The Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge for the U.S. *

District Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LKAV,JUVENILE MALE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-10483

D.C. No.

4:11-cr-02966-JGZCRP-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 15, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed April 2, 2013

Before: Jerome Farris and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges,

and Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith
2 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

**

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

SUMMARY

**

Criminal Law

Reversing an order committing a juvenile for a study of

his competency to stand trial, the panel held that the district

court erred by committing the juvenile under 18 U.S.C.

§ 4241(d), rather than proceeding pursuant to Federal

Juvenile Delinquency Act.

COUNSEL

J. Ryan Moore (argued), D. Erendira Castillo-Reina, and

Brian I. Rademacher, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,

Tucson, Arizona, for Juvenile-Appellant.

Christina Cabanillas (argued) and Ann L. DeMarais,

Assistant United States Attorneys, Tucson, Arizona, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

When the United States charges a juvenile with an act of

juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency

Act (the “FJDA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–42, the district court
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 3

 LKAV turned twenty-one in August 2012. 1

must follow 18 U.S.C. § 5037(e) if it commits the juvenile for

a study of the juvenile’s competency to stand trial. Because

the district court in this case instead committed LKAV under

18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tribal authorities of the Tohono O’odham nation charged

LKAV (age 17) with murder in May 2009. After being 1

charged, he remained in tribal custody from 2009 until 2011.

While in custody, he was found incompetent, but was not sent

to a treatment facility for restoration to competency. In late

2011, the United States filed its own charge against LKAV

and obtained a writ of habeas corpus to remove him from

tribal custody. To obtain federal jurisdiction over LKAV, the

United States filed a “Certification to Proceed Against

Juvenile Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section

5032, as Amended.” The United States certified that

LKAV’s charge warranted federal jurisdiction and signaled

the United States’ intent to proceed against LKAV as an

alleged juvenile delinquent under the FJDA.

In November 2011, the United States moved to commit

LKAV, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, to an adult medical

facility for psychiatric evaluation. LKAV did not oppose the

United States’ request to proceed under § 4241, but asked for

a local evaluation. LKAV also requested a competency

hearing take place before he was committed under § 4241.

Deferring to these requests, the government withdrew its

motion to proceed under § 4241, and the magistrate judge did

not decide at that time whether § 4241 governed LKAV’s

commitment. The magistrate judge granted LKAV’s request
4 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

for a preliminary examination to take place in Phoenix,

Arizona. After extensive neuropsychological examination,

the examining psychologist deemed LKAV incompetent to

stand trial.

LKAV then filed a motion to proceed with commitment

under the FJDA, § 5037(e). At a status conference before the

magistrate judge in July 2012, the United States stipulated to

LKAV’s incompetency. However, the United States

maintained its position that LKAV should be committed to an

adult facility under § 4241(d). The United States filed a

motion to that effect the next day.

The magistrate judge granted the United States’ motion to

proceed under § 4241 and denied LKAV’s motion to proceed

under § 5037(e). The magistrate judge’s Order of

Commitment committed LKAV “to the custody of the

Attorney General to be hospitalized in a suitable facility for

a reasonable period of time, NOT TO EXCEED FOUR (4)

MONTHS, as is necessary to determine whether there is a

substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will

attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed.” In its own

written order (the “Order”), the district court affirmed the

Order of Commitment. LKAV filed a timely, interlocutory

appeal of the Order, challenging his § 4241(d) commitment.

After the appeal was filed, the United States transported

LKAV to FMC-Butner, an adult medical facility, pursuant to

the Order. FMC-Butner completed its competency evaluation

of LKAV in January 2013. FMC-Butner’s report concluded

that LKAV was incompetent to stand trial. However, the

report further concluded that, “with an additional period of

hospitalization and treatment,” LKAV could be restored to

competency. The report also suggested a 120-day extension
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 5

of the previous commitment deadline (set to expire in January

2013) for such hospitalization and treatment. The United

States filed a motion for the requested extension, based on the

report. On LKAV’s motion, the district court decided to hear

the motion for extension of time (rather than refer it to the

magistrate judge). On February 11, 2013, the district court

granted the United States’ motion and extended LKAV’s

commitment for up to an additional 120 days.

