THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Lance Antonio Brewton, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-001572 

Appeal From Spartanburg County 

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5912 

Heard November 10, 2021 – Filed May 25, 2022 

AFFIRMED 

Appellate Defender Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Columbia, 

for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 

Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, 

Jr., both of Columbia, and Solicitor Barry J. Barnette, of 

Spartanburg, all for Respondent. 

KONDUROS, J.: Lance Antonio Brewton appeals his convictions for murder and 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. Brewton 

contends the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on the lesser 

included offense of involuntary manslaughter and the defense of accident; (2) 

prohibiting his testimony regarding witchcraft and hearing voices in his head; and 

(3) allowing the State to impeach him with his 1999 robbery conviction. We 

affirm. 
 

 

FACTS 

On the morning of September 25, 2017, Brewton arrived at Natalie Niemitalo's 

house. Brewton and Niemitalo had been in an on-again, off-again relationship for 

two years. After their friend Kevin Schuerman arrived, the three decided to go 

purchase cigarettes and drinks. Niemitalo got into the driver's seat of her mother's 

black, two-door Honda Civic, Brewton got into the back seat on the passenger side, 

and Schuerman got into the passenger seat. 

Once in the car, Niemitalo began putting on makeup. After about five minutes, 

Brewton exited the car, walked around to the driver's side, and began arguing with 

Niemitalo because he wanted to drive. Shortly after the argument began, 

Schuerman heard a gunshot. Schuerman exited the car and ran towards Niemitalo's 

garage because he thought he had been shot. After Schuerman realized he had not 

been shot, he returned to the driveway and watched Brewton pull Niemitalo out of 

the car, get into the driver's seat, and drive away. 

Schuerman approached Niemitalo and saw she was gasping for air and in pain. 

Schuerman called 9-1-1 and held a towel on Niemitalo's wound until first 

responders arrived. While first responders were treating Niemitalo, Brewton drove 

by her house in the Honda Civic. Brewton drove by Niemitalo's house a second 

time, and an officer initiated a traffic stop by turning on his blue lights; however, 

Brewton continued driving for twenty-three miles. Officers apprehended Brewton 

after he collided with a vehicle in the driveway of his home. 

First responders airlifted Niemitalo to a hospital, but she died from a single 

gunshot wound. The doctor that performed Niemitalo's autopsy determined she 

bled to death after a bullet entered her upper-left torso and exited nine-and-a-half 

inches lower on the right side of her back. Police collected physical evidence 

associated with the shooting including the Honda Civic, Brewton's gun, a fired 

bullet, and a spent shell casing. Brewton was indicted for murder, possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a violent crime, escape, driving under 

suspension, and failure to stop when signaled by an officer using a blue light. 

A forensic psychologist evaluated Brewton and determined he was competent to 

stand trial for an unrelated federal weapons charge.1 In a pretrial motions hearing, 

the State presented Brewton's mental evaluation and moved to prevent him from 

1

 The incident leading to Brewton's federal conviction for "Possession of a Firearm 

by a Convicted Felon" occurred nine days before Niemitalo's death. 
 

presenting any evidence regarding mental illness or hearing voices. The State 

argued any testimony about mental illness or hearing voices would not be relevant 

because the forensic psychologist concluded Brewton did not have a mental illness 

and was competent to stand trial. Alternatively, the State contended that if the 

testimony was relevant, it would be highly prejudicial. 

Brewton argued he was not presenting the testimony about hearing voices as a 

defense for his actions; rather, Brewton argued he should be allowed to present the 

testimony as an alternative explanation to the State's assertion that he fled due to a 

guilty mind. Initially, the trial court indicated the testimony would not be relevant 

and would confuse the jury because Brewton did not suffer from a mental illness; 

however, the trial court delayed making a final determination until after Brewton 

proffered the testimony. 

Additionally, the State disclosed it planned to introduce Brewton's federal weapons 

conviction and two common law robbery convictions from 1999 and 2008. 

Brewton argued the federal weapons conviction was not relevant, but the State 

maintained it would preclude an accident jury instruction because Brewton was not 

allowed to possess a weapon. Brewton also moved to prevent the State from using 

any remote convictions; again, the trial court delayed making a final determination. 

