T h e H on or abl e T i mot h y M

. B u r g es s, D i st ri ct J u dg e f or t h e U

. S. * D i st ri ct C o urt f

o r t he D i st ri ct of A l aska, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
L KAV, J UVENI L E M A LE ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 12-10483

D.C. No. 4 : 1 1 -c r- 0 2 9 6 6 -J GZCRP -1
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona J ennife r G. Z ipps, District J udg e, Presiding

Argued and Submitted F e br ua ry 15 , 2 01 3— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed Apr il 2, 2013

B e fo re : Jer ome F arr is a

nd N. Rand y Smith, Cir c uit

Judg e s, and Timothy

M. Bur g ess, District J udg e. * Op ini on by Judg e N. R. Sm ithU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw Reversingan orde r committing a juvenil e fo r a study

of his competenc y

to stand t ri al , t he pane l held that the district
c ourt e rr e d b y c omm itt ingthe juv e nil e un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 4241(d), r ather

than pr ocee ding pur suant to Fe dera l Juve nil e De lin qu e nc y

Ac t.

CO UN SEL
J . Ry an Moore (ar gued), D . Erendir a C as t i llo-Reina, and B ri an I

. Ra de ma c he r, As sis tant F e de ra l Pub lic Defen de rs , Tu c so n, Ar izon a , f

or Juve nil e -A

pp e lla nt.
Chris tin a Ca ba nil la s ( argue d) and

Ann L . D e Ma

ra is, Assistant United States Attorney s, Tucson, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee

.

OP IN ION
N.R. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e:
When the United States char g es a juvenile with an a ct of juvenile delinquency under the Fe dera l J uvenile De linquency Act (the “F J DA”) , 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–42, the distri ct courtU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 3

LKA V t u r n ed t we n t y - on e i n Au g u s t 2012. 1 must follow 18 U.S.C. § 5037(e) if it commits t he juvenile f or a stu dy of the juv e nil e ’s c omp e te nc y to sta nd tr ia l. B e c a

us e the district court in this case instead committed L KAV unde r 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), we r ever se.
F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY
Tribal author ities of the Tohono O’odham nation char g ed L KAV ( ag e 17) w ith murder in May 2009. After

being 1 char g ed, he rema ined in tribal custody from 2009 until 2011. Whil e in custody , he wa s found i ncompetent, but wa s not sent to a tr e atme nt f

a c ili ty for re sto ratio n to c omp e te nc y . In late 2011, the United States filed its own cha rg e ag ainst L KAV and obtained a

writ of habe as cor

pus to remove him from tribal custody

. To obtain fede ral jurisdiction ove r L KAV, the Un ite d St ate s f

ile d a “ Ce rtifi cat ion

to P ro c e e d A g a ins t J uvenile Pursuant to Title 18, United Sta t es Code, Section 5 0 3 2 , as Amende d.” The United States ce rtified that L KAV’ s char g e wa

rra nted fe dera l jurisd i cti on and sig naled the United States’ intent to proc eed a g ainst L KAV as an alleg ed juvenile de linquent under the F J DA.
In N ov e mbe r 2 01 1, the United State s mo ve d to c omm it L KAV, pur suan t t o 18 U.S.C. § 4241, to an adult medical fac ility for psychiatric evaluation. L KAV did not oppose the United States’ reque st to proce ed under § 4241, but a sked for a loca l evaluation. L KAV also requeste d a compe tency hear ing tak e place be

fore he wa s committed under § 4241. De fe rr ingto the se re qu e sts , th e g ov e rnme nt w ith dr e w i ts mot ion to p ro c e e d und e r § 42 41 , a nd the ma g ist

rate jud g e did not decide at that time whether § 4241 g overne d L KAV’ s c omm itm e nt. Th e ma g istrate jud g e g ra nte d L KA V’ s r e qu e stU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 4
f o r a preli mi n ar

y e xami n ati o nto ta

k e p la c e in

Ph o e n ix, Arizona. After

exten s ive neur opsy cholog ical examination, the e xami nin gpsy cho log ist de e me d L KA V i nc omp e te nt t o sta nd tr ia l.

L KAV the n fi l ed a motion to proce ed with commitment under the FJDA, § 5037(e)

. At a status conf ere nce be fore the
ma g istrate jud g e in Jul y

20 12 , th e Un ite d State s st ipu late d to L KAV’ s incompetenc y . Howe v er, the United States maintained its position t hat L KAV should be c ommitt ed to an adult fac ility

under § 4241( d). The United Sta t es fi l ed a
m o t i o nt o th ate f

f e c tth e n e x td ay.
Th e ma g istrate jud g e g ra

nte d the Un ite d Stat e s’ mot ion to proce ed under § 4241 and denied L KAV’ s motion t o proce ed
un d er § 5037( e). The mag istrate judg e’s Or der of Commi tment committed L KAV “ to the cu s tody of the Attorney Ge n er al to be hospitalized in a suitable fac ility for a reasonable period of time, NOT TO E XCEED F OUR (4) M ON THS , a s is ne c e ssa ry to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he re is a
su bs tanti a l pr ob a

bil ity that in the fo re se e a

bl e future he wi ll attain t he capac ity to permit the t rial t o proce ed.” I n its own written orde r (the “ Orde r”) , the district court a ffirme d the Orde r o f Co mm itme n t. L K

