J-S09005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KOLBRIN HOLYFIELD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 320 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 26, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0007654-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: JULY 17, 2023

Appellant, Kolbrin Holyfield, appeals from his judgment of sentence of 

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, imposed following his nonjury trial conviction for homicide in the first degree. Appellant submits that 

the Commonwealth failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted 

in self-defense. We affirm.

Shortly after midnight on May 21, 2017, Appellant saw the victim, 

Dahrique Smith, inside the Rowdy Buck bar in the South Side area of 

Pittsburgh. Appellant testified that he believed Smith had killed Appellant’s 

brother and that Smith planned to kill Appellant, too. Appellant left the bar

but reentered one minute and thirty seconds later, claiming that he was 

looking to get a ride from his companions. One minute and six seconds after

that, Appellant shot and killed Smith. Appellant claimed at trial, and reiterates 

on appeal, that he fired only after Smith made remarks indicating that he
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would kill Appellant, followed by Smith’s approaching Appellant in an 

aggressive manner. The Commonwealth, in contrast, submits that the trial 

court correctly determined that Appellant harbored the specific intent to kill 

Smith when he reentered the bar and, therefore, the Commonwealth 

successfully disproved beyond a reasonable doubt his self-defense claim. 

The trial court prepared a thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion 

addressing Appellant’s concise statement of matters complained of on appeal,

which cogently sets forth the essential facts:

On May 21, 2017, at approximately 12:40 a.m., [Appellant] shot 

and killed Dahrique Smith at the Rowdy Buck bar located on the 

South Side of Pittsburgh before immediately fleeing the scene. 

Mr. Smith received first aid treatment from a responding officer 

within less than a minute of being shot, and, although medics 

arrived approximately three (3) to five (5) minutes later to

transport him to Mercy Hospital, Mr. Smith ultimately succumbed 

to the two (2) gunshot wounds that he sustained to his chest, 

which had lacerated his lungs and aorta. 

The evidence presented at trial established that [Appellant] shot 

Mr. Smith while they were inside ... the Rowdy Buck, and that Mr. 

Smith stumbled outside and collapsed on the corner of East 

Carson and South 14th Street. No weapons were found on Mr. 

Smith’s person or within his vicinity, and the officers on scene did 

not observe anyone removing anything from Mr. Smith while he 

was lying in a pool of his own blood on the sidewalk. The crime 

scene investigation led to the discovery of two (2) spent shell

casings “immediately inside of the threshold of the [bar] door" 

next to a beer cooler. Subsequent analysis of the casings revealed 

that they were discharged from a Glock 17 firearm with a laser 

grip, bearing Serial Number YCL923. The Glock 17 was registered 

to [Appellant] and in his possession as of August 15, 2016.

On June 20, 2017, a month after the shooting, [Appellant] was

arrested at his residence by the United States Marshals Fugitive 

Taskforce. [Appellant] had been apprehended after officers 

pieced together his identity through witness interviews and video
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surveillance from the Rowdy Buck and surrounding 

establishments. 

The surveillance footage from the Rowdy Buck shows that 

[Appellant] initially entered the bar with three (3) individuals and 

remained there for approximately 26 minutes. The video then 

depicts [Appellant] leaving the bar for approximately one minute 

and 30 seconds and then reentering, but this time with the bulge 

of a firearm visible in his front waistband. Approximately one 

minute and six (6) seconds later, [Appellant] is seen firing his 

laser-grip Glock 17 at Mr. Smith, and Mr. Smith is shown “being 

shot and running out of the bar.” Immediately prior to the 

shooting, the video shows Mr. Smith “walking over to the direction 

where the shooting [wa]s about to occur....” From what can be 

seen on the video, Mr. Smith was not carrying a gun in his hands, 

only a cell phone in his left hand and a drink in his other hand. 

The video shows Mr. Smith being shot, and it then captured 

[Appellant] running out of the bar, chasing after Mr. Smith, with 

his Glock 17 still in his left hand. 

A search of [Appellant]’s residence, which was conducted on the

same day as his arrest, led to the recovery of the maroon T-Shirt, 

Nike Shoes, and tan cargo shorts that the surveillance footage 

shows [Appellant] wearing on the night of the shooting. Although 

officers recovered a Glock 23 firearm and ammunition in the 

residence, the weapon that [Appellant] used to kill Mr. Smith - -

a Glock 17 bearing Serial Number YCL923 - - was never found. 

