UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN VALLES, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. MATTHEW HANSEN, W arden, Sterling Correctional Facility ; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents- Appellees. No. 18-1116 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-02707-LTB) (D. Colorado)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

Before LUCERO , HARTZ, and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Steven Valles, a Color ado state prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA” ) to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He also seeks l eave to proceed in forma pauperis in this court. The distr ict court dismissed Mr. Valles ’s petition as untimely under

* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral esto ppel. It may be cited, however , for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of A ppellate Procedure 32.1 and 10 th Circuit Rule 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Valles is pro se, “we liberally construe his filin gs, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas , 724 F.3d 1312, 131 5 (10th Cir. 2013). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 18, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one-year limitations period. We deny Mr. Valles’s COA request, deny his in forma pauperis mo tion, and dismiss the petition.
BACKGROUND In February 2009, a jury convicted Mr. Valles of a variety of c ontrolled substance distribution and posse ssion violations. He received a combined sixty-nine-year term of imprisonment. After pursuing st ate direct appeal and post-convi ction relief, Mr. Valles filed his application for hab eas corpus relief in federal distr ict court. The district court found his application untimely under 28 U.S.C . § 2244(d) and he ld that Mr. Valles had failed to demonstrate he was en titled to equitable tolling or e xcused from the limitations period under the actual-innocen ce exception. The court also den ied him a COA.
ANALYSIS The Antiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED PA”) conditions a state prisoner’s right to appeal a denial of habea s relief on the grant of a COA, which is unavailable unless the applicant demonstrates a “ substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S. C. §§ 2253(c)(1)( A), (c)(2). Where, as here, the district court denies a hab eas petition on pr ocedural groun ds, we issue a COA only when the prisoner shows that “ jurists of reason would find it d ebatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whet her the district court was c orrect in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Mr . Valles cannot make this showing, and we therefore deny his request.3 A. The Timing of Mr. Valles’s Habeas Petition AEDPA provides a one-year limita tions period for habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Mr. Valles does not co ntest that he filed his habeas petition outside the one-y ear AEDPA limitations period e ven after considering the effects of statutory tolling. A nd he does not assert any right to equitable tolling. Instead, Mr. Valles challenges the cons titutionality of the one-year lim itations period.
B. Mr. Valles’s Challenges to the One-Year Limitations Period Mr. Valles argues that the one-y ear AEDPA limitations period is unconstitutional because it: (1) “abridg[es] . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” U.S. Cons t. amend. I; (2) violates the Suspension Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; (3) amends the First Amendment without the requisit e process, see id. art. V; (4) violates the separation of p owers doctrine because the temp orary suspension of the writ is reserved to the Executiv e Branch; (5) violates the Four teenth Amendment prohibition on arbitrary governme nt action because the one-year limitations period begins after state direct review conclud es and expires before the limi tations period for Colorado post-conviction remedies; (6) vio lates the Equal Protection gua rantee of the Fourteenth Amendment because counseled pe titioners are able to comply with the requirement while pro se petitioners are penalized ; and (7) violates the Supremac y Clause because state and federal officials are required to obey the Constitution and the one-year limitations period is in violation of the Constitu tion for the previous six reason s. As an initial matter, even given our liberal construction of pr o se briefing, Mr. Valles has not adequately pre sented many of his arguments i n his opening brief;4 accordingly, we may deem them waived. See Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arg uments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, i n an appellant’s opening brief. ”); Garrett v. Selby Connor
Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10t h Cir. 2005) (“[T]his court has repeate dly insisted that pro se parties fo llow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” (quotation marks omitted)). In a ny event, Mr. Valles’s argument s fail. The Supreme Court has regularly applied and interpreted AEDPA’s one-year li mitations period without questioning its constitutionality. See, e.g. , McQuiggin v. Perkins , 569 U.S. 383 (2013);
Holland v. Florida , 560 U.S. 631 (2010); Lawrence v. Florida , 549 U.S. 327 (2007); Pace v. DiGuglielmo , 544 U.S. 408 (2005); Duncan v. Walker , 533 U.S. 167 (2001). And we have addressed and rej ected challenges to the constituti onality of the oneyear limitations peri od on many of the same grounds Mr. Valles now raises. See Miller v.
Marr , 141 F.3d 976, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1998) (abs ent grounds for equ itable tolling or a showing of actual innocence, one -year limitations period does n ot render habeas remedy “inadequate and ineffective” and thus does not violate the Susp ension Clause); see also Ong Vue v. Allbaugh , 682 F. App’x 636, 638 (10th Cir. 2017) (one -year limitations period is not an unconstituti onal suspension of the writ); United States v. Sanchez , 568 F. App’x 557, 559 (10t h Cir. 2014) (one-year limitations period fo r § 2255 motions does not violate the First Amendment’s right of access to the courts); Gutianez v. Parker , 237 F. App’x 349, 352 (10t h Cir. 2007) (one-year limitations period do es not usurp state prerogatives in having longer s tate post-conviction limitations periods).5 His other arguments similarly fa il. For example, because the li mitations period does not run afoul of the First Amendment, see Sanchez , 568 F. App’x at 559, Mr. Valles’s argument that AEDPA amends the First Amendment is incorrect. We have also repeatedly enforced the on e-year limitations period agains t pro se petitioners in the absence of equitable tolling, e ven if counseled petitioners are better equipped to comply with the time limit. See Marsh v. Soares , 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 ( 10th Cir. 2000) (pro se status of petitioner and lack of leg al knowledge do not merit e quitable tolling); Gutianez , 237 F. App’x at 352–53. Because the one-year period is not a “s uspension” of habeas relief, see Ong Vue , 682 F. App’x at 638, Congress di d not violate the separation of powers doctrine with t he passage of AEDPA. 2 Finally, because Mr. V alles’s first six arguments are without merit, his s eventh argument that relies o n the first six is also meritless. Because Mr. Valles’s habeas pe tition was clearly time-barred an d his contention that the one-year limitations p eriod is unconstitutional lacks merit, no reasonable jurist could conclude that the district court erred in its procedural ruling. We thus deny Mr. Valles’s request for a COA an d do not reach the merits of t he other issues he raises in his application for a COA.

2 Mr. Valles’s argument also fails because Congress has the auth ority to suspend the writ, contrary to his assertion. See Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008) (habeas relief “ought not to be den ied or delayed, except when, on account of public danger, the Congress shall suspen d the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ” (quoting 1 Debates in the Several State Co nventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 328 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876))); id. at 771 (“If the privilege o f habeas corpus is to be denied . . . , Congress must act in accordance with the require ments of the Suspension Clause.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (plu rality opinion) (“Only in the rarest of circumstan ces has Congress seen fit to suspend the wr it.”).6 C. Mr. Valles’s In Forma Pauperis Motion “An appeal may not be taken in f orma pauperis if the trial cou rt certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a )(3). Although the trial court so certified in this case, Mr. V alles “may nonetheless move thi s court for leave to proceed on appeal in forma paup eris pursuant to the mechanism set forth in” Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5). Rolland v. Primesour ce Staffing, L.L.C. , 497 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 2 007). As in the distric t court, “to succeed on his motion, an appellant must show a financial inability to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan , 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10t h Cir. 1991). After careful consideration of Mr. Valles’s ap plication, we agree with the di strict court that he has not shown the existence of such a reasoned, nonfrivol ous argument. His motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is accordingly denied.
CONCLUSION We DENY Mr. Valles’s request for a COA, DENY his in forma paupe ris motion, and DISMISS this appeal. Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge