UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SIMONE L. GREGGS, Plaintiff,



### v. AUTISM SPEAKS, INC. 

### etal, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 12-1107 (RJL)

# MEMORAN~PINION (March 

## Z-6 ,2013) [#3] Plaintiff, Simone L. Greggs ("plaintiff' or "Greggs"), who is proceeding

### prose, brings this action against MarkRoithmayr, Ann Gibbons, Pat deSaules, Tracy Wilbanks, and LindaLePage (collectively, the "individual defendants"), in addition to Autism Speaks Inc. ("Autism Speaks") (collectively, "defendants"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, for numerous causes of action relating to Autism Speaks' rescindment ofan offer ofemployment to plaintiff. Beforethe Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #3], contending that plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for which reliefcanbe granted. Upon consideration ofthe parties' pleadings, relevant law, and the entire record therein, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. BACKGROUND Simone L. Greggs is a 44 year-old resident ofPrince George's County, Maryland with two children, one ofwhich is autistic. Compl.**~~** 7, 17, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff

1previously worked for several non-profit organizations in a fundraising and event planning capacity, including the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights.**!d.~** 17. Afterbeing laid offfrom herprevious employment, plaintiffapplied for the Walk Events Managerposition at Autism Speaks in March 2012.**!d.~~** 18-19. On March 26, 2012, Autism Speaks' Director ofTalentAcquisitions, PatDeSaules, reached out to plaintifffor a preliminary interview and discussion about the WalkEvents Manager position. 

### !d.**~** 20. On March 27 and April3, 2012, plaintiffhad a telephone interview and an in-person interview, respectively, with Autism Speaks' Executive Director Ann Gibbons.**!d.~~** 21-22. After another telephone interview with Autism Speaks' Regional Director, Tracey Wilbanks, on April 5, 2012, plaintiffwas invitedto Autism Speaks' Washington, D.C. office to meet with staff.**!d.~~** 23-24. On April13, 2012, Autism Speaks offeredplaintiffthe position, which she accepted via a signed offer letter.**!d.~** 25. According to the plaintiff, Autism Speaks' employment offerwas contingent on a successful background check and drug test, which she successfully passed on April23, 2012.**!d.~~** 25, 28. As a result ofher newposition with Autism Speaks, plaintiffdeclined an employment opportunity with the Democratic National Committee at the end ofApril2012.**!d.~** 33. On May 6, 2012, one day priorto her start date, plaintiffcontacted defendant Ann Gibbons regarding a day care issue with her autistic son, who arrives home from school early on Wednesdays.**/d.~** 29. Although she proposed several ways to solve the problem, including working from home on Wednesdays, plaintiffalleges that Gibbons was unreceptive and would only allow herto 2delay her start date by one weekto find the appropriate solution. /d. Onthat same day, plaintiffwas able to successfully resolve the daycare issue, and immediately let Gibbons know that working in the office on Wednesdays would no longerbe a problem.**/d.~** 30. The next day, however, plaintiffalleges that, via a conference call with defendants Gibbons, DeSaules, Wilbanks, and LindaLePage, she learned thatAutism Speaks was rescinding its employment offerbecause it did not want to make any adjustments for the provision ofplaintiffs autistic child. 

### /d.**~** 31. OnMay 8, 2012, plaintiffclaims that she filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that defendants engaged in unlawful discriminatory employment practices against herbecause she had a disabled child. 

### /d.**~~** 15, 32. Plaintifffiled the instant suit onJuly 6, 2012. See generally id. Alleging violations ofnumerous antidiscrimination laws, as well breach ofcontract, plaintiffasks this Courtto grantjudgment in her favor, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages and an award ofcosts and fees. 

### /d. Defendants movedto dismiss this action on July 30, 2012. See generallyDefs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mot."), ECF No.3. Forthe following reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED. ANALYSIS The defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs complaintbecause it "fails to state any viable cause ofaction against [d]efendants upon which reliefcan be granted." See Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem.") at 2, ECF No. 3-1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although the complaint is ambiguous as to the causes ofaction asserted, this Courtwill assume thatplaintiffalleges violations ofTitle VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 31964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. 