The search of [Appellant]’s home revealed that [Appellant] had 

purchased the Glock 23 firearm on June 3, 2017, just two (2) 

weeks after the shooting, at a pawnshop in North Versailles.

[Appellant] ultimately did not dispute his identity as the shooter 

at trial. Rather, [Appellant] took the stand and testified that he 

killed Mr. Smith in self-defense. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 7/20/22, at 5-7 (citations and footnote deleted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the court’s 

order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Appellant raises one issue on 

appeal: “Is the evidence of record insufficient as a matter of law to support 

[Appellant]’s conviction for first-degree murder where the Commonwealth 
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failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]’s use of deadly 

force was undertaken in either ‘perfect’ or ‘imperfect’ self-defense, negating

the essential element of malice?” Appellant’s Brief at 3.

“If a defendant introduces evidence of self-defense, the Commonwealth 

bears the burden of disproving the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. 2011). This 

calls for a review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the contrary 

verdict, i.e., the trial court’s determination that Appellant specifically intended 

to kill Smith and that the Commonwealth concomitantly disproved the selfdefense claim. See id. We apply the following principles of review:

In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support 

a jury’s finding, we are “obliged to determine whether the 

evidence presented at trial and all reasonable inferences derived 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to satisfy all 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, ... 987 A.2d 699, 705 ([Pa.] 2009) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, ... 960 A.2d 59, 68 

([Pa.] 2008)). To convict a defendant of first[-]degree murder, 

the Commonwealth must prove: a human being was unlawfully 

killed; the defendant was responsible for the killing; and the 

defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. See 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2502(a); Brown, [987 A.2d] at 705; Commonwealth

v. Sherwood, ... 982 A.2d 483, 491–92 ([Pa.] 2009) (citations 

omitted). The Commonwealth may use solely circumstantial 

evidence to prove a killing was intentional, and the fact-finder 

“may infer that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the 

victim based on the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon upon a 

vital part of the victim's body.” Brown, [987 A.2d] at 705 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Blakeney, ... 946 A.2d 645, 651 

([Pa.] 2008)). Malice, as well, may be inferred from the use of a 

deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body. 

Commonwealth v. Gardner, ... 416 A.2d 1007, 1008 ([Pa.] 

1980) (citations omitted).
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Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133–34 (Pa. 2011).

The right to use deadly force in defense of self is established by statute: 

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--

The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when 

the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the 

purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by 

such other person on the present occasion.

(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.--

. . . .

(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section 

unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect 

himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual 

intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:

(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious 

bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in 

the same encounter; or

(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using 

such force with complete safety by retreating, except the 

actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of 

work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his 

place of work by another person whose place of work the 

actor knows it to be.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505. A self-defense claim is comprised of three elements: 

(1) the defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent 

danger of death or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary 

to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such harm; (2) 

the defendant was free from fault in provoking the difficulty which 

culminated in his use of deadly force; and (3) the defendant did 

not violate any duty to retreat. 

Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840, 846 (Pa. Super. 2020). 

The first element “encompasses two aspects, one subjective and one 

objective.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (Pa. 2012). 
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Subjectively, Appellant “must have acted out of an honest, bona fide belief 

that he was in imminent danger, which involves consideration of the 

defendant’s subjective state of mind.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This 

belief, “if it existed, must be reasonable in light of the facts as they appeared 

to the defendant,” which involves an objective analysis. Id. If the belief is 

objectively reasonable, Appellant is entitled to acquittal, as the use of force 

was lawfully justified. If, however, Appellant’s subjective belief was 

objectively unreasonable, then he acted in “imperfect self-defense,” which 

“exists where the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed that deadly 

force was necessary.” Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (en banc) (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b)). “However, all other 

principles of self-defense must still be met in order to establish this defense.” 

Id. 

Because all three elements must be met to establish a statutory 

entitlement to self-defense, the Commonwealth prevails if it disproves beyond 

a reasonable doubt any of the three elements. Mouzon, 53 A.3d at 740. In 

disproving a self-defense claim, the Commonwealth cannot prevail merely by

convincing the fact-finder that the defendant’s testimony is not credible. 

Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001). By the same 

token, the fact-finder is not required to believe the defendant’s testimony; as 

always, it may accept, reject, or credit testimony as it sees fit. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1222 (Pa. 2009). 
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For ease of discussion, we first discuss Appellant’s view of the facts. We 

are mindful that, as an appellate court, we must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner. That said, 

Appellant’s legal arguments are largely driven by the version of events set 

forth in his testimony, which he claims the Commonwealth did not contest

and, therefore, did not disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus begin 

with that version of events.

Appellant worked as a studio engineer recording music. One of the 

artists he worked with was his half-brother, Reno Wallace (a/k/a “Trillzee”). 

In 2015, Trillzee recorded a track with lyrics disparaging Smith. According to 

Appellant, he objected to this content, but Wallace decided to release the track 

anyway. Appellant testified that Wallace called him a few weeks later, telling 

Appellant that Smith was angry about the song, that there was a hit out for 

them, and that Smith was violent and known to carry guns. As a result, 

Appellant “stopped going out, stopped performing in the city, and became 

very selective about the artists with whom he would record music.”

Appellant’s Brief at 8. Two months after this conversation, Wallace was shot 

and killed while at Wallace’s recording studio. Three other members of 

Wallace’s rap group were present but survived. According to Appellant, he 

“learned from one of the surviving victims that Smith was the shooter.” Id. 

Due to his belief that Smith killed his half-brother, Appellant feared that 

Smith would kill him and, thus, he “continued to stay to himself and stay 

home.” Id. at 9. The night of Smith’s murder was an exception to this general 
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practice, as Appellant decided to watch his friend, Joel Kellem, perform at a 

venue in Pittsburgh’s Mt. Oliver neighborhood. Id. His mother gave him a 

ride to the venue, and the plan was for Kellem to give Appellant a ride home. 

When that plan fell through, Appellant obtained a ride from Aneesa Fulton, a 

friend who was also present for Kellem’s show. Fulton and her friend, Jimikia 

Wiley, suggested going to the South Side neighborhood. Appellant reluctantly 

agreed, as he “didn’t want to be a ‘party pooper.’” Id. at 10 (quoting 

transcript). Appellant did not initially remain with the group, opting to try to 

get a tattoo that he had wanted. However, the tattoo’s design was saved to 

Appellant’s phone, which had died by this point in the evening. Appellant then 

found Fulton and Wiley waiting in line at the Rowdy Buck, where he made the 

fateful decision to join them.

Approximately twenty minutes after entering the Rowdy Buck, Appellant 

realized that Smith was there. Appellant’s “first reaction was to leave the 

bar,” and he did so. Id. at 12. Believing Fulton and Wiley to be outside 

smoking cigarettes, Appellant looked for them so he could get a ride home.

“He didn’t find them outside, and reentered the Rowdy Buck to ‘grab the girls 

and go home.’” Id. (quoting transcript). Appellant purposefully avoided 

Smith by walking towards the opposite side of the bar. But “it became clear 

that Smith spotted [Appellant].” Id. at 13-14. Smith acted aggressively, and 

Appellant testified “that he heard and watched as Smith said, ‘You’re next.’” 

Id. at 15 (quoting transcript). Appellant believed this meant that Smith would 
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kill him just like he had killed his half-brother. Appellant summarized what 

happened next:

Unable to see Smith as Smith ostensibly approached his location, 

[Appellant] testified that he could hear Smith screaming, “I’m 

sending you to Trillzee.” This alarmed [Appellant], as he believed 

that Smith, who was known to carry a gun, “was going to make

good on his threat.” Bolstering his belief that Smith was armed, 

[Appellant] knew that Smith would not have been patted down for 

weapons before entering the Rowdy Buck, just as [Appellant] 

himself had not been. 

A “full shot of adrenaline shot through” [Appellant]’s body as he 

heard Smith scream, “I’m sending you to Trillzee.” [Appellant]

tried to determine his means of escape. He could not proceed 

toward the back of the club because it was so congested with other 

people. He would be trapped. He raced toward the front of the 

club to try to exit onto Carson Street, ahead of Smith. As he 

moved toward the front of the club, [Appellant] drew his firearm 

in order to protect himself in the event that Smith beat him to the 

exit. [Appellant] watched as Smith suddenly appeared from 

behind a partition and came at him “sideways” with “his right hand 

out of sight.” 

[Appellant] believed Smith to be reaching for his gun. [Appellant] 

twice fired his lawfully carried firearm in quick succession in 

Smith’s direction “[t]o make him go away, get away from me. So 

I can go home.”

Appellant’s Brief at 15-16 (citations to transcript and footnote omitted). 

Appellant argues that when viewing the facts and reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom, the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to disprove selfdefense. We disagree, as we conclude that the Commonwealth successfully 

established that Appellant did not subjectively fear that Smith posed an 

imminent threat. 

On this crucial point, Appellant argues that “the events that unfolded on 

the night of the shooting simply cannot be divorced, in an intellectually honest 
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way, from the preceding[,] extremely violent events perpetrated by Smith.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 32.1 Appellant attaches far too much significance to the 

Commonwealth’s alleged failures to rebut Appellant’s mental state. See id.

(“Indeed, the violence perpetrated by Smith against [Appellant]’s family, 

which went unchallenged by the Commonwealth, unquestionably bore on 

[Appellant]’s state of mind on the night of the encounter.”); id. at 33

(“Critically, the Commonwealth did not in any way dispute, much less 

contradict, [Appellant]’s account of the history of violence and terror that 

Smith perpetrated.”); id. at 34 (“This unchallenged history undeniably 

supports that [Appellant] held an honest, bona fide fear of Smith—albeit a 

general fear—leading up to the night in question.”); id. at 36 (arguing that 

Appellant’s decision to reenter the Rowdy Buck “neither raises a reasonable 

inference of an intent to commit murder nor disproves his claim that he was 

generally terrified of Smith”); id. at 43 (asserting that, when Smith displayed 

aggression in the Rowdy Buck, “[Appellant]’s fear of Smith was transformed 

from an honest and bona fide, but generalized, fear of Smith to an honest, 

bona fide and acute belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect 

himself against imminent death or serious bodily injury”). 

We dispose of these points by reference to the familiar proposition in

conducting a sufficiency review that “[t]he Commonwealth need not preclude 

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1 As the trial court opinion notes, Reno Wallace’s murder remains unsolved. 

Thus, Appellant’s remarks are overstated, as the “extremely violent events 

perpetrated by Smith” are not objectively established facts but rather things

that Appellant professed to believe on the night of Smith’s death.
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every possibility of innocence or establish the defendant’s guilt to a 

mathematical certainty.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 871 A.2d 254, 259 

(Pa. Super. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Applied to the selfdefense scenario, the Commonwealth need not definitively disprove

Appellant’s own description of his mental state. Appellant offers no precedent 

for the proposition that the fact-finder must simply accept a defendant’s 

testimony in the absence of objective proof to the contrary. While the 

Commonwealth cannot simply rely on the fact-finder’s disbelieving the 

defendant’s version of events, the question for sufficiency review is whether 

any rational fact-finder could make the required inferences. The

Commonwealth’s “standard of review follows the United States Supreme 

Court’s approach as articulated by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979)[.]” Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 528 (Pa. 2022). 

“Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw 

from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors ‘draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. 

Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012).

To the extent Appellant asserts that the only justifiable, rational 

inferences to be drawn from Appellant’s behavior must proceed from the 

presumption that his state of mind was uncontradicted and therefore must be 

accepted as true, we disagree. Absent a statement by Appellant to another 

person, no direct proof of his mental state could ever be produced. It is 

axiomatic that, “[a]s intent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity 
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difficult of direct proof.” Commonwealth v. Matthews, 870 A.2d 924, 929 

(Pa. Super. 2005), aff'd, 909 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2006). Similarly, whether 

Appellant believed that Smith had killed his half-brother and intended to kill 

Appellant is something that can be known only to Appellant. It is well-settled 

that the Commonwealth “may sustain its burden of proving every element of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence,” Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 578 (Pa. Super. 

