alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 17, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-40362

Summary Calendar

 

UNITES STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SERAFIN VIDAL-MORALES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1-03-CR-768-ALL

--------------------

Before Davis, Smith, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Serafin Vidal-Morales pleaded guilty to being found in the

United States after deportation and was sentenced to 41 months of

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Vidal-Morales

appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider

sentence for lack of jurisdiction. He also contends that his

motion to reconsider was filed within the time for requesting an

extension of time to appeal based on excusable neglect and that
No. 04-40362

-2-

this court should remand this case to the district court for a

determination of excusable neglect.

Vidal-Morales’ motion sought reconsideration of the district

court’s sentence, and contrary to Vidal-Morales’ contention, his

motion does not evince an intent to appeal. Vidal-Morales’ request

for a remand for a determination of excusable neglect is DENIED.

See Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987); Page v.

DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1988). 

Because Vidal-Morales’ motion for reconsideration was filed

more than ten days after the entry of the district court's

judgment, the district court was without jurisdiction to address

it. United States v. Cook, 670 F.2d 46, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1982).

Likewise, the motion for reconsideration was not authorized under

FED. R. CRIM. P. 35, and the district court did not err in denying

Vidal-Morales’ motion to reconsider sentence for lack of

jurisdiction. See United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th

Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Vidal-Morales’

motion to reconsider sentence is AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of Jose Gandia, by His Mother and Natural Guardian, Lillian Gandia, Respondent, v New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Leone, J.), dated September 29, 1989, which granted the application.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, as an exercise of discretion, with costs, and the application is denied.

The infant petitioner was injured while riding his bicycle when he became caught on a twisted and broken chain link fence which surrounded a building owned by the New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter NYCHA). The instant application for leave to file a late notice of claim was made *IdVi*months after the cause of action accrued. The granting of the petitioner’s application was an improvident exercise of discretion since the NYCHA did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose, or within a reasonable time thereafter, nor did the petitioner provide a valid excuse for the delay *(see,*General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; *Matter of Andersen v Nassau County Med. Center,*135 AD2d 530; *Matter of Mallory v City of New York,*135 AD2d 636).

The availability of the toll of infancy in a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) does not require the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim in every case *(see, Cohen v Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist.,*51 NY2d 256, 265-266; *Caparco v Town of Brookhaven,*133 AD2d 803). Indeed, the absence of a showing that the delay is the product of the infancy itself is a factor which militates against granting such relief *(see, Matter of Andersen v Nassau County Med. Center, supra; Matter of Albanese v Village of Floral Park,*128 AD2d 611, 613). The petitioner failed to present sufficient facts to establish a nexus between the disability of infancy and the delay in filing the notice of claim. Although the infant’s mother claims that she reported the accident to the resident manager of the NYCHA housing complex several days after *825its occurrence and provided all the relevant information necessary to constitute actual notice, no documentary or other proof was provided in the moving papers to demonstrate that the accident report was actually filed *(see, Matter of Perez v New York City Hous. Auth.,*156 AD2d 177). The petitioner’s contention that she was unaware of the requirements of the statute is not sufficient to excuse the delay in filing the notice of claim since ignorance of the statute has been held to be an unacceptable excuse *(see, Matter of Mallory v City of New York, supra; Figueroa v City of New York,*92 AD2d 908; *see also, Matter of Perez v New York City Hous. Auth., supra).*Thompson, J. P., Brown, Kunzeman and Balletta, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     Form 10-K for the Year Ending December 31, 1997
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                          0000949091
<NAME>                                         SMART CHOICE AUTOMOTIVE GROUP INC
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  Year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   Dec-31-1997
<CASH>                                           1,067
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   41,857
<ALLOWANCES>                                     6,857
<INVENTORY>                                     15,516
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                51,583
<PP&E>                                          13,546
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,331
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  89,105
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           49,410
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                      4,942
<COMMON>                                            97
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,423
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    89,105
<SALES>                                         70,914
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                71,083
<CGS>                                           51,801
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   51,801
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                31,475
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 4,942
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,454
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (18,649)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (18,649)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (18,649)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (2.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (2.14)
        



