IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30131

Summary Calendar

LIZA C. ARIZA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

LOOMIS ARMORED US, L.L.C., 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:13-CV-419

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Liza C. Ariza (“Ariza”) sued her employer,

Defendant-Appellee Loomis Armored US, L.L.C. (“Loomis”), alleging violations 

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family and Medical 

Leave Act (“FMLA”). At trial, the jury found for Loomis on all claims, and the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 18, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

2

district court entered a final judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. 

Ariza appealed. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Loomis hired Ariza as an armored truck driver and guard in February 

2008. According to Ariza, at the time she interviewed for the position, she 

informed Loomis’s then-branch manager, Lauren Baronet, that she suffered 

from seizures. Baronet, however, disputed that Ariza ever indicated that she 

suffered from seizures or had any disability. Ariza did not identify that she 

had seizures or any disabling condition on Loomis’s “Disabled & Veterans SelfIdentification Form,” nor did she request any ADA accommodation in the space 

provided on the form.

Ariza claims that on September 9, 2008, she suffered a seizure or fainting 

spell while driving an armored truck with coworker Allen Pierson. Pierson 

testified that, at the time of the incident, Ariza was not driving erratically, and

he “didn’t see anything that would be related to a seizure.” Ariza’s emergency 

room records stated that she had experienced a fainting episode, or syncope. 

Afterwards, Ariza did not request any accommodations, and she continued to 

drive the armored truck. In 2011, Loomis promoted Ariza to evening vault 

supervisor, a position that required her to carry a gun and to oversee millions 

of dollars in customer funds. Although Ariza alleges that Loomis moved her 

into the vault as an accommodation for her purported disability, Baronet 

testified that Ariza requested the position due to her school schedule.

On June 5, 2012, Ariza alleged that she suffered another seizure while

at work. Loomis requested that she take FMLA leave, and she complied. While 

on leave, Ariza was in contact with Rebekah Jackson, Loomis’s corporate 

benefits supervisor. Jackson testified that she explained to Ariza that in order 

to return to work, she needed to obtain a return-to-work release from both a

private doctor and from Dr. Uzoma Moore, the company physician at 

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

3

Concentra Health Care (“Concentra”). According to Jackson, Loomis was not 

a decision maker in Ariza’s fitness to return to work nor did it have access to 

medical records from her outside providers. Rather, the process was handled

by Concentra and a third-party administrator. Ariza therefore needed to 

satisfy Dr. Moore’s requests for information so that he could determine her 

fitness to return to work.

Ariza saw her personal neurologist, Dr. William Gladney, and he

provided a fitness-for-duty certification on June 12, 2012. However, Loomis 

determined that the certification was based on false information provided by

Ariza.1 Dr. Gladney saw Ariza again on June 26th and concluded that she did

not have seizures or epilepsy but rather occasional common vasovagal syncopal 

spells, which were possibly sinusitis-related. Ariza did not return to Dr. 

Gladney after that, and he never completed the required paperwork. Instead, 

Ariza obtained fitness-for-duty certifications from Dr. Bruce Craig, her family 

practitioner, and Dr. Charles Mitchell, the ENT physician who had recently 

performed her nasal surgery.

Ariza’s FMLA leave ended on August 27, 2012. Because Ariza had not

yet obtained a return-to-work clearance from Dr. Moore, Loomis determined 

that she had not satisfied the requirements for reinstatement. Instead, Loomis

extended her leave through its internal Medical Leave of Absence program. 

Ariza saw Dr. Moore on August 28th, at which time he explained that Dr. 

Craig’s return-to-work submission was illegible and insufficient due to its 

failure to address whether she was fit to carry a gun or whether her alleged 

 

1 Loomis asserts that Ariza provided a false medical history of seizures and epilepsy, 

falsely stated that she was on medication prior to June 5, 2012, falsely stated that she had 

gone off her medication prior to the June 5th seizure, and failed to advise Dr. Gladney that 

her job required her to carry a firearm. 

 

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

4

seizures were being controlled by medication.2 Ariza reportedly “verbalized 

understanding” that Dr. Craig needed to provide a legible fitness-for-duty 

letter containing this information. Ariza maintains that she eventually

provided the requested certification. Dr. Moore informed Loomis, however,

that the documentation Ariza offered “did not include the information/details 

needed for clearance,” and, accordingly, he “did not feel comfortable releasing 

[her] back to work.”

On October 5, 2012, Ariza filed an Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) charge against Loomis. In a letter dated October 8, 

2012, Jackson informed Ariza that Dr. Moore was still awaiting an evaluation 

from a neurologist. Three days later, Jackson sent Ariza a letter explaining

that if she did not obtain the evaluation, Loomis would have no evidence that 

she could safely perform her job duties and would therefore be unable to return 

her to work as a vault supervisor. 

Ten months later, Ariza sued Loomis in federal district court, alleging

(1) discrimination on the basis of disability, (2) discrimination on the basis of 

being regarded as having a disability, (3) discrimination based on failure to 

accommodate a disability, and (4) interference with FMLA rights.3 Following 

a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Loomis on all claims. On appeal, 

Ariza challenges the verdict on two grounds: (1) that “the jury plainly err[ed] 

in not finding that Loomis regarded [her] as disabled” and (2) that “the jury 

plainly err[ed] when it found that Loomis had not failed or refused to restore 

[her] to her same or equivalent job on her return from FMLA leave.”

 

2 According to Dr. Moore, Dr. Craig was not aware at the time he provided the 

certification that Ariza’s job as vault supervisor required her to carry a firearm. 

3 Ariza’s claim of discrimination on the basis of sex was dismissed by the district court 

on summary judgment. 

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

5

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Ariza concedes that she did not file a post-verdict motion for judgment 

as a matter of law, and so we review the sufficiency of the evidence for plain 

error only. See Shepherd v. Dall. Cty., 591 F.3d 445, 456 (5th Cir. 2009); 

Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 2002). Under the plain 

error standard, we will set aside the jury’s verdict only if “the judgment works 

a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 573 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Such a review requires us merely to 

ascertain whether Loomis has “submitted any evidence in support of [its]

claim.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 456 (quoting 

Polanco v. City of Austin, 78 F.3d 968, 974 (5th Cir. 1996)) (“the question . . . is 

not whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict, but 

whether there was any evidence to support the jury verdict”). If Loomis has 

presented any such evidence, we will uphold the district court’s judgment. See 

Polanco, 78 F.3d at 974. However, if no evidence supports the jury’s verdict, 

we must order a new trial. Id.

B. ADA Claim

Ariza argues that “the jury plainly err[ed] in not finding that Loomis 

regarded [her] as disabled.” We disagree. “The ADA’s definition of ‘disability’ 

includes individuals who are ‘regarded as having such an impairment [that 

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities].’” EEOC v. E.I. Du 

Pont de Nemours & Co., 480 F.3d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

12102(2)(C)) (alteration in original). An individual is “regarded as” being 

disabled if she “(1) has an impairment that is not substantially limiting but 

which the employer perceives as substantially limiting, (2) has an impairment 

that is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others, or (3) has 

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

6

no impairment but is perceived by the employer as having a substantially 

limiting impairment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).4

This court has held that an employer’s “mere knowledge” of an 

employee’s medical condition does not in itself “support an inference that [the 

employer] regarded [her] as disabled.” Flanner v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 600 

F. App’x 914, 922 (5th Cir. 2015). We have also held that “an employer may 

regard an employee as impaired or restricted from one position or a narrow 

range of jobs without regarding [her] as ‘disabled.’” E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 

480 F.3d at 729. Additionally, we have recognized that a person who is 

epileptic or has seizures is not automatically considered disabled; rather, such 

a determination requires an individualized assessment of the effects of that 

impairment on the person’s major life activities. Deas v. River W., L.P., 152 

F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 1998).

Ariza contends that Loomis regarded her as disabled because certain 

employees were aware of her history of seizures, and consequently, Loomis

made changes to her work duties. Ariza points in particular to “Jackson’s false 

and baseless assertions,” which, in her view, caused Loomis to “regard[] Ariza 

as so disabled . . . she posed a safety risk from her seizure disorder preventing 

 

4 The jury instructions for the ADA “regarded as” claim stated in relevant part: 

TO SUCCEED ON THIS CLAIM, PLAINTIFFS MUST PROVE THE 

FOLLOWING BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE: ONE, 

PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE PERFORMED THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS 

OF HER POSITION WHEN DEFENDANT FIRED HER; TWO, PLAINTIFF 

HAS A RECORD OF AN EPILEPTIC AND/OR SEIZURE CONDITION THAT 

. . . SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED ONE OR MORE MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES 

OR WAS REGARDED AS HAVING SUCH A PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT; 

THREE, DEFENDANT KNEW THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A RECORD OF THIS 

IMPAIRMENT OR REGARDED PLAINTIFF AS HAVING SUCH AN 

IMPAIRMENT; FOUR, DEFENDANT FIRED PLAINTIFF; FIVE, 

DEFENDANT FIRED PLAINTIFF BECAUSE SHE HAD A RECORD OF AN 

EPILEPTIC AND/OR SEIZURE CONDITION OR WAS REGARDED AS 

HAVING SUCH A CONDITION.

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

7

Loomis from returning her to work.” At trial, however, Loomis put forth ample 

evidence that it did not—nor did it have reason to—regard Ariza as disabled. 

For example, Loomis presented the records that Ariza claimed documented her 

long history of seizures and epilepsy—e.g., Ariza’s DMV records, National 

Guard records, and hospital records—none of which reflected a history of 

seizures, epilepsy, or any other disability. Baronet testified that when Ariza

was hired, she never indicated that she had a disability or requested any 

accommodations. Baronet also stated that Ariza was transferred to the vault 

position not because she posed a safety risk but because she was attending

college during her off time. Pierson testified that, on the day Ariza fell ill while 

driving, he did not observe any symptoms consistent with a seizure—an 

observation corroborated by Ariza’s emergency room records. Jackson, who 

was aware that Ariza allegedly suffered from seizures, testified that she had 

no opinion as to Ariza’s medical condition, that such a determination was not 

part of her job, and that Loomis was not a decision maker in Ariza’s fitness to 

return to work. Additionally, Loomis presented evidence, such as text 

messages, to discredit Ariza and to show that she was a disgruntled employee 

who had been looking to change jobs for some time.

Thus, because Loomis presented ample evidence to support the jury 

verdict, see Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 456, we uphold the district court’s judgment

as to this claim. 

C. FMLA Claim

Ariza additionally argues that “the jury plainly err[ed] when it found 

that Loomis had not failed or refused to restore [her] to her same or equivalent 

job on her return from FMLA leave.” We disagree. “The FMLA allows eligible 

employees to take up to twelve weeks of leave in any one-year period to address 

. . . the employee’s own serious health condition.” Bryant v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging 

& Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

8

2612(a)(1)(C)–(D)). An employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the 

exercise of or the attempt to exercise” this right.5 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 

Employees who take FMLA leave “are entitled, upon their return, ‘to be 

restored . . . to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave 

commenced’ or ‘to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent 

employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.’”

Forbes v. Unit Tex. Drilling, L.L.C., 526 F. App’x 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2013)

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)–(B)).6

Ariza argues that Loomis interfered with her rights under the FMLA 

because it did not return her to work after her FMLA leave ended. At trial, 

however, Loomis presented evidence that it did not engage in such interference

and, in fact, made a concerted effort to restore Ariza to her position as vault 

supervisor. For example, Jackson testified that she did everything within her 

power to expedite Ariza’s return to work and that Loomis “went above and 

beyond” what it would normally do to accommodate an employee—including 

offering to pay for Ariza to visit a neurologist and providing her with a written 

copy of her job description “to present to a neurologist of [her] choice.” Jackson

testified that it was Dr. Moore, not Loomis, who requested that Ariza obtain 

an evaluation from a neurologist, and because Ariza did not receive Dr. Moore’s 

 

5 Although the FMLA does not specifically define “interference,” “Department of Labor 

regulations provide that interference includes refusing to authorize FMLA leave, restraining 

or discouraging FMLA leave, and retaliating against employees who exercise FMLA rights.” 

Forbes v. Unit Tex. Drilling, L.L.C., 526 F. App’x 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2013).

6 The jury instructions for the FMLA claim stated in relevant part:

TO PREVAIL ON THIS FMLA CLAIM, PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE BY A 

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT, ONE, PLAINTIFF 

SOUGHT TO RETURN TO EMPLOYMENT WITH DEFENDANT 

FOLLOWING FMLA LEAVE; AND, TWO, DEFENDANT FAILED TO 

RESTORE PLAINTIFF TO THE SAME POSITION SHE HELD AT THE 

TIME HER FMLA LEAVE BEGAN OR TO AN EQUIVALENT POSITION.

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/18/2017
No. 16-30131

9

clearance, Loomis was never in a position to facilitate her return to work. 

Jackson additionally testified that, at the time of trial, Ariza was still on 

medical leave of absence pending her satisfaction of Loomis’s return-to-work 

requirements and that Ariza’s failure to see a neurologist was the “piece” 

preventing the completion of the reinstatement process. Further, Dr. Moore

testified that it was his job to get Ariza back to work, that he informed Ariza 

that without a neurologist’s evaluation he could not complete his own fitnessfor-duty evaluation, and that Loomis in no way interfered or ever asked him to 

prevent Ariza from returning to work. Thus, Loomis provided abundant

evidence that it was Ariza’s own failure to comply with its established

protocol—and not any action of the company—that prevented her from being 

restored to her job as vault supervisor or an equivalent position.7 

Because Loomis provided sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, 

see Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 456, the district court’s judgment is sustained.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

 

7 Even assuming that Loomis prevented Ariza from being restored to her position, an 

employer “may delay restoration to an employee who fails to provide a fitness-for-dutycertificate to return to work.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(b). The FMLA permits employers to have 

“a uniformly-applied policy or practice that requires all similarly-situated employees . . . who 

take leave for such conditions to obtain and present certification from the employee’s health 

care provider that the employee is able to resume work.” Id. § 825.312(a). Section 825.312 

generally describes the conditions required for an employer to delay restoration to an 

employee who fails to provide a fitness-for-duty certification. At trial, Loomis put forth 

evidence that it did not return Ariza to work due to her failure to provide the requisite fitnessfor-duty certification.

 Case: 16-30131 Document: 00513838948 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/18/2017