1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-10344

Summary Calendar.

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

William A. BRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

Oct. 10, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Texas.

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant William A. Bright ("Bright") appeals the

district court's March 10, 1994 order denying his Motion to Vacate

or Reconsider Order Granting Summary Judgment and Declaring Moot

Motion for Leave to Amend pursuant to F ED .R.C IV .P. 59(e) and 15(a).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Bright's motion to reopen his case. AFFIRM.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bright was the majority shareholder, president and director of

Horn-Williams Ford, Inc . ("Horn-Williams"), a Ford dealership in

Dallas, Texas. Horn-Williams participated in a "floor-plan"

financing agreement with Plaintiff-Appellee Ford Motor Credit

Company ("Ford Credit"), through which Ford Cred it financed the

purchase of new cars by Horn-Williams, receiving payment upon the

sale of the cars by Horn-Williams.

In 1988, Horn-Williams obtained a capital loan of $ 600,0002

from Ford Cre dit. The loan was renewed on May 9, 1990 for the

balance of $3 70,056.36. Bright, in his individual capacity,

executed a continuing guaranty covering all monies loaned to HornWilliams, and executed individual unconditional guaranties on the

capital loan and its renewal.

After experiencing financial difficulties, Horn-Williams

defaulted on its obligations under t he capital loan renewal and

floor plan financing agreements. On August 6, 1991, Horn-Williams

filed f or Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, which was subsequently

converted to a liquidation under Chapter 7 on January 31, 1992.

Ford Credit made a demand for payment on Bright as guarantor

of the Horn-Williams debt. When no payment was forthcoming, Ford

Cre dit filed suit on January 20, 1993 to recover debts on the

unconditional guaranties signed by Bright in connection with the

loans made by Ford Credit to Horn-Williams.

On November 10, 1993, Ford Credit filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment. The district court granted Bright an extension of time

to respond to F ord Credit's motion due to the sudden death of

Bright's counsel. On February 25, 1994, the court granted summary

judgment for Ford Credit on the grounds that Bright relied on a

defense that he failed to rai se in his answer to Ford Credit's

complaint. The court entered Final Judgment against Bright for a

total of $1,565,755.13, plus attorneys' fees. On March 7, 1994,

Bright filed a motion to vacate or for reconsideration pursuant to

Rule 59(e) and a motion for leave to file an amended answer

pursuant to Rule 15(a). On March 10, 1994, the district court3

denied Bright's Rule 59(e) motion, and declared moot Bright's Rule

15(a) motion. Bright appeals the court's March 10, 1994 order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to vacate or for reconsideration filed pursuant to

F ED .R.C IV .P. 59(e) allows a losing party to seek the trial court's

reconsideration of its order granting summary judgment if served

within 10 days of the rendition of judgment. See L aves pere v.

Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th

Cir.1990), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 171, 126 L.Ed.2d

131 (1993). If the party seeking reconsideration attaches

additional materials to its motion that were not presented to the

trial court for considera tion at the time the court initially

considered the motion for summary judgment, the court may consider

the new materials in its discretion. F iel ds v. City of South

Hou ston, Texas, 922 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir.1991) (citing

Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 172-75). If the court considers the

materials but still grants summary judgment, the appellat e court

may review all materials de novo. Fields, 922 F.2d at 1188 (citing

Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 177-78). "On the other hand, if the

district cour t refuses to consider the materials, the reviewing

court applies the abuse of discretion standard." F ields, 922 F.2d

at 1188. "Under this standard, the district court's decision and

decision-making process need only be reasonable." M idland We s t

Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th

Cir.1990). Because the district court did not consider the

m aterials Bright submitted with his Rule 59(e) motion, we rev iew4

the court's o rder for an abuse of discretion. In addition, we

review the district court's denial of Bright's motion to amend his

complaint pursuant to F ED .R.C IV .P. 15(a) for an abuse of discretion.

See Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d

606, 611 (5th Cir.1993).

DISCUSSION

Bright's answer to Ford Credit's complaint did not plead a

defense under T EX .B US

. & C OM .C ODE § 9.504(c). However, in response

to Ford Credit's summary judgment motion, Bright argued that he was

not liable on the guaranties because he did not receive a notice of

the sale of the collateral, and because Ford Credit did not dispose

of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. The

dis t rict court granted summary judgment, finding that because

Bright failed to specifically deny notifica tion or commercially

reasonable disposition in his answer, there exist ed no triable

issue of fact as to Bright's liability on the guaranties.

In its order denying Bright's Rule 59(e) motion and Rule

15(a) motion, the district court stated that the "alleged

"professional carelessness' of Bright's previous counsel does not

merit reinstatement of his case." Our review of the record reveals

no abuse of discretion. Bright failed to plead a defense pursuant

to § 9.504(c) in his answer to Ford Credit's complaint. He also

failed to seek leave to amend his answer to include the defense

before the district court entered summary judgment against him. A

court considering a Rule 59(e) motion requesting reconsideration

may take into consideration an attorney's conduct in determining5

whether to reopen a case. See L avespere, 910 F.2d at 175.

Therefore, the court's decision regarding whether to reopen a case

m ust be reviewed in light of all the relevant circumstances on a

case-by-case basis. Id. In this case, we find that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bright's Rule 59(e)

motion. Further, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Bright's Rule 15(a) motion as moot. AFFIRM.