IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Quaker Valley School District :

:

 v. : No. 1474 C.D. 2022

: ARGUED: October 10, 2023

Leet Township Zoning Hearing Board, :

Leet Township, William Jasper, :

Michelle Antonelli, and Leet Township :

Municipal Authority :

:

Appeal of: William Jasper and :

Michelle Antonelli :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: January 26, 2024

Objectors, William Jasper and Michelle Antonelli, appeal from an order 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which reversed a decision of 

the Leet Township Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) that had denied Quaker Valley 

School District’s (QVSD) application for a special exception. Upon review, we 

affirm. 

I. Background

The pertinent facts are as follows. QVSD owns approximately 108 

acres of land located at 200-210 Camp Meeting Road within Leet Township’s AAA 

Residence Zoning District (AAA District). ZHB’s Findings of Fact (F.F.) 3; 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 10a. The property “is situated at the top of a steep hill 

consisting in part of landslide-prone Pittsburgh Red Bed clay that is common 
2

throughout Western Pennsylvania.” Id. Both Objectors own property and 

residences in close proximity to, and downhill from, QVSD’s property. 

A school is a use permitted by special exception in the AAA District 

pursuant to Section 27-301 of the Leet Township Zoning Ordinance. Leet Twp., 

Allegheny Cnty., Pa., Zoning Ordinance § 27-301 (1978). As such, QVSD filed an 

application for a special exception seeking to construct a new public high school on 

the property under Township Ordinance No. 2019-02.1 F.F. 1; R.R. at 10a. 

Approximately 650 students will attend the school and about 47 of the 108 acres will

be cleared for the project. F.F. 2, 4; R.R. at 10a. While the school will be served by 

only one road – Camp Meeting Road – the preliminary plans call for two access 

driveways off that road and into the school. F.F. 7-8; R.R. at 11a. 

The ZHB held multiple hearings on the application between June 2021 

and February 2022.2 The following witnesses testified on behalf of QVSD: licensed 

professional engineer and traffic expert Charles Wooster; engineer, program 

manager, and feasibility expert Jon Thomas; and licensed professional engineers 

Geoffrey Phillips and Joseph Boward. QVSD submitted into evidence, among other 

things, Mr. Wooster’s initial traffic impact study and rebuttal report, and Mr. 

Thomas’s expert report. 

1 On March 11, 2019, the Leet Township Board of Commissioners passed Ordinance No. 

2019-02, which provides the requirements for special exceptions within the Township. See R.R. 

at 35a. Ordinance No. 2019-02 repealed in its entirety and replaced former Chapter 27, Part 6 of 

the Leet Township Zoning Ordinance pertaining to special exceptions. Id. 

2

It bears noting that at multiple times during the lengthy ZHB proceedings, QVSD’s 

counsel objected to the scope and subject matter of the testimony and evidence presented, arguing 

that it went beyond the issue of the property’s use and the parameters of the application for special 

exception, treading into development issues and details, consideration of which lies with the 

Planning Commission and Township Commissioners during the project’s land development phase. 

See R.R. at 28a. 
3

Objectors, who were represented by counsel, presented testimony and 

evidence in opposition to the application, including the testimony and expert report 

of James French, a licensed engineer and traffic expert. Numerous residents testified 

throughout the hearings, some in support of the application and many in opposition. 

Those opposed to the application, including Objectors, cited such concerns as 

increased traffic, the steepness and poor sight lines of Camp Meeting Road, 

diminution of property values, and the enhanced risk of accidents due to the volume 

of teenage drivers on what Objectors characterized as an already problematic 

roadway. Objectors also voiced environmental concerns due to the proposed 

leveling of the hilltop site and clear cutting of woodlands, and the risk of landslides 

due to the topography and geography of the site and the blasting that would most 

likely be involved during construction of the school.3 

The ZHB subsequently issued its decision denying the application for 

special exception, along with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a statement 

of reasons for the decision. R.R. at 1a-34a.

4 The ZHB stressed the concerns raised 

“that Camp Meeting Road was already congested during times of shift changes at 

nearby employers and that, with the addition of two-third[s] more student drivers 

and school buses [], first responders would be delayed in reaching the school” in the 

event of an emergency. R.R. at 21a. The ZHB determined that QVSD’s failure to 

3 Leetsdale Borough initially objected to the application. As counsel for the Borough 

explained during the ZHB’s October 26, 2021 public hearing, the Borough engaged in discussions 

with QVSD given concerns regarding the impact the proposed school use could have on downhill 

neighbors. Following these discussions, QVSD and the Borough entered into a Mutual 

Cooperation Agreement (MCA) outlining various agreed-upon conditions. The Borough 

subsequently withdrew its objection to the application subject to the conditions approved through 

the MCA. 

4 While not explicitly stated, it is apparent from the ZHB’s statement of reasons for decision 

that it found the testimony of QVSD’s experts to be credible. See R.R. at 30a-34a. 
4

implement an emergency management plan that included an emergency only road 

(EOR) created substantial risks to public safety and welfare, and that such risks were 

abnormal for a school use. See R.R. at 23a-24a. Among the ZHB’s findings of fact 

were the following:

10. The current high school has two roads serving it – Ohio 

River Boulevard and Beaver Street – that are available to 

first responders. 

. . . . 

12. First responder delays of minutes or seconds in 

reaching the school can cost students and faculty members 

their lives. 

. . . . 

15. No first responders or emergency management experts 

testified. 

. . . . 

25. Based on Mr. Wooster’s testimony, Mr. Thomas’s 

testimony, and the objectors’ testimony on the EOR issue, 

[the] ZHB determined [i]t is an abnormal risk for a school 

not to implement an emergency management plan that 

included an EOR if reasonably recommended by the first 

responders. 

26. If a public high school’s emergency management plan 

does not include an EOR reasonably recommended by first 

responders, the risks to public safety and welfare will be 

substantial, serious, highly probable and virtually certain, 

and will be abnormal for a school. 

27. On February 9, 2022, [the] ZHB made its public oral 

decision denying the application but giving QVSD [30] 

days to amend the application with regard to the EOR. 

28. Also on February 9, 2022, [the] ZHB announced [that] 

if an EOR amendment were made to the application, then 

it would convert the denial into an approval subject to the 

condition that the EOR would be implemented if and as 
5

reasonably recommended by first responders, and subject 

to several other conditions involving safety measures for 

landslides, water runoff, Camp Meeting Road, insurance, 

monitoring of conditions[,] and other matters unrelated to 

the EOR. 

. . . . 

34. QVSD responded that it would commit to 

collaboration with first responders and to considering their 

recommendations in its plan. It stopped abruptly short of 

committing to implement the first responders’ reasonable 

recommendations concerning an EOR. 

F.F. 10, 12, 15, 25-28, 34 (emphasis added); R.R. at 11a, 13a-14a. The ZHB also 

issued 13 conclusions of law, including: 

2. It is an abnormal risk for a school not to implement an 

emergency management plan that included an []EOR[] if

reasonably recommended by the first responders. 

3. If an EOR reasonably recommended by first responders 

is not implemented by []QVSD[], the risks to public safety 

and welfare would be substantial, serious, highly 

probable[,] and virtually certain. 

4. [The] Township’s special exception ordinance

[Ordinance No. 2019-02] shifts the burden of persuasion 

in proving issues addressing risks to health, safety[,] and 

welfare from the objectors to the applicant as permitted by 

law. 

5. The EOR issue is [a] matter of health, safety[,] and 

welfare. 

6. QVSD failed to meet its burden of persuasion to prove 

that, if first responder reasonable EOR recommendations 

were not implemented, the risks would nevertheless be 

normal for a school without a resulting serious and highly 

probable risk of harm to public health, safety[,] and 

welfare. 
6

7. Applicable case law does not permit a zoning hearing 

board to use a condition to rectify a failure to meet a 

burden of proof and, as a result, [the] ZHB could not 

simply grant the application with the EOR condition 

attached. Instead, it had to deny the application altogether. 

And even if [the] ZHB was mistaken about the burden 

shifting, [O]bjectors satisfied the burden of persuasion. 

8. The school will be a regular public high school with a 

normal curriculum and normal extra-curricular activities 

and sports. 

Conclusions of Law (COL) 2-8 (emphasis added); R.R. at 16a-17a. 

The ZHB’s decision explains that had QVSD agreed to amend its 

application to include the EOR provision, the ZHB would have approved the 

application with certain conditions. R.R. at 1a. These conditions include conducting 

a full watershed impact study and complying with its recommendations; naming the 

downhill property owners in QVSD’s general liability insurance policy as direct 

additional insureds for personal injury and property damage resulting from 

landslides and water runoff caused by the project; monitoring of serious traffic 

accidents on Camp Meeting Road and monitoring to check for earth movement on 

the site for three years after construction of the project is completed; and 

implementing all of the conditions and safeguards “recommended” by QVSD’s 

experts during their testimony before the ZHB. R.R. at 1a-3a. 

QVSD appealed to the trial court, and the Township, Objectors, and the 

Leet Township Municipal Authority intervened. Without taking additional 

evidence, the trial court reversed the ZHB’s decision. The trial court explained that 

while the previous Ordinance provision expressly required that certain conditions be 

met to grant a special exception, Ordinance No. 2019-02 does not set forth any

specific or general criteria for review of an application for special exception and 
7

merely requires that an application address certain topics. Trial Ct. Op. 11/28/22 at 

3. As such, it was improper for the ZHB to require QVSD to include an EOR 

provision in its application. 

The trial court further determined that “[t]he record lacks evidence to 

support the [ZHB]’s finding that the failure to provide an [EOR] would, to a high 

degree of probability, pose a substantial threat to the health, safety[,] and welfare of 

the community beyond what would normally be expected by use of the [p]roperty 

for a school.” Id. The ZHB incorrectly applied the burden of proof as to general 

welfare because “objectors must first raise an objection showing to a high degree of 

probability that the use as a school may cause a substantial harm beyond what is 

normally expected, and that the impact would pose a substantial threat to the 

community. This burden may not be shifted by the ordinance.” Id. at 4 (emphasis 

added) [citing Bray v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980)]. 

While “recogniz[ing] that implementing an emergency plan is a legitimate concern 

to members of the community,” the trial court reasoned that “the [EOR] is a matter 

to be addressed as part of the land development process, not zoning use approval.” 

Id. at 5. Objectors now appeal to this Court.5 

II. Issues

At bottom, Objectors argue that the ZHB did not commit an error of 

law or abuse of discretion in reaching its decision and, therefore, the trial court’s

5 The ZHB filed a notice of non-participation with the Court on May 9, 2023. In addition, 

the Court issued an order precluding the Township and the Leet Township Municipal Authority 

from filing briefs and participating in oral argument given their failure to file briefs in compliance 

with previous orders. As such, Objectors, William Jasper and Michelle Antonelli, are the only 

remaining appellants participating in this matter. 
8

order should be reversed.6 The specific issues identified by Objectors can be 

distilled to the following: (1) whether Ordinance No. 2019-02 imposes any specific 

criteria that must be met to grant an application for a special exception; (2) whether 

Ordinance No. 2019-02 shifts the burden from Objectors to QVSD regarding issues 

affecting the health, safety, and welfare of the community; (3) whether the parties 

met their respective burdens; and (4) even if the trial court correctly held that the 

ZHB erred or abused its discretion in denying QVSD’s application for a special 

exception, whether the trial court erred by granting the application without imposing 

the conditions that the ZHB would otherwise have imposed, including the EOR. See

Objectors’ Br. at 7-8. 

III. Analysis

As for the first issue raised by Objectors, “the primary objective of 

interpreting ordinances is to determine the intent of the legislative body that [passed]

the ordinance. In pursuing that end, we are mindful that a statute’s plain language 

generally provides the best indication of legislative intent.” Tri-Cnty. Landfill, Inc. 

v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d 488, 509 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citations 

omitted). Moreover, 

[t]he rules of statutory construction are applicable to 

statutes and ordinances alike. One of the primary rules of 

statutory construction is that an ordinance must be 

construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. 

An interpretation of an ordinance which produces an 

absurd result is contrary to the rules of statutory 

construction. 

6 Where, as in the present case, “the trial court does not take additional evidence, our scope 

of review is limited to determining whether the zoning board committed an error of law or a 

manifest abuse of discretion. A zoning board abuses its discretion only if its findings are not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Siya Real Est. LLC v. Allentown City Zoning Hearing Bd., 

210 A.3d 1152, 1156 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quotations omitted). 
9

In re Thompson, 896 A.2d 659, 669 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 

We begin, as we must, with the plain language of Ordinance No. 2019-

02 and its predecessor. As mentioned in footnote one, supra, in 2019 the Township 

repealed and replaced former Chapter 27, Part 6 of the Ordinance pertaining to 

special exceptions with the current Ordinance No. 2019-02. The relevant repealed 

provision of the Ordinance expressly required that certain conditions be met. It 

stated, in pertinent part: “The following additional requirements must be met for the 

granting of a [s]pecial [e]xception.” QVSD’s Br. at 10, Appendix A (emphasis 

added). The ordinance applicable here, Ordinance No. 2019-02, in contrast, contains 

no such express language. Instead, under the heading “procedures for approval,” it 

provides as follows:

2. Approval of uses by special exception. The Z[HB] shall 

hear and decide requests for uses by special exception. 

The Z[HB] shall not approve an application for a use by 

special exception unless and until: 

A. A written application for approval of a use by 

special exception is submitted to the Township. The 

application shall indicate the section of this chapter under 

which approval of the use by special exception is sought 

and shall state the grounds upon which it is requested. The 

application shall include the following . . . . 

R.R. at 38a. Ordinance No. 2019-02 then lists 13 items to be included in an 

application for special exception, such as a current property survey, the application 

fee, and a traffic impact study when appropriate. R.R. at 38a-39a. What Ordinance 

No. 2019-02 does not include is express criteria which must be considered by the 

ZHB when reviewing an application for special exception. 

Importantly, Ordinance No. 2019-02 also contains several subsections 

devoted to particular special exception uses – such as motels, gasoline stations and 
10

automobile dealerships, and mobile home parks – and enumerates very specific 

criteria that are to be considered for each use. For example, subsection 2 states that 

motels are permitted in certain zoning districts provided that 8 express requirements 

are met, including that no part of the building exceeds 2 stories, no more than 40% 

of the ground area on the lot is occupied by buildings, and no building is set nearer 

than 50 feet to the front, side, and rear lot lines, etc. R.R. at 40a-41a. Importantly, 

a school is not one of the uses for which explicit conditions are delineated. 

Given the plain language of Ordinance No. 2019-02 – which was 

enacted by the Township within the last five years and which removed the explicit 

conditioning language of the former Ordinance provision – as well as the absence of 

a particular subsection discussing a school use, we must agree with the trial court 

that there simply are no specific requirements for the granting of a special exception

for a school use. Unless the proposed special exception use is one for which there 

is a subsection enumerating express criteria, Ordinance No. 2019-02 merely 

provides what must be included in an application before it can be considered by the 

ZHB.7 

The remaining issues Objectors raise concern where the burdens lie 

with respect to the general criteria of detriment to health, safety, and public welfare, 

and whether those burdens have been met. Objectors point to subsection 2.D of 

Ordinance No. 2019-02, which states: 

D. In proceedings involving a request for a use by special 

exception, both the duty of initially presenting evidence 

and the burden of persuading the Z[HB] that the proposed 

use is available by special exception and satisfies the 

specific or objective requirements for the grant of a use by 

7 There is no allegation that the application was in any way deficient. Further, it is 

undisputed that Ordinance No. 2019-02 does not mention an EOR. 
11

special exception as set forth in this chapter rest upon the 

applicant. The burden of persuading the Z[HB] that the 

proposed use will not offend general public interest, such 

as the health, safety[,] and welfare of the neighborhood, 

rests upon the applicant. 

R.R. at 39a (emphasis added). Objectors maintain that the explicit language of 

subsection 2.D places the burden of persuasion regarding health, safety, and welfare 

on QVSD as the applicant, not on Objectors, and that QVSD failed to meet this 

burden. In support of their argument, they cite this Court’s decisions in 

Elizabethtown/Mt. Joy Associates, L.P. v. Mount Joy Township Zoning Hearing 

Board, 934 A.2d 759, 764 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), and Greaton Properties, Inc. v. 

Lower Merion Township, 796 A.2d 1038, 1046 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Objectors’ 

argument, however, glosses over the preliminary issue of whether they met their own

evidence presentation burden. 

As we have repeatedly explained, despite its name, “[a] special 

exception is not an exception to the zoning ordinance, but rather a use to which the 

applicant is entitled provided the specific standards enumerated in the ordinance . . . 

are met[.]” In re Thompson, 896 A.2d at 670. See also Greaton, 796 A.2d at 1045. 

Generally, “an applicant for a special exception has both the duty of presenting 

evidence and the burden of persuading the board that his proposed use satisfies the 

objective [or specific] requirements of the zoning ordinance for the grant of a special 

exception.” Siya Real Est. LLC v. Allentown City Zoning Hearing Bd., 210 A.3d 

1152, 1157 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Once the 

applicant meets its burden of proof and persuasion regarding the objective 

requirements, “a presumption arises that [] the proposed use [] is consistent with the 

health, safety[,] and general welfare of the community.” Id. (quotation omitted). As 

explained above, there are no objective requirements for a special exception within 
12

Ordinance No. 2019-02. Therefore, it is presumed that QVSD’s proposed use of the 

property as a school is consistent with the health, safety, and general welfare of the 

community. “The burden then normally shifts to the objectors to the application to 

present evidence and persuade the [zoning hearing] board[] that the proposed use 

will have a generally detrimental effect on health, safety, and welfare.” Id.

(quotation omitted). See also Marr Dev. Mifflinville, LLC v. Mifflin Twp. Zoning 

Hearing Bd., 166 A.3d 479, 483 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc). 

Objectors correctly assert that, in some instances, the express language 

of a zoning ordinance can alter the parties’ respective burdens in the context of an 

application for special exception. See, e.g., Siya, 210 A.3d at 1157; Bray, 410 A.2d 

at 912-13. However, regarding general detriment to the health, safety, and welfare 

of the community, this Court has repeatedly explained that the express terms of an 

ordinance “can place the burden on the applicant but cannot shift the duty.” Siya, 

210 A.3d at 1157 (citations omitted). Stated differently, 

[w]here, as here, [] the ordinance specifically places the 

burden on the applicant to show that the proposed use will 

not have a detrimental effect, the applicant only retains 

the burden of persuasion. Objectors still retain the 

initial presentation burden with respect to the general 

matter of the detriment to health[,] safety, and general 

welfare.

Greaton, 796 A.2d at 1046 (emphasis added) [citing Manor Healthcare Corp. v. 

Lower Moreland Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 590 A.2d 65, 70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991)]. 

See also Siya, 210 A.3d at 1160; Bray, 410 A.2d at 912 (“The objectors have the 

initial evidence presentation duty with respect to the general matter of detriment to 

health, safety[,] and general welfare, even if the ordinance has expressly placed the 
13

persuasion burden upon the applicant, where it remains if detriment is identified.”)

(emphasis added). 

Here, the ZHB correctly determined that the language of subsection 2.D 

of Ordinance No. 2019-02 shifts the burden of persuasion to QVSD with respect to 

the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. See R.R. at 39a. However,

this determination is of no moment here as Objectors retain the initial evidence 

presentation duty in this regard, a duty which cannot be shifted by a zoning 

ordinance. See, e.g., Siya; Greaton; Bray.

8

 

This initial “burden placed on the objectors is a heavy one.” Marr Dev. 

Mifflinville, LLC, 166 A.3d at 483. Crucial to the present matter, “[t]he evidence 

presented by objectors must show, to a high degree of probability, that the use will

generate adverse impacts not normally generated by this type of use and that these 

impacts will pose a substantial threat to the health and safety of the community.” 

Siya, 210 A.3d at 1157 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re 

Thompson, 896 A.2d at 679 (citing Manor Healthcare Corp.). Moreover, the 

“[o]bjectors must demonstrate more than unsubstantiated concerns or vague 

generalities, and mere speculation as to possible harm is insufficient.” Siya, 210 

A.3d at 1160 (quotation omitted). 

Again, Ordinance No. 2019-02 contains no objective criteria for a 

special exception and, therefore, a presumption arose that QVSD’s proposed use is 

consistent with the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. As such, 

Objectors bore the initial burden of rebutting this presumption. If, and only if, 

8 Despite Objectors’ argument, the trial court did not hold that a zoning ordinance cannot 

shift the burden of persuasion. To the contrary, the trial court properly stated and applied the 

parties’ respective burdens here in keeping with both Ordinance No. 2019-02 and our courts’ 

precedent. 
14

Objectors satisfied this initial hurdle would the burden then shift to QVSD. See, 

e.g., Siya; Bray. 

The crux of the ZHB’s decision, truly the singular reason for its denial,

9

is the fact that QVSD’s application for a special exception does not include an EOR 

for access to the school in case of an emergency. Specifically, the ZHB found: “If a 

public high school’s emergency management plan does not include an EOR 

reasonably recommended by first responders, the risks to public safety and welfare 

will be substantial, serious, highly probable and virtually certain, and will be 

abnormal for a school.” F.F. 26; R.R. at 13a (emphasis added).10 We agree with the 

trial court that the record lacks substantial evidence to support this determination. 

First, the ZHB’s holding is premised purely on speculation as “[n]o first

responders or emergency management experts testified,” F.F. 15; R.R. at 11a, let 

alone recommended that failure to include an EOR presented an abnormal risk for a 

9

Indeed, the ZHB found that Objectors did not prevail on their assertions that the increased 

traffic, water-runoff, and landslide potential due to QVSD’s proposed school use presented an 

abnormal risk for this type of use, or that the risk of serious injury to the public was “highly 

probable or a virtual certainty.” R.R. at 31a; see also R.R. at 30a. We discern no error in this 

regard. 

By way of brief explanation, Objectors testified generally about the potential for more 

accidents given the topography of Camp Meeting Road and the increased numbers of young, 

inexperienced drivers that would frequent the roadway. “However, ‘an increase in traffic is 

generally not grounds for denial of a special exception unless there is a high probability that the 

proposed use will generate traffic not normally generated by that type of use and that the abnormal 

traffic threatens safety.” Marr Dev. Mifflinville, LLC, 166 A.3d at 484 [quoting Accelerated 

Enters., Inc. v. The Hazle Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 773 A.2d 824, 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)]. 

Objectors’ speculative testimony regarding teenage drivers fails to meet this standard and, at all 

events, would apply to any ordinary high school. Their general concerns regarding potential 

increased risk of landslides and water-runoff issues suffer the same deficiency. 

10 See also COL 2; R.R. at 16a (“It is an abnormal risk for a school not to implement an 

emergency management plan that included an []EOR[] if reasonably recommended by the first 

responders.”). 
15

proposed school use. Objectors’ assertion that the testimony of QVSD’s own 

witnesses supports the ZHB’s determination regarding an EOR is simply without 

merit. To the contrary, our review of the record reveals that QVSD’s witnesses 

clearly stated they had not consulted any first responders or emergency management 

experts when preparing their reports. Moreover, QVSD’s witnesses reiterated time 

and again that the site and proposed plan is safe, there is nothing unique about Camp 

Meeting Road, and they do not have any additional concerns for neighboring 

property owners above and beyond those normally inherent when a new school is 

built.

11 As QVSD’s witnesses also explained, the ZHB’s finding is premature since 

we are not at the land development stage and an emergency management plan for 

the proposed school has yet to be developed. See In re Thompson, 896 A.2d at 670 

(noting well established principle that special exceptions involve only the proposed 

use of land, not the particular details of the design and development). 

Further undermining the ZHB’s determination is its own conclusion, 

which is amply supported by the record, that QVSD’s proposed “school will be a 

regular public high school with a normal curriculum and normal extra-curricular 

activities and sports.” COL 8; R.R. at 17a. Such a conclusion is directly at odds 

with the ZHB’s ultimate decision. The conclusion also prevents Objectors from 

11 See, e.g., Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 8/20/21 at 17 (testimony of licensed professional 

engineer Geoffrey Phillips that the site can be safely developed as a school); N.T. 7/15/21 at 76

(testimony of traffic expert Charles Wooster that the traffic generated from this school would not 

be any greater than the traffic that would be expected from any other typical high school); id. at 

184 (testimony of Mr. Wooster: “I wouldn’t say there is anything that unique about [] this 

location.”); id. at 198-99 (testimony of Mr. Wooster indicating he does not have any additional 

concerns for neighboring property owners above and beyond those normally inherent when a new 

school is built); id. at 203 (opinion of Mr. Wooster that when and if QVSD’s proposed school is 

built, Camp Meeting Road will not be materially more dangerous or materially more inconvenient 

than it is now). 
16

meeting their evidence presentation burden, that QVSD’s proposed school use will 

generate adverse impacts not normally generated by this type of use. 

Simply put, there is no evidence in the record that an EOR is required, 

let alone that failure to provide an EOR will, to a high degree of probability, generate 

adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare not normally generated by a 

school use. See Siya, 210 A.3d at 1157. Objectors’ testimony and evidence 

“amounted to allegations of mere possibilities and fell far short of the high degree 

of probability standard necessary to sustain” their heavy burden of going forward. 

Manor Healthcare Corp., 590 A.2d at 71. Therefore, the burden never switched to

QVSD and the ZHB abused its discretion in determining otherwise. See id. at 70. 

Finally, Objectors argue that even if the trial court correctly held that 

the ZHB erred in denying QVSD’s application for a special exception, the trial court 

should have imposed the conditions the ZHB would have required for the proposed 

school use. Objectors maintain that the ZHB was well within its authority to place 

conditions on approval of the special exception as subsection 2.E of Ordinance No. 

2019-02 states: “In considering an application for approval of a use by special 

exception, the Z[HB] may prescribe appropriate conditions and safeguards in 

conformity with the spirit and intent of this article.” R.R. at 39a. 

Objectors’ argument neglects the remainder of subsection 2.E of 

Ordinance No. 2019-02, which states: “A violation of such conditions and 

safeguards, when made a part of the terms and conditions under which approval of 

a use by special exception is granted, shall be deemed a violation of this chapter.” 

Id. Objectors similarly fail to address Section 912.1 of the Pennsylvania 

Municipalities Planning Code, which provides that “[i]n granting a special 

exception, the [zoning hearing] board may attach such reasonable conditions and 
17

safeguards, in addition to those expressed in the ordinance, as it may deem necessary 

to implement the purposes of this act and the zoning ordinance.” Act of July 31, 

1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 91 of the Act of December 21, 1988, 

P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10912.1. Here, the ZHB obviously denied QVSD’s application 

for a special exception. Moreover, the conditions it would have imposed were 

premised upon QVSD amending its application to include an EOR, among other 

things, not on the application that was currently before it. As such, the conditions 

the ZHB theoretically would have imposed if QVSD had amended its application

and if the ZHB had granted the application are a legal nullity.

In addition, the conditions themselves seem to constitute development 

issues rather than zoning use issues. As stated earlier, it is well established that 

“[s]pecial exception . . . proceedings involve only the proposed use of the land, and 

do not involve the particular details of the design of the proposed development.” In 

re Thompson, 896 A.2d at 670 [citing Schatz v. New Britain Twp. Zoning Hearing 

Bd. of Adjustment, 596 A.2d 294, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (“Zoning only regulates 

the use of land and not the particulars of development and construction.”) (emphasis 

in original)]. As such, the specific details regarding development and construction 

outlined in the ZHB’s proposed conditions should be addressed further along in the

land development and permitting process. See Elizabethtown/Mt. Joy, 934 A.2d at 

768 (citing Schatz). Simply, the ZHB’s proposed conditions do not relate to 

requirements under the Ordinance, but instead are essentially the ZHB’s attempt to 

control development issues. 
18

IV. Conclusion

In sum, we agree with the trial court that the ZHB’s decision, 

specifically the determination regarding an EOR, was based on speculation and is 

not supported by substantial record evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. 

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Quaker Valley School District :

:

 v. : No. 1474 C.D. 2022

:

Leet Township Zoning Hearing Board, :

Leet Township, William Jasper, :

Michelle Antonelli, and Leet Township :

Municipal Authority :

:

Appeal of: William Jasper and :

Michelle Antonelli :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2024, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED. 

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita