IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE In the Matter of the Parental Rights to:
M.W. ) ) ) ) ) No. 36110

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- III UNPUBLISHED OPINION

P ENNELL , J.

— C.W. appeals an order terminating her paren tal rights to M. W.
We affirm. FACTS
C.W. gave birth to her daughter, M.W. , in 2014. Seven months later, M.W. was presented at the hospital with severe burns s ustained during a house fire. Child Protective Services launched an investigation and removed M.W. from C.W.’s care . At the time of M.W.’s removal , the Department o f Social and Health Services suspected C.W. of 

### FILED JULY 2, 2019 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division IIINo. 36110

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2 methamphetamine use , based on her prior history , 1 her appearance, and the circumstances of M.W.’s injuries. Department social workers were concerned C .W.’ s struggles with substance abuse and resistance to treatment impaired her ability to provide for M.W. ’s basic needs

. In August 2015, t he parties entered into an agreed order of dependency. C.W.’s primary parental defi ciencies were identified as substance abuse and mental health issues

. T he trial court directed C.W. to participate in several remedial services, including drug and mental health treatment

. Things did not go well. For the next two years , C.W. failed to avail herself of any court

- or dered serv ices. She also refused to comply with court

ordered urinalysis testing. On August 31, 2017, t he Department petitioned to end C.W.’s parental rights over M.W. Trial took place in April 2018. At trial, the Department’s staff had difficulty recalling some of the dependency’s details. Notably, the Department had difficulty recounting the specifics of C.W.’s referrals for services. However, C.W. testified and admitted to knowing of each referral except for th e mental health evaluations.

1 In addition to the Department’s involvement with M.W., C.W.’s older child was involved in dependency proceedings based on C.W.’s drug use. C.W. failed to follow through with services and substance abuse treatment during her older chi ld’s case. By the time of trial regardi ng M.W., C.W.’s rights to her older child had been terminated and the older child had been adopted.No. 36110

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3 In addition, a De partment social worker testified that, based on her review of the file and case notes, she had no doubt C.W. had been provided referrals for a psychological and neuropsycho logical evaluation. The trial testimony also established C.W. had received service referrals during the dependency for her older child that overlapped with M.W.’s dependency. Despite evading most departmental services, C.W. claimed to have corrected her parental deficiencies on her own. C.W. testified she no longer had a substance abu se problem

. She also maintained that she was not suffering from mental illness, only situational depression related to parent

- child separation

. C.W. pointed out that she had obtained a substance abuse evaluation in February 2018 and a mental health evalu ation in March 2018. Although C.W.’s substance abuse evaluation indicated she had a severe substance abuse disorder and needed intensive outpatient treatment , C.W. testified that she did not agree with the evaluation’s analysis. At the time of trial, C.W . was not yet engaged in any treatment services. C.W. testified that her positive turnaround was largely attributable to the supportive living environment provided by her new boyfriend. C.W.’s boyfriend also took the stand at trial and corroborated at lea st some of C.W.’s testimony. C.W.’s boyfriend explained he had been living with C.W. since August 2017, and since that timeNo. 36110

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4 he had obse rved C.W. to be sober and working through her depression

. C.W.’s boyfriend did admit that C.W. had never discussed her substance abuse disorder with him. The Department’ s representative testified she was skeptical of C.W.’s boyfriend. C.W. had refused to provide the name and address of her boyfriend until a few days before trial. When the Department was finally able to r un a background check on the boyfriend’s name, he did not pass. At the close of her trial testimony, C.W. was asked how the c ourt could be assured she would engage in recommended s ervices, should the c ourt opt to continue with the dependency in lieu of ter mination . C.W. testified, “I don’t really know. I can just say that it will happen.” Re port of Proceedings ( RP ) (Apr. 16, 2018) at 150. The court found C.W.’s assurances unpersuasive. It terminated her parental rights , finding that C. W. had been offere d all necessary services and C.W.’s parental deficiencies could not be remedied in the time appropriate for M.W.’s needs. C.W. appeals the termination order. ANALYSIS An order terminating parental rights is subject to two statutory prerequisites.No. 36110

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5 First , the Department must prove the six elements outlined in RCW 13.34.180 (1) 2 by clear and convincing evidence. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a)(i) ; In re Dependency of
T.L.G. , 126 Wn. App. 181, 197, 108 P.3d 156 (2005). Second, a preponderance of the evidence must esta blish that termination is in the child’s best interest s . RCW 13.34.190(1)(b); In re Welfare of A .B. , 168 Wn.2d 908, 911 , 232 P.3d 1104 (2010)

.

2 The statute reads , in relevant part : (1) A petition seeking termination of a parent and child relationship may be filed in juvenile court by any party to the dependency proceedings concerning that child. Such petition shall conform to the requirements of RCW 13.34.040, shall be served upon the parties as provided in RCW 13.34.070(8), and shall allege all of the following unless subsection (3) or (4) of th is section applies: (a) That the child has been found to be a dependent child; (b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to RCW 13.34.130; (c) That the child has been removed or will, at the time of the hearing, have been removed from t he custody of the parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency; (d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided; (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.

. . . . (f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a s table and permanent home. RCW 13.34.180(1).No. 36110

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6 In addition to these two statutory requirements, due process also requires the court to make a finding of curren t parental unfitness. In re Parental Rights to K.M.M. , 186 Wn.2d 466, 479, 379 P.3d 75 (2016). C.W. does not substantively challenge the court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in M.W. ’s best interest s . 3 Her appeal focuses on the statu tory elements provided by RCW 13.34.180(1) and parental fitness

. S tatutory prerequisites for termination One of the statutory requirements for termination is that the parent has been “expressly and understandably offered or provided” all court

- ordered rem edial services. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). C.W. claims the Department failed to meet its burden of proving this requirement because the trial evidence never demonstrated C.W. was notified of
court

- ordered chemical dependency and mental health services. C.W.’s criticism of the Department’s proof is unconvincing. The purpose of notification is to confer knowledge. C.W. admitted at trial that she knew of the

3 C.W. assigns error to

— but presents no argument on

— the trial court’s finding (finding of fact 2.17) that termination is in M.W. ’s best interest s . Clerk’s Papers at 83. On appeal, parties are required to support their argument s with “citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the rec ord.” RAP 10.3(6). Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the assigned error. In re Marriage of Fahey , 164 Wn. App. 42, 59, 262 P.3d 128 (2011). This court does not analyze an issue where the party raising it has declined to do so. See West v. Thurs ton County , 168 Wn. App. 162, 195, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012). C.W. ’s lack of argument waives her challenge to finding of fact 2.17.No. 36110

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7 Department’s referral for substance abuse treatment. That admission was sufficient
to prove the Departm ent had notified her of the referral , regardless of whether the Department documented the referral process. In addition, a Department social worker testified she was confident C.W. had been provided a referral for a mental health evaluation. This testimo ny was corroborated by the fact that C.W. eventually obtained

an evaluation shortly before trial. The trial court therefore had ample bases to find that requisite referrals had been made.
E ven if the Department had failed to provide C.W. a timely referra l for a mental health evaluation, this failure would be excused as futile. See In re Dependency of T.R. , 108 Wn. App. 149, 164

- 65 , 29 P.3d 1275 (2001) (affirming termination of mother’s parental rights when she failed to make timely progress during depend ency)

. By th e time of trial, M.W. was three years old and had been living away from C.W. for most of her life. D uring the time C.W. and M.W. were apart, C.W. failed to add ress her primary obstacle to reunification

— untreated substance abuse disorder . Aft er over two years of dependency proceedings, C.W. had not attended a single treat ment session and had never submitted to a verified urinalysis test. According to the trial testimony, C.W. would need six to nine months to make strides in treatment and show she had made a lasting lifestyle change. This was too long for M.W , who needed permanency “now

. ” RP (Apr.No. 36110

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8 16, 2018) at 85. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the Department had pro vided sufficient services. Current parental f itness Due process requires the Department to prove current parental unfitness prior to entry of a termination order. A.B. , 168 Wn.2d at 918

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. C.W. claims this burden was not met at trial because she presented evidence that she had addressed her substa nce abuse and mental health problems. We are unpersuaded by C.W.’s position. C.W. failed to obtain either a substance abuse or mental health evaluation until shortly before trial. She never substantively participated in any services . The testimony from C.W.’s boyfriend that C.W. did not appear to be using drugs w as unconvincing evidence that C.W. had finally achieved sobriety , particularly in light of C.W. ’s absolute refusal to engage in drug testing. See In re Welfare of A.G. , 155 Wn. App. 578, 591,
22 9 P.3d 935 (2010) (F ailure to participate in urinalysis testing justifies a finding that “substance a buse has not been corrected.”). There was ample evidence at trial linking C.W.’s failed efforts at services to her inability to parent. C.W. herself admit ted that her depression would cause her to shut down and fail to communicate. In addition, the trial testimony showed C.W.’s substance abuse disorder inhibited her ability to meet M.W.’s day

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- day needs. C.W. ’s refusal to work with the Department and pa rticipate in services prohibited the Department fromNo. 36110-1-111 In re Parental Rights to M W

independently assessing whether C.W. had made the types of changes necessary for
M.W. 's safe return to C.W. 'scare. Given these circumstances, the trial court had every

reason to believe C.W. 's parental deficiencies were ongoing and posed a barrier to
reunification in M. W.' s foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
The order of termination is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.

Pennell, J.
WE CONCUR:

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