2007 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

5-17-2007 

# U S A v . W o o d

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ock e t N o . 06-1372

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2007

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2007 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

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w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2007/1029PREC EDENTIAL
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

No. 06-1372

UNI TED STATES

v. SHAHEED WOOD, Appellant

On Appea l from the United States District Court

fo r t he Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Pe nn sylva

nia (D.C. Criminal No. 04-00431) Ho n o rab l e J

. C urt i s J o y

n er , Di s tri ctJ u d ge
Argued Mar ch 16, 2007
BEF ORE: FUEN TES, GREENBE RG and L OURI E*, Circuit J udg es

(F iled: May

17, 2007)

Mark S. Gre enber g (ar g ued) La C h e e nD i x o nW i t t e l s & G r e e nb e r g LLP 1429 Walnut S tree t, Suit e 1301 Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorney

for Appe llant
Patrick L . Meeha

n United States Attorney J ose R. Artea g a (a

rgued)

*Honora ble Alan D. L ourie, United States Circuit Judge f or the Fe dera l Circuit, sit ting by desig nation.2 Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert A. Z auzmer Assistant U.S. Attorney Chi e f o f A

pp e a ls United States Attorney ’s Off ice 615 Chestnut St ree t Philadelphia, PA 19106 Attorney s for Appe llee

OPI NI ONOF TH E CO UR T

GREENB ERG, Circuit J udg e.

I . I NTRODUCTI ON A jury convicted Shahe ed Wood of conspira cy to interfer e with interstate commer ce by robber y , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 19 51 (a ), int e rf

e re nc e wi th i nte rs tate c omm e rc e by ro bb e ry , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 18 U .S.C. § 2, and using and c arr yinga fi re arm duri ngand

in r e latio n to a

c ri me of vio le nc e , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). B ased on the se convic tions, the district court sentenc ed Wood to a total custodial term of 240 months to be followed by

five y ear s of supervise d rele ase. The court e ntere d a judg ment ref

lectingthis dispos ition on J anuar y 27, 2006. Wood appea ls, assertingthat the district court e rre d in denying his motion for a mistrial given what he c ontends wer e the pr osecutor’ s improper state me nts in h is c los ingargume nt t o th e jur y . Wo od fu rt he r a sse rt s that the district court e rre d in imposi ng a 6-le vel sentenc ing enhanc ement for

his assault on a police of fice r pursua

nt to U.S.S .G. § 3A1.2(c ). F or the re asons we se t forth below, we will affirm Wood’s c onvic tio n b ut w ill va c a te his se nte nc e , a nd wi ll r e mand

the c a se to the district court for

rese ntencing

.

I I . F AC TS A

ND PRO CED UR

AL HI STO RY
Af te r a jur y ha s r e tur ne d a g uil ty ve rd ic t w e are bo un d to interpre t the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the g overnme nt.I t is undispu t ed t h at Demota wa s approximately 35 to 40 fee t 1
awa y from the s u s p ec t s at this point and, beca use it was nig httime, streetlig hts aided him in his identification and pursuit eff orts. 3 Un ite d St a te s v . Pung ito re , 9 10 F .2 d 1 08 4, 10 97 (3 d Ci r. 19 90 ). With that premise in mind, we of fer the followingbackground fa cts which we note that, except for the identific ation of Wood as a fle eingrobber , seem not to be in dispute.
On J anuar

y 10, 2004, employ ees of

the Pep B oy s Automotive Store locate d at 4101 Marke t Street in West P hiladelphia we re prepa ringto close for

the eve ning when seve ral men w ear ing da rk clothes, blac k g loves, and masks e ntere d the pre mises and, at g unpoint, ordere d the employ ees to g et down on the f loor. At the same time, unbeknownst to the robbers, Philadelphia police office rs Martin Demota a

nd Marque rite Wilcox , dresse d in full uniform, were enter ing the parkinglot adjace nt to the Pep Boy s service are a in a marke d police vehic le. As De mota exit ed his vehicle , he noticed a masked man in the store ’s servic e bay are a and r ealized a r obbery was takin g pla c e . D e mot a

the n h e ard

so me on e fr om i ns ide the sto re y e ll, “one time,” a stree t slang term used to sig nal police pr esenc e. As the ro bb e rs be g an to fl e e in v ari ou s d ir e c tio ns , D e mot a he ard g un sh ots . H e tur

ne d w e st at th e c or

ne r o nto Ma

rk e t Str e e t, from which va

ntag e point he obser

ved a f oot coming out of

the front window of the store . Ultimately , Demota sa w two men eme rg e fr om the sto re ’s fr on t do or , o ne thi n a nd the oth e r m or e he avy se t. 1 Although D emota, who wa s y elling “ stop, police,” wa s unable to see either ma n’s fa ce, he observe d the thinner individual take something from the he avy set one, at which point there w as gunfire f rom one of the men. De mota, uninjured, re turned gunfire a nd watche d as the thinner man e scape d, runningwest on Mar ket Street a

nd north on 42nd Street. The he avy set man wa s not as lucky . After fallingto the g round, he g ot up and hea ded in the same direc tion as the thinner man. Duringthe pursuit Demota lost sight of the heavy set man for a pp ro ximate ly

fi ve se c on ds wh e n, tur

nin g the c or

ne r o f 4 2n d Stre e t, he no tic e d a

n in div idu a l – l a te r i de nti fi e d a s Woo d – a pp ro ximate ly eig ht to ten fee t in front of him. Wood fit t he desc ription of the heavy set man. De mota arr ested Wood who false ly told him t hat he worke d at Pep B oy s. On Marc h 9, 2005, a g rand jury in the Easter

n District of Pe nn sylva

nia re tur ne d a thr e e -c ount s up e rs e din g ind ic tme nt a g a ins tThe g rand jury orig inally

indicted Wood on J uly

27, 2004. 2
4 Wood char g ing him with the off enses we listed above. The trial 2 be g an o n July

5, 20 05 . A t th e tr ia l, t

he de fe ns e , in

an e ff or t to undermine D emota’s identific ation of Wood as the heavy set man, focuse d on the circ umstances surr ounding the commission of the crime a nd Demota’ s identification of the f leeingrobber . In particula r, the de fe ns e c ite d th e da

rk ne ss; the dis tanc e s f

ro m w hic h D e mot a made his obser

vations; Demota’s inability to observe the fac es of the suspects who fle d from the store ; Demota’s “ excited state-of- mind” a ft e r t he fl e e ingme n s ho t at hi m; a nd the tim e duri ngwh ic h D e mot a lost sight of the suspec ts while pursuing them. Not surprising ly , the prosec utor counter ed by citing e vidence that te nd e d to bo lst e r D e mot a ’s ide nti fi c a tio n. Am on g oth e r t hin g s, the prosec utor pointed out that a surve illance video ha d captur ed the imag e of two a

rmed men w ear ing ma sks and black c lothing and Demota ha d testified that a lar g e blac k jacke t he re cover ed fr om Wood was simil ar to the one that one of the robber s in the videotape wore . Moreove r, De mota identified Wood as the heavy set man fr om the videotape . There was a dditional support for the prose cutor’s c ase, though pe rhaps not dire ctly pointing to Wood, as items found at the c ri me sc e ne and

in t he surr ound ingare a

inc lud e d c art

ri dg e c a sin g s, two firea rms, sever al live rounds of a mmuniti on, black ski masks, a black knitted ca

p, black knitted g loves, loose coins, and a roll of duct tape.
Th e re wa s a lso highly inc ri min a tin g e vid e nc e po int ingdir e c tly a t Woo d in a smu c h a s th e po lic e ha d f ound a g old 19 97 Ol ds mob ile p ar k e d o na s tr e e ta d j a c e n tt o , b u tp o i n t i n g aw ay f r o m , th e P e p B o ys that belong ed to Wood’s gir lfriend Stacy Dawkins a

nd for whic h Wood had the only

set of key s. As it happens, Da wkins lent Wood her c ar the day

of the robbe ry . L ater

that evening , office rs re cover ed the followingitems from the ca r: a pink cle aningrec eipt with Wood’s name on it; a holster; a bla ck knitted skullcap; a bla ck knitted hat; and the key s, which had be en lef t in the ignition.
Th e pa rt ie s, in t he ir c los ingargume nts , c on tin ue d to a dd

re ss the identification issue. Aga in drawingattention to what he r eg arde d as inconsistencie s in Demota’s testimony , Wood’s attorney argued, amon g oth e r t

hin g s, that: [M]e mbe rs of

the jur y , ju st a s Po lic e Of

fi c e r D e mot a5 was mistaken a

bout where he is locate d when he fired those shots under the pa

ndemonium, the anguish going on at that time, he ver

y well could have been mistake n as to what Mr. Wood might have said.

