*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
TOWN OF SOUTH WINDSOR ET AL. v.

KRISTIN LANATA ET AL.

(SC 20587)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, the town of South Windsor and its zoning enforcement officer,

O, sought an injunction and the assessment of fines against the defendant

homeowner, who was using her property to store salvage and debris

that she had obtained in connection with a cleaning business that she

operated. O notified the defendant in 2014 that she was in violation of

the town’s blight ordinance and zoning regulations, and ordered her to

remove the debris from her property. In December, 2016, a fire occurred

on the property, and the fire marshal subsequently initiated an arson

investigation. In light of the pending investigation, both the police and

the defendant’s insurance carrier instructed the defendant not to touch

or remove anything from the property. Thereafter, on February 24, 2017,

O issued the defendant a notice of violation, informing her that her

property was in violation of the town’s blight ordinance and directing

her to remove the debris, as well as a cease and desist order, which

identifed the defendant’s creation of a junkyard in a residential zone as

a zoning violation and directed her to stop depositing material on her

property. The defendant did not appeal from either notice or the cease

and desist order, and the plaintiffs commenced the present action in

an effort to compel her compliance, alleging that the defendant had

violated the town’s blight ordinance and zoning regulations. Pointing to

the instructions she received not to touch or remove anything during

the arson investigation, the defendant raised the special defense of

legal impossibility, which the trial court ultimately failed to credit. With

respect to the zoning claim, the trial court found that the defendant had

been wilfully violating the town’s zoning regulations since at least the

date on which the cease and desist order was issued. Accordingly, the

trial court imposed a daily fine pursuant to statute (§ 8-12), commencing

on February 24, 2017. The trial court also issued an injunction, precluding

the defendant from, inter alia, storing salvage on her property. On appeal,

the Appellate Court concluded, inter alia, that the trial court had abused

its discretion in imposing the fines because, although it was undisputed

that the defendant was prohibited from removing items from her property for some period of time following February 24, 2017, the trial court,

in assessing the fines, had failed to consider the effect of the arson

investigation on the defendant’s ability to comply with the cease and

desist order. Because the trial court made no finding as to the precise

date the defendant regained control of her property, the Appellate Court

remanded the case for a new trial on the zoning violation claim and

affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. On the granting

of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court improperly remanded the case for a new trial as to liability,

rather than a proceeding limited to damages, in connection with the

plaintiffs’ zoning violation claim: because there was no dispute remaining

regarding the defendant’s liability for the zoning violation, the only

question pertained to the effect of the defendant’s legal impossibility

defense in relation to the trial court’s assessment of fines under § 8-12,

which was a factual matter within the province of the trial court and

discrete from its underlying finding of liability; accordingly, this court

reversed in part the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case

with direction to reverse the trial court’s judgment only as to its assessment of fines and remedies in connection with the zoning violation

claim, and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings

as to damages and remedies.

Submitted on briefs June 21—officially released October 1, 2021*

Procedural History
Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction ordering the

defendants to take certain corrective action to bring

their real property into compliance with town ordinances and zoning regulations, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Hartford, where the defendant Michael Lanata was

defaulted for failure to plead; thereafter, the case was

tried to the court, Moukawsher, J.; judgment for the

plaintiffs, from which the named defendant appealed

to the Appellate Court, Alvord, Prescott and DiPentima,

Js., which reversed in part the trial court’s judgment

and remanded the case for a new trial, and the plaintiffs,

on the granting of certification, appealed to this court.

Reversed in part; further proceedings.

Richard D. Carella filed a brief for the appellants

(plaintiffs).

Edward C. Taiman, Jr., filed a brief for the appellee

(named defendant).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in this certified appeal

is whether the Appellate Court properly remanded this

case to the trial court for a new trial, rather than a

proceeding limited to damages, after reversing in part

the judgment of the trial court, which assessed a fine

and imposed injunctive relief for certain zoning violations pursuant to General Statutes § 8-12.1 The plaintiffs,

the town of South Windsor (town) and its zoning

enforcement officer, Pamela Oliva, appeal, upon our

grant of their petition for certification,2

from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court in their favor and remanding the

case for a new trial on count two of their complaint.

