UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5181

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSE FIDEL DE PAZ-LOPEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:09-cr-00014-CCB-2)

Submitted: January 26, 2011 Decided: February 24, 2011

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

A. D. Martin, LAW OFFICE OF ANTHONY D. MARTIN, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Judson T. Mihok, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jose Fidel de Paz-Lopez appeals his convictions and 

114-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant 

to a written plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to 

interfere with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951 (2006); and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 

violence and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924, 2 (2006). The district court sentenced Paz-Lopez to 

thirty months’ imprisonment on the robbery conspiracy, plus 

eighty-four consecutive months’ imprisonment on the firearms 

count. 

Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal, but alleging the Government 

acted in bad faith by failing to debrief Paz-Lopez and to 

consider a downward departure pursuant to U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2006). The Government has filed a 

motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that Paz-Lopez 

explicitly waived his right to appeal his sentence in the plea 

agreement. Paz-Lopez opposes the motion, contending that he did 

not knowingly agree to the waiver, and that even if the waiver 

is valid, the Government’s bad faith refusal to provide him an 

opportunity to cooperate is a claim beyond the scope of the 

waiver. Paz-Lopez filed a pro se supplemental brief also 
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challenging the Government’s failure to debrief him and move for

a downward departure based on substantial assistance. Paz-Lopez 

also contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 

to explain the consequences of his plea.

We review the validity of a waiver de novo. United 

States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). A waiver is 

valid if the defendant’s agreement to the waiver was knowing and 

voluntary. United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 

1992); United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 

1991). To determine whether a waiver is knowing and 

intelligent, we examine “the totality of the circumstances, 

including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as 

the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the 

terms of the plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278 

F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Generally, if a district court fully 

questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights 

during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is valid and 

enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th 

Cir. 2005).

At the plea hearing, the district court fully complied 

with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and specifically ensured that PazLopez understood and agreed to the appellate waiver provision. 

Accordingly, we find that Paz-Lopez knowingly and voluntarily 
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entered his guilty plea and that his appellate waiver was also 

knowing and voluntary. 

We will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue 

being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” Blick, 408 

F.3d at 168. Paz-Lopez explicitly waived his “right to appeal 

any sentence within or below the advisory guidelines range 

resulting from an adjusted offense level of 19, with a seven 

year consecutive sentence. . . .” Thus, Paz-Lopez’s appeal of 

his within-guidelines sentence resulting from his adjusted 

offense level of nineteen falls within the scope of that waiver. 

Accordingly, we grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss 

the appeal.

The appellate waiver does not, however, foreclose a 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Johnson, 410 

F.3d at 151. Nor does it preclude our Anders review of the 

integrity of the Rule 11 proceeding. Therefore, we deny in part 

the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal. A defendant may 

raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “on direct 

appeal if and only if it conclusively appears from the record 

that his counsel did not provide effective assistance.” United 

States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir. 1998). We find 

that the record does not conclusively establish that trial 

counsel’s assistance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Accordingly, we decline to consider this claim 
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on direct appeal. Finally, to the extent Paz-Lopez claims that 

the Government breached the plea agreement and acted in bad 

faith in declining the opportunity for him to cooperate and 

perhaps earn a reduction in his sentence, we conclude these 

claims are squarely contradicted by the record. Wade v. United 

States, 504 U.S. 181, 184-87 (1992). 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in the case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal outside the scope of the appellate waiver. We therefore 

affirm Paz-Lopez’s convictions and dismiss the appeal of his 

sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Paz-Lopez, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Paz-Lopez requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Paz-Lopez.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART