Filed 7/15 /16 ; pub. & mod. order 8/8/16 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

PAUL CRUZ et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CULVER CITY et al.,

Defendants an d Respondents. B265690

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC565079)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles Co unty. Michael

Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.

Herbert L. Greenberg for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Bur ke, Williams & Sorenson and Thomas B. Brown for Defendants and

Respondents.

__________________________2

Plaintiffs Paula Cruz and four of her neighbors appeal from the order dismissing

as an anti

- SLAPP action their complaint against the city council (t he council) of Culver

City and five of its council members for allegedly violating the state’s open meeting

laws. We reject plaintiffs’ contentions that the action is exempt from the anti

- SLAPP

provisions because it concerned the public interest, and affi rm because there is no

probability plaintiffs will prevail on the merits.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Culver City residents Paula Cruz, Ronald Davis, John Heyl, James Province, and

Nadine F. Province sued the City of Culver City (the city) for violatin g the state’s open

meeting law (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq. (the Bro wn Act)), alleging that the council

violated the Brown Act in two ways: (1) by discuss ing a change to parking restrictions in

their neighborhood even though it was not on the ag enda; and (2 ) by taking action on that

issue when the council implicitly decided that the new challenge to those restrictions

could proceed as an appeal of an earlier denial by city staff members.

The parking restrictions were imposed in 1982 when residents of Farrag ut Drive

complained that parishioners of nearby Grace Lutheran Church (the church) jammed their

street with parked cars during church services. 1 In 2004, the council adopted an

ordinance for the establishment of preferential parking zones throughout the c ity and

included the 1982 Farragut Drive P arking restrictions as one such zone.

In 2013, the council adopted regulations governing the establishment and

regulation of preferential parking/residential pa rking permit zones. These regulations

delegated to a “Traffic Committee” comprised of city staff members in the traffic

engineering department the ability to administer and implement those regulations. 2

1 Among those taking part in the 1982 parking dispute were current plaintiff and

appellant Ronald Davis, and plaintiff s’ counsel, Herbert L. Greenberg.

2 The scope of this ordinance is in dispute, an issue we discuss below.3

In April 2014, a lawyer for the church sent a letter to city traffic analyst Gabriel

Garcia seeking info rmation about the application process for a change to the existing

Farragut Drive P arking restrictions pursuant to the 2013 parking regulations. Garcia

wrote back one month later that the city e ngineer was unable to act on such a request

because the 2013 regulations did not provide a means by which non

- residents could seek

modification of the conditions imposed in a residential parking permit zone.

On August 1, 2014, the church sent a letter to council member Andrew We issman

complaining about Garcia’ s res ponse and asking to address the council about the

“onerous parking restrictions” on Farragut Drive

.

At the council’s August 11, 2014 meeting, Weissman mentioned the church’s

letter during the portion of the meeting set aside for the receipt and filing of

c orrespondence from the public. Following a six

- minute discussion with then

- Mayor

Meghan Sahli

- Wells and Public Works Director and City Engineer Charles D.

Herbertson, the church’s request to review the Farragut Drive Parking restrictions was

placed on the agenda for the next council meeting on September 8, 2014. 3

In November 2014, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeki ng declaratory relief that the

c ity and its five council members had violated t he Brown Act by discussing the c hurch’s

letter and by acting upo n it by placing it on the agenda for the next meeting, even though

the 2013 parking regulations did not provide for such action. 4

The c ity brought an anti

- SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), seeking to

dismiss plaintiffs’ action because the c ity’s a lleged misconduct arose from First

Amendment activity and because plaintiffs could not show a probability of prevailing on

the merits. The c ity contended that it had done nothing more than have preliminary

3 It is the nature of that discussion and the decision to place the item on the next

agenda that give rise to this action. In the discussion part of our opinion

, we will set forth

a transcript of the events.

