MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 193 Docket: Ken

- 16

- 342 Argued: April	12,	2017 Decided: September 12 ,	2017 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J. ,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , and HUMPHREY, JJ. Majority : SAUFLEY,	C.J. ,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD, GORMAN , and	HUMPHREY,	JJ. Dissent : JABAR,	J. ST EPHEN	DOANE

v. DEPARTMENT	OF	HEALTH	AND	HUMAN	SERVICES

SAUFLEY,	C. J. [¶1] The	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 appeals	 from	 a summary	 judgment	 entered	 by	 the	 Superior	 Court	 (Kennebec	 County, Murphy, J. )	 declaring that	 the	 District	 Court

— not	 the	 Department

— has exclusive	original jurisdiction	over the	decision	to	terminate physician Steven Doane’s participation	in,	and	reimbursement	 from, MaineCare and	any	other medical	assistance programs in	Maine

. 1 The	Department	argues	that	the	court erred	in	concluding	that	a	provider ’ s participation in MaineCare constitutes	a

“ license , ” the	 revocation	 of	 which	 invokes	 D istrict	 Court	 jurisdiction. See
4 M.R.S.	 § 152(9)	 (2016) ;	 5	 M.R.S.	 §§ 8002 (5) , 10051 ( 1) (2016)

. We	 agree

1 Because	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 termination	 was	 grounded	 in	 state	 and	 federal	 Medicaid	 and MaineCare	regulations,	and	no	other	programs	have	been	identified	by	the	parties	on	appeal,	we	do not	discuss	further	any	other	medical	assistance	programs.2 that	 jurisdiction	 did	 not	 li e	 in	 the	 District	 Court, and we vacate	 the	 court ’ s judgment.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶2 ]		The following	undisputed	 facts	are	drawn	 from	 th e	record	of the proceedings	in	the	Superior	C ourt	and	the undisputed statements	of	material facts	presented	on	Doane ’ s	motion	for	summary	judgment. See Grant	v.	Foster Wheeler,	LLC ,	2016	ME	85,	¶	2,	140	A.3d	12 42

. Stephen	Doane is	a	physician licensed	 to	 practice	 in	 Maine	 by	 the	 Board of	 Licensure	 in	 Medicine

. That Board	censured Doane in	March	2015	for (1) being	insufficiently	aware	of	the hazards	 associated	 with	 the	 opiate	 medications	 he	 was	 prescribing	 to	 a patient	 who	 ultimately	 died	 of	 accidental	 oxycodone	 and	 cyclobenzaprine
intoxication , (2) failing	to	follow	up	on	informat ion	from	other	doctors	about that patient,	 and (3) violating	 a	 B oard	 rule	 regarding	 the	 use	 of	 controlled substances	for	pain	treatment. The	Board	found	that	Doane	had	not	created	a written	 treatment	 plan,	 discussed	 with	 the	 patient	 the	 risks	 and	 benefits	 of using	 controlled	 substances,	 implemented	 a	 written	 agreement outlining patient	responsibilities,	or	kept	accurate	and	complete	medical	records. The Board	 renewed	 his	 license, but it imposed	 terms	 of	 probation	 and	 required3 him	 to	 pay	 $12,000	 to	 the	 Board	 for the costs	 of	 investigation	 and enforc ement. [¶ 3 ]	 	 In	 a	 l etter	 dated	 April	 9,	 2015,	 the	 Department of	 Health	 and
Human	 Services informed	 Doane	 that	 it	 had	 decided	 to	 terminate	 his participation	 in ,	 or	 reimbursement	 from , the MaineCare	 program.	 	 The Department	stated	 that	it	 took	its	action	pursuant	 to	 the	MaineC are	Benefits Manual,	14	C.M.R.	10 144 101

- I

- 9,

- 26	 to

- 28,	§§	1.03

- 6,	1.19

- 1 to
- 3	(2014) , 2 and	 the	 authority	 granted	 by	 the	 federal	 go vernment	 through	 42	 C.F.R. part 1002 (2016)

. Specifically,	 the	 Department indicated that	 the	 sanction was	 being	 imposed because	 Doane	 had	 violated	 the “ regulations	 or	 code	 of ethics	 governing	 the	 conduct	 of	 occupations	 or	 professions	 or	 regulated industries, ” had failed to “ meet	s tandards	required	for	State	or	F ederal	law	for participation	(e.g.	licensure	or	certification requirements), ” and	had	received

a “ [f]ormal	reprimand	or	censure	[from]	an	association	of	the	provider ’ s	peers for	 unethical	 practices. ” 14	 C.M.R.	 10 144 101

- I

- 26	 to

- 27,	 § 1. 19

- 1(M),	 (O), (R). [¶ 4 ] The letter informed Doane that	he could	request	infor mal	review of	the determination	within	sixty	days after	receiving	the	letter and	that	if	he

2 Rule	1.19 has	since	been	recodified	as	Rule	1.20. See Dep’t	of	Health	&	Human	S e rvs. Adopted Rule	No.	2017

- 105	(effective	July	5,	2017).4 disagreed	with	 the	 result	 of	 that	 review,	 he	 could	 request	 an	 administrative hearing	 within	 sixty	 days	 after	 receiving	 the	 informal	 review	 decision. See
14 C.M.R. 10 144 101

- I

- 33	 to

- 34,	 § 1.21 (2013) ; see	 also 5 M.R.S. § § 8001

- 11008	 (2016) .		Doane	requested	informal	review. T he	Department , after	 informal	 review, affirmed the	 initial	 decision	 terminating Doane ’ s participation	in	MaineCare	and informed	Doane ,	by letter	dated	September 11, 2015, of	his right	to request an administrative	hearing within	sixty	days

. [¶ 5 ]	 	On	September	 23,	 2015 , Doane	 filed	a	 complaint	in	 the	Superior Court	 seeking	 a	 declarat ory	 judgment that	 the Department ’ s decision terminating his participation	 in,	 and	 reimbursement	 by, the	 MaineCare program	constituted	a	license	revocation

— a	decision	over	which	the	District Court	 has	 exclusive	 original	 jurisdiction. See 4	 M.R.S.	 § 152(9) ; 5	 M.R.S. § § 8002(5), 10051(1 ) ; M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80G

