IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE In the Matter of Raymond Walters, 

### ) No. 79707-7-I a vulnerable adult, 

### ) CLAYWALTERS, an individual, 

### ) ) Appellant, v. 

### ) ) CORBIN WALTERS, individually and 

### ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION In his capacity as attorney-in-factfor 

### ) RayWalters and in his capacity as 

### ) FILED: August 5, 2019 Trustee forthe Trust of Raymond and 

### ) Elaine Walters, 

### )

Respondent. __________________________________________________________________________________) VERELLEN, J. —Superior courts have broad subject matterjurisdiction to address trust disputes, and the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA)1 grants superior courts broad authority over such matters. ClayWalters’s2 narrow appeal presents the question whetherthe superior court lost subject matter jurisdiction or authority to modify a July2017 settlement order in a pending TEDRA lawsuit afterthe court administratively dismissed the lawsuitwithout

1 Ch. 11.96ARCW. 2 For clarity, we referto ClayWalters and Corbin Walters bytheirfirst names.No. 79707-7-I

prejudice due to inaction. The superior court always had subject matter jurisdiction overthe TEDRA action, and the administrative dismissal did not preclude the courtfrom modifying a priorsettlement orderthat did not result in a finaljudgment. We affirm the court’s November2017 orderdismissing Clay’s action with prejudice. Because the November order in effectvacated the July 2017 order on settlement, Clay’s challenge to that order is moot. Therefore, we affirm. FACTS Clay and Corbin are brothers and beneficiaries ofa familytrust.3 Corbin is also atrustee.4 In 2014, Clayfiled a TEDRA action against Corbin in Pierce County Superior Court alleging several torts, requesting an accounting, and moving to appoint an additional trustee to serve alongside Corbin.5 The tort claims were dismissed on summaryjudgment in 2016.6 Clay and Corbin began settlement negotiations on the remaining issues. In November of2016, Clayfiled a notice ofsettlement, although the parties had notfinalized theiragreement.7 One month later, they still had not submitted a written settlement to the court.8 In April of2017, Clay moved to entersettlement

~ Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 3, 17, 20.

~ CP at 3, 17.

~ CP at 1-15. 6 CP at212, 215.

~ CP at43-44. 8 CP at 83-88.
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based on all but a single paragraph ofa draft settlement agreement.9 In response, Corbin moved to enforce the entire agreement.1° In July, the court held a hearing and entered a settlement order.11 The settlement order required the parties execute a TEDRA agreement based on the entire purported settlement agreement including a broad release and dismissal with prejudice.12 Neither occurred. Corbin’s attorney drafted a TEDRA agreement and sent itto Clay’s attorney. Clay’s attorneywithdrewfrom representation, and Clay did not respond to the draftTEDRA agreement. In August, the court administratively dismissed the matterdue to inaction, pursuantto local rule.13 In November, Corbin requested thatthe courttake up the case again, replace the settlement orderwith an orderto wind down the trust under its own terms ratherthan the settlement’s terms, and dismiss with prejudice.14 Three days before the hearing on Corbin’s motion, Clay’s newly hired attorney moved fora continuance.15 The court denied the continuance and granted Corbin’s motion.16 Clay appeals.

~ CF at 37-40, 43-44. 10 CP at 60-61.

~ CF at 97-98; Report of Proceedings (RF) (July 28, 2017) at 4-5. 12 CP at 97-98. 13 CP at 100. 14 CF at 101-06. 15 RP (Nov. 17, 2017) at2-3. 16 kI. at 8-9; CF at 187-88.
3No. 79707-7-I
ANALYSIS

Clay contends the November dismissal with prejudice and the July settlement orderwere erroneous.17 Because the November order in effect vacated the parts ofthe July order Clay challenges on appeal, we mustfirst determine whetherthe November dismissal was entered in error. Clay does not contestthe substance ofthe November order. Instead, his narrow argument is that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction” to enterthe Novemberdismissal after administratively dismissing the matter pursuant to Pierce County Local Rule 41(e)(3).18 “[Jjurisdiction is the powerofa courtto hearand determine a case.”19 Washington recognizes onlytwo types ofjurisdiction: personaljurisdiction and subject matterjurisdiction.20 Because Clay argues the court lacked power overthe substance ofthe case ratherthan any person or property, he appears to contend the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction.

17Appellant’s Br. at 2. Clay also assigns errorto denial of his continuance motion. j4. But he makes no supporting arguments, and we decline to consider it. See In re Irrevocable Trust of McKean, 144 Wn. App. 333, 344, 183 P.3d 317 (2008) (“We do not considerarguments unsupported by argument or legal authority.”).

18 Appellant’s Br. at 2, 25. 19 Bueckinc~ v. Bueckinci, 179 Wn.2d 438, 447, 316 P.3d 999 (2013). 20 Id.
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We reviewthe question ofsubject matterjurisdiction de novo.21 ‘Subject matterjurisdiction refers to a court’s abilityto entertain a ~yj~ ofcase, notto its authorityto enter an order in a particular case.”22 “Ifthe type ofcontroversy is within the subject matterjurisdiction, then all otherdefects orerrors go to something otherthan subject matterjurisdiction.”23 A court can commit an error of law by acting without authority but does not exceed its subject matterjurisdiction by doing so.24 An order issued by a courtwithout subject matterjurisdiction is void.25Washington’s superior courts have subject matterjurisdiction “in all cases

. . . in which jurisdiction shall not have been vested in some other court.”26 TEDRA recites that superior courts have “original subject matterjurisdiction over trusts and all matters relating to trusts.”27 “Matter” is defined expansively in

21 In re Guardianship ofWells, 150Wn. App. 491, 499, 208 P.3d 1126 (2009).22 Buecking, 179 Wn.2d at448 (emphasis added); see In re Marriage of Malor, 71 Wn. App. 531, 534, 859 P.2d 1262 (1993) (“The term ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ is often confused with a court’s ‘authority’ to rule in a particular manner.”).

23 ZDI Gaming Inc. v. State ex rel. Washington State Gambling Comm’n, 173 Wn.2d 608, 618, 268 P.3d 929 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marleyv. Dep’t of Labor& Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994)).

24 In re Schneider, 173 Wn.2d 353, 362, 268 P.3d 215 (2011) (citing Marley, 125 Wn.2d at 539). 25 McKean, 144 Wn. App. at 339. 26 Schneider, 173 Wn.2d at 360 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. IV, 

### § 6). 27 RCW 11.96A.040(2).
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TEDRAto include “any issue, question, or dispute involving:

. . . (b) The direction of a.

. . trustee to do orabstain from doing any act in a fiduciary capacity: (c) The determination ofany question arising in the administration of an estate ortrust.”28 This broad grant even confers “full power and authority” to administer a case under circumstances where it is unclearwhether and howTEDRA applies.29 Clay does not argue the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction atthe outset ofthis case when he expressly invoked TEDRAforsubject matter jurisdiction.30 He fails to explain howthe superior court lost its abilityto consider TEDRA actions by administrativelydismissing this lawsuitfor inaction. An orderto dismiss would have no effect on the court’s subject matterjurisdiction overa particularcase.31 The court had subject matterjurisdiction atthis case’s outset and never lost it. Clay also appears to contend the court lacked authorityto entertain the November motion to dismiss because oftheAugust administrative dismissal.32 The crux of his argument is the August administrative dismissal was a final order

28 RCW 11 .96A.030(2). 29 RCW 11 .96A.020(2): see McKean, 144 Wn. App. at 343 (describing circumstances illustrating “the trial court’s authorityto take action in the face of uncertainty”) (citing RCW 11.96A.020(2)). 30CPat4. 31 See ZDI Gaming, 173 Wn.2d at 616 (“Simply put, the existence ofsubject matterjurisdiction is a matterof law and does not depend on procedural rules.”). 32 See Appellant’s Br. at 25-26 (“The November 17, 2017, order dismissing the underlying case with prejudice is void for lack ofjurisdiction. TheAugust 8, 2017, order controls, and it effectivelyterminated the underlying litigation without prejudice and [Corbin] never appealed thatfinal order.”) (citation omitted). 6No. 79707-7-I

that “effectively terminated the underlying litigation” and was never appealed, so the subsequent Novemberorderwas entered in error.33 A “finaljudgment” is “‘[a] court’s last action that settles the rights ofthe parties and disposes ofall issues in controversy.”34 An order is itselffinal and appealable where its practical effect is to determine an action by discontinuing it or preventing a finaljudgment.35 Where substantive issues are left unresolved and the plaintiff could refile, no finaljudgment has been entered.36 The ‘primaryfunction” of involuntary administrative dismissals underCivil Rule 41 (b)(2)(A) and related rule PCLR 41 (e)(3) “is to clearthe clerk’s record of inactive cases.”37 Such dismissals are not intended to be final adjudications because the civil rules prefer“deciding cases on their merits ratherthan on procedural technicalities.”38 Thus, courts retain their authorityto vacate

~ Id.

