J-S40033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC C. MCCOLLISTER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1447 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002043-2007

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY KING, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2023

Appellant, Eric C. McCollister, appeals pro se from the order entered in 

the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, denying as untimely his 

serial petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. In 

2008, a jury convicted Appellant of burglary, criminal trespass, robbery, 

aggravated assault, and simple assault. The court sentenced Appellant on 

December 29, 2008, to an aggregate 40 years’ to life imprisonment. The 

sentence included a 25-year mandatory minimum under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9714(a)(2) (providing mandatory minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment where 

defendant had, at time of commission of current offense, previously been 

convicted of two or more crimes of violence). This Court affirmed the sentence 
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on August 30, 2010; Appellant did not seek further direct review. See 

Commonwealth v. McCollister, 11 A.3d 1042 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

Appellant filed the current serial PCRA petition pro se on January 26, 

2022. On April 7, 2022, the court issued appropriate notice per Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907; Appellant did not respond. The court denied PCRA relief on May 2, 2022. 

On May 24, 2022, Appellant timely appealed. That day, the court ordered 

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and Appellant complied. 

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016). A PCRA 

petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one 

year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final “at the conclusion of 

direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The statutory 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow very limited circumstances to excuse 

the late filing of a petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 

29, 2010, upon expiration of the time for Appellant to file a petition for 

allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Thus, 

Appellant’s current PCRA petition filed on January 26, 2022, is patently 

untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant now attempts to invoke 
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the “newly-discovered facts” exception,

1 at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) (providing 

time-bar exception where facts upon which claim is predicated were unknown 

to petitioner and could not have been ascertained sooner by exercise of due 

diligence). Specifically, as the PCRA court observed:

[Appellant] argued that he “repeatedly asked the sentencing

and direct appeals panel ... to review the sentence and the 

application of the [Section] 9714(a)(2) statute as it applied 

to his case” but that “the error [of the sentence] was 

overlooked and the courts in the case at bar ruled that the 

application of the statute and sentence was legal.” PCRA 

Pet., 6, Jan. 26, 2022. He alleges that he “believed the 

actual sentence was legal because [the] Superior Court said 

so during direct appeal proceedings” and that he would not 

have discovered his sentence was “illegal” if [he] was not 

transferred and did not meet [fellow inmate] Fred Ray.” Id.

at 7. Once “discovered” in December 2021 by fellow inmate 

Mr. Ray who was reviewing Appellant’s case, Appellant 

asked for a copy of his “status sheet” and was informed 

“only the court could correct the error.” Id. at 4. 

As Appellant noted, the sentence imposed was the subject 

of each of his PCRA petitions and the appeals that ensued 

thereafter. The sentence itself was not a new fact unknown 

to Appellant, despite its new evaluation by another inmate. 

See [Commonwealth v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587, 947 A.2d 

714 (2008)] (newly discovered notes of former prosecutor 

found to be another source, rather than a new fact, 

regarding Appellant’s claim of a racially discriminatory policy 

within the district attorney’s officer)....

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2 We further note that Appellant’s claims are based on 

the application of the “three strikes rule” codified at 

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1 Although Appellant also checked the box on his PCRA petition for the 

“governmental interference” exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(i), he made no 

argument concerning that exception in his petition. To the extent Appellant 

attempts to assert prior counsel’s ineffectiveness as satisfying the exception, 

for purposes of the PCRA, the definition of “government officials” does not 

include defense counsel. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(4). 
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9714, a claim he has made previously 

and continuously over the more than thirteen years 

since he has been sentenced.

Appellant failed to demonstrate that there were any new 

facts to invoke the timeliness exception pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)[(ii)]. ...

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 6/30/22, at 9-10) (emphasis in original). 

We agree with the court’s analysis. Put simply, Appellant has known 

about his sentence and could have discovered any illegality regarding 

application of the mandatory minimum since 2008, when the sentence was 

imposed. Thus, Appellant’s current PCRA petition is untimely, and we affirm. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2023