This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0310

Randall Mark Spears, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed August 25, 2014

Affirmed

Schellhas, Judge

Scott County District Court

File No. 1995-10941

Randall Mark Spears, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick J. Ciliberto, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney, 

Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and 

Schellhas, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SCHELLHAS, Judge

Appellant challenges his sentences for first-degree criminal sexual conduct and 

kidnapping. We affirm.
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FACTS

This appeal is the latest in a series of appeals by appellant Randall Spears

relating to his convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (1994), and kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.25 (1994). This 

court previously summarized the facts related to the offense as follows:

Appellant Randall Spears met the victim, R.H., at a 

south Minneapolis bar in July 1995. R.H. and appellant 

drank, talked, and smoked a marijuana joint together. Later 

that evening, R.H. and appellant left the bar and went to a 

local fast food restaurant. After they ate, R.H. asked 

appellant to take her home. Appellant told R.H. that he 

wanted to show her a pretty spot where they could view the 

city. R.H. repeatedly asked to go home and said she did not 

want to see the city. After driving for approximately 20 

minutes, appellant pulled off the main road and leaned over 

to kiss R.H. R.H. pushed him away and grabbed for the 

door, but she was stopped from leaving when appellant 

punched her in the face twice, and told her that this was 

“going to happen no matter what.” Appellant choked R.H. 

while she was crying hysterically and forced her into the 

backseat. R.H. moved toward the sunroof, but appellant told 

her that she wouldn’t get very far and that he would kill her 

if she did not cooperate. Appellant demanded that R.H. take 

off her shorts and told her that she could take this the “easy 

way or the hard way.” Appellant then forced his penis into 

R.H.’s vagina while she screamed and cried. Even though 

R.H. was menstruating appellant made R.H. perform oral 

sex on him after he had vaginally penetrated her.

After appellant vaginally penetrated R.H. a second 

time, R.H. asked if she could go to the bathroom. R.H. was 

planning to escape, but appellant stood next to her while she 

squatted on the ground. The two went back into the car and 

appellant again told R.H. to get into the backseat. R.H. went 

into the backseat, took off her shorts, and started to cry. 

Appellant told R.H. “if you don’t quit crying I am going to 

f-ing kill you.” R.H. begged for her life as appellant 

vaginally penetrated her a third time.
3

After the third incident, appellant began to drive 

back to Minneapolis. Appellant pulled off the freeway, 

stating that he needed to urinate. As the car pulled to a stop 

R.H. fought her way out of the car. R.H. ran to a nearby 

house and pounded on the door while screaming “help me, 

help me.” Appellant pulled away in his car. A resident 

called the police and allowed R.H. to enter the resident’s 

home. Another neighborhood resident also heard R.H. 

screaming, saw a car speeding away, and called 911.

State v. Spears, CX-99-2092, 2000 WL 558162, at *1 (Minn. App. May 9, 2000), 

review denied (Minn. June 27, 2000) (Spears III).

This court previously summarized the procedural history as follows.

In his first appeal, Spears claimed that the district 

court erred by sustaining the state’s Batson challenge, 

entering six convictions for three acts of criminal sexual 

conduct, and imposing multiple sentences, including a 

sentence of life imprisonment. State v. Spears, 560 N.W.2d 

723, 725 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 28, 

1997) (Spears I). Spears further argued that the district court 

abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the victim’s 

out-of-court statements describing the attack to police and a 

private citizen. Id. We vacated three of Spears’s convictions 

as duplicative, reversed five of Spears’s criminal-sexualconduct sentences, and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 

726–28. On remand, the district court sentenced Spears to 

40 years in prison on one count of criminal sexual conduct 

and an additional 40 years, to be served consecutively, on 

one count of kidnapping. State v. Spears, No. C8-98-2307, 

1999 WL 319022, at *1 (Minn. App. May 18, 1999), review 

denied (Minn. July 28, 1999) (Spears II).

Spears appealed, and we again remanded for 

resentencing, concluding that the consecutive 40-year 

sentences were an impermissible expansion of the original 

sentence. Id. at *2. Following the second remand, the 

district court sentenced Spears to 40 years in prison on the 

criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Spears III, 2000 WL 

558162, at *2. The 40-year sentence was an enhancement of 

the statutory maximum 30-year sentence based on judicial 
4

fact-finding of aggravating factors under Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.1352, the patterned-sex-offender statute. Spears v. 

State, 725 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 2006) (Spears V); see 

also Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2 (1994) (setting a 30-year 

statutory maximum for conviction of first-degree criminal 

sexual conduct); Minn. Stat. § 609.1352, subd. 1a 

(lengthening the statutory maximum for individuals 

sentenced under the patterned-sex-offender statute to 40 

years). The district court also imposed a consecutive fiveyear sentence on the kidnapping conviction, after finding 

that there were severe aggravating factors. Spears III, 2000 

WL 558162, at *2. This court affirmed the 540-month 

sentence. Id. at *2–*4.

After this court affirmed the sentence, Spears filed a 

petition for postconviction relief, raising a claim under 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 

(2000). The district court denied the petition, and this court 

affirmed, holding that Spears’s claim was barred under 

State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 

(1976), because he did not challenge his sentence on Sixth 

Amendment grounds in his direct appeal. Spears v. State,

C0-01-76 (Minn. App. Aug. 1, 2001), review granted and 

stayed (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001), review denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 

2002) (Spears IV). The Minnesota Supreme Court granted 

review and stayed proceedings pending its decision in State 

v. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001) (holding that 

enhancement of the statutory maximum 30-year sentence 

for first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on judicial 

findings under the patterned-sex-offender statute is 

unconstitutional). See Spears V, 725 N.W.2d at 699. The 

supreme court ultimately vacated the stay and denied 

review. Id.

Spears again petitioned for postconviction relief, 

arguing that his 40-year sentence for criminal sexual 

conduct was unauthorized by the statutes in effect at the 

time of his offense; was unconstitutional under Apprendi, as 

applied in Grossman; and was unconstitutional under 

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 

(2004). Id. The district court denied the petition, and this 

court affirmed. Id. Upon further review, the supreme court 

held that Blakely does not apply to Spears’s collateral attack 
5

on his sentence because the sentence was final before 

Blakely was announced; but the court held that Spears is 

entitled to benefit from Apprendi. Id. at 699-700. The 

supreme court remanded to the district court for 

resentencing. Id. at 702.

On remand, the state demanded a sentencing trial 

under Minn. Stat. § 244.10 (2008) and requested sentencing 

under the patterned-sex-offender statute. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 244.10, subd. 5(a) (“When the prosecutor provides 

reasonable notice under subdivision 4, the district court 

shall allow the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a 

jury of 12 members the factors in support of the state’s 

request for an aggravated departure from the Sentencing 

Guidelines or the state’s request for an aggravated sentence 

under any sentencing enhancement statute or the state’s 

request for a mandatory minimum under section 609.11 as 

provided in paragraph (b) or (c).”). . . .

. . . .

The district court imposed a 360-month sentence on 

the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and a consecutive 

five-year sentence on the kidnapping conviction.

State v. Spears, A10-264, 2011 WL 134935, at *2–*4 (Minn. App. Jan. 18, 2011) 

(footnote omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011) (Spears VI). Spears 

“challenge[d] his executed prison sentence of 360 months for criminal sexual conduct 

in the first degree, which is an aggravated departure from the presumptive guidelines 

sentence of 122 months under Minn. Stat. § 609.1352 (1994 & Supp. 1995), the 

patterned-sex-offender statute.” Id. at *1. This court affirmed, concluding that the 

resulting error, if any, from Spears’s alleged evidentiary issues was harmless. Id. at *8.

In October 2013, Spears moved for a “Correction or Reduction of Sentence,”

pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, specifying that his motion was “not a 
6

post-conviction appeal.” Spears argued to the district court that it lacked authority to 

impose (1) “any sentence other than a presumptive sentence of 122 months” for firstdegree criminal sexual conduct, (2) any sentence for kidnapping, or (3) a sentence 

longer than the original sentence. The district court denied Spears any relief.

This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

In denying Spears’s motion, the district court stated that “[t]he Court of Appeals 

did not find it improper that the Court imposed a consecutive sentence for kidnapping,” 

that “[Spears]’s new aggregated sentence does not exceed his original aggregate 

sentence and is therefore, proper,” and that “[Spears]’s current sentence of 420 months 

is shorter than his last sentence of 540 months and both are shorter than the original 

sentence.” Spears argues that, due to actions on the part of the original sentencing court 

in 1996, the district court lacked authority to sentence him to (1) 360 months instead of 

122 months for criminal sexual conduct, (2) any sentence for kidnapping, and 

(3) consecutive sentences. He raises his consecutive-sentences argument for the first 

time on appeal. None of Spears’s arguments has merit.

Appellate courts “review the district court’s denial of a motion to correct a 

sentence for an abuse of discretion,” reviewing “legal conclusions de novo 

and . . . factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.” Townsend v. State, 834 

N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 2013). “The relevant procedures for review of a sentence are 

provided by the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure and Minnesota Statutes.” Id.
7

Rule 27.03, subdivision 9 states that the district court “may 

at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” 

Section 590.01 provides that “a person convicted of a crime, 

who claims . . . the sentence . . . made violated the person’s 

rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or 

of [Minnesota]” may “commence a proceeding to secure 

relief by filing a petition [to] . . . correct the sentence.” 

Generally, the procedure for a motion filed under rule 

27.03, subdivision 9 is less formal than the procedure 

involving a postconviction petition brought under section 

590.01.

Id. at 738−39 (citations omitted). The supreme court has “not yet addressed whether 

the statutory time bar under section 590.01, subdivision 4(a)(2), or the procedural bar 

under Knaffla apply to a motion to correct a sentence under rule 27.03, subdivision 9.” 

Id. at 739.

Spears and respondent State of Minnesota disagree about the proper treatment of 

Spears’s motion. Spears argues that his motion for a sentence correction under Minn. R. 

Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, should be treated as such; the state argues that Spears’s motion 

should be treated as a petition for postconviction relief.

The two alternative means of challenging a sentence 

are subject to different procedural requirements . . . First, the 

legislature has imposed strict time limits on postconviction 

petitions. As a general rule, “[n]o petition for postconviction 

relief may be filed more than two years after” a judgment of 

conviction becomes final. Second, both the supreme court and 

the legislature have imposed limitations on repetitive 

challenges to a conviction or a sentence under the 

postconviction act.

Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. App. 2014) (citations omitted). In 

Washington, this court stated “that the two-year time limit in section 590.01, 

subdivision 4(a) does not apply to motions properly filed under rule 27.03, subdivision 
8

9.” Id. at 211 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). A motion is properly filed under 

rule 27.03, subdivision 9, “only if the offender challenges the sentence on the ground 

that it is ‘unauthorized by law’ in the sense that the sentence is contrary to an applicable 

statute or other applicable law.” Id. at 214; see also State v. Borrego, 661 N.W.2d 663, 

667 (Minn. App. 2003) (“An unauthorized sentence must be contrary to statutory 

requirements.”).

Spears argues that the district court’s 360-month sentence was unauthorized and 

that the court only had authority to sentence him to the guidelines sentence of 122 

months for criminal sexual conduct and 60 months for kidnapping, concurrently. Spears 

cites State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 514–15 (Minn. 2003), which provides that “[n]o 

departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence is permitted absent a statement of 

the reasons for a sentencing departure placed on the record by the court at the time of 

sentencing.” But Spears’s reliance on Geller is misplaced because, at Spears’s original 

sentencing, the district court explained that it was imposing a life sentence because of 

its understanding that a life sentence was statutorily mandated. In resentencing Spears 

on remand, the district court did not err by imposing an upward-departure sentence and 

therefore Spears’s current sentence is not unauthorized by law and consequently cannot 

be challenged under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. See Washington, 845 N.W.2d at 

214–15 (concluding that a claim is not within Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, when 

the “claim asserts only a fact-based challenge to the record of the sentencing hearing 

and, ultimately, to the district court’s findings of facts relevant to his sentence”).
9

Even if we deemed Spears’s challenge to fall within the scope of Minn. R. Crim. 

P. 27.03, subd. 9, his challenge would be barred by the doctrine of law of the case 

because Spears previously argued that a sentence greater than 122 months was (1) an 

impermissible upward departure before this court, Spears VI, 2011 WL 134935, at *1, 

and (2) unconstitutional under Blakely before the supreme court, Spears V, 725 N.W.2d 

at 699. See Lynch v. State, 749 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 2008) (“This doctrine provides 

that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern 

the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”) (quotations omitted)); State v. 

Bailey, 732 N.W.2d 612, 623 (Minn. 2007) (“Issues determined in a first appeal will not 

be relitigated in the trial court nor re-examined in a second appeal.”).

Spears also argues that the district court lacked authority to sentence him for 

kidnapping because the original sentencing court did not sentence him for kidnapping. 

Because this court addressed this argument in Spears II, 1999 WL 319022 at *2, by 

citation to State v. Coe, 411 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1987), this argument also is barred by 

the doctrine of law of the case. Similarly, Spears’s argument that the district court 

lacked authority to impose consecutive sentences for first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct and kidnapping is barred by the doctrine of law of the case because this court 

already addressed the argument in Spears III, 2000 WL 558162, at *3.

We conclude that Spears’s challenged sentences are not unauthorized under the 

law. The district court therefore did not err by denying Spears’s request for relief.

Affirmed.