South Windsor v. Lanata, 203 Conn. App. 89, 92, 115,

247 A.3d 626 (2021). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that,

after concluding that the trial court had improperly

assessed a fine on the named defendant, Kristin Lanata,3

pursuant to § 8-12 for zoning violations for a period of

time that she was under lawful orders not to disturb

her property because of an ongoing fire investigation,

the Appellate Court improperly remanded the case for

a new trial on that count, rather than a proceeding

limited to damages. Because there is no remaining dispute as to the defendant’s liability for the zoning violations, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court

in part.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history relevant to this certified appeal, much of which

is set forth in the Appellate Court’s opinion.4

‘‘The defendant, who operates a business in which she is hired by

lenders to clean personal property out of homes on

which they have foreclosed, is the owner of property

located at 460 Miller Road in South Windsor (property).

For years, the defendant used the property to sort, store,

and dispose of salvage she obtained in her business.’’

South Windsor v. Lanata, supra, 203 Conn. App. 92. In

May, 2014, and October, 2014 respectively, Oliva notified the defendant that she was in violation of the town’s

blight ordinance and zoning regulations, and ordered

the defendant to remove the accumulated material and

debris from the property. Id., 92–93.

Thereafter, in December, 2016, a fire occurred at the

property that ‘‘reduced [the house] to a burned out

shell, and the back lawn of the property was strewn

with salvage from the inside of the house. The fire

marshal for the town made an accusation that the fire

was the result of arson, which claim, following an investigation, was ultimately disproven.’’ Id., 94–95.

‘‘By notice of violation dated February 24, 2017, Oliva

informed the defendant that the property was in violation of the town’s blight ordinance, specifically the sections defining a blighted structure, dangerous structure,

and nuisance. The notice directed the defendant to
‘[r]emove the debris and unregistered vehicles from the

property and [to] correct all damage to the building,

including but not limited to the roof, exterior walls,

windows and supporting structures . . . .’ ’’ (Footnote

omitted.) Id., 95–96. ‘‘Oliva also issued, and the defendant received, a February 24, 2017 cease and desist

order identifying a zoning violation at the property,’’

namely, the creation of a junkyard in a residential zone.

Id., 96. The defendant did not appeal from Oliva’s

notices of blight and zoning violations. Id., 96–97.

‘‘The plaintiffs instituted this action on October 30,

2017. The plaintiffs filed an amended two count complaint dated January 25, 2019 (operative complaint).

The first count alleges that the defendant violated the

[town’s] blight ordinance . . . . Specifically, the plaintiffs allege[d] that the defendant ‘ha[d] not complied

with the town’s notices’ and had ‘continue[d] to accumulate more debris and materials’ at the property. In

the second count, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant

violated [the town’s zoning regulations] by storing ‘discarded or second-hand material creating a junkyard.’

In their request for relief, the plaintiffs sought ‘[a]n

injunction ordering the [defendant] to perform immediately the corrective action pursuant to the notices of

violation and [the] cease and desist order to bring the

property in compliance with the blight ordinance and

zoning regulations.’ The plaintiffs additionally sought,

inter alia, ‘[a] fine of $100 per day’ as provided for in

the blight ordinance, ‘[a] fine of $100 per day as provided

for in . . . § 8-12,’ relative to violations of zoning regulations, and attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant

filed an answer and special defenses on January 31,

2019. The plaintiffs filed their reply on February 1,

2019.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 97–98.

