### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 4, 200 4, S es sio n

HER MA N T AY LORv. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 00-209-II Car ol L. McCoy, Chancellor

No. M2002- 02608-COA-R 3-CV - F iled March 17, 2005

Th is i s a n a c tio n f

or br e a c h o f c on tr a c t f

ile d b y Pla int if f/ Con tr a c tor

a g a ins t th e Sta te , to g e the r w ith a Counterc laim and a Third- Party Complaint aga i n s t the surety company for Plaintiff/Contractor

. The trial c ourt g rante d parti al s ummary judgme nt to Pl aintiff as to liability beca use the State ha d failed to c omply

with the require ments of Tenne s s ee R u l e of Civi l Procedure 56 in answering Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment. After

much proce dural combat, the trial court adher ed to its ruling on the Motion for Summary J udg ment, dismiss ed the Third-Party Complaint against the surety and the Counterclaim of the S tate ag ainst Plainti ff, he ld that Plainti ff ha d failed to prove any damag es ag ainst the State, and sustained the M o t i o n o f the State for an involuntary dismiss al of Plaintiff’s entire c laim, tax ing the costs to Plain t i ff

. W e fi nd that the trial court erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt to Pl aintiff as to liability without considering document at i o n and evide nce submitt ed by the State subsequent to the initial non-f inal order g ranting partial summary judgme nt

a s to lia bil ity . It fo llo ws that the c ou rt a lso e rr e d indis mis sin g the Cou nte rc la im a ndthe Th ir d- Part y Complaint aga inst the surety . The g rant of pa rtial summary judgme nt as to liabilit y is rever sed, and the c a se is r e ma nd e d to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r t ri a l on the me ri ts.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Re verse d

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J
., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J
., M.S., and H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., joined.

G. Kline Preston, I V, Nashville, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Herman B . Tay lor.

Paul G . Su mme rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Mo or e , Sol ic ito r G e ne ra l; S. El iza be th Martin, Sr. Counsel; and Wil liam J . Mare tt, J r., for the third-party

appellants, S tate of Te nnessee
a ndTh e B oa

rdof Re g e nts

.

Br ett A. Oe s er, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, N orth Americ an Specia lty I nsuranc e C o m p a n y.

OP IN ION-2-

I n this brea ch of c ontrac t action, it is necessa ry to set forth a de tailed chr onology of the proce dural history

evidenc ed by

the trial court proce eding s.

Herman B . Tay lor, d/b/a Herman Tay l o r Construction Company , filed suit on J anuary 20, 2000, ag ainst the State of Tennessee and The Boa rd of Reg ents in the Chance ry Court of Davidson County . His claim was ba sed on a Ma rch 5, 1996, c ontrac t to r enovate an addition to the Tennesse e Te c hn olo g y Ce nte r loc a te d in Di c ks on , T e nn e sse e . H e a lle g e d n e g lig e nc e on the pa rt of De fe nd a nts beca use the a rchitec t improperly

desig ned p o rt i o n s of the proje ct causing de lay s in the project, a s well as a dditional ex pense. H e further a lleg ed that, on May 17, 1997, he wa s wrong fully terminated

a ndsu ff e re d d a ma g e s in the a mou nt o f $ 73 6,32 3. 53
, fo r w hic h h e de ma nd e d ju dg me nt a g a ins t De fe nd a nts

. On April 5, 2000, De fenda nts answer ed asse rting numerous def enses a nd essentially

denying

a ny lia bil ity to P la int if

f. De fe nd a nts the n a sse rt e d a Cou nte rc la im a g a ins t Pla int if f anda Th ir d- Part y Complaint

a g a ins t N orth A me ri c a n Spe c ia lty I ns ur a nc e Compa ny , s ur e ty fo r P la int if

f o n th e pr oje c t. T h i s C o u n t er cl ai mas s er t ed m at er i al b re ac h es o f co n tra ct b y P l ai n t i ff i n fa i l i n g t o p ro p er l y m an age the pr oje c t, f

a ili ng to pr ov ide qu a lif

ie d wo rk e rs , faili ng to pay so me su bc on tr a c tor s a ndsu pp lie rs , and fa iling to abide by

projec t scheduling . This Counterclaim and Third- Party Complaint asserted th a t P lain ti f

f /C o u n te r D e f e n d a n t an d T h ir d

- Pa

r ty D e f e n d a n t w e r e jo in tl y

li ab le to th e St a te f

or damag es in the amount of $1, 0 4 5
, 3 5 1.50. On J uly 6, 2000, Herman Taylor and North America n Spe c ia lty I ns ur a nc e Compa ny a ns we re d the se c ha rg e s a g a ins t the m de nying a ny lia bil ity to the Sta te of Tenne ssee.
On May 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sum mary J udg ment on the Countercla im of Def endant a nd on the issue of liability in Plaintiff’s Complaint. This Motion was supported by the Af fi da vit of He rm a n T a y lor

tog e the r w ith a

Sta te me nt o f U nd isp utedMate ri a l F a c ts w ith sp e c if ic

re fe re nc e to the re c or d to su pp ort su c h f a c ts.

The re spo n s e o f t he State to this Motion for Summ ary J udg ment did not comply with the provisions of Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 56, and such failure was of g reat conce rn to the trial judge , as re flec ted i n her Memorandum and Orde r of J uly 2, 2002 (“July2, 2002 Orde r”) . The trial court observed:

On J une 21, 2002, the State of Tenne ssee f

iled a re spo n s e to the motion and the aff idavit of J erry

Preston. On J une 24, 2002, the State filed a nother doc ument that pu rp orte d to be a n a ff

ida vit ; it ha d n o oat h a ndthe re fo re , w a s in su ff ic ie nt t o constitute an af

fidavit. Attache d to this l ast fi l i n g was a nother doc ument entitled WMB Report and numer ous exhi bits. The attache d exhibi ts were copies of

corr espondenc e in 1997 betwe en Mr. Tay lor and the a rchitec t reg arding vari ous disputes. On J une 24, 2002, the State a l s o fi l ed a Response to Mr. Tay lor’s Sta te m e n to f

M a t e r i a l F a c t s N o tI n D i s p u t e

. T h i s R e s p o n s e d i d n o tc o m p l y wi th Rule 56.02. The State responde d to many of Mr. Tay lor’s fa cts by

simplydenying the f a c tu a l s tate me n t w ith o u t r e f e r e n c e to a n y

s p e c if ic p ar t o f th e r e c o r d

. M a n y

of-3-

the re sp on se s st a te d “ De nie d. Se e WMB re po rt .” I n o ne ins ta nc e , th e Sta te responde d to undisputed fact No. 14 a s follows: “See re sponse to Parag raph 14.” The State’s re sponse did not contain a spe cific r efe renc e to the re cord i n o rder for the Court to determine whic h fac ts supported its denial. The S tate filed no memorandum of law to a ssist t he Court in try ing to utilize the material that the State ha d filed.

After discussing at leng th the shortcoming s of t h e S t at e’ s response to the Motion for Summary J udg ment, the trial court held: “For the fore g oing r easons a nd afte r ca ref ul review and

re c on sid e ratio n o f the re c or d, pa rt ia l su mma

ry jud g me nt on the iss ue of lia bil ity is e nte re d o n b e ha lf of Mr

. Tay lor

. F urthe r, the Sta te ’s c ou nte rc la im a lle g ing br e a c h o f c on tr a c t a ndne g lig e nc e on be ha lf of Mr. Tay lor is dismi ssed. The issue of damag es shall be he ard on July29, 2002.”

I t is from this point forwa rd t hat the ca se bec omes a proc edura l mine field. Having g rante d partial summary

judgme nt as to liabilit yin favor of Plaintiff in its J uly

2, 2002 Orde r, the

cor re s p onding dismissal of the State’ s Counterclaim nec essarily had to follow. As the g rant of partial summary

judgme nt and the dismissal of the Countercla im did not resolve all issues betwee n the pa rt ie s, the July

2, 20 02 Or de r c ou ld n ot b e a fi na l ju dg me nt i n th e abs e nc e of a Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civil P roce dure 54.02 de signation, which was not conta ined in the J uly 2, 2002 Orde r.

North American Spec ialty I nsuranc e Company

was quick t o respond to the J uly 2, 2002 Orde r whe n, on J uly

5, 2002, it filed a Motion to Dismi ss asserting t h at , as a matter of law , the Third-Party

Complaint shoul d be dismissed.

On J uly 17, 2002, the State filed a Tenne ssee Rule of C i v i l Procedure 60.02 Motion for Relief fr om J udg ment (“Rule 60.02 Motion”) se eking to have the July2, 2002 Orde r set aside and the ca se set for trial on its merits. This R ule 60.02 Motion was ac companied by extensive

ev i d en t i ar y

m at er i al s as s er t i n g m at er i al i s s u es o f d i s p u t ed fa ct wh i ch we re o b viously intended to cure the de fe c ts i n th e Sta te ’s re sp on se to the orig ina l Motio n for Sum mary

Judg me nt. Th e se ma te ri a ls inc lud e d th e Af

fi da vit of Jer ry Pr e sto n, a n arc hit e c t, to the e ff e c t th a t th e re wa s n oth ing wr on g wi th the ar chitectur al dra wing s in the contrac t and a 23- pag e re sponse t o P laintiff’s Statement of Un dis pu te d F a c ts f

ile d pu rs ua nt to Rul e 56 .0 3. Th is r e sp on se dis pu te s 3 0 o f the 37 un dis pu te d f a c ts

a sse rt e d in Pla int if

f’ s State me nt o f U nd isp ute d F a c ts.

Ex tensive brief

ing by the pa rt i es addre ssing the c riteria f or g ranting Rule 60.02 motions prec eded the hearing on July22, 2002, resulting in an Orde r of Aug ust 21, 2002, (“Aug ust 21, 2002 Or de r” ) o f the tr ia l c ou rt

re a ff ir min g its g rant o f p art ia l su mma ry jud g me nt o n th e ba sis that:

The C o u rt finds that Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60.02(5) require s th at clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e be submitted bef ore Rule 60 r elief c an be g rante d. The Court finds that the S t at e o f Tenne ssee a nd The Te nnessee Boa rd of Re g e n t s h a v e n o t s u b m i t t e d c l e ar a n d c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f the ir Mo tio n. Th e re fo re , it

is ORDERED, DECREED, and ADJUDG ED that th e Rul e 60 .0 2( 5) Mo tio n is DE NI ED

.-4-

On Aug u s t 2 2
, 2 0 0 2
, the trial court e ntere d another Orde r (“ Aug ust 22, 2002 Order ”) g ranting the Motion of North Americ an S pecia lty I nsuranc e C ompany to dismi ss the Third-Party Complaint ag ainst it. How ever , this Order c ontained a f inding pur suant to Rule 54.02 that the Orde r wa s final

a s t o N o r t h A m e r i c a n S p e c i a l t y In s u r a n c e C o m p a n y a n d t h a tt h e r e w a s n o j u s tr e a s o n f o r d e l a y.

On that same day , the State filed its Motion to R evise Non- Final Or der, or I n the Alternative, to Alter or Ame nd Final J udg ment (“Motion t o Revise”) reg arding both the court’s g rant of pa rtial summary judgme nt and dismiss al of the Third-Party Complaint. This Motion to R evise wa s filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedur e 54.02 and, in the a lternative, 59.04. O n September 13, the trial court hear d the Motion to Rev i s e an d en t ere d an Or der on Septe mber 25, 2002 (“ S ep t em b er2 5
, 2 0 0 2 Or d er ”)
, p ro v i d i n g:

This cause came befor e the Court on the 13 day of September , 2002, upon th motion of the S TA TE O F T ENN ESS EE and the T ENN ESS EE B O A R D O F R EGEN TS [Sta te Def endants], pursuant to T ENNES S EE R U LES O F C I V I L P R OC E DURE 5 4

. 0 2 or, in the altern at i v e, R u l e 59.04, see king the Court to revise, or a lter or a mend, the orde r g ranting Plaintiff pa

rtial summary judgme nt, and to alter or amend t h e Order di smissi ng Sta te De fe nd a nts ’ c la ims a g a ins t D e fe nd a nt N OR TH A ME R I C AN S PE C I AL TY INS URANCE C OMPANY , the re sponses in opposition t o same of Plaintiff

a nd Cou nte r- De fe nd a nt He rm a n B. Tay lor a ndDe fe nd a nt N orth A me ri c a n Sp e c ia lty I nsuranc e Company
, the arg uments of counsel, and the entire rec ord of t h i s ca use, fr om a ll o f w hic h th e Cou rt fi nd s a s f oll ow s:

The ora l ruling of

the C ourt has bee n transcribed by a ce rtified court reporte r and is att ached her eto and incor porate d by

ref ere nce, a s if fully

set forth v e rb ati m , here in.

As to the merits of the State De fendant’s motion, the Court finds that neither Rul e 54 no r R ule 59 g ive th is Co urt auth ority to c on sid e r S ta te De fe nd a nts ’ A MENDE D A ND S U PPLEMENTAR Y M EMOR ANDUM I N O PP OS I TI ON TO P LA I N T I FF ’ S M O T I O N F O R S UMMARY J UDGME NT , R ES PO NS E TO P LA I N T I FF ’ S S TATEME NT OF M A T ER IA L F A CT S N OT I N D I S P UT E , A FFI D A V I T O F K EN S WA NN , Portions of the D EP O SI T I O N O F J ER R Y P R ES TON taken on F ebrua ry 15, 2002, and A F F I DAVI T OF J ER R Y P R ES TON , submitt ed by State Def endants following the Court’s J uly 2, 2002 Or de r g ranti ng Pla int if

f p art ia l su mma

ry jud g me nt.

De fe nd a nts Sta te of

Te nn e sse e a nd Te nn e sse e B oa rd of Re g e nt’ s M OT I ON TO R EVI S E N ON

- FIN A L O RDER , OR IN TH E A L TER NATI VE , TO A LTER O R A MEND F I NAL J UD GME NT is theref

ore, D ENIED .

T ENN ESS EE R U LE S OF A PP ELLATE P R OC EDU R E 9 C E RT I F I CAT I ON-5- The Cou rt grants Sta te De fe nd a nts ’ o ra l mo tio n f or pe rm iss ionto a

pp e a l, pursuant to Rule 9 of the T ENNES S EE R U LES O F A PPEL L AT E P ROCE D U RE , it s O RDER g ranting Plaintiff pa

rtial summary judgme nt, dated J uly 2, 2002, and the C o u rt ’s denials of State De fenda nts’ M O T I O N F O R R E L I E F F R OM J U D G M EN T , p ur su a nt t o T ENNES S EE R U LE O F C I V I L P ROCE DURE 60.02, and the State De fendants’ M OT I ON TO R EVI S E N ON

- FI N A L O RDER , OR IN TH E A L TER NATI VE , TO A LTER O R A MEND F I NAL J UDGME NT , pursuant to T ENNES S EE R U LES O F C I V I L P RO CEDU RE 54.02 or, in the

a lte rn a tiv e , Ru le 59 .0 4, fo r the fo llo wi ng re a so ns : ( 1) the ne e d to pr e ve nt i rr e pa ra ble injury , g iving c onsideration to the seve rity of the potential inj ury , the proba bilityof its occurr ence , and the pr obability that revie w upon entry

of final judg ment will be ineffe ctive; and ( 2) the need to preve nt needless, e x pensive, a nd protrac ted litigation, g iving c onsideration to wh ether the cha lleng ed orde r would be a basis for r ever sal upon entry

of a fi n al judgme nt, the probability of re versa l, and whethe r an interlocutory

appea l will result in a net reduc tion in the duration and e x pense of the l i t i gat i o n i f t h e c h al l en ged o rd eri s re v er s ed

. T h e C o u rt fi n d s t h at i f i t s p ri o r r u l i n gs
are in e rr or , th e n it

sh ou ld c on sid e r the pr e vio us ly no t con si dered d oc ume nts submitt ed by

State Def

endants. I f these doc uments had bee n proper ly befor e the Cou rt at the hea

ring on the motion for summary judgme nt, said documents may

c on ta in f a c ts that e sta

bli sh that th e re are qu e sti on s o f f a c t onthe issue of

lia bil ity

re ma ini ng , a ndthat tria l w a s n e c e ssa ry to r e so lve the se matt ers. In a dd iti on , th is Cou rt has prev iousl y

he ld that it s O RDER g rating [si c] Defe ndant North Ame rica n Spe c ia lty I ns ur a nc e c omp a ny ’s M OTI ON TO D I SM I SS is a fi na l or de r, fo r w hic h St a te Def endants may

file an appea l as of right. The ref ore, to a void duplicative litigation and appe als, and to re solve all issues at once , it is i n the i n t er es t s of justice and judicial economy

that State Def

endants be g rante d permission to f ile an interloc utory

app e a l.

Suc h b e ing the e sse nti a l r e c or d in thi s c a se , th e Sta te fi le d it s a pp lic ati on , p ur su a nt t o Tenne ssee Rul e of Appellate Procedure 9, for a n interlocutory appea l. This application was de nied b y t h i s C o u rt o n Oc t o b er2 8
, 2 0 0 2
, b y Or d er(“ Oc t o b er2 8
, 2 0 0 2 Or d er ”) as s er t i n g:
Having revie wed the a

pplication, we c annot conc lude that an inter locutory

app e a l is ne c e ssa

ry to p re ve nt n e e dle ss, e x pen sive a ndpr otr a c te d li tig a tio n o r t o preve nt irrepa

rable injury . Howeve r, the State de fendants have f i led a notice of appea l from the fina l judgme nt dismiss ing their claims ag ainst North American, a nd an appeal as of right from that order is, presumably
, proce eding

. We concur with the trial court’ s conclusion t hat re solving a ll issues at once will avoid duplicative l i t i g a t i o n a n d ap p e a l s a n d f u r t h e r t h e i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e a n d j u d i c i a l e c o n o m y. Ac c or din g ly , t he app eal a s o f rig ht f ro m th e dis mis sa l of

the c la ims a g a ins t N orth Americ an should be stay ed pending entry of a f inal judgme n t reg arding the re maining claims betwe en the plaintiff and the State defe ndants. Should an appea l be filed fr om such a f inal judgme nt, it shoul d be consolidate d with the appeal from the dismissal of the c laims ag ainst North American.-6-

Th e Rul e 9 a

pp lic a tio n of the Sta te ha vin g be e n de nie d, the c a se wa s re ma nd e d for tr ia l of the on ly issue left betwe en the pa

rties, the amount of damag es, if any , to be awa rded to Mr. Tay lor.

After a number of proce dural strug g les, the case came on for he aring on J une 17, 2003, and, on J une 27, 2003, the tria l court ente red the following Final Or der:

This ca use having come be fore the Court on the 17 day of June, 2003, for th a hea ring on the matter of

Plaintiff’s damag es by virtue of this Court’s prior ruling

o n li ab il it y th a t ar o s e o u t o f a s u mm ar y ju d g me n t s o u g h t b y Pl a in ti f f in w h ic h the State Def endants failed to adequately respond to the motion.

Upon t h e close of Plaintiff’ s proof, the State D efe ndants moved for an inv olu nta ri ly dis mis sa l a sse rt ing that Mr. Tay lor ha d fa ile d to pro ve in any c re dib le

way a ndwi th any

c e rt a int y the da ma g e s th a t he a sse rt e d in his c omp la int . D ue to this Court’s prior ruling , Mr. Tay lor was e ntitled, through an offe r of proof, t o submit any do c ume ntatio n th a t mi g ht p e rs ua de the Cou rt that he has da ma g e s f

or wh ic h h e is entitle d t o b e co m pensate d. The Court has be en under whelmed by the lack of

any documentation to support the alleg ations made b y Mr. Tay lor with reg ards to any damag es that he has sustained. Mr. Tay lor’s t estimony is all that he presented to the Cou rt in s up po rt

of his da ma g e s c la im.

T h eCourt concludes that it cannot put any weig ht into Mr. Tay lor’s testimony and finds him to be not cre dible on the t estimony with reg ards to damag es. Based on the e v id e n c e th a t h a s b e e n s u b mi tt e d
, it ap p e ar s th a t M r

. T a y lo r

w a s n o t f o rthrig ht in talking a

bout his prior backg round. That wa s never explained, nor did his counsel inquire into it to allow Mr. Tay lor an opportunity to expl ain. T h erefore the Court fi nd s that Pla int if

f He rm a n B a nk s Tay lor is the on e a nd sa me pe rs on a s id e nti fi e d in the Depa rtment of Corre ction rec ords. That proof wea kens what cre dibilit y the Court

m i gh t have othe rwise put in Mr. Tay lor’s testimony , but was not the main fa ctor upon which the Court re li ed in determining the cr edibilityof Mr. Tay lor. Mr. Tay lor ’s te sti mon y

c ou ld b e st b e de sc ri be d a s c on sis tin g so le ly of g e ne ral iz ati on s. His memory

was fa ulty

. He was not c onsistent in his testimony . The fig ures that Mr. Tay lor test i fi ed to as to the amount that he is due we re inc omprehe nsible to the Cou rt . M r. Tay lor

so ug ht d a ma g e s th at ha ve la be ls u nkno wn to the Cou rt

.
Th e re fo re , the Cou rt fi nd s that Mr . T a y lor ha s n ot p ro ve n d a ma g e s f or un pa id chan g e o r d e r s

. H e h a s n o t p r o v e n a n y d a ma g e s f

o r w h a t h e a s s e r ts is a

w r o n g ful termination. He ha s not proven any damag es for delay
, and in this instance , the Court is unawar e that one would rec over damag es for delay since this is a contra ct dispute, and such r equire s liquidated damag es which ar e ca pable of deter mination if proper,

rea sonable e vidence is submit ted. Mr. Ta y lor has not prove n other c onsequential damag es. There is no reliable proof in the rec ord for which the Court c an awa rd Mr. Tay lor a ny los t pr of it.-7- Acc ording ly
, at the cl o s e of Plaintiff ’s proof, the Court grante d State Defendan ts’ m otion f

or involun tary dism issal on all claim s for unp aid chan ge orders, wrongfu l ter m ination , delays, consequential dam ages, or lost profit.

The Court, howe ver, f

ound that there was a

re tainag e ac count that was

accum ulated by

rese rving five [5] perc ent of a ny money s due Mr. Tay lor when he submitt ed an a

pplication for payment. The proof ref lects that there wer e twelve [12]

app lic a tio ns fo r p a y me nt andthat pay me nts were ma de pu rs ua nt t o th os e applications, with a re tainag e amount of $115,021.58. Mr

. Tay lor takes the position that his money

was wrong fully reta ined by the State. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof
, the Court could not conclude that the State Def endants ha d clea

rly demonstrated that the re t ainage was used to pay the subcontra ctors. Althoug h it is clear is [sic] that the re wa s a

re ta ina g e a c c ou nt andthat th e Sta te too k po ss ess ion of tho se fu nd s, te sti mon y a s to h ow thos e fu nd s w e re us e d h a d n ot b e e n p ut i nto the re c or d. Sta te Def endants we re r equire d to submit proof on this issue, and as to this issue, the Court

re se rv e d it s d e c isi onon theSta te De fe nd a nts ’ m oti on fo r i nv olu nta ry dis mis sa l.
Having then hea

rd the State Def

endants’ proof a s to how the reta inag e funds

we re us e d, the Cou rt

fi nd s th a t State De fendants ha ve ma de a sh ow ing of

sp e c if ic

a mou nts that c on sti tut e liq uid a te d d a ma g e s th a t hav e be e n pa id by State De fe nd a nts and that these liquidated damag es more than exceed the amount of the re tainag e that was in the re tainag e ac count at the time of termination. The f unds that were being held in the re tainag e ac count for the contra ctor we re use d by State Def endants to pay subc o n tr a c to r s a n d v e n d o r s w h o h a d c o mp le te d w o rk a n d w h o w e r e e n ti tl e d to be compensated for that work. The Court f urther finds that the complaint acknow ledg es that any money s to which Mr. Taylor might be en t i t led in this lawsuit shoul d be reduc ed by

any amounts pai d b y S t ate De fendants on behalf of the plaintiff. The reta inag e ac count was thus prope rly used in its enti re ty

by State Def

endants to pay subcontrac tors and vendor s, and Plaintiff is entitled to no recove ry of any funds that the Sta te too k p os se ssi on of up on the te rm inatio n o f the c on tr a c t.

Therefo r e , t he C o ur t

fi nd s t ha t

t he St a t e D e fe nd a nt s ’ m o t io n f o ran involu ntary dism issal of all of P laintif f’s claims is appropri a te

. T h e Court gr ant s th e m ot ion for inv olu nt ar y dism iss al, e nt e r s a ju dgm e nt in fav orof t he State De fend ants, and dismisses this action in its entirety.
Finally , the Co u rt finds that the Plaintiff instit uted this lawsuit and had the prima ry bu rd e n o f p e rs ua sio n a s to lia bil ity a ndwi th r e g ards to p ro of of da ma g e s. Once having preva iled on the issue of liability throug h the motion for summ ary judgme nt, it was incumbent upon Mr. Tay lor to put forth the very best ca se that he could. Fi n d i n g t h at the pre sentation of Plaintiff’s ca se wa s woefully lacking , the Court concludes that the costs of this matte r shoul d be asse ssed solely ag ainst the-8-

Plaintiff. The c osts are assessed against t he P laintif f for wh ich e xecution m ay issue if necessar y.

Sin c e the Sta te fi le d th e fi rs t N otic e of Ap pe a l, i t app e ars a s th e app e lla nt i n th is C ou rt , to which eve ry

body except the surety

complains.

On appe al, the State asse rts four issues for revie w:

1. Whether the Chance llor err ed in g ranting Plaintiff’s Motion for P ar tial Sum mary Judg me nt so le ly be c a us e State De fe nd a nt f a ile d to ful ly c omp ly

wi th R ule 56 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure.

2. Whether t he C hance llor err ed in g ranting Summary J udg ment to Plainti ff who had not met his burden to establish that there was no g enuine issue of materia l fac t and that he wa s entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law

.
3. Wh e th e r th e Ch a n c e ll o r ab u s e d h e r d is c r e ti o n b y f a il in g to consider documentation submitted by State Def endants in Support of Motions under Rule 54 and Rule 59.

4. Whe the r the Cha nc e llo r’ s g rant o f S umm ary Judg me nt t o t

he su re ty sh ou ld be re verse d.

He rm a n T a y lor

su bmi ts the fo llo wi ng iss ue s f or re vie w o n a

pp e a l:

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting The P l aint iff’s Motion for Sum mary Judg me nt.

2. Th e Tria l Co urt D id N ot A bu se I ts D isc re tio n In All owi ng Th e Sta te Ad dit ion a l T ime To Re sp on d T o T he Mo tio n F or Sum mary

Judg me nt.

3. Th e Tria l Co urt E rr e d In A llo wi ng Th e State To Se tof f D a ma g e s.

4. The Trial Court Erre d I n Not Awar ding Damag es To Mr. Tay lor For Delay An d O the r D a ma g e s.

No rth A me ri c a n Sp e c ia lty I ns ur a nc e Compa ny

a sse rt s th e fo llo wi ng iss ue s o n a pp e a l:

I . Wh e the r the Cha nc e llo r p ro pe rl y g rante d p art ia l su mmaryjud g me nt, dismiss ing the State’s counter claim ag ainst Tay lor, when Tay lor established that he

was entitled to pa

rtial summary

judgme nt, and the State failed to offer any evidenc e to dispute his contention.-9- I I . W h e t h e r , h a v i n g p r o p e r l y d i s m i s s e d t h e S t a t e ’ s c o u n t e r c l a i ma g a i n st Tay lor , th e Cha nc e llo r p ro pe rl y dis mis se d th e State ’s th ir d p art y c la im a g a ins t NA SI C.

I I I

. Wh e th e r th e Ch a n c e ll o r p r o p e r ly d e n ie d th e St a te ’ s M o ti o n for r elief under Rules 54.02 and 59.04, when the State f ailed to demonstrate that it was entitled to such relief

.
The diff iculty fac ing this Court is that there w as neve r a final judg ment in this case until the F ina l O rd e r o f the c ou rt on June 27 , 200 3. Ne ith e r a Rule 60 .0 2 moti on no r a R ule 59 mot ion wi ll lie prior to the entry of a final judgme nt. The g rant of partial summary judgme nt to Plaintiff in the J uly 2, 2002 Orde r left ope n for future dis position t he issue of Plaintiff’s damag es. I n the abse nce of a Rul e 54 .0 2 d e sig nati on by the tr ia l c ou rt , s uc h a

jud g me nt i s n ot “ fi na l” fo r any pu rp os e s. Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e du re 54 .0 2 p ro vid e s:

5 4

. 0 2. Multiple Claims for Re lief. — W h e n m o r e t h a n o n e c l a i m f o r re lie f i s pr e se nt in a n a c t i o n , w h e t h e r a s a c l a i m , c o u n t e r c l a i m , c r o s s

- c l a i m , o r t h i r d p ar ty

c l a i m , o r w h e n m u l t i p l e p ar t i e s ar e i n v o l v e d
, t h e c o u r t , w h e t h e r a tl a w o r i n e q u i t y, may direc t the entry

of a final judgme nt as to one or more but fewe r than a ll of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an e x press dire ction for the e ntry of judg ment. I n the abse nce of such deter min at i o n an d d i re ct i o n , an y o rd ero r o t h erfo rm o f d ec i s i o n , h o we v erd es i gnated, that a dju dic a te s f

e we r tha n all the c la ims or the ri g hts a ndlia

bil iti e s o f f

e we r tha n a ll the parties s h al l n o t terminate the action as to a ny of the c laims or parties, a nd the order or other f orm of dec ision is subject t o revision at any time before the entry of the judg ment adjudicating all the clai m s and the rig hts and liabiliti es of a ll the pa rt ie s.

Th e di ff ic ult ie s st a

rt e d w he n th e Sta te fi le d it s Ru le 60 .0 2 M oti onrathe r tha n a mot ionto revise unde r Rule 54.02. Se e Ha rri s v . Ch e rn , 33 S.W .3d 741 (Tenn. 2000) . The pa rties and the trial

c ou rt , th e re a ft e r, too k th e Rul e 60 .0 2 M oti on lit e ra lly a ndapp lie d th e na

rr ow c on str

uc tio n r ule

m a n d a t e d b y Toney v. Mueller Co. , 810 S.W .2d 145 (Tenn. 1991) and NCNB Nat ion al B an k of N or th Car oli na v . Th ra ilk ill , 856 S.W .2d 150 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1993).

The issue is whethe r the aff idavits de monstrate that the judg ment enter ed wa s based upon a “mistake” within the meaning of rule 60.02, Tenn.R.Civ.P.
, wh ich state s in pe rt ine nt p art : On motion and upon such terms as ar e jus t, the court may relieve a party or his leg al re prese ntative from a final judg ment, order

or proce eding fo r the following rea sons: (1) mistake, inadve rtenc e,
su rp ri se or

e xcu sa ble ne g le c t. Rule 60.02 is not meant to be used in eve ry case in which the cir cumstance s of a pa rt y c ha ng e a ft e r the e ntry

of a jud g me nt o r o rd e r. No r i s th e ru le a me c ha nis m-10-

fo r u se by a pa rt y wh o is me re ly dis satis fi e d with the re su lt of a pa rt ic ula r c a se . Ru le 60 .0 2 is me a nt to b e us e d o nly in tho se fe w c a se s th a t me e t on e or mor e of the c ri te ri a stated. As re cently

stated by this Court, “Rule 60.02 acts as an e scape valve f rom possible inequity that might otherwise arise from the unrele nting impos ition of the principle of f

inality imbedded in our proc edura l ru le s

. ” Thompson v. Fireme n’s Fund Ins. Co. , 7 98 S.W. 2d23 5, 23 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) . B e c a us e of the imp orta nc e of

thi s “princ iple of finality ,” the “ esca pe valve ” should not be ea sily opened.

Toney , 810 S.W .2d at 146.

Th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

app lie d this stric t rule in d isp os ing of the Sta te ’s Rul e 60 .0 2 M oti on is established in t he August 21, 2002 Orde r wherein the court held: “The Court finds that Tennesse e Rules of Civil P roce dure Rule 60.02( 5) re quires that cle ar and convincing evidenc e must be submitt ed bef

ore Rule 60 r elief c an be g rante d.”
The Supreme Court held in Ha rri s v . Ch e rn :

Rul e 54 .0 2 r e qu ir e s th a t a jud g me nt d isp os ing of fe we r tha n all of the c la ims

or fe we r tha n a ll o f the pa

rt ie s is fi na l on ly

wh e n th e tr ia l c ou rt mak es “a n e xpre ss determination that there is no just re ason for delay and upon an e x press dire ction for the e ntry of jud g me nt. ” Te nn . R. Civ. P. 54.0 2. Th is d e te rm inatio n is a n “ abs olu te prer equisite” to a f

inal judgme nt in such a ca se. F ox v. Fox , 657 S.W .2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 19 83 ); Sti dh am v . F ic k le He irs , 643 S.W .2d 324, 325 (Tenn. 1982) (ad d r e s s in g Ru le 5 4

. 0 2 in it s p r e v io u s f o r m a t T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 2 7

- 3 0 5 )

. The

rec ord r ev eals no ex press de termination of fina lityby the trial court in the initi al g rant o f s umm ary

jud g me nt. Ac c or din g ly , the ini tial gr a nt o f s umm ary jud g me nt i n this c ase was non-final and was subject to r evision until it was e x pressly made f inal in acc ordanc e with Rule 54.02.

Ha rri s , 33 S.W . 3d at 744.

The r e q u ir e me n ts o f Ru le 5 4

. 0 2 in th is r e s p e c t ar e s o c le ar a n d u n a mb ig u ous that “cons tr u c ti o n ” o f th e s e p r o v is io n s is n e ith e r w arr a n te d n o r n e c e s s ar y

. N o n e th e le s s , s in ce the pro v is io n s ar e id e n ti c a l to th e p r o v is io n s o f F e d e r a l Ru le o f Ci v il Pr o c e d u r e 5 4
, f e d e r a l c a se law interpre ting the r

ule is persua sive authority in Tennesse e. Bo wm an v . H e na rd
, 547 S.W .2d 527, 530 (T e nn .1 97 7) ; March v . Levine , 115 S.W .3d 892, 908 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003).

I n addre ssing the e x act issue that is bef ore this Court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appea ls held:

T h i s p ar t i a l s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t o r d e r d i d n o te v e n d e t e r m i n e A v o n d a l e ’ s l i ab i l i t y – the re be ing no det erm in ati on e ith e r o f f a ult on its pa rt or of c a us a tio n –

muc h le ss King ’s damage s, and hence was interlocutory and not appe alable. Cf. Fe d. R. Civ. P. 5 6( c ) ( su mma

ry jud g me nt o n li abil ity

a lon e “ int e rl oc uto ry

in c ha ra c te r” ). No t on ly-11-

is such an orde r not appea lable, but it rema ins w ithin the plenary power of the district court to re vise or set aside in its sound discre tion without any nece ssityto meet the require ments of Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60(b).

Avondale Shipy ards, Inc. v . Insured Lloyd’s , 786 F.2d 1265, 1269 ( 5 Cir. 1986). th

Th e F if th Cir c uit Cou rt of Ap pe a ls ag a in ad dr e sse d the qu e sti on in c ir c ums ta nc e s ma rk e dly simil ar to the c ase at bar.

Th e dis tr ic t c ou rt a llo we d Ch e vr on to f ile a mot ionfo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, g rante d th e m o tion, but deferr ed the que stion of amount to allow the parties a n opport unity

to rea ch an a g ree ment. The judg ment was only partial, the c ourt

rese rving the jurisdiction over the unresolved issues. “A n order of a district c ourt g ranting partial summary judgme nt which leave s claims t o be adjudicated may

c on sti tut e a

fi na l or de r ‘ on ly

up on a n e xpre ss d ete rm inatio n th a t th e re is n o ju st

rea son for de lay

and upon an e x press de terminati o n fo r t he entry of judg ment’.” Eudy v

. Motor Guide, He rschede Hall Clock Co. , 604 F.2d 17, 18 ( 5 Cir. 1979), th Fe d.R.Civ.P . 54(b), Gonzales v. Texas Employme nt Commission , 563 F.2d 776, 777 (5 Cir . 1 97 7) . T he re wa s n o r ule 54 (b ) c e rt if

ic a tio n re nd e ri ng the jud g me nt f ina l in th the instant case . Oil Well’s cross claims, filed three months after the partial summary judgme nt, were filed while the matter wa s still within the jurisdiction of the district court. The motion was timelyfile. The contention of Teledyne that Oil Well was not

a pa rt y to the a c tio n is de vo id o f m e ri t. Oi l W ell wa s b ro ug ht i n a s a thi rdpa rt y defe ndant. Its attorney

was pre sent throug hout the trial of the main de mand.

Hobbs v. Teledy ne Mov ible Offshore, Inc. , 632 F.2d 1238, 1240 ( 5 Cir. 1980). Th

Sin c e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s July 2, 20 02 Or de r co ntaine d no Rule 54 .0 2 d e sig natio n o f f ina lit y , it

wa s n ot a fi na l or de r f

or a ny pu rp os e s u nd e r the e xpre ss pr ov isi on s of that ru le

. Tr e a tin g the Rul e 60.02 Motion as, i n fac t, a motion to revise under Rule 54.02, Se e Ha rri s , 33 S.W .3d at 744, and Savage v. Hildenbrandt
, No

. M1 99 9- 00 63 0- CO A- R3- CV
, 20 01 WL 10 13 05 6 (T e nn .Ct .A pp . Se pt. 6, 2001), the m er i t s o f t he Rule 60.02 Motion should have bee n subjected to the Ha rri s a na ly sis rathe r than the Rule 60.02 analy sis. Further, the Aug ust 21, 2002 Orde r overruling the Rule 60.02 Mo tion of th e S tat e wa s n o mo re a fi na l or de r tha n th e July

2, 20 02 Or de r. I t c on ta ine d n o Ru le 54.02 desig nation of finality , and the issue of damag es re mained to be trie d.

So it is that the State’s Aug ust 22, 2002, Motion t o Revise ca nnot be consider ed, at lea st as to the State and He rman Tay lor, to be a Rule 59.04 motion. As to those parties, it will be treated as another Rule 54.02 motion since the Aug ust 21, 2002 Order lacke d finality . Since the Aug ust 22, 20 02 Or de r d ism iss ing No rth A me ri c a n Sp ecia lty I ns ur a nc e Compa ny

did , in fa c t, c on ta in a

Rul e 54.02 desig nation of finality
, the S tate was left wit h littl e alternative but to file the Aug ust 22 Motion t o R e v i s e a l t e r n a t i v e l y u n d e r R u l e 5 9

. 0 4 i n o r d e r

t o p r o t e c ti t s r i g h t s a g a i n s tt h e s u r e t y.-12-

I n it s Se pte mbe r 2 5, 20 02 Or de r d e nying bo th the State ’s Rul e 54 .0 2 mo ti on a ndits alternative Rule 59.04 motion contained in the Motion to R evise, the tria l court held:

As to the merits of the State De fendants’ Motion, the C ourt finds that neither Rul e 54 no r R ule 59 g ive thi s Co urt auth orit y to c on sid e r S ta te De fe nd a nts ’ A MENDE D AND S UP PL EME NTAR Y M EMOR ANDUM I N O PPO S I TI ON TO P LA I N T I FF ’ S M O T I O N F O R S UMMARY J UDGME NT , R ES PO NS E TO P LA I N T I FF ’ S S TATEME NT OF M A T ER I A L F A CT S N OT I N D I S P UT E , A FFI D A V I T O F K EN S WA NN , Portions of the D EP O SI T I O N O F J ER R Y P R ES TON taken on F eb. 15, 2002, and A FFI D A V I T O F J ERRY P R ES TON , submitt ed by

State Def

endants following the C ourt’s J uly 2, 2002 Orde r g ranti ng Pla int if

f p art ia l su mma

ry jud g me nt.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt is in erro r i n s o h old ing . N o f ina l ju dg me nt h a d y e t be e n e nte re d, a ndit i s clea r that “Rule 54.02 c onfer s upon the trial co u rt ‘t he privileg e of r ever sing itself up to a nd including the date of

entry of a f inal judgme nt’”. Ha rri s , 33 S.W .3d at 744.

Th e true te st a

pp lic able un de r the se c on dit ion s is se t f orth c le arl y

by the Sup re me Cou rt

.
Whe n a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e is s ub mit te d in su pp ort of a Rul e 54 .0 2 mo tio n to revise a g rant of summary

judgme nt, a t rial court should consider, whe n applicable : 1) th e movant’s efforts to obtain evidence to respond to the motion for summary judgme nt; 2) the importance of the newly submitt ed evide nce to the mova nt’s case ; 3) the e x planation offe red by the movant for its fa ilure to offe r the ne wly submitt ed evidenc e in its init ial response to the motion for summary judgme nt; 4) the likelihood that the nonmoving pa

rty wi l l s u ff er unf air pre judice; and 5) any

other re levant fac tor.

Acc ording ly , we hold that the “ newly discovere d evidenc e ” s ta

ndard ne ed not be satisfied be fore a trial c ourt revise s a partial summary judgme nt unde r Rule 54.02 on the basis of a dditional e vidence

. When a dditional e vidence is of fer ed by a litiga nt to o ve rc ome a

g rant o f s umm ary

jud g me nt p ur su a nt to Rule 54 .0 2, tr ia l cou rt s mu st undertake the a

bove-state d balanc ing analy sis and should make adequate finding s of fa c t a ndc on c lus ion s o f l a w o n th e re c or d to su pp ort th e ir ru lin g s.

Ha rri s , 33 S.W .3d at 745 (c itations omitted). J ust as t he “newly discovere d evidenc e” sta ndard ne ed

no t be sa tis fi e d be fo re a tr ia l c ou rt re vis e s a pa rt ia l su mma

ry jud g me nt u nd e r R ule 54 .0 2 o n th e ba sis of additional evide nce, so the restrictive standard of Rule 60.02 does not have to be met as to such additional evidenc e.

I t is clear, the ref

ore, that as in Ha rris , th e g rant o f p art ia l su mma ry jud g me nt i n th is c a se must be reve rsed. We perc eive no rea son, howeve r, t o rema nd the ca se as wa s done in Ha rri s for further trial court c onsideration of the post-partial summary judgme nt evidence presen t ed bythe State. I n the Orde r of Septembe r 25, 2002 g ranting the Tenne ssee Rule of A p p el l at e Proce dure 9-13-

I nterlocutory

Appea l, the trial court a sserted, “ I f these documents had been pr operly befor e the Court

a t th e he ari ng on the mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt, sa id d oc ume nts ma y c on ta in f a c ts that e sta

bli sh that th e re are qu est io ns of fa c t on the iss ue of lia bil ity re ma ini ng , a ndthat tria l w a s n e c e ssa ry to

re so lve the se ma tte rs .” Th e e vid e nc e on wh ic h the tr ia l cou rt sp ok e is i n th e re c or d a ndbe fo re thi s Court for appe llate re view. It is c lear from the evidenc e pre sented that disputed questions of mate rial fac t as to liabilit y

exis ts and summary

judgme nt as to that issue was improper ly g rante d.

When this C ourt enter ed its October 28, 2002 Orde r denying theState’s application for a Rule 9 interlocutory

appea l, we re cog nized the proce dural proble ms resulting f rom the trial court’s de sig natio n of fi na lit y in i ts A ug us t 22 , 2 00 2 O rd e r d ism iss ing the Th ir d- Part y Complaint

a g a ins t North American Spec ialty I nsuranc e Company . We held, “Ac cording ly , the appe al as of right f rom the dismissal of the claims ag ainst North American should be stay ed pending entry of a f inal judgme nt reg arding the re maining c laims betwee n the pl aintiff and the State defe ndants.” Since the dis mis sa l of

the C ou nt erc la im o f the Sta te a g a ins t Plaint if f andthe dis mis sa l of

the Th ir d- Part y Com p l ai n t aga inst North America n wer e pre dicated upon the err oneous g rant of pa rtial summary judgme nt to the Plainti ff a s to the liabilit y of the State, it follows that the dismissal of the Counterclaim and the Third-Party Complaint m ust be reve rsed.

This leaves us with the ve ry troublesome proble m of the iss ues asse rted on a ppeal by Plaintiff, H erma n Tay lor. Wit h the State’s Counterc laim and the Third- Party Complaint against the surety eff ective l y re m oved fr om the case by the J uly 2, 2002 Orde r g ranting partial summary judgme nt to Pl aintiff as to liability , the ca se proceede d on the issue of Plaintiff’s da mag es in a hearing on June 17, 2003. The burde n was upon Plaintiff to establish his damag es, and the level of frustration besetting the trial court is re flec ted i n i ts Final Orde r of June 27, 2003, where in the defe ndant’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal was sustained.

I n th e pr e se nt s ta te of

the re c or d, e ff

orts t o e ff e c t pr op e r app e llate re vie w a re a n e xer c ise in futility

. Be tween the ruling s of the trial court limit ing the scope of evidenc e beca use of Plaintiff’s failure to make prope r di scovery and the near total failure to corr elate the uncorr aborated testimony of Herman Tay lor with the myriad of e x hibits offere d, we a re una ble to make se nse out of the r ecor d

on app e a l.
What was bound to happen w as cle arly fore seen by the t rial court prior to the beg inning of Mr . T a y lor ’s te sti mon y . T he re c or d r e fl e c ts:

THE COURT: All rig ht. L et’s do that then. This is a motion i n limine f iled by the State to enter

an orde r prohibiting the pla intiff from re ly ing upon any d o cu m en t ation obtained fr om J erry Prest on or Ke n Swann pursuant to the subpoe na served af ter the June 6, 2003 h ea ri n g.

With re g ard s to the plaint if f’ s o ff e r o f p ro of

, th e pl ain tif

f i s entitled, based on my

prior ruling , to make an of fer of proof with reg ar d s t o the-14-

do c ume nts that th e plaint if f h a s a s to how he c a lc ulate d his da ma g e s. Th e do c ume nts sh ou ld b e the on e s th a t w e re us e d to pr e pa re the su mma

ry state me nts

.
At the time that we we re he re be fore , I inquired as to how the summaries we re pr epar ed. Mr. Pre ston, y ou advised me that either y ou or someone in y ou r o ff

ic e ha d u se d th e do c ume nts a va ila ble to y ou to p re pa

re tho se su mma

ri e s.

I t is mye xp e c ta

ti o n throug h that order

that y ou will be allowed to make an of

fer of proof

. Ty pically , an off

er of proof is ma de with me off of the benc h. I think under these circ umstances I may have to stay on the benc h. But y ou will be

a llo we d to do that. Ho we ve r, y ou are on ly g oin g to be a llo we d to d o th a t in the sa me way that y ou prepa

red the summaries, and that is ei t h er through y our witnesses or y our assistant or whoe ver he lped y ou and the documents t hat wer e available to y ou in y our off

ice, be cause that was the intent of the offe r of pr oof.

You broug ht to the deposition the se summaries as to how y ou calc ulated the da mag es. Mr. Mar ett had a rig ht to ex plore how that was done. A nd he ha d re qu e ste d tha t whate ve r doc ume nts y ou int e nd e d to re ly up on be br ou g ht t o the deposition. For r easons unbe knownst to me, that was not done.

As a c onsequence, Iam not g oing to pe rmit documents that

wer e not identified in the de position t o be introduce d now. That’s not the pr oper w ay to conduct discove ry . The State ha d reque sted all of t he docume nts. They had a right to do it. All t he docume nts were prese nted t o M s

. S teele. T hey wer e not B ates stamped. They

wer e not identified. The y wer en’t c ollated. They wer en’t seg reg ated. They wer e just delivere d.

I n ord e r to b e able to d e te rm ine a ndmake se ns e ou t of the se documents, Mr. Mar ett wanted to de pose y our client a n d as ked him to bring the do c ume nts that hadbe e n f urnis he d. I

su sp e c t th a t Mr . M are tt h a d a ll the do c ume nts

a nd tr ie d to mak e so me se ns e ou t of the m bef or e he wante d to de po se y ou r c lie nts

. B ut y ou r c lie nt n e e de d to bring tho se re c or ds to the de po sit ion , a ndhe did n’ t.

Yo u a sse rt e d th a t y ou ha d pr e pa re d the se su mma

ri e s, a ndit i s
on that ba sis that he fi le d h is m oti on fo r sa nc tio ns . I ’v e ma de the ru lin g . A t th is t ime I am g oing to g rant the or der that with reg ards to y our proof that may be submitted pursuant to my ruling and that is whate ver doc umentation y ou intend to supplyas an of fe r o f p ro of

wi ll n ot be thr ou g h Jer

ry Pr e sto n o r K e n Sw a nn sin c e the y didno t he lp y ou pr e pa re the su mma

ri e s.-15- MR. PR ESTON: Your Honor
, does that addr ess – y our orde r talked about the doc uments which wer e identified. And the ones that I am conc erne d about ar e the ones that – pay ment applications which we submi t don’t fall under that cate g ory , beca

use they wer e in the summaries spe cifica lly ident i fi ed by

number. I don’t think there’ s any

question those wer e in the State’s possession at the time and should not, therefor e, be e x cluded.

I s it y our ruling that those documents are exclud ed even though the y

wer e identified?

THE COURT: Mr. P reston, y ou’ve a sked me a question that I ’m g oin g to ha ve to ha ve a lit tle mor e a ssi stanc e on be fo re I c a n a ns we r, bu t I wo uld like to do these thing s in an orderly fashion. So what I ’ve g ot right now is the motion in limi ne to prohibit the pl aintiff from relying on any documentation obtained f rom J erryP re s t o n o r K en S wa n n p u rs u an tt o t h e s u b p o en as

. T h at ’s t h e r u l i n g.

The a nswer is y es, I am g oing to prohibit y ou from re ly ing on any documentation obtained f rom J erry Preston or K en S wann pur suant to the subpoenas. All rig ht. I

have just g one through all the documents that y ou reque sted, and by and larg e it looks like y ou have most of t hose docume nts in y our possession. You will not be able to ca ll Ken Swann or Jerry Preston to the stand during y our off er of proof

. Now, with re g ards to the question that y ou just posed to me, y ou ha v e –a n dM r

. M ar e tt n o t q u it e a s lo n g –b e e n in v o lv e d in th is la w s u it

. I am basica lly uneduca ted with reg ards to the f acts in this lawsuit. I

have minimal kn ow le dg e of

thi s la ws uit , a ndit i s f

or a va ri e ty of re a so ns

.
When the m o t i o n for summary judgme nt was filed, y ou benef ited [si c] beca

use Ms. Steele was in a position t hat she did not properly respond to the mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. I wa s un able to g o thr ou g h a ll the do c ume nts that sh e fi le d a ndmake se ns e of the m.

You now ask me a question about documents that I have not be e n a ble to make se ns e of be c a us e I ha ve n’ t had the tim e no r ha ve I ha d th e be ne fi t of pre liminary

motions t hat woul d fac ilitate my understanding of what pay

app lic a tio n d oc ume nts are ve rs us the e qu ipm e nt andfu e l c os t/l os s o f p ro du c tiv ity do c ume nts or

the do c ume nts that pu rp ort to re pr esent de la y s c a us e d d ue to

arc hitectura l error s. I have no idea how to seg reg ate whatever documents there are and how to answ er y our question as to wh at y ou mean whe n y ou say , “Do the pay
ap p l i c a t i o n d o c u m e n t s f

a l l u n d e r a c e r t a i n c a t e g o r y

f o r e x c l u s i o n o r

i n c l u s i o n ?”-16- I f I knew what the documents we re, if I had the ability to look at them and r ead the m – and I real l y d o t ak e t h e ti me, if it’s prese nted in a prope r
way , to try

a ndun de rs ta nd wh a t th e pr oo f w ill be e ith e r b e fo re tr ia l or du ri ng tr ia l. I kn ow wh a t a

pa y app lic a tio n lo ok s li ke , b ut i t’ s n ot m y du ty to f e rr e t it ou t.

I don’t know that I

could clear l y say

what is an e quipment documentation or a

fuel c ost documentation if they are all run tog ether . I

know what a bill looks li ke for

g as; I could do that. But that’s not my responsibility . And that’s wh y I sa y y ou ha ve a n un e du c a te d jud g e sittin g he re , be c a us e I do n’ t ha ve the be ne fi t of any preliminary

motions t h at h elp me g ain an unde rstanding of what the documents ar e that are go i n g t o b e tendered to prove the damag es. And that is of

conce rn to me.

Pr ov ing lia bil ity is o nly on e ha lf of a la ws uit . T he oth e r h a lf of a la wsuit is proving the damag es to which y ou ar e entitled. This is a very imp orta nt p ortio n o f the la ws uit

.

For all prac tical purposes
, t h e o n l y evidenc e off ere d by Plaintiff was the testimony of Mr. Tay l o r , a n d q u i t e ap ar t f

r o m t h e c r e d i b i l i t y i s s u e s f r o m w h i c h h e s u f

f e r e d i n t h e tr i a l c ou rt , h is testimonydemonstrated a rathe r marke d lack of

familiarity with his own records a nd, by and lar g e,
wa s c ou c he d inabs tr a c t g e ne ra lit ie s.
On appe al of the damag es issues, we are left in some thing of a quanda ry . Ba sed on the re cord we ha ve, it would be ea sy enoug h to sustain the action of the trial cour t in the involuntary

dismiss al of Plaintiff’s cla im because of the total f ailure of his pr oof as to damag es. We have a ca se, howe ver, which mus t g o back to the t rial court for further procee dings because of err ors, not all of which c an be la id at th e do or of Pla int if f. I t w a s, a ft e r a ll, the Sta te of Te nn e sse e that f

ile d th e g ro ssl y inadequate re spon s e t o P l aintiff’s Rule 56 Motion for Summary J udg ment and, af

ter the pa rtial summary judgme nt was g rante d, responde d with a Rule 60.02 Motion. The trial court, taking its cue
, in part, fr om the State’s Rule 60.02 Motion, applied the re strictive criteria of a Rule 60.02 motion rathe r than the criteria of Ha rri s v. C he rn under Rule 54.02. The resulting overr uling of the State’s Rule 60.02 Motion under those re strictive criteria buttresse d the er roneous di s m i s s al of the Counterclaim and the Third-Party Complaint. S ending the ca se bac k to the trial court f or trial on the Counterclaim and the Third-Party Complaint wit hout reg ard to Plaintiff’s a lleg ation of dama g es inv olv e s a

le ss- than- sa tis fa c tory

re su lt.

This court has the s tatutory power to rema nd case s when we determine that complete justice c annot be done on appea l and when the rec ord indicate s that more satisfac tory

evidenc e can be pre sented whic h will enable the trial court to re nder a more just decision. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 7- 3-1 28 (1 98 0) ; Ha ur y an d S mi th Re alt y Co. v . P ic c ad ill

y Pa rtn e rs I

, 802 S.W .2d 612, 616 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1990).

State ex re l. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d 244, 250 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000).-17-

We choose to vac ate the judgme nt as t o Plaintiff’s damag es and rema nd the case t o the trial court for trial on all issues made by the pleading s. Such proce edings o n re mand will be without p r e j u d i c e t o t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s p r e v i o u s ru l i n g r e l a t i v e t o P l a i n t i f f ’ s f a i l u r e i n r e s p o n s e t o d i s c o v e r y. We m ig ht a ddthat, i f P la int if f c a nn ot d o s ome thi ng to imp ro ve the qu a lit y of his pr oo f a s to damag es, the roa d ahea d is effe ctively blocked.

T h e j u d gm en to f t h e t ri al co u rt i s re v er s ed
, an d t h e c as e i s re m an d ed fo r f u rt h erp ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion.

Costs of the cause are taxed equally to Herma n Tay lor and the State of Tenne ssee.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B.CAIN, J UDGE