4 In addition to Weissman, the complaint named council members Meghan Sahli

Wells (the mayor) , Michael O’Leary, Jim B. Clarke, and Jeffrey Cooper. For ease of

reference, we will refer to all the defendants collectively as the c ity.4

discussions with staff members concerning the chu rch’s letter in order to have the matter

placed on a future agenda, as expressly permitted by the Brown Act.

Plaintiffs contended their action was exempt from the anti

- SLAPP provisions

because it concerned a matter affecting the public interest. They al so contended that the

council’s discussions and actions were so substantive that they fell outside the statutory

exceptions. The t rial court agreed with the c ity, granted the anti

- SLAPP motion, and

dismissed the complaint.

DISCUSSION

1. The Law Governing A nti

- SLAPP Motions

Code of Civil Procedure s ection 425.16 was enacted to address a sharp rise in the

number of “[ l ] awsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional

rights of fre edom of speech and petition for the redress of grie vances. ” (§ 425.16,

subd. (a).) 5 The statute provides that a “cause of action against a person arising from any

act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the

United States Constitution or the California Cons titution in connection with a public issue

shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff

has established that there is a probability that the plainti ff will prevail on the claim.” ( Id

,

subd. (b)(1).)

The t rial court undertakes a two

- step process when considering a defendant’s anti

SLAPP motion. First, the trial court determines whether the defendant has shown the

challenged cause of action a rises from protected activity. The trial court reviews the

pleadi ngs, declarations, and other supporting documents to determine what conduct is

actually being challenged, not wheth er that conduct is actionable. The defendant does

not have to show the challenged conduct is protected as a matter of law; only a prima

faci e showing is required. ( People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012)

5 Such actions are commonly referred to as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public

Participation, or SLAPP actions. All further undesignated section references are to the

Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.5

211 Cal.App.4th 809, 822.) If the defendant shows the challenged conduct was taken in

furtherance of his First Amendment rights of free speech, petition, and to seek redress of

gr ievances, the trial court must then determine whether the plaintiff has shown a

probabil ity of prevailing on the claim. ( People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange ,at p. 822 )

We review the trial court’s ruling on a n anti

- SLAPP motion independently,

engaging in the same two

- step process. ( Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471,

478.) We do not weigh credibility or th e weight of the evidence. Instead, we accept as

true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to

dete rmine if it has defeated plaintiff ’s evidence as a matter of law. ( Soukup v. Law

Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3.)

The anti

- SLAPP provisions do not apply to cer tain public interest lawsuits.

Section 425 .17, subdivision (b) prov ides: “Section 425.16 does not apply to any action

brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public if all of the

following conditions exist: [¶] (1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than or

different from the reli ef sought for the general public or a class of wh ich the plaintiff is a

member. A claim for attorney’s fees, costs, or penalties does not constitute greater relief

for purposes of this subdivision. [¶] (2) The action, if successful, would enforce an

im portant right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit,

whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons. [¶]

(3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial b urden on

the plaintiff in relation to plaintiff’s stake in the matter.”

2. The Brown Act

The Brown Act requires that most meetings of a local agency’s legislative body be

open to the public for attendance by all. ( Gov. Code, § 54953, subd. (a).) Among its

provisions, the Brown Act requires that an agenda be posted at least 72 hours before a

regular meeting and forbids action on any items not on that agenda. (§ 54954.2, subd.

(a) (1) .) “The [Brown] Act thus serves to facilitate public participation in all p hases of

local government decisionmaking and to curb misuse of the democratic process by secret

legislation of public bodies. [Citation.]” ( Epstein v. Hollywood Entertainment Dist. II6

Bus. Improvement Dist. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 862, 868.) Either the di strict attorney or

any interested person may bring an action for mandamus or injunctive or declaratory

relief in order to stop or prevent violations of the Brown Act “or to determine the

applicability of this chapter to actions or threatened future action of the legislative body

. . . .” ( Gov. Code, § 54960, subd. (a).)

