alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Herbert Jones, Also Known as Gregory Jones, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Quinones, J.), rendered March 1, 1988, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the court’s isolated query "Who speaks the truth? This is a question for you to decide”, delivered at the end of its charge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him. The defense counsel took no exception to the charge as given and, thus, this claim of error is not preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621; *People v Cadorette,*56 NY2d 1007, 1009). In any event, the court’s charge viewed in its entirety adequately explained the concepts of reasonable doubt and the People’s burden of proof and made it clear that the defendant bore no burden of proof *(see, People v Coleman,*70 NY2d 817, 819; *People v Green,*154 AD2d 616; *People v Burns,*133 AD2d 642; *see also, People v Flecha,*161 AD2d 116). Thus, the court’s isolated remarks did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The jury hearing the whole charge was properly instructed as to the correct principles to be applied in reaching its verdict *(see, People v Canty,*60 NY2d 830).

Equally without merit is the defendant’s contention that his sentence is excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). In view of the crime for which the defendant stands convicted, the defendant’s circumstances and the purpose of penal sanctions, the sentence imposed was entirely proper. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Brown and Eiber, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form
10-K for the period ending December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the Report), I, Karen M. Spaun, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. By: /s/
Karen M. Spaun Karen M. Spaun
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
March 16, 2005
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 45 (Wednesday, March 7, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13682-13683]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-5526]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary


Notice of Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and 
Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier Permits Filed Under Subpart B 
(Formerly Subpart Q) During the Week Ending February 18, 2012

    The following Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience 
and Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier Permits were filed under Subpart 
B (formerly Subpart Q) of the Department of Transportation's Procedural 
Regulations (See 14 CFR 301.201 et. seq.). The due date for Answers, 
Conforming Applications, or Motions to Modify Scope are set forth below 
for each application. Following the Answer period DOT may process the 
application by expedited procedures. Such procedures may consist of the 
adoption of a show-cause order, a tentative order, or in appropriate 
cases a final order without further proceedings.
    Docket Number: DOT-OST-2006-25857.
    Date Filed: February 16, 2012.
    Due Date for Answers, Conforming Applications, or Motion to Modify 
Scope: March 8, 2012.
    Description: Application of Sundance Air Venezuela S.A. requesting 
renewal of its existing foreign air carrier permit

[[Page 13683]]

authorizing it to engage in the foreign air transportation of property 
and mail between points in Venezuela and points in the United States.

Renee V. Wright,
Program Manager, Docket Operations, Federal Register Liaison.
[FR Doc. 2012-5526 Filed 3-6-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
#### Edward E. SMITH, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondents.

No. 85 SC 252.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Feb. 27, 1987.

Thomas M. Van Cleve, III, Deputy State Public Defender, for petitioner.

Cynthia Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

ORDER OF COURT

Upon review of the record and briefs filed herein, and having heard the oral arguments of counsel,

IT IS THIS DAY Ordered that the Writ of Certiorari in the above captioned cases shall be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as having been improvidently granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this cause be and is remanded to the Court of Appeals.
Exhibit 32.1

US ONCOLOGY HOLDINGS, INC.



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of US Oncology Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2006
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, R. Dale Ross, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.



|                                                     
|-----------------------------------------------------
|/s/ R. Dale Ross                                     
|R. Dale Ross                                         
|Chief Executive Officer of US Oncology Holdings, Inc.
|                                                     
|May 8, 2006
# L_2006132EN.01001001.xml

| 19.5.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 132/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.5.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 132/10

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 752/2006

of 18 May 2006

fixing the maximum export refund for white sugar to certain third countries for the 26th partial invitation to tender issued within the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1138/2005

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1) and in particular the second indent of Article 27(5) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 1138/2005 of 15 July 2005 on a standing invitation to tender to determine levies and/or refunds on exports of white sugar (2), for the 2005/2006 marketing year, requires partial invitations to tender to be issued for the export of this sugar to certain third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1138/2005 of 15 July 2005 on a standing invitation to tender to determine levies and/or refunds on exports of white sugar (2), for the 2005/2006 marketing year, requires partial invitations to tender to be issued for the export of this sugar to certain third countries.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1138/2005 a maximum export refund shall be fixed, as the case may be, account being taken in particular of the state and foreseeable development of the Community and world markets in sugar, for the partial invitation to tender in question. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1138/2005 a maximum export refund shall be fixed, as the case may be, account being taken in particular of the state and foreseeable development of the Community and world markets in sugar, for the partial invitation to tender in question.

| (3) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the 26th partial invitation to tender for white sugar issued pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1138/2005 the maximum amount of the export refund shall be 26,963 EUR/100 kg.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 19 May 2006.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 May 2006.

For the Commission

J. L. DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 178, 30.6.2001, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 39/2004 (OJ L 6, 10.1.2004, p. 16).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 185, 16.7.2005, p. 3.

2

---
-82 -80 -78 -76 -74

36 38 40 

### ★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲



### ★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 500 1000 1500 100 18 12 06 00 06/22 

### NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL 

## Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 22 Jun 06

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 38.90 N 76.65 WMeters AGL
# L AW 

# O FFICE OF 

# J OHN 

# M IETUS

, LLC

6701 D EMOCRACY B OULEVARD

, S UITE 300

B ETHESDA

, MD 20817-7500

J OHN R. M IETUS

, J R

. (202) 747-5212 (240) 396-5362 fax john@mietuslaw.com

April 4, 2011

VIA REGULATIONS.GOV

Director, Flight Standards Service
Federal Aviation Administration c/o DOT Docket Management System 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20590

Re: Petition of Mesaba Aviation, Inc. for Extension of FAA Exemption No. 9303A, Docket FAA-2007-27561

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. Part 11, Mesaba Aviation, Inc. d/b/a Mesaba Airlines and Delta Connection ("Mesaba") respectfully requests that the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") extend the above-c aptioned exemption, issued May 29, 2009 and set to expire May 31, 2011, for an ad ditional period of two years (that is, through May 31, 2013). The current exempti on from 14 C.F.R. § 121.434(c)(1)(ii) permits Mesaba to substitute a qualified and authorized check airman or aircrew program designee for an FAA inspector to observe a qualifying pilot in command (PIC) who is completing initial or upgrade training specified in § 121.424 during at least one flight leg that includ es a takeoff and a landing.

Extension of Mesaba's exemption, as curre ntly conditioned and limited, is in the public interest and will continue to pr ovide a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the applicable regulation. Mesaba employs check airmen and aircrew program designees who are highly qualif ied in its aircraft and who can observe qualifying PICs with the necessary level of scrutiny and objectivity. Continuing to permit these Mesaba employees to conduct th e required observations will allow the FAA (which retains the absolute right to observe qualifying PICs) greater flexibility in managing its inspection resources while allowing Mesa ba to ensure the timely qualification of PICs as n eeded. Thus, the relevant fact s do not differ materially from those previously presented by Mes aba and similarly situated petitioners. Further, the reasons cited by the FAA for granting the exemption to Mesaba and to similarly situated petitioners also apply to Mesaba's current situation. See, e.g., Exemptions 6473 (Federal Express, Docket FAA-2002-12343) and 10227 (Centurion Air Cargo, Docket FAA-2011-0120).
#### TRACY-BURKE ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Industrial Commission of Utah, and Karen A. Westlund, Defendants.

No. 20091.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 1, 1985.

*688Tracy-Burke Associates, pro se.

K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

PER CURIAM:

This petition for writ of review challenges an unemployment compensation award under the “equity and good conscience” clause of U.C.A., 1953, § 35-4-5(a). Without addressing the merits of plaintiffs contentions, we are constrained to dismiss the petition due to plaintiff-corporation’s improper attempt to represent itself.