After a three day court trial, the trial court issued a

memorandum of decision that, with respect to the second count of the operative complaint that is at issue

in this certified appeal,5

‘‘first found that ‘for around five

years [the defendant] has been using her residentially

zoned home . . . to run a junk or salvage business.’ It

stated that, although the defendant takes some personal

property that she cleans out of foreclosed homes to

storage facilities, she also takes material to her property

and sorts it on her lawn. She then ‘sells some, discards

some, and keeps some.’ The court found that, ‘[o]ver

the years, the front and right side[s] of her house have

been regularly strewn with things and parts of things

that appear to come and go.’ The court stated that,

although the defendant no longer lives at the property,

she continues to be there most days and that she stores

equipment and sorts salvage there.

‘‘The court found that the defendant had been using

her property for years to operate her business in violation of [the town’s zoning] regulations, which identifies

the permitted uses of a residential property. The court
stated that whether one considered her use of the property as running a junkyard or a salvage operation, neither use is permitted in a residential zone.’’ Id., 98–99.

‘‘The court . . . impose[d] fines for the defendant’s

violation of the zoning regulations. It declined to impose

fines dating back to the [October, 2014] notice, given

[certain] evidence suggesting that the defendant had not

received that notice. The court found that the defendant

wilfully had violated the town’s zoning regulations since

at least February 24, 2017, the date of the cease and

desist order. The court credited testimony of neighbors

that the defendant continued to deposit and sort material at the property even up to the date of trial, and it

found not credible the testimony of the defendant that

she had not brought any new material to the property

since the 2016 fire.

‘‘Pursuant to § 8-12, the court ‘[chose] a per diem fine

of $175 per day, running from February 24, 2017, to [the]

date [of its memorandum of decision] and round[ed] the

total to an even $125,000.’ . . . In setting the amount

of the daily fine, the court considered . . . the defendant’s ‘lack of candor and the length of time since 2017

in which she has violated the peace of this residential

neighborhood,’ the loss of the defendant’s home and

her claims of financial hardship, the defendant’s claim

‘that she has been financially handicapped by the town’s

claim against her insurance proceeds and what proved

to be baseless accusations by the fire marshal of arson

on her property.’ The court found that the hardship

faced by the defendant in cleaning up the property did

not justify her continuing to operate part of her business

on the property.

‘‘The court also enjoined the defendant from ‘parking

overnight or storing for any period of time, commercial

vehicles, machinery, tools or other equipment she uses

for business purposes . . . unloading, sorting, storing,

or disposing of any salvage or other personal property

except that she may store there personal property that is

currently being used for the sole purpose of maintaining

that property . . . [and] maintaining on the lawns of

the property any personal property not currently being

used for its intended purpose.’ The court indicated that

it would ‘separately entertain a motion for attorney’s

fees as provided by the statute for wilful violations.’ It

stated that it would not [render] judgment until the

resolution of any attorney’s fees motion.’’ (Footnotes

omitted.) Id., 99–101. Subsequently, the trial court granted

the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs.

Id., 101.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the

trial court to the Appellate Court. With respect to the

claims relevant to this certified appeal, the defendant

argued that the trial court improperly ‘‘fail[ed] to conclude that she was justified in not cleaning the property

following her receipt of the February 24, 2017 cease and
desist order on the basis that she ‘had been instructed

by both the Connecticut State Police and her insurance

carrier not to touch or remove any of the personal

property located in the backyard,’ ’’ or the structures

themselves, given the pending arson investigation into

the December, 2016 fire. Id., 108–109; see id., 110. The

Appellate Court described this claim, raised under the

special defense of ‘‘ ‘legal impossibility,’ ’’ as one that

‘‘essentially challenges the trial court’s imposition of

fines for the time period during which she was under

orders not to disturb the property.’’ Id., 109–10. The

Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had

abused its discretion by imposing fines because,

although it ‘‘acknowledged and considered the defendant’s ‘claim that she has been financially handicapped

by the town’s claim against her insurance proceeds

and what proved to be baseless accusations by the fire

marshal of arson on her property,’ ’’ it ‘‘did not . . .

factor into its penalties assessment the effect of the

arson investigation on the defendant’s ability to comply

with the February 24, 2017 cease and desist order. By

way of that order, the defendant was directed to ‘cease

the deposition of discarded and/or second-hand material on the property.’ Because the record contains undisputed evidence, and the plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledges that the defendant was prohibited for some

period of time following February 24, 2017, by her

insurer and the police from removing items from the

property, [the Appellate Court] conclude[d] that the

[trial] court [had] abused its discretion in imposing fines

beginning on February 24, 2017.’’ Id., 112. Given that,

‘‘as an appellate tribunal, [it] cannot find facts,’’ the

Appellate Court determined that it was ‘‘not at liberty

to resolve the question of precisely what date the defendant regained control of her property following the

conclusion of the police and insurance investigations.

Accordingly, a remand to the trial court for a new trial

on the zoning violation [was] necessary.’’ (Emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The

Appellate Court further determined that it was necessary to reverse the attorney’s fees award and injunction

that ‘‘flow from the judgment in favor of the [plaintiffs]’’

in connection with that count.6

Id., 112–13.

The Appellate Court, therefore, rendered judgment

reversing in part the judgment of the trial court and

remanding the case for a new trial ‘‘as to count two

alleging a zoning violation’’ and affirming the judgment

of the trial court in all other respects. Id., 115. This

certified appeal followed.7

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate Court

improperly ordered a new trial, given the trial court’s

unchallenged finding that the defendant had violated

§ 8-12. Asserting that the ‘‘only issue [that] remains is

damages,’’ the plaintiffs argue that they ‘‘should not be

forced to retry the entirety of their case when they have

proven both [the defendant’s] liability and the time for
which fines should be assessed [in the absence of] proof

of [the defendant’s] special defense’’ of legal impossibility. They emphasize that proof of the special defense

remains with the defendant. Relying on this court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 626

A.2d 259 (1993), for the proposition that the scope of

penalties and injunctive relief to be imposed under § 8-

12 are discretionary matters that are severable from

liability, the plaintiffs further contend that, under Channing Real Estate, LLC v. Gates, 326 Conn. 123, 161 A.3d

1227 (2017), the ‘‘only issues on remand should be the

amount of the judgment in light of the defendant’s legal

justification defense and limitation on the amount of

the fine set forth in . . . § 8-12.’’ Citing no case or statutory law or otherwise challenging the authorities relied

on by the plaintiffs, the defendant argues in response

that the Appellate Court properly ordered a new trial

‘‘because there is no evidence in the record’’ with

respect to when she was notified that she could reenter

and clean up her property given the conclusions of the

state police and insurance investigations. We agree with

the plaintiffs and conclude that the Appellate Court

improperly ordered a new trial as to liability on the

zoning violation count, and we further conclude that the

proceedings on remand are limited to a determination

of fines and remedies in light of the legal justification

special defense.

We begin with the standard of review. ‘‘Whether the

Appellate Court [correctly] determined the scope of a

remand order is a question of law over which this court’s

review is plenary.’’ Channing Real Estate, LLC v. Gates,

supra, 326 Conn. 132.

‘‘As a rule the issues [at trial] are interwoven, and

may not be separated without injustice to one of the

parties, and [a]n order restricting the issues [of a new

trial] is the exception, not the rule. . . . Nevertheless,

a retrial may be limited to a specific issue or issues,

[when] the error as to one issue or issues is separable

from the general issues . . . [and] such . . . limitation does not work injustice to the other issues or the

case as a whole.’’8

(Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Bruno v. Whipple, 162 Conn. App. 186,

208, 130 A.3d 899 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901,

138 A.3d 280 (2016), quoting Fazio v. Brown, 209 Conn.

450, 455–56, 551 A.2d 1227 (1988). It is well settled that

the retrial may be limited to ‘‘the issue of damages

[when] the facts found compel judgment for the plaintiff

but were insufficient to show the amount of damages.’’