A V f il e d a ti me ly , inte r lo c u tor

y a pp e a l of the Or de r, c ha lle ng inghis § 4 24 1( d) c omm itm e nt.
After the appe al was f

iled, the United States t ra n s ported L KA V t o F MC- B utn e r, an a du lt me dic a l fa c ili ty , purs ua nt t o the Orde r. F MC-Butner

comple te d

its c ompetency

evaluation of L KAV in January 2013. FMC-B utner’s report c oncluded that L KAV was incompetent to sta nd trial. Howev er , the repor t further conclude d that, “with an a d d i t ional period of ho s p i t a l i z at i o n an d tr e atm e n t , ” L K A V c o u l d b e r e s t o re d to competenc y . The re port also sug g ested a 120-day extensionU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 5
of the previous commitment de adline (set to expire in J anuar y 2013) for such hospit alization and treatment. The United States filed a motion for the reque sted extension, based on the repor t. O n L KAV’ s motion, the district court dec ided to hear the motion for extension of ti me (ra ther than r efe r it to the mag istrate judg e). O n Fe bruar y 11, 2013, the distri ct court g rante d th e U n it e d

St ate s ’ mo ti o nan d

e xte n d e d

L K A V ’s c omm itm e nt f

or up to a n a dd iti on a l 12 0 d ay s.
JU RI SDI CT ION We ordinarily

hear ap p eals “only

from a district c ourt’s final dec ision.” United St ates v. Loughner , 672 F.3d 731, 742 (9th Cir. 2012) (c iting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). H o we v er , under the coll ateral order

doctrine, w e re view “a

district court’s pr e lim ina ry or int e ri m de c isi on

wh en it ‘( 1) c on c lus ive ly deter mines the disputed question, (2) re solves an im portant issue completely separ ate from the merits of the acti o n , and (3) is e ffe ctively unrevie wable on appea l f rom a f inal judgme nt.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Sell v. United States , 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003))

. Her e, L KAV’ s challeng e to the Or der is appe alable unde r the collater al orde r doctrine , and no party challeng es our jurisdiction. Th e Or der c onclusively deter mines L KAV’ s ri g hts wi th r e sp e c t to his pr e -a dju dic atio n c omm itm e nt. F ur the r, the iss ue be fo re us —whe the r § 42 41 (d ) app lie s to L KA V— i s completely

separ ate f

rom the ultimate issue of L KAV’ s delinquency . Finally , delay would rende r the Or der eff ectively unrevie wable. L KAV se eks only re l ease from
c omm itm e nt at F MC- B utn e r. L KAV ’s re le a se fr om F MCButne r would obviate the need f or our c ourt to issue an orde rU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 6

Ind eed , w e o rdered the p art i es t o b ri ef t he m o o t ness i ss ue. H o wever, 2 t h e g ov e r n me n t c on c e de s t h a t t h i s a pp e a l i s n ot mo ot s o l on g a s L K AV
rem ai ns co m m i t t ed at FM C

- B ut ner. T hus, we nee d not reach t he
mo ot nes s i s s ue. and c ould rend er L KA V’ s a pp e a l mo ot. See id. at 743

2 ( “ F in a ll y , th e is s u e is e f

f e c ti v e ly un r e v ie w a

b le b e c a u s e [b ]y the time of trial [ L oug hner] will have under g one for ced medication—the ve ry

harm that he seeks to avoid.” (alter ations in origina l) (interna l quotation marks omitted)).

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW
We r eview the district court’s inter pretation of §§ 4241(d) and 5037(e ) de novo. Se e Un it ed St ate s v . J uv e nile Ma le , 670 F.3d 999, 1007 ( 9th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) (“ W e re view a district court’s c onstruction or interpr etation of a statute de novo.” ).

DI SCU SSIO N

“ As in a ny c a se of statut or y c on str uc tio n, our a

na ly sis beg ins with the lang uag e of the statute.” United St a t es v. Ha rre ll , 637 F.3d 1008, 1010 ( 9th Cir. 2 0 1 1) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). “To a id our i n q u iry , we r ely on our established r

ules of statutory

construction . . . .” Id. We a lso loo k to sim ila

r p ro vis ion s w ith in the st atute a s a wh ole
and the langua g e of

re late d o r s imi lar s tat ute s to a id i n interpre tation. See J

onah R. v. Carmona , 446 F.3d 1000, 1006–07, 1011 (9th Cir

. 2 006). “[S] tatutory interpre tations which would produc e absur d results ar e to be avoided.” Arizona St. Bd. for C

harter Schs. v. U

.S. Dep’t of Educ. , 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted). I f a statute is ambiguous, we may “co n s u l t the le g isl ativ e his tory , to th e e xtent th at it is o f v a lue , to a id i nU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 7

o ur inte r p r e tati o n
. ” Me rke l v. Comm’r , 192 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1999). Finally , in some case s, a statute’s “ purpose” may shed lig ht on the interpre t i v e q uestion. See J onah R. , 446 F.3d at 1005, 1010–11.
We conclude that eac h of the fo re g oing “ tools” of statut or y int e rp re tatio n in dic ate that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld have a pp lie d § 50 37 (e ), rath er tha n § 42 41 (d ). Th e pla in language of § 5 03 7( e ) m ake s c le ar t hat it a pp lie s to commitment and study

of alleged juvenile delinquents like L KAV. Other tex tual “evide nce” supports this conclusion as well. Our inter

pre t at ion would not lead to an absur d or irrational r esult. Finally , even as suming that the statutory languag e is ambiguous, commitment under § 5037(e ) (r ather than § 4 2 4 1 ( d ) ) is c o n s is te n t w it h th e p ur p o s e o f th e FJDA,
a s e v i d e n c e d

b y th e s t atu t e ’ s l e g i s l at i v e h i s t o r y.
1. P lain L anguage
Wor ds in s tatut e s u su a lly c arr y “ the ir pla in, natur a l,
o rd inary and commonly

understood mea

nings.” U

n ite d States v. Romo-Romo , 246 F.3d 1272, 1275 ( 9 t h C ir. 2001). In addition, courts “try to avoid, whe re possibl e, an int e rp re tatio n o f a

statut e tha

t r e nd e rs any

pa rt of it superf luous and does not g ive ef fec t to all of the wor ds used by Congr ess.” Bosley M

ed. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer , 403 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
The United States a ckn o wl edges that it filed a
c e rt if ic atio n to pr oc e e d ag a ins t L KA V as an all e g e d juve nil e delinquent pursuant to § 5032, there by invoking th e F J DA. Indeed, the United States conc eded at oral ar gument that § 5037(e) applies to a lleg ed juvenile delinquents. Howe ver, the United States ar gues that § 5 0 3 7(e) does not mentionU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 8 competenc y

and, thus, ca n not “supplant the mandatory c omp e te nc y

e va luatio n a

nd c omm itm e nt pr oc e dure fo r a ll defe ndants set forth in § 4241.” This arg ument overlooks the plain languag e of § 5037( e).
Se c tio n 5 03 7( e ) p ro vid e s:
I f the c ourt desire s more detailed information
conce rning an alleg ed or adjudicate d delinquent, it m ay commit him, after notice
and heari ngat w hic h th e juv e nil e is repr esente d by

counsel, to the c ustod y o f t he Attorney Gene ral for

observation and study

by an appr opriate a g ency . Such observation and study shall b e conducte d on an outpatient basis, unless the cour t determines that inpatient observation and study are nece ssary to obt a in the de sir e d inf

or matio n. In the c a se of an a lleg ed juvenile d elinquent, inpatient study may be ordered only with the consent of th e juv e n il e an d

h is att o r n e y
. T h e ag ency shall make a

complete study of the alleg ed or
a dju dic ate d d e lin qu e nt t o a sc ert a in h is pe rs on a l tr a its , h is capab il it ies, his background, any

previous delinquenc y

or crimin al experience , any mental or phy sical defe ct, and a

ny oth er rele vant fa ctors. The Attorney Gene ral shall submit to the cour t and the attorne y s for the juve n ile and the Go ve rnme nt t

he re su lts of th e stu dy

wi thi n thirty day s after the commitment of the juvenile, unless the co u rt g rants additional time.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 9 As is evident by

its plain languag e, § 5037(e ) applies in ca ses ag ainst alleg ed juvenile de linquents like L KA V. In such
case s, the court may

order commitment to the Attorney Gen er al for obse rvation or study , if the cour t “desire s more de ta ile d in formati on

c on c e rn ing ” an a lle g e d juve nil e delinquent. 18 U.S.C. § 5 0 3 7(e) . One of the subjects of study specific ally

stated in the statute is “a ny men t al or phy sic a l de fe c t” o f the a lle g e d juve nil e de lin qu e nt. Whil e § 5037(e) does not mention comp etenc y , it does provide
cer tain restric tions on the cour t’s ability to order c ommitm ent of alleg ed juvenile de linquents. Id. Section 4241(d) se ts forth a diff ere nt commitment scheme . That sec tion provides for a mandatory

commitment of a defe ndant, who has bee n deeme d incompetent, for study of the de fendan t’s potential for r estorability to competenc e. 28 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Whil e the United States ac knowledg es tha t § 4 2 4 1 d o e s n o t u s e th e w o r d “ juv e n il e , ” it ar g ues that § 4241’s text “‘una

mbiguously describes’ t h e competency e va luatin g and c omm itm e nt pr oc e dure a pp lic a ble to [ a ll] defe ndants.” How ever , this argument overlooks the fac t that the g overnme nt char g ed L KAV with juvenile de linquency
un de r t he F JDA. As su c h, he is a n “ a lle g e d juve nil e de lin qu e nt” as that te rm is u se d in

