IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT VANDE KROL, Petitioner Employee, 

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, 

SUPERSTITION FIRE & MEDICAL, Respondent Employer, 

BENCHMARK INSURANCE, Respondent Insurance Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 22-0046 

Special Action - Industrial Commission 

ICA Claim No. 20210280125 

Carrier Claim No. 7138292 

The Honorable Amy L. Foster, Administrative Law Judge 

AWARD SET ASIDE 

COUNSEL 

Taylor & Associates, PLLC, Phoenix 

By Thomas C. Whitley, Nicholas C. Whitley 

Counsel for Petitioner Employee 

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix 

By Gaetano J. Testini 

Counsel for Respondent 

Norton & Brozina, PC, Phoenix 

By Christopher S. Norton 

Counsel for Respondent Employer and Respondent Carrier

FILED 7-11-2023
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

OPINION 

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 Arizona’s workers’ compensation system provides covered 

firefighters with benefits for workplace injuries. Yet not all firefighting 

injuries are alike. Physical injuries stemming from perceptible dangers (like 

burns or smoke inhalation from rushing into a burning building) are easily 

provable. Occupational diseases stemming from imperceptible dangers 

(like cancer from inhaling carcinogens or other noxious chemicals) are more 

difficult (if not impossible) to prove, particularly as to causation. 

¶2 So, starting in 2001 the Arizona Legislature made it easier for 

firefighters (and peace officers) to satisfy causation in some circumstances. 

It did so by granting firefighters a statutory presumption that certain 

diseases, including brain cancer, are compensable, provided the firefighter 

satisfies certain elements. See A.R.S. § 23-901.01 (2017); A.R.S. § 23-901.09 

(2021). The legislature, in 2017, changed the law to provide additional 

guidance about the amount and nature of the evidence needed to rebut the 

presumption. See 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 318 (1st Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2161). 

And in 2021, the legislature again changed the law, further relaxing the 

showing required to invoke the presumption and heightening the standard 

required to rebut it. See 2021 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 229 § 6 (1st Reg. Sess.) 

(S.B. 1451). We refer to the 2017 version of the statutory framework as the 

“2017 statute” and the 2021 version as the “2021 statute.” 

¶3 This appeal turns on whether the 2021 statute applies when 

the listed injury date falls before, but the evidentiary hearing occurs after, 

the effective date of that statute. We hold the 2021 statute applies, which 

does not result in an impermissible retroactive application. We, therefore, 

set aside the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) award of no 

compensation and remand for further proceedings under the 2021 statute. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶4 Superstition Fire and Medical (“Superstition”) employed 

petitioner Robert Vande Krol (“Vande Krol”) as a firefighter and engineer. 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

3 

After eighteen years of service, at the age of fifty, he was diagnosed with 

oligodendroglioma, a rare form of brain cancer. 

¶5 Vande Krol underwent brain surgery (a right craniotomy) on 

October 26, 2020, which successfully removed the tumor. Post-surgery, 

Vande Krol experienced headaches, memory problems, loss of some 

peripheral vision, and vertigo. In January 2021, Vande Krol submitted a 

worker’s report of injury, listing his date of injury as October 28, 2020. 

Superstition’s insurer, Benchmark Insurance Company (“Benchmark”), 

denied the claim. Vande Krol requested a hearing with an ALJ. The 

Industrial Commission obliged, appointing an ALJ who held an evidentiary 

hearing over three non-consecutive days beginning on October 5, 2021. 

¶6 Following those hearings, the ALJ issued a written decision 

denying Vande Krol’s workers’ compensation claim. The ALJ concluded 

that because there was no provision in the 2021 statute stating the changes 

made therein apply retroactively, the 2021 statute applied only to injuries 

occurring after the 2021 statute’s effective date. Then, applying the 2017 

statute instead, the ALJ concluded Vande Krol failed to show he was 

exposed to known carcinogens causing his specific type of brain cancer. 

Vande Krol filed a Request for Review, after which the ALJ affirmed her 

original ruling. 

¶7 Vande Krol timely petitioned for review. We have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-120.21(B), A.R.S. § 23-943(H), and Arizona 

Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10. 

DISCUSSION 

¶8 When reviewing a worker’s compensation award, we defer to 

the ALJ’s factual findings. Special Fund Division v. Indus. Comm’n, 252 Ariz. 

267, 269 ¶ 6 (App. 2021). The interpretation and application of a statute 

presents a question of law we review de novo. Vangilder v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Revenue, 252 Ariz. 481, 485 ¶ 11 (2022). 

I. The Statutory Framework 

A. The 2017 and 2021 Statutes 

¶9 Arizona’s workers’ compensation laws grant employees 

compensation for personal injury or death from any accident arising out of 

and in the course of employment. Ariz. Const. art. 18, § 8. An occupational 

disease is considered a compensable injury provided a claimant satisfies six 

listed elements. See A.R.S. § 23-901.01(A). But due to their increased risk of 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

4 

exposure to known carcinogens, since 2001, the legislature has required 

firefighters (and peace officers) to satisfy a lesser burden for certain 

diseases, including brain cancer. See A.R.S. § 23-901.01(B)–(C). The 

legislature amended the statutory framework for firefighters several times 

over the past two decades, including, as relevant here, in 2017 and 2021. 

¶10 Under the 2017 statute, a firefighter is entitled to a 

presumption that certain diseases are occupational diseases “arising out of 

employment” if, as relevant here, the firefighter: 

1. passed a physical examination before employment and 

the examination did not indicate evidence of cancer. 

 

2. was assigned to hazardous duty for at least five years. 

3. was exposed to a known carcinogen as defined by the 

international agency for research on cancer and informed 

the department of this exposure, and the carcinogen is 

reasonably related to the cancer. 

A.R.S. § 23-901.01(C) (2017). This presumption “may be rebutted by a 

preponderance of the evidence that there is a specific cause of the cancer 

other than an occupational exposure to a carcinogen[.]” A.R.S. § 23-

901.01(F) (2017). 

¶11 In 2021, the legislature again amended the statute by 

eliminating one element for invoking the presumption under the 2017 

statute. To qualify for the presumption under the 2021 statute, the evidence 

must show the firefighter: 

1. passed a physical examination before employment and 

the examination did not indicate evidence of cancer. 

 

2. was assigned to hazardous duty for at least five years. 

A.R.S. § 23-901.09(B) (2021).1 The presumption may now only be overcome 

with “clear and convincing evidence that there is a specific cause of the cancer 

other than an occupational exposure to a carcinogen[.]” A.R.S. § 23-

901.09(E) (2021) (emphasis added). 

1 Both statutes require a firefighter prove an additional element if the 

firefighter is diagnosed with certain enumerated diseases not relevant here. 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

5 

B. Uncontested Elements 

¶12 Here, the ALJ found and both parties agree Vande Krol 

satisfied the first two elements in the 2017 statute—the only two elements 

required in the 2021 statute. Vande Krol was a firefighter who passed a 

physical examination before employment. He continuously underwent 

yearly physicals that were reasonably aligned with the national fire 

protection association standard on comprehensive occupational medical 

programs for fire departments. None of those exams revealed cancer. 

Finally, he was assigned to hazardous duty for more than five years before 

his diagnosis. So, we agree Vande Krol satisfied two of the three elements 

in the 2017 statute and each relevant element in the 2021 statute. But the 

parties disagree over which version of the statute applies. If the 2021 statute 

applies, Vande Krol is entitled to the statutory presumption. It is less clear 

he gets the presumption if the 2017 statute applies. Thus, whether the 2021 

statute applies is the question to which we now turn. 

II. The 2021 Statute Applies 

A. Retroactivity Framework 

¶13 Under Arizona law, when the legislature enacts a statute, the 

default rule is that the statute, once effective, applies only prospectively. In 

other words, courts apply a “canon of construction” that “statutes are 

presumed to have a prospective and not a retroactive effect.” Gietz v. 

Webster, 46 Ariz. 261, 267 (1935). That presumption, which we refer to in 

shorthand as the presumption against retroactivity, “is deeply rooted in our 

jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our 

Republic.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). The 

presumption protects due process by ensuring fair notice of the law, and 

equal protection by protecting disfavored groups from post-hoc 

discrimination. See Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601, 1607 (2020). 

¶14 There are at least three instances, however, where the 

presumption against retroactivity does not come into play, even if a change 

occurs after events giving rise to a lawsuit. The first is when the legislature 

expressly declares the statute applies retroactively. The second is when a 

statute impacts a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding that has not 

yet occurred. And the third is when the enactment is procedural and does 

not affect substantive rights (or at least such rights that have vested). We 

describe each instance in more detail, and then explain why the 2021 statute 

applies here. 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

6 

1. Express Language 

¶15 Like other secondary canons of construction, the presumption 

against retroactivity does not apply when the legislature expressly and 

plainly indicates the new statute applies to a given situation. The 

legislature has written this notion into positive law, instructing that “[n]o 

statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein.” A.R.S. § 1-244 

(emphasis added). Thus, the legislature may give a statute retroactive effect 

by “direct[ing] that it applies retroactively.” State v. Williams, 254 Ariz. 516, 

__ ¶ 11 (App. 2023). 

¶16 How do we know the required language when we see it? The 

legislature need not use magic words. See Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 

199 (1933). Instead, “[a]ny language that shows a legislative purpose to 

bring about [retroactivity] is sufficient.” Id. We use the same rules of 

statutory construction we ordinarily use. This “requires us to determine 

the meaning of the words the legislature chose to use.” S. Ariz. Home 

Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, __ Ariz. __, 522 P.3d 671, 676 ¶ 31 (2023). 

“We do so . . . according to the plain meaning of the words in their broader 

statutory context, unless the legislature directs us to do otherwise.” Id. 

¶17 Here is the twist. Typically, when the plain meaning of the 

words employed are ambiguous, we have several secondary interpretative 

tools at our disposal. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 253 Ariz. 24, __ ¶13 (2022) 

(“When a statute is ambiguous, we consult ‘secondary interpretation 

methods[.]’”) (cleaned up). But if the statutory language is unclear as to 

retroactivity, we use one—and just one—interpretive tool: we employ the 

presumption against retroactivity. See Garcia v. Browning, 214 Ariz. 250, 

252–53 ¶ 11 (2007), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Montes, 226 Ariz. 

194 (2011) (“In A.R.S. § 1–244, the legislature has plainly directed that we 

are not to look to external sources, such as legislative history, to determine 

whether a statute is to be applied retroactively.”); see also Biden v. Nebraska, 

No. 22-506, 600 U.S. __, 2023 WL 4277210 *16 (June 30, 2023) (Barrett, J., 

concurring) (describing the “presumption against retroactivity” as “a 

strong-form canon counsel[ing] a court to strain statutory text to advance a 

particular value”). 

2. Non-Retroactive Application 

¶18 There are other times when a statute can apply to facts 

occurring before its effective date even if the statute does not 

unambiguously say that it should be applied retroactively. One is when the 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

7 

statute, while post-dating the events at issue, is not actually applied 

retroactively. 

¶19 Saying “this new statute cannot be applied retroactively” 

raises a question—what underlying events or facts determine whether the 

statute is being applied retroactively? It is common, for example, for the 

legislature to pass a statute impacting how a judicial or administrative 

proceeding is conducted. And, at times, such a statute’s effective date lands 

during ongoing proceedings. One might be tempted to say there that the 

statute cannot apply because the statute post-dates the start of litigation or 

the events leading to it, resulting in a retroactive application. Yet that is not 

how this Court typically handles the situation. Rather, when that occurs, 

we allow the new statute to apply immediately. See Wilco Aviation v. 

Garfield, 123 Ariz. 360, 362 (App. 1979) (“[S]tatutory changes in procedures 

or remedies may be applied to proceedings already pending[.]”); State 

Comp. Fund of Ariz. v. Fink, 224 Ariz. 611, 613 ¶ 9 (App. 2010) (“New rules 

of procedure are often applied to actions already pending.”). Doing so 

recognizes that “[a]pplication of a statute in a particular situation is not 

necessarily ‘retroactive’ simply because it relates to antecedent facts.” Fink, 

224 Ariz. at 613 ¶ 9. 

¶20 Distilled down, we apply a rather straightforward 

framework: applying a new procedural statute to a future procedure is not 

applying the statute retroactively and is generally permissible. See State v. 

Perez-Gutierrez, __ Ariz. ___, 2023 WL 3312385, at *1 ¶7 (App. May 9, 2023) 

(applying a new statute regulating sentencing procedures when the 

effective date occurred before sentencing); Fink, 224 Ariz. at 613 ¶¶ 6–11 

(applying a 2007 statute regarding intervention to a 2006 action arising from 

a 2004 accident); Garcia, 214 Ariz. at 253 ¶ 12 (“If the provisions of Senate 

Bill 1145 apply only to the conduct of the trial, . . . then application of the 

new justification defense statutes is required.”); but see A.R.S. § 1-246 

(“When the penalty for an offense is prescribed by one law and altered by 

a subsequent law, . . . the offender shall be punished under the law in force 

when the offense was committed.”); A.R.S. § 12-505 (setting special rules for 

applying changes in statutes of limitation). If, however, a new statute 

would change a procedure already completed, the new statute does not 

invalidate such procedure. See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 

209 Ariz. 544, 549 ¶ 17 (2005) (“[C]hanges in modes of procedure do not 

invalidate completed procedural actions valid under the law in effect at the 

time they were taken.”). 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

8 

3. Procedural Enactments 

¶21 There are also “judge-made exceptions to the general 

statutory rule about retroactivity.” Id. at 548 ¶ 12. One such exception is 

that “[e]nactments that are procedural only, and do not alter or affect earlier 

established substantive rights may be applied retroactively.” Aranda v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 198 Ariz. 467, 470 ¶ 11 (2000). Procedural enactments may 

be applied retroactively “because litigants have no vested right in a given 

mode of procedure.” Id.; Mia. Copper Co., 17 Ariz. at 193 (“[T]here is no 

vested right in the modes of procedure.”). Thus, while a new procedural 

statute does not invalidate procedures already completed (see supra ¶ 20), it 

can be applied in situations where doing so might otherwise be thought of 

as retroactive. For example, a statutory change to a procedural rule after a 

procedure is completed might not be valid reason to reverse a judgment on 

appeal, but the new rule could apply to proceedings on remand if the 

judgment is otherwise set aside. 

B. Application to the 2021 Statute 

1. The 2021 Statute’s Text 

¶22 The ALJ applied the 2017 statute, in part, because “[t]here is 

no provision in [the 2021 statute] that the changes are retroactive.” The ALJ 

looked to the date of injury listed in Vande Krol’s application for benefits 

(October 28, 2020) in determining whether retroactivity is implicated. 

Because the date of injury occurred before the 2021 statute’s effective date, 

the ALJ concluded that using the 2021 statute would result in an 

impermissible retroactive application. But the ALJ’s analysis overlooked 

that the 2021 statute, in A.R.S. § 23-901.09(C)(2), expressly lays out when it 

applies (and by implication when it does not); application does not hinge 

on the date of injury. 

¶23 In deciding when the 2021 statute applies, we start with the 

plain meaning of its text. The legislature directed that the presumption 

therein “applies to . . . [f]ormer firefighters . . . who are sixty-five years of 

age or younger and who are diagnosed with [brain cancer] not more than 

fifteen years after the firefighter’s last date of employment as a 

firefighter[.]” A.R.S. § 23-901.09(C)(2). Thus, application of the 2021 statute 

turns on: (1) the firefighter’s age at the time of diagnosis and (2) a maximum 

length of separation from employment at the time of diagnosis. The 

legislature did not except application where the date of injury (however one 

defines it) occurred before the 2021 statute’s effective date. 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

9 

¶24 Nonetheless, the ALJ focused solely on the date of injury 

listed in Vande Krol’s claim for benefits. Doing so is inconsistent with the 

legislature’s directive on when the 2021 statute applies. Tellingly, the date 

of injury Vande Krol listed is the date he reported his diagnosis to his 

employer, not the date he underwent surgery, was diagnosed with cancer, 

or started experiencing side effects, demonstrating the arbitrariness of 

using a firefighter’s listed date of injury, rather than the criteria the 

legislature chose, in determining retroactivity. 

