alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 31, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50211

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BERNARDINO MENDOZA-GALVAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CR-1643

--------------------

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bernardino Mendoza-Galvan (Mendoza) appeals his guilty-plea

conviction and the 41-month sentence imposed for illegally

reentering the United States after removal. Mendoza argues that

his sentence is unreasonable and that it exceeds the statutory

maximum for the offense charged in his indictment.

A sentence, such as Mendoza’s, “within a properly

calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable.” 

United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). 

Mendoza argues that the district court failed to consider the
No. 06-50211

-2-

mitigating evidence he presented and misweighed the guidelines

range. However, Mendoza has failed to demonstrate that his

properly calculated guidelines sentence was unreasonable. See

Alonzo, 435 F.3d at 554; United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511,

519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005).

Mendoza also argues, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the 41-month term of imprisonment

imposed in his case exceeds the statutory maximum sentence

allowed for the 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) offense charged in his

indictment. He challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s

treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as

sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must

be found by a jury. 

Mendoza’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). 

Although he contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly

decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule

Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly

rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres

remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268,

276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Mendoza

properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of

Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to

preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.
Order entered April 14, 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05 - 19 - 00826 - CR No. 05 - 19 - 00828 - CR RUSSELL TODD WILSON, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On App eal from the 291st Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F - 1834038 - U , F - 172066 - U

ORDER Before the Court is t he State’s April 13, 2020 m otion to e xtend the t ime for f iling its tendered brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER th e brief filed as of the date of this order

. /s/ DAVID J. SCHENCK PRESIDING JUSTICE
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1901 

To reduce temporarily the duty on Evergol. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 26, 2009 

Mr. ROBERTS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To reduce temporarily the duty on Evergol. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EVERGOL. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1901 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Product mixtures containing 

Isoxaflutole (5-Cyclospropyl4-(2-Methylsulfonyl-4- 

Trifluoromethylbenxoyl)Isoxazole) & 

Cyprosulfamide(N-({4- 

[(Cyclopropylamino)carbonyl]phenyl}sulfonyl)- 

2-methoxybenzamide) (CAS 

Nos. 141112–29–0, 221667– 

31–8) (provided for in subheading 3808.93.15) ............. 5.2% No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to articles entered, or withdrawn 

3 from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 23-3221

___________________________

Reginald L. Dunahue

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

William F. Straughn, Deputy Director, ADC; Maurice Culclager, Warden,

Brickeys, ADC; C. Johnson, Assistant Warden, Brickeys Max, ADC; 

Marcus Etherly, Captain, Brickeys Max, ADC; Richardson, Assistant Warden,

Brickeys Max, ADC; Stephanie Palmer, Sgt., Brickeys Max, ADC; 

White, Sgt., Brickeys Max, ADC; Westbrook, Sgt., Brickeys Max, ADC; 

Tyrone Allison, Sgt./Major, Brickeys Max, ADC; Erma Bell, Captain, Brickeys

Max, ADC; James Shipman, Warden, Brickeys, ADC; Moses Jackson, Warden,

Brickeys Max, ADC; Swiney, Captain, Brickeys Max, ADC; 

Dexter Payne, Director, ADC

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas

 ____________

Submitted: April 16, 2024 

Filed: April 19, 2024 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________
PER CURIAM.

In this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Reginald Dunahue appeals the district

court’s1 orders dismissing some of his claims for improper joinder and granting

summary judgment on the remaining claims. Having carefully reviewed the record

and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we find no basis for reversal. See Strandlund

v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2008) (reviewing dismissal for misjoinder

under abuse of discretion standard); Townsend v. Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir.

2018) (reviewing grant of summary judgment de novo). Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court, see 8th Cir. R. 47B, and we deny Dunahue’s motion

for appointment of counsel as moot.

______________________________

1The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas, adopting the recommended disposition of the Honorable Edie

R. Ervin, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

-2-
CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
      TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Execute Sports, Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Periodic Report"), I, Todd
      Pitcher, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





1.
      the
      Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;


and





2.
      the
      information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Execute
      Sports, Inc..





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.











Dated:
              May 10,
              2006
            
            
            /s/ Todd
              Pitcher------------------------------------Todd
              PitcherPresident
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1929 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.1929

                      One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
             the sixth day of January, two thousand and nine

                                 An Act

 
 To provide for an additional temporary extension of programs under the 
 Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, and 
                           for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. ADDITIONAL TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF PROGRAMS 
UNDER THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT AND THE SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT ACT OF 
1958.
    (a) In General.--Section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to extend 
temporarily certain authorities of the Small Business Administration'', 
approved October 10, 2006 (Public Law 109-316; 120 Stat. 1742), as most 
recently amended by section 1 of Public Law 111-66, is amended by 
striking ``October 31, 2009'' each place it appears and inserting 
``January 31, 2010''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on October 30, 2009.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David McKenzie, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (King, J.), rendered June 15, 1989, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to support his conviction. In order to convict the defendant of assault in the second degree, the People were required to prove that he intended to prevent the arresting officer from performing a lawful duty and that he caused physical injury to the arresting officer *(see,*Penal Law § 120.05 [3]). The arresting officer’s testimony that the defendant attacked and injured him after he told him that he was going to arrest him for disorderly conduct adequately provided the required proof. A jury could reasonably infer from this testimony that the defendant attacked the officer in order to avoid being arrested. That the defendant testified that the *494officer initially pushed or shoved him only provided a credibility question for the jury to decide *(see, People v Winslow,*153 AD2d 965). Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant further contends that the court erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict. Generally, a jury verdict may not be impeached by proof of the tenor of its deliberations, but it may be impeached upon a showing of improper influence *(see, People v Brown,*48 NY2d 388, 393). The defendant attempted to show that some jurors pressured and prevailed upon the others in order to avoid sequestration. It is clear that the defendant raises no question of improper influence, but rather seeks to impeach the verdict by delving into the tenor of the jury’s deliberative process. Under these circumstances, it was a proper exercise of the court’s discretion to deny the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict *(see, People v Testa,*61 NY2d 1008, 1009; *People v Scales,*121 AD2d 578; *People v Smalls,*112 AD2d 173, 175).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]) or do not warrant reversal. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Kunzeman and Miller, JJ., concur.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1885 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain air pressure distillation columns. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 26, 2009 

Mr. CASEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain air pressure 

distillation columns. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN AIR PRESSURE DISTILLATION COL4 UMNS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

6 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

7 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

8 new heading: 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1885 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Pressure distillation columns, 

designed to liquefy air and its 

component gases, the foregoing containing brazed aluminum plate-fin heat exchangers (provided for in 

subheading 8419.60.10) ........ Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### U.S. Customs and Border Protection

# AGENCY:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

# ACTION:

Notice of approval of Intertek USA, Inc., as a commercial gauger.

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 19 CFR 151.13, Intertek USA, Inc., 3741 Red Bluff Road, Suite 105, Pasadena, TX 77503, has been approved to gauge petroleum, petroleum products, organic chemicals and vegetable oils for customs purposes, in accordance with the provisions of 19 CFR 151.13. Anyone wishing to employ this entity to conduct gauger services should request and receive written assurances from the entity that it is approved by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to conduct the specific gauger service requested. Alternatively, inquires regarding the specific gauger service this entity is approved to perform may be directed to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection by calling (202) 344-1060. The inquiry may also be sent to                         *cbp.labhq@dhs.gov.*                         Please reference the Web site listed below for a complete listing of CBP approved gaugers and accredited laboratories.                    

*http://cbp.gov/​linkhandler/​cgov/​trade/​automated/​labs_​scientific_​svcs/​commercial_​gaugers/​gaulist.ctt/​gaulist.pdf.*

# DATES:

The approval of Intertek USA, Inc., as commercial gauger became effective on July 08, 2011. The next triennial inspection date will be scheduled for July 2014.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dr. Mike McCormick, Laboratories and Scientific Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 1500N, Washington, DC 20229, 202-344-1060.

Dated: February 29, 2012.

Ira S. Reese,

Executive Director, Laboratories and Scientific Services.

[FR Doc. 2012-5746 Filed 3-8-12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-14-P
#### David Lee HOGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-84-561.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

July 20, 1987.

Gloyd L. McCoy, Asst. Appellate Public Defender, Norman, for appellant.

Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen., Tomilou Gentry Liddell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

The appellant, David Lee Hogan, pleaded guilty on October 13, 1982, in the District Court of Osage County to the crime of Unlawful Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute and was sentenced to a two (2) year deferred sentence. Subsequently, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Unlawful Delivery of Marijuana in the District Court of Tulsa County, and he was sentenced to three (3) years imprisonment. On January 11,1984, a Motion to Accelerate Sentencing was filed by the State, and after the hearing, the District Court of Osage County entered an order accelerating the deferred sentence and sentenced appellant to two (2) years imprisonment, to run consecutive to any other sentence he was serving.

In his single assignment of error appellant contends that the failure of the trial court to make written findings regarding the reasons for acceleration of his deferred sentence violated his right to due process. In *Mack v. State,*637 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Okl.Cr.1981), this Court addressed this same issue and stated that:

> In *Caudill v. State,*532 P.2d 63 (Okl.Cr.1975), this Court approved conclusory findings of fact in a revocation hearing, *1019when the defendant was sufficiently apprised of the grounds upon which his suspended sentence was revoked. In the case before us, the written notation by the judge that the suspended sentence was revoked consecutively with CRF-79-1749, taken with his statement from the transcript that he based his decision ‘upon ... stipulation and ... upon the facts,’ was sufficient to apprise the appellant of the grounds upon which his suspended sentence was revoked. Further, in a revocation hearing a probationer is not entitled to the full panoply of constitutional rights, *Woods v. State,*526 P.2d 944 (Okl.Cr.1974); and the decision to revoke lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. *Fain v. State,*503 P.2d 254 (Okl.Cr.1972).

In this case, appellant admitted that he pleaded guilty to a subsequent crime in Tulsa County, and the trial court accelerated appellant’s deferred sentence based upon this evidence. Clearly, the appellant was aware of the court’s reason for accelerating his sentence. Consequently, this contention is without merit.

The judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED.

BRETT, P.J., and PARKS, J., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE BODY OF THE ACCOMPANYING FORM 10-K AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   84,002
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,633
<INVENTORY>                                     82,968
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               192,954
<PP&E>                                         296,716
<DEPRECIATION>                                 118,069
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 639,114
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          105,279
<BONDS>                                        520,983
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (31,560)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   639,114
<SALES>                                        645,921
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               645,921
<CGS>                                          464,552
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  464,552
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                41,932
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              54,433
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 23,815
<INCOME-TAX>                                    10,002
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,813
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,813
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>