SECOND DIVISION	

									June 14, 2005

No. 1-02-0365

BETTY M. PALEN, Independent Executor

of the Estate of DAVID SCOTT PALEN,

Deceased, 

		Plaintiff-Appellant and

Cross-Appellee, 

				v.

DAEWOO MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., d/b/a

DAEWOO-FSO, WARSAW, 

		Defendant-Appellee and

Cross-Appellant,

(Daewoo Motor America (Central),

Inc., and Daewoo America Development

(Illinois) Corp.,

		Defendants).

_____________________________________

BETTY M. PALEN, Independent Executor

of the Estate of DAVID SCOTT PALEN,

Deceased, 

		Plaintiff-Appellant and

Cross-Appellee, 

                   v.

DAEWOO GROUP; DAEWOO HEAVY

INDUSTRIES, LTD.; DAEWOO CORPORATION;

and KIM WOO-CHOONG,  

		Defendants-Appellees and

Cross-Appellants,

(Daewoo FSO Motor SP. Zoo,

		Defendant). 	

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

Honorable

James M. Varga, 

Judge Presiding.

	PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

	Plaintiff Betty Palen, as independent executor of the estate

of David Palen, deceased, appeals from an order of the circuit

court (1) granting defendants Daewoo Motor Company, Ltd. (DMC),1 Daewoo Corporation (Daewoo Corp.),2  Daewoo Group, Daewoo Heavy Industries, Ltd. (Heavy Industries), "Daewoo FSO Motor SP. z.o.o."

(Daewoo-FSO),3 and Kim Woo-Choong's motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) granting

defendant Daewoo Motor America, Inc.'s (DMA)4 motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the trial court erred in granting

Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Group, Heavy Industries, Daewoo-FSO, and Kim

Woo-Choong’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint because the

above entities and individual waived their right to contest

personal jurisdiction by serving general interrogatories on

plaintiff that sought information not related to their special and

limited appearance; (2) personal jurisdiction may be asserted over

DMC, Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Group, Heavy Industries, Daewoo-FSO, and

Kim Woo-Choong, pursuant to section 2-209(b)(4) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-209(b)(4) (West

2000)), because the above entities and individual are "doing

business" in Illinois; (3) DMA's motion to dismiss plaintiff's

cause of action based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens was untimely as a matter of law; and (4) the trial court abused its

discretion in dismissing plaintiff's cause of action based on the

doctrine of forum non conveniens.  Defendants DMC, Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Group, Heavy Industries, and Kim Woo-Choong cross-appeal,

arguing that the trial court erred in denying in part their motion

to quash service of summons.  For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

	On September 30, 1997, decedent David Palen was a passenger in

an automobile that crashed into a tree in Poland, killing everyone

inside.  On January 20, 1998, plaintiff, decedent's wife, filed a

complaint based on negligence (case No. 98 L 710) against DMC, DMA,

and Daewoo America Development (Illinois) Corporation (Daewoo

Illinois), alleging that they, "by and through their agents and/or

employees, owned[,] operated, *** and controlled" the vehicle in

which the decedent was killed, and that jurisdiction was proper

over the above defendants because each "engaged in and transacted

business" in Illinois.  In her complaint, plaintiff alleged claims

based on wrongful death and survival.  Daewoo Illinois was

subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit for reasons unrelated to this appeal.  

	On June 12, DMA filed its answer and affirmative defenses to

plaintiff's complaint, and DMC filed a special and limited

appearance requesting that the trial court quash service of summons

and dismiss the action against it based on lack of personal

jurisdiction.  DMC argued that it was a Korean corporation with its

principal place of business in Korea and had not done any acts by

which it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts. 

The trial court subsequently granted plaintiff's motion to conduct

special and limited discovery relating to the issue of personal

jurisdiction over DMC.

	On September 30, plaintiff initiated a second lawsuit (case

No. 98 L 11276) based on negligence against Daewoo Corp., Daewoo

Group, Heavy Industries, Daewoo-FSO, and Kim Woo-Choong

(collectively the Palen II defendants).  As plaintiff had in case

No. 98 L 710, she alleged in her complaint filed in case No. 98 L

11276 that the Palen II defendants, "by and through their agents

and/or employees, owned[,] operated, *** and controlled" the

vehicle in which the decedent was killed, and alleged causes of

action based on wrongful death and survival.  Plaintiff attempted

to effectuate service upon each of the Palen II defendants by

leaving copies of the complaint and summons with Kim Woo-Choong, in

his individual capacity and as an "agent for the above

corporations," while he was giving a speech in Chicago, Illinois on

September 30, 1998.  

	On December 22, after filing special and limited appearances

to contest jurisdiction, the Palen II defendants filed a motion to

quash service of summons and dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on

lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that Kim Woo-Choong was a

citizen and resident of South Korea, that Daewoo Group was not a

legal entity,5 and that the remaining Palen II defendants were either South Korean or Polish corporations that were not doing

business in Illinois.  The Palen II defendants also argued that

Daewoo-FSO and Daewoo Group were not properly served through Kim

Woo-Choong because Kim Woo-Choong was neither an officer nor an

agent of their companies.  Attached to their motion to quash and

dismiss was: the affidavit of Lee Sung Won, executive director of

Daewoo Corp., who averred that Daewoo Corp. was a South Korean

corporation with its principal place of business in South Korea,

was engaged in the business of trading and international

investment, and had never maintained an office, held property,

hired employees, or otherwise done business in Illinois; the

affidavit of Sang-Il Park,6 who averred that, as a South Korean attorney practicing in the area of, among others, general corporate

law, he was familiar with Daewoo Group and that Daewoo Group was

"not a corporation or other entity" that had the capacity to sue or be sued; the affidavit of Shin Young-Kyun, president of Heavy

Industries, who averred that Heavy Industries was a South Korean

corporation with its principal place of business in South Korea,

was engaged in the business of manufacturing heavy machinery and

vehicles, and had never maintained an office, held property, hired

employees, or otherwise done business in Illinois; the affidavit of

Kin Kwang Woong, the "Legal Coordinator" of Daewoo-FSO, who averred

that Daewoo-FSO was a Polish corporation with its principal place

of business in Poland, was in the business of manufacturing motor

vehicles, and had never maintained an office, held property, hired

employees, or otherwise done business in Illinois; and the

affidavit of Kim Woo-Choong, who averred that he was a citizen and

resident of South Korea, had never owned property or otherwise done

business in Illinois, and was not an officer or agent of Daewoo-FSO

or Daewoo Group at the time he was served with the summons or

presently.

	On December 18, in case No. 98 L 710, DMA filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that it had no connection to the accident

which allegedly gave rise to plaintiff's action.  On January 20,

1999, the trial court granted DMA's motion, dismissing plaintiff's

complaint against DMA without prejudice.  Also on January 20, DMC,

the sole remaining defendant in case No. 98 L 710, filed a notice

of removal of the cause to the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois.  On February 17, plaintiff filed a

first amended complaint in case No. 98 L 710 in the circuit court, again alleging wrongful death and survival claims against DMC and

DMA.  Plaintiff also alleged in her amended complaint that DMC and

DMA "were part of a commonly controlled family of 'Daewoo'

entities," including Daewoo Group, Heavy Industries, Daewoo Corp.,

Daewoo-FSO, and Kim Woo-Choong.  On March 3, DMA filed a motion in

the district court to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint in case

No. 98 L 710, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

(Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6)), for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.  This motion was never ruled upon by

the district court, and, on April 1, the district court remanded

the matter back to the circuit court based on insufficient

allegations regarding citizenship for complete diversity.  On June

11, case No. 98 L 710 was consolidated with case No. 98 L 11276.

	On August 24, DMC filed a "renewed" motion to quash service of

process and dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of

jurisdiction.7  In support of its motion, DMC attached the affidavit of H.S. Hwang,8 "legal manager" of DMC, who averred that DMC was a South Korean corporation with its principal place of

business in South Korea, was in the business of manufacturing

vehicles, and had never had offices or facilities, employees or agents, or otherwise done business in Illinois.  

	On April 10, 2001, DMA filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's

consolidated cases on the ground of forum non conveniens, arguing that all defendants in plaintiff's action were nonresidents of

Illinois, that all witnesses to the accident, documents, and other

tangible evidence needed to try the cases were located in Poland,

that plaintiff's claims were controlled by the laws of Poland, and

that plaintiff had also filed a lawsuit in Poland "seeking the same

relief sought in this action."  Attached to DMA's motion were

plaintiff's answers to the interrogatories previously propounded by

the Palen II defendants,9 in which plaintiff admitted that: she lived in Illinois only from October 5, 1997, to January 15, 1998;

the decedent never lived or maintained a residence in Illinois; and

the decedent's estate "has been or is being probated" in Will

County, Illinois.

	The trial court allowed additional and limited discovery with

respect to the issue of jurisdiction over the Palen II defendants

and, on July 17, Kim Woo-Choong filed a response to plaintiff's

special and limited interrogatories.  In his response, Kim Woo-

Choong stated:  he had been the chairman of Daewoo Corp. since

January 1, 1981, representative director of Daewoo Corp. since

March 23, 1998, chairman and representative director of Heavy

Industries since March 27, 1998, and chairman and representative director of DMC since April 11, 1998; at the time he was served

with summons, Daewoo Corp. was the parent corporation of DMA; he

had never worked for DMA or Daewoo-FSO, but, on rare occasions, he

assisted with DMA's promotional activities upon its request for him

to do so; as representative director of Daewoo Corp., he had, over

the years, voted in favor of incorporating various subsidiaries and

affiliates, including DMA and Daewoo-FSO, although he did not have

any role in the day-to-day operations of any of the companies, and

had voted in favor of certain directors for corporations in which

Daewoo Corp. owned stock, including Daewoo-FSO, DMA, Heavy

Industries, and DMC; of all the defendants named in plaintiff's

lawsuit, he only owned shares of stock in Heavy Industries; he

never had authority to direct which individuals DMA should hire or

fire; and he never personally provided financing or guarantees for

DMA or Daewoo-FSO.

	Kim Woo-Choong further stated that: his autobiography was

published from 1991 to 1996; a publishing company distributed his

autobiography throughout the United States, including Illinois, but

he did not know how many copies were distributed in Illinois; he

was invited to give a speech in Chicago by Moon Hyun Kim, the

former president of DMA, when he was served with summons; Chicago

was one of the several U.S. cities he visited as a representative

of Daewoo Corp., and his purpose was to assist DMA "in launching

its sales of Daewoo brand automobiles in the United States"; he was

also in Chicago around 1970 as Daewoo Corp.'s president "to secure a contract [with Sears Roebuck & Co.] for the sale of dress linen

shirts"; and, on average, he had visited Illinois once per year for

the last 30 years, with most of those visits being layovers at

O'Hare airport.

	DMA also answered interrogatories propounded by plaintiff,

stating: it is a Delaware corporation; it is a United States

"distributor and dealer of Daewoo automobiles" that are

manufactured by DMC in Korea and imported from Daewoo Corp.; in

1998, DMA was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Daewoo Corp.; DMA sells

automobiles in the United States at DMA's company-owned stores; and DMA maintains headquarters in California and has a regional office

in Illinois.  In Daewoo-FSO's answers to plaintiff's

interrogatories, Daewoo-FSO stated:  neither it nor any of its

divisions, departments, subsidiaries, or affiliates are or were

related to DMA; its shareholders are Heavy Industries, Daewoo

Corp., the State Treasury of Poland, and various employees of

Daewoo-FSO; it had never maintained or financed the maintenance of

any address or telephone number in Illinois; no automobiles

manufactured by Daewoo-FSO had ever been shipped to and/or

distributed in the U.S.; and it had no connection with the websites

www.daewoo.com and www.daewoous.com.

	Additionally, Chang-Ki Min, general manager of Daewoo Corp.,

testified in a deposition that DMA was "set up" after a decision

had been made by Daewoo Corp.'s board of directors.  He also

testified that, although Daewoo Corp. had the authority to elect persons to DMA's board of directors, it never paid the salaries of

DMA's employees or managers.  Rather, according to Min, DMA paid

its own salaries.  None of the employees of Daewoo Corp. are, or

were, also employees of DMA.  He further testified that Daewoo

Corp. and DMA did not share any common departments, that Daewoo

Corp. did not influence the promotion or hiring of any employees

within DMA, and that none of "the assets of the companies named in

this lawsuit" were "commingled with one another."  

