alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
|   | 1. | The      Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31,      2009 (the “Periodic Report”) fully complies with the requirements of      section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.      §§78m or 78o(d)); and |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The      information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      the Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By:    | /s/      Andrew  Berman       |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                    |
|   |   | Andrew  Berman                |
|   |   | Chief  Executive      Officer |
|   |   | (Principal      Executive Officer)      |

----
# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, May 20, 2021 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A21A1334. IN THE INTEREST OF N.S., A CHILD.

The appellant in this case failed to comply with the notice of docketing mailed by this Court and with Court of Appeals Rule 23 (a), regarding the filing of an enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days after the appeal was docketed. See also Court of Appeals Rule 13. On May 06, 2021, this Court ordered the appellant to file an enumeration of errors and a brief no later than May 17, 2021. As of the date of this order, the appellant's enumeration of errors and brief still have not been filed. Accordingly, this appeal is deemed abandoned and is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Court of Appeals Rules 7, 23 (a). Because procedural deficiencies have deprived the appellant of the right of appellate review, the appellant is hereby informed of the following in accordance with Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (452 SE2d 756) (1995): This Court has dismissed your appeal because an enumeration of errors and a brief have not been filed on your behalf as required. If this failure occurred while you were represented by legal counsel and was due to your appellate counsel's failure to perform the duties of appellate counsel, and if you still wish to appeal, you may file a motion in the trial court for permission to pursue an out-of-time appeal. If the trial court grants your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will have 30 days from the filing date of the order granting your motion to file in the trial court a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. If the trial court denies your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will have 30 days from the filing date of the order denying your motion to file in the trial court a notice of appeal from that order.Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, May 20, 2021. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the appellant as well as to the appellant's attorney of record, if any. The appellant's attorney is also directed to send a copy of this order to the appellant.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 7224** 

BERT V.E. PARKER , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.
GEORGE TRENT; DONNA KUROSKI; ASHLEY GINANNI; JOHN DOE, Unknown , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia , at Clarksburg

. Irene M. Keeley , District Judge. ( 1:10

- cv
- 00120

- IMK

- DJJ )

Submitted : November 2 1 , 2012 Decided: December 28, 2012

Before WYNN and DIAZ , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Bert V.E. Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Llewellyn Deniker, Sara Ellen Hauptfuehrer, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpub lished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Bert V.E. Parker appeals the district court ’ s order s adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, dismissing
Parker’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint , and denying Parker’s

F ed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend

. We have reviewed the
record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for
the reasons stated by the district court. Parker v. Trent , No.

1:10

- cv
- 00120

- IMK

- DJJ (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 10 & June 20, 2012). We
di spense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# L_2006343EN.01007701.xml

| 8.12.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 343/77 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.12.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 343/77

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1810/2006

of 7 December 2006

fixing the maximum export refund for white sugar in the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 958/2006

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1), and in particular the second subparagraph and point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 33(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 958/2006 of 28 June 2006 on a standing invitation to tender to determine refunds on exports of white sugar for the 2006/2007 marketing year (2) requires the issuing of partial invitations to tender. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 958/2006 of 28 June 2006 on a standing invitation to tender to determine refunds on exports of white sugar for the 2006/2007 marketing year (2) requires the issuing of partial invitations to tender.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 958/2006 and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the partial invitation to tender ending on 7 December 2006, it is appropriate to fix a maximum export refund for that partial invitation to tender. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 958/2006 and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the partial invitation to tender ending on 7 December 2006, it is appropriate to fix a maximum export refund for that partial invitation to tender.

| (3) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the partial invitation to tender ending on 7 December 2006, the maximum export refund for the product referred to in Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 958/2006 shall be 28,341 EUR/100 kg.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 8 December 2006.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 7 December 2006.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 58, 28.2.2006, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1585/2006 (OJ L 294, 25.10.2006, p. 19).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 175, 29.6.2006, p. 49.

2

---
Order filed September 2, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-15-00209-CR

____________

ERICK EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 184th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1392161

ABATEMENT ORDER

The trial court failed to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law on the 

voluntariness of appellant’s statement. Article 38.22, section 6 of the Texas Code 

of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to make written fact findings and 

conclusions of law as to whether a challenged statement was made voluntarily, 

even if appellant did not request them or object to their absence. Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. art. 38.22 ' 6; Urias v. State, 155 S.W.3d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
The statute is mandatory and the proper procedure to correct the error is to abate 

the appeal and direct the trial court to make the required findings and conclusions. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 44.4; Wicker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1987). 

Accordingly, the trial court is directed to reduce to writing its findings of 

fact and conclusions of law on the voluntariness of appellant’s statement and have 

a supplemental clerk’s record containing those findings filed with the clerk of this 

Court on or before October 2, 2015.

The appeal is abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this Court’s 

active docket. The appeal will be reinstated on this Court’s active docket when the 

trial court’s findings and recommendations are filed in this Court. The Court will 

also consider an appropriate motion to reinstate the appeal filed by either party. 

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM
#### 1776 Second Avenue Associates, Plaintiff, v Beyer, Blinder & Belle, Appellant, and Testwell, Craig, Berger, Inc., Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Diane Lebedeff, J.), entered October 23, 1990, which, *inter alia,*denied defendant Beyer, Blinder & Belle’s cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3025 for permission to amend its answer to assert cross-claims for contribution and indemnification, unanimously modified, on the law, insofar as to permit such cross-claims to be asserted against the named co-defendants, other than Testwell, Craig, Berger, Inc., and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

This is an action by plaintiff building owner for breach of contract and negligence in the construction and design of its building’s curtain wall, resulting in alleged water leakage problems. Defendant Testwell, which settled with plaintiff, is a design professional. Defendant Dunbarton supplied window units and related parts. Defendant Rosner was Dunbarton’s sales agent. Defendant Beyer, the appellant herein, performed architectural and engineering services. It is conceded by crossmovant Beyer that defendant Testwell is not liable for contribution because of the settlement and release executed between Testwell and the plaintiff. (General Obligations Law § 15-108.)

*397Defendant Beyer has not alleged facts sufficient to permit an amendment to its answer to include a cross-claim for indemnification as against defendant Testwell *(Daniels v Empire-Orr, Inc.,*151 AD2d 370). Indeed, there is no indication in the pleadings of any of the parties that Beyer might be contractually or vicariously liable for the wrongs of Testwell *(Mas v Two Bridges Assocs.,*75 NY2d 680). Finally, insofar as the remaining defendants have not settled with the plaintiff, and have not opposed co-defendant Beyer’s cross-motion to assert cross-claims for indemnification and contribution, Beyer, in light of the facts pleaded, should be permitted to amend its answer to include cross-claims as against the remaining defendants, other than defendant Testwell. Concur— Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Kupferman, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
---

Exhibit 32.1

|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                     
|----------------------------------------------
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

The undersigned, Rahim Rayani, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Force Energy Corp.
      for the quarterly period ended August 31, 2008 (the "Report") fully
      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of Force Energy Corp.                                                                              

|Dated: October 20, 2008.                                  | 
|--------------------------------------------------------- | 
|                                                          | 
|                                                          | 
|/s/ Rahim
      Rayani                                    | 
|Rahim Rayani                                              | 
|Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer       | 
|(Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer | 
|and Principal Accounting Officer)                         | 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Force Energy
Corp. and will be retained by Force Energy Corp. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21 - 0261 IN THE MATTER OF: J.D.L., Respondent and Appellant. **ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including October 8, 2021 within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 2 2021

09/02/2021

Case Number: DA 21-0261
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 40256 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
LUIS BOANEGRE

- CRESPO , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:13

- CR

- 952

- 1

Before KING, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Luis Boanegre

Crespo has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Although Boanegre

- Crespo was gr anted an extension of time in which to file a response, he has not filed a response . We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 16, 2014 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-40256 Document: 00512871759 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/16/2014No. 14

- 40256

therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 14-40256 Document: 00512871759 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/16/2014
#### PATRICK KELLY *v.*STOP AND SHOP COMPANIES, INC.

*William J. Ward,*in support of the petition.

*Dion W. Moore*and *Suzannah K. Nigro,*in opposition.

Decided February 18, 1998

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 47 Conn. App. 923 (AC 17110), is denied.

MCDONALD, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1

                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

  We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No.
333-61101, as amended; and No. 333-35051 on Form S-3 of Hearst-Argyle
Television, Inc. and in Registration Statement No. 333-35043 on Form S-8 of
Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc. of our report dated February 5, 2001 (February
23, 2001 as to Note 18), appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2000.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche

New York, New York
March 27, 2001
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2088 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain capacitor panels specifically 

designed for wind turbines. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain capacitor panels 

specifically designed for wind turbines. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN CAPACITOR PANELS SPECIFICALLY 

4 DESIGNED FOR WIND TURBINES. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

6 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

7 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

8 new heading: 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2088 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Capacitor panels specifically 

designed for wind turbine 

generators in excess of 2 

MW; such panels are specifically designed to optimize the 

power factor of the asynchronous induction generator 

in a wind turbine. The capacitor panel is managed by the 

wind turbine generator controller and has dimensions of 

2350–2450 mm (length) x 

350–450 mm (width) x 

2200–2350 mm (height) 

(provided for in subheading 

8537.10.90) ........................... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

HAYWARD EVANS

, §

§ No. 636 , 201 5

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below : Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

v. §

§ Cr. ID No. 0111010136

STATE OF DELAWARE, §

§

Plaintiff Below

, §

Appellee. §

Submitted: December 18 , 2015

Decided: February 19 , 201 6

Before STRINE

, Chief Justice; VAUGHN

, and SEITZ

, Justices.

ORDE R

This 19 th day of February 2016 , it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Hayward Evans , is an inmate incarcerated in a

Delaware correctional facility

. On November 24, 2015 , the Court received Evans’

notice of appeal from a Superior Court order docketed on October 21, 2015

,

dismissing his motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred. 1 Under

Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(i v ), the notice of appeal should have been filed on or

before November 20 , 201 5

. 2

1 State v. Evans , 2015 WL 6437721 (Del. Super. Oct. 2 1 , 2015).

2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(i v ) (providing that an appeal from a proceeding for postconviction relief

must be filed within thirty days after entry upon the docket of the judgment sought to be

reviewed )

.2 (2) On December 8, 2015, the Clerk issued a notice directing Evans to

show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely filed. 3 Evans has

filed a response, explaining that he was under the impression that counsel would be

appointed to assist him in filing the appeal . Evans contends that he was unable to

prepare the necessary appeal pap ers within the thirty

- day appeal period.

( 3 ) In Delaware, “[t]ime is a jurisdictional requirement.” 4 “ [ T ] he

appellate jurisdiction of this [ C ] ourt rests wholly upon the perfecting of an appeal

within the period of limitations fixed by law.” 5 The jurisdictional defect created by

the untimely filing of an appeal cannot be excused unless the appellant can

demonstrate that the delay in filing the appeal is attributable to court

- related

personnel. 6 An appellant’s pro se status does not excuse the fail ure to comply

strictly with the jurisdictional requirements for filing a notice of appeal. 7

( 4 ) T he record does not reflect that Evan’s failure to file a timely appeal

is attributable to court

- related personnel

. T h is case does not fall within the

exce ption to the general rule that mandates the timely filing of a notice of appeal.

3 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 29(b) ( governing involuntary dismissal upon notice of the Court).

4 Carr v. State , 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1989 )

. 5 Fisher v. Biggs , 284 A.2d 117, 118 (Del. 1971).

6 Bey v. State , 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979).

7 Carter v. State , 2013 WL 5974913 (Del. Nov. 8, 2013) (citing Carr v. State , 554 A.2d 778, 779

(Del. 1989)).3 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED , under Supreme Court Rules

6 (a)(i v ) and 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.

Justice
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos C. De Jesus, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Harrigan, J.), rendered April 9, 1990, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of robbery in the first degree.

The prison sentence defendant received of 4 to 8 years was in accordance with the plea-bargain agreement and his plea was in full satisfaction of a six-count indictment. Furthermore, given that the conviction was for an armed class B violent felony, defendant could have received a sentence of 121/z to 25 years (Penal Law § 70.02 [3], [4]; CPL 1.20 [41]). Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed by County Court *(see, People v Mackey,*136 AD2d 780, *lv denied*71 NY2d 899).

Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.