2020 IL App (1st) 162299-U 

 

 FIRST DISTRICT

SECOND DIVISION

June 30, 2020 

No. 1-16-2299 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL JOHNSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of 

) Cook County 

) 

) No. 13 CR 19206 

) 

) Honorable 

) Alfredo Maldonado, 

) Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a 

detective regarding evidence found at defendant’s home following a thorough and 

systematic search. The facts of this case do not support remand for a resentencing 

hearing. 

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Michael Johnson was convicted of the first degree murder 

of 16-year old Maurice Knowles and attempted first degree murder of Christian Slaughter. The 

trial court sentenced defendant to 55 years’ imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction 

and 25 years’ imprisonment on the attempted murder conviction to be served consecutively. On 

appeal, defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court abused its 
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discretion in prohibiting testimony on cross-examination that no handgun was recovered during a 

search of defendant’s house. Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing 

because the trial court improperly considered his void 2012 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon 

(AUUW) conviction as an aggravating factor and failed to sufficiently consider in mitigation his 

rehabilitative potential and bipolar diagnosis. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant’s

first degree murder and attempted murder convictions and the imposed sentences. Because 

defendant’s prior conviction for AUUW was void ab initio under People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 

112116, ¶ 22, we vacate that conviction. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant’s convictions stem from a shooting that occurred over Labor Day weekend on 

September 2, 2013, killing Knowles and injuring Slaughter.1 Following a search of defendant’s 

house, the police recovered a shotgun inside the house and an extended firearm magazine under 

the rear porch.

2 The defense filed a motion in limine to bar use of the shotgun and extended 

magazine, arguing those items had no relevancy to the shooting, which involved a handgun, not a 

shotgun, and there was no eyewitness testimony that the shooter used an extended magazine. The 

State had no objection as to the shotgun, but argued that the extended magazine was relevant

because 9-millimeter shell casings were recovered at the scene and an extended magazine may be 

used with a 9-millimeter gun. The trial court “agreed with defense here in that it’s a bit of a tenuous 

connection, if any” and granted the motion in limine. 

¶ 5 The defense also moved to prohibit use of defendant’s 2012 AUUW conviction to impeach 

his credibility, arguing that conviction was void ab initio under Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22. The 

1

Defendant and co-defendant Ray Coleman were tried together with separate juries. 2

Defendant also moved to exclude a black hoodie, but that evidence is not relevant to the 

issues raised on appeal. 
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3 

State agreed with the defense. The trial court granted defendant’s motion in limine, citing Aguilar. 

The following testimony was elicited during defendant’s jury trial. 

¶ 6 Edna Knowles3 testified that she was Knowles’ great aunt and foster mother, and raised 

him since he was three days old. Edna lived at 10551 South LaSalle Street in Chicago with 

Knowles, Slaughter, Lisa Johnson4

 (Slaughter’s girlfriend), and Slaughter and Lisa’s children. 

¶ 7 On September 2, 2013, Edna, Knowles, Slaughter, and others gathered outside her house. 

Around 5 p.m., Edna went inside and heard “some gunshots,” “it was rapid fire.” Edna did not see 

the shooting. After hearing the gunshots, Edna saw Knowles running in the door and she learned 

that he had been shot. Edna knew defendant because he used to come to her house and have dinner 

with the family. He had also “stayed all night there before.” 

¶ 8 Slaughter testified that around 5 p.m. on September 2, 2013, he was on the front porch with 

Knowles, Lisa, Latisha “Nookie” Thompson, his four-year-old son, Edna, and “like two more 

people.” The group was sitting on the porch “cracking jokes.” Between 5 and 5:30 p.m. while still

on the porch, Slaughter saw three guys “ducked down coming out the yard” across the street. 

Slaughter first saw defendant (a former friend), behind him was Ray “Little Ray” Coleman (a guy 

from the neighborhood), and then “Lamaris” (a former high school classmate). Slaughter saw a 

gun in defendant’s and Little Ray’s hands, but could “not see the type of gun that they had.” 

Slaughter saw “them drawing the guns lifting them up from ducking down” and everyone who was 

gathered on the porch turned to go inside the house. Slaughter heard two different guns “go off” 

and more than three gunshots. 

¶ 9 Once inside the house, Slaughter felt blood on his lower back, and Nookie told him that he 

“got grazed by the bullet, but was not hit.” Slaughter was worried about Knowles, “because he 

3

We refer to Edna Knowles by her first name because she has the same last name as the victim. 4

We refer to Lisa Johnson by her first name because she has the same last name as defendant. 
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4 

kept on saying he was hit.” Knowles was inside the house, lying flat on his stomach. Slaughter 

saw “a hole in [Knowles’] lower back.” 

¶ 10 The police and an ambulance arrived at the scene. Slaughter refused medical treatment 

“[b]ecause I was focused on, I wasn’t shot you know since I was grazed to the back, I was just 

focused on Maurice.” After more police officers arrived, Slaughter spoke to the officers and named 

defendant as the shooter. 

¶ 11 On September 2, 2013, Lisa testified that she was sitting in her van with her three children, 

which was parked on the same side of the street as Edna’s house and she could see the house from 

the van. Her four-year old son was on the porch with Slaughter and the others. At around 5:30 

p.m., Lisa heard gunshots coming from the house directly across the street from Edna’s house. Lisa 

looked in that direction and saw “three dudes,” recognizing defendant as one of them. Lisa saw 

defendant shoot a black gun towards Edna’s porch and heard “like seven gunshots.” After the 

police arrived, she “gave them defendant’s name.” 

¶ 12 Andrea Price testified that on September 2, 2013, at around 5- 5:30 p.m., she was 

barbequing on her back porch when she heard two gunshots and then “more rapid shots.” Price did 

not see the shooting. She could see 106th Place and LaSalle Street from her porch and saw three 

men running up the alley about two or three minutes after the shooting. Price first saw defendant, 

then Ray Coleman, and then Lamaris Oliver. She knew all three men.

¶ 13 After she saw the men running, Price left her porch “to be nosy to see what happened.” She 

walked towards 106th Place and LaSalle Street, which was in the direction of the gunshots that 

she heard. Price walked to Edna’s house because a crowd had gathered there, and she heard people 

“crying and screaming and yelling.” Price knew Knowles because her children had gone to school 

with him. Price then left, making “a conscious choice not to tell the police what she had seen” 

because she was “afraid for [her] children’s [lives] dealing with a situation like that because [she 
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had] been threatened before.” Price later felt bothered about not talking to the police. The next day, 

she went to the police station and told detectives what she saw. 

¶ 14 Chicago Police Officer Mohammad5 testified that he responded to a “person shot call” on 

September 2, 2013, at 10551 South LaSalle Street. He spoke with Slaughter, who identified 

defendant as the shooter. Less than 10 minutes after arriving at the scene, Officer Mohammad 

relocated to defendant’s house at 352 West 106th Place. 

¶ 15 Defendant’s father, Willie Johnson, answered the door and let Officer Mohammad inside. 

While they stood in the living room, Officer Mohammad “observed feet coming from the ceiling 

of the living room.” Officer Mohammed saw “drywall coming down and debris from the ceiling, 

and [saw] *** two feet coming through the drywall where somebody above [him was] trying to 

run to the back.” For safety reasons, he and Willie6 left the house. Officer Mohammed believed 

defendant was in the house, so he called for assistance. 

¶ 16 Chicago Police Lieutenant Michael Casey testified that he arrived at 352 West 106th Place 

and helped set up a perimeter around the house. Willie was on his cellphone talking to defendant 

and handed the cellphone to Lieutenant Casey. He had a conversation with defendant, who stated: 

“that he didn’t have anything to do with a shooting, and then he was asking [him] who would be 

in his lineup, who would be the fillers [ ] with him in his lineup.” Lieutenant Casey did not tell 

defendant anything about a shooting or a lineup before he made those comments. After the 

conversation, defendant voluntarily surrendered and was arrested. 

¶ 17 Chicago Police Detective Nathan Poole testified that the day after the shooting, he went to 

defendant’s house to search for physical evidence. On cross-examination, the State objected to the 

5

No first name was given for Officer Mohammad. 

6

We refer to Willie Johnson by his first name because he has the same last name as defendant.
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following question: “When you went back the next day and did that thorough systematic search, 

you didn’t find any handguns?” During a sidebar, the State argued that the motion in limine barred 

use of the shotgun and extended magazine recovered at defendant’s house and defense counsel’s 

question was “getting too close to violating the whole motion in limine.” The trial court agreed, 

sustaining the objection and directing the defense to rephrase the question. Detective Poole 

testified that he located a bag of clothes on the back porch following his thorough and systematic 

search of the house. 

¶ 18 Chicago Police Officer Joseph Scumaci worked as an evidence technician and recovered a 

bullet that was lodged in the porch at Edna’s house. He also recovered three shell casings from the 

grass in the front yard across the street from Edna’s house. The shell casings were discharged from 

a 9-millimeter gun. Officer Scumaci returned to the police station and administered a gunshot 

residue test on defendant’s hands. 

¶ 19 Ellen Chapman of the microscopy trace evidence unit at the Illinois State Police Forensic 

Science Center tested defendant’s gunshot residue kit, which did not test positive for gunshot 

residue. Chapman explained that washing or wiping one’s hands is very effective at removing 

gunshot residue. 

¶ 20 Cassandra Richards of the latent print section of the Illinois State Police Forensic Science 

Center testified that there were no suitable latent prints on the three shell casings recovered at the 

scene. 

¶ 21 Illinois State Police Forensic Scientist Tracy Konior examined the three shell casings

recovered at the scene and determined that all three were fired from the same gun. Konior did not 

have a gun to test. 

¶ 22 The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Knowles and attempted first

degree murder of Slaughter. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 
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a term of 55 years’ imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction consecutive to a term of 

25 years’ imprisonment on the attempted murder conviction. 

¶ 23 ANALYSIS

¶ 24 Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited defense 

counsel from asking Detective Poole whether any handguns were found following a search of 

defendant’s house. Defendant claims that this limitation on cross-examination prevented the 

development of an effective reasonable doubt defense. Defendant, though, concedes that his 

constitutional right to cross-examination was not infringed. 

¶ 25 A defendant has a sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, which 

includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. U.S. Const., amend VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; 

People v. Sanders, 2019 IL App (1st) 160718, ¶ 22; People v. Whitfield, 2014 IL App (1st) 123135, 

¶ 25. Where a defendant’s constitutional confrontation rights have been satisfied, the trial court 

may exercise its discretion and limit the scope of cross-examination. People v. Harmon, 2015 IL 

App (1st) 122345, ¶ 100. We will reverse a trial court’s restriction on the scope of crossexamination where there has been a clear abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to 

the defendant. People v. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 151779, ¶ 22. A trial court abuses its discretion 

only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Peach v. 

McGovern, 2019 IL 123156, ¶ 25. 

¶ 26 Here, the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of 

Detective Poole on the subject of firearms recovered at defendant’s house. The question at issue 

is: “When you went back the next day and did that thorough systematic search, you didn’t find any 

handguns?” Defense counsel’s question risked opening the door to evidence of any firearm 

recovered from the “thorough systematic search,” including the shotgun and extended magazine

that had been previously barred and deemed prejudicial. 
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¶ 27 Nevertheless, the jury was well informed about the lack of a handgun. Specifically, the jury

heard testimony from a forensic scientist that she did not have a gun to test, which was in addition

to hearing testimony that defendant’s hands did not test positive for gunshot residue and 

defendant’s fingerprints were not on the shell casings recovered at the scene. Moreover, defense 

counsel reiterated during closing that there was no physical evidence tying defendant to the 

shooting, stating that “[t]here is no firearm at all that is found.” Thus, the trial court reasonably 

restricted the scope of the cross-examination of Detective Poole about the recovery of any handgun 

and that ruling did not hinder the defense’s ability to develop an effective reasonable doubt defense 

based on the lack of physical evidence corroborating the eyewitness identification of defendant as 

the shooter. See People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 356-57 (2009) (no abuse of discretion in 

limiting cross-examination of a witness where the information sought to be elicited was well noted 

in the record); People v. Arze, 2016 IL App (1st) 131959, ¶ 114 (same). 

¶ 28 Defendant next claims that his 2012 conviction for AUUW should be vacated because our 

supreme court in Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22, declared the statute he was convicted under (720 

ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2)/(3)(A) (West 2012)) facially unconstitutional. People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 

115872, ¶ 25. The State concedes, and we agree, that defendant’s prior AUUW conviction is void 

ab initio. See In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 36 (conduct under a statute found to be facially 

unconstitutional “was not, is not, and could never be a crime” and “the conviction must be treated 

by the courts as if it did not exist”). Thus, we vacate defendant’s void 2012 AUUW conviction (12 

CR 1376901). People v. Bridges, 2020 IL App (1st) 170129, ¶ 36; see In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, 

¶ 43 (void judgments may be “impeached at any time in any proceeding”). 

¶ 29 Defendant also claims that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court 

improperly considered his void 2012 AUUW conviction in aggravation. 
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¶ 30 Defendant acknowledges that he has forfeited our review of this claim, but urges review 

under the plain error doctrine. People v. Harvey, 2018 IL 122325, ¶ 15. The plain-error doctrine is 

“a narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule.” People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 

188 (1982). The first step in a plain error analysis requires the defendant to establish that a clear 

or obvious error occurred. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). “In the sentencing context, 

a defendant must then show either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely 

balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Id.

Under both prongs, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, and the failure to meet that 

burden results in the procedural default being honored. Id. 

¶ 31 The State recognizes that the trial court “erred by acknowledging defendant’s conviction 

at the sentencing hearing,” but argues that the prior conviction had no impact on defendant’s 

sentence. 

¶ 32 Here, defendant failed to meet his burden of persuasion under either prong of the plain 

error doctrine. The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion in limine, finding “the gun case 

is void ab initio under People versus Aguilar.” Thus, the record is clear that the trial court knew 

that defendant’s prior AUUW conviction was void. People v. Golden, 229 Ill. 2d 277, 284 (2008)

(we must presume that a trial judge knows and follows the law). 

¶ 33 Although the trial court knew defendant’s prior AUUW conviction was void, the trial court 

erred in alluding to that conviction when discussing the factors in aggravation, stating that 

“although it is low level, but there is criminal history that involves a gun, which is, unfortunately, 

very telling in that he caused the death of Maurice Knowles by using a gun.” See People v. Billups, 

2016 IL App (1st) 134006, ¶ 15 (a trial court may not consider in aggravation a prior conviction 

based on an unconstitutional statute). However, in fashioning defendant’s sentence, the trial court 

properly considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the presentence investigation report
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(PSI), the victim impact statement, the testimony and letters offered in support by the defense, and 

the material presented before the court in its entirety. The trial court stated that defendant 

“committed an awful offense. It is an absolute tragedy. I am sentencing you to a very long sentence 

in the penitentiary.” The trial court recognized the need for “a sentence that is commiserate with 

the crimes that Mr. Johnson committed here and necessary to protect the citizens of Cook County 

and to deter others from following in Mr. Johnson’s footsteps.” See People v. Bridges, 2020 IL 

App (1st) 170129, ¶ 39 (the trial court’s detailed and clear explanation of its sentence indicated 

that defendant’s void AUUW conviction had no effect on the sentence). 

¶ 34 The trial court’s telling remarks during the sentencing hearing reveal that the trial court 

placed little to no weight on defendant’s prior AUUW conviction in sentencing defendant, but 

imposed a sentence reflecting the “awful” nature of the crimes committed. Indeed, the trial court 

did not refer to defendant’s void AUUW conviction when it explained the basis for defendant’s 

sentence. See contra People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (2d) 130997, ¶ 9 (the trial court determined 

that the defendant’s “prior record alone coupled with the facts of this case certainly require a 

sentence far in excess of the minimum”). In this case, defendant failed to demonstrate “that the 

error was so egregious as to deny [him] a fair sentencing hearing.” People v. Ware, 2014 IL App 

(1st) 120485, ¶ 36; see People v. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (1994) (resentencing not required 

where the record established that the trial court placed insignificant weight on the improperly 

considered aggravating factor); People v. Whitney, 297 Ill. App. 3d 965, 969 (1998) (sentence may 

be affirmed where the weight placed on “an improperly considered aggravating factor was so 

insignificant it resulted in no increase in the defendant’s sentence”). 

¶ 35 Likewise, the evidence at the sentencing hearing was not closely balanced, particularly 

given that the trial court did not find that any of the statutory mitigating factors applied. The trial 

court did not err in finding that the factors in aggravation and the nature of the crimes committed
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outweighed any factors and considerations in mitigation. Therefore, resentencing is not warranted 

because defendant failed to establish plain error.

¶ 36 Defendant finally argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to fully 

consider his rehabilitative potential and bipolar disorder. 

¶ 37 A sentence imposed by the trial court that falls within the statutory range is presumed 

proper and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which occurs “where the sentence is at variance 

with the purpose and spirit of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” 

People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010); People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. 

In imposing a sentence, the trial court must balance the relevant factors, including the nature of 

the offense, the protection of the public, and the defendant’s rehabilitative potential. Alexander, 

239 Ill. 2d at 213. The trial court is presumed to have considered all mitigating evidence, absent 

some affirmative indication to the contrary and despite the length of the sentence imposed. People 

v. Salazar-Corona, 2020 IL App (1st) 172496, ¶ 32. 

¶ 38 In this case, defendant’s first-degree murder conviction was subject to a sentencing range 

of 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment (720 ILCS 5/9(a)(1) (West 2012)) consecutive to a sentence in the 

range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment for attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c) (West 

2012)). The trial court imposed a sentence of 55 years for defendant’s first-degree murder 

conviction and 25 years for the attempted first-degree murder conviction to be served 

consecutively (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2012)), which fell within the permissible statutory 

guidelines. Thus, defendant’s sentence is presumed proper and will be reversed only if found to be 

an abuse of discretion. People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 373-74 (1995); People v. Knox, 2014 IL 

App (1st) 120349, ¶ 45. 

¶ 39 We find that the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing defendant’s sentence. 

Evidence of defendant’s bipolar diagnosis was detailed in the PSI and discussed during the 
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sentencing hearing, including his prior hospitalization for “psychological situations.” See People 

v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 42-43 (2010) (defendant’s mental or psychological impairment may 

not be inherently mitigating and may not be enough to overcome factors in aggravation). Nothing 

in the record establishes that the trial court ignored defendant’s bipolar diagnosis, especially 

considering that the trial court referred to the bipolar diagnosis at the start of the sentencing 

hearing. 

¶ 40 Defendant also argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to 

sufficiently consider his rehabilitative potential, based on his youth (23-years old at the time of the 

offense),

7 education, and background. But the trial court recognized that defendant had strong 

family support, a two-year college education, and was a talented drummer. The trial court noted 

“[t]here is rehabilitative potential here, which makes what happened all the more tragic.” The trial 

court found that defendant “committed an awful offense. It is an absolute tragedy.” Defendant’s 

conduct consisted of shooting at a group of unsuspecting individuals enjoying themselves outside 

their home, killing a 16-year old boy and injuring another individual as they turned away from the 

gunfire to go inside their home. The trial court was entitled to exercise its discretion and find that 

the nature and seriousness of the offense outweighed the considerations in mitigation and the goal 

of rehabilitation. People v. Abrams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 34.; People v. Sims, 403 Ill. App. 

3d 9, 24 (2010). In essence, defendant is requesting this court to reweigh the sentencing factors 

and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, which we cannot do. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 

at 213; People v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 160924, ¶ 8. The trial court was in the best position to 

evaluate the facts of this case and did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a sentence that fell 

7

The trial court was not required to consider the sentencing factors applicable to juveniles or treat 

his age as a mitigating factor because defendant was an adult when he committed the offenses. People v. 

Charleston, 2108 IL App (1st) 161323, ¶ 23.
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within the permissible statutory guidelines. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 37; see People v. 

Parker, 288 Ill. App. 3d 417, 423 (1997) (“A lengthy sentence does not mean mitigating factors 

were ignored.”).

¶ 41 CONCLUSION

¶ 42 Defendant’s first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder convictions and 

sentences are affirmed. We vacate defendant’s void 2012 AUUW conviction in case number 12 

CR 1376901. 

¶ 43 13 CR 1920601 affirmed; 12 CR 1376901 vacated.