44110 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

the request and will publish that 

determination in the Federal Register. 

* * * * * 

Done in Washington, DC, this 23rd day of 

July 2012. 

Kevin Shea, 

Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–18324 Filed 7–26–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 29 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0785; Special 

Conditions No. 29–027–SC] 

Special Conditions: Agusta S.p.A. 

Model AW139 and AB139 Helicopter, 

Installation of a Search and Rescue 

(SAR) Automatic Flight Control System 

(AFCS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) 

Model AW139 and AB139 helicopters. 

These model helicopters, as modified by 

Agusta, will have novel or unusual 

design features associated with 

installing an optional SAR AFCS. The 

applicable airworthiness standards do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

show a level of safety equivalent to that 

established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is July 18, 2012. We 

must receive your comments by 

September 25, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [FAA–2012–0785] 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver 

comments to the ‘‘Mail’’ address 

between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://regulations.gov, including any 

personal information the commenter 

provides. Using the search function of 

the docket Web site, anyone can find 

and read the electronic form of all 

comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: You can read the background 

documents or comments received at 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for accessing the 

docket or go to the Docket Operations in 

Room @12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 

9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

FAA, Aircraft Certification Service, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and 

Policy Group (ASW–111), Attn: Stephen 

Barbini, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 

222–5196; facsimile (817) 222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and 

Comment Before Adoption 

The substance of these special 

conditions has been subjected to the 

notice and comment period previously 

and has been derived without 

substantive change from those 

previously issued. It is unlikely that 

prior public comment would result in a 

significant change from the substance 

contained herein. Further, a delay in the 

effective date of these special conditions 

would significantly delay issuance of 

the design approval and thus delivery of 

the helicopter, which is imminent. 

Therefore, the FAA has determined that 

prior public notice and comment are 

unnecessary, impracticable, and 

contrary to the public interest, and finds 

good cause exists for adopting these 

special conditions upon issuance. The 

FAA is requesting comments to allow 

interested persons to submit views that 

may not have been submitted in 

response to the prior opportunities for 

comment. 

Comments Invited 

While we did not precede this with a 

notice of proposed special conditions, 

we invite interested people to take part 

in this action by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring additional expense or 

delay. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

Background and Discussion 

On November 11, 2008, Agusta 

applied for a change to Type Certificate 

(TC) No. R00002RD to install an 

optional SAR AFCS in the Model AB139 

and AW139 helicopters. The AB139 and 

AW139 models are transport category 

helicopters certificated to Category A 

and Category B requirements, and 

instrument flight certificated under the 

requirements of Appendix B to 14 CFR 

part 29, Amendment 29–40. 

There is a need to use dedicated 

AFCS upper modes, in which a fully 

coupled autopilot provides operational 

SAR profiles, for SAR operations 

conducted over water in offshore areas 

clear of obstructions. The SAR modes 

enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully 

coupled maneuvers, to include 

predefined search patterns during cruise 

flight, and to transition from cruise 

flight to a stabilized hover and 

departure (transition from hover to 

cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also 

includes an auxiliary crew control that 

allows another crewmember (such as a 

hoist operator) to have limited authority 

to control the helicopter’s longitudinal 

and lateral position during hover 

operations. 

Flight operations conducted over 

water at night may have an extremely 

limited visual horizon with little visual 

reference to the surface even when 

conducted under Visual Meteorological 

Conditions. Consequently, the 

certification requirements for SAR 

modes must meet Appendix B to 14 CFR 

part 29 for helicopter instrument flight. 

While this appendix prescribes 

airworthiness criteria for instrument 

flight, it does not consider operations 

below instrument flight minimum speed 

(VMINI), whereas the SAR modes allow 

for coupled operations at low speed, allazimuth flight to zero airspeed (hover). 