</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1920 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1920

      To suspend temporarily the duty on certain sports footwear.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 26, 2009

  Mr. Roberts introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To suspend temporarily the duty on certain sports footwear.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN SPORTS FOOTWEAR.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.01.00       Tennis shoes,       Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/ ''.
                          basketball shoes,                                                  31/2011.......
                          gym shoes,
                          training shoes,
                          and the like, the
                          foregoing with
                          outer soles of
                          rubber or
                          plastics
                          (provided for in
                          subheading
                          6402.99.31)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0243 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ZECHARIAH JUSTIN DANIEL SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including April 1 4 , 2023, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 8 2023

03/08/2023
Case Number: DA 22-0243
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *880Frankie Valle, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Beldock, J.), rendered September 9, 1987, convicting him of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree (two counts), and riot in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

While the defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial due to the actions of the trial court, we note that his consent to the conduct now complained of renders his argument unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Bowles,*168 AD2d 562; CPL 470.05 [2]; *cf., People v Mehmedi,*69 NY2d 759). In any event, the actions of the trial court did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. After personally admonishing the jurors against engaging in premature deliberations, and sending them to the jury room, the court during the charge conference, obtained the defendant’s consent to the court officer’s "let[ting] the jury go [and] * * * reminding] them of [the court’s] admonitions”. This delegation of a minor ministerial matter by the court neither affected the organization of the court nor the mode of proceedings prescribed by law *(see, People v Bowles, supra; see also, People v Harris,*76 NY2d 810; *People v Torres,*72 NY2d 1007). Accordingly the defendant’s argument is unavailing.

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Thompson, J. P., Brown, Fiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1914 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on strontium halophosphate 

doped with europium. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 26, 2009 

Mr. ROBERTS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on strontium 

halophosphate doped with europium. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. STRONTIUM HALOPHOSPHATE DOPED WITH 

4 EUROPIUM. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.22.73 of the Har6 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

7 strontium halophosphate doped with europium) is amend8 ed by striking the date in the effective period column and 

9 inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1914 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 47 (Friday, March 9, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14458-14459]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-5718]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i>13024]


Connecticut Disaster <greek-i>CT-00027; Declaration of Economic 
Injury

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) 
declaration for the State of Connecticut, dated 02/29/2012.
    Incident: Major Winter Storm.
    Incident Period: 10/29/2011.
    Effective Date: 02/29/2012.
    EIDL Loan Application Deadline Date: 11/29/2012.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

[[Page 14459]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of 
the Administrator's EIDL declaration, applications for economic injury 
disaster loans may be filed at the address listed above or other 
locally announced locations.
    The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected 
by the disaster:

Primary Counties: Hartford.
Contiguous Counties:
    Connecticut: Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven, New London, Tolland.
    Massachusetts: Hampden.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Interest Rates are:
  Businesses and Small Agricultural Cooperatives Without           4.000
   Credit Available Elsewhere................................
  Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit Available Elsewhere      3.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number assigned to this disaster for economic injury is 130240.
    The States which received an EIDL Declaration <greek-i> are 
Connecticut, Massachusetts.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59002)


    Dated: February 29, 2012.
Karen G. Mills,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2012-5718 Filed 3-8-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
AZON METREX HEYWOOD,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D13-6127

_____________________________/

Opinion filed February 25, 2015.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Suzanne Bass, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Bracey, III, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BENTON, WETHERELL, and SWANSON, JJ., CONCUR.
#### Tracy Lee KNOX, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, State of Colorado, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86CA0860.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

May 21, 1987.

*929No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Dan B. Zimmerman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellant.

BABCOCK, Judge.

The Department of Revenue (Department) appeals the judgment of the district court reversing the revocation of the driver’s license of Tracy Lee Knox. We reverse.

Knox was injured when his car was involved in a collision. Conscious but combative and incoherent, he was taken to a hospital. The arresting officer ordered a blood sample drawn. A fellow officer observed collection of the sample and delivered it to the arresting officer. Analysis of the sample showed a blood alcohol content of 0.187 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.

The arresting officer testified at the license revocation hearing. The hearing officer admitted into evidence the arresting officer’s report, which included the test results. Knox objected to the report on grounds of hearsay and lack of foundation. The hearing officer overruled Knox’s objection and revoked his license for one year.

The district court reversed and reinstated the license, holding that the foundation for the test results was inadequate because the officer who observed collection of the sample did not testify.

The Department contends that a sufficient foundation was laid for admission of the test results. We agree.

The regulation concerning blood tests for alcohol content requires that “blood samples shall be collected in the presence of the arresting officer or *other responsible person*who can authenticate the samples.” Department of Health Rules & Regulations I.A.1.a., 5 Code Colo.Reg. 1005-2 (emphasis added). Thus, the regulation’s plain language indicates that the arresting officer is not the only person who may observe the sample collection. *Miller v. Motor Vehicle Division,*706 P.2d 10 (Colo.App.1985) provides no authority to the contrary, and the district court therefore erred in concluding otherwise.

Here, the arresting officer testified to his fellow officer’s observation of the sample collection. This testimony, along with the written report, was adequate to authenticate the sample, establish the time of its collection, and lay the foundation for admission of the test results. *See Kelln v. Department of Revenue,*719 P.2d 358 (Colo.App.1986); *Miller v. Motor Vehicle Division, supra.*There was thus no need for the fellow officer to appear and testify. *See Cordova v. Mansheim,*725 P.2d 1158 (Colo.App.1986); *Renck v. Motor Vehicle Division,*636 P.2d 1294 (Colo.App.1981).

Accordingly, the hearing officer’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and the district court erred in reversing it. *See DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Division,*667 P.2d 1360 (Colo.1983).

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate the revocation.

PIERCE, and VAN CISE, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos Garcia, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John P. Collins, J.), rendered February 7, 1990, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment of from 15 years to life and from 25 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

The bodies of the victims, Juan Nieto, a reputed drug dealer, and Jaqueline Martinez, his girlfriend, were discovered in the passenger compartment of a grey Plymouth in the vicinity of Bronx River Avenue and the Cross Bronx Expressway, at approximately 7:00 a.m. on October 19, 1987. Nieto’s body was slumped over that of Martinez, which was in a seated position in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. Four photographs of the bodies were introduced at trial in order to illustrate the position of the bodies and the crime scene.

The evidence which connected the defendant to the homicides was the testimony of a witness, who stated at trial that he was privy to a conversation in the home of his brother-in-*400law, in which the defendant told him the details of the crime and his reason for killing the victims.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, and giving due deference to the jury’s finding with respect to credibility *(People v Malizia, 62*NY2d *755, cert denied*469 US 932), it is clear that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. The witness’s criminal history was fully presented to the jury, and defendant can point to nothing in the record which warrants disturbing the jury’s finding with respect to that testimony, which was supported by the other evidence submitted.

It was not error for the trial court to admit in evidence the photographs of the victims’ bodies. Photographs of the victim’s corpse which are likely to arouse the passions of the jury should not be admitted unless they tend to prove or disprove some material fact in issue. *(People v Stevens, 76*NY2d 833, 835.) In the present case the photographs were properly admitted to illustrate the positioning of the bodies in order to show that Lopez’ account of what defendant said comported with the physical evidence. Their probative value outweighed any potential prejudice *(cf., People v Bell,*63 NY2d 796).

Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible if the evidence tends to establish an element of the crime under consideration or is relevant because of a recognized exception to the general prohibition against the admission of such evidence. *(People v Alvino,*71 NY2d 233, 241.) The testimony concerning the defendant’s and his mother’s prior involvement with the male victim’s drug business, was admissible for the purposes of completing the narrative and of demonstrating the defendant’s motive to commit the crime *(People v Powell,*157 AD2d 524, 524-525, *lv denied 75*NY2d 923; *People v Conyers,*160 AD2d 318, *lv denied 76*NY2d 786). Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Kupferman, Asch and Kassal, JJ.