* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determ ined th at this opinio n should not be published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set fo rth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED July 27, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30057 Summary Calendar

WILLARD E. GOLDEN, Pl aint iff- Appellee,

versus OMNI ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Texas Civil Act io n No. 6:05-CV-02100-RTH-CMH

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal of William E. Golden’s personal injury claims against Omni Energy Services Corp. (“Omni”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm t he district court’s judgment.2 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Golden, a Texas resident, was the passenger in a helico pter th at crashed near Mouton Cove, Loui siana. Golden filed suit against Omni in federal district court. Golden later joined the helicopter owner, American Helicopters, Inc. (“American Helicopters”), wit h the consent of Omni. The joinder of American Helicopters, a Texas corporation and cit izen, destroyed com plete diversity between the parties. Omni filed a mo tion for reco nsideration, requesting that the district court reconsider its g ranting leave fo r Golden to jo in American Helicopters as a defendant. The district court denied Omni’s mo tion for reconsideration. Counsel fo r Omni th en attem pted to negoti ate a sti

pulation wit h Golden’s counsel th at would permit dismissal of American Helicopters and restore the district court’s diversity jurisdiction over th e cas e. The parties never reached an agreement, however, on the proposed language of the sti pulation. On November 8, 2006, Golden filed a motion to dismiss fo r l ack of subj ect matter jurisdiction because the joinder of American Helicopters defeated com plete diversity of citizenship
amo ng th e parties. On November 28, 2006, Omni moved the district court to retain jurisdiction under th e Outer Continent al Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) or alternatively, to dismiss the claims against American Helicopters and retain diversity jurisdiction. Omni reiterated these arguments in its opposition brief to Golden’s mo tion to dismiss fo r lack of subject mat ter jurisdiction. On December 14, 2006, th e district court ruled from the bench th at it lacked jurisdiction under OCSLA and dismissed Golden ’s claims against American Helicopters for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Shortl y th ereafter, on January 8, 2007, the district court denied Omni’s mo tion to retain jurisdiction because it s prior rul

ing render ed the m

otion moot. The district court then dismissed without prejudice the entire action. Omni timely appeals.3 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This court reviews de novo th e district court’s dismissal of a case based on lack of subject mat ter jurisdiction. P ositive Softw are Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. , 436 F.3d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 2006). We review the district court’s decision to not cure the jurisdictional defect, by dismissing th e non-diverse defendant pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 21, fo r abuse of discretion. Moore v. Knowles , 482 F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1973). III. DISCUSSION A. Under OCSLA, federal district courts shall exercise jurisdiction over “cases and controversies arising out of

, or in connection wit h
. . . any o perati on conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which invo lves exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil, and seabed of th e outer Continental Shelf . . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A). Omni argues that the helicopter accident giving ri se to Golden’s alleged personal injuries fal l wit hin the scope of OCSLA’s jur isdictional provi sio n. According to Omni, the jurisdictional provision does not entail a situs requirement; inst ead, th e court must determ ine if the accident would not have occurred b ut for operations on th e Continental Shelf. In this case, the helicopter accident happened while transporting Golden to his jo b on an of

fsho re platform in the Gulf of Mexico in West Cameron Blo ck 280, a work sit e lo cated on th e Continental Shelf. For these reasons, Omni argues that the district court erred in finding no jurisdiction under OCSLA. OCSLA merely establishes jurisdiction while conferring no substantive rights. In O ffshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire , th e Supreme Court held th at OCSLA does not “requi re or perm

it [courts] to extend th e coverage of th e statute to platf orm workers” injured “miles away from the4

platform and on th e high seas” based solely on their occupational status. 477 U.S. 207, 219 (1986). The scope of OCSLA’s coverage must be “determined principally by lo cale.” I d. I n line wit h th e Court’s int erpretation of OCSLA, th e Fift h Circuit in Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc. , set fo rth th ree conditions fo r employing OCSLA: “(1) The controversy must arise on a sit us covered by OCSLA (i .e. the subsoil, seabed or artificial structures p ermanently or tem

porarily attached thereto). (2) Federal marit ime law must not apply of it s own fo rce. (3) The state l aw must not be inconsistent with Federal law.” 448 F.3d 760, 774 (5th Cir. 2006). For OCSLA jurisdictional purposes, both cases compel the district court to take into account th e lo cation of incidents giving ri se to the lawsuit. Here, the undisputed facts show that the helicopter accident giving ri se to Golden’s lawsuit did not occur on the Continental Shelf. The helicopter crash inst ead occurred in a field near Mouton C ove, Louisiana. Therefore, the di strict court cannot exercise jurisdiction over instant lawsuit under OCSLA. B. FRCP Rule 21 provides th at “[m]isjoinder of parties is not grounds fo r dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on mo tion of any party or of it s own init iat ive at any stage of th e action and on such terms as are just.” More specifically, “Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allo w a dispensible nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has b een rendered.” G rupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P. , 541 U.S. 567, 572 (2004) (emphasis added). Omni argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the
case because Golden jo ined American Helicopters seven and a half mo nt hs aft er filing the lawsuit, and Omni and American Helicopters are clo s ely related in such a manner th at Omni could be held responsible for any liability of American Helicopters under governing Louisiana laws.5

The district court deter mined that despite the available theories under Louisiana law for Golden to hold Omni l

iable fo r American Helicopters’ actions, the entities are still separate corporations. The district court stated to Om ni’s counsel that “although you are willing to waive that protection, [by sti

pulating th at Omni and American Helicopters are alt er egos], [Golden is] not willing to waive the jurisdictional issue . . . .” At th e time of th e district court’s dismissal, the parties had yet to conduct discovery and the only evidence of th e com

pany’s association was an affidavit provided by Omni. Golden persuasively argues that in due course, further discovery may reveal insurance policies and theories of recovery requiring American Helicopt ers to be a party fo r the maximum prosecution of Golden’s claims. Moreover, in this case, Omni init ially consented to the jo inder of American Helicopters until realizing th at this addition defeated th e court’s diversity jurisdiction. Finally, t he mere possibility of American Helicopters and Omni qualifying as alt er egos of one another does not render American Helicopters dispensable to this lit igation. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing t he entire case without prejudice as opposed to curing the jurisdictional defect. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.