	Min further testified that:  Kim Woo-Choong was the founder of

"Daewoo";  Daewoo Corp. is not a subsidiary, but, rather, is its

own corporate entity; in 2000, DMA became a wholly-owned subsidiary

of DMC; Daewoo Corp.'s "business purpose" can be defined as

"[t]rading, financing, project organization ***, resource

development" and investing;  Daewoo Corp. also produces car seats

from a factory in Korea, but the car seats are not sold in

Illinois; presently, Daewoo Corp. does not "have anything to do"

with the marketing of automobiles; in 1997 or 1998, there was no

one at Daewoo Corp. who was responsible for overseeing and

evaluating whether DMA was "doing a good job"; after DMA's

inception, Daewoo Corp. gave DMA's board of directors authority to

conduct the company's business; the officers of Daewoo Corp. did

not determine the policies of DMA; DMA filed annual reports with

Daewoo Corp. because of Daewoo Corp.'s shareholder status; in 1997

and 1998, Daewoo Corp. sold completed cars to DMA; the prices of

the cars sold by DMA were determined by DMA; Daewoo Corp. did not "approve" DMA's manuals or sales brochures; and Kim Woo-Choong was

authorized to receive service of process only by Daewoo Corp., DMC,

and Heavy Industries.  When Min was asked, "D[id] Daewoo Corp.***

dictate any of the policies and procedures that [DMA] uses in

selling vehicles," he answered, "No, not at all."  When asked

whether Daewoo Corp. had "anything to do with trading, financing,

project organizing, resource development and investing with [DMA],"

Min answered, "No."  He stated that "[DMA] is a corporation just

solely established for the sale of the cars," but denied that DMA

was "in existence as of 1997 for the mutual benefit of Daewoo

Corp." 

	Documents were also produced during the special and limited

discovery.  Daewoo Corp.'s 1997 "Annual Report" showed that, as of

December 31, 1997, the company owned 37% of DMC; 29.91% of Heavy

Industries, and 22.25% of Daewoo-FSO.10  Plaintiff submitted documentation apparently printed from the websites of

www.daewoo.com and www.daewoous.com, which listed DMA as a subsidiary of "Daewoo Group," and spoke of "Daewoo Group," "Daewoo"

in general, and its "global companies."  Plaintiff also submitted

a "Daewoo" marketing brochure.

	On January 4, 2002, the trial court entered a memorandum

opinion and order (1) granting in part "defendant's [DMC's renewed]" motion to quash service of process, (2) granting

"defendant's" motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,

and (3) granting DMA's motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, thereby dismissing plaintiff’s consolidated cases in their entirety.  This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I.  Personal Jurisdiction

A.  Waiver

	Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting DMC,

Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Group, Heavy Industries, Daewoo-FSO, and Kim

Woo-Choong's (hereinafter, collectively referred to as the Daewoo

defendants11) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because the Daewoo defendants waived their

right to contest jurisdiction.  Specifically, plaintiff argues that

certain "general" interrogatories filed by the Daewoo defendants

constituted a general appearance on their behalf, and, as a result,

their right to contest personal jurisdiction was waived.  The

Daewoo defendants maintain that plaintiff waived the issue for

appeal by failing to present her argument to the trial court.

	It is well settled that " '[a]n argument not raised in the trial court and presented for the first time on appeal is waived.' 

[Citation.]" Johnson Press of America, Inc. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 339 Ill. App. 3d 864, 874, 791 N.E.2d 1291 (2003).  In the instant case, a review of the record reveals that plaintiff

failed to present this argument to the trial court before the court

ruled on the Daewoo defendants' motion to quash service and dismiss

plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we

find that plaintiff waived the issue for appeal.

B.  Doing Business in Illinois

	Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in granting

the Daewoo defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for

lack of personal jurisdiction because, pursuant to the theory expressed in Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, 102 Ill. 2d 342, 466 N.E.2d 217 (1984), she sufficiently proved that the Daewoo

defendants were "doing business" in Illinois.  Plaintiff argues

that "there is only one Daewoo" and that this court should not

separate the Daewoo defendants into "distinct entities" when

deciding whether Illinois courts have jurisdiction over them

because they hold themselves out as a single corporate entity.  

	The Daewoo defendants contend that each of their challenges to

personal jurisdiction must be evaluated individually and that, when

so evaluated, the record shows that they were not doing business in

Illinois.  Alternatively, the Daewoo defendants argue that the

exercise of an Illinois court's jurisdiction over them would violate both federal and Illinois due process because requiring

them to defend plaintiff's action in Illinois would violate

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.  The

Palen II defendants maintain that the theory expressed in Maunder does not apply to the instant case.

	For purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff

" 'carr[ies] the burden of establishing a prima facie basis upon which jurisdiction over the defendant can be exercised."  Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 296 Ill. App. 3d 520, 523, 695 N.E.2d 518 (1998).  "A plaintiff's prima facie case may be overcome by a defendant's uncontradicted evidence that defeats jurisdiction."  Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d  832, 846, 747 N.E.2d 926 (2001).  When a trial court determines jurisdiction solely on

the basis of documentary evidence, and hears no courtroom

testimony, we review the issue of jurisdiction de novo.  Alderson, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 846.  See also Stein, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 523.

	Section 2-209(b)(4) of the Code provides that Illinois courts

may exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within or without

Illinois against any person who "is a natural person or corporation

doing business in this State."  735 ILCS 5/2-209(b)(4) (West 2000). 

With respect to section 2-209(b)(4) of the Code, we note that

		"[t]he 'doing business standard is quite high

and requires a showing that the defendant is

conducting business of such character and

extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the

jurisdiction and laws of the forum.

[Citations.] The defendant must transact

business in Illinois ' "not occasionally or

casually, but with a fair measure of

permanence and continuity." ' [Citation.]

Thus, the statute requires a 'course of

business' or 'regularity of activities' as

opposed to isolated or sporadic acts.

[Citation.] Once the doing business standard

is satisfied, the defendant is deemed a

resident of Illinois and may be sued on causes

of action both related and unrelated to its

Illinois activities."  Alderson, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 848-49.

The court's determination of whether a defendant is doing business

in Illinois varies based upon the facts of each case, with the

court's focus being on whether the defendant's contacts were

purposely directed toward Illinois.  Morecambie Maritime, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, S.A., 354 Ill. App. 3d 707, 711, 821 N.E.2d 780 (2004).  In determining whether a defendant's contacts

were purposely directed toward Illinois, the relevant time period

to be reviewed by the court begins when the claim arose and extends

to the date the lawsuit was filed and service was attempted, with

"the critical point of inquiry [being] the time the defendant was made a party to the suit and was served."  Riemer v. KSL Recreation Corp., 348 Ill. App. 3d 26, 35-36, 807 N.E.2d 1004 (2004).

	In Maunder, our supreme court recognized the appropriateness of asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent

corporation when the parent corporation's subsidiary, which is

subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts, is acting as the

parent corporation's Illinois agent and the parent corporation is,

in effect, doing business through its subsidiary due to the high

amount of control exhibited over its subsidiary.  Haubner v. Abercrombie & Kent International, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 112, 122, 812 N.E.2d 704 (2004).  The Maunder court found that a foreign parent corporation was doing business through its subsidiary, and,

thus, the subsidiary was qualified, as an agent, to accept service

of process on behalf of the corporation,12 when the evidence showed that: the subsidiary was wholly owned by the parent company; the

subsidiary was established for the purposes of selling aircraft

parts for the parent and, as described by its own manual, to

"provide [p]roduct [s]upport to the American users of the Parent

Company's products"; the subsidiary telephoned the parent company

an average of eight times per day; and the parent company paid the

salaries of the subsidiary's directors, guaranteed the subsidiary's

lease in Illinois, and included the subsidiary's address in its own

advertising.  Maunder, 102 Ill. 2d at 345-47.  

	However, "Illinois courts cannot assert personal jurisdiction

over the nonresident parent corporation simply because they have

personal jurisdiction over the local subsidiary."  Morecambie Maritime, Inc., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 711.  As noted in Behr v. Club Med, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 396, 546 N.E.2d 751 (1989), the Maunder decision was not based solely on the fact that a subsidiary corporation was wholly owned by its parent corporation, but, rather, was based on the degree of control which the parent

corporation exercised over the subsidiary.  Behr, 190 Ill. App. 3d  at 405.  "Parents of wholly-owned subsidiaries necessarily control,

direct, and supervise subsidiaries to some extent.  If, however, the subsidiary is conducting it own business, then an Illinois

court may not assert in personam jurisdiction over the parent simply because it is the parent."  Alderson, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 854.  Factors to consider when determining whether the parent corporation is doing business in Illinois through its subsidiary

include:

		"(1) the control exercised by the parent over

the subsidiary, (2) obligations of the

subsidiary to service the parent's products,

(3) inclusion of the subsidiary's name and

address in the parent's advertising, (4) joint

sponsorship of promotional activities, (5)

interlocking directorships, (6) the sites of

meeting[s] of the subsidiary's board of

directors, and (7) whether the subsidiary is

authorized to prosecute trademark infringement

suits in the parent's name."  Wissmiller v. Lincoln Trail Motosports, Inc., 195 Ill. App. 3d 399, 403, 552 N.E.2d 295 (1990).	

