## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Cain v. Ham er , 2012 IL App (1st) 112833

Appellate Court Caption TYL ER R. CAI N and TAL BO T D. CAI N, Plaintiffs-Appellee s and Cross-Appellants, v. BRI AN HAMER, in his offi cial capa city as DI RECTOR, I L L I

NOI S DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE I L L I NOI S DEPARTMENT OF R EVENUE ; and J UDI TH BA AR TOPI NKA, in her officia l capa city as STATE TREASURER of the State of I llinois , Def

endants-A

ppellants and Cross-Appe llees.

District & N o. First District, F irst Division Docke t No. 1-11-2833

Filed J uly 16, 2012

Held (N ote : Thi s syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by t h e Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Where the rele vant fac tors supported the con cl u sion that plaintiffs had abandone d I llinois and wer e Florida residents for purposes of the I llinois I ncome Tax Act during the tax y ear s at issue, they wer e entitled to summary judgme nt on their complaint seek i n g a decla ration that they

wer e not re quired to pay

resident I llinois income taxes for those y ear s.

Dec ision Under
Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 06-L -050986; the Hon. Elmer J. Tolmaire I I I , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med; cross-a

ppeal dismissed.Counsel on

Appea l L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Chic ago (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicitor Gene ral, and Timothy K. McPike, Assistant A ttorney Gene ral, of counse l), for a

ppellants.

Reed Smith L L P, of Chicag o (Michae l J. Wy nne, Michae l D. Richman, and Adam P. Bec kerink, of c ounsel), for appellee s.

Panel PRES I DI NG J USTI CE HOF FMAN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Kar

nezis a nd Rochford concur

red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The defe ndants, the I llin o i s De p ar t m en t of Revenue (De partment), the Depa rtment’s Direc tor Br ian Hamer
, and I llinois State Trea surer J udith Ba ar Topinka, appea l the decision of the circ uit court g ranting summary judgme nt to the plaintiffs, Ty ler and Talbot Cain, on thei r co m p l ai n t for a decla ration that they are not require d to pay resident I llinois income
taxes for the y ear s from 1996 through 2004. On appea l, the parties dispute whether the plaintiffs qualified a s I llinois residents duringthe re levant time period. The pla intiffs have also cross- appea led t o arg ue that, in the event they wer e residents during the re levant time period, the Depa

rtment should be barr ed from collecting their taxes due to cer tain proce dural infirmities. For the rea sons that follow, we af fi rm the judgme nt of the circ uit court on the defe ndants’ appe al, and we dismiss the plaintiffs’ c ross-appe al as moot. ¶ 2 I n Au gu s t 2 0 0 6
, the Depa rtment sent the plaintiffs a notice of tax defic iency , which

asser ted that the plaintiffs owed $ 1,842,582 in unpaid income taxes and penalties for the
y ear s from 1996 throug h 2004. After submitt ing pay ment under protest, the plaintiffs filed

a complaint seeking a decla ration that they wer e not I llinois residen t s during the disputed period. Prior to filing cross-motions for summary judgme nt, the parties stipulated to the fac ts of the c ase. ¶ 3 As the stipulation rec ites, the plaintiffs marrie d “46 y ear s ag o” (appr ox imately 1964, by the date of the stipulation’s filing) and beg an living in I llinois
, wher e Mr. Cain worke d as a self-e mploy ed trader at the C hicag o Bo ar d o f Options Ex chang e unti l 1990. They lived in their l ong time I llinois home unt il 1995, when they purcha sed anothe r lot in I llinois as par t of a plan to sell their old home and build a smaller one. They eventua lly abandone d that plan, and, in Aug ust 1995, beg an wor k on an addition to their long time I llinois home. ¶ 4 I n November 1995, the plaintiffs executed and filed in Flori d a a “d ec l ar at i o n o f domicile” indicating that they had chang ed their domicile from I llinois t o a Fl orida home they had constructe d in 1990. I n the document, the plaintif fs re n o u n ced their I llinois residenc y and decla

red themselves Florida residents. In 1995 and 1996, the plaintiffs

-2-obtained perma nent-re sident identification car ds in Florida

. The plaintiffs also held Florida drivers’ licenses, voted in Florida
, and rec eived Florida jury duty summonses in the rele vant time period, and Mr. Cain held a Florida firea rm license. They had newspa pers delivere d to their Florida residenc e, and Mr. Cain used a cellular telephone with a Florida are a code. They also purcha sed burial plots in Florida. ¶ 5 During the relevant period, the pl aintiffs developed relati o n s h i ps with sever al medica l profe ssionals in Flori d a , b ut th e y a ls o continued rela tionships with I llinois doctors. L ikewise, the plaintiffs reta ined leg al advisors in both states. They used I llinois income tax pr epar ers to help them file their fede ral tax returns, and they made political contributions to I llinois and national ca

ndidates, and some othe r-state candidates, but no Florida c andidates. ¶ 6 During the rele vant period, the plaintiffs divided their time betwee n I llinois and F lorida, with only minimal varia

tion in the t ime allotment from y ear to y ear . In 1996, for ex ample, they spent 159 day s in Florida
, 161 in I llinois
, and 45 elsewhe re, while, in 2004, the plaintiffs spent 170 day s in Florida
, 171 in I llinois
, and 24 elsewhe re. I n t o t al
, from 1996 throug h 2005, the plaintiffs spent 1,700 day s in Florida
, 1,666 in I llinois
, and 28 4 el s ew h er e. Testimonial e vidence indicated that the plaintiffs had a pattern of g oing to F lorida near the end of October
, returning to I llinois for the Christmas holiday
, then returning to Florida until May of ea ch y ear

. ¶ 7 The stipulation cites the plaintiffs’ J uly 2001 throug h Aug ust 2004 cre dit car d statements

as showing that “73% of their expenditures wer e made outside of I llinois
, and t h ey we re making those expendi t u re s outside of I llinois 61% of the time.” The plaintiffs maintained private club memberships in both states: their expenditures at those clubs for the y ear s 2003
t h ro u gh 2007 totaled approximately $236,000 for the I llinois clubs and $422,500 for t h e Florida clubs. Mrs. Cain parti cipated in a Florida bridg e club, and the plaintiffs wer e members, boa

rd member s, or committee member s of seve ral org anizations in both Florida and I llinois . They

attended r eg ularly

schedule d meeting s at clubs in both states. ¶ 8 Mrs. Cain, an interior desig ner, rene wed her I llinois interior desig ner license throughout the rele vant period, and, on her rene wal forms, she did not indicate t h at her addre ss had chang ed. However
, she never used her decorator’s l icense for business in either I llinois or Florida

. ¶ 9 Although the plaintif fs o wn ed co mpanies during the rele vant period, they had limited involvement in those companies. They al s o controlled a foundation that made char itable donations in both Florida a nd I llinois , but Mr. Cain was shifting the contributions to f ocus more on F lorida cha

rities. ¶ 10 After considering th e p ar t i es ’ cr o s s -m o t i o ns for summary judgme nt based on these stipulated fac ts, the circ uit c ourt ruled that the plaintiffs wer e “mer e seasona l visitors,” not residents, of I llinoi s

. Ac co rding ly
, the circ uit court g rante d the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgme nt and denied the def endants’ cross-motion. Be cause there wer e other
matters pending at the time, including claims for discovery sanctions ag ainst the defe ndants, the circ uit court en tere d a finding that there was no just rea son to delay enfor ceme nt or appea l of its summary judgme nt order

. See I ll. S

. C t

. R

. 3 0 4(a) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). The defe ndants now appe al.

-3-¶ 11 On appea l, the defe ndants argue that the circ uit co u rt er red in g ranting the plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgme nt and ruling that they did not owe I llinois income tax from 1996 throug h 2004. “Summary judgme nt is proper wher e ‘the pleading s, deposit ions, and admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.’ ” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v

. Giannoulias
, 231 I ll. 2d 62, 68-69, 896 N.E.2d 277 (2008) (quoting 735 I L CS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000)). “We revie w the circ u i t co u rt ’s g rant of
summary judgme nt de novo .” Empress Casino , 231 I ll. 2d at 69. ¶ 12 The parties spe nd some eff ort disputing the bur den of pr oof applica ble to the plaintiffs in this case

. The dispute, howeve r, is somewhat misdirected. “[T] he term ‘burde n of proof’
encompa sses both the burden of producing evidenc e that will satisfy a judge of the exis tence of an alleg ed fac t and the burden of persua ding the trier of fac t that the alleg ed fac t is true.” Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean
, 95 I ll. 2d 452, 462, 448 N.E.2d 872 (1983). Her e, there are no disputed fac ts. The parties stipulated to all the rele vant fac ts and submitt ed the matter to the court for a leg al decision. To the extent the stipulated fa ct s es tablish the plaintiffs’ chang e of residenc e as a matter of law, the pla intiffs have c arr ied any burden of proof assig ned to them. Thus, this burden- of-pr oof question is no more than a ref raming of the rea l issue on appea l: whether
, under the stipulated fac ts, the plaintiffs wer e obligated to pay I llinois income tax from 1996 throug h 2004. We addre ss that issue now. ¶ 13 Section 201(a) o f t h e I llinois I ncome Tax Act (Ac t) (35 I L CS 5/201(a) (West 2010)) imposes an i ncome tax “on the privileg e of ear ning or rec eiving income in or a s a re sident of this State.” The parties focus their arguments on the question of whether the plaintiffs

wer e I llinois residents during the rele vant time period. Although there are many I llinois decisions defining the conce pt of residenc y in sever al differ ent contexts, those decisions are not controlling here

. As explained in the Depa rtment’s regulations rela ted to the Act, “[t] he
term ‘re sident’ is define d differ ently for differ ent purposes. For example, an individual may be a ‘ resident’ for I llinois income tax purposes but not a ‘ resident’ elig ible to vote.” 86 I ll. Adm. Code 100.3020(i) (2012)

. ¶ 14 I n lieu of citing unrela ted case law, the parties rely primarily on the controlling statutes and regulations. The first o f t h o s e statutes, section 1501(a) (20)( A) of the Act, define s the word “re siden t ” as “an individual (i) who is in this State for other than a temporar y or transitory purpose during the taxable y ear ; or (ii) who is domiciled in this State but is absent from the State for a tem p o ra ry o r t ransitory purpose during the taxable y ear .” 35 I L CS 5/1501(a)( 20)(A) (West 2010). The Ac t fu rt her explains the term “re sident” in section 1501(a) (17), whic h define s the term “pa rt-y ear resident” as follows:
“The term ‘pa rt -y ea r resident’ means an individual who beca me a resident during the
tax ab l e y ea r or cea sed to be a resident during the taxable y ear

. Under Section 1501(a) (20)( A)(i) residenc e commence s with prese nce in t his State for other than a temporar y or t ransitory purpose and cea ses wi t h absenc e from this State for other than

a temporar

y or transitory purpose. Under Section 1 5 0 1 (a )(20) (A)( ii) residenc e

commences wi t h t h e establishment of domicile in this State and cea ses with the establishment of domicile in another State.” 35 I L CS 5/ 1501(a) (17) ( West 2010).

-4-¶ 15 The De partment’s r eg ulations ex pound on these de finitions of “reside nt”: “The purpose of the gene ral definition is to include in the categ ory of i ndividuals wh o

are taxable on their entire net income, reg ardle ss of whether derive d from source s within

or without I l l i n o i s , all individuals who are phy sically prese nt in I llinois enjoy ing the benef it of its g overnme nt, except those individuals who ar e h ere temporar ily
, and to exclude from this cate g ory , all individuals, who, althoug h domi ci l ed in I llinois
, are outside I ll inois for other than temporar y and transitory purposes, and, hence
, do not obtain the benef

it of I llinois g overnme nt. I f an individual acquir es the status of a resident by virtue of being phy sically prese nt in I llinois for other than temporar y o r t ra nsitory
p u rp o ses, he rema ins a resident even though temporar ily absent from I llinois

. I f, howeve r, he leave s I llinois for other than temporar y or transitory purposes, he there upon

cea ses to be a resident. I f an individua l is domiciled in I llinois
, he rema ins a resident unless he is outside I llinois for other than temporar y or transitory purposes.” 86 I ll. Adm. Code 100.3020(b). ¶ 16 Under the above statutory and regul at o ry lang uag e, individuals are considere d I llinois residents if they are prese nt in the state for other than a “tempora ry or transitory purpose” or

are “d o m i ci l ed” in I llinois but leave for a temporar y or transitory purpose. 35 I L CS 5/1501(a)( 20)(A) (West 2010). I f individuals leav e t h e s tate for other than a temporar y or t ransitory purpose, or establish domicile elsewhe re, they cea se to be I llinois resident s

. 3 5 I L CS 5/1501(a)( 17) (West 2010). The plaintiffs here wer e admittedly I llinois residents prior
to their move to Florida in 1995. The quest ions for us are whether their move to Florida constituted a chang e in domicile or a depar ture from I llinois for “other than a temporar y or transitory purpose” so that they lost their I llinois residenc y , and, conversely
, whether their periodic returns to I llinois wer e for “other for a temporar y or transitory purpose” so that they should be classified a s I llinois residents. ¶ 17 We beg in by examining whether the plaintiffs can be said to have chang ed their domicile
to Florida

. Although the Act does not define the term “domi ci l e, ” t he Depa rtment’s
regulations do:
“Domicile has been define d as the place whe re an i n dividual has his true, fix ed,
perma nent home and principal est ab l i s h m ent, the place to which he intends to return whene ver he is absent. I t is the place in which an individual has volunt ar i l y fi x ed the habitation of himself and family
, not for a mere specia l or limit ed purpose, but with the
prese nt intention of making a perma nent home, until some unexpected event shall occur to induce him to adopt some other perma nent home. Another definition of ‘dom i cile’ consistent with the ab o v e i s the pl ace wher e an individual has fix ed his habitation and has a perma

nent residenc e without any prese n t i ntention of perma nently removing there from. An individual can at any one time have but one domicile. I f an individual has acquired a domicile at one place
, he reta ins that domicile until he acquir es an o t h er elsewh er e. T h u s, if an individual, who has acquir ed a domicile in California, for example, comes to I llinois for a rest or vaca tion or on business or for some other purpose, but intends either to return to Ca l i fornia or to g o elsewhe re as soon as his purpose in I llinois is achie ved, he reta ins his domicile in California and does not acquir e a domicile in I llinois

. L ikewise, an individual who is domiciled in I llinois and who leave s the state

-5-reta ins his I llinois domicile as long as he has the definite intention of returning to I llinois

. On the other hand, an individual, domiciled in California, who comes to I llinois with the intention of rema ining indefinitely and with no fix ed intention of returning to California loses his California domicile and acquir es an I llinois domicile the moment he enter s the state. Simil arly , an individual domiciled in I llinois loses his I llinois domicile: 1) by locating elsewhe re with the intention of establishing the new location as his domicile, and 2) by abandoning any intention of returning to I llinois .” 86 I ll. Adm

. Code 100.3020(d). ¶ 18 As the defe ndants observe in the ir brief, this de finition of “domicile” closely trac ks the definition I llinois law ascr ibes the term g ener ally

. See, e.g. , Viking Dodge Inc. v. Hoffman
, 147 I ll. App. 3d 203, 205, 497 N.E.2d 1346 (1986) (“The four elements require d for a chang e of domicile are phy sical abandonme nt of the first domicile; an intent not to return to the first domicile; phy sical prese nce in the new d o m i ci l e; and an intent to make that one’s domicile.”). Her e, there is no dispute that, in 1995, the plaintiffs phy sically left their I llinois home, renounc ed their I llinois residenc y , phy sically moved to Florida
, and decla red Florida their domicile. The difficulty comes in deter mining whether the plaintiffs “aba ndon[ed] any intention of returning ” to their I llinois home. ¶ 19 Aft er t h eir move, the pl aintiffs spl it their t ime roug hly equally betwee n the t wo states. Thus, in some sense, the plaintiffs have maintained an intent to ret u rn to both I llinois and Florida for approximately half of their time throug hout the rele vant period. Howeve r, as the
regulations explain, individuals may have only one domicile, and none of the parties propose that the plaintiffs’ domicile alternated betwee n the two states. Acc ording ly
, this c oncept of “intent to return” cannot g overn our result. I nstead, we rely on the conce pt of domicile as an intended perma

nent home (and of “re turn” as a perma nent, indefinite, or leng thy return)

. I n that sense, the plaintiffs chose Florida as their domicile. Although they maintained contac ts and memberships (and rea l proper ty holdings) in I llinois afte r their 1995 move, the plaintiffs chang ed their voter reg istrations to Florida
, paid F l o rida income taxes, obtained residency

car ds and drivers’ licenses in Florida
, and even filed a decla ration of their Florida residenc y

. Thus, the plaintiffs’ intent is quite clea r: they wished to establish Florida as their perma nent residenc e in 1995, even though they planned to keep ties in I llinois and have reg ular seasona l visits. That is, the plaintiffs intended to live in Florida for half the y ear and visit I llinois
, not the other w ay

around. ¶ 20 Our conce ption of “domicile” finds harmony with the regulatory explanation of the other major component of a residenc y analy sis under the Act: the idea of individuals’ prese nce in,

or depar ture from, the state being for a “tempora ry or transitory purpose.” The Depa rtment’s
regulations define this phrase at some leng th:
“W hether or not the purpose for which an individual is in I llinois will be consi d er ed temporar y or transitory in char acte r will depend upon the fac ts and circ umstances of eac h particula r case

. I t can be stated g ener ally
, howeve r, that if an individual is simply passing throug h I llinois on his way to another state, or is here for a brief rest o r v acation, or t o complete a particula

r transac tion, or perf

orm a particula

r contra ct, or fulfill a particula r

-6-eng ag ement, which will require his prese nce in I llinois for but a short p er i o d
, h e is in I llinois for temporary or t ransitory purposes, and will not be a resident by virtue of his
pres en ce h er e. I f, howeve r, an individual is in I llinois to improve his health and his illness is of such a char acte r as t o require a rela tively long or indefinite period to

rec upera te, or he is here for business purp o s es wh i ch will require a long or indefinite period to acc omplish, or is employ ed in a po s i tion that may last perma nently or indefinitely
, or has retire d from business and moved to I llinois with no definite intention of leaving shortly there afte r, he is in I llinois for other than temporar y or transitory
purposes, and, acc ording ly
, is a resident taxable upon his entire net income even though he may also maintain an a

bode in some other sta te.” 86 I ll. Adm. Code 100.3020(c). ¶ 21 This pref

atory portion of the regu l at o ry d ef i n i t i o n provides us littl e g uidance . The plaintiffs’ prese nce in I llinois was not “simply passing throug h ***, here for a brief ***

vacation, or t o complete a particula r transa ction,” or the like, nor was their presence “long

or indef i n i t e” o r “per

manent[ ] or indefinite[ ].” 86 I ll. Adm. Code 100.3020(c)

. The
regulations follow, however , with severa l helpful illustrations: “1) Ex ample 1. X is domiciled in Fa irbanks, Alaska, wher e he had lived for 50 y ear s and had acc umulated a larg e fortune. For medical rea sons, X moves to I llinois wher e he

now spends his entire time, except for y ear ly summer trips of about three or four months duration to Fa irbanks. X maintains an abode in I llinois and still maintains, and occupie s

on v i s i t s t here
, his old abode in Fa irbanks. Notwithstanding his abode in Fa irbanks, beca use his y ear ly sojourn in I llinois is not temporar y or transitory
, he is a resident of I llinois , and is taxable on his entire net income

. AG E NC Y NO T E : I f in the fore g oing example, the fac ts are reve rsed so that I llinois is the state of orig inal domicile and Alaska is the state in which the person is
prese nt f or the indicated pe riods and purpose s, X is not a resident of I llinois within the m eaning of t he law, beca use he is abse nt from I llinois for other than tempora

ry or transitory

purposes. 2) Ex ample 2. Unt il the summer of 1969, Y admitted domicile in I llinois

. At that time, howeve r, t o avoid t he I llinois income tax
, Y declare d himself t o b e d o m i ciled in Neva da, wher e he had a summer home. Y moved his bank acc ounts to banks in Neva da, and ea ch y ea r there afte r spent about three or four months in Neva da. He continued to spend six or seve n months of eac h y ear at his estate in I llinois
, which he continued to maintain, and continued his social club and business connec tions in I llinois

. The months
not spent in Neva da or I llinois he spent trave ling in other states. Y is a resident of I llinois and is taxable on his entire net income, for his sojourns in I llinois are not for temporar y or transitory

purposes. AGENCY NOTE: I f, in the fore g oing examp l e, t h e facts are reve rsed so that Neva da is the state of his orig inal domicile, and the state in wh i ch the person is
prese nt f or the indicated periods and purposes, Y is not a reside nt of I llinois within the meaning of the law beca use he is absent from I llinois for other than temporar y or transitory purposes. 3) Ex ample 3. B and C, husband and wife, domiciled in Minn es o t a wh er e they

-7-maintain their family h o m e, co m e t o I llinois eac h November and stay here until the middle of Marc h. Orig inally they rente d an apar tment or house for the duration of their stay here but thr ee y ear s ag o they purcha sed a house here

. The house is e ither rente d or put in the char g e of a car etake r from Marc h to Nov ember. B has retire d from active control of his Minnesota bus iness but stil l keeps office space and nomi nal authority in it. He belong s to clubs in Minnesota, but to none in I llinois

. He has no business interests in I llinois . C has littl e social life i n I llinois
, more in Minnesota, and ha s no relatives in I llinois . Neither

B nor C is a resident of I llinois . The c onnection of e ach to Minnesota, the state of domicile, in eac h y ear is closer than it is to I llinois

. Their prese nce here is for temporar y or transitory

purposes. AGENCY NOTE: I f, i n t h e foreg oing example, the fac ts are reve rsed so that I llinois is the s tate of d o m i ci l e and B and C are visitors to Minnesota, B and C are residents of I llinois .” 86 I ll. Adm. Code 100.3020(c). ¶ 22 T h e m ost challeng ing aspec t of this case is the fac t that the plaintiffs split their t i m e roug hly equally betwee n Florida and I llinois

. Howeve r, the above examples make clea r that this level of time-splitti ng d o es n o t rende r individuals’ prese nce in I llinois other than “tempora ry or transitory .” I n the first two examples above, t h e h y pothetical individuals’ three - to four- month y ear ly trips to another state do not aff ect their residenc y , beca

use other factors reg arding their intent are considere d controlling

. The third example is particu l ar l y telling. In this example, the hy pothetical individuals spend over four months in I llinois and
actua lly own a home in I llinois
, but are nonetheless considere d Minnesota residents beca use “[t] he connec tion of eac h to Minne sota *** in eac h y ear is closer than it is to I llinois .” The

same holds true here

. Although the plaintiffs maintai n some I llinois ties, including social club memberships and the continued owner ship of their longtime home, the stipulated fac ts dem o n s t rate their m uch st rong er connec tion to Florida

. As noted, t hey spend m ore money

on Florida social clubs, hold drivers’ lic enses and residenc y car ds in Florida
, and vote in Florida . Mr. Cain uses a Florida telephone number. Alt houg h the t ies betwee n I llinois and their companies continue, the plaintiffs have distanced themselves from their companies. L ikewise, althoug h the plaintiffs’ char itable foundation is still involved in I llinois cause s, the plaintiffs have beg un to shift its focus to F lorida. The plaintiffs also spend m ore money in Florida than in I llinois
, and they have purcha sed burial plots in Fl o ri d a. All of these fac ts demonstrate the plaintiffs’ much strong er connec tion to Florida than to I llinois

. Ba sed on the examples g iven in the regulations’ definition of “t em p o ra ry and transitory purpose,” the
regularity and duration of the plaintiffs’ visits to I llinois do not aff ect their residenc y status in the fac e of this disparity in connec tions. ¶ 23 One last portion of the Depa rtment’s regulations lends further support to our conc lusion
t h at t h e plaintiffs wer e not I llinois residents for purposes of the Act during the rele van t p er i o d. After lay ing out the above definitions, the Depa rtment’s regulations list ty pes of evidenc e that may help to deter mine whether an individual is an I llinois resident. Those ty pes of evidenc e include evidenc e o f “ v o te r r e g is tr a ti o n , a uto mobile or drivers license reg istration, fi l i n g an income tax return as a resident of another state, home owner ship or renta l
ag ree ments, club and/or org anizational memberships and participa tion, telephone and/or other utilit y usag e over a duration of time.” 86 I ll. Adm. Code 100.3020(g )(1)

. Be cause we

-8-have alre ady descr ibed the plaintiffs’ actions at l en gt h
, we will not repe at those fac ts to

dis cu s s ea ch o f these ty

pes of evidenc e individually

. I nstead, we note that the balanc e of these fac tors leads us to conclude that, for purposes of the Act, the plaintiffs wer e residents of Florida
, and not I llinois
, during t h e re l ev an t t ime period. For that rea son, and for the

rea sons stated above, we reje ct the defe ndan t s ’ ar gu ment that the circ uit court err ed in
g ranting summary

judgme nt to the plaintiffs. ¶ 24 Although t h e p l ai n t i ff s h av e fi l ed a cross-a

ppeal, their cross-a

ppeal is devoted to providing another
, separ ate basis for excusing them from I llinois income tax for the rele vant time period. I n their brief, the plaintiffs explain that their cross-a ppeal “will be unnece ssary to de cide if [we] affirm[ ] ” the c ircuit court’ s judgme nt. B eca use we do, indeed, aff

irm the circ uit court’s judg ment, we dismiss the cross-a ppeal a s moot. ¶ 25 For the fore g oing rea sons, we af fi rm the judgme nt of the circ uit court and dismiss the plaintiffs’ cr oss-appe al.

¶ 26 Affir

med; cross-a

ppeal dismissed.

-9-