alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2006049EN.01000501.xml

| 21.2.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 49/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.2.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 49/5

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 303/2006

of 20 February 2006

on the issue of system B export licences in the fruit and vegetables sector (lemons and apples)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1961/2001 of 8 October 2001 on detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as regards export refunds on fruit and vegetables (2), and in particular Article 6(6) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 2044/2005 (3) fixes the indicative quantities for which system B export licences may be issued. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2044/2005 (3) fixes the indicative quantities for which system B export licences may be issued.

| (2) | In the light of the information available to the Commission today, there is a risk that the indicative quantities laid down for the current export period for lemons and apples will shortly be exceeded. This overrun will prejudice the proper working of the export refund scheme in the fruit and vegetables sector. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In the light of the information available to the Commission today, there is a risk that the indicative quantities laid down for the current export period for lemons and apples will shortly be exceeded. This overrun will prejudice the proper working of the export refund scheme in the fruit and vegetables sector.

| (3) | To avoid this situation, applications for system B licences for lemons and apples after 21 February 2006 should be rejected until the end of the current export period, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

To avoid this situation, applications for system B licences for lemons and apples after 21 February 2006 should be rejected until the end of the current export period,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Applications for system B export licences for lemons and apples submitted pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 2044/2005, export declarations for which are accepted after 21 February and before 17 March 2006, are hereby rejected.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 21 February 2006.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 20 February 2006.

For the Commission

J. L. DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 297, 21.11.1996, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 47/2003 (OJ L 7, 11.1.2003, p. 64).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 268, 9.10.2001, p. 8. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 386/2005 (OJ L 62, 9.3.2005, p. 3).

2

(3)  
  OJ L 328, 15.12.2005, p. 54.

3

---
```

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 103 (Friday, May 27, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33669-33670]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-12630]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-9947-10-OARM]

National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and 
Technology; Notice of Charter Renewal

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice; charter renewal.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notice is hereby given that the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has determined that, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C.
    App. 2, the National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and 
Technology (NACEPT) is a necessary committee which is in the public 
interest. Accordingly, NACEPT will be renewed for an additional two-
year period. The purpose of NACEPT is to provide advice and 
recommendations to the Administrator of EPA on a broad range of 
environmental policy, technology and management issues. Inquiries may 
be directed to Eugene Green, U.S. EPA, (Mail Code 1601M), 1200 
Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20460, telephone (202) 564-
2432, or green.eugene@epa.gov.

[[Page 33670]]

    Dated: May 5, 2016.
Donna J. Vizian,
Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Administration and Resources 
Management.
[FR Doc. 2016-12630 Filed 5-26-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Share and per share amounts have been adjusted to reflect the effects
recapitalization and initial public offering in October 1995 and the
subsequent stock split in March 1996.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000949298
<NAME> CENTRAL PARKING CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996             SEP-30-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996             SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                           28605                   10218
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    11998                   12503
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 45422                   26521
<PP&E>                                           38188                   24279
<DEPRECIATION>                                    3420                    2882
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  107212                   70440
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            25715                   23845
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                           175                     160
<OTHER-SE>                                       76618                   41200
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    107212                   70440
<SALES>                                         143316                  126155
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                147452                  128060
<CGS>                                           108965                   96842
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   126384                  112553
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  21068                   15507
<INCOME-TAX>                                      7232                    5563
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0                       0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                     13836                    9944
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .79                     .65
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .79                     .65
        


</TABLE>
#### William Taft AHLSTROM, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jerry B. ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20072.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 9, 1986.

Barbara E. Ochoa, Provo, for defendant and appellant.

Douglas F. White, Tooele, for plaintiff and respondent,

PER CURIAM:

Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment entered by the court below. We dismiss the appeal, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction.

An amended default judgment was entered March 19, 1984, in an action alleging breach of a uniform real estate contract. Defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment was heard and taken under advisement by the court on June 11, 1984. That same day, an unsigned minute entry was entered by the clerk indicating that the motion had been denied. No final order was thereafter signed or entered in the record.

An unsigned minute entry is not a final, appealable order. *See Utah State Tax Commission v. Erekson,*714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1986); and cases cited therein. This Court cannot consider an appeal in the absence of a final order, signed by the court and supported, when appropriate, by findings of fact and conclusions of law. *Wilson v. Manning,*645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah R.App.P. 3(a).

Defendant’s appeal is dismissed. No costs awarded.1

1

. *See*Utah R.App.P. 34. While defendant has responsibility to see that his appeal is properly taken from a final order, plaintiff could have avoided the delay and his costs incurred by filing a timely motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. *Cf. Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co.,*495 F.2d 906 (10th Cir.1974).
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03- 08 -00 309 -CR Bobb y J oe Luc e Jr . , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas , Appellee F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 04- 206- K2 77 , HO NORAB LE KEN ANDERSO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E MO R

A N D UM O P I N I O N Appellant B obby

J oe L uce, Jr. has filed a motion to dismiss his appea l. The motion is signed by appellant and complies with the require ments of rule 42.2. See Tex. R. App. P . 42.2(a) . We gr ant the motion and dismiss t he appe al. Id .

__________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________ David Puryear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Puryear and He nson Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: Mar ch 13, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6288** 

LA ’ RON MARSHALL , Plaintiff

– Appellant ,
v. HARLEY LAPPIN, Director of the BOP; K. M. WHITE, Mid

- Atlantic Regional Dir.; JAMES CROSS, Warden USP Hazelton; DEBBIE LO HR, DHO Official of USP

- Hazelton; CONSTANCE REESE, Warden FCI Talladega , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia , at Elkins
. John Preston Bailey, Chief District Judge. ( 2:10

- cv - 00003

- JPB

- DJJ )

Submitted : October 31, 2011 Decided: November 29, 2011

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
.
La’Ron Marshall, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: La’Ron Marshall appeals the district court ’ s order s : accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his complaint filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Na rcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ; and denying his motion for reconsideration . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Marshall v. Lappin , No. 2:10

- cv - 00003

- JPB

- DJJ (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 23, 2010 ; Feb. 2, 2011 ) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
<PAGE>
                                                                               .
                                                                               .
                                                                               .

                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1

STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                    2004        2003        2002        2001        2000
                                                    ----        ----        ----        ----        ----
<S>                                              <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>          <C>
Income (loss) from continuing operations         $  25,587   $  15,321   $   2,041   $  (26,037)  $  (3,159)
Add fixed charges                                   31,455      34,662      33,893       32,055      29,117
                                                 ---------   ---------   ---------   ----------   ---------
Earnings (as defined)                            $  57,042   $  49,983   $  35,934   $    6,018   $  25,958
                                                 ---------   ---------   ---------   ----------   ---------
Fixed charges:
  Interest expense                                   5,139       5,223       4,690        5,981       5,442
  Amortization of debt issuance costs                  568         943         258          197         172
  Estimated interest component of rent expenses     25,748      28,496      28,945       25,877      23,503
                                                 ---------   ---------   ---------   ----------   ---------
Total fixed charges                              $  31,455   $  34,662   $  33,893   $   32,055   $  29,117
                                                 ---------   ---------   ---------   ----------   ---------

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges (1)                1.81x       1.45x       1.06x          --          --
Deficiency in earnings to cover fixed charges           --          --          --   $   26,037   $   3,159
</TABLE>

(1) The "ratio of earnings to fixed charges" represents earnings divided by
   fixed charges, as defined in the following paragraph. The "deficiency"
   represents the amount of fixed charges in excess of earnings.

   For purposes of computing the ratio of earnings to fixed charges, earnings
   consist of earnings (loss) from continuing operations before income taxes and
   change in accounting principle plus fixed charges. Fixed charges consist of
   interest expense, amortization of debt issuance costs, and one-third of rent
   expense, which is deemed to be representative of interest expense.
#### Mario Chiulli et al., Appellants, v Harry Reiter et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

In an action, *inter alia,*to set aside the authorization of a mortgage given by the officers and directors of Cross Westchester Development Corp., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Di Noto, J.), dated September 14, 1989, which granted the motion of the defendant Citytrust to dismiss the plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action to set aside a mortgage held by Citytrust on certain property.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs, payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

Business Corporation Law § 911 states that the board of directors "may authorize any mortgage * * * of * * * all or any part of the corporate property, or any interest therein. Unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, no vote or consent of shareholders shall be required to approve such action by the board”. Since the certificate of incorporation of Cross Westchester Development Corp. does not restrict the authority of its board of directors to mortgage corporate property, it was within the board’s power to authorize the subject mortgage. The fact that there is a clause in the bylaws restricting corporate action without a majority vote of the shareholders is, in this respect, of no effect, and the plaintiffs’ argument based on that clause fails *(see, Polchinski Co. v Cemetery Floral Co.,*79 AD2d 648, 649; *see, Model, Roland & Co. v Industrial Acoustics Co.,*16 NY2d 703, 705).

In a prior appeal involving these parties, *Chiulli v Cross Westchester Dev. Corp.*(134 AD2d 559), this court canceled a notice of pendency filed against the subject property on December 2, 1985, since a prior notice of pendency regarding the same property and action had been canceled because of their failure to effect timely service of process. A plaintiff "cannot avoid the mandatory statutory requirements of CPLR 6512 and 6514 (a) simply by refiling the notice of pendency” *(Gargano v Rubin,*130 AD2d 709, 710). Furthermore, "[a] *lis pendens,*invalid for failure to comply with the mandate of the statute, is a nullity; it cannot be validated by reason of any act done or any knowledge acquired by third parties” *(Skoler v*
      *673
      *Rimberg,*20 AD2d 580, 581). Thus, properly characterizing the plaintiffs’ notice of pendency filed December 2, 1985, as a nullity, it is clear that it never had any legal significance and did not provide Citytrust with constructive notice of any intended legal protection to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the sixth cause of action challenging the mortgage held by Citytrust, was properly dismissed. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Brown and Balletta, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v *879Lewis Teage, Respondent.

Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Zelman, J.), dated September 20, 1989, which, after a hearing, granted that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Pursuant to a radio call concerning a dispute involving a gun, the police arrived at an Amoco service station where they encountered both the defendant and the complainant, Joseph Easton. Easton informed the police that he was employed by the owner of the station and that he had been left in charge that day. He further revealed that he had had a dispute with the defendant approximately 10 minutes before the police arrived. During the course of the altercation, the defendant had allegedly produced a firearm from his waistband and threatened Easton with it. Easton further informed the police that the gun had been left in a storage area adjoining the office and was possibly in a cabinet located in that room. After a brief search, the officer retrieved the gun, which Easton identified as the one with which the defendant had threatened him.

The search of the storage area was justified on the ground that the police justifiably relied upon " 'the apparent capability of [Easton] to consent to a search and the circumstances reasonably indicate[d] that [he] did, in fact, have the authority to consent’ ” *(People v Adams,*53 NY2d 1, 9, *cert denied*454 US 854; *People v George,*150 AD2d 486, 487). There is nothing in the present record to suggest that Easton did not have the apparent authority to consent to the warrantless search *(see, People v Mills,*159 AD2d 520, 521).

Moreover, the testimony adduced was insufficient to establish that the defendant and the owner of the service station were partners on the date of the incident. The defendant failed to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy sufficient to afford him standing to challenge the search of the storage room or the seizure of the gun.

Accordingly, the hearing court erred in suppressing the physical evidence. Brown, J. P., Kunzeman, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
NO. 06-14-00186-CR, 06-14-00187-CR, 06-14-00188-CR

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA DARRIAN DE’ANTHONY DAVIS-SANDERS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

* * * * * APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLATE BRIEF * * * * *

DONALD K. HOOVER

Counsel for Appellant Bar I.D. No. 24053019 414 W. Sam Rayburn Bonham, Texas 75418 903/820-8464 (Telephone) 972/767-4355 (Facsimile)

NO. 06-14-00186-CR, 06-14-00187-CR, 06-14-00188-CR ACCEPTED 06-14-00186-CR SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 3/16/2015 2:12:21 PM DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERKNO. 06-14-00186-CR, 06-14-00187-CR, 06-14-00188-CR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA DARRIAN DE’ANTHONY DAVIS-SANDERS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee * * * * * APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLATE BRIEF * * * * * TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA: Comes now the Appellant, by and th rough his counsel of record, and respectfully requests this Court grant him anextension of time to file his appellant brief in the above named causes, pursuant to Rule 10 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. On September 19, 2014, the Appellant was adjudicated and sentenced to 60 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On October 17, 2014 the Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal. Mr. Davis -Sanders also filed a motion for new trialon October 17, 2014, which was denied by operation of law. The reporter’s record and clerk’s record were with the Court on or about February 12, 2015. Counsel for the Appe llant received the clerk’s and reporter’s records on the same date. The Appellant’s brief is due on March 16, 2015. Counsel for the Appellant was in trial, three of the last four weeks. Additional time is necessary for Appellant’s counsel to finish review of the record, research and identify the grounds for appeal, and consult with the Appellant to draft a brief. Appellant counsel now makes his first re quest for an extension of time to file the Appellant’s Brief. The Appellant re quests an extension of time until April 16, 2015 to file the Appellant’s brief. This reque st is not for the purpose of delay, but so that justice may be done. WHEREFORE, the Appellant prays that the Court grant this motion for extension of time in which to file his appellate brief in this case. Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Donald Hoover Donald Hoover Counsel for Appellant Bar I.D. No. 24053019 414 W. Sam Rayburn Bonham, Texas 75418 (903) 820-8464 (Telephone) (972) 767-4355 (Facsimile)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellate Brief has been mailed via firs t-class mail, or hand-delivered, on March 12, 2015, to: Via Hand Delivery Fannin County District Attorney’s Office Fannin County Courthouse 101 E. Sam Rayburn Bonham, Texas 75418 Via first-class mail Mr. Darrian D. Davis-Sanders #01957802 Eastham Unit- TDCJ 2665 Prison Road #1 Lovelady, Texas 75851

/s/ Donald Hoover Donald Hoover