J-S24041-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

GARY THOMAS SNYDER, :

:

Appellant : No. 3299 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered on October 29, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-15-CR-0004049-2002

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2015

Gary Thomas Snyder (“Snyder”) appeals from the Order denying his 

Petition (hereinafter “the Petition for Relief”) seeking exemption from being 

required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) as a sex 

offender for his lifetime, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”),1and challenging SORNA’s constitutionality 

concerning its retroactive application. We affirm.

Between July 1994 and August 1995, Snyder sexually assaulted a 

seven-year-old girl, A.G., on several occasions. Snyder, inter alia, (1) 

fondled A.G.’s chest; (2) kissed her on the mouth after removing both of 

their clothes; (3) inserted his finger into her vagina; and (4) forced her to 

touch his penis with her hand. A.G. stated that after each assault, Snyder 

 

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799, et seq.
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threatened that he would harm her family if she told anyone about what had 

happened. 

A.G. reported the sexual assaults to the police several years later, 

when she was fifteen-years-old. In September 2002, the Commonwealth 

charged Snyder with several offenses, including four counts each of indecent 

assault of a minor less than thirteen years of age and corruption of minors.2 

On February 13, 2003, Snyder pled guilty to two counts each of indecent 

assault of a minor less than thirteen years of age and corruption of minors. 

Snyder’s guilty plea was the result of a negotiated agreement, wherein the 

Commonwealth agreed that it would withdraw the remaining charges and 

recommend a sentence of eight years of probation, the first nine months of 

which would be under electronic home monitoring. Notably, at the time of 

Snyder’s plea, the offense of indecent assault of a minor less than thirteen 

years of age required a ten-year period of sex offender registration under 

Megan’s Law II.3

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court set forth what 

transpired thereafter as follows:

[Snyder] was sentenced on June 9, 2003[, pursuant to the 

negotiated plea agreement,] ... [to] an aggregate sentence of 8 

years [of] probation. He was also ordered to undergo 9 months 

of electronic home confinement, undergo [a] sex offender 

evaluation, a psychological evaluation, to complete a Sex 

 

2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1).

3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1(a)(1). This statutory provision was replaced by 

the provisions of SORNA, which became effective in December 2012. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.41.
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Offender Program, and have no unsupervised contact with 

minors. As sentenced, his probation extended through June 9, 

2011. [Snyder] did not file a direct appeal from [his] judgment 

of sentence.

On June 25, 2008, the Chester County Probation 

Department sought a bench warrant for [Snyder’s] arrest[,] 

[based] upon allegations of [his] probation violation, alleging he 

had failed to complete the Sex Offender Program and had 

unsupervised contact with minors on multiple occasions. 

[Snyder] was taken into custody and imprisoned on September 

9, 2008, and following [a] hearing ..., [Snyder] was found in 

violation of his probation. He was sentenced to 3 to 23 months 

[of] incarceration, subject to conditions, given credit for time 

served, and made eligible for parole after serving his minimum 

sentence. ... He was paroled on December 3, 2008, and 

completed probation supervision on February 12, 2011. He was 

not on probation when he filed the instant [P]etition [for Relief] 

seeking relief from the lifetime registration requirement. 

[Snyder] began registering as a sex offender on June 12, 2003. 

Under Megan’s Law II[,] he was required to register through 

mid-June 2013.

On December 3, 2012, the Commander of the Megan’s Law 

Section of the [PSP] notified [Snyder] in writing that [pursuant 

to SORNA,] he was required to register as a sexual offender with 

the [PSP] for [his l]ifetime as a Tier III sexual offender,[4] and to 

verify his registration information in person every 3 months at 

an approved registration site. He was further advised that he 

now appeared on the Megan’s Law Registry as a sexual offender. 

... SORNA increased [Snyder’s] reporting requirements by a 

multiple of four. Under Megan’s Law III, he was required to 

appear only once each year[,] at a location designated by the 

[PSP,] to verify his residence and be photographed. Under 

SORNA, Snyder must register a wider array of information with 

the PSP, including aliases, nicknames, internet identifiers under 

which he communicates or posts, date of birth, social security 

 

4 Under SORNA, a conviction for indecent assault of a minor less than 

thirteen years of age is designated as a “Tier III sexual offense,” subjecting 

an individual convicted of this offense to a lifetime registration requirement. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(8); id. § 9799.15(a)(3). Pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.13(3)(i), Snyder was required to register for his lifetime 

because he had not yet fulfilled his ten-year period of registration under 

Megan’s Law when SORNA became effective in December 2012.
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number, telephone number, passport, driver’s license, 

professional licenses, and license plate or motor vehicle 

registration numbers. 

On September 23, 2013, [Snyder] filed the [Petition for 

Relief, wherein he] essentially contends that the effects upon 

him of SORNA are punitive in nature, and not mere collateral 

consequences of his conviction, thereby rendering its ex post 

facto application to him unconstitutional. He further contends 

that he is legally entitled to the benefit of the bargain made in 

his plea agreement with the Commonwealth, which included the 

limitation that he register as a sexual offender for not more than 

ten years.[5]

Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/14, at 2-5 (footnotes added, citations omitted).

By an Order entered on October 29, 2014, the trial court denied the 

Petition for Relief.6 Snyder timely filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court 

 

5 Snyder has abandoned on appeal his claim that he is entitled to specific 

enforcement of the ten-year sex offender registration period because it was 

part of his negotiated plea agreement. Indeed, this Court previously 

rejected such a claim in Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245 (Pa. 

Super. 2014). In Partee, the defendant had (1) entered a negotiated nolo 

contendere plea to a sexual offense that required a ten-year period of 

registration under Megan’s Law II; (2) subsequently violated his probation; 

and (3) thereafter received notification following the enactment of SORNA 

that he was now required to register with the PSP as a sex offender for life. 

Id. at 246. This Court held that the defendant was not entitled to specific 

performance of the negotiated plea agreement because, “having failed to 

abide by the terms of the plea bargain, that agreement [was] no longer in 

effect[.]” Id. at 250. Like the situation in Partee, Snyder’s violation of his 

probation abrogated the plea agreement.

6 The trial court properly determined that the Petition for Relief does not fall 

under the provisions of the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/14, at 7; see also 

Commonwealth v. Bundy, 96 A.3d 390, 394 (Pa. Super. 2014) (collecting 

cases and holding that “the statutory and rule-based requirements 

governing a PCRA petition do not apply to a challenge to the retroactive 

application of [SORNA], but [] this Court has jurisdiction to review orders 

confirming or rejecting a retroactive registration requirement.”).
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did not order Snyder to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal.

Snyder presents the following issues for our review:

Whether the Court of Common Pleas committed error:

I. In failing to grant [the P]etition [for Relief] because the 

Court failed to consider that [Snyder] should only be 

required to register for ten (10) years[,] as his 

offenses were part of a single criminal episode or 

course of conduct[?]

II. In failing to grant [the P]etition [for Relief] because the 

Court failed to consider that changing, or expanding 

and extending, [Snyder’s] registration and reporting 

requirements is a form of punishment and thus, 

[retroactive] application of SORNA violates the Ex Post 

Facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania 

Constitutions[?]

Brief for Appellant at 4. 

Because Snyder’s issues implicate a pure question of law, our standard 

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. 

Raban, 85 A.3d 467, 468 (Pa. 2014); see also In the Interest of J.B., 

107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014) (addressing a challenge to the constitutionality of 

the retroactive application of SORNA and observing that “a party challenging 

a statute must meet the high burden of demonstrating that the statute 

clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” (citation and 

quotation marks omitted)).

Snyder first argues that the trial court erred by denying the Petition for 

Relief because his offenses were part of a single criminal episode or course 

of conduct, and, therefore, he should only be required to register as a sex 
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offender for ten years, as opposed to his lifetime. Brief for Appellant at 8, 9. 