¶25 The legislature can (and should) include provisions in statutes 

defining their application. See A.R.S. § 1-244. When it does, courts and 

administrative agencies should start there. They should not, instead, work 

in the opposite direction, using alternative criteria combined with 

secondary tools of interpretation to alter when a statute applies. But that is 

what happened here when the ALJ foreclosed the 2021 statute’s application 

based on the listed date of injury (again, not one of the criteria in the statute) 

and the presumption against retroactivity. 

¶26 A hypothetical scenario shows why pegging the presumption 

against retroactivity to the date of listed injury is problematic. Imagine a 

firefighter who is 62 and retired 5 years ago. In 2023, he is diagnosed with 

brain cancer, which he thinks he can trace to a chemical fire in 2001 

(although he cannot be sure). When he applies for benefits in 2023, he lists 

his date of injury as the date of that fire, not knowing the legal implications 

of doing so. Under the plain text of the 2021 statute, it should apply to the 

firefighter’s claim and be used to determine whether he is entitled to 

benefits—after all, he is under 65 and has been separated from employment 

for less than 15 years. See A.R.S. § 23-901.09(C)(2). 

¶27 Under Benchmark’s view, adopted by the ALJ, the 

firefighter’s claim would be subject, instead, to the version of the statute 

existing in 2001, despite that the injury was undiscovered for years and the 

date of actual injury is unknowable. Using the date of listed injury and the 

presumption against retroactivity excises a portion of the class of 

individuals to whom the 2021 statute would otherwise apply—those who 

unwittingly list a date of injury prior to the 2021 statute’s effective date. 

This does more than strain statutory text; it overrides it. The better course 

is to refrain from using a secondary tool of interpretation to alter the 

legislature’s unambiguous text (which implements the legislature’s policy 

choice about when a statute applies), particularly when applying the text in 

a particular proceeding does not implicate retroactivity (see infra ¶¶ 29-32). 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

10 

¶28 At the time of his hearing, Vande Krol was 51 and was 

diagnosed with brain cancer in 2020, less than 15 years before ending his 

employment. Under the statute’s unambiguous text, the 2021 statute 

should have been applied to Vande Krol’s proceedings. Cf. Opati, 140 S. Ct. 

at 1608–09 (concluding the presumption against retroactivity was overcome 

when Congress allowed certain plaintiffs to invoke a new cause of action in 

“Prior Actions” and “Related Actions”). 

2. The 2021 Statute’s Non-Retroactive Application 

¶29 Applying the 2021 statute to Vande Krol’s proceedings based 

on the criteria in the text—age and years of separation (see A.R.S. § 23-

901.09(C)(2))—does not violate retroactivity principles because the 2021 

statute became effective before the start of Vande Krol’s hearings. 

¶30 The 2021 statute deals primarily with the showing the parties 

must make to obtain or defeat the presumption that certain cancers are 

work-related. See generally A.R.S. § 23-901.09. At the earliest, the statute 

comes into play in a particular proceeding once an ALJ begins to hear and 

consider the parties’ evidence during a formal hearing. The Governor 

signed the 2021 statute into law on April 14, 2021, and the 2021 statute 

became effective on September 29, 2021. Vande Krol’s hearing started on 

October 5, 2021, almost six months after the 2021 statute’s passage and 

about a week after its effective date. This, therefore, is a situation where 

new rules should have been applied “to [an] action[] already pending.” 

Fink, 224 Ariz. at 613 ¶ 9; see also In re Dos Cabezas Power Dist., 17 Ariz. App. 

414, 420 (1972) (“Every right or remedy created solely by a modified statute 

disappears or falls with the modified statute unless carried to final judgment 

before the repeal or modification[.]”(emphasis added)). 

¶31 This situation bears a strong resemblance to that in Fink. The 

plaintiff there sued a tire manufacturer in 2006, arising out of a motor 

vehicle accident in 2004. See Fink, 224 Ariz. at 612 ¶ 1. One year into the 

litigation, the legislature amended the workers’ compensation laws 

(specifically, A.R.S. § 23–1023(C)) to “provid[e] a workers’ compensation 

carrier or self-insured employer the right to intervene in personal injury 

actions to protect their interests.” Id. ¶ 3. In 2009, the plaintiff’s insurance 

company moved to intervene, and the tire manufacturer successfully 

opposed the request by convincing the superior court that applying a 2007 

statute to a 2006 action arising out of a 2004 accident would be an 

impermissible retroactive application. Id. at 613 ¶¶ 6–8. This Court 

disagreed, explaining that “[t]he intervention applies to future events—

preparation for trial and trial—and does not change or alter the significance 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

11 

of past events.” Id. ¶ 8. Thus, “on a common sense level, application in 

2009 of the 2007 amendment is not a retroactive application.” Id.

¶32 The same goes here. The 2021 statute, when it became 

effective, applied to a future event—Vande Krol’s evidentiary hearing—

and did not change or alter the significance of past events. The 2021 statute 

did not alter anything previously occurring in the proceedings or the facts 

giving rise to Vande Krol’s claim. Simply put, applying the 2021 statute to 

a later hearing “is not a retroactive application.” Id.; see also Landgraf, 511 

U.S. at 273 (“[I]n many situations, a court should ‘apply the law in effect at 

the time it renders its decision,’ even though that law was enacted after the 

events that gave rise to the suit.” (citation omitted)). 

3. The 2021 Statute’s Procedural Nature 

¶33 There is another reason the 2021 statute should have been 

applied: the statute is procedural in nature and “do[es] not alter or affect 

earlier established substantive rights[.]” Aranda, 198 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 11. Our 

supreme court has clarified that a substantive law “creates, defines and 

regulates rights,” whereas a procedural law “prescribes the method of 

enforcing the right or obtaining redress[.]” State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 

110 (1964). In the workers’ compensation context, a procedural statute 

serves “to facilitate the manner and means by which benefits are 

administered.” Aranda, 198 Ariz. at 470–71 ¶ 13. Procedural statutes “do 

not create, define, or regulate the right to receive benefits.” Id. at 471 ¶ 13. 

¶34 The 2021 statute regulates how firefighters obtain redress for 

occupational diseases. The 2021 statute does not create a new right to 

redress; firefighters have long been entitled to redress for occupational 

diseases, including in the 2017 statute. The 2021 statute does not define the 

right to receive benefits. The 2021 statute does not alter the definition of the 

term “occupational disease” in A.R.S. § 23-901(13)(c), the definition of the 

broader term “[p]ersonal injury by accident arising out of and in the course 

of employment” in A.R.S. § 23-901(13), or the general right to workers’ 

compensation in A.R.S. § 23-1021. 

¶35 The 2021 statute also does not sufficiently regulate the right 

to receive benefits to be considered a substantive law. The ultimate 

presumption afforded to firefighters under the 2021 statute is the same as 

that afforded to them under the 2017 statute, even if there are now less 

elements to obtain that presumption. As relevant here, the 2021 statute did 

two things: it removed one requirement under the 2017 statute for 

obtaining the presumption, and it increased the evidentiary burden for 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

12 

overcoming it (from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and 

convincing evidence). These changes—although undoubtedly important to 

those seeking or opposing benefits—are far enough removed from the core 

right to benefits to avoid the substantive label. 

¶36 Arizona courts have consistently explained that legal 

presumptions are procedural in nature; we see no reason to depart here. 

See State v. Grilz, 136 Ariz. 450, 455 (1983) (“[T]he presumption of sanity is 

a procedural device[.]”); State v. Nihiser, 191 Ariz. 199, 203 (App. 1997) (“We 

view presumptions as procedural, rather than evidentiary, concepts.“); 

Seiler v. Whiting, 52 Ariz. 542, 549 (1938) (“A presumption is not evidence of 

anything, and only relates to a rule of law as to which party shall first go 

forward and produce evidence sustaining a matter in issue” (citation 

omitted)); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 301. 

¶37 This does not mean that a presumption can never be 

substantive. The Fifth Circuit has provided guidance—albeit in a different 

context (choice of law)—on when a presumption is procedural and when it 

is substantive. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Williams, the court described “the 

general rule that presumptions are procedural in nature.” 377 F.2d 389, 394 

(5th Cir. 1967). But a presumption is substantive when it is “conclusive,” 

which “may be described as one which is final and irrebuttable, an inference 

which must be drawn from proof of given facts which no evidence, 

however strong, can overcome.” Id. On the flip side, “a procedural 

presumption is one which is rebuttable, it operates to require the 

production of credible evidence to refute the presumption, after which the 

presumption disappears.” Id. 

¶38 We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s framework and apply it here. 

The 2021 statute contains a procedural presumption—the presumption is 

rebuttable and disappears with clear and convincing evidence of “a specific 

cause of the cancer other than an occupational exposure to a carcinogen.” 

A.R.S. § 23-901.09(E). 

¶39 Our conclusion is consistent with the en banc Sixth Circuit’s 

analysis in Combs v. Commissioner of Social Security, 459 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 

2006). There, the court considered “whether a change in a rule governing 

the adjudication of social security disability benefits claims that is applied 

as of its effective date to all pending cases has an impermissibly retroactive 

effect.” Id. at 642. The new rule at issue “required more detailed proof of 

disability from obese claimants by eliminating a presumption of disability 

for obesity.” Id. The en banc Sixth Circuit concluded that the new rule was 

not impermissibly retroactive because the presumption was procedural. Id.
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

13 

at 647. While acknowledging that “the change may be outcomedeterminative for some claimants,” the court said the presumption was 

procedural because “[t]he substantive requirements for disability eligibility 

have not changed, only the way in which the agency goes about 

determining whether they are present.” Id.

¶40 Contrast the situation here with that in Aranda, where a 

statutory revision to the workers’ compensation laws was substantive. The 

statute there suspended payment of workers’ compensation to any 

employee who had “[b]een convicted of a crime and is incarcerated in any 

state, federal, county or city jail or correctional facility.” 198 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 

9. Our supreme court said the statute was substantive because it could 

“eliminate a claimant’s legal authorization to receive benefits based on his 

incarcerated status.” Id. at 471 ¶ 15. The effect of the 2021 statute—further 

clarifying how to process a claim for benefits in a specific factual context 

(occupational diseases impacting firefighters)—is a far cry from the 

statute’s effect in Aranda—permanently eliminating vested benefits for an 

entire class of workers’ compensation recipients. 

¶41 Even if the 2021 statute could be deemed substantive, it still 

applies because it did not impact a right that vested before the 2021 statute’s 

effective date. “[A] substantive legal right may be subject to retroactive 

impairment before it becomes a vested right.” Id. at 471 ¶ 16. A right cannot 

be vested if it remains contingent. See Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 465 

(1913). Rights remain contingent “when they are only to come into 

existence on an event or condition which may not happen[.]” Id. 

¶42 In the workers’ compensation arena, a “substantive property 

right in workers’ compensation payments vest[s] once the Industrial 

Commission’s Findings and Award became final.” Aranda, 198 Ariz. at 473 

¶ 27. To the extent Benchmark (as the insurer) had a vested right in the 

proceedings, the best we can imagine is a vested right in successfully 

defending against monetary payment under the insurance policy. But even 

if Benchmark had such a right, the right had not vested vis-à-vis Vande 

Krol’s claim because his formal hearing had not begun, let alone had any 

award of non-compensation become final, when the 2021 statute became 

effective. Pre-hearing, any right to successfully defend against Vande 

Krol’s claim was subject to several events and conditions which may not 

have happened, making any such right contingent. See id. at 471 ¶ 16. 

 
VANDE KROL v. SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK 

Opinion of the Court 

14 

CONCLUSION 

¶43 We conclude the 2021 statute applies to Vande Krol’s 

workers’ compensation claim, and we, therefore, need not address whether 

the ALJ correctly interpreted the 2017 statute. Because the ALJ did not 

apply the 2021 statute, we set aside the award of non-compensation. The 

parties and the ALJ all correctly agreed Vande Krol satisfied the elements 

necessary to invoke the presumption in the 2021 statute. We remand to 

allow the ALJ to determine in the first instance whether Benchmark 

presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. See

A.R.S. § 23-951(B); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 62 Ariz. 516, 

521–22, 528 (1945) (reviewing court can only set aside the award and must 

assume on rehearing due consideration will be given to facts).