Accordingly, in Wissmiller, the court found that the evidence did "not support a conclusion" that an American subsidiary and foreign

manufacturer had such a "close relationship" as to make service

upon the American subsidiary's registered Illinois agent proper for

service of process on the foreign manufacturer, where the foreign manufacturer submitted unrefuted evidence, through an affidavit,

that it had its own employees and did "not control or supervise the

daily business affairs" of the American subsidiary, that the

American subsidiary was "totally autonomous" from the foreign manufacturer, and that "each set their own policies and operate[d]

their business separate and apart from each other."  Wissmiller, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 404.  In addition, the court in Morecambie Maritime, Inc., found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation that had a subsidiary with an

Illinois office because the subsidiary was "a separate, fully

capitalized corporation, distinct from [the parent], that

maintain[ed] its own books, records, tax returns, financial

statements," paid its own bills, funded its own operations, had

different executives than that of the parent company, and was not

susceptible to the parent company's participation in its "daily

decision-making."  Morecambie, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 712.

	In the instant case, we first note that we reject plaintiff's

contention that we should consider the Daewoo defendants as a

single corporate entity for purposes of determining whether

Illinois courts can assert personal jurisdiction over them. 

Plaintiff's contention is not only unsupported by Illinois case

law, but refuted by it.  See, e.g., Haubner, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 118-22 (in a case against three Illinois tour operators, collectively known as the Illinois A & K defendants, and three

foreign tour operators, known as A & K Uganda, A & K Kenya, and A

& K Luxembourg, even though, in their complaint, the plaintiffs

referred to all of the defendants as "A & K," the court considered

each defendant individually for purposes of determining whether it

could assert personal jurisdiction over them).  Accordingly, we evaluate the appropriateness of asserting personal jurisdiction

over each of the Daewoo defendants individually.

	1.  Daewoo Group

	Daewoo Group submitted an affidavit from a South Korean

practicing attorney who averred that Daewoo Group was not a legal

entity that can sue or be sued, and plaintiff submitted no evidence

to the contrary.  As stated by the court in Tyler v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d 967, 496 N.E.2d 323 (1986),

		"[a] prime requisite to maintaining a proper

lawsuit is that the parties, whether

plaintiffs or defendants, be either a natural

or an artificial person.  [Citation.]  Our law

recognizes that legal corporations

partnerships, or other associations registered

with this State are, in effect, artificial

persons amenable to lawsuit in this

jurisdiction.

			*** Where a suit is brought against an

entity which is legally nonexistent, the

proceedings are void ab initio *** ."  Tyler, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 972.

Because the uncontroverted evidence shows that Daewoo Group is a

legally nonexistent entity, we find the proceedings here are void ab initio, and, as a result, the trial court properly granted Daewoo Group's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

	2.  Heavy Industries, Daewoo-FSO, and DMC

	The undisputed evidence set forth in the record also shows

that Heavy Industries, Daewoo-FSO, and DMC, when examined

individually, cannot be said to be doing business in Illinois

pursuant to section 2-209(b)(4) of the Code.  With respect to Heavy

Industries, Shin Young-Kyun's uncontroverted affidavit stated that

Heavy Industries was a South Korean corporation that never

maintained an office, held property, hired employees, or otherwise

did business in Illinois.  With respect to Daewoo-FSO, the

uncontroverted affidavit of Kin Kwang Woong stated that Daewoo-FSO

was a Polish corporation that never maintained an office, held

property, hired employees in Illinois, or otherwise did business in

Illinois.  Likewise, with respect to DMC, H.S. Hwang averred that

DMC was a South Korean corporation that never maintained offices or

facilities, hired employees, or otherwise did business in Illinois. 

	Further, although it is apparent that personal jurisdiction

may be asserted over DMA, as it failed to contest personal

jurisdiction in the proceedings below and admitted that it

maintained an office in Illinois, plaintiff failed to set forth any

evidence in the proceedings below suggesting that Heavy Industries

or Daewoo-FSO were parent companies of, or had any control

whatsoever over, DMA, such that Heavy Industries or Daewoo-FSO

would be considered to be doing business in Illinois through DMA.  With respect to DMC, there was evidence that DMA became a wholly-

owned subsidiary of DMC in 2000, but this evidence is irrelevant

for purposes of determining whether DMC was doing business through

DMA because the relevant time period to be considered by us began

when the claim arose, in this case September 1997, and extended to

the date the suit was filed and service was attempted in January

1998. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly granted 

Heavy Industries, Daewoo-FSO, and DMC's motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction.

	3.  Kim Woo-Choong

	Kim Woo-Choong’s testimony, as set forth in his affidavit and

deposition, shows that he is a citizen and resident of South Korea

and that he has never owned property in Illinois.  He further

testified that he has only visited Illinois approximately once per

year for the past 30 years, with most of the visits being a result

of layovers at O’Hare airport.  These isolated and sporadic acts

are not the kind of regular business activities needed to warrant

the inference that Kim Woo-Choong has submitted himself to the

jurisdiction and laws of Illinois.  Nor has plaintiff provided any

evidence to support a conclusion that Kim Woo-Choong somehow

controlled DMA in September 1997.  

	We briefly note that, although plaintiff argues that Kim Woo-

Choong's autobiography, published in the United States from 1991 to

1996, and his trip to Chicago in approximately 1970 to secure a business deal with Sears Roebuck & Co., weigh in favor of finding

that Illinois courts can assert personal jurisdiction over him,

these contacts cannot be considered in the jurisdictional analysis

because, as stated above, in determining whether Kim Woo-Choong's

contacts were purposely directed toward Illinois, the relevant time

period to be considered begins when the claim arose, which, in the

instant case, is September 1997.  Accordingly, we find that the

trial court properly found that it lacked personal jurisdiction

over Kim Woo-Choong. 

	4.  Daewoo Corp.

	With respect to Daewoo Corp., Lee Sung Won averred that the

corporation was a South Korean corporation with its principal place

of business in South Korea, and this evidence was uncontroverted by

plaintiff.  Thus, the question is whether Illinois courts can

obtain personal jurisdiction over Daewoo Corp., pursuant to the

theory expressed in Maunder, because it was doing business in Illinois through its subsidiary, DMA, at the time it was served.  With regard to this question, we note that the record on appeal

consists of various volumes of affidavits, answers to

interrogatories, depositions, and other documentary evidence.  From

these extensive records, however, there is very little evidence to

support plaintiff’s contention that Daewoo Corp. was doing business

through DMA.  

	With respect to the amount of control Daewoo Corp. had over DMA, the fact that DMA was, at the relevant time period, a wholly-

owned subsidiary of Daewoo Corp., that Daewoo Corp.'s board of

directors voted to create DMA, and that Daewoo Corp. elected DMA's

initial board of directors arguably weigh in favor of finding that

Daewoo Corp. was doing business in Illinois through DMA.  However,

there are numerous other facts that suggest Daewoo Corp. did not

have the necessary control over DMA to be considered doing business

in Illinois through DMA.  For instance, there was evidence that

Daewoo Corp. never paid the salaries of DMA's employees or

managers, no DMA employee was also an employee of Daewoo Corp.,

Daewoo Corp. did not share any common departments with DMA, Daewoo

Corp. did not influence the promotion or hiring of any employees

within DMA, none of DMA's assets was commingled with Daewoo Corp.,

no one at Daewoo Corp. was responsible for overseeing and

evaluating DMA’s performance, neither Daewoo Corp. nor its officers

determined the policies of DMA, Daewoo Corp. did not "approve"

DMA's manuals or sales brochures, DMA's own board of directors

conducted the company’s business, Daewoo Corp. received annual

reports from DMA only in its capacity as shareholder, and DMA

itself determined the prices of the cars it sold.  