Specifically, Snyder contends as follows:

When SORNA became the effective law, part of the reason that 

[Snyder] was reclassified as a lifetime registrant (Tier III) ... was 

due to the language in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16)[,] which 

states that an individual is subject to lifetime registration if he or

she has “[t]wo or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or 

Tier II sexual offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16)[]. 

[Snyder is] of the opinion that this provision requiring lifetime 

registration only applies to repeat offenders and recidivists who 

are convicted of separate acts of misconduct that lead to 

separate and multiple convictions. This provision should not 

apply to individuals who engage in misconduct that results in 

one conviction with multiple criminal charges/offenses.

Brief for Appellant at 9.

This claim is waived because Snyder failed to preserve it for our 

review, having never raised it in the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(stating that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); see 

also Commonwealth v. Miller, 80 A.3d 806, 811 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(stating that “[b]y requiring that an issue be considered waived if raised for 

the first time on appeal, our [appellate C]ourts ensure that the trial court 

that initially hears a dispute has had an opportunity to consider the issue. 

This jurisprudential mandate is also grounded upon the principle that a trial 

court must be given the opportunity to correct its errors as early as 

possible.” (citation and ellipses omitted));7see also Commonwealth v. 

Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 891 (Pa. 2010) (stating that “[w]here the parties 

 

7 The trial court did not address Snyder’s instant claim in its Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) Opinion.
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fail to preserve an issue for appeal, the Superior Court may not address that 

issue sua sponte.” (citation omitted)).8

Next, Snyder argues that SORNA is punitive, and that the retroactive 

application of SORNA to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of Article 1, 

§ 10 of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. See Brief for Appellant at 21-38.

A panel of this Court recently addressed this precise issue in 

Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014). Snyder 

acknowledges Perez in a footnote, but argues that its holding does not 

apply to his particular circumstances. Brief for Appellant at 21 n.12. 

Contrary to Snyder’s assertion, we determine that Perez is directly 

applicable and requires rejection of his constitutional challenge. 

In Perez, the defendant committed the offense of indecent assault 

prior to SORNA’s enactment, and entered a negotiated nolo contendere plea 

to this charge. Perez, 97 A.3d at 749. At the time of his offense, the 

version of Megan’s Law then in effect required him to register as a sex 

offender for 10 years. Id. Under SORNA, which went into effect shortly 

before the defendant’s plea, he was required to register for 25 years. Id. 

Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to declare SORNA 

unconstitutional on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clauses in the federal 

and state constitutions prohibited retroactive application of the 25-year 

 

8 Nevertheless, we observe that Snyder’s crimes did not constitute a single 

criminal episode, as he had sexually assaulted A.G. on multiple separate 

occasions.
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registration requirement to him. Id. The trial court denied the motion and 

ordered the defendant to register for the next 25 years. Id.

On appeal, this Court observed that the defendant’s challenge to the 

constitutionality of the retroactive application of SORNA must be evaluated 

under a two-step test, established by the United States Supreme Court in 

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). Perez, 97 A.3d at 751 (citing Smith, 

538 U.S. at 92 (stating that the two-step test for determining whether a civil 

remedy is punitive in nature requires an inquiry into (1) whether the 

legislature intended the statutory scheme to be punitive; and (2) only if the 

first step is met, “whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in 

purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.”)); see 

also Perez, 97 A.3d at 750 n.4 (stating that “[a]lthough the [United States] 

Supreme Court has addressed the federal version of SORNA on prior 

occasions, it has never had the occasion to address its constitutionality visà-vis the Ex Post Facto Clause[,]” but acknowledging that most of the Courts 

of Appeals have concluded that SORNA does not violate the federal Ex Post 

Facto Clause).

Concerning the first step under Smith, the Perez Court declared that 

the General Assembly did not intend SORNA to be punitive in nature. 

Perez, 97 A.3d at 751 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.11(b)(2), which sets forth 

legislative findings and a declaration of policy instructing that SORNA shall 

not be construed as punitive). Turning to the second step, the Court 

addressed whether SORNA constitutes “punishment” under the multi-factor 
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test articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 

Perez, 97 A.3d at 751 (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that only 

the ‘clearest proof’ will suffice to override the legislature’s preferred 

classification of the statute.” (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92)). The panel 

held, after conducting an exhaustive analysis of the seven Kennedy factors, 

that SORNA does not constitute punishment, and, therefore, was valid under 

the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 752-59. 

The panel explained that all but one of the Kennedy factors weighed against 

finding SORNA punitive, stating, in sum, that (1) registration requirements 

historically are not regarded as punishment, unlike probation/parole, 

because individuals subject to SORNA are free to live and work where they 

wish, without supervision; (2) SORNA does not come into play upon a 

finding of scienter; (3) although SORNA has some aspects of retribution for 

past conduct, and deterrence of future criminal conduct, the statutory 

scheme primarily is regulatory, and the General Assembly is permitted to 

have some deterrent and retributive effects in its legislation, particularly 

where its goal is to prevent recidivism and protect the public; (4) SORNA is 

rationally related to a non-punitive purpose, namely the Commonwealth’s 

interest in preventing crimes of a sexual nature; and (5) SORNA is not 

excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose of protecting the public from 

convicted sexual offenders, who pose a high risk of recidivism. Id. at 752-

58. The Perez Court found that only one factor weighed in favor of finding 

SORNA punitive, i.e., SORNA imposed an affirmative restraint on the 
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defendant by requiring him to appear in-person at a PSP facility a minimum 

of 50 times over the next 25 years. Id. at 752-54. However, the panel 

concluded that this single factor did not render SORNA punitive because, 

inter alia, “the restraint is relatively minor when balanced against the 

remaining factors.” Id. at 758.

The Perez Court then proceeded to address the defendant’s ex post 

facto claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and determined that it did 

not entitle him to relief:

Article I, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states 

that “[n]o ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation 

of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special 

privileges or immunities, shall be passed.” Pa. Const. Art. I, 

§ 17. This Court has recently held that “the standards applied to 

determine an ex post facto violation under the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and the United States Constitution are comparable.” 

Commonwealth v. Rose, 2013 PA Super 305, 81 A.3d 123, 

127 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Our Supreme Court has 

previously declined to hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution imposes greater protections than 

Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution. See 

Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 557 Pa. 327, 733 A.2d 616, 622 

(Pa. 1999) (stating that Gaffney “failed to present any 

compelling reason for our departure from the standards 

appropriate for determining whether an ex post facto violation 

pursuant to the federal constitution has occurred[,] and we find 

no independent reasons for doing so[]”).

It is axiomatic that when presenting a claim for higher 

protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the [a]ppellant 

must discuss the following four factors:

1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;

2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania caselaw;

3) related case-law from other states;
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4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state 

and local concern, and applicability within modern 

Pennsylvania jurisprudence.

Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 895 

(Pa. 1991). The Edmunds analysis is mandatory and a failure 

to provide it precludes the consideration of a state constitutional 

claim independent of its federal counterpart. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 621 Pa. 401, 78 A.3d 1044, 1048 

(Pa. 2013) (concluding that Baker’s failure to provide an 

Edmunds analysis precluded considering whether Article I, 

Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provided higher 

protections that the Eighth Amendment of the Federal 

Constitution on cruel and unusual punishments).

Here, [a]ppellant’s brief does not include the required 

Edmunds analysis to consider whether under this specific 

statute, the Pennsylvania Constitution would provide higher ex 

post facto protections than Article I, Section 10 of the Federal 

Constitution. ... Because we have already resolved [the 

appellant’s] federal ex post facto claim using [the] framework 

promulgated by the United States Supreme Court, and 

[a]ppellant does not argue that the Pennsylvania Constitution 

provides higher protection, his claim under the Pennsylvania 

Constitution likewise fails. See Baker, supra; Edmunds, 

supra.

Perez, 97 A.3d at 759-60.

In the instant case, although Snyder (1) argues that the retroactive 

application of SORNA’s provisions violates the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Ex 

Post Facto Clause; and (2) exhaustively discusses all seven Kennedy

factors, related case law from other states, and policy considerations, like 

the situation in Perez, he does not argue that the Pennsylvania 

Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause provides greater protection than its 

federal counterpart. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 21 (wherein Snyder 

sets forth the respective language of both Ex Post Facto Clauses, but does 
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not assert that Pennsylvania’s clause provides greater protection); see also

Perez, 97 A.3d at 760 (rejecting the appellant’s challenge to the 

constitutionality of SORNA under the Pennsylvania Constitution where he did 

not argue that the state constitution provided greater protection than its 

federal counterpart). Accordingly, we are compelled to apply the Perez

decision in rejecting Snyder’s constitutional challenge.9

In conclusion, we understand Snyder’s displeasure at having to 

register for his lifetime as a sex offender, even though approximately nine 

years had elapsed between the date of sentencing and the date he received 

notice of his requirement to register for his lifetime under SORNA. 

Nevertheless, the trial court’s Order denying his constitutional challenge is

 

9

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court in the instant case points 

out that at least two other states have ruled contrary to Perez, holding that, 

under their respective state constitutions, the retroactive application of 

longer sexual offender registration periods under SORNA was 

unconstitutional. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/14, at 11-12 (citing 

Gonzalez v. State of Indiana, 980 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 2013), and State v. 

Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011), as well as Judge Donohue’s 

concurring opinion in Perez, Perez, 97 A.3d at 760-67). The trial court also 

suggests that further appellate consideration of the constitutional issues 

presented in the instant case is appropriate. See Trial Court Opinion, 

10/29/14, at 12. However, it is axiomatic that a three-judge panel is bound 

by previous panel opinions unless overruled by this Court sitting en banc, 

our Supreme Court, or the United States Supreme Court. Commonwealth 

v. Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Commonwealth 

v. Perez, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2910 (Pa. Super. 2014) (denying Perez’s 

petition for reargument). Accordingly, under the particular circumstances of 

this case, we are bound by the majority’s holding in Perez, as Perez is 

directly on point.
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correct under the current law.10

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/2015

 

10 To the extent that Snyder argues SORNA violates his federal and state 

due process rights because it (1) did not afford him proper notice concerning 

his new registration requirement, and an opportunity to challenge the 

requirement; and (2) utilizes an irrebuttable presumption about sexual 

offenders’ high risk of recidivism and impinges upon offenders’ right to 

reputation, see Brief for Appellant at 15-20, 35-36, such claims are waived 

because they were not raised in, or fairly suggested by, Snyder’s Statement 

of Questions Presented, nor were they preserved in the trial court. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is 

stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested 

thereby.”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). However, even if these claims were not 

waived, we would determine that they are without merit. First, the letter 

that the PSP sent Snyder in December 2012 adequately put him on notice 

that he was required to register for his lifetime under SORNA, and Snyder 

has, in fact, been permitted to challenge SORNA’s registration requirement 

in the trial court and this Court. Second, though Snyder cites to our 

Supreme Court’s decision in In the Interest of J.B., supra, in support of 

his claim that SORNA deprives him of due process by applying an 

irrebuttable presumption concerning recidivism, and impinges upon his right 

to reputation, he fails to acknowledge that the Supreme Court’s holding in 

J.B. was limited to only juveniles. Id. at 2, 19-20 (holding that “SORNA

violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the use of an 

irrebuttable presumption[,]” where the presumption is not universally true 

and a reasonable alternative means exists for determining which juvenile 

offenders are likely to reoffend.) (emphasis assed)). Moreover, our research 

discloses no cases extending this holding to adult offenders under SORNA.