Throughout this case, plaintiff has been represented by Linda Tracy. Her status as a non-lawyer was not questioned in the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, but when she filed for judicial review she was told that a corporation cannot appear *pro se*before this Court. She insisted that she could proceed, asserting that her business functions not as a corporation but as “Tracy & Burke,” a partnership. Without addressing the implications of that assertion, it is clear that this dispute is between “Tracy-Burke Associates” and one of its former employees. Tracy-Burke Associates is a viable corporation registered in this state, a fact admitted by Ms. Tracy. At a hearing before the administrative law judge, it was established that Ms. Tracy is plaintiffs president and Carol Burke is its secretary-treasurer. Plaintiff in this action is clearly a corporation and not a partnership.

It has long been the law of this jurisdiction that a corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed attorney. The rationale of this rule was explained in *Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman’s Association,*10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616 (1960). In that case, we quoted with approval the following language of *Paradise v. Nowlin,*86 Cal.App.2d 897, 195 P.2d 867 (1948):

> A composite of the rule in the decided cases, overwhelmingly sustained by the authorities, may be thus stated: A natural person may represent himself and present his own ease to the court although he is not a licensed attorney. A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial entity created by law and as such it can neither practice law nor appear or act in person. Out of court it must act in its affairs through its agents and representatives and in matters in court it can act only through licensed attorneys. A corporation cannot appear in court by an officer who is not an attorney and it cannot appear in propria persona.

(Citations omitted.) This is consistent with our statutes1 and with the general law in other jurisdictions.2

Because plaintiff is a corporation not represented by a licensed attorney, its petition for writ of review must be dismissed. *So ordered.*

1

. U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-51-25 and -40.

2

. *See*Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1073 (1968).
From: Raj Rao/RTP/USEPA/US 

To: "Kymn, Christine J." <Christine_J._Kymn@omb.eop.gov> 

Date: 08/09/2010 06:17 PM 

Subject: Final FIP Files 

 

GHG FIP Call Proposal 090810 RLSO.doc GHG FIP Call Proposal 080910.doc 

Please call me with the green signal. Thanks for all your help. 

Raj 

Raj Rao, P.E. 

Group Leader, NSRG 

OAQPS/AQPD(MD- C504-03) 

109 TW Alexander Drive 

RTP, NC 27709 

919-541-5344 

919-541-5509 fax 

Note: Positions or views expressed here do not represent official EPA policy. Interagency 

deliberative and Confidential.
* Pursuant to 5TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 31, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50211 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus BERNARDINO MENDOZA-GALVAN, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:05-CR-1643

-------------------- Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Bernardino Mendoza-Galvan (Mendoza) appeals his guilty-plea conviction and the 41-month sentence imposed for illegally reentering the United States after removal. Mendoza argues that his sentence is unreasonable and that it exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense charged in his indictment. A sentence, such as Mendoza’s, “within a properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Alonzo , 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Mendoza argues that the district court failed to consider theNo. 06-50211 -2- mitigating evidence he presented and misweighed the guidelines range. However, Mendoza has failed to demonstrate that his properly calculated guidelines sentence was unreasonable. See Alonzo , 435 F.3d at 554; United States v. Mares , 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). Mendoza also argues, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the 41-month term of imprisonment imposed in his case exceeds the statutory maximum sentence allowed for the 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) offense charged in his indictment. He challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. Mendoza’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although he contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi , we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Mendoza properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 10, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 133721(60) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, LARRY HODGES, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 133721 

 COA: 272157 
 Wayne CC: 04-423193-AV

RENAISSANCE CENTER, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s June 26, 2007 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously. 

d0830 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 10, 2007 

 Clerk
# ·FecEx® Express
October 8, 2012

·Federal Aviation Administration TransportAirplane Directorate 1601'Lind Avenue, SW Renton, WA 98057-3356 ,.: i**~** Air Operations

. , .._,,,. Teleptiohe 901.224.4735 Aircraft Systems.Engineering Fax 901.224.4819 3131 Democrat Road Memphis,TN 38118

## .!)EF~"\RTMENT 

# OF i

## f~ANSPORTATION 

# 0{::/'\ETOPERATIONS lOll 

# OCT I0 

# P 2: 1 

# 3'

Attention: Rules Docket No. FAA-2012-0859 Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-090-AD References: 

### /AI AD 2008-06-03

.Dear Sir or Madam,

In response to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-090-AD, FedEx · Express offersthe following comments: 1: The new unsafe condition introduced

### rby the new actuator part number MA30A1001 has not been explained. Fed Ex requests a more specific and detailed explanation ofthe new unsafe condition caused by the new installed actuator. 2. Ifthe existing AD 2008-06-03 is rescinded prior to the completion ofthe AD and before a new solution is introduced, can FedEx continue replacing actuator part number MA20A1001-1 with actuator part numberMA30A1001 or should FedEx stop all together installing the new actuator? 3. Is there a specific serial number group that is declared unsafe within the new actuator part number MA30A1001? Has serial number group "-D" for the actuator part number MA30A1001 been reviewed and deemed as safe?

FedEx is requesting clearer direction ofthe proposed AD. Ifyou have any questions regarding these comments, feel free to call me at (901) 224-4683 or by email at yjamal@fedex.com. 

# y::.r

Yasir Jamal Aircraft Systems Engineering FedEx Express 901.224.4683 E-mail: yjamal@fedex.com
#### Antonio Puccio et al., Appellants, v Ursula Julian, Respondent, and David Barbuti, Also Known as August D. Barbuti, Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

Mercure, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Torraca, J.), entered April 30, 1990 in Sullivan County, which, *inter alia,*granted defendant Ursula Julian’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her.

Plaintiff Antonio Puccio (hereinafter plaintiff) was injured when he fell from a ladder in the course of his employment with third-party defendant Julian Mechanical Corporation. The accident took place on land owned by third-party defendant Russell Julian, principal and sole shareholder of Julian Mechanical, and defendant Ursula Julian (hereinafter Julian). Plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, Julian, alleging liability under Labor Law §§ 200, 240 and 241 based *927upon her ownership interest in the real property. Julian moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her upon the ground that she too was an employee of Julian Mechanical and that, as a result, the action against her is barred by the provisions of Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (6) *(see, St. Andrews v Lucarelli,*115 AD2d 155; *Heritage v Van Patten,*90 AD2d 936, 937, *affd*59 NY2d 1017). The motion was opposed by plaintiffs and defendant David Barbuti, general contractor on the project. Supreme Court granted the motion and plaintiffs and Barbuti appeal.

There must be a reversal. Although Julian supported the motion with some evidence of her employment with Julian Mechanical, the fact that she performed services for her husband’s corporation, such as answering the telephone, typing, filing, bookkeeping and banking, is by no means conclusive of the issue, particularly in view of the fact that Julian received no pay for her services and was not covered on Julian Mechanical’s disability or workers’ compensation insurance policies *(see, Moss v Rista,*158 AD2d 417, 418). Moreover, Julian’s evidentiary showing is essentially devoid of detail, with no particularization of the amount of time spent in her asserted employment or the nature and extent of her duties *(see, Coley v Michelin Tire Corp., 99*AD2d 795) and is, thus, subject to conflicting inferences. In our view, the record presents triable issues of fact on the relationship between Julian and Julian Mechanical which may not be resolved upon a motion for summary judgment *(see,*CPLR 3212 [b]; *Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center,*64 NY2d 851, 853; *Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562).

Order reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, and motion denied. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.
Current SAN CLASS B

Proposed SAN CLASS B
EDWARD WALKER

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 13

- 6150

__________ ___________________/

Opinion filed July 18, 2014.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Union County

. Stanley H. Griffis, III , Judge

.

Edward Walker, pro se

, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Perrone, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF

, ROBERTS

, and ROWE

, J J

. , CONCUR.