[Cite as In re J.M.G., 2013-Ohio-2693.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 98990

IN RE: J.M.G. 

A MINOR CHILD 

[Appeal by: R.B., Father]

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case No. SU 09722663 

BEFORE: Rocco, J., Boyle, P.J., and Kilbane, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 27, 2013 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Deanna L. DiPetta 

Victoria A. Glowacki 

Andrew A. Zashin 

Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A. 

55 Public Square, 4th Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE J.G.

Patrick M. Farrell 

Patrick M. Farrell Co., L.P.A. 

600 East Granger Road, 2nd Floor 

Brooklyn Heights, Ohio 44131 

ATTORNEYS FOR C.J.F.S. 

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Joseph C. Young 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

C.J.F.S. 

P.O. Box 93894 

Cleveland, Ohio 44101-5984 
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.: 

{¶1} Obligor-appellant R.B. appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County 

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, ordering R.B. to pay $3,908.15 in monthly 

child support to obligee-appellee, J.G., for the support of their minor child, J.M.G. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶2} J.M.G. was born on August 3, 2008. After the child was born, R.B. filed a 

custody case in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division 

(Cuyahoga C.P. No. PR 09705332), for the purpose of determining custody and 

companionship rights with respect to J.M.G. On June 22, 2009, while the custody action 

was pending, the Cuyahoga County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) issued 

an administrative child support order requiring R.B. to pay J.G. $4,528.11 a month, plus a 

2 percent processing fee, for child support for J.M.G. and to provide medical insurance 

for the child. On July 21, 2009, R.B. filed objections to the CSEA’s administrative child 

support order, along with a motion to modify support and a motion to stay enforcement of 

the administrative child support order, in the pending custody case. 

 {¶3} By magistrate’s order in the custody case, entered on September 19, 2009, 

R.B. was found not to have properly perfected his objections to the administrative child 

support order. He was granted leave until October 19, 2009, to amend and correct the 

deficiencies with his objections. R.B. contends that his counsel never received a copy of 

the September 19, 2009 order and did not learn of the order until a subsequent pretrial in 
the custody matter. In any event, R.B. failed to comply with the September 19, 2009 

order. Accordingly, on December 30, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment entry in 

the custody case, dismissing R.B.’s objections to the administrative child support order 

without prejudice. The administrative child support order then went into effect. 1

 

{¶4} On December 8, 2009, prior to the dismissal of his objections in the custody 

action, R.B. filed the support action that is the subject of this appeal (Cuyahoga C.P. No. 

SU 09772663), in which he refiled the objections to the administrative order, motion to 

modify support, and motion to stay enforcement of the administrative child support order 

that he had previously filed in the custody case, along with an application to adopt 

administrative order, an application to determine child support, and a motion to correct 

child support arrearage and determine overpayment. R.B. argued that his monthly child 

support payment as set forth in the administrative order was excessive and that the 

CSEA’s calculation of the parties’ child support obligations violated R.C. 3119.04(B). 

R.B. also argued that his annual income had decreased, and was expected to continue to 

decrease, as a result of tort reform and a decision issued by the Ohio Supreme Court that 

limited claims in his primary area of practice. 

 1

With the exception of R.B.’s objections to the CSEA’s administrative child support order, 

motion to modify support, and motion to stay enforcement of the administrative child support order 

filed on July 19, 2009, none of the documents from the custody case, including the magistrate’s 

September 19, 2009 order (requiring R.B. to correct certain deficiencies with his objections) nor the 

December 30, 2009 judgment entry (dismissing his objections) is included in the record in this case. 

Accordingly, this recitation of the facts, as it relates to the custody case, is based on the undisputed 

facts as set forth in the briefs of the parties and the trial court’s August 27, 2012 judgment entry in 

this case.
{¶5} On October 6, 2010 and November 30, 2010, the magistrate held hearings on 

the motions. On July 11, 2011, the magistrate issued a decision (1) denying R.B.’s 

objections to the administrative order on the basis of res judicata, and (2) denying R.B.’s 

motion to modify his child support obligation on the ground that R.B. had failed to prove 

a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of the child support order. 

Under the magistrate’s decision, R.B.’s monthly child support obligation of $4,528.11 

(plus fee) remained unchanged. On July 25, 2011, R.B. filed “preliminary objections” to 

the magistrate’s decision. Without ruling on R.B.’s objections, on October 5, 2011, the 

trial court entered judgment on the magistrate’s decision, adopting the magistrate’s 

decision in full. 

{¶6} On October 27, 2011, R.B. filed an appeal with this court. The appeal was 

dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order and remanded to the trial court. Upon 

remand, the trial court permitted the parties to submit supplemental objections to the 

magistrate’s decision. In his preliminary and supplemental objections, R.B. objected to 

the magistrate’s recommended denial of his December 8, 2009 objections to the 

administrative child support order, arguing that (1) denial of his objections would elevate 

“form over substance” and violate due process, and (2) the December 30, 2009 dismissal 

of his July 21, 2009 objections had no res judicata effect. R.B. also objected to the 

magistrate’s recommended denial of his motion to modify his child support obligation, 

arguing that (1) the court abused its discretion in determining that there had not been a 

sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification of the child support order, (2) 
additional income should have been imputed to J.G., and (3) the calculation of his child 

support obligation did not comply with R.C. 3119.04(B) and 3119.22. 

 {¶7} On August 27, 2012, the trial court issued a judgment entry, ruling on each of 

R.B.’s objections and adopting the magistrate’s decision in part and modifying it in part. 

With respect to R.B.’s objections to the administrative child support order, the trial court 

determined that it had “no jurisdiction over the matters dealt with in [the custody matter]” 

and that R.B.’s objections to the administrative order filed on December 8, 2009, were 

untimely, having been filed outside the 30-day time period prescribed by R.C. 3111.84. 

As such, R.B.’s objections were denied. With respect to R.B.’s motion to modify the 

administrative child support order, the trial court determined that R.B. had demonstrated a 

significant change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of the child support 

order. Using the extrapolation method of computing child support, the trial court 

determined the parties’ child support obligations (including $50,000 in income imputed to 

J.G.) by completing the basic child support computation worksheet based on the parties’ 

combined gross income. Concluding that there was a greater than 10 percent difference 

between R.B.’s child support obligation as computed on the worksheet and the child 

support ordered in the June 22, 2009 child support administrative order, the trial court 

held that R.B. was entitled to a modification of his child support obligation. The trial 

court ordered R.B. to pay monthly child support of $3,908.15 if he provided health 

insurance for J.M.G., and $4,026.77 in monthly child support if health insurance was not 

provided. 
{¶8} R.B. appeals the trial court’s judgment, raising seven assignments of error: 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court erred in finding that the magistrate’s decision was minimally 

sufficient so that it could conduct the independent review thereof as 

required by Civil Rule 53 and Juvenile Rule 40. 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the appellant’s 

objections to the administrative child support order under the Ohio savings 

statute. 

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the appellant’s objections 

to the administrative child support order and application to determine child 

support after appellant had corrected any procedural defects stated in the 

magistrate’s September 19, 2009 order. 

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court erred in finding that the child was entitled to the standard of 

living that he would have enjoyed if the parties married or resided together 

with the child. 

FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court denied appellant his federal and Ohio constitutional due 

process right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time when it 

dismissed his objections to the administrative child support order and 

application to determine child support. 

SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court abused its discretion by awarding child support in an amount 

exceeding the child’s current needs so as to, in effect, constitute an award of 

spousal support to appellee. 

SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court’s determination of appellant’s child support obligation is not 

supported by sufficient, competent evidence. 

Standard of Review 
{¶9} We review a trial court’s ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision for 

abuse of discretion. Gobel v. Rivers, 8th Dist. No. 94148, 2010-Ohio-4493, ¶ 16. “In 

so doing, we consider the trial court’s action with reference to the nature of the 

underlying matter.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0049-M, 

2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 18. “Any claim of trial court error must be based on the actions of 

the trial court, not on the magistrate’s findings or proposed decision.” Mealey v. 

Mealey, 9th Dist. No. 95CA0093, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1828, *6 (May 8, 1996). A 

trial court’s decision regarding a child support obligation will not be reversed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390, 686 N.E.2d 1108 

(1997), citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989). An 

abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial 

court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). It describes a judgment 

neither comporting with the record, nor reason. Klayman v. Luck, 8th Dist. Nos. 97074 

and 97075, 2012-Ohio-3354, ¶ 12, citing State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678, 

148 N.E. 362 (1925). As long as the trial court’s decision is supported by some 

competent, credible evidence, a reviewing court will not disturb it. Brokaw v. Brokaw, 

8th Dist. No. 97477, 2012-Ohio-2630, ¶ 21, citing Masitto v. Masitto, 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 

488 N.E.2d 857 (1986). 

Objections to Administrative Child Support Order 
{¶10} For ease of discussion, we address R.B.’s assignments of error out of order. 

R.B.’s second, third, and fifth assignments of error relate to the trial court’s denial of his 

objections to the CSEA’s administrative child support order. R.B. contends that the trial 

court’s denial of his December 8, 2009 objections as untimely under R.C. 3111.84 

violated the savings statute. R.B. further contends that the trial court’s denial of his 

objections after he had corrected the procedural deficiencies with the objections 

constituted an abuse of discretion and denied R.B. “a meaningful hearing at a meaningful 

time” in violation of the due process clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.2

 For the reasons that follow, R.B.’s arguments are meritless. 

{¶11} R.C. 3111.84 governs the filing of objections to administrative child support 

orders. R.C. 3111.84 provides: 

The mother or father of a child who is the subject of an administrative 

support order may object to the order by bringing an action for the payment 

of support and provision for the child’s health care under section 2151.231 

of the Revised Code in the juvenile court or other court with jurisdiction 

 2

As noted above, neither the magistrate’s September 19, 2009 order, requiring R.B. to correct 

certain deficiencies with his objections, nor the December 30, 2009 judgment entry in the custody 

case, dismissing the objections based on R.B.’s failure to correct those deficiencies, is part of the 

record in this case. Nor do we find anything in the record in this case (other than the conclusory 

assertions of counsel) supporting R.B.’s contentions that he did not timely receive notice of the 

magistrate’s September 19, 2009 order or that he promptly corrected the deficiencies with his 

objections once he learned of the order. Accordingly, we have no way of assessing whether R.B. 

corrected the deficiencies identified in the September 19, 2009 order. R.B. contends that the trial 

court “mistakenly dismissed” his objections in the custody case because they “were filed under the 

parties’ custody matter * * * instead of being filed in a matter that is designated ‘support’” and that he 

“rectified * * * any procedural defects” simply by refiling his objections in this support action. The 

trial court, however, observed that R.B. also failed to “(a) join all necessary parties, (b) designate the 

parties, and (c) seek the appropriate relief,” “failings” that it described as “prejudicial to the other 

parties” in the case. 
under section 2101.022 or 2301.03 of the Revised Code of the county in 

which the child support enforcement agency that employs the administrative 

officer is located. The action shall be brought not later than thirty days 

after the date of the issuance of the administrative support order. If neither 

the mother nor the father brings an action for the payment of support and 

provision for the child’s health care within that thirty-day period, the 

administrative support order is final and enforceable by a court and may be 

modified only as provided in Chapters 3119., 3121., and 3123. of the 

Revised Code. 

{¶12} In this case, it is undisputed that R.B.’s objections to the administrative child 

support order were filed on December 8, 2009 — well outside the statutory 30-day time 

frame for filing objections under R.C. 3111.84. Nonetheless, R.B. contends that the trial 

court erred in denying his objections to the administrative child support order based on 

Ohio’s savings statute. Specifically, R.B. contends that because R.C. 3111.84 requires 

the bringing of an “action” to assert to an administrative support order, his July 21, 2009 

and December 8, 2009 objections were “actions” within the meaning of Ohio’s savings 

statute, R.C. 2305.19(A). R.C. 2305.19(A) provides, in relevant part: 

In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced 

* * * if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff * * * 

may commence a new action within one year after the date of * * * the 

plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the 

original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. 

Thus, R.B. argues that the savings statute “saved” his otherwise untimely December 8, 

2009 objections, entitling him to refile his objections within one year of the trial court’s 

dismissal of his July 21, 2009 objections without prejudice in the custody action. 

{¶13} R.B. did not raise his savings statute argument below. Generally, an 

appellate court will not consider a legal theory or issue a party failed to raise in the trial 
court. See, e.g., State ex rel. Zollner v. Indus. Comm., 66 Ohio St.3d 276, 278, 611 

N.E.2d 830 (1993). Even if, however, we were to consider R.B.’s savings statute 

argument, it has no merit. 

