry to i nv ok e the pr ote c tio ns of th e F ourt e e nth Amendment of the United S tates C onstitut ion and Ar ticle I , section 8 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. Bryant v. Tenet, Inc. , 969 S.W .2d 923, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). A ccor dingly , the constitutional protec tions of those sections do not apply to the actions of Mr. I

ng le. The H ea d s cl ai m t h at the Har din County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment par t i ci p at ed in an unlaw ful detention of the ve hicle, but the Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment is not a party

to this case.

In sum, we find no mer it in the Heads’ unsuppor ted ar g uments reg ardingthis iss ue.
C. P rio rit y
Mr. and Mrs. H ead ne x t argue that the tria l c ourt err ed in findingthat Mr. Cossey ’s lien on the vehicle was subordinate to Mr. I ng le’s ex ecution lien. In Ke e p Fresh Fi

lte rs, Inc . v . Re gul i , 888 S.W. 2d 43 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 4) , the Mi dd le Se c tio n o f t his Court re so lve d a

pr ior ity dis pute strikingly simil ar to the one prese nted in this case

. The Court expl ained the la w applica ble to the 7 iss ue a s f oll ow s:
Three bodies of la w gover n the re spective r ights that Ke ep Fr esh F ilters and Ms. Senec al have in Ms. Reg uli’s automobile. They include Ar

ticle Nine of

the Uniform Commerc ial Code, the statutes g overning motor vehicle cer tificates of title, a

nd t h e s t atut es g ov e rn ingjud g me nt lie ns and e xec uti on s. Con str

ue d to g e the r, the seT en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 47- 9- 109 l i s t s t y pes of t r an s ac t i on s n ot c ov er ed by Ar t i cl e 9. 8

-10- statu t es p rovide the pr inciples for f ix ing the priorities among
c omp e tin g lie n c la ima

nts and se c ur e d p art ie s.
Id. at 442. Article 9 of the Unifor m Comm erc ial Code applies to nea rly all consensua l transac tions int e nd e d to c re a te a

se c ur ity int e re st i n g oo ds by c on tr a c t, inc lud ingtr ans a c tio ns int e nd e d to c re a te 8
a sec urity interest in a u tomobiles. Id. Howeve r, Article 9 is not the only body of law g overning
secur ity interests in automobiles. Id. Pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 47-9-311, Article 9' s filing r equire ments must give wa y to state statutes requiring se curity interests to be indicated on a

n automobile’s ce rtificate of title in order to be perf ecte d. Tenne ssee ha s just such statutes, and complianc e with the motor vehicle title and reg istration laws “is the exclusive method for perfe cting a security interest in automobiles not part of inventory .” Re gul i , 888 S.W .2d at 442;
see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 3-126 (Supp. 2007). In sum, t h e m o t o r vehicle title and reg istration statutes g overn r equire ments for pe rfe cting secur ity interests in automobiles, but the Uniform Commercial Code still provides the rules for deter mining priorities when there is a dispute among persons c laiming a

n interest in the same automobile. Id.

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 7- 9- 31 7 p ro vid e s th a t a se c ur ity int e re st i s su

bo rd inate to t he ri g hts of

a pe rs on tha t be c ome s a lien c re dit or be fo re the se c ur ity int e re st i s p e rf

e c te d. As in Re gul i , this provision i s disposit ive of the issue be fore u s

. Howeve r, we must consider seve ral qu e sti on s in

or de r t o r e so lve the iss ue : (1) I s Mr. Ing le a lie n cr e dit or ? (2 ) I f so, wh e n d id h e be c ome a lien c re d i tor? (3) Was Mr. Cossey ’s sec urity interest unper fec ted when Mr . Ing le bec ame a lien
cre ditor? 1. Is Mr. Ingle a lien cre ditor?