. . . . Isay to y ou, members of

the jury , that no one saw Shaheed Wood drive that car to that location, that no one sawMr. Wood ge t out of that car . We know that the ca r wa s held for f

inge rprints but that there w ere no fing erpr ints in t hat ca

r that conne cted Mr. Wood at that date to that ca

r. . . . [T] hat’s why

this corroborative evidenc e is important. And, that’s why it is t he lac k of the e vid e nc e in t

his c a se that c re a te s th e re a so na ble doubt. Imean the A g ent g ot up here and had the g umption to t ell y ou that we didn’t have to examine e v id e n c e b e c a

u s e w e h a d

a c a s e a g a in s t t

h is ma n
. We didn’t have to look – examine the evide nce be cause we will wait for the guy s to ge t caug ht before we e x amine the evidenc e. Well, that belies common sense. Y ou kn ow , me mbe rs of

the jur y , h owmany

pe op le on

de a th row have bee n let off with the discove ry of DNA evidenc e that say s that they are innocent? Surely , the c o p s i nth a tc a s e th o u g h tth e y h a d th e r i g h tg uy.

. . . . This case , members of

the jury boils down to the fact that the phy sical evide nce that’s taken f rom Mr. Wood i s n o tc o n s i s t e n tw i thh i s i n v o l v e m e n ti nth i s r o b b e r y. The distance s from, testified to by Offic er D emota ar e not consistent with what he said, that the attempt to put sq ua re pe g s in a ro un d h ole by

tr yingto p ig e onho le thi s jacke t to this photogr aph and the fac t of the lac k of the evidenc e that shows that the items that we re to c heck[,] not to hold, but check for hairs and f

ibers and te sts for DNA we re not done and linked to him. That’s what c re a te s a re a so na ble do ub t. App. at 45, 50-52. Wood’s attorne y ’s re fer ence to an ag ent testifying ref err ed to an a g ent of the F eder al B urea u of Investig ation.The prose cutor, ra ther than t h e d e f e n s e a tt o r n e y , s ug g ested to the 3 court that it c ould cure any improprieties in his closing a rgument with a cautionar y instruction. 6 In r e sp on se , th e pr os e c uto r b e g an h is c los inga rgume nt w ith the fo llo wi ngre mark s: Was Office r De mota acc urate about what Shahe ed Wood said or mist aken a

bout what y ou hear d on the radio in the e x citement[? ] You heard the of fice r’s scre ams. He w as extremely ag itated and e x cited and mistakes happen. O f cour se, they can ha ppen[.] You know why

beca use that’s how huma

n nature is. I can’ t expl ain it but that’s what it is. W e all make mistakes.
Gover nment ag ents make mistakes, police office rs make mistakes, c itiz ens make mistakes, judge s make mis take s, that’ s w hy

we have c ourt s o f a

pp e a ls.
I d. at 53. Def

ense c ounsel objecte d to these re marks and move d for a mistrial, arguing the g overnme nt’s “par ticular juxt aposition of mistakes and cour

ts of appea ls may

somehow lea d this jury

to believe that if the y make a mis take in wro ng ly

c onvic tin g Mr . Wo od , th a t, somehow, the Court of Appe als ca n corr ect that mistake,” thus

“ min imi z[ing ] in the jur

y ’s min d th e g ra

vit y of the re sp on sib ili ty

to g et it rig ht.” I d. at 60-61. The prosec utor answe red de fense counsel’s contention by

arguing that he was “ mere ly emphasizing that making mistakes is part of human nature, a nd it is not limit ed to what a n ind ivi du a l do e s in

his lin e of

wo rk

. . . . I t is so me thi ng

that is common amonghuman being s. That’s somethingthat, in my view, all of these jur ors know. The se jurors know that there a re c ourts of appea ls.” I d. at 61. The district c ourt denied the motion for a mistrial, pointi ng out that its “instructions to t he jury will more than adequa tely direc t them to their purpose in their de liberations and not that they ’re to make mistakes for somebody

else to cle an up, but that they ’re to consider the e vidence and make a dec ision based on that evidenc e.” I d. at 62.

3 Followingthe jury

verdic t, the district court sentenc ed Wood to concur rent 120-month custodial ter ms on Counts Iand I Iof the su pe rs e din g ind ic tme nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fu rt he r s e nte nc e d Wo od

to7 a 120-month custodial ter m on Count I I Iof the super seding indictment, but this sentenc e wa s to run consec utively to that imposed on Counts Iand I I . Wood’s total incarce ration re flec ted, in part, a 6- level upwa

rd adjustment under

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c) ( 2004) on the g rounds that Wood’s actions and/or those of his acc omplices cre ated a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to Demota. Wood now appea ls, challeng ing both his convic tion and his sentence

.

I I I . J URI SDI CTI ON
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e xer c ise d ju

ri sd ic tio n p ur su ant t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 3231. We have a

ppellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 3742(a)

.

I V. DI SCUS SI ON
A. The Prosec utor’s Closing Statements to the Jury
Woo d a rgue s f ir st that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in de nyinghis motion for a mistrial g iven statements made by the prosec utor during closing arguments. Specifica lly , Wood st resse s that “[a] remark by the prosec utor in the course of his closing argument to the jury to the eff ect that if the jurors make a mistake in the ve rdict, some other tr ibu na l w ill c or

re c t it , is imp ro pe r a s te nd ingto i nf lue nc e the m to sh if t th e bu rd e n o f t he ir re sp on sib ili ty

fr om t he mse lve s to an a

pp e llate court.” Appellant’s br . at 12 (interna l citation omitt ed).
We reviewa district cour t’s decision to deny

a motion for mistrial predicated on the g rounds that the prose cutor made improper rema rks in a closingargument for a buse of discr etion. United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1365 ( 3d Cir. 1991). “To f ind that the court a bused its discretion in failingto order a mistrial for prosec utorial misconduct, we must first be c onvinced that the prosec ution did in fact misconduct itself.” United States v. Rivas, 479 F.3d 259, 266 ( 3d Cir. 2007). Thoug h, as we shall expl ain, the point is debatable , we a

re tre ating the prosec utor’s comment a s ina pp ro pr iate and

thu s a s mi sc on du c t.
Init ia lly , w e re c og nize that c omm e nts te nd ingto l e a d a jur y to8 believe that the responsibility for de termining the appr opriatene ss of a defe ndant’s sente nce lies w ith an authority other than the jury

are inappropriate. See Caldwe ll v. Miss issippi, 472 U.S . 320, 328-29, 105 S. Ct . 2633, 2639 (1985); Riley v. Tayor, 277 F .3d 261, 298 (3d Cir. 2001) (en ba

nc). Eve n though a

rguments reg ardingthe shifting of re sp on sib ili ty

fo r t he outc ome in a

c ri min a l c a se a

pp e ar t o a ri se most often on appea ls of sentenc es in ca pital case s, “state- induced sug g estions that the sentenc ing jur y may shift its sense of responsibility

to an appe llate cour

t” similarly

have no pla ce in c ases wher e a de fenda

nt may be sente nced to a

punishment other than dea th. Se e Ca ldw e ll, 47 2 U .S. a t 33 0, 10 5 S. Ct. a t 26 40 . T he re a so n f or thi s rule is clea

r inasmuch a s the jury

should not reg ard itself a s “advisory when it is not, or . . . be comf orted by a belief that its decision will not have e ffe ct unless others make the same de cision,” bec ause that approa ch would be “ a fr

ustration of the e ssence of the jury function.” Riley , 277 F.3d at 297 (quoting Sawy er v. B utler, 881 F .2d 1273, 1282 (5th Cir. 1989) (interna l quotation marks omitted)).
I t is also important to consider that inasmuch as it may be difficult to g lean f

rom an a ppellate r ecor d those intang ibles that a jury considers w ith respec t to its deter minations, it is essential that the “pre sumption of corre ctness” w e attac h to a ver dict not be destroyed by comments from the pr osecutor misstating the jury ’s role in the judicial proce ss. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330-31, 105 S. Ct. at 2640-41. He re, a

rguably the prosec utor’s re marks that “[g ]overnment ag ents make mistakes, police office rs make mistake s, citiz ens make mistakes, judge s make mistakes, that’s why we have cour

ts of appea ls,” app. at 53, were improper to the e x tent that they might have sug g ested to the jury

that a cour

t of appe als would corr ect a ny err or on its part. Clearly , the principle that the prosec ution should not attempt to d e fe a t th e jur

y ’s se ns e of

re sp on sib ili ty , th ou g h u su a lly se t f or th wh e n ju ri e s ma ke se nte nc ingde te rm inatio ns , is a pp lic a ble wi th re sp e c t to a

jur y ’s de te rm inatio n o f whe the r o r n ot t he de fe nd ant i s g u i l ty. Yet, that beingsaid, it is by no means c lear

that the prosec utor’s comment tende d to deflec t a sense of responsibility

for its verdict from the jur

y . In this reg ard, w e point out that the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt w ithre sp e c t to c ourt s o f a pp e a ls i mme diate ly followed his comment that judg es make mistakes. This sequenc e makes it log ical to believe that the jury would have unde rstood the p ro s ec u t o r’ s co m m en tas re l at i n g t o th e f un ct i o n s o f t h e t ri al j u d ge and not the jury , an appr oach bolster ed by the fa ct that the prose cutor9 did no t me nti on

that juri e s ma

ke mis take s. F ur

the rm or e , th e po ssi ble sting of this comment wa s reduc ed by the circ umstance that the prosec utor’s re fer ence to “citizens [ making ] m istakes” f ollowing

“ [g ]ove rnme nt a g e nts ” and “ po lic e of

fi c e rs ” makin g mis take s, if related to the func tioning of c ourts of appe als beyond revie wing actions of district judg es, see ms to refe r to the ac tions of other per sons as witnesses a

nd not jurors. In this reg ard w e point out that the prosec utor ca lled an F BI

ag ent, police of

fice rs, and c ivilians as witnesses. Thus, what the prosec utor said her e wa s very differ ent than the prose cutors’ ove rre achingrema rks in two case s on which Wood relies, J ohnson v. Maryland, 601 A.2d 1093 (Md. 1992) , and People v. Rutledg e, 179 A.D.2d 404, 578 N .Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). Ne verthe less, it would have bee n better if the prosec utor he re ha d n ot m a de his bo rd e rl ine c omm e nt r e g ard ingc ourt s o f a pp e a ls and we will treat the re marks as be ing ina ppropriate

. Trea ting the pr osecutor’ s remar ks as inappropr iate, the g overnme nt invokes the “invited re sponse” doc trine. B ut we find that the g overnme nt’s relianc e on the invited re sponse doctrine is not jus tif ie d. Th e inv ite d r e sp on se do c tr ine pr ote c ts c omm e nts ma de in “re asonable response to improper attac ks by defe nse counse l.” United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 ( 3d Cir. 1998) (interna l quotations and citation omitted); see a lso United States v. Dispoz -OPla sti c s, Inc ., 17 2 F .3 d 2 75 , 2 84 (3 d Ci r. 19 99 ). Th e pr e mis e underlying the doctrine’ s rationale is that “ the unfa ir prejudice flowingfrom the two a

rguments may

balanc e ea ch other

out, thus obviating the need f

or a ne w trial.” Walker , 155 F.3d at 186 n.5 (i nte rn a l qu otatio ns and

c itatio n o mitte d) ; se e a lso Di sp oz- O- Pla sti c s, Inc., 172 F .3d at 284. But thoug h a prose cutor may use the doc trine def

ensively , he may not do so offensively . Dispoz-O-Plastics, I nc., 172 F .3d at 284- 85 (n oti ngthe do c tr ine may no t be us e d a s a

