NO. 07-01-0006 -CV IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L A NOVEM BER 15, 2001

______________________________ ALFRED YOUNG, JR. , APPE LLANT

V. DAVID GUTIERREZ AND GARY ANTHONY, APPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE72 ND DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2000-511,451; HO NORABL E BLAI R CHER RY, JUD GE

_______________________________ Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ. Appellant Alfre d Youn g, Jr., an inm ate proceeding pro se , challenges the trial court’s order

dism iss ing h is personal injury action against appellees David Gutierrez and Gary Anthony. Y

oung contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by dism issing his cl ai m, (2) his claims raise num erous fa cts in sup por t of his claim , (3 ) heade qua tely rendered a paupe r’s af

fidavit in a t imely

m anner, and (4) he is a laym an-at-law and sho uld1 All references herein ar e to the T exas C ivil Practice and Remedies Co de

Annotated (Vernon S upp. 200 1). 2 notbe held to the sam e standards as a licensed law yer. Based on t he rationale expressed he re i n, we a ff i rm.
Yo ung , w hile imprisoned at the Lubbock Count

y Jail, filed suit in Lubbock County alleging eye injuries sustained from cleaning chemicals sprayed in his face by appell ees. After Yo un g f or wa rd ed hi s p et i ti on , t he Di st ri ct Cl er k n ot i fi ed hi m t hat it w as b eing held because itdid not com ply with the rules set out in the Texas Civil Practice and Rem edies Code for failure to include an “affidavit or unsworn declaration not ac co mpanied by certifi ed copy of trust account statem ent required by § 14.006(f).” 1 Young then sent the clerk’s office correspondence containing a letter, a pauper’s affidavit, and an uncertified copyof his trust account s tatement. Ho w eve r, h e did not incl udea s epa rat e af

fida vit identifying other suits in which he had be en involved as required by section 14.004(a)(1) of the Code. Following a general denial, Gutierrez and Anthonyfiled a motion to dismiss pursuantto the Texas

Civil Prac ti ce a nd Rem edie s C odeand theTex as R ulesof C ivil Procedure, w hich was subs equently granted.
We first address Young’s contention that

he shoul d not be held to the stringent stan dards of a licensed attorney. This Court recognizes t hat an inm ate has a constitutional right to access the co urts for the purpose of prese nting thei r complaints. Cruzv. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 3 1 L.Ed.2 d 263 (1972). However, pro se3

litigants are held to the same standards as lice nse d attorney s and m ust com ply with app licab le laws and rules of procedu re. Greenstreet v. H eiskell, 940 S. W .2d 831, 834 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1997), reh’gdenied, 960 S.W.2d 713 (1997). Yo ung ’scon ten tion is therefore overruled. Byhis remaining contentions, appellant contends t he t ria l court abused its discretion by dism iss ing h is claim prematurely because he rendered an adequate paupe r’s aff idav itand his com plaint was factually supported. We disagree. We note that Young does not re fer ence the record in support of his claim as required by Rule 38.1(f) of the TexasRules of Appella te Procedure. However, in the intere stof jus tice, we w ill consider his com plaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; see also Motor Vehicle Bd. of Tex . v. Epiada, 1 S.W.3d 108, 11 1 (Tex . 1999).
In reviewing the dism issal of a claim under chapter 14of the Code, w

e apply the abuse of d isc ret ion s tan dar d. M cC oll um v. Mt. A rarat Baptist Church, 980 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex.App.

– Houst on [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.); see also Hick v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex.App.–W aco 1996, no writ). Abuse of discretion is determined by w hether the court acted w ithoutreference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc. 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). The m ere fact that a trial judg e m ay decide a m atter

within his discretionary authority in a different ma nner than an appellate judgedoes not dem onstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Id . Because th e order dismiss ing Young’ s com plaint did not specify a reason for the dism issal, we m ay4

affirmthe order if any proper ground supports it. Shook v. Gilm ore & Tatge Mf g. Co., Inc. 951 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.App.–Waco 1997, writ denied). Young’s lawsuit is gove rned by the rul es se t out in chapter 14 of the Code

. Thom pson v. Henderson, 927 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex.App.–Hous ton [1st Dist.] 1996 , n o writ). In order

for an inmate to file a complaint he m ust com ply with all the requirements setout in c hap ter

14 o r hissuit

is subject to dismissal. See W illi ams v. Brow n, 33 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Tex.A pp.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Young failed to file a certified copy of his trust account statement as required by section 14.006(f)and als o failed to file an affidavit relating to previous filings under section 14.004 of the Code. Thus, we find that the tr ia l c ou rt di d n ot ab us e i ts di scr et io n i n d is mis si ng You ng ’s l aws uit. Appel lant’s contentions are overruled. Accordingly, the j udgme nt of the trial court is affirmed.

Don H. Rea vis Justice Do not publish.