COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, AtLe e and Senior Judge Clements

SHERI REDDICK MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1321- 17-1 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 13, 2018 VIRGINIA BEACH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF T HE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH A. Bonwill Shoc kley, Judge (Debraca C. Arrington, on brief), for appellant. (Mark D. Stiles, City Attorney; Christopher S. Boynton, Deput y City Attorney; Elena E. Ilardi, Associate City Attorney; Theresa B. Berry, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, on brief), for appellee.
Sheri Reddick (mother) appeals the order terminating her paren tal rights to he r two youngest children. Mother argues that the circuit court erred by (1) “f ailing to consider [her] 14th Amendment right to due process;” and (2) terminating her parent al rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Upon reviewi ng the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordi ngly, we summarily affirm the decision of the circuit court. See Rule 5A:27. BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the prevai ling party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Se e Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Mother is the biological mother to four children. 1 In 2012, mother married Brian Goffigan, who is the biological father to four other children. In July 2014, the Virginia Beach Child Protective Services (CPS) r eceived a referral that there was a “tremendous amount of sexual activity” among the eight children. The referral indica ted that mother and Goffigan were aware of the sexual activity a mong the children for a period of a year or more and continued to allow the children to be unsupe rvised with one another. CPS ob tained child protective orders for the eight children. CPS sought polygraphs and psychosexual eva luations for the older children and parenting capacit y evaluations for mother and Goffigan. CPS also ordered that mother’s children not have contact with G offigan because he was a violent felon. Immediately prio r to CPS’s involvement, the SWA T team arrested Goffigan for selling crack cocai ne out of the house. Mother’s two youngest children were in the house when Goffigan was arrested. On September 8, 2014, the Virginia Beach Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) entered a n adjudicatory order finding tha t the two youngest children were at risk of being abused or neglec ted. Based on mother’s promis es to follow a safety plan, her two youngest children were returned to her custody. 2 The older children participated in polygraphs and psychosexual evaluations, which revealed that numerous sexual ac ts, including incestuous acts, occurred in mother’s home for years prior to CPS’s involvement . Mother’s two oldest children were the primary perpetrators. Residential treatment was recomm ended for mother’s two oldest c hildren.

1 Mother’s two youngest children, born in January 2006 and Janua ry 2007, are the subject of this appeal.

2 Mother’s oldest child lived w ith one of mother’s friends, and mother’s second oldest child was at the Lynnhaven Boys Home.- 3 - On January 16, 2015, the Virginia B each Department of Human Ser vices (the Department) removed the two youngest children from mother’s cus tody because mother had stopped following the safety plan. T he Department placed the t wo youngest children in separate foster homes. The Department provided numerous services to the family. Mothe r completed a parenting capacity evaluation. The Department referred mother to individual therapy, case management services, substance abuse counseling, substance abus e testing, trauma group therapy, women’s empowerment group, and a domestic violence cla ss. The two youngest children received trauma-focuse d therapy and individual therapy . Mother and the two youngest children also participat ed in family therapy. One of the youngest children said that he repeatedly told his m other that he was being sexually abused by the second oldest child. He said that mothe r would hit the older child, but the abuse continued. Mother told t he counselors that she did not k now about the abuse. At the circuit court hearing, mother admitted that she never read the children’s polygraphs or psychosexual evaluations. The two youngest children stopped wanting to visit with mother. They would not participate in therapy when she was present. Each of the child ren indicated that they wished to live permanently with his/her respective foster family. A sex offender treatment provide r recommended that none of the children live together due to the trauma and sexual abus e that they experienced. The provider also recommended that mother’s second oldest child nothave any contact with the othe r three children. On March 27, 2017, mother’s oldes t child turned eighteen years old. The Department had arranged for the child to go t o an independent living progr am. However, on the child’s- 4 - birthday, mother picked up the child and took the child to a go dmother’s house. The child left that home within a month and moved in with the maternal grandmo ther. At the time of the circuit cour t hearing, the second oldest chi ld lived with mother, and the oldest child still lived with the maternal grandmother. Theref ore, mother’s two youngest children could not live with mothe r or the maternal grandmother . Mother had no plan to offer for the children’s placement. After hearing all of the eviden ce and argument, the circuit cou rt terminated mother’s parental rights to the two younge st children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and approved the goal of adoption. The circuit cour t entered its final order on July 18, 2017. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS Assignment of error #1 Mother argues that the circuit court violated her due process rights when it terminated her parental rights to her two younge st children. She contends the re is a “fundamental constitutional right endowed and protected by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution” to parent one’s child. She asserts that she is “willing and able . . . t o remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continua tion of the Children’s foster care placement.” Mother endorsed the final or der as “seen and objected to.” A statement of “seen and objected to” is insufficient t o preserve an issue for appeal. Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1991) ( en banc ). However, in a bench trial , an appellant can preserve her issues for appeal in a motion t o strike, in closing argument, i n a motion to set aside the verdict, or in a motion to reconsider. Id. M other did not raise her due p rocess argument with the circuit

court.- 5 - “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a bas is for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonabl e certainty at the time of t he ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of A ppeals to attain the ends of j ustice.” Rule 5A:18. We “will not consider an argument on appeal w hich was not presented to the t rial court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). “The purpose of Rule 5A:18 is to allow the trial court to correct in the trial court any error that i s called to its attention.” Lee, 12 Va . App. at 514, 404 S.E.2d at 737. Mother asks this Court to cons ider her argument based on the g ood cause exception. Mother and her attorney were present throughout the two-day tri al in the circuit court. Mother had the opportunity to object, bu t failed to do so; therefore, the good cause exception does not apply. See M. Morgan Cherry & Assocs. v. Cherry, 38 Va. App. 6 93, 702, 568 S.E.2d 391, 396 (2002) ( en banc ) (holding that Rule 5A:18 applied because the party failed, “w ithout good cause,” to object t o the evidence). Mother also asks this Court to consider her argument based on the ends of justice exception. “The ends of justice exception is narrow and is to be used sparingly . . . .” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989)). “ In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show that a miscarria ge of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)). “All the authorities agree th at ‘due process of law’ requires that a person shall have reasonable notice and a reasonabl e opportunity to be heard befo re an impartial tribunal, before any binding decree can be passed a ffecting his right to liberty or property.” Tidwell v. Late, 67 Va. App. 668, 687, 799 S.E.2d 696, 705 (2017) (quoting Menninge r v. Menninger, 64 Va. App.- 6 - 616, 621, 770 S.E.2d 232, 235 (2015)). “A day in court, an opp ortunity to be heard, is an integral part of due process of law.” Id. (quoting Menninger, 64 Va. App. at 621, 770 S.E.2d at 235). As noted above, mother and her a ttorney were present throughou t the two-day trial. Mother had the opportunity to cros s-examine witnesses, present evidence, and offer argument. There was no miscarriage of jus tice in this case, and the ends of justice excep tion does not apply. Therefore, we will not consider t he first assignment of error. Assignment of error #2 Mother argues that the circui t court erred in terminating her parental rights to her two youngest children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbe d on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. A pp. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citation omitted). When consid ering termination of parental r ights, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. A court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the chil d was placed in foster care to rem edy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Although mother participated i n the services recommended by th e Department and was willing to remedy the s ituation, mother was unable to remedy th e situation that led to the children- 7 - being placed, and remai ning, in foster care. She admitted that she had not read the polygraphs or psychosexual evaluations, which explained the trauma experience d by the children. Mother had custody of the second oldest chi ld, who was one of the perpetra tors of the abuse. The counselors recommended that the children not live together and that the tw o youngest children not have contact with the second oldest child. Since the second oldest child li ved with mother, she had no alternative plans for placement for th e two youngest children. At the time of the circuit cour t hearing, the t wo youngest chi ldren had been in foster care for approximately thirty months. Mot her was not in a position to h ave the children live with her. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc . Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S. E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Accordingly, the circuit cour t did not err in terminating moth er’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is summar ily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.