1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PAUL BULLOCK, 

Plaintiff,

v. No. 20-cv-1764-ZMF

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Paul Bullock (“Mr. Bullock”) moves for reversal of Defendant Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA” or “Commissioner”) decision adopting the findings 

of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in denying Mr. Bullock’s application for Supplemental 

Security Income. See Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 18. The Commissioner moves 

for affirmance. See Def.’s Mot. J. Affirmance & Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Def.’s Mot.”), 

ECF No. 19. Having considered the parties’ submissions and the Administrative Record,1 the court 

will DENY Mr. Bullock’s Motion for Judgment Reversal and GRANT the Commissioner’s 

Motion for Judgment of Affirmance in an accompanying order. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides benefits for “disabled” individuals. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(a)(1). The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful 

1 The Administrative Record consists of sixty-nine exhibits. See Administrative R., ECF No. 9. 

For ease of reference citations to the Administrative Record will refer to the “AR” and cite to the 

consecutive page numbers provided in the lower right-hand corner of each page.
2

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” Id.

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be severe and must render the individual unable to perform 

both “previous work” and “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 

economy[.]” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).

The SSA uses a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). If a determination can be made at any step, the SSA does not go on 

to the next step. See id. The burden of proof is borne by the claimant at each of the first four steps 

and switches to the Commissioner at step five. See Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)). At step one, the claimant must 

demonstrate he is not presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 

(a)(4)(i). At step two, the claimant must show that he has a “severe medically determinable” 

impairment that “significantly limits [his] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 

Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three, the claimant must show that his impairment—or 

combination of impairments—“meets or equals” the criteria of an impairment listed in the 

Commissioner’s regulations. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairment does not meet 

or equal a listed impairment, the Commissioner proceeds to step four, which requires the 

Commissioner to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 and whether, 

considering the RFC, the claimant can still perform any relevant past work. See id. 

§§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)–(f). If the RFC indicates that the claimant cannot engage in past work, 

2 The RFC assessment is “what an individual can still do despite his or her limitations . . . [and 

reflects an individual’s] maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities.” SSR 96-8p, 

1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996).
3 

then at step five, the ALJ looks to the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to 

determine if he can perform “other work” in the national economy. Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g).

B. Factual Background 

Mr. Bullock is an adult male with an eleventh-grade education. See AR 37, 197. He

previously worked as a landscaper and was last employed as a laborer in 2013. See AR 72. 

Mr. Bullock alleged his disability began on August 1, 2016, asserting an inability to work due to 

major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), irritability, 

anger, and asthma. See AR 196. During the ALJ hearing, Mr. Bullock testified that he had also 

been diagnosed with insomnia and that his sleeping medication made it “hard for [him] to get 

up[.]” AR 42. Mr. Bullock confirmed that he was homeless and lived with either a friend or in a 

shelter. See AR 36. He testified that he could participate in daily activities such as cleaning, caring 

for his therapy cat, seeing his daughters, and using the Internet. See AR 45–47. 

Mr. Bullock has been treated and evaluated by numerous medical and psychological 

professionals throughout his life. See AR 482–502, 504–506, 544–642. On June 26, 2017, Greg 

Mathis, LPC, found Mr. Bullock had moderate impairments in his “ab[ility] to fulfill social 

responsibilities, to interact with others, maintain [] physical functioning . . . [and] self-care[,]” but 

“maintain[ed] control of any impulsive, aggressive or abusive behaviors.” AR 565. 

Mr. Bullock reported improved symptoms when compliant with a medication regimen. See 

AR 426. However, one of the drugs, Trazodone, caused excessive sleepiness and nightmares, 

which caused Mr. Bullock to stop taking it. See AR 49. Despite improvements, Mr. Bullock has a 

history of noncompliance with his medication and treatment plans. See AR 390, 394. On December 

4, 2018, Dr. Colleen Hawthorne, MD, evaluated Mr. Bullock after he was noncompliant with his 

medication. See AR 829. Dr. Hawthorne found that his “mood disturbances, angry outbursts, low 
4

frustration tolerance, social isolation, and anhedonia . . . contributed to his limited social and 

vocational functioning.” AR 505 (cleaned up). But Dr. Hawthorne noted that Mr. Bullock did not 

have any suicidal ideation and demonstrated normal judgment, attention, and speech; good insight;

and intact memory. See AR 833–34. Dr. Hawthorne determined that Mr. Bullock had “no 

limitation in understanding, remembering, and applying information[;] . . . moderate difficulties 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and moderate difficulties adapting or managing 

oneself.” AR 21. Dr. Hawthorne concluded that Mr. Bullock was unable to work. See AR 21.

