Filed 3/30/16 P. v. Velasquez CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VINCENT RICARDO VELASQUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D069290

 (Super. Ct. No. FSB1400215)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 

Victor R. Stull, Judge. Affirmed.

Alan S. Yockelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Charles C. 

Ragland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury convicted Vincent Ricardo Velasquez of forcible rape in concert (Pen. 

Code, § 264.1, subd. (a); count 1; further undesignated statutory references are to the Pen. 

Code) and forcible oral copulation in concert (§ 288a, subd. (d)(1); count 2), and in a 

bifurcated proceeding following the verdict, the trial court found true the allegations that 

Velasquez had convictions resulting in two prior strikes (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, 

subds. (b)-(i)), two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and four prior prison terms 

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

The trial court sentenced Velasquez to prison for a determinate term of 17 years on 

count 2 and an indeterminate term of 39 years to life on count 1 and imposed certain fines 

and fees. 

On appeal, Velasquez raises five issues, contending that the trial court erred: 

(1) in admitting into evidence a photograph of Velasquez that showed the front of his 

tattooed body from the waist to the head; (2) in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on 

unanimity; (3) in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser included offense; (4) in 

failing to vacate Velasquez's two prior convictions for gang participation or, alternatively, 

in failing to dismiss the allegation of those convictions at the time of sentencing; and 

(5) in calculating the total prison sentence. None provides a basis on which to reverse; 

accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We review the record and recite the facts in a light most favorable to the judgment. 

(People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 848-849.) Where, in the discussion of certain 
3

issues on appeal, Velasquez is entitled to our consideration of other evidence, we will set 

forth in that discussion the additional issue-specific evidence.

On the night of January 10, 2014 (all subsequent dates are in the year 2014), the 

family with which Jane Doe was living1 hosted a small gathering. Around 11:00 or 

11:30 p.m., Velasquez, his younger brother Brian Jamerson and his friend Jesse Sandoval 

arrived at the get-together. Doe had not met any of them before, although Sandoval was 

a friend of Doe's boyfriend, who was incarcerated, and Sandoval had contacted Doe 

about the boyfriend and the two of them (Sandoval and Doe) had exchanged Facebook 

messages. Sandoval recognized Doe, introduced himself, and the two of them talked for 

an hour or so. Around 12:30 a.m. on January 11, at Sandoval's request, Doe gave 

Sandoval, Velasquez and Jamerson a ride to the house of Cecilia Jeminte, the mother of 

Velasquez and Jamerson. 

When they arrived at Jeminte's house, Jeminte opened the door for everyone, and 

Doe went to use the bathroom. On her way out, Doe walked into the bedroom where the 

three men had gone to say good night to them. The room was small, approximately eight 

feet by 12 feet, with a couch and a mattress. Jamerson was just leaving, and once Doe 

entered the bedroom Sandoval closed the door with Doe, Velasquez and Sandoval inside. 

The door did not have a knob or lock, and Velasquez placed an air tank next to the inside 

of the door as he and Sandoval asked her to stay. Doe told them that she had to go home 

 

1 At one point, Doe testified that the family was that of her ex-boyfriend. At other 

points, Doe referred to him as a current boyfriend. The status of Doe's relationship with 

the friend is irrelevant to the issues on appeal. For convenience, we will refer to him as a 

current boyfriend.
4

because her roommate was expecting her and she had plans to go to church in the 

morning, but Sandoval moved closer to her and told her she was going to stay. 

At this point, Doe became scared sitting on the couch; she testified that "little 

alarms started going off." Sandoval sat down next to Doe and began kissing her, putting 

his hands up her shirt and taking off her bra. Doe told Sandoval "no," explained that she 

had to go and then asked him to please let her leave; but that only made him more 

determined to keep her there, and he began pulling off her pants. Meanwhile, Sandoval 

was naked, and Velasquez began taking off his clothes. Seeing what she described as the 

"scary" tattoos on Velasquez's naked body, Doe became even more afraid. 

Sandoval removed the remainder of Doe's clothing, forced her to lay on her back 

on the arm of the couch and have sexual intercourse with him. Doe again told Sandoval 

"no" and again asked to leave, but Sandoval continued with the intercourse. 

Velasquez approached Doe, pulled down his boxer shorts and told Doe, "suck my 

dick." When Doe tried to push Velasquez away and again said "no" and that she wanted 

to go home, Sandoval told her not to say "no" to his "homie" and to do what his "homie"

said or the situation "was gonna be worse" for her. Doe then put down her arm, at which 

time Velasquez grabbed the back of her head, turned it sideways to face him and forced 

her to orally copulate him — all the while being vaginally penetrated by Sandoval. 

This continued for hours, although at some point Sandoval withdrew long enough 

for the two men to guide Doe to the mattress. Velasquez continued to force the oral 

copulation even during the move. When Sandoval withdrew, Doe was crying and again 

asked to leave. 
5

Once on the mattress, the men continued to penetrate Doe — Sandoval vaginally 

and Velasquez orally. The men compelled Doe to participate in nonconsensual, nonstop 

sex for four hours, physically pushing her into different positions. Although the positions 

changed, for the most part Sandoval was forcing his penis into Doe's vagina, and 

Velasquez was forcing his penis into Doe's mouth. Both men ejaculated "a few times"

over the course of the ordeal — Sandoval three times and Velasquez at least once. 

Sandoval generally told Doe what to do, and if she did not respond promptly, he

punched her with a closed fist or slapped her — all the while encouraging Velasquez to 

participate more fully. Likewise, Velasquez caused Doe physical pain by constantly

pulling her head forcefully into his pelvis during the oral copulation. In addition, 

Sandoval verbally demeaned and degraded Doe. Doe explained that she did not scream 

for help, because at one point — and the record is unclear as to exactly when — Sandoval 

told Doe to "be quiet and not to yell" or else he and Velasquez would "hurt" her. Doe 

believed the threat. 

According to Doe, shortly before the events concluded, Sandoval stuck his fingers 

in her anus. He removed them (covered with feces) and ordered Doe to clean them. She 

wiped them with a sock on the floor, but Sandoval was not satisfied and stuck his fingers 

in Doe's mouth, causing her to vomit. 

Leading up to the final acts, Sandoval ejaculated in or around Doe's vagina and 

proceeded to watch as Velasquez continued forcing Doe to orally copulate him until he 

ejaculated. Sandoval then ordered Doe to turn around in order for her to orally copulate 
6

him while Velasquez had intercourse from behind. Although Velasquez had difficulty 

regaining an erection, he nonetheless penetrated her vagina with his penis. 

Meanwhile, Sandoval had finished and gotten dressed. When Velasquez finished, 

Doe asked the men whether she could put on her clothes, but Sandoval said no. After 

Sandoval left the bedroom, Velasquez told Doe she could get dressed. Doe put on her 

pants and sweatshirt, but did not take time to look for her bra, underpants or socks. The 

keys to Doe's truck were not where she left them. Wanting only to leave, Doe told 

Velasquez that she did not care about the car and could walk home, but as she headed 

toward the bedroom door, Velasquez grabbed her by the shoulders and threatened, "I'm 

not sure if I'm done fucking you yet." Doe was crying and begging Velasquez to let her 

go home, and he allowed her to leave the room and the house. 

Not seeing her truck on the street where she had left it hours earlier, Doe just 

began walking away. Fearful that Sandoval might return, see her on the sidewalk and 

further detain her, Doe began to run — all the way to where her adult son and ex-husband 

lived, which was approximately five blocks away. Ten minutes later, Doe arrived at their 

house in shock and collapsed after knocking on a window. 

Doe's son and ex-husband found her in front of their house, behind a bench, in the 

fetal position crying around 5:00 a.m. As she was attempting to tell them that she had 

been raped, she suffered an asthma attack. Doe's son quickly got an inhaler and medicine 

from his father and treated Doe. Once she was able to breathe again, her son tried to 

convince her to call the police, but she would not because she was too scared. After 
7

letting Doe cry for a while, her son took her to the house of her boyfriend's family where 

she had been staying. 

Later in the day on January 11, after showering Doe went to a hospital to report 

the rape and be examined. The medical staff gave Doe medication for pain and anxiety 

and performed a basic examination. After the police arrived, they took her to a different 

hospital where a nurse performed an examination with a rape kit. The nurse who 

examined Doe noted several tears to her anal verge (where Doe said Sandoval had 

penetrated her); tenderness on the bridge of her nose (where Doe said Velasquez had 

forced her head into his pelvis); bruises on her upper arms (where Doe said Sandoval had 

held her); and abrasions on the sides of her body between her ribs and hips (where Doe 

said Sandoval had hit her). Although the vaginal examination did not disclose any 

physical injuries, the nurse confirmed multiple times that the lack of a noticeable injury 

to the vagina did not rule out vaginal rape. 

Police officers went to Jeminte's house to detain possible suspects based on Doe's 

description of events from early that morning. As the officers were talking to Jeminte at 

the front door, Velasquez and another man fled from the house; they ran through yards 

and jumped over five or six fences as the officers and their back-ups chased them. The 

police caught the two suspects and arrested Velasquez.2 Other officers, who had 

obtained a warrant, searched Jeminte's house and took with them, among other items, 

underpants and a bra that officers believed belonged to Doe. 

 

2 At trial, the People presented evidence that Sandoval was still at large. 
8

At the beginning of the police interview, Velasquez denied knowing Doe. By the 

end of the interview, Velasquez admitted receiving oral sex from and having vaginal 

intercourse with Doe — initially explaining that Doe had invited him to have sex, then 

changing his story to an invitation from Sandoval to join him (Sandoval) and Doe. 

II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In early February, the People filed an information against Velasquez, alleging the 

following four counts: (1) forcible rape in concert, in violation of section 264.1, 

subdivision (a); (2) forcible oral copulation in concert, in violation of section 288a, 

subdivision (d)(1); (3) forcible sexual penetration in concert, in violation of 

section 264.1, subdivision (a); and (4) forcible sodomy in concert, in violation of 

section 286, subdivision (d)(1). The information alleged a number of prior strikes

(§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), prior serious or violent felony 

convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

Following trial, the jury found Velasquez guilty on count 1 (forcible rape in 

concert) and count 2 (forcible oral copulation in concert) and not guilty on count 3 

(forcible sexual penetration in concert) and count 4 (forcible sodomy in concert). The 

trial court found true the allegations that Velasquez had convictions resulting in two prior 

strikes, two prior serious felonies and four prior prison terms. 

In posttrial proceedings, the court denied a new trial, declined to set aside or 

invalidate the prior (strike) convictions for gang participation (§ 186.22, subd. (a)), and 

struck the two prior strike convictions as to count 2 (forcible oral copulation in concert).
9

The court sentenced Velasquez to a determinate term of 17 years on count 2 and a 

consecutive indeterminate term of 39 years to life on count 1, calculated credits and 

imposed a fine. Defendant timely appealed. 

III.

DISCUSSION

Velasquez raises five major issues on appeal. The first three concern events 

during the trial, and the final occurred in posttrial proceedings. We find no reversible 

error.

A. The Court Did Not Err in Admitting Into Evidence the Photograph of Velasquez

Velasquez argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a photograph 

of him from the waist up in which he is shirtless and his tattoos are plainly visible. 

Velasquez contends the photograph is irrelevant and whatever probative value it might 

have had was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The People respond by arguing that

the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph into evidence. 

The court did not err in admitting the photograph into evidence.

1. Additional Background

The evidence at issue, trial exhibit No. 1, is an eight-inch by 10-inch color 

photograph of the frontal view of Velasquez which the prosecutor represented to the trial 

court was taken within 24 hours of the events of January 11. The photograph is of

Velasquez standing with his hands at his sides and from the bottom to the top shows from 

his finger tips to the top of his head. Velasquez is shirtless, and from what can be seen of 

the front of his arms, chest, neck and face, tattoos cover almost the entirety of his upper 
10

body (with the exception of a small area on his right shoulder and a small area around his 

cheeks and nose). The illustrations include women's faces, numerous letters of the 

alphabet,3 a hooded figure, the grim reaper (including the scythe) and various intricate 

scenes and designs. 

To prove the charges of rape in concert (count 1), the People were required to 

establish that the perpetrator accomplished the sexual intercourse by "force, violence, 

duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury." (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) 

To prove the charges of oral copulation in concert (count 2), the People were required to 

establish that the perpetrator committed an act of oral copulation by "force or fear of 

immediate and unlawful bodily injury." (§ 288a, subd. (d)(1).) In pretrial proceedings,

the People brought a motion in limine to allow the photograph to be admitted into 

evidence. The People argued that, because they had the burden of proving that Doe was 

actually and reasonably in fear of Velasquez, they wanted to let the jury see and 

understand what Doe faced when Velasquez confronted her in the bedroom on 

January 11. In response to Velasquez's argument that the photograph would prejudicially 

suggest gang membership, the prosecutor agreed to a limiting instruction, if necessary, in 

which the jury would be told that it could consider the photograph only with regard to 

Doe's state of mind. The court deferred ruling until it could hear Doe's trial testimony 

regarding her fear. 

 

3 The only discernable word is "Cecilia." 
11

At trial, Doe testified that she first became scared after Velasquez placed the air 

tank next to the bedroom door to keep the door from opening. She became even more 

afraid as Velasquez undressed and she saw the "scary" tattoos on Velasquez's naked 

body. The prosecutor then asked the court's permission to show the photograph to Doe. 

In a sidebar conference, Velasquez's attorney objected on the basis the photograph was 

irrelevant and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. The court ruled that

(1) because Doe's fear was relevant, evidence of what contributed to her fear was 

relevant, and (2) because Doe testified Velasquez's tattoos elevated her fear, the People 

were entitled to present visual evidence of what she said caused the additional fear. The 

court also ruled that, on balance, the evidence of the tattoos was more probative than 

prejudicial given the issue of Doe's fear and, thus, her purported consent to the sexual 

advances as asserted by Velasquez.

Finally, days later when the People asked that the photograph be admitted into 

evidence, Velasquez's counsel again objected. Commenting that it had previously ruled 

that the photograph was admissible, the court overruled the objection.

2. Law

Velasquez argues that the trial court erred in admitting the photograph into 

evidence on two grounds: (1) the photograph was not relevant; and if relevant, (2) the 

prejudicial effect of the admission of the evidence outweighed any probative value. 

Under Evidence Code sections 350 and 351, respectively, "[n]o evidence is 

admissible except relevant evidence[,]" and "all relevant evidence is admissible." In this 

regard, "relevant evidence" means "evidence, including evidence relevant to the 
12

credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or 

disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." 

(Evid. Code, § 210.) Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court may exclude 

otherwise relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

probability that its admission will . . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."

Because a trial court has "wide discretion in assessing whether in a given case a 

particular piece of evidence is relevant and whether it is more prejudicial than probative,"

we review the court's decision under these standards for an abuse of discretion. (People 

v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 558, italics added.) A court abuses its discretion in this 

context only where the appellant establishes that, by its ruling, the court acted "in an 

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 

justice." (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113.)

3. Analysis

a. Relevance (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 351)

Velasquez argues first that the photograph was not relevant to "any issue at trial"

(capitalization omitted), discussing what he characterizes as "[t]he primary issue" of 

Doe's consent. We assume that the defense of consent includes the issue whether 

Velasquez engaged Doe in sexual intercourse or oral copulation by fear.

Doe first became afraid when Velasquez moved the air tank next to the door so 

that it would not open. The next mention of fear by Doe was when Velasquez undressed. 

In particular, Doe testified that the tattoos on Velasquez's naked body made her "more 
13

afraid" because they were so "scary." Given that testimony and the People's burden of 

proving forcible rape and forcible oral copulation, the evidence of Velasquez's tattoos 

was relevant. 

Accordingly, in ruling that photograph was relevant to the issue of Doe's fear —

both its existence and reasonableness — the trial court did not act in an arbitrary, 

capricious or absurd manner and, thus, did not abuse its discretion in determining 

relevance. 

b. More Probative Than Prejudicial (Evid. Code, § 352)

Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court must balance the probative value 

of the proffered evidence against the potential prejudice should the evidence be admitted. 

(People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 779, fn. 16.) " 'The chief elements of probative 

value are relevance, materiality and necessity. [¶] Before permitting the jury to [receive 

the challenged] evidence . . . the court must ascertain that the evidence (a) "tends 

logically, naturally and by reasonable inference" to prove the issue upon which it is 

offered; (b) is offered upon an issue which will ultimately prove to be material to the 

People's case; and (c) is not merely cumulative with respect to other evidence which the 

People may use to prove the same issue.' " (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1049

(conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), abrogated on other grounds in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 

Cal.4th 1176.) In contrast, "the chief element of prejudice is the potential to lead a jury 

to convict the defendant because of his bad character or record and not on the basis of his 

conduct." (Lang, at p. 1049.)
14

Given the foregoing standard and our discussion in part III.A.3.a., ante, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the photograph had probative value: 

it tended to prove Doe's fear (both its existence and reasonableness), an issue material to 

the People's case, and was not cumulative. Indeed, given the issues of consent and fear, 

the evidence of Velasquez's appearance at the time he engaged in sex with Doe was 

highly probative.

Velasquez's attempt to distinguish this case from People v. Thomas (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 449 (Thomas) is not persuasive. For purposes of this argument, we accept 

Velasquez's premise that evidence of a defendant's gang membership must be " 'carefully 

scrutinized by trial courts' " so as to avoid the jury's inference that a gang member has a 

criminal disposition. (Quoting People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1194.) In 

Thomas, an appeal following a conviction for rape and murder, the trial court had 

admitted into evidence several photographs of the defendant's tattoos that the defendant 

contended established a gang connection. (Thomas, at p. 488.) Under facts similar to 

those here, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

ruling that, because of the issue of consent to the sexual intercourse, the photographs by 

themselves (i.e., without evidence connecting them to gang membership) were not 

inherently prejudicial. (Ibid.) Velasquez tries to distinguish Thomas on the basis that the 

the defendant in Thomas had no prior relationship with the victim, whereas here Doe 

knew Velasquez. We fail to see any true distinction, since Doe had met Velasquez only 
15

hours before the events and did not really know him. Otherwise, Thomas is directly on 

point and controlling.4

For the first time on appeal, Velasquez objects to what his appellate attorney 

describes as "the most prominent tattoo in the photograph[, which] states 'Westside'

across [Velasquez's] abdomen" and argues that, because Jamerson belonged to a gang 

called "West Side Verdugo," the jury could infer that Velasquez was also an active 

member in the gang. We are not convinced.

First, by not presenting any argument to the trial court based on the purported 

meaning of the specific tattoo — thereby giving the trial court the opportunity to consider 

this argument in ruling on the admissibility of the photograph (People v. De Soto (1997) 

54 Cal.App.4th 1, 10) — Velasquez forfeited appellate review of the issue. (People v. 

Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 244.) Second, contrary to Velasquez's description of the 

tattoo in his opening brief — i.e., "the very large gang tattoo across [Velasquez's] 

abdomen" — the photograph only shows the letters "ESTSID" (and, in fact the "D" looks 

more like an "O," resulting in "ESTSIO"), which is distinctly different than Jamerson's 

testimony regarding his membership in the "West Side Verdugo" gang. Finally, at the 

 

4 We note that, in Thomas, the trial court instructed the jury that the photographs 

" 'can only be used on the issue of consent. In other words, what [the victim] actually 

could see on the day in question. You cannot use it for any other issue or purpose other 

than the issue of consent.' " (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 488.) Here, the prosecutor 

agreed to — in fact, suggested — the same limiting instruction. If Velasquez had the 

same concern at trial that he expresses on appeal, he could have requested a similar 

instruction. Having failed to do so, he cannot complain about the lack of an instruction 

(People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 480) and is left only with a prejudice argument 

that likely could have been avoided altogether by a limiting instruction.
16

time the trial court was balancing probative value and prejudicial effect (while Doe was 

on the witness stand), the evidence from Jamerson regarding his gang membership had 

not been presented, and Velasquez's counsel did not advise the court that such evidence 

might be forthcoming. 

In any event, even if we consider the events after the court overruled Velasquez's 

evidentiary objection, Velasquez cannot establish prejudice — i.e., what he suggests may 

have been the jury's erroneous inference that the tattoo was gang-related. First, there is 

no indication anywhere in the record that the jury considered, let alone determined, 

whether Velasquez was a gang member at the time of the charged offenses. Second,

Velasquez's attorney — not the prosecutor — presented the evidence Velasquez contends 

might have associated him with a gang. Velasquez's attorney called Jamerson as a 

witness and asked him about his gang affiliation, including the name of the gang and his 

related tattoos. Even after that introduction of gang evidence on direct examination, the 

prosecutor only asked Jamerson six questions, none of which had anything to do with

Velasquez's photograph, gang membership or tattoos. Additionally, Velasquez's attorney

first asked Velasquez about his prior gang affiliation and two prior convictions for 

associating with a criminal street gang. Although the prosecutor confirmed the two 

convictions on cross-examination, he did not ask any other gang-related questions. 

Finally, the prosecutor did not mention anything gang-related in his closing argument or 

rebuttal. 
17

Accordingly, in ruling that the probative value of the photograph outweighed any 

chance of undue prejudice, the trial court did not act in an arbitrary, capricious or absurd 

manner and, thus, did not abuse its discretion. 

c. Conclusion

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling both that the 

photograph was relevant and that its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice, 

the trial court did not err in admitting the photograph into evidence.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Instruct the Jury on Unanimity

Velasquez argues that, because the evidence could have supported "two discreet 

rape in concert offenses" — one with Velasquez as principal and one with Sandoval as 

principal — the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it had to agree 

unanimously on which act they relied in finding Velasquez guilty of rape in concert. The 

People counter by arguing that a unanimity instruction was not required because the jury 

did not have to agree on whether Velasquez was the principal or an aider and abettor in 

the rape in concert charge.

The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on unanimity.

1. Additional Background

In count 1, Velasquez was charged with violating Section 264.1, subdivision (a), 

which criminalizes as rape in concert "any case in which the defendant, voluntarily acting 

in concert with another person, by force or violence and against the will of the victim, 

commit[s] an act described in Section 261, 262, or 289, either personally or by aiding and 

abetting the other person." As applicable here, section 261, subdivision (a)(2) defines 
18

"[r]ape" as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the 

perpetrator" "[w]here it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, 

violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person 

or another." 

Based on CALCRIM No. 1001, the court instructed the jury in part as follows: 

"To prove that [Velasquez] is guilty of [rape in concert,] the People must 

prove that: (1) [Velasquez] personally committed forcible rape and 

voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted its commission. 

Or, (2) [Velasquez] voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who 

personally committed forcible rape."

Given this instruction and the evidence introduced at trial, the People argued to the jury 

both that Sandoval aided and abetted Velasquez as the principal and that Velasquez aided 

and abetted Sandoval as the principal. 

In defense to the evidence that Velasquez was the principal, Velasquez argued to 

the jury both (1) that, because he did not penetrate Doe vaginally, he did not commit 

rape, and (2) that Doe voluntarily participated in (i.e., consented to) to the intercourse. In 

support of the first argument, the record contains evidence that, at the time Velasquez 

attempted sexual intercourse with Doe, he did not have an erection; he merely rubbed his 

penis on the outside of her vagina; he did not penetrate her; and he did not ejaculate. 

In defense to the evidence that Velasquez aided and abetted Sandoval as the 

principal, Velasquez argued to the jury that, because he reasonably believed Doe 

voluntarily participated in (i.e., consented to) the intercourse with Sandoval, he 

(Velasquez) did not aid or abet a rape. In support of this argument, the record contains 

evidence that Velasquez saw Doe and Sandoval hugging and kissing at the party and in 
19

the bedroom, that Doe undressed herself in the bedroom, that he believed Doe and 

Sandoval invited him to join them, and that he never heard Sandoval tell Doe to do what 

Velasquez told her to do (i.e., to orally copulate him) or she would suffer. Velasquez's 

brother and sister also testified that they saw Doe and Sandoval hugging and kissing in 

the bedroom. 

The jury found Velasquez guilty of rape in concert, as charged in count 1. 

2. Law

Under the California Constitution, a unanimous jury verdict is required to convict 

a person of a crime. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 

1132 (Russo).) In particular, the jury must agree unanimously that the defendant is guilty 

of a specific crime. (People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 281.)

When a defendant is charged with a criminal offense, but the evidence suggests 

more than one discrete crime, either the People must elect among the crimes or the trial 

court must instruct the jurors that they all agree on the same criminal act. (Russo, supra,

25 Cal.4th at p. 1132; see CALCRIM No. 3500.5) A trial court is required sua sponte to 

give a unanimity instruction where the evidence in the case suggests more than one 

 

5 "The defendant is charged with <insert description of alleged offense>

[in Count _____] [sometime during the period of __________ to _________]. [¶] 

The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the defendant 

committed this offense. You must not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that 

the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all 

agree on which act (he/she) committed." (CALCRIM No. 3500.)
20

discrete crime and the prosecutor does not elect among the crimes.6 (Russo, at p. 1132; 

People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199.) The requirement for such an instruction

" 'is intended to eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even though 

there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the defendant committed.' " (Russo,

at p. 1132.) However, "where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves 

room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the 

defendant's precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the 

cases often put it, the 'theory' whereby the defendant is guilty."7 (Ibid.)

A related exception to the unanimity requirement is that the jurors need not agree 

on the specific criminal act where the offense constitutes a "continuous course of 

conduct." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423 (Maury); see 5 Witkin, Cal. 

Crim. Law (4th ed. 2012) Crim. Trial, § 729, p. 1133.) This exception arises " ' "when 

the acts alleged are so closely connected that they form part of one and the same 

transaction, and thus one offense." ' "8 (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 

 

6 Here, the prosecutor did not elect, and Velasquez did not request a unanimity

instruction. 

7 For example, in deciding whether a defendant is guilty of murder, "the jury need 

not decide unanimously whether defendant was guilty as the aider and abettor or as the 

direct perpetrator." (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918; see People v. 

Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1024-1025 [jury may convict defendant of first degree 

murder without making unanimous determination whether murder was deliberate and 

premeditated or committed during the course of a felony].) 

8 Although inapplicable here, the exception is also used when the criminal statute 

contemplates a continuous course of conduct or a series of acts over a period of time. 

(Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572.) Examples include statutes criminalizing 
21

559, 572 (Hernandez), italics added; see People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 98

(Benavides) [same; jury not required to agree on which specific act of rape or sodomy 

supported conviction of lewd and lascivious conduct].)

In sum, although a unanimity instruction is required where there are discrete 

crimes, it is not required where the acts are so closely connected as to form one offense

even if supported by different theories.

Because our consideration of whether the trial court should have given a particular 

jury instruction involves a mixed question of law and fact which is " 'predominantly 

legal,' " we review de novo the issue whether a unanimity instruction was required here. 

(Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 568 [unanimity instruction].)

3. Analysis

In support of his position that two discrete criminal acts may have been committed 

(one as principal and one as aider and abettor), Velasquez first contrasts the People's 

information against him with the People's information against Sandoval. The People 

charged Sandoval with two counts of violating section 264.1, subdivision (a): in one 

count, as principal, by "unlawfully and voluntarily acting with another person, 

personally" to rape Doe; and in another count, as aider and abettor, by "unlawfully and 

voluntarily acting with another person, by aiding [and] abetting Vincent Velasquez," to 

rape Doe. (Italics added.) In contrast, here the People charged Velasquez with one count 

 

pimping, pandering, failure to provide for a minor, contributing to the delinquency of a 

minor and child abuse. (People v. Avina (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309 [collecting 

cases].) 
22

of violating section 264.1, subdivision (a) by "unlawfully and voluntarily acting with 

another person, personally and by aiding and abetting the other person," to rape Doe. 

(Italics added.) The differences in the two informations do not, by themselves, establish 

two discrete criminal acts by Velasquez. Indeed, the language in the charging document 

specifying that Velasquez was both a principal and an aider and abettor not only suggests 

that the prosecution based its charge on a continuous course of conduct, but also " 'alerts 

the jury that the charge consists of a continuous course of conduct, to be proved by 

evidence of more than one individual act.' " (People v. Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 

465, 491 [pandering].)

Regardless, on the merits, we are satisfied that a unanimity instruction was not 

required here, because all of the acts of rape, regardless who was the principal and who 

was the aider and abettor, were part of a continuous course of conduct with acts so 

closely connected as to form one ongoing offense. (Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 423;

Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 98.) The men did not allow Doe to leave the eight-foot

by 12-foot room (that contained only a couch and mattress) for over four hours, during 

which time nonstop sexual activity occurred until Velasquez allowed Doe to leave.

Velasquez emphasizes that he presented distinct defenses to the different acts —

lack of penetration as to acts in which Doe testified Velasquez was the principal, and lack 

of knowledge that Doe had not consented to the acts in which she testified Sandoval was 

the principal. Quoting from People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164, 181

(Percelle), Velasquez suggests that the continuous course of conduct exception only

applies "when '[ "]the defendant offers essentially the same defense to each of the acts, 
23

and there is no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them.[" ]' " (Italics 

added.) However, that is not what Percelle says; Velasquez conflates two independent 

exceptions to requiring a unanimity instruction. As Division Two of our court recently 

explained, quoting more fully from Percelle: 

"[A] unanimity instruction is not ' "required when the acts alleged are so 

closely connected as to form part of one continuing transaction or course of 

criminal conduct," ' or ' " 'when the defendant offers essentially the same 

defense to each of the acts, and there is no reasonable basis for the jury to 

distinguish between them.' [Citations.]" [Citation.]' ([Percelle, supra,] 

126 Cal.App.4th 164, 181-182.)"

(Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572, italics added.) 

Thus, the unanimity instruction is unnecessary in either of two situations: 

(1) where the defendant asserts essentially the same defense to each of the acts that could 

justify the conviction, and there is no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between 

the defenses; or (2) where the acts alleged are so closely connected that they formed one 

continuing course of criminal conduct. (Percelle, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 181-182; 

Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572.) Notably, Velasquez presents no argument 

on appeal in response to the second situation, which was what was before the trial court 

here — namely, acts so closely connected that they formed one continuous course of 

conduct. Indeed, Velasquez cites three authorities that he contends cannot be 

distinguished from the present case, but in each the court required a unanimity instruction

only because the defendant offered evidence of distinct defenses to separate acts; there

was no issue on appeal as to whether the defendant's separate acts were so closely 

connected that they formed one continuing course of criminal conduct. (Hernandez, at 
24

p. 575 ["separate instances of possession [of a gun], separated by time and space"]; 

People v. Castaneda (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1070-1071 [charge of possession of 

heroin; heroin found on television set at home prior to arrest, and heroin found in 

defendant's pocket later in the day after arrest]; People v. Laport (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 

281, 282-283 [one count of grand theft with evidence of embezzlement and theft over a 

15-month period].)9

Contrary to Velasquez's argument on appeal, just because he presented two 

distinct defenses — lack of penetration to the evidence that Velasquez raped Doe, and 

lack of knowledge of the evidence that Doe did not consent to the sexual intercourse with 

Sandoval — does not affect our consideration as to whether the rapes, regardless who 

was the principal, were part of a continuous course of conduct with acts so closely 

connected as to form one ongoing offense. Because of the overwhelming evidence of a 

continuous course of conduct, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on 

unanimity.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error in Failing to Instruct the Jury 

Sua Sponte on a Lesser Included Offense

Velasquez argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on assault 

with intent to commit rape, a lesser included offense of rape in concert. The People 

 

9 Additionally, Velasquez relies on People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 

184, and People v. Crawford (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 591, 599, for the argument that his 

distinct defenses also preclude application of a different exception to the unanimity 

requirement — an exception where the two criminal acts are so substantially identical in 

nature that any juror believing one act took place would also believe that all acts took 

place. However, the People do not contend the criminal acts here are so substantially 

identical to preclude application of the unanimity requirement. 
25

respond by arguing, first, that there was no substantial evidence to support such an 

instruction and, second, that even if the instruction was required, the error did not 

prejudice Velasquez. 

Although the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included crime, 

the error was harmless.

1. Additional Background

Velasquez again relies on the two defenses he presented to count 1, rape in 

concert: To the extent he was considered the principal, he did not penetrate Doe; and to 

the extent he was considered the aider and abettor, he was unaware Doe had not 

consented to the sex with Sandoval. From this premise, Velasquez argues on appeal that, 

because there was the possibility that the jury would find (1) that he was unaware Doe 

had not consented to the sex with Sandoval (and thus would acquit on the aiding and 

abetting charge) and (2) that he did not penetrate Doe (and thus would acquit on the rape 

charge), the court was required to instruct the jury on assault with intent to commit rape 

— an offense included within a charge of rape in concert. 

In support of his defense based on a lack of penetration, Velasquez directs us to 

evidence in the record from both him and Doe that suggests he did not penetrate her 

vagina with his penis. In response, the People tell us that there is "no evidence" that 

Velasquez attempted but failed to penetrate Doe's vagina with his penis. 

2. Law

Because "every" lesser included offense that is supported by substantial evidence 

"must" be presented to the jury, "a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all 
26

theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence." 

(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 155, 162 (Breverman).) This sua sponte 

responsibility arises regardless of the wishes of trial counsel or the parties, whenever 

substantial evidence supports the lesser charge. (Id. at pp. 158, 162.) In this context, 

substantial evidence means " ' "evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable 

[persons] could . . . conclude[]" ' that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was 

committed." (Id. at p. 162.) In determining the substantiality of evidence, a trial court is 

to consider only the "legal sufficiency" of the evidence, not its weight or the credibility of 

the witnesses who presented the evidence. (Id. at p. 177.) 

Without deciding the issue, for purposes of this argument we accept the parties'

agreement that assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)(1))10 is a lesser 

included offense of rape in concert (§ 264.1, subd. (a)). (See In re Jose M. (1994) 21 

Cal.App.4th 1470, 1476-1477.) Thus, as applicable here, because Velasquez was 

charged with raping Doe (while Sandoval aided and abetted), if the record contains 

substantial evidence both that Velasquez assaulted Doe with the intent to rape her and 

that he did not rape her, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on assault with 

intent to rape. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.)

We review de novo whether a jury instruction on a lesser included offense should 

have been given. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 [trespass and assault as 

lesser included offenses in burglary and robbery, respectively].) In so doing, we view the 

 

10 A crime is committed under section 220, subdivision (a)(1) whenever "any person 

. . . assaults another with intent to commit . . . rape . . . in violation of Section 264.1 . . . ."
27

evidence in a light most favorable to Velasquez, resolving any doubts as to the 

sufficiency of the evidence in his favor. (People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461, 

1482-1483 & fn. 7 [voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder as lesser included 

offenses in first degree murder].)

3. Analysis

The Attorney General tells us that "there was no evidence presented that 

[Velasquez] attempted . . . but failed to penetrate Doe's vagina with his penis." (Italics 

added.) Although that statement accurately reflects Velasquez's trial testimony —

because Velasquez testified that he neither attempted to have nor succeeded in having 

intercourse with Doe — the statement fails to take into account Doe's inconsistent 

recollection of the event.

Velasquez and Doe each testified without contradiction that Velasquez could not 

get an erection after ejaculating during oral copulation. Doe then testified that, despite 

his flaccid penis, Velasquez attempted sexual intercourse from behind her. Despite some 

evidence of penetration, Doe's testimony regarding penetration was not consistent: She

testified at least once that she could not feel whether Velasquez penetrated her vagina and 

at least twice that she was not sure whether Velasquez penetrated her vagina; and at the 

hospital on the night of January 11, she told one of the investigating officers that 

Velasquez did not penetrate her and that he only rubbed his penis on the outside of her 

vagina. 

In response to this evidence, the People refer us to Doe's later testimony in which 

she clearly and unequivocally testified that Velasquez penetrated her vagina. However, 
28

we merely review the record for substantial evidence; we do not weigh the evidence or 

make credibility determinations. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.) Moreover, by 

relying on this later testimony by Doe, the Attorney General impliedly confirms that the 

record earlier contains substantial evidence to the contrary. Indeed, this unequivocal 

testimony of penetration was elicited during the People's redirect examination — after

Doe's earlier equivocation (on direct and cross-examination) that she was not sure 

whether Velasquez had penetrated her and after Doe's earlier testimony (on crossexamination) that she told an investigating officer Velasquez had not penetrated her. 

Thus, if the jury believed (1) Doe merely rubbed his penis on the outside of, but 

did not penetrate, Doe's vagina (Velasquez's defense as principal), and (2) Velasquez was 

unaware Doe did not consent to the sexual advances of Sandoval (Velasquez's defense as 

aider and abettor), then the jury could have acquitted Velasquez of rape in concert yet

still convicted him of assault with the intent to rape. Accordingly, because the record 

contains substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that Velasquez 

committed the lesser crime (assault with intent to rape) but not the greater crime (rape in 

concert), the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on the lesser crime. 

(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 155, 162; People v. Eid (2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, 656.)

The question remains whether this error was prejudicial, since reversal is required 

only if the error "resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) We 

apply the standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) to

determine whether the failure to instruct on the lesser included offense resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955; 
29

Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178.) Under this standard, such error is reversible 

only when there is a reasonable probability that the appellant would have received a more 

favorable result had the instruction been given. (Breverman, at p. 178; Watson, at 

p. 836.) For purposes of this analysis, a "reasonable probability" is one sufficient to 

undermine the confidence in the conviction. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 

668, 694.) "Such posttrial review focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but 

what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration."

(Breverman, at p. 177.) In this context, we may consider the relative strength of the 

evidence in support of the judgment compared to the relative weakness of the evidence in 

support of a different outcome. (Ibid.) The appellant bears the burden of establishing 

prejudice. (People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, 510, fn. 11.)

With regard to Velasquez as principal, Velasquez argues that the evidence 

regarding penetration "was not overwhelming." We disagree. Initially, the jury could not 

have believed Velasquez; otherwise, it would have acquitted him entirely, since his 

testimony was that there was no penetration because he did not attempt vaginal 

intercourse with Doe. Looking next to Doe's testimony, although she did equivocate as 

we described ante, once the prosecutor explained to Doe the legal definition of 

penetration on redirect, she testified unequivocally that Velasquez penetrated her.11 Doe 

 

11 "[Prosecutor:] You were also asked some questions about whether or not you 

were sure the defendant was able to penetrate you, and I want to ask a more specific 

question. [¶] If when we ask about penetration we mean any penetration, however 

slight, does that make it an easier question for your to answer?

"[Doe:] Yes.
30

explained that by the time she met with the police officer at the hospital, she had been 

given medication that made her "fuzzy" and "was confused," and that she was "sure now"

that Velasquez had penetrated her. Also, on January 11, once Doe reported the incident: 

based on her first interview with a police officer (which was prior to the interview with a 

different officer described in the preceding sentence), the officer testified that Doe told 

him she "was certain" Velasquez had penetrated her vagina with his penis;12 and the 

nurse who examined Doe at the hospital confirmed that, during the interview, Doe told 

her that Velasquez had penetrated her vaginally. Finally — and most persuasively —

when a police officer interviewed Velasquez (having told him she was investigating 

allegations by Doe), without qualification Velasquez admitted that he had had "vaginal 

sex" with Doe on January 11.13

With regard to Velasquez as aider and abettor, Velasquez suggests that, because 

the jury returned not guilty verdicts on counts 3 and 4 (forcible sexual penetration in 

concert and forcible sodomy in concert, respectively) and because the jury asked for a 

clarification on the aiding and abetting instruction, the jury likely had difficulty finding 

 

"[Prosecutor:] Did the defendant penetrate you, however slightly?

"[Doe:] Yes, he did." (Italics added.) 

Consistently, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1000, the court instructed the jury: 

" 'Sexual intercourse means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or 

genitalia by the penis.' " (Italics added.) 

12 The officer even showed where in his written report he noted the vaginal 

penetration. 

13 Velasquez first explained to the officer that Doe initiated the sexual activity with 

him and later in the interview that Sandoval invited Velasquez to join him (Sandoval) and 

Doe. 
31

that Velasquez aided or abetted Sandoval's rape. We disagree. First, counts 3 and 4 had 

to do with anal penetration by Sandoval, and the jury could have believed such acts never 

took place. With regard to vaginal penetration, Velasquez's only defense was that he was 

unaware Doe had not consented to the sex with Sandoval. Velasquez's testimony in this 

regard (that he never heard Doe say "no" or otherwise communicate a lack of consent 

over the course of the four hours and he did not hear what Sandoval told Doe before 

Velasquez joined them) was not credible, and Doe's testimony of her lack of consent was 

both credible and overwhelming.14

Because Velasquez did not establish that there is a reasonable probability he 

would have received a more favorable result had the instruction on the lesser charge been 

given, Velasquez did not meet his burden of establishing prejudice and, thus, reversible 

error. 

D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Its Consideration of Velasquez's Two Prior 

Convictions of Gang Participation

Velasquez presents two independent arguments based on the court's true findings

of his two prior strike convictions. First, he argues that the court erred by not vacating or 

invalidating both prior convictions. Alternatively, he argues that the court abused its 

discretion in declining to strike the prior convictions as applicable to count 1 (rape in 

concert). The People respond by arguing, first, that the trial court properly refused to 

 

14 In addition to our independent review of the evidence, we note the trial court's 

comment that Doe presented "most certainly, by far, the most compelling testimony from 

a victim in a sexual assault case" that the court had ever heard. 
32

vacate the prior convictions and, second, that Velasquez did not meet his burden of 

establishing the court abused its discretion in declining to strike the priors as to count 1. 

The trial court did not err in its consideration of Velasquez's prior two strike 

convictions.

1. Additional Background

In April 2012, the People filed a two-count criminal complaint against Velasquez 

(2012 Complaint), alleging: In count 1, Velasquez was a felon in possession of a firearm 

in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a); and in count 2, Velasquez committed street 

terrorism in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a).15 Later in April 2012, 

Velasquez pleaded guilty to count 2 (2012 Conviction), and the court dismissed count 1. 

At the time of the plea, Velasquez acknowledged that the 2012 Conviction would be a 

"strike." The court imposed a sentence of one year four months. 

Less than one year later, in April 2013, the People filed another two-count

criminal complaint against Velasquez (2013 Complaint), alleging: In count 1, Velasquez 

committed street terrorism in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a); and in count 2, 

Velasquez was a felon in possession of metal knuckles in violation of section 21810.16 

 

15 This offense is also referred to as "gang participation." (People v. Rios (2013) 222 

Cal.App.4th 542, 558.)

16 The 2013 Complaint also named Velasquez's brother, Jamerson, charging him 

with one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety

Code section 11377, subdivision (a). 
33

In June 2013, Velasquez pleaded guilty to count 1 (2013 Conviction).17 At the time of 

the plea, Velasquez acknowledged the 2013 Conviction would be a second "strike." The 

court imposed a sentence of one year four months. 

Prior to the court trial to determine the truth of the charging allegations that 

Velasquez had been convicted of the two prior strikes, Velasquez filed a motion to 

invalidate the 2012 Conviction.18 In the motion, Velasquez argued that, in the 

"felonious criminal conduct by members of th[e] gang" (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) underlying 

the street terrorism conviction in the 2012 Conviction, Velasquez acted alone with no 

other gang member.19 This fact was important to Velasquez, because he sought to 

 

17 We assume the court dismissed count 1, but the record on appeal does not contain 

a copy of an order of dismissal or court minutes reflecting such dismissal.

18 The three-page document is entitled "Motion to Set Aside Prior Conviction; 

Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Motion to 

Vacate Judgment of Conviction; Request for Evidentiary Hearing." In one and a half 

pages of text with no legal authority as to the procedure being invoked, Velasquez asked 

the court "to invalidate" the 2012 Conviction. 

19 The street terrorism statute, section 186.22, subdivision (a), provides a criminal 

punishment for anyone convicted of "actively participat[ing] in any criminal street gang 

with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 

activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal 

conduct by members of that gang." (Ibid., italics added.) Velasquez's appellate counsel 

tells us the underlying " 'felonious criminal conduct' " in count 1 of the 2012 Complaint 

was Velasquez's "lone act of possession of a firearm." However, counsel presents no 

record reference or evidence to support the statement, and the arguments of counsel are 

not evidence. (People v. Gardner (1969) 71 Cal.2d 843, 849 (Gardner) ["Matters not 

presented by the record cannot be considered on the suggestion of counsel in the briefs."]; 

In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11 [counsel's statements in brief to court are 

not evidence]; People v. Wallace (2004) 33 Cal.4th 738, 754, fn. 3 (Wallace) [in § 1385, 

subd. (a) proceedings to strike a prior strike conviction, defense counsel's explanation of 
34

vacate the 2012 Conviction on the basis that, in People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 

1125 — an opinion filed after the 2012 Conviction — our Supreme Court held that a 

conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a) requires that the underlying felony be 

committed "by at least two gang members." (Rodriguez, at p. 1132.) According to 

Velasquez, therefore, since he pled guilty to a crime he did not commit, he was entitled to 

have the conviction "invalidate[d]." 

The People opposed the motion on the basis that it was an improper collateral 

attack on the factual basis underlying Velasquez's plea to the 2012 Complaint. 

The court denied the motion, orally citing and quoting from People v. Maultsby

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 296: Because " '[a] guilty plea admits every element of the offense 

charged and is a conclusive admission of guilt,' " by pleading guilty, Velasquez 

" 'waive[d] any right to raise questions about the evidence, including its sufficiency,' "

underlying count 1 of the 2012 Complaint. (Id. at p. 302.) 

The court then held a trial on the truth of two prior strike convictions. After 

receiving evidence and hearing the argument of counsel, the court found true the 

allegations of the two prior strike convictions that are at issue in this appeal — namely, 

the violations of section 186.22, subdivision (a) in 2012 and 2013.20 At sentencing, the 

 

events surrounding defendant's plea not evidence].) We discuss this further at 

part III.D.3.a., post. 

20 The court also found true other allegations of prior convictions, none of which are 

at issue in this appeal.
35

court exercised its discretion under section 1385, subdivision(a),21 and struck the 

allegations of the two prior strike convictions as to count 2 only. 

2. Law

In In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996 (Madrid), three habeas corpus 

petitioners challenged their convictions of kidnapping for robbery under section 209. (Id.

at p. 998.) Although each petitioner had pled guilty, between the date of the last plea and 

the filing of the three writ petitions, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in which it 

interpreted section 209 as requiring proof of an element that, according to each of the 

three petitioners, was not present in the underlying criminal case in which he pleaded 

guilty. (Madrid, at p. 998.) Significantly, the record in each underlying case supported 

each petitioner's contention regarding the element of proof missing in his case. (Id. at 

p. 1003.) Based on the facts in the underlying records, the Court of Appeal issued the 

requested writ relief, allowing each petitioner to withdraw the guilty plea in his

underlying criminal case. (Id. at pp. 1006-1007.) The Supreme Court agreed with this 

reasoning and, citing and relying on Madrid, granted the same relief two years later to a 

similarly situated habeas corpus petitioner in In re Crumpton (1973) 9 Cal.3d 463, 467-

469 (Crumpton).

 

21 "The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the 

application of the prosecuting attorney, and in the furtherance of justice, order an action 

to be dismissed. . . ." (§ 1385, subd. (a).) Our Supreme Court has construed this statute 

"as permitting a judge to dismiss . . . the allegation that a defendant has previously been 

convicted of a felony." (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 508

(Romero).)
36

Because Velasquez did not tell the trial court — and does not suggest to us on 

appeal — the procedural basis on which he brought his motion to invalidate the 2012 

Conviction (see fn. 18, ante.), our ability to determine the appropriate standard of review 

has been hampered. However, given the basis of our ruling, post, the standard of review 

does not affect the outcome. 

We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's decision not to strike the 

priors on count 1. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) In so doing, we consider only 

whether "the ruling in question 'falls outside the bounds of reason' " in light of the 

"applicable law and the relevant facts." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 

(Williams) [review of order vacating prior strikes under § 1385, subd. (a)].) 

3. Analysis

a. Order Denying Motion to Invalidate 2012 Conviction

Velasquez's argument that the 2012 Conviction should be invalidated is based on 

the factual premise that Velasquez acted alone with no other gang member. Despite 

appellate counsel's statement that "the record clearly shows [Velasquez] did not commit 

that crime," the record on appeal contains no evidence of any facts related to the acts 

underlying the 2012 Conviction. More specifically, Velasquez's motion did not contain 

any evidence; and at the hearing on the motion, counsel did not proffer any evidence, 

merely stating that he "would like" the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.22 The 

 

22 To the extent trial counsel asked for an evidentiary hearing and the court only 

entertained oral argument, Velasquez does not raise any issue on appeal. 
37

arguments of counsel — both in the trial court and on appeal — are not evidence. 

(Gardner, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 849; Wallace, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 754, fn. 3.)

Notably, in Madrid, each of the three petitioners presented a reporter's transcript of 

proceedings in which evidence of the facts underlying the offense to which the petitioner 

pled guilty was presented to the trial court in each of the habeas corpus proceedings. 

(Madrid, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 1002 [two preliminary hearing transcripts and one 

grand jury proceeding transcript].) Likewise, in Crumpton, the habeas corpus petitioner 

presented evidence of the underlying facts contained in a reporter's transcript from a

preliminary hearing. (Crumpton, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 467.) Thus, whereas in Madrid

and Crumpton the records contained evidence of facts that each petitioner did not commit 

the crime to which he pled guilty, here there is no record that Velasquez did not commit 

the crime to which he pled guilty. 

" '[T]he judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the 

appellant's burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.' " (People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 

Cal.App.4th 220, 227.) Our review is "limited to consideration of the matters contained 

in the appellate record," and in this regard "[t]he appellant has the burden of furnishing an 

appellate court with a record sufficient to consider the issues on appeal." (People v. 

Neilson (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534.) In People v. Siegenthaler (1972) 7 Cal.3d 

465 (Siegenthaler), for example, in an appeal from a denial of a motion to set aside an 

information, a defendant who "failed to include as part of the record on appeal the 

transcript of the preliminary hearing . . . [was] precluded from seeking appellate review 

of the denial of the motion." (Id. at p. 469.) Based on the record in the present appeal, 
38

the only evidence (as opposed to argument) that was before the court was Velasquez's 

guilty plea on which the trial court based its finding that Velasquez suffered a strike 

conviction. 

As in Siegenthaler, therefore, because Velasquez failed to provided evidence of 

the facts he contends entitled him to have the 2012 Conviction invalidated, he is 

precluded from seeking appellate review of his motion. For this reason, Velasquez has 

not met his burden of establishing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set 

aside the 2012 Conviction.

In his opening brief, Velasquez also raises the issue of his entitlement to invalidate 

the 2013 Conviction. Because trial counsel did not include the 2013 Conviction in his 

motion to invalidate the 2012 Conviction, appellate counsel presents the issue in the 

context of constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial court. Once again, however, 

because Velasquez has failed to provide evidence of the facts he contends might entitle 

him to have the 2013 Conviction invalidated, any error in failing to include the 2013 

Conviction in the motion is necessarily harmless. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 

Thus, we have no reason to consider whether trial counsel was ineffective.

In the event Velasquez attempts to invalidate either the 2012 Conviction or the 

2013 Conviction in subsequent proceedings, we express no opinion on the procedure he 

may employ or the merits of any argument he may raise.
39

b. Order Denying Romero Motion to Strike Prior Convictions on 

Count 1

Velasquez argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not striking the 2012 

Conviction or the 2013 Conviction on count 1. He suggests that because the trial court 

ruled that the prior strikes were both " 'purely status offenses' "23 and "not criminalized 

by section 186.22, subdivision (a)," Velasquez is "squarely outside the spirit of the Three 

Strikes law." We disagree.

When a trial court is presented with the consideration whether to strike a prior 

strike conviction, the court "must consider whether, in light of the nature and 

circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, 

and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be 

deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as 

though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent 

felonies." (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) The trial court here did exactly what is 

required of it. In declining to strike the two priors as to count 1, the court: began its 

analysis by expressly stating that it considered Williams and Romero and was exercising 

its discretion in the "further . . . interest of justice"; found that the convictions in the 

present case were for "violent and serious crimes" and the underlying offenses had a 

considerable impact on a victim; detailed at least a dozen convictions from Velasquez's 

extensive criminal history other than the two strike convictions and the jury verdicts in the 

 

23 Apparently the trial court accepted trial counsel's offer of proof as to the facts 

underlying the two convictions. 
40

present case, which presented "a pretty dismal example of citizenship" and "d[id] him 

considerable harm";24 noted that the two prior strikes came close in time25 and did not 

occur during "an aberrant period of lawlessness"; and, as to Velasquez's character and 

future prospects, found that Velasquez had no special education or training that would 

allow him to compete in today's job market for anything other than a low level position.26 

Based on those findings, the court's ruling was not arbitrary or beyond the bounds of 

reason. 

Although Velasquez acknowledges the Williams factors we quoted ante, 

(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161), he does not attempt to establish how the court's 

analysis and application of these factors were inappropriate or erroneous in this case. 

Instead, as we mentioned, Velasquez contends only that, because the court found both 

prior strikes were " 'purely status offenses,' " the court erred in not striking them on the 

basis they are "squarely outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law" — without telling us

what he contends is "the spirit of the Three Strikes Law" or providing us with legal 

authority supporting the argument that the court's failure to strike the priors is outside that 

 

24 These offenses included assault with a deadly weapon, battery and burglary as a 

juvenile; and as an adult, they included burglary, petty theft, public intoxication, failure 

to appear, possession of stolen property, assault with force, felon in possession of a 

firearm, and numerous probation and parole violations over the years. Velasquez was 29 

years old at the time of his arrest in this case. 

25 The 2013 Complaint was filed less than a year after the 2012 Complaint. 

26 Velasquez did not finish high school and never held a job for any appreciable 

period of time. 
41

"spirit." As such, Velasquez did not meet his burden of establishing an abuse of 

discretion.

The trial court did not err in declining to strike either the 2012 Conviction or the

2013 Conviction for purposes of sentencing Velasquez on count 1.

E. Velasquez Did Not Meet His Burden of Establishing Reversible Error in 

Sentencing

Velasquez argues that the judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded 

for resentencing because the total sentence on both counts is inconsistent with the court's 

oral pronouncement of the total sentence.27 The People's position is that, because the 

clerk's and reporter's transcripts are consistent with the sentences on each count, the court 

merely made a mathematical error in totaling Velasquez's prison time, and there is no 

need for resentencing.

Under the totality of the circumstances, Velasquez is not entitled to be 

resentenced.

1. Additional Background 

The court conducted two sentencing hearings — one on October 3 and one on 

October 21. The minutes from the October 3 hearing do not reflect a complete sentence 

and conclude with the entry, "[T]he defendant is not properly sentenced." At the 

October 21 hearing, the court explained that at the prior hearing the court may have failed 

to formally pronounce a sentence on count 1, and both counsel agreed. Accordingly, the 

 

27 Although the sentence contained other terms and conditions, throughout this part 

of the opinion, the only portion of the sentence at issue — and, thus, the only portion of 

the sentence we will discuss — is the prison term.
42

court sentenced Velasquez at the October 21 hearing, as follows: On count 1, the court 

orally pronounced an indeterminate sentence of 39 years to life, and on count 2, the court

orally pronounced a sentence of 17 years.28 Consistently, these identical prison terms 

are reflected in the clerk's minutes and the abstract of judgment for each count. 

In addition to orally pronouncing a sentence on each of the two counts on 

October 21, the court stated, "So combining the counts 1 and 2 . . . , total commitment is 

46 years to life." (Italics added.) Inconsistently, the clerk's minutes reflect: "Total state 

prison time is 56 years to life." (Italics added.)

2. Law

Velasquez relies on the concept that the abstract of judgment is not the judgment; 

it "may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize." (People v. 

Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) 

3. Analysis

Velasquez's position is that, because the court orally stated the total sentence "is 

46 years to life," we cannot determine whether this total sentence influenced the trial 

court's discretionary sentencing choices on each of the individual counts; and, if so, then 

the discretionary sentencing on the two counts would be wrong, since the apparent 

exercise of the court's discretion totaled 56 years, not 46 years. Velasquez describes the 

issue as a clerical error in not accurately recording in the court's minutes the court's oral 

pronouncement of the total sentence — a clerical error that cannot be corrected without a 

 

28 As we explain post, each of these sentences includes all enhancements.
43

remand for resentencing. The People's position is that the court clearly exercised its 

discretion as required as to each count, and the court merely "misspoke" in stating the 

total commitment was 46 years instead of 56 years (39 + 17). 

At the October 3 hearing, the court exercised its discretion as follows as to 

count 2:29 

"I . . . do also recognize that I have the ability obviously, under Penal Code 

Section 1385, to dismiss or strike allegations, and I am going to do so as to 

Count 2. I am going to strike both strikes as to Count 2. And the reason I 

am going to do that is that . . . Mr. Velasquez was not actively engaged in 

conduct which would constitute theft or a crime which would harm a 

personal victim . . . , although I will note he did possess a firearm in one of 

the prior strikes. There was no indication he was doing anything other than 

carrying it. So to this [count], I think Mr. Velasquez is partially outside the 

spirit of the Three Strikes statute, and that's why I am striking both strikes 

as to Count 2.

"[T]he sentences are mandated to be consecutive, so Count 2 will be 

consecutive to Count 1. . . . [T]he primary support for that is Penal Code 

section 1170.12 and, I believe it is, (a)(7). In case there is other support 

needed for that, in an exercise of discretion, I would find that the defendant 

has not shown remorse and also that there is reasonable likelihood that, if 

not imprisoned, he will continue to be a danger to others as an independent 

justification for [a] consecutive sentence.

"There is a need to make a sentencing choice as to which term to apply. It's 

not a one-third the mid. It is a full consecutive term. So I am choosing the 

mitigated term of five years. And I am doing that . . . . Relying on 

circumstances in mitigation, . . . the defendant played a minor role in the 

offense, and I thought that there was some indication that there was a level 

of intoxication involved.

"And I fully realize that to strike a strike is an extraordinary exercise of 

discretion, . . . and I can only say I have stated my reasons.

 

29 The punishment for oral copulation in concert, as alleged in count 2 is 

"imprisonment in the state prison for five, seven, or nine years." (§ 288a, subd. (d)(1).)
44

"The sentence as to Count 2, therefore, will be[:] [¶] . . . [¶] [A] mitigated 

term of five years is imposed to be consecutive with an enhancement for a 

prior serious felony conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 667(a)(1), a 

period of five years, the second five years enhancement to be consecutive, 

same serious felony prior under 667(a)(1), a period of five years, and two 

one-year state prison priors under 667.5(B). So the total as to Count 2 will 

be 17 years." (Italics added.) 

Also at the October 3 hearing, the court explained that it placed in the court's file a 

written copy of all of its "sentencing choices." As to count 2, the written choices are 

consistent with both the court's oral statements quoted ante and the court's oral statements

in the exercise of its discretion on Velasquez's Romero motion (in which the court struck 

the two prior strikes) described ante at part III.D.3.b.30 As to the sentencing on count 1, 

the court's detailed written explanation is as follows:31

"Sentencing as to Count 1:

"1. The greatest minimum sentence is option 1, 3x9 years, the aggravated 

term for P.C. 264.1, for a total of 27 years to life.

"2. The upper term of 9 years is selected for the following reasons:

"a. The defendant was an active participant in the commission of the 

crime.

 

30 We note that, at the August 29 hearing at which the court heard arguments on 

Velasquez's Romero motion, when the court mentioned the sentence it had been 

considering, the court estimated the total term would be "around 60 some years."

31 The punishment for rape in concert, as alleged and proven in count 1, is 

"confinement in the state prison for five, seven, or nine years." (§ 264.1, subd. (a).) 

Based on the true findings of the 2012 Conviction and the 2013 Conviction and the 

selection of the upper term for the section 264.1, subdivision (a) conviction, the 

punishment "shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 

the indeterminate sentence . . ." trebled. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(i), 667, 

subd. (e)(2)(A)(i).)
45

"b. The defendant inflicted emotional injury.

"c. The defendant's record begins as a minor and has continued 

rather consistently until his conviction in this case indicating a 

pattern of regular criminal conduct.

"d. The defendant's performance on probation and parole has not 

been satisfactory. He was on a grant of parole at the time he 

committed the crime for which he has been convicted.

"For purposes of making this selection the court finds no 

circumstances in mitigation.

"3. Priors:

"a. [Two] P.C. 667(a) priors were found true and defendant will 

serve an additional determinate term of 5 years for each such prior 

conviction, consecutive to each other, consecutive to the life term, 

and consecutive to Count 2.

"b. [Two] P.C. 667.5(b) [priors] were found true and defendant will 

serve an additional determinate term of 1 year for each such prior 

conviction, consecutive to each other, consecutive to the life term, 

and consecutive to Count 2.

"4. The total term for Count 1 is 39 years to life." (Italics added.)

The written explanation also contains a notation at the end, "[t]otal commitment is 46 

years to life."

At the October 21 hearing, the court confirmed the October 3 exercise of its 

discretion communicated to counsel on count 1:

"THE COURT: Well, I know I gave my reasons for the way I exercised my 

discretion.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct. [¶] . . . [¶] Well, I have 39 years on 

count 1. Does that . . . conform with the Court?

"THE COURT: Yes."
46

The court then confirmed that it had arrived at the 39-year figure, as follows: "[T]he 

Court impos[ed] a nine-year-high term, tripled, by virtue of the three-strike law, to 

27 years. Plus an additional 10 for each of the 667(A) prior serious felonies, plus two, 

one-year enhancements for a prior prison term, total 39." (Italics added.) The court 

continued: "I've already expressed why I chose the terms that I did and why I made my 

decisions with respect to denial of probation and choosing aggravated terms [on count 1] 

and sentencing consecutively between counts 1 and 2." The court then repeated the 

calculations of the two prison terms, as follows:

"So as to count 1, Penal Code section 264[.]1, rape in concert, total 27 years 

to life. [¶] Consecutive to that, state prison prior under 667(a), which 

w[as] found true, five years, that will . . . run consecutive to count 1; the 

second 667[(a)] prior found true, five years. That will run consecutive to 

the . . . first 667(a) prior and to count 1. [¶] There are two state prison 

priors under 667[.]5 sub[division] (b). [E]ach is one year consecutive to 

count 1, each consecutive to each other, each consecutive to the two 667(a) 

priors. Total term for count 1 is 39 years to life.

"And I have already sentenced as to count 2. I'm not going to repeat that. 

[¶] But for count 2, the total term of imprisonment is 17 years. And that 

was all determinate time. All determinate time will [be] served first, 

followed by the indeterminate time. The . . . period of imprisonment may 

be followed by a period of parole to life." (Italics added.)

Finally, the court orally stated, "So combining the counts 1 and 2 and the applicable 

enhancements . . . , total commitment is 46 years to life."

From our detailed review of the record, the totality of the circumstances leads to 

only one conclusion: the trial court intended to sentence Velasquez to prison for a 

determinate term of 17 years on count 2 and an indeterminate term of 39 years to life on 

count 1; the court merely miscalculated the total years of commitment by incorrectly 
47

adding 17 and 39 to reach 46 (instead of 56, which was much closer to the court's original 

estimate of "60 some years").

The court thoroughly and properly exercised its discretion, as required, in 

sentencing Velasquez on each count. Contrary to Velasquez's speculation, there is no 

indication or reason to suspect that the trial court's understanding of the total commitment

— whether 46 or 56 years — influenced the exercise of the court's discretion in 

sentencing Velasquez on each of the individual counts. Indeed, Velasquez does not 

contend either (1) that the court abused its discretion or otherwise erred in sentencing him 

on either count, or (2) that an exercise of discretion or legal duty was triggered in the 

court's calculation of the total commitment.

Accordingly, Velasquez did not meet his burden of establishing reversible error 

entitling him to be resentenced.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.