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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 12-BG-1914

IN RE MIKEL D.JONES, RESPONDENT.

A Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 456094)

On Report and Recommendation

of the Board on Professional Responsibility

(BDN 439-11)

(Submitted September 24, 2013 Decided August 21, 2014)

Before FISHER, Associate Judge, and PRYOR and KING, Senior Judges.

PER CURIAM: Mikel D. Jones was convicted in the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of one count of conspiracy to 

commit mail and wire fraud; fourteen counts of aiding and abetting mail fraud;

fourteen counts of aiding and abetting wire fraud; and one count of aiding and 

abetting money laundering. United States v. Jones, CRIM.A. 11-261, 2012 WL 

383668 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2012), aff’d, 544 F. App’x 87 (3d Cir. 2013). On July 9, 

2012, the Pennsylvania court sentenced Jones to forty-two months of incarceration 
2

on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by three years of supervised 

release, and ordered him to make restitution of $457,743.75.1

Jones did not report his criminal convictions to this court or the Board of 

Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) as required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10 (a). 

Bar Counsel learned of Jones’s convictions through news reports. On November 

30, 2012, Bar Counsel filed with this court a certified copy of the judgment of 

conviction. On December 17, 2012, this court suspended Jones pursuant to D.C. 

Bar R. XI, § 10 (c) and referred the matter to the Board. In January 2013, Bar 

Counsel determined that Jones’s convictions were based on offenses involving 

moral turpitude per se within the meaning of D.C. Code § 11-2503 (a) (2012 Repl.)

and accordingly recommended disbarment. Jones did not respond to Bar 

Counsel’s statement on moral turpitude. Jones failed to file the affidavit required 

by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g) following entry of this court’s order of suspension. 

 

1 On October 31, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision. United States v. Jones, 544 F. App’x 87

(3d Cir. 2013). We note that Mikel D. Jones has not petitioned for certiorari nor 

rehearing.
3

The Board has concluded that respondent’s convictions involve moral 

turpitude per se and recommends disbarment pursuant to § 11-2503 (a). Jones did 

not oppose the Board’s recommendation.

Mail fraud is a crime of moral turpitude per se, In re Bryant, 46 A.3d 402, 

402 (D.C. 2012) (quoting In re Evans, 793 A.2d 468, 469 (D.C. 2002) and citing In 

re Leffler, 940 A.2d 105, 106 (D.C. 2007)). Therefore, D.C. Code § 11-2503 (a) 

mandates that this court disbar Jones. See In re Schainker, 871 A.2d 1206, 1206

(D.C. 2005). Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Mikel D. Jones is disbarred from the practice of law in the 

District of Columbia. We direct Jones’s attention to the requirements of D.C. Bar 

R. XI, § 14 (g) and their effect on his eligibility for reinstatement. See D.C. Bar R. 

XI, § 16 (c).

 So ordered.