On October 3, 2019, Emmanuel Sango, RN, prescribed Mr. Bullock medication to treat his 

nightmares and sleep disturbances and stabilize his mood after Mr. Bullock stopped taking the 

medication prescribed to him in 2017. See AR 872. 

State and agency psychological consultants also evaluated Mr. Bullock. See AR 63–73, 

76–88. Dr. Patrica Cott, Ph.D., reviewed Mr. Bullock’s medical record. See AR 68. On November 

22, 2017, Dr. Cott found that Mr. Bullock’s mental impairments resulted in moderate limitations 

in understanding, remembering, and applying information; interacting with others; maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace3 (“CPP”); and adapting or managing oneself. See AR 69–71.

Dr. Cott further concluded he was “able to complete tasks during a standard work day and week

with limited contact with the public or others who might trigger anger.” AR 71. 

On April 13, 2018, Dr. Nancy Heiser, Ph.D., found Mr. Bullock had moderate limitations 

in his ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended 

periods, complete a workday without interruptions, interact with the public, respond to changes in 

his work environment, and make plans independently from others. See AR 83–84. Ultimately, 

3 CPP is “the ability to sustain focused attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the 

timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.” Johnson v. Saul, 

No. 19-cv-3829, 2021 WL 411202, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2021) (cleaned up).
5 

Dr. Heiser found no severe limitations and determined that Mr. Bullock was not disabled. See AR 

76–87. 

C. Procedural History 

On October 20, 2017, Mr. Bullock applied for disability benefits. See AR 74. On January 

5, 2018, the SSA denied his claim. See AR 73. Mr. Bullock requested a timely hearing before an 

ALJ, which was held on December 10, 2019. See AR 30. 

On January 17, 2020, the ALJ denied Mr. Bullock’s claim. See AR 12–23. At step one, the 

ALJ determined that Mr. Bullock had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged 

onset date. See AR 14. At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Bullock had the following severe 

impairments: depressive disorder, personality disorder, trauma disorder, and substance abuse 

disorder. See AR 14. At step three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Bullock’s “impairment or 

combination of impairments [did not meet] or medically equal[] the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926).” AR 15. 

At step four, the ALJ determined that Mr. Bullock had the RFC to perform a full range of 

work with exertional levels, with limitations. See AR 16. Specifically, the ALJ limited Mr. Bullock 

to occupations with no contact with the public; only occasional coworker contact and supervision; 

set routines, procedures, and instructions; and few changes during the workday. See AR 16–17. 

Additionally, the ALJ determined that Mr. Bullock could not “climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; 

. . . must avoid all exposure to hazards, such as dangerous machinery and unprotected heights; and 

[could not] drive vehicular equipment.” AR 16. Finally, the ALJ asserted that Mr. Bullock could 

“work with below average work production pressures; . . . maintain regular attendance and be 

punctual within customary tolerances, and perform activities within a schedule.” AR 17. 
6

Finally, at step five, the ALJ determined that when considering Mr. Bullock’s RFC, “there 

[were] jobs that exist[ed] in significant numbers in the national economy that [Mr. Bullock] c[ould]

perform[.]” AR 22. The vocational expert (“VE”) testified that an individual with Mr. Bullock’s 

characteristics could perform the requirements of the representative occupations of kitchen helper, 

laundry worker, and floor waxer. See 56. Thus, the ALJ ruled that Mr. Bullock was not disabled. 

See AR 23.

On January 17, 2020, Mr. Bullock requested a review of the ALJ’s Decision. See AR 1. 

On April 23, 2020, the Appeals Council denied his request. See AR 1. On June 6, 2020, 

Mr. Bullock filed the complaint in this matter. See Compl., ECF No. 1. On November 9, 2021, the 

parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for all purposes. See Min. Order (Nov. 15, 

2021). On May 9, 2023, this case was directly reassigned from Magistrate Judge Meriweather to 

Magistrate Judge Faruqui. See Reassignment Civ. Case, EFC No. 26. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court sits in what is essentially an appellate role when it reviews the 

Commissioner’s disability determination, which must be upheld “if it is supported by substantial 

evidence and is not tainted by an error of law.” Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 

1987). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 999 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). This standard “requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by 

something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. Fed. Energy 

Regul. Comm’n, 315 F.3d 362, 365–66 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

“Substantial-evidence review is highly deferential to the agency fact-finder.” Rosello ex 

rel. Rosello v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “An ALJ’s credibility determinations, 
7

in particular, ‘are entitled to great deference.’” Harrison Cnty. Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & 

Health Rev. Comm’n, 790 F. App’x 210, 212 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Keystone 

Coal Mining Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). “The reviewing court may neither 

reweigh the evidence presented to it nor replace the Commissioner’s judgment ‘concerning the 

credibility of the evidence with its own.’” Goodman v. Colvin, 233 F. Supp. 3d 88, 104 (D.D.C. 

2017) (quoting Crosson v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995)). But the ALJ must have built 

a “logical bridge” between the evidence and her conclusions so that this Court may “assess the 

validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.” LaneRauth v. Barnhart, 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 

589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002)).

On review, the “plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s 

decision [was] not based on substantial evidence or that the incorrect legal standards were applied.” 

Settles v. Colvin, 121 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Muldrow v. Astrue, 2012 WL 

2877697, No. 11-cv-1385, at *6 (D.D.C. July 11, 2012)). If the ALJ is found to have applied the 

correct legal standards and met the substantial evidence threshold, then the reviewing court may 

grant the Commissioner’s motion for an affirmance of the disability determination. See, e.g., Hicks 

v. Astrue, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2010). If a reviewing court finds that an ALJ erred in his 

determination that a claimant was not disabled, it may reverse and remand, requiring the SSA to 

conduct further proceedings consistent with the law. See, e.g., Jackson v. Barnhart, 271 F. Supp. 

2d. 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2002).
8 

III. DISCUSSION

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding. The ALJ properly conducted the RFC 

analysis and adequately considered Mr. Bullock’s limitations in CPP, daily activities, medication 

side effects, and medical opinions. 

A. ALJ Properly Based Conclusion on Substantial Evidence

Medical Source Statements 

“ALJs must articulate in their decisions how persuasive they find each medical opinion.” 

Demetria R. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-3227, 2022 WL 3142376, at *21 (D.D.C. June 30, 2022), R. & 

R. adopted, 2022 WL 3139026 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2022). “Supportability and consistency are the key 

factors when assessing the persuasiveness of medical opinions.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.1520c(b)(2)).4 An ALJ must explain how he considered supportability and consistency in 

his opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). ALJs must also assess other factors 

listed in the regulations “but [are] not required to” expressly explain that consideration in their 

decisions. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). When there are “[e]qually persuasive medical 

opinions or prior administrative medical findings about the same issue, . . . [ALJs must] articulate 

how [they] considered the other most persuasive factors . . . in [their] determination or decision.” 

Id. § 404.1520c(b)(3). 

The ALJ found Dr. Cott and Heiser to be persuasive. See AR 21. Mr. Bullock asserts

Dr. Hawthorne’s opinion was more persuasive than the ALJ gave credit,

5 see AR 21, but this 

4 Supportability refers to “the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations provided 

by a medical source.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency refers to the 

consistency between the medical source’s opinion and “the evidence from other medical sources 

and nonmedical sources[.]” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). 

5 One such reason was that Dr. Hawthorne was the treating physician. See Pl.’s Reply at 6. “The 

treating physician’s rule’ required an ALJ to give ‘controlling weight’ to a treating physician's 
9

invites “the Court to reweigh the evidence in [Mr. Bullock’s] favor—which the Court cannot do[.]”

Demetria R., 2022 WL 3142376, at *22 (cleaned up). “In other words, even if [Dr. Hawthorne’s]

opinion was persuasive in some respects, the Court must defer to the contrary finding of the ALJ 

so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, which, again as the D.C. Circuit and Supreme 

Court have recently explained, is a ‘low bar.’” Id. (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy 

Regul. Comm’n, 20 F.4th 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2021)).

“That ‘low bar’ is cleared here.” Demetria R., 2022 WL 3142376, at *22 (cleaned up). The 

ALJ reviewed how Dr. Cott’s moderate limitation finding was consistent with the record evidence. 

