[Cite as State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-2583.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113388

v. :

CURTIS HARRIS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 3, 2024 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-23-681786-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Mary Grace Tokmenko, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Donald Butler, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant, Curtis Harris, appeals the conviction for forcible 

rape subsequent to a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On June 6, 2023, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned an 

indictment charging Harris with two counts of rape in violation of 

R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) each of which carried a notice of prior conviction pursuant to 

R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) and a repeat-violent-offender specification under R.C.

2941.149(A).

The State’s theory of the case was that Harris raped 25-year-old T.J. 

during the night of June 13 into June 14, 2022 through digital penetration (Count 1) 

and vaginal penetration (Count 2). The defense argued that the evidence was 

consistent with consensual sex and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Harris compelled the sexual conduct through force or threat of force.

The case came for trial in October 2023.

The parties stipulated that Harris had previous convictions for 

aggravated robbery (R.C. 2911.01(A)(1)) and felonious assault (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)) 

from Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-09-522687-A.

A. The Examination of T.J.

T.J. testified that she met Harris while they were both working at 

Harris’ brother’s birthday party on October 8, 2021. She described the party as a 

“male review” party in which male entertainers danced and stripped for the 

audience’s entertainment. Harris worked security for the event and T.J. collected 

money from audience members and otherwise assisted the dancers. T.J. and Harris 

spoke to each other at the event and “hit it off,” exchanging contact information.
Within a week they met at a restaurant for a date and had a “good 

connection.” They talked and then went to Harris’ home, where they “cuddl[ed]” 

but did not engage in sexual activity.

After that first date, they continued talking and spending time together. 

They had consensual sexual intercourse on two occasions, once at Harris’ home and 

once in his car. They communicated over text messages and over electronic 

messages through the social-media application, Instagram. After their second 

sexual encounter, communication slowed until January 2022 since T.J. was 

involved in a car accident that had her largely homebound.

Between January and June 2022, Harris and T.J. continued 

exchanging electronic messages. The State introduced photographs of these 

messages into evidence and T.J. described them to the jury. Several messages refer 

to their previous sexual encounters and Harris expressed a desire to have sex again. 

In one instance, T.J. specifically told him that he could come over to her house but 

that she did not want to have sex. They did not see one another during this period.

On June 13, 2022, Harris messaged T.J., saying that he was “[t]rying 

to see you for real.” T.J. was agreeable to meeting because she felt she had been 

clear about not wanting to have sex. T.J. agreed to come to a basketball game in 

which Harris was playing that evening. T.J. attended the game and spoke with 

Harris “a little bit” during which Harris asked her to come to his home and she said 

she would think about it.
Later that evening, T.J. texted Harris to ask if he was still awake. He 

said that he was and T.J. told him that she would “come over for a little bit.” 

T.J. drove to the house, arriving around 11:00 p.m., and Harris met 

her in the driveway. They walked up to Harris’ third-floor apartment together and 

went to his bedroom. He watched some television, with Harris in his bed and T.J. 

watching from outside the bed. Harris smoked some marijuana and they talked with 

Harris listening to her and comforting her about the car accident in which she was 

involved.

T.J. continued as follows:

[E]ventually I did end up getting into the bed just to get comfortable 

because his house seemed a little cold. . . . I had been through a lot that 

whole beginning of the year with my car accident and stuff so just 

having another person interaction, being able to hug them, being able 

to cuddle or just talking to somebody was something that I was looking 

forward to so I didn’t mind whatever was happening at that moment 

until it pretty much escalated a little bit more once he got me in my 

comfortable or vulnerable state.

They continued cuddling under the covers on his bed, laughing and 

watching television. But T.J. said there came a point where Harris “[got] up and 

[went] right in front of me and then he proceeded to take down his pants and try to 

force me to give him oral sex.” T.J. told him to stop and pushed him away at which 

point Harris “back[ed] off.” T.J. continued testifying as follows:

[W]e started kissing and then he started just kind of taking over and I 

could tell that his hands was going in places that I didn’t want him to 

go so I kept telling him to stop, stop, no, no, and then that’s when things 

kind of got a little violent. . . .

So as I was trying to tell him no and everything, I could tell that he was 

starting to, like I said, get violent, drop all his body weight on me as far 
as me not trying to move, but I’m trying to fight him off as much as I 

can. I don’t remember everything but all I remember is just telling him 

no, stop, and also used my forearm to push him back by his neck and 

also using my knees and everything. But I couldn’t overpower him 

because he’s so strong so he was trying to — like I said, it was a struggle 

to get my pants down. . . . I keep trying to tell him to stop, but he keeps 

telling me to calm down, calm down, you’re playing.

And then as time went on, after he got my pants off and stuff, I 

remember him choking me for I don’t know how long, it was pretty 

short, but it was long enough that I could feel the damage in my neck, 

and he said, “Stop f****** playing. You know why you’re over here.”

T.J. described that, when Harris choked her, he used both hands 

around her whole neck. She related that she grew afraid “that this man is going to 

kill me” so she “just laid there like a dead body and let him do his business.” She 

continued lying on her back, crying, as Harris penetrated her vagina with his penis. 

She said, “I remember he finished his business, I don’t know if he finished his 

business inside of me or not . . . .” 

Harris then got off of T.J. and she “got up real quickly, got my pants 

and everything.” Harris brought T.J. a towel but T.J. left the apartment without 

using it. Harris walked T.J. downstairs and tried to give her a hug, an act that she

refused. T.J. told Harris to “have a good night” and drove herself to a 24-hour store, 

where she called a rape-crisis hotline.

The hotline directed T.J. to drive to a location in Lorain, Ohio. She 

arrived there “really early in the morning.” She met with a nurse, who examined her 

and took swabs for DNA. T.J. understood that the rape kit collected during the 

examination would be sent to the police.
T.J. had no visible injuries but her throat “hurt for a few days” after 

the assault.

T.J. met with a detective approximately a week after the assault. She 

identified Harris from a lineup of photographs.

The prosecutor inquired further, as follows:

[PROSECUTOR]: I had asked you what he penetrated you with and do 

you remember what you said?

A: I did say his penis.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember if you told the police or do you 

remember now, was there any other way that [Harris] penetrated you?

A: I don’t remember.

On cross-examination, T.J. admitted that Harris did not try to block 

T.J. from leaving the apartment after the sexual intercourse. He did not try to take 

her keys or phone. He did not ask her not to tell anyone about the encounter. To 

the contrary, he walked her out and offered a hug. She further admitted that she 

checked a box at the rape-crisis center indicating that she did not wish to speak with 

law enforcement.

B. The Examination of Laura Gaertner

Laura Gaertner testified that she is a registered nurse and is employed 

as a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE nurse”) at the Nord Center. Gaertner 

examined T.J. on June 14, 2022.

T.J. arrived at the Nord Center at 2:22 a.m. T.J. recounted to Gaertner 

the circumstances of the assault. T.J. said that she went to Harris’ basketball game 
at 8:00 p.m., then went roller skating. T.J. arrived at Harris’ home at approximately 

11:30 p.m. T.J. and Harris “were watching TV and relaxing.” Then Harris pulled 

down his pants and put his penis on her. She described that she tried to move away 

but Harris got on top of her. She said she wrestled with him to get him off of her, at 

which time Harris became angry. She described that “[h]e grabbed my wrists and 

pulled my pants down.” He put both hands on T.J.’s neck and “was basically choking 

me.” T.J. decided to stop fighting Harris. Harris penetrated T.J.’s vagina with his 

penis. T.J. also reported that Harris penetrated her vagina with his fingers.

Gaertner’s examination revealed no visible injuries on T.J., but T.J. 

reported that her neck and wrists were sore. T.J. seemed to have a limited range of 

motion in her shoulder.

T.J. did not want to speak with law enforcement on the night of the 

examination, so Gaertner informed her that she could speak with them later if she 

wished.

On cross-examination, Gaertner admitted that T.J. appeared “clean” 

and “well groomed” upon her arrival; her clothes were not ripped or otherwise 

damaged. She was not tearful or crying and she made appropriate eye contact. She 

did not have visible injuries and was able to eat and drink with ease. Gaertner 

further admitted that it was not her job as a SANE nurse to determine if a patient is 

being truthful about an alleged assault.
C. The Examination of Ashondre Welch

Ashondre Welch testified that he is employed as a patrol officer 

employed by the City of Cleveland Division of Police. Welch collected the sexual 

assault kit from the Nord Center on June 21, 2022 and brought it to the evidence 

room at the police department. It is his understanding that the kit was thereafter 

transferred to the medical examiner’s office.