Brewton proceeded to trial for murder and possession of a weapon during the 

commission of a violent crime after he pled guilty to escape, driving under 

suspension, and failing to stop when signaled by an officer. Schuerman testified 

that Brewton was "acting erratic" and "on edge" when he got to Niemitalo's house 

but recalled Brewton's behavior had not concerned him. Schuerman stated the 

argument between Brewton and Niemitalo was not out of the ordinary and 

elaborated he had seen Brewton and Niemitalo in worse arguments; however, 

Schuerman clarified he had never seen any violence during their arguments. 

Schuerman also testified he did not see Brewton with a gun the morning of 

Niemitalo's death. 

An expert in firearm examination, Chad Smith, testified the gun involved did not 

have an external safety mechanism, which is typically thought of as a button that 

would prevent the gun from firing. Smith explained the gun would fire once fiveand-a-half pounds of pressure was applied to its trigger, even if the pressure was 

applied unintentionally. Smith opined: 

The trigger guard is here . . . to guard that trigger from 

any kind of unintentional pressure against the trigger. 
 

But I suppose . . . something . . . could enter into the 

trigger guard . . . and if the firearm was pushed against 

that object and enough pressure . . . [was] exerted on that 

trigger, then it could fire. 

Still, Smith explained the gun would not fire unless its slide had been pulled back 

while it was loaded with ammunition. Smith testified he performed several tests 

on the weapon and concluded the recovered bullet and spent shell casing both 

came from Brewton's gun. 

At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, Brewton proffered his testimony 

regarding witchcraft and hearing voices in his head. Brewton testified he believed 

Niemitalo's mother and her friend Aaron2

 practiced witchcraft and one of them had 

cast a spell on him that caused him to hear the voices. Brewton admitted 

Niemitalo's mother denied practicing witchcraft and Niemitalo never told him her 

mother practiced witchcraft; nevertheless, Brewton believed Niemitalo's mother 

practiced witchcraft because he believed she had also cast a spell on Aaron and 

Niemitalo told him she knew about the voices. Brewton estimated he had 

intermittently been under a spell for eight or ten months. 

Brewton described "experiencing paranoia" at Niemitalo's house on the morning of 

her death because the voices were telling him his family was being murdered. 

Brewton explained he got in the car's back seat because the voices were telling him 

people were trying to kill him. Brewton testified that while the group was sitting 

in the car, he observed a cement truck drive past Niemitalo's house, and the voices 

told him it was going to bury his family alive. 

Brewton recalled he wanted to drive so he could follow the cement truck, and he 

felt that Niemitalo was not putting on her makeup "fast enough." Brewton stated 

he left Niemitalo's house to find the cement truck. Brewton explained he did not 

stop to check on Niemitalo the first time he drove by her house because 

paramedics were already there and he wanted to keep looking for the cement truck. 

Brewton testified he drove by Niemitalo's house a second time because he could 

not find the cement truck and the voices had stopped speaking to him. Brewton 

admitted he did not stop the second time because police officers were there and he 

had drugs in the car. 

2

 The record does not contain Aaron's surname. 
 

The State objected to Brewton's proffer at its conclusion and argued it was filled 

with hearsay, not relevant, and highly prejudicial if relevant. Brewton responded 

he had the absolute right to testify, the hearsay would be omitted in front of the 

jury, and the probative value of his testimony would not be substantially 

outweighed by unfair prejudice. Brewton insisted he should be allowed to give an 

alternative reason for leaving the scene other than a guilty mind. 

The trial court ruled Brewton could not testify about witchcraft or hearing voices. 

The trial court found Brewton's proffer was largely based on hearsay and the 

danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value because it 

seemed to give rise to an unasserted mental illness defense. Additionally, the trial 

court determined Brewton's right to testify was not violated because he was not 

entirely prevented from testifying. The trial court explained Brewton could testify 

he was fearful and felt like he needed to leave Niemitalo's house. 

After Brewton elected to testify,3

 the trial court ruled both of his robbery 

convictions were admissible because they were part of a "continuous course of 

conduct." The trial court also ruled that if the convictions were remote, their 

probative value substantially outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. Brewton 

argued his 1999 conviction was remote because it was a separate charge from his 

2008 conviction. The trial court reiterated Brewton's convictions were a 

continuous criminal history because they were similar offenses that all occurred 

without a passage of ten years. Brewton maintained his 1999 conviction was 

remote because he finished serving that sentence in 2004 and he would be 

testifying in 2018. Brewton also asserted the probative value of that conviction 

was outweighed by unfair prejudice because there was limited value in attacking 

his credibility. 

