IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Drew Williams, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

Department of Corrections, and :

Prison Liaison Unit, et al., : No. 65 M.D. 2023

Respondents : Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: April 3, 2024

Drew Williams (Williams), an inmate incarcerated in the State 

Correctional Institution at Somerset (SCI Somerset), has filed a pro se Petition for 

Review (Petition) seeking relief in mandamus in this Court’s original jurisdiction. 

Williams seeks an order directing the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 

(Department) or the Prison Liaison Unit of Philadelphia County (Liaison Unit) to 

recalculate the amount of sentence credit awarded to him for time served, pursuant 

to a sentencing order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

(sentencing court) dated September 29, 2017. Both the Department and the Liaison 

Unit have filed preliminary objections to the Petition. For the reasons discussed 

below, we sustain the preliminary objections. We dismiss Williams’s claim against 

the Department and transfer his claim against the Liaison Unit to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction.
2

I. Background

The Petition recites the following facts, which we accept as true for 

purposes of addressing preliminary objections.1 Williams has been incarcerated on 

various criminal charges since October 5, 2015. Pet., ¶ 4. On September 29, 2017, 

Williams was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years of 

imprisonment for various consolidated criminal offenses, as follows:

No. CP-51-CR-0012559-2015 – concurrent sentences totaling 8-16 years

No. CP-51-CR-0012560-2015 – consecutive sentence of 1-2 years

No. CP-51-CR-0012561-2015 – consecutive sentence of 1-2 years

No. CP-51-CR-0012562-2015 – concurrent sentence of 1-2 years

Id., ¶¶ 5-6 & Ex. A.

The sentencing court also ordered that Williams receive credit for time 

served. Pet., ¶ 6 & Ex. A. Williams alleges that the Department and the Liaison 

Unit are refusing to honor the sentencing court’s directive, in that he has been denied 

credit for 12 months of presentencing confinement. Id., ¶ 7. He also asserts that the 

failure to award credit for time served has resulted in an effective total sentence of 

11 to 20 years, thus rendering his minimum sentence more than half the length of 

his maximum sentence, in violation of Section 9756(b) of the Sentencing Code,

2 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9756(b). Pet., ¶¶ 9-10.

1

In ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, we accept as true all wellpleaded allegations of material fact in the Petition and all inferences reasonably deducible from 

those facts. Black v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 889 A.2d 672, 675 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). However, 

we do not accept as true any conclusions of law, unwarranted factual inferences, argumentative 

allegations, or expressions of opinion. Dodgson v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 922 A.2d 1023, 1027-28 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

2

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9701-9799.42.
3

II. Discussion

A. Mandamus Relief

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly held:

A proceeding in mandamus is an extraordinary action at 

common law and is available only to compel the 

performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where 

there exists no other adequate and appropriate remedy[,]

there is a clear legal right in the [petitioner], and a 

corresponding duty in the [respondent]. 

McCray v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 2005) (citing Jackson v. 

Vaughn, 777 A.2d 436, 438 (Pa. 2001)). With specific reference to inmate claims 

relating to credit for time served, our Supreme Court has observed:

The Commonwealth Court has routinely entertained 

Petitions for Review in the nature of mandamus seeking 

orders to compel the Department to apply credit for time 

served. . . . Where discretionary actions and criteria are 

not being contested, but rather the actions of the 

Department in computing an inmate’s maximum and 

minimum dates of confinement are being challenged, an 

action for mandamus remains viable as a means for 

examining whether statutory requirements have been met.

McCray, 872 A.2d at 1130-31 (footnote omitted) (first citing Alston v. Pa. Bd. of 

Prob. & Parole, 799 A.2d 875 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); then citing Saunders v. Dep’t of 

Corr., 749 A.2d 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); then citing Doxsey v. Bureau of Corr., 674 

A.2d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); and then citing Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. 

Commonwealth, 340 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975)).

B. The Department’s Preliminary Objection

The Department has filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a 

demurrer. The Department asserts that the Petition and its exhibits demonstrate that
4

Williams is not entitled to the credit he seeks and that he has established neither a 

clear right to relief nor a duty on the part of the Department to provide such relief. 

Specifically, the Department observes that Williams received a 

sentence on an unrelated conviction on January 5, 2017 (Previous Sentence 1). See

Pet., Ex. B. Although no credit for time served was awarded at that time, Williams 

received another sentence for another unrelated conviction on June 6, 2017 (Previous 

Sentence 2), at which point he received credit for time served from October 8, 2015 

through January 4, 2017, the day before the imposition of Previous Sentence 1. Id.

Thus, when Williams was sentenced for the offenses at issue here, he was given 

credit for only one additional day of credit, October 7, 2015, on which he was 

confined in relation to those offenses and for which he had not already received 

credit against time served.3 That day of credit was applied to Williams’s sentence at 

docket number CP-51-CR-0012559-2015. Pet., Exs. A & B. The Department thus 

posits that Williams has already received credit for all time served from October 7 

forward and that he is not entitled to seek a double credit. 

We agree with the Department’s analysis of this issue in all respects.4

The sentencing court ordered “credit for time served.” Pet., Ex. A. The 

order did not specify the amount of credit to be given. However, that issue is 

governed by Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, which mandates that 

the [sentencing] court shall give credit as follows:

3 The pleadings provide no explanation of the apparent discrepancy between the October 7 

beginning credit date and Williams’s assertion that he was in custody beginning two days earlier 

on October 5. That discrepancy is not material to our analysis except as it further illustrates that 

there is doubt regarding the amount of credit to which Williams was entitled for time served, which

undermines Williams’s assertion of a clear right to relief in mandamus, as discussed infra at 7-9.

4 The Department additionally argues that Williams is not entitled to mandamus relief 

because he had another remedy available in the form of an appeal of the sentencing order. Because 

we sustain the Department’s demurrer on other grounds, we do not reach this argument.
5

(1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum 

term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in 

custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a 

prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on 

which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit 

for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending 

sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.

(2) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum 

term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in 

custody under a prior sentence if he is later reprosecuted 

and resentenced for the same offense or for another 

offense based on the same act or acts. This shall include 

credit in accordance with paragraph (1) of this section for 

all time spent in custody as a result of both the original 

charge and any subsequent charge for the same offense or 

for another offense based on the same act or acts.

(3) If the defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if 

one of the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or 

collateral attack, credit against the maximum and any 

minimum term of the remaining sentences shall be given 

for all time served in relation to the sentence set aside since 

the commission of the offenses on which the sentences 

were based.

(4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later 

prosecuted on another charge growing out of an act or acts 

that occurred prior to his arrest, credit against the 

maximum term and any minimum term of any sentence 

resulting from such prosecution shall be given for all time 

spent in custody under the former charge that has not been 

credited against another sentence.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 (emphasis added); see also Bernardini v. Commonwealth (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 650 M.D. 2016, filed May 12, 2017), slip op. at 5

5

(explaining that “a 

defendant must be given credit for any days spent in custody before imposition of 

5 This unreported opinion is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s 

Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
6

his sentence, but only if such commitment is attributable to the offense for which the 

sentence was imposed”) (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 

358, 367 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

Exhibit B to the Petition indicates that Williams already received credit 

for time served from October 8, 2015, to January 4, 2017, in connection with his 

sentence relating to Previous Conviction 2. From January 5, 2017, forward, 

Williams was serving that sentence, so the time served beginning on that date was 

necessarily credited to that sentence. Therefore, the Petition itself establishes that 

Williams is not entitled to credit for any of that time as “time served” under the 

sentences at issue here.6 The Sentencing Code does not authorize application of 

credit against multiple unrelated sentences for the same time served; “Section 9760 

of the Sentencing Code ‘does not contemplate credit for time served to be awarded 

twice.’” Bernardini, slip op. at 5 (quoting Barndt v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 902 A.2d 

589, 595 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). Such a multiple credit would constitute “a windfall 

on sentencing for a completely unrelated crime . . . ,” which windfalls the Superior 

Court has rejected. Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 604 A.2d 723, 726 (Pa. Super. 

1992).

7 Like the Superior Court, in considering claims of credit for time served,

“[t]his [C]ourt does not deal in ‘volume discounts.’” Id.

6 To the extent that the Petition’s averment of improper credit conflicts with its exhibits, 

we note that, in considering preliminary objections, “‘[i]t is not necessary to accept as true any 

averments in the [Petition] that conflict with exhibits attached to it.’” Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 

A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); see also Vasilinda v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 440 

M.D. 2019, filed Jan. 6, 2021), slip op. at 7 (quoting Allen).

7

“Although not binding on this Court, Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions may be cited 

for their persuasive value when they address analogous issues.” City of Phila. v. Hart, 224 A.3d 

815, 821 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citing Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 

550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)).
7

Thus, we agree with the Department that Williams has failed to plead a 

claim in mandamus because he has already received the time credit he seeks. 

Further, because Williams is not owed any further credit for time served, we likewise 

reject his claim that the absence of credit effectively added time to his sentence and 

thereby rendered his minimum sentence more than half the length of his maximum 

sentence. 

Moreover, we sustain the Department’s demurrer for the additional 

reason that the sentencing court’s order is not sufficiently definite to support 

Williams’s clear entitlement to relief in mandamus or a corresponding duty on the 

part of the Department. This Court has repeatedly concluded that relief in mandamus 

is not available where a sentencing order merely orders credit for time served, 

without specifying the amount of time to be awarded. See, e.g., Canfield v. Pa. Dep’t 

of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 585 M.D. 2016, filed Aug. 11, 2017); Leonhauser v. Pa. 

Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 499 M.D. 2007, filed Apr. 4, 2008). As we 

explained in Canfield:

Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct an error in 

[the Department’s] computation of maximum and 

minimum dates of confinement where the sentencing order 

clearly gives the inmate credit for the time period in 

question and [the Department’s] computation does not 

comply with that credit. . . . It cannot be used to challenge 

[the Department’s] failure to give credit where the 

sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not provide 

the credit at issue. . . . The requirements for mandamus 

cannot be satisfied in those circumstances because there is 

no clear right to relief and because the inmate has an 

adequate and more appropriate alternative remedy of 

seeking modification or clarification of the sentence in the 

trial court. . . .

[The p]etitioner’s averments here do not satisfy the 

requirements for mandamus. The only alleged error in [the 
8

Department’s] sentence calculation is that it gave [the 

p]etitioner 149 days for time served rather than 730 days. 

The . . . sentencing order did not provide that [the 

p]etitioner was to receive credit for 730 days or any other 

specific number of days against his sentence. Rather, the 

trial court ordered that Petitioner receive “credit for time 

served.” . . . Nothing in the petition for review supports a 

conclusion that [the Department’s] . . . calculation failed 

to give [the p]etitioner full credit for all time served.

Canfield, slip op. at 3-4 (first citing Oakman v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 903 A.2d 106, 

108-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); then citing Black v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 889 A.2d 672, 

677 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); then citing Saunders, 749 A.2d at 556; then citing McCray, 

872 A.2d at 1132-33; and then citing Hoyt v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 79 A.3d 741, 742-

43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).

Similarly, in Leonhauser, this Court reasoned:

We agree with [the p]etitioner that, pursuant to 42 Pa. 

C.S. § 9760(1)[,] he is entitled to credit for the time spent 

in custody on a criminal charge prior to sentencing on that 

charge. We also agree with [the p]etitioner that a writ of 

mandamus may be brought to compel the Department to 

apply credit for time served. . . . However, we disagree 

with [the p]etitioner that he has [pleaded] facts which 

establish that he has a clear legal right to the credit . . . .

. . . Here, the trial court awarded credit for time served, but 

failed to specify the amount of credit it was awarding. The 

Department cannot speculate as to the time to be credited 

based on its own review of the record or calculate the 

award of credit based on the claims of [the p]etitioner. . . .

Leonhauser, slip op. at 4 (citing McCray, 872 A.2d at 1133).

Here, as in Canfield and Leonhauser, the sentencing court awarded 

credit for time served but did not specify the amount of credit to be given. Williams

has not pleaded facts establishing a clear right to credit for the number of days 

Williams claims he is owed for pre-sentencing time served in relation to the offenses 
9

at issue here. At best, there is doubt on that issue, as the exhibits to the Petition 

indicate that Williams already received credit for the same time period in relation to 

other offenses. Accordingly, we are persuaded by our reasoning in Canfield and 

Leonhauser that a claim in mandamus will not lie.

For these reasons, we sustain the Department’s preliminary objection 

to the Petition.

C. The Liaison Unit’s Preliminary Objection

The Liaison Unit also preliminarily objects to the Petition, albeit on a 

different basis. The Liaison Unit asserts that it is part of the Unified Judicial System 

and that, as such, it is not subject to any order in mandamus from this Court in its 

original jurisdiction. Williams does not directly dispute the Liaison Unit’s 

contention but maintains that the proper course is not dismissal of the claim, but 

rather, transfer to our Supreme Court. We agree with both parties’ arguments.

The Liaison Unit explains that it is part of the Office of Judicial Records 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Office of Judicial Records); 

as such, the Liaison Unit is an entity of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania. 

We agree. See Commonwealth v. Williams (Pa. Super., Nos. 1263-1265 EDA 2020, 

filed June 14, 2022), slip op. at 7, 2022 WL 21271318(describing the Liaison Unit 

as part of the Office of Judicial Records); Silas v. Off. of Jud. Recs. (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 223 M.D. 2020, filed Mar. 22, 2021), slip op. at 5 (explaining that the Office of 

Judicial Records is part of the First Judicial District) (quoting In re: Transfer of 

8 Unreported decisions of the Superior Court dated after May 1, 2019 may be cited as 

persuasive pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 

126(b), and Section 37 of the Superior Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 65.37.
10

Duties of Prothonotary & Clerk of Quarter Sessions of Phila., First Judicial Dist. of 

Pa. (Pa., Judicial Administration Docket No. 412, filed September 30, 2013)).

As this Court has previously explained, only our Supreme Court has 

jurisdiction over a mandamus claim against a judicial entity:

[T]he Judicial Code provides that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has “original but not exclusive jurisdiction 

of all cases of . . . [m]andamus or prohibition to courts of 

inferior jurisdiction.” . . . The Judicial Code further 

provides that “[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have 

original jurisdiction in cases of mandamus and prohibition 

to courts of inferior jurisdiction and other government 

units where such relief is ancillary to matters within its 

appellate jurisdiction. . . .” [T]he Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court, when interpreting a similarly worded provision of 

the Judicial Code governing the Superior Court’s original 

jurisdiction over mandamus actions involving a court of 

common pleas,[] held that the Superior Court only had 

“jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus . . . where an 

appeal properly within its appellate jurisdiction is pending 

before that court and where the issuance of such a writ is 

necessary to protect that court’s appellate jurisdiction.” . 

. . Because no appeal was pending, “there was no predicate 

for the Superior Court's exercise of jurisdiction. . . .”

. . . Accordingly, we agree with [the r]espondent that this 

Court does not have jurisdiction and sustain its 

preliminary objections.

Silas, slip op. at 4-5 (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Section 

721 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 721; then quoting Section 761(c) of the 

Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c); and then quoting Mun. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Court of 

Common Pleas, 489 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa. 1985)); see also Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(a)

(providing that “[t]he [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court shall exercise general 

supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts . . . ”); 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 721(a)

(conferring upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court original, though not exclusive, 
11

jurisdiction over, inter alia, mandamus claims against courts of inferior jurisdiction) &

1701 (conferring upon our Supreme Court “general supervisory and administrative 

authority over the unified judicial system”).

Here, as in Silas and Municipal Publications, there is no pending appeal 

to which the Petition’s request for mandamus relief is ancillary. Therefore, we agree 

with the Liaison Unit that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Williams’s claim against 

the Liaison Unit. Such jurisdiction lies solely with the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court.9

Nonetheless, because our Supreme Court has jurisdiction, we are not 

permitted to dismiss the claim. Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code provides:

(a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to 

or brought in a court or magisterial district of this 

Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the 

appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial district 

judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, 

but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal 

of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter 

shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee 

tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was 

first filed in a court or magisterial district of this 

Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of a court or magisterial district judge of this 

Commonwealth but which is commenced in any other 

tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the 

other tribunal to the proper court or magisterial district of 

this Commonwealth where it shall be treated as if 

originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial 

district of this Commonwealth on the date when first filed 

in the other tribunal.

9 Because we lack jurisdiction over Williams’s claim against the Liaison Unit, we do not 

reach the Liaison Unit’s additional argument that it is not the entity responsible for calculating 

sentence credit for time served.
12

42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a). Because we lack jurisdiction over William’s mandamus claim 

against the Liaison Unit, Section 5103(a) requires us to transfer that claim to our 

Supreme Court. See Silas, slip op. at 5-6 (quoting Section 5103(a)); see generally

Lichtman v. Feder (Pa. Super. No. 2551 EDA 2019, filed Mar. 2, 2020), 2020 WL 

996749 (citing and discussing Municipal Publications and transferring a mandamus 

claim against the administrator of the Office of Judicial Records to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction).

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, we sustain the Department’s 

preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer and dismiss Williams’s claim 

against the Department. We sustain the Liaison Unit’s preliminary objection 

asserting lack of jurisdiction and transfer Williams’s claim against the Liaison Unit 

to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

 

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Drew Williams, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

Department of Corrections, and :

Prison Liaison Unit, et al., : No. 65 M.D. 2023

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of April, 2024, the preliminary objections of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) and the 

Prison Liaison Unit (Liaison Unit) are SUSTAINED. The claim against the 

Department is DISMISSED. The claim against the Liaison Unit is TRANSFERRED 

to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a).

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge