F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

FEB 18 2000

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BRIAN C. PRINCE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-3081

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

(D.C. No. 98-CR-20005)

Submitted on the briefs:

Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney and Leon Patton, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, James P. Moran, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.

KELLY , Circuit Judge.
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

-2-

Defendant was indicted on one count of bank robbery in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He entered into a plea agreement with the United States,

agreeing to plead guilty to the offense. In exchange, the government agreed that

it would not oppose a three-level reduction in the applicable offense level under

the United States Sentencing Guidelines (guidelines) for acceptance of

responsibility and that it would not take any position on the sentence to be

imposed within the applicable guideline range. The district court declined to

apply the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Defendant now

appeals his sentence, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement

and that the district court erred in not crediting him with a reduction in his

offense level for acceptance of responsibility.1

We review de novo defendant’s assertion that the government violated the

plea agreement. See United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 565 (10th Cir. 1995). 

The district court’s denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is

entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless it is without

foundation. See United States v. Amos, 984 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 (10th Cir. 1993). 

Application of the guidelines to the facts is a question of fact that we review for
-3-

clear error. See id. at 1072. However, “[p]ure questions of interpretation of the

sentencing guidelines, which are closely analogous to questions of statutory

interpretation, are questions of law,” which we review de novo. Id. Guided by

these standards, we affirm.

While defendant was in custody awaiting sentencing, the government

received FBI reports indicating that defendant stabbed another prisoner. The

government passed the reports on to the probation department, and the probation

officer included the information in his presentence investigation report. The

probation officer recommended in the report that defendant not receive the

reduction for acceptance of responsibility because defendant’s actions were

inconsistent with a “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct.” 

USSG § 3E1.1, comment (n.1(b)).

Defendant first argues that the government violated the plea agreement by

providing the probation department with the FBI reports of defendant’s criminal

conduct that occurred while he awaited sentencing. The government agreed not to

oppose a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The

presentence investigation report prepared by the probation department reflected

the government’s lack of opposition to the reduction, and the government did not

actively oppose, or otherwise comment on, the reduction at the sentencing

hearing. Cf. United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1996)
-4-

(holding that government accomplished through indirect means what it promised

not to do directly when prosecutor qualified its lack of opposition through

comments at sentencing).

The plea agreement must be construed according to what defendant

reasonably understood at the time he made the agreement. See United States v.

Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th Cir. 1991) (government may inform the court of

relevant conduct occurring subsequent to the plea agreement without violating

plea agreement provisions concerning a sentencing recommendation). The

agreement cannot be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting the government from

informing the sentencing court of conduct relevant to sentencing. “In fact, the

prosecutor has an ethical duty to disclose such information which, in this case,

postdated the parties’ plea agreement.” Id.; see also United States v. Hand, 913

F.2d 854, 856 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (contrasting cases where prosecutor argued

opposite position of that agreed upon in plea agreement and holding that

prosecutor’s cross-examination was not breach of plea agreement, but rather

fulfilled prosecutor’s responsibility to inform the court “so that its decision would

not be tainted by incomplete and inaccurate information”). It is not a reasonable

interpretation of the plea agreement to “require the judge to sentence in the dark.” 

Jimenez, 928 F.2d at 363 (further quotation omitted). The government did not
-5-

violate the plea agreement by supplying the probation department with the reports

of defendant’s post-plea agreement criminal conduct. See id. at 363-64.

Defendant also argues that the district court erred in denying the acceptance

of responsibility reduction based on the reports that he stabbed a fellow prisoner

because that criminal activity was unrelated to the criminal conduct for which he

was convicted. The guidelines state that voluntary withdrawal from criminal

conduct is a relevant consideration in deciding whether to grant a reduction for

acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment (n.1(b)). The

guidelines do not, however, qualify that factor to permit consideration of only

criminal conduct related to or of the same nature as the offense of conviction.

The majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue have held that,

in deciding whether to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant

to § 3E1.1, a sentencing court is entitled to consider whether a defendant has

voluntarily withdrawn from criminal conduct, regardless of whether the conduct is

similar or related to the criminal conduct for which a defendant was convicted. 

See United States v. O’Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 600-01 (1st Cir. 1991); United States

v. Ceccarini, 98 F.3d 126, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Watkins, 911

F.2d 983, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144

(7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 (11th Cir. 1994); but see United States v.
-6-

Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 1993). We join the majority of circuits and

hold that the guidelines do not prohibit a sentencing court from considering, in its

discretion, criminal conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction in determining

whether a defendant qualifies for an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility

under § 3E1.1. Consequently, the district court’s denial of an adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility based on reports of defendant’s criminal conduct in

prison while awaiting sentencing was not legal error.

Finally, defendant has the burden to show he is entitled to an adjustment

for acceptance of responsibility. See Amos, 984 F.2d at 1073. We agree with the

district court that defendant did not meet his burden. Defendant objected to

inclusion in the presentence investigation report of the information contained in

the FBI reports on the basis that he had not been “charged or found guilty of the

unlawful conduct alleged by the report.” R. Vol. I, Tab 50 at 1. Defendant did

not, however, dispute or offer any evidence against the fact or accuracy of the

witness accounts. The district court’s decision not to grant the adjustment

because defendant had not met his burden was not clear error.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.