However, Brewton asked the trial court if his convictions would be referred to as 

common law robbery convictions or as crimes involving dishonesty. The State 

responded it was willing to refer to the convictions as crimes of dishonesty, and the 

trial court concluded the convictions would be referred to as crimes of dishonesty. 

Brewton did not object. 

3

 The record indicates Brewton stated "I will not testify" after the trial court 

prohibited him from testifying about witchcraft and the voices. However, this 

appears to be a scrivener's error because Brewton went on to testify and it was not 

mentioned on appeal. 
 

 

Brewton's testimony was mostly consistent with Schuerman's, but Brewton 

admitted he was not legally allowed to possess a weapon, he had been on a drug 

binge that made him unable to sleep for the three days preceding Niemitalo's death, 

and he had used drugs the morning of Niemitalo's death. Brewton also testified 

that his gun fell out of his pocket as he got out of the car. Brewton explained he 

kept the gun in his hand after he picked it up because he assumed Niemitalo was 

going to let him drive and he preferred to keep it in the car's center console while 

driving. 

Brewton maintained he did not intentionally kill Niemitalo and claimed "the gun 

went off" when Niemitalo pushed his hand back as he reached into the car to grab 

its keys. Brewton testified he did not stop when signaled by officers because he 

had drugs in the car. Brewton explained he drove all the way to his house because 

he was afraid officers would shoot him. At the end of his direct examination, 

Brewton admitted he had been convicted of two crimes of dishonesty. The State 

did not mention crimes of dishonesty during its cross-examination of Brewton. 

After the defense rested, Brewton requested the trial court instruct the jury on 

involuntary manslaughter and accident. The State objected and asserted (1) an 

involuntary manslaughter instruction was improper because Brewton was not 

armed in self-defense and (2) an accident instruction was improper because 

Brewton was not legally able to possess a weapon. Brewton argued that even 

though his possession of the gun was unlawful, it was not the proximate cause of 

Niemitalo's death. 

The trial court declined to instruct the jury on either involuntary manslaughter or 

accident. The trial court reasoned Brewton was acting unlawfully by possessing 

the gun and trying to take the car from Niemitalo. Additionally, the trial court 

concluded Brewton was not exercising reasonable care in handling the gun. 

Following jury deliberations, Brewton was convicted of murder and possession of 

a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced 

Brewton to life in prison without the possibility of parole. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v. 

Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "The conduct of a criminal 

trial is left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who will not be 

reversed in the absence of a prejudicial abuse of discretion." State v. Bryant, 372 

S.C. 305, 312, 642 S.E.2d 582, 586 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a 
 

trial court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of 

law." Id. 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

I. Jury Instructions 

Brewton argues the trial court erred by failing to give an involuntary manslaughter 

jury instruction because Brewton testified the shooting was unintentional and the 

record contained sufficient evidence Brewton acted recklessly in handling the gun. 

Brewton contends the trial court erred by failing to give an accident jury 

instruction because he testified the shooting was unintentional and the record 

contained sufficient evidence he used due care in handling the gun. Brewton 

maintains his illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude either jury instruction 

because his illegal possession did not proximately cause Niemitalo's death. We 

disagree. 

"[T]he trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South 

Carolina." State v. Marin, 415 S.C. 475, 482, 783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) 

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 

603 (2011)). "The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence 

presented at trial." State v. Brown, 362 S.C. 258, 261-62, 607 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. 

App. 2004) (quoting State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993)). 

"If there is any evidence to support a jury charge, the trial [court] should grant the 

request." Id. at 262, 607 S.E.2d at 95. "To warrant reversal, a trial [court]'s refusal 

to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the 

defendant." Id. 

Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of 

murder, and "is defined as the unintentional killing of 

another without malice while engaged in either (1) the 

commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a 

felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great 

bodily harm, or (2) the doing of a lawful act with a 

reckless disregard for the safety of others." 

State v. Scott, 414 S.C. 482, 487, 779 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2015) (quoting State v. 

Sams, 410 S.C. 303, 309, 764 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2014)). 
 

"If there is any evidence warranting a charge on involuntary manslaughter, then the 

charge must be given." State v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 216, 672 S.E.2d 786, 789 

(2009). "In determining whether to charge the lesser included offense of 

manslaughter[,] the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

defendant." State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 356, 701 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 

2010). "Declining to charge the lesser included offense is warranted when it 'very 

clearly appear[s] that . . . no evidence whatsoever [exists] tending to reduce the 

crime from murder to manslaughter.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. 

Brayboy, 387 S.C. 174, 179, 691 S.E.2d 482, 485 (Ct. App. 2010)). 

Additionally, "[f]or a homicide to be excusable on the ground of accident, it must 

be shown that the killing was unintentional, the defendant was acting lawfully, and 

due care was exercised in the handling of the weapon." Wharton, 381 S.C. at 216, 

672 S.E.2d at 789. "Evidence of an accidental discharge of a gun will support a 

charge of accident where the defendant lawfully arms himself in self-defense." Id. 

"[U]nlawful possession of a firearm can . . . constitute an unlawful activity . . . 

[that] preclude[s] an accident defense if it is the proximate cause of the killing." 

State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 262 n.5, 513 S.E.2d 104, 107 n.5 (1999). "[I]t 

would be incongruous not to apply this same reasoning in the context of 

involuntary manslaughter." Id. at 265, 513 S.E.2d at 109. "[T]he State [must] 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful act in which the [defendant] 

was engaged was at least the proximate cause of the homicide." Id. at 262, 513 

S.E.2d at 107 (quoting State v. Goodson, 312 S.C. 278, 280 n.1, 440 S.E.2d 370, 

372 n.1 (1994)). 

The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to involuntary manslaughter and 

accident jury instructions despite unlawfully possessing a firearm was developed in 

Goodson and Burriss. In Goodson, our supreme court determined the illegally 

armed defendant was not entitled to an accident jury instruction. 312 S.C. at 281, 

440 S.E.2d at 372. In that case, the defendant was drinking while playing pool at a 

bar and got into an argument with another player over a bet. Id. at 279, 440 S.E.2d 

at 371. The other player threatened the defendant with a pool stick, and the 

defendant responded by drawing a gun from his pocket. Id. The bar's owner 

intervened and escorted the defendant outside. Id. While outside, the defendant 

shot and killed the owner. Id. at 279, 440 S.E.2d at 371-72. The defendant 

claimed the gun "just went off" as the owner approached him. Id. at 279, 440 

S.E.2d at 372. 
 

The Goodson court rejected the State's proposition that unlawful possession of a 

firearm always precluded an accident jury instruction. Id. at 280 n.1, 440 S.E.2d at 

372 n.1. The Goodson court noted the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

the defendant's unlawful act proximately caused the homicide. Id. However, the 

Goodson court reasoned the defendant was not entitled to an accident jury 

instruction because he did not present any evidence that he was lawfully acting in 

self-defense. Id. at 281, 440 S.E.2d at 372. 

In a concurring opinion, Justice Toal stated she would have held the defendant was 

not entitled to an accident jury instruction because he was not lawfully armed when 

he shot the victim. Id. at 281, 440 S.E.2d at 372-73 (Toal, J., concurring). Justice 

Toal reasoned any right the defendant had to be armed due to the dispute with the 

other pool player ended when the owner removed him from that situation. Id. at 

282, 440 S.E.2d at 373 (Toal, J. concurring). Still, Justice Toal agreed with the 

majority that the defendant's unlawful possession must have proximately caused 

the victim's injury to preclude an accident jury instruction. Id. (Toal, J., 

concurring). Justice Toal concluded "where, as here, the defendant unlawfully 

possesses a firearm, has been drinking heavily all day, and kills the [victim] with 

the unlawful firearm, the unlawful possession of the firearm is a proximate cause 

of the injury." Id. (Toal, J., concurring). 

In Burriss, our supreme court held the illegally armed defendant was entitled to 

involuntary manslaughter and accident jury instructions. 334 S.C. at 264-65, 513 

S.E.2d at 109. In that case, two men attempted to rob the defendant. Id. at 258, 

513 S.E.2d at 106. After the attackers threw the defendant to the ground, the 

defendant drew a gun from his pocket and fired two shots into the ground. Id. at 

258-59, 513 S.E.2d 106. The attackers initially backed away, but one of the 

attackers advanced again as the defendant was getting up. Id. at 259, 513 S.E.2d 

106. When the defendant picked up his gun, it fired a shot that killed the 

advancing attacker. Id. 

The Burriss court agreed with Justice Toal's analysis in her Goodson concurrence 

and clarified Goodson as holding "unlawful possession of a firearm can . . . 

constitute an unlawful activity . . . [that] preclude[s] an accident defense if it is the 

proximate cause of the killing." Id. at 262 n.5, 513 S.E.2d at 107 n.5. The Burriss 

court reasoned "a person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in unlawful 

possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense at the 

time of the shooting." Id. at 262, 513 S.E.2d at 108. Further, the Burriss court 

determined "it would be incongruous not to apply this same reasoning in the 

context of involuntary manslaughter." Id. at 265, 513 S.E.2d at 109. The Burriss 
 

 

 

 

court concluded the defendant was entitled to both accident and involuntary 

manslaughter jury instructions because evidence in the record supported his claim 

that he was lawfully armed in self-defense when the shooting occurred. Id. at 

262-63, 265, 513 S.E.2d at 108-09. 

Here, the trial court did not err by refusing to give involuntary manslaughter or 

accident jury instructions. Brewton directs this court to State v. Slater4 and State v. 

Williams5

 as support for his proposition that his illegal possession of a weapon did 

not preclude involuntary manslaughter or accident jury instructions. However, we 

find those cases inapplicable because they revolved around whether the defendants 

were lawfully armed in self-defense. See Slater, 373 S.C. at 71, 644 S.E.2d at 53 

(noting "where the defendant's unlawful possession of a weapon is merely 

incidental to the defendant's lawful act of arming himself in self-defense, the 

unlawful possession of the weapon will not prevent the use of an accident 

defense"); Williams, 427 S.C. at 254 n.4, 830 S.E.2d at 908 n.4 (clarifying "the 

question is whether [the weapon] is the proximate cause of the 'difficulty' or 

'occasion' that led to the killing" in determining whether a defendant is precluded 

from a self-defense jury instruction). 

In stark contrast to the defendants' arguments in Goodson, Burriss, Slater, and 

Williams, Brewton does not argue he was lawfully armed in self-defense. Indeed, 

this record contains no evidence Brewton was defending himself at the time of the 

shooting. Brewton and Schuerman both testified Brewton and Niemitalo were 

arguing but not physically fighting. Further, Brewton testified the gun fired when 

Niemitalo pushed his hand back as he reached for the car keys; Brewton did not 

testify that Niemitalo attempted to take or control the gun. Consequently, like the 

defendant in Goodson, Brewton presented no evidence he was lawfully armed in 

self-defense. 

Therefore, the dispositive question of this issue is whether Brewton's illegal 

possession proximately caused Niemitalo's death; we determine it did. Like the 

defendant in Goodson, Brewton admitted he was unlawfully handling a loaded 

firearm while intoxicated. Brewton testified he had been on an illegal drug binge 

that prevented him from sleeping the three days preceding Niemitalo's death; 

Brewton also admitted he used illegal drugs the morning of Niemitalo's death.6 

Additionally, Brewton testified the gun fell out of his pocket as he got out of the 

4

 373 S.C. 66, 644 S.E.2d 50 (2007). 

5

 427 S.C. 246, 830 S.E.2d 904 (2019).

6

 The record indicates the shooting also occurred during the morning hours. 
 

 

car, he held the gun in his hand while arguing with Niemitalo, and he still held the 

gun in his hand when he reached into the car to take its keys. Further, Brewton 

held a gun that would fire once it had five-and-a-half pounds of pressure applied to 

its trigger, even if that pressure was unintentional. Finally, like the defendant in 

Goodson, Brewton's illegally possessed gun fired the shot that killed Niemitalo. 

Therefore, Brewton's unlawful possession proximately caused Niemitalo's death. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to refuse to instruct the jury on 

involuntary manslaughter and accident.7 

II. Brewton's Proffered Testimony 

Brewton asserts the trial court erred by prohibiting him from testifying about 

witchcraft and hearing voices. Brewton contends he should have been able to 

testify the voices caused him to flee the scene after the shooting. Brewton argues 

that testimony was relevant to rebut the State's assertion that he fled the scene due 

to a guilty conscience, which allowed the jury to infer malice. Brewton insists his 

inability to explain the cause of his flight to the jury in his own words violated his 

fundamental right to testify in his own defense. We disagree. 

"[A]n exception to the trial court's ruling will be deemed abandoned where the 

appellant fails to specifically argue it in his brief." State v. Black, 319 S.C. 515, 

518 n.2, 462 S.E.2d 311, 313 n.2 (Ct. App. 1995). "[S]hort, conclusory statements 

made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore 

not presented for review." State v. Jones, 392 S.C. 647, 655, 709 S.E.2d 696, 700 

(Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 

81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001)). "[A]n unappealed ruling, right or 

wrong, is the law of the case." Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 

398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012); see also State v. Williams, 427 

S.C. 148, 157, 829 S.E.2d 702, 706-07 (2019) (explaining an unappealed jury 

instruction became the law of the case). 

Here, the trial court limited the scope of Brewton's testimony to prohibit the jury 

from hearing about witchcraft and hearing voices because it determined his 

testimony (1) was largely based on hearsay and (2) would result in unfair prejudice 

by confusing the jury. The trial court also determined prohibiting Brewton from 

7

 Additionally, Brewton was precluded from an accident jury instruction because 

he was not exercising due care in handling the weapon. See Wharton, 381 S.C. at 

216, 672 S.E.2d at 789 (stating a defendant must have been exercising due care in 

handling the weapon for a homicide to be excusable by accident). 
 

testifying about witchcraft and hearing voices did not violate his right to testify 

because Brewton was not entirely prohibited from testifying; indeed, Brewton 

testified in his own defense. 

While Brewton objected to the trial court's ruling on all grounds, he only argues on 

appeal that his right to testify was violated. Brewton's brief provides no authority 

regarding the trial court's ruling that Brewton's proffered testimony was largely 

based on hearsay and would result in unfair prejudice. Consequently, Brewton 

abandoned his arguments that his proffered testimony was not hearsay and would 

not result in unfair prejudice. As a result, the trial court's ruling that Brewton's 

proffered testimony was hearsay and unfairly prejudicial became the law of the 

case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to prohibit Brewton from 

testifying about witchcraft and hearing voices. 

III. Impeachment 

Brewton asserts the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with his 

1999 common law robbery conviction. Brewton contends that conviction was 

remote because his sentence expired in 2004 and he testified in 2018. 

Additionally, Brewton argues the trial court did not conduct the required State v. 

Colf 8 analysis. We disagree. 

"To preserve an issue for review[,] there must be a contemporaneous objection that 

is ruled upon by the trial court." State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58, 609 S.E.2d 

520, 523 (2005). An appellant is barred from arguing an issue on appeal if trial 

"counsel acquiesced [to a ruling] . . . and made no other objections regarding [that 

ruling] . . . ." State v. Mitchell, 330 S.C. 189, 195, 498 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1998); see 

also State v. McKinney, 258 S.C. 570, 190 S.E.2d 30 (1972) (finding the appellant 

waived his objection to certain testimony by cross-examining a witness regarding 

that testimony without reserving his previous objection). 

Brewton ultimately waived for appellate review his contention the trial court erred 

by allowing the State to impeach him with his 1999 common law robbery 

conviction. Brewton initially objected to the trial court's ruling that the State could 

impeach him with his 1999 conviction and argued it was remote. However, 

Brewton asked if his convictions would be referred to by their name or as crimes of 

dishonesty. The State agreed to refer to both convictions as crimes of dishonesty, 

8

 337 S.C. 622, 525 S.E.2d 246 (2000). 
and the trial court allowed both convictions to be referred to as crimes of 

dishonesty. Critically, Brewton did not object or reserve his previous objection. 

Brewton testified on direct examination he had been convicted of two crimes of 

dishonesty. Before the parties presented their closing arguments, Brewton 

renewed all of his objections; however, the record indicates the trial court did not 

respond. In its closing argument, the State referred to Brewton's convictions as 

crimes of dishonesty. Again, Brewton did not object. Consequently, Brewton 

waived his objection that his 1999 conviction was remote because he acquiesced to 

referring to it as a crime of dishonesty. 

CONCLUSION 

In short, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on involuntary 

manslaughter and accident. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prohibit 

Brewton's proffered testimony became the law of the case. Finally, Brewton failed 

to preserve for appellate review the trial court's decision to allow the State to 

impeach him with his 1999 conviction. Accordingly, Brewton's convictions for 

murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime are 

AFFIRMED. 

HILL and HEWITT, JJ., concur.