There are three exceptions to the B rown Act’s agenda requirement. Even if an

item is not on the agenda, “members of a legislative body or its staff may briefly respond

to statements made or questions posed by person s exercising their public testimony rights

under [Government Code] Section 54954.3

. In addition, on their own initiative or in

response to questions posed by the public, a member of a legislative body or its staff may

ask a que stion for clarification, make a brief announcement, or make a brief report on his

or her own activiti es. Furthermore, a member of a legislative body, or the body itself,

subject to rules or procedures of the legislative body, may provide a reference to st aff or

other resources for factual information, request staff to report back to the body at a

subsequent meeting concerning any matter, or take action to direct staff to place a matter

of business on a future agenda.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.2, subd. (a)( 2 ).)

3. The Council’s Discussion Concerning t he Church’s Letter

What follows is a transcript of the portion of the August 11, 2014 council meeting

where the church’s letter was discussed: 6

“ MAYOR MEGHAN SAHLI

- WELLS : M a y I have a m o t ion to r e ce i ve and f ile

corre spond e nce.

“ Councilpe r son M e haul O’Lea r y : S o m ov e d.

“ Councilpe r son J i m Cl a rke: Seco n d.

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: A m o t ion and a se c ond.

“ Martin Co l e: And Ma d am M a y or a s the C i t y Council is voting on th i s m otion

t hat incl u des it e m s that were rece i v e d b y the C i t y Cle r k’s o f f ice up ‘til 4 o’clo c k t his

6 Although the record contain s a video recording of the exchange, which we have

viewed, it did not include a transcript. We asked the parties to provide a transcript and

have aug mented the appellate record to include that transcript.7

a f ternoon and t h e y are about ev e n l y sp l it b etween it e ms A

- 1 a nd A

- 2.

“ Secreta r y : T hat m o t i o n passes 5 AYES.

“ Councilpe r son A n drew W e is s m an: Mad a m Ma y o r m a y I a sk a qu e st i on

regardi n g one of the it e m s t hat we j u st r eceived and f iled?

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: Yes.

“ W e i s s m an: It’s a l e tter f rom Ilbert Phi l i p s re g arding the p arking dist r ict in and

a r ound Farragut a n d Frank l in. And it w a s direct e d to m e, I think it was dire c ted to m e

b ecause when we h a d the d i sc u ssion a n u mber of m on t hs ago rega r ding the c o nsolidated

districts I’m the one that rai s ed the issue of an appe a l f r o m a decis i on or n on

- decision b y

the Ci t y Engineer, a n d I wo u ld l ike to ask f or cons e ns u s to agendi z e the i s sue. Apparent l y

the sta ff ’s position is th at t he avenue of appeal onl y a pplies t o resid e nts s ince it’s a

r e sidential parking di s trict. P e rha p s I wasn’t su ff icient l y c lear the nig h t we d i scu s sed the

app e al, but I would like to, I’d l ike t o discuss i t again. And get s o m e c l ari f ication with

regard t o what the actual i n tent wa s

.

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: So t h e agenda it e m t hat y ou ’ re pro p osi n g is to

dis c uss the appeal proc e ss?

“ W e i s s m an: and the

. . .

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: Or th i s speci f ic c a se?

“ W e i s s m an: W ell w e c ould do it I guess we c ould do it one o f two wa y s and

m a y b e sta ff

, Mr. Herber t son m a y be here, can a s sist m e. I t hink we ei t her age n di z e an

it e m f or discussion of the speci f ic parking d istrict o r w e can have a discuss i on of what it

was that we intended to do wh e n we prov i ded f or a ri g ht of app eal when w e c onsolidated

the parking di s tricts?

“ O’Lea r y : A nd wo u ld y ou like to put on h old t he appeal t i me? [ indist i nct] and

t i ming

. . . .

“ W e i s s m an: I don’t thi n k, based on sta ff ’s positio n

, there i s no a p peal time cuz

there’s no right to appeal.

“ O’ Lea r y : O k a y

.8

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: I ’ m c o m f ortab l e d i scussing t he issue.

“ Clarke: So a m I.

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: Alri g ht.

“ W e i s s m an: M a y I ask, just ask, Mr. Herb e rts o n f or so m e clari f

ication as to what

sta ff ’s pre f

erred direction is o n this?

“ Charles He r b ertson: S t af f ’s pre f erence would be to just t ake up t he i s sue of the

parking, speci f

ical l y r egardi n g t he parking on Farr a gut as opposed to whe t her or not

bu s iness or non

- reside n t shou l d be able to appe a l a park in g district. The reas o n f or that is

i t ’s a v e r y rare circ u m s t ance

-- f irst t i m e I c a n r e m e mber that this h as c o m e up where

there ’ s been a desire to ch a nge the p a rking distr i ct once i t’s been f or m e d

, b y an a ff

ected

near b y busine s s or in this [ case] a c h ur c h. So just I wou l d rec o mmend th a t we ju s t

di s cuss this p articular it e m as op p osed to a more general t he idea of an appeal, b ut that of

c ourse is up to the Ci t y Council. I f

, if we are g oing to ag e ndize th a t I would rec o mmend

that we noti f y both the Church, a n d as well as eve r y bo d y i n the d i str i ct, s o th e y would

have the opport u ni t y to c o m e in and state t h eir case.

“ O’Lea r y : A nd is t h ere a t i m e f ra m e b y wh i ch an appeal can u m m

, is t hat going t o

be an issue?

“ Herbertson: No, t h ere ’ s no t i m e f r a m e C o unc i l m a n W eis s man w a s s a y in g the

p r ocess, least as w e ’ ve interp r e t ed it at the Sta f f level, doesn’t real l y allow f or an appeal

p e r se but th e y can al w a y s c o me t o direct l y t o the C i t y C ouncil at a n y t i m e. It’ s

, it’s y our

poli c y t hat y ou ’ve ad o pted so a t an y point in each t i me a district is f o r m ed t he c it y c o uncil

e ff ective l y has the abi l i t y to h e ar an y objecti o ns to t h at d i strict at a n y t i m e, s o.

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: In reg a rds to t he t i m i ng, I be l ieve that th i s is one of

the old e st parking di s tricts in Cu l ver Ci t y if I ’ m not mis t aken, so it ’ s not b a sed on a new

d e cision o r restriction i t’s bas e d on existing c o nditio n s, is that correct?

“ W e i s s m an: I think it’ s

— I don’t want to s peak f or the Church, but I t hink it’s

e v olving conditions. I think the, when the p a rking d istr i ct was f irst establi s hed twen t y

pl u s y ears ago, it was based o n o n e set of circ u m stanc e s, and I think those c i rc u m s tances

h a ve evolved. T h e neig h bo r hood has c hanged, a nd I think wh a t, what we would be d oing9

w ould be looking at the n a ture of and justi f ication f or continui n g the di s trict in its curre n t

iterati o n or deciding that we w a nt to do s o methi n g di f ferent.

“ Herbertson: Yes, y o u know I don’t ha v e the hi s to r y right in f ront of me, b u t what

Co u nci l m an W e i s s m an said is c orr e ct. M y rec o llection is t hat the l i m i ts on t he di s trict

have c h anged at least a coup l e of times I think over the y ea r s s o it is an o ld distr i ct b u t the

restric t ions h a ve been chang e d over t im e and certai n l y

, it’s po s sible also t hat other th i ngs

have a l so chan g ed as well as f or other us e s in the area, etc. S o it would be a ppropri a te t o

take a f resh look a t it if that’s the, the c ou n cil’s desire t o do s o.

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS : Alri g ht.

“ Herbertson: Ok a y

.

“ MAYOR SAHLI

- WELLS: Thank You. ”

4. The Public Interest Exception Does Not Apply

Section 425.17 was enacted to curb the “ ‘ disturbing abuse’ ” of the anti

- SLAPP

provisions. ( Club Members For An Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4 th

309, 315, quoting § 425.17, subd. (a).) The public interest exception applies to only

those actions brought solely in the public inter est. It does not apply to an action that

seeks a more narrow advantage for a particular plaintiff. ( Id. at pp. 316

- 317.) As a

result, section 425.17, subdivision (b) does not apply to a party seeking any personal

relief. ( Club Members For An Honest Ele ction

, pp

. 309, 315

. )

We look to the allegations of the complaint and the scope of relief sought in order

to determine whether the public interest exception applies. ( Tourgeman v. Nelson &

Kennard (2014) 222 Cal.App.4 th 1447, 1460.) 7

Plaintiffs contend they have satisfied all three requirements of the exception

because: (1) they have asked for nothing oth er than a declaration that the c ity’s conduct

violated the Brown Act, which would provide them no greater relief than the publi c at

large would receive ; (2) a judgment in their favor would provide a sign ificant benefit to

the public; and (3) private enforcement was necessary because no one else stepped up to

7 As a result, we hereby deny plaintiffs’ request that we judicially notice the city’s

March 2016 resolution directing a study of the Farragut Drive P arking restrictions

.10

challenge the c ity’s action, and plaintiffs will incur legal fees without a concomitant

damages a ward should they prevail. The c ity contends that plaintiffs have an individual

stake in the outcome that defeats application of the public interest exception.

O ur examination of the com plaint tips the balance in the c ity’s favor. The

complaint alleges t hat the c ity grandfathered in the Farragut Drive P arking restrictions in

2004, and then, pursuant to the 2013 parking regulations, delegated to the t raffic e ngineer

exclusive authority regarding changes to preferential parking zones. The traf fic engineer

later refused the c hurch’s requests to modify the Farragut Drive P arki ng restrictions,

prompting the c hurch’s August 1, 2014 letter to Weisman.

Plaintiffs allege that contrary to the 201 3 parking regulations, the council decided :

(1) to remove the traffi c engineer’s exclusive jurisdiction over parking zone modification

issues ; (2 ) that it had original jurisdiction over the matter ; and (3) that the Farragut Drive

residents would have to re

- petition the c ity to keep their restrictions in place. Plai ntiffs

also allege that the council did not inform the public “and in particula r Farragut

residents” that the c ity’s traffic engineer believed th e c hurch had no per se right to appeal

to the council, and instead decided that such a right was available. As part o f this,

plaintiffs allege, the council discussed sub stantive issues concerning the c hurch’s

viewpoint on the need for changes to the parking zone.

Finally, plaintiffs alleged that they submitted a cease and desist letter to the c ity

that “clearly describe s the past action of the c ouncil on August 11, 2014 ” that the conduct

violat ed the Brown Act, and that the c ity has not provided an unconditional commitment

to “cease, desist from, and not repeat the past action that plaintiffs alleged in their

aforesaid c ease

- and

- desist letter.” 8

8 Plaintif

fs provided a copy of the cease

- and

- desist letter in opposition t o the c ity’s

ant i

- SLAPP motion. In it, p laintiffs complain that the council violated the 2013 parking

regulations by providing the church with “non

- existent appellate rights” and by ordering

staff to take a fresh look at the Farragut Drive P arking restrictions. The letter asked the

c ity to “cease and desist discussions and action related to its meeting on August 11,

2014.”11

Distilled, p laintiffs alleged that the c ouncil had no auth ority to hear an appeal by

the c hurch regarding the Farragut Drive P arki ng restrictions, and asked the c ity to stop

taking further actions in that regard. Keeping the par king restriction at sta tus quo would

directly benefit p laintiff Farragut Drive homeowners. In short, plaintiffs sought personal

relief in the form of a halt to any atte mpts by the c hurch to undo the long

- standing

parking restrictions. As a result, the pu blic interest exception to the anti

- SLAPP

provisions does not apply.

5. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely t o Prevail o n t he Merits

Plai ntiffs do not dispute that the c ity has satisfied the first prong of an anti

- SLAPP

motion

– that its statements concerning the parkin g restrictions and its direction to place

the issue on a future agenda w ere form s of protected activ ity under the First Amendment.

The issue we must decide is whether plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing it is

probable they will prevail on the merits.

We begin with the three Brown Act exceptions to discussing or acti ng upon non

agenda it ems: (1) members of a legislative body, or their staff, may briefly respond to

statements made or questions posed by persons exercising their right to publi cly testify at

a hearing; (2) either on their own initiative or in response to a question posed by the

public, the legislative body or its staff may ask a question for clarification, make a brief

announcement, or make a brief report on their own activities; a nd (3) subject to its rules

or procedures, a legislative body may ask staff to provide factual information, report back

at a later time, or place an item on a future agenda. (Gov. Code, § 54954.2, subd. (a)(2 ).)

Although p laintiffs characterize the counc il’s comment s and questions concerning

the c hurch’s ability to challenge the Farragut Drive P arking restrictions as something

substantiv e and substantial, we disagree. Based on our reading of the transcript and

viewing of the video recording, Weisman did no more than ask for clarification as to the

appropr iate avenue of response to the c hurch’s letter. Engineer H erbert son answered

those questions and advised the council that the matter could be placed on a future

agenda, with all parties given notice and an opportunity to comment. Therefore, the

discussion itself falls within all three statutory exceptions.12

Finally, plaintiffs contend they will likely pre vail on the merits because the c ity’s

actions

– placing the parking restriction issue on the next age nda

– violated the rules and

procedures in the 2013 parking regulations, which plaintiffs contend prohibited what was

effectively an appeal of the traffic engineer’s statement that the regulations provided for

no such appeal. (Gov. Code, § 54954.2, subd. (a) (2) [subject to rules of procedures of

legislative body, staff can be directed to place a matter on the agenda].)

We see two fundamental problems with this contention. First, as we read the

statute , it requires the legislative body to follow its rules or procedures in regard to setting

agendas, and does not address whether a matter was wrongly placed on the agenda for

other reasons. To hold otherwise would convert the Brown Act into a vehicle for

challenging agendized matters because opponents believe the legislative body lacks

authority to act for reasons unrelated to the policies behind t he open meeting law. If the

2013 parking regulations barred the c ity from acting, that issue was ripe for discussion by

plaintiffs when the matter was heard at the next council meeting.

Second, as we read the record, city staffers concluded the 2013 parking regulations

applied to parking zone issues raised by only the residents of an affected area , not by

organizations or businesses locat ed in or near the parking zo ne. It was on that basis that

the c hurch’s attempt to appeal was administratively rejected, and it was that concern that

led the c ity, acting on advice of its traffic engineer, to conclude it still possessed the

authority to reconsider parking restriction s in response to a challen ge such as that brought

by the c hurch. We have read the 2013 parking regulations, and agree that they are silent

on the type of challenge raised here. Under plaintiffs ’ interpretation, however, the c ity

could never reconsider lo ng

- standing parking restrictions no matter how much conditions

had changed, so long as the challenge came from someone other t han the residents of that

zone. We reject that interpretation, and on that basis as well conclude that the plaintiffs

are not lik ely to prevail on the merits.13 DISPOSITION

The order dismissing plaintiffs’ action under the anti

- SLAPP provisions is

affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

FLIER, J.Filed 8/8 /16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

PAUL CRUZ et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CULVER CITY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents. B265690

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC565079)

ORDER MODIFYING AND

CERTIFYING OPINION FOR

PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on July 15, 2016, was not certified for

publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be

published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

It is further ordered, the opinion shall be modified as follows:

On page 9, subheading No. 4 “The Public Interest E xception Does Not Apply” is

replaced with: The Public Interest Exception Does Not Defeat the anti

- SLAPP Motion.

This modification does not change the judgment.

________________________________________________________________________ BIGELOW, P. J. RUBIN, J. FLIER, J.