{¶14} R.C. 2305.19 affords a plaintiff a limited time period within which to refile 

a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time barred. As an initial matter, we have 

doubts as to whether the legislature intended the savings statute to apply to “actions” 

raising objections to an administrative child support order. Compare United Tel. Credit 

Union, Inc. v. Roberts, 115 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-5247, 875 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 25 

(savings statute does not apply to actions brought under R.C. 1733.361 because its 

application would adversely affect the administration of conservatorship). However, we 

need not decide that issue in this case because R.B. did not otherwise satisfy the 

requirements for application of the savings statute. 

{¶15} The savings statute applies where a second action is commenced “within 

one year after the date of * * * the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits.” 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2305.19(A). R.B.’s December 8, 2009 objections, however, 

were filed prior to the dismissal of his July 21, 2009 objections. Accordingly, the 

savings statute does not “save” R.B.’s untimely December 8, 2009 objections. See, e.g., 

GLA Water Mgt. Co. v. Univ. of Toledo, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1129, 2011-Ohio-4655, ¶ 

17 (“‘the savings statute does not apply where a plaintiff files a second complaint before 

failing otherwise than upon the merits in a previous complaint’”), quoting Windsor 

House, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-584, 
2010-Ohio-257, ¶ 19 (savings statute did not apply to plaintiff’s court of claims complaint 

where plaintiff had not “failed otherwise than upon the merits” in the court of common 

pleas before filing second action in the court of claims). “Although courts liberally 

construe the savings statute, a plaintiff must satisfy the criteria of the statute in order to 

prevent circumvention of the statute of limitations and unfairness to defendants.” 

Boozer v. Univ. of Cincinnati School of Law, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1099, 

2006-Ohio-2610, ¶ 32 (savings statute did not apply where plaintiff filed a second 

complaint before failing otherwise than upon the merits on prior complaint), citing 

Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp., 73 Ohio St.3d 391, 397, 653 N.E.2d 235 

(1995). R.B.’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶16} In his third and fifth assignments of error, R.B. contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion in dismissing his objections to the administrative child support order 

after he had “corrected any procedural defects” stated in the magistrate’s September 19, 

2009 order. He further contends that the denial of his objections, without a hearing, 

after he had corrected such “defects” denied him “a meaningful hearing at a meaningful 

time” in violation of the due process clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 

 

 {¶17} R.B.’s complaints regarding what allegedly occurred in the custody case — 

e.g., his alleged non-receipt of the September 19, 2009 order, the requirement that he 

refile his objections in a separate support action, and R.B.’s purported correction of the 

“procedural defects” identified in the September 19, 2009 order prior to the dismissal of 
his objections — are not the proper subject of this appeal. This appeal does not 

involve the happenings or rulings in the custody case. 

{¶18} The trial court’s judgment in this case — the subject of this appeal — 

was not based on what R.B. or the trial court did (or failed to do) in the custody case. 

As the trial court aptly observed, this court “has no jurisdiction over matters dealt with in 

[the child custody case]. If [R.B.] wished to challenge the [c]ourt’s actions in [the child 

custody case], he was obligated to do so then and within that case.” 

{¶19} With respect to R.B.’s claim that he was denied a “meaningful opportunity 

to be heard” concerning his objections to the administrative child support order, R.C. 

3111.84 provided him such an opportunity. Under R.C. 3111.84, a parent who is the 

subject of an administrative child support order may bring an action under R.C. 2151.231, 

objecting to the administrative order. R.B., however, failed to perfect his objections in 

accordance with the statutory scheme and then chose not to challenge the trial court’s 

actions in the custody case at the appropriate time, within that case. 

{¶20} If R.B. disagreed with the September 19, 2009 order in the custody case or 

the subsequent judgment entry dismissing his objections for non-compliance with that 

order, he should have sought the appropriate relief at that time, in that case. Having 

failed to do so, he cannot claim the actions of the trial court in the custody case as errors 

in this case. Accordingly, R.B.’s third and fifth assignments of error are overruled. 

Calculation of Modified Child Support Obligation 

Independent Review of Magistrate’s Decision 
{¶21} R.B.’s remaining assignments of error relate to the trial court’s calculation 

of R.B.’s modified child support obligation. In his first assignment of error, R.B. 

contends that the magistrate’s decision contained insufficient facts regarding J.M.G.’s 

needs and the parties’ standard of living and that the trial court, therefore, could not have 

conducted a proper independent review of the magistrate’s decision as required by Civ.R. 

53 and Juv.R. 40. We disagree. 

 {¶22} Under Juv.R. 40 and Civ.R. 53, when ruling on objections to a magistrate’s 

decision, the trial court is required to conduct an “independent review” of the case, 

having the “ultimate authority and responsibility over the [magistrate’s] findings and 

rulings.” Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 5, 615 N.E.2d 617 (1993). The trial court 

must decide “‘whether the [magistrate] has properly determined the factual issues and 

appropriately applied the law, and where the [magistrate] has failed to do so, the trial 

court must substitute its judgment for that of the [magistrate].’” Gobel, 2010-Ohio-4493 

at ¶ 16, quoting Inman v. Inman, 101 Ohio App.3d 115, 118, 655 N.E.2d 199 (2d 

Dist.1995). 

{¶23} It is generally presumed that the trial court properly conducted an 

independent review of the magistrate’s decision unless the party asserting the error 

affirmatively shows otherwise. Hartt, 67 Ohio St.3d at 7, 615 N.E.2d 617 (“An 

appellate court reviewing a lower court’s judgment indulges in a presumption of 

regularity of the proceedings below.”); see also In re R.J.G., 8th Dist. No. 87427, 

2012-Ohio-3802, ¶ 26 (in reviewing a trial court’s decision, an appellate court presumes 
that the trial court “did exactly what it said it did”), citing Figel v. Figel, 3d Dist. No. 

10-08-14, 2009-Ohio-1659. 

 {¶24} In this case, the trial court clearly stated in its August 27, 2012 judgment 

entry that it had “made an independent review” of the magistrate’s decision, the parties’ 

respective objections and briefs, and the transcript and exhibits from the hearing upon 

which the magistrate’s decision was issued. The trial court further stated that the 

magistrate’s decision, “when read in conjunction with the transcripts and the exhibits,” 

was “minimally adequate” and that the record was, therefore, “sufficient for an 

independent analysis and review.” We do not find that the trial court erred in making 

this determination. 

{¶25} The trial court then proceeded to address R.B.’s objections, providing 

detailed, reasoned rulings with respect to each of R.B.’s objections and specifying the 

facts — including facts relating to the parties’ income and expenses, the child’s needs, 

and the parties’ lifestyles — supporting the trial court’s conclusions, demonstrating that 

the trial court had a sufficient basis upon which to independently review the magistrate’s 

decision. 

The “affirmative showing” required to rebut our general presumption 

requires “more than a mere inference”; it requires appellant to provide the 

reviewing court with specific facts demonstrating that the trial court failed to 

conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s findings. See, e.g., In re 

Taylor G., 6th Dist. No. L-05-1197, 2006-Ohio-1992, ¶ 21. R.B. has pointed to 

nothing in the record that would indicate that the trial court’s August 27, 2012 

judgment was not the result of a proper independent review of the magistrate’s 

decision. Accordingly, we overrule R.B.’s first assignment of error. Use of 

Extrapolation Method to Calculate Modified Child Support Obligation 
{¶26} In his fourth and sixth assignments of error, R.B. challenges the trial court’s 

use of the extrapolation method to calculate his modified child support obligation, 

claiming that it resulted in an award that exceeds the child’s current needs and, in effect, 

constitutes a “spousal support award.” As the party seeking a modification of the child 

support order, R.B. “‘had the burden of proof to establish how the relevant factors would 

support a modification of his child support obligation.’” Strimbu v. Strimbu, 11th Dist. 

No. 2010-T-0104, 2011-Ohio-3629, ¶ 17, quoting Maguire v. Maguire, 9th Dist. No. 

23581, 2007-Ohio-4531, ¶ 14. “‘[T]he trial court has no obligation to investigate and 

develop evidence that the parties have failed to present.’” Id., quoting Maguire at ¶ 14. 

{¶27} When the combined income of the parties exceeds $150,000, as it does in 

this case, R.C. 3119.04(B) controls the determination of the parents’ child support 

obligation. R.C. 3119.04(B) provides in relevant part: 

If the combined gross income of both parents is greater than one hundred 

fifty thousand dollars per year, the court, with respect to a court child 

support order * * * shall determine the amount of the obligor’s child 

support obligation on a case-by-case basis and shall consider the needs and 

the standard of living of the children who are the subject of the child 

support order and of the parents. The court * * * shall compute a basic 

combined child support obligation that is no less than the obligation that 

would have been computed under the basic child support schedule and 

applicable worksheet for a combined gross income of one hundred fifty 

thousand dollars, unless the court * * * determines that it would be unjust or 

inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child, obligor, or 

obligee to order that amount. If the court * * * makes such a determination, 

it shall enter in the journal the figure, determination, and findings. 

