SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3068-22 

DISCOVER BANK, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

SADIA TAHIR, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________ 

Submitted May 15, 2024 – Decided July 19, 2024 

Before Judges Firko and Susswein. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 

DC-010515-20.

Erik Mark Helbing, attorney for appellant. 

Zwicker & Associates, PC, attorneys for respondent (G. 

Todd Pondish, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Sadia Tahir appeals from an April 27, 2023 Law Division order 

granting plaintiff Discover Bank's motion to turnover $9,985.92 seized from 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3068-22

defendant's account at J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (Chase Bank). The funds were 

levied following a judgment against defendant. Defendant contends she and her 

husband own the Chase Bank account as tenants by the entirety. Thus, because 

she is solely responsible for the underlying judgment, defendant argues the trial 

court had no authority to order the turnover of funds from the jointly-owned 

account. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the governing legal 

principles and arguments of the parties, we affirm.

The record shows that defendant married her husband, Malik Tahir, in 

Pakistan in January 2014. They are the joint owners of the Chase Bank account. 

It is not disputed that the underlying judgment is solely against defendant. 

On July 12, 2022, $9,985.92 was levied against the Chase Bank account. 

On July 22, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for turnover of the levied funds. 

Defendant opposed the motion, arguing the funds in the account were exempt. 

However, she did not provide any documentation to identify the source of the 

funds deposited in the Chase Bank account. 

 At oral argument, the trial court noted there was no evidence the money 

in the account belonged to one spouse or another. Citing Banc of Am. Leasing 

& Cap., LLC v. Fletcher-Thompson Inc., 453 N.J. Super. 50, 53 (App. Div. 

2018), the court determined it needed documentation showing the source of the 
3 A-3068-22

funds comprising the Chase Bank account. The court adjourned the matter to 

allow defendant to provide bank statements establishing the source of the funds. 

At the next hearing, the trial court noted defendant did not present the 

requested evidence concerning ownership of the funds in the Chase Bank 

account. The court concluded the money was not exempt, denied defendant's 

objection to the levy, and granted plaintiff's motion to turnover the funds. This 

appeal follows. 

 In Banc of America, we held "when seeking a turnover from a joint 

account, the judgment creditor has the burden 'to prove that the moneys thus 

deposited are the individual property of the judgment debtor, and therefore 

applicable to the satisfaction of the judgment.'" 453 N.J. Super. at 53 (quoting 

Esposito v. Palovick, 29 N.J. Super. 3, 10-11 (App. Div. 1953)). In Esposito, 

we held it could not be presumed "that one depositing his [or her] own funds in 

a joint account in the names of himself [or herself] and another has thereby 

created a joint tenancy in the account." 29 N.J. Super. at 8. 

 N.J.S.A. 17:16I-4(a) provides in relevant part: 

A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all

parties, to the parties in proportion to the net 

contributions by each to the sums on deposit. In the 

absence of proof of net contributions, the account 

belongs in equal shares to all parties having present 

right of withdrawal. 
4 A-3068-22

Under this statutory framework, the Chase Bank account funds belong to 

both defendant and her husband in proportion to their individual deposits. 

Further, the statute clearly provides that absent proof of their individual 

contributions, it is presumed that each named account holder owns an equal 

share in the funds in the account. 

 In this instance, the trial court gave defendant an opportunity to present 

evidence to overcome the statutory presumption, but she did not avail herself of 

that opportunity. Instead, she argues that another statute effectively supersedes 

N.J.S.A. 17:16I-4. Specifically, defendant relies on N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4, which 

provides: 

Neither spouse may sever, alienate, or otherwise affect 

their interest in the tenancy by the entirety during the 

marriage or upon separation without the written consent 

of both spouses. 

 Defendant also relies on our decision in Jimenez v. Jimenez, 454 N.J. 

Super. 432 (App. Div. 2018). In that case, the defendant and his non-party 

spouse obtained a tract of land they owned as tenants by the entirety. Id. at 434. 

The plaintiffs moved to compel the partition and sale of the jointly-owned 

property to satisfy a judgment against the defendant. Id. at 434-35. The trial 
5 A-3068-22

court denied the motion, finding N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4 prohibited that remedy. Id. 

at 435. We affirmed, noting: 

We recognize Section 17.4 literally commands that 

"neither spouse" may sever, alienate, or otherwise 

affect their shared interests in the tenancy by the

entirety, and that plaintiffs are not [the defendant's] 

"spouse." Even so, we conclude the statutory 

prohibition applies to a situation where, as here, one 

spouse's failure to pay his personal debts to third-party 

creditors has resulted in a money judgment entered 

against him alone. Otherwise, a free-wheeling spouse, 

by amassing such individual debt, could detrimentally 

"affect" the other spouse's interests in their co-owned 

property. 

[Id. at 438.] 

 Plaintiff argues defendant's reliance upon Jimenez is misplaced because it 

involved a judgment creditor attempting to force the sale of real property to 

enforce payment of an obligation against one of the co-owners. Real property 

rights as between joint owners, plaintiff contends, cannot be individually 

addressed without liquidating the property in question. Therefore, any 

execution on that property would necessarily involve its sale, infringing on the 

individual property rights of the innocent co-owner. Plaintiff argues—and we 

agree—that concern does not arise with respect a joint bank account, since it is 

a straightforward matter to apportion the relative ownership interests of the 
6 A-3068-22

depositors without affecting the remaining funds belonging to the innocent coowner. 

 Defendant notes that the concept of tenancy by the entirety can apply to 

personal property and not just real property, citing N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.2(a). That 

statute provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] tenancy by entirety shall be created 

when . . . [a] husband and wife together take title to an interest in real property 

or personal property under a written instrument designating both of their names 

as husband and wife." (Emphasis added). 

We conclude that in this specific application, N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4 does not 

supersede the presumptive apportionment established in N.J.S.A. 17:16I-4. The 

latter statute upon which the trial court relied deals specifically with jointlyowned bank accounts. We are not persuaded that it was effectively eviscerated 

by another statute dealing with all manner of personal property, including 

personal property that could not be apportioned without liquidation. 

Furthermore, as we have noted, defendant was afforded an opportunity to 

overcome the presumption but chose not to comply with the trial court's 

instructions. Her refusal to provide documentation to answer the question raised 

by the trial court provides an adequate basis for applying the unrebutted 

statutory presumption. In sum, we find no error in the trial court's determination 
7 A-3068-22

that the Chase Bank account funds were not exempt and could be levied upon to 

satisfy the judgment against plaintiff. To the extent we have not specifically 

addressed them, any remaining arguments raised by defendant lack sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.