2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-19-2012

USA v. Jason Clark

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1115

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1115

___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JASON CLARK,

 Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 2-04-cr-00212-001)

District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 18, 2012

Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 19, 2012 )

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

In 2005, appellant Jason Clark pleaded guilty to one count of possession with 

intent to distribute 150 grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)), one 

count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), and one 

count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. 
2

§ 924(c)(1)), charges attached to conduct from 2001. He was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of 176 months of imprisonment. Before this Court is Clark’s appeal of his second 

motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2),1

In his motion, Clark argued that both the guidelines applicable to his sentence and 

the relevant mandatory minimum term of imprisonment have been lowered since he was 

originally sentenced. He pointed to 

which was denied by 

the District Court. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

Freeman v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 

2685 (2011), which addressed “whether defendants who enter into plea agreements that 

recommend a particular sentence as a condition of the guilty plea may be eligible for 

relief under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 2690. In opposing Clark’s motion, the Government 

argued that Freeman did not apply, as the plea agreement was not pegged to a guidelines 

range. The District Court agreed with this reasoning, finding Clark’s case to not “fit 

within Freeman

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While the ultimate decision to 

reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is committed to the discretion of the 

District Court, we exercise plenary review over the Court’s legal analysis. 

” because his sentence “was based solely on his plea agreement” and not 

“the guidelines range.” Order n.2, ECF No. 60.

United States 

v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Doe

 1 Section 3582(c)(2) allows for the sentencing court to reduce the term of imprisonment if 

a defendant was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that 

has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 

(3d Cir. 2009).
3

When Clark was originally sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) required 

that “any person who . . . in furtherance of [a drug trafficking] crime, possesses a 

firearm” shall “in addition to the punishment provided for such . . . drug trafficking 

crime” be sentenced to “a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.” Meanwhile, 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006) imposed a ten-year mandatory minimum for possession of 

more than 50 grams of crack. Taken together, the mandatory minimum sentence Clark 

could expect was a fifteen-year term. The plea agreement to which Clark was a party 

reflected an understanding of such a sentence2 (see Guilty Plea Agreement § 3(a), ECF 

No. 40), and Clark’s counsel acknowledged that fifteen years was “the lowest sentence 

which this Court may impose” (see

Several years later, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 

111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). Section 2 of the Act amended the relevant subsection of 

21 U.S.C. § 841, striking “50 grams” and inserting “280 grams.” 

Def.’s Sentencing Memo. 6, ECF No. 46). 

See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). The Act also led to the promulgation of sentencing guidelines 

reflecting the new statutory scheme. See United States v. Dixon

We need not determine whether the modification of the guidelines could affect 

relief under § 3582 and 

, 648 F.3d 195, 197–98

(3d Cir. 2011).

Freeman, because Clark was sentenced to a mandatory-minimum 

statutory term that still applies to him. In United States v. Reevey

 2 The sentence was reduced somewhat due to prior-custody credits that are not relevant 

here. 

, 631 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 
4

2010), we held that the Fair Sentencing Act is not retroactive if both the offense and 

initial sentencing occurred before its enactment, as is the case here. Id. at 114–15. A 

defendant is not eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) if another statute or provision, 

such as a statutory mandatory minimum, controls his sentence. See Doe

In sum, we agree with the District Court that it could not adjust Clark’s sentence 

under § 3582. We will therefore affirm its judgment.

, 564 F.3d at 312. 

Thus, as Clark was sentenced to the minimum time possible under the old statutory 

scheme, the fact that a guidelines range has changed in the interim is of no moment. 

Finally, to the extent that Clark attacks the constitutionality of his sentence, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2) is not the proper vehicle for doing so.