At the Nord Center, Welch was informed that T.J. did not want to 

speak with him.

D. The Examination of Sarene Saffo

Sarene Saffo testified that she is employed as a detective in the 

Cleveland Police Department where she investigates sex crimes and child abuse.

Harris consented to the collection of his DNA during the 

investigation. Saffo collected buccal swabs from him. It is her understanding that 

the swabs were thereafter transferred to the medical examiner’s office.

E. The Examination of Darryl Turner

Darryl Turner testified that he is employed as a detective in the 

Cleveland Police Department where he investigates sex crimes and child abuse. 

Turner was assigned to investigate the allegations against Harris on June 22, 2022.

Turner interviewed T.J. He then called Harris, who agreed to an 

interview but did not show up for it. Turner was able to interview Harris 

approximately four or five months later. A search warrant was obtained for Harris’ 

account on the social-media website, Instagram.
On cross-examination, Turner admitted that he did not visit the scene 

of the alleged assault. He did not execute a search warrant for T.J.’s Instagram 

account or subpoena cell-phone records for either Harris or T.J.

F. The Examination of Hristina Lekova

Hristina Lekova testified that she is employed as a forensic DNA 

analyst at the Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory. She acted as 

the technical reviewer in this case, “mak[ing] sure that findings in this case 

correspond[] with the actual data in the case and all the standards and controls are 

followed.”

A DNA swab taken from T.J.’s thighs revealed the presence of DNA 

matching Harris. The match was “882 septillion times in an African American 

person, 13.9 octillion times more probable than coincidental in an unrelated 

Caucasian person, and 13.1 octillion times more probable than coincidental in an 

unrelated Hispanic person.”

A DNA swab taken from T.J.’s neck revealed the presence of DNA 

matching Harris. The match was “2.89 quadrillion times more probable than a 

coincidental to unrelated African American person, 2.88 quadrillion times more 

probable than coincidental to unrelated Caucasian person, and 47.7 quadrillion 

times more probable than coincidental to unrelated Hispanic person.”

On cross-examination, Turner admitted that several samples tested 

presumptively positive as seminal fluid, but the result could not be confirmed 

because no sperm were found when the samples were reviewed under a microscope. 
She further admitted that the testing did not determine whether Harris’ DNA was 

deposited through a primary or secondary transfer. The testing also did not reveal 

whether the DNA came from skin cells or through a biological fluid.

G. The Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

The State rested after Lekova’s testimony, offering 11 exhibits into 

evidence with no objection from the defense. Harris then moved for acquittal 

pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The trial court granted the motion as to Count 1 (rape 

through digital penetration) and denied it as to Count 2 (rape through vaginal 

penetration).

The defense then rested without presenting a case. Harris renewed 

his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, which was denied.

H.The Verdict

The jury found Harris guilty of Count 2 (rape through vaginal 

penetration). The trial court found Harris guilty of the specifications; it found him 

to be a repeat violent offender and further found that he had a prior conviction for 

an offense of violence.

I. The Sentence and Appeal

The court held a sentencing hearing on October 20, 2023.

The court found Harris to be a Tier III sex offender and explained his 

registration duties. The State addressed the court. The defense addressed the court, 

summarizing several character letters submitted from Harris’ friends and family. 
Harris’ mother addressed the court. Harris declined to address the court on advice 

of counsel, pending an appeal.

The court then announced its sentence. It sentenced Harris to an 

indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes Law, consisting of a minimum term 

of eight years and a maximum term of 12 years.

Harris appealed, raising the following assignments of error for review:

First Assignment of Error

The Trial Court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for acquittal on the 

rape charge when the state failed to present sufficient evidence to 

sustain the conviction.

Second Assignment of Error

Appellant’s conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

II. Law and Analysis

We address Harris’ assignments of error together, as they are 

intertwined. Harris contends that his rape conviction should be vacated, arguing 

that there was insufficient evidence that he compelled T.J. into sexual conduct by 

force or threat of force. Even if there were sufficient evidence, the argument goes, 

we should reverse the conviction because the verdict was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction 

requires a determination of whether the State has met its burden of production at 

trial. State v. Hunter, 2006-Ohio-20, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 
Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997). Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a 

verdict is a question of law. Thompkins at 386.

