J-A20023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JANE DOE (L.G.) 

Appellant

v.

HAND AND STONE FRANCHISE 

CORPORATION, RUFFENACH, G., 

LLC, T/A HAND & STONE 

PHOENIXVILLE-OAKS, CATHERINE 

RUFFENACH & GERARD RUFFENACH, 

W/H STEVEN M. WALDMAN AND 

STEVEN WALDMAN MASSAGE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 862 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No: 190903709

JANE DOE (L.G.) 

Appellant

v.

HAND AND STONE FRANCHISE 

CORPORATION, RUFFENACH, G., 

LLC, T/A HAND & STONE 

PHOENIXVILLE-OAKS, CATHERINE 

RUFFENACH & GERARD RUFFENACH, 

W/H STEVEN M. WALDMAN AND 

STEVEN WALDMAN MASSAGE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 863 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No: 190903709
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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2022

Appellant, Jane Doe (L.G.), appeals from two February 17, 2022 orders 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting 

summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Hand and Stone Franchise 

Corporation, Ruffenach, G. LLC t/a Hand and Stone Phoenixville-Oaks Spa, 

Catherine Ruffenach and Gerard Ruffenach, w/h, Steven M. Waldman, and 

Steven Waldman Massage. Following review, we affirm.

In its Memorandum Opinion, the trial court explained:

[Appellant] commenced this personal injury action on September 

30, 2019, by writ of summons. A complaint was filed on 

November 13, 2019. In her complaint, [Appellant] alleged that 

she was sexually assaulted by [Appellee] Steven M. Waldman 

(“Waldman”) at Hand and Stone Franchise Corp (“Hand and 

Stone”) on April 9, 2016. After the assault, [Appellant] confided 

about the abuse to her friends but did not notify the police as she 

felt it would be her word against his. Waldman ceased 

employment months after the assault. 

Almost two years after the assault, [Appellant] informed 

[Appellee] Hand & Stone of the 2016 assault.[1] Sometime in 

November of 2018, [Appellant] learned that [Appellee] Waldman 

was arrested and charged with the sexual assault of massage 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court suggests that Appellant’s report of the April 9, 2016 assault 

was made “almost two years after the assault,” citing Appellant’s Complaint 

at ¶ 33 (“In early 2018, [Appellant] bravely informed Hand and Stone of the 

assault.”). However, testimony and documentary evidence from Appellant’s 

deposition reflect that she reported the April 9, 2016 incident on May 10, 2018 

when she returned to the Hand and Stone location after the events of April 

2016. See Appellant’s Deposition, 11/20/20, at 31-32, 35-36. 
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therapy clients. “Only after [Appellant] learned of [Appellee] 

Waldman’s other victims, did [Appellant] appreciate the gravity of 

what happened to her[.]”

On November 1, 2021, Hand & Stone filed a motion for summary 

judgment. On November 2, 2021, the Ruffenach defendants filed 

a motion for summary judgment as well. On February 14, 2022, 

the court granted the motions and dismissed [Appellant’s] 

complaint as time barred. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/22, at 1-2 (citations to Appellant’s Complaint 

omitted). 

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal from both orders and the appeals 

were consolidated by order of this Court entered on May 6, 2022.2 Appellant 

asks us to consider four issues in this appeal:

1. Did the trial court err in granting Appellees’ Motions for 

Summary Judgment grounds [sic] where the discovery rule 

tolled the statute of limitations of Appellant[’]s claims such that 

her Complaint was timely filed?

2. Did the trial court err in granting Appellees’ Motions for 

Summary Judgment where Appellees’ fraudulent concealment 

tolled the statute of limitations on Appellant[’]s claims such 

that her Complaint was timely filed?

3. Did the trial court err in granting Appellees’ Motions for 

Summary Judgment where there existed genuine issues of 

material fact that should have been presented to a jury?

4. Did the trial court err in granting Appellees’ Motions for 

Summary Judgment where the trial court was estopped from 

addressing whether Appellant’s claims were within the statute 

of limitations?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.

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2 The trial court did not order the filing of Rule 1925(b) statements. 
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“In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Bourgeois v. Snow 

Time, Inc., 242 A.3d 637, 649 (Pa. 2020) (citing Pyeritz v. Commonwealth

of Pa., State Police Dep't, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (Pa. 2011)). “A trial court 

should grant summary judgment only in cases where the record contains no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Id. at 649-50 (citing Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997

A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010)). “An appellate court may reverse a grant of 

summary judgment only if the trial court erred in its application of the law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. at 650 (citing Summers, 997 A.2d at 1159).

In her first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by granting 

summary judgment because the discovery rule tolled the statute of 

limitations. In Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005), our Supreme Court 

stated:

The Judicial Code provides in pertinent part that limitations 

periods are computed from the time the cause of action 

accrued. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5502(a). In Pennsylvania, a cause of action 

accrues when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action 

to a successful conclusion. Thus, we have stated that the statute 

of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and 

maintain a suit arises. Pocono International Raceway, Inc. v.

Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983). 

Generally speaking, in a suit to recover damages for personal 

injuries, this right arises when the injury is inflicted. See Ayers 

v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788, 791 (1959). Mistake, 

misunderstanding, or lack of knowledge in themselves do not toll 

the running of the statute. Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa.

89, 204 A.2d 473, 475 (1964). Pocono International, 468 A.2d

at 471. Once a cause of action has accrued and the prescribed 
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statutory period has run, an injured party is barred from bringing 

his cause of action. Id.

Id. at 857 (some citations omitted). See also Rice v. Diocese of AltoonaJohnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246-47 (Pa. 2021). The Court in Fine also noted 

that 

when a court is presented with the assertion of the discovery rule’s 

application, it must address the ability of the damaged party, 

exercising reasonable diligence, to ascertain that he has been 

injured and by what cause. Since this question involves a factual 

determination as to whether a party was able, in the exercise of 

reasonable diligence, to know of his injury and its cause, 

ordinarily, a jury is to decide it. Where, however, reasonable 

minds would not differ in finding that a party knew or should have 

known on the exercise of reasonable diligence of his injury and its 

cause, the court determines that the discovery rule does not apply 

as a matter of law.

Fine, 870 A.2d at 858-59 (citations omitted). 

The trial court in the instant action found that Appellant “admits that 

she had actual knowledge of the assault and that Waldman caused her injury 

on April 9, 2016. [She] had two years to commence an action against the 

defendants; she did not. Accordingly, her action is time barred.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/8/22, at 3.

We agree. The record reflects that Appellant knew immediately that she 

had suffered an injury and knew that Waldman was the cause. See 

Appellant’s Complaint at ¶¶ 26-31. For instance, in Paragraph 31, Appellant 

asserted that upon checking out at Hand and Stone after the assault, 

[s]he went to her car in the parking lot and cried. [She] felt upset, 

angry, and scared. Immediately following the assault, [she] 

confided about the abuse to a few of her friends. [She] did not 
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contact law enforcement at this time as she did not think police 

would believe her, and felt it would be her word against [] 

Waldman’s. 

Id. at ¶ 31. Moreover, her deposition testimony recounting the details of the 

assault reveals her recognition that Waldman’s actions caused her to be 

“basically frozen in fear” as “[h]e was breathing heavily and pressing his 

erection into the side of [her] head.” Appellant’s Deposition, 11/20/20, at 19-

20. She testified that when she left the facility, she went to her car “and sat 

there for a long time. I cried, and tried to figure out what I should do next.” 

Id. at 27. She considered calling the police or going back into the reception

area and speaking with the receptionist or a manager, but did not. However, 

she did talk with a few people on her phone while still in the Hand and Stone 

parking lot. Id. at 29. She explained, “I don’t recall exactly what was said in 

those phone conversations, but I do remember telling them that I had been 

just sexually assaulted by my massage therapist and that I was scared.” Id. 

at 31. 

Because reasonable minds would not differ in finding that Appellant 

knew of her injury and its cause on April 9, 2016, the trial court properly and 

correctly determined that the discovery rule does not apply as a matter of law. 

See Fine, 870 A.2d at 858-59. Appellant’s first issue fails. 

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred by granting summary 

judgment because Appellees’ fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of 

limitations. Appellant’s argument is meritless.
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As Appellees recognize, “The doctrine of fraudulent concealment ‘is 

based on a theory of estoppel’ which acts to toll the statute of limitations only 

where a defendant ‘through fraud or concealment . . . causes the appellant to 

relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry into the facts.’” Hand 

and Stone Brief at 39 (quoting Fine, 870 A.2d at 860). See also Ruffenach 

Brief at 11 (citing, inter alia, Fine and Rice, supra). Moreover, “in order for 

fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations, the defendant must 

have committed some affirmative independent act of concealment upon which 

the appellant justifiable relied.” Hand and Stone Brief at 40 (quoting 

Kingston Coal Co. v. Felton Mining Co., Inc., 690 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa. 

Super. 1997)). 

Appellant contends that Hand and Stone “had a moral and ethical 

obligation to report what happened to me as soon as I told them and, instead 

of putting it in my hands and making it my decision and asking me what they 

should do or what I wanted them to do[.]” Id. at 43 (quoting Appellant’s 

Deposition, 11/20/20, at 42-43). However, as Hand and Stone recognizes, 

Appellant did not even report the incident to Appellees until May 18, 2018, 

more than two years after the assault, by which time the statute of limitations 

had already run. Id. at 42.

Quoting Rice, supra, Hand and Stone explains that the doctrine of 

fraudulent concealment does not apply in the instant case. Id. at 44-46. See 

also Ruffenach Brief at 11-14. In Rice, our Supreme Court stated, inter alia, 
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that “before a plaintiff may invoke the principles of fraudulent concealment, 

the plaintiff must use reasonable diligence to investigate her claims.” Rice, 

255 A.3d at 253. The Court held that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s 

claim “accrued when she knew she was injured by [her abuser].” Id. As in 

Rice, Appellant here had two years to investigate Appellees’ role, if any, in 

causing her injury. Even if Appellees were somehow obligated to disclose 

events that Appellant had not even reported to them, “the failure to do so 

does not excuse [Appellant’s] own failure to conduct any investigation” into 

Appellees as an additional cause of her injury. Id. at 254. 

The doctrine of fraudulent concealment does not operate to toll the 

statute of limitations under the facts of this case. Appellant’s second issue 

fails.

In her third issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting 

summary judgment despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact. 

We find no merit in this contention. Appellant was assaulted on April 9, 2016. 

Because neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended the 

limitations period, Appellant’s statute of limitations expired on April 9, 2018. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(1). Appellant did not initiate her action until September 

30, 2019, more than two years after the assault. There is no genuine issue 

of material fact at play here and Appellees were entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Appellant’s third issue does not afford her any relief.
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In her fourth issue, Appellant asserts trial court error based on a 

violation of the coordinate jurisdiction rule. However, the coordinate 

jurisdiction rule does not operate to prevent the grant of summary judgment 

based on an earlier denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, 

e.g., Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 586 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing 

Goldey v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, 675 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 

1996) (coordinate jurisdiction rule does not apply where two motions differ 

in kind)); Petrongola v. Comcast-Spectator, 789 A.2d 204, 214-15 (Pa. 

Super. 2001 (recognizing that coordinate jurisdiction rule does not prevent 

judge from granting summary judgment after denying judgment on the 

pleadings). As in the instant case, the trial court’s denial of judgment on the 

pleadings in Petrongola was based on the pleadings only, whereas when 

considering the motions for summary judgment, “the trial court had a plethora 

of new information.” Id. at 215. 

The coordinate jurisdiction rule is not implicated here. Appellant’s fourth 

issue fails.

Because the trial court neither erred in its application of the law nor 

abused its discretion, we shall not disturb its grant of summary judgment in 

favor of Appellees. 

Judgments affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2022