alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2006279EN.01001701.xml

| 11.10.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 279/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.10.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 279/17

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1499/2006

of 10 October 2006

on the issue of import licences for high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 936/97 of 27 May 1997 opening and providing for the administration of tariff quotas for high-quality fresh, chilled and frozen beef and for frozen buffalo meat (2),

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 936/97 provides in Articles 4 and 5 the conditions for applications and for the issue of import licences for meat referred to in Article 2(f). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 936/97 provides in Articles 4 and 5 the conditions for applications and for the issue of import licences for meat referred to in Article 2(f).

| (2) | Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 fixes the amount of high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal meeting the definition laid down therein which may be imported on special terms for the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 at 11 500 t. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 fixes the amount of high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal meeting the definition laid down therein which may be imported on special terms for the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 at 11 500 t.

| (3) | It should be recalled that licences issued pursuant to this Regulation will, throughout the period of validity, be open for use only in so far as provisions on health protection in force permit, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

It should be recalled that licences issued pursuant to this Regulation will, throughout the period of validity, be open for use only in so far as provisions on health protection in force permit,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   All applications for import licences from 1 to 5 October 2006 for high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal as referred to in Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 shall be granted in full.

2.   Applications for licences may be submitted, in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 936/97, during the first five days of November 2006 for 4 055,544 t.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 11 October 2006.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 October 2006.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 21. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1913/2005 (OJ L 307, 25.11.2005, p. 2).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 137, 28.5.1997, p. 10. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 408/2006 (OJ L 71, 10.3.2006, p. 3).

2

---
KAREN McBRIEN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION, et at., 

Defendants. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FILED 

FEB" 3 2009 

NANCY MAYER WHITIINGTON. Cl.EHK 

u.s. DISTRICT COlIIr 

09 0197 

This matter comes before the court on review of plaintiff s application to proceed in 

forma pauperis and pro se civil complaint. 1 The court will grant the application, and dismiss the 

complaint. 

The court must dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(I)(B). In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 

319 (1989), the Supreme Court states that the trial court has the authority to dismiss not only 

claims based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also claims whose factual contentions 

are clearly baseless. Claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios fall into the category of 

cases whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. !d. at 328. The trial court has the discretion 

to decide whether a complaint is frivolous, and such finding is appropriate when the facts alleged 

are irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). 

Plaintiff has submitted two pleadings which appear to be duplicates. For purposes 

ofthis Memorandum Opinion and Order, the court consolidates the two pleadings. 

1 
Plaintiff alleges that various federal government agencies and contractors are conducting 

surveillance on her in her home and as she travels, that other entities have conducted biomedical 

and genetic experiments on her, and that other unidentified individuals are conspiring to harass 

her and to deprive her of any assistance with her troubles. Plaintiff demands monetary damages 

and injunctive relief. The court is mindful that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to 

less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,520 (1972). Having reviewed plaintiffs complaint, it appears that its 

factual contentions are baseless and wholly incredible. For this reason, the complaint is frivolous 

and must be dismissed. 

An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately. 

2
EDWARD WALKER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D13-6150

_____________________________/

Opinion filed July 18, 2014.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Union County.

Stanley H. Griffis, III, Judge.

Edward Walker, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Perrone, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
S. 1599 

One Hundred Eleventh Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 

the sixth day of January, two thousand and nine 

An Act 

To amend title 36, United States Code, to include in the Federal charter of the 

Reserve Officers Association leadership positions newly added in its constitution 

and bylaws. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Reserve Officers Association 

Modernization Act of 2009’’. 

SEC. 2. INCLUSION OF NEW LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE FEDERAL 

CHARTER OF THE RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION. 

(a) NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.—Section 190104(b)(2) of 

title 36, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by inserting ‘‘the president elect,’’ after ‘‘the president,’’; 

(2) by inserting ‘‘a minimum of’’ before ‘‘3 national executive 

committee members,’’; and 

(3) by striking ‘‘except the executive director,’’ and inserting 

‘‘except the president elect and the executive director,’’. 

(b) OFFICERS.—Section 190104(c) of such title is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (1)— 

(A) by inserting ‘‘a president elect,’’ after ‘‘a president,’’; 

(B) by inserting ‘‘a minimum of’’ before ‘‘3 national 

executive committee members,’’; 

(C) by striking ‘‘a surgeon, a chaplain, a historian, 

a public relations officer,’’; and 

(D) by striking ‘‘as decided at the national convention’’ 

and inserting ‘‘specified in the constitution of the corporation’’; and 

(2) in paragraph (2)— 

(A) by inserting ‘‘and take office’’ after ‘‘be elected’’; 

and 

(B) by striking ‘‘and the national public relations 

officer,’’ and inserting ‘‘the judge advocate, and any other 

national officers specified in the constitution of the corporation,’’. 

(c) VACANCIES.—Section 190104(d)(1) of such title is amended 

by striking ‘‘president and last past president,’’ and inserting ‘‘president, president elect, and last past president,’’. 
S. 1599—2 

(d) RECORDS AND INSPECTION.—Section 190109(a)(2) of such 

title is amended by striking ‘‘national council;’’ and inserting ‘‘other 

national entities of the corporation;’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### Debora M. BAUER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE of Colorado, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86CA0437.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

July 10, 1986.

Richard E. Falcone, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellee.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Steven M. Bush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellant.

SMITH, Judge.

This driver’s license revocation matter is before us for consideration of the response *682of the Department of Revenue, (department) to this court’s order to show cause. Upon consideration of the department’s response, we conclude that the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction in ruling on Deborah M. Bauer’s motion for reconsideration. Because this judgment from which appeal is taken is void, we dismiss the appeal.

On December 5, 1985, the trial court affirmed the department’s order of revocation of Bauer’s driver’s license. Thereafter, on December 13, 1985, Bauer filed a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59. On March 5, 1985, more than 60 days after the motion had been filed, the trial court entered an order setting aside its affirmance of the revocation and remanded the case to the department for further proceedings.

The department initiated this appeal on March 27, 1986, seeking reversal of the trial court’s March 5, 1986, ruling. On May 14, 1986, we issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed with prejudice for the reason that on March 5, 1986, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiff’s C.R. C.P. 59 motion, and that, therefore, the department’s appeal was from a favorable judgment.

Bauer failed to respond to the order to show cause. In its response, the department simply stated that it was unsure as to whether the trial court had had jurisdiction to issue its March 5,1986, order; therefore, in order to avoid compliance with an unfavorable judgment or to escape contempt proceedings for noncompliance, it appealed.

Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j), a trial court must rule on a post-trial motion within 60 days of its filing. If the trial court fails to do so, the motion is deemed denied, the trial court cannot thereafter act on the motion, and the time in which to commence an appeal begins to run. *See*C.R.C.P. 59; C.A.R. 4; *Baum v. State Board for Community Colleges,*715 P.2d 346 (Colo.App.1986).

Under the circumstances present here, Bauer’s motion for reconsideration was deemed denied under C.R.C.P. 59(j) on February 11, 1986. At that time, the trial court’s December 5, 1985, order affirming the revocation of Bauer’s driver’s license became final, the trial court’s authority to act on the motion terminated, and the time in which to commence an appeal began to run. No notice of appeal has been filed with respect to the December 5, 1985, order.

Accordingly, the trial court’s March 5, 1986, judgment is void, and the appeal of that judgment is dismissed with prejudice.

VAN CISE and BABCOCK, JJ„ concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS, STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF
CASH FLOWS QUALIFIED INCLUDED IN THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND NOTES THERETO.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          12,166
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      500
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                19,185
<PP&E>                                           3,571
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (1,252)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  21,592
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,774
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                            11
<OTHER-SE>                                    (41,191)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    21,592
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,625
<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                19,592
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 192
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (17,501)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (17,501)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (17,501)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.94)
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</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21
- 0435 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DONALD RAY CHERRY ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including December 14 , 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 4 2022

11/04/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0435
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1903 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1903

  To suspend temporarily the duty on 1,3-Dimethyl-1H-pyrazol-5-ol and 
                       1,3-Dimethylpyrazol-5-one.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 26, 2009

  Mr. Roberts introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To suspend temporarily the duty on 1,3-Dimethyl-1H-pyrazol-5-ol and 
                       1,3-Dimethylpyrazol-5-one.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. 1,3-DIMETHYL-1H-PYRAZOL-5-OL AND 1,3-DIMETHYLPYRAZOL-5-ONE.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.01.00       1,3-Dimethyl-1H-    Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/ ''.
                          pyrazol-5-ol (CAS                                                  31/2011.......
                          No. 5203-77-0);
                          or 1,3-
                          dimethylpyrazol-5-
                          one (CAS No. 2749-
                          59-9) (provided
                          for in subheading
                          2933.19.90)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
1 The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 10-1302

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Alfredo Sauz-Flores, also known as * Alfredo Sauz, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: August 19, 2010 Filed: August 24, 2010

___________ Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Pursuant to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, which contained an appeal waiver, Alfredo Sauz-Flores pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in an amount greater than 50 grams, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. The district court 1 sentenced him to 360 months in prison--in accord with the pl ea agreement--and 10 years of supervised-2- release. On appeal, his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
We will enforce the appeal waiver in th is case, because the record shows the requisite knowledge and voluntarin ess, the appeal is withinthe scope of the waiver, and no injustice would result fro m enforcing the waiver. SeeUnited States v. Andis , 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (court shoul d enforce appeal waiver and dismiss appeal where it falls within scope of waiver, both plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result; one important way district c ourt can ensure plea agreement and appeal waiver are knowing and voluntary is to que stion defendant properly about decision to enter agreement and to waiv e right to appeal); see also United States v. Sisco , 576 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2009) (enforcing app eal waiver and finding no miscarriage of justice in appeal challenging sentence as unreasonable because sentence did not exceed statutory maximum); Unite d States v. Estrada-Bahena , 201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (enforcing appeal waiver in Anders case).
Having reviewed the record i ndependently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues that are not covered by the appeal waiver. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and we dismiss this appeal.

______________________________
**Exhibit 32.1**

** **

CertificationPursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asAdopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Safety Products Holdings, Inc. (the “Registrant”) on Form10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert A. Peterson, Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)           TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| Dated:  November 14, 2006 | By:    | /s/ ROBERT A. PETERSON                           |   |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                |   | Robert A. Peterson                               |
|                                |   | President, Chief  Executive Officer and Director |
|                                |   | (Principal Executive Officer)                    |

 

**A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided tothe Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.**

1

----
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

PROTON SPORTS INC., 

Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

Appellee

______________________

2023-1535

______________________

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1283.

______________________

O R D E R

The parties having so agreed, it is ordered that:

(1) The proceeding is DISMISSED under Fed. R. App. 

P. 42 (b).

Case: 23-1535 Document: 9 Page: 1 Filed: 06/02/2023
2 PROTON SPORTS INC. V. ITC

(2) Each side shall bear their own costs.

FOR THE COURT

June 2, 2023

Date /s/ Jarrett B. Perlow

Jarrett B. Perlow 

Acting Clerk of Court

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: June 2, 2023

Case: 23-1535 Document: 9 Page: 2 Filed: 06/02/2023
#### City of Shaker Heights, Appellant, *v.*Zangerle, Aud., et al., Appellees. (Two cases.)

(Nos. 30938 and 30939

Decided July 30, 1947.)

*362
      *Mr. Ralph W. Jones,*director of law, for appellant.

*Mr. Frank T. Cullitan,*prosecuting attorney, and *Mr. A. M. Braun,*for appellee John A* Zangerle, county auditor.

*Messrs. Squire, Sanders é Dempsey*and *Mr. Robert F. Denison,*for appellee Board of Education of the Cleveland City School, District.

By the Court.

Counsel for appellant .in his brief *363insists that this court reconsider the case of *Zangerle, Aud.,*v. *City of Cleveland,*145 Ohio St., 347, 61 N. E. (2d), 720, and he contends in this court that the Shaker Heights Eapid Transit System is not in the field of private business, competitive business or business for profit.

The Board of Tax Appeals in its journal entry found that the rapid transit system provides the only practical and rapid transportation between Shaker Heights and Cleveland; that facilities of the system are used also by residents of University Heights, Cleveland Heights and Cleveland; that most of the transportation afforded by the rapid transit system is between Shaker Heights and Cleveland, although such system furnishes intracity transportation; that lines of the Cleveland Transit System run from the southeast and northwest corners of Shaker, Heights to downtown Cleveland but transportation so afforded is much slower; and that there was no more actual competition in the case of *Zangerle*v. *City of Cleveland, supra,*than there was in the instant case and, therefore, the board could not distinguish the two cases.

In the journal entry of the Board of Tax Appeals it was found also that for the period from January 1 to October 31,1945, the operating revenue of the Shaker Heights Eapid Transit System was $728,546.63, out of which were paid all operating expenses and interest on bonds, $2,851.10 was allocated to the city of Shaker Heights and its city school district in lieu of taxes, $20,833.30 was set aside for bonded debt service and $143,525.80 was placed as earned surplus in the replacement fund for new equipment.

The Board of Tax Appeals was of the opinion, in view of what this court said in the *Cleveland case,*that the extent of profit was immaterial, since this *364court held, in effect, in that case that the operation of a transit system is a type of business which is designed primarily for profit.

A majority of this court adheres to the law pronounced in the cases of *State, ex rel. Methodist Book Concern,*v. *Guckenberger, Aud.,*and *Zangerle, Aud.,*v. *City of Cleveland, supra,*and the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is in the- present proceedings, therefore, affirmed.

*Decision affirmed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Turner, Matthias, Hart, Sohngen and Stewart, JJ., concur.

Zimmerman, J., dissents for the reason stated in the dissenting opinion in *Zangerle, Aud.,*v. *City of Cleveland,*145 Ohio St., 347, 361, 61 N. E. (2d), 720.