T.C. Memo. 1998-272

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JUDITH E. STEPHENSON FAST, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 5371-96. Filed July 27, 1998.

Judith E. Stephenson Fast, pro se.

Susan K. Greene, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GALE, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $14,704

in petitioner’s 1993 Federal income tax, an addition to tax under
- 2 -

1 Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all

Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and

Procedure.

2 Petitioner has conceded that she is liable for the

addition to tax under sec. 6651(a).

Petitioner did not file a return for 1993 prior to

respondent’s issuance of the notice of deficiency. In her 1993

return subsequently submitted, petitioner claimed a deduction

with respect to an individual retirement account. The parties

have not addressed this issue, and we accordingly treat the

deduction as conceded by petitioner.

section 6651(a)1 of $1,476.75, and an addition to tax under

section 6654(a) of $206.50.

After concessions,2 we must decide the following issues:

(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to certain business

expense deductions. We hold that she is, to the extent discussed

below.

(2) Whether petitioner is entitled to a charitable

contribution deduction. We hold that she is, to the extent

discussed below.

(3) Whether petitioner is entitled to a casualty loss

deduction. We hold that she is not.

(4) Whether petitioner is entitled to a bad debt deduction. 

We hold that she is not.

(5) Whether petitioner is liable for an addition to tax

under section 6654(a). We hold that she is, to the extent

discussed below.
- 3 -

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. We

incorporate by this reference the stipulation of facts,

supplemental stipulation of facts, and attached exhibits. At the

time of filing the petition, petitioner resided in Houston,

Texas. 

Business Expenses

Petitioner was employed as a faculty educator by San Jacinto

Junior College and as a registered nurse by Eastway General

Hospital. Also, she taught a review course on nursing for Health

Education Systems and contributed to a review textbook as part of

her Schedule C business, Health Care Consultations. Petitioner

has a doctorate in public health and is a registered nurse. 

Petitioner attended an International Conference on Women’s

Health in the People's Republic of China from March 27 to

April 8, 1993, at which she had been invited to present a paper. 

The Conference was sponsored by the Chinese Medical Association

and the Foundation for International Cooperation and Development

and was devoted to public health issues affecting women. The

participants in the Conference were public health professionals

from around the world. Petitioner spent 2 days attending the

formal Conference proceedings that included panel sessions and

the presentation of papers, including hers. On 7 of the

remaining 11 days, the Conference participants, including

petitioner, made Conference-sponsored trips to medical facilities
- 4 -

and met with Chinese health officials, for either half of the day

or for the entire day. Two days, Thursday, April 1, and

Saturday, April 3, were fully devoted to sightseeing. Respondent

argues that the expenses of the trip were not “ordinary and

necessary” business expenses within the meaning of section 162(a)

and that petitioner did not substantiate the deductions under

section 274(d).

The regulations provide that travel expenses are deductible

only if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer’s business. 

Sec. 1.162-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. One of the important

factors in deciding whether a trip is primarily business or

personal is the amount of time spent on each activity. Sec.

1.162-2(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. In an example in the

regulations, if 1 week is spent on business and 5 are spent on

vacation, the trip is primarily personal. Id. Thus, if onesixth of the time is spent on business and the rest is personal,

the trip is primarily personal. Further, the regulations provide

that expenses paid or incurred in attending a convention may be

ordinary and necessary depending on the facts and circumstances

of each case. Sec. 1.162-2(d), Income Tax Regs.

Based on our review of the record, we believe that

respondent's efforts to portray petitioner's trip to China as a

personal sightseeing junket are unavailing. While it is true

that she spent a certain amount of time touring the Great Wall
- 5 -

and other sites of interest, a far greater proportion of her time

was spent visiting hospitals and medical clinics accompanied by

Chinese health officials or participating in the formal

presentation of papers. Visiting medical facilities is not

personal recreation. On the contrary, we believe it bears a

direct relation to petitioner's work as an educator in the public

health field and is accordingly an ordinary and necessary

business activity with respect to petitioner. Consequently, her

travel to China and participation in the Conference activities

were primarily for business reasons within the meaning of the

regulations. As a result, we conclude that the following

expenses claimed by petitioner were "ordinary and necessary"

within the meaning of section 162(a): airfare to China, the

Conference fee ("delegation fee"), visa fee, books regarding

China, travel insurance, slides for presentations, tips,

breakfast, taxi, customs fees, parking, three meals, and a

beverage. Petitioner also claimed several additional expenses

with respect to the China trip that were purely personal or

living expenses which are not deductible under section 262(a). 

Respondent's disallowance of these expenses is sustained.

Respondent has also challenged the China trip expenses on

the grounds that they have not been substantiated in accordance
- 6 -

3 Respondent has not challenged the expenses of the China

trip under sec. 274(c), (h), (m)(2), or (n). We consequently do

not address the extent to which these provisions may limit

petitioner’s deductions.

with section 274(d).3 On this record, we believe that petitioner

has, by means of the receipts, Conference itinerary, and other

Conference materials introduced into evidence, substantiated all

of the expenses found to be ordinary and necessary above, see

sec. 1.274-5T(c)(3)(i), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.

46020 (Nov. 6, 1985), except the delegation fee. Under section

274(d), one of the elements that the taxpayer must prove with

respect to an expenditure for travel away from home is the 

Amount of each separate expenditure for traveling away

from home, such as cost of transportation or lodging,

except that the daily cost of the traveler’s own

breakfast, lunch, and dinner and of expenditures

incidental to such travel may be aggregated, if set

forth in reasonable categories, such as for meals, for

gasoline and oil, and for taxi fares. [Sec. 1.274-

5T(b)(2)(i), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.

46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).]

Petitioner indicated on the Conference materials she introduced

into evidence that the delegation fee covered some meals during

the Conference. We also note that although petitioner spent 12

days in China in connection with the Conference, there is no

stated expense for lodging. Likewise, although Conference events

occurred in four different cities, there is no stated expense for

travel within China. Given that the delegation fee was $3,400,

it is obvious that it covered more than meals. Based on the
- 7 -

record, we find that the delegation fee also covered lodging and

travel within China. Neither the meals, lodging, or travel

expenses covered by the delegation fee have been separately

accounted for, as required by section 1.274-5T(b)(2)(i),

Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985). 

Thus, these amounts are not deductible. While we also believe

that some portion of the delegation fee likely represented a fee

for attending the conference, there is no evidence in the record

from which we might discern that portion, as distinguished from

amounts subject to section 274(d)'s limitations. Accordingly,

the entire fee is disallowed under section 274(d).

Petitioner claimed a deduction for job-hunting expenses in

the amount of $2,372.96. Respondent argues that the trips were

primarily personal in nature. Petitioner took five trips during

the year in issue during which she interviewed for positions in

the health field. On all the trips, she stayed with colleagues

or friends. The first trip was to San Francisco. She had a 1-

day interview and stayed in San Francisco from March 14 through

March 17. The second trip was to Beckley, West Virginia. 

Petitioner had a 1-day interview and stayed in Beckley from

July 1 to July 6. Petitioner has family in West Virginia. The

third trip was to Los Angeles, California. Petitioner again had

a 1-day interview and stayed in Los Angeles from July 6 to July

11. The fourth trip was to Los Angeles, beginning November 27. 
- 8 -

She interviewed for about 2 hours and stayed for about 2 or 3

days, including Thanksgiving. The fifth trip was to Charleston,

West Virginia. Petitioner again had a 1-day interview and stayed

in Charleston from December 23 to December 29.

As noted above, the regulations provide that travel expenses

are deductible only if the trip is related primarily to the

taxpayer’s business, sec. 1.162-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., and an

important factor in determining this is the amount of time spent

on personal activities compared to the time spent on activities

related to the taxpayer’s trade or business. Sec. 1.162-2(b)(2),

Income Tax Regs. Respondent concedes that petitioner has

substantiated the expenses in question. However, petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that three of the trips in question,

namely, the July trip to Beckley, the July trip to Los Angeles,

and the December trip to Charleston, were not primarily personal. 

In the case of these three trips, each was at least 5 days long,

even though the job interview that occurred during each trip was

only for 1 day. Petitioner has failed to show that any of the

remaining time, other than the time during interviews, was spent

on business rather than personal activities. Moreover, two of

these three trips occurred over major holidays. We find that

these trips were primarily personal in nature, and accordingly

petitioner is not entitled to deduct any of the travel costs

associated with them. 
- 9 -

We find that the remaining two trips were primarily for

business. For the November trip to Los Angeles, petitioner spent

only 2 or 3 days there. Even though the trip occurred over

Thanksgiving, we think that 3 days was a reasonable period to

spend for an interview at that distance from her home in Houston,

and we hold that petitioner is entitled to deduct the roundtrip

airfare expense of the trip. She is not entitled to deduct the

expenses of a side trip from Los Angeles to San Jose and back,

because she has not demonstrated a business purpose for this side

trip. For the March trip to San Francisco, petitioner spent 3

days in San Francisco and interviewed for 1 day. We think this

was a reasonable period to spend for the interview, and we hold

that petitioner is entitled to deduct the airfare expense to San

Francisco. She is not entitled to deduct any additional costs

associated with the trip to San Francisco because she has not

demonstrated a business purpose for them.

Petitioner claims a deduction for local transportation of

$448 in connection with her teaching job. Respondent argues that

her employer would have reimbursed the expenses. Petitioner was

required to travel from San Jacinto Junior College to Ben Taub

Hospital and back for clinical work related to her nursing

students. Petitioner could have received reimbursement from her

employer with respect to the expenses of traveling from the

college to the hospital. If a taxpayer was eligible for
- 10 -

reimbursement from his or her employer, even though not obtained,

the expense is not deductible. Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.

345, 356 (1963), affd. 326 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1964); Orvis v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-533, affd. 788 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.

1986).

Petitioner claims other business expenses in the amount of

$7,210.54. She has presented no receipts or other evidence that

she actually incurred the expenses. Her substantiation consists

of a listing of the expenses she prepared shortly before trial,

which was admitted as a summary of her testimony. Thus,

petitioner has not substantiated the expenses and is not entitled

to a deduction. See sec. 1.162-17(d)(2), Income Tax Regs.

Charitable Contribution

Petitioner claims a charitable contribution deduction of

$6,600. Respondent argues that she has not substantiated the

deduction. In her return, petitioner claimed a $4,600 noncash

charitable contribution deduction; in a conference with the IRS

after the return was filed, she claimed an additional $2,000

deduction. Of the $4,600 deduction claimed on the return, $4,000

was for clothing. The additional $2,000 deduction was also for

clothing. The remaining $600 was for various items such as

furniture, electronic equipment, and household appliances.

Under the regulations, substantiation requirements for gifts

of property other than money vary depending on the amount of the
- 11 -

deduction claimed. The regulations set up three tiers of

deductions, for amounts up to and including $500, greater than

$500 but less than $5,000, and greater than $5,000, and require

greater substantiation for each tier. See sec. 1.170A-13, Income

Tax Regs. The third tier applies to “any charitable contribution

* * * of property * * * if the amount claimed or reported as a

deduction under section 170 with respect to such item exceeds

$5,000.” Sec. 1.170A-13(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. For purposes of

this threshold, the aggregate amount claimed for items of

“similar property” is considered. Sec. 1.170A-13(c)(1)(i),

Income Tax Regs. One of the categories of similar property is

clothing. Sec. 1.170A-13(c)(7)(iii), Income Tax Regs. Because

petitioner claimed a deduction for clothing in the amount of

$6,000, she must meet the requirements of the third tier with

respect to clothing. For the third tier, the taxpayer must

obtain a qualified appraisal to substantiate the deduction. Sec.

1.170A-13(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner has presented no

appraisal of any kind and is therefore not entitled to a

deduction for the clothing.

The remaining $600 in claimed noncash contributions, which

is the total estimate for several household items, has been

substantiated as required by the regulations. Since petitioner

has not claimed a single item or category worth more than $500,

the regulations covering noncash contributions of $500 or less
- 12 -

are applicable. See sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. 

Under that regulation, the taxpayer need only have a receipt from

the donee containing the name and address of the donee, the date

and place of the contribution, and a description of the property. 

Sec. 1.170A-13(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. We find that petitioner

has satisfied the requirements of section l.170A-13(a)(1), Income

Tax Regs., with respect to the remaining items and is entitled to

a $600 charitable contribution deduction.

Casualty Loss

Petitioner claims a casualty loss deduction in the amount of

$710.38. Respondent argues that the loss in question was not a

casualty but instead deterioration, and that petitioner has in

any event presented no evidence of the amount of the loss. 

Petitioner experienced flooding in one room of her house that was

lower than the rest of the structure. Such flooding had not

occurred prior to 1993, but in that year it happened several

times during a 1- to 2-month period. Section 165(c)(3) allows a

deduction for losses arising from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or

other casualty”. A casualty is a sudden, unexpected loss, not

steady deterioration over time. Durden v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1

(1944). We need not decide whether petitioner’s loss was a

casualty, because we find that she has not proved the amount of

the loss. The measure of the deduction is the difference in the

fair market value of the house before and after the loss, not to
- 13 -

exceed adjusted basis. Lamphere v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 391,

395 (1978). Ordinarily an appraisal is required. Sec. 1.165-

7(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs. The regulations also permit the

cost of repairs as evidence of the amount of the loss. Sec.

1.165-7(a)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs. However, this must be the

cost of repairs actually made, not the estimated cost of repairs. 

Lamphere v. Commissioner, supra at 396. Petitioner has

introduced no appraisal and no evidence of repairs actually made. 

Thus, she is not entitled to the deduction.

Bad Debt

Petitioner claims a bad debt deduction in the amount of

$750. Respondent argues that petitioner has not proved that the

debts were worthless and that petitioner did not include the $750

in income. Petitioner taught some students in a nursing review

course, and they did not pay her the $750 they had agreed on. 

Petitioner did not include the $750 in income. Section 166(a)(1)

permits a deduction for debts that become worthless in the year

in issue. Petitioner has provided no evidence that the debts

became worthless during the year in issue. See sec. 1.166-2,

Income Tax Regs. Moreover, to be entitled to a bad debt

deduction, petitioner must have included the $750 in income

either in 1993 or in some previous year. Sec. 1.166-1(e), Income

Tax Regs. She did not, and therefore she is not entitled to the

deduction.
- 14 -

Addition to Tax

Petitioner has not shown that she qualifies for any of the

exceptions to the addition to tax under section 6654(a) and the

extent, if any, of her liability for this addition to tax will be

computed under Rule 155.

To reflect the foregoing,

 Decision will be entered

under Rule 155.