An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at 

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince a reasonable 

juror of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see also State v. 

Bankston, 2009-Ohio-754, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.) (noting that “in a sufficiency of the 

evidence review, an appellate court does not engage in a determination of witness 

credibility; rather, it essentially assumes the state’s witnesses testified truthfully and 

determines if that testimony satisfies each element of the crime”). We must 

determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, 

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

The elements of an offense may be proven by direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or both. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 2021-Ohio-2585, ¶ 25 (8th 

Dist.), citing State v. Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991). Circumstantial evidence and 

direct evidence have “equal evidentiary value.” Wells at ¶ 26, citing State v. 

Santiago, 2011-Ohio-1691, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

A person commits forcible rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) by 

engaging in sexual conduct with another person “when the offender purposely 

compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.” “Force” means “any 
violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against 

a person or thing.” R.C. 2901.01(A).

Here, T.J.’s testimony, if believed, would convince a reasonable 

factfinder of Harris’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. T.J. testified that she 

voluntarily went to Harris’ house and consensually cuddled with him in his bed. 

When Harris propositioned her for oral sex, she declined and Harris desisted for a 

time. The two consensually kissed. T.J. testified, however, that when Harris 

advanced toward sexual intercourse, she repeatedly told him “no” and asked him to 

stop. Despite these protestations, and despite the fact that T.J. was fighting against 

the interaction using her forearms and knees, Harris persisted, using his body 

weight to hold her down and “choking” her with both hands on her neck until she 

relented out of fear. Harris removed T.J.’s pants and penetrated her vagina with his 

penis.

This evidence was sufficient to support Harris’ conviction. See, e.g., 

In re C.B., 2020-Ohio-4749, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.) (sufficient evidence where the victim 

did not give consent and told the defendant to stop, but the defendant persisted and 

placed his body weight on top of her, among other force); In re L.S., 2023-Ohio4122, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.) (defendant pulled off the victim’s underpants despite her 

protestations and she could not get the defendant off of her by pushing on his chest). 

Having found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we turn to a 

consideration of whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.
A manifest-weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence 

presented and questions whether the State met its burden of persuasion at trial. See 

State v. Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 387; State 

v. Bowden, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).

When considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, the court of appeals sits as a “‘thirteenth juror’” and 

may disagree with “the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” 

Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). The reviewing 

court must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider the witness’ credibility and determine whether, in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. Thompkins at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st 

Dist. 1983). Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for the “‘exceptional 

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at 

387, quoting Martin, supra.

Harris’ argument about the weight of the evidence focuses on a 

perceived lack of corroborating physical evidence supporting a conclusion that the 

sexual conduct was nonconsensual. He points out that T.J. had no physical injuries 

from the alleged assault. He further contends that certain facts cast significant 

doubt on T.J.’s testimony about the assault. For example, he says it should be hard 

to believe that Harris raped T.J. after initially desisting when T.J. declined to engage 
in oral sex and when Harris voluntarily walked T.J. to her car after the encounter. 

Harris did not prevent her from leaving, threaten her, or ask her not to tell anyone 

about the encounter. The two had engaged in consensual sex several times in the 

past. T.J. initially declined to speak with police about the encounter.

After a careful review of the record, we find that Harris’ conviction is 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

The SANE nurse testified that a person can be strangled and raped 

without presenting with visible injuries. Moreover, T.J.’s testimony was 

corroborated in other ways. The fact that T.J. willingly went to Harris’ home on the 

date in question is corroborated by electronic messages exchanged between them. 

Harris’ DNA was found on T.J.’s thighs and wrists. The SANE nurse examiner 

corroborated that T.J. drove to Lorain to undergo a sexual-assault examination after 

the incident and reported feeling pain, including in her neck.

Harris argued his defense to the jury and the jury was free to reject any 

portion of the State’s evidence or T.J.’s testimony that was inconsistent or otherwise 

unbelievable. The jury believed T.J. We cannot say that this is an exceptional case 

where the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of 

justice such that a conviction must be reversed.

We, therefore, overrule Harris’ first and second assignments of error.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled Harris’ assignments of error for the reasons stated 

above, we affirm.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that the appellant recover from the appellee the costs herein 

taxed.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is 

terminated. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR