J-S59018-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WADE ANTHONY MASON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1590 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 29, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0006304-2009

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2019

Appellant Wade Anthony Mason appeals from the order dismissing as 

untimely his third petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA). 

Appellant’s PCRA counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and an 

Anders/Santiago brief.2 We affirm and grant PCRA counsel’s petition to 

withdraw.

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Counsel filed a brief and petition withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 

2009). When counsel seeks to withdraw from a matter involving the denial of 

PCRA relief, a Turner/Finley “no-merit letter” is the appropriate filing. See 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). However, “[b]ecause an 

Anders brief provides greater protection to a defendant, this Court may 

accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter.” Commonwealth 

v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as 

follows:

On January 20, 2011, a jury convicted [Appellant] of rape, sexual 

assault and simple assault. Thereafter, on April 11, 2011, the 

[trial] court sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of seven 

to fourteen years of imprisonment, and a consecutive two-year 

probationary term. Following the denial of [Appellant]’s timely

post-sentence motion, [Appellant] filed an appeal [with this 

Court], in which he raised a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. In 

an unpublished memorandum filed on April 14, 2012, [this Court]

rejected [Appellant]’s claim and affirmed his judgment of 

sentence. On September 19, 2012, the Supreme Court denied

[Appellant]’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth 

v. Mason, 48 A.3d 484 (Pa. Super. 2012).

[Appellant] thereafter filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and [the 

PCRA] court appointed counsel. After reviewing the record and 

[Appellant]’s proposed issues, PCRA counsel filed a petition to 

withdraw and “no-merit” letter pursuant to [Turner/Finley].

[The PCRA] court then issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of intent to 

dismiss [Appellant]’s pro se petition without a hearing. 

[Appellant] filed a pro se response. By order entered March 26,

2014, [the PCRA] court dismissed [Appellant]’s PCRA petition and 

granted PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw. [Appellant] filed a 

timely pro se appeal to [this Court]. In an unpublished 

memorandum filed on January 16, 2015, [this Court] affirmed the 

order denying [PCRA] relief. Commonwealth v. Mason, 118

A.3d 448 (Pa. Super. 2015). [Appellant] did not file a motion for 

allowance of appeal.

[Appellant] then filed his second pro se PCRA petition on March

20, 2015. Within this petition, [Appellant] reiterated his claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct that he unsuccessfully litigated during 

his direct appeal. [The PCRA] court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice 

of intent to dismiss [Appellant]’s second PCRA petition as untimely 

filed. [Appellant] filed a pro se response on May 18, 2015. By 

order entered June 22, 2015, this court dismissed [Appellant]’s 

second PCRA petition. [Appellant] filed a pro se appeal to [this 

Court]. In an unpublished memorandum filed on March 14, 2016, 

the Superior Court affirmed this court’s order denying [PCRA]

relief. Commonwealth v. Mason, No. 2483 EDA 2015.
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On November 30, 2017, [Appellant] filed the instant PCRA 

petition, his third, citing Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 

1189 (Pa. 2017). PCRA [c]ounsel was appointed to represent his 

interests. On March 5, 2019, [the PCRA court] served [Appellant] 

with a [Rule 907 notice]. Thereafter[, Appellant’s] PCRA was 

dismissed on April 30, 2019[.]

PCRA Ct. Op., 7/8/19, at 1-3 (some formatting altered).

On June 10, 2019, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He filed a 

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on June 21, 2019. The trial court 

issued a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion stating that Appellant’s PCRA 

petition was untimely. On August 29, 2019, PCRA counsel filed a petition to 

withdraw and an Anders brief with this Court. Appellant subsequently filed 

two pro se responses.

Counsel identifies one issue for our review:

Was the trial court in error for dismissing [Appellant’s PCRA] 

petition alleging that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant 

to [Muniz] and its progeny?

Anders/Santiago Brief at 9.

Initially, we must address whether PCRA counsel has fulfilled the 

procedural requirements for withdrawing his representation in this Court. 

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 510 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating 

that before “addressing the merits of the appeal, we must review counsel’s 

compliance with the procedural requirements for withdrawing as counsel” 

(citation omitted)).

As we have explained, 
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[c]ounsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must 

proceed under [Turner and Finley] and must review the case 

zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “no-merit” 

letter to the [PCRA] court, or brief on appeal to this Court, 

detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the 

case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to have reviewed, 

explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting 

permission to withdraw. 

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the 

“no merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to 

withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the 

right to proceed pro se or by new counsel.

Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that 

satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court—

[PCRA] court or this Court—must then conduct its own 

review of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with 

counsel that the claims are without merit, the court will 

permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief.

Id. at 510-11 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

As noted previously, we may accept PCRA counsel’s Anders brief if we 

conclude that it substantially complies with Turner/Finley. See Widgins, 

29 A.3d at 817 n.2. PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw and brief to this 

Court detail his diligent review of the case and includes the issue that 

Appellant wishes to have reviewed. PCRA counsel sets forth reasons why the 

issue lacks merit and requests permission to withdraw. Additionally, PCRA 

counsel has provided Appellant with a copy of the no-merit brief and his

application to withdraw, as well as a statement advising Appellant of his right 

to proceed pro se or with privately retained counsel. See Widgins, 29 A.3d 

at 818. Accordingly, we will permit PCRA counsel to withdraw if, after our 

review, we conclude that the issues relevant to this appeal lack merit.
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PCRA counsel identifies Appellant’s claim that Muniz satisfies the newly 

recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s time bar. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Anders/Santiago Brief at 6. PCRA counsel notes

that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to hold that Muniz applies 

retroactively. Id. Therefore, PCRA counsel maintains that Appellant cannot 

rely on Muniz to excuse the timeliness of his instant PCRA petition. Id.

Our standard of review for the dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to 

“whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the 

PCRA court’s decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 

A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We grant great deference to 

the PCRA court’s factual findings and we will not disturb them unless they 

have no support in the record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

It is well settled that “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional 

requisite.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 175 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). A PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent petition, 

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is final “at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
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Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a 

judgment of sentence becomes final only if the petitioner pleads and proves 

one of the following three statutory exceptions:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Moreover, a petitioner must file his petition 

within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).3

In Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 405-06 (Pa. Super. 

2018), appeal denied, 195 A.3d 559 (Pa. 2018), this Court explained that

[s]ubsection (iii) of Section 9545 has two requirements. 

First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional 

right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the 

United States or th[e Pennsylvania Supreme Court] after the 

time provided in this section. Second, it provides that the 

right “has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. 

Thus, a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” 

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33 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended on October 24, 2018, effective December 

24, 2018, extending the time for filing from sixty days of the date the claim 

could have been first presented to one year. The amendment applies to claims 

arising on December 24, 2017, or thereafter. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 

894, No. 146, § 3. 
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constitutional right and that the right “has been held” by 

that court to apply retroactively. The language “has been 

held” is in the past tense. These words mean that the action 

has already occurred, i.e., “that court” has already held the 

new constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on 

collateral review. By employing the past tense in writing 

this provision, the legislature clearly intended that the right 

was already recognized at the time the petition was filed.

Here, we acknowledge that this Court has declared that, “Muniz

created a substantive rule that retroactively applies in the 

collateral context.” Commonwealth v. Rivera-Figueroa, 174 

A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, because [the 

petitioner]’s PCRA petition is untimely (unlike the petition at issue 

in Rivera-Figueroa), he must demonstrate that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has held that Muniz applies retroactively in order 

to satisfy section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Because at this time, no such 

holding has been issued by our Supreme Court, [the petitioner] 

cannot rely on Muniz to meet that timeliness exception.

[fn1]

[fn1] Certainly, if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issues a 

decision holding that Muniz applies retroactively, [the 

petitioner] can then file a PCRA petition . . . attempting to 

invoke the ‘new retroactive right’ exception of section 

9545(b)(1)(iii). 

Murphy, 180 A.3d at 405-06 (some citations omitted).

Instantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to hold that Muniz

applies retroactively. Accordingly, like the petitioner in Murphy, Appellant 

cannot rely on Muniz to excuse the facial untimeliness of the instant PCRA 

petition. See id. Therefore, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s 

petition as untimely. See Lawson, 90 A.3d at 4.
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We must also address Appellant’s pro se responses to PCRA counsel’s 

Anders brief and petition to withdraw. From what we can discern,4it appears 

that Appellant is seeking to characterize his untimely PCRA as a petition for 

habeas corpus or coram nobis relief. Additionally, Appellant cites to the ex 

post facto clause of the United States Constitution, an apparent reference to 

his Muniz claim.

Our Supreme Court has held that “claims that could be brought under 

the PCRA must be brought under that Act. No other statutory or common law 

remedy ‘for the same purpose’ is intended to be available; instead, such 

remedies are explicitly ‘encompassed’ within the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. 

Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis omitted); see also 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9542 (stating that the PCRA subsumes both habeas corpus and 

coram nobis); see also Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (explaining that other remedies do “not become available 

merely because the PCRA [court] refuses to remedy a petitioner’s grievance; 

rather, we look at the claims a petitioner is raising”). In sum, if “a petitioner’s 

claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining 

collateral review.” Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 503 (Pa. 

2016).

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4

In his pro se filings, Appellant includes numerous citations to cases and 

statutes, but does not indicate how they are applicable to his case. Therefore, 

we limit our analysis to the issue that we were able to decipher from his 

statements of the law.
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Here, to the extent Appellant challenges his sentence under Muniz and 

the ex post facto clause, his claim is cognizable under the PCRA. See

Commonwealth v. Greco, 203 A.3d 1120, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding 

that a post-conviction claim that an original sentence is illegal due to the 

retroactive application of a sexual offender registration requirement must be 

raised in a PCRA petition). Therefore, because Appellant’s underlying claim is 

cognizable under the PCRA, he cannot seek habeas corpus or coram nobis

relief. See Descardes, 136 A.3d at 503; see also Pagan, 864 A.2d at 1233.

Because our own review of the record confirms that Appellant’s claims

are without merit, we affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition, and 

we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Murphy, 180 A.3d at 405-06; 

Muzzy, 141 A.3d at 510.

Order affirmed. Application to withdraw as counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/12/19