Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 2 , 2024.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 23

- 00003

- CV

ANGELA ROSS , Appellant

V.

WILLIAM ROSS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 247th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2021 -41326

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Angela Ross and appellee William Ross filed for divorce and proceeded to a bench trial. After hearing testimony and evidence, the trial court granted the divorce a nd ordered a division of the parties ’ estate

. Angela fi le d this appeal and, in five issues, chall enges the trial court ’ s final divorce decree . For the reasons below, we affirm.2 B ACKGROUND Angela and William were married for approximately 20 years before they filed for divorce in July 2021. The parties procee d e d to a bench trial via Zoom in
O c to ber 2022.

A t the beginning of trial, Angela a lleged that her attorney had been working
for William rather than representing her i nterests. Angela ’ s attorney moved to
withdraw as coun sel , and the trial court granted th e motion. Angela represented
herself pro se through the remainder of the trial and c on tinues to do so on appeal.

Both William and Angela testified at trial. William also offered testimony
from an expert witness regarding the valuation of his counseling b usiness , Ross Counseling Service, PLLC. After the close of evidence, the trial court granted the parties ’ divorce and rendered a division of their estate . The trial court signed a
final divorce decree on December 4, 2022 . Angela timely filed this appe a l

. A N A L YS IS Angela r aises five issues on appeal and asserts:

1. the trial court ’ s written decree does not conform to its oral rendition made following the bench trial; 2. William ’ s expert should have been disq ualified for a conflict of inte r est and lacked t he n ecessary qualifications to testify ; 3. the tri a l court abused its discretion in denying Angel a ’ s application to designate an expert; 4. the trial court abused its discretion in denying Angela ’ s request for a continuance; and 5. “ [t]here were n u merous other e rr ors at trial. ”
We consider these issues individ u ally below.3 I. The Trial C o urt ’ s Oral Rendition

The tri al court ’ s final divorce decree includes the following in its allo cation of property to Angela:

100% of the Prairie V iew 403 ( b) Fide lity ac co unt in [William ’ s] n ame and the balance in it as of October 25 , 2022. On appeal , Angela asserts that this allocation of William ’ s retirement accounts
does not comport with th e trial court ’s oral rendition following the bench t rial

. Accordi ng to Angel a , t he oral rendit i on granted t o her thr ee of William ’ s retirement accounts: two 403( b) accounts managed by Fidelity In vestments and

one 401(k) account managed by Str ategic Education, Inc. Angela requests that we modify the trial court ’ s final di vorce decree to include in her award al l three o f
William ’ s retirement accounts. The record does not show that Angel a raised this issue in the trial court

. Angela did not notify the trial court of an error in the final divorce decree , if any,
nor did she file a motio n to m odify, correct, or reform the judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(g). Therefore, Angela did not preserve the issue for appellate review.
See Tex. R. App. P. 33 .1(a); s ee, e.g. , In re Marriage of Williams , No. 1 4

- 15

- 00090

- CV , 2016 WL 299 7094, at * 1 (Tex. App.

— Ho ust on [14th Dist.] May 24,
201 6, no pet.) (mem. op. ) (concluding the appellant waived h is argument that “ the
de cree did not conform to the judg e ’ s oral pronouncements ” because he did “ not cite to any place in the record where he pr eserve d this argument by mak ing it in the
trial court ” ) ; Roone y v. Rooney , No. 14

- 10

- 01007

- CV , 2011 WL 3684618, at * 9 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding
th e appellant w aived his argument that the trial court ’ s or der provided a double

rec ove ry bec ause “ he did not bring this alleged error to the attention of the trial court by filin g a motion for new trial or motion to modify ju dgm ent ” ).4 We overrule Ange la ’ s fir st issue.

I I. William ’ s Expert

In her second issue, Angela challenges the te sti mony of CP A Elicia Rideau,
William ’ s expert witness on the valuation of his bu siness. Specifically, A ngel a
asserts t hat Rideau should not ha ve been permitted to testify at trial because (1) she had a conflict of interest, and (2 ) she lacked the n ecessa ry qualificat ions and her

m ethods were flawed. 1

A. Standard of Revi ew

“ ‘ I f scientific, technical, or other specializ ed knowledge will assist t he trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an exp ert by kn owledge, s kil l, ex p erience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion o r otherwise. ’ ” C oo per Tire & Rubber Co.

v. Mendez , 204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 702). Expert testimony is admissible when (1) t h e expert is qualifie d , and (2) the testimony is
relevant and based on a r eliable foundation. Taber v. Roush , 316 S.W .3 d 139, 147 (Tex. App.

— Ho uston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm s ., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 588

- 89 (1993) ). C our t s determin e relia b i lity from all
the evidence. Id . at 147

- 48.

The trial court ’ s determination tha t these require me nts have been met is

re v iewed for an abuse of discretion. Mendez , 204 S.W.3d at 800; Taber , 316
S.W.3d at 148. We also a pply the abus e o f discretio n standa r d when the issue

1 A ngela raised these obje c tion s at trial and received a ruling, thus preser vi ng the arguments for app ellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (a) ; see also, e.g. , I n re Marriage of Mug ford , No. 14

- 16

- 00436

- CV , 2018 WL 2306737, at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Ho uston [14 th Dist.] Ma y 22, 2018, pet

. den ied) (mem. op. ) ( “ To preserve a comp la int that expert opinion evidence is inadmissible because it is unreliable, a party must object to the evidence before trial or w he n the evidence is offered. ” )

.5 turns on an alleged conflict of interest. See, e.g. , Formo sa Plastics Corp. , U SA v. Kajima Int ’ l, Inc. , 216 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2006, pet.
denie d). The test for abuse of discretion is whe ther the trial cour t acted w ithout reference to any guiding rules or principl es. Taber , 316 S.W.3d at 148.

Similar to th e issue before us now , we previously have examine d the reliability of a CPA ’ s p r oposed testimony regarding the analysis of financial

recor ds in the con text of a divorce

. See In re Marriage of Mug ford , No. 14

- 16

- 00436

- CV , 2018 WL 230 6737, at * 5 (T ex . App.

— Houston [14th Dis t.] May 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op. ). There, w e held that the testimony ’ s adequacy should be j udged by the “ general r e liabil ity ” tes t , which we de scribed as follows: When experts rely on experience and training rather than a p articular methodology to reach their conclusions, reviewing courts determi ne whether there may be “ simply too great an analytica l gap between the d a ta and the opi n ion proffered ” for the op inion to be reliable.
Id . (quoting Gammill v. Jack W illiams Chevro le t, Inc. , 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998)). We apply that standard here.

B. Rideau ’ s Testimony

Ride au began her testimony b y des cribi ng her qua li f icatio ns. Rid e au said
she has been a practicing accountant since 2009 and received her CPA license in
201 5. Rideau is employed a t Mou ntain West Pipeline Compan y and als o owns her
own CPA business.

Ride au said she has worked with W illi am for the past t w o year s and

pe r form s bookkeeping and completes tax returns for Ross Counseling Service

. Ride au said she a ls o has prepared joint tax retu rns for William and Angela.

Ride a u prepared a valuation report for Ross Counseling Service using th e

“ excess earni ng s metho d. ” Acc o rding to Rideau, this me thod “ looks at what his6 business is earning over the last several y ea rs, it weighs each y ear by the most recent to least recent, and takes that in addition to the assets and liability of the
business to perform the v a luatio n. ” Rid e au said she felt com fortable using thi s method g iven that she had “ been doing [William ’ s] b oo kkeeping for the last

se veral years , as well as preparing his tax returns. ”

Rideau describe d two other valuation methods and her r easons for not

ut i l izing them to valu e Ross C ounseling Service. Ride au described the “ fair
market val ue method , ” which take s into account “ actual off ers to buy the
business. ” Rideau said she chose not to employ this method because there is “ not a super h uge market of p eo p le who can bu y this type of practice ” that essentially is
based on William ’ s “ good wil l , and his education, a nd his background

. ” Rid eau describe d a second valuation method “ based on the balance sheet , ” which w ould
have entailed exami ning “ the assets tha t w e can sell ” a nd “ the liabilit ies that we would need to pay off

. ” According to Rideau, sh e did not use thi s method because
there wer e “ not a lot of balance sheet or liability accounts ” for physical assets. Rather, Ross Counseling Service was primarily an “ accou nts pay ab le, accounts
receivable ” business.

Ride au sa id she completed h er valuation based on three y e ars of Ross Counseling Service ’ s operations : 2018, 2019, and 2020. According to Ride au, she
relie d on the b usiness ’ s income sta tements, tax re tu r ns, bu siness ex pense receipts,
and bank a ccounts

. Rideau opi ned that Ross C ounseling Service would contin ue to be profitable becaus e “ there were multiple insurance p roviders that use him, and so he was paid through contracts with t he U.S . courts, as we ll as the Texas
De partment of Justice, as well as thir d

- party in surance providers. ” Rideau valued
the bu si ne ss at $370, 898.84 , with a ran ge of $33 3,000

- $ 407 ,000. Rideau ’ s written valuation report also was a dmitted into evidence.7 Ride au sai d this is the f ir st b usines s valuati on she has completed. Rideau

s aid she felt comfortable per forming the valuation because sh e employed a method

“ based on mathematical formu las ” that “ leaves very little room for e rror or for judgment. ” Rid eau also testifie d that she i s “ fa m iliar with [Wil liam ’ s] earnings based on doing his books, his monthly bookkeeping ” and preparing t he busin e s s ’ s income tax returns. According to Ride au, she also completed two joint tax return s for William and Angela. Rideau s aid the 2 020 joint ta x ret u rn was complete d after William and Angel a had separated

. Rideau testified that she p resent ed the tax retu rn to Angel a for her signa ture, which A n gela signed after review ing the return and asking several questions.

C. Application

I n h er first cha ll eng e to Ri deau ’ s te stimony , Ang ela asserts that a conflict of
i nteres t warranted the exclusion of the expert t es timony because Ride au pr epared a joint income tax return for Angel a and William. We disagree. Angela does not point to any evid ence in the re cor d sugge sting tha t Rideau was provided confident ial information from Angela that would inhibit Rideau ’ s abil it y to provide an accurate valuation of Willi am ’ s business. Rather, the record suggests that Ride au ’ s and Angela ’ s interactions wer e limited to t he c omplet ion of

an d signature on the parties ’ joi nt tax return. Moreover, William was the only party earning a n income during the year s Rideau filed the parties ’ joint income tax

return , further limiting the amount o f in formation Rideau wou ld have rece iv ed
f

rom An gela and the substance of their in teract ions. Likewise, Angela does not cite

— a nd our research did n ot find

— any cases hold ing that a conflict of interest existed in analogous circumstances. Consider ing8 the record as a whole, it does not in cl ude any in dication that Rideau ’ s relatio nship
with Ange la impacted her valuation of Ross Counseling Ser vice. Th e refore, the
trial court did not abuse it s discretion in overruling Angela ’ s objection on this ground. See Mendez , 204 S.W.3d at 800; Formo sa P las t ics Co rp. , USA , 216
S.W.3d at 447

. Second, Ang ela summarily asserts that Rid eau “ lacked the necessary qual if ications and her methods were flawed. ” We disagree with this
characterization of Rideau ’ s testimony.

We set out Rideau ’ s backgr ound above : s he h as bee n working in account ing since 2009, ea rn ed her CPA in 2015, and ha s completed the bookkeeping and ta x returns for Ross Counsel ing Service for two years. Ride au also provided a de tailed
overview of the valuation methods available to her and her r eas o ns for selectin g the excess earnings method. Rid eau ’ s valuation report provides further details regarding t he specifics of her valu ation. Taken together, this ev idence provides an analytical foundation su fficient to support Rideau ’ s exp ert testimon y. S e e In re
Mar riage of Mug ford , 2018 WL 23 06737, at * 5

. Therefore, the trial cour t did not
abuse i ts discretion in o verrulin g Angela ’ s objection on this ground. See Mendez , 204 S.W.3d at 800

. Having overruled Angela ’ s argum ents o n this point, we overr u l e he r second
is sue in i ts entirety.

III. Angela ’ s Application to De signate an Expert

In her third is sue , Angela assert s “ it was an abuse of discretion to deny [ her ] application to designate an expert. ” Angel a filed her moti on for leave to designa t e a n e xpert wit ness approximately two month s before tria l and William filed a response opposing the9 re quested leave. The cler k ’ s record does not show that the trial court ruled on Angela ’ s motion for leave. Angela did not re

- asser t her motion for leave a t t r ia l
nor did she object to the trial cou rt ’ s failure to ru le on the motion.

As a prerequisite t o pres enting an evidentiar y complaint for appellate review, the complaining party must object to the evidence and obtain a ruling. See
Tex. R. A pp. P. 33. 1 (a) ; s ee also B ay Area Healthcar e Grp., Ltd . v. McShane , 239 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam ). Because Angela did not obtain a ruling
on he r motion for leave or object to the trial court ’ s failure to rule on it, she failed

to preserve this issue f or a pp ell ate re view. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Bay Area Healthcare Grp., Ltd. , 239 S.W.3d at 235 ; see also, e.g. , Cal Dive Offshore Contractors Inc. v. Bryant , 478 S.W.3d 914, 921 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ( the appella nt ’ s failure to o bt ain a rul ing on motion to strike did not preserve his argu ments for appellate review ).

We over ru le Angela ’ s third issue.

IV. Angela ’ s R equest for a Continu ance In her fourth issue, Angela asserts the trial court erred in denyi ng her requ est for a con tin u an ce afte r her counsel was permitted to withd raw. We review th e denial of a request for continu an ce under the abuse of di scretion standard. In re Marriage of Moncur , 640 S.W.3d 309, 320

- 21 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Di st.] 2022, no pet .). We conclude th a t showin g is not made he re.
When the case was called to trial, Angela immediately sta te d that she did not

“ have anyone representing ” her and alleged that there had been “ much corr uption, lies, and i ntimidation. ” A nge la asserted that her attorney , De l an e y , was w orking
f

or Willi am rather than for her. Angela also asserted that William “ has b e en hacking everything

. ”10 Responding to these al legations, De l aney said: “ I have absolutely no idea why she ’ s making these alleg ations. I have w orked my butt off o n this ca se, and I
think Angel a knows that. ” Noting that this was “ a complete surprise, ” Delaney
made an oral mot ion to withdraw because he apparently lacked “ the confidence of [his] client. ”

The tria l cou rt asked Ang ela i f she intend ed to discharge D el a n ey . In response, Angel a asserted ( 1) she “ just didn ’ t trust ” De laney ; (2) this was th e third attorney that had been “ enti ced by William Ross ” ; (3) if she had to proceed ,

“ there ’ s no way it will be fair ” ; (4) she “ felt like [she] had n o one on [her ] si de ” ; and ( 5 ) she was limite d to what she could do online because “ all [her] electronics
ha ve been hacked

. ” The tria l court granted Delaney ’ s request to withd raw and instructed him to file an order granting the requested w ithdrawal.

The tria l court then tu r n ed to o ther pre

- trial m atters. When the order on

w ithdrawal was ready, the trial cour t had the following exchan ge with Delaney :
Trial Court: If [Angela] is able to, I ’ d like for her to come back. Let ’ s just state fo r the record that [Angela] put her p h o ne down , I ’ d say 30 min utes ago , and she hasn ’ t come back to it. We ’ re looking at wha t appears to be a hotel ro om mirror , mayb e. And then Mr. Delaney has called her name on the Zoom, she didn ’ t answer. And he says th at

– I believe y o u said, sir, you tr i e d calli ng her, but that her ringer is off. Delaney : Yes. My phone, when I tried to c on t act her by te xting or b y phone, it says that she silenced her notifications.
Trial Court: Okay. [Angela], if you can hear us, we need y ou to
c ome back.
I ’ m go in g to need her to come bac k so that I can tell11 her what, what her attorneys are requestin g that I do, and determine , also, whether s he ’ s asking for additional time if I allow her attorneys to do what her attorneys are try ing to do. And I need her to tell m e that.
I f she isn ’ t here in the next five minutes, I ’ m going to consider her to have le ft in the middle of our tr ial, then we ’ ll continue. Angela did not return in the next five minutes. 2 The trial court grante d De l a ney ’ s motion to with draw. In Del an e y ’ s “ las t duty

. . . bef ore withd rawing, ” he made

“ an oral motion for continuance , in c as e [Angela] wants to get a fourth attorney. ” William objected to the continu ance, pointing out tha t the trial court had already

gr anted previous co ntinuance s

. The tr i a l court denied the requ este d cont inuance. Based on this sequ ence of events, we concl ud e the trial court did no t err in denying Angela ’ s oral request for a continuance . We overrule Angela ’ s fourth
issue.

V. “ Other Errors ”

In her fifth issue, Angel a s u m ma rily argu es that the trial court should have (1) divided the $280,000 in the parti es ’ joint account equally rather than awarding it to William, and (2) should have ordered that the $21,000 debt from Akard plumbing b e split between the pa rties.

In div i din g the par ties ’ community e state, the trial court shall render a division of proper ty it deems just and right , having due regard for each party ’ s rights. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001; Maxwell v. Maxwell , No. 14

- 20

- 0 0 298

- CV,
2021 WL 495688 1, at * 17 (T ex. App

. — Ho uston [14th Dist.] Oc t. 26, 2021, pet.
deni ed) (mem. op.). This standard vest s the trial court with bro ad discretion in

2 Angela return ed to the Zoom trial later in the pr o ceed ings when William ’ s expert was testi fy ing.12 dividing th e marital estate and we will not disturb this division on appeal unless the

co m plaining party shows t ha t the divi sio n wa s so unju st and unfair as to cons titute
an abuse of discretion. Murff v. Murff , 6 15 S.W.2d 696, 698

- 99 (Tex . 1981) ; Ma xwell , 2021 WL 495688 1, at *17. Angela did not make that showing here. As summarized above, s he bald ly
asserts that the trial c our t er red in it s allocat ion of two assets. Angela does not cite

any case law to support t hese contentions

. N or d oes she analyze these assets ’
allocation in the context of the overall division of the parties ’ sizable co m munity

e state , which i ncludes thre e h o mes , three v ehicles, numerou s bank and i nvestment accounts, retirement accounts, and Wi lliam ’ s business

. There fore, Ang el a ’ s conclusory argument i s insufficient to show that the trial court ’ s allocation of the partie s ’ joint account and th e Akard plum bin g bi ll consti tutes an abuse o f
di scretion. See also, e.g. , Michelena v. Mi chelena , No

. 13

- 09

- 00588

- CV , 2012
WL 3012642, at * 9 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Ju ne 15, 20 12, no pet.) (mem. op.) (overruling the husband ’ s chal l enge to the allocation o f an asset wh e n he “ cites to no legal a uthority in support of this assertion, and h is argument in su pport of this
issue cons ists of two or three conclusory sentences with no substantive analysis ” ). We overrule Angela ’ s fifth issue

. C ONCLUSION Having ove rruled all of An gel a ’ s issue s on appeal, we af firm the trial court ’ s Decembe r 4, 2022 final decree of d ivorce.13 /s/ Mea ga n Hassan J u st ice

Pan el consis t s of Just ice s Wise, Spain, and Hassan

.