J-A22008-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.D.N.T.R., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.D.N.T.R., CHILD

No. 725 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered March 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s):

CP-51-AP-0000753-2017

CP-51-DP-0001031-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.M.R., CHILD

No. 726 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Dated March 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s):

CP-51-AP-0000754-2017

CP-51-DP-0001030-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2018

The guardian ad litem (“GAL”), on behalf of L.M.R. (“L.R.”) (born in April 

of 2011) and T.D.N.T.R. (“T.D.”) (born in February of 2015) (collectively “the 

Children”), appeals from the amended orders entered on March 20, 2018, 

denying the petitions to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of E.B. 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“Father”) and to change the goals for Children to adoption. After careful 

review, we reverse. 

The trial court’s extensive opinion provides a detailed explanation of the 

facts and procedure that led to the orders now on appeal. However, 

recognizing that this Court rendered a decision relating to the termination of 

R.R.’s (“Mother”) parental rights on June 5, 2018, we include a portion of that 

memorandum opinion to provide a context for Father’s appeal. In this Court’s

decision in Mother’s case, we stated:

By way of background, on April 17, 2015, the Department of 

Human Services (“DHS”) became involved with Mother, E.B. 

(“Father”), and the Children upon receiving a report alleging that 

[T.R.] had fallen in the home and sustained nearly fatal injuries. 

Mother’s explanation of the incident was “while she and Father 

were arguing, Father raised his hand as if to strike her while she 

was holding the [c]hild and she dropped the [c]hild on a mattress 

to protect him[.]” On April 20, 2015, DHS met with Mother who 

stated, “Mother and Father argued and Father physically assaulted 

her while she was holding [T.R.]; that she dropped him onto a 

mattress during the incident and later fell on top of him as Father 

continued to assault her[.] ...” 

[T.R.’s] diagnosis was “acute or chronic bilateral subdural 

hemorrhages, multilayer retinal hemorrhages in both eyes, a 

closed right rib fracture, and a cervical spine injury, most likely 

due to abusive head trauma in the absence of accidental trauma

to account for the injuries.” On April 21, 2015, DHS received a 

supplemental report alleging that, “the [c]hild was in critical 

condition based on suspected abuse; that he had internal bleeding 

from old and new injuries; and that it was not known at that time 

if the [c]hild would survive.” The report alleged that Mother’s 

explanation did not match [T.R.’s] injuries. Rather, the report 

alleged that, due to his injuries, [T.R.] “would had to have fallen 

from a waist-high height onto a hard surface.” 

With respect to the older female child, [L.R.], who was nearly four 

years old at the time of the incident involving [T.R.], DHS learned 
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from hospital staff on April 18, 2015, that she did not appear to 

have any injuries. However, she “appeared to have some 

developmental delays and suffered from non-verbal autism[.]” 

The Children were placed in protective custody on April 22, 2015. 

[T.R.] was discharged from the hospital on April 28, 2015, and he 

was placed in a foster home separate from his sister, [L.R.] The 

Children were adjudicated dependent on May 13, 2015. On 

November 10, 2015, the trial court found that aggravating 

circumstances existed as to Mother and Father. 

In the Interest of: T.D.N.T.R., No. 3185 EDA 2017, unpublished 

memorandum at 2-3 (Pa. Super. filed June 5, 2018) (citations to the record 

omitted). 

As in Mother’s case, the trial court here provided a discussion about the 

various hearings that took place, beginning in April of 2015. The trial court 

included information about the transfer of legal custody to DHS and the 

placement of Children in foster care, and each parent’s explanation about the 

injuries suffered by T.R. The trial court’s opinion also discussed Father’s

compliance, or lack thereof, with the objectives developed for him. For 

example, Father’s objectives included a visitation schedule with line-of-sight 

supervision, attendance at the Children’s medical appointments, attending 

Behavioral Health Services, participating and completing anger management 

counseling, domestic violence counseling, and parenting classes. The court’s 

opinion provided this type of information for the permanency review hearings 

held through May of 2017. Notably, in April of 2017, Father finally admitted 

his part in the altercation that resulted in T.R.’s injuries. On August 15, 2017, 

the termination and goal change hearing was held relating to Mother and 
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resulted in the involuntary termination of her parental rights to both Children. 

Thereafter, due to changes of counsel representing Father, a number of 

continuances occurred. Then, on January 30, 2018, the termination and goal 

change hearing concerning Father was held. 

