Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 1 of 15

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Gabriel A. Hawkins

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Stacy F. Thompson

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Frances L. Batchelder, Special 

Administrator of the Estate of 

John E. Batchelder, M.D., 

Deceased,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Indiana University Health Care 

Associates, INC, d/b/a IUHP,

Appellee-Defendant.

May 14, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CT-2569

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Timothy Oakes, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D02-1808-CT-31406

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Frances L. Batchelder, special administrator of the estate (“the Estate”) of John 

E. Batchelder, M.D. (the “Decedent”), appeals from the trial court’s entry of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 2 of 15

summary judgment in favor of Indiana University Health Care Associates, Inc. 

d/b/a IUHP (“IUHP”) regarding the Estate’s medical malpractice action. We 

reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting IUHP’s 

motion for summary judgment and finding that IUHP was entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.

Facts

[3] The Decedent, who was a practicing cardiologist, was also a paraplegic. On 

September 25, 2015, a vehicle driven by Emma Mourouzis collided with the 

Decedent’s vehicle on a Hamilton County roadway. The Decedent was 

transported to Indiana University Health North Hospital. An IUHP radiologist 

misread the Decedent’s x-rays, failed to diagnose the Decedent’s cervical spine 

fracture, and released the Decedent. On September 27, 2015, the Decedent

sought a second opinion from another medical provider, who diagnosed the

spine fracture and performed neurosurgery. 

[4] On April 19, 2016, the Decedent filed a complaint for damages against 

Mourouzis. The Decedent died on April 21, 2016. On June 17, 2016, the 

Estate filed an amended complaint for damages against Mourouzis. In the 

course of discovery, the Estate alleged total damages of “between six and ten 

million [dollars].” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. On March 13, 2017, Mourouzis settled all 

claims arising from the collision for $1.25 million. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 3 of 15

[5] On June 14, 2017, the Estate filed a proposed complaint for damages with the 

Indiana Department of Insurance. A medical review panel “found that the 

[IUHP] radiologist . . . violated the standard of care” when he misread the 

Decedent’s x-rays, regarded “an unstable cervical spinal fracture . . . . as a 

chronic injury that had been there for a long time[,]” and released the 

Decedent, when the Decedent’s injury warranted immediate surgery. Id. 

[6] On August 8, 2018, the Estate filed a wrongful death complaint against Indiana 

University Health, Inc., and IUHP, alleging that their provision of negligent 

medical care resulted in the Decedent’s death.1

 On June 13, 2019, IUHP 

moved for summary judgment and argued that the Estate was not entitled to 

additional damages because: (1) the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act

(“MMA”) “cap[s]” the Estate’s damages at $1.25 million; and (2) the Estate 

already obtained $1.25 million. IUHP’s Br. p. 6. 

[7] On July 9, 2019, the Estate filed a stipulation of dismissal as to Indiana 

University Health, Inc., which the trial court approved the same day. The trial 

court conducted a hearing on IUHP’s motion for summary judgment on 

September 4, 2019. The Estate argued that the setoff for the $1.25 million 

Mourouzis settlement should be deducted from the total damages or the value 

of the case; whereas, IUHP argued that the $1.25 million setoff should be 

applied to the $1.25 million statutory limit, which would render the Estate’s 

1 The jury trial was scheduled for April 2020. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 4 of 15

claim moot. On October 18, 2019, the trial court granted IUHP’s motion for 

summary judgment. The Estate now appeals.

Analysis

[8] The Estate argues that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in 

favor of IUHP. Specifically, the Estate argues that: (1) setoff should be applied 

to the verdict; and (2) the trial court’s decision to apply the Mourouzis 

settlement setoff to a possible judgment against IUHP “conflicts with 

controlling precedent as well as the policy considerations that gave rise to such 

precedent[.]” Estate’s Br. p. 7. IUHP counters that a jury verdict in excess of 

the $1.25 million statutory cap must be reduced to the statutory cap prior to 

becoming a judgment; and “[o]nce reduced, the judgment should then be 

reduced by the amount of any payments received in settlement from another 

joint tortfeasor.” Estate’s App. Vol. II p. 26. IUHP maintains that, doing so, 

renders the Estate’s claim against IUHP moot because the Estate has already 

recovered $1.25 million. 

[9] In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we “stand in 

the shoes of the trial court.” Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 

450, 452 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Company v. Johnson, 

109 N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018)). We consider “whether there is a genuine 

issue of material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 

(Ind. 2016) (citation omitted); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (Summary judgment is 

appropriate if the designated evidence “shows that there is no genuine issue as 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 5 of 15

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.”). 

[10] The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima 

facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386; Tr. 

R. 56(C). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence 

of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny 

doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the 

non-moving party.” Id. 

[11] This matter is a medical malpractice action for wrongful death and is subject to 

the MMA. 

The [MMA] allows a “patient or the representative of a patient” 

to bring a malpractice claim “for bodily injury or death.” Goleski 

v. Fritz, 768 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ind. 2002) (citing Ind. Code § 34-

18-8-1). The [MMA] was designed to curtail liability for medical 

malpractice. It does not create substantive rights or new causes 

of action and, instead, “merely requires that claims for medical 

malpractice that are otherwise recognized under tort law and 

applicable statutes be pursued through the procedures of the 

[MMA].” The [MMA] provides that for an act of malpractice 

occurring after June 30, 1999[, and before July 1, 2017,] the total 

amount recoverable for an injury or death of a patient may not 

exceed $1,250,000. I.C. § 34-18-14-3. A qualified healthcare 

provider[ ] is liable for the initial $250,000 of damages, and the 

remainder of the judgment or settlement amount shall be paid 

from the [Patient Compensation] Fund. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 6 of 15

Wallen v. Hossler, 130 N.E.3d 138, 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, 

(quoting Atterholt v. Robinson, 872 N.E.2d 633, 639-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)) 

(footnote omitted).

[12] The Estate alleges that Mourouzis and IUHP are joint tortfeasors whose acts or 

omissions caused the Estate to suffer injury—namely, the Decedent’s death. 

The Indiana Comparative Fault Act, which replaced the common law defense 

of contributory negligence with a system for providing for the reduction of a 

plaintiff’s recovery in proportion to the plaintiff’s fault, “expressly exempted 

medical malpractice claims from its ambit[.]” Indiana Dept. of Ins. v. Everhart, 

960 N.E.2d 129, 138 (Ind. 2012); see Palmer v. Comprehensive Neurologic Services,

P.C., 864 N.E.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Thus, the 

historic common law rule of joint and several liability2 “remains available to 

defendants in cases alleging medical malpractice.” Palmer, 864 N.E.2d at 1099. 

[13] When the actions of multiple defendants cause a single injury to 

a plaintiff, a defendant against whom judgment is rendered at 

trial is entitled to a setoff against the assessed damages in the 

amount of any funds the plaintiff received from any settling joint 

tortfeasor. [ ] This credit is allowed in order to prevent a plaintiff 

from recovering twice for the same injury. As our Supreme 

Court outlined in [Mendenhall v. Skinner & Broadbent Co., 728 

N.E.2d 140, 141 (Ind. 2000)], Indiana courts have traditionally 

followed the “one satisfaction” principle, meaning that courts 

should take account of settlement agreements and credit the 

2 Under a theory of joint and several liability, “each defendant whose negligence contributed to the plaintiff’s 

loss was liable for the entire amount of damages.” Shelton v. Kroger Ltd. Partnership I, 58 N.E.2d 229, 233 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 7 of 15

funds received by the plaintiff through such agreements, pro 

tanto[3

], toward the judgment against the co-defendants.

Id. at 1100-01 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 

[14] Stated differently, “[u]nder the one satisfaction rule, where a plaintiff asserts 

that the wrongful acts of two or more joint tortfeasors caused a single injury, 

satisfaction of the loss by one tortfeasor releases all other joint tortfeasors.” 

Minix v. Canarecci, 956 N.E.2d 62, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Restatement 

(Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 25(a) (2000) summarizes the one 

satisfaction rule as follows:

When a judgment includes a determination of the entirety of 

recoverable damages suffered by the plaintiff for an indivisible 

injury and provides for their recovery by the plaintiff 

against one or more of the defendants, payment of the full 

amount of recoverable damages constitutes a satisfaction 

of the plaintiff’s rights against all tortfeasors legally 

responsible for the plaintiff’s indivisible injury.

(emphasis added). Comment c to that section further provides 

that “[w]hen a plaintiff obtains a judgment for all recoverable damages,

discharge of the judgment bars any further action against other 

potential tortfeasors. . . . By obtaining the full amount of recoverable 

damages, the plaintiff’s legal rights are satisfied, and the plaintiff 

may not pursue any others for further recovery.” (emphases 

added). See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50 cmt. d 

(1982) (“[W]hen a judgment is based on actual litigation of the measure 

3 “Pro tanto” means “[t]o that extent; for so much; as far as it goes[.]” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(11th ed. 2019). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 8 of 15

of a loss, and the judgment is thereafter paid in full, the injured 

party has no enforcible [sic] claim against any other obligor who 

is responsible for the same loss.” (emphasis added)).

Id. at 74 (emphasis in original).

[15] Palmer and Everhart are the seminal cases pertinent to our review of the Estate’s 

argument. In Palmer, medical providers—CNS and Dr. Muckway—diagnosed 

the decedent with multiple sclerosis, breached the standard of care regarding

treatment of the decedent’s seizures, and failed to diagnose the decedent’s viral 

encephalopathy. After the decedent died, his widow, Palmer, sued the medical 

providers, as well as certain non-health care providers, on a theory of joint and 

several liability for medical malpractice resulting in the decedent’s wrongful 

death. Palmer settled with the non-health care providers before the matter 

proceeded to trial against the two medical providers; the combined settlements 

from the non-health care providers exceeded $375,000.00.

4

 The jury awarded 

Palmer $375,000.00 in damages. The two medical providers subsequently 

sought setoffs in the amounts that Palmer received in settlement from the nonhealth care providers, which the trial court granted. The trial court stated: “The 

jury having found for [Palmer] and against the [medical providers] in the 

amount of $375,000 and the settlement contributions having exceed[ed] that amount, 

the Court must deny [Palmer]’s Motions and enter a judgment [for] Plaintiff 

4 “The appeal was filed under seal, so the settling parties and the terms of their settlements [were] omitted 

from [our] opinion.” Palmer, 864 N.E.2d at 1104 n.2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 9 of 15

and award damages of $0.” Palmer, 864 N.E.2d at 1101 (emphasis added). On 

appeal, this Court affirmed, reasoning:

. . . [T]he common law permitting setoffs remains, and the trial 

court [ ] in permitting setoff, determined that the settlement 

payments served as the same compensation of damages as the 

jury’s verdict. It is the trial court’s duty to reduce jury verdicts by 

amounts received in settlement to ensure that a plaintiff not receive more 

than a full recovery. As the record in this case supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that both the settlements and the verdict covered the injury of 

Mr. Palmer’s death, we cannot say that the trial court erred in 

determining that [the medical providers] met their burden . . . .

Id. at 1102 (emphasis added). The holding in Palmer, thus, reflected this Court’s

determination that Palmer received payment of the full amount of recoverable 

damages, which constituted satisfaction of Palmer’s legal rights against the 

various joint tortfeasors.

[16] In the same vein, in Everhart, the decedent was injured in a motor vehicle 

collision with a semi-truck owned by Standard Forwarding Company (“SFC”). 

A medical provider failed to administer a vital blood transfusion, and the 

decedent died. The decedent’s survivors, Robin and Troy Everhart, sued the 

truck driver, SFC, and the medical provider for the decedent’s wrongful death. 

The Everharts settled with SFC for $1.9 million and with the medical provider 

“for a lump-sum payment and future payment with a total present value of 

$187,001.” Everhart, 960 N.E.2d at 132. The Everharts then sought excess 

damages from the Patient Compensation Fund (“PCF”). As noted above, 

Indiana Code Section 34-18-14-3 provides that a qualified healthcare provider is 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 10 of 15

liable for the initial $250,000.00 of damages, with the remainder of the 

judgment or settlement amount to be paid from the PCF. After a bench trial, 

the trial court found that the Everharts suffered damages of at least $3.15

million and awarded the PCF statutory maximum of $1 million to the 

Everharts. The PCF filed a motion for setoff, arguing that the $1.9 million 

settlement from SFC satisfied the Everharts’ legal claims. The trial court denied 

the PCF’s request to reduce the award. 

