UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

EDDIE MAGALLANES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

P. HARDING, individually and in his 

official capacity; SECURITY MAJOR 

DOE, individually and in his official 

capacity; EDDIE WILSON, individually 

and in his official capacity; DAN 

SHANNON, individually and in his official 

capacity; ROBERT LAMPERT, 

individually and in his official capacity; 

STEVE LUNDLY, individually and in his 

official capacity; STEVE HARGETT, 

individually and in his official capacity; 

CORPORAL KENNEDY, individually and 

in his official capacity; MATTHEW 

MEAD, individually and in his official 

capacity; MICHAEL GROOMAN, 

individually; JOSEPH MARTINEZ, 

individually; BOBBY SCHAPER; STATE 

OF WYOMING; WYOMING 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 

WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY; 

JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1-30, 

individually and in his/her/their official 

capacity(ies), 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 17-8077 

(D.C. No. 2:16-CV-00278-SWS) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 12, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

 _________________________________ 

Plaintiff Eddie Magallanes brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Wyoming law 

against several prison officials and inmates arising out of his beating while incarcerated 

at the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP). The United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming dismissed all his claims. On appeal Magallanes challenges only the 

dismissal of his § 1983 claims against prison officials based on his failure to exhaust 

prison administrative remedies and qualified immunity. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Because the district court correctly dismissed his claims with 

prejudice for failure to exhaust, we need not address qualified immunity. 

 “Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), [prisoners are] required to 

exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing . . . suit in federal court.” 

Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2010). “Proper exhaustion demands 

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no 

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on 

the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006). Wyoming 

prisoners are required to submit their initial grievances within 30 days of the relevant 

incident. 

 

without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under 

the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, 

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 

32.1. 
3 

In 2012 Magallanes was placed in an administrative-segregation unit at the WSP 

after he was involved in an altercation with a corrections officer. On November 19, 

2014, he was released back into a general-population unit. Soon after being released into 

general population, three fellow inmates assaulted him, causing a traumatic brain injury 

that placed him in a coma for a month. The State conducted an investigation into the 

assault that began on the date of the assault and concluded in April 2015. 

On December 10, 2014, Magallanes was moved to the infirmary at the Wyoming 

Medium Correctional Institute (WMCI), which had better treatment capabilities. He was 

moved from the infirmary to a segregation unit in April 2015. In August 2015, nine 

months after his assault, an outside medical consultant concluded that he had made 

significant improvements in his recovery and might no longer require physical, 

occupational, or speech therapy. By January 2016 he was able to file a grievance asking 

to be returned to general population at the WMCI or to be returned to WSP, although this 

request was denied since classification and housing decisions could not be addressed 

under the grievance policy. 

On March 30, 2016, while still housed at the WMCI, Magallanes filed a separate 

grievance concerning his 2014 assault. His grievance was forwarded to the WSP. The 

grievance asserted that prison officials placed him in general population at the WSP 

knowing that he would be assaulted by other inmates. The WSP rejected the grievance as 

untimely. The grievance manager indicated that although Magallanes’s injuries excused 

him from having to meet the 30-day requirement, his grievance was still filed too late 

after his 2014 assault. On April 3, 2016, he filed two separate appeals: one to the 
4 

Director of the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) and another to the WMCI, 

where he was still housed. The Director summarily rejected his appeal since it was not 

accepted by the WSP and thus could not be considered by the Director. A few days later, 

the WMCI rejected his other appeal. Ignoring any issue of timeliness, the WMCI 

explained that the State had already conducted an investigation into the assault and did 

not intend further action. 

We agree that the grievance was untimely. Magallanes filed his initial grievance 

in March 2016, far after the 30-day deadline to grieve his November 2014 beating. 

Although he was certainly entitled to additional time because of his coma, he fails to 

explain why he could not have filed a grievance much earlier. He had been released from 

the infirmary about a year before he filed the grievance, and he had even filed a grievance 

on an unrelated issue two months earlier. 

We are not persuaded by Magallanes’s suggestion that the State waived the 30-day 

limit because the WMCI did not reject his appeal on timeliness grounds. Even if we 

make the doubtful assumption that the WMCI had authority to hear an appeal from denial 

of a grievance by the WSP, the Director of the WDOC is the highest authority, and he 

affirmed the untimeliness dismissal. 

Because Magallanes did not file a timely grievance, he failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies and his § 1983 claim was properly dismissed. Although 

Magallanes argues that the district court should have permitted him to amend his 

complaint, he does not explain how he could overcome his failure to exhaust. The 

district court’s dismissal with prejudice was therefore proper. See McKinney v. 
5 

Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991) (court need not permit plaintiff to amend 

when amendment would be futile). 

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge