J-S03031-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

2018 PA Super 25

MARC BLUCAS AND RYAN BLUCAS

v.

PERRY AGIOVLASITIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2448 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 

2012-10690

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2018

Appellant Perry Agiovlasitis appeals from the Order entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Bucks County on June 29, 2017, at which time the trial 

court granted the Motion to Award Costs and Interest filed by Appellees Marc 

Blucas and Ryan Blucas and Ordered the Prothonotary to enter judgment in 

favor of Appellees and against Appellant in the principal amount of $8,550.00 

along with costs in the amount of $225.00, prejudgment interest in the 

amount of $2,191.18 and post-judgment interest at 6% per annum from 

November 4, 2016, until the date upon which the judgment is fully satisfied. 

Upon review, we vacate and reinstate the award of the arbitrators. 

The trial court aptly set forth the relevant factual and procedural 

background herein as follows: 

On December 20, 2012, Appellees [ ] filed a Complaint 

initiating a landlord-tenant dispute against Appellant. Complaint, 

p. 1. Appellees entered into a lease agreement with Appellant to 
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lease the home located at 6630 Stump Road, Plumsteadville, 

Pennsylvania, from July 1, 2011, until June 30, 2012. Complaint, 

Exhibit A, lines 22-23. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, 

Appellees paid a security deposit and pet deposit equal in the 

amount of $10,000. Complaint, Exhibit A, line 44; Pet Addendum 

to Residential Lease, line 21. Appellees did not renew the lease at 

the end of the term and moved out of the home on June 30, 2012. 

Complaint, Exhibit B. Appellant did not return Appellees' security 

deposit. Complaint, Exhibit C. It is disputed whether Appellant 

neglected to provide a written list of damaged property within 

thirty days of the end of the lease term as required under the 

Lease Agreement. See Complaint, Exhibit A, lines 54-57; cf. 

Answer, Exhibit A.

On February 12, 2013, Appellant filed an answer with new

matter and counterclaim. Answer, p. 1. Appellant contended that 

Appellees damaged the leased premises and therefore breached 

the lease by failing to surrender the premises in substantially the 

same condition in which it was leased. Answer, Exhibit A.1

The parties entered into arbitration[1] wherein Appellees' net 

award was $8,550 without mention of prejudgment interest or 

costs.2 See generally, Arbitration Award. Judgment was entered 

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1 Appellee's complaint sought damages in the amount of $10,000.00 along 

with prejudgment interest and “[s]uch other relief as the [c]ourt deems just 

and equitable.” See Complaint at ¶ 22. Thus, this was a compulsory 

arbitration pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(a) which provides as follows:

(a) General rule.—Except as provided in subsection (b), when 

prescribed by general rule or rule of court such civil matters 

or issues therein as shall be specified by rule shall first be 

submitted to and heard by a board of three members of the 

bar of the court.

(b) Limitations.—No matter shall be referred under subsection 

(a):

(1) which involves title to real property; or

(2) where the amount in controversy, exclusive of 

interest and costs, exceeds $50,000.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7361(a), (b).
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on November 4, 2016.[2] On November 14, 2016, Appellant wrote 

a check to Appellees in the amount of $8,550. Defendant's 

Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest, 

p. 1. The memo of the check stated that it was for "return of 

security deposit." Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 

Costs and Prejudgment Interest, Exhibits 1 and 2.

Appellees sought pre-judgment interest totaling $2,191.18, 

post-judgment interest at 6% per annum ($1.41/day from 

November 4, 2016), and costs in the amount of $225.00. Brief in

Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest, 

pp. 2-3. The $225.00 was stipulated to by the parties. Stipulation.

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2 The arbitrators’ award and notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1307 was 

entered on the docket on July 13, 2016. Specifically, the docket entry 

states:

Arbitration award in favor of [Appellees] in the sum of 

$10,000 for [Appellant] on the counter claim [sic] in the 

sum of $1450.00. Net award to [Appellees] is $8550.00 

EO DIE, Notice of Entry of Award mailed on 07/13/2016. 

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In addition, a docket entry for November 4, 2016, indicates “Judgment 

on Award entered in favor of [Appellees] & against [Appellant] in the sum of 

$8,500.00 Notice 236 sent on 11-4-2016.” (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).

 In Stivers Temporary Personnel, Inc. v. Brown, 789 A.2d 292 

(Pa.Super. 2001), this Court noted: 

Upon entry of the compulsory arbitration award on the docket and 

appropriate notice, the award took the force and effect of a final 

judgment. This procedure differs substantially from statutory or 

common law arbitration, which provides that a party must petition 

the trial court to confirm the award thirty days or more following 

the date of the award. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7313, 7342(b). As 

this case involves a compulsory arbitration award, neither party 

was required to praecipe the prothonotary to enter judgment on 

the award. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7361(d). 

