IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-60666

Summary Calendar

TAJUDIN JARALLAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SODEXO, INCORPORATED; UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL

CENTER; SCOTT MEESE; BONNIE BEARDSLEY; PATRICK MCGHEE;

JULIE WILLIAMS; JIM MCKEOWN,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(3:09-CV-180)

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Tajudin JarAllah appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his case pursuant to a signed and executed settlement agreement and

release. As JarAllah voluntarily settled the case and did not reserve a right to

appeal the dismissal, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisidiction.1

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 7, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

JarAllah also challenges the district court’s order requiring him to post a supersedeas 1

bond. A supersedeas bond is “[a]n appellant’s bond to stay execution on a judgment during the

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I.

In February 2009, JarAllah, a citizen of Georgia, brought this action pro

se in Mississippi state court challenging his termination by Defendant-Appellee

Sodexo, Inc.,(Sodexo), asserting various Mississippi employment discrimination,

tort, and contract claims, as well as deprivation of due process. On March 25,

2009, Sodexo, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

Maryland, removed the case to federal court, asserting both diversity and federal

question jurisdiction.

On April 6, 2009, JarAllah filed a motion to remand the case to state court,

which asserted, in part, that his complaint brought claims arising only under

Mississippi state law. On December 14, 2009, the district court denied

JarAllah’s motion to remand, concluding that diversity jurisdiction was satisfied

because the Mississippi-resident defendants were not properly served in the

case. The district court also determined that it was unclear whether federal

question jurisdiction existed because it was difficult to tell whether the

complaint, which referenced deprivations of due process but made no direct

reference to any federal constitutional or statutory provision, raised a federal

question.

On December 22, 2009, the district court ordered JarAllah to file a more

definite statement of his claims. In response, on January 28, 2010, JarAllah

filed a bill of particulars which asserted, among other claims, retaliation, 

discrimination, and deprivation of due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

and 1983. 

The parties negotiated the settlement of the case in June 2010. As part

of the settlement agreement, JarAllah agreed, in exchange for $50,000 and a

pendency of the appeal.” Blacks Law Dictionary 202 (9th ed. 2009). As this appeal is

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and as JarAllah never posted a supersedeas bond, the issue

is moot.

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neutral letter of reference, to release all claims relating to his employment with

and termination from Sodexo and to not file any additional legal proceedings. 

On July 6, 2010, JarAllah traveled to Mississippi and the parties consummated

the settlement agreement in the magistrate’s chambers. On the same day, the

district court dismissed the case with prejudice, retaining jurisdiction only to

enforce the settlement agreement.

On August 5, 2010, JarAllah filed a Notice of Appeal of the district court’s

order of dismissal. JarAllah has not returned the consideration for the

settlement agreement.

II.

JarAllah challenges the dismissal of this case on the ground that he did

not knowingly and voluntarily execute the settlement agreement and release,

but did so under duress. “Normally the release of federal claims is governed by

federal law.” Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 935 (5th Cir.

1994). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally. See Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t

of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2008). Applying this liberal

construction to JarAllah’s pro se complaint, and taking into consideration his bill

of particulars, it is evident that JarAllah has raised federal constitutional and

statutory claims. Accordingly, federal law regarding the validity of settlement

agreements and releases governs.

“In determining whether a release was knowingly and voluntarily

executed, this court has adopted a ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach.” 

Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2002). “Once a party

establishes that his opponent signed a release that addresses the claims at issue,

received adequate consideration, and breached the release, the opponent has the

burden of demonstrating that the release was invalid because of fraud, duress,

material mistake, or some other defense.” Williams, 23 F.3d at 935. In

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determining whether a former employee has met this burden, we examine the

following factors:

(1) the plaintiff’s education and business experience, (2) the amount

of time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement

before signing it, (3) the role of [the] plaintiff in deciding the terms

of the agreement, (4) the clarity of the agreement, (5) whether the

plaintiff was represented by or consulted with an attorney, and (6)

whether consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds

employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by

contract or law.

Smith, 298 F.3d at 441 (quoting O’Hare v. Global Natural Res., 898 F.2d 1015,

1017 (5th Cir. 1990)). Additionally, under federal law, “[e]ven if a release is

tainted by misrepresentation or duress, it is ratified if the releasor retains the

consideration after learning that the release is voidable.” Williams, 23 F.3d at

937.2

In the present case, it is clear that JarAllah has not met his burden of

demonstrating that the settlement agreement is invalid. First, as JarAllah has

retained the consideration for the release, he cannot now assert that the

agreement was not voluntarily entered into. Additionally, JarAllah has

competently litigated several cases pro se, and adeptly negotiated this clear and

plain settlement agreement himself over a lengthy period of time. As part of the

agreement, JarAllah acknowledged that he had been advised to consult with an

attorney, that he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement, and

that he entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, as

settlement agreements are highly favored by the law and will be upheld

whenever possible, JarAllah has not satisfied the difficult burden of showing

that he did not voluntarily execute the agreement.

But see Bogy v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2008) (making Erie guess

2

and holding that Mississippi law does not require a plaintiff to rescind proceeds of settlement

agreement in order to pursue a damage claim for fraudulent inducement of settlement

agreement).

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Furthermore, even assuming that JarAllah’s complaint raises only state

claims, Mississippi law is likewise inhospitable to JarAllah’s challenge to the

settlement agreement. “[Mississippi] law favors the settlement of disputes by

agreement of the parties and, ordinarily, will enforce the Agreement which the

parties have made, absent any fraud, mistake, or overreaching.” McManus v.

Howard, 569 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Miss. 1990) (citations omitted). Settlement

agreements “are contracts, made by the parties, upon consideration acceptable

to each of them, and the law will enforce them.” Id.

To constitute duress by threats the actor’s manifestation must be

made for the purpose of coercing the other; must have for its object

the securing of undue advantage with respect to the other; must be

of such a character that it is adapted to overpower the will of the

other and is reasonably adequate for the purpose; must in fact

deprive the other to act to his detriment. 

Estate of Davis v. O’Neill, 42 So.3d 520, 525 (Miss. 2010) (quoting Askew v.

Askew, 699 So.2d 515, 518 (Miss. 1997)).

JarAllah has simply made no showing that his agreement was reached by

duress. There is no indication that any party threatened or coerced him, or

obtained any undue benefit. JarAllah’s only argument is that by dismissing the

case upon consummation of the settlement agreement, rather than awaiting

JarAllah’s voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(1), the district court forced settlement upon him. We reject this argument

for two reasons. First, the settlement agreement requires only that the case be

dismissed, and does not specify a means of dismissal. Additionally, as the

dismissal came after the consummation of the settlement agreement, it could not

have coerced JarAllah to enter into the agreement.

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III.

Accordingly, as JarAllah voluntarily settled the entire action and did not

reserve a right to appeal, we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Dugas v.

Trans Union Corp., 99 F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 1996).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

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