XiMO±h DH8M:11M1621:1MM 

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facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 

(2005). 

First, appellant argues that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to investigate and present testimony from a linguist who had 

reviewed her statement to police. Appellant argues that her statements 

where she appeared to admit guilt were actually questions or 

hypotheticals made in response to the police's inquiries. An expert in 

linguistics testified at the evidentiary hearing that appellant's intonation 

rose at the end of her statements, indicating a question and not a factual 

statement. For example, appellant asserts that her statement, which 

appeared to be "I hit him with a knife," was actually a question to the 

officers, "I hit him with a knife?" 

Appellant fails to demonstrate that her counsel's performance 

was deficient or that she was prejudiced. Testimony presented at the 

evidentiary hearing demonstrated that use of a linguistics expert in a 

criminal trial was relatively novel at the time counsel prepared for trial of 

this matter. Considering the relatively novel use of a linguistics expert in 

preparation for a criminal trial, appellant fails to demonstrate it was 

unreasonable for counsel to have not investigated and obtained a 

linguistics expert to testify in this case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 

("A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate that 

conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.") The district court further 

concluded, after listening to the expert's testimony and the recording of 

appellant's interviews with the police, that the testimony of appellant's 

expert was insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome at trial had counsel obtained an expert in linguistics. 

Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that appellant 

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failed to demonstrate prejudice. Therefore, appellant fails to demonstrate 

the district court erred in denying this claim. 

Second, appellant argues that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to provide the defense crime scene analyst with all of the 

evidence available and failing to ask the analyst proper questions at trial. 

Appellant fails to demonstrate that her trial counsel's performance was 

deficient or that she was prejudiced. Counsel testified that he provided 

the analyst with all of the evidence in his possession, but that a State's 

witness caused a delay in sending one report to the analyst. The analyst 

testified at the evidentiary hearing that he believed the victim pulled the 

knife out of his own chest after he was stabbed; but even after further 

review of all of the available evidence, the analyst testified that he could 

not state how the knife got into the victim's chest. Given the analyst's 

testimony that he could not opine that appellant did not cause the victim's 

death, appellant fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome at trial had counsel supplied the analyst with additional 

evidence or asked different questions during the trial. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Third, appellant argues that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to investigate and present evidence through a forensic 

psychologist regarding battered woman's syndrome and the mental issues 

appellant suffered as a result of domestic violence. Appellant fails to 

demonstrate that her trial counsel's performance was deficient or that she 

was prejudiced. Counsel testified that, while he could not recall if he 

sought expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome, he did 

investigate whether appellant had been abused by the victim; he could not 

find credible evidence of such abuse. Based on that testimony, counsel's 

performance was not deficient. Further, the district court concluded that 

the expert testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing did not 

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establish that any mental issues appellant suffered from occurred solely 

by domestic violence at the hands of the victim and not due to traumas 

suffered since her incarceration. Appellant fails to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel sought to 

present expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome and its effect on 

appellant. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Fourth, appellant argues that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek an instruction on the spoliation of evidence that the 

police failed to collect. Appellant fails to demonstrate that her trial 

counsel's performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced as 

appellant fails to demonstrate that any of the evidence she asserts the 

State should have collected was material—that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of trial would have been different had the 

defense had access to the uncollected evidence. See Daniels v. State, 114 

Nev. 261, 267, 956 P.2d 111, 115 (1998). Therefore, the district court did 

not err in denying this claim. 

Fifth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

requesting an instruction on self-defense. Appellant fails to demonstrate 

that her trial counsel's performance was deficient or that she was 

prejudiced. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he wanted to 

give the jury multiple chances to return a verdict in appellant's favor and 

that was why he requested a self-defense instruction. Tactical decisions 

such as this one "are virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary 

circumstances," Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989), 

which appellant did not demonstrate. Appellant also fails to demonstrate 

a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had counsel not 

requested a self-defense instruction. Therefore, the district court did not 

err in denying this claim. 

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Sixth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to properly present evidence and testimony from an audio expert, 

which would have demonstrated appellant invoked her right to counsel 

prior to confessing. Appellant fails to demonstrate that her trial counsel 

was deficient or that she was prejudiced. The district court concluded, 

even after listening to the recording enhanced by the audio expert, that 

appellant failed to demonstrate that she requested a lawyer prior to 

confessing. Appellant fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome had counsel presented further expert testimony 

incorporating the enhanced recording. Therefore, the district court did not 

err in denying this claim." 

Seventh, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate and present testimony from R. Goldie. Appellant 

fails to demonstrate that her trial counsel's performance was deficient or 

that she was prejudiced. Appellant's investigator testified that he 

investigated Goldie prior to trial and gave the information regarding 

Goldie to counsel. Further, Goldie's testimony at the evidentiary hearing 

was similar to that of witnesses who testified at trial. Appellant fails to 

demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had 

further investigation of Goldie been performed or had Goldie's testimony 

'Appellant also appears to argue that trial counsel should have 

hired an independent transcriber to transcribe the recordings of 

appellant's interviews with the police. Appellant fails to demonstrate that 

counsel's performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced. Counsel 

testified that he did not want to use a transcript at the trial, as he wanted 

the jury to listen to the tape for themselves and appellant fails to 

demonstrate this was an unreasonable decision. See Ford, 105 Nev. at 

853, 784 P.2d at 953. As the jury was not given a transcript to use at trial, 

appellant fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome at trial had counsel sought an independent transcriber. 

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been presented at trial. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying 

this claim. 

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Eighth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a motion to suppress evidence because the search warrant 

was not served properly on appellant. Appellant fails to demonstrate that 

her trial counsel's performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced. 

The officer testified that he left the search warrant for appellant with the 

jail after appellant's arrest and appellant fails to demonstrate that this 

service was insufficient. Appellant fails to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability of a different outcome had counsel argued the search warrant 

was not properly served on appellant. Therefore, the district court did not 

err in denying this claim. 

Ninth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), as appellant asserts the officer 

falsely claimed in his affidavit in support of the search warrant that 

appellant was uncooperative and had confessed, and that the officer 

improperly stated a particular witness had knowledge of the facts prior to 

the stabbing. Appellant fails to demonstrate that her trial counsel's 

performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced. Counsel testified at 

the evidentiary hearing that he considered raising an argument about the 

affidavit under the Franks case, but decided against it as he wanted to 

challenge the officer's statement at trial and wanted the officer to be 

surprised by the challenge. Tactical decisions such as this one "are 

virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances," Ford, 105 

Nev. at 853, 784 P.2d at 953, which appellant did not demonstrate. 

Appellant fails to demonstrate that any of the statements were false or 

that the officer made knowing and intentional false statements, and 

therefore, fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different 

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outcome had counsel sought to suppress the search warrant. Franks,438 

U.S. at 155-56. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this 

claim. 

Tenth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to make a proper record regarding invocation of appellant's right to 

remain silent, which caused appellate counsel to litigate this issue on 

appeal with an incomplete record. Appellant fails to demonstrate that her 

trial counsel's performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced. The 

underlying claim was considered on direct appeal and this court concluded 

that the police did not violate appellant's right to remain silent. Dewey v. 

State,123 Nev. 483, 489-91, 169 P.3d 1149, 1153-54 (2007). Appellant 

fails to demonstrate that the additional issues she highlights, such as 

appellant's concern for her children, appellant's intoxication level, and the 

waiver-of-rights form, were not available to be considered on direct appeal 

as they were discussed during the trial and the discussion was included in 

the trial transcript. Appellant also fails to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability of a different outcome had counsel made an additional record 

regarding this issue as appellant fails to demonstrate the police violated 

her right to remain silent. Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Eleventh, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek suppression of appellant's statements as appellant was 

detained longer than 60 minutes in violation of NRS 171.123. Appellant 

fails to demonstrate that her trial counsel's performance was deficient or 

that she was prejudiced. A suspect has been detained 'only if, in view of 

all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 

would have believed that he was not free to leave. . . . [T]he subjective 

intent of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth 

Amendment implications of police conduct only to the extent that that 

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intent has been conveyed to the person confronted.' State v. McKellips, 

118 Nev. 465, 469-70, 49 P.3d 655 659 (2002) (quoting Michigan v. 

Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 575 n.7 (1988)). In the context of a 

voluntariness inquiry, the trial court determined that appellant was not in 

custody until she was placed under arrest after her initial interview. 

Here, appellant points to no evidence, other than a few police officers' 

testimony that they would not have allowed appellant to leave the crime 

scene on her own, to demonstrate that reasonable trial counsel would have 

raised additional arguments that appellant was improperly detained prearrest. 

In addition, even assuming that appellant was actually 

detained longer than 60 minutes prior to her arrest, ripening the 

detainment into an arrest, appellant fails to demonstrate that the police 

did not have probable cause to arrest her, given the evidence that 

appellant was the only person with her fatally stabbed husband and that 

appellant had been in a struggle with the victim. Id. at 472, 49 P.3d at 

660 ("Probable cause to arrest 'exists when police have reasonably 

trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient in 

themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that [a 

crime] has been . . . committed by the person to be arrested." (alteration 

and omission in original) (quoting Doleman v. State, 107 Nev. 409, 413, 

812 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1991))). Accordingly, appellant fails to demonstrate 

a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had counsel raised this 

claim. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Twelfth, appellant argues that errors committed by trial 

counsel cumulatively amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Appellant fails to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice for any of the 

previous claims, and therefore, fails to demonstrate errors of counsel 

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SERUIMMEEME REIMMIEWZi4EICZZ 
Hardesty 

Pareaguirre U ° Cherry 

J. 

amount cumulatively to ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to relief, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2 

cc: Chief Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court 

Hon. Charles M. McGee, Senior Judge 

Richard F. Cornell 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Elko County District Attorney 

Elko County Clerk 

2Appellant filed a motion requesting oral argument. We conclude 

that oral argument is unnecessary for our disposition of this appeal and 

deny appellant's motion. See NRAP 34(0(3). 

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