alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Karl Dehlow, Jr., Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Baker, J.), rendered December 6, 1989, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating so much of the sentence as directed the defendant to pay restitution; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

As part of his plea bargain, the defendant expressly agreed to waive his right to appeal the length of his sentence, thereby precluding him from raising an excessive sentence argument before this court *(see, People v Seaberg,*74 NY2d 1). In any event, we do not find that the term of incarceration imposed was harsh or excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80).

However, as conceded by the People, the trial court erred in directing the defendant to pay restitution in the sum of $1,560, representing unrecovered "buy money” used by the police in the drug sale which formed the basis of the conviction *(see, People v Rowe,*152 AD2d 907, *affd*75 NY2d 948). *554Accordingly, that part of the sentence is vacated. Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Lawrence, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                      Exhibit 23

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Nos. 33-98440, 33-98444, 38-98442, 33-98446, 333-21799, 333-21795, 333-70599,
333-35812, 333-35814, 333-50322, 333-91490, 333-101280, 333-101284, and
333-101881) on Form S-8 and the registration statements (Nos. 333-94757 and
333-50494) on Form S-3 of CheckFree Corporation of our report dated August 5,
2003, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of CheckFree Corporation for
the year ended June 30, 2003.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Atlanta, Georgia
September 12, 2003
# ______________

# ......... 09/12/2012 14:46 9072765291 

### HOZUBIN&MOBERLY

LAWOFl'lCEOF 

### HOZUBIN &MOBERLY 310K STRJ:m',SUITE4.05 ANOIORACF.AK9MOI

TEL• (11(17) 2'1'U297 l'AX: (.\107)**27~>-S2tH** 

## u.s.

In 

### the Matter of:


### 'I'GI FREXGHT PAGE 02



# .**::;i~~~;;.~3-1}1ENT**

## OF 

# .· ., ,**:ls~l:uBfA**

# TION DEPARTMENT 

### OF

## TRANSPORTAT!dN\i~: I

## OPERATIONS OFFICE OF HEARINGS WASHINGTON, DC 

## ll 2: 

# Qq ) ) 

### )FAA Pocket No. CP10NM0012 )DMS NO. FAA-2010-1079

_____________________________)Judge RICHARD C. 

### GOODWIN

NOTICE OF fNTENT RE EVIDENCE RULE 404(b) (2) 

### TGI Freight, through counsel, the Law Office of Hozubin & Moberly, hereby notifies the Court that it intends to elicit testimony from one of the FAA's proposed witnesses, Kathy Poitras, a representative of Unitex, who may be subject to Evidence Rule 404. While Evidence Rule 404(b) (2) requires that application be made in a criminal matter, and this is not a criminal proceeding, TGI is filing this notice as a cautionary

measure.



# . r· DATED this

## ~day of September 2012.

By: 

### LAW OFFICE OF HOZUBIN & MOBERLY Attorneys for TGI Freight**~~/12/2012** 14:45 9072755291 

### HOZUBIN&MOBERLY

I..A.WOfl'ICEOI? 

### HOZUBIN &MOBERLY 3W I(S'O.t,F.ET 15UirE 40$ ANO.ORAGE, AK99501

TE.L: (D07) %7$.'1;297 fAX: QJ07)**:27~291** CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certi!y that on the

### ~day of September, 2012, 

### a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on the following: Oriqinal Plus 1 Copy-VIA Facsimile Only Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, OC 20591 Attn; Hearin9 Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000 (202) 493-5123

- fax .1 Copx=ViA**Facsimi~e** The Honorable Richard 

### C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

### u.s. Department of Transportation Office of Hearings, 

### M-20 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. East Building, Ground Floor, Room El2-320 Washington, DC 20590 (202) 366-7536

- fax One Copy-VIA Facsimile Howard 

### L. Martin, Jr. Regional Counsel, Office of**Reg~onal** Counsel, AAL-7 Alaska Region Federal Aviation Administration 222 West 7th Avenue #14 Anchorage, AK 99513-7587 (907) 271-2800**~fax** .one Copy:-VIA. Facsi:w..il.a Cheryl 

### M. Jones, Sr. Attorney Office o£ Regional Counsel Alaska Re9ion federal Aviation Administration 222 West 7t'll Avenue 

### #14 Anchorage, AK 99513-7587 (907)271-2800- 

### fax

9A00/242/trial/Notice of**~n~ent** re 404(b) (2)



### NOTICE In the Matter of TGI Freight OoQket No. CP10NM0012 

### Page 2 PAGE 03
#### Richmond County Country Club, Respondent, v Finance Administrator of the City of New York et al., Appellants.

In consolidated proceedings to review the tax assessments on certain real property for the tax years 1984/ 1985, 1985/1986, 1986/1987, 1987/1988, and 1988/1989, the Finance Administrator of the City of New York and Tax Commission of the City of New York appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Ventiera, J.H.O.), entered August 16, 1989, which, after a nonjury trial, reduced the assessments for the tax years in question to $860,000 for lot 1 of block 900, $1,316,000 for lot 1 of block 902, and $1,172,000 for lot 1 of block 905.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs or disbursements, the assessments for the years in question are reinstated and confirmed, and the petitions are dismissed.

The three tax lots under review contain a total area of 5,390,110 square feet, comprising the Richmond County Country Club golf course. In support of its claim of overvaluation, the petitioner relied on the appraisal report and testimony of its sole expert witness, who is a real estate appraiser and broker. The petitioner’s expert testified that the lots could not be valued by the capitalization of income approach since there was "no income generated”, and also could not be valued by *533the market approach because of the lack of any comparable sales. He further maintained that the property was a "special use type” of property which, we note, is valued by the summation approach, i.e., replacement cost of improvements less depreciation, plus land value *(see, Matter of Suffolk County [C.J. Van Bourgondien, Inc.],*47 NY2d 507; *Matter of Rochester Urban Renewal Agency [Patchen Post]*45 NY2d 1; 51 NY Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 232, 236, 238). The record indicates that the petitioner’s expert agreed with the respondents’ assessed values for the relatively insignificant improvements on the lots in question. Accordingly, the crux of the petitioner’s case hinged on the value of the land.

With respect to the value of the land, the appraisal report of the petitioner’s expert simply concluded that the land should be valued at "approximately $25,000 per acre”. However, this conclusion was not supported by any "facts, figures and calculations”, as required by 22 NYCRR 202.60 (g) (3) *(see also, Matter of Rusciano & Son Corp. v Roche,*118 AD2d 861). In addition, this omission was further compounded when the petitioner’s expert testified at the trial that, solely based on his subjective "opinion”, the land should be valued at "sixty cents a square foot, twenty-five thousand an acre or a total of $3,234,000”. This speculative testimony is not sufficient to satisfy the petitioner’s burden of proof. The petitioner having failed to demonstrate that the property in question was overvalued, the assessments in question must be reinstated and the petitions dismissed on the merits *(see, Matter of Manno v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y.,*92 AD2d 896). Mangano, P. J., Kunzeman, Lawrence and Miller, JJ., concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 21
 Subsidiaries of CheckFree Corporation
 Name
    
    Jurisdiction of OrganizationCheckFree Services Corporation
    
    DelawareAccurate Software Inc.
    
    GeorgiaAmerican Payment Holdco, Inc.
    
    DelawareBastogne, Inc.
    
    NevadaCarreker (SAS)
    
    FranceCarreker Canada Inc.
    
    CanadaCarreker Check Solutions LLC
    
    DelawareCarreker Corporation
    
    DelawareCarreker Holdings Australia Pty Ltd.
    
    AustraliaCarreker Ltd.
    
    United KingdomCDT Realty Corp.
    
    ConnecticutCEE Associates, L.P.
    
    ConnecticutCheckFree E-Commerce Solutions Ltd.
    
    United KingdomCheckFree Investment Corporation
    
    NevadaCheckFree i-Solutions Corp.
    
    OntarioCheckFree i-Solutions, Inc.
    
    DelawareCheckFree PhonePay Services, Inc.(d/b/a CheckFree Pay-by-Phone)
    
    New YorkCheckFree Software & Services UK Limited
    
    United KingdomCheckFree Solutions (Australia) PTY Ltd.
    
    AustraliaCheckFree Solutions Limited
    
    United KingdomCheckFree Solutions S.A.
    
    LuxembourgCheckFreePay Corporation of California
    
    CaliforniaCheckFreePay Corporation of New York
    
    DelawareCheckFreePay Corporation
    
    ConnecticutColonial Technologies Corp.
    
    DelawareCorillian Community Banking Solutions, LLC
    
    OregonCorillian Corporation
    
    OregonCorillian International, Ltd.
    
    United KingdomCorillian South Asia Sdn Bhd
    
    MalaysiaDistrict Corporation
    
    ConnecticutGenisys Operation, Inc.
    
    TexasHeliograph Inc.
    
    DelawareHeliograph Ltd.
    
    United KingdomPickett Corporation
    
    ConnecticutUpstream Securities, LLC
    
    Delaware
#### Kebharu Smith et al., Respondents, v Brookdale Hospital Medical Center, Appellant.

In an action to recover *692damages for medical malpractice, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bellard, J.), dated September 18, 1989, as denied its motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that the Supreme Court did not err in assuming the role of *parens patriae*with respect to the infant plaintiff and in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment *(see, Humbert v Misericordia Hosp. Med. Center,*140 AD2d 185). We note that the court’s denial was without prejudice to renew after the results of an investigation by a medical malpractice panel, an investigation which the court directed be held expeditiously. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Brown and Balletta, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>          5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
August 31, 1998 consolidated financial statements and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements and the notes thereto.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                           12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1998
<CASH>                                           3,772
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   98,352
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               115,774
<PP&E>                                         147,058
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,897
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 258,935
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          130,360
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        88,942
<OTHER-SE>                                     (40,145)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   258,935
<SALES>                                        397,383
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               397,383
<CGS>                                           52,001
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   52,001
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               350,538
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,843
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (11,019)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (11,119)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (11,119)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.0)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      (.0)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1765 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1765

 To amend the Hate Crime Statistics Act to include crimes against the 
                               homeless.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 8, 2009

  Mr. Cardin (for himself, Ms. Collins, Mr. Brown, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. 
Whitehouse, Mr. Schumer, and Mr. Burris) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Hate Crime Statistics Act to include crimes against the 
                               homeless.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Hate Crimes Against the Homeless 
Statistics Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. INCLUSION OF HOMELESS.

