COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Frank and Clements 

BEVIN R. ALEXANDER, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 1299-01-3 PER CURIAM 

 NOVEMBER 20, 2001 

PAMELA CRAIG ALEXANDER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

A. Dow Owens, Judge Designate 

 (H. David Natkin; H. David Natkin, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (David W. Shreve, on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Bevin Alexander (appellant) contends the trial court erred 

in: (1) failing to reduce his child support payments; (2) 

awarding child support without considering the child support 

guidelines; (3) awarding child support, medical reimbursement and 

college expenses without considering his ability to pay; (4) 

requiring him to pay out-of-state college expenses; (5) entering a 

judgment against him for medical expenses; (6) refusing to modify 

the original separation agreement to reflect his change in 

circumstances; and (7) awarding appellee attorney's fees. Upon 

reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that 

this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 
BACKGROUND

 The parties married on August 6, 1977. Two children were 

born during their marriage: a daughter, born on May 30, 1982 

and a son, born on December 16, 1984. The parties separated on 

April 15, 1994, and "voluntarily entered into a separation 

agreement, dated February 6, 1995."1 On May 23, 1995, the 

parties executed an addendum amending, in part, the February 6 

separation agreement. On June 27, 1995, the trial court entered 

a divorce decree in which it "affirmed, ratified, approved, and 

incorporated" the separation agreement and the addendum. 

 The addendum provides, in pertinent part: 

 The Husband agrees to pay support for 

the minor children and the Wife in the 

amount of $1,750.00 per month, said amount 

being due in two equal monthly installments 

on the 1st and 15th of each and every month. 

The parties agree that, at the Wife's 

option, the entire amount of support shall 

be treated for tax purposes as child 

support, the Wife reserving the right to 

reallocate the amount as to spousal support 

and child support as the children become 

adults. The parties agree that this amount 

is modifiable upon a showing of change of 

circumstances by either party, but the 

amount of support under any circumstances 

shall not ever be lower than $1,200.00 a 

month even after both children reach the age 

of eighteen (18) years. The parties agree 

that the maximum amount the Husband will pay 

as support to the Wife or combined support 

to the Wife and children will be $2,700.00 

unless his gross income exceeds $100,000.00. 

The parties agree that in calculating the 

 1

 This language was taken verbatim from the June 27, 1995 

divorce decree, signed by the parties without objection. 

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support amount, they will not use any 

percentage of support as the basis for any 

future calculation and that, every year on 

the anniversary date of the original 

agreement, they will review the amount of 

support to be paid by the Husband to the 

Wife, exchanging tax returns two (2) weeks 

prior to this reassessment. 

* * * * * * * 

 Support, as to the Wife, will continue 

until her death or remarriage. In the event 

of her remarriage, child support will be 

recalculated, but in no event will it be 

lower than $1,200.00 per month or higher 

than $2,700.00, unless the Husband's gross 

income exceeds $100,000.00 a year. 

 On October 2, 2000, wife petitioned the trial court to 

reinstate the case on the docket and issue a rule to show cause 

why husband should not be held in contempt for violating the 

terms of the decree. On October 4, 2000, the trial court 

reinstated the case on the docket and ordered husband to appear 

on October 16, 2000, to show cause why he should not be held in 

contempt for violating the decree. 

 On October 11, 2000, the trial court requested "a 

designation pursuant to an order of disqualification of all of 

the Judges" in the circuit. 

 On October 27, 2000, husband filed motions requesting the 

trial court to determine his spousal support obligation and to 

reduce his child support obligation. 

 On November 7, 2000, the Supreme Court designated Judge 

Owens to preside over the case. 

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 On December 5, 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing at 

which the parties presented evidence. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court ruled as follows: 

I can see no evidence of any fraud or 

misleading or threats. It's obvious that 

[husband's] income has dropped considerably, 

but when his income was close to what it is 

now he had agreed to pay twenty-seven 

hundred dollars. I think it's quite 

reasonable to continue to require the twelve 

hundred-dollar a month payment and he owes 

an additional four hundred dollars to bring 

it current. 