Id. at 294. 
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1 Specifically, Appellant alleged that Appellees badly damaged the 

wood floors, upstairs carpeting, failed to clean the home, among 

other things.

2 Appellees were awarded $10,000 and Appellant was awarded 

$1,450 for the counterclaim.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/5/17, at 1-2. 

In his brief, Appellant presents the following issue for our review: 

Whether the lower court abused its discretion and/or 

committed a clear error of law by opening the judgment and 

modifying the arbitration award well outside the applicable time 

imposed by Pa. R.C.P. 1307(d).

Brief for Appellant at 2. In support of this claim, Appellant posits that:

[t]he order in question, with just a few words and some 

simple math, not only rendered the arbitration hearing and 

unappealed award in this case meaningless, but also, and more 

importantly, undermined the entire compulsory arbitration 

process and disregarded our well-established jurisprudence and 

expectations as they pertain to the finality of judgments.

Without any appeal having been taken by either party within 

thirty (30) days after entry of the arbitration award on July 13, 

2016, [Appellant], in strict accordance with all applicable rules of 

civil procedure, properly entered the Judgment upon it nearly four 

months later on November 4, 2016. Except for the $10.41 that 

had accrued since entry of the Judgment on November 4, 2016, 

[Appellant] tendered full payment of the arbitration award 

($8,550.00) on November 14, 2016. The lower court had no right 

or authority to open the Judgment nearly 7 months later and 

modify the arbitration award to give [Appellees] an award of prejudgment interest that the arbitration panel might or might not 

ha[ve] already given them in the award entered July 13, 2016 

from which neither party sought ay relief within 30 days of its 

entry. 

Brief for Appellant at 6. 

Initially, we must consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction to 

consider Appellees’ Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest. In its Opinion 
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filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court recognizes that “[t]he 

motion at issue on appeal was filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal.” 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/5/17, at 3 n. 4. Nevertheless, without citation 

to any authority, the court opines that the arbitration panel could not make a 

ruling on prejudgment interest because such claim did not amount to a “claim

for relief” pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1306.

3

 The court asserts it was, therefore,

required to modify the arbitration award “with the compelling reason of 

respecting Appellees rights” in light of this Court’s and the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s previous holdings that an award of prejudgment interest is 

a matter of right. Id. at 4. In support of its decision, the trial court relies

upon Thomas H. Ross, Inc. v. Seigfreid, 592 A.2d 1353 (Pa.Super. 1991),

wherein this Court held, inter alia, that the trial court did not have discretion 

to suspend prejudgment interest from the close of a nonjury trial through the 

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3 This rule provides: 

The board shall make an award promptly upon termination of the 

hearing. The award shall dispose of all claims for relief and shall 

be substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1312. If damages for 

delay are awarded under Rule 238, the amount shall be separately 

stated. The award shall be signed by the arbitrators or a majority 

of them. A dissenting vote without further comment may be noted 

thereon. The award shall be filed with the prothonotary 

immediately after it is signed.

Pa.R.C.P. 1306.
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date of final judgment, even where the two-year delay in the entry of 

judgment was due to the court's own neglect in dealing with the case. 

In compulsory arbitration, the board of arbitrators conducts the 

hearing as a judge would conduct a trial without a jury, ruling on 

legal as well as factual matters. Conner v. DaimlerChrysler 

Corp., 820 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Pa.Super. 2003). Whether the harm 

sustained is capable of apportionment is a question of law. 

Capone v. Donovan, 332 Pa.Super. 185, 480 A.2d 1249, 1251 

(1984). Apportionment is a practical inquiry into the specific 

circumstances and depends on the unique context of each case. 

Glomb v. Glomb, 366 Pa.Super. 206, 530 A.2d 1362, 1365–66 

(1987) (en banc), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 

(1988). Allocation of liability among distinct causes is possible 

when the injured party suffers discrete harms or a reasonable 

basis exists to define the contribution of each cause to a single 

harm. Id. at 1365. Once the trier of law's decision to apportion 

liability is made, the trier of fact then decides how to allocate the 

fault. Voyles v. Corwin, 295 Pa.Super. 126, 441 A.2d 381, 383 

(1982).

Hairston v. Allen, 153 A.3d 999, 1002 (Pa.Super. 2016), reargument denied,

(Feb. 22, 2017), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 1028 (Pa. 2017).

When a board of arbitrators issues its award and disposes of each claim

before it, its decision is final unless and until it is appealed. Connor v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 820 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). “If a party 

is dissatisfied with a compulsory arbitration award, he has the right to appeal

for a trial de novo within thirty days. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d); Pa.R.C.P. 

1308. If no appeal is filed within thirty days, the prothonotary, upon praecipe, 
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shall enter judgment on the arbitration award as rendered. See Pa.R.C.P. 

1307(c).” Hairston, supra at 1002.

4

In the instant case, the arbitration decision was rendered and entered 

on the docket and the proper notices were mailed on July 13, 2016. Appellees

failed to file a petition with the Court of Common Pleas to vacate or modify 

the arbitrator’s award within thirty days of that award. In fact, there is no 

petition to vacate or modify the award in the certified record, for Appellees’

Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest cannot be confused with a timely 

petition to vacate or modify the arbitration award pursuant. See Lowther v. 

Roxborough Memorial Hospital, 738 A.2d 480, 485 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 1999). 

In Stivers this Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court had 

jurisdiction to review the appellant's petition to vacate the arbitration award 

which was filed fifty-eight days after the prothonotary had entered the 

arbitration award on the docket and sent the required notice. Stivers, 789 

A.2d at 295. In doing so, we opined:

In compulsory arbitration, once an award is issued, it is sent 

to the prothonotary for entry on the docket and publication to the 

parties. Pa.R.C.P. 1306; 1307; 1308(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d) 

(stating “In the absence of appeal the judgment entered on 

the award of the arbitrators shall be enforced as any other 

judgment of the court.”). Here, the arbitrators forwarded the 

award to the prothonotary on November 20, 2000, for entry on 

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4 The Explanatory Comment accompanying Pa.R.C.P. 1307 stresses that “[i]f 

the award is unintelligible or ambiguous or unclear or subject to alternative 

interpretations, an aggrieved party can only appeal.” Id., Explanatory 

Comment-1981 at ¶ 9.
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the docket, and the prothonotary notified the parties of the award 

on the same day. See Pa R.C.P. 1307.

Once entered, a compulsory arbitration award may only be 

challenged by a timely appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for a 

trial de novo. Pa.R.C.P. 1308(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1308(a) provides in pertinent 

part:

(a) An appeal from an [arbitration] award shall be taken by

(1) filing a notice of appeal in the form provided by Rule 1313 

with the prothonotary of the court in which the action is 

pending not later than thirty days after the day on which the 

prothonotary makes the notation on the docket that notice of 

the entry of the arbitration award has been provided as 

required by rule 1307(a)(3).

Pa.R.C.P. 1308(a). This Court has stated:

The procedure for taking an appeal from a compulsory 

arbitration award is clear. A party to a compulsory arbitration 

may take an appeal from the award by seeking a trial de novo

in the Court of Common Pleas. 42 Pa.[C.S.] § 7361(d). Rule 

of Civil Procedure 1308(a) provides that an appeal from an 

arbitration award must be taken “not later than thirty 

days after the entry of the award on the docket....” The 

Explanatory Note to Pa.R.C.P. 1307 states:

These Rules contemplate that the board will disperse 

after rendering the award, not to reconvene and not to 

hear any motions or applications to amend modify or 

change the award. If any party is dissatisfied with any 

aspect of the award, the sole remedy is an appeal for 

a trial de novo. (emphasis added)

The rules provide only one exception to this procedure.

Subsection (d) of Rule 1307 provides that the court of 

common pleas may mold an award where the record discloses 

obvious errors in either the mathematics or language of the 

award. The court's power to mold is specifically limited 

to correction of such patent errors and is the same as the 

power of a trial court to mold a jury verdict. Pa.R.C.P. 

1307(d). The rule is aimed at the corrections of formal 

errors that do not go to the substance and merits of 

the award.
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Lough [v. Spring, 556 A.2d 441, 442–43 (Pa.Super. 1989)], 

(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Additionally, 

Timeliness of an appeal, whether it is an appeal to an 

appellate court or a de novo appeal in common pleas 

court, is a jurisdictional question. Where a statute fixes 

the time within which an appeal may be taken, the time 

may not be extended as a matter of indulgence or grace.

Lee v. Guerin, 735 A.2d 1280, 1281 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal 

denied, 561 Pa. 659, 747 A.2d 901 (1999).

Id. at 295-97 (some emphasis added; some citations omitted). 

As previously mentioned, the arbitrators’ award herein was entered on 

the docket and notices were given pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1307 on July 13, 

2016. Neither party perfected an appeal for a trial de novo pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 1308(a); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d). To the contrary, on 

November 4, 2016, Appellant entered judgment on the award in favor of 

Appellees and against himself in the amount of $8,550.00 and ten days later 

tendered a check in that amount to Appellees as payment in full. 

Over five months later, on April 17, 2017, Appellees filed their Motion 

for Costs and Prejudgment Interest wherein they did not request that the trial 

court correct a typographical or mathematical error in the arbitration award; 

rather, they asked the trial court to award them prejudgment interest and 

costs. In doing so, Appellees relied upon PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown 

Heirs, 929 A.2d 219, 227 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 2007) for the proposition that a trial 

court has the power to modify a judgment upon the proper application to the 
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court for amendment. 5 However, as stated above, Appellees’ filing of their

untimely motion did not constitute compliance with the procedures applicable 

to the filing of an appeal from an arbitration award and the requested relief 

cannot be considered to be a “molding” thereof. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d); 

Pa.R.C.P. 1307, 1308(a); Stivers, 789 A.2d at 295-97. 

Although it involved review of a common law arbitration award, this 

Court’s prior decision in F.J. Busse Co., Inc. v. Sheila Zipporah, L.P., 879 

A.2d 809 (Pa.Super. 2005) is instructive herein. In that case, the appellee 

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5 We find the facts of PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, which involved a 

mortgage foreclosure action, to be distinguishable from those presented 

herein. There, this Court found a trial court could modify an unappealed order 

within thirty days after its entry under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 and had the 

authority to open a judgment by default under applicable Pennsylvania Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Specifically, we stated: 

it is well settled that “a court upon notice to the parties may 

modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry ... if no 

appeal from such an order has been taken or allowed.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. “Under section 5505, the trial court has broad 

discretion to modify or rescind an order, and this power may be 

exercised sua sponte or invoked pursuant to a party's motion for 

reconsideration.” Haines v. Jones, 830 A.2d 579, 584 

(Pa.Super.2003). “[T]he trial court may consider a motion for 

reconsideration only if the motion for reconsideration is filed 

within thirty days of the entry of the disputed order.” Id. “The 

mere filing of a motion for reconsideration, however, is insufficient 

to toll the appeal period.” Valley Forge Center Associates, 693 

A.2d at 245. “If the trial court fails to grant reconsideration 

expressly within the prescribed 30 days, it loses the power to act 

upon both the [motion] and the original order.” Id.

Id. at 226.
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filed a petition to modify the amount of an arbitrator’s award with the trial 

court to include an additional award of counsel fees and costs.

6

 The appellee

contended that fees and expenses were mandatory under the Contractor 

Payment Act because he had been the substantially prevailing party in the 

action and the failure to award counsel fees pursuant thereto constituted a 

procedural irregularity by the arbitrators. 

The trial court agreed that the award of counsel fees and expenses was 

mandatory and entered an order directing the arbitrators to determine the 

amount of counsel fees due to the appellees. The trial court then stayed all 

proceedings pending an appeal wherein the appellant argued that the 

arbitrators' failure to award counsel fees did not constitute an irregularity 

under Pennsylvania law which would require the vacating or modification of 

the arbitration award. Instead, the appellant contended the arbitrators' failure 

to award counsel fees and expenses was merely an error of law on their part

and, thus, did not form a basis for modifying the common law arbitration 

award. Id. at 810-12. 

This Court agreed and in doing so reasoned as follows: 

[T]his claim is actually a contention that the arbitrators made an 

error of law by ignoring the relevant provision of the Contractor 

Payment Act. As set forth above, a common law arbitration award 

is not reviewable for an error of law. Therefore, regardless of 

whether the arbitrators committed an error of law, the arbitrator's 

award cannot be vacated on this basis.

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6 The timeliness of the petition was not discussed as part of the factual and 

procedural history. 
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***

Here, although appellee claims that there was an irregularity in 

the process employed by the arbitrators, his allegations in fact 

assert that the arbitrators made an error of law by not awarding 

attorney's fees under the Contractor Payment Act. As we 

previously indicated, an error of law by the arbitrators is not a 

basis upon which a trial court, which is reviewing an arbitration 

decision, may modify that decision. Thus, . . . we conclude that 

the trial court in the present case abused its discretion in ordering 

modification of the arbitrator's decision. Accordingly, we must 

reverse the Order on appeal and reinstate the award of the 

arbitrators. 

Id. at 812 (citations omitted). 

Presently, the panel of arbitrators made no specific findings of fact or 

conclusions of law; however, its award indicates it believed aspects of both 

parties’ arguments, as neither party received the entire amount of damages 

that it had requested. In addition, although claims for prejudgment interest 

and costs had been presented to the arbitrators, the arbitration award in favor 

of Appellees was unclear as to whether it included a portion of the security

and pet deposits along with prejudgment interest and costs or was comprised 

of the security and pet deposits alone. Thus, in light of the foregoing, we 

conclude that because Appellee did not file a timely appeal from the 

arbitrator’s award, the trial court was without authority to revisit the issue of 

prejudgment interest. See Hairston, supra, at 1004. The arbitrators’ 

decision was final and the subsequent judgment on the award was entered 

correctly and should not be disturbed. Id. 
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Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellees’ 

Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest. Therefore, we reverse and vacate 

its June 29, 2017, Order, reinstate the arbitrator’s award entered on July 13, 

2016, and direct the parties to comply therewith. 

Order vacated. Arbitrator’s award reinstated. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/9/18