	Additionally, while Daewoo Corp. sent Kim Woo-Choong to assist

in the launching of DMA's sales of automobiles in the United States

and the website www.daewoo.com may have promoted international name-recognition advertising on behalf of Daewoo Corp. and its

subsidiaries, there is no evidence that there were any obligations on the part of DMA to service Daewoo Corp.'s products; that DMA or

Daewoo Corp. shared the same board of directors; that any of DMA's

board of directors meetings were held in South Korea; or that DMA

was authorized to prosecute trademark infringements in Daewoo

Corp.'s name.  Because plaintiff failed to prove Daewoo’s control

over DMA was such that it can be said that Daewoo Corp. was doing

business through DMA, we find that the trial court properly granted

Daewoo Corp.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

	We briefly note that the cases plaintiff relies upon, in support of her contention that Daewoo Corp. was doing business in

Illinois through DMA, are distinguishable.  For example, Alderson, and other cases that have similarly found that a parent company was

"doing business" through it's subsidiary, all involved parent

corporations which had more control over their respective Illinois

subsidiaries than the case at bar.  See, e.g., Alderson, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 855 (the court found that personal jurisdiction existed over the foreign parent company because it was doing business

through its subsidiary where there was evidence that the

subsidiary's day-to-day operations were overseen by the parent, the

parent was primarily a holding company and described by its

president as an " 'umbrella company' " that formed subsidiary

corporations merely to "bid on projects[,] for tax purposes, or to

own the assets that '[the parent was] doing business out of,' " the

subsidiary's purchase of a power plant required the approval of the

parent's board of directors, the parent's name and logo was part of the subsidiary's letterhead, and the parent conducted "national

name-recognition advertising" on behalf of its various

subsidiaries); Japax, Inc. v. Sodick Co. Ltd., 186 Ill. App. 3d  656, 664-65, 542 N.E.2d 792 (1989) (the court found that personal

jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation existed where the

parent, inter alia, " 'loaned' " its wholly-owned subsidiary employees and guaranteed millions of dollars on behalf of the

subsidiary, "most" of the subsidiary's officers and board members

"c[a]me from" the parent company, the subsidiary regularly

communicated with the parent, and the subsidiary's officer

regularly reported to the parent's executive managing director);

Schlunk, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 602-04 (the court found the subsidiary to be an agent of the foreign parent manufacturer for the

determination of whether there had been proper service of process

where the parent, inter alia, had no liability to the wholly-owned subsidiary for late or nondelivery of its product, demanded

consultation with the subsidiary in establishing dealerships and

sales objectives, obligated the subsidiary to prosecute suits in

the parent's name in certain situations, had complete discretion in

determining the warranty terms offered by the subsidiary to its

customers, demanded that the subsidiary service all of its products

irrespective of whether they were originally sold in the

subsidiary's territory, demanded that the subsidiary "fully inform"

the parent "of all aspects of [the subsidiary's] business," had

eight members on its board of directors who were also directors of the subsidiary, and had five of the subsidiary's seven board

meetings in the parent's home domicile of West Germany).

	Even the Haubner court--which, out of all the Illinois cases that have found that personal jurisdiction existed over a foreign corporate parent, based its decision on the least amount of specified control between the defendant parent corporation and its

subsidiary--involved a parent corporation that had more control

over its subsidiary than is shown in the instant case.  In Haubner, the court found that personal jurisdiction existed over a foreign

parent corporation where the evidence, although not specified in

the opinion, showed that the parent operated as a holding company

for its subsidiaries and "[t]here [wa]s no evidence that [the

parent] existed for any other purpose," the parent owned a majority

interest in the subsidiary, the marketing and promotional materials

included the same general name, and the court was able to conclude

that the subsidiary was a "mere conduit[]" through which the parent

did business.   Haubner, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 116, 122.  In the instant case, there is no evidence, despite extensive discovery,

that Daewoo Corp. existed only or primarily as a holding company

for DMA or its other subsidiaries.  To the contrary, Daewoo Corp.'s

executive director stated that it was in the business of trading

and international investment and its general manager noted that

Daewoo Corp. was a producer of car seats.  Moreover, there was

extensive evidence, as set forth above, of DMA's autonomy from

Daewoo Corp., contradicting the contention that DMA was a mere conduit through which Daewoo Corp. did business.  Clearly, there is

less evidence in the instant case to support a finding that Daewoo

Corp. was doing business through DMA than there was in Haubner. 

	Because none of the Daewoo defendants can be said to be doing

business in Illinois pursuant to section 2-202(b)(4) of the Code,

we need not address the issue of whether the Daewoo defendants had

sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois, such that the assertion

of personal jurisdiction over them would not offend traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.  Accordingly, we find

that the trial court properly granted the Daewoo defendants'

motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction.  

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[The preceding material is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23]. 

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

	Affirmed.

	WOLFSON and HALL, JJ., concur.