Since SAR operations have 

traditionally been a public use mission, 

the use of SAR modes in civil 

operations requires special 

airworthiness standards (special 

conditions) to maintain a level of safety 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 44111 

consistent with Category A and 

Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) 

certification. In this regard, 14 CFR part 

29 lacks adequate airworthiness 

standards for AFCS SAR mode 

certification to include flight 

characteristics, performance, and 

installed equipment and systems. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.101, Agusta must 

show the AW139 and AB139 model 

helicopters, as changed, continue to 

meet either the applicable provisions of 

the rules incorporated by reference in 

TC No. R00002RD or the applicable 

regulations in effect on the date of 

application for the change, depending 

on the significance of the change as 

defined by 14 CFR 21.101. The 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

the TC are commonly referred to as the 

‘‘original type certification basis.’’ The 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

R00002RD are as follows: 

(a) 14 CFR 21.29 and Part 29, 

Amendments 29–1 through 29–45. 

(b) Appendix B to Part 29, 

Amendment 29–40. 

(c) 14 CFR part 36, Appendix H, 

Amendment 36–1 through Amendment 

36–25. 

(d) Special Condition No. 29–0010– 

SC, High Intensity Radiated Fields 

(HIRF), dated Feb. 19, 2004. 

(e) Equivalent Level of Safety 

Findings issued against: 

(1) 14 CFR 29.1305, as documented in 

AB139 FAA Memo dated Dec. 20, 2004. 

(2) 14 CFR 29.1321, as documented in 

AB139 FAA Memo dated Dec. 20, 2004. 

Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness standards (i.e., 

14 CFR part 29) do not contain adequate 

or appropriate safety standards for the 

Agusta model AW139 and AB139 

helicopters because of a novel or 

unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under 14 CFR 

21.16. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the TC for that model 

be amended later to include any other 

model that incorporates the same novel 

or unusual design feature, or should any 

other model already included on the 

same TC be modified to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would also 

apply to the other model. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Agusta model AW139 and AB139 

helicopters will incorporate the 

following novel or unusual design 

features: 

The SAR system is composed of a 

navigation computer with SAR modes, 

an AFCS that provides coupled SAR 

functions, hoist operator control, a 

hover speed reference system, and two 

radio altimeters. The AFCS coupled 

SAR functions include: 

(a) Hover hold at selected height 

above the surface. 

(b) Ground speed hold. 

(c) Transition down and hover to a 

waypoint under guidance from the 

navigation computer. 

(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and 

hover near a target over which the 

helicopter has flown. 

(e) Transition up, climb, and capture 

a cruise height. 

(f) Capture and track SAR search 

patterns generated by the navigation 

computer. 

(g) Monitor the preselected hover 

height with automatic increase in 

collective if the aircraft height drops 

below the safe minimum height. 

These SAR modes are intended to be 

used over large bodies of water in areas 

clear of obstructions. Further, use of the 

modes that transition down from cruise 

to hover will include operation at 

airspeeds below VMINI. 

The SAR system only entails 

navigation, flight control, and coupled 

AFCS operation of the helicopter. The 

system does not include the additional 

equipment that may be required for over 

water flight or external loads to meet 

other operational requirements. 

Applicability 

These special conditions apply to the 

Agusta Model AW139 and AB139 

helicopters. Should Agusta apply at a 

later date for a change to the TC to 

include another model incorporating the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would apply to 

that model as well under the provisions 

of § 21.101(d). 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on two 

model helicopters (i.e., AW139 and 

AB139 helicopters). It is not a rule of 

general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

■ The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701– 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Agusta Model 

AW139 and AB139 helicopters when 

the optional Search and Rescue (SAR) 

Automatic Flight Control System 

(AFCS) is installed: 

In addition to the part 29 certification 

requirements for Category A and 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B), the following additional 

requirements must be met for 

certification of the SAR AFCS: 

(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled 

SAR flight modes must provide: 

(1) Safe and controlled flight in three 

axes (lateral and longitudinal position/ 

speed and height/vertical speed) at all 

airspeeds from instrument flight 

minimum speed (VMINI) to a hover 

within the maximum demonstrated 

wind envelope. 

(2) Automatic transition to the 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B) envelope as part of the normal SAR 

mode sequencing. 

(3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around 

mode that safely interrupts any other 

coupled mode and automatically 

transitions the helicopter to the 

instrument flight (Appendix B) 

envelope. 

(4) A means to prevent unintended 

flight below a safe minimum height. 

Pilot-commanded descent below the 

safe minimum height is acceptable 

provided the alerting requirements in 

(b)(7)(i) alert the pilot of this descent 

below safe minimum height. 

(b) SAR Mode System Architecture. 

To support the integrity of the SAR 

modes, the following system 

architecture is required: 

(1) A system for limiting the engine 

power demanded by the AFCS when 

any of the automatic piloting modes are 

engaged, so full authority digital engine 

control power limitations, such as 

torque and temperature, are not 

exceeded. 

(2) A system providing the aircraft 

height above the surface and final pilotselected height at a location on the 

instrument panel in a position 

acceptable to the FAA that will make it 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at their station. 

(3) A system providing the aircraft 

heading and the pilot-selected heading 

at a location on the instrument panel in 

a position acceptable to the FAA that 

will make it plainly visible to and 

usable by any pilot at their station. 

(4) A system providing the aircraft 

longitudinal and lateral ground speeds 


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44112 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

and the pilot-selected longitudinal and 

lateral ground speeds when used by the 

AFCS in the flight envelope where 

airspeed indications become unreliable. 

This information must be presented at a 

location on the instrument panel in a 

position acceptable to the FAA that is 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at their station. 

(5) A system providing wind speed 

and wind direction when automatic 

piloting modes are engaged or 

transitioning from one mode to another. 

(6) A system that monitors for flight 

guidance deviations and failures, and 

contains an alerting function that 

provides the flight crew with enough 

information to take appropriate 

corrective action. 

(7) The alerting system must provide 

visual or aural alerts, or both, to the 

flight crew under any of the below 

conditions: 

(i) When the stored or pilot-selected 

safe minimum height is reached. 

(ii) When a SAR mode system 

malfunction occurs. 

(iii) When the AFCS changes modes 

automatically from one SAR mode to 

another. 

For normal transitions from one SAR 

mode to another, a single visual or aural 

alert may suffice. For a SAR mode 

malfunction or a mode having a timecritical component, the flight crew 

alerting system must activate early 

enough to allow the flight crew to take 

timely and appropriate action. The 

alerting system means must be designed 

to alert the flight crew in order to 

minimize crew errors that could create 

an additional hazard. 

(8) The SAR system hoist operator 

control is considered a flight control 

with limited authority and must comply 

with the following: 

(i) The hoist operator control must be 

designed and located to provide for 

convenient operation and to prevent 

confusion and inadvertent operation. 

(ii) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable by the hoist operator 

control throughout the range of that 

control. 

(iii) The hoist operator control may 

not interfere with the safe operation of 

the helicopter. 

(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls 

must be able to smoothly override the 

limited control authority of the hoist 

operator control, without exceptional 

piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and 

without the danger of exceeding any 

other limitation because of the override. 

(9) The reliability of the AFCS must 

be related to the effects of its failure. 

The occurrence of any failure condition 

that would prevent continued safe flight 

and landing must be extremely 

improbable. For any failure condition of 

the AFCS which is not shown to be 

extremely improbable: 

(i) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable and capable of continued 

safe flight without exceptional piloting 

skill, alertness, or strength. Additional 

unrelated probable failures affecting the 

control system must be evaluated. 

(ii) The AFCS must be designed so 

that it cannot create a hazardous 

deviation in the flight path or produce 

hazardous loads on the helicopter 

during normal operation or in the event 

of a malfunction or failure, assuming 

corrective action begins within an 

appropriate period of time. Where 

multiple systems are installed, 

subsequent malfunction conditions 

must be evaluated in sequence unless 

their occurrence is shown to be 

improbable. 

(10) A functional hazard assessment 

and a system safety assessment must be 

provided to the FAA that addresses the 

failure conditions associated with SAR 

operations. 

(i) For SAR catastrophic failure 

conditions, changes may be required to 

the following: 

(A) System architecture. 

(B) Software and complex electronic 

hardware design assurance levels. 

(C) High Intensity Radiated Field 

(HIRF) test levels. 

(D) Instructions for continued 

airworthiness. 

(ii) The assessments must consider all 

the systems required for SAR operations 

to include the AFCS, all associated 

AFCS sensors (for example, radio 

altimeter), and primary flight displays. 

Electrical and electronic systems with 

SAR catastrophic failure conditions (for 

example, AFCS) must comply with the 

§ 29.1317(a)(4) HIRF requirements. 

(c) SAR Mode Performance 

Requirements. 

(1) Demonstrate the SAR modes for 

the requested flight envelope, including 

the following minimum sea-state and 

wind conditions: 

(i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 

meters (8.2 feet), considering both short 

and long swells. 

(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 

knots for all other azimuths. 

(2) The selected hover height and 

hover velocity must be captured (to 

include the transition from one captured 

mode to another captured mode) 

accurately and smoothly and not exhibit 

any significant overshoot or oscillation. 

(3) The minimum use height (MUH) 

for the SAR modes must be no more 

than the maximum loss of height 

following any single failure or any 

combination of failures not shown to be 

extremely improbable, plus an 

additional 15 feet. The MUH is the 

minimum height at which any SAR 

AFCS mode may be engaged. 

(4) The SAR mode system must be 

usable up to the maximum certified 

gross weight of the aircraft or to the 

lower of the following weights: 

(i) Maximum emergency flotation 

weight. 

(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground 

Effect (OGE) weight. 

(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight. 

(d) Flight Characteristics. 

(1) The basic aircraft must meet all of 

the part 29 airworthiness criteria for 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B). 

(2) For SAR mode coupled flight 

below VMINI, at the maximum 

demonstrated winds, the helicopter 

must be able to maintain any required 

flight condition and make a smooth 

transition from any flight condition to 

any other flight condition without 

requiring exceptional piloting skill, 

alertness, or strength, and without 

exceeding the limit load factor. This 

requirement also includes aircraft 

control through the hoist operator’s 

control. 

(3) For SAR modes at airspeeds below 

VMINI, the following requirements of 

Appendix B to part 29 must be met and 

will be used as an extension to the IFR 

certification envelope of the basic 

aircraft: 

(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: the 

requirements of paragraph IV of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: 

The requirements of paragraph V of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(iii) Dynamic Stability: The 

requirements of paragraph VI of 

Appendix B are replaced with the 

following two paragraphs: 

(A) Any oscillation must be damped 

and any aperiodic response must not 

double in amplitude in less than 10 

seconds. This requirement must also be 

met with degraded upper mode(s) of the 

AFCS. An ‘‘upper mode’’ is a mode that 

utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to 

provide an operational SAR profile. 

(B) After any upset, the AFCS must 

return the aircraft to the last 

commanded position within 10 seconds 

or less. 

(4) With any of the upper mode(s) of 

the AFCS engaged, the pilot must be 

able to manually recover the aircraft and 

transition to the normal (Appendix B) 

IFR flight profile envelope without 

exceptional skill, alertness, or strength. 

(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) 

Performance Information. 

(1) The following performance 

information must be provided in the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 44113 

Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement 

(RFMS): 

(i) OEI performance information and 

emergency procedures, providing the 

maximum weight that will provide a 

minimum clearance of 15 feet above the 

surface, following failure of the critical 

engine in a hover. The maximum weight 

must be presented as a function of the 

hover height for the temperature and 

pressure altitude range requested for 

certification. The effects of wind must 

be reflected in the hover performance 

information. 

(ii) Hover OGE performance with the 

critical engine inoperative for OEI 

continuous and time-limited power 

ratings for those weights, altitudes, and 

temperatures for which certification is 

requested. 

Note: These OEI performance requirements 

do not replace performance requirements that 

may be needed to comply with the 

airworthiness or operational standards (14 

CFR 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external 

loads or human external cargo. 