. He	 sought an	 order	 enjoining	 the progress	of	the	administrative	proceeding	to	terminate	his	participation	in	the
programs. Doane also filed	a	request	 for an	administrative	hearing with	 the Department	on	November	5,	2015,	but he later filed	a	motion in	the	Superior
Court declaratory	 judgment	 proceeding seeking a	 preliminary	 injunction enjoining the	 Department	 from utilizing the	 administrative	 proceeding	 t o revoke	that	alleged	license.5 [¶ 6 ] The	Department	moved	 to	dismiss Doane’s declaratory	judgment complaint	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 no	 license	 had	 been	 revoked	 but	 rather	 the Department	 had	 determined	 not	 to	 contract	 with	 Doane.	 	 It	 referred	 to	 and attached Doane’s	 employer’s provider	 agreement with	 the	 Department that was	 in	 effect	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 event s	 that	 led	 to	 Doane ’ s	 discipline	 by	 the
B oard	of	Licensure	in	Medicine. The	Department	also	attached	a	copy	of	the decision	 of	 the	 Board of	 Licensure	 in	 Medicine	 allowing	 Doane	 to	 continue practicing	medicine	in	Maine

. [¶ 7 ] Doane	 opposed	 the	 motion	 to	 d ismiss	 and	 moved	 for	 summary judgment ,	submitting a	statement	of	material	facts	with	supporting	evidence. The	Department filed a	 responsive statement	 of	material	 facts	admitting	 the pertinent	facts	and	additionally	referring	to the	informal	review	decisio n. [¶ 8 ] The	court	entered	a	judgment	on	 July	1,	2016,	in	which	it	denied the	Department ’ s	motion	to	dismiss	and	granted	Doane ’ s	motion	for	summary judgment , essentially	 providing	 the	 declaratory	 relief	 sought	 by	Doane

. T he court	concluded	that	the	abili ty	to	provide	and	be	reimbursed	 for	MaineCare patient	 treatment	 constituted	 a	 form	 of	 permission	 that	 fell	 within	 the statutory definition	 of	 a “ license ” provided	in 4	M.R.S.	 §	 152(9)	 and	 5 M.R.S. § 8002(5) ,	and	 therefore that the	District	 Court	 had	exclusive	jurisdiction	 to6 adjudicate	the	Department’s	proposed	termination	of	Doane ’s	participation	in the MaineCare program. [¶ 9 ] The	Department	timely	appealed	from	the	judgment. See 14	M.R.S. §§ 1851 , 5959 (2016); M.R.	 App.	 P. 2. Upon	 inquiry	 from	 the	 court, Doane filed	 a	 letter	 indic ating	 that	 he	 did	 not	 intend	 to pursue	 the	 motion	 for preliminary	injunction at	that	time.
II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 0 ] At	 the	 outset,	we	 agree	with	 the	 Superior	 Court	 that	it	 had	 the authority	to	rule	on	the	legal	dispute	raised	here. “ When a	party	seeks	relief that	is beyond	 the	jurisdiction	 of	 the	 administrative	 agency	 .	 .	 .	 and	when	it would	 be	 futile	 for	 the	 plaintiff s	 to	 complete	 the	 administrative	 appeal process[,] the	 party	 need	 not	 exhaust	 its	 administrative	 remedies	 before seeking	judicial	relief. ” Houlton	Band	of	Maliseet	Indians	v.	Boyce ,	1997	ME	4, ¶	 11,	 688	 A.2d	 908 (alterations	 in	 original) (quotation	 marks omitted). Moreover, a	jurisdictional	issue	such	as	that	raised	here “ may	be	rai sed	at	any time	 in	 a	 proceeding

. ” Ford	 Motor	 Co.	 v.	 Darling ’ s ( Darling’s	 I ) ,	 2014	 ME	 7, ¶ 41,	86	A.3d	35

. Accordingly,	we	review	the	court ’ s	summary	judgment.7 A. Summary Judgment	and	the	Standard	of	Review [¶1 1 ] Summary	 judgment “ shall	 be	 rendered	 forthwith ” if	 the supported	statements	of	material	facts “ show	that	there	is	no	genuine	issue	as to	any	material	fact	set	forth	in	those	statements	and	that	any	party	is	entitl ed to	a	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law. ” M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(c)

. The relevant facts	are	not in	dispute,	and	we review	 the	summary	judgment de	novo for	errors	of	law

. Harlor	v.	Amica	Mut.	Ins.	Co. ,	2016	ME	161,	¶ 7,	150	A.3d	793

. [¶1 2 ] We also review de	novo whether	a	trial	court	has	subject	matter jurisdiction

. Midland	Funding	LLC	v.	Walton ,	2017	ME	24,	¶	12,	155 A.3d 864

. Generally , c ourt	 jurisdiction	is “ strictly	 a	 function	 of	 statute. ” Norris	 Family Assocs.,	 LLC	 v.	 Town	 of	 Phippsburg ,	 2005	 ME	 102,	 ¶	 21, 879	 A.2d	 1007

. Statutory	interpretation	is	 also	 reviewed	 de	 novo. Carignan	 v.	Dumas ,	 2017 ME	15,	¶	14,	154 A.3d 629

. [¶1 3 ] In	interpreting	statutes, our	primary	objective is “ to	discern	and give	effect	to	the	Legislature ’ s	intent. ” Ford	Motor	Co.	v. Darling ’ s ( Darling’s	II ), 2016	ME	171,	¶ 24,	151	A.3d	507 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. “ To	determine that	intent, we first	look to	the	statute ’ s	plain	meaning	and	the	entire	statutory scheme	 of	 which	 the	 provi sion	 at	 issue	 forms	 a	 part. ” Id. (quotation	 mar ks omitted). We	determine	the	plain	meaning	of	a	statute “ by	taking	into	account8 the	 subject	 matter	 and	 purposes	 of	 the	 statute,	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 a particular	 interpretation. ” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted). We will	 reject statutory	 interpretations “ that	 are	 inimical	 to	 the	 public	 interest or	 that
pro duce	absurd	or	illogical	results. ” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). Only	if	the meaning	 of	 a	 statute	 is	 ambiguous after	 applying	 these	 principles	 will we consider	e xtrinsic	information	such	as	legislative	history. Id. If	a regulation conflicts with an existing	 statute ,	 the	 statute	 controls. See Larson	 v.
New England	Tel.	&	Tel.	Co. ,	141	Me.	326,	334,	44	A.2d	1	(1945)

. B

. Jurisdiction	Over	Licensing	Decisions [¶1 4 ] The District	 Court	 has	exclusive	jurisdiction,	 upon	 complaint	 of an	agency	or	the	Attorney	General,	to	revoke	or	suspend certain licenses

. See
4 M.R.S.	 §	 152(9);	 5	 M.R.S.	 §§	 8002(5),	 10051(1). In	 the	 title	 of	 the	 Maine Revised	Statutes	establishing	the	courts	and	their	jurisdiction,	the	Legislature has conferred	on	the	District	Court	jurisdiction	over	the	following: Licensing	 jurisdiction. Except	 as	 provided	 in	 Title	 5,	 section 10004;	 Title	 8, section	 279

- B;	 Title	 10,	 section	 8003;	 Title	 20

- A, sections	10712	and	10713;	T itle	29

- A;	Title	32,	chapters	2

- B,	114 and	135;	and	Title	35

- A,	section	3132, exclusive	jurisdiction	upon complaint	of	an	agency or,	if	the	licensing	agency	fails	or	refuses	to act	 within	 a	 reasonable	 time,	 upon	 complaint	 of	 the	 Attorney General to	 revoke	 or	 suspend	 licenses	 issued	 by	 the	 agency

. The District	 Court	 has	 original	 jurisdiction	 upon	 complaint	 of	 a licensing	agency	to	determine	whether	renewal	or	reissuance	of	a lice nse	 of	 that	 agency	 may	 be	 refused. The	 District	 Court	 has9 original	 concurrent	 jurisdiction	 to	 grant	 equitable	 relief	 in proceedings	 initiated	 by	 an	 agency	 or	 the	 Department	 of	 the Attorney	 General	 alleging	 any	 violation	 of	 a	 license	 or	 licensing laws	or	r ules. Notwithstanding	 any	 other	 provisions	 of	 law,	 a	 licensing	 agency may	 not	 reinstate	 or	 otherwise	 affect	 a	 license	 suspended, revoked	or	modified	by	the	District	Court	pursuant	to	a	complaint filed	by	the	Attorney	General	without	the	a pproval	of	the	At torney General. 4	 M.R.S.	 §	 152(9)	 (emphasis	 added); see	 also M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80G.	 	 The	 District
Court ’ s	jurisdiction with	respect	to	license	revocation	or	suspension is	also set forth in	the Maine Administrative	Procedure	Act: Jurisdiction. Except	as	provided	in	section	10004;	Title	8,	section 279

- B;	 Title	 10,	 section	 8003;	 Title	 20

- A,	 sections	 10712	 and 10713;	 Title	 29

- A;	 and	 Title	 32,	 chapters	 2

- B,	 114	 and	 135, the District	 Court	 has	 exclusive	 jurisdiction	 upon	 complaint	 of	 any agency or, if	 the	licensing	 agency	 fails	 or	 refuses	 to	 act	 within	 a reasonable	time,	upon	complaint	of	the	Attorney	General to	revoke or	 suspend	 licenses	 issued	 by	 the	 agency and	 has	 original jurisdiction	 upon	 complaint	 of	 an	 agency	 to	 determine	 whether renewal	or	r eissuance	of	a	license	of	that	agency	may	be	refused. 5	M.R.S.	§	10051(1)	(emphasis	added). 3 [¶1 5 ] Separately,	a physician’s	authority	to	practice	medicine	in	Maine is	provided	 through	 the	issuance	of	a	license	 from	 the	Board	of Licensure in Medicine. See 32	 M.R.S.	 §	 3274	 (2016)

. Pursuant	 to	 4	 M.R.S.	 §	 152(9) and

3 The	 Board	 of	 Licensure	 in	 Medicine

— established	 by 5	 M.R.S.	 §	 12004

- A(24)	 (2016) and 32 M.R.S.	§	3263	(2016) (codified	withi n	chapter	48	of	title	32)

— is	not	excepted	from	District	Court jurisdiction	for	license	revocation	or	suspension.10 5 M.R.S.	§	10051(1), license	revocation proceeding s by the	Board	of	Licensure in	Medicine are not	 subject	 to the	District	 Court’s exclusive jurisdiction	 over license	 revocations	 and	 suspensions because	 the	 proceedings	 fall	 within

“ [t] itle	10,	section	8003

. ” See 10 M.R.S.	§§ 8001

- A (4), 8003 (5)	(2016); see	also
32 M.R.S.	§§ 3269 (4), 3282

- A (2016). [¶1 6 ] It	 is	 unclear whether	 the	 Board now has	 exclusive	 jurisdiction over	 the revo cation or	 suspen sion	 of a medical license or	 whether	 that jurisdiction	 is	 concurrent	 with the	 District	 Court

. As	 set	 forth	 in	 10 M.R.S. § 8003 (5) , t he “ jurisdiction	 to	 suspend	 and	 revoke	 occupational	 and professiona l	licenses	 conferred	 by	 this	 subsection	is	 concurrent	wi th	 that	 of the	 District	 Court.”	 	 We	 recently	 noted,	 however,	 withou t	 discussing	 this provision	 of	 t itle	 10,	 that	 the	 Legislature’s amendment	 of the	 Board	 of Licensure	 in	 Medicine’s	 authorizing	 statute in title	 32	 to	 omit	 the	 option	 of filing	a	complaint	with	the	District	Court 4 left	the	Board with	“only	one	path” to	 revoke	 a	 license

. Zablotny	 v.	 State	 Bd.	 of	 Nursing ,	 2014	 ME	 46,	 ¶	 14 n.2,
89 A.3d	143

. Because t he	dispute	h ere	focuses	not	on Doane’s medical license but	 on his capacity	 to participate	in	and receive	 compensation	 from	Maine’s

4 See P.L.	2013,	ch.	355,	§ § 8

- 12 (effective	Oct.	9,	2013)	(codi fied	at 32	M.R.S.	§	3282

- A	(2016) ).11 Medicaid	 program , MaineCare ,	 we	 need	 not	 resolve any jurisdictional question	related	to	the revocation	of	medical	licenses

. [¶1 7 ] The issue	 now	 before	 us	 is whether,	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law,	 th e capacity to	 participate	 in	 MaineCare	 as	 a	 provider	 who	 may	 receive compensation is	 also	 a	 “license , ” the	 revocation	 of	 which	 the	 Legislature intended	to	place	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	District	Court. [¶18] The	Admi nistrative	Procedure	Act	defines	a “ license ” as	 follows:

“‘ License ’ includes	 the	 whole	 or	 any	 part	 of	 any	 agency	 permit,	 certificate, approval,	registration,	charter	or	similar	 form	of	permission	required	by	law which	 represents	 an	 exercise	 of	 the	 state ’ s regulatory	 or	 police	 powers. ” 5 M.R.S.	 § 8002(5). This	 definition	is	 the	 source	 of	 the	 parties ’ dispute	 over whether	 the District	 Court	 or	 the	 Department	 has	 original	 jurisdiction	 over the	 decision	 whether a	 provider	 may	 continue	 to	 participate	 in	 and	 be reimbursed	by Maine ’ s	Medicaid	program

— MaineCare. [¶1 9 ] An	understanding	of	 the federal Medicaid	program	is	important
to resolve the	 question	 presented here

. Medicaid	 is	 a primarily federally funded	program. See 42 U.S.C .S.	§	1396

- 1	(LEXIS	through Pub.	L.	No.	115

- 4 5 )

. The	 federal	 government	 appropriates	 money	 to	 Maine	 to pay	 for medical, rehabilitation,	 and	 other	 assistance “ on	 behalf	 of	 families	 with	 dependent12 children	and	of	aged,	blind,	or	disabled	individuals,	whose	income	r esources are	 insuffi cient	 to	 meet	 the	 costs	 of	 necessary	 medical	 services. ” Id. The applicable	 federal	 regulations	 require	 gubernatorial	 and	 federal	 review	 and approval	of	the	state	plan. 42	C.F.R.	§§ 430.10

- 430.16	(2016). [¶ 20 ] Maine ’ s	Department	 of	Health	and	Human	Services	administers the	 Medicaid	 program	 in	 Maine. See 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 3173	 (2016) ; see	 also
24

- A M.R.S.	 § 6911	 (2016) .	 	 To	 perform	 its	 functions,	 the	 Department is authorized	and	required	to issue	rules	and	regulations to	ad minister Maine’s Medicaid	program ,	known	as	MaineCare

. See 22 M.R.S.	§ 3173. [¶ 2 1 ] T he	Department	 has	 adopted Medicaid rules	in	 the form	 of	 the MaineCare	 Benefits	 Manual. See	 generally 14	 C.M.R.	 10	 144	 101,	 ch.	 101 (2016)

. Neither	federal Medicaid nor	state MaineCare regulations	call	for	the issuance	 of	 a	 “license”	 to	 a	 physician	 to	 receive	 Medicaid	 funds	 for	 the provision	of	medical	services. The	Manual does,	however,	require a provider seeking	to	provide services	to	MaineCare	members to complete an	enrollment form	and	enter	into a	Medicaid	provider	agreement. 14	C.M.R.	10	144	101

- I

- 2
to
- 4,	 §§ 1.02

- 4(H),	 1.03

- 1(A) (2014) .	 	 The	 agreement	 is	 conditioned	 on compliance	with	 the	 requirements	 for	 provider	 participation	 outlined	in	 the Manual. See	gen erally 14	C.M.R.	10	144	101 ,	ch.	101

.13 [¶ 2 2 ] Some providers, pursuant	 to t he	 federal	 Medicaid	 regulations , must	or	may	be excluded	from	the	Medicaid	program by	the	federal Office	of Inspector	 General

. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.101 , 1001.201

- 1001.951	 (2016). The	Inspector	General’s	office must	exclude	from	participating	in	the	Medicaid
program providers who	have	been	convicted	of	certain	types	of	crimes, see id. § 1001.101 ,	 and may exclude	 from	 participation	 providers	 who	 have committed	 othe r	 misconduct,	 including	 providers	 who	 have	 had	 their	 state professional	 licenses	 revoked	 or	 suspended , s ee id. §§ 1001.201

- 1001.951. The	 federal	 regulations	 are	 not	 to	 be	 “construed	 to	 limit	 a	 State’s	 own authority	 to	exclude	an	individual	or	entity	 from Medicaid	 for	any	reason	or period	authorized	by	State	law.” 42	C.F.R.	 § 1002.2(b)	 (2016) (redesignated

as 42	C.F.R.	§ 1002.3(b) by 82	Fed.	Reg.	4100	§	36 (Jan. 12,	2017) ). [¶ 2 3 ] In	e xercising Maine’s authority	to	exclude	individuals	or	entities from	 participating	 in	 the MaineCare program ,	 the Department may impose
sanctions on a	provider	for “ [v]iolation	of	any	.	.	.	regulations	or	code	of	ethics governing	 the	conduct	of	occupations	or	profess ions	or	regulated	industries;

. . . [f]ailure	 to	 meet	 standards	 required by State	 or	 Federal	 law	 for participation	 (e.g.	 licensure	 or	 certification	 requirements);	 [or]	 .	 .	 .	 [f]ormal reprimand	or	censure	by	an	association	of	 the	provider ’ s	peers	 for	unethical14 practices. ” 14	 C.M.R.	 10	 144 10 1

- I

- 26	 to

- 27,	 § 1.19

- 1(M),	 (O),	 (R). 5 If	 a provider’s	 participation	 in	 the	 program	 is	 suspended	 or	 terminated	 as	 a sanction,	 the	 provider	 is	 precluded	 “ from	 submitting	 claims	 for	 payment, either	 personally	 or	 through	 claims	 submitted	 by	 any	 clinic,	 group , corporation	or	other	association.” Id. § 1.19

- 3(B)(2). [¶ 2 4 ] The State’s regulations	explicitly	vest in the	Commissioner	of	the Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services the responsibility to decid e whether	to	impose sanctions within	the MaineCare program and	thus whether to	 continue	 a	 physician’s	 or	 a	 facility’s participation	 in	 the	 program	 as	 set forth	in	 the provider	agreement

. See 14 C.M.R.	10 144 101

- I

- 28,	§ 1.19

- 3(A).
T he	 Commissioner “ may	 delegate	 sanction	 responsibilities	 to	 the	Division of Audit,	and	the	Director	of	MaineCare	Services. ” Id. [¶ 2 5 ] When	 the	Department	 decides	 to	limit,	 terminate , or	 otherwise sanction	a	physician	who	is participating	as	a	MaineCare	provider	pursuant	to a	 provide r agreement	 with	 the	 State	 of	 Maine,	 t he	 Ma nual authorizes a provide r to pursue	informal	 review	 by	writing	 to	 the	Director	 of	MaineCare Services	 within	 sixty	 days,	 after	 which,	 if	 dissatisfied,	 the	 provider	 may

5 The	 Manual	 also	 authorizes	 the	 Department	 to “ terminate	 a	 provider ’ s	 participation	 .	 .	 . without	 cause, ” though	 neither	 party	 contends	 that	 this	 is	 what	 happened	 here. See 14	 C.M.R. 10 144 101

- I

- 8,	§	1.03

- 4(A)	(2014).15 request	 an	 administrative	 hearing,	 with	 the	 Commissioner	 having	 final decision

- making	authority,	or	may	elect	 to	participate	in	binding	arbitration.
14	 C.M.R.	 10 144 101

- I

- 33	 to

- 34,	 § 1.21

- 1(A),	 (B) (2013) .	 	 If	 the	 provider	is dissatisfied	with	the	final decision	after	an	administrative	hearing, “ an	appeal may	be	taken	to	the	Superior	Court	pursuant	to	the	Administrative	Procedure
Act. ” 14	C.M.R.	10	144 101

- I

- 33,	§ 1.21

- 1(A); see 5	M.R.S.	§	11002	(2016) ; M.R.
Civ.	P.	80C

. [¶ 2 6 ] The	 question before us	i s whether the	 Manual ’ s administrative review	process for	the	imposition	of	sanctions ,	through	which a	provider	may appeal the	 Department’s	 administrative	 decision	 to	 the	 Superior	 Court , applies	 to	 the	 termination	 of	 a	 physician	 from	 the MaineCare program,	 or whether ,	 by	 statute,	 the	 Legislature	 has	 provided that	 termination	 is the revocation	 of a	 “license , ”	 bringing	 the	 decision	within	 the	 exclusive ,	 or	 even concurrent, jurisdiction	 of	 the	 District	 Court. See 10	 M.R.S. § 800 3(5)(A

- 1)(2

- A). To	an swer	that	question,	we	look	to	the	meaning	of	the
statute s in	 the	context	of	 the	entire	statutory	scheme. See 4 M.R.S.	§	152(9) ; 5 M.R.S.	§ §	8002(5), 10051(1) ; Darling’s	II ,	2016	ME	171,	¶ 24,	151	A.3d	507. [¶ 2 7 ] S ection s 152(9) and	 10051 (1) do	 no t specifically mention	 the Medicaid	or	MaineCare	program , and they	do not list	or describe the	license16 revocations	and	 suspensions	 that	 fall	within	 th e	District	 Court’s	jurisdiction. The	 statutes	 do ,	 however, explicitly list , by	 statutory	 citation , license determinations	that	are excepted from	that	jurisdiction. See 4	M.R.S.	§ 152(9); 5 M.R.S.	 § 10051(1)

. E xamining the	 nature	 of	 the	 license	 revocations	 or suspensions excepted	 from	 the District	 Court’s	 jurisdiction gives	 a	 strong indication	of	what ,	if	not ex ce pted,	constitute s the	revocation	or	suspension	of

a professional	or	occupational “ license. ” [¶ 2 8 ] The	exc epted occupational licensing	decisions	are	as	follows:

• Suspension	of a harness	racing license , 8	M.R.S.	§	279

- B (2016) ;

• Suspension	or	revocation	of	a “ license,	certification, registration, permit, approval	or	other	similar	document	evidencing	admission	to	or	granting authority	 to	 engage	in	 a	 profession,	 occupation,	 business	 or	industry , ” 10	M.R.S.	§ 8003(3),	(5)(A

- 1) (2) (2016); 6

• Suspension	 or	 revocation	 of	 an emergency	 medical services person ’ s
“ license, ” 32 M.R.S.	§	9 0

- A	(2016) ; and

• Suspension	 or	 revocation	 of	 a	 license	 pursuant	 to	 the	 Maine	 Uniform Securi ties	Act, t itle	32,	chapter	135

. Each	 occupational	 license revocation	 or	 suspension	 listed	 operates	 as	 a complete	 revocation	 or	 suspension	 of	 the	 authorization	 to	 engage	 in	 a

6 Registrations,	 permits,	 approval s,	 or	 other	 documents “ evidencing	 the	 grant	 of	 authority	 to engage	in	the	business	of	banking ” are	governed	by	title	9

- B,	which	the	Legislature	acknowledged as	separate	 from	 the	regulation	of	professions,	occupations,	businesses, or industries	in 10	M.R.S. § 8003(3)	(2016).17 profession	 or	 occupation.	 	 None	 of	 these	 suspensions	 or	 revocations	 is analogous	 to	 a termination	 of	 participation	 in a federally	 funded pro gram through	 a provider	 agreement

. Moreover,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 explicit	 regulatory authority	providing	 for	 the	De partment	 to	act	as	 the	decision

- maker ,	subject to	appellate	review	in	the	Superior	Court ,	the	Legislature	has	not enacted	any legislation	to	expl icitly	remove	the	Department’s	authority	and require initial decision

- making	in	the	District	Court. [¶ 2 9 ] From	the language	of the	statu t e s,	viewed	in	context of	the	entire statutory	scheme , see Darling’s	II ,	2016	ME	171,	¶	24,	151	A.3d	507, including the	 recent	 changes	 in	 statutes regarding the	 adjudicatory	 authority	 of	 the Board	 of	 Licensure	in	Medicine, 7 and	 considering	 the	 functional	 distinctions between	a	license	revocation	and	a	termination of	participation	in	a	program through a	 provide r	 agreement,	 we	 conclude	 that t he	 entity	 that	 provides	 a physician	with	the “ approval

.	.	. required	by	law [that] represents	an	exercise of	 the	 stat e ’ s	 regulatory	 or	 police	 powers, ” 5 M.R.S.	 § 8002(5), to	 practice medicine	is	 the	 Board	 of	 Licensure	in	Med icine. See 5 M.R.S.	 § 12004

- A (24) (2016) ; 32	M.R.S.	§ 3270	(2016)

. T he	Board

— not	 the	Department	of	Health and	 Human	 Services

— i s	 responsible	 for initiating	 any	 effort	 to revoke	 or

7 S ee P.L.	2013,	ch.	355,	§§	8

- 12

.18 suspend a	physician ’ s	license for	violating	professional	standards

. See 5 M.R.S. § § 10001

- 100 05 ; 32 M.R.S.	 § § 3269(4), 3282

- A ; see	 also 4	 M.R.S.	 §	 152(9); 5 M.R.S.	 §	 10051(1);	 10 M.R.S.	 §§	 8001

- A(4),	 8003(5)

. It	 is	 through	 th e professional	licensing	of	physicians

— not	 through	 the	State ’ s	implementation of	 MaineCare	 as	 part	 of	 the	 federal	 Medicaid	 program

— that	 the	 State exercises	its	police	power on	behalf	of all Maine	citizens to “‘ preserv [e]

.	.	. the health,	safety	and	comfort	of [ its ] citizens ’” from	unqualified,	incompetent,	or uneth ical	 physicians. State	 v.	 Pelletier ,	 2015 ME 129,	 ¶	 7,	 125	 A.3d	 354 (quoting Hendrick	v.	Maryland ,	235	U.S.	610,	622	(1915) ). [¶ 30 ] To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 Department ’ s	 decision	 regarding	 Doane affects the	health	or	safety	of	Maine’s citizens,	it	does so only with	respect	to those Maine	 citizens	 who	 receive services through	 the	 Department ’s MaineCare	program .		The Department’s	other	purpose

— to	make	the	best	use of	 State	 funds	 received	 from	 the	 federal	 governme nt

— may	 redound to	 the fiscal benefit	 of	 all citizens, but	 it is	 not the	 exercise	 of the	 police	 power to license	and	regulate the medical profession

. [¶ 3 1 ] T o avoid	an	interpretation	of	the	statutes	that	is	“ inimical	to	the public	 interest or	 that	 pro duce[s]	 absurd	 or	 illogical	 results,” Darling’s II , 2016 ME	 171,	 ¶	 24,	 151	 A.3d	 507 (quotation	 marks	 omitted) ,	 we construe19 section s 152(9) and	10051(1) not to confer	on	the	District	Court	jurisdiction

over the imposition	of	a sanction on	a MaineCare provider by	the	Department of	Health	 and	Human Services

. Therefore,	 contrary	 to	 the	 determination	 of the	 Superior	 Court,	 t he	 Department’s	 decision	 to terminate	 Doane’s participation	 in	 the	 MaineCare	 program does	 not	 fall	 within	 the licensing decisions over	 which the Legislature	 gave	 the District	 Court original and exclusive jurisdiction

. See 4 M.R .S.	§	152(9);	5	M.R.S.	§	10051(1 ). 8 [¶ 3 2 ]	 	We	 vacate	 the	judgment	entered	in	 favor	 of	Doane	and	 remand the	 matter	 for	 the	 Superior	 Court	 to	 enter a	 declaratory	 judgment	 that jurisdiction	over	the	termination of	Doane’s	participation	as	a	provider	in	the MaineCare	program	is	as	set	out	in	the	MaineCare	Benefits	Manual

. The	entry	is: Judgment vacated

. Remanded	 for	 the	 entry	 of summary	 judgment	 for	 the	 Department	 of Health	and	Human	Services.

8 From	this	record,	we	cannot	determine	whether	a dditional	process is available	to	Doane,	who requested	an administrative	hearing in	November	2015 but	appears	to	have	declined	to	prosecute his	 request	 to	 enjoin	 the	 Department	 from	 taking	 further	 action	 on	 his	 administrative	 challenge. See 14	C.M.R.	10 144 101

- I

- 33,	§ 1.21

- 1(A) (2013)

.20 JABAR ,	J., dissenting. [¶ 33 ] Because	 I	 disagree	 with	 the	 Court	 and	 would	 hold	 that	 the Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services’	 decision	 to	 terminate	 Doane’s participation	 in,	 and	 reimbursement	 from,	 Department

- operated	 medical assistance	programs	constitutes	revo cation	of	a	“license”	within	the	meaning of	the	Administrative	Procedure	Act, I respectfully dissent

. A	plain	reading	of the	 Administrative	 Procedure	 Act,	 5	 M.R.S.	 §	 10051(1)	 (2016),	 and	 4	 M.R.S. § 152(9)	 (2016)	provides	 that,	except	 for	certain	statutory actions,	including action	 taken	 by	 the	 Board	 of	 Licensure	 in	 Medicine	 pursuant	 to	 10	 M.R.S. § 8003	 (2016),	 the	 District	 Court	 has	 exclusive	 jurisdiction	 upon	 the complaint	of	an	agency	to	revoke	a	license	issued	by	the	agency. [¶ 34 ] In	civil	matters,	th e	District	Court	has,	with	limited	exceptions	by statutory	 reference,	 including	 the	 Licensure	 Board,	 “exclusive	 jurisdiction upon	complaint	 of	an	agency	 .

. . to	 revoke	 or	 suspend	licenses	issued	by	 the agency.” 4	 M.R.S.	 § 152(9); see M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80G(a). Similarly,	 the Administrative	 Procedure	 Act	 provides	 for	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	 District	 Court “upon	 complaint	 of	 any	 agency”	 and	 “upon	 complaint	 of	 an	 agency	 to determine	whether	renewal	or	reissuance	of	a	license	of	 that	agency	may	be refused.”	 	 5	 M.R.S. § 10051(1).	 	 The	 Administrative	 Procedure	 Act	 defines21 “license”	expansively	to	include	“the	whole	or	any	part	of	any	agency	permit, certificate,	 approval,	 registration,	 charter	 or	 similar	 form	 of	 permission required	 by	 law	 which	 represents	 an	 exercise	 of	 t he	 state’s	 regulatory	 or police	powers.” 5	M.R.S.	 § 8002(5)	 (2016) .		Doane’s	right	 to	participate	as	a provider	 in	 the	 MaineCare	 program	 is	 a	 “form	 of	 permission”	 by	 the Department	 and	 meets	 the	 Administrative	 Procedure	 Act’s	 definition	 of “license.” [¶ 3 5 ] Applying	the	plain	meaning	of	5	M.R.S.	§	8002(5),	the	decision	to authorize	 MaineCare	 provider	 participation	 and	 payment	 is	 an	 “approval

. . . required	 by	law	which	 represents	an	exercise	 of	 the	 state’s	 regulatory	 or police	powers.”		Despite	the	Depart ment’s	contention	that	it	was	not	acting	in its	 regulatory	 or	 policing	 authority	 in	 reaching	 its	 decision	 to	 terminate Doane’s	 MaineCare	 provider	 participation	 and	 payment,	 its	 decision	 was made	to	secure	the	best	possible	care	for	MaineCare	patients	and	a rose	from the	 use	 of	 its	 power	 to	 preserve	 “the	 health,	 safety	 and	 comfort	 of	 [Maine] citizens.” State	v.	Pelletier ,	2015	ME	129,	¶	7,	125	A.3d	354 (quotation	marks omitted); see	also Barnes	v.	Glen	Theatre ,	Inc. ,	501	U.S.	560,	569	(1991) (“The traditional	police	power	of	the	States	is	defined	as	the	authority	to	provide	for the	public	health,	safety,	and	morals	.	.	.	.	”).22 [¶ 36]	 	 The	 Department’s	 action	 was	 a	 quintessential	 state	 regulatory action,	as	evidenced	by	the	language	of	the	Dep artment’s	notice	and	its	efforts to	 have	 the	 matter	 proceed	 through	 the	 administrative	 appeal	 process established	 by	 the	 MaineCare	 Benefits	 Manual.	 	 The	 notice	 stated	 that	 the Department	was	 “terminating	 [Doane’s]	participation	in,	and	reimbursement from, all	 medical	 assistance	 programs	 administered	 by	 the	 Department,” preventing	Doane	or	any	MaineCare	“provider	for	whom	[he	is]	an	employee, partner,	 or	 owner”	 from	 receiving	 MaineCare	 reimbursement	 “for	 services rendered	by	[Doane,]	including	administrative and	management	services	.

. . .” The	 notice	 goes	 on	 to	 state	 that	 “[t]he	 general	 practical	 effect	 of	 this restriction	 is	 to	 prohibit	 employment	 in	 any	 capacity	 by	 a	 provider	 that receives	 reimbursement, indirectly	 or	 directly , from	 MaineCare	 or	 other Med icaid	 programs.”	 	 This	 sanction	 significantly	 affects	 Doane’s	 practice	 of medicine	in	the	State	of	Maine. [¶ 37]		Removing	a	doctor	from	MaineCare	reimbursement	is	not	like	the other	 contractual	 scenarios	 to	 which	 the	 Department	 points	 by	 which	 the
State may	 provide	 for	 public	 health	 and	 safety,	 such	 as	 contracts	 for	 bridge construction,	 snowplowing,	 or	 mobile	 crisis	 intervention	 services.	 	 Unlike those	 contractual	 services,	 a	 doctor’s	 primary	 role	is	 to	influence	 the	 health23 and	 safety	 of	 patients	 through direct,	 one

- on - one	 appointments	 at	 regular intervals	throughout	the	patients’	lives.		Though	the	Department	administers MaineCare	 in	 part	 through	 provider	 agreements,	 without	 which	 a	 provider may	 not	 receive	 reimbursement	 from	 MaineCare	 funds,	 14	 C.M.R.	 1 0	 144
101

- I

- 2	 to

- 4	 §§ 1.02

- 4(H),	 1.03

- 1(A)	 to	 (C)	 (2016),	 providers	 may	 be excluded,	 as	 here,	 from	 the	 program	 for	 violations	 of	 regulations	 or	 ethics codes. See 14	C.M.R.	10	144	101

- I

- 26	to

- 28	§	1.19

- 1	to

- 3	(2014). [¶ 38]	 	 Sanctions	 for	 violations	 a re	 not	 contractual	 in	 nature.	 	 Nor	 are they	 mere	 formalities	 agreed	 upon	 by	 the	 providers	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 the Department:	they	are	in	place	to	protect	the	patients	whom	the	doctor	treats. Doane	was	sanctioned	for	violation	of	laws,	regulations,	or	codes of	ethics;	for failure	 to	 meet	 standards	 for	 participation;	 and	 for	 formal	 reprimand	 or censure	by	peers	due	to	unethical	practice.		14	C.M.R.	10	144

- 101

- I

- 26	to

- 27, §	1.19

- 1(M),	(O),	(R).		These	sanctions	are	the	result	of	the	Licensure	Board’s March	 20 15	 censure	 of	 Doane	 following	 a	 patient’s	 death	 from	 accidental intoxication	from	opiate	medications	Doane	had	prescribed.		His	censure	and the	resulting	sanctions	are	not	the	result	of	fraudulent	billing,	self

- referrals,	or some	 other	 financial	 or	 adminis trative	 concern. See 14	 C.M.R.
10 144

- 101

- I

- 26	 to

- 27	 §	 1.19

- 1(F),	 (J),	 (T). The	 Licensure	 Board’s	 censure24 and	 the	 Department’s	 sanctions	 are	 plainly	 an	 exercise	 of	 the	 state’s	 police power	 to	 provide	 for	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 of	 Maine	 citizens. See Pel letier , 2015	ME	129,	¶	7,	125	A.3d	354 .		The	Court’s	assertion	that	the	Department’s decision	to	remove	Doane	from	MaineCare	affects	only	the	health	or	safety	of those	citizens	who	receive	MaineCare	services,	Court’s	Opinion	¶	30,	does	not prove	 that	 the	 D epartment’s	 act	 was	 not	 an	 exercise	 of	 the	 police	 power. Whether	a	state	is	exercising	its	police	power	is	not	defined	by	the	number	of people	 affected;	 instead,	 it	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 regulatory
action. [¶ 39 ] Nor	does	 the	Department’s	pur pose	 to	make	best	use	of	 federal funds	provided	to	the	State,	Court’s	Opinion	¶	30,	prove	that	the	Department’s action	here	was	not	an	exercise	of	police	power.		The	Department’s	decision was	not	purely	fiscal:	because	the	Department	imposed	sanctions	due to,	inter alia,	 ethical	 violations,	its	 decision	was	 on	its	 face	 a	 decision	 concerning	 the welfare	 of	 future	 MaineCare	 patients	 to	 whom	 Doane	 otherwise	might	 have provided	 medical	 services. See 10	 C.M.R.	 10	 144	 101

- I

- 27	 § 1.19

- 1(M). Though	 one	 purpose	 of the	 Department	 may	 be	 to	 create	 “fiscal	 benefit,” Court’s Opinion	¶	30 ,	for	Maine	citizens,	the	fiscal	benefit	is	only	a	secondary purpose.	 	 The	 primary	 purpose	 of	 the	 Department’s	 role	 in	 MaineCare	 is	 to25 administer	a	program	that	provides	families	and	in dividuals	with	insufficient income	 resources	 access	 to	 necessary medical	 services

