THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lance Antonio Brewton, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001572

Appeal From Spartanburg County J. Derham Cole, Ci rcuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5912 Heard Novem ber 10, 2021 – Filed May 25, 2022

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Ad am Sinclair Ruffin, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Mc Crory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia, and Solicitor Barry J. Barnette, of Spartanburg, all for Respondent.

KONDUROS, J.: Lance Antonio Brewton appeals his convictions for murder and possession of a firearm during the commi ssion of a violent crime. Brewton contends the trial court erred by (1) fa iling to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaug hter and the defense of accident; (2) prohibiting his testimony regarding witchcra ft and hearing voices in his head; and (3) allowing the State to impeach him wi th his 1999 robbery conviction. We affirm.FACTS

On the morning of September 25, 2017, Br ewton arrived at Natalie Niemitalo's house. Brewton and Niemitalo had been in an on-again, off-again relationship for two years. After their friend Kevin Schuerman arrived, the three decided to go purchase cigarettes and drinks. Niemitalo got into the driver's s eat of her mother's black, two-door Honda Civic, Brewton got in to the back seat on the passenger side, and Schuerman got into the passenger seat.

Once in the car, Niemitalo began putti ng on makeup. After about five minutes, Brewton exited the car, walked around to th e driver's side, and began arguing with Niemitalo because he wanted to drive. Shortly after the argument began, Schuerman heard a gunshot. Schuerman exite d the car and ran towards Niemitalo's garage because he thought he had been shot. After Schue rman realized he had not been shot, he returned to the driveway and watched Brewton pull Niemitalo out of the car, get into the driver 's seat, and drive away.

Schuerman approached Niemitalo and saw she was gasping for air and in pain. Schuerman called 9-1-1 and held a towel on Niemitalo's wound until first responders arrived. While first responders were treating Niemitalo, Brewton drove by her house in the Honda Civic. Br ewton drove by Niemitalo's house a second time, and an officer initiated a traffic st op by turning on his blue lights; however, Brewton continued driving for twenty-thr ee miles. Officers apprehended Brewton after he collided with a vehicle in the driveway of his home.

First responders airlifted Niemitalo to a hospital, but she died from a single gunshot wound. The doctor that performed Niemitalo's autopsy determined she bled to death after a bullet entered her upper-left torso and exited nine-and-a-half inches lower on the right side of her back. Police collect ed physical evidence associated with the shooting including th e Honda Civic, Brewton's gun, a fired bullet, and a spent shell casing. Brewt on was indicted for murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, escape, driving under suspension, and failure to stop when si gnaled by an officer using a blue light.

A forensic psychologist evaluated Brewt on and determined he was competent to stand trial for an unrelated federal weapons charge. 1 In a pretrial motions hearing, the State presented Brewton's mental ev aluation and moved to prevent him from

1 The incident leading to Brewton's fede ral conviction for "Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon" occurred nine days before Niemitalo's death.presenting any evidence regarding mental illness or hearing voices. The State argued any testimony about mental illness or hearing voices would not be relevant because the forensic psychol ogist concluded Brewton did not have a mental illness and was competent to stand tr ial. Alternatively, the St ate contended that if the testimony was relevant, it would be highly prejudicial.

Brewton argued he was not presenting th e testimony about hearing voices as a defense for his actions; rather, Brewton ar gued he should be allowed to present the testimony as an alternative expl anation to the State's assertion that he fled due to a guilty mind. Initially, the trial court indi cated the testimony would not be relevant and would confuse the jury because Brewt on did not suffer from a mental illness; however, the trial court delayed making a final determination until after Brewton proffered the testimony.

Additionally, the State disclosed it planne d to introduce Brewton's federal weapons conviction and two common law robbery convictions from 1999 and 2008. Brewton argued the federal weapons conviction was not relevant, but the State maintained it would preclude an accident jury instruction because Brewton was not allowed to possess a weapon. Brewton also moved to prevent the State from using any remote convictions; again, the trial cour t delayed making a fi nal determination.

Brewton proceeded to trial for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime after he pled guilty to escape, driving under suspension, and failing to stop when signa led by an officer. Schuerman testified that Brewton was "acting erratic" and "on edge" when he got to Niemitalo's house but recalled Brewton's behavior had not concerned him. Sc huerman stated the argument between Brewton and Niemital o was not out of the ordinary and elaborated he had seen Brewton and Niemitalo in worse arguments; however, Schuerman clarified he ha d never seen any violence during their arguments. Schuerman also testified he did not see Brewton with a gun the morning of Niemitalo's death.

An expert in firearm exam ination, Chad Smith, testified the gun involved did not have an external safety m echanism, which is typically thought of as a button that would prevent the gun from firing. Smith explained the gun would fire once five

and-a-half pounds of pressure was applied to its trigger, even if the pressure was applied unintentionally. Smith opined:

The trigger guard is here . . . to guard that trigger from any kind of unintentional pressure against the trigger.But I suppose . . . something . . . could enter into the trigger guard . . . and if the firearm was pushed against that object and enough pressure . . . [was] exerted on that trigger, then it could fire.

Still, Smith explained the gun would not fire unless its slide had been pulled back while it was loaded with ammunition. Sm ith testified he perf ormed several tests on the weapon and concluded the recove red bullet and spent shell casing both came from Brewton's gun.

At the conclusion of the State's case-in -chief, Brewton proffered his testimony regarding witchcraft and hear ing voices in his head. Br ewton testified he believed Niemitalo's mother and her friend Aaron 2 practiced witchcraft and one of them had cast a spell on him that caused him to hear the voices. Brewton admitted Niemitalo's mother denied practicing witc hcraft and Niemitalo never told him her mother practiced witchcraft; neverthele ss, Brewton believed Niemitalo's mother practiced witchcraft because he believe d she had also cast a spell on Aaron and Niemitalo told him she knew about the voices. Brewton estimated he had intermittently been under a spell for eight or ten months.

Brewton described "experien cing paranoia" at Niemitalo's house on the morning of her death because the voices were telling him his family was being murdered. Brewton explained he got in the car's back seat because the voices were telling him people were trying to kill him. Brewton testified that while the group was sitting in the car, he observed a cement truck driv e past Niemitalo's house, and the voices told him it was going to bury his family alive.

Brewton recalled he wanted to drive so he could follo w the cement truck, and he felt that Niemitalo was not putting on her makeup "fast enough." Brewton stated he left Niemitalo's house to find the cem ent truck. Brewton explained he did not stop to check on Niemitalo the firs t time he drove by her house because paramedics were already there and he wanted to keep looking for the cement truck. Brewton testified he drove by Niemitalo' s house a second time because he could not find the cement truck and the voices had stopped speaking to him. Brewton admitted he did not stop the second time be cause police officers were there and he had drugs in the car.

2 The record does not contain Aaron's surname.The State objected to Brewto n's proffer at its conclu sion and argued it was filled with hearsay, not relevant , and highly prejudicial if relevant. Brewton responded he had the absolute right to testify, th e hearsay would be omitted in front of the jury, and the probative value of his testimony would not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Brewton insi sted he should be allowed to give an alternative reason for leaving the scene other than a guilty mind.

The trial court ruled Brewton could not tes tify about witchcraft or hearing voices. The trial court found Brewton's proffe r was largely based on hearsay and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value because it seemed to give rise to an unasserted mental illness defe nse. Additionally, the trial court determined Brewton's right to tes tify was not violated because he was not entirely prevented from testifying. The tr ial court explained Brewton could testify he was fearful and felt like he need ed to leave Niemitalo's house.

After Brewton elected to testify, 3 the trial court ruled both of his robbery convictions were admissible because they were part of a "continuous course of conduct." The trial court also ruled that if the convictions were remote, their probative value substantially outweighed a ny danger of unfair prejudice. Brewton argued his 1999 conviction was remote beca use it was a separate charge from his 2008 conviction. The tria l court reiterated Brewton's convictions were a continuous criminal history because they were similar offenses that all occurred without a passage of ten years. Brew ton maintained his 1999 conviction was remote because he finished serving th at sentence in 2004 and he would be testifying in 2018. Brewton also asserted the probative value of that conviction was outweighed by unfair prejudice because there was limited value in attacking his credibility.

However, Brewton asked the trial court if his convictions would be referred to as common law robbery convictions or as crimes involving dishonesty. The State responded it was willing to refer to the convictions as crimes of dishonesty, and the trial court concluded the convictions would be referred to as crimes of dishonesty. Brewton did not object.

3 The record indicates Brewton stated "I will not testify" af ter the trial court prohibited him from testifying about witchc raft and the voices. However, this appears to be a scrivener's error because Brewton went on to testify and it was not mentioned on appeal.Brewton's testimony was mostly consis tent with Schuerman's, but Brewton admitted he was not legally allowed to possess a weapon, he had been on a drug binge that made him unable to sleep for th e three days preceding Niemitalo's death, and he had used drugs the morning of Niem italo's death. Brewton also testified that his gun fell out of his pocket as he got out of the car. Brewton explained he kept the gun in his hand after he picked it up because he assumed Niemitalo was going to let him drive and he preferred to keep it in the car's center console while driving.

Brewton maintained he did not intentio nally kill Niemitalo and claimed "the gun went off" when Niemitalo pushed his hand b ack as he reached into the car to grab its keys. Brewton testified he did not stop when signaled by officers because he had drugs in the car. Brewton explained he drove all the way to his house because he was afraid officers would shoot him. At the end of his direct examination, Brewton admitted he had been convicted of two crimes of dishonesty. The State did not mention crimes of dishonesty during its cross-examination of Brewton.

After the defense rested, Brewton requested the trial court instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter and accident. The State objected a nd asserted (1) an involuntary manslaughter instruction was improper because Brewton was not armed in self-defense and (2) an acci dent instruction was improper because Brewton was not legally able to possess a weapon. Brewton argued that even though his possession of the gun was unlawful, it was not the proximate cause of Niemitalo's death.

The trial court declined to instruct the jury on either involuntary manslaughter or accident. The trial cour t reasoned Brewton was acting unlawfully by possessing the gun and trying to take the car from Ni emitalo. Additionally, the trial court concluded Brewton was not exercising r easonable care in handling the gun. Following jury deliberations, Brewton wa s convicted of murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a viol ent crime. The trial court sentenced Brewton to life in prison without the possib ility of parole. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v. Baccus , 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2 006). "The conduct of a criminal trial is left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who will not be reversed in the absence of a pr ejudicial abuse of discretion." State v. Bryant , 372 S.C. 305, 312, 642 S.E.2d 582, 586 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when atrial court's decision is unsupported by th e evidence or controlled by an error of law." Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Jury Instructions

Brewton argues the trial court erred by fa iling to give an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction because Brewton testif ied the shooting was unintentional and the record contained sufficient evidence Brewton acted recklessly in handling the gun. Brewton contends the trial court erre d by failing to give an accident jury instruction because he testified the s hooting was unintentional and the record contained sufficient evidence he used due care in handling the gun. Brewton maintains his illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude either jury instruction because his illegal possession did not proxima tely cause Niemitalo's death. We disagree.

"[T]he trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina." State v. Marin , 415 S.C. 475, 482, 783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011)). "The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence presented at trial." State v. Brown , 362 S.C. 258, 261-62, 607 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S. E.2d 848, 849 (1993)). "If there is any evidence to support a jury charge, the trial [cou rt] should grant the request." Id. at 262, 607 S.E.2d at 95. "To warrant reversal, a trial [court]'s refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant." Id.

Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder, and "is defined as the unintentional killing of another without malice while engaged in either (1) the commission of some unlawfu l act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or (2) the doing of a lawful act with a reckless disregard for the sa fety of others."

State v. Scott , 414 S.C. 482, 487, 779 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2015) (quoting State v. Sams , 410 S.C. 303, 309, 764 S. E.2d 511, 514 (2014))."If there is any evidence warranting a char ge on involuntary manslaughter, then the charge must be given." State v. Wharton , 381 S.C. 209, 216, 672 S.E.2d 786, 789 (2009). "In determining whether to charge the lesser included offense of manslaughter[,] the court must view the evid ence in the light most favorable to the defendant." State v. Gibson , 390 S.C. 347, 356, 701 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 2010). "Declining to charge the lesser included offense is warranted when it 'very clearly appear[s] that . . . no evidence whatsoever [exists] tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Brayboy , 387 S.C. 174, 179, 691 S.E.2d 482, 485 (Ct. App. 2010)).

Additionally, "[f]or a homic ide to be excusable on the ground of accident, it must be shown that the killing was unintentional, the defendant was acting lawfully, and due care was exercised in th e handling of the weapon." Wharton , 381 S.C. at 216, 672 S.E.2d at 789. "Evidence of an acci dental discharge of a gun will support a charge of accident where the defendant la wfully arms himself in self-defense." Id.

"[U]nlawful possession of a firearm can . . . constitute an unlawful activity . . . [that] preclude[s] an accident defense if it is the proxi mate cause of the killing." State v. Burriss , 334 S.C. 256, 262 n.5, 513 S.E.2d 104, 107 n.5 (1999). "[I]t would be incongruous not to apply this same reasoning in the context of involuntary manslaughter." Id. at 265, 513 S.E.2d at 109. "[T]he State [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful act in whic h the [defendant] was engaged was at least the proxi mate cause of the homicide." Id. at 262, 513 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting State v. Goodson , 312 S.C. 278, 280 n.1, 440 S.E.2d 370, 372 n.1 (1994)).

The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to involuntary manslaughter and accident jury instructions despite unlaw fully possessing a firearm was developed in Goodson and Burriss

. In Goodson

, our supreme court dete rmined the illegally armed defendant was not entitled to an accid ent jury instruction. 312 S.C. at 281, 440 S.E.2d at 372. In that case, the defe ndant was drinking while playing pool at a bar and got into an argument with another player over a bet. Id. at 279, 440 S.E.2d at 371. The other player threatened th e defendant with a pool stick, and the defendant responded by drawi ng a gun from his pocket. Id. The bar's owner intervened and escorted the defendant outside. Id. While outside, the defendant shot and killed the owner. Id. at 279, 440 S.E.2d at 371-72. The defendant claimed the gun "just went off" as the owner approached him. Id. at 279, 440 S.E.2d at 372.The Goodson court rejected the State's proposition that unlawful possession of a firearm always precluded an accident jury instruction. Id. at 280 n.1, 440 S.E.2d at 372 n.1. The Goodson court noted the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's unlawful act proximately caused the homicide. Id. However, the Goodson court reasoned the defendant was not entitled to an accident jury instruction because he did not present any evidence that he was lawfully acting in self-defense. Id. at 281, 440 S.E.2d at 372.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Toal stat ed she would have held the defendant was not entitled to an accident jury instructio n because he was not lawfully armed when he shot the victim. Id. at 281, 440 S.E.2d at 372-73 (Toal, J., concurring). Justice Toal reasoned any right the defendant had to be armed due to the dispute with the other pool player ended when the owne r removed him from that situation. Id. at 282, 440 S.E.2d at 373 (Toa l, J. concurring). Still, Justice Toal agreed with the majority that the defendant's unlawful possession must have proximately caused the victim's injury to preclude an accident jury instruction. Id. (Toal, J., concurring). Justice Toal concluded "w here, as here, the defendant unlawfully possesses a firearm, has been drinking heavily all day, and kills the [victim] with the unlawful firearm, the unlawful possessi on of the firearm is a proximate cause of the injury." Id. (Toal, J., concurring).

In Burriss
, our supreme court held the illegally armed defendant was entitled to involuntary manslaughter and accident jury instructions. 334 S.C. at 264-65, 513 S.E.2d at 109. In that case, two me n attempted to rob the defendant. Id. at 258, 513 S.E.2d at 106. After the attackers th rew the defendant to the ground, the defendant drew a gun from his pocket and fired two shots into the ground. Id. at 258-59, 513 S.E.2d 106. The attackers in itially backed away, but one of the attackers advanced again as the defendant was getting up. Id. at 259, 513 S.E.2d 106. When the defendant picked up his gun, it fired a shot that killed the advancing attacker. Id.

The Burriss court agreed with Justice Toal's analysis in her Goodson concurrence and clarified Goodson as holding "unlawful possession of a firearm can . . . constitute an unlawful activity . . . [that] preclude[s] an a ccident defense if it is the proximate cause of the killing." Id. at 262 n.5, 513 S.E.2d at 107 n.5. The Burriss court reasoned "a person can be acting la wfully, even if he is in unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense at the time of the shooting." Id. at 262, 513 S.E.2d at 108. Further, the Burriss court determined "it would be incongruous not to apply this same reasoning in the context of involuntary manslaughter." Id. at 265, 513 S.E.2d at 109. The Burrisscourt concluded the defe ndant was entitled to both accident and involuntary manslaughter jury instructions because ev idence in the record supported his claim that he was lawfully armed in self-d efense when the shooting occurred. Id. at 262-63, 265, 513 S.E.2d at 108-09.

Here, the trial court did not err by refusi ng to give involuntary manslaughter or accident jury instructions. Brewton directs this court to State v. Slater 4 and State v. Williams 5 as support for his proposition that his illegal possession of a weapon did not preclude involuntary manslaughter or acci dent jury instructions. However, we find those cases inapplicable because th ey revolved around whether the defendants were lawfully armed in self-defense. See Slater

, 373 S.C. at 71, 644 S.E.2d at 53 (noting "where the defendant's unlaw ful possession of a weapon is merely incidental to the defendant's lawful act of arming himself in self-defense, the unlawful possession of the weapon will no t prevent the use of an accident defense"); Williams

, 427 S.C. at 254 n.4, 830 S.E.2d at 908 n.4 (clarifying "the question is whether [the weapon] is the proximate cause of the 'difficulty' or 'occasion' that led to the killing" in de termining whether a defendant is precluded from a self-defense jury instruction).

In stark contrast to the defendants' arguments in Goodson

, Burriss
, Slater , and Williams , Brewton does not argue he was lawfu lly armed in self-defense. Indeed, this record contains no evidence Brewton was defending himself at the time of the shooting. Brewton and Schuerman both testified Brewton and Niemitalo were arguing but not physically fighting. Further, Brewton testified the gun fired when Niemitalo pushed his hand back as he re ached for the car keys; Brewton did not testify that Niemitalo attempted to take or control the gun. Consequently, like the defendant in Goodson , Brewton presented no evidence he was lawfully armed in self-defense.

Therefore, the dispositive question of th is issue is whether Brewton's illegal possession proximately caused Niemitalo's d eath; we determine it did. Like the defendant in Goodson , Brewton admitted he was unlawfully handling a loaded firearm while intoxicated. Brewton testified he had b een on an illegal drug binge that prevented him from sleeping the three days preceding Niemitalo's death; Brewton also admitted he used illegal drugs the morning of Niemitalo's death. 6 Additionally, Brewton testified the gun fell out of his pocket as he got out of the

4 373 S.C. 66, 644 S.E.2d 50 (2007).

5 427 S.C. 246, 830 S.E.2d 904 (2019).

6 The record indicates the shooting also occurred during the morning hours.car, he held the gun in his hand while argui ng with Niemitalo, and he still held the gun in his hand when he reached into the car to take its keys. Further, Brewton held a gun that would fire once it had five-a nd-a-half pounds of pressure applied to its trigger, even if that pressure was uni ntentional. Finally, like the defendant in Goodson , Brewton's illegally posse ssed gun fired the shot that killed Niemitalo. Therefore, Brewton's unlawful possession pr oximately caused Niemitalo's death. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's de cision to refuse to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter and accident. 7

II. Brewton's Proffered Testimony

Brewton asserts the trial court erred by prohibiting him from testifying about witchcraft and hearing voices. Brewton c ontends he should have been able to testify the voices caused him to flee the scene after the shooting. Brewton argues that testimony was relevant to rebut the Stat e's assertion that he fled the scene due to a guilty conscience, which allowed the ju ry to infer malice. Brewton insists his inability to explain the cause of his flight to the jury in his own words violated his fundamental right to testify in his own defense. We disagree.

"[A]n exception to the trial court's ru ling will be deemed abandoned where the appellant fails to specifically argue it in his brief." State v. Black , 319 S.C. 515, 518 n.2, 462 S.E.2d 311, 313 n.2 (Ct. App. 1995). "[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are d eemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review." State v. Jones , 392 S.C. 647, 655, 709 S.E.2d 696, 700 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. , 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001)). "[A]n unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case." Atl. Coast Builders & Cont ractors, LLC v. Lewis
, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012); see also State v. Williams , 427 S.C. 148, 157, 829 S.E.2d 702, 706-07 (2019) (explaining an unappealed jury instruction became the law of the case).

Here, the trial court limited the scope of Brewton's testimony to prohibit the jury from hearing about witchcraft and hear ing voices because it determined his testimony (1) was largely based on hearsay a nd (2) would result in unfair prejudice by confusing the jury. The trial court also determined prohibiting Brewton from

7 Additionally, Brewton was precluded from an accident jury instruction because he was not exercising due care in handling the weapon. See Wharton , 381 S.C. at 216, 672 S.E.2d at 789 (stating a defendant must have been exercising due care in handling the weapon for a homicide to be excusable by accident).testifying about witchcraft and hearing voices did not violate his right to testify because Brewton was not entirely prohibi ted from testifying; indeed, Brewton testified in his own defense.

While Brewton objected to the trial court' s ruling on all grounds, he only argues on appeal that his right to testify was violat ed. Brewton's brief provides no authority regarding the trial court's ruling that Brewton's proffered testimony was largely based on hearsay and would result in unfair prejudice. Consequently, Brewton abandoned his arguments that his proffere d testimony was not hearsay and would not result in unfair prejudice. As a result, the trial court's ruling that Brewton's proffered testimony was hear say and unfairly prejudicial became the law of the case. Accordingly, we a ffirm the trial court's deci sion to prohibit Brewton from testifying about witchcraft and hearing voices.

III. Impeachment

Brewton asserts the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with his 1999 common law robbery conviction. Brewton contends that conviction was remote because his sentence expired in 2004 and he testified in 2018. Additionally, Brewton argues the tria l court did not conduct the required State v. Colf 8 analysis. We disagree.

"To preserve an issue for review[,] there must be a contemporaneous objection that is ruled upon by the trial court." State v. Johnson , 363 S.C. 53, 58, 609 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2005). An appellant is barred from arguing an issue on appeal if trial "counsel acquiesced [to a ruling] . . . and made no other objections regarding [that ruling] . . . ." State v. Mitchell

, 330 S.C. 189, 195, 498 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1998); see also State v. McKinney , 258 S.C. 570, 190 S.E.2d 30 (197 2) (finding the appellant waived his objection to certain testimony by cross-examining a witness regarding that testimony without reserving his previous objection).

Brewton ultimately waived for appellate re view his contention the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with his 1999 common law robbery conviction. Brewton initially objected to th e trial court's ruling that the State could impeach him with his 1999 conviction a nd argued it was remo te. However, Brewton asked if his convictions would be re ferred to by their name or as crimes of dishonesty. The Stat e agreed to refer to both convictions as crimes of dishonesty,

8 337 S.C. 622, 525 S.E.2d 246 (2000).and the trial court allowed both convicti ons to be referred to as crimes of dishonesty. Critically, Brewton did not object or reserve his previous objection.

Brewton testified on direct examination he had been convicted of two crimes of dishonesty. Before the parties presen ted their closing arguments, Brewton renewed all of his objections; however, the record indicates the trial court did not respond. In its closing argument, the St ate referred to Brewton's convictions as crimes of dishonesty. Again, Brewt on did not object. Consequently, Brewton waived his objection that his 1999 conviction was remote because he acquiesced to referring to it as a crime of dishonesty.

CONCLUSION

In short, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter and accident. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prohibit Brewton's proffered testimony became the la w of the case. Finally, Brewton failed to preserve for appellate review the tria l court's decision to allow the State to impeach him with his 1999 conviction. A ccordingly, Brewton's convictions for murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime are

AFFIRMED.

HILL and HEWITT, JJ., concur.