JURISDICTION

We ordinarily hear appeals “only from a district court’s

final decision.” United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 742

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). However, under

the collateral order doctrine, we review “a district court’s

preliminary or interim decision when it ‘(1) conclusively

determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and

(3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final

judgment.’” Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,

176 (2003)).

Here, LKAV’s challenge to the Order is appealable under

the collateral order doctrine, and no party challenges our

jurisdiction. The Order conclusively determines LKAV’s

rights with respect to his pre-adjudication commitment.

Further, the issue before us—whether § 4241(d) applies to

LKAV—is completely separate from the ultimate issue of

LKAV’s delinquency. Finally, delay would render the Order

effectively unreviewable. LKAV seeks only release from

commitment at FMC-Butner. LKAV’s release from FMCButner would obviate the need for our court to issue an order
6 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

 Indeed, we ordered the parties to brief the mootness issue. However, 2

the government concedes that this appeal is not moot so long as LKAV

remains committed at FMC-Butner. Thus, we need not reach the

mootness issue.

and could render LKAV’s appeal moot. See id. at 743 2

(“Finally, the issue is effectively unreviewable because [b]y

the time of trial [Loughner] will have undergone forced

medication—the very harm that he seeks to avoid.”

(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s interpretation of §§ 4241(d)

and 5037(e) de novo. See United States v. Juvenile Male,

670 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We review a district

court’s construction or interpretation of a statute de novo.”).

DISCUSSION

“As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis

begins with the language of the statute.” United States v.

Harrell, 637 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “To aid our inquiry, we rely on

our established rules of statutory construction . . . .” Id. We

also look to similar provisions within the statute as a whole

and the language of related or similar statutes to aid in

interpretation. See Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000,

1006–07, 1011 (9th Cir. 2006). “[S]tatutory interpretations

which would produce absurd results are to be avoided.”

Arizona St. Bd. for Charter Schs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,

464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

omitted). If a statute is ambiguous, we may “consult the

legislative history, to the extent that it is of value, to aid in
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 7

our interpretation.” Merkel v. Comm’r, 192 F.3d 844, 848

(9th Cir. 1999). Finally, in some cases, a statute’s “purpose”

may shed light on the interpretive question. See Jonah R.,

446 F.3d at 1005, 1010–11.

We conclude that each of the foregoing “tools” of

statutory interpretation indicate that the district court should

have applied § 5037(e), rather than § 4241(d). The plain

language of § 5037(e) makes clear that it applies to

commitment and study of alleged juvenile delinquents like

LKAV. Other textual “evidence” supports this conclusion as

well. Our interpretation would not lead to an absurd or

irrational result. Finally, even assuming that the statutory

language is ambiguous, commitment under § 5037(e) (rather

than § 4241(d)) is consistent with the purpose of the FJDA,

as evidenced by the statute’s legislative history.

1. Plain Language

Words in statutes usually carry “their plain, natural,

ordinary and commonly understood meanings.” United

States v. Romo-Romo, 246 F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, courts “try to avoid, where possible, an

interpretation of a statute that renders any part of it

superfluous and does not give effect to all of the words used

by Congress.” Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d

672, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The United States acknowledges that it filed a

certification to proceed against LKAV as an alleged juvenile

delinquent pursuant to § 5032, thereby invoking the FJDA.

Indeed, the United States conceded at oral argument that

§ 5037(e) applies to alleged juvenile delinquents. However,

the United States argues that § 5037(e) does not mention
8 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

competency and, thus, cannot “supplant the mandatory

competency evaluation and commitment procedure for all

defendants set forth in § 4241.” This argument overlooks the

plain language of § 5037(e).

Section 5037(e) provides:

If the court desires more detailed information

concerning an alleged or adjudicated

delinquent, it may commit him, after notice

and hearing at which the juvenile is

represented by counsel, to the custody of the

Attorney General for observation and study by

an appropriate agency. Such observation and

study shall be conducted on an outpatient

basis, unless the court determines that

inpatient observation and study are necessary

to obtain the desired information. In the case

of an alleged juvenile delinquent, inpatient

study may be ordered only with the consent of

the juvenile and his attorney. The agency

shall make a complete study of the alleged or

adjudicated delinquent to ascertain his

personal traits, his capabilities, his

background, any previous delinquency or

criminal experience, any mental or physical

defect, and any other relevant factors. The

Attorney General shall submit to the court and

the attorneys for the juvenile and the

Government the results of the study within

thirty days after the commitment of the

juvenile, unless the court grants additional

time.
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 9

As is evident by its plain language, § 5037(e) applies in cases

against alleged juvenile delinquents like LKAV. In such

cases, the court may order commitment to the Attorney

General for observation or study, if the court “desires more

detailed information concerning” an alleged juvenile

delinquent. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(e). One of the subjects of

study specifically stated in the statute is “any mental or

physical defect” of the alleged juvenile delinquent. While

§ 5037(e) does not mention competency, it does provide

certain restrictions on the court’s ability to order commitment

of alleged juvenile delinquents. Id.

Section 4241(d) sets forth a different commitment

scheme. That section provides for a mandatory commitment

of a defendant, who has been deemed incompetent, for study

of the defendant’s potential for restorability to competence.

28 U.S.C. § 4241(d). While the United States acknowledges

that § 4241 does not use the word “juvenile,” it argues that

§ 4241’s text “‘unambiguously describes’ the competency

evaluating and commitment procedure applicable to [all]

defendants.” However, this argument overlooks the fact that

the government charged LKAV with juvenile delinquency

under the FJDA. As such, he is an “alleged juvenile

delinquent” as that term is used in § 5037(e). Because

§ 5037(e) expressly provides for commitment, study, and

observation of alleged juvenile delinquents, it controls over

conflicting provisions of § 4241(d), which is applicable to

federal criminal defendants generally. Cf. United States v.

Pete, 525 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the

FJDA’s speedy trial provision, not the adult analog, applied

during defendant’s detention as an “alleged juvenile

delinquent”).
10 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

The United States cites our decision in Jonah R. to

support its argument that § 4241(d) controls. The United

States argues that Jonah R. mandates that the term

“defendant” apply to LKAV, even though LKAV is a

juvenile. We disagree. In Jonah R., we held that 18 U.S.C.

§ 3585(b), a statute applicable to federal criminal defendants

in general, also applied to juveniles. 446 F.3d at 1011.

Under § 3585(b), “[a] defendant shall be given credit toward

the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has

spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence

commences . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3585. Although the FJDA did

not “expressly incorporate § 3585,” the Bureau of Prisons

(“BOP”) had consistently applied it to juveniles for a period

of time. Jonah R., 446 F.3d at 1002. The court based its

conclusion that § 3585 applies to juveniles on the text,

legislative history, and purpose of the FJDA, § 3585, and

similar statutes. Id. at 1006–11. Specifically, the court

reasoned that the elimination of an express exception from

§ 3585’s predecessor, § 3568, had made the subsequent

statute more generally applicable. Id. at 1007. Congress’s

changes to the various, relevant statutes signaled Congress’s

expectation that “juveniles would receive credit for presentence custody as a matter of course.” Id. at 1008.

The United States makes too much of Jonah R. While the

court concluded that the term “defendant” could be applied to

a juvenile, it did not hold that the term always applies to

juveniles. A close reading of Jonah R. reveals that the court

based its decision on the unique history of § 3585 and the

other relevant statutes. The textual argument, as well as the

FJDA purpose argument, were only corollary to the court’s

structural/legislative history rationale. We decline the United

States’ invitation to stretch Jonah R. to compel application of
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 11

 Though not part of our reasoning, there is no indication in Jonah R. 3

that the custody credit provision in § 3585 conflicted with any provision

of the FJDA.

the term “defendant” to LKAV under § 4241(d),

notwithstanding contrary provisions in the FJDA.3

In addition, the United States cannot rely on § 5037(e)’s

heading—“Disposition”—in support of its textual argument.

