[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DELAWARE COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY : : JUDGES: : Appellan t : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs- : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. : STEPHEN O. KISE : : Plaintiff-Appellee : Case No. 19 CAF 12 0064 : and : : JUDITH A. KISE : : : Defendant-Appellee : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. 02 DR B 04 0177

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:

APPEARANCES: March 22, 2021

For Appellant: For Plaintiff-Appellee:

TANYA H. KIDD ELIZABETH N. GABA 145 North Union St., 3rd Floo r 1231 E. Broad St. Delaware, OH 43015 Columbus , OH 43205 For Defendant-Appellee:

CALEB CARSON III 144 E. Center St. Marion, OH 43302[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.]

Delaney, J. {¶1} Appellant Delaware County Child Support Enforcement Agency appeals the November 27, 2019 judgment entry of the Delaware County Court o f Common Pleas,

Domestic Relations Division.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶2} On June 27, 2003, Appellee Judith A. Kise (“Wife”) and App ellee Stephen O. Kise (“Husband”) were divorced by Agreed Judgment Entry Decr ee of Divorce in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Divis ion. The Decree ordered Husband to pay spousal support in the amount of $1,900. 00 per month directly to Wife for 177 months, effective May 1, 2003. The trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the amount, duration, and payment of spousal support. {¶3} By judgment entry filed January 5, 2007, the trial court o rdered Husband to pay all future spousal support payments and arrearage liquidati on payments through Appellant Delaware County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“DC CSEA”). Husband’s spousal support arrearage was $29,000 as of November 29, 2006. The trial court ordered Husband to liquidate the arrearage at a rate of $1,000 per mont h. Upon receipt of the trial court’s order, the DCCSEA inputted all party and order informat ion into the Support Enforcement Tracking System (“SETS”). The DCCSEA collected and disbursed the spousal support payments, maintained records, and charged the s tatutory two percent processing charge. {¶4} Husband and Wife continued to litigate the issue of spousa l support. Through a judgment entry filed December 31, 2008, the trial court deter mined Husband’s spousal support arrearage was $50,543.98 as of December 17, 2007. Husba nd was[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] ordered to liquidate the arrearage at a rate of $380 per month. The DCCSEA adjusted SETS to accurately reflect the changes made to the order. {¶5} On November 9, 2010, the trial court issued a judgment ent ry finding Husband was in contempt for failure to comply with the spousal support order. Husband’s spousal support arrearage was $109,439.80 plus the two percent processing fee. {¶6} Husband and Wife entered into an Agreed Order on June 29, 2011. Husband was ordered to pay spousal support in the amount of $400 per mo nth and ordered to pay $200 per month toward the spousal support arrearage thro ugh the DCCSEA. Upon receipt of the entry, the DCCSEA adjusted the SETS to accu rately reflect the changes made to the spousal support order. {¶7} On June 8, 2017, the trial court reactivated the divorce p roceeding upon Wife’s motion to show cause regarding spousal support. The DCCS EA was ordered to complete and disseminate to Husband and Wife’s counsel an audit of the spousal support

account. {¶8} On January 31, 2018, the DCCSEA took administrative action to terminate the current spousal support effective January 31, 2018 because 177 months had lapsed. On April 19, 2018, the DCCSEA provided a certified audit includ ing all spousal support arrearages and administrative processing charge arrearages. {¶9} On May 3, 2019, the DCCSEA received a subpoena to appear o n June 5, 2019 for trial. After reviewing the trial court docket, the DCC SEA discovered the trial date

had been vacated and the trial court had ordered Husband and Wi fe to mediation. {¶10} On July 17, 2019, the trial court filed a Judgment Entry In Court Settlement. The judgment entry stated the trial court held an ad hoc Final Hearing on May 23, 2019[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] regarding all outstanding post-decree motions. Husband and Wife participated in trial court mediation services and reached a full agreement on all ou tstanding issues and motions. Husband and Wife agreed that by May 23, 2019, Husband shall pay Wife $13,000 in full satisfaction of all claims and counterclaims pe rtaining to spousal support, which the trial court noted “was an arrears only matter.” (Judg ment Entry, July 17, 2019). {¶11} The judgment entry stated in pertinent part to this appea l: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that The Lump Sum Payment that resolves th e disputed arrearages is specifically authorized by the Court and shall be paid direct from the Plaintiff to the Defendant (contemplated as thr ough a third party) on May 23, 2019. CSEA shall be directed to adjust its re cords accordingly effective the date of this entry to reflect that an y arrears or credits on the above-referenced spousal support account – inclu ding those regarding the spousal support account and the processing fee be reduced to zero. Should CSEA require an acknowledgement from one or bot h of the parties they shall cooperate, however the directive from the Co urt should

be sufficient to effectuate the reduction of the arrears to zer o and close the

account. (Judgment Entry, July 17, 2019). {¶12} On July 22, 2019, the DCCSEA filed a motion for relief fr om judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) requesting relief from the July 17, 20 19 judgment entry. It argued the trial court erred when it ordered the processing charges to zero and failed to provide the DCCSEA with notice of the proceedings and the opportunity t o be heard. In support[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] of its motion, the DCCSEA attached a certified audit of the spo usal support order that reflected Husband owed $4,142.01 in processing charge arrearage s as of April 30, 2019. {¶13} Without a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment on November 27, 2019. It is from this judgment that the DCCSEA now appeals. {¶14} Neither Husband nor Wife filed an appellate brief.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶15} The DCCSEA raises two Assignments of Errors: {¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED HUSBAND AND WIFE TO WAIVE THE ADMINISTRATIVE 2% PROCESSING CHAR GE

OWED TO THE DELAWARE COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY. {¶17} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED

DCCSEA’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 60(B) BECAUSE THE DELAWARE COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WAS NEVER PROVIDED NOTICE, THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, OR

THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE UNDERLYING ORDER TO WAIVE

PROCESSING CHARGES.”

ANALYSIS

I. and II. {¶18} We consider the two Assignments of Error raised by the DC CSEA together because they are interrelated. The DCCSEA contends the trial co urt abused its discretion when it ordered the DCCSEA to reduce Husband’s processing fee a rrearage to zero and to deny the DCCSEA’s motion for relief from that judgment. We a gree.[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] Civ.R. 60(B) {¶19} A motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the trial court's

sound discretion. Griffey v. Rajan , 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987). To find an abuse of that discretion, we must determine the trial court's d ecision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v.

Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). The DCCSEA bases it s motion on 60(B)(5). In GTE Automatic Electric Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc ., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, the Supre me Court of Ohio held the following: To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant m ust demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or cl aim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is ma de within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60 (B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or procee ding was

entered or taken. {¶20} The DCCSEA argued it was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Civ.R. 60(B)(5) allows the trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” Civ.R. 60(B)(5) operates as a catch-all provision and “reflects ‘the inherent power of a court to relieve a person fr om the unjust operation of a judgment.’” Maggiore v. Barensfeld , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011CA00180, 2012-Ohio-2909, 2012 WL 2415184, ¶ 35 citing Dutton v. Potroos , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010CA00318, 2011- Ohio-3646, 2011 WL 3057612, at ¶ 49. It is reserved for “extrao rdinary and unusual case[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.]

[s],” Myers v. Myers , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22393, 2005-Ohio-3800, 2005 WL 1763608, at ¶ 14, and “is not a substitute for the enumerated grounds fo r relief from judgment [.]”

Id

. {¶21} In examining the three GTE factors, we first find that the DCCSEA’s motion for relief from judgment was made in a reasonable time. It was filed five days after the trial court issued its judgment entry waiving Husband’s process ing fee arrearage. We next

determine whether the DCCSEA has a meritorious claim or defense to present if relief is granted. The Meritorious Claim and the Processing Fee {¶22} The Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) was “establ ished pursuant to R.C. 3125.03 so that it could enforce support order s, oversee the collection of support obligations, and perform other actions associated wi th child support

enforcement.” Saari v. Lorain Cty. Child Support Enf't Agency , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009905, 2011-Ohio-2198, 2011 WL 1782102, ¶ 7. Under certain circumstances, the CSEA must also collect spousal support. Id. citing Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12–1–10. {¶23} To perform its statutorily mandated duties to enforce sup port orders and oversee the collection of support obligations, the General Asse mbly authorized the CSEA to collect a processing charge. R.C. 3119.27(A) states: A court that issues or modifies a court support order, or an ad ministrative agency that issues or modifies an administrative child support order, shall impose on the obligor under the support order a processing char ge in the amount of two per cent of the support payment to be collected u nder a support order. No court or agency may call the charge a poundag e fee.[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.]

R.C. 19.28 next states: (A) As used in this section, “current support payment” means th e amount of support due an obligee that an obligor is required to pay in a particular payment for the current month as specified in a support order. “Current support payment” does not include payments on arrearages under the support order. (B) The obligor shall pay the amount imposed pursuant to sectio n 3119.27 of the Revised Code with every current support payment, and wit h every payment on arrearages. {¶24} The purpose of a processing fee is to compensate official s for the risk of handling and disbursing money. Tuscarawas Cty. Child Support Enf't Agency (CSEA) v. Burger , 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2000AP110074, 2001-Ohio-1440, *2 cit ing Granzow v. Bureau of Support , 54 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 560 N.E. 2d 1307 ( 1990). T he two percent processing charge is part of a uniform state practice of suppor t order enforcement mandated by federal and state law. R.C. 3125.07 codifies the di rective to create the Support Enforcement Tracking System (“SETS”) used by all Ohio c ounty child support enforcement agencies: The department of job and family services shall establish and m aintain a statewide, automated data processing system in compliance with Title IV-D of the “Social Security Act,” 88 Stat. 2351 (1975), 42 U.S.C. 6 51, as amended, to support the enforcement of child support that shall be implemented in every county. Every county shall accept the auto mated system and, in accordance with the written instructions of the department[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] for the implementation of the automated system, shall convert t o the automated system all records that are maintained by any county entity and that are related to any case for which a local agency is enforc ing a child support order in accordance with Title IV-D of the “Social Secu rity Act,” 88 Stat. 2351 (1975), 42 U.S.C. 651, as amended. {¶25} The above-cited law demonstrates it is well-settled that the two percent processing fee collected by an CSEA is statutorily mandated. Th e issue presented in this

case is whether the DCCSEA had a meritorious claim or defense t hat the trial court could not order the DCCSEA to waive a processing fee arrearage accrue d by Husband. We

examine two cases that addressed the issue of whether a CSEA wa s entitled to collect an additional two percent in processing charges on a processing fee arrearage. These cases provide guidance as to whether a trial court can order th e DCCSEA to reduce Husband’s processing fee arrearage to zero. {¶26} In Tuscarawas Cty. Child Support Enf't Agency (CSEA) v. Burger , 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2000AP110074, 2001-Ohio-1440, the CSEA filed con tempt actions against multiple obligors under a child support order due to ch ild support arrearages. The trial court ordered additional monthly payment toward arrearage s, but ultimately declared in each case the CSEA could not collect processing fees on any support arrearage payments, including those attributable to prior unpaid processi ng fees. Id . at *1. The trial court used the following language in several of the cases: Thus, the Court finds that although the Revised Code gives the court and administrative agency authority to account for past due process ing fees,

neither the Revised Code nor the O.A.C. authorizes the collecti on of an[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] additional processing fee on the past due processing fee. The C ourt finds that the law does not allow for cumulative processing fees to b e charged upon past due support. The accumulation of processing fees coul d result in an unconscionable, exponential obligation for which there is no clear legislative intent and which this court will not endorse.

Id . at *1. {¶27} On appeal, this Court examined the meaning of R.C. 2301.3 5, which was the predecessor statute to R.C. 3119.27 and R.C. 3119.28. In S. B. 180, 2000 Ohio Laws 291, the General Assembly repealed R.C. 2301.3 5 and enacted R.C . 3119.27 and R.C. 3119.28. The relevant content of R.C. 2301.35 was split between the two statutes but the language remained the same, and the relevant language has essen tially been unchanged

since we examined it in Burger . R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) stated: (G)(1) A court or administrative agency that issues or modifies a support order shall impose a processing charge that is the greater of t wo per cent of the support payment to be collected under a support order or one dollar per month on the obligor under the support order. The obligor s hall pay the amount with every current support payment, and with every payme nt on arrearages. No court or agency may call the charge a poundage f ee. {¶28} Upon our appellate review of the statutory language, the majority in Burger

found the trial court erred when it disallowed the collection o f statutory processing charges on monthly arrearage payments. Id . at *3. We first disagreed with the trial court’s statutory interpretation of R.C. 2310.35(G)(1):[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] Following its review of various provisions in the Ohio Revised Code and Ohio Administrative Code, the trial court found that it could n ot locate a definition of “arrearages” as used in 2301.35(G)(1). However, t he court concluded that “[t]he obligor must pay the processing charge on the support, whether the support is paid on time (current) or paid late (pastdue);” but that no authority exists for assessing a “second” pr ocessing fee on the support amount if paid past-due. * * * Courts are guided by the axiom that statutes should be construed to avoid unreasonable consequ ences. See State ex rel. Dispatch Printing v. Wells (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 382, 384. The trial court's reading of R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) effectively alt ered the second sentence from conjunctive to disjunctive; i.e., the phrase “and with every payment on arrearages” was essentially construed as “or with ev ery payment on arrearages,” (if not previously paid with current su pport.) Generally, “ * * * we must presume the legislature means what i t says; we cannot amend statutes to provide what we consider a more logica l result.” State v. Virasayachack (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 570, 574. Additionally, the trial court effectively read “two per cent of the support payme nt” in the first sentence of R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) as referring to a current suppor t order only. In construing a statute, a court may not add or delete words. State ex rel. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm . (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 144, 148; State v. Hughes (1999), 86 Ohio St.3 d 424 , 427. As CSEA points out, the aforementioned second sentence of R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) was origin ally added to the statute, via amendment, on March 29, 1988. Althoug h the[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] second sentence has from its onset contained the phrase “curren t support,” the General Assembly never chose to amend “support payment” or “support order” from the first sentence in like fashion. Indeed, at leas t one appellate court has held that a “child support order” includes an order r equiring periodic payments for past-due support. See Treadway v. Ballew (Oct. 7, 1998), Summit App.No. 18984, unreported.

Id . at *2 {¶29} In interpreting R.C. 2301.35(G)(1), we next examined R.C. 5101.325(B)(1). The content of R.C. 5101.325(B)(1) is now codified in R.C. 3121 .56 and R.C. 3121.58, with no relevant change in wording. Furthermore, at the time of the cases sub judice, the Ohio Depa rtment of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”) was statutorily charged in R. C. 5101.325(B)(1) with maintaining an account of unpaid processing fees for every child support obligor: (B)(1) The division [of child supp ort in the department of job and family services] shall collect the charge imposed on the obligor under the support order pursuant to division (G)(1) of section 2301.35 of the Revised Code. If an obligor fails to pay the req uired amount with each current support payment due in increments specified u nder the support order, the division shall maintain a separate arrearage account of that amount for that obligor. * * *.

Id . at *2. {¶30} The majority in Burger concluded that in “[r]eading R.C. 5101.325(B)(1) and R.C. 2301.35(G)(1) in pari materia, we cannot accept th e trial court's restrictive[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] interpretation of the collection of processing fees. An obligor who fails to pay current support remains statutorily liable for the corresponding accumulation of unpaid processing fees on said support; otherwise, the mandate of R.C. 5101.325(B)(1) is superfluous. When the obligor later makes an arrearage payment, we find no b asis to bar CSEA from assessing thereon a separate processing fee under R.C . 2301.35(G)(1). * * * Moreover, when interpreting statutes, courts ‘* * * must give d ue deference to an administrative interpretation formulated by an agency that has accumulated substantial expertise and to which the General Assembly has delegated the r esponsibility of implementing the legislative command.’ Swallow v. Indus. Comm . (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 55, 57.” Id . at *2 (emphasis added). {¶31} The Second District Court of Appeals was faced with the s ame question in

Osborne v. Osborne , 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 26624, 2015-Ohio-3382, where the tri al

court stated the CSEA was not entitled to collect an additional two percent in processing charges on a processing fee arrearage of $301.91 owed to the CS EA. The court relied upon our decision in Burger, supra , to find the trial court erred in refusing to allow the CSEA collect the additional two percent processing charge on th e processing fee

arrearage. Id . at ¶ 2. {¶32} The DCCSEA argues the trial court was without the authori ty to order the DCCSEA to waive the processing fee arrearage owed by Husband; b ased on our instructive analysis in Burger , we agree. The statutorily mandated purpose of the CSEA is to enforce support orders, oversee the collection of support obligations, and perform other actions associated with child support enforcement. A two percent processing fee has been held to be reasonable to compensate the CSEA for the a ssumption of the risk[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] with the handling and disbursement of funds in proportion to th e amount of those funds. Curran v. Kelly , 9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0139-M, 2012-Ohio-218, ¶ 13 citing Granzow , 54 Ohio St.3d at 38. The history of this case shows that the DC CSEA has been enforcing the parties’ support order, overseeing the collection of Husban d’s support obligations, and performing other actions associated with support enforcemen t since 2007. {¶33} We found in Burger , which was followed in Osborne , that Ohio law permitted the CSEA to collect an additional two percent processing charge on a processing fee arrearage and the trial court could not order the CSEA to waive the collection of the charge. Based on the same statutory provisions, we likewise fin d the language of R.C. 3119.27, R.C. 3119.28(B), and R.C. 3121.58 limits the trial cou rt’s ability to order the DCCSEA to reduce a processing fee arrearage to a zero balance. While Husband and Wife may have reached an agreement as to Husband’s spousal supp ort obligation, the

DCCSEA has a meritorious claim or defense that it was entitled to the processing fees under Ohio law, regardless of their agreement. {¶34} The first Assignment of E rror of the DCCSEA is sustained. Civ.R. 60(B)(5) {¶35} The third GTE factor is whether the DCCSEA is entitled to relief under one of the enumerated factors. The DCCSEA argues it is entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), which allows the trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” Civ.R. 60(B)(5) op erates as a catch-all provision and “reflects ‘the inherent power of a court to relie ve a person from the unjust operation of a judgment.’” Maggiore v. Barensfeld , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011CA00180, 2012-Ohio-2909, 2012 WL 2415184, ¶ 35 citing Dutton v. Potroos , 5th Dist. Stark No.[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] 2010CA00318, 2011-Ohio-3646, 2011 WL 3057612, at ¶ 49. It is re served for “extraordinary and unusual case [s],” Myers v. Myers , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22393, 2005- Ohio-3800, 2005 WL 1763608, at ¶ 14, and “is not a substitute f or the enumerated grounds for relief from judgment [.]” Id

. {¶36} The DCCSEA argues it should be entitled to relief from ju dgment because it was never provided the opportunity to be heard on the issue of waiving Husband’s processing charge arrearages owed to the DCCSEA. In Saari v. Lorain Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009905, 2011-Ohio-2198, the appellat e court reversed the trial court’s determination that a provision in a prenuptial agreement waiving spousal s upport was invali d. While the appeal was pendi ng, the trial court ordered the husband to pay spousal support to the wife plus a two perce nt processing fee to the CSEA for collection and distribution of the spousal support. Id . at ¶ 2. After reversal and remand, the trial court ordered the CSEA to reimburse the husba nd $1,030.23 in processing fees that had been collected for distribution of spo usal support. The CSEA filed a motion to intervene and motion to vacate/relief from ju dgment. Id . at ¶ 4. The trial

court denied the motion to intervene. {¶37} On appeal, the CSEA argued it was deprived of due process of law because it was not a party to the litigation, and it was never provided notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether it should be required to reimburs e fees. Id . at ¶ 10. The Ninth District Court of Appeals, based on our decision in Messer v. Messer , 5th Dist. Licking No. 2005CA00128, 2006-Ohio-4833, agreed and found that the concepts of fundamental fairness and due process demanded that the CSEA sho uld have received notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id . at ¶ 11.[Cite as Delaware Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise , 2021-Ohio-915.] {¶38} Based on Saari , we find that the DCCSEA was deprived of the due process of law when the trial court failed to provide it with notice of the ad hoc Final Hearing on May 23, 2019 where the DCCSEA could have been heard on the issu e of waiving Husband’s processing fee arrearage. We reverse the trial court’ s denial of the DCCSEA’s motion for relief from judgment in accordance with the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust operation of a judgment. See Civ.R. 60(B)(5). {¶39} The second Assignment of Error of the DCCSEA is sustained

. CONCLUSION {¶40} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the November 27, 2019 judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations D ivision and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consiste nt with this opinion and law. By: Delaney, J., Baldwin, P.J. and Wise, Earle, J., concur.