NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOMINGO QUEBRADO-CANTOR, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 14-72458 

Agency No. A200-885-573 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 10, 2018 

Seattle, Washington

Before: FERNANDEZ and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** Senior 

District Judge.

Domingo Quebrado-Cantor, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the denial of 

his applications for asylum and withholding of removal and the denial of his 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 18 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

motion for administrative closure. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, 

and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that QuebradoCantor is ineligible for asylum because of his failure to meet the one-year filing 

deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Quebrado-Cantor makes no substantive 

argument to explain what “extraordinary circumstances” justified the almost-three 

year delay between his eighteenth birthday and the filing of his application, and 

therefore has waived this issue. See Singh v. Holder, 656 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2011); Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996). He also 

does not show how the changed circumstance of increased violence between 

warring drug cartels “materially affect[s]” his eligibility for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A). 

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that QuebradoCantor failed to “demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he would be 

subject to persecution on one of the specified grounds” if removed to Mexico. See

Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Robleto-Pastora 

v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010)). Even assuming that QuebradoCantor suffered past harm on account of his membership in the particular social 

group of his family, the agency’s factual finding that his similarly situated family 

members currently reside, unharmed, in Mexico is uncontroverted. Therefore, he 
3 

has not shown that his “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of his 

membership in his family. 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).1 

3. We reject Quebrado-Cantor’s contentions as to the denial of his motion 

for administrative closure. At the time of his removal proceedings, the 

immigration judge (IJ) was permitted to consider Quebrado-Cantor’s likelihood of 

obtaining relief outside of removal proceedings. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 

688, 696 (BIA 2012). The BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s discretionary decision to 

deny administrative closure was not an abuse of discretion. 

PETITION DENIED. 

 

1 For that reason, the incorrect application of the “one central reason” standard to 

the question of nexus is harmless error. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 

351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the “a reason” standard for withholding of 

removal is “less demanding” than the “one central reason” test for asylum).