alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stephanie Wallace, Individually and on Behalf of The Salmon Group, Inc., Appellant, v Stephen Crisman et al., Respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Francis N. Pécora, J.), entered September 27, 1990, which, *inter alia,*granted defendants’ motion to sever and stay the first, second, third and seventh causes of action, and dismissed the sixth cause of action, of the amended complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action based upon alleged misappropriation of assets of The Salmon Group, Inc. by defendants and alleged willful misrepresentations to induce plaintiff to purchase shares of stock in the corporation.

The court properly severed the derivative claims raised in the first, second, third and seventh causes of action, pending the outcome of the fifth cause of action for rescission of plaintiff’s subscription agreement. Should plaintiff succeed in rescinding the subscription agreement she would no longer possess the requisite interest in the affairs of the corporation *(see generally, Steinberg v Steinberg,*106 Misc 2d 720; *cf., Center v Hampton Affiliates,*66 NY2d 782).

The cause of action for fraud fails to meet the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016 (b) *(Bramex Assocs. v CBI Agencies,*149 AD2d 383). Plaintiff did not adequately allege an intent to deceive nor set forth factual details showing specific damages resulting from alleged misrepresentations *(see, Gordon v De Laurentiis Corp.,*141 AD2d 435). Nor may a fraud claim arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract or allegations that a defendant did not intend to *323perform a contract when made *(Gordon v De Laurentiis Corp., supra).*Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Ellerin, Ross and Rubin, JJ.
#### Ralph Eugene BYNUM, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-87-222.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

July 21, 1987.

James A. Clark, Mordy & Clark, Inc., Ardmore, for appellant.

Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen., Terry J. Jenks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

BRETT, Presiding Judge:

Appellant, Ralph Eugene Bynum, Jr., was convicted by a jury of two counts of Feloniously Carrying a Firearm in Marshall County Case No. CRF-79-43. 21 O.S.1971, § 1283. He was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of seven years, two months and two days each with a recommendation that five years of his sentence be suspended.

Appellant has been out on bail since his conviction on April 6, 1981. This Court previously found that appellant was without fault in his failure to appeal this case in a timely manner, and he was granted a late appeal. Since appellant does not recite the facts involved in these two offenses, we will assume the facts are not in dispute.

*1023Appellant was convicted on a guilty plea of Unlawful Possession of a Narcotic Drug, to-wit: Marijuana, in Dallas County, Texas on January 21, 1972, and was sentenced to a term of five years with the Texas Department of Corrections. This is the prior felony conviction that triggered the instant offenses. Appellant’s sole contention is a claim that, although, the crime he was convicted of in Texas was a felony there, it is only a misdemeanor in Oklahoma. Appellant cites as authority a 1971 case that deals only with enhancement. *See Fischer v.*State, 483 P.2d 1165 (Okl.Cr.1971).

This case does not deal with enhancement but a separate crime that has as an element a prior felony conviction. *See*21 O.S.1981, § 51. The pertinent language of the statute under which appellant was prosecuted provides that “It shall be unlawful for any person having previously been convicted of *any*felony in *any*court of a state or the United States ...” [Emphasis added] to possess a firearm. As in *Fenter v. State,*695 P.2d 12 (Okl.Cr.1985), appellant has confused the use of a prior felony for sentencing purposes with a crime where one of the elements of the offense is a prior felony. Section 1283 is clear and leaves no room for appellant's interpretation. This Court will not undertake to dissect the statutes of its sister states and redefine the meaning of a felony on a case by case basis as appellant has suggested.

The judgment and sentence on both counts are AFFIRMED.

BUSSEY and PARKS, JJ., concur.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1971 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Mesosulfuronmethyl. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 28, 2009 

Mr. CRAPO introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 

Mesosulfuronmethyl. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. MESOSULFURONMETHYL. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.11.48 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 Mesosulfuronmethyl) is amended by striking ‘‘12/31/ 

7 2009’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies with respect to goods entered, or 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1971 IS

1 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

2 the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

|I, Stanley J. Gadek, certify that:
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|Date: March 12, 2004 |  | By: | /s/  Stanley J. Gadek
Stanley J. Gadek
Senior Vice President, Finance,
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
|-------------------- |  | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### Top-All Varieties, Inc., Appellant, v Raj Development Co. et al., Respondents. (Action No. 1.) Richard Albert, Respondent, v Top-All Varieties, Inc., Appellant. (Action No. 2.)

In two actions, *inter alia,*for judgments declaring the parties’ respective rights under a lease, the tenant Top-All Varieties, Inc., appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gurahian, J.), entered September 21, 1989, as granted that branch of a motion by Raj Development Co. and Richard Albert, the defendants in Action Number 1, for summary judgment dismissing the fourth and fifth causes of action in Action Number 1, and for leave to Richard Albert to discontinue Action Number 2, and denied its cross motion to consolidate Action Number 1 and Action Number 2.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

*605In this landlord/tenant dispute involving two actions commenced in the Supreme Court, the tenant Top-All Varieties, Inc., contends that the court erred in dismissing its fourth cause of action seeking a judgment declaring that it need not pay certain expenses charged by the landlord, Raj Development Co., as "common area” expenses. At the time that the court dismissed this cause of action, a summary proceeding had been commenced by the landlord for nonpayment of disputed water charges as well as the "common area” charges. Since there was a summary proceeding pending between the same parties in which all issues could be decided *(see, Woollard v Schaffer Stores Co.,*272 NY 304, 313; *New York Univ. v Molner,*119 Misc 2d 989), the court properly determined that the tenant could not seek declaratory relief as to its rights under the lease concerning "common area” charges. We note that this court, on a prior motion by the tenant, refused to stay the same summary proceeding after June 18, 1990, and the trial of that proceeding is imminent.

We also find that the court did not err in dismissing the tenant’s fifth cause of action seeking an accounting concerning some alleged overcharged "common area” expenses. A fiduciary relationship between the parties is necessary in order to obtain an accounting *(see, Mendelson v Feinman,*143 AD2d 76). The tenant has not established a fiduciary relationship between the parties justifying such a remedy *(see, Keating v Weinberger,*160 AD2d 675; *NOPA Realty Corp. v Central Caterers,*91 AD2d 991).

We have reviewed the tenant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Kunzeman, J. P., Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
• 

2/24/92 . SPA 9 

RCRA REVISION CHECKLIST 72 

Modification of F019 Listing 

55 FR 5340-5342 

February 14, 1990 

(Non-HSWA Cluster VI) 

FEDERAL 

REQUIREMENT 

FEDERAL 

RCRA 

CITATION 

ANALOGOUS 

STATE 

CITATION 

STATE ANALOG IS: 

MORE 

EQUIV- STRINALENT GENT 

BROADER IN 

SCOPE 

PART 261 - IDENTIFICATION AND LISTING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE WAC 173-303 

SUBPART 0 - LISTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES 

t HAZARDOUS WASTE FROM NON-SPECIFIC SOURCES 

revi se entry' 

IF019" 261.31 9904 x 

Industry and EPA hazardous Hazard 

waste No. Hazardous waste code 

* * * * * * * * 

• 

F019.............................................. Wastewater treatment sludges from the (T) 

chemical conversion coating of aluminum 

except from zirconium phosphating in 

aluminum can washing when such phosphating 

is an exclusive conversion coating process. 

* * * * * * * * 

• February 14, 1990 - Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 31.1

  Certification of Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
            Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
             and Securities and Exchange Commission Release 34-46427

I, William Dioguardi, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Adagio Acquisition
II, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. I have:

         a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

         b) disclosed in this report any change in registrant's internal control
over financial reporting the occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

         a) all deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.

Date: November 28, 2005                        /s/William Dioguardi
                                               --------------------
                                               William Dioguardi
                                               Principal Executive Officer
                                               and Principal Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of Leroy Geames, Appellant, v Patrick Henry et al., Respondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to compel the production of certain documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6), the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mclnerney, J.), entered September 25, 1989, which dismissed the proceeding with prejudice.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion, by (1) deleting therefrom the phrase "with prejudice”, and substituting therefor the phrase "without prejudice to the commencement of another proceeding”, and (2) adding thereto a provision directing the respondents to produce the conviction report of Johnnie Bonds; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondents shall produce the report within 30 days after service upon them of a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry.

Given the respondents’ statement that they were not in possession of any of the documents that the petitioner sought to obtain from them pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6), the Supreme Court did not err in dismissing the proceeding. In view, however, of the fact that the respondents have located one of those documents, specifically, the conviction report of one Johnnie Bonds, while doing further research in connection with this appeal, and since, contrary to the respondents’ contention, the conviction record herein does not fall within the invasion of privacy exception to the Freedom of Information Law *(see, Matter of Thompson v Weinstein,*150 AD2d 782), we have provided that the dismissal of the proceeding is without prejudice to the *826commencement of another proceeding by the petitioner, and the respondents are to produce the conviction report of Johnnie Bonds. Mangano, P. J., Brown, Sullivan, Harwood and Miller, JJ., concur.
----

----

| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| November 5, 2010 | /s/ David J. Bryant                                  |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
|             | David J. Bryant                                      |
|             | Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer |
|             |                                                 |

----

----
Exhibit 32.2      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES- OXLEY ACT OF 2002    I, Jack Wagenti, Principal  Financial Officer of International Power Group, Ltd. (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:  1.This Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the period ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2.The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.     Date:  August 18, 2006   /s/ Jack WagentiJack Wagenti(Secretary, Treasurer, and Director )
<PAGE>
                                                                               .
                                                                               .
                                                                               .

                                  EXHIBIT 21.1

                SUBSIDIARIES OF PERSONNEL GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                             State of
Subsidiary                                Incorporation        Does Business As
-----------------------------------     ------------------     --------------------------------------------------
<S>                                     <C>                    <C>
PFI Corp                                     Delaware          N/A; serves as a holding company

StaffPLUS, Inc.                              Delaware          Venturi Staffing Partners, Venturi Career Partners

Personnel Group Holdings, Inc.               Florida           N/A; serves as a holding company

InfoTech Services, LLC                    North Carolina       Venturi Technology Partners; Broughton Systems
                                        limited liability
                                             company

BAL Associates, Inc.                        California         Venturi Technology Partners

Advanced Business Consultants, Inc.           Kansas           Venturi Technology Partners

Venturi Staffing Partners, LLC          California limited     Venturi Staffing Partners, Venturi Career Partners
                                        liability company

Venturi Texas Staffing Partners, LP       Texas limited        Venturi Staffing Partners, Venturi Career Partners
                                           partnership
</TABLE>
#### Stacia Nautel, Respondent, v David Crates, Appellant.

Yesawich, Jr., J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Doran, J.), entered February 15, 1990 in Schenectady County, which partially granted plaintiffs motion to set aside a verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff, and, *inter alia,*ordered a new trial on the issue of future damages.

As a result of a fall, plaintiff sustained a fractured clavicle and other injuries; this negligence action followed. A jury awarded plaintiff $10,000 for pain, suffering and disability endured to the date of the verdict, but nothing for future damages. On the return of the verdict, plaintiffs motion to set it aside as inadequate and contrary to the evidence was denied.

*937Shortly thereafter, plaintiff moved again, this time on formal papers, to set the verdict aside. Supreme Court concluded that in view of the uncontradicted evidence that "[t]he bony prominence of the plaintiff’s left clavicle is clearly a permanent disfigurement”, the jury’s failure to award plaintiff any damages for future injury, pain, suffering and disability deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation *(see,*CPLR 5501 [c]).* A new trial on the question of future damages for the permanent collarbone disfigurement only was ordered unless defendant agreed to stipulate to pay $15,000 for that injury. Defendant argues on appeal that the court abused its discretion when it altered the jury’s verdict; we disagree.

Although defense counsel’s recollection is that Supreme Court never saw plaintiff’s clavicle, which she displayed to the jury during the trial, the court’s decision implicitly suggests otherwise. Moreover, the evidence is overwhelming that plaintiff’s collarbone was permanently disfigured. Photographs received into evidence at trial depict a prominent deformity of the clavicle. Both plaintiff and her mother testified without objection that the photographs, though taken approximately one year prior to the trial, accurately reflected the collarbone as it looked at the time of trial. Moreover, plaintiff’s medical expert testified that there was a "deformity” which was "permanent”. Finally, the medical records classified the prominance as permanent and defendant introduced no evidence to the contrary. Given the undisputed evidence respecting the disfiguring nature of plaintiff’s injury, Supreme Court’s decision to adjust the jury award was a reasonable exercise of its discretionary powers *(see, Klump v Bowman,*117 AD2d 857, 858; *cf., Hutchins v Gorlicki,*92 AD2d 1000, 1001, *appeal dismissed*61 NY2d 757).

Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.

*

 Neither party has questioned the propriety of Supreme Court employing this standard of review *(but see,*Siegel, 1986 Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C5501:10 [1991 Pocket Part], at 5).
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 47 (Friday, March 9, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 14321]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-5715]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Part 1

[REG-110980-10]
RIN 1545-BJ55


Modifications to Minimum Present Value Requirements for Partial 
Annuity Distribution Options Under Defined Benefit Pension Plans; 
Correction

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Correcting amendments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document contains a correction to the notice of proposed 
rulemaking and notice of public hearing (REG-110980-10) that was 
published in the Federal Register on Friday, February 3, 2012 (77 FR 
5454), providing guidance relating to the minimum present value 
requirements applicable to certain defined benefit pension plans.

DATES: This correction is effective on March 9, 2012 and is applicable 
on February 3, 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peter J. Marks or Linda S.F. Marshall 
at (202) 622-6090 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing that 
are the subject of this correcting amendment are under sections 401 and 
417 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Need for Correction

    As published, the notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of 
public hearing (REG-110980-10) contain an error that may prove to be 
misleading and is in need of clarification.

List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 1

    Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Correction of Publication

    Accordingly, 26 CFR part 1 is corrected by making the following 
correcting amendment:

PART 1--INCOME TAXES

    Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read, 
in part, as follows:

    Authority:  26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

    Par. 2. Section 1.417(e)-1 is amended by:
    Revising the last sentence of paragraph (d)(7)(vi), Example 5 (i) 
to read as follows:


Sec.  1.417(e)-1  Restrictions and valuations of distributions from 
plans subject to sections 401(a)(11) and 417.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (7) * * *
    (vi) * * *

    Example (5) * * *
    (i) * * * Participating X elects to receive $15,000 of the 
current hypothetical account balance in the form of a single sum and 
to receive the remainder of the total accrued benefit as a life 
annuity.
* * * * *

LaNita Van Dyke,
Chief, Publications and Regulations Branch, Legal Processing Division, 
Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).
[FR Doc. 2012-5715 Filed 3-8-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P