In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 11, 2021

S20A1289. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.

 WARREN, Justice.

Sharod Johnson was convicted of malice murder and other 

crimes in connection with a string of armed robberies that 

culminated in the shooting death of David Lee Casto.1 On appeal,

 1 The crimes occurred on August 25 to 26 and September 5, 2010. On 

March 15, 2011, a Forsyth County grand jury issued a multiple-count 

indictment against Johnson and four of his accomplices. The indictment 

charged Johnson with armed robbery of Alicia Richard, aggravated assault of 

Kenneth Barrett, armed robbery of Suzette McCrary, burglary of an Ingles 

store, armed robbery of Casto, armed robbery of Rosa Marie Turpin, 

aggravated assault of Turpin, malice murder of Casto, felony murder of Casto 

predicated on armed robbery of Turpin, and felony murder of Casto predicated 

on burglary. Johnson was tried separately in August 2013, and the jury found 

him guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Johnson to life in prison for 

malice murder, a consecutive term of life imprisonment for the armed robbery 

of Casto, a consecutive term of 20 years for the aggravated assault of Turpin, 

two concurrent terms of 20 years each for the armed robberies of Richard and 

McCrary, and a concurrent term of 20 years for the aggravated assault of 

Barrett. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law.

Although the trial court erred in merging the burglary count with one of the 

felony murder counts, see Carter v. State, 299 Ga. 1, 2-3 (785 SE2d 532) (2016), 
2

Johnson contends that the trial court erred when it failed to strike 

the testimony of a State witness and that Johnson was deprived of 

the effective assistance of counsel with regard to that witness.

Johnson also contends that the trial court erred when it denied his 

motions to suppress evidence related to searches of his cell phone, 

home, and car. Seeing no reversible error, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the 

evidence presented at trial showed that Johnson and his coindictees—Tyrice Adside, Travarius Jackson, Nakitta Holmes, and 

Darren Slayton—were friends or acquaintances and spent time 

together in the summer of 2010. In late August and early September 

2010, Johnson and the others engaged in three separate armed 

robberies, as detailed below.

 

this merger error benefits Johnson, and the State has not raised it by crossappeal, so we decline to correct the error. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 698

(808 SE2d 696) (2017). Johnson filed a timely motion for new trial on August 

22, 2013, and he amended it through new counsel on November 28, 2018. After 

a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, as amended, on June 24, 2019.

Johnson timely appealed, and this case was docketed in this Court for the

August 2020 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 
3

The Waffle House Robbery

In August 2010, Johnson, Adside, and Slayton decided to rob a 

Waffle House in Forsyth County. To carry out the robbery, the men 

used Johnson’s shotgun (which he kept in the trunk of his car) and 

a .40 caliber Glock handgun that they borrowed from another 

acquaintance, Ardansac McMillan. Around 1:00 a.m. on August 25, 

the trio drove to the Waffle House in Johnson’s car and parked at 

the back of the building. Johnson and Adside then got out, jumped 

over a fence, and ran inside the Waffle House dressed in all-black 

clothing and with their faces covered with t-shirts. Adside carried 

the shotgun and Johnson carried the handgun, though both weapons 

were unloaded at the time. Inside the restaurant, the men 

encountered a server, Alicia Richard, and the cook, Kenneth Barrett. 

Adside threatened Richard with the shotgun and had her give him 

money from the cash register. Meanwhile, Johnson pointed a gun 

at Barrett and demanded that he open the safe. When Barrett said 

he was unable to do so, Johnson threatened to kill him. Adside and 

Johnson then took the money from the cash register and left. 
4

The Chevron Robbery

After robbing the Waffle House, Johnson and his accomplices

decided to rob a Chevron gas station on Buford Highway, where 

Adside had been a customer and “knew the lady inside.” This time, 

five men participated in the robbery: Johnson, Adside, Jackson, 

Holmes, and Slayton. Early in the morning of August 26, the group 

drove to the gas station in Johnson’s car and parked behind the 

building. Adside stayed in the car while Johnson and the others

went inside the gas station, where Suzette McCrary was working 

the night shift as a cashier. Holmes carried Johnson’s shotgun and

Jackson carried McMillan’s handgun. The four men confronted 

McCrary, forced her at gunpoint to give them cash from the 

registers, and stole some cigarettes. After the robbery, on the way 

home, Slayton and Jackson referred to Holmes as a “beast” because 

he was “good at what he does,” and Johnson and the others laughed.

The Ingles Robbery

After the Chevron robbery, Johnson suggested to Adside and 

the others that they rob the Ingles grocery store where Johnson
5

worked as a cashier; Johnson said the robbery would net “a lot of 

money”—over $20,000—and would be easy to accomplish. Johnson 

informed the group that a security guard would be present, so the 

men devised a plan to “tie him up and put him in the freezer,” and 

Holmes said that “if the guard tried to buck or anything, he was 

going to shoot him.” The night before the robbery, Johnson, along 

with Adside and Jackson, drove by Ingles to “case the place.”

Afterward, the trio drove to a nearby Waffle House, where they 

ordered a drink.

On the evening of September 5, after Johnson began his shift 

at Ingles, Adside, Jackson, and Holmes drove to Ingles in Johnson’s 

car, parked in the back of the store near the loading dock, and texted 

Johnson to alert him of their arrival. Johnson opened the back door, 

let the others inside, and told them to wait inside the meat freezer, 

though he moved the men to the milk cooler when Adside 

complained that the freezer was too cold. As they had planned, 

Holmes carried the shotgun and Jackson carried the handgun.
6

Around 11:00 p.m., only three employees remained at the store: 

Johnson, Casto (the security guard), and Rosa Marie Turpin (the 

assistant manager). When all three employees went to the back of 

the store to check the security door, Adside and his group came out 

of the cooler with their faces covered, pointed their guns at the 

employees, and told them to get down. The men then placed tape on 

Casto’s eyes and wrists and removed his gun and bulletproof vest. 

When Holmes took the guard’s gun, Adside took the shotgun Holmes 

had been carrying. Adside then placed Casto in the freezer and 

closed the door, while Holmes and Jackson went to the front of the 

store and forced Turpin at gunpoint to give them cash from the safe 

and the self-check-out counters. As the money was being retrieved, 

Holmes went to the back of the store and shot Casto, who was still 

tied up in the freezer.

After collecting the money and some cigarettes, Adside and his 

group took Johnson and Turpin to the back of the store and placed 

tape on Turpin’s eyes and wrists, while Johnson did the same to 

himself. The trio then moved Turpin and Johnson into the freezer 
7

where Casto was lying, though Turpin did not know at the time that 

Casto had been shot or that he was in the freezer with them. Adside, 

Holmes, and Jackson left the store and drove to McMillan’s house in 

Buford, where they split the proceeds of the robbery. Meanwhile, 

Johnson was able to free himself relatively quickly, and Turpin—not 

realizing at the time that he was involved in the robbery—asked him 

to call the police. Johnson did not want to use his own phone, 

however, and suggested that Turpin use hers. When the police 

arrived on the scene, they found Casto lying in the back of the

freezer and determined that he was deceased. An autopsy revealed 

that Casto died from a close-range gunshot wound to the head.2

Johnson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Nevertheless, consistent with this Court’s general practice in 

 2 Much of the evidence against Johnson came from the testimony of 

Adside, who participated in all three robberies, and the testimony of the 

robbery victims: Richard, Barrett, McCrary, and Turpin. The State also 

presented the testimony of Johnson’s friend, Adaria Cooper, who testified that 

she had seen a shotgun in the trunk of Johnson’s car, that she was present 

when Adside, Holmes, and Jackson arrived at McMillan’s house after the 

Ingles robbery, and that the men discussed the robbery and flaunted the 

proceeds. 
8

murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence 

presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was guilty of the crimes for 

which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-

319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).3

2. Johnson contends that the trial court erred when it failed to 

strike the testimony of Darren Slayton after he invoked the Fifth 

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to 

testify further at trial. Slayton had pleaded guilty to two charges of 

armed robbery for his involvement in the Waffle House and Chevron 

robberies, and he was called by the State as a witness at Johnson’s 

trial. The prosecutor began the direct examination by eliciting 

background information from Slayton. Among other things, Slayton

testified that he had introduced Adside to Johnson, that Slayton had 

 3 We remind litigants that, starting with cases docketed to the term of 

this Court that began in December 2020, we will end our practice of considering 

sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases. See Davenport v. State, 309 

Ga. 385, 398-399 (846 SE2d 83) (2020). This Court began assigning cases to 

the December term on August 3, 2020.
9

talked to Johnson “at community service,” and that he, Johnson,

Jackson, and McMillan regularly spent time at McMillan’s home, 

where they smoked marijuana and consumed “X pills.” Slayton also 

testified that he had seen a shotgun in the trunk of Johnson’s car.

The prosecutor then started questioning Slayton about the 

events of August 25, 2010; Slayton testified that, on that day, 

Johnson called him and asked what he was doing, after which they 

went to meet with McMillan and Jackson. Before providing any 

more details, however, Slayton said, “I’m sorry, I can’t do this. I’m 

sorry, I can’t do this. I can’t—I plead the Fifth. I can’t talk anymore. 

I’m sorry.” After confirming that Slayton had invoked his Fifth 

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Johnson’s lawyer 

moved to strike Slayton’s “entire testimony.” The State opposed the 

motion, stating that Johnson could “cross-examine [Slayton] on the 

stuff that he’s testified about,” but that Johnson “just apparently 

can’t go any further, unless [Slayton] chooses to testify further.” The 

trial court told Johnson’s lawyer: “I will permit you to cross-examine 

[Slayton] on what he’s testified about. But he’s indicated he’s not 
10

going to go further.” Johnson’s lawyer responded, “Then I don’t 

believe I have any questions.” At that point, Slayton left the stand, 

and the State called its next witness. 

On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court’s failure to 

strike Slayton’s testimony violated his right to confrontation. We 

disagree.4 “The main and essential purpose of the right of 

confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.” State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 638 (571 SE2d 752)

(2002) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (94 SCt 1105, 39 

LE2d 347) (1974) (punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 24-6-611

(b) (“The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall 

belong to every party as to the witnesses called against the party.”). 

Here, the trial court expressly gave Johnson the opportunity to 

 4 The State argues that we should review this enumeration only for plain 

error because Johnson did not expressly assert his right to confrontation when 

he moved to strike Slayton’s testimony. But we need not address whether to 

review Johnson’s claim under our ordinary standard of review or the more 

stringent “plain error” standard; as discussed below, Johnson has not shown 

any error, plain or otherwise, and so his claim fails under either standard of 

review. See Barton-Smith v. State, __ Ga. __ n.6 (848 SE2d 384, 388) (2020) 

(declining to decide whether defendant preserved his claim of error because the 

alleged error was harmless under both the ordinary standard of review and the 

plain-error standard).
11

cross-examine Slayton about the events to which Slayton testified, 

but Johnson expressly declined to do so. As a result, Johnson cannot 

show that he was improperly deprived of his right to confront 

Slayton. See, e.g., Rice v. State, 281 Ga. 149, 151 (635 SE2d 707) 

(2006) (defendant was not denied his right to confrontation because

he “was afforded a sufficient opportunity for cross-examination,” 

and “the lack of cross-examination in this case is the result of his 

waiving that opportunity”); Sherrell v. State, 274 Ga. 431, 431 (554 

SE2d 726) (2001) (“‘By refusing to cross examine, defense counsel 

waived any right to object based on a denial of cross examination.’”) 

(quoting Lively v. State, 237 Ga. 35, 36 (226 SE2d 581) (1976)); Green 

v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 24 (679 SE2d 348) (2009) (defendant was 

not denied the right of confrontation where the witness was 

available for cross-examination “but defense counsel expressly 

declined the opportunity to cross-examine him”).5

 5 To support his claim, Johnson relies primarily on Soto v. State, 285 Ga. 

367, 368 (677 SE2d 95) (2009), in which we stated that, “when a witness refuses 

to continue to testify after having already done so, the proper remedy is to 

strike pertinent portions of the witness’ testimony.” This statement, however, 
12

Johnson argues that an attempt to cross-examine Slayton 

would have been futile. See Green, 298 Ga. App. at 25 (“In some 

instances, the failure to cross-examine may not waive a 

confrontation clause claim because it is clear from the record that 

an attempt at cross-examination would have been futile.”). But the 

record here does not clearly show that Slayton would have refused 

to answer questions on cross-examination about the testimony that 

he already had given. That testimony dealt primarily with 

background information and did not delve into the crimes at issue,

and there is no indication that Slayton would have refused to answer 

 

refers to a scenario where the witness refuses to testify on cross-examination. 

See id. at 368-369 (“As it is said: ‘[W]hen a witness declines to answer on cross 

examination certain pertinent questions relevant to a matter testified about 

by the witness on direct examination, all of the witness’ testimony on the same 

subject matter should be stricken.’”) (quoting Smith v. State, 225 Ga. 328, 331 

(168 SE2d 587) (1969)). See also Cody v. State, 278 Ga. 779, 780-781 (609 SE2d 

320) (2004) (“If the witness’s refusal to answer . . . denies a party a thorough 

and sifting cross-examination of the specifics of the witness’s testimony on 

direct, then the trial court is authorized to strike that witness’s direct 

testimony.”). Indeed, in Soto, the witness “refused to answer questions posed 

by the defense” and “continued to refuse to answer questions even after the 

trial court ordered him to do so and threatened to hold him in contempt.” Soto, 

285 Ga. at 368. Here, by contrast, Slayton invoked his Fifth Amendment 

privilege on direct examination, when the prosecution began asking him about 

the crimes at issue, and Johnson’s lawyer declined to conduct any crossexamination. Johnson’s reliance on Soto is therefore unavailing.
13

similar background questions posed by Johnson’s counsel. Thus, we 

cannot say that an attempt to cross-examine Slayton would have 

been futile. Johnson’s enumeration therefore fails.

3. As an alternative to his confrontation claim, Johnson 

contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because, 

he says, his trial lawyer failed to obtain a proper ruling on his motion 

to strike, did not otherwise attempt to exclude Slayton’s testimony, 

and did not attempt to cross-examine Slayton about the testimony 

he already had given. Johnson’s claims, however, fail.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant generally must show that counsel’s performance was 

constitutionally deficient and that the deficient performance 

resulted in prejudice to the defendant. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (689 SE2d 280) (2010). To 

satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his 

attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way 

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing 
14

professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (745 SE2d 

637) (2013); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. This requires 

a defendant to overcome the “strong presumption” that trial 

counsel’s performance was adequate. Marshall v. State, 297 Ga. 

445, 448 (774 SE2d 675) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

To carry the burden of overcoming this presumption, a defendant 

“must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his 

lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” 

Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 183 (787 SE2d 221) (2016). “In 

particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form 

the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently 

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such 

a course.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). To satisfy the 

prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a reasonable 

probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, 

the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. “If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of 

proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does 
15

not have to examine the other prong.” Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 

533, 533-534 (690 SE2d 801) (2010).

Here, Johnson has failed to show that his trial counsel 

performed deficiently in declining to cross-examine Slayton. To 

begin, Johnson did not call his trial lawyer to testify at the hearing 

on his motion for new trial, and we have stated that, where “trial 

counsel does not testify at the motion for new trial hearing, it is 

extremely difficult to overcome the presumption that counsel’s 

conduct resulted from reasonable trial strategy.” Charleston v. 

State, 292 Ga. 678, 684 (743 SE2d 1) (2013) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). Johnson does not explain, and the record does 

not show, how cross-examination would have been particularly 

helpful to him—especially given that much of Slayton’s testimony 

pertained only to background information and did not delve into the 

crimes at issue. Indeed, cross-examination might have produced 

more background evidence linking Johnson to his accomplices, or it 

might have led Slayton to reconsider his invocation of the Fifth 

Amendment and could have opened the door to the prosecutor 
16

asking about the charged crimes on redirect examination. Johnson’s 

counsel reasonably could have viewed Slayton’s refusal to testify as 

a benefit counsel did not want to risk undermining. Thus, Johnson 

has not overcome the presumption that his lawyer’s decision not to 

cross-examine Slayton was reasonable trial strategy. See Sullivan 

v. State, 301 Ga. 37, 41 (799 SE2d 163) (2017) (“[A] matter such as 

the cross-examination of a witness is most often grounded in matters 

of trial tactics and strategy and, in those instances, provides no basis 

for finding counsel’s performance deficient.”) (citation and 

punctuation omitted); Lawrence, 286 Ga. at 534 (“[T]rial counsel’s 

decision not to cross-examine certain State’s witnesses was 

reasonable trial strategy and did not amount to ineffective 

assistance.”). 

Moreover, Johnson’s trial counsel was not deficient for not

pursuing the motion to strike Slayton’s testimony. Because defense 

counsel received an opportunity to cross-examine Slayton but made 

a strategic decision not to do so, an attempt to exclude Slayton’s 

testimony would have been meritless. See Evans v. State, 306 Ga. 
17

403, 409 (831 SE2d 818) (2019) (“[T]rial counsel cannot be deficient 

for failing to file a meritless motion . . . .”); Hampton v. State, 295 

Ga. 665, 670 (763 SE2d 467) (2014) (“[T]he failure to make a 

meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to 

find ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

Johnson further contends that his counsel at least could have 

attempted to cross-examine Slayton, and if Slayton had refused to 

testify, then counsel could have renewed the motion to strike, which 

the trial court would have granted. As mentioned above, however,

it was reasonable trial strategy for Johnson’s counsel to leave 

Slayton’s testimony as it was, rather than to risk eliciting 

additional, potentially damaging testimony. And even if trial 

counsel rendered deficient performance by neglecting to confirm 

with Slayton whether he would agree to cross-examination, Johnson 

has failed to show prejudice under Strickland; he has offered no 

evidence—only pure speculation—that Slayton would have refused 

to testify on cross-examination. See Baker v. State, 293 Ga. 811, 815 

(750 SE2d 137) (2013) (to show Strickland prejudice, appellant “was 
18

required to offer more than mere speculation that, absent the 

counsel’s alleged errors, a different result probably would have 

occurred at trial”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Whitus v. 

State, 287 Ga. 801, 805 (700 SE2d 377) (2010) (“Speculation is 

insufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.”) (citation 

and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Johnson has failed to 

establish that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel

with regard to Slayton’s testimony. 

4. Johnson also contends, in several enumerations of error,

that the trial court erred when it admitted certain evidence obtained 

from a search of his cell phone. The record shows that, after the 

Ingles robbery, Johnson voluntarily came to the police station for an 

interview, which began shortly after midnight on September 6. 

While Johnson—who was not under arrest at that point—was in the 

interrogation room, the interviewing officer observed Johnson

receiving calls or text messages on his iPhone, so the officer asked 

to see the phone. Johnson handed the phone to the officer, who saw 

that someone named “Tye” was contacting Johnson. At one point, 
19

the officer took the iPhone outside the interrogation room and looked 

at the recent-call log and contact list. Johnson initially had been

treated as a victim, but officers began to suspect that he actually

was a participant in the robbery based on his calm demeanor (as 

compared to Turpin’s) and certain inconsistencies in his statements. 

Eventually, at 9:40 a.m., another officer obtained a search warrant 

for Johnson’s phone.

Before trial, Johnson filed a motion to suppress all evidence 

derived from his phone, claiming that the pre-warrant search and 

seizure of his phone during interrogation was illegal and that the 

warrant itself was invalid because it was issued based on 

information recovered from the warrantless search of the phone.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Johnson’s motion in part, 

suppressing “all information and data obtained from Johnson’s 

iPhone prior to 9:40 a.m. on September 6, 2010”—i.e., all 

information obtained from the phone before a search warrant was 

issued—prohibiting the State “from presenting any witness 

testimony discussing any of the phone numbers or other data 
20

appearing on Johnson’s iPhone that was collected prior to 9:40 a.m.” 

The trial court also determined, however, that because the search 

warrant for the phone was valid, it was not the “fruit of the 

poisonous tree.” Thus, the trial court denied Johnson’s motion to 

suppress evidence recovered from the post-warrant search of the 

phone.

At trial, the State presented evidence—over Johnson’s 

objection—that Adside was contacting Johnson’s phone repeatedly

after the Ingles robbery and that, in the afternoon following the 

robbery, officers used Adside’s number to track Adside’s phone to the 

Mall of Georgia, where Adside and two other people (Jackson and 

McMillan) were arrested as they entered Johnson’s car. Johnson 

raises three claims of error pertaining to this evidence.

(a) First, Johnson argues that the trial court should have 

excluded testimony that Adside had called Johnson repeatedly after 

the Ingles robbery because, Johnson says, the trial court previously 

ruled that this evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained 

from a pre-warrant search of his phone. We disagree. Although the 
21

trial court suppressed the evidence obtained from the pre-warrant 

search of Johnson’s phone, the court declined to suppress any 

evidence retrieved from the phone after the issuance of the search 

warrant. The court also found that Adside’s phone number was

obtained from a forensic analysis of the phone after the search 

warrant was issued, and this finding is supported by the

investigating officers’ testimony. See State v. Gates, 308 Ga. 238, 

250 (840 SE2d 437) (2020) (“We review the trial court’s findings of 

fact under the clearly erroneous standard, meaning that we uphold 

a factual finding if there is any evidence in the record to support it.”). 

See also Douglas v. State, 303 Ga. 178, 181 (811 SE2d 337) (2018). 

Because the evidence about which Johnson complains was derived 

from a post-warrant search of the phone, its admission did not 

violate the trial court’s suppression order.

(b) Johnson further challenges the validity of the search 

warrant itself, contending that there was no probable cause to issue 

the warrant for his phone. Specifically, Johnson argues that the 

affidavit used to obtain the warrant failed to specify with 
22

particularity the items to be searched, failed to allege a sufficient 

connection between the phone and the crimes at issue, and 

improperly relied on tainted information obtained during the illegal 

search of the phone. We again disagree.

To determine whether probable cause exists to issue a search 

warrant, the task of the magistrate judge evaluating an application 

for a search warrant “is simply to make a practical, common-sense 

decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 

affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband 

or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. 

Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 77 (673 SE2d 237) (2009) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). On appellate review, our duty “is to 

determine if the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding 

that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant.” Id. at 78

(citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, “a magistrate’s 

decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable 

cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.” 
23

Glispie v. State, 300 Ga. 128, 132 (793 SE2d 381) (2016) (citation and 

punctuation omitted).

Here, the affidavit used to apply for the warrant for Johnson’s 

phone described the applying officer’s training and experience in law 

enforcement; recited the facts of the Ingles robbery, including a 

description of Johnson’s actions suggesting that he opened the 

store’s security door to allow the other perpetrators inside; and 

stated that a “black in color I-phone 8gb” was found in Johnson’s 

possession at the time of the incident. The affidavit further stated

that,

[d]ue to variations in [Johnson’s] account of the events of 

September 4, and 5, 2010 as compared to the statements 

of other witnesses, the inconsistencies in his statements 

regarding [the meeting at the Waffle House near Ingles], 

the violation of store policy, and his presence inside the 

store at the time of David Casto’s death, Affiant has 

probable cause to believe that [Johnson] caused the death 

of David Casto.

The affidavit concluded that, “[b]ased on your Affiants [sic] training, 

knowledge and experience in the field of cellular phone forensics 

your affiant knows that evidence of Armed Robbery and Murder” 
24

may be revealed by a search of the phone. Among other things, the 

warrant application sought “all evidence of Armed Robbery and 

Murder recovered from the aforementioned I-phone,” including 

“contact lists, call histories,” and “any other data stored on the 

phone.” 

Given all of this, we conclude that the officer’s affidavit 

provided a “substantial basis” for the magistrate to determine that 

probable cause existed for the issuance of a warrant for Johnson’s 

phone. See Palmer, 285 Ga. at 77. The affidavit described with 

sufficient particularity the phone to be seized and the data to be 

collected from that phone, which was limited to evidence of armed 

robbery and murder. See Rickman v. State, 309 Ga. 38, 42 (842 

SE2d 289) (2020) (search warrants did not lack sufficient 

particularity where, “read as a whole,” they “limited the search of 

the contents of [defendant]’s cell phones to items reasonably 

appearing to be connected to [victim]’s murder”); Westbrook v. State, 

308 Ga. 92, 98 (839 SE2d 620) (2020) (“[T]he use of the phrase 

“electronic data” was specific enough to enable a prudent officer to 
25

know to look for photographs and videos stored on [defendant]’s cell 

phone.”); Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 185 (664 SE2d 211) (2008) (a 

warrant authorizing a search “for specified items of potential 

evidence, as well as for ‘other related items to the crime of murder’ 

or for ‘any other fruits of the crime of murder,’ is sufficiently 

particular and does not authorize a general search in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment”) (citations omitted). See also Hourin v. State, 

301 Ga. 835, 844 (804 SE2d 388) (2017) (“The degree of the 

description’s specificity [in the search warrant] is flexible and will 

vary with the circumstances involved.”) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). The affidavit also alleged a sufficient connection between 

the phone and the crimes at issue. The facts laid out in the affidavit 

showed that several people were involved in the robbery and that

Johnson helped the robbers enter the store through the back door.

It was reasonable to infer from these facts that Johnson likely used 

his phone to communicate with the other perpetrators. See Taylor 

v. State, 303 Ga. 57, 61 (810 SE2d 113) (2018) (“[A] magistrate may 

draw ‘reasonable inferences . . . from the material supplied to him 
26

by applicants for a warrant.’”) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 240 (103 SCt 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983)); Glispie, 300 Ga. at

133 (“In light of the facts and circumstances detailed in the search 

warrant application, it was reasonable for the magistrate to infer 

that the cell phones in [defendant]’s possession at the time of his 

arrest were used as communicative devices with third parties for 

drug deals.”). 

Finally, nothing in the affidavit references the information 

derived from the pre-warrant search of Johnson’s phone, and so the 

trial court properly concluded that the evidence obtained pursuant 

to the warrant was not, as Johnson claims, the “fruit of the 

poisonous tree.” See Reaves, 284 Ga. at 183 (search warrants were 

not tainted by an earlier, warrantless search because “no 

information obtained during a warrantless search was used to 

obtain the warrants”). See also United States v. Barron-Soto, 820 

F3d 409, 415-416 (11th Cir. 2016) (evidence derived from 

defendants’ cell phones was admissible because, although the initial 

search of the phones was illegal, officers later obtained a warrant for 
27

the phones without relying on any information learned during the 

illegal search). Because the warrant for Johnson’s phone was 

sufficiently particularized and supported by probable cause without 

the use of tainted evidence, the trial court did not err in denying 

Johnson’s motion to suppress on this ground.

(c) Johnson also contends that the trial court erred in failing to 

suppress “cell site location data” pertaining to Adside’s phone, given 

that Adside’s phone number was found on Johnson’s phone. In its 

suppression order, the trial court made the following finding of fact: 

Investigator Strano . . . faxed a Mandatory Information 

for Exigent Circumstances Request to Sprint’s Legal 

Compliance department making an “exigent 

circumstances request” for [Adside’s phone number]. The 

request, which Strano made at 9:34 a.m., failed to state a 

specific exigent description to support the request. The 

request sought the following information: subscriber 

information; call detail records with cell site information; 

and precision location of mobile device (GPS location).

(Emphasis supplied.) The trial court did not expressly rule on the 

admissibility of the cell site location data, but noted that “Johnson 

can claim no privacy interest in a cell phone number that was not 

registered or used by him.” See Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 669 
28

(763 SE2d 467) (2014) (“[R]ights under the Fourth Amendment are 

personal, and in order to challenge the validity of a government 

search an individual must actually enjoy the reasonable expectation 

of privacy, that is, the individual must have standing.”). On appeal, 

Johnson argues that Adside’s cell site location data should have been 

suppressed because it was derived from an illegal search of 

Johnson’s phone. He reasons that the cell site data was requested

from Sprint at 9:34 a.m., before Adside’s phone number was legally 

obtained from Johnson’s phone based on the 9:40 a.m. search 

warrant.

Johnson’s claim fails because, even if he could show that the 

trial court erred in this regard, any such error was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. See Ensslin v. State, 308 Ga. 462, 471 (841 SE2d 

676) (2020) (an error of constitutional magnitude “may be deemed 

harmless if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

error did not contribute to the verdict”) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). The only evidence introduced at trial relating to Adside’s

cell site location data was that officers “pinged” Adside’s number on 
29

the day after the Ingles robbery and tracked his location from 

McMillan’s house to the Mall of Georgia, where he was arrested. 

Johnson did not dispute that information at trial and it did little, if 

anything, to incriminate Johnson. We thus see “no reasonable 

possibility that th[is] evidence may have contributed to the verdict,” 

Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 575 (619 SE2d 668) (2005) (even if 

the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained as a result of 

improper seizure, any such error was “harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt” because the evidence did not pertain to a disputed issue at 

trial), and Johnson’s contention therefore fails. See also Hill v.

State, __ Ga. __ (850 SE2d 110, 119-120) (2020) (admission of cell 

site location data, even if erroneous, was harmless error).

5. Johnson contends that the trial court erred when it failed to 

suppress the evidence gathered from a search of his house at 3555

Ballybandon Court and a search of his car—a black Nissan Altima. 

The house and car were searched using separate warrants, and 

these searches yielded incriminating evidence that was introduced 

at trial. Johnson argues that the affidavit supporting the warrant 
30

for his house contained no facts to show that he lived at the 

residence, and that the warrant affidavit for his car failed to show 

that he owned the car. We are not persuaded. 

The warrant affidavit for Johnson’s home stated that, during a 

police interview, Johnson eventually admitted to being involved in 

the Ingles, Waffle House, and Chevron robberies, and that “the 

clothing worn by him during the Chevron and Waffle House Armed 

Robberies would be located in his residence . . . .” The affidavit 

further stated that, on September 6, 2010, the affiant “conducted a 

drive by of 3555 Ballybandon Court . . . . This is the residence of 

Sherod Johnson.” 

The search warrant affidavit for Johnson’s car likewise 

recounted his confession, including his admission that “he gave the 

shotgun” to Adside, that Johnson “loaned his vehicle” to Adside, that 

Adside drove Johnson to Ingles, and that Adside used the vehicle “in 

the commission of the crime.” Further, according to the affidavit, 

Johnson identified Adside and Jackson as among his co-conspirators 

“involved in the Armed Robberies” and that Johnson “believes that 
31

[Adside] is in possession of his vehicle.” Moreover, the affidavit 

indicated that, right before Adside and Jackson were arrested at the 

mall, “[t]hey entered a 2005 Nissan Altima . . . Georgia registration 

BJU4394 and [VIN number] registered to Zora Johnson,” and “a 

large sum of currency was found in their possession.”

We conclude that the affidavits contained sufficient 

information to give the magistrate probable cause to conclude that 

items related to the robberies would be found at 3555 Ballybandon 

Court and in the Nissan Altima. See Taylor, 303 Ga. at 62 (the 

magistrate, “making a practical and common-sense decision, was 

entitled to infer that there was a ‘fair probability’” that defendant

lived at the address listed in the warrant application); Carter v. 

State, 283 Ga. 76, 77 (656 SE2d 524) (2008) (the “test for probable 

cause is not hypertechnical,” but “must be based on the factual and 

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 

prudent” people act) (citations and punctuation omitted). Because 

the search warrants for Johnson’s house and car were supported by 
32

probable cause, the trial court did not err in denying Johnson’s 

motion to suppress the evidence found using those warrants.

Judgment affirmed. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and Boggs, 

Peterson, Bethel, Ellington, and McMillian, JJ., concur.