[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DELAWARE COUNTY CHILD 

SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 

: 

: JUDGES: 

: 

Appellant : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

-vs- : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

: 

STEPHEN O. KISE : 

: 

Plaintiff-Appellee : Case No. 19 CAF 12 0064 

: 

and : 

: 

JUDITH A. KISE : 

: 

: 

Defendant-Appellee : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court 

of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 

Division, Case No. 02 DR B 04 0177 

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: 

APPEARANCES: 

March 22, 2021 

For Appellant: For Plaintiff-Appellee: 

TANYA H. KIDD ELIZABETH N. GABA 

145 North Union St., 3rd Floor 1231 E. Broad St. 

Delaware, OH 43015 Columbus, OH 43205 

For Defendant-Appellee: 

CALEB CARSON III 

144 E. Center St. 

Marion, OH 43302 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

Delaney, J.

{¶1} Appellant Delaware County Child Support Enforcement Agency appeals the 

November 27, 2019 judgment entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, 

Domestic Relations Division. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On June 27, 2003, Appellee Judith A. Kise (“Wife”) and Appellee Stephen 

O. Kise (“Husband”) were divorced by Agreed Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce in the 

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. The Decree 

ordered Husband to pay spousal support in the amount of $1,900.00 per month directly 

to Wife for 177 months, effective May 1, 2003. The trial court retained jurisdiction to modify 

the amount, duration, and payment of spousal support. 

{¶3} By judgment entry filed January 5, 2007, the trial court ordered Husband to 

pay all future spousal support payments and arrearage liquidation payments through 

Appellant Delaware County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“DCCSEA”). Husband’s 

spousal support arrearage was $29,000 as of November 29, 2006. The trial court ordered 

Husband to liquidate the arrearage at a rate of $1,000 per month. Upon receipt of the trial 

court’s order, the DCCSEA inputted all party and order information into the Support 

Enforcement Tracking System (“SETS”). The DCCSEA collected and disbursed the 

spousal support payments, maintained records, and charged the statutory two percent 

processing charge. 

{¶4} Husband and Wife continued to litigate the issue of spousal support. Through 

a judgment entry filed December 31, 2008, the trial court determined Husband’s spousal 

support arrearage was $50,543.98 as of December 17, 2007. Husband was 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

ordered to liquidate the arrearage at a rate of $380 per month. The DCCSEA adjusted 

SETS to accurately reflect the changes made to the order. 

{¶5} On November 9, 2010, the trial court issued a judgment entry finding 

Husband was in contempt for failure to comply with the spousal support order. Husband’s 

spousal support arrearage was $109,439.80 plus the two percent processing fee. 

{¶6} Husband and Wife entered into an Agreed Order on June 29, 2011. Husband 

was ordered to pay spousal support in the amount of $400 per month and ordered 

to pay $200 per month toward the spousal support arrearage through the DCCSEA. 

Upon receipt of the entry, the DCCSEA adjusted the SETS to accurately reflect the 

changes made to the spousal support order. 

{¶7} On June 8, 2017, the trial court reactivated the divorce proceeding upon 

Wife’s motion to show cause regarding spousal support. The DCCSEA was ordered to 

complete and disseminate to Husband and Wife’s counsel an audit of the spousal support 

account. 

{¶8} On January 31, 2018, the DCCSEA took administrative action to terminate 

the current spousal support effective January 31, 2018 because 177 months had lapsed. 

On April 19, 2018, the DCCSEA provided a certified audit including all spousal support 

arrearages and administrative processing charge arrearages. 

{¶9} On May 3, 2019, the DCCSEA received a subpoena to appear on June 5, 

2019 for trial. After reviewing the trial court docket, the DCCSEA discovered the trial date 

had been vacated and the trial court had ordered Husband and Wife to mediation. 

{¶10} On July 17, 2019, the trial court filed a Judgment Entry In Court Settlement. 

The judgment entry stated the trial court held an ad hoc Final Hearing on May 23, 2019 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

regarding all outstanding post-decree motions. Husband and Wife participated in trial 

court mediation services and reached a full agreement on all outstanding issues and 

motions. Husband and Wife agreed that by May 23, 2019, Husband shall pay Wife 

$13,000 in full satisfaction of all claims and counterclaims pertaining to spousal support, 

which the trial court noted “was an arrears only matter.” (Judgment Entry, July 17, 2019). 

{¶11} The judgment entry stated in pertinent part to this appeal: 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that The Lump Sum Payment that resolves the 

disputed arrearages is specifically authorized by the Court and shall be paid 

direct from the Plaintiff to the Defendant (contemplated as through a third 

party) on May 23, 2019. CSEA shall be directed to adjust its records 

accordingly effective the date of this entry to reflect that any arrears or 

credits on the above-referenced spousal support account – including those 

regarding the spousal support account and the processing fee be reduced 

to zero. Should CSEA require an acknowledgement from one or both of the 

parties they shall cooperate, however the directive from the Court should 

be sufficient to effectuate the reduction of the arrears to zero and close the 

account. 

(Judgment Entry, July 17, 2019). 

{¶12} On July 22, 2019, the DCCSEA filed a motion for relief from judgment 

pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) requesting relief from the July 17, 2019 judgment entry. It argued 

the trial court erred when it ordered the processing charges to zero and failed to provide 

the DCCSEA with notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to be heard. In support 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

of its motion, the DCCSEA attached a certified audit of the spousal support order that 

reflected Husband owed $4,142.01 in processing charge arrearages as of April 30, 2019. 

{¶13} Without a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment 

on November 27, 2019. It is from this judgment that the DCCSEA now appeals. 

{¶14} Neither Husband nor Wife filed an appellate brief. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶15} The DCCSEA raises two Assignments of Errors: 

{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED

HUSBAND AND WIFE TO WAIVE THE ADMINISTRATIVE 2% PROCESSING CHARGE 

OWED TO THE DELAWARE COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY. 

{¶17} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED

DCCSEA’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE

60(B) BECAUSE THE DELAWARE COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 

AGENCY WAS NEVER PROVIDED NOTICE, THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, OR 

THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE UNDERLYING ORDER TO WAIVE 

PROCESSING CHARGES.” 

ANALYSIS

I. and II.

{¶18} We consider the two Assignments of Error raised by the DCCSEA together 

because they are interrelated. The DCCSEA contends the trial court abused its discretion 

when it ordered the DCCSEA to reduce Husband’s processing fee arrearage to zero and 

to deny the DCCSEA’s motion for relief from that judgment. We agree. 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

Civ.R. 60(B)

{¶19} A motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the trial court's 

sound discretion. Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987). To find an 

abuse of that discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). The DCCSEA bases its motion 

on 60(B)(5). In GTE Automatic Electric Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 

351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held 

the following: 

To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must 

demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present 

if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds 

stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a 

reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or 

(3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was 

entered or taken. 

{¶20} The DCCSEA argued it was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Civ.R. 

60(B)(5) allows the trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason 

justifying relief from the judgment.” Civ.R. 60(B)(5) operates as a catch-all provision and 

“reflects ‘the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust operation of a 

judgment.’” Maggiore v. Barensfeld, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011CA00180, 2012-Ohio-2909, 

2012 WL 2415184, ¶ 35 citing Dutton v. Potroos, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010CA00318, 2011- 

Ohio-3646, 2011 WL 3057612, at ¶ 49. It is reserved for “extraordinary and unusual case 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

[s],” Myers v. Myers, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22393, 2005-Ohio-3800, 2005 WL 1763608, 

at ¶ 14, and “is not a substitute for the enumerated grounds for relief from judgment [.]” 

Id. 

{¶21} In examining the three GTE factors, we first find that the DCCSEA’s motion 

for relief from judgment was made in a reasonable time. It was filed five days after the 

trial court issued its judgment entry waiving Husband’s processing fee arrearage. We next 

determine whether the DCCSEA has a meritorious claim or defense to present if relief is 

granted. 

The Meritorious Claim and the Processing Fee

{¶22} The Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) was “established 

pursuant to R.C. 3125.03 so that it could enforce support orders, oversee the collection 

of support obligations, and perform other actions associated with child support 

enforcement.” Saari v. Lorain Cty. Child Support Enf't Agency, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 

10CA009905, 2011-Ohio-2198, 2011 WL 1782102, ¶ 7. Under certain circumstances, the 

CSEA must also collect spousal support. Id. citing Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12–1–10. 

