NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________
No. 21

- 3269

________________ ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY; AMINAH SINGLETARY; LATIESHA SINGLETARY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY

v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; POLICE OFFICER ROBERT SCHUTTE; CHARLES RAMSEY; POLICE OFFICER MICHAEL NAVEDO; RICHARD ROSS; POLICE OFFICER JENNIFER GRESHAM;

POLICE OFFI C ER OWEN SCHAEFFER

Police Officer Robert Schutte; Police Officer Michael Navedo; Police Officer Jennifer Gresham; Police Officer Owen Schaeffer,
Appellants

________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D. C. No. 2

- 1 9

- cv

- 0 0 1 9 0 ) District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge

________________ Argued on January 12, 2023 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS and ROTH
, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : August 10, 2023 )
Craig R. Gottlieb ( ARGUED ) City of Philadelphia Law Department 1515 Arch Street, 17 th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellants2

Christopher Markos ( ARGUED ) Willia m s Cedar One South Broad Street Suite 1510 Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellees

________________
OPINION *

________________

RO TH
, Circuit Judge

Ronald Singletary was fatally shot by law enforcement in a bedroom of his
Philadelphia boarding house. His personal representatives filed state and federal civil
rights claims against numerous parties, including fo ur police officers (Officers). The

Officers ask us to review the District Court’s denial, at summary judgment, of their
entitlement to qualified immunity. For the following reasons, we lack jurisdiction of this
appeal

.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Philadelphia Police Policy Directive 10.7 is intended to “help identify a ‘ barricaded

person ,’ hostage taker, or Severely Mentally Disabled Person (SMDP) and instruct police
personnel in the proper tactics and procedures in order to remove such an individu al and
safeguard the personal well

- being of all concerned.” 1 The policy establishes that a person

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

1 JA009 ( citing Compl. ¶ 19; Ex. A to Pl.’s Compl.)

.3

who “has indicated by action or implication that he/she may have a weapon and refuses to
cooperate with police commands” is generally considered a barricaded person, and sets

forth procedures for police to follow in this situation

. 2

On May 12, 2017, polic e were called to Ronald Singletary’s boarding house to arrest
him for violating a protective order obtained against him by a companion. 3 Upon arrival,
Officer Schutte found the companion outside
, and observed Singletary inside at an upstairs

window, from which Singletary called down “that Officer Schutte would ‘have to call
SWAT and all the cops . . . because he’s not going without a fight.’” 4 The companion
informed Schutte that Singletary had knives in the room, and Schutte called additional

officers t o the scene. Officers Schutte and Navedo entered the residence and went upstairs
, where they observed Singletary enter a bedroom with a knife. Meanwhile, Officers
Gresham and Schaeffer arrived and followed Schutte and Navedo up the stairs. Schutte

then kicked in Singletary’s bedroom door
, Navedo tased Singletary
, and Schutte fatally
shot him. None of the Officers designated the situation as a barricade per Policy Directive

10.7

. A Philadelphia Police Department Lieutenant assigned to the Internal Affai rs

Division later testified that
, under the policy
, at least one Officer should have done so.
The parties dispute the particulars of these events, and the Officers

— the only
eyewitnesses to the interactions with Singletary

— provided contradictory testimony. As

the District Court observed, “ [t] he Defendant Officers here offer markedly different

2 JA009 ( citing Compl. ¶ 19; Ex. A to Pl.’s Compl.)

. 3 Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the facts and proceedings only to the extent necessary to resolve this matter.
4 JA007 (quoting ECF No. 50

- 4 at 17)

.4

accounts of what happened during the pivotal seconds before Singletary’s death.” 5

Crucially, the Officers presented conflicting accounts of how and why they stormed the
bedroom and whether Singletary “lunged” at them with a knife after Officer Schutte kicked

in the door. 6
Singletary’s personal representatives ( the Singletarys) filed claims against
numerous parties. Relevant to this appeal, these included federal excessive force claims
against the Officers. 7 On the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court
found “the record reveals a genuine dispute of material fa cts as to whether the Defendant

Officers used excessive force.” 8 These material facts included “whether the Defendant

Officers ’ failure to conform to established police policy and storm the door, when
Singletary was neither a flight risk nor a risk to ot hers, was a proximate cause of
Singletary’s shooting
, ” 9 and whether Ronald Singletary lunged at the Officers with a knife.

The court found t hat t hese issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on qualified
immunity, where the officers “knowingly violated police policy [and] there are significant
factual inconsistencies that call into question the application of force and whether the

5 JA034.
6 JA007

– 08, 10

– 11.
7 The Singletarys commenced this action in the Phil adelphia Court of Common Pleas by Writ of Summons, and the defendants removed it to federal court. W ith respect to the Officers, the Singletarys sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging constitutional violations based on use of excessive force and state

- crea ted danger . They additionally brought claims for assault and battery under Pennsylvania state law. The Singletarys alleged an additional federal excessive force claim against Officer Schutte alone. The District Court granted partial summary judgment to the Officers on the Singletarys’ state

- created danger and failure to train claims.
8 JA024.
9 JA024.5

Defendant Officers were acting in self

- defense.” 10 Accordingly, the c ourt found the
Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claims as a matter
of law. The Officers appealed.

II. Discussion
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

. Under the collateral

order doctrine, 11 pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
, we may exercise limited jurisdiction over
an interlocutory order “to the extent that [the order] turns on an issue of law

. ” 12 Therefore,

we may review “whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to
establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right,” but not “whether the
district court correctly identified the set of facts that the summary judgment record is
sufficient to prove.” 13 We recognize only a narrow exception to this limited jurisdiction in

such cases: “[W]here the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to reasonable

10 JA038.
11 T he collateral order doctrine maintains that “ an interlocutory order is immediately appealable as a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of § 1291 if it ‘[1] conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Dougherty v. Sch. D ist. of Phila. , 772 F.3d 979, 985

– 86 (3d Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995) ).
12 Id. at 986 ( citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526

– 530 (1985)).
13 Id . (quoting Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002) ) ; see also Williams

v. City of York , 967 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2020) (asserting this Court “ lack [ s ] jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity when ‘the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” i ssue of fact for trial’”) (quoting Johnson , 515 U.S. at 320); Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those issues must be determined by the jury.”)

.6

dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false , a court of appeals may say so, even on
interlocutory review.” 14

The Officers argue that this exception to our limited jurisdiction applies here.
Specifically, the Officers contend that the District Court reached the “factual conclusion”
that Singletary did not lunge at the Officers with the knife, and that this conclusion was
“blatantly” wrong because the Singletarys admitted the lunge in their Complaint and Local

Rule 56.1 statement. 15 In light of this purported concession, the Officers argue that the trial
court’s contrary determination

— that the fact of the lunge remains at issue

— is blatantly
and demonstrably false.
This argument is unavailing. 16 The text of Federal Rule of Civil Proc edure 56,
which governs summary judgments, implies that a district court is not bound by the parties’
factual stipulations when those stipulations are contradicted by the record. As an initial
matter, nothing in the rule states that a district court is so bound; rather, the rule requires
that the moving party “show[],” i.e., convince, the district court that “there is no genuine

14 Williams , 967 F.3d at 258 (quoting Blaylock v. City of Phila.
, 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007) ).
15 Officers’ Br. at 20
, 23

– 25; see JA 52

– 53 (Officers’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 44

– 53); JA 57

– 58 (Singletarys’ Statement in Opposition ¶ 44

– 53). The Officer s also cite a line from the Singletarys’ Complaint, which the Officers construe as an ad mission of the same. See JA 372 (Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 49). This line is ambiguously drafted, however, and could be read to plead only that the Officers claimed Sin gletary lunged.
16 We observe that the Officers appear to misstate the District Court’s conclusions. The court did not make a “determination that Singletary did not lunge.” Officers Br. 2. Rather, consistent with its obligations at summary judgment, the court found a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non

- moving party (i.e., the Singletarys) on this issue, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

non

- moving party’s favor. See JA017, 24, 25, 28

.7

dispute as to any material fact[.]” 17 Additionally, the rule provides that “[t]he court need
consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” 18

Because Rule 56 permits the District Court to review the entire record, and because nothing
in the rule prevents the District Court from discounting a party’s stipulation when it is
contradicted by the record, we should not impose an extra

- textual limitation on Rule 56

that would circumscribe the District Court’s discretion. Indeed, this case underscores the
advantage of allowing the district court such leeway, as the decedent is unavailable to

contest the Officers’ factual account. 19

17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a ). See Doeblers ’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler , 442 F.3d 812 , 820 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (“ ‘ [A] district court may not rely solely on the statement of undisputed facts ’ . . . . This admonition applies with equal force to this Court on appeal. ” ) (quoting Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1

– 800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) )

. 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
19 As the Dissent notes, we have long recognized that judicial admissions “are concessions in pleadings or briefs” and “bind the party who makes them.” Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt , 455 F.3d 195, 211 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). But we also gave some meaningful context and nuance to that rule when we said that, where there is “no evidence contradicting [an] admission,” and “no compelling reason” to contradict the plain meaning of an admission, a district court cannot contradict the admit ted fact, and the admission necessarily “narrows the trial issues in the case[.]” Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. Div. of the BOC Grp., Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund of Phila. & Vicinity , 850 F.2d 1028, 1036

– 37 (3d Cir. 1988). Our dissenting colleague would read our precedent as saying that an ill

- chosen word in court filing s overcomes any and all other evidence in the factual record, no matter how compelling. We do not believe our precedent so rigid that it requires that result. On the contrary, as suggested in Airco , if a district court finds a compelling reason to discoun t a party’s admission, the court should be free to do so. Here, the District Court found evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that the Officers attempted to contrive a false account of what transpired in Singletary’s bedroom before Officer Schutte shot Singletary. We do not mean to imply that such a suspicion will turn out to be well

- founded; only that it is not unreasonable on this record and so is a sufficient basis for the District Court to look past the admission.8

Such is the case here. As the District Court explained, the record reflects the
Officers’ conflicting testimon ies concerning Ronald Singletary’s actions prior to the
shooting. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Si ngletarys, as proper at summary
judgment, th e Officers’ testimon y do es not clearly support the conclusion that Singletary
lunged at them with a knife. Moreover, we advise district courts to “be cautious on
summary judgment to ‘ensure that the officer is n ot taking advantage of the fact that the
witness most likely to contradict his story

— the person shot dead

— is unable to testify

. [T]he court may not simply accept what may be a selfserving account by the officer.’” 20

Thus , the District Court exercised appropriate caution by reviewing the record
independently rather than facially accepting the noted assertions. Because the record does

not show that the District Court’s finding with respect to the lunge was blatantly and

de monstrably false, we lack jurisdiction to review it

. The Officers’ remaining arguments assume that we find Singletary lunged at the
Officers with a knife. Because such a finding is beyond our jurisdiction, we neither
consider nor address their remaining arguments.

III. Conclusion

For th e foregoing reasons, w e will dismiss the Officers’ appeal.

20 Abraham v. Raso , 183 F.3d 27 9, 294 (3d Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) )

.1

Estate of Ronald Singletary v. City of Philadelphia , No. 21

- 3269 PHIPPS, Circuit Judge
, dissenting

. In declin ing jurisdiction over this appeal, the Majority Opinion validates the

Di s trict Court’s disregard of two judicial admissions made by the Estate of Ronald
Singletary

. But the District Court erred in overriding those admissions, and such an error
does not shield the denial of qualified immunity from appellate review.

Both admissions unequivocally confirm the same under lying fact : that Singletary
lunged
, with a knife
, at officers attempt ing to arrest him for violating a protection from

abuse order , which was issued based on allegations that he had choked a woman. First, the Estate’s own complaint alleges that “[Singletary] then walked toward Officer Navedo

and lunged with the knife . Officer S [c] hutte then shot Singletary twice.” Compl. ¶ 48
(App. 372) (emphasis added)

. Second, the Estate admitted the paragraph i n the officers’

statement of material facts to the same effect : Defendants’ Statement, Paragraph 49: [Singletary] then charged at the officers with the knife in an overhead motion.

Plaintiffs ’ Response, Paragraph 49: Admitted.

See Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 49 (App. 52) (emphasis added) ; Pl s .’ Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 49
(App. 58).

T his Circ u it has long recognized that judicial admission s are “ binding. ” Berckeley

Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt , 455 F.3d 195, 211 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2006) ( collecting cases)

. S tatements in pleading s are judicial admissions by the party making the statement

. See
Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc. , 368 F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining
that no factfinding was necessary because the plaintiff “conceded” the dispositive facts “in her complaint”) ; see also 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al.
, McCormick on Evid ence § 2572

(8th ed. July 2022 update ) (explaining th at statements in pleadings “are conclusive” as
judicial admissions). So are fact ual admissions used as evidence at summary judgment.

See Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. Div. of the BOC Grp., Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare

Pension Fund of Phila. & Vicinity
, 850 F.2d 1028, 1037 (3d Cir. 1988) (“This admission
is not merely another layer of evidence, upon which the district court can superimpose its own assessment of weight and validity.”); see also Federal Trial Objections § J30 (7th

ed. Oct. 2020 update ) (“[A ] judicial admission is binding on the party making it and cannot be subsequently contradicted at trial or on appeal.”).

T his Circuit has previously relied on judicial admissions to decide excessive force

cases

. See Williams v. City of York
, 967 F.3d 252, 262

– 63 (3d Cir. 2020) (immunizing officers in excessive force case where, “most importantly, in [the arrestee’s] summary
judgment briefing, she conceded she cannot establish that any of the Officers were personally involved in the violations”). E very other federal appellate court with
jurisdiction over such claims 1 has done the same

– sometimes using a victim’s admission
against the victim, sometimes using a law enforcement officer’s admission against the

officer

. 2 Thus, it was error for the District Court to override the two judicial admission s

1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1294; cf. id. § 1295 (defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).

2 See Est ate of Rahim v. Doe , 51 F.4th 402, 407, 412, 414 n.12 (1st Cir. 2022) ( relying on counsel’s admission that the deceased “had a knife”); Jeffreys v. City of New York
, 426 F.3d 549, 555 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) ( relying on arrestee’s “multiple admissions” that “were neither ambiguous, confusing, nor incomplete” ); Pegg v. Herrnberg er , 845 F.3d 112 , 120 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2017) ( relying on response to request for admission that “Admitted” resistance to arrest); Linicomn v. Hill , 902 F.3d 529, 540 & n.9 (5th Cir

. 2018) ( relying on “admission of the facts” submitted in response to the Answer); Jones v. City of Elyria
, 947 F.3d 905, 917 (6th Cir. 20 2 0) ( relying on officers’ “own admission” that they tackled , struck, and tased the victim ); O ’ Malley v. Litscher , 465 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 2006) ( relying on inmate ’s “ conce [ssion] that he told staff he would [resist]”); McManemy v. Tierney , 970 F.3d 1034, 10 38 (8th Cir. 2020) ( relying on arrestee’s “admissions ,” which would “ take on central importance”); Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange
,3

and conclude that without those admissions there was a genuine dispute of material fact

about excessive force

. The Majority Opini on recasts my position as being that “a n ill

- chosen word in
court filing s ” c ould “overcome[] any and all other evidence in the factual record, no matter how compelling.” Maj

. Op. at n. 1 9

. But that is not the case here

. The admitted

fact had a solid grounding in the record as the four officers all agreed: Singletary lunged

with a knife. 3 Thus, this case is not about an inadvertent mistake that should not receive
dispositive weight; it involves nearly identical judicial admissions made on two separat e occasions in court filings upon which courts are expected to rely

. B ecause the two admissions eliminate any dispute of material fact and place this
matter in the heartland of qualified immunity, the District Court should have entered
summary judgment in the officers’ favor. See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan
, 575 U.S. 600, 605

– 06, 613 (2015) (immunizing officers applying deadly force in
bedroom where the deceased threatened them with a knife); Reese v. Cnty. of

351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003 ) ( relying on supervisory officer’s admission that “ he observed the deputies struggling with [the] victim ” ); Hinton v. City of Elwood , 997 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir. 1993) ( relying on arrestee ’s “ admi [ssion]

. . . t hat he was actively and open ly resisting . . . attempts to handcuff him, even to the extent of biting the officers ”); Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep ’ t , 783 F.3d 1347, 135 6 (11th Cir. 2015) ( relying
on arrestee ’s “conce [ssion] that he had refused to surrender his hands” ); DeGraff v. District of Columbia
, 120 F.3d 298, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (relying on arrestee’s admission at a deposition that “she had not suffered any physical injury” to limit her claim to “mental and emotional injuries”).

3 See Officer Schaeffer Interview (App. 469) (“[H]e had the knife in his hand, I forget which hand. He got up, screamed, and went towards Nevado and that’s when [Officer] Schutte discharged his weapon twice.”); Officer Navedo Interview (App. 474) (“He lun ged at me again with the knife making the same kind of jabbing motion. At that point Officer Schutte discharged two times into his lower torso with his firearm.”); Officer Gresham Interview (App. 532) (“[H]e immediately popped back up, still holding the k nife and again charged towards our direction.”); Officer Schutte Interview (App. 563) (“He proceeded to rush toward us with the knife in an overhand position and I discharged my weapon twice.”).4

Sacramento , 888 F.3d 1030, 1038

– 3 9 (9th Cir. 2018) (immunizing officer applying
deadly force in apartment after the deceased held “a knife in his hand in an elevated position”); cf. Brown v. United States , 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ( “Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.”); Johnson v. City of
Philadelphia , 837 F.3d 343, 346

– 47, 352 (3d Cir. 2016) ( dismissing a claim against an
officer who appl ied deadly force after the deceased survived a taser a nd then attacked,

reach ing for the officer’s service weapon )

. To correct that error, I would have exercised
jurisdiction over this appeal and reversed the denial of summary judgment . For that

reason, I respectfully dissent.