UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4234

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

GREGORY LAWRENCE TROPEA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior

District Judge. (4:13-cr-00075-RGD-DEM-1)

Submitted: September 23, 2014 Decided: October 6, 2014

Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Ellenson, LAW OFFICE OF JAMES STEPHEN ELLENSON, Newport 

News, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States 

Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In accordance with a written plea agreement, Gregory 

Tropea pled guilty to three counts of receipt of child 

pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2012), and one count of 

making a false statement to a probation officer, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001 (2012). He was sentenced to 336 months in prison. 

Tropea now appeals, claiming that the district court erroneously 

denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no 

error, we affirm.

Tropea contends he was unaware that, by pleading 

guilty, he was waiving his right to appeal the district court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search 

of a motel room. The record, which establishes that the 

district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, is to 

the contrary. Tropea acknowledged at his Rule 11 hearing that 

he had read the plea agreement, understood it, and had reviewed 

the agreement with his attorney. In the agreement, Tropea 

waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence; there 

was no reservation of the right to appeal the ruling on the 

suppression motion. Further, the court inquired at the Rule 11 

hearing whether Tropea had reserved his right to appeal the 

suppression ruling. Both defense counsel and the Assistant 

United States Attorney stated that he had not. Tropea had the 

opportunity to disagree, but he said nothing. 
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“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a 

guilty plea.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383-84

(4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, 

the defendant bears the burden of “show[ing] a fair and just 

reason” for withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United 

State v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). We review 

for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea. Nicholson, 676 F.3d at 383. 

 Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we hold that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion. First, the 

court properly conducted Tropea’s Rule 11 proceeding. See

United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) (“a 

properly conducted Rule 11 . . . colloquy leaves a defendant 

with a very limited basis upon which to have his plea 

withdrawn”). Additionally, the district court correctly applied 

the factors set forth in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 

248 (4th Cir. 1991). Notably, Tropea offered no credible 

evidence that his plea was unknowing or involuntary, he did not 

assert his legal innocence, and the district court found that 

allowing withdrawal of the plea would have both inconvenienced 

the court and the Government and wasted judicial resources. 

We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 
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in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED