1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-10297.

Gary STERLING, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Wayne SCOTT, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.

July 1, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Northern

District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

The basic question pre sented in this appeal is whether this

death-row inmate may tap federal funds to pay his counsel to

exhaust his habeas claims in state court.

Her e, the federal district court dismissed the petitioning

inmate's habeas corpus action for failure to exhaust state remedies

and denied his application for a certificate of probable cause

("CPC"). Sterling asks this court for CPC on his habeas claims and

an order holding his federal appeal in abeyance so that he may use

federally fun ded counsel for the exhaustion of his state

postconviction remedies. Because we hold that Sterling has not

exhausted his postconviction claims, we deny CPC. Further, because

we hold that the petitioner has no statutory right to federally

funded counsel for exhausting postconviction claims in state court,

we deny h is request for an order holding this federal appeal in

abeyance.2 I

A Texas jury, based in part on the de fendant's confession,

convicted Gary Sterling of murdering his robbery victim by bashing

his head with a bumper jack. S terlin g v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114,

116 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct.

816, 121 L.Ed.2d 688 (1992). The Texas jury, based in part upon

evidence of Sterling's other murders and the testimony of a

district attorney that he had never "run across

... a more violent

mass murderer than Gary Sterling," sentenced the defendant to

death. Id. at 120.

II

In an effort to overturn his conviction and capital sentence,

Sterling filed a motion for stay of execution and for appointment

of counsel in federal district court on January 22, 1993—a few days

before his scheduled execution date. After the magistrate judge

appointed counsel for Sterling, Sterling filed an amended habeas

petition asserting thirty-nine grounds for relief. Only five of

those grounds had been dealt with previously by Texas courts. The

State filed a motion with the district court to dismiss Sterling's

federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Sterling argued that the federal habeas proceedings should be held

in abeyance so that he c ould enjoy his federal right to counsel

under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) while exhausting his state remedies.

The district court, agreeing with the magistrate judge, dismissed

Sterling's habeas petitio n for failure to exhaust state remedies

and denied Sterling's application for CPC.1 We note that although a CPC is required for appellate

review of the denial of habeas relief, no such requirement exists

for appellate review of the denial of appointment of counsel

under § 848(q)(4)(B). Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d 871, 878 n. 6

(5th Cir.1994). The same rule should apply to the retention of

such counsel.

3 III

Sterling comes before this court with an application for CPC

f rom the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition.

We have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from deni al of habeas

relief un less we grant CPC. B lack v. Collins, 962 F.2d 394, 398

(5th Cir.), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2983, 119

L.Ed.2d 601 (1992). To obtain CPC, Sterling must make a

substantial s howing that he has been denied a federal right.

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3394, 77

L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). A fundamental prerequisite to federal habeas

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the exhaustion of all claims in

state court under § 2254(b) prior to requesting federal collateral

relief. S ee Rose v. Lundy, 455 U .S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71

L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (requiring dismissal of habeas action containing

both exhausted and unexhausted claims). Because Sterling has

failed to exhaust his postconviction claims in state court, he has

asserted no cognizable right to federal habeas relief under § 2254.

Consequently, we deny his application for CPC.

Sterling also argues that the district court's dismissal of

his habeas petition was inappropriate because it deprives him of

his statutory right, under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), to retain his

federally funded counsel in his state postconviction proceedings. 12 We note that in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct.

2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), the Supreme Court held that prisoners

have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings.

Accordingly, our task is confined to statutory interpretation.

3 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10) authorizes the payment of fees to

attorneys appointed under § 848(q)(4)(B).

4 Because Sterling apparently recognizes that absent a § 2254

proceeding he is not entitled to federally provided counsel under

§ 848(q)(4)(B), he is effectively asking this court to order a stay

of the federal habeas proceeding in the district court to allow him

to use federally funded counsel to exhaust his state remedies.

Sterling argues that § 848(q) obligates the federal government to

appoint and fund counsel in this fed eral habeas proceeding, and

that this counsel should represent him in all future state and

federal proceedings. 2 We disagree.

In pertinent part, § 848(q)(4)(B) provides:

In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255

of Title 28, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence,

any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain

adequate representation ... shall be entitled to the

appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of

such other servic es in accordance with paragraph [ ] ...

(8)....

Section 848(q)(8), in turn, provides in pertinent part:

[E]ach attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant

throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial

proceedings, including

... all available postconviction

process,

... competency proceedings and proceedings for

executive or other clemency.... 3

The Eleventh and Eighth Circuits have both held that the above

language does not require the federal government to pay for counsel

for the exhaustion of postconviction claims in state court. I n re

Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502, 1505-07 (11th Cir.1989); H ill v. Lockhart,4 See Hill, 992 F.2d at 803 ("We agree with Lindsey's

analysis in cases of unexhausted claims, where comity mandates

that state judicial proceedings precede the seeking of federal

5 992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1993). The Eleventh Circuit emphasized

that while section 848 is triggered by "any post conviction

proceeding under section 2254," § 2254(b) precludes § 2254 relief

until the petitioner exhausts all state remedies. Lindsey, 875

F.2d at 1506. We agree with the following statutory interpretation

of the Lindsey

Court:

The words "proceeding under section 2254" must be read to

comprehend all of section 2254—especially the exhaustion

requirement of subsection 2254(b).... [Because of his failure

to exhaust, the petitioner] has not yet initiated a

"proceeding under section 2254" as that ter m is used in

subsection 848(q)(4)(B) and

..., consequently, his right[ ] to

the assistance of a federally a ppointed lawyer ... under 21

U.S.C. § 848(q) [has] not attached.

Id.

We further agree with the policy arguments of the Lindsey

Court. The court reasoned:

Acceptance of [the petitioner's] vie w of a state prisoner's

rights under subsection 848(q) would have the practical effect

of supplan ting state-court systems for the appointment of

counsel in collateral review cases. Adherence to petitioner's

view would encourage st ate prisoners to ignore, as [the

petitioner] has here, the proper sequence, dev eloped from

concerns for f ederalism, for seeking collateral relief from

state-court judgmen t s in death-penalty cases. Like [the

petitioner], other state inmates, for no reason other than to

gain the assistance of federally appointed co unsel ...

throughout all stages o f collateral review (both state and

federal), would ignore the exhaustion requirement and, before

seeking state remedies, futilely file for fed e ral habeas

relief. Only after procuring a federally appointed lawyer

would state inmates have an incentive to set upon the right

track in pursuit of state remedies. If Congress had intended

so novel a result , we think it would have stated so in

unmistakable terms....

Lindsey, 875 F.2d at 1506-07. 4habeas relief.")

5 Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Hill, 992 F.2d at 803, we do

not address the question of whether 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) requires

the federal government to pay for counsel to represent a state

prisoner in a postconviction proceeding for clemency before a

state executive or in a competency proceeding in state court

after remand for fact-finding by a federal court.

6 In short, Sterling must exhaust his state remedies pursuant to

§ 2254(b) before he can seek federally appointed and paid counsel

under § 848(q)(4)(B). 5

IV

For the reasons stated above, Sterling's application for CPC

and his request for an order holding his appeal in abeyance pending

exhaustion of state remedies are

DENIED.