NO. 5-98-0164

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)  Appeal from the

								)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,					)  St. Clair County.

								)    

v.								)  No. 91-CF-881

								)

THERESA LANE,						)  Honorable

								)  James M. Radcliffe, III,

     Defendant-Appellant.					)  Judge, presiding.  

________________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

	Theresa Lane (defendant) was convicted of first-degree murder on December 19,

1997.  The conviction stemmed from the death of Jerry Lane, defendant's husband, on

December 20, 1989, in the basement of his and defendant's abode.  On July 22, 1991,

defendant was charged by way of information with first-degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989,

ch. 38, par. 9-1 (now see 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1996))).  The first trial began on September

25, 1996, and ended in a hung jury.  A second trial occurred from June 12, 1997, to June 19,

1997, and also ended in a hung jury.  The third trial, the subject of this appeal, took place

from December 15, 1997, until December 19, 1997.  This trial ended with a jury verdict of

guilty.  On March 9, 1998, the trial judge entered judgment and sentenced defendant to 20

years' imprisonment.  Defendant filed a notice of appeal on the same date.  Defendant raises

two issues on appeal: (1) whether defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

where defendant denied her guilt and only circumstantial evidence was used against her and

(2) whether Public Act 89-689, which modified the requirements governing automatic

fitness hearings based upon psychotropic medication, violates the single-subject rule of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)).

	I. FACTS

	Before the trial, on July 11, 1996, defendant admitted to taking Xanax, a psychotropic

drug, which defendant continued to take throughout all three trials.  After defendant's

admission to taking Xanax, no fitness hearing was held due to changes in the law regarding

fitness hearings under Public Act 89-689 (Pub. Act 89-689, eff. December 31, 1996).  The

following evidence was presented at the third trial.

	Defendant and the decedent lived at 9402 Richfield Road in Belleville.  The decedent

worked at Hunter-Krey Packing in St. Louis, and defendant owned a dog-grooming business

in Cahokia.  On December 20, 1989, the decedent left work at the usual time of 2:30 p.m.,

and he arrived home between 3 p.m. and 3:15 p.m.  It was established that the decedent

routinely called defendant at her dog-grooming shop when he arrived home.  On the date in

question, the decedent did not call defendant.  Defendant called Tom Gabriel, a neighbor,

at 5 p.m. to inquire as to whether the decedent's truck was at their house; he told her it was

not.  She immediately called the neighbor directly across the street, Ron Rahar, who stated

that the decedent's truck left their home at around 3:30 p.m.  At the time, Rahar assumed it

was the decedent, but later he conceded that he did not see the face of the driver.  Between

6 p.m. and 6:15 p.m., defendant called Hunter-Krey Packing to inquire as to what time the

decedent left work, and she was told that he clocked out at 2:30 p.m.

	It was established that at 2:30 p.m. on the date in question, defendant went home to

get her three dogs and one cat to take to her dog-grooming shop to wash because they had

fleas.  Upon returning to her shop, defendant and her assistant, Katherine Poole, washed the

dogs and thereafter ate pizza.  At 7 p.m., Poole suggested that the two of them return to

defendant's home to get her Christmas presents so they could wrap them.  Defendant and

Poole went to the house, and defendant noticed that the front curtains were open, which was unusual because they were normally closed.  Defendant also noticed that the decedent's truck

was not there.  Upon approaching the house, defendant and Poole noticed fire in the house. 

Poole went and got a neighbor, Gabriel, who began to shovel snow on the flames.  The

neighbor across the street, Rahar, called the fire department and told them that the house was

on fire but that no one was alive in the house.  The firefighters found the decedent, with four

gunshot wounds, in the basement of the house next to an open refrigerator.  No blood

analysis was performed, because the technician failed to put anticoagulant in the sample. 

Also, no DNA was taken.

	Clyde Goin, the arson investigator, testified as to the nature of the fire.  He stated that

there were several fires set in the house.  The fires smoldered because the house was built

in such a way that there was insufficient oxygen reaching the fires to create a blaze.  He

opined that the fires were set between 7:15 p.m. and 7:45 p.m., and there was no evidence

of a time-delay device being used.  He testified that the kitchen and hall fires could have

been started hours earlier.

	Defendant informed the police that a number of guns were missing from the home: 

a .38-caliber-pistol-and-.357-magnum collector's set, a small shotgun known as a "snake

charmer," and two small handguns–one hidden in the china cabinet and the other on a beam

in the basement.  Later, defendant informed police that cash from a kitchen drawer and from

the decedent's toolbox was missing.  Jewelry in a cedar box on defendant's dresser and 12

pairs of men's jeans were also missing.

	Defendant was suspected from the beginning of the investigation.  Defendant and the

decedent had recently been behind on mortgage payments on their house and the house they

rented to Rahar across the street.  Defendant sold stock worth a net of $6,562 and used

$3,130 in November 1989 to pay the late mortgage payments and to pay the mortgage for

November and December.  Defendant had the habit of picking up their mail directly from the mail carrier in the neighborhood.  She stated that she did so because the decedent got

angry when bills were not paid on time, but he left the bill paying to defendant.  The

decedent had his pay cut recently, adding to their financial problems.  The decedent was a

heavy drinker and had been hospitalized for alcoholism a few weeks before his death.  At

that time, defendant told the decedent to straighten himself out or she would leave him, to

which the decedent replied that he did not care.  The couple had mortgage insurance that

would pay off upon the death of the decedent.  The decedent had a life insurance policy

through Hunter-Kreyg Packing, which paid $6,000.  The decedent had additional life

insurance through Western Southern Life Insurance Company, issued in 1985.  Defendant

received $30,875.70 on the life insurance policy and $20,000 for accidental-death benefits. 

Also, defendant had recently obtained a 90-day life insurance policy from J.C. Penney for

defendant, the decedent, and their son as part of a promotion for new charge-card holders

in October 1989.  It paid $20,819 on the death of the decedent.  Defendant received a

$27,000 interest in stock that the decedent would receive from the death of his mother,

which occurred in February 1991.  Despite the suspicions of the police, defendant

cooperated with the authorities and informed them of her impending move to Waynesville,

Missouri, in November 1990, including her new address and phone number.

	In October 1990 the police discovered the decedent's .38-caliber pistol when

responding to a domestic disturbance in St. Louis involving Donald Isringhaus.  Isringhaus

informed the police that he obtained the weapon from Jose Solis and that it was part of a

collector's set.  The police then discovered at the home of Solis the .357-magnum

complement from the set.

	Trial evidence established that Rahar, the neighbor across the street, misled police

about his schooling and job experience.  It became evident that Rahar lived off of the

disability his girlfriend and her daughter received as dependent adults.  Rahar and the decedent frequently smoked and drank alcohol together, many times in the basement of the

decedent's home.  Rahar smoked generic cigarettes with "Q" on the butt, some of which

were found in a tin can used as an ashtray in the basement.  On December 20, 1989, Rahar

had been Christmas shopping and returned home at around 3:30 p.m.  He observed the

decedent's truck leaving the neighborhood at a high rate of speed.  Initially, he identified the

decedent as the driver, but he later conceded that he never saw the face of the driver and

could have been mistaken.  The truck did not return to the decedent's home, to the

knowledge of Rahar, and he stated that he was watching the street because a van was coming

to pick up his girlfriend's daughter.  It was established that Rahar could see the decedent's

home from his bay window in the front of his house across the street.  Rahar was driving a

rental car at the time, and the police requested to search the vehicle, which Rahar refused. 

A month later, the rental car was repossessed by the rental company for delinquent

payments, at which time the police searched the vehicle and found generic cigarettes with

"Q" on the butt.  A written report was presented at the trial, prepared by a police dispatcher,

which recounted a conversation Rahar had with his girlfriend's daughter, telling her not to

inform the police about the argument Rahar had with the decedent shortly before his death. 

The dispatcher could not independently recall the conversation but authenticated her

involvement with the report.  Rahar knew that the dogs and cat were gone from the

decedent's on the day in question, because the decedent informed him of that fact the night

before.  Testimony established that the dogs barked loudly upon the approach of a person

to the home.

	Linda Fillback Stevens lived in the neighborhood and stated that she saw the

decedent's truck speed past her on the date of the incident.  She described the driver as a

male with long, blond hair.  Multiple patrons and employees of a nearby Amoco gas station

observed the decedent's truck drive into a snowy field near the station.  The driver stopped, exited the vehicle, and walked in the direction of the neighborhood.  No one got a clear look

at the driver, but they described the person as a male with long, blond hair.  The police found

the truck in a field with the ignition coil missing.  No photographs or impressions of

footprints were taken, nor were fingerprints obtained.  The police did not present the

witnesses with a photograph lineup.  Evidence at the trial illustrated that the decedent's home

had woods behind it.  It was one-quarter of a mile from the back of the decedent's house to

the next marked street.  A vehicle with four-wheel-drive capabilities could drive on a dirt

road and get behind the decedent's home without being noticed.  Also, the field where the

truck was found was three-quarters of a mile from the decedent's home if one walked

directly through the woods.

	Donald Turner was defendant's former brother-in-law.  His testimony set up the

theory that defendant hired a hit man to kill her husband.  Turner testified that less than two

months before the decedent's death, defendant came to see him at a bar where he worked and

asked where she could find a hit man to kill her neighbor because he caused the decedent

to drink alcohol and use drugs.  He informed her that that kind of person did not frequent

his bar, and he offhandedly told her to go to a biker bar in East St. Louis.  Turner never

heard from defendant on the subject again, but he did tell his ex-wife's boyfriend, Ray

Fredericks, about the conversation.  In September 1990 Fredericks informed the police of

the conversation.  The police did not immediately follow up on Fredericks' statement, but

when defendant informed the police that she was moving to Missouri, Detective John Betten

of Fairview Heights contacted Turner about discussing the subject with defendant again, at

which time they would be either audiotaped or videotaped or both.

	Turner contacted defendant and asked her to meet him in the parking lot of the

Schnucks grocery store in Swansea.  Turner was wired and fabricated a story of needing a

hit man to eliminate his bar partner, Jackie.  Defendant denied contacting anyone after their previous conversation.  Defendant suggested that he do what he told her to do and go to a

biker bar in East St. Louis.  Turner kept pressing her for help and stated that he knew she

paid someone to kill the decedent.  Defendant denied the accusation and stated that she

would not have been stupid enough to set fires in her own home.  Defendant complained that

the insurance company did not pay her enough money to fix the damage to the house caused

by the fires.  She continued to state that she did not have enough money to pay a hit man and

could show anybody where the insurance money had gone.  She mentioned that a hit man

would cost between $10,000 and $20,000.  Turner asked how she knew, and she said,

"That's what people say."  Defendant told Turner to burn his trailer with Jackie in it and not

to inform the arsonists that someone would be in the trailer.  After Turner continued to press

defendant, she ended the conversation by telling Turner that she would call him and use the

name Brittany.  She never contacted Turner.  On November 28, 1990, Turner called

defendant and complained that Jackie had him arrested, and Turner asked for a name and

a number for a hit man.  He said that he knew she paid someone to kill the decedent. 

Defendant stated that she could not help, but she agreed to meet Turner at his bar the

following Saturday.  That Saturday they met at his bar.  Detective Betten listened to their

conversation in the basement of the bar.  Defendant told Turner that she talked to a friend

and that no one would touch it because the story sounded like a setup.

	Detective Betten took over the investigation after the major case squad disbanded. 

He had no face-to-face contact with defendant until January 1990.  At this point, Detective

Betten informed defendant that she was a suspect, and the two discussed the case. 

Defendant informed Detective Betten of some her theories.  She mentioned that Rahar had

a dispute with a previous landlord and threatened to kill him.  The former landlord

confirmed the argument but could not say whether there was a threat or not.  Defendant

mentioned another neighbor, Terry Oplt, who denied seeing the decedent two days before his death.  Detective Betten stated that he felt that her stories were suspicious.  Detective

Betten also testified about the bar, Lyle's Knock-Knock Tavern, on Eighth Street in East St.

Louis, about three-quarters of a mile from Sauget, the town next to Cahokia.  The bar was

located about four miles from defendant's dog-grooming shop.  The bar had the nickname

of "Froggie's," which Turner mentioned to defendant during the Swansea Schnucks

conversation, but defendant did not acknowledge the name one way or another.  The owner

of Lyle's Knock-Knock Tavern, Linda Stevens, testified that Jose Solis, in whose possession

the .357-magnum collector's pistol was found, worked as a bouncer at the tavern.  She stated

that she had never seen defendant in the tavern, and if defendant did visit the establishment,

she probably would have been informed of her presence because the tavern required patrons

to check in through a peephole in the door.

	II. ANALYSIS

	The first issue raised is whether there was insufficient evidence to warrant a

conviction of first-degree murder.  Defendant argues that the evidence was entirely

circumstantial.  Defendant notes that the State had to rely on circumstantial evidence because

defendant had an alibi for the estimated period of time during which the murder occurred. 

Also, defendant claims that the police investigation was poorly conducted with leads not

followed, blood work not done, fingerprints not taken, and footprints not taken from the

field in which the decedent's truck was abandoned following his murder.  Defendant argues

that the taped conversations between defendant and Donald Turner might lead one to believe

that defendant "more likely than not" hired someone to kill her husband but "more likely

than not" are insufficient to convict a defendant in a criminal setting.

	The State argues that all of theses arguments raised by defendant's brief do not refute

the fact that a jury of defendant's peers heard these arguments and found defendant guilty

of first-degree murder.  Absent clear error on the part of the jury, the reviewing court must not retry the defendant and should defer to the trier of fact.  See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 191, 549 N.E.2d 268, 276 (1989).

	The standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements

of the crime exist beyond a reasonable doubt.  See People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 299, 647 N.E.2d 946, 956 (1995); People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 95-96, 572 N.E.2d 895, 904 (1991).  A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless it is so improbable or unsatisfactory that

a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt still remains.  See Byron, 164 Ill. 2d at 299, 647 N.E.2d at 955; People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 43, 535 N.E.2d 889, 903 (1989).  The credibility of a witness, the weight to be given to testimony, and reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom are all the provinces for the trier of fact.  See Byron, 164 Ill. 2d at 299, 647 N.E.2d at 955-56; People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226, 568 N.E.2d 837, 845 (1991).

	In this case, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable

doubt, defendant guilty of first-degree murder.  Granted, the State's case is circumstantial,

but largely circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to warrant a guilty verdict, and the

standard of review is the reasonable-doubt standard, as with direct evidence.  See People v. Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d 286, 291, 549 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1989); People v. Anderson, 237 Ill. App. 3d 621, 632, 604 N.E.2d 546, 553 (1992).  It is not the responsibility of the reviewing court

to retry the defendant.  See Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d at 191, 549 N.E.2d at 276.  We will not disturb the jury verdict in this case.

	The second issue on appeal involves an alleged violation of the single-subject rule

of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)).  The constitutionality of a statute

is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  See People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448, 705 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (1998).  "[T]he single subject rule ensures that the legislature addresses

the difficult decisions it faces directly and subject to public scrutiny, rather than passing unpopular measures on the backs of popular ones."  Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (1997).  Legislative subjects need not be related to one another

substantively but, rather, satisfy the rule as long as the subjects included in it have a natural

and logical connection.  See Premier Property Management, Inc. v. Chavez, 191 Ill. 2d 101, 112, 728 N.E.2d 476, 482-83 (2000); Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 354-55, 718 N.E.2d 191, 197 (1999).  The term "subject" shall be liberally construed in favor of

upholding the legislation.  Premier Property Management, Inc., 191 Ill. 2d at 112, 728 N.E.2d at 482; Arangold Corp., 187 Ill. 2d at 352, 718 N.E.2d at 198.

	In order to assess whether Public Act 89-689 passes the single-subject test, we must

give a quick overview of the topics that it addresses.  Sections 5, 110, and 120 of Public Act

89-689 amend the Criminal Code of 1961.  Pub. Act 89-689, §§5, 110, 120, eff. December

31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3775, 3799, 3802) (amending 720 ILCS 5/31-6, 31-7, 12-7.1, 8-1.1

(West 1996)).  Sections 20, 65, 100, 115, 125, 130, and 135 amend the Unified Code of

Corrections.  Pub. Act 89-689, §§20, 65, 100, 115, 125, 130, 135, eff. December 31, 1996

(1996 Ill. Laws 3776, 3780, 3793, 3800, 3803, 3808, 3809) (amending 730 ILCS 5/3-4-3,

5-5-3.2, 3-3-5, 5-5-6, 5-5-3.2, 3-2-2, 3-5-1, 3-6-3.1, 3-7-2 (West 1996)).  Sections 90 and

105 amend the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.  Pub. Act 89-689, §§90, 105, eff.

December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3792, 3798) (amending 725 ILCS 5/104-21, 115-10.2

(West 1996)).  Section 35 amends section 8 of the Court of Claims Act by adjusting the awards to be received by a person unjustly imprisoned and subsequently pardoned by the

Governor on the basis of innocence.  Pub. Act 89-689, §35, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996

Ill. Laws 3777) (amending 705 ILCS 505/8 (West 1996)).  Section 55 amends the Humane

Care of Animals Act, creating a crime and defining the punishment for killing or

incapacitating a guide dog.  Pub. Act 89-689, §55, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 

3778) (adding 510 ILCS 70/7.15 (West 1996) and amending 510 ILCS 70/16 (West 1996)).  Section 70 gives a person drawing blood or obtaining urine immunity when that person acts

upon the request of law enforcement and the liquid is to be used for evidentiary purposes. 

Pub. Act 89-689, §70, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3783) (adding 625 ILCS

5/11-500.1 (West 1996)).  Section 75 amends the Counties Code and deals with the juvenile

impact incarceration program.  Pub. Act 89-689, §75, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill.

Laws 3784) (amending 55 ILCS 5/3-6039 (West 1996)).  Section 80 amends the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 by changing the probationary or conditional discharge period for

juveniles.  Pub. Act 89-689, §80, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3786) (amending

705 ILCS 405/5-23 (West 1996)).  Section 85 amends the Criminal Identification Act by

changing the section dealing with whether certain violations are expunged or not.  Pub. Act

89-689, §85, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3789) (amending 20 ILCS 2630/5

(West 1996)).  Section 95 amends the State Appellate Defender Act by changing the

procedure to accept bids and appoint counsel for indigent, noncapital criminal cases.  Pub.

Act 89-689, §95, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3793) (adding 725 ILCS 105/10.5

(West 1996)).

	All of the provisions of Public Act 89-689 relate to the criminal justice system.  The

sections amending the Criminal Code of 1961, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or

the Unified Code of Corrections clearly relate to the criminal justice system.  The remaining

sections either directly affect criminal justice by creating crimes or punishments or the

procedures by which the Illinois criminal justice system operates, such as the compensation

due wrongfully imprisoned citizens.  They all have a natural and logical connection to the

criminal justice system, and accordingly, Public Act 89-689 does not violate the single-

subject rule of the Illinois Constitution.  See People v. Jones, 317 Ill. App. 3d 283, 739 N.E.2d 105 (2000); People v. Majors, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 721 N.E.2d 753 (1999); People v. Dixon, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 721 N.E.2d 1172 (1999).

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is

affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	CHAPMAN, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.

                                     	NO. 5-98-0164

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

___________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)  Appeal from the

							)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,				)  St. Clair County.

							)    

v.							)  No. 91-CF-881

							)

THERESA LANE,					)  Honorable

							)  James M. Radcliffe, III,

     Defendant-Appellant.				)  Judge, presiding.  

___________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed:	February 16, 2001

___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices:	Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.

	Honorable Charles W. Chapman, P.J., and

	Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.,

	Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys	Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, E. Joyce Randolph, Assistant Defender, 

for	Office of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, Route 15 East, P.O.

Appellant	Box 2430, Mount Vernon, IL 62864-0047

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys	Hon. Robert Haida, State's Attorney, St. Clair County, 10 Public Square, Belleville,

for	IL 62220; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Patrick

Appellee	D. Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Rt.

	15 East, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

___________________________________________________________________________________