* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 22 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. RONNI JONES,

Defendant-Appellant. No. 97-3277 (D.C. No. 97-CR-40058-01-SAC)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, TACHA, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Ronni Jones appeals from the district court’s orderdetaining him before trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. “Appellate re view of detention or release orders is plenary as to mixed questions of law and fact and independent, with due deference to the district court’s purely factual fi ndings.” United States v. Stricklin , 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991). Under § 3142, a district court must order the pretr ial release of a criminal defendant unless the court determines that such rel ease will not assure the defendant’s appearance or will endanger another per son or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The parties agree that, due t o the maximum penalties possible for the crimes with which Jones is charged , a presumption arises pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community.” Without discussing the risk of fli ght factor, the district court concluded that defendant had not rebutted the § 314 2(e) presumption, and that the government had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Jones is a danger to the community. See Stricklin , 932 F.2d at 1354-55 (discussing the parties’ burdens under § 3142(e)). On appeal, Jones contends that 1) he presented evid ence which rebutted the statutory presumption, 2) the government failed to prove that no conditions of release will insure the community’s safety before t rial, and 3) the district court1 The government’s motion to supplement the record onappeal with

documentation of Jones’ criminal history is denied. -3- did not consider all of the factors listed in § 314 2(g) and did not make findings about possible conditions of release. After carefu l consideration of the parties’ briefs, defendant’s appendix, 1 and the applicable law, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that defendant should be detained. The evidence defendant proffered at his detention heari ng did not counter the presumption of dangerousness. Based on the languag e of the presumption, the government was not required to prove that no condit ions of release would ensure the community’s safety, and the district court was not required to make findings on that point. The district court’s order is thoro ugh and correctly concludes both that Jones did not rebut the presumption and that J ones is a danger to the community. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT PER CURIAM