~ Wachovia SBA Lending, Inc. v. Kraft, 165 Wn.2d 481, 492, 200 P.3d 683 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DIcT. 859 (8th ed. 2004)).

~ ki. at487 (quoting Munden v. Hazelrigg, 105 Wn.2d 39, 44, 711 P.2d 295 (1985)). 36 See k~. at 492 (stating a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under CR 41 is not afinaljudgment because “[njo substantive issues are resolved, and the plaintiff may refile the suit.”).

~ Vaughn v. Chung, 119 Wn.2d 273, 277, 830 P.2d 668 (1992) (citing 4 LEWIS ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE 

### § 5502, at 243 (3d ed. 1983)). Id. at 280.
7No. 79707-7-I

administrative dismissals and considerthe merits ofa case.39 “Allowing trial courts to vacate

. . . dismissals caused by mistake, inadvertence, or othergood reasons is not inconsistentwith a mandatory procedure for dismissing cases.”4° The court dismissed this case on August 8 because PCLR 41(e)(3) requires that a court “dismiss the matter” after 90 days passes from the filing ofa notice of settlement unless an order disposing ofall claims is entered. PCLR 41 (e)(3) states onlythatthe court “shall dismiss the matter” and does not mandate dismissal with prejudice. Because we interpret local rules in the same manner as statutes, we will not read additional terms into the rule.41 And Clay and Corbin agree the administrative dismissal was not entered with prejudice.42 Clay’s refusal to complywith the July settlement order left his claims foran accounting and trustee appointment unresolved because the court neverenteredjudgment based on the settlement agreement. In absence ofajudgment resolving the case’s merits, theAugust administrative dismissal was not a finaljudgment. And because the court had the authorityto vacate the November8 order granting an administrative dismissal, the court necessarily had the authorityto address the remaining TEDRA issues and modifythe July settlement order once it

~ ki. at 283-84. We note, though, that dismissal without prejudice can be final and appealable under circumstances not present here. Munden, 105 Wn.2d at 40-41. 40 Vaughn, 119 Wn.2d at 282. 41 Heaneyv. Seattle Mun. Court, 35 Wn. App. 150, 154, 665 P.2d 918 (1983); see In re Marriage of Ruffand Worthley, 198 Wn. App. 419, 425, 393 P.3d 859 (2017) (‘Courts cannot amend statutes byjudicial construction.”). 42 Appellant’s Br. at26; Resp’t’s Br. at 25.
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effectivelyvacated the order granting the August administrative dismissal.43 The court had the authorityto consider Corbin’s November motion. Clay makes no arguments about the substance ofthe November motion to dismiss with prejudice and challenges onlythe court’s subject matterjurisdiction and general authorityto entertain motions in this case. Butthe court had both. Thus, Clay’s assignment oferrorto the July settlement order is moot, and we need not address his arguments regarding CR 2A.44 Corbin requests we award fees underTEDRAto Corbin in his capacity as trustee and require that Clay paythose fees.45 RCW 11 .96A. 150(1) authorizes an award ofcosts and attorney fees on appeal “to be paid [by a party orthe trust] in such amount and in such manner as the court determines to be equitable.” We considerwhetherthe litigation and participation ofthe party seeking attorneyfees benefited the trust.46 Corbin’s participation as trustee resulted in success forthe trust on appeal and affirmance ofthe order allowing wind down ofthe trust. Even ifClay’s request foran accounting and forappointment ofan additional trustee might have

~ See RCW 11 .96A.020 (courts may adjudicate trust matters even under uncertain circumstances); RCW 11 .96A.060 (courts may issue any orders necessary to exercise powers underTEDRA). See Matterof Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 393, 409 P.3d 1184 (2018) (“A case is moot ifa court can no longer provide effective relief.”) (quoting State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 616, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995)), review denied, 190 Wn.2d 1022 (2018)).

~ Resp’t’s Br. at 28. 46 In re Estate ofWimberley, 186 Wn. App. 475, 512, 349 P.3d 11(2015)
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benefited the trust, his refusal to complywith the trial court’s July settlement order led to the loss ofthose benefits. That same refusal led to the November dismissal order and this appeal. In his capacity as trustee, Corbin is entitled to attorneyfees and costs to be assessed against Clay under RCW 11 .96A. 150(1) upon compliance with RAP ~ Therefore, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

_______________ A 

# •! P

~ Because we award costs and attorneyfees underTEDRA, we do not consider Corbin’s requestfor costs and attorneyfees under RAP 18.9. 10