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E L E C TR O N I C C I TAT I O N : 2003 F E D App . 0234P ( 6th C ir .) F il e N a me : 03a 0234p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________

N ICOLE M. L OCH ,

Plaintiff- Appellant

,

v.

F RED W ATKIN S ; J OHN D. O’H AIR ; C OUNT Y OF W AYNE ; B ENNY N APOLEON ; T HE C ITY
OF D ET ROIT , Defenda nts-Appe llees. X - - - -
> , - - - - - - N No. 01-1598

Appeal from the United States District Court for the E astern D istrict of Michiga n at Detr oit. No. 00-70478—Denise Page Hood, District Judge.

Argued: March 27, 2003 Decided and Filed: July 17, 2003

Before: MARTIN , Chief Circuit Judge; KENNEDY and

DAUGHTR

EY, Circu

it Judges. 2 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. No. 01-1598

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Hugh M. Davis, Jr., CONSTITUTI ONAL LI TIGATI ON ASSOCIATES , Detroit, Michigan, for Appellan t. Linda D. Fegins, CI TY OF DETROIT L AW DEPARTMENT, Detroit, Michigan, Jul i e C. QuinlanDufrane, WA YNE COU NTY COR PO RAT ION C OUN SE L, Detroit, Michi gan, fo r Appellees. ON BRI EF: Cyn thia Heenan, CONST ITUTI ONAL L ITI GATI ON ASSOCIATES , Detroit, Michiga

n, for Ap pellant. Linda D. Fegins, CITY O F DET ROIT LA W DEPA

RTMENT, Detroit , Mich iga n, W. StevenPearson, WAYNE CO UN TY CORPORATION COUNSEL , Detroit , Michig an, for A ppellee s.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ B OYCE F . MARTI

N, JR., Chief

Circuit Judg e. Nicole Loch appeals the decision of

the district

court dismissing her claims under state law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground of abstention. The ca s e stemmed from seizure of Loch’s Jeep Cherokee under the Michigan forfeiture statute. Loch challen ged the seizure u nder 42 U .S.C. § 1983 and state
c onversionground s, seekin g damages. She la

ter file d motions for dec larator

y a nd injunct ive relie f, as we ll as leave to ame nd her complaint to include would-be plaintiffs wh o could represent a proposed c lass of litigants opposing the forfeiture procedur e. Upon motion by the defenda nt municipalities and officer s, t he distric t court fo und that it could not review her c ompl aints because they were intertwined

with pending state litigation. F or th e following
reasons , we AFF IRM th e judgme nt of the d

istrict c ourt.
On January 7, 2000, Detroit police off icers seized a 19 9 6 Jeep Cheroke e driven

by Ja ck Paul B arrett

II after Barrett wasNo. 01-1598 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. 3

arrested for attempting to purchase marijuana. The Jeep wa s impounded, thenseized, under section 333.7521(1)(d) of the Michigan Compiled Laws, which

authorizes forfeiture of

any vehicle involved i

n the use , transport, or facilitation of transport of con t rolled substances for sale or receipt. The officers seized the vehicle as part of a Wayne County

program called Operati on Push-Of

f. The pr ogram permit s the police to seize vehicles that are used in the purchase or attempted purchas e of any amount of ma rijuana. The local prosecutors then subject those vehicles to forfeiture. Loch, who owned the Jeep, was not pr esent a t the time of the arrest b

ut receiv ed notice of the pending forfeiture. T he notice advises th e owner of the right to post a bond and contest the forf eiture in state co urt. The owner has the option, however, of settling the case for a specified sum plus towing and storage costs, thereby

regaining possession

of the vehicle. Loch attempted to post bond and contes t the seizure of her pr op er ty. She claim s, howeve r, that th e prose cutor’s office told her that she wa s not perm itted to pos t bond and contest the forfeiture because there was a lien on

the vehicle and that the vehicle

would be t

urned ov er to the

li en holder of record unless Loch entered into an a greement on the forfeiture.

Loch claims tha

t the pros ecutor’ s office

le ads owne rs to believe that to obtain atrial date, the owners mu st waive t heir rightsto certa

in pretri al proce edings. The def endants c ontest that claim, sta

ting tha t pretria l waiv e r is optional and not required to o btain a trial da

te. The prosecut

or’s off ice also seeks to have state courts hold owne rs w ho prevail on the forfeiture li ab le fo r t ow in g a nd st or ag e e xp en se . E ve nt ua ll y, the Wayne County

prosecutor’s office waived the bond requirement

and filed a forfeiture action in Way ne Cou nt y Circuit Court.

At the trial on the merits on June 22 , 2000, th e court determined

that Loch

was a n “innocent owner” of the Jeep because she was unaware of Bar

rett’s intent to use the car for procuringmarijuana. The c ourt c onclude d that Loch was 4 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. No. 01-1598

innocent of wrongdoing, ordered r eturn of the vehicle, and on
a motion for reconsideration of a decision to impose a $600 towing a nd storag e fee, r

uled that Loch was not re sponsible for th ose costs. The state appealed that judgment, and th e Michigan Court of Appeals ruled on the case on August 23, 20 0 2. People v. 1996 Jeep and Nichole Loch, Claimant Appellee , 652 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. App. 2002). Twenty days afte r the seizur e of th e vehicle in Barrett’s arrest, but before the forfeiture he ari ng in state court, Loch filed a complaint in federal district court. L och first made a claim under section 1983, claiming that Michigan’s Operation Push-Off violated the d ue pro cess clause of the Fo urt eenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution because it deprived individuals of forfeiture hearings and extortedsettlements from owners who wished to a void losing the vehicle s to lienholders. Loch made a second claim under section1983, alle ging that the City of Detroit and Way ne County failed to train their employe es adequately in the operation of the forfeiture, thus depriving Loch of due pr ocess and resulting in an unlawful seizure of property . Loch’s third section1983 clai

m alleg ed that th e forfe iture amo unted to taking of property w

ithout just compensation. Loch’s fourth section1983 claim alleged that police Serge ant Watkins ’s use of the forfeiture statute constituted an ab use of process

. Loch’s final claim arose out of state law, and she alleged that all of the def

endants c onspired

to conver

t the Jeep to

their possession.

Ev en tu al ly, Loch filed motions with the di strict court seeking declaratory

and injunctive relief and

leave to amend her complaint to add plaintiffs who could represent a class of litigant s challenging the forfeiture procedure. Th e municipalities and their employees r esponded by filing motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdictionunder Feder al Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The defendants claimed tha t the districtcourt sho

uld abstain from deciding the claims before it b ecause the federal proce edings involved clai m sNo. 01-1598 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. 5

inextrica bly i nt ertwined with the pending state forfeiture action.

The district cou rt gr anted the motions to dismiss, finding t hat the federal court should not invoke jurisdiction over Loch’s complaint during pendency of the stat e p roceed

ings, based upon principles of ab stent ion articulated in Rooker v

. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeal

s v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983); and Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The distr ict cour t also denied Loch’s motions for declara tory and injunc tive relief and leave to amend.

We review a

dismissal f

or la ck o f subject matter jurisdiction de novo

. Blakely v. United States , 276 F.3d 853, 863 (6th Cir. 2002). As to the review of the district court’s decisionto abstain, we said in United Stat es v. Commonwealth o

f Kentucky , 252 F.3d 816, 825 (6th Cir. 2001):

While w e norma lly review de novo a dist rict c ourt's decisionto abstain, see Fed. Express Corp. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv . Comm 'n , 925 F.2d 962, 96 7 (6th Cir.1991),
we have at l e ast on o ne occasion reviewed such a d ec ision for abuse of discretion, see Romine v. Compuserve Corp. , 160 F.3d 337, 341 , 343 (6th Cir.1998). As th e Se cond Circuit has noted, however, "there is little practical distinction between review for abuseof discretion and review de nov o " i n abstention cases, inasmuch

as the dis trict c ourt's d iscretion to abstain "is narrowed by

a fede ral c ourt's o

bligation to exercise its jurisdiction in all but the most extraordinary cases." Hachamovitch v . DeBu ono , 159 F.3d 687, 693 (2d Cir.1998).

As that case indicates, generally federal courts should not abstain from exercising jurisdiction o n abstention ground s, fo r abstention“is an extraordinar y and narrow exception to the duty of a Distr

ict Court t

o adjudica

te a cont roversy properl y 6 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. No. 01-1598

before it.” County of Allegheny v

. Frank Ma

shuda Co ., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959). Whena court does elect to abstain, the decis ion must be under “the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly se rve an important countervailing interest.” Id.

The Supreme Court has announced several cir cumstances whi ch q ualify

as except

ional and in which a

bstention is appropriate. One of these “doctrines” is applica ble to this
case. In Younger v. H

arris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971) , the Supre me Courtadvised f

ederal courts to abstain from d ecidi ng a matter that w ould be p roperly be fore them but for the pendency of state criminal proceedings in thematt er. Id . at 4 3-45 . We look at three factors to determine if Younger abstention is warranted: “(1) wh ether the underlying procee dings constitute
anongoing

state judi cial pro ceeding , (2) whe th er the p roc eedin gs implicate important state interests, and (3) whether there is an a dequat e opportu nity in the stat

e pro ceedin gs to raise a constitutional challenge.” Tinda ll v

. Wayne County Fri

end of the Court , 269 F.3d

533, 538 ( 6th Cir. 2001); see also Co oper v. P arrish , 203 F.3d 9 37, 954 (6th Cir. 2000) ; Zalman v. Armstrong , 802 F.2d 199, 201-02 (6th Cir. 1986).

First , wh en det ermin ing whe ther s tate c ourt p roceed ings involving the plaintiffs are pending, we look to see if the state court proceeding was pending at the time the federal complaint was filed. Zalman , 802 F.2d at 204 . It remains pending until a litigant has ex haustedhis state a ppellate remedie s. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. , 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975); Foster v. Kassulke , 898 F.2d 1144, 11 46 (6t h Cir. 1990). Loch arg ues that the state court proceeding was not pending when she filed her federal lawsuit because she filed her federal complaint four days be fore the state fil ed its complaint seekingforfeiture. She asserts that the state j udic ial procee dings had

not been initiated, so no ongoing proceeding would have given her

opportuni

ty to raise any constitutional challen ges in st ate cour t.No. 01-1598 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. 7

In Hicks v

. Miranda , 4 22 U.S. 332, 349 (1975), however, the Court held

“that w her e state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but

before any proceed ings of substa nce on the merits have taken p lace in the federal court, the principles of Younger v

. Harrisshould apply in full force.” Alth ough Loch argues that the state pro ceeding s had run t heir cou rse before the district court made i ts decision in March of 2001, she cannot be correct. The state of Michiga n a ppealed the judgment of the sta te court in the for feiture case, a nd the sta te appella te process was not complete whe n the d istrict court decided to abstain in the case, as is clea rfrom the A

ugust 2002 judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals in People

v

. 1996 Jeep and Nichole Loch, Claimant Appellee , 652 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. App. 2002).

As the Supreme Court said in Huffm an , 420 U.S. at 608, “[A]ll of the evils at which Younger is directed

would inhere i n feder al interv ention pr ior to comp letion of s tate app ellate procee dings, just

as surely as the

y would if such

intervention occurred at or before trial.” For that reason, we hold that the districtcourt was correct in assessing theproceedings before it as ong oing in the state c ourts.

Next we turn to the questions of “whether the procee dings implicate import a nt state interests, and whether there is an adequa te opportunity in the state procee dings to raise a constitutional challenge.” Tindall , 269 F.3d at 538. T hough Younger itself concerned abstention when a state crimi nal

m atter was pend

ing, the doctrine has been

interpre te d t o cautionagains t interfe

rence i n state c iv il matt ers. As the Supreme Court said in Juidice v. Vai l , 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977) ( interna

l citation s omitted) : [T]he more vita

l conside rati on b ehind the Younger doctrine of nonintervention lay not in the fac t that the st ate criminal process was involved but rather in th e notion of comity

, that is, a

proper r espect f or s tate function s, a recognition of the fact that the entire country 8 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. No. 01-1598

is made up of a Union of sepa rate sta te governments, and
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions intheir sep arate way s.
See also Middlesex

County Ethics Comm’n

. v

. Garden State Bar Ass’n , 457 U.S. 423 (1982 ); Kelm v

. Hyatt , 44 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 1995).

We find per su asiv e the Eig hth Circui

t’s persp ective in Postscript

Enterprises, Inc. v. Peach , 878 F.2d 1114, 11 16 (8th Cir. 1 989) , in which the court held that forfeiture procee dings are quasi-criminal in nature and of such a character as to warrant application of the Yo unger doctrine. “The state’s interest in these forfeiturepro ceeding s is likely to be as great as its interest in its criminal law proceeding s.” Id. Citi ng Huffman , 420 U.S. at 605 (internal citations omitted), the court in Postscript Enterprises said, “Under the Youn ger abstention doctrine the federal courts must abstain frominterfering with the effor ts o f states or local gover nments ‘to prot ectthe very interest s which un

derlie [their] criminal

laws and to obtain compliance with

precise ly the standards which

are embodied in [their] criminal laws.’” We find this reasoning persuasive. We believe tha t Michigan’s interest

in its forfeiture laws is directly cor related with its interest

in the enf orceme nt of the c riminal la ws. We further believe that there was no impediment to Loc h’s raising the constituti onal issue s of this casein the stat e proce edings. For these reasons, we believe Younger abstention is appropriate in this case.

It is crucial that we make clear that the district court’s decisionto abstain

fromhearing this case was appropria te at the time of the decision given the pen de ncy of the sta

te procee dings. Loch’s claims are ther efore dismissed

without prejudice, because

we decl ine to add

ress the ir merits, and she is free to raise any

and all of these claims in federal court when the state proceedings are fully completed.No. 01-1598 Loch v. W atkins, e t al. 9

Based on the fo regoing, we AFF IRM the judgment of the district c ourt.