alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ben Allen COX, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-86-213.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Oct. 14, 1986.

*910Silas C. Wolf, Jr., Norman, for appellant.

Michael C. Turpén, Atty. Gen., Tomilou Gentry Liddell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

The appellant, Ben Allen Cox, was charged, tried and convicted for the crimes of Conspiracy to Submit a False or Fraudulent Insurance Claim, Count I, and Presenting a False and Fraudulent Insurance Claim, Count II, in Case No. CRF-85-2082 in the District Court of Oklahoma County and was fined four thousand dollars ($4,000) on Count I and one thousand dollars ($1,000) on Count II, and he appeals.

On March 1, 1985, appellant’s diesel tractor was stolen by Ronald Wilson, Danny Burge and Tommy Qualls. The three men were arrested and charged with the theft, and all three admitted the crime. However, the three men stated that appellant asked them to steal the tractor for insurance purposes.

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He argues that the testimony of the three accomplices was not corroborated by independent evidence. We must first determine whether the co-conspirators were accomplices. In *Frye v. State,*606 P.2d 599, 606 (Okl.Cr.1980), This Court held that:

> To be an accomplice, the actions of the witness must make him a principal pursuant to 21 O.S.1971, § 172. It is well established that if under all the facts of the case the witness could be indicted for the offense with which the defendant stands accused, the witness is an accomplice.

Clearly, the co-conspirators in the instant case could have been indicted for the offense of conspiracy to submit a false or fraudulent insurance claim and were therefore accomplices.

Next, we must determine whether there is sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to corroborate the testimony of these accomplices. Title 22 O.S.1981, § 742 provides that:

> A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.

Also, this Court has stated that, “As to the adequacy of corroborative evidence, it must of itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tend in some degree to connect a defendant to the commission of the offense charged.” *Frye*at 606.

In the instant case there is no corroborative evidence to link the appellant to a conspiracy to commit insurance fraud with*911out reference to the testimony of the alleged accomplices. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to establish appellant’s participation in a conspiracy to submit a false or fraudulent insurance claim or that he presented a false or fraudulent insurance claim. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to address appellant’s other assignment of error.

For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgments and sentences are REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to DISMISS.

PARKS, P.J., and BRETT, J., concur.
### Page 1 of 3 **Disposition Comments Docket No:**  

### FAA - 2011 - 0647 These comments are in **Directorate ID:** 

### 2010 -NM - 193 - AD response to an SNPRM Originating Office Tracking No.: **Next Step:** FRAN SNPRM 

### N o C omments/Only

Supportive Comments Received

– If this box is checked, no signatures are required. No 

### Has the reference d service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? I f ye s, lis t latest revision and attach a cop y. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance. Instructions: Summarize all comments **by issue** (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of each issue. **All comments relating to the sam e issue should be discussed together.**  Do not list all of the issues from one commenter togeth er. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA - IR- M - 8040.1C Chapter 9. **ISSUE 1:** Select one o

f the following : If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD: If **NO** , we don’t agree because **ISSUE 2**  **:** Select one of the following :

If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree w ith because We disagree with because Make the following changes to the AD:

### Page 2 of 3

If **NO** , we don’t agree because **For additional issues, do uble**  **- click**  **here**

### Page 3 of 3 **S ignature Section**  Signature indicates concurrence with this action. Originating Office Tracking No.: **ASE** Printed Name **: Date** 

**Branch M anager**  **Date**
Order entered January 25, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-00044-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.P., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 469th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 469-30012-2018

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s January 14, 2019 unopposed motion for an extension of 

time to file a notice of appeal. We GRANT the motion. The notice of appeal filed in the trial 

court on January 10, 2019 is deemed timely for jurisdictional purposes.

This accelerated appeal involves the termination of appellant’s parental rights. The 

appellate record is overdue. The district clerk and court reporter have informed the Court that 

they have not filed their respective records due to nonpayment. On January 22nd, appellant filed 

a motion to extend the time to file the clerk’s and reporter’s records. Appellant explains in the 

motion that she filed an affidavit of indigency in the trial court on February 5, 2018. Texas Rule 

of Civil Procedure 145 provides that “[a] party who files a Statement of Inability to Afford 

Payment of Court Costs cannot be required to pay costs except by order of the court[.]” See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 145. Because nothing before this Court reflects the trial court has ordered appellant to 
pay costs, we GRANT the motion to the extent that we ORDER the clerk’s and reporter’s 

records be filed no later than February 5, 2019.

Also before the Court is appellant’s January 22nd motion for an extension of time to 

remit this Court’s filing fee. In light of appellant’s affidavit of indigence, we DENY the motion 

as moot.

We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order to Lynne Finley, Collin 

County District Clerk, Stephanie Hunn, Official Court Reporter for the 469th Judicial District 

Court, and all parties.

/s/ BILL WHITEHILL

JUSTICE
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 1594** 

ASHISH SHRESTHA , Petitioner ,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General , Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of a n Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

.

Submitted : February 18, 2016 Decided: March 1 5, 2016

Before AGEE and FLOYD , Circuit Judge s , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion

.

Kevin H. Knutson, Sacramento, California, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant, Derek C. Julius, Senior Litigation Counsel, Andrew B. Insenga, Nelle M. Seymour, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Ashish Shrestha, a native and citizen of Nepal, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board) dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s
denial of his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. *

We have reviewed the administrative record , including the
transcript of Shrestha’s merits hearing, the applications for
relief, and all supporting evidence. We conclude that the record evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to any of the
administrative findings of fact, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(2012), and that substant ial evidence supports the Board ’s
decision to uphold the denial of the application s for relief

.
See INS v. Elias

- Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). We accordingly deny the petition for review for the reasons stated
by the Board. See In re: Shrestha (B.I.A. May 7, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

* Shreshtha failed to challenge the agency’s denial of his request for protection under the Convention Against Torture. He has therefore waived appellate review of this claim. See Suarez

- Valenzuela v. Holder , 714 F.3d 241, 248

- 49 (4th Cir. 20 13)

.3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### Hartz Mountain Corporation, Respondent, v Allou Distributors, Inc., Appellant.

In an action, *inter alia,*to recover the cost of goods sold and delivered, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gerard, J.), entered November 22, 1989, which granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint and severed the defendant’s counterclaims for trial, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered December 12, 1989, which, *inter alia,*is in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $59,229.92.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action *(see, Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment *(see,*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

In this action to recover damages for breach of contract, account stated, and goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff, as the moving party, made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the defendant to come forth with evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of triable issues of fact *(see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320; *Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557; *Steingart Assocs. v Sandler,*28 AD2d 801). This the defendant failed to do. Bare conclusory assertions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment *(see, Fink, Weinberger, Fredman, Berman & Lowell v Petrides,*80 AD2d 781; *Steingart Assocs. v Sandler, supra).*

Moreover, under the facts of this case, the court properly severed the defendant’s counterclaims from the action and granted the plaintiff summary judgment, on the complaint *(see generally,*4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac 3212.17). The mere assertion of counterclaims, unsupported by proof that they are meritorious, will not bar relief to a plaintiff who is otherwise entitled to summary judgment *(see, M & S Mercury Air Conditioning Corp. v Rodolitz,*24 AD2d 873, *affd*17 *441NY2d 909). Harwood, J. P., Balletta, Rosenblatt and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1**Certificate Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,****as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, the undersigned officers of Cray Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certify, to such officers’knowledge, that:(i) the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the period endedDecember 31, 2006 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended; and(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.Dated:March 8, 2007                 /s/ PETER J. UNGARO                   Peter J. Ungaro              Chief Executive Officer         /s/ BRIAN C. HENRY                   Brian C. Henry              Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Roger Dokes, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Linakis, J.), rendered June 5, 1989, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and unlawful possession of marihuana, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was arrested for selling drugs to an undercover police officer during a buy-and-bust operation conducted by the Queens Tactical Narcotics Task Force. The arresting officer claimed that he had confiscated additional vials of cocaine and a quantity of marihuana from the defendant’s pants pocket. The attorney who represented the defendant at arraignment recalled that the garments worn by the defendant at the time of his arrest had no pockets. Since the seller’s identification subsequently became a key issue in the case, the defendant maintains that the court’s preclusion of the attorney’s reasons for remembering a specific detail about the defendant’s clothing deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.

"Evidence, while technically relevant, may be excluded if it is too slight, remote, or conjectural to have any legitimate influence in determining the fact in issue” *(People v O’Connor,*154 AD2d 626, 627). Here, the prospective testimony of the attorney’s reasons for remembering details of the defendant’s clothing was not determinative of the issue of the defendant’s identification, particularly in light of the other positive identification evidence in the case.

The defendant’s absence from the informal conference between the court and counsel prior to voir dire, during which the sole matters of discussion were ministerial matters of jury selection and the recording of the peremptory and for-cause challenges, did not deprive him of a fair trial. "The in-chambers discussion was a mere preliminary advisement of the court of challenges later effectuated in open court in the presence of defendant and thus did not constitute a material part of the trial” *(People v Velasco,*77 NY2d 469, 473).

Nor was the defendant prejudiced by his absence from the precharge conference between the court and counsel or from a conference during which the court’s earlier *Sandoval*rulings *725were discussed and modified slightly in the defendant’s favor. The defendant’s absences did not effect his ability to defend himself against the charges in any way and thus did not violate his due process right to be present at trial *(see, People v Rodriguez,*76 NY2d 918, 921).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Kunzeman and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### Ardell GALLOWAY and Frances Galloway, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Kim MANGUM, AFCO Development Corporation, a Utah corporation, and Grant Affleck, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 19844.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 13, 1987.

Duane A. Burnett, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.

Ellen M. Maycock, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.

*Memorandum of Decision*

HALL, Chief Justice:

When this matter proceeded to trial, defendants AFCO Development Corporation and Grant Affleck were not present, the matter having been stayed as to them because they had each filed a petition in bankruptcy in the federal court. At the conclusion of trial, the judge entered a money judgment against only defendant Kim Mangum based upon a finding of negligent misrepresentation concerning the collateral for plaintiffs’ investment.

At the time this case was originally calendared in this Court, it was observed that the judgment did not appear to be final and, in the absence of a determination by the trial court of no just reason for delay and the entry of a final judgment pursuant to the provisions of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), that this Court was without jurisdiction. As a consequence, counsel were requested to brief the issue.

The supplemental brief of appellant asserts that Rule 54(b) has no application in this case since AFCO and Affleck have since been discharged in bankruptcy. The brief of respondent simply suggests that in *1366this instance, we decline to apply the rule. Neither of the positions taken by counsel is consistent with our recent decisions on this point.

Just as in *Freegard v. First Western National Bank,*
      *1*
      **dispositive of this appeal is the fact that at the time the appeal was taken, plaintiffs’ cause of action against AFCO and Affleck had not been resolved and therefore remained pending. The judgment against Mangum was thus not final and not appealable in the absence of a proper certification by the trial court.2

In *Freegard,*counsel represented that the trial court had since dismissed the action against the remaining party defendant. However, we concluded that the subsequent dismissal, having occurred after the fact, did not cure the procedural defect which deprived this Court of jurisdiction. The same holds true in the instant case, and the subsequent adjudication in bankruptcy of AFCO and Affleck does not confer jurisdiction on this Court after the fact.

The appeal is dismissed as it was not taken from a final judgment.3

STEWART, Associate C.J., ZIMMERMAN, J., and SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, concur.

HOWE, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.

DANIELS, District Judge, sat.

DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself, does not participate herein.

. 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987).

. *See Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist.,*724 P.2d 960, 964-65 (Utah 1986).

*.See Williams v. State,*716 P.2d 806, 807-08 (Utah 1986); *Pate*v. *Marathon Steel Co.,*692 P.2d 765, 767-68 (Utah 1984).
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Complainant 

R 

HEAR! 

Vs. 

Docket No. FAA-2013-1086 

FAA Case No. 2011S0190181 

PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPT. 

Respondent 

Judge J. E. Sullivan 

INFORMATIVE MOTION REGARDNG POSTAL ADDRESS 

Hereby appears Respondent, Puerto Rico Police Department, represented by the 

subscribing counsel, and states, alleges and requests as follows: 

1. Through the present Motion Respondent hereby informs and clarifies that the 

correct postal address of the subscribing attorneys is the one that features on 

the previous motions filed by the latter: PO Box 71200, San Juan, Puerto 00936. 

2. We notice that Complainant and the Federal Aviation Administration are 

sending the orders, notifications and motions to the Puerto Rico Police 

Department general postal address and this provokes a substantial delay until 

the subscribing attorneys receive the documents sent. 

3. Respondent respectfully request that all parties update their records in order 

that the notifications and/or motions are sent to the subscribing attorneys 

correct postal address mentioned above. 

Respectfully submitted this 5th day of September 2014. 
Page 2 of 2 

/'/\ 

J)~~~~i,l .. t .. {i l/L ~·h~~ ~ulrahman Soler -, 

Att ney 

Office of Legal Affairs 

PO Box 71200 

San Juan, PR 00936 

Phone 787-793-1234 ext. 3067, 2203 

Fax. 787-781-7993 

nmabdu lrahman@pol icia. pr. gov 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing INFORMATIVE MOTION REGARDING 

POSTAL ADDRESS has been sent by the following methods: 

Original and one copy via certified mail on September s'h, 2014: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

Wilbur Wright Building 

Suite 2W1 000 

Washington, DC 20591 

One copy via certified mail on September 51h, 2014: 

Christopher R. Stevenson 

Attorney 

Office of the Regional Counsel 

Southern Region 

P.O. Box 20636 

Atlanta, GA 30320 

Fax: (404)-305-5223 

Honorable Judge J.E. Sullivan 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (e11-310) 

Washington, de 20590 

Fax: (202) 366-7536
# L_2006003EN.01000601.xml

| 6.1.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 3/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.1.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 3/6

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 7/2006

of 5 January 2006

on the issue of system B export licences in the fruit and vegetables sector (apples)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1961/2001 of 8 October 2001 on detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as regards export refunds on fruit and vegetables (2), and in particular Article 6(6) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 1702/2005 (3) fixes the indicative quantities for which system B export licences may be issued. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1702/2005 (3) fixes the indicative quantities for which system B export licences may be issued.

| (2) | In the light of the information available to the Commission today, there is a risk that the indicative quantities laid down for the current export period for apples will shortly be exceeded. This overrun will prejudice the proper working of the export refund scheme in the fruit and vegetables sector. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In the light of the information available to the Commission today, there is a risk that the indicative quantities laid down for the current export period for apples will shortly be exceeded. This overrun will prejudice the proper working of the export refund scheme in the fruit and vegetables sector.

| (3) | To avoid this situation, applications for system B licences for apples after 6 January 2006 should be rejected until the end of the current export period, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

To avoid this situation, applications for system B licences for apples after 6 January 2006 should be rejected until the end of the current export period,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Applications for system B export licences for apples submitted pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1702/2005, export declarations for which are accepted after 6 January and before 17 January 2006, are hereby rejected.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 6 January 2006.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 5 January 2006.

For the Commission

J. L. DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 297, 21.11.1996, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 47/2003 (OJ L 7, 11.1.2003, p. 64).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 268, 9.10.2001, p. 8. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 386/2005 (OJ L 62, 9.3.2005, p. 3).

2

(3)  
  OJ L 273, 19.10.2005, p. 9.

3

---