This version includes a n err ata dated 19Apr00 - e UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR VE TER AN S CL AI M S

N O
. 97-676
I N TH E M AT TER OF THE F EE A G RE EM EN T O F K EN NE TH M. C ARPENTER
.

On Appellant' s Motion for Reconsider ation
(De cided Ma

rch 13, 2000 )

Michae l E. W

ildhaber, of

Was hin g ton , D .C. , w a s o n th e br ie f f or the a pp e lla nt. John H. Thompson , A c tin g Ge ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Assistant Gener al Counsel; and R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel, wer e on the br ief for the appe llee.
Be fore NEB EKER, Chief Judge , and HOL DAWAY and IVERS, Judges

. HOL DAWAY, Judge : The appellant, Kenne th M. Carpente r, Esquire, appea ls the Fe bruar y 1997 decision of the Boa

rd of Veter ans' Appea ls (B VA or Boa rd) which deter

mined that he was not

e l i g i b l e t o c h ar g e a

f e e f o r s e r v i c e b e f o r e t h e S e c r e t ar

y an d t h e B o ar d o n b e h a l f o f v e t e r anO n z i e L. Wil kins, J r. On Oc tober 15, 1999, the Court issued a single -judg e memora

ndum decision aff

irming the dec ision of the Boa

rd, and the appellant f

iled a timely

motion for rec onsiderat i o n o r, in the alternative, a pane l decision. The Court has de termined that the instant dec ision will clar ify the law in the area of attorney fee ag ree ments and that a decision by a pane l of the Court is appropriate. See Frankel v . Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 2 3 , 25-26 (1990) . For that rea son, the appe llant's motion for a pa ne l de c isi on

is g ra nte d. Th e Cou

rt ha s juri sd ic tio n o f t he c a se un de r 3 8 U .S. C. §§ 5904(c) (2), 7252( a), 7263( d). F or the following rea sons, the Court will affirm the de cision of the Boa rd.

I. F AC TS2

I n Marc h 1990, the veteran de signated Mr. Carpe nter to be his re prese ntative bef ore V A. The veter an filed a claim for a 100% di sability rating for post-traumatic st ress disorder (P TSD). At that time, the veter an was rate d 30% disabled for a dy sthy mic disorder, 10% disabled for residuals of a la c e ratio n o f his le ft fe mor a l art e ry , and 10 % dis a ble d fo r idi op a thi c c lub bin g of the fi ng e rs on his le ft ha nd . H e a lso ha d n on c omp e ns a ble ratin g s fo r se ve ra l oth e r c on dit ion s. Hi s c omb ine d d isa bil ity

ratin g wa s 4 0% . I n Apr il 19 91 , a VAre g ion a l of

fi c e (V AR O) inc re a se d th e ve te ra n' s d isa bil ity rating for his dy sthy

mic disorder with PTSD to 40% , which resulted in a combined rating of 50%. Th e ve te ra

n fi le d a No tic e of Di sa g re e me nt and , a t a VAhe ari ng , r a ise d th e iss ue of e nti tle me nt t o a total disability rating based on individual unemploy ability (TDI U). A June 1991 decision by a VA he ari ngof

fi c e r d e nie d e nti tle me nt t o a n in c reased disa

bil ity ratin g fo r t

he ve te ra n' s p sy c hiatr ic dis or de r, bu t di d n ot a dd

re ss h is e nti tle me nt t o T DI U. Th e ve te ra

n f ile d a Sub sta nti ve Ap pe a l w ith

re sp e c t to the inc re a se d r a tin g iss ue . A t a he ari ngbe fo re a

me mbe r o f t

he B VA , th e ve te ra

n a g a in clea rly expressed his belief that he was e ntitled to TDI U. I n April 1992, the Board issued a decision rema nding the veter an' s case for the a djudication of his c la im f

or TD I U a nd fo r c on sid e ratio n o f w he the r p oly su bs tanc e a bu se wa s a sy

mpt om of his PTSD . A ft e r f

ur the r d e ve lop me nt o f the c a se , the VA RO de nie d h is c la im f or TD I U a nd his c la im for se condar

y service connec tion fo r poly substance a buse. In April 1994, the B VA g rante d the veter an a 70% disability rating for his psy chiatric disability , denied his cla im for sec ondary service

connec tion of poly substance a buse, and r emande d his c l ai m fo r TDI U to the VARO for

rea djudication in light of the 70% disability rating awa

rded by the B oard. I n J une 1994, the ve tera

n enter ed into a fee ag ree ment with the appellant f or re prese ntation befor e this Court and for a ny repr esentation before the B VA and V A that may result from a r emand

or de r i ssu e d b y

thi s Co ur t. T he ve te ra

n, thro ug h th e a

pp e lla nt, fi le d a No tic e of

Ap pe a l w iththi s Court challeng ing the Boa rd' s denial of se condar

y service connec tion for poly substance a buse and of a disability

rating in excess of 70% for the veter an's p s y ch iatric c ondition. The vetera n then moved for a

stay of proc eeding s befor e this Court until the VARO de termined whe ther the ve tera n
w a s e n t i t l e d

t o T D IU

. T h e C o u rtg r an t e d t h e s t ay. Subsequently , the VA Of

fice of Ge nera l Counsel sent the appellant a letter stating , inter alia, that it had r e c e iv e d h is Ju n e 1 9 9 4 f e e a g r e e me n t, b u t b e c a

u s e th e B V A h a d n o t is s u e d a final3

decision re g ardingthe TDIU claim, he w as not elig ible to char g e a f ee f or services provide d befor e VAon that is su e . T he a

pp e lla nt res po nd ed th a t he be lie ve d th a t th e TD I U i ssu e wa s in e xtri c a bly intertwined with the iss ue of an increase d rating for the veter an' s psy chiatric condition and there fore , that he wa s entitled to charg e a f ee f or ser vices re lating to the T DIU issue. I n October 1995, the VARO g rante d the appellant' s claim for TDIU, eff ective April 1, 1991. I n April 1996, the VA O ffice of Ge nera l Counsel requested that the Boa rd re view the a

ppell an t 's elig ibilit y to char g e a f

ee f or re prese nting the ve tera n wi t h re s p ect to the TD I U claim. In J anuar y 19 97 , th e Court

iss ue d a n o rd e r w ith dr awi ngthe iss ue s o f a n in creased

e va luatio n f

or dy sth y mic disorder w ith PTS D and of entitlement to a TDI

U. The Court late r g rante d the par ties' joint mot ion for a rema nd of the issue of se condar y service connec tion for poly substance a buse. T h e B o ar d , r e ly

in g o n th is Co u rt' s d e c is ion in In the Matter of the Fe e Agree ment of Leventhal , 9 Ve t.A

pp
. 38 7 (1 99 6) , de te rm ine d that the TD I U c la im wa s a se pa rate and dis tin c t c la im from the c laim for incr ea s e d i s ab i l ity compensation for the vete ran' s psy chiatric condition. The Boa rd found that it had n o t i s sued a f inal decision on the TDI U issue and, ther efor e, that the

a pp e lla nt w a s n ot e nti tle d to c ha rg e a fe e fo r r e pr e se nti ngthe ve te ra n o n th a t c la im.

II. AN AL YSI S This Court has held that while an attorney may repr esent a veter an before VA or the B oard prior to a f

inal BV A dec ision in the case, t he attorney may not char g e a fee for the se rvice s provided. Se e In th e Mat terof t

he Fe e Ag

re e me nt o f Sm ith , 4 Vet.App. 487, 490 ( 1993), vacate d on other grounds sub nom. In re W ick, 4 0 F .3 d 3 67 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 4) ; s e e a lso 3 8 U. S

. C. § 5904(c)( 1) (prohibiting an at t o rney

or ag ent from c harg ing a fee for se rvice s rende red in a proce eding befor e VA o r th e Bo ar d p ri o r t o t h e fi rs tfi n al BV A d ec i s i o ni s s u edi nt h e c as e)

. An at t o rn ey m ay ch ar ge a fe e only for a n issue or issues dec ided by the B oard. See I

n the Matter o

f t h e F ee Agreeme nt of Stanley , 10 Ve t.A

pp
. 10 4, 10 8 (1 99 7) (u

ph old ingthe Se c re tary ' s in te rp re ta tio n th a t th e te rm c as e in section 5904 (c )(1) involves only those issues decide d by the B oard) . Fur

thermore , wher e the B oard

rema nds an issue for f

urther de velopment or re adjudication, neither the re mand orde r nor the VA R O's re s ulting dec ision constitut es a f inal decision of the B oard. S e e I n th e M a tt e r o f t h e Fee Agreem ent of Stanley , 9 Vet.App. 203, 206- 08 (1996) ( Stanley I) ; se e als o 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b)4

(1998) ( "A

rema nd is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a final decision of the B oard." ). T h e ap p el l an tar gu es t h at t h e B o ar d 's 1 9 9 4 d en i al o f a 1 0 0 % s ch edu l ar ra t i n g fo r t h e v et er an 's

men t al d i sorder

was a lso a final dec ision deny ing the veter an' s claim for a TDIU. The a

ppellant claims that the two cla ims are insepa rable . Whil e this Court h as re ce n t l y h el d that the issue of entitlement to TDI U lies " inchoate a nd would re m ai n as an underlying issue until a f inal decision on the question of serviceconnec tion is is su ed, " see In the Matter of the Fe e Agree ment of Mason , 13 Vet.App. 79, 87 ( 19 9 9 ) (e mphasis added) , the Court has pre viously held that claims for

an inc re a se d d isa

bil ity ratin g and

TD I U, bo th o f w hic h a

re iss ue s th a t ari se a ft e r s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n is

e s ta b li s h e d , ar e s e p ar a te an d d is ti n c t claims. See Fe e Ag re e me nt o f Le v e nth al, su

pra ; Is e nb ar t

v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t.A

pp . 537 , 5 40 (1 99 5) ; Pa rk e r v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t.A

pp . 1 16 , 1 18 -1 9 ( 19 94 ); Holland

v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 443, 446- 47 (1994). I n this matter, the appellant was seeking (1) an incre ased rating for his mental disability , (2) seconda ry service connec tion f

or poly substance abuse, and (3) TDIU. The Boa rd awa rded the appellant a

70% disability

rating for the me ntal disability and denie d a t o t al schedula r eva luation. The B oard a lso rema

nded to the VARO the i ssue of entitlement to a TDIU. At that time, the issues of entitlement to TDIU and to a 100% schedula r rating wer e sepa

rate and distinct claims. See F ee Agreem ent of Lev enthal, Isenbart, Parke r , and Holland , a ll su pra . There fore , the B oard' s denial of a 100% sc hedular ra t ing w as not inext rica bly intertwined with the TDI U issue and the de nial was fin al an d appea lable to this Court. Se e Ho lla nd , s up ra . On the other

hand, the TD I U issue was

rema nded as a separ ate c laim to the VARO for f urther pr ocee dings, and, as a matter of law, the BV A

rema nd order was not a final BV A decision. Se e Sta nle yI, su pra ; se e als o 38 C.F.R. § 20.1110(b). I t was also not appea lable to this Court. Sm all woo d v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 93, 100 (1997) ( holding that a claim pending befor e VA is not ripe for revie w by

this Court). The appe llant rec og nized that the T D I U c l a i m w a s s t i l l p e n d i n g b e f o r e V A w h e nh e r e qu e s t e d a s t ay o f p r o c e e d i n g s b e f

o r e thi s Court until t he VARO i s s u ed a decision reg ardingthe veter an' s entitlement to TDI U. Ther efor e, "[b]ecause there has neve r bee n a fina l BVAdecision wit h re s p ec t to . . . a TDIU rating. . . , the appellant c ould not charg e a fee for repr esenting the veter an bef ore V A or the B VA on [that issue] ." Fee Agreem ent of Mason , 1 3 V e t.A pp . at 84 ; se e als o 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 5 9 0 4 ( c ) ( 1 )

. T h e aw ar d o f T D IU5

to t he vet e ra n w a s a c c omp lis he d w ith in t he VAno na dv e rs ari a l sy ste m f or a dju dic a tin g c la ims

. Whil e Mr. Car

penter ' s assistance ma

y have be en very helpful t o the veteran, he is prec luded by law from cha rg ing a fee for his ser

vices. See 38 U. S.C. § 5 90 4( c )( 1) ; Fee Agreem ent of Mason and Fee Agreem ent of Leventhal, both supra. There fore , the Court will affirm the de cision of the B oard.

III . C ON CL USI ON After consideration of the pleading s and a r eview of the re cord, the Court holds that the

a pp e lla nt h a s n ot d e mon str a te d th a t th e B VAc omm itt e d e ith e r l e g a l or fa c tua l e rr or

wh ic h w ou ld

war rant re versa l or rema

nd. The de cision of the B oard is AF FI RMED.