* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40300

Summary Calendar

ANTONIO F VERA

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BOARD OF JUDGES OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NUECES COUNTY

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:07-CV-51

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Antonio F. Vera, Texas pre-trial detainee # 10142862, filed a civil rights

lawsuit pursuantto 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The magistrate judge (MJ) assigned to the

case questioned Vera during a Spears hearing.1 On the MJ’s recommendation,

the district court dismissed Vera’s lawsuit. Because the district court dismissed

Vera’s lawsuit as both frivolous and for failure to state a claim under

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 21, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-40300

2

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) as well as § 1915A(b)(1), our review is de novo. Geiger

v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

Like his complaint below, Vera’s appeal brief is largely incoherent. The

closest Vera comes to making an argument addressing the district court’s

dismissal of his case is a series of conclusory assertions that he has stated

nonfrivolous claims upon which relief can be granted. First, Vera suggests that

his rights were violated because the Board of Judges of Nueces County have

neglected their obligation to train judges, supervise the administration justice,

and “prevent a pervasive and massive series of criminal schemes.” The district

court properly rejected these claims on the basis that “[j]udges enjoy absolute

immunity from liability for judicial or adjudicatory acts.” Bauer v. Texas, 341

F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Although Vera also challenges

the district court’s reasoning that Vera failed to state a claim against the Board

because § 1983 does not create respondeat superior liability, that finding was

proper as well. See, e.g., Steward v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1999).

Vera next suggests that the district court misapplied Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971). Because Vera’s claims involve an ongoing state judicial

proceeding, Texas has a compelling interest in its criminal justice system, and

Vera can raise his constitutional concerns during the criminal proceedings, the

district court properly abstained from intervening in Vera’s state criminal case.

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 518-19 (5th Cir. 2004). Vera also

contends that he stated a claim for conspiracy, but the district court properly

found that Vera has never actually described the acts of the defendants which

he believes renders them liable under § 1983. Because “a plaintiff's obligation

to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do,” Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 (citation omitted; alteration in

original), Vera has failed to state a conspiracy claim. Vera suggests in

conclusory fashion that he has stated a claim against his court-appointed
No. 07-40300

3

attorney, but Vera’s court-appointed attorney was not a state actor for purposes

of § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Thus, Vera has

failed to identify any error in the district court’s ruling. In addition, while pro

se briefs are liberally construed, even pro se litigants must brief arguments in

order to preserve them. See Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995);

Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). Accordingly, any

other claims Vera raised below are deemed abandoned.

For the first time on appeal, Vera contends that his rights were violated

because he was reindicted and because the state used one of two convictions of

October 25th, 1966 to “cover-up the other indictment.” In addition, Vera points

to a newspaper article that allegedly details the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals’s mishandling of appeals by other prisoners, and Vera asserts that this

demonstrates that his rights have been violated. Because this court typically

does not consider claims that are raised for the first time on appeal, see Yohey,

985 F.2d at 225, we decline to consider these claims.

Thus, Vera’s brief fails to raise any issue of arguable merit, and we dismiss

his appeal as frivolous. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2; Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d

383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court’s dismissal of Vera’s § 1983 suit as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b)(1) and this court’s dismissal of this appeal as frivolous both count as

strikes for purposes of § 1915(g). See Adepegba, 103 F.3d at 385-87. Vera

previously accumulated two strikes in another case. See Vera v. Martin, 253

F.3d 705, 705 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Vera v. Martin, No. A-00-CA-380

(W.D. Tex. Sep. 21, 2000) (order). As Vera has now accumulated at least three

strikes, he is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g) while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

APPEAL DISMISSED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) BAR IMPOSED.