See AR 21. For example, Dr. Cott found that Mr. Bullock could complete tasks during the workday 

with little exposure to others based on his feelings of anger and paranoia toward others improving 

when compliant with treatment and medications. See AR 21, 70–71. The ALJ further explained 

that Dr. Heiser’s evaluation confirmed Dr. Cott’s findings. Indeed, Dr. Heiser addressed the same 

symptoms as Dr. Hawthorne—“problems with anger and irritability”—but concluded that a 

limitation “to routine tasks with infrequent interactions with the public” would still allow 

Mr. Bullock to work. AR 85; see AR 21. The ALJ noted that these findings were consistent with

Mr. Bullock’s daily activities. See AR 21. Drawing on the record, the ALJ then concluded that 

Mr. Bullock was of “average intelligence, normal judgment, normal attention, good insight, intact 

memory, and normal speech,” with or without compliance with medication. AR 21.

medical opinion if it was ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and [was] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case 

record[.]’ 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). [However, the] ‘treating physician’s rule’ does not apply to 

cases[—such as this one—]filed on or after March 27, 2017.” Ronald D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 20-cv-197, 2021 WL 6133909, at *4 (D. Vt. Dec. 29, 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927; 

416.920c).
10

Moreover, the ALJ explained why he discounted Dr. Hawthorne’s statements in certain 

aspects but credited them in others. See AR 21–22. The ALJ noted that Dr. Hawthorne’s 

determinations did not account for Mr. Bullock’s inconsistent compliance with his medication. See 

AR 21. This is a factor that Dr. Hawthorne should have considered. See Elder v. Berryhill, 774 F.

App’x 980, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (ALJ did not err in considering claimant’s inconsistent compliance 

with prescribed medication in disability determination). And Dr. Hawthorne’s opinion “was based 

only on a one-time examination[,]” which explains why it was inconsistent with the record. Hobbs

v. Saul, No. 20-cv-4, 2021 WL 1574421, at *10 (W.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2021); see AR 366, 375. The 

ALJ explained that he also discounted Dr. Hawthorne’s findings over internal inconsistencies:

Dr. Hawthorne asserted Mr. Bullock had marked limitations interacting with others and moderate 

difficulties in CPP and adapting oneself but noted Mr. Bullock had “average intelligence normal 

judgment, normal attention, good insight, intact memory, and normal speech.” AR 506; see AR 

21. The ALJ further explained that Dr. Hawthorne’s finding that Mr. Bullock could not work was

“extreme and unpersuasive” given Dr. Hawthorne’s observation that Mr. Bullock had no limitation 

in understanding, remembering, and applying information. AR 20; see AR 21. “That is substantial 

evidence, and other courts have found similar discounting of physician’s opinions to be 

appropriate.” Demetria R., 2022 WL 3142376, at *22 (collecting cases).

Daily Activities

ALJs may consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating the severity and credibility 

of reported impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7.

Hence, ALJs regularly consider daily activities when assessing plaintiffs’ claims about limited 

work capacity. See, e.g., Colter v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-632, 2022 WL 715218, at *13–14 (D.D.C. 

Mar. 10, 2022); Grant v. Astrue, 857 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156–57 (D.D.C. 2012).
11

Mr. Bullock’s testimony about daily activities provides substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Bullock was not disabled. See AR 21. For example, the ALJ noted that 

Mr. Bullock could “fool[] around” on his phone, use public transportation, clean his house, see his 

children anywhere from twice a month to twice a year, and live either at a homeless shelter or with 

a friend, AR 51; see AR 44–46. The ALJ also noted that Mr. Bullock had no limitations in 

performing personal care activities and pet care. See AR 17–28. These daily activities 

“demonstrate[d] that while the claimant may be limited by his mental impairments, he c[ould] still 

perform activities that require attention and concentration, as well as understand[] at least simple, 

routine tasks and instructions.” AR 18; see Hall v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 343504, No. 20-cv-2073, at

*6 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2022) (ALJ found that reported daily activities indicated the claimant was not 

as limited as alleged). And “the ALJ did not reason that [Mr. Bullock’s] activities of daily living 

[we]re as demanding as those of full-time work. Rather, the ALJ considered [Mr. Bullock’s] 

activities to determine whether [his] symptoms were as severe and limiting as []he alleged.” Jeske 

v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2020); see AR 18.

“Were these [] statements to be the only times where the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s daily 

activities as part of his analysis as to [Mr. Bullock’s] subjective complaints of [his] symptoms, 

Plaintiff would have a more compelling case.” Colter, 2022 WL 715218, at *14 (cleaned up).

“However, the ALJ’s opinion makes clear that he recognized and understood Plaintiff’s alleged 

limitations as to [his] ability to perform daily activities.” Id. For example, the ALJ noted “contrary 

hearing testimony”: Mr. Bullock reported fatigue, low energy and trouble concentrating, only 

getting four to six hours of sleep a night, not having a driver’s license because he was too afraid 

to drive, and only seeing his four daughters when their mother permitted. Laura A. v. Kijakazi, No. 

21-cv-451, 2022 WL 3644810, at *17 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2022); see AR 17–18. “So, like in Colter, 
12

contrary to Plaintiff’s insinuations, the ALJ did not ignore or disregard [his] testimony as to the 

extent to which []he [could or could not] perform [his] daily activities. Rather, as the ALJ 

explained, he found that Plaintiff’s alleged severity of symptoms was not entirely in accord with 

[his] professed daily activities, taking into account the relevant limitations.” Laura A., 2022 WL 

3644810, at *17 (cleaned up).

“More importantly, and as in Colter, the ALJ here did not rely solely on the discrepancies 

between Plaintiff’s testimony and [his] daily activities in concluding that [his] symptoms were not 

disabling.” Id. “Instead, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s medical records, treatment records, and the 

opinions of medical experts and found that the record as a whole undermined some of [his] 

subjective complaints.” Colter, 2022 WL 715218, at *14; see AR 17–22. Moreover, the ALJ 

accounted for Mr. Bullock’s credible symptoms by limiting the available work to below-average 

work production pressures to manage stress exacerbating Mr. Bullock’s symptoms, and to limited 

contact with coworkers and no contact with the public to manage Mr. Bullock’s “anger complaints 

and his reported history of panic symptoms[.]” AR 20. 

Making these detailed findings demonstrated that the ALJ “did not assume [Mr. Bullock

could] work solely based on [daily] activities.” Jeanine J. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-4044, 2022 WL 

4483812, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2022). In all, over five pages the ALJ discussed how myriad

evidence supported his determination. See AR 17–22. This is more comprehensive than the norm. 

Compare Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“[T]he ALJ’s ruling spen[t] three pages simply listing 

the plaintiff’s entire medical history and then conclusively stating that . . . claimant . . . could

perform sedentary work.”), with Williams v. Colvin, 134 F. Supp. 3d 358, 365 (D.D.C. 2015)

(remanding the case when the ALJ did not explain any basis for his findings). Thus, the ALJ 

created a logical bridge between Mr. Bullock’s credible symptoms and abilities, and the conclusion
13 

that jobs existed in the national economy that Mr. Bullock could perform. See Colter, 2022 WL 

715218, at *15; AR 22. 

B. The ALJ Conducted a Proper RFC Assessment 

In determining Mr. Bullock’s RFC, the ALJ “buil[t] an accurate and logical bridge from 

the evidence to his conclusion,” properly accounting for the side effects of Mr. Bullock’s

medication and his mild or moderate limitations in CPP. Laura A., 2022 WL 3644810, at *11 

(cleaned up).

The RFC was Appropriately Tailored 

“In essence, an RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment of a claimant’s 

physical and mental work-related capabilities used to determine what an individual can still do 

despite his or her limitations.” Johnson v. Kijakazi, No. 18-cv-2749, 2022 WL 2452610, at *2 

(D.D.C July 6, 2022) (cleaned up). The assessment “must include a narrative discussion describing 

how the evidence supports each conclusion . . . citing specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical 

evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). The narrative discussion is not an “articulation of each function and 

its implication on the ALJ’s overall conclusion,” rather it must allow a reviewing court to 

determine that an ALJ “consider[ed] the [whole] record and discuss[ed] which evidence he found 

credible and why.” Gregory v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2115, 2022 WL 7463984, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 

12, 2022) (cleaned up). 

Here, the ALJ thoroughly examined both the medical and nonmedical evidence and 

concluded that Mr. Bullock was able to perform work at all exertional levels with the following

limitations: 

- Physical: cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, must avoid all hazards, cannot drive 

vehicular equipment; 
14 

- Mental: able to understand and carry out simple, routine instructions, able to sustain 

concentration for two-hour periods at a time, able to use judgment in making work 

decisions, able to work with below-average work production pressure; and 

- Social: only occasional coworker contact and supervision and no contact with the 

public. 

See AR 16–17. The ALJ further explained how his evaluation of evidence—such as medical 

opinions, daily activities, Mr. Bullock’s testimony, and the VE’s testimony—informed his final 

determination that Mr. Bullock was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. See AR 17–22. 

Thus, “the ALJ did more than merely list the evidence.” Pinkney v. Astrue, 675 F. Supp. 2d. 9, 17–

18 (D.D.C. 2009). Instead, “[t]he ALJ explained which evidence he found credible and why,” 

while providing a sufficient explanation of Mr. Bullock’s limitations. Id. at 18. In so doing, the 

ALJ built a logical bridge to his conclusion, allowing this Court to assess the validity of the 

agency’s ultimate findings and afford Mr. Bullock meaningful judicial review. See id. at 17. 

Medication’s Sedative Side Effects 

Relevant evidence in the disability determination includes “how functioning may be 

affected by factors including . . . medication[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1). It is “an ALJ’s duty 

to develop a full record [which] can include investigating the side effects of medications.” Walker 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 404 F. App’x 362, 366 (11th Cir. 2010). “Consideration of the side effects 

of medication applies to both the assessment of functional limitations and the RFC assessment.” 

Lomax v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-cv-55, 2021 WL 3508087, at *6 (D.D.C Aug. 4, 2021)

(cleaned up).

The ALJ stated that he considered “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any 

medication the individual takes or has taken.” AR 18 (emphasis added). Mr. Bullock alleges that 
15

the ALJ failed to address the side effect of drowsiness from his medication. See Pl.’s Reply at 3.

“We have previously observed that drowsiness often accompanies the taking of medication, and it 

should not be viewed as disabling unless the record references serious functional limitations[.]” 

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 555 (3d Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Neither the medical records 

nor Plaintiff’s testimony demonstrated that Mr. Bullock’s drowsiness was disabling. See AR 42, 

49; see also Caitlin v. Kijakazi, No. 17-cv-1939, 2022 WL 17370231, at *23–24 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 

2022) (ALJ correctly determined claimant was not disabled despite chronic fatigue disorder, 

insomnia, and medication side effects by relying on evidence including medical opinions, medical 

records, and testimony). Indeed, Mr. Bullock said he “just [got] tired,” and that it was difficult to 

wake up in the morning. AR 43, see AR 40.

6

The cases Mr. Bullock cited are distinguishable. See Pl.’s Mot. at 13. For example, in

Martin v. Apfel, the Court reversed the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ ignored uncontradicted 

testimony from the Plaintiff that his medications caused him to be excessively drowsy. 118 F. Supp. 

2d 9, 16, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2000). And in Newton v. Apfel, the ALJ considered on remand Plaintiff’s 

ability to remain gainfully employed given that she had to visit the doctor often and that her 

treatment caused her to sleep for several hours during the day. 209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000).

These complaints are more severe than Mr. Bullock’s. Mr. Bullock did claim that the medication’s 

side effects made him sleep during the day, let alone in such extreme amounts. See AR 42, 49. 

“An ALJ’s discretion is at its apex when weighing evidence and testimony.” Lomax, 2021 

WL 3508087, at *8. The ALJ specifically mentioned the claimant’s “sleep difficulties” after 

starting new medication in 2017 and that the claimant reported low energy and fatigue in October 

6 Mr. Bullock testified Trazodone caused excessive drowsiness. See AR 49. But because 

Mr. Bullock stopped taking the drug, the ALJ did not need to consider its impact. See AR 49.
16

2019. See AR 18–19. This demonstrates that the ALJ weighed Mr. Bullock’s drowsiness when 

making his determination. See Grant, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (court found ALJ properly 

acknowledged claimant’s reported drowsiness but found reported daily activities supported a 

finding of no disability). The record, including Mr. Bullock’s daily activities, supported the ALJ’s 

decision to find that this side effect was not disabling. See id.; AR 44–47, 51. Thus, substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, which adequately considered and explained the 

medication side effects on Mr. Bullock. See Grant, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 156. 

