UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4821

LARRY ARNOLD JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(CR-97-57)

Submitted: February 24, 1998

Decided: June 19, 1998

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Brian K. Miller, BRIAN K. MILLER, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, S. David Schiller,

Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Larry Arnold Jackson pled guilty to one count of possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of carrying a firearm

during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. He appeals the

denial of his motion to suppress drugs and a firearm recovered from

his person during an encounter with interdiction officers at Richmond's train station. We affirm.

Not all police-citizen encounters amount to seizures within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.

429, 433-34 (1991). A seizure of the person takes place only when the

officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority restrains the

liberty of a citizen in such a way that a reasonable person would

believe he was not free to terminate the encounter, and the person

submits to the show of authority. See California v. Hodari D., 499

U.S. 621, 626 (1991). Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that

person, ask to examine his or her identification, and request consent

to search his or her luggage--as long as the police officers do not

convey a message that compliance with their requests is required. See

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35.

Jackson first contends that he was illegally seized in his encounter

with detectives at the train station. The record discloses that Detective

Armstead approached Jackson and his companion as they headed

toward the parking lot of the train station and identified himself, displaying his badge. He explained that his job was to stop the flow of

illegal narcotics into the Richmond area and asked for their cooperation. When both men indicated they would cooperate, Armstead asked

to see their train tickets and identification. Armstead specifically told

them that they were not under arrest or detention. He then asked them

if they had any illegal narcotics, and both denied having any drugs.

Armstead then asked to search their persons and Jackson's bag. Jackson said that Armstead could search his bag. Armstead noticed that

Jackson's hands began to shake. After securing Jackson's permission

to let his partner search the bag, Armstead asked Jackson again if he

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could search his person. Jackson's hands began shaking again, and he

responded, "yeah" with a trembling voice.

As Armstead began the patdown, Jackson asked him if he wanted

to search his bag. Armstead responded that Jackson had already given

consent to search his bag. Jackson did not respond and began emptying his pockets, stating that he did not have anything in his pockets.

Armstead told him that there was no need to empty his pockets and

that he could just pat him down. Jackson then stepped towards Armstead with his arms outstretched from his sides. Armstead told him to

put his arms down and then conducted a patdown. He felt a long,

irregularly-shaped object. Armstead informed Jackson that he felt

something he believed to be hidden drugs, and told him he was now

under detention. Armstead then recovered a lumpy oval object

wrapped in plastic that later proved to be cocaine. He continued the

patdown and felt the hand grip of what appeared to be a weapon.

After recovering a Glock 9mm gun, Armstead placed Jackson under

arrest for carrying a concealed weapon.

We find that Jackson's encounter with Armstead was entirely consensual and thus did not amount to a seizure within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment. Armstead approached Jackson in a public

place, identified himself, explained the purpose of the encounter, and

informed Jackson that he was not detained or under arrest. Under

these circumstances, we find that a reasonable person would believe

he was free to terminate the encounter.

Jackson next contends that the district court erred in concluding

that he consented to a search of his person. To determine whether

Jackson voluntarily consented to the search, we must examine the

totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d

868, 877 (4th Cir. 1992). Although such consent must be voluntary,

it is not necessary that Jackson knew he had the right to refuse consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).

We consider the circumstances surrounding the encounter, including

the conduct of police, in determining whether consent to search was

voluntary. See United States v. Bueno, 21 F.3d 120, 126-27 (6th Cir.

1994). Another relevant factor is the extent to which Jackson cooperated with the police. See United States v. Smith , 30 F.3d 568, 571 (4th

Cir. 1994).

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We find Jackson voluntarily consented to the search of his person.

Jackson cooperated fully during the encounter and responded affirmatively to Armstead's requests to search his bag. In addition, Armstead

made it clear to Jackson that he was not under arrest or detention.

Finally, we conclude that Jackson effectively conveyed his consent to

a patdown of his person when he stepped towards Armstead with his

arms raised from his sides in response to Armstead's request.

Accordingly, we find the district court properly denied Jackson's

motion to suppress and affirm. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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