A “heading cannot substitute for the operative text of the

statute.” See Florida Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly

Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008). While the bulk of

§ 5037(e) is dedicated to the disposition of an adjudicated

juvenile delinquent, § 5037(e), by its plain language, also

applies to alleged juvenile delinquents. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(e).

This application is not reflected in the heading. See

Piccadilly, 554 U.S. at 47. (“[T]he title of a statute . . .

cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The United States makes only one, vague attempt to

account for the term “alleged juvenile delinquent” in

§ 5037(e). The United States points to United States v.

Juvenile Male, 492 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2007) (a juvenile

transfer case) and suggests that it demonstrates a proper use

of the § 5037(e) commitment proceedings. The United States

argues that § 5037(e) commitment would be appropriate in

cases like Juvenile Male, because a judge might sometimes

need additional information before deciding the question of

transferability of an alleged juvenile delinquent. Yet, the

United States fails to make any logical distinction between

commitment for study to obtain more information on the

transferability question and commitment for study on the

question of competency. Both are situations where the judge
12 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

 The United States employs a similar argument—pointing out that 4

LKAV did not initially object to proceeding under § 4241(d). Given the

plain language of § 5037(e), proceeding under § 4241(d) was error,

regardless of whether LKAV initially failed to point out the error.

may “desire[ ] more detailed information concerning an

alleged” juvenile delinquent. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(e).

While § 5037(e) is admittedly less comprehensive than

§ 4241(d) on the subject of competency, it covers the same

subject matter—commitment. Accordingly, the plain

language of § 5037(e) shows that it applies to LKAV’s

commitment, rather than § 4241(d).

2. Other Textual Support

The conclusion that LKAV’s commitment falls under

§ 5037(e), not § 4241(d), finds support in the other provisions

of the FJDA and the adult commitment statutes. To proceed

against LKAV in federal court, § 5032 required the United

States to file a certification and demonstrate the basis for

federal jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; United States v.

Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2010). The

United States acknowledged this requirement and filed the

necessary certification. Like § 5037(e), § 5032 uses the term

“alleged juvenile delinquent.” The United States does not

explain why it would be required to follow § 5032 to obtain

jurisdiction over LKAV, but not follow procedures for his

commitment under identical language in § 5037(e).4

Further, in numerous places, the FJDA specifically

references criminal statutes of general applicability. See, e.g.,

18 U.S.C. § 5032 (referencing adult criminal statutes in the

FJDA jurisdiction provision); id. § 5037 (incorporating

certain adult sentencing provisions). Under the well-
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 13

established expressio unius canon, Congress could have made

express reference to § 4241(d) in § 5037(e) had it intended

the adult provision to apply.

The United States makes the reverse argument. It argues

that § 4241(d) and the surrounding provisions contain no

exception for juvenile offenders. In essence, nothing in

§ 4241(d), and related provisions, indicates that it does not

apply to juveniles. But this argument overlooks our cases

where we have observed that the FJDA “governs the

detention and disposition of juveniles charged with

delinquency.” Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1004 (internal

quotation marks omitted). While the United States is

technically correct that nothing in § 4241(d) says that it does

not apply to juveniles, nothing in the statute says that it does

apply to juveniles. By contrast, § 5037(e) by its clear terms

applies to “alleged juvenile delinquents” like LKAV.

The United States cites two out-of-circuit cases to support

its argument that § 4241(d) applies to LKAV: United States

v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 1997), and United States

v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 856–58 (4th Cir. 2005). The

United States’ reliance on these cases is misplaced. In S.A.,

the Eighth Circuit applied § 4246—which governs

permanent, civil commitment of adults—to juveniles.

129 F.3d at 998–99. However, S.A. is inapposite for similar

reasons as Jonah R. The court references the plain meaning

rule, id. at 998, but then focuses on the “policy considerations

that form the foundation of” the adult commitment statute.
14 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

 At oral argument, LKAV briefly implied that one reason that the 5

question of which statute applies is so important is that the United States’

efforts to restore LKAV to competency may fail. In that case, the United

States may need to seek permanent civil commitment under § 4246.

Whether § 4246 would be an appropriate provision to control in LKAV’s

case is not before us and we do not decide that issue. Accordingly, we

express no opinion on whether § 4246 would apply to FJDA cases.

Id. at 999. This case does not implicate the same policy

considerations.

5

Similarly, the relationship between § 4241(d) and

§ 5037(e) distinguishes this case from S.A. Again, this is not

a case where courts are using generally applicable statutes to

fill in gaps in the FJDA. Section 5037(e) already squarely

addresses pre-adjudication commitment for study and

observation.

Robinson is inapplicable to this question, too. While the

Robinson court referenced § 4241(d) in passing in a juvenile

case, 404 F.3d at 856, commitment under § 4241(d) was not

at issue. Rather, the juvenile challenged the district court’s

competency determination. Id. Robinson does not implicate

the conflict between § 4241(d) and § 5037(e), and thus

provides no support for the government’s argument.

3. Absurdity

We reject the United States’ various arguments that our

interpretation of §§ 4241(d) and 5037(e) would lead to an

absurd result. We must avoid an interpretation that “would

produce absurd results.” Arizona St. Bd., 464 F.3d at 1008.

However, “[w]hen a natural reading of the statutes leads to a

rational, common-sense result, an alteration ofmeaning is not

only unnecessary, but also extrajudicial.” Id. In other words,
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 15

 Of course, the United States could have moved to transfer LKAV to an 6

adult proceeding under § 5032, in which case subsequent commitment

under § 4241(d) would be appropriate. Courts look to a number of

attributes of the alleged juvenile delinquent to determine whether transfer

would be “in the interest of justice.” See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; Juvenile Male,

492 F.3d at 1048. The United States does not explain why it failed to seek

transfer, if LKAV’s particular needs warranted treating him as an adult

anyway.

“a decision to [rearrange] or rewrite [a] statute falls within the

legislative, not the judicial, prerogative.” Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d

832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002).

Most of the United States’ absurdity arguments focus on

the peculiar facts of this case and the practical difficulty of

keeping LKAV in a different facility than FMC-Butner. For

example, the United States points out that LKAV is no longer

a juvenile, because he has turned twenty-one. While LKAV

no longer meets the statutory definition of a juvenile, that

does not mean that he is no longer subject to the FJDA. It is

well-settled that jurisdiction under the FJDA is determined at

the time of the information. See United States v. Doe,

631 F.2d 110, 112–13 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, LKAV

is still an “alleged juvenile delinquent” under § 5037(e).6

While treating LKAV as a juvenile might create some

housing issues, because he cannot be housed with other

juveniles, such difficulty (necessarily temporary under the

statute) does not lead to absurdity. In fact, the BOP program

statement provided in the record states that a juvenile “may

remain in a contract juvenile facility for continuity of

program participation” after the juvenile’s twenty-first

birthday.

The United States also argues that it would be difficult

and impractical to require the United States “to provide 24-
16 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

 The United States (and the district court) make much of the fact that 7

LKAV has failed to suggest a suitable facility to meet LKAV’s treatment

needs. However, they overlook the fact that the Order left little room for

LKAV to suggest an alternate facility. Had the United States truly sought

greater input from LKAV, it could have proceeded under § 5037(e). And,

in any event, the ultimate responsibility to make suitable

arrangements—whether under § 4241 or § 5037(e)—remains with the

Attorney General.

hour security in a private medical facility” given LKAV’s

circumstances. Yet, § 5037(e) clearly calls for a thirty-day,

in-patient commitment in some cases. It does not strain

reason to believe that some alleged or adjudicated juvenile

delinquents are charged with dangerous crimes and must be

kept in a secure facility, apart from other juveniles. See

18 U.S.C. § 5032. Even if this is more difficult in LKAV’s

case, it is beyond our purview to relieve the United States of

any incidental inconvenience arising from LKAV’s unique

treatment needs. Given § 5037(e)’s clear import, the idea that

the United States could make arrangements for LKAV’s

particular needs is not absurd.

The United States argues that our interpretation will lead

to uncertain application of § 5037(e). Again, the United

States fails to explain why the government would be unable

to establish a set of procedures for commitment under

§ 5037(e). Just like § 4241(d), § 5037(e) provides for

commitment to the custody of the Attorney General. Section 7

5037(e) simply modifies certain other commitment details

required in the case of alleged or adjudicated juveniles.

Indeed, we expect that the United States’ § 4241(d)

procedures will continue to serve as a guide to how it might

carry out § 5037(e) commitment. This is permissible, so long

as the United States observes § 5037(e)’s enumerated limits

on the juvenile’s commitment.
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 17

Finally, the United States argues that § 5037(e) cannot

apply to competency determinations, because it requires

consent for inpatient study and imposes a thirty-day

commitment time limit that may be too short to determine

competency. We disagree. The juvenile’s consent to

inpatient study would be no barrier to commitment in cases

like this one, because both parties have a vested interest in a

swift and accurate competency determination. Further,

§ 5037(e) specifically contemplates court-sanctioned

exceptions to the thirty-day commitment rule where needed.

Accordingly, simply insisting that the United States comply

with § 5037(e)’s commitment requirements does not lead to

an irrational or absurd result.

4. Legislative History and Purpose

LKAV does not point to any legislative history that would

aid in the interpretation of § 5037(e) specifically. However,

LKAV argues that our case law generally requires juveniles

to be treated differently from adults. Our cases make clear

that the FJDA’s purpose is to provide special protections for

juveniles, over and above those available to adults. “First

enacted in 1938, the FJDA was intended to provide for the

care and treatment of juvenile delinquents in recognition of

significant differences between juvenile delinquents and adult

offenders.” Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1004 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words:

Under the [FJDA’s] provisions, a juvenile is

accorded preferential and protective handling

not available to adults accused of committing

crimes. Special obligations not applicable in

adult criminal proceedings are imposed upon

the arresting officer, § 5033, the magistrate,
18 UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE

 The United States argues that, even if the district court erred, there was

8

no prejudice because evaluation and treatment at FMC-Butner would still

be appropriate. There is authority for a harmless error analysis for

violations of the FJDA. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male,

336 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by

United States v. Doe, 366 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). However, we

conclude that LKAV’s ongoing commitment in violation of § 5037(e)

prejudices him. LKAV has been at FMC-Butner far past the thirty days

normally prescribed under § 5037(e). Commitment at FMC-Butner might

be the most effective way to study and treat LKAV, even under § 5037(e).

But, proceeding under § 4241(d) took away any flexibility that the district

§ 5034, the Attorney General, §§ 5032, 5035,

5039, the court, §§ 5032, 5036, 5037, 5038,

and the U.S. Parole Commission, § 5041.

United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th

Cir. 1980). In sum, “the purpose of the FJDA is to enhance

the juvenile system by removing juveniles from the ordinary

criminal justice system and by providing a separate system of

treatment for them.” Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1004

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The FJDA’s purpose sheds little light on how we should

construe “alleged juvenile delinquent” and the other specific

terms of § 5037(e). However, the legislative purpose serves

the limited function of rebutting the United States’ argument

that our plain meaning interpretation is absurd, because it

requires numerous accommodations for LKAV due to his

juvenile status. The strong “purpose” language in our cases

makes clear that the FJDA was meant to accord special status

to juveniles. Accordingly, we reject the United States’

argument that § 5037(e) cannot apply, because it potentially

requires different (and perhaps more taxing) procedures than

those set forth in § 4241(d).

8
UNITED STATES V. JUVENILE MALE 19

court may have had to vary LKAV’s commitment term or other

commitment details. The district court’s decision also took away any

bargaining power that LKAV might otherwise have brought to bear on the

conditions of his commitment.

 Because we reverse the district court on statutory interpretation 9

grounds, we decline to reach LKAV’s due process claim.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred by applying § 4241(d) to LKAV’s

commitment, rather than § 5037(e). Accordingly, we reverse

the district court, vacate the Order, and remand for further

proceedings.9

REVERSED and REMANDED.