Moderate Limitation in CPP

The ALJ found Mr. Bullock had a moderate limitation in CPP. See AR 15. This “means 

that the claimant’s functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a 

sustained basis [wa]s fair.” Laura A., 2022 WL 3644810, at *11 (cleaned up). Fair is “commonly 

understood to mean not very good or very bad: of average or acceptable quality.” Id. (cleaned up).

Mr. Bullock alleges that “[a]s a matter of law, finding moderate limitations in the domain 

of [CPP] requires an additional finding of diminished ability to stay on task.” Pl.’s Mot. at 12. This 

conclusion is based on the premise that “the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability 

to stay on task. Only the latter limitation would account for a claimant’s limitation in [CPP].” Petty 

v. Colvin, 204 F. Supp. 3d 196, 206 (D.D.C. 2016). Mr. Bullock is incorrect. A finding of moderate 

limitations in CPP does not require a finding of diminished ability to stay on task, rather it requires 

that the RFC and the hypotheticals provided by the ALJ “adequately accounts for a claimant’s 

moderate limitations in [CPP].” Id. Further, “an ALJ’s decision is not necessarily internally 

inconsistent when an impairment is found to be severe[,] . . . [but] found not disabling[.]” McIntyre 

v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 2014). But an ALJ cannot merely limit work to simple, 

routine, and unskilled tasks to account for a claimant’s moderate CPP limitations. See id.; Mascio 
17

v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 2015) (remanded because the ALJ did not explain how 

claimant’s limitation in CPP did not affect their ability to work and did not include any mental 

limitations in the hypothetical provided to the VE).

Here, the ALJ adequately explained how Mr. Bullock’s RFC limitations accounted for his 

CPP limitation. The ALJ found that Mr. Bullock had a moderate limitation in CPP but stated Mr. 

Bullock’s daily activities—such as watching TV, reading, using the Internet, and handling his 

medical care—showed that his limitations were not debilitating. See AR 15. The ALJ stated that

Mr. Bullock could “sustain attention and concentration for two-hour periods at a time and for eight 

hours in the workday on short simple routine instructions.” AR 16. Further, the ALJ explained that 

despite Mr. Bullock being “distractable,” AR 18, and his symptoms being “worsened by 

complicated situational stressors” and noncompliance with his medication,

7 AR 19, Mr. Bullock 

retained the ability to understand, remember, and carry out short, simple, routine instructions. See

AR 20. The ALJ’s conclusion drew upon Mr. Bullock’s daily activities and Dr. Hawthorne’s 

testimony that Mr. Bullock had “normal attention,” good insight, intact memory, and normal 

speech. AR 21; see AR 70, 85. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion. See 

Mcintyre, 758 F.3d at 152 (substantial evidence supported ALJ’s determination and the 

explanation of limitations sufficiently accounted for claimant’s impairments) (cleaned up).

Moreover, the hypothetical that the ALJ provided to the VE “adequately” captured 

Mr. Bullock’s limitation on CPP by using time and complexity limitations. Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d 

at 206; see AR 56. Compare White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 288 (6th Cir. 2009) (ALJ 

explicitly stated to VE that claimant had moderate limitations in CPP), with Winschel v. Comm’r 

7 See Darlene M. v Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-1817, 2021 WL 6841641, at *22 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2021) 

(failure to comply with medication treatment was factor ALJ could consider when assigning 

weight to subjective evidence on symptoms provided by claimants).
18

of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (11th Cir. 2011) (ALJ did not indicate that medical evidence 

suggested the claimant’s ability to work was unaffected by CPP limitation nor implicitly accounted 

for the limitation in the hypothetical posed to the VE). The VE concluded that a claimant with such 

limitations could perform occupations that exist in the national economy. See AR 56. The ALJ 

thereby sufficiently accounted for Mr. Bullock’s ability to stay on task with the VE and properly 

considered the VE’s opinion in his RFC determination. See Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 

(6th Cir. 2001) (ALJ did not explicitly include limitation of CPP but accounted for it implicitly by 

restricted complexity and quota limits).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as set out in an accompanying order, the Court will DENY 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of 

Affirmance.

Date: August 8, 2023

___________________________________

ZIA M. FARUQUI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE