Filed 3/23/21 Marriage of Whiteaker CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of TRAVIS 

WHITEAKER and MICHELLE 

WHITEAKER.

TRAVIS WHITEAKER,

 Appellant,

v.

MICHELLE WHITEAKER,

 Respondent.

2d Civ. No. B303969

(Super. Ct. No. SD042529)

(Ventura County)

Michelle and Travis Whiteaker married in 2005 and 

divorced in 2012. Travis left his job in 2019 and requested an 

order ending his monthly child support payments to Michelle.1 A

year of contentious litigation resulted in the trial court’s deciding

1 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid 

confusion. No disrespect is intended.
2

that neither spouse would pay support to the other. In so 

ordering, however, the trial court directed Travis to pay Michelle 

$50,000 in attorney’s fees as sanctions for his misconduct during

the proceedings. (Family Code section 271.)2

Travis appeals the sanctions order contending it constitutes 

an unreasonable financial burden. We conclude substantial 

evidence supports the trial court’s orders including the finding 

that he has sufficient financial resources to pay. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Michelle and Travis divorced in 2012 after seven years of 

marriage. During that time Travis served as a deputy with the 

Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) and had paid courtordered child support to Michelle for their three minor daughters. 

LASD reassigned Travis to a civilian position in 2016 after 

he injured his hand on duty. He took a four-month personal 

leave in 2018 to attend court dates and other appointments 

related to his ongoing custody dispute with Michelle. When he 

attempted to return to work, LASD told him his former position 

was no longer available. 

Travis filed a request for order (RFO) seeking to reduce his 

child support payments to zero because he was no longer

employed by LASD. He testified he had recently started a career 

in real estate using capital invested by his current wife, 

Elizabeth. He disclosed property interests in several states but 

purported to make little or no income after deducting business 

expenses. The matter was heard over two days and included 

Michelle’s request for attorney’s fees in excess of $100,000. 

The trial court set child support at zero for both parents; 

and, in a supplemental ruling, granted Michelle’s request for 

2 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Family Code.
3

attorney’s fees under section 271. The court awarded her $50,000 

as sanctions for Travis’s misconduct during the custody dispute. 

It also cited Travis’s frequent business travel and his payment of 

$30,000 for a real estate mentor as showing he could “find funds 

to contribute to [Michelle’s] attorney fees.” 

DISCUSSION

“Section 271 authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs 

as a sanction for uncooperative conduct that frustrates 

settlement and increases litigation costs.” (In re Marriage of 

Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 290.) We review sanctions 

orders under this statute for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage 

of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478.) “‘Accordingly,

we will overturn such an order only if, considering all of the 

evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all 

reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably 

make the order. [Citations.]’” (Fong at p. 291, quoting In re 

Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225-1226.) 

We review any factual findings for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) 

Travis contends the court abused its discretion by ignoring 

section 271’s mandate to “take into consideration all evidence 

concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities” before 

awarding sanctions. The $50,000 fee award, he reasons, rings 

dissonant to the ruling that lowered his support payment to zero. 

Travis describes the award as an unreasonable financial burden 

considering his inability to pay even his own personal expenses. 

He cites the court’s statement that he could “find funds” to pay 

Michelle’s fees as conjecture. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

The court’s aside that Travis could “find funds” cites to its earlier 

support ruling. There, it characterized Travis’s testimony about 

his business expenses as lacking clarity, and noted he spent 

significant time and money on classes, webinars, a personal 
4

mentor, as well as on out-of-state travel to view potential 

properties. The court reasonably interpreted the incongruence 

and opacity of Travis’s testimony as indicating he could, in fact, 

bear the burden of a significant sanctions award despite his 

ostensibly meager income.

Travis does not challenge the basis of the award. The 

court’s ruling recounts Travis misrepresenting his custody rights, 

making unfounded allegations of child abuse against Michelle, 

and criticizing CPS officers who did not agree with those 

allegations. The court-assigned child custody evaluator described 

Travis as a “combative co-parent” whose efforts to alienate his 

daughters from Michelle were “about as bad as I have seen.” 

Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision that 

Travis frustrated settlement and increased the cost of litigation. 

The size of the sanctions award, less than half the total requested 

by Michelle, is commensurate with the pervasive and egregious 

conduct described by the court. (See In re Marriage of Fong,

supra, 193 Cal. App.4th at pp. 291-293 [husband’s obstruction 

during discovery justified $100,000 attorney fees award under 

section 271].)

CONCLUSION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. TANGEMAN, J. 
5

JoAnn Johnson, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Alpert Law Group, Jeffrey Alpert, Dean Asher and Adam 

Mikaelian, for Appellant.

Negley Law, John J. Negley, Jr. and Michael J. Rutkowski, 

Jr., for Respondent.