J-S27019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDREW TERRY INGRAM 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 505 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-01-CR-0001106-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 03, 2024

Andrew Terry Ingram appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

seventy-two hours to six months of incarceration imposed following his 

convictions of three counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one 

count of failing to drive on the right side of the roadway. Upon review, we 

affirm.

We previously summarized the procedural and factual history as follows:

This case stems from a traffic stop conducted by Pennsylvania 

State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Alexander Loder [around midnight] 

on June 13, 2022. Trooper Loder was driving behind Appellant 

when Trooper Loder observed Appellant’s front and rear driver’s 

side tires cross the double yellow centerline. Appellant continued 

to travel with a portion of his vehicle over the centerline for sixteen 

seconds. Trooper Loder initiated a traffic stop and Appellant 

complied by pulling over. The trooper approached Appellant and, 

upon speaking with him, smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana 

and noticed that Appellant had bloodshot eyes. Appellant stated 

that he had smoked marijuana twenty to thirty minutes before the 

stop. Trooper Loder conducted field sobriety tests and ultimately 
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concluded that Appellant was under the influence of marijuana 

and could not safely drive. Appellant was arrested and 

subsequently consented to a blood draw, which revealed the 

presence of marijuana. 

On January 6, 2023, Appellant proceeded to a combined 

suppression hearing and bench trial. [At the hearing, the 

Commonwealth presented a dashcam video that recorded the stop 

and the events immediately preceding it.] The trial court denied 

Appellant’s suppression motion, found him guilty as indicated 

above, and sentenced him. This timely appeal followed. The trial 

court entered an order directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement, but none was filed. The court issued a 

statement suggesting the appeal be dismissed as a result. Over 

one month later, counsel filed an untimely concise statement on 

Appellant’s behalf, raising a single issue challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence. Counsel then filed in this Court [an 

application to withdraw and brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009)], presenting the same

sufficiency challenge as the only issue arguably supporting an 

appeal. 

Given this procedural posture, and the fact that the certified 

record was missing material items, we denied counsel’s petition, 

remanded for counsel to ensure inclusion within the certified 

record of all necessary materials, and directed the trial court to 

file a Rule 1925(a) opinion in response to the untimely Rule 

1925(b) statement. 

Commonwealth v. Ingram, 307 A.3d 685, 2023 WL 6999363, at *1 

(Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned up). 

Ultimately, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Counsel 

supplemented the record with all pertinent evidence, including the dashcam 

video, and filed an advocate’s brief. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for 

our review, and we proceed to the merits of Appellant’s sole issue on appeal: 

“Did the trial court err in finding sufficient evidence to establish a violation of 
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[§] 3301 of the Motor Vehicle Code, based on Appellant’s momentary and 

slight crossing of the double yellow line without impeding any other vehicle 

traveling on that section of roadway at this time?” Appellant’s brief at 3. 

While at first appearing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, 

Appellant in actuality assails the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion 

based upon the court’s finding that the trooper had probable cause to stop his

vehicle for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3301.

1

 We consider such a claim mindful of 

the following legal principles:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

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1 The Commonwealth argues that we should find the suppression issue waived 

for failure to clearly articulate it in the Rule 1925(b) statement. See

Commonwealth’s brief at 8. However, since the trial court readily identified 

the precise issue Appellant sought to raise on appeal and addressed it in its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion upon remand, we decline to find waiver.
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Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 266 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned 

up).

It is undisputed that the trooper stopped Appellant’s vehicle because he 

crossed the double yellow centerline, which is prohibited by § 3301.2 Since 

the stop was based upon a perceived traffic violation that required no further 

investigation, Trooper Loder needed to have probable cause for it to pass 

constitutional muster. Id. at 267. In that regard, we reiterate “that a police 

officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a 

traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Id. (cleaned up).

The trial court found that Appellant had driven his vehicle “with its front 

and rear driver’s side tires over the double yellow centerline for over [sixteen] 

seconds” for “no valid reason[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/23, at 7. Based 

upon Appellant’s violation of § 3301, the court held that Trooper Loder had 

probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Id. Appellant contends that these

factual findings are not supported by the record. See Appellant’s brief at 16. 

In particular, he argues that the dashcam video contravenes Trooper Loder’s

testimony, showing his tires on the centerline, but not across it, except for 

perhaps two seconds. Id. at 17. Consequently, he maintains that this fleeting

infraction cannot support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 18-19. In 

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2 Section 3301 of the Vehicle Code provides, except for delineated exceptions:

“Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right 

half of the roadway[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a). 
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support, Appellant relies on this Court’s prior declaration that we were “not 

foreclos[ing] the possibility that a momentary and minor violation of § 3301 

might, in a different case, be insufficient to establish probable cause for a 

vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 847 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Upon review, we do not find this to be that case. At the suppression 

hearing, Trooper Loder testified that as he traveled behind Appellant’s vehicle, 

he “observed the vehicle cross over the center double-yellow line for 

approximately [sixteen] seconds.” N.T. Suppression, 1/6/23, at 7. From that

vantage point, Appellant “was clearly over the double-yellow line.” Id. at 9. 

Our review of the dashcam video does not undermine this testimony. 

Preliminarily, it bears mentioning that the video is visually grainy and the 

extreme contrast between the low-light nighttime conditions and bursts of 

overexposure from vehicle and streetlights makes it difficult to ascertain the 

precise location of the vehicle’s tires in relation to the centerline during the 

thirty-second range from 0:17, when the dashcam begins to continuously 

capture the vehicle, to 0:47, when the vehicle comes into clearer focus. Once 

in focus, though, the front and rear tires of the driver’s side of the vehicle are 

plainly past the near-line of the double-yellow division, and wavering on and 

past the far-line, until the vehicle drifts back into the appropriate lane around 

0:50. 

Based on the foregoing, we determine that the trial court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and, consequently, that Appellant’s 
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violation of § 3301 was neither minor nor momentary. Discerning no error in 

the court’s conclusion that Trooper Loder had probable cause to stop the 

vehicle for a violation of § 3301, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/03/2024