{¶23} To perform its statutorily mandated duties to enforce support orders and 

oversee the collection of support obligations, the General Assembly authorized the CSEA 

to collect a processing charge. R.C. 3119.27(A) states: 

A court that issues or modifies a court support order, or an administrative 

agency that issues or modifies an administrative child support order, shall 

impose on the obligor under the support order a processing charge in the 

amount of two per cent of the support payment to be collected under a 

support order. No court or agency may call the charge a poundage fee. 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

R.C. 19.28 next states: 

(A) As used in this section, “current support payment” means the amount of 

support due an obligee that an obligor is required to pay in a particular 

payment for the current month as specified in a support order. “Current 

support payment” does not include payments on arrearages under the 

support order. 

(B) The obligor shall pay the amount imposed pursuant to section 3119.27 

of the Revised Code with every current support payment, and with every 

payment on arrearages. 

{¶24} The purpose of a processing fee is to compensate officials for the risk of 

handling and disbursing money. Tuscarawas Cty. Child Support Enf't Agency (CSEA) v. 

Burger, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2000AP110074, 2001-Ohio-1440, *2 citing Granzow v. 

Bureau of Support, 54 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 560 N.E.2d 1307 (1990). The two percent

processing charge is part of a uniform state practice of support order enforcement 

mandated by federal and state law. R.C. 3125.07 codifies the directive to create the 

Support Enforcement Tracking System (“SETS”) used by all Ohio county child support 

enforcement agencies: 

The department of job and family services shall establish and maintain a 

statewide, automated data processing system in compliance with Title IV-D 

of the “Social Security Act,” 88 Stat. 2351 (1975), 42 U.S.C. 651, as 

amended, to support the enforcement of child support that shall be 

implemented in every county. Every county shall accept the automated 

system and, in accordance with the written instructions of the department 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

for the implementation of the automated system, shall convert to the 

automated system all records that are maintained by any county entity and 

that are related to any case for which a local agency is enforcing a child 

support order in accordance with Title IV-D of the “Social Security Act,” 88 

Stat. 2351 (1975), 42 U.S.C. 651, as amended. 

{¶25} The above-cited law demonstrates it is well-settled that the two percent 

processing fee collected by an CSEA is statutorily mandated. The issue presented in this 

case is whether the DCCSEA had a meritorious claim or defense that the trial court could 

not order the DCCSEA to waive a processing fee arrearage accrued by Husband. We 

examine two cases that addressed the issue of whether a CSEA was entitled to collect 

an additional two percent in processing charges on a processing fee arrearage. These 

cases provide guidance as to whether a trial court can order the DCCSEA to reduce 

Husband’s processing fee arrearage to zero. 

{¶26} In Tuscarawas Cty. Child Support Enf't Agency (CSEA) v. Burger, 5th Dist. 

Tuscarawas No. 2000AP110074, 2001-Ohio-1440, the CSEA filed contempt actions 

against multiple obligors under a child support order due to child support arrearages. The 

trial court ordered additional monthly payment toward arrearages, but ultimately declared 

in each case the CSEA could not collect processing fees on any support arrearage 

payments, including those attributable to prior unpaid processing fees. Id. at *1. The trial 

court used the following language in several of the cases: 

Thus, the Court finds that although the Revised Code gives the court and 

administrative agency authority to account for past due processing fees, 

neither the Revised Code nor the O.A.C. authorizes the collection of an 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

additional processing fee on the past due processing fee. The Court finds 

that the law does not allow for cumulative processing fees to be charged 

upon past due support. The accumulation of processing fees could result in 

an unconscionable, exponential obligation for which there is no clear 

legislative intent and which this court will not endorse. 

Id. at *1. 

{¶27} On appeal, this Court examined the meaning of R.C. 2301.35, which was 

the predecessor statute to R.C. 3119.27 and R.C. 3119.28. In S.B. 180, 2000 Ohio Laws 

291, the General Assembly repealed R.C. 2301.35 and enacted R.C. 3119.27 and R.C. 

3119.28. The relevant content of R.C. 2301.35 was split between the two statutes but the 

language remained the same, and the relevant language has essentially been unchanged 

since we examined it in Burger. R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) stated: 

(G)(1) A court or administrative agency that issues or modifies a support 

order shall impose a processing charge that is the greater of two per cent 

of the support payment to be collected under a support order or one dollar 

per month on the obligor under the support order. The obligor shall pay the 

amount with every current support payment, and with every payment on 

arrearages. No court or agency may call the charge a poundage fee. 

{¶28} Upon our appellate review of the statutory language, the majority in Burger 

found the trial court erred when it disallowed the collection of statutory processing charges 

on monthly arrearage payments. Id. at *3. We first disagreed with the trial court’s statutory 

interpretation of R.C. 2310.35(G)(1): 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

Following its review of various provisions in the Ohio Revised Code and 

Ohio Administrative Code, the trial court found that it could not locate a 

definition of “arrearages” as used in 2301.35(G)(1). However, the court 

concluded that “[t]he obligor must pay the processing charge on the 

support, whether the support is paid on time (current) or paid late (pastdue);” but that no authority exists for assessing a “second” processing fee 

on the support amount if paid past-due. * * * Courts are guided by the axiom 

that statutes should be construed to avoid unreasonable consequences. 

See State ex rel. Dispatch Printing v. Wells (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 382, 384. 

The trial court's reading of R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) effectively altered the second 

sentence from conjunctive to disjunctive; i.e., the phrase “and with every 

payment on arrearages” was essentially construed as “or with every 

payment on arrearages,” (if not previously paid with current support.) 

Generally, “ * * * we must presume the legislature means what it says; we 

cannot amend statutes to provide what we consider a more logical result.” 

State v. Virasayachack (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 570, 574. Additionally, the 

trial court effectively read “two per cent of the support payment” in the first 

sentence of R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) as referring to a current support order only. 

In construing a statute, a court may not add or delete words. State ex rel. 

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 144, 148; 

State v. Hughes (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427. As CSEA points out, the 

aforementioned second sentence of R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) was originally 

added to the statute, via amendment, on March 29, 1988. Although the 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

second sentence has from its onset contained the phrase “current support,” 

the General Assembly never chose to amend “support payment” or “support 

order” from the first sentence in like fashion. Indeed, at least one appellate 

court has held that a “child support order” includes an order requiring 

periodic payments for past-due support. See Treadway v. Ballew (Oct. 7, 

1998), Summit App.No. 18984, unreported. 

Id. at *2 

{¶29} In interpreting R.C. 2301.35(G)(1), we next examined R.C. 5101.325(B)(1). 

The content of R.C. 5101.325(B)(1) is now codified in R.C. 3121.56 and R.C. 3121.58, 

with no relevant change in wording. 

Furthermore, at the time of the cases sub judice, the Ohio Department of 

Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”) was statutorily charged in R.C. 

5101.325(B)(1) with maintaining an account of unpaid processing fees for 

every child support obligor: (B)(1) The division [of child support in the 

department of job and family services] shall collect the charge imposed on 

the obligor under the support order pursuant to division (G)(1) of section 

2301.35 of the Revised Code. If an obligor fails to pay the required amount 

with each current support payment due in increments specified under the 

support order, the division shall maintain a separate arrearage account of 

that amount for that obligor. * * *. 

Id. at *2. 

{¶30} The majority in Burger concluded that in “[r]eading R.C. 5101.325(B)(1) and 

R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) in pari materia, we cannot accept the trial court's restrictive 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

interpretation of the collection of processing fees. An obligor who fails to pay current 

support remains statutorily liable for the corresponding accumulation of unpaid 

processing fees on said support; otherwise, the mandate of R.C. 5101.325(B)(1) is 

superfluous. When the obligor later makes an arrearage payment, we find no basis to bar 

CSEA from assessing thereon a separate processing fee under R.C. 2301.35(G)(1). * * * 

Moreover, when interpreting statutes, courts ‘* * * must give due deference to an 

administrative interpretation formulated by an agency that has accumulated substantial 

expertise and to which the General Assembly has delegated the responsibility of 

implementing the legislative command.’ Swallow v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 

55, 57.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 

{¶31} The Second District Court of Appeals was faced with the same question in 

Osborne v. Osborne, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 26624, 2015-Ohio-3382, where the trial 

court stated the CSEA was not entitled to collect an additional two percent in processing 

charges on a processing fee arrearage of $301.91 owed to the CSEA. The court relied 

upon our decision in Burger, supra, to find the trial court erred in refusing to allow the 

CSEA collect the additional two percent processing charge on the processing fee 

arrearage. Id. at ¶ 2. 

{¶32} The DCCSEA argues the trial court was without the authority to order the 

DCCSEA to waive the processing fee arrearage owed by Husband; based on our 

instructive analysis in Burger, we agree. The statutorily mandated purpose of the CSEA 

is to enforce support orders, oversee the collection of support obligations, and perform 

other actions associated with child support enforcement. A two percent processing fee 

has been held to be reasonable to compensate the CSEA for the assumption of the risk 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

with the handling and disbursement of funds in proportion to the amount of those funds. 

Curran v. Kelly, 9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0139-M, 2012-Ohio-218, ¶ 13 citing Granzow, 

54 Ohio St.3d at 38. The history of this case shows that the DCCSEA has been enforcing 

the parties’ support order, overseeing the collection of Husband’s support obligations, 

and performing other actions associated with support enforcement since 2007. 

{¶33} We found in Burger, which was followed in Osborne, that Ohio law permitted 

the CSEA to collect an additional two percent processing charge on a processing fee 

arrearage and the trial court could not order the CSEA to waive the collection of the 

charge. Based on the same statutory provisions, we likewise find the language of R.C. 

3119.27, R.C. 3119.28(B), and R.C. 3121.58 limits the trial court’s ability to order the 

DCCSEA to reduce a processing fee arrearage to a zero balance. While Husband and 

Wife may have reached an agreement as to Husband’s spousal support obligation, the 

DCCSEA has a meritorious claim or defense that it was entitled to the processing fees 

under Ohio law, regardless of their agreement. 

{¶34} The first Assignment of Error of the DCCSEA is sustained.

Civ.R. 60(B)(5)

{¶35} The third GTE factor is whether the DCCSEA is entitled to relief under one 

of the enumerated factors. The DCCSEA argues it is entitled to relief under Civ.R. 

60(B)(5), which allows the trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other 

reason justifying relief from the judgment.” Civ.R. 60(B)(5) operates as a catch-all 

provision and “reflects ‘the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust 

operation of a judgment.’” Maggiore v. Barensfeld, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011CA00180, 

2012-Ohio-2909, 2012 WL 2415184, ¶ 35 citing Dutton v. Potroos, 5th Dist. Stark No. 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

2010CA00318, 2011-Ohio-3646, 2011 WL 3057612, at ¶ 49. It is reserved for 

“extraordinary and unusual case [s],” Myers v. Myers, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22393, 2005- 

Ohio-3800, 2005 WL 1763608, at ¶ 14, and “is not a substitute for the enumerated 

grounds for relief from judgment [.]” Id. 

{¶36} The DCCSEA argues it should be entitled to relief from judgment because 

it was never provided the opportunity to be heard on the issue of waiving Husband’s 

processing charge arrearages owed to the DCCSEA. In Saari v. Lorain Cty. Child Support 

Enforcement Agency, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009905, 2011-Ohio-2198, the appellate 

court reversed the trial court’s determination that a provision in a prenuptial agreement 

waiving spousal support was invalid. While the appeal was pending, the trial court ordered 

the husband to pay spousal support to the wife plus a two percent processing fee to the 

CSEA for collection and distribution of the spousal support. Id. at ¶ 2. After reversal and 

remand, the trial court ordered the CSEA to reimburse the husband $1,030.23 in 

processing fees that had been collected for distribution of spousal support. The CSEA 

filed a motion to intervene and motion to vacate/relief from judgment. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial 

court denied the motion to intervene. 

{¶37} On appeal, the CSEA argued it was deprived of due process of law because 

it was not a party to the litigation, and it was never provided notice or an opportunity to be 

heard on the issue of whether it should be required to reimburse fees. Id. at ¶ 10. The 

Ninth District Court of Appeals, based on our decision in Messer v. Messer, 5th Dist. 

Licking No. 2005CA00128, 2006-Ohio-4833, agreed and found that the concepts of 

fundamental fairness and due process demanded that the CSEA should have received 

notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at ¶ 11. 
[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915.]

{¶38} Based on Saari, we find that the DCCSEA was deprived of the due process 

of law when the trial court failed to provide it with notice of the ad hoc Final Hearing on 

May 23, 2019 where the DCCSEA could have been heard on the issue of waiving 

Husband’s processing fee arrearage. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the DCCSEA’s 

motion for relief from judgment in accordance with the inherent power of a court to relieve 

a person from the unjust operation of a judgment. See Civ.R. 60(B)(5). 

{¶39} The second Assignment of Error of the DCCSEA is sustained. 

CONCLUSION

{¶40} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the November 27, 2019 judgment of 

the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division and remand 

this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and law. 

By: Delaney, J., 

Baldwin, P.J. and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur.