alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2172 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2172

    To suspend temporarily the duty on ultra-high molecular weight 
polyethylene yarn measuring not less than 40 decitex but not more than 
                              130 decitex.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 2009

Mr. Specter (for himself and Mr. Casey) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To suspend temporarily the duty on ultra-high molecular weight 
polyethylene yarn measuring not less than 40 decitex but not more than 
                              130 decitex.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ULTRA-HIGH MOLECULAR WEIGHT POLYETHYLENE YARN MEASURING NOT 
              LESS THAN 40 DECITEX BUT NOT MORE THAN 130 DECITEX.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00      Ultra-high          Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                        molecular weight                                                   31/2011.......
                        polyethylene
                        yarn, measuring
                        not less than 40
                        decitex but not
                        more than 130
                        decitex (provided
                        for in subheading
                        5402.59.00)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 9 (Friday, January 13, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2031-2032]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-585]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-570-601]

Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and 
Unfinished From the People's Republic of China: Extension of the Time 
Limit for the Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty New Shipper 
Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

DATES: Effective Date: January 13, 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeffrey Pedersen or Lori Apodaca, AD/
CVD Operations, Office 4, Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
2769 or (202) 482-4551, respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On August 1, 2011, the Department of Commerce (``Department'') 
published a notice of initiation of the new shipper review of the 
antidumping duty order on tapered roller bearings and parts thereof, 
finished and unfinished from the People's Republic of China. See 
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished From 
the People's Republic of China: Initiation of Antidumping Duty New 
Shipper Review, 76 FR 45777 (August 1, 2011). The period of the review 
is June 1, 2010, through May 31, 2011. The preliminary results of the 
new shipper review are currently due no later than January 23, 2012.

[[Page 2032]]