Jennings v. Reale Construction Co., 175 Conn. 16, 24,

392 A.2d 962 (1978). The new trial may also be limited

to a special defense. See Haynes v. Middletown, 314

Conn. 303, 330–31, 101 A.3d 249 (2014) (remanding case

to trial court for new trial as to defendant’s special

defense of governmental immunity and imminent harm

to identifiable persons exception to that defense, rather

than reinstating verdict in favor of plaintiff, given that
governmental immunity issue was never submitted to

jury).

As the plaintiffs point out, our decision in Channing

Real Estate, LLC v. Gates, supra, 326 Conn. 123, is

instructive with respect to whether the remand to the

trial court should direct a completely new trial on count

two of the complaint, alleging zoning violations or,

instead, be limited to a hearing as to fines and remedies.

In Channing Real Estate, LLC, we considered whether

the Appellate Court properly remanded the case to the

trial court for a new trial of a contract dispute, rather

than directing judgment and ordering a hearing in damages, in light of its ‘‘correct conclusion that the parol

evidence rule precluded consideration of the extrinsic

evidence relied on by the defendant . . . .’’ Id., 132.

Citing authorities holding that a remand for a decision

as to liability is unnecessary when the elements are

undisputed or can be determined as a matter of law

from the record,9 we observed that, ‘‘[w]hen no question

of liability remains, given the undisputed facts in the

record, the appropriate scope of the remand is limited

to a hearing in damages.’’ Id. We concluded that ‘‘a

remand to the trial court for a new trial is unnecessary

because there is no question as to the defendant’s liability under the notes’’ insofar as ‘‘there is no dispute that

each of the six notes contains the language that . . .

bars the introduction of extrinsic evidence under the

. . . parol evidence rule.’’ Id., 133–34. In so concluding,

we disagreed with the Appellate Court’s conclusion

‘‘that the trial court’s misapplication of the law so permeated the trial court’s findings that a new trial was

necessary.’’ Id., 134. We observed that the affected factual findings were limited to those that pertained to

extrinsic evidence that was inadmissible as a matter

of law under the parol evidence rule, rendering them

‘‘irrelevant. What remain unaffected . . . are the trial

court’s findings of fact that govern the disposition of

the present case as a matter of law. The only matter that

remains to be litigated between the parties, therefore,

is the amount of the plaintiff’s damages.’’ Id., 134–35; see

id., 134–36 (rejecting claim that new trial was required

because of special defense of equitable estoppel insofar

as that claim was not preserved before trial court and

observing that ruling rejecting special defense of fraud,

which would have been exception to parol evidence

rule, was unchallenged).

This court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford,

supra, 225 Conn. 575, provides additional guidance as

to the scope of the appropriate remand. In that case,

this court concluded that the trial court had improperly

imposed daily fines of $100 for wilful offenses under

§ 8-12 and reversed the judgment of the trial court with

direction to vacate that fine ‘‘and to impose such civil

penalties pursuant to § 8-12 as the trial court may deem

appropriate in the proper exercise of its discretion.’’

Id., 593. This court also concluded that the trial court
had improperly failed to enjoin a property owner from

the unauthorized business use of his basement, observing that the ‘‘review of the record discloses that the

equities . . . patently lie with the town [of West Hartford]. The record clearly reveals that [the property

owner] installed commercial ventures in the basement

of the subject building knowing full well that he was

flagrantly violating the West Hartford zoning ordinances.’’ Id., 596. Although this court held that ‘‘the trial

court [had] abused its discretion by refusing to render

judgment entitling [West Hartford] to injunctive relief

from the unauthorized business use of the basement’’

and remanded the case ‘‘to the trial court with direction

to render judgment for [West Hartford] consistent with

[its] opinion,’’ it nevertheless ‘‘[left] it to the discretion

of the trial court to fashion the scope of the injunctive

relief to which [West Hartford was] entitled.’’ Id.

Having reviewed the record in the present case, we

observe that no dispute remains as to the defendant’s

liability for the zoning violations alleged in count two

of the plaintiffs’ complaint. The only question concerns

the effect of the legal impossibility special defense as

it affects the calculation of the fines under § 8-12, with

the application of that defense being limited to a certain

time period between the December, 2016 fire and the

conclusion of the ensuing arson investigations, the

determination of which is a factual question within the

province of the trial court, as the Appellate Court aptly

noted. See South Windsor v. Lanata, supra, 203 Conn.

App. 112. This is a discrete matter that does not affect

the underlying liability finding. See, e.g., Channing Real

Estate, LLC v. Gates, supra, 326 Conn. 134–35. Insofar

as the plaintiffs do not seek any relief from this court

pursuant to Practice Book § 84-1110 with respect to the

injunction that the Appellate Court criticized and

vacated in connection with reversing the judgment as

to count two in its entirety; see footnote 6 of this opinion

and accompanying text; we leave it to the trial court

on remand to fashion appropriate injunctive relief in

connection with a proper calculation of the fines consistent with the defense of legal impossibility.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in

part and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court as to

count two of the complaint only as to its determination

of fines and remedies, and to remand the case to the

trial court for further proceedings as to damages and

remedies.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* October 1, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 General Statutes § 8-12 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If . . . any building,

structure or land has been used, in violation of any provision of this chapter

or of any bylaw, ordinance, rule or regulation made under authority conferred hereby, any official having jurisdiction, in addition to other remedies,

may institute an action or proceeding to prevent such unlawful . . . use

or to restrain, correct or abate such violation or to prevent the occupancy
of such building, structure or land or to prevent any illegal act, conduct,

business or use in or about such premises. Such regulations shall be enforced

by the officer or official board or authority designated therein, who shall

be authorized to cause any building, structure, place or premises to be

inspected and examined and to order in writing the remedying of any condition found to exist therein or thereon in violation of any provision of the

regulations made under authority of the provisions of this chapter . . . .

The owner or agent of any building or premises where a violation of any

provision of such regulations has been committed or exists . . . shall be

fined not less than ten dollars or more than one hundred dollars for each

day that such violation continues; but, if the offense is wilful, the person

convicted thereof shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars or more

than two hundred fifty dollars for each day that such violation continues,

or imprisoned not more than ten days for each day such violation continues

not to exceed a maximum of thirty days for such violation, or both; and

the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of all such offenses, subject to

appeal as in other cases. . . . If the court renders judgment for such municipality and finds that the violation was wilful, the court shall allow such

municipality its costs, together with reasonable attorney’s fees to be taxed

by the court. . . .’’

2 We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certification, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly reverse the trial court’s

judgment and remand for an entirely new trial when it determined only that

the trial court erred in awarding (1) fines for a period of time for which

the named defendant had provided evidence in support of her special defense

of ‘legal impossibility,’ and (2) statutory fines in excess of those authorized

by statute?’’ South Windsor v. Lanata, 336 Conn. 945, 250 A.3d 694 (2021).

3

‘‘Michael Lanata was also named as a defendant in this action. On February 11, 2019, Michael Lanata was defaulted for failure to plead. He is not

participating in this appeal,’’ and, like the Appellate Court, ‘‘we therefore

refer to Kristin Lanata as the defendant.’’ South Windsor v. Lanata, supra,

203 Conn. App. 91 n.1.

4 For a more detailed rendition of the facts and procedural history of this

case, along with the text of the applicable ordinances and regulations, see

South Windsor v. Lanata, supra, 203 Conn. App. 92–101 and nn. 9 and 10.

5 With respect to the first count of the complaint, the trial court found

that the defendant’s property violated the town’s blight ordinance. See South

Windsor v. Lanata, supra, 203 Conn. App. 99. The trial court declined,

however, to impose any fines for the blight violation, deeming that ordinance’s fine provision to be sufficiently unclear as to constitute a potential

due process violation. Id.