(f) RFMS. 

(1) The RFMS must contain, at a 

minimum: 

(i) Limitations necessary for safe 

operation of the SAR system to include: 

(A) Minimum crew requirements. 

(B) Maximum SAR weight. 

(C) Engagement criteria for each of the 

SAR modes to include MUH (as 

determined in paragraph (c)(3)). 

(ii) Normal and emergency procedures 

for operation of the SAR system (to 

include operation of the hoist operator 

control), with AFCS failure modes, 

AFCS degraded modes, and engine 

failures. 

(iii) Performance information: 

(A) OEI performance and height-loss. 

(B) Hover OGE performance 

information, utilizing OEI continuous 

and time-limited power ratings. 

(C) The maximum wind envelope 

demonstrated in flight test. 

(g) Flight Demonstration. 

(1) Before approval of the SAR 

system, an acceptable flight 

demonstration of all the coupled SAR 

modes is required. 

(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe 

operations during coupled maneuvers. 

The demonstration of fail-safe 

operations must include a pilot 

workload assessment associated with 

manually flying the aircraft to an 

altitude greater than 200 feet above the 

surface and an airspeed of at least the 

best rate of climb airspeed (Vy). 

(3) For any failure condition of the 

SAR system not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the pilot must be able to 

make a smooth transition from one 

flight mode to another without 

exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength. 

(4) Failure conditions that are not 

shown to be extremely improbable must 

be demonstrated by analysis, ground 

testing, or flight testing. For failures 

demonstrated in flight, the following 

normal pilot recovery times are 

acceptable: 

(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/ 

Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover modes: 

Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second. 

(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot 

recognition plus 3 seconds. 

(5) All AFCS malfunctions must 

include evaluation at the low-speed and 

high-power flight conditions typical of 

SAR operations. Additionally, AFCS 

hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory 

malfunctions, particularly in yaw, 

require evaluation. AFCS malfunction 

testing must include a single or a 

combination of failures (e.g., erroneous 

data from and loss of the radio altimeter, 

attitude, heading, and altitude sensors) 

that are not shown to be extremely 

improbable. 

(6) The flight demonstration must 

include the following environmental 

conditions: 

(i) Swell into wind. 

(ii) Swell and wind from different 

directions. 

(iii) Cross swell. 

(iv) Swell of different lengths (short 

and long swell). 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on July 18, 

2012. 

Kimberly K. Smith, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–18199 Filed 7–26–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0675; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–120–AD; Amendment 

39–17131; AD 2012–13–51] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Gulfstream 

Aerospace LP (Type Certificate 

Previously Held by Israel Aircraft 

Industries, Ltd.) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Gulfstream Aerospace LP (Type 

Certificate previously held by Israel 

Aircraft Industries, Ltd.) Model 

Gulfstream G150 airplanes. This 

emergency AD was sent previously to 

all known U.S. owners and operators of 

these airplanes. This AD requires a onetime detailed or borescope inspection of 

the left- and right-hand inboard vent 

holes for debris or obstructions, and 

repair if necessary. This AD was 

prompted by a report indicating that an 

inboard vent tube hole was completely 

covered with sealant, which blocked 

airflow through the vent. Under these 

conditions, the rise of internal pressure 

during pressure fueling or due to 

thermal expansion is sufficient to 

damage the wing. We are issuing this 

AD to detect and correct compromised 

integrity of the wing structure. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 13, 

2012 to all persons except those persons 

to whom it was made immediately 

effective by emergency AD 2012–13–51, 

issued on June 26, 2012, which 

contained the requirements of this 

amendment. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication identified in the 

AD as of August 13, 2012. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by September 10, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Gulfstream Aerospace 

Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, Mail 

Station D–25, Savannah, Georgia 31402– 

2206; telephone 800–810–4853; fax 

912–965–3520; email 

pubs@gulfstream.com; Internet http:// 

www.gulfstream.com/product_support/ 

technical_pubs/pubs/index.htm. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 


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