United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 20, 2018

Decided December 20, 2018

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐1913

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

CHAY ANTHONY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 13‐30043‐001

Sue E. Myerscough,

Judge.

O R D E R

Chay Anthony pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). Only two months after Anthony was released from prison, he possessed and

used methamphetamine and violated conditions of his sober‐living program. Anthony

admitted to a probation officer and to the district court at his revocation hearing that he

violated the terms of his supervised release. Based on Anthony’s Grade B violation and

criminal history category of VI, the judge calculated the term of imprisonment under

the Chapter 7 policy statements to be 21 to 27 months, see USSG § 7B1.4. As for

supervised release, the judge said that Anthony could be sentenced to up to a life’s

term, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The judge sentenced him to

27 months’ imprisonment and 6 years’ supervised release. Anthony filed a notice of

appeal, but his lawyer moves to withdraw, arguing that the appeal is frivolous.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐1913    Page 2

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We agree with his attorney, grant the

motion, and dismiss the appeal.

A defendant facing revocation of supervised release does not have a

constitutional right to counsel unless he has a serious claim that he has not violated his

conditions of release or a substantial argument against revocation that would be hard to

develop without counsel. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973);

United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Because Anthony admitted

that he violated his conditions of release and does not offer a complex mitigating

argument, we are not obligated to apply the Anders safeguards in ruling on counsel’s

motion to withdraw. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016).  

As a matter of practice, however, we apply the Anders standard here. See United

States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of

the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected

to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough and Anthony has not

responded to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects

counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States

v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel first considers whether Anthony could argue that the district court

abused its discretion in revoking his supervised release. See United States v. Musso,

643 F.3d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 2011). Anthony admitted to his probation officer and to the

court that he possessed and used methamphetamine, which violated his terms of

supervised release. Counsel correctly finds no basis to argue that Anthony’s admissions

were unknowing or involuntary. The judge engaged in a lengthy colloquy, explaining

the nature of the allegations and the consequences of admitting their truth, including

the rights that Anthony was giving up, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b), and the judge

ensured that no one had induced him to admit the violations. Once the judge found that

Anthony possessed methamphetamine, revocation was mandatory, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(g)(1). Challenging the revocation, therefore, would be frivolous.   

Next, counsel appropriately concludes that a procedural challenge to Anthony’s

sentence would be frivolous. A district court would commit procedural error by

incorrectly calculating the guidelines range or by treating the guidelines as mandatory.

See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But here, we could not find that the judge

erred in classifying Anthony’s methamphetamine possession as a Grade B violation

because his prior drug conviction “exposed him to a maximum of two years in prison.”

United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1156 (7th Cir. 2001); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); USSG
No. 18‐1913    Page 3

§ 7B1.1(a)(2). Nor would we find that the judge erred in determining that Anthony’s

criminal history category was VI, that the correct policy‐statement range was 21 to 27

months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4, or that Anthony could be sentenced up to a

life term of supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).

We would also find frivolous an argument that the judge thought she could not deviate

from the guidelines, because she acknowledged at the hearing that the policy‐statement

range was advisory.  

Finally, counsel explores a challenge to Anthony’s sentence as substantively

unreasonable. We would presume that a sentence within the policy‐statement range is

reasonable, United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2014), and we agree with

counsel that the record presents no basis to disturb that presumption. First, the judge

explained that the sentence was justified based on factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

including Anthony’s repeated failures to stay off drugs. This led the judge to conclude

that incarceration would help deter him from possessing and using drugs in the future.

Second, the judge clarified why she thought that Anthony would be better served in

prison rather than at another drug‐treatment facility. She acknowledged that Anthony

had been a drug addict since his teenage years, that he turned to drugs when grieving,

and that he came from a hard background. But based on Anthony’s repeated failures to

change, she was skeptical that he was serious about addressing his addiction. Given the

judge’s consideration of the relevant factors, including Anthony’s mitigating

arguments, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to challenge the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.