The trial court’s opinion contains the following discussion of the 

testimony provided by the witnesses at the January 30th hearing:

On January 30, 2018, a hearing was held before the 

Honorable Allan L. Tereshko. Counsel for DHS, Michael Pratt, 

presented Dr. Erica Williams, Psychologist, Forensic Mental Health 

Services, as an Expert Witness to testify. All parties stipulated to 

her qualifications as an Expert in Forensic Psychology. Dr. Williams 

testified [that] the circumstances that brought the two Children 

into care occurred when T.R., at nine-weeks old, suffered a near 

fatal injury that was classified by medical providers to be nonaccidental. The explanation the parents provided was not 

consistent with the injuries. She conducted a Parenting Capacity 

Evaluation of Father on 2/23/2017 and an Addendum on 

4/05/2017. At the initial evaluation, Father reported that he was 

not involved and Mother was present. However, Father reviewed 

the PCE Report and provided a subsequent written correction 

statement on 4/04/2017, admitting his role in the infant’s injuries. 

Dr. Williams then provided a subsequent Addendum to the PCE 

dated 4/05/ 2017. At the time of the initial Report and subsequent 

Addendum, it was determined that Father did not have the capacity 

to provide safety or permanency to either of the Children because 

of concerns regarding his inability to manage his own behavior and 

a pattern of behaviors that were observed regarding his inability to 

modulate his emotions. Resource parents and Case Managers 

having to adjust visitation because of Father’s intimidating 

behaviors and verbal aggression.

Dr. Williams testified that subsequent to Father’s admission 

regarding the Child’s injury, the recommendations did not 

change[;] however, it raised immediate concerns for the safety of 

the Children because Father was having unsupervised overnight 

visitation. At that point, she recommended the focus of mental 

health therapy to be a therapeutic setting where he can develop 
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an accurate and consistent narrative as to the events that occurred 

that day and the role he played. To address the larger patterns of 

his aggressive and intimidating behaviors. The pattern of 

aggression both verbal as well as physical would need to be 

evaluated and addressed. He would need to be able to recognize 

those behaviors and begin to understand the behavior cycle that 

led to him engaging in this pattern. So[,] an important part of the 

treatment is [to] understand what, specifically, are your diagnoses, 

how do they affect your day to day function and how could they 

interact with you as a parent. Dr. Williams further noted that 

attendance in treatment in itself does not mean progress. So, it 

would also matter whether or not that during those sessions he 

was motivated and even engaging in the conversations necessary 

to propel it forward.

On cross-examination by Emily Cherniack, Father’s attorney, 

Dr. Williams noted that following the April Addendum to Father’s 

PCE, it was determined that Father would receive therapy at the 

agency, Forensic Mental Health Services[;] however, the CUA 

workers chose to have Father attend another agency instead, and 

she did not understand what led to that decision by the CUA 

workers. She opined that her recommendation in the Addendum 

did not change because the concern was already raised. What that 

Addendum allowed was for Father to kind of skip that first hurdle 

in therapy where he was denying events. So, it would help him 

jump-start his therapy, but the safety concern was still completely 

present. Father’s admission allows the therapy to not have to focus

on his denial, but it allows the therapist to advance the goals with 

the patient. Dr. Williams finally noted that since the Report and 

the Addendum she has not observed any of the interactions of 

Father and his Children.

Beverly Ford-Green, CUA-NET Case Manager, also testified 

at the hearing. She began managing this case on March 9, 2017, 

and stated this case became known to DHS because of a near fatal 

incident to T.R. in April 2015, based upon physical[ly] aggressive 

behavior between Mother and Father. Mother had provided three 

different versions of what happened to the Child. Father stated it 

was an accident because they had an altercation and the Child fell. 

Medical evidence later established that the injury was almost fatal 

and did not match what the parents were saying to investigators 

and hospital staff.
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Ms. Green testified Father’s SCP objectives were to attend 

anger management classes, domestic violence counseling, ... all 

medical appointments for both Children, ... mental health 

counseling, and ... supervised visitation with the Children. She 

noted that Father completed an anger management course, 

parenting classes, and mental health counseling. Father was 

attending therapy at Panamerican Mental Health, however, they 

did not offer child abuse and domestic violence therapy, which was 

ordered by Dr. Erica Williams’ PCE evaluation, and so he stopped 

attending there in August 2017. Father then attended 

Empowerment and Resource Associates on 10/27/2017, and 

11/06/2017. Finally, he began therapy at New Life Community 

Services on 11/30/2017, and attended 1/04/2018, 1/11/2018, and 

1/25/2018. He continues to attend that therapy, and is currently 

receiving therapies for domestic violence, child abuse and anger 

management. Ms. Green opined that Father needs more therapy 

because she observed an incident in July 2017 when Father

became irate during a visit with the Children and she had to 

terminate the visit because the Children became scared and upset.

Regarding the visitation, Ms. Green testified she has 

observed the visits and since the last court date, the visits went 

well. She opined that Father is more bonded to his daughter, than 

to his son.

On cross-examination by Ms. Cherniack, Father’s attorney, 

Ms. Green testified that after Dr. Williams’ evaluation stated Father 

needed specialized mental health treatment, she referred Father 

to Menergy and the Wedge. However, Father chose to attend New 

Life Treatment Community Services. She stated that Father has 

been more cooperative with all the services that CUA provides, and 

that his interaction with both Children has improved. In fact, she 

stated Father does appropriate things with his son, T.R.[,] who is 

almost three years old and developmentally on target. L.R.[] is six 

years old and is also developmentally on target.

Yvonne Brittingham, Father’s sister, also testified at the 

hearing on 1/30/2018. She stated she has supervised the 

visitations between Father and his Children since 2016, when 

Father moved into her home in Levittown, and she subsequently 

received clearance from DHS. She supervised visits on a weekly 

basis, sometimes two to three visits per week, totaling 

approximately forty visits. There were overnight visits on 

weekends, approximately ten to twelve weekends. She stated 
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Father would take the Children to the park, and swimming at the 

pool in the summertime. Father would also take the Children to 

Chuckie Cheese and the Mall and sometimes walk at the lake.

Ms. Brittingham also testified that she has observed Father’s 

parenting skills and activities. Father bathes his son and puts him 

to sleep, and he also combs his daughter’s hair. She notes he does 

many things a mother would do for their Children, and he cooks, 

cleans, plays and bathes them. He also helps them with their 

alphabet, lettering and does not treat them differently.

On cross-examination by Michael Pratt, attorney for DHS, 

Ms. Brittingham testified she would not lie for her brother regarding

his parenting. She stated she would not be testifying if she did not 

believe he was a good parent. Father knows his Children have 

special needs, and he takes the time to sit down and talk and 

explain things to them. When questioned regarding if she was

aware how the children came into DHS care, Ms. Brittingham 

stated Father told her the Child was injured and had surgery at the 

hospital, however she did not know the circumstances that brought 

the Child into the hospital.

Father was the last witness to testify. He stated he 

completed parenting classes for 12 or 13 weeks and presented a 

Certificate dated 7/15/2015. He attended various parent cafés 

presented by local CUA[]s. [At] [t]he café on 3/23/2017, he 

watched videos and filled out a work book of exercises where the 

parent gets to know themselves and become a better parent when 

you are reunited with your Children. He attended another one on 

5/10/2016, where he was instructed to find balance in different 

situations with your Children when they are not behaving correctly, 

and to educate them on how to behave. Another café he attended 

focused on single-parent parenting, showing how to juggle life and 

still focus on the care and nurturing of your Child. On 12/14/2016, 

Father attended another café focusing on building a strong 

relationship with your Children, again watching videos and filling 

out workbooks on how to incorporate the skills seen on video into 

your own personal life and relationship with your Children. Father 

also presented a Certificate of Completion of an anger 

management class dated 9/1/2015. Father presented various 

other parenting café Certificates, and finally presented a Certificate 

dated 5/12/2017 for attending the Philadelphia Autism Project 

because his daughter is borderline autistic.
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Father testified he continues mental health counseling at 

New Life and is focusing on Dr. Williams’ recommendations of the 

PCE, including domestic violence, child abuse, and a solid narrative 

on how his son became injured. He notes he does not favor one 

Child over the other and misses them both. Father testified he has 

changed as a person and that the services provided by the [c]ourt 

were and continue to be very beneficial to him as a human being 

and as a Father. He had never experienced a situation like this 

before and every month is a learning process for him, to learn and 

apply skills about keeping calm in high-level stressful situations to 

ensure the safety of his Children. Father states he has done all 

that the [c]ourt has asked him to do, missing only three visits in 

the almost three years, has attended medical appointments, 

attended therapy and classes. He loves his Children and knows he 

can provide safety and permanency for them.

On cross-examination by Michael Pratt, DHS attorney, Father 

was questioned about what he wants to get out of going to therapy. 

He responded, “I want to continue discussing about my day to day 

situation, how I feel, and my goals. I go to a therapist to talk, to 

see someone who cares about what I’m going through and can give 

me advice. And, to nurture me on how to become a better parent.” 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/3/18, at 18-24 (citations to the record omitted). 

The court then stated that it 

is very familiar with this case from the very beginning and is 

familiar with all the twists and turns and ups and down of the 

circumstances surrounding the case. After hearing the testimony 

of the witnesses and considering the best interest focus, as well 

as the obligation to attempt reunification, this [c]ourt found it 

compelling to change the Children’s goal from adoption back to 

reunification with Father. This point was not reached after any 

specified time period of compliance or non-compliance, but 

reached based upon the facts of this particular case and these 

particular Children. 

Id. at 27. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained its reliance on the 

credible testimony of Dr. Erica Williams, Father’s sister, Yvonne Brittingham, 

and Father. Although the court acknowledged that Dr. Williams testified that 
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“her opinion remains that Father cannot provide safety and permanency for 

his Children now,” the court based its decision on “the fact that Father 

recognized his contribution to the injury of his Child, after his denial of the 

facts, and that Father has put forth the effort to begin the process of healing, 

remediation, learning and understanding the circumstances that placed his 

Children in care.” Id. Essentially, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court 

stated to Father “that he had earned the opportunity to work for reunification 

with his Children....” Id. at 30. 

Following the entry of the court’s orders denying DHS’s termination 

petitions as to both Children and denying the request to change the goal for 

both Children from reunification to adoption, the GAL filed the instant appeals

on behalf of Children. In the GAL’s brief, she sets forth the following issues 

for our review: 

1. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion when it refused to terminate the parental rights of 

[Father] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a) (1); (2); (5) and (8) 

and 23 Pa. C.S.[]. § 2511(b) when: (i) there was clear and 

convincing evidence demonstrating each prong of each ground, 

including, but not limited to, the fact that this matter began as a 

near fatality to [L.R.’s] sibling, [T.R.], nearly three (3) years ago 

as the result of abuse to the sibling while he was in the care of 

Father; (ii) there was a finding of aggravated circumstances 

against both Mother and Father; (iii) the Trial Court previously 

terminated Mother’s parental rights for failing to recognize the risk 

that Father posed to [the Children]; and (iv) Father still had not

remedied the circumstances that led to the Children’s placement?

2. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion when it refused to grant [DHS’s] Motion for Goal Change 

to Adoption, and instead changed the goal back to reunification

under circumstances where, five months previously, the Trial 
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Court terminated the parental rights of Mother and found that it 

was in the best interest of the Children to change their goals to 

adoption, and, since that finding, there has been no change in 

circumstances?

3. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion when it refused to terminate the parental rights of 

Father pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1); (2); (5) and (8) 

and 23 Pa. C.S.[] § 2511(b) when the Trial Court suggested Father 

might be [a] reunification resource in the future after the same 

Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights on August 15, 

2017, finding that Mother was incapable of protecting the Children 

because she continued to suggest that Father might be a 

reunification resource in the future?

4. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion when it refused to terminate Father’s parental rights 

when it found that Father could potentially be a reunification 

resource at some unknown time in the future when the case had 

been open for nearly three (3) years and when the Trial Court 

made vastly different findings of fact five (5) months previously 

at the hearing in August 2017, based on a substantially similar 

evidentiary record, when nothing of consequence had occurred 

between August 2017 and January 30, 2018?

GAL’s brief at 4.1 

Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases 

implicate the following principles:

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether 

the order of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate 

consideration to the effect of such a decree on the 

welfare of the child.”

In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.D.T., 

Jr., 934 A.2d 703 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 68 

950 A.2d 270 (2008)).

____________________________________________

1 DHS filed a brief in support of the GAL’s position; however, Father has not 

submitted a brief in response to the issues raised by the GAL.
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Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. ... We must employ 

a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order 

to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder 

of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of 

witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be 

resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof 

is on the party seeking termination to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. 

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 
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parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination 

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

However, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d at 384. 

With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts 

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

We address the GAL’s argument relating to DHS’s petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b) of the 

Adoption Act, which provides:
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition is filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of the removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child. 

. . . 

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b). 

In the In re Z.P. opinion, this Court explained that:

“[T]o terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the

child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more

from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the

removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266,

1275 (Pa. Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8). “Section
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2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy

the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In

re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-

month period has been established, the court must next

determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal

continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of the

Agency supplied over a realistic time period. Id. Termination

under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate

a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions

that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of

Agency services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396

(Pa. Super. 2003), In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118. 

The GAL contends that by January 30, 2018, the date of the termination 

and goal change hearing, Children had been in placement for 23⁄4 years, which 

is well beyond the twelve month period indicated in Section (a)(8). Moreover, 

the GAL also points out that under Section (a)(8) the court cannot consider 

any efforts made by Father after the filing of the termination petition on July 

25, 2017, as set forth in section 2511(b). Also, in support of the twelvemonth time frame, the GAL relies on this Court’s decision in In re C.L.G., 956 

A.2d 999 (Pa. Super. 2008), which reproduced a portion of the trial court’s 

discussion in that case, stating:

We recognize that the application of Section (a)(8) may seem 

harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward 

resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children. By 

allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal 

of the child continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly 

recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the 

parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. 

Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates 
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only a short period of time, to wit, eighteen (18) months, in which 

to complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a 

child who has been placed in foster care. 

Id. at 1005 (quoting trial court opinion, at 10 (citations omitted) (emphasis 

in original)). See also Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFS), 42 U.S.C. § 

671 et seq. The ASFA essentially provides,

that when a child is placed in foster care, after reasonable efforts 

have been made to reestablish the biological relationship, the 

needs and welfare of the child require CYS and foster care 

institutions to work toward termination of parental rights, placing 

the child with adoptive parents. It is contemplated this process 

realistically should be completed within 18 months. 

In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

In C.L.G., the child was in placement for 21 months, while here, by the 

time the termination hearing was held, Children were in placement for 32 

months. In C.L.G., the circumstances revolved around the parental drug use 

and housing issues. In the instant case, placement in foster care occurred 

after the younger child’s near fatal injury due to Father’s assault on Mother

and the discovery of the healing of the infant’s old injuries. There was also a 

finding of a lack of parental care of the older child and a finding of aggravated 

circumstances. Moreover, at the termination hearing, the court found credible 

the testimony of Dr. Williams, who stated that although Father finally 

acknowledged his actions were the cause of the infant’s near fatal injuries, 

Father was still not able to safely parent Children. We are compelled to agree 

with the GAL’s position. To allow Children, who have been waiting almost 

three years for permanency, to continue in “a state of proverbial limbo in 
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anticipation of a scenario that is speculative at best,” Children’s needs for 

permanency as dictated by the ASFA would be overlooked. C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

at 1008. 

As for the needs and welfare prong of Section (a)(8), we again recognize

that T.R. has spent nearly his entire life in care, while L.R. has been in care 

for more than half her life. Therefore, no meaningful bond between Children 

and Father has developed, since Father never had the responsibility of caring 

for Children. This was evidenced by Father’s interaction with Children, when 

he demonstrated an inability to curb his angry outbursts during visitation. The 

GAL also noted Dr. Williams’ safety concerns, which is part of both the Section 

(a)(8) and the Section (b) analysis. The GAL points out that the trial court 

recognized that safety was a major concern during the extended dependency 

proceedings and relied on that concern when terminating Mother’s parental 

rights. However, a mere five months later, the court appears to overlook any 

safety concerns when denying the petition to terminate Father’s parental 

rights. Specifically, in her brief, the GAL listed the following evidence as 

support for termination, which she contends was not countered by the 

evidence presented by Father. 

 evidence of brutal abuse of T.R. (at Mother’s TPR hearing, the 

same [t]rial [c]ourt stated that Father was “a man who has been 

found to have been abusive to a completely helpless infant”);

 a finding of aggravated circumstances;

 uncontroverted testimony of an expert that Father was incapable 

of parenting and still had a long way to go, after 23⁄4 years; and
J-A22008-18

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 evidence from the expert that she had significant safety concerns 

for the Children should the Father have unsupervised contact with 

them. 

GAL’s brief at 40. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence presented demonstrates

that Father’s parental rights should have been terminated pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(8) and (b), that Children have been in foster care for three years, 

that the time frame for Father to show he had the ability to care for Children 

remains speculative, and that permanency at this time for Children would best 

serve their needs and welfare. Therefore, we agree with the GAL and conclude 

that the trial court erred by denying the petition to terminate Father’s parental 

rights and refusing to grant the request to change the goal for Children back 

to adoption. 

Orders reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/18
J-A22008-18

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