2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 

2014)), and it follows that the same is true with respect to disproving selfdefense. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. 2001) 

(“[The a]ppellant contends that ... the Commonwealth failed to disprove his 

claim of self-defense. In reviewing a claim based upon the sufficiency of the 

evidence, the appellate court must view all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner....”). Therefore, we may examine 

circumstantial evidence in assessing whether Appellant’s claim to be 

subjectively afraid was rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt.

Having rejected the argument that we must accept that Appellant 

subjectively believed Smith posed a threat, we are left to examine whether 

the rational inferences drawn from Appellant’s behavior preceding, during, and 

after the shooting, support the trial court’s verdict that Appellant specifically 

intended to kill Smith. Cases addressing self-defense claims readily support 

the notion that we may examine whether Appellant’s behavior is consistent 

with his alleged fear of Smith, including his flight and concealment of evidence. 
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Our precedents have dealt with this point in the analogous scenario of a deadly

encounter between the victim and defendant, with only the defendant 

surviving to tell his or her side of the story. In Commonwealth v. Carbone, 

574 A.2d 584 (Pa. 1990), Patricia Carbone was convicted of murder in the first 

degree, and our Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth sufficiently 

disproved her claim of self-defense. There, the victim went fishing on a 

Saturday and did not return home. Family members spent the next two days 

checking the victim’s usual fishing spots and, on Monday, found the victim’s

body in his car, which was parked on an isolated dirt lane approximately 150 

feet off a road. The victim had suffered four stab wounds, one of which pierced 

his heart. 

Police learned that Carbone had flagged down a vehicle on Saturday 

evening at about 9:30 p.m. “She was screaming and appeared to be 

frightened. [Carbone] had her purse in one hand and a knife in the other. 

She begged [the driver] to give her a ride, claiming that someone was going 

to kill her.” Id. at 586. The driver dropped her off at a house, which Carbone 

entered. The residents told police that Carbone “did not appear to be crying 

or otherwise frightened or out of breath, [and] stated that she had just 

punched her boyfriend in the nose.” Id. Carbone turned down offers to call 

the police. Shortly thereafter, she went on a scheduled date with her 

boyfriend. She told him that someone had tried to rape her. Carbone declined 

her boyfriend's suggestion to call the police and stated that she wanted to go 

home to be with her daughter. On Sunday morning, Carbone visited the baby-
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sitter and again relayed that she had been raped. The baby-sitter likewise 

suggested that Carbone call the police. 

An en banc panel of the Superior Court determined that the 

Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to justify a verdict of any 

degree of murder, and remanded for a new trial on whether Carbone was 

guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The Commonwealth appealed and the

Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of the verdict, explaining that the 

en banc panel had failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as the verdict winner:

It is clear that [the] Superior Court failed to review the evidence 

in the case in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. 

What the Superior Court has overlooked is that [the] appellee was 

armed with a deadly weapon and the victim was not so armed; 

that the victim’s wounds were such that he could not have gotten 

up after being stabbed, then walked 35 to 40 yards back to his 

vehicle, and then opened the door on the driver’s side and gotten 

into his vehicle; that there were no flattened weeds in the area of 

the victim’s vehicle to indicate that an attempted rape had taken 

place as claimed by [the] appellee; that [the] appellee lied to the 

Boyers about why she suddenly appeared at their home on a 

Saturday night with blood on her clothes; that [the] appellee’s 

neat appearance after the incident did not support her claim of 

attempted rape; that [the] appellee’s friends did not believe her 

story about an attempted rape; that [the] appellee never tried to 

contact the authorities, in spite of being advised to do so on 

numerous occasions; that [the] appellee and her boyfriend told 

remarkably consistent stories which were, in part, contradicted by 

other witnesses; and that numerous witnesses testified as to the 

peaceful and non-violent reputation of the victim. 

Id. at 589. Additionally, the Carbone Court observed that “[t]he fabrication 

of false and contradictory statements by an accused are evidence from which 

a jury may infer that they were made with an intent to mislead the police or 
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other authorities, or to establish an alibi or innocence, and hence are 

indicatory of guilt.’’ Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Carbone had 

offered contradictory stories (punching her boyfriend versus an alleged rape) 

and that was a factor supporting a finding of first-degree murder. 

Commonwealth v. Ward, 188 A.3d 1301 (Pa. Super. 2018), is another 

example of a case where the appellant, as in the case at bar, claimed that the 

Commonwealth failed to negate his own self-serving testimony about the 

circumstances requiring a use of force in self-defense. In that case, a citizen 

heard gunshots and looked outside her window. Seeing a vehicle that 

appeared to be stopped, she went outside to see if anyone was injured. She 

heard four more shots and saw sparks coming from the back of the car. The 

citizen called 911 and police found Jason Eubanks and Cherylann Sabatasso 

dead in the car. Tracks led to Ward’s home. 

Ward testified that he had called Eubanks to obtain cocaine. Eubanks 

then arrived at Ward’s house with Sabatasso, Ward’s girlfriend, driving. Ward 

testified that he got in the back. As they drove, Sabatasso argued with Ward 

about Ward’s informing Eubanks that Sabatasso had cheated. Ward claimed 

that Eubanks told everyone to calm down, with Ward’s questioning Eubanks’s 

manhood in response. Ward said that Eubanks then pulled a gun on Ward, 

and the two men struggled. According to Ward, Sabatasso was accidentally 

shot in the head when she abruptly stopped the car. Ward explained that he 

and Eubanks continued to struggle for control of the gun, with Ward prevailing. 

Ward shot Eubanks twice during this incident. Ward then “ran home, placed 
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the bullets from the gun into a sock, put his bloody clothing in a plastic bag, 

and hid the gun under a kitchen cabinet.” Id. at 1305. Ward argued on 

appeal that the jury's verdict rested on disbelieving his account. The Ward 

Court disagreed: 

In the instant case, [Ward] offered multiple versions of his actions 

on the day of the shootings. In his initial statement to the police, 

[Ward] indicated that Mr. Eubanks was supposed to come to 

[Ward’s] house on the day of the shooting, but that Mr. Eubanks 

never appeared. [Ward] also offered three different versions of 

how he got from his home on Rochelle Street to his mother’s 

house: that he had walked, that he drove ... there, and that he 

had driven a different, unidentified person’s car there. [Ward] 

first placed himself home alone at 302 Rochelle Street during the 

evening in question, including at the time Mr. Eubanks and Ms. 

Sabatasso were killed. Then he claimed that he called his friend 

to meet at a local bar to toast Mr. Eubanks. [Ward] indicated that 

he learned of Mr. Eubanks’s death because [Ward] was standing 

on the porch of 302 Rochelle Street when an unidentified person 

walked by and informed him that there were two people dead in 

a vehicle; [Ward] figured it was Mr. Eubanks and Ms. Sabatasso 

based upon the description of the car. [Ward] initially denied 

having gone to the crime scene, but later contradicted that 

statement and said that he went to the corner after hearing a 

gunshot, and called Mr. Eubanks’s phone upon seeing the Lexus 

in the middle of the intersection. 

Additionally, the Commonwealth offered evidence that a sock 

containing bullets and a plastic bag containing bloody clothing 

were recovered from a wooded area at the end of [Ward’s] street. 

A pistol and magazine were retrieved from under a cabinet in the 

kitchen at 302 Rochelle Street. The jury could conclude from 

[Ward’s] attempts to conceal or dispose of evidence of his 

involvement in the shootings constituted evidence of guilt [sic]. 

Id. at 1305–06 (citations omitted).

Cases of self-defense will necessarily be fact-specific, and the instant 

facts do not contain the same type of inconsistencies as in Carbone and 
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Ward. The video surveillance evidence in the case sub judice establishes 

several key facts: Appellant’s time of entry, how long he remained inside

before exiting, how long he was inside before the shooting, and portions of 

the encounter that led to Smith’s death. But unless we are required to accept 

Appellant’s description of his state of mind, a conclusion we have rejected, we 

agree with the trial court that several specific contradictions and 

inconsistencies are relevant to whether the Commonwealth disproved 

Appellant’s claim of self-defense. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the trial court’s factual findings justify its conclusion that Appellant specifically 

intended to kill Smith upon reentering the bar. And if the evidence sufficiently 

supports that Appellant specifically intended to kill Smith, that verdict is 

incompatible with self-defense, as “malice and self-defense are mutually 

exclusive concepts.” Commonwealth v. Hinchcliffe, 388 A.2d 1068, 1071 

(Pa. 1978).2 In other words, if Appellant reentered the Rowdy Buck with the 

specific intent to kill, then there could be no lawful use of deadly force in selfdefense. Even if Appellant were correct that Smith had planned to kill him at 

some point in the future, the use of force statute does not authorize 

vigilantism; Appellant could not have sought out Smith and assassinated him. 

____________________________________________

2 “Pennsylvania retains the common law definition of murder, which is a killing 

conducted ‘with malice aforethought.’” Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 

161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). “Third-degree murder is defined as 

‘all other kinds of murder,’ i.e., those committed with malice that are not 

intentional (first-degree)....” Id. (citation omitted). 
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Thus, the trial court’s verdict of first-degree homicide overlaps with its 

rejection of Appellant’s assertion of self-defense. We now address the specific 

findings and inferences that support the verdict.

Beginning with Appellant’s decision to proceed to the South Side after 

Kellem’s show, Appellant testified that he expected Fulton to immediately 

drive him home. The trial court credited Fulton’s testimony that she, 

Appellant, and Wiley jointly decided to go to the South Side prior to Appellant’s

getting in her car. TCO at 25 (“Fulton directly rebutted that claim....”). This 

factual finding severely undermines Appellant’s testimony that he was so 

afraid of Smith that he simply refrained from leaving his home for fear he 

would run into Smith. Relatedly, the trial court discredited Appellant’s 

testimony that he reentered the bar to find his friends for a ride home as 

inconsistent with his purported fear. “Ultimately, despite the great lengths to 

which [Appellant] went to describe the history between [Appellant] and Mr. 

Smith so that he could show ... he was in legitimate fear of him at the time of 

the shooting, his testimony cannot be reconciled with his actions on the night 

of the murder.” Id. at 21. As the trial court pointed out, Appellant agreed on 

cross-examination that he knew his friends wanted to barhop.

3

____________________________________________

3 Appellant states that the trial court takes an “extraordinarily dim view of 

human kindness” because “it simply defies common sense and notions of basic 

human decency that the girls would deny [Appellant] a ride home if he 

explained” the situation. Appellant’s Brief at 38 n.18. Of course, it also defies 

common sense and expectations of decency that Appellant’s friends would 

force him to go to the South Side in the first place if he had so objected. In 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s attempts to paint the verdict as 

resting solely on an assessment of why he reentered the Rowdy Buck, the trial 

court made additional findings concerning Appellant’s encounter with Smith

and why those facts established his specific intent to kill. For example, 

Appellant claims that his generalized fear transformed into a specific fear after 

Smith made aggressive overtures. The trial court appropriately reasoned that 

it would have to “first accept that Mr. Smith was able to recognize [Appellant] 

in a dark, loud, and crowded bar when the only evidence that Mr. Smith even 

knew what [Appellant] looked like was [Appellant]’s testimony that Mr. Smith 

was ‘probably going to recognize’ him” due to the fact Appellant and his 

murdered brother Reno were half-siblings and thus looked alike. Id. at 32. 

Similarly, Appellant believed that Smith “realized” who Appellant was, but the 

court found it extremely unlikely that Smith “would be able to almost instantly 

recognize [Appellant] upon seeing him for the first time in a dark room, on a 

dance floor that had over 50 people dancing, unless [Appellant] made sure to 

put himself in his clear view.” Id. In contrast, Appellant testified that he 

knew what Smith looked like, as Reno had shown Appellant social media 

____________________________________________

any event, the trial court did not appear to be making predictions of what 

Appellant’s friends would do if asked, but rather observing that Appellant’s 

explanations for why he chose to reenter the Rowdy Buck were not credible in 

the aggregate. See also TCO at 26 (noting that Appellant explained he did 

not want to call his mother for a ride because he would have “gotten an 

earbeating”; “This is just another instance where [Appellant]’s testimony was 

incredible and illogical, as the court is quite sure that his mother would have 

rather been woken from her sleep ... than risk losing another child....”)

(citations omitted). 
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pictures of Smith when warning Appellant. Id. at 32. The trial court could 

rationally conclude that the deadly encounter, which took place one minute 

and nine seconds after Appellant reentered the bar, was effectively initiated 

by Appellant. 

Setting aside the implausibility of Smith’s immediately recognizing 

Appellant, the trial court went on to conclude that Appellant’s testimony about

hearing Smith was not believable. Appellant claimed that he heard Smith 

make specific threatening comments. The trial court determined that he could 

not have done so, as there was ample testimony establishing that the bar was

crowded and playing loud music. In fact, Appellant is observed on the video 

surveillance speaking directly into a woman’s ear in order to be heard over 

the din. Id. at 33 (citing Commonwealth’s Exhibit 67). While the video does 

show Smith “mov[ing] his head sharply prior to walking” towards Appellant, 

Appellant is not visible on the video. Id. The trial court found that this

suggests that Appellant made his presence known to Smith first. Id. at 34. 

Additionally, police officers immediately converged on the Rowdy Buck, with 

the first reaching Smith’s body within one minute. No weapon was found on 

Smith. See Carbone, 574 A.2d at 589 (noting that the defendant “was armed 

with a deadly weapon and the victim was not so armed”). These findings, and 

the rational inferences to be drawn from them, are not based on a mere 

disbelief of Appellant’s testimony. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 

452 (Pa. Super. 2021) (concluding that Commonwealth disproved self-defense 

where the appellant shot victim after a bar fight; noting that no weapon was 
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found on the victim, none of the witnesses saw the victim with a weapon, and 

threats made by the victim did not involve use of a firearm or a weapon). 

Turning to events transpiring after the shooting, we agree that 

Appellant’s actions after the shooting dispel any lingering doubt regarding the 

strength of the foregoing circumstantial evidence. A rational fact-finder could 

conclude that if Appellant truly acted in self-defense he would have 

immediately told responding authorities what had happened. Instead, 

Appellant fled the scene. Even charitably accepting Appellant’s claim that he 

was uncertain if he had struck Smith and was therefore worried about

retaliation, he testified that he learned of Smith’s death the next day. He did 

not attempt to contact the authorities at any point over the next month and 

was ultimately arrested by a fugitive task force. Appellant also actively 

destroyed evidence. Whether he discarded the firearm while fleeing from the 

Rowdy Buck (as the trial court determined was likely the case) or gave it to 

his father (as Appellant claims), the fact remains that Appellant’s concealment 

and flight are valid considerations in assessing whether he truly acted in selfdefense, as they were in Carbone and Ward.

The trial court also found that Appellant’s testimony about how he 

managed to leave the South Side was not credible. According to Appellant, 

he obtained a ride from Fulton after the shooting when the entire crowd began 

to flee from the bar. But he did not tell Fulton what had happened. In fact, 

Appellant stated that he did not follow Fulton and Wiley to Fulton’s car because 

he went to look for another friend who had been present at the Rowdy Buck 
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that evening. This explanation was illogical since “the whole point of 

[Appellant]’s reentry into the bar was to find Ms. Fulton for a ride home[.]” 

TCO at 14. Appellant claimed that he instructed Fulton where to pick him up, 

but she denied this. Id. at 15. The trial court opined that Appellant’s 

separation from his only ride home was illogical, and concluded that Appellant

took this opportunity to discard the firearm. 

In sum, the trial court’s factual findings, as supported by the record, 

warrant the rational inference that Appellant did not subjectively fear Smith 

when he deliberately reentered the Rowdy Buck instead of choosing any 

number of viable alternatives that would have avoided close contact with the 

man he thought would kill him. Even accepting that this was simply

remarkably poor judgment, Appellant’s version of what happened between he 

and Smith once back inside the bar was not credible. Finally, his actions after 

the shooting are not the acts of a person who was pressed into self-defense. 

Taken together, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, and the rational inferences drawn from them 

sufficiently disproved Appellant’s claim that he had a subjective fear of Smith. 

These inferences also adequately support the trial court’s conclusion that 

Appellant formed the specific intent to kill when he reentered the bar. As selfdefense is incompatible with a specific intent to kill, the Commonwealth 

disproved a fully justified killing, as well as imperfect self-defense. We 

therefore affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.

Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023