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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter ofthe Disciplinary Proceeding Against MARIAM. STARCZEWSKI,
an Attorney at Law. ) ) No. 201,073-3 ) ) EnBane ) ) )

______________ ) Filed ·**~l\.11** 1 

### 82013 OWENS, J.

-- We are ultimately responsible for disciplining attorneys who bring disrepute to the legal profession. Inthis case, the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) charged Marja Starczewski withthree counts ofattorney misconduct because she represented her client without diligence, information, or honesty. Atthe disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer concluded the WSBAhad proved all three counts. He recommended a sanction of$15,000 in restitution, 24 months ofsuspension, and 18 months ofpractice monitoring. The WSBA Disciplinary Board (Board) adopted the hearing officer's decision except for the term ofpractice monitoring, which it amendedto 24 months.In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 That decision is before us now. Because substantial evidence supports the findings and Starczewski does notpresent a clear reason to depart from the Board's decision, we affirm it. I. FACTS This case ofattorney discipline begins with a simple tort claim. In 2005, an employee ofWalters & WolfCurtain and Wall LLC (Walters & Wolf), Kelly Reeser, avoided DawnDe LaFuerte's stalled car on a King County highway. In doing so she hitRajinder Singh's taxi. Singhhired attorney BarishBharti who referred him to Starczewski on a fee-sharing basis. Starczewski obtained a $15,000 settlement offer from Reeser's insurance company, which Singh rejected. Onthe day before the statute oflimitations ran in May 2007 Starczewski filed suit against Reeser, Walters & Wolf, andDeLaFuerte in King County Superior Court. She claimedpersonal injury and lost wages and named Singh and his brother, Surinder Khangura,1as plaintiffs. After Starczewski filed suit the trial court issued a scheduling order, which provided an October 2007 deadline for filing a confirmation of joinder. Under King County Local Superior Court Rule 4.2, theplaintiffmust file the confirmation of

1 Starczewski signed a contingent-fee agreement with Khangura, which named her as his attorney on a lost wages claim arising from the damage to the taxi the brothers shared. Despite knowing that the claims overlapped, Starczewski neither informed Singh ofthe concurrent conflict ofinterest nor obtained the informed consent ofeither brother. However, these particular actions are not the basis ofthe charges in this case. 2In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 joinder and the plaintiffs attorney must sign it. After filing, the trial courtreviews the confirmation of joinder, and ifit decides a hearing is necessary, it may issue a show
cause order. Ifthe trial court issues such an order, all cited parties must appear. Betweenthe issuance ofthe scheduling order and the deadline ofthe confirmation of joinder, Starczewski suffered financially and moved to East Wenatchee-presumablyfrom somewhere in King County. Starczewski did not inform Singh ofher financial hardships or how they might affect her work even though her financial hardships coincided with a series ofprofessional shortcomings in Singh's case: Starczewski did not respond to, or inform Singh of, a September 2007 settlement offer of$20,000 from Reeser and Walter & Wolfs attorney, Julia Kyte. When Kyte followed up, Starczewski still did notrespond. In October 2007, Starczewski neglectedto timely serve and file a confirmation of joinder for DeLa Fuerte. In response, the superior court ordered a show cause hearing on why it should not dismiss Singh's case and order $250 in sanctions. Starczewski did not inform Singh ofthe hearing nor did she appear at it, which caused the superior court to order sanctions. The court continued the hearing to January 2008, however, and indicated it would strike the hearing ifStarczewski filed a confirmation of joinderup to seven days beforehand. Starczewski did not inform Singh ofthe sanctions or continuance. Because she neglected to file the confirmation of joinder a second time and did not

3In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3
appear at the continued show cause hearing, the superior court dismissed Singh's case
onprocedural grounds. Starczewski did not inform Singh ofthe dismissal. Although Starczewski neglected Singh's case, she did not abandon it, and in February 2008 she moved to vacate the superior court's dismissal. Yet again she did not inform Singh ofthe status oflitigation. In March 2008, the superior courtheard oral argument onher motion and conditioned vacating its dismissal on Starczewski paying $250 in sanctions, complying withthe case scheduling order, and serving and filing the confirmation of joinderby late April. Starczewski paid the sanctions but did not inform Singh ofthe March 2008 order, did nottimely file the confirmation of joinder, and did not notify the superior court ofany effort onherpartto complywith the scheduling order. Starczewski's neglect was Singh's loss for in May 2008 the superior court issued a second and final order ofdismissal. The order noted Starczewski's failure to file a confirmation of joinder. As before, Starczewski did not inform Singh ofthe dismissal or his options. The day after the court dismissed Singh's case the statute of limitations ran. Since Starczewski had neverupdated Singh onhis case, he was ofcourse
unaware that the case had been dismissed and the statute oflimitations had run. Indeed it was a year after the dismissal that he first contacted Starczewski for an update. Starczewski did not give Singh an honest account. In a July 2009 letter, she

4In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3
wrote Singh that the superior courthad dismissed his case because it found opposing counsel's arguments persuasive. She supported her assertion with excerpted portions ofopposing counsel's March 2008 "Responseto the Motionto Vacate" where counsel argued the emergency doctrine defeated Singh's claim. In other words, Starczewski told Singh thatthe court dismissed his case onthe merits rather than that the court had dismissed his case onprocedural grounds because ofher failures. Admittedly, Starczewski did include the actual order ofdismissal with her letter. However, that only served to confuse Singh because Starczewski did not explainthe order and Singh is not fluent in English. In January 2010, Singh filed a grievance letter with the WSBA that requested
an investigation into Starczewski's handling ofhis case. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY In January 2011, the WSBA charged Starczewski with three counts of professional misconduct: (1) failure to represent Singh with reasonable diligence and expedite his litigation in violation ofRPC 1.3 and 3.2; (2) failure to inform Singh of the status ofhis case and explain matters such thathe could make informed decisions about the representation in violation ofRPC 1.4(a) and (b); and (3) failure to honestly inform Singh ofthereason the court dismissed his case in violation ofRPC 8.4(c). These charges triggered a disciplinary hearing. The hearing officer bifurcated the hearing into a violation hearing and a sanctionhearing. Atthe May 2011 violation

5In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 hearing, the hearing officer found thatthe WSBAhadproved all three counts by a clear preponderance ofthe evidence. Atthe October 2011 sanctionhearing, the hearing officer applied the American BarAssociation's Standardsfor Imposing LawyerSanctions (1991 & Supp. 1992). He concluded that the presumptive sanction for all three counts was suspension. The hearing officer then applied six aggravating factors and one mitigating factor to the presumptive sanction and concluded the suspension should be 24 months long. He also recommended 18 months ofpractice monitoring following reinstatement and $15,000 in restitutionto Singh. That decision wentbefore the Board in May 2012 on automatic review. By a vote of 11 to 1 with one board memberrecusing, the Board affirmedthe hearing officer's decision with one exception: it amended the duration ofpractice monitoring from 18 to 24 months. The Board did not state the reason for the amendment. Starczewski immediately appealed the Board's decisionto this court. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW We have plenarypower over attorney discipline in Washington. ELC 2.1. On review, we give great weightto the hearing officer's findings offact. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstMarshall, 167 Wn.2d 51, 66, 217 P.3d 291 (2009). We treatunchallenged findings offact as true, and so long as they are supportedby substantial evidence we also treat challenged findings offact as true. 

### !d. at 66-67.

6In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3
In contrastwe review the Board's conclusions oflaw de novo. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainst Van Camp, 171 Wn.2d 781, 797,257 P.3d 599 (2011). Ifthey are supported bythe findings offact they will be upheld. 

### I d. Further,
we will uphold a unanimous Board decision absent a clear reason for departure. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstBehrman, 165 Wn.2d 414, 422, 197 P.3d 1177 (2008). IV. ANALYSIS Starczewski claims that (A) the hearing and decision violated due process and hearing procedure, (B) the findings were not supported by substantial evidence, (C) the hearing officer determined the incorrectpresumptive sanctionunder theABA Standards, (D) the hearing officer applied the incorrect aggravating and mitigating factors, (E) a 24-month suspension is disproportionate, (F) restitution is not proper, and (G) the WSBA cannot order her proposed practice monitorto serve. A. Whether the Hearing Officer or BoardViolated Due Process or Proper Procedure We review alleged due process violations de novo and evidentiary rulings for abuse ofdiscretion. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstKing, 168 Wn.2d 888, 899, 232 P.3d 1095 (2010); Van Camp, 171 Wn.2d at 799. Starczewski alleges that (1) the hearing officer denied her the opportunityto rebut the WSBA's proposed decision, (2) the WSBA's formal complaint did not notify her ofaggravating factors, (3) the WSBA made an improperrequest for

7In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 documents, (4) the hearing officerprevented her from admitting rebuttal evidence, (5) special disciplinary counsel was biased, (6) the hearing officer was biased, (7) the hearing officer wrongly putthe burden ofproofonher, (8) the hearing officer wrongly calculated the amount ofrestitution, and (9) the Board wrongly adopted the hearing officer's recommendation. 1. Whetherthe Hearing OfficerDenied Starczewski the Opportunity To Rebut the WSBA's Proposed Findings and Conclusions After the violation hearing, the hearing officer allowed the WSBA and Starczewski to submitproposedfindings and conclusions. Starczewski claims the hearing officer denied herthe opportunity to rebut the WSBA'sproposal because he adopted it before she submitted herrebuttal. We disagree. The ELCs provide thatafter a violation hearing and upon agreement withthe hearing officer, eitherparty may submit a proposed decision and eitherparty may motionto modify, amend, or correct a decision. ELC 10.15(b)(1)(B), 10.16(b), (c). Inresponse, the hearing officer may deny the motion or amend, modify, or correctthe decision. ELC 1 0.16(c)(2). The hearing officer's decision is final when the time for the parties to motion lapses or the hearing officer rules onthe motion. ELC 1

0.15(b)(1)(B)(ii). This case presents a situation where the hearing officer and parties agreed upon
atime line for submitting proposals from which the hearing officer then deviated. The hearing officer deviated from the time line by adopting the WSBA proposed
8In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 decision before Starczewski submitted her proposed decision. The hearing officer, however, did not in fact deny Starczewskithe opportunity to rebut the WSBA's proposal: Starczewski moved to object and amended her motion within the time frame provided by the ELCs. Thenthe hearing officer ruled onher motions before reaffirming his earlier decision. Atthat point, the hearing officer's decision became final. Thus there was no denial and no procedural violation. 2. Whether the WSBA Notified Starczewski ofthe Charges AgainstHer Starczewski claims the WSBA's formal complaint against her violated due process because it did notnotify her ofthe aggravating factors. Specifically she argues the WSBA did not notify her that the hearing officer would consider evidence ofa pattern ofmisconduct. We find that the WSBA's formal complaint did not violate due process because, as we heldpreviously, the law does not require the WSBA to include aggravating factors in the formal complaint. In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstBurtch, 162 Wn.2d 873, 889, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008); ELC 10.3(a)(3). Further, the WSBA's formal complaint notified Starczewski ofthe charges, and 3 5 days before the sanctionhearing, the WSBA properly filed and served
a disclosure ofits desired sanctions. More notification was not required. 3. Whether the WSBA Made a ProperRequest for Documents Starczewski claims that the WSBA's request for documents 23 days before her sanctionhearing was untimely, unnecessary, and prejudicial. The WSBA's request

9In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3

was none ofthose things because the ELCs permitthe WSBA to make a requestup to three days before the sanction hearing. ELC 10.13(c). We note that Starczewskirefused to comply with the WSBA's proper request despite the hearing officer's orderthat she do so. Becausethe hearing officer did not enforce the request in the end, Starczewski's claim is actually moot. Buther defiance ofthe hearing officer's order is grounds for discipline underELC 10.13(c), and we consider it in ourreview ofthis case. 4. Whether the Hearing OfficerWrongly Excluded Starczewski's Evidence Starczewski claims that even though she was cooperative, the hearing officer ignored the scheduling order and wrongly excluded certain evidence from the sanction hearing such as testimony from current clients, WSBA commendations, and awards for pro bono service. In fact, the record shows the hearing officer excluded some, not all, ofStarczewski's proffered evidence because she disobeyed the scheduling order. Thehearing officer's evidentiary ruling was not an abuse ofdiscretion because a hearing officer may preclude a party that does notprovide discovery as ordered from introducing matters into evidence. ELC 10.1(a), (c), 10.11(g); CR 37(b)(2)(B). 5. Whether Special Disciplinary Counsel Should Have BeenDisqualified Starczewski claims special disciplinary counsel involvement in Saldivar v. 

