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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA S. MANLEY, MARY MATTERN, TIMOTHY MATTERN, JANET B. MATTERN, EMORY MULHOLLAND, PAM MULHOLLAND, RICHARD SEBRING, and MICHAEL SMILEY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, UNPUBLISHED December 6, 2016

v No. 327510 Lenawee Circuit Court SUE PIKULSKI, also known as SUE HAWKINS, and JOSEPH A. PIKULSKI, JR., LC No. 89-004109-CH

Defendants-Appellants.

Before: J ANSEN , P.J., and M URPHY and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendants Sue Pikulski and Joseph Pikulski appeal as of rightthe trial court’s June 25, 2014 order denying the parties’ motions for summary disposition , the trial court’s November 21, 2014 opinion and order entered after the bench trial in this ca se, and the trial court’s May 14, 2015 final judgment denying defenda nts’ posttrial motions and c losing the case. We affirm the trial court’s opinions and orders, but remand is necessary for the trial court to determine a maximum width for the constructe d pathway provided for in its N ovember 21, 2014 order.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In August and December 1959, Farland R. Myers and Anna H. Myer s, the previous owners of defendants’ property, entered into several easement a greements that had substantively identical terms. In relevant pa rt, the agreements provided:

This indenture, made this 3rd day of December, 1959 by and between Farland R. Myers and Anna H. Myers, of Toledo, Ohio, grantors, and [the grantees],

Witnesseth:

That, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar and ot her valuable considerations in hand paid by th e grantee, the receipt whereof is hereby-2- acknowledged do hereby grant unto the grantees, [the owners of specific lots in the Oak Shade Park Subdivision in] Cambridge Twp., Lenawee Coun ty, Michigan, and to subsequent owner s of [the specific lots] or oc cupiers of [the specific lots] as tenants in po ssession, only, access for pedes trian traffic only, along Outlet No. A. Supervisors Plat No. 2, a part of Lot No. 2 , Government Survey N E 1/4 Fractional Section 2, T. 5 South, Range 2 East, Cambridge Twp., Lenawee Co., Michigan according to the Plat thereof recorded inLiber 6 page 47 of Plats, to Wampler’s Lake and the right to maintain only one boat but no motorized rafts at the lake dock on the frontage of said Outlet A provided grantees, subsequent owners or occupying tenants of said premis es pay their proportionate share of the expens e of maintaining the dock and of keeping it in good condition.

It is further understood and ag reed by both parties hereto tha t it is a condition of this easement and binding upon grantee, subsequent owners, and occupying tenants that the way of access must be kept clear at all times and that the grantors, their heirs and assigns may designate the path of access as they see fit.

In February 1989, Linda S. Manle y, Donald J. Mattern, Mary C. Mattern, Mary E. Mattern, William P. Mulholland, Vivian M. Mulholland, Ronald Sa raniecki, Richard Sebring, and Shirley Sebring filed a complaint against Sue Hawkins, 1 Joseph A. Pikulski, Jr., and Kenneth Richardson, alleging that the defendants had wrongfully and sub stantially interfered with the plaintiffs’ use of the easement, and attempted to force the pla intiffs to abandon the easement, through a variety of actions. A ccordingly, the plaintiffs requ ested, inter alia , a declaration of their rights and a permanent in junction enjoining the defendant s from interfering with the plaintiffs’ rights, which w ould be binding on the parties’ succ essors in interest.

In March 1989, the defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff s’ complaint, in which they denied the plaintiffs’ allegations of interference. They also filed a counter-complaint in which they contended that the plaintiffs, as well as their guests and invitees, had violated the easement by using Outlot A and other property in a variety of ways. Acc ordingly, the defendants requested, among other things, temporary and permanent injuncti ve relief requiring the plaintiffs to strictly comply with the terms of the easement agreements, r equiring the plaintiffs to stay within the way of access designated by the defendants and only use it as a walkway, and requiring a series of restricti ons concerning the placement of the plaintiffs’ dock.

More than a year of litigation followed. On May 9, 1990, the d ate set for trial, the parties placed a settlement on the record. On March 18, 1991, an order was entered consistent with the parties’ settlement.

1 Sue Hawkins is now married to J oseph Pikulski and is a defenda nt in the instant appeal.-3- In September 2013, the plaintiffs at issue in the instant appea l 2 filed a petition for a permanent and interim injunction, as well as other relief, agai nst defendants Sue Pikulski and Joseph A. Pikulski, Jr. In October 2013, defendants filed a re sponse to plaintiffs’ petition, denying plaintiffs’ claims of wrongful conduct and requesting t hat the trial court deny plaintiffs’ request for relief. After subsequent filings and proceedings, the trial court denied both parties’ motions for summary disposition an d other requests for pretrial relief. The trial court then held a four-day bench trial.

In October 2014, both parties s ubmitted proposed findings of fa ct and conclusions of law. On November 21, 2014, the trial court entered its opinion and o rder. Most relevant to this appeal, it found, “The 1991 Order which represents the Stipulat ed Agreement of the parties altered the terms of the 1959 easement as to the walkway and to the maintenance of boats on Wampler’s Lake.” It made the following findings of fact:

The 1991 Order is clear that the easement holders may place th eir boats due east or dead east to be in c ompliance with said Order. The refore . . . the current practice employed by Plaintiffs is in compliance and th e 1991 Order pertaining to mooring of boats, facing easterly along the west side of the dock shall not be disturbed.

Testimony was provided by Plaintiffs and Defendant regarding t he installation of the concrete break wall installed by Defendant Pikulski. The concrete wall interrupts the natural flow of the water and Plai ntiffs’ use and enjoyment of a beach feature formerly available to them as ease ment holders. Defendant may not unilaterally ch ange the nature of the land or interfere with Plaintiffs’ use.

The garden fence placed by Defendant along the walkway used by Plaintiffs is of no consequence. It is too small, too light, a nd too easily moved and manipulated. The walkway as is prevents foot traffic and c lear parameters for guidance. The fence was placed i n the ground by Defendant sole ly to preclude or inhibit Plaintiffs’ use. The fence was an attempt to make foot traffic impassible or at best, impracticable.

Neither the 1959, nor the 1991 Order pertaining to the walkway is ambiguous. The easement holders have a right to occupy the pro perty at issue to the extent necessary to fully enj oy the rights conferred by the easement document. The owner of the land burdened by the easement cannot block the easement or otherwise take such action as may constitute an unreasonable in terference with

2 In June 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for a substitution of parties, based on the death of original plaintiffs to the acti on giving rise to the 1991 order and subsequent sales of property benefitted by the easement, so that the current title holders o r occupants of the subject properties were listed as plaintiffs in the current action. The trial cou rt granted the substitution.-4- the easement holders’ use. Further, Defendant may not unilater ally block or change the easement.

Accordingly, it ordered:

That Plaintiffs may moor their boats on the west side of their dock, facing due east, dead east, or in an easterly direction;

That Defendant shall, on or bef ore July 1, 2015, remove the co ncrete structure, the break wall, at the northern end of Outlot A, the reby reestablishing the beach front currently enj oyed by the easement holders;

That the easement holders shall install a walkway, no less than 5 (five) foot wide along the easternmost side of Outlot A. Said walkway may be wood, concrete, blacktop, stone or any other material appropriately d esignated by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs shall be ar the expense associated with materials and installation of the walkway. Said walkway shall comply with an y and all State and local building regulations;

That in all other respects, the Orders and Agreements between the Plaintiffs and Defendants rema in in full force and effect.

Subsequently, defendants filed mo tions requesting amendment of the trial court’s opinion and order, a new trial or other appropriate relief, and further clarification, in which they argued, inter alia , that the trial court’s finding s were against the great weight of the evidence admitted at trial, and that the trial court erred by failing to address man y of the purported violations of the easement agreement and 1991 order that they raised in their cou nter-petition and litigated at trial. Ultimately, the trial court denied defendants’ motions, except for their request that the trial court clarify whether a fina l order closing the c ase had been entered , explaining that itbelieved that the findings and conclusions in its November 21, 2014 opinion and o rder were sufficient, and that further findings were unnecessar y given the language of the 199 1 stipulated order.

Defendants now appeal as of right.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The extent of a party’s rights under an easement is a question of fact, and a trial court’s determination of those facts is reviewed for clear error.” Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter , 473 Mich 33, 40; 700 NW2d 364 (2005). Likewise, “[t]he scope and extent of an easement” and “whether the scope of an easement has been exceed ed” are generally questions of fact that are “reviewed for clear error on appeal.” Wiggins v City of Burton , 291 Mich App 532, 550; 805 NW2d 517 (2011). See also Bang v Forman , 244 Mich 571, 573; 222 NW 96 (1928). Stated differently, “[w]hat may be considered a proper and reas onable use by the owner of the fee, as distinguished from an unreasonable and improper use, as well as what may be necessary to [the easement holder’s] benef icial use and enjoyment, are qu estions of fact to be determined by the trial court or jury.” Lakeside Assoc v Toski Sands , 131 Mich App 292, 300; 346 NW2d 92 (1983). A trial court’s “factual findings are clearly erroneou s if there is no evidence to support them or there is evidence to support them but this Court is lef t with a definite and firm conviction-5- that a mistake has been made.” A & M Supply Co v Microsoft Corp , 252 Mich App 580, 588; 654 NW2d 572 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘[G]reat deference’ [is] generally afforded to trial courts, which are in a better posit ion to examine the facts.” Hill v City of Warren, 276 Mich App 299, 308; 740 NW2d 706 (2007) (citation omitted).

However, the proper interpretati on of the language in an easeme nt or deed is reviewed de

novo as a question of law, In re Rudell Estate , 286 Mich App 391, 402-403; 780 NW2d 884 (2009), as the principles applicab le to contract interpretationsimilarly apply when a court reviews the language establishing an easement, see In re Egbert R Smith Trust , 480 Mich 19, 24; 745 NW2d 754 (2008); Little v Kin , 468 Mich 699, 700; 664 NW2d 749 (2003). See also Schadewald v Brule , 225 Mich App 26, 35; 570 NW2d 788 (1997). Likewise, “[i]nter preting the meaning of a court order involve s questions of law that we revi ew de novo on appeal.” Hanton v Hantz Fin Services , Inc, 306 Mich App 654, 660; 858 NW2d 481 (2014) (quotation ma rks and citation omitted).

Even though appellate courts generally review de novo a trial court’s determination that equitable relief is proper under the circumstances, McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co , 480 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 (2008), this Court reviews the grant or denial of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion, Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v City of Pontiac , 482 Mich 1, 8; 753 NW2d 595 (2008); Martin v Murray , 309 Mich App 37, 45; 867 NW2d 444 (2015); Janet Travis, Inc v Preka Holdings, LLC , 306 Mich App 266, 274; 856 NW2d 206 (2014). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision results in an ou tcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Epps v 4 Quarters Restoration LLC , 498 Mich 518, 528; 872 NW2d 412 (2015). 3

III. REMOVAL OF THE BREAKWALL

Defendants first contend that the trial court erred when it or dered them to remove the concrete breakwall. We disagree.

“An easement is a right to use the land of another for a specif ic purpose.” Bowen v Buck & Fur Hunting Club, 217 Mich App 191, 192; 550 NW2d 850 (1996). “An easement does not displace the general possession of the land by its owner, but m erely grants the holder of the easement qualified possession only to the extent necessary for enjoyment of the rights conferred by the easement.” Schadewald , 225 Mich App at 35, citing Morrill v Mackman, 24 Mich 279, 284 (1872). As such, “the owner o f a fee subject to an easemen t may rightfully use the land only for a purpose consistent with the rights of the owner of the ea sement[.]” Smith v Edwards , 249 Mich App 199, 209-210; 645 NW2d 304 (2002). See also Harr v Coolbaugh , 337 Mich 158, 165-166; 59 NW2d 132 (1953) (“[T]he owner of the servient estat e may make any use of the premises not inconsistent with easement.”) (emphasis omitted). Stated differently, the fee owner may make any use of his land as long as it does not unreasonabl y interfere with the easement holder’s use of the land. Lee v Fidelity Life & Income Mut Ins Co, 2 Mich App 82, 86-87; 138

3 Defendants’ summary disposition and directed verdict claims fa il for the same reasons discussed in this opinion.-6- NW2d 545 (1965), citing 2 Thomps on Real Property (1961 Rev), Ea sements, § 431, p 719, and Kirby v Meyering Land Co , 260 Mich 156; 244 NW 433 (1932). See also Murphy Chair Co v Am Radiator Co , 172 Mich 14, 28-29; 137 NW 791 (1912). Likewise, “[t]he owne r of the right of way has the right to a reasonably unobstructed passage at al l times, and also such rights as are incident or necessary to the enjoyment of such right of passage .” Murphy Chair Co , 172 Mich at 29. See also Blackhawk Dev Corp , 473 Mich at 41-42 (“It is an established principle that the conveyance of an easement gives to the grantee all such rights as are incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement.”) (quotation m arks and citation omitted).

“Once granted, an easement cannot be modified by either party u nilaterally.” Schadewald

, 225 Mich App at 36. If the owner of the servient estate interf eres with an easement owner’s use of the easement, the easement owner may bring an ac tion—seeking damages, an injunction, or both types of remedies—in order to enforce the e asement. See, e.g., Choals v Plummer , 353 Mich 64, 73; 90 NW2d 851 (1958); Hasselbring v Koepke , 263 Mich 466, 476; 248 NW 869 (1933); Soergel v Preston , 141 Mich App 585, 587-588, 590-591; 367 NW2d 366 (1985); Bd of Comm’rs v Abraham , 93 Mich App 774, 781; 287 NW2d 371 (1979).

When an injury is irreparable, or the interference is of a perm anent or continuous character, or the remedy at law will not afford adequate relief , a bill for an injunction is an appropriate re medy. 10 Michigan Law & Practic e, Easements, § 34, p 128. The granting of injunc tive relief is within the sou nd discretion of the court, and the decision must be based on the facts of the parti cular case. [ Soergel

, 141 Mich App at 589-590.]

See also Janet Travis, Inc , 306 Mich App at 274-275; 2 Restatement Property, 3d, Servitud es, § 8.3, pp 495-496 (“Injunctive relief is normally available to re dress violations of easements and restrictive covenants without pr oof of irreparable injury or a showing that a judgment for damages would be inadequate.”). Notably, the Michigan Supreme Court previously stated, “The violation of complainants’ right s by the erection of a permanen t structure obstructing an easement and right of way created by deed will be relieved by i njunction in a court of equity.” Kirby v Meyering Land Co , 260 Mich 156, 167; 244 NW 433 (1932) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

It is undisputed that plainti ffs were entitled, under the 1959 easement agreements, to use the easement for pedestrian access to Wampler’s Lake, and that plaintiffs also were entitled, under the 1991 stipulated order, “to utilize[] the beach on the lake front of ‘Outlo t A’ as far south as the current position of the north-east corner of defendants’ house for such purposes as the supervision of young children in the water at the lake front of ‘Outlot A,’ ” as long as the easement holders did not go further than the endpoints indicate d in the order. After hearing the evidence presented at trial, t he trial court concluded:

Testimony was provided by Plaintiffs and Defendant regarding t he installation of the concrete break wall installed by Defendant Pikulski. The concrete wall interrupts the natural flow of the water and Plai ntiffs’ use and enjoyment of a beach feature formerly available to them as ease ment holders. Defendant may not unilaterally ch ange the nature of the land or interfere with Plaintiffs’ use.-7- Accordingly, the trial court ord ered “[t]hat Defendant shall . . . remove the concrete structure, the break wall, at the northern end of Outlot A, thereby reestablis hing the beach front currently enjoyed by the easement holders[.]” In so holding, the trial court implicitly found that removal of the wall was necessary for plaintiffs’ use of the beach, and that defendants’ installation of the easement was inconsistent with plaintiffs’ rights and unreasona bly interfered with plaintiffs’ reasonable use of the easement. See Blackhawk Dev Corp , 473 Mich at 40; Harr , 337 Mich at 165-166; Smith

, 249 Mich App at 209-210; Lakeside Associates , 131 Mich App at 300; Lee , 2 Mich App at 86-87. The trial court did not clearly err in so f inding, especially given the “ ‘great deference’ [that this Court] generally afford[s] to trial court s, which are in a better position to examine the facts.” Hill , 276 Mich App at 308.

On appeal, defendants mischaracterize the testimony provided b y plaintiffs’ witnesses, stating, “In fact, the Easement Holders’ witnesses conceded tha t the breakwall was an improvement over the old set-up.” Although plaintiffs’ witnesses confirmed that the breakwall provided a flatter, sturdier f oundation for plaintiffs’ dock, d efendants fail to acknowledge trial testimony demonstrating that def endants’ installation of the br eakwall significantly inhibited plaintiffs’ access to, and use of, the beach area. Additionall y, even though defendants testified that there still was a beach between the b reakwall and the wate r, that the breakwall did not “hurt” the beach area, and that whether the water “butts up against th e concrete wall” depends on the level of the lake, it appears that the trial court believed tha t the contrary was true following its visit to Outlot A. The photographs admitted at trial similarlyshow that the wall significantly reduced or fully eliminated the beach area. 4 Given this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that removal of the breakwall was necessary f or plaintiffs’ reasonable use of the beach area under the 1991 stipulated order. See Lakeside Assoc , 131 Mich App at 300; A & M Supply Co , 252 Mich App at 588.

Contrary to defendants’ claims, whether installation of the bre akwall was a “per se reasonable” action in their estimation in order to prevent further erosion of the property is not relevant, as the pertinent focus is whether defendants’ interference was reasonable—not whether the act itself would be objectiv ely reasonable without consider ing the terms of the easement— given defendants’ duty to refr ain from any unreasonable interfe rence with plaintiffs’ reasonable use of the easement. See Murphy Chair Co , 172 Mich at 28-29; Smith , 249 Mich App at 209- 210; Lee , 2 Mich App at 86-87. Likewise, whether defendants’ installat ion of the breakwall was expressly prohibited under the 1959 easement agreements or the 1991 stip ulated order is not dispositive, as the appropriate i nquiry is whether defendants’ actions were inconsistent with plaintiffs’ rights under the agreement, or whether defendants’ act unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs’ rights. See Smith , 249 Mich App at 209-210; Harr , 337 Mich at 165-166. Furthermore, contrary to defendants’ claims on appeal, there is no basis in the record for

4 Notably, at the hearing on defendants’ motions requesting amen dment of the trial court’s opinion and order, a new trial or other appropriate relief, and further clarification, the trial court emphasized its conclusion that there is no beachfront as a resu lt of the breakwall, and that the easement holders are now required to access the water over a wa ll, which is impossible for someone with a walker.-8- concluding that the breakwall “saved” the beach area. Rather, as previously discussed, the testimony and photographic evidence confirms that the breakwall wholly altered the portion of the easement adjacent to the lake and effectively eliminated th e beach area. 5

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it iss ued an injunction requiring defendants to remove the breakwa ll, as defendants’ unilateral c hange of the property—which affected plaintiffs’ access to the water as well as the charact er of the beach—obstructed and interfered with plaintiffs’ righ ts to use the beach area in acc ordance with the 1991 order.

IV. CONSTRUCTION OF WALKWAY

Next, defendants contend, for a variety of reasons, that the t rial court erred when it ordered plaintiffs to construct a walkway along Outlot A. We d isagree, except to the extent that we find that remand is required so that the trial court may est ablish a maximum width for the walkway.

First, the trial court did not c learly err in concluding that “ [t]he walkway as is prevents foot traffic and clear parameters for guidance.” The evidence presented at trial supported this conclusion and demonstrated that a constructed walkway was nece ssary and reasonable for plaintiffs’ use of the easement. See Blackhawk, 473 Mich at 41-42. Photographs and witness testimony indicated that the garden fence was flimsy and easilymoved or damaged, confirming the trial court’s conclusion that it did not clearly demarcate the pathway established by defendants. Additionally, witne sses testified at trial that th e unevenness of the pathway makes it difficult for some people to maintain their footing, and that t he narrow width of the pathway defined by defendants makes it impossible to walk down the path way while holding a child’s hand or while walking side-by-side with another adult, impossib le to carry a paddle boat or canoe down the path, difficult to carry an inner tube down the path, and impossible for easement holders in wheelchairs to access the lake. Additionally, whenplaintiff Pamela Mulholland, an easement holder, was assisting plaintiff Mary Mattern, an elder ly easement holder, down the easement, she had to walk single file in front of Mary, while M ary held on to Pamela’s shoulders, due to the narrow width. Individuals using the ease ment also have to wait to access the walkway if others are already traversing in the opposite di rection due to the narrow width. Although defendant Joseph testifie d that he has seen the easeme nt holders walk side-by-side and carry inner tubes down the path, this Court must defer to “the trial court’s superior ability to judge the credibility of the witn esses who appeared before it,” Ambs v Kalamazoo Co Rd Comm’n , 255 Mich App 637, 652; 662 NW2d 424 (2003), especially in the face of conflicting evidence, Dawe v Bar-Levav & Assoc (On Remand) , 289 Mich App 380, 401; 808 NW2d 240 (2010) (“[I]f there is conflictin g evidence, the question of cr edibility ordinarily should be left for the fact-finder.”). See also MCR 2.613(C).

5 At oral argument, defendants’ counsel admitted that defendants erected the concrete breakwall without obtaining approval from t he relevant regulatory agencie s and without obtaining an opinion from an engineering expert regarding the necessity or e fficacy of a breakwall for their intended purpose of preventing ero sion of their lake frontage.-9- Likewise, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding tha t defendants installed the garden fence “solely to preclude or inhibit Plaintiffs’ use,” a nd that “[t]he fence was an attempt to make foot traffic impassible or at best, impracticable.” De fendant Joseph repeatedly testified that he believed that the 41-inch pathway was an appropriate an d sufficient width, commenting that he thought that he was “r eal liberal on what [he] did withthat boundary.” 6 He explained that he has seen the easement holders walk side-by-side and walk inn er tubes down the path, and that he believes that the “easternmost side” of the easement under t he 1991 order is 42 inches wide. However, as previously discussed, multiple witnesses provided t estimony directly contrary to defendant Joseph’s, and the trial court was in the best positio n “to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” MCR 2.613(C). See also Dawe , 289 Mich App at 401; Ambs , 255 Mich App at 652. Additionally, defendant Joseph’s trial testimony plainly revealed defendants’ uninhibited frustration with plaintiffs’ use of Out lot A to access their dock and the beach area, which prompted defendants to limit plaintiffs’ use as much as possible by taking numerous actions, including, inter alia , taking countless photographs of plaintiffs using the easement, installing four surveillance cameras, calling the pol ice and posting no trespassing signs, and circulating a notice to the easement holders that st ated, among other things, that defendants “will be enforcing our contract to the fullest exten t,” that “[d]ue to a few, everyone must suffer the consequences of their actions,” and that they w ere “installing 24 hour surveillance cameras to make sur e that you all ab ide by the con tract.” Notably, defendant Joseph also testified that he installed the garden fence the night bef ore plaintiffs installed their dock in 2013, knowing that they would be installing the dock the follow ing day. This deliberate action further reveals an intent to limit plaintiffs’ use of the easem ent. From this testimony, and the trial court’s opportunity to observe defendant Joseph’s demeano r as he testified, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that defendants intended to l imit the pathway to such an extent that it was impracticable, impassable, or, at the very least, i nconvenient for some or all of the easement holders. See MCR 2.613(C); Dawe , 289 Mich App at 401; Ambs , 255 Mich App at 652.

“The courts of this state have repeatedly held that ‘equity may shape her relief according to the situation as it may present itself when the time for the decree arrives[.’] ” Greenspan v Rehberg , 56 Mich App 310, 325; 224 NW2d 67 (1974), quoting Thompson v Enz , 385 Mich 103, 110; 188 NW2d 579 (1971). As mentioned supra , when the owner of a servient estate interferes with an easement, the owner of the easement may proceed by brin ging an action for damages, injunctive relief, or both. See, e.g., Choals , 353 Mich at 73; Hasselbring , 263 Mich at 476; Soergel , 141 Mich App at 587-588, 590-591; Bd of Comm’rs , 93 Mich App at 781. Notably, “[i]f a grantee is not content with a way designated by his gra ntor, and an agreement cannot be reached, a court of equity has power to designate a convenient way . . . .” Douglas v Jordan , 232 Mich 283, 288; 205 NW 52 (1925).

Here, similar to Greenspan , given the intense and ceaseless conflict between the parties in this case, “[t]he trial court was faced with the situation i n which the only feasible method of

6 Defendant Joseph did not have any expertise in this regard. T herefore, we conclude that his opinion on the issue has no merit.-10- insuring that the originally expressed intent of the parties wa s fulfilled[] was by ordering the construction of” a walkway. Greenspan , 56 Mich App at 325. During the hearing on defendants’ posttrial motions, th e trial court specifically rec ognized defendants’ right to designate a pathway for plaintiffs, but it found that “[i]t’s j ust not able to be done by them [so that] the easement [is] practical or even possible the way it’s been handled at this point, which is why the Court had to intervene and had to adjust what would oth erwise have been a process they could’ve carried out, but they w ouldn’t, and the Court so deter mined.” As the trial court concluded, it was clear from the evidence presented at trial th at allowing the parties to determine the width of the walkway on their own in accordance with the 19 59 easement agreements and 1991 stipulated order would not res olve the ongoing dispute bet ween the parties regarding the path or walkway that plaintiffs may use in accordance with the easement. See id . As such, simply ordering plaintiffs to comply with the existing terms of the 1959 easement agreements and 1991 order “would be only a temporary and wholly unsatisfac tory solution to the problem.” See id . On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that ordering plaintiffs to construct the walk way was proper in the interest of equity. See id

. However, we find that the trial court’s order fails to resolve the incessant dispute between the parties with regard to the pathway, which has continued whi le this case has been on appeal. Given the seemingly never-ending conflict and animosity between the parties, the trial court’s decision to prescribe only a minimum width for the constructed pathway leaves the issue subject to an expansive range of interpretations and thus is outside th e range of principled outcomes. See Epps , 498 Mich at 528. Remand is nece ssary only for the trial court to determine an appropriate maximum width for the pathway under the circumstanc es of this case so that this issue can be put to rest, rather than subject to further litiga tion. See MCR 7.216(A)(7).

V. GUESTS

Defendants also argue that the trial court “erred by ruling th at guests of the easement holders have the right to utilize the easement.” We disagree. Contrary to defendants’ statement in their questions presented, the trial court did not explicitl y rule on the guest issue, but, instead, found that this issue was addres sed by the 1991 order and that further findings would be redundant. Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the 1991 order was dispositive on the issue of guests and implicitly rej ecting defendants’ claim that plaintiffs had violated the 1959 easement agreements and 1991 o rder by allowing guests to utilize the easement.

“The scope of an easement [should] encompass[] only those burde ns on the servient estate that were contemplated by the parties at the time the ea sement was created.” Wiggins , 291 Mich App at 551-552 (quotation marks and citations omitted). W hen easement rights are conveyed by grant, an easement can be altered if the parties mutually agree to the modification. See Blackhawk Dev Corp , 473 Mich at 46 (“Where the rights to an easement are conveyed by grant, neither party can alter the easement without the other p arty’s consent.”); Douglas v Jordan , 232 Mich 283, 287; 205 NW 52 (1925).

We agree with the parties and the trial court that the languag e of the 1959 easement agreements and the language of the 1991 stipulated order are un ambiguous. See Coates v Bastian Bros, Inc , 276 Mich App 498, 503-504; 741 NW2d 539 (2007) (“A contract i s-11- ambiguous when two provisions irreconcilably conflict with each other, or when [a term] is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.”); Port Huron Ed Ass'n, MEA/NEA v Port Huron Area Sch Dist , 452 Mich 309, 323; 550 NW2d 228 (1996) (indicating that contr act language is ambiguous when it is “ unclear or susceptible to mul tiple meanings”). Thus, the plain language of the documents must be enforced as written. Wiggins , 291 Mich App at 551-552.

The 1959 easement agreements did not expressly discuss the issu e of guests. Rather, as defendants repeatedly emphasize, the only language that could b e construed as suggesting whether guests are permitted to use the easement pursuant to th at document is the statement that the easement was “grant[ed] unto the grantees, . . . and to sub sequent owners of [the specific lots] or occupiers of [the speci fic lots] as tenants in possess ion, only. . . . .”

As the trial court recognized, it is clear from the language of the 1991 order memorializing the stipulated agreement between the parties that the parties clarified—and, in the process, altered—their respec tive rights under the easement by adding specific terms and conditions that were not included in the original easement agre ements. Most relevant to this issue, the order clarifies that “in 1959 easements were granted across . . . Outlot A . . . for the benefit of lots 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 12 . . . .” As such, based on the plain language of the stipulated agreement and order, the easements were granted for the benefit of particular lots, not particular individuals who fulfilled particular classifications of ownersh ip or rights of possession. Additionally, the order also states, “ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each individual easement holder shall provide all children utilizing the easement through them with such care and supervision as is appropriate for their age and maturity.” (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language in this provision clearly assumes that indi viduals other than the easement holders themselves may use the easement “through” the easement holders, meaning they may use the easement “by means of,” “by the agency of,” or “because of” an easement holder, not in their own right. See Merriam-Webster’s Co llegiate Dictionary (11th edition) (defining “through”). There are no other provisions in the 1991 order that indicate t he contrary, or that apply to this issue.

To counter this understanding of t he 1991 order, defendants arg ue that “children can be owners or occupiers of benefited parcels.” However, this mere possibility does not make less significant the specific language i ndicating that children may “utiliz[e] the property through ” an individual easement holde r. (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, to the extent that defendants claim that the 1959 easement agreements specifically prohibited non-easement holders ( i.e. , anyone who was not a grantee, subsequent owner, or occupier who specifically constituted a tenant in pos session) from using the easements, it is clear that this limitation or understanding was altered b y the language of the 1991 agreement. The 1991 order specifically states that only the pr ovisions of the 1959 easement agreements that are “not inconsistent” with the 1991 order “sha ll remain in full force and effect.” Defendants’ position, based on the 1959 easement agreements, is irreconcilable with the language in the 1991 order, and the trial court correctly deter mined that the guest issue was addressed, albeit minimally, by the 1991 order.

In sum, even if we assume, arguendo, that the quoted language f rom the 1959 easement agreements underscored by defendants precludes guests from util izing the easement, the plain-12- language of the 1991 stipulated ord er clearly contemplates that individuals other than the grantees, subsequent owners, or “occupiers . . . as tenants in possession” of the lots benefitted by the easement may use the property “through” the easement holder s. Accordingly, even though neither the 1959 easement agreements nor the 1991 order expressly allow guests to use the easements, it is clear that the parties, in conjunction with th e 1991 order, specifi cally envisioned use of the easement by individuals not named as easement holder s. To the extent that the 1959 easement agreements contemplated otherwise, the 1991 stipulated order properly altered easement agreements, as the parties negotiated the settlement a greement and stipulated to the trial court’s entry of the order memorializing the agreed-upon terms. See Blackhawk Dev Corp

, 473 Mich at 46; Douglas , 232 Mich at 287.

Thus, the trial court did not cle arly err in concluding that th e 1991 order indicated whether guests are allowed to use the easement and implicitly f inding that defendants are not entitled to relief based on their claim that plaintiffs violate d the easement agreements and 1991 order by allowing guests t o use the easement.

VI. DIRECTION OF BOAT PARKING

Defendants next contend that th e trial court erroneously concl uded that plaintiffs could park their boats due east i n order to comply with the 1991 orde r, and that it erroneously declined to modify the 1991 order. We disagree.

In relevant part, the 1991 order provides:

IT IS FURTHER O RDERED that easement holders shall moor their boats on the western side of their dock facing in an easterly direction with the first boat being moored at the northern most end of the western side of the dock with the remainder of the easement holders boats being placed in the same manner along the western side of the dock im m ediately to the south of the first boat

. As the trial court concluded, the 1991 order is unambiguous. “Easterly” is defined as “situated toward or belonging to the east.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11 ed). As such, it is apparent that “easterly” necessarily encompasses “due east.” 7 There is absolutely no indication in the definition of “easterly” that an object fa cing directly east would be excluded from the common meaning of “easterly.” Defendants’ claim attem pts to draw a distinction where none exists and, therefore, has no merit.

Nonetheless, defendants highlight defendant Joseph’s trial tes timony indicating that he did not realize, when he entered into the agreement giving rise to the 1991 order, that plaintiffs would be authorized to park their boats due east so that their “boats would be sticking out across his lakeview.” Rather, defendants contend that defendant Josep h believed that the boats would

7 The caselaw cited in defendants’ brief on appeal does not hold otherwise. See Ortynski v Grand Trunk W R Co , 307 Mich 61, 63; 11 NW2d 326 (1943); Fors v La Freniere , 284 Mich 5, 8; 278 NW 743 (1938).-13- be parked parallel to the dock, which defendants characterize a s “in an easterly direction,” like other boats on the lake. Defendants also note defendant Joseph ’s trial testimony that plaintiffs’ mooring of the boats due east makes it difficult or impossible for defendants to utilize their own boat and dock. This Court should not consider this extrinsic e vidence in interpreting the 1991 order memorializing the parties’ stipulated agreement, which cl arified the 1959 easement agreements. “Only where the language in the granting instrumen t is ambiguous may this Court examine evidence extrinsic to the document to determine the meaning within it,” Blackhawk Dev Corp , 473 Mich at 42; see also Little , 468 Mich at 700, and, again, the parties as well as the trial court agree that the langua ge is unambiguous. See also Dyball v Lennox , 260 Mich App 698, 703-704; 680 NW2d 522 (2004) (expl aining that it is inappropriate for a trial court to consider “the circumstances existing at the time [an] easement was grant ed” if the language of the easement is unambiguous).

In the alternative, defendants argue that the trial court “sho uld still have modified the parking arrangement, either to better conform to the term ‘east erly’ in the 1991 Order, and/or in order to keep the peace.” For the reasons already discusse d, the current parking arrangem ent is consistent with the word “easterly.” As such, it would be nons ensical for the trial court to alter the parking arrangement in order to make the parking situation “better conform” to the 1991 order. Moreover, defendants have cited no authority that trial courts are required to modify easements “in order to keep the peace,” and Michigan caselaw un dermines defendants’ claim. See Little

, 468 Mich at 700 (“Where the language of a legal instrument is p lain and unambiguous, it is to be enforced as written and no further inq uiry is permitted.”). The 1991 order is unambiguous, and the trial court was constrained to en force it as written.

VII. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT

Defendants argue that reversal or remand is required based on the trial court’s failure to enter an injunction—or, at a mini mum, make factual findings—reg arding several of plaintiffs’ alleged violations of the 1959 easement agreements and 1991 sti pulated order that defendants raised in the trial c ourt. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In addition to the standard of review described supra , “[f]ollowing a bench trial, we review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and r eview de novo its conclusions of law.” Ligon v City of Detroit , 276 Mich App 120, 124; 739 NW2d 900 (2007). See also MCR 2.613(C). Because the purpose of the requirement that a trial court must articulate its factual findings is to facilitate appellate review, People v Johnson , 208 Mich App 137, 141-142; 526 NW2d 617 (1994), this Court reviews the adequacy of the trial c ourt’s findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine whether the court was aware of the issues in the case, whether it correctly applied the law, and whether appellate review would b e facilitated by requiring further explanation. Triple E Produce Corp v Mastronardi Produce Ltd, 209 Mich App 165, 176; 530 NW2d 772 (1995).

B. ANALYSIS-14- “A trial court sitting without ajury must make specific findin gs of fact, state its conclusions of law separately, a nd direct entry of the appropri ate judgment. MCR 2.517(A)(1).” Triple E Produce Corp , 209 Mich App at 176. “Findings of fact regarding matters con tested at a bench trial are sufficient if they are “[b]rief, definite, and pertinent,” and it appears that the trial court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law, and where appellate review would not be facilitated by requiring further explanatio n. Id . at 176-177, citing MCR 2.517(A)(2), and People v Porter, 169 Mich App 190, 194; 425 NW2d 514 (1988).

Given the context of this case and the findings and ruling del ineated in the trial court’s November 21, 2014 opinion and order, the trial court’s factual findings were sufficient in this case, and remand is unnecessary. See People v Rushlow, 179 Mich App 172, 177; 445 NW2d 222 (1989) (“The sufficiency of factual findings cannot be judg ed on their face alone; the findings must be reviewed in the context of the specific legal and factual issues raised by the parties and the evidence.”), aff’d 437 Mich 149 (1991). The tr ial court specifically recognized that “[b]oth sides seek injunctive relief based upon their fact s, the law[] (Defendant raised the Funneling Ordinance), the original easement of 1959, and the 19 91 Order.” It then omitted any factual findings supporting injuncti ve relief in favor of defen dants. Accordingly, given its express recognition of defendants’ request for relief, it is cl ear that the trial court implicitly rejected defendants’ claims by concluding that it was unnecessary to specifically enjoin any of plaintiffs’ conduct.

Further, as defendants emphasize on appeal, all of plaintiffs’ purported violations were expressly or implicitly addressed by the language of the 1959 e asement agreements and the 1991 order, which established the sc ope of plaintiffs’ rights under the easement. Moreover, it is apparent from the trial transcripts that nearly all of the viol ations raised in defendants’ counterpetition and contested by defenda nts at trial concerned specifi c incidents that had ceased before the trial began and, in many cases , occurred years before the p etitions at issue in this appeal were filed. Accordingly, when the trial court held, “[I]n all other respects, the Orders and Agreements between the Plaintiffs and Defendants remain in full force and effect,” it implicitly—and properly—held that plaintiffs remain bound by the terms of the documents governing the parties’ rights with regard to the easement and that plaintiffs must abi de by the requirements of those documents in the future. See Blackhawk Dev Corp , 473 Mich at 41. As the trial court concluded, it would have been red undant to enter an injunction in addition to its holding that the easement agreements and the 1991 order otherwise remained in ef fect.

Accordingly, the trial court’s f actual findings and conclusions of law were sufficient in this case, as it is apparent from the language of the trial court’s November 21, 2014 order that “the trial court was aware of the issues in the case and correc tly applied the law,” and that “appellate review would not be fa cilitated by requiring further explanation.” Triple E Produce Corp , 209 Mich App at 176-177. And, for the same reasons previousl y discussed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to separately enjoi n each of alleged violations of the 1959 easement agreements and 1991 s tipulated order raised by de fendants below.

VIII. VIOLATION OF ZONING ORDINANCE-15- Lastly, defendants argue that t he trial court erred when it fa iled to invalidate some or all of the 1991 order based on the anti-“funneling” provision of th e Cambridge Township Zoning Ordinance. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo the interpretation and application of ordinances, City of Riverview v Sibley Limestone, 270 Mich App 627, 630; 716 NW2d 615 (2006), the proper interpretation of a court order, see Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991); Silberstein v Pro-Golf of Am, Inc , 278 Mich App 446, 460; 750 NW2d 615 (2008), a nd issues of law gener ally, see Oakland Co Bd of C Rd Comm’rs v Mich Prop & Cas Guaranty Ass'n , 456 Mich 590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).

B. ANALYSIS

The Cambridge Township Zoning Or dinance prohibits “funneling,” as defined in § 2.2.57 of the ordinance, unless certainrestrictions are followed. Ca mbridge Township Zoning Ordinance, § 5.21. It appears that the plaintiffs’ use of the easement constitutes “funneling” under the zoning ordinance, and that Outlot A does not comply w ith the restrictions under § 5.21. See Cambridge Township Zoning Ordinance, §§ 2.2.57, 5.21. Howe ver, the underlying use of Outlot A for “funnelling” did not change in conjunction with th e 1991 order. Thus, the use of Outlot A for “funnelling” purposes constituted a valid nonconfo rming use after the anti- “funnelling” section was enacted in July 1989. See Cambridge T ownship Zoning Ordinance, § 5.7. See also MCL 125.3208(1); Edw C Levy Co v Marine City Zoning Bd of Appeals , 293 Mich App 333, 341-342; 810 NW2d 621 (2011).

Defendants’ claim is solely based on purported “expansions” of plaintiffs’ use of the easement under the 1991 order that violated of the nonconformin g use provisions of the zoning ordinance, which prohibit the e xpansion of an existing nonconfo rming use. See Cambridge Township Zoning Ordinance, § 5.7 (including multiple references to the principle that nonconforming uses shall not be enlarged, expanded, or expanded ). Thus, the crux of defendants’ claim is that the trial court erred in failing to amend the 1991 order or enjoin any conduct pursuant to the 1991 order which constitutes an expansi on of plaintiffs’ rights under the 1959 easement agreements.

It appears that defendants would have standing to bring a clai m seeking relief based on a violation of the zoning ordinance. 8 Likewise, Michigan courts have recognized that neighboring property owners may bring an equitable cause of action in orderto enforce compliance with a zoning regulation. 9 However, consistent with plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal that defendants are

8 See Bowie v Arder , 441 Mich 23, 42-43; 490 NW2d 568 (1992); Towne v Harr , 185 Mich App 230, 232; 460 NW2d 596 (1990).

9 See, e.g., Cook v Bandeen , 356 Mich 328, 330-334; 96 NW2d 743 (1959); Jones v De Vries
, 326 Mich 126, 128-135, 139; 40 NW2d 317 (1949); Baura v Thomasma, 321 Mich 139, 142--16- not entitled to raise this claim given their previous agreement to the 1991 order, it is well established that this Court will not allow a party to benefit f rom a claim of error arising from conduct that the aggrieved party contributed to by plan or negl igence. Lewis v LeGrow , 258 Mich App 175, 210; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). It is apparent that de fendants seek to benefit from full or partial reversal of the 1991 stipulated order, in which defendants fully participated and to which defendants unequivocally agreed. If the zoning ordinance was, in fact, violated by the 1991 stipulated order, defendants were active participants in that violation, and they should not benefit now from their prior unlawful actions. On this basis, the trial court did not err in declining to grant defendants’ relief and failing to reverse any portion of the 1991 stipulated order.

Further, it also appears that d efendants’ claim is barred by t he equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, “which generally prevents a party from preva iling in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevai l in another phase.” Spohn v Van Dyke Pub Sch , 296 Mich App 470, 479; 822 NW2d 239 (2012) (quotation marks a nd citations omitted). See also Opland v Kiesgan , 234 Mich App 352, 362-365; 594 NW2d 505 (1999) (explaining the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel in detail, including the “prior success” model adopted in Michigan).

Here, there is a danger of inconsistent rulings, given defendan ts’ specific advancement of, and agreement to, the stipulated 1991 order in the previous proceeding involving the exact same easement, and many of the same issues, contested in the in stant appeal. See id . at 365 (stating that the focus of the “prior success” model is “the da nger of inconsistent rulings”). Likewise, given the fact that de fendants stipulated to the earl ier order, they are effectively attempting to invoke the authority of a later trial court to ov erride a bargain that they made with an earlier court presiding over the same case. See id . (“The prior success rule limits the application of judicial estoppel to a situation where a party a ttempts to invoke the authority of a second tribunal to override a ba rgain made with a prior tribuna l.”). Additionally, given the trial court’s entry of the stipulated or der, it is clear that the tri al court accepted the fact that defendants actually agreed to the terms of the 1991 order as true, and def endants’ current position that the order is invalid is wholly incons istent with their earlier posi tion that the 1991 stipulated order was appropriate. See id . at 362 (stating that under the “prior success” model, “there must be some indication that the court in the earlier proceeding accept ed that party’s pos ition as true”). See also Szyszlo v Akowitz , 296 Mich App 40, 51; 818 NW2d 424 (2012). Accordingly, we conclude that defendants are j udicially estopped from claiming that the trial court’s entry of all or part of the 1991 order was in error, such that the trial court did not err in declining to grant their requested relief.

Even if defendants were entitled to seek relief on this claim, we conclude that their claim lacks merit. Defendants argue that the 1991 order is wholly or partially unenforceable based on the rule that agreements that vi olate the law are void. “Contr acts founded on acts prohibited by a statute, or contracts in viola tion of public policy, are void.” Michelson v Voison , 254 Mich App 691, 694; 658 NW2d 188 (2003). See also Am Trust Co v Michigan Trust Co , 263 Mich 337,

143, 146; 32 NW2d 369 (1948); Indian Village Ass'n v Shreve, 52 Mich App 35, 38; 216 NW2d 447 (1974).-17- 340; 248 NW 829 (1933) (“The general rule of law is that a contract made in violation of a statute is void, and that, when a plaintiff cannot establish hi s cause of action without relying upon an illegal contract, he cannot recover.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 Likewise, if a “statute precludes entering into an agreement pr oviding exactly what the [disputed] clause states . . . th e clause is void and unenforce able as a matter of law.” Mino v Clio School Dist , 255 Mich App 60, 71; 661 NW2d 586 (2003). 11 Thus, the critical inquiry is whether an illegal provision is “central to the parties’ agreem ent.” See Stokes v Millen Roofing Co , 466 Mich 660, 666; 649 NW2d 371 (2002). There are exceptions to the rule that a contract is void if it is based on illegal conduct, including if the parties were ignorant of the illegal nature, if it is a matter of slight ille gality, if it involves an uness ential legal provision, or if the illegal portion can be severed from the rest of the contract. See Kukla v Perry , 361 Mich 311, 323; 105 NW2d 176 (1960).

As previously discussed, the underlying use of Outlot A for “fu nneling” did not change in conjunction with the 1991 order. As such, the underlying activ ity regulated by the 1991 order, which constituted the fundamental or “central” portion of the s ettlement agreement and stipulated order, was not illegal. See Kukla , 361 Mich at 323; Michelson , 254 Mich App at 694; Mino , 255 Mich App at 71; Stokes , 466 Mich at 666. Further, although, as the trial court recognized, the 1991 order altered the 1959 easement agreements “as to the walkway and to the maintenance of boats on Wampler’s Lake” by establishing specifi c limitations or restrictions applicable to those activities and plaintiffs’ overall use of the easement, there is no indication that these additional specifications increased the use or mater ially changed the location of the use. Therefore, contrary to defe ndants’ characterization of th e 1991 order, there is no indication in its plain language that the parties intended to expand the e asement through the 1991 order. See Wiggins , 291 Mich App at 551-552 (explaining that easements are interp reted like contracts, and that the plain language of c ontracts and easements, if clea r, must be enforced as written). Likewise, there is no indication in the language of the 1991 st ipulated order that the parties created new rights under the orde r. Instead, all of the provis ions in the order appear to specify particular restrictions or limitations on activities already pe rformed by both parties. See id . As such, there is nothing disposit ive in the 1991 stipulated order that the “funnelling” uses of the easement were expanded after the ordinance section prohibiting “funnelling” was enacted. Notably, defendants have failed to identify any specific langua ge in the 1991 order that

10 Settlement agreements are contracts, constituting “a compromis e of a disputed claim,” and they are “governed by the legal rules applicable to the constru ction and interpretation of other contracts.” Reicher v SET Enterprises, Inc, 283 Mich App 657, 663; 770 NW2d 902 (2009). See also MacInnes v MacInnes , 260 Mich App 280, 289-290; 677 NW2d 889 (2004). Courts will enforce contracts, including settlement agreements, as wri tten unless they violate law or public policy. See Reicher , 283 Mich App at 663; Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n Inc v City of Birmingham, 479 Mich 206, 212; 737 NW2d 670 (2007).

11 Ordinances have the same effect as statutes. Gale v Bd of Sup'rs of Oakland Co , 260 Mich 399, 404; 245 NW 363 (1932).-18- specifically expanded plaintiffs’ rights and, instead, mention blanket categories of rights that were allegedly expanded without providing any citations to the order.

There is no basis for concluding that the 1991 order is inval id based on the Cambridge Township Zoning Ordinance. The trial court did not err in decl ining defendants’ request for relief based on the “f unnelling” ordinance.

IX. CONCLUSION

Defendants have failed to establish that any of their claims w arrant relief, except to the extent that they have demonstrated that remand is necessary for the trial court to establish a maximum width for the constructe d pathway. Therefore, we affir m the trial court’s opinions and orders, but remand this case for that limited purpose. The cou rt shall have 60 days to supplement its opinion on remand and transm it a copy of its supplemental o rder to this Court. See MCR 7.216(A)(7). On remand, the trial court may make its finding r egarding the maximum width of the pathway on the existing record, or it may take additional t estimony if the court deems it
necessary.
Affirmed, but remanded for further proceedings consistent withthis opinion. We retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen /s/ William B. Murphy /s/ Michael J. Riordan**Court of**  **Appeals, State**  **of Michigan** 

**ORDER**

**Linda S.**  **Manley v**  **Sue Pikulski** 

**Docket No. 327510** 

**LC No.**  **89-004109-CH Kathleen**  **Jansen Presiding**  **Judge**

**William B.**  **Murphy**

**Michael J.**  **Riordan Judges** 

**Pursuant to**  **the opinion**  **issued concurrently**  **with this**  **order, this**  **case is**  **REMANDED for**  **further proceedings**  **consistent with**  **the opinion**  **of this**  **Court. We**  **retain jurisdiction.** 

**The trial**  **court shall**  **have 60**  **days from**  **the date**  **of the**  **Clerk's certification**  **of this**  **order to**  **supplement its**  **opinion on**  **remand and**  **transmit a**  **copy of**  **its supplemental**  **order to**  **this Court.**  **See MCR**  **7 .216(A)(7).**  **The supplemental**  **order shall**  **be limited**  **to establishing**  **a maximum**  **width for**  **the constructed**  **pathway. The**  **trial court**  **may make**  **its finding**  **on the**  **existing record,**  **or it**  **may take**  **additional testimony**  **if the**  **court deems**  **it necessary.** 

**We retain**  **jurisdiction.**

**A true**  **copy entered**  **and certified**  **by Jerome**  **W. Zimmer**  **Jr., Chief**  **Clerk, on** 



## DEC **0 o**  **2016**

**Date**