COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, McClanahan and Senior Judge Willis 

JOHN VICTOR DRITSELIS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1498-07-3 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 18, 2008 

MARY TSAKIRES DRITSELIS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

Jonathan M. Apgar, Judge 

 (Terry N. Grimes, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (William C. Maxwell; Osterhoudt, Prillaman, Natt, Helscher, Yost, 

Maxwell & Ferguson, PLC, on brief), for appellee. 

 John Victor Dritselis (husband) appeals from the circuit court’s May 23, 2007 order granting 

his motion for an award of spousal support and requiring Mary Tsakires Dritselis (wife) to pay him 

support and maintenance in the amount of $1,200 a month. On appeal, husband contends (1) the 

trial “court’s spousal support award of $1,200 per month and attorney’s fees was inadequate given 

the respective incomes and expenses of the parties,” and (2) “the trial court erred by finding as a 

matter of fact that Dr. Cametas gave to [husband] the sum of $200,000 or any sum whatsoever for 

which no repayment is required, and whether the evidence concerning [husband’s] living expenses 

was inadequate.” Wife asserts the trial court erred in making spousal support retroactive to July 

1, 2004. She also requests attorney’s fees and costs associated with this appeal. Upon reviewing 

the record and briefs, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
- 2 -

BACKGROUND

We view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences flowing from the evidence, in a light 

most favorable to wife as the party prevailing below. Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 

258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2003). “That principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence’ of the 

appellant which conflicts, either directly or inferentially, with the evidence presented by the 

appellee at trial.” Id. (quoting Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 

162 (2002)). 

The parties married in 1962. In 1991 the parties entered into a separation agreement in 

which husband conveyed his interest in certain real property to wife. In Dritselis v. Dritselis, 

Record Nos. 2790-04-3 and 0239-05-3 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2005), we held that the parties’ 

settlement agreement was valid “and that the trial court properly rejected the husband’s 

challenges to it.” However, we reversed the trial court’s refusal “to allow husband to amend his 

bill of complaint and request spousal support or a reservation of future support.” 

At a January 5, 2007 hearing, the trial court heard extensive evidence regarding the 

parties’ financial positions and husband’s need for support. Husband established he receives 

$797 monthly through Social Security. Husband claimed his monthly expenses exceed $4,500. 

The court indicated “there is slim evidence on what specific amount [husband] actually needs,” 

but concluded his Social Security income “is insufficient” to meet his “vague” financial needs. 

The evidence established wife received rental property income near or exceeding 

$200,000 annually. Her tax returns state her income after interest and other expenses was 

approximately $80,000 a year. Wife provided a detailed account of her business and personal 

expenses in her testimony. 

Husband testified that Dr. John Cametas, his cousin, has given him money “to help [him] 

make ends meet.” Husband indicated he “would like to pay it back.” Husband divides his time 
- 3 -

between Richmond, Virginia and Athens, Greece. He explained he lives in houses owned or 

rented by Cametas and that he maintains the properties while staying in them. He has no written 

or formal agreement with Cametas and denied that Cametas allows him to live in the homes 

rent-free in exchange for maintaining the properties. Cametas testified that although he does not 

anticipate ever being repaid the $200,000 he has loaned to husband, he does “want to get paid.” 

Following the hearing, the trial court awarded husband spousal support in the amount of 

$1,200 per month retroactive to July 1, 2004. The court further awarded husband attorney’s fees 

in the amount of $12,000. 

ANALYSIS

I. 

“Whether and how much spousal support will be awarded 

is a matter of discretion for the trial court.” Barker v. Barker, 27 

Va. App. 519, 527, 500 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1998). “‘In fixing the 

amount of the spousal support award, . . . the court’s ruling will not 

be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion. We will reverse the trial court only when its decision is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Moreno v. 

Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 194-95, 480 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1997). 

Northcutt v. Northcutt, 39 Va. App. 192, 196, 571 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2002); see also Huger v. 

Huger, 16 Va. App. 785, 791, 433 S.E.2d 255, 259 (1993). 

When the trial judge “awards spousal support based upon due consideration of the factors 

enumerated in Code § 20-107.1, as shown by the evidence, its determination ‘will not be 

disturbed except for a clear abuse of discretion.’” Dodge v. Dodge, 2 Va. App. 238, 246, 343 

S.E.2d 363, 367 (1986) (quoting Thomasson v. Thomasson, 225 Va. 394, 398, 302 S.E.2d 63, 66 

(1983)). 

In making a spousal support determination, a trial judge must consider all the factors 

listed in Code § 20-107.1. Failure to do so is grounds for reversal. Woolley v. Woolley, 3 

Va. App. 337, 344, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). “‘The requirement that the trial court consider 
- 4 -

all of the statutory factors necessarily implies substantive consideration of the evidence presented 

as it relates to all of these factors.’” Calamos v. Calamos, 4 Va. App. 96, 100, 354 S.E.2d 102, 

105 (1987) (quoting Woolley, 3 Va. App. at 345, 349 S.E.2d at 426). The trial judge is not 

required, however, to specify exactly what consideration he or she gave to each statutory factor. 

Id. A trial judge’s findings must have a basis in the record. If they do not, “the court has abused 

its discretion.” Woolley, 3 Va. App. at 345, 349 S.E.2d at 426. 

The trial court announced it considered all the statutory factors and concluded husband 

established a need for support and that wife has the ability to pay. The record supports the 

court’s determination, and we find no abuse of discretion in its spousal support award. 

II. 

In support of his second question presented, husband asserts that “although it is not clear 

that the trial court found specifically that Dr. Cametas gave to [husband] the sum of $200,000 for 

which no repayment was required, the evidence compels a finding that Dr. Cametas loaned, and 

did not give, the money to [husband].” 

In its opinion letter, the trial court noted it found “that the large amounts of money given 

by [Cametas] to [husband] were transferred with no real expectation of repayment.” Although 

Cametas testified he wanted to be repaid, he acknowledged he did not anticipate husband would 

pay him back. The court concluded husband did “not have any real $200,000 debt liability for 

which repayment is required, or which figures into his finances.” 

“It is well established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the 

weight to be given to [a witness’] testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any of the 

witness’ testimony.” Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) 

(en banc). “In determining whether credible evidence exists, the appellate court does not retry 

the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination of the 
- 5 -

credibility of the witnesses.” Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 

32, 35 (1991). Thus, we find no error with the court’s factual finding that no real liability 

existed. 

To the extent husband argues “the evidence concerning [his] living expenses was 

inadequate,” we note the trial court concluded that “despite the monthly budget of [husband] . . . 

there is slim evidence on what specific amount [he] actually needs.” The trial court found 

husband’s “projected budget of future financial need (in his exhibit 13) is more fiction than fact.” 

The trial court considered husband’s budgetary evidence and found it incredible and unworthy of 

belief. As noted above, determinations of credibility and weight of the evidence fall within the 

discretion of the trier of fact. See Anderson v. Anderson, 29 Va. App. 673, 687, 514 S.E.2d 369, 

376 (1999) (“the trier of fact determines the credibility and weight of the evidence”); Parish v. 

Spaulding, 26 Va. App. 566, 575, 496 S.E.2d 91, 95 (1998) (“it is well settled that issues of 

credibility and the weight of the evidence are within the unique province of the trier of fact”). 

“This Court will not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s determination . . . .” Parish, 26 

Va. App. at 575, 496 S.E.2d at 95. We therefore affirm its finding regarding husband’s actual 

financial needs. 

III. 

Husband asserts the trial court abused its discretion in awarding him only a portion of the 

attorney’s fees he has incurred. He argues only that “[g]iven the economic disparity of the 

parties, [he] requests entry of an order compelling [wife] to pay all of his attorney’s fees and 

costs.” He claims he has incurred over $88,000 in attorney’s fees and costs “in an effort to 

obtain some reasonable amount of spousal support.” 
- 6 -

We review an award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 

4 Va. App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). Based on the circumstances and equities of 

this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in making this award. 

IV. 

 Wife asserts the trial court erred in making spousal support retroactive to July 1, 2004. 

Wife correctly notes that “[f]undamental rules of pleading provide that no court can base 

its judgment or decree upon a right which has not been pleaded and claimed.” Boyd v. Boyd, 2 

Va. App. 16, 18, 340 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1986). 

Code § 20-107.1(A) provides that, upon entry of a decree for a divorce, “the court may 

make such further decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the maintenance and support of 

the spouses.” This statutory grant of authority means that “[d]ecisions regarding ‘spousal . . . 

support rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal 

unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.’” Konefal v. Konefal, 18 Va. App. 612, 

614, 446 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1994) (quoting Floyd v. Floyd, 17 Va. App. 222, 224, 436 S.E.2d 457, 

458 (1993)). Moreover, the Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held “that the time 

permanent [spousal support] shall commence is within the sound discretion of the court and may

be made effective as of the date of the commencement of the suit.” Lawrence v. Lawrence, 212 

Va. 44, 47, 181 S.E.2d 640, 642 (1971); see also Young v. Young, 215 Va. 125, 126, 107 S.E.2d 

825, 825 (1974) (per curiam); Konefal, 18 Va. App. at 614, 446 S.E.2d at 154; Weizenbaum v. 

Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 904, 407 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1991). 

 Following remand, the trial court entered a decree permitting husband to file an amended 

bill of complaint. On March 27, 2006, husband filed the amended complaint seeking temporary 

and permanent spousal support and attorney’s fees and costs. Although husband had not filed a 

pleading requesting an award of spousal support beginning July 1, 2004, the only reason that 
- 7 -

such relief was not requested was because the trial court did not allow him to file an amended 

pleading requesting that relief. This Court reversed the trial court’s refusal and remanded the 

case for the trial court to allow husband to file his amended pleading. Had the trial court not 

erred, husband would have requested support on July 1, 2004. Thus, the trial court permissibly 

awarded spousal support retroactive to the date of the denial of husband’s initial motion to 

amend his bill of complaint. The retroactive award was within the court’s discretion and 

consistent with the mandate on remand. 

V. 

 Wife requests costs and attorney’s fees for matters relating to this appeal. 

The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to 

determine the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees for efforts 

expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the 

opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine 

whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for 

requiring additional payment. 

O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). In this context, 

and upon consideration of the entire record in this case, we hold that wife is not entitled to costs 

or attorney’s fees in the matter. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is summarily affirmed. 

Affirmed.