No. 95-241 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

BRET CHRISTOFFERSON, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Respondent and Respondent. i\l.l(j % 9 ,1995 

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APPEAL FROM: District Court of the ~welfth"~~&@T~1"b4Y?~ict, 

In and for the County of Liberty, 

The Honorable John Warner, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Bret Christofferson, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; 

Patricia Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

Merle Raph, Special Deputy Liberty County Attorney, 

Shelby, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: August 4, 1995 

Decided: August 29, 1995 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Bret Christofferson appeals from an order of the Twelfth 

Judicial District Court, Liberty County, denying his petition for 

post-conviction relief. We affirm. 

In the absence of a statement of the issue by Christofferson, 

we state the issue as whether the District Court erred in denying 

the petition for post-conviction relief. 

In January 1992, Christofferson was adjudged guilty of 

burglary, based upon a plea bargain. He was sentenced to ten 

years' imprisonment, with five years suspended. The court set 

forth ten terms and conditions of probation for the period of 

suspension. 

Christofferson began serving his prison sentence on January 

22, 1992, and was paroled on April 8, 1993. In December 1993, the 

State of Montana petitioned for revocation of Christofferson's 

suspended sentence because he had violated terms and conditions of 

the January 1992 judgment. After a hearing, the District Court 

revoked the suspended portion of Christofferson's sentence and 

ordered that he shall serve the remaining portion of his ten-year 

sentence at the Montana State Prison, with credit given for time 

expired on the sentence. 

Christofferson was returned to Montana State Prison. There, 

the Board of Pardons notified him that it had revoked his remaining 

parole time on the non-suspended portion of his sentence. 

Christofferson wrote to the District Court in protest, arguing that 

he is being subjected to double jeopardy. 
Construing Christofferson's letter in a manner in which relief 

could possibly be granted at that stage of the proceedings, the 

District Court considered the letter as a petition for postconviction relief. It asked for a response from the State of 

Montana. The court subsequently ruled that it did not constitute 

double jeopardy for it to revoke the suspended part of Christof ferson's sentence and for the Board of Pardons to revoke his parole on 

the non-suspended portion of the sentence. Christofferson appeals. 

Did the District Court err in denying the petition for postconviction relief? 

The facts underlying Christofferson's petition for postconviction relief are not in dispute. In reviewing a district 

court's denial of post-conviction relief, we will not overturn the 

court's legal conclusions if the court's interpretation of the law 

is correct. Wagner v. State (Mont. 1995), 889 P.2d 1189, 1190, 52 

St.Rep. 61, 61. 

Christofferson's argument is based on his perception that, at 

the revocation hearing, the District Court determined that he had 

already finished the non-suspended portion of his sentence and that 

the court then gave him credit for it. While that perception may 

be valid, at least in part, Christofferson's conclusion is not 

valid. 

In ruling on the petition for post-conviction relief, the 

District Court stated: 

At the revocation hearing there may have been some 

confusion because there was no record of whether the 
first, non-suspended portion of the sentence had been 

discharged because of a grant of good time credit. 

The court went on to describe why the apparent confusion had no 

effect : 

However, it is clear from the order of February 18, 1994, 

and it was the intention of the court that the suspended 

portion of the sentence was revoked. 

The revocation order clearly states: 

[TI he suspended portion of the sentence is revoked and 

that the Defendant shall serve the remaining portion of 

his 10 year sentence at the Montana State Prison, with 

credit given for time expired on such sentence. 

Under Montana law, the District Court did not have power to 

release Christofferson from parole. 

When a prisoner on parole or conditional release has 

performed the obligations of his release, the board shall 

make a final order or discharge and issue a certificate 

of discharge to the prisoner. 

Section 46-23-216(2), MCA. It was up to the Board of Pardons, not 

the District Court, to determine when the parole time had been 

completed on the non-suspended portion of Christofferson's 

sentence. Nothing in the record indicates that the Board of 

Pardons determined that Christofferson had met the obligations of 

his release on that portion of his sentence. 

We further note that orders of the Board of Pardons are not 

reviewable. Section 46-23-107, MCA. The decision of the Board of 

Pardons is therefore not subject to consideration in this action 

for post-conviction relief, at either the District Court level or 

by this Court 

The action taken by the District Court at the revocation 

hearing, however, is supported by Montana case law. This Court has 
held that a suspension of sentence may be revoked for acts of a 

probationer after sentence is imposed but before the probationer 

actually begins serving the suspended sentence. State v. Sullivan 

(1982), 197 Mont. 395, 642 P.2d 1008. Therefore, we conclude that 

the District Court had the power to revoke Christofferson's 

suspended sentence even if he was still serving the non-suspended 

part of his sentence. 

We conclude that any misunderstanding at the revocation 

hearing regarding the expiration of the non-suspended portion of 

Christofferson's sentence was irrelevant, because the District 

Court did not have the authority to make decisions regarding 

Christofferson's parole. Because the District Court was within its 

authority in revoking the suspended portion of the sentence, we 

hold that it did not err in denying the petition for post-conviction relief. 

Affirmed.