Extension of Time Limits for Preliminary Results

    Section 751(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 
(``Act''), and 19 CFR 351.214(i)(1) require the Department to issue the 
preliminary results in a new shipper review of an antidumping duty 
order 180 days after the date on which the review is initiated. The 
Department may, however, extend the deadline for completion of the 
preliminary results of a new shipper review to 300 days if it 
determines that the case is extraordinarily complicated. See section 
751(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act and 19 CFR 351.214(i)(2).
    The Department finds that this new shipper review is 
extraordinarily complicated and, therefore, it requires additional time 
to complete the preliminary results. Specifically, the Department 
requires additional time to examine factors of production data that 
were only fully provided this month and then issue supplemental 
questionnaires for any additional information that may be needed. 
Accordingly, we are extending the time for the completion of the 
preliminary results of this review by 120 days, until May 22, 2012.
    This notice is published in accordance with sections 
751(a)(2)(B)(iv) and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: January 5, 2012.
Christian Marsh,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Operations.
[FR Doc. 2012-585 Filed 1-12-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
```
---

Exhibit 32

|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                     
|----------------------------------------------
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

The undersigned, Rahim Rayani, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Force Energy Corp.
for the quarterly period ended February 29, 2008 (the "Report") fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
Force Energy Corp.

Dated: April 16, 2008.

|/s/ Rahim Rayani                                         
|---------------------------------------------------------
|Rahim Rayani                                             
|President, Chief Executive Officer and Director          
|(Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer
|and Principal Accounting Officer)                        

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Force Energy
Corp. and will be retained by Force Energy Corp. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Brian Griffin, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (George Covington, J.), rendered June 23, 1989, convicting defendant after jury trial of robbery in the first degree and sentencing him to two-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half years imprisonment, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s alibi evidence was equivocal enough to warrant its rejection by the jury, and it cannot be sustained as a matter of law in this Court. Nor does the treatment of the alibi testimony in the prosecutor’s summation warrant reversal. Prior familiarity with the neighborhood where a crime has occurred cannot be equated with a juror’s impermissibly " 'conscious, contrived experimentation’ ” *(People v Martin,*149 AD2d 534, 535). There is nothing wrong with a juror’s "casual observation of a common, everyday experience which was readily available to any of the jurors without the benefit of any special expertise” *(People v Suraci,*137 AD2d 567, 568). As to the propriety of the prosecutor’s invitation for the jury to consider, from their own personal experience, how long it would have taken to get from the crime scene to the alibi situs, this was fair response to the defense summation, which had similarly invited such speculation.

The victim spotted the man she believed to have been her assailant several hours after the crime, following which she gave a somewhat fuller (although not inconsistent) description to the police. Testimonial reference to that later description, by the victim and a detective, was not hearsay because it was offered not for its truth, but for the jury’s evaluation of her opportunity to have observed the crime sufficiently to have been able to report it accurately to the police *(People v Huertas,*75 NY2d 487). Even if the repetition of the description were considered bolstering, the admission of such strong and certain identification testimony would be harmless error *(People v Johnson,*57 NY2d 969; *People v Guerra,*169 AD2d 479). Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Ellerin, Wallach, Ross and Smith, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF
TORO VENTURES INC.
FORM 10-Q FOR THE  NINE MONTH PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 2010
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Joseph Arcaro, am the
Chief Executive Officer of Toro Ventures Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Company"). I am delivering this
certificate in connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the  nine month period ended March 31,
2010 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Quarterly Report").

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Quarterly
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



|Date: June 17, 2013                                                                     
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|By: /s/ Joseph Arcaro
        Joseph Arcaro
        Chief Executive Officer and Director
Exhibit 24

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

         The  undersigned,  members of the Board of  Directors  and  Officers of
SALTON SEA FUNDING CORPORATION,  a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), and the
following companies:

         CalEnergy Minerals LLC
         Salton Sea Minerals Corp.


hereby  constitute  and appoint  Steven A.  McArthur and Douglas L. Anderson and
each of them, as his/her true and lawful  attorney-in-fact  and agent, with full
power of substitution and  resubstitution,  for and in his stead, in any and all
capacities,  to sign on his behalf the Company's Form 10-K Annual Report for the
fiscal year ending  December 31, 2000 and to execute any amendments  thereto and
to file  the  same,  with all  exhibits  thereto,  and all  other  documents  in
connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission and applicable
stock  exchanges,  with the full power and  authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing  necessary  or  advisable  to all intents and purposes as he
might or could do in  person,  hereby  ratifying  and  confirming  all that said
attorney-in-fact and agent or his substitute or substitutes,  may lawfully do or
cause to be done by virtue hereof.

Dated as of March 29, 2001.


/s/ Gregory E. Abel
------------------------------------
GREGORY E. ABEL



/s/ Patrick J. Goodman
------------------------------------
PATRICK J. GOODMAN
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF LS POWER FUNDING CORPORATION AS OF AND FOR THE YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                               1
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     1
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 332,001
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                        332,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           1
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   332,001
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                25,886
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,886
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Patricia R. Goodwin, Respondent, v Charles W. Goodwin, Appellant.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were previously divorced by judgment dated April 10, 1990, the defendant husband appeals from so much of an order of the the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Kaiser, J.H.O.), entered January 23, 1991, as granted the plaintiff wife’s motion to modify the divorce judgment to include a provision permitting her to move to the State of Florida with the parties’ children.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to *770the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a hearing and new determination in accordance herewith.

We reject the husband’s claim that, by granting the wife’s motion to relocate to Florida with the children, the court erroneously vacated the parties’ stipulation. In the instant case, the parties never stipulated as to whether the wife could relocate to a different region. Therefore, the court’s order permitting relocation did not alter their agreement.

We agree with the husband, however, that the court should have held a hearing before resolving the wife’s motion. "It is well settled that a move by a custodial parent to a distant domicile, unless there are exceptional circumstances present, will not be permitted when it would effectively deprive the noncustodial parent of regular access to his or her children” *(Meier v Meier,*156 AD2d 348, 351; *see also, Coniglio v Coniglio,*170 AD2d 477). Here, the wife submitted proof indicating that she could not afford to purchase a house in the area near the former marital residence, but the record was devoid of proof regarding the cost of renting a house in the area. It cannot be said upon the present record, therefore, that the relocation to Florida is economically necessary *(see, Morgano v Morgano,*119 AD2d 734; *Kozak v Kozak,*111 AD2d 842). Nor does the record clearly establish that the husband has "forfeited his * * * right to access to the children” *(Matter of Bonfiglio v Bonfiglio,*134 AD2d 426, 427).

Further, questions of fact exist as to whether relocation to a distant domicile would be in the best interests of the children. Although a resolution of disputes regarding relocation requires a consideration of the parents’ rights, ultimately the "predominant concern is the best interest of the children” *(Meier v Meier, supra,*at 351). Because the record does not indicate whether exceptional circumstances are present nor whether the relocation would be in the best interests of the children, an evidentiary hearing is essential *(cf., Venzer v Venzer,*144 AD2d 552; *Coniglio v Coniglio, supra).*

Finally, we note that the wife did not relocate with the children until after obtaining a court order permitting the move and until after the husband’s application for a stay was denied. Accordingly, the children should be permitted to remain in Florida pending the outcome of the hearing. Brown, J. P., Sullivan, Lawrence and Ritter, JJ., concur.
# L_2006195EN.01000401.xml

| 15.7.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 195/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.7.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 195/4

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1088/2006

of 14 July 2006

amending Regulation (EC) No 1164/2005 as regards the quantity covered by the standing invitation to tender for the resale on the Community market of maize held by the Polish intervention agency

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1), and in particular Article 6 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 1164/2005 (2) opened a standing invitation to tender for the resale on the Community market of 246 437 tonnes of maize held by the Polish intervention agency. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1164/2005 (2) opened a standing invitation to tender for the resale on the Community market of 246 437 tonnes of maize held by the Polish intervention agency.

| (2) | Given the current market situation, the quantities of maize put up for sale by the Polish intervention agency on the internal market should be increased, taking the permanent invitation to tender to 253 437 tonnes. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Given the current market situation, the quantities of maize put up for sale by the Polish intervention agency on the internal market should be increased, taking the permanent invitation to tender to 253 437 tonnes.

| (3) | Regulation (EC) No 1164/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Regulation (EC) No 1164/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly.

| (4) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EC) No 1164/2005 is hereby amended as follows:

| 1. | in Article 1, ‘246 437 tonnes’ is replaced by ‘253 437 tonnes’; |
| --- | --- |

1.

in Article 1, ‘246 437 tonnes’ is replaced by ‘253 437 tonnes’;

| 2. | in the title of the Annex, ‘246 437 tonnes’ is replaced by ‘253 437 tonnes’. |
| --- | --- |

2.

in the title of the Annex, ‘246 437 tonnes’ is replaced by ‘253 437 tonnes’.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 14 July 2006.

For the Commission

Mariann FISCHER BOEL

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 270, 21.10.2003, p. 78. Regulation as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1154/2005 (OJ L 187, 19.7.2005, p. 11).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 188, 20.7.2005, p. 4. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 923/2006 (OJ L 170, 23.6.2006, p. 3).

2

---
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GERALD L. FLUNDER, Jr.,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, a public entity; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 14

- 15906
D.C. No. 2:13

- cv - 01893

- DGC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017 **
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Gerald L. Flunder, Jr. , appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 action alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo

. Johnson v. Lucent Tech s. Inc. , 653 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously conclud es this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 19 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 15906

2011) (dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations ); Romano v. Bible , 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6))

. W e affirm.

T he district co urt properly dismissed Flunder’s claims under §§ 198 1, 1983

and 1985 , other than his § 1981 retaliation claim, on the basis of the applicable

statute of limitations because the claims accrued more than two years before

Flunder filed this acti on
. See TwoRivers v. Lewis , 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) ( stati ng that a § 1983 claim is subject to Arizona’ s two

- years statute of limitations for personal injury claims and “accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action” ) ; Taylor v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. , 993 F.2d 710, 711

- 12 (9th Cir. 1993) (the limitations period that

governs § 1983 claims also governs claims under § § 1981 and 1985) ; see also

Johnson , 653 F.3d at 1007 (recognizing that “ some § 1981 claims continue to be subject to the most analogous state statute of limitations ”)

. Dismissal of F lunder’s retaliation claim under § 1981 was proper because

Flunder failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See

Hebbe v. Pliler , 627 F.3d 338, 341

- 42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient3 14

- 15906

to state a plausible claim for relief); Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA , 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9t h Cir. 2003) (elements of a § 1981 retaliation claim). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief

. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED

.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

KWILSON COLEMAN,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 706 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of June, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.