* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

OCT 22 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RONNI JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-3277

(D.C. No. 97-CR-40058-01-SAC)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before PORFILIO, TACHA, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

Ronni Jones appeals from the district court’s order detaining him before

trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. “Appellate review of detention or release

orders is plenary as to mixed questions of law and fact and independent, with due

deference to the district court’s purely factual findings.” United States v.

Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Under § 3142, a district court must order the pretrial release of a criminal

defendant unless the court determines that such release will not assure the

defendant’s appearance or will endanger another person or the community. 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The parties agree that, due to the maximum penalties

possible for the crimes with which Jones is charged, a presumption arises

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) that “no condition or combination of conditions

will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of

the community.” Without discussing the risk of flight factor, the district court

concluded that defendant had not rebutted the § 3142(e) presumption, and that the

government had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Jones is a

danger to the community. See Stricklin, 932 F.2d at 1354-55 (discussing the

parties’ burdens under § 3142(e)). 

On appeal, Jones contends that 1) he presented evidence which rebutted the

statutory presumption, 2) the government failed to prove that no conditions of

release will insure the community’s safety before trial, and 3) the district court
1 The government’s motion to supplement the record on appeal with

documentation of Jones’ criminal history is denied. 

-3-

did not consider all of the factors listed in § 3142(g) and did not make findings

about possible conditions of release. After careful consideration of the parties’

briefs, defendant’s appendix,1 and the applicable law, we conclude that the

district court correctly determined that defendant should be detained. The

evidence defendant proffered at his detention hearing did not counter the

presumption of dangerousness. Based on the language of the presumption, the

government was not required to prove that no conditions of release would ensure

the community’s safety, and the district court was not required to make findings

on that point. The district court’s order is thorough and correctly concludes both

that Jones did not rebut the presumption and that Jones is a danger to the

community. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

PER CURIAM