NO. 96-101 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

IN RE MARRIAGE OF 

ALAN L. HOOKER, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

DIANE L. HOOKER, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Garfield, 

The Honorable Kenneth R. Wilson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Donald R. Herndon, Herndon, Sweeney & Halverson, 

Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

J. Reuss, Wright, Tolliver & Guthals, 

Billings, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: June 27, 1996 

Decided: September 12, 1996 
Justice Charles E. Erdmann delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

Appellant Alan L. Hooker appeals from the amended findings of 

fact, conclusions of law, decree of dissolution, and final order 

issued by the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Garfield County. 

We affirm. 

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Alan should be 

estopped from challenging the oral property settlement which the 

District Court incorporated into its final decree of dissolution. 

FACTS 

In May 1989, Alan L. Hooker petitioned the District Court for 

a dissolution of his marriage to Diane L. Hooker. Alan and Diane 

were married in 1968 and together they operated Hooker Livestock, 

Inc., a farming and ranching business. Alan's parents (John and 

Mildred) also operated a farming and ranching operation called the 

Hooker Cattle Company. Over the years, the operation of Hooker 

Livestock and Hooker Cattle became commingled and essentially the 

two companies were operated together. John died in 1975 and when 

Mildred passed away in 1982 her will provided for equal 

distribution of Hooker Cattle assets into two trusts--one for her 

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grandchildren and one providing income to Alan during his life with 

the remainder to her grandchildren. To establish the trusts, it 

became necessary to value the assets of both ranching operations 

and eventually the land, cattle, equipment, and cash were divided, 

which resulted in a determination of the value of Alan's interest 

in the trust. 

The dissolution proceeding was set for trial on April 2, 1991. 

On the morning of trial, the parties informed the court they were 

in the process of negotiating a settlement regarding property 

distribution. Later that day the parties told the court they had 

reached an agreement. The court convened and the parties read the 

settlement agreement into the record. Alan and Diane were sworn as 

witnesses and both of them stated that they understood and agreed 

to the terms of the property distribution. Both parties agreed to 

sign the settlement agreement once it was reduced to writing and 

the District Court requested a copy of the agreement once it was 

signed. However, subsequent efforts by the parties to reduce the 

agreement to writing failed and a written agreement was never 

executed. 

On June 4, 1991, Alan moved the District Court to adopt the 

transcript of the April 2, 1991, proceedings as its findings of 

fact, conclusions of law, and final decree in the matter. On 

August 29, 1991, the District Court issued an order stating that 

the oral stipulation was a contractual obligation between the 

parties and ordered it to be specifically performed. On October 2, 

3 
1991, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, 

and decree of dissolution stating that the "parties['] property 

settlement agreement is not unconscionable and is approved by the 

Court." On the same day, the parties filed a stipulation into the 

record agreeing that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

decree of dissolution should be entered. 

Over the course of the next two years, the parties proceeded 

to execute many of the terms of the property settlement agreement. 

Property was exchanged, titles were signed, and monies were paid. 

On March 10, 1994, two years and five months after the court had 

entered its original decree, Alan filed a motion with the District 

Court to revoke or modify the decree with respect to the property 

distribution. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court 

entered an order on May 4, 1994, denying Alan's motion to revoke or 

modify stating that: 

[Plrior to April 2, 1991, and subsequent thereto up to 

the hearing of April 28, 1994, the parties have 

voluntarily made exchanges, transfers and agreements 

which in effect resulted in an almost total performance 

of the settlement agreement . . . . 

In April 1995, Diane filed a motion for leave to file a 

third-party complaint against the First Trust Company of Montana to 

resolve the terms of a land transfer associated with the property 

distribution. On May 4, 1995, the District Court denied Diane's 

motion and entered an amended decree and final order. In that 

order the District Court concluded that: 

The Property Settlement Agreement stipulated into the 

record at the trial of this cause on April 2, 1991, is 

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not unconscionable and is approved by the Court, and is 

by this reference incorporated herein as is this Court's 

Order dated May 4, 1994, insofar as it makes any findings 

or conclusions not inconsistent with this Order. 

The court found that: 

The stipulation for settlement between the parties which 

has been approved by this Court has been almost totally 

performed and the remaining dispute over the land 

exchange is considered by the Court to be de minimis. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

The parties addressed the issues of whether the District Court 

erred in determining that the oral property settlement agreement 

was not unconscionable and whether the court erred in incorporating 

the agreement into the amended final decree. However, we determine 

that the dispositive issue in this case is whether Alan should be 

estopped from challenging the agreement. 

Diane argues that since Alan assented to the agreement in open 

court and later moved the court to adopt the agreement as its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, he should be estopped from 

challenging the agreement. Diane also argues that Alan should be 

estopped because the agreement has been substantially performed. 

Alan argues that he should not be estopped from challenging 

the agreement because the District Court did not grant the motion 

filed by his former counsel to adopt the on-record stipulation as 

its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Alan also claims that 

substantial portions of the agreement have not been performed. 

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In its May 4, 1995, final order the District Court found that 

the property settlement between the parties "has been almost 

totally performed and the remaining dispute over the land exchange 

is considered by the Court to be de minimis." The court based its 

finding on a number of other findings it had made in its May 4, 

1994, order which it adopted into the final order. 

This Court has stated that if a district court reaches the 

correct result, its decision will be affirmed regardless of the 

court's reasoning. Farmers Union Cent. v. Department of Revenue 

(1995), 272 Mont. 471, 475, 901 P.2d 561, 563. We determine it is 

not necessary to answer the evidentiary question of whether the 

parties' settlement agreement has been substantially performed. 

Instead, we conclude that Alan is judicially estopped from 

challenging the agreement. 

This Court has previously recognized the doctrine of judicial 

estoppel. gee Caekaert v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund (1994), 268 

Mont. 105, 885 P.2d 495; Rowland v. Klies (1986), 223 Mont. 360, 

726 P.2d 310. Under this doctrine we do not permit litigants to 

assert inconsistent and contradictory positions in separate 

litigation. Caekaert, 885 P.2d at 501. The clearest reason for 

the rule is to prevent parties from playing "fast-and-loose with 

the courts." Caekaert, 885 P.2d at 501 (citing Rowland, 726 P.2d 

at 315). To give rise to judicial estoppel, the first 

representation must have been made knowingly and free from the 

other party's inducement and it applies particularly to admissions 

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or positions asserted under oath or in previous litigation. 

Caekaert, 885 P.Zd at 501-02 (citing Rowland, 726 P.2d at 315). 

In the present case, the record is clear that Alan 

unequivocally expressed his assent to the stipulation which had 

been read into the record in open court at the April 2, 1991, 

hearing. In June 1991, through his counsel, Alan moved the 

District Court to adopt the on-record stipulation as its findings 

of fact and conclusions of law. In effect, the court granted the 

motion in its August 29, 1991, order when it stated that it deemed 

the stipulation to be a contractual obligation between the parties 

and ordered it specifically performed through the filing of 

findings of fact and appropriate decree. In September 1991, the 

parties stipulated that the findings, conclusions, and decree be 

entered. 

Alan's previous actions in agreeing under oath to the 

on-record stipulation, his motion requesting the court to adopt the 

agreement as its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and his 

stipulation that the decree be entered, all prevent him from now 

asserting a contrary position. 

We therefore hold that Alan is judicially estopped from 

challenging the oral property settlement agreement which the 

District Court incorporated into its amended final decree of 

dissolution. 

Affirmed. 

ald%L 

Justice 

7 
Chief Justice 

/2!2zkw 

Justices 
September 12, 1996 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the 

following named: 

Donald R. Herndon, Esq. 

HERNDON, SWEENEY & HALVERSON, P.C. 

Box 80270 

Billings MT 59108-0270 

J. Reuss 

Wright, Tolliver & Guthais 

Box 1977 

Billings MT 59103 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA