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*********************************************** 
PETER REK ET AL. v. KIRK PETTIT ET AL.

(AC 45210)

Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, legal guardians of the minor child C, appealed from the orders

of the trial court requiring C to suspend contact with his long-term

personal counselor, L, and engage with a new therapist with the goal

of working toward the resumption of visitation with the defendants, C’s

maternal grandparents. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion with

the trial court, seeking an order that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’

appeal, there was no automatic appellate stay in effect. Subsequently,

the trial court issued an order that there was no automatic stay of the

custody and visitation orders and that the plaintiffs were to comply

with the trial court’s orders. Thereafter, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a discretionary stay. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed

motions for review of the trial court’s orders determining that there

was no automatic appellate stay and denying their motion for a discretionary stay. Held:

1. This court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for review of the trial court’s

order determining that there was no automatic appellate stay in effect

but concluded that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that

the trial court incorrectly determined that there was no automatic appellate stay; the trial court’s orders pertained to the manner and extent of

visitation, as well as contact with the defendants, and visitation orders

expressly were exempt from the automatic appellate stay under the

relevant rule of practice (§ 61-11 (c)).

2. This court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for review of the trial court’s

order denying their motion for a discretionary stay and concluded that

the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion only insofar as the

court ordered the parties to engage with a new therapist for the purpose

of facilitating visitation, but it concluded that the trial court did abuse

its discretion in suspending contact between C and L, as that court did

not have before it any evidence regarding the impact of the suspension

of therapy on C’s best interest, L was not engaged at the behest of the

trial court, the suspension of therapy was only a suggestion made by

the defendants’ counsel at closing arguments, the guardian ad litem

indicated that suspension of therapy with L would not be in C’s best

interest and, therefore, the court did not adequately account for the

potential harm to C that could follow from the disruption of his relationship with L; accordingly, relief was granted in part, in that the court’s

order that the therapy sessions between C and L were suspended until

further order of the court was stayed pending the final resolution of

this appeal, and the remainder of the relief requested was denied.

Considered May 11—officially released September 6, 2022

Procedural History

Action seeking to modify the terms of a visitation

agreement, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Waterbury, Juvenile Matters, where the court,

Coleman, J., granted the plaintiffs’ motion to modify

custody and issued certain orders; thereafter, following

an evidentiary hearing, the court, Hon. Eric D. Coleman, judge trial referee, reversed its previous orders

and issued new orders, from which the plaintiffs

appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Hon.

Eric D. Coleman, judge trial referee, granted the defendants’ motion for order for a determination as to

whether an automatic stay was in effect; thereafter, the

court, Hon. Eric D. Coleman, judge trial referee, denied
the plaintiffs’ motion for a mistrial, and the plaintiffs

filed an amended appeal; subsequently, the court, Hon.

Eric D. Coleman, judge trial referee, denied the plaintiffs’ motion for an order of discretionary stay; thereafter, the plaintiffs filed motions for review with this

court. Motion for review of order of no automatic appellate stay granted; relief denied. Motion for review of

denial of discretionary stay granted; relief granted

in part.

Megan L. Wade and James P. Sexton, in support of

the plaintiffs’ motions for review.
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The plaintiffs, Peter Rek and Carisa Rek,

the legal guardians of a minor child named Caleb,1 have

appealed from the December 15, 2021 orders of the trial

court requiring Caleb to suspend contact with his longterm personal counselor and engage with a new therapist with the goal of working toward the resumption

of visitation with Caleb’s maternal grandparents, the

defendants, Kirk Pettit and Charlotte Pettit. On January

7, 2022, the defendants filed a motion with the trial court

seeking an order that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’

appeal, there is no automatic stay of the court’s December 15, 2021 orders. On March 8, 2022, the court issued

a written order indicating that there is no automatic

stay of custody and visitation orders and that the plaintiffs are to comply immediately with its December 15,

2021 orders. On March 17, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a

motion for discretionary stay, which the court denied

on March 22, 2022.

Before this court are two motions for review filed by

the plaintiffs.2 The first motion, filed on April 4, 2022,

asks this court to review and reverse the court’s March

8, 2022 order determining that there is no automatic

appellate stay in effect. The second motion, filed on

April 21, 2022, asks this court to review and reverse

the court’s March 22, 2022 order denying their request

for a discretionary stay. On the first motion for review,

we conclude that the underlying orders are visitation

orders that are not automatically stayed pursuant to

Practice Book § 61-11 (c). On the second motion for

review, we conclude that the court did not abuse its

broad discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ request for a

discretionary stay only insofar as the court ordered the

parties to engage with a new therapist for the purposes

of facilitating visitation; we reach a different conclusion

with respect to the court’s order suspending Caleb’s

contact with his long-term personal counselor. We

therefore grant the plaintiffs’ April 4, 2022 motion for

review, but deny the relief requested therein, and grant

the April 21, 2022 motion for review, and grant, in part,

the relief requested therein.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are pertinent to the resolution of these motions.

Caleb was born in 2010. When Caleb’s biological parents

became unavailable to care for him, the plaintiffs and

the defendants filed petitions for custody of Caleb with

the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Waterbury.

On August 8, 2016, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Dooley, J., appointed the plaintiffs as legal guardians of Caleb, and approved a visitation agreement

between the plaintiffs and the defendants and entered

it as an order of the court. The order further provided

that enforcement or modification thereof would be in

family court. On November 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed

the underlying action seeking to modify the terms of
the visitation agreement. The defendants objected and

filed a motion for contempt. This protracted litigation

followed. Notwithstanding court orders to the contrary,

visitation actually ceased in August, 2017, allegedly due

to Caleb’s anxiety in the presence of the defendants.

Attorney Rosa C. Rebimbas was appointed as guardian

ad litem (GAL) for Caleb on September 10, 2018.

The court, Coleman, J., conducted an evidentiary

hearing from September 3 through 6, 2019, on the plaintiffs’ November 29, 2016 motion. Among the witnesses

who testified at the 2019 trial were the GAL; Patricia

Levesque, Caleb’s personal counselor since 2016; Constance Mindell, who, the court found, had been involved

to ‘‘assist the parties in working together for the best

interests of the child’’ since September, 2017; and Kristan McClean, who, the court found, has ‘‘been involved

since January 14, 2019, to help the parties foster a better

relationship’’ between Caleb and the defendants. On

January 3, 2020, the court, in a memorandum of decision, granted the plaintiffs’ motion to modify and issued

orders requiring progressively increased contact (letters, phone calls, and ‘‘fun time’’ outings with Peter

Rek, Kirk Pettit, and Caleb). It specifically required the

parties to ‘‘continue to work together in a therapeutic

setting with Kristan McClean or some other mutually

agreed upon duly licensed and qualified therapist to

arrive at a schedule of visitation . . . .’’ The court gave

the parties a one year report back date. Neither party

appealed from the January 3, 2020 orders.

On February 26, 2020, the defendants filed a motion

for order claiming that the plaintiffs would not cooperate in finding a different ‘‘mutually agreed upon’’ therapist to work toward visitation, to which the plaintiffs

objected. Court operations were curtailed shortly thereafter due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

On January 5, 2021, the parties appeared before Judge

Coleman for their report back date. On January 26,

2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for order, asking the

court to preclude the defendants from rearguing issues

that predated the January 3, 2020 decision. The defendants objected. The parties and their counsel appeared

before the court on various dates in early 2021. On

February 16, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a request for an

evidentiary hearing because there was a disagreement

as to whether the parties had complied with the court’s

January 3, 2020 orders. Thereafter, the court requested

that each side provide the name of a family therapy

professional acceptable to that side. On April 7, 2021,

the defendants filed a notice of compliance, giving the

name of Philip J. Mays. On April 8, 2021, the plaintiffs

filed their notice of compliance, giving the names of

three professionals at Connecticut Behavioral Health.

In that notice, they also requested ‘‘an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether . . . engag[ing] with

another therapist for the purpose of determining
whether visitation between [the defendants and Caleb]

is in the best interest of the minor child.’’

The court heard testimony on June 1, June 28, and

August 16, 2021, on the plaintiffs’ April 8, 2021 request

for a hearing. At that hearing, McClean testified that,

beginning in January, 2019, her role was to work with

the parties to establish a safe and healthy visitation

relationship. In alternating weeks, she met with Caleb

and then the defendants, to work through Caleb’s concerns with ‘‘past interactions’’ with the defendants in

order to ‘‘work toward’’ a joint session. There was one

joint session in the summer of 2019, which she

described as ‘‘uncomfortable’’ for Caleb. McClean testified that she had not met with the defendants since

September, 2019. She testified that she believed they

were unwilling to work with her, although she had

‘‘made herself available.’’ She continued to meet

remotely with Caleb and the plaintiffs approximately

once per month through September, 2020. The court

also heard testimony from Kirk Pettit, Carisa Rek, Levesque, and the GAL, and then heard closing arguments.

On December 15, 2021, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it reversed its January 3, 2020

orders and issued a series of new orders. The court,

inter alia, (1) ordered the parties to discontinue working

with McClean altogether, (2) ‘‘suspended until further

order of the court’’ any contact between Caleb and

Levesque, and (3) ordered the parties to engage the

services of Mays, the defendants’ chosen family therapist, to ‘‘conduct one therapeutic/reunification visit per

month’’ with Caleb, and ‘‘as appropriate including with

[the defendants] and any other parties deemed necessary.’’ Those orders also required progressively

increased contact (letters, phone calls, and ‘‘fun time’’

outings with Peter Rek, Kirk Pettit, and Caleb) and

monthly in-person visits between Caleb and the defendants, supervised by one or both of the plaintiffs, beginning as soon as March, 2022, ‘‘[i]f and when deemed

appropriate’’ by Mays.

On January 3, 2022, the plaintiffs filed this appeal.

On January 4, 2022, the plaintiffs’ appellate counsel

notified Mays, by way of email, that he had filed an

appeal of the court’s January 3, 2022 orders and, as a

result of the automatic stay stemming from the appeal,

he advised the plaintiffs not to meet with him. On January 10, 2022, the defendants filed a motion for order in

the trial court, asking the court to terminate the appellate stay, if one existed. The plaintiffs objected on substantive and procedural grounds.3 The plaintiffs also

filed a motion for a mistrial, which the court denied.

On January 28, 2022, the plaintiffs filed an amended

appeal challenging the denial of their motion for a mistrial.

I
In their first motion for review, filed on April 4, 2022,

the plaintiffs challenge the court’s determination that

an automatic appellate stay was not in effect and argue

that the December 15, 2021 orders are not ‘‘orders of

. . . visitation’’ that are exempt from the automatic

appellate stay. We are not persuaded.

Our review of the plaintiffs’ claim requires us to construe Practice Book § 61-11, particularly subsections

(a) and (c). The interpretation and application of provisions of the rules of practice involves a question of

law over which our review is plenary. See Bouffard v.

Lewis, 203 Conn. App. 116, 120, 247 A.3d 667 (2021).

Practice Book § 61-11 governs stays of execution.

Section 61-11 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except

where otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment or order

shall be automatically stayed until the time to file an

appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of the

cause. . . .’’ Pursuant to § 61-11 (c), certain orders in

family matters are exempt from the automatic stay provision: ‘‘Unless otherwise ordered, no automatic stay

shall apply . . . to orders of . . . custody or visitation

in family matters brought pursuant to chapter 25

. . . .’’

The plaintiffs maintain that the December 15, 2021

orders change ‘‘Caleb’s medical providers with the

intent of potentially leading to future visitation. To be

clear, not a single [December 15, 2021] order actually

orders any visitation between Caleb and the [defendants] on a date certain. As a result, they are not visitation orders . . . .’’ In support of their position, the

plaintiffs rely on the ‘‘plain meaning’’ of the term ‘‘visitation order.’’ The plaintiffs argue that most of the orders

do not ‘‘[establish] a visiting time between Caleb’’ and

the defendants, but rather ‘‘detail progressive potential

contact that is explicitly contingent on’’ whether Mays

deems such contact to be appropriate. And because,

according to the plaintiffs, an order requiring them to

change therapists is automatically stayed, so too is any

‘‘progressive potential contact.’’4 We are not persuaded.

The court’s authority to adjudicate the dispute

between these parties arises under General Statutes

§ 46b-56, which allows the court to issue ‘‘[o]rders

[regarding] custody, care, education, visitation and support of children.’’ General Statutes § 46b-56 (i) clearly

states that ‘‘[a]s part of a decision concerning custody

or visitation, the court may order either parent or both

of the parents and any child of such parent to participate

in counseling . . . provided such participation is in the

best interest of the child.’’ Our Supreme Court, in DiGiovanna v. St. George, 300 Conn. 59, 75, 12 A.3d 900

(2011), described the ‘‘tools in [the trial court’s] arsenal

to effectuate visitation’’ as including ‘‘prescrib[ing] spe-
cific conditions under which visitation would take place

to address legitimate concerns of either party.’’5 The

court can order ‘‘appropriate counseling sessions

geared toward the cessation of the animosity between

the parties or, at the least, minimizing the possibility

that such animosity will have a negative impact upon

the child.’’ Id., 76. The court also may use its contempt

powers to coerce a recalcitrant party’s compliance. See

id. ‘‘[T]he best interest of the child guides the court in

determining how best to foster [the] relationship. Those

considerations may indicate . . . counseling, as well

as restrictions on the time, place, manner and extent

of visitation.’’ Id., 78.

In the present case, in its January 3, 2020 memorandum of decision, the court suspended the August 8,

2016 orders of visitation, finding that those orders were

not in Caleb’s best interest at that time. The court,

however, expressly and clearly ordered, inter alia, the

parties to ‘‘continue to work together in a therapeutic

setting with . . . McLean or some other mutually

agreed upon duly licensed and qualified therapist to

arrive at a schedule of visitation between [the defendants] and Caleb.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court went

on to issue further orders to reinstate visitation between

the defendants and Caleb, as deemed appropriate by

the therapist. Neither party appealed from these orders.

In its December 15, 2021 memorandum of decision,

the court explicitly found that its January 3, 2020 orders

were not complied with and little effort had been made

to achieve contact between Caleb and the defendants.

The court issued new orders that pertain to the ‘‘manner

and extent of visitation’’ and contemplate progressively

increased contact, with Mays’ approval, geared toward

the possibility of resuming regular monthly visits

between Caleb and the defendants. Visitation orders

expressly are exempted from the automatic appellate

stay by Practice Book § 61-11 (c). Because we conclude

that the orders at issue are ‘‘orders of . . . visitation’’

within the meaning of § 61-11 (c), they are not automatically stayed. Accordingly, the relief requested in the

first motion for review is denied.

II

In their second motion for review, filed on April 21,

2022, the plaintiffs challenge the court’s decision denying their request for a discretionary stay pursuant to

Practice Book §§ 61-11 (c) and 61-12 pending the resolution of this appeal. They maintain that: (1) ‘‘the trial

court failed to weigh properly the factors set forth in

Practice Book § 61-11 (c) in support of its denial of a

discretionary stay; and (2) the findings upon which the

trial court based its decision are clearly erroneous, finding no support in the record . . . .’’ We conclude that

the court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining that staying those orders would not be in the child’s

best interest. We further conclude, however, that the
court abused its discretion in suspending the ‘‘psychotherapy sessions and any other contacts between

[Caleb] and Patricia Levesque,’’ his personal therapist

since 2016, pending the resolution of this appeal.

This court reviews trial court orders concerning discretionary stays under an abuse of discretion standard.

See Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals &

Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 459, 493 A.2d 229 (1985).

‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its

broad discretion . . . we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . .

Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is

governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.

. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there

is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kyle S. v. Jayne

K., 182 Conn. App. 353, 362, 190 A.3d 68 (2018).

Practice Book § 61-11 (c) provides that a trial court

may terminate or impose a stay in family matters following a hearing, provided the court considers the following factors relevant to this case: ‘‘(1) the needs and

interests of the parties, their children and any other

persons affected by such order; (2) the potential prejudice that may be caused to the parties, their children

and any other persons affected, if a stay is entered, not

entered or is terminated . . . (4) the need to preserve

the rights of the party taking the appeal to obtain effective relief if the appeal is successful . . . and (6) any

other factors affecting the equity of the parties.’’6

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a discretionary stay on March 22, 2022, and issued a memorandum of decision on April 11, 2022. In that decision, the

court found that ‘‘absolutely nothing had been done in

furtherance of the progressive steps set forth’’ in the

court’s initial January 3, 2020 decision. It determined

that further delay of an opportunity for ‘‘another therapist to attempt to facilitate a functional relationship

between Caleb and the defendants merely allows the

assessment of the current therapists to go unchallenged

and to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.’’ The court

was highly critical of Levesque, who testified that she

‘‘never discussed’’ the visitation issue with Caleb, yet

repeatedly testified in various proceedings that the

‘‘slightest contact’’ with the defendants ‘‘might be

incredibly damaging to Caleb.’’ The court characterized

her testimony as ‘‘speculat[ive]’’ no fewer than three

times. The court found that the other providers and

Caleb had ‘‘been influenced by Levesque.’’

The plaintiffs maintain that the court based its decision on a series of ‘‘core factual findings [that] are

clearly erroneous.’’ Among these are that McClean

‘‘never’’ held a joint session with the defendants and
Caleb; and that Levesque had ‘‘influenced’’ McClean.

Other challenged findings include the court’s characterization of the efforts by the various professionals to

facilitate visitation as ‘‘pitifully feeble’’ and the suggestion that, if anything, Caleb’s anxiety regarding the

defendants has ‘‘gotten progressively worse.’’

The record before the court, however, supports a

finding that Caleb has not visited with the defendants

since the summer of 2019—months before the court’s

January 3, 2020 orders, and not at all since the court

issued those orders. The court in its April 11, 2022

memorandum of decision, found that none of the court’s

January 3, 2020 orders had resulted in ‘‘progressively

increased contact,’’ nor had the parties ‘‘work[ed]

together in a therapeutic setting . . . to arrive at a

schedule of visitation.’’ On this record, and for the limited purpose of determining whether the court abused

its discretion in declining to stay its December 15, 2021

orders that the parties engage with a new therapist,

Mays, to facilitate visitation, we are not left with a

definite and firm conviction that the challenged findings

were clearly erroneous.

In determining whether to enter a discretionary

appellate stay of its orders in a family matter, the court

must consider the ‘‘needs and interests’’ of the parties

and weigh the ‘‘potential prejudice’’ that may be caused

if a stay is not entered. See Practice Book § 61-11 (c)

(1) and (2). In weighing those factors here, the court

determined that Caleb’s needs and interests were ‘‘paramount’’ and ‘‘[t]hose needs and interests are protected

by the oversight of Mr. Mays, whose involvement is

an essential part of the [court’s] December 15, 2021

[decision].’’ The court found that, if Mays ‘‘determines

that visitation between [Caleb and the defendants]

should proceed, that visitation will occur under his professional and responsible guidance and direction.’’ The

court further found that the plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by allowing Caleb to begin therapy with Mays

because it is possible that Mays could agree with the

plaintiffs and recommend against visitation.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (c) (6), the trial

court was free to consider ‘‘any other factors affecting

the equity of the parties.’’ Here, the court found: (1)

the parties had entered into the negotiated visitation

agreement with the juvenile court in 2016, and the plaintiffs almost immediately moved to modify it; (2) the

plaintiffs have ‘‘never . . . attempted to offer or produce any evidence’’ that the defendants ‘‘failed to protect [Caleb] from inappropriate adult situation and

behavior,’’ despite the representation in their 2016

motion to modify; (3) the plaintiffs unilaterally terminated visitation in 2017; and (4) the plaintiffs have not

done ‘‘all they could’’ to alleviate Caleb’s anxiety regarding visitation. The court apparently weighed these findings heavily in determining that immediately engaging
with a new family therapist to facilitate visitation was

in Caleb’s best interest.

In arguing that the court abused its broad discretion

in refusing to stay that order pending the resolution of

their appeal, the plaintiffs emphasize contrary evidence

that was before the court. McClean testified that the

defendants were unwilling to follow through with therapeutic recommendations. The GAL recommended reengaging with McClean because, in her opinion, engaging

yet another professional to facilitate visitation would

not be in Caleb’s best interest. The court had before

it a three page document handwritten by Caleb and

introduced through Levesque, in which Caleb stated

that he was eleven and one-half years old and just

wished that the defendants would ‘‘leave [him] alone’’

because they make him ‘‘uncomfortable’’ and ‘‘all the

therapy is thanks to them . . . and I think I have [posttraumatic stress disorder]. . . .’’ Levesque testified that

Caleb’s response to visitation with the defendants was

that of someone who experienced ‘‘trauma’’ and who

had been diagnosed with ‘‘post-traumatic stress disorder.’’ In their motion for review, the plaintiffs acknowledge that the court was free to discredit all of this

evidence. They emphasize, however, that, in order for

the court to have reached the conclusions that it did,

there must be some affirmative evidence that engaging

with Mays is in Caleb’s best interest, and they argue

that no such evidence was presented because Mays was

not called to testify.

We are troubled by the court’s heavy reliance on the

professional judgment of Mays in fashioning its orders

when Mays was not presented as a witness at trial nor

were his credentials presented as evidence. However,

because contact between the defendants and Caleb has

been minimal since August, 2017 (and apparently nonexistent since August, 2019, notwithstanding court

orders to the contrary), the court determined that an

‘‘assessment concerning whether . . . [a visitation

relationship] is feasible should be done without any

further delay.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendants’

position at trial was that McClean had ‘‘failed’’ to facilitate a visitation relationship between the defendants

and Caleb and that, instead, Mays should be engaged

to conduct at least one ‘‘therapeutic reunification’’ visit

per month with them and Caleb. The court’s various

orders clearly indicate that it was dissatisfied with

McClean’s efforts at facilitating visitation. The court

weighed the Practice Book § 61-11 (c) factors in a manner that furthered Caleb’s interests in a relationship

with the defendants, and declined to stay its December

15, 2021 orders requiring the parties to engage with

Mays for the purpose of assessing whether visitation

is feasible. On this record, we cannot say that the court

abused its broad discretion in declining to stay those

orders pending the resolution of the plaintiffs’ appeal.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the court abused its

broad discretion when it did not stay its December 15,

2021 order that Caleb suspend all contact with Levesque, his personal therapist since August, 2016, pending the final resolution of this appeal. The evidence

before the court was that, unlike McClean, the GAL, and

other professionals tasked with facilitating a visitation

relationship between Caleb and the defendants, Levesque was not engaged at the behest of the court. Moreover, it appears that the defendants’ request for relief

with respect to Levesque was raised, for the first time,

during their counsel’s closing argument when counsel

asked the court to ‘‘remove Patty Levesque from this

boy’s life.’’7 When counsel concluded argument, the GAL

asked for permission to ‘‘speak up’’ in response to the

defendants’ late ‘‘modification of the proposed orders,’’

which the court permitted. The GAL indicated that Levesque is Caleb’s ‘‘personal counselor,’’ not a ‘‘courtordered’’ professional, and that Caleb ‘‘does have a bond

[with Levesque and] . . . that any action by this court

to [affect] that bond would be detrimental to the child

and not in the child’s best interest.’’ There was no evidence presented to support a contrary opinion.

To be clear, we make no determination, at this juncture, that the court erred in its assessment of Levesque’s

credibility or the progress that Caleb had made in his

treatment with her. However, the court did not have

before it any evidence as to the impact the suspension

of therapy between Caleb and Levesque would have on

Caleb’s best interest. The court only heard a suggestion

by the defendants’ counsel at closing arguments that

the court should suspend the therapy. Moreover, we

find it compelling that the GAL’s response to the defendants’ eleventh hour request to remove Levesque from

Caleb’s life was to seek permission to address the court

to make known her professional assessment that such

an order would not be in Caleb’s best interest. We conclude that, in declining to stay this order, the court did

not adequately account for the potential harm to Caleb

that could follow from the disruption of his relationship

with his long-term personal counselor. We agree with

the plaintiffs insofar as they ask this court to stay that

portion of the trial court’s December 15, 2021 orders

pending the final resolution of this appeal. We therefore

grant the second motion for review and grant relief

limited to this order.

The motion for review filed on April 4, 2022, is

granted, but the relief requested therein is denied. The

motion for review filed on April 21, 2022, is granted,

and the relief requested therein is granted, in part, in

that the court’s December 15, 2021 order that ‘‘[t]he

psycho-therapy sessions and any other contacts

between the minor child and Patricia Levesque shall be

suspended until further order of the court’’ is stayed

pending the final resolution of this appeal; the remain-
der of the relief requested is denied.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiffs are very close friends of Caleb’s biological mother.

2 The plaintiffs filed several other motions seeking relief from this court.

On March 25, 2022, this court ordered a temporary stay of the trial court’s

orders pending the resolution of these motions for review. See Practice

Book §§ 60-1 and 61-14. This court also directed the court to comply with

Practice Book § 64-1 (b) and issue a decision setting forth the factual and

legal basis of its March 22, 2022 order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a

discretionary stay. The court issued its memorandum of decision on April

11, 2022.

3 After an appeal is filed, Practice Book § 61-11 (e) requires that a motion

to terminate an appellate stay be filed with the appellate clerk.

4 The plaintiffs also argue that the court’s consideration of the issue of

whether there was an appellate stay of the December 15, 2021 orders ‘‘violated the automatic stay that was created by the plaintiffs appealing the

trial court’s denial of their motion for mistrial.’’ This argument merits little

discussion. See Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 482–83, 706 A.2d 960

(1998) (‘‘It is well established that a trial court maintains jurisdiction over

an action subsequent to the filing of an appeal. . . . Moreover, a trial court’s

postappeal jurisdiction persists regardless of any degree of substantive connection between the postappeal motion and the issue on appeal.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).

5

In DiGiovanna v. St. George, supra, 300 Conn. 73–79, our Supreme Court

considered whether a trial court may deny a nonparent’s application for

visitation when the applicant has met the stringent burden of proof established in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 234–35, 789 A.2d 431 (2002). In

DiGiovanna, our Supreme Court treated, as uncontested, that the applicant

had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the requisite relationship

existed between the applicant and the child pursuant to Roth, and that the

child would suffer the requisite level of harm if the relationship was not

permitted to continue. DiGiovanna v. St. George, supra, 61. In resolving

that appeal, our Supreme Court primarily addressed the implementation

of visitation under a best interest of the child standard. See id., 73–79.

Implementation of visitation orders is also the issue in this matter.

6 Practice Book § 61-11 (c) (3) and (5) are factors specific to financial

issues in a marital dissolution action that are not relevant to the resolution

of this matter.

7 Relevant portions of the closing argument by the defendants’ counsel

are as follows:

‘‘It’s really perplexing on how we have five years of intensive therapy

with Patty Levesque and we’ve got no amelioration of his anxiety. His

anxiety, as you pointed out, I don’t know if you were saying his anxiety is

regressing but there’s regression not progression. Why? It really makes no

sense. . . .

‘‘Our proposed orders are to utilize Mr. Philip Mays . . . conduct one

therapeutic reunification visit at minimum per month between Caleb and

his grandparents. And that’s without the presence of Peter and [Carisa] Rek.

. . . [For reasons stated, Ms. McClean] is not the right person for this job.

I do believe Mr. Mays is. . . .

‘‘I think Ms. McClean had the opportunity to get a breakthrough going

and she failed. It’s too bad that so much time has passed and I think our

postorders appreciate that. . . . [We] are very measured in our request.

Once a month therapeutic visitation, reunification visitation, supervised by

Mr. Mays. Is that so much to ask? Under the circumstances, Your Honor,

it’s the best interest for Caleb. . . . His best interest is to deal with this

irrational perspective of his grandparents in a therapeutic setting with a

competent professional.

‘‘I don’t know if Your Honor would take the steps that it would take to

remove Patty Levesque from this boy’s life. I know you have the authority

to do that. I think she’s testified, I think three times now and I’ve never

been more certain that that should happen. So, I would, I think, modify my

proposed orders just slightly and ask Your Honor to at least consider that.

Is she the source? I don’t think so. But is she helpful? I don’t think so. Will

you order it? I’m not so sure you will. But I could see, Your Honor, if you

tie it together. If we remove her and we add one person one time per month

I think it’s actually going to benefit Caleb quite a bit.’’