§ 5 03 7( e ). B e c a

us e § 5037(e) express l y provides for commitment, study , and observ at i on of alleg ed juvenile de linquents, it controls over
c on fl ic tin gpr ov isi on s of § 4 24 1( d) , whic h is a

pp lic a ble to fed eral criminal def

endants g ener ally

. Cf. United States v. Pe te , 525 F.3d 8 4 4 , 848 (9th Cir. 2008) (notingthat the FJDA’s speedy

trial provision, not the adult analog , applied duri ngde fe nd ant’ s d e te nti on a s an “ a lleged juve nil e delinquent”)

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 10
T he United States c ites our dec ision in J o n ah R. to support its argument t h at § 4241(d) c ontrols. The United S tates a rgue s th at Jonah R. ma n d ate s th at t

h e term

“ de fe nd ant” a

pp ly to L KA V, e ven tho ugh L KA V i s a juvenile. We disag ree . In Jonah R. , w e he ld t hat 18 U. S .C. § 358 5( b) , a statut e a

pp lic a ble to fe de ra l cr imi na l de fe nd ants in ge nera l, also applied t o j u v en i les. 446 F.3d at 1011. Under § 3585(b), “[a] defe ndant s hall be g iven cr edit toward the servic e of a

term of imprisonment for a ny time he has spent in of

ficial detention prior to the date th e sentence c omm e nc e s
. . . .” 18 U. S.C. § 3 58 5. Al tho ugh th e F JDA d id not “expressly

incorpora

te § 358 5 , ” the Bure au of Prisons (“B OP”) ha d consistently applied it to juveniles for a period of time. Jonah R. , 4 46 F .3 d at 10 02 . T he cou rt based its
c on c lus ion

that § 3 58 5 a

pp li es to juv e nil e s o n th e te xt, leg islative history , and purpose of the F J DA, § 3585, and simil ar statutes. Id. at 1006–11. Specific ally , the cour t rea soned that the e limination of an expr ess ex ception fr om § 3 5 8 5 ’s pre dece ssor, § 3568, had made the subsequent statute more g ener ally

applicable

. Id. at 1 0 0 7. Congr ess’s chang es to the various, rele vant statutes signa led Cong ress’s expectation that “juveniles would re ceive cre dit for pre

sentenc e custody

as a matter of c ourse.” Id. at 1008.
The United States make s too much of Jonah R. Whil e the
c ourt c on c lud e d th at th e te rm

“ de fe nd ant” c ou ld b e a

pp lie d to
a juv e nil e , it

did n ot hold t

hat th e te rm always a

pp lie s to juveniles. A close r eadingof Jonah R. reve als that the cour t based its dec ision on the uni q u e history of § 3585 and the other re levant statutes. The text ual ar gument, as we ll as the FJDA purpose argument, wer e only corollar y to the court’s structura l/legislative history rationale

. We decline the United States’ invitation to st retc h Jonah R. to compel application ofU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 11

T h o u g h n o t pa rt of o ur r easoning, t here i s no i nd i cat i o n i n J o n a h R. 3 t h at t h e cu s t ody c r edi t pr ov i s i on i n § 3585 c on f l i ct ed wi t h a n y pr ov i s i on of t h e F J D A. th e t er m “def

endant” to L KAV unde r § 4241(d) , notwithstanding c ontrary

provisions in the FJDA. 3

In addition, the United States cannot re ly on § 5037(e) ’s he a din g—“ Di sp os iti on ” —in su pp or t of its te xtua l argume nt. A “he adingcannot substitute for the ope rative te x t o f t he
s t at u te.” S

e e F l o r i d a D e p ’ t o f R e v e n u e v

. P i c c a di l ly Cafeterias, Inc. , 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008). W hile the bulk of § 5037(e) is d ed i ca t ed to the disposition of an adjudicated juv e nil e del in que nt, § 5 03 7( e ), by its pla in l angua g e , a lso applies to alleged

juvenile delinquents. 18 U.S .C. § 5037(e)

. T h i s appli cation is not ref lected in the he ading

. See Pi c c ad ill y , 554 U.S. at 47. (“[T]h e t i t le of a statute . . . c a nn o t l i m i t th e p l a i n m e an i n g o f th e t e xt

. ” ( a l t e r at i o nin orig inal) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted)).
Th e Un it e d St ate s ma

ke s o nly on e , v a gue atte mpt

to a c c ount f

or the te rm

“ a lle g e d juve nil e de lin qu ent” in § 5 0 3 7 ( e )

. T h e U n it e d

St ate s p o ints to Un i t ed States v. J uv e nile Ma le , 4 92 F .3 d 1 04 6 ( 9th Cir . 2 007) ( a

juv e nil e tr ans fe r c a se ) a

nd su g g e sts tha

t it de mons tr ates a

pr op e r u se of t he § 5037(e) commitment procee dings. The United States
argue s th at § 5 03 7( e ) c omm itm e nt w ou ld b e a pp ro pr iate in
case s like J

uv e nile Ma le , beca

use a judg e mi gh t sometimes need a dditional informat i o n befor e dec iding the que stion of transfe rabili t y o f an alleg ed juvenile de linquent. Yet, the United States fails to make a ny logic al distinction between
comm itment for study

to obtain more information on the transfe rabili ty

question and commitment for study on the qu es t i o no f c o mp et en cy
. Bo thar e s i tu at i o n s wh er e t h e j u d geU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 12

T he U ni t ed St at es empl oy s a s i mi l ar argu ment

— po i nt i ng out t hat 4 LK A V did no t i ni t i al l y ob ject t o pro ceed i ng und er § 4 2 4 1 (d). G i ven t he p l ai n l anguage o f

§ 5 0 3 7 (e), pro ceed ing u nd er § 4 2 4 1 (d) was er ror, regardl ess of whether LK A V i ni t i al l y f ai l ed t o po i nt out t he error. may “desire [ ] more de tailed i nformation conc erningan alleg ed” juve n i l e delinquent. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(e). Whil e § 5037(e ) i s ad mittedly less compre hensive than § 4 24 1 ( d ) o n th e s u

b j e c t o f c o mp e t e n c y , i t c o v e r s th e sa me su bje c t matte r— c omm itm e nt. Acco rd ing ly , th e pla in languag e of § 5037( e) shows that it applies t o L KAV’ s commitment, rather tha

n § 4241(d).
2. Other Text ual S upp ort
The c onclusion t hat L KAV’ s commitment falls under § 5037(e) , not § 4241(d), finds support in the other provisions of the F J DA and the adult commitment statutes. To procee d ag ainst L KAV in fe dera l court, § 5 0 3 2 require d the United States t o file a c ertifica

tion and demonstrate the basis for fede ral jurisdi ct i o n
. See 18 U. S.C. § 5 03 2; United States v. J uv e nile Ma le , 595 F.3d 885, 891 ( 9 t h Cir. 2010). The United States ac knowledg ed this require ment and filed the
nece ssary cer

tification. L ike § 5037(e) , § 5032 uses the ter m “alleg ed juvenile de linquent.” The Un i t ed S tates does not
e xpla in why

it w ou ld b e re qu ir e d to fo llo w § 50 32 to o bta in jur isd ic tio n o ve r L KA V, but no t f oll owpr oc e dure s f

or his commitment under identica l languag e in § 5037(e ). 4

F ur the r, in n

ume ro us pla c e s, the F JDA s pe c if ic a lly ref ere nces c riminal statutes of g ener al applica bility

. See, e .g. , 18 U.S. C. § 5032 (ref

ere ncingadult criminal statutes in the F JDA j ur isd ic tio n p ro vis ion ); id . § 5037 (incorpor ating
c e rt a in adul t se nte nc ingpr ov isi on s) . Und e r t he we ll-U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 13 established expressio unius canon, Co n gr ess could have made express ref

ere nce to § 4241( d) in § 5 0 37(e) had it intended th e a d u l tp r o v i s i o nt o a

p p l y.
The United States makes the reve rse argument. I t argues t h at § 4241(d) a

nd the surroundingprovisions contain no
e xce pti on fo r j uv e nil e of

fender s. In e sse nc e , n oth ingin § 4 24 1( d), a

nd re late d p ro vis ion s, ind ic ate s th at it do e s not apply to juveniles. But this argument overlooks our c ases wher e w e h av e o b s e r

v e d th at t h e F JD A“ g o v e r

n s the de te nti on and dis po sit io n o f j uv e nil e s c ha rg e d w ith delinquency .” J

uv e nile Ma le , 670 F.3d at 1004 (internal qu ot atio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . Wh ile the Un ite d St ate s is te c hn ic a lly c or

re c t th at no thi ngin § 42 41 (d ) s ay s th at it does not a pp ly to juv e nil e s, no thi ng in the statut e sa y s that it does
a pp ly to j uv e nil e s. B y

c ontr ast , § 5037 (e ) b y

its c le ar t e rm s applies to “a lleg ed juvenile de linquents” like L KAV.
The United States c ites two out-of-c ircuit case s to support its argume nt that § 42 41 (d ) a pp lie s to L KAV : United States v. S.A. , 129 F.3d 995, 999 ( 8th Cir. 1997) , and United States v. R o b i nson , 404 F.3d 850, 856–58 ( 4th Cir. 2005). The United States’ re liance on t hese c ases is misplaced. I n S.A. , the Eig h t h Circuit applied § 4246—which g overns pe rm an e n t , c i v i l c o m m i tm e n to f a d u l t s

—t o j uv e n i l e s. 129 F.3d at 998–99. Howeve r, S.A. is inapposite for similar
re a so ns a s Jonah R. The court re fer ence s the plain meaning rule, id. at 998, but then foc uses on the “policy considerations that form the f

oundation of” t h e adult commit ment statute.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 14

A t oral argument, L K A V b rief l y i m p l i ed t hat one reas o n t hat t he 5 q ue st i o n o f

wh i ch st atute ap p l i es is so i m p o rtant i s t ha t t he U nit ed S t ates’ ef f ort s t o re s t ore LK A V t o com pet enc y may f ai l

. I n t hat ca s e, t he U ni t ed St at es ma y n ee d t o s ee k pe r man en t c i v i l c ommi t men t u n der § 42 46. W h e the r § 4 2 4 6 w o u ld b e a n a p p ro p ria te p ro v isio n to c o n tro l i n L K A V ’s
cas e i s not bef

ore u s a nd w e d o not deci de t hat i s s ue. Accordi ng l y , we ex p ress no o p i nio n o n w he t he r § 4 2 4 6 wo uld ap p l y t o F JD A ca ses. Id. at 999. This cas e d o es n ot impli cate the same policy
c on sid e ratio ns
. 5
Simi larly , the relationship betwe en § 4241(d ) a nd § 503 7( e ) dis tin guis he s this c a se fr om S.A. Ag ain, this is not
a c a se wh e re c ourt s are us ingg e ne ra lly a pp lic a ble statut e s to fi ll i n g a ps in t he FJ DA . Se c tio n 5 03 7( e ) a lr e a dy sq ua re ly addre sses pre- adjudication commit m en t for study and observation.
Robinson is inapplicable to this question, too. Whil e the Robinson c ourt

re fe re nc e d § 42 41 (d ) in pa ssi ngin a juv e nil e case , 404 F.3d at 856, commitment under § 4241( d) wa s not at i s s u e. Rather, the juve nile challeng ed the district cour t’s competenc y

deter mination. Id. Robinson do e s n ot i mpl ic ate the conf lict betwee n § 424 1 (d) and § 5037(e) , and thus pr ov ide s n o s up po rt

fo r t he g ov e rnme nt’ s a

rgume nt.
3. Absurdi ty We rejec t the United States’ var ious arguments that our interpre tation of §§ 4241(d) a nd 5037(e) wo u l dlead to an
a bs ur d r e su lt. We m

us t avo id an inte rp re tatio n th at “ wo uld p r o d u c e a b s ur d r e s u lt s.” Arizona St. Bd. , 464 F.3d at 1008. Howeve r, “[w]hen a natura l rea ding of the statutes leads to a rational, c ommon-sense re sult, an alteration of meaning is not only unnece ssary , but also ext rajudicia l.” Id. In o the r w or ds ,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 15

O f co ur s e, t he U ni t ed St at es co ul d hav e m oved t o t r ans f er LK A V t o an 6 ad ul t pro ceed i ng unde r § 50 3 2 , i n whi ch case s ub sequent co m m i t m ent
u n der § 4241( d) w ou l d be a ppr opr i at e. Cou r t s l ook t o a num ber of at t r i but es of

t he al l ege d j uv eni l e del i nquen t t o det er mi ne whe t her t r ans f er woul d be “ i n t he i nt er es t of j us t i ce. ” See 1 8 U .S .C . § 5 0 3 2 ; J u v e n ile M a le , 49 2 F. 3d at 10 48

. T he U ni t ed St at es do es not expl ai n w hy i t f ai l ed t o s eek tra n sfe r, if L K A V ’s p a rtic u la r n e e d s w a rr a n te d tre a ting him a s a n a d u lt
a n yw a y. “a de cision to [ rea

rra ng e] or rewrite [ a] statute falls within the leg islative, not the judicial, prer og ative.” Xiv . I NS , 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002).
Most of the Unit ed S tates’ a bsurdity arguments focus on the pec uliar fa cts of this ca s e an d the pra ctical diff iculty of keepingL KAV in a dif

fer ent fa cility

than FMC-B utner. For example, the United States points out that L KAV is no long er a juvenile, be cause he has turned twenty -one. Whil e L KAV no longe r mee ts the statutory def i n i t i on of a juve nile, that do e s no t me an th at he is n o lo ng e r s ub je c t to the F JDA. I t is well-settled that jurisdiction under the FJDA is determined at the time of t h e i n fo rmation. See U nited States v. Doe , 631 F.2d 110, 112–13 (9th Cir. 1980). Acc ording ly , L KAV is stil l an “a lleg ed j u v en i le delinquent” unde r § 5037(e ). 6 Whil e tr e atin gL KA V a s a juv e nil e mi ght c re ate so me housing issues, be cause he ca nnot be housed w ith other juveniles, such diffic ulty (nec essar ily

tempo ra ry

under the statute) does not lead to absurdity

. In fac t, the BO P prog ram statement provided in the r ecor d states th at a juvenile “may
rema in in a contra ct juvenile fa cility for c o n t i nuity

of pr ogra m pa rt ic ipatio n” a ft e r t

he juv e nil e ’s tw e nt y -f

ir st b i rth d ay.
Th e Un ite d St ate s a lso argue s th at it wo uld be dif fi c ult and imprac ti cal to require the United States “to provide 24-U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 16

T he U ni t ed St at es ( and t he di s t r i ct cour t ) m ak e m uc h o f t he f act t hat 7 LK A V has f

ai l ed to sugges t a sui t ab l e f aci l i t y to m eet L K A V ’ s t reat m ent
n ee ds

. H owe v er , t h ey ov er l ook t h e f ac t t h at t h e O r der l ef

t l i t t l e r oom f

or LK A V t o s uggest an al t ernat e f aci l i t y
. H ad t he U ni t ed Stat es t rul y s o ught g r ea t er i n pu t f

r om LK AV , i t c ou l d ha v e pr oce ede d u n der § 5037( e)

. An d, in a n y e v e n t, the ul ti m a te r e s p o n s ib il it y to m a k e su itab le arrangeme n ts— w het her under § 42 4 1 or § 50 3 7 (e)— rem ai ns wi t h t he A tto rn e y G e n e ra l. hour sec urity

in a private medical fa cility ” g iven L KAV’ s c i r c um s t an c e s
. Y e t , § 5 0 3 7 ( e ) c l e ar l y c a l l s f o r a th i rty- d ay, in- patie nt c omm itm e nt in so me c a se s. I t do e s no t s tr ain
re a so n to be lie ve tha

t so me all eg e d o r a dju dic ate d juve nil e delinquents are char g ed w ith dang erous c rimes and must be kept in a sec ure f

acili t y , apar

t from other juve niles. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Even if this is more diffic ult in L KAV’ s case , it is bey ond our purview to relieve the United States of any incidental inconve nience arisingfrom L KAV’s unique treatment needs. Given § 5037(e) ’s clea r import, the idea that the United States could make arr ang ements for L KAV’ s particula r nee ds is not absurd.
The United St ates argues t hat our interpre tation will lead to uncer tain application of § 5037( e)

. Again, the United States fails to expl ain whythe g ov e rnme nt would b e un a ble to establish a set of pr ocedur es for commitment under § 5037(e) . J ust like § 4241(d), § 503 7 (e ) provides for
c omm itm e nt t o the c us tod y of the Attor ne y Ge ne ra l. Section

7 50 37 (e ) s imp ly

mod if ie s c e rt a in o the r c ommit ment de ta ils
re qu ir e d in

the c a se of

a lle g e d o r a dju di cat ed juve nil e s. Indeed, w e e x pect that the United States’ § 4241(d) proce dures will continue to serve as a guide to how it might
car ry out § 5037(e) commitment. This is permissible, so long
a s th e Un ite d St ate s o bser ve s § 50 37 (e )’ s e nume rate d li mit s on the juv e nil e ’s c omm itm e nt.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 17 Finally , t h e United States a rgues that § 5037(e ) ca

nnot apply to com petenc y

deter minations, because it requires consent for

inpatient study

and imposes a thirty -day commitment tim e limit that may be too short to dete rmine
c omp e te nc y . W e disa g re e . T he juv e nil e ’s c on se nt t o inpatient study would be no barr ier to c ommitm ent in cases like this one, beca

use both parties have a veste d interest in a swift and ac curate compete ncy deter mination. Further , § 503 7 (e) specific ally contemplates c ourt-sanc tioned exceptions to the thirty -day commitment r

ule wher e nee ded. Ac c or dingl y , s imp ly

ins ist ingthat th e Un ite d St ate s c omp ly wi th § 50 37 (e )’ s c omm itm e nt r e qu ir e me nts do e s n ot l e a d to
an ir ratio na l or

a bs ur d r e su lt.
4. Le gis lat ive His to r y a nd P ur pos e
L KA V d oe s n ot p oint to any le g isl ativ e his tor

y that w ou ld aid in the interpre tation of § 5037(e) specific ally . Howeve r, L KAV a rgues that our c ase la

w g ener ally requires juveniles to be treated diffe rently

from adults. Our ca s es m ake c lear that the FJDA’s purpose is to provide specia l pr otections for juv e nil e s, ov e r a

nd a bo ve tho se ava ila

ble to a du lts . “ F ir st enac ted in 1938, the FJDA was intende d to p rovide for the
car e and tr eatment of juvenile delinquents in rec ognition of signif ic a nt d i f f e r e n c e s b e tw e e n juve nil e de lin qu e nts and a du lt offe nders.” J

uv e nile Ma le , 670 F.3d at 10 0 4 (i nterna l qu otatio n ma

rk s and c itatio n o mitte d) . In o the r w or ds :
Un de r t he [F JDA’ s] pr ov isi on s, a juv enil e is
acc orded pr efe rential and protec tive handling not available to adults acc used of c ommitt ing
c ri me s. Spe c ia l ob lig atio ns no t a pp lic a ble in adult criminal proceeding s are imposed upon the ar restingoffice r, § 5 033, the mag istrate,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 18

T he U ni t ed St at es arg ues t hat , even i f t he di s t r i ct co ur t err ed, t her e wa s 8
n o p reju d ic e b e c a u se e v a lua tio n a n d tre a tm e n t a t F M C -B u tne r w o u ld stil l be appr opr i at e. T h er e i s a u t h or i t y f or a h ar ml es s e r r or a n al y s i s f or v io la tio n s o f t h e F J D A

. See , e

. g. , Un ited S ta te s v . Ju v e n ile M a le , 3 3 6 F .3 d 1 1 0 7 , 1 1 1 1 (9 th C ir . 2 0 0 3 ), ove r r ul ed on ot her gr ounds by Uni t ed St at es v

. D oe , 366 F. 3d 106 9 (9t h Ci r
. 200 4). H o w ev er, we concl ude t hat LK A V ’ s o ng oi ng comm i t ment i n v i ol at i on of § 50 37 ( e) p reju d ic e s h im . L K A V ha s b e e n a t F M C -B u tne r fa r p a st the thirty d a ys no rma l l y p res cri b ed und er § 5 0 3 7 (e). C o m m i t m ent at FM C

- B ut ner might b e t he m o st ef

f ect i ve way t o s t ud y and t reat LK A V , even und er § 5 0 3 7 (e). B ut , procee di ng un der § 42 41 ( d) t oo k a way an y f l exi bi l i t y t hat t he di s t r i ct § 5034, the Attorney

Gene ral, §§ 5032, 5035, 5039, th e c o urt, § § 5 0 3 2 , 5 0 3 6 , 5 0 3 7 , 5 0 38, and the U.S. Parole Commi ssion, § 5041.
Un ite d S tates v . F ra sq uil lo- Zom os a , 6 26 F .2 d 9 9, 10 1 ( 9th Cir. 1980). In sum, “ t h e p u rpose of the FJDA is to enhance the juvenile sy stem by removingjuveniles from the or dinary criminal justice sy stem and by providinga sepa rate sy stem of tr e atm e n t f

o r th em.” J

uv e nile Ma le , 670 F.3d at 1004 (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Th e F JDA’ s p ur

po se sh e ds little light o n ho w w e sh ou ld
c on str ue “ a lle g e d juve nil e de lin qu e nt” and the oth e r s pe c if

ic terms of § 5037(e)

. Howeve r, the leg islative purpose ser ves the limited function of re butting the United States’ argument that ou r p la in m e anin gint e rp re tatio n is a bs ur d, becaus e it
re qu ir e s nume ro us a c c omm od atio ns fo r L KA V du e to h is juvenile status. The strong “purpose ” languag e in ou r cases makes c lear

that the FJ DA was meant to ac cord spe cial status to j uv e nil e s. Ac c or din g ly , w e re je c t th e Uni ted St ate s’
argume nt t

hat § 5 03 7( e ) c ann ot a

pp ly , b e c a

us e it p ote nti a lly require s differ ent (and perha ps more tax ing) proce dures than those set forth in § 4241(d)

. 8U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UVENI L E M A LE 19

cour t may ha ve had t o var y LK A V ’ s comm i t m en t t er m o r ot her
co m m i t m ent de t ai l s. T he d i st ri ct co urt ’ s d eci sio n a ls o t o o k away any b argai ni ng po wer t hat LK A V m i ght other wi se have bro ught to b ear on t he
c o n d iti o n s o f his c o m m itm e n t.

B ec au s e we revers e t h e di s t r i ct c ou r t on s t at u t or y i n t er pr et at i on 9 g r ou n ds , w e de c l i n e t o r e a c h L K AV’ s du e pr oc e s s c l a i m.

CO NC LU SION
The district cour

t erre d by applying § 4241(d) to L KAV’ s c omm itm e nt, rathe r tha

n § 50 37 (e ). Ac c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the district court, va cate the Orde r, and r emand f or fur t her pr oc e e din g s. 9
REVERSED an d REMANDED.