alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit      32.1**

| (1) | The                report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                       |                                                          |                                        |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Dated:                  May 14, 2007  | By:                                                 | /s/ Xiong                Junhong  |
|                                       | Xiong                      Junhong                            |
|                                       | Chief                    Executive                    Officer |

----
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DSG ENTERTAINMENT

SERVICES INC. (f/k/a Deluxe

Entertainment Services Inc.)

,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellant,

v.

DLX ACQUISITION

CORPORATION and DELUXE

MEDIA INC.

,

Defendants Below,

Appellees. §

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§ No

. 185, 2021

Court Below

– Court of Chancery

of the State of Delaware

C.A. No. 2020

- 0618

- MTZ

Submitted: February 9, 2021

Decided: February 21 , 2022

Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY

- REEVES , Justices.

ORDER

On this 2 1 s t day of February, 2022 , after careful consideration of all the briefs

and the record on appeal, we find it evident that the judgment of the Court of

Chancery should be affirmed on the basis of and for t he reasons stated in the March

29, 2021 opinion and the May 19 , 2021 order

.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of Chancery

is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery

- Reeves

Justice
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kenneth Van Duyne, Also Known as Van Duyne Hayes, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alvin Schlesinger, J., at *Wade*hearing, plea and sentencing), rendered on February 5, 1986, convicting defendant on his plea of guilty of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 6 to 12 years, unanimously affirmed.

On November 28, 1986, the defendant and two other accomplices robbed the complainant in the vestibule of his apartment on West 104th Street. The defendant simulated the appearance of a gun by holding his hand in his pocket, threatened to use "it” on the complainant, and stole $25.

The police, who were called immediately, arrived at the scene within 15 minutes and took the victim to Central Park West and West 106th to identify some suspects. The complainant identified the trio after looking at each suspect for approximately a minute.

At the plea allocution, defendant admitted simulating a gun with his hand. The Judge informed the defendant at the sentencing that inoperability of a weapon was an affirmative defense which, if established, could reduce the crime to robbery in the second degree. Defendant did not change his plea nor seek to assert the affirmative defense.

On appeal defendant claims that the showup identification was unduly suggestive, and that all the elements of robbery in the first degree were not proven. Although all showup identifications are to some degree suggestive, showups are permissible when the suspects are apprehended in close proximity in time and space to the scene of the crime. *(People v Love,*57 NY2d 1023.) We see no reason on this record to interfere with *344the hearing court’s finding that the showing was not suggestive.

At the plea allocution, defendant admitted all of the elements of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the court pointed out to the defendant the availability of the affirmative defense that his "gun” was not loaded and that he could withdraw his plea, which he chose not to do. Where the defendant chooses not to use the affirmative defense, it is deemed waived. *(People v Ebron,*87 AD2d 653.) Under these circumstances, we perceive no basis for reversal. Concur— Murphy, P. J., Carro, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         128,074
<SECURITIES>                                    56,548
<RECEIVABLES>                                   62,311
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (4,003)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               265,476
<PP&E>                                         160,669
<DEPRECIATION>                                (67,455)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 713,114
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           86,715
<BONDS>                                        172,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           584
<OTHER-SE>                                     445,310
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   713,114
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               310,195
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  353,614
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,027
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (43,757)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (11,437)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (32,320)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (32,320)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.61)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.61)


</TABLE>
#### Frank Blesi et al., Appellants, v Robert W. Andruzzi et al., Respondents.

In consolidated actions to recover damages and for injunctive relief arising from the alleged illegal operation of a junk yard, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burstein, J.), dated December 4, 1989, as denied, in part, that branch of their motion which was for leave to serve an amended complaint asserting causes of action based upon General Municipal Law § 136, by permitting only the assertion of a cause of <■ action based upon General Municipal Law § 136 (14).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

By its clear and express terms, all of General Municipal Law § 136, with the exception of subdivision (14) thereof, *585concerning the regulation of automobile junk yards is inapplicable "to any municipality which has any ordinance or local law or regulation to license or regulate junk yards” (General Municipal Law § 136 [12]). Only General Municipal Law § 136 (14) regarding the operation of junk yards within 500 feet of churches, schools, hospitals, public buildings or places of public assembly is applicable to municipalities whether or not they have enacted junk yard ordinances of their own *(see,*General Municipal Law § 136 [14]). Since the defendant Town of Oyster Bay has clearly enacted its own legislation governing the licensing and regulation of junk yards *(see,*Oyster Bay Code ch 14; *see,*Town Law § 136), General Municipal Law § 136, with the exception of subdivision (14) thereof, is inapplicable to the plaintiffs in the instant action.

The plaintiffs’ assertion that General Municipal Law § 136 has been incorporated by reference into the Oyster Bay Code is without merit. Oyster Bay Code § 14-9 purports to incorporate "all other statutes now existing or which may hereafter be enacted *affecting*[junk yard] businesses] or the conduct thereof’ (emphasis added). By its own terms, General Municipal Law § 136 "shall not be construed to affect * * * zoning ordinances or local laws or any other ordinances * * * for the control of junk yards now in effect or hereafter enacted in any municipality * * * and shall not be deemed to apply to any municipality which has any ordinance or local law or regulation to license or regulate junk yards” (General Municipal Law § 136 [12]).

Therefore, again save for its subdivision (14), General Municipal Law § 136 is not a statute "affecting” junk yards within the jurisdiction of the Town of Oyster Bay. Kunzeman, J. P., Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 32(b)

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of CheckFree Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
David E. Mangum, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date: September 2, 2005


                                        /s/ David E. Mangum
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        David E. Mangum
                                        Executive Vice President and Chief
                                        Financial Officer
                                        CheckFree Corporation



This Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed "filed" by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, whether made before or after the date of this Report,
irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
---

EXHIBIT 32.2

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The undersigned, Johannes T. Petersen, hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)         
 the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Century Petroleum Corp. for the
quarterly period ended January 31, 2008 (the "Report") fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

(2)         
 the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Century Petroleum
Corp.

Dated: March 24 , 2008



/s/ Johannes T. Petersen
  Johannes T. Petersen 
  Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Director 
  (Principal Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer)





A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Century
Petroleum Corp. and will be retained by Century Petroleum Corp. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
#### In the Matter of Nassau County Department of Social Services, on Behalf of Kimberly S., Respondent, v Denise S., Respondent, and Wayne S., Appellant.

In a child neglect and abuse proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the father appeals from so much of an order of disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County (De Maro, J.), entered February 9, 1989, as, upon a fact finding order of the same court, dated June 16, 1988, which, after a hearing, found that the child had been abused by him, barred the father from having any contact with his daughter until she reaches the age of 18 years.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and without prejudice to the appellant moving in the Family Court, Nassau County, for visitation with his daughter, if he be so advised.

At bar, the child had made out-of-court statements indicating that her father had sexually abused her. Such statements may properly be used to establish a prima facie case of abuse when sufficiently corroborated (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]). Corroboration can take the form of "validation testimony” of experts regarding their investigations of the underlying complaints *(Matter of Linda K.,*132 AD2d 149, 157; *see also, Matter of Nicole V.,*123 AD2d 97, *affd*71 NY2d 112), which testimony, if "highly credible” *(see, Matter of E. M.,*137 Misc *8312d 197, 204), is sufficient corroboration to make out a prima facie case of sexual abuse *(see, Matter of Linda K., supra,*at 158-159, 160; *see also, Matter of E. M., supra,*at 198).

Upon our review of the record, we find that the validation testimony adduced herein sufficiently corroborated the child’s out-of-court statements and that the Family Court’s finding of abuse is supported by a preponderance of the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing *(see, Matter of Nicole V.,*71 NY2d 112, 117, *supra; Matter of Tammie Z.,*66 NY2d 1, 3).

The order precludes the father from having any contact with his daughter until she reaches the age of 18 years. The order further provides that the father may apply for a modification of the order in six months, upon his demonstration that he has entered a sex offender treatment program. This court has previously upheld an order of protection of such extended duration where the order was subject to modification upon application by the father, upon a showing that the resumption of visitation would not be detrimental to the child *(see, Matter of Erin G.,*139 AD2d 737, 739-740). Since the order at bar is similarly subject to modification upon proper application by the father, we do not consider it unduly harsh.

We have reviewed the appellant’s remaining contentions and find that none warrants disturbing the provisions of the order appealed from. Thompson, J. P., Brown, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1749 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the possession or use 

of cell phones and similar wireless devices by Federal prisoners. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 5, 2009 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself and Mr. GRASSLEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the possession or use of cell phones and similar wireless devices 

by Federal prisoners. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Cell Phone Contraband 

5 Act of 2009’’. 

6 SEC. 2. WIRELESS DEVICES IN PRISON. 

7 Section 1971 of title 18, United States Code, is 

8 amended— 

9 (1) in subsection (b)— 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1749 IS

1 (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘or 

2 (d)(1)(E)’’ and inserting ‘‘, (d)(1)(E), or 

3 (d)(1)(F)’’; and 

4 (B) in paragraph (5), by striking 

5 ‘‘(d)(1)(F)’’ and inserting ‘‘(d)(1)(G)’’; and 

6 (2) in subsection (d)(1)— 

7 (A) in subparagraph (E), by striking 

8 ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

9 (B) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as 

10 subparagraph (G); and 

11 (C) by inserting after subparagraph (E) 

12 the following: 

13 ‘‘(F) a phone or other device used by a 

14 user of commercial mobile service (as defined in 

15 section 332(d) of the Communications Act of 

16 1934 (47 U.S.C. 332(d))) in connection with 

17 such service; and’’. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2100 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain sensors. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. LEVIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain sensors. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN SENSORS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2100 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Sensors (provided for in subheading 9030.33.00) certified 

by the importer to monitor 

and report voltage, current 

and temperature status of 

battery cells designed for use 

in electrically powered vehicles of subheading 8703.90 in 

which an on board gasoline 

engine is used to run a generator that recharges the electric drive motor battery ........ Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Negron, Also Known as Mikail Muwwakkil, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kooper, J.), rendered December 15, 1977, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We do not agree with the defendant’s claim that the evidence adduced at the trial was legally insufficient. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s contention that the testimony of the eyewitness, an individual with a criminal history and a drug abuser, should not have been believed by the jury is unavailing. Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

In addition, we find that the defendant’s statements were properly admitted into evidence. Although a suspect may not be questioned once he requests the assistance of an attorney *(see, People v Cunningham,*49 NY2d 203, 205), in this case the hearing court properly determined that the defendant never *572unequivocally invoked his right to counsel *(see, People v Fridman,*71 NY2d 845; *People v Sanchez,*117 AD2d 685).

Further, the defendant’s contention that he has been denied due process as a result of delay in appellate review of his conviction is without merit since he has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the delay *(see, People v Wallace,*159 AD2d 1022; *People v Barber,*154 AD2d 882; *People v Pratt,*149 AD2d 956) and in view of our disposition of the merits of the appeal *(see, People v Gaines,*143 AD2d 520, 521).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions and find that they are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Balletta, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.