“ sp ri ngbo ard ” to “launc h[] aff

irmative attac ks upon defe ndants”) ( internal quotation and citation omitted); United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 218 (3d Cir . 1 99 2) . N ota

bly , “ [w]e have g e ne ra lly fo un d th e inv ite d r e sp on se doctrine to be applicable only in instances whe re the prosec ution team was attacked f

or re asons unsupported by the evidenc e at tria l.” Dispoz-O-Plastics, I nc., 172 F .3d at 285. For example, we have upheld use of the doctrine where the def ense ha s asserte d that the prosec utor suborned pe rjury , Gambino, 926 F.2d a t 1364-66, and wher e the de fense has made persona l attacks on the integrity of prosec utors and law e nforc ement off icer s, Pungitore, 910 F .2d at10 1126-27.
Her e, the g overnme nt protests that defe nse counse l “invited the jur y to c on sid e r t

he re su lts in u

nr e late d c a se s in

wh ic h d e fe nd ants wer e exonerated af

ter trial due to later re view of D NA finding s” and “cle arly intended for

the jury to decide to a cquit based on uncer tain[t y ] caused by

the re sults in di ffe rent c ases.” Appellee ’s br. at 21. B ut the g overnme nt’s interpre tation of defe nse counse l’s re mark s is un du ly

br oa d. Re a d in

c on te xt, de fe ns e c ouns e l me re ly was e mphasizi ng the importance of g ather ing c orrobor ative evide nce at the outset of a

n investigation for purposes of deter mining whe ther a particula r suspec t is in fact re sponsible for a pa rticular c rime for , as we se t forth above , he said:
Isay to y ou, members of

the jury , that no one saw Shaheed Wood drive that car to that location, that no one sawMr. Wood ge t out of that car . We know that the ca r wa s held for f

inge rprints but that there w ere no fing erpr ints in t hat ca

r that conne cted Mr. Wood at that date to that ca

r. . . . [T] hat’s why

this corroborative evidenc e is important. And, that’s why it is t he lac k of the e vid e nc e in t

his c a se that c re a te s th e re a so na ble doubt. Imean the A g ent g ot up here and had the g umption to t ell y ou that we didn’t have to examine e v id e n c e b e c a

u s e w e h a d

a c a s e a g a in s t t

h is ma n
. We didn’t have to look – examine the evide nce be cause we will wait for the guy s to ge t caug ht before we e x amine the evidenc e. Well, that belies common sense. Y ou kn ow , me mbe rs of

the jur y , h owmany

pe op le on

de a th row have bee n let off with the discove ry of DNA evidenc e that say s that they are innocent? Surely , the c o p s i nth a tc a s e th o u g h tth e y h a d th e r i g h tg uy. App. at 50-51.
Mo re pe rt ine ntl y

fo r p re se nt p ur

po se s, the re is n o w ay

in which we can vie w the def ense attorney ’s comments as c onstitut ing an attac k on the prosec utor’s ca se pre dicated on a rguments that are unsupported by

the evidenc e at tria l as, in fac t, has happe ned in other case s. See Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F .3d at 284-86; Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1364-66; Pungitore, 910 F .2d at 1126-27. Ac cording ly , we find that treating the pr osecutor’ s remar ks as inappropr iate, the invited response doctrine is not applica ble in this case.Not o n ly w a s th e ju

r y in s tr u c te d n o t t o tr e a t c o un s el’s 4
su m m a t i o na s e v i d e n c e , b u ti tw a s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s tr u c t e d t o “ c ar e fu lly and impartially consider all of the evidenc e in the ca se, follow the law , as stated by

the Court, an d re ac h a true and just verdict.” App. at 65. An d, if the pr os e c uti on ’s re mark s lef t any do ub t abo ut t

he jur y ’s ro le , it was ne utralized by

this inst ruction:
As jurors, y our role is to resolve a nd decide the fa ctual issues in this case.
You ar e the sole and e x clusive judg es of the f acts [,] y ou decide upon the weig ht of the evidenc e. You de termine the cred i b ility

of witnesses. You r esolve such c onflicts as there ma y be i nth e e v i d e n c e , an d y o udr aws u c hr e a s o n a b le inf e re nc e s a s ma

y be wa rr ante d by the te sti mony

or e xhibi ts i n the ca se.
I d. I f d efen se c ouns e l be lie ve d th is i ns tr uc tio n w a s in su ff

ic ie nt t o preve nt the jury

from re lying on the court of a ppeals, c ounsel had the opportunity

to offer an instruction of his own. T h e gover nment su g g e ste d that the re c ou ld be a c a uti on ary ins tr uc tio n b ut t

he de fe ns e did no t se e k it

. 11 B ut n otw ith sta

nd ingthe ina

pp lic a bil ity of the inv ite d r e sp on se do c tr ine and

tr e a tin g the pr os e c uto r’ s r e mark a s im pr op e r, we sti ll w ill not reve rse f

or “[a] mist rial is not require d wher e improper rema rks wer e har mless, consideringtheir scope , their re lation to the context of the trial, the ameliorative e ffe ct of a ny curative instructions and the streng th of the evide nce suppor ting the c onviction.” Rivas, 479 F.3d at 267; see a lso United States v. Gambone, 314 F .3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Z ehrba ch, 47 F .3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995). He re , a s th e g ov e rnme nt p oints o ut, the c ha lle ng e d c omm e nt w a s o nly a sing le sentenc e in the prose cutor’s e ntire closingargument, which c on tin ue d at so me le ng th a ft e r h e ma de his c omm e nt. Th ou g h it is tr ue that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t c ha rg e the jur

y wi th a n e xpre ssl y curative instruction, it did s tate to the jury that openingand closing statements made by

counsel we re not c onsidered e vidence , and that the jury must base its verdict on only the evidenc e pre sented. 4 Moreove r, we have ma de an intensive revie w of the c ase a nd based on that revie w we a

re satisfied that there is convincingevidenc e, including, but not limited to Demota’s testimony , supporting Wood’s convictions on the cha

rg es listed in the indictment. I n short, we a re cer tain beyond any

possible doubt that the prosecutor ’s commentSe c tio n 3 A1 .2 (c ) n owpr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : 5
I f, in a manne r cr eatinga subst an t i al risk of ser ious bo dil y inj ur

y , the de fe nd ant or a pe rs on for wh os e conduct the de fenda

nt is otherwise ac countable– (1) knowing or having r ea s o n able cause to believe that a per son was a la

w enf orce ment office r, assaulted suc h office r duringthe cour se of the offe nse or immediate f

light ther efr om . . . inc re a se by

6 le ve ls. Under the pl ain error standard, a r eviewingcourt may reve rse a n 6 order or judg m ent of the district c ourt “only if [it ] find[ s] t hat (1) a

n err or wa s c o mm itte d ; ( 2 ) th e e r r o r w a s p la in , th a t i s , it

is ‘ c le ar ’ and ‘obvious;’ and (3) the err or ‘af fec ted [t he defe ndant’ s ] s ubstantial rig hts.’” United States v. Na ppi, 243 F.3d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United S tates v. Olano, 507 U .S. 725, 734, 113 S. C t. 1770, 177 7 -7 8 (1993)) . “I f a f

orfe ited err or is plain and af fec t[ s] s ubstantial rig hts, a Court of Appea ls has the authority to order c orre ction, but is not require d to do so.” United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 242 ( 3d Cir.
12 could not have a ffe cted the ve rdict and thus if ther e wa s an er ror in the district court, whe ther by

the prosec utor or the c ourt, it was har mless. There is simpl y

no doubt that Wood i s g uilty . See Gambone, 314 F.3d at 177.
We close our se ction on the re view of the trial aspec t of the case with the following caution. In this case the pr osecutor’ s c omm e nt d id n ot l e a d to re ve rs a l. B ut w e e mph a size that r e fe re nc e in an ar g ument to the revie w func tion of the courts of a ppeals may

be dang erous ter

ritory into which a prose cutor should venture with car e. B. Upwar d Adjustment for “O fficia l Victim” under the SentencingGuidelines
Woo d a rgue s se c on d th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt vio late d th e e x pos t fa c to c la us e by a pp lyinga 6- le ve l se nte nc e e nh anc e me nt p ur su ant t o U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c). Although Wood objecte d to the application of 5 se c tio n 3 A1 .2 (c ), he did

so on g ro un ds oth e r t

ha n th e e x pos t f

a c to clause and he doe s not raise those g rounds on this appea l. A c c o r d i n g l y, o ur

r e v i e wo f

th i s a l l e g e d

e r r o r i s f o r p l a i ne r r o r o n l y. 62000) (inter nal quotations and citation om itted). Rather, the court should ex erc ise its d i s cr et i on “only if the er ror se riously

aff ect[s] the fairne ss, integr ity , or public re putation of judicial proce edi n gs
. ” I d. (interna l quotations and citation omitt ed). D efe ndants bear the burde n of demonstratin g t h at “p lain err or” oc curr ed. Olano, 507 U .S. at 734, 113 S. Ct . at 1778. Spe c if ic a lly , § 3A 1. 2( b) (2 00 2) pr ov ide d th a t: 7
I f, i n a m anner

cre ating a substantial risk of ser ious bo dily inj ur

y , th e de fe nd ant o r a

pe rs on fo r who se conduct the de fenda

nt is otherwise ac countable– (1) knowing or havingrea sonable c ause to be lieve that a per son was a la

w enf orce ment office r, assaulted suc h office r duringthe cour se of the offe nse or immediate f

light ther efr om . . . inc re a se by

3 le ve ls. 13 See F ed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Sy me, 276 F.3d 131, 158 (3d Cir. 2002).
The “ officia l victim” enhanc ement re lied on by the district court duringWood’s J anuar y 5, 2006 sentenc ing w as ame nded, eff ective N ovember

1, 2004. Wood, however, e ng ag ed in the conduc t char g ed in the indictment on J anuar y 10, 2004, approximately 10 months before the amendme nt became ef fec tive. Prior to the amendment, Wood would have be en subjec t to a 3 rathe r than 6 leve l enhanc ement under

the “of ficial victim” guideline provision. See 7 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b) (2002) . We rea liz e that, as a g ener al rule, “sente ncingcourts must apply the guidelines in eff

ect at the time of sentenc ing, not at the time of the cr ime.” United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 ( 3d Cir. 1991), superse ded in par t on other g rounds as rec og nized by

United States v. Corrado, 53 F .3d 620 (3d Cir. 1995). But whe re, a s here , “such r etroa ctivity results in harshe r pena lties, Ex Post Facto Clause pr oblems arise, a nd courts must apply

the ea rlier version.” I d.; see a lso U.S.S .G. § 1B 1.11(b) ( “I f the c ourt deter mines that use of the Guidelines Manual in ef fec t on the date that the defe ndant is sentence d would violate the ex post facto cla use of the United States Constit ution, the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effe ct on the date that the offe nse of c onviction was committed.”); United States v. Menon, 24 F .3d 550, 566 (3d Cir. 1994) (“ [C ]hange s14 in s e nte nc ingg uid e lin e s th a t e nh anc e the pe na lty of fe nd the Ex Pos t Fa cto Clause of A rticle I

of the United States Constitution.”).
In this case, the g overnme nt conce des that all three prong s of pla in e rr or

re vie w h ave be e n me t, i .e ., that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in a pp lyingthe 20 04 , r a the r t ha n th e 20 02 , “ of

fi c ia l vi c tim ” enhanc ement, the e rror

was c lear and obvious, and Wood’s substantial rig hts were aff

ecte d. See United States v. Knig ht, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3 d Ci r. 20 01 ) ( ho ldi ngthat un de r p la in e rr or re vie w “ an e rr or

in application of the Guidelines that re sults in us e of a highe r sentenc ing rang e should be pre sumed to aff ect the de fenda

nt’s substantial rig hts”). Ac cording ly , we will vac ate Wood’s sentenc e and r emand the ca se to the district court with instructions to rely on the 2002, rathe r than the 2004, “ officia l victim” enhanc ement for purposes of sentenc ing. Re sentenc ing should be in acc ordanc e with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . See United States v. Cooper , 437 F.3d 324, 329 ( 3d Cir. 2006); see a lso United States v. Colon, 474 F.3d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2007).

V. CONCLUSI ON
For the fore g oing r easons, we will affirm Wood’s judg ment of conviction enter ed on January 27, 2006, but will vacate the sentenc e and wi ll r e mand

the c a se to t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r t he lim ite d p ur

po se o f r es en t en ci n g.