Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-421 | August 31, 2020 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Jay T. Hirschauer

Logansport, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Michael Stone,

Appellee-Defendant

August 31, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-421

Appeal from the Cass Superior

Court

The Honorable Lisa Swaim, Judge

The Honorable Leo T. Burns, 

Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09D02-1907-F4-6

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] The State appeals from the trial court’s grant of Michael Stone’s motion to 

suppress evidence found following the execution of a search warrant at his 
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residence. The trial court determined that the warrant was not supported by 

probable cause and that the officers executing the warrant did not rely on the 

warrant in good faith.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In May 2019, Detective Joseph Nies with the Cass County Sheriff’s 

Department was investigating the theft of firearms from two local residences. 

The first involved a Sig Sauer 9-milimeter handgun owned by Cory Zeider and 

taken from a closet in his residence on or about March 7, 2019. Zeider reported 

no sign of forced entry and named two possible suspects – Brad Bell and Cody 

Putnam – who were friends of Zeider and knew where he kept a spare key.

[4] The other stolen firearm was reported by Thomas Prater on May 1, 2019. 

Prater reported that his Ruger P-94 had been stolen from his house, and he 

named Putnam as a possible suspect. Putnam had previously lived with him

and knew about Prater’s guns.

[5] Detective Nies entered the serial numbers for the stolen firearms into a national 

database. He received a hit on the Ruger, which had been recovered during a 

traffic stop in Michigan on May 2, 2019. Maverick Waltz was in possession of 

the Ruger at the time of the stop. Detective Nies traveled to Michigan on May 

17, 2019, and he interviewed Waltz in jail. Waltz informed Detective Nies that 

he had received the Ruger from Putnam in exchange for debt forgiveness. 
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Because the firearm was worth more than the debt, Waltz reported that he also 

gave Putnam some cash in the exchange.

[6] After locating Putnam, Detective Nies interviewed him on May 23, 2019. 

Putnam confessed to burglarizing both residences and taking the firearms. He 

indicated that he used a card to enter Zieder’s residence and a spare key hidden 

outside to enter Prater’s residence. Regarding Waltz’s possession of the Ruger, 

Putnam indicated that he owed Waltz a debt, so he traded the Ruger for the 

debt and an additional sum of money. Additionally, Putnam reported that he 

had sold the Sig Sauer to Stone for $400 about three weeks ago because Stone 

liked the gun and wanted to keep it for himself. Putnam then identified Stone 

in a photo array. Though Detective Nies did not know him, Stone was known 

to the Cass County Drug Task Force and he had prior convictions for dealing 

methamphetamine and for a felony handgun charge. With information from 

other officers, Detective Nies determined Stone’s address, which was a singlefamily home in Logansport.

[7] That same day, Detective Nies applied for a search warrant and testified at a 

probable cause hearing to the facts set out above. After hearing the evidence, 

the trial court authorized a search of Stone’s residence for a Sig Sauer P-320 9-

milimeter handgun. The search, which was conducted in the early morning 

hours of May 24, 2019, resulted in the discovery of multiple firearms, though 

not the Sig Sauer, as well as drugs and $6000 in cash. Stone was arrested at the 

scene for possession of methamphetamine.
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[8] On July 23, 2019, the State charged Stone with Level 4 felony unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Level 5 felony possession 

of methamphetamine. In subsequent amendments, the State added charges of 

Level 5 felony possession of a narcotic drug (hydrocodone) and Class A 

misdemeanor theft.

[9] Stone filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the search 

warrant, and the trial court held a suppression hearing on October 15, 2019. 

The trial court granted the motion to suppress on December 20, 2019, expressly 

determining that “[t]he analysis of the facts in this case is controlled by the 

Indiana Supreme court’s holding in State v. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 

2006).” Appellant’s Appendix at 81. The State now appeals, arguing that the 

warrant was supported by probable cause and, thus, that the trial court erred in 

suppressing the evidence found during execution of the search warrant.

Discussion & Decision

[10] Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution require probable cause for the issuance 

of a search warrant, which we have explained is a fluid concept incapable of 

precise definition and must be decided based on the facts of each case. State v. 

Shipman, 987 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In deciding whether to 

issue a search warrant, a judge’s task is “simply to make a practical, 

commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
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affidavit, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place.” Id.; see also Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 952-53.

[11] On review, we consider whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for 

concluding that probable cause existed. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 953. A 

substantial basis requires the reviewing court, with significant deference to the 

issuing judge’s determination, to “focus on whether reasonable inferences 

drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination of probable 

cause.” Id. While we give substantial deference to the issuing judge’s 

determination, our review of the trial court’s substantial basis determination

following a motion to suppress is reviewed by this court de novo. Id. “In 

determining whether an affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a 

search warrant, doubtful cases are to be resolved in favor of upholding the 

warrant.” Smith v. State, 982 N.E.2d 393, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting 

Mehring v. State, 884 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied), trans. 

denied.

[12] Where a warrant is sought based on hearsay information, the probable cause 

affidavit (or testimony, as in this case) must either: (1) contain reliable 

information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the 

declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the 

information furnished; or (2) contain information that establishes that the 

totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at

953-54 (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(b) and I.C. § 31-35-5-8(a)(1)). The 

trustworthiness of hearsay in this context can be established in a number of 
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ways, including where: (1) the informant has given correct information in the 

past, (2) independent police investigation corroborates the informant’s 

statements, (3) some basis for the informant’s knowledge is demonstrated, or (4) 

the informant predicts conduct or activity by the suspect that is not ordinarily 

easily predicted. Id. at 954. This list is not exclusive and, depending on the 

facts, other considerations may come into play. Id. Relevant here, an 

informant’s declaration against penal interest can furnish sufficient basis for 

establishing the informant’s credibility. See id.; Shipman, 987 N.E.2d at 1127. 

[13] In Spillers, our Supreme Court considered whether the informant’s statement 

qualified as one against penal interest. Craib, the informant, had been caught

by police with more than three grams of cocaine, which was found during the 

execution of a search warrant at his home. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 956. After 

his arrest, Craib informed the detectives that Spillers was his drug source and 

that he had obtained cocaine from Spillers more than ten times over the last few 

months, most recently that same day. Craib also provided Spiller’s address and 

the make and model of his car, which were facts readily available to the general 

public.

[14] The Court observed that statements by informants have qualified as against 

penal interest and been found sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance 

of a search warrant in cases where:

the informant either volunteered inculpatory information after 

being arrested for a minor offense or for an offense only 

indirectly related to the information given to police, or the 
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informant was not under arrest at all and voluntarily gave police 

inculpatory information that the police would not otherwise have 

necessarily known or suspected.

Id. at 955. After noting several such cases, the Court summarized, “[t]he 

underlying thread binding these cases together is that an informant, after arrest 

or confrontation by police, admitted committing criminal offenses under 

circumstances in which the crimes otherwise would likely have gone 

undetected.” Id. at 956. Indeed, the Court recognized, people do not lightly

admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police by their own 

admissions and, thus, such admissions carry an indicia of credibility sufficient 

to support a finding of probable cause to search. Id.

[15] The Court found such indicia of credibility lacking in Spillers because Craib had 

been “caught ‘red handed’ with drugs in his possession before naming his 

purported supplier.” Id. at 956. Though he admitted committing additional 

crimes of possession of cocaine, the Court noted that “his tip was less a 

statement against his penal interest than an obvious attempt to curry favor with 

the police.” Id. (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 607-08 (1994) 

(“A person arrested in incriminating circumstances has a strong incentive to 

shift blame or downplay his own role in comparison with that of others, in 

hopes of receiving a shorter sentence and leniency in exchange for 

cooperation.”)). Because the decision to reveal his source did not subject him 

to any additional criminal liability, the Court concluded that “under the 

circumstances Craib’s declarations were not against his penal interest and 
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therefore did not demonstrate that Craib was a credible source of information.” 

Id. at 956-57.

[16] Similarly, in the case at hand, the trial court found that Putnam’s statements 

were not declarations against penal interest. We cannot agree, as the facts of 

this case are clearly distinguishable. Here, Putnam was not under arrest when 

he spoke with Detective Nies and the evidence against him was slim – far from 

being caught red handed. Two victims had listed Putnam as a possible suspect 

in the separate thefts of firearms because he was a friend who had access to 

each home. Further, the Ruger had been recovered shortly after it went missing 

in the possession of another individual – Waltz, who, while in jail, named 

Putnam as the source of the firearm. This was the only actual evidence linking 

Putnam to the theft of the Ruger, and no evidence linked him to the theft of the 

Sig Sauer, which had occurred about two months earlier.

[17] During the interview with Detective Nies, Putnam admitted to burglarizing 

both residences and stealing the firearms, and he provided incriminating details 

not known by police, including describing how he gained entrance to each 

residence. Putnam also indicated that he transferred the Ruger to Waltz in

exchange for debt forgiveness and cash, which was the same account given by 

Waltz. With regard to the Sig Sauer, Putnam reported that he sold the stolen

firearm to Stone in exchange for $400. Thus, Putnam not only informed police 

where the stolen Sig Sauer might be recovered, he also made himself subject to 

a new criminal charge, based on the criminal transfer of a firearm to a serious 

violent felon. See Ind. Code § 35-47-2.5-16(b)(1) (“A person who provides a 
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firearm to an individual who the person knows ... is ineligible to purchase or 

otherwise receive or possess a firearm for any reason other than the person’s 

age...commits criminal transfer of a firearm, a Level 5 felony.”).

[18] Nothing about Putnam’s admissions indicates that he was attempting to shift 

blame, downplay his role in the offenses, or curry favor with the police. Rather, 

we find his statements to be true declarations against his penal interest, 

subjecting him to criminal liability and demonstrating that he was a credible 

source of information. The trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress 

based on Spillers.

[19] Alternatively, Stone argues that even crediting Putnam’s statement, there was 

insufficient probable cause for issuance of the warrant because the State failed 

to establish a sufficient nexus between the Sig Sauer and his residence. He 

asserts that there is “absolutely nothing in the record to support a belief that 

Stone possessed the handgun at his residence.” Appellee’s Brief at 13.

[20] To obtain a search warrant, the State must establish a fair probability that the 

thing sought – here the stolen Sig Sauer – will be found in the particular 

location being searched. See Fry v. State, 25 N.E.3d at 237, 245-46 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015), trans. denied. Here, Putnam indicated that Stone purchased the Sig 

Sauer from him three weeks earlier for $400 and that Stone liked the gun and 

wanted to keep it for himself. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for 

Detective Nies to believe that the stolen gun would be found at Stone’s home. 

See Allen v. State, 798 N.E.2d 490, 497-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (permitting 
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search for murder weapons at apartment of one suspect’s cousin where suspects

began spending time after the series of murders that began two months prior to 

the execution of the search warrant and noting that “handguns and rifles are the 

type of property that a person reasonably could be expected to keep for at least 

a period of a month and a half”); Foster v. State, 633 N.E.2d 337, 345 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1994) (finding that a handgun, unlike controlled substances that can be 

expected to be consumed or distributed, was the “sort of property that the 

perpetrator reasonably could be expected to keep” and concluding that warrant 

for search of suspect’s residence issued twenty-eight days after murder was not 

stale). 

[21] In sum, we find that a reasonably prudent person could make a practical, 

common-sense determination, given all the circumstances set forth in Detective 

Nies’s testimony, that there was a fair probability the stolen Sig Sauer would be 

found at Stone’s home. Thus, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence 

seized during the execution of the search warrant.

[22] Reversed and remanded.

Bailey, J. and Crone, J., concur.