17-611 

Chen v. Whitaker 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A205 727 791 

A205 846 586 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 27th 4 day of December, two thousand eighteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 GUIDO CALABRESI,

8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 HUI CHEN, QIANG CHEN, 

14 Petitioners, 

15 

16 v. 17-611 

17 NAC 

18 MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING 

19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONERS: Aileen Shao, New York, NY. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

26 Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez 

27 Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel; 

28 Lori B. Warlick, Trial Attorney, 

29 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

30 United States Department of 

31 Justice, Washington, DC. 
2 

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

4 is DENIED. 

5 Petitioners Hui Chen and Qiang Chen, natives and citizens 

6 of the People’s Republic of China, seek review of a February 

7 1, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming a February 18, 2016, 

8 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their 

9 applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

10 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Hui 

11 Chen, Qiang Chen, Nos. A205 727 791, A205 846 586 (B.I.A. 

12 Feb. 1, 2017), aff’g Nos. A205 727 791, A205 846 586 (Immig. 

13 Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 18, 2016). We assume the parties’ 

14 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 

15 in this case. 

16 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

17 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 

18 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 

19 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 

20 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

21 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 

22 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

23 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 
3 

1 determination on . . . the inherent plausibility of the 

2 applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the 

3 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , 

4 the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the 

5 consistency of such statements with other evidence of record 

6 . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, 

7 or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 

8 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-

9 64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 

10 that Hui and Qiang were not credible as to their claims that 

11 police detained Hui and targeted Qiang on account of their 

12 religious practice in China and that they continue to attend 

13 church in the United States. 

14 In finding Hui and Qiang not credible, the agency 

15 reasonably relied on their inconsistent statements regarding 

16 each other’s experiences with religion and police in China. 

17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Hui testified that he 

18 knew his brother was Christian and had been threatened with 

19 arrest in China, but he did not mention these facts in his 

20 asylum application even though he was explicitly asked to do 

21 so. See Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 

22 2018) (“[T]he probative value of a witness’s . . . silence on 

23 particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the 
4 

1 witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose.”). 

2 Similarly, Qiang testified that he was aware of his brother’s 

3 religion and detentions but failed to disclose them in his 

4 own application. See id. The agency was not compelled to 

5 credit their explanation that they omitted this information 

6 because they do not get along or communicate given that they 

7 knew about each other’s troubles despite their lack of 

8 communication. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d 

9 Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible 

10 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 

11 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be 

12 compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations 

13 omitted)). The agency also reasonably relied on the 

14 implausibility that Hui and Qiang would not mention each other 

15 in their asylum applications when they attended underground 

16 churches in the same village during the same period, were 

17 confronted by police for attending church within months of 

18 each other, and fled China for the United States three days 

19 apart with the help of the same smuggler. See Wensheng Yan 

20 v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66-68 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing 

21 that adverse credibility determination may be based on 

22 inherent implausibility in applicant’s story if the “finding 

23 is tethered to record evidence” or based on common sense). 
5 

1 The agency also reasonably found that Hui and Qiang’s 

2 mother’s letter, which was submitted in support of Hui’s 

3 application, omitted any mention that Qiang was Christian or 

4 that he was wanted by police for an attack on a police officer 

5 during a raid on his church. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 

6 82 (agency did not err in relying on omission of applicant’s 

7 beating in detention from mother’s letter because letter 

8 “discusse[d] other post-arrest events”); see also Xiu Xia 

9 Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67 & n.3. The agency was not compelled 

10 to credit Qiang’s explanation that his parents are not 

11 educated given that his mother managed to prepare a letter 

12 for Hui. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

13 Having questioned Hui’s and Qiang’s credibility, the 

14 agency reasonably relied further on their failure to 

15 rehabilitate their testimony with reliable corroborating 

16 evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her 

17 testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of 

18 corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to 

19 rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 

20 question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 

21 2007). The agency did not err in declining to afford weight 

22 to their mother’s letter, which was unsworn and from an 

23 interested party who was not available for cross-examination. 
6 

1 See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) 

2 (deferring to agency’s decision to afford little weight to 

3 relative’s letter from China because it was unsworn and from 

4 an interested witness). The agency reasonably declined to 

5 credit Hui’s handwritten detention certificates and fine 

6 receipt because they were not authenticated by any means. 

7 See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-

8 42 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that determination of the weight 

9 of evidence is largely matter of agency discretion); see also 

10 Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214-16 & n.5 

11 (B.I.A. 2010) (declining to credit village committee notices 

12 that were unauthenticated, unsigned, and prepared for 

13 purposes of removal proceedings), overruled on other grounds 

14 by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 133-38 (2d Cir. 

15 2012). Further, Hui and Qiang did not submit any evidence 

16 from their churches or from fellow church members 

17 corroborating their church attendance in either China or the 

18 United States. 

19 Given the inconsistencies and lack of reliable 

20 corroboration, substantial evidence supports the agency’s 

21 adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. 

22 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 

23 163-64. Contrary to Hui and Qiang’s argument, the adverse 
7 

1 credibility determination applied not only to their 

2 testimony about past events but extended to their claimed 

3 fear of future persecution because the agency did not 

4 credit their testimony that they are practicing Christians. 

5 Accordingly, the adverse credibility determination was 

6 dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 

7 relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d 

8 Cir. 2006). 

9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

10 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

11 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

12 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

13 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

14 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

15 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

16 34.1(b). 

17 FOR THE COURT: 

18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 

19 Clerk of Court