Opinion filed August 1 , 2024



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No. 11

- 2 3

- 00 168

- C R

__________ JEREM Y MARTINEZ, JR. , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 32nd District Court Nolan County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 13 798 , 13802 , 13804 , & 13805

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant, Jeremy Martinez, Jr., was indicted in separate ca u se numbers for the offenses of : (1) indecency with a child by contact, a second

- degree felony ; (2) indecency with a child by exposure (two offenses ) , third

- degree felonies ; and (3) continuous sexual abuse of a child under fourteen years of age , a first

- degree felony

. T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 21.02(b), (h) (West Supp. 2023); § 21.11( a) , (d)2 (West 2019 ). The se ca u ses were consolidated for trial. 1 The jury convicted Appellant of each offense and assessed his punishment at imprison ment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twenty years for the conviction for indecency with a child by contact , ten years for each conviction for indecency with a child by exposure , and life for the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child

. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently. Appellant raises two issues on appeal. He contends that we should reverse the trial court’s judgments and ord er a judgment of acquittal for each conviction because there i s insufficient evidence that (1) the State of Texas ha s territorial jurisdiction to decide the se case s and (2) Nolan County i s the county of proper venue for these prosecution s

. We affirm. I. Factual Background Because of the scope of t hese appeals , we only recite the facts that are necessary to address the issues that Appellant has raised on appeal

. At trial, the victim, J.M. , described her home life and stat ed that , from the age s of four to fourteen, she lived with her grandparents , sibl ings, and Appellant at a residence on Alamo Street in Sweetwater, Texas. She explained that when she was fourteen , t hey moved to a residence on Poplar Street in Nolan County. J.M. testified that Appellant sexually abused her from the time that she was six until she outcried to her sister at age fourteen

. J.M.’s cousin, A.M. , also t estifie d that Appellant sexually a bused her each time that she stayed at her grandparents’ home between the ages of eight t o fourteen

.

1 A ppellant appealed from eac h judgment of conviction , and they we re originally docketed in our court as four separate appeals

. However, pursuant to Appellant’s request, our C ause Nos. 11

- 23

- 00169

- CR, 11

- 23

- 00170

- CR, and 11

- 23

- 00171

- CR were consolidated in to Cause No. 11

- 23

- 00168

- CR for purposes o f appeal

.3 The State also presented testimony from Cory Stroman, Assistant Chief of Police f or the Sweetwater Police Department , S pecial A gent Michelle Wilson with the Texas Department of Public Safety Criminal Investigations Division , and SANE

nurses Susie Striegler and Erica Gooding

. Chief Stroman testified that he became the l ead investigator for the se case s after he receiv ed information from the Roscoe Police Department that , during their investigation of a custody dispute , there had been an outcry of potential sexual assault

. During his investigation, Chief Stroman picked Appellant up from his residence on Alamo Street for an interview

. Chief Stroman testified that most of the offenses were alleged to hav e been committed at th at residence. Further, Chief Stroman not at ed i n the request s that he submitted to Hendrick Medical Center in Abilene , Texas for J.M. ’s and A.M. ’s SANE exam s , that the county where the se sexual assaults had occurred was Nolan County. During his interview with Special Agent Wilson, Appellant verified that the residence on Alamo Street was his residential address , and although he did not explicitly admit to the offens es for which he was charg ed, Appellant did admit that he had sexually abuse d J.M. and A.M. when they were minor s

. He specifically described one incident in which he sexually assaulted J.M. in her bed room. Striegler and Gooding reco unted the histor ies that they noted during J.M.’s and A.M.’s SANE exam s

. Striegler testified that J.M. reported that she presented to the hospital because Appellant had touched her , that he was living with her at th e time , and that he would have sex with her and touch her inappropriately when they

were in his bedroom

. Gooding testified that A.M

. explained that Appellant had touched her inappropriate ly multiple times when she was at her grandmother’s house while her grandparent s were either working or outside. Appellant ’s grandmother and the victims testified that she live s in a residence on Poplar Street and stat ed that this residence is located in Sweetwater, Texas

.4 II. Territorial J urisdiction In Appellant’s first issue, he a sserts that the State did not adduc e sufficient evidence to prove that the charged offense s occurred in Texas , which is necessary to establish the state’s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute the se offense s

. See P ENAL § 1.04 (a)(1) (West 2021 ). Texas has jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense if the criminal conduct occurs within its territorial boundaries

. Id. ; Lee v. State , 537 S.W.3d 924 , 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). J urisdiction can be prove d by circumstantial evidence

. Vaughn v. State , 607 S.W.2d 914, 920 ( Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) ; Jessop v. State , 368 S.W.3d 653, 666 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2012 , no pet.); Gunter v. State , 327 S.W.3d 797, 799 –8 00 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2010, no pet.)

. W e apply the Vaughn standar d to determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded that the criminal conduct occurred in the State of Texas

. Vaughn , 607 S.W. 2 d at 919

. Under th is standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. Appellant argues that the State did not present any evidence to establish that the alleged acts of sexual abuse committed by him occurred in Texas or that Texas otherwise ha s territorial jurisdiction over these causes. We disagree. J.M. testified that the residences where she lived with her grandparents were located on Alamo Street in Sweetwater, Texas, and Poplar Street in Nolan County. T he State presented evidence that acts of sexual abuse had occurred at the residence on Alamo Street where J.M. and Appellant resid ed with their grandparents. 2 J.M. testified that Appellant frequently abused her sexually as a child and she report ed during her SANE exam that he was living with them at the time and would commit the acts of sexual abuse in his bedroom

. A.M. also testified that Appellant abused her at their

2 Appellant emphasizes that there were two homes where the sexual abuse committed against J.M. alleged ly occurred: the residence on Alamo Street and the residence on Poplar Street. He notes that if the se offenses were committed when J.M. was younger than fourteen , these offenses could only have been committed at the residence on Alamo Street, because she lived there until she attained the age of fourteen

.5 grandparents’ house on Alamo Street when their grandparents were not home , and the grandmother confirmed that there were many times that Appellant was alone with the children. In fact, Appellant even conceded during his interview with Special Agent Wilson that an instance of sexual abuse occurred at the residence on Alamo Street

. Additionally, Chief Stroman t estified that most of the charged offenses were alleged to have been committed at the residence on Alamo Street and he no ted on the SANE exam request forms he submitted that the county where the sexual a buse had occurred was Nolan County

. Appellant argues that while J.M. testified that the residence on Poplar Street is located in Nolan County, she never testified that th is house i s also located in Texas. Although J.M. did not specifically indicate that this residence is located in Texas, medical records admitted by the trial court state that J.M.’s residence was on Poplar Street in Sweetwater, Texas. T he grandmother also confirmed that th e Poplar Street residence i s located in Texas

. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, we conclude that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have reasonably concluded that the charged criminal conduct occurred in Texas. See Vaughn , 607 S.W. 2 d at 919. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, t he evidence

— which shows that the offenses occurred in Sweetwater, Nolan County, Texas

— is sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction in Texas

. Accordingly, w e overrule Appellant’s first issue on appeal. III. Venue In Appellant’s second issue, he asserts that the State did not adduc e sufficient evidence to prove that venue for the prosecution of the charged offenses was proper in Nolan County. Despite Appellant labeling his venue complaint as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, v enue is not an element of a ny criminal offense, and the6 State’s failure to prove it does not implicate sufficiency of the evidence concerns or require that an acquittal be ordered under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979)

. Schmutz v. State , 440 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; Foster v. State , No. 11

- 21

- 00175

- CR, 2022 WL 5237134, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Eastland Oct. 6, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

. Instead, when a party raises a venue challenge on appeal, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellate courts to presume that venue was proven unless it is “disputed in the trial court” or “the record affirmatively shows the contrary.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 44.2(c)(1); see Schmutz , 440 S.W.3d at 35. Venue need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P RO C

. A NN

. art. 13.17 (West 2015); Fairfield v. State , 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim

. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Further, v enue may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, and the factfinder may make reasonable inferences from th e evidence. Cox v. State , 4 97 S.W.3d 42, 56 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d.). Here, Appellant did not contest or object to Nolan County being the county of
proper venue for these prosecutions in the trial court. Therefore , we presume that venue was proven in the trial court unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 44.2(c)(1). For the charge d offenses in these cases , venue is
proper in the county in which: (1) an y element of the offense was committed, (2) the defendant is apprehended, (3) the victim resides, or (4) the defendant resides. C RIM

. P ROC . art. 13.075. Appellant asserts that the totality of the evidence presented i s in sufficient to support the determination that the alleged acts of sexual abuse committed by him occurred in Nolan County. H owever , we have already concluded, as noted above, that th e State add uced sufficient evidence that the sexual abuse committed by Appellant occurred at the victims ’ grandparents’ residence in Sweetwater, Texas, where Appellant and J.M. resided. Despite this, Appellant argues that , although the7 State add uced evidence that th is residence is located on Alamo Street in Sweetwater, Texas , it did not prove that Sweetwater, Texas is situated in Nolan County , Texas

. W e may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute if i t can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be r easonably questioned. T EX

. R. E VID

. 201(b) (2) ; s ee Barton v. State , 94 8 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (per curiam) (appellate courts may take judicial notice of geographical facts because they are “easily ascertainable and capable of verifiable certainty”)

. We may do so sua sponte

or if a party requests it; we may also do so for the first time on appeal. T EX

. R. E VID

. 201( c); Granados v. State , 843 S.W.2d 736 , 738 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– E dinburg 1992, no pet.). In this regard, w e take judicial notice , as we have before, that the City of Sweetwater, Texas is situated in Nolan County , Texas

. Leyva v. State , 552 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (judicial notice taken that El Paso County is situated in Texas); Williams v. State , 924 S.W. 2 d 189, 191

– 92 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 1996, pet. ref’d) ( taking judicial notice that a particular location in the City of Sweetwater , where the offense occurred, was situated in Nolan County, Texas); Sixta v. State , 875 S.W. 2d 17, 18 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (holding that the court may take judicial notice of the fact that the City of Houston is situated in Harris County, Texas) ; Garcia v. State , 819 S.W

. 2d 634, 636 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi –E dinburg 1991, no pet.) (judicial notice taken sua sponte that Goliad County is situated in Texas). T he record shows that the victim s and Appellant all resided in Nolan County when the acts of sexual abuse occurred. J.M. testified that she lived on Poplar Street in Nolan County. Appellant confirmed that he resided on Alamo Stree t in his interview with Special Agent Wilson , and Chief Stroman testified that he picked up Appellant for an interview from Appellant’s residence on Alamo Street.8 Further, Appellant has failed to show that the record affirmatively (1) negates the State’s proof of venue or (2) establishes that proper venue for these prosecutions exists in a county other than Nolan County

. Therefore, we presume that the State sufficiently proved that Nolan County is the county of proper venue for these prosecutions

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 44.2(c) (1)

. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue on appeal

. IV. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment s of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE

August 1 , 20 24 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.