### §§ 2000(e) etseq., 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1981, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq., and a breach ofcontract claim. 1 Out ofan abundance ofcaution, this Courtwill also presume thatplaintiffintends to bring the aforementioned claims against each ofthe individual defendants, as well as defendant Autism Speaks, despite heruse ofthe word "defendant"throughoutthe complaint, without any specificity orplurality. See generally Com pl. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds ofhis entitle[ment] to reliefrequires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation ofthe elements ofa cause ofaction will not do." BellAt!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state

a claimto reliefthat is plausible on its face." Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he [C]ourt need not accept inferences drawn byplaintiffl] ifsuch inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint." Kowalv. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider "any documents either attached to or incorporated in

1See Compl.**~** 1 ("[Plaintiff] has claims ofdiscriminatory treatment and breach of contract as a result ofconductby the [d]efendantthat interferes with herrightto be employed based on a disability."); id.**~** 2 ("This is an action

...toredress [d]efendant's unlawful employmentpractices and retaliation against [p]laintiff

... in violation of

...42 U.S.C. 

### § 1981

...Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964

... and the Americans with Disabilities Act[.]"); id.**~** 5 ("[T]his action involves federal questions regarding the deprivation of[p]laintiffs civil rights underTitle VII, Section 1981 and the ADA."); id.**~** 46 ("OnMay 7, 2012, [d]efendant had breach [sic] the contract by rescindingthe employment offer."). 4the complaint and matters ofwhich [the court] may takejudicial notice." EEOCv. St. FrancisXavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Under the aforementioned standards, plaintiffs complaint is deficient for several

reasons. First, the complaint fails to plead any claim under either Title VII or 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1981. A cause ofaction under Section 1981 may be broughtwhen a plaintiffsuffers an injury flowing from the racially-motivated breach ofhis or her contractual relationship with anotherparty. See Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 480 (2006). And Title VII proscribes employment discrimination on the basis ofan "individual's

race, color, religion, sex, ornational origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Far from the typical Title VII or Section 1981 case, however, plaintiffis alleging that the defendants "discriminated against [her] on the basis ofher child's disability by denying her reasonable accommodations in orderto perform thejob and to take care ofher [a]utistic child." Compl.**~** 35 (emphasis added); see also id.**~~** 2, 7, 39. Becauseplaintiffs allegations ofemployment discrimination against the defendants do not "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face" under either Title VII or Section 1981,Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), her causes ofactions based thereon must be dismissed. Second, the plaintiffhas failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the ADA and Title VII claims. The ADA incorporates the "powers, remedies, and procedures" ofTitle VII, which includes the limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); see also Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 04-1444, 2006 WL 626921, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2006). Before initiating an action in federal court, 5"ADAplaintiffs, like those under Title VII, must exhaust their administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge and giving that agency a chance to act on it." Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1). More specifically, ifa plaintiffwishes to bring a suit in federal court, his or her complaint must be pending before the agency or the EEOC for at least 180 days, or plaintiffmust be notified by the EEOC ofhis or her right to sue through the issuance ofa right-to-sue letter, and bring suit within ninety days. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e16(c); see Hunter v. Dist. ofColumbia, No. 09-1491, 2012 WL 5974036, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2012). "Thepurpose ofthe [administrative exhaustion] doctrine is to afford the agency an opportunity to resolve the matter internally and to avoid unnecessarily burdeningthe courts." Wilson v. Pefia, 79 F.3d 154, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Accepting all ofher allegations as true for purposes ofthis motion, plaintifffiled a formal EEOC complaint on May 8, 2012, yet initiated the present action on July 6, 2012, well before the 180-day window had run its course orplaintiffreceived a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See Compl. 

### ,-r 32; Pl.'s Opp'nto Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 1, ECF No. 7. Indeed, plaintiffherselfconcedes that, four months after she filed this lawsuit, she still had yet to receive a right-to-sue letter from the agency, and the EEOC was still engaged in its investigation ofher claims.2 See Pl.'s Opp'n at 1. Because

2 Defendants have supported their Rule 12(b)(6) motion with a notice ofplaintiff's EEOC charge ofdiscrimination, attached as an exhibit to defendants' briefing. See Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. ofMot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Reply"), Ex. A, ECF No.8; Wiley v. NEBF

### lnvs., No. 09-223,2010 WL 114953, at *1 n.l (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (court can considerNotice ofCharge without converting motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment). This administrative notice reflects that defendant Autism Speaks did not even 6plaintiffdeprived the EEOC ofthe opportunity to resolve the present matter administratively, her claims under Title VII and the ADA3 in this court must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Dahlman v. Am. Ass 'n of Retired Persons (AARP), 791 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2011) ("ordinarily, receipt ofa notice of right-to-sue letter is a condition precedentto the initiation ofan ADA [or] Title VII

... action in court."); Parkv. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904,907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Only after the EEOC has notified the aggrieved person ofits decision to dismiss or its inability to bring a civil action within the requisite time period can thatperson bring a civil action herself."). Last, the complaint fails to assert a viable cause ofaction for breach ofcontract against eitherthe individual defendants or Autism Speaks. In her complaint, plaintiff contends that she was given an offer ofemployment by defendant Autism Speaks on April13, 2012, which she "sign[ed] and faxed back to the organization." Compl.**~** 25. Although the employment offerwas contingent on herpassing a background check and drug test, plaintiffsuccessfully completed such tests, and was given a start date ofMay 7, 2012. See id.**~~** 25, 28. Plaintiffargues that, when Autism Speaks rescinded her

receive notice ofplaintiffs discrimination charge from the EEOC until, at the earliest, October 12, 2012, over three months after plaintifffiled the instant suit. See generally Compl.; Defs.' Reply, Ex. A. 3 Additionally, the notice ofplaintiffs EEOC charge ofdiscrimination, see Defs.' Reply, Ex. A, also demonstrates that plaintifffailed to assert a Title VII discrimination claim against defendants. This is yet another ground upon which plaintiffsTitle VII claim is deficient. See Howardv. Fenty, 580 F. Supp. 2d 86, 90 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Plaintiffs must exhaust their Title VII claims prior to raising them for the first time in a lawsuit, and the law in this Circuit is clearthat an allegation as to one type ofdiscrimination does not exhaust all administrative remedies as to another type ofalleged discrimination."). 7employment offer on May 7, 2012, defendants committed a breach ofcontract. See id. ,-r,-r 31,42-47. As an initial matter, even ifthe offer letter could properly be construed as an employment contract, plaintiffcannot assert a claim for breach ofcontract against the individual defendants because they were not parties to the alleged contract. More specifically, the offer letter is unambiguously between plaintiffand defendant Autism Speaks, and makes no mention ofany ofthe individual defendants. See Defs.' Mot., Ex. A at 1 ("On behalfofAutism Speaks, we are pleased to confirm our offer of employment."). As such, plaintiffs contract-based claim against Mark Roithmayr, Ann Gibbons, Pat deSaules, Tracy Wilbanks, and Linda LePage fail. With regard to plaintiffs breach ofcontract claim against Autism Speaks, plaintiff does notcontend that the employment offer at issue is anything but an offer ofat-will employment with Autism Speaks, which can be terminated "by either party for any reason, or no reason, at any time." Hopkins v. Blue Cross andBlue ShieldAss 'n, No. 10- 900, 2010 WL 5300536, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2010). Indeed, it is long-standing precedent in the District ofColumbia that "unless a contrary contractual intent is clearly expressed, all employment is at-will." Turner v. Fed. Express Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (D.D.C. 2008) (citation omitted). Thus, even ifthe offer letter is deemed an employment contract, plaintiffdoes not allege that it alters her at-will employment status with Autism Speaks in any way, and the offer letter's language is consistentwith an atwill employment relationship. See generally Compl.; Defs.' Mot., Ex. A at 1("You are being employed as an 'employee-at will,' which means your employment and 8compensation may be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, by either Autism Speaks or yourself."). And under the at-will employment doctrine, Autism Speaks had the capacity to withdraw the offer or cease the employment relationship with plaintiffat any time, a right which Autism Speaks properly exercised on May 7, 2012. See Daisley v. Riggs Bank, NA., 372 F. Supp. 2d 61,67 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Termination ofemployment, then, does not breach an at-will employment contract, because by its very terms the agreement contemplates that either party may end the employmentrelationship, with or without cause.");Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28,30 (D.C. 1991). Accordingly, plaintiffs breach ofcontract claim must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim for which reliefcan be granted. CONCLUSION For all ofthe foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #3]. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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