### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE August 2000 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSEPH D. GRAY Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Davidson County

No. 2767 Gale B. Robinson, Judge

No. M1998-00256-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 5, 2000

The sole remaining question in this appeal is whether in October of 1998 the General Sessions Court of Davidson Co

unt y had jurisdiction over a contempt warrant issued for violating the Davidson County Circuit Court’s order of protection. We affirm the Gener al Sess ions Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Affirmed and Remanded
B EN H. C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W ILLI AM C. K OCH , J R
. and W ILLI

AM B. C AIN , JJ., joined.
Joh n E. Herb iso n, N ash vil le, Ten nes see, for the app ell ant , Jo sep h D. Gray.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Lucian D. Geise, Assistant Attorney General; and Sean Allen, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tenne ssee. OPINION
I.
On July 11, 1997, the Second Circuit Court of Davidson County issued an order of protection prohibiting Joseph Darryl Gray fr omcoming about, te

lephoning, or sta

lking the petition

er, Loretta Sue Gray. On July 2, 1998 and August 3, 1 998, the General Sessions Court of Davidson Co

unty issued warrants for Mr. Gray’s arrest on a cha rge of contempt of court for two separate v iolations of the SecondCircuit’s order. Mr. Gray appeared and challenge d the jurisdiction of the court, but he entered a be

st-interest guil

ty plea, re serving the juri

sdictional issue fo

r appeal.
Mr. Gray appea

led t o the Court of Criminal Appeals, but that court, in a written opinion, foundthat this court had jurisdictio n of the appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-4- 108(b)(1994). See State v. Joseph D. Gray , No. M1998-00256-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at1 Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102 goes ba ck to the Publ

ic Acts of

1831, the same year that t he United States Congress passed an almost ide ntical statute to g overn fe deral cou rts. See 18 U.S.C. § 4 01 (1988 ). Apparently C ongress bec ame alarmed by the expansive view of his cont empt powers by a federal judge in St.Louis, who punished a lawyer for publishin g a critical article. See Green v. United States , 356 U.S. 165 (1957). We suspect that the state legislature passed our s

tatute out of a si

milar concer

n. -2- Nashville, Dec. 20, 1999). Consequently that court transferred the cause to this court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 17.
II. C ONTEMPT The power to

punish for contemp

t is inherent in

the courts of justice. Thigpen v. Thigpen , 874 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). “But this power, inherent andvital as it is, is not unlimited; it can be exercised only within the fixed rules of law. Our statutes are declaratory of these rules.” Loy v. Loy , 222 S.W.2d 873 at 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).
The general statutes are found in Chapter 9 of Title 29 of the Code. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9- 102 defines the scope of the contempt power; it includes the power to punish the contemnor for the willful disobedience of any lawful order, ru

le, decree, or

command of the cou

rts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3). 1
The general contempt

statutes do not, however, deal with thequestion of whether a court may punish contempts of

another court’s order. The answer to that question is to be found in our court decisions, and generally, the power to punish for contempt is reserved

to the court against which the contempt is committed, i.e. the court whose order is disobeyed. Chaffinv. Robinson , 213 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. 1948). “One tribunal may not punish for contempt of another.” Raht v. Southern

Railway Company , 387 S.W.2d 781 (Tenn. 1965). See also Churchwell v. Callens , 252 S.W.2d 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952); 17 A m. Jur. 2d Conte mpt § 41. A court may, however, punish a contempt committed against another division of the same court, Mayhew v. Mayhew , 376 S.W.2d 324 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), and the power to p unish for cont empt may be given by statute to more tha n one tribunal. Milton v. Richardson , 47 N.Y.S. 735 (1897).
III. T HE D OMESTIC A BUSE S TATUTES In 1979, in an effort to curb domestic abuse, as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601, the legislaturecreated a device to deal with the problem

expeditiously. The device is called an “order of protection”, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-603, or a “protection order”, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-604. The statutes also extended the power to issue orders of protection to courts that otherwise would not have had it. In Davidson County the courts having jurisdiction incl ude “an y court of r

ecord with jurisdiction over domestic relations matters and the general sessions court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 3-601 (3)(B).2 Tenn. Code A nn. § 29-9-1 03(b) em powe rs courts of record to punish conte mpt with a fi

ne of fift y dollars and up to ten day s in jail; while the Met ropolit an Charter pe

rmits gener

al sess ions courts t

o punish conte

mpt with a fi

ne of $25 and/o r a jail sentence not to exce ed ten days. -3- With respect to enforcement, the legislature provided: (a) Upon violation of the order of protection or a court- approved consent agreement,

the court may

hold the defendant

in civil or crimin

al contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with the law . A judge of thegeneral sessions court shall have the same po we r as a court of record to punish the defendant for contempt when exercising jurisdiction pursua nt to this part or when exercising concurrent

jurisdiction with

a court of record. A judge of the general sessions court who is not a licensed a

ttorney sha

ll appoint an atto

r ney referee to hear charg es of criminal contempt. (Emphasis added) Tenn. Code Ann. 36-3-610(a).
It seems to us that the answer to the appellant’ s contention in this case is found in the statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(a) gives the general sessions court the pow e r to enforce the order of the circuit court.

The first sentence of the

paragraph sa

ys “the cou

rt” may hold

the defendant in c

ivil or criminal contempt. As we have seen “the court” has been defined to include the general sessions court in Davidson County. The second sentence of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(a) also reflects the GeneralAssembly’s decis ion to permit general sessions courts to hear contempt petitions for violations of protective orders previously issued by a court of record. This senten ce expand s a general sessions court’s contempt power to the same level as the circuit court 2 not only when the general sessions court is “exercisi ng jurisdiction pu

rsuant to this part”

but alsowhen it is “exercising concurrent

jurisdiction with a court of record.” In cases of t his sort, a general sessions court can be said to b e ex erci sin g “co ncu rren t ju ris dic tio n” w ith a cou rt o f rec ord onl y when it is hearing a contempt proceeding for the violation of an order of p rotection previously issued by a court of record.
A related issue has been raised co ncernin g the proper venue for a contempt petition based on the violation of an order of protection issued in one county and violated in another. The office of the Attorney General issued its opinion No. 98-060 containing the conclusion that the only proper venue was in the county where the order was issued. The opinion cited Chaffin, Churchwell, and Mayhew for the conclusion, because there were no cases dealing with inter-county enforcement of orders of protec

tion and these cas

es involved near

ly-relate d issues.
After the Attorney General issued opinion No. 98-060 the legislature solved the problem by adding paragraph (b) to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-612:

(b) Either the court that originally issued the order of pro tection or a court having jurisdiction over o

rders of protec

tion in the county

where thealleged violation-4-

of the order occurred shall have the authority and jurisdiction to conduct the contempt hearing requi

red by subse

ction (a). If

the court conduc

ting th e co ntempt hearing is not the same court that originally issued the order of protection, the court cond ucting th e hearing shall have the same authority to punish a violation of the order of protection as the court originally issuing such order

. The legislative history of the amendment reflects that the legislature’s concern was directed solely a t the question of multi-county enforcement of protection orders. The sponsors cited the Attorney General’s opinion and the confusion it creat ed over whether protection orders could be enforced statewi de. The am endment was designed to ensure that a protection order could be enforced wherever a violation occurred. Although the logic in the A ttorney Ge

neral’s opinion c

ould be applied to in

tra- county enforcement

of protection orders – based on the cases cited in the opinion – we think thelegislature hadalready solved that problem by providing that the court

could hold the defendant in contempt and defining the court

to include courts other than the one that issued the order.
The judgment of the trialcourt is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the General Sessions Court of Davidson County for any further proc eedings necessary. Tax the costs on appeal to t h e app ell ant , Jo sep h D. Gray.

_________________________________________ BEN H. CANTREL

L, PRESIDI

NG JUDGE, M.S.