. See 42	 U.S.C.S. § 1396

— 1	 (LEXIS	 through	 Pub.	 L. No. 115

- 51); 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 3173	 (2016) ; 24

- A M.R.S.	§ 6911	(2016) ; see	also 22	M.R.S.	§	42(1)	(2016) (stating	that	the Department	 “shall	 issue	 rules	 and	 regulations	 considered	 necessary	 and proper	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 life,	 health	 and	 welfare,	 and	 the	 successful operation	 of	 the	 health	 and	 welfare	 laws”).	 	 The	 Department	 undertook	 to
sanction	 Doane	 not because	 it	 would	 be	 fiscally	 imprudent	 to	 reimburse Doane	for	future	services	provided	to	MaineCare	patients,	but	because	he	was censured	by	the	Board	for	concerns	with medical	care provided	to	a	patient. [¶ 40 ] This	removal	of	Doane	from	MaineCare	reimbu rsement	therefore falls	 into	 the	 broad	 definition	 of	 “license”	 as	 that	 term	 is	 used	 in	 the Administrative	Procedure	Act. See 5	M.R.S.	§	8002(5). Although	based	on	the same	 conduct	 that	 resulted	in	 a	 censure	 by	 the	 Licensure	 Board,	 this	 action taken	by	th e	Department	is	separate	and	distinct	from	the	action	taken	by	the Licensure	Board	pursuant	to	10	M.R.S.	§	8003. [¶ 41 ] I	 disagree	 with	 the	 Court	 that	 the	 exceptions	 from	 the	 District Court’s	licensing	jurisdiction	found	in	4	M.R.S.	§	152(9)	provide	any indication of	 the	 types	 of	 suspensions	 or	 revocations	 that	 are not excepted	 from	 the26 District	 Court’s	 licensing	 jurisdiction,	 Court’s Opinion	 ¶	 27. Title	 4	 M.R.S. § 152(9)	excepts	from	the	District	Court’s	jurisdiction	“Title	10,	section	8003,” which	 exce pts	 suspension	 or	 revocation	 of	 a	 “license,	 certification, registration,	 permit,	 approval	 or	 other	 similar	 document	 evidencing admission	 to	 or	 granting	 authority	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 profession,	 occupation, business[,]	 or	industry.” 10	M .R.S.	 § 8003(3);	 s ee	 als o	id. §	 8003(5)(A

- 1)(2), (2

- A).		Also	excepted	are	harness	racing	licenses,	under title	8	section	279

- B; licenses	 pursuant	 to	 the Maine	Uniform	Securities	Act ,	 title	 32,	 chapter	 135; the Real	 Estate	 Brokerage License Act ,	 title	 32,	 chapter	 114;	 and	 the Mai ne Emergency	 Medical	 Services	 Act	 of	 1982 ,	 title	 32,	 chapter	 2

- B.	 	While	 these statutes	 permit,	 as	 the	 Court	 notes, Court’s	 Opinion	 ¶	 28, complete revocations	or	suspensions	of	 the	authorization	 to	engage	in	a	profession	or occupation,	these	are	the exclus ions from	the	District	Court’s	jurisdiction.		It	is legally	 significant	 that	 the	 suspension	 or	 revocation	 of	 a	 license	 by termination	from	MaineCare	reimbursement	and	participation	brought	by	the Department	is not excepted	from	the	District	Court’s	jurisdi ction. [¶42]		The	Court	considers	 “the	 functional	distinctions	between	a	 true license	revocation	and	a	 termination	of	participation	in	a	program	 through	a provider	agreement”	and	concludes	that	the	Board	of	Licensure	of	Medicine	is27 responsible	for	policin g	physicians.		Court’s Opinion	¶	29 .		While	this	may	be true,	the	expansive	definition	of	“license”	under	the	Administrative	Procedure Act,	coupled	with	the	language	of	the	statute	conferring	jurisdiction	upon	the District	 Court	 in	 section	 152(9),	 affords Doane	 the	 right	 to	 a	 hearing	 in	 the District	 Court	 rather	 than	 a	 hearing	 before	 the	 Department.	 	 This	 reading comports	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 legislation

— a	 neutral	 decision

- maker should	decide	the	contested	matter	rather	than	the	agency	seeking	to	revoke the	 physician’s	 ability	 to	 practice.	 	 If	 the	 Court	 is	 correct,	 that	 the	 Board	 of Licensure	 in	 Medicine

— and	 not	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human
Services

— is	 responsible	 for	 initiating	 any	 effort	 to	 revoke	 or	 suspend	 a physician’s	license	for	violating	pro fessional	standards,	Court’s Opinion	¶	29, then	 the	 Licensure	 Board	 should	 be	 making	 the	 decision	 regarding	 Doane’s termination	of	participation	in	 the	MaineCare	program. The	Court	discusses the	 issue	 of	 concurrent	 jurisdiction	 in	 section	 8003. This	 discussion	 is	 not relevant	 to	 a discussion	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 section	 152(9 )	 because	 proceedings pursuant	 to	 section	 8003	 are	 excepted	 out	 of	 the	 legislation. The	 Court’s approach	 affords	 a	 physician	less	 protection	 before	 a	 state	 agency,	 than	 the physi cian	 would	 receive	 before	 the	 Licensure Board,	 which	 presumably	 has more	expertise	and	experience	dealing	with	alleged	misconduct	of	physicians.28 If	the	Legislature	wants	to	give	any	agency,	other	than	the	Board	of	Licensure in	Medicine,	the	authority	to	a ffect	a	physician’s	license	without	affording	the physician	 a	 hearing	 before	 the	 District	 Court,	 or	 if	 the	 Legislature	 wants	 to give	 the	 Licensure	Board	exclusive	jurisdiction	 over	 “any	matter”	affecting	a physician’s	practice,	then	it	will	need	to	amend	t he	Administrative	Procedure Act	 and	 section	 152(9).	 	 This	 revocation	 of	 the	 right	 to	 participate	 in	 the MaineCare	 program	 affects	 Doane’s	 “license,”	 therefore	 the	 Department	 of Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 must	 proceed	 in	 the	 District	 Court	 pursuant	 to
sectio n	152(9). [¶ 43 ] For	 the	 reasons	 above,	 I	 would	 affirm	 the	 Superior	 Court’s granting	of	Doane’s	motion	for	summary	judgment.

Janet	 T.	 Mills,	 Attorney	 General,	 Thomas	 C.	 Bradley,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.,	 and Christopher	 C.	 Taub,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.	 (orally),	O ffice	 of	 the	 Attorney	 General, Augusta,	for	appellant	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services Christopher	 C.	 Taintor,	 Esq. (orally),	 Norman,	 Hanson	 &	 DeTroy,	 LLC, Portland, for	appellee	Stephen	Doane

Kennebec	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV

- 2015

- 168 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY