In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-19-00394-CV

___________________________

VICTOR MIGNOGNA, Appellant

V.

FUNIMATION PRODUCTIONS, LLC, JAMIE MARCHI, MONICA RIAL, AND 

RONALD TOYE, Appellees

AND

MONICA RIAL AND RONALD TOYE, Appellants

V.

VICTOR MIGNOGNA, Appellee
2

On Appeal from the 141st District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 141-307474-19

Concurring and Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
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CONCURRING1 AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The trial court awarded Monica Rial and Ronald Toye $100,000 in attorney’s 

fees. Both Appellant Victor Mignogna and Cross-Appellants Rial and Toye challenge 

this award. While Mignogna disputes the award of any fees because “the trial court 

improperly dismissed [his TCPA] claims,”2 Rial and Toye dispute the amount of the 

attorney’s-fees award, complaining that it was lower than the amount they requested. 

The majority agrees with Rial and Toye, reversing and remanding for a 

redetermination of fees. Because I do not agree that the trial court abused its

discretion, I respectfully dissent. 

II. DISCUSSION

In their sole cross-appeal issue, Rial and Toye complain that the trial court’s 

award of $100,000 in attorney’s fees is improper because they requested and provided 

evidence of $282,953.80 in fees. Mignogna responds that the trial court acted within 

its discretion in reducing the attorney’s-fees award in light of the following: Rial and 

Toye’s “heavily redacted billing statements”; “deficiencies in Rial and Toye’s attorney 

1

I concur with the majority opinion’s disposition of the Texas Citizens 

Participation Act (TCPA) claim.

2

I agree with the majority opinion that, due to its disposition of the TCPA 

claim, it was proper for the trial court to award some amount of attorney’s fees to the 

successful movants. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.009(a)(1); Sullivan v. 

Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016).
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billing statements, including Rial and Toye’s attempt to recover attorney’s fees for 

block billing, billing for unnecessary tasks such as discussions with a NY bankruptcy 

attorney, several hours of discussions regarding alleged death threats to Rial and Toye 

from unknown individuals, unreasonably large time spent on discre[te] tasks such as 

billing over fifty (50) hours to prepare for a single deposition, duplicative and 

excessive attorney work, and for billing time spent on opposition research not related 

to resolving a case under the TCPA”; the fact that Mignogna’s attorney “informed the 

trial court Rial and Toye’s attorney’s fees rates were excessive”; deficiencies in their 

attorney’s fee expert; and the testimony of Jamie Marchi’s expert witness that Marchi’s 

reasonable and necessary fees for “defending the exact same claims and achieving the 

exact same results as Rial and Toye” were $48,137.50. For these reasons and others, I 

agree with Mignogna that the trial court acted within its discretion in reducing the 

attorney’s-fees award to Rial and Toye.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a trial court dismisses a suit under the TCPA, it must award “reasonable 

attorney’s fees” to the successful movant. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 

§ 27.009(a)(1); Sullivan, 488 S.W.3d at 299. A reasonable attorney’s fee “is one that is 

not excessive or extreme, but rather moderate or fair.” Sullivan, 488 S.W.3d at 299

(citing Garcia v. Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex. 2010)). 

We review the trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees under this section

for an abuse of discretion. Navidea Biopharm., Inc. v. Cap. Royalty Partners II, L.P., 
5

No. 14-18-00740-CV, 2020 WL 5087826, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

Aug. 28, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Sullivan v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 

551 S.W.3d 848, 857 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied)). “A trial court abuses its 

discretion if its decision ‘is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding 

principles.’” Sullivan, 551 S.W.3d at 857 (quoting Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441,

446 (Tex. 1997)); see In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. 2019). A trial court 

does not abuse its discretion when its ruling is based on conflicting evidence and 

some evidence of substantive and probative character supports its decision. Unifund 

CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009). And a trial court does not abuse 

its discretion merely because the appellate court would have ruled differently in the 

same circumstances. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 

(Tex. 1995); see Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 620 (Tex. 2007).

B. ANALYSIS

The hearing on attorney’s fees spanned 192 pages of testimony from four 

witnesses as well as fifteen exhibits. After examining the evidence, the majority

opinion states that “[b]y awarding essentially the same amount [to Rial and Toye as it 

did to Marchi,][3] the trial court apparently failed to factor in all of the testimony

3

While the majority opinion says that the amounts awarded by the trial court 

were “essentially the same amount,” this is not what the judgment reflects. Rather, 

the judgment states that different amounts of attorney’s fees—trial and appellate—

and different amounts of litigation expenses were awarded to Funimation

Productions, LLC; Rial and Toye; and Marchi. See Exhibit A.
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addressing expertise and experience, as well as the distinction between a large firm’s 

billing rate and a small firm’s billing rate and the fact that Marchi’s counsel had 

leveraged the ‘heavy lifting’ by Rial and Toye’s legal team to prevail with significantly 

fewer hours at a significantly lower cost.” While noting that “the trial court had

ample evidence upon which to exercise its discretion,” the majority opinion then 

concludes that “the trial court’s comments[4] make apparent what the record otherwise 

4

When referring to the “trial court’s comments,” the majority opinion is 

apparently citing its earlier statements that “the trial court observed that Funimation’s 

bill was $100,000 less than Rial and Toye’s”; that the trial court noted that there was a 

“$234,000 difference [between the requested attorney’s fees for Marchi as compared 

to Rial and Toye]”; and that the trial court stated, “[I]f you brought me a repair bill on 

a car or something, and one is 48,000 and one is 282,000, you can’t say those are both

reasonable, or that the 282,000 was reasonable. It’s the same causes of action.” 

These comments by the trial court should not figure into the abuse-ofdiscretion analysis as there were no findings of fact or conclusions of law filed in this 

case; therefore, we must infer all findings necessary to support the trial court’s 

judgment. Lemons v. EMW Mfg. Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex. 1988); see BMC 

Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); see also Sprute v. Levey, 

No. 04-14-00358-CV, 2015 WL 4638298, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 15, 

2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that where the trial court did not expressly state its 

reason for a reduced fee, “we must infer that the trial court found ‘some of the 

claimed fees to be unreasonable, unwarranted, or some other circumstance which 

[made] an award of the uncontroverted claim wrong’” (quoting Ragsdale v. Progressive 

Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990)). In addition, a court of appeals is not 

entitled to look to any of the trial court’s comments at the conclusion of a bench trial 

as a substitute for findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 

716, 716 (Tex. 1984); see Elgohary v. Lakes on Eldridge N. Cmty. Ass’n., Inc., No. 01-14-

00216-CV, 2016 WL 4374918, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that despite the “trial court’s off-the-cuff 

statement” that it was “going to arbitrarily reduce the award for attorney’s fees,” the 

“trial court heard testimony, exhibits, and the cross-examination contesting an award

of attorney’s fees” and did not act arbitrarily in reducing attorney’s fees); see also Dow 

Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240–41 (Tex. 2001) (“A trial court has the 
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shows,” that “the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded to Rial and Toye 

collectively just over one-third of their requested amount of attorney’s fees.” I believe 

that this analysis goes beyond the scope of our review, interferes with the trial court’s 

discretion, and substitutes our opinion for that of the factfinder.

The determination of what is a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees cannot be 

made by application of some mechanical formula. USX Corp. v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 

753 S.W.2d 845, 858 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ). While a movant must

prove that its requested attorney’s fees are both reasonable and necessary, whether a 

fee is reasonable and whether it is necessary are both “questions of fact to be 

determined by the fact finder,” and each “act[s] as [a] limit[ ] on the amount of fees 

that a prevailing party can shift to the non-prevailing party.” Rohrmoos Venture v. 

UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tex. 2019). And here, where the 

fees were presented under the Rohrmoos lodestar method, the determination of what 

constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee involves two steps, and the trial court may 

adjust the base lodestar up or down if relevant factors indicate an adjustment is 

necessary to reach a reasonable fee in the case. Id. at 494. This second step permits 

the factfinder to determine whether evidence of other considerations overcomes the 

authority to express itself in exercising this broad discretion [over the conduct of a 

trial].”). Therefore, the trial court’s comments did not limit the scope of what we may 

infer from the judgment. See In re Q.M., No. 02-19-00367-CV, 2020 WL 827595, at *4

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
8

presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 501. Here, those considerations could have

included the following:

• Rial and Toye’s attorney’s fees were $282,953.80 while Marchi’s were 

$48,137.50 and Funimation’s were $168,941;

• Rial and Toye’s attorneys’ rates were $650 and $515 per hour as 

compared to Marchi’s attorney’s rate of $250 per hour plus a $100 per 

hour “success bonus” by getting the claims dismissed within six months

and Funimation’s attorneys’ rates of $500 and $410 per hour;

• two attorneys for Rial and Toye testified by affidavits that were admitted 

into evidence that, in their experience, “a rate between $275.00 per hour 

and $515.00 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for the attorneys

working on this matter in Tarrant County”;

• Rial and Toye’s attorney spent sixty hours preparing for a ten-hour 

deposition;

• Rial and Toye had three attorneys appear at one deposition; and 

• few documents were filed prior to the granting of the motion to dismiss.

Further, while the attorney for Marchi—who had the lowest attorney’s fees—testified 

that this was the first TCPA motion he had ever drafted, and the attorney for Rial and 

Toye—who had the highest attorney’s fees—testified that he had extensive 

experience with the TCPA, all movants achieved the same result—dismissal of the 
9

lawsuit at the same hearing and in the same judgment. All of these considerations 

could have factored into the trial court’s decision to reduce the amount of attorney’s 

fees awarded to Rial and Toye.

Rial and Toye’s attorney even agreed that the trial court had wide discretion in 

setting their attorney’s fees. At the hearing on attorney’s fees, he stated, “[T]he Court 

doesn’t have discretion to award zero, but the Court does have the discretion to set 

the amount.” Their attorney admitted that while his rate was $650 an hour, his “rate 

at $300 would also be reasonable, or any rate below [his] 650 rate.” Although Rial and 

Toye had “more timekeepers,” “higher rates,” and “spent more time on the file,” their 

attorney agreed that they “got the same result” as the other movants. Ultimately, he 

simply “ask[ed] the Court to just fill in the blank on what the Court finds as a 

reasonable fee.” Now, on appeal, Rial and Toye urge otherwise.

However, the trial court was not required to award the amount requested by 

Rial and Toye. Rather, as we have stated before, “a trial court is not, of course, a 

mere rubber stamp or bean-counter; even when evidence of attorney’s fees is 

uncontroverted, a trial court is not obligated to award the requested amount.” Mogged 

v. Lindamood, No. 02-18-00126-CV, 2020 WL 7074390, at *18 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Dec. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see McGibney v. Rauhauser, 549 S.W.3d 

816, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (“In the proper exercise of its 

discretion, the trial judge is obliged to do more than simply act as a rubber-stamp, 

accepting carte blanche the amount appearing on the bill.”). And, as noted in Mogged, 
10

reduced attorney’s-fees awards under the TCPA can be and have been upheld as a 

proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion if conflicting evidence of their 

reasonableness exists. Mogged, 2020 WL 7074390, at *18 (citing Ruder v. Jordan, 

No. 05-16-00742-CV, 2018 WL 672091, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2, 2018, no 

pet.) (mem. op.)); see Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978) (stating that “[a]n 

abuse of discretion does not exist where the trial court bases its decisions on 

conflicting evidence”).

On appeal, we must defer to the trial court’s role as factfinder and its role in 

evaluating the complexity and necessity of the legal services in light of the $282,953.80 

requested. See Pro-Care Med. Ctr. & Injury Med. Grp. v. Quality Carriers, Inc., No. 14-18-

01062-CV, 2020 WL 1617116, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 2, 2020, 

no pet.) (mem. op.). We must recognize that the trial court did not need to award the 

full amount of fees requested even if the evidence was undisputed.5

 Smith v. Patrick 

5

The Texas Supreme Court has made it clear that even uncontroverted

evidence of attorney’s fees does not necessarily require a finding of reasonableness as

a matter of law:

In order for the court to award an amount of attorneys’ fees as a matter 

of law, the evidence from an interested witness must not be contradicted 

by any other witness or attendant circumstances and the same must be 

clear, direct and positive, and free from contradiction, inaccuracies and 

circumstances tending to [cause] suspicion thereon. The court, as a trier 

of fact, may award attorneys’ fees as a matter of law in such 

circumstances, especially when the opposing party has the means and

opportunity of disproving the testimony or evidence and fails to do 

so . . . . In [some situations,] the evidence may be uncontradicted, but the trial judge 
11

W.Y. Tam Tr., 296 S.W.3d 545, 547–48 (Tex. 2009). While the testimony of Rial and 

Toye’s attorney was some evidence of a reasonable fee, it was not conclusive. See 

Garcia, 319 S.W.3d at 642. Rather, the determination of reasonableness “rests within

the court’s sound discretion.” Sullivan, 488 S.W.3d at 299. As part of its discretion, 

the trial court could “consider the entire record and common knowledge of the

participants as lawyers and judges in making its determination.” Mogged, 2020 WL 

7074390, at *18 (citing In re A.M., No. 02-18-00412-CV, 2020 WL 3987578, at *4 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see McMahon v. 

Zimmerman, 433 S.W.3d 680, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)

(“Trial courts are considered experts on the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.”). 

After adhering to these principles and considering the entire record, I would conclude 

that the award of $100,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Rial and Toye was well within the 

discretion of the trial court.

III. CONCLUSION

The majority concludes that the trial court’s “attorney’s-fee amount awarded is 

not supported by factually sufficient evidence” and remands the issue to the trial court 

for a redetermination. But the trial court—an expert on the reasonableness of 

attorney’s fees—considered the entire record, heard the disputed evidence, exercised 

could find some of the claimed fees to be unreasonable, unwarranted, or some other 

circumstance which would make an award of the uncontroverted claim wrong.

Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882 (emphasis added).
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its discretion, and reduced the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Rial and Toye. 

Because the determination of attorney’s fees is within the trial court’s sound discretion

and there are insufficient grounds to second-guess that discretion in this case, I would 

affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Delivered: August 18, 2022
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EXHIBIT A
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