{¶28} Under R.C. 3119.04(B), the amount of child support to be awarded is left 

“‘entirely to the court’s discretion.’” Brownlee v. Brownlee, 8th Dist. Nos. 97037 and 
97105, 2012-Ohio-1539, ¶ 26, quoting Cyr v. Cyr, 8th Dist. No. 84255, 2005-Ohio-504, ¶ 

54. In determining an appropriate child support award, the trial court must, however, 

consider “the needs and the standard of living of the children who are the subject of the 

child support order and of the parents.” R.C. 3119.04(B). 

{¶29} Under R.C. 3119.04(B), the level of support for a combined gross income of 

$150,000 is the “starting point” from which a trial court exercises its discretion in 

determining an appropriate child support award in higher income cases. Bajzer v. 

Bajzer, 9th Dist. No. 25635, 2012-Ohio-252, ¶ 5. This is because R.C. 3119.04(B) 

expressly prohibits a trial court from awarding less than that minimum unless it makes a 

determination “that it would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best 

interest of the child, obligor, or obligee to order that amount.” Brownlee at ¶ 26. Child 

support awards in excess of that minimum are, however, “anticipated by R.C. 3119.04(B) 

and are not deviations.” Bajzer at ¶ 5. The trial court is not required to make any 

specific findings or to provide any explanation for its child support award unless it awards 

less than the amount calculated for combined incomes of $150,000. Brownlee at ¶ 26; 

Cyr at ¶ 56. 

 {¶30} In this case, the record reflects that R.B. is an attorney with an annual 

income of $470,000 from his law practice. He resides in a four-bedroom home in 

Russell Township, Ohio, with his wife and their son, and, as the trial court described, 

“lives an upscale life-style commensurate with his income.” He has virtually no 

relationship with J.M.G. In contrast, J.G. and J.M.G. live with her parents. J.G. is 
unemployed, does not drive, and has no independent transportation.3

 The trial court 

found that J.M.G. lives a “basic” lifestyle with his mother and her parents in his 

grandparents’ home and “is not experiencing the life-style commensurate with the 

socio-economic status of his father.” The record reflects that J.G.’s current child-related 

expenses range from $1,520 to $3,470 a month, depending on which items are included as 

child-related expenses. 

{¶31} Under the particular circumstances of this case, the trial court found it “fair 

and equitable” to the parties and “in the best interests of the child” to use the 

extrapolation method in computing child support, concluding that the extrapolation 

method “allows for the child to be maintained at a standard of living to which he is 

entitled.” Upon review of the relevant law and the record before us, we cannot say that 

the trial court abused its discretion in using the extrapolation method to compute R.B.’s 

child support obligation in this case. Although a trial court is not required to use the 

extrapolation method in calculating an award of child support award under R.C. 

3119.04(B), it is not error for a trial court to use the extrapolation method in determining 

a parent’s child support obligation in high income cases, so long as the trial court 

otherwise complies with the requirements of R.C. 3119.04(B). Lanham v. Mierzwiak, 

197 Ohio App.3d 426, 2011-Ohio-6190, 967 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.) (“[A] trial 

court [does not err] * * * if it used the extrapolation method to determine the amount of 

 3

Finding J.G. to be in good health, with employable skills as a dancer and insurance agent, the 

trial court found her to be voluntarily unemployed and imputed an annual income of $50,000 to her in 

calculating the parties’ child support obligations. 
child support due.”); Cyr, 2005-Ohio-504 at ¶ 56 (“Nothing in [R.C. 3119.04(B) * * * 

prohibits the [trial] court from using [extrapolation] to determine the amount of support 

due in high income cases; it merely no longer mandates that the court use this method.”); 

see also Bunkers v. Bunkers, 6th Dist. No. WD-06-030, 2007-Ohio-561, ¶ 23, citing 

Kendall v. Kendall, 6th Dist. No. OT-04-004, 2005-Ohio-1777, ¶ 25.4

 

 {¶32} R.B. argues that a parent’s child support obligation “extends only to the 

[child’s] ‘necessities,’” and that the amount of child support awarded should have, 

therefore, been limited to the $1,520 in current, “actual child-related monthly expenses” 

that R.B. claims had been expressly documented by J.G., rather than the $3,908.15 in 

monthly child support calculated using the extrapolation method. We disagree. As 

stated above, a child’s “qualitative needs” is only one of the factors the trial court was 

required to consider in determining an appropriate child support award under R.C. 

3119.04(B); another is the “standard of living of the children and parents.” See Siebert 

v. Tavarez, 8th Dist. No. 88310, 2007-Ohio-2643, ¶ 38-39 (decision to limit modification 

of child support solely to increase in custodial parent’s actual expenses constituted an 

 4

In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using the extrapolation 

method to calculate R.B.’s child support obligation, we are mindful of Siebert v. Tavarez, 8th Dist. 

No. 88310, 2007-Ohio-2643, in which this court expressed “significant doubts” as to “whether the 

court fulfills its statutory duty to determine child support on a case-by-case analysis as required by 

R.C. 3911.04(B) when it by rote extrapolates a percentage of income to determine child support.” 

Id. at ¶ 34. This, however, is not that case. The trial court in this case did not use the extrapolation 

method “by rote” to determine the appropriate level of child support. Rather, in considering the needs 

of the child and the standard of living of the child and parents, the trial court reasonably determined, 

under the particular facts and circumstances here, that the extrapolation method was a fair and 

equitable means of determining the appropriate amount of child support to be paid. 
abuse of discretion under the circumstances; although child of baseball player was “not 

entitled to a windfall based on [his father’s] salary, neither should he be denied a standard 

of living commensurate with his father’s professional success”). 

{¶33} R.B. also contends that the trial court erred in finding that J.M.G. was 

entitled to the standard of living he would have enjoyed had his parents married or 

otherwise resided together with him and that the child support awarded by the trial court 

using the extrapolation method was thus, in effect, an improper award of “spousal 

support.” R.B., however, misstates the trial court’s ruling. The trial court did not 

determine, as R.B. contends, that J.M.G. “should be entitled to the same lifestyle he 

would have enjoyed had [R.B. and J.G.] married or resided together with the child.” 

Rather, the trial court held that the child was “entitled to have a life-style with his mother 

which is reasonable in relationship to the life-style he would enjoy with his father, were 

the father to participate in his son’s life.” An award of child support to accomplish such 

a goal is not tantamount to spousal support, nor, as R.B. suggests, does it “give a mother a 

windfall for bearing an illegitimate child.” Rather, it is the fulfillment of a parent’s 

obligation to provide for and act in the best interests of his or her child consistent with the 

parent’s resources and capabilities. The fact that R.B. never lived with J.M.G. or 

J.M.G.’s mother does not mean J.M.G. should be denied a lifestyle comparable to that he 

would have enjoyed had R.B. chosen to actively participate in his son’s life. 

{¶34} The record reflects that the trial court properly considered both the needs of 

J.M.G. and the standard of living of J.M.G. and his parents in extrapolating the parties’ 
child support obligations as required under R.C. 3119.04(B). Lanham, 197 Ohio App.3d 

426, 2011-Ohio-6190, 967 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶ 22; R.C. 3119.04(B). After reviewing the 

record, we do not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining R.B.’s 

modified child support obligation. Accordingly, R.B.’s fourth and sixth assignments of 

error are overruled. 

Sufficient, Competent Evidence Supporting Judgment

{¶35} In his final assignment of error, R.B. contends that because the only 

evidence of J.M.G.’s qualitative needs was J.G.’s testimony regarding her monthly 

child-related expenses, the trial court’s judgment, ordering R.B. to pay “almost three 

times that amount,” “was not supported by sufficient, competent evidence.” Once again, 

we disagree. As discussed above, J.M.G.’s needs were only part of the equation. The 

record reflects that in extrapolating the child support obligation, the trial court considered 

both the needs and standard of living of J.M.G. and his parents as required under R.C. 

3119.04(B), determining that a fair and equitable child support award was $3,908.15 per 

month if medical insurance was provided, and $4,026.77 per month if medical insurance 

was not provided. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s child support 

determination complies with R.C. 3119.04(B) and is supported by competent, credible 

evidence. R.B.’s seventh assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶36} The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
 It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_________________________________ 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR