Present: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, Powell, and 

Kelsey, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 

WILLIAM D. EVANS, IN HIS CAPACITY 

AS TRUSTEE OF THE WANDA S. EVANS TRUST 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 141277 SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 June 4, 2015 

WAYNE L. EVANS, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF 

DOUGLAS E. EVANS, DECEASED, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 

Keary R. Williams, Judge 

In this appeal, we consider as an issue of first 

impression in Virginia whether one spouse with an ownership as 

a tenant by the entirety in real property may, by his or her 

sole act, convey that ownership to the other spouse to create 

a fee simple estate in the grantee spouse. 

BACKGROUND 

On November 26, 1973, Douglas E. Evans and Wanda S. 

Evans, husband and wife, obtained title to a parcel of real 

property known as 605 Fairway Drive in the Town of Bluefield 

in Tazewell County (the "Fairway Drive property") as tenants 

by the entirety with right of survivorship by way of a deed 

from Ply Developing Corporation. On December 27, 1976, 

Douglas executed a general warranty deed (the "1976 deed") 

that purported to convey to Wanda "all of his interest" in the 

Fairway Drive property in exchange for both "love and 

affection" and "ten dollars, cash-in-hand paid." The 1976 
2

deed identified Douglas as the sole grantor, naming Wanda only 

as the grantee. 

For reasons not explained in the record, the 1976 deed 

was not recorded in the land records of Tazewell County in 

Deed Book 456, page 322 until April 11, 1979. Nor does the 

record provide direct evidence that prior to it being 

recorded, Wanda accepted physical delivery of the 1976 deed or 

that it was she who caused the deed to be recorded. 

Douglas and Wanda had three sons, William D. Evans, Lloyd 

David Evans and Wayne Lewis Evans. Wayne has two children, 

Lisa Marie Evans and Jason Lloyd Evans. On February 2, 1993, 

Wanda executed a trust agreement creating a revocable inter 

vivos trust designated as the Wanda S. Evans Trust (the 

"trust"). 

Under the pertinent terms of the trust, upon Wanda's 

death the assets were to be distributed as follows: 

• $25,000 each individually to her grandchildren Lisa 

and Jason, to be held in separate trusts by William 

until each grandchild reached the age of 30; 

• A life estate to Douglas in the Fairway Drive 

property including household goods, if he survived 

Wanda at her death; 

• The remainder of the trust assets, including the 

Fairway Drive property and the household goods, to 

William. 

In the trust Wanda expressly made no provision for Wayne and 

Lloyd to receive any assets of the trust. The trust further 
3

provided that William was to serve as an alternate successor 

trustee. At all times relevant to the litigation in this 

appeal, William served in that capacity after Wanda's death 

and the death of the first named successor trustee. 

Contemporaneous with the creation of the trust, Wanda 

executed a deed which purported to convey by general warranty 

"all of her interest in" the Fairway Drive property to herself 

as trustee of the trust (the "1993 deed"). The 1993 deed 

identifies the property as "being the same interest in real 

estate conveyed to [Wanda] by deed dated February 2, 1993 

[sic], from Douglas E. Evans, which deed is of record in . . . 

Deed Book 456, page 322."1

Wanda died testate on April 18, 1994. At the time of her 

death, she and Douglas were residing in the Fairway Drive 

property. Under the terms of her will, which was executed the 

same day as the 1993 deed and the trust, any property 

remaining in her estate was to pour over into the trust. 

Consistent with the provisions of the trust, her will also 

purports to bequeath the Fairway Drive property to William 

subject to a life estate in Douglas. 

 1

 Although the 1993 deed misstates the record date of the 

1976 deed, it correctly identifies that deed by its location 

in the land records. Because the 1993 deed was not challenged 

on this discrepancy, we will treat it as a scrivener's error. 
4

Following Wanda's death, title to the Fairway Drive 

property became a subject of dispute principally between Wayne 

and William. On April 17, 1995, Wayne, as next friend of Lisa 

and Jason, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit 

Court of Tazewell County against Douglas, William and the 

executor of Wanda's estate. Therein, Wayne asserted that the 

trust failed on numerous grounds. As pertinent to this 

appeal, Wayne asserted that the 1993 deed was ineffective to 

transfer any interest in the Fairway Drive property to the 

trust because "neither spouse can sever an estate by the 

entireties or convey or dispose of any part of it . . . by his 

or her sole act." Implicit in this assertion was the further 

assertion that the 1976 deed was ineffective to convey 

Douglas' interest in the Fairway Drive property to Wanda by 

his sole act. Thus, Wayne contended that Wanda "had no 

separate estate or interest in" the Fairway Drive property 

which she could convey by deed to the trust or devise in her 

will. 

On November 13, 1995, the circuit court ruled that "no 

actual controversy" existed between the parties and dismissed 

the complaint without prejudice. Thereafter, on November 30, 

1995, Wayne, both as next friend of his children and 

individually, William, Douglas, and Wanda's executor entered 

into a mutual release and settlement agreement. As relevant 
5

to this appeal, the parties to the settlement agreed that 

Douglas would be permitted to remain in the Fairway Drive 

property until his death and further was to receive a payment 

of $81,869.63 from Wanda's estate in "full satisfaction of his 

claims against the estate, whether under the Trust, the Will, 

his elective share or otherwise." Douglas expressly "waive[d] 

any right he may have to [the Fairway Drive property] except 

for his life interest." Douglas continued to live in the 

Fairway Drive property until his death on March 12, 2012. 

On November 19, 2012, William, in his capacity as trustee 

of the trust, filed a declaratory judgment action against 

Wayne, both individually and as personal representative of 

Douglas' estate, Lloyd, Lisa and Jason in the circuit court 

seeking to quiet title in the Fairway Drive property. An 

amended complaint was filed on February 22, 2013. As alleged 

therein, Wayne and Lloyd asserted a claim of ownership in the 

Fairway Drive property through Douglas' estate, contending 

that title to the property had remained in Douglas and Wanda 

as tenants by the entirety at the time of Wanda's death and, 

thus, that it became Douglas' property in fee simple as the 

survivor. 

Wayne and the other defendants (collectively, "Wayne") 

filed an answer in which they acknowledged the claim that the 

Fairway Drive property had remained as an estate by the 
6

entirety in Douglas and Wanda. This was so, they contended, 

because the 1976 deed was ineffective to divest Douglas of his 

interest since it was not executed both by Douglas and Wanda 

as grantors. 

William and Wayne filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment, the respective positions of which parallel the 

arguments made in this appeal. In summary, William maintained 

that the 1976 deed was effective because Douglas and Wanda 

"joined" in the deed as grantor and grantee. He further 

maintained that even if the 1976 deed was technically 

deficient, the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed should 

prevent Douglas' estate from seeking an interest in the 

property. Finally he contended that the settlement agreement 

barred Douglas' estate from asserting that Douglas had any 

interest other than a life estate in the Fairway Drive 

property. 

In response, Wayne maintained that the 1976 deed was 

ineffective because tenants by the entirety must join as 

grantors to convey any interest in the property, even if the 

conveyance is to one of them individually. He further 

maintained estoppel by deed was inapplicable where the deed 

relied upon was void, and not merely technically deficient. 

Finally, Wayne denied that the settlement agreement was 

applicable to the Fairway Drive property because neither the 
7

trust nor Wanda's estate ever had ownership of the property 

and, thus, the trust could not assert a claim of ownership 

based on Douglas' waiver of any interest he might have had in 

the property. 

Following argument on the cross-motions, the circuit 

court issued an opinion letter dated October 10, 2013 in which 

it concluded that the 1976 deed failed to show the requisite 

intent to "jointly transfer[]" the Fairway Drive property to 

Wanda in fee simple and thus, because that deed was 

ineffective, the 1993 deed was likewise ineffective to 

transfer any interest to the trust. The circuit court 

concluded that William could not rely upon the equitable 

doctrine of estoppel by deed "due to the invalidity of the 

1976 conveyance." The court entered an order dated December 

17, 2013 sustaining Wayne's motion for summary judgment, but 

retaining jurisdiction over the case to consider a motion for 

reconsideration which had been filed by William on December 5, 

2013. 

In the motion for reconsideration, William, among other 

things, asked the circuit court to make an express ruling as 

to the effect of the November 30, 1995 settlement agreement. 

William asserted that the settlement agreement constituted a 

waiver of any claim that Douglas, and by extension his estate, 
8

had on the Fairway Drive property, thus effectively validating 

the 1976 deed. 

In a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the 

circuit court acknowledged that it had not expressly addressed 

the effect of the settlement agreement, but that "it was 

implicitly addressed." Accordingly, the court ruled that its 

judgment did not violate the terms of the agreement. By a 

final order dated May 27, 2014, the court denied the motion 

for reconsideration and entered final judgment for Wayne. We 

awarded William this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

William assigns error to the circuit court's rulings that 

the 1976 deed was ineffective and, therefore, failed to 

terminate Douglas' and Wanda's tenancy by the entirety in the 

Fairway Drive property. He further assigns error to the 

court's correlative rulings that neither estoppel by deed nor 

the terms of the settlement agreement barred Douglas' estate 

from asserting ownership of the Fairway Drive property. 

We review questions regarding the validity and effect of 

deeds and other written legal documents de novo. See Ott v. 

L&J Holdings, LLC, 275 Va. 182, 187, 654 S.E.2d 902, 904 

(2008). Because the dispositive issue in this case, as 

recognized by the circuit court and the parties, is whether 

the 1976 deed effectively terminated Douglas' tenancy by the 
9

entirety ownership in the Fairway Drive property, leaving 

Wanda as the sole owner in fee simple, we begin our analysis 

with a review of our prior decisions regarding ownership of 

real property as tenants by the entirety. 

Virginia is one of about two-dozen states that continue 

to recognize tenancies by the entirety. See Bunker v. Peyton, 

312 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2002). Tenancy by the entirety is 

a legal fiction "'based upon the same four unities that 

support joint tenancies [plus] a fifth unity . . . of 

marriage.'" Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 326, 512 S.E.2d 

821, 822 (1999)(quoting Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 

314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984)); see also Pitts v. United States, 

242 Va. 254, 258-59, 408 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1991). 

It is well established that specific consequences flow 

from the addition of this fifth unity. First, during the 

marriage, neither spouse may make an absolute disposition of 

property held as tenants by the entirety "by his or her sole 

act." Hausman v. Hausman, 233 Va. 1, 3, 353 S.E.2d 710, 711 

(1987). Second, consistent with this restriction on 

alienability, no creditor of only one spouse can attach 

property held by both spouses as tenants by the entirety. 

Pitts, 242 Va. at 258-59, 408 S.E.2d at 903. Finally, so long 

as the property remains held by them as tenants by the 

entirety, upon the death of one spouse, ownership of the 
10

property will pass to the other in fee simple outside the 

estate of the deceased spouse. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 

735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951). 

While these principles have been applied in many cases 

extending to the earliest decisions of this Court, see, e.g., 

Thornton v. Thornton, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 179 (1825), a careful 

review of these cases reveals that, unlike the current case, 

they primarily involved either a security interest of or a 

conveyance to a third party. See, e.g., Hausman, 233 Va. at 

3, 353 S.E.2d at 711 (1987)(refusing to prioritize lien on 

marital property granted by only one spouse); Waskey v. 

Thomas, 218 Va. 109, 113, 235 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1977)(granting 

rescission where grantee obtained deed signed by only one 

spouse). Thus, the question whether a deed executed by one 

spouse purporting to convey his or her ownership in a property 

held by the entirety to the other spouse is one of first 

impression in Virginia. 

Wayne contends that the circuit court correctly ruled 

that any conveyance of ownership in property held by the 

entirety must be joined by both spouses as grantors. In 

support of this contention, he relies heavily on our decision 

in Vasilion. 

In Vasilion, we considered whether a judgment creditor of 

the husband was entitled to rescission of a deed in which the 
11

husband and wife jointly conveyed a property held by them as 

tenants by the entirety to the wife solely on the ground that 

the purpose of the deed was to put the property beyond the 

reach of the creditor. 192 Va. at 738, 66 S.E.2d at 601. 

Concluding that the trial court did not err in refusing to 

rescind the deed, we based our decision on the fact that the 

property could not have been attached by the creditor prior to 

the conveyance, because the debt was not a "joint debt[] of 

both spouses." Id. at 740, 66 S.E.2d at 602. In so doing, we 

noted that "husband and wife unquestionably can join in a deed 

conveying the entirety to a third party, and in 

Virginia[, Code § 55-9] permits a husband and wife to join in 

a deed conveying land to himself or herself." Id. 

Emphasizing the latter part of this statement, Wayne contends 

that property held by spouses as tenants by the entirety may 

only be conveyed to one of them when both join in the deed as 

grantors. We disagree. 

First, we note that in Vasilion the validity of the deed 

to the wife would not have altered our holding that the 

judgment creditor could not have attached the property prior 

to the conveyance. Thus, while we held that the deed to the 

wife was effective because both spouses joined as grantors in 

the deed, this does not resolve the question whether both 
12

spouses must join as grantors in a deed purporting to convey 

property held as tenants by the entirety solely to one spouse. 

This case presents the first opportunity for the Court to 

resolve the issue whether under any circumstance one spouse 

(the "grantor-spouse") may effectively convey all of his or 

her ownership in property held in a tenancy by the entirety to 

the other spouse (the "grantee-spouse") who does not join in 

the deed as grantor. While the best practice would still be 

for both spouses to join as grantors in a deed to one of them 

separately, for the reasons that follow we hold that where 

there is sufficient evidence of the intent of the grantorspouse to make such a conveyance and, likewise, of voluntary 

acceptance of the conveyance by the grantee-spouse, the 

requirement of mutual consent in the conveyance is met. 

In discussing the requisites for a valid deed, voluntary 

acceptance by the grantee is often discounted as a formality 

that is subsumed within the prerequisite delivery of the deed 

to the grantee. As we observed long ago in Skipwith v. 

Cunningham, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 271, 282 (1837), "the assent of 

the grantee is implied in all conveyances; first, because of 

the supposed benefit; secondly, because it is incongruous and 

absurd that when a conveyance is completely executed on the 

grantor's part, the estate should continue in him; thirdly, to 

prevent the uncertainty of the freehold." Nonetheless, the 
13

role of the grantee to a conveyance is not a passive one. 

"Delivery indeed to the grantee himself implies acceptance by 

him; but as such delivery is not always to him in person, the 

necessity of immediate acceptance is not implied in the 

necessity of a delivery." Id. at 281. 

"That act [of delivery of the deed] indeed cannot compel 

the grantee to take against his will, but it is, as to the 

grantor, a complete and consummate act before that will is 

declared, although it may be avoided by the dissent of the 

grantee. No [person] indeed can be forced to take an estate 

against his will; but the law on the other hand presumes that 

every estate, given by will or otherwise, is beneficial to the 

party to whom it is given, until he renounces it." Id. at 

281. The rule laid down in Skipwith nearly two centuries ago 

remains the law of the Commonwealth today. See, e.g., Langman 

v. Alumni Ass'n of the Univ. of Va., 247 Va. 491, 500, 442 

S.E.2d 669, 675 (1994)("Acceptance on the part of the grantee 

is implied, because the conveyance is presumed to be 

beneficial, unless the grantee refuses to accept the deed by 

some act of renunciation, dissent, disagreement, or 

disclaimer."). 

This is not to say that in the case of tenants by the 

entirety that implied acceptance by the fact of a purported 

delivery will be sufficient to prove the validity of the deed, 
14

for the consent of the grantee-spouse must be affirmative in 

order to satisfy the requirement of mutual consent. The 

grantee-spouse's acceptance must be affirmative in order to 

avoid any mischief that might result in the rare case where 

conversion of an entirety ownership to a fee simple ownership 

would not be beneficial to the grantee-spouse.2

 Accordingly, 

we turn to consider whether the record in this case 

establishes that Wanda affirmatively accepted the conveyance 

from Douglas under the 1976 deed and, thus, gave her consent 

to the dissolution of the tenancy by the entirety. 

Douglas’ unilateral execution of the 1976 deed plainly is 

sufficient to establish his intent to divest himself of his 

tenancy by the entirety ownership in the Fairway Drive 

property in favor of a fee simple ownership in Wanda. 

However, there is no evidence as to how, when or to whom the 

deed was delivered, nor can it be established from the record 

who caused the deed to be recorded in 1979. As of 1979, at 

 2

 For example, where the spouses are estranged, one spouse 

might attempt to be divested of an interest in property that 

was environmentally contaminated or otherwise undesirable by 

surreptitiously recording a deed purporting to convey a fee 

simple interest to a grantee-spouse. Such a deed would be 

ineffective, however, because there would be no evidence of 

mutual consent. Indeed, in such a case, even actual delivery 

of the deed to and acceptance by the grantee-spouse in person 

might not be sufficient if the evidence showed that the 

acceptance was made without knowledge of the undesirable 

nature of the property or other fraudulent purpose by the 

grantor-spouse. 
15

best there was only an implied delivery to and acceptance of 

the deed by Wanda. 

Nevertheless, Wanda's execution in 1993 of a deed, trust 

and will, which each addressed her ownership of the Fairway 

Drive property as her separate property, is clear evidence of 

her affirmative intent to accept the 1976 deed and thereby her 

consent to the dissolution of the tenancy by the entirety to 

create her fee simple ownership of the property. The specific 

reference in the 1993 deed to the conveyance to her by the 

1976 deed removes any doubt that Wanda could have believed she 

still was seized only of a tenancy by the entirety ownership 

in the property. Based on the record in this particular case, 

there is sufficient evidence to establish the mutual consent 

of Douglas and Wanda to the conversion of their tenancy by the 

entirety ownership of the Fairway Drive property to the fee 

simple ownership in Wanda. Thus, the circuit court erred in 

finding that the 1976 deed was not valid to accomplish its 

object.3

 It then follows that the 1993 deed would likewise 

have been valid to transfer Wanda's fee simple interest to the 

trust. 

 3

 Our resolution of this issue in William's favor moots 

his further assignments of error challenging the circuit 

court's failure to apply the doctrine of estoppel by deed or 

to interpret the settlement agreement as waiving any claim by 

the estate to the Fairway Drive property. Accordingly, we 

express no opinion on those issues. 
16

 CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred 

in finding that the 1976 deed was ineffective and void. We 

will reverse the judgment of the court in favor of Wayne and 

enter final judgment for William confirming that the Fairway 

Drive property is the property of the trust, as is already 

reflected in the land records of Tazewell County. 

Reversed and final judgment. 

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE 

MIMS join, concurring. 

 Although I agree with the outcome of this case, I cannot 

agree with the majority’s rationale. According to the 

majority, evidence of mutual consent is all that is necessary 

for one spouse to convey his interest in a tenancy by the 

entirety to the other spouse. I disagree with the majority 

because, in my opinion, it ignores the fundamental nature of 

tenancies by the entirety, creates an incorrect standard for 

reviewing such conveyances, and unnecessarily creates an 

exception to longstanding principles of law that could 

potentially, as demonstrated by the facts at bar, create 

uncertainty as to ownership. 

 This Court has long recognized that “[n]either spouse can 

by separate act make an absolute disposition of property they 
17

hold as tenants by the entirety.” Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 

323, 326, 512 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1999) (quoting Jones v. 

Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984)). This is 

because tenancies by the entirety are based on the legal 

fiction that husband and wife are one entity. Id. As husband 

and wife are one, “neither [spouse] has an interest [in the 

property] which can be conveyed.” Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 

Va. 735, 742, 66 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1951). Indeed, it is the 

very fact that neither spouse has an individual interest in 

the property that protects the tenancy by the entirety from 

judgments against only one spouse. Id. at 742-43, 66 S.E.2d 

at 603-04. 

Notably, in the 1976 deed, Douglas purported to convey 

“all of his interest” in the Fairway Drive property. If 

Douglas, as an individual, held any interest in the Fairway 

Drive property which he could unilaterally convey, that 

interest would be reachable by any of Douglas’ creditors. 

Clearly, that is not the case because, as previously noted, 

Douglas’ interest in the Fairway Drive property amounts to no 

interest at all. Thus, it is clear that Wanda and Douglas, 

jointly as husband and wife, held all of the interest in the 

Fairway Drive property. 

Notwithstanding the fact that Douglas had no individual 

interest in the Fairway Drive property, “it is settled beyond 
18

debate that . . . tenants by the entirety [have] no power to 

alienate permanently their interest, unless they act[] 

together.” Jones, 227 Va. at 182, 314 S.E.2d at 65 (emphasis 

added). See also Vasilion, 192 Va. at 740, 66 S.E.2d at 602 

(“When an estate by the entireties is once set up, neither 

spouse can sever it by his or her sole act.”). Given that 

Douglas and Wanda’s actions in the present case occurred over 

16 years apart, it can hardly be said that they acted 

together. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that 

Wanda was even aware of Douglas’ unilateral actions until she 

executed the 1993 deed. 

 Further, the majority fails to explain the state of the 

property between the time it is conveyed by one spouse and the 

time such conveyance is accepted by the other. I recognize 

that this may be of little consequence in a case where the 

conveyance and acceptance occur simultaneously, but a coherent 

doctrine must also account for cases like the present, where 

the gap between unilateral conveyance and affirmative 

acceptance is measured in years. When does the tenancy by the 

entirety actually terminate: on the date of the initial 

conveyance, on the date the deed is recorded, or on the date 

it is affirmatively accepted? I recognize that such questions 

may have little bearing on the present case, but they will 

likely have significant ramifications in other areas of the 
19

law (e.g., tax, bankruptcy, etc.). Furthermore, although the 

majority addresses the need for an affirmative acceptance to 

avoid the potential mischief a surreptitious conveyance could 

cause, it fails to address the reverse situation, where the 

grantee-spouse withholds affirmative acceptance to the 

detriment of the grantor-spouse. 

I also take issue with the majority’s reliance on Wanda’s 

acceptance of Douglas’ unilateral conveyance to demonstrate 

the parties “mutual consent.” Mutual consent, without more, 

has never been recognized as a valid means for terminating a 

tenancy by the entirety. Indeed, the phrase “mutual consent” 

has never once been mentioned in our entire jurisprudence on 

tenancies by the entirety. 

It has been established law in this Commonwealth since 

1825 that terminating a tenancy by the entirety requires “a 

joint conveyance of the property.” Vasilion, 192 Va. at 740, 

66 S.E.2d at 602 (citing 2 Raleigh C. Minor, The Law of Real 

Property, § 854 (1908)). See also Thornton v. Thornton, 24 

Va. (3 Rand.) 179, 183 (1825). This is true regardless of 

whether the property is being conveyed to one spouse or to a 

third party. While such an approach may appear to put form 

over substance, in reality, it avoids all of the pitfalls 

discussed above. Both parties, along with any affected third 

parties, will immediately know the state of the property 
20

ownership; there can be no gamesmanship in the form of 

surreptitious conveyances or withheld acceptances; and the 

“mutual consent” of both spouses is readily apparent in the 

joint conveyance. 

Rather than relying on a strained interpretation of the 

alleged 1976 conveyance from Douglas to Wanda, I would reverse 

the judgment of the trial court based on the terms of the 

November 30, 1995 settlement agreement (the “Settlement 

Agreement”). At the time Douglas entered into the Settlement 

Agreement, Wanda had already passed away. Therefore, Douglas 

was the sole owner of the property because the tenancy by the 

entirety had terminated with Wanda’s death. At that point, he 

was free to alienate his interest in the property, which he 

did in the Settlement Agreement, with the exception of a life 

interest. In exchange, he received $81,869.63 in 

consideration. As Douglas only retained a life estate, he had 

no interest to pass on to his heirs. Accordingly, I concur 

with the majority that a judgment confirming that the Fairway 

Drive property is the property of the trust should have been 

entered for William.