This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-1644

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Ronaldo Earl Rounds,

Appellant.

Filed August 25, 2014

Affirmed

Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-11-20573

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

John L. Lucas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

REILLY, Judge

The state convicted appellant Ronaldo Rounds of two second-degree controlledsubstance crimes based on the seizure of drugs from his car. Rounds challenges the

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found after a citizen 
2

informant’s tip led police to search his vehicle. Because probable cause existed to search 

his vehicle, we affirm. 

FACTS

In the evening hours of October 1, 2010, Minneapolis police officers Scott Aikins 

and Jesse Lopez were patrolling a small beat in the Lake Street and Lyndale Avenue area

of Minneapolis. That same day, the officers received a citizen complaint, stating that a

car in a parking lot was being used to sell narcotics. The citizen caller, who provided his 

contact information, gave a description of the car and a description of the car’s driver. 

After receiving the call, Officer Aikins drove a marked squad car to the specified location 

and identified the car described in the 911 call. Officer Aikins parked the squad car, and 

both officers approached the car on foot. Rounds was sitting in the driver’s seat. 

Officer Aikins asked Rounds for his identification and asked a few general 

questions to investigate the call. Officer Aikins testified that he was looking for signs of 

narcotics due to the nature of the call. While Rounds was retrieving his driver’s license 

and insurance card, Officer Aikins saw that the interior console area looked broken and 

dismantled. This observation made Officer Aikins suspicious because he had been on 

multiple calls where narcotics were hidden in car compartments or “tucked up” in a 

broken area of a dashboard. Officer Aikins also noticed that, when Rounds pulled out his 

license, “he had an overly large full billfold full of paper money.” Officer Aikins took 

Rounds’s identification and went back to the squad car to run routine checks. 

After returning to the squad car, Officer Aikins contacted the 911 caller for more 

information. From this call, Officer Aikins learned that this was the second time that day
3

that the caller called 911 to report suspicious activity. The caller further reported that 

individuals would approach Rounds’s car, there would be a short conversation at the 

window, some sort of exchange would occur at the window between hands, and the 

individuals would walk away, with their hands closed, like “they were holding 

something.”

Officer Aikins then returned to Rounds’s car and had him exit and sit in the back 

seat of the squad car. Initially, Officer Aikins intended to detain, and possibly arrest, 

Rounds for loitering with the purpose of selling narcotics. But at the time, the officers

did not tell Rounds that he was under arrest. The officers then returned to Rounds’s car 

to see if they could observe anything from outside the car. While approaching, Officer

Aikins noticed an empty, thin cellophane wrapper that he referred to as a “crack wrapper”

near the car. Officer Aikins testified that he had seen many of these types of wrappers 

used to package narcotics and thought the wrapper had not been there long because it was 

extremely light and “[a]ny kind of wind or anything” could blow it away. 

After finding the wrapper, Officer Aikins requested a canine unit to sniff around 

the car to determine if narcotics were inside the car. Approximately 15 minutes later, a 

canine unit arrived. After informing the canine officer of what the officers had observed, 

the canine officer walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog stopped at the driver’s 

door and attempted to climb into the window. The canine officer opened the door and 

allowed the dog inside the vehicle to prevent the dog from jumping through the window 

and damaging the car. The dog indicated that drugs were in the center console area. 

Officer Aikins opened the console and found Rounds’s prescription medication and a 
4

package of cigarettes with small white pieces wrapped in plastic inside. Chemical testing 

confirmed that the suspected narcotics were crack and powder cocaine. 

Rounds moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing that the 

officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him and lacked probable cause to 

search his vehicle. The district court denied Rounds’s motion to suppress, stating that 

“by contacting the [informant] and having a far more detailed conversation about exactly 

what had been observed, gave the officer a sufficient basis to proceed as he did.”

Rounds waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a stipulated-facts trial 

pursuant to the procedure in Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, previously referred to as a 

Lothenbach proceeding. See State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1980). The 

district court found Rounds guilty of two second-degree controlled-substance counts and 

sentenced him to imprisonment. 

Rounds appeals.

D E C I S I O N

On appeal, Rounds challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. 

When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we 

independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district 

court erred by not suppressing the evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 

1999). The validity of a search or seizure is a question of law, which is reviewed de 

novo. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011).

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a person’s right to 

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. 
5

art. I, § 10. With a few exceptions, warrantless searches are unreasonable. Katz v. 

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967). “Evidence obtained as a 

result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d 

at 842. A law enforcement officer may, however, “consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehicle if “the officer has a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 

N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 

1884 (1968)). We review de novo the legal issue of whether reasonable, articulable 

suspicion exists. Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 777 N.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Minn. App. 

2010).

An officer must be able to articulate a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the person of criminal activity before the seizure. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 

388, 391 (Minn. 1995). The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, demands less than 

the standard for probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence, but requires more 

than a hunch. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843. “[W]e consider the totality of the 

circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to 

make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained 

person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001). The totality of the 

circumstances include “the officer’s general knowledge and experience, the officer’s 

personal observations, information the officer has received from other sources, the nature 

of the offense suspected, the time, the location, and anything else that is relevant.” 

Appelgate v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987).
6

Rounds first argues that the initial stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion 

because the citizen informant did not articulate a reliable basis of knowledge and the 

police did not corroborate the information. The state counters that the informant’s report 

to officers was reliable and established reasonable, articulable suspicion for the 

investigatory stop. 

The factual basis necessary to support an investigatory stop may arise from the 

personal observations of the police officer or from information provided by another 

person. Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2005). 

An informant’s tip may be adequate to support an investigative stop if the tip has 

sufficient indicia of reliability. In re Welfare of G. M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 

1997). When examining the sufficiency of an informant’s tip to provide reasonable, 

articulable suspicion for a stop, we examine two factors: (1) identification of the 

informant and (2) facts supporting the informant’s basis of knowledge. Rose v. Comm’r 

of Pub. Safety, 637 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 12, 

2002). Neither factor is dispositive, and the overall determination of reasonable 

suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Here, the officers received a 

tip from a private citizen who was working at a business bordering the parking lot.

Tips from private citizens are presumed reliable, especially when informants “give 

information about their identity so that the police can locate them if necessary.” State v. 

Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 183 (Minn. 2007). In addition, the Supreme Court recently 

concluded that an informant’s “use of the 911 system is . . . one of the relevant 

circumstances that, taken together, [may] justif[y] the officer’s reliance on the 
7

information reported in the 911 call.” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690

(2014). The district court found that the citizen informant made “detailed first-person 

observations of a car, a license plate, a color, a description, ongoing activity, and activity 

that was consistent with narcotics dealing.” 

We agree with the district court that the citizen informant’s tip was sufficiently 

reliable. The citizen informant used the 911 system to call in and report suspected 

narcotics dealing. The citizen informant left a call-back number, which the officers later 

called to gather additional information about the suspected narcotics dealing. The

officers knew the location of the citizen informant at a business approximately 35 feet 

from Rounds’s car. Additionally, the citizen informant told the officers that although he 

never saw actual drugs, he did make personal observations: “[H]e saw people making 

exchanges in the door, in the window, and then walking away with their hands clenched, 

as if they were holding something small enough to fit in the palm of their hand.” 

Because the citizen informant provided identifying information and details about 

Rounds that the police officers’ observations corroborated, the officers had reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support expanding their investigatory stop. 

See, e.g., Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1988) (concluding that 

when a person, who identified himself as an employee of a certain gas station, reported 

an intoxicated driver had just left the station, and a few minutes later, an officer observed 

a vehicle stopped in the middle of the road, the officer had sufficient information to 

justify a stop); Playle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 1989) 

(concluding that reasonable suspicion existed for a stop when an informant, who 
8

identified himself as an employee of a certain restaurant, observed a car leave the drivethrough window and reported a “drunk driver”). 

Lastly, Rounds’s reliance on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000), 

to support his claim that the informant’s call lacked sufficient indicia of reliability is not 

availing. In J.L., an anonymous caller reported to the police that a young black male 

wearing a plaid shirt at a bus stop was carrying a gun. Id. at 268, 120 S. Ct. at 1377. The 

record in J.L. contained no additional information about the informant or how long it took 

police to respond to the tip. Id. The Supreme Court held that the tip lacked sufficient 

indicia of reliability because the police only had the “bare report of an unknown, 

unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied 

any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.” Id. at 271, 120 S. Ct. at 

1379.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the information provided by the citizen 

informant was sufficiently reliable and thus provided the reasonable, articulable suspicion 

necessary to justify the officers’ investigative stop of Rounds. 

Rounds next argues that the officers unlawfully seized him. The district court 

concluded that the “police [had] reasonable suspicion to take Mr. Rounds into custody for 

purposes of an investigatory, continuing investigation.” A proper investigatory stop 

generally must be limited in scope and duration to the original purpose of the stop. 

Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 845. This requires the investigatory stop to “be temporary and last 

no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” State v. Wiegand, 645 

N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). Otherwise, the duration of an investigatory stop may be 
9

extended only if doing so would be “reasonably related to the investigation of an offense 

lawfully discovered or suspected during the stop.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 

370 (Minn. 2004); Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 845 (allowing expansion for “the investigation 

of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense”). Here 

Rounds sat in the back of the squad car for approximately 15 minutes.

We measure the “reasonableness” of an expansion objectively by considering the 

totality of the circumstances. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364. The question is whether 

“the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure [would] warrant a [person]

of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Id.

Rounds’s detention in the squad car was a proper expansion of the investigatory 

stop. A citizen complaint concerning suspected drug activity prompted the police to stop 

Rounds. This tip was later corroborated by the officers. In addition to the tip, while 

asking Rounds general questions, Officer Aikins observed a large amount of cash on 

Rounds and a dismantled dashboard in Rounds’s car. Shortly thereafter, Officer Aikins 

found the cellophane wrapper that, in his experience, was consistent with narcotics 

dealing. The officers detained Rounds in the squad car for approximately 15 minutes 

until the canine unit arrived. See State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1990)

(finding a one-hour detainment in squad car not too long when officers acted reasonably 

and diligently); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985)

(stating there is no bright-line rule regarding an appropriate length of an investigation 

detention).
10

Rounds contends, under Askerooth, that it was improper to confine Rounds to the 

squad car. In Askerooth, the supreme court held that the lack of a driver’s license is not a 

reasonable basis for confining a suspect in the back of a squad car when the suspect was 

pulled over for a minor traffic violation. 681 N.W.2d at 365. But here, the officers were 

not investigating Rounds for a minor traffic violation; rather, the officers were 

investigating him for suspected narcotics dealing. Thus, Askerooth does not apply to the 

facts of this case. Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, Rounds’s confinement in 

the squad car was a permissible expansion of the scope of the initial stop and justified by 

the original purpose of the stop.1 

Lastly, Rounds claims that the search of his car was illegal as it was conducted 

without a warrant or valid exception to the warrant requirement. An exception to the 

warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Under this exception, police may 

search a motor vehicle without a warrant “[w]hen probable cause exists to believe that a 

vehicle contains contraband.” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). 

Probable cause exists when, looking at the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).

 

1 We commend the officers in this case for their patient investigative work. The officers 

expanded the scope of the search in calculated, incremental steps, and each expansion 

was justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 

(“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the 

circumstances which rendered [the initiation of the stop] permissible.” (alteration in 

original)).
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The firsthand observations by a reliable citizen informant that were later 

corroborated by the officers are relevant and provide a basis in the probable cause 

analysis. Next, the officers’ personal knowledge that there was a problem with narcotics 

dealing in the same parking lot provides further probable cause. See State v. Charley,

278 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. 1979) (recognizing that officer’s knowledge of drug 

problems in a parking lot was a valid totality-of-the-circumstances factor). Rounds’s 

dismantled dashboard and the large amount of cash in Rounds’s wallet all further support 

a finding of probable cause. Lastly, these facts combined with Officer Aikins’s discovery 

of the “crack wrapper” next to Rounds’s car provided the officers with probable cause 

that a search of Rounds’s car would reveal contraband. See Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251-

52 (stating that because of their special training, “police officers articulating a reasonable 

suspicion may make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 

person”).

We conclude that the corroborated observations of the citizen informant, together 

with the officers’ independent observations, gave the officers probable cause to believe 

that Rounds’s vehicle contained narcotics. Accordingly, the search of Rounds’s vehicle 

was valid. Because probable cause to search Rounds’s vehicle existed independent of the 

canine search, we decline to address the arguments raised regarding the subsequent 

canine sniff.

Affirmed.