[17] In affirming the trial court, our Supreme Court observed: “The [trial] court 

found that [the Everharts’] total injuries exceeded the sum of all distinct, legally 

allowable awards of damages. A double recovery would therefore have been 

impossible under a correct application of the setoff rules.” Everhart, 960 N.E.2d 

at 137. Further, our Supreme Court held:

. . . [A] trial court has the power and duty to reduce a jury verdict 

by an amount already received in an earlier settlement to ensure 

that a plaintiff does not receive more than one recovery. Indeed, 

we had already held that when a jury returned a verdict against a 

jointly and severally liable defendant after another jointly and 

severally liable defendant had already settled in exchange for a 

covenant not to sue, a court should adjust pro tanto the amount of 

any damages determined by the jury verdict by subtracting any 

consideration received from the amount of any damages 

determined by the jury verdict. 

* * * * *

Here, the PCF belatedly concedes that [the truck driver and 

medical provider] constitute joint tortfeasors. [The truck driver’s] 

negligent driving and [the medical provider]’s negligent medical 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 11 of 15

care both caused a single indivisible harm: Everhart’s death. 

Under the pure common law rule of joint and several liability, 

Robin could have sued either [the truck driver] or [the medical 

provider] and recovered from the defendant of her choice 

damages in the entire amount of the injuries she and Troy 

suffered. The second defendant, however, would have been 

entitled to a set-off from the total judgment against him in the 

amount of any settlement Robin reached with the first. Because 

the PCF assumes [the medical provider]’s liability over and 

above the statutory cap in the [MMA], the PCF is entitled to the 

same set-off and no more.

The trial court found that Robin and Troy suffered injuries of at 

least $3.15 million. . . . [T]he court should have reduced its 

finding on total injuries by $1.9 million on account of the 

settlement with [SFC]. The court should have further reduced 

that amount by another $250,000 on account of the settlement 

with [the medical provider]’s insurance company. The 

convenient result: $1 million in uncompensated damages, which 

is precisely equal to the statutory limit of the PCF’s liability for 

excess damages.

* * * * *

The PCF concedes that [the medical provider] caused eighty 

percent of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Because the only possible 

causes of Everhart’s death are two known joint tortfeasors, 

however, this concession is tantamount to conceding that [SFC]

caused the remaining twenty percent. Initially, the PCF would 

be responsible for $2,520,000 [or 80% of $3.15 million] in 

damages, whereas [SFC] would be responsible for $630,000 [or 

20% of $3.15 million]. At most, the PCF would therefore only be 

entitled to a set-off on account of the settlement with [SFC] to the 

extent that it exceeded [SFC]’s liability. Giving the PCF the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 12 of 15

benefit of this set-off in the amount of $1,270,000[5

] and a further 

$250,000 set-off on account of the settlement with [the medical 

provider]’s insurance company would still leave a remaining $1 

million [$2,520,000 - $1,270,000 - $250,000] in uncompensated 

damages for the PCF to cover in excess damages payable to 

Robin and Troy.

Reducing the finding on injuries by twenty percent and then

subtracting the full $1.9 million from the remainder, and then 

another $250,000, as the PCF asks, effectively ignores that [SFC], 

not Robin and Troy, should bear the remaining loss. Indeed, 

doing so would magically wipe out $630,000 of Robin and Troy’s 

total recovery and leave the PCF with a windfall in the same 

amount. In essence, the PCF would succeed in turning the onesatisfaction doctrine from a shield into a sword. The purpose of 

the one-satisfaction doctrine is to prevent a plaintiff from 

realizing more than one recovery. It is plainly not to reduce a 

plaintiff to realizing less than one full recovery.

Id. at 138, 139-40 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). The 

Everhart Court, thus, upheld the Everharts’ $1 million excess damages award 

because the Everharts did not receive the full amount of recoverable damages

from SFC and, therefore, were entitled to seek excess damages from the PCF in 

pursuit of the “one satisfaction” to which they were entitled.

[18] Here, in its order granting summary judgment for IUHP, the trial court found: 

“[T]here are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and [IUHP] is entitled to 

5 SFC caused twenty percent of the Everharts’ damages or $630,000.00; however, SFC settled with the 

Everharts for $1,900,000. Thus, the Everhart court applied a setoff of $1,270,000.00, or the difference 

between the amount of SFC’s settlement and SFC’s liability.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 13 of 15

judgment as a matter of law[.]” Estate’s App. Vol. II p. 11. The record reveals 

that, at the hearing on IUHP’s motion for summary judgment, the Estate 

asserted that “the value of this case is between six and ten million [dollars].” 

Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Counsel for the Estate further argued:

[M]y first argument, Your Honor, is that the overall value of this 

case needs to be established first, that the issue is not ripe for 

decision-making because we don’t know what the value is. We 

know what the facts are and the allegations are. [Mourouzis]

and [IUHP] are joint tortfeasors in this case. And the court in 

Everhart [ ] talks about the one satisfaction rule, and that is you 

can have joint tortfeasors but you can’t collect more than the case 

is worth. That’s the issue and that has been the law in Indiana 

forever, that you can’t collect more than the value of the case. 

My point is we don’t know the value of this case till we try it. 

This is way premature to try to establish the value of the case 

now before it’s even been tried.

Id. at 12-13. 

[19] The Palmer and Everhart decisions highlight a crucial omission in the instant 

case. In those cases, the jury or trial court determined the value of the case or 

the entirety of the recoverable damages incurred by the plaintiffs before the trial 

court applied any setoffs. See Palmer, 864 N.E.2d at 1101 (“The jury having 

found for [Palmer] and against the [medical providers] in the amount of 

$375,000 . . . .”); see Everhart, 960 N.E.2d at 139 (“The trial court found that 

Robin and Troy suffered injuries of at least $3.15 million.”). 

[20] In the instant case, however, the trial court applied the setoff without first 

determining: (1) the value of the case or the extent of the Estate’s injury; and (2) 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 14 of 15

whether the Mourouzis settlement satisfied the Estate’s injury and made the 

Estate whole. Forgoing this threshold determination, the trial court found that 

the Mourouzis settlement satisfied the Estate’s losses such that the Estate was 

not entitled to pursue additional damages from IUHP. We have found no 

support for this conclusion.

[21] Assuming arguendo that the Estate correctly valued its injury at between six 

and ten million dollars: (1) the $1.25 million Mourouzis settlement left 

remaining several million dollars in uncompensated damages and did not make 

the Estate whole; (2) the Estate would be entitled to seek the remaining balance 

of the uncompensated damages, up to an additional $1.25 million, from IUHP

and the PCF; and (3) there would be no danger of the Estate receiving a double 

recovery because, as the Everhart Court found, even if the Estate received an 

additional $1.25 million from IUHP, the combined Mourouzis and IUHP 

settlements would still fall short of the Estate’s “one satisfaction.” 

[22] By prematurely applying the Mourouzis setoff to the statutory limit and

offsetting the IUHP judgment to zero, without first determining the value of 

Estate’s case, the trial court denied the Estate the potential full recovery to 

which it is legally entitled. See Everhart, 960 N.E.2d at 140 (“The purpose of the 

one-satisfaction doctrine is to prevent a plaintiff from realizing more than one 

recovery. It is [ ] not to reduce a plaintiff to realizing less than one full 

recovery.”). Accordingly, we find that genuine issues of material fact exist; 

and, thus, as to the amount of damages, IUHP was not entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 15 of 15

[23] For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting IUHP’s motion for summary 

judgment and finding that IUHP was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; 

we must, therefore, reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of IUHP 

and remand for further proceedings.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court erred in granting IUHP’s motion for summary judgment. We 

reverse and remand.

[25] Reversed and remanded.

Najam, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.