    Section (1)(b) of the Hate Crime Statistics Act is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``homeless status,'' 
        after ``sexual orientation,''; and
            (2) by adding the end the following:
            ``(6) As used in this subsection, the term `homeless 
        status' with respect to an individual, refers to an individual 
        who--
                    ``(A) lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate 
                nighttime residence; or
                    ``(B) has a primary nighttime residence that is--
                            ``(i) a public or private place not 
                        designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular 
                        sleeping accommodation for human beings, 
                        including cars, parks, public spaces, abandoned 
                        buildings, substandard housing, bus or train 
                        stations, or similar settings;
                            ``(ii) a supervised publicly or privately 
                        operated shelter designed to provide temporary 
                        living accommodations, including motels, 
                        hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional 
                        housing; or
                            ``(iii) housing of other persons in which 
                        the individual is temporarily staying due to 
                        loss of housing, economic hardship, or a 
                        similar reason.''.
                                 <all>
```
Comment Info: ================= General Comment:Joint motion
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-1141

SAMUEL HENDERSON, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; BLUE RIDGE MENTAL

ASSOCIATION; ASHEVILLE BUNCOMBE COMMUNITY

RELATIONS COUNCIL; BUNCOMBE COUNTY HEALTH

DEPARTMENT; ASHEVILLE HEAD, NECK & EAR SURGEONS, P.A.; CLERK OF COURT OF HENDERSON

COUNTY, Henderson, NC; BUNCOMBE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, Asheville, NC; HOUSING AUTHORITY

OF THE CITY OF ASHEVILLE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,

District Judge. (CA-97-279-1-C)

Submitted: April 14, 1998 Decided: June 18, 1998

Before WIDENER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Samuel Henderson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Virginia Anne Gibbons,

Assistant Attorney General, Bruce Steuart Ambrose, Richard Earl

Slipsky, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh,

North Carolina; David Earl Matney, III, MATNEY & ASSOCIATES, P.A.,

Asheville, North Carolina; Martha Walker-McGlohon, CITY ATTORNEY’S

OFFICE, Asheville, North Carolina; Isaac Noyes Northup, Jr.,

Jacqueline Denise Grant, ROBERTS & STEVENS, P.A., Asheville, North

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s order dismissing Appellant’s civil rights claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Henderson v. North

Carolina, No. CA-97-279-1-C (W.D.N.C. Nov. 13, 1997). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Otto Nordquist et al., Respondents, v Piccadilly Hotel Company et al., Appellants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Irma Vidal Santaella, J.), entered August 31, 1990, which, *inter alia,*denied defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

There are material issues of fact with respect to their ownership or control of the area where plaintiff Otto Nordquist slipped and fell. Even absent evidence that defendants repaired the pathway in question, issues of fact remain with respect to whether this pathway was developed or used exclusively to benefit the land admittedly owned by defendant Piccadilly Hotel Company, such that a duty would arise to maintain it in a reasonably safe condition by virtue of a special use or benefit *(Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp.,*139 AD2d 292, *lv dismissed in part*73 NY2d 783). Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Ellerin, Kupferman, Asch and Smith, JJ.
#### Philip BAILEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. C-85-301.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 2, 1987.

*1213Gloyd McCoy, Asst. Public Defender, Norman, for petitioner.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

The petitioner, Philip Bailey, was charged with three (3) counts of Delivery of Controlled Drugs, After Former Conviction of a Felony, Case Nos. CRF-84-3256, 3257 and 3259, Possession of Controlled Drugs, After Former Conviction of a Felony, Case No. CRF-84-3733, and Resisting an Officer, Case No. CRM-84-1608. On December 11,1984, petitioner pled guilty to all five charges. On February 22, 1985, the trial court sentenced petitioner to twenty-five (25) years on each of the four (4) felony charges, the sentences to run concurrently. Petitioner was also sentenced to one (1) year in the county jail on the Resisting an Officer charge.

For his second assignment of error petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his pleas of guilty because the trial judge failed to follow a plea bargain agreement. We agree. Petitioner’s guilty pleas were based on plea negotiations with the District Attorney for fifteen (15) years on each count to run concurrent. However, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced petitioner to twenty-five (25) years on each count to run concurrent. The trial judge stated his reason for not following the initial fifteen (15) year sentence recommendation:

> It is my understanding, Counsellor, and the record should also reflect, that you jumped bond, apparently because you didn’t show at the last date this case was set for sentencing; is that not correct? ... Well, you failed to appear on the date that you were to be here for sentencing; is that not correct? And, also, further, did I not state on that day, Mr. Bailey, that any agreement you had with the State, if you failed to appear on the date of sentencing would not be available to you at a subsequent time; do you recall that? That was on the record. (S.Tr. 2-3)

We are of the opinion that the trial court’s action was erroneous. Initially, we note that the record does not reflect that the trial judge informed petitioner that if he failed to appear at the sentencing hearing the plea agreement would not be available. Moreover, Bail Jumping is a separate offense and the trial court cannot add time to a defendant’s plea bargain agreement simply because he allegedly committed another offense before sentencing. Where, as in the instant case, a defendant enters a plea of guilt based upon a plea bargain agreement, he must be allowed to withdraw his plea if the judge declines to follow the recommended sentence. *King v. State,*553 P.2d 529, 536 (Okl.Cr.1976).

Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED, and this matter is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

PARKS, P.J., and BRETT, J., concur.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-00816-CR

Walter SCOTT,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CR6975

Honorable Ron Rangel, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 1, 2023

DISMISSED

Appellant pled nolo contendre to murder and was sentenced within the terms of a plea

bargain. The trial court’s certification in this appeal states: “[T]his criminal case is a plea-bargain 

case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” 

“In a plea bargain case . . . a defendant may appeal only: (a) those matters that were raised 

by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (b) after getting the trial court’s permission to

appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record, which contains a written plea bargain, 

establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended 
04-23-00816-CR

- 2 -

by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See id. The clerk’s record does not include a 

written motion filed and ruled upon before trial, nor does it indicate the trial court gave its 

permission to appeal. See id. The trial court’s certification, therefore, appears to accurately reflect 

that this is a plea-bargain case and appellant does not have a right to appeal.

We must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of 

appeal has not been made part of the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). On September 18, 2023, we 

issued an order stating this appeal would be dismissed unless an amended trial court certification 

was made part of the appellate record by October 18, 2023. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Daniels 

v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). On October 16, 2023, counsel 

for appellant filed a response to this court’s order stating counsel unsuccessfully sought an 

amended certification authorizing an appeal after which counsel “reluctantly concludes this court 

of appeals has little choice but to dismiss the instant attempted appeal.” Accordingly, this appeal

is dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d).

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH