alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF
TORO VENTURES INC.
FORM 10-Q FOR THE  NINE MONTH PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 2009
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Joseph Arcaro, am the
Chief Executive Officer of Toro Ventures Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Company"). I am delivering this
certificate in connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the  nine month period ended March 31,
2009 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Quarterly Report").

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Quarterly
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



|Date: June 17, 2013                                                                     
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|By: /s/ Joseph Arcaro
        Joseph Arcaro
        Chief Executive Officer and Director
**Exhibit 32.1**

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,asAdopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of SafetyProducts Holdings, Inc. (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended April 1, 2006, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert A. Peterson, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)           TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)           Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

 
| Dated: May 12, 2006 | By:    | /s/ ROBERT A. PETERSON                          |
|--------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
|                     |   | Robert A. Peterson                              |
|                     |   | President, Chief Executive Officer and Director |
|                     |   | (Chief Executive Officer)                       |

 

**A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.**

 

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Paul Scogna, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (West, J.), rendered January 15, 1988, convicting him of criminal sale of *875a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the People failed to disprove the defense of agency beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. The defendant’s initiation of the first drug transaction, his salesmanlike behavior, the long acquaintance between the defendant and his supplier, the absence of any prior relationship between the defendant and the undercover officer, and the defendant’s independent desire to promote the transactions to support his own drug addiction, were all factors sufficient for the jury to reject the agency defense *(see, People v Roche,*45 NY2d 78, *cert denied*439 US 958; *People v Bethea,*73 AD2d 920).

Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental *pro se*brief, are either without merit or unpreserved for appellate review, and we decline to consider the latter in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Brown, J. P., Sullivan, Lawrence and Ritter, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES ex rel. McNEILL v. AVIS, District Judge.

No. 7288.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Dec. 18, 1939.

No counsel on either side.

Before BIGGS, MARIS, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The relator, Thomas M. McNeill, is now imprisoned by detention in _ the United States Penitentiary at Alcatraz, California. He prays leavé to prosecute his application for a writ of mandamus in forma pauperis. We grant such leave, but the prayers of his petition for a writ of mandamus directed to Judge Avis, commanding the latter to furnish the relator without cost with copies of the docket entries, etc. must be denied for the following reasons,

First: This court has jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus only when necessary for the protection of its appellate jurisdiction and strictly in aid of that jurisdiction when it is involved. Section 262 Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 377, 28 U.S.C.A. § 377; ‘United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 35 S.Ct. 16, 59 L.Ed. 129; In re Eastman Kodak Co., 3 Cir., 48 F.2d 125. In the present case the relator did not take an appeal from his conviction in the District Court of New Jersey and the time for taking an appeal has long since passed. His present application is stated to be in aid of a habeas corpus proceeding which he desires to institute in the District Court for the Northern District of California. The latter proceeding obviously could not involve the appellate jurisdiction of this court.

Second: The District Court has no power in a criminal case to compel the stenographer who took the testimony to furnish either at his own expense or at the expense of the United States a transcript of the testimony to the defendant even though the latter be a poor person entitled to proceed in forma pauperis under the Act of July 20, 1892 as amended 28 U.S.C. Sec. 832, 28 U.S.C.A. § 832; United States ex rel. Estabrook v. Otis, 8 Cir., 18 F.2d 689.

Third: Since the relator did not take an appeal from his conviction in the District Court and the judgment of conviction has become final the provisions *458of the Act of July 20, 1892 as amended, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 832, 28 U.S.C.A. § 832, authorizing criminal actions to be defended by poor persons in forma pauperis are no longer applicable to his case. Accordingly any copies of papers relating to his case which he desires to procure from the Clerk of the District Court for the District of New Jersey must be procured in the ordinary way upon payment of lawful fees.

An order will be entered in accordance with this opinion.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2139 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2139

            To reduce temporarily the duty on Syloboc K-200.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

  Mr. Alexander (for himself and Mr. Corker) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
            To reduce temporarily the duty on Syloboc K-200.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SYLOBOC K-200.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00      Silicon dioxide     2%           No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                        (CAS No. 7631-86-                                                  31/2011.......
                        9) (provided for
                        in subheading
                        2811.22.10)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Clayton APPLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-85-799.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Sept. 21, 1987.

*143Gloyd McCoy, Asst. Appellate Public Defender, Norman, for appellant.

Michael C. Turpén, Atty. Gen., Tomilou Gentry Liddell, Asst. Atty. Gen., William S. Newberry, Jr., Legal Intern, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

The appellant, Clayton Appleton, was charged, tried and convicted in the District Court of Beckham County for the crime of Concealing Stolen Property in Case No. CRF-84-135 and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence under the Nonviolent Intermediate Offender Act, and he appeals.

Briefly stated the facts are that on December 7, 1984, the appellant was arrested in Elk City, Oklahoma after a police officer observed that he was driving a new car that had been stolen from a car dealership in Frederick, Oklahoma on December 6, 1984. The tag number on the car checked to a different vehicle, and the Vehicle Identification Number matched the vehicle taken from Frederick. Also, a pistol stolen from a desk at the car dealership was found hidden in the rear compartment of the car.

Appellant testified that he was surprised when he found out that the car was stolen. He testified that he rode in the car to Elk City with a close friend on December 6, 1984, and that he did not know where his friend had obtained the car. He also stated that when he was arrested he had driven the car to the store while his friend stayed at a house in Elk City. Appellant testified that the car was obviously new, and he admitted that he had a previous felony conviction.

In his sole assignment of error appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the verdict. Specifically, he alleges that the State failed to prove that he had knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. This Court has held that while mere possession of property recently stolen is not alone sufficient proof of such knowledge, that fact supplemented with other facts inconsistent with honest possession creates a question of fact for the jury. *Williams v. State,*704 P.2d 502, 504 (Okl.Cr.1985). Such facts were that appellant allegedly rode in the new car with his close friend for several hours and knew or should have known that it was stolen; the vehicle had a stolen license plate; the vehicle was recovered less than forty-eight (48) hours after it was reported stolen; the appellant was in the car the day it was stolen; and appellant’s explanation is wholly uncorroborated. We are of the opinion that these facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, were sufficient to establish the element of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. *Spuehler v. State,*709 P.2d 202 (Okl.Cr.1985). This assignment of error is without merit.

The judgment is affirmed; however, this case must be remanded for resentencing since a majority of this Court has recently held the Nonviolent Intermediate Offender Act is unconstitutional. *Swart v. State,*720 P.2d 1265 (Okl.Cr.1986).

BRETT, P.J., and PARKS, J., concur.
# C_2006241EN.01000501.xml

| 6.10.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 241/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.10.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 241/5

---

COUNCIL DECISION

COUNCIL DECISION

of 18 September 2006

appointing a member of the Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency

(2006/C 241/05)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular the second and third paragraphs of Article 54 thereof,

Having regard to Article X of the Statutes of the Euratom Supply Agency (1), as last amended by Decision 95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC of 1 January 1995 (2),

1

2

Having regard to the Council Decision of 12 July 2005 appointing the members of the Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency (3),

3

Having regard to the opinion of the Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | A member's seat on the above Committee has fallen vacant following the resignation of Mr Luis A. RICO URIOS, of which the Council was informed on 22 February 2006. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

A member's seat on the above Committee has fallen vacant following the resignation of Mr Luis A. RICO URIOS, of which the Council was informed on 22 February 2006.

| (2) | That vacancy should therefore be filled. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

That vacancy should therefore be filled.

| (3) | The Spanish Government submitted a nomination on 22 February 2006, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Spanish Government submitted a nomination on 22 February 2006,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

Ms Maria Jesús ONEGA COLADAS is hereby appointed a member of the Advisory Committee of the Euratom Supply Agency for the remainder of the Committee's term of office, which ends on 28 March 2007.

Done at Brussels, 18 September 2006

For the Council

The President

J. KORKEAOJA

---

(1)  OJ 27, 6.12.1958, p. 534/58.

1

(2)  OJ L 1, 1.1.1995, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ C 178, 20.7.2005, p. 1.

3

---
#### Elaine Ross, Appellant, v Mobil Oil Corporation et al., Respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol E. Huff, J.), entered June 21, 1990, granting defendant Mobil’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s verified complaint as against it and granting defendant Bismark’s cross-motion to transfer venue from New York County to Suffolk County, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff, a Suffolk resident, slipped and fell in a Mobil gas station in Suffolk County, sustaining personal injuries. She commenced this action against defendants seeking damages for their negligence in creating a dangerous and unsafe condition, to wit, the collection of water leaking from an ice-filled soda tub near the convenience store on the premises.

The court below properly granted Mobil’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the display of its signs and logos at the station was an insufficient basis upon which to impose a duty of care, since the display merely indicated that Mobil’s products were sold at the premises *(Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp.,*139 AD2d 292, *lv dismissed in part and denied in part*73 NY2d 783). Inspection of the premises by Mobil employees on a sporadic basis, for the sole purpose of determining whether oil displays were neatly arranged, waste receptacles emptied, and the toilets maintained, is also an *362insufficient predicate on which to postulate a duty running to the plaintiff. *(Supra.)*

The court, however, did not abuse its discretion in granting Bismark’s cross-motion to transfer venue to Suffolk County, pursuant to CPLR 510 (3). Concur—Milonas, J. P., Ross, Asch, Kassal and Smith, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MIKE MCDOUGELL, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 09-1013 (RMU) : v. : : JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General, : : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION D ISMISSING THE C ASE W ITHOUT P REJUDICE B ASED ON THE P LAINTIFF ’ S F AILURE TO P ROSECUTE The plaintiff commenced this action on May 29, 2009. See generally Compl. The docket sheet indicates that over the follo wing eleven months, the plainti ff took no action to prosecute his claims. Thus, on April 26, 2010, the court ordered the plaintiff to show cause on or before May 10, 2010 why this case should not be di smissed for failure to prosecute. See Minute Order (Apr. 26, 2010). The plaintiff failed to respond to the court’s order. “The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecu te cannot seriously be doubted.” Link v. Wabash R. Co ., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962); see also F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 41(b) (authorizing the involuntary dismissal of actions based on the plaintiff’s failure to pros ecute); LCvR 83.23 (providing that the court may dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute); Automated Datatron, Inc. v. Woodcock , 659 F.2d 1168, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (observi ng that “[i]f district court judges are to discharge their heavy responsibilities effectively, their power to dismiss . . . must be more than theoretical”). This Circuit has cautioned, however, that dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “harsh sanction” reserved for “cases involving egregious conduct by particularly dilatory2 plaintiffs, after ‘less dire alternatives ’ have been tried without success,” Noble v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 71 Fed. Appx. 69, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Trakas v. Quality Brands, Inc. , 759 F.2d 185, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). In accordance with these principles, the court will impose the less dire sanction of dismissal without prejudice based on the plaintiff’s failure to pr osecute this action or respond to the court’s order to show cause. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously i ssued this 19th day of May, 2010.

RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in connection with the filing of Harry & David Holdings, Inc.s (the Company)
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 25, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned officers certifies that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the
periods presented in the Report.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 4, 2010



By:

/s/ STEVEN J. HEYERSteven J. HeyerChairman of the Board and Chief Executive OfficerBy:

/s/ EDWARD F. DUNLAPEdward F. DunlapChief Financial Officer
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      Exhibit 23

                         Independent Auditors' Consent

The Board of Directors
Central Parking Corporation:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
33-98118) on Form S-8 of Central Parking Corporation of our report dated July
2, 1999, with respect to the statements of net assets of Central Parking
Corporation's Employee Stock Purchase Plan as of March 31, 1998 and 1999, and
the related statements of changes in net assets for the three year period ended
March 31, 1999, which report appears in the Form 10-K/A of Central Parking
Corporation.


/s/ KPMG LLP


Nashville, Tennessee
July 27, 1999
Exhibit 32.1

Residential Capital, LLC

Certification of Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial
Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Residential Capital, LLC (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the
undersigned officers of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                    
|--------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                    
|/S/    THOMAS F. MARANO                                             
|Thomas F. Marano Chairman and Chief Executive Officer August 7, 2009



|                                                     
|-----------------------------------------------------
|                                                     
|/S/    JAMES N.
YOUNG                                
|James N. Young Chief Financial Officer August 7, 2009
[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________
No. 23

- 10454

Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________
SHERLYN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus U.S. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,

Defendant

- Appellee.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:22

- cv

- 00036

- CLM

____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-10454 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/26/2024 Page: 1 of 32 Opinion of the Court 23

- 10454

Before R OSENBAUM , G RANT , and A NDERSON , Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Sher ly n Johnson , in a counseled complaint, sued the Secretary of the Army, alleging race and gender discrimination and unlawful retaliation. The district court concluded that it lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction and dismissed her suit without prejudice

. Johnson now challenges that conclusion on appeal. We affirm. Johnson’s third amended complaint includes two counts: (1) “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Discrimination”; and (2) “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Retaliation.” The district court dismissed her complaint for lack of jurisdiction , reasoning that the federal government has not waived its sovereign immunity for § 1981 claims. On appeal, Johnson argues that even though her “chosen language highlighted 42 U.S.C. § 1981, t he basis and crux of her argument pertained to violations of [Title VII]”

— claims for which the United States has waived its immunity. To support that
contention , she points to other parts of the complaint that alternatively mention Title VII and the Feder al Torts Claims Act as bases for the court’s jurisdiction. Although Johnson may have mentioned Title VII in her complaint, she did not bring any Title VII claims against the Secretary. Instead, she chose to sue under § 1981. But w e have long held that “t he United States has not waived its immunity to suit under” § 1981. United States v. Timmons , 672 F.2d 1373, 1380 USCA11 Case: 23-10454 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/26/2024 Page: 2 of 323

- 10454 Opinion of the Court 3

(11th Cir. 1982). That section “ does not provide a cause of action for discrimination under color of federal law.” Lee v. Hughes , 145 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998). Because Johnson’s only claims against the Secretary were brought under § 1981, the district court properly concluded that it lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we AFFIRM

. USCA11 Case: 23-10454 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/26/2024 Page: 3 of 3