### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 21, 200 9 S es sio n JOHNN Y H ATC HER , JR . v. CH AIR MA N, SHEL BY COU NTY ELEC TION COMMI SSI ON, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelb y County No. CH-07-160A -3/1604-3 Kenny Armst rong, Chancellor

No. W2008-01727-C OA-R3-C V - Filed May 29, 2009

Appellant, a c andidate f or t he Memphis City

Council, filed suit ag ainst his opponent and the
me mbe rs of

the She lby

County El e c tio n Co mmi ssi on , s e e kin g a de c laratory jud g me nt t

hat hi s opponent was not a qualified candidate and to e njoin the Commission from including his opponent’ s name on the e lection ballot

. Following the election, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s c omplaint
a s b e ingmoo t. We a ff

ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right.; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Af firme d

J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W .S, and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.

Dar rell J. O'Ne al, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Johnny Hatche r, Jr.

El be rt Je ff e rs on , J r. , J a c k L

. P ayn e, Jr ., Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e s, She lby Cou nty Election Commissi on
OP IN ION Appellant Johnny Hatche r, J r. was a candidate for the District 4 City Council position in the City of Me mph is El ect io n, wh ic h w a s h e ld o n O c tob e r 4 , 2 00 7. Wan da M. Ha lbe rt

wa s th e on ly other c andidate f

or that position. At the time of the elec tion, Ms. Ha lbert held the position of Boa rd Commi ssioner At-L arg e Position 1 wit h the Memphis City School Boa

rd. Ms

. Halber

t was issued a petition to run for the District 4 City Council position on April 20, 2007, and she f iled her pe tition to run for the District 4 seat on July 18, 2007.

At the Aug ust 2, 2007 special mee ting of the Shelby County Election Commissi on, which
was c alled to ce rtify

the Octobe r 4, 2007 City of Memphis Municipal Election ballot , Mr. Hatc her voiced h i s co mplaint that Ms. Halbert wa s not a qualified c andidate. O n Aug ust 14, 2007, Mr.The m em ber s of t he She l by Count y El ec t i on Com m i s s i on w er e s ued i n t hei r of f i ci al c apa ci t i es onl y. 1

-2- Hatche r filed a

Complaint for Dec laratory and I n j u n cti ve re lief ag ainst Ms. Halbert a nd the five
me mbe rs of

the She lby

County El e c tio n Co mmissi on , M y ra Style s, Ric ha

rd L . H old e n, O. C. Pleasant, Jr., Nancy

Hines, and Shep Wil burn (tog ether with Ms. Halber t, “Appellee s”). There in, 1 Mr . H a tc he r a sse rt s th a t Ms . H a lbert was in eli gible to r un or to b e e le c te d to the Me mph is C ity Council beca

use she he ld a s eat on the M emphis City School Boa rd at the t ime of t he fili ng of her pe tit ion to r un . M r. Hat cher fur th er a sse rt s th a t App e lle e s w e re in v iol a tio n o f t he Me mph is C ity Cha rt e r, sp e c if

ic a lly Se c tio n 1 7, Ar

tic le 5, wh ic h p ro vid e s, in pa rt that “

.. .n o pe rs on sh a ll b e e lig ibl e to a se a t in e ith e r B oa

rd of the L e g isl a tiv e Counc il.

.. wh o hold s any of fi c e or a g e nc y un de r t he City of Memphis, County

of Shelby , or State of Te nnessee ....” B ased upon the se asse rtions, Mr. Hatche r asked the court to enjoin the Commiss ion from including Ms. Halber t’s name on the O ctober

4, 2007 ba llo t. O n A ugus t 29 , 2 00 7, the me mbe rs of the She lby

County El e c tio n Co mmi ssi on

fi le d th e ir
answ e r

. M s

. H a lb e rt f

il e d an an s w e r o n O c to b e r 2 , 2 0 0 7

. O n Se p te mb e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 7 , Mr. Hatc her petitioned the cour

t for a temporar

y restra ining order and preliminary injunction seeking to stop the October 4, 2007 elec tion. After hear ing arguments, the trial cour t denied Mr. Hatcher ’s re quest for immediate re lief.

Whil e Mr. Ha

tcher ’s complaint was pending , the Memphis municipal elec tions were he ld on Oc tob e r 4 , 2 00 7. A t ota l of 17 ,9 42 vo te s w e re c a st f or the City Coun cil D ist

ri c t 4 p os iti on . M s. Halber t rec eived a

total of 14,314 (or 79.78% ) of the vote s cast. Mr. Hatcher rec eived a t otal of 3, 58 6 (o r 19 .9 9% ) of the vo te s. On Oc tob e r 1 5, 20 07 , th e Com mis sio n c e rt if ie d th e e le c tio n r e su lts

. On Dec ember

31, 2007, Ms. Halber

t resig ned fr om her position on the Memphis Cit y School Boa

rd, and, on January

1, 2008, Ms. Halber

t was inaugurate d in her position as City Councilwoman.

On J anuar

y 14, 2 0 0 8 , Ap p el lees filed a motion to di smiss Mr. Hatcher ’s complaint. As g rounds for the motion, Appellees asse rt that Mr. Hatcher fails to state a claim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d, and that his complaint is moot. The motion was hear d o n May 30, 2008. By

order of July 15 , 2 00 8, the tr ia l c ourt

dis mis se d M r. Hatc he r’ s c omp la int fo r moo tne ss. Mr . H a tc he r a pp e a ls and ra ises two issues for re view as state d in his brief:

1. Whether the trial c ourt er red w hen it dismiss ed the Appe llant’s complaint for de clar atory and injunctive r elief on a theory of
moo tne ss.
2

. Wh e th e r th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d w h e n it f

a il e d to d etermine the
e lig ibi lity of Wan da Ha lbe rt fo r the po sit ion of Memp hi s City Council District 4 pursuant to the Memphis City Charter

. A motion to dismiss pursuant to T enn. R. Civ. P. 12.02( 6) for failure to state a claim upon which re lief ca

n be g rante d is the equivalent of a demurre r under our for mer c ommon law proce dure
an d th u s i s a t es to f t h e s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e l ea d i n g p l ea d i n g. See Cornpr opst v . Sloan , 528 S.W .2d 188, 190 (Tenn.1975) . The moti o n admits the truth of all rele vant and mate rial ave rments in the-3-

complaint but asserts that the stat em en t s do not constitute a ca use of a ction. See id. a t1 9 0

. In consideringwhether

to dismi ss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court should c onstrue the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, taking a ll of the alleg ations of fa ct there in as true. See Huckeby v

. Spangl er , 521 S.W .2d 568, 571 (Tenn.1975)

. A complaint should not be dismis sed upon such a moti on “unless it appea rs beyond doubt that the plaintiff ca n prove no se t of fac ts in support of his c laim that would entitle him to relief.” Fue rst v . Met hod ist Hos pit al S out h , 566 S.W .2d 847, 848 (Tenn.1978)

. The Te nnessee Dec laratory J udg ments Act, Tenn. Code An n

. § § 29-14-101- 113 (2008), makes the e quitable re medy of decla ratory judgme nt a

vailable to cour

ts; however, in or der f

or such
re me dy to l ie , th e re mus t be a sh ow ing of a “ ‘s ub sta nti a l con tr ov e rs y , be tw e e n part ie s hav inga dv e rs e leg al intere sts, of sufficient immediac y and r ea l i t y t o war

rant a decla ratory judgme nt.’” Evers v. Dwyer , 3 5 8 U. S

. 2 0 2 , 2 0 4 , 7 9 S

. C t

. 1 7 8 , 1 7 9 , 3 L

. E d

. 2 d 2 2 2 (1 9 5 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Ma ry lan d Ca sua lty Co. v. Pac i

fi c C o a l & Oil Co. , 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.C t. 510, 512, 85 L .Ed. 826 (1941)) . I f, beca use of the pa ssag e of time, a case has lost i t s char acte r as a prese nt, live controver sy , or the qu e sti on s in vo lve d h a ve be e n d e pr ive d o f t he ir pr a c tic a l si gnif

ic anc e , th e c ourt s h a ve re fu se d to decide them beca

use they are then “moot” or “ac ademic.” See Perry v . Banks , 521 S.W .2d 549, 550 (Tenn.1975)

. As set out in his Com plaint, Mr. Hatche r seeks the foll owing relief : (1) a judg ment decla

ring Ms. Halber

t to b e an “invalid ca

ndidate,” a

nd (2) a n injunction keeping the Commiss ion from placingMs. Halber

t’s name on the ba llot. S ince Mr. H atche r filed h is complaint on Aug ust 14, 20 07 , th e re ha s be e n an e le c tio n, the vo te rs have e le c te d Ms. Ha lbe rt by a lmo st 80 % o f t he vo te , M s. Halber t has resig ned her

position wit h the Memphi s C i t y S chool Board, Ms. Ha lbert has be en ina ugur a te d in to h e r p os iti on a s Ci ty Counc ilw oma

n, and Ms. Ha lbe rt

ha s pe rf or me d he r du tie s in that office since the ina

ug uration. The tr ial court re ache d the conc lusio n t h at t h es e events had
c ha ng e d th e po sture of

Mr . H a tc he r’ s c a se so a s to re nd e r i t mo ot.

I n a similar ca se, Perry v

. Banks , 521 S.W .2d 549 (Tenn. 1975) , suit was filed to obtain a decla ratory judgme nt as to the elig ibilit y of t wo ca ndidates to hold the offic e of c ounty judge . The Chance ry Court he ld that the office was to be filled by a person “lea rned in the l aw ” a n d , t h o u gh permi t t i n g i n d i v iduals to remain on the ba llot, enjoined issuance of a ce rtificate of ele ction in the
e ve nt t hat e ith e r n on -l awy e r c and idate sh ou ld w in. On e of the c and idate s and

me mbe rs of

the c ounty elec tion commissi on appea led. Upon re view, our Supre me Court held that the is sue of whether the court wa s corr ect in r

uling that candidates for office of county judge wer e re quired to be la wy ers wa s rende red moot by the fact that the ca ndidates had, in fa ct, bee n defe ated in their attempt to obtain the of fi c e in the g e ne ra l e le c tio n. L ike wi se , in the c a se a t ba r, the Me mph is mun ic ipa l e le c tio n w a s h e ld
on Oc tob e r 4 , 2 00 7, and

Mr . H a tc he r w a s d e fe a te d in his bid fo r C ity Counc il.

I n La Rouc he v . Cr owe ll , 709 S.W .2d 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) , a ca ndidate petitioned the court for : (1) a te mporary restra ining or der pr ohibiting printing of the bal l o t s ; (2 ) an injunction
o r d e r in g th e Se c r e ta

r y o f St a te to p la c e L a Ro u c h e o nth e b a ll o t; an d ( 3 ) a ju d g me n t d e c laring L aRouche “to be a

proper candidate to appea

r on the Te nnessee P re s i dential Primary Election-4-

ballot.” Afte r the e lection occ urre d, the t rial court dismiss ed Mr. L aRouche ’s action as m oot. On
a pp e a l, thi s C o u rta f

f i r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u rt , f

i n d i n g t h a tt h e i s s u e o f

w h e t h e r t h e S e c r e t ar

y o f S t a te should have plac ed a c andida t e’ s n am e o n the ballot beca me moot after

the primary

elec tion had
occur red. Id. We conclude that both the Pe rry case and the La

Rouc he case are on point with the ins tant a pp e a l. B e c a

us e the mun ic ipa l e le c tio n h a s o c c ur re d, un le ss M r. Hatc he r’ s c a se fa lls wi thi n one of the two exceptions to the mootness bar, we must ag ree with the trial court’ s conclusion.

The fir st ex ception to the mootness bar occur s in a ca s e wh i ch involves a matter of “g reat public interest.” W

a l k e r v . Dun n , 4 9 8 S .W.2d 102 (Tenn.1972). In New Riviera Arts Theatre v. Sta te , 4 12 S.W. 2d

89 0 ( Te nn . 1 96 7) , th e ru le is d e fi ne d a s f oll ow s:
Whi l e t h e r

u l e t h a t t h i s C o u rt w i l l n o t d e c i d e a m o o t que sti on is applicable when the q

u e stion for deter

mination affe cts only

rig hts and claims persona l to the parties, an ex ception is well re cog nized when interest of a

public char acte r and of

importance in the administration of j ustice gene rally

are involved. Mc Canl

ess v . Kl e in , 182 Tenn. 631, 188 S. W.2 d 7 45 (1 94 5) . B e c a us e the qu e sti on

inv olv e s a deter mination of public rig hts or interests under

the conditions which may b e re p eated in the future, w e will consider the question. Id. at 893.

Th e se c on d e xce pti on

to t he moo tne ss do c tr ine oc c ur s w he n a n o the rw ise moo t c a se is capa ble of re petition y et will evade revie w if not addre ssed by the cour ts. Se e Sta te

e x r e l. A ngl

in
v . M itc he ll , 5 96 S.W. 2d

77 9, 78 2 ( Te nn .1 98 0) ; Perry v . Banks , 521 S.W .2d 549 (Tenn.1975)

. On appe al, M r. Hatcher a sserts that this case is not moot beca use it falls within the “g reat public interest” e x ception to the mootness doctrine . We disag ree . As in the La Rouc he case , Mr. Hatche r’s c ase is one pr imarily involving per sonal rig hts rather than rights of gre at public conc ern. I n his c omp la int , M r. Hatc he r a lle g e s th a t he ha s b e e n in jur e d b y the e le c tio n o f M s. Ha lbe rt . T his may be true ; however , he has f ailed to alleg e fa cts sufficie n t to show that the voting public w as inj ur e d. I n f

a c t, f ro m th e re c or d, it a

pp e ars that th e vo te rs ma de the ir pr e fe rence kn ow n in

the ir
ov e rw he lmi nge le c tio n o f M s. Ha lbe rt

. Mr. Hatc her’ s second issue involves the que stion of whether the trial court e rre d in failing to issue a decla

ratory judgme nt a s to w hether Ms. H alber t w as a proper candidate for the office she soug ht; and specific ally

whether the fac t that she held a position on the school boar d at the time she p e t i t i o n e d

t o r u nf o r C i t y C o u n c i l m a d e h e r

i n e l i g i b l e f

o r t h a to f f i c e u n d e r t h e C i t y C h art e r

. In addre ssing this issue, it is im portant to note that Mr. Hat cher did not file his case a s an ele ction contest pursua

nt to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-17-101 and 2-17- 105. Under these statutes, a

n “ele ction
c on te st” sh a ll b e fi le d w ith in 1 0 d ay s after the e le c tio n. He re , M r. Hatc he r’ s c a se wa s f ile d s ome tw o mont hs be fo re the e le c tio n oc c ur re d. F ro m our re a din g of his c omp la int , M r. Hatc he r s e e ks a de c laratio n th a t Ms . H a lbe rt is n ot a pr op e r c and idate , a

nd an in jun c tio n ( ba se d u

po n th is deter mination) removing her na me from the ba llot. As discussed above, onc e the e lection had-5-

oc c ur re d, the tr ia l c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t th e pr ay e r f or injunc tiv e re lie f w a s mo ot, and that a decla ratory judgme nt conce rning t h e p ropriety of Ms. Halbe rt’s ca

ndidacy would amount to an advisory opinion given the posture of the case

. At the hea ring on the motion to dis miss, the court made the f

ollowing, r eleva

nt comments conce rning the ca se: What y ou’re asking me to do is give some sort of advisory opinion and that’s e x actly

what the Courts ca

n’t do. We can’ t give advisory
o p i n i o n s

. . . . H e r e , w e d o n ’ t h a v e [ a ] c o n t i n u i n g c a s e i nc o n t r o v e r s y. I ’m g oing to dismiss based on the f act that the c ase i s now moot. I find that it meets no exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
We ag ree . Howeve r, eve n if we a llow, arguendo (which we do not), that the trial court e rre d in not addressing Ms. Halber t’s candida cy

in lig ht of the City Charter , we nonetheless find that Mr. Hatche r’s a

rg ument on this issue is fata lly flawe d. Mr. Hatc her r elies upon Memphis City Charter Se c tio n 1 7, Ar

tic le 5 ( Ac ts 1 90 5, Ch . 5 4, se c . 1 6) and Te nn . Co de Ann. §7 -2 -1 08 (a )( 11 )- (1 6) in
su pp or t of his argume nt that Ms

. Hal be rt wa s in e lig ibl e to h old

of fi c e a s a c ounc ilm e mbe r w hil e se rv inga s Co mmi ssi on e r o n th e Memp hi s S chool B oa rd . F ro m ou

r r e a din g of

his argume nt, it appea rs that Mr. Hatcher

actua lly relies upon the e ditor’s note cited unde r Article 5, Section 17 of the C ity Charter

. The editor’s note s pecif ically ref ere nces a Private Ac t, which was a dopted in 1905 and which pr eclude d a member of the City

Council from holdi n g an o t her public of fice within the City , Co un ty , o r Sta te

. Ho we ve r, fu rt he r re a din g ind ic a te s tha t th is p ro vis ion is n o lo ng e r a

pp lic a ble as the City

Charter has bee n amende d by

Home Rule Ordinance No. 1852 (a/k/a the “POP Charter” ), which wa s passed by

re fe re n d u m v o te on Novembe r 8, 1966. In acc ordanc e with Ordina nce N o. 18 52 , th e City

Cha rt e r d oe s n ot e xpre ssl y

dis qu a lif y a c and idate fr om se e king of fi c e a s a Counc ilm e mbe r w hil e ho ldi ngano ther p ub lic of fi c e . So , e ve n if

we we re to c on c e de that Ms

. Halber t could not a ctually hold two office s simult aneously , we can f ind nothing in the City

Charter to p re c lud e he r f

ro m ho ldi ngon e of

fi c e wh ile ru

nn ingfo r a

no the r. He re , it is un dis pu te d th a t Ms

. Halber t resig ned fr om her position on the school board pr ior to tak i n g her oath of offic e as Councilwoman.

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the order

of the t ri al co u rt . Costs of this appea l are
a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l an t , J o h n n y H a t c h e r , J r

. an d h i s s u r e t y.

___________________________________ J. STE VE N ST AFF OR D, J.