COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

DICKENSON COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER AND 

 FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE 

 COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0731-00-3 PER CURIAM 

 AUGUST 1, 2000 

BARBARA G. ROSE 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Robert M. McAdam; Jones & Glenn, P.L.C., on 

brief), for appellants. 

 (Paul L. Phipps; Lee & Phipps, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Dickenson County Medical Center and its insurer 

(hereinafter referred to as "employer") contend that the 

Workers’ Compensation Commission erred in finding that Barbara 

G. Rose proved that (1) her current psychiatric condition is, in 

part, causally related to her May 3, 1998 compensable injury by 

accident, and (2) she was totally disabled from work due to her 

psychiatric condition. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs 

of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. See

Rule 5A:27. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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I. 

 "General principles of workman's compensation law provide 

that '[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground of 

change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such 

change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the 

evidence.'" Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 

464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers, 

Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570, 572 

(1986)). "[I]t is fundamental that a finding of fact made by the 

Commission is conclusive and binding upon this court on review. A 

question raised by conflicting medical opinion is a question of 

fact." Commonwealth v. Powell, 2 Va. App. 712, 714, 347 S.E.2d 

532, 533 (1986). "Questions raised by conflicting medical 

opinions must be decided by the commission." Penley v. Island 

Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989). 

 In granting Rose's application alleging a 

change-in-condition, the commission found as follows: 

 We . . . note that, after Dr. 

[Patricia] Vanover offered her opinion on 

the issue of disability, neither party 

thereafter approached Dr. [Russell D.] 

McKnight or Dr. [Ashvin A.] Patel for a 

clarification of their respective opinions 

on the issue of causation. Dr. McKnight 

found that [Rose's] psychiatric condition 

was causally related to the work injury and 

Dr. Patel had previously found that the 

industrial accident at least aggravated or 

exacerbated the pre-existing depressive 

disorder. 
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 Given the record before us, we find a 

sufficient foundation for the opinions 

rendered by Dr. McKnight and Dr. Patel. We 

find that the greater weight of the evidence 

establishes that [Rose's] current 

psychiatric condition is, in part, causally 

related to the work injury and likewise any 

disability flowing therefrom. 

 The commission's findings are supported by credible 

evidence, including the opinions and medical records of Drs. 

McKnight and Patel. In its role as fact finder, the commission 

was entitled to accept the opinions of Drs. McKnight and Patel 

and to reject any contrary medical evidence. In addition, based 

upon the opinions and medical records of Drs. McKnight and 

Patel, the commission, as fact finder, could reasonably infer 

that Rose's current psychiatric condition is, at least in part, 

causally related to her compensable injury by accident. See

Papco Oil Co. v. Farr, 26 Va. App. 66, 75, 492 S.E.2d 858, 862 

(1997) (holding that "a condition which has two causes, one 

related to a work injury, and one not, is compensable and the 

treatment of that condition will be the responsibility of the 

employer"). 

II. 

 On review, before the commission, employer did not argue 

that Rose failed to prove that she was entitled to temporary 

total disability benefits as a result of her psychiatric 

condition. The sole issue raised by employer in its written 

statement submitted on review was whether Rose had proven a 
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causal connection between her psychiatric condition and her 

compensable injury by accident. Accordingly, we will not 

address this issue on appeal. See Green v. Warwick Plumbing & 

Heating Corp., 5 Va. App. 409, 413, 364 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1988); Rule 

5A:18. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

Affirmed.