NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

TODD DOUGLAS MCRAE,

Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

LISA MARIE HUNTER,

Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0445 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

FC2015-054089

The Honorable Dawn M. Bergin, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Michael P. Schloss Attorney at Law, Scottsdale

By Michael P. Schloss

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

The Murray Law Offices, PC, Scottsdale

By Stanley D. Murray

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

FILED 6-16-2020
2

Law Office of Timothy M. Collier, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Timothy M. Collier, William A. Weber

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Todd Douglas McRae ("Father") appeals from the superior 

court's decision awarding sole legal decision-making authority to Lisa 

Marie Hunter ("Mother") for their minor child. For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father never married but are the biological 

parents of one minor child. For five years they have been involved in a 

dispute over legal decision-making for their child. The parties were 

awarded joint legal decision-making by an Arizona court in 2014, an 

Alberta court in 2015 ("Canadian order"), and finally again by an Arizona 

court in March of 2017 ("current order"). In August of 2018 Father 

petitioned to modify the current order, seeking sole legal decision-making 

authority. Father also filed a Motion for Temporary Orders ("MTO") 

seeking temporary sole legal decision-making regarding medical decisions. 

Mother opposed both motions, arguing for continued joint legal decisionmaking or that she be awarded sole legal decision-making authority. 

¶3 At the MTO hearing, the court heard evidence about how 

both parties have "harassed" and "hound[ed]" medical providers during

their constant disputes about medical decisions for their child. After noting 

that neither party was a good option, the court concluded that joint 

decision-making was not possible, and awarded Father temporary sole 

legal decision-making authority for medical decisions. However, the court 

warned that it could change its decision "at any time" if Father began 

"abusing" his authority. 

¶4 At trial on Father's petition to modify, the court heard

extensive evidence about the parties "relentless and petty bickering" and 
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Decision of the Court

3

their inability to "cooperate in decision-making." Accordingly, pursuant to

A.R.S. § 25-403.1(B), the court found that joint legal decision-making was 

no longer in the child's best interest and awarded Mother sole legal 

decision-making authority. The court denied both parties' motions for 

attorney fees. Father timely appeals from both the award of sole legal 

decision-making authority to Mother and denial of his motion for attorney 

fees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶5 Father agrees with the superior court's decision that joint legal

decision-making is no longer in the child's best interest. However, he 

argues that the court abused its discretion by awarding Mother sole legal 

decision-making authority because the evidence did not support that 

decision. 

¶6 We review a legal decision-making order by the superior 

court for an abuse of discretion. See Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 420, 

¶ 7 (App. 2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the record is "'devoid 

of competent evidence to support the decision,' or when the court commits 

an error of law in the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion." 

Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471, ¶ 4 (App. 2018) (citation omitted).

"We defer to the court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous."

Id. 

¶7 In a contested action for legal decision-making authority the 

superior court must consider the statutorily enumerated factors in A.R.S. § 

25-403(A), Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 (App. 2009), and make 

"specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons 

for which the decision is in the best interests of the child," A.R.S. § 25-

403(B). Here, the superior court made written findings for all eleven 

statutorily enumerated factors. 

¶8 Regarding the child's best interests, the court opined that as 

the child gets older, it will become "more and more important for the legal 

decision-maker to consider [the child's] thoughts and wishes on [her] own 

medical care." The court found that Father "believes he is smarter than 

everyone else and should not have to consider others' input." By contrast, 

the court found that despite her many flaws, "Mother is more likely to listen 

to [the child] than Father is." As such, the court held that awarding Mother 

sole legal decision-making authority was in the child's best interest. The 

record includes competent evidence to support this finding. Father had 

ignored the child's concerns after he was awarded temporary sole legal 
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Decision of the Court

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decision-making. On three occasions, Mother tried to inform Father that 

the child was unhappy with the choice of doctor and time of doctor 

appointments. Father belittled the concerns in each instance, explaining 

that he did "not require [Mother's] input on these matters." 

¶9 Further, the court also found that Father had placed his 

disdain for Mother above the child's best interest, and would reflexively

oppose a course of treatment "simply because Mother was in favor of it." 

The record includes evidence to support this finding. Father has 

historically disagreed or argued with medical providers who agree with 

Mother. Indeed, the catalyst for Father petitioning to modify the current 

order and seeking sole legal decision-making authority was his 

disagreement with a gynecologist who agreed with Mother on the timing 

of a vaccination. Moreover, the court-appointed expert reported that Father 

has "acknowledged long-term issues with his temper" and has difficulty 

controlling his anger. Father confirmed this problem at the hearing, often 

becoming "extremely argumentative" with the court. 

¶10 Father counters with evidence of Mother's shortcomings, but 

this court "does not reweigh evidence[.]" Clark v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, 

276, ¶ 14 (App. 2017) (citation omitted). The existence of conflicting 

evidence does not rebut the substantial evidence that supports the superior 

court's best-interest finding. Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16 ("Even though 

conflicting evidence may exist, we affirm the trial court's ruling if 

substantial evidence supports it."). 

¶11 Father also asserts that the trial court erred by finding that 

Father abused his temporary legal decision-making authority. Temporary 

orders under A.R.S. § 25-404 are "preparatory in nature" and "made in 

anticipation of further resolution of the issues at trial." Villares v. Pineda, 217 

Ariz. 623, 625, ¶ 11 (App. 2008). Therefore, the superior court had authority

to reverse its decision and verbally warned Father that his ongoing conduct 

would matter to the court's final decision. Father further contends that 

gender presumptions impermissibly prompted the superior court's 

decision. This argument lacks merit as the same court awarded temporary,

sole legal decision-making to Father only four months earlier. There is no 

evidence to suggest that gender presumptions, rather than Father's own

actions, guided the superior court's decision. 

¶12 Finally, Father challenges the superior court's denial of his 

motion for attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. We review the 

superior court's denial of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. See 

Mangan v. Mangan, 227 Ariz. 346, 352, ¶ 26 (App. 2011). The superior court 
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Decision of the Court

5

declined to award fees because "both parties have acted equally 

unreasonably in these proceedings." The evidence in the record supports 

that finding and we affirm.

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the foregoing reasons we affirm. Both parties have 

requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. In our 

discretion and after considering the parties' positions and economic 

resources, we deny both requests.