IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0416

Filed February 7, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CASSI MAE BIRD,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert 

(guilty plea) and Lawrence P. McLellan (sentencing), Judges.

Cassi Bird appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following her 

guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and drug tax 

stamp violation. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.

Cassi Bird and the State entered into a plea agreement where Bird would 

plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver as a lesser 

class “C” felony count, one drug tax stamp violation, each with the habitual offender 

enhancement. In exchange, the State would dismiss the Iowa Code section 

124.411(2022) second- and-subsequent-offender enhancement provision and all 

remaining counts of the trial information. The parties agreed they would jointly 

recommend sentences on the two counts run consecutively to one another for a 

term not to exceed thirty years with a mandatory minimum of six years. 

Additionally, the parties would be free to argue for any legal disposition of the thirtyyear term, specifically whether the thirty-year term should run consecutive or 

concurrent to Bird’s separately pending parole matter.

The district court sentenced Bird to an indeterminate fifteen-year prison 

term, with a mandatory minimum of at least three years, on each count. The court

ordered the terms to be served consecutively for a total indeterminate term not to 

exceed thirty years with a mandatory minimum of six years and consecutive to 

Bird’s pending parole matter.

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In its statement of reasons for the sentence, the court stated:

Court knows of no legal reason why sentence and judgment 

should not be pronounced. And the Court in pronouncing sentence 

and judgment has considered Ms. Bird’s age, her prior record of 

convictions, her employment and family circumstances.

1 The court further ordered submission of a DNA sample, imposed a firearm 

prohibition, imposed but suspended a $1000 fine and 15% surcharge on Count I, 

and ordered payment of category B restitution. It then dismissed the second-or 

subsequent-offender enhancement, as well as the remaining counts of the trial 

information at Bird’s cost. 
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Court has also considered her history of substance abuse and 

the various treatment options that she’s had. Court also considers 

the nature of the offenses committed here[;] the plea agreement that 

the parties have outlined for the court; and the Court has also 

reviewed and considered the comments in the presentence 

investigation report.

Court has also considered all the sentencing options that are 

available under the statute. And the Court concludes that the 

following judgment and sentence provides the maximum opportunity 

for rehabilitation of Ms. Bird and the protection of the community from 

further offenses by her. 

The court went on to further elaborate:

With regard to the request for essentially probation and 

sending you to Bridges, the Court is going to deny that request. The 

Court is going to remand you to the Department of Corrections.

That’s primarily based upon your record and the fact—

particularly in light of the fact that you were on parole for essentially 

the same charges that we’re looking at here, so the Court believes 

that a term of incarceration is the better sentence here than 

probation.

Court is going to run the sentence here consecutive to each 

other for a total period not to exceed thirty years, and then this thirtyyear term will run consecutive to your parole.

Court is running these sentences consecutive to each other 

and to your parole based upon the separate and serious nature of 

each of the charges, to carry out the plea agreement as to Counts I 

and II and the fact that the present crimes were committed while you 

were on parole and the fact that the crimes for which you were on 

parole are essentially the same as what you have now been charged 

with.

Bird argues the court improperly incorporated the plea agreement into its 

sentencing consideration when it elected to impose its sentence and states, 

“resentencing is required based on the utilization of an improper sentencing 

consideration.” Bird also points to the court’s written statement of reasons in which 

the court cites the plea agreement among its reasons for the sentences imposed.

The State asserts the court’s sentencing decision was based on Bird’s 

criminal acts, criminal history, and past failures on parole. The State further argues 
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the court had to have knowledge of the plea agreement, as required by Iowa Rules 

of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b)(8), .8(2)(b)(9), .8(4)(b), and .10(2), but never 

stated it relied on the dismissed counts or the concessions on the counts Bird 

pleaded guilty to when imposing sentencing.

We review sentencing rulings for correction of errors at law. State v.

Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). “[T]he decision of the district court to 

impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong 

presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or 

the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 

724 (Iowa 2022). “[W]e review a sentence for an abuse of discretion based on the 

entire record, and look to see if the reasons articulated by the trial court are 

sufficient to enable us to determine if an abuse of discretion occurred.” State v. 

Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Here, the court noted it considered 

Bird’s history of substance abuse and various treatment options previously 

provided. The court further noted the nature of the offenses committed and the 

comments in the presentence investigation report. Indeed, it did make note of the 

plea agreement outlined by the parties. However, the court merely made a general 

reference to the parties’ plea agreement, not indicating it gave it further

consideration. Upon our review, we find the district court did not base its

sentencing decision “on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or 

unreasonable,” so it did not abuse its discretion. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. We 

therefore affirm. 

AFFIRMED.