Filed 11/23/21 Marriage of Rubanowitz CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re the Marriage of 

BARBRA and SHALOM

RUBANOWITZ.

 B301941

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD574834)

BARBRA RUBANOWITZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHALOM RUBANOWITZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Scott M. Gordon, Judge. Affirmed.

Melvin Teitelbaum for Appellant.

James Alex Karagianides for Respondent.

___________________
2

Shalom Rubanowitz appeals from the judgment entered 

following a marital dissolution trial awarding child and spousal 

support to his former wife, Barbra Rubanowitz, and denying his

request for attorneys’ fees.

1 Shalom contends the family court 

erred by not considering monetary payments that Barbra’s father 

made to Barbra or to third parties on her behalf as income to 

Barbra when calculating child and spousal support. Further, 

Shalom argues he was prejudiced by the denial of his request for 

a trial continuance to allow him to call Barbra’s vocational 

evaluator as a witness. Shalom also asserts the family court 

abused its discretion in denying his request for attorneys’ fees

under Family Code section 2030.

2

 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Marital Dissolution Proceeding

Barbra and Shalom were married in 1991 and separated on 

September 24, 2012. Barbra filed a petition for marital 

dissolution on December 10, 2012, and a status-only judgment of 

dissolution was entered on November 19, 2015. Barbra and 

Shalom have seven children, six of whom were minors when the 

dissolution proceeding began. 

Shalom is a rabbi and an attorney who practices as a sole 

practitioner. Shalom’s revenues from his law practice dropped in 

2011 when he lost a major client. In 2012, after Barbra and 

Shalom separated, Shalom lost the bulk of his legal business 

because he no longer represented the business interests of 

1 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid 

confusion. 

2 Further statutory references are to the Family Code. 
3

Barbra’s family. Barbra is a stay-at-home mother who did some 

part-time work as a doula for a short period of time. After their 

separation, Shalom did not provide child or spousal support to 

Barbra.

B. The Pretrial Orders and Barbra’s Appeal 

In January 2013 Barbra filed a request for pendente lite 

child and spousal support. Following a two-day hearing, on 

May 29, 2014 the family court3issued a written order on the 

parties’ requests for pendente lite child and spousal support and 

attorneys’ fees. The court found payments made by Barbra’s 

father, William Moskovits, to Barbra or to vendors on her behalf 

were regular and recuring cash gifts that should be treated as 

income to Barbra when calculating child and spousal support. 

The court found Barbra’s gross income available for support was 

$30,000 per month based on Moskovits’s payments of at least 

$57,000 per month. The court found the child support guidelines 

provided for payment by Shalom to Barbra of $424 per month as 

child support for their five minor children (one by then was an 

adult) based on gross income of $11,098 per month for Shalom 

and $30,000 per month for Barbra. But the court deviated 

upward from the guideline amount and ordered Shalom to pay 

$1,500 per month in child support because Shalom was spending 

generously on himself, and the court found the money would be 

better spent on the children. The court also found the spousal 

support guidelines provided for Barbra to pay Shalom $5,791 per 

month as pendente lite spousal support, but the court did not 

order payment of spousal support, finding Moskovits would 

reduce his payments to Barbra if they were used to pay spousal 

3 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki. 
4

support to Shalom, which would be detrimental to the children. 

The court found it was in the children’s best interest that neither 

party pay the other pendente lite spousal support. Finally, the 

court ordered Barbra to pay Shalom’s counsel $140,000 in 

attorneys’ fees and costs under section 2030 because there was a 

substantial disparity in access to funds to pay for an attorney, 

Shalom’s request for attorneys’ fees was reasonable, and Barbra 

had the ability to pay Shalom’s attorneys’ fees. Barbra appealed 

from the orders.

On June 7, 2016 we reversed the family court’s orders for 

pendente lite child support, spousal support, and attorneys’ fees. 

(In re Marriage of Rubanowitz (June 7, 2016, B257782) [nonpub. 

opn.] (Rubanowitz I).) We concluded the family court abused its 

discretion in determining Moskovits’s payments to Barbra and to 

third party vendors were income to Barbra for purposes of 

pendente lite child and spousal support. Although Moskovits 

made regular payments in fixed amounts for some expenses, such

as private school tuition for the children, Moskovits’s payments to 

Barbra and other third parties “were sporadic in nature, varied 

in amount, and depended on what particular expenses were 

incurred in a given month.” (Ibid.) Moskovits’s payments

therefore were outside “‘the traditional concept of income as a 

recurrent monetary benefit,’” as described by In re Marriage of 

Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718, 736 (Alter). (Rubanowitz I, 

B257782.) Further, the family court abused its discretion by 

arbitrarily estimating $30,000 per month as gross income 

attributable to Barbra based on Moskovits’s monthly $57,000

payments. We also concluded the “[family] court’s order that 

Barbra pay $140,000 in attorney’s fees and costs to Shalom’s 

counsel exceeded the amount reasonably necessary for Shalom to 

maintain the dissolution action during the pendency of the 
5

proceeding.” (Ibid.) We instructed the family court to “reconsider 

the role of the payments made by Moskovits as part of its review 

of the statutory factors” delineated by sections 2030 and 2032 

given that Moskovits’s payments to Barbra “were not regular and 

recurring.” (Ibid.) We stated, “On remand, the trial court shall 

consider its redetermination of Barbra’s income and the balance 

of funds remaining in the client trust account held by Shalom’s 

counsel, as well as the attorney’s fees and costs likely to be 

incurred by Shalom through trial, in deciding whether to order an 

award of attorney’s fees and costs to Shalom under section 2030, 

and if so, the amount of such award.” (Ibid.)

C. The Evidence at Trial

A six-day trial was held in March 2019. At the time of 

trial, Barbra and Shalom had three minor children: 17-year-old 

Shlomo, 14-year-old Avigayil, and 10-year-old Batsheva.

Shalom testified he has been a licensed attorney since 

1995. He worked “somewhere between 15 and 20 hours” per 

week for the prior three years and charged clients between $100 

and $350 per hour. In addition, Shalom worked a minimum of 

38 hours per week as a rabbi at the Pacific Jewish Center. The 

Pacific Jewish Center paid Shalom a starting salary of $4,000 per 

month (increased to $5,000 per month in November 2017), his 

housing cost of $4,800 per month (paid directly to the landlord), 

and $5,000 per year for leading services during the high holidays.

Shalom testified that during the marriage, Barbra’s 

grandfather Mark Kornwasser paid for Shalom and Barbra’s 

household expenses, their children’s private school tuition, food, 

clothes, vacation, and health-related expenses. After 

Kornwasser’s death in approximately 2010, Moskovits “agreed to 
6

pay everything the grandparents paid.”4 During the marriage,

Shalom’s law practice “was split between doing work for Barbra’s 

family and working in the mortgage banking industry.” After 

Barbra and Shalom separated, Shalom’s work with Kornwasser’s 

real estate business “dwindled drastically” and “was gone within 

a year or so after separation.”

Barbra testified that during the marriage she did not work 

outside the home except for some work as a doula because she 

was the primary caregiver for her and Shalom’s seven children.

At the time of trial, Shlomo primarily resided with Shalom and 

visited Barbra twice a week for four hours each visit. Avigayil

and Batsheva primarily resided with Barbra.

Moskovits testified that prior to Barbra and Shalom’s 

separation he did not pay for their expenses except for the 

children’s private school tuition and summer camp fees. After 

Barbra and Shalom’s separation, Shalom paid $1,500 per month 

in child support from 2015 to July 2017. Moskovits testified he 

“had to step in and pay” Barbra’s expenses because “Shalom 

wasn’t paying any of the bills.” Barbra relied on Moskovits to pay 

her monthly expenses, which averaged $17,825 per month. 

Moskovits paid Avigayil’s and Batsheva’s tuition directly to their

school. Shalom paid for Shlomo’s private school tuition for the 

prior two years because Moskovits did not approve of the school.

Barbra testified Moskovits did not give her a set amount of 

money. Moskovits initially made payments directly to vendors

and service providers. Later, she “would present him with [an] 

Excel spreadsheet, and he would look at all the expenses and give 

4 Moskovits denied this conversation occurred. Further, 

Moskovits testified Kornwasser only paid for the children’s 

private school tuition prior to Kornwasser’s death in 2011.
7

[her] a check for that month’s expenses.” Moskovits similarly 

testified he initially wrote checks directly to the vendors. 

Beginning in February 2013, Moskovits wrote checks to Barbra to 

ensure she had enough money to cover her and the children’s 

expenses for the next month. Once a month, Moskovits and 

Barbra would review Barbra’s credit card bills and bank 

statements on a spreadsheet, and Moskovits would pay the total 

of the bills. Moskovits recorded his payments to Barbra, her 

attorneys, and vendors on spreadsheets, which were admitted 

into evidence. The spreadsheets included the dates and amounts 

of the payments and payees covering the period from 

November 2011 to February 2019.

Barbra and Moskovits testified Moskovits’s payments to 

her and others on her behalf were loans. Barbra signed

promissory notes prepared by Moskovits reflecting his payments 

to her from February 4, 2014 to February 26, 2019, which totaled

more than $7 million. The last four promissory notes executed on 

August 30, 2018 reflected the accrued amount Barbra owed 

Moskovits. The promissory notes either stated the loan was 

without interest or did not state an interest rate. Further, the 

promissory notes did not have a due date or were due within 

30 days after Moskovits’ written notice of demand to Barbra. 

Moskovits testified Barbra repaid him $50,000 or $100,000 from 

the proceeds Barbra received from the sale of her and Shalom’s 

house. Moskovits expected Barbra to repay the promissory notes

from the child support arrears and Barbra’s wages once she could 

work after her minor children became adults. Barbra testified 

she intended to pay Moskovitz back by going to work when her 

youngest child Batsheva entered high school.

Tracy Katz, Barbra’s accounting expert, testified she 

prepared cash flow analysis and community property balance 
8

sheet analysis to calculate the appropriate amount of child and 

spousal support that should have been paid during the period 

from 2013 through 2018. Katz calculated Shalom’s average cash 

flow was $244,870 per year ($20,406 per month). Katz did not 

prepare a cash flow analysis for Barbra because Barbra was not 

employed.

Ron J. Anfuso, Shalom’s accounting expert, testified he 

prepared cash flow reports for Shalom and Barbra based on 

information for the two-year period ending December 31, 2018. 

Anfuso calculated Shalom’s income from his law practice and 

employment with Pacific Jewish Center was $9,651 per month. 

Anfuso imputed income of $3,389 per month to Barbra based on 

“an average of three different job categories as opined by 

[Barbra’s] vocational evaluator,” which “were social service case 

work at approximately $40,000 a year, program coordinator at 

approximately [$]41,000 and licensed vocation[al] nurse at 

[$]41,000.” Further, Anfuso attributed income of $208,612 per 

month to Barbra from the funds she received from Moskovits,

which was approximately $5 million over the two-year period.

Anfuso opined Moskovits’s payments should be attributed as 

income to Barbra because they were recurring gifts under Alter. 

But Anfuso admitted Moskovits’s monthly payments varied 

“based on the expense reports provided by [Barbra] to her father.” 

Based on these income calculations, Anfuso calculated Barbra 

owed Shalom $37,749 per month in child support for the three 

children who were still minors. 

Towards the end of trial, Shalom’s attorney indicated he 

intended to call Susan Miller, who had conducted a vocational
9

examination of Barbra pursuant to a court order.

5

 Shalom’s 

attorney asked for a trial continuance because Miller was in 

San Francisco. Shalom’s attorney admitted he did not subpoena 

Miller, but he had paid her witness fees. Subsequently, Shalom’s 

attorney informed the court Miller was at a conference. The

family court denied the request for a trial continuance, stating,

“[T]o delay a trial because she is at a conference isn’t good cause.” 

To avoid delay of the trial, Barbra’s attorney offered to stipulate 

to the admission of Miller’s report and to waive the right to crossexamine Miller. Shalom’s attorney responded, “I’ll accept that.” 

The family court admitted Miller’s vocational examination report, 

noting the parties stipulated to its admission.

In the vocational examination report, Miller stated, 

“[Barbra] will need to prepare for work before applying for paid 

positions. Specifically, she will need to become computer 

proficient using the programs contained in Microsoft Office. [¶]

In addition, [Barbra] needs to gain current relevant experience. 

She could volunteer three to four days a week, for three to four 

hours per day, over a six-month period at a Jewish nonprofit 

organization or an organization that helps children with cancer. 

[¶] After becoming computer proficient and gaining focused, 

relevant, experience as a volunteer, she will be qualified to work 

as a intake or social service aide, or program coordinator, 

particularly in a Jewish nonprofit agency or an organization that 

helps children with cancer. [¶] . . . [¶] My research indicates 

that the projected 2019 beginning annual earnings of 

5 On January 7, 2019 the family court granted Shalom’s 

request for a vocational examination of Barbra and ordered that 

Barbra “shall bear the costs of her vocational examination and 

the associated written report.”
10

intake/social service case workers in Los Angeles are 

approximately $40,000. Program Coordinators at nonprofit 

organizations in Los Angeles are projected to have beginning 

annual earnings in 2019 of approximately $41,000. [¶] For the 

longer term future, [Barbra] may be interested in becoming a 

licensed vocational nurse. In this position, she could work as a 

labor and delivery, or post partum nurse.”

D. Shalom’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees

On May 13, 2019 Shalom filed a posttrial brief requesting

attorneys’ fees and costs.6 Shalom contended he was entitled to 

an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under section 2030 because 

there was a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel and 

Barbra was able to pay for her and Shalom’s legal representation.

Shalom requested the family court order Barbra to pay for 

attorneys’ fees and costs Shalom incurred during the pendency of 

the dissolution action, including $49,000 to his prior attorney 

Stephen Landau; $620,000 to his prior law firm Shuchman and 

Kaplan; $144,454 to appellate attorney Ed Horowitz; $11,500 in 

costs awarded to Barbra in the prior appeal; $439,400 to his 

current attorney Melvin Teitelbaum for attorneys’ fees incurred 

through March 2018, plus $152,587 in trial preparation costs

Teitelbaum had incurred since that time; $100,000 to reimburse

Shalom for payments he made to his attorneys and prior forensic 

accounting expert; and $24,857 to pay for the judgment obtained 

against Shalom by his prior accounting expert, White 

Zuckerman. Shalom requested the court also award him 

6 Barbra separately filed a brief requesting $800,000 as 

sanctions against Shalom under section 271 for Shalom’s and his 

attorney’s litigation misconduct.
11

$900,000, the amount Barbra paid to her divorce advisor Mark 

Rosenberg, as a sanction under section 271 because “the sole 

objective of the services” was to litigate and not settle.

In support of his motion, Shalom submitted a four-page 

billing statement from Teitelbaum for the period from 

March 2018 to May 2019. The billing statement generally 

summarized blocks of hours (without time frames), for example, 

claiming 18 hours of work for a total of $9,000 with the entry: 

“Write Trial Brief, Supplmntl Trial Brief and Statement of 

Positions and review PET Trial brief and Statement of Positions.” 

Another entry listed 13 dates and requested payment for “4 hr 

per appearance . . . @ 500 per hour . . . .” The billing statement

listed the amount owed to Anfuso ($17,575.50) and for reporter 

fees ($1,912), although no further documentation was provided.

Teitelbaum also submitted a two-page declaration that stated his 

hourly rate was $400 per hour, with a $500 rate for trial 

preparation and trial. Teitelbaum explained that the time he 

incurred (as reflected in the four-page summary) included “time 

expended to combat the deceptive enforcement [Barbra] filed with 

[the Los Angeles County Child Support Services Department] 

claiming [Shalom] was in violation of an existing support order.”

Teitelbaum also declared he billed for time expended to obtain 

entry of an order nunc pro tunc to reverse a prior order requiring 

the parties exchange exhibits by a certain date. Teitelbaum did 

not provide any additional explanation of his four-page billing 

record or the attorneys’ fees he claimed were incurred by other 

attorneys. Shalom submitted a declaration setting forth the 

amount of attorneys’ fees he owed his prior attorneys, without

further information or explanation of the work performed.
12

E. The Ruling and Judgment

On June 10, 2019 the family court issued a 90-page ruling 

addressing the issues raised by Barbra and Shalom at trial. The 

court observed,“Despite this limited estate and parties with little 

or no employment income ([Barbra]) and moderate income 

([Shalom]), the parties incurred almost $4,000,000 in attorney 

fees.” The court added, “[M]uch of this challenge results from the 

clear and very present anger and resentment [Shalom] bears 

towards [Barbra’s] parents and now deceased grandparents.”

The family court considered the promissory notes and 

Barbra’s and Moskovits’s testimony that Moskovits’s payments to 

Barbra and vendors were loans. The court found Moskovits’s 

payments were not loans, but instead were “gifts occurring at 

varying amounts tied to [Barbra’s] and the minor children’s 

needs and expenses.” Further, Moskovits’s payments were 

“irregular in both amount and frequency of payment.”7 The court 

concluded Moskovits’s payments were not income attributable to 

Barbra for the calculation of child support under section 4058.

Further, the court denied Shalom’s request to impute 

income to Barbra to calculate child support. The court found

Shalom had not met his burden of proof to present evidence that

Barbra had the ability and opportunity to work. But the court 

ordered Barbra to provide Shalom “with a written list of at least 

ten different places [Barbra] has applied for employment every 

month.” The court ordered Shalom to pay Barbra $237,866 in 

retroactive child support covering the period from February 1, 

7 The court also apportioned the community property assets,

which are not at issue in this appeal.
13

2013 to June 30, 2019 and $3,783 per month in child support 

beginning January 1, 2019.

Although the family court did not attribute Moskovits’s 

monetary gifts to Barbra as income, the court “considered the 

impact and access to those funds” in determining spousal 

support. The court ordered Shalom to pay Barbra $1,000 per 

month in spousal support, retroactive to February 1, 2013, until 

the death of either Barbra or Shalom, Barbra’s remarriage, or 

further order of the court. The court also ordered Shalom to pay 

Barbra $77,000 in spousal support arrears for the period from 

February 1, 2013 to June 30, 2019.

The family court denied Shalom’s request for attorneys’ 

fees and costs. The court observed that although Moskovits’s 

payments to or on behalf of Barbra were not income for purposes 

of child and spousal support, “[t]he Court can consider the 

payment of attorney fees by a third party in balancing the 

evidence in a request for attorney fees.” But the court explained

Shalom did not meet the standard set forth in In re Marriage of 

Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860 (Keech) and California Rules of 

Court, rule 5.427. Specifically, Shalom provided “no evidence 

regarding the basis or reasonableness of the legal fees” he 

requested for Landau, Shuchman and Kaplan, and Horwitz.

Further, the court noted Teitelbaum’s billing statement from 

March 2018 to March 2019 was “very summary in nature and

does not describe the legal work done other than in bulk hour 

descriptions.” In addition, the court found the billing statement 

indicated Teitelbaum’s total attorneys’ fees were $126,500, yet 

Teitelbaum in his declaration sought $565,900 in attorneys’ fees.

The court rejected Shalom’s request that Barbra pay the $24,857

judgment White Zuckerman obtained against Shalom because 
14

Shalom provided no legal authority for the court to order Barbra 

to satisfy a judgment obtained by a third party against Shalom.

The court added that at trial, Shalom “produced little, if 

any, evidence to support his requests and demands. The evidence 

shows that he did not produce necessary current financial 

information and his testimony was in many instances not 

credible.” Further, Shalom “incurred attorney fees well in excess 

of the relief requested.” The court also observed that Shalom, 

who himself was a practicing lawyer, “did much to attempt to 

frustrate this trial.” The court explained, “He did not fully 

cooperate with discovery, never disclosed his 2017 and 2018 

business income and answered most substantive financial 

question[s] in trial with the repeated answers of ‘I don't know’ 

and ‘I don’t recall.’ [Shalom’s] testimony was not credible and 

was punctuated with him uttering curses during a break in the 

trial to [Barbra’s] father wishing him a horrible death. [Shalom] 

declared to the court in pleadings and in trial setting conferences 

that he needed the court time and resources to call no less than 

forty witnesses. Other than [Barbra], he called three to testify. 

He presented only 4 exhibits. Many of the claims that he made

and requests for relief were not supported by any evidence or 

legal authorities.”

The court ordered Shalom to pay Barbra $50,000 in 

attorneys’ fees as sanctions pursuant to section 271.8

Shalom timely appealed.

8 Shalom does not appeal the $50,000 sanctions award under 

section 271.
15

DISCUSSION

A. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Awarding Child and Spousal Support to Barbra

1. Law governing child and spousal support

Statutory guidelines govern the determination of 

temporary and permanent child support. (See § 4050 et seq.) 

“‘The guideline amount of child support, which is calculated by 

applying a mathematical formula to the relative incomes of the 

parents, is presumptively correct. (See §§ 4055, 4057, subd. (a); 

[citation].) “The court may depart from the guideline only in 

‘special circumstances’ set forth in the child support statutes. 

(§ 4052).”’” (Anna M. v. Jeffrey E. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 439, 446 

(Anna M.); accord, In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 

92 Cal.App.4th 269, 284.) “‘This mandatory formula “takes into 

account both parents’ ‘net monthly disposable income’ (§ 4055, 

subds. (a), (b)), which is determined based upon the parents’ 

‘annual gross income’ (§ 4058). Section 4058, subdivision (a), 

defines ‘annual gross income’ as ‘income from whatever source 

derived,’ and lists more than a dozen possible income sources to 

be considered as part of annual gross income.”’” (Anna M., at 

p. 446; accord, In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 

1221, 1237 [“Parental income is ‘broadly defined’ for the purpose 

of calculating child support under the statutory guidelines.”].) 

“California law provides for two distinct types of spousal 

support—temporary and permanent. ‘Awards of temporary 

spousal support do not serve the same purpose, nor are they 

governed by the same procedures, as awards for permanent 

spousal support. “Pendente lite allowances and permanent 

allowances differ fundamentally in nature [citation] and function 

[citation].”’ [Citation.] Whereas the latter is intended to make an 
16

equitable apportionment between the parties, the former is 

meant to allow a spouse to continue to live in the manner to 

which he or she is accustomed during the time the dissolution 

action is pending.” (In re Marriage of Mendoza & Cuellar (2017) 

14 Cal.App.5th 939, 942-943; accord, In re Marriage of Brewster 

& Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481, 513.) 

Under section 3600, a family court may order temporary 

spousal support in “any amount that is necessary for the support 

of the other spouse,” as long as the amount is consistent with 

section 4320 (listing circumstances to consider in ordering 

support) and section 4325 (limiting spousal support to a spouse 

convicted of domestic violence). “The purpose of pendente lite 

spousal support is to maintain the parties’ standards of living in 

as close as possible to the preseparation status quo, pending trial. 

In fixing temporary spousal support, trial courts are not 

restricted by any set of statutory guidelines.” (In re Marriage of 

Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 103-104 (Ciprari); accord, In re 

Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 513-514.) 

“‘Permanent spousal support “is governed by the statutory 

scheme set forth in sections 4300 through 4360. Section 4330 

authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support 

in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines 

is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living 

established during the marriage, taking into consideration the 

circumstances set forth in section 4320.” [Citations.] The 

statutory factors include the supporting spouse’s ability to pay; 

the needs of each spouse based on the marital standard of living; 

the obligations and assets of each spouse, including separate 

property; and any other factors pertinent to a just and equitable 
17

award.’” (Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 108; accord, In re 

Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442.)

2. Standard of review

We review a child support award for an abuse of discretion. 

(In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 529; In re 

Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1038.) We 

likewise review temporary and permanent spousal support orders 

for an abuse of discretion. (See Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 104 [explaining as to temporary spousal support, “[t]he amount 

of the award lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, and is 

reversible only on a showing of clear abuse of discretion”]; In re 

Marriage of Lim & Carrasco (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 768, 773

[same]; see also Ciprari, at p. 108 [“‘“In making its [permanent] 

spousal support order, the trial court possesses broad discretion 

so as to fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by 

section 4320, with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice 

for the parties in the case before it.”’”]; In re Marriage of Blazer, 

supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1442-1443 [same].) 

“Under this standard, we consider only ‘whether the court’s 

factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion.’ 

[Citation.] ‘We do not substitute our own judgment for that of the 

trial court, but confine ourselves to determining whether any 

judge could have reasonably made the challenged order.’” (In re 

Marriage of Macilwaine (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 514, 527; accord, 

In re Marriage of Hein, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 529; In re 

Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532 [a support 

order “‘will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence 

viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could 

reasonably make the order made’”].) “On review for substantial 
18

evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every 

reasonable inference.” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 

53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.)

3. The family court did not abuse its discretion 

Shalom contends Moskovits’s monthly payments to Barbra 

should be deemed income to her in determining child and spousal 

support, relying on Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 718.9 In Alter, 

the father received $6,000 every month from his mother, 

including $3,000 to pay for rent, which the family court treated 

as nontaxable income to the father under section 4058 in 

calculating child support. (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 730, 737.) The Court of Appeal concluded the payments were 

gifts rather than loans because the father’s mother had given 

similar monetary gifts to the couple and their children during the 

marriage and there was no evidence the father had ever repaid 

any money to his mother. (Id. at p. 731.) The court held it was 

not an abuse its discretion to consider the cash gifts as income to 

the father for purposes of child support because “the gifts bear a 

reasonable relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a 

recurrent monetary benefit.” (Id. at pp. 736-737.) The court 

added, “But while regular gifts of cash may fairly represent 

income, that might not always be so. Therefore, the question of 

9 The parties do not challenge whether Alter was correctly 

decided, and we do not reach that question. But as we observed 

in Rubanowitz I, Alter is “in some ways inconsistent with 

economic reality” because “the common understanding of the 

term ‘income’ does not usually include gifts, whether recurrent in 

nature or not.” (Rubanowitz I, supra, B257782.)
19

whether gifts should be considered income for purposes of the 

child support calculation is one that must be left to the discretion 

of the trial court.” (Id. at p. 737.) 

Substantial evidence supports the family court’s finding

that Moskovits’s payments to Barbra and to third parties on her 

behalf were gifts that “were irregular in both amount and 

frequency of payment” and the varying amounts were “tied to 

[Barbra’s] and the minor children’s needs and expenses.” 

Moskovits’s spreadsheets, which were admitted at trial, show 

Moskovits made payments to Barbra, her attorneys, and other 

service providers in varying amounts from November 2011 to 

February 2019. Shalom’s accounting expert Anfuso admitted 

Moskovits’s monthly payments varied “based on the expense 

reports provided by [Barbra] to her father.” On appeal, Shalom 

asserts Moskovits made regular monthly payments to Barbra, 

but he does not point to any specific payments or other evidence 

to support this contention. On this record, the family court did 

not abuse its discretion in determining Moskovits’s payments 

were not income attributable to Barbra for purposes of child and 

spousal support. (See County of San Diego v. P.B. (2020) 

55 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1073, 1076 [trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ruling payments made by father’s parents to his 

attorneys was not “recurring and regular monetary gifts that 

may be treated as income under section 4058”]; Anna M., supra, 

7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 444, 454 [trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding monthly payments by mother’s friend to 

her or to third parties on her behalf were not income for child 

support where there was no familial relationship between mother 

and her friend and no evidence showing whether the cash gifts 

varied and for how long mother’s friend had supported her]; In re 

Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1314-1315 
20

[trial court did not err in determining the recurring annual taxfree gifts to father from his parents were income, but not the cash 

advances that were irregular and had ceased].) 

B. Shalom Forfeited His Challenge to the Family Court’s 

Denial of a Trial Continuance 

Shalom contends he was prejudiced by the family court’s 

denial of his request to continue the trial to allow him to call 

Miller, Barbra’s vocational evaluator, because he was unable to 

show Barbra’s ability to earn an income. Shalom forfeited his 

claim of error because his attorney stipulated to the admission of 

Miller’s vocational examination report in lieu of her trial 

testimony. (See People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 

[“‘[W]hen a party enters into a voluntary stipulation, he generally 

is precluded from taking an appeal claiming defects in the 

stipulation.’”]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 623 

[same].) Further, Anfuso relied on Miller’s vocational 

examination report in imputing income to Barbra, explaining at 

trial that he had imputed $3,389 per month in income to Barbra 

based on “an average of three different job categories as opined 

by [Barbra’s] vocational evaluator” which “were social service 

case work at approximately $40,000 a year, program coordinator 

at approximately [$]41,000 and licensed vocation nurse at 

[$]41,000.” Shalom cannot stipulate to the admission of Miller’s 

report in lieu of her testimony, rely on the report at trial, then 

claim error only after the family court rules against him.

C. Shalom Forfeited His Challenge to the Family Court’s 

Denial of His Request for Attorneys’ Fees

Sections 2030 and 2032 govern an award of attorneys’ fees

and costs in a dissolution action. Under section 2030, 
21

subdivision (a)(1), the family court “shall ensure” all parties have 

access to legal representation. The court may award attorneys’ 

fees “where the making of the award, and the amount of the 

award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances 

of the respective parties.” (§ 2032, subd. (a).) “When a request 

for attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall make 

findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 

this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access 

to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay 

for legal representation of both parties. If the findings 

demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall 

make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 2030, 

subd. (a)(2); accord, Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 112 [“an 

award of ‘reasonably necessary’ fees and costs” to a party is 

mandatory if the trial court find there is a disparity in access to 

funds to retain counsel and the other party can pay both parties’ 

legal representation]; In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 

27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1052-1053; In re Marriage of Bendetti

(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 863, 868 [“In deciding whether to award 

attorney fees, the trial court considers the parties’ respective 

needs and incomes, including their assets and liabilities.”].) 

“The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney’s 

fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the 

party’s own attorney’s fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order 

that the other party pay part or all of the fees and costs 

requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to 

consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the 

litigation equitably between the parties under their relative 

circumstances.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).)

We review an order granting or denying attorneys’ fees and 

costs for an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Bendetti, 
22

supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 868 [“A motion for attorney fees is 

left to the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed 

on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.”]; In re Marriage of 

Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626, 662 [under §§ 2030 & 2032, “a

trial court has wide discretion in fashioning an award of attorney 

fees in marital proceedings”]; In re Marriage of Keech, supra, 

75 Cal.App.4th at p. 866.) “‘“[T]he trial court’s order will be

overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most 

favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make 

the order made.”’” (Bendetti, at pp. 868-869, quoting In re 

Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762, 769; accord, Keech, at 

p. 866.) The party challenging the order on attorneys’ fees has 

the burden of showing the family court abused its discretion. 

(Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 644.) 

On appeal, Shalom contends the family court abused its 

discretion in failing to consider the payments made by Moskovits 

to Barbra with respect to Shalom’s request for attorneys’ fees and 

costs. But in ruling on Shalom’s request, the court acknowledged 

it could consider Moskovits’s payments of Barbra’s attorneys’ and 

expert fees “in balancing the evidence in a request for attorney 

fees.” (See In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 534 [trial court had discretion to consider payments made by 

wife’s father to her attorneys “as part of its determination of the 

relative circumstances of the respective parties and their ability 

to maintain or defend the proceedings”]; Kevin Q. v. Lauren W., 

supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 647 [trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in considering wife’s receipt of regular, recurring 

monetary gifts from her father in determining her ability to pay 

her attorneys’ fees].)

Instead, the family court denied Shalom’s request for 

attorneys’ fees and costs because Shalom “produced little, if any, 
23

evidence to support his requests and demands.” The court 

correctly found Shalom “provided no evidence regarding the basis 

or reasonableness of the legal fees requested” for Landau, 

Shuchman and Kaplan, and Horwitz because Shalom did not 

provide any attorney declarations or billing statements from 

these attorneys. As to Teitelbaum’s four-page billing record for 

the period from March 2018 to March 2019, the court found the 

statement was “very summary in nature and does not describe 

the legal work done other than in bulk hour descriptions.” On 

appeal, Shalom does not argue the family court abused its 

discretion in finding there was insufficient support for Shalom’s 

request for attorneys’ fees and costs. Nor does he point to 

evidence in the record to support his requests for payment of

costs paid to Barbra in the prior appeal; payment for a judgment 

obtained by White Zuckerman; and $900,000 in sanctions against 

Barbra.

10

Shalom therefore has forfeited his challenge to the family 

court’s denial of his request for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363 

[“If a party’s briefs do not provide legal argument and citation to 

authority on each point raised, ‘“the court may treat it as waived, 

and pass it without consideration.”’”]; Ko v. Maxim Healthcare 

Services, Inc. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1147, fn. 3 [“‘Issues not 

raised in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived or 

abandoned.’”].)

10 Teitelbaum also included in his billing statement 

approximately $1,900 in court reporter fees and $17,000 for

Anfuso’s expert witness fees. No documentation was provided for 

any of these charges. 
24

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Barbra is entitled to recover her 

costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.