[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-14178

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cv-00912-JSM-JSS

DEE RUSSELL, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

CITY OF TAMPA, FLORIDA, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(June 8, 2018)

Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Case: 17-14178 Date Filed: 06/08/2018 Page: 1 of 5 
2

Dee Russell appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 

of the City of Tampa, his former employer, in his employment discrimination suit 

alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12203, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), 

Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7). Russell contends that he was terminated in retaliation for 

subpoenaing and deposing the City’s Director of Solid Waste in the course of an 

earlier ADA suit against the City. The City maintains that it terminated Russell for 

lying in violation of City policy. On appeal, Russell argues that the district court 

erred in finding, under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 

that he had not established that the City’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for 

firing him was pretextual.

1

 The facts are known the parties and counsel; we will 

not repeat them here. After careful review, we affirm. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Thomas v. 

Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment 

is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether the movant has met this burden, we view the 

 1 Russell also asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the district court should have applied the 

“convincing mosaic” approach from Smith v. Lockheed-Martin, 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011), 

when assessing whether he met his burden against the City’s summary judgment motion. We 

decline to address this argument because he failed to raise it before the district court. See Access 

Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).

Case: 17-14178 Date Filed: 06/08/2018 Page: 2 of 5 
3

evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Retaliation claims under both the ADA and FCRA follow the analysis under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). See Harper v. 

Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying Title 

VII analysis to an FCRA retaliation claim); see also Stewart v. Happy Herman’s 

Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying Title VII 

elements in an ADA retaliation claim). Title VII protects an employee against 

retaliation by her employer on the ground that the employee has (1) opposed any 

practice prohibited by Title VII, or (2) made a charge of unlawful employment 

practice or participated in any investigation or proceeding under Title VII. See 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th 

Cir. 2000). A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires the plaintiff 

to show (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causalrelation between the two

events. Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1363. 

Where it rests solely on circumstantial evidence, courts may assess a 

retaliation claim according to the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell

Douglas. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010)

(en banc). Under this standard, once a prima facie retaliation case is established, 

Case: 17-14178 Date Filed: 06/08/2018 Page: 3 of 5 
4

the defendant bears the burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If a legitimate reason is produced, 

then the plaintiff must show that this reason is a pretext for retaliation. Id. at 

1181–82. 

For the employer’s reason to be a pretext for retaliation, the plaintiff must 

show “both that the [stated] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real 

reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). Conclusory 

allegations, “without more, are not sufficient to raise an inference of pretext.” 

Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must produce evidence that reveals “such 

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the 

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder 

could find them unworthy of credence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The 

plaintiff must meet the employer’s reason “head on and rebut it.” Chapman v. AI 

Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Here, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City. 

The district court assumed arguendo that Russell had met the elements of a prima 

facie retaliation case, and we will do the same. But even so, Russell has not shown 

that the City’s reason for firing him was false and that the real reason was 

retaliation. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515. As an initial matter, 

Case: 17-14178 Date Filed: 06/08/2018 Page: 4 of 5 
5

Russell failed to sufficiently dispute―or rebut “head-on”―the City’s proffered 

reason for firing him. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. But even assuming Russell 

had sufficiently disputed falsity, he failed to establish that the real reason for his 

termination was retaliation for deposing the Director. Russell presented only 

conclusory allegations that being deposed upset the Director based on his poor 

body language and facial expressions while being deposed. Russell did not 

contradict or show sufficient implausibilities in the City’s proffered explanation for 

terminating his employment to show that he was actually terminated because of 

retaliation. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515; Furcron, 843 F.3d at 

1313. And his conclusory allegations, without more, are insufficient to establish 

pretext. See Furcron, 843 F.3d at 1313. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 17-14178 Date Filed: 06/08/2018 Page: 5 of 5