6 Addressing an issue that it considered likely to arise on remand, the

Appellate Court also agreed with the defendant’s claim that the trial court

‘‘improperly assessed a fine [in the amount of $175 per day] for the wilful

violation of zoning regulations pursuant to § 8-12.’’ South Windsor v. Lanata,

supra, 203 Conn. App. 114. The Appellate Court observed that there was

no evidence ‘‘that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a

criminal proceeding’’; id., 115; as required by this court’s decision in Gelinas

v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 593, 626 A.2d 259 (1993), and its decision

in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 280, 782 A.2d 679, cert.

denied, 258 Conn. 926, 783 A.2d 1028 (2001), which held that a criminal

conviction was a predicate to the finding of wilfulness necessary to allow

the imposition of fines of more than $100 per day pursuant to § 8-12. See

South Windsor v. Lanata, supra, 114–15.

In a footnote, the Appellate Court briefly addressed the defendant’s claim

that the ‘‘injunction exceeded the scope of the relief sought by the plaintiffs’’

insofar as it enjoined ‘‘her from using her property to ‘[park] overnight or

[store] for any period of time, commercial vehicles, machinery, tools or

other equipment she uses for business purposes.’ ’’ South Windsor v. Lanata,

supra, 203 Conn. App. 113 n.22. Deeming it unnecessary to address this

claim given its remand for a new trial, the Appellate Court nevertheless

described the defendant’s concerns about ‘‘the scope of the injunction’’ as

‘‘serious,’’ insofar as the injunction was specific to the zoning violation, and

the cease and desist order imposed by the town and enforced by the injunction did not address the overnight parking of commercial vehicles. Id.

We note that the plaintiffs do not challenge the Appellate Court’s (1)

conclusion that the trial court improperly assessed fines at a daily rate of

$175, or (2) concerns about the scope of the injunction ordered by the trial

court. Accordingly, we need not address these issues further.

7 After we granted the plaintiff’s unopposed petition for certification to
appeal; see footnote 2 of this opinion; we sua sponte ordered the parties

‘‘to file simultaneous briefs of no more than ten pages . . . addressing the

following’’: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly reverse the trial court’s

judgment and remand for an entirely new trial when it determined only that

the trial court erred in awarding . . . fines for a period of time for which

the named defendant had provided evidence in support of her special defense

of legal impossibility, and . . . statutory fines in excess of those authorized

by statute?’’ And (2) ‘‘Whether . . . this matter can be decided without oral

argument?’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In their simultaneous briefs, both parties indicated that this matter is

suitable for decision without oral argument. See Practice Book § 70-2. Moreover, neither party’s simultaneous brief indicated that further briefing was

necessary, and both filings were well under the ten page limit of our order.

Having reviewed these briefs, along with the record and Appellate Court

decision in this case, we have determined that the ordinary course of full

briefing and oral argument is not necessary for the decision of this certified

appeal. In the interest of judicial economy, we issue this opinion modifying

the relief granted by the Appellate Court with respect to its new trial order.

8 We note that, under this court’s seminal decision in Murray v. Krenz,

94 Conn. 503, 507–508, 109 A. 859 (1920), reviewing courts should be even

more reticent to order a new trial limited to a specific issue when a jury

verdict is involved. ‘‘Ordinarily the reversal of a jury verdict requires a new

trial of all the issues in the case. . . . In other words, [a]n order restricting

the issues [of a new trial] is the exception, not the rule. . . . When, however,

the error as to one issue . . . is separable from the general issues, the new

trial may be limited to the error found, provided that such qualification or

limitation does not work injustice to the other issues or the case as a whole.