 The trial court also ruled that wife's $702.02 dental bill 

"is due" and payable by husband within six months. It took the 

medical bills under advisement. Regarding college tuition, the 

trial court explained, 

[t]here's nothing in the separation 

agreement that says she can't go outside the 

state and that he will only pay a portion of 

her costs if she does go to an in-state 

college. There's nothing unreasonable about 

her selecting the college of her choice that 

she wanted. I will require him to pay his 

pro rata share. One-third of the bonds that 

they hold now will be used for each of the 

succeeding years after this year. 

 The trial court found wife's attorney's fees reasonable and 

payable by husband, and allowed husband six months to pay them. 

The trial court also ordered wife to "provide, through the 

school, a letter from the principal" regarding the parties' 

son's performance in school. The trial court directed wife's 

attorney to draft an order reflecting the court's ruling. 

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 On January 5, 2001, husband filed objections to the 

proposed draft decree and a motion for reconsideration. 

 On April 9, 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on 

father's objections and motion for reconsideration. 

 On May 4, 2001, the trial court and parties signed a 

decree. On May 17, 2001, the trial court entered a final order. 

ISSUE I: CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

 Husband contends the trial court erred in refusing to 

reduce his spousal support based on changed circumstances. 

 Pursuant to Code § 20-109, a trial court may modify the 

existing terms of spousal support and maintenance upon the 

petition of either party. However, 

where the parties contract or stipulate to 

the amount of spousal support and that 

agreement is filed without objection prior 

to the entry of the final divorce decree, 

"no decree or order directing the payment of 

support and maintenance for the spouse . . . 

shall be entered except in accordance with 

that stipulation or contract." 

Pendleton v. Pendleton, 22 Va. App. 503, 506, 471 S.E.2d 783, 

784 (1996) (citations omitted); see Code § 20-109(C). Code 

§ 20-109(C) "inhibits the power of the court to award or 

consider modification of the decree to the extent that spousal 

support and maintenance are provided for in the incorporated 

agreement of the parties." White v. White, 257 Va. 139, 144, 

509 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1999) (citations omitted). But cf.

Blackburn v. Michael, 30 Va. App. 95, 99, 515 S.E.2d 780, 782 

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(1999) (although parties entered into agreement that was 

incorporated into decree, the agreement setting forth amount of 

spousal support expressly provided modification "by Court of 

competent jurisdiction"). 

 Despite husband's attempt to attack it, the addendum to the 

property settlement agreement was clear, unambiguous and 

reflected the parties' intention that although modifiable, "the 

amount of support under any circumstances shall not ever be 

lower than $1,200.00 a month." (Emphasis added.) 

 In 1995, the year the parties executed the addendum, 

husband's 1995 W-2 form reflected income of $62,500. His 1996 

W-2 form reflected income of $49,713. At the December 2000 

hearing, husband estimated his income for the year would be 

between $50,000 and $55,000. That figure is close to the amount 

appellant earned when he executed the addendum. Moreover, in 

1996, he made less than what he anticipated his 2000 income 

would be, yet managed to comply with the terms of the agreement. 

 Although the trial court acknowledged husband's income had 

diminished, "'"[c]ourts cannot relieve one of the consequences 

of a contract merely because it was unwise . . . [or] rewrite a 

contract simply because the contract may appear to reach an 

unfair result."'" Pelfrey v. Pelfrey, 25 Va. App. 239, 245, 487 

S.E.2d 281, 284 (1997) (citations omitted); see also Kaufman v. 

Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 501, 375 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1988) ("A 

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court is not at liberty to rewrite a contract simply because the 

contract may appear to reach an unfair result."). 

 Based on these circumstances, the trial court did not err 

in upholding the contractual support obligation. 

ISSUE II: CHILD SUPPORT 

 Husband contends the trial court made no findings pursuant 

to Code § 20-108.2 to justify its award of child support. 

 The parties agreed to a unitary amount of support to cover 

child and spousal support. The trial court awarded the minimum 

amount of combined support agreed upon, $1,200 per month. That 

amount was above the statutory guidelines figure, and it created 

a contractual obligation when the parties executed the addendum. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to apply 

the child support guidelines. 

ISSUE III: CHILD SUPPORT, MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENT 

AND COLLEGE EXPENSES

 Husband contends the trial court failed to consider his 

financial ability to pay. He argues that the trial court failed 

to make the required guidelines analysis and it made no 

calculations to determine husband's ability to pay. 

 As explained above, the unitary support amount was a 

contractual obligation that did not contemplate using the 

guidelines. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing 

to apply the statutory guidelines analysis. 

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 Husband correctly points out "that the record is devoid of 

any calculation by the trial court, in writing or otherwise, 

regarding [his] financial situation or his ability to pay 

support of any kind." However, the record fails to show that 

husband prepared and presented a financial income and expense 

statement for the trial court to review in light of his argument 

that he was unable to pay. See Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. 

App. 189, 194, 390 S.E.2d 782, 785, aff'd in part, rev'd in 

part, 240 Va. ix, 396 S.E.2d 675 (1990) (holding that appellant 

has primary responsibility of ensuring that complete record is 

furnished to an appellate court so that errors assigned may be 

properly decided). 

ISSUE IV: COLLEGE EXPENSES

 Husband contends the trial court erred in requiring him to 

pay a pro rata share of his daughter's college tuition at an 

out-of-state school. 

 Paragraph 6 of the initial February 6, 1995 Property 

Settlement Agreement, provided, in pertinent part: 

The parties shall contribute, on a pro rata

basis, according to their financial ability, 

toward the tuition, room and board, 

clothing, books and required fees for up to 

a four (4) year program of undergraduate 

college education or vocational training at 

an institution subject to the parties' 

reasonable right of approval, for both 

children, until either child reaches the age 

of twenty-four (24). 

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 At the December 5, 2000 hearing, husband argued that he 

"actively and vigorously disapproved" of his daughter's choice 

to attend an out-of-state school. Husband contended she was 

accepted to Radford, a state-supported school, but she chose not 

to attend; moreover, she refused to apply to other 

state-supported schools, "particularly Virginia Commonwealth." 

He asserted that both of those schools were appropriate for her 

to attend and would have been financially more feasible. 

 Wife testified that her daughter is currently attending 

Appalachian State University, but she "particularly wanted to go 

to Guilford College." The cost for Guilford was $22,386, 

whereas the cost for Appalachian State was $12,937.50. Wife 

explained that she agreed to an installment contract with and 

made payments to Appalachian State without any contributions 

from husband. 

 Finding nothing in the "separation agreement that says [the 

daughter] can't go outside the state and that he will only pay a 

portion of her costs if she does," and finding "nothing 

unreasonable about her selecting the college of her choice," the 

trial court required husband to pay his pro rata share. 

 Based on the terms of the agreement and the facts adduced 

at the hearing, the trial court did not err in so holding. 

Moreover, we find no reversible error in the trial court 

directing the parties to calculate their pro rata shares 

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according to the most recent incomes reported on their 

respective W-2 forms. 

ISSUE V: PAYMENTS FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES

 Wife presented evidence that, from October 1995 until 

September 30, 2000, she paid dental premiums totaling $1,702.20 

for the children. From 1995 until 2000, wife paid an additional 

$4,534 for various medical bills. Wife was never reimbursed by 

husband for those expenses. 

 Paragraph 8 of the February 1995 agreement provides that 

husband would "maintain health insurance" for the children. 

That paragraph further provided, "Any medical, dental or 

orthodontic expenses not covered by such insurance in excess of 

a yearly amount of $300.00 shall be paid by the Husband." 

 Under the contract incorporated into the decree, husband 

was obligated to pay the medical expenses as a unitary support 

payment to wife. The fact that wife waited several years to ask 

for the money did not lessen husband's obligation to pay it. 

 "Husband may not invoke the principles of estoppel or 

laches to bar rights granted to wife by the lawful decree 

. . . ." Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 

826 (1988). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Va. App. 330, 332, 

338 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1986) (stating same). 

 Husband also contends the trial court improperly admitted 

and relied on inadmissible hearsay regarding husband's 

obligation to pay for his son's continued prescriptions for 

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Ritalin. At the December 5, 2000 hearing, husband argued that 

he never had any input into whether his son should continue to 

take Ritalin. He explained, "I understand why there is an 

argument for using Ritalin to control him in school," however, 

husband contended he always objected to use of the drug. 

 Wife testified that the parties' son had been diagnosed as 

having an "attention deficit hyperactivity disorder" for which 

Dr. Milanovich has been prescribing Ritalin since fourth grade. 

At the time of the hearing, the son was in tenth grade. 

According to wife, "h]e has not had behavior problems since he 

has been" taking Ritalin, and it has "helped him tremendously." 

According to wife, Ritalin has enabled the son to better "focus 

his attention" and "complete tasks. . . . without being 

distracted." Wife averred that the son only takes Ritalin 

"during school hours" and that she has discontinued providing 

Ritalin to her son at night and during the weekends. Although 

she is able to deal with the son's louder and busier behavior on 

the weekends when he doesn't take Ritalin, the school is unable 

to deal effectively with the son if he does not take it. 

According to wife, each time the son forgot to take his Ritalin, 

the school contacted her regarding poor behavior. 

 Before ruling, the trial court indicated it would take the 

past medical bills for Ritalin under advisement. It directed 

wife "to provide, through the school, a letter from the 

principal saying anything that he has observed about [the son]." 

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On January 25, 2001, wife filed with the clerk's office a letter 

from the son's principal, Susan Morrison. Morrison advised that 

the son's "academic progress indicates that he appears to be 

very successful while on the medication." "As a professional," 

Morrison was "concerned about taking him off medication." On 

March 9, 2001, wife filed a letter from Dr. Milanovich detailing 

the son's history in school before and after taking Ritalin for 

ADHD symptoms. Dr. Milanovich noted that the son "continues to 

be successful academically" taking a single dose of Ritalin in 

the morning before school. 

 At the April 9, 2001 hearing, husband sought to strike 

Dr. Milanovich's letter because he received it too late and 

because it was inadmissible hearsay. The trial court refused to 

strike the letter but allowed husband's attorney's request for 

an "opportunity to address the issues raised in those letters." 

Husband declined the trial court's invitation to call and 

cross-examine Dr. Milanovich. As to the Ritalin, the May 4, 

2001 decree included the following: 

The additional sum of $299.00, which 

represents the cost of Ritalin for the 

parties' minor child, Craig Alexander, is 

taken under advisement for a period of 

thirty (30) days from April 9, 2001 for the 

Defendant to submit such further evidence 

thereon as he may be advised. . . . If the 

defendant submits additional evidence and 

requests a hearing before May 9, 2001 

judgment will not be entered on the amount 

of $299.00 representing the cost of Ritalin. 

However, if no motion is made or further 

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evidence submitted judgment in the amount of 

$299.00 will be entered as of May 10, 2001. 

 By order dated May 17, 2001, the trial court noted that the 

parties no longer "wished to pursue the motions, which they have 

previously filed." It then ruled that the May 4, 2001 decree 

was final. 

 Appellant had an opportunity to call and cross-examine 

Dr. Milanovich, and he had the opportunity to submit evidence to 

rebut the letters. He chose not to do so. Accordingly, the 

trial court did not err in admitting and considering the letters 

from the principal and the doctor. 

ISSUE VI: REFUSAL TO MODIFY THE ORIGINAL 

SEPARATION AGREEMENT

 Husband contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow 

him to present evidence attacking the contract on the basis that 

the terms were ambiguous and the alleged lack of intent to pay 

spousal support until wife remarried or dies. 

 The trial court found no evidence of fraud, duress or 

coercion in the execution of the agreement. Moreover, as 

explained in I., supra, the agreement between the parties that 

was incorporated into the decree was unambiguous and clearly 

articulated the parties' intentions. "The general rule in 

Virginia is that parol evidence of prior stipulations or oral 

agreements is inadmissible to vary, contradict, or explain the 

terms of a complete, unambiguous, unconditional written 

contract." Price v. Taylor, 251 Va. 82, 86-87, 466 S.E.2d 87, 

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89 (1996). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing 

to hear parol evidence intended to modify the agreement. 

ISSUE VII: ATTORNEY'S FEES 

 During the December 5, 2000 hearing, wife introduced, 

without objection, an itemized statement detailing her 

attorney's fees. The trial court found attorney's fees of 

$2,981.50 "reasonable" and awarded that amount to wife. 

 The trial court has broad discretion so long as the 

attorney's fees award is reasonable under the circumstances. 

Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 

(1987); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 338 S.E.2d 

159, 162 (1985). Based on the circumstances and equities of 

this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion 

in making this award. Accordingly, the trial court did not err. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court 

is summarily affirmed. 

Affirmed.

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