21-571-cv

Cavanaugh v. Geballe

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2021

(Argued: December 14, 2021 Decided: March 17, 2022)

Docket No. 21-571-cv

_____________________________________

BRIAN CAVANAUGH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOSH GEBALLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES OF THE STATE OF 

CONNECTICUT,

Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________________________

Before:

CABRANES, LOHIER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Brian Cavanaugh filed this federal action after a Connecticut 

probate court issued an order recognizing the validity of a state lien against 

Cavanaugh’s interest in an estate. The United States District Court for the 

District of Connecticut (Dooley, J.) applied the doctrine established in 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and abstained from adjudicating 

Cavanaugh’s suit because of the ongoing state probate proceedings. The 

Younger abstention doctrine is an exception to the general rule that federal 

courts must hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction. Apart from 

certain state civil enforcement proceedings, the doctrine applies only to those

civil proceedings “involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the 
2

state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, 

Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013). This narrow class of cases does not 

include all ongoing state probate proceedings that concern the validity of a 

lien. Because the District Court ought not to have abstained pursuant to 

Younger, we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings.

JOHN D. WATTS, Clinton, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Brian Cavanaugh. 

KRISLYN M. LAUNER, Assistant Attorney General 

(Clare Kindall, Solicitor General, Maria A. Santos, 

Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), for William 

Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, 

CT, for Defendant-Appellee Josh Geballe. 

LOHIER, Circuit Judge:

Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise 

the jurisdiction given [to] them.” Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. 

United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 

571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013). Under the Younger abstention1 doctrine, however, 

federal courts refrain from interfering with three categories of state 

proceedings. One of these is “pending civil proceedings involving certain 

orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their 

judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (cleaned up). In this appeal, which 

involves a state probate proceeding, we clarify that Younger abstention 

1

 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
3

applies only to a narrow class of state civil proceedings. Civil probate 

proceedings are no more invulnerable to federal court interference than any 

other state civil proceedings, unless the state order at issue protects the State’s 

administration of its judicial system or its process for compelling compliance

with the judgments of its courts. Because the District Court in this case 

appears to have misunderstood the narrow scope of Younger to extend to 

state probate proceedings that concern the validity of a lien, we vacate its

decision and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2011, Brian Cavanaugh, a Connecticut resident, became a 

member in the HUSKY D health insurance program, a Medicaid health 

insurance program provided by the Affordable Care Act and offered by 

Connecticut to its residents. From October 3, 2011, through November 16, 

2011, Cavanaugh received “rehabilitation and other services to help to attain 

or retain capability for independence or self-care.” Compl. ¶ 15. The parties 

dispute whether federal or state funds were used to pay for these services.2 

2 According to Cavanaugh, HUSKY D provided coverage with funds the State 

received from the Federal Government, while the State maintains that it paid for 

Cavanaugh’s healthcare expenses solely with state funds.
4

In July 2018 a probate proceeding was commenced in the Connecticut 

State Probate Court for the District of Saybrook to administer the will of 

Cavanaugh’s deceased grandmother, DiBirma Burnham. The probate court

determined that Cavanaugh was to inherit $44,565.96 under the will. In

March 2019, however, the Commissioner of the Department of 

Administrative Services of the State of Connecticut (the “Commissioner” or 

“DAS”) filed a state statutory claim against the Burnham estate under

Connecticut General Statutes §§ 17b-93, 17b-94, 17b-224, 18-85b, 46b-129, and

46b-130, seeking the lesser of $57,915 or fifty percent of Cavanaugh’s 

distributive share of the estate for repayment of the medical services 

Cavanaugh received in 2011. 

The executor of Burnham’s estate later filed a financial accounting 

report that listed the amounts each beneficiary, including Cavanaugh, was to 

receive from the estate. The report did not mention the Commissioner’s lien, 

however, and it omitted from its list of proposed distributions $30,000 in cash 

bequests intended for Cavanaugh and his brother. The Commissioner 

objected to the financial accounting report. The objection, together with the

discrepancies between the will and the proposed distributions, prompted the 
5

probate court to hold a hearing attended by the executor of Burnham’s estate, 

the executor’s attorney John Watts (counsel for Cavanaugh in this action), and 

the Commissioner’s attorney. 

During the hearing, Watts “argued that DAS had no standing in the 

matter and should not be allowed to object to the accounting.” Supp. App’x 

14. The probate court ultimately rejected the financial report and ordered “a 

memo of law that would justify the Proposed Distribution” and “a brief on 

the issue of DAS’s standing.” Id. In January 2020, after the executor 

withdrew the financial report, Watts filed a brief challenging the 

Commissioner’s standing on a number of grounds, including that the 

Commissioner lacked “a legally protected interest in the estate because it is a 

creditor of a beneficiary and not of the estate.” Id. at 15. The probate court

rejected that challenge. Cavanaugh’s “share of the estate is subject to [the 

Commissioner’s] lien” under Connecticut law, the court concluded, and the 

Commissioner “has the right to object to the Proposed Distribution in the 

Financial Report” since “[t]he court’s acceptance or rejection of the Proposed 

Distribution in the Final Financial Report for the estate could adversely affect 

this interest.” Id. at 15–16. The probate court then determined that fifty 
6

percent of Cavanaugh’s distributive share, which was less than the 

Commissioner’s claim for $57,915, “would go toward repayment of 

[Cavanaugh’s] debt to [the Commissioner].” Id. The probate court ordered 

“[t]he fiduciary” to file a Financial Report/Final Account “in accordance with 

the provisions of the decedent’s Will” with the probate court within thirty 

days of its order. Id. at 16. 

Cavanaugh filed this § 1983 action in the United States District Court 

for the District of Connecticut (Dooley, J.), alleging that the Commissioner’s 

lien violated the Fourteenth Amendment and three provisions of Title XIX of 

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.3 Among other relief, 

Cavanaugh asked for (1) a declaratory judgment that the Commissioner did

not have a statutory lien on his inheritance or his grandmother’s estate, and 

(2) a permanent injunction enjoining the Commissioner from asserting the

lien or enforcing various sections of the Connecticut General Statutes “in a 

manner that violates” federal law. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. 

3 Specifically, Cavanaugh asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(25)(C),

1396p(a)(1), and 1396p(b)(1).
7

As relevant to this appeal, the Commissioner moved to dismiss 

Cavanaugh’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground 

that the District Court was obligated to abstain from exercising jurisdiction 

under both the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the 

probate exception to federal jurisdiction. The District Court decided that 

Younger applied and granted the motion. “[T]he Probate Court determined 

that Cavanaugh’s interest in Burnham’s estate is subject to the 

Commissioner’s statutory lien,” the court explained, and “determining the 

validity of such claims is integral to the Probate Court’s ability to perform its 

judicial function of overseeing the administration of the estate.” Cavanaugh 

v. Geballe, No. 3:20 Civ. 00981 (KAD), 2021 WL 781796, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 1, 

2021). Invalidating the lien, the District Court believed, fell into the third 

category of “exceptional circumstances” relating to civil proceedings that 

required Younger abstention. Id. (quoting Falco v. Justs. of the Matrim. Parts 

of Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015)).

This appeal followed. 
8

DISCUSSION

We consider whether Younger abstention extends to state probate 

proceedings that both raise a federal question and concern the validity of a 

lien against an estate. We conclude that the District Court’s decision to 

abstain here was error, and we reverse.4 

The Supreme Court has stated that the obligation of federal courts to 

hear cases within their jurisdiction is “virtually unflagging.” Colorado River,

424 U.S. at 817. While comity and other interests may sometimes require a 

district court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over a matter out of 

respect for certain state court functions, see Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77, the Supreme 

Court has reminded us that abstention is “the exception, not the rule,” id. at 

4 As a threshold matter, the District Court did not err in first deciding whether 

abstention was proper under Younger before deciding whether it had jurisdiction 

over Cavanaugh’s claims. We have an “ongoing duty to satisfy ourselves not only 

of our own jurisdiction, but also that of” a district court “in a cause under review.” 

Stagg, P.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 983 F.3d 589, 601 (2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). 

Although Younger abstention is a prudential decision not to exercise jurisdiction, 

we and the Supreme Court have reaffirmed that federal courts maintain “the 

inherent flexibility . . . ‘to choose among threshold grounds’ for disposing of a case 

without reaching the merits.” Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 351 

F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 

585 (1999)) (determining whether abstention was proper under Younger without 

deciding whether the plaintiffs demonstrated Article III standing). 
9

82 (quotation marks omitted); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City 

of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (“NOPSI”); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. 

Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813. 

In Sprint, the Supreme Court instructed us that a district court should 

abstain under Younger “only in three exceptional circumstances involving (1) 

ongoing state criminal prosecutions, (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings,

and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of 

the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Falco, 805 F.3d at

427 (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78) (quotation marks omitted). These three 

exceptions “define Younger’s scope.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78. To be sure,

before invoking Younger a federal court may “appropriately consider[]” three 

additional factors laid out in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden 

State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), that further counsel in favor of

abstention: Whether “there is (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding [that]

(2) implicates important state interests and (3) provides an adequate 

opportunity to raise federal challenges.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81 (cleaned up); 

see Falco, 805 F.3d at 427. But these conditions “[are] not dispositive; they 
10

[are], instead, additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court 

before invoking Younger.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81. 

In Falco, we applied Sprint’s “straightforward categorical approach” to 

conclude that abstention was warranted under the circumstances of that case. 

805 F.3d at 427. Falco involved a husband who sued his wife for divorce and 

also sought custody of their children. A New York state court appointed 

counsel to represent the children during the custody proceedings, as 

permitted under New York law. Id. at 426. The state court ordered the 

parents to each pay half of the attorney’s retainer and fees, but when the 

husband failed to do so, the court issued an order to show cause as to why he 

should not be held in contempt. Id. The husband then filed suit in federal 

court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute authorizing New York

state judges to order parents to pay for attorneys appointed for their children. 

Id. at 427. We held that the husband’s challenge fell squarely in Sprint’s third 

category of proceedings that require federal court abstention. “[O]rders 

relating to the selection and compensation of court-appointed counsel for 

children,” we said, “are integral to the State court’s ability to perform its 

judicial function in divorce and custody proceedings.” Id. at 428. 
11

In holding that abstention was proper in this case, the District Court 

relied on our decision in Falco, analogizing the civil custody proceeding there 

to the probate proceedings here. But the District Court misread the narrow 

scope of Younger abstention and the focus of our decision in Falco.

To start, the District Court mistakenly reasoned that any action that 

invalidates the probate court’s order recognizing the validity of the 

Commissioner’s statutory lien would interfere with the probate court’s ability 

to oversee the administration of the estate, which the District Court viewed as 

integral to the probate court’s performance of its judicial function. See

Cavanaugh, 2021 WL 781796, at *3. The broad conclusion that Younger

abstention requires a federal court to abstain whenever an action might 

interfere with a probate court’s oversight function does not follow from either

Sprint or Falco. In particular, we do not believe that the probate court’s order

recognizing the validity of the Commissioner’s lien in this case qualifies as an 

order “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their 

judicial functions.” Falco, 805 F.3d at 427 (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78).

In Sprint, the Supreme Court identified two types of orders that clearly 

fall within that category: civil contempt orders and orders requiring the 
12

posting of bonds pending appeal. See 571 U.S. at 79. In further describing the 

type of orders that permit state courts to perform their judicial function and to 

enforce their orders and judgments, the Supreme Court helpfully cited Juidice 

v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977), and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 

1, 13 (1987). In Juidice, the Court held that, under Younger, federal courts

should not interfere in state court proceedings “in which the State’s contempt 

process is involved,” 430 U.S. at 335, because the contempt process “stands in 

aid of the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are 

not rendered nugatory,” id. at 336 n.12. “A State’s interest in the contempt 

process,” the Court said, “through which it vindicates the regular operation of 

its judicial system, so long as that system itself affords the opportunity to 

pursue federal claims within it, is surely an important interest” that should be 

protected from federal court intrusion. Id. at 335 (emphasis added). In

Pennzoil, the Court held that federal courts should not interfere with state 

courts enforcing their own orders and judgments. “Not only would federal 

injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution of state judgments,” the 

Court reasoned, “but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very 

process by which those judgments were obtained.” Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14.
13

The state court bond orders at issue in Pennzoil were meant to “forc[e]

persons to transfer property in response to a court’s judgment,” id. at 13, so 

the state court’s interest went “beyond its interest as adjudicator of wholly 

private disputes,” id. at 14 n.12 (quotation marks omitted).

Likewise, in Falco, our Court determined that the state court order in a 

divorce and child custody proceeding fit neatly into the third Younger

category of exceptional circumstances and warranted abstention. There the 

federal plaintiff sought to enjoin New York State courts from enforcing their 

orders requiring parents to pay fees for court-appointed attorneys in child 

custody cases. See Falco, 805 F.3d at 428. The fees ensured that the children 

were represented by counsel and, in our view, were necessary for the effective 

administration and disposition of child custody proceedings and to 

“vindicate[] the regular operation” of those proceedings. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 

335; see Falco, 805 F.3d at 428.

Juidice and Pennzoil both “involve[d] challenges to the processes by 

which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts.” 

Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13–14 (emphasis added). Similarly, Falco involved a 

challenge to “the way that New York courts manage their own divorce and 
14

custody proceedings.” Falco, 805 F.3d at 427 (emphasis added). We learn 

from these cases that federal courts should refrain from interfering with core 

state court civil administrative processes, powers, and functions that allow 

the state courts to adjudicate the matters before them and enforce their 

judgments. But just as there is “no doctrine that the availability or even the 

pendency of state judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts,” NOPSI, 

491 U.S. at 373, Younger abstention does not prevent a federal court from 

exercising its jurisdiction simply because its decision might contradict a state 

court decision. 

Here, the probate court’s order recognizing the Commissioner’s lien 

and standing to participate in the proceedings neither “lies at the core of the 

administration of a State’s judicial system,” Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335, nor 

implicates a process that aids the state court’s core ability to function or force 

the parties to comply with its order. To the contrary, the probate court’s 

order merely affects how the executor administers the estate. In this case, 

moreover, there is no record of non-compliance with the probate court’s 
15

orders, and neither party challenges the probate court’s basic authority to 

enforce its orders or adjudicate the matters before it.5 

In holding otherwise, the District Court was primarily concerned that 

Cavanaugh’s challenge, as an attempt to relitigate the validity of the 

Commissioner’s lien, would “nullif[y]” the probate court’s determination. 

See Cavanaugh, 2021 WL 781796, at *3. Viewed correctly, however, the state 

suit in this case was no more than a run-of-the-mill challenge to a claim for 

money, while the related federal suit would not hinder the probate court’s 

basic authority to enforce its orders. As such, the state suit comes within 

none of the exceptions that Younger or Sprint established. 

The District Court also considered Connecticut’s interest in having its 

probate courts properly administer estates within their custody and the 

possibility that the probate court’s determination was reviewable on “appeal 

to the superior court.” See Cavanaugh, 2021 WL 781796, at *3. The District 

Court appears to have taken its cue in part from a 2005 decision of the Fourth 

5 Although the order also directed “[t]he fiduciary” to file a Financial Report/Final 

Account “in accordance with the provisions of the decedent’s Will,” Supp. App’x 16, 

it was not an order forcing the executor to distribute funds or to do anything on pain 

of contempt by the probate court. 
16

Circuit, Harper v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 396 F.3d 348

(4th Cir. 2005), which did not concern state probate proceedings but stated, in 

dictum, that “the law of probate, trusts, and estates — allocating the personal 

property of citizens — remains an important interest of the states for Younger

purposes.” Id. at 352–53. Harper preceded Sprint, which, in our view, casts 

serious doubt on the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Harper. With the benefit of 

Sprint, our sister Circuits have held that “Younger abstention is improper in 

civil cases outside of the two limited categories referred to [in Sprint], 

regardless of the subject matter or the importance of the state interest.” Cook 

v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Mulholland v. Marion 

Cnty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 819 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In the three categories of 

cases identified in Sprint, Younger abstention serves to reach an equitable 

accommodation of the states’ interest in enforcing their own laws with the 

need for federal protection of federal rights.”). We agree. Although the 

State’s interest in probate matters and the possibility of using the State’s 

appellate process may be important factors, they implicate the additional, 

non-dispositive Middlesex factors, which, as Sprint instructs, do not by 
17

themselves tell us whether the federal court should abstain. See Sprint, 571 

U.S. at 81. 

Because Cavanaugh’s federal action does not fall within Sprint’s third 

category, we conclude that abstention under Younger was not warranted.6

We therefore vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for the District 

Court to consider in the first instance the parties’ arguments regarding the 

probate exception to federal jurisdiction and, if necessary, the merits of 

Cavanaugh’s claims. See Eric M. Berman, P.C. v. City of New York, 796 F.3d 

171, 175 (2d Cir. 2015). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the Commissioner’s remaining arguments 

regarding whether the District Court properly abstained under Younger and 

conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we 

VACATE the judgment of the District Court and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

6 The Commissioner does not argue, nor did the District Court conclude, that 

abstention is proper under Sprint’s first or second categories, because the probate 

proceeding at issue is not at all similar to a state criminal prosecution or civil 

enforcement proceeding. See Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79–80.