Filed 8/20/24 Marriage of Tsatryan CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re the Marriage of ARTHUR 

and POLINA TSATRYAN.

 B323246

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD512645)

ARTHUR TSATRYAN,

Appellant,

v.

POLINA TSATRYAN,

Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Dianna Gould-Saltman, Judge. Affirmed in 

part; dismissed in part.

Arthur Tsatryan, in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

__________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

In May 2015 the family court entered a judgment of 

dissolution of Arthur and Polina1 Tsatryan’s marriage and found

their residence was community property. The court subsequently

awarded Polina 100 percent of the property after finding Arthur 

breached his fiduciary duties to Polina by executing seven deeds 

of trust conveying security interests in the property to his 

relatives on the eve of the dissolution trial, substantially 

encumbering all equity in the property.

In August 2016 Polina filed a complaint for fraudulent 

transfer and declaratory relief against Arthur and the 

transferees, and a summons issued in June 2017. Polina served 

the summons and complaint on the transferees in July 2017, and 

the family court entered judgments against the transferees,

voiding their deeds of trust. We dismissed Arthur’s appeal from 

these judgments for lack of standing in In re Marriage of 

Tsatryan (April 18, 2022, B305927) (nonpub. opn.). However, we 

subsequently vacated the default judgment entered against 

transferee Vyacheslav Shirinyan due to defective service of the 

summons and complaint. (See In re Marriage of Tsatryan

(Sept. 22, 2022, B311072) [nonpub. opn.].)

Days after we dismissed Arthur’s appeal from the 

judgments against the transferees, Arthur tried again to vacate 

the judgments by moving on April 22, 2022 to dismiss the 2016 

complaint and summons (and thus vacate the judgments) against 

the seven transferees under Code of Civil Procedure sections 

1 We refer to Arthur and Polina by their first names to avoid 

confusion.
3

583.210 and 583.250.2 Arthur asserted the (frivolous) argument 

that under those statutes the trial court was required to dismiss 

Polina’s complaint because she failed to serve the defendants 

within 60 days after filing the complaint, and as a result, any 

subsequent proceedings and judgments were void. Contrary to 

Arthur’s contention—made for the first time six years after the 

purported failure to timely serve—sections 583.210 and 583.250

mandate dismissal of an action where a summons and complaint 

have not been served within three years of commencement of the 

action (not within 60 days). It is undisputed that Polina served 

the summons and complaint within a three-year period. 

We therefore affirm the order denying Arthur’s motion to 

dismiss as to six of the judgments. However, we dismiss Arthur’s 

appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint and 

summons as to Shirinyan because there is no final judgment

against him. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Judgment of Dissolution and Santa Clarita Property3

Arthur and Polina were married on August 5, 1987. They 

separated on August 3, 2009, and Arthur filed a petition for 

dissolution of marriage on September 23, 2009.

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Code of Civil Procedure.

3 This is Arthur’s 17th appeal from an order or judgment 

entered in the marital dissolution action. Our discussion of the 

factual and procedural background is taken from In re Marriage 

of Tsatryan, supra, B311072. In his opening brief, Arthur 
4

After a five-day trial, on May 21, 2015 the family court4

entered a judgment of dissolution. In relevant part, the court 

found the family residence in Santa Clarita (Santa Clarita

property) was community property and ordered the property to be 

sold and the proceeds divided evenly, subject to equalization 

payments. Arthur appealed from the judgment, and we affirmed. 

(In re Marriage of Tsatryan (Feb. 13, 2018, B265467) [nonpub. 

opn.].)

On September 24, 2015 Polina filed a request for order 

partially vacating the judgment of dissolution as to the division of 

the Santa Clarita property. Polina’s attorney submitted a 

declaration stating Arthur secretly caused seven deeds of trust to 

be recorded against the Santa Clarita property on February 11 

and 12, 2015 in favor of his friends and relatives, creating total 

encumbrances of $583,000.

5 

On January 26, 2016 the family court issued an order 

finding Arthur encumbered the Santa Clarita property in 

violation of the family law restraining order. The court observed 

that the deeds of trust had “‘no corresponding promissory notes 

discusses numerous purported errors made by the family court 

during the pendency of the dissolution case (from 2013 to 2022). 

~(AOB 1-21)~ These matters are not properly before us in this 

appeal. This appeal only concerns the service of Polina’s 2016 

complaint for fraudulent transfer and Arthur’s 2022 motion to 

dismiss that complaint.

4 Judge Mark A. Juhas presided over the trial and signed the 

judgment of dissolution.

5 The Santa Clarita property was appraised at $695,000 at 

the time of the dissolution trial. (In re Marriage of Tsatryan, 

supra, B270784.)
5

and no loan repayment terms’” and “‘[t]here is no evidence that 

[Arthur] received the funds from these [e]ncumbering [d]eeds.’”

The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Arthur’s 

“‘egregious’” breach of fiduciary duty constituted malice, 

oppression, or fraud under Civil Code section 3294. (In re 

Marriage of Tsatryan (Jan 14, 2019, B207784 [nonpub. opn.].)

The family court awarded Polina 100 percent of the 

Santa Clarita property pursuant to Family Code section 1101, 

subdivision (h), and ordered Arthur to execute an interspousal 

transfer deed transferring his entire interest in the property to 

Polina as her sole and separate property. The court retained 

jurisdiction over the Santa Clarita property, execution of the 

interspousal transfer deed, and all issues related to the 

encumbering deeds. Arthur appealed, and we affirmed. (In re 

Marriage of Tsatryan, supra, B270784.)

B. Polina’s 2016 Complaint for Fraudulent Transfer

On August 2, 2016 Polina filed a “complaint in joinder” in 

the dissolution action asserting causes of action for fraudulent 

transfer and declaratory relief against Arthur and the seven 

transferees on the encumbering deeds: Shirinyan, Gaiane 

Galstian, Svetlana Gevondyan, Arkadiy Petrosyan, Karen 

Tsatouryan, Karina Yesayeva, and Lyudmila Yesayeva. Polina 

alleged that Arthur, with the cooperation of the other defendants,

executed and recorded the deeds of trust encumbering the 

Santa Clarita property on the eve of the dissolution trial to 

deprive Polina of her community interest in the property. Polina 

sought voidance of the transfer, declaratory and injunctive relief, 

an attachment order, imposition of a constructive trust, and 

appointment of a receiver. She also sought compensatory
6

damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. On 

June 20, 2017 the superior court clerk issued a summons. 

In July 2018 a registered process server served the 

summons and complaint by personal service on Galstian (July 

18), Gevondyan (July 22), Karina Yesayeva (July 31), and 

Lyudmila Yesayeva (July 15); Polina filed a proof of service on 

August 10. On July 19 the process server served Petrosyan and 

Shirinyan by substituted service; on August 10 Polina filed proofs 

of service with declarations of due diligence signed by the process 

server. On July 20 the process server served Karen Tsatouryan 

by substituted service; Polina filed a proof of service with a

declaration of due diligence on August 29. 

On July 31, 2017 Lyudmila Yesayeva filed a general denial. 

The other six transferees filed motions to quash service of the 

summons and complaint, asserting various defects in service

(although none argued there was undue delay in serving or 

prosecuting the complaint). After a hearing, on October 16, 2017 

the family court6 granted Shirinyan’s motion to quash, finding 

the process server’s declaration did not support valid substituted 

service. The court denied the other transferees’ motions to 

quash. 

On December 22, 2017 the family court set an order to 

show cause why sanctions, “including monetary sanctions and/or 

dismissal of the Complaint in Joinder should not be imposed

against [Polina] for failure to prosecute the action.” Polina filed a 

response stating that her attorney withdrew after she filed the 

2016 complaint, but she had recently retained the services of a 

paralegal to help her with filings. In advance of the hearing on 

6 Judge Shelley Kaufman. 
7

the order to show cause, Arthur filed a motion to dismiss the 

summons and complaint for failure to prosecute under California 

Rules of Court, rule 3.1342.

7 Arthur argued that more than two 

years had elapsed since the family court ordered Arthur to 

transfer his interest in the property to Polina and found him 

solely liable for the encumbrances benefiting the transferees. 

Arthur did not argue that Polina delayed in serving the summons 

and complaint in violation of section 583.210, and he did not 

move to dismiss under section 583.250. 

On October 17, 2018 the family court8 denied Arthur’s 

motion to dismiss, finding “there has not been a delay in 

prosecution under [section] 583.110 et seq. sufficient to warrant 

dismissal.”

9

C. The Judgments Against the Transferees

Galstian, Gevondyan, Tsatouryan, Petrosyan, and Karina 

Yesayeva defaulted, and after a prove-up trial, on February 27, 

2020 the family court10 entered a default judgment voiding the 

7 California Rules of Court, rule 3.1342 sets forth procedures 

for filing a motion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute under 

Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.410 through 583.430. Those 

sections relate to discretionary dismissals when service is not 

made within two years (§ 583.420, subd. (a)(1)) or the action is 

not brought to trial within three years of commencement

(§ 583.420, subd. (a)(2)(A)). 

8 Judge Gregory J. Weingart.

9 The record on appeal does not show whether the family 

court heard or acted on the order to show cause after denying the 

motion to dismiss.

10 Judge Dean H. Hansell.
8

deeds of trust executed in the transferees’ favor. Polina’s claims 

against Lyudmila Yesayeva were tried in a bifurcated proceeding 

on January 27, 2020, and on February 27 the court entered a 

judgment voiding Lyudmila’s deed of trust. Arthur appealed 

from the judgments, and we dismissed his appeal for lack of 

standing. (See In re Marriage of Tsatrayan, supra, B305927.) 

We held that Arthur was not aggrieved by the judgments voiding 

the transferees’ deeds because the judgments did not require 

Arthur to do anything, and Arthur had no interest, pecuniary or 

otherwise, in the Santa Clarita property. (Ibid.) 

After the family court quashed the summons against 

Shirinyan, Polina commenced a multiyear effort to serve him and 

then take his default. In April 2020 the clerk entered a default 

against Shirinyan, and after a prove-up trial, the family court 

entered a default judgment voiding Shirinyan’s deed of trust. In 

November 2020 Shirinyan filed a request for order seeking to 

vacate the default and default judgment under section 473, 

subdivision (d), arguing, among other things, that he had never 

been properly served with the summons and complaint. The 

family court denied his request. Shirinyan appealed, and we 

reversed in part in In re Marriage of Tsatrayan, supra, B311072, 

holding that the judgment roll reflected that Shirinyan had never 

been effectively served with the summons and complaint. We 

directed the family court to vacate the default and default 

judgment and to set a date for Shirinyan to respond to the 

complaint. In the same decision, we dismissed Arthur’s identical 

appeal from the judgment against Shirinyan for lack of standing. 
9

D. Arthur’s Motion To Dismiss the Complaint

On April 25, 2022 Arthur filed a motion to dismiss Polina’s

August 2016 complaint and June 2017 summons.

11 Citing 

California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b) (Rule 3.110(b)), Arthur 

argued Polina was required to serve the complaint on the 

transferees within 60 days after filing the complaint. Arthur 

cited section 583.210, subdivision (b), which requires that “proof 

of service of the summons shall be filed within 60 days after the 

time the summons and complaint must be served upon a 

defendant,” and section 583.250, which provides that if service is 

not made “within the time prescribed in this article,” an action 

may not be further prosecuted and “shall be dismissed by the 

court on its own motion or on motion of any person interested in 

the action, whether named as a party or not . . . .” (§ 583.250, 

subd. (a)(2), italics added.) 

Arthur did not discuss the deadline for service of a 

summons and complaint under section 583.210, subdivision (a)

(three years), instead arguing that because Polina “failed to file 

[a] proof of service [of the] complaint within 60 days as 

commanded per [section] 583.210, no summons ever existed, thus 

11 Arthur titled his motion as a “motion to vacate complaint 

filed on August 02, 2016, concurrently to vacate summons 

wrongly claimed issued and filed on 6/20/2018 due to void orders” 

(capitalization omitted), but he has not cited any statute that 

authorizes a motion to vacate a pleading (nor are we aware of any 

other than a motion to strike). We therefore construe his motion 

as a motion to dismiss the summons and complaint under section 

583.250, subdivision (a)(2). Arthur concurrently filed a request 

for order (RFO) on Judicial Council form FL-300 seeking the 

same relief as his motion. ~(CT 8633)~ We refer to the RFO and 

the motion to dismiss collectively as the motion to dismiss.
10

proof of service of the summons could not be filed.” 

(Capitalization omitted.) He asserted Polina filed the complaint 

in August 2016, but she did not serve the transferees until July 

2017. And because there was no summons, Arthur argued, the 

court lacked jurisdiction over the parties and all subsequent 

proceedings were “illegal and void.” Finally, “[b]ecause the facts 

supporting the alleged jurisdictional defect are ascertainable by 

looking solely at the record, [Arthur’s] motion is not barred for 

being untimely.” 

On May 20, 2022 Polina filed a responsive declaration 

stating Arthur lacked standing to bring a motion challenging the 

judgments against the transferees, citing our opinion In re 

Marriage of Tsatryan, supra, B305927. Arthur argued in reply 

that he had standing because a void order is subject to collateral 

attack and can be set aside by the court on the court’s own 

motion.

12 After a hearing, on August 3, 2022 the family court13

denied Arthur’s motion without making any findings. 

Arthur timely appealed.14

12 Arthur also filed evidentiary objections to Polina’s 

responsive declaration, which the family court overruled. ~(CT 

8869-8874; RT 2)~

13 Judge Dianna Gould-Saltman. 

14 Arthur’s motion to dismiss, filed six years after the 

complaint was filed and more than two years after judgments 

were entered, also raises serious justiciability concerns, including 

whether Arthur waived any right to seek dismissal under 

section 583.250 by failing to file his motion to dismiss in the 

family court before the court entered the February 2020 

judgments against the transferees; whether Arthur had a right to

seek dismissal of the complaint against the transferees without 
11

DISCUSSION

A. Mandatory Time for Service of a Summons and Complaint

Section 583.210, subdivision (a), states that a summons 

and complaint “shall be served upon a defendant within 

three years after the action is commenced against the defendant. 

For the purpose of this subdivision, an action is commenced at 

the time the complaint is filed.” Section 583.210, subdivision (b), 

further requires that “[p]roof of service of the summons shall be 

filed within 60 days after the time the summons and complaint 

must be served upon a defendant.”

Section 583.250, subdivision (a)(1), provides that “[i]f 

service is not made in an action within the time prescribed in this 

article: [¶] (1) The action shall not be further prosecuted and no 

further proceedings shall be held in the action. [¶] (2) The action 

shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of 

any person interested in the action, whether named as a party or 

not, after notice to the parties.” Sections 583.210 and 583.250 are 

both in article 2 of chapter 1.5 of title 8 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure.

Under section 583.250, subdivision (b), dismissal is 

generally mandatory: “The requirements of this article are 

first vacating the judgments against them; and whether Arthur 

had standing to attack the judgments even if we were to construe 

his motion as a viable motion to vacate under section 473 or 

equitable principles. We do not reach these issues, which have 

not been briefed, because as a matter of law, there simply was no 

statutory basis for the trial court to dismiss Polina’s complaint 

under section 583.250.
12

mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception 

except as expressly provided by statute.” (Accord, Watts v. 

Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 748; State ex rel. Edelweiss 

Fund, LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 

1113, 1120.) However, under section 583.240, subdivisions (a) 

through (d), tolling of the three-year period applies in certain 

circumstances, including when the defendant was not amenable 

to process of the court; during a stay; when the validity of service 

is subject to litigation; and when service was impossible, 

impracticable, or futile due to causes beyond the plaintiff’s 

control. The Supreme Court has recognized based on the tolling 

provisions that “discretion has entered into the application of this 

provision so as to prevent it from being used to compel the 

dismissal of actions where the plaintiff has not had a reasonable 

opportunity to proceed to trial.” (Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431, 437 [discussing predecessor to 

section 583.240].) 

Thus, a trial court’s ruling on a contested motion to dismiss 

under section 583.250 is often reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

(See Busching v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 44, 53

[addressing predecessor to section 583.250]; Republic Corp. v. 

Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1253, 1258.) However, 

where an appeal involves interpretation of a statute, the issue is 

a legal one that we review de novo. (In re Marriage of E.U. & 

J.E. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1389 [de novo standard of 

review applies to court’s interpretation of a child custody statute 

and whether the family court applied the correct legal standard]; 

see People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 

24 Cal.4th 415, 432.)
13

California Rules of Court, rule 3.110 also addresses the 

time for serving a complaint and filing a proof of service.

15 

Rule 3.110(b) states that a complaint “must be served on all 

named defendants and proofs of service on those defendants must 

be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the 

complaint.” And California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(f) 

addresses noncompliance: “If a party fails to serve and file 

pleadings as required under this rule, and has not obtained an 

order extending time to serve its pleadings, the court may issue 

an order to show cause why sanctions shall not be imposed.” 

There is no express provision for imposing any sanction for 

delayed service of the complaint other than a monetary sanction. 

(Cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.30(b) [“In addition to any other 

sanctions permitted by law, the court may order a person, after 

written notice and an opportunity to be heard, to pay reasonable 

monetary sanctions to the court or an aggrieved person, or both, 

for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable 

15 California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(a) states that the 

timing requirements of the rule do not apply to “proceedings 

under the Family Code.” California Rules of Court, rule 5.83 has 

an analogous requirement that the family court must advise 

parties that “a proof of service of summons and petition should be 

filed within 60 days of case initiation.” (Rule 5.83(c)(4)(A).) 

However, if parties do not cooperate, after 18 months “the court’s 

obligation for further review of the case [for procedural milestone 

compliance] is relieved until the case qualifies for dismissal 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.210 or 583.310.” 

(Rule 5.83(c)(3).) We assume for this appeal (without reaching 

the issue) that Polina’s action against the transferees to void the 

encumbering deeds is not a “proceeding under the Family Code,” 

although the family court retained jurisdiction over this civil 

proceeding. 
14

rules.”].) A court must grant an extension from the 60-day 

service rule “on a showing that service could not reasonably be 

achieved within the time required with the exercise of due 

diligence, consistent with the amount in controversy.” (Gov. Code 

§ 68616.) 

B. Service of the Complaint Complied with Section 583.210

On appeal, Arthur advances the same contentions he raised 

in his motion to dismiss. Citing sections 583.210, subdivision (b), 

and 583.250, and Rule 3.110(b), Arthur argues that because 

Polina did not serve the summons and complaint on the 

transferees within 60 days after filing the complaint, “as 

commanded” under section 583.210, “no summons ever existed, 

thus proof of service could not be filed.” Arthur elaborates: “It is 

an irrefutable fact that [Polina] failed to comply with [the] 

mandatory statutory provision [§] 583.250, service was not made 

within the time prescribed in [§] 583.250” and “[a]s such no 

further proceedings shall be held in the action and the action 

must be dismissed.” (Boldface and underlining omitted.) Arthur

misconstrues the mandatory time requirements in sections

583.210 and 583.250, relying on section 583.210, subdivision (b), 

while ignoring subdivision (a), which is directly on point. His 

argument is frivolous.

Arthur concedes the following facts: the complaint was filed 

on August 2, 2016; the summons was issued on June 6, 2017;

16

and Galstian, Gevondyan, Petrosyan, Karina Yesayeva, and 

16 Arthur contends the summons was “wrongly” issued due to 

Polina’s delay in serving the complaint, but he does not dispute 

that a summons was issued by the court clerk on June 6, 2017. 

~(See AOB 20)~
15

Lyudmila Yesayeva were all served with the summons and 

complaint in July 2017. Arthur disputes that Tsatouryan was 

ever served, but the family court expressly found she was 

properly served in July 2017.

17 Further, it is undisputed that 

Polina filed proofs of service of the summons and complaint on 

these six transferees in August 2017. Thus, Polina’s service on 

these transferees occurred well within the time limits mandated 

by section 583.210: she served the summons and complaint 

within three years after filing the complaint (§ 583.210, subd. 

(a)), and she filed proofs of service within 60 days thereafter

(§ 583.210, subd. (b)). Because Polina’s service complied with the 

time limits in section 583.210, the mandatory dismissal 

requirements of section 583.250, which expressly apply only 

when there have been violations under article 2, do not apply 

here. 

Arthur argues (correctly) that Polina’s service of the 

complaint did not comport with the requirement of Rule 3.110(b) 

that a complaint should be served within 60 days after filing. 

But there is no authority for his position that noncompliance with 

Rule 3.110(b) prevents further prosecution of an action and 

mandates dismissal. To the contrary, California Rules of Court, 

rule 3.110(f) addresses noncompliance with Rule 3.110(b) and 

provides as a remedy that the court may set an order to show 

cause to impose monetary sanctions. Arthur’s motion and 

opening brief conflate the 60-day service requirement under 

Rule 3.110(b) (with its remedy of monetary sanctions) with the 

60-day proof of service requirement under section 583.210, 

17 Tsatouryan did not appeal from the judgment against her, 

and the family court’s finding she was properly served is now 

final. 
16

subdivision (b) (which Polina complied with), while ignoring the 

three-year service requirement under section 583.210, 

subdivision (a), for which dismissal is an appropriate remedy.

C. Denial of Arthur’s Motion To Dismiss Shirinyan Is Not an 

Appealable Order 

As discussed, in In re Marriage of Tsatryan, supra, 

B311072 we ordered the family court to vacate the default and 

default judgment against Shirinyan because the proof of 

substituted service was facially defective. Nonetheless, we 

deemed service to have been effectuated by his appearance, and 

we instructed the family court to direct Shirinyan to respond to 

the complaint. We filed our decision in September 2022, after the 

court decided Arthur’s instant motion to dismiss and after Arthur 

filed this appeal. Although the record reflects that Shirinyan 

filed a general denial on October 12, 2022, both the appellate 

record and the family court docket do not indicate that a 

judgment has been entered against Shirinyan (or dismissing 

him). 

Arthur’s notice of appeal states Arthur is appealing from a 

postjudgment order under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), and

his motion appears to seek dismissal of Polina’s action against all 

seven transferees, including Shirinyan and the six transferees 

with final judgments. To the extent Arthur is appealing from the 

denial of his motion to dismiss the action against Shirinyan, 

there is no judgment and therefore no appealable order under 

section 904.1, and his appeal must be dismissed.

18

18 At the time the family court heard Arthur’s motion to 

dismiss, the court had no reason to regard Shirinyan as 
17

DISPOSITION

To the extent Arthur appeals from the family court’s order 

denying his motion to dismiss the action against Shirinyan, his 

appeal is dismissed. In all other respects, we affirm the 

August 3, 2022 order. The parties are to bear their own costs on 

appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

differently situated than the other transferees with judgments

against them, let alone for the court to consider whether the 

deadline for serving Shirinyan was tolled under section 583.240. 

Consideration of the tolling factors will be a fact-intensive 

inquiry, and we do not express any opinion whether dismissal of 

the complaint against Shirinyan is compulsory under the 

circumstances.