### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON September 19,

2001 Session VENELSIA STEPHENS v. THE SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ET AL 

### . A Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. 80136 T.D., The Honorable D'Army Bailey, Judge

No. W2000-01353-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 18, 2001
County employee sued county for on-the -job injury benefits resul

ting from carpel tunnel syndrome. Employee filed suit over one year after the county denied her claim for benefits. After a nonjury trial, the trial court dismissed pla

intiff’s case with prejudice as barred by the one-y ear statute of limitatio

ns. Employee

appeals. We affi

rm.
Tenn.R.App.P. 3; A

ppeal as of Right; Judgm ent of the Circuit C

ourt Affirmed and Remanded
W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W .S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS , J. and H OLLY K IRBY L ILLARD , J., joined. Florence M. Johnson, Memphis, For Appellant, Venelsia Stephens Carroll C. Johnson, Memphis, For Appellees, Shelby County Government, et al

OPINION Since December of 1982, plaintiff, Venelsia Stephens, has been employed with the Shelby County Correctional Cen

ter as a deputy jailer. Her duties

include supervising inmates, operating and controlling the metal doors, tending to the needs of prisoners and filling out

forms. Some time in the year 1992, Ms. Stephens began having pain, numbness, an

d tingling in

both of her hands. She was seen and treated by Dr. John Huffman. Dr. Huffman testified that when he saw Ms. Stephens on March 4, 1994, she was havi ng severe car

pel tunnel sy

mptoms, and he sug

gested that she w

ould need surgery. She was fitted splints and placed on non-steroidal anti-inflammatory agent s. He further testified that he saw her again on March 18, 1994, and her sy mptoms were very severe. He then referred her

to a Dr. Manugian. At

that time, he determined that she would need a letter stating-2-

that this condition was job-related. Ms. Stephens testified that she made a claim w

ith the county

in February or March of 1994 for an on-the-job injury. Shortly thereafter, she received a letter dated April 11, 1994, denying her claim for an on-the-job injury

. Shelby County has not

e lected to c ome under the provisions of the Tennessee Workers Compensation Act, but the County has adopted an on-

the-job injury

policy (“O

JI polic y ”) to compensate emplo

yees injure

d on the job. The poli

cy further provides: On issues where Coun

ty poli cy is s ilent, the policy and practice of Shelby County is to use the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act as a guide and to operate in substantial compliance with the Act. There is no limitation period set out in the OJI policy. The statute of limitations contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that suit must be filed within one year of the dat e of i nju ry. T.C.A. § § 50-6-203, 224 (1999).
Ms. Stephens argue

d in the trial court

, and asserts

in this Court, that the

statute of limitations is not triggered

until the employee is advised of a permanent impairment rating. As the trial court aptly observed, an employee can get a temporar y disability compensation without any permanent impairment. In Hibner v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. , 619 S.W.2d 109 (1981), the Court said:

The determination of

the time the statute of limitations begins to run often is troublesome, not from the standpoint of what triggers the running of the statute but from a factual standp oint . It is now settled that the date the employee ’s disa bility manifests itself to a person of reasonable diligence, not the date of the accident, triggers the statute of limitations. Davidson & Graham Const. Co. v. McKee , 562 S.W.2d 426 (Tenn. 197 8); Norton Co. v. Coffin , 553 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. 1977); U

nion Carbide Corp., Food Prod. Div. v. Cannon , 523 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 197 5); Imperial Shi rt Corporation v. Jenkin s , 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S. W.2d 757 (1966); Griffitts v. Humphrey , 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955). Id. at 110-11. The statute begins to run when the employee knows or reasonably

should know that a compen

sable injury has been sustained. See Livington v. Shelby Williams Industries , 811 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1991). Plaintiff’s complaint was filed July

24, 1996. The rec

ord establishes th

at in April 1994, Ms. Stephens knew that her condition was diagnosed as carpel tunnel syndrome, she knew that her physician felt that it was work-related, she filed a claim for on-the-job injury, the claim was denied, she had surgery on

bothhands, and she missed time from work because of this condition. Under the-3-

facts in this record, Ms. Stephens knew or reasonably should have known that she had sustained a compensable injury

more than one year the complaint was filed. The trial court so found, and the evidence does not preponderate against this finding. Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d).
Acco rdi ngly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and

the case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be ne cessary. Costs of the appeal are assessed agai

nst the app ell ant , Ve nel sia Ste phe ns, and her s uret y.

__________________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD , PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S

.