. . . But [when] the retrial of the single issue may affect the other issues

to the prejudice of either party, the court will not exercise its discretion in

limiting the new trial but will grant it de novo. . . . Thus, [t]he decision to

retain the jury verdict on the issue of liability and order a rehearing to

determine only the issue of damages should never be made unless the court

can clearly see that this is the way of doing justice in [a] case. . . . As a

rule the issues are interwoven, and may not be separated without injustice

to one of the parties.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Carlson v. Waterbury Hospital, 280 Conn. 125, 151–52, 905 A.2d 654 (2006);

see, e.g., Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284 Conn. 645, 660, 935 A.2d

1004 (2007) (The court declined to limit the retrial resulting from erroneous

jury instructions on the special defense of comparative negligence to that

issue because it had ‘‘no way of knowing whether the jury [returned] a

compromise verdict, with some of the jurors agreeing to a finding of liability

only because other jurors were willing to compromise on the amount of

damages. If the verdict was the product of such a compromise, the comparative negligence finding and award may have been a component of the jurors’

agreement.’’); George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 332–33, 736 A.2d 889 (1999)

(not limiting issue on remand to damages because jury verdict declining to

award noneconomic damages might have been compromise); cf. Bruno v.

Whipple, 162 Conn. App. 186, 207–208, 130 A.3d 899 (2015) (remanding case

for hearing in damages on breach of contract claim without retrial as to

liability after reversing jury verdict on special defense of waiver that trial

court had improperly permitted defendant to raise), cert. denied, 321 Conn.

901, 138 A.3d 280 (2016); Musorofiti v. Vlcek, 65 Conn. App. 365, 381, 783

A.2d 36 (retrial limited to damages on wife’s loss of consortium count ‘‘will

not work an injustice to the parties in this case’’ because ‘‘[t]he parties

already have litigated the plaintiff husband’s claim without any argument

to the trial court or to this court that the jury charge was incorrect as to

his claim’’), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 938, 786 A.2d 426 (2001); Harewood v.

Carter, 63 Conn. App. 199, 206–207, 772 A.2d 764 (2001) (restricting retrial

to count seeking punitive damages for wilful or reckless disregard of motor

vehicle statutes pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 because ‘‘[n]either

party claims, and no reason exists for us to conclude, that the jury was

misled or confused about liability or the compensatory damages’’ as to

negligence count).

9

‘‘See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 296 Conn. 253, 268, 994 A.2d 174

(2010) ([t]here are times . . . when the undisputed facts or uncontroverted

evidence and testimony in the record make a factual conclusion inevitable

so that a remand to the trial court for a determination would be unnecessary

. . .); Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 583, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002)

(remand for decision on unreached elements of claim is unnecessary if

remaining elements can be determined as matter of law on record); Coppola
Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 157 Conn. App.

139, 171–72, 117 A.3d 876 (remand for new trial was unnecessary when all

elements of cause of action for breach of contract had been proven), cert.

denied, 318 Conn. 902, 122 A.3d 631 (2015); see also State v. Carbone, 172

Conn. 242, 254, 374 A.2d 215 (The reversal of a judgment annuls it, but does

not necessarily set aside the foundation on which it rests. This foundation

may be sufficient to support a judgment of a different kind, and may be

such as to require it. A reversal therefore is never, standing alone, and ex

vi termini, the grant of a new trial. If the error was one in drawing a wrong

legal conclusion from facts properly found and appearing on the record, it

would be an unnecessary prolongation of litigation to enter again on the

work of ascertaining them. . . .), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967, 97 S. Ct. 2925,

53 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (1977).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Channing

Real Estate, LLC v. Gates, supra, 326 Conn. 132–33.

10 Practice Book § 84-11 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Upon the granting

of certification, the appellee may present for review alternative grounds

upon which the judgment may be affirmed provided those grounds were

raised and briefed in the Appellate Court. Any party to the appeal may also

present for review adverse rulings or decisions which should be considered

on the appeal in the event of a new trial, provided that such party has

raised such claims in the Appellate Court. . . .

‘‘(b) Any party may also present for review any claim that the relief

afforded by the Appellate Court in its judgment should be modified, provided

such claim was raised in the Appellate Court either in such party’s brief or

upon a motion for reconsideration.

‘‘(c) Any party desiring to present alternative grounds for affirmance,

adverse rulings or decisions in the event of a new trial or a claim concerning

the relief ordered by the Appellate Court shall file a statement thereof within

fourteen days from the date the certified appeal is filed in accordance with

Section 84-9. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)