*

The Honorable Michael H. Watson, United States District Judge for the Southern District of

Ohio, sitting by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0348p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MONEA FAMILY TRUST I; BROOKE MONEA;

BLAKE MONEA,

Interested Parties-Appellants.

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No. 09-3730

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.

No. 07-00030-002—John R. Adams, District Judge.

Argued: July 30, 2010

Decided and Filed: November 8, 2010 

Before: GILMAN and WHITE, Circuit Judges; WATSON, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas R. Houlihan, AMER CUNNINGHAM CO., L.P.A., Akron, Ohio,

for Appellants. Herbert J. Villa, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas R. Houlihan, AMER

CUNNINGHAM CO., L.P.A., Akron, Ohio, for Appellants. Herbert J. Villa,

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, Robert E. Bulford,

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. 

GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WATSON, D. J.,

joined. WHITE, J. (pp. 13–14), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

1
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Paul Monea and a coconspirator were

convicted of participating in a money-laundering scheme to hide the proceeds of drug

trafficking. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary order of forfeiture

regarding several items of personal property used in the scheme, including a large

diamond that purportedly belonged to Monea. Several parties filed petitions to amend

the order of forfeiture on the basis of their alleged ownership interest in the diamond,

including the Monea Family Trust I–1999 (the Trust), of which Monea and two of his

children were beneficiaries. Holding that the government’s interest in the diamond was

superior to that of all of the claimants, the district court denied the various petitions.

The Trust now appeals the district court’s order. For the following reasons, we

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

The Trust was established in 1999 by Deborah Douglas, who named as

beneficiaries her children, Blake and Brook Monea, and her then-husband, Paul Monea

(hereinafter referred to as Monea). John Tuggle, a business acquaintance of Monea, was

appointed as trustee. Under the terms of the Trust Agreement, the trustee could be

removed by Monea or by a majority vote of all of the beneficiaries. Monea also had the

singular authority to appoint new trustees. The Trust was initially funded with $1,000,

but later acquired ownership of a home near Warren, Ohio that was previously owned

by former boxer Mike Tyson. 

In 2005, Monea completed a term of imprisonment that he had been serving for

an unrelated tax-evasion conviction. Upon his release, Monea discovered that Tuggle
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 3

had misappropriated well in excess of $100,000 of Trust funds. This caused Monea to

remove Tuggle as the trustee in November 2005. 

Tuggle’s replacement died unexpectedly soon after being appointed. Monea then

asked Michael Miller, an acquaintance of Monea’s who owned a car dealership, to serve

as the trustee. During the subsequent months, Miller introduced Monea to John Rizzo,

a sales broker for whom Miller was laundering drug money. Unbeknownst to either

Miller or Monea, Rizzo was actually an undercover agent with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI). 

Monea and Rizzo first met on March 30, 2006 to discuss the possibility of Rizzo

supplying cash for some of Monea’s business ventures. The two men met again on May

19, 2006 in Los Angeles, California. During this meeting, which Rizzo recorded, Monea

mentioned “a diamond that I own,” although he did not seek Rizzo’s assistance in selling

it at the time. The diamond to which Monea referred is a 43.51 Carat Modified

Rectangular Brilliant Yellow Diamond Internally Flawless with Fancy Intense Grate

known as the “Golden Eye.” There is no clear evidence of how Monea first came to

possess the diamond, but he told others involved in this case that he owned a diamond

mine in Africa and that he received the diamond from a friend. 

Prior to being imprisoned for tax evasion, Monea had borrowed $500,000 from

a man named Michael Dillard, who owned a pawn shop in Oklahoma. Monea used the

money to pay taxes that he had owed. He left the diamond in Dillard’s possession as

collateral for the loan. Around the time that Monea first met Rizzo, he borrowed another

$500,000 from an acquaintance named Gerald Deleo to pay off the Dillard loan and

reacquire the diamond. Deleo also gave Monea an additional $30,000 shortly thereafter

to have the diamond readied for sale by gemologists in New York. Monea led Deleo to

believe that the latter would receive an ownership interest in the diamond in exchange

for the monies advanced. Deleo had the diamond in his possession for two to three

weeks sometime after it was readied for sale, during which time Deleo unsuccessfully

searched for a potential buyer.
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 4

In June 2006, Miller, in his capacity as trustee, appointed an acquaintance named

David Ramsey as an agent of the Trust for the limited purpose of retrieving the diamond

from a jeweler in Oklahoma who was holding the diamond on behalf of Dillard. This

arrangement was made, according to Miller, so that the “paper trail” showed “that the

trust bought the stone for $500,000.” Monea and Rizzo spoke shortly after Ramsey

retrieved the diamond, but Monea again did not ask Rizzo for help in finding a buyer for

the gemstone. 

In August and September 2006, Monea and Ramsey engaged in discussions with

representatives from the Charity Fellowship of Truth Church, located in Avon, New

York, regarding the purchase of a lake house in Massillon, Ohio. Monea had rented the

house in the past and had used it to host business associates while negotiating contracts

and discussing his various entrepreneurial ventures. But by August 2006, the home was

in danger of going into foreclosure. Pursuant to the purchase agreement, the church

would buy the lake house from its current owners for approximately $2.5 million. The

Trust then agreed to purchase the home from the church for $3 million within one year

thereafter. 

To secure the Trust’s obligation to ultimately buy the home, the church was to

receive a 50 percent interest in the diamond, as memorialized in a separate “Certificate

of Giving” signed on the same day as the purchase agreement. According to the

purchase agreement, the diamond would be sold, with the proceeds from the sale to first

be used to buy the lake house from the church for $3 million. The remaining balance

from the sale of the diamond would belong to the Trust.

Church representatives present during these discussions testified that Monea and

Ramsey conveyed the impression that the diamond belonged to the Trust and that

Ramsey was acting as the Trust’s agent. They further stated that Miller was present at

a Canton, Ohio country club where both the purchase agreement and the Certificate of

Giving were signed in September 2006. Miller acknowledged meeting the church

representatives at his home earlier on the day in question. Although Miller never

testified as to whether he was present at the country club when the documents were
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 5

signed, he denied participating in any negotiations between the church and Monea and

maintained that he was never informed of any agreement reached by the two parties.

Moreover, Miller said that he had not authorized Ramsey to act on behalf of the Trust

beyond retrieving the diamond from Dillard’s jeweler in Oklahoma. Ramsey, however,

signed both documents on behalf of the Trust, and Monea signed the purchase agreement

as an “acting Trustee” for the Charity Fellowship of Truth Church. 

Following these negotiations, Monea, Ramsey, and Reverend David Moore from

the church took the diamond to Los Angeles and Las Vegas to show to potential buyers.

During part of this time, Reverend Moore had the diamond in his possession without

either Monea or Ramsey being present. Miller was never informed that these showings

were taking place or that Reverend Moore at times had sole custody of the diamond.

That fall, Miller and Monea continued their efforts to sell the diamond, with

Miller hiring at least two different brokers in October 2006 to assist them in finding a

buyer. Miller and Monea met with Rizzo again on October 17, 2006. This time their

discussion, which Rizzo recorded, revolved around Rizzo finding a buyer to purchase

the diamond for $15 million. During their conversation, Monea maintained that he was

“just trying to sell on behalf of the trust an asset that the trust has.” Miller added that

any money from the sale was “going in the trust.” 

In early November 2006, Monea and Rizzo reached an agreement in which

Monea agreed to sell the diamond to drug dealers who Rizzo knew in exchange for $19.5

million and a boat. Discussions regarding commissions, the payment of earnest money,

and the wiring of funds continued through mid-December. Monea typically handled

these negotiations, with little meaningful involvement from Miller, and he met with

Rizzo on one occasion in Las Vegas without Miller being present. On another occasion

in November 2006, when Monea believed that he was nearing the close of a deal, he told

a potential buyer that “I think I got my diamond sold.” 

Monea also gave Miller a list detailing how the proceeds of the sale were to be

disbursed. A majority of the payments to be made were unrelated to either the debts or
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 6

investments of the Trust, and several payments were to be used to discharge personal

debts incurred by Monea. 

On December 13, 2006, Monea, Miller, and Rizzo met at the office of the Trust’s

lawyer, Jack Morrison, to complete the sale of the diamond. Morrison had prepared

several documents to complete the transaction, including a bill of sale, an

acknowledgment and receipt, and a tax return, all of which indicated that the Trust

owned the diamond. At the close of the meeting, Miller and Monea were arrested by the

FBI. 

B. Procedural background

A grand jury charged Monea with one count of conspiracy to launder money, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and three counts of money laundering, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). Miller was charged with one count of conspiracy to launder money

and 36 counts of money laundering. The superseding indictment also sought forfeiture

of several pieces of personal property and real estate used in the money-laundering

scheme, including the diamond. 

Following a jury trial, Monea was convicted on all four counts and was sentenced

to 150 months’ imprisonment. The jury also found that the diamond was involved in the

four counts with which Monea was charged. For his part in the scheme, Miller pled

guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. 

In June 2007, the district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture that

authorized the government to seize various properties used in the money-laundering

scheme, including the diamond. Several parties, including the Charity Fellowship of

Truth Church, Deleo, and the Trust, filed petitions seeking to establish ownership of the

diamond. After the court denied the government’s motion to dismiss all but one of the

petitions, it held a three-day forfeiture hearing in October 2007. 

During the hearing, several witnesses testified that the diamond was a Trust asset.

Miller, as well as the current trustee, Nancy McCann, both testified that the Trust owned

the diamond. Blake Monea similarly testified that he had always understood that the
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 7

diamond belonged to the Trust. None of these witnesses, however, were able to identify

any document that established the Trust’s ownership of the diamond. Furthermore, both

Miller and Blake Monea testified that they arrived at their conclusions regarding the

Trust’s ownership based solely on representations made by Paul Monea. 

Other evidence introduced at the hearing indicated that the Trust did not own the

diamond. Tuggle testified that the diamond never became a trust asset while he was

serving as trustee. John Tanza, the undercover agent posing as Rizzo, likewise testified

that when he first discussed finding a buyer for the diamond, Monea stated that the

diamond was his. Also undercutting the Trust’s claim of ownership was an affidavit of

Paul A. Monea (one of Monea’s sons) that was filed in a bankruptcy case involving the

son’s business. In the affidavit, Paul A. Monea stated that “[t]o the best of my

knowledge the diamond was and is owned by Paul M. Monea, my father, in his

individual capacity.” 

The legitimacy of the Trust was also called into doubt at the hearing. Tuggle, for

example, conceded that when he was trustee, Monea had him “step and fetch and do

whatever [Monea] said.” The Trust, Tuggle further admitted, was in reality Monea’s

“private slush fund[].” Tanza similarly testified that, based on his conversations with

Monea and Miller, “the reason for the trust was to protect the assets of Mr. Monea from

any type of attack from either legal or civil actions.” 

As for Miller, in describing his role as trustee, he stated that he was not involved

in the negotiations with brokers to sell the diamond and would simply sign whatever

broker agreements that Monea presented. Miller also testified that Monea directed him

to sign a document designating Ramsey as an agent of the Trust for the purpose of

picking up the diamond from Dillard’s jeweler in Oklahoma. He further recalled that he

“never had the diamond in my possession, ever”; instead, Monea usually carried the

diamond in a velvet bag in his pants pocket, although Ramsey would “sometimes” carry

it in his pocket.

Following the hearing, the district court denied all of the petitions seeking

ownership of the diamond. Specifically, the court found that the government’s interest
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 8

in the diamond vested on March 30, 2006, the date on which Monea first spoke with

Rizzo, because that was when the conspiracy first began. The court further concluded

that Monea never “surrendered ownership and control of the diamond” to the Trust and

that he “always treated the diamond as his own, despite his representations that it was

an asset of the estate.” Moreover, the court questioned the validity of the Trust.

Although the court declined to make a formal ruling, it noted that “there is strong

evidence that the Trust itself was a sham.” Finally, the court held that none of the other

claimants had established an interest in the diamond superior to that of the government’s.

This timely appeal of the district court’s order, brought by the Trust only, followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of federal forfeiture law.

United States v. Jones, 502 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 2007). Although findings of fact are

reviewed under the clear-error standard, “[t]he issue of whether those facts are sufficient

to constitute a proper criminal forfeiture is reviewed de novo.” Id.

B. The Trust’s interest in the diamond

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), a district court can amend an order of

forfeiture in only two circumstances. The first of these circumstances is where “the

petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property” that “was vested in the

petitioner . . . or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time

of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property.” Id.

§ 853(n)(6)(A). Amending an order of forfeiture is also appropriate where “the

petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest of the property

and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property

was subject to forfeiture under such section.” Id. § 853(n)(6)(B). 

To succeed on a petition to amend a forfeiture order, a claimant must establish

ownership by a preponderance of evidence. Id. § 853(n)(6). The Trust does not argue

that it was a bona fide purchaser of the diamond, so we need address only whether the
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 9

Trust had a vested interest in the diamond when the acts giving rise to the moneylaundering conspiracy occurred. Both parties agree that Ohio law governs. We must

therefore determine (1) whether the Trust had a legal right, title, or interest in the

diamond, and (2) if so, whether that right, title, or interest vested prior to the government

obtaining its interest. 

Turning to the first issue, we note that there is no dispute that the first person to

possess the diamond among all of the interested parties was Monea. There is also no

evidence of any document granting the Trust an ownership interest in the diamond. In

light of these facts, the district court limited its analysis to whether Monea had gifted the

diamond to the Trust, thereby implying that this was the only remaining method that

could have resulted in the transfer of ownership from Monea to the Trust. Neither side

has indicated that any other method of transfer occurred.

Two conditions must be met under Ohio law for a gift to be made. First, there

must be “an intention on the part of the donor to transfer the title and right of possession

of the particular property to the donee.” Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 4 N.E.2d 917, 920

(Ohio 1936). Second, there must be “a delivery by the donor to the donee of the subjectmatter of the gift to the extent practicable or possible considering its nature, with

relinquishment of ownership, dominion, and control over it.” Id. Each of these

conditions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because this

standard is higher than that for establishing an ownership interest under 21 U.S.C.

§ 853(n)(6), a finding that Monea gifted the diamond to the Trust would necessarily

result in a finding that the Trust has an ownership interest in the diamond. 

Regarding the question of donative intent, the district court concluded that, “[a]t

best, . . . Monea’s repeated assertions that the diamond was an asset of the Trust”

evidenced his intent to make a gift to the Trust. Neither party has challenged the court’s

ruling in this regard.

We therefore turn our attention to the second element—whether Monea delivered

the diamond to the Trust by relinquishing ownership, dominion, and control over it. The

Trust contends that such delivery took place when Ramsey picked up the diamond from
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 10

the jeweler in Oklahoma because Ramsey was acting as an agent of the Trust at that

time. Once Ramsey retrieved the diamond, however, he never gave it to the Trust.

Rather, Monea permitted Deleo to have the diamond for two to three weeks while

shopping it to potential buyers. There is no evidence that the Trust approved or was ever

aware of this arrangement. 

Upon repossessing the diamond, Monea typically carried it in his pants pocket,

with Ramsey “sometimes” doing the same. On the other hand, Miller, then serving as

the trustee, never had the diamond in his possession and had no input “on where the

diamond would go and where it would be.” The fact that Monea and Ramsey never

surrendered possession of the diamond to the trustee weighs strongly against a finding

of delivery to the Trust. See LCP Holding Co. v. Taylor, 817 N.E.2d 439, 445 (Ohio Ct.

App. 2004) (holding that “delivery occurred when appellee surrendered possession of

the stock and endorsed the stock to his children as owners”). 

In addition to not surrendering possession of the diamond, Monea continued to

keep it for his personal use. He promised Deleo an interest in the diamond in exchange

for money to pay off Monea’s debt to Dillard and to have the diamond readied for sale.

Soon thereafter, Monea and Ramsey entered into a Certificate of Giving with Charity

Fellowship of Truth Church that granted the church a 50 percent security interest in the

diamond. Although Ramsey stated in the Certificate that he was acting on behalf of the

Trust, Miller denied any knowledge of the church obtaining an interest in the diamond

or that Monea and Ramsey were even participating in such negotiations. Miller was also

never informed that Monea, Ramsey, and Reverend Moore were showing the diamond

to potential buyers in Los Angeles and Las Vegas or that Reverend Moore at times had

sole custody of the diamond.

The Trust defends these actions by claiming that both Monea and Ramsey were

acting as agents of the Trust, but we find this argument unpersuasive. There is no

evidence in the record that the Trust ever appointed Monea to be an agent or entrusted

him with the diamond in any other capacity. In fact, the only evidence that Monea was

negotiating on behalf of any party is when he signed the purchase agreement as a trustee
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 11

of the church. And although documentation exists appointing Ramsey as an agent of the

Trust, it specifically limited his authority to “the purpose of delivering $500,000 (Five

Hundred Thousand Dollars) payment to Mike Dillard and the receipt of any material at

the time of payment.” Monea and Ramsey then proceeded to engage in negotiations to

sell the diamond not only without the Trust’s knowledge, but also well beyond any scope

of agency that either potentially had with the Trust. 

The evidence also shows that the primary beneficiary of these negotiations was

to be Monea himself rather than the Trust. Monea sought ownership of the Massillon

lake house so that he could continue to entertain business clients at the residence, and

the majority of the proceeds from the planned December 2006 sale of the diamond was

earmarked for Monea’s personal debts and investments. He even referred to the

gemstone as “my diamond” on at least one occasion during conversations with potential

buyers. And because Monea continued to use the diamond for his own purposes and did

not surrender possession of it, delivery of the diamond to the Trust never occurred.

The Trust nevertheless contends that testimony from the forfeiture hearing

regarding its ownership of the diamond was unrebutted and therefore conclusively

establishes that the diamond was a Trust asset. To support this assertion, the Trust relies

upon Howard v. Himmelrick, No. 03AP-1034, 2004 WL 1405293 (Ohio Ct. App. June

24, 2004). In Howard, the fiancée of a recently deceased man sued to recover

possession of several pieces of personal property located in the man’s home when he

died, but which she claimed were hers. Following a hearing, the trial court determined

that the property belonged to the fiancée. The man’s children, who had refused to

surrender possession of the items, argued on appeal that this ruling was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Although the only evidence that the fiancée had

retained ownership of the property was her own testimony, there was no other evidence

refuting her statements. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that such unrebutted testimony

was “competent and credible evidence” of ownership and, accordingly, that the trial

court’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at *3.
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 12

But the Trust misreads Howard. In that case, the deceased’s children challenged

the trial court’s determination that the disputed personal property belonged to the

fiancée. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the children’s argument in light of the

fiancée’s testimony that she had not given the items to the deceased and the lack of any

evidence to the contrary. Howard, 2004 WL 1405293, at *3.

In contrast, there is significant evidence in the present case supporting the

conclusion that Monea never made a gift of the diamond to the Trust. Howard is

therefore distinguishable. In sum, the Trust has not shown by clear and convincing

evidence that Monea ever relinquished ownership, dominion, and control over the

diamond. See Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 4 N.E. 2d 917, 920 (Ohio 1936). The district

court thus did not err in finding that no gift had been made. We therefore have no need

to address the Trust’s claim that its interest in the diamond vested prior to the

government’s forfeiture claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 13

________________________

CONCURRENCE

________________________

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge (concurring). I write separately to make

clear that my concurrence is based on the deference owed to the district court as finder

of fact, and on the unique facts of the case. I do not regard Monea’s retention of

considerable control over the diamond and the trustee as invalidating an intended gift to

the trust, if such a gift was in fact intended. 

The trust at issue here was a family trust, created by Monea’s ex-wife for Monea

and their children. The ex-wife did not fund the trust, except in an insignificant amount.

Apparently, the parties contemplated that Monea would do so if he chose. In such

situations, it is common for the co-beneficiary/parent/donor to give assets to the trust and

simultaneously exercise a significant degree of control over the assets. It is also

common for settlors of trusts, or beneficiaries granted the power, to name trustees over

whom they have considerable control. Although this degree of control may possibly

have tax consequences, it does not negate the fact that the assets are owned by the trust.

Under the circumstances here, I do not think it was necessary for Monea to do

more than declare the diamond to be a trust asset and so inform the trustee. It has been

said that bad facts make bad law, and I am concerned that we not do so here. Had

Monea not been involved in money laundering, but had remarried and left the residuary

of his estate to his second wife, I doubt that we would hold that his retained control of

the management of the diamond rendered it an asset of his estate, belonging to his

second wife, rather than an asset of the trust, belonging to his children.

Notwithstanding these observations, however, I concur in the affirmance because

I believe that there were circumstances from which the district court could have

concluded that Monea’s retained control and other conduct reflected that he intended that

the diamond be an asset of the trust in name only, and did not intend to transfer true

ownership to the trust. Although the district court’s analysis proceeded along a different

path, I understand this to be the import of the district court’s observation that “While
No. 09-3730 United States v. Monea Family Trust I et al. Page 14

Monea consistently shopped the diamond to buyers and investors, there is no evidence

that he did so with authority from the Trustee. Rather, the evidence indicates that Monea

always treated the diamond as his own, despite his representations that it was an asset

of the estate.” On this basis, I concur.