NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JEFFREY NATHAN SCHIRRIPA,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5070

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-01031-SGB, Judge Susan G. 

Braden.

______________________ 

Decided: September 9, 2015 

______________________ 

JEFFREY NATHAN SCHIRRIPA, Kinnelon, NJ, pro se.

ERIN MURDOCK-PARK, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CHEN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
2 SCHIRRIPA v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Jeffrey Nathan Schirripa filed claims at the United 

States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) seeking 

money for an “antiterrorism technology” that he believes 

combats an unspecified threat to the United States. The 

court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, and for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Because the court did not err, we 

affirm.

I.

This is the second time Mr. Schirripa has appealed a 

Claims Court decision to this court. The prior case involved claims for compensation concerning what appears 

to be the same alleged antiterrorism technology. See

Schirripa v. United States, 570 F. App’x 938 (Fed. Cir. 

2014). In that appeal, this court affirmed the lower 

court’s decision to dismiss the claims for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Id. at 939. 

In the present appeal, Mr. Schirripa alleges claims 

under the “bounty” provision of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 

States, the “seizure” clause of 50 U.S.C. § 212, and 18 

U.S.C. § 3071. The claims are based on his allegations 

that there is an “unconventional” and “significant” threat 

to the United States, which obligates the government to 

procure, seize, and compensate him for the antiterrorism 

technology. 

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) to 

review the Claims Court’s final decision. We review de 

novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Todd Const., L.P. v. United States, 

656 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
SCHIRRIPA v. US 3

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under 

the Claims Court’s Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must allege 

facts ‘plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ a 

showing of entitlement to relief.” Acceptance Ins. Cos., 

Inc. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 

(2007)). The facts as alleged “must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true 

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(citations omitted).

We find that the Claims Court properly held that the 

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. In particular, we agree that the allegations are 

speculative and lack a specific prayer for relief. See 

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (proper to 

dismiss complaint as factually frivolous if facts alleged 

are “clearly baseless, . . . a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, . . . , fantastic, . . . and delusional”) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

III.

We have considered Mr. Schirripa’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit.1 Because Mr. Schirripa’s claims were properly dismissed for 

failure to state a claim, the decision of the Claims Court is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

No costs.

1 We have considered Mr. Schirripa’s various motions, including those to “expedite arbitration,” for “default judgment,” and for “summary judgment.” We find 

the motions without merit and therefore deny them.