Filed 5/2/22 P. v. Bonnaudet CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NORA ANDAYA BONNAUDET,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B309787

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SA043504)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Yvette Verastegui, Judge. Dismissed. 

____________________________

Daniel G. Koryn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

In 2002, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Nora 

Andaya Bonnaudet of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1

§ 187, subd. (a)) for the death of her husband, Georges Bonnaudet. 

The jury also found true a special circumstance allegation that 

she committed the offense for financial gain. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) 

The trial court sentenced her to life in prison without the possibility 

of parole.

We described the facts of the case in detail in our opinion 

in Bonnaudet’s direct appeal, People v. Bonnaudet (July 27, 2004, 

B164987) [nonpub. opn.], and we will summarize them only briefly 

here: In 1989, Georges2 executed a will leaving almost all his 

possessions to Bonnaudet. The relationship later soured, and

Bonnaudet began having an affair at some point before December 

2000. In the year before his death in 2001, Georges told friends 

that he wanted to divorce Bonnaudet and did not want her to 

receive any of his money.

On the morning of October 5, 2001, two unidentified men 

attacked Georges in a public parking lot, took nothing, and fled. 

Georges went to the hospital, received treatment, and was 

discharged. At around 8:50 p.m. that evening, Bonnaudet went into 

a restaurant and screamed that she needed the police. She claimed 

that the same men who had attacked Georges that morning had 

returned, beaten Georges, and put him in the front seat of an 

automobile nearby. Paramedics arrived on the scene a few minutes 

later. Bonnaudet told the paramedics that the attack had just 

happened, but the paramedics found that Georges’s body was 

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references 

are to the Penal Code. 

2 We refer to the victim by his first name to distinguish him 

from the defendant. We intend no disrespect.
3

already cold. The body also exhibited lividity, a condition that 

typically occurs at least 30 minutes after death. There were no 

signs of a struggle either inside or outside the vehicle, and no blood 

on the sidewalk nearby, as would be expected if Georges had been 

attacked there as Bonnaudet claimed. 

Investigators concluded that Georges had sustained blunt 

force trauma to the back of the head and had died at some point 

after 6:45 p.m. The prosecution theorized that Bonnaudet either 

killed Georges herself or aided and abetted the killing, then drove

Georges’s body to the restaurant where she called for help. We 

affirmed Bonnaudet’s conviction on appeal. (People v. Bonnaudet, 

supra, B164987.)

In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 

(2017−2018 Reg. Sess.), which eliminated liability for murder under 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and limited the 

application of the felony-murder doctrine. (People v. Gentile (2020) 

10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) The legislation also enacted 

section 1170.95, which established a procedure for vacating murder 

convictions for defendants who could no longer be convicted of 

murder because of the changes in the law and resentencing those

who were so convicted. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, pp. 6675–6677.)

Bonnaudet filed a petition for resentencing under 

section 1170.95 on February 5, 2019. The court appointed 

counsel to represent Bonnaudet, and gave both sides an opportunity 

to submit briefing. The court found that Bonnaudet had failed to 

make a prima facie showing that she was entitled to relief because 

the record showed that she was “convicted under a true aider and 

abettor theory,” not a theory of felony murder or the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine.
4

Bonnaudet filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed 

counsel to represent her. Counsel filed a Wende3 brief raising 

no issues and requesting that we review the entire record. When 

a defendant’s appointed counsel files a brief raising no issues in 

an appeal of a denial of postconviction relief, we are not obligated 

to review the record independently to determine whether there 

are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Cole (2020) 52

Cal.App.5th 1023, 1039 (Cole), review granted Oct. 14, 2020, 

S264278.) Instead, we follow the procedures set forth in People v. 

Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496 (Serrano). Under Serrano, 

both this court and counsel must inform the defendant that she 

has the right to file a supplemental brief. If the defendant files 

a supplemental brief, we must address the issues she raises on 

the merits. Otherwise, we may dismiss the appeal as abandoned. 

(Cole, supra, at pp. 1039–1040.)

In this case, both this court and counsel sent letters to 

Bonnaudet informing her of her right to file a supplemental brief, 

but we have not received a response. We therefore dismiss the 

appeal as abandoned.

If the appeal were not abandoned, we would affirm the 

denial of Bonnaudet’s petition. To avoid denial of her petition, 

a defendant must make a prima facie case that she “could not 

presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because 

of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective” as a part of 

Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) The effect of the 

amendments to sections 188 and 189 was to “eliminate[ ] natural 

and probable consequences liability for first and second degree 

murder” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 849), and to restrict the 

application of the felony murder doctrine. (See id. at pp. 842–843.) 

3 People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
5

Where, as in this case, the jury did not receive instructions on 

either the natural and probable consequences doctrine or felony 

murder, the trial court may properly conclude that the defendant 

was not convicted under either of those theories, and deny her 

petition for failing to make a prima facie case for relief. (People v. 

Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677.) We are satisfied that 

Bonnaudet’s counsel has fully complied with his responsibilities.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

CRANDALL, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.