Tenne sse e Code

Anno tat e d s e c tio n 47

-9-1 02 (a )( 52 ) d e fi ne s a “li e n c re dit or ,” fo r o ur purposes, a s “a c reditor that ha s acquire d a lien on the prope rty involved by

attachme nt, levy , or the like.” Thus, we must deter mine whether Mr. I ng le i s a creditor, whether he has a lien r ecognized by state law, and

wh e the r t he lie n att a c he d to the pr op e rt y by a tta c hme nt, le vy , or the lik e . M r. Ing le is clear ly a cr editor, spec ifically

a judg ment cre ditor, by virtue of his valid final judg ment ag ainst Mr. and Mrs. He ad.

No w w e mus t de te rm ine wh eth er he ho lds a lie n r e c og nize d b y

state law. “ A l ie n, in i ts b ro ad es t s en s e, is a leg al claim or c harg e on re al or pe rsonal prope rty used as se curity

for the pay ment of some debt or oblig ation.” Re gul i , 8 8 8 S

. W

. 2 d

at4 4 3 (c i t i n g Sh iple

yv . M e tro po lit an Life Ins. Co. , 25 Tenn. App. 452, 4 5 4 , 1 5 8 S .W.2d 739, 741 (1941)). Persons who obtain a judgme nt become judgme nt cre ditors and m ay o b t ai n two signific antly differ ent ty

pes of liens a g ainst the judgme nt debtor’s prope rty

. I d. T h e fi rs t ty

pe is a judg ment lien, authorized by Tenne ssee Code Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 5- 5- 10 1( b) , w hic h atta c he s to the jud g me nt d e bto r’ s r e a l pr op e rt y fr om t he tim e a ce rtified copy

of the judg ment is r ecor ded in the reg ister’s off ice. The second ty

pe is an e x ecution lien, authorized by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 25-5-103, which attaches to the judg ment“ A wr i t of ex ecu t i on i s now t he cu s t om ar y vehi cl e f or e nf orci ng mo ney j udgment s

. ” R eg u li , 888 S. W

. 2d at 9 4 4 3 (c iti n g T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 6 -1 -1 0 3 ; H e n ry R . G ib so n , G i bson’s Su i ts i n C ha ncer y § 3 0 7 (W ill ia m H . In m a n e d ., 7 th e d . 1 9 8 8 ); L a w re n c e A . P ivn ic k , Tenn es s ee C i r cui t Co urt P r act i ce § 2 9 -1 (3 d e d . 1 9 9 1 ))

. T h e w rit o f ex e c u tio n is
s i mpl y a n or der di r ec t i n g t h e s h er i f f t o l ev y u pon a n d s el l t h e j u dg men t de bt or ’ s pr oper t y i den t i f i ed i n t h e wr i t t h at i s n ot sta tuto rily ex e m p t. I

d. (ci t i ng T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 6

- 1

- 1 0 4 ). “A l evy o f execut i o n i s t he o f

f i cer’ s act of ap p rop ri at i ng
or s i ng l i ng out t he debt or’ s propert y f or t he s at i s f

act i on of a debt

. ” I

d. (ci t i ng M cM i l l an v

. G ayl or , 35 S. W

. 453, 454- 55 (T enn. C h. A p p

. 18 9 5 ))

. A l evy i s acco m p l i shed b y t he o f f i cer’ s ass ert i ng d o m i ni o n o ver t he p rop ert y , ei t her by t aki ng p o s s e s s io n o r d o ing so m e thin g tha t am o u n ts to the sa m e thin g

. I d. ( ci t at i ons om i t t ed). A l evy r es ul t s i n t he act ual d i vest i t ure of

t he judgm ent de b t o r’ s t i t l e, t he p rop ert y be i ng placed i n t he cust o d y of t he l aw, and t he sher i f f acq ui ri ng
a sp e c ia l i n te re st in the p ro p e rty. I d. at 44 4 (ci t at i o ns o m i t t ed ).

T h i s r u l e does n ot appl y t o ex ec u t i on s i s s u ed by g en er al s es s i on s cou r t s or t o w r i t s of a t t ac h men t , w h i ch do 10

n o t giv e rise to li e n s u n til the sh e riff a c tua lly le v ie s o n the p ro p e rty. R eg u li , 888 S. W

. 2d a t 444, n

. 3.
-11- de bto r’ s p e rs on a l pr op e rt

y . T he e xec uti on lie n r e qu ir e s th e re g istra tio n o f t he jud g me nt w ith in s ixty day s after it is rendere d and the issuance and le vy of a writ of execution. Re gul i , 888 S.W .2d at 9 443. Thu s , a ju d g me n t c r e d it o r ’ s e xe c u ti o n li e n is in e xtr ic a b ly li n k e d to th e s h e r if

f ’ s le vy of execution. Id. at 444. The exis tence and eff icac y of Mr. I ng le’s execution lien depe nds only upon strict compliance with the statutes g overning execution liens and writs of execution, and not upon any require ments of Article 9 or t he mot or vehicle title and reg istration statutes. See id. We have alre ady deter mined that Mr. Ing le’s execution lien is not invalid for the re asons alleg ed by Mr. and Mrs. Hea d.

2. When di d Mr. Ingle’s lien arise?
“The rig hts of a lien cr editor hing e upon identifying the prec ise point when its lien arises.” Re gul i , 888 S.W .2d at 444. In Tenne ssee, we follow the ear ly common-law rule that an execution lien relates to the teste of the e x ecution. Id. The “ doctrine of relation” provides that the e x ecution lien of a c ourt of re cord r elates to its teste. Id. “Court executions are tested the da y of issuance .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 26- 1-109 (2000)

. There fore , “[a] properly issued execution give s rise to a lien on the defe ndant’s leviable pr operty from the da

y it is i ssued.” Re

gul i , 888 S.W .2d at 444 (c iting 10 Te nn . Code Ann. § 2 6- 1- 10 9; Car ma c k v . Ni c ho ls , 181 Tenn. 551, 560, 181 S.W.2d 977, 980 (1944); John W eis, Inc. v . Ree d , 22 Te nn

. Ap p. 90 , 10 0, 11 8 S.W. 2d 67 7, 68 3 ( 19 38 ); Stahlman v. W atson , 39 S.W . 1055, 1059 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897) ). This rule serves the purpose of execution liens, which is “to fac ilitate using the judg ment debtor’s pr operty to satisfy its debt t o the j udg ment cre ditor.” Id. (c i t i n g Ove rton v. Perk

ins , 8 Te nn . ( Mart . & Yer.) 367 , 3 74 (1 82 8) ). Th e sh e ri ff is g ive n ti me to car ry out t h e co u rt’s orde rs and the de btor is preve nted from disposing of the prope rty afte r the judgme nt. Id. (c i t i n g Edwards v. Thompson , 85 Te nn . 720 , 722 , 4 S.W. 91 3, 91 3 ( 18 87 ); L onnie C. Rich, Note, Enforcing Money Judgme nts in T

ennesse e , 4 Mem. St. U. L

. Rev. 65, 70, n.48 (1973))

. In this case , the clerk and master issued the writ of e x ecution dire cting an off icer to levy on the Corvette on January

30, 2006. In acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 26-1-109, the wr it’ s te ste date wa s Jan ua ry 30 , 2 00 6. Ac c or din g ly , M r. Ing le ’s e xec uti on lie n o n th e Cor

ve tte arose on J anuar

y 30, 2006.W e e x p re ss n o o p inio n a s to the v a lid ity o f M r. C o sse y’s u n d e rlying se c u rity inte re st. W e o n ly ho ld tha t, 11
to the e x te n t t h a t M r. C o sse y h o ld s a v a lid s e c u rity in te re st in th e C o rv e tte, it w a s u n p e rfe c te d o n th e d a te tha t M r. In g le ’s executi o n l i en arose, and t heref o re s ub o rdinat e t o M r. Ingl e’ s l i en.

-12- 3. Was Mr. C ossey’s sec urity intere st perfect ed on Janu ary 30, 2006?

As previously discussed, compli ance with Tenne ssee’ s motor vehicle title and r eg istration statutes is the ex clusive m eans f or per fec ting a

secur ity interest in automobiles that are not part of
a d e a l e r ’ s i n v e n t o r

y. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-3-126 (Supp. 2007). Tenne ssee Code Annotated
se c tio n 5 5- 3- 12 6 p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art : (a) . . . a lien or se curity

interest in a ve hicl e of the ty pe for which a
c e rt if ic a te is re qu ir e d s ha ll b e pe rf e c te d a nd sh a ll b e va lid

a g a ins t subsequent cr editors of the owner, subse quent transf er ee s , and the holders of se curity

interest and liens on the vehicle by comp l i an ce with this chapter. (b)( 1) A sec urity

interest or lien is per fec ted by deliver y to the d e p art m e n t o r th e c o un ty c l e r k o f th e e xi s t i n g c e rt i f

i c a t e o f t i t l e , if any , title ex tension form, or manuf actur er’ s statement of origin and an applicatio n for a certificate of title containing the name and
a d d r es s of the holder of a security interest or lien wi th v e hic le descr iption and the require d fee

. (2) The sec urity

interest is perf

ecte d as of the date of de livery to the
c ounty c le rk or the div isi on

of mot or ve hic le s. (empha sis added). Mr . Hea d’s first application for ce rtificate of title and re g istration, submit ted on Dec ember

2, 2005, cer

tified that there wer e no liens on the vehicle. I t was not until Marc h 2, 2006, that Mr . He a d sub mitte d his se c on d ap pli c a tio n for c e rt if ic a te of tit le de signatin g Mr . Coss e y a s a lienholder. A c ertifica

te of title was issued on Ma rch 9, 2006, with a notation of Mr. Cossey ’s lien. Thus , o n J anu ary 30 , 200 6, wh e n Mr. Ing le ’s lie n of exe c uti on aro se , Mr. Cos se y ’s se c ur ity int e re st in t he Cor ve tte wa s unp erfect ed. Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 7- 9- 31 7 p ro vid e s th a t a secur ity interest is subordinate to the r ights of a person that be comes a

lien cre ditor before the
se c ur ity int e re st is pe rf

e c te d. Th e re fo re , M r. Cos se y ’s un pe rf e c te d s e c ur ity

int e re st w a s su

bo rd inate to Mr. Ing le’s valid execution lien. 11 D. Stay of Execution

F ina lly , M r. and

Mr s. He a d c on te nd

that th e tr ia l court e rr e d in not i ssu inga sta y on the sa le
o f t he vehic le. A s p r e v io u s ly d is c u s s e d , M r

. an d

M r s

. H e a d

f il e d a “ M o ti o nf

o r E me rg ency Injunctive Relief” in this C ourt, which we interpre ted as a motion for revie w of the trial court’s orde r de nyinga sta y or inj un c tio n p e nd inga

pp e a l, p ur su ant t o Ru le 7 o f t he Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A

pp e llate Pr o c e d ur e

. We d e n ie d th e mo ti o n an d d e c li n e d to s ta y e xe c u ti o n o f th e tr ia l c o urt’ s ju d g me n t. We-13-

considere d the Hea ds’ ar g uments reg ardingthis iss ue whe n revie wing their motion, and we dec line to addre ss the issue further in this opi nion.

V. C ONCL US I ON
F or the a fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of the c ha

nc e ry c ourt . Co sts of

thi s appea l ar e t ax ed to the appellants, Christopher a nd Be rnadine Hea d, and their sur ety , for whic h
e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

ALANE. HI GH ERS , P. J., W.S

.