### Momah, 145 Wn. App. 365, 186 P.3d 1117 (2008), and in her disciplinary proceedings violates due process. We disagree. Starczewski was an attorney for the

10In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 plaintiffs in Saldivar and the hearing officer considered her performance in that case
as evidence ofapattern ofmisconduct, an aggravating factor. Special disciplinary counsel was not personally involved in the Saldivar case that the hearing officer considered at the sanction hearing. Even ifcounsel was personally involved in Saldivar, his involvement in that case and the proceedings would not violate due process. While due process ensures that civil proceedings are impartial and disinterested, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980), and disciplinaryhearings are civil proceedings, ELC 10.1, a hearing's "appearance ofimpropriety is not a serious consideration in attorney discipline cases where the general public has little, ifany, direct interest in the process. Unlike a public prosecutor, [disciplinary] counsel's actions affect only attorneys who have voluntarily subjected themselves to regulationbythis court." In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainst Vetter, 104 Wn.2d 779, 782, 711 P.2d 284 (1985). 6. Whether the Hearing Officer Should Have BeenDisqualified Starczewski also claims the hearing officer's awareness ofSaldivar (by virtue ofhis specialty in medical malpractice law), coupled with his involvement in the disciplinary proceedings, violated due process. Yet she cites no legal authority for this proposition. Without such legal authority, we will not question the hearing officer's impartialitymerely because he was aware ofa case that Starczewski participated in and that the WSBA introduced into evidence at the sanctionhearing.

11In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3
We note thatthe ELCs provide anonexhaustive list ofreasons for disqualifying a hearing officer and none apply to the facts here. ELC 2.6(e)(4)(A). 7. Whether the WSBA Proved the Charges by a Clear Preponderance Starczewski claims the hearing officer violated due process by allegedly requiring her to muster evidence inher defense. Her claim is compromised since she does not point to where the hearing officer wronglyputthe burden ofproofonher. Starczewski also claims the WSBA did notinvestigate her current clients or her Singh files. But, similarly, she does not cite legal authority for the propositionthatthe WSBA must investigate evidence she submits to them. Without citationto the record
or precedent to undergird her argument, we conclude there was no violation ofdue process. We also note the WSBA does have the burden ofproof, ELC 10.14(b), and in this case, the hearing officer found the WSBA met its burden on all three counts. 8. Whetherthe Hearing Officer Properly Determinedthe Restitution Amount Starczewski claims $15,000 in restitution is improper because it does not account for costs and expenses the WSBA billed her for orher ability to pay. Because
an order ofrestitution does not have to accouht for the WSBA's costs and expenses or the attorney's ability to pay, see ELC 13.7, 13.9(d)(1), we conclude that $15,000 is not improper in this respect.

12In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 9. Whether the BoardProperly Amendedthe Hearing Officer's Decision Starczewski claims the Board erred when it failed to state a reason for amending the hearing officer's recommended term ofpractice monitoring. Starczewski makes a valid claim. The Board must state the reason for an amendment, modification, or reversal ofthe hearing officer's decision. ELC 11.12(e). Butits omission does not offend due process or affect our powerto reviewthe decision. In

re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstBlanchard, 158 Wn.2d 317, 329-31, 144 P.3d 286 (2006). Ordinarily where the hearing officer's recommendation and the Board's decision differ, we give greater weight to the Board's decision in light ofits superior experience and widerperspective. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstPreszler, 169 Wn.2d 1, 19, 232 P.3d 1118 (20 1 0). Abiding bythatrule is problematic here sincethe Board does not state the reason for its amendment. Nevertheless we uphold the Board's 24-month, practice-monitoring term because Starczewski has shown no signs ofcurbing her misconduct as evinced by her defiance ofthe hearing officer's discovery order. Finally, Starczewski claims the Board made no findings or adopted the hearing officer's erroneous findings. This argument is meritless because the Board adopted the hearing officer's findings as is permitted, ELC 11.12(d), and the findings are not
erroneous.

13In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3
B. Whether Substantial Evidence Supports the Hearing Officer's Challenged Findings Starczewski generally claims 27 ofthe hearing officer's 74 findings are irrelevant, incomplete, unsupported, or all ofthe above. We are notpersuaded. We reject 21 ofher challenges because she fails to supportthem with citations to the record or legal authority. Marshall, 167 Wn.2d at 67 (providing that a challenge is sufficient only ifthe attorney cites to the record in support ofher argument); RAP 1

0.3(a)(6) (providing that arguments in a briefshould contain citations to the record and legal authority). We reject three other challenges because they are either supported by unchallenged findings, amount to an attack on witness credibility, or amount to an alternative explanation ofthe facts the hearing officer rejected. Marshall, 167 Wn.2d at 66-67. Three challenges remain. Two ofthese challenges concernprocedural failures. First, the hearing officer found that at the March 2008 hearing on Starczewski's motionto vacate the order of dismissal, the court ordered Starczewski to serve De LaFuerte, file a confirmation of joinder, and comply with all pretrial deadlines set in the original case scheduling order. Second, he found the court dismissed the case again in May 2008 because Starczewski failed to file the confirmation of joinder. Starczewski claims these findings are incomplete because they do not note that thejudgepromised a second show cause hearing. In fact, the March 2008 show cause hearing transcript shows the judge started to say there would be a second show cause hearing before stopping
14In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 midsentence to instead say he would order Starczewski to serve De LaFuerte, file a confirmation of joinder, and to comply with all pretrial deadlines set in the original
case scheduling order, which he ultimately did. Hence these challenges fail because substantial evidence shows thejudge did not promise or actually order a second show
cause hearing. Finally, the hearing officer found that Starczewski's explanation for the dismissal was false. Starczewski claims this finding assumes another finding is true and misrepresents a sentence from her July 2009 letter? Substantial evidence shows Singh's case was dismissed for procedural violations rather than onthe merits. For instance, the final order ofdismissal refers to the plaintiffs' noncompliance but not the merits. Thus, substantial evidence shows Starczewski's explanation for the dismissal
was false, and for thatreason the challenge fails. C. Whetherthe Hearing Officer Applied the CorrectPresumptive Sanction We-as well as the hearing officer and Board-follow atwo-step process to determine the appropriate sanction against an attorney. 

### In re DisciplinaryProceeding Against Cramer, 165 Wn.2d 323, 339, 198 P.3d 485 (2008). At step one, we determine the presumptive sanctionunder the ABA 

### Standards. !d. We do so by considering the ethical duty violated, the attorney's mental state, and the actual or potential harm to the client. 

### !d. At step two, we consider the applicable aggravating

2 Because Starczewski does not identify which sentence the hearing officer's finding misrepresents, we refrain from considering that particular challenge.
15In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 and mitigating factors' impact onthe presumptive sanction. Id. In this case the hearing officer concluded the presumptive sanction was suspension for all three counts. Starczewski claims the hearing officer's conclusions abouther mental state and the actual orpotential harmto Singh were wrong. As the fact finder, the hearing officer is best positioned to make the mentalstate determination. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAnschell, 149 Wn.2d 484, 501, 69 P.3d 844 (2003). The hearing officer concluded Starczewski's mental state
was "knowing" for all three counts. Starczewski claims the hearing officer's conclusions are wrong or unsupported. We disagree. First, the unchallenged findings ofthe hearing officer show Starczewski knew ofthe deadlines in the case scheduling order and her responsibility to meetthem. Thus, she knew when she was failing to meet the deadlines she was failing to represent Singh diligently and expeditiously. Second, the absence ofdocumented conversations between Starczewski and Singh is circumstantial evidence that no conversations occurred betweenthem "[a]nd circumstantial evidence is as good as direct evidence," RogersPotato Serv., LLCv. Countrywide Potato, LLC, 152 Wn.2d 387, 391, 97 P.3d 745 (2004). Thus, Starczewski knew that when she was failing to have any conversations with Singh, she was failing to inform him and explainmatters to him. Finally, when Starczewski wrote Singh in July 2009, she knew his case had been dismissed onprocedural grounds because she had the order ofdismissal that showedthe case was dismissed

16In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 for noncompliance. Thus Starczewski knew her written explanation that the superior courthad dismissed the case onthe merits was false. Onthis final point we emphasize again that "circumstantial evidence is as good as direct evidence," id., and the WSBA did not have to prove intent to prove a "knowing" mental state, seeABA, STANDARDS FORIMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Definitions at 17 (1991) (defining "[k]nowledge" as "the conscious awareness ofthe nature or attendant circumstances ofthe conduct but withoutthe conscious objective orpurpose to accomplish a particular result"); In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstBrothers, 149 Wn.2d 575, 585, 70 P.3d 940 (2003) (stating that in an attorney disciplinary matter, "outright dishonesty is not a necessary element to a finding that an attorney acted knowingly"). Consequently the hearing officer concluded correctly that the mental state was "knowing" for all three counts. Next, we address the injuries. First, the hearing officer concluded Starczewski injured Singh in that he never received current information about his case, neverhad· the opportunity to consult with the court or seek another attorney, and never hadthe opportunity to accept orreject the $20,000 settlement offer. Starczewski claims the evidence supporting the first and third ofthese injuries is insubstantial. However, we believe the evidence is substantial and note the second injury alone shows potential harmto Singh.

17In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 Second, the hearing officer concluded Starczewski's misrepresentation ofthe dismissal injured Singh becausethe resulting misunderstanding prevented Singh from pursuing potential remedies. Starczewski's strongest argument here is that the conclusion is irrelevantbecause there is no indicationpotential remedies wouldhave been successful. However, she fails to cite authority for the propositionthatthe hearing officer must find that a remedy would be successful. In any case, Singh's remedies are not limited to his claim against Reeser, Walters & Wolf, and DeLa Fuerte as Starczewski may believe. Starczewski's misrepresentation raised new claims ofattorney malpractice and restitution (viathe Lawyer's Fund for Client Protection). See 16 DAVID K. DEWOLF &KELLERW.ALLEN, WASHINGTONPRACTICE: TORTLAWAND PRACTICE§ 15.41, at 490 (3d ed. 2006); APR 15. Had Singhnot learned the truth, he would not have had the chance to realize these claims against Starczewski. That constitutes a potential injury to Singh, which means Starczewski's claim fails. The hearing officer concluded correctly that Starczewski injured Singh and that the presumptive sanction is suspension. D. Whether the BoardApplied the CorrectAggravating and Mitigating Factors The second step we take to determine the appropriate sanction is to consider the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors' impact onthe presumptive sanction. Cramer, 165 Wn.2d at 339. The ABA Standards provide a list ofaggravating factors.

18In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No.**201,073~3** STANDARDS std. 9.22. Inthis case thehearing officer determined the applicable aggravating factors were dishonest motive, pattern ofmisconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge misconduct, substantial legal experience, and indifference to making restitution. Starczewski challenges the consideration ofall these factors except for substantial legal experience. We reviewthe challenges one by one. Thehearing officer applied the dishonest-motive factor because Starczewski misrepresented Singh's case dismissal to hide her own misconduct. Starczewski claims the evidence militates against applying the factor because Singhwas responsible for the lack ofcommunication and she sent Singhthe actual order of dismissal. Her first argument fails because it amounts to an "alternative explanation[]
or version[] ofthe facts rejected bythe hearing officer," an insufficient argumentupon reviewbefore this court. 

### Marshall, 167 Wn.2d at 67. Her second argument fails because the enclosure ofthe order ofdismissal was insufficient to overcome her misrepresentations inthe July 2009 letter.3 Accordingly her challenge fails. The hearing officer applied the pattern-of-misconduct factor because of Starczewski's history ofdishonesty, frivolous claims, and disregard forjudicial and

3 Starczewski's challenge on grounds ofrelevancy to this factual finding-that Starczewski's enclosure ofthe order ofdismissal was insufficient to overcome her misrepresentation-fails becausethe finding is relevant to the duties to inform, explain, and avoid dishonesty. Also Starczewski does not cite legal authority for the proposition that the finding is irrelevant because it does not support a finding ofmisconduct. See RAP 10.3(a)(6) (providing that arguments in a briefshould contain citations to legal authority). 19In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 disciplinary warnings. Starczewski claims the factor applies only to similar violations ofthe RPCs and her pastmisconduct is dissimilar. The ABAStandards are clear that the pattern-of-misconduct factor applies to mere misconduct not violations ofthe RPCs. Compare STANDARDS std. 9.22(a) (prior disciplinary offenses), with std. 9.22(c) (apattern ofmisconduct). Further, the rule as articulated by this court does notrequire the misconductto be similar: the factor applies whenthe attorney has simply committed multiple acts ofmisconduct involving multiple clients over aperiod oftime. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainst Cohen, 150 Wn.2d 744, 760 n.8, 82 P.3d 224 (2004). Moreover, the two cases Starczewski cites in support ofher argument address the issue in dicta or not at all. See Burtch, 162 Wn.2d at 889 (noting Burtch'sprior misconduct was similar to that at issue, which shows he knewhis conduct violated the RPCs); In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainst Whitney, 155 Wn.2d 451, 464, 120 P.3d 550 (2005) (rejecting Whitney's claim that collateral estoppel precludes the court from considering evidence ofpast misconduct). Accordingly her challenge fails. Next we address Starczewski's claim that the hearing officer wrongly applied the multiple-offenses factor because he did not list whathe considered as multiple offenses. In short, no explanation was necessary because the factor plainly applies where an attorney faces multiple counts ofviolating the RPCs. See In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstPoole, 156 Wn.2d 196, 225, 125 P.3d 954 (2006) (applyingthe

20In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 multiple-offenses factor because the courtupheld two counts ofmisconduct against the attorney). Because Starczewski faces three counts ofmisconduct, the factor applied inher case. The hearing officer applied the refusal-to-acknowledge-wrongful-nature-ofconduct factor because Starczewski blamed her failure to inform Singh onhis lack of communication and argued she was only40 percent responsible for his case because she was entitled to only 40 percent ofthe contingency fee under the fee-sharing agreement withBharti. Starczewski claims the factor punishes her for appearing pro
se because it allows the hearing officerto considerher arguments as evidence that she has no remorse. Her argument raises a real concern about the fairness, albeit one we have previously addressed. An attorney may appearpro se in a disciplinary proceeding without automatically incurring the refusal-to-acknowledge-wrongful-nature-of-conduct factor. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstFerguson, 170 Wn.2d 916, 943, 246 P.3d 1236 (2011). Indeed the factor applies only when an attorney denies conduct
was wrongful or rationalizes misconduct as error. 

### !d. at 943-44. Here, substantial evidence supports applying the factor. While under examination, Starczewski acted
as witness rather thanpro se counsel. And while under examination, Starczewski testified that she was not the reason for the case dismissal, she was entitled to a second show cause hearing, and she truthfully told Singh why his case was dismissed

21In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 byvirtue ofenclosing the actual order ofdismissal. Her statements amount to denial and rationalization ofmisconduct, and the hearing officer was entitled to credit them just as we are entitledto give great weight to that finding. Behrman, 165 Wn.2d at 423; Marshall, 167 Wn.2d at 67. Accordingly her challenge fails. Finally, Starczewski claims the indifference-to-making-restitution factor should not apply because restitution is not warranted inher case. Thehearing officer applied the indifference-to-making-restitution factor because Starczewski made no attempt to make restitution to Singh, did nottell Singhthat he had a potential claim against her, and did not tell Singh that he could seek redress through herprofessional liability coverage. Because this case warrants restitution, as discussed below, Starczewski's challenge fails. Next weturn to mitigating factors. The ABA Standards also provide a list of mitigating factors. STANDARDS std. 9.32. Inthis case, the hearing officer concluded only the personal-problems factor warranted application. Yethe gave the factor minimal weight because he felt Starczewski's financial challenges did notjustifyher misconduct. Generally, we do not considerpersonal financial problems to be a mitigating factor. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstHolcomb, 162 Wn.2d 563, 591, 173 P.3d 898 (2007). We see no reason to make an exception here because as the**he~ring** officer noted, financial problems did notjustify Starczewski's misconduct. Thus, the

22In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 hearing officer wrongly applied the factor. However, the error does notundermine the hearing officer's ultimate recommendation ofa 24-month suspension since he gave the factor minimal weight. Starczewski claims the hearing officer should have applied more mitigating factors to her sanction. Examples includeher loss ofoffice staff, her prior WSBA commendations, association with Bharti,4 her cooperation with disciplinary proceedings, and the lack ofcommunication from Singh. In disciplinary cases, the attorneyhas the burden ofproving that some fact should be considered a mitigating factor inher case. 

### CfIn re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainst Carpenter, 160 Wn.2d 16, 30, 155 P.3d 937 (2007) (stating the subject attorneyhas the burden ofproving the mitigating factor ofan absence ofa selfish or dishonest motive). Cooperation and character are enumerated mitigating factors under ABA 

### Standards std. 9.32(e) and (g). But Starczewski does not meet her burden on these factors because she presents hertwo WSBA commendations without argument. And though she points to a moment during the hearings whenthe hearing officer thanked her for cooperating as a witness, she does not articulate why her cooperation onthat day overshadows, for example, her failure to comply with the hearing offlcer's discovery order. Similarly, she does not make policy arguments for accepting her otherproposed mitigating factors, which do not fall within one ofthe ABA 

### Standards'

4 

### It is unclear whether Starczewski is referring to her fee-sharing agreement with Bharti or to an attorney-client relationship between Singh and Bharti. 23In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 enumerated categories. STANDARDS std. 9.32. Because Starczewski does notmeet her burden on this issue, we refrain from applying herproposed mitigating factors. In sum, the hearing officer's recommendation ofa 24-month suspension is sound. E. Whether a 24-Month SuspensionIs Disproportionate Onreview, the subject attorney must raise demonstrative cases to showthe recommended sanction is disproportionate. Cohen, 150 Wn.2d at 763. Starczewski claims a 24-month suspension is disproportionate in her case but fails to raise demonstrative cases because the two cases she cites are inapposite. In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstJohnson, 114 Wn.2d 737, 752-53, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990) (ordering the disbarment ofa disciplined attorney who converted client funds for personal use and concealed his conversion); In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainst Haskell, 136 Wn.2d 300, 320-22,962 P.2d 813 (1998) (holding two years of suspension, notthe recommended disbarment, was the appropriate sanction where the attorney deceptively overbilled clients). Starczewski appears to argue these cases are demonstrative because, in her opinion, a 24-month suspension is equivalent to disbarment. We disagree. The ELCs distinguish between disbarment and suspension, and the ceiling for suspension is 36 months. ELC 13.3(a). Because Starczewski's 24- month suspension does not pierce that ceiling, we are hard-pressed to agree it is equivalent to disbarment especially without citationto contrary legal authority.

24In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3 Finally, Starczewski claims the hearing officer wrongly started at a baseline suspension of21 months ratherthan 6 months. Therecord shows the WSBA argued for an 18-monthbaseline that equals 6 months per count. Inthe alternative, the WSBA argued for a 21-month baseline suspension that is halfway betweenthe ABA Standards' minimum and maximum of6 and 36 months. STANDARDS std. 2.3. Becausethe WSBA's arguments and the hearing officer's decision in this regard were reasonable and because Starczewski fails to cite legal authority to the contrary, we accept the 21-monthbaseline. F. Whether Restitution Is Proper Starczewski claims our precedent supports ordering restitution only where the client actually lost money and that there is no evidence in this case that Singh would have accepted the settlement offers. We disagree for two reasons. First, there is substantial evidence that Singhwould have accepted the settlement offers. For instance in a letterto the WSBA, Singh stated that ifhe had known his case was weak, he would have accepted the $15,000 settlement offer.5 Also, Singh testified that he could have used the $20,000 settlement offer. The hearing officer determined Singh's testimony was credible, a determination to which

5 Starczewski argues that because Singh's daughter wrote the letter, it is not indicative of Singh's intent. Her argument is not compelling. At the hearing, Singh adopted the letter as his own statement. 25In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3

we give greatweight. 

### Marshall, 167 Wn.2d at 67. Thus, the hearing officer correctly concluded that Singh would have accepted the settlement offers. Second, the ELCs provide an attorney maybe ordered to pay restitutionto persons who are financially injured by the attorney's misconduct. ELC 13.7(a). The hearing officer found Singhwas injured because he never had the opportunity to accept the $20,000 settlement offer. Giventhat Singh would have accepted the offer, that injury-thelost opportunity to accept the offer-is financial. Starczewski fails to present a clear and supported reason to depart from that conclusion.6 Thus restitution is proper in this case. G. Whether the Court Can Order a Proposed Practice Monitor To Serve Lastly Starczewski states herproposed practice monitor, AnthonyUrie, will
serve only ifshe is not suspended because he requires her assistance inhis practice. She claims the WSBA may not have the authority to force Urie to serve as a practice monitor. The issue is notproperly before us because the hearing officer did not order Urie to serve as practice monitor. Further, Starczewski does not have to propose a monitor until 60 days priorto her reinstatement and there is no evidence that she has formally proposedUrie. IfStarczewski and the WSBA cannot agree on a practice monitor, then the Board mayresolve the dispute.

6 Starczewski's reference to cases in the form ofPDF (portable document format) attachments to an e-mail to the WSBA insufficiently apprises us ofcontrary precedent. See RAP 10.3(a)(6) (providing that arguments in abriefshould contain citations to legal authority). 26In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3
V. CONCLUSION We affirm the Board's unanimous decision to suspend Starczewski for 24 months and order $15,000 in restitution because substantial evidence supports it. In addition, Starczewski fails to provide a clear reason to depart from it. Also, we affirm the majority ofthe Board's decision to extend the hearing officer's recommended 18 months ofpractice monitoring to 24 months. While the Board did notjustify its amendment, we believe it isjust in light ofStarczewski's defiance ofthe hearing officer's discovery order.

27In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstStarczewski No. 201,073-3

WE CONCUR:

28