UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1592

MICHAEL A. WATT,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

RAY MABUS, Secretary, Department of the Navy,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:12-cv-00128-LO-JFA)

Submitted: April 27, 2015 Decided: May 1, 2015

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas F. Hennessy, VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY LAW OFFICE, 

Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States 

Attorney, Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr., Assistant United States 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael A. Watt appeals the district court’s order granting 

the Secretary of the Navy’s motion for summary judgment on 

Watt’s Title VII∗ employment discrimination and retaliation 

claims. We affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. 

Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). 

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] 

against any of [its] employees . . . because [the employee] has 

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 

[Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). Because Watt did 

not present direct evidence of retaliation, the district court 

analyzed his retaliation claim under the familiar burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff 

 ∗ Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
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establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating 

“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment 

action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and 

the employment action.” Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 

F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). If the plaintiff makes such a 

showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to establish a 

legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the action.” Price v. 

Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). If the employer 

does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “show that 

the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual.” Id.

Throughout this process, the employee bears the ultimate burden 

of establishing that his protected activity was a “but-for” 

cause of the alleged adverse action and was not merely a 

motivating factor. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 

S. Ct. 2517, 2532-34 (2013). We have reviewed the record in 

this case and find no reversible error in the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment on Watt’s retaliation claim. 

We next turn to Watt’s claim that the district court erred 

in holding that his claims of a hostile work environment and 

constructive discharge were barred by Watt’s failure to exhaust 

his claims through the administrative process. Absent 

exceptional circumstances, this Court generally does not 

consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. See In re 

Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014). Watt offers no 
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explanation, exceptional or otherwise, for his failure to 

address the issue of exhaustion either in his brief in response 

to the motion for summary judgment or upon questioning by the 

district court at the hearing